CHANGING SOVIET DOCTRINE ON NUCLEAR WAR

Mary C. FitzGerald
In January 1977, General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev delivered an address in the city of Tula whose impact on Soviet doctrine and capabilities continues to this day. By rejecting the possibility of a means of defense against nuclear weapons, or a damage-limiting capacity in nuclear war, Brezhnev closed the door on a debate that had lasted for over a decade in Soviet military thought. Since Tula, the Soviet politico-military leadership has presented a consensus on the reality of "Mutual Assured Destruction" in present-day conditions. The Soviet debate on the viability of nuclear war as an instrument of policy was likewise resolved by a consensus. Nuclear war is so unpromising and dangerous that it remains an instrument of policy only in theory, an instrument of policy that cannot be used. While the Soviet consensus on the diminishing military utility of nuclear weapons represents a ground-breaking shift in doctrine since the heyday of Marshal Sokolovsky, there is scant evidence of any dispute on the new correlation of war and policy in a nuclear age. Marshal N. V. Ogarkov and other hard-minded military figures have themselves emerged as the architects of the Soviet shift away from a nuclear war-fighting and war-winning strategy, while General Secretary Gorbachev has fashioned a corresponding arms control agenda.
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1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded as a matter of possible interest.

2. Since L. I. Brezhnev's 1977 address at Tula, the Soviet politico-military leadership has presented a consensus on the diminishing military utility of nuclear war in present-day conditions. While this consensus represents a groundbreaking shift in Soviet doctrine since the heyday of Marshal Sokolovskiy, there is scant evidence of any dispute on the new correlation of war and policy in a nuclear age. Sokolovskiy has, on the contrary, been quietly displaced by a new revolution in Soviet military affairs. Marshal N. V. Ogarkov and other hard-minded Soviet military figures have themselves emerged as the architects of the Soviet shift away from a nuclear war-fighting and war-winning strategy, while General Secretary Gorbachev has shaped a corresponding arms control agenda.

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CHANGING SOVIET DOCTRINE
ON NUCLEAR WAR

Mary C. FitzGerald

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ABSTRACT

In January 1977, General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev delivered an address in the city of Tula whose impact on Soviet doctrine and capabilities continues to this day. By rejecting the possibility of a means of defense against nuclear weapons, or a damage-limiting capacity in nuclear war, Brezhnev closed the door on a debate that had lasted for over a decade in Soviet military thought. Since Tula, the Soviet politico-military leadership has presented a consensus on the reality of "Mutual Assured Destruction" in present-day conditions. The Soviet debate on the viability of nuclear war as an instrument of policy was likewise resolved by a consensus: nuclear war is so unpromising and dangerous that it remains an instrument of policy only in theory, an instrument of policy that cannot be used. While the Soviet consensus on the diminishing military utility of nuclear weapons represents a ground-breaking shift in doctrine since the heyday of Marshal Sokolovskiy, there is scant evidence of any dispute on the new correlation of war and policy in a nuclear age. Marshal N. V. Ogarkov and other hard-minded military figures have themselves emerged as the architects of the Soviet shift away from a nuclear war-fighting and war-winning strategy, while General Secretary Gorbachev has fashioned a corresponding arms control agenda.
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I. INTRODUCTION

To enter the world of Western Sovietology is to enter a debate as endless as Lenin’s Collected Works. Some analysts have long perceived a Soviet nuclear war-fighting and war-winning strategy, while others have presented evidence that the heart of Soviet national security policy is the prevention of nuclear war. Perhaps even more than capabilities and behavior, changing Soviet doctrine on nuclear war has itself generated this dispute.

In January 1977, General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev delivered a ground-breaking address in the city of Tula whose doctrinal and policy reverberations continue to this day. The essence of Tula was a downgrading of nuclear options in Soviet military thought. A growing body of evidence indicates that in early 1977, coincidentally with Tula, Moscow designated an independent conventional war option as its long-term military development goal. The Soviets now appear to count on the capability of the Warsaw Pact to fight the NATO coalition conventionally from start to finish, without resorting to nuclear weapons. As Red Star put it in 1984: “Modern conceptions of a non-nuclear war envisage reconciling the attainment of strategic results using conventional weapons with the readiness to repel a nuclear attack.”

In recent years, the significance of Tula has also split Western Sovietology in two. But Western analysts are presenting more and more evidence that changes in Soviet strategy, operational art, and force developments do in fact indicate a Soviet shift away from nuclear options and toward an independent conventional war option. The Defense Intelligence Agency published a report in early 1983 that highlighted “weapons modernization and changes in force structure evident in the Soviet air, ground, and missile forces” that clearly enhance Soviet capabilities to execute “the complex, high-speed conventional operations which are being discussed with ever-increasing frequency by Soviet/Warsaw Pact military leaders.” According to Phillip Petersen and John Hines, the Soviets have already done a great deal “to expand and adjust the structure of their armed forces to accommodate operational concepts that support the conventional offensive.” The extent of these structural changes strongly suggests that “this latest phase in the evolution of Soviet strategy is already quite mature.”

The present study will not attempt to document the ongoing debate on Soviet nuclear doctrine. It will review Soviet politico-military writings in order to document a shift in Soviet policy that has grown more and more explicit since Tula. While analyses of Soviet capabilities and operational behavior are crucial for determining the U.S.
war-fighting capability, an analysis of Soviet views on nuclear war is crucial for determining the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent capability.

For reasons that include a penchant for secrecy, Soviet writers use a rigorous system of esoteric communication techniques whose decoding requires an equally rigorous cryptology. This study will therefore apply certain methodological criteria that have proved in the past to help discriminate between propaganda and true belief in Soviet writings. Only those major, officially-sanctioned Soviet publications that are designated for internal audiences are cited in the text, and these were reviewed in original Russian. Selection of author/speaker has been restricted to Politburo members and Central Committee elites, prominent military figures, and influential "institchikhi." [NOTE: Soviet sources and commentators are listed alphabetically and identified in appendices A and B.]

While there has long been dispute in the West over the validity of Soviet writings, they have time and again been subsequently confirmed in Soviet hardware, exercises, and operational behavior. James McConnell maintains that "[i]f disinformation be defined as a communication that the Soviet elite, skilled in reading the literature of its specialty, would declare to be an untruth, then there is very little disinformation in the Soviet press." Among others, Richard Pipes and Leon Goure have asserted that the Soviets say what they mean, and usually mean what they say.

Some Western analysts will nonetheless contend that the Soviet statements under examination in this study are merely a "commodity for export." It should here be emphasized that the contrary contention has likewise been alive and well over time. In 1975, Frank R. Barnett argued that "it would be inconceivable that the Moscow regime would risk deluding its own military personnel on such a mass scale, simply to confound the West." About a decade later, Benjamin Lambeth affirmed that "...it has long been recognized by Western analysts that the Soviets can scarcely lie to their own officers charged with implementing Soviet defense guidance merely in order to deceive outsiders." Numerous Western researchers of all persuasions, in fact, are convinced that Soviet writings provide an expansive display-case for de facto elite perceptions.

The shift in Soviet doctrine on nuclear war can best be documented by examining several recurrent themes that relate to the correlation of war and policy in Soviet military thought. These include strategic parity and "military superiority," mutual deterrence and "Mutual Assured Destruction" (M.A.D.), war as a continuation and instrument of policy, and the operation of the three dialectical laws in Soviet military affairs. By examining these themes we find a logical chain leading from the Tula principles to a shift in Soviet doctrine on the military utility of nuclear war.
II. STRATEGIC PARITY

The Soviet leadership has often viewed U.S. political-military strategic intentions as a central concern. Writing in 1981 in Kommunist, Marshal N. V. Ogarkov articulated a perennial concern of the Soviet military: the U.S. “is seeking to change in its own favor the approximate military balance prevailing at the present time...” Col. L. Semeyko has explained that “[t]he military and strategic equilibrium existing between the USSR and the United States clearly does not suit the U.S. leadership.” Moreover, he asserted, Washington has a global policy “for achieving military superiority by approximately the end of this century...” Taken at face value, these themes have a palpable propaganda content and could doubtless serve other parochial interests. But Soviet military doctrine on the concepts in question indicates that over time they have acquired a quite specific military significance independent of their prominence in Soviet propaganda scripts.

The Soviets rely on a variety of interchangeable terms to express the notion of parity. Col. G. Lukava has defined it as “the approximate balance of combat potentials (of strategic nuclear forces, medium-range nuclear forces, and conventional forces) of the Warsaw Pact and the NATO bloc.” But the present study will demonstrate that when the Soviets refer to strategic parity, they mean the capability of both sides to deliver an annihilating retaliatory strike even after subjection to a first strike.

The Soviet military leadership has been quite explicit in its affirmations that parity between the U.S. and USSR exists on all force levels. Among others, Marshal Ogarkov has consistently referred to the fact of parity: “the existing, approximate equilibrium in the correlation of the sides’ military forces” (1978); “the existing, approximate equality in medium-range nuclear means in Europe” (1980); “parity between the U.S. and USSR in the quantitative correlation of strategic arms” (1982); “the balance of forces on a regional, European, and global scale” (1983); and “the approximate equality in nuclear arms between the U.S. and USSR” (1985).

Writing in 1982 in Pravda, Marshal D. F. Ustinov specifically confirmed the existence of parity in the principal U.S. and Soviet forces: “...[W]hether you take strategic nuclear arms or medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe or the conventional forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, in every case an approximate parity exists between the sides.” Marshal Akhromeyev has asserted that “continuing to maintain the approximate military equilibrium between the USSR and the U.S., and between the Warsaw Pact Organization and the NATO bloc at the established level is currently one of the main conditions for ensuring the security of states of the socialist community.”
The Chief of the Soviet General Staff has explained that while some differences exist, "[t]he truth is that an approximate equilibrium in strategic arms exists between the USSR and the U.S." He stressed further that approximate equality is also the necessary basis for the process of limiting nuclear arms. General of the Army Maksimov has noted that "[e]quality of forces does not at all mean their identical structure." Col. Semeyko linked parity and the unthinkability of nuclear war in a 1984 article in Izvestiya. "A situation has been established that is often called the 'nuclear impasse' in the West," he advised. "The balance of forces nevertheless ensures strategic stability: from a purely military point of view, a nuclear war under its conditions is simply unthinkable." In his 1985 Kommunist article, Marshal Sokolov referred to "the military-strategic equilibrium" between the USSR and the U.S., between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, and stressed that "[e]normous efforts and means were demanded of the Soviet people and the peoples of the other socialist countries to achieve this equilibrium. We will not permit its disruption." Numerous other Soviet commentators have acknowledged the existence of strategic parity between the U.S. and USSR.

"Military Superiority"

How do the Soviets define "military superiority"? The answer to this question is crucial for understanding the implications of the Tula line. Prior to the existence of parity, attained by the Soviets in the late 60s-early 70s, "superiority" was used either as an amorphous concept or in the traditional sense of an overwhelming preponderance of nuclear might. With few exceptions, this ragged usage prevailed until L. I. Brezhnev's 1977 speech at Tula.

G. A. Trofimenko had articulated a definition of "military superiority" in 1970 that would become mainstream only in the wake of Tula: a unilateral capacity to prevent, by a disarming strike, unacceptable damage from an opponent's retaliatory strike. Pre-Tula mainstream thinking was prepared to concede that all-out nuclear war would result in unacceptable damage in present-day conditions. But it clung to the premise that "[r]aising the effectiveness of means of defense can substantially limit...the destruction associated with the use of nuclear weapons." At Tula, L. I. Brezhnev affirmed that the USSR was not striving for superiority in armaments with the aim of delivering a first strike. "First strike" was understood in the Western sense: a unilateral damage-limiting capacity in all-out war, achieved through some combination of offensive means and active and passive defensive means.
In a 1978 interview conducted by the German Social Democratic Party Weekly Vorwarts, L. I. Brezhnev described the declining utility of “superiority”: “The Soviet Union on its part feels that approximate equality and parity are enough for defense needs. We do not set for ourselves the goal of achieving military superiority. We know also that this very concept no longer makes sense given the present enormous arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means for their delivery already accumulated.” Writing in Pravda in 1984, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko agreed that in present-day conditions, “[c]alculations on achieving military superiority are untenable and without prospect.”

A. G. Arbatov impugns the value of superiority in present-day conditions when he stresses that the real political-military meaning of counterforce superiority has been eroded “because, with the present balance of forces, it cannot signify a disarming strike capability.” In his 1984 book, Arbatov reaffirms the standard formulation. Military superiority in the real sense of the word “has become unattainable, and one or another partial advantage in strategic forces cannot be transformed into a means of political pressure.” Among others, O. Bykov has emphasized that regardless of “the differences in structure of the strategic forces opposing each other, a balance has emerged, excluding the possibility of one side’s achieving a decisive superiority over the other.”

Marshal Ogarkov cited the no-superiority formula a month after Tula, and has consistently echoed it throughout his writings. Marshal Ustinov announced later that “relying on military superiority is completely hopeless. And it is also senseless in conditions where available arr . . . more than enough to make biological life on earth impossible.” Gen.-Maj. R. Simonyan was no less explicit: “In fact, given the equality in strategic forces, when both sides have weapons capable of destroying all life on earth many times over, neither the addition of new armaments systems nor the enhancement of their destructive power can yield any substantial military, much less political advantage.” Col. Semeyko reiterated the Tula message in a 1984 article in Red Star. In present-day conditions, he insisted, “strategic nuclear superiority, like military superiority in general, is unattainable.” Many other authoritative commentators have echoed the no-superiority theme.

Since Tula, Soviet elites have obediently equated “military superiority” with a first-strike capability, in both the military and civilian media. Marshal Ustinov, for one, offered an accurate definition of superiority in his 1983 book: “Superiority is solely
offered an accurate definition of superiority in his 1983 book: "Superiority is solely understood to be the attainment of the capability to inflict a strike on the Soviet Union where and when Washington considers it expedient, reckoning on the fact that a retaliatory strike on the U.S. will be smaller in magnitude than under other conditions."\(^{31}\)

The Soviet anti-SDI campaign clearly reflects the continuing interchangeability, for the Soviets, of the concepts "military superiority" and first-strike capability. Shortly before his death, K. U. Chernenko made the following statement to CNN’s Stuart Loory: “To put it simply, the aim [of SDI] is to acquire the capability to deliver a nuclear strike counting on impunity with an anti-missile defense 'shield' to protect oneself against retaliation. This is the same old policy to achieve decisive military superiority...."\(^{32}\) Since Reagan’s so-called “Star Wars” speech, numerous political and military commentators have likewise reaffirmed the cornerstone of the Tula line: in present-day conditions, “military superiority” is equated with the capability to inflict a first nuclear strike. V. V. Shcherbitskiy, for one, asserted in 1985 that the U.S. "is attempting to achieve decisive military superiority, and to guarantee for itself conditions allowing it to deliver a first nuclear strike while counting on impunity."\(^{33}\)

Col. V. Chernyshev has confirmed that SDI is linked to “the course of attaining military superiority,...the strategy of being the first to deliver a nuclear strike.”\(^{34}\) Col. V. Viktorov published an article in 1984 that focused on the Pentagon's work in the area of ASAT weapons. The latter resulted from the U.S. quest for “military superiority” over the Soviet Union, a quest for the potential to inflict a first, disarming strike.\(^{35}\) Also writing in 1984, Col. M. Ponomarev provided one of the most explicit statements to date of the interchangeability of these concepts: U.S. plans to create an extensive anti-missile defense system “are an integral part of the policy of using a first strike, of attaining military superiority.”\(^{36}\) According to Col. E Buynovskiy, the Reagan administration is concerned not with defense, but with acquiring “a nuclear first-strike capability..., and attainment of military superiority.”\(^{37}\)

The record of written evidence indicates that the Soviet politico-military leadership accepts strategic parity between the U.S. and USSR as a reality of present-day conditions that is grounded in the mutual unattainability of “military superiority”/first-strike capability, or a damage-limiting capacity in nuclear war. The record further indicates that in 1977, in a town that might otherwise still be known only as the home of small-arms and samovars, L. I. Brezhnev enunciated a major reformulation of classic Soviet military policy.

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The Law of Unity and Struggle of Opposites

By denying the possibility of achieving a first-strike capability, defined as a unilateral damage-limiting capacity, Brezhnev had cut the line running from 1965 to 1976 on the possibility of developing a means of defense against nuclear weapons. In Marxist-Leninist terms, this possibility is determined by the dialectical law of unity and struggle of opposites, or the dialectic of arms development.

This dialectic, the process wherein every means of attack generates a new means of defense, has proved crucial in shaping long-term Soviet force development programs. From 1965–1976, the proponents of nuclear force development held center stage precisely because of the open-ended nature of the dialectic of arms development. While they were prepared to concede that all-out nuclear war would result in unacceptable damage in present-day conditions, they deemed it "indisputable that, in all countries that have nuclear weapons, means and methods of active and passive defense against these weapons and their carriers will be perfected."³⁸

Col. Ye. Rybkin clarified the premise in late 1965: "There is a possibility of developing and creating new means of waging war, which are capable of reliably parrying an opponent's nuclear strikes."³⁹ Over a decade later, V. M. Bondarenko was even more explicit: "Granted the potential opponents do have the weapons for mutual destruction, then the side that first manages to create a means of defense against them will acquire a decisive advantage. The history of military-technological development is replete with examples wherein weapons that seemed irresistible have, within a certain time, been countered by sufficiently effective means of defense. ...."⁴⁰

L. I. Brezhnev broke two grounds of Soviet military policy with his Tula address. First, he defined "military superiority" as the possession of a first-strike capability. Second, he pronounced the impossibility of either side's attaining military superiority, or limiting damage in an all-out nuclear war to acceptable levels, and thus pronounced the impossibility of either side's developing Bondarenko's "sufficiently effective means of defense." As V. I. Zamkovoy explained, "the historical struggle between weapons of attack and weapons of defense will apparently be tilted in the future in favor of weapons of attack. Under these circumstances, the very idea of achieving military superiority...becomes absurd.... The ineluctable development of nuclear weapons has led to their beginning, in a certain sense, to negate themselves...."⁴¹

Western analysts sometimes assert that the Soviets have never viewed offensive nuclear forces as absolute weapons.⁴² Neither have the Soviets viewed defensive weapons as absolute: it is the nature of the dialectic of arms development to be
continuous. Since Tula, however, authoritative Soviet political, military, and other commentators have consistently reiterated the Brezhnev formula: neither side can achieve “military superiority”/first-strike capability/“sufficiently effective means of defense” because the dialectic of arms development will be tilted in the future in favor of offensive weapons.

The dialectic of arms development is the process wherein every means of attack generates a new means of defense. But the process continues: every means of defense then generates a new means of attack, and so on. In other words, every weapon breeds its own counter-weapon. Soviet references to this phenomenon began to emerge again en masse after the “Star Wars” speech. In his very first statement on the proposed U.S. program, Yu. V. Andropov reminded the world that “[w]hen the USSR and the U.S. began discussing the problem of strategic arms, they agreed that there is an inseverable interconnection between strategic offensive and defensive weapons. And it was not by chance that the treaty on limiting strategic offensive arms was simultaneously signed by our countries in 1972 [year of the ABM Treaty].”

This inseverable connection between defensive and offensive weapons, between every weapon and its counter-weapon, has been stressed by numerous elite commentators during the anti-SDI campaign, including the then Foreign Minister A. Gromyko. A. G. Arbatov has likewise noted that “the dialectical interdependence between the development of defensive and of offensive weapons is real in the sphere of strategic weapons....” In 1985, A. Kokoshin wrote that creation of the space-based systems will inevitably lead to the emergence of “systems for resisting those weapons, after which more weapons to combat those systems will appear.” Kokoshin has also summarized the view of numerous Soviet elite commentators: “After all, the entire history of creating new weapons proves: for every weapon, a counter-weapon is always found.” A. Bovin has asserted the general conclusion of the dialectic of arms development: “The experience of the development of military hardware shows that offensive weapons ultimately gain the upper hand over defensive ones. And there are no grounds for hoping that everything will be the opposite in the given case.”

Especially in the context of the Soviet anti-SDI campaign, the top Soviet military leadership has likewise reinvigorated the law of unity and struggle of opposites. In late 1985, Marshal Sokolov asserted that in signing the ABM Treaty, the U.S. and USSR “agreed that an indissoluble interconnection exists between strategic offensive and defensive arms.” Marshal Akhromeyev has held that “[t]he interconnection between strategic defensive and offensive arms is enduring and objective in nature, irrespective of the technical level of development reached by those arms.” In late 1985, General of the Army Shabanov concluded that the creation of defensive
systems “inevitably provokes the qualitative and quantitative improvement of offensive weapons systems.... The history of armed combat and the dialectic of the development of the means of attack and defense confirm this.... The absolute weapon does not exist.”

Marshal Ogarkov is the only top Soviet military leader in recent years who has discussed the operation of all three dialectical laws in military affairs. In light of the SDI, his views on this law—the process wherein every means of attack generates a means of defense, and every means of defense generates a new means of attack—are of more than theoretical interest. Ogarkov’s writings have consistently echoed the Tula formula of the offense’s edge over the defense. In his 1978 Kommunist article, he explained that “the history of wars convincingly testifies,...to the constant contradiction between the means of attack and defense. The appearance of new means of attack has always [inevitably] led to the creation of corresponding means of counter-action, and this in the final analysis has led to the development of new methods for conducting engagements, battles, and operations [and the war in general]. This also applies fully to nuclear-missile weapons, whose rapid development stimulated military-scientific theory and practice to actively develop means and methods of counteraction. The appearance of means of defense against weapons of mass destruction in turn prompted the improvement of nuclear-missile means of attack.”

The foregoing passage was repeated verbatim in Ogarkov’s 1982 book, with the addition of the words in brackets. In his 1985 book, however, Ogarkov made several significant changes in his standard discussion of this dialectical law. First, the sentences italicized above did not appear in History Teaches Vigilance. Second, he added a discussion that had never appeared before. World War I, he said, had led to a situation wherein the defense proved to be stronger than the offense. In the course of World War II, however, a new contradiction arose: the means of offense proved to be stronger than the means of defense. As a result, during the war and especially in the post-war period, “means of defense were developed at an accelerated rate...whose skillful use at a certain stage balanced the means of offense and defense to some degree.”

By excising the italicized sentences of 1978 and 1982, and replacing them with the notion of a “balance” in nuclear means of offense and defense in 1985, Ogarkov may be affirming that he sees no military utility in the further “improvement of nuclear-missile means of attack.” He may in fact be referring to a neutralization of nuclear weapons in general. This is supported by his 1985 removal of a sentence that had always appeared in his previous discussions of the law of unity and struggle of opposites: “This [the law] applies fully to nuclear-missile weapons,...” Without the
possibility of "military superiority"/first-strike capability, without a defense against unacceptable damage in nuclear war, the military utility of nuclear weapons of necessity declines.
III. MUTUAL DETERRENCE

One of the most obvious aspects of the Soviet-American strategic relationship has been the attainment and recognition by both sides of a state of parity in mutual deterrence: each side must be able to respond with a devastating retaliatory strike even if the other were to launch a massive surprise attack. Writing in 1980, G. Trofimenko argued that the creation by the Soviet Union of a strategic arsenal comparable to the U.S. strategic arsenal, not only in the number of systems but also in quality, had radically changed the strategic picture. The American force was neutralized by the Soviet Union’s force, he explained, “and the trend towards mutual deterrence of the sides, not in words but in fact, came to be dominant.”

Raymond Garthoff has noted that during the key formative period of Soviet arms control policy, “there were a number of very clear and explicit endorsements in Military Thought by influential Soviet military leaders of the concepts of mutual assured retaliation and mutual deterrence.” Garthoff has likewise described the connection between these concepts. Mutual deterrence in Soviet writings “is usually expressed in terms of assured retaliatory capability which would devastate the aggressor,.... This formula avoids identification with the specific content of the American concept of ‘mutual assured destruction,’ often expressed in terms of a countervalue capability for destroying a specified percentage of the opponent’s industry and population. This American interpretation is much more limited than the Soviet recognition of mutual deterrence resting on mutual capability for devastating retaliation unacceptable to a rational potential initiator of war, without calculations of arbitrary industrial and population losses which theoretically would be acceptable costs.”

Writing in Kommunist in 1981, A. Arbatov articulated the Soviet acceptance of M.A.D. when he reminded his readers that by the end of the 1960s, “as strategic parity took shape between the USSR and the U.S., the U.S. leadership was compelled to acknowledge that the Soviet Union had acquired an indisputable ability to destroy a hypothetical aggressor by a retaliatory strike. This possibility was called a capacity for ‘assured destruction’ as a result of retaliation, and the U.S. could not help reckon with the fact that it had arisen more or less symmetrically for the two sides.”

G. Gerasimov explicitly confirmed the Soviet acceptance of M.A.D. in 1983: “then, as now, both sides in the nuclear confrontation possessed an assured capability to inflict an annihilating retaliatory strike on the aggressor (the Soviet formula), or to inflict ‘unacceptable damage’ on the attacking party as long as the situation for ‘mutual assured destruction’ exists (the American formula).”
The cornerstone message of Tula was the unattainability of “military superiority”/first-strike capability by either of the sides. This formula, by Gerasimov’s admission the Soviet formula for M.A.D., is repeated with consistency by the Soviet military leadership. Marshal Ogarkov in particular has grown more explicit over time regarding the Soviet formula for M.A.D. In 1983 he published an article in *Red Star* that included a concrete acknowledgement of M.A.D.: “Given the modern development and spread of nuclear arms in the world, a defender will always retain that quantity of nuclear means which are capable of inflicting ‘unacceptable damage’, as former U.S. Defense Secretary R. McNamara once put it, on an aggressor in a retaliatory strike... In present-day conditions, therefore, only suicides can gamble on a nuclear first strike.”

Twice in 1984 and again in the 1985 book, Ogarkov was determined to make a point regarding unacceptable damage. In his 1984 interview in *Red Star*, he asserted that “with the quantity and diversity of nuclear-missile means achieved, it is already impossible to destroy them [the opponent’s nuclear-missile means] with one strike. An annihilating retaliatory strike on an aggressor with even a limited number of the nuclear warheads left to a defender, a strike inflicting unacceptable damage, is inevitable in present-day conditions.”

In his 1984 post-transfer article in *Kommunist of the Armed Forces*, Ogarkov reiterated the above formulation for M.A.D. But he clarified the phrase “a strike inflicting unacceptable damage” with “a retaliation depriving the aggressor of the capability thereafter of conducting not only the war, but also any kind of serious operations...” This fine-tuning of unacceptable damage was repeated in his 1985 book.

Variations on the aforementioned formula for M.A.D. have become standard fare in post-Tula Soviet thought. A. Arbatov noted in his 1984 book that “...the mutual capability of both powers to inflict unacceptable damage upon each other even with a retaliatory strike made a first nuclear strike senseless and brought about a stability of the strategic balance.”

While the Soviets have enunciated their own formula for M.A.D., they have also been known to echo the American terminology. Mikhail Suslov observed in 1980 that “[t]he possibility of potential opponents destroying each other many times over has long been acknowledged.” Writing in *Red Star* in 1982, Marshal Kulikov held that the concentration of nuclear weapons in the center of the European continent was already sufficient for “repeated mutual destruction.” As recently as early 1986, Col. Semeyko noted that quantitative improvements in the late.}
combat have led to an unprecedented phenomenon: "the potential for the repeated destruction of each of the sides." Elsewhere in the article he refers to "the inevitability of mutual destruction" and "the danger of mutual nuclear destruction." With the implementation of SDI, he continued, "U.S. acknowledgement of the inevitability of mutual destruction as a result of nuclear war would be replaced by a stake on the destruction of only one side."

Soviet elite commentators have strongly condemned the Western contention that SDI is more stabilizing than M.A.D. As already indicated, President Reagan's controversial initiative has incited a revival of Soviet discussions on the law of unity and struggle of opposites, or the dialectic of arms development. SDI has likewise provoked a flurry of Soviet statements on mutual vulnerability and M.A.D. One of the linchpins of the entire anti-SDI campaign, in fact, is the charge that SDI is inherently destabilizing precisely because it threatens to undermine the more equalizing reality of M.A.D.

SDI has evoked the most explicit Soviet statement on M.A.D. ever found by this author. As indicated earlier, G. Gerasimov wrote in 1983 that the mutual assured capability to inflict unacceptable damage on the aggressor constituted the "American formula" for M.A.D. In turn, the mutual assured capability to inflict an annihilating retaliatory strike on the aggressor constituted the "Soviet formula" for M.A.D. Gerasimov then emphasized that "[t]his capability is determined, apart from everything else, by very restricted limitations on developing missile defense in the Soviet Union and the U.S."

In 1985, G. A. Trofimenko stated clearly that (1) the SALT II Treaty has cemented the premises of M.A.D., (2) strategic parity is rooted in M.A.D., and (3) mutual deterrence is synonymous with mutual vulnerability. "But was it the Soviet Union...that scrapped the SALT II agreement, which confirmed the situation of mutual assured destruction at the level of complete parity? Is it the Soviet Union...that nurtures the idea of liquidating the ABM Treaty, which...represents the best guarantee of preserving the mutual vulnerability of the two sides, and thereby also of deterrence through its realistic function of persuading the two sides of the need to refrain from the first strike?"

Consequences of Nuclear War

The Soviet formula for M.A.D. has been defined as the possession by "both sides" of an assured capability to inflict an annihilating retaliatory strike on the aggressor. While the Soviets have not been slavish in adopting American terminology for M.A.D., they have developed other formulas that are at least equivalent and perhaps
even stronger than M.A.D.: “extinction of world civilization” and “annihilation of mankind.” These formulas have been echoed with consistency since Tula by the top political and military leaders, in officially-sanctioned publications designated for internal audiences.

Over the years, Soviet statements on the consequences of nuclear war have ranged in magnitude from “dangerous” to “irreparable” to “lethal.” In 1973, Col. Rybkin warned that a nuclear war could, but not necessarily would, lead to the loss of hundreds of millions of lives.17 For years there was apparently a distinction among the millions of casualties expected in a theater war, the tens of millions expected from a limited intercontinental exchange, and the hundreds of millions expected from all-out nuclear war. But Col. Shirman clearly articulated the pre-Tula mainstream line when discussing the possibility of developing a means of defense against nuclear weapons in 1972: “Consequently, the existence of technology making possible the annihilation of hundreds of millions of people does not at all mean the extinction of mankind if a nuclear war breaks out....”18

Considering the demonstrable significance of formulas in Soviet elite writings, it is telling that since Tula, the consequences of nuclear war have become explicit and unequivocal in Soviet discourse: from the quantitative criteria of the 1970s to the “extinction of world civilization” and the “annihilation of mankind.” The timing was right for this shift, especially in light of the Tula pronouncement on the impossibility of either side’s attaining a first-strike capability. Theoretically, at least, such a capability would have limited damage in an all-out nuclear war to acceptable levels.

Post-Tula consequence statements are distinguishable by the degree of probability involved: the stated consequences are likely to occur (“can/could”), or the stated consequences are inevitable (“will/would”). Regardless of the formula used, however, the stated consequences extend to both sides in the nuclear confrontation by virtue of extending to “mankind” and “civilization.” Such statements thereby qualify as acknowledgements of the reality of M.A.D. in present-day conditions.

In 1980, L. I. Brezhnev announced that “[i]t has now come to the point where, if the weapons presently stockpiled are put into action, mankind would be completely annihilated.”19 One year later the General Secretary reiterated that “the means for waging war, means of mass destruction, have now assumed such a scope that their use would pose the question of the existence of many peoples and, what is more, the whole of modern civilization.”20 Later that year he wrote that “[a]rsenal[s] of weapons have been created on our planet, the use of which would not only inflict an irreparable loss on world civilization, but would also generate a threat to the very existence of
mankind." Elsewhere Brezhnev asserted that "[t]he very nature of modern arms has become such that, if they are used, the future of all mankind will be at stake."  

K. U. Chemenko likewise asserted that "[t]oday, any responsible state figure must recognize that putting hopes on force, on the use of nuclear-missile weapons, places the future of mankind in doubt." Several of Gorbachev's "elect" have also echoed the post-Tula consensus. G. M. Korniyenko has cited Brezhnev's statement that "if the weapons presently stockpiled are put into action, mankind would be completely annihilated." In 1981, E. Shevardnadze wrote that thermonuclear war "would cause the destruction of all mankind." In the same year, V. Zagladin warned that "today, following the appearance of nuclear and missile weapons, the nature of weaponry has changed, and any new major war, not to mention a global conflict, could prove to be fatal to all mankind."  

G. V. Romanov asserted in 1981 that "[t]he means of warfare have now acquired such destructive strength that their use would cast doubt not only on the existence of many peoples, but also of all modern civilization." Writing in 1980, K. V. Rusakov affirmed that "[s]o many [nuclear-missile weapons] have been stockpiled that if all these means were used, life on earth would be destroyed." L. Tolkunov warned in 1983 that "the strongest nuclear powers possess a destructive force that would, in the event of a military conflict, be able to eliminate life on earth altogether,..." A. G. Arbatov published a book in 1980 wherein he noted that "[c]olossal stockpiles of means of destruction have been accumulated on earth, which are capable of putting an end to our civilization." Arbatov has elsewhere written that "[a]ll new additions to the arsenals of global devastation change virtually nothing in a nuclear potential already sufficient to destroy life on earth many times over." Throughout his writings, in fact, Arbatov has focused on the issue as he sees it: "The thermonuclear potentials accumulated on the planet, which bear a threat to the very existence of our civilization, have made a deep imprint on the interdependence of military power, strategy, and policy."  

G. K. Shakhnazarov has argued that "[a] general recognition of the impermissibility of a world nuclear conflict and its suicidal nature for mankind may be considered the chief result of the social development and ideological struggle of recent decades." But in 1984, he provided one of the most explicit Soviet consequence statements to date when he referred to "the total nature of nuclear war, which would lead with inevitability to the extinction of all mankind and the whole of civilization."  

Also writing in 1984, G. A. Vorontsov agreed that "now armies are equipped with a vast arsenal of mass-destruction weapons that are totally sufficient to annihilate
the whole of world civilization." He went on to warn that "nuclear weapons, created by man, are capable of also annihilating their creator, man as a biological species,..." R. G. Bogdanov has noted that "nuclear weapons,...are an identical threat to the states of different social systems,...whose use would place the very existence of mankind in question."

O. Bykov published an article in 1983 wherein he agreed that "[t]he use of mass-destruction weapons would bring about an enormous number of victims, and turn the centers of world production and culture into ruins. At stake here is human civilization and, possibly, life itself on earth." A. Bovin has affirmed that the thermonuclear threat "will mean zero security for the U.S., as for all of mankind: in other words, it will mean the absolute threat of its total annihilation."

As indicated above, Shakhnazarov's 1984 statement was unequivocal regarding the mutuality of assured destruction: "nuclear war... would lead with inevitability to the extinction of all mankind and the whole of civilization." The Soviet military leadership has similarly expanded the consequences of nuclear war to include all mankind and the whole of civilization. In his 1981 article in Kommunist, Marshal Ogarkov warned that "[i]n terms of ferocity and scale of potential destruction, it [a new world war] could be compared with no wars of the past. The very nature of modern weapons is such that, if they are put into action, the future of all mankind would be at stake." He specifically cites L.I. Brezhnev in his 1982 book: "The very nature of modern weapons has become such that, if they are used, the future of all mankind will be at stake."

Ogarkov's post-transfer writings do not differ from their predecessors. In the 1984 article in Kommunist of the Armed Forces, Ogarkov asserted that world wars "are fraught with the threat of annihilation for the whole of world civilization." He also stressed that a world nuclear war would "threaten the total annihilation of human civilization." In his 1985 book, Ogarkov not only repeated the foregoing statements verbatim, but also added that in the hands of the imperialists, nuclear-missile means "have created a real threat to the existence of all mankind."

In his 1982 book, Marshal Ustinov cited L.I. Brezhnev's assertion that if nuclear weapons were put into action, "the future of all mankind would be at stake." In the same 1982 Pravda article in which he declared that victory in nuclear war was impossible, Ustinov maintained that in present-day conditions, "available arms are more than enough to make biological life on earth impossible." While Marshal Sokolov does not specify nuclear war, he asserted in 1985 that a "[w]orld-wide conflict would mean the extinction of human civilization." In 1980, Marshal Akhromeyev
asserted in *Red Star* that in the event of their use, nuclear weapons "could destroy everything living on earth many times over."49

A review of the literature reveals that Soviet military figures on all levels have joined the post-Tula consensus on the mutually destructive consequences of nuclear war. General of the Army A. Gribkov’s 1984 article in the *Military-historical Journal* serves as an example, for in it he wrote that nuclear war "can lead not only to the annihilation of world civilization, but also of life itself on earth."50 Gen.-Lt. Volkogonov warned in 1982 that "even the partial, let alone the full use of the presently available arsenal of the nuclear states could pose the question of the existence of civilization."51 In 1984 he reaffirmed that nuclear war "can lead to the extinction of human civilization...."52 Col.-Gen. Sredin wrote in 1982 that nuclear war could lead "to the death of all civilization, and could make the existence of all living things on earth impossible."53 Gen.-Maj. Tyushkevich has noted that "the means for waging war, means of mass destruction, have now assumed such a scope that their use would pose the question of the existence of many peoples and, what is more, the whole of modern civilization."54 Writing in *Pravda* shortly after Tula, Gen.-Maj. R. Simonyan referred to "the equality of strategic forces, when both sides have weapons capable of destroying all life on earth many times over,...."55

Col. Rybkin stressed in 1982 that the need for military detente and disarmament "is persistently dictated by the availability of huge arsenals of mass-destruction means in the world, which threaten the very existence of mankind."56 He went on to cite remarks by "top Soviet leaders" that nuclear war "is madness and the road to the destruction of civilization."57 He has acknowledged elsewhere that "mankind and civilization...could perish during a world nuclear war, the threat of which has been increasing."58 Rybkin certainly argued the mutuality of destruction when he asserted that "a nuclear war,...could destroy the whole of world civilization."59

In the late 1970s, coincidentally with Tula, Soviet mainstream thinking revived the practice of citing Lenin’s forecasts on the future impossibility of war due to its destructiveness: "war between the leading countries will not only be the greatest of crimes, but also can, and inevitably will, lead to the undermining of the very conditions essential for the existence of human society."60 According to Richard Pipes, Lenin’s doctrines “form the basis of all political and military indoctrination in that country.”61 Raymond Garthoff has pinpointed the significance of Lenin’s writings: “Lenin’s works today, after all, are to those of us living in the real world not of interest because they represent some fount of wisdom, but because contemporary Soviet selection of particular statements from the apparently inexhaustible store of Lenin’s writings tells us
something about the present Soviet line in support of which Soviet spokesmen invoke his authority.62

Prior to Tula, the following words of Lenin on war were cited by the proponents of a long-term nuclear force development program: "No matter how great the destruction of culture, it is impossible to strike it from historical existence; it will be hard to restore, but no destruction will ever lead to the complete disappearance of culture."63

In light of the Western consensus that references to Lenin's written legacy are an indicator of the presence of Soviet doctrine, the post-Tula revival of his other statement on war's destructiveness should not go unremarked.

In 1980, G. M. Korniyenko wrote that "V. I. Lenin warned that war with the use of the latest mighty achievements of science and technology 'could lead, and inevitably will lead, to the undermining of the very conditions essential for the existence of human society.' This Leninist warning is all the more valid today,..."64 Among others, such luminaries as Boris Ponomarev, Col.-Gen. Sredin, and Gen.-Maj. Milovidov have likewise echoed this Leninist warning.65

Finally, the record of written evidence yields numerous other Soviet political, military, and academic commentators who have subscribed to the post-Tula consensus on the mutuality of a nuclear war's destructiveness.66

The Law of the Negation of the Negation

Since Stalin's death, the reverberating effects of the "nuclear revolution in military affairs" on the essence of modern war have saturated Soviet elite writings. Soviet analysts have often discussed the impact of nuclear weapons on military theory and practice in connection with the dialectical law of the negation of the negation. During the 1960s, two schools of thought in the USSR competed for the imprimatur on long-term Soviet military development. The first group (hereafter referred to as "Nikol'skyites" after one of its members), argued that nuclear war had reached its inner dialectical limits and "negated itself," that there were no prospects for defending against nuclear weapons, and that the ensuing universal destruction would therefore be so great as to make the concept of victory meaningless.67

N. M. Nikol'skiy summarized the thesis of his controversial 1964 book as follows: "The disappearance of the possibility of victory in a world thermonuclear war as a means of achieving the political objectives of states, and the negation of all the military categories of the institution of war in thermonuclear war, testify to the fact that world thermonuclear war is, essentially, no longer war but the self-negation of war."68
But in late 1965, the Nikol’skyites and their thesis retreated in the face of the opposing school. Certain military figures like Gen.-Maj. Bochkarev stood solidly behind the development of nuclear force options. He denied that victory in all-out nuclear war was impossible, and that it would result in the destruction of civilization, particularly—and this was the theoretical marrow of his school—given the prospects for future technological development. Like Bochkarev, Col. Rybkin charged that the Nikol’skyites not only ignored crucial factors that validated all-out nuclear war, but were also mistaken in their prognosis of future technological trends. In late 1965, he enunciated the school’s position: “There is a possibility of developing and creating new means of waging war, which are capable of reliably parrying an opponent’s nuclear strikes.”

In short, nuclear war had not negated itself; the present balance of weapons systems was only a moment in the inner dialectic of the military-technological process; and a means of defense could and would be developed against nuclear weapons. The Nikol’skyites did not become extinct: Nikol’skiy himself published a book in 1970 that still brandished the thesis that nuclear war had negated itself. But the opposing school appears to have been decisive in influencing Soviet force development programs, because nuclear options remained important until the late 1970s.

The post-Tula rehabilitation of the Nikol’skyites is therefore one of the clearest indicators of the change wrought by Tula. Nikol’skiy himself surfaced with a new publication and the same thesis. Nuclear war had reached its inner dialectical limits in the material-technological, economic, and political senses; it had therefore negated itself. He went on to explain that “the approach of the material-technical limit of world wars can be characterized as the creation and possession by opposing states of military technology that can make war so destructive that it becomes practically impossible.” He then stressed that as regards nuclear, biological, and chemical, “but not conventional” weapons, they are already reaching this “material-technical level of destructive and lethal power at the present time.”


In sharp contrast to the mid-60s, when the Nikol’skyites were attacked publicly for their “self-negation” thesis, many Soviet writers have joined Milovidov and Rybkin in echoing the once-heretical views. N. I. Lebedev has argued that “a nuclear war...is
capable of destroying not only world civilization, but also life itself on earth. There will be no victors in such a war. And in that case it loses its political sense and negates itself...." In a 1983 article, M. V. Igolkin sounds more like Nikol’skiy than Nikol’skiy: “The dialectics of war have reached the stage where war negates itself as a means of resolving conflicts and as a continuation of politics."

In his 1985 book, Marshal Ogarkov’s discussion of the law of the negation of the negation in military affairs—e.g., the replacement of the cavalry by mechanized infantry—follows all of his previous discussions practically verbatim. But at the end of his discussion he introduces a passage that has never appeared before in his writings: “The law of the negation of the negation, the birth of the new and the extinction of the old, is of a universal nature. But this law is manifested, like all of the other laws of the dialectic, in different ways: in nature, involuntarily; in society and consequently in military affairs, as a tendency and necessarily through the activities of people. The leaps from old to new are also not standardized in terms of time. For the barley grain sown in the soil, the negation of the negation comes in the fruiting spikes of the new harvest after several months; while wars, appearing at the dawn of class society, have been blazing for a millenium and still have not died out. But this by no means indicates the eternity of wars, as bourgeois historians and politicians claim. No. They are also subject to the action of this dialectical law of development. And the law of the negation of the negation underscores precisely this thought: both in military theory and in the practical experience of military affairs, one must not absolutize.”

As already indicated, the Nikol’skiyites believed that war had negated itself primarily because a means of defense against nuclear weapons was impossible. In light of the startling changes Ogarkov made in his 1985 discussion of the means of defense and means of attack, his unprecedented statement in the 1985 book, that war is also subject to the law of self-negation, assumes a potentially large significance. When viewed in the context of these discussions on evolving military technology, his position on the diminishing military utility of nuclear war becomes clear.

Whether or not the Soviets accept M.A.D. as a reality in present-day conditions has perhaps emerged as the most contentious issue in Western Sovietology over the years. The present section has demonstrated that since Tula, the Soviet politico-military leadership has presented a consensus on the mutuality of a nuclear war’s destructiveness. These statements are provided with consistency over time in the official publications that are designated for internal audiences. It is unlikely that the entire Soviet publishing apparatus would consistently swing into action merely to deceive American analysts as well as its own military cadres.
When Brezhnev rejected at Tula the possibility of developing a means of defense against nuclear weapons, he thereby rejected the possibility of limiting the destructive consequences of a nuclear exchange to acceptable levels. According to the Soviets, strategic parity is thus a parity in M.A.D. The Soviets themselves have described the Soviet formula for M.A.D. as the possession by "both sides" of an assured capability to deliver an annihilating retaliatory strike on an aggressor. Since Tula, they have clearly expanded the destructiveness of a nuclear war's consequences: millions and hundreds of millions of casualties have been displaced by the extinction of world civilization and the annihilation of all mankind. Over the years, all of the top political and military leaders have subscribed to one or both of these formulas to express the reality of mutual assured destruction in present-day conditions.
IV. WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY

Since post-Tula Soviet military thought presents a consensus on the reality of M.A.D. in present-day conditions, what is the Soviet view of the military utility of nuclear war? Owing to Lenin’s study of Clausewitz, the Soviets have long discussed war as both a “continuation” and “instrument” of politics. While there is often confusion in the West concerning the relationship between these concepts, the Russian words are clearly discrete.\(^1\) As Robert Arnett has noted, the Soviets have repeatedly stressed that to view war as a continuation of politics in a nuclear age is not the same as to view it as a practical instrument of politics.\(^2\) While the two concepts are linked, war as a continuation of politics differs concretely from war as an instrument of politics.

According to Gen.-Maj. A. S. Milovidov, “[c]onfusion is being allowed to occur between two different, though interconnected problems: the question of the social orientation of war and the question of the destructive consequences of nuclear war....”\(^3\) Writing in 1984, Col. A. Dmitriyev explained that the correct approach lies in distinguishing the question about the nature and essence of nuclear war from the question about its possible consequences and effectiveness as an instrument. A world nuclear war would be both a continuation of imperialism’s aggressive politics and its instrument. But today one cannot fail to see, stressed Dmitriyev, that “such a war cannot be an effective instrument of aggressive politics. It will not produce the results expected by imperialism’s strategists; rather, its consequences will be catastrophic for all people on earth. That is why nuclear war cannot be permitted.”\(^4\)

In a 1984 book entitled *Marxist-Leninist Doctrine on War and the Army*, Gen.-Lt. D. A. Volkogonov cites Lenin as emphasizing that “…war is a reflection of that domestic politics which the given country pursues prior to war.... War is politics throughout; it is a continuation of the pursuit..., by classes, of the same goals by other means.”\(^5\) Volkogonov then frames the sacred formulation for the present: “It must be said quite categorically that nuclear-missile war fully retains the general social essence of war within its genetic foundation: it is a continuation of politics by other, violent means.” Gen.-Lt. P. Zhilin has reiterated that “[w]ar has and remains a continuation of politics.”\(^6\) It is politics throughout, “regardless of the level reached in the development of the means for waging the armed struggle.” The development of military technology and of the means of warfare “does not eliminate the circumstances that trigger wars or void them of their political content.”

But the Soviets are now agreed that nuclear war has lost its expediency as an instrument of policy. Shortly before he died, K. U. Chernenko wrote that “it is impossible
to achieve any kind of political objectives" with the help of nuclear war. Writing in *Pravda* in 1980, Boris Ponomarev noted that "...both in the quantitative and qualitative senses, the weapons for destroying people have reached the level where world war as a means of achieving a political objective has become impossible."\(^7\) Ye. Velikhov advised in 1982 that "[n]uclear weapons differ in principle from conventional types of weapons. They must not be regarded as acceptable instruments of war."\(^8\)

G. A. Trofimenko published an article in 1980 wherein he argued that war's being the servant of politics “does not at all make a world war with the use of nuclear weapons acceptable, a realistic instrument of policy.”\(^9\) Precisely because nuclear war cannot serve any rational political objective, and the very means for such a war, nuclear missiles, make the price of gaining any political objective with their aid not simply excessively high but prohibitive, “nuclear war also ceases to be a practical instrument of policy at the present time, remaining such only in theory: an instrument of policy that you cannot use.”

In 1984, G. A. Vorontsov also echoed the prevailing, post-Tula line when he warned that “the consequences of a nuclear war are so destructive that military operations cannot be regarded as a rational instrument of foreign policy.”\(^10\) Also writing in 1984, G. K. Shakhnazarov described one of the features of the nuclear era in the following manner: “the political objectives do not exist that would justify the use of means capable of leading to a nuclear war.”\(^11\) In 1980, A. Bovin asked his readers whether one can look today on a general nuclear-missile war as another, yet nonetheless rational instrument of state policy. “It is obvious that a retaliatory strike potential...deprives such a choice of any rationality,” he wrote, “and automatically transforms aggression into suicide, into an aggressor’s self-destruction.”\(^12\) F. Burlatskiy wrote that “a world thermonuclear war has no rational objective,...”\(^13\)

But Col. Rybkin was even more explicit when he cited Lenin as saying that “there are conditions under which violence...can produce no results whatsoever.” That thesis is applicable precisely to world war involving the use of nuclear missiles, Rybkin continued, which under present conditions make such a war “absolutely unacceptable as an instrument of policy, and absolutely unacceptable not only from the standpoint of pragmatic considerations, but chiefly for moral and ethical reasons.”\(^14\)

While the record of written evidence supports the primacy of post-Tula thought on the issue of nuclear war as an instrument of policy, a nuclear war remains a continuation of politics in the Leninist sense. But in present-day conditions it has lost its rationality in this context as well, as K. U. Chemenko noted during a 1981 Lenin Day Address: “Never before have attempts to make use of weaponry to resolve disputes or
conflicts carried such a threat to the whole of civilization, or even to life in our world. Hence the indisputable conclusion: it is criminal to look upon nuclear war as a rational, almost legitimate continuation of politics."

Prior to his transfer, Marshal Ogarkov appears to have subscribed to the prevailing line on this ideologically sensitive issue. In 1979 he referred to "the essence of war as a continuation of the politics of classes and states by means of force."17 In the 1982 book, he wrote that a war unleashed by imperialism would be "a continuation of their aggressive politics,..."18 But in his 1984 post-transfer article in Kommunist of the Armed Forces, Ogarkov decided to cite the Chernenko statement verbatim.19 He repeats it in the 1985 book, but with two differences. First, he does not attribute the statement to Chernenko as he did in 1984. Second, Ogarkov has inserted an additional word into the original statement, so that it now reads: "...it is criminal to look upon nuclear war as a rational, almost legitimate means of continuing politics."20 This may be an attempt on Ogarkov's part to correct Chernenko, as it brings the statement closer to the more acceptable line: that nuclear war has ceased to be a rational instrument or means for achieving political objectives.

And this Ogarkov also states, explicitly for the first time, in both of his post-transfer publications. The passages are almost identical in both the 198421 and 198522 works: "The appearance in 1945 and rapid subsequent development of nuclear weapons, with their unbelievable destructive force, have posed anew the question of the expediency of war as a means of achieving political objectives. [The grim reality of our day is that, in contrast with the past, the very correlation of these most important categories of 'war' and 'politics' has changed.] Only having ultimately lost all reason can one try to find such arguments, and define such an objective, that would justify the unleashing of a world nuclear war, thereby threatening human civilization with its total annihilation." In light of the change that Ogarkov made in 1985 regarding the Chernenko statement, it is interesting that a similar alteration occurred in the foregoing passage: the sentence bracketed above did not appear in the 1985 book.

A review of post-Tula writings indicates that Soviet elite commentators now present a consensus on the inutility of nuclear war as a rational instrument of policy. But any analysis of Soviet doctrine on nuclear war should also address the issue of limited nuclear options. Do the Soviets present a consensus on the viability of a limited nuclear war as an instrument for achieving political objectives?
Limited Nuclear War

According to Soviet military thought, one of the specific features of a future war is its escalation potential. Since L. I. Brezhnev’s address at the 26th Party Congress in early 1981, Soviet political and military elites have consistently stressed the impossibility of keeping a nuclear war limited. Raymond Garthoff has explained that “apart from probably reflecting a genuine Soviet concern over escalation, this authoritative public declaratory stance clearly has been directed at dissuading U.S. leaders from contemplating limited nuclear warfare as an option, rather than at pursuing such an option themselves. The Soviet leaders have been quite prepared to forego the option of threatening a Eurostrategic war as a price for reducing Western interest in such an option.”

L. I. Brezhnev set the line when he announced in 1981 that the Western notion of keeping a nuclear war limited was “a flagrant deception of the peoples! A nuclear war limited in American terms, say to Europe, would mean at the very beginning the certain extinction of European civilization. And indeed the U.S. itself could of course not remain on the sidelines, away from the flames of war....” The new line was quickly reflected in both the civilian and military media. Writing in Red Star in 1982, G. Trofimenko argued that “a ‘limited’ nuclear war on the European continent...would inevitably escalate to a general nuclear war with all of its fatal consequences.” Yu. V. Andropov subsequently affirmed that “one would truly have to be blind to the realities of our age not to see that no matter how and no matter where a nuclear tornado arises, it would inevitably get out of control and cause a universal catastrophe....” Andropov’s variation on this theme has also become a standard line.

Writing in 1982, G. A. Arbatov warned that faith in the possibility of a limited nuclear war was “a dangerous illusion. Any limited conflict will inevitably escalate into a universal one, and will lead to catastrophic consequences....” N. I. Lebedev published a book in 1982 wherein he noted that “a ‘Eurostrategic’ war will inevitably cross the ocean and pay back those preparing it: American imperialism.” V. Kudryavtsev has criticized “American propaganda” for popularizing the limited character of nuclear war, “which will inevitably escalate to total war.” S. Kondrashov announced in 1981 that any use of nuclear weapons “will inevitably lead to a general catastrophe.”

In his 1983 Kommunist article, A. Chernyshev warned that any use of nuclear weapons would inevitably lead to a global clash with catastrophic consequences “for mankind, and even for all living things on earth.” R. Bogdanov and N. Turkatenko published an article in Pravda in which they advised that “the first nuclear explosion
will inevitably trigger a chain reaction of explosions and become the prologue to a world-wide holocaust. A. Prokhanov specified that “the explosion of small, tactical, ‘local’ shells will, because of the logic and necessity of modern warfare, instantly detonate a general nuclear clash using the entire nuclear arsenals of the belligerent parties.” G. A. Vorontsov wrote unequivocally in 1984 that it is impossible to limit a nuclear war. Having begun in one place, a nuclear war “will inevitably expand and inflict unacceptable damage not only on individual states and peoples, but on all mankind as well.” Other civilian elites have likewise devised their own formulas for expressing the impossibility of keeping a nuclear war limited.

Among Soviet military men, Marshal Ogarkov has used some of the strongest language possible to express the inadmissibility of a limited nuclear war. In his 1982 book, he discussed the Pentagon’s plans to wage a limited nuclear war in Europe: “One can, of course, reason theoretically in this manner. But any sober-minded person can understand, without any particular difficulty, that to realize this in practice—that is, to confine nuclear war within some kind of limited framework—is impossible.” Ogarkov then cites Brezhnev to the effect that no matter where a nuclear war breaks out, “it will inevitably and inescapably assume a worldwide character.” In his 1982 article in Izvestiya, Ogarkov repeated that “to confine nuclear war within some kind of limited framework is fantasy in practice.”

Ogarkov used a variation of the “impossible in practice” formula in his May 1983 article in Izvestiya: If the imperialists succeed in unleashing a new war, “it will be impossible to confine military action within some kind of limited framework,.... The war would inevitably encompass the entire territories of the belligerent states, and it would be difficult to distinguish the front from the rear.” His 1985 book reiterates that “once begun, it is impossible in practice to confine a nuclear war within some kind of limited framework.”

Throughout his writings, Ogarkov has also relied on other formulas to express the impossibility of keeping a nuclear war limited. In his 1984 Red Star article, he insisted that the calculation of the transatlantic strategists on the possibility of waging a so-called limited nuclear war “now has no basis whatsoever. It is fantasy: any so-called limited use of nuclear means will lead inevitably to the immediate use of the entire nuclear arsenal of the sides. Such is the grim logic of war.” This formula was repeated in both of Ogarkov’s post-transfer publications, verbatim in the 1984 article in Kommunist of the Armed Forces. In the 1985 book, Ogarkov added some further fine-tuning: “As for the hopes of the transatlantic strategists for waging a ‘limited’ nuclear war, they now have no basis whatsoever, and are intended for simpletons.... However limited the use of nuclear means, it will inevitably lead to the immediate use.
of the entire nuclear arsenal of the sides." Ogarkov wrote further that in the opinion of the Pentagon, the possession by the U.S. of powerful strategic nuclear forces, as well as the creation of the so-called Eurostrategic nuclear forces, allegedly enhance its potential for achieving political and military objectives in a limited nuclear war in the European theater of war without its escalating into a world war: "Hoping for this is of course sheer fantasy," he declared. "Any attempt to put nuclear weapons into action will inevitably end in a catastrophe that can call into question the fate of life itself on the whole earth." In his 1982 book, Marshal Ustinov wrote unequivocally that "[t]here can be no kind of 'limited' nuclear war at all." From the very outset, he continued, such a war would cause untold destruction and would, moreover, "inevitably and ineluctably assume a world-wide character." Thus the calculations of those who hope to limit a nuclear conflagration to the European continent "are not so much cynical as illusory." In his answers to a TASS correspondent in 1984, Ustinov insisted that "a nuclear attack on the USSR and its allies will ineluctably lead to a swift and inevitable retaliatory strike on both the territory where the missiles are located, and the territories from which the commands for their use are issued. There must be no doubt about this." In May 1983, Marshal Akhromeyev asserted that "a so-called limited war is impossible. If it breaks out, it will be a general war, with all of the ensuing consequences." Later in 1983 his message was even more explicit. In present-day conditions, he warned, given the possession by both sides of many thousands of nuclear warheads, "a limited war is impossible. If a nuclear war breaks out, it will inevitably become a general war..." Writing in Izvestiya in 1985, he stated unequivocally that in present-day conditions, military conflicts cannot be limited by territory. It will be impossible to direct the conflagration of a war into a narrow channel. "And this applies especially to nuclear war," he stressed. "If the imperialists unleash it, it will inevitably assume a general and global character." In 1982, Marshal Kulikov published an article in the Military-historical Journal that referred to U.S. aspirations towards achieving superiority over the USSR in nuclear weapons, and limiting a nuclear war to the territory of Europe. These illusions, he emphasized, "are without prospect." Writing in Red Star in early 1984, however, Kulikov made a statement that could be interpreted as unorthodox for the post-1981 period. As already indicated, Soviet doctrine since 1981 has held that it is impossible to keep a nuclear war limited. Among others, Ogarkov has continued to contrast the stability of conventional conflict with the inherent instability of nuclear warfare. But in February 1984, Kulikov wrote that "with whatever means a new world war begins, it will inevitably end in a nuclear catastrophe." While Kulikov reprinted
his article in the June 1984 issue of Soviet Military Review (Russian version), neither he nor others have since echoed this anomalous statement.54

Prominent Soviet military figures on all levels have presented a consensus regarding the impossibility of a limited nuclear war. Writing in Red Star in 1982, General of the Army Varennikov announced that if it is unleashed, a limited nuclear war "would necessarily assume a general character."55 General of the Army Yashin gave an interview in 1983 in which he stated unequivocally that "there cannot be a local nuclear conflict...." While Europe's population would suffer to a great extent, "a guaranteed inevitable strike will also be delivered against U.S. territory."56 Col.-Gen. G. V. Sredin published an article in 1982 wherein he asserted that having broken out, whether in Europe or in another place, "a nuclear war would unavoidably and inevitably become a universal one."57 Among others, Gen.-Lt. I. Perov, Gen.-Lt. A. Borsuk, and Gen.-Maj. Tyushkevich have echoed the inevitability of a limited nuclear war's escalation to a general holocaust.58

As if to dispel any possible doubts regarding the spatial parameters of the escalation under discussion, Col. Kondratkov wrote in 1983 that a limited or local nuclear war "will inevitably become global and will ineluctably lead to a catastrophe for all mankind."59 Col. Khmara asserted in 1982 that a limited nuclear war "will inevitably become the detonator of a global thermonuclear conflict."60 Writing in Red Star in late 1984, Col. Semeyko became even more specific when he stated that "a nuclear war will not be limited by any kind of artificially-designed spatial or temporal framework, nor by the scale on which the accumulated nuclear arsenals are used."61 Numerous other Soviet military figures have echoed these formulas for the inevitable escalation of a limited nuclear war.62

The Law of Passage from Quantitative to Qualitative Change

Since Tula, numerous Soviet commentators have explained the inutility of nuclear war as an instrument of policy in terms of the law of passage from quantitative to qualitative change. Writing in the Military-historical Journal in 1985, Col.-Gen. M. A. Gareyev referred to a qualitative "turning point" in the development of military affairs that was connected with quantitative developments in nuclear weapons.63 Col. Semeyko published an article in early 1986 that clearly connects the diminishing military utility of nuclear war with the law of passage from quantitative to qualitative change. According to Semeyko, the post-war quantitative changes in nuclear weapons soon led to an unprecedented phenomenon: "the potential for the repeated destruction of each of the sides."64 Above all, he stressed, this development proved that "nuclear
war cannot be a means of resolving international disputes. The inevitability of mutual
destruction has made the unleashing of nuclear war suicide for an aggressor himself.”

In a 1983 article in Izvestiya, Marshal Ogarkov wrote that in the 1950s, nuclear
weapons became the decisive means of armed combat. But quantitative changes in the
 arsenals stockpiled in the world led to qualitative changes: “that which could be
achieved with nuclear weapons 20–30 years ago has become impossible for an aggres-
sor today.”65 Later in 1983, he reiterated that about 20 years ago, the U.S. could to
some degree still count on the possibility of a disarming strike on the USSR. Today,
however, “this is an illusion pure and simple.”66 The quantitative changes of recent
years are changing the qualitative aspect of the phenomenon. In present-day condi-
tions, therefore, “only suicides gamble on a first nuclear strike.”

In his Red Star interview in May 1984, Ogarkov expanded on the “paradox” of
present-day conditions: “On the one hand, it would seem that a process is occurring of
steadily increasing the ability of the nuclear powers to destroy an opponent; and on the
other hand—just as steadily and, I would say, even more sharply—an aggressor’s
potential for delivering a so-called ‘disarming strike’ on his principal opponent is being
reduced.”67 He reiterated the “paradox” in his post-transfer writings.68

Marshal Ogarkov’s recurrent discussions of the law of passage from quantita-
tive to qualitative changes contain further indications of the diminishing military utility
of nuclear weapons. In his 1978 Kommunist article, he noted that the rapid quantitative
growth of nuclear-missile weapons has led to “a break in previous views on the meth-
ods of conducting engagements, operations, and armed combat in general.” He con-
nects this “break” with the creation of the strategic nuclear forces, which for the first
time in the entire history of wars permitted the strategic leadership “to immediately
deliver a powerful retaliatory strike on an aggressor in any area of the world.”69

The 1982 book essentially repeats the 1978 discussion, although the impact of
nuclear weapons on military theory and practice is perceived as more pervasive. In the
mid-50s, he writes, when nuclear weapons were few and their primary delivery vehicles
were aircraft, they were viewed only as a means of sharply increasing the firepower of
troops. The new weapons were therefore adapted to existing forms and methods of
military action (above all strategic), and the troops retained their leading role in the
accomplishment of combat tasks directly on the field of battle. The rapid quantitative
growth of nuclear weapons and creation of intercontinental delivery means led subse-
duently to “a fundamental reassessment of the role of these weapons, to a break in
previous views on the...importance of each branch of the Armed Forces in war, and on
the methods for conducting engagements, operations, and war in general.”70
In his 1985 book, Ogarkov introduces a periodization for nuclear weapons development that differs not only from its predecessor, but also from prevailing Soviet practice. The period 1945–1953 is traditionally viewed as the period during which the Soviet Union modernized its military technology and methods of conducting strategic action in light of the U.S. possession of nuclear weapons. The period after 1954 is associated with the incorporation of nuclear weapons and missiles into the Soviet Armed Forces, and with the appearance of new branches of the Armed Forces and troop-arms.\(^7\)

But in 1985 Ogarkov writes that throughout the 1950s and 1960s, nuclear weapons were few and viewed only as a means of supplementing the firepower of troops. Here it should be recalled that the 1960s belonged to Sokolovskiy. In the 1970s and 1980s, however, the rapid quantitative growth of nuclear weapons led to “a fundamental reassessment of the role of these weapons, and to a break in previous views on their place and importance in war, on the methods of conducting engagements and operations, and even on the possibility of waging war at all with the use of nuclear weapons.”\(^7\) Soviet military thought has perhaps not offered a stronger statement on the diminishing military utility of nuclear war.

A 1985 book on M. V. Frunze, authored by Col.-Gen. M. A. Gareyev, could well be the pivotal work on Soviet nuclear doctrine in recent years. Western analysts are agreed that the work constitutes the first official requiem for the seemingly indestructible Marshal V. D. Sokolovskiy. While Sokolovskiy’s classic Military Strategy was generally valid for its time, wrote Gareyev, “given the appearance of nuclear-missile weapons,” many of its central propositions have become obsolete.\(^7\) The evidence for a Soviet shift away from nuclear warfare has become so compelling, in fact, that Western analysts now speak of a new revolution in Soviet military affairs.\(^7\) This ongoing phenomenon promises far-reaching implications for U.S. strategy and force structure in the very near future.
V. CONCLUSION

The cornerstone message of Tula was the renunciation of "military superiority," which in Soviet doctrine was equated with a first-strike capability. "First strike" was in turn understood in the Western sense: a unilateral damage-limiting capacity in all-out nuclear war, a defense against nuclear weapons ensuring that only acceptable damage would be sustained in the course of an exchange. By pronouncing the impossibility of such a damage-limiting capacity, L. I. Brezhnev closed the door on a debate that had lasted for over a decade in Soviet military thought. The ineluctable development of nuclear weapons had led to a situation wherein the dialectic of attack and defense would henceforth be tilted in favor of weapons of attack. Defense against nuclear weapons was unattainable.

In short, the essence of the Tula line was a downgrading of all nuclear options. When the Soviets accepted M.A.D. as a present-day reality, the Soviet debate on the viability of nuclear war as an instrument of policy was resolved by a consensus: nuclear war is so unpromising and dangerous that it remains an instrument of policy only in theory, an instrument of policy that cannot be used. A growing body of evidence thus indicates that in 1977, coincidentally with Tula, Moscow designated an independent conventional war option as its long-term military development goal. Numerous Western analysts continue to present evidence of changes in Soviet strategy, operational art, force structure, weapons modernization, and operational behavior that clearly point to a Soviet preference for conventional warfare.

The present study has provided evidence that the highest political, military, and academic figures in the Soviet Union clearly present a consensus on the diminishing politico-military utility of nuclear war in present-day conditions. While this consensus represents a ground-breaking shift in Soviet doctrine since the heyday of Marshal Sokolovskiy, there is scant evidence of any dispute on the new correlation of war and policy in a nuclear age. Sokolovskiy has, on the contrary, been quietly displaced by a new revolution in Soviet military affairs. Marshal N. V. Ogarkov and other hard-minded Soviet military figures have themselves emerged as the architects of the Soviet shift away from a nuclear war-fighting and war-winning strategy, while General Secretary Gorbachev has fashioned a corresponding arms control agenda.
I. NOTES


9. Ibid., p. 724.


II. NOTES


6. For example: "ravnovesiye sil" ("equilibrium of forces"), "balans sil" ("balance of forces"), "ravenstvo" ("equality"), and "paritet" ("parity").


30. For example, see Gen.-Lt. P. Zhilin, “U.S.A.—Bulwark of Reaction and Militarism,” *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn’,* No. 4, 1982, p. 82.


40. V. M. Bondarenko, Sovremennaya nauka i razvitiye voyennovo dela (Moscow, 1976), pp. 131-132.


56. I am indebted to Ambassador Raymond L. Garthoff for this point.
III. NOTES


32. Ibid., p. 102.


36. Ibid., p. 3.


44. Ibid., p. 25.


63. For example, see Col. V. F. Khalipov, in A. S. Milovidov and V. G. Kozlov (eds.), *Filosofskoye naslediye V. I. Lenina i problemy sovremennoi voyny* (Moscow, 1972), p. 24.


67. For example, see N. M. Nikol’skiy, *Osnovoi vopros sovremennosti: problema unichtozheniya voyn* (Moscow: 1964).


73. *Ibid*.


79. Ogarkov, *Istoriya, op. cit.*, p. 54. While the disappearance of wars with the disappearance of classes is vintage Marxism-Leninism, Ogarkov’s passage is set in the context of evolving military technology rather than evolving socialism.
IV. NOTES

1. The word for "continuation" is *prodolzheniye*, whose dictionary meaning is "continuation," "sequel," "prolongation," "extension." The Russian choices for "instrument" are *instrument* ("instrument," "implement, "), *orudie* ("instrument," "implement," "tool," "piece of ordnance"), *sredstvo* ("means").


23. When the Soviets say "limited," they may be referring to limitations on geographical scope, type of weaponry, number of weapons, or any combination of the above.


34. R. Bogdanov and N. Turkatenko, "They Should Know About It...," PR, October 23, 1981, p. 5.


38. Ogarkov, Vsegda, op. cit., p. 16.

39. Ibid.

40. MSU N. V. Ogarkov, "In the Name of Peace and Progress," IZ, May 9, 1982, p. 3.


43. Ogarkov, "Defense of Socialism," op. cit., p. 3.

45. Ogarkov, Istoriya, op. cit., p. 89.

46. Ibid., p. 68.

47. MSU D.F. Ustinov, Sluzhim rodine, delu kommunizma (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1982), p. 49.


54. See a forthcoming paper by James M. McConnell on the "debate" manifested in part by Kulikov's statement.


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APPENDIX B

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