Analysts in War and Peace: MccGwire, McConnell, and Admiral Gorshkov

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PREFACE

This essay helps to clarify conflicting interpretations of Soviet naval policy in the works of two leading practitioners of that art. It was produced as part of a project aimed at improving the methods through which we in the West draw inferences regarding true Soviet beliefs and intentions from Soviet open writings. Open publications from totalitarian societies have long provided a rich source of such insights. As Alexander George* showed twenty years ago, even materials explicitly meant to conceal secret information and to mislead the audience can be exploited with remarkable success if the proper methods are employed by skilled analysts working in concert. One of the principal impediments to concerted effort in the "discipline" of Soviet writings analysis is the notable absence of agreed methods of interpretation. Indeed this reality was given ample testimony by the recent publication by one of these analysts** of an extended methodological treatment of the conflicting interpretations addressed in this essay. It is in the interest of contributing to the debate on these methodologies that this essay is now made available publicly.

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Bradford Dismukes
Alexandria, Virginia
June 1987


** Michael McCwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1987), Appendix C.
INTRODUCTION

This paper is an attempt to evaluate the debate between two Western analysts of the Soviet Navy. The material in question is Soviet military literature, and the focus is on Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov. Our two scholarly protagonists are James M. McConnell and Michael K. McCGwire. There are two major questions. First, was Gorshkov speaking authoritatively in his celebrated series "Navies in War and Peace"? Second, what was he saying? Was he elaborating a novel strategy of withholding SSBN? Alternatively, was the Gorshkov series a polemic for an expansion of the Soviet Navy along more traditional lines, with defense against Western naval strike forces as a principal mission?

In this essay, I focus primarily on the second of these questions, for a number of reasons. First, the question of Gorshkov's authoritativeness is presently moot, given the 1976 publication of his book The Sea Power of the State. Regardless of the status of the series, it is probable that Gorshkov's views (essentially unchanged from the series to the book) are now official. Second, the issue of authoritativeness seems to me to be largely (if not wholly) unresolvable. The protagonists in this debate use different kinds of evidence, and no one has yet assembled a completely satisfactory argument. Third, it is simply more important that we understand the content of Gorshkov's statements, because they have important implications for Western naval strategy. Therefore, I shall give a very brief summary of McCGwire and McConnell's view on the authoritativeness of the series, and confine the bulk of my
analysis to the question of content. An expanded discussion of the question of authoritativeness is available upon request.

THE QUESTION OF AUTHORITATIVENESS

McConnell's View

McConnell believes that Gorshkov was speaking authoritatively. He bases this conclusion on a detailed analysis of the linguistic conventions the Soviets apparently use to distinguish military science from military doctrine. In the Soviet view military science is not official, but features the "clash of opinions." Military doctrine, however, "has the force of state law" and expresses "united views" (edinstvo vzglyadov). Science examines the past, present, and future; doctrine considers only the "present and immediate future." The substantive focus of military science proper is military-technical (e.g., the laws of armed combat) while the focus of military doctrine is military-political, covering both peace and war. Finally, McConnell also points to a third branch of Soviet military thought: "concrete expressions of doctrine." This is a branch of military science that elaborates and justifies the general principles of doctrine. As part of military science, "concrete expressions of doctrine" can discuss the past and future, and because they are based upon doctrine, they are authoritative, concerned with military-political questions, and they express a "unity of views."
McConnell concludes that the Gorshkov series was authoritative because it contains a series of discrete phrases that he views as consistent with the Soviet definitions of a "concrete expression of doctrine." Gorshkov's editors claim that "in their opinion...the publication of these articles will foster the development of a unity of views..." and Gorshkov repeated a similar phrase in his own introduction to the first installment. Second, Gorshkov denies giving exclusive focus to the Navy, and explicitly refers to the need to rely on all of the Soviet armed forces. This is seen as consistent with doctrine as well, because the Soviet military lexicon does not recognize separate service doctrines, only a single military doctrine for the entire state. Moreover, there is a separate "naval science." Third, the subject of the series is "Navies in War and Peace," indicating a military-political focus. Fourth, Gorshkov apparently limits his concern with the past to justifying present-day principles:

...it is not proposed to cover (izlagat) the history of naval art, much less to determine prospects for the development of naval forces. We intend only to express a few thoughts about the role and place of navies in various historical eras, and at different stages in the development of military equipment...in order, on this basis, to determine the trends and principles of the change in the role and position of navies in wars, and also in their employment in peacetime as an instrument of state policy.

Finally, reviewers of the series (and book) described it as a "system of views" with "scientific validity." This is the standard Soviet phrase for military doctrine, but military science proper is called a "system of knowledge." The presence of these tell-tale "doctrinal authentica-
tors" leads McConnell to conclude that Gorshkov was giving official policy from the very beginning. 

McCgwire's View

Michael K. McCgwire has challenged the criteria of temporal focus and "united views," but to me his challenges are unconvincing. With respect to temporal focus, he claims that the verb izlagat (to cover, treat, set forth, expound) "has some connotations of comprehensiveness." Therefore, Gorshkov is not denying a concern for history, but merely denying any intention of covering the past comprehensively. Further research into Soviet usage indicates that this argument stretches the meaning of izlagat excessively. Second, he claims that the editors' wording (e.g., "in our opinion") is scarcely authoritative, and that there are important differences between their choice of words and Gorshkov's. Yet, he provides no direct evidence to suggest why the subtle differences negate the presence of the specific phrase (unity of views) that McConnell claims is significant.

McCgwire believes that the Gorshkov series is an extended piece of advocacy justifying an enhanced force structure and more assertive naval policy. He asserts that the "tone" of Gorshkov's introduction is "defensive," and that the overall "tone and thrust" of the series is polemical. He then claims that the Gorshkov series coincided with a "great debate" in the Soviet Union regarding military roles and missions. Given this context, he feels the series should be viewed as an example of one faction expressing its own particular view within the
larger debate. MccGwire suggests both a set of likely points of contention and the probable members of each faction. Finally, he points to a set of publications anomalies identified by R.G. Weinland. These anomalies are invoked to support the belief that the series was politically sensitive, and therefore not insulated from outside interference by its official character.9

Assessment

As noted, MccGwire and McConnell address different aspects of the problem, and neither has succeeded in coming to grips with the entirety of the other's argument. MccGwire's objections to McConnell's "doctrinal authenticators" do not stand up to further research into usage, and these criticisms ultimately appear to be little more than ad hoc rejoinders with little positive force. Furthermore, his own case is weakened by inadequate evidence. He supports the assertion of an internal debate by citing an article by John Erickson, but Erickson's article contains no footnotes or other direct evidence for this alleged clash of interests within the Soviet elite. There may be such evidence, but it has not been provided.10 Moreover, MccGwire's admittedly tentative identification of factions rests on a questionable analysis of a section of the series entitled "The Leninist Principles of Military Science." MccGwire believes that this section is a series of veiled polemics against internal opponents, and he argues that the entire section "stands out as a massive non-sequitur...its only justification being historical chronology."11 This is dubious. Not only is chronology a very logical way of organizing historical material, but that also is
precisely how Gorshkov did organize the series. The section of "Leninist Principles" fits exactly where one would expect, (in a discussion of the Revolution and Civil War, which occurred when Lenin was alive and leading the government) both on logical grounds and in light of the way Gorshkov has chosen to organize his material. These are weak reeds upon which to make a case.

Yet, McConnell's argument raises questions as well. The single greatest weakness is the one-dimensional nature of his analysis. The argument rests on linguistic distinctions alone, and furthermore, on an inferred set of rules for the use of "doctrinal authenticators" for which he has no direct evidence. Are these "two or three little words" sacrosanct? Who approves their use? The editors of Morskoi Sbornik (who were fired shortly after the series was run)? The censors at Glavlit? Brezhnev himself? We don't know. Moreover, while Weinland's publications anomalies do not make a definitive case either way, there are elements of the publications' history that are difficult to reconcile with a view of the series as a definitive and officially-approved work of military doctrine. Finally, the period of publications was one of tremendous change in world politics in general and Soviet foreign policy in particular, but the impact of these events on the publication of the series is not examined in McConnell's analysis.

It is quite likely that we shall never know the truth. Gorshkov may have been advocating, and it seems clear that he has won his points. Whether he did so before or after 1972 remains unclear. Indeed, we don't even know when the series was written, only when it was
published. In any event, the question is surely moot by now. We turn
to the more critical question: what was he trying to say?

THE CONTENT OF THE GORSHKOV SERIES (AND BOOK)

If events have overtaken the issue of the authoritativeness of
Gorshkov's discussion, this is not true of the content of his argu-
ment. Of course, these questions are not unrelated, for we might expect
different statements to be found in a piece of doctrinal exposition.
But the issue of content can be separated from the issue of authorita-
tiveness, and it is the former that concerns us now.

The key question is: was Gorshkov using the series (and book) to
elaborate and justify a new set of naval missions (a task of national
defense) that consists of withholding SSBN as a strategic reserve while
protecting them with general-purpose forces? Alternatively, is Gorsh-
kov's advocacy of seapower a call for greater assets in order to conduct
broad-area anti-SSBN operations and to deter imperialist aggression
through the active Soviet presence throughout the world's oceans?
McConnell has long advocated the former position, McCGwire the latter.
We turn now to their respective arguments.

As with his analysis of Gorshkov's authoritativeness, McConnell's
argument is based almost entirely upon the careful study and interpreta-
tion of linguistic conventions in Soviet military writing. By observ-
ing, marking, and interpreting subtle changes in characteristic expres-
sions, McConnell has reached a number of conclusions regarding Gorshkov's meaning.

The argument that Gorshkov is revealing a withholding mission for SSBN begins with McConnell's distinction between the terms oborona strany and zashchita strany. Both Russian terms translate as "defense of the state" or "national defense." According to McConnell, Soviet military writers have adopted a set of formal conventions regarding their use. There is no need to consider all the nuances of these conventions, but roughly speaking, oborona refers to the defense capabilities of the entire state (i.e., including military-economic potential) and subsumes defense tasks in both war and peace. These tasks are apparently assigned by the Defense Council. For example, a defense industry may be assigned a task of oborona strany by the Defense Council, either in war or peace. By contrast, zashchita is used in reference to combat readiness, in the context of the "combat system of the armed forces." Tasks of zashchita strany are carried out by military personnel only, under the direction of the "strategic leadership of the armed forces." Such tasks are not "military-political" in nature, but are described as "military-strategic tasks."

McConnell documents these distinctions exhaustively, and McCGwire does not dispute them. McConnell's inferences regarding the withholding strategy draw upon this basic distinction, and involve following an extended chain of logic.
One further point demands clarification. McConnell's distinction between oborona and zashchita refers to their applicability to the spheres of military-political activity and military-strategic activity, respectively. He does not equate oborona with SSBN deterrence. For example, he quotes Gorshkov as saying

> Among the main means insuring the Motherland's high defensive (oborona) capabilities, one must name above all the strategic missile troops and the navy....Aviation, the ground troops and the other branches of our valiant armed forces are, to a large extent [also] a means for deterring the aggressive acts of the imperialists.... 15

Nowhere does McConnell suggest that this reference to "oborona capabilities" has a specific and limited meaning. Rather, it is simply a recognition that the "tasks of the armed forces in national oborona are political in nature," including "peacetime deterrence, offsetting western politico-military pressure etc." What he does claim is that Gorshkov's references to the Navy's "main task of national defense" (oborona strany, not zashchita strany) are both specific and unprecedented. How does he reach this conclusion? 16

First, McConnell cites a 1967 statement by Colonel Derevyanko stating that "missiles have a special role in national defense (borona strany)." 17 We should note that all the armed forces will contribute during combat, but strategic missiles would play a special role in nuclear deterrence. This statement may thus be implying that oborona strany involves the "military-political task" of nuclear deterrence. In 1967, Marshal Malinovsky stated authoritatively that the Strategic Rocket Forces and the Navy were "the main instrument" for (1) deterring
the aggressor, and (2) decisively defeating him in war.\textsuperscript{18} In McConnell's view, (1) refers to a task of \textit{oborona strany}; while (2) is clearly a task of \textit{zashchita strany}, involving the use of the combat power of these forces during an actual war. McConnell supports this inference with a statement by Admiral Kasatonov. Kasatonov claims that Malinovsky's formulation, which has been endorsed by the Central Committee, had:

\begin{quote}
defined that Navy's place in national defense (\textit{oborona strany}) and indicated the path for developing a modern ocean going missile fleet capable of accomplishing strategic tasks of an offensive type in modern war.
\end{quote}

In addition to its role as a "main instrument" in deterring the aggressor in this period, the Navy itself had two tasks as a "most important instrument of strategy." McConnell cites a variety of authors who refer to the Navy's mission as (1) "destroying...targets in the depths of the enemy's territory"; and (2) "combatting enemy naval forces at sea and in their bases." In short, as of 1967 the Navy had two equally important tasks as a "most important instrument of strategy." These were strategic tasks, not tasks of national defense (\textit{oborona strany}).\textsuperscript{19}

According to McConnell, this situation changed in 1971. In their 1971 Navy Day statements, both Marshal Grechko and Gorshkov referred to joint SRF/Navy participation in deterring the aggressor, but only the SRF was involved in "defeating him in war." This was a clear change from the formula quoted earlier in which both branches were "main instruments" in both tasks. Second, Admiral Novikov now wrote that the Navy was an "important" instrument for accomplishing strategic tasks.
Previously a "most important instrument of strategy," this role now appeared to have been downgraded. Despite the Navy's increasing capabilities, it was a "main instrument" only in "deterring the aggressor." And what was previously a "most important" set of missions (the two strategic tasks mentioned above) was now apparently only "important" in the Soviet military mission structure.²⁰

According to McConnell, this interpretation is supported by Gorshkov. I will quote the relevant passage at length because it is a source of much disagreement between McConnell and MccGwire:

The Soviet Armed Forces, including also the Navy, have emerged as one of the instruments of USSR policy. However, the goals and methods of employing them in this capacity in the international arena differs fundamentally from the goals and methods of the political employment of the armed forces of the imperialist powers in peacetime....

In realistically appraising the growing threat to the security of our country, the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government have seen that the way out of the situation which has been created lies in opposing the forces of aggression on the World Ocean with strategic counterforces of defense (oborona) whose foundation is made up of the Strategic Missile Forces and an ocean-going navy.

The creation at the will of the Party of a new Soviet Navy and its emergence onto the ocean expanses have fundamentally altered the relative strength of forces and the situation in this sphere of contention. In the person of our modern Navy, the Soviet Armed Forces have acquired a powerful means of defense (oborona) in the oceanic areas, a formidable force for the deterrence of aggression, which is constantly ready to deliver punishing retaliatory blows and to disrupt the plans of the Imperialists. And this--its main task--national defense (oborona strany) against attacks from ocean axes, the Navy is successfully fulfilling along with the other branches of the Soviet Armed Forces. The warships of our Navy are a threat to no one, but they are always ready to decisively
repulse any aggressor who dares infringe upon the security of the Motherland.

Thus, the inspirers of the arms race...in counting on speeding up the development of their own naval forces and the creation of new problems which are difficult for the defense of the Soviet Union to resolve, have themselves been faced with even more complex problems with the strengthening of our Navy on the oceans. The former inaccessibility of the continents, which permitted them in the past to count on impunity for aggression, has now become ancient history.

But there is still another side to this question.

With the emergence of the Soviet Navy onto the ocean expanses, our warships are calling with continually greater frequency at foreign ports, fulfilling the role of "plenipotentaries" of the Socialist countries... (and he continues to discuss this role in considerable detail). 21

McConnell draws a number of insights from this passage. First, it is clear that the "national defense" task is the Navy's main task, but the question remains: what does this task involve? McConnell infers that this task is deterrence via withheld SLBMs. Second, we note that the simple "oborona" refers to a variety of activities here, all of them political in nature. Indeed, this passage focuses on the Navy as a means of state policy, and the chapter from which it has been excerpted deals with navies in peacetime. Third, Gorshkov is quite explicit about the Navy's main mission. It is "oborona strany against attacks from ocean axes." This mission, moreover, apparently relies on "punishing retaliatory blows." Finally, the imperialists have failed in their attempts to gain an advantage, for they "themselves have been faced with ever more complex problems." Why? Because the strengthened Soviet Navy has removed the "impunity from aggression" that the imperialists once enjoyed due to their "inaccessibility." 22
There are a number of other statements that support this interpretation. For example, McConnell sees two main themes in the final article, buried within Gorshkov's extended discourse. The first theme addresses the policy implications of the external constraints on the Soviet Union (e.g., geographical restrictions). The second theme refers (obliquely) to Soviet policy and the basic missions of the armed forces in war. McConnell believes that the first theme (which addresses a wide range of factors that are salient in both peacetime and wartime) is concerned with the missions of oborona strany while the second main theme focuses on the mission of zashchita strany (armed defense in war), as part of the "combat system of the armed forces."23

In interpreting the alleged "oborona" sections, McConnell focuses on the following passage, worth quoting at length:

The problems of a modern Navy. In taking into account the importance of questions related to the strengthening of the country's defense (oborona) from the direction of the sea, the Soviet Union...is constantly strengthening her own sea power, including several necessary components....

(Gorshkov then discusses oceanography, the merchant marine, and the fishing fleet.)

However, we must consider the most important component of the seapower of the state to be the Navy, whose missions are to protect state interests on the seas and oceans and to defend (oborona) the country from possible attacks from the direction of the seas and oceans.

Through the efforts of the people in the Soviet Union a nuclear-missile, technically advanced Navy has been created as an Indispensable Integral part of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The need to have a powerful Navy corresponding both to the geographical position of our country and
to its political importance as a great world power has already long been understood....However, this question became particularly acute in the world arena, when the USSR and the Socialist countries found themselves surrounded on all sides by a hostile coalition of maritime states posing a serious threat of a nuclear missile attack from the direction of the sea.

At the same time the imperialists headed by the USA, having created a situation for the Socialist countries in which they were surrounded from the direction of the sea, did not experience a similar danger....

The Communist party fully appreciated both the threat to our country which is arising from the oceans, and the need to deter the aggressive aspirations of the enemy through the construction of a new ocean-going navy. And this need is being answered.

Our party and government are taking serious steps to ensure the security of the Socialist countries. The chief measure was the building up of the powerful modern Armed Forces, including the Navy, capable of opposing enemy plots, also including those in the oceanic sectors, where the mere presence of our Fleet presents a potential aggressor with the need to solve those same problems himself which he had hoped to create for our Armed Forces.24

First, it is clear from this passage and McConnell's interpretation that oborona has a broader meaning than just SSBN deterrence. However, if we view the quotation as one interconnected argument, it also seems clear that a countervalue deterrent role for SSBN is part of oborona strany. The passage refers to Soviet concern over sea-based missile attacks, and Gorshkov indicates that the "chief measure" taken included "presenting the aggressor with the same problems." Taken together with the previous statement, McConnell infers that the Navy's "main task of national oborona" is just that—preventing an attack from the sea by posing an analogous danger of retaliation.25
Later in the same article (and same subheading), Gorshkov discusses the role of the SSBN. Again, we quote him at length:

The foreign and domestic preconditions cited above which determined the development of the Navy in the postwar period have had a considerable effect on the formation of views on its role in modern warfare. Thus, in connection with the equipping of the Navy with strategic nuclear weapons, the Navy is objectively acquiring (or objectively acquires) the capability of not only participating in the crushing of the enemy's military-economic potential, but also in becoming (becomes) a most important factor in deterring his nuclear attack.

In this connection, missile carrying submarines, owing to their great survivability in comparison with land-based launch installations, are an even more effective means of deterrence. They represent a constant threat to any aggressor who, by comprehending the inevitability of nuclear retaliation from the direction of the oceans, can be faced with the necessity of renouncing the unleashing of a nuclear war.

McConnell takes the reference to "foreign and domestic preconditions" to provide a link with the "oborona section" or theme running throughout the final article. This helps support his belief that the new "main task" is one of deterrence. Because McConnell is reluctant to believe that the main task of a branch of the armed forces could be a purely peacetime mission, he interprets the above passage as implying an intrawar deterrence role as well. First, the context does not refer to peacetime, but to the Navy's "role in modern warfare." Second, Gorshkov emphasizes the "great survivability" of SSBNs over land-based missiles. This can be seen as implying that SSBNs will survive the initial counterforce attacks and may deter the aggressor from initiating a countervalue war.
The argument to this point may be summarized as follows. The Soviets apparently distinguish between tasks of *oborona strany* and *zashchita strany*, with the former being military-political tasks under the direction of the Defense Council. The Navy, which previously was a "most important" instrument of strategic tasks, and which was equal to the SRF in both deterring and defeating the aggressor, is now merely an important strategic instrument, and is linked with the SRF only in deterrence. The Navy's main task is now one of national defense (*oborona strany*). This main task, according to McConnell's reading of Gorshkov, is intrawar deterrence via withheld SSBNs.

With the acquisition of this new main task, McConnell also claims to see a reallocation of resources to the various potential naval missions. This inference is based upon a number of pieces of evidence. First, Gorshkov's 1974 Navy Day article contains the following passage:

> Our navy has always had two main tasks—combat against the enemy fleet and operations against the shore. For long centuries the first of these tasks had priority. But beginning with World War II, the situation began to change. Now if we are to judge by the developmental tendencies of navies and their weapons, the main naval mission is becoming (coming to be, comes to be) operations against targets on land.

Therefore, national defense (*oborona strany*) against an attack from the sea is acquiring for our armed forces an even more important significance. This is again the result of the development of submarines, which in a series of navies are now coming forward as the main platform for strategic missile weapons.

Of course, the task of combating the enemy fleet is also still with us....If required, Soviet navymen know how to solve both these tasks successfully.
McConnell views this in the following way. Technological developments have made operations against the shore the "main naval mission." Therefore, "national defense" against such attack is even more important, as a result of the development of submarines. The task of combatting the enemy fleet remains, but is decreasingly important. Because McConnell believes that "combatting the enemy fleet" includes attacking the opponent's own SSBN force (the anti-SSBN mission), he does not view that as part of the task of national defense (oborona strany). The national defense task, by implication, must be the defense of the country against attacks from the sea by posing a similar threat with one's own forces.29

Finally, in his most recent paper on this subject, McConnell has examined the Gorshkov series, the subsequent book, and the writings of a number of other naval authors to further elaborate his case. He makes the following claim:

In his new book Gorshkov denies the belief of earlier doctrinal eras that the pro-SSBN general-purpose mission was a 'secondary matter', with the implication therefore that today it was more than 'important' and presumably 'most important.' By contrast, the task of 'combatting the strike forces of the enemy fleet,' primarily his nuclear powered missile submarines and carrier task forces' is evaluated today simply as 'important.' These two treatments are compatible with each other, suggesting that the lion's share of general purpose resources has gone to the pro-SSBN task.30

McConnell then relies on a statement by Gorshkov on the importance of acquiring "command of the sea" (gospotsvo na more):

From these examples it is apparent that the period of maintaining command of the sea has a tendency to
shorten....This trend still holds today. It is especially important that submarines have become the principal force of modern navies. A major role is also played by the new strategic orientation of the fleets for struggle against the shore. All this is making more necessary the all-round backing of the actions of the forces solving strategic tasks.

This statement, along with a number of historical examples and a reversal of previous Soviet estimates of SSBN vulnerability, is interpreted as an indication that the Soviets will devote general-purpose forces to the role of supporting the SSBN.31

This interpretation receives support from other naval writers. In particular, we have the following (admittedly convoluted) statement by Aleshkin, writing in Morskoi Sbornik in 1972:

...specialists of many countries feel that strategic naval forces, in having a narrowly specialized mission, cannot take an active part in accomplishing the various operational and tactical tasks. Moreover, they are not capable of fully realizing their potential even in a nuclear war, without the appropriate support of other forces; if the war starts out non-nuclear, they will always be in the reserve.

This situation is accelerating the development of...general purpose forces....32

This passage, like the others, is interpreted by McConnell as indicating that "even in a nuclear war SSBNs will be found 'in reserve'...and that consequently, these 'strategic naval forces' are not capable of fully realizing their potential without the appropriate support of other forces."33 In other words, strategic naval forces will not be part of the conventional phase, because their specialized mission prevents them from taking an "active part...in operational and tactical tasks." But if SSBNs are not supported by other forces, they will be vulnerable and
will not reach their full potential. This passage, along with a host of others, is used to argue that Gorshkov is identifying a pro-SSBN mission for Soviet general-purpose forces.

Finally, McConnell sees many of Gorshkov's historical examples as analogies to the withholding strategy. For example, Gorshkov's discussion of the Crimean War stresses how the British and French fleets, by their presence at the end of the war, forced Russia to accept onerous peace terms. McConnell also views Gorshkov's discussion of the Battle of Jutland as especially telling, because Gorshkov reverses the arguments of other Soviet writers regarding the appropriateness of the strategies adopted at this battle. Where previous Soviet writers (e.g., Belli) had criticized British timidity and use of a "fleet-in-being" method, Gorshkov commends this approach as appropriate under the circumstances. McConnell sees this as another indication that Soviet doctrine now contains its own variety of a "fleet in being" method—the withholding strategy for SSBN.

In conclusion, McConnell has constructed a complex, tightly interdependent but internally consistent argument that Gorshkov is elaborating a new mission structure for the Soviet Navy. The "main task" of the Soviet Navy is "national defense," and this task is deterrence via withheld SSBN. To accomplish this, the general-purpose fleet will be used to provide protection for this strategic reserve. This does not imply that the navy does not have other important tasks as well (e.g., combatting the enemy fleet), but does give some idea of mission priorities for the Soviet Navy at the present time, at least as indi-
cated in their military press. It is, moreover, a novel doctrinal development and can be viewed as consistent with a variety of changes in the Soviet force structure and exercise behavior. We now turn to a number of possible objections to this thesis.

MccGwire's View

We have already examined MccGwire's belief that Gorshkov is advocating, not stating policy. In interpreting the content of the series, MccGwire believes that Gorshkov is lobbying for a large and balanced fleet, in order to perform the task of strategic defense (via an anti-SSBN capability) and also to sustain a variety of other operations (e.g., peacetime presence) under the guise of "protecting state interests" and "countering imperialist aggression" in the Third World. Not surprisingly, we find him disputing McConnell's interpretation in a number of places.

MccGwire does not, however, offer a point-by-point refutation of McConnell's argument. Instead, he attacks McConnell's analysis of oborona as used by Gorshkov. Where McConnell has inferred that the main task of national defense (оборона страны) is deterrence via SSBN withholding, MccGwire believes that

the use of oborona is not restricted to the deterrent role of SSBN. In fact on the two occasions when Gorshkov is most explicit about the scope of the term, he uses it to cover the role of the general purpose forces deployed to counter the West's seaborne strategic delivery capability.35
The focus of MccGwire's attack is very important, and I shall return to this point later. His goal is to show that oborona has a broader meaning, and that the "main task" is the anti-SSBN mission.

MccGwire's analysis proceeds in a series of stages. First, he notes three cases where Gorshkov discusses either SSBNs or strategic strikes without referring to oborona. One is especially interesting (as I shall note in more detail below) and reads as follows:

...the basic mission of navies in a world-wide nuclear war is their participation in the attacks of the country's nuclear forces...the blunting of the nuclear attacks by the enemy navy from the direction of the ocean, and participation in the operations conducted by the ground forces.

There is no mention of oborona in this passage, and MccGwire views this as weakening the linkage between oborona strany and strategic strike.36

MccGwire then examines the lengthy passage cited by McConnell and quoted on p. 15 (footnote 26). MccGwire agrees that this is a discussion of deterrence, but notes that there is no mention of oborona here, and that therefore this is not a discussion of the "national defense" task. Furthermore, he argues that Gorshkov's statement that the navy is "objectively acquiring" the capability (of crushing military-economic potential) implies that such a deterrent capacity has not yet been obtained.37
The next stage in McCGwire's analysis is an examination of the sections where Gorshkov discusses the Navy and the Strategic Rocket Forces together. He cites the following passage from the final article:

Only our powerful Armed Forces capable of blocking the unrestrained expansionism displayed today all over the world by imperialism can deter its aggressiveness. In addition, of course, to the Strategic Rocket Forces, it is the Navy which is this kind of force, capable in peacetime of visibly demonstrating to the peoples of friendly and hostile countries not only the power of military equipment and the perfection of naval ships, but also its readiness to use this force in defense (zashchita) of the state interests of our nations or for the security of socialist countries.

McCGwire infers from this that the Navy (along with the SRF) is the kind of force that can "deter imperialist aggression," but that SSBNs are not involved in this deterrent role. The latter inference follows from Gorshkov's reference to how the Navy "visibly" demonstrates Soviet power and readiness. This is clearly more applicable to surface ships than to submerged SSBN.38

Fourth, McCGwire cites the passage analyzed by McConnell and quoted on p. 9 (footnote 15). McCGwire quotes the full passage and then makes the following statement:

There are three points to be drawn from this quotation: (1) deterrence is in some way distinguished from oborona in this context; (2) the SRF and the navy are already the main means of oborona, whereas we know from (the earlier quotation--fn. 26 and 37--that the deterrent capability was being 'objectively acquired') that the navy's nuclear deterrence capability was still only emerging at this date; and (3) the navy incorporates many of the capabilities of the other three branches, which means that Gorshkov can not be referring only to SSBN.
This piece of analysis is intended to further challenge McConnell's identification of the task of oborona strany with SSBN deterrence. 39

Finally, MccGwire analyzes the same passage discussed earlier on pp. 11-13. Where McConnell interprets this passage as a reference to nuclear deterrence, MccGwire asserts that it is an argument for a greater global presence as a means for countering imperialist action around the world. He focuses on the section:

Thus, the inspirers of the arms race and of the preparation of a new world war, in counting on the forced draught development of their own naval forces and the creation of new problems which are difficult to resolve for the defense of the Soviet Union have themselves been faced with even more complex problems with the strengthening of our fleet on the oceans. The former inaccessibility of the continents, which permitted them in the past to count on impunity from aggression, has now become ancient history.

But there is still another side to this question.

With the emergence of the Soviet Navy onto the oceanic expanses, our warships are calling with continually greater frequency at foreign ports, fulfilling the role of 'plenipotentiaries' of the Socialist countries.

MccGwire draws a number of points from this passage. First, he asserts that the phrase "former inaccessibility of the continents" (note the use of the plural) means that the passage refers to action around the globe, not just retaliation against the single continent of North America. Gorshkov is thus seen as referring to conventional action in the Third World. Second, MccGwire asserts that the preceding paragraph in the passage (see pp. 11-12) identifies two types of deterrence. The first is "deterrence of aggression, the delivery of retaliatory blows,
and the disrupting of the aggressors plans." The second is the Navy's main mission of oborona strany, which is "the defense of the country against attacks by aggressors from the ocean axes." MccGwire argues that oborona applies to both of these, and that they are distinct tasks. The former, in his view, refers to "deterrence" but the "main task" is anti-SSBN defense. Because the deterrent, "retributory" task of oborona is seen as separate from the "main task," MccGwire argues that the main task must be the anti-SSBN mission of defense.

Third, MccGwire points to the last paragraph quoted on p. 12. He argues that the phrase "emergence onto the oceanic expanses" refers to general-purpose forces and not to SSBN. If this paragraph is linked with Gorshkov's earlier mention of national defense (oborona strany) five paragraphs later, then the scope of this term clearly extends to tasks other than intrawar deterrence, and certainly includes countering the West's attempts at intervention.

Fourth, MccGwire argues that the entire passage, despite the clear emphasis on oborona, contains no explicit references to SSBN. On the contrary, the references are to the "ocean-going fleet," or the "modern Soviet navy." This is also considered evidence that oborona does not refer to SSBN, contrary to McConnell's position.40

Next, MccGwire analyzes the final article of the series and especially the conclusions. He once again suggests that oborona (e.g., as "defense capability"—'oboronosposobnost') is not confined to SSBN, and points to a passage exhorting Soviet navymen to improve readiness.
for "employing combat equipment under any climatic and weather conditions in order to defend (oborona) the state." This he views as a reference to general-purpose forces, not SSBN, because weather conditions should not affect SSBNs.⁴¹

Sixth, McCaigwire also considers the extended passage discussed on pp. 13-14. He considers the initial reference to oborona as distinct from the later discussion of retaliation, separated by the discussion of oceanographic research, the merchant marine and the fishing fleet. He does acknowledge that if Gorshkov intended this passage to serve as a single theme, then it is "the only linkage" between deterrence of nuclear attack by SSBN and the mission of national defense signified by oborona.⁴²

McCaigwire's analysis of oborona is intended to show that the term has broader connotations than just the withholding strategy. It is clear from his analysis that this is indeed the case. It is less clear that his own suggestion—that the national defense task is the anti-SSBN mission—is what Gorshkov is implying when he uses oborona strany. Furthermore, as I shall argue in my assessment below, there is a logical fallacy in McCaigwire's line of attack, for McConnell has never maintained that oborona meant only the withholding strategy for SSBN. To prove that the term has a broader meaning therefore leaves McConnell's position undamaged.

McCawire also offers some specific counters to McConnell's description of the withholding strategy. He claims that McConnell has
offered only two positive pieces of evidence: Gorshkov's mention of the "great survivability of SSBN" from the eleventh installment, and his discussion of the relative weakness of ASW during World War II from the ninth article. He accuses McConnell of "lifting these statements from their contexts, and offering them jointly as evidence on quite another matter."43

Our two protagonists also contend over the proper interpretation of Gorshkov's 1974 Navy Day article. The relevant passage has already been quoted on p. 16, and we saw how McConnell interprets the statement that "the main naval mission" is "coming to be" operations against targets on land as implying a countervalue strike role for the SSBN. McGWire suggests a novel interpretation. First, he proposes that we invert the first two paragraphs. If we do this (and why one should isn't clear), then McGWire claims that Gorshkov is saying, in effect: the greater strike potential of SSBNs has produced a need for greater attention to national defense (oborona strany). He believes this refers to direct defense (i.e., ASW), and he asserts that "this leaves undecided whether attacks on land targets is the main mission of the Soviet Navy."44

McGWire then notes that the third paragraph means that "combatting the enemy fleet" is not part of the task of national defense. Gorshkov clearly states that the "national defense task" is the Navy's "main task." Therefore, McGWire acknowledges that if "combatting the enemy fleet" includes operations against enemy SSBN, then the "strategic defense" task has been downgraded. He concedes that the
phrase "combatting the enemy fleet" previously included SSBN and carrier strike forces, but he claims "this is hardly sufficient reason for concluding that there has been a major change in the established priorities accorded to tasks." He goes on to propose that Gorshkov is either misusing a standard definition because he is speaking to a non-professional audience (the article appeared in Pravda) or that there has been a "redefinition of terms."  

Finally, where McConnell views Gorshkov's historical examples as indicating the importance of naval forces in determining the outcome of war and their peace negotiations, MccGwire sees these discussions as placing "most emphasis on the capacity of navies to enable the actual conduct of war." Such a difference is rather subtle, but is more stark in the case of Gorshkov's discussion of the Battle of Jutland. Where McConnell views Gorshkov's reversal of Belli as indicating the enhanced role of naval "forces-in-being" (e.g., withheld SSBN, see p. 19), MccGwire argues that Gorshkov is disputing only part of Belli's argument. He claims that Gorshkov is merely disputing: (1) the belief that British commanders were "indecisive"; and (2) the belief that Jutland did not influence the outcome. According to MccGwire, neither of these objections on Gorshkov's part means that Gorshkov was also disputing Belli's earlier criticisms of the "fleet-in-being" approach. As such, he does not view the Jutland example as supporting McConnell's position.  

Not surprisingly, MccGwire has an alternative interpretation. He believes that Gorshkov is arguing for more general-purpose naval forces,
primarily for "strategic defense" (anti-SSBN ASW). Such forces will also be useful in countering "imperialist aggression" in the Third World. The primary non-textual evidence for this belief is the Soviet shift to forward deployment shortly after the development of Polaris, although this shift did not occur for four years after the first Polaris patrol. MccGwire claims that this view is also supported by "operational and material evidence," and off-the-record statements by U.S. officials. This is not the place for a detailed analysis of MccGwire's thesis—which rests primarily on construction data and his own interpretation of Soviet operational deployments. However, we should recognize that his alternative interpretations of the passages discussed above are generally consistent with this largely "reactive" view of Soviet naval development.47

Assessment

On the question of content, I believe that McConnell again carries the day. Despite the complexity of his argument, it is both better substantiated and supported than MccGwire's alternative, and MccGwire's various criticisms do not, in my view, invalidate McConnell's basic points.

First, the meaning of Gorshkov's historical discussions is probably unresolvable. Both MccGwire and McConnell refer to the various historical examples as supporting their differing positions, but the evidence from these examples is sufficiently slippery as to render the matter inconclusive at best. For example, do navies influence the war
by their presence at the end or by their actions during the course of
the conflict? Gorshkov provides examples of both, and I conclude that
the historical material in both the series and the book can be used to
support either interpretation. Resolving the debate will have to rest
on other grounds. However, the specific dispute over the Battle of
Jutland can be clarified. MccGwire argues that "Gorshkov does not take
issue with Belli's criticisms of withholding weapons to influence the
peace," and believes that Gorshkov's discussion simply reinforces the
concept of navies affecting the outcome of the war through military
action.48 He quotes a section of Gorshkov's discussion as follows:

...in this engagement Germany had the goal of
defeating the British fleet to insure freedom of
action in order to crush England by a subsequent
unrestricted naval blockade, that is to achieve a
sharp change in the course of the war to its advan-
tage. A victory by the German forces would have
permitted the Central powers to extract themselves
from a naval blockade whose severe effect was already
being felt by the German economy. But the German
fleet did not achieve the goal it was set.

Great Britain, on the other hand, was striving
through this battle to retain her existing position on
the seas and to strengthen the blockade operations
against Germany. She achieved these goals.

MccGwire then claims that "Gorshkov makes no reference to peace
negotiations." Any analogy with a withholding strategy is considered
suspect on these grounds.49

This interpretation can be questioned, however, if we examine
Gorshkov's discussion more closely. He states that "Jutland determined
the future immutability of the course of the prolonged war." What was
this course, and why was it important? The "course" was the Allied
naval blockade that severely weakened Germany. Moreover, as Gorshkov states in the series and clarifies in the book, the German aim was to commence an unrestricted submarine blockade, after defeating the British battle fleet. As he writes:

Germany sought in this engagement (Jutland) to bring about a sharp turn in the course of the war in her favour, to crush the British Grand Fleet and provide herself with freedom of operations in order then, by an unrestricted sea blockade, to strangle England. A victory would have meant the lifting of the sea blockade on the Central powers, the severe effects of which...they were already painfully experiencing....

What did the Germans hope to achieve through an "unrestricted sea blockade"? The answer is the same in the series and book:

The leaders of Germany including the land command, saw in unrestricted submarine warfare the sole and last possibility of salvation and probably of achieving victory or at least an honorable peace.

Taking the whole of Gorshkov's discussion, then, he can be seen as arguing that the British acted correctly to preserve their fleet at Jutland. This foiled the German strategy, because the British "fleet-in-being" could continue to protect convoys to Britain and sustain the blockade against Germany. As a result, the unlimited submarine campaign--intended to secure at least an "honorable peace"--failed. (As a side note, it is intriguing that Gorshkov calls this mission the "main task" of the German Navy in war!) Viewed in this light, the analogy with the contemporary situation looks more plausible. Still, this is fairly slippery stuff, and I don't think one should consider either interpretation definitive or unchallengable.
Second, McCwire's analysis of Gorshkov's use of oborona complicates, but in my view does not invalidate, the argument made by McConnell. It is clear that oborona (or its linguistic relatives) can be used in ways that do not refer to the withholding mission. There is no logical reason to conclude from this that the navy's national defense task (zadacha oborona strany) is not (1) the main task (for Gorshkov is unequivocal on this point); or (2) a task involving nuclear deterrence by SSBNs, both in peace and through withholding in war. In other words, even if oborona has broader connotations than the one assigned it by McConnell, the real question is whether it also has the meaning he has identified.

McCwire makes a number of specific criticisms of McConnell's interpretation, which I have summarized above. I believe that many of these points are open to serious challenge. Let's consider each in turn.

First, McCwire quotes Gorshkov's discussion of the navy's "basic tasks in a world-wide war." None of these tasks mentions or implies deterrence. This would appear to contradict McConnell's inference that the main task is deterrence via withholding, but such a conclusion may be quite wrong. In particular, McConnell argues that basic tasks are confined to operations within a theater of military action, even in a worldwide nuclear war. He provides a variety of citations to support this point, and if correct, this would negate McCwire's use of this quotation as a potential challenge to McConnell's argument.
Second, McCrawire differs with McConnell in his interpretation of the passage presented on p. 15. His argument is summarized on p. 21, and his main point is that this discussion of deterrence does not mention oborona. He also asserts that the phrase "objectively acquiring" (a deterrent capability) refers to a future situation, and is not a description of the existing capability.

There are three possible objections to this point. First, the passage begins with a reference to "the foreign and domestic preconditions cited above," and the passage is part of a section subtitled "Problems of a Modern Navy." This section contains an explicit discussion of the defense task (oborona) in the context of a variety of factors (e.g., geography, presence of foreign enemies with a maritime capability, etc.). As a result, the passage quoted on p. 15 can be seen as linked with the earlier discussion of oborona, despite the fact that the word does not appear directly in this passage. Next, regarding the tenses involved in the passage, Gorshkov refers in this same passage to the fact that "submarines are an even more effective means of deterrence." This implies that the capability is already available to the Soviets.

The problem here lies in translating the passage quoted on p. 15. McCrawire relies on the U.S. Naval Institute translation and argues that because Gorshkov says "is objectively acquiring" and "is becoming" with reference to the navy's deterrent capabilities, that this implies such capabilities are not yet part of the navy's mission structure. Yet the phrases in question are best translated as "objectively acquires" and
"becomes," especially if we consider the preceding sentence. This sentence reads:

Thus, in connection with the equipping of the Navy with strategic nuclear weapons (note the present tense, and the fact that the Soviet Navy had such weapons long before Gorshkov wrote) the Navy objectively acquires the capability not only of participating in the crushing of the enemy's military-economic potential, but also becomes a most important factor in deterring his nuclear attack.

This amended translation (which has been confirmed by two Russian linguists) eliminates MccGwire's objection.

Third, this amended translation also damages MccGwire's interpretation of the passage quoted on p. 9 and discussed on pp. 22-23. There he claims the SRF/Navy are already "main means of oborona" but are only "objectively acquiring" a deterrent capability. With a more accurate translation, this objection collapses as well.  

MccGwire also quotes a passage linking the SRF with the Navy. For reasons that are unclear to me, he expects oborona to be used in this context. At any rate, he infers from this passage (see p. 22) that the navy is a principal part of deterring aggression around the world, and that it is general-purpose forces, not SSBN, that are involved.  

It is not clear what to make of this. One can very easily see this passage as supporting McConnell's argument, rather than challenging it. The surface fleet can help deter Western intervention around the globe, by its "visibility" and by demonstrating "readiness to use this force." But this role clearly involves "defense (zashchita) of state
interests," not oborona strany. McCGwire admits this point when he says that "Gorshkov is speaking about a different kind of deterrence...deterring imperialist aggression in other parts of the world." But McConnell would certainly agree with this. His argument is that while this type of deterrence is a mission of the Soviet Navy, it is not the "main task." The fact that Gorshkov used "zashchita" in this passage is just what McConnell would expect, given that the national defense task is directed against attacks from sea and ocean axes, not the "deterrence of imperialistic aggression." Moreover, when referring to the "defense of state interests," Soviet writers apparently rely on zashchita exclusively.

Fourth, McCGwire analyzes the passage quoted on p. 9, and concludes that deterrence is distinguished from oborona in this context (see p. 22, para. 3). He believes this further damages the linkage between oborona strany and SSBN deterrence that McConnell has proposed. But it is not clear what real damage this passage does to McConnell's position as well. This article in the series is an essay on navies as instruments of imperialism in peacetime, and the section from which this passage is excerpted focuses on the role of the Soviet Navy in deterring imperialist aggression, as part of the USSR's "high defensive (oboronnaya) capability." There is no logical reason to associate this use of a linguistic relative with the specific task of national defense (zadacha oborona strany). As with the previous passage, McCGwire is apparently merging two very different things while implying that McConnell views them as totally distinct. The first is deterrence against imperialist aggression around the world (not the main task of

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national defense). The second is deterrence against nuclear missile attack (which according to McConnell is part of that task).56

Fifth, McCGwire analyzes the long passage presented on pp. 11-12. In my view, his analysis (see p. 23-24 especially) is questionable. He seizes upon the use of the plural "continents" and argues that

(two) indicates that Gorshkov is not talking about North America, but about the other continents...which were previously only accessible to Western forces. Their 'more complex problems' do not therefore refer to SSBN....57

This is perhaps intuitively appealing, but ignores common Soviet usage. Many Soviet writers refer to the threat of nuclear attack from the continents, and they use the plural.58 And after all, strategic delivery systems are targeted on the Soviet Union from Europe, Asia (the PRC), North America, and in earlier periods, Africa as well. Gorshkov is simply using a common (and appropriate) Soviet formula, that McCGwire has failed to recognize. Next, McCGwire argues that the second paragraph of this passage contains two different types of oborona. The first is the navy "as an instrument of defense" that deters aggression, delivers retributory blows, and disrupts the plans of the aggressors. The second is the defense of the country against attacks from the ocean axes. The second task is the "main task." In making this distinction, McCGwire apparently wants to separate the retaliatory and deterrent function of the "first" oborona task from the "defense of the country against attacks from ocean axes" function of the "second" oborona task. This would support his belief that the main task (defense of the
country) is anti-SSBN defense, not SLBM retaliation. The issue here boils down to translation. MccGwire has relied on the U.S. Naval Institute version, which reads:

...a powerful instrument of oborona on the ocean axes, a formidable force for the deterrence of aggression, which is constantly ready to deliver punishing retributory blows and to disrupt the plans of the imperialists. And the navy, along with the other branches of the Soviet armed forces, is successfully fulfilling its main mission—defense of the country against attacks from the ocean axes.

McConnell's translation is slightly different. I have consulted two other Russian linguists, and I believe that McConnell's version is far and away the most appropriate. His reads:

...a powerful instrument of oborona on ocean axes, a formidable force for deterring aggression....And this, its main task—national oborona against attacks by the aggressor from ocean axes—the Navy is successfully fulfilling together with the other branches of the Soviet Armed Forces....

The difference should be obvious. McConnell's version, which closely follows the order and wording used by Gorshkov, links the designation of the "main task" with the previous sentences. The alternative rendering used by MccGwire does create the impression that there are two separate tasks here, but that is clearly not what Gorshkov intended. It seems more likely that the main task of national defense (oborona strany) is deterrence, and that "retributory blows" are certainly part of it.59

MccGwire also focuses our attention on the final paragraph, and argues that the reference to "emergence on ocean expanses" and to visits
to foreign ports is clearly a reference to the surface fleet and not to SSBN. But this paragraph (and the subsequent discussion) follows a "break paragraph" of a single sentence that is almost certainly intended to signal a change in the subject. After all, what does Gorshkov say? He says: "But there is still another side to this question." What is the question? The Soviet Navy as an "instrument of policy." What is the "first side?" The paragraphs before the break, which deal with the oborona mission of deterring aggression (including Western nuclear strikes) by posing a similar threat. What is the "other side to this question"? The Navy's peacetime role as a source of influence, by serving as "plenipotentiaries." This seems all too obvious. Lastly, MccGwire's argument that this passage refers to oborona but not to SSBN is dubious. In particular, Gorshkov's reference to our attempt at "forced draught development" of naval forces is coupled with the statement that the imperialists have themselves been faced with "even more complex problems." MccGwire (in my view correctly) identifies this as a reference to Kennedy's acceleration of the Polaris program, but why he believes that the rest of the passage is not a reference to the Soviets' reciprocal reply is difficult to understand. After all, the passage refers to "punishing retributory blows" (implying retaliatory strikes, not simple ASW operations). Finally, as already discussed, Soviet naval writers acknowledge that the main striking force of the navy lies in its strategic missile weapons. Although SSBN are not explicitly mentioned, it is a bit far-fetched to assert that they have been excluded from Gorshkov's mind in the first part of this long quotation.
Sixth, McGwire's analysis of Gorshkov's conclusions contains the inference that increasing "combat readiness" in different weather conditions is a reference to the surface fleet. But if McConnell is correct in his inference that the Soviets plan to protect their SSBN with general-purpose forces, then the need for combat readiness by these personnel is quite understandable.

Seventh, McGwire questions McConnell's linkage of two references to oborona as given on pp. 13-14 and p. 25. He concedes that if Gorshkov meant this to be one interconnected argument, then the two references to oborona (one of which clearly refers to SSBN) are linked. However, he discounts McConnell's interpretation by calling this passage an enigmatic reference to the mere presence of the fleet presenting a potential aggressor with the same problems which he had hoped to create for our armed forces.

Although McGwire sees this as "obscure," one cannot help but wonder why. Viewing the passage as a whole (pp. 13-14) it seems obvious that Gorshkov is speaking of SSBN deterrence. After all, the threat being discussed is nuclear missile attack from the oceans, and the response the Soviets chose (because the West "did not experience a similar danger") was to pose the same problems for us.

Eighth, and perhaps most important, are the differing interpretations placed on the 1974 Navy Day article. As already noted, Gorshkov clearly states that the Navy's main task is "national defense (oborona
strany) against attack from ocean axes." The Navy Day article implies that "combatting the enemy fleet," previously the "priority task," has been downgraded. MccGwire concedes that if "combatting the enemy fleet" still includes the anti-SSBN mission, then perhaps obrorna strany is something different and of higher priority. But he suggests that Gorshkov is either altering his language for a lay audience, or that the Soviets have redefined their terms.61 The first explanation is very unlikely, given the consistency with which formulas are followed in Soviet military writings, regardless of the audience. As for the possibility of a redefinition of terms, this hypothesis is falsified by a number of subsequent Soviet statements indicating that combatting the enemy fleet still includes the anti-SSBN mission. For example, Gorshkov writes in his more recent book:

The new potential of a navy in operations against the shore....has determined the character of the principal efforts of a navy in combatting the enemy fleet. The most important of these efforts has become the use of naval forces against the enemy's sea-based strategic nuclear systems for the purpose of disrupting or blunting their strikes on ground targets to the maximum extent possible.62

It is clear from this passage that the mission of combatting the enemy fleet still contains the anti-SSBN task, indeed, this is the "most important" part of that particular mission. Nor is Gorshkov the only example.63

Ninth, MccGwire's claim that McConnell has offered only two pieces of evidence for the withholding mission, and that these were taken out of context, is misplaced (see p. 26). All McConnell has done is note
two separate discussions that are consistent with the interpretation he has made. The correctness of that interpretation may be disputed, but there is no methodological error. Gorshkov's statements regarding SSBN survivability ("great") and his disparagement of Allied ASW during WWII (not cost-effective) are consistent with each other and the use of SSBN as a withheld reserve. 64

Finally, MccGwire's alternative interpretation, namely, that the task of national defense is "strategic defense" (anti-SSBN) and "defense of state interests" around the globe rests on shaky ground. It doesn't make strategic or operational sense (given the extreme improbability of either existing or future Soviet surface vessels being capable of conducting broad-area ASW operations against evasive SSBN) and is inconsistent with construction data (despite MccGwire's allusions to the contrary). For example, the Soviets have consistently devoted more effort to the construction of SSBN than hunter-killer subs, or the support capabilities needed to sustain such ASW systems on effective forward deployment. 65 Moreover, it is by no means obvious that the various "ASW" platforms that the Soviets produced during the 1960s were (1) intended for any ASW role initially, or (2) ever intended for broad area ASW. Indeed, given the vulnerability of Soviet SSBN, it is at least as likely that these vessels (many of which had a minimal ASW capability anyway) were intended to protect Soviet SSBN during the necessary breakout, or against U.S. intrusion into Soviet homewaters. All this would seem to indicate that they (like us) view the goal of "strategic defense" as more readily achievable through deterrence, rather than by the trailing and sinking of evasive SSBN throughout the world's oceans.
For all these reasons, I find McGwire's analysis less convincing. His analysis of oborona fails to damage McConnell's hypothesis, or even address it directly. McConnell, as I read him, is not arguing that oborona refers solely to SSBN deterrence. Rather, he is arguing that the Navy's main task is national defense (оборона странны), and that this task is SSBN deterrence. The fact that Gorshkov can use oborona to refer to other forces and/or missions (e.g., "defensive capability") does not invalidate McConnell's argument. Similarly, there is a persistent confusion of the various types of deterrence. The Navy's main task is "оборона странны against attacks from ocean axes." This does not mean that the Navy, as an instrument of oborona, does not also deter "aggression" elsewhere. McConnell's point is much more limited than McGwire's characterization implies.

This debate appears to have moderated over time, and there has been a convergence of opinion. In particular, McGwire appears to have embraced aspects of McConnell's interpretation in his more recent writings. For example, in the May 1980 issue of Proceedings, he writes:

...the Americans were actually talking about going after (Soviet SSBNs). That was what worried the Soviets...Meanwhile, as more ASW systems became available, mounted in surface ships, submarines, and aircraft, it must have become increasingly clear that however innovative their methods, the traditional ASW methods embodied in these units would have inherent limitations, and an effective solution to the Polaris and Poseidon problem would have to wait....

Taken together, these two events engendered a shift away from developing a conventional ASW capability in distant waters towards extending the inner defense zones in the Northern Fleet area and in the Pacific off Kamchatka, and providing them with watertight antisubmarine defense which would turn them into
ocean bastions where SSBN could deploy in safety. Because ASW units could be brushed aside by superior forces, it would be necessary to establish command on the sea of both these sea areas.\textsuperscript{66}

McCormick now sees a different theme in Gorshkov as well. Discussing Gorshkov’s views in \textit{The Sea Power of the State}, McCormick says:

\begin{quote}
The discussion...provides powerful support to the arguments for the continued importance of general purpose surface forces, particularly in the anti-ASW/pro-SSBN role. Gorshkov argues that the strategic significance of sea-based long-range nuclear systems makes it essential to ensure a ‘favorable operating regime’ for one’s own forces, and asserts that undoubtedly, the West will seek to gain such command for themselves at the very outbreak of war.
\end{quote}

This would seem to be perfectly consistent with McConnell’s description of the withholding mission and the pro-SSBN general-purpose force task. This is especially salient given Gorshkov’s statement (as noted by McCormick) that the concept of “command of the sea” is “the most vital in naval warfare.”\textsuperscript{67}

McCormick may think I have been unfair to him in this unabashedly critical attention. Although I do not find his argument compelling, it is by no means clear that McConnell’s position is without fault as well.

Problems with McConnell

First, there are a number of passages that appear to be inconsistent with the various linguistic distinctions identified by McConnell. For example, his distinction between “national defense tasks” and “strategic tasks” supports the argument that intrawar deterrence is now the
Navy's main task. This is based on the persistent association of this mission with references to national defense (oborona strany rather than zashchita strany). But we have the following problematic passage from Gorshkov, cited by McConnell in the course of his discussion of different Soviet naval missions:

It is particularly important to note that submarines have become the main branch of the forces of modern fleets. A major role is also played by the new strategic orientation of the fleets for struggle against the shore. All this is making necessary the all-round backing of the actions of the forces solving strategic tasks...

McConnell interprets this passage (which appears in a discussion of command of the sea) as indicating the need to support SSBNs during the war with general purpose forces. But if these are submarines performing the task of national defense (oborona strany) that McConnell believes to be intrawar deterrence, then why does Gorshkov refer to "strategic tasks"? Given the distinction he has previously made regarding the use of oborona and zashchita (see p. 8), we might have expected something different.

McConnell is aware of this problem. In the final section of his most complete analysis of Gorshkov's writings, he draws attention to the hybrid language that occasionally appears.

Gorshkov's formulas have a hybrid character, composed of individual elements that are all too common and which give the illusion of familiarity. I have come to the conclusion, however, that his combinations of these individually common elements have never appeared before as a type; they are unique to the Navy of today.
McConnell then notes a number of these—including the example mentioned above—and accounts for the inconsistency by saying:

I am tempted to attribute this...to the fact that the Navy's military-political role is played out, not only in peace (deterrence, applying and offsetting "nuclear blackmail" and so on), but also in war, with the "armed struggle" an integral part of the setting; that it will take substantial combat action from the rest of the naval force to keep the SSBN viable as a militarily dormant but militarily-political active threat; and that in the end it may have a strategic mission anyway, if the enemy does not "behave."

Thus having made much of the consistency with which the spheres of oborona and zashchita are separated, McConnell now views the breakdown of this consistency as supporting his thesis as well. This may be, but it may also mean that the various linguistic conventions inferred by McConnell are less rigid (and therefore less meaningful) than he believes. We should also note that McConnell presents this interpretation in a very tentative way.

Second, there are some problems with the treatment of evidence in his various analyses. In my opinion, accusations of "dishonesty" are not justified, but the nature of these problems should be addressed openly. I shall make some suggestions below on how to minimize these problems in the future.

For example, in a passage cited earlier, McConnell provides the following translation:

Among the main means in insuring the Motherland's high oborona capabilities, one must name above all the
strategic missile troops and the navy...Aviation, the
ground troops and other branches of our valiant armed
forces, are, to a large extent, (also) means for
deterring the aggressive acts of the imperialists....

The full translation by the U.S. Naval Institute reads as follows:

Among the main means supporting the high defensive
capability of the Motherland we must cite above all
the Strategic Rocket Troops and the Navy, which incor-
porate as many means of armed combat as practical of
those which the other branches of the armed forces
have at their disposal. The Air Force, the Ground
forces, and the other branches of our glorious Armed
Forces, which we shall not examine here since our main
attention is being devoted to the Navy, to a great
degree are an instrument of deterrence to the aggres-
sive acts of the imperialists.71

Apart from some meaningless minor differences, there is a problem with
the bracketed "also" in McConnell's version. If the full USNIP version
is correct, this word appears to be very misleading. The insertion of
"[also]" implies a connection between the SRF and the Navy and the
deterrent role ascribed to the other branches. But the full quotation
contains no such direct implication. This does not mean that the SRF
and the Navy do not have a deterrent role, only that this passage pro-
vides no independent evidence that they do. Essentially, the presenta-
tion of evidence has become somewhat circular. McConnell interprets the
entire passage as a discussion of deterrence, and inserts an "[also]" in
the provided quotation. But once this is done, the passage as given is
not independent evidence for the preferred interpretation. Because
McConnell believes that the entire passage from which it is drawn is a
discussion of deterrence, he inserts an "[also]" linking all branches
with the deterrent task. But the passage offered to support the interpre-
tation requires further interpretation before it fits. At the very
least, this is likely to look suspicious to the reader. Because the goal is achieving consensus, this situation should be avoided if possible.

Next, we find the following passage in a 1975 essay by McConnell:

In his new book Groshkov denies the belief of earlier doctrinal eras that the pro-SSBN general purpose mission was a "secondary matter", with the implication therefore that today it was more than important and presumably "most important". By contrast, the task of "combatting the strike forces of the enemy fleet, primarily his nuclear power submarines and carrier task forces" is evaluated today simply as "important".* These two treatments are compatible with each other, suggesting that the lion's share of general purpose resources has gone to the pro-SSBN task.  

There are a number of objections to be raised here. First, although Gorshkov does state that the pro-SSBN mission was a "secondary matter" during previous periods, he never explicitly "denies this belief." He makes no positive assertions either way, and the passage is certainly more ambiguous than McConnell's admittedly plausible statement implies. Furthermore, the second citation in the passage (noted with an asterisk above) refers to a passage in a 1974 book by Basov, Achkasov, et al. which reads as follows:

An important task of our navy in a future war against the aggressor is the delivery of nuclear strikes against targets in his territory. Another no less important task of the Navy is the struggle with the strike forces of the enemy's Navy, primarily with his missile submarines and his aircraft carriers. A successful fulfillment of that task allows the signif-

* This asterisk marks where McConnell has footnoted a reference to a 1974 work by Basov, Achkasov, et al.
icant degrading of the enemy's nuclear strikes on
the territory of the Soviet Union and the socialist
countries friendly to us.73

It is quite clear that both "the delivery of nuclear strikes" and "the
struggle with the strike forces of the enemy's navy" are equally
important. If the first task (the delivery of nuclear strikes) is the
same as Gorshkov's statement of the navy's mission after its equipping
with nuclear missiles (e.g., crushing the enemy's military-economic
potential) and consequent need to achieve command of the sea to protect
the SSBN (see p. 16-18), then McConnell's statement violates the
evidence he has presented. McConnell is arguing that the pro-SSBN task
is of greater importance than "combatting the strike forces of the enemy
fleet." However, it is clear from Basov et al. that if the pro-SSBN
mission (and the SSBN role it implies) is the same as that of delivering
"nuclear strikes in his territory," no such inference can be drawn from
this statement. This is because Basov et al. quite clearly equates the
two tasks.

McConnell responds by arguing that the pro-SSBN/withholding
mission is not the same as the navy's participation in the "delivery of
nuclear strikes." The former he considers part of the mission of
oborona strany, the latter is one of the "basic tasks in sea and ocean
theatres of military action." This distinction is based on Soviet
usage, if not on simple logic. Among the basic tasks is the "delivery
of nuclear strikes," or "hitting ground targets." All basic tasks are
considered "important" and they are combat tasks. They are not, accord-
ing to this reconstruction, "main" or "most important" tasks.
If this complex structure of Soviet linguistic conventions is accurate, McConnell’s use of these statements is justified. One would have to be intimately familiar with this literature to make a definitive assessment. Regardless of the truth or falsity of McConnell’s assertion, it is clear that there is a complex analytical process underlying the interpretation. It is surely too much to ask that even the intelligent and informed reader accept the evidence as given, without simultaneously providing the background definitions, sources, and logic that underlie McConnell’s inference. Once again, there is no evidence of scholarly dishonesty, given that there is a logical structure to his argument that is consistent with presentable evidence (e.g., Basev, Achkasov, et al. do state that the task of “combating the enemy fleet” is important). However, because the inferences are based upon evidence that has not been given to the reader, it is hard to be very comfortable with McConnell’s written treatment of this question.

This omission is particularly grave in view of (1) the difficulty (in terms of availability) of obtaining the original sources needed to replicate his analysis; and (2) the exceedingly detailed and complicated nature of McConnell’s reasoning, evidence, and use of background information. This situation (which is shared by any analyst doing serious interpretive work with Soviet sources) places a very high premium on the individual analyst’s credibility. Given the ease with which an alternative interpretation (e.g., that McConnell is tampering with sources) of the above passages can be reached in the absence of the supporting background evidence, it is at least a tactical error for McConnell to assume this kind of omniscience on the part of his
readers. Once again, I find that his inferences are plausible and generally well-supported. Given that the primary goal of analysis should be to achieve consensus, however, providing more complete summaries of background evidence and internal logic would no doubt reduce the confusion and skepticism with which his analyses are occasionally viewed.

Much the same problem occurs in McConnell's use of the Aleshkin passage quoted on p. 18. McConnell rearranges the wording of Aleshkin's statement and concludes:

If the first strike era used historical surrogates to demonstrate a contemporary rejection of the pro-SSBN mission, the deferred-strike era uses Western surrogates in a matter-of-fact, non-polemical way to imply that "even in a nuclear war" SSBNs will be found "in the reserve", and that, consequently, these strategic naval forces are not fully capable of realizing their potential without the appropriate support of other forces.75

McConnell rearranges the order of Aleshkin's statement in order to illuminate what he feels is the real logic of the argument. This is not necessarily dishonest (indeed, McCGwire does the same thing with a passage from Gorshkov's 1974 Navy Day article) and the only question to ask in both cases is whether or not the reordering does violence to the author's intended meaning. Furthermore, McConnell is really very careful in dealing with this reference, for he states that Aleshkin only implies a reserve role for SSBN. He is aware of the fact that there is a conscious act of interpretation involved. The implication is there, but not absolute certainty. Still, it is perhaps not surprising that such manipulation makes the reader uneasy, and the inferences less convincing.
CONCLUSION

This attempt to assess a long-running dispute between two extremely perceptive and tenacious analysts has not been easy. I hope this effort will have a positive effect, and will not simply serve to add new fuel to an otherwise dying fire. I offer the following conclusions in the hope that these two protagonists will recognize their considerable debt to each other, along with the persistent differences. One would like to see renewed progress, but with a bit less rancor.

First, on balance, I think McConnell's arguments on both the question of authoritativeness and content stand on firmer ground. Of course, Gorshkov did not write the series or the book merely to publicize the withholding strategy. His aim was certainly broader than that, and it would be astonishing if Gorshkov (or his successor) did not continue to press for an enhanced naval role should the pro-SSBN/writhholding strategy eventually be replaced by a different "main task." I hasten to add that I would gladly accept additional arguments and evidence from McCGwire, should he consider my attempt to adjudicate this matter either faulty or unconsciously biased. Other interpretations are plausible, but McConnell's view of Gorshkov is both plausible and well-supported.

Second, the value of scholarly exchange on complex analytical question is clearly revealed by this analysis. Anyone reading the various published works by McCGwire and McConnell cannot fail to be
struck by how each has refined his arguments, evidence, and overall understanding as a result of the stimulus provided by the other. I doubt very much if McConnell would have acquired the range of knowledge and familiarity with Soviet military language that he now enjoys were it not for the persistent and insightful pressure provided by McGWire's alternative views. In short, each has pushed the other, and the community at large reaps the benefits.

Third, I strongly recommend the increased use of open scholarly forums (i.e., seminars, professional meetings). While it is important to write and publish—if only to be forced to clarify one's own thoughts—the kind of "give and take" of ideas that I have been both documenting and performing in this paper is very time-consuming. Putting respected protagonists face-to-face on occasion would streamline the analytic process considerably. In this regard, one can only mourn the passing of the Dalhousie conferences.

Fourth, many of the specific disagreements (e.g., the true meaning of Gorshkov's historical examples, the different types of deterrence) are probably indeterminate. Each analyst fits these pieces into his own picture of the puzzle, and the analysis rarely stands or falls on this basis. As a result, it is important to search for more unequivocal statements that can help us actually decide between two contrasting hypotheses. The fact that "combatting the enemy fleet" has been downgraded and still includes the anti-SSBN missions is a good example of this kind of evidence (see pp. 38-39).
Fifth, I have found no good evidence that either McCGwire or McConnell is dishonest in their use of Soviet sources. Such a charge, moreover, is exceedingly serious. One would hope that all analysts would take care to be very sure of their ground before making such charges. A definitive case has yet to be made—so far as I am aware—and many of the existing controversies merely reflect some methodological problems. Not surprisingly, I find McCGwire and McConnell to be guilty of somewhat different methodological sins.

In my opinion, McCGwire tends to let his inferences and assertions outrun the available evidence. For example, he repeatedly asserts that a "great debate" took place in Soviet defense planning during the late 1960s and early 1970s, but presents no hard (and very little soft) evidence to support the claim. In another example, McCGwire relies upon Ra'an'an's account of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship to indicate how unstable Moscow's foreign policy preferences were. Ra'an'an sees the Soviet departure from Egypt as a Soviet initiative (!) and Gorshkov's series is thus in part a protest against this move, on "strategic defense" grounds. Yet Ra'an'an's account (described by one commentator as "one of the best short stories of the year") is full of questionable methodological and substantive problems, and is a weak reed upon which to support a case. Because this type of assertion in turn guides the subsequent analysis (i.e., the assumption that a debate is going on supports the inference that Gorshkov must be polemicizing and then the further inferences about who his supporters and opponents are, as well as what topics are being disputed), such creative but unsupported theorizing can lead to some dubious conclusions. To mention but one exam-
ple, MccGwire has suggested on a number of occasions that the U.S. plans to "deny the Soviets the use of Western Europe as a means for reconstruction," probably by firing U.S. SLBMs at our NATO allies in the event of a protracted war. This hypothesis is thus used to explain the Soviet interest in countering U.S. SSBNs. One would like to see just a little evidence to support this idea. Finally, his various criticisms of McConnell's views either miss the point (e.g., the oborona/zashchita controversy) or do not stand up to further investigation (e.g., the definition of "combatting the enemy fleet").

If one can chide MccGwire for failing to provide adequate evidence for his rather sweeping assertions, then perhaps McConnell is supremely guilty of the opposite sin. McConnell's entire method consists of relating particular external events (which one can always interpret a number of ways) with a variety of specialized esoteric definitions based on extensive research into Soviet military conventions regarding language use. This has the practical effect of making his interpretations by definition idiosyncratic, because one cannot fully understand the logic of his arguments unless one is privy to the background definitions upon which the interpretations are based. Moreover, when one is dealing with a system of conventions that one has inferred from reading Soviet literature (but which no Soviet has ever confirmed for him), it will always be possible to fit an apparent departure into the structure, especially if one is willing to mold it a bit. Thus McConnell accounts for the almost unprecedented use of "doctrinal authenticators" by explaining that Gorshkov was presenting a radically different argument. And he accounts for the use of language violating previously observed
conventions by arguing that the Navy's "national defense task" really combines "military-political aspects" with "strategic aspects." In short, conformity to convention confirms his thesis, but so do the aberrations. A final example might be his unsupported inference that there are two "hidden themes" in the final installment of the Gorshkov series, one of which focuses on the main task of oborona strany.

McConnell may of course be absolutely right, and his conclusions are plausible and supported by ample textual evidence. On the other hand, these cases may also mean that the linguistic distinctions upon which his analysis is based are not as rigid as believed. The Soviets may well employ this rigid linguistic structure in order to "make a science out of a vocabulary." This language is thus a set of conventions qua conventions, existing as much for convenience and political conformity as for communicating content. Thus, to draw vital substantive conclusions from what are ultimately arbitrary rules for language use may indeed be an example of "two or three little words under more weight than they can bear." Unfortunately, there is no way—short of Soviet testimony—to confirm or disconfirm these points.

Sixth, this highlights the need for all analysts to be more explicit in outlining the logic of their arguments, along with the available evidence. I have argued elsewhere that there are particular patterns of evidence that must be satisfied before general inferences can be made about the goals a Soviet writer has in his statements.78 What I am calling for here is greater attention to both the logic and the presentation of supporting evidence, particularly when complex
structures of background definitions are involved. All parts are essential to making a convincing argument.

Seventh, I believe there is a real need for greater resources being devoted to this field. It is exceptionally difficult to verify works of doctrinal analysis, given the problems involved in locating sources, checking translations, etc. Unless one has worked in the field for a long time (and accumulated the necessary files), it is time-consuming (and often impossible) to obtain the various original Russian sources used in an analyst's interpretation. For example, there are 119 footnotes in McConnell's essay in Soviet Oceans Development, many of which contain more than five separate references. Verifying crucial interpretive passages would be an exhaustive job, given the present state of source material availability. MccGwire has suggested that a centralized data retrieval system (e.g., with disc storage of both the original Russian texts and an English translation) would be invaluable. I can only agree. It would not be cheap, but such a tool would probably be more valuable than any other single resource. Not only would such a centralized clearing house enhance the capacity for verification, but it would decrease the "entry costs" to the entire field. Greater participation by diligent and talented scholars will only improve our understanding. Indeed, one difficulty that afflicted the disagreements between MccGwire and McConnell was the fact that relatively few people were both willing and able to penetrate the arguments, assemble the points of disagreement, and attempt to balance the merits of each position. Having spent over a month on just this task, I am quite aware why others have been dissuaded.

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Finally, I wish to reiterate my concern about possible bias. Given my professional proximity to McConnell, I am particularly sensitive to the possibility that I have been unconsciously swayed in my analysis. Where his written arguments were obscure or problematic, he was available for further discussion. As a result, I now welcome Professor MccGwire's comments, criticisms, and complaints. I am eager to consider the arguments and evidence he may muster against either my judgments or McConnell's latest iterations. This essay is in no sense the definitive treatment of these matters. If it has a primary purpose, it is to bring these two conflicting analysts back together, to indicate how each profits from the other, and to encourage a renewed exchange of ideas and evidence. Given our present need to understand Soviet naval intentions, using our collective intellectual resources in the most productive fashion should remain our "main task" for some time to come.
NOTES


7. Consider the following passages from typical Soviet military writings, translating izlagat (or its derivatives) as "to cover comprehensively":

"One cannot fail to note that in certain sections of the book, particular problems which are very important for the practical activity of commanders and political workers are covered comprehensively with an unwarranted brevity and conciseness."

"The authors make no pretensions to an exhaustive comprehensive coverage of the same theme." (redundant at the very least)

"The author...has covered comprehensively a few thoughts on the role and place of navies in various historical eras...."
All these quotations suggest that *izlagat*, as used by Soviet military writers means "to cover, treat, expound, etc..." but without any further connotations. The quotations are, respectively: Captains 1st rank Zuev and Isupov, "Bearing in Mind the Requirements of the Time," *Morsko Sbornik* 75/9/109; E.I. Rybkin, *Kritika burzhuaznykh ucheniy o prichinakh i rol' voyn v istorii* (filosofsko-istoricheskii ocherk), Moscow, Izd Nauka, 1979, p. 9; and Gorshkov, *Morskaya moshch' gosudarstva*, Moscow, 1976, p. 8 (editor's introduction).


9. See Weinland in Weinland, *McGwire*, and McConnell, op. cit. Briefly, the "publications anomalies" refer to a variety of phenomena. There are two gaps in the series (July 1972 and January 1973) occurring at potentially sensitive points in the publication (the SALT process and the Christmas bombing campaign in North Vietnam). There were a number of apparent aberrations in the censorship process (either lengthy or excessively short periods at the censor), and there was an apparent increase in the overall time spent at the censor following the July 1972 issue. I have examined all the arguments and evidence available on this question and find the matter wholly ambiguous. See also the detailed analysis by John McDonnell, "Content Analysis of Soviet Naval Writings," Part I, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Department of Political Science, Dalhousie University, Sept. 1980, pp. 18-28.

10. *McGwire* (1976), p. 168 and *McGwire* (1974) p. 22. *McGwire* refers to works by David Cox and Thomas Wolfe regarding the existence of an internal debate. However, these references do not, in my view, provide very solid support. Wolfe's discussion deals with a Soviet debate on the utility of force "as an instrument of policy," a matter only loosely connected with most of Gorshkov's discussion. Cox examines an internal debate in the period 1964-65. Neither of these support the idea that a "major debate on foreign policy" was contemporaneous with the Gorshkov series, or that Gorshkov was a major player in one faction.


12. In particular, the gaps in the series in July 1972 and January 1973. McConnell has argued that there are a number of possible explanations—"each worth about a nickel each"—but it is still difficult to believe that a work approved in advance and clearly of some importance would be interrupted without explanation on two occasions.


14. *ibid*.


17. ibid., p. 203, footnote 97. (I should add that the footnotes are misprinted in this volume, beginning with footnote 51. After that, the references in the text are one ahead of the corresponding number at the bottom of the page. Thus footnote 97 (text) is really footnote 96 (as marked at the bottom of the page).

18. ibid.

19. ibid.

20. ibid., p. 204.

21. Gorshkov, MS 72/12/20-21; USNIP p. 119. As will be seen below, the translation of this passage is crucial. I have provided the USNIP version here, with one important change. When USNIP reads "And the Navy, along with the other branches of the Soviet Armed Forces, is successfully fulfilling its main mission..." I have used McConnell's translation. His reads "And this--its main task...the Navy is successfully fulfilling along with the other branches of the Soviet Armed Forces." My reasons for this change will become clearer below. (See especially footnote 59.)


23. ibid., p. 205-6.


26. Gorshkov, MS 73/2/20-21 (see also footnote 53).


32. Aleshkin, MS 72/1/25.


36. ibid., p. 172.

37. ibid.
38. Gorshkov, MS 72/2/21; USNIP p. 131; and McCwire, ibid.


40. ibid., p. 174.

41. ibid., p. 175-76.

42. ibid., p. 176.

43. ibid., p. 177.

44. ibid., p. 178.

45. ibid.

46. ibid., p. 180-81.

47. See ibid., pp. 82-88, 95-96, 171, as well as McCwire's various essays in the Dalhousie conference volumes.

48. ibid., pp. 180-81.

49. ibid., p. 181.


51. ibid. The passages in the series and book are not identical, but very nearly so.

52. ibid., p. 100.

53. See McCwire, (1976) pp. 172-73. As I read this passage, the use of the present tense makes more sense than the use of the future. This is clearly the kind of issue that is best left to Russian language specialists, and I would defer to expert consensus if it could be achieved. At the very least, the issue is sufficiently uncertain that McCwire should probably not make too much of it.

54. ibid., p. 172.

55. ibid.

56. ibid., p. 173.

57. ibid., p. 174.

58. For example: "The Soviet Navy, while reliably guarding the sea frontiers of our motherland, is capable of operating on the expanses of the ocean, and also of delivering powerful strikes against targets located on other continents" (Levchenko, Turkmen-skaya iskra July 26, '59) And the following: "The Navy of the Soviet Union, armed with modern means of combat, is capable not only of defending the sea frontier of the motherland, but also of
successfully...delivering powerful strikes on hostile targets located on the continents." Zinchenko, Mamaev, Khasmamedov, Boevoy otryad leninskogo komsomola, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1968, p. 51.

59. See MccGwire, 1976, pp. 172-73. In Russian, the key sentence begins: "I etu svoyu glavnuyu zadachu ... ." If we render this into English literally, we get "And this its main task ... ." There seems to be no good reason not to use this literal form, with the implied linkage between the "main task" and the delivery of "retributory blows."

60. ibid., p. 176.

61. ibid., p. 178.

62. Gorshkov, op. cit., (1979) p. 221. The translations here are slightly different, but the message is the same.

63. For example, see the discussion of "Naval Operations" by V.P. Karponin in the official Soviet Military Encyclopedia, Moscow, 1978, Volume VI, p. 62.


65. To do justice to MccGwire's arguments would require another essay. He has contributed mightily to the study of Soviet sea-power, and should be commended for his systematic study of construction patterns. MccGwire has long maintained that Soviet naval policy is reactive, and that the shift to forward deployment was caused by Soviet concern over Western sea-based strategic strike systems. He interprets a wide variety of data to support this point, including: ship construction data, deployment patterns, statements by Soviet naval personnel, and discrete instances of Soviet coercive diplomacy. Unfortunately, much of this data are ephemeral, and can easily be viewed as supporting other hypotheses. MccGwire goes on considerable length to defend his thesis. Thus Soviet politico-military presence in the Third World, even when unrelated to any changes in Western strategic posture, is part of the inferred mission of "developing a strategic infrastructure." The otherwise implausible notion of conducting open-ocean ASW with surface platforms is explained by the Soviet willingness to pursue "10% solutions," despite the fact that they had neither the requisite platforms or sensors to conduct such a mission (and still don't). Moreover, some of MccGwire's arguments rested on "facts" that were subsequently falsified, such as the SS-N-13 ballistic missile and the "closed-cycle" submarine program. One should wonder what this does to his argument. Finally, of course, is the fact that the Soviets have exhibited little or no tendency for covert trailing (a legitimate task of "strategic defense") or even open-area ASW, during either peacetime or crisis periods. As
noted in the text, MccGwire seems to be shifting his ground of late, probably in response to a number of these factors. For a full statement of MccGwire's arguments over the past 10 years, consult "Current Soviet Warship Construction and Naval Weapons Development," "The Evolution of Soviet Naval Policy," and "Soviet Strategic Weapons Policy" in Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints, New York, Praeger, 1975; "The Turning Points in Soviet Naval Policy" in Soviet Naval Developments; Capability and Context, New York, Praeger, 1973; as well as the other works by MccGwire already cited. For a brief but cogent critique of MccGwire's basic thesis, see Robert G. Weinland, "The Changing Mission Structure of the Soviet Navy" in Soviet Naval Developments. I would like to make it very clear that I don't consider my treatment of this question to be anywhere near definitive. My goal in this essay was an assessment of methods of doctrinal interpretation, not the "once-and-for-all" summary of Soviet naval diplomacy.


67. ibid., p. 175.


70. ibid., pp. 615-16.


74. My understanding of McConnell's position here is based upon lengthy discussions with him, not on any published works. That, of course, is part of the problem, he is not available for personal consultations with all his readers.


76. For MccGwire's use of Ra'anana, see MccGwire, (1976) pp. 105-6. For effective critiques of Ra'anana's argument, consult Frank J. Stech, "Estimates of Peacetime Soviet Naval Intentions: An Assessment of Methods" Technical Report, Mathtech, Inc., March 1981, pp. 32-33, 130. For the original argument, consult Uri Ra'anana, "Soviet Decisionmaking in the Middle East, 1967-73," Orbis, Fall 1973. The essence of Ra'anana's argument is that the Soviets carefully orchestrated their entire relationship with Egypt during this period, including their "expulsion" in 1972. Critics generally focus on
the dearth of evidence supporting this position, and the lack of understandable Soviet motivation.


1. CNA Professional Papers with an AD number may be obtained from the National Technical Information Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, Springfield, Virginia 22151. Other papers are available from the Management Information Office, Center for Naval Analyses, 4401 Ford Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22302-0268. An index of selected publications is also available on request. The index includes a listing of professional papers, with abstracts, issued from 1969 to December 1983.

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