Special Operations Forces: Expanding the Mid and High Intensity Battlefield

LTC Richard A. Todd
Infantry

School of Advanced Military Studies
Advanced Operational Fellowship Studies
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

4 May 1987

Approved for public released; distribution is unlimited.
**SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES: EXPENDING THE MID AND HIGH INTENSITY BATTLEFIELD (U)**

**LTC RICHARD A. TODD**

This monograph examines the role of the special operations forces as a component of the United States Army war fighting system described by FM 100-5, *Operations*, as AirLand Battle Doctrine. The impetus for this monograph was a lack of recent literary effort examining the relationship between special operations forces and major military operations and campaigns on the mid and high intensity battlefield. The lack of recent interest by military writers coupled with minimal SOF play in the war games developed at the Combined Arms Center for use by the School of Advanced Military Studies, and a demonstrated lack of understanding of the role of special operations forces as a supporting arm in the global war scenarios played by SAMS students, dictates the need for an examination of this subject.

The monograph explores the theoretical basis for the integration of SOF into campaign plans, establishes a historical basis for the link between SOF operations and the major efforts of conventional forces in the main battle area, and explores current joint and US Army doctrine for incorporation of SOF into campaign plans for mid - and high -
The study concludes that both a theoretical and a historical basis exist for the integration of SOF into campaign plans to support the efforts of major conventional forces on the mid- and high-intensity battlefield. However, integration has not been the focus of efforts for improving SOF capabilities in recent years, while the doctrine in FM 100-5 calls for integration and TRADOC PAM 525-34, OPERATIONAL CONCEPT FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES, outlines the roles and missions for ARSOF, the educational system has largely ignored the issue. Planners, commanders and staffs must be educated to incorporate SOF into campaign plans. SOF commanders must establish close working relationships with the commanders and staffs to ensure maximum integration is achieved, so that the desired synergistic effect of all arms battle can be achieved.
School of Advanced Military Studies
Monograph Approval

Name of Student: Lieutenant Colonel Richard A. Todd
Title of Monograph: Special Operations Forces: Expanding the Mid and High Intensity Battle Field

Approved By:

Harold R. Winton, Monograph Director
Lieutenant Colonel Harold R. Winton, Ph.D.

Richard Hart Sinnreich, Director, School of Advanced Military Studies

Colonel Richard Hart Sinnreich, MA

Gordon R. Sullivan, MS, Deputy Commandant, Command and General Staff College

Accepted this 15th day of May 1987.
This monograph examines the role of the special operations forces as a component of the United States Army war fighting system described by FM 100-5, Operations, as AirLand Battle Doctrine. The impetus for this monograph was a lack of recent literary effort examining the relationship between special operations forces and major military operations and campaigns on the mid and high intensity battlefield. The lack of recent interest by military writers coupled with minimal SOF play in the war games developed at the Combined Arms Center for use by the School of Advanced Military Studies, and a demonstrated lack of understanding of the role of special operations forces as a supporting arm in the global war scenarios played by SAMS students, dictates the need for an examination of this subject.

The monograph explores the theoretical basis for the integration of SOF into campaign plans, establishes a historical basis for the link between SOF operations and the major efforts of conventional forces in the main battle area, and explores current joint and US Army doctrine for incorporation of SOF into campaign plans for mid- and high-intensity battle.

The study concludes that both a theoretical and a historical basis exist for the integration of SOF into campaign plans to support the efforts of major conventional forces on the mid- and high-intensity battlefield. However integration has not been the focus of efforts for improving SOF capabilities in recent years, while the doctrine in FM 100-5 calls for integration and TRADOC PAM 525-34, Operational Concept for the Employment of Army Special Operations Forces, outlines the roles and missions for ARSOF, the educational system has largely ignored the issue. Planners, commanders and staffs must be educated to incorporate SOF into campaign plans. SOF commanders must establish close working relationships with the commanders and staffs to insure maximum integration is achieved, so that the desired synergistic effect of all arms battle can be achieved.
Table of Contents

I. Introduction.................................................1
II. Integration of SOF into the Campaign Plan: The Theory...3
III. Historical Examples.......................................6
IV. Contemporary Analysis....................................20
V. Conclusions......................................................24
VI. Implications....................................................27
VII. Endnotes.........................................................30
VIII. Bibliography..................................................33
"Successful attack will require isolation of the battle area in great depth as well as the defeat of enemy forces in deeply echeloned defensive areas, prompt massing of fires, interdiction of follow-on forces, and the containment and defeat of large formations by fire and maneuver."

--FM 100-5 Operations

INTRODUCTION

The United States armed forces must be prepared to meet the challenge of an enemy who is as well trained as, and better equipped and more numerous than any we have fought in the past. This study addresses the role of special operations forces in mid and high intensity conflict as an integrated component of a system of fighting defined by current army doctrine as AirLand Battle. AirLand Battle Doctrine is a logical approach to fighting a joint battle to defeat an enemy who has at his disposal large numbers of well equipped modern forces that can strike across a broad front in sufficient strength to penetrate into our rear, and if not checked achieve decisive results quickly. AirLand Battle Doctrine seeks to bring combat power to bear at the critical point at the critical time to defeat the enemy, and to be prepared to fight his succeeding echelons. In order to defeat the enemy United States armed forces must fully integrate a number of battlefield systems. This study argues that special operations forces (SOF), in particular U.S. Army Special Forces, are a key component system of AirLand Battle and that their integration into the campaign plan for successful battle must be
planned for just as one plans for battlefield air interdiction, employment of artillery, all source intelligence, or sustainment.

Integration, the word I have chosen to express the need for inclusion and coordination of the effort special operations forces make on the mid and high intensity battle field, is used in FM 100-5 to explain the role of sustaining AirLand Battle operations. That is fitting because special operations forces normally play a supporting role as Otto Heilbrunn points out in his excellent study, Warfare in the Enemy's Rear.

The forces of the rear normally make a supporting effort, in the offense they act as an accelerator to speed up the friendly main effort; in the defense they act as a brake to slow down the enemy's advance; at all times they act to isolate the enemy.(1)

The scope of this study is necessarily limited by several factors. First, it is intentionally limited to the integration of army special operations forces, primarily Special Forces, into the campaign plan for mid and high intensity battle. Low intensity conflict is not addressed. While unconventional warfare will be mentioned, it will not receive the attention that direct action intelligence collection and interdiction missions, unilaterial missions by army special operations forces (ARSOF) directed against the enemy rear do. This is because the development of an indigenous guerrilla or partisan force and the infrastructure to support them is so time consuming that a modern war in Europe may well be settled before unconventional warfare operations could take effect.
I have also limited the scope of this paper to the integration of Army Special Forces and to a lesser extent Army Rangers. I am in full agreement with Major Glenn M. Harned who in his masters thesis, "Army Special Operations Forces and AirLand Battle," states:

There is no doctrinal justification for including civil affairs and psychological operations in the SOF Operational Concept. (2)

I seek to accomplish two things in this study. First, to show that special operations forces have historically contributed to the success of major land campaigns; and second, to demonstrate that they can contribute to the overall success of AirLand Battle if campaign planners plan for the integration of these forces on the modern battlefield to achieve a synergistic effect.

INTEGRATION OF ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES INTO THE CAMPAIGN PLAN: THE THEORY

FM 100-5 states that:

"To be effective, the operations of all units must be coordinated combined arms actions." (4)

FM 100-5 recognizes the role of special operations forces along with all arms in a coordinated effort. This effort can be further amplified by elaborating on the contributions that special operations forces can make in the collection of battlefield information, electronic warfare, deception, joint suppression of enemy air defense, and in assisting tactical air operations by target acquisition, terminal guidance and timely reporting of bomb damage. FM 100-5 clearly recognizes the need for combined arms
operations and includes special operations forces as a component in the war fighting system. The most well-known writers of military doctrine to include Clausewitz, Jomini, and Liddell Hart all recognize the need for all arms to play a part in the campaign. However, little direct reference is given for the inclusion of special operations forces into the plan for a successful campaign, though all recognize a need for operations in the enemy rear.

In *On War*, Clausewitz states:

"There are two reasons for attacking into the enemy's rear, to reduce the ability of an army to sustain itself by cutting its' lines of communications or to encircle an army and cut off its retreat." (5)

Clausewitz also recognized that:

"Forces sent to operate against the enemy's rear or flank are not available for use against his front." (6)

Thus he recognizes the need for special forces, or at least forces dedicated to operations in the enemy's rear. While Clausewitz seems to scorn intelligence he does state:

Advance guards and outposts are needed to detect and reconnoiter the enemy's approach before he comes into view. (7)

And: An Army must use its vanguard as its strategic eyes, sending out individual detachments, spies and so forth. (8)

Both are roles consistent with those outlined in FM 100-5 for special operations forces.

Jomini looked at battle in the enemy rear in a somewhat different light than Clausewitz. Jomini allowed that forces operating in the enemy rear could also seize decisive points, and sever
lines of communications to obtain an advantage in either terrain or relative combat power. (9) Jomini felt that attacking in the enemy's rear could prevent the enemy from concentrating combat power thus achieving greater relative mass at decisive points (10) not unlike our intent to disrupt follow-on echelons.

In Strategy, Liddell Hart addresses flanking and rear attacks in great detail, his primary theme being that:

"Modern armies require constant support from huge military industrial bases in the home territory, conscript armies are too large to feed off the land." (11)

This implies a weakness or vulnerability to interdiction in the rear, a weakening of sustainment which could bring an army down.

To appreciate fully the potential contribution the integration of special operations in the enemy rear can make to the success of a campaign, it is necessary to look at the doctrine of our primary adversary, the Soviet Union. In his School of Advanced Military Studies monograph, "Rear Operations, Protecting the Points of Decisions", Major James L. Saunders traces Soviet doctrine for operations in the enemy rear and the linkage between these operations and the operations of the attack echelons of each front. This work shows the importance the Soviets place on the integration of all arms to include the intelligence collection and direct attack of special purpose forces (SPETSNAZ) units working in NATO'S rear to desynchronize the NATO operational and tactical defense and add momentum to the advance of the Soviet frontal operation. (12)
Military theorists have provided the basis for planning operations in the enemy's rear area. While they did not specify that special forces need be developed to operate in the enemy rear, history has proven that these operations required special training and equipment to insure a high probability of success.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLES

In this study I will examine two major campaigns to trace the role of special operations forces in rear battle, and to determine the impact if any of their actions on the success of the overall campaign. I will also attempt to trace the integration of special operations into the overall campaign plan and the synchronization of these operations with other operations in the campaign. I will then discuss the command and control mechanisms developed to facilitate both integration and synchronization.

After the fall of France in June, 1940, and before the invasion of Sicily in July, 1943, war in North Africa was the main effort for the British.

"On the German side, Rommel was sent to Africa to mount a successful holding operation but succeeded in turning a campaign regarded as a side show into a major theater of war."(13)

The British on the other hand made the Mediterranean their major theater of war. The British attempted to give Wavell, then Auchinleck and Montgomery sufficient troops and supplies in Egypt to prevent an initial Axis take over of the Suez and then to drive the Germans and Italians out of Libya and Africa.
altogether. The war in the Western Desert, as it came to be called, was a series of offensives and counteroffensives in which supply, control of supply lines, and eventually the ability to mass enough supplies to out duel the enemy became the pattern. (14) After the end of 1941 Rommel was at a disadvantage because the Germans were throwing everything they had into stopping the Russian winter offensive, and then into reopening their own drive deeper into Russia. (15) The war in North Africa went back and forth based on which side had the resources to attack. As each army advanced, however, it got farther away from its supply base, and thus became more vulnerable. The British proved themselves to be particularly adept at raiding enemy LOC's, supply dumps and airfields. It is these operations into the German rear, their impact on the overall campaign, and the linkage between these special operations in the enemy rear and close operations in the main battle area that this study will analyze.

On 5 July 1941 General Sir Claude Auchinleck succeeded General Wavell, who was transferred to India, as Commander-in-Chief, Middle Eastern Command. With the change of command in Cairo and the promise of reinforcement, great optimism prevailed in the British ranks. (16) At this time British special operations units were starting to emerge in the theater. Long Range Desert Group (LRDG) operations began in September, 1940. The LRDG's primary role was reconnaissance. However, raiding of enemy airfields and logistics dumps and the interdiction of enemy lines of communications, sometimes in conjunction with the other emerging army
special operations unit, the Special Air Service (SAS), soon became the norm. (17)

David Sterling, founder and original Commander of the SAS convinced General Ritchie, and then through him General Auchinleck and General Cunningham, the 8th Army Commander, of the utility of the SAS and the impact SAS raiders could have on the main British effort.

"In November of 1941 Auchinleck launched a major offensive with his newly acquired U.S. armor. The British intent was to make a short left hook from Maddalena toward Tobruk and to force Rommel to give battle." (18)

During a two week period operations took on the characteristics of typical desert whirligig warfare. The British hoped to succeed based on a superiority in numbers of tanks, guns, and troops as well as the support of the desert Air Force which was in good fettle. (19) The SAS purposed a mission to destroy enemy fighter aircraft based at forward airfields, thus denying the enemy fighter support during the impending battle. (20) The plan, though conceived by the SAS, was coordinated with GHQ, Cairo. Had it succeeded, it would no doubt have contributed greatly to the outcome of the battle. In the event, the aircraft carrying the SAS raiders to their drop zone in the enemy rear got lost in bad weather, several crashed, and a number of the would be raiders were injured.

"The SAS learned three important lessons from the failed raid. First parachutists couldn't take chances with the weather, second units should be self contained, and third that targets might be more easily reached overland with the Long Range Desert Groups." (21)
The SAS commander had direct access to General Auchinleck, the Theater Commander, and his staff in Cairo. Operations throughout the campaign were proposed by Commander SAS, or LRDG, after being briefed on the overall plan by the GHQ staff. While this system did not coordinate special operations with army, corps or division level units, it did integrate the special operations actions into the overall campaign by attacking targets of operational significance. In support of western desert offensive operations between November, 1941, and August, 1942, the SAS destroyed over 400 enemy aircraft on the ground. (22)

"Rommel's second offensive, 21 January - 7 July 1942 took Benghazi and forced the British back to a defensive line that extended south from Gazala. The initial German advance lasted from 21 January until the British established their weak defense on 4 February. The Germans then paused, re-equipped and trained for four months. March, April and May, 1942, were busy months for the British and Germans alike. Both planned another offensive but first sufficient supplies had to be accumulated for such an operation." (23)

The SAS and LRDG did not rest during this period. Their initial attack was against the German port at Boverat in January. They destroyed seventeen fuel tankers, which exacerbated German problems of petroleum distribution, as well as the local radio station. (24) LRDG reconnaissance elements reported on German troop buildups, supply dump locations and German training activities. Targets discovered by the LRDG were often attacked by the SAS.

On 24-28 May 1942 Rommel kicked off his attack again; from 28-30 May the battle grew in scope and intensity as more British
armor moved into the area. Rommel struggled to supply his tanks over his extended supply lines, which were exposed to strikes from the desert air force. (25) The Long Range Desert Group supplied the GHQ with critical intelligence during this period.

For four and one half weeks beginning in mid April the LRDG kept watch twenty four hours a day against the enemy main supply route, logging every tank and vehicle that passed by. This information was invaluable to intelligence in Cairo. (26)

During the same period the SAS operated sixteen patrols against the road, this meant that each night three or four raids were conducted against the enemy's main line of communication. (27)

Throughout the campaign in the western desert, British army special operations forces operated effectively in the enemy rear, in support of the operations of the army and in consultation with the desert air force.

How was this integration of special operations forces effected? While most authors prefer to write about the exciting aspects of SAS and LRDG operations in the desert, one must read between the lines to understand clearly how the operations were conducted. It seems evident that both David Sterling, a commando officer who conceived the Special Air Service concept, and the organizers of the Long Range Desert Group established very special relationships with the Commander-in-Chief and senior staff officers at GHQ. Sterling in fact wrote a memorandum to the C in C which proposed the formation of the SAS and outlined its mission. The memorandum pointed out the raison de etre for special
operations forces and proposed a command and control link directly to the C in C himself. (28)

The command and control arrangements and most importantly the integration and synchronization of special operations support for major operations was based on the relationship of the junior officers who commanded the special operations units to the senior officers who commanded British forces in the theater and the army in the desert. Integration was worked out on a personal basis by commanders and senior staff. While coordination was close, the organization remained "off line" and flexible. Resources and support were allocated to the LRDG and SAS based on the mission requirements.

The role and impact of special operations units in the western desert was very significant. While most authors choose to write of deeds as opposed to effects upon the campaign as a whole, it is fair to state that more aircraft were destroyed on the ground by the SAS and LRDG than were destroyed by raids on airfields by the desert air force. Maintenance shops, hangar facilities and spare parts also fell victim to desert raiders. They interdicted the enemy's main line of communication along its entire length and diverted thousands of enemy soldiers to guard airfields and secure railway and roads nets. They clearly had a major psychological impact on enemy units. (29)

The overall impact of their operations is difficult to assess. It is clear, however, that these operations were integrated into the overall campaign plan by the efforts and initia-
tive of relatively junior officers who commanded the special operations units and by the foresight and willingness of very senior commanders to accept new ideas.

The other historical example I have chosen to examine is that of the Normandy invasion of June, 1944, Operation Neptune. Neptune was one of the largest military operations of all time. It was a joint and combined operation, including ground, naval and air forces of the United States and the British Commonwealth, as well as Free French and Polish contingents. The invasion plan called for an assault wave of five divisions, two American on the right or western portion of the invasion area and a Canadian division and two British divisions on the left. The amphibious assaults were supported by the landing of two reinforced American Airborne Divisions and one British Airborne Division. The amphibious invasion was scheduled for 5 June 1944. However, due to adverse weather conditions the invasion was postponed to one hour after dawn on 6 June 1944. The airborne divisions went in on the night of 5-6 June 1944 with the mission of protecting the lodgment.(30) After securing a lodgment and building up forces a breakout was foreseen. While the British on the left had the best tank country in front of them and heavier forces planned to be put ashore in their sector, the fact that Britain was down to the end of her manpower reserves mitigated against an all out British assault. The British chiefs of staff and government felt that it was essential to husband British manpower, to insure a proper place in the final peace negotiations.
The Americans then on the right facing the bocage country of endless hedge rows were faced with the initial break through effort. (31)

The Germans under Field Marshal Rommel and Commander of Army Forces West (OKW) Field Marshal Von Rundstedt had prepared the beaches and battle fields by mining, and placing obstacles both on land and under the water. While Von Runstedt's strategy of reliance on counterattack was the classic one for the defense of an extended front, there were many well placed Germans including Rommel, who felt that allied air power would curtail the German ability to maneuver forces to counterattack. Fuel shortages also hampered German plans for a more mobile defense. (32)

To support Operation Overlord, the overall plan for the invasion of Europe, a much larger special operations organization existed than ever developed in North Africa.

The British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the American Office of Special Services (OSS) were already in existence, and had been operating in France from 1941 onward. (33)

Both were mixed civilian/military agencies run from the national level. SOE and OSS were essentially staffed by civilians in uniform, many of whom were notable wealthy adventurers and aristocrats. Both organizations were filled with people who had political influence as well as connections with government and big business. Professional soldiers were not normally found in the ranks of the OSS or SOE, and were not particularly fond of these citizen soldiers with friends in high places. SOE and OSS
both had strong connections with the French resistance. Small teams of officers and enlisted radio operators parachuted into occupied France to coordinate operations and resupply the resistance bands. The Free French under General DeGaulle wanted control of the resistance as French fighters on French soil.

The political situation surrounding secret service or special operations activity in and around Operations Overlord and Neptune is worthy of a paper in itself.

On 23 March 1944 Eisenhower's headquarters, SHAFE, assumed control of all Secret Service activity connected with the Overlord landings. The joint special operations unit formed by OSS and SOE was divorced entirely from its parent organizations and eventually renamed Special Forces Headquarters, reporting directly to SHAFE. (34)

Bureaucratic wrangling in London continued throughout the operation, with the French insisting on control of all OSS and SOE operations in France. The French in fact did gain control from General Eisenhower only one month before the invasion. The muddle continued, and ended up in late June, 1944 in an unwieldy structure called EMFFI (Etat Major des Forces Francaises de L'Intérieur). (35)

Attempts at integration and synchronization began in earnest in the beginning of 1944. Small SOE detachments were set up at the headquarters of 21 Army Group and of the Canadian First and British Second Armies to explain to the army operational staffs what resistance could and could not do. After D-Day, Brooke, with Advance Special Forces Headquarters, was along side SHAFE's advanced headquarters to do the same thing. (36)
However, throughout the period a lack of understanding of the special operations forces' capabilities was evident in the ranks of both British and American commanders. M. R. D. Foot remarks in his book, *SOE in France*:

This is not the place to touch on the question of whether the best brains in the American Armed Forces were available for Europe at all, but certainly in this theater the conservatism natural to all high commanders was reinforced by extra conformist action. (37)

Integration of special operations into the overall campaign was deemed important enough to warrant the development of a special forces headquarters formally to integrate special operations into the overall campaign plan. The special forces headquarters for Neptune placed planning cells to integrate operation at the army group and army levels; and I have quoted M. R. D. Foot who found that the best use of special operations forces was not made due to over caution or conservatism on the part of commanders.

Another source seems relevant here. Weigley in *Eisenhower's Lieutenants* writes of:

Major General Charles H. 'Pete' Corlett, an officer experienced in amphibious operations who had helped to plan the invasion of the Aleutians and commanded the 7th Infantry Division in its invasion of Kwajalein Islet. MG Corlett, designated by General Marshall to command XIX Corps, one of the early follow on units, tried at General Marshall's urging to assist the planners in preparation for the invasion, he was well received by Major General Sir Francis de Guingand, Montgomery's chief of staff who arranged an address on lessons learned and amphibious training and techniques for senior British commanders and staffs. Corlett did not find the Americans receptive in the way Marshall had intended. Instead they seemed to dismiss the Pacific as the bush leagues, and to quote Corlett: "I felt like an expert, according to the naval definition 'a son-of-a-bitch' from out of town."
Corlett's advice was not wanted or needed, one example being that plans for Neptune went ahead with only one fifteenth the ammunition that was allocated for the invasion of Kwajalein. Events would apply a direct test to Corlett's warnings, and the test results would not be happy. (38)

Though it was not readily apparent, one gets the feeling that the same attitude was displayed towards the civilian soldier leaders of the Special Forces Headquarters as towards M.G. Corlett. Certainly special operations forces played a role in the operation, but not to the extent desired by or recommended to SHAPE planners.

What of special operations missions? Intelligence reporting of German troop dispositions, rail movements, level of readiness and training were routinely forwarded by resistance elements through their SOE/OSS contacts to Special Forces Headquarters in London and passed on to SHAPE planners. Information on defensive preparations on and behind the beaches also aided planners especially in developing the pre-invasion bombing campaign designed to weaken defenses and an interdiction campaign designed to prevent German counterattacks and reinforcement.

The British Special Air Service, working not as part of Special Forces Headquarters, but as a British army unit for the army played key deception roles during the invasion.

On D-Day the German 915th Infantry Regiment, divisional reserve for the division defending the Omaha Beach sector, most tenuous for the allies was deceived into
countering a non-existent airborne landing, which was staged by three SAS soldiers with the aid of loud speakers and pyrotechnique boards. (39)

The Germans distrusted radio communications and used wire whenever possible. The French resistance cut telephone wires by the thousands on the night of 5–6 June, forcing the Germans back on the air, giving Ultra additional opportunities.

The resistance certainly played a role. It interdicted rail lines in most corners of France and in some cases, though more difficult to document, dropped bridges or bombed tunnels. However, tactical air interdiction claims and resistance claims overlap on many targets.

American OSS operational groups known as Jedburg teams helped to delay, by more than ten days, the arrival of the S. S. Armored Division DAS Reich as it moved from southern France to the invasion area. (40)

Army Rangers, a modern day SOF unit, tackled the tough ground at Pointe de Hoc in support of the 1st Infantry division, a mission consistent with Ranger doctrine then and now. However, Shaun M. Darragh in his article, "Rangers and Special Forces: Two Edges of the Same Dagger", argues that top level army leaders misused the Rangers throughout the war:

U. S. Army Commanders mismanaged the Rangers throughout the war and expended them on standard infantry missions. (41)

After Normandy there was very little use of special operations in the European Theater by the U. S. Army. Though the SAS continued to support British operations with jeep mounted
reconnaissance, one wonders if fewer casualties might have been taken and battles won more easily had special operations forces been used in behind enemy lines in reconnaissance and interdiction roles.

An analysis of special operations as part of the Neptune landings give some valuable insights:

* General Eisenhower realized that special operations forces could play a very valuable supporting role for conventional operations.(42)

* Integration and synchronization were considered important enough to develop a special forces headquarters subordinate to SHAFE to coordinate all Neptune related special operations.

* Intelligence collection and interdiction of enemy forces were considered the key roles for special operations forces.

* The American leadership was less inclined towards putting faith in special operations forces than the British who had a successful experience in North Africa.

* The American leadership tended to resent things "not invented here" as indicated by General Corlett's experience with amphibious operations advice.

Special operations forces received little credit for the support they rendered during the invasion of France, and were used little during the remainder of World War II.

A great deal of bitterness exists in special operations publications about the credit given to the Air Force for blocking enemy counterattacks, resupply operations and troop movements.
throughout the Neptune and Overlord Operations. Many special operators feel the credit should have been shared much more equitably.

While the Special Air Service and the Long Range Desert Group were both regular military organizations created from within the ranks of the British Army, (the SAS eventually received regular regimental status), SOE and OSS were organizations of an almost paramilitary nature, staffed by wartime soldiers. The relationship between senior American military leaders and their OSS counterparts was never very good. The army leaders resented the links with government and big business leaders enjoyed by the OSS and were perhaps jealous of the glamor attached to the mystique of special operations.

In North Africa, the SAS and LRDG coordinated directly with the C in C and his staff. They enjoyed a closeness of cooperation which enhanced integration greatly. The impression that emerges from this study is that the British spirit of "the same officers mess" existed between the senior commander and the junior officers who led the special operations units. This attitude or spirit was not present at Normandy. Special operations types were kept at arm's length. American senior commanders of the time tended not to heed the advice of more junior officers. While this generalization may not be absolutely valid, enough evidence exists to make it worthy of consideration.

The relationship of the special operations units in North Africa to conventional main forces operations was personal at the
commander level. The commanders of the SAS and LRDG acted as informal special staff officers for the C in C and assisted his campaign plan by organizing, planning, and integrating special operations to support the commander's intent. A two-way closeness and reliance developed which seems to have lead to a common effort and easy integration of special operations into the major campaigns they supported.

The American tendency towards bureaucracy seems to have taken hold for Neptune and created a structure which while sound on paper did not seem to function as well as the British system in North Africa when one compares the results of the two campaigns.

Both historical examples point out that "Special Operations", as Otto Heilbrunn so skillfully points out, "make a supporting effort."(43) The skill with which this supporting effort is integrated with the main effort and the ability to synchronize time and place are measures of the campaign planner's skills. It is with these thoughts in mind that we will move to an analysis of current United States Army Special Operations Forces doctrine and practice.

CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS

In doing research for this study I have reviewed a wide range of joint and service publications and many of the recent articles and publications that the so called renewed interest in special operations has produced. Among other things I have found that there is no shortage of commentators in the field. What I
have found that is neither surprising nor very reassuring is that
the majority of recent publications both official and unofficial,
deal with the role of special operations forces in the nebulous
area of low intensity conflict. Others deal with anti-terrorism
or terrorism counteraction. Very few publications deal with the
role of special operations forces in mid and high intensity
battle. Those official publications that do focus on the role of
SOF on the mid to high intensity battlefield are primarily con-
cerned with unconventional warfare, that is, the relationship be-
tween army special operations forces (ARSOF) and indigenous
resistance elements. While unconventional warfare may still be a
pertinent role for ARSOF, especially special forces in some sce-
narios, the short, violent war envisioned by all planners for
NATO would seem to require a focus or a role which could pay a
very rapid dividend. JCS Pub 20, Joint Unconventional Warfare
(U), is a two volume secret publication that defines basic UW
terms, service UW organizations and establishes joint UW proce-
dures. It was published, however, in 1978, and is now outdated
because it precedes both AirLand Battle Doctrine and the restruc-
turing of Army SOF. It is also a procedural manual which does
not address employment.

Major Glenn M. Harned in his very well done 1984 Master of
Military Art and Science Thesis, "Army Special Operations and
AirLand Battle", wrote:

This study found no joint how-to-fight manual or op-
erational concept that explains how to plan,
coordinate, and execute special operations in support of strategic contingencies and AirLand Battle.(44)

Service doctrine is also somewhat dated. FM 31-22, Command, Control, and Support of Special Forces Operations, is an unclassified manual which tells a special forces commander how to organize the Special Forces Operational Base, what communications links must be employed in order to control his deployed elements, and who is responsible for logistical support. It briefly outlines Special Forces missions, capabilities, organization and operations but again fails to deal with employment considerations or integration into the theater campaign plan. It does address the fact that unconventional warfare plans are prepared and updated by Unified Commands and briefly addresses the normal command arrangements for special forces units. Like JCS Pub 20 it was written before the advent of AirLand Battle Doctrine and the reorganization of ARSOF.

The Army's latest publication which defines an Army Special Operations Force Operational Concept, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-34, U.S. Army Operational Concept for Special Operations Forces, is a more current document which attempts to cover all bases. The document addresses the missions for ARSOF in both low intensity conflict and AirLand Battle terms. According to TRADOC Pamphlet 525-34, the purpose of the SOF operational concept is: "To describe the mission's concept of operation, and command and control of army special operations forces (ARSOF) in war and peace." It goes on to state: "Army SOF play significant roles that range
from participation in AirLand Battle scenarios to independent low-intensity conflict, security assistance missions." (45)

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-34 also addresses the fact that while ARSOF normally are theater level assets which operate to achieve strategic missions, they may operate at operational and tactical levels and may be commanded by units at those levels. (46) Each mission at each level of war for the five types of ARSOF units is stated. In essence it is a fairly comprehensive effort. Major Glenn Harned has thoroughly analyzed the content of TRADOC Pamphlet 525-34 from the point of view of whether or not the operational concept supports AirLand Battle. His findings indicate that the concept is not adequate because:

CAC—which has the responsibility for integration service school doctrine—lacked the SOF expertise to provide the JFK Center the guidance to integrate special operations into AirLand Battle... (he goes on to say) the focus of CAC and the rest of the army has been on AirLand Battle at Corps level and below. (47)

Joint and service doctrine is lacking, though TRADOC Pamphlet 525-34, is a much more complete document than either JCS Pub 20 or FM 31-22. Major Harned recommends a number of fixes in his paper, which if implemented would bring the Army concept for SOF employment, and for that matter joint doctrine for ARSOF and AIRSOF into line with AirLand Battle doctrine. FM 100-5 serves as a good baseline document, and allows for the integration of ARSOF into plans at all levels of conflict, and
restates the mission of SOF units consistent with TRADOC Pamphlet 525-34.(4)

However, the problem is actually deeper than that. A quick telephone poll of battalion commanders, battalion and group G-3's, and other key staff officers at the 1st Special Forces Group, my former unit, and at Special Operations Command Pacific indicated that nobody was familiar with TRADOC Pamphlet 525-34. No matter what document one reads, the ARSOF capabilities to support the main effort of major campaigns exist. If one looks back to the Second World War, one sees that ARSOF, that is, British ARSOF, made a major contribution to the campaigns in the western desert. The commanders at Normandy recognized the special operations forces capability to the extent that a separate headquarters, Special Forces Headquarters, was developed to oversee its integration into the overall campaign plan. Each Unified Command now has an element of its headquarters dedicated to peacetime planning and wartime command and control of special operations forces. So if a problem exists in the integration of special operations forces into campaign plans to expand the mid and high intensity battlefield, where does it lie?

CONCLUSIONS

Army special operations forces have a valid role on the mid and high intensity battlefield. FM 100-5, Operations lays out the role thoroughly in Chapter 3. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-34, Army Operational Concept for Special Operations Forces (SOF) further
amplifies the concept for employment of ARSOF, in all levels of war. Some shortfalls in terminology may exist as Major Harned points out, but in a far from a perfect world, this is a rather good document.

Then why is SOF not integrated more thoroughly in war games here at the Command and General Staff College and in major training exercise for our army? As a result of the research I have done for this paper, I believe the shortfalls lie in two essential areas. First, army special operations forces have been listed as theater level assets. JCS Pub 20, FM 31-22, and the majority of other publications have indicated that ARSOF is a theater level asset which is employed on strategic level missions by the theater commander. The army trains primarily at corps level and below. A natural gulf exists between corps and theater level operations and SOF has been lost in this gulf.

The 1986 version of FM 100-5 addresses the issue:

"U.S. Army Special Forces and other SOF can disrupt the enemy's operations by conducting either unconventional warfare or unilateral operations in his rear areas. Normally, pre-established command arrangements will determine how the unified commander assigns missions to his SOF. Special forces can provide support to lower level commanders when their elements are located in such a commander's area of interest."(49)

FM 100-5 is the Army's base document for operations and is hopefully read at all levels of command. A revision of joint doctrine in the works with the creation of the new joint special operations command will also address doctrinal issues and
hopefully develop joint how to fight manuals which will attack
the issue of employment.

The army education system is the second area which contributes
to the problem of non-integration of special operations into
campaign planning. The 1986-87 students at the School of Ad-
vanced Military Studies, future corps and division plans officers
were almost totally ignorant of the role of SOF in AirLand
Battle. The exercise models at the Combined Arms Center used for
all NATO scenario war games from the AFCENT level down lacked SOF
play.

As a pre-command course student designated for command of a
Special Forces Battalion in February, 1984, I asked about the in-
clusion of ARSOF during the deep attack briefing which was given
by the Command and General Staff College Department of Tactics
briefers. The answer I received was, "we don't play SOF; they
are theater level assets, this is an army concept." During the
Fort Benning portion of my pre-command course ARSOF was never ad-
dressed.

Integration is not an issue just for campaign planners, but
one for educators as well. If we are to have a fully integrated
war fighting system which makes best use of all its components,
if we are to meet the challenges outlined in FM 100-5, and win,
let us plan and train to integrate all arms to include special
operations forces. The capability exists, the units are in the
force structure, the doctrine, while lacking in terms of specific
guidance on employment, is there. We, the leaders and educators
of the army, need to force planners and exercise writers to incorporate SOF missions in their campaign plans and war games. The challenge is to create a mind state in which SOF are considered a normal part of the team much as offensive air, battle field air interdiction, or general support artillery. Creativity and the will to integrate and synchronize operations are the keys to success.

IMPLICATIONS

In the area of joint doctrine a new version of JCS Pub 20 should be written which will be consistent with both Army and Air Force doctrinal changes and which will address the issue of joint considerations for SOF employment as opposed to addressing only joint procedures as the current JCS Pub 20 does. The purpose of integrating SOF missions is better to support the overall theater objectives, and the mechanism for integration at the planner level should also be addressed. A link between the Joint Special Operations Command, the Unified Commands and the land and air component commands must be established to insure that special operations support the main effort.

The issue of doctrinal integration must be taken up by the Combined Arms Center. While ARSOF remains a theater-level asset, the missions SOF detachments perform must support the operational concept outlined in joint campaign plans. FM 100-5 addresses this use and includes SOF as a component of our war-fighting system. It is incumbent on the Combined Arms Center to insure
that doctrinal integration reaches the other branch schools and their instructional platforms. Wargames at Fort Leavenworth must incorporate SOF play and call for planners to address SOF's role as a supporting force to insure that students leave with an understanding that SOF is a component of AirLand Battle much as battlefield air interdiction is.

Most instruction related to SOF in our school system is related to low intensity conflict or counterterrorism. This is understandable because these two mission areas have been the focus of the major media efforts and the SOF modernization program in the last few years. However, if SOF again are to play the important role that they played in the Western Desert or in Normandy, commanders, staffs and doctrine writers as well as instructors at officer training schools must strive to include SOF as an element of our overall war-fighting system.

Both SOF commanders and the commanders of the major supported units must make a major effort to insure that SOF capabilities are considered in developing war plans. A close relationship between the supporting SOF unit and the supported unit will pay dividends in any future conflict. That is not to say that SOF should become a land component asset, but that the land component must understand what SOF can and cannot do better to plan land campaigns which make use of all available resources.

Eventually an increased emphasis on the role of SOF on the mid- and high-intensity battlefield will insure integration. Improved General Officer education will have to help fill the void.
for the present so that more effective use of SOF can be driven from the top down. Wargames, major training exercises and warfighting seminars all should insure that SOF play as a supporting component of AirLand Battle.

Only by making a considerable effort across the educational spectrum can we bridge the planning gulf between SOF's traditional place as a theater asset not planned for by the Army and a major supporting force as so well articulated by Otto Heilbrunn, in his work *Warfare in the Enemy's Rear.*
ENDNOTES


3. Ibid, pg. 147.


8. Ibid, pg. 259.


10. Ibid, pg. 98.


12. James L. Saunders, "Rear Operations: Protecting the Points of Decision" (Ft. Leavenworth, KS School of Advanced Military Studies, 5 January 1987) pgs. 23-24, a synthesis, not a direct quote. Major Saunders has analyzed numerous soviet sources, many of which I have read in preparation for this paper, and made an excellent study of soviet plans for deep attack, and their logic for the integration of special purpose forces (Spetsnaz) into plans for TVD and front offensive operations.


15. Ibid, pg 218.


19. Ibid, pg. 11.


22. Ibid, pg. 80.


27. Ibid, pg. 69.

28. Ibid, pg. 33.

29. Ibid, pg. 80. Special Air Service operations prompted Hitler to state in a special order: "These men are very dangerous, they must be hunted down and destroyed at all cost."


31. Ibid, pg. 51.

32. Ibid, pg. 44. Not a direct quote, synthesis of Rommel's ideas on defense.


34. Harris R. Smith. OSS. The Secretary's History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972) pg. 179.

-31-
35. Ibid, pg. 188.


37. Ibid, pg. 390.


40. Ibid, pg. 399.

41. Shaun M. Danagh, "Rangers and Special Forces: Two Edges of the Same Dagger," Army 27 (December 1977, 14-19) pg. 15.

42. M. R. D. Foot. SOE in France, pg 440. Eisenhower's letter to Gubbins of 31 May 1945 gives full credit to Special Forces Headquarters and the men of SOE and OSS for their support of SHAPE operations.


46. Ibid, pg. 7.


48. FM 100-5 Operations. Ch. 3, pg. 57. Not a direct quote, a synthesis of text.

49. FM 100-5 Operations. Ch. 3, pg. 57.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books


Geraghty, Tony. This is the SAS. New York, Arco Publishing Co., 1983.


---


Periodicals


