The Staff: Another Dimension of the Operational Level of War

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Recently, much has been written about the United States Army's re-discovery of the operational level of war. It has been defined, redefined, and re-redefined by numerous authors. Hopefully, more and more professional soldiers are beginning to restudy old campaigns with an eye to what they can learn about command at the operational level, rather than about what the conduct or outcome of the campaign happened to be. Many of these campaigns occurred during World War II, our largest and best documented war to date.
One of the Army's most successful organizations in that war was the Third U.S. Army, commanded by General George S. Patton, Jr. This paper discusses the actions of his headquarters during a very limited period of time—mid-December 1944 until the end of January 1945—the Battle of the Bulge. Plans for the upcoming Saar campaign had to be set aside in order to respond to the German threat in the Ardennes. This was quickly and efficiently done and Third Army turned 90 degrees to attack in a different direction. The actions of each staff section are examined to reveal what an army headquarters does at the operational level of war. The relationships between commander and staff are also addressed to illustrate how they must be synchronized in order to contribute to a leader's ability to fight a successful campaign. One conclusion drawn is that General Patton's selection of his staff officers had much to do with his ability to lead in the way that he did.
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THE STAFF ANOTHER DIMENSION OF THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR

An Individual Study Project
Intended for Publication

by

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ABSTRACT

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Recently, much has been written about the United States Army's re-discovery of the operational level of war. It has been defined, redefined, and re-redefined by numerous authors. Hopefully, more and more professional soldiers are beginning to restudy old campaigns with an eye to what they can learn about command at the operational level, rather than about what the conduct or outcome of the campaign happened to be. Many of these campaigns occurred during World War II, our largest and best documented war to date.

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THE STAFF AND THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR

A noted historian recently said, "Too many people have been attempting to define the operational level of war. They need to spend less time trying to decide what it is and start studying it instead." While he would not deny that definitions are important to one's understanding of a subject (for they can tell us what something is as well as what it is not), his point was that until one actually studies campaigns at the operational level he or she cannot fully grasp what that level of warfare comprises. In other words, what sets the operational apart from the strategic and tactical levels of war is best understood by studying real campaigns.

Pursuing that advice, what follows is a discussion of a portion of the American effort to respond to the German Ardennes offensive of 1944-1945--the Battle of the Bulge, as it is more commonly called. The focus will be on only those actions of the Third United States Army, commanded by General George S. Patton, Jr. Actions which took place at higher headquarters (the strategic level) will be discussed only insofar as they affected the course taken by Third Army. Actions of subordinate units at the tactical level will be discussed only as they impacted on the Third Army commander and his staff in managing the battle.
What follows, therefore, is not a story of the Battle of the Bulge itself. Rather, the emphasis will be on General Patton and his staff and the actions that they took when in the midst of preparing to initiate a major attack against German positions along the Siegfried Wall. The focus of the attack was changed from west-east and turned northward to answer the massive German attack that had come against First U.S. Army.

The discussion begins with a look at the overall military situation as it existed in Europe in the Fall of 1944 and then proceeds to an overview of the reasons for the German offensive. With the stage thus set for the entrance of Third Army, the focus then turns to that command. Following a brief discussion of its organization and disposition at the onset of the campaign, the Third Army response will then be examined by looking at the actions of the General and Special Staff sections. Fortunately, those soldiers left a very detailed after action report of their activities.

What does the report tell us about their actions? With the United States Army rediscovering the operational level of war in its doctrinal literature, are there lessons from that campaign of four decades ago that may be useful to today's commanders and staff officers? Are today's tasks at army level the same as they were in 1944? Are there any differences? More importantly, can a study of the Third Army staff provide clues as to why that army was so successful in its counter-offensive? General Patton was a brilliant, dynamic combat leader. Does the performance of his staff offer some explanation for his success? As military leaders study the operational art, should more attention be paid to relationships between commanders and their staffs or to the criteria for selecting good staff officers? This paper will address these and related questions while
attempting, along the way, to provide an appreciation for the duties of an army headquarters fighting at the operational level of war
BACKGROUND. WHY THE ARDENNES?

The history of the Second World War is so widely known that any detailed treatment here can easily be dispensed with in the interest of preceding to the central issue. Suffice it to say that in the fall of 1944 the Allies were swiftly closing in on Germany. To the south, in Italy, Allied forces were north of Florence, while on the Eastern Front Russian troops had broken into East Prussia. In the West, German forces had been on the retreat since the invasion of Normandy in June. Allied landings in Southern France in August added to the pressure. By September, German forces had begun to stiffen on the Western Front after their rapid and unexpected retreat from the coast. Nevertheless, American troops were now inside Germany for the first time, despite extremely hard and vicious fighting in the Hurtgen Forest near Aachen. Pressed steadily on all land fronts, Germany was clearly losing. At sea, also, her U-boat fleet had been bested and was less and less a significant factor due to the success of Allied convoy operations, and because overwhelming numbers of ships were being produced in American shipyards. In the air, the Luftwaffe could only hope for temporary local air supremacy if German officials were willing to pay the price of stripping meager forces from other areas. Thus, as the end of
1944 approached, millions of people could hope that the new year would bring the end of war. So, too, in Germany, yet Adolf Hitler hoped that 1945 would not result in the defeat of the Third Reich. Instead, he planned an offensive which might restore the balance of power.

"Brilliant," "audacious," "daring." These and other accolades could be accorded Hitler's Ardennes Campaign of 1944, more commonly known as the Battle of the Bulge because of the temporary alteration that the offensive made to the shape of American front lines. Each adjective is appropriate, yet one must also add "desperate," "costly," and perhaps even "doomed from the start," for once checked by the Allies, Germany was incapable of ever again accomplishing any operation of offensive significance. The inevitability of her defeat, though already obvious to most, could only be denied by the most fanatical or deluded. Given such a military situation it would appear that Germany had four options: Sue for peace, surrender, remain on the defensive, or go over to the offensive.

At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill took away the first option by making unconditional surrender a specific war aim, so it appeared to be out of the question that Germany could hope to negotiate an end to the war. Likewise, surrender offered little hope for it carried with it the prospect of occupation and partition by the Allies—to include the hated and feared Russians. In addition, in September 1944 the Germans learned of the existence of the "Morgenthau Plan", so named for U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr. This ill-conceived plan called for a post-war program in which Germany would be turned into a primarily agricultural nation, devoid of war-making industries. The impact of such a devastating
program on the most industrialized nation in Central Europe was not lost on the German government. Finally, the certainty that they would be called to account for their reign of terror had to be obvious to Hitler and the Nazi leadership.

The third German option, to remain on the defensive, would merely cause a delay of their inevitable defeat and would leave the initiative to the Allies; at best, it was only a way of buying time. Hitler reasoned, however, that an offensive offered some promise of success. If, as he believed, the Allied coalition possessed significant structural defects coupled with logistical problems, and if his forces could seize the initiative so as to once again deal a decisive blow to their enemies similar to those of the early years of the war, then Germany might salvage some chance of ultimate success. In deciding to go on the offensive, Hitler must have been aware of the following:

- Germany still had over seven and a half million men under arms and the production of armaments was continuing at a high level, despite intensive Allied bombing.

- In the east, Germany faced only the Soviet Union. The vast spaces available on the Eastern Front were such that any German offensive could easily be accommodated, if not by large amounts of Soviet soldiers, then by the trade-off of territory until events had run their course. Such an offensive in this area would, therefore, accomplish little.

- In the west, on the other hand, space was much more limited. Front lines in some places were still within two hundred miles of the coast. A deep, well-placed, and successful penetration could have a more significant impact in this theater.
An additional factor favoring an attack in the west was that in the Fall of 1944 Allied supply lines were becoming more and more strained. The first Anglo-American supply ship did not even enter the port of Antwerp, Holland until late November. Prior to that time, all supplies still had to be brought in over the beaches (or air-dropped during Operation MARKET GARDEN).4

A final factor was the placement of Allied forces in the west. British and Canadian units predominated to the north and Americans in the south. Should these forces be split, Hitler reasoned, that Germany could both literally and figuratively drive a wedge between them. As a despot possessing complete governmental authority, he incorrectly assumed that the Americans and British would lose much time in consultations about how to respond to any German offensive such as the one that he was contemplating. In the intervening period, Hitler expected to achieve his military objectives and, thereby, his political ones.5 Following his supposed victory in the west, Hitler planned to turn and defeat the Soviet Union. Hopefully, the Allied coalition would then break up, for the British would have insufficient troops to continue the fight and the United States would be reluctant to go it alone. After all, the U.S. still had a war to fight in the Pacific.

There is evidence that Hitler began to develop his plans along the above lines in August 1944.6 As secretive and mistrustful as he was, however (particularly after the Army attempt on his life on 20 July 1944), he kept his thoughts to himself and it was not until 16 September that he announced his scheme to his top military advisors. For reasons previously discussed, the attack was to come through the Ardennes Forest in Belgium.
just as in 1914 and 1940. The military objective would be Antwerp and the encirclement of Allied forces north of the Ardennes.

In selecting the Ardennes as the point of attack, Hitler correctly focused on the quietest and most lightly defended portion of the Allied lines—a sector where new units were sent to gain initial combat experience and older ones to rest and recuperate. With Antwerp as an objective, success would result in the cut-off of the First U.S. Army and the British 21st Army Group. This would isolate approximately 25 to 30 Allied divisions and, it was hoped, lead to their destruction.
THE GERMAN ATTACK

The German offensive began with an intense artillery barrage at 0525 hours on the morning of 16 December 1944. The efforts of Hitler and his generals to assemble a tremendous striking force had been significant and the amount of combat power at their disposal was ominous.

Thirteen infantry and seven armored divisions were ready for the initial assault. Five divisions from the OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) reserve were on alert or actually en route (sic) to form the second wave, plus one armored and one mechanized brigade at reinforced strength. Approximately five additional divisions were listed in the OKW reserve, but their availability was highly dubious. Some 1,900 artillery pieces— including rocket projectors—were ready to support the attack. The seven armored divisions in the initial echelon had about 970 tanks and armored assault guns. The armored and mechanized elements of the immediate OKW reserve had another 450 to swell the armored attack. If and when the Fifteenth Army joined in, the total force could be counted as twenty-nine infantry and twelve armored divisions.

These numbers are significant in relation to the limited size of the American force that was opposing the German offensive, yet further analysis would reveal significant shortfalls in the German ability to sustain an offensive. Still, Hitler had managed to concentrate significant mass vis-
a-vis those limited forces opposed to him, for, to the Allies, the Ardennes represented a "backwater" sector best used for "green" new units and tired old ones. This was the case on 16 December. On the Allied side the area was defended by four U.S. divisions: 4th, 28th, 99th, and 106th infantry divisions. The first two were veteran divisions, battle tested, but also battle weary. The 4th had assaulted Utah Beach in France on 6 June. The 28th had landed in France on 22 July. Each had experienced heavy combat in earlier fighting in the Hurtgen Forest and each had received new replacements. The other two were new arrivals to the theater. The 99th had landed in France on 3 November and the 106th had arrived on 6 December. Each needed time; neither would get it. Rounding out American forces in the area was the 14th Cavalry Group, which had landed in France on 27 September and which had the mission of screening between the two newer divisions.10

The German attack came across a forty mile wide front. It came as a surprise to many, both in its ferocity and in the fact that it was occurring at all. Here and there individual groups of Americans fought well and from almost the start German timetables were disrupted because of these rugged little stands, but in general, the impact was such that American units all along the line were either pushed back, surrounded, or bypassed to be left to follow-on German forces. A large number quickly fell out of contact with higher headquarters. Radios went out of action in many cases; in others, signals were jammed. Such was the general confusion that it was difficult for commanders at higher levels to quickly obtain a true picture of what was happening. This was especially true the higher up the chain of command one went.
General Omar Bradley, Twelfth Army Group commander, had his headquarters in Luxembourg City, Luxembourg, only a few miles from the battle taking place in the Ardennes. Nevertheless, information was so limited that on the day of the attack he felt confident enough to set off by car for Paris and a meeting at SHAEF headquarters with General Dwight D. Eisenhower. It was a long trip and he arrived late in the afternoon so that it was nearly dark when the SHAEF intelligence officer brought the two generals the news of the German counterattack. Information was still limited. It was known that the Germans had penetrated at five places in the VIII Corps front, but General Bradley did not seem to have been overly alarmed at that time.

Perhaps General Eisenhower was more cautious or maybe he intuitively sensed that this was more than a spoiling attack, for he saw the need to assist VIII Corps. In truth, there were few reserves available, except for the US XVIII Airborne Corps and its two airborne divisions, but these were being refitted after being withdrawn from Holland. The 7th Armored Division was also available in the Ninth Army area, and the 10th Armored Division was uncommitted in the Third Army sector. Eisenhower suggested to Bradley that he move the two armored divisions. Thus, it was that Third Army came to be drawn into the Battle of the Bulge.

THIRD ARMY RESPONDS

By 16 December, Third Army had fought its way across France, completed the capture of German positions around Metz, and was preparing to attack the Siegfried Wall to continue the offensive into Germany through
the Palatinate. This attack had been planned to begin on 19 December. In order to do so, General Patton's forces were aligned as follows: Sandwiched between First Army to the north and Seventh Army to the south, were Third Army's three corps. XX Corps and XII Corps were aligned abreast from north to south along the Franco-German border in the vicinity of Saarlautern and Saarbrucken, Germany, and Sarreguemines, France. III Corps was in the rear. The operation was planned to be conducted as follows:

The plan for the smash to the Rhine consisted of a co-ordinated two-Corps assault. On the south, XII Corps would attack in the Saarbrucken-Sarreguemines area with Kaiserlautern as the immediate objective. Simultaneously, on the north, XX Corps would attack in the Saarlautern salient with Bad Kreuznach, 25 miles southwest of Mainz, as the intermediate objective; III Corps, in reserve in the center, would exploit the first penetration to implement a breakthrough. This double envelopment, along the two main corridors through the rugged Palatinate, was designed to destroy all enemy forces west of the Rhine [in Third Army's area of concern] and thus eliminate them as a factor in the assault across the river in conjunction with Lucky [Third Army's codename] VI Corps of Seventh Army also would assail the Siegfried Line on Seventh's south flank.¹⁴

These plans had been meticulously prepared over a period of time. All tasks necessary to move a large army into the attack had been thoroughly coordinated. Reconnaissance had been conducted, plans and orders developed, supplies positioned or distributed, maps issued, and staffs briefed. Thus, General Patton initially protested when he was called by General Bradley on the 16th and told to send the 10th Armored Division to Luxembourg. Not only would its redeployment affect the impending operation, but the lack of information available to Allied leaders at that
time kept them (to include Patton) from fully appreciating the magnitude of the German attack. Nevertheless, he obeyed within an hour after it received the order, 10th Armored was underway; by daylight the next morning some of its units were in contact with the enemy. General Patton followed up the next morning by alerting III Corps to be prepared to also respond if so ordered.

With Third Army units now involved, a brief interlude is in order since the purpose of this paper is not to recount the Battle of the Bulge, but rather, to examine the actions of the Third Army commander and his staff for the lessons that they may teach us about war at the operational level. The paper will deal specifically with the actions of the headquarters. But because the material to be discussed took place within the overall context of a major battle, it is necessary to give is a quick overview of Third Army's participation.

OVERVIEW. THIRD ARMY PARTICIPATION

Third Army operations in December may be divided into two phases. Prior to the onset of the German offensive, Third Army was concentrating on the drive eastward. With seizure of the last positions around Metz, full attention turned to preparing for the attack through the Siegfried Line. Once tasked to respond to the German offensive, however, Third Army's focus changed to initiating an attack to the north to respond to the German effort, while holding in the south. In doing so, it went from a three corps army to one with four corps with the addition of VIII Corps, formerly part of the First Army. In this way, the orientation changed from three corps facing
east to two corps (VIII and III Corps) facing north and two (XII and XX Corps) continuing to face eastward, at least initially.

December 16-19

On 16 December, 10th Armored Division was ordered to move north to the vicinity of Luxembourg City. The next day General Patton also ordered III Corps to be prepared to deploy if necessary. On 18 December, General Patton and selected staff members met with General Bradley in Luxembourg City to review the situation and to plan accordingly. By midnight, one combat command of the 4th Armored was moving north and the rest of the division, plus the 80th Infantry Division, moved the next day. Planning continued on the 19th. Also on that day General Patton traveled to Verdun where he met with Generals Eisenhower and Bradley and others to coordinate the Allied campaign. Key decisions were made at this conference, to include assigning Seventh Army responsibility for the southern portion of Third Army's front and confirmation of the transfer of VIII Corps from First to Third Army. Third Army was to attack on the morning of 23 December.

December 20-21

Although some elements were already in contact, this was primarily a period of movement as units were shifted along the front or withdrawn from the line and turned north. Third Army's forward (tactical) command post moved to Luxembourg City on 20 December. On that same day, Patton roamed throughout the area of operations meeting with commanders. On this one
day he visited Twelfth Army Group Headquarters, III Corps, VIII Corps, 4th, 9th, and 10th Armored Divisions; the 4th and 26th Infantry Divisions, and the advanced element of the 80th Infantry Division. That day, General Patton also directed VIII Corps to hold Bastogne. Meanwhile, throughout the 20th and 21st units continued to move over constricted (and constrained) roads in cold weather and with minimal preparation time.

**December 22-26**

III Corps attacked on the 22nd, as did elements of XII Corps. Meanwhile, VIII Corps forces at Bastogne continued to hold out despite being surrounded. Good flying weather on the 23rd allowed for much needed tactical air support from the Army Air Corps. Meanwhile, XX Corps attacked in the south in an attempt to divert German attention. Third Army attacks continued to make progress on 24 and 25 December. On 26 December, Combat Command “R” of the 4th Armored Division made contact with Bastogne, thereby opening a corridor to its previously surrounded garrison.

**December 27-31**

During this period Bastogne was reinforced, additional forces were made available to Third Army (11th Armored Division and 87th Infantry Division), and German attacks to retake Bastogne were countered. On 31 December, III Corps began an attack to the northeast of Bastogne. Of its four corps, Third Army now had all but the XXth involved in the Allied counteroffensive. XX Corps remained to the south in a defensive posture. By this time, the results of the Ardennes Campaign was obvious; combat
continued in order to restore pre-battle boundaries and to continue the offensive

January 1-8

During this period, Third Army continued on the offensive to regain that territory previously lost, while planning the initiation of new attacks against the Siegfried Line. Enemy forces continued to delay and to counterattack, especially around Bastogne. General Patton and his corps commanders met on 2 January to coordinate the attack against the Siegfried Line. Seventeen German counterattacks were experienced on 4 January throughout the area of operations. Throughout the period, progress was slow due to determined (but ultimately futile) German resistance and bad weather.

January 10-28

Third Army units continued on the offensive. Meanwhile, the Germans began to withdraw forces from the bulge to avoid being surrounded and cut off. On 11 January, VIII Corps elements made contact with British forces to their north and on the 16th VII Corps made contact near Houffalize with First Army troops driving down from the top of the bulge. During the latter half of January, Third Army's unit roster began to decrease as higher headquarters began to shift forces to other armies. Nevertheless, offensive operations continued. By the 28th, III, XII, and VIII Corps were in position from north to south along the Our River, ready to continue the offensive.
across the Our and into the Siegfried Line. This marked the end of Third Army's response to the Ardennes Offensive.
WHAT THIRD ARMY ACCOMPLISHED

OVERVIEW

As one reads about the efforts of Third Army during World War II in Europe, he is struck by just how efficiently it functioned as a team. This is evident in its renowned dash across France and subsequent drive into Germany. Nowhere, however, it is more noticeable than in the Ardennes Campaign. Colonel Robert S. Allen, by no means an unbiased source, nevertheless was on solid ground when he credited Third Army with an accomplishment of epic proportions.

... an Army massed in jump-off positions for a coordinated drive east through the Palatinate, disengage[d] its main forces and race[d] through a blizzard to a meeting engagement 125 miles to the northwest.

An Army poised to attack in one direction, literally picked up bodily and with guns blazing hurled against an onrushing enemy 125 miles away in the opposite direction.

Within a period of a few days, over a limited road net and in freezing weather, sleet, and ice [an Army that was able to]--

Change from a three Corps-battle line running north and south to a four-Corps battle line extending east and west in the Ardennes and north and south in the Saar.
Move smoothly, and without hitch hundreds of combat and supply units. (From December 18 to 23, 133,178 motor vehicles traversed a total of 1,654,042 miles.)

Establish an entire supply system, including the setting up of scores of new depots and dumps and shifting thousands of tons of supplies. (In five days, 37 truck companies, operating on a 24-hour basis, transported 61,935 tons of supplies, of which 18,910 tons were ammunition.)

Construct a vast and complex communications network, involving not only the stringing of thousands of miles of telephone lines, but keeping them operating under extreme winter conditions and enemy attack. (Field wire consumption totaled 19,928 miles—equivalent to six times across the United States.)

Transfer and erect numerous Evacuation Hospitals, prepare and distribute hundreds of thousands of maps, Terrain Analyses of the new battle area, Estimates of the Enemy Situation, and detailed Orders of Battle. 18

Colonel Allen had every right to be proud of Third Army's accomplishments. One might argue over whether or not its redeployment was one of epic proportions, 19 but there is little argument that it was a significant achievement. The roles of the commander and his staff in carrying out this movement and the subsequent combat operations leading to the end of the campaign on 28 January 1945 are the subject of the remainder of this paper.

COMMANDER AND STAFF

How does one best address these actions in an attempt to learn what lessons they may teach a modern audience? What approach would best result in an appreciation of the Third Army workload while also discovering, if possible, those actions undertaken which either no longer apply or which may have faded from use in the intervening years, but which possibly should
be resurrected? The answers are not clear cut, for while we are interested in process, after-action reports and memoirs normally take a different approach. Authors are not inclined to write about the systems that they followed; they explain what they did, but not always how they did it. Fortunately, however, the record is fairly detailed and documented, so that the statistics of the campaign will help in gauging its magnitude.

**THE COMMANDER**

From the time that Third Army was alerted on the 16 December with instructions to move the 10th Armored Division, General Patton was involved in preparing the response. Within an hour the division had been contacted and its first elements were moving. As we have seen, more units were alerted over the next two days and Patton was active in meeting with key commanders. On the 18th, all that was required to notify additional units was a telephone call to the Third Army Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Hobart R. Gay. These orders are interesting for their conciseness, given the magnitude of what was about to take place. In his diary, General Gay recorded:

Stop Hugh [Major General Hugh Gaffey, CG, 4th Armored Division] and McBride [Major General Horace L. McBride, CG, 80th Infantry Division] from whatever they are doing. Alert them for movement. They should make no retrograde movement at this time, but this is the real thing and they will undoubtedly move tomorrow. They will go under George M (this means General Millikin) [Major General John M. Millikin, CG, III Corps]. Arrange to have sufficient transportation on hand to move McBride (this means the 80th Division). Hugh (this means the 4th Armored Division) can move under his own power. I am going to leave here and stop to see
Johnnie W (General Walker) [Major General Walton H. Walker, CG, XX Corps] it will probably be late when I come home. 20

Patton stayed on the move while he and his staff formulated plans for the counterattack. By the 19th, when he met with Generals Eisenhower and Bradley at Verdun, Third Army was prepared. All that was required to implement the chosen course of action was a telephone call and a codeword from General Patton. From Verdun, where he contacted General Gay to give him the order, Patton drove to XX Corps to brief General Walker. He spent the night there and on the 20th he drove to Luxembourg again to meet with General Bradley. He also drove to Verdun to meet with Generals Troy H. Middleton (VIII Corps), Millikin, Gaffey, and Willard S. Paul (26th Infantry Division). In his diary he wrote of his travels and said, "I have no staff officers [with me] and conducted the whole thing by telephone through Gay and a fine staff at Nancy."

It is evident from reading much of the literature that Patton was a commander who led by example and from the front. Even his critics rate him as having few peers as a combat commander. Contributing to his success was also an efficient headquarters, staffed by officers and enlisted personnel who either performed or were cut from the roster if they did not. His staff seems to have possessed a level of esprit de corps and a loyalty to its commander matched by few. Obviously, it was a successful staff that enabled the commander to be out visiting, inspecting, checking, and leading, for he had the confidence that they would function as expected.

An army headquarters is a composite of many individuals, organized into sections with different responsibilities, but all intended to function as a team toward attainment of desired goals and objectives. Military tasks
remain fairly constant, for few basic functions in armies change over time. Estimates, plans and orders still must be developed, units moved, soldiers supplied, replacements provided, casualties taken care of, and so on. A staff officer of Frederick the Great, or of Robert E. Lee, of George Patton, or of William Westmoreland would recognize the general similarities of their functions, although the means to accomplish them would change over time. Thus, the magnitude of what Third Army accomplished from 16 December 1944 to 28 January 1945 is best illustrated not in what they may have done differently, but in how much they did of the routine. What follows is a discussion of those activities, staff section by staff section.  

THE GENERAL STAFF

G-2 Section (Intelligence)

The G-2 Section was organized into five sub-sections, each of which was composed of various branches. The Situation Sub-section was responsible for the collection, production, and dissemination of combat intelligence, preparation of estimates, analyses, and bulletins, and maintenance of the G-2 situation and work maps. The Administration Sub-section managed files, personnel, supply functions, and the G-2 message center, among other administrative tasks. The Auxiliary Agencies Sub-section was responsible for the supervision, coordination, and administration of attached auxiliary agencies, such as OSS and special intelligence, interrogation teams, and others. The Security Sub-section was concerned with counter espionage and counter sabotage activities, counter subversion, document security, censorship, and the like. Finally, the
G-2 Air Sub-section was responsible for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information gathered by tactical and photo reconnaissance.

The G-2, Colonel Oscar W. Koch, later wrote that the growth in the use of photographic intelligence was phenomenal. Whereas only two photo missions were flown for General Patton's II Corps during a 30-day period in Tunisia in 1943, in August 1944, Third Army received 3,365,287 air photo prints, and more than a half-million the following month. In December, photographs were air-dropped into Bastogne for use by its defenders. As a result of such use, Koch reported that just before the end of the war, the War Department issued orders that the G-2 Air and G-3 Air sections would be combined at Army level. Since Third Army was satisfied with its current structure, however, the reorganization was only accomplished on paper and the headquarters continued to work as before.

During the period under study, the G-2 Section's daily reports provide a good source of information regarding enemy activity in the Third Army zone of action—its nature, location, size, and the identification of enemy units being encountered. These reports followed a standard format of detailing any changes in enemy front lines and enemy operations during the period in the various corps zones and provided order of battle notes on German units being engaged. Conclusions were drawn as to enemy capabilities. One also finds information regarding enemy activities in the zones of interest of adjacent units, such as First and Seventh Armies. Periodically, quantitative data may also be found about the status of German forces in other theaters. For each significant period there are charts showing the estimate of enemy casualties. During the period 22-31 December, for example, 6,895 enemy prisoners of war (EPW) are reported.
and estimates of 12,000 killed (KIA) and 31,100 wounded (WIA) are given. The figures for 1–31 January are higher, reflecting a longer period of Third Army involvement: 16,625 EPW, 21,200 KIA, and 58,700 WIA. As in most wars, EPW figures were actual headcounts, KIA and WIA figures were obtained from reports of subordinate units (and, no doubt, captured enemy soldiers) and reflected actual counts as well as estimates, such as those made by infantry, artillery, armor, and aviation units. While these KIA and WIA statistics reveal nothing about G-2 Section workload other than the maintenance of statistics, EPW figures translate into real people interrogated at some point, with the reports generated being evaluated and processed. Likewise, the details of the various daily reports suggest intensive work to assemble, evaluate, and disseminate information about the enemy from various sources, to include EPW, and higher, lower, and adjacent American and Allied units. 25

G-3 Section (Operations and Training)

The G-3 Section of Headquarters, Third Army, was divided into seven sub-sections and had staff responsibility for two other elements, the latter being the Army Information Service—responsible for liaison with front line units in order to rapidly furnish tactical information to the headquarters, and the Special Forces Detachment, which was responsible for control and coordination of resistance force activities in the Third Army area. The first of the G-3’s organic elements was the Operations Sub-section. It had the critical responsibility for developing operational plans, directives, orders, situation maps, and reports. It also had staff proponenty for maintenance of the war diary, as well as for maintenance of the War Room in conjunction
with G-2. The G-3 Air element was involved in the management and planning of all actions involving the use of aviation. The Troop Movements and Organization Sub-section was charged with the maintenance of troop lists, preparation of unit assignment and attachment orders, reorganization and activation of units, and the preparation of unit movement orders. The Administration Sub-section, as in the case of that in the G-2 Section, ran the message center, took care of personnel policy matters relating to G-3, performed routine typing and filing, oversaw office security functions, acquired supplies, and was responsible for matters dealing with the disestablishment, relocation, and re-establishment of the G-3 Section in combat. The Training, Historical, and Miscellaneous Sub-section monitored training programs, prepared training directives, organized Army schools as necessary, and conducted studies leading to recommendations regarding needed training. It also maintained Army historical records, supervised the Army Educational Program, and distributed information obtained from War Department sources. The Liaison and Accommodations Sub-section was responsible for the maintenance of liaison personnel with subordinate corps and with adjacent and higher headquarters. It also coordinated the dissemination of information to those liaison officers who represented other armies at Third Army headquarters. Additionally, it assisted in securing accommodations for arriving units and provided reception parties for them. The Passive Air Defense Sub-section had staff supervision for all passive measures taken to mitigate the effects of enemy air action against Third Army units or equipment.26

What kind of workload did the G-3 Section generate during this period? Judging from its after-action report, it was substantial as the
following statistics will show. It is interesting to note that in the midst of some of the toughest combat yet encountered, routine tasks still had to be accomplished. For example, while an estimated 250,000 troops and 25,000 vehicles had to be moved in changing the orientation of Third Army's front, 106 types of units still had to reorganized under new War Department Tables of Organization and Equipment and recommendations were prepared recommending that seven types of others not be reorganized due to operational reasons. Paperwork never stops, even in combat.

On 31 December 1944, the G-3 Section was authorized 50 officers, one warrant officer, and 65 enlisted personnel. During the month the Army received in assignment or attachment one additional corps and six more divisions. Quite naturally, this added to the liaison element's work load. Together with those units already assigned or attached, the Third Army troop list on 31 December contained 925 separate units. Helping to keep track of the actions of many of these was the Operations Sub-section, which maintained six separate situation maps on a 24-hour-a-day basis. It also prepared and released four situation reports (or Sitreps) each day and briefing notes for the two daily briefings.

On 20 December, a decision was made to form a tactical command post (CP) so several personnel were selected to go forward. (This tactical CP relocated to Luxembourg City while the remainder of the headquarters stayed at Nancy, France until the 28th.) Meanwhile, routine tasks continued to be accomplished along with the non-routine. For example, in the midst of the counter-offensive, personnel from the Training and Miscellaneous Sub-section attended meetings and visited units regarding the acquisition of new items of equipment, to include medium tanks with a 140 mm gun.
candlepower searchlight, amphibious tanks, a new version of the standard M4 medium tank, and a flamethrower which could be tank mounted.

The Air element was probably as busy as any sub-section, despite the fact that poor flying weather prevailed during much of December. During that month, for example, the Army Air Corps flew 461 missions, consisting of 4,963 sorties for Third Army units. Meanwhile, the Army Information Service was discontinued at the beginning of December; no substitute had been developed by the end of the month. From 20 December to 31 January the Troop Movements Sub-section orchestrated a total of 37 separate divisional moves. This does not take into account the numerous non-divisional units.

January was a month much like December in terms of staff load. On 1 January, Third Army listed 16 divisions in its Order of Battle, although this number had shrunk to 13 by the end of the month. During the month the Army was on the offensive (there were 21 divisional moves in January), but the staff stayed busy doing the routine as well as the extraordinary. As the operational tempo increased in January, more liaison trips were made and more orders and operational directives were issued. Training personnel continued to be concerned about orientation training, the receipt of new equipment, and the like, while the operational tempo in the air increased for the Air Sub-section, with 536 missions and 5,855 sorties being flown for Third Army. While Air statistics were kept differently before December, compare this with the 1,786 sorties flown for Third Army during the month of November. There were only eight good flying days in that former month, but the point is to compare the work load on the G-3 Air staff. Obviously
December and January were very busy months for an element authorized only four officers and seven enlisted men.

G-1 Section (Personnel)

The G-1 Section was organized into four sub-sections—Administrative, Miscellaneous, Personnel, and Reports. Their's was the all-important but unglamorous job of managing the myriad of routine personnel planning tasks that must be accomplished in peace or war if an Army is to continue to function efficiently. The Administrative Sub-section was responsible for headquarters files and reference materials, rosters, and administrative checking—which includes checking correspondence and helping other staff sections. The Miscellaneous Sub-section was responsible for a variety of important details, most in the area of morale and discipline. They handled awards and decorations, graves registration (at least the administrative portions of it since graves registration is normally the responsibility of the G-4), mail, post exchange activities, administrative matters, and records pertaining to discipline, law and order, uniform regulations and policies, and administrative matters involving prisoners of war. The Personnel Sub-section had staff responsibility for appointments, assignments, reassignments, discharges, promotions, leaves, and the normal variety of activities normally classified as personnel actions. Finally, the Reports Sub-section prepared daily casualty summaries, statistical information, maintained unit strength data, and was responsible for preparation of the weekly G-1 Periodic Report.

What did December and January do to their workload? What kinds of data remain that can tell us something of the pace that the G-1 Section had
to maintain during this important period? For one thing, we see that routine
tasks continued to be accomplished. Although at war, some soldiers still
did not measure up and in December 1944, 18 officers were processed for
for reclassification, whether for poor performance or due to physical
problems (perhaps due to wounds?) we can not say. Four other officers
tendered their resignations in lieu of reclassification. Twenty-seven
officers were reclassified in January, while two others tendered their
resignations. Meanwhile, records were kept on the 486 routine officer
promotions in December while 211 battlefield promotions were made. The
numbers rose in January to 1,019 normal promotions for officers and 267
battlefield promotions.

Leave, pass, and furlough quotas were also monitored by G-1 and the
record contains the interesting note that in early December additional
quotas were obtained to send Army nurses on pass to Paris. This program
was inaugurated on 15 December. Those ladies were among the lucky few
for on the 22nd, all passes to Paris were cancelled until further notice.
Meanwhile, it was also reported that a program had been developed to allow
selected personnel to return to the United States for up to 30 days for
rehabilitation, recuperation, and recovery. It was anticipated that these
soldiers might be away from their units for up to 90 days, based on the
availability of transportation. Third Army received a quota of 390 during
the month of December, and the records show the breakout of sub-quotas to
the various divisions. This was a nice Christmas present, perhaps a life-
saving one for some soldiers in January, despite the on-going battle, one
finds this program continuing with another 612 spaces allocated to Third
Army. Additionally, Twelfth Army Group allowed another 208 personnel to
return to the United States as non-medical attendants on hospital ships. Each was to receive a 10-day furlough upon arrival. Also in January, the Paris pass policy was reinstated on the 17th, but the time limit was extended from 48-hours to 72-hours, exclusive of travel time. Third Army received a quota of 1,569. The G-1 staff broke out the quotas to subordinate commands by category. It is somewhat startling in today’s fully integrated Army to see those figures reported as 252 officers, 18 nurses, 1,255 enlisted men (white), and 44 enlisted men (colored). [Emphasis added. We’ve come a long way.] Finally, in January General Patton also approved a plan to allocate quotas for officers and enlisted men to spend seven days in the United Kingdom, exclusive of travel time. It fell to the G-1 section to manage all of the details of such programs.

Combat brings heroism and for a G-1 staff this translates into increased efforts spent in processing awards and decorations. Lower level commanders had authority to award certain decorations so that not all were processed by the Third Army staff. G-1 did, however, have responsibility for staff oversight of the awards and decorations program and for promulgating policy, while also processing awards either generated by the headquarters or which needed to be forwarded to higher levels. In December, 343 awards were received or initiated in the G-1 Section and an average processing time of seven days was reported. A total of 370 awards were completed and of these, 74 had to be forwarded to higher headquarters. 186 were awarded by the Army commander, and 110 were disapproved. Meanwhile, 5,013 awards were made by Third Army units, the bulk of these (3,938) being Bronze Stars. January figures were higher. In fact, they were the highest of any month since Third Army had initiated combat in August.
The G-1 Section reported that 543 awards were received and initiated by the section and a total of 483 were completed. Of these, 29 were forwarded to higher headquarters, 162 were awarded by the Army commander, and 191 were disapproved. Third Army units awarded a total of 7,381. Note that these figures include Air Medals and above. Statistics for Purple Hearts, letters of commendation, unit citations, and foreign decorations are not provided. The G-1 staff was involved in the processing of recommendations for the latter three, however. The report also reflects that the staff monitored the number of awards approved to ensure the norms established by Twelfth Army Group for the recognition of members of major commands were not violated. The G-1 reported that guidelines were being followed.

From time to time professional soldiers have seen some words come into vogue and others fall from favor, perhaps as new commanders or service secretaries come or go or following some significant event. Any officer with Pentagon experience will vouch for this assertion. Thus, the G-1 report noted that in accordance with General Order 131, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, dated 28 December 1944, the word "replacement" would no longer be used when referring to newly arriving soldiers. Henceforth, the correct term would be "reinforcements." In the January and subsequent monthly reports, therefore, the new term became the one to be used, partial proof that a good staff never has to be told twice.

Maintenance of unit strength data and the allocation of replacements—(Oops!), reinforcements—was, of course, a major G-1 responsibility. The shortage of personnel became critical in Third Army in December. The flow of new troops had simply been inadequate to meet previous casualty rates and the Battle of the Bulge accelerated the problem. Particularly acute was
the shortage of infantrymen. On 5 December, therefore, with the shortage of riflemen about 7,600, General Patton directed that a retraining program be established. (Note: By 31 December the shortage of infantrymen had risen to 10,984. By then, of course, Third Army was considerably larger.) If the incoming flow of personnel was not sufficient, he would solve as much of the problem as he could himself. Non-divisional units were directed to transfer five percent of their authorized strength (not their actual strength) to infantry divisions as these units rotated through Metz. Each division, in turn, operated the infantry training center. The only units exempt from this instruction were units attached to divisions, medical, cavalry and signal units, and—again, remember that this was 1945—units having 'colored' enlisted personnel. Subsequently, another levy became necessary. This time, the Signal corps was not exempt. Even the Army headquarters had to provide a share and 104 personnel were furnished. Would that happen today?

More reinforcements reached Third Army units in January than in any other month, enough to outnumber the casualty rates suffered in the Ardennes campaign. For the first time since its arrival in combat Third Army's replacements exceeded its casualties. A total of 45,889 personnel were received, against a loss of 40,806. Some 7,725 men were returned to duty from Third Army hospitals. Still, problems existed since the replacements were apparently all infantry. Added to the previous levies on non-divisional units, this resulted in critical shortages in engineer, field artillery, signal, tank destroyer, and anti-aircraft artillery units. Once can envision the officer responsible for strength management pulling his hair out in an attempt to cope with this situation. Again, as before, higher headquarters were informed of the problem.
Part of strength management, of course, includes maintaining accurate data on casualties by date, command, job specialty, and rank so that requisitions can be initiated. These statistics are not kept merely for statistical purposes: unless it is done properly, the combat effectiveness of the command can deteriorate. Casualty totals for the two months are shown below.

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<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>Wounded</td>
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<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>2,032</td>
<td>12,788</td>
<td>5,814</td>
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<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>2,526</td>
<td>15,150</td>
<td>3,765</td>
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What did the G-1 Section do to occupy its time during this critical two-month period? Judging from the above, quite a bit. What, then, about the logisticians?29

**G-4 Section (Logistics)**

It is safe to say that the Army-level G-4s of World War II were confronted with problems of a magnitude never before faced in the American Army. Nowhere else was this more true in December 1944 than in Third Army, a force which had just raced across France, consuming massive amounts of expendable materials, which habitually had fuel and ammunition requirements that could not be met, and which demanded the most resourceful efforts of logistics personnel. On top of this, the Army was now called upon to turn its attention north to face the German offensive. The magnitude of this undertaking, in extremely immoderate weather conditions.
with the intendant requirements to move and supply hundreds of units and
thousands of soldiers, is worthy of study.

The 6-4 staff was divided into five sub-sections: Administration, Supply and Statistics, Fiscal, Operations, and Transportation. As before, a brief overview of their responsibilities will help to set the stage for a review of what they did in this battle.

The Administrative Sub-section, as in the other staff sections, was concerned with the routine administration encountered in almost any organization. Matters dealt with included personnel, publications, reports and records, security orders, control of correspondence and reproduction, and routine supply matters pertaining to the 6-4 Section. Supply and Statistics had staff oversight and responsibility for matters dealing with the supply of subordinate units. It was concerned with levels of supply, procurement and distribution of supplies and equipment, maintenance, salvage, the disposition of captured materiel, and the preparation of periodic reports. The Fiscal Sub-section was concerned with monetary matters dealing with the procurement of general supplies, services, facilities, real estate, billets, and the allocation of civilian labor. This was an extremely important area since the American Army generally makes it a practice to pay for what it uses, unlike armies of some other nations. In order to carry out such functions, this sub-section appointed purchasing and contracting personnel.

6-4 Operations was responsible for logistics planning so that service units could be moved and located where they would best be able to support the Army commander's plans. This sub-section maintained the 6-4 situation map, prepared administrative orders necessary to accomplish its primary
task, and coordinated the establishment of lines of communication (highways, roads, railroads, air routes) necessary to ensure prompt and efficient supply of the force. G-4 Operations also planned the location of the Army rear boundary (an all-important graphic measure on the map that depicts the limit of a unit's area of responsibility).

The Transportation Sub-section was concerned with marshaling and managing transportation assets to ensure the timely support of the Army with men and materiel. Thus, it was concerned with highway and rail movement and with traffic control (working very closely with the Army Provost Marshal). Regulation of railheads and operations of truck units also quite naturally came under G-4 control.

In addition to these sub-sections, the G-4 also had a liaison element which reported directly to him. It was charged with making daily contact with the corps and divisions, with checking Army supply points, with monitoring the reception of new units, and with making contact with logistics personnel at higher headquarters. To accomplish all of his assigned tasks, the G-4 was authorized a total of 15 officers, one warrant officer, and 25 enlisted men, effective 6 May 1944.

The need to turn the Third Army 90 degrees resulted in two problems for the logisticians. First they had to establish supply points to support the drive in a new direction, while continuing to support those units left in contact in the south. Second, massive amounts of transportation had to be marshalled to move units. As they did so, Third Army also picked up responsibility for a new corps, VIII Corps, many of whose logistics units had been caught in the German offensive themselves and which, therefore, were of limited assistance to Third Army planners. Assignment of VIII
Corps added an additional problem, since many of its units were cut off, short of or out of supplies, and in need of transportation. The after-action report indicates that Third Army was fortunate, however, in having both a sufficiently large rear area to allow freedom of movement and sufficient road and rail nets to carry it out. Additionally, much of the reserve supplies had been kept semi-mobile, perhaps, because of lessons learned in the dash across France. Thus it was easier to move supply points than it would have been otherwise.

While the logisticians prepared to relocate many supply points to support the attack to the north, others in the south were also being turned over to Seventh Army to support its units as they shifted sideways to take over portions of the line held by Third Army. Simultaneously the staff turned its attention to assisting VIII Corps. As has been seen, the unexpected nature of the German offensive and their initial gains, resulted in many U.S. units being cut-off, surrounded, or by-passed. Much friendly equipment was lost, destroyed, captured, or abandoned as American units fought, were overcome, or retreated. Replenishing some of these became an immediate priority and placed heavy demands on Third Army stocks. At one time, for example, the Army ran out of replacement artillery pieces of 105mm caliber and above, medium and light tanks, 30 caliber machine guns, rocket launchers, and mortars. Another item of immediate need was snow suits. Many German units had them and used them to tactical success on occasion, but U.S. troops had none. Immediate requisitions for snow suits, white paint, and white wash went out. Eventually, units began to be supplied, and here or there, local commanders and soldiers improvised with
sheets, table cloths or paint as they could acquire, but the supply system could not meet the demand in the early stages of the campaign.

Another area of immediate concern became the resupply of the Bastogne garrison, which included elements of several units that had been forced back by the German attack, plus the 101st Airborne Division which had been ordered to that vital crossroads town to meet the German forces. This resupply problem became particularly acute after Bastogne was cut off and surrounded on 20 December. Thereafter, resupply was only possible by air drop until the relief column broke through on the 26th.

In Bastogne, the priority of need at the outset was ammunition followed by rations. Not only did the G-4 staff have to secure these, but coordination also had to be made through G-3 channels to ensure fighter coverage for the scheduled airdrops. Other items soon supplied included signal equipment, gasoline, medical supplies, and chemical smoke. In addition, on 26 December, auxiliary surgeon teams were flown into Bastogne by glider. Altogether, between 23 and 27 December a total of 820 airplane sorties were flown to drop supplies into Bastogne. Additionally, 42 gliders flew in with cargo.

Airlift, of course, was not the only way that units were supplied. In fact, it played a relatively small role. Supplies and personnel were most frequently moved by ground transportation. This required not only the intense management of road use, but also of transportation assets. Regarding traffic management, during the period from 17 to 23 December, for example, seven separate divisions, 26 battalions of artillery, and numerous other units moved through the Third Army area in 153 convoys. If this number seems small, recall that convoys are further broken down into...
separate march units which are further divided into distinct serials in order that the numbers of vehicles moving together at the same time may be kept to a minimum. All total, 133,178 vehicles passed through Third Army traffic control points in this seven day period at all times, night and day. This included vehicles organic to the moving units, as well as the trucks of 37 truck companies. Working closely with G-4 personnel to manage all of this traffic were soldiers from Third Army military police units. Their activities will be discussed later in connection with the duties of the Provost Marshal.

A final point on convoy movements is appropriate, for numbers alone do not explain the importance of movement management in the conduct of military operations. Not only must convoys, march units, and serials be routed, but adherence to strict time schedules is vital. Units must leave, pass, and reach designated points at prescribed times, since roads are often limited in number or capacity and must be shared by many other units. Often, different units may be passing through intersections on converging or crossing routes.30

Statistics kept by the G--4 Section on truck transportation requirements help to tell the story. In December, trucks assigned to Third Army units, exclusive of its corps and divisions, traveled approximately 2,000,000 miles. Of this figure, 1,254,042 miles were traveled from 18 through 31 December. The total miles covered amounted to 19,825 separate truck loads during the month.

Trucks, airplanes, and the limited number of gliders used could move only so much materiel. A great deal of emphasis was also placed on the use of rail lines. The after-action report does not provide the total number of
tons of supplies unloaded during the December period, but it does speak to the number of railcars. The difference between the number unloaded during the first half of the month and the second half is dramatic. From 1 through 15 December 4,252 rail cars were received, 3,780 were unloaded, and 485 were diverted elsewhere. From 16 through 31 December, however, these numbers rose significantly. During this latter period, 8,264 railcars were received, 5,313 were unloaded, and 2,068 were diverted. Diversions are not explained. It is logical to assume, however, that they were rerouted outside the Third Army area, perhaps to Seventh or to First Army logisticians.

These statistics tell of a large logistics effort. What they do not reveal, however, is that supplies and rail yards had to be guarded (and by supply services personnel as other troops were unavailable, according to the after-action report); rail cars had to be distributed over a wide area and in multiple rail yards to decrease the potential for damage or destruction by enemy action; rail lines had to be kept open and in a constant state of good repair, traffic managers had to be ready to reroute trains to those yards most able to receive supplies, or closest to the greatest need, or if enemy action made that necessary. Finally, emptied rolling stock had to be quickly routed out of the area to enable it to be reloaded. Add to this, the need to rapidly unload railcars and to marry up their contents with trucks and one begins to gain a fuller appreciation of the transportation management problems faced by logisticians in this or any other modern campaign.

In the midst of such activity, time had to be found to prepare the orders announcing such activity and reconnaissance and selection of supply points had to go forth. Meanwhile, action was underway to plan for the use
of coal to be seized from German mines in the Saar region, and policies were being finalized to govern the manner in which supplies, services, or facilities would be procured in Germany. Under certain conditions direct purchases would be made; in others, requirements could be met by seizure, confiscation, or requisition, depending on the nature and ownership of the property. (Items belonging to the German Government are examples of those which could be seized outright without reimbursement.)

Logistical operations in January continued, however, now the urgency of the initial days of the Bulge changed from establishing the effort to maintaining it. During this month there were 20 divisional moves, each with the attendant requirements for traffic and transportation support, and often dictating the relocation of supply points to sustain the combat effort. Accompanying this was the need to relocate some supply points later in the month when the boundary between the Third and Twelfth Armies was shifted to the north. Some facilities, of course, were turned over rather than moved.

For the month of January, transportation figures show that 18,255 truckloads of personnel, supplies, or miscellaneous materiel (such as mail) were moved, accounting for 2,417,576 miles. The report states that these figures pertain to major hauls, involving the movement of ten divisions. The implication, therefore, is that for total hauls, the numbers would be higher. It is assumed that only figures for Army level transportation battalion and company vehicles are included.

Achievement of such a mileage rate was not without its wear and tear on individual drivers and vehicles. Fatigue is specifically cited as a limiting factor. The report also notes that the acute shortage of tires and
tubes that had been experienced in December was alleviated in January, but that this shortage did have the side benefit of increasing conservation. During the month 559,800 vehicles and 296 convoys cleared Third Army traffic control points.

One logistical activity not previously discussed is battlefield recovery. In combat equipment is often damaged or lost. A good battlefield recovery program ensures that what can be reclaimed will be. Recovered equipment is repaired if possible and redistributed. If repair is not possible, parts are cannibalized and used to maintain other items of like equipment. Given the severe losses particularly inherent during the early days of the Bulge, and the shortage of various items of equipment (as, for example, when VIII Corps units had to be re-outfitted), the battlefield recovery program had a priority in January. Of particular note was the need to recover the standard M-1 rifle. Likewise, emphasis was placed on recycling captured enemy equipment whenever possible. Included on the "want" list were artillery, engineer, and signal equipment, as well as ammunition.

While this was taking place, efforts were undertaken to requisition an increased number of rations. Because of the attachment or assignment of additional units to Third Army, plus the need to feed enemy prisoners, civilian laborers, and others, the daily ration requirement rose from 350,000 to 500,000. The record does not reflect any problem in obtaining ration support.

Previously, the need for snow suits was mentioned. By the end of January 40,000 had been procured or fabricated, and had been distributed to corps and divisions. Procurement of other items of winter equipment...
included boots, overshoes, tinted glasses, socks, and skis. There were also heavy demands for shelter halves, field jackets, and blankets, particularly as replacement items for VIII Corps troops. By 31 January, the report stated, some 100,000 field jackets were received. Meanwhile, Third Army was well on the way to making up battle losses, particularly in those items previously reported as critical.

Third Army also had a large solid fuel requirement. Coal was the desired fuel; where the demand could not be met, coke was procured as a substitute. The daily fuel requirement for Third Army averaged 500 tons. To help offset this, in the latter part of January, some 1,850 cords of wood were procured.

"By and large, the story of logistics is concerned with the gradual emancipation of armies from the need to depend on local supplies," wrote Martin van Creveld in *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton*. Despite this, local supplies are still used when available or where necessary. Thus, while much was being obtained through regular supply systems, the Fiscal Sub-section of the G-4 reported on efforts to locally procure items. Now that Third Army was located in Luxembourg and Belgium, surveys of sources of supply and of manufacturing facilities were undertaken. This led to numerous contracts being let for items such as gears, axles, fanbelts, and various other parts. Contracts were also let with gravel pits, machine shops, sawmills, foundries, and lumber yards.

What these figures show is the depth and breath of an Army G-4's responsibility in combat. Further, they serve to demonstrate what soldiers and others serious students of warfare know, namely that no operation is
without logistical implications. The commander who ignores this maxim does so at his peril and the peril of his force.

**G-5 Section (Civil Affairs)**

Civil affairs soldiers are charged with dealing with the civilian population during the conduct of military operations. While many units come into contact with civilians, someone must be responsible for working with them, with paying attention to their needs, with the conduct of military government in enemy areas that are overrun by friendly forces, or in liberated areas until friendly governments can be reestablished, and, in general, with doing their best to ensure that civilian matters interfere with military operations to the least degree possible. Of particular importance is the need to control the large numbers of refugees and other displaced persons (DPs) so that they will not clog highways and roads needed for military traffic. One can quickly see, therefore, that civil affairs personnel have responsibilities which require them to coordinate with many other staff sections so that the mission can be accomplished.

At Headquarters, Third Army, the G-5 Section was organized into five sub-sections or branches: Personnel and Administration, Intelligence, Plans and Operations, Relief and Supply, and Government Affairs. The Personnel and Administration Branch performed functions similar to those performed by those in other staff sections. In addition, this branch also coordinated with the Plans and Operations Branch to obtain, reinforce, or replace civil affairs companies or detachments. Because their duties required them to work with civilian personnel, civil affairs personnel were to ensure the gathering of information pertaining to the civilian population which might
impact on military operations, The G-5 Intelligence Branch was tasked with
this function, but also with the routine control of classified documents and
with security within the G-5 Section.

The Plans and Operations Branch was responsible for planning and
coordinating the movement and employment of civil affairs units within the
Army area, with staff oversight responsibilities for civil affairs training
and inspections, for maintenance of the G-5 situation map, and for
supervision of activities involved in the control of refugees and displaced
persons.

The Relief and Supply Branch was concerned with arranging for the
support of refugees, to include the provision of food, clothing, sanitation,
and medical support. The titles of its sub-sections give an immediate idea
of the breadth of its responsibilities: Relief Supply, Economics,
Agriculture, Labor, Public Welfare, Communications, Transportation, and
Public Works and Utilities.

G-5's last branch, Governmental Affairs, was concerned with those
aspects of civil government pertaining to the maintenance of public safety,
to include police, fire, and civil defense efforts; public health and
sanitation, restoration of sound economic conditions in areas occupied by
Third Army units, and with the safeguarding of arts and monuments.
Additionally, the Governmental Affairs Branch had responsibility for
restoration (or replacement where necessary) of courts in the civil sector
and for monitoring those judicial proceedings which might affect the
interests of friendly forces.
In its introductory paragraphs to the report of December operations, the G-5 Section provides the reader with a quick appreciation for some of the problems associated with the onset of the surprise German offensive.

With the swift shift in the tactical situation in mid-December, G-5 was confronted simultaneously with the civil problems of four nationalities under the stress of combat conditions. Approximately fifty Civil Affairs and Military Government Detachments were deployed in portions of France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg. The entire Zone of the Army was being subjected to enemy action. It was swept by a rising wave of fear of continued enemy successes. Civilian panic, with thousands of refugees clogging the roads and hindering troop movements, might easily have developed had a hesitant policy been adopted.

No such panic occurred and at no time did civilians get out of hand, first, because of the confident attitude of Third US Army troops, and second, because of the direct and positive nature of the civilian control measures that were adopted.

The narrative goes on to discuss some of those control measures.35

During the first half of December, the G-5 Section was concerned with operations in France, but when Third Army moved into the Saar it became involved with German civilians for the first time. The German attack, however, brought an immediate expansion of responsibility when Third Army was ordered into Luxembourg and Belgium. The immediate concern of G-5 personnel was control of civilian movements. Civilian unrest was not confined to these two countries, but extended to northern France, as well. A "stay-put" policy was immediately placed into effect with the desired results, according to the after-action report. Meanwhile, those persons who violated this policy, whether because of fear, direct combat action, or loss of shelter, still had to be managed to ensure that
they received humanitarian treatment and to preclude their disruption of military operations. This included both displaced persons (DPs) and refugees. To provide for their control, Third Army civil affairs personnel had available 16 separate transit points where these people could be collected, provided temporary care, and furnished with further transportation, if necessary. As of 31 December, the total number of refugees reported in the four countries within the Third Army area of operations was 50,982; the total number of DPs was 6,547.

Supporting such a large number of people required supplies. During the month of December, 63.3 tons of food were issued, as were 10.52 tons of clothing, 15.33 tons of blankets, and 13.6 tons of soap. Captured food stuffs were not ignored, particularly grains and potatoes. Large amounts were turned over to the civilian population wherever possible and rehabilitation of grain processing plants received a high priority. Likewise, attention was paid to assisting civilian authorities in obtaining fuel resources wherever possible.

Civil affairs personnel also had access to transportation resources to enable them to meet their responsibilities. Supplies had to be moved and DPs and refugees often had to be relocated. In December, over 24,000 personnel were moved in civil affairs vehicles, some more than once. Over 5,331,000 pounds of supplies were also transported. Where possible, rail was used. Coal, steel, medical supplies, other types of supplies, and limited amounts of personnel were moved by train when authorized. Although such topics would not immediately come to mind to soldiers of other branches, civil affairs personnel were also involved in the restoration of trolley service in some cities (thereby reducing traffic on military roads) and in
attempting to rehabilitate canals. Here, however, the terribly cold weather, heavy rains in some locations, flooding, and the shortage of labor and materials served to slow down repair efforts.

Another function of the G-5 was to assist in the location of civilian laborers. Not only did this help to reduce the burden on military units, particularly in engineering, but it also offered the prospect of employment to people who might be out of work. This function was made easier through the conduct of labor surveys by labor offices established to oversee this program.

The Governmental Affairs portion of the after-action report states that it was difficult to assess progress or quality of governmental organizations in December in that only very limited portions of Germany were as yet under Third Army control and the intense combat under way had an impact on programs in parts of Belgium and Luxembourg. For those parts of France which were in the Third Army area, however, the report commented on the progress of French administration and the cooperation between French and U.S. authorities.

The Legal Branch reported on efforts to discourage French civilians from taking U.S. Government property, even when given to them by American soldiers. It also discussed coordination with French authorities to ensure that the latter took sole jurisdiction within France over cases involving Allied forces. Meanwhile, efforts were made to reduce the amount of claims, particularly those arising out of the improper requisitioning of civilian property by units which were unfamiliar with procurement regulations. Finally, the report briefly mentioned the establishment of
Military Government courts in area of Germany that came under Third Army jurisdiction

Prior to the German attack, the main concern in the area of public safety was the control of the civilian population through the issuance of passes. With the onset of the Battle of the Bulge, however, great concern arose about the possibility of infiltration of German spies or saboteurs. French authorities were contacted and asked to be aware of this and to exercise more stringent enforcement of curfew, circulation, and blackout measures.

Public health is another important area of concern for civil affairs units. Not only may civilians become injured as a result of combat, but the destruction of public facilities may contribute to an increase in disease by fostering the conditions which give rise to pestilence and infection. Persons without adequate food, shelter, or clothing are susceptible to sickness. Within the Third Army area of operations three mobile civilian medical teams were employed, along with an ambulance service. There was no unusual rise in sickness rates and no increase in the demand for medical supplies during the period under study was reported.

Regarding financial matters, the most pressing problem during the month seems to have been a concern on the part of some French shopkeepers about the validity of Allied military script, because of a counterfeiting scare. Arrangements were made to exchange much of this currency for formal French currency and this helped to alleviate the concern. Meanwhile, steps were also taken to assist in the exchange of Allied script for local currency in Belgium and Luxembourg as Third Army units moved into those countries.
The above paragraphs have served to illustrate the types of tasks accomplished by civil affairs personnel in December. These efforts continued in January and will be told more quickly by briefly recounting some of the key statistics. One important factor that was different between the two months was that as the Germans retreated, and as Third Army units advanced into areas desolated by combat action, there was, perhaps, an even greater need to provide emergency assistance to the affected civilians.

The Ardennes area had been a quiet agricultural backwater area since the German invasion of 1940 and the damage experienced in the Allied advance in the Fall of 1944 had been slight in comparison to that unleashed in December. As they departed this second and last time, the Germans carried away as much food, clothing, and livestock as they could. Hundreds of other farm animals were left dead from combat action, starvation, and the terrible weather. In addition, the intense artillery battles of the period had reduced many villages to rubble, creating both a need for shelter and for fuel during a very cold winter. The consequence was that the need to assist the civilian population was more pressing. The Relief and Supply Branch issued approximately 1,040,000 rations and 187,040 gallons of fuel. Nearly 180,000 garments were distributed to approximately 90,000 persons, courtesy of the American Red Cross, and 1,000 tons of materials were transported in G-5 trucks. During the entire month 825.35 long tons of food were issued, as well as 5.77 of clothing, 11.44 of blankets, 45.22 of sanitary supplies and soap, and 668.97 of fuel. A total of 2,133 refugees and 66,124 DPs were reported within the four countries in the Third Army area. To carry out their responsibilities, the Operations and Plans Branch
reported that civil affairs detachments were operating in 39 separate locations within the Army's area.

Activities involving currency controls also took place in January, but this time the focus was on Luxembourg. The after-action report also mentioned population control and the issuance of passes to restrict movement.

Medical concerns increased over December. In particular, in the forward areas where most of the combat activity had been experienced, there were increased incidence of diphtheria and dysentery, while foot and mouth disease also made its appearance in larger numbers. One response was to issue 5,000,000 units of diphtheria anti-toxin to Belgian and Luxembourger physicians. Increased attention was also placed on public sanitation and the boiling of water was emphasized. Simultaneously, efforts were undertaken with the assistance of the Red Crosses of the two nations to evacuate sick and wounded civilians and auxiliary hospitals were established. In this way, there was less of a drain made on the limited and overtaxed military medical system.

Just as the preceding section on G-4 activities served to demonstrate the breath and impact of logistical matters on the operation, so too, the scope of G-5 functions is equally impressive. It is an area that receives scant attention in the considerations of present day planners, yet the potential impact on military operations, not to mention the humanitarian requirements for ministering to the needs of persons in assistance, make a strong case that the activities of the G-5 Section contributed immeasurably to the successful outcome of the mission. Given our cultural values, had civil affairs units not been present, other soldiers would have
had to have been diverted from their missions to provide the kinds of support that these experts were trained to do. This would have detracted from the combat mission and would undoubtedly not have been accomplished in as efficient manner. The outcome would have been to interfere in the conduct of military operations.36

THE SPECIAL STAFF

To this point in our discussion the activities of the principal G1 staff have been reviewed. Many others also helped the Army commander to carry out his responsibilities. Besides the Headquarters Commandant, at Third Army these special staff sections were:

Adjutant General
Anti aircraft Artillery
Artillery
Chaplain
Chemical Warfare
Engineer
Finance
Inspector General
Judge Advocate
Medical
Ordnance
Provost Marshal
Public Relations
Quartermaster
Signal
Special Services
Tank Destroyer

The Headquarters Commandant

All soldiers are assigned to some unit, to some commander who is responsible for billeting, feeding, supplying, equipping, administering, and, in some cases, disciplining. In the case of a soldier assigned to a headquarters unit, that officer is known as the Headquarters Commandant. At Third Army, this position was filled by a colonel who also served as the commander of Special Troops, with command responsibilities over a variety
of units such as the band, the post exchange, the special services company (entertainment), a surgeon who ran the headquarters aid stations, and the headquarters company.

A principal function of a Headquarters Commandant consists of moving the headquarters or its various echelons in response to the tactical situation. In these circumstances, sites have to be chosen, routes reconnoitered, facilities prepared (and perhaps repaired), communications established, billets located, space allocated, and security established. It is a position calling for attention to detail and for precision. One usually must work under the watchful eye of a commander who is proud of his headquarters and who will demand nothing less than a top-notch performance and a first-class effort to ensure not only that everything is done right, but that it also looks right, for the appearance of the headquarters is a reflection on the commander.

During the Battle of the Bulge, the Headquarters Commandant was involved in the routine conduct of providing day-to-day service and with supporting movements. On 20 December the Mobile Command Group moved from Nancy to Luxembourg City. This element of 35 officers, 167 enlisted men, and 54 vehicles consisted of personnel from the Command Section, and from the G-2, G-3, G-4, Artillery, Engineer and Signal sections, plus support personnel such as military police, signal troops, engineers, the aid station, and the headquarters company. That part of the headquarters which comprised the Forward Echelon moved on the 28th of December and the Rear Echelon relocated to Esch, Luxembourg on 7 January. The Advanced Party of the Rear Echelon followed to Luxembourg on 28 January with the remainder of the personnel arriving on 6-7 February.
Adjutant General

The day-to-day functions of personnel administration are handled by the Adjutant General (or AG). The G-1 is also involved in the personnel area, but his is primarily a planning function. It is the AG who takes care of the nuts and bolts of assignments, discharges, personnel replacements, mail, casualty reporting, management of documents, and so on. At Third Army, the AG Section was headed by a colonel with responsibility for the following functions.

**Miscellaneous Division**
- Cables Section
- Mail and Records Section
- Publications Section
- Distribution Section

**Executive Division**
- Casualty Section
- Machine Records Unit
- Postal Section
- Top Secret Section

**Personnel Division**
- Classification Section
- Officers Section
- Enlisted Men Section
- Morning Report Section

Every casualty, every replacement, every mail shipment, and so on, translates into an AG action, so what this section did in December and January can probably be best told by looking at some of the more important statistics.

Casualty reporting was affected by two events: The German attack quite naturally resulted in an increase in casualties, while the addition of VIII Corps and other units to the Third Army troop list also brought an
increase in the workload. Because VIII Corps units were intensively engaged from the outset, there was a delay in reporting casualties, and a consequent backlog for the Third Army AG once that corps became assigned. This heavy workload continued in January to the point that the Casualty Branch had to be augmented by 8 additional soldiers on the 13th. An additional problem was that while casualties were mainly being incurred in Belgium, the Third Army headquarters was in Luxembourg and the Rear Echelon (where apparently casualty reporting was completed) was located in Nancy, France until it moved forward. The distances contributed to slowing down reporting times.

Statistics for casualty report processing for the two months are as follows. (Casualties include KIAs, WIsAs, missing, and captured)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted Men</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>15,818</td>
<td>16,652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>2,104</td>
<td>44,363</td>
<td>46,467</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The preceding figures pertain only to battle casualty reports filed. During December, AG personnel also processed 3,687 sets of personnel records of deceased, missing, missing in action, and captured soldiers, reviewed 92 Reports of Investigation on non-battle incurred deaths and injuries, and cleared 84 other non-battle casualty reports of dead or missing soldiers. In January, these figures rose to 5,674 sets of personnel records, 92 Reports of Investigation, and 128 non-battle casualty reports.

The after-action report reveals that the processing times between the casualty date and the date that the report was forwarded to higher headquarters were as follows.
The postal workload also increased in December and January, primarily because it was the Christmas season. The tactical situation made transportation of the mail difficult at times because trucks were being used elsewhere, as discussed above under the 6-4 and 6-5. Still, the after-action report states that no appreciable delay of mail was encountered. Food and mail have a special importance to soldiers and commanders do their best to ensure that they get plenty of the first and rapid delivery of the second. Statistics for the two months are impressive in comparison to the previous months of October and November.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Parcel Post Sacks per Month</th>
<th>Parcel Post Sacks Daily Average</th>
<th>First Class Pouches per Month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>50,100</td>
<td>1,616</td>
<td>Data not kept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>84,020</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>19,247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>246,057</td>
<td>7,937</td>
<td>14,987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>177,953</td>
<td>5,740</td>
<td>21,788^38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Antiaircraft Artillery

Third Army's Antiaircraft Artillery Section was charged with responsibility for coordinating all matters pertaining to the employment of antiaircraft artillery (AAA) within the Army area. The actions of AAA soldiers during the Bulge were commendable, but contribute little to an understanding of the operational level of war. The AAA Section's report is devoted entirely to a discussion of the actions of Individual units during the campaign. For the sake of consistency, however, the organization of the section will be shown so that the reader can gain an appreciation for the duties of the Antiaircraft Officer and his personnel.

AA-1
Administration, correspondence, personnel requisition, citations, and section files.

AA-2
Reports analysis, weekly intelligence reports, daily SITREPS (Situation Reports), communications, radar, claims, and aircraft recognition.

AA-3
Operations directives, missions, defense priority lists, situation map, attachments, journal, unit locations, order of battle, and history.

AA-4
Supply, ammunition, materiel, and transportation.

Training Branch (not a part of the section)
Attached Instruction teams.

It is interesting to highlight at least some of the types of data mentioned in the AAA section of the report. For example, detailed percentages were maintained on the types of targets attacked by the Germans during various periods. Examples are airstrips, or bridges, or troop concentrations. Fifteen different categories were used, plus unknown...
targets and reconnaissance flights. Likewise, statistics were kept on the types of German air attacks, such as high, medium, or low level bombing; dive bombing, strafing and rocket firing, and unknown "batting averages" of the various Third Army AAA units were also kept, listing the numbers of enemy aircraft engaged, the success rate, and the relative "order of merit" of the various units. Thus, one sees that the thirty Third Army AAA battalions reported engaging 1,667 enemy aircraft from 15 December 1944 to 5 February 1945.

Artillery

The Artillery Section of Headquarters, Third Army, was led by a brigadier general and was organized into the following sub-sections.

S-2
Responsible for collection, evaluation, and dissemination of artillery intelligence, coordination of supply of maps and aerial photography, and coordination of counter-battery procedures and activities.

S-3
Responsible for such normal G-3 related matters as training, operations, troop movements, and liaison, plus communications.

S-1-4
Responsible for ammunition, supply, maintenance, and personnel matters.

Artillery-Air
Activities of this sub-section included responsibility for training, operations, supply and maintenance, and personnel matters relating to the employment of aviation to support the employment of artillery.

Chief Clerk
Duties of this section were chiefly administrative. Clerical support, drafting, and message center services were provided.
As with the Antiaircraft Artillery Section's report, this section was also devoted to a discussion of the activities of units supporting tactical operations. The report is a day-by-day recounting of artillery unit dispositions, missions, and locations. It details the artillery order-of-battle, tells how the force was tailored to support the various armored or infantry divisions in combat, and describes the results of that support. The Artillery Section, of course, was active in recommending that force composition and in keeping the detailed historical records of the outcome.

December 1944, required an intensive effort by Third Army to respond to the German offensive. Of those units which made the move from the Saar area north to the Ardennes, 53 were field artillery battalions which, along with hundreds of other units, moved over limited roads in foul weather, and crossed the three available Moselle River bridges to get into position to support the attacking units. This effort was orchestrated by Artillery Section planners. Meanwhile, another critical problem facing the Artillery Officer was the refitting of those VIII Corps artillery units which had lost equipment and personnel in the initial German onslaught. Significant losses included seventeen 105mm howitzers (Self Propelled), five 105mm howitzers, ten 4.5 inch guns, twelve 155mm howitzers, one 155mm gun, three 155mm guns, and nine 8-inch howitzers (seven of which were recovered by First Army and returned to Third Army through ordnance evacuation channels. Also lost were 148 trucks smaller than two and a half tons, 100 trucks of two and a half tons or larger, twenty-three M5 tractors, fifteen M4 tractors, twelve liaison-type aircraft, and large amounts of signal, quartermaster, and engineer equipment belonging both to units and to individual soldiers. There were also critical ammunition needs to be met so
that coordination between artillery and ordnance planners had to be extensive.

There was also a shortage of personnel for "colored" artillery battalions. One field artillery group and three artillery battalions had suffered extensive enlisted personnel losses among these soldiers. As no replacements existed within the theater, the solution in the segregated Army of 1944 was to deactivate one battalion in order to provide replacements for the other units. Since disbandment of a battalion required War Department approval, however, the temporary solution was to place the soldiers affected in a "special duty" status to the gaining units, pending formal agreement. How much things have changed in the intervening years.

When one reads of the Battle of the Bulge there may be a tendency to focus more on December than upon January. Perhaps this is because the initial German attack, the massacre at Malmédy, the siege of Bastogne and its relief all occurred in December. Yet January was a very busy month as the Allies pursued their counter-offensive. During the seven day period ending at 070600 January, Third Army artillery units fired 430,619 rounds, the highest number since entering combat. During the following week it tapered off to 249,284 rounds as a result of decreased enemy resistance and smaller amounts of ammunition being available. Meanwhile, efforts continued to refit those units which had experienced equipment and personnel losses during the earlier stages of the battle. 40
Chaplain Section

Besides being a clergyman, an Army chaplain may also be an administrator with supervisory responsibilities. It is not clear how many personnel were assigned to the Third Army Chaplain's Section during December and January, but we do know that there were two chaplains at the Army headquarters and that the senior chaplain had oversight over all chaplains in Third Army units. There were 262 of these in December and 354 in January, the difference being due to the change in the number of units.

Administrative responsibilities included the preparation of training directives pertaining to the instruction of chaplains, public relations, whether with visiting dignitaries or civilian clergy, support of graves registration, the conduct of inspections and conferences, dissemination of policies relative to religious activities within the Army, requisition of chaplains, and the provision of religious and pastoral support. In this regard, many readers know that the Third Army Chaplain prepared a prayer which was distributed during the Battle of the Bulge and is mentioned in many books about the Third Army Commander and in the movie, Patton, starring George C. Scott.

Almighty and most merciful Father, we humbly beseech Thee of Thy great goodness, to restrain these immoderate rains with which we have had to contend. Grant us fair weather for Battle. Graciously hearken to us as soldiers who call upon Thee that armed with Thy power, we may advance from victory to victory, and crush the oppression and wickedness of our enemies, and establish Thy justice among men and nations. Amen. 41
General Patton had suggested to the chaplain that he prepare a prayer since December was usually a time of notoriously bad weather. The above prayer resulted and 250,000 copies of it were circulated to Third Army soldiers. On the reverse side of the card was printed a Christmas message from General Patton. The prayer was distributed on 22 December; it had been intended to be issued just before the attack against the Siegfried Line. Colonel Allen writes that the Chief of Staff pointed this out to General Patton, who replied, "Oh, the Lord won't mind. I know He will understand. He knows we're too busy right now killing Germans to print another prayer. It's the spirit that counts with the Lord. And He knows I mean well." 42

During December the Chaplain also issued a training letter (Training Letter Number 5) on the subject of prayer for Third Army unit chaplains, suggesting that they consider the value of prayer. It was a short, but eloquent discourse which suggested that soldiers practice it in Third Army. 43

Meanwhile, other matters besides prayer required attention. The narrative of chaplain activities in December 1944 reveals that two chaplains served at the execution of German spies and at the internment of approximately 4,924 Allied and enemy dead. Christmas services were also held. The percentages of various German religious denominations were given, along with details about the difficulties of obtaining religious supplies for chaplains. Protestant and Catholic supplies had been short for some months and in typical Army fashion chaplains were advised in January of the procedures for requisitioning their needs. (File requests in triplicate, by the 25th of each month, etc.) Simultaneously, there was a discussion as to the proper way in which Americans might worship in
German churches once they began to move into enemy towns. (Sit on the right, facing the alter, don't commingle. Don't be afraid to gather there for fear that you might become a target. Be aggressive; to avoid the use of German churches might be seen as excessive politeness and be viewed as a sign of weakness.) Instructions were also issued on preparations for the Jewish Passover Holidays, scheduled for 29 March through 5 April. Requisitions for Passover wine and matzoh were to be submitted before 25 February.

At the same time, chaplains were cautioned to maintain attention to correspondence, particularly in regard to the number of internments at which they had presided. It seems that some weren't keeping up with their paperwork during the Battle of the Bulge.

Chemical Warfare Service Section

Poison gas was not used by the opposing forces in World War II, but it could have been. Armies had to be prepared to defend against its use by the enemy and to retaliate if such a decision was made to do so. This required that soldiers be trained, protective equipment be obtained, and chemical warfare supplies be stored. While poison gas was not used, chemical units were active in support of combat operations. Flame throwers came under the general heading of chemical equipment as did smoke generators and 4.2 inch mortars which fired both smoke and white phosphorus rounds, the latter being a casualty producer. (These weapons also fired high explosive rounds.)

The Chemical Warfare Service Section was organized into three subsections: Intelligence and Technical, Operations and Training, and
Administration and Supply. In England it was authorized six officers, one warrant officer, and nineteen enlisted men, but this number was later reduced. Essentially, the Chemical Warfare Officer's primary responsibilities were to ensure that Third Army had an adequate number of chemical units, that adequate training standards were being met to prepare soldiers to defend against chemical warfare, that proper policies were in effect for the employment of gas warfare if that decision was ever made, and that chemical units were trained to the proper standards. Chemical units included battalions which fired the 4.2 inch mortar, chemical depot companies, chemical decontamination companies, and chemical maintenance companies.

The Chemical Warfare Service Section's report in the Third Army after action report tells nothing of its duties at the operational level during the Battle of the Bulge. Instead, it is devoted to a discussion of the tactical use of chemical units during the campaign. Thus, the preceding description of the Chemical Warfare Officer's duties will suffice. Before parting, however, one notes that chemical mortar units appear to have been quite active, firing to harass the enemy or to break up German concentrations and providing smoke to screen American activities (and to disorganize German actions, perhaps). The maintenance companies were employed to repair broken equipment, particularly the 4.2 inch mortars. One note indicates a large amount of breakage due to the selection of poor firing positions. This situation improved as the weather turned better (less snow cover, perhaps), as shorter distance missions were fired, and as reinforced baseplates became available. Meanwhile, chemical maintenance personnel also produced 520 white camouflage suits in January and the Chemical Section
was able to obtain approximately 80,000 colored eyeshields for soldiers to prevent snow blindness. Why this section got involved in obtaining this item is not stated, but fabrication of the snow suits was at the request of the Engineers, who provided the material.

**Engineer Section**

SS Obersturmbannführer Jochen Peiper supposedly cursed, "Those damned engineers!", when after a frustrating march in the Ardennes he arrived at a river crossing near Habemont, Belgium, with his tank and infantry column only to see the bridge to his front blown up by American engineers. The efforts of engineer units contributed greatly to the American success and responsibility for orchestrating their activities within the Third Army area fell to the Army Engineer.

The Engineer Section was divided into six sub-components: Administration, Intelligence, Operations and Training, Supply, Technical, and Topographic. The responsibilities of the first four of these sub-sections were similar to those in other staff sections. The last two were different however, and unique to the Engineer Section.

Among other matters, the Technical Sub-section was responsible for developing engineering plans and projects, preparing construction estimates of labor and materials required, conducting technical inspections to ensure that engineer units were proficient in construction skills, performing functions dealing with the acquisition or disposition of real estate, preparing plans pertaining to mine fields and barriers, fortifications, demolitions, assaults of fortified zones (such as the Siegfried Line) camouflage, floating bridges, and water supplies, and conducting...
reconnaissance of the road net so as to take maximum advantage of existing roads with the expenditure of minimal maintenance.

The Topographic Sub-section was responsible for matters dealing with the procurement or production, and the dissemination of maps, map substitutes, models, charts, and photographs. It also coordinated the activities of the topographic units which conducted mapping surveys. Finally, it was responsible for meeting the reproduction needs of the headquarters.

In combat, engineers perform a wide variety of tasks. They may build bridges or breach mine fields, operate a sawmill or a water filtration plant, or fight fires. They may fight as infantry or make maps. Of course, there are specialized units to do many of these things and the average engineer soldier won't be trained to do them all, but the point to be made is that the responsibilities of this branch of the Army are wide, varied, and critical to the success of the force in combat. Thus, during the Ardennes Campaign the Third Army Engineer had great responsibilities. Like other staff officers, he was faced with shifting attention from the Saar area to the Ardennes. He, too, had to plan the redeployment of units, while continuing to provide some support in the south and while assuming technical channel concerns for newly assigned VIII Corps units. VIII Corps brought with it two engineer groups, four battalions, four separate companies, and one technical intelligence team. Two of the battalions had been heavily damaged and had suffered 50 and 72 percent casualties, rendering them non-effective.

Access to bridges in combat is vital. Retreating forces will destroy them and advancing armies must construct new ones, often under enemy fire. In December 1944, Third Army engineer units erected 316 bridges of
various types amounting to a total of 21,190 feet. In addition, over 1,000 feet of infantry footbridges were constructed and more than 20 rafts were operated. Most bridges were built in the first half of the month. Thereafter, the major emphasis turned to the movement of the force over bridges that had been previously constructed.

Culvert repair also occupied much attention. The Germans had been particularly aggressive about blowing culverts during their retreat. This impaired travel in two ways. First, it cut the roads. Second, the heavy rains of the period caused a great deal of flooding. Often, therefore, it was nearly impossible to bypass blown culvert sites.

Bridging requirements decreased in January with 157 bridges of all types being built. These amounted to 9,303 feet in total length. By far the biggest effort, however, was in road maintenance. A total 1,100 miles of roads were maintained. Snow required removal, German mines had to be cleared, and anti-tank ditches had to be filled as did craters caused by bombs and artillery fire.

While some were concentrating on supporting the battle at hand, others were planning for the eventual Rhein River crossings. Supplies were being gathered and stockpiled. This included bridging materials, such as Bailey bridging and lumber. A release of two million board feet was obtained in December and another three million in January. Meanwhile, intelligence was being gathered on existing Rhein bridges and the location and characteristics of potential crossing sites. Studies were disseminated on Rhein River hydrology and on the winds along that river valley.

Mapping and the distribution of maps is another engineer responsibility that takes on particularly critical importance when a
military unit enters or prepares to enter a new area. In December, approximately 60 tons of maps were received in Third Army and 57 tons were issued. Distribution of maps was coordinated with the G-2, who established the policies as to who would get what and how much.

Meanwhile, engineers operated over 20 water treatment plants and provided fire fighting assistance where necessary to protect supply dumps or cities which required additional assistance. In January, 14 water points were in operation. At the same time, engineer equipment was being replaced, particularly in units which had suffered combat damage. Additional bridging had to be obtained to replace that which could not be removed. All total, approximately 1,630 tons of engineer supplies were received in January from the Communications Zone.

Finally, like other staff officers, the Third Army Engineer was also involved in obtaining winter camouflage suits for combat units. By the end of the month approximately 50,000 suits had been distributed.

**Finance**

The Third Army Finance Officer's job during the Ardennes Campaign differed little from that in peacetime, yet it was vital. He supervised financial and fiscal activities within the Army area, sub-allocated funds to subordinate units, and insured that soldiers and commercial accounts were paid. Upon arrival in Great Britain, General Patton had been granted unlimited authority to allocate General Allotment funds, plus authority to allot up to $1,500 for entertainment and $10,000 for military intelligence purposes. Subsequently, the amount for intelligence was increased to $160,000. Corps and division commanders were also given authority to
allocate dollars. Again, specific limitations were set on entertainment and for intelligence purposes, but not for other expenditures under the General Allotment category.

To carry out his responsibilities, the Third Army Finance Officer was authorized a total of four officers, one warrant officer, and twenty enlisted men at Army level. There also existed corps and division finance offices, as well as numbered disbursing sections attached to Third Army and to the corps.

Accomplishing the finance mission required this staff section to deal not only in U.S. Military script, but also in the currencies of Luxembourg, France, and Belgium, while planning for the use of German Allied Military currency once German territory was occupied. In December there also came word of the counterfeiting of Supplemental French 500 and 1,000 Franc notes. Finance offices were directed to turn in such currency for French bank notes of the same denominations.

Inspector General

The Inspector General's responsibilities consisted of conducting inspections and investigations into those matters that might affect the good order, discipline, or efficiency of Third Army. To carry out these tasks, the Inspector General Section consisted of three sub-sections: Investigations, Administrative, and Inspections. The after action report does not record any change in these actions during the Battle of the Bulge. In other words, these soldiers continued to do these tasks in combat just as they would in peacetime.
Judge Advocate

The Judge Advocate Section was organized into five separate branches. The Executive Branch, War Criminals Branch, Legal Assistance Branch, Military Justice Branch, and a Military Affairs Branch. The titles of these are fairly self-explanatory, except for the first and the last. The Executive Branch performed tasks similar to the administrative branches in other staff sections. The Military Affairs Branch provided legal advice to General Patton and to the staff.

Legal activities in December involved the conduct of 32 general courts-martial cases, two of which involved crimes against French citizens. Four were for murder. One ended in acquittal, two in life sentences, and one soldier received the death sentence. The death sentences of two German soldiers convicted during November of spying were confirmed by General Patton and they were executed by firing squad. (Probably these were the same two that received chaplain support as previously mentioned.) Another 55 cases were tried in January, the highest yet. There were six acquittals. No war crimes cases were tried during either month, but war crime law was studied in preparation for the eventual trials that would follow the defeat of Germany.

Less one get the impression that this is all that the Judge Advocate Section did during the Ardennes Campaign, that is not the case. Criminal proceeding of trials continued to be reviewed, letters of reprimand were prepared for action, and so on. Legal affairs continue, whether in peace or war.51
Medical Section

In the performance of his duties, the Third Army Surgeon oversaw the following sub-sections: Administration and Personnel, Preventive Medicine, Operations and Training, Supply and Finance, Consultant, Dental, and Veterinary.

The duties of each of these are generally self-explanatory to the average person, except perhaps for those of the Consultant and Veterinary Sub-sections. The former included surgical, medical, neuropsychiatric, and nursing consultants whose duties consisted mainly of providing technical advice, assistance, and inspections in these fields. They were "resource persons," to use a more modern term. Army veterinary personnel, unlike their civilian counterparts, are primarily concerned with the inspection of food, whether at storage depots, ration breakdown points, or unit messes.

Perhaps the most important task facing the Third Army medical staff during the Ardennes Campaign was placement of medical units where they could best support the battle. Much of this was accomplished by infiltration rather than by scheduled convoys. The after-action report compared the level and skill of this operation with that of the infantry and armor units, which also moved during the period.

Much initial attention, of course, was given to those VIII Corps units hard hit in the early days of the German attack. In particular, units at Bastogne were hard pressed. Medical supplies, equipment, and personnel had been lost, destroyed, or captured and treatment facilities within the town were makeshift. Medical supplies were air-dropped on 23, 24, and 25 December and medical personnel were flown in by gliders on the 26th. Other
medical units, to include a hastily established provisional medical battalion, were positioned where they could rush to Bastogne immediately after ground contact was reestablished. In this way, on the day after the breakthrough, 652 of 1,150 casualties in Bastogne were evacuated by ambulance.

Meanwhile, coordination and positioning of medical units throughout the entire Third Army area went on, for treatment still had to be provided wherever soldiers were stationed. For some soldiers, this medical evacuation chain extended all the way from the front line aid station to the large station hospitals in the United States. From a unit aid station, a wounded soldier would go on to the battalion aid station and then, if necessary, to a regimental collecting point. From there he might continue on to the division clearing station several miles to the rear. He might cease his travel at any stage, based on the nature of treatment needed and the severity of his wounds. If continued evacuation was necessary and his wounds would allow it, the soldier would be moved further on to an evacuation hospital. If critical, however, the division clearing station would send him to a nearby field hospital for emergency treatment.

The evacuation hospital might be 15 miles further on behind the division. If one's recuperation time was judged to be short, he might remain here until able to be returned to combat. If further surgery and convalescence were required, however, the soldier would be evacuated outside the Army area to one of the 91 general hospitals in Belgium, Holland, France, or England. As before, patients might complete their treatment at these facilities and be returned to combat or other duties.
Many, however, were evacuated to the United States for further treatment or recovery.  
During December, a total of 24,092 patients were evacuated from the Third Army area. Total battle casualties reported for the month, including wounds and burns, were 11,495; the morbidity rate was reported as one percent. Sixty percent of the wounds were to the extremities.

The neuropsychiatric portion of the report stated that 7.7% (2,587 cases) of the total non-battle casualties were for neuropsychiatric reasons. Seventy-five percent of these were returned to duty. It was further reported that for the period 1 August through 31 December the total rate was 8.9%, the lowest of all Allied armies. This amounted to 12,512 of the 139,893 admissions for all causes; 8,811 of these soldiers were returned to duty. The neuropsychiatric consultant attributed this low rate to good leadership and high morale in Third Army units.

The dental statistics in the after-action report reveal that 5.9% of the total casualties admitted to hospitals were for maxillo-facial injuries - a total of 803 cases. (Of course, many soldiers with head wounds died on the battlefield and never made it to hospitals.) Three of these soldiers died. This section also discussed efforts to fabricate acrylic anti-concussion devices that soldiers could wear in their ears.

Medical supply was a critical area of interest during the campaign, not only because of increased casualties, but also because many VIII Corps medical units had lost equipment. Some 50 to 60 items of supply (not identified) were in critical shortage, while equipment losses in some units demanded immediate attention. How rapid these shortages were met is not
stated, it is merely reported that they were filled in an expeditious manner in coordination with the medical depots in the Communications Zone.

Concerning sanitation, preventive medicine personnel reported that the standard of water supplies provided to the troops during the month reached a new, all-time high. Over 95% of the water tested met Army standards, compared with 89% in November and 51% in August. At the same time, general sanitary conditions seemed to improve during the month, due primarily to the generally low temperatures and frozen ground. The few insect problems that were encountered (such as lice) were mainly found with non-US personnel. Disease rates were also low, including those for venereal diseases. The movements of large amounts of units during December resulted in the curtailment of pass privileges, apparently leading to fewer close encounters of a personal nature. Nevertheless, the Surgeon's report states that 11 Army prophylactic stations were in operation throughout the Army area in December and that 16,728 prophylactics were issued. (One wonders what the map symbol for a prophylactic station would look like on the Medical Section's situation map.)

Increased heavy combat, freezing weather, and the largest number of units assigned to date, combined to make January's casualty figures the highest yet. In spite of this, the mortality rate for soldiers reaching Third Army hospitals remained at one percent.

At the outset of the month, the disposition of medical units was rather static, however, as the Germans began to withdraw from the salient and as Third Army's counter-attack took its units further to the northeast, relocations of medical units were required in order to provide support as far forward as possible. This is easier said than done, for not only did some
units have to move, but others had their area boundaries adjusted to compensate, units being supported had to be notified, medical supplies had to be rerouted, and so on. In this regard, it was a typical military operation such as would occupy the efforts of a G-3 or a G-4 planner in this way, during the month Third Army hospitals were able to support a maximum of 18 divisions.

There were 16,035 battle casualties treated in Third Army hospitals during January and 436 of these died. The Surgeon commented that 332 of the deaths were the result of artillery explosions and 88 could be attributed to small arms fire. He concluded that close-in fighting was not occurring to the degree that it had since this represented a four to one ratio.

Cold weather injuries increased in January, due to the continuing cold weather and the fact that combat troops remained constantly in the line. Wounded soldiers whose evacuation was delayed seemed to incur many of the cold weather injuries. The cold weather injury rate increased from 128 to 264 per thousand per year. On the other hand, the percentage of neuropsychiatric cases fell from the previous month to 5.5%. The report suggested that this fact and the fact that Third Army's rates were the lowest of Allied armies could be attributed to good leadership. It was also suggested that the fact that the Germans were retreating was good for soldier's morale as they could see an eventual end to the war.

The medical supply situation improved dramatically in January. Third Army medical depots received approximately 635 long tons of medical supplies, depot stocks were balanced, and approximately 16 days of supply were on hand. By the middle of the month units which had lost equipment in the early days of the campaign had been re-equipped.
Infectious diseases, particularly upper respiratory problems, increased in the month (constant exposure to cold and snow no doubt being a chief cause), but venereal disease rates were down. Only 374 instances of venereal disease were reported and 36.8% of these were incurred in contacts outside the Third Army area. New prophylactic stations were established—-one in France, one in Belgium, and two in Luxembourg, but only 11,072 prophylactics were issued. Perhaps the troops were too busy elsewhere.

As a final note on the activities of the Medical Section, a survey was made of the requirements for whiskey for medicinal purposes and the allocation of 24 quarts per week for divisions was increased to 48 quarts per week. The report only states that 24 quarts were insufficient, whether because of the increased number of patients requiring it or the increased stress on doctors and medical personnel. One presumes the former.

Ordnance

Ordnance responsibilities may be divided into three categories: Provision of maintenance support to units, supply of major end items (such as artillery, trucks, tanks, and other vehicles), parts, and weapons, and ammunition supply. The Ordnance Section was divided into five subsections to carry out these functions. They were Administration, Operations, Supply, Maintenance, and Ammunition. Also under the control of the Ordnance Officer were three ordnance groups to carry out responsibilities in the three main areas. The 69th Ordnance Group was charged with responsibility for maintenance support. The 70th Ordnance Group was concerned with supply of major end items and replacement parts.
and assemblies. The 82nd Ordnance Group had ammunition supply responsibilities. The German attack led to intense activity in each of these areas.

Perhaps the most immediate concern for the Ordnance Officer once the decision was made to commit Third Army units, was the need to relocate ammunition to support an attack to the north. Previously, all efforts had been taken to stockpile ammunition in preparation for the drive through the Siegfried Line. Now, ammunition supply points (ASPs) had to be relocated and additional stockages had to be requisitioned. Many VIII Corps units had been cut off from the ASPs that they had previously used and their requirements for exact types of ammunition were not known. This required Third Army ammunition managers to increase stockages (by type and amount) in order to ensure that they could meet as many requests as possible. During December, 151,705 tons of ammunition were issued. The figures for January were not given.

The second major area of concern was the need to recover, repair, and replace large amounts of major end items lost, captured, or destroyed during the German offensive. Additional equipment was damaged or destroyed because of the bad roads and icy driving conditions. Major items repaired in ordnance shops during the two months were reported as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>December</th>
<th>January</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Purpose Vehicles</td>
<td>9,031</td>
<td>8,537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Vehicles</td>
<td>1,719</td>
<td>2,092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>1,445</td>
<td>1,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms</td>
<td>22,013</td>
<td>19,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instruments</td>
<td>4,121</td>
<td>4,234</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The after action report does not mention the number of major items that were received in December, only that Army reserve stocks were soon depleted and that requisitions were submitted to solve this problem. It does state that the shortage of combat vehicles was soon rectified, but that general purpose vehicles remained critically short. January entries reveal that shortages existed in light machine guns, pistols, grenade launchers, rocket launchers, general purpose vehicles, fire control equipment, tires and tubes, and hot patches. The report also shows the following receipts and issuances:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Received</th>
<th>Issued</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Light Tanks</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Tanks</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Vehicles</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery (over 57mm)</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Purpose Vehicles</td>
<td>3,469</td>
<td>3,426</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tires and tubes were mentioned as critically short items. This problem was also highlighted in the G-4 Section's report. Part of the reason had to do with the increased miles being driven as well as, apparently, routine shortages in the supply system. Another reason, however, was shrapnel on roadways and the strewing of nails on the roads as the Germans retreated. In an effort to help counter this problem, ordnance personnel built and tested magnetic road sweepers in cooperation with the engineers. The tests were successful and specifications and plans were forwarded to the Communications Zone for construction.
The Military Police Corps in 1944, as now, was responsible for more than law enforcement. In both periods, duties consisted of traffic control (battlefield circulation control), security, safeguarding enemy prisoners of war (EPW), and law enforcement. To carry out his responsibilities, the Third Army Provost Marshal (PM) (actually a colonel of cavalry) had the following organization: Provost Marshal Headquarters, Traffic Sub-section, Prisoner of War Sub-section, Maintenance of Law and Order Sub-section, and the Investigations Sub-section. Under the EPW umbrella also rested a responsibility to take charge of internment camps and of overrun Allied prisoners of war. Finally, the Provost Marshal was also charged with coordinating the security of lines of communication (roads, bridges, railroads, and signal centers), and of the command post.

The Provost Marshal's two greatest areas of concern during December and January were the movement of units throughout the zone of operations, and security in the rear area. Immediately following development of the traffic control plan to move the bulk of the Army north into the Ardennes, special officer couriers were dispatched to the two military police (MP) battalions directly under the PM's control. Four routes were opened and posted with traffic control points. Throughout the campaign, MPs directed traffic, checked for convoy clearances, and roamed the roads to assess traffic conditions or to provide emergency service. Where necessary, alternate routes were opened to by-pass problem areas, such as weakened bridges, landslides, or wrecks. Close coordination was maintained with the engineers in order to keep them advised of repair needs.
The second major activity involved rear area security. Because they may be posted throughout the area and because they patrol the highways, MPs are a natural force for keeping watch over a wide area. During the Battle of the Bulge this took on greater urgency because of the widespread rumors of infiltrating Nazi commandos and paratroops. That these rumors were grossly inflated and that the threat was never as great as imagined was not known at the time. The after action report comments on the heightened state of security awareness throughout the Army area during this period. From a standpoint of point defense, security was provided at railroad and highways bridges, tunnels, and overpasses. Here, however, other troops had to be used, to include quartermaster and artillery soldiers, and French troops and police. Then, as now, there were apparently too few military policemen to meet all requirements. At the same time, their mobility provides a good argument for not tying MPs down to fixed locations. By remaining mobile they are more able to observe a wide area and to rapidly respond to emergencies, be they combat or otherwise.

Prisoner of war statistics reveal that the military police handled a total of 18,420 prisoners during December and 16,625 in January. Military police also processed four Allied escapers or evaders during the two months.

On a more commonplace topic, crime continued and statistics were kept on it. Summary courts were held for 407 routine disciplinary violations in December and for 227 in January. Disciplinary reports were issued for 1,971 violations in December and 2,157 in January. By far, the majority of these (2,064) were for pass violations. Meanwhile, 76 stragglers and 166 AWOLs (absent without leave) were picked up in
December. For January, the figures were 166 and 379, respectively. As of 31 January, 609 Third Army soldiers were listed as AWOL, per the Adjutant General's Machine Records Unit data.

As for more serious crimes, 45 reports of investigation were completed as of 30 December and 10 criminal cases remained in January. 28 cases had been completed as of the 27th and another 15 were pending final action on the 31st. No data is available to determine what the rate per thousand was for serious crimes. Eighty U.S. prisoners were released to their units or evacuated from the area in December. Information for January was not reported.

Public Relations

The role of the Public Relations Officer (now called the Public Affairs Officer) was to deal with the media. He dealt with newspaper, magazine, photographic, and radio correspondents, to include military and civilian reporters, provided pictorial assistance, and operated the Press Camp War Room. Under his direct supervision were the press censors, a communications platoon and Radio Mackay. This latter was a communications system provided by the Mackay Radio Corporation to transmit press copy to London or New York via continuous wave or telephone.

There were usually 35 to 50 correspondents traveling with the Army and the Public Relations Section's mission was to assist them with access to information, transportation, billets, messing, and communications. In his introduction to the after action report, the Public Relations Officer, a lieutenant colonel of the Quartermaster Corps, states that this program was successful to the point that Third Army had more news and pictures filed.
about its activities than any other American Army. No doubt this contributed to the good morale that existed in Third Army. Contrast this situation with that of Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger, commander of Eighth Army in the Philippines. Early in the campaign, the existence of his army was a secret, so public attention was focused on Lieutenant General Walter Krueger's Sixth Army. Eichelberger's troops were engaged in hard fighting in a tough environment, but no one knew it.

To give an appreciation of the number of press people who were received in Third Army, at the end of December 28 correspondents were assigned. During the month 25 had arrived and 30 had departed. In January, 30 arrived and 25 departed, leaving 32 on hand at the end of the month. The record shows that 2,901 items (press copy) were dispatched in December by either Mackay Radio, Army communications, or Air Dispatch Letter Service. For January, the number was 3,246.

Military units are encouraged to submit newspaper articles about soldiers. In December, 7,780 such items were received at Third Army Headquarters. These covered promotions, awards, citations, stories of general interest, and photographs. Another 8,358 were received in January.

A total of 3,624 items were submitted for field press censorship at Army level in December, plus 326 photographs. For January the figures were 3,371 and 1,550, respectively.

An Information Room was established to cater to the press's need to be informed. On the basis of newsreels, situation maps were maintained on the progress of American forces in the Philippine Islands, and in Italy. The progress of Russian forces was also shown, as was the Allied situation in Western Europe. Likewise, the dispositions of known German forces were
snown. One can easily see why the Public Relations Officer would write that Third Army received such a large amount of coverage.

**Quartermaster**

In the United States Army supplies are grouped into classes and each class is identified with a Roman numeral. Responsibility for their acquisition and/or distribution rests with various branches. Thus, the Third Army Engineer was concerned with the issue of Class IV (construction and barrier materiel), the Surgeon with Class VIII (medical supplies), and the Ordnance Officer with Class V (ammunition), Class VII (major end items), and Class IX (repair parts). The Quartermaster was primarily concerned with the issue of Class I (rations), Class II (clothing and general items of equipment), Class III (petroleum, oil, and lubricants, plus solid fuel), and some Class IV. That both he and the Engineer were involved with Class IV is not necessarily a contradiction. Lumber, for example, might be used by the engineers for construction, but by other units for making storage containers.

To assist him in meeting his responsibilities, the Army Quartermaster had four divisions. The Administrative Division performed duties similar to its counterparts in the other staff sections, plus it carried out purchasing and contracting duties for Third Army. The Supply Division was concerned with the movement of Class I, II, III, and IV supplies. The Graves Registration Division was responsible within the Third Army area for the evacuation, identification, and burial of American, Allied, and enemy dead. This included the operation of military cemeteries. Finally, the Field Service Division had overall supervision of quartermaster units within the
Army area. These units operated laundries, baths, salvage points, and equipment repair sites. They provided labor and were responsible for the disposition of captured enemy equipment.

Like other Third Army support troops, the attention of quartermaster personnel was focused to the east in the first part of December. Like others, their supply points, depots, and other facilities were oriented to providing service in that direction and to continuing that service during and after the anticipated breakthrough of the Siegfried Line. The change in mission for Third Army required a massive change in plans for all logisticians. Not only that, but the abrupt assignment or attachment of additional units added to the pressure. Between 16 and 31 December, for example, the number of soldiers assigned to Third Army increased from approximately 255,000 to around 350,000. Another 50,000 to 70,000 soldiers of other units also had to be supplied on a daily basis.

As Third Army shifted to the north and as its southern boundary was changed, the Quartermaster transferred some supplies were transferred to Seventh Army, rather than move them and require the gaining Army to submit additional requisitions. In this way, 97,750 rations, 152,137 gallons of aviation fuel, 32 railcars of coke, and 514 tons of coal were released by Third Army quartermaster personnel. Meanwhile, additional supply points were opened in the north in order to provide Class I and Class III assistance to III and VIII Corps.

Total Class I receipts for December were 29,085.1 long tons. Total issues were 26,921 long tons. This amounted to a daily average of 380,274 rations. Of these, 15.6% went to non-Third Army units which were operating with or adjacent to the Army. One special ration issued was
Christmas dinner. It amounted to one and a half pounds of turkey per person. Cranberries, fresh apples, and raisin bread were also served, along with 350,000 cigars and 700,000 candy bars. These latter two items were picked up by five 10 ton trucks which made a special trip all the way to the French port of Le Havre and back.

Most supplies arrived in the Army area by rail, although some came by air and some by truck. Within Third Army, trucks were mainly used to haul supplies to their final destinations.

Class II items were at sufficient levels in the early part of the month, but the influx of VIII Corps units tested the system. Estimated shortages included 55,000 wool trousers, shirts, underwear, overcoats, field jackets, and raincoats; 12,000 combat jackets, 16,000 pairs of overshoes, 330,000 pairs of socks, 12,673 meat cans, 42,618 shelter halves, and 96,000 blankets. Because it was winter, various cold weather items were also needed, to include skis, mufflers, parkas, and the snow camouflage suits, as has been previously mentioned. Requisitions for all of these items were initiated. In the case of the camouflage suits, however, local expediencies were resorted to when the supply system could not keep up with the demand. As previously mentioned, engineer, ordnance, and chemical units were also involved. So, too, was the Quartermaster. In his case, 5,000 mattress covers were obtained and 10,000 suits were fabricated. Another 2,185 yards of white material were procured from local French sources and used to make 700 tunics.

Class III requirements did not prove to be a problem in December. At the beginning of the month there were some shortages, but these were later resolved by the 17th, in time for the Bulge. The Quartermaster's after
action report states that 10,577,491 gallons were received in December and that this figure was 55% more than requests. Much fuel was held in tank cars as a mobile reserve and later in the month this fuel was dispersed to eight separate rail sites. At the same time, Third Army asked that the Communications Zone cut back on the daily amount shipped, and this was done—from 1,000 tons a day down to 500 tons. Still, the excess apparently continued.

Solid fuel—mainly coal—was also issued. It was received through the supply system from the Communications Zone, from French mines, and from captured German stocks. Prior to December it was mainly issued to headquarters, medical, laundry and bath units, rest areas, and coffee-roasting sites. In December, however, sufficient stocks had been built up to allow it to be issued to individual units for troop comfort. The increase for December over any previous month amounted to 241%. By the end of the month, the increased consumption significantly reduced the stocks to about 4,000 tons.

Class IV requirements are not discussed. Tonnages received are reported, but they cannot be separated from Class II. No data is given to indicate what, if any, items were in critical demand, or by whom.

Graves registration information is also sparse, but the report does discuss the fact that both U.S. Military and German cemeteries were in operation. During December, 4,924 burials were made by graves registration personnel. Of these, 3,021 were American dead, but only 25 of these were unknown. This amounted to an unknown rate of 0.8%. One Allied soldier was buried, as were 1,902 enemy dead.
The report mentioned the effect that the cold weather and frozen ground had on graves registration operations. It also reported that for the first time, coordination was made with the Signal Section to photograph unknown remains. Pictures were then apparently circulated to the suspected units of the deceased. Some success in identification was apparently obtained, although how much is not stated.

The Field Service Division reported that all laundry and bath units were moved during the month and that 118,857 soldiers were provided with baths. The reader is reminded that bath units provided more than baths. Clothing was also exchanged at these sites. Collected clothing was then laundered, fumigated, sorted, and reissued where possible. (Later in the month, the European Theater Chief Surgeon advised that fumigation was no longer necessary if clothing was laundered. Fumigation of laundered clothing was discontinued.)

While on the subject of clothing, quartermaster personnel also had the mission of salvaging clothing and items of general equipment where possible. They ran collection points at each Class I issue point. Clothing, helmets, overshoes, entrenching tools, mess equipment, and so on could be brought to these locations. Once gathered, it would be sorted, classified by type, cleaned, repaired if necessary, and returned to the supply system for re-issue. In this way, 1,141,049 items were collected during the month.

January operations were similar to December's, except that an abrupt change in plans was not necessary due to the change in the tactical situation. The supply situation for Classes I, II, III, and IV were satisfactory. The average daily issue of rations was 496,769 during the month, higher than in December. Class II and Class IV receipts were almost
50 long tons more per day than in the preceding month (an average of 192.7 versus an average of 144.53). By 31 January, Class II and IV stockages in quartermaster depots were 68% higher than at the end of December.

In the fuel category, the amounts of liquid fuel on hand remained satisfactory, although the amount at the end of the month was smaller than that at the end of December. On the other hand, the coal supply problem became critical and by the end of the month the daily ration had been cut from four pounds per day per man down to two. The problem was partially alleviated by the end of the month.

Graves registration personnel reported another 6,597 burials, to include 4,254 Americans, 17 Allied, 2,326 enemy. Only 20 U.S. remains went unidentified. The report also states that 176 American remains which had been interred at Bastogne during the battle there were disintered and moved to an American military cemetery. No new cemeteries were opened and none were closed.

Finally, salvage personnel collected 1,473,269 items and were able to classify 1,432,269 of them. Although not all could be reused, those that were serviceable were placed back into the supply system. This included the 69,804 items of personal clothing and equipment which were repaired and passed to the depots or to bath points for re-issue. Regarding baths, 182,647 soldiers were able to bath at QM bath sites. Meanwhile, the laundries processed 4,429,100 pounds of laundry, an increase of 21% over December.

As the preceding paragraphs have shown, it is hard to gain an appreciation of the Quartermaster Officer's duties without dealing with statistics, yet so unfamiliar is the average person with such data that it
may be difficult to determine just what they mean. When one reads of 20
divisions on the move, or of 400,000 artillery rounds being fired, of an Army
of 350,000 doing something, some appreciation can be gained as to what that
means. It is less easy to do so when speaking of gallons of fuel processed
or numbers of rations issued. Likewise, bath data may not mean a lot to one
who quickly calculates that only one soldier in three managed to shower in a
month. That some never did is accepted; that most managed to take a field-
expedient shower or bath will be evident to any who have soldiered; anyone
who has worn a standard Army steel helmet knows how it is done. (One is
tempted to sing a lament now that the new one piece Kevlar helmets have
taken their place.)

Nevertheless, the numbers in all these categories are so large that
one can at least develop an idea of the magnitude of the Quartermaster's
accomplishments, simply because the support in most cases kept up with
demand, and that demand was from upwards of 400,000 people, a pretty
large number by anyone's standards. That lesson would seem to apply to
other staff sections as well.

Signal Section

Modern commanders know that armies which can't communicate can't
win. Some writers have even lamented that given today's technology leaders
have become so tied to communications devices that it is now difficult for
commanders to fight the battle from any place other than the command post.
Perhaps that is true, but one could make the counter argument that while
better communications means may make it possible to better direct one's
forces, this does not necessarily mean that the commander has to be tied down to the headquarters.

We are about to examine the Third Army Signal Section, but let us pause for a moment to make a point about leadership style—specifically, General Patton's during the Battle of the Bulge—because communications and the art of command are closely related. Headquarters, Third Army, had a full array of communications devices as complete as in any other army, yet the general spent little time there. Instead, he roamed the area of operations, leaving the staff to carry out his intent. It was the headquarters that needed the communications links to enable it to carry out its functions. One author wrote that Patton could have spent each day in Luxembourg City where the staff was obliged to stay in a number of very fine hotels. Instead, he drove himself beyond the endurance of ordinary men of his age. Every day he sallied forth in his jeep, well-bedecked with stars, and in this open vehicle he sat himself stiffly in the front seat beside his driver, folded his arms across his bemedalled chest, and whizzed along the ice-bound roads, shouting at military policemen to keep the convoys moving, personally challenging guards to discover if they knew the password for the day, inspecting isolated groups of men, stamping into command posts, and studying the course of the battle from forward observation posts. He would return to his headquarters at the end of the day, and walk into the evening briefing, a very tired and old-looking man. The cold was no respecter of Patton's big stature or harsh voice, and it lined his face with stiff wrinkles, watered his blue eyes, and gripped his vocal cords, so that his voice was as mild as an old woman's when he spoke to his staff.

The point of this slight diversion has been that as we examine the signal process, let us not draw the conclusion that it allowed General...
Patton to personally control the campaign from his headquarters. Nor do modern commanders have to 'lead' from their's. Instead, they and their staffs must use the communications means available without being used themselves. In other words, the tail can not be allowed to wag the dog if one is to be an effective combat leader.

To accomplish his responsibilities, the Signal Officer's section was divided into seven sub-components, plus an attached intelligence element which was concerned with studying captured enemy signal equipment. The organic sub-sections were: Section Headquarters, Administration and Personnel, Communications, Plans and Operations, Photo, Signal Intelligence Service, and Supply. The position of Signal Officer called for a brigadier general. To carry out his duties, he was authorized 16 officers and 51 enlisted men, not counting the attached Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service.

The principal signal concern for Third Army Headquarters at the beginning of the Battle of the Bulge was reorienting the plan for signal support from preparing for a strike through the Siegfried Line to one of supporting the new counter-attack to the north. Sites which had already been established had to be hastily de-rigged and communications had to be quickly established in and through Luxembourg City. The fact that General Bradley's Twelfth Army Group was already operating there made the establishment of signal support a quicker process.

The primary means of communication continued to be by wire. Where possible, local underground telephone cable systems were used and were further supplemented with field wire when necessary. This was particularly true in Luxembourg. In this way, contact was quickly established with
Twelfth Army, all four of Third Army's corps, and other headquarters. During the month, Third Army signal soldiers laid 580 miles of wire, and 636 miles of cable. In January, another 764 miles of wire and 550 miles of cable were laid. This represents only a part of the workload, however. Recovery of wire also had to be accomplished. Sometimes this was even more difficult than laying it, for to be done correctly it also had to be inspected, cleaned, and repaired as necessary. In December, soldiers recovered 455 miles of wire and 62 miles of cable. January figures were 279 and 58, respectively. Also in January, nearly 5,100 miles of field wire were returned to signal depots for service and salvage. Approximately 3,000 of these were found to be re-usable.

The new tactical situation, attachment of VIII Corps, and the uncertainty as to German locations (but the knowledge that they probably could intercept wire communications) led to a much greater use of coded messages than previously recorded. On 25 December the code room handled its greatest number of messages yet—174. This amounted to 45,615 code groups and the average processing time was 61 minutes per message. During the month these soldiers decoded a total of 2,278 incoming messages and encoded 547 outgoing ones. And in the message center, excluding packages and official mail, soldiers processed a total of 7,007 incoming messages and 5,689 outgoing ones.

January message traffic figures were slightly higher. Workload for the code room amounted to 2,564 incoming messages and 613 outgoing ones. Meanwhile, the message center processed 7,279 incoming and 6,488 outgoing messages.
THE STAFF: ANOTHER DIMENSION OF THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL
OF WAR(U) ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA F J DAVIS
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Signal soldiers do not only code, decode, transmit, or receive messages. Some also monitor those of others to determine whether correct procedures are being followed—particularly security procedures. Analysts from an on-loan Twelfth Army signal unit analyzed 3,800 radio transmissions and 72 messages generated by Third Army units. They found 3,360 errors, the most common being lengthy transmissions. (Some things never change from war to war.) Some transmissions had more than one error, so the findings do not mean that everyone monitored was violating procedures. Results were forwarded through technical channels for action by unit signal officers. Nets were monitored again in January and significant improvements were noted.

As in any campaign, but particularly one which had begun with such significant losses to some units, supply was a critical area of interest. Some VIII Corps units (number unknown) lost as much as 85% of their signal items during the initial days of the offensive. Some units of counter-attacking corps had to redeploy so rapidly that not all of their items could be recovered. This was particularly true of wire. Where possible, they received replacement items from signal depots and by the end of January approximately 85% of all battle losses were replaced.

During December, four depots were operated by the depot company to fill signal requisitions. Rail transport was available between each depot and teletype service was established between the four so that needed items could be rushed to the area with the greatest requirement. Unfortunately, the Army-wide shortage of tires meant that truck transportation could only be provided to forward the most critical of needs.
During the month 3,329 tons of signal supplies were received out of a total of 3,800 tons requisitioned. January, however, saw an improvement in the overall signal supply situation. This was mainly due to the fact that more and more supplies were being unloaded in Antwerp.

Before closing, one signal means no longer used by today's Army should be mentioned. One of Third Army's subordinate units was the 277th Signal Pigeon Company. Late in December a request was submitted to augment this unit with another platoon and 300 more birds. A platoon of the 285th Signal Pigeon Company reported on 3 January and its arrival allowed Third Army to place one platoon with each of the four corps. One section of each platoon was left at Army headquarters to provide Army communications and birds for breeding. Because Luxembourg was a center for civilian pigeon breeding, inspections of 391 lofts were conducted. Some birds were requisitioned. Others had their wings clipped so that they could not be used by German sympathizers.61

Special Services

It was the responsibility of the Special Services Section to assist the commander in maintaining a high state of morale through the conduct of entertainment, athletic, and recreational programs. To carry out his responsibilities, the Special Services Officer had the following subordinate elements: The Third Special Services Company was responsible for coordinating entertainment activities. The Supply and Distribution Sub-section was charged with requisitioning and distributing morale and welfare equipment, such as athletic supplies. Another sub-section was concerned with supervising and coordinating American Red Cross activities.
The Army Exchange Officer oversaw the establishment of exchanges to support subordinate units. The Cinema Sub-section received and distributed films, repaired projectors and radios, and maintained a film library. Finally, the Athletic and Recreational Sub-section planned and presented special athletic events and supervised the recreation programs at Red Cross clubs.

Early in December a rest center was established in Nancy, France for XII Corps troops and plans were underway to do the same for all corps when the Battle of the Bulge intervened. (In January one was established by XX Corps Special Services at Metz for artillery troops.) Soldiers were to be allowed four days at these centers. Showers, beds, a complete change of clothing, and a pass into town each day were the norm at Nancy. (And yes, one of those previously mentioned medical corps prophylactic stations was also established at the rest center.) There was a thermal bath and a swimming pool adjacent to the camp and USO Camp Shows were also presented. While performers were known artists, only the oldest of us would recognize their names today. One artist whose name is still familiar and who played to Third Army audiences is Marlene Dietrich. She entertained in the Army area in October and November and was nearby in the VIII Corps area of operations when the German offensive began. Bing Crosby had also played to Third Army soldiers earlier in the fall.

Besides the USO Shows, the War Department also made available "Jeep Shows," so named because these were small groups which traveled by jeep and trailer. These were two and three-man soldier elements, usually singers and musicians who were sent to provide entertainment to small units. They almost always performed forward of regimental command posts.
Between 31 December and 17 January nearly 100,000 soldiers saw these shows. Audiences were small, usually between 100 and 700 soldiers. The program was a success and the Special Services Officer recommended that four teams be attached to each special service company.

The after action report states that the Third Special Service Company kept movie teams out in the field and indicates that 60,000 soldiers were able to see films during December in the 26 Infantry Division and in the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions. This was in addition to those soldiers who saw films at the Nancy Rest Center. January movie attendance figures reflect another 1,500,000 viewers. In some cases, this was the result of the film loan program whereby units borrowed films and showed them using unit projectors.

Finally, during these two months the Special Service Section established a program to provide service to the field on a geographical basis. In this way, unit commanders could send their representatives to the nearest Corps Special Service Company to arrange for entertainment.

**Tank Destroyer**

Like pigeon companies, horse cavalry troops, and the coast artillery, tank destroyer units have disappeared from the Army's inventory. As long as potential aggressors have tanks, there will be a need for an anti-armor capability, but today's anti-tank weapons are integrated into other types of units, principally Infantry and cavalry. The tank itself remains the primary tank killer so tank companies also have an anti-armor role.

Perhaps because of the Army's organizational evolution since World War II, many have forgotten the tank destroyer units that once existed. At
one time, however, their numbers were quite significant. Shelby Stanton's *Order of Battle, U.S. Army, World War II,* lists two separate tank destroyer brigades, 24 groups, and 107 battalions. Within Third Army there were 19 tank destroyer (TD) battalions assigned as of 31 December 1944. A month later this figure had fallen to 15 as some units were reassigned. The 1st Tank Destroyer Brigade was assigned at Army level and groups were assigned to the corps. (Of the two U.S. TD brigades, Third Army's was the only one that served in combat. The other remained in the United States and was disbanded in March 1944.)

The Chief of the Tank Destroyer Section was dual-hatted as the Commander, 1st TD Brigade. (Actually brigade command came first. The brigade joined Third Army in England in early 1944 and the extra duties as section leader came after that assignment.) To accomplish his duties, the section chief had a normal S-1 through S-4 staff, plus an aide, a liaison officer, a headquarters commandant, and a communications officer. Their responsibilities to him were those of any staff to its commander. His responsibilities were no different than those of any other commanding officer. The additional duty as head of the Tank Destroyer Section made him the Army level focal point for TD matters and the one who would be expected to provide guidance on the employment of these units. At the operational level of war this would have been his major contribution—the tailoring of the force to assist in meeting overall objectives. As a brigade commander, however, he was mainly interested in the accomplishments of his soldiers at the tactical level.

Tank destroyer units were either towed or self-propelled. During the period under study, Third Army's ratio was about one-third towed and two-
thirds self-propelled (7 of 19 battalions assigned in December were towed, 5 of 15 in January were). Missions were varied depending on the threat. Thus, while the TD weapons were designed to take out armor and point targets, they could also be used as artillery in an indirect fire role. Reinforcing artillery fires was the secondary mission of tank destroyer units. They could also be used in a direct fire role to support infantry or armor operations by destroying point targets, such as pill boxes and other fortifications. As the German armor threat decreased in the latter months of 1944 it was this role that became most common. The German attack changed this slightly for Hitler had husbanded his armor resources and committed more tanks and self-propelled guns in December than he had in the immediate past. Tank destroyer units reverted more often to their primary mission in the latter half of the month and in January in order to counter this threat. The after action report provides figures on the destruction of enemy targets which illustrate this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1-18 December</th>
<th>19-31 December</th>
<th>January</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Propelled Guns</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Tank Guns</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery Pieces</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillboxes</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Guns</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous Vehicles</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above figures show an increase in vehicular targets destroyed and a dramatic drop-off in the destruction of fortifications, machine guns, and anti-tank guns. (Anti-tank guns are normally deployed defensively in
concealed positions.) This, of course, is explained by the general differences in combat before Third Army's commitment to the Ardennes and afterwards. In early December, Third Army was preparing to attack through the Siegfried Line, while the Germans were in defensive positions. During the latter part of the month, many German units were attacking. Consequently, they had more vehicles out in the open and troops were spending less time building prepared positions. The rise in tank and self-propelled gun kills in January and the continuing low number of point targets destroyed, may be explained in two ways. First, heavier than normal armor contacts were made in early January for the Germans were still attacking in some locations. Second, as they began to pull out of the salient, retreating enemy units did not have time to prepare fixed fortifications. Instead, they were attempting to withdraw back behind the Siegfried Line. (Thus, tank and self-propelled gun kills in February dropped off to 23 and 22, while pillboxes and machine guns destroyed rose to 198 and 15. There were also 20 anti-tank gun kills in February.) An analysis of 800 tank kills in the southern portion of the bulge during the campaign (where Third Army units fought) indicated that TD units had accounted for approximately 200 of them.

Regarding the secondary mission of providing artillery fire support, TD unit ammunition expenditures for December and January were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Indirect Fire</th>
<th>Direct Fire</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-18 December</td>
<td>2,793</td>
<td>32,214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-19 December</td>
<td>4,407</td>
<td>6,824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>28,494</td>
<td>6,464</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As before, differences in totals are dramatic, but easily explained. The large number of rounds expended in direct fire in early December is due to the fact that Third Army was softening up German positions on the Siegfried Line, preparatory to an attack. The decrease after the 18th is due to the German attack. The large number for indirect fire in January is a result of two of Third Army's corps, XII and XX Corps, being mainly on the defense. In this situation, TD units fired a large number of artillery missions, to include harassing fires, to help deter any possibility of a German advance in the south.
PATTON AND HIS STAFF  SOME THOUGHTS

To this point, the focus has been on what the staff did during the Battle of the Bulge, preceded by an overview of Third Army's participation in the campaign. What the staff did, however, is only a part of the story. Even more important for our purposes is the consideration of how and why it operated as it did in support of the Third Army commander. More specifically, what can be said about the commander-staff relationships that may be of value to potential commanders in today's Army? How did General Patton and the staff relate to each other? What can be said about the dynamic that must have existed between them? How was the staff a reflection of his personality and leadership style?

In his introduction to General Patton's posthumous *War As I Knew It*, Douglas Southall Freeman, noted American historian and biographer of Robert E. Lee, wrote

"... *War As I Knew It* represents a type of early narrative—one might say of provisional narrative—that had a place in the historiography of the Second World War.

About 1960 Americans may expect more deliberate works of a character similar to the memoirs of Grant, of Sherman, and of Sheridan. Some of those future volumes will be more accurate historically than the military autobiographies issued immediately after the war... After 1965 or 1970 glamour will begin to envelop
memories. Few will be valuable; most of them will deceive more than they will enlighten.

By that time, it should be possible to write measurable accurate biographies of the leading figures of the war. The picture of the leaders will be clear enough in two or three decades for the biographer to undertake his task. It is hoped that General Patton will be among the first to attract a competent biographer and that others will leave him alone.

Doctor Freeman was right and today General Patton is one of our better known World War II generals. Much has been written about him, to include books by Martin Blumenson (Patton: The Man Behind the Legend, 1985-1945 and The Patton Papers) and Ladislas Farago (Patton: Ordeal and Triumph). At the same time, a highly popular, though often "Hollywoodized" movie appeared in 1969 and won a number of awards, including an Oscar for Best Actor for George C. Scott. Thus, much is known about the general. His triumphs and his tragedies have been subjected to intense scrutiny; his personality and his leadership style have been analyzed, discussed, and studied. Few officers are unaware of his exploits and he generally is remembered with respect and admiration. He was perhaps the most dynamic senior leader that the United States produced in World War II. Certainly, he was the most flamboyant. He was aggressive, smart, a student of military history, and a leader who could get the most out of his fellow men. Perhaps one of the best, and most concise descriptions of him was written by his wartime G-2, Colonel (later Brigadier General) Oscar W. Koch, who wrote:

He was a professional soldier, a student of history, a planner all of his life, beginning in boyhood. He was a general officer long before stars adorned his shoulders. Anything he had done that would have military application later was stored in his retentive memory, to be applied at the first opportunity. He was a military analyst, always analyzing what the result would be if
certain other things happened first. If it were possible, he would be the one to make those other things happen. 68

Yet Patton was not a one-man army. How then, did his staff conform to his style so that it could support him in the way that he required?

From the time when wars began to involve more than small groups of people fighting each other, commanders have needed assistants to help them carry out their responsibilities. One of the meanings of the word "lieutenant," for example, is one authorized to act for a senior official. Thus, the origin of that term which is now embodied in several military ranks. Likewise, aides did, and still do, tasks for a commander which either allowed the latter to extend his span of control or which freed him to focus on other, perhaps more important or more sensitive tasks. As armies became larger and more complex it was necessary for commanders to employ more and more specialists (staffs) to accomplish detailed functions, while also freeing commanders to devote their time and skills to the leadership and direction of soldiers.

A staff, then, is an extension of its commander. It is an extension in more ways than one, however. Not only is it an extension which allows him to do or to oversee more. It may also become an extension of his personality. Weak or strong commanders breed weak or strong staffs, whereas thorough commanders are rewarded with thorough staff work. Incompetents are usually weeded out, and because most commanders tend to be happy with themselves, replacements usually are cut in a way that is pleasing to them, if not from the same cloth.

Patton's criteria for selecting good staff officers does not appear to have been much different from that of most successful leaders. He
demanded hard work, loyalty, and competence. He expected discipline, self-confidence, and aggressiveness. Not surprisingly, these were the same traits that he demanded of himself. Once he found soldiers with these qualities, he kept many of them with him.

An examination of the roster of Third Army's key staff members is instructive to an officer of the 1980's. Numerous officers had served with Patton in previous assignments; some had been with him throughout the entire war. This practice of staff selection and retention is no longer in vogue, at least not to the degree followed by General Patton. Following the list is a discussion of who worked with Patton and when.

Roster of Principal Staff Officers, Headquarters, Third Army

**Chiefs of Staff:**
- Major General Hugh J. Gaffey, April to December 1944; Major General Hobart R. Gay, December, 1944, to end of war

**Deputy Chief of Staff:**
- Colonel Paul D. Harkins

**Secretary, General Staff:**
- Lieutenant Colonel G.R. Pfann

**G-1:**
- Colonel Frederick S. Matthews

**G-2:**
- Colonel Oscar W. Koch

**G-3 Air:**
- Colonel Harold M. Forde

**G-3:**
- Brigadier General Halley G. Maddox

**G-4 ARTILLERY:**
- Brigadier General Walter J. Muller

**G-5:**
- Colonel Nicholas W. Campanole; Colonel Roy L. Dalferes

**Adjutant General:**
- Colonel Robert E. Cummings

**Anti-Aircraft:**
- Colonel F.R. Chamberlain, Jr.; Colonel T.F. Gallagher

**Artillery:**
- Brigadier General Edward T. Williams

**Chaplain:**
- Colonel James H. O'Neill

**Chemical Warfare:**
- Colonel Edward C. Wallington

**Engineers:**
- Brigadier General John F. Conklin

**Finance:**
- Colonel Charles B. Milliken

**Headquarters Commandant:**
- Colonel Rufus C. Bratton

**Inspector General:**
- Colonel C.C. Park

**Staff Judge Advocate:**
- Colonel Charles E. Cheever

**Medical Section:**
- Brigadier General T.D. Hurley; Colonel Thomas J. Hartford
Let us take a quick look at General Patton's assignments just before and during World War II and then at the above list again to see who served with him and when. In 1939 and 1940, he commanded Fort Myer, Virginia. From there, he was transferred in July 1941, to Fort Benning, Georgia and command of the armored brigade in the 2nd Armored Division. He was promoted to brigadier general and then to major general and took command of the division. In early 1942, he was placed in command of the newly formed 1st Armored Corps, consisting of the 1st and 2nd Armored Divisions. Thus, he was a logical choice to command troops in North Africa once fighting began. In July 1942 he was chosen to lead American forces invading French Morocco. As such, he landed in Africa in November as Commander, Western Task Force.

In March 1943, Patton was placed in temporary command of II Corps in Tunisia following the American disaster at Kasserine Pass. Once he had restored confidence within II Corps, Patton relinquished command and returned to Morocco to help plan the invasion of Sicily. In July 1943, he landed on that island in command of Seventh Army. (Patton's 1st Armored Corps was upgraded to become Seventh Army in order to put it on par with (then) General Bernard Law Montgomery's British Eighth Army which also landed on Sicily.) In January 1944, Patton gave up command of Seventh
Army and later took command of Third Army in England. Third Army became operational in France on 1 August 1944.

Now look at the assignments of some of Patton's staff officers, beginning with those closest to him—Generals Gaffey and Gay, Colonel Harkins, and his aides, Colonel Charles R. Codman and Major Alexander C. Stiler.

General Gaffey served with him as his Chief of Staff in Western Task Force and at II Corps in Sicily he commanded the 2nd Armored Division under Patton's Seventh Army, but rejoined the general to become Chief of Staff of Third Army.

General Gay served with General Patton from the time that the latter commanded Fort Myer, until Patton died in December 1945. A cavalryman, he transferred to the Quartermaster Corps in 1934 because of injuries. (He later transferred back to the cavalry.) He was Patton's quartermaster at Fort Myer, went with him to Fort Benning, served as chief of staff in the 2nd Armored Division, and was with the general at 1st Armored Corps. General Gay was his chief of staff in Western Task Force and in Seventh Army, and was assistant chief of staff at Third Army. He replaced Gaffey as chief of staff in December 1944, when the later took command of the 4th Armored Division.

Colonel Harkins, who later became a four-star general and who preceded General William C. Westmoreland as senior U.S. military officer in Vietnam, first joined General Patton in the G-3 section, 2nd Armored Division. He did not serve with Patton in the 1st Armored Corps, but he rejoined him in August 1942 as deputy chief of staff for operations with the western Task Force. He remained with Patton from then on. He had known
General Patton even earlier at Fort Riley and had commanded a cavalry troop at Fort Myer when Patton was post commander.

Patton's aides also remained with him. He had three. Captain Richard N. Jensen became Patton's aide at Fort Benning and remained so until he was killed in action in North Africa. Colonel Charles R. Codman, a world war I aviator, joined Patton in the United States in 1942 and remained with him thereafter. He became his aide when Jensen was killed. Major Alexander L. Stiller was also an aide who remained with Patton. He had been an enlisted man in World War I in Patton's outfit. One author has commented that Patton's selection of Codman and Stiller did not fit the mold. Because they were closer to Patton's age than most aides, he could enjoy their company, in sharp contrast to those other commanders who allowed themselves when off duty to be exposed to the artless prattle of youthful aides.  

Enlisted members of his personal staff also remained with Patton. They included his orderly, Sergeant William George Meeks, a cavalryman who had been with the general since their days at the Cavalry School at Fort Riley; his cook, Sergeant Phue P. Lee, who joined Patton in Morocco; and Corporal Joe Rosevich, who became the general's private secretary at Fort Benning and remained with him until June 1946.

It is not as easy to fully trace the association of Patton's general and special staff sections leaders with him, but a pattern can be discerned which further illustrates that he retained good people wherever he went. Colonel Koch, G-2, served with Patton at Fort Riley, at Fort Benning, in North Africa, Sicily, and in Third Army. Brigadier General Maddox served with the general in the Seventh Army and in Third Army. The G-4, General Muller also was with Patton throughout the war, as was the Adjutant.
General, Colonel Cummings. Brigadier General Conklin, Third Army Engineer was with Patton in North Africa, went to the United States in 1943, but returned to work for Patton in Third Army. The Ordnance Officer, Colonel Nixon, and the Signal Officer, Colonel Hammond, also served with General Patton in North Africa and in Third Army.

Colonel Allan writes that Patton brought 16 officers with him from Seventh Army when he reported to England. Upon arrival of the Third Army staff from the United States, the main body was met by orders relieving the chief of staff and all the senior General Staff officers, with one exception.

They were replaced by Patton men who had served under him in the African and Sicilian campaigns. Later a number of the Special Staff chiefs also gave way to Patton veterans. The purge did not affect subordinate officers. Subsequent combat operations wrought many changes in their ranks, but Patton confined his head-lopping to the upper ranks.

Practically all of Patton's Section chiefs were Cavalrymen. A number also were veterans of the 2nd Armored Division, his first divisional command. With the exception of MacDonald [sic] [Colonel John C. MacDonald, former G-2 of Third Army, became Patton's Provost Marshal], Hodges' senior officers had been doughboys [Prior to its departure from the United States, Third Army had been commanded by General Courtney H. Hodges.] Under Patton, Hq Third Army became predominantly Cavalry, the only one in the ETO [European Theater of Operations]. It was the only Headquarters where riding breeches and boots were common articles of attire.

It was also the only Headquarters where every officer always wore a necktie.

Hot or cold, rain, snow, or sunshine, in the lines or in the CP, every officer on Patton's Staff always wore a necktie. Also, shaved every day. And a Hq Third Army area always was instantly recognized by the unfailing and snappy saluting.

What lessons can be drawn from the above discussion? There would seem to be several. First, Patton valued loyalty and competence. Once he
found officers who could meet his requirements he retained them in assignment after assignment. This is important for it meant that staff and commander knew what to expect from each other. Given his awesome wartime responsibilities, Patton obviously saw the advantage in surrounding himself with officers who had learned their lessons, who knew what he wanted, and who could produce. In a society where failure often translated into lives lost on the battlefield, less was left to chance.

A second lesson may be found in his decision to surround himself with cavalrymen. As a cavalry officer Patton had encountered or known many of these officers for years and it would be natural that he would seek out those with whom he was acquainted. At the same time, however, he was also getting officers who had been trained to think like him if the adage is true that cavalry or armor officers were conditioned to see the battlefield in a different manner than infantrymen (meaning that they saw the battlefield in terms of grander sweeps, faster movements, and greater distances covered) than it would be important for an officer like Patton to select a staff which would be philosophically attuned to his concept of war. His, after all, was the American field army that moved fastest, farthest, and on a grander scale, even though he was not the only Army commander with armored units. Though there were many factors involved, to include missions assigned to the other armies and the disposition of German forces, Patton's philosophy of war has much to do with Third Army's successes.

Another lesson from the above discussion is found in Alains comments on saluting, appearance, and uniform standards. Patton was a disciplinarian who set high standards. Like many leaders, he recognized that this is one way of instilling pride in soldiers. He followed this policy.
everywhere that he went, most conspicuously in North Africa when he temporarily took command of a demoralized II Corps after the American defeat at Kasserine Pass. Likewise, it is interested to note from the Provost Marshal's after action report for December and January 1944-45 that even during the Battle of the Bulge military police continued to enforce uniform and appearance policies.

Although one might expect Patton to have been close to a staff formed in his image, that apparently was not so. Allan reports that the general had no intimates outside his family. (Whether Allan was referring to his biological or official family is unclear. Presumably, he meant the former.) Blumenstein wrote that Patton's "family" included Generals Gaffey and Gay; his aides, Codman and Stiller; Sergeant Meeks, his orderly; and Colonel Charles B. Odom, his personal physician. He also included Patton's bull terrier, Willie. Certainly, Colonel Harkins must be included with those who spent a great deal of time with Patton. Harkins stated that he accompanied Patton quite a bit as the latter made his rounds so as to know what the general wanted. In this way, he (Harkins) knew what Patton wanted and he would go and oversee it.

One key to making a staff an effective tool of the commander is knowing the commander's intent. In the above comment, Harkins stressed this. Koch did also. He recounts that in addition to the regular staff briefing each day, Patton held a special one at 0800. It was usually attended by Patton, the chief of staff, the commander of Third Army's air component (XIX Tactical Air Command) and his chief of staff; the deputy chief of staff, the G-2, the G-2 Air, and the G-3. Koch wrote:
These briefings were usually quite informal. The standard procedure was for me, using a portable map or blackboard posted specifically for the purpose, to present a resume of enemy activities of the previous day and enemy capabilities as they appeared to me at the moment. My presentation would be followed by a period of "thinking out loud" by all present. All told, the sessions rarely lasted beyond fifteen minutes.

"If the enemy does so and so," General Patton would ask, "what do you think of our doing this?"

A member of his staff would probably remark that "if such and such does happen we are in a position to do this...."

General Patton then might say, "I'm going to do this—or this—depending on the situation at that time." Or, "I'm going to suggest this to Bradley or Ike.”

Then, turning to General Weyland [General Otto P Weyland], the TAC commander, he would ask, "How about it, 'Opey'? Can you give us air support?"

General Weyland's reply was always the same, always in the affirmative. Still better, his frequent answer was, "I've already laid that on," or "We're doing that today.”

This early-hour briefing led to a most fruitful exchange of ideas. But of even greater importance, it made everyone there aware of what the commander had in mind, what he would do under various circumstances that might arise. The staff was kept up to date with Patton's thinking on a daily basis. Future plans were laid and made known and an intimacy of thinking developed [Emphasis added].79

Thus, there was an understanding of what was required. More important, the staff knew what Patton would do or want done in a given situation. This was the product of staff sessions such as the above and of the fact that Patton kept key officers with him throughout the war. Koch reports that staff members did not have to get Patton's approval to take action when that action was in accordance with established policies and procedures. In fact, Patton expected such initiative.80
General Gay commented similarly. Each day, after the staff briefing, General Patton went out to visit corps and division commanders and soldiers. The chief of staff was left to pretty much run the staff, confident that he knew what his boss wanted. Patton, in turn, could indulge his personal style of command, namely visiting the front and being seen by his soldiers, secure in the knowledge that he and the staff were synchronized. Thus, his telephone call to Gay on 18 December was all that was necessary to start 4th Armored Division and 80th Infantry Division in motion. Patton knew that his instructions were understood and that they would be carried out; he didn't need to be there to oversee the effort.

So much did Patton depend on his staff and his relationship with the chief of staff, that Gay reported that directions to the G-4 mostly went through the chief of staff. Gay received broad guidance at the early morning meeting and then gave direct guidance to the G-4. In fact, Martin van Creveld reports that “throughout the campaign of 1944-5, he [Patton] only saw his G-4 twice—once before he assumed active command and again in the last week of the war.”

While most commanders would be uncomfortable with such a practice, if true, it at least further serves to emphasize the trust inherent in the commander-staff relationship at Third Army.

Lest this discussion appear to be one-sided, it should be noted that some have criticized Patton’s staff. In Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, weigley quoted General Omar Bradley:

Until the Battle of the Bulge I did not share George’s enthusiasm for his Third Army staff which, unlike those of both the First and Ninth Armies, lacked outstanding individual performers. Indeed, I had once agreed with the observation of another senior commander who said, “Patton can get more good work out of a mediocre bunch of staff officers than anyone I ever saw.”
Doctor Weigley commented on General Bradley's observation as follows:

This assessment was surely unfair to several of Patton's staff, particularly his prudent G-2, Colonel Koch. Bradley also had the emphasis a bit wrong. Any weakness in Patton's staff lay less in individuals than in organization. It was occasional bursts of individual exertion and ability that had to compensate for the lack of a consistently effective organization, which failed to manage the day-to-day activities of the Third Army with the consistency of staff supervision in the First or the Ninth Army. This absence of constant, detailed, untiring staff work at Third Army headquarters was at the same time a corollary of the personalized command that Patton exerted over his army in contrast to Hodges or Simpson [Lieutenant General William H. Simpson, Commander, Ninth Army]. It was not Patton's design that his army should be directed by anonymous staff officers.85

This analysis requires some comment. Certainly Allan and Harkins, parochial though they might be expected to be, would quarrel with it. Regarding Bradley's comment, no doubt Allan would point out that Bradley had previously commanded First Army. Certainly, Allan's book, Lucky Forward, gives no evidence of a great love for First Army and he seemed, at least, to feel that higher headquarters were biased toward First Army. For example, regarding Patton's desire to deploy to the Pacific Theater after victory in Europe, the fact that Third Army was designated for European occupational duty, while First Army was designated for redeployment to Japan was "bitterly resented at Lucky [codename for Third Army headquarters], and attributed to topside bias against Patton."86

Weigley's assessment that the Third Army staff was not a continually effective organization and that it failed to manage daily tasks with the
consistently of First or Ninth Armies, does not seem to be supported by the data previously discussed in connection with the daily activities of the individual staff sections during the Battle of the Bulge. The proof of a staff lies in whether or not it is able to conduct an operation, plan subsequent ones, and attend to the routine tasks that have to be performed at the same time, while doing all to the satisfaction of its commander. An examination of the previous material would seem to support a conclusion that Third Army's staff met this test.

Weigley lays the supposed faults of the staff at the feet of Patton, whose style of "personalized command" would not allow Third Army to be directed by staff officers. While he is correct in attributing to Patton any faults that may have existed (for commanders are ultimately responsible for what their soldiers do or fail to do), this is not necessarily a fault. Commanders have many tools to allow them to accomplish their goals. They can hire and fire staff officers as need be until the right combinations are found which will allow them to get the most mileage out of the staff. But this is simply management and while successful commanders must be good managers, they are paid to lead soldiers. This can most effectively be accomplished by personal example, by being seen by soldiers and subordinate leaders. Soldiers expect to see commanders, not staff officers, and it is to the former that their loyalty lies in the chain of command. In the process of moving around the area of operations, the commander--normally an officer with greater experience than his subordinates--is in a position to gain a "feel" for the situation in a way that will never be apparent through the receipt of numerous briefings in some sheltered headquarters. Patton knew this and he practiced it. The staff successfully adapted to his style of
leadership and it is one reason why Third Army was so successful. If it did in fact, fall to match the organizational efficiency of other army staffs, it nevertheless excelled on the battlefield, which, after all, is the ultimate testing ground. As Koch said:

Patton believed a commander should be seen by his troops in pre-war maneuvers this meant standing in the dust as his tanks rumbled by, arms extended and hands clasped in the fashion of a victorious prizefighter, and yelling encouragement. "Give 'em hell!" in combat, when the going was tough, it meant visiting the front, getting shot at. He felt it was a morale builder for the troops to see a commander sharing the danger of his soldiers. The more senior an officer, he contended, the more time he had for visiting the front.87

Just as Patton went forward every day to gain that "feel" for the situation and to see and be seen by soldiers, so too, he expected his staff to do the same. He wanted no "armchair" soldiers, said Colonel Koch.88 Colonel Allan said the same thing.

It was SOP [Standard Operating Procedure] in Hq Third Army for every Staff Section to send an officer to the lines each day. One of the first rules he laid down was "One officer from each Staff Section of the Army and Corps will go to the front daily. Anything of vital moment obtained during the visit will be reported to the Chief of Staff immediately upon returning. The Commanding General or Chief of Staff must visit part of the front daily."89

Paul Harkins discussed the practical effects of this policy. Patton insisted that

somebody from the staff go forward every single day. He wouldn't give out any medals for beautiful warehouses and things like that, if the soldiers didn't have what they needed up front.

At first, the corps and divisions didn't think much of having the Army staff come up and bother them, but when they found out we went up there to find out what they needed and then we would get it to them, well, they changed a 180, they were all heart.90
Although not unique to Third Army, this is another way that the commander and his staff were able to stay abreast of requirements and conditions in the Army area and to take the appropriate action.

Patton's personal style of leadership has also been criticized because it gives the appearance of a 'hip-pocket operation.' Weigley commends Third Army for an effective and efficient 90 degree turn of the Army to go on the offensive in the Ardennes, while commenting that there were some command and control problems encountered in doing so in the early days when some units were unsure for whom they were working. He blames Patton's 'impetuous' command style for this. He suggests that "Patton tried to do too much and thereby crowded his strategic and tactical vision with too many details." He also cites General Eisenhower's fear that Third Army might be committed piecemeal when its forces should be "husbanded" for a major counterattack. It is true that in the early days of the Bulge General Patton roamed about, giving many orders and directions himself, far away from his headquarters, as he and his driver drove from unit to unit. It is also correct, as Weigley notes, that Patton wrote to his wife:

"On the 19th it was decided to send me up here to stop the Germans... The next day, the staff of the Third Army, which consisted of myself and Sergeant Mims [Sergeant George Mims, his driver], visited two corps and five division commanders, reshuffled two divisions, and telephoned for the engineers, tank destroyers, extra tank battalions, etc." 

But in War As I Knew It, Patton expanded on this thought:

At the end of this rather hectic day, my driver, Sergeant Mims, said to me, "General, this Government is wasting a lot of money hiring a whole General Staff. You and me has run the Third Army
all day and done a better job than they do. Actually, the remarkable movement of the Third Army from the Saar to the Bulge was wholly due to the superior efficiency of the Third Army staff, particularly General Gay, General Muller, Colonel Nixon, and Colonel E. Busch, Quartermaster of the Third Army. Those who desire to inform themselves on how an army should be moved should study this operation as set forth in meticulous detail in the "After Action Operations Report" of the Third Army.93

One of the more interesting commentaries on this episode and how it illustrates Patton’s personal style of leadership, was given by Paul Harkins in his oral history interview for the U.S. Army Military History Institute. Harkins went with Patton to the Verdun conference on 19 December. The staff had already been working out plans to shift the Army north so when General Eisenhower asked General Patton how fast he could move, the latter responded that he could attack in three days. This was not well-received, for some interpreted it as braggadocio. Few thought it possible, including Eisenhower. Following the conference, Patton drove to Luxembourg while Harkins headed for Nancy to brief the Third Army staff.

I told them what we had to do and [to] get things moving. I left that afternoon for Luxembourg to join General Patton and I arrived after supper. He wanted to know where the hell I had been, and I said, "I’ve been fighting divisions, moving up this way. It took quite a while all through a snow storm." So, he said, "Well, here’s what I did or here’s what I’ve done," and he turned to his driver, Sergeant Mins [sic], who had been with him all day and the only one with him and said, "Didn’t you take notes Mins [sic]?" He said, "No, sir, I didn’t." "Well," he said, "I’ll try to remember what I did," and he started telling me and I said, "I’ll start out tonight and go check and see if everything is in order," and he said, "Nobody’s going out tonight because they are shooting everybody." So, I went around the next day. The units [VIII Corps units] were so broken up after they got hit by the Germans, anti-aircraft mixed up with infantry, etc. There were tanks mixed up with anti-aircraft and nobody seemed to be in command. Well, General Patton just went up there and got them all together and formed little task forces.
out of them and said, "You are in command and you are now known as Task Force --," he named them, gave the men a Task Force name with a commander. It would be Task Force Gregory or Task Force Jones and this is what you got to fight as. I don't think if you sat down in Fort Leavenworth and tried to figure out how you could save that thing, you could have done better than he did. He just had a knack of what should go together and what they should do. In the first place, he just turned them all around and sent them north. It was absolutely fantastic, and when it got all straightened out in two or three days, and the divisions started coming up [Third Army's divisions] and taking over and absorbing these little Task Forces. They, the Task Forces really held the enemy off while the divisions moved up. As I say, it was fantastic, quite a job.94

While it is true, that such action on the part of a commander might lead to confusion, it is also true that the situation was desperate and that it demanded personal leadership. Patton's staff knew what was expected of them and he stayed in touch with them. Meanwhile, he placed himself where he felt that he could have the greatest impact. This can hardly be criticized, especially when one views the results.

The preceding discussion should in no way be taken as implying any criticism of Doctor Weigley, one of this country's most respected military historians. It is true that a senior commander who personally gives orders from the field during a confusing or emergency situation may lose sight of the overall picture. Yet mistakes can also be made from a headquarters full of staff officers if one does not have a 'feel' for what is happening. This, Patton was able to acquire as he moved throughout the area of operations. More importantly, his physical presence undoubtedly communicated his sense of urgency far better than could have been done by written orders, courier, or radio.
The Third Army staff should also be judged in light of its ability to improvise when it was required to change directions in the midst of planning to initiate a major attack through the Siegfried Line. Much work had gone into plans for this operation. Supplies had been pre-positioned, plans prepared, units briefed, and forces aligned, yet when confronted with the German offensive into the Ardennes, the changeover was instantaneous. Contrast this flexibility with that of SHAЕF headquarters when the Ludendorff Bridge over the Rhein was captured at Remagen, Germany on 7 March 1945. A tremendous amount of effort had gone into Allied plans and preparations for a Rhein crossing, led by the 21st Army Group in the north, with 12th Army Group units crossing between Mainz and Karlsruhe. Major General Harold R. Bull, Eisenhower's G-3, was unhappy with this turn of events and his concerns affected Eisenhower in the days that followed. Although there were valid reasons to support a major crossing in the north, and although the possibility existed that the Remagen site might not support enough divisions, still the contrast between SHAЕF and Third Army could not be any more obvious. In the one case, there was a concern about the change in plans; in the other, plans were jettisoned abruptly with little apparent concern. One is reminded at this point, of the quote attributed to Count Helmuth von Moltke, the elder, to the effect that plans are only good until the fighting starts.

Yet if Third Army showed great flexibility, it was also flexibility based on preparation, another characteristic of a good staff. In late November 1944, General Patton had written in his diary that he thought Generals Bradley and Hodges were making a mistake by keeping the Ardennes area static and he wondered if the Germans were building up strength in the
area. Further, Koch made it his practice to monitor adjacent zones of operations for the obvious reason that what happened there might have an impact on Third Army. At a staff briefing on 9 December, he pointed to the VIII Corps front and suggested that the Germans might be concentrating there. Plans were initiated, therefore, to be prepared for eventualities. This included surveying roads and bridges leading to the north. Col. Harkins also kept watch on the area, as did IX Tactical Air Command's General Weyland. The latter had found out that his planes could not go into German territory north of Third Army's area as easily as they previously had, due to increased anti-aircraft. "We knew something was going on," said Harkins.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This brief look at the Third Army staff suggests some conclusions, as well as some questions for present day leaders. Certainly, it re-validates the importance of the role of a staff to the success of a commander on the modern battlefield. Simultaneously, it suggests the need for commanders to develop their staffs so that they will become able extensions of themselves. At the same time, commanders are well advised to ensure that their own weaknesses or areas of lesser interest are amply compensated for by officers with strengths in those areas. Thus, if he was truly indifferent to logistics tables, as Martin Van Creveld suggests, Patton was well-served by Muller and Nixon and the other logisticians of Third Army who helped make his battlefield successes possible.
The point that a staff needs to be philosophically in tune with its commander is demonstrated by the selection and retention by General Patton of like-minded officers whose methods of operation fit with his style of leadership. More importantly, this raises a question for modern commanders. In today's Army it is often frowned upon when one repetitively works for the same officer. Turn-over of personnel in all units, to include headquarters, is the norm and is viewed by many as being a healthy way of bringing in new ideas. Be that as it may, Patton's success suggests that this might be a question for study as the Defense Department moves to an increased emphasis on the role of the various unified commands. Given congressional guidance on the development of officers with joint service skills, the new "ticket punch" for many will be the joint assignment will an emphasis develop on qualifying as many joint service officers as possible and will this lead to a rapid turn-over of personnel as soon as each officer achieves the congressionally-mandated tour length? If the spirit of the new legislation is to develop specialists while also strengthening the capabilities of the joint headquarters, then is there a lesson to be learned from General Patton's retention of key staff members in multiple assignments?

There are many roads to success and many successful leaders with different styles. Still, the ability of Third Army to improvise and to rapidly change direction in an emergency situation has real lessons for today's soldiers. We live in a fast-paced world. Changes in weapons systems, communications, and mobility have been dynamic, if not revolutionary since 1944. We must be prepared for explosive changes on the modern battlefield. Third Army's situation at the beginning of the Battle of the
Bulge was also fast-paced. Perhaps the operational tempo that Third Army faced in that emergency situation will be the norm on many future battlefields. If so, then the ability of General Patton and his staff to meet the challenges of the Bulge, an ability which was the result of competence, dynamic leadership, and teamwork, is worthy of study by modern day leaders.

Although their response to the German offensive was initiated with little warning, there is no reason to suggest that what the Third Army staff accomplished during the Ardennes Campaign was out of the ordinary. Indeed, much was routine. The staff served as a go-between with higher and lower headquarters and it facilitated the accomplishment of the commander's intent, but that was no different than at the other levels. The staff organization remained constant and normal tasks continued to be completed, albeit, perhaps, at a more rapid pace. A conclusion to be drawn, therefore, is that there is nothing unique about staff functions at the operational level of war.

One must search elsewhere, therefore, for those factors which make the operational level distinct from the tactical or the strategic. The more important differences are found in the roles of commanders. It is here that one must focus to see the real changes.

This paper has addressed the part played by the staff in helping the commander to meet his requirements. A future look is required to consider how the role of the commander evolves from level to level. Third Army's part in the Ardennes Campaign will serve as the framework for that study.
The three levels of warfare are the strategic (at a very high level where the emphasis is primarily on the achievement of overall national objectives), the operational (where the planning and conduct of campaigns takes place), and the tactical (where combat occurs). As for the involvement of different levels of organizations, the national command authority, major coalition headquarters, and other major headquarters, such as those at theater level, are normally concerned with the strategic level of war. Army Groups may be included, but may also be involved in planning at the operational level. Armies and corps, primarily the latter, fight the operational level. Divisions may as well, but normally divisions are concerned with the tactical fight. Units below division fight the tactical level of war. One must not interpret from this explanation that the levels of war are defined by the size of the organizations concerned instead, is the scope and the magnitude of the undertaking that forms the definition. Another term that will be used is the operational art, which simply means the conduct of war at the operational level.

2 The Siegfried Wall was the name given to the German defensive fortification belt that existed along that country's western border.

3 The wisdom of this action has since been debated. The argument against it is that the prospect of unconditional surrender forced the Germans to fight much harder and took away any possibility of a popular revolt against the Nazis. The argument in favor is that it was designed to assure the Russians that the Americans and British would not opt for a separate peace.

4 Operation MARKET GARDEN was the Allied attempt in September 1944 to attack through Holland, so as to enter Germany in the north.
5. Hitler's assumptions were faulty. The democracies were not as weak as he believed. Instead, in the midst of battle, Eisenhower quickly adjusted command boundaries and responsibilities by transferring American forces north of the bulge to the control of Field Marshal Montgomery. Those to the south were left under General Bradley's charge. Additionally, General Eisenhower received immediate support from both the British and United States governments. Coalition paralysis did not occur.


7. German planning and preparation for the offensive is not the subject of this paper, but can be easily reviewed elsewhere. See, for example, John S.D. Eisenhower, The Bitter Woods (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1969). See also, Charles B. MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1985).


9. The importance that Hitler gave to the Ardennes offensive is demonstrated, in part, by the amount of resources that he accorded to it in relation to those available elsewhere, and in the fact that he was willing to risk such an effort in spite of serious overall logistical shortfalls. For example, there were only 2,567 tanks and armored assault guns available on the Western Front and the Ardennes offensive (to include forces held in reserve) was granted 2,168 of them. Thus, only 400 were left for the entire rest of the German forces in the west. Only about 1,500 tanks and assault guns were available on the entire Eastern Front. There was a shortage of prime movers for towed artillery and the amount of aircraft that could be allotted to the attack was minimal. Only on one day were the Germans able to scrape together 800 aircraft, they had attacked Poland with 1,800, the Balkans with 1,000, and invaded the Soviet Union with 2,500 aircraft in support. Motorized transportation assets were also limited. The best divisions had only 80 percent of authorizations and some could manage to field only 50 percent. One of the best divisions had 60 types of motorized transport. Spare parts, signal equipment, ammunition, antitank guns, and
petroleum stocks were also in short supply (ibid., pp. 71-73). Additionally, many of the divisions used had been filled with replacements, many less than adequately trained. Conscriptions standards were not up to those of the early war years, owing to the tremendous losses that the German Army had taken by this time.

10 Dates of arrival in theater of the various units are from Shelby L. Stanton, *Order of Battle U.S. Army, World War II* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1984). To the north of these divisions was the U.S. 2nd infantry Division; it too, became heavily engaged, but managed to deflect the brunt of the attack so that the critical penetration of Allied lines occurred to its south. The 2nd Division was assigned to V Corps, while the others were part of VIII Corps. Both corps were part of First U.S. Army commanded by Lieutenant General Courtney H. Hodges. Soon after the battle began, VIII Corps was transferred to Third Army to better facilitate command and control of the American counter-offensive.

11 Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces


13 ibid., pp. 457-458


15 Martin Blumenson, *Patton: The Man Behind the Legend, 1885-1945* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1985), p. 246. The author writes that General Bradley called Patton. However, Patton's Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General (then Brigadier General) Hobart R. Gay, said in his wartime diary entry for Saturday, 16 December 1944, Word was received late by telephone from Chief of Staff, Twelfth Army Group, to Chief of Staff, Third Army, directing that the 10th Armored Division be attached to the VIII Corps, a representative to proceed at once to Headquarters, VIII Corps for details reference movement into that area.

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Hobart R. Gay, unpublished diary on file at the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, pp. 612-613. The Gay diary is extremely detailed and gives evidence that entries were meticulously kept on a day-by-day basis, rather than being entered sometime later. The order to move 10th Armored was not an extraordinary one and there is little evidence to doubt the above entry.


17. Primary reference for the above discussion of actions during the Ardennes Campaign was ibid., pp. 6-9.


19. Dr. Weigley points out that the operation was designed by a master and masterfully executed, but it was not unique. General Heinz Guderian performed similar feats several times in France in 1940 and then again near Kiev in Russia in September, 1941. Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants, pp. 500-501.


22. Each of the 22 general and special staff sections, plus the Headquarters Commandant, will now be examined. Unless otherwise indicated, Volume II of the Third Army After Action Report will be the principal source document for this discussion. Citations to this reference will be found at the end of each section. The general staff sections will be presented in the order of a typical briefing--G-2, G-3, G-1, G-4, and G-5. The special staff sections will then be addressed in alphabetical order.

23. The term, Auxiliary Agencies, needs explanation for modern-day readers. Colonel Oscar W. Koch, General Patton's G-2 at Third Army, offered the following.

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What the division lacked in collecting enemy information was usually provided by attached intelligence specialists who served as extremely efficient helping hands. Each division had at least fifty auxiliary intelligence specialist personnel attached in the form of teams. Normally included were tactical interrogators of prisoners of war, enemy order of battle specialists, military intelligence interpreters, translators, aerial photo interpreters, and CIC (Counter Intelligence Corps) personnel.

The corps would have at least twice as many specialist teams as its divisions, including the same types plus others, better organized and equipped to serve a larger command. A mobile weather detachment which could forecast weather for the entire corps area, for example, and specialized engineers with map reproduction facilities.

By the time all these teams were totaled up at the field army headquarters, the number of attached specialists rarely fell below 2,000—and on many occasions it was double that number. Those units attached directly to the army headquarters would again include the same types as were attached to division and corps headquarters, plus those whose duties, broader in scope, would more adequately augment intelligence resources at that level. Here would be found teams designed to process enemy documents in volume, evasion and escape experts who would instruct the troops in how to evade capture or how to escape if they were captured, special air interrogators for downed enemy air force personnel, mobile interrogation units which served strategic purposes rather than front line tactical needs, and OSS detachments.

All of these auxiliary agencies normally were responsible directly to the chief intelligence officer. They were as varied in size as in purpose, on occasion ranging from three-man teams to detachments equivalent in size to a battalion of artillery or a cavalry group with two or more mechanized squadrons.


26. The Third Army After Action Report provides a thorough definition of this element's responsibilities. Although its title is somewhat nebulous, when its charter is reviewed the importance of its role takes on a fuller meaning.

Passive air defense measures, in general, include personnel protection, slit trenches, fox holes, and other shelters, cover and concealment of personnel and stores, dispersal of stores and the segregation of inflammables and explosives from other stores, early information of enemy air raids; blackouts and dimouts; reconnaissance, marking, reporting of, and prompt removal by proper personnel, of unexploded bombs, mines and booby traps; defense against chemical agents and the prompt report of their use by the enemy, effective use of first aid measures in the case of the wounded, and, prompt and effective measures to remove from destroyed and damaged structures persons trapped therein Closely allied with passive air defense, but not a part of it, is fire prevention and fire control.

(Prop, p 6 of the G-3 Section report.)

27. Regarding the Third Army daily briefings, one author wrote:

General Patton demanded that the most up-to-date information be at his Headquarters from all units on all fronts at 0800 and again at 1600. The General was briefed at 0900 and again at 1700. At the 0900 briefing, all the Chiefs of Sections were present and our front line situation—as reported by information received from liaison officers, Corps G-2 and G-3 reports or possibly a late phone call from a Corps or a short wave radio pick-up—was explained by the G-3. The Air Officer next gave a short summary of events relative to the air arm. Then the G-2 gave a briefing on the enemy intelligence situation, secured from the same sources as the G-3. Finally a brief summary of the newscasts was given as picked up from the B.B.C. (British Broadcasting Corporation), American stations, and short wave interceptions. All of the
reports covered not only information on our own front, but also from the Armies on our flanks, the British, Canadians, French, and Ninth US Army as well as higher headquarters. There was news of course from Russia, the Pacific and in fact the whole world, but it was all brief and very much to the point.

The whole briefing, given in the War Room of Tent, where were kept up-to-date maps of the whole world, never lasted over 20 minutes. Immediately after this War Room briefing, the same information was given, taken from notes, to the 25 odd liaison officers collected in the liaison room or tent in front of the liaison situation maps. All the liaison officers took notes at this briefing and immediately thereafter went to their own headquarters to deliver the complete information there. So that by approximately noon each day, every unit in Third Army had a summary of the complete situation and news from every other front.

Brenton G. Wallace, Patton and His Third Army (Harrisburg, PA. Military Services Publishing Company, 1946), p. 20

28 Third Army After Action Report, G-3 Section, pp 1 and 21-28
29 Ibid, G-1 Section, pp 1 and 6-9
30 Koch wrote:

Patton was aware, of course, that his applications of accepted military principles often did not fit the prescribed method. Academically, crossing columns in troop movements as he did in the Battle of the Bulge would have been considered tactical suicide. "I'd hate to go to Leavenworth (Command and General Staff School) after the war," he remarked in discussing the success of that move. "They'll be giving Us (failing grades) for our successful operations. They're going to be in a tough spot, though, with their tactical principles subject to too many historical exceptions."

Koch, G-2, Intelligence for Patton, p. 159.
Although it may appear to be redundant, snow suit fabrication and procurement will be mentioned several times. This is because several sections did so in their reports. Interestingly, no one single agency handled the action. One finds the engineer, ordnance, chemical, and quartermaster sections all involved to varying degrees in trying to obtain or make these items. It may be that one section tasked the others to help, but that is not evident from the after action report. If not, then this is a defect, though the participation of all earns points for initiative.


Third Army After Action Report, G-4 Section, pp. 1-2 and 37-49

Civil affairs units in Europe were organized into regiments, companies, and detachments, with the detachment being the basic operating unit. Of these, there were four types.

Type "A," with a strength of seventeen officers, two warrant officers, and twenty-two enlisted men, was equipped to work in larger cities and on higher governmental levels, such as Regions or Provinces. It had specialists in police work and public health, fiscal experts and engineers, sanitary officers and lawyers.

Type "B," with nine officers, two warrant officers, and sixteen enlisted men, was for employment in the next lower grade of cities and governmental units.

Type "C," with five officers and nine enlisted men, and Type "D," of four officers and six enlisted men, were to supervise towns and villages—often, in practice, as many as twenty communities in a single jurisdiction.

Ibid., G-5 Section, p. 2.

Ibid., p. 20.

Third Army After Action Report, G-5 Section, pp. 1-2 and 20-27

Ibid., Headquarters Commandant Section, pp. 1-3 and 5-6

Ibid., Adjutant General Section, pp. 1-3 and 11-14
Allen, Lucky Forward, pp. 239-240. Allen continues, "The next morning [24 December] Patton was jubilant. And when told a few more days of clear skies could be expected, he whooped with pleasure. "Hot dog!" he shouted. "I guess I'll have another 100,000 of those prayers printed. The Lord is on our side, and we've got to keep Him informed of what we need." (Patton awarded Chaplain James H. O'Neill the Bronze Star Medal for preparing the Christmas prayer.)

One can't help but comment that a good sermon could be made on whether the Lord was on our side or we on His. The German Army belt buckle, after all, was inscribed "Gott Mit Uns." (God with us.) Clearly, some Germans might have tried to argue the other side of the equation in 1944.

MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets, pp. 243-244. Peiper's curse served as the title of a book about the engineers. See also Nies, The Damned Engineers.

Koch, G-2 Intelligence for Patton, p. 145.


Ibid., Finance Section, pp. 1-4.

Ibid., Inspector General Section, pp. 1-3.

Ibid., Judge Advocate Section, pp. 1 and 4-5.

53. This figure does not square with the previously reported statistic of 24,092 evacuations, nor with the G-1's report of 12,788 wounded (although obviously not all wounded would have been evacuated). Probably the battle casualty figures reported by the surgeon pertain only to those soldiers treated in hospitals under direct control of Third Army. The higher evacuation figure may be explained by the fact that some of November's casualties would be included and by the fact that a soldier could bypass a hospital in the system based on the nature of treatment required and the capacity of facilities at the time.

54. Third Army After Action Report, Medical Section, pp. 1-5 and 28-41.

55. Ibid, Ordnance Section, pp. 1 and 17-20.

56. Ibid, Provost Marshal Section, pp. 1-3 and 16-21.


58. Ibid, Public Relations Section, pp. 1-3 and 9-11.

59. Ibid, Quartermaster Section, pp. 1-2 and 12-19.


62. Ibid, Special Services Section, pp. 1-4.

64. Ibid., p. 326

65. Third Army After Action Report, Tank Destroyer Section, pp. 1-5


67. Unlike his movie character, Scott refused to receive the award Patton would have accepted it with great fanfare.

68. Koch, G-2, Intelligence for Patton, p. 158

69. Patton, War as I Knew It, pp. 420-421. While the basic list came from Patton's book, it was cross-referenced with several other works to determine first names of officers. In the case of Chaplain O'Neill and Colonel Millikin, their initials on Patton's list were found to be incorrect. Note: Although some of these officers rose to higher rank after the war, their wartime ranks will be used in the text.

70. No single source was located which presented this information. To obtain it required cross-referencing a number of different books, to include Blumenson's Patton: The Man Behind the Legend, 1885-1945, Patton's War As I Knew It, Ladislas Farago's Patton, Ordeal and Triumph (New York: Ivan Obolensky, Inc., 1963), Allan's Lucky Forward, H. Essame's Patton (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974), General Gay's diary, and the interviews of Generals Gay and Harkins located in the U.S. Army Military History Institute, and Koch's G-2, Intelligence for Patton.

71. Essame, Patton, p. 123

72. Allan, Lucky Forward, p. 47

73. Ibid., p. 16-17

74. Third Army After Action Report, Provost Marshal Section, pp. 16-21

75. Allan, Lucky Forward, p. 23

77 Senior Officers Debriefing Program, Conversations between General Paul D. Harkins and Major Joseph B. Couch, Jr., 26 April 1974, Dallas, Texas. U.S. Army Military History Research Collection. P. 25

Note: Koch's book was subsequently published as G-2, Intelligence for Patton (previously cited).

79 Koch, G-2, Intelligence for Patton, pp. 147-148

80 Ibid., p. 157

81 Senior Officers Oral History Project, Project 81-6, Interview of Lieutenant General Hobart Raymond Gay by Colonel Willard L. Wallace, 1981. U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, p. 20

82 Ibid.


85 Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants, pp. 519-520

In Dear Miss Em (p. 23), Jay Levaas recounts how General Eichelberger also believed that it was important for a leader to be seen by his men. Once, when he was preparing to visit the front lines at Buna, in New Guinea, his chief of staff surreptitiously removed the general's stars from his uniform out of concern that the commander might become too conspicuous a target for a Japanese sniper. The general returned that evening mad because he had misplaced his insignia. The chief confessed, whereupon Eichelberger exploded, "I want the boys to know I'm here with them. Hell, what's the use of my going up front if I go incognito?"

General Patton and Field Marshal Erwin Rommel have often been favorably compared with one another. Commenting on his front-line decisions, Major General F W von Mellenthin wrote.

His custom of 'leading from the front' occasionally told against him; decisions affecting the army as a whole were sometimes influenced unduly by purely local successes or failures. On the other hand by going himself to a danger spot-and he had an uncanny faculty for appearing at the right place at the right time-he was able to adapt his plans to new situations, and in the fluid conditions of the Western Desert this was a factor of supreme importance.


Farago, Patton: Ordeal and Triumph, p. 713

Patton, War As I Knew It, p. 196
94. Harkins interview, pp. 30-31

95. Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants, pp. 627-630


97. Harkins interview, p. 29
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