BATTLE IN THE REAR: LESSONS FROM KOREA

Major Paul D. Hughes
Signal Corps

School of Advanced Military Studies
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

15 January 1988

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Battle in the Rear: Lessons from Korea (U)

This monograph reviews the experiences of the US Army in planning and conducting rear operations during the Korean War and examines our current rear operations doctrine in light of these experiences. This review is significant because doctrine is developed based upon an army's war experiences or the wartime conditions it expects to encounter. During the Korean War the experiences of many leaders in the Army, and especially those of the Army staff in Washington, were grounded in the campaigns against the Wehrmacht in North Africa and Europe during World War II. It was natural to assume that these leaders' experiences would color their decisions regarding doctrine and force structure. In fighting the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) our army faced an enemy trained in the tactics of the Soviet Army and experienced what our current force may see in a future conflict. An analysis of these experiences may offer some insights into the requirements for an effective rear operations doctrine and its related tactics designed to fight Soviet deep operations.

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The study concludes that the US Army's rear operations doctrine was conceived in a manner that neglected our only major experience in fighting a Soviet trained rear area threat. The study reveals that our doctrine is passive in nature and fails to address the tactical requirements of rear area defense. Additionally, the introduction of a command and control system that uses the base cluster concept has been done without enough thought regarding the associated force structure implications. The study recommends that this command and control structure be reevaluated for its feasibility and supportability and that the question of the appropriate tactics for rear operations be addressed more directly. A failure to do so would leave us in a position similar to our entry into the Korean War: a force at war without a viable doctrine.
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Name of Student: Major Paul D. Hughes

Title of Monograph: Battle in the Rear: Lessons from Korea

Approved by:

Monograph Director

Lieutenant Colonel James R. McDonough, M.S.

Director, School of
Advanced Military Studies

Colonel L. D. Holder, M.A.

Director, Graduate Degree
Programs

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

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Rain clouds hung low over the village of Songso-dong in mid-September, 1950, as the 38th Ordnance Company prepared for its move to a new location from which it could support the 2nd Infantry Division. The company had been performing its maintenance support mission for the division during the last several days after having set up its base one-half mile from the village and along the banks of the Chongdo River. The soldiers of the 38th had established good relations with the villagers of Songso-dong but had kept them at a distance from the company’s perimeter for security reasons. (1)

As the company broke camp and formed up its convoy, many of the villagers came out into the adjacent rice paddies to watch the soldiers’ activities. Preoccupied with the move, the company leadership had allowed security to lapse. Shortly after the convoy was formed, word came back from the division that the new location for the 38th had already been occupied by an armor battalion and its supporting artillery. Since daylight was waning and the company needed to have a secure position for the night, the commander decided to reoccupy his old location. The trucks were partially unloaded and the routine of the camp was quickly reestablished. None of the previously filled in foxholes were reoccupied nor were any of the light machine guns set up. The guard force of four stationary and two roving guards was organized to watch over the company’s 800 yard perimeter. As the soldiers bedded down in the trucks and some makeshift lean-tos, an unusual quiet took hold of the area, unusual because Songso-dong sat on the division’s MSR.
Just before 0200 a company-size force of guerrillas closed to within hand grenade range of the encampment without being spotted by the guards. The thudding explosions of grenades and the firing of small-arms woke the company and its men tumbled out of the trucks desperately seeking some form of cover. The attackers continued to pour fire into the camp and several defenders found cover behind a nearby dike outside the base from which they could return fire. Inside the camp the soldiers recognized that all the fire was incoming and that several men were not returning fire. The crew of a M-24 light tank that had been repaired that day scampered into its tank, buttoned up, and did not participate in the fight. One NCO in the camp climbed up into his truck and began to return fire with its .50 caliber machine gun. His heavy rate of fire succeeded in driving off the first attack and when the guerrillas attacked again five minutes later, he was instrumental in breaking that assault. Near the end of the second assault, the company commander sent a messenger to a nearby MP company to get help.

The MP patrol arrived within a few minutes but did not pursue the retreating guerrillas because of the darkness. An inspection of the camp revealed that four trucks were destroyed with several others damaged, and that one soldier had been killed and five wounded. At daybreak a Republic of Korea (ROK) police force began a search for the enemy and succeeded in finding one dead North Korean soldier in the enemy's old assembly area. The Americans learned subsequently that another force had attacked the ROK police base in the area just prior to the attack on the 38th's base. This coordinated action had been designed to separate the ROK reaction force from the area it was responsible for defending.(2)
Earlier that month a similar action occurred in the 25th Infantry Division's sector when a radio relay team of the division's signal company installed a site on a hilltop above Changwon. A large portion of the division's support command was located in the town and the division's main command post was five miles away. The signal team, consisting of one NCO, five American and four Korean soldiers, was providing the communications support to the main CP. As the soldiers in Changwon watched the team depart for the hilltop in the rain, none thought that they were in any real danger -- after all, the front lines were 12 miles away.

The rain continued throughout the night, hiding the sounds of grenades and small arms fire coming from the hilltop where the signal team had set up its position. Early next morning a reporter seeking a story ventured up the hill only to be wounded by grenades thrown by enemy soldiers hidden among the rocks of the hillside. Retreating back into town he quickly passed the news that something was wrong up the hill. Incoming mortar rounds soon verified the reporter's story and the units in Changwon scurried to improve their weak defensive posture. The division main CP was alerted but could offer help only in the form of the division's reconnaissance company which would not be available until the following day. As it turned out, the enemy harassed the town with mortar fire until the hilltop was retaken the following day by the reconnaissance company. The signal team had been wiped out; all of its members had been killed in their squad tent. No local security had been posted on that dark, rainy night.(3)
These actions were repeated many times over during the course of the Korean War, especially during those periods characterized by high degrees of fluidity that resulted in non-linear conditions. Eventually the threat to the United Nations Command (UNC) rear area became so great that entire corps were dedicated to rear operations. (4)

The purpose of this monograph is to review the experiences of the US Army in planning and conducting rear operations, and to examine our current rear operations doctrine in light of these experiences. Such a review is significant because doctrine is developed based upon an army's war experiences or the wartime conditions it expects to encounter. (5)

The experiences of many leaders in the Army, and especially those of the Army staff in Washington, were grounded in the campaigns against the Wehrmacht in North Africa and Europe during World War II. It was natural to assume that the Army staff's experiences colored its decisions regarding force structure and doctrine. The Korean War was the last major war the US Army fought which could be characterized by a usually well-defined front line and rear area. Although the Vietnam War could be characterized as a war of many rear battles because of its lack of any well-defined front line, it will not be reviewed in this study because it lacked the structure normally associated with mid- and high-intensity combat.

The initial enemy force, the North Korean People's Army (NKPA), was a new enemy for the US Army, one that did not run in the face of our firepower as had been predicted. (6) The NKPA had been trained and equipped by the Soviet Union during the post-World War II years and employed Soviet Army doctrine and tactics against the Republic of Korea and its allied forces. Fighting the NKPA exposed
our army to the tactics of the Soviet Army and we experienced to some degree the same troubles in our rear area that the Wehrmacht faced in Russia. An analysis of these experiences may provide some insights into the requirements for effective rear area operations doctrine and tactics.

This study is an analysis of both the US Army’s and the NKPA's doctrines and tactics for rear operations and guerrilla warfare, respectively. The combat between these two belligerents is reviewed to identify the US Army's Korean War doctrine's strengths and weaknesses. Then these strengths and weaknesses are compared to the Army's current rear operations doctrine as outlined in Field Manual (FM) 90-14, Rear Battle, and a determination is made of the doctrine's potential to cope with the Soviet Army's deep operations threat successfully.

The Threat

Since the advent of modern war many theorists have recognized the vulnerabilities present in an army's rear area and its lines of communications (LOCs). The foremost theorist on war, Karl von Clausewitz, said that by attacking the LOCs in an enemy's rear area the attacker can achieve both a psychological superiority over his enemy and a distinct advantage. Such attacks should not be designed to destroy the enemy for the mere sake of destruction; rather the attack should be aimed at denying the defender the ability to concentrate his forces. Furthermore, such an attack will throw the defender off balance even if he is successful in concentrating his forces. Finally, Clausewitz believed there was great value in attacking the enemy's rear:

The risk of having to fight on two fronts...tend(s) to paralyze movement and the ability to resist, and so affect(s) the balance between victory and defeat. What is more, in the case of defeat, (it) increase(s) the losses and can raise them to their very limit
-- to annihilation. A threat to the rear can, therefore, make a defeat more probable, as well as more decisive. (Author's emphasis) (10)

Any understanding of the North Korean Peoples Army's (NKPA) practice of attacking its enemy's rear area must begin with an understanding of the Soviet Army's theory, doctrine, and experiences concerning deep operations. The Soviet doctrine is based on its experiences fighting the Wehrmacht during World War II during which it developed an extensive guerrilla organization effectively integrated into the Soviet Army's operational plans. The main goal of these partisan forces was to establish a type of a blockade that isolated the battlefield units from any other support. The means used to achieve this goal consisted of attacks on both rail and road networks at their most vulnerable points, usually bridges, defiles, or some other similar location.

Initially, these attacks were viewed by the Germans as an irritant rather than as a serious threat. This attitude was not far off the mark because many partisan bands had received no guidance from any central authority and were concerned more with their own personal survival than that of the State. (11) Consequently, the guerrillas had little impact on German operations. Werhmacht indifference to the partisans, however, was exactly what the Soviets needed because it gave them time with which to organize, train, and establish a coordinated partisan movement that became the largest ever seen by the world. (12) The first true show of strength by the partisans came in the form of supporting attacks for the Soviet counter-offensive to the Germans' Operation CITADELLE, the ill-fated Kursk offensive. Although designed by the Soviet High Command, STAVKA, to interdict enemy railroads and LOCs, the partisan effort was only partially successful. The partisan contribution in later offensives was
more successful, however, and earned a well-deserved place among those forces responsible for the ejection of the Wehrmacht from the Soviet Union.

The Soviets sought to develop a more comprehensive deep operations doctrine following the war and in doing so integrated the roles of the partisans with those of the airborne units. While developing this doctrine the Soviet Army recognized that the role of the foot soldier was of paramount importance and that the airborne troop was best suited for this role because he could be inserted into hostile territory. Therefore, two basic missions were developed for airborne units: the disruption and destruction of enemy rear area activities, and the seizure of key objectives in the rear areas such as airfields and bridges. So important is this concept to the Soviet way of war that a leading observer of the Soviet Army remarked:

"We must take it for granted that, in any operation of whatever kind in which the Soviet Armed Forces may be engaged in the future, a vital role will be allotted, whenever practicable, to the projection forward of forces by means of airpower deep into the enemy's rear. The purpose of the undertaking will be to paralyze vital nerve centers and thus bring the operation to a successful conclusion much more quickly and much more surely than one could expect it to be done otherwise."

Such operations are based upon the attainment of surprise, which has become a key factor in the Soviet Army's doctrine for its deep attacks. Additionally, Soviet forces must apply surprise throughout the depth of the enemy's defense.

The success of the Soviets in fighting deep operations was transferred to the NKPA during its buildup prior to the invasion of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in June, 1950. As NKPA units were formed they were also armed and trained by Soviet advisors who instructed them in guerrilla operations. Emphasis was placed on small-unit tactics, mortars, lengthy night movements, surprise
measures, roadblocks, and the coordination of guerrilla operations with
conventional forces.\(^{(18)}\) Prior to the initiation of hostilities numerous
guerrillas infiltrated into the ROK to conduct assassinations, sabotage, and
intelligence activities to assist the major offensive. The results of their
efforts justified the expense. Chaos reigned throughout the ROK from the start
of the invasion until the United Nations Command (UNC) stabilized its lines
along the Naktong River. The UNC's highly successful invasion of Inchon routed
the NKPA from South Korea and, in their haste to escape the UNC trap, many NKPA
units were bypassed and left behind. True to Soviet doctrine, these units
became guerrilla bands infiltrating into the most inaccessible parts of the ROK.

At this point in the war, these bands were disorganized and primarily
concerned with their own survival. The organizing of these disparate bands into
an effective rear area threat force was the work of a NKPA officer named Bae
Choi who had extensive experience in the Soviet style of guerrilla operations.
During World War II Bae Choi had fought as a Soviet guerrilla in the southern
Caucasus.\(^{(19)}\) His organization in South Korea, the 526th Army Unit, was
assigned the mission of facilitating the southward movement of both the NKPA and
Communist Chinese Forces (CCF) by conducting reconnaissance patrols, sabotage,
and assassinations.\(^{(20)}\) The unit attacked UNC lines of communications, rear
area installations, and potential laborers.\(^{(21)}\) Eventually, the 526th Army Unit
was expanded and redesignated as the NKPA 1st Guerrilla Corps, consisting of
five brigades. Having received new officers and support personnel via sea
infiltration, the 1st Guerrilla Corps was ordered to perform the missions of the
526th Army Unit.
Guerrilla operations have enjoyed various degrees of success against larger opponents depending upon the effort that the opponent puts into combatting the guerrillas. It was no different in Korea; the US response was initially disorganized because of its lack of any centralized control of rear area defense operations, the lack of intelligence, and the ineffectiveness of efforts to coordinate rear area defensive measures. Consequently, the 1st Guerrilla Corps was successful in its efforts to interdict LOCs, attack rear area bases, and intimidate the local population. This threat was eventually brought under control once the US Army developed an organized response to it.

The Response

The initial response by the Army to the rear area threat was based upon its experiences in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) during World War II. Several of the practices developed in response to rear area threats were based upon the principles of economy of force, unity of command, and responsiveness. The first principle, economy of force, required that units allocate the minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. The term, secondary effort, was an apt description for rear area operations because these unforeseen occurrences could not be allowed to drain scarce resources away permanently from where the enemy was making his effort. The second principle, unity of command, was used to ensure that one, and only one, headquarters was responsible for an ongoing rear area defense operation. Finally, the last principle, responsiveness, was employed to bring about the immediate engagement and defeat of a rear area threat force through the use of units assigned to a corps and normally available for rear area defense missions.
The units in World War II usually involved with rear area defense operations were either the corps' tank destroyer battalion, one of the assigned artillery groups, or the air defense group. Additionally, the unit assigned this mission was the controlling headquarters for rear area defense and reported directly to the corps G3. As long as the corps possessed any of these units it could effectively guard against any German rear area threat, usually expected to be an airborne insertion.

Following the end of the war, the Army's tactical doctrine, articulated in Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, was updated in late 1949. The included changes attempted to capture the lessons learned from the ETO experiences and focused mainly on the use of armored forces fighting the enemy along the line of contact, or in today's parlance, the forward edge of the battle area. The chapter on security operations focused exclusively on defending against armored and airborne attacks. In the chapter on special operations one paragraph was devoted to partisan operations and any discussion of rear area defense was omitted. Despite the updating of the Army's tactical doctrine, a unit's abilities to implement the 1949 version of FM 100-5 was severely limited because the tremendous post-war demobilization of the Army left many units as mere skeletons of their authorized strength levels.

The effects of demobilization were quickly felt by the first units deployed to Korea; the Army suddenly realized that it had sent itself off to war with a force structure that did not meet the doctrine's requirements. This realization had a tremendous effect on the Army's abilities to defend its rear areas. The 25th Infantry Division had to conduct its rear area defense using jeeps armed with machine guns as a means of protecting its LOCs. The Chief
of Staff of the Army, GEN J. Lawton Collins, had received reports of unit shortcomings and determined to see for himself what problems existed. Accordingly, in early 1951 he toured Korea with GEN Matthew Ridgway, the commanding general of the Eighth US Army (EUSA), and became aware that rear area defense was a major problem. Upon his return, GEN Collins sent GEN Ridgway two operations memos that GEN Collins had used during World War II when he commanded VII Corps in the ETO. These two memos were the VII Corps' rear area security standing operating procedures (SOPs). He had hoped that by providing these memos to both the EUSA and the Army Field Forces, the organization charged with the development of doctrine, that the memos "...might furnish some ideas for a system of rear area defense against infiltration or guerrillas." (29) These memos were instrumental in the formation of a rear area defense doctrine for EUSA. They mandated several essential actions to assure the effective protection of rear areas. These actions included the constant observation of the rear area, adequate communications between the area's tenant units and the corps headquarters, efficient security of local installations and bivouac sites by the tenant units, the physical occupation of communication centers and key road junctions, and the execution of speedy counterattacks against any rear area threat. (30) Additionally, the memos specifically addressed the security of LOCs by requiring the defense of key towns and defiles, the establishing of a Corps Counter-Intelligence Line as a means of controlling the movements of the local populace, and the improving of convoy security. (31) These memos immediately became the model for rear area defense SOPs at the corps level. (32)
However, once these stopgap measures were implemented, the Department of the Army (DA) in late 1951 tasked its Office of Psychological Warfare to examine rear area defensive operations of both World War II and the Korean War and identify any common principles. (33) The resulting staff study approached the problem with a broader perspective than had been exercised before. The study introduced the effects of political and administrative policies in rear area defense and the requisite coordination of these policies between the political, administrative, and military forces in the rear area. Additionally, the study found that the control of rear area defense operations must be vested in one stable, centralized headquarters and that consistent enforcement of policies must be practiced by that headquarters. Furthermore, the study discovered that rear area defense was improved through the maximum supplementing of regular forces with indigenous personnel. Finally, the study concluded that rear area operations required both rapid, efficient communications and detailed intelligence to counter enemy actions effectively. (34) These findings validated the principles upon which the Army’s rear area defensive practices of World War II were constructed, but these principles failed to provide the concept, organization, and tactics necessary for effective rear area defense.

The Engagements

In his discussion concerning the nature of engagements, Clausewitz introduced the idea that a successful attack in the enemy’s rear area could result not only in the physical destruction of the enemy force, but also in a psychological advantage that far exceeded the gains won from the enemy’s destruction. (35) Furthermore, he went on to state:
Out of this then arises an instinctive determination in the conduct of war and particularly in engagements, large and small, to protect one's own rear and to gain control of the enemy's. The instinct is derived from the concept of victory itself, which as we have shown, is more than mere killing. (36)

When the US Army and the NKPA first collided in combat, the engagements were more chaotic for the US than for the NKPA. This was caused not only by the NKPA's advantage of the initiative but also by the impact that their prepositioned guerrillas had on the US Army's sense of security. Again, Clausewitz had an insight concerning rear area operations:

The key result of successful rear attacks, besides the psychological superiority attained, is the temporary gain of throwing the enemy off balance and demoralizing his forces, even if he is successful in concentrating them. (37)

North Korea had infiltrated several thousand guerrillas into South Korea over a five year period before the war in the guise of peasants or workers and, after June, 1950, as civilian refugees. (38) These forces concentrated their efforts on disrupting communications facilities, committing assassinations, interdicting railroads, and attacking army and police units. As the NKPA's offensive forced the US and ROK forces back, the guerrillas kept pace by moving ahead of the front lines so that when the Pusan Perimeter was established a sizable rear area threat existed behind the UNC lines. During this early period of the war the US forces took elementary steps to counter the guerrillas. Realizing that the NKPA guerrillas favored night operations, the US command ordered all civilians removed from areas around the combat zones and placed in government controlled refugee camps. Prior to being moved, the refugees were searched for evidence that might have connected them to the NKPA. Although these steps limited the number of unauthorized personnel in the combat zones,
The most effective step in countering guerrilla activities was the adoption of the practice of shooting on sight any person dressed in civilian clothing caught moving at night. (39)

The successful Inchon landing and the subsequent severing of the NKPA's LOCs shattered the NKPA as an effective fighting force. Routed in mid-September, 1950, the NKPA began a disorganized retreat and the UNC forces took full advantage of the situation to destroy many enemy units. As NKPA units became isolated, their soldiers took to the mountains and formed themselves into guerrilla bands or joined already existing ones. As previously noted, these units were formed under the command of the 1st NKPA Guerrilla Corps which took its orders from the Front Headquarters of the NKPA. (40)

By October, 1950, UNC forces were moving north of the 38th Parallel and achieving overwhelming success. Such success normally would have suggested that the rear areas were secured, but this was far from true. During this time over 40,000 guerrillas were operating against UNC forces south of the 38th Parallel and were attacking isolated villages and police units, ambushing convoys and patrols, and interrupting communications lines. (41) This threat was serious enough to the UNC's LOCs that IX Corps detailed its 25th (US) Infantry Division to antiguerilla operations for the entire month of October, 1950.

The 25th Infantry Division operated in an area that included the most active escape routes for NKPA units attempting to flee north. Relying mostly on timely intelligence the division sought to use its tremendous indirect fire capabilities to destroy enemy units in the open. In one instance, the 3rd Battalion, 35th Infantry employed its supporting artillery in its attack against an enemy force of 500 soldiers and successfully destroyed the force, inflicting
over 400 casualties. Many other similar actions occurred during the period immediately following the Pusan breakout.

As UNC forces continued their drive into North Korea, the focus of the NKPA guerrilla operations kept up with the front lines. In late October, 1950, the X Corps landed at Wonsan in northeast North Korea marking the beginning of some of the war's fiercest rear area operations. The X Corps never achieved a continuous front with the rest of Eighth US Army (EUSA) and as a result NKPA units moved through and around UNC positions. Despite this lack of battlefield structure, the corps commanding general, MG Almond, considered the situation as one in which he possessed a rear area. In fact, X Corps held a semicircular perimeter along the east coast of the Korean peninsula with its back to the Sea of Japan. The southern portion of the perimeter was considered the rear area because the logistical base established by the 1st (ROK) Marine Division was located there during its drive to the Yalu River. The 3rd (US) Infantry Division eventually was assigned to this sector with the 1st (ROK) Marine Division. These two divisions found that instead of holding a rear area they became involved in combat with a force consisting of 25,000 soldiers from five different NKPA divisions. The enemy attacks attempted to divert X Corps' attention away from its main effort, the drive to the Yalu River. By 22 November it became apparent to X Corps that these rear area attacks were coordinated by either the NKPA or the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) to coincide with other operations against X Corps. While the effects of these attacks failed to divert the X Corps, they successfully disrupted the land LOCs of the corps and prevented any sustained link-up with EUSA.
On the other side of the peninsula, EUSA had succeeded in capturing the capital of North Korea, Pyongyang. Intense rear area attacks also were experienced in this area of operations. The long, unguarded LOCs that wound northward in desperate attempts to keep up with the rapidly advancing combat forces were especially vulnerable to guerrilla attacks. One of the worst guerrilla attacks of the war occurred when the 25th Infantry Division, after having completed its antiguerrilla operations in the south, moved into the area east of Pyongyang and sought to establish itself on the front line. During this move through the II (ROK) Corps rear area, two infantry platoons and an artillery battery were ambushed by NKPA guerrillas. Neglecting to establish adequate convoy security, the US force was totally surprised and wiped out. When its parent battalion, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, arrived the next day it found few survivors. The survivors told of captured soldiers being executed by the NKPA force because one platoon leader refused to provide any information to the enemy other than his name, rank, and service number.(46)

During this same time period the 25th Infantry Division took part in several actions to clear the LOCs of NKPA guerrillas. Adjacent to the 25th Infantry Division were several ROK divisions whose organic infantry regiments were composed of two line infantry battalions and one specially trained antiguerrilla battalion.(47) These divisions attempted to secure an area in central Korea called the Iron Triangle, an open plateau bounded by high ranging hills. This area provided the NKPA with an ideal location in which to consolidate its scattered forces as they tried to infiltrate northward. Any attempt to seize the Triangle was stiffly resisted and the NKPA frequently sent out ambush patrols to prey on unwary US and ROK convoys. Several times the 25th
Infantry Division suffered significant losses at the hands of these guerrillas. (48)

The introduction of CCF units greatly altered the situation in North Korea and began both the retreat of all UNC forces and the second invasion of South Korea. Again, the rear area threats to the UNC grew as the front line rolled southward creating very porous lines. In January, 1951, one entire NKPA division successfully slipped through the frontline in the X Corps sector causing the UNC to commit the 1st (US) Marine Division to the mission of finding and destroying this rear area threat. (49)

The last major antiguerrilla operation of the war, Operation RATKILLER, was a ROK Army effort that required one corps. Lasting from December, 1951 to March, 1952, the operation killed or captured more than 19,000 NKPA guerrillas or bandits in the UNC rear area and eliminated the threat of large unit attacks on UNC supply lines. (50) Following the operation's completion, GEN Mark Clark, the Commander in Chief of the UNC, declared that the hunting down of guerrillas was an internal ROK matter and that non-ROK forces would fight the CCF/NKPA on the front lines. (51) This declaration did not free UNC forces from the responsibility of protecting their own rear areas, but by this stage of the war the rear area threat had been greatly diminished.

The Result

The US Army had met for the first time a Soviet trained proxy in the Korean War and had fared well, despite the political limitations of the war. The effects of rear area operations were at times crucial to the success of the UNC forces. Ultimately, rear area threats were brought under control through the
efforts of leaders trained on the battlefields of World War II who adapted to the Korean War’s conditions and developed a solution to the Soviet war of war. Underpinning their actions were several concepts and principles upon which the Army’s rear area defense doctrine was built.

"Fighting is the central military act; all other activities merely support it." Because the focus of units rests on the locations where fighting is most expected, these locations receive the majority of an army’s personnel and resources. Consequently, there is a weakness elsewhere in the assigned area of operations. That part of the battlefield where weakness is accepted is the area least threatened by the enemy, usually the rear area. This willingness to accept risk requires the application of measures based on the principle of economy of force, simply because it is impossible to defend everywhere in strength.

As the war dragged on, US units had adapted themselves to guarding against rear area attacks. The measures adopted included establishing SOPs, enlarging staffs to handle this new threat, and increasing active and passive security measures. These adopted measures sought the destruction of the rear area threat force by isolating it from any external support, any other enemy force, and the population.

Three measures were identified by the Army in after action reviews as necessary for the successful prosecution of rear area operations. The first was the establishment of an effective rear area intelligence network that was aware of enemy activities and agents. The consolidation of rear area units into locations that were easily controlled and defended was considered as the next major step that could be taken to simplify the defense of the rear area.
Finally, a well trained mobile reaction force was necessary to find, fix, and destroy any rear area threat force.

In order to provide adequate defense in their rear areas, US forces developed a method to prioritize the critical importance of potential enemy targets. These priorities were based on the logistical needs of the frontline operations, the potential target's vulnerability to attack, and the estimated time required to destroy the target or render it ineffective. Another consideration was the possibility of a potential target being attacked in conjunction with enemy offensive actions along the frontline. Rear area reaction forces, therefore, were employed in accordance with these defense priorities. This method relied heavily on accurate intelligence estimates of the enemy's intentions and objectives. The method's inherent weakness was its inability to identify accurately which rear area bases would most likely become targets and whose destruction would contribute most to the enemy's success.

Several rules evolved as EUSA gained experience in planning rear area defense. Recognizing the value of terrain in the defense, increased consideration was given to employing obstacles, observation posts, minefields, and fields of fire when establishing rear area bases. Base locations were planned to provide mutual support to each other but this was very difficult to achieve in practice because the requirements for dispersion, operating space, and traffic control dictated that units not be located together. If possible, bases were arranged in-depth to prevent an attacker from totally eliminating a support area without being attrited himself. As stated earlier, rear area units had to provide their own internal security and an all-around external defense until a counterattack, if possible, could be launched. As a part of the
defense, each base was required to develop a coordinated fireplan with its appropriate artillery support unit. Finally, the plan had to provide for some form of surveillance of critical points and LOCs. (56)

Rear area operations were controlled by the support command headquarters of the concerned division or corps. Subordinate headquarters lacked an adequate S-2 section and were entirely dependent upon division or corps headquarters for intelligence updates. Although the usual intelligence subjects such as enemy capabilities, ingress and egress routes, tactics, and guerrilla support were covered, the status of enemy air activities rarely raised questions. The efficacy of the intelligence sections also was limited by the lack of adequate communications support. (57)

**The Analysis Tool**

To become both wise and courageous one must acquire a method, a method to be employed in learning as well as in applying what has been learned. (58)

This statement has applicability to today's Army and its understanding of AirLand Battle doctrine. In the last two decades many attempts have been made to comprehend doctrine and its impact on the Army, the nadir of these attempts being reached when senior Defense Department officials felt that combat was best understood in the terms of operations research and system analysis, and fiscal management techniques. In 1984 COL Huba Wass de Czege developed his concept of the "Combat Power Model" as a means of understanding combat as a functional process. His model is appropriate because its logical and comprehensive approach to understanding the functional components of combat power allows us to understand more fully our own doctrine.
The Combat Power Model examines four facets: leadership, firepower, maneuver, and protection. Each facet produces its own set of discrete effects. The outcome of any battle depends on the effective synthesis of these four facets. The most important of these effects are those produced by the force's leaders and their understanding and knowledge of a variety of subjects. Among these subjects are the leader's technical proficiency, understanding of his unit's capabilities, analytical skills, interpersonal communications skills, dedication, commitment, moral standards, and an understanding of both the enemy and the effects of battle.(59)

The effects associated with the role of firepower include such things as volume of fire, lethality of munitions, accuracy of fires, target acquisition, and flexibility of employment. These effects are created through a melding of unit leadership, proficiency, and weapons capabilities; for example, the volume of fire is a function of the number of delivery means available, the unit's supply capability, and the weapons' rates of fire.(60) The effect that the commander has the least control over is that of munitions' lethality; that which he can most influence is the employment of his unit.

The next facet of combat power is that of maneuver. Its impact on the battle is a function of unit mobility, tactical analysis, resource management, and command, control, and communications.(61) The commander has complete control over all of these functions and can influence the outcome of a battle with his skillful application of maneuver and its associated functions.

The final facet of the model is protection. It is a function of three effects: concealment, exposure limitation, and damage limitation.(62) Again the commander can exercise great influence over his unit's ability to protect
itself. This particular facet greatly affects rear area units because of their inherent weakness in direct combat. Clausewitz believed that the positive purposes, or the goals one seeks, in war were attained only through the attack because it increased the attacker's capacity to wage war. Therefore, he would hold that the sole adoption of passive protection measures in the rear area is inadequate because it would allow the enemy to gain and retain the initiative. Although the three effects of protection could be construed as passive in nature, it would be a mistake to do so because they allow rear area units to pursue their own positive purposes -- their functional missions.

This study has employed the Combat Power Model with the intent of fulfilling the two goals defined by COL Wass de Czege. The first goal is to use the model as an assessment tool for the AirLand Battle doctrine to ensure that the doctrine is refined in a manner that will maximize its combat power. The second goal is to identify necessary changes and communicate the need for them in an effective manner. Before an assessment of AirLand Battle doctrine and its rear area operations subset is performed, however, it will be useful to analyze our experiences from the Korean War, the last war in which we faced a true rear area threat.

Analysis of the Korean War

Characteristic of many US Army units that deployed to Korea during the initial period of the war was their poor readiness postures and their lack of firepower. The massive demobilization of the Army following World War II left many units mere skeletons of their authorized strength levels. These deficits were felt most notably by the lack of firepower systems, such as artillery and mortars, and the availability of grenades. Although these shortages were
eventually corrected as the war effort increased production levels, an almost continual shortage of artillery ammunition existed throughout the war. This shortage was caused initially by low production levels in the United States and later by the massive requirements of the war. The famous "Van Fleet load," named after the commander of EUSA who succeeded Ridgway, contributed to this shortage. This term referred to the firing of a battalion's basic load of ammunition upon request because units recognized that massed artillery fire was effective in breaking up enemy attacks.

The US units experienced difficulty in bringing their superior firepower to bear on the enemy because of their inability to acquire and identify targets consistently, especially in rear areas. The lack of reconnaissance units and intelligence gathering assets hindered the Army's ability to detect enemy movements, especially at night. The most reliable means of gathering intelligence about enemy activities was in gaining and maintaining contact with them. Any attempt to avoid contact with them, such as the ill-advised Operation CLAM-UP in February, 1952, resulted in the loss of current intelligence.

Another firepower function concerned the adequacy of the training given to combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units and soldiers in crew served weapon and individual weapon skills. This state of unreadiness was characteristic of the Army's posture following the end of World War II. Examples of these problems abounded during the war's early stages in the form of insufficient rates of fire, poor accuracy, and poorly sited crew-served weapons. One additional factor, based entirely on the psychological preparation of the American soldier, aggravated the problems. American leaders and soldiers firmly believed that the NKPA would never fight them once the
presence of American forces was made known; the disaster of Task Force Smith in June, 1950 nullified this deadly assumption.\(^{(67)}\) This state of unpreparedness was corrected at the cost of many soldiers' lives and several lost battles.

Rear area defense and the role that maneuver played in it were never adequately linked in the early stages of the war because rear area units were left to defend themselves in static positions. These units relied entirely upon their own security abilities until the dramatic collapse of the NKPA following the Inchon invasion created a massive increase in the numbers of cut off NKPA soldiers. These large numbers of NKPA soldiers swelled the guerrilla ranks thereby resulting in a rear area threat that stressed any unit's defensive capabilities. The assignment of the 25th Infantry Division in October, 1950 to antiguerrilla operations melded the concept of rear area defense and the role of maneuver. The division perceived its missions as normal combat operations and its schemes of maneuver were designed as such. The division habitually sought to capitalize on its superior maneuver capabilities in its efforts to isolate and destroy enemy forces. The surprise encirclement of an area followed by penetrations into it were the tactics favored by units assigned these missions, tactics that proved successful.\(^{(68)}\)

Maneuver was affected by the inability of US leaders to analyze both the tactical and operational level conditions of the war. The major cause for this lack of appreciation was due to the false sense of superiority with which the US Army entered the war. Grounded in the successes of fighting in Europe during World War II, many leaders considered the threat posed in Korea to be a minor nuisance that would be easily cleaned up. The facts were that the Army had no experience in fighting a Soviet trained threat, the commitment of forces to
combat meant that losses would be incurred, and North Korea started the war seeking victory and would fight any other force that opposed it. The lack of knowledge about NKPA tactics caused US units to assume that the enemy would fight in a manner consistent with the Army's European experience. In fact, the NKPA and CCF understood the American way of war better than the US did and capitalized on the Americans' weaknesses. They knew that the US Army was wedded to its tanks and artillery; therefore they took great pains to develop combat situations so that US forces were denied effective support of these systems. Additionally, they found US units to be inept in night fighting and small-unit tactics, and that US frontline units became unsteady if their rear areas were attacked or cut off from them. (69)

Another major factor in developing the maneuver potential of US forces was the effect of terrain. Unfortunately, the Korean terrain was not appreciated by Army leaders. During the period in which EUSA operated north of the 38th Parallel many instances were recorded where units established defensive positions at night on the false assumption that their firepower would dominate the intervening ground between positions. (70) This supposed domination by fire was used as a substitute for patrols as a means to prevent an enemy force from infiltrating between the American positions.

Rear area defense, as well as all other combat operations, was severely hampered by the Army's tactical command, control, and communications (C3) structure and its attending host of defects. During this period a commander of a regiment, division, or corps was responsible for the rear area defense of his assigned sector. (71) The staff officer charged with assisting the commander in planning and controlling the rear area defense was the Ground Defense
Officer. (72) His duties included developing training programs for rear area units on subjects such as weapons marksmanship, defensive tactics, and night operations. Additionally, he was responsible for counterattack plans and coordinating fire support plans between all units stationed in the rear area. The immense size of these responsibilities would demand a sizable staff section, but usually the task fell on the shoulders of two officers and one NCO. (73) As a result of inadequate staffing, the Ground Defense Officer's section was generally ineffective. Compounding this problem was the inadequate state of tactical communications systems found in all of the divisions. (74) Together, these two problems created a much larger one that caused S.L.A. Marshall to write "...when battle troops lack effective communications, and when they do not understand down to the last man that fullness of information is the mainspring of operations, the fight is already half-lost." (75)

The Army's tactical doctrine had to be updated for it was sadly outdated and unsupported by the force structure. (76) Designed for fights against the Wehrmacht and its highly efficient style of mechanized warfare, the US Army in Korea faced an enemy who consciously eschewed mechanized combat in favor of light infantry operations. This hindered the Americans' abilities to bring their tremendous firepower to bear simply because of the maneuver constraints imposed by the terrain. The ability of the enemy infantry to operate behind US lines caused the Army's senior leaders to employ their successful World War II tactics as stopgap measures until the Army developed new tactics.

An analysis of rear area defense in Korea must examine the abilities of rear area units to defend themselves. This ability was the cornerstone upon which the rest of the rear area defense doctrine was built. Three functions
comprised a unit's effectiveness in defending itself. First, the unit had to conceal its personnel and equipment from the enemy. This was more easily said than done in a land where the indigenous population made a habit of following Army units in hopes of acquiring some valuable item that had been discarded. The most effective form of concealment was through the use of camouflage of base activities, such as maintenance operations or supply dumps. The major threat was not from enemy air activity but from controlled indirect fires. In addition to concealing unit activities, steps were taken to minimize the levels of exposure of personnel and equipment to enemy fire. This was achieved through the dispersion of units in the rear areas thus minimizing the target size of any base. Additionally, units established and maintained strong internal security measures in order to prevent enemy infiltration and sabotage. Damage limitation was primarily the result of a unit's ability to execute its defensive plans properly and, therefore, was not practiced with any degree of standardization.

In the final assessment, rear area defense operations during the Korean War evolved from the adoption of rudimentary security measures for each base to one in which the implementation of adequately planned, coordinated, and executed combat operations became the norm. These operations achieved their goal of destroying the enemy's guerrilla force and securing the LOCs. Additionally, the initiative was regained, lending considerable weight to the execution of combat operations along the front lines and dispelling the enemy's psychological advantage over the American soldier. Through the combination of effective security measures for rear area bases and speedy counterattacks by combat units, the battle in the rear was won in Korea.
Analysis of the Current Doctrine

The Army's current doctrine for rear operations, as described in Field Manual 90-14, Rear Battle, was analyzed using the Combat Power Model. The only difference was the sequence in which the facets of combat power were examined; maneuver was analyzed first, followed by firepower and protection. The use of the Combat Power Model provides a consistent set of criteria with which to compare and contrast the rear area defense doctrine of the Korean War era with today's doctrine.

In his work, On War, Clausewitz stated that "...the aim of the commander in an offensive battle is to expedite the decision" and this requires the commander to seize the initiative. Our current rear operations doctrine, however, cedes the initiative to the enemy through its passive nature, its overreliance on economy of force, and the built-in friction that results from a confusing C3 structure. Together these three problems affect our maneuver capability because the doctrine is reactive in nature and does not seek to deny the enemy's desire to battle us on his terms. Such a doctrine would not receive total approval from our senior NATO leaders because they fully expect to fight the Soviets throughout the depth of the battlefield, to include our rear areas, through the application of superior maneuver integrated with effective firepower and obstacles. The doctrine's lack of an offensive character also degrades the ability of the commander to synchronize time and space factors adequately. This doctrine's impact upon the Army has been minimal because its passive nature fits in with our underestimation of the Soviet Army's deep operations capabilities. No major change to any force structures, especially in military police units, has resulted in response to this danger.
The proper response to a rear area threat is dependent upon our ability to assess the threat, determine the appropriate response, and to move the necessary forces into the area. According to the current Commander in Chief of USAREUR, GEN Glenn Otis, "...the Soviets will take advantage of dispersion on the battlefield in order to infiltrate units whose missions lie in the rear areas of the opponent." (80) A review of Soviet doctrine suggests that deep operations against our rear areas seek to neutralize our nuclear weapons, exploit any surprise achieved in a fluid battle, capture vital ground, destroy key command and control nodes or logistics bases, or demoralize our forces. (81) Additionally, the Soviets view our AirLand Battle doctrine as a real threat to their ability to generate and maintain momentum because they believe that if we properly execute our operations we will delay their forces and disrupt their tempo. Therefore, the Soviets must take full advantage of their offensive actions to strike at us throughout our entire depth. (82) Their doctrine also suggests that their deep operations will use units of battalion or larger if their operation involves objectives more complex than reconnaissance or assassination missions.

Never before in the Army's history has so much destructive firepower been available to a division commander on the battlefield. Yet the abilities of rear area units to employ any of this firepower are inadequate. The heart of the problem is a resource issue. The distribution of firepower to CS and CSS units should begin with tables of authorization and equipment (TO&Es) that provide these units with firepower systems to defend against the most probable rear area threat in a theater. Currently, the lack of sufficient numbers of anti-armor weapons systems and machine guns in CS and CSS units stationed in Europe leaves
them defenseless against attacks by either a Soviet air assault, airborne, or mechanized attack. Compounding this problem is the lack of ammunition for these units to train their soldiers properly in the use of their machine guns, individual weapons, and light anti-tank weapons. The resulting shortage of ammunition affects rates of fire, a vital element in the defense of rear area bases. Additionally, many CS and CSS units feel so much pressure to perform their functional missions that they fail to train their soldiers to do basic soldier skills, such as calls for fire. The ability to call for fire accurately can greatly enhance a unit's defensive abilities. Finally, this tremendous firepower is effective only when it is applied to enemy units. Consequently, target acquisition becomes a major concern to rear area defense. The inability of our units to acquire targets accurately may result in incidents of fratricidal engagements. This inability stems from poor training and a lack of sensing devices in rear area units that would allow them to identify enemy units.

As it was during the Korean War, the ability of rear area units to protect themselves has remained a major cause of concern for commanders whose operations depend upon the support provided by them. Because these units are located in areas away from the enemy fire, they are better able to perform complex and difficult tasks. Removing these activities from the main battle areas allows commanders to concentrate their combat forces at the decisive points of the battle, rather than securing support activities. The art of war, however, has advanced itself in both theory and technology and provides belligerents the potential to defeat the enemy's rear area activities. A defeat in the rear area contributes greatly to the defeat of enemy forces in the main battle area.
Therefore, rear area units must undertake active measures to provide increased levels of protection to themselves while still performing their functional support missions. One such measure is the conduct of reconnaissance and ambush patrols around rear area bases to deny the enemy the element of surprise. (83)

Additionally, rear area units must consistently practice deception and concealment to minimize the exposure of personnel and equipment to threat detection efforts. (84) Coupled with active defense measures, the enterprising commander could establish dummy logistical sites to lure an enemy force into an ambush. If an enemy force succeeds in its attack against the rear area, units must have established coordination with their supporting engineer units to begin the rebuilding of bases and with their superior headquarters to begin reconstitution procedures.

The current rear operations doctrine of FM 90-14 attempts to provide organization to the rear area by establishing the Rear Area Operations Center (RAOC), the Base Cluster, the Base Cluster Operations Center (BCOC), and the Base Defense Liaison Teams (BDLTs). This organization is designed to observe the principles of economy of force and unity of effort in conducting rear operations. Instead this new organization has created a confusing situation in our command, control, communications, and intelligence structures. The base cluster, which is an ad hoc command and control relationship, is the main weakness in this organization and has been designed in a manner that inhibits rapid decisionmaking and intelligence dissemination. It has created new organizational relationships between units on the basis of location in a cluster and not on tactical or operational requirements. Therefore, the BCOC's utility as a coordinating headquarters is questionable because of the cluster's ad hoc
nature. The unit tasked with establishing the BCOC will find itself woefully short of communications assets, especially in the number of tactical radios needed to communicate with both its organic units and assigned bases. Additionally, the clustered units are not structured to support the BCOC's personnel or equipment requirements.

The doctrine has ignored our major tool for assessing enemy capabilities, the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). This tool focuses our attention on the main and deep battlefields and fails to cover our rear areas adequately. The requirement for a rear area IPB product should include information concerning subjects such as potential landing zones or aerial access corridors. The BCOC will need additional personnel to perform staff intelligence functions. Current allocations for military intelligence personnel in CS and CSS units are inadequate because these units lack sufficient numbers of intelligence personnel to perform their responsibilities on a 24-hour basis. Currently these units must rely on the intelligence product of the RACC, which presently is found only in the reserve structure of the Army.

The greatest weakness of our rear operations doctrine is its lack of guidance about the tactics needed to combat rear area threats. This results in a gap between the actions of both rear area units and the tactical combat force (TCF), and their ability to fulfill the doctrine's requirements. There are four requirements: provide secure forward support, detect the enemy force, delay its movement, and destroy it. Although providing secure forward support is the ultimate goal of rear area units, it is dependent upon the successful completion of the other three tasks. It is essential that the doctrine support active measures; the Germans found that passive rear area defenses were not sufficient to defeat Soviet rear area threats.
The doctrine discusses the requirement for detection in a comprehensive manner, but places a great deal of emphasis on assets that are not available to rear area units. These assets cover the wide range of detection and acquisition devices already fielded in the Army, but fielded to units other than those normally associated with rear areas. Additionally, the doctrine places a heavy burden for detection on the military police units in rear areas. For example, both FM 90-14 and FM 19-1, Military Police Support for the AirLand Battlefield contend that the division's military police company will be responsible for patrolling potential enemy landing zones and other locations that could provide concealment to the enemy. When the company is organized to support the three brigades of the division, only three of its six platoons are left to conduct these patrols and perform the company's missions of traffic control, security of the division's Main CP, and prisoner of war operations. This meager force has barely sufficient assets to conduct patrols; therefore, rear area units must assist in the detection of enemy units before the enemy has an opportunity to attack a base.

The doctrine's requirement for delaying an enemy force relies on firepower and obstacles, both of which are lacking in the rear area. The use of obstacles must be carefully applied and must have a force available to overwatch them. Two forms of firepower mentioned in FM 90-14 are the use of scatterable mines and chemical weapons to deny the enemy flexibility of movement. The effects of these weapons, however, will be felt by both sides, either in direct casualties or in route/terrain denial. The most effective form of delaying the enemy is gaining contact with him on our terms and maintaining it until the TCF can destroy him. Two possible forms of achieving contact are the use of ambush patrols and prepositioned snipers.
The destruction of the enemy first requires an estimate of the size of the threat force. Our own rear operations doctrine divides the enemy's efforts into three categories with Level I consisting of a small threat force that normal base security can defeat. Level II assumes an increase in the size of the threat force and the use of military police elements as a response force in addition to the base security. Level III involves the enemy's use of battalion or larger and this threat requires the commitment of our TCF.(90) In light of Soviet doctrine, we must accept the likelihood that the Soviets will attack our rear areas with Level III force. This presents us with a situation that requires us to respond in one of three ways. We can contain the enemy force, deny it any opportunity to link-up with another enemy force attacking through our main battle area, or destroy it in place. Each action requires different resources and presents different outcomes for the commander.

The first possible action, containment of the enemy force, is the least expensive option. A smaller force, given the time to establish a hasty defense around the Soviet force, can fix the enemy in place until a larger force is available to destroy the Soviets. It is essential that this option be exercised as soon as the enemy landing occurs because that is the time he is most disorganized and vulnerable to our actions. The Soviets will assume a hasty defense if they cannot successfully break the encirclement, but they will still pose a threat in the rear and must be denied any reinforcement and resupply. The enemy presence will require rerouting traffic such as resupply convoys, artillery units, signal elements, and reserve units until its position in the rear is neutralized.
If the enemy deep operations force succeeded in seizing a piece of key terrain, such as a bridge or a city, for use by a larger force attacking through the main battle area, we should prevent any link-up from occurring between the deep operations force and any other enemy force. Denying this link-up is more costly than containing the enemy because it accepts his presence in our rear area and all the limitations that it imposes on our operations. The intent of the denial operation is to render the enemy's seizure of a key piece of terrain moot if he cannot exploit its capture with a larger ground force. A successful denial operation requires a keen insight into the enemy's intent and the identification of his breakthrough point in the main battle area.

The optimum solution to enemy deep operations threat is to destroy his force. The destruction of the enemy force, however, is the most costly option available to the commander. The commander must be shrewd enough to determine whether a Soviet attack in his rear area is an indicator of the enemy's main effort or merely a clever deception operation. Having decided to destroy the enemy force, the commander will have to generate enough combat power in his TCF to accomplish the task. Current rear operations doctrine neglects to address this point or any other tactical issue, but in the draft of FM 100-15, Corps Operations, the brigade is suggested as the preferred size for the TCF. The first task at hand for the TCF will be to fix the enemy force in place. The TCF commander will then have to decide whether to reduce the enemy force by fire, or to reduce it by fire and maneuver.(91) The former method conserves lives but involves a great deal of time and ammunition. The latter method is quicker and more effective at rooting out the enemy from dug in positions, but will involve the costs associated with small unit combat. In Korea this method, when used,
sought to use maneuver to divide an encircled force and then destroy it piecemeal. Three drawbacks are normally associated with the destruction option: it is resource intensive, especially in the use of indirect-fire systems that may have to be withdrawn from the main battle, it may not use enough combat power to destroy the enemy, and it shares the initiative with the enemy.<ref>\(92\)

Conclusions

In comparison then, what are the differences between how our rear operations were planned and conducted in Korea and how our current doctrine envisions their being done? The first major difference is that today we have developed a rear operations doctrine during peacetime whereas when we went into the Korean War we had no such doctrine. As our Korean War doctrine emerged, it was based initially on the German threat of World War II and not on a Soviet style threat. Although our current doctrine focuses on the Soviet threat, it has neglected many of the practical lessons from Korea.

A major flaw in our current doctrine is its passive nature regarding our response to an enemy incursion. It adequately discusses what could be done to counter the threat, but it fails to link that discussion with what is available for performing the requisite tasks. Much of this shortfall is due to the doctrine's over emphasis on economy of force and its unwillingness to accept risks.<ref>\(93\) The doctrine treats rear operations as escalatory in response to the level of the threat; unfortunately, the enemy does not view its deep operations in the same vein. By the time we decide to escalate our rear operations response, the enemy may have already accomplished his mission.
Although our entry into the Korean War was made without the benefit of a rear area defense doctrine, standard tactical responses to enemy rear area incursions were developed and incorporated into Army doctrine. Current rear operations doctrine neglects any serious treatment of our tactical response to an enemy’s threat in our rear area. The failure to identify possible tactical responses to an enemy’s threat in our rear area affects the Army’s ability to resource units properly and degrades the ability of units to train in conducting rear operations.

Current doctrine has placed an excessive amount of emphasis on establishing new command and control elements for rear operations, whereas in Korea the control of rear operations was left to established headquarters that were supplemented with a small number of staff personnel. Existing command relationships in Korea were not tampered with. Today, our establishment of BCOC has muddled the C3 environment of the battlefield. In Korea the commander was responsible for rear area defense. Our current operational concept states that a support unit commander should be the rear operations officer. (94)

When events in Korea required it, large forces were dedicated to performing rear area operations as their primary missions. The unwillingness of the current doctrine to accept risk by providing such dedicated forces has presented the US Army with three problems: a delay in any response to an enemy incursion, a lack of surveillance throughout the rear, and a lack of an effective opposition to guerrilla activities. (95) A dedicated rear operations force not only would enhance rear area defense but also would allow CS and CSS units to concentrate more time and effort on their functional support missions. An ideal force for this role would be a military police unit, such as a MP battalion at
the division level and a MP brigade at the corps level. Given the Army's force development concept, however, it is quite doubtful that such an expansion of the military police force structure will take place in the Army's active component.\(^{(96)}\)

Therefore, two major actions should be undertaken to correct the deficiencies of our current rear operations doctrine. First, the current command and control structure should be reevaluated for its feasibility and supportability. Nothing could be worse than to impose a command and control structure for rear operations that compounds the friction of the battlefield without providing any clear control over subordinate units. Secondly, our rear operations doctrine should address the role of tactics more directly. A failure to do so would leave us in a position similar to our entry into the Korean War: a force at war without a viable doctrine.

In the final analysis, our tactical doctrine must concern itself with adequacy not only in depth (deep, close, and rear), but also in breadth (leadership, firepower, maneuver, and protection). As the doctrine is developed its authors must focus on the most effective means to achieve victory and recognize that those means consist of well trained and well led soldiers. The failure to comprehend this will not only result in lost battles, but in the loss of our soldiers' lives as well. 

\(^{(96)}\)
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid., p. 189 - 212. One of the few sources of rear area actions during the Korean War, Westover's book contains many vignettes that illuminate combat support problems of various natures.

3. Ibid., p. 201 - 205.


9. Ibid., p. 558.

10. Ibid., p. 233.


12. Ibid., p. 2.


15. Ibid., p. 144.


20. Ibid., p. 37.

21. Ibid.


23. Ibid., p. 2.


25. Ibid., p. 231.


27. Ibid.


30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.


34. Ibid.

36. Ibid., p. 233.
37. Ibid., p. 588.
42. Appleman, *op. cit.*, p. 721.
43. Ibid., p. 726.
45. Appleman, *op. cit.*, p. 748. Only once did EUSA and X Corps establish physical contact with each other.
46. Ibid., p. 727. The platoon leader involved, 1LT Harold G. Parris, was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross posthumously for his action.
47. Ibid., p. 667.
48. Ibid., p. 728.
51. Ibid., p. 347.
55. Ibid., p. 27.
56. Ibid., p. 15.
57. Ibid., p. 27.
59. Ibid., p. 30 - 34.
60. Ibid., p. 19 - 21.
61. Ibid., p. 22 - 25.
62. Ibid., p. 25 - 30.
63. Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 358.
64. Hermes, op. cit., p. 96.
65. Ibid., p. 184.
70. Marshall, op. cit., p. 56 - 78.
71. USATS, op. cit., p. 18.
72. Ibid.
73. HQ, I Corps, op. cit., p. 2.
74. Appleman, op. cit., p. 280. Many instances of communications failures are recorded in both Appleman and Hermes. These failures were caused mostly by the poor maintenance of equipment, the state of the art, and the rough terrain of Korea.
75. Marshall, op. cit., p. 76.
76. House, op. cit., p. 149.
77. Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 531.


81. Ministry of Defense, United Kingdom, op. cit., p. 6-1.

82. Ibid.


94. TRADOC Pam 525-30, p. 4.

95. Otis, op. cit., p. 110.

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