FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND THE INF (INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCE) TREATY: WHAT NEXT? (U) ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA H A WILLIAMS 14 MAR 88
The prospect of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty led the former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, GEN Bernard Rogers, to claim that NATO would lose weapons vital to the Alliance's defense when Pershing II (PlI) and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) were withdrawn from Europe. Nuclear weapons and the NATO strategy of flexible response are inseparably dependent upon each other. GEN Rogers' comments focus directly on the capability which PlI and GLCM provided NATO to strike Soviet territory in event of conflict and if such an escalatory step was deemed necessary. Various sources were (con't)
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FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND THE INF TREATY: WHAT NEXT?

An Individual Study Project
Intended for Publication

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ABSTRACT

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The prospect of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty led the former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, GEN Bernard Rogers, to claim that NATO would lose weapons vital to the Alliance's defense when Pershing II (PII) and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) were withdrawn from Europe. Nuclear weapons and the NATO strategy of flexible response are inseparably dependent upon each other. GEN Rogers' comments focus directly on the capability which PII and GLCM provided NATO to strike Soviet territory in event of conflict and if such an escalatory step was deemed necessary. Various sources were researched to determine if the INF Treaty will cripple the flexible response strategy; while it should not, certain changes in NATO's approach to defense are suggested. Specifically, conventional and nuclear improvements, the latter within the terms of the INF Treaty, are suggested, as are conventional force reduction negotiations and the "Europeanization" of NATO.
INTRODUCTION

"I maintain that we have lost, therefore, a vital tool, namely theater nuclear weapons that can strike with certainty into the Soviet homeland by losing Pershing IIs."¹

"I am concerned that, under the aegis of the United States, the long-term credibility of NATO’s deterrent is being sacrificed by this treaty on the altar of short-term political expediency."²

So says GEN (Ret) Bernard W. Rogers', former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), commenting on the American-Soviet arms control treaty eliminating Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) missiles. But what is the loss? Surely reducing nuclear weapons is a goal to be pursued with vigor. Has NATO lost a vital tool? Will the loss of INF missiles compromise NATO’s "Flexible Response" strategy? If so, should NATO take action to restore the strategy?

Assuming the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. ratify the pact, the INF treaty is a done deal. Both sides will destroy long-range and shorter-range INF missiles,³ missiles originally intended in part to maintain flexible response as a viable strategy. Can the strategy remain valid? Before we can answer that, we must better understand the flexible
response strategy, the role of INF missiles in it and the impact the loss of those missiles will have on it. Options for continued deterrence in Europe can then be considered.

NATO NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENTS

Part and parcel of the flexible response strategy is the evolution of American nuclear weapon deployments to Europe; indeed, without nuclear weapons the strategy would not exist. An explanation of the evolution of flexible response by definition includes an explanation of the evolution of those deployments.

During the 1952 Lisbon Conference, NATO members determined the force structure they believed necessary to deter the Soviets conventionally: 50 divisions and 4000 aircraft, with even larger forces ultimately needed. It was apparent that this was beyond the economic reach of NATO members, either singly or combined. There was an alternative, however. America had a monopoly on nuclear weapons and a "Massive Retaliation" philosophy, a belief that the nuclear monopoly could deter aggression through threat of a massive nuclear attack. NATO members bought into that theory; how could they not, given that none of them, the U.S. included, could afford the conventional force requirement? But
nuclear weapons in America were not sufficient; American nuclear weapons were needed in Europe as well.

In 1959 the U.S. deployed THOR and JUPITER "medium range" ballistic missiles to NATO. An important characteristic of these missiles was that they could range the U.S.S.R. from their launch points in Europe. In addition to countering the Soviet conventional threat, these weapons provided a clear demonstration of the American commitment to defend Europe. That rationale has remained essentially unchanged ever since, despite the fact that the strategy has changed.

Thinking on nuclear strategy is a dynamic process, and nuclear strategy is continually being refined. No attempt is made here to recount that refinement history except to say that a development in the early 1960s had a direct and lasting effect on NATO. During the Kennedy administration, the U.S. embarked on a review of its nuclear policy, spurred on by the Soviet Union's development of nuclear weapons and delivery systems which could reach the U.S. The nuclear monopoly was over, and the U.S. was no longer invulnerable to a Soviet nuclear strike. The Kennedy administration believed America needed more than a nuclear-only military
response capability; thus was born the American version of the "Flexible Response" strategy, providing a range of responses to aggression ranging from conventional to nuclear. European NATO members were persuaded to accept this strategy as a replacement for massive retaliation; they did so with less than elation. In 1967 NATO published MC 14/3, the formal adoption and codification of flexible response as the Alliance's deterrent and warfighting strategy.

Concurrent with America's reappraisal of nuclear policy, NATO decided to modernize the weapons deployed to Europe. THOR and JUPITER missiles were withdrawn subsequent to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis (THOR in 1963, JUPITER in 1965), leading the SACEUR to request additional medium range missiles to enhance NATO's nuclear capability. He was given operational control of a number of U.S. and British POLARIS submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) as well as a number of F-111 dual-capable aircraft (DCA) with nuclear bombs; these systems were capable of carrying nuclear warheads into the U.S.S.R. The 1960s also saw a heavy build-up of other types of nuclear weapons based in Europe; most were either short range systems (ranges sufficient to affect the tactical battlefield, but not the extended
battlefield) or defensive systems (air defense or atomic demolitions). A notable exception was the Pershing 1a (P1a), a nuclear missile with a range of 740km - long enough to reach what we now call the "deep battlefield", but not long enough to reach the U.S.S.R.

From NATO’s inception, American nuclear weapons have been a fundamental part of its defensive strategy, and the adoption of the flexible response strategy did not change that. Indeed, the adoption of flexible response had the effect of multiplying the number of nuclear weapons deployed to Europe in order to give NATO the range of escalation options deemed necessary to the strategy.

WHAT IS FLEXIBLE RESPONSE?

The first element of NATO’s flexible response strategy is to meet any aggression with "direct response", responding to an attack at the level initiated (i.e., a conventional attack would be met with conventional defense, at least initially; a nuclear attack would be met with a nuclear response). If direct response fails, NATO will engage in "deliberate escalation", including the first use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons might be used to halt a conventional attack if all other means failed. Such use would also demonstrate
NATO's resolve to defend itself at all costs in the hope of convincing the aggressor he had bitten off more than he could chew; nothing the aggressor could gain would be worth the ever-escalating price he would be made to pay. If necessary, NATO would continue to escalate through the continuum of force options to general nuclear release.* "General nuclear release" means a coordinated nuclear attack against the Soviet Union and WP countries with both NATO weapons and U.S. strategic weapons. The credibility of flexible response requires not only a mix of conventional and nuclear, but also a mix of nuclear weapon types and ranges, designed to control the ascent up the escalation ladder.

A key flexible response concept is the "coupling" of Europe's defense to that of the U.S. and, more specifically, of NATO nuclear forces to the U.S. strategic nuclear forces, the "top rung" of the escalation ladder. Since the majority of NATO nuclear warheads are under U.S. control and only the U.S. President can authorize their release, even a "NATO-only" nuclear strike on Soviet soil is implicitly a U.S. strike on Soviet soil. Therefore, it's important for coupling that European NATO be able to threaten Soviet territory with nuclear attack, insuring the Soviets will understand that
their homeland is not a sanctuary, and even theater war could lead to a strategic nuclear exchange. Conversely, because of the Soviet capability and propensity to strike back at the U.S., U.S. survival is also at risk if the strike occurs. Thus the U.S. will be more apt to do all in its power to deter war in the first place. NATO feels this will deter the Soviet Union from becoming adventuresome.

Is flexible response realistic? The strategy envisions use of nuclear weapons for defense -- but that very use could well be on west European soil, destroying what it is meant to defend. It is understandable that Europeans are not anxious to contemplate warfighting, particularly nuclear warfighting.

A second, equally troubling question is whether the U.S. really would be willing to authorize a launch of NATO weapons targeted on the U.S.S.R., risking survival to save Europe. Technical improvements to C³ systems and to pre-launch survivability may increase the probability that the launch decision, once made, will be executed, but only continued close European-American ties will help make the decision. The question may not have an answer before the fact.

Is flexible response a useful strategy, then?
Leon Sigal may give the most telling response in saying that it is "less a strategy than an agreement not to disagree over strategy." The true value of flexible response may not be what it offers as a warfighting strategy to defeat a Soviet attack, but what it offers as a peacetime deterrent strategy. From whichever perspective one views it, it is a useful strategy if only because it provides a framework within which NATO can address both deterrence and defense.

INF MISSILES AND FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

How, then, do -- or did -- INF missiles fit into the strategy? GEN Rogers says the decision to deploy INF was "for the purpose of filling a gap in our spectrum [or continuum] of deterrence which had to be filled irrespective of the SS-20." But there was more to it than that. INF missiles were conceived and deployed at least as much for political as for military reasons, if GEN Rogers' rationale may be termed "military"; a review of how we got here from there will illustrate that point.

Several factors motivated the INF deployment decision. U.S. Administration statements regarding development of Limited Nuclear Options fed European fears that the U.S. was planning to fight a nuclear war limited to Europe; this led to efforts to
strengthen coupling, and INF missiles were seen as part of that effort. Another motivation was modernization. In 1974, U.S. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger noted the growing vulnerability of the F-111 in attempting to penetrate Soviet airspace. Additionally, NATO's entire nuclear stockpile, the majority deployed in the 1960's, was aging. These factors led NATO in 1977 to initiate a study to determine how best to modernize its stockpile.

In 1975, in an event which caused little stir in NATO at the time, the Soviets began deploying a new "intermediate range" nuclear missile which NATO dubbed the SS-20. In October 1977, after NATO began its modernization study, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, in a presentation to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, assessed the danger he and other European leaders saw in the SS-20. He argued that the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreements codified strategic nuclear parity between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.; this in turn magnified the effect of other East-West disparities, both conventional and nuclear. The SS-20 (not subject to SALT), gave the Soviets a clear superiority in Europe if NATO took no action to redress the imbalance. Schmidt's comments got attention on both sides of the
Atlantic. NATO members, already considering nuclear modernization, reached a consensus that NATO lacked a credible long range nuclear capability and should develop it. In one author's opinion, this was a watershed decision, moving NATO from the historic philosophy of deterring Soviet conventional strength with nuclear weapons to one of deterring Soviet nuclear capabilities.9

NATO opted for 572 Pershing II (PII) and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM). NATO discussions on number and types of systems centered not so much on the capabilities (read "military utility") of specific systems (beyond the capability to range the U.S.S.R.) as on whether the systems selected should be land- or sea-based. Sea-basing eased deployment problems, but NATO preferred land-basing to make the systems more visible; the purpose was to demonstrate U.S. commitment, to both West Europeans and the Soviets, to the defense of Europe. PII and GLCM were selected because they could be available in the relative near-term. NATO determined the number of systems needed was between 200-600, for several reasons: it would provide sufficient numbers of weapons to be a threat to the Soviets even after wartime attrition; it would provide sufficient numbers to deploy weapons in several European
countries (West Germany insisted that weapons be deployed in at least one other continental NATO country); it provided operational flexibility; and it would provide sufficient numbers to serve both the needs of modernization and coupling following reductions brought about by any U.S.-U.S.S.R. arms reduction agreements [emphasis added]. The final number of 572 systems was based on organizational structure and the decision to base the weapons in five countries.

NATO's deployment decision is known as the "dual-track" decision because of the companion decision to, simultaneously with deployment, attempt to reduce SS-20 numbers through negotiations. The U.S. administration reasoned that it would have great difficulty convincing Congress to fund INF missiles if there was no intent to deploy the systems to Europe, and the Soviets would have little incentive to bargain if they knew the systems would not be built or deployed. Thus there was pressure to deploy. However, European governments were concerned with the domestic political consequences of deploying. From the European viewpoint, it was not politically feasible to delay an offer to negotiate reductions until after deployment. The solution was to link the deployment and negotiation
decisions in a dual track.

As part of the Dual Track Decision, NATO also decided to unilaterally reduce the NATO nuclear stockpile by 1000 warheads, in addition to the 572 warheads to be replaced on a one-for-one basis by INF warheads. In a further effort to calm west European publics' fears, in October 1983 NATO made the "Montebello Decision" to unilaterally reduce its nuclear stockpile by another 1400 warheads to about 4600. NATO thus made some relatively extraordinary unilateral stockpile reductions to soothe European deployment jitters.

That is not to suggest that P11 and GLCM did not serve deterrence well. As GEN Rogers notes, deterrence must be in the mind of the beholder. Obviously, Soviet thinking regarding INF missiles must for the most part be deduced, but there are some indicators of what the beholders thought. The Soviets did not, as NATO, view INF missile deployment as a correction of the imbalance of forces in Europe. Whatever balance of forces had existed before was not, in their view, upset by their deployment of the SS-20s which were not, after all, targeted on the U.S., and were merely a modernization of existing SS-4 and SS-5 intermediate range missiles. P11 was, from the Soviet
perspective, a very threatening weapon system. It could reach Soviet territory in about 13 minutes with little chance of interception." They viewed it as an American gambit for an additional strategic option with which to threaten the U.S.S.R., without resorting to U.S. strategic systems or, even worse, as a component of a first-strike strategic option. Perhaps they even felt, as GEN Rogers apparently does, that INF gave NATO a firm grip on, if not control of, the next to the top rung of the escalation ladder. Normal Soviet obstructiveness aside, it's not surprising that they objected to INF deployment. They mounted a massive disinformation campaign directed toward European publics and for a long period refused to enter negotiations. Even after agreeing to negotiate, they walked out when NATO actually began P11 deployment in continental Europe. INF missiles did guarantee some level of pain for the Soviet homeland if a conflict erupted, and the eye of the beholder understood that. However, impressing the Soviets was not the only, or even the most important, facet of INF deployment.

This review underscores the notion that the decision to deploy INF missiles served both domestic political and military motives, not "military" alone as suggested by GEN Rogers. Reassuring West
Europeans and providing leverage to bring the Soviets and their SS-20s to the bargaining table were every bit as important as filling gaps in deterrence. That has implications for how one thinks about the impact of the loss and what, if anything, must be done to compensate for it.

IMPACT OF INF MISSILE LOSS

GEN Rogers' comments suggest that NATO's strategy will be sorely hurt by the loss of the missiles. Various other authors and NATO leaders have shown concern that the INF treaty will be the first step onto the slippery slope of NATO denuclearization, or that loss of INF missiles concedes the conventional balance of military power to the WP, or that the treaty is the first step in a steadily dwindling NATO role for the U.S. On the other hand, NATO leaders, even after having had time to think through the ramifications, publicly laud the loss of the weapons they worked so hard to get. Whichever side of the question one wants to get on, it seems he'll find himself in good company.

It would be foolish to suggest that the loss of INF missiles will not impact on the viability of flexible response. It will have an impact, but one which need not be fatal. NATO will lose the capability to strike targets in the U.S.S.R. with
visible American missiles deployed in Europe. However, the entire INF episode should be viewed in the positive lights of NATO unity and purpose. The INF deployment decision from the beginning had as part of its motivation the leveraging of the Soviets to the arms control table to reduce the number of SS-20s. It worked. There is something to be said for doing a tough job successfully, and NATO should make the most of it. Flexible response was not originally designed to be dependent on any particular weapon system and we should not now allow it to be dependent on PII and GLCM.

Additionally, there is no real near-term alternative to flexible response. As GEN Rogers notes in discussing alternatives to flexible response:

"You either revert to the strategy of 'massive retaliation', which makes no sense, or you say, 'If we are attacked conventionally, we will have to capitulate because we are not going to resort to the use of nuclear weapons'; that makes no sense either.'"

Conventional increases cannot replace nuclear weapons. While some such increases may be possible and perhaps even probable, it is doubtful that any NATO member country could or would afford (politically or economically) increases of the magnitude necessary to "match" the current WP.
conventional threat. Even if both east and west Europe could be \textit{veifiably} denuclearized and conventional forces \textit{balanced} at much lower levels, it is far from clear that it would be a good idea to do so; resort to arms might seem less threatening in that situation. Nuclear weapons are not inherently bad, and they have played a central role in maintaining European peace for nearly 40 years. Indeed, NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington recently stated categorically that NATO will always require a sufficient mix and number of nuclear weapons.\footnote{16}

While loss of PI1 and GLCM may not compromise flexible response, neither does it leave NATO where its leaders thought, in 1979, they would be today. To keep Soviet expectations of wartime pain appropriately high, the Alliance has rather consistently maintained nuclear delivery means capable of reaching Soviet territory. Loss of PI1 and GLCM means NATO now has only the venerable F-111 (and perhaps now the F-15E) and SLBMs assigned to NATO for this mission. DCA will probably have problems penetrating Soviet airspace, thus reliability is suspect. SLBMs are not visible, thus reassurance is suspect. NATO will also lose Pershing 1a shorter-range missiles (through a
unilateral West German decision). Neither side will field any land-based missiles in the future with ranges between 500-5500km. That was not what NATO bargained for when it initially contemplated INF negotiations. Recall that part of the original rationale for INF missile numbers was to provide sufficient numbers to serve both the needs of modernization and coupling following reductions brought about by any U.S.-U.S.S.R. arms reduction agreements. NATO wasn’t thinking of a “zero option” when it made the decision to deploy, and clearly expected to have PII and/or GLCM missiles left after negotiations. True, NATO supported the U.S. zero option proposal, but GEN Rogers is quite blunt in saying that “Nobody expected the Soviets to agree.”

WHERE TO NEXT?

There are many suggestions on the steps to take to keep NATO - and its strategy - viable. GEN John R. Galvin, current SACEUR, echoes GEN Rogers’ calls for new short range (under 500km) nuclear weapons, such as a replacement for the LANCE missile and a nuclear air-launched missile, as well as improved conventional systems and command and control improvements. These improvements would enhance NATO’s “Follow-On Forces Attack” (FOFA) tactic,
designed to attrite second and successive WP echelons before they engage NATO forces. The U.S. Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy in its report\(^2\)\(^1\) (hereafter referred to as the Commission Report) also makes a strong case for improvements in both conventional and nuclear weapons.

A second approach calls for further arms control negotiations aimed at asymmetrical conventional force reductions and/or additional nuclear reductions.

In a third approach, European members of NATO have shown increased interest in a greater degree of cooperation among themselves to improve their own security. This is evidenced by a resurgence of interest in the Western European Union (WEU) and bilateral, defense-oriented agreements and discussions; for instance, France and West Germany have recently agreed to create a Franco-German brigade and a high-level commission to "coordinate Franco-German policies on nuclear disarmament and other defense matters."\(^2\)\(^2\) The thrust of these moves is to increase the European role in defense because of a fear the U.S. may decrease its role.

These approaches for the most part fall into three general categories: the technological approach (new or modernized nuclear and conventional
weapons); the arms control approach; and what might be termed the "Europeanization" approach (increased European responsibility for European defense). Thus far the three approaches are being discussed separately, but any one approach would seem not to address the entire problem. Rather than focus on one approach to the exclusion of others, NATO should seek its solution in a combination of all three approaches, or a "triple-track" approach.

**THE TECHNOLOGICAL TRACK**

As has been a central theme of the entire preceding discussion, nuclear weapons -- American nuclear weapons -- have consistently been a fundamental part of NATO's defensive philosophy, strategy and planning. They provide the firepower thought necessary to deter the enemy and the reassurance thought necessary to maintain Alliance unity. The U.S. must continue to deploy nuclear weapons to Europe if NATO is to continue to exist in any reasonably effective form. The coupling of European defense to that of the U.S. is a crucial element of NATO's deterrence equation, and that coupling is accomplished through American nuclear weapons deployed to Europe. And, as noted in the Commission Report:

"Even if NATO makes dramatic improvements in its conventional
defenses, the Alliance will still want nuclear weapons (including weapons based in Europe) for at least two reasons. First, because nuclear weapons discourage the massing of forces in any attack. Second, because NATO's ability to respond with controlled and effective nuclear strikes would minimize the Soviets' temptations to use such weapons in discriminate attacks of their own on key elements of the Alliance's conventional capability.  

Ideally, to enhance coupling, the U.S. should deploy additional nuclear missiles allowed by the treaty and capable of ranging the U.S.S.R. Possibilities are Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCM) deployed to NATO air bases or Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCM) deployed aboard U.S. ships. The first alternative offers NATO no significant military advantage, since ALCM can be quickly deployed by air in time of tension or conflict, and has the disadvantage that forward deployment increases weapon vulnerability. Any political benefit would likely be outweighed by a resurgence of the anti-nuclear sentiment so visible during P11 and GLCM deployments. SLCM, on the other hand, are now deployed aboard U.S. ships, and could be made available to NATO quickly if necessary.

Nuclear weapons with ranges below 500km are not affected by the treaty. NATO's nuclear stockpile still requires modernization as agreed at Montebello
in 1983. Deployment of improved short range weapons would serve this purpose. Emphasis should, however, be placed on deployment of weapons at the upper end of the range bracket, both to improve NATO's capability to hold WP forces at risk in depth and to respond to west European fears concerning their own countries being the nuclear battlefield. However, deploying any nuclear weapons in the near future will not be easy. Germany, particularly, is sensitive to deployment of short-range nuclear weapons. Further, the U.S. and NATO will more than likely be accused, both by the Soviets and at home, of deliberately attempting to circumvent the INF Treaty when modernization is attempted. Nonetheless, the pressure to fulfill the Montebello modernization decision should be maintained. Short-range nuclear weapons affect the tactical and operational battlefield, disrupting Soviet/WP thoughts of winning quickly on that battlefield; these weapons have deterrent value because they have warfighting potential. Modernization may have to wait awhile before proceeding quietly, but it should be ultimately possible.

Conventional improvements should also be made. As noted in the Commission Report:

"The Alliance's posture could be transformed by new military
technologies. Among the most important: those distributed, advanced processors promising new effectiveness for command and intelligence functions, those involved in accurate stand-off weapons, in new target acquisition systems for these weapons, in "low-observables" (Stealth) systems for aircraft and other vehicles, and for improved ballistic missile and air defenses... These advanced weapons do not come cheaply; still, their cost would remain only a small fraction of current Alliance spending - small enough so that their acquisition could be accomplished by reallocating funds among NATO programs, if necessary."

Loss of INF missiles and increased conventional dependence may result in future coupling being somewhat "weaker", but the U.S. will still be tied to Europe's defense. Shorter range nuclear weapons serve coupling also; release of these weapons to destroy Soviet troops, even outside the U.S.S.R., is a significant step for an American president to take in support of his European allies. It is still a step up the escalation ladder. Additionally, the continued deployment of sizable U.S. forces to Europe couples European and U.S. defense. To quote Lord Carrington again, the "tangible manifestation of American commitment [to European defense] is not in-theater missiles but the presence of 326,000 American troops."
THE ARMS CONTROL TRACK

Arms control agreements reducing conventional forces could have useful benefits for NATO, but should be approached warily. There are indications that the Soviets would like to achieve a 50% reduction in conventional forces in Central Europe, primarily for economic reasons. Such reductions would obviously be very tempting to NATO, but the cost of achieving them must be weighed carefully. A portion of any conventional reduction should be U.S. forces, but those should be no more than proportional to the current U.S. contribution to NATO standing forces; it would be to NATO's advantage if any U.S. reductions were less than proportional. Despite promises and best intentions, it is more difficult and expensive to return U.S. forces to Europe in response to a possible crisis than it is to mobilize (if necessary) European forces. A conventional reduction agreement should be the only motive for withdrawal of any U.S. forces; withdrawal of U.S. forces without a quid pro quo from the WP could have disastrous results for the Alliance.

NATO must insist that any reductions be asymmetrical, with the WP decreasing more than NATO. Some sources show NATO-WP active ground force manpower levels in the "Atlantic to the Urals" area.
to be roughly equal (2.385M for NATO vs. 2.292M for WP\textsuperscript{27}) and numbers of divisions about the same (107 for NATO, 101 for WP). There is, however, a rather wide disparity in combat power multipliers in or available for deployment to NATO's geographic area; for instance: numbers of tanks are almost 2.5:1 in favor of the WP, mechanized infantry combat vehicles are about 6:1 in favor of the WP and artillery pieces are 3:1 in favor of the WP (same source as above). That indicates greater combat power for the WP. NATO must seek to equalize combat power (vice manpower) in any conventional arms control negotiations. The geographic area covered by proposed Conventional Stability Talks, the "Atlantic to the Urals", is more realistic than the old "NATO Guidelines Area" used in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks (MBFR), which have gone on for years without result. The new area at least recognizes the fact that Soviet forces, even if withdrawn to Soviet territory, can be moved forward with relative ease. Soviet deactivation of forces pursuant to a conventional reduction agreement would not necessarily improve NATO security because of the relative mobilization efficiency of the Soviets. NATO must insist on destruction of WP combat power multipliers, but should protect its own, par-
particularly DCA and artillery (most of which is also dual-capable).

Further nuclear arms control negotiations affecting NATO weapons should be avoided for several reasons. The coupling of Europe-U.S. defense is so important that European denuclearization, a possibility in any further nuclear agreements, must be avoided at all costs. Additionally, nuclear weapons in place provide a disincentive for WP adventures in a post-conventional reduction environment. Thirdly, even if the U.S.S.R. removed all nuclear weapons from non-Soviet WP territories, they would retain the capability to strike Western Europe with systems deployed inside the U.S.S.R.; NATO need not denude itself of some protection simply because the bulk of its nuclear forces are American. Finally, a Europe safe from nuclear conflict might be safe for conflict. No war is better than conventional war.

The Soviets would, however, like to see NATO denuclearized. A scenario for that could be their unilateral withdrawal of significant numbers of conventional forces. Their argument would be that the rationale for NATO short-range nuclear weapons (most of those remaining after the INF Treaty) was to counter superior WP conventional forces; since
these forces had been removed, the nuclear weapons would have lost their purpose and should be withdrawn. If the Soviets also unilaterally beat their tanks, artillery and personnel carriers into plowshares, the argument will be even more persuasive. But NATO should still avoid denuclearization, for the reasons given above.

THE EUROPEANIZATION TRACK

NATO was formed when Europe was still prostrate from WWII; it simply could not afford the expense of defense. That's no longer true. European members of NATO as a group rival the U.S. in economic strength and have long since come of age, yet they have not taken on commensurate defense responsibilities. NATO's continued existence as a viable defense organization is in the best interests of the U.S.; it's also in the best interests of its European members. NATO probably could not only survive but prosper with European acceptance of increased responsibilities for Alliance leadership and support. That's nothing new; Americans have been saying it for years. The difference now is that it appears that steps in this direction are being taken. France, which has opted out of NATO's military structure, and West Germany, particularly, are leading this move, but interest in it is more
widespread. France's recent cooperation may signal a new willingness which should be explored. The movement toward greater European cooperation should be nurtured diplomatically by the U.S., but care should also be taken to channel it within the NATO framework. A true "European Defense Community", without the U.S. as an honest broker, is still futuristic. But a more Europeanized NATO, with European members accepting a larger proportional role in troops assigned or in joint weapons system developments, etc., does appear more within reach now than ever before.

Europeanization of the Alliance should extend beyond conventional contributions. Two European NATO members are nuclear powers. France has in being a land-based nuclear ballistic missile system with sufficient range to reach the U.S.S.R. (the SSBS S-3D/TN-61\*), and plans to modernize its forces. Neither the United Kingdom nor France is bound by the INF Treaty. They can, legally and morally, provide weapons which ensure that the U.S.S.R. would not be a wartime sanctuary. Neither country has shown much desire to subordinate their national nuclear forces to NATO, and there is no reason they should. Even deployed American nuclear weapons must be released by the U.S. President; the
arrangement has worked, will continue to work, and there is no reason it wouldn't work for the U.K. or France.

CONCLUSION

The total loss of INF missiles, particularly P11, does damage the credibility of NATO's deterrence by reducing flexible response options. But the INF Treaty need not, and should not be allowed to, compromise the strategy, deterrence or NATO unity. A triple-track approach, with none of these tracks being particularly unique or earth-shattering, will allow NATO to stay its course of 40 years.

Europeanization of the Alliance can work. NATO may have no choice but to make it work if conventional forces are reduced. But it will not work, or will not work as well, if it is not planned, and developed in concert with both the technological and arms control tracks. That is the critical point: all three tracks must be considered and planned collectively, because what happens in one track affects what happens in the other two.

The triple-track solution to NATO's current dilemma may come as a blinding flash of the obvious. All the better. Perhaps that will keep us from collectively thrashing around for major restructuring
moves. NATO has been relatively successful for a significant period of time. Flexible response has served as a useful strategy for NATO for over 20 years. Successful organizations - and strategies - don't usually need drastic overhauls, just some fine tuning from time to time. NATO has reached tuneup time.
ENDNOTES


3. Under the terms of the treaty, the following INF missiles will be destroyed: for the U.S., the Pershing II and the BGM 109G Ground Launched Cruise Missile; for the U.S.S.R., the SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5. These missiles have range capabilities between 1000-5500 km. Additionally, the treaty bans "shorter range missiles, or those with range capabilities between 500-1000 km. This class includes for the U.S. the Pershing 1a, and for the U.S.S.R., the SS-12 and the SS-23. See "The Treaty: U.S.-Soviet Accord to Eliminate Some Missiles", New York Times, (9 December 1987), pp. A24-A26.


7. Ibid., p. 15.


10. Faubry, pp. 11-12.


17. Binder, p. 27.


24. Ibid.


28. David P. Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1987) p. 15. His comment is: "As Europeans have grown stronger, they have not supplanted the Americans within NATO so much as developed independent national military capabilities outside it." He is apparently thinking primarily of France, but the same may be said for the U.K., Greece and, to some extent, Turkey.

29. IISS, p. 204.
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