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USE OF MILITARY RETIREES IN WARTIME

Report FP602R1

December 1987

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This report reviews the Military Services’ programs for utilization of military retirees during mobilization. More than 1.5 million military retirees are eligible for recall to active service. Recognizing that these retirees are a valuable source of pretrained manpower that could be used to help meet the critical personnel needs during time of war, OSD has issued to the Services, guidance to develop programs for use of these retirees.

The basic philosophy and resulting plans for retiree utilization vary significantly from Service to Service, with the most dramatic difference being in the use of preassignment orders. While the Army has preassigned more than 125,000 retirees to specific mobilization positions, the other three Services have preferred to remain more flexible by limiting their preassignment orders and, instead, preparing to make assignments quickly once mobilization begins. These variations among the retiree programs are well justified by the diverse missions of the Services and need to be preserved.

In a major, national mobilization, however, the need will occur for experienced military people to serve in positions beyond parent Service boundaries. Many of the needs will occur within DoD itself, but other agencies and activities will have wartime demand for service by uniformly-represented members of the Military Services. In many instances, that service should be performed by recalled military retirees.

In order to plan for more effective use of military retirees, improved central planning and coordination is needed. A common statement of objectives for use of military retirees by DoD should be defined. It is also necessary to establish a means by which information on requirements and available

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19. ABSTRACT (continued)

retired personnel can be exchanged among the Services or with other governmental organizations. We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel):

- Identify a standing committee, with representatives of OSD, each of the Services, and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to monitor the peacetime supply of retirees in each Service and prepare plans to apply them against the expected wartime demand for personnel. The committee should have the authority in wartime to direct assignment of retirees who are not essential to their parent Services and place them in positions in other Military Services, joint Service agencies, other DoD agencies, or other Federal agencies.

- Establish a common statement of objectives for incorporation into each Service's retiree recall program. The statement should call for the most effective use of military retirees, first within the parent Service, and then to other assignments if necessary. At the same time, the statement should give the Services the latitude to tailor their peacetime planning procedures to meet individual Service requirements.

- Call on the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) to simplify procedures for exempting retirees who are key government employees.

- Instruct the Services to provide all retirees periodically with current information on their liability for recall.

- Enforce the principal information-gathering provisions of Department of Defense Directive 1352.1, and assist the Services in verifying all retiree data that are required by that directive and which are self-reported. Direct the capture and storage of secondary military specialties for all retirees as well as primary military specialties. Cause all this retiree information to be passed regularly by the Services to the Defense Manpower Data Center for storage.

- Direct the Military Services to assign both a military and a civilian job and rating classification (specialty and grade) to each civilian position declared potentially suitable for fill by a recalled retiree upon mobilization at all Military Service installations and activities within CONUS. This requirement should be valid for both those civilian positions authorized during peacetime and those positions anticipated during a wartime surge in manpower requirements.
Executive Summary

USE OF MILITARY RETIREES IN WARTIME

More than 1.5 million military retirees are eligible for recall to active service during mobilization. Recognizing that these retirees are a valuable source of pretrained manpower, OSD has issued guidance to the Military Services to develop programs for using them. The resulting programs vary substantially among the Services. The most dramatic difference is in the use of preassignment orders. While the Army has preassigned more than 125,000 retirees to specific mobilization positions, the other three Services have prepared to make assignments quickly once mobilization begins.

Some variations among the retiree programs seem reasonable, although all Services should ensure that their retirees are alerted to the likelihood of recall. In addition, some military retirees could be needed for duty assignments outside their parent Services. For these uses, some central planning and coordination is needed. We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel):

- Identify a standing committee, with representatives of OSD, each of the Services, and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to monitor the peacetime supply of retirees in each Service and prepare plans to apply them against the expected wartime demand for personnel. The committee should have the authority in wartime to direct assignment of retirees who are not essential to their parent Services and place them in positions in other Military Services, joint Service agencies, other DoD agencies, or other Federal agencies.

- Establish a common statement of objectives for incorporation into each Service’s retiree recall program. The statement should call for the most effective use of military retirees, first within the parent Service, and then to other assignments if necessary. At the same time, the statement should give the Services the latitude to tailor their peacetime planning procedures to meet individual Service requirements.

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The United States has 1.5 million military retirees. They comprise a trained, experienced, dedicated pool of men and women who could be recalled to active service in time of war or national emergency. Many have served in key, high-level command and staff positions. Others have gone on to serve in important Federal posts or to develop new careers. During mobilization, when managerial and leadership ability are in demand, military retirees could be an important source of these skills. How best to make use of military retirees and the peacetime planning needed to prepare for their use are the topics of this report.

Military retirees are defined in Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 1352.1, 27 February 1984, as all regular and reserve officers and enlisted members who retire from the Military Services for any of the reasons specified in Title 10, United States Code. Figure 1-1 shows the age distribution of military retirees as of March 1986. We are concerned mainly with nondisabled regular and reserve officer and enlisted service members who have either served on active duty for 20 years or more or have been credited with 20 years or more of active service. There are

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1The reasons for retirement cited in Title 10, United States Code, are: physical disability, age, length of service, years of service, loss of professional qualification, and selective early retirement. Retirement provisions for members of the United States Coast Guard are included in Title 14, United States Code.

2DoD considers an individual disabled if a medical authority has determined that the individual has suffered at least 30 percent disability. DoD applies the Veterans Administration’s standard scale for rating disabilities. At present, military retirees who have been declared by the Veterans Administration to be disabled are not recognized as disabled retirees, unless there has been a separate DoD determination of a disability greater than 30 percent. Efforts have begun by OSD toward merging DoD and Veterans Administration files for better retiree management and mobilization planning.

3“Active service” and “active duty” are not the same. “Active service” is service by members of the reserve components that is creditable toward the award of retirement pay beginning at age 60. Active service credit includes that earned on active duty (all of which is creditable toward age-60 retirement pay) plus credits earned during inactive duty for training phases of the member’s career in the reserve components.
768,000 nondisabled retirees between the ages of 40 and 60 and an additional 220,000 between the ages 60 and 65.

Several retiree classifications and titles are specified in various directives and laws. These classifications and titles vary from Service to Service. For management purposes, however, a clear distinction can be made on the basis of total years of active duty service. Military retirees who have served on full-time active duty for 20 years or more, as either regular or reserve members, normally begin receiving retirement compensation immediately upon retirement. These individuals may be recalled to active duty at any time on the authority of the Secretaries of the Military Departments. Reserve service members who have been credited with 20 years or more of active service are eligible to receive retirement compensation beginning at age 60. These reserve retirees can be called to active duty only if Congress has declared war or a national emergency and if the Military Department Secretary, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, determines that there are not enough qualified reserves in active status or in the inactive National Guard to meet the need.

Recognizing retirees as a valuable source of pretrained manpower that could be used to help meet critical personnel needs in time of war, OSD has issued guidance to develop Military Service programs for their use. The basic philosophy and resulting plans for retiree utilization vary significantly from Service to Service. The Army has preassigned over 125,000 retirees to specific mobilization positions, but the other three Services have opted to retain greater flexibility by limiting preassignment orders and preparing to make assignments quickly once mobilization begins.

In Chapter 2 we describe and assess DoD policy and the retiree recall programs now conducted by the individual Services. Our assessments include, where appropriate, suggestions for improvement.

An objective of the study was to provide ideas for the wartime use of retirees. Those ideas are presented in Chapter 3, which also includes a discussion of the coordination required for expanded retiree utilization.
FIG. 1-1. MILITARY RETIREES: AGE AND DISABILITY

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, March 1986
Chapter 4 contains discussions of three modified approaches to the management of retiree populations in peacetime. These modifications are presented for consideration as supplements to the present management approaches used by the Services.

Chapter 5 contains recommendations intended to improve the use of military retirees in wartime.
CHAPTER 2
RETIREE POLICY AND PROGRAMS

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICY

General

OSD intends to draw on military retirees to help meet the demands of mobilization or other emergencies and has authorized the Secretaries of the Military Departments to recall retired military members to active duty.

Three categories of military retirees have been established. They are based on age and recency of active military service. Category I consists of nondisabled military retirees under age 60 who have been retired less than 5 years. Nondisabled retirees under age 60 who have been retired for 5 years or more are grouped in Category II. All other retirees fall into Category III. The categories do not distinguish between regular and reserve military retirees, even though regular retirees are much more accessible than most reserve retirees.

Preassignment Policy

The current policy, stated in DoDD 1352.1, specifies that "... military retirees who are physically qualified should be preassigned in peacetime, either voluntarily or involuntarily, to installations or to mobilization positions that must be filled within 30 days after mobilization and that are determined appropriate for retirees by the Secretary of the Military Department concerned." Preassignment orders for regular and reserve retirees with 20 years or more of active duty will specify, in the event of mobilization, the place and time to report. The remaining reserve retirees are not as immediately accessible and may be issued contingent preassignment orders that indicate the place to report when specifically called.

The focus of OSD policy on retirees includes Category I and Category II retirees, leaving to the individual Services the nature and extent of mobilization of

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1In this report the term "reserve," in lower-case type, is generic. It refers to Service members in the National Guard and the Military Department Reserve Forces.
retirees belonging to Category III. The wartime use of Category III retirees is discussed more extensively in Appendix B of this report.

Exemption of Key Employees

Military retirees who are key employees may be declared exempt from recall upon mobilization. Key employees are individuals who, in their capacity as civilian employees of Federal, State, or local governments or of private industry, are vital to the defense of the United States. Guidelines for determining key employee status and provisions for obtaining the exemption are contained in DoDD 1200.7, Screening the Ready Reserve, dated 6 April 1984. That directive also applies to retirees.

Service Information Requirements

In support of plans for using military retirees during mobilization, each Service is required by DoDD 1352.1 to maintain information on the status of its retirees and on any requirements for refresher training. The minimum information required includes: date of retirement, date of birth, current address, military qualifications, physical condition, civilian occupation, and availability during mobilization. Based on Service need, each Military Department is also required to determine how much refresher training is needed — and how often.

Assessment of DoD Policy

General

We believe that DoD policy should require planning for the use of retirees beyond the limits of the parent Service of the individual retiree, including temporary assignment to other Services, to joint or other Defense agencies, other Federal Government agencies, and beyond, as long as Defense needs exist. Such an increase in scope would, however, impose upon OSD management and coordinating responsibilities. The present sharing of retiree guidance and planning work by the staffs of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) [OASD(FM&P)] and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) [OASD(RA)] may have to be re-examined and modified in light of any increased role in retiree management by OSD.
Preassignment Policy

DoD guidance calling for the preassignment of retirees in peacetime is not being followed by any of the Military Services except the Army.\(^2\) We believe that policy should be enforced or changed, and have concluded that a changed policy — one that allows the Services increased flexibility — is warranted. We have included a recommendation to that effect in Chapter 5. The rationale for this recommendation can best be understood in the context of each Service’s retiree recall program, so that rationale is provided in the next sections of this report.

The overall case for or against peacetime preassignment to a specific wartime position is not made easily. We have concluded that some variations in preassignment policy among the Services are reasonable in spite of well-known OSD policy to the contrary. Our position, which is restated in several places throughout this report, is based principally upon the lack of persuasive benefits of such a policy, when measured against the costs. Unfortunately, neither the costs nor the benefits of such a preassignment policy lend themselves to mathematical analysis.

The question of assigning recalled retirees to deployed and deploying units — an OSD policy now under consideration — is controversial. Those who oppose such a blanket policy point out each retiree’s long and faithful service, often in earlier wars ("Let the newer, younger folks have their turn."). In addition, concern is expressed over inevitable loss of individual skills and loss of recent familiarity with military operations firsthand. There will also be an impact on unit leaders’ morale because of the arrival of an older stranger whose rank or grade places him in a position of leadership — all on the eve of battle. Finally, the physical conditioning and medical health of the retiree is an important and troubling factor.\(^3\) These concerns are

\(^2\)Representatives of the Navy and the Marine Corps disagree with this observation. Both Services hold that, until and unless the Secretary of the Navy identifies a specific position to be appropriate for retiree fill, the preassignment procedure is not obligatory. Further, Navy and Marine Corps planners see their responsibilities as including the issuance of preassignment orders only as necessary (Italics ours; see Paragraph F3f, page 4, DoDD 1352.1, February 27, 1984). Necessity in this case is understood as a responsibility of the Secretary of the Navy.

\(^3\)Of the several hundred Category I and II volunteer retirees who participated in the Army’s Grey Thunder exercise in 1986, 69 percent passed the standard Army physical examination. Participants in the next Army retiree exercise, Certain Sage ’87, were given a less rigorous examination in which qualification meant suitability for service only in nondeploying units. Eighty-four percent of those participants were qualified medically. Expressed as subsets of the Army’s current number of preassigned retirees (125,000), this would mean that approximately 105,000 retirees would be medically qualified for this limited wartime duty while 20,000 would not.
expressed over the general use of retirees in theater or at sea, whether they are to serve in combat, combat support, or combat service support units.

On the other hand, retirees (particularly recent retirees) could bring maturity and experience to units facing imminent battle. Those with combat experience would bring that unique and important background to units whose current leaders may not have served in battle.

The demand for retirees in deploying units is low. In the Army, for example, the typical officer retiree is an O5, the typical enlisted retiree an E7. Even with application of the universally applied "one up/two down" grade substitution rule used for retiree assignments, the Services state that there are limited deploying-unit vacancies that will be suitable for military retirees. It is more likely that these units will be filled by members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) if the Services follow their present practices.

We believe that retirees should not be barred from assignment to deployed or deploying units. In Chapter 3 of this report we discuss five important characteristics of good retiree utilization, the first of which is genuine need. If the Service requires the assignment of a fully qualified retiree to a deployed or deploying unit, that assignment should be made. A discussion of the Army's current plans in that regard is found in the section describing the Army retiree program.

To the extent that individual preassignments are issued at all by a given Military Service, it would seem desirable (at least from the viewpoint of the individual retiree) to make that assignment at the time of separation. The inevitability and the straightforward nature of that action, taken at the very moment of retirement, should encourage feelings of continued obligation and allegiance that would serve the country well.

On the other hand, there are costs that would accompany a policy of this kind. Firstly, new retirees are embarking on a time of geographic and employment turbulence (often related); preassignment orders based on the retiree's intended retirement place of residence will require change as a new job causes displacement to, say, a new state. Secondly, specific administrative and management actions must occur prior to separation in order for the process to proceed smoothly. We believe that a number of retirees identify moderate-to-serious medical problems only during
the physical examinations that are a part of one's separation preparations.⁴ If any such practice results in the declaration by the DoD of a physical disability equaling or exceeding 30 percent, however, the preassignment orders of those individuals must be canceled. Thus far the Army, which continues to display the keenest interest in specific preassignment of its retirees, has been unwilling to issue preassignment orders upon separation because of the associated costs. Army retirees typically receive preassignment orders about a year after separation occurs.

**Exemption of Key Employees**

The procedures leading to exemption from recall of retirees who are key employees are obscure. Further, they contain minor irregularities. These procedures should not, in our judgment, be written in language intended for members of the Ready Reserve. The thrust and tone of the applicable directive, DoDD 1200.7, largely ignores the unique and special condition of retirees. Indeed, the individual retiree who seeks to secure a proper exemption from recall due to his status as a key employee must begin the search for the proper procedure in a different directive entirely (DoDD 1352.1). We believe that *bona fide* exemptions for key employees should be available under simple application and review procedures prepared separately for retirees.

Application for exemption as a key employee is linked, in our judgment, with anticipation of imminent recall in the mind of the individual retiree. If the retiree believes his parent Service has forgotten about him, he is apt to conclude (wrongly) that that Service will not recall him, especially if his new, post-retirement job is important to any future war effort.

Unfortunately, many retirees are not adequately aware of their degree of vulnerability to wartime recall. Army retirees who have not received preassignment orders may reasonably conclude it is unlikely they will be recalled during the early days of a major conflict. However, most retirees from the other Services are unaware of the frequency of their simulated recall during computer-based inventory reviews.

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⁴This information is largely anecdotal. We were unable to determine just how often this type of thing occurs, but it is widely discussed among retirees as a somewhat common practice.
conducted periodically to test the several retiree recall programs.\textsuperscript{5} As part of the separation process upon retirement, all the Services inform retirees of their recall obligation under the law.\textsuperscript{6} While that practice may provide sufficient, long-range alert for some retirees, we believe that many retirees may lose awareness of their recall obligation, especially if their principal contact with their parent Service is limited to the receipt of the retirement stipend.\textsuperscript{7} We believe retirees should be alerted to the likelihood of their recall. At the very least, this practice should sharpen and focus the procedures for obtaining exemption as a key employee.

\textit{Service Information Requirements}

Assigning the Services specific responsibilities for the capture and storage of information with high likelihood of use during wartime makes good sense. The Military Services are uneven in their compliance with the present DoDD 1352.1 requirements for the retention of eight descriptors on each retiree. Table 2-1 shows that variation in compliance with the directive.

We believe that the Military Services should retain information on both the primary and secondary specialties of retirees assigned to Categories I and II. Of equal or greater importance is information on each retiree’s civilian occupation. All of these data elements are important for planning appropriate wartime utilization. We doubt whether Service-wide attempts to capture precise information on physical condition – except perhaps through annual questionnaires, as the Army does it – would be cost effective. The almost universal lack of verifiable information on skill decay makes retiree information on refresher training needs almost worthless. The present requirements to retain that information should be dropped, as should

\textsuperscript{5}Beginning in 1985, the Marine Corps began sending about 2,000 call-up notification mailgrams to selected retirees as part of each major Joint Chiefs of Staff mobilization exercise. That practice is continuing.

\textsuperscript{6}Military Department staff representatives responsible for retiree management reported these practices to us. We did not verify the procedure by independent audit.

\textsuperscript{7}As a matter of practice, most military retirees regularly receive newsletters, either from a central source within their parent Service (examples are the Navy’s \textit{Shift Colors}, the Army’s \textit{Army Echoes}, and the Marine Corps’ \textit{Retired Newsletter}) or from a nearby military installation (such as the “family” newsletters sent by Air Force installations to retirees in their respective service areas). While these communications amount to a continuing contact between each Service and its retirees, the emphasis of these newsletters – particularly that of the local variety – lies in the support and services afforded these members of the military community. Reminders of each retiree’s recall obligation are uneven and sporadic.
the requirement to retain information on each retiree’s wartime availability. If our recommendations on retiree notification and exemption procedures are accepted, the need for this information on availability should disappear.

THE SERVICE RETIREE PROGRAMS

General

Guidance on the use of military retirees during mobilization has been implemented in different ways across the Services. Strictly speaking, the Army is the only Service which now complies completely with that guidance. The variation in the programs reflects the different views that the Services hold on how best to utilize their manpower assets to accomplish their separate wartime missions. In the remaining sections of this chapter we review each Service’s retiree program.

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8See Footnote 2, page 2-3.
Included in each review is an assessment of how well the program meets the needs of that Service.

The Army Program

**Description**

The object of the Army's management efforts for retirees is to make sure that all physically qualified military retirees under age 60 whose skills match mobilization requirements are preassigned, in peacetime, to mobilization positions or installations. Retirees may be assigned to any of three kinds of positions: those authorized for fill during mobilization but not in peacetime, those authorized for peacetime fill but vacant now, and those authorized during peacetime and occupied now. These categories are designed to help plan for the increase in requirements that the Army faces in moving from a peacetime to a wartime environment and to release active duty personnel from CONUS assignments so that they may be deployed overseas.

Since the inception of the Army's retiree program in 1979, it has evolved to the point where approximately 125,000 retirees are now preassigned against more than 182,000 mobilization positions. In addition, the Army provides 2,484 medical professionals and administrative specialists to Joint Augment Units (JAUs) at Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS).

Preassignment of military retirees begins with designation of the mobilization positions they can fill. Installations do this during the annual review of their authorization documents. Major commands and the Army Staff review the installation documents before they are incorporated into the Mobilization Personnel Structure and Composition System (MOBPERSACS), the Army's common source of mobilization authorizations. The vast majority of the retiree positions are in Mobilization Table of Distribution and Allowances organizations and virtually all are based in CONUS. The Army's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans forwards the retiree positions from the MOBPERSACS to the Army's Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN), where data on military retirees are maintained. ARPERCEN manages the Army's retiree program.

ARPERCEN matches retirees to positions by means of a computerized assignment algorithm. The algorithm is a multistep process that considers the retired member's primary military specialty and geographic location. Only Categories I and
II retirees are considered in the algorithm, and no distinction is made between regular and reserve retirees in the matching process. When a satisfactory match of individual and requirement is complete, preassignment orders are generated. Regular and reserve retirees with 20 years or more of active duty receive preassignment orders; reserve retirees credited with 20 years or more of active service are issued contingent preassignment orders. A retired military member may volunteer for the preassignment program; in that case, orders can be generated without regard to age or to regular or reserve status. Physical disability precludes preassignment.

More than 57,000 positions designated as suitable for retiree fill cannot currently be filled by ARPERCEN. Approximately 65 percent of these unfilled positions are in medical specialties. The remaining unfilled positions call for lower grade officer and enlisted positions, or represent recently created specialties.9

Installation commanders are notified every month about the retirees assigned to their control. The installation has the final authority to assign individual retirees to specific positions.

The Army is continually improving its process for matching retirees to suitable positions. The current computer algorithm uses a 300-mile radius as the criterion for determining if an installation is within reasonable travel distance. It has been determined that this criterion is too broad, in that it can cause some retirees to be assigned to installations hundreds of miles away when they reside within 10 miles of another post. ARPERCEN began to add 30-mile and 120-mile geographic criteria to the algorithm in September 1987.

There is also an acknowledged flaw in the method for defining positions to be filled by retirees. As noted, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans provides ARPERCEN with the suitable retiree positions from the MOBPERSACS. The Army's Military Personnel Center, as part of the IRR management program, also provides ARPERCEN with vacant MOBPERSACS positions that require fill by IRR members. Since these statements of requirements come from independent sources, the potential exists for the assignment of two individuals to the

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9Mobilization and Reserve Affairs Division (DAPE-MPR), Headquarters Department of the Army, November 1987.
same position. The Military Personnel Center is developing a single requirements file to overcome this flaw.

As part of the study of the Army's retiree program, we visited five installations (Fort Leonard Wood, MO; Fort Riley, KA; Fort Campbell, KY; Fort Bragg, NC; and Fort Lee, VA). Each post approached the management of retirees in a slightly different manner. Some programs appeared to be more complete and aggressive than others, but all installations had developed systematic approaches that appeared to be functioning well. We held a preconceived notion that there was a bias against identifying positions as suitable for retirees. We found this not to be the case. All installations were conscientiously applying sound criteria in determining the suitability of positions for retiree use.

The Army, more than any other Service, has emphasized peacetime preassignment in seeking to make its retiree program more effective in meeting mobilization requirements. At the program's outset, virtually all of the positions considered suitable for retirees were at installations or in units that do not deploy. However, for the past 15 months, ARPERCEN has been preassigning retirees to the Modified Table of Organization and Equipment units of the Army Reserve training divisions and separate brigades. There is also an initiative underway to allow installation commanders to assign recently retired individuals to deploying units after mobilization occurs. The Army does not now intend to preassign these people to deployed or deploying units.

As the Army has sought to expand its program, it has been confronted with a series of important issues. As an example, a retiree's date of rank can become a sensitive problem. It is very likely that a recalled retiree could outrank the incumbent active duty supervisor (section chief, team leader, etc.) of the activity of assignment. Such a situation could obviously create a strained working environment. Provisions exist in Army regulations to overcome this problem for officer personnel who are considered for command, but not for other positions. To accommodate the potential enlisted (and staff officer) problem, the Army is considering revision of Army Regulation 601-10, the governing regulation, to discount for longevity purposes in computing date of rank those days between retirement and recall to active duty.
The Army has initiated a series of exercises (Grey Thunder, Certain Sage '87) to test the effectiveness of aspects of the retiree program at Department of the Army, ARPERCEN, and installation levels. These exercises have concentrated on the reliability of the notification system to be used during mobilization, the installation plans, and the accuracy of retiree information, with some attention given to the suitability of retirees for the designated positions. There have been several important results from the exercises. First, the volunteers for the exercises have been positive and eager and good performers. Most of the retirees, being higher-ranking people with preretirement management experience, were expected to suffer less skill decay when assigned to management positions. Indications are that approximately 2 weeks of on-the-job experience would return most of these retirees to a high level of performance. In 1988, Army exercise plans call for assessing the skill decay of enlisted retirees holding technical specialties. While Army planners now consider skill decay in general management and supervision positions to be inconsequential, they are withholding judgment on that phenomenon in more technical areas with lower-ranking retirees.

The exercises have also pointed out that physical condition can be a critical concern for many retirees. In our assessment of the Army program, we note the medical concerns that surfaced during the exercises. Administering more frequent physicals to retirees designated for recall would be costly and place additional strain on an already overburdened medical system.

Figure 2-1 shows the distribution of the 519,000 Army retirees by age. The age distribution of the disabled retirees is also displayed. Although a very high percentage of retirees age 40 and under are disabled, this is not true of retirees above age 40. The largest group of retired members is in the 61-to-65 age group, and 42 percent of all Army retirees are above age 60.

**Assessment**

Manpower planning in the Army is less scenario-sensitive than it is in the other Military Services. The Army considers the manpower requirements stemming from the Defense Guidance to constitute a "worst case" set of demands. Full mobilization is considered to be a phase or stage through which the Army quickly passes on its way to total mobilization. Army manpower planners focus on a long war in which major Army manpower requirements will continue for more than 180 days.
In this planning climate, a general, rapid buildup of the Army CONUS support base, including training and logistics installations, is anticipated. Since 1979, Army installations and commands have developed, then refined, their individual wartime manpower surge requirements from the somewhat general warfighting support missions they have been given. Although Army planners anticipate a high level of personnel and transportation turbulence in the early days of mobilization, they believe that the present "push-package" of over 125,000 Category I and II retirees will provide marked benefit to the expanding Army support base. The sheer size of Army manpower problems in the early days following mobilization have brought about much of this Service's manpower planning, including those plans involving retiree preassignments. These Army manpower shifts and surges, unique among the Services in their magnitude, have been a strong incentive to accomplish as much as possible before mobilization. While preassignment of these retirees will inevitably produce some local problems, a large, able, preassigned retiree population meets the needs of present Army plans for mobilization.

On balance, we found Army planners to be aware of present and potential problems in their program. The Army is moving to refine and improve that program. We support the Army initiative to adjust downward their residence-to-duty-station assignment criterion. We also support their consideration of authorizing mobilization station commanders to assign recalled retirees to deploying units if they are qualified for those assignments. Finally, we applaud the Army's current attempt to solve the thorny date-of-rank problem characteristic of retiree recall considerations. The approach presently under consideration by the Army may not prevail in the end, but this issue does require some sort of resolution on a Service-by-Service basis.

Altogether, the program refinements being considered by the Army will cost that Service a considerable increase in management effort. We are not optimistic that Army leaders will be able to support these program initiatives by providing a larger retiree management staff at ARPERCEN. However good ideas such as these are, they must confront questions of affordability, often in hostile environments.

One area where Army mobilization planners have not sought to increase management effort is toward any acceleration in issuing preassignment orders to retirees. Present regulations allow each retiree 1 year from the date of retirement to locate a permanent home for the purpose of shipping household goods and similar logistics matters. During the first 6 months of that period the Army allows a
"shake-out period," during which an initial questionnaire is sent (about 4 months after retirement) to the retiree requesting verification of personal and professional data. By the 6-month point the retiree's information has begun entering the automated system for matching with a suitable mobilization position. The present processing load of 16,000 to 18,000 retirements per month dictates the 2-month questionnaire turnaround and the processing of information into the Army automated matching system. We believe that attempts to accelerate this process to any marked degree would produce, as well as solve, problems in retiree placement.

The Navy Program

Description

Both Navy regular and reserve retirees are subject to the same recall authorities as all other Service retirees. But the Navy has long had a separate and special term for some retirees — the Fleet Reserve. The Fleet Reserve consists of enlisted regular and reserve members who are retired with 20-to-30 years of active duty. When they complete a total of 30 years of active and Fleet Reserve service, they are assigned to the Retired Reserve or placed on the regular retired list, depending on their earlier status. Retiree recall provisions in Section 6485, Title 10, United States Code, apply specifically to the Fleet Reserve. The Fleet Reserve category and the special recall provisions in this section are no longer significant for mobilization planning purposes, however, because Section 688, Title 10, United States Code, as revised, authorizes the Service secretaries the authority to recall regular and reserve officer and enlisted personnel who have retired with 20 years or more of active duty. Figure 2-2 shows the distribution of the Navy retirees by age. The age distribution of the disabled retirees is also displayed.

Preassignments for Navy retirees number approximately 1,700. This figure includes the Convoy Commodore Program (125 preassignments); the Retired Augmentee Program, whose members will serve on personnel mobilization teams at Navy installations (918); and the JAU Program (600).10 All of these programs rely on retirees to help ease the administrative and logistics load associated with

10All Navy retirees assigned to JAUs have received preassignment orders, and the Navy has notified the United States Military Entrance Processing Command (USMEPCOM) of the identity of JAUs' members. Retired participants in the Convoy Commodore Program and the Retired Augmentee Program have been notified of their mobilization assignments; they have not received preassignment orders.
FIG. 2-2. NAVY RETIREES: AGE AND DISABILITY

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, March 1986
mobilization. Retirees will help process new personnel. Retirees in the Convoy Commodore Program will control the movements of supply convoys. Those retirees called forward after mobilization begins are expected to be used predominately in the Navy's support force or shore establishment.

The total mobilization requirements for the Navy's operational forces, the ships and aircraft squadrons, are clearly specified in Ship Manning Documents and Squadron Manning Documents. Peacetime manning levels are constrained by budget and fall below the level required in mobilization to an annual "billet authorized" level. Further, the Navy's inventory of active duty personnel does not perfectly match these peacetime authorizations, either in number or skill distribution. This shortage (approximately 5 to 8 percent of total billet authorizations) will have to be overcome from the Navy's Pretrained Individual Manpower pools upon mobilization, since the Ship Augmentation Units and Squadron Augmentation Units of the Navy Selected Reserve have been organized specifically to fill only the difference between the peacetime billet authorizations and the mobilization requirements. The Navy also recognizes, however, that during mobilization 30 to 50 percent of the fleet may be deployed before the reserve units could join their ships. An alternative plan has been developed to address this problem.

The Emergency Fleet Augmentation Plan is an orderly cross-leveling of personnel assets controlled by the Navy's Commanders-in-Chief. It calls for reassigning active personnel from the shore establishment to ships and, if necessary, from one ship to another in order to man the early-deploying ships as fully as possible. Vacancies thus created in the shore establishment and in the complements of later-deploying ships will be backfilled, in part, by retirees11 (along with some members of the Selected Reserve and the IRR). Since the vast majority of retirees are expected to be assigned in the shore establishment, it is important to understand how these support requirements are developed in the Navy Manpower Mobilization System (NAMMOS).

For the shore establishment, NAMMOS estimates total mobilization manpower needs for each activity by first establishing the relationship between peacetime workload and associated manpower authorizations and then extrapolating

11It is not Navy policy to send recalled retirees "in harm's way." Navy planners do not preclude occasional assignments of retirees to combat ships and units in wartime if the needs of the Navy dictate those actions.
those relationships based on projected mobilization workload. These relationships are derived, where possible, using linear regression analysis. Shore establishment activities that do not allow for reasonable linear regression analysis have requirements determined either by "positional coverage" or by professional judgment techniques. Positional coverage applies to activities that must be staffed 24 hours a day in wartime but not peacetime. To determine manpower requirements for these activities, the number of actual hours available for watch in peacetime are divided into the number required for war, and the staffing level of the activity is raised by that factor. For staff agencies where missions and workloads are highly variable, requirements are estimated, as a last resort, by professional judgment. The NAMMOS-generated wartime manpower requirements are shown in Table 2-2.

TABLE 2-2
THE NAVY’S SHORE ESTABLISHMENT WARTIME MANPOWER SURGE REQUIREMENTS
(Thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel category</th>
<th>Months following mobilization</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First</td>
<td>Second</td>
<td>Third</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer Military</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted Military</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Quantities shown are in addition to personnel assigned in peacetime. Data based on projections developed by NAMMOS, August 1987.

To meet the military personnel portion of these requirements, the Navy has ready access to over 310,000 trained people upon mobilization, in addition to a gradually increasing number of graduates from its training base. Since 1980, the Navy has conducted only one supply-versus-demand matching exercise based on its NAMMOS projections and its Pretrained Individual Manpower inventories. The matching was accomplished at the career field or rating level of detail. The results

12Although the quantities ebb and flow, the Navy expects to use about 30,000 active duty Navy people who have been released from peacetime-only assignments. Other military manpower pools are: IRR (70,000), Standby Reserve (11,000), and retirees [201,000 (Categories I and II)].

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showed supply and demand to be in general alignment, and no additional, more detailed analyses have since been conducted.

**Assessment**

The Navy's mobilization plans for manning the ships and squadrons of the fleet are precise, and they are — if necessary — capable of execution even before Selected Reservists can arrive at portside. In contrast, Navy plans for shore establishment expansion for war are based on best-estimate workload projections, using the NAMMOS methods, some of which are over 5 years old. Further, Navy manpower planners annually adjust and smooth these projections after negotiations with representatives of shore-based activities relating to the wartime workload of those wartime support activities. Our impression is that the quantities and the skill and grade distribution of the wartime manning required for all of the shore establishment are generally valid, except perhaps for major Naval headquarters, where some softness remains. Despite confidence in the NAMMOS projections, the Navy has continued to be reluctant to preassign retirees to those billets. This position is based on three considerations:

- **The Pace of Wartime Buildup.** The Navy's combat forces are commonly considered to be “mobilized” in peacetime, except for the absence of third-watch personnel and some live munitions. The ships and squadrons operate close to potential enemies and they are maintained there by combat support ships and units in relatively high states of readiness. The shore establishment, by contrast, faces a more gradual buildup to high operating tempos once hostilities begin. The influx of recalled retirees can and should be metered and adjusted to this growth in activity.

- **Planning Support Required.** Navy staff members are aware of the Army retiree recall program, and they are vaguely aware of the management effort required to maintain that program. Given the first consideration above, the Naval personnel community has been unwilling internally to redirect some of its own staff resources away from other current programs to this effort.

- **Uncertainty of Projections.** Predictions of the surge levels in the shore establishment are estimates based on experience and judgment. All Navy planners know that the actual experience of new hostilities will begin replacing planning parameters as soon as mobilization begins. The slower nature of the shore establishment buildup will allow for a deliberate allocation adjustment of retirees, deviating from peacetime estimates where wartime experience demands it.
The Navy's plans for meeting its wartime manpower needs in the shore establishment lack precision, and those plans have never been exercised in detail. The plans are not yet refined sufficiently to warrant specific preassignment, by billet, in peacetime. Those plans need to be refined and improved. Exercises should be conducted regularly to identify manpower overages and shortages, by specialty, skill level, and grade. As those exercises identify individual retirees or groups of retirees as having a high likelihood of recall upon mobilization, those retirees should be so notified.

We also believe that the Navy should begin notification of all retirees who are already being identified individually of their likelihood of recall in the event of mobilization. The notifications need not be specific with regard to billet assignment, but each retiree likely to be recalled should be made aware of his vulnerability to that action. A recommendation to that effect is included in Chapter 5.

Finally, we believe that, given the uncertainty of wartime needs, the Navy will protect its retiree population from manpower demands from outside the Navy. It regards its retirees as a valuable resource which is to be husbanded carefully. As its recall plans are refined, the Navy will be better able to substantiate that protection in the eyes of other claimants.

The Air Force Program

Description

Upon mobilization, the Air Force establishes the Manpower and Personnel Readiness Center Network as the focal point for preparation for movement, personnel accountability and reporting, and force sustainment. The network is made up of staff agencies, centers, and units, starting at Headquarters, United States Air Force, and continuing down through the major commands and bases. This network manages the personnel flow during mobilization.

As an emergency situation develops and appropriate authorities are received, the Air Force is prepared to call three groupings of manpower in order of priority. Members of the Selected Reserve are assigned to units with specific mobilization missions and are the first assets used. If the Air Force requires additional manpower
it will call its IRR and active duty retirees\textsuperscript{13} as priority two. The Standby Reserve and Retired Reserve are priority three.

In order to call retirees and other individuals in priority groups two and three the Air Force uses the Personnel Data System, an extensive computerized data base. The Personnel Data System provides the capability to designate a criterion (such as most recently retired, most geographically proximate, etc.) to be used in selecting the individual retirees to be called. The Personnel Data System can respond to specific, individual requests from major commands, or to the demands for large groups of personnel under the Push-Pull system.

The Push-Pull system is based on early identification of shortfalls in critical skills. It anticipates requirements and arranges for the return of selected retirees to military control as quickly as possible. The retirees with the critical skills report to the Technical Training Centers responsible for their specific Air Force Specialty Codes. The Technical Training Center receives them, determines their physical condition, and either validates their skill qualifications or provides refresher training. Once any needed training is complete, the retirees are moved to the locations where they are needed. Both the individual assignment process and the Push-Pull system have been tested during annual mobilization exercises. The exercises have stopped short of actually notifying individual retirees and issuing recall orders.

Air Force wartime manpower planning reflects the belief that flexibility is more important than specificity. To be ready to respond to the potentially unique demands of many different scenarios, the Air Force is prepared to regroup its Unit Type Codes (packages of people and equipment designed to perform specific functions) to create the most effective organization for each conflict. Many decisions on personnel actions will be made or modified as the situation unfolds. Within this planning environment, minimal peacetime preassignments of Air Force retirees have been made.\textsuperscript{14} Current Air Force plans call for utilization of Air Force Retired

\textsuperscript{13}The Air Force considers an active duty retiree to be any Service member who has completed at least 20 years of active duty and is receiving a retirement stipend, whether that person saw active duty as a member of the active or reserve forces.

\textsuperscript{14}The Air Force has designated approximately 800 retirees to serve as members of JAUs upon mobilization. Both USMEPCOM and the individual retirees have been notified of this selection. Orders are to be issued upon mobilization.
Reserve personnel only in several high-demand specialties. Figure 2-3 displays the distribution of Air Force retirees by age. The age distribution of the disabled retirees is also shown.

Assessment

The Air Force operates a manpower planning system which is designed to respond to a wide variety of warfighting scenarios. This Service exercises its plans repeatedly and adjusts those plans as a result of the exercises. All this activity is directed at designing and refining a family of very rapid and precise responses to emergencies or hostilities.

One thing seems certain: the Air Force does not now feel the need to call forward significant numbers of retirees to accomplish any of its early wartime missions. Certain groups, such as health care professionals and civil engineers, are certainly expected to be required. But the quick movement and immediate support of Air Force combat and support units are to occur without the use of significant numbers of recalled retirees. While the size and number of Push-Pull groups have been growing (they now include more than a dozen Air Force specialties), Air Force recall orders for most of its retirees await base-generated requests that will appear only after mobilization has begun. That planning reflects confidence in the Push-Pull process for selected specialties and in the responsiveness of the Air Force's wartime personnel system generally.

We believe that the Air Force intends to maintain its large retiree pool as a hedge against unforeseen manpower demands and would resist efforts by OSD and other Services to detail Air Force retirees elsewhere.

The Air Force does not need to preassign retirees into mobilization positions. The power and flexibility of its personnel system are such that Air Force needs will be best (that is, most responsively) met by following its plan for retiree activation once mobilization has begun. However, a case may be made for ordering up its Push-Pull populations for periodic physical examinations, orientations, and perhaps some refresher training, since those groups have been positively identified as high-demand people. Other than for these selected populations, however, intensive peacetime management would probably be an unnecessary impediment to effective wartime retiree use within the Air Force.
Even though Air Force retirees should not generally receive preassignment orders in peacetime, we believe strongly that all retirees who are identified repeatedly by separate, scenario-based computer inventory screening should receive clear alert messages notifying them of their recall vulnerability. A recommendation to that effect is included in Chapter 5.

**The Marine Corps Program**

**Description**

Wartime manpower planning in the Marine Corps is highly scenario-dependent. In general, however, the planners' task is to meet the wartime manpower needs of the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) and those of the Marines' support establishment. For the FMF, where the peacetime and wartime organizations are identical, the concern is how best to increase the personnel inventory from the 90 percent peacetime manning to the full 100 percent. The FMF has the highest priority for manning mobilization positions and is the place where relatively young and lower-grade personnel are in greatest demand. Therefore, the Marine Corps does not expect to use as many retirees as IRR members there. The support establishment (Navy and Marine Corps bases and stations), which realizes increases in wartime workload and personnel authorizations, is where the assignments of most Marine retirees are anticipated.

An automated system monitors the positions that will require filler personnel. The Wartime Authorized Strength Report file contains the official statement of the Marine Corps mobilization manpower structure requirements. Three separate data systems provide information on the individuals available from the active, reserve, and retired lists. By matching these systems and files, supply-versus-demand analyses are conducted.

Upon mobilization, this computer matching work will identify the billets to be filled by retirees (primarily in the surging support establishment), and mailgram orders will be issued to those retirees identified for recall. Thereafter, until about

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15This file presently contains information on billets making up the current force, and it anticipates the conditions of full mobilization. The Marine Corps staff also routinely reviews manpower requirements called for in expansion to the unconstrained Planning Force associated with total mobilization. Under those more demanding conditions, of course, much larger numbers of retirees will be required.
M+30 days, Marine Corps plans anticipate a plateau in requirements for retiree assignments. At about 30 days following the beginning of mobilization, the displacement of active Marine Corps personnel from bases and stations forward to the FMF will bring about an increasing demand for retirees to be used for backfill assignments.

Approximately 2,500 Marine Corps retirees are preassigned to JAUs, Marine Corps Casualty Assistance Teams, and a few select positions that require special management consideration. The Marine Corps is moving toward increased preassignments of individual retirees as requirements are identified. Areas of potential use for additional preassignments are the Marine Corps training system and in Joint Agencies.

Figure 2-4 portrays the population of Marine Corps retirees by age. The age distribution of the disabled retiree population is also shown. As in the Navy, the Fleet Marine Reserve is a special term for regular and reserve members who have retired with 20-to-30 years of active duty. As members reach 30 years of combined active and Fleet Marine Reserve service, they are assigned to the Retired Reserve. As with the Fleet Reserve of the Navy, the significance of this separate identification of the Fleet Marine Reserve has been obviated by recent Federal legislation.

**Assessment**

The Marine Corps plan for utilization of its retiree population makes good sense and should be followed. According to Marine Corps planners, more preassignment orders are to be issued by this Service, an action to be taken at the initiative of the Headquarters Marine Corps staff.

The Marines' plan to re-evaluate the manpower situation during the first month of mobilization before beginning a second effort of displacing Marines from staff positions to combat by using retirees seems to be well conceived; it should work. Because of the restricted size of the Marine Corps forces, however, with its attendant relative ease of management, we think this scheme would not be suitable for the other Military Services.
FIG. 2-4. MARINE CORPS RETIREES: AGE AND DISABILITY

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, March 1986.
COMPARISON OF SERVICE PROGRAMS

Introduction

Having reviewed the retiree recall programs of all four major Military Services, and having presented capsule descriptions of those programs as part of this report, we now make some comparisons among those programs. The comparisons reveal what we believe to be something of the underlying (and unspoken) manpower orientations of the several Services. Those orientations or perspectives, in our judgment, largely determine the nature and the complexity of each Service's program for using the pretrained military manpower available to it.

Army

The Army is largely people-dependent. Its leaders and staff perceive a large and growing demand for trained manpower — including retirees. Its manpower planning is somewhat more cumbersome than the other Services. That planning lacks degrees of scenario-sensitivity. Nevertheless, its recognition that the essence of land warfare involves the loss and reconstitution of major manpower forces has created within the Army a recognition of its overriding dependence on available pools of trained manpower — including retirees. Because of this dependence, Army leaders accord their retiree recall program a relatively high priority. The Army is therefore willing to provide the staff and effort to manage intensively its retiree population. But internal competition for resources continues to threaten that effort, and additional staff resources required to expend even more effort on retiree management are not likely in the near future, in our judgment.

Navy and Air Force

By contrast, the Navy and Air Force (grouped here because we believe their basic orientations regarding wartime manpower planning are nearly identical) believe in planning for a high-intensity conflict dependent to a major degree on weapons platforms, and only to a lesser degree on the manpower supporting those platforms. As major ships (or squadrons of aircraft) are lost in combat, the need to replace those crews or to replace their support personnel must await the building of new weapons platforms. Large quantities of trained manpower are simply unneeded, except to support the moderate surges in the support bases of the Navy and the Air Force. For these two Services, such levels of support base growth are
more manageable than the Army's wartime growth projections. Neither of these Services expects to use large numbers of its retirees upon mobilization (see Table 3-1).

The Navy and the Air Force staffs do not approach wartime manpower requirements with the same sense of urgency felt by Army planners. Therefore, wartime manpower planning assumes a relatively low priority and, as a result, these Services have not thought it appropriate to manage their pretrained manpower — including retirees — as intensively as has the Army. The absence of peacetime preassignment of retirees is one result of this orientation. Unfortunately, in our judgment, these lower levels of retiree management have included a lack of communication with retirees of both the Navy and the Air Force — communication which should be established.

**Marine Corps**

Until recently, the small staff of the Marine Corps could not devote the considerable staff effort and time required to manage their pretrained manpower pools with any real sensitivity. Throughout the past year and a half, however, the Headquarters Marine Corps staff has been moving deliberately toward increasing the numbers of preassigned Marine retirees. If left to their own devices, they probably will never reach the Army's proportion of retirees with peacetime preassignment orders because of their unique, peacetime, force-in-readiness concept for the FMF. That arrangement fits their own needs quite well. Nevertheless, the assignment of retirees to the support establishment of the Marine Corps does have a high priority for staff action. OSD may anticipate more preassignments with the passage of time.
CHAPTER 3
ADDITIONAL USES OF RETIREES

INTRODUCTION

In each of the four retiree recall programs now in effect, the logical focus is on wartime duty positions in the parent Service. In a national mobilization, however, there will be a need for experienced military people to serve in positions outside their parent Services. Though many such needs will occur within DoD itself, other agencies and activities will have wartime needs for service by uniformed representatives of the Military Services. In many instances, that service should be performed by recalled retirees.

In the following sections we discuss — in five broad categories — wartime service by retirees beyond Service boundaries. Because this type of service requires planning and coordination, we then review the activities of a coordinating committee or other body. Finally, we include a group of additional ideas, related to wartime uses of military retirees, which have emerged from our work in this area.

Other Services

In wartime, the need of the Military Services for personnel with experience in certain critical skills (health care professionals and civil engineers are examples from the past) will surge. Occasionally these needs cannot be met by each Service's own Pretrained Individual Manpower inventory, but can be at least partially offset by the personnel assets of another Service. Under such conditions, qualified retirees can serve the country best by temporary assignment to the Service where the need exists. We believe this other-Service use should represent the highest priority of assignment for retirees after in-Service personnel needs are met.

Due to the sensitivity of this issue and to the substantial staff work already required to operate the existing retiree programs, no analysis of such use of retirees has been developed by Service manpower planners. Rather, it seems to be the practice to seek other relief (beyond a sister Service's retiree population) as particularly critical wartime shortages of skilled groups are identified. For example, as the
Army began to project acute shortages in the health care fields for the early days of mobilization, its approach was to formulate legislation authorizing wartime conscription-by-skill (a "doctor draft"), rather than placing before OSD its unfilled needs for possible fill by, say, Air Force retirees in the health care fields.

An additional inhibitor to computing demand for other-Service retirees is the serious lack of occupational skill data in the files of Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) for retirees of all Services. The staff of OASD(RA) has begun efforts to improve the completeness of these records, and those efforts should be supported vigorously.

As personnel demands suitable for fill by another Service's retirees are identified, it will become necessary for OSD to play the important and difficult role of broker in any resulting transactions. In a later section of this chapter, we discuss a reasonable device to help fulfill this emerging obligation.

Joint Agencies

In peacetime, many military officers and enlisted personnel serve in joint activities beyond their own Military Service boundaries. Such activities as the Office, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Joint Special Operations Agency; and USMEPCOM depend upon Military Service personnel for both their peacetime and their wartime missions. Though the Services assign their personnel to these (and similar) activities routinely in peacetime, activity manning levels may change dramatically under mobilization conditions. Categories I and II retirees — particularly those with recent experience in these specific activities — represent an attractive personnel pool for wartime assignment, thus freeing younger Service members for combat or other duty. We believe these Joint activities should represent the second priority of assignment for retirees, after other-Service personnel needs are met.

Defense Agencies

Other Defense activities whose wartime work will depend on sizable groups of military people from the Services are the Defense Agencies. Such activities as the

1 USMEPCOM is now the recipient of the only all-Service "preassignment" program for military retirees. To cope with the wartime surge of personnel flowing into the Armed Forces, all the Services have taken steps toward the designation of retirees to serve in JAUs, designed to augment USMEPCOM staffs operating the MEPS.
Defense Communications Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) can use recalled retirees effectively in time of war. There are about a dozen of these agencies in the National Capital region alone. If one includes similar activities, such as the DoD Field Activities, the list of Defense organizations to which it may be reasonable to make wartime assignments of recalled retirees grows quickly. The Services should be prepared to meet the wartime manning requirements of these agencies and other activities, and their plans should include consideration of the possibility of assigning recalled retirees to this work. We suggest that this group of assignments constitute a third priority of duty (after Joint Agencies).

The DLA presents an interesting example and challenge. The peacetime personnel strength of this agency is approximately 1,500 military personnel and about 52,000 civilian employees. Wartime workload projections require a surge of about 750 military and 11,000 civilians. This agency has already anticipated its military growth by staffing its wartime military billets with 750 Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs), but the plan to achieve the required growth in its civilian work force is still incomplete. Of particular concern to DLA mobilization planners is the 25 percent growth forecast in the areas of quality assurance and contract administration and management — areas requiring expertise and experience which could be difficult to find. Would it be wise to consider filling these civilian positions with military retirees? This question, which has a fairly broad application, is addressed in some detail in Appendix A.

Other Federal Agencies

A number of Federal Government agencies other than DoD anticipate the assignment of military people under mobilization conditions. Some, such as the Selective Service System (SSS) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), have made extensive preparations to receive and use military personnel. In the case of SSS in particular, all the Military Services have agreed that, upon mobilization, they will provide sizable groups from their respective recruiting services to augment the SSS staff and raise it to a wartime footing. Some military personnel are now assigned to FEMA as IMAs, to serve there as soon as mobilization occurs.
But other agencies of the Federal Government, such as the Departments of State, Energy, Transportation, and Treasury, have wartime military personnel needs of varying magnitude. Though our work in this study has stopped short of attempting to determine those needs, we have reviewed those peacetime assignments of military personnel to Federal Government agencies beyond DoD boundaries that are governed by the provisions of DoDD 1000.17, *Department of Defense Personnel Assigned to Duty Outside the Department and Supporting Non-DoD Activities*. We also have reviewed the continuing State-Defense Officer Exchange Program, which calls for peacetime utilization of some 20 military officers within the Department of State. All told, over 700 active duty military officers are assigned to other Federal agencies in peacetime. Some of these positions can be filled effectively by recent military retirees. We view these types of assignments as representing a fourth priority (see preceding sections) of the wartime use of military retirees.

A review of the magnitude and nature of this type of assignment in World War II is instructive. That review, with emphasis on War Department participation, is contained in Appendix C.

**Non-Federal Agencies and Activities**

The need for wartime service by military personnel beyond the boundaries of the Federal Government should be anticipated as the nation passes through full mobilization toward total mobilization of its resources for war. Utilization of military retirees — as a fifth priority — in two non-Federal activities is discussed as an example.

The State Defense Forces (SDF) are designed to provide state Governors with armed forces after the National Guard has been called into Federal service. The mission of the SDF is to provide security and to maintain law and order. The use of military retirees (particularly retirees from the National Guard) in SDF positions of leadership would seem to represent the kind of assignment for which retirees are particularly well-suited.

Civil defense and emergency management organizations at the state and local level also offer good potential for retiree service during mobilization. (Some IMAs now serving with FEMA are assigned to local activities, but they are few in number.) This type of retiree use, if anticipated in peacetime, might have the added benefit of
providing experienced people to deal with significant peacetime emergencies, such as floods and earthquakes.

How many recalled retirees might be needed for wartime jobs in these agencies and activities? The answer is particularly difficult to reach because of the general lack of specific, numbers-oriented planning at state and local levels.

The example of the SDF is representative. At the present time, 22 states have established separate military forces under the SDF umbrella, and 21 more are at various stages of active consideration. Total SDF enrollment today is about 10,000 men and women. Virginia is organizing five brigades — three infantry, one maritime, and one aviation — but only the commanders and a small cadre of leaders have been named to fill positions within those units. Ohio, by contrast, has established a somewhat loose organization of about 600 people in its Ohio Defense Corps. Some SDF coordination occurs within the National Guard Bureau, where a regulation on SDF (National Guard Regulation 10-2) has been issued. But SDF units clearly report to the several governors. If recalled retirees are to be made available to these slowly developing forces, DoD will have to assume an active planning role, rather than just the policy role it has played in the past.

COORDINATION OF RETIREE UTILIZATION

If military retirees are to be recalled effectively for service outside their parent Services, those types of use must be anticipated. In addition, the extra-Service nature of that use calls for coordination and planning by an entity made up of representatives from all the Military Services and from OSD.

The OASD(FM&P) and OASD(RA) share peacetime responsibility for guidance and coordination in this area, but those offices do not have large enough staffs to manage plans involving wartime personnel assignments of retirees from all the Military Services. Such a planning and coordinating body is clearly called for, however. That organization (whether it is a standing committee, board, working group, or more formal entity) should have the authority in peacetime to call for and review projected wartime staffing needs of agencies and other groups that are potential claimants for retiree use, and to prepare coordinated plans for retiree use beyond parent Service boundaries. To accomplish these tasks, the organization will
need access both to Military Service retiree inventories\(^2\) and to Military Service plans for wartime use of retirees.

We recognize the sensitivity of each of the Military Services to the prospects of involuntary assignment of its own personnel outside that Service, but present Service plans do not anticipate extensive use of retiree resources, at least under the manpower requirements implied by the warfighting scenarios of the current Defense Guidance. Table 3-1 contains summary information on current Military Service plans for wartime utilization of retirees, compared with Service inventories of Category I and Category II retirees.

### TABLE 3-1

**INVENTORIES AND PROJECTED UTILIZATION OF RETIREES**

(Thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Marine Corps</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Categories I and II retirees</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projected utilization by D + 180</td>
<td>112 (53%)</td>
<td>53 (26%)</td>
<td>32 (80%)</td>
<td>63 (21%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Defense Manpower Data Center, March 1986 and OASD(FM&P).

**Note:** Utilization projections are based on the requirements of the current Defense Guidance scenario. No allowance is made in these quantities for physical disqualifications or for unanticipated assignment to deployed or deploying units (an action which may create a vacancy in a Service’s support base).

### IDEAS

#### Background

Our review and assessment of plans for using military retirees in wartime has inevitably yielded ideas regarding the principles involved in retiree utilization, as well as the types of use for which retirees are particularly well-suited. These ideas

\(^2\)There is a serious data problem within the data base of the DMDC. The primary skills of fully 51 percent of enlisted retirees and 67 percent of officer retirees in the DMDC data base are unknown. To be sure, DMDC captures no skill information on men and women who retired before FY71, but the omissions in skill data seem to be too numerous to be explained completely by that fact. The staff of OASD(RA) has begun work to improve the quality of retiree data now held by DMDC. The work should be supported by all of the DoD. It should also be accelerated, because these types of interservice plans are largely dependent on data of these types.
are presented here for consideration by planners and by those who are responsible for providing retiree program guidance.

- **General Characteristics of Effective Utilization of Retirees.** The best applications for retired military personnel appear to have five basic characteristics:
  - There is a genuine need.
  - Youth is not of primary concern.
  - Experience is an important asset.
  - Other groups are not threatened.
  - Voluntary affiliation is possible.

- **Real Need.** The primary characteristic of an application for retirees is a genuine need. Neither the retirees nor the Services should be put in the position of using or planning to use retired military personnel simply to have manpower available on mobilization day or shortly thereafter. The need to have this particular kind of personnel should be demonstrated ahead of time. It may be that the primary reason that the Navy and Air Force have not made extensive plans for using retirees is that they have failed to locate areas where there is a real need. That is not to say that no real needs exist. It may simply be that finding them may require greater ingenuity. Much work needs to be done, therefore, in finding areas appropriate for wartime use of retired personnel. These areas should be well-defined.

- **Youth Not the Primary Consideration.** Retirees should not be placed in jobs where youth and vigor are required. This disqualifies many (but not all) combat jobs. We suggest, however, that another quality—stamina—required for air operations, naval warfare, and other military activities may argue for a wider use of some retirees who are older than 40 and younger than 60. On this point, medical evidence in support or refutation would be especially helpful.

- **Experience an Important Asset.** The most important characteristic of retirees is that they have 20 years or more of experience. They have mastered their jobs and have shown persistence by succeeding enough to earn retirement. The Services appreciate skill, and experience is an indicator of skill. Even a skill that has decayed is likely to be better than one recently acquired by training. Fundamental work must still be done on experience-based skill decay, the rapidity of relearning, and on ways to retain skills after retirement from active duty.

- **Other Groups Not Threatened.** One of the obstacles to good premobilization planning for retiree utilization is that retirees pose a potential threat to
current active duty personnel and to other groups, such as civilian personnel managers and administrators. By definition, retirees are somewhat senior people; they will outrank incumbents when they are recalled to active duty. This issue should be faced squarely, and seniority and promotion policies for recalled retirees must be worked out in advance. Group anxieties also need to be considered. Selected Reservists are generally uneasy about retirees taking reservists' jobs. The National Guard does not want retirees from the regular forces intruding on its turf (as in assignments to the SDFs). Accordingly, it is useful to find wartime jobs for retirees that do not threaten any current active duty, reserve component, or other group. It should be emphasized that this principle of "threat" operates primarily in peacetime. Once mobilization begins, we expect widespread dissipation of most of these concerns. Unfortunately, retiree utilization plans must be made when the anxieties are present.  

Voluntary Affiliation. Even though retirees may be recalled involuntarily, there appears to be no effective way to require them to train in peacetime. Even if more funds are made available, retiree training will remain a voluntary matter for the near future. If so, it follows that the best way to use retirees is in a program for which they volunteer. The implication is that, having volunteered for an assignment, they will also volunteer for

3The Army is attempting to deal with an anticipated morale problem. It will occur when a recalled retiree, senior in terms of date of rank, automatically becomes chief of section, division leader, or shop supervisor and displaces the incumbent. Commanders are exempt from the date-of-rank problem since current Army regulations permit the appointment of junior people to command positions. The Army is now actively considering a policy change which will strip away from each retiree's seniority all "civilian" days since retirement. The policy would apply to both enlisted personnel and officers.

Another policy, now used by all Services, is apt to cause morale problems of a different kind. Recalled retirees may be posted to mobilization billets as much as one grade higher or two grades lower than their retirement grade. Lieutenant Colonels could serve in Captains' positions (or Commanders in Lieutenants'), and Command Sergeants Major could be asked to perform Master Sergeants' jobs. Every planner takes these adjustments for granted, although no retiree — even in the preassigned Army retiree pool — is aware of any such "reduced grade assignment" planned to occur once recall takes place. We believe that the dimensions and impact of this policy need review with a representative sample of retirees. It may be that a policy of fuller disclosure, with accompanying rationale and review of the implications, is warranted.

4The recent history of the Army's attempts to recall involuntarily members of the IRR is instructive. Army Regulation 135-200 has for some time cited authorization for the involuntary recall to active duty of members of the IRR for a limited period of time. In 1981, in the face of the dwindling strength of the Army's IRR, Dr. Lawrence Korb, then the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics), testified before the Congress that DoD would soon be recalling for training IRR members needed in the early days of any major war. Representatives of the Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives promptly objected, citing their concern over this proposed involuntary action in the midst of the All-Volunteer Force initiative. It is not clear whether the committee's concerns carried an implied threat of fiscal retaliation upon Defense or not. DoD has not since sought to recall IRR members to duty involuntarily, even for a short period of refresher training.
peacetime refresher training, possibly without pay. One of the useful criteria for uses of retirees is whether each utilization can be defined specifically enough and described attractively enough to cause retirees to volunteer for wartime assignments.

Sample Programs

*Introduction*

Eight retiree utilization programs, actual and potential, are discussed below because they embody all or most of the important characteristics discussed in the preceding section. The first two of these programs are active programs; they are discussed elsewhere in this report.

*Convoy Commodore Program.* This may be the paradigm of a good retiree program. There is real need for senior people with great experience to take over the operation of wartime convoys. All the members of this well-defined program are volunteers, and they have taken peacetime refresher training. The program does not compete with any active group.

*Joint Augmentation Units.* This program fills a real need for health professionals to augment USMEPCOM upon mobilization. Retired personnel who live in areas where there are processing stations may volunteer for wartime assignment at the stations. Experience is absolutely necessary, and the program does not compete with any active group. Unfortunately, only Army retirees have taken peacetime training thus far.

*State Defense Forces.* These forces represent a needed program with good potential for some retirees. The states are establishing such programs under the aegis of the Chief, National Guard Bureau. Though the states vary in their levels of interest in the program, all of them need it.

Youth is not desired for this job because young men are eligible for active Federal military service. Previous national experience with similar forces indicates that SDFs have unacceptably high turnover if they rely on personnel of draft age. Experience is useful, and simply having had military service seems to be enough, because SDF jobs are general and do not require highly technical skills.

Widespread use of military retirees of the active forces might threaten the state-oriented groups that now form the cadres of the SDF. It is suggested, therefore,
that this program be aimed primarily at National Guard retirees, particularly those who have retired but have not yet begun to receive their retirement pay. Previous service in the National Guard should make these retirees more acceptable locally, and their use in this role may actually be perceived as a way to extend military service after retirement from the reserve. This would bring into the retired pool a group whose status is now ambiguous.

Finally, voluntary affiliation is necessary because of the nature of the SDF. This appears to be an ideal program for National Guard retirees. Even though it is not Federal in nature, it would fill a mobilization requirement. See further comments on the SDF in an earlier section of this chapter.

**National Defense Reserve Fleet.** The National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) consists of many mothballed ships. The NDRF — and particularly the Ready Reserve Fleet portion of the NDRF — will be activated early in a mobilization to provide ships for both strategic deployment and resupply. There is an urgent need for the ships, but the present program to provide crews for them is not dependable. Assignment of retired Naval personnel to this program could provide the cadre for crews. The ships' officers and senior petty officers could come from retirees, and the lower enlisted ranks could be provided from lower-ranking personnel now in the Navy's shore establishment.

Youth and vigor are not absolute necessities, but experience in operating ships is. Many Naval retirees could qualify for these jobs because of the general nature of the skills. The job of operating the ships should not be overly demanding for retired personnel. Because there is no provision now for manning these ships, there is no competition with another group.

It is likely that retired Naval personnel would volunteer for these crews. It is also likely that some form of peacetime briefing or training could be administered on a voluntary basis. This is a Federal function, although it is not a strictly military function. It does appear to be another good use for retired personnel.

**Selective Service System.** Current plans call for augmentation of the SSS upon mobilization by about half of the active duty recruiting force. These personnel will perform essential administrative and liaison functions for SSS when that system activates and starts drafting young people for military service.
The job does not require youth and vigor because most of the work is office routine. However, it could benefit from experience, particularly in general military administration.

The Services are not enthusiastic about sending young and vigorous active duty enlisted personnel to SSS, for even a few months; therefore, there should be little opposition to the use of retired personnel for this job. It is also likely that retired personnel would volunteer for these kinds of jobs in their own localities. Since this job is service-immaterial, the apparent excess of Navy and Air Force retirees could be used for this purpose. SSS augmentation appears to be useful work for retirees.

**Federal Emergency Management Agency.** Upon mobilization, FEMA will expand to manage the national mobilization. FEMA will be augmented by its own National Defense Executive Reserve contingent, consisting of retired civilian executives. It will also benefit from augmentation by retired military personnel.

FEMA now has a program for augmentation by IMAs; the structure of the program is under review, however, and the cost to FEMA is a real problem. In addition, the requirement for military augmentation exceeds the present number of IMAs. There is a real possibility, therefore, that FEMA will welcome voluntary affiliation by a substantial number of military retirees.

Youth is not as important as general military experience for the kinds of jobs that would be done by these military personnel. The primary tasks would be liaison with local military units and operation of the Military Support for Civil Authority Program. Coordination with state military headquarters, the SDFs, and active military installations and activities could be accomplished effectively by retired military personnel assigned to FEMA.

This would be a fairly small but well-defined program. Navy and Air Force retirees could participate because the nature of the work is service-immaterial. This could be an ideal, though limited, application for military retirees.

**Emergency Management.** A larger application would be allocation of military retirees to emergency management or civil defense organizations at the local and state levels. In a mobilization, there will be a need for many trained personnel to
augment existing emergency management organizations to cope with the additional risks of conventional or nuclear attack.

This would be an ideal use of retired military personnel. They would be called to active duty and serve in their own counties or states under elected or appointed civil officials. This allocation should not offend any existing group because there is no significant provision now for this kind of augmentation. (Some FEMA IMAs are now assigned to local agencies, but they are few in number.) Experience in military organization and administration would be highly useful.

Finally, there should be some interest in volunteering for this program and in making some preparation in peacetime. These retirees might also serve during some of the larger peacetime emergencies, such as floods and hurricanes. This is not a Federal use of retirees, but it does meet a mobilization need.

**County Individual Ready Reserve Battalions.** This is an idea to organize most Army IRR enlisted personnel into personnel replacement battalions, organized on the basis of one per county. There are about 2,200 counties in the United States. Every one of the 300,000 enlisted IRR members who are not preassigned to a unit or a mobilization station would be assigned to one of them.

The County IRR Battalion would be responsible for strength accounting and for initial activation and processing of all IRR personnel living in the county. The unit would be administered in peacetime and operated briefly in wartime by a volunteer cadre consisting of military retirees. Upon mobilization, the County Battalion would form and would place each IRR member in the county under military control. Military processing could take place at a local facility, such as a courthouse or library. All assignments and instructions would be routed through the County Battalion.

In peacetime the County Battalion would maintain a roster of IRR members and would work with the ARPERCEN to keep a fairly current list. IRR members would be instructed to report to the County Battalion upon relocation. There would be an annual muster day, with a briefing and, perhaps, a picnic or other social event. The retired personnel would perform all administrative functions without pay. The cost of administration would therefore be minimal.
This is a kind of program that should attract retired personnel volunteers. The idea, which was proposed several years ago, deserves serious consideration on its merits. Certainly, the use of retired military personnel to form the chain of command would represent suitable use of some of these personnel, particularly senior officers for whom there is not much demand elsewhere. The County Battalion organization could improve significantly the show rate of IRR enlisted personnel.
CHAPTER 4
APPROACHES TO RETIREE MANAGEMENT

THE PRESENT SYSTEMS

The Services now follow traditional and limited approaches to planning for use of military retirees during mobilization. The search for positions suitable for retiree fill is generally restricted to military positions in requirements documents. Assessment of retiree qualification considers only the individual's military specialty. These approaches are simple and supportable within existing resource constraints. They are also effective as long as the plans for use of retirees include only documented or anticipated military positions within each Service.

We believe, however, that recalled retirees can and should perform important duties — some of which do not require a specific military specialty — beyond Service boundaries. Anticipation of this wider range of duties places new demands on retiree program management. In the next section, we discuss some modified approaches for managing retirees. These different approaches are designed to complement the additional uses of retirees presented in Chapter 3. The goal is to utilize the retiree population as completely and as effectively as possible.

MODIFICATIONS TO THE PRESENT APPROACH

General

Relying on a close match between military specialty and job requirements is not the only way to manage military retirees. Alternative methods should be explored because of the different character of the retiree population as compared to the active duty manpower pool.

To begin with, military specialty may not be the most appropriate measure of a retiree's qualification. Most of the retirees now considered for assignment during mobilization have 20 years or more of experience and training. Their backgrounds are such that many can contribute in staff and general supervisory positions irrespective of military specialty. Moreover, depending on the specialty, the length of time since retirement, and the deterioration in skill, a retiree may no longer be
able to perform satisfactorily in that specialty. Skill erosion varies from low in some traditional specialties to severe in some of the more technical and equipment-specific skills. The Air Force, recognizing the problem, allows for skill validation and refresher training in its retiree program.

Some retirees have entered new careers; others have enhanced their qualifications in their former military specialties. Table 4-1 shows the numbers of military retirees who are DoD employees. These individuals are working on a daily basis in new or related DoD positions. To the figures in Table 4-1 can be added the retirees who have gone on to new careers with DoD contractors and other private firms. These new careers may have generated new skills.

### TABLE 4-1

**MILITARY RETIREES WHO ARE DoD CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES\(^a\)**

(Thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employing Military Services and DoD Agencies</th>
<th>Retirees by Military Service</th>
<th>Total number employed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other DoD</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Figures may not add because of rounding*

\(^a\) Defense Manpower Data Center, March 1986.

\(^b\) Defense Manpower Data Center, 30 September 1985.

Finally, the positions to which retirees are assigned during mobilization need not be strictly military. Retirees do not have to be concerned with the career implications of being assigned to positions outside their military specialty or outside their Military Service. Because of their experience and training, they are likely to adapt easily to positions in nonmilitary Federal organizations.
Given these features of the retiree population, we now turn to a discussion of some possible alternatives and related considerations for managing retirees.

**Geographic Location**

One way to manage retirees is to assign them to a military installation within a specified geographic area. Many retirees now reside within a day’s travel from a military installation. Many of these individuals use the installation services regularly and attend retiree activities. They are generally familiar with installation functions and missions.

Under this scheme, each installation would be responsible for identifying its wartime needs for retirees, assigning retirees to these duties, and notifying Service headquarters of any individuals available for assignment elsewhere. It would not be necessary for the installation to link each retiree to a specific position in peacetime. Some individuals could be designated for general supervisory duties associated with the heavier workload expected during mobilization.

A management method based on geographic location could benefit all installations, especially those programmed for large increases in resident populations during mobilization. Retirees assigned to general supervisory duties could help smooth the arrival, processing, and care of incoming personnel. Though this method offers an installation greater flexibility and makes refresher and familiarization training easier, it also adds significantly to the installation’s responsibilities and peacetime planning load.

**Specific Retiree Experience**

Some retirees have had extensive experience in specific commands or staff organizations. They are familiar with the special features and operating procedures of the organization. They also represent a major portion of the activity’s institutional knowledge. During mobilization, these retired personnel are excellent candidates for assignment to their former organizations. They can serve as augmentation personnel or free active duty personnel for other duties.

Linking military retirees to specific organizations in this way can reduce and even eliminate the need to refresh or retrain the retiree during mobilization. The gaining command can offer informal and inexpensive peacetime orientation
periodically. The retiree may also acquire a greater sense of identification with the unit than is true under present plans.

Recent Retirees

The present system allows an individual to retire from military service after 20 years of active service. For many, this means retirement at an age ranging from the late 30s to early 40s. There are approximately 140,000 nondisabled military retirees between the ages of 41 and 45.

The more recent retirees may be as fully qualified physically as their active duty counterparts. Furthermore, depending on their specialties, some recent retirees may be able to assume the duties they performed during their last assignments — possibly including assignments in deployed tactical units. Special management will have to be instituted to determine and track the qualifications of recent retirees.

Additional Demands of Alternative Management Systems

The systems described above represent only three possible alternatives to retiree management. These systems need not replace existing programs. They may supplement them with the ultimate goal being the most effective use of military retirees in meeting all genuine defense needs. To achieve this goal, it may be necessary and desirable to employ alternate approaches to management. Some of the proposed alternatives require marked increases in management activity and resource expenditures. If any of the proposed (or similar) alternatives are to be implemented and additional retiree assignments considered, a corresponding commitment must be made to devote increased levels of management attention and resources to the retiree program:

- **Geographic Location.** Local staffs devoted to retiree recall planning would need to grow, their size being dependent upon the size of the retiree influx anticipated. Continued staffing at the national level would be necessary to handle the annual cohort of retirees emerging from active service, to track down “lost” retirees, to arrange for interservice or noninstallation assignments, to identify persons with critical skills whose services may be required elsewhere, and to perform other similar functions.

- **Specific Experience.** If this were to be an isolated system of retiree management, it would require a somewhat smaller increase in management effort than the effort required to support assignments related to geographic
location alone. The greatest limiting factor in assignments of this kind should be time-since-retirement. Some time limit or statute of limitations might well be appropriate for retirees assigned under this approach, and the analysis leading to decisions and plans in that direction would require some effort. Since large groups of retirees would probably not be suitable for assignment under the "specific experience" plans, retention of a substantial national-level staff would be called for as well. Unit-level planning might be undertaken as an additional duty in the case of moderate- to small-sized units.

One group for which this type of assignment might be considered is comprised of recent retirees from the units encompassed by the Army's regimental system. This system encourages strong unit identification (its original model is the British regimental system) and, although the system is less than a decade old, unit "alumni" gatherings are said to occur already. Two concerns are, of course, that not many retirees retire directly from this restricted set of units, and the seniority, age, and physical condition (most are combat units) might make effective utilization difficult.

- **Recent Retirees.** This large group of relatively young, vigorous retirees constitutes an attractive resource for intensive management in peacetime, primarily because of their youth and vigor, but also because of their relatively fresh experience. Indeed, the Army has already begun to plan wartime assignments separately for an analogous population in its IRR, those who have left active duty within the past year. The group is called RT-12.

There are penalties to pay, however, in the selective management of this retiree group. These costs should be considered before action is taken.

- The definition or limits may be difficult to define. Ideally, the "recency" of service should vary across or among jobs (because of skill decay) and perhaps among individuals (because of quality of performance). Because of the problems associated with this level of differentiation, however, it may be most appropriate to use a single, time-since-retirement cutoff, say, 1 year.

- The population is a "rolling" one, with one monthly cohort leaving and one entering annually. Further, the abilities and grades of those leaving will never match the abilities and grades of those entering. All of this implies management support of considerable flexibility and responsiveness.

- As mentioned elsewhere, this first year of retirement is a turbulent year from the perspectives of residence and employment. These movements and transfers place additional requirements for sensitivity and responsiveness on the monitoring and oversight aspects of management.
This valuable group has left active service from management and supervisory positions, for the most part. It is those types of positions for which they are best suited. Care would be required in making assignments to more subordinate, technical positions — which are apt to represent positions in highest demand for retirees in this group.

There are also more general demands associated with more intense retiree management. First, a common statement of objective that calls for the most effective use of military retirees across all DoD Components should be made. Without such a stated objective, it is impossible to monitor the program's effectiveness. Second, if military retirees are to be assigned outside their parent Services (to other Services, joint agencies, or other Government agencies), a mechanism must be established to communicate outside requirements to the Services and to receive and utilize available retirees. Finally, additional personnel, funding, and information about military retirees will be needed. Under any of the alternatives described above, more people will be required to manage the retired population and to collect and maintain the necessary retiree information. More resources will have to be made available for retiree management, including resources to be diverted from other programs.

The source of the additional resources will necessarily be the manpower and personnel communities of the Services, three of which have shown continuing reluctance to commit more staff people to these programs. At OSD level, increased retiree planning and coordination will have to occur in committees or boards, where members are already assigned full-time duties elsewhere. This assessment of resource availability sounds bleak, but it represents the candor and honesty displayed to the study team by retiree program planners throughout this project.
CHAPTER 5
RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) take the following six actions to help ensure a smoother, more effective actual call-up and utilization of military retirees in the event of mobilization:

1. **PEACETIME PLANNING ORGANIZATION.** Identify a standing committee, with representatives of OSD, each of the Services, and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to monitor the peacetime supply of retirees in each Service and prepare plans to apply them against the expected wartime demand for personnel. The committee should have the authority in wartime to direct assignment of retirees who are not essential to their parent Services and place them in positions in other Military Services, joint Service agencies, other DoD agencies, or other Federal agencies.

In wartime, we believe, there will be a great, continuing need for military personnel to serve beyond the boundaries of their own Services. Consideration should be given to meeting some of these needs with retirees who have been recalled to active duty. With proper planning in peacetime, many of these needs can be anticipated, and the individual Services can be prepared to deal with assignments across Service lines. The ideas on the general characteristics of effective utilization of retirees and the sample programs presented in Chapter 3 can help guide preparations for meeting these critical mobilization manpower requirements, both within and outside of the parent Services. But these characteristics and sample programs should be analyzed jointly by the Services and OSD to determine the best way to incorporate them into the planning process.

At present, OSD does little to coordinate the planning efforts by individual Services regarding recall of retirees. Though we recommend creation of a planning committee to do this work, OSD may wish to assign the effort to an existing committee – the Pretrained Individual Manpower Working Group of OSD’s Mobilization and Deployment Steering Group, for instance. This working group routinely addresses issues involving military retirees. Though its present concerns extend well beyond retiree issues, its membership includes the Military Service
planners for wartime manpower who are responsible for the retiree programs that now exist. We think this group is nearly ideal for the purposes outlined in the recommendation, especially since it includes a representative of the Office, Joint Chiefs of Staff, among its members.

We recognize the potential for disagreement among the Services about other-agency use of retirees, with a resulting need for mediation by OSD representatives. To date, OSD and the Services have avoided exercising scenarios that require one Service to yield personnel to another Service, joint agency, or other military activity. But requests for such actions are inevitable in wartime. The recommended planning body should have the authority to deal with these situations as they arise.

2. STATEMENT OF PROGRAM OBJECTIVES. Establish a common statement of objectives for incorporation into each Service's retiree recall program. The statement should call for the most effective use of military retirees, first within the parent Service, and then to other assignments if necessary. At the same time, the statement should give the Services the latitude to tailor their peacetime planning procedures to meet individual Service requirements.

A program of maximum peacetime preassignment of retirees to documented wartime jobs serves the Army well. Most of the Navy's wartime manpower plans cannot yet accommodate any real degree of assignment specificity. The Air Force has built a powerful, responsive system designed to recall retirees promptly, once real mobilization needs become known. The Marine Corps has begun a process whereby a growing number of retired Marines will in peacetime receive preassignment orders to the projected wartime shore establishment. In short, each of the Services has undertaken a slightly different approach to optimum retiree utilization. While mobilization plans of high quality — plans which best meet individual Service needs while also meeting DoD needs — should be sought throughout the Defense Department, an identical or repetitive approach across all Services is not called for, in our judgment.

The common statement of objectives that we recommend should call for optimum utilization of retirees in all the Military Services. This means that some Services will use more of their retiree populations than other Services. The
statement should also call for the sharing of this important resource among the Services and other agencies with critical defense needs.¹

The statement should be incorporated in both OSD and Service documents dealing with plans for using retirees in wartime.

3. SIMPLIFIED PROCEDURES FOR EXEMPTION. Call on the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) to simplify procedures for exempting retirees who are key employees of government or of private industry.

Retirees whose continued service in their present positions would be crucial to the nation’s war effort should not be recalled to active military service in the event of mobilization. The present peacetime system for exempting this group from recall is included in a directive about the Ready Reserve (DoDD 1200.7).² A separate retiree directive, widely distributed and containing simple instructions, should ease the peacetime exemption from recall of retirees who occupy genuinely key positions in government and industry.

4. INFORMATION ON RECALL VULNERABILITY. Instruct the Services to provide all retirees periodically with current information on their liability for recall.

As the Services conduct peacetime tests of their retiree recall programs, these exercises or tests can be made to produce lists of Social Security Numbers of retirees identified for recall for the specific scenario tested at the time. As each war scenario is tested, additional lists can be produced. Because the skills of some Categories I and II retirees are critically needed under several mobilization plans, people holding such skills are identified for recall during a number of these tests. Yet, except for the Army, which has issued contingent recall orders to a large number of retirees, no Service informs these exercise-identified retirees with high vulnerability to recall of that status or condition. They should be notified.

Upon retirement, Service members are notified of their legal responsibility to return to active duty under emergency circumstances. We suspect that many

¹The identification of portions of any Service’s retiree population for possible use beyond that Service’s boundaries strongly implies the development of mobilization plans of such specificity that wartime needs are projected by grade, specialty, and location.

²Though the annual, supplementary instructions from the OASD(RA) are clear and specific, we do not believe that many retirees are acquainted with them.
retirees become more or less oblivious to that responsibility with the passage of time. Pointed and specific notification by the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force of increased degrees of recall vulnerability of selected retirees should reduce personnel turbulence when mobilization arrives by: (1) alerting and conditioning the individual retiree for actual recall, and (2) triggering an exemption action, should the retiree hold a key position in government or industry.

5. BETTER RETIREE DATA. Enforce the principal information-gathering provisions of DoDD 1352.1 and assist the Services in verifying all retiree data that are required by that directive and which are self-reported. Direct the capture and storage of secondary military specialties for all retirees as well as primary military specialties. Cause all this retiree information to be passed regularly by the Services to DMDC for storage.

If peacetime planning for retiree assignments is to be truly useful, it must be based on accurate information about each retiree. The quality and quantity of descriptive retiree information now retained by the Military Services can be improved, and it should be available to DoD planners considering assignments beyond the limits of each parent Service. Thus, DMDC (as well as the Services) should store all retiree data. All wartime planners working with retirees should be especially concerned about the real job qualification, the medical condition, and the wartime availability of each retiree. The first of these concerns is based on three considerations: primary military job, secondary military job, and civilian occupation. With the passage of time, each retiree’s civilian occupation becomes more important. The availability for wartime service, of course, is critical to mobilization plans. Unfortunately (for accuracy’s sake), the retiree’s civilian occupation, medical condition, and availability during mobilization are all self-reported, a condition sometimes leading to substantial error rates in the information reported. OSD should acquire and maintain confidence in these data by calling upon the statistical sampling and survey abilities of the DMDC staff to verify these self-reported data.

6. DUAL CODING OF CIVILIAN POSITIONS. Direct the Military Services to assign both a military and a civilian job and rating classification (specialty and grade) to each civilian position declared potentially suitable for fill by a recalled retiree upon mobilization at all Military Service installations and activities within CONUS. This requirement should be valid for both those civilian positions authorized
during peacetime and those positions anticipated during a wartime surge in manpower requirements.

We expect that wartime requirements will emerge for the assignment of some military people to civilian positions in direct support of the nation’s war effort. If so, the documentation of the appropriate depots, maintenance activities, rework facilities, bases, headquarters, and other installations should be ready for that military augmentation. A military-to-civilian job “crosswalk” now exists within OASD(FM&P) to assist the Services in executing this recommended dual classification of civilian positions. In our judgment, all civilian positions at CONUS military installations should be so coded, except those specifically declared to be unsuitable for military assignment. Because of the inherent imprecision of all occupational “crosswalks,” some civilian positions may necessarily carry more than one military specialty and grade.
APPENDIX A

SERVICE BY RECALLED RETIREES IN CIVILIAN POSITIONS

All of the Military Service retiree programs call for assignment to the support bases and organizations of the Services. Those support establishments (and similar organizations outside the Services) characteristically include wartime surge requirements for their respective civilian employee work forces as well. In many instances, civilian personnel officers report anticipating difficulty in hiring full complements of civilian employees now forecast as part of the installation or command mobilization plan. Should military retirees be considered for service in wartime civilian billets where skill and grade matches can be made? What would be the advantages and disadvantages of such a plan?

In the early work of this project we visited five Army installations that participate in that Service's retiree recall program. As part of our structured interviews with local retiree program managers, we asked whether they felt some of their inbound, preassigned retirees might effectively serve in civilian positions under wartime conditions. These installation representatives were uniformly enthusiastic about that kind of service.

Earlier, however, during the conduct of a mobilization exercise in California\(^1\) that involved simulated civilian work force expansion at several installations, we asked civilian personnel officials similar questions about military people holding civilian jobs upon mobilization. Some responses were discouraging and negative. We believe that those responding this way were threatened by the idea of a retiree influx.

\(^1\)In conjunction with the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mobilization Exercise "Port Call '86."
Should the United States lay deliberate plans to utilize recalled retirees to serve in civilian billets during war, assuming compatibility of grade, responsibilities, and skills and experience required? As with most questions of this kind, there are advantages and disadvantages to this action.

- **Advantages:**
  - Retirees represent a pool of people under obligation to the United States Government. They are available.
  - Skilled retirees may be ordered to remote military locations where there is little labor market to support a civilian work force wartime surge.
  - Retirees represent mature, experienced military professionals who should bring added stability and dedication to a civilian work force.

- **Disadvantages:**
  - Civilian-military occupational "crosswalks" do not represent a perfect match. Military people would inevitably be overqualified, underqualified, or qualified in extraneous skills in meeting the requirements of the civilian job.
  - Most wartime civilian position vacancies represent requirements for technicians, while most military retirees have moved beyond the technical stages of their jobs to management.
  - In peacetime, the prospect of a large group of inbound, recalled retirees, most of whom qualify for higher-grade supervisory positions, constitutes a threat to civilian personnel administrators, who can perceive the plan as blocking the promotion of faithful civilian employees.
  - The morale of the retiree may be affected seriously — and thereby his performance — depending on the nature of the work and the place of service. There is, of course, the possibility that the retiree would be delighted at such an assignment.

Throughout this project the question of retiree service in civilian positions continued to find its way into discussions and deliberations. We now feel strongly that, should military people be ordered to serve in a civilian job, that position would have to carry a military grade and specialty classification. The soldier, sailor, Marine, or airman, in other words, would serve as a military person in a military job, though his supervisors may be civilians. All of the military planners who were a part of this study concurred in this position, and we of the study team concur in its importance.
APPENDIX B
WARTIME USE OF RETIREES IN CATEGORY III

No Military Service currently plans to use in wartime those retirees classified in Category III, except as volunteers. Should those plans be reviewed and changed? What are the important issues to be considered when assessing the viability of Category III retirees as personnel assets for wartime use?

While one or two small, additional groups are included in this retiree category, the preponderance of Category III retirees are 60 years old or older. For purposes of this discussion, all Category III retirees will be considered to be at least 60 years of age. This group represents the greatest single segment of the retiree population in all Military Services. Table B-1 contains those data for all Services.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Total retirees</th>
<th>Category III retirees</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,522</strong></td>
<td><strong>757</strong></td>
<td><strong>50</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If Category III people are to be considered as attractive mobilization assets, some limitations on their usability should be considered. That is due primarily to the important consideration of physical health and any accompanying limitations on the performance of the individual. Health considerations could well make plans for standard or commonly expected duty performance difficult or untenable. Once an accommodation to duty performance is made on account of retiree health, one must
face the question of how to deal with the gradually increasing impairment—
differential impairment among individuals—which accompanies increasing age. Specifically, while the mean ability levels of individuals in standardized performance tests may change gradually with increasing age beyond 60, the variance within each annual age cohort increases very quickly. What all this means is that standardized plans using average expectations can be wildly wrong in either direction. We believe that, to be genuinely effective, plans for the utilization of Category III retirees will have to do one of two things:

- Screen retirees (by means of medical and performance examinations) so that a somewhat restricted number of retirees, based on performance and health, are identified for recall. With this group, almost standard duty performance can be expected. Repetitive, cyclical testing would be a continuing requirement under this type of planning.

- Accept wide health and performance variability among recalled Category III retirees. Local installation or command management and supervision would require flexibility and responsiveness to individual differences. Some health screening would be required to exclude from duty retirees who are genuine medical risks.

Either of these options constitutes a difficult management challenge. Yet the Category III retiree pool represents an attractive group of able, experienced people. Is the management effort, or costs, offset by the dividends to be derived from the wartime service of these people? The remainder of this discussion will simply itemize the positive and negative considerations in anticipating use of Category III people.

- Positive considerations:
  - Experience—both in and beyond the Military Service.
  - Size of the pool—a truly imposing resource.
  - Level of dedication—based on anecdotal but widespread information, this group has the highest level of positive identification with military service.
  - Free of encumbrances—the group most apt to be truly retired and therefore more eager to serve again.
  - Prepared to serve—societal and peer pressures result in very high levels of volunteer service among members of this group. The "grey power" movement and groups like the American Association of Retired
Persons are producing more active, able seniors who want to serve others.

- Negative considerations:
  - Outdated in their military experience – this is the group generally furthest from active duty. Force structure, organization, equipment, even enlisted grade structure will be foreign to some of these people. Some retirees under 65 years have been retired for over 20 years.
  
  - Medical support required – as these recalled retirees serve on active duty again, their elevated health care requirements will require support at the very time when military medicine strains to support the war effort. While these retirees do receive medical treatment during peacetime on a space-available basis, return to full duty status and obligatory medical treatment could be a significant factor. In addition, the dollar cost of the immediate health care obligation by DoD to the individual incurred (above and beyond that which accompanies retiree status) would increase accordingly.
APPENDIX C

THE ASSIGNMENT OF MILITARY PERSONNEL TO OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES IN WORLD WAR II

There is historic precedent for the detailing of military personnel to nonmilitary departments or organizations of the Government and to civilian organizations in meeting national security objectives. Prior to the outbreak of World War II, United States military officers of all Services were assigned to defense contractor plants where Lend Lease Administration aircraft and military materiel were being produced. The War Production Board benefited worked continuously with military representatives assigned to its senior staff, and the National Security Resources Board, prior to the transfer of its functions to the Office of Defense Mobilization, had assigned to it military officers who were expert in such varied areas as medical materiel, industrial equipment, and other areas needed in the coordination of civilian, military, and industrial mobilization.

There are several examples of Army officers being assigned under Executive Orders of the President as War Department representatives responsible for industrial plants and facilities seized by the U.S. Government during World War II. Perhaps the most famous example of plant seizure and appointment of a military representative was that of Montgomery Ward and Company, which was seized in December 1944.

As World War II progressed, an increasing number of both officers and enlisted personnel were assigned to nonmilitary federal departments and agencies. War Department data indicate that, as of 30 November 1943, a total of 262 Army officers (including 7 general officers, 159 field grade, and 96 company grade officers) and a total of 1,138 Army enlisted personnel were assigned for duty to more than 20 different nonmilitary Federal departments and agencies including the Office of Emergency Management, the War Production Board, the Lend Lease Administration, the Federal Security Agency, the Departments of State and Labor, and

1No Navy Department information on assignments of this type was available during this review.

C-1
others. By 31 March 1944 a total of some 1,566 officers (including 21 general officers, 995 field grade, and 650 company grade officers) and 1,568 enlisted personnel were assigned for duty to 24 nonmilitary government organizations. During the closing months of World War II, there was a marked increase in the number of military personnel assigned to the so-called "Civilian Agencies Group," which consisted of 24 non-Defense agencies and other organizations. For example, by February 1945 over 2,800 Army officers and over 7,800 Army enlisted personnel were assigned to these agencies, with the preponderance of assignments having been made to the Veterans Administration and the Selective Service System.
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