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STUDENT REPORT
THE GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE IN NATO:
POLITICAL ASPECTS

MAJOR CHARLES G. CRUPPER JR. 88-0610
MAJOR RICHARD T. MCDONALD 88-1740
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This paper is a historical analysis of the political aspects of deploying the ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations. The paper first identifies United States (US) political and military reasons for deployment of the GLCM. Secondly, it traces diplomacy between the US and NATO leading to NATO's concurrence to deploy the GLCM. Thirdly, it identifies political problems encountered by deploying NATO nations, up to the actual deployment of GLCMs in each nation. Lastly, as a result of analyzing the historical data presented, the paper develops both positive and negative political "lessons learned" from the deployment process for future use.
This paper historically analyzes the political aspects of deploying the GLCM in NATO nations. The paper identifies US political and military reasons for deployment of the GLCM, traces diplomacy between the US and NATO leading to deployment of the GLCM, and identifies political problems by deploying NATO nations. The positive and negative "lessons learned" from the GLCM deployment are given in the last chapter.

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As this paper is prepared in response to a request by the USAFHR, it is probable, data in this paper may be incorporated into historical reference material in the future.
Major Charles G. Crupper Jr., graduated in December 1974 from Washburn University of Topeka, with a Bachelor of Arts Degree in English. After graduation he entered the Air Force in the 18XX (missile) career field, which he has continuously served in to the time of this writing. During his Air Force career he has served in Strategic Air Command (SAC) unit, intermediate, and MAJCOM-level missile assignments. While at the unit level he held combat crew, command and control, and instructor staff positions. At the intermediate-level he held positions in command and control and operations plans. At the MAJCOM-level he served as a Warning Systems Controller in the SAC Command Center and as Branch Chief, Command Center Processing and Display System—our nation's foremost tactical warning/attack assessment system. He attended Squadron Officer School in residence in 1980, and received a Master of Education Degree from Northern Montana College in 1982.

Major Richard T. (Tim) McDonald graduated in 1975 from East Carolina University with a Bachelor of Science Degree in Business Administration. Following graduation, he entered the Air Force as part of the 18XX (missile) career field and he continues to serve in the 18XX specialty as of this writing. He has served in both unit and MAJCOM-level missile assignments during his career. At the unit level, he served as a combat crew member, staff officer, and in various staff officer instructor positions while assigned to Minot and Vandenberg AFBS. He held various supervisory positions while assigned to a HQ SAC MAJCOM Special Duty Activity. This Special Duty Activity involved managing the activities of a computer software branch tasked with supporting the missile warning processing and display systems serving the National Military Command Center, its alternate, and HQ SAC. A 1981 graduate of the Squadron Officer School residence course, Major McDonald received a Master Degree in Business Administration from Golden Gate University in 1982.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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AUTHOR(S) MAJOR CHARLES G. CRUPPER JR., USAF
MAJOR RICHARD T. MCDONALD, USAF
TITLE THE GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE IN NATO: POLITICAL ASPECTS

I. Purpose: To accomplish a historical analysis of the political aspects of deploying the ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations. Also to provide positive and negative political "lessons learned" for decision-maker use, when making future decisions about deploying weapon systems in NATO nations.

II. Problem: The NATO nations experienced many political problems while deploying GLCMs in Western Europe. The problems encountered nearly caused abandonment of the deployment on several occasions. These problems came about through misjudgments by the US and NATO, public concern over nuclear proliferation in Western Europe, and Soviet intervention. To facilitate future deployments, the deployment problems of the past must be fully understood.

III. Data: This paper examines four main areas. The first area covers the political reasons for GLCM deployment in the NATO nations. Included is a review of the role of US domestic politics on the development of cruise missiles, relations between Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) and cruise missiles, and how our allies viewed these negotiations. Next, a review of how
the neutron bomb and B-1 cancellation affected the GLCM deployment decision is discussed. Finally reviewed is how the European community began to express politically the need for increased defense, and the US leadership change in thinking towards providing long-range tactical nuclear force (LRTNF) modernization to answer NATO defense needs. The second area examines military factors behind the decision to deploy GLCMs in Western Europe. Discussed first is the buildup of Soviet nuclear forces by deployment of the Backfire bomber and SS-20 missile. The need for NATO nuclear force modernization is then examined. Finally, NATO's ability to support a flexible response strategy is looked at through discussion of GLCM military roles, the potential for GLCMs to support flexible response, and the role special groups played in the deployment decision. The third area covers diplomacy between US and NATO allies leading to actual deployment of GLCMs in Western Europe. The third area initially discusses the deployment decision, the "dual-track" decision, and events leading up to the decision. Next, it examines the impact of the anti-nuclear peace movement on diplomacy. Lastly, the "zero option" and follow-on intermediate nuclear force (INF) talks between US and USSR are discussed. The last area reviews political problems which affected GLCM deployment in Western Europe. Soviet influence before and after the 12 December 1979 deployment decision is examined in detail. US miscalculations in the deployment process are then reviewed. Finally, the impact of deployment on the deploying NATO nations is examined.

IV. Conclusions:
The dual-track decision provides three positive, political lessons learned: the decision achieved objectives, restored unity to the NATO Alliance, and showed how effective joint consultation can be on multilateral issues. Five negative, political lessons learned became clear during analysis: not all NATO countries interpreted the decision in the same way; the US attempted to negotiate with an unratified arms control agreement; the length of time between the 12 December 1979 decision and actual deployment was excessive; the lack of complete acceptance by all countries where GLCMs would be deployed prior to the decision's announcement; and lastly, the delayed negotiations threatened the success of the dual-track process.

V. Recommendations:
The conclusion makes specific recommendations for improvements in future negotiations with NATO. A general overall recommendation would be to ensure agreements on weapon deployments with NATO must be unambiguous, sensitive to current and near-term domestic politics, fully supported by all deployment countries, and expedited to ensure a reasonable probability of success.
Chapter One

POLITICAL REASONS FOR GLCM DEPLOYMENT

The political reasons for deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) in Western Europe are varied and interrelated. This chapter chronologically traces factors leading to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) decision to deploy GLCMs in Western Europe. The chapter first reviews the role of United States (US) domestic politics in the seventies on the development of cruise missiles and how the ground-launched variant came into being. It then examines the relationship between strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) and cruise missiles, and shows how our European allies viewed those negotiations. Following the SALT section, the chapter reviews two other developments which impacted the GLCM deployment decision: the neutron bomb revelation and B-1 bomber cancellation. Having reviewed those two developments, the chapter next reveals how the West European community awoke to its defense needs and expressed them politically. The final section discusses the change in US thinking about the need for West European long-range tactical nuclear force (LRTNF) modernization.

EARLY POLITICS AND THE CRUISE MISSILE

The earliest linkage of the current generation of cruise missiles to the political process goes back to 1972, when Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, "initiated a developmental program for a sea-launched cruise missile (SCM) as a means of obtaining the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the SALT I accords." (47:31) Secretary of State Henry Kissinger actively supported the Department of Defense's (DoD) new program. (38:121) Laird also hoped the "high-level OSD support" for the Navy program would encourage the Air Force to commence their own long-range cruise missile program. The Air Force, he suspected, was resisting long-range cruise missile development to protect their B-1 program. (1:368) The first of three cruise missile types, the sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM), received Congressional approval for initial funding during the summer of 1972. (14:4)

Following renewal of cruise missile interest, Air Force and Navy programs suffered several setbacks. On 13 April 1973,
analysts from DoD's Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) debated with Air Force analysts the cost effectiveness of armed versus unarmed subsonic missiles. They requested the subsonic cruise armed decoy (SCAD) program either be supported over subsonic cruise unarmed decoy (SCUD) program, or the SCUD program be cancelled. (1:368) Since the Air Force was not willing to support a standoff weapon such as SCAD due to cost considerations and the advent of the B-1 bomber, Deputy Secretary of Defense William C. Clements informed Congress of the SCAD program cancellation on 6 July 1973. (1:368-369) In July 1973, "Congress froze funding for the strategic SLCM; and the Senate later eliminated the entire project." (1:388)

In 1973, Kissinger became skeptical about many of the claims promised by cruise missile technology; however, he still saw the program as a vehicle to gain concessions in the current arms limitations talks. His vision resulted in continued political support for the cruise missile program and for increases in its funding. (12:203) In October 1973, Congress, at Secretary Laird's urging, directed the Navy to use any elements of the Air Force's defunct SCAD program, with the provision "that the Navy develop a clear rationale for it and simultaneously explore tactical antiship cruise missiles." (1:369,388; 47:39)

Clements pursued Secretary of Defense Laird's suspicions of the Air Force, by directing development of a long-range cruise missile and by influencing an Air Force study of bomber alternatives. On 19 December 1973, believing new advancements could overcome previous cruise missile limitations, Clements directed the Air Force to commence a formal air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) program. The program utilized elements from their previous SCAD program and from the Navy's experiments with terrain-contour-matching navigation. (1:370) In August 1973, the Office, Secretary of Defense (OSD) requested the Air Force to exhaustively review all bomber alternatives. (1:370)

The results of Clements' initiatives confirmed his suspicions. The Air Force only attempted to comply with his wishes when they began the ALCM program in February 1974. The program's purpose was to provide a complementary weapon to the existing B-52 and future B-1 bomber force. (14:4) The Air Force, however, continued with the SCAD design, one which ensured limited range and ineffectiveness as a standoff weapon. (1:370) The Air Force chose this strategy to defend the B-1 bomber against a perceived shift in doctrine towards long-range standoff weapons from the use of penetrating bombers. (1:370) On 1 September 1974, the Air Force published their bomber alternatives findings, the Joint Strategic Bomber Study (JSBS). The study reviewed the use of current and potential aircraft, carrying different types of bombs and missiles to meet operational objectives. The findings supported the use of B-1 penetrating...
bombers over a force comprised of "standoff cruise missile carriers." (1:370-371)

The Air Force's SCAD design and support of the penetrating bomber, coupled with Navy progress in designing a cruise missile with a long-range capability, gave DoD an alternative to the Air Force's ALCM. As a result, the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC), in late 1974, ordered the Air Force to phase back the ALCM program and closely coordinate with the Navy's SLCM program. (1:371)

The DSARC order marked the beginning of the end of Air Force control over cruise missile development. The Air Force responded by trying to increase their ALCM's range, but only to the extent it did not threaten their JSBS findings. At a 9 January 1977 DSARC meeting, "OSD directed the Air Force to develop an extended-range ALCM by stretching the fuselage of its prototype missile and to give the extended-range missile (ALCM-B) priority over the shorter-range ALCM-A" (1:372). The Air Force was also to develop a ground-launched version of the Navy's SLCM. (68:44; 15:171-172) On 14 January 1977, Clements approved the DSARC recommendations, directing the merger of the Air Force program with the Navy's, and creating a Joint Cruise Missile Project Office with the Navy placed in charge of the combined program. This ensured in Clements' mind, the Air Force would now have to build a true standoff missile due to Naval supervision. (1:372-373; 15:9,172)

Clements' GLCM program received a boost in February 1977, when the Carter Administration, fulfilling its campaign promises, reduced the defense budget and increased GLCM spending. The Administration viewed the GLCM as a long-range theater nuclear weapon which could reach into the Soviet Union from Europe. (14:5)

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS AND THE CRUISE MISSILE

In January 1976, following the November 1974 Vladivostok summit, the Russians contended America's cruise missiles were part of the agreed to ceiling of 2,400 strategic nuclear launch vehicles. To ensure Soviet willingness to sign the SALT II treaty and to have the Backfire bomber counted against the 2,400 vehicle ceiling, the US reluctantly agreed to include US cruise missiles in SALT II. (48:35) The US also proposed limitations to the range and number of sea and air-launched cruise missiles for concessions on Backfire bomber deployment. (48:35) Russia offered a nontransfer provision which blocked the transfer of technology leading to the development of strategic offensive weapons, as well as the actual deployment of US strategic
offensive systems in Europe. The US rejected this proposal. (12:203)

Not until March 1977 did the US start any serious efforts to break this deadlock. During that month, the Carter Administration proposed significant changes in arms limitations compared to the 1974 Vladivostok talks. The Soviets rejected this initiative. (12:210) Besides calling for serious reductions in delivery systems and modifying the US stand on the Backfire bomber, President Carter proposed new limitations on cruise missiles. He proposed limiting their range to 2,500 kilometers (KM). Additionally, only bomber-mounted cruise missiles, with ranges greater than 600 KM, would be counted against the multiple, independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) ceiling. Finally, there would be no restrictions on cruise missiles with ranges less than 600 KM. (15:174-175)

Following this failure, the Carter Administration in May 1977 proposed a three-tier approach to get the talks rolling again. The second tier was especially important, as it constrained cruise missile development and deployment through 1981. (12:210; 53:16) The US willingness to delay cruise missile development resulted in several European government requests for detailed information on US cruise missile status. The resulting briefing served to increase European mistrust of US intentions. In fact, the US was afraid to raise European interest and hamper the SALT process by accurately briefing cruise missile status. The briefing did little more than raise doubt in European minds to America's real intentions. The Europeans felt they were being stalled while the US gained valuable time to negotiate the cruise missile away in SALT II. (12:211)

Following NATO consultation, the US proposed their first noncircumvention clause to the USSR in August 1977 to revitalize the SALT process. Noncircumvention would prevent either side from violating the second tier of the SALT II treaty. The first noncircumvention proposal, one of two possible clauses discussed with the Europeans, sought Soviet withdrawal of their nontransfer demands. The Soviets rejected this initiative in January 1978. (12:211-212) Following the Russian rejection, the US obtained NATO approval to table a more restrictive alternative. NATO's approval was conditional on the US promising a statement, stressing NATO LRTNF modernization was not prohibited under SALT II. (12:212)

The US promise did not quell all West European fears. Several top European military leaders openly complained about US willingness to bargain away a possible counterweight to the SS-20 to reach an arms control accord with the Russians. (57:34) Despite West European fears, the US and USSR agreed to the second
proposed noncircumvention clause based on the withdrawal of Russia's nontransfer proposal in April 1978. The SALT agreement was initialed on 18 June 1979. (12:212; 15:175) Major treaty features were the absence of maximum-range for ALCMs and the imposition of a 600 KM cap on both GLCMs and SLCMs. (15:176)

**THE IMPACT OF THE NEUTRON BOMB REVELATION**

On 6 June 1977, the world learned of the neutron bomb program. The revelation created controversy and debate throughout the world. The Europeans, especially in the Netherlands and West Germany, debated the morality of such a weapon. (12:208) In late June 1977, these revelations stirred controversy ranging from Russian to Senate protests. "Pravda accused the U.S. of escalating the arms race," and Senator Mark Hatfield worked hard to deny neutron bomb funding because he believed "it would increase the danger of nuclear war." (17:44)

The controversy did not immediately stop the program, and the Carter Administration went on the offensive to gain support for it. In late June 1977, Congress approved the go-ahead for the neutron bomb program. On 1 July 1977, the Senate, in a secret session, approved the funds while postponing their final decision. (64:15) During President Carter's European visit in January 1978, he stressed the threat posed to Europe by SS-20 deployments, hoping to "counter allegations by Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev that the U.S. would jeopardize stability and force another upward spiral in the arms race by placing neutron bombs in Western Europe." (57:34) During the visit, President Carter "argued that the neutron bomb is a battlefield weapon, far less destructive than the new Soviet SS-20 missile." (57:34)

However, public opinion had taken a heavy toll on West European political support. On 2 February 1978, National Security Advisor Brzezinski reported to President Carter the West Germans could only support the neutron bomb if arms talks were unsuccessful. (3:226) President Carter wrote in his diary on 4 April 1978 the West Germans were "playing footsie with us on the ER (enhanced radiation) weapons," indicating they wanted an announcement of production, but were unwilling to accept deployment without another European country accepting deployment. (3:227) Brzezinski also told Carter Great Britain had a severe political problem on their hands with the weapon. (3:226) In March 1978, the Dutch Parliament resolved that weapon production was undesirable. Their Prime Minister informed the US "they could not now agree to deployment even if the Soviets were unwilling to negotiate on nuclear arms control." (3:226) During a 23 March 1978 meeting, British Prime Minister Callaghan told President Carter, Britain would support a decision to stop or
reduce neutron bomb deployment. He went on to say they would be greatly relieved by a project cancellation decision. (3:227)

The Carter Administration did not yield to the lack of West European political support, but instead, left the production decision up to West Germany. On 7 April 1978, the US released a communique to the NATO council, stating the US "and our NATO allies would reserve the option of producing and deploying the weapons in the future. In the meantime, the United States would improve existing tactical weapons, incorporating in their design the capability of later conversion to ER use once our allies were willing to agree to deployment." (3:228) On 8 and 9 April 1978, the New York Times reported President Carter was making the decision whether to proceed with production dependent on a West German petition for these weapons. The paper also indicated West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt had been placed in a political vise and was unhappy with the apparent lack of American consultation on the whole issue. (12:209)

This series of events led up to one of President Carter's greatest miscalculations. Later in the month, after the US obtained the West German petition at considerable political cost to Schmidt, President Carter reversed his decision without any European consultation. (12:223-224) President Carter's decision resulted in two political costs. First, a diminished European view of his leadership of the Alliance. Second, it left some thinking "the Soviet Union had a veto over NATO deployments." (12:224) Additionally, Chancellor Schmidt was so furious about President Carter's decision, "from then on he filled his background briefings to American journalists with complaints about Carter's inability to understand European problems." (8:12)

A much greater cost came out of the entire neutron bomb episode--namely the anti-nuclear protest movement in Western Europe. The fact "the Carter Administration was made to look diplomatically inept" gave the European left "an unexpected propaganda windfall" which they used to maximum advantage. (6:2; 40:45)

THE B-1 BOMBER CANCELLATION DECISION

President Carter publicly announced the B-1 cancellation on 30 June 1978. The President indicated the decision was based on cost considerations due to the advent of the cruise missile. He also said the decision was independent of the current SALT negotiations. (14:22-23; 25:9) The next day Secretary of Defense Brown clarified the President's decision, stressing the greater effectiveness of the ALCM, more than the cost savings
associated with the B-1 cancellation, promoted the decision. (14:23)

The actual or perceived reasons for the decision are wide ranging. One of President Carter's campaign promises was to cancel the B-1 bomber. The cancellation decision also demonstrated to congressional liberals, the President, to achieve a balanced budget (a campaign promise), would not just be looking at their "pet social programs." (29:15) Finally, there was some conjecture the decision was nothing more than a "signal to the Soviets the U.S. was serious about arms limitation and thus improve the atmosphere for the SALT talks." (29:16) President Carter's "decision was not so much against the B-1 as it was in favor of cruise missiles launched from B-52s as the most effective way of preserving the viability of the bomber leg of the strategic Triad." (7:80) In his autobiography, President Carter credited two developments for his choice. First, the US needed a post-nuclear airborne delivery capability. Second, the US was developing highly secret technology at the time, which if successful, would revolutionize our ability to overcome enemy air defenses. (3:82-83)

Regardless of the reasons, the B-1 cancellation decision gave the ALCM program renewed emphasis. During July 1977, the Carter Administration sponsored a Fiscal 1978 budget amendment, asking for a $449 million increase for cruise missile development. (52:12) With the B-1 cancellation, "the Administration found itself in a position of requiring the greater range . . . to provide target coverage of the USSR from standoff ranges using the B-52 or the wide-body missile carrier as launch platforms to insure target list coverage with cruise missiles." (52:14) Due to the B-1 cancellation, the ALCM program was restructured, emphasizing competition to improve performance and lower unit cost. (14:24) "The cancellation of the B-1 in June 1977 had made the air-launched cruise missile 'our highest national priority.'" (7:51) It also raised Western European interest in the cruise missile by basing the decision on the merits of the cruise missile. (14:44)

THE AWAKENING OF WESTERN EUROPE

In 1975 a number of European and American political and military analysts joined together to study possible roles for the cruise missile in Europe. The findings of these workshops and seminars were assembled and published in 1977 in a book titled, Beyond Nuclear Deterrence. The book emphasized weaknesses in NATO's flexible response strategy and "evolving requirements" for eliminating those weaknesses. (12:205) It also stressed how the cruise missile could fill many of those gaps in the flexible response strategy. (12:205)
By this time, a number of factors existed which implied the need for LRTNF modernization. Helmut Schmidt had reluctantly followed Carter's lead up to this time. But on 10 May 1977, Schmidt took to the podium to deliver his views on the SALT process. He told the North Atlantic Council the SALT process had reduced strategic nuclear weapons to last resort weapons, only ensuring the survival and national interests of the nations possessing them. (11:54) This speech was a tune-up for his famous October 1977 speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies which exposed on-going SALT problems, and their impact on the future security of Western Europe.

Following Schmidt's May speech, West European politicians and military leaders became increasingly sensitive to the East/West military balance. In June 1977, the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) received a briefing from the US on cruise missile development and potential uses in the NATO theater. At nearly the same time, the Chairman of the German Armed Services Committee, Manfred Worner, asked the US not to bargain away the cruise missile with the Russians. (55:46) Western Europe now advocated the need for a military balance in Europe. (48:24) Their new concept of military balance was dependent on defense and deterrence, but also dealt with the "political-psychological dimensions of the European security environment." (48:24)

A newspaper leak also added to West European frustrations. In a series of articles from 3 to 8 August 1977, the Washington Post reported Presidential Review Memorandum 10 recommended concession of one-third of West Germany in the event of Soviet attack, using the Weser-Lech line as NATO's main line of defense. The US gave many assurances to the contrary, but Schmidt and other Europeans were still furious, feeling even more, that Carter was insensitive to their "political-strategic problems." (12:213)

One answer to West European defense concerns came in early October 1977, when the NPG created the High Level Group (HLG) to review the long-term defense plan. This group was made up of foreign and defense ministry representatives. The US instigated the HLG because of the NPG's inability to predict the political problems of the neutron bomb revelation. David E. McGiffert, US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA) chaired the HLG. (12:217)

Chancellor Schmidt took to the podium to vent his frustrations on 28 October 1977. His speech created a stir in Europe and the US by stressing the SALT process was undermining the "credibility of American (extended deterrent)" and magnifying the "significance of disparities between East and West in nuclear tactical and conventional weapons." (10:110; 54:19) A main point of his speech was the "newly discovered (grey area) problem
for arms control and for the stability of security for Europe." (54:19) Politically, this speech gave momentum for the European consideration of LRTNF modernization. (6:14)

Following Schmidt's speech, the US tried to downplay growing European defense concerns. In October 1977, Secretary of State Vance testified during the SALT II hearings about the adequacy of American forward-based systems (FBS). Alluding to the buildup of F-111 aircraft in Britain and the assignment of additional Poseidon warheads to the theater, he stated the European FBSs were adequate. (10:112) In August 1977, British Defense Secretary Mulley wrote Secretary of Defense Brown about "the need for new land-based deployments in Europe that would be more visible than the Poseidon SLBMs dedicated to NATO and more capable than the American medium-range aircraft then in Europe." (13:57) Mulley's rationale was the "emerging gap in NATO's spectrum of defense." (13:57) Late in 1977 National Security Council (NSC) advisor David Aaron went to Europe to sway European leadership away from nuclear force modernization. (13:58)

Following Aaron's trip a slight shift in the US position became evident. In December 1977, the first HLG meeting introduced its membership to NATO doctrine and to NATO and Warsaw Pact nuclear capabilities. Following the meeting US members concluded a NATO consensus was achievable on how to approach LRTNF modernization. (12:217) As late as February 1978, the US still publicly downplayed European concerns. That month, General Brown testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee the US currently had an advantage in theater nuclear forces. He viewed nuclear modernization in Europe as a means of "maintaining American nuclear superiority, not to reverse an imbalance in the Soviets' favor." (13:51)

**A CHANGE IN AMERICAN THINKING**

To this point the US had not changed its position about the need for nuclear force modernization in Europe. Following the December 1977 HLG meeting, the US prepared four alternatives for presentation to the February 1978 HLG:

1. do nothing; 2. build a serious nuclear capability for the theater, without the capability to strike targets in the Soviet Union; 3. make a modest improvement in long-range theater nuclear capable weapons; or (4) develop a theater capability to wage a counterforce and countervalue strategic nuclear war against the Soviet Union. (12:218)

These options were considered at the February 1978 HLG in a nonbinding discussion. The group consensus was option three, but
they added to this option the need to be able to strike the Soviet Union. (12:218)

Although the US obtained the consensus it sought, some Carter Administration officials viewed it as a ruse to obtain new cruise missiles. Despite the implications for future arms control negotiations, the US accepted the consensus in order to obtain European support for immediate limitations on strategic weapons. (12:218; 60:375) Acting on the March consensus, the NSC and State Department started looking into LRTNF modernization seriously, even to the point of developing a strategic rationale for doing it. (12:219) In June 1978, President Carter issued Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) 38, Long Range Theater Nuclear Capabilities and Arms Control. President Carter hoped PRM 38 would stimulate additional study of the LRTNF modernization impact not only on the military balance between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, but on arms control as well. (12:224) Further study resulted in a final consensus reached in October 1978. According to the consensus:

(1) The role of U.S. central strategic forces in alliance defense required no revision; (2) There were both political and military needs for the new LRTNF deployments in Europe; (3) Any arms-control efforts to limit SS-20 and Backfire deployments would probably not succeed unless NATO demonstrated its willingness to modernize its LRTNF; and (4) The United States should support the High Level Group, which was moving toward recommending an LRTNF deployment option for NATO. (12:224)

The political reasons described in the second finding were two-fold. First, the unmatched growth of the Warsaw Pact LRTNF could lead to a "serious potential problem of political perceptions." Second, since SALT II was the Carter Administration's top priority, the Administration decided to pursue LRTNF modernization to obtain European support for SALT II. (12:219-220)
Chapter Two

THE MILITARY DECISION TO DEPLOY GLCMs

Several military factors led to the 12 December 1979 NATO decision to deploy the GLCM in Western Europe. These factors included the buildup of Soviet nuclear forces, the requirement to modernize NATO nuclear forces, and the need to restore NATO's flexible response strategy option. (80:2-3) The Soviet nuclear force buildup portion of this study will address deployment of the Backfire bomber and SS-20 missile. The study will then examine allied concern for nuclear force modernization. Lastly, NATO's ability to support a "flexible response" strategy option will be discussed by looking at GLCM military roles, the potential for GLCMs to support "flexible response", and the role special groups' recommendations played in the deployment decision.

INTRODUCTION OF THE BACKFIRE BOMBER

In 1974 the Soviet's began to deploy a new bomber, known by its NATO code name, Backfire. It possessed an unrefueled range/combustion radius of 4,025 kilometers. (41:21) Some members of the US intelligence community reported the Backfire capable of performing intercontinental missions. By the late 1970s US intelligence agencies believed Backfire capable of striking the US. The Soviets claimed Backfire had been designed for use only as a theater weapon for deployment against European and Asian targets. Backfire basing, training missions, and technical characteristics supported the Soviet claim. Eventually, America dropped its insistence on including the Backfire under SALT II ceilings in exchange for the Soviets' pledge not to change basing or introduce training to facilitate intercontinental missions.

Backfire's potential for use against European targets stirred political controversy within the NATO Alliance. (12:206) This concern increased due to continuing Backfire deployments. By December 1979, the Soviets had approximately 50 Backfire bombers deployed against NATO, with the capability to produce an additional 25 to 30 new aircraft a year. (16:85) While NATO considered the Backfire threat as serious, they felt the deployment of the SS-20 missile was critical.
SS-20 DEPLOYMENT AGAINST NATO

To understand why NATO viewed the SS-20 as the greatest threat to Europe, one only needs to look at the missile's capabilities. As early as February 1977 popular magazines began publicizing its potential. According to The World Today:

The SS-20, on the other hand, is a solid-fuel missile which can be easily transported and launched; deployed aboard a mobile launcher, it will greatly enhance the ability of Soviet Eurostrategic forces to survive attack from the West. The missile, moreover, represents a qualitative jump in destructive capability. Fitted with multiple, independently targeted reentry vehicles and possessing improved accuracy, the SS-20 will not only make existing targets in Western Europe more vulnerable to attack; a larger number of smaller, more accurate warheads will enable the Soviet Union to place a larger range of Western European assets at risk and with greater discrimination. (23:46)

If the Soviets attained projected SS-20 deployments, they would have the capability to destroy virtually all of NATO's land-based nuclear forces, as well as many other key military targets. (83:5)

The Soviets countered the articles by claiming the SS-20 was part of a normal modernization program to replace aging SS-4s and SS-5s. Because the SS-20 deployment was a normal, follow-on system, the Soviets did not recognize it as a significantly new threat to Western Europe. (4:82) The HLG rejected the Soviet claims. Instead, the HLG viewed the SS-20 as having the additional advantages of more selective targets; greater accuracy; and mobility. These advantages ensure survival and give the Soviet's significant leverage in times of political crisis. (73:15)

The upward spiral of SS-20 deployments continued unabated. By the 12 December 1979 decision to deploy the GLCM, the total number of deployed SS-20s had reached approximately 140. This constituted an additional 420 nuclear warheads aimed at Western Europe. (4:22) Along with the advent of the SS-20 and Backfire bomber, one other factor contributed significantly to the decision to deploy the GLCM. This factor, the aging nuclear strike forces in the NATO inventory, was cause for rising concern by NATO and the US.
NATO NUCLEAR FORCE MODERNIZATION REQUIREMENTS

As early as 1974, the US began to believe modernization of NATO nuclear forces was inevitable, if NATO was to remain strong. In a 1974 congressional report, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger expressed strong dissatisfaction with the nuclear arsenal. He regarded the F-111s in Great Britain as vulnerable and referred to NATO's theater nuclear arsenal as a "pile of junk." (10:111) The Pentagon looked favorably on cruise missiles for potential theater missions even before the system had begun development. As early as 1976 the US initiated a study to replace F-111s with GLCMs. (10:111) The NATO HLG supported the US assessment, asserting that:

The credibility of the American nuclear deterrent vis-a-vis Europe had been further diminished by the declining effectiveness of existing NATO long-range nuclear assets in Europe, notably American F-111 and British Vulcan aircraft, whose penetration capability had been put in doubt by improvements in Soviet air defenses and by their own obsolescence. These deficiencies in NATO's forces contrasted with the very substantial improvements in Soviet LRINF... the introduction of the SS-20 and the Backfire bomber... As a result of these related developments, Alliance officials argued that NATO's strategy of flexible response had become deficient. (4:11-12)

Because of Soviet increases in theater nuclear capability and allied decreases in nuclear delivery systems, NATO was in danger of not being able to carry out its strategy of "flexible response."

FLEXIBLE RESPONSE STRATEGY BACKGROUND

While writing for the United States Strategic Institute in 1983, Donald Rumsfeld referenced a report submitted by the NATO NPG in the Fall of 1976:

The NATO strategy of flexible response requires adequate capabilities for conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic nuclear operations and provides the overall framework for Tactical Nuclear Force (TNF) modernization. Within this broad strategy, the changes outlined above provide impetus to the continuing evolution of the detailed concepts for NATO's defense. NATO's current TNF capabilities, assessed against the requirements implied by these evolving defense concepts, indicate goals for modernizing the TNF posture—delivery systems, warheads, essential support such as command, control and

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communications, target acquisition and TNF deployments. A more modern TNF posture, coupled with more flexible employment plans, will maintain or improve NATO's overall military capabilities in a changing environment, thus enhancing deterrence. (26:viii-ix)

The recognition of a need to provide "flexible response" to the Soviet threat by the NATO NPG culminated 14 years of negotiations by the US with NATO. As early as 1962 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara supported "flexible response." While a "flexible response" policy had been adopted in 1967, little had been done to implement the decision. (61:916-917) The NPG statement set the stage for the development and subsequent decision for GLCM deployment.

GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE MILITARY ROLES

NATO strategists viewed the GLCM as the key to flexible response in the 1980s because of its versatility. As early as August 1977, NATO considered GLCM deployment as a means of freeing Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) aircraft for air-superiority and ground-support roles. QRA aircraft were being used to strike fixed targets such as depots, airfields, and other installations required to be destroyed in the initial stages of a conflict. Nuclear-tipped GLCMs, because of their high degree of accuracy and penetration capabilities, could be used to attack defended, high-priority targets ordinarily struck by QRA aircraft. (48:29)

Other possibilities included use of the GLCM as a conventional weapon against mobile surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and Warsaw Pact armor. Projected developments in technology would allow as few as four cruise missiles to destroy up to 200 enemy tanks and SAMs with the advent of a MIRVed weapon system for the GLCM. (48:30) Another possibility was the use of the cruise missile as a forward observer. With their long loiter time cruise missiles could acquire targets, pass the information to other cruise missiles, which would then strike the targets. (48:30) Perhaps the most critical role envisioned was as a strategic weapon. Too slow to serve as a first strike weapon, it could backup a US intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) attack. This strategic capability would provide the US a new nuclear attack deterrent. (24:175)

The presence of the GLCM complicated defense planning. Extremely difficult to detect or intercept, the cruise missile posed an economic as well as military threat. To mount a credible defense, the Soviet Union would have to spend an extraordinary amount of money. In 1977 the Soviets would spend an estimated $10 to $15 billion dollars to modernize its air
defense system against cruise missiles. (47:32) Because of the wide variety of military roles the GLCM could fulfill, it was an acceptable solution to NATO's "flexible response" problems.

GLCM APPLICATION TO FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

NATO adopted the "flexible response" strategy proposed during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations in 1967. This philosophy espoused conventional weapons as the preferred method for deterring and defending against an attack by the Soviet Union or Warsaw Pact. However, the use of theater nuclear weapons to control escalation would continue to be a viable option. (14:45) This supported the broad objective of flexible response by allowing deliberate escalation and selective nuclear employment, as the threat of general war or massive retaliation was not considered a credible response to conventional attack. (13:37-38) Because of conventional and nuclear advances in Soviet capabilities, the NATO Ministers agreed on 12 December 1979, to the deployment of 108 Pershing II and 464 GLCMs in Western Europe.

There were two major general political/military reasons for the figure 572:

- The new systems were chosen to enhance deterrence by providing NATO with the means to respond to a nuclear attack short of a general strategic exchange, and by replacing the aging systems--Filss and Vulcans--which currently fulfill these requirements;

- To meet the requirements for deterrence and for flexible response, there had to be a sufficient number of systems capable of surviving a possible pre-emptive attack, particularly in view of improving Soviet capabilities. (4:15)

In addition to the general political/military requirements cited above, six specific military rationales for use of the GLCM and Pershing II emerged:

To deter Soviet use of nuclear weapons against Western Europe;

To deter Soviet use of chemical or biological weapons in Western Europe;

To deter Soviet conventional attack against Western Europe by threatening limited or selective use as a signal to warn of the risk of further escalation;
- To deter Soviet conventional attack against Western Europe by threatening use on or near the battlefield, which carries with it the risk of further escalation;
- To deter Soviet conventional attack against Western Europe by threatening use to defend Western Europe in ways likely to bring about the defeat of enemy forces; and
- To deter Soviet use of nuclear weapons against the United States in connection with the threat by the United States to use nuclear weapons for any purposes enumerated above. (13:35)

While these specific rationales were the product of years of evolution, several groups made key recommendations leading to the decision to deploy the GLCM in Western Europe.

RECOMMENDATIONS BY SPECIAL GROUPS

NATO Nuclear Forces: Modernization and Arms Control offers information on the establishment of the HLG:

On October 12, 1977 NATO established a "High Level Group" to study deficiencies in NATO's theater nuclear posture. The group was directed to study implications for NATO's strategy of three factors: the condition of strategic parity; the ongoing modernization of Soviet theater forces; and the growing obsolescence of existing NATO theater forces." (84:CRS-29)

This group met regularly from November 1977 on, and in April 1978 reached a consensus on how NATO should proceed. Their recommendation to the NPG called for "new long-range nuclear weapons to be based in Europe without specifying either their type or their quantity." (13:57) In October 1978, the HLG reviewed a military options paper examining five weapon systems: (1) the GLCM; (2) Pershing II XR; (3) a medium-range ballistic missile; (4) FB-11IH; and (5) the SLCM. The paper focused the group's discussions on the various deployment schemes. (12:225-226)

Based on their, review the HLG concluded in April 1979: (1) NATO should modernize its LRTNF through an "evolutionary upward adjustment;" (2) the deployment should be comprised of GLCMs and ballistic missiles; (3) the total number of missiles deployed should be more than 200, but less than 600; (4) as many NATO allies as possible should share in the deployment; and (5) a final deployment decision should be made by December 1979. (12:227) The final HLG deployment recommendation in September
1979 "called for the deployment of a total of 572 missiles in five European countries to be distributed as follows: (1) Germany, 108 Pershing IIs and 96 GLCMs; (2) United Kingdom, 160 GLCMs; (3) Italy, 112 GLCMs; (4) Belgium, 48 GLCMs; and (5) Netherlands, 48 GLCMs." (11:58) The NATO Defense Ministers adopted these proposals on 12 December 1979.

While the HLG served to review NATO's defense needs, the Special Consultative Group (SCG) reviewed arms control. The SCG, formed in 1978 by NATO studied "arms-control initiatives parallel to the LRTNF deployment schedule." (12:231) A counterpart to the HLG, it included national government officials. The group met monthly and advised the US in its arms control negotiations. (13:59) In September 1979, the SCG final report identified three problem areas: "the forum for LRTNF arms-control talks; the channels of participation and consultation in their talks; and the utility and validity of various arms-control principles, such as equal aggregates, equal ceilings by specific category, and reductions." (12:231)

Since the HLG report contained the recommended deployment package, and the SCG report analyzed arms-control issues, the data needed for a deployment decision prior to December 1979 was finally in place. Through the efforts of these groups, NATO achieved the decision to proceed with deployment of GLCMs and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe. The following chapters will develop the political challenges resulting from this decision.
Chapter Three

UNITED STATES GLCM DEPLOYMENT DIPLOMACY

The two previous chapters discussed political and military factors influencing the decision to deploy GLCMs in Western Europe. This chapter chronologically traces US diplomacy leading to the deployment decision, and actual GLCM deployment in each selected country. The chapter first covers the deployment decision, the "dual-track" decision, and the events leading up to the decision. Next, the chapter presents the initial diplomacy following the decision through late 1980. Following the section on initial diplomacy, the chapter gives an account of the impact of the anti-nuclear peace movement on the dual-track process and the diplomacy and arms control progress through late 1982. The next section reviews the demise of President Reagan's "zero option" bargaining position and takes the dual-track process to early 1985. The chapter concludes by reviewing the events leading to an INF agreement between the US and USSR.

THE DUAL-TRACK DECISION

At the May 1977 NATO summit, President Carter said, "the Soviet Union should be given one more chance to demonstrate that its interest in detente was sincere." (27:1606) Two bilateral conferences with France on 21 June 1978 and with West Germany on 21 July 1978 revealed concerns about three subjects: the European nuclear balance, the SALT II results, and the prospects for SALT III. (13:58) Following a series of meetings chaired by National Security Advisor Brzezinski in August and September 1978, the US established a position in principle to support NATO LRTNF modernization. Brzezinski then visited West European leaders to determine their political views. Brzezinski did not see a military requirement for LRTNF modernization, but indicated the US would proceed with LRTNF modernization to meet "European political-military concerns." (30:202) The President approved the NPG LRTNF modernization proposal during Fall 1978. (54:18) Later in the year, the NSC staff determined the need for direct NSC and White House involvement in the coordination and direction of the American initiative to avoid problems previously encountered with the neutron bomb. (12:228)
In January 1979, President Carter tested the LRTNF modernization waters at the Guadeloupe Summit Conference attended by Chancellor Schmidt, British Prime Minister Callaghan, and French President Giscard. (12:228) President Carter "surprised Schmidt with his initiative" and the three leaders agreed to pursue LRTNF modernization. At the same time, they agreed to offer the Soviets "co-operative arms control" to offset the US and Russian failure to reach final agreement on the SALT II treaty. (54:18) The three European leaders, however, proposed a modification to Carter's initiative to deploy intermediate-range missiles to counterbalance SS-20 deployments. They suggested negotiating with the Soviets, while deploying intermediate-range missiles. Their suggestion gave birth to the dual-track decision. (58:29)

Late in January 1979, David Aaron presented the US position on LRTNF modernization to the leadership of Britain, France, and West Germany. Britain and France remained publicly quiet for political considerations. In West Germany, however, Schmidt wanted assurances on two matters: (1) other nations besides his own would deploy the new weapons, and (2) LRTNF modernization would be part of the arms-control package. (12:228-229)

The Carter Administration announced in late Spring 1979 production plans for the GLCM and Pershing IIs. These intermediate-range missiles would be deployed in Europe. (36:100) The Carter Administration had five reasons for urging NATO to approve production and deployment of GLCMs and Pershing IIs: (1) the greater significance of theater nuclear balance in light of strategic nuclear parity; (2) less credible US deterrent of conflict in Western Europe than before strategic nuclear parity; (3) Soviet deployment of modernized tactical nuclear forces, seeking theater nuclear superiority; (4) not allowing the Soviets to believe strategic nuclear parity causes a "decoupling" of Western European defense from the US; and (5) a NATO LRTNF modernization program would not endanger the arms control process, but instead, promote Soviet restraint through arms control. (14:170-171)

David Aaron's return trip to Europe in March 1979 found broad support for a politically visible response to the SS-20s deployment. However, Belgian and Dutch leadership hesitated to give public support due to the political problems they would face. They instead preferred to wait on a formal NATO decision before tackling the issue. (12:229) On the other hand, Italian Prime Minister Francesco Cossiga enthusiastically received Aaron's LRTNF modernization proposals. Cossiga retained a staunch advocate of LRTNF modernization as his Minister of Defense, Attilio Ruffini. Cossiga used the LRTNF issue as a test of NATO loyalty for the Italian Communist Party to overcome domestic political problems. (12:230)
During the Summer of 1979, Aaron returned to the five European capitals with ISA's proposal to deploy replacement Pershing IIs and GLCMs in Western Europe. Allied sentiment had changed little from March. Britain, Germany, and Italy remained genuinely interested while Belgium and the Netherlands delayed their decision by deferring judgment to the HLG. (12:230-231)

Chancellor Schmidt found it harder to gain approval for the American initiative than he indicated in January 1979. He had tied his political future to LRTNF modernization, causing him to force reluctant support from his Social Democratic Party (SPD). (56:55) This resulted in a heavily qualified resolution from the SPD. First, it allowed LRTNF modernization, but only on the condition of unsuccessful arms control negotiations. Second, and least publicized, the SPD required US ratification of the SALT II treaty, prior to entry into meaningful arms control negotiations. (56:55-56) Party Chairman Willy Brandt best summarized the SPD position during a speech to the Party Congress. He said, "The SPD has cast its decision not in order that arms will necessarily be increased, but rather so that there can be negotiations over disarmament." (56:55)

During the two months preceding dual-track ratification, NATO rallied together, and launched a concerted effort to push for Senate ratification for SALT II. In October 1979 NATO members followed the US lead by rejecting the USSR's offer of withdrawing 20,000 Russian troops and 1,000 tanks from East Germany for abandonment of the Alliance's LRTNF modernization plan. (37:18) On 16 October 1979, the US came out with a (US Rationale Paper) Modernization and Arms Control for Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces as a supporting brief to be used at the December NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers meeting. (30:207) During October 1979, NATO members heavily lobbied the US Senate, attempting to gain Senate ratification of SALT II. (31:37) On 6 November 1979, the HLG submitted a draft decision, establishing a deployment plan and guidelines for arms control talks to the North Atlantic Council. (30:206)

West European support continued to develop for the dual-track decision, but West Germany continued to strive to satisfy the SPD resolution. On 28 November 1979, the North Atlantic Council approved the HLG's draft decision on deployment and arms control guidelines. (30:206-207) Later in the month, West German Defense Minister Apel, in a Washington visit, linked Senate ratification of SALT II with LRTNF modernization plans. (44:1408)

Prior to the 11-12 December 1979 scheduled meeting of NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers, Secretary of State Vance met with government officials from Britain, France, Italy, and West Germany. (76:15) On 12 December 1979, the NATO Foreign and
Defense Ministers met in Brussels and agreed to pursue a two-track decision of both LRTNF modernization and arms control. (12:193) The decision called for the replacement of 108 Pershing IAs by the same number of Pershing IIs, the deployment of 464 GLCMs, and the eventual withdrawal of 1,000 US nuclear warheads from Europe. (12:239) American forces only, would operate and command these systems. The US would pay development and production expenses while the allies would contribute to support costs. (4:10) Additionally, the US agreed to commence LRTNF arms negotiations with the Soviets. (12:194) Britain, West Germany, and Italy agreed to the deployments on their soil; however, Belgium and the Netherlands approved the plan, but postponed their deployment decision. (12:193-194)

Secretary Vance's 12 December 1979 communique, following the meeting, stressed the "pursuit of detente, including balanced arms control agreements, must rest on a firm foundation of military security." (76:15) He also stated the strengthening of NATO defense was not only essential to deterrence, but also to find a means to relax tensions. (76:15)

**INITIAL DIPLOMACY FOLLOWING 12 DECEMBER 1979**

The North Atlantic Council met on 12-13 December 1979. Following the meeting, Secretary Vance spoke positively about NATO's commitment to the Long-Term Defense Program, linking NATO strength to productive East-West relations. (76:20) On 14 December 1979, the North Atlantic Council reasserted the need for worldwide detente, but indicated the events during the last six months had not been "conducive to the consolidation of international stability and security." (76:20) The council also stressed their resolve to alleviate the growing imbalance of forces to maintain deterrence and defense over a wide spectrum. Finally, it stressed force modernization and buildup should go hand-in-hand with arms control and disarmament. (76:20) Even before the North Atlantic Council recessed, Secretary Vance announced US interest in resuming arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. (76:22)

The Dutch reduced the dual-track momentum on 18 December 1979, when Netherlands Prime Minister van Agt endorsed the dual-track decision, but expressed reservations about deployments in his country. (13:99-100) The Dutch announcement preceded the 26 December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The invasion resulted in President Carter's withdrawal of the SALT II treaty from Senate ratification, placing additional pressure on Chancellor Schmidt. (50:17) Allied pursuit of the arms control track continued as NATO established a Special Consultative Group on Arms Control involving Theater Nuclear Forces on 24 January
1980. This group succeeded the special group formed in 1979. (84:CRS-30)

On 12 April 1980, Chancellor Schmidt attempted to bolster his position with his party and to get the arms control talks off dead center following the Afghanistan invasion. At a SPD campaign rally, he highlighted the positive signs for detente and a recent agreement with East Germany on West Berlin access. He further suggested a moratorium on both production and deployment of medium-range missiles. Hoping his proposed moratorium would encourage the Soviets to alter their arms control position, Schmidt aroused considerable hostility within West Germany and the US. (13:79) At home, the leading contender for Chancellor, Franz Josef Strauss, declared the speech to be "an open affront against NATO and an undisguised provocation against the United States", denouncing Schmidt "as a security risk." (13:79) After Schmidt restated his proposal at the SPD Party Congress on 9 June 1980, President Carter drafted a harsh note to Schmidt at the urging of National Security Advisor Brzezinski. Carter "warned against any departure from the NATO decision." (13:80) Carter's note outraged Schmidt, especially when he found out it had been leaked to the West German magazine Stern. (13:80) Incensed, Schmidt called Carter's position "astonishing" and expressed wonder why his proposal "created such a fuss in Western circles." (13:80) Schmidt also expressed the need for European government autonomous action, indicating NATO influence should not flow only from West to East. (13:80)

On 30 June-1 July 1980 Schmidt met with Chairman Brezhnev in Moscow to obtain Soviet agreement for "preliminary talks on theater nuclear weapons." (56:56) He got the Soviets to give up their preconditions to beginning the talks, but had to concede the inclusion of NATO FBS into the talks. (56:56) During a 15 July 1980 visit to Bonn, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher expressed US hostility towards Schmidt's new initiative. Christopher referred to it as "Schmidt's ostensible concession of FBS" and pointed out US intentions to concentrate the upcoming talks with the Soviets strictly on "land-based, long range Eurostrategic systems." (56:57)

The Belgians continued at least passive support of the dual track decision. On 19 September 1980, the Belgian cabinet issued a statement saying if "negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union do not produce any results, Belgium will, together with its allies, take all measures agreed among the NATO partners." (13:102-103) During a 19 November 1980 defense budget debate, Belgian Foreign Minister Charles Nothomb said in reference to GLCM site preparations, "It goes without saying that the government must see to it that possible deployment of missiles not be delayed through our fault. Since
no decision has been made, the door remains open in both
directions and nothing irreparable should be done." (13:103)

THE IMPACT OF THE PEACE MOVEMENT ON DIPLOMACY

The increases in the amount of media attention given to
LRTNF modernization and the growing atmosphere of
anti-Americanism resulted in Chancellor Schmidt expressing a
tough line on 2 February 1981. He stated:

This dual decision by the Alliance is militarily an
indispensable component of the strategy of the West,
politically a test of the solidarity of the Alliance.
In the present international situation, anyone who
questions the dual decision, or one of its two parts,
brings the Alliance into question. (56:58)

Schmidt's approach, however, did not deter continued West German
attacks on the dual-track decision. His SPD party, in
particular, continued to express highly negative views on the
decision. On 16 February 1981, SPD Secretary-General Egon Bahr
expressed his views on the dual-track decision. He supported the
decision because it was the only way to get the Soviets to the
peace table. Regarding the decision he said, "anyone in America
who wrecks the negotiations also wrecks the decision to station
'nuclear weapons in Europe.'" (56:58) On 9 March 1981, West
German Foreign Minister Genscher, in a meeting with Secretary of
State Haig, achieved a reluctant commitment from the US "to
continue close consultations" in the process to implement both
segments of the dual-track decision. (13:81)

The advent of the Reagan Administration brought about some
diplomatic changes. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger told the
NATO Defense Ministers in April 1981, the US would pursue a
two-pronged strategy of rapid theater nuclear force development
coupled with negotiating for a "balanced, equitable, and
verifiable arms control agreement." (45:69) He also told the
ministers SALT II failed because it favored the USSR, failed to
provide stability, and was unverifiable. (45:69) During the May
1981 visit to Washington by the Special Committee, the Reagan
Administration expressed to the US their unwillingness to follow
the Carter Administration policy of "abdicating American
leadership in Alliance nuclear policy." (73:22) Further, the
Administration stressed the need for unilateral American
involvement in Alliance nuclear procurement decisions and direct
consultation regarding deployment decisions. (73:22)

Chancellor Schmidt placed much hope in the US administration
change. In May 1981, he visited Washington and pressed for arms
control progress due to waning SPD support for the dual-track
As a result of the meeting, President Reagan and Chancellor Schmidt emerged with a closer working relationship. President Reagan promised Chancellor Schmidt he would put as much effort into arms control as to NATO LRNF modernization. At an early May 1981 NATO Foreign Minister conference, the US announced it would attempt to initiate INF negotiations before year's end. West German officials expressed satisfaction with the US decision to resume talks and to prepare for formal negotiations.

The new Administration also maintained strong Italian support for the dual-track decision. Premier Spadolini, in an early June 1981 address to the Italian Senate, strongly supported the dual-track decision, favoring arms negotiations and completely rejecting Soviet moratorium proposals. In August 1981, Italian Socialist Defense Minister Lagorio announced Comiso, Sicily as the selected site for 112 GLCMs.

The administration change brought about a resumption of negotiations as well as a negotiating modification. On 24 September 1981, the two superpowers announced the 30 November 1981 resumption of negotiations. In October 1981, the NATO Defense Ministers, especially the West German and Dutch ministers, urged the Reagan Administration to consider a zero level option for arms control. The US reacted positively to the Defense Ministers and in October 1981, Assistant Secretary of State Eagleburger received European blessing on a final negotiating proposal at a special NATO consultative group meeting. This proposal was the basis for President Reagan's zero option. Additionally, in October 1981, the Reagan Administration announced its Strategic Force Modernization program. The core of the program was acquisition of the B-1B bomber, the Peacekeeper ICBM, and Trident II SLBM.

The Reagan Administration followed through with the NATO initiative and during the second week of November 1981, Eagleburger returned to Europe and briefed top European leaders prior to President Reagan's zero option speech. On 18 November 1981, President Reagan spoke live, on European television. During his speech on arms reduction, he formally announced his zero option package. He offered cancellation of scheduled GLCM and Pershing II deployments for Soviet dismantling of SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 medium-range missiles. He also indicated the possibilities for a new round of strategic nuclear weapons negotiations starting as early as 1982, and titled these new negotiations START—Strategic Arms Reduction Talks.

Guarded initial reactions came from the European capitals. Chancellor Schmidt said, "Reagan has set forth a comprehensive concept for the stabilization of peace" and Prime Minister
Thatcher added "it will receive a warm welcome not only in political circles but in the minds and hearts of people across Europe." (32:17) Italian Prime Minister Spandolini said in France, "the Italian and French reactions are both favorable" and French Foreign Minister Cheysson said, "the zero option is obviously advisable." (32:17) Shortly thereafter, NATO Defense Ministers reaffirmed deployment plans for the LRTNF on 21 November 1981. (84:CRS-35)

Arms control negotiations resumed, but the US kept pressure on NATO to support the dual-track decision. On 30 November 1981, the US and USSR commenced formal LRTNF negotiations. (11:84) Arthur Burns, US Ambassador to West Germany expressed concern over nuclear weapon debate in Europe and "growing pacifism in several NATO countries," indicating current events "might force the U.S. back into a new isolationism." (66:18) NATO Secretary General Luns supported the dual-track strategy by saying "it must be perfectly clear that the Soviet Union is at fault" for any failure in Soviet and US negotiations. (66:18)

The next four months of negotiations produced nothing meaningful, instead it tended to polarize the situation. On 17 December 1981, the two superpowers recessed talks on intermediate nuclear weapon systems in Europe. (84:CRS-37) Negotiations on medium-range nuclear weapons resumed in Geneva on 28 January 1982, and recessed on 16 March 1982 for two months. Following the recess, Soviet President Brezhnev announced a moratorium on the deployment of SS-20s. He also promised deployment reductions in 1982, which would last until fruitful Geneva negotiations or until the US started GLCM and Pershing deployments. Finally, he threatened retaliatory measures for any NATO deployments. (84:CRS-38) In March 1982, the NPG rejected Soviet President Brezhnev's proposal for a moratorium, feeling such a moratorium would serve to undermine "Soviet incentives to negotiate seriously in Geneva." (73:41)

The Reagan Administration continued to pursue meaningful arms control negotiations. In May 1982, President Reagan announced talks between the US and USSR on strategic nuclear weapon reduction would soon start. He indicated the goal would be to reduce the number of ICBMs and their warheads in a phased approach. (73:29) The US and USSR resumed medium-range nuclear weapon negotiations on 20 May 1982 following a two month recess. (84:CRS-39) In July 1982, the US and the Soviets achieved a compromise bargaining position in the famous Nitze-Kvitsinskiy "walk in the woods." (4:31) The compromise laid out limitations on various theater nuclear weapons and banned Pershing II deployment. The Soviets rejected the original package "as an unacceptable basis for negotiation" prior to the US's counteroffer of reinstating the Pershing IIs. (4:31)
The Soviet rejection preceded two allied losses: the resignation of the US director of arms control negotiations and the West German Chancellor. Our European allies did not find out about the "walk in the woods" offer until 14 September 1982. The resulting controversy caused Eugene Rostow, the Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to resign. (4:31-32) During September 1982 Chancellor Schmidt's coalition split over economic matters, leading to Chancellor Helmut Kohl's election. Chancellor Kohl continued to support previous West German policy as evidenced by his comment to a visiting high-ranking Russian official. He told the Soviet the "FRG would work for genuine detente and that if the Soviet Union did not agree in the Geneva INF negotiations to reduce its missiles, the FRG was determined to go forward with deployments in 1983." (73:47)

ZERO OPTION--JUST WISHFUL THINKING?

The European nuclear peace movement took a toll on Britain and the continent. British Prime Minister Thatcher softened her support for the zero option. On 20 January 1983, she said we hope "to achieve the zero option, but in the absence of that we must achieve balanced numbers." (13:98) On the same day, West German Foreign Minister Genscher criticized the zero option and advocated "an interim solution in the negotiations." (13:84) SPD party leader Vogel visited the White House on 23 January 1983, hoping to shift its opinion from the zero option. The White House rejected the proposal, stating any negotiating change now would legitimize SPD party opposition to LRTNF deployments. (13:84) On 24 January 1983, Franz Josef Strauss joined Genscher against the zero option, claiming it to be "unattainable and absurd." (13:84) Finally, on 13 March 1983, Chancellor Kohl came out publicly for a change in negotiating strategy away from the zero option, a week after German elections. (13:84)

From the start of INF negotiations, the Soviets had done little to alter their negotiating baseline, calling for a ban on all US missiles in Europe, and a balanced number of British and French missiles against Soviet missiles based in European Russia. (19:38) On 30 March 1983, President Reagan succumbed to European pressures to develop a new negotiating position. He revealed a new US willingness to negotiate an interim agreement for a balanced number of warheads globally, excluding the third world. He stipulated the need for an agreement by December 1983, or the US would commence European missile deployments. Any actual deployments could be withdrawn if a treaty was concluded after the December deadline. (19:38) On 29 May 1983, the Williamsburg summit of industrialized nations endorsed President Reagan's approach. (19:38) Later, on 14 November 1983, the US proposed a global limit of 420 warheads for intermediate-range missiles due
to West German pressure for a new negotiating proposal. The
Soviets rejected the US proposal. (65:20)

Despite European pressure for a new negotiating baseline,
support for deployments remained strong. British Defense
Minister Heseltine said GLCM deployment will go on as scheduled,
"because it is not likely we'll get a totally acceptable
agreement in Geneva" during the INF talks. (22:22) In an
attempt to keep Italian support strong for GLCM deployment,
General Rogers, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe stated on 11
September 1983, "Italy must have the leadership of the defense of
the Western world in NATO's southern region." (28:37) In early
November 1983, the British Parliament voted to reaffirm Britain's
promises to deploy GLCMs in the absence of an INF agreement by
year's end. (21:25)

On 14 November 1983, the first GLCMs arrived in Great
Britain. (65:20) Due to the GLCM arrival, INF negotiations
broke down. (10:108) The breakdown started a long period of
disagreements over the actual number of deployed SS-20s. In
November 1983, the US claimed the Soviets had deployed 369
SS-20s. (10:108) On 13 November 1984, the Soviets insisted they
had not deployed SS-20s since December 1983, but they refused to
give the number of actual deployments. Additionally, the Soviets
said the US was mixing missile sites and actual deployed missiles
in their counts. To further complicate matters, the Dutch
Defense Minister also "publicly disputed the American figures for
deployed SS-20s." (10:108) The following day the US made a
public relations error of announcing the GLCM deliveries to Italy
prior to the Italian Chamber of Deputies final approval for GLCM
deployment. (8:160) A long three day debate followed the
American announcement of GLCM deliveries in the Italian Chamber
of Deputies. The debate ended in a positive vote for deployment
on 16 November 1983, despite the noticeable absenteeism within
the Parliament. (8:160)

On 1 June 1984, Netherlands's Prime Minister Lubbers stated
the Dutch government would make their final GLCM deployment
decision on 1 November 1985. (79:3) The Dutch made several
stipulations about deployment. First, they would accept their
share of the GLCMs, if the US and USSR had not achieved an INF
agreement by 1 November 1985. Second, if no agreement existed by
1 November 1985 and the Soviets had deployed more SS-20s than on
1 June 1984, they would conclude an agreement with the US for
deployment of 48 GLCMs and review their tactical nuclear
commitments. Third, they would postpone construction at
Woensdrecht, the selected GLCM site until 1986. (79:4)

US and Soviet debate over actual SS-20 deployments
continued. In March 1985, the US reported the Soviets had
deployed 414 SS-20s without specifying between Western and
Eastern deployed missiles. (10:108) As late as June 1985, Vice-President George Bush claimed the Soviets had increased the number of deployed SS-20s to 423 missiles. (10:108)

PRELUDE TO AN INF AGREEMENT

On 1 November 1985, in accordance with the 1 June 1984 Dutch compromise, the Lubbers government announced they would deploy 48 GLCMs, but at the same time, abandon two other assigned NATO nuclear responsibilities. (78:5) The US and the Netherlands reached a tentative agreement on 4 November 1985. The agreement stated the missiles would operate under NATO procedures and the US would weigh Dutch views, prior to employing GLCMs stationed in the Netherlands. (78:6) On 2 December 1985, the Dutch Parliament received the agreement for approval, allowing Parliament to debate the issue up to 14 weeks. (78:6)

Soviet interest towards INF negotiations remained dormant until 19 September 1986, when Soviet leader Gorbachev sent President Reagan a letter offering a deep reduction in Soviet and US medium-range warheads in Europe to 100 each. (34:47) On 11-12 October 1986, President Reagan met with Soviet leader Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland to prepare for a possible Washington summit conference. The meeting resulted in three outcomes: (1) a "near breakthrough on INF;" (2) a US proposal to do away with all ballistic missiles in the next ten years; and (3) an impasse on strategic defense issues. The far-reaching discussions eclipsed anything the US had studied or consulted with the allies on prior to the summit. (59:65)

The next three months resulted in more progress than in the previous seven years. On 28 February 1987, Gorbachev separated INF negotiations from the Strategic Defense Initiative and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty based on the Reykjavik framework. (33:11,13) On 4 March 1987, the US proposed a draft treaty "freezing Soviet SS-12/22 and SS-23 missiles, while maintaining the right to match the Soviet level." (33:13) The Soviets counteroffered to remove East European deployed SS-12/22s to Russia, freeze their numbers, and to enter these missiles into separate negotiations. (33:13) By April, when Secretary of State Schultz left for Moscow, Gorbachev had gone even further, offering to eliminate short-range systems in Europe. This proposal has been termed the double-zero option and was not backed by France or Germany. (33:13) On 27 April 1987, the Soviets tabled a draft treaty proposal. It included the destruction of US warheads for West Germany's Pershing Is and prevented conversion of Pershing IIIs to short-range systems. The US and West Germany jointly rejected the destruction of the warheads, based on the contention "they are third country systems, not belonging to the United States." (33:14)
Chapter Four

POLITICAL PROBLEMS AFFECTING GLCM DEPLOYMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE

Major political problems stemming from cruise missile deployment plagued the NATO nations. Throughout the time period prior to, and after the GLCM deployment decision, the NATO nations suffered from major political problems. Political pressures from internal and external sources affected both the decision to deploy and actual deployment of the weapon system. To focus on the root causes of these pressures, this chapter will look at three major political problems: (1) the attempt by the Soviet Union to influence Western European public sentiment against the LRTNF modernization and deployment, both prior to the 12 December 1979 decision, and during deployment; (2) a review of US miscalculations, which led to political problems for West European leaders supporting the GLCM deployment and; (3) the impact of the factors in one and two above prior to the GLCM deployment in West Germany, Britain, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands.

SOVIET INFLUENCE PRIOR TO 12 DECEMBER 1979

The Soviet's first expressed serious concern over the possibility of GLCM deployment on 1 March 1979, after the US repulsed the Soviets over FBSS in the SALT II negotiations. Soviet Premier Aleksey N. Kosygin "warned Western Europe of the adverse consequences U.S. missile deployment would create for detente while, on the very next day, Leonid I. Brezhnev announced that the USSR stood ready to negotiate on medium-range weapons in Europe." (20:6) The Soviets fired the next serious salvo on 6 October 1979. In an East Berlin address, Brezhnev "declared that the USSR was prepared to reduce the level of medium-range nuclear missiles deployed in the western part of the USSR provided US missile deployment did not go forward." (20:6) Brezhnev's offer included "a unilateral cutback of up to 20,000 Soviet troops in East Germany and a withdrawal of 1,000 tanks" as well as negotiations on the reduction of medium-range nuclear missiles as mentioned above. (12:237) President Carter "regarded Brezhnev's offer as a propagandistic attempt to weaken NATO unity, and he rejected the initiative out of hand." (71:159)
The Soviets continued to increase pressure on the allies. On 23 November 1979, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrel Gromyko stated: "stationing the new weapons in Europe would violate SALT II, destroy future arms control negotiations, and start a new spiral in the arms race." (36:101) The Soviets' campaign peaked in early December 1979. Prior to the NATO ministers deadline for a decision, the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact joined together to denounce the pending decision: "a special meeting of the Warsaw Pact nations in East Berlin warned that the actual deployment of new missiles by NATO 'would destroy the basis for future negotiations.'" (39:52)

Despite significant pressure, the NATO allies decided to modernize theater nuclear forces on 12 December 1979. The original plan called for deployment of 464 GLCMs and 108 Pershing II missiles by late 1983. (56:54) Despite the deployment decision, the Soviet Union continued to pressure NATO to delay or cancel deployment.

**SOVIET INFLUENCE AFTER 12 DECEMBER 1979**

Although the NATO Foreign Ministers approved the deployment concept on 12 December 1979, several countries reserved the right to postpone the final decision on whether or not they would accept intermediate-range missiles in their countries. The Dutch government reserved the right to make a final decision until 1981, while the Belgian government reserved the right to delay a final decision for six months. (18:35)

The Soviet pressure led to reservations by West European governments. At first, the Soviets rejected US overtures to discuss limiting theater nuclear weapons. However, in February-May 1980, the Soviets appeared ready to negotiate.

In February Gromyko was somewhat more conciliatory when he said that "detente is alive and well" in spite of a Carter Administration effort to ring its death knell. He added that "all talks in the field of the arms race should be resumed and continued." The Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact, meeting in Warsaw in mid-May, took much the same position, stressing that "Negotiations on medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe are possible," if NATO were to reverse its decision of the previous December. (18:35)

In response to allied firmness on deploying intermediate-range missiles, Moscow finally changed positions in July 1980 and offered to begin negotiations without preconditions. (20:6)
Despite Moscow's concession, the Soviets continued to delay negotiations, while attempting to influence NATO nations to cancel scheduled deployments. Delay took the form of unacceptable offers to reduce intermediate-range missiles. As late as December 1982, Yuri V. Andropov stated, "It would be a good thing if thought were given to the grave consequences that the stationing in Europe of new US medium-range missiles could entail for all further efforts to limit nuclear armaments in general." (20:6)

By now the Soviets were attempting to use the arms control reduction talks as a basis for influencing the NATO nations deployment decision. They slowly lowered warhead requirements, while demanding the allies do likewise. The allies saw the Soviet proposals as inequitable and therefore unacceptable.

By 23 November 1983, it was too late for arms control negotiations to effect the outcome of deployment. On this day, the Bundestag confirmed Pershing II deployment. As a result, Soviet negotiators walked out of the INF talks. (5:135) The Soviet propaganda campaign continued unabated, resulting in delays and discontent among the NATO nations.

The Danish government maintained its decision to refuse to contribute to INF infrastructure, and the Belgian and Netherlands governments were repeatedly obliged to postpone their final decisions on deployment, which the Belgians finally took only in 1985 and the Netherlands in a hard-fought seventy-nine to seventy vote only in February 1986. (5:136)

The Soviets concentrated their efforts on NATO nations to disrupt the deployment decision as well as actual deployment. While the Soviets deliberately caused turmoil, the US, through miscalculations, caused additional problems for the West European leaders in supporting the GLCM deployment.

**UNITED STATES MISCALCULATIONS**

As late as September 1979, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger created unrest and doubt in NATO LRTNF deliberations. Speaking to European academicians and bureaucrats, Kissinger questioned the will of the US to defend Europe with strategic nuclear weapons:

No one disputes any longer that in the 1980s ... the United States will no longer be in a strategic position to reduce a Soviet counter-blow against the United States to tolerable levels. Indeed, one can argue that the United States will not be in a position in which
attacking the Soviet strategic forces makes any military sense, because it may represent a marginal expenditure of our own strategic striking force without helping greatly in ensuring the safety of our forces. (12:234)

Kissinger's speech resurrected old fears. The US still maintained total control over the use of strategic nuclear weapons. For years Europeans had wondered whether the US would really use this weaponry to defend Europe at the risk of provoking an attack on its own territory. (12:237)

After the GLCM deployment decision, many US errors in judgment caused concern and problems for European leaders. The Carter Administration confused NATO leaders in the Summer of 1980 when the US issued PD-59. PD-59 directed "that some amount of our nuclear deterrent force be shifted in targeting from countervalue (cities, industry) to counterforce (military, command and control) targets." (35:28) The shift allowed for more flexibility for decision-makers in the advent of a nuclear war. After PD-59 NATO leaders questioned whether deployment of GLCMs was the right answer to their security problems. (35:28)

Despite issuance of PD-59, relative unity reigned until November 1983. In November the US announced GLCMs would arrive in Italy on schedule before the Italian Chamber of Deputies voted to permit them in their country; an obvious affront to Italian sovereignty. (8:161) In May 1984, the US stumbled once again. During questioning by a British Broadcast Corporation reporter, Secretary of Defense Weinberger "acknowledged the possibility of a limited nuclear war confined to Europe while insisting that the object was to prevent it." (13:60)

Defense issues unrelated to cruise missiles compounded US problems with NATO. A poorly worded and late invitation from Secretary of Defense Weinberger to NATO to join the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) fueled allied resentment. Weinberger's letter stated: "If your nation is interested in exploring possible cooperative efforts or contributions, I would ask, as a first step, that you send me within 60 days an indication of your interest in participating in the SDI research program." (9:159) This invitation came in the midst of the cruise missile uproar, and incensed the public sector. They began criticizing NATO government officials for further expanding the arms race. Also, since the invitation arrived without prior notification to NATO officials, the attitude of the uncaring American once again came to the forefront. (9:159-160) These miscalculations, along with the Soviet Union's attempts at influencing the deployment process, contributed to problems for the NATO allies in meeting deployment schedules.
IMPACT OF THE MISSILE DEPLOYMENT DECISION

There are numerous reasons why West European countries worried about missile deployment. Still vivid memories of World War II promoted a strong peace sentiment. While conventional war might be undesirable, a nuclear war limited to European soil was almost totally unacceptable to the average European. Probably the most committed country to national defense was West Germany. Even there, only 19% of the population was willing to fight a nuclear war on European soil, if the situation dictated war was inevitable. (72:519) Secondly, the Europeans worried increasingly about US commitment to the defense of Europe. They saw the US political system as unreliable, based upon such decisions as nonratification of SALT II. (72:519) The failure of SALT II, and an apparent US willingness to confine a nuclear war to Europe, received emphasis from the on-and-off again neutron bomb decision and the PD-59 decision for more flexible targeting. Europeans no longer wanted the US and USSR to solely control the arms race. (84:CRS-6) Given US pressures on NATO to increase defense spending, and the cuts required in social programs to fund the increases, the nuclear issue received the attention of the entire European population. (84:CRS-6) Against this backdrop the US dragged its feet in arms control negotiations, while the Soviet Union actively encouraged growth of anti-nuclear sentiment in Europe. (84:CRS-7)

Political unrest gripped NATO nations affected by the 12 December 1979 decision to deploy intermediate-range missiles. Intra-governmental and public quarreling split West Germany, formerly a primary force in the dual-track deployment decision. Initially, the Pershing II deployment decision called for operational capability by December 1983. Opponents to deployment saw halting Pershing II deployment as a prerequisite to cancelling the GLCMs. The people had returned the SPD and Free Democratic Party (FDP) coalition to government in the October 1980 elections. The SPD/FDP coalition began to unravel in late 1980 and 1981, over the lack of arms control negotiations. (4:98)

The rise of the anti-nuclear lobby in Western Europe compounded FRG government problems. By mid 1981, "leftists, ecologists and religious groups exerted strong pacifist pressure on Chancellor Helmut Schmidt." (62:29) On 21 June 1981, over 120,000 people concluded a four-day meeting in Hamburg which called for a nuclear-free Europe and a halt to TNF modernization plans. (84:CRS-32) Later in the year, on 10 October 1981, anti-nuclear demonstrations in Bonn, drew over 250,000 participants. (84:CRS-34) By April 1982, the left-wing of the SPD demanded a moratorium on GLCM deployments as long as INF talks continued. (4:100) At the SPD party congress in April 1982, Chancellor Schmidt addressed the continued support of the
GLCM deployment decision in Europe. Schmidt won the day by a two-to-one margin, and the deployment decision stood. (42:32)

The anti-nuclear lobby continued to hold massive rallies throughout the year as government leaders struggled with not only the nuclear issue, but economic reforms as well. On 10 June 1982, for example, over 300,000 persons rallied in Bonn to condemn US defense policies. (84:CRS-39) On 1 October 1982, the FDP/SPD coalition split over economic concerns unseating Chancellor Schmidt. Christian Democratic Union (CDU) leader Helmut Kohl succeeded him. The CDU then formed a coalition with the Christian Social Union (CSU) and the FDP. This coalition continued to support the 12 December 1979 deployment decision. (4:103)

Continuous anti-nuclear rallies marked 1983. These rallies increased in number and size as the December 1983 deployment date approached. During 15-22 October 1983, for example, anti-nuclear forces scheduled over 100,000 demonstrations involving three million people. (70:36) Various debates continued throughout the summer of 1983, with the Bundestag Debate on 21-22 November 1983, deciding the deployment issue in favor of the government:

The Greens' resolution urging rejection of the NATO missiles and withdrawal from NATO was overwhelmingly defeated . . . The SPD resolution opposing deployment was defeated . . . The government resolution favouring deployment and continuation of negotiations was passed with 286 in favor, 226 opposed, and one abstention. (4:112)

By defeating the opposition, the way was open for deployment of the Pershing IIs, and the subsequent deployment of GLCMs at Wuescheim in 1986. The anti-nuclear groups fell into disarray, and by June 1984 public opinion moved away from anti-nuclear. (4:115) Although anti-nuclear activity continues in the FRG to present day, deployment of intermediate-range missiles will occur. As with problems encountered by the FRG, the British decision for deployment on home soil met with government debate and public outcry.

Britain, like the FRG, experienced extreme anti-nuclear demonstrations between the 12 December 1979 deployment decision, and the actual deployment of the first GLCMs in December 1983. Britain "served as an intellectual anti-nuclear center through two groups, The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and European Nuclear Disarmament." (62:29) As early as June 1980, Britain began to experience anti-nuclear rallies. A Labour party rally drew 20,000 people, in what was the largest British nuclear protest since the early 1960s. (13:61) Later, on 24 October 1984, an estimated 150,000 protesters rallied in London in
anti-nuclear demonstrations. (84:CRS-35) One month later, on 2 November 1982, over 150,000 persons rallied against nuclear weapons in Hyde Park, London. (43:22)

The rallies continued into 1983, and intensified as the December 1983 deployment for GLCMs at Greenham Common approached. During two demonstrations in 1983 a total of over 100,000 protesters ringed Greenham Common. In addition to the demonstrations, as many as 250,000 people went door-to-door in an attempt to gain support for anti-nuclear candidates during the election campaign in June 1983. (49:51) By the time GLCMs became operational on 1 January 1984, British authorities had arrested and jailed hundreds of protesters attempting to enter the base at Greenham Common. (4:122-123) After 1 January 1984, the British anti-nuclear movement met the same fate as West Germany's movement. The protest organizations fell into disarray, and the number and intensity of demonstrations quickly dissipated with one exception. The Peace Camp outside Greenham Common remains to this writing, manned mainly by women protesters who vow to stay until GLCMs deactivate.

While anti-nuclear groups protested in the countryside and cities, the British government grappled with the deployment decision. The Conservative Party of Mrs. Thatcher began to receive serious opposition to its nuclear policies from the Labour Party in 1981. The Labour Party, at the 1981 conference in Brighton, "voted to endorse an unambiguous commitment to unilateral disarmament and to declare its unconditional opposition to the deployment of cruise missiles and all other nuclear weapons in Britain." (4:116) At the conference in 1982, the Labour Party passed the same endorsement by a two-thirds majority, creating an official anti-nuclear party position. (4:117) Also dissenting, but with marginal effect, was the Alliance. The Liberal Party and the newly formed Social Democratic Party (SDP) composed the Alliance in 1981. They opposed "the deployment of cruise missiles in Europe and... as a first step, to reject and campaign against the siting of cruise missiles in Britain." (4:117)

The national elections on 9 June 1983, inflicted a major defeat to Conservative Party opposition, "ensuring continued British acceptance of the deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles in Britain in the absence of an arms control agreement in Geneva limiting intermediate-range systems." (84:CRS-47) This vote ensured the deployment at Greenham Common in December 1983 and Molesworth in 1987. Britain remains committed to nuclear modernization, unless INF talks prove fruitful; in which case, Britain would support US initiatives. (75:9) As December 1983 was the critical deployment date for Britain's GLCMs, it also was the initial date for the deployment at Comiso, Sicily.
Italy, like other NATO deployment countries, experienced political opposition and domestic turmoil. The problems encountered, by and large, were much less extreme than in other NATO nations. "Lack of sufficient support from the Italian Communist party" drastically diminished the effectiveness of some rather large protests. (81:4) Demonstrations began in earnest on 24 October 1981, when over 500,000 turned-out unexpectedly for the first big peace demonstration in Rome. (8:144) They continued through 1982 with a petition drive collecting 1,200,000 signatures in Sicily in less than two months. (8:144) The largest demonstration was in Rome on 22 October 1983, when over 800,000 protesters demonstrated. (8:145)

While the demonstrations were large, they were generally peaceful and nonviolent. In the face of these demonstrations the Italian government pushed through approval for the deployment of GLCMs. On 2 October 1981, "The Italian Chamber of Deputies approved by a 244 to 225 vote the Italian government's plan to allow deployment of American cruise missiles in Sicily if US-Soviet arms reduction negotiations should fail." (84:CRS-34) In the elections of June 1983, the Christian Democrats lost 37 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 18 seats in the Senate. Because of these losses smaller parties, such as the Italian Socialist Party (ISP) made gains. As a result an ISP member, Mr. Craxi became the new Prime Minister. (4:127) Despite pressure from Soviet President Andropov in August 1983 to cancel GLCM deployment, Prime Minister Craxi refused to knuckle under to the Soviets. (4:127-128) In November 1983, the Italian Parliament voted 351 to 219 to deploy cruise missiles in Comiso if the US and Soviets failed to reach an arms control agreement. This vote verified deployment of operational GLCMs in Comiso, Sicily by March 1984. (4:128)

As in other deploying countries, demonstrations continue to the present, with little impact. A successful attempt to establish an "international peace camp" occurred in Comiso, but with little practical benefit. (81:4) The Craxi government continues to support the deployment strongly, barring constructive arms reduction agreements. The fourth country scheduled to receive GLCMs was Belgium.

The 12 December 1979 decision for deployment of intermediate-range missiles left a loophole for the Belgian government: the right to confirm deployment of the missiles within six months. (18:35) In June 1980 the Belgian government, at a NATO Foreign Minister meeting, requested another six months to make its decision. (4:141) Finally, in September 1980 the Belgian government stated:
In order to facilitate the conduct of the negotiations (arms control), the government declares that Belgium is here and now prepared to accept the outcome of the negotiations with the Soviet Union and to execute its role within the context of the Alliance. Should the negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union not succeed, Belgium, in concert with its Allies, will take all the measures agreed upon by the NATO partners. For this purpose, the government will examine the state and progress of the negotiations every six months in conjunction with its Allies and draw the necessary conclusions in the context of the Alliance. (4:141)

The Belgian government, in effect, put deployment of the GLCMs at risk, as it allowed the Belgians to indefinitely delay the deployment decision. Finally on 30 December 1983, the Belgian government, after extensive debates in Parliament, announced deployment would proceed as scheduled without an arms reduction agreement. (4:143) Because of this decision, and a later majority vote in 1985, Belgium would begin deploying GLCMs at Florennes in 1985. (61:924)

While the Belgian Parliament worked towards a final decision on deployment, anti-nuclear groups conducted extensive demonstrations. As in other NATO countries, the anti-nuclear movement gathered emphasis in Belgium as time passed. On 19 April 1981, 6,000 demonstrators marched on NATO headquarters in Brussels to demonstrate against intermediate-range missile deployment plans. (84:CRS-31) The frequency of demonstrations and number of participants grew. For example, a second demonstration held in Brussels on 25 October 1981 drew hundreds-of-thousands of protesters. (8:175)

Anti-nuclear rallies continued from 1982 to 1985. However, after the deployment confirmations in West Germany, Britain, and Italy, the anti-nuclear movement in Belgium lost steam. A particular crushing blow to the anti-nuclear movement was the unification of the Flemish Christian Democratic Party (FCDP) in 1985. The FCDP, to which the Prime Minister belonged, finally resolved differences, and turned in favor of the deployment. The unified government was able to win a majority vote for deployment on 20 March 1985, setting the final stage for arrival of the missiles. (81:4) The last deployment location identified was the Netherlands. Like the Belgians, the Dutch put off the decision of accepting deployment in the Netherlands on 12 December 1979. As with other deploying nations, political and civil obstacles needed to be overcome prior to actual deployment.

The Netherlands has one of the longest and most colorful histories of anti-nuclear movements in all Europe. The Interfaith Council for Peace (IKV), a coalition of nine churches
formed in 1966 led the way. As early as 1977, it campaigned for nuclear disarmament with the slogan, "Rid the world--but first the Netherlands--of nuclear weapons." (63:25) In late 1981, the IKV joined with the communist-led Stop De N-Bom group and formed an extremely strong anti-nuclear umbrella movement which eventually encompassed nearly 400 different groups. (62:29)

The Dutch anti-nuclear groups supported many demonstrations throughout Europe during this period. They also held large demonstrations in the Netherlands. On 21 November 1981, a large anti-nuclear demonstration occurred in Amsterdam. Estimates put the number of demonstrators at over 300,000. (84:CRS-36) Support for demonstrations continued through 1982 and into 1983. The IKV, for example, organized a demonstration at The Hague on 29 October 1983, during which 500,000 people demonstrated peacefully for removal of nuclear weapons from Europe. (4:137)

Sentiment against GLCMs in the Netherlands ran very strong as an important vote on the deployment issue approached in June 1984. After an affirming vote, support for deployment increased and the anti-nuclear forces lost strength, despite continued lobbying and demonstrations. This vote came about through political maneuvering over the years since the 12 December 1979 decision for deployment. The Dutch government's initial position was to decide by December 1981 if deployment would be allowed in the Netherlands. (4:131) In May 1981 national elections occurred in the Netherlands. The elections failed to resolve the nuclear issues since neither side could obtain a majority vote.

The deployment issue split the cabinet, provoking a political crisis and new elections. (4:132) The new election, held in September 1982, resulted in another coalition government, divided on nuclear issues. However, the new government, formed under Rudd Lubbers, agreed to go ahead with site surveys in anticipation of deploying GLCMs in 1986. (13:101) As a result of site survey completion, the Lubbers government chose to base GLCMs at Woensdrecht Air Base in late June 1983. While a site was chosen, the Dutch government did not confirm the actual deployment. (4:134)

Between late June 1983 and 1 June 1984, the government conducted discussions and research into whether to accept the GLCMs. As noted previously in Chapter Three, the government announced on 1 June 1984 it would postpone its decision until 1 November 1985, with specific stipulations. On 1 June 1985, the Lubbers government announced it would deploy the GLCMs. (78:CRS-5) The government submitted a note to Parliament to gain approval for the deployment. Although Parliament granted approval, it did not happen until 1986, much too late to meet the projected December 1986 deployment date. In fact, as of the INF
Treaty signing date, no GLCMs were operational in the Netherlands. (69:A29)
Chapter Five

POLITICAL LESSONS LEARNED

Over a decade has passed since Chancellor Schmidt's famous October 1977 speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies which initiated political debate over LRTNF modernization. At the time of this writing, the US Senate faces the decision of whether or not to ratify an INF agreement between the US and USSR. The INF agreement would, if ratified, result in the removal and/or destruction of all US intermediate and long-range tactical nuclear missiles stationed in Europe. This final chapter reviews the political process associated with the GLCM deployment decision by identifying and justifying positive and negative political "lessons learned."

POSITIVE LESSONS LEARNED

To truly judge a decision, one must compare the actual results with the original expectations of the decision-makers. The dual-track decision provides three positive, political lessons learned: the decision achieved the desired objectives, provided unity to the NATO Alliance at a time it needed it the most, and provided an excellent example on how well joint consultation can work on multilateral issues.

Regarding the dual-track decision, the record shows all parties desired either a reduction or elimination of Russia's SS-20 threat to Western Europe. The SS-20 deployments gave the USSR the ability to destroy nearly all of Europe's nuclear and key military targets, due to improved accuracy and increased number of nuclear warheads. To this end, the dual-track decision met or exceeded the original goals by eliminating not only the SS-20, but also all other Soviet intermediate and long-range tactical nuclear missiles aimed at Western Europe. One can argue the process took longer than envisioned, heightened the probability of nuclear war, and caused significant domestic and foreign political problems. However, due to the Alliance's dual-track decision, a signed INF agreement now exists between the two superpowers. The agreement, upon ratification, will address more than the Alliance's original expectations.
The dual-track results provide another positive lesson learned. One of the results was the unity displayed by the Alliance in supporting their decision. As seen in Chapter Four, only Denmark made a solid gesture against the decision by withdrawing support to the INF infrastructure. Belgium and the Netherlands delayed their final deployment decisions due to domestic politics. In the end, Belgium allowed actual GLCM deployments and the Dutch finally approved the deployments in 1986. Some reasons why the US decided to support LRTNF modernization were the Carter Administration's desire to overcome the negative leadership image obtained during the neutron bomb debate; unite a perceived disintegrating Alliance behind one issue; and to keep prospects for an arms control agreement with the Soviets open. The Soviets with all their propaganda, intimidation, and sponsored peace movements could not split the political consensus of the NATO nations in their resolve to support the multilateral decision.

The use of consultation in achieving the dual-track decision and in implementing the negotiating track of the decision, provides an exceptional political lesson learned. During the SALT II process, although we kept our allies consistently informed of negotiation progress, there was an element of mistrust. One factor figuring into this mistrust was the perception the US was negotiating NATO security without NATO participation. (77:716) Part of this mistrust stemmed from a perceived US willingness to negotiate away the cruise missile—a possible answer to West European defense needs. Understanding the existence of this mistrust over the SALT negotiations, and not desiring to repeat the Alliance "shaking" mistakes of the neutron bomb debate, the Carter Administration introduced high-level US participation into the LRTNF modernization considerations early. The US also ensured NATO participation through the use of the SCG on Arms Control throughout most of the arms control negotiations following the 12 December 1979 dual-track decision.

NEGATIVE LESSONS LEARNED

The job of a Monday morning quarterback is to figure how a football team or coach could have done better on Sunday. The US made its share of mistakes during the decade covering the span of the dual-track process. We'll cover five significant, negative political lessons learned from the dual-track decision: the fact not all NATO countries interpreted the decision in the same way; the fact the US attempted to negotiate with an outstanding, unratiﬁed arms control agreement; the length of time between the 12 December 1979 decision and actual deployments; the lack of complete acceptance by all countries where GLCMs would be
deployed prior to the decision's announcement; and finally, the negotiation delays in the dual-track process.

The dual-track decision at face value seems hard to misinterpret; however, not all NATO nations viewed the decision in the same light. West Germany, in particular, saw the decision as a "three-track" decision, tying ratification of the SALT II Treaty as a prerequisite to the remaining two tracks. They sold the decision to the members of the ruling party based on three tracks and to save face, the West Germans actively lobbied the US Senate in an attempt to secure SALT II ratification. The Carter Administration did not view the dual-track decision in the same manner. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the US withdrew the SALT II Treaty from Senate ratification. Additionally, the Carter Administration wanted any theater-level negotiations delayed until after the 1980 election for two reasons. First, they worried about Ronald Reagan's assertions of a weak US defense policy and second, they felt early negotiations might cause the Belgian government to decide against the deployment of missiles in Belgium. (2:41-42) These differences in interpretation of the dual-track decision proved politically costly to West German Chancellor Schmidt. In addition, they could have ultimately resulted in NATO overturning the decision due to a cancellation of West German support of the decision.

An additional negative political lesson learned is closely related to the first. Specifically, it is not wise to negotiate a new arms control treaty, with a previously unratified arms control agreement under consideration. Logically, there is little reason for the other side to return to the bargaining table when (1) you have not ratified the previously negotiated position, (2) you are threatening deployment of systems four years down the road which are not in production yet, and (3) the neutron bomb debate rekindled the West European anti-nuclear movement. From the Soviet view, the US was acting in bad faith by withdrawing the SALT II Treaty from Senate ratification. The Carter Administration's response to the Afghanistan invasion was not congruent with the allied intentions of pursuing a two-track policy of LRTNF modernization and arms control negotiations. The attempt to negotiate without a mutually agreed upon baseline, gave the Soviets little reason to honestly negotiate; especially in light of the West European views of desiring SALT II ratification as a prelude to the dual-track implementation. In the beginning it was to the Soviets' advantage not to make any noticeable headway in the negotiations; as they were trying to break the Alliance consensus, not support it. Later it worked against the Soviets, especially in conjunction with further SS-20 deployments.

An additional negative political lesson learned is the length of time between the 12 December 1979 decision and actual
deployment of GLCMs in Western Europe. This lesson is especially critical since implementation of the decision was dependent on more than one nation and the loss of any nation could have jeopardized the decision. Professor Treverton of Harvard University expressed his views during Congressional testimony. He felt the gap between the decision and actual deployment was too large. He also indicated if the gap for such decisions cannot be shortened, we need to do a better job of predicting domestic politics down the road. (74:3) Decisions requiring sustained political support from many nations should be implemented in a much shorter time period to ensure a higher probability of success. The ability of enemy propaganda and international events to influence domestic politics must be taken into consideration in any multilateral decision. Additionally, possible changes in leadership and the impact of those changes should also be taken into account. Although the dual-track decision overcame changes in leadership in the US, West Germany, and the Netherlands as well as a very strong European anti-nuclear movement; any of those factors could have proven fatal to the decision.

The fact NATO did not have acceptance of all countries where the GLCMs would be deployed prior to the decision's announcement, provides another negative political lesson learned. As we saw earlier, West Germany's acceptance depended on other West European countries sharing the burden of deployment. Likewise, NATO membership viewed West Germany as the linchpin of the Alliance and tended to follow their lead on Alliance matters. Both Belgium and the Netherlands opted to defer acceptance of deployment to a later date. Belgium did not finally approve the decision to accept deployment until latter 1983. The deployment was still in doubt, however, until March 1985 when the government obtained a majority vote in favor of deployment. The Dutch procrastinated even longer in accepting the deployment, with approval delayed until 1986. Even at the date of the INF Treaty signing, there were no operational GLCMs deployed in the Netherlands. To be certain, many domestic and foreign political events influenced both of these countries in delaying final decisions. The fact of the matter is neither country, at the time, was able to foster enough domestic or political support for deployment. There appears to have been naivete, that somehow, the Dutch and Belgian situation might change to allow acceptance. Regardless, NATO gambled without having all the cards for a "full house," an error which could have resulted in failure of the deployment phase of the dual-track decision. Without the Netherlands and Belgium accepting deployment, West Germany would have probably rejected deployment. These two small NATO nations had to go through fierce political battles to achieve what they did in support of the Alliance.
The final negative political lesson learned, which nearly led to derailment of the dual-track decision, was the negotiation delays encountered in the dual-track process. We reviewed how President Carter wished to delay the theater-level negotiations until after the 1980 election. With President Carter's defeat, his lame-duck Administration became ineffective in pursuing meaningful arms control talks with the Soviets. Upon taking office, President Reagan's Administration refused to rush into the arms control negotiations inherited from the outgoing administration, especially in light of campaign rhetoric. These delays in reopening negotiations until November 1981 served to deteriorate West European support for the deployment portion of the dual-track decision. (30:213) It is important to remember, when the US appeared willing to negotiate with the Soviets, and the Soviets withdrew from the negotiations and continued SS-20 deployments, government support for the GLCM deployments in Europe strengthened. On the other hand, whenever the US reached a negotiation impasse with the Soviets and appeared to be "stonewalling," such as with the "zero option," West European support waned.
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