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THE USAF AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT:
EVOLUTION OF A DOCTRINAL VOID

MAJOR DENNIS L. BARNETT 88-0215

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TITLE THE USAF AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT: EVOLUTION OF A DOCTRINAL VOID

AUTHOR(S) MAJOR DENNIS L. BARNETT, USAF

FACULTY ADVISOR MAJOR JAMES P. KIPPERT, ACSC/EDO

SPONSOR MAJOR JIM CONNORS, ACSC/EDJ

Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment of requirements for graduation.

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
AIR UNIVERSITY
MAXWELL AFB, AL 36112-5542
The USAF and Low-Intensity Conflict: Evolution of a Doctrinal Void

Barnett, Dennis L., Major, USAF

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The first part of this research project analyzes the book, *The New Battlefield: The United States and Unconventional Conflict* by Sam C. Sarkesian. The author of the book contends the US and its military are poorly prepared to deal in the low-intensity conflict (LIC) arena. Lack of understanding of the Third World and LIC is identified as the primary culprit. The second part of this project evaluates USAF readiness by reviewing the evolution of LIC doctrine. The conclusion is the Air Force has created a LIC doctrinal void by ignoring history, experience, and earlier discarded doctrines. *The New Battlefield* provides a good starting point towards better understanding of LIC and elimination of the void created by the USAF.
Since the end of World War II, the United States has become more and more involved with Third World countries. That involvement has inevitably led the US into a variety of unconventional conflicts with mixed results. Since the hasty retreat from Saigon, there has been a strong call by some Americans for the US to withdraw into isolationism for fear of "another Vietnam." However, there is also an opposing call for the US to revise that view and stop the slow progression of communism through the Third World. In fact, many view access to some Third World countries as critical to survival of the Free World as it is known today. Former President Richard Nixon stated in his book, No More Vietnams, "We must be concerned [with the Third World] because the greatest threat to peace today is in the Third World." Is the United States military prepared to deal with Third World unconventional conflicts? Dr. Sam C. Sarkesian, in his book The New Battlefield: The United States and Unconventional Conflicts, contends US forces are poorly prepared to deal with these most-likely conflicts successfully.

Sarkesian’s assertions lead one to ask, "Is the USAF prepared to meet the challenge of low-intensity conflict (LIC)?" After reviewing the book in terms of support, credibility, and readability, this research paper will attempt to answer that question. Using Sarkesian’s assertions as a focal point, USAF doctrine, both past and present, is analyzed to establish the Air Force’s state of readiness regarding LIC.

This research has two purposes. The first is to analyze The New Battlefield to determine its usefulness for study by professional military officers concerned with LIC and Third World affairs. The second, and more important, is to show USAF doctrine is lagging far behind in preparing for a role in Third World conflicts. This is a critical area that needs to be addressed by senior USAF leaders in the very near future.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major Dennis L. Barnett is a senior pilot with over 3900 flying hours in T-37 and C-130 aircraft. He graduated from pilot training at Webb AFB in 1975 and remained as a T-37 instructor. While there he instructed foreign students in the Security Assistance Program. Upon Webb's closure in 1977, he was transferred to Sheppard AFB. He again flew with foreign students and also American and German Air Force instructor candidates in the Pilot Instructor Training program. In 1980 he moved to Little Rock AFB and qualified as a Tactical Airlifter in the C-130. His latest assignment was as an exchange pilot flying the British versions of the C-130 with the Royal Air Force (RAF). In addition to maintaining a worldwide strategic airlift qualification, he also instructed and evaluated RAF students and pilots in low level, tactics, threat avoidance, formation, and airdrop. Major Barnett is a graduate of Squadron Officer School. He is presently attending Air Command and Staff College and will graduate in June 1988. He is married and has three daughters.

Major Barnett has a bachelor's degree in Secondary Mathematics Education from the University of Wyoming and a master's degree in Educational Psychology from the University of Oklahoma. His published work includes an article in an Air Training Command standardization newsletter. He also recently co-authored an article called "Herculean Formations Station Keeping Equipment," which was published in the RAF magazine Air Clues in October 1987.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Part of our College mission is distribution of the students' problem solving products to DOD sponsors and other interested agencies to enhance insight into contemporary, defense related issues. While the College has accepted this product as meeting academic requirements for graduation, the views and opinions expressed or implied are solely those of the author and should not be construed as carrying official sanction.

REPORT NUMBER 88-0215
AUTHOR(S) Major Dennis L. Barnett, USAF
TITLE THE USAF AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT: EVOLUTION OF A DOCTRINAL VOID

I. Purpose: To review and analyze the book The New Battlefield: The United States and Unconventional Conflict, by Dr. Sam C. Sarkesian, and assess its usefulness to military professionals. Additionally, to evaluate USAF readiness to deal with low-intensity conflict (LIC) based on assertions made in The New Battlefield.

II. Problem: This research focuses on three problems. First to analyze the book to establish the credibility of its author and his support. Second, based on assertions made in The New Battlefield, evaluate Air Force doctrine to establish USAF preparation for LIC. And finally, combine both findings to draw conclusions and recommendations about the overall usefulness of Sarkesian's book.

III. Data: The New Battlefield's primary theme is that the US and its military are poorly prepared to deal with Third World conflict. Sarkesian lays the blame for this in a number of areas including democracy's openness, America's propensity for high-tech answers to all problems, and a military engrossed with large European-style conflicts. However, the author of this research
project contends that there is another overall underlying theme witnessed throughout the book. That is, Americans, and subsequently the American military, simply do not understand Third World affairs or LIC.

After establishing Sarkesian's credibility, and analyzing his support, writing style, and agreement with other professionals in the field, the paper uses this "lack of understanding" as a backdrop to evaluate USAF readiness to deal with LIC. The author of this paper examines AFM 1-1 to draw conclusions about USAF understanding of the subject. Unfortunately, it is discovered that there is indeed very little guidance for present-day planners and strategists concerning LIC.

The paper then reviews past manuals to determine if guidance was always missing or if it is only a recent phenomena. The paper's author discovers what he calls "evolution of a doctrinal void" after the Vietnam war. Prior to and during the war, doctrinal guidance was fairly explicit concerning LIC, but post-Vietnam manuals slowly eroded to almost total ignorance of the subject. This is a sobering correlation.

There are many documented cases of successful use of airpower in LIC environments. In addition to a review of Vietnam, the author contends the USAF must study other examples. He provides data on successful development of doctrine and strategy by the British in Somaliland in the early part of the century. He also notes this same strategy was used successfully as late as 1960 to defeat an insurgency in Malaya. Many of the problems encountered by the Royal Air Force were similar to ones the USAF witnessed in Vietnam.

IV. Conclusions: Can the USAF be ignoring the very history and experiences that should lead naturally to a viable doctrine? The author of this report concludes just that and contends this has led the USAF to the "lack of understanding" that Dr. Sarkesian points to in The New Battlefield. By almost total exclusion of doctrinal guidance for general purpose forces, the USAF leaves commanders and strategists in a quandary as to how to deal with the most likely conflicts of all.

V. Recommendations: The doctrinal void creates a real dilemma for officers assigned the task of writing LIC doctrine. Without doctrinal guidance, officers have not received the training that instills the understanding Dr. Sarkesian calls for. But, without a good understanding of LIC, reasonable doctrine cannot be written. Therefore, since there is no institutional guidance to rely on, the paper's author contends self-education is necessary.

This research found Dr. Sarkesian's book suffers some readability problems and does not provide all the answers, but
the paper's author recommends it as an excellent tool to begin a study of LIC. Only through a thorough and objective historical study of the use of airpower in LIC, and also a comprehensive analysis of previously discarded doctrine, can the USAF fill the void. The paper's author also recommends a return to the general purpose guidance regarding LIC in previous AFM 1-1's; most notably the 1964 version. This guidance was never disproven; only discarded. The USAF must also accept the fact that not all modern-day problems are solved through high technology or "bigger bangs." Senior leadership must recognize and correct this serious vacuum lest the US indeed suffers "another Vietnam" simply because of a "lack of understanding."
Chapter One

THE AUTHOR

INTRODUCTION

The main focus of *The New Battlefield* is assertions by the author concerning unconventional warfare. Thus, it is important to establish the author's credibility in order to make an intelligent conclusion about the book. This chapter will focus on Sarkesian's educational and employment background, his literary contributions to the field, and finally, analysis of the regard in which he is held by other authors and authorities on low-intensity conflict (LIC). A short conclusion on Sarkesian's credibility will lay the framework for the rest of the research report. (How well the author supports his assertions will be addressed in a subsequent chapter.)

BACKGROUND

Dr. Sarkesian is a retired Army Lieutenant Colonel who served from 1945-1968. He received his Bachelor's degree from The Citadel and both his master's and doctorate in political science from Columbia University. He is presently a professor in the Political Science Department at Loyola University of Chicago. He has lectured and taught at numerous other institutions; the most notable being West Point as assistant professor of political science from 1962-1966. (24:507) Sarkesian is also chairman of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces in Society. (11:1471)

LITERARY CONTRIBUTIONS

Sarkesian has written extensively on unconventional warfare and other subjects pertaining to the military. His books include *Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare* (1975), *US Policy and Low Intensity Conflict* (1981), and *America's Forgotten War* (1984). (18:122,123) He has also published numerous articles in military journals and related periodicals including, *Air University Review, Conflict Quarterly*, and others. One of Dr. Sarkesian's articles is presently used in the text for the low-intensity conflict curriculum at Air Command and Staff College. (27:188-188)
OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS

Dr. Sarkesian is a prolific author on unconventional warfare and low-intensity conflict, but how is he viewed by other professionals in the field? Research for this book analysis uncovered an impressive array of proof that Sarkesian is well respected by other authorities. For example, he was selected as a participant in a "Symposium on the Role of Special Operations in US Strategy for the 1980's." (23:311) This symposium was jointly sponsored by The National Strategy Information Center, of the National Defense University, and the National Securities Studies Program at Georgetown University in March of 1983. In the words of Lieutenant General Richard D. Lawrence, former President of the National Defense University, "This meeting attracted current and former practitioners in the various functional areas of special operations and brought them together with other professionals from government, academia, the media, and public policy centers." (23:vii) There were over one-hundred participants including the Secretary of the Army who gave the keynote address. Attending were members of: the National Security Council Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, State Department, Congress and others. (23:301-314) From this group, Sarkesian was one of only eight selected to provide articles for discussion and subsequent publication in the compendium entitled Special Operations in US Strategy. Sarkesian's article was called "Organizational Strategy and Low-Intensity Conflicts." (23:261-289)

Further proof of Sarkesian's professional esteem was discovered in a work called Low-Intensity Conflict and Modern Technology. This book is a collection of articles written for a workshop conducted by the Air University Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (CADRE) in March 1984. Sarkesian was again selected as a contributor and provided an article called, "Low-Intensity Conflict: Concepts, Principles, and Policy Guidelines." In the Foreword US Congressman Newt Gingrich states, "Any student of American survival and any citizen concerned with understanding how this nation can cope with the challenge of low-intensity conflict more effectively will be well served by studying this work. Its authors are to be commended for a job well done and a process well initiated." (26:ix)

Two more items are worthy of mention. The first is a Congressional Study which was prepared at the request of the Special Operations Panel of the Readiness Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. This study was done by Mr. John Collins, Senior Specialist in National Defense, and was approved for printing 26 April 1987 by Representative Les Aspin. Sarkesian's book US Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict, as well as the previously mentioned Low-Intensity Conflict and Modern Technology, were both cited as references. (8:119)
One final example of Sarkesian’s professional credentials is provided by a member of the Airpower Research Institute in The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict. In the first chapter the author states, “Professor Sam Sarkesian of the Loyola University of Chicago has done more than anyone to try to establish a meaningful definition of low-intensity conflict.” (25:1-3) This book also makes several references to a workshop that Sarkesian conducted at Loyola in 1979. In addition, the workshop’s definition of LIC and several graphic models developed by Sarkesian are used to depict different levels of the conflict spectrum. (25:1-3)

CONCLUSION

It should be noted that this short list of Sarkesian’s works and his contributions to various symposiums, workshops, and studies is not exhaustive. There are many more examples that could be provided. However, this group provides enough data to conclude that Sarkesian’s views and opinions concerning low-intensity conflict are extremely well respected throughout the professional community. Thus, Sarkesian’s credibility on the subject must be considered as very high. How he presents and supports his assertions in The New Battlefield will be explored in the next chapter.
Chapter Two

REVIEW OF THE NEW BATTLEFIELD

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will explore the book itself. After identifying Sarkesian's thesis, a short synopsis and a critical analysis of his support will be provided. In addition, this report, in conjunction with other reviews, will critique Sarkesian's writing style.

THESIS

In the preface Sarkesian shows where he plans to take the reader stating, "the purpose of this book is to study and analyze the US political-military posture and effectiveness in responding to unconventional conflicts." (29:xv) He goes on to say, "...the US political-military posture and capability to deal with unconventional conflicts are inadequate and, in the main, ineffective." (29:xv) To develop this thesis, Sarkesian divides his book into three parts.

SYNOPSIS

Part I is titled "The Nature of Unconventional Conflicts: The Challenge." This portion of the book provides the backdrop for the rest of his work. Sarkesian gives the reader background information on Third World problems, a quick study of the evolution of the modern international system, and a host of definitions related to unconventional conflicts. He also supplies graphic models that enable the reader to visualize US military preparedness for conflict on a spectrum from non-combat through nuclear. (29:104,110) In addition, he expresses the view that the primary reason the US military is not prepared for low-intensity conflict is an overriding concern for containment of the Soviet Union. This has led US armed forces to place primary emphasis on preparing for big European-type conventional wars. (29:105,106)

Throughout this portion of the book, the reader encounters a theme secondary to the one exposed in the preface. Specifically, Sarkesian contends one reason the US is not prepared to deal with
unconventional conflict is "the nature and character of US democracy." (29:6) One example of this view is provided in Chapter Three when he suggests the American view of war, coupled with the US democratic policy-making process, causes many Americans to misperceive the nature of revolution. (29:81) He further contends this affects how Americans view war, the nature of the US military profession, and the US way of war. (29:122,123)

In summary, while the primary purpose of Part I is to provide essential background information, Sarkesian exposes the underlying theme viewed throughout the book—Americans do not understand the Third World. Therefore, they do not understand Third World conflicts. Since American people in general do not understand Third World conflicts, it follows the military does not either. Therefore, US forces are not prepared for low-intensity conflicts. This theme is critical to understanding Sarkesian's position. It is explored further in Chapter Three of this paper to establish whether Sarkesian is alone in this view.

Part II of the book is called "The US Political-Military Posture: The Response." Here Sarkesian provides a brief background on Vietnam. He also attempts to explain how Vietnam has affected US inability to deal with Third World unconventional conflicts; both politically and militarily. He suggests one reason for this is "Americans have forgotten the kind of war that was fought in Vietnam." (29:129) He further develops the underlying theme identified in Part I when he addresses problems created by open systems versus closed systems. His main points regarding this are (1) Americans believe the military should keep its noses out of politics and, (2) adversaries of open systems have ready access to our system and use our openness to their advantage. He provides a very succinct example of how our adversaries recognize the second when he says, "...a member of the Vietnamese Politburo, Le Duc Tho, at the tenth anniversary of the fall of Saigon and the defeat of South Vietnam publicly thanked the American people on television for helping the North in their victory." (29:189)

Sarkesian contends another problem with US-type democracies is impatience. He states, "It is difficult for democracies to reconcile long-run goals with short-run strategy...." (29:194) By this he means the very nature of unconventional conflicts sometimes puts the US on the side of unsavory characters. However, this is necessary in some cases to "...set aside strict adherence to law temporarily to a higher morality in order to advance democracy in the long run." (29:194) For most Americans this is a difficult concept to accept and requires a "new realism." (29:251)

Sarkesian says this "...new realism is concerned with developing a broader perspective and a realistic view of the nature of the Third World and unconventional conflicts." (29:251)
He proposes US national values, norms, and expectations place it at a disadvantage when dealing with Third World conflicts. He contends this problem is further compounded by the mass media. Dr. Sarkesian cites, "...the three dimensions for developing a new realism are civic illiteracy, the role of the media, and the nature of the American system." He further states, "The American value system and its expectations tend not to provide the kind of empathy or awareness needed to develop an understanding of foreign cultures, particularly those in the Third World, as a background for effective policy." (28:277,278) Again, Sarkesian points to "a lack of understanding" as the culprit. How to deal with this phenomena is addressed in the concluding portion of the book.

Part Three is titled simply "Conclusions." This leads the reader to believe Sarkesian will provide answers to questions raised throughout The New Battlefield. He does develop two sets of very broad suggestions. The first is seven policy proposals aimed at the US political-psychological posture. The second is another set of seven addressed at the US military system. Both sets are quite general in nature and unfortunately are not significant contributions.

Finally, Sarkesian's last chapter is designed to remotivate the reader about the US need to improve its unconventional warfare capabilities. He underlines the seriousness of this need by stating:

For the United States, the challenge of this new battlefield is particularly serious since its adversaries employ the very virtues and instruments of open systems to pursue their own goals to the detriment of open systems. In the process, these adversaries look with fear as well as disdain at open systems: fear because of the threat these open systems pose to closed systems, and disdain because of the nature of open systems that often prevents effective response to the challenges of unconventional warfare. (29:305)

In summary, Sarkesian's primary thesis should be amended. It is apparent to this writer that his overall theme should be expanded to state, "The US political-military posture and capability to deal with unconventional conflicts are inadequate and in the main, ineffective, [primarily because of a lack of understanding of the Third World in general and their conflicts in particular]." This is the overall bottom-line of Sarkesian's The New Battlefield. How he supports that theme is the subject of the next portion of this report.
ANALYSIS OF SUPPORT

As noted earlier, the main thrust of The New Battlefield is assertions by the author. To support his contentions Sarkesian uses a variety of techniques. These include historical analysis, deductive logic, and an array of "quotes from civilian and military thinkers...." (15:4) His widely varied support is well documented at the end of each chapter. He also provides a bibliographical essay that has an extensive list of related literature. Sarkesian states, "[This essay] is intended to provide a framework for categorizing the published literature and to give serious readers a method for managing a detailed study of unconventional conflicts based on many sources that have been useful in writing this book." (29:315) The references section of the essay alone contains over 75 entries. One book review referred to this as "...the star of the book--a bibliographical essay that is insightful and a powerful research tool for the study of unconventional warfare." (15:4)

In addition to the bibliography, Sarkesian provides an appendix with several charts showing US and USSR military assistance to various countries, as well as Soviet and Soviet-Bloc military presence in different parts of the world. He uses this to provide support for his assertions concerning the Soviet ability and willingness to involve itself in Third World affairs. While the charts are from reputable sources (a JCS publication, United States Military Posture FY 1986, and the Atlas of United States Foreign Relations) and provide a good perspective of how the Soviet Union is outspending and outmanning the US in the Third World, one reviewer felt they were unnecessary. He stated, "The appendix however, is unremarkable...[he] found little reason to include it since the information contained in its six charts is neither current nor unavailable from other open sources." (15:4) This reader disagrees and would contend if one is a new student of this topic, then the tables are useful and enhance Sarkesian's credibility and support.

Sarkesian relies heavily on his previous works for support. For example at the end of Chapter Two, in the Notes section, footnote 2 states, "Much of the material in this chapter is taken from Sam C. Sarkesian, 'American Policy on Revolution and Counterrevolution: A Review of the Themes in the Literature,' Conflict 5, no. 2...." (29:68) Again in Chapter Four, his chapter on conflict spectrum, two models were extracted from another of his previous works. One more example occurs in his "Notes" for Chapter Six where he refers the reader to: "...see Sam C. Sarkesian, America's Forgotten Wars: The Counterrevolutionary Past and Lessons for the Future." (29:160,161)

One reviewer of The New Battlefield states, "Indeed much of the material contained in this latest volume is readily available, down to the same footnotes, in Sarkesian's other works on the
subject." (18:123) Research for this paper confirmed that many of his themes were previously exposed in other works. One notable example was an article in the Summer 1984 edition of Conflict Quarterly. There were "...four major components to this study: democratic imperatives, American perceptions of war, American military posture, and the character of revolution and counterrevolution." (20:6) Each of these topics is addressed in The New Battlefield. A serious student who is familiar with Sarkesian's previous works might be disappointed with this aspect of the book. However, this should be considered a minor complaint unless one has read Sarkesian extensively.

In summary, Dr. Sarkesian logically, and effectively, supports his assertions with an extensive array of quotes, historical data, statistics, and references. These are powerful tools and effectively substantiate his thesis. Couple this with the professional regard pointed to in the first chapter of this report, and his credibility is even further enhanced. This strongly overrides, at least for the new student, the minor criticism on his over-reliance on previous works.

ANALYSIS OF MECHANICS

Sarkesian's support cannot be heavily criticized, but how he integrates it into his text is another question. Dr. Sarkesian at times used too many lengthy quotes. This often created confusion for the reader and caused him to retrace his steps to ensure he was extracting the proper meaning. An example of this is in Chapter Two. Here, Sarkesian addresses the basis for successful leadership in a revolution. Three separate quotes from an interpretation of Mao, Che Guevara, and Billington encompassed 29 lines of text. However, the three quotes are separated by only three lines each of Sarkesian's own words. (29:56,57) While the repetition could have produced the effect he desired, the length and intricacy of these quotes detracted considerably from overall readability. Thus, the meaning was lost. One reviewer agreed, stating, "The text is broken up with many quotations such that in some sections the feeling one gets is of reading an extended bibliographic essay." (18:123)

Another complaint is that Sarkesian too often starts a quote by internally citing someone only in the most general terms. For example, he often makes references such as, "In the Malayan conflict, the same points were emphasized by one authority on the subject." (28:85) Other times he simply uses "one authority writes." Only by jumping to the end of the chapter and looking at the footnotes can the reader determine who the "one authority" is. This unnecessarily interrupts the flow of reading. Another complaint regarding quotes is that Sarkesian often begins a quote assuming the reader is as familiar as he with particular writers. For example, on one occasion he writes, "Kerkvliet notes that
there were three reasons for the failure of the Huks and the parallel success of the Philippine government." (29:87) Most discerning readers, unless already familiar with works by Kerkvliet, would stop to ask, "Who is he/she?" Again, this interrupts the flow of information to the reader. A quick internal reference to who Kerkvliet is would enhance readability.

In addition to some awkward use of quotations and sources, Sarkesian was at times hard to follow due to overuse of subheadings within chapters. A reviewer for The Friday Review of Defense Literature states, "Another aspect of this book that is disturbing is its organization. There are too many chapters, subchapters, and sub-sub-headings." (15:5) These "sub-chapters and sub-sub-headings" could only be distinguished by the size, or form, of the type used to print the topic. Obviously this confuses the reader about what the original topic was.

Another area of concern is the "material contained in each major section and in many of the chapters is repetitious." (18:123) The reader, as he proceeds through the book, is often struck by a literary sense of "deja-vu." This is caused by unnecessary repetition of the same theme. For example, on page 13, Sarkesian presents the notion that "US political-military posture remains rooted in conventional perspectives and big battle scenarios." On page 114, addressing the topic of conflict spectrum he states, "...the [United States] experience in war...is deeply rooted in European models, the Civil War, and World War II." Again in Chapter Six, on p. 177, the same theme is addressed when Sarkesian states, "Although the United States has had a great deal of experience in unconventional conflicts, the modern way of war and military mind-sets are shaped by the big battles of World War I and World War II." One final example of the same theme occurs on p. 261 where he states, "Since the end of World War II, the United States has devoted much of its defense expenditures and strategic thought and posturing to counter the Soviet Union in the European area." This theme is only one that was constantly repeated throughout the book. While subtle repetitions can enhance learning, overuse of that technique can become distracting and boring.

One final mild criticism of The New Battlefield concerns Chapter Five called "Vietnam and After." Sarkesian states at the beginning of this chapter, "The Vietnam War has become part of the American psyche." He goes on to say, "What is important for our study is that the Vietnam experience has added to the misconceptions of unconventional warfare policy, strategy and political-military posture." Sarkesian, for the most part, provides a good analysis of why that has occurred. However, this reader felt that he detracted from that argument when he provided this very broad analysis of United States involvement in Vietnam. This portion of the book does little to add to his stated theme. More importantly, the historical facts presented here are hardly
new to the intended audience of "serious students of US political-military policy" identified in the preface of his book.

In summary, this review of Sarkesian's writing mechanics may appear overly critical. There are parts that read very smoothly and thoughts are nicely conveyed to the reader. The areas mentioned here were the distractors and do not disqualify this work for serious study. The next chapter will address Sarkesian's underlying themes and how well they meet with the views of other authorities in the area of LIC.
Chapter Three

OTHER VIEWS

INTRODUCTION

In a speech delivered at a Low-Intensity Warfare Conference held at the National Defense University in January 1986, former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger stated,

Tonight, one out of every four countries around the globe is at war. In virtually every case there is a mask on the face of war. In virtually every case, behind the mask is the Soviet Union and those who do its bidding. Much has been written about low-intensity warfare, but it remains an open question how much is understood. (22:258)

Sarkesian might answer that not a lot is understood because ignorance of low-intensity warfare is part of a larger misunderstanding of Third World conflicts. This chapter will attempt to establish the degree other authors agree with this assertion.

To pursue this end, some definitions must be established. This paper will consider the terms "Third World conflicts" and "low-intensity conflicts" to be synonymous. This work will also accept the universally agreed view that Third World conflicts have various root causes. Lastly, while there are many faces to Third World conflicts, in this paper references to LIC are to insurgencies. To that end it is also recognized that, according to a Sarkesian article about Mao's generally accepted insurgency theory, there are several stages to successful insurgencies. (27:175,181) It is also accepted as arguable if an insurgency reaches Mao's third stage, mobilized conventional warfare, whether the conflict could still be classified as LIC. (27:181) Hence, insurgencies referenced here are no further developed than Mao's second, or strategic stalemate, stage. (27:175)

DEFINITION DILEMMAS

The first step toward understanding a concept lies in a good definition. In researching Sarkesian's ideas it was discovered most authors developed distinct definitions of LIC. For example,
in an article in *Air University Review* entitled "Air Power in Low-Intensity Conflict In the Middle East," the author fought through a full two and one-half pages to arrive at the following definition for use of US forces: "...low-intensity conflict is the use of all the means of power--diplomatic, economic, and military--to influence or create a situation more favorable to US interests at the lowest possible level of involvement." (17:5)

Army writers only add to the confusion. One author stated, "Additionally, a new and more encompassing definition for low-intensity conflict is being created." He goes on to say, "The new definition is apt to include terrorism counteraction, as well as peacekeeping and rescue operations. Low-intensity conflict is therefore rapidly becoming a catchall." (19:33)

Lieutenant Colonel David J. Dean, of the Air University CADRE, agrees with Sarkesian that a first step towards understanding LIC is defining the concept. As previously noted, he uses a Sarkesian workshop definition and models to describe the concept in his book, *The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict*. He also points out the Army defines this concept differently than the Air Force.

Sarkesian highlights another problem in understanding LIC as the perception concerning the threat to American interests. Lt Col Dean points out, "Several characteristics of conflict make them 'low-intensity' from the US point of view. The issues that will be involved will probably not be 'vital' US interests." (25:7) As noted earlier, and as Sarkesian states, these conflicts are by their very nature protracted affairs. It is difficult to convince Americans a conflict in a Third World country, that is not a direct vital interest today, could affect their vital interests tomorrow. Thus, many agree with Sarkesian that "low-intensity conflict remains a somewhat nebulous concept" (25:11) and Americans in particular have trouble with the notion.

**UNIQUELY AMERICAN PROBLEMS**

In addition to the problems military professionals have in defining LIC, this author would also contend that one reason they have difficulty understanding these types of conflicts is the American need to categorize things. Americans prefer, or even expect, everything to fall into neat little niches. LIC's are not easy to categorize and are therefore difficult for the American mind to fathom. "Unfortunately, the abstract factors abounding in the realm of insurgency are not compatible with our propensity for systems analysis, quantifiable measures of evaluation and an overall quest for tangible results that can be presented on multicolored graphs." (18:24) Couple this with the fact that most insurgencies are long drawn-out affairs and these wars become even more difficult for average Americans to understand. Describing
the British Army defeat of the communist insurgency in Malaya, one author states. "In short, the army settled in for the long haul—something the fragile MRLA Structure could not withstand. This sharply contradicts the American penchant for large-scale, fast tempo operations designed to yield rapid results before the American public and Congress lose patience." (10:69) This supports Sarkesian's basic theme of American ignorance of LIC and also touches upon the patience factor that he addresses throughout the book.

A collection of articles produced by CADRE called Low-Intensity Conflict and Modern Technology is another source that agrees with Sarkesian's view that better understanding of LIC is needed. In the preface the editors list as one goal: "... we wanted to increase the awareness among the defense community of the importance of understanding and planning to deal with low-intensity conflict." (28:xii) In addition, the editors make an attempt at defining LIC. This again demonstrates that authors recognize there is a problem presenting useful information about LIC to an unknowing audience.

Dr. Richard H. Shultz lays the blame for this lack of understanding in a different area. He states, "An examination of the record demonstrates a frequent lack of understanding and little consistency among successive administrations in addressing issues of revolution-counterrevolution or insurgency-counterinsurgency." (28:72) In a related article, Dr. Shultz provides the reader with a short historical essay of American involvement in LIC environments since World War II. Near the end he states, "In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, US capacity for responding to low-intensity threats to geostrategic, political and economic interests in the developing world was reduced greatly." (28:72) He attributes part of this lack of consistency and continuity to the American political system and new administrations. In this regard, he not only supports Sarkesian's views about the American democratic and political systems inability to cope with LIC concepts, but also quotes a Sarkesian to support his position. (26:72)

SUMMARY

While these are but a few of the examples of agreement available, they are strong evidence Sarkesian's basic theme is generally supported by other writers in the field. Additionally, his use as a reference source by other authors is further testament to Sarkesian's credibility. One can therefore conclude his assertions at least warrant further investigation.

Thus, if one accepts Sarkesian as a credible source on LIC, his basic premise that the US military does not understand and is not prepared to deal with LIC should create anxiety. Military
members should especially take note and a truly concerned officer will certainly question the readiness of his own organization. Where does one look to find the answer to that query? The next chapter addresses that question as it relates to the USAF.
Chapter Four

EVOLUTION OF A DOCTRINAL VOID

INTRODUCTION

How well does the USAF understand LIC? Doctrine is the obvious first place to look for an answer. This chapter will analyze USAF basic doctrine to assess the Air Force’s readiness to deal with LIC. A short review of the current AFM 1-1 will establish present guidance concerning LIC. In addition, analysis of the evolution of the present manual from past versions establishes a historical correlation between old and new. This correlation leads to some disturbing conclusions about strategies for the future.

TODAY’S GUIDANCE?

"At the very heart of warfare lies doctrine. It represents the central beliefs for waging war in order to achieve victory.... It is the building material for strategy. It is fundamental to sound judgment." (5:i) This General LeMay quote is the foundation for USAF doctrine. While he says doctrine is the key to building strategy, this author contends doctrine is also imperative to building understanding of LIC in the USAF. Without that basic understanding, USAF commanders confronting a LIC environment lack the basic tools to apply the judgment that both General LeMay and AFM 1-1 call for.

AFM 1-1 states, "The types of military action in which a commander may employ aerospace forces cross a wide spectrum of warfare from low-intensity combat to strategic warfare for national survival." (5:2-1) Yet, close perusal of AFM 1-1 will leave the serious doctrinal student searching for guidance about the employment of aerospace forces at the low end of the conflict spectrum. In fact, the issue is only vaguely addressed in two areas.

The first is in the Special Operations mission. AFM 1-1’s definition of special operations objectives are "to influence the accomplishment of strategic or tactical objectives normally through the conduct of low visibility, covert, or clandestine military actions." (5:3-4) "Thus, the unconventional warfare
mission refers almost exclusively to activity behind enemy lines, implying that it is a mission adjunct only to those undertaken in a conventional conflict." (25:106) While this type of mission may play a vital part in some realms of LIC, it certainly is not the only role of airpower required to deal with even the most basic form of insurgency. For example, in the successful defeat of an insurgency in Malaya, Royal Air Force (RAF) airpower was used for bombing, ground attack, PSYOPS, airlift, and even crop spraying to destroy insurgent gardens. (26:150,151) While some of these missions were no doubt clandestine in nature; most were not.

The second and last area that a reader could make a vague connection with LIC in AFM 1-1 is under the Specialized Tasks section of psychological operations (PSYOPS). AFM 1-1 describes this task as "A specialized task performed by aerospace forces to support national objectives by influencing the attitudes and behavior of hostile, neutral, or friendly groups." (5:3-7) Again, while it is generally accepted that PSYOPS play an important role in countering insurgencies for a variety of reasons, there is no specific mention of LIC. In both cases it is only through inference that the reader makes any connection.

PRESENT STRATEGY?

Dr. Sarkesian would raise few arguments when he contends, "A great deal of the strategic success of the United States in dealing with Third World conflicts rests in doctrine." (29:238) Nor would he raise many eyebrows when he states simply that, "Success in unconventional conflicts requires that doctrine differ from doctrines designed for conventional and nuclear conflicts." (29:239) However, one author contends, "With regard to low-intensity conflict, the current AFM 1-1 makes it reasonably clear that the USAF has little serious interest in it." (14:16) This lack of "serious interest" presents the USAF with a real problem since LIC is the most likely form of warfare US forces will encounter for the remainder of the century. Thus, for the USAF, lack of doctrine is key to the "lack of understanding" that Sarkesian addresses throughout his book.

Colonel Thomas A. Fabyanic, USAF retired, gives AFM 1-1 a scathing review regarding the subject:

An equally serious failing of AFM 1-1 is its nearly complete disregard for the conduct of war across the spectrum of conflict. No meaningful designations are made about the various levels of war and the differing challenges they present. Thus, AFM 1-1 ignores the Clausewitzian admonition that the profound act of judgment is to establish, at the outset, the type of war upon which one is embarking. (14:16)
This is a succinct admonishment of the manual regarding both General LeMay's views on judgment and Dr. Sarkesian's call for different strategies for different levels of combat. A review of earlier manuals shows that this void was not always present.

**EARLY DEVELOPMENT AND LATER EROSION**

In 1955, AFM 1-2 touched lightly on the subject. It stated, "The nature of conflict varies greatly. It may range all the way from a routing exchange of diplomatic notes conducted in a friendly atmosphere of peace to general war. Between these two extremes a nation may be involved in international tensions in many forms including limited wars and possibly for long periods." (6:1) The 1959 version contained essentially the same quote with only minor changes. These were general descriptions and were indicative of a new force searching for a definitive role across the spectrum of conflict.

In 1964, the first AFI 1-1 superseded the 1955 AFM 1-2 and addressed LIC more specifically. The new manual devoted an entire chapter to "Employment of Aerospace Forces in Counterinsurgency." This chapter defined insurgencies, described the different levels of insurgency, and emphasized the importance of popular support. It provided general guidance to the planner and strategist for use of airpower in early stages of an insurgency by "assisting in civic actions designed to improve economic and social conditions." Later the manual addressed "Direct Air Action Against Insurgent Forces." The chapter also discussed airlift, provided the rudiments for PSYOPS, and explained "Interdiction of External Support." (1:Ch 6) All in all, commanders were provided a strong foundation to begin operations in a LIC arena. (See Appendix)

Seven years later the 1971 version of the manual became slightly more general and provided only a chapter on "Air Force Special Operations." It defined these operations as including "foreign internal defense, psychological operations, unconventional warfare and related activities." (2:6-1) This edition of the manual also specified, "All forces of the USAF are responsible for conducting and supporting special operations..." (2:6-1) It also distinguished, as does Sarkesian, between Special Operations, conducted by all forces of the USAF, and Special Operations Forces who "conduct their own special operations and provide orientation and training for other US Air Force and allied personnel as required." (2:6-1) While this version at least addresses LIC, a trend towards relegating this type warfare to more general terms is noted.

The 1975 version becomes even more general as "Subtheater and Localized Conflicts" warrants only three short paragraphs. The USAF is absolved of primary responsibility in insurgency situations with the statement, "...the nation or ally which is
threatened will bear the primary responsibility for its own defense." (3:3-6) It does go on to say, however, that the USAF will assist friendly nations by conducting special operations.

The 1979 model of AFM 1-1 becomes even broader stating, "We must be ready to assist in counterrevolutionary, insurgency, and low-intensity conflicts." (4:1-9) It also alludes to the fact that Special Operations will be conducted by Special Forces and that one facet of Special Operations is unconventional warfare. It is interesting to note that in an Air Force manual the graphic used to highlight the notion of Special Operations is a group of well armed Special Forces types approaching their target in a rubber dinghy. (4:2-19) This further indicates the USAF trend toward assigning this form of conflict to Special Forces and clandestine type operations. From there it was only a small step to almost total elimination of the topic in the present manual.

CONCLUSION: A HISTORICAL GAP?

This quick review of LIC doctrinal erosion shows a definite trend. The early manuals were very general about LIC. However, the closer one gets to the Vietnam Conflict, the more specific the guidance is regarding use of airpower in LIC scenarios. This is clearly seen in the '64 and '71 manuals at the height of the war. Yet, the manuals from 1975 onwards gradually erode leading one author to state, "The first thing one notices about post-Vietnam basic doctrinal manuals, is that the Air Force has largely ignored the war in Vietnam. These manuals concentrate almost exclusively on theater-level conventional warfare and are clearly centered on the European case." (13:11) Is this an attempt, perhaps, to not only forget a first defeat, but also a subconscious effort to ignore what Sarkesian proposes is not understood? It seems to be reflected in some US responses to requests for aid.

The greatest deficiency in US aid is that it tends to place reliance upon mechanization and automation to compensate for defects in strategy, tactics, training and discipline of the recipient army.... Currently US training for foreign nations tends to stress conventional warfare activities such as close-air-support coordination, artillery preparation of attack zones and large scale troop movements. As a result, these foreign troops are well-trained--for a land war in Korea or Central Europe. (12:6)

If the Air Force is in fact ignoring Vietnam and its impact on doctrinal development, it is ignoring the most basic and primary tools used to develop doctrine and strategy--history and experience. There is a wealth of historical experience for the USAF to use in the development of this needed doctrine. The next chapter will provide a few examples that should be studied.
Chapter Five

FILLING THE VOID

INTRODUCTION

No nuclear weapons have been fired. No massive nuclear retaliation has been considered appropriate. This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin—war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It is a form of warfare uniquely adapted to what has been strangely called ‘wars of liberation’ to undermine the efforts of new and poor countries to maintain the freedom that they have finally achieved. It preys on economic unrest and ethnic conflicts. It requires in those situations where we must counter it, and these are the kinds of challenges that will be before us in the next decade if freedom is to be saved, a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training. (16:25)

The above quote is just as applicable today as it was over 25 years ago when President John F. Kennedy addressed a graduating class at West Point. His statement about the next decade was truly prophetic, yet it appears the US in general, and the USAF in particular, has not learned the lessons of Kennedy’s “next” or previous decades. This paper will now address areas the USAF must examine to reverse the dangerous trend identified in the previous chapter.

VIETNAM: PAINFUL, BUT VITAL LESSONS

Dr. Sarkesian’s premise of a US military ill prepared to deal with Third World conflicts is well supported. Unfortunately, it is also widely recognized that the USAF has created a void regarding LIC doctrine. As previously related, one reason for this doctrinal void is the USAF has ignored historical data regarding the use of airpower in LIC. By ignoring history, the USAF has omitted a critical ingredient in the strategy-doctrine
Without a thorough study of history, successful military doctrine cannot be developed. Therefore, a first step toward filling the void is to study both successful and unsuccessful uses of airpower in LIC environments.

As established earlier, it is widely thought that lessons from Vietnam have largely been ignored. One reason for this is the pain required to look to an unpleasant past. It is much easier to blame the loss of the war on interference from Washington, the press, or a hostile public, than to look deeper into the situation to derive the facts from a purely military standpoint. That Washington was heavily involved and the war was taken almost immediately to the public via an electronic media are important lessons. These facts are here to stay and will need to be considered in any Third World conflict of the future. Thus, they should be reflected in doctrine to allow development of strategies for the future.

Regarding Vietnam, "...airmen have been accused of not understanding the nature of the war, the nature of the enemy, and the restraint required to wage limited war and keep it limited." (13:10) Steps must be taken to apply these lessons in a viable doctrine if planners of the future are to develop successful strategies. Studying the use of airpower in Vietnam is a first step in developing the understanding of Third World conflicts that Sarkesian points to. Yet, there are other, more successful, historical examples that should be studied before this lack of doctrine can be eliminated properly.

LEARNING FROM OTHERS

One early successful use of airpower in a LIC environment occurred between the two World Wars. "During the 1930's the British were very effective in developing a strategy and doctrine for dealing with one form of low-intensity conflict: low level counterinsurgent warfare." (25:19) At the end of World War I Winston Churchill, then Minister of War and Air, declared, "The first duty of the RAF is to garrison the British Empire." (25:21) It was during this time that the British were encountering low-intensity conflicts in various colonies. In 1920, Air Chief Marshall Hugh M. Trenchard used Churchill's guidance and his own theories to develop a concept for using airpower to defeat an insurgent force in Somaliland. This early encounter, along with experiences in Iraq and several other colonies, was studied at the RAF Staff College and the Imperial Defence College in the mid-1930's. Using Trenchard's theories and combat experiences as source material, these schools devised the well-known and successful British Air Control Doctrine. (25:Ch 2)
The RAF used strategies derived from this doctrine well into
the 1960's. (9:19) Parts of this strategy were used to defeat a
Communist insurgency in Malaya. A lesson Sarkesian would
immediately point to is the length of this protracted conflict.
It began in 1948 and was not successfully defeated until 1960.

A close look at this insurgency shows several direct
applications of airpower that should provide useful lessons for
developers of doctrine. Some of their forces encountered problems
very similar to those of the USAF in Vietnam. For example, one
constraint was the RAF was restricted from targeting insurgent
sanctuaries along Thailand borders. Another, was the problem of
attacking targets hidden in heavily foliaged jungles. (28:128-136)

There were several other successful uses of airpower. RAF
aircraft were used to spray hidden gardens to assist in starving
insurgents into submission. (28:136) They were also used
extensively in PSYOP operations dropping leaflets and flying
Dakotas fitted with loudspeakers. The value of these voice
flights was 70 per cent of the surrendering enemy personnel said
they were influenced by them in their decisions. (28:151) Some of
the first extensive use of helicopters is seen in this conflict as
well as vigorous use of airdrop and airlift of troops and
supplies. (28:133,135) Perhaps the greatest lesson of all was it
was a totally coordinated effort with an eye on all facets of the
political, military, and social spectrum of the conflict. (28:168)

_DISCARDED--NOT DISPROVEN_

This paper is not trying to establish the RAF successes as the
panacea for successful operations in LIC environments. Rather, it
is trying to highlight documented successful use of airpower in
Third World conflicts that deserve study to fill the void the USAF
has created in its present AFM 1-1. In addition to historical
data, the USAF has previous documents of its own that should be
studied to derive statements of doctrine that remain as correct
today as when originally written.

Just as President Kennedy's statement remains valid a quarter
of a century later; just as the theories of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu
remain as valid in today's wars as in those of the past; so do
some of our previously established and discarded doctrines. One
author agrees:

A shift has occurred in Air Force thinking about
counterinsurgency, and it becomes quite evident if one
examines past doctrinal expressions. As Air Force doct-
trinal manuals go, perhaps the best yet promulgated is the
1964 version written during General Curtis E. LeMay's
tenure as Chief of Staff. The chapter titled "Employment
of Aerospace Forces in Counterinsurgency" offers a valid
conceptual base for developing a collective Air Force response to that type of conflict. Perhaps it should be reexamined in the light of events in such areas as the Philippines, all of Central America, parts of South America, and various countries in Africa and Southwest Asia. That we have yet to do so is evidence of a professional lapse of the gravest proportions. It is reasonably obvious that our current thinking is clouded by the "never again" syndrome of Vietnam, but, in that respect, we are confusing a poorly executed example with a valid concept of modern war. One would hope that sound doctrinal thinking could distinguish between the two. (14:17)

SUMMARY

Training will be required to develop the understanding of LIC Dr. Sarkesian calls for. Since "aerospace doctrine drives how the Air Force organizes, trains, equips and sustains its forces," (5:v) that training will not take place until doctrine is established to require it. In addition, until that void is filled through study of its own past, historical data from other air forces, and a review of its own previous manuals, the USAF will not be prepared to deal with what General Nutting, former USSOUTHCOM commander, calls "the most important strategic issue facing the US." (25:1)
Chapter Six

CONCLUSION

STRATEGY FOR THE MOST LIKELY WAR

Sarkesian contends, and it is universally accepted, that there is a much greater likelihood for the US, and subsequently the USAF, to encounter conflict in the Third World than any other arena. The recent developments in superpower relations regarding the INF treaty should make this even more clear. Neither of the superpowers wishes a direct confrontation with the other lest they risk nuclear exchange and possible self-destruction. Yet, based on Secretary Weinberger’s statement about Soviet support for Third World conflicts, the US cannot afford to sit idly by as the USSR takes advantage of Third World instability. However, it is just this arena that Sarkesian and many others contend the US and its military is least prepared to engage in because of a basic lack of understanding.

The New Battlefield: The United States and Unconventional Conflicts, provides the concerned military professional a springboard from which to launch into a better understanding of these conflicts. It is an especially adept tool for the USAF officer to gain a better understanding of what has been largely ignored in doctrinal manuals since the end of the Vietnam war.

While Sarkesian’s book has faults regarding readability, reliance on his own previous works, and disappointingly general recommendations for solutions, these do not detract from the fact that this book provides a much needed look at a critically ignored subject for beginning students. (18:122) Sarkesian’s background on Third World problems and his views about American societal trends, democracy’s openness, and efforts needed to rectify the situation, provide the serious officer with at least a start towards a better understanding of LIC.

USAF officers in particular have much to gain from a study of Sarkesian’s work. It is particularly apparent after reviewing his book and assertions about strategy and doctrine that the USAF is indeed ill prepared for these most likely encounters. While recent efforts such as the establishment of the Low-Intensity Warfare Center at Langley AFB are steps in the right direction, “the establishment of the Center has [not] ended the Pentagon’s
struggles to identify what LIC is--and is not...." (21:102) These efforts do not fill the doctrinal void created over the last fifteen years.

This void can only be filled by convincing the authors of AFM 1-1 of the need to do so. Once convinced, where should they begin? As stated earlier, the 1964 version of AFM 1-1 provided the most comprehensive guidance concerning LIC. Only this manual placed the impetus for dealing with insurgencies on the entire Air Force vice special forces. Only this manual provides guidelines for differing strategies dependent on the stage of the insurgency. After a closer look at the manual, it is apparent that much of the guidance provided in this relatively old document is the same as doctrine used successfully by the RAF in Malaya. To deter World War III, modern Air Force strategy is by necessity very technically oriented. However, this should not blind strategists to the fact that technology alone will not win the war in the Third World.

At present AFM 1-1 outlines nine specific missions for employment of aerospace forces. (5:3-2) Most could probably be used in certain aspects of a LIC scenario, but the fact remains there is no specific guidance for the use of any air forces at the low end of the spectrum. AFM 1-1 states, "Air Force missions describe broad military objectives attained by employing aerospace forces." (5:3-2) This applies to use of airpower in a LIC environment just as it does higher up the spectrum. As previously discussed, the 1964 version of Air Force doctrine provides the basic guidance necessary to use airpower effectively in a counterinsurgent role. The '64 version should be studied and the use of aerospace forces in LIC should become the tenth Air Force mission. This would allow the Air Force to be "...ready to conduct warfare to support national objectives" (5:3-1) at all levels of the conflict spectrum.

However, until institutional guidance is provided, it is necessary for conscientious professionals to educate themselves about these most likely conflicts. Dr. Sarkesian's book provides a positive step in the right direction. He shows the need for a separate strategy for dealing with LIC. A close study of his work points to the necessity for studying a sometimes painful past. Perhaps most importantly, however, Sarkesian's book leads the modern military officer toward the conclusion that new is not always better. It will convince the thorough author of doctrine and strategy to look to past documents such as the 1964 AFM 1-1 for answers to fill the LIC doctrinal void. Sarkesian's book does not have all the answers, but it certainly launches the serious student of LIC towards resolution of the oft quoted Sun Tzu phrase: "If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle." (31:9)
A. REFERENCES CITED

Official Documents


Articles and Periodicals


CONTINUED

Books


B. RELATED SOURCES

Articles and Periodicals

CONTINUED

Books


EMPLOYMENT OF AEROSPACE FORCES IN COUNTERINSURGENCY

6-1. Definitions of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency. Insurgency is a condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted government which falls short of civil war. Insurgency movements seek to develop local support and external aid for subversive action against the organized government. Their ultimate objective is the control of the people. The U.S. is not against all revolution, but against revolutionary movements that are used by aggressive totalitarian interests to prevent the growth of representative government. Counterinsurgency includes those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat subversive insurgency.

6-2. Characteristics of Insurgency Warfare. Operating from the cover of the civilian population or of rough terrain, insurgent forces may execute surprise attacks against government positions—thereby gradually supplanting government authority in the countryside. They can be quick to exploit local grievances, economic or social inequities, and political dissatisfaction. Insurgent forces may receive any or all of the following forms of support:

a. The civilian population may provide concealment, reinforcements, financial support, supplies, and intelligence.

b. External sources may provide leaders, training, motivation, sanctuary, weapons, reinforcements, funds, and supplies.

c. Government offices, infiltrated by insurgents or their sympathizers, may provide essential intelligence, secure political sanctions, assure access to weapons and military supplies, and provide opportunities for exploitation of government weaknesses through military action or propaganda.

6-3. Objectives of Counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency operations and activities seek to eliminate the causes of insurgency, the insurgent forces, and the flow of external support. In the early stages of potential insurgency, political, social, economic, and internal security programs can be utilized to prevent the growth of a popular base from which insurgents could operate. In later phases, insurgents must be positively identified, cut off from the local population, denied external aid, and ultimately destroyed or forced to surrender. Insurgency is likely to be defeated only if the local population is loyal to the constituted government. The U.S. Air Force can contribute to counterinsurgency most effectively by providing training assistance to the indigenous forces to enable them to secure the loyalty of the people and to insure that these forces can protect the people from insurgent attack.

6-4. The Air Role in the Early Stages of Insurgency. Air forces can strengthen internal security by assisting in civic actions designed to improve economic and social conditions, and by identifying governmental military forces with the needs and aspirations of the people. The development of air communication and transportation systems and the application of military technical skills to meet civilian requirements can be of major importance to governmental stability and internal security.

6-5. Protection of the Civilian Population. While the elimination of popular support for insurgency involves primarily political and economic activities, it must also include military protection of civilian communities from insurgent military and paramilitary forces. Air weapons are particularly suitable for this task since they are able to concentrate firepower rapidly at threatened points, and are capable of applying selective degrees of force in consonance with the insurgent threat. In such operations a premium is placed on precise target identification to protect noncombatants. Air strikes are usually directed.
by Forward Air Controllers and are launched only against clearly identified enemy targets to insure this protection.

6-6. Direct Air Action Against Insurgent Forces. When insurgents have been separated from the cover of civilian communities, hunter-killer aircraft can be used to destroy hard-core units. Airlift provides quick-reaction mobility and supply to ground forces, to enable them to rapidly achieve and maintain contact with insurgent units. Coordinated joint operations and centralized control are essential. In addition, leaflets, loudspeakers, and other psychological measures can be used from the air to produce defections from insurgent forces and provide guidance for the civil population. Maximum advantage should be taken of friendly air capabilities since insurgents generally lack this source of military power.

6-7. Interdiction of External Support. Often the lines of communication for insurgents extend into neighboring countries, compounding the problems of intelligence and interdiction. Because insurgents generally suffer from a serious shortage of weapons, ammunition, food, and other supplies, interdiction can strike a critical blow if supply routes can be located and successfully sealed off. Night and marginal weather capabilities, as well as weapons having delayed effects, are essential. However, effective interdiction may require direct or covert action against insurgent bases within the neighboring state or states.