N-Version Software Demonstration for Digital Flight Controls

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Final Report

This document is available to the U.S. public through the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161.
This report illustrates how four independently developed versions of digital flight controls applications software might be used in a quadruplex system architecture. This approach to software fault tolerance is called N-version software. Here each computer channel has distinct versions of Ada programming units performing the same functions concurrently. Since intermediate software results are voted to detect and isolate discrepant computations, cross-channel synchronization occurs at each voting plane. The demonstration of this system was based on a high-level software design, English language specifications, and associated Ada program unit specifications parts. The demonstration was performed in non-realtime on a single VAX 8600 computer using an Ada multitasking test harness to effect voting plane synchronization and test case application and analyses.
N-VERSION SOFTWARE SPECIFICATION, DESIGN, AND
DEMO tool STRATION FOR DIGITAL FLIGHT CONTROLS

Dennis B. Mulcare and Lynn A. Barton

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Foreword

This report describes the specification, design, and testing of a digital flight control system (DFCS) software that has been prepared under an FAA-sponsored program entitled "Methods for the Verification and Validation of Digital Flight Control Systems," as Subtask 4.5.2.1 of Contract NAS2-11853, Modification 1. The intent has been to conduct an N-version programming demonstration illustrative of DFCS software fault tolerance for a quadruplex architecture. Accordingly, four independently developed versions of applications software were coded and demonstrated in respective DFCS channels.

Considerable background information is presented, largely of a system or software design nature. First, higher level software encompassing the N-version software is described, including a multitasking test harness and the foreground executive programs for the four DFCS channels. Coded in Ada R, the interfaces for this software were set up for the insertion of the N-version applications modules and the associated software voters. These applications modules were then developed in accord with the respective DFCS program unit specifications.

This report has also been published as Lockheed-Georgia Company Engineering Report LG86ER0163.

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I.0 I.RODUCTION

A set of software program unit specifications was generated via the process depicted in Figure 1 for use in an exploratory investigation of software fault tolerance using the N-version programming approach. The resultanty developed software is representative of a scaled-down flight control system (see Section 2.0) with a critical pitch-axis fly-by-wire (FBW) function. Accordingly, a double fail-operational, quadruplex system architecture was postulated to furnish requisite system reliability. Each of the four DFCS channels, moreover, incorporated a different version of applications software as independently developed by a different programmer.

The overall DFCS software structure, or the multirate executive program and its called procedure interfaces, however, was essentially the same in each channel per Section 4.0. Each DFCS executive contains calls to N-version program units, which in turn usually include calls to voters for cross-checking the intermediate computations of all the channels. Central to the N-version demonstration, these program units were developed using the Ada programming language in accordance with a set of applications software module specifications, which are presented in Sections 5.0 through 13.0.

Each of the program units was constructed so that it could be run in a single channel test harness on a stand-alone basis for unit testing and de-bugging, or as part of the total program for integrated 4-version testing. The latter entails the voting of the four versions of the DFCS software running effectively in parallel on a single VAX 8650 for the N-version software demonstration and evaluation. Hence, a non-realtime multitasking test executive program with suitable integral test drivers was devised (see Section 14.0) to enable convenient software integration and valid N-version evaluation testing.

Figure 2 summarizes the organization of the multitasking test harness, where Ada tasks are denoted by the parallelogram shaped boxes. Task TEST_EXEC performs or directs all of the automated test functions, such as input test data application and results processing. The software for each of the four DFCS channels runs within an associated DFCS_EXEC task, which are coordinated such that synchronization occurs at each software voting plane. If a channel output is outside of permissible limits, it is assigned the voter selected value so that the erroneous state is not propagated. Note that the DFCS_EXEC tasks replace the top-level flight software, which is not germane to the problem at hand, so that the four DFCS channels can run logically in parallel.

1.1 Software Fault Tolerance

Concern over the potential for generic or common-mode software faults in critical systems has prompted rather widespread interest within the aerospace industry in software fault tolerance. While the enabling technology appears to be in place, it remains to demonstrate and assess all aspects of fault-tolerant software for critical DFCS applications. Various attributes of DFCS software, moreover, present some challenging demands. Temporal constraints, such as difference equation iteration rates or maximum fault detection/recovery times, are of particular concern.
Figure 1 - Project Task Flow Diagram
Figure 2 - Overall Test Harness Organization
The two primary approaches to fault tolerance, N-version software and recovery blocks (Ref. 1), are depicted in Figure 3. Both involve dissimilar versions of software performing the same function(s). In the case of N-version software, the versions must be developed independently. They run logically in parallel, and the version outputs are submitted to a voter/comparator for selection of the proper result. Recovery block alternates run logically in a sequence, which needs to be invoked only to the extent that alternate versions fail their acceptance test. Normally, some level of degradation in performance is accepted with among successive Alternates to ensure continuing operation.

Of these two approaches, N-version holds strong appeal for most types of DFCS software. The aforementioned time constraints are a dominant factor in such a preference. Hence, the DFCS application program modules under this investigation, were implemented using the N-version method. As suggested in Figure 3, the voter/comparator is a potential single point of failure in the N-version approach. As a consequence, dissimilar voters are sometimes used to obviate this prospect, but the compounding of complexity is appreciable, so only single voters were used in this investigation.

As with all software fault tolerance development efforts, strong emphasis was placed on establishing definitive, high quality software specifications (e.g., see Ref. 2). Completeness, accuracy, and lack of ambiguity are in general essential to the realization of fault-tolerant software, so the prospects for demonstrating and evaluating N-version software are critically dependent on the software specifications. For example, aspects such as maximum time allowances for voted code segments, as well as specific modes and responses for voting, must be completely and precisely stipulated.

Despite all initial efforts, some deficiencies existed in the specifications. Their rectification was rather time-consuming, but the variety of questions raised by different programmers did force corrections to the specifications that might otherwise might not have been so thorough. Similarly, software debugging was facilitated by the the N-version approach. Overall, software fault tolerance has some drawbacks, inherent or potential, as summarized in Figure 4. Still, the net benefits appear worth pursuing.

1.2 Demonstration Guidelines

The DFCS demonstration software was coded using DEC's Ada compiler for the VAX VMS operating system at the Lockheed-Georgia Company. The DFCS software and the descriptions in this memorandum are intended to be essentially in accord with DO-178A, i.e., the documentation is to be illustrative of compliance without necessarily being exhaustive. Configuration control, error logging, and delineation of software development phases are to be observed in an orderly manner that supports and enhances the value of the results of the investigation.

The following assumptions were adopted at the outset to expedite but in no way compromise, the conduct of the investigation:

- No Flight Control Computer Operating System
- No Bus Management Software Functions
- No Hardware-Related Instructions
Figure 3 - Approaches to Software Fault Tolerance
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Figure 4 - Potential Drawbacks of Software Fault Tolerance
Limited Pitch Axis Functions Only
- No Fixed Point Arithmetic, and Hence No Variable Scaling.

After program unit testing and debugging, several stages of testing were conducted: integration and demonstration testing. Due to specification discrepancies detected during coding, the specification parts of this document were revised before consistency among versions was established. Most of these discrepancies were incompletely or incorrectly specified logic.

1.3 Ada Programming Language

There are strong indications that the Ada programming language (Ref. 3) will experience widespread usage in civil aviation in the near term. This would be based primarily on the merits of the language itself, rather than on the U.S. Department of Defense's influence. Despite its drawbacks, the Ada programming language has no viable competition now for use in digital flight system applications. Of course, the language is still developmental with regard to support of flightworthy computers, but the associated problems should be correctable with adequate funding from military programs. Two particularly significant problems associated with Ada are the overhead of tasking and machine language code insertions. Neither factor was applicable to the problem addressed here. Tasking was used for simulation purposes, but not for DFCS software per se.

Here the use of Ada facilitated the conduct of the N-version software demonstration by enabling explicit definition of program units specification parts, precise definition of their software interfaces, the construction of the multitasking test harness, and non-interference observation of test results through Ada package importation by test units.

Specification benefits naturally derive from the two-part composition of Ada program units, which involve a specification part and a corresponding body part. The intent here is to use Ada packages and procedure specification parts to define the fault-tolerant software modules. Each specification part defines a particular interface and its available services, and is reflective of and consistent with the overall design of the program. Hence, this document includes Ada specification parts as the precise, lower-level portions of the respective module specifications. The N-version programmers used them to implement the DFCS functions and services in the associated body parts in the form of executable Ada code.

Although the imposition of a well-defined program design tends to eliminate many types of software faults, those that might remain would seem likely to be more restricted to those types that are detectable by the N-version software voters. This would obviously be desirable from both experimental and architectural standpoints. Note that the Ada specification parts are only one component of the module specifications; English text and analytical diagrams, for example, were used as well. Follow-up activities will investigate the use of comments expressed in the Anna (annotated Ada) specification language. Logic specification checks for completeness and test case generation will also be pursued.
1.4 Anna Specification Language

In general, formal specification has been identified as the key to rationalizing the software development process (Ref. 4). In the case of fault-tolerant software, moreover, formal specification would seem necessary to eliminate a class of faults that cannot be tolerated, namely software faults originating in specifications. By definition, such faults lie outside the safeguards of software fault tolerance, which it is charged with ensuring specification conformity during operation, under the assumption that the specification is correct. This property can be affirmed to some extent by the verifiability inherent in formal specifications.

The Anna (annotated Ada) specification language (Ref. 5) appears to be a significant advance in specification technology for practical systems. Despite its as yet developmental status, Anna is considered mature and promising enough to merit a limited trial application. This seems feasible because: Anna statements are of the form of actual Ada comments, so they are ignored by an Ada compiler; in many cases they resemble Ada source code, so they are comparatively readable; and above all Anna specifications need not be complete, so they can be used to the extent desired for any particular program unit.

Although the processing of Anna statements normally involves associated, but currently unavailable, support software for automated consistency checks, the addition of semantic definition to Ada specifications alone is expected to yield more than ample return for the effort expended. In particular, Anna holds promise of providing the high quality specifications that are so are vital to fault-tolerant software.

Eventually, it should be possible to obtain the Anna support software, and it would doubtlessly prove informative to evaluate its static consistency checking as well as to apply its dynamic run-time checks during simulation testing. Exceptions raised by the run-time checks might well prove useful in the conduct or analysis of testing. From a fault avoidance standpoint, both of these types of checks should improve software quality in general, and from a fault tolerance standpoint, the dynamic checks might serve as acceptance tests in recovery block mechanizations.
2.0 SYSTEM DESIGN

As a framework and context for the software program unit specifications, a DFCS design was systematically developed that illustrates the precision and accountability appropriate for critical functions. Here only certain pitch-axis functions were levied as requirements in order to suitably bound the scope of the software development effort. Accordingly, the following system functions were included:

- Augmented Fly-by-Wire (AFBW) for a Negative Static Margin Transport - double fail-operational redundancy
- Autoland (Glideslope and Flare Modes) - single fail-operational redundancy
- Vertical Navigation and Altitude Hold (Growth Provisions Only) - fail-passive.

Inclusion of growth provisions was based on a potential interfacing with a navigation estimation algorithm that Battelle developed under this same contractual task to explore recovery block software fault tolerance.

2.1 System Description

The above requirements, especially the AFBW function, would typically result in a quadruplex system architecture as depicted in Figure 5. The redundancy levels and interconnections shown are representative of current industry practice, based on the safety and reliability requirements associated with the above DFCS functions. Four parallel MIL-STD-1553B multiplex (MUX) buses are assumed for system interconnection, and the computer cross-channel buses are asynchronous broadcast buses like ARINC 429.

Top-level system logic requirements in terms of MIL-F-9490D Operational States (Ref. 6) are summarized in Figure 6. This logic, which reflects system safety based on the interaction between redundancy margins and airplane flying qualities status, is most appropriate for an AFBW function. This system state logic, whose definition is expanded and applied in subsequent sections on fault and annunciator logic, was ultimately be implemented in N-version software modules.

The system-level signal flow for a single channel, which is typical of all channels except for the routing of dual or triplex signals, is given in Figure 7. Distribution of these signals is clarified in Figure 4 or in the software interface definitions. The individual system-level signals are characterized in Figure 8.

Each flight computer is postulated to be identical, with an input/output processor (IOP) for transferring and formatting external signals and a central processor unit (CPU) for flight software computation. As depicted in Figure 9, the two processors operate autonomously and share two sections of memory. Only the IOP can write the memory addresses assigned to input variables, and the CPU can only read them. Similarly, only the CPU can write the output addresses, and the IOP can only read them. The input data refresh rate is assumed to be high enough such that associated data skew or phase lag are not serious concerns.
Figure 5 - System Block Diagram

NOTES
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2. INTER-COMPUTER COMMUNICATION VIA ASYNCHRONOUS BROADCAST BUSES
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<td>OPERATIONAL_STATE_3</td>
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<td>III Marginal</td>
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<td>OPERATIONAL_STATE_4</td>
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<td>Unflyable *</td>
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\text{OPERATIONAL\_STATE\_2} = \text{DOUBLE\_FAIL\_OP} \times \text{DEGRADED\_FLYING\_QLTY} + \text{SINGLE\_FAIL\_OP} \times (\text{NORMAL\_FLYING\_QLTY} + \text{DEGRADED\_FLYING\_QLTY})
\]
\[
\text{OPERATIONAL\_STATE\_3} = \text{MARGINAL\_FLYING\_QLTY} \times \text{not UNSAFE} + \text{FAIL\_UNSAFE} \times \text{not UNFLYABLE}
\]
\[
\text{OPERATIONAL\_STATE\_4} = \text{DEPLETED} + \text{UNFLYABLE}
\]

\[
\text{DOUBLE\_FAIL\_OP} = \text{MIN}_2\_\text{SERVOS\_ENGAGED} \times \text{COMPUTERS\_VALID} \times \text{STICKS\_VALID} \times \text{AOA\_PAINS\_VALID}
\]
\[
\text{SINGLE\_FAIL\_OP} = \text{MIN}_2\_\text{SERVOS\_ENGAGED} \times \text{MIN}_1\_\text{COMPUTERS\_VALID} \times \text{MIN}_2\_\text{AUA\_PRS\_VAL} \times (\text{not MIN}_1\_\text{SERVOS\_ENGAGED} + \text{not COMPUTERS\_VALID} + \text{not STICKS\_VALID} + \text{not AOA\_PAINS\_VALID})
\]
\[
\text{FAIL\_UNSAFE} = \text{MIN}_1\_\text{SERVOS\_ENGAGED} \times \text{XCT\_2\_COMPUTERS\_VALID} \times \text{MIN}_2\_\text{AUA\_PRS\_VAL}
\]
\[
\text{UNSAFE} = \text{MAX}_1\_\text{COMPUTERS\_VALID} \times \text{MAX}_1\_\text{AUA\_BUS\_VAL} \times \text{MAX}_2\_\text{STICKS\_VALID} \times \text{MAX}_1\_\text{AOA\_PR\_VAL}
\]
\[
\text{NORMAL\_FLYING\_QLTY} = \text{MIN}_2\_\text{PANGYROS\_VAL} \times \text{MIN}_2\_\text{AUA\_PRS\_VAL}
\]
\[
\text{DEGRADED\_FLYING\_QLTY} = \text{MAX}_1\_\text{PANGYROS\_VAL} \times \text{MIN}_2\_\text{AUA\_PRS\_VAL}
\]
\[
\text{MARGINAL\_FLYING\_QLTY} = \text{MIN}_2\_\text{PANGYROS\_VAL} \times \text{ZRO\_AUA\_PR\_VAL}
\]
\[
\text{UNFLYABLE} = \text{MAX}_1\_\text{PANGYROS\_VAL} \times \text{ZRO\_AOA\_PR\_VAL}
\]

Figure 6 - Top-Level System Logic
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pilot's Stick Command No.1</td>
<td>Float</td>
<td>0.5 to 1.5 deg</td>
<td>Pilot's Stick Command No.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot's Stick Command No.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pilot's Stick Command No.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot's Stick Command No.3</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Pilot's Stick Command No.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot's Stick Command No.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pilot's Stick Command No.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copilot's Stick Command No.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CP Stick Command No.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copilot's Stick Command No.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CP Stick Command No.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copilot's Stick Command No.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CP Stick Command No.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copilot's Stick Command No.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CP Stick Command No.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Angle of Attack No.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>50 to 10 deg</td>
<td>Left Angle of Attack No.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Angle of Attack No.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Left Angle of Attack No.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Angle of Attack No.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Left Angle of Attack No.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Angle of Attack No.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Right Angle of Attack No.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Right Angle of Attack No.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Right Angle of Attack No.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Right Angle of Attack No.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Right Angle of Attack No.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Angle of Attack No.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Right Angle of Attack No.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pitch Rate No.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>+/- 30 deg/sec</td>
<td>Pitch Rate No.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pitch Rate No.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pitch Rate No.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal Acceleration No.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>+/- 3 G</td>
<td>Normal Acceleration No.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal Acceleration No.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Normal Acceleration No.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>True Airspeed No.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>100 to 1000 kts</td>
<td>True Airspeed No.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>True Airspeed No.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>True Airspeed No.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>True Airspeed No.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>True Airspeed No.3</td>
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<td>Radio Altitude No.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>-20 to 2500 ft</td>
<td>Radio Altitude No.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Altitude No.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Radio Altitude No.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Altitude No.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Radio Altitude No.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gildeslope Deviation No.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>+/- 1.4 deg</td>
<td>Gildeslope Deviation No.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gildeslope Deviation No.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gildeslope Deviation No.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gildeslope Deviation No.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gildeslope Deviation No.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gildeslope Deviation No.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gildeslope Deviation No.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot's Stick Validity No.1</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>1 =&gt; Valid</td>
<td>Pilot's Stick Validity No.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot's Stick Validity No.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pilot's Stick Validity No.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot's Stick Validity No.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pilot's Stick Validity No.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot's Stick Validity No.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pilot's Stick Validity No.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copilot's Stick Validity No.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Copilot's Stick Validity No.1</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Copilot's Stick Validity No.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copilot's Stick Validity No.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Copilot's Stick Validity No.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Angle of Attack Validity No.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Left Angle of Attack Validity No.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Angle of Attack Validity No.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Left Angle of Attack Validity No.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Angle of Attack Validity No.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Left Angle of Attack Validity No.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Angle of Attack Validity No.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Left Angle of Attack Validity No.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Angle of Attack Validity No.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Right Angle of Attack Validity No.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Angle of Attack Validity No.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Right Angle of Attack Validity No.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Angle of Attack Validity No.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Right Angle of Attack Validity No.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Angle of Attack Validity No.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Right Angle of Attack Validity No.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8 - System-Level Signal Summary (1 of 2)
### Figure 8 - System-Level Signal Summary (2 of 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IDENTIFIER</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>RANGE</th>
<th>IDENTIFIER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pitch Rate Gyro Validity No.1</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>1 =&gt; valid</td>
<td>P_RATE.VAL(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pitch Rate Gyro Validity No.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>P_RATE.VAL(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pitch Rate Gyro Validity No.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>P_RATE.VAL(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal Accelerometer Validity No.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N_ACCEL.VAL(1)</td>
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<td>Normal Accelerometer Validity No.2</td>
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<td></td>
<td>N_ACCEL.VAL(2)</td>
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<td>Normal Accelerometer Validity No.3</td>
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<td>N_ACCEL.VAL(3)</td>
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<td>True Airspeed Validity No.1A</td>
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<td></td>
<td>T_AIR.VAL(1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>True Airspeed Validity No.1B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>T_AIR.VAL(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>True Airspeed Validity No.2A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>T_AIR.VAL(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Altimeter Validity No.1A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>R_ALT.VAL(1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radio Altimeter Validity No.2A</td>
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<td></td>
<td>R_ALT.VAL(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Altimeter Validity No.3A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>R_ALT.VAL(3)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Glideslope Validity No.1A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GLS.VAL(1)</td>
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<td>Glideslope Validity No.1B</td>
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<td>GLS.VAL(2)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GLS.VAL(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glideslope Validity No.3A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GLS.VAL(4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Autopilot Selection A &amp; B</td>
<td>Enumerated</td>
<td>5 modes</td>
<td>NOME.SEL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autopilot Category A &amp; B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ANNUN_V1, ANNUN_V2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autopilot Engagement A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ANNUN_V3, ANNUN_V4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autopilot Engagement B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ANNUN_V5, ANNUN_V6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autopilot Progress B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ANNUN_V7, ANNUN_V8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flying Qualities Level A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ANNUN_V9, ANNUN_V10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flying Qualities Level B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ANNUN_V11, ANNUN_V12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autopilot Status A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ANNUN_V13, ANNUN_V14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autopilot Status B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ANNUN_V15, ANNUN_V16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fly-by-Wire Status A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ANNUN_V17, ANNUN_V18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fly-by-Wire Status B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ANNUN_V19, ANNUN_V20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flying Qualities Status A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ANNUN_V21, ANNUN_V22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flying Qualities Status B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ANNUN_V23, ANNUN_V24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master Warning A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FLASN.MARK.V1, FLASN.MARK.V2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master Warning B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FLASN.MARK.V3, FLASN.MARK.V4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledge Warning</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>1 =&gt; Acknowledge</td>
<td>ACKNUGE.HEAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Servo Engage Status No.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3ENVG.U1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Servo Engage Status No.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3ENVG.U2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Servo Engage Status No.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3ENVG.U3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Servo Engage Status No.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3ENVG.U4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Servo Command No.1</td>
<td>Float</td>
<td>-11, +2 deg</td>
<td>STAB.SLVV.ChD.V1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Servo Command No.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>STAB.SLVV.ChD.V2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Servo Command No.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>STAB.SLVV.ChD.V3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Servo Command No.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>STAB.SLVV.ChD.V4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14
Figure 9 - Computer Input/Output Organization (Same for All Computers)
Figure 10 lists all of the DFCS computer cross-channel signals and summarizes their salient characteristics. Note that some logic input signals require a dedicated discrete input for a practical design, e.g., to provide responsiveness in the real-time coordination of resources. As far as the flight software is concerned, all input, output, or cross-channel signals could be made available as local data objects. However, for test observability or software voting, the level of visibility of these objects was raised. Figure 11 shows the interaction between the IOP/CPU shared memory and the input signal that must be accomplished by the flight software. The latter is specified in Sections 8.0 and 10.0 as part of the N-version test article.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IDENTITY</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>RANGE</th>
<th>IDENTIFIER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Left Angle-of-Attack No.1</td>
<td>Float</td>
<td>+50°, 10 deg</td>
<td>LEFT_AOA(1)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Left Angle-of-Attack No.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>LEFT_AOA(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Angle-of-Attack No.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>LEFT_AOA(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Angle-of-Attack No.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>LEFT_AOA(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Angle-of-Attack No.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RIGHT_AOA(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Angle-of-Attack No.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RIGHT_AOA(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Angle-of-Attack No.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RIGHT_AOA(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Angle-of-Attack No.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RIGHT_AOA(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Channel Status No.1</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>1 =&gt; valid</td>
<td>CHNL_STATUS_V1</td>
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<td>Channel Status No.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CHNL_STATUS_V2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Channel Status No.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CHNL_STATUS_V3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Channel Status No.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CHNL_STATUS_V4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** All sensor inputs and their validity signals are cross-bused by the I/O Processor. The logic signals are the result of software computation.

Figure 10 - Computer Cross-Channel Signal Summary
Figure 11 - Software Input Signal Flow
3.0 SOFTWARE DESIGN

Two aspects of software design were considered: the actual DFCS flight software for the four computational channels; and the test executive to manage N-version software execution and assessment on a single VAX 8650 host machine. This section develops the DFCS software design, while the test executive and the overall demonstration software organization are presented in Section 14.0.

For the test article, note that the lower-level DFCS software in each channel runs under an autonomous Ada task, DFCS_x_EXEC, in Figure 2. Here "x" denotes the DFCS channel number. All four of these tasks are active, although perhaps blocked, throughout testing. The DFCS_x_EXEC tasks serve to enable the non-real-time testing of parallel channels in a sequential, yet acceptable, manner involving coordinated task blocking at the cross-check points. The basic point, however, is that the same DFCS software can run in either parallel DFCS processors or a single test computer in effectively the same way.

The overall organization of each DFCS channel's flight software is depicted in Figure 12. Note that the two top-level procedures are not included in the DFCS test article, but partial contents of the top-level DFCS packages, CHANNEL_RESOURCES and SYSTEM_RESOURCES, are still used in the test set-up. The associated Ada source code listings are given in Figure 13, Parts a and b.

3.1 DFCS Software Design

The overall design of the software was intended to closely follow the prior design of a quadruplex DFCS that was implemented and demonstrated on the RDFCS (Reconfigurable DFCS) Simulator Facility at NASA Ames under the same contract as this task (Ref. 7). It is expected that the similarities will serve to strengthen the tutorial value of the contract reports by viewing essentially the same system from different perspectives.

The top-level DFCS software design is the same for each channel. With reference to Figure 12, the main program in each channel, RUN_DFCSEXEC_x, is taken to be an austere operating system that establishes a given channel's readiness for operation upon start-up or following a temporary disruption. Normally then, the second-level procedure, RUN_DFCSEXEC_x, directs ongoing system management during normal operation, e.g., major frame channel synchronization. In a complete flight software load module, it also calls Procedure RUN_FOREGROUND_x, which is included in the the N-version test article.

Figure 14 illustrates the looping, multirate structure of RUN_FOREGROUND_x, which in the test set-up is called by Task DFCS_x_EXEC of the test harness (which replaces Procedure RUN_DFCSEXEC_x for demonstration purposes). After each top-to-bottom traversal of the flow diagram, control is re-assumed by DFCS_x_EXEC for a simulated elapsed time of 50 millisecond per computational cycle as defined in Figure 15). When appropriate, Procedure RUN_FOREGROUND_x is called again and the next one of the four path traversals is effected. Note in Figure 14 that the N-version cross-check points are shown following each of the affected applications procedures; at such points, the four
Figure 12 - Overall DFCS Flight Program Organization

NOTE
This is a simplified representation of a DFCS load module. The two top-level procedures must be replaced to run the applications software in the N-version test harness.
Figure 13a - Top-Level DFCS Package Listing
Package CHANNEL_RESOURCES

```plaintext
-- Type declarations

-- Computer Channels Units

type CHANNEL_RESOURCES is
  record
    C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C7, C8, C9, C10 : CHANNEL
  end record;

-- Server Status Units:

type SERVER_STATUS is
  record
    AL, RL, NL, FL : SERVER
  end record;

-- Other Implementations

-- CHANNEL STATUS

CHANNEL : CHANNEL_RESOURCES;

SERVER : SERVER

end CHANNEL_RESOURCES;
```
package SYSTEM_RESOURCES is

-- Procedure Declarations

procedure P1: procedure; procedure P2: procedure; procedure P3: procedure; procedure P4: procedure;

-- Type Declaration

type Path_Type is interface;

-- Object Declarations

Path_1, Path_2, Path_3, Path_4 : Path_Type;

end SYSTEM_RESOURCES;

package only SYSTEM_RESOURCES is

procedure P1: procedure is separate; procedure P2: procedure is separate; procedure P3: procedure is separate; procedure P4: procedure is separate;

end SYSTEM_RESOURCES;

Figure 13b - Top-Level DFCS Package Listing
Package SYSTEM_RESOURCES
Figure 14 - Multirate Foreground Executive Flow Diagram
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME SLICE NO.</th>
<th>SUB FRAME TIME</th>
<th>PATH NUMBER</th>
<th>SUB FRAME TIME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T₁</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>SELECT MODE_Vx</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T₂</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>XCHK SYNCH_Vx</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T₃</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>ASSESS CHANNEL_Vx</td>
<td>ASSESS SYSTEM_Vx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T₄</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>XCHK SYNCH_Vx</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T₅</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>GIVE STATUS_Vx</td>
<td>GIVE WARNING_Vx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T₆</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>XCHK SYNCH_Vx</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T₇</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>MANAGE_AL_SENSORS_Vx</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T₈</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>XCHK SYNCH_Vx</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T₉</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>CALC_AUTOLAND_Vx</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T₁₀</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>XCHK SYNCH_Vx</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>11</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T₁₂</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>XCHK SYNCH_Vx</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T₁₃</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>CALC INNER LOOP_Vx</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T₁₄</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>XCHK SYNCH_Vx</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T₁₅</td>
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<td></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T₂₀</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 15 - Foreground Procedure Timing Diagram
channels must synchronize, exchange data, and vote before executing to the next applications module.

1.2 DFCS Applications Software

For years the authors have used a software design strategy that is based on control state decomposition (see Ref. 8), and this sufficed for the development of FAA’s quadruplex DFCS at NASA Ames. The implementation language used there (AED), however, did not permit the extensive protection of data objects that Ada fosters through packages and strong typing. Hence, the concern for minimization of the data objects’ namespace over the total program could not be addressed systematically until the present implementation in Ada. The intent, of course, is to alleviate the vulnerability of data objects to inadvertent changes through reducing their respective scopes in the DFCS software.

To accomplish this, a data flow decomposition strategy (Ref. 9) has been introduced at the applications software level. Figure 16 depicts the intermediate step for this design stage. System and cross-channel input signals are introduced to a single channel on the left, and output signals emerge on the right of Figure 16. In between new data objects are identified that are internal to the DFCS applications software, along with their flow relative to the applications procedures in Figure 14. Finally, the three intermediate-level Ada packages of Figure 12 are shown, information additional to that normally contained in data flow diagrams.

This data flow representation was actually used to group associated data objects and procedures within these Ada packages and to determine the levels at which each data object is to be declared in the Ada-based design. The lower the levels are in general, the less is the namespace over most of the program execution. This type information is indicated to a certain extent statically in the call/usage graph presented in Figure 17. Definition of the actual Ada package specification parts is then initiated from information in these representations.

Note that Figure 17 portrays appreciable complexity and dispersed dependencies in the overall DFCS/test program. This complexity is due to software fault tolerance and to the composition of the test harness. Perhaps the biggest contributing factor is the non-interference requirement imposed on the test harness. Section 14.0 further describes the mechanization and rationale.

The associated Ada source code listings for the packages shown in Figures 15 are presented in Figure 18: (a) Package DFCS_LOGIC; (b) Package DFCS_RESOURCES; (c) Package CONTROL LAWS; (d) Package N_VERSION_VOTERS; and (e) Package VOTING PLANES. These package specifications, which capture much of the DFCS applications software design in non-executable Ada code, are referenced by the Ada N-version procedures pursuant to the namespace reduction strategy.

All but Packages N_VERSION_VOTER and VOTING_PLANES are referenced by Procedure RUN_FOREGROUND, as indicated in Figures 12 and 17. The affected applications procedures reference Package VOTING_PLANES, which effects cross-channel synchronization and calls the voter procedure contained in Package N_VERSION_VOTER. The voting requirements are summarized in Figure 19.
Figure 16 - DFCS Data Flow Diagram
Figure 17 - Call/Usage Graph
package CONTROL_LAWS is

-- Procedure Declarations
-------------

procedure CALC_AUTOLAND_V1; 
procedure CALC_INNER_LOOP_V1; 

procedure CALC_AUTOLAND_V2; 
procedure CALC_INNER_LOOP_V2; 

procedure CALC_AUTOLAND_V3; 
procedure CALC_INNER_LOOP_V3; 

procedure CALC_AUTOLAND_V4; 
procedure CALC_INNER_LOOP_V4; 

-- Type Declarations
-------------

type PITCH_COMMAND is new FLOAT range -5.0 .. 10.0; 
type STAB_COMMAND is new FLOAT range -11.0 .. 2.0; 

-- Object Declarations
-------------

AUTOLAND_CMD_V1, AUTOLAND_CMD_V2, AUTOLAND_CMD_V3, 
AUTOLAND_CMD_V4 : PITCH_COMMAND; 

STAB_SERVO_CMD_V1, STAB_SERVO_CMD_V2, STAB_SERVO_CMD_V3, 
STAB_SERVO_CMD_V4 : STAB_COMMAND; 
end CONTROL_LAWS; 

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

package body CONTROL_LAWS is

procedure CALC_AUTOLAND_V1 is separate; 
procedure CALC_INNER_LOOP_V1 is separate; 

procedure CALC_AUTOLAND_V2 is separate; 
procedure CALC_INNER_LOOP_V2 is separate; 

procedure CALC_AUTOLAND_V3 is separate; 
procedure CALC_INNER_LOOP_V3 is separate; 

procedure CALC_AUTOLAND_V4 is separate; 
procedure CALC_INNER_LOOP_V4 is separate; 
end CONTROL_LAWS; 

Figure 18a - DFCS Applications Package Listing
Package CONTROL_LAWS

28
package DFCS_LOGIC is

-- Procedure Declarations

procedure ACCESS_CHANNEL_V1;
procedure ACCESS_SYSTEM_V1;
procedure GIVE_STATUS_V1;
procedure GIVE_ALARMIN_V1;
procedure SELECT_NOF_V1;

procedure ACCESS_CHANNEL_V2;
procedure ACCESS_SYSTEM_V2;
procedure GIVE_STATUS_V2;
procedure GIVE_ALARMIN_V2;
procedure SELECT_NOF_V2;

procedure ACCESS_CHANNEL_V3;
procedure ACCESS_SYSTEM_V3;
procedure GIVE_STATUS_V3;
procedure GIVE_ALARMIN_V3;
procedure SELECT_NOF_V3;

procedure ACCESS_CHANNEL_V4;
procedure ACCESS_SYSTEM_V4;
procedure GIVE_STATUS_V4;
procedure GIVE_ALARMIN_V4;
procedure SELECT_NOF_V4;

-- Type Declarations

-- Sensor Validity Logic:
type DM=./Validity is array (1..4) of BOOLEAN;
type IM=./Validity is array (1..3) of BOOLEAN;
type RM=./Validity is array (1..2) of BOOLEAN;

-- Aircraft Sensor Logic:
type AIR SENSOR STATUS is
record
  COM_FAA=VALID : DM=./Validity,
  LATCH=VALID : IM=./Validity,
  RAMAL=VALID : RM=./Validity,
end record;

Figure 18b - DFCS Applications Package Listing
Package DFCS_LOGIC (1 of 4)
Figure 18b - DFCS Applications Package Listing
Package DFCS_LOGIC (2 of 4)
Figure 18b - DFCS Applications Package Listing
Package DFCS_LOGIC (3 of 4)
package body DFCS_LOGIC is

-- procedures:

procedure ASSERSS_SYSTM_SYS is separate;
procedure GIVE_TRANSFORM is separate;
procedure SELECT_HELP is separate;
procedure GIVE_NAVIGATION is separate;
procedure ASSESS_CHANNEL is separate;
procedure GIVE_STATUS is separate;
procedure GIVE_SYSTEM is separate;
procedure SELECT_HELP is separate;
procedure GIVE_SYSTEM is separate;
procedure GIVE_STATUS is separate;
procedure GIVE_SYSTEM is separate;
procedure GIVE_STATUS is separate;
procedure SELECT_HELP is separate;
procedure GIVE_SYSTEM is separate;
procedure GIVE_STATUS is separate;
procedure GIVE_SYSTEM is separate;

end DFCS_LOGIC;

Figure 18b - DFCS Applications Package Listing
Package DFCS_LOGIC (4 of 4)
Figure 18c - DFCS Applications Package Listing
Package DFCS_RESOURCES (1 of 3)
Figure 18c - DFCS Applications Package Listing
Package DFCS_RESOURCES (2 of 3)
package mod: DFCS_RESOUncES is

-- Procedures:

procedure MANAGEl_AL_SOURCES_1 is separate;
procedure MANAGEl_AL_SOURCES_2 is separate;
procedure MANAGEl_AL_SOURCES_2 is separate;
procedure MANAGEl_AL_SOURCES_3 is separate;
procedure MANAGEl_AL_SOURCES_3 is separate;
procedure MANAGEl_AL_SOURCES_4 is separate;
procedure MANAGEl_AL_SOURCES_4 is separate;

end DFCS_RESOURCES;

Figure 18c - DFCS Applications Package Listing
Package DFCS_RESOURCES (3 of 3)
- Type Declarations

```

Figure 18d - DFCS Applications Package Listing
Package N_VERSION_VOTERS

```
with VERS10; use VERS10;
package VOTINGPLANES is

-- Procedure Declarations

procedure YCHA_SYNC_1;
procedure YCHA_SYNC_2;
procedure YCHA_SYNC_3;
procedure YCHA_SYNC_4;

-- Data Declarations

CHL1_XCHK_NUM, CHL2_XCHK_NUM,
CHL3_XCHK_NUM, CHL4_XCHK_NUM : CC_PUT_T;

end VOTING_PLANES;

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

package body VOTING_PLANES is

procedure YCHA_SYNC_1 is separate;
procedure YCHA_SYNC_2 is separate;
procedure YCHA_SYNC_3 is separate;
procedure YCHA_SYNC_4 is separate;

end VOTING_PLANES;

Figure 18e - DFCS Applications Package Listing
Package VOTING_PLANES

37
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>PROCEDURE</th>
<th>VOTED SIGNAL(S)</th>
<th>TYPE(S)</th>
<th>MATCH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>SELECT_MODE_Vx</td>
<td>NODE_ENH_Vx</td>
<td>Record of Enumerated</td>
<td>Exact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>GIVE_STATUS_Vx</td>
<td>ANNUN_Vx</td>
<td>Record of Enumerated</td>
<td>Exact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>MANAGE_AL_SENSORS_Vx</td>
<td>AL_MEO_Vx, AL_COMP_Vx</td>
<td>Record of Floats</td>
<td>TSO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AL_PHASE_Vx</td>
<td>Record of Boolean Vectors</td>
<td>Exact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>CALC_AUTOLAND_Vx</td>
<td>AUTOLANU_CM0_Vx, AL_PHASE_Vx</td>
<td>Float</td>
<td>TSO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Enumerated</td>
<td>Exact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>MANAGE_IL_SENSORS_Vx</td>
<td>IL_MEO_Vx, IL_COMP_Vx</td>
<td>Record of Floats</td>
<td>TSO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Record of Boolean Vectors</td>
<td>Exact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>CALC_INNER_LOOP_Vx</td>
<td>STAB_SEQNO_CM0_Vx</td>
<td>Float</td>
<td>TSO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>ASSESS_SYSTEM_Vx</td>
<td>FLT_QUAL_Vx, FBW_STATUS_Vx</td>
<td>Enumerated</td>
<td>Exact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>GIVE_WARNING_Vx</td>
<td>WARN_Vx, FLASH_WARNING_Vx</td>
<td>Record of Enumerated</td>
<td>Exact</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 19 - N-Version Voting Requirements

```plaintext
with CONTROL_LAWS ; use CONTROL_LAWS ;
with DFCS_LOGIC ; use DFCS_LOGIC ;
with DFCS_RESOURCES ; use DFCS_RESOURCES ;
separate(SYSTEM_RESOURCES)
procedure RUN_FOREGROUND_1 is
begin
  SELECT_MODE_V1;
  case PATH_1 is
    when 0 => null;
    when 1 | 3 =>
      ASSESS_CHANNEL_V1;
      if PATH_1 = 1 then
        GIVE_STATUS_V1;
      end if;
      MANAGE_AL_SENSORS_V1;
      CALC_AUTOLAND_V1;
    when 2 | 4 =>
      ASSESS_SYSTEM_V1;
      if PATH_1 = 4 then
        GIVE_WARNING_V1;
      end if;
  end case;
  MANAGE_IL_SENSORS_V1;
  CALC_INNER_LOOP_V1;
end RUN_FOREGROUND_1;
```

Figure 20 - Procedure RUN_FOREGROUND_1 Listing
4.0 MULTIRATE EXECUTIVE DESCRIPTION

The control structure of Procedure RUN_FOREGROUND_\(x\) was presented in a multirate flow graph form in Figure 14, and the intent has been to implement it and its called procedures such that the applications software might run intact in either a (hypothetical) target flight computer or a host computer test harness. The foreground executive procedure was implemented for each of the four DFCS channels, and incorporated into the test harness (see Section 14.0). The Ada source code listing for RUN_FOREGROUND_1 is given in Figure 20.

With the exception of channel/version number designations, the software for RUN_FOREGROUND_1 is the same as for each of the other channels. In the names of program units such as RUN_FOREGROUND_1, note that the suffix "1" by itself denotes pre-existing Channel 1 software, whereas "V1" designates later-to-be-developed Version 1 software. Of course, all Version 1 software is used in Channel 1.

The listing in Figure 20 is mainly the executable code that calls the N-version control function applications procedures. The location of N-version cross-check points do not appear in the listing, as Figure 11 might suggest, because voter calls take place at a lower level in the program structure. This is done primarily because the same synchronization process is used by all voted procedures. Also, it facilitates changes to procedure outputs for fault correction purposes, which is more easily handled if the affected procedure has not been exited. The associated mechanization, moreover, seems to afford some reductions of the namespace.

Only one version of N-version voting is employed because multiple voting implementations would significantly and needlessly complicate the investigation. Also, voting of the foreground executive itself is avoided as an unwarranted addition of complexity. Besides, the limited scope and logic-oriented nature of DFCS executives render them amenable to formal verification. Hence, the need for software fault tolerance on this level may conceivably be alleviated. Such issues may possibly be addressed under NASA Langley auspices (see Ref. 10).

Timing intervals for the N-version code segments were stipulated in Figure 15, with a total of 50 milliseconds allotted for each top-down path traversal in Figure 14. Associated 20 Hertz hardware timer interrupts are in general assumed to be satisfied in all channels for most N-version testing purposes, but code segment timeouts at cross-check points are to be explored per Section 14.0.
5.0 SELECT_MODE PROCEDURE SPECIFICATION

The operational mode(s) of each channel shall be determined based on identical externally applied logic signals to each channel and on internally generated ones reflecting the availability conditions of the AFBW (augmented fly-by-wire) function and the autoland sensors. The internal logic shall confirm that the selected mode(s) is(are) engagable. The resultant mode selection(s) shall then be furnished for activation of the corresponding control functions and for indication of mode engagement to the autopilot controller.

5.1 Autopilot Modes

Autopilot mode engagement shall be determined by the externally applied logic signal MODE_SEL, which is available to all channels. The order of precedence of mode engagement in ascending order shall be: Basic, Altitude Hold, Vertical Navigation, Autoland, and Off. Due to external logic interlocks, when MODE_SEL.AUTOPILOT is set at Autoland, MODE_SEL.AUTOLAND will never be set at off. The output MODE_ENG.Vx.AUTOPILOT reflects the input selection in all but the Autoland Mode which shall be conditionally engageable.

5.2 Autoland Mode

The autoland selection, MODE_ENG_Vx.AUTOLAND, shall be determined by the internal logic signals, AL_CMP_Vx and FBW_STATUS_Vx, according to the following logic conditions:

Off --> Autoland Not Selected OR No Category Engagable.

Category 1 -->

Autoland Selected
AND ((Category 1 Selected
AND Minimum of 1 Each Autoland Sensors)
OR (Category 2 or 3 Selected
AND Exactly 1 Sensor for at Least One Type of Sensor
AND At Least 1 of Other Types of Sensors
OR Operational State Less than 2).

Category 2 -->

Autoland Selected
AND ((Category 2 Selected
AND Minimum of 2 Each Autoland Sensors
AND Minimum Operational State 2)
OR (Category 3 Selected
AND [at Least 1 Autoland Sensor Fault
AND Minimum of 2 Each Autoland Sensors
AND Minimum of Operational State 2
OR Operational State of 2)).

Category 3A -->

Autoland Selected
AND Category 3 Selected
AND All Autoland Sensors
AND Operational State 1.
5.2.1 Autoland Category Reversion

If failures occur during a higher category autoland, the autoland engagement shall revert to the next lower category whose engage logic is satisfied.

5.2.2 Autoland Select Warning

If Category 2 or 3 Autoland is selected, but cannot be engaged, this situation shall be reflected in the logic signal AL_WARN VX. If Category 3 is selected, but not engagable, AL_WARN VX shall be set to CAT_3_INOP. If Category 2 is selected, but not engageable, AL_WARN VX shall be set to CAT_2_INOP. In all other cases, AL_WARN VX shall be set to OFF.

5.3 Maximum Allowable Computational Time

The maximum allowable sub-frame time for this computation shall be 2 milliseconds.

5.4 Input/Output

| INPUTS |

AL_COMP_Vx AL_SENSOR_STATUS : type AL_SENSOR_STATUS is record GS_BEAM_VAL : QUAD_VALIDITY, N_ACCEL_VAL : TRIAD_VALIDITY, RAD_ALT_VAL : QUAD_VALIDITY, end record.

FBW_STATUS_Vx PRI_FCS_STATUS : type PRI_FCS_STATUS is (OP_STATE_4, OP_STATE_3, OP_STATE_2, OP_STATE_1).

MODE_SEL AFCS_SELECTION : type AFCS_SELECTION is record AUTOPilot : AP_SELECTION, AUTOLAND : ALCATEGORY, end record.

type AP_SELECTION is (ALT_HOLD, AUTOLAND, BASIC, VERT_NAV, OFF). type ALCATEGORY is (CAT_1, CAT_2, CAT_3A, OFF).
| OUTPUTS |

```
AL_WARN_Vx : AL_STATUS.

type AL_STATUS is (CAT_3_INOP, CAT_2_INOP, BLANK);

MODE ENG Vx : AFCS_SELECTION.
```
Ada Procedure SELECT_MODE_Vx ADA

with VOTING_PLANES : use VOTING_PLANES
separate(DFCS_LOGIC)
procedure SELECT_MODE_Vx is

-- Local Declarations (if any)
-- Place Static Variables in Programmer-Defined Packages

-- Using the mode selection/enablement inputs as defined in Section
-- 5.4 (as declared in Package DFCS_LOGIC) determine the resultant
-- output signals: mode engagement (MODE_ENG_Vx) and autoland warning
-- (AL_WARN_Vx) per the English text specification requirements.

begin

-- Procedure SELECT_MODE_Vx

--

-- Add Demonstration Software Here
--

CHNL_x_XCHK_NUM := 1 ;
XCHK_SYNCH_X : -- Call for N-Version Vote

end SELECT_MODE_Vx ;
6.0 ASSESS_CHANNEL PROCEDURE SPECIFICATION

Once a channel is initialized and Procedure RUN_FOREGROUND_x is running, the fault logic states of channel components shall be monitored to ascertain the continued proper status of the channel, independent of the conditions of the other channels. Normally then, a channel will be activated and its servoactuator engaged before this procedure can be called. Once Procedure RUN_FOREGROUND_x is operating, this procedure oversees channel fault and recovery events until the maximum recoveries below are exceeded.

6.1 Channel Validity Logic

Channel x's status, CHNL_STATUS_Vx, shall be determined via an examination of the associated servo status, SERVO_x, and the computer channel states, CMPTR_x.

6.1.1 Servo Validity

Since SERVO_x is of Type Record, the various servo validities shall be examined. All must evaluate True under the limitations described below for the associated servo to be considered in acceptable condition.

6.1.2 Computer Validity

Similarly, CMPTR_x is a Record Type, so its elements must all evaluate True under the limitations prescribed below for acceptability.

6.2 Logic State Change

The state of CHNL_STATUS_Vx will have been set True prior to the initial calling of this procedure during any given execution. Having initially been set True, prescribed time delays, or iteration counts, shall be observed in declaring the channel validity False. Under certain conditions, a channel validity shall be restored if a faulted item remains healed sufficiently long.

6.2.1 Time Delays

The following delays shall be applied to the respective logic states on an independent basis. Specifically, there shall be no internal logic coupling of constituent validity states, so non-offending validity signals must be monitored while CHNL_STATUS_Vx is False for other reasons. CHNL_STATUS_Vx shall be set False if any of the input variables given below are False for the indicated number of times in a row:

- CPU_CHK_OK 1 count
- IO_PROC_OK 1 count
- MUX_BUS_OK 3 counts
6.2.2 Channel Recovery Delays

A channel shall recover and operate in the foreground applications mode up to a specified number of times if all appropriate indications of channel recovery and acceptability are satisfied. Basically, recovery indications are particular durations of acceptable validity states following an associated validity trip:

- **CPU_CHK_OK**: maximum of 5 recoveries, each following a 10-count duration of validity after a declared logic trip.
- **MUX_BUS_OK**: maximum of 6 recoveries, each following a 50-count duration of validity after a declared logic trip.
- **ACTUATOR_ON**: maximum of 2 recoveries, each following a 50-count duration of validity after a declared logic trip.
- **PVWR_AVAIL**: no limit or delay on recoveries in software.

6.3 Maximum Allowable Computation Time

The maximum allowable sub-frame time for this computation shall be 2 milliseconds.
6.4 Input/Output

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INPUTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

CMPTR_x : CMPTR_CHANNEL_STATUS ;

type CMPTR_CHANNEL_STATUS is
  record
    CPU_CHANNEL_OK : BOOLEAN ;
    IO_PROC_OK : BOOLEAN ;
    MUX_BUS_OK : BOOLEAN ;
  end record ;

SERVO_x : SERVO_STATUS ;

type SERVO_STATUS is
  record
    ACTUATOR_ON : BOOLEAN ;
    LVDT_VALID : BOOLEAN ;
    POWER_AVAIL : BOOLEAN ;
  end record ;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUTPUTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

CHNL_STATUS_Vx : BOOLEAN ;
Procedure ASSESS_CHANNEL_Vx

with CHANNEL_RESOURCES ; use CHANNEL_RESOURCES :
separate(DFGS_LOGIC)
procedure ASSESS_CHANNEL_Vx is

-- Local Declarations (if any)
-- Place Static Variables in User-Defined Package(s)

begin

-- Procedure ASSESS_CHANNEL_Vx
null;

--
--
-- Add Demonstration Software Here
--
--
-- No N-Version Vote Taken Because Status is Unique to each Channel

end ASSESS_CHANNEL_Vx;
7.0 GIVE_STATUS PROCEDURE SPECIFICATION

Mode annunciator outputs shall be generated based on internal logic computations. The outputs for pilot display shall include autopilot engage/select status, autoland progress, and stability augmentation performance. Each computer channel will generate an output, and the N-version voter will resolve contradictions.

7.1 Annunciator Display Outputs

Four functional state outputs shall be generated as ANNUN_Vx per the record type ANNUN_STATUS.

7.1.1 Automatic Flight Control System Status

The autopilot engage status shall be derived from the input MODE_ENG_Vx, with the following rules for the output ANNUN_Vx.AFCS_STATUS:

\[
\text{MODE}_\text{ENG}_\text{Vx}.\text{AUTOPILLOT} = \text{OFF} \quad \rightarrow \quad \text{AFCS DISENGAGED}
\]

\[
\text{MODE}_\text{ENG}_\text{Vx}.\text{AUTOPILLOT} = \text{ALT HOLD} + \text{BASIC} + \text{VERT NAV}
\]

\[
\rightarrow \quad \text{AUTOPILLOT ENGAGED}
\]

\[
\text{MODE}_\text{ENG}_\text{Vx}.\text{AUTOPILLOT} = \text{AUTOLAND} \quad \rightarrow \quad \text{AUTOLAND ENGAGED}
\]

7.1.2 Autopilot Mode Engagement

The autopilot mode, ANNUN_Vx.AUTOPILLOT_MODE, shall be set equal to the selected autopilot mode, MODE_ENG_Vx.AUTOPILLOT, since they are both of Type AP_SELECTION.

7.1.3 Autoland Progress

If MODE_ENG_Vx.AUTOPILLOT = AUTOLAND, the autoland progress display ANNUN_Vx.AL_PROG_DISP, a 1x5 Boolean vector, shall reflect the input state and input sequence furnished by AL_PHASE_Vx. Progress shall be indicated by setting corresponding output vector elements to True/False. Except for AUTOLAND_INOP, this Boolean vector has a one-to-one correspondence with the values of the enumerated type AL_PROGRESS : AUTOLAND_ARME, GLIDESLOPE_TRACK, DECISION_ALTITUDE, ALERT_ALTITUDE, FLARE. Normal autoland progress is noted by stepping through these phases in the above order with the following externally controlled exceptions:

- Category 1 progress proceeds only through DECISION_ALTITUDE
- Category 2 skips ALERT_ALTITUDE
- Category 3A skips DECISION_ALTITUDE.
The output ANNUN_Vx.AL_PROG_DISP should reflect the progression observed by indicating the cumulative phases. Thus, once AL_PHASE_Vx is set to AUTOLAND_ARMED, it and the succeeding phases shall all be recorded in ANNUN_Vx.AL_PROG_DISP, until MODE_ENG_Vx.AUTOPILOT is no longer in AUTOLAND. If AL_PHASE_Vx = AUTOLAND_INOP or if MODE_ENG_Vx.AUTOPILOT = Not AUTOLAND, all components of ANNUN_Vx.AL_PROG_DISP shall be set to False.

7.1.4 Augmented Flying Qualities

The augmented flying qualities, as defined by FLY_QUAL_Vx, shall be displayed as output by ANNUN_Vx.FLY_QLTY exactly as furnished at the program unit input.

7.2 Update Conditions

Annunciator display updates shall be immediate, with a logic calculation iterations at a 20 Hz rate.

7.3 Maximum Allowable Time

The maximum allowable sub-frame for this computation shall be 2 milliseconds.

7.4 Input/Output

```
|INPUTS|
```

AL_PHASE_Vx : AL_PROGRESS;

type AL_PROGRESS is (AUTOLAND_ARMED, GLIDESLOPE_TRACK, DECISION_ALTITUDE, ALERT_ALTITUDE, FLARE, AUTOLAND_INOP);

FLY_QUAL_Vx : FLYING_QUALITIES;

type FLYING_QUALITIES is (UNFLYABLE, MARGINAL, DEGRADED, NORMAL);

MODE_ENG_Vx : AFCS_SELECTION;

type AFCS_SELECTION is

    record
    AUTOPILOT : AP_SELECTION;
    AUTOLAND : AL_CATEGORY;
    end record;

end record;

type AP_SELECTION is (ALT_HOLD, AUTOLAND, BASIC, VERT_NAV, OFF);

type AL_CATEGORY is (CAT_1, CAT_2, CAT_3A, OFF);
type ANNUN_STATUS is
record
  AFCS_STATUS : ENGAGE_STATUS ;
  AL_PROG_DISP : CUM_AL_PROGRESS ;
  AUTOPILLOT_MODE : AP_SELECTION ;
  FLY_QLTY : FLYING_QUALITIES ;
end record ;

type ENGAGE_STATUS is (AFCS_DISENGAGED, AUTOPLIOT_ENGAGED,
  AUTOLAND_ENGAGED) ;

type CUM_AL_PROGRESS is array (1..5) of Boolean :

type AP_SELECTION is (ALT_HOLD, AUTOLAND, BASIC, VERT_NAV, OFF) ;

type FLYING_QUALITIES is (UNFLYABLE, MARGINAL, DEGRADED, NORMAL) ;
Ada Procedure GIVE_STATUS_Vx

with VOTING_PLANES; use VOTING_PLANES;
separate(DPCS_LOGIC)
procedure GIVE_STATUS_Vx is

-- Local Declarations (if any)
-- Declare Static Variables in User-Defined Package(s)

-- Using the inputs ALPHASE_Vx, FLY_QUAL_Vx, and MODE_ENG_Vx.
-- compute the appropriate outputs to the Annunciator Displays,
-- ANNUN_Vx per the logic requirements in the English language
-- specification.

begin
  -- Procedure GIVE_STATUS_Vx

  CHNL_x_XCHK_NUM := 2;
  XCHK_SYNCH_x;
end GIVE_STATUS_Vx;
8.0 MANAGE_AL_SENSOR PROCEDURE SPECIFICATION

Whenever the autopilot is engaged, the various sensors needed for automatic approach and landing shall be voted and compared to ensure the integrity of the signals used for autoland. Direct and cross-channel inputs shall be processed, and the results shall be placed in a record data structure. Logic states shall be maintained regarding both the internal and external status of the various sensor signals.

8.1 Sensor Signal Voting

Three separate autoland sensor signal votes shall be made on the input vectors each cycle: Glideslope Beam Deviation (GS_BEADEV), Normal or Vertical Acceleration (NORM ACCEL), and Radio Altitude (RAD ALTITUDE). In each case a median output signal shall be generated and placed in a record, AL MED Vx. Where an even number of inputs is applied, the median shall be taken as the lesser of the two middle signal values.

8.1.1 Signal Ranges

The range of the respective input signals shall be defined in the derived type definitions in Package DFCS_RESOURCES, Figure 18c. Note that type conversions to Float may be necessary at some point.

8.1.2 Input Signal Validities

If the input validity signal associated with any input sensor signal, as reflected in the record AL FLAGS, is False 5 consecutive iterations, the sensor signal shall be removed as an input to the corresponding voter. The associated signal comparator in AL COMP Vx shall then be set to False ( tripped state) until 5 consecutive True values of the associated input validity flag signal are observed. The fault logic trip due to external signals flags shall be permitted to heal as many times as this logic is satisfied.

8.1.3 Signal Comparators

Each of the non-faulted input sensor signals shall be applied to a corresponding voter and shall be compared every iteration with the current median signal output of the voter. When the associated time and amplitude thresholds are simultaneously exceeded, the affected input signal shall be declared faulted in AL COMP Vx, and the signal shall be discontinued as an input to the voter. The associated fault logic shall latch, for no healing of comparison faulted sensor signals shall occur.

8.1.4 Amplitude Thresholds

The following absolute values of signal comparator differences (each voter input compared with the corresponding voter output) shall delineate out-of-tolerance input signals for the respective types of sensors:
Glideslope Beam Deviation  
> 0.05 degrees

Normal Acceleration  
> 0.025 g.

Radio Altitude  
> 2% of current median value of altitude

8.1.5 Time Thresholds

The following number of successive out-of-tolerance input sensor comparisons shall constitute the time thresholds for declaring a faulty input signal. Note that the comparisons, and hence each count, is only made every other call of this procedure.

- Glideslope Beam Deviation  
  >= 5 counts

- Normal Acceleration  
  >= 4 counts

- Radio Altitude  
  >= 4 counts

8.2 Output Signals

The median output signals and the comparator state logic shall be available as data objects exported by Packages DFCS_RESOURCES and DFCS_LOGIC respectively.

8.2.1 Median Output Signals

The median output signals, AL_MED_Vx, shall be a record of Type AL_SENSOR_SET.

8.2.2 Comparator State Output Signals

The comparator state output signals, AL_COMP_Vx, shall be a record of Type AL_SENSOR_STATUS. AL_COMP_Vx shall reflect the total effect of input sensor validity flags and the internal sensor comparator validities, i.e., the flag input for any sensor shall be OR-ed with the associated comparator validity to obtain the corresponding AL_COMP_Vx component value. The resultant states shall determine which input sensor signals are applied to the voters.

8.3 Program Structure Requirements

From a static standpoint, Procedure MANAGE_AL_SENSORS_Vx is incorporated into the program structure as shown in the call usage graph in Figure 14. From a dynamic standpoint, the multirate executive control flow in Figure 11 depicts the invocation of MANAGE_AL_SENSORS_Vx.

8.3.1 Iteration Rate

As shown in Figure 14, the iteration rate for the autoland sensor processing is 10 Hz.
8.3.2 Maximum Allowable Computation Time

As indicated in Figure 15, the maximum allowable time for MANAGE_AL_SENSORS_Vx is 5 milliseconds.

8.4 Input/Output

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INPUTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

GS_BEAM_DEV : GS_DEV_QUAD;
type GS_DEV_QUAD is array (1..4) of BEAM_DEV_SIGNAL;
type BEAM_DEV_SIGNAL is new FLOAT range -25.25.

NORM_ACCEL : N_ACCEL_TRIAD;
type N_ACCEL_TRIAD is array (1..3) of ACCEL_SIGNAL;
type ACCEL_SIGNAL is new FLOAT range -1.0..3.0.

RAD_ALTITUDE : RAD_ALT_QUAD;
type RAD_ALT_QUAD is array (1..4) of RAD_ALT_SIGNAL;
type RAD_ALT_SIGNAL is new FLOAT range -20.0..2500.0.

AL_FLAGS : AL_SENSOR_STATUS;
type AL_SENSOR_STATUS is
    record
        GS_BEAM_VAL : QUAD_VALID;
        N_ACCEL_VAL : TRIAD_VALID;
        RAD_ALT_VAL : QUAD_VALID;
    end record;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUTPUTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

AL_COMP_Vx : AL_SENSOR_STATUS;
AL_MED_Vx : AL_SENSOR_SET;
type AL_SENSOR_SET is
    record
        GS_DEV : BEAM_DEV_SIGNAL;
        N_ACCEL : ACCEL_SIGNAL;
        RAD_ALT : RAD_ALT_SIGNAL;
    end record;
Ada Procedure \texttt{MANAGE\_AL\_SENSORS\_Vx}

\begin{verbatim}
with DFCS\_LOGIC : use DFCS\_LOGIC ;
with VOTING\_PLANES : use VOTING\_PLANES ;
separate(DFCS\_RESOURCES);

procedure MANAGE\_AL\_SENSORS\_Vx is
  -- Local Declarations (if any)
  -- Place Static Variables in User Defined Packages

  -- Using the sets of autoland sensor inputs (GS\_BEAM\_DEV,
  -- NORM\_ACCEL, RAD\_ALTITUDE), compute the respective median value
  -- outputs for AL\_MED\_Vx, per the English text specification
  -- requirements.

  -- Do not vote an input signal if its associated validity flag,
  -- AL\_FLAGS(y), is False for a prescribed period Then the indicated
  -- fault should be reflected in the corresponding output comparator
  -- logic, AL\_COMP\_Vx(y).

  -- Compare each signal input with the associated median value, and
  -- if out of specification tolerance, note a comparator trip in
  -- AL\_COMP\_Vx(y).

begin

  -- Procedure MANAGE\_AL\_SENSORS\_Vx

  --

  -- Add Demonstration Software Here

  --

  CHNL\_X\_XCHK\_NUM := 3 ;
  XCHK\_SYNCH\_X : = Call for \texttt{N-Version Vote}

end MANAGE\_AL\_SENSORS\_Vx ;
\end{verbatim}

9.0 CALC_AUTOLAND PROCEDE SPECIFICATION

Glideslope tracking and landing flare functions shall be provided as an orderly sequence of pitch axis sub-modes for automatic approach and landing under Category I, II, and IIIa weather conditions. Appropriate fault survivability capability will be provided based on fault logic external to this procedure. Depending on mode selection and component availability, autoland status annunciation outputs shall be generated for external display.

9.1 Control Laws

The glideslope and flare control laws shall be in accord with the analytical block diagram presented in Figure 21. Neither fixed point nor extended precision floating point arithmetic shall be used.

9.1.1 Signal Shaping

Digital filtering (as contrasted with numerical integration, for example) shall be used for the transfer functions. The sampling interval T shall be in accord with the iteration rate in paragraph 9.4.1. The Tustin transform may be used on the complex frequency operator, \( \sigma \), to obtain \( z \), the complex delay operator as appears in digital filter equations:

\[
\frac{s}{T z - 1} = \frac{2(z - 1)}{z + 1}
\]

Since all of the filters are first-order, only the one previous input and output difference equation values must be saved. These saved values must be initialized, moreover, before mode engagement to preclude spurious transient steering commands. Specifically, high-pass filters (those with an \( s \)-operator in the numerator) must have their past input values set to input values present at engagement time, and their past output values set to zero. Low-pass filters (those with only a constant in the numerator) must have their outputs and saved values set to zero prior to engagement. The effect in both cases is to null filter outputs for the first computational cycle following mode engagement.

9.1.2 De-sensitization Schedule

The glideslope beam deviation signal shall be desensitized or down-gained as a function of decreasing radio altitude as shown in Figure 21 to offset the effects of beam convergence.

9.1.3 Glideslope Fader

Since some residual glideslope error signal may be present at flare engage, an exponential bleed-off signal fader shall be activated for Category II or IIIa autoland at flare engage, simultaneously with the switching in of the flare command signal per Figure 21. Category I approaches shall terminate at the Decision Altitude, and shall use this same fader to bleed off any residual command at this point.
Figure 21 - Autoland Control Law Block Diagram
9.1.4 Flare Sink Rate Command

For Category II or IIIa autoland, an exponential flare path shall be generated upon descent to 60 feet of radio altitude in accordance with the altitude scheduling of the sink rate command as shown in Figure 21.

9.1.5 Altitude Rate Signal

An altitude rate signal shall be synthesized from normal acceleration and radio altitude as blended through complementary filtering as shown in Figure 21. This signal shall be summed with sink rate command to obtain sink rate error during both glideslope and flare modes.

9.1.6 Command Rate Limiting

Excursions of the sink rate error signal shall be limited by a command rate limiter per Figure 21 to preclude spurious or extreme flight path corrections.

9.1.7 Command Loop Closure

The autoland loop closure shall be effected through the summation of the sink rate command with pitch rate as shown in Figure 21. Pitch rate shall be obtained from IL_MED_Vx.P_RATE.

9.2 Mode Engagement Logic

Autoland mode engagement shall be effected via the logical signal MODE_ENG_Vx.AUTOPILOT - AUTOLAND, which reflects both pilot mode selections and component availability. The mode selection logic shall be used along with the radio altitude signal to activate control law sub-modes and to perform the autoland progress display logic computations.

9.2.1 Glideslope Mode Engagement

The glideslope mode shall be active in beam tracking mode for Categories II and IIIa autoland any time the radio altitude is above 60 feet. The radio altimeter level detector shall be included in Procedure CALC_AUTOLAND."x.

9.2.2 Flare Mode Engagement

The flare mode shall be engaged for either Category II or IIIa autoland when the radio altitude is below 60 feet.
9.2.3 Autoland Progress Display

The following logic conditions shall be observed in determining output logic states, AL_PHASE_Vx, for annunciation. Since it is an enumeration type data object, the assignments below are made upon satisfaction, and remain only until another condition is fulfilled, or until the Autoland Mode is reset.

**AUTOLAND_ARMED** --> Category II or IIIa Engaged

**GLIDESLOPETRACK** --> Glideslope Mode Engaged (presumed)

**DECISION_ALTITUDE** --> Category I Engaged if \( h \leq 200 \text{ ft} \) or Category II Engaged if \( h \leq 150 \text{ ft} \).

**ALERT_ALTITUDE** --> Category IIIa \( h < 100 \text{ ft} \)

**FLARE** --> (Category II or Category IIIa) \( h < 60 \text{ ft} \)

**AUTOLAND_INOP** --> Category II and IIIa Engage Logic Lost During Approach or Landing or when Autoland De-Selected

9.3 Signal Interfaces

All sensor input signals will have been voted prior to receipt by Procedure CALC_AUTOLAND_Vx to eliminate discrepant inputs due to hardware faults.

9.3.1 Signal Inputs

All sensor inputs are derived types with constraints as follows. Type conversions to Float are therefore needed. Unit conversion from g's to feet per second squared for normal acceleration are also needed.

- Glideslope Beam Deviation: +/- 2.5 degrees
- Normal Acceleration: 1.0/+3.0 g's
- Radio Altimeter: 20/+2500 feet
- Pitch Rate: +/- 25 deg/sec

9.3.2 Logic Inputs

The logic inputs MODE_ENG_Vx is a record of enumeration types.

9.3.3 Pitch Command Output

The output steering command, AUTOLAND_CMD_Vx, is a derived type with a range constraint of 60/+3.0 degrees per second. A type conversion from Float is therefore needed for this output.
9.3.4 Logic Output

The logic output, AL_PHASE_Vx, is an enumeration type.

9.4 Program Structure

From a static standpoint, CALC_AUTOLAND_Vx is incorporated into the program structure as shown in the call/usage graph in Figure 17; from a dynamic standpoint, the multirate executive structure in Figure 14 depicts CALC_AUTOLAND_Vx's invocation.

9.4.1 Iteration Rate

As evident in Figure 14, the iteration rate for the autoland calculations is 10 Hz.

9.4.2 Maximum Allowable Computation Time

As indicated in Figure 15, the maximum allowable computation time for CALC_AUTOLAND_Vx is 4 milliseconds.

9.5 Input/Output

```
| INPUTS |

MODE_ENG_Vx : AFCS_SELECTION ;

type AFCS_SELECTION is
record
  AUTOPilot : AP_SELECTION ;
  AUTOLAND : AL_CATEGORY ;
end record ;

type AP_SELECTION is (ALTHOLD, AUTOIAND, BASIC, VERT_NAV, OFF) ;

type AL_CATEGORY is (CAT_1, CAT_2, CAT_3A, OFF) ;

AL_MED_Vx : AL_SENSOR_SET ;

type AL_SENSOR_SET is
record
  GS_DEV : BEAM_DEV_SIGNAL ;
  N_ACCEL : ACCEL_SIGNAL ;
  RAD_ALT : RAD_ALT_SIGNAL ;
end record ;

type BEAM_DEV_SIGNAL is new FLOAT range -2.5..2.5 ;

```


IL_SENSOR_SET;

**type IL_SENSOR_SET is**

record
  o
  P_RATE : ANG_RATE_SIGNAL ; (only component needed)
end record;

**AUTOLAND_CMD_Vx : PITCH_COMMAND ;**

type PITCH_COMMAND is new FLOAT -5.0..10.0 ;

**AL_PHASE_Vx : AL_PROGRESS ;**

type AL_PROGRESS is (AUTOLAND_ARMED, GLIDESLOPE_TRACK
DECISION_ALTITUDE, ALERT_ALTITUDE, FLARE, AUTOLAND_INOP) ;
Ada Procedure CALC_AUTOLAND_Vx

with DFCS_LOGIC ; use DFCS_LOGIC ;
with DFCS_RESOURCES ; use DFCS_RESOURCES ;
with VOTING_PLANES ; use VOTING_PLANES ;
separate(CONTROL LAWS)
procedure CALC_AUTOLAND_Vx is

   -- Local Declarations (if any)
   -- Place Static Variables in User-Defined Package(s)
   -----------------------------------------------

   -- Conditional upon proper mode logic input, MODE_ENG_Vx, calculate
   -- the pitch axis autoland command, AUTOLAND_COMMAND_Vx, using the
   -- sensor inputs, AL_MED_Vx and IL_MED_Vx.PRATE

   -- autoland is engaged, compute the progress display outputs,
   -- AL_PHASE_Vx, as well.
   -----------------------------------------------

begin

   --
   -- Add Demonstration Software Here
   --
   --

   CHNL_x_XCHK_NUM := 4 :
   XCHK_SYNCH_x :

end CALC_AUTOLAND_Vx ;
10.0 MANAGE_IL_SENSORS PROCEDURE SPECIFICATION

During all foreground executive program execution, the inner loop sensor and command input signals shall be voted and compared to ensure the integrity of the signals used for DFCS functions. Direct and cross-channel inputs shall be processed, and the results placed in appropriate record data structures. Logic states shall be maintained regarding the status of the various input signal sources.

10.1 Sensor Signal Voting

Five separate inner loop sensor signal votes shall be made on the input vectors: Pilot's Stick Command (P_STICK_CMD), Copilot's Stick Command (CP_STICK_CMD), Average Angle-of-Attack (to be named), True Airspeed (TRUE_AIRSPEED), and Pitch Rate (P_RATE_GYRO). In each case a median output signal shall be generated and placed in a record, IL_MED_Vx. Where there are an even number of inputs applied, the median shall be taken as the lesser of the two middle value signals.

10.1.1 Signal Ranges

The range of the respective input signals are defined in Section 10.4. Since these signals are of derived types, type conversion to Float type may be necessary for calculation purposes.

10.1.2 Input Signal Validities

If the input validity flag signals furnished by the respective sensors, per IL_FLAGS, is False 5 consecutive iterations, the sensor signal shall be removed as an input to the corresponding voter. The associated signal comparator output, IL_COMP_Vx, shall then be set to False (tripped state). Following a particular logic trip, 5 consecutive True inputs per IL_FLAGS shall reset the corresponding IL_COMP_Vx state.

10.1.3 Angle-of-Attack Inputs

Each corresponding left and right angle-of-attack signal pair shall be averaged prior to being voted, as illustrated in Figure 7.

10.1.4 Signal Comparators

Each of the input signals applied to a particular voter shall be compared each iteration with the current median signal output. When the associated time and amplitude thresholds are simultaneously exceeded, the affected input signal shall be declared faulted in IL_COMP_Vx, and it shall be permanently discontinued as an input to the voter.
10.1.5 Amplitude Thresholds

The following absolute values of signal comparator differences (between the median value and that of each voter input) shall delineate out-of-tolerance input signals for the respective types of signals:

- **Pilot's/Copilot's Stick Command**: >- 0.2 degrees
- **Angle-of-Attack**: >- 1.25 degrees
- **True Airspeed**: >- 10 knots
- **Pitch Rate**: >- 1.0 degrees/second

10.1.6 Time Thresholds

The following number of consecutive out-of-tolerance amplitude comparisons shall constitute the time thresholds for declaring a faulty input signal:

- **Pilot's/Copilot's Stick Command**: >- 6 counts
- **Angle-of-Attack & Pitch Rate**: >- 8 counts
- **True Airspeed**: >- 16 counts

10.2 Output Signals

The median output signals and the sensor status logic shall be available as data objects exported by Packages DFCS_RESOURCES and DFCS_LOGIC, respectively.

10.2.1 Median Output Signals

The median output signals, IL_MED_Vx, shall be a record of Type IL_SENSOR_SET.

10.2.2 Sensor Status Output Signals

The sensor status signals, IL_COMP_Vx, shall be a record of Type IL_SENSOR_STATUS.

10.3 Program Structure Requirements

From a static standpoint, Procedure MANAGE_IL_SENSORS_Vx is incorporated into the program structure as shown in the call-usage graph in Figure 1. From a dynamic standpoint, the multirate executive structure in Figure 14 depicts the invocation of MANAGE_IL_SENSORS_Vx.

10.3.1 Iteration Rate

As shown in Figure 14, the iteration rate for the inner loop sensor processing shall be 20 Hz.
10.3.2 Maximum Allowable Computation Time

As indicated in Figure 15, the maximum allowable time for MANAGE_IL_SENSORS_Vx is 5 milliseconds.

10.4 Input/Output

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INPUTS</th>
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</table>

- CP_STICK_CMD : STICK_CMD_QUAD
- LEFT_AOA : AOA_QUAD
- P_RATE_GYRO : RATE_GYRO_TRIAD
- P_STICK_CMD : STICK_CMD_QUAD
- RIGHT_AOA : AOA_QUAD
- TRUE_AIRSPEED : TAS_PAIR
- IL_FLAGS : IL_SENSOR_STATUS

Type IL_SENSOR_STATUS is

record
- AVG_AOA_VAL : QUAD_VALIDITY
- CP_STK_VAL : QUAD_VALIDITY
- LF_AOA_VAL : QUAD_VALIDITY
- P_STK_VAL : QUAD_VALIDITY
- P_RATE_VAL : TRIAD_VALIDITY
- RT_AOA_VAL : QUAD_VALIDITY
- TAS_VAL : PAIR_VALIDITY
end record

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUTPUTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

- IL_MED_Vx : IL_SENSOR_SET

Type IL_SENSOR_SET is

record
- AOA_DISPL : AOA_SIGNAL
- CP_STICK : STICK_CMD
- P_RATE : ANG_RATE_SIGNAL
- P_STICK : STICK_CMD
- TR_AIRSPEED : TAS_SIGNAL

Type ANG_RATE_SIGNAL is new FLOAT range -250..25.0 -- deg.sec
Type AOA_SIGNAL is new FLOAT range -10.0..50.0 -- degrees
Type STICK_CMD is new FLOAT range -1.5..0.5 -- degrees
Type TAS_SIGNAL is new FLOAT range 100.0..600.0 -- knots

IL_COMP_Vx : IL_SENSOR_STATUS
Ada Procedure MANAGE_IL_SENSORS_Vx

with DECS_LOGIC    ; use DFCS_LOGIC ;
with VOTING_PLANES ; use VOTING_PLANES ;
separate(DFCS_RESOURCES)
procedure MANAGE_IL_SENSORS_Vx is

-- Local Declarations (if any)
-- Place Static Variables in User-Defined Package(s)

-- Using the Voter/Comparator Inputs (CP_STICK_CMD, LEFT_AOA,
-- P_RATE_GYRO, P_STICK_CMD, RIGHT_AOA, TRUE_AIRSPEED) compute
-- the median value outputs, IL_MED_Vx, per the English test
-- specification requirements.
-- Do not vote an input signal if its associated validity flag
-- IL_FLAGS(y), is False Then record a corresponding comparator
-- trip, IL_COMP_Vx(y).
-- Compare each voted input signal with the associated median
-- value, and if out of specification tolerance, not a comparator
-- trip in IL_COMP_Vx(y).

begin

-- Procedure MANAGE_IL_SENSORS_Vx

-- Add Demonstration Software Here

CHNL_x_XCHK_NUM  := 5 :
XCHK_SYNCH_x     := Call for N-Version Vote

end MANAGE_IL_SENSORS_Vx .

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A pitch inner loop stability augmentation control law shall be provided to improve the inherent flying qualities of the aircraft. Since a negative static stability margin is assumed for the aircraft, the pitch stability function shall be regarded as critical. Double fail-operational redundancy is therefore inherent in the design, with graceful degradation of performance under most multiple fault conditions.

11.1 Control Law

The pitch stability augmentation control law shall be in accord with the analytical block diagram presented in Figure 22. No extended precision arithmetic shall be used.

11.1.1 Signal Shaping

Digital filtering shall be used (as contrasted with numerical integration, for example) for dynamic signal shaping. The sampling interval $T$ shall be in accord with the iteration rate in Paragraph 11.4.1. The Tustin transform may be used on the complex frequency operator, $s$, to obtain $z$, the complex delay operator as appears in digital filter equations:

$$s = \frac{2(z-1)}{T(z+1)}$$

11.1.2 Gain Scheduling

Sensor signal gains shall be scheduled as a function of true airspeed in accord with Figure 22. In the event that the true airspeed signal is questionable, i.e., if both components of $IL\_COMP\_n\_TAS\_VAL$ are not valid, all gains shall revert to their lowest scheduled values.

11.1.3 Outer Loop Command Summation

When externally selected, via $MODE\_ENG\_n\_AUTOPilot = AUTOLAND$, an outer loop pitch servo command, $AUTOLAND\_CMD\_n\_x$, shall be summed with the inner loop command as shown in Figure 22.

11.1.4 Command Limiting

The summation of the inner and outer loop servo commands shall be limited to $-8.0, +1.0$ degree of stabilizer displacement.
Figure 22 - Inner Loop Control Law Block Diagram
11.2 Activation Logic

The inner loop control law shall be engaged at all times, but it may be altered externally due to sensor resource depletion, which can cause a median sensor input(s) to clamp to zero.

11.2.1 Mode Engagement

The basic stability augmentation function shall be activated as a function of aircraft electrical power on, provided the respective DFCS channels are able to commence cycling in the foreground executive program (see Section 4). During the first pass through the control law following power application or resumption, the high-pass filter for angle-of-attack shall be initialized to set its output to zero (past difference equation output to zero, and past input value to present input value). This initialization precludes an engagement transient.

11.2.2 Stick Command Blending

Each of the pilots' stick command inputs shall be passed through a +/- 0.05 degrees of stabilize command deadband, and then they shall be summed to obtain an averaged input value. The resultant command shall then be limited to an +/- 12.5 degrees of stick command.

11.2.3 True Airspeed Validity

The true airspeed validity signal, IL_COMP/Vx.TAS.VAL, shall be used to determine that the true airspeed signal is acceptable for use in gain scheduling. Both validity signals must be True.

11.3 Signal Interfaces

All input signals, with the possible exception of the outer loop command will have been voted prior to receipt by CALLINNER_CMD/Vx to eliminate discrepant inputs due to hardware faults.

11.3.1 Sensor Inputs

All sensor inputs are of derived types. Consequently, type conversion to Float shall be performed where necessary, e.g., prior to signal unit conversions.

11.3.2 Steering Command Input

The outer loop steering command input signal, ALTOLAND_CMD/Vx is incremental about the stabilizer trim position (which is irrelevant to the implementation of this procedure). Since it is a derived type, it shall be converted to Float type for control law computation.
11.3.3 Logic Inputs

The logic inputs, IL_COMP_Vx, TAS_VAL and MODE_ENG_Vx AUTOPILOT, are a Boolean vector and a record enumeration types, respectively.

11.3.4 Servo Command Output

The stabilizer servo command output signal shall be converted from a float type to the derived type, STAB_COMMAND, with a range constraint of +/- 25 degrees.

11.4 Program Structure Requirements

From a static standpoint, CALC.Inner_LOOP_Vx is incorporated into the program structure as shown in the call/usage graph in Figure 1a. From a dynamic standpoint, the multirate executive structure in Figure 1a depicts CALC.Inner_LOOP_Vx's invocation.

11.4.1 Iteration Rate

As evident in Figure 1a, the iteration rate for the inner loop is 30 Hz.

11.4.2 Maximum Computation Time

As indicated in Figure 1b, the maximum allowable computation time for CALC.Inner_LOOP_Vx is 6 milliseconds.

11.5 Input/Output

```
INPUTS

IL_MED_Vx  IL SENSOR_SET

type IL_SENSOR_SET is
record
  AOA_DISPL : AOA_SIGNAL;
  CP_STICK  : STICK_CMD;
  P_RATE   : ANG_RATE_SIGNAL;
  P_STICK  : STICK_CMD;
  TR_AIRSPED: TAS_SIGNAL;
end record;

type AOA_SIGNAL is new float range (-100,100);
type ANG_RATE_SIGNAL is new float range (-360,360);
type STICK_CMD is new float range (-300,300);
type TAS_SIGNAL is new float range (-100,100);
```
type PITCH_COMMAND is new FLOAT range -3.6.

type AFCS_SELECTION is record
  AUTOPILOT : AP_SELECTION;
  AUTOLONAD : AL_CATEGORY;
end record;

type AP_SELECTION is (ALT_HOLD, AUTOLONAD, BASIC, VERT_NAV, OFF);

type AL_CATEGORY is (CAT_1, CAT_2, CAT_3A, OFF);

IL_COMP_VX.TAS.VAL : PAIRVALIDITY;

OUTPUTS :

STAB_SERVO_CMD_VX : STAB_COMMAND;

type STAB_COMMAND is new FLOAT range -11.0..11.0;
Ada Procedure CALCINNER_LOOP_Vx

with DFCS_LOGIC : use DFCS_LOGIC;
with DFCS_RESOURCES : use DFCS_RESOURCES;
with VOTING_PLANES : use VOTING_PLANES;
separate(CONTROL_LAWS);
procedure CALCINNER_LOOP_Vx is

-- Local Declarations (if any)
-- Place Static Variables in User-Defined Packages

-- the inner loop control law commands are generated from the
-- input signals, IL_MED_Vx. If an autopilot mode is selected
-- via MODE_ENG_Vx, the autopilot input command is summed with
-- the inner loop command. The output in either case is
-- STAB_Servo_CMD_Vx.

begin
...
...
-- Add Demonstration Software Here
...
...
CHNL_x_XCHK_NUM  = 6;
XCHK_STINCH_x .
end CALCINNER_LOOP_Vx ;
12.0 ASSESS_SYSTEM PROCEDURE SPECIFICATION

The fault logic states of all channels shall be evaluated to ascertain the status of the total system with respect to the augmented flying qualities and the operational state of the system. Note that the operational state implies a lower bound on flying qualities level, which can be exceeded for non-normal operational states. The system status logic should be consistent with that given in Figure 6 of DOT.FAA CT-86-11, but the following requirements shall govern. None of the following logic shall latch: any such effect would result from latching of input logic signals upstream in the data flow.

12.1 Flying Qualities Status

The fault status of the augmented fly-by-wire (AFB) sensors, IL_COMP_x, shall be evaluated to determine flying qualities status. FLI_QUAL_x. The following logic shall be implemented. where AOA denotes angle-of-attack, and TAS denotes true airspeed.

Normal Flying Qualities --> Minimum of 1 Rate Gains Valid
AND Minimum of 1 AOA pairs Valid
AND Both True Airspeeds Valid
AND Minimum of 2 Associated Stick Commands Valid.

Degraded Flying Qualities --> Maximum of 1 Rate Gains Valid
OR Maximum of 1 TAS Valid
AND Minimum of 2 AOA pairs Valid
AND Minimum of 2 Associated Stick Commands Valid

Marginal Flying Qualities --> Minimum of 2 Rate Gains Valid
AND Maximum of 2 AOA pairs Valid
AND Minimum of 2 Associated Stick Commands Valid

Unlatchable --> Anything Else

12.2 Redundancy Status

The fault status of the augmented fly-by-wire (AFB) sensors, IL_COMP_x, and the status of all four computational models, TFL, CTX, CTY, and CTZ, is evaluated to determine component redundancy for fail-safe and test availability purposes. The following logic shall be implemented:

Operational State 1 --> All Rate Gains Valid
(Double Fail Operational) AND All TAS Valid
AND All AOA Pairs Valid
AND All of the Set of Stick
Commands Valid
OR Minimum of 3 Rate Gains Valid
AND All Associated Stick Commands Valid
AND All Input Valid
Operational State 2 -> All Rate Gyros Valid
(Single Fail Operational) AND All TAS Valid
AND
((Exactly 3 AOA Pairs Valid
AND Minimum of 3 Computer Channels Valid
AND [Minimum of 3 of One Set of Stick Commands Valid
OR Minimum of 2 of Both Stick Commands Valid])
OR (Minimum of 3 AOA Pairs Valid
AND Exactly 3 Computer Channels Valid
AND [Minimum of 3 of One Set of Stick Commands Valid
OR Minimum of 2 of Both Stick Commands Valid])
OR (Minimum of 3 AOA Pairs Valid
AND Minimum of 3 Computer Channels Valid
AND [Exactly 3 of One Set of Stick Commands Valid
AND Maximum of 1 of Other Set of Stick Commands Valid
OR Exactly 2 of Both Sets of Stick Commands Valid])

Operational State 3 ->
(Fail Unsafe)

(Exactly 2 AOA Pairs Valid
AND Minimum of 2 Computer Channels Valid
AND Minimum of 2 of One Set of Stick Commands Valid)
OR (Minimum of 2 AOA Pairs Valid
AND Exactly 2 Computer Channels Valid
AND Minimum of 2 of One Set of Stick Commands Valid)
OR (Minimum of 2 AOA Pairs Valid
AND Minimum of 2 Computer Channels Valid
AND Exactly 2 of One Set of Stick Commands Valid
AND Maximum of 1 of Other Set of Stick Commands Valid)

Operational State 4 ->
(Effectively Depleted)
Maximum of 1 AOA Pair Valid
OR Maximum of 1 Computer Channel Valid
OR Maximum of 1 Stick Command Valid

12.2 Maximum Allowable Computation Time

The maximum allowable sub-frame time for this computation will be 7 milliseconds.
12.4 Input/Output

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INPUTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

CHNL_STATUS_V1, CHNL_STATUS_V2,
CHNL_STATUS_V3, CHNL_STATUS_V4 : BOOLEAN :

IL_COMP_Vx : IL_SENSOR_STATUS :

type IL_SENSOR_STATUS is
record
  AVG_AOA_VAL : QUAD_VALIDITY ;
  CP_STK_VAL : QUAD_VALIDITY ;
  LF_AOA_VAL : QUAD_VALIDITY ;
  P_STK_VAL : QUAD_VALIDITY ;
  P_RATE_VAL : TRIAD_VALIDITY ;
  RT_AOA_VAL : QUAD_VALIDITY ;
  TAS_VAL : PAIR_VALIDITY ;
end record ;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
</table>

FLY_QUAL_Vx : FLYING_QUALITIES :

type FLYING_QUALITIES is (UNFLYABLE, MARGINAL, DEGRADED, NORMAL) :

FBW_STATUS_Vx : PRI_FCS_STATUS :

type PRI_FCS_STATUS is (OP_STATE_4, OP_STATE_3, OP_STATE_2,
OP_STATE_1) ;
Ada Procedure ASSESS_SYSTEM_Vx

with VOTING_PLANES ; use VOTING_PLANES ;
separate(DFCS_LOGIC)
procedure ASSESS_SYSTEM_Vx is

-- Local Declarations (if any)
-- Place Static Variables in User-Defined Package(s)

begin

-- Procedure ASSESS_SYSTEM_Vx

--

-- Add Demonstration Software Here
--

CHNL_x_XCHK_NUM := 7 ;
XCHK_SYNCH_x ;
-- Call for N-Version Vote

end ASSESS_SYSTEM_Vx ;
13.0 GIVE_WARNING PROCEDURE SPECIFICATION

Warning display output signals shall be generated based on internal mode and fault logic variables to indicate control function status and availability. Information shall be displayed only when appropriate to inform the flight crew; this corresponds to warning logic conditions other than "BLANK."

13.1 Autoland Status

The autoland status output, WARN_Vx.AUTOLAND, shall directly reflect the logic input signal, AL_WARN_Vx, for both are of the same type.

13.2 Augmented Fly-By-Wire (AFBW) Status

The AFBW status output, WARN_Vx.FLY_BY_WIRE, shall reflect the logic input signal, FBW_STATUS_Vx, with the input state OP_STATE_1 mapping to BLANK.

13.3 Flying Qualities Status

Flying Qualities status, WARN_Vx.FLYING_QUAL, shall reflect the input logic signal, FLY_QUAL_Vx, with the following correspondences:

- IMPAIRED_FQ  --> Degraded Flying Qualities OR Marginal Flying Qualities OR Unflyable Flying Qualities.
- BLANK        --> Normal Flying Qualities.

13.4 Master Warning Indicator

Each time a new warning state is first annunciated, a master warning signal, FLASH_WARNING_Vx, shall be set to BLINKING. When acknowledged by an externally applied Boolean variable ACKNOWLEDGE being momentarily set to True, FLASH_WARNING_Vx shall be set to STEADY, where it shall remain until a new warning is generated, or all prior warnings are terminated via the input logic to this procedure. When no warnings exist, FLASHARNING_Vx shall be set to OFF.

13.5 Maximum Allowable Computational Time

The maximum allowable sub-frame time for this computation shall be 2 milliseconds.
13.6 Input/Output

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INPUTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

AL_WARN_Vx    : AL_STATUS;

 type AL_STATUS is (CAT_2_INOP, CAT_3_INOP, OFF):

FBW_STATUS_Vx : PRI_FCS_STATUS;

 type PRI_FCS_STATUS is (OP_STATE_4, OP_STATE_3, OP_STATE_2, OP_STATE_1):

FLY_QUAL_Vx   : FLYING_QUALTITIES;

 type FLYING_QUALTITIES is (UNFLYABLE, MARGINAL, DEGRADED, NORMAL):

ACKNOWLEDGE    : BOOLEAN;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUTPUTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

WARN_Vx       : WARNING_STATE;

 type WARNING_STATE is
 record
   AUTOLAND    : AL_STATUS;
   FLY_BY_WIRE : FBW_STATUS;
   FLYING_QUAL  : FQ_STATUS;
 end record;

 type FBW_STATUS is (OP_STATE_4, OP_STATE_3, OP_STATE_2, BLANK):

type FQ_STATUS is (IMPAIRED_FQ, BLANK);

FLASH_WARNING_Vx : MASTER_WARN;

 type MASTER_WARN is (BLINKING, STEADY, OFF);
Ada Procedure GIVE_WARNING_Vx

with VOTING_PLANES; use VOTING_PLANES;
separate(DFCS_LOGIC);
procedure GIVE.WARNING_Vx is

-- Local Declarations (if any)
-- Place Static Variables in User-Defined Package(s)

begin

-- Using the inputs AL_WARN.Vx, FBW_STATUS.Vx, and FLY_QUAL.Vx,
-- compute the appropriate outputs to the Warning Display.
-- WARN.Vx, and in turn, the Master Warning, FLASH.WARNING.Vx, per
-- the logic given in the English text part of the specification.
-- The Boolean input ACKNOWLEDGE should cause the Master Warning to
-- glow steadily, rather than continue flashing as should occur
-- at the onset of a new warning.

CHNL_X_XCHK_NUM := 8;
XCHK_SYNCH_X;

end GIVE.WARNING.Vx;
14.0 TEST HARNESS SET-UP

Although it was planned that the testing of the software fault-tolerant DFCS be done sequentially in non-realtime on a VAX computer, it was understood that the four versions of demonstration software would normally reside in a quadruplex DFCS architecture. Hence, four parallel channels with double fail-operational capability were assumed, along with appropriate sensor/effector redundancy. Note, however, that the test harness software itself is mostly single string. The overall program organization to mechanize all this is shown in Figure 23; here only Tasks DFCS x EXEC and CHNL x SYNCH are replicated four times, because they interface with the four DFCS channels. All of the DFCS software, moreover, is effectively contained within Tasks DFCS x EXEC in the Figure 23 representation.

The test harness runs interactively on a non-realtime basis, with test cases applied through files readable by the test program. Considerable flexibility exists to expand the variety and extent of testing possible, but currently, the primary testing mode is customary airplane closed-loop simulation. The DFCS software is incorporated in the test harness as shown in Figure 24 for a typical channel. All of the program units shown belong to the DFCS except for the three shaded ones. As previously stated, the calling of Procedure RUN_FOREGROUND x in the test harness is done by Task DFCS x EXEC in the test harness, rather than by Procedure RUN DFCS EXEC in the actual DFCS software load module. Also, Procedure VOTE_RESULTS is called by the test harness rather than by the DFCS software.

14.1 Test Harness Operation

At the outset of testing, the top-level program, Procedure RUN_TEST_EXEC, makes procedure calls to SELECT_OPTIONS and APPLY_INPUTS to initialize testing (see the listing in Figure 25a) based on prompted selections by the user. Following this Procedure START_TESTING (see the listing in Figure 25b) is invoked by RUN_TEST_EXEC, and actual testing ensues when entry is called to each of the four DFCS x EXEC tasks (see the body part listing for Package TEST_RESOURCES in Figure 25c). Normal testing then proceeds primarily under the control of Task TEST_EXEC (see the listing in Figure 25d). For each test cycle, it calls Procedure APPLY_INPUTS. As indicated in its source code in Figure 25e, this procedure can effect open or closed loop testing and faulted or fault free testing for a predefined number of cycles. Sensor and logic inputs can be altered independently.

Once a voted DFCS procedure called by Procedure RUN_FOREGROUND x completes, it calls Procedure XCHK_SYNCH x as listed in Figure 25f. These four DFCS procedures are the only ones modified whatsoever for test harness use. Basically, cross-channel voter synchronization would probably involve hardware oriented instruction that would be cumbersome to run on a general purpose computer. Furthermore, the effort would be difficult to justify for the type testing undertaken here. These procedures still perform the type conversions and voted value corrections as required in the DFCS application, but they make entry calls to test harness task, CHNL x SYNCH, as defined in Figure 25g.
Figure 23 - Overall Test Program Call Graph
Figure 24 - DFCS Program Call Graph (In Test Harness)
Figure 25a - Test Harness Program Unit Listing
Procedure RUN_TEST_EXEC

Figure 25b - Test Harness Program Unit Listing
Procedure START_TESTING
Figure 25c - Test Harness Program Unit Listing

Procedure APPLY_INPUTS
Figure 25d - Test Harness Program Unit Listing
Package TEST_RESOURCES (1 of 3)
Figure 25d - Test Harness Program Unit Listing
Package TEST_RESOURCES (2 of 3)
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Package</th>
<th>Test Harness Program Unit Listing</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TEST/Resources (3 of 3)</td>
<td>Figure 25d - Test Harness Program Unit Listing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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```haskell
SYNCHRONIZATION:

| select CHPL_HARNESS(CHPL_CCERT : in CC_CERT)  
|    do  
|      CHPL_HARNESS(1) := TRUE  
|      YCPL_HARNESS(1) := CHPL_CCERT  
|      if YCPL_HARNESS(1) /= CHPL_CCERT then  
|        raise WCIC_ERROR;  
|      end if  
|    end do  
|  end select  

| select CHPL_HARNESS(CHPL_CCERT : in CC_CERT)  
|    do  
|      CHPL_HARNESS(2) := TRUE  
|      YCPL_HARNESS(2) := CHPL_CCERT  
|      if YCPL_HARNESS(2) /= CHPL_CCERT then  
|        raise WCIC_ERROR;  
|      end if  
|    end do  
|  end select  

| select CHPL_HARNESS(CHPL_CCERT : in CC_CERT)  
|    do  
|      CHPL_HARNESS(3) := TRUE  
|      YCPL_HARNESS(3) := CHPL_CCERT  
|      if YCPL_HARNESS(3) /= CHPL_CCERT then  
|        raise WCIC_ERROR;  
|      end if  
|    end do  
|  end select  

| select CHPL_HARNESS(CHPL_CCERT : in CC_CERT)  
|    do  
|      CHPL_HARNESS(4) := TRUE  
|      YCPL_HARNESS(4) := CHPL_CCERT  
|      if YCPL_HARNESS(4) /= CHPL_CCERT then  
|        raise WCIC_ERROR;  
|      end if  
|    end do  
|  end select  

| delay 1.0;  
|  WTIMEOUT := WTIMEOUT + 1;  
|  end select;  
|  if WTIMEOUT > WTIMEOUT then  
|    WTIMEOUT := WTIMEOUT;  
|    putline("TIMEOUT, try again ");  
|  end if  
|  exit open(CHAFLABY(1) and CHAFFLABY(2) and  
|           CHALFLABY(1) and CHALFLABY(2) or WTIMEOUT  
|           and loop SYNCHRONIZATION);  
```

Figure 25e - Test Harness Program Unit Listings
Task Body TEST_EXEC (2 of 3)

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if VOTE_TIMEOUT then
    put_line("Abnormal Vote Forthcoming");
else
    put_line("Normal Vote Forthcoming");
end if;
VOTE_RESULTS(CC_REF_PT, CC_RESULTS);
if CC_RESULTS /= IDEAL_VOTE then
    ASSESS_VOTE(CC_REF_PT, CC_RESULTS);
end if;
NUM_VOTES := NUM_VOTES + 1;
if NUM_VOTES >= MAX_VOTES
then
    NUM_LOOPS := NUM_LOOPS + 1;
    NUM_VOTES := 0;
    if NUM_LOOPS < MAX_LOOPS
    then
        APPLY_INPUTS;
    else
        RUNNING := FALSE;
        CHNL_1_SYNCH_RESUME;
        CHNL_2_SYNCH_RESUME;
        CHNL_3_SYNCH_RESUME;
        CHNL_4_SYNCH_RESUME;
        exit AUTO_TESTING;
    end if;
end if;
-- Moving to next voting plane
if CHNL_READY(1) then
    CHNL_1_SYNCH_RESUME;
end if;
if CHNL_READY(2) then
    CHNL_2_SYNCH_RESUME;
end if;
if CHNL_READY(3) then
    CHNL_3_SYNCH_RESUME;
end if;
if CHNL_READY(4) then
    CHNL_4_SYNCH_RESUME;
end if;
end loop AUTO_TESTING;
-- Test of foreground complete
exception
    when WRONG_PLANE =>
        put_line("End Synchronization");
end TEST_EXEC;

Figure 25e - Test Harness Program Unit Listings
Task Body TEST_EXEC (3 of 3)
Figure 25f - Test Harness Program Unit Listings
Procedure XCHK_SYNCH_1

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Figure 25g - Test Harness Program Unit Listings
Task Body CHNL_1_SYNCH
14.2 N-Version Voter Synchronization

Including the top-level program for the N-version demonstration, Procedure RUN_TEST_EXEC, ten Ada tasks are active from the outset of program execution. These include the four test harness DFCS executive programs, Task DFCS_x_EXEC, four secretary tasks that regulate voting plane synchronization, Task CHNL_x_SYNCH, and the test coordinator, Task TEST_EXEC. The secretary tasks needed to effect a four-way synchronization using Ada inherently two-way rendezvous. These tasks are declared in Package TEST_RESOURCES per Figure 25c. Intertask communication as depicted in Figure 26 continues so long as the master control Boolean, RUNNING, is True.

Initially, entries to Tasks DFCS_x_EXEC are called from Procedure START_TESTING, namely, DFCS_x_EXEC.ENGAGE for each of the four channels. As each voted DFCS applications procedure completes, the associated Procedure XCHK_SYNCH_x calls entry to the corresponding secretary tasks with a CHNL_x_SYNCH.READY statement. When the CHNL_x_SYNCH accepts the entry call and relays it to Task TEST_EXEC, both DFCS_x_EXEC and CHNL_x_SYNCH are suspended. Then the other channel tasks are activated one by one until all have reported in to TEST_EXEC's timed select loop that accepts TEST_EXEC.CHNL_x_READY entry calls. After checking to ensure that all DFCS channels are at the correct voting plane, Task TEST_EXEC calls Procedure VOTERESULTS and analyzes and records the results.

TEST_EXEC then checks for additional test case selections. If so, it calls applies them and one by one releases DFCS channels for the next test cycle. This is done by a CHNL_x_SYNCH.RESUME entry call that completes two rendezvous and permits DFCS_x_EXEC to become active again. The next DFCS applications module in RUN_FOREGROUND_x is then executed, and the next voting plane is sought via a repeat of the four-way synchronization process. If Task TEST_EXEC determines that all test has been completed, it sets RUNNING to False and terminates. The rest of the tasks then terminate as well.

14.3 Closed-Loop Simulation

The closed-loop simulation set-up is depicted in Figure 27 in a state variable form that coincides with the external DFCS sensor/effector signal interfaces. The source code for the simulation is presented in Figure 28. Basically, it reads in flight case data from an interactively named file, trims the airplane under selected conditions, and commences to generate the array of inner and outer loop sensor signals based on the input STAB_SERVO_CMD_x. The output signals undergo data type and scaling changes as appropriate. Signal fan-out for multiple sensors and fault insertion faculties reside in Procedure UPDATE_SENSORS, which is also called by Procedure APPLY_INPUTS per Figure 23.

14.4 Software Development

During DFCS software versions, the test harness was modified for single channel use. Basically, this involved disabling all but one particular channels tasks, and tailoring input test data for limited scope or unit testing. Some data object visibility problems were encountered that necessitated selective raising of the variable namespace so that the test harness could import and access certain variables. Basically, the test
Figure 26 - Ada Multitasking Communication
procedure simulate_flight is new float40 (num => float); use simulation_data;

constant := 57.29;
constant := 1.6078;
constant := 32.174;
constant := 0.659269;
constant := 0.01745;

-- Initialize simulation

loop

STABTHRTHR := (CLAO + CLAO*2) / CLCH;
CL := CLAO + CLAO*2 + CLCH*STABTHRTHR;

end loop;

Figure 28 - Procedure SIMULATE_FLIGHT Listing (1 of 3)
Figure 28 – Procedure SIMULATE_FLIGHT Listing (2 of 3)
Figure 28 - Procedure SIMULATE_FLIGHT Listing (3 of 3)
Figure 29 - Overall Compilation Dependencies (1 of 2)
harness could import and access certain variables. Basically, the test harness was readily usable, and naturally provided all the Ada package objects needed for testing. Test case definition was problematical because of the data dependencies among applications program units, but test case application via the harness was quite convenient.

14.5 Compilation Dependencies

The total DFCS/test program is exceptionally complex for its lines of source code because of the N-version voting requirements and the test observability requirements. While the procedure/task calling structure in Figure 23 is rather straightforward, the compilation dependencies are quite tortuous, as Figure 29 reveals. They can complicate recompilation following essentially minor code changes. These dependencies are inherent in Ada, and they are the price of global consistency checks among program units. This figure, however, makes it clear what recompilation sequences are required, and hence facilitates orderly software development.
15.0 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS

The all-up test harness was run with a modest amount of further development. Despite prior awareness of the criticality of specifications (e.g., see Reference 11), several iterations of specification de-bugging were necessary to eliminate associated software faults. The Ada program structuring techniques seemed to work well, with the exception of raising the visibility level of many variables for test observability or N-version voting. The software fault tolerance seemed to work well, but further study of the voter mechanisms is indicated.

Since some of the programmers had no prior Ada experience, the incidence of software faults was somewhat high. But all considered, programmer usage of Ada was really quite good. Variations among versions was very substantial, alleviating concern that Ada restrictions would hamper independence of software versions. The richness of Ada admits diverse ways of implementing the same functionality, provided the encompassing design does not encroach beyond program unit interfaces. This means that N-version programmers must have freedom to define and control all data objects at the level they are developing, a rule that was learned by early and unsuccessful initiatives to the contrary.

A summary critique of the effort is presented in Figure 30, and expanded in the following sub-sections.

15.1 N-Version Software Demonstration

Basically, the N-version demonstration was satisfactory. Ample faults indigenous to the four versions permitted affirmation of the fundamental adequacy of the N-version approach, but some questions remain due to the limited scale evaluation possible. Still, the degree of complexity of the N-version software was surprisingly high, largely due to mode and fault logic. The problems with the specifications resided mostly in this area as well. The preparation of adequate specifications was found to be especially problemsome. Hence, our continuing interest in formal specification has been intensified. Larger-scale logic definition problems may dictate some new type verification tools with respect to correctness and completeness.

In the course of N-version development, it was also discovered that the top-level design had been too encompassing. For example, the definition of data types and objects for the applications programs units was found to be best left to the individual programmer's discretion. This enabled greater independence among versions and better overall program structure. At the same time, the low-level N-version programmer defined packages were found to be very useful in a variety of ways, such as containing saved variables and text for newly defined procedures. The ultimate variation among versions was appreciable, alleviating concerns that Ada would be too restrictive.

15.2 Methodology Extensions

Basically, the Ada package partitioning technique produced qualitatively good results in limited use. Certain benefits accrue to source code compactness and comprehensibility. For example, the way in which data objects were declared obviated the need for the N-version program units to have parameters
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Figure 30 - Project Critique
passed to them, thereby making the source code for Procedure RUN FOREGROUND x far less cluttered than it otherwise would be. Had it not been for the raising of the namespace for voting or testability, this absence of parameter passing would have been accompanied by reductions in the data object namespace. Specifically, some of the objects would have been declared in package bodies, rather than in specification parts.

The same package definition approach lent itself to "detached" test harness observability of the voted DFCS data objects in that the DFCS code was unaffected by the test harness except for certain object visibility elevations. This passive observation capacity is of course inherent in the Ada language. For unit checkout/de-bugging, the test harness was set up to run for just one DFCS channel task. This worked well, but it prompted concern over unit testing in Ada in general. Basically, access to the entities required of all interfacing program units seems to complicate unit testing. Since the single channel test harness alleviated such problems, perhaps this type tool may prove widely useful.

Despite the relatively modest size of the overall program, a significant effort was involved in coping with compilation dependencies among Ada units. Such dependancies are complicated in the combined DFCS/test software. More generally, they are the price of Ada's global syntax checks, so the only alternative is the purposeful improvement of program structuring relative to compilation dependancies. This was accomplished using graphical representations of the kind illustrated in Ref. 17. This technique yielded the perspective to lower the levels of some dependencies. It also made recompilation demands more apparent. Based on this experience, it would seem appropriate to include compilation dependencies in the characterization of Ada program structuredness.

15.3 Test Harness Flexibility

The test harness was surprisingly compact and extensible, as well as very serviceable. Although the harness met essentially all of its requirements, it was necessary to modify the test article software at the lowest, hardware-oriented level. This was considered reasonable in the absence of target computers, for the tradeoffs for simulating synchronization hardware was very unfavorable. Note that testing the software in flight computers would normally enable visibility of any address location, independent of program structuring of the namespace. This suggests that the raising of the namespace for test observability purposes might not be necessary under a different testing scenario. This issue, together with the Ada unit testing question, prompts further investigation into Ada testing techniques.

To date the test harness usage has been somewhat limited compared with its potential. The test driver and test instrumentation/monitor are inherently adaptable and are being augmented for protracted, multiple test cases. The aforementioned DFCS logic complexity, in part, motivates this, along with the prospect of probing for persistent software faults. These are of major concern because they are the kind that software fault tolerance must cope with. Another pending use of the harness is a proposed investigation of N-version voters.
15.4 Conclusions

The following conclusions have been formulated as a result of this project:

- Calibration of benefits of N-version software are needed that quantitatively validate its favorable impact on system reliability.

- Complexity metrics are needed to quantitatively delineate design techniques or alternatives relative to program structure.

- Means to characterize the overall structure of Ada programs are desirable that acknowledge compilation dependencies.

- Ada testability needs to be explored in terms of data object visibility versus preferred program structuring alternatives.

- Specification technology needs to be improved to facilitate orderly N-version software development and preclude specification oriented faults.

Despite the extent of these follow-on recommendations, the investigation results were quite favorable with regard to improved structuring techniques, high-fidelity multitasking testing, and N-version software implementation. The identification of further needs are actually an indication of progress.
References


Appendix A - Version 3 Applications Software

Altogether, six versions of DFCS applications software were generated. Ultimately, two were required for specification de-bugging. The following version is provided as an example of the Ada source code produced. Note that the programmer defined Ada packages were a key to approaching version independence in that any desired data types or objects could be declared there. Also, the packages permitted the definition of saved variables as needed for digital filters or logic latches, and the shortening of procedure bodies by distributing source code. The sequence of program unit listings in this appendix is:

<table>
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A-1
Ada Procedure SRLFCT_MODE_V3.ADA

with VOTING_PLANES; use VOTING_PLANES;
separate(DFCS_LOGIC)
procedure SELECT_MODE_V3 is

begin
AL.Warn_V3 := BLANK;
case MODE_SEL.AUTOPILOT is
when ALT_HOLD =>
   MODE.ENG.V3.AUTOPILOT := ALT_HOLD;
   MODE.ENG.V3.AUTOLAND := OFF;
when BASIC =>
   MODE.ENG.V3.AUTOPILOT := BASIC;
   MODE.ENG.V3.AUTOLAND := OFF;
when OFF =>
   MODE.ENG.V3.AUTOPILOT := OFF;
   MODE.ENG.V3.AUTOLAND := OFF;
when VERT_NAV =>
   MODE.ENG.V3.AUTOPILOT := VERT_NAV;
   MODE.ENG.V3.AUTOLAND := OFF;
when AUTOLAND =>
   AUTOLAND.ENGAGE_LOGIC:
   declare
   type VALIDITY_CNT is
      record
         GS : INTEGER range 0..4 := 0;
         NA : INTEGER range 0..3 := 0;
         RA : INTEGER range 0..4 := 0;
      end record;
      NUM_VAL : VALIDITY_CNT;
   begin
      MODE_SEL.AUTOPILOT := AUTOLAND;
      for INDEX in 1..4
      loop
         if AL.COMP.V3.GS.BEAM.VAL(INDEX) = TRUE
         then NUM_VAL.GS := NUM_VAL.GS + 1;
         end if;
         if AL.COMP.V3.RAD_ALT.VAL(INDEX) = TRUE
         then NUM_VAL.RA := NUM_VAL.RA + 1;
         end if;
         if INDEX /= 4
         then if AL.COMP.V3.N.ACCEL.VAL(INDEX) = TRUE
            then NUM_VAL.NA := NUM_VAL.NA + 1;
            end if;
         end if;
      end loop;
end case;
end SELECT_MODE_V3;
case MODE_EFL_AUTOLAND is
  when CAT_3A =>
    if FBW_STATUS_V3 = OP_STATE_1 and NUM_VAL NA = 1
      and NUM_VAL GS = 4 and NUM_VAL RA = 4
      then MODE_ENG_V3,AUTOLAND := CAT_3A;
    elsif FBW_STATUS_V3 = OP_STATE_2 and NUM_VAL NA = 2
      and NUM_VAL GS = 2 and NUMVAL RA = 2
      then MODE_ENG_V3,AUTOLAND := CAT_2;
      AL_WARN_V3 := CAT_2,1NOP;
    elsif FBW_STATUS_V3 < OP_STATE_2 or NUM_VAL NA = 1
      or NUM_VAL GS = 1 or NUM_VAL RA = 1
      then MODE_ENG_V3,AUTOLAND := CAT_1;
      AL_WARN_V3 := CAT_1,1NOP;
    else MODE_ENG_V3,AUTOLAND := OFF;
      AL_WARN_V3 := CAT_1,1NOP;
  end if;
  when CAT_2 =>
    if FBW_STATUS_V3 = OP_STATE_2 and NUM_VAL NA = 2
      and NUM_VAL GS = 2 and NUM_VAL RA = 2
      then MODE_ENG_V3,AUTOLAND := CAT_2;
    elsif FBW_STATUS_V3 < OP_STATE_2 or NUM_VAL NA = 1
      or NUM_VAL GS = 1 or NUM_VAL RA = 1
      then MODE_ENG_V3,AUTOLAND := CAT_1;
      AL_WARN_V3 := CAT_2,1NOP;
    else MODE_ENG_V3,AUTOLAND := OFF;
      AL_WARN_V3 := CAT_1,1NOP;
  end if;
  when CAT_1 =>
    if NUM_VAL NA = 1 and NUM_VAL GS = 1
      and NUM_VAL RA = 1
      then MODE_ENG_V3,AUTOLAND := CAT_1;
    else MODE_ENG_V3,AUTOLAND := OFF;
  end if;
  when OFF =>
    null;
end case;
end AUTOLAND_ENGAGE_LOGIC;

end case;

CHNL_1,CHN_2,NUM := 1;
SYNC,SYNC_2;
end SELECT_NODE_V3;

-- Call for N-Version Vote

Figure A-1 Procedure SELECT_NODE_V3 (Sheet 2 of 2)
with CHNL_3 ASSESSMENT; use CHNL_3 ASSESSMENT;
with CHANNEL_Resources; use CHANNEL_Resources;
separate(DCFS_LOGIC)
procedure ASSESS_CHANNEL_V3 is

begin

case CPU_COUNT is
when 0 =>
  if CMPTR_3.CPU_CHK_OK = FALSE
  then CPU_CHK := FALSE;
     CPU_COUNT := 1;
  end if;
when 1 =>
  if CMPTR_3.CPU_CHK_OK = TRUE
  then CPU_COUNT := -1;
  end if;
when -10..-1 =>
  if CMPTR_3.CPU_CHK_OK = TRUE
  then CPU_COUNT := CPU_COUNT - 1;
     if CPU_COUNT <= -10
     then CPU_HEAL := CPU_HEAL + 1;
        if CPU_HEAL > 5
        then CPU_COUNT := 2;
           else CPU_CHK := TRUE;
                  CPU_COUNT := 0;
        end if;
     end if;
  end if;
else CPU_COUNT := -1;
end if;
when 2 =>
  CPU_CHK := FALSE;
end case;

case IOP_COUNT is
when 0 =>
  if CMPTR_3.IOP_PROC_OK = FALSE
  then IOP_CHK := FALSE;
     IOP_COUNT := 1;
  end if;
when 1 =>
  if CMPTR_3.IOP_PROC_OK = TRUE
  then IOP_COUNT := -1;
  end if;
end case;

Figure A-2 Procedure ASSESS_CHANNEL_V3 (Sheet 1 of 4)
when -10..-1 => -- Healing
  if CMPTR_3.IO_PROC_OK = TRUE
    then IOP_COUNT := IOP_COUNT - 1 ;
    if IOP_COUNT <= -10
      then IOP_HEAL := TOP_HEAL + 1 ;
      if IOP_HEAL > 5
        then IOP_COUNT := 2 ;
      else IOP_CHK := TRUE ;
        IOP_COUNT := 0 ;
      end if ;
    end if ;
  else IOP_COUNT := -1 ;
  end if ;
when 2 => -- Failed
  IOP_CHK := FALSE ;
end case ;

case MUX_COUNT is -- MUX Bus Checks --
  when 0..2 => -- Normal
    if MUX_COUNT = 0
      then if CMPTR_3.MUX_BUS_OK = FALSE
                    then MUX_COUNT := 1 ;
                  end if ;
      else if CMPTR_3.MUX_BUS_OK = FALSE
                  then MUX_COUNT := MUX_COUNT + 1 ;
                  if MUX_COUNT >= 3
                    then MUX_CHK := FALSE ;
                  end if ;
      else MUX_COUNT := 0 ;
    end if ;
  end if ;
when 3 => -- Faulted
  if CMPTR_3.MUX_BUS_OK = TRUE
    then MUX_COUNT := -1 ;
  end if ;
when -50..-1 => -- Healing
  if CMPTR_3.MUX_BUS_OK = TRUE
    then MUX_COUNT := MUX_COUNT - 1 ;
    if MUX_COUNT <= -50
      then MUX_HEAL := MUX_HEAL + 1 ;
      if MUX_HEAL > 6
        then MUX_COUNT := 4 ;
      else MUX_CHK := TRUE ;
        MUX_COUNT := 0 ;
      end if ;
    end if ;
  else MUX_COUNT := -1 ;
  end if ;
when 4 => -- Failed
  CPU_CHK := FALSE ;
end case ;

Figure A-2 Procedure ASSESS_CHANNEL_V3 (Sheet 2 of 4)
case ACTP_COUNT is
  -- Actuator Checks
  when 0..2 =>
    if ACTR_COUNT = 0
      then if SERVO_3,ACTUATOR_ON = FALSE
         then ACTR_COUNT := 1;
         end if;
      else if SERVO_3,ACTUATOR_ON = FALSE
         then ACTR_COUNT := ACTR_COUNT + 1;
         if ACTR_COUNT >= 3
           then ACTR_CHK := FALSE;
           end if;
         else ACTR_COUNT := 0;
         end if;
    end if;
  when 3 =>
    if SERVO_3,ACTUATOR_ON = TRUF.
    then ACIP_COUNT := -1;
    end if;
  when -50..-1 =>
    if SERVO_3,ACTUATOR_ON = TRUF.
    then ACTR_COUNT := ACIP_COUNT - 1;
    if ACTR_COUNT <= -50
      then ACTR_HEAL := ACIP_HEAL + 1;
      if ACTR_HEAL > 2
        then ACTR_COUNT := 4;
      else ACTR_CHK := TRUF;
      else ACTR_COUNT := 0;
      end if;
    end if;
    else ACTR_COUNT := -1;
    end if;
  when 4 =>
    ACTR_CHK := FALSE;
end case;

Figure A-2 Procedure ASSESS_CHANNEL_V3 (Sheet 3 of 4)
case LVDT_COUNT is  -- LVDT Sensor Checks
when 0..3 =>  -- Normal
  if LVDT_COUNT = 0
    then if SERVO_3.LVDT_VALID = FALSE
        then LVDT_COUNT := 1;
        end if;
    else if SERVO_3.LVDT_VALID = FALSE
        then LVDT_COUNT := LVDT_COUNT + 1;
        if LVDT_COUNT >= 4
            then LVDT_CHK := FALSE;
            end if;
        else LVDT_COUNT := 0;
        end if;
  end if;
when 4 =>  -- Faulted
  if SERVO_3.LVDT_VALID = TRUE
    then LVDT_COUNT := LVDT_COUNT - 1;
    end if;
when -50..-1 =>  -- Healing
  if SERVO_3.LVDT_VALID = TRUE
    then LVDT_COUNT := LVDT_COUNT - 1;
    if LVDT_COUNT <= -50
        then LVDT_FAULT := LVDT_FAULT + 1;
        if LVDT_FAULT > 2
            then LVDT_COUNT := 5;
            else LVDT_CHK := TRUE;
            LVDT_COUNT := 0;
        end if;
    end if;
  else LVDT_COUNT := -1;
  end if;
when 5 =>  -- Failed
  LVDT_CHK := FALSE;
end case;

CHNL_STATUS_VJ := CPU_CHK and IOP_CHK and MUX_CHK and ACT_CHK
    and MUX_CHK and SERVO_3.POSER_AVAIL;

-- No N-Version Vote Taken Because Status Is Unique to each Channel
end ASSESS_CHANNEL_V3;

Figure A-2  Procedure ASSESS_CHANNEL_V3 (Sheet 4 of 4)
package CHNL_3_ASSESSMENT is

    CPU_COUNT : INTEGER range -10..2 := 0;
    IOP_COUNT : INTEGER range -10..2 := 0;
    MUX_COUNT : INTEGER range -50..4 := 0;
    ACTR_COUNT : INTEGER range -50..4 := 0;
    LVDT_COUNT : INTEGER range -50..5 := 0;

    CPU_CHK, IOP_CHK, MUX_CHK, ACTR_CHK, LVDT_CHK : RUNLEAN := TRUE;

    CPU_HEAL : INTEGER range 0..5 := 0;
    IOP_HEAL : INTEGER range 0..5 := 0;
    MUX_HEAL : INTEGER range 0..6 := 0;
    ACTR_HEAL : INTEGER range 0..2 := 0;
    LVDT_HEAL : INTEGER range 0..2 := 0;

end CHNL_3_ASSESSMENT;

package body CHNL_3_ASSESSMENT is

    begin
        null;
    end CHNL_3_ASSESSMENT;

Figure A-3 Package CHNL_3_ASSESSMENT
with VOTING_PLANES; use VOTING_PLANES;
separate(DFCS_LOGIC)
procedure GIVE_STATUS_V3 is

begin
ANNUN_V3.FLY_QUAL := FLY_QUAL_V3;
case MODE.ENG_V3,AUTOPilot is
when OFF =>
  ANNUN_V3.AFCS_STATUS := AFCS_DSIENGAGED;
  ANNUN_V3.AL_PROG_DISP := (1..5 => FALSE);
  ANNUN_V3.AUTOPILOT_MODE := OFF;
when AUTOLAND =>
  if AL_PHASE_V3 = AUTOLAND_INOP
  then ANNUN_V3.AFCS_STATUS := AUTOPilot_ENGAGED;
     ANNUN_V3.AUTOPILOT_MODE := BASIC;
     ANNUN_V3.AL_PROG_DISP := AUTOLAND_ENGAGED;
  else ANNUN_V3.AFCS_STATUS := AUTOPilot_ENGAGED;
     ANNUN_V3.AUTOPILOT_MODE := AUTOLAND;
  case AL_PHASE_V3 is
  when AUTOLAND_INOP =>
    ANNUN_V3.AL_PROG_DISP := (1..5 => FALSE);
  when AUTOLAND_ARMED =>
    ANNUN_V3.AL_PROG_DISP := (1 => TRUE,
          2..5 => FALSE);
  when GLIDESLOPE_TRACK =>
    ANNUN_V3.AL_PROG_DISP(2) := TRUE;
  when DECISION_ALTITUDE =>
    ANNUN_V3.AL_PROG_DISP(3) := TRUE;
  when ALERT_ALTITUDE =>
    ANNUN_V3.AL_PROG_DISP(4) := TRUE;
  when FLARE =>
    ANNUN_V3.AL_PROG_DISP(5) := TRUE;
  end case;
when others =>
  ANNUN_V3.AFCS_STATUS := AUTOPilot_ENGAGED;
  ANNUN_V3.AUTOPILOT_MODE := MODE.ENG_V3,AUTOPilot;
  ANNUN_V3.AL_PROG_DISP := (1..5 => FALSE);
end case;
CHNL_3.XCHK_NUM := 2;
XCHK_SYNCH_3;
end GIVE_STATUS_V3;

Figure A-4 Procedure GIVE_STATUS_V3
with CHNL_AL_VOTEK; use CHNL_AL_VOTEK;
with DFC_LOGIC; use DFC_LOGIC;
with VOTING_PLANFS; use VOTING_PLANFS;
separate(DFC_RESWKS);
procedure MANAGE_AL_SENSORS_V3 is
  GS_FLAGS_IN, GS_CUMP_IN, GS_CUMP_OUT, NA_FLAGS_IN, NA_CUMP_IN, 
  RA_FLAGS_OUT : BUNL_VECTOR(1 .. 4);
  NA_FLAGS_IN, NA_CUMP_IN, NA_CUMP_OUT : ROOL_VECTOR(1 .. 4);
  GS_SIGNALS, RA_SIGNALS : REAL_VECTOR(1 .. 4);
  NA_SIGNALS : REAL_VECTOR(1 .. 3);
  GS_RFD, NA_RFD, RA_RFD : FLOAT;
begin
for INDEX in 1 .. 4 loop
  GS_FLAGS_IN(INDEX) := AL_FLAGS.GS_HEAM_VAL(INDEX);
  RA_FLAGS_OUT(INDEX) := AL_FLAGS.RA_HEAM_VAL(INDEX);
end loop;
for INDEX in 1 .. 3 loop
  NA_FLAGS_IN(INDEX) := AL_FLAGS.NA ACCEL.Val(INDEX);
end loop;
  CHK_ALFLAGS_IN(GS_FLAGS_IN, 1, 4);  -- Check Sensor
  CHK_ALFLAGS_IN(NA_FLAGS_IN, 2, 3);  -- Flag input
  CHK_ALFLAGS_IN(PA_FLAGS_IN, 3, 4);  -- Validities
for INDEX in 1 .. 4 loop
  GS_SIGNALS(INDEX) := FLOAT(GS_RFD.DEV.INDEX);
  RA_SIGNALS(INDEX) := FLOAT(RA_RFD.DEV.INDEX);
end loop;
for INDEX in 1 .. 3 loop
  NA_SIGNALS(INDEX) := FLOAT(NA_RFD.DEV.INDEX);
end loop;
  VUTE_AL_SENSORS(GS_SIGNALS, 1, 4, GS_RFD);
  AL_RFD.V3.GS.DEV := PEAK.DEV SIGNAL(GS_RFD);
  AL_RFD.V3.NA.ACCEL := ACCEL SIGNAL(NA_RFD);
  VUTE_AL_SENSORS(RA_SIGNALS, 3, 4, RA_RFD);
  AL_RFD.V3.RA_ALT := RAD ALT SIGNAL(RA_RFD);
end procedure MANAGE_AL_SENSORS_V3;

Figure A-5 Procedure MANAGE_AL_SENSORS_V3 (Sheet 1 of 2)
if MY_TURN then
  CHK_FAULT_LOGIC(GS_SIGNALS, GS_MUX, 1, 4, GS_COMP_OUT);  -- Compare
  CHK_FAULT_LOGIC(NA_SIGNALS, NA_MUX, 2, 3, NA_COMP_OUT);  -- Inputs
  CHK_FAULT_LOGIC(NA_SIGNALS, NA_MUX, 3, 4, NA_COMP_OUT);  -- Check
  MY_TURN := FALSE;
else MY_TURN := TRUE;
end if;  

for INDEX in 1..4 loop
  AL_COMP_V3.US_REAL_VAL(INDEX) := US_COMP_OUT(INDEX);
  AL_COMP_V3.HAD_REAL_VAL(INDEX) := NA_COMP_OUT(INDEX);
end loop;

for INDEX in 1..3 loop
  AL_COMP_V3.HAD_ALL_VAL(INDEX) := NA_COMP_OUT(INDEX);
end loop;

CHR_NUM := 3;
XCHR_SYNC := 3;  -- Call for N-version vote

end MANAGE_AL_SENSORS_V3;

Figure A-5  Procedure MANAGE_AL_SENSORS_V3 (Sheet 2 of 2)
Package CHNL_3_AL_VOTER

package CHNL_3_AL_VOTER is

   AL_COMP_COUNT : array (1..3, 1..4) of INTEGER range 0..6
                  in (1..3) or (1..4) & 0);
   AL_FLAG_COUNT : array (1..3, 1..4) of INTEGER range =5..9
                  in (1..3) or (1..4) & 0);
   AL_FLAG_IN   : array (1..3, 1..4) of BOOLEAN
                  := (others => (others => TRUE));
   AL_COMP_OUT   : array (1..3, 1..4) of BOOLEAN
                  := (others => (others => TRUE));

   MY_TURN     : BOOLEAN;
   NUM_SENSORS : INTEGER range 1..4 := 4;
   NUM_VOTES   : INTEGER range 0..4 := 0;
   SET_NUM     : INTEGER range 1..3 := 1;

   type BOOL_VECTOR is array (INTEGER range <>) of BOOLEAN;
   type REAL_VECTOR is array (INTEGER range <>) of FLOAT;

   procedure CHK_AL_FLAGS_IN(AL_FLAG : in BOOL_VECTOR ;
                            SFT_NUM, NUM_SENSORS : in INTEGER);
   procedure VOTE_AL_SENSORS(AL_SENSORS : in REAL_VECTOR ;
                            SFT_NUM, NUM_SENSORS : in INTEGER ;
                            AL_SENSOR_MLD : out FLOAT);
   procedure CHK_FAULT_LOGICAL(AL_SENSORS : in REAL_VECTOR ;
                            AL_SENSOR_MLD : in FLOAT ; SFT_NUM, NUM_SENSORS : in INTEGER ; AL_COMP_VAL : out BOOL_VECTOR);

end CHNL_3_AL_VOTER;

Figure A-6 Package CHNL_3_AL_VOTER (Sheet 1 of 4)
package body CHNL_3_AL_VOTER is

procedure CHK_AL_FLAGS_IN(AL_FLAG : in BOOLEAN_VECTOR; SET_NUM, NUM_SENSORS : in INTEGER) is
begin
for INDEX in 1..NUM_SENSORS loop
  case AL_FLAG_COUNT(SET_NUM, INDEX) is
  when 0 =>
    if AL_FLAG(INDEX) = FALSE
    then AL_FLAG_COUNT(SET_NUM, INDEX) := 1;
    end if;
  when 1..5 =>
    if AL_FLAG(INDEX) = FALSE
    then AL_FLAG_COUNT(SET_NUM, INDEX) :=
      if AL_FLAG_COUNT(SET_NUM, INDEX) >= 5
      then AL_FLAG_IN(SET_NUM, INDEX) := FALSE;
      AL_FLAG_COUNT(SET_NUM, INDEX) := 1;
      end if;
    else AL_FLAG_COUNT(SET_NUM, INDEX) := 0;
    end if;
  when 6..10 =>
    if AL_FLAG(INDEX) = TRUE
    then AL_FLAG_COUNT(SET_NUM, INDEX) :=
      if AL_FLAG_COUNT(SET_NUM, INDEX) <= 5
      then AL_FLAG_IN(SET_NUM, INDEX) := TRUE;
      AL_FLAG_COUNT(SET_NUM, INDEX) := 0;
      end if;
    else AL_FLAG_COUNT(SET_NUM, INDEX) := -1;
    end if;
  when others =>
    end case;
  end loop;
end CHK_AL_FLAGS_IN;

Figure A-6 Package CHNL_3_AL_VOTER (Sheet 2 of 4)
procedure VOTL_AL_SENSORS (AL_SENSORS : in REAL; VOTL_OUT : out FLOAT) is

SET_RANKING : array (1..4) of INTEGER range 0..4 := (0, 0, 0, 0);

SET_RANKING : array (1..4) of FLOAT is (0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0);

TMP : FLOAT := 0.0;

begin

NUM_VOTES := NUM_SENSORS;

for INDEX in 1..NUM_SENSORS loop

if ALL_COMP_NUM (SET_NUM, INDEX) = FALSE
then NUM_VOTES := NUM_VOTES + 1;
else SET_RANKING (INDEX) := INDEX;
end if;
end loop;

for INDEX in 1..NUM_VOTES loop

for CHNL_NUM in INDEX..4 loop

if CHNL_NUM = SET_RANKING (CHNL_NUM)
then V (INDEX) := AL_SENSORS (CHNL_NUM);
end if;
end loop;
end case;

when 0 =>
null;
when 1 =>
AL_SENSORS := V (1);
when 2 =>
if V (1) < V (2)
then AL_SENSORS := V (1);
else AL_SENSORS := V (2);
end if;
when 3 =>
if (V (2) < V (1) and V (1) < V (3)) or
(V (3) < V (1) and V (1) < V (2))
then AL_SENSORS := V (1);
elseif (V (1) < V (2) and V (2) < V (3)) or
(V (3) < V (2) and V (2) < V (1))
then AL_SENSORS := V (2);
else AL_SENSORS := V (3);
end if;
when 4 =>
for I in 1..NUM_VOTES-1 loop

for J in I+1..NUM_VOTES loop

if V (I) > V (J)
then TEMP := V (I);
V (I) := V (J);
V (J) := TEMP;
end if;
end loop;
end loop;
al_AL_SENSORS := V (2);
end case;
end VOTL_AL_SENSORS;

Figure A-6 Package CHNL_3_AL_VOTER (Sheet 3 of 4)

A-14
procedure CHK_FAULT_LOGIC(ALSENSORS: in REAL_VECTOR;
    AL_SENSOR_MED: in FLOAT; SET_NUM, NUM_SENSORS: in INTEGER;
    AL.COMP.VAL: out ANGL_VECTOR) is
  AMPLimit: array (1..3) of FLOAT := (1 => 0.02, 2 => 0.05, 3 => 0.25);
  MAX_CT: constant array (1..3) of INTEGER := (5, 4, 4);
begin
for INDEX in 1..NUM_SENSORS loop
  if FLT_NUM = 3 then AMPLimit(3) := 0.02*AL_SENSOR_MED; end if;
  case AL.COMP.COUNT(SET_NUM, INDEX) is
    when 0 =>
      if AL.SENSORS_MED = AL_SENSORS(INDEX) then AMPLimit(SET_NUM) := MAX_CT(SET_NUM);
      then AL.COMP.COUNT(SET_NUM, INDEX) := 1;
      end if;
    when 1 =>
      if AL.SENSORS_MED = ALSENSORS(INDEX) then AMPLimit(SET_NUM) := MAX_CT(SET_NUM);
      then AL.COMP.COUNT(SET_NUM, INDEX) := 1;
      end if;
    when 2 =>
      if AL.SENSORS_MED = ALSENSORS(INDEX) then AMPLimit(SET_NUM) := MAX_CT(SET_NUM);
      then AL.COMP.COUNT(SET_NUM, INDEX) := 1;
      end if;
    else AL.COMP.COUNT(SET_NUM, INDEX) := 0; -- Recovering
      end if;
    when 5 =>
      null; end case;
  AL.COMP.VAL(INDEX) := AL.COMP.OUT(SET_NUM, INDEX) or
    AL_FLAG.IN(SET_NUM, INDEX);
end loop;
end CHK_FAULT_LOGIC;
end CHNL_3_AL_VOTER;
Figure A-7 Procedure CALC_AUTOLAND_V3
-- Signal Shaping Filter Coefficients

-- Filter 1: Glide Slope Deviation Low-Pass

GSI_X, GSI_XM1 : constant := 1.0/4.0 ;
GSI_XM1 : constant := 3.0/4.0 ;

-- Filter 2: Normal Acceleration High-Pass

N2L_X : constant := 90.0/90.0 ;
N2L_XM1 : constant := -900.0/901.0 ;
N2O_XM1 : constant := 80.0/90.0 ;

-- Filter 3: Altitude Acceleration Low-Pass

N2O_XM1, N2O_XM1M1 : constant := 1.0/22.0 ;
N2O_XM1 : constant := 9.0/11.0 ;

-- Filter 4: Radio Altitude High-Pass

N1L_X : constant := 20.0/11.0 ;
N1L_XM1 : constant := -20.0/11.0 ;
N1O_X : constant := 9.0/11.0 ;

-- Filter 5: Glide Slope Command Fader

AGSI_X, AGSI_XM1 : constant := 1.0/61.0 ;
AGSI_XM1 : constant := 59.0/61.0 ;

-- Filter 6: Command Rate Limiter

RATE_LIMIT : constant := 1.0 ;

-- Filter 7: Pitch Rate Error Fader

PMF1_X, PMF1_XM1 : constant := 1.0/11.0 ;
PMF1_XM1 : constant := 29.0/31.0 ;

-- Filter 8: Altitude Acceleration Integrator

M2DA_X, M2DA_XM1 : constant := 1.0/20.0 ;
M2DA_XM1 : constant := 1.0 ;

Figure A-8 Package AL_RESOURCES (Sheet 1 of 6)
-- Gain Schedules

-- Gainslope Desensitization Gain (60 to 1000 FT.)
KGS
constant := 1.0/9400.0

-- Flare Command Gain (-20 to 0 FT.)
KFL
constant := -8.0/60.0

-- Control Law Variables
GSERR, GSERR_LP, GS_FLP_DS,
DEL_NZ, M2DOT, M2DOT_AUG, M2DOT_LP,
MKA, MRAHP, MDOT,
MDOTGS, MDOT_REF, MDOT_AGS, MDOT_CMD1,
MOUTCMD2, MOUT_ERR,
PR_CMD, PR_CMD_LIM, PR_ERR
: FLOAT

-- Filter Memory Variables
OLD_GSERR, OLD_GSERR_LP, OLD_FLP_NZ, OLD_M2DOT,
OLD_M2DOT_LP, OLD_M2DOT_AUG, OLD_MDOT_REF, OLD_MKA,
OLD_MKA_LP, OLD_MDOT_AGS, OLD_PR_ERR,
OLD_MOUT_CMD2
: FLOAT

-- Gainslope/Autoland Progress Trip Points
ALT_REF_1
constant := 200.0
ALT_REF_2
constant := 150.0
ALT_REF_3
constant := 100.0
ALT_REF_4
constant := 50.0

TYPE SENSOR_VECTOR IS ARRAY (1..4) OF FLOAT;
AL_SENSENSHARD I SENSOR_VECTOR;
AL_STERLING_CMD, PITCH_RATE, RAd_ALT
: FLOAT;

INITIALIZE
constant := FALSE;

PROCEDURE CALCULATE_STEPHEN(VA_SENSENHARD) IS
AL_STERLING_CMD, PITCH_RATE, RAD_ALT
: FLOAT;

PROCEDURE CHECK_MODE(SFL_AL_MODE, AL_CATEGORY, AL_MODE_STATUS)
: FLOAT;

PROCEDURE INITIALIZE_FILTERS
; PROCEDURE CALCULATE_FLAP
; PROCEDURE FADE_LIMITER
; PROCEDURE RESET_FILTERS

end AL_RESOURCES;

Figure A-8 Package AL_RESOURCES (Sheet 2 of 6)
package mody AL_RESOURCES is

procedure CALC_AL_STEERING(AL_SENSOR_HFD5 : in SENSOR_VECION; 
   SEL_AL_MDE : in AL_CATEGORY; MODF_STATUS : in AL_PUCHARSS; 
   PITCH_AL_CMD : out FLOAT) is
begin
   GS_FRP := AL_SENSOR_HFD5(1); 
   DEH_XZ := AL_SENSOR_HFD5(2); 
   MPA := AL_SENSOR_HFD5(3); 
   PITCH_AL_MTF := AL_SENSOR_HFD5(4); 
end case;
when CAT_2 | CAT_1A =>
   when MODF_STATUS = AUTOLAND_INTOP 
      then INITIALIZE_FILTHKAS; 
   elsif MODF_STATUS = FLARE 
      then CALCULATE_FLARE; 
   else CALCULATE_GLIDESLOPE; 
end if;
when CAT_1 =>
   when MODF_STATUS = AUTOLAND_INTOP 
      then INITIALIZE_FILTHKAS; 
   elsif MODF_STATUS = GLIDESLOPE_TRAC 
      then CALCULATE_GLIDESLOPE; 
   elsif MODF_STATUS = DECISION_ALTITUDE 
      then FAUETHMIFIER; 
end if;
when OFF =>
   RLST_FILTHKAS; 
end case;
PITCH_AL_CMD := PR_LRR; 
end CALC_AL_STEERING;
Figure A-8  Package AL_RESOURCES (Sheet 4 of 6)
procedure INITIALIZEFILTERS is
begin
    ULD_DFL_NZ := DFL_NZ;
    H2DUT := 0.0;
    ULD_H2DUT := 0.0;
    ULD_HRA := HRA;
    HRA_HR := 0.0;
    ULD_HRA_HR := 0.0;
end INITIALIZEFILTERS;

procedure CALCULATE_GLIDESLOPE is
begin
    GS_ERR_LP := GS0_K1*ULU_GS_ERR_LP + GS1_K1*ULU_GS_ERR + GS2_K*GS_ERR;
    GS_ERR_DS := 0.1*ULU_GS_ERR_LP;
    if HRA < 1000.0
    then GS_ERR_DS := (HRA-60.0)*GS*GS_ERR_DS;
    end if;
    M2DUT := M2O_K1*ULU_M2DUT + M2I_K1*ULU_M2DUT + M2I_K*DEL_NZ;
    OLD_LFL_NZ := DFL_NZ;
    M2DUT_LP := M2O_K1*MLD_M2DUT_LP + M2D1_K1*MLD_M2DUT + M2D1_K*M2DUT;
    OLD_M2DUT := M2DUT;
    OLD_M2DUT_LP := M2DUT_LP;
    HRA_HR := M0_K1*OLD_HRA_HR + M1_K1*MLD_HRA + M2_K*HRA;
    OLD_HRA := HRA;
    OLD_HRA_HR := HRA_HR;
    M2DUT := M2D0T_LP + HRA_HR;
    M2DUT_AUG := M2DUT + GS_ERR_DS;
    M2DOT_REF := M2D41_K1*OLD_M2DOT_REF + M2D51_K1*MLD_M2DOT_AUG + M2D51_K*M2DUT_AUG;
    OLD_M2DOT_REF := M2DOT_REF;
    OLD_M2DOT_AUG := M2D0T_AUG;
    H2DOT_AGS := M2DOT_RFF + GS_ERR_DS;
    H2DOT_CMD1 := M2DOT_RFF;
    H2DOT_CMD2 := -8.0;
    H2DOT_ERR := H2DOT_CMD1 + H2DOT_CMD2 - H2DOT;
    if abs(PR_CND_LIM - PR_CMD) >= RATE_LIMIT
    then if PR_CND > 0.0
        then PR_CND_LIM := PR_CND_LIM + 0.3;
        else PR_CND_LIM := PR_CND_LIM - 0.3;
    end if;
    else PR_CND_LIM := PR_CND;
    end if;
end if;
end CALUCATE_GLIDESLOPE;

Figure A-8 Package AL_RESOURCES (Sheet 5 of 6)
procedure CALCULATE_FLAKE is
begin
H_2DOT := N20_KM1*OLD_H_2DOT + N21_KM1*OLD_DEL_NZ + N21_KM1*DEL_NZ + N21_KM1*H_2DOT;
OLD_DEL_NZ := DEL_NZ;
H_2DOT_LP := H20_KM1*OLD_H_2DOT_LP + N20_KM1*OLD_H_2DOT + N20_KM1*H_2DOT;
OLD_H_2DOT := H_2DOT;
OLD_H_2DOT_LP := H_2DOT_LP;
HRA_HP := H0_KM1*OLD_HRA_HP + H1_KM1*OLD_HRA + H1_KM1*HRA;
OLD_HRA := HRA;
OLD_HRA_HP := HRA_HP;
H_DOT := H_2DOT_LP + HRA_HP;
HDOT_CMD1 := PRE2_KM1*LD_H_DOUT_CMD1; -- Fader
OLD_HOUT_CMD1 := HDOT_CMD1;
HDOT_CMD2 := (HRA + 20.0)*KFL;
HDOT_ERR := HDOT_CMD1 + HDOT_CMD2 - H_DOT;
PR_CMD := 0.5*HDOT_ERR;
if ans(PR_CMD-LIM = PH_CMD) >= RATE_LIMIT
then if PH_CMD > 0.0
then PH_CMD_LIM := PH_CMD + 0.3;
else PH_CMD_LIM := PH_CMD - 0.3;
end if;
else PH_CMD_LIM := PR_CMD;
end if;
PHER := PH_CMD_LIM = PITCH_RATE;
end CALCULATE_FLAKE;

procedure FADER_LIMITER is
begin
H_DOT_CMD1 := PRE2_KM1*LD_H_DOUT_CMD1;
OLD_HOUT_CMD1 := H_DOT_CMD1;
PR_CMD := H_DOT_CMD1;
if ans(PR_CMD-LIM = PH_CMD) >= RATE_LIMIT
then if PH_CMD > 0.0
then PH_CMD_LIM := PH_CMD + 0.3;
else PH_CMD_LIM := PH_CMD - 0.3;
end if;
else PH_CMD_LIM := PR_CMD;
end if;
PHER := PH_CMD_LIM = PITCH_RATE;
end FADER_LIMITER;

procedure RESET_FILTERS is
begin
OLD_HS.ERR := 0.0;
OLD_HS.ERR+LP := 0.0;
OLD_DEL_NZ := 0.0;
OLD_H_2DOT := 0.0;
OLD_H_2DOT_LP := 0.0;
OLD_H_2DOT_AUG := 0.0;
OLD_HDOT_REF := 0.0;
OLD_HRA := 0.0;
OLD_HRA_HP := 0.0;
OLD_HOUT_CMD1 := 0.0;
OLD_PR.ERR := 0.0;
end RESET_FILTERS;
end AL_RESOURCES;

Figure A-8 Package AL_RESOURCES (Sheet 6 of 6)
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Figure A-9 Procedure MANAGE_IL_SENSORS_V3 (Sheet 1 of 2)
-- Median Signal Selection

VUTL_IL_SENSORS(CHP_STK_SIGNALS, 1, 4, CP_STK_MED);  
VUTL_IL_SENSORS(P.STK_SIGNALS, 2, 4, P_STK_MED);  
VUTL_IL_SENSORS(AVG.AOA_SIGNALS, 3, 4, AVG.AOA_MED);  
VUTL_IL_SENSORS(P_RATE_SIGNALS, 4, 3, P_RATE_MED);  
VUTL_IL_SENSORS(TAS_SIGNALS, 5, 2, TAS_MED);  

-- Median Select Outputs

IFMFD.V3_CP_STICK := STICK.CHU(CP_STK_MED);  
IFMFD.V3_P_STICK := STICK.CHU(P.STK_MED);  
IFMFD.V3_AOA_DISP := AOA_SIGNAL(AVG.AOA_MED);  
IFMFD.V3_P_RATE := ANG.WAKIE_SIGNAL(P_RATE_MED);  
IFMFD.V3_TAS_SPEED := TAS_SIGNAL(TAS_MED);  

-- Comparator Logic Checks

CHM_FAULT_LOGIC(CHP_STK_SIGNALS, CP_STK_MED, 1, 4, CP_STK_COMP);  
CHM_FAULT_LOGIC(P.STK_SIGNALS, P_STK_MED, 2, 4, P_STK_COMP);  
CHM_FAULT_LOGIC(AVG.AOA_SIGNALS, AVG.AOA_MED, 3, 4, AVG.AOA_COMP);  
CHM_FAULT_LOGIC(P_RATE_SIGNALS, P_RATE_MED, 4, 3, P_RATE_COMP);  
CHM_FAULT_LOGIC(TAS_SIGNALS, TAS_MED, 5, 2, TAS_COMP);  

for INDEX in 1..4 loop

TL_CMP_V3_CP_STK_VAL(INDEX) := CP_STK_COMP(INDEX);  
TL_CMP_V3_P_STK_VAL(INDEX) := P_STK_COMP(INDEX);  
TL_CMP_V3_AOA_VAL(INDEX) := AVG.AOA_COMP(INDEX);  
it INDEX <= 3 then

TL_CMP_V3_P_RATE_VAL(INDEX) := P_RATE_COMP(INDEX);  
it INDEX <= 2 then

TL_CMP_V3_TAS_VAL(INDEX) := TAS_COMP(INDEX);  
end if;  
end loop;  

CHMמספר1 := 5;  
CHM_SYNC.J;  

end MANAGE_IL_SENSORS.V3;  

Figure A-9 Procedure MANAGE_IL_SENSORS_V3 (Sheet 2 of 2)
package CHNL_3_IL_VOTER is

   type REAL_VECTOR is array (0 .. 4) of REAL;
   type INTEGER_VECTOR is array (0 .. 4) of INTEGER;
   type BOOLEAN_VECTOR is array (0 .. 4) of BOOLEAN;

   NUM_SENSORS : INTEGER range 2 .. 4 := 2;
   NUM_VOTES : INTEGER range 0 .. 4 := 0;
   SET_NUM : INTEGER range 1 .. 5 := 1;

   type INCL_VECTOR is array (INTEGER range <>) of BOOLEAN;
   type REAL_VECTOR is array (INTEGER range <>) of REAL;

   IL_COMP_COUNT : array (1 .. 4) of INTEGER range 0 .. 17 := (others => (others => 0));
   IL_FLAG_COUNT : array (1 .. 4) of INTEGER range 0 .. 5 := (others => (others => 0));
   IL_FLAG_IN : array (1 .. 4) of BOOLEAN := (others => (others => FALSE));
   IL_COMP_OUT : array (1 .. 4) of BOOLEAN := (others => (others => TRUE));

end CHNL_3_IL_VOTER;

Figure A-10 Package CHNL_3_IL_VOTER (Sheet 1 of 4)
package body CHNL_3_IL_VOTER is

procedure Chck_IL_FLAGS(IL_FLAGS : in BOOLEAN_VECTOR ; SET_NUM, NUM_SENSORS : in INTEGER) is

begin
  for INDEX in 1..NUM_SENSORS loop
    case IL_FLAG_COUNT(SET_NUM, INDEX) is
      when 0 => -- normal
        if IL_FLAGS(INDEX) = FALSE then
          IL_FLAG_COUNT(SET_NUM, INDEX) := 1;
        end if;
      when 1..5 => -- failed
        if IL_FLAGS(INDEX) = FALSE then
          IL_FLAG_COUNT(SET_NUM, INDEX) :=
            IL_FLAG_COUNT(SET_NUM, INDEX) + 1;
          if IL_FLAG_COUNT(SET_NUM, INDEX) >= 9 then
            IL_FLAG_IN(SET_NUM, INDEX) := FALSE;
            IL_FLAG_COUNT(SET_NUM, INDEX) := 1;
          end if;
        else IL_FLAG_COUNT(SET_NUM, INDEX) := 0;
        end if;
      when -5..-1 => -- naively
        if IL_FLAGS(INDEX) = TRUE then
          IL_FLAG_COUNT(SET_NUM, INDEX) :=
            IL_FLAG_COUNT(SET_NUM, INDEX) - 1;
          if IL_FLAG_COUNT(SET_NUM, INDEX) <= -5 then
            IL_FLAG_IN(SET_NUM, INDEX) := TRUE;
            IL_FLAG_COUNT(SET_NUM, INDEX) := 0;
          end if;
        else IL_FLAG_COUNT(SET_NUM, INDEX) := -1;
        end if;
      end case;
    end loop;
end Chck_IL_FLAGS;

Figure A-10 Package CHNL_3_IL_VOTER (Sheet 2 of 4)
procedure VOTE_IL_SENSORS(IL_SENSORS : in REAL_VECTOR ; SEL_NUM,
NUM_SENSORS : in INTEGER ; IL_SENSORS_RFU : out FLOAT) is

SEL_RANKING : array (1..4) of INTEGER range 0..4 := (U, U, U, U, 0) :
V : array (1..4) of FLOAT := (0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0) :
TEMP : FLOAT := 0.0 ;

begin

NUM_VOTES := NUM_SENSORS ;
for INDEX in 1..NUM_SENSORS loop
  if IL_SENSORS_RFU(SF1_NUM, INDEX) = FALSE
    then NUM_VOTES := NUM_VOTES - 1 ;
    SEL_RANKING(INDEX) := INDEX ;
  end loop ;
for INDEX in 1..NUM_VOTES loop
  for CHNL_NUM in INDEX .. 4 loop
    if CHNL_NUM = SEL_RANKING(CHNL_NUM) then
      V(INDEX) := IL_SENSORS(CHNL_NUM) ;
      exit ;
    end if ;
  end loop ;
case NUM_VOTES is
  when 0 =>
    null ;
  when 1 =>
    IL_SENSORS_RFU := V(1) ;
  when 2 =>
    if V(1) < V(2)
      then IL_SENSORS_RFU := V(1) ;
      SEL_RANKING(INDEX) := INDEX ;
    end if ;
  when 3 | 4 =>
    for I in 1..NUM_VOTES-1 loop
      for J in I+1..NUM_VOTES loop
        if V(I) > V(J) then
          TEMP := V(I) ;
          V(I) := V(J) ;
          V(J) := TEMP ;
          exit ;
        end if ;
      end loop ;
    end loop ;
    IL_SENSORS_RFU := V(2) ;
  end case ;
end VOTE_IL_SENSORS ;

Figure A-10 Package CHNL_3_IL_VOTER (Sheet 3 of 4)
procedure Cnf_FAULT_LOGIC; TL_SENSORS : in REAL_VECTOR; TL_SENSORS_WED : in FLOAT; SET_NUM, NUM_SENSORS : in INTEGER; IL_COMP_VAL : out REAL_VECTOR) is

AMPL_LIMIT : constant array (1..5) of FLOAT := (0.2, 0.2, 1.25, 1.0, 10.0); MAX_CT : constant array (1..5) of INTEGER := (5, 8, 8, 10, 1); begin

for INDEX in 1..SET_NUM loop
  case IL_COMP_COUNT(SFI_NUM, INDEX) is
    when 0 => -- Normal
      if abs(IL_SENSORS_WED - IL_SENSORS(INDEX)) >= AMPL_LIMIT(SET_NUM) then IL_COMP_COUNT(SET_NUM, INDEX) := 1; end if;
    when 1..10 => -- Faulty
      if abs(IL_SENSORS_WED - IL_SENSORS(INDEX)) >= AMPL_LIMIT(SET_NUM) then IL_COMP_COUNT(SET_NUM, INDEX) := 1; if IL_COMP_COUNT(SET_NUM, INDEX) >= MAX_CT(SET_NUM) then IL_COMP_OUT(SET_NUM, INDEX) := FALSE; IL_COMP_COUNT(SET_NUM, INDEX) := 17; end if;
    end if;
    when 17 => -- Recovering
      IL_COMP_COUNT(SET_NUM, INDEX) := 0; end if;
    when 18 => -- Failed
      null;
    end case;
  end loop;

end Cnf_FAULT_LOGIC;
end CHNL_3_IL_VOTER;

Figure A-10  Package CHNL_3_IL_VOTER (Sheet 4 of 4)
Figure A-11 Procedure CALC_INNER_LOOP_V3 (Sheet 1 of 2)
If \( \text{abs}(\text{PS-TICK-MF}) \leq 0.05 \) 
then \( \text{PS-TICK-MF} := 0.0 \); 
end if;

if \( \text{abs}(\text{CP-STICK-MED}) \leq 0.05 \) 
then \( \text{CP-STICK-MED} := 0.0 \); 
end if;

if \( \text{abs} \left( \text{TOT-STICK} \right) \leq 1.25 \) 
then \( \text{TOT-STICK} := 1.25 \); 
else \( \text{TOT-STICK} := -1.25 \); 
end if;

if \( \text{not INITIALIZE} \) 
then \( \text{ULD-AVG} = \text{AVG} \); 
else if \( \text{ULD-HV} = \text{AVG} \) 
then \( \text{ULD-HV} = \text{AVG} \); 
end if;

\( \text{IL-STAB-CMD} := \text{K-RATE} \cdot \text{K-STICK} \cdot \text{K-RATE} + \text{K-STICK} \cdot \text{K-RATE} \); 

if \( \text{MODE} = \text{DO} \) 
then \( \text{GL-STAB-CMD} := 0.15 \cdot \text{FLUAT} \); 
else \( \text{UL-STAB-CMD} := 0.0 \); 
end if;

if \( \text{TOT-STAB-CMD} > 1.0 \) 
then \( \text{TOT-STAB-CMD} := 1.0 \); 
else if \( \text{TOT-STAB-CMD} < -0.0 \) 
then \( \text{TOT-STAB-CMD} := -0.0 \); 
end if;

\( \text{STAB-CMD} := \text{STAB-CMD} \times \text{OUT} \); 

\( \text{CMV} := \text{CMV} \cdot \text{CMV} \times \text{CMV} \); 

end CALC-INNER_LOOP_V3;
package IL_RESOURCES

package TL_RESOURCES is

DEL_K_STICK : constant FLOAT := 0.4/350.0 ;
DEL_K_ALPHA : constant FLOAT := 0.1/350.0 ;
DEL_K_P_RATE : constant FLOAT := 0.1/350.0 ;

-- Angle-of-Attack High-Pass Filter Coefficients

AOA1_K : constant := 800.0/601.0 ;
AQA1_KM1 : constant := -800.0/601.0 ;
AQA1_KM1 : constant := 799.0/601.0 ;

WINAVG_AOA_AMD, UND_AOA_AMD : FLOAT := 0.0 ;
INITIALIZED : BOOLEAN := FALSE ;

end TL_RESOURCES ;

Figure A-12 Package IL_RESOURCES
with CHANNEL_REFSCIRCLES; use CHANNEL_REFSCIRCUITS;
with VOTING_PLANES; use VOTING_PLANES;
with SEPARATE_FOCI_LOGIC;

procedure ASSESS_SYSTEM_V3 is

CP_STK_CT, P_STK_CT, ANAL_CT, 
CPPTH_CT
P_RATE_CT
TAN_CT

GULF

begin

if CHANNEL_STATUS = TRUE 

then CPPTH_CT := CPPTH_CT + 1;

end if;

if CHANNEL_STATUS = TRUE 
then CPPTH_CT := CPPTH_CT + 1;

end if;

if CHANNEL_STATUS = TRUE 
then CPPTH_CT := CPPTH_CT + 1;

end if;

if CHANNEL_STATUS = TRUE 
then CPPTH_CT := CPPTH_CT + 1;

end if;

for INDEX in 1..4 loop

if ILCOMP_V3.CP_STK_VAL(INDEX) = TRUE 
then CP_STK_CT := CP_STK_CT + 1;

end if;

if ILCOMP_V3.P_STK_VAL (INDEX) = TRUE 
then P_STK_CT := P_STK_CT + 1;

end if;

if ILCOMP_V3.LF_AUA_VAI(INDEX) = TRUE and 
ILCOMP_V3.AC_AUA_VAI(INDEX) = TRUE 
then ANAL_CT := ANAL_CT + 1;

end if;

if INDEX = 1 and then 
ILCOMP_V3.PHAE_VAI(INDEX) = TRUE 
then P_RATE_CT := P_RATE_CT + 1;

end if;

if INDEX = 2 and then 
ILCOMP_V3.ITA катал (INDEX) = TRUE 
then TAN_CT := TAN_CT + 1;

end if;

end loop;

end ASSESS_SYSTEM_V3;

Figure A-13 Procedure ASSESS_SYSTEM_V3 (Sheet 1 of 2)
begin

if KATF_CT = 2 and IAS_CT = 2 then UN_ON := FALSE;
if AOA_CT = 4 and CHPH_CT = 4 and
(CP_STA_CT = 4 or else P_STA_CT = 4 or else
(CP_STA_CT = 4 and P_STA_CT = 3)) then FLY_STATUS_V3 := OP_STATE1;
elsif AOA_CT = 3 and CHPH_CT = 3 and
(P_STA_CT = 3 or else (P_STA_CT = 2 and P_STA_CT = 2)) then FLY_STATUS_V3 := OP_STATE2;
elsif AOA_CT = 2 and CHPH_CT = 2 and
(P_STA_CT = 2 or else P_STA_CT = 2) then FLY_STATUS_V3 := OP_STATE3;
elsif AOA_CT = 1 and CHPH_CT = 1 and
(P_STA_CT = 1 or else P_STA_CT = 1) then FLY_STATUS_V3 := OP_STATE4;
else FLY_STATUS_V3 := THRU;
end if;
else UN_ON := TRUE;
end if;
if UN_ON = TRUE then
  if having factors
  then L:
    if AOA_CT = 2 and CHPH_CT = 2 then
      if (P_STA_CT = 2 or else P_STA_CT = 2) then 
        FLY_STATUS_V3 := OP_STATE1;
      elseif AOA_CT = 2 and CHPH_CT = 2 then
        if (P_STA_CT = 2 or else P_STA_CT = 2) then 
          FLY_STATUS_V3 := OP_STATE2;
        elseif AOA_CT = 2 and CHPH_CT = 2 then
          if (P_STA_CT = 2 or else P_STA_CT = 2) then 
            FLY_STATUS_V3 := OP_STATE3;
          elseif AOA_CT = 2 and CHPH_CT = 2 then
            if (P_STA_CT = 2 or else P_STA_CT = 2) then 
              FLY_STATUS_V3 := OP_STATE4;
            else FLY_STATUS_V3 := THRU;
          end if;
        end if;
      end if;
    end if;
  end if;
case FLY_STATUS_V3 is
    when UP_STATE1 | OP_STATE2 => 
      FLY_QUAL_V3 := NORM;
    when UP_STATE3 | OP_STATE4 => 
      if P_RATE_CT = 2 and AOA_CT = 2 and
        IAS_CT = 2 and (P_STA_CT = 2 or else P_STA_CT = 2) then 
        FLY_QUAL_V3 := NORM;
      elseif P_RATE_CT = 2 and AOA_CT = 2 and
        IAS_CT = 2 and (P_STA_CT = 2 or else P_STA_CT = 2) then 
        FLY_QUAL_V3 := DEFALTD;
      elseif P_RATE_CT = 2 and AOA_CT = 2 and
        IAS_CT = 2 and (P_STA_CT = 2 or else P_STA_CT = 2) then 
        FLY_QUAL_V3 := WRTNL;
      else FLY_QUAL_V3 := UNFLY;
      end if;
    end case;

CHNL_1_CHKNUM := 7;
XCHK_SYNCED :=
end ASSESS_SYSTEM_V3;

Figure A-13 Procedure_ASSESS_SYSTEM_V3 (Sheet 2 of 2)
WITH-WAVING-PLANS; USE-WAVING-PLANS;
WITH-WAVING-CHECKS; USE-WAVING-CHECKS;
BEGIN(WAVE-LUGIC)
PROCEDURE GIVE-WARNING_V3 IS

BEGIN
    CASE FLASH-WARNING_V3 IS
        WHEN OFF =>
            IF AL-WARN_V3 THEN
                WARN_V3.AUTOCLANG := AL-WARN_V3;
                NUM_FAULTS := 1;
                FLASH_WARNING_V3 := BLINKING;
            END IF;
        CASE FBM.STATUS_V3 IS
            WHEN UP.STATE_1 =>
                WHEN UP.STATE_2 =>
                    WARN_V3.FLY-RI cogn := UP.STATE_2;
                    FLASH_WARNING_V3 := BLINKING;
                    NUM_FAULTS := INTEGFR'SUCC(NUM_FAULTS);
                WHEN UP.STATE_3 =>
                    WARN_V3.FLY-RI cogn := UP.STATE_3;
                    FLASH_WARNING_V3 := BLINKING;
                    NUM_FAULTS := INTEGFR'SUCC(NUM_FAULTS);
                WHEN UP.STATE_4 =>
                    WARN_V3.FLY-RI cogn := UP.STATE_4;
                    FLASH_WARNING_V3 := BLINKING;
                    NUM_FAULTS := INTEGFR'SUCC(NUM_FAULTS);
            END CASE;
            IF FLY-QUAL_V3 THEN
                WARN_V3.FLY-QUAL := IMPAIR.FLY-Q;
                NUM_FAULTS := INTEGFR'SUCC(NUM_FAULTS);
                FLASH_WARNING_V3 := BLINKING;
            END IF;
        WHEN BLINKING =>
            IF ACKER-START THEN
                FLASH_WARNING_V3 := STEADY; -- fault(s) noted
            END IF;
        WHEN UPSTATE_STATUS(AL-WARN_V3, FBM.STATUS_V3, FLY-QUAL_V3 ,
            WARN_V3, FLASH_WARNING_V3) ;
        WHEN STEADY =>
            UPSTATE_STATUS(AL-WARN_V3, FBM.STATUS_V3, FLY-QUAL_V3 ,
            WARN_V3, FLASH_WARNING_V3) ;
    END CASE;
    CALL_LATCH_CHK_NUM := b;
    LATCH_CHK_NUM;
    GIVE_WARNING_V3;
END GIVE_WARNING_V3;

Figure A-14 Procedure GIVE_WARNING_V3
with DFCS_LOGIC ; use DFCS_LOGIC ;
package WARNING_CHECKS is

  NUM_FAULTS : INTEGER range 0..3 := 0;

procedure UPDATE_STATUS(AL_AHN_V3: in AL_STATUS; FLW_STATUS: in FLY_QUALITY; WARM_V3: in our WARNING_STATUS; FLASH_WARMING_V3: out MASTER_WARM) is
  begin
    if WARM_V3.AUT Land = FLANK and then
      AL_AHN_V3 <= CAT_LINUp
      then FLASH_WARMING_V3 := BLINKING ;
      NUM_FAULTS := INTFGEK*SUCCE(NUM_FAULTS) ;
    elsif AL_AHN_V3 = BLANK
      then WARM_V3.AUT Land = FLANK ;
      NUM_FAULTS := INTFGEK*SUCCE(NUM_FAULTS) ;
    end if ;
    if WARM_V3.FLY_RY_INF = BLANK and then
      FLW_STATUS := UP_STATUS ;
      then WARM_V3.FLY_RY_INF := UP_STATUS ;
      FLASH_WARMING_V3 := BLINKING ;
      NUM_FAULTS := INTFGEK*SUCCE(NUM_FAULTS) ;
    elsif AL_AHN_V3.FLW_RY_WIRL = OP_STATUS ;
      then FLW_STATUS := UP_STATUS ;
      AL_AHN_V3.FLW_RY_WIRL := OP_STATUS ;
    end if ;
  end if ;
end WARNING_CHECKS ;

package body WARNING_CHECKS is

procedure UPDATE_STATUS(AL_AHN_V3: in AL_STATUS; FLW_STATUS: in FLY_QUALITY; WARM_V3: in our WARNING_STATUS; FLASH_WARMING_V3: out MASTER_WARM) is
  begin
    if WARM_V3.AUT Land = FLANK and then
      AL_AHN_V3 <= CAT_LINUp
      then FLASH_WARMING_V3 := BLINKING ;
      NUM_FAULTS := INTFGEK*SUCCE(NUM_FAULTS) ;
    elsif AL_AHN_V3 = BLANK
      then WARM_V3.AUT Land = FLANK ;
      NUM_FAULTS := INTFGEK*SUCCE(NUM_FAULTS) ;
    end if ;
    if WARM_V3.FLY_RY_INF = BLANK and then
      FLW_STATUS := UP_STATUS ;
      then WARM_V3.FLY_RY_INF := UP_STATUS ;
      FLASH_WARMING_V3 := BLINKING ;
      NUM_FAULTS := INTFGEK*SUCCE(NUM_FAULTS) ;
    elsif AL_AHN_V3.FLW_RY_WIRL = OP_STATUS ;
      then FLW_STATUS := UP_STATUS ;
      AL_AHN_V3.FLW_RY_WIRL := OP_STATUS ;
    end if ;
  end if ;
end WARNING_CHECKS ;

Figure A-15 Package WARNING_CHECKS (Sheet 1 of 2)
else if \( \text{WARM}_V3, \text{FLY}_Qually = \text{BLANK} \) then
  \( \text{NUM_FAULTS} = \text{INTG}(\text{PHDF}(\text{NUM_FAULTS})) \)
  if \( \text{NUM_FAULTS} = 0 \) then \( \text{FLASH.Warning}_V3 = \text{OFF} \) -- All Faults Healed
end if;
when \( \text{CP.STATE}_2 \) then
  if \( \text{WARN}_V3, \text{FLY}_By_\text{WIRE} = \text{UP.STATE}_3 \) then
    \( \text{APN.Route} = \text{APN.Route}_2 \) end if;
  if \( \text{WARN}_V3, \text{FLY}_By_\text{WIRE} = \text{UP.STATE}_4 \) then
    \( \text{APN.Route} = \text{APN.Route}_2 \) end if;
end when;
when \( \text{UP.STATE}_3 \) then
  if \( \text{WARN}_V3, \text{FLY}_By_\text{WIRE} = \text{UP.STATE}_3 \) then
    \( \text{APN.Route} = \text{APN.Route}_2 \) end if;
end when;
when \( \text{UP.STATE}_4 \) then
  \( \text{null} \) end case;
end when;
if \( \text{warn}_V3, \text{FLY}_Qualy = \text{BLANK} \) and then
  \( \text{FLY.Qualy}_V3 = \text{UP.GATE} \)
then
  \( \text{FLASH.Warning}_V3 = \text{BLINK} \) -- New Fault
elsif \( \text{warn}_V3, \text{FLY}_Qualy = \text{INVQ} \) and then
  \( \text{FLY.Qualy}_V3 = \text{NORMAL} \)
then
  \( \text{FLASH.Warning}_V3 = \text{BLINK} \) -- One Fault Healed
elsif \( \text{NUM_FAULTS = 0} \) then
  \( \text{FLASH.Warning}_V3 = \text{OFF} \) -- All Faults Healed
end if;
end UPDATE.STATUS;
end WARNING_CHECKS;

Figure A-15 Package WARNING_CHECKS (Sheet 2 of 2)
END
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