COURTNERING TERRORISM
IN THE LATE 1980s AND THE 1990s
Future Threats and Opportunities for the United States

CENTER FOR AEROSPACE DOCTRINE, RESEARCH, AND EDUCATION
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Future Threats and Opportunities for the United States

by

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ABSTRACT

Although terrorism has been practiced since before the dawn of recorded history, it has never constituted the worldwide threat it does today. The proliferation of arms and the very real potential for nuclear terrorism combine with immediate worldwide mobility and highly sophisticated technology to put terrorism near the top of threats that must be effectively countered.

Some terrorist groups practice local terrorism, others practice international terrorism. The United States has its own terrorist groups; for example, the Armed Forces of Puerto Rican Liberation (FALN), the Black Liberation Army, and the Jewish Defense League. And it is probable that spillover from the Middle East will reach the United States. But the greatest danger may well be from new extremist groups. One group that is "ripe" for such development is that of Central and South American immigrants for whom the "American Dream" seems impossibly remote; and there is reason to believe that the Cuban intelligence service will continue to promote terrorist group development here.

Alternatives for countering terrorism will depend on the group's organization and operation, the need for a counterterrorist cadre, the need for psychological operations, and the need for integration of counterterrorism efforts.
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Dr Sloan has pioneered the development of simulations of terrorist incidents to assist concerned personnel and organizations in the public and private sector to respond to threats and acts of terrorism. He has conducted more than 16 exercises with US military forces overseas and in the United States. He has also conducted simulations for various domestic police departments and for the corporate sector. He is an author of three books, coauthored another, and has written numerous articles on terrorism. Dr Sloan's latest books are The Pocket Guide to Safe Travel (1986), and Beating International Terrorism (1986).
COUNTERING TERRORISM IN THE LATE 1980s AND THE 1990s

It is particularly difficult to assess changes in terrorist tactics and strategy over the long term; if there is a "fog of war," there is an even denser "smog of terrorism." The clandestine character of the terrorist infrastructure, the emergence of new and yet unknown groups, the shifting coalitions of organizations and their relationships to their state sponsors, the rise of new causes, and the ready availability of numerous targets makes even a general forecasting of future trends a frustrating, hazardous undertaking. And yet such an undertaking is essential if the United States is ever going to respond effectively to and take the initiative against this particularly invidious threat to its national security; and this threat is quite likely to intensify from the late 1980s into the mid-1990s. Such forecasting is especially important if Washington is to move beyond its preoccupation with present threats and incidents as well as the revelations and accompanying debates surrounding "Irangate" that act as an impediment to the development of an effective counterterrorism strategy and its attendant capabilities. The United States must go on the offensive against those terrorist groups and their state sponsors who are waging and will continue to wage their own form of a protracted war of attrition against US interests at home and overseas.

Terrorism forecasting is especially important in providing an analytical frame of reference that can be used for formulating and implementing actions by the intelligence community which must play a central role in combating terrorism. Schlomo Gazit and Michael Handel may overstate the military aspect of the terrorist threat, given their
Israeli perspective, but they are on the mark when they make the following point about the role of intelligence in counterterrorist operations and campaigns.

It should perhaps be emphasized that in counterterrorism warfare more than any other type of war, the intelligence organization is on the forefront of military operations; frequently the border between intelligence work and combat activity is blurred.¹

The intelligence function is absolutely essential in formulating any strategy that seeks to provide guidance for covering civilian and military measures associated with the development of short- and long-term counterterrorist actions. This paper seeks to assist those who are involved in or concerned about the intelligence community and who are or will be on the forefront in meeting a danger that has aptly been called "a new mode of conflict." This paper also endeavors to promote discussion of the requirements for meeting an increasingly major threat to national security. It will do so by addressing:

° Types of terrorist groups that will be operating from the mid-1980s to mid-1990s and their threats to US national interests domestically and abroad.

° Possible alternatives for influencing the behavior of the coming generation of terrorists and their state sponsors.

An underlying question must be considered by the intelligence community, which has the primary task of penetrating the "smog of terrorism": What kinds of information will the United States need to meet the changing threat of terrorism as we move toward the twenty-first century?

Terrorist Groups and Their Threats to US Interests

In assessing the types of terrorist groups that are likely to be operating in the late 1980s to mid-1990s time frame and in evaluating
the threats that they may pose to US interests, it is important to engage in two analytical steps. In surveying the terrorist landscape, it will be necessary to present a brief classification of different groups in order to ascertain major patterns of terrorist organizations and operations. Failure to do so may blur the necessary analytical capabilities required to forecast future trends. At the same time, it must be stressed that in the search for long-term terrorist patterns, it is important to avoid bringing artificial analytic order out of chaos by maintaining that there is a highly organized and cohesive "terror network" that can be readily identified. It is probably more prudent to suggest that there are a variety of highly complex terrorist networks that are constantly subject to change.

It is also essential to survey the terrorist groups as they now exist in order to have a baseline to project both continuity and change in terrorist organizations, tactics, and strategies in the coming years. While there indeed may be major changes in objectives and operations, the various terrorist groups have nevertheless developed their own methods of operation; and many of them will be resistant to change.

A number of useful classifications can be used to establish a framework for analyzing present and future terrorist groups. Professor Richard Shultz, for example, developed a typology of political terrorism, which categorizes terrorism as revolutionary, subrevolutionary, or establishment; the Central Intelligence Agency, in a pioneering study, primarily differentiated between transnational and international terrorism. It is also useful to classify groups based on their ideologies and associated belief systems (e.g.,
nationalist, Islamic, Communist), ethnic, protest groups, and state sponsorship.

Some terrorist groups essentially practice internal or national terrorism. Their field of operations is a limited geographic area, and their major objective is often the seizure of state power. In contrast, some groups practice nonterritorial international terrorism, and their field of operations is not geographically limited. In these cases, the major objective may be the destabilization of either a region or the entire political and social order.

In the case of groups practicing local internal terrorism, ethnic, linguistic, sectarian, and subnational groups will continue to engage in acts of terrorism against existing regimes. In Western Europe, ETA-M and the ETA-PM (Basque Fatherland and Freedom) will probably pursue their separate objectives (from the Spanish political system) in the near term. The Provisional Wing of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) will continue their assaults against British rule while the Ulster Defense Association (UDA) will offer its own extremist alternative to the "Irish problem." In France, terrorism will continue to be employed by such organizations as the Association of Corsican Patriots (APC) and Corsican Revolutionary Action. These and other groups will persist even though attempts to resolve subnational conflict through political accommodation may lessen the appeal of a number of their causes. Unfortunately, the inherently nature of deeply embedded ethnic and sectarian animosity, and the continued existence of the "men of violence" who have a vested interest in perpetuating conflicts, will enable a number of these groups to survive and others to emerge and purport to represent their causes.
communities. By themselves, these groups will in all probability not represent a major threat to US interests overseas, but they will continue to be a threat if they are willing to be mercenaries for nonterritorial terrorist organizations or agents for such states as Libya, Iran, and Syria. These states support highly diverse terrorist organizations as an integral aspect of their foreign policy.

The United States has been spared large-scale systematic campaigns of terrorism like those of the European separatists. In part, this may be because the political system has offered means to accommodate ethnic demands and communities have therefore not become so alienated from the national mainstream that they constitute a recruiting ground for terrorism. Also, the absence of such campaigns may result from the sheer size of the country or from effective measures by law enforcement agencies at the state, local, and national levels to prevent or deter terrorism. But in all probability, the fact that domestic terrorist groups have not become a serious threat to national security may also be a matter of luck and timing. The outlook for the emergence of territorially based groups within the United States may be an area of more concern in the next ten years.

This is not to suggest that the United States does not have its own separatist groups who have and will continue to use terrorism to pursue their political agendas. The Armed Forces of Puerto Rican Liberation (FALN) and the Macheteros have continued to assault US military personnel and installations both in Puerto Rico and on the mainland. In addition, there are organizations that represent extremist views in a number of ethnic communities: the Black Liberation Army, the Croatian Revolutionary Army, the Jewish Defense League, the Justice Commandos for
Armenian Genocide, and others. These groups will continue to justify the use of terrorism in seeking their own objectives. And they have their counterparts in the far right of the political spectrum. The Ku Klux Klan, despite recent reverses, may yet resort to terrorism; and there is valid concern that heavily armed extremists from the survivalist movement (e.g., the Aryan nations and the posse comitatus) may regroup and outgun authorities in future incidents.

But perhaps of greater concern in the next ten years will be the evolution and development of new extremist groups. Some might feed on the anger and frustration of recent Central and South American immigrants who will not realize their own version of the American dream. And there is reason to believe that the Cuban intelligence service (DGI) and other organizations opposed to US interests in the region will continue to develop, support, and provide agents to be activated in future operations against American targets.

In addition, it is probable that the spillover from the Middle Eastern conflict that has led to terrorism on the streets of London, Paris, and Bonn will come to the United States. The Ayatollah and the Islamic fundamentalists who might succeed him must be taken at their word when they say that ultimately they will attack the heartland of what they regard to be the "great satan." They are most likely to introduce agents to encourage the development and activation of terrorist organizations in Shiite communities within the United States. And Colonel Qadhafi's attempts to gain support from extremists in black Islamic fundamentalist groups may stimulate other states to do the same.

Finally, there is valid concern that extremists within the environmental movement and other issue-oriented movements (e.g.,
antiabortionists) will increasingly resort to bombing as a form of "armed propaganda" for their respective causes. Local internal terrorism is therefore likely to bring the terrorist war home in the next few years unless appropriate strategies are formulated and acted on in the immediate future.

What is particularly alarming for US interests both at home and overseas is the fact that the next generation of terrorists will probably have the capability to acquire a growing arsenal of sophisticated automatic and standoff weapons (e.g., heat-seeking missiles) that will enable them to inflict damage on the delicate infrastructure of the industrial order. This next generation of terrorists will have the ability to practice a form of violence undreamed of by the Weathermen and other groups who relied on the Anarchist Cookbook and such crude weaponry as the fertilizer bomb. We will witness the assault on American interests by the "techno-guerrilla" who will strike at power plants, electric grid systems, and the soft underbelly of the growing service industry--especially computer systems. Such guerrillas could possibly immobilize the routine functions of the industrial/service complex, which would have a devastating impact on the US population. In this, they may be assisted by highly skilled apolitical terrorists motivated by excitement and money, or by criminals who will take advantage of the opportunity to engage in a form of highly profitable extortion undreamed of in the past. These terrorists may be part of

the emergence of a semi-permanent subculture of terrorism. As succeeding generations of terrorists replace those arrested or killed and acquire a following of active supporters, groupies, sympathizers, lawyers, propagandists, and chroniclers--all in some way dependent on the survival of the terrorist group and
the continuation of its activities—it may become a political underground that is able to survive the fate of any specific terrorist group. It may develop its own service industries, providing legal documents and weapons as well as fences for stolen cash and ransoms.7

That subculture has already emerged; terrorism has become a big business. The practitioners of the incredibly profitable narcoterrorism have joined forces with terrorist insurgents in both the countryside and the boardroom to acquire, launder, disperse, and make legitimate the fruits of vast criminal enterprises. Despite Washington's current war against drugs, other insurgent organizations, like M-19 and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), will forge unholy alliances with the drug traffickers.

Most ominous of all is the possibility that both internal and international nonterritorial terrorists will not only acquire the ability but also have the willingness to engage in mass terrorism through the use of chemical and biological agents and nuclear weapons. We may witness the development of fanatical groups who are not concerned about public opinion or the reaction of governments because they regard their acts as a religious obligation for which there need not be a concern for secular accountability. The thought of the nuclear equivalent of the car bomber cannot be handily dismissed. The dislocation caused by a demented individual in the Tylenol tampering pales in comparison to the panic and paralysis that could occur if dedicated and highly trained terrorists had the capability and the willingness to engage in an act of mass terrorism.

It must be recognized that these technologically oriented terrorists will also have the capability to spread their message of fear.
and intimidation to a global audience on a scale that is yet to be fully realized. They will increasingly have their own underground studios where they can cover and quite possibly stage their own incidents. The Baader Mienhof Gang monopolized West German television coverage by providing tapes with an appeal from their captive, Hans-Martin Scheyer; and similar tapes showing American hostages have already been played on the American networks. With the proliferation of cable channels, there will be even more opportunities to penetrate the consciousness of a mass audience.

In the international arena, it is quite evident that terrorism will continue to be used by those who would test the resolve of the United States to maintain and protect its international interests. Present events underscore that, although Washington is acquiring a body of doctrine and a capability to fight "small wars," it is by no means clear that the American public, still semitraumatized by the Indochinese experience and stung by the unfolding revelations of "Irangate," will have the resolve to engage in protracted wars. Will the United States, as a government and a people, have the dedication to fight that particularly "dirty war" known as terrorism? The question must be raised by those who are and will be in the forefront of combating terrorism in the next decades.

What is perhaps an even more challenging threat to US interests in the late 1980s to the mid-1990s is the development of organizations and groups that practice nonterritorial terrorism. These groups are not limited to a geographically confined field of operations. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) developed this form of terrorism when it became clear that its insurgency operations within Israel and the
occupied territories were not effective. Skyjacking and the seizure and murder of the Israeli athletes at Munich enabled the PLO and groups that followed to literally have the world as a target of opportunity. Within the PLO, there was and still is a view of a revolutionary transformation throughout the Middle East. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), for example, has this broader regional view; while it calls for the destruction of the state of Israel, it also seeks to promote a Marxist revolution throughout the states of the Middle East. But the threat posed by such diverse organizations has until recently not been a major threat to US interests overseas. The seizure of aircraft with Americans on board presents a challenge to US resolve; but it hardly threatens the United States. The bulk of early terrorist operations took place within Israel and the tragic battlefield of Lebanon and spilled over into the states of Western Europe. Then came the seizure of the American embassy in Iran and the bombing of the American embassy and Marine Amphibious Brigade Headquarters in Beirut. US interests and personnel in Western Europe and the Middle East are increasingly subject to attack. Particularly under the sponsorship of the Iranian and Syrian governments—for their own national objectives—such groups as Islamic Jihad and Hizbullah are expanding their attacks against US interests.

Nonterritorial terrorism fed by Islamic fundamentalism has also had and will increasingly have serious security implications for Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates. The attack on the Grand Mosque and the assaults in Kuwait serve as a clear indication that these societies, caught between the desire to modernize and the desire to retain traditional values, will be threatened by a new generation of
nonterritorial terrorists. They will be confronted by terrorists who think they are not modernizing quickly enough to meet their version of a "people's democracy" and by terrorists who maintain that the modernization process is destroying values and institutions that must be preserved. In the next decades, these states will increasingly recognize that the payment of blood money to terrorist groups will not give them immunity to attack; but as we shall see, this may open useful alternatives for the United States in combating terrorism in the next several years.

It should also be noted that such European terrorist groups as Direct Action, the Fighting Communist Cells, the Red Army Faction, and other organizations that wish to destroy NATO and dismantle the multinational corporations are calling for a destabilization that transcends the boundaries of individual states. They, and the groups that follow them, will continue to form alliances with other nonterritorial terrorists in the coming years.

Finally, it must be recognized that these nonterritorial terrorist groups, like their territorial counterparts, will ultimately not only attack US interests overseas, but be indirectly involved in supporting operations within the United States. In addition to state-sponsored terrorism, we will increasingly see terrorist groups acting as the cadre to train new nonterritorial groups that will strike at targets within the United States. In Nicaragua, for example, nonterritorial terrorists experienced in the arts of terrorist warfare are training new terrorists to attack US interests both at home and abroad. Faced with this reality, it is imperative that the United States forge a strategy. The intelligence community, especially, must be willing to recognize that America is not immune to nonterritorial or territorially based terrorism.
Alternatives for Influencing Terrorist Behaviors

While terrorism will pose a growing threat to national security into the mid-1990s, the threat should not be viewed as immune to counteraction. Indeed, the threat may provide new opportunities for Washington to develop innovative programs that take the initiative against terrorism. It is now time to develop an effective counterterrorism strategy that can assist the intelligence community in meeting its heavy responsibility of being at the forefront of combating the terrorist threat as it evolves over the next several years.

The outlines of such strategy will be predicated on:

- terrorist organization and operation,
- the need for a counterterrorist cadre,
- the use of psychological operations, and
- the need for integration of counterterrorism operations.

Terrorist Organization and Operation

The very success of various terrorist organizations may have increasingly generated a liability. Terrorist groups have been a difficult target for intelligence collection precisely because they have been composed of small clandestine cells that have been hard to identify, much less penetrate. This has, to a degree, changed—especially in reference to various "old-line" organizations. The PLO, for example, enjoyed the advantages of clandestinity until it literally became a state within a state in Lebanon. As a result, it faced a number of vulnerabilities to counterterrorist operations. It became increasingly bureaucratized because it had to maintain a wide variety of activities that required administrative coordination and record keeping.
Consequently, the requirement for auxiliary services often took precedence over the need for a cadre dedicated to combat. The ratio of combat to auxiliary forces decreased, providing an opportunity for intelligence forces to acquire information about their logistical requirements, international linkages, and financial dealings.

Since the Israeli invasion, the PLO has been forced to return to emphasizing the requirement for small clandestine operations instead of running a state within a state. In doing so, it may become less vulnerable as a target of collection—but at a price. It is not the force it was when it was a significant player in the Lebanese quagmire. Other organizations have also lost their clandestine capability by becoming too successful in the short run. The Provisional Wing of the IRA, for example, was so confident at one point that it opted to emulate a traditional military organization; but when it became more easily penetrated by the British intelligence services, it reverted to the clandestine organization that had been difficult for the authorities to counter.

Unlike more organized political organizations, terrorist groups are far easier to analyze through the use of open source material than are small, clandestine groups. Small organizations that promote their cause are perceived as least significant, and yet they suggest future terrorist and infrastructure targets. Information organizations are often considered the least important information sources, yet they can be the most valuable. IT systems, financial and logistical networks, even the mundane, may hold the clues to the group's ability to operate. However, it is important to remember that the ideas behind terrorist organizations may be considered quite legitimate and not entirely inconsistent with those of the state. Terrorist groups have a purpose, goals, and a reason for existence.
is consequently an increased opportunity to analyze the larger terrorist groups.

State sponsorship of larger terrorist groups further enhances their susceptibility to analysis; and it may enable the US intelligence community to more effectively target terrorist groups. It may be far more difficult to identify and intercept personal messages carried by a courier to a member of the Red Army Faction in a safe house in Wiesbaden than to intercept communication between Libya and its People's Bureau in East Berlin. Through effectively using human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities, and by recruiting third-party nationals and working closely with other friendly intelligence services, the United States has the opportunity to not only analyze but penetrate the "smog of terrorism." And when state sponsorship is proven, there is the opportunity to use both conventional military forces and special operations assets against targets in the offending state. The raid on Libya indicates that state sponsorship can become a liability to terrorist groups.

The Need for a Countercadre

Over the last decades we have witnessed the emergence of not only increasingly bureaucratized old-line terrorist groups but also a semipermanent subculture of terrorism. But the development of a larger terrorist infrastructure, including the proliferation of front groups, offers opportunities not only for penetration but also for the development of counterrorist fronts and cadres. These organizations would co-opt, redirect the activities of, or destroy the operational capabilities of terrorist groups. Organizations that are outwardly
sympathetic to the terrorist cause provide the opportunity not only to identify potential recruits for terrorist activities and to penetrate through the layers of infrastructure into the combat cells, but also to turn the terrorist organizational support mechanism and the combat cell against itself. The ability of British intelligence to run the German intelligence agent network in England during the Second World War should not be dismissed as unique to its time. The same techniques may also be employed by the United States. Moreover, the oil-rich states of the Middle East, which will increasingly be threatened by both territorial and nonterritorial terrorists as we move into the 1990s, may be willing to help develop counterterrorist cadres and organizations for their own national security. They, independently and in conjunction with the United States, may seek to increasingly co-opt and control various terrorist groups in the style with which Syria has been largely successful over the past years.

The ability to establish counterorganizations will also be enhanced by the growth of apolitical terrorist bands that may represent a new and frightening service industry. The US intelligence community has the opportunity to penetrate such groups and to create its own organizations to attract and apprehend the new mercenaries and their employers. The techniques of the sting operation can be used in the covert world of counterterrorism operations. There will, of course, be the requirements to develop capabilities that enable individuals to survive and work in a terrorist-underground environment. To acquire the knowledge of a terrorist's mindset without losing one's basic objectivity and values calls for unique and highly dedicated personnel. Furthermore, one cannot develop the necessary language, area expertise, and tradecraft
over a few years--it may take at least a decade. There is also another potential problem: It remains to be seen whether "Irangate" will dry up the necessary funding and training for those officers in the community who are willing to take on the vital role of living in the world of the terrorist. But three fundamental lessons should have been learned from the circumstances of this low-water mark in US covert operations: such operations must be conducted by the professionals in the intelligence community, who must take the lead in conducting such programs; the oversight process cannot be ignored; and neither clandestine nor covert operations can substitute for a consistent and well-thought-out counterterrorism policy.

The Use of Psychological Operations

The stock in trade of the terrorist is the use of fear to coerce and change the attitudes of a target group. As one astute observer notes, terrorism is

a form of psychological warfare (PSYOP). Many other characteristics of terrorism are argued by the drafters of competing definitions, but virtually all include words to the effect that acts of terrorism are directed at a target audience and not just the immediate victim. Without this provision, terrorism would be indistinguishable from other acts of violence.10

Psychological operations should be increasingly used against terrorist groups over the next decade. Gazit and Handel are again on the mark.

Psychological warfare is a powerful weapon in the war against terrorism. Its aim is to hit the terrorist organization at its most vulnerable spot which is the motivation of its members and the readiness of others to join its ranks or to remain and operate within its framework.11
Psychological operations have the potential to unbalance "the center of gravity" of terrorist organizations—the dedication of its membership. The intelligence community, therefore, should constantly play on the theme that the terrorists will not accomplish their objectives. But perhaps even more significant, it should play on the inherent paranoia of terrorist groups and particularly the combat-cadre cell, where a unity of outlook is forged by living in a world of "we versus they"—a world in which there is a mutual reinforcement of the terrorist ideology through generation of paranoia against the outside world. Measures that play on that paranoia by suggesting that there are informers either in the group, within other cells, or within the leadership of the terrorist organization should be increasingly utilized—ideally through agents who, by infiltrating terrorist organizations or forming countercadre, can intimidate the terrorists and break down their unity of outlook. In refining these capabilities, the US intelligence community would be particularly well advised to learn from the experience of the British, French, West Germans, and Italians. These states have effectively fractionalized terrorist groups through the traditional use of informers and by reducing sentences or granting amnesties for those terrorists who are willing to "come out of the cold" and inform on their associates.

The terrorists have been disseminating their message to the widest possible audience. And with the development of hand-held portable cameras and associated television equipment, they even have the potential to produce their own "spectaculars." The intelligence community must use the techniques of advertising to discredit them by
deglamorizing, demystifying, and delegitimizing those who resort to terrorism. There is much to learn from Madison Avenue.

The Need for Integration of Counterterrorism Operations

As the United States moves toward the 1990s, the new generation of terrorists will increasingly conduct a form of conflict that will be neither war nor peace. Or, if one accepts the idea that terrorism is a form of warfare, it will be warfare that "is difficult to deal with in a coherent and planned fashion."\(^2\) Given this reality, the entire intelligence community and the respective military services will have to address more closely what their roles and missions should be in the less-than-coherent battlefield of terrorism and counterterrorism. Such roles and missions must be more clearly defined, for they will determine future data collection and operational requirements.

In the gray area of counterterrorist operations, it may be fairly evident that penetration of a terrorist cell would primarily fall under the responsibilities of civilian intelligence agencies. It might also be relatively clear that full-scale hostage rescue operations would be the responsibility of the military services. But between those two poles, the issues associated with civilian and military roles and missions are not easy to resolve. Unless such issues are addressed, it will not be clear what the data-collection requirements are, or whether they will be based on who is conducting the counterterrorism operation. Perhaps there will even be the need for an integrated civilian/military force having the necessary collection and operational capabilities to function effectively in the ambiguous battlefield of terrorist warfare.\(^3\)
This fundamental question of doctrine must be approached by asking whether the United States is going to develop new capabilities to effectively counter terrorism. Whether the division between the civilian public intelligence community and its military counterpart, as well as the division associated with parochialism among the respective services, can be reduced is yet to be seen. Opportunities to develop the capability and capacity to effectively counter terrorist organizations to protect our own nation will be seen whether the United States will take advantage of them.

If the question of role and mission causes anxiety among agencies and among those agencies and forces who might engage in counterterrorist operations, the problem is further complicated when we address the relationship of the public intelligence community and the private sector. Since it can be expected that as we move into the 1990s there will be increasing terrorist assaults against corporate interests both at home and abroad, it can also be expected that these corporations will heighten their own capability to engage in the collection and analysis of counterterrorism data. Presently, we are witnessing an explosive growth within the private security sector of counterterrorism equipment and services; but they are very uneven in quality. In the next several years, this new service industry will increasingly develop its own capabilities. It is therefore vital that the intelligence community—within the constraints of security requirements—identify and cooperate with those private security services who are staffed by the counterterrorist state of the art; and some initial steps have been taken in this direction. For example, the State Department's Terrorism Security Advisory Council has provided a forum for sharing information.
on terrorist threats as they relate to the private sector, but there is much more to be done.

A particular challenge will arise when corporations actually conduct their own counterterrorist operations. The boardroom, as well as the intelligence crisis center or military command post, must become a strategy center in which counterattacks against terrorism are planned. The intelligence community must address the nature of the public/private relationship now to establish ground rules.

Conclusion

In the ensuring decades the threat of modern terrorism, in its territorial or nonterritorial in nature, cannot be understated. The United States, both overseas and domestically, will probably be subject to attack by highly dedicated, well-trained, technologically equipped groups who will strike at the numerous relatively soft targets that are readily available in an industrial/service order. At the same time, the intelligence community has opportunities to effectively develop a new generation of terrorists. By identifying new trends in terrorist organization and operation, by acquiring the type of information that is required, by exploiting the different processes of collection, by developing the necessary counterterrorist operational capabilities, the United States can use the initiative in a contested conflicts that we all believe we can win, to a global war on terrorism. In short, to conduct an effective global war, the United States must give greater emphasis to the counterterrorist operations of the intelligence community.
NOTES


8. For an excellent collection of readings on this topic, see Hydra of Carnage, International Linkages of Terrorism: The Attitudinal 21


11. Gazit and Handel, 141.


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- "Air Power and the Defeat of a Warsaw Pact Offensive: Taking a Different Approach to Air Interdiction in NATO." Lt Col Price T. Bingham, USAF. Public release. A penetrating look at the present US Air Force approach to air interdiction in NATO, its flaws, and its weaknesses. An alternate approach, the use of the family of air scatterable mines (FASCM) integrated with the intelligent maneuver of NATO land forces for an air interdiction campaign is presented along with a look at the problems to be overcome before the US Air Force could effectively use FASCM for air interdiction. (AU-ARI-CP-87-2)

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