COPING WITH TERRORISM: A CONCEPT PAPER

By COLONEL JOHN E. KILLEN

AND

COLONEL ROBERT A. HOFFMANN
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John E. Killeen

and

Robert A. Hoffmann

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH REQUIREMENT

Thesis Advisor: Colonel Walter E. Hines, III

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA
April 1987
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DISCLAIMER-ABSTAINER

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TITLE: Coping With Terrorism: A Concept Paper

AUTHORS: John E. Killeen, Colonel, USAF and Robert A. Hoffmann, Colonel, USAF

An analysis is provided concerning the serious, adverse effects of international political terrorism on the United States and other democratic nations. A discussion is presented regarding what terrorism really is and how it has grown in importance and power. Evidence is presented to suggest that international terrorism will probably become an even greater problem in the future. The basic thesis argues that the United States is not coping effectively with terrorism. A large measure of this failure is attributed to the fact that many American leaders do not recognize terrorism for what it truly is—a form of indirect, low-intensity warfare being waged against western style democracies. The absence of a comprehensive, coherent national strategy is pointed out. The authors state that development of a systematic strategy which employs the full range of national instruments of power in an integrated fashion is the key to making progress in fighting terrorism. Thoughts on how this national strategy may be created are provided along with some specific recommendations for the Department of Defense and the U.S. Air Force.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Colonel John E. Killeen (M.A., Colgate University; M.A., Catholic University) has been directly involved with military and international antiterrorism and counterterrorism programs as a security police squadron commander with commitments in Europe and as the Director of U.S. Air Force Security Police in Turkey. He has been stationed in Guam and Turkey and has traveled extensively in the Philippines, Okinawa, Japan, Turkey, West Germany, England, Spain, Italy, and Belgium. In 1979, he authored the DoD Concept Paper on Drug Abuse which laid the foundation for the systematic and successful attack on drug abuse in the military services. He has sought to provide a similar concept paper on terrorism in this document. He taught the Air War College's elective courses on terrorism during his attendance at the Institution. His decorations include the Defense Meritorious Service medal with one oak leaf cluster, the Air Force Meritorious Service medal with two oak leaf clusters, and the Air Force Commendation medal. He has attended Squadron Officer School and the Armed Forces Staff College. Colonel Killeen is a graduate of the Air War College, Class of 1987.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Colonel Robert A. Hoffmann (M.S., George Washington University) has been involved in various aspects of antiterrorism and counterterrorism training, education, and operations during his career in the USAF. He has served in Vietnam, Iran, and twice in Germany, as well as having traveled throughout various countries in South America and Western Europe. Colonel Hoffmann has served most of his career in the Air Force Office of Special Investigations but spent a career broadening assignment at the Central Intelligence Agency. He holds the Airman's Medal, Bronze Star, Meritorious Service Medal with four oak leaf clusters, and the National Intelligence Achievement Medal, among others. He is a graduate of the Squadron Officer School and the Air Command and Staff College. Colonel Hoffmann is a graduate of the Air War College, Class of 1987.
Since World War II, the United States of America and our allies have successfully contained direct communist aggression. As a result, the free world has enjoyed an unprecedented 40-year period of freedom from large scale conventional warfare. We have also deterred nuclear war. However, we have failed miserably to contain the indirect, low-intensity warfare which is being continually waged against us. We are continuing to make the same mistakes that have plagued us over the last three decades. We are being beaten again and again by a method of warfare few of us understand.

We have seen Lyndon Baines Johnson refuse to run for a second term as president because of his inability to understand and cope with low-intensity warfare in Vietnam. The Vietnam War ripped the very fabric of our national unity. We have seen former President Jimmy Carter lose his bid for re-election largely as a result of his inability to cope with state-sponsored terrorism—most vividly symbolized by the tragic failure of the hostage rescue mission at Desert One in Iran. Most recently, through an abortive attempt to gain the release of hostages held by terrorists in Lebanon and the apparent relationship of that initiative to the low-intensity warfare problem in Central America, we have seen the Reagan presidency suffer serious criticism.

Our strategic policies in the vital Middle East have been dealt crippling blows by such terrorist actions as the assassination of Anwar Sadat and the car-bombings of the American Embassy and Marine Corps barracks in Lebanon. Our nightly news is dominated by the latest terrorist hostage-takings, atrocities, or pronouncements. Our political agenda—both in the Executive and the Legislative branches of our government—is often driven by attempts to cope with terrorist- or guerrilla-precipitated crises.

Our relationship with allies—Italy, France, West Germany, and others—has often been damaged by disagreements over responses to terrorism. European economies have been hard hit by loss of tourist revenue due to fear of terrorists. Our civil liberties, privacy and quality of life have suffered because of increased internal security measures and costs. Some American leaders openly speak of the need for government to place greater control on our free press, and a frightening number of citizens seem to agree.

Many of our problems and blunders can be attributed to our failure to recognize that guerrilla war, subversion and
International political terrorism have evolved into a sophisticated method of conducting indirect, low-intensity warfare against western democracies and other non-totalitarian states.

The growth of this low-intensity form of warfare results, in part, from our success in containing communist aggression at the conventional and nuclear levels of conflict. Our inability to respond effectively results partly from the fact that our open democracies are particularly vulnerable to this type of ambiguous warfare. But more of our failure stems from a lack of vision and understanding. Most Americans and American leaders simply do not understand the problem we face. America seems mystified, and our responses remain fragmented and ineffective.

Since Americans do not understand that we are being attacked by an indirect form of warfare, we have not developed or employed a consistent national strategy or a coherent military strategy to combat the threat. We have no strategy which fully integrates all instruments of national power and focuses them on conducting a long-term offensive and defensive struggle against guerrilla war, subversion and terrorism. Not grasping the reality of our situation, we can't even agree that we ought to get involved. We have not yet developed a method of integrating the efforts of all the agencies of our government, let alone those of our allies, in a concerted approach to low-intensity conflict.

The central premise of this paper is that the United States, including the Department of Defense, is not coping effectively with terrorism. The purpose of this work is to describe why we are not doing well and to suggest, in detail, some ways to improve our approach.

In order to fight terrorism more effectively, we must have a clear concept of what terrorism is and why our nation has such difficulty in coping with it. We will provide that concept and will address the reasons for our difficulties. We will then provide courses of action to be taken to curb the terrorist threat. Some of these courses of action require difficult decisions—both moral and political. We will address some of those decision points and show the consequences of making each choice. Our recommendations for the nation will be specific but brief. Our recommendations for the Department of Defense and the Air Force will be presented in more depth.

The views of the authors derive from recent working level experience in coping with terrorism—one as a director of security police in Turkey, the other as a detachment
commander with the Office of Special Investigations in Germany. We have worked closely with police and military forces from other nations who are fighting terrorism. We have also experienced terrorist assaults or attempts on military facilities and people for whom we had some degree of responsibility. Obviously, such experience has influenced our views, and the reader must bear this in mind when evaluating our work.

Additionally, to ensure that the concepts we discuss are available to as wide an audience as possible, we have refrained from using classified sources. This necessarily limits discussion of some programs which are already addressing a few of the deficiencies we cite. However, in the main, our suggested courses of action apply. Our intention is to stimulate thought and action in an area full of misunderstanding and fragmented activity.
CHAPTER II
HOW ARE WE DOING?
DOMESTIC DISRUPTION

The most striking examples of the difficulty we are having in coping with terrorism are the political problems created for our last two American presidents by terrorist actions.

On November 4, 1979 Iranian "students" stormed the American embassy in Teheran. Supported by the Iranian government, these terrorists held 52 Americans hostage for 444 days. This act of state-sponsored terrorism, amplified by intensive television coverage, gripped the attention of the American people and set much of our political agenda during an election year. According to Steven R. Weisman, White House correspondent for the New York Times, "the hostage crisis illuminated the extent to which the United States could prove itself unable to protect its vital strategic and economic interests, as well as its citizens."(1:114)

The frustration of the American people, reinforced nightly on television by Walter Cronkite's daily countdown and Ted Koppel's nightly "America Held Hostage" reports, skyrocketed when "Desert One," the hostage rescue attempt, foundered in the Iranian desert. President Carter, unable to find an effective way to cope with Iranian terrorists activities, was overwhelmingly defeated in the presidential election. Hamilton Jordan, Chief of Staff and campaign manager for President Carter in 1980, clearly documented the cause of this defeat in his book Crisis: The Last Year of the Carter Presidency. Quoting his conversation with Pat Caddell, President Carter's pollster, he wrote,

"Ham," he repeated, "it's all over--it's gone!"

"Gone!" I almost yelled. "What do you mean it's gone?"

"The sky has fallen in. We are getting murdered. All the people who have been waiting and holding out for some reason to vote Democratic have left us. I've never seen anything like it in polling. Here we are neck and neck with Reagan up until the very end and everything breaks against us. It's the hostage thing."

"What do you mean, 'breaks against us'?"

"It's going to be a big Reagan victory, Ham, in the
range of eight to ten points. All of these last-minute developments about the hostages and all the anniversary stuff just served as a strong reminder that those people were still over there and Jimmy Carter hasn’t been able to do anything about it. The hostage crisis symbolizes our impotence. Ronald Reagan’s message is, “Elect me and you won’t have to take that anymore.” (2:335)

More recently, President Reagan has also experienced a political crisis as a result of attempting to cope with terrorist activity in Lebanon. After enjoying six years of popularity and public approval unequalled in recent history, President Reagan is being battered by the media and the Congress over the so-called “arms for hostages deal” with Iran. Although all facts are not yet in, clearly many Americans believe that President Reagan violated his long-standing policy of not dealing with terrorists. Because we appear to have sold arms to Iran in exchange for the release of American hostages held by Iranian-sponsored terrorists in Beirut, many believe we were manipulated and made to look like amateurs, not world leaders. Although three hostages were released in the deal, six more had been kidnapped by early February 1987. As Mortimer Zuckerman, Editor-in-Chief of U.S. News and World Report indicated,

The effect of Iran has been stunning. The Washington Post-ABC poll reports that around 60 percent of Americans do not believe the President’s denial that it was an arms-for-hostages trade; 72 percent do not believe that Poindexter and North acted on their own. When the President says he had no prior knowledge of the diversion of funds to the Contras, 62 percent or Americans disbelieve him. As many as 67 percent do not believe that President Reagan is doing as much as he can to bring out the facts. The Wall Street Journal-NBC poll reports 75 percent believe Reagan a less effective leader now than at the start of his presidency and 61 percent believe he no longer has a clear idea of where he wants to lead the country. The New York Times-CBS poll shows Americans still have considerable affection for him. Half of them see him as more honest than most people in public life. But 40 percent think Reagan too old to be President, and 69 percent think his advisors make most of the important decisions. Furthermore, the Washington Post-ABC poll reveals that the country is increasingly looking to the Democratic Party to find answers to the nation’s challenges. Reagan’s credibility and his leadership have been severely eroded. (3:80)

Although these Presidential crises provide the two most
compelling instances of the ability of terrorists to destabilize our nation, many more abound. What dynamics enable relatively powerless fanatical groups, supported by certain patron states, to dictate the political agenda of the most powerful democracy in the world? What are we doing wrong?

A recent analysis of terrorism describes the pressures we feel,

"Do something, do something." Each time an American is taken hostage, the President is implored to take action. The victim's family, the relentless attention from the media, and a plain old nagging sense of impotence all impel the White house to move. It is just that kind of pressure plus Ronald Reagan's own deep sympathy for the hostages, that had so much to do with the flawed policy of sending arms to Iran. That, as even the President has come to admit, was a grievous mistake. (4:29)

INTERNATIONAL DISRUPTION

Internationally during 1985 and 1986 the economies of the European democracies were badly stung by the steep drop in American tourism. Although objectively the risk to travelers was low, Americans stayed home because of fear of terrorism.

In October 1985, U.S. military aircraft forced down an Egyptian airliner carrying the terrorists who hijacked the ACHILLE LAURO luxury liner and killed Leon Klinghoffer, a wheelchair-bound American citizen. The airliner was forced to land at a NATO base in Italy. Arguments over jurisdiction had U.S. and Italian armed forces aiming automatic weapons at each other—on the edge of a firefight between allies. The Italians subsequently let Abu Abbas, the ringleader, escape the country—considerably souring American public opinion towards Italy.

During April 1986, American and French relations were strained by France's refusal to allow overflight of U.S. aircraft that were raiding Libya. The raid was in retaliation for a terrorist bombing that killed and injured U.S. military members in La Belle Disco, West Berlin.

As we write, relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States are strained over the question of whether or not to extradite Mohammad Ali Hamadi. Hamadi is wanted by the U.S. to face charges of murdering a Navy diver during the hijacking of a TWA jet in 1985. Kidnappings of German citizens by terrorists in Beirut have
raised doubt that agreement about extraditing Hamadi can be reached.

How can a few weak but violent groups exert such powerful leverage on the economies of and the relations among the strongest democracies in the world?

In 1981, terrorists assassinated President Anwar Sadat of Egypt. This action significantly slowed the Middle East peace process initiated by Anwar Sadat, Menachen Begin of Israel and former President Jimmy Carter. The April 1983 car bombing of the American Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, followed by the October 1983 car bombing of the Marine Corps barracks at Beirut Airport influenced the United States to withdraw peacekeeping forces from Lebanon. This setback in American peacekeeping efforts virtually eliminated any chance of establishing effective government in Lebanon, handing power and influence over to violent private armies who have created a major terrorist training and control center in that nation. Both of these instances are clear examples of terrorists actions which have dealt major defeats to American foreign policy.

How can a superpower suffer crucial strategic defeats at the hands of such bandit gangs? What don't we understand?

PERSONAL DISRUPTION

Individually, how many readers have changed their views toward air travel over the last fifteen years? Can you recall when overseas air travel conjured images of relaxing seats, fine service by gracious hostesses, good food and drink, stereo music and a movie—all sweetened by a sense of anticipation and adventure? How many now travel with at least a thought, if not a contingency plan, concerning what to do if terrorists attack your plane or your airport? How many people, military and civilian, turn down jobs overseas and resign or retire because of fear that terrorists may harm their families?

How did a weak collection of fanatics acquire such an influence over our attitudes and our behavior?

TERRORISM TRENDS

To begin to partially grasp the nature and extent of international terrorism, it is necessary to examine recent trends. As shown in Figure 1, total international terrorist incidents have been increasing steadily. The 900 incidents which occurred during 1986 constitute an increase of about 9 percent over 1985. On the other hand, as reflected in Figure 2, the level of terrorist incidents directed
specifically against U.S. personnel and property has remained relatively constant over the past seven years.

Geographically, there is considerable variation between the pattern of attacks against U.S. interests (Figure 3) and the pattern of total attacks. Distribution by region of the world was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>ATTACKS vs U.S.</th>
<th>TOTAL ATTACKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>49.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>50.5%</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia/Pacific</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

United States business interests were the most likely targets of terrorist attacks in 1986, followed by diplomatic, government and military interests. As shown in Figure 4, bombing is the preferred method of attack. It normally proves effective, attracts excellent media coverage, and enables the terrorists to escape undetected.

Figure 5 provides a review of the number of incidents targeted against the military, the services targeted, the results, the distribution by country, and the tactics employed. As is evident, Europe remains the highest risk threat area for military forces, with NATO and joint DoD units and people most frequently targeted. As Figure 6 demonstrates, the belief that only senior military personnel are targeted is a myth. All ranks are at risk of terrorist attacks. (6)
The USAF Antiterrorism Program

INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS
1979 - 1986
The USAF Antiterrorism Program

INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS AGAINST U.S. PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY 1979 - 1986

Figure 2
The USAF Antiterrorism Program

GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS DIRECTED AGAINST U.S. PERSONNEL/PROPERTY - 1986

Figure 3

TOTAL INCIDENTS - 196
The USAF Antiterrorism Program

INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST U.S. PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1985 Incidents</th>
<th>1986 Incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extortions/Harassment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skyjacking/Hijacking</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabotage/Vandalism</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Attack</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidnapping</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arson</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombing</td>
<td>102</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NUMBER OF INCIDENTS
# 1986 Statistical Review

## Service Targeted*  | Results**  | U.S. | NATO
--- | --- | --- | ---
AIR FORCE | 7 | DEATHS | 2 | 1
ARMY | 8 | INJURIES | 83 | 2
NAVY | 5 | FACILITIES DAMAGED/DESTROYED | 10 | 7
JOINT DOD | 10 | VEHICLES DAMAGED*** | | 31 | 1
NATO | 11 | TOTAL 50 | 60 | 60

### Incident Distribution by Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITALY</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUERTO RICCO</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREECE</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE NETHERLANDS</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PORTUGAL</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TURKEY</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOLIVIA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CYPRUS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAPAN</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUNISIA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITED STATES</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>50</td>
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</table>

### Incidents by Generic Target**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Incidents</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PEOPLE</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROPERTY</td>
<td>43</td>
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</table>

### Incidents by Tactic***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tactic</th>
<th>Incidents</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARSON</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSASSINATION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOMBING</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUNFIRE</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIREBOMBING</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STANDOFF ATTACK</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
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</table>

* Incidents directed against NATO targets are included

** Totals do not equal the number of incidents perpetrated

*** Includes privately owned vehicles
THE USAF ANTITERRORISM PROGRAM
U.S. MILITARY DEATHS (THROUGH 1986)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>KILLED</th>
<th>PERCENT</th>
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<tr>
<td>GENERALS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>COLONELS</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>LT COLS</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAJORS</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPTAINS</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 LTS</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 LTS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. O.s</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENLISTED</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>06.0</td>
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</table>
WHY STATISTICS DON'T TELL THE STORY

Statistics are one means of understanding patterns and trends of terrorist activity. However, focus on numbers will hinder much more than help one to understand the nature and impact of terrorism. Incident and casualty data are no more helpful in measuring the impact of terrorism than were body counts in helping us to gauge the outcome of the Vietnam war. Unfortunately, many thinkers—military and civilian alike—make the error of inappropriate quantitative analysis. Even such an expert as Walter Laqueur focuses on the numerically small impact of terrorism and draws the wrong conclusions.

Terrorism is, of course, a danger, but magnifying its importance is even more dangerous. Modern society may be vulnerable to attack, but it is also exceedingly resilient. A plane is hijacked, but all others continue to fly. A bank is robbed but the rest continue to function.... Terrorism creates tremendous noise. It will continue to cause destruction and the loss of human life. It will always attract much publicity but, politically, it tends to be ineffective. Compared with other dangers threatening mankind, it is almost irrelevant. (5:105)

Similarly, an Air Force briefing employs the following comparison:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPACT OF TERRORISM (6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LOSS OF USAF RESOURCES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TERRORISM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lives lost 2 196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injuries 83 122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost in facilities and equipment $1.24mil $62.98mil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. incidents 14 302</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although in all fairness we must state that the implications of the slide are placed in good perspective by the briefers, when such information is used elsewhere it is a classic illustration of analysis that appears to be persuasive and accurate but completely misses the point. Terrorism is not about numbers and statistics. Terrorism is violent theatre. It is the dramatic employment of symbolic violence against innocents to generate pervasive fear and anxiety among a large target population. The fact that more Americans are killed on our highways in one month than are
killed in terrorist incidents in a year is irrelevant.

Rational analysis of death and casualty data would not lead you to predict that such activities could destabilize two American presidencies, disrupt relations among strong allies and damage European economies—but they did. Just as you cannot quantify the impact of a Greek or Shakespearean tragedy, you cannot quantify the psychological and emotional impact of terrorism.

Terrorism is symbolic warfare. Terrorists use extreme violence to project fear and to intimidate large audiences—primarily through the immediacy of television—in order to gain their political ends. The impact of terrorist incidents is amplified by the symbolic value of the targets they attack and by the susceptibility of the United States and other Western democracies to be flooded by that symbolism through our free media.

**HOW WELL ARE WE COPING?**

Contrary to popular opinion, most terrorists do not wish to die for their cause. They wish to fight for it, but live to fight another day. Most do. Western democracies have not been effective in deterring attacks or in capturing terrorists. One analysis by a terrorism expert revealed the following success rates for the Islamic Jihad:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Success Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bomb</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assassination</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidnapping</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hijacking</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL: all operations</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although there is some variation by region or the world, a very high success rate is a common factor in terrorist operations. With such low risk and substantial successes being facts of life, we are not likely to deter terrorist attacks using our currently fragmented and inconsistent approaches to the problem. Neil Livingstone says,

Terrorism...has been employed successfully to embarrass governments and to compel them to grant concessions and pay ransoms used to underwrite new revolutionary activities. It has demonstrated to subject populations the vulnerability of the state.... Terrorism has eroded government authority and diminished the rule of law by so intimidating national governments that they have, on occasion, tolerated terrorists in their midst.
or declined to punish terrorists in their custody out of fear of reprisals. Other governments have felt compelled to adopt extralegal methods to combat terrorism. Scarce resources have been diverted from more productive uses by national governments forced to defend themselves and their populations from terrorist attacks. Often governments have sought greatly expanded police powers and restrictions on civil liberties in order to combat the problem. The private sector, too, has been forced to spend billions of dollars on elaborate security precautions. Terrorism has changed the way most of us live. ...terrorism has reduced the quality of life. (7:5)

What are we doing wrong? How can these groups with no direct political power achieve an impact on western society that is so far out of proportion to their size and to the statistical significance of their acts? How have they managed to so powerfully affect our thoughts and our behavior? What don't we understand? What is terrorism, really?
CHAPTER III
WHAT IS TERRORISM, REALLY, AND HOW DO WE KNOW?

WHAT TERRORISM ISN’T

In order to understand what terrorism is, it is necessary to understand what it is not. It is not a natural social phenomenon brought about by an unjust world order. Paul Johnson says it is a mistake, ...to see terrorism as one of many symptoms of a deep seated malaise in our society, part of a pattern of violence which includes juvenile delinquency, rising crime rates, student riots, vandalism and football hooliganism, and which is to be attributed to the shadow of the H-bomb, rising divorce rates, inadequate welfare services and poverty. This analysis ends in the meaningless and defeatist conclusion that society itself is to blame: “We are all guilty.”(1:247)

Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s Ambassador to the United Nations and a leading Israeli expert on terrorism says, “International terrorism is not a sporadic phenomenon born of social misery and frustration. It is rooted in the political ambitions and designs of expansionist states and the groups that serve them. Without the support of such states, international terrorism would be impossible.”(2:48)

Terrorism is also not insane or irrational criminal behavior carried out at random by groups of sick, fanatical people. As a tactic, terrorism is neither irrational nor psychopathic. Grant Wardlaw, an Australian Research Criminologist, states,

However one may personally feel about terrorist acts or how abhorrent they may be, they are not, in the frame of reference of the terrorist, either wanton or irrational. Terrorism is not mindless. It is a deliberate means to an end. Terrorism has objectives, a point which is often obscured by the fact that, to the observer, terrorist acts are random and directed at killing those whose deaths can be of no value to the terrorists cause.(3:17)

If terrorism is neither a natural reaction to frustration, social misery, injustice or poverty nor random psychotic criminal behavior, what is it?

WHAT TERRORISM IS

Terrorism is a sophisticated method of conducting
indirect, low-intensity warfare on Western democracies and other nontotalitarian states. It is a calculated instrument of national policy employed by a number of states that are attempting to expand their power and influence. These policies are designed to achieve the specific political objectives of those states and of the terrorist groups that carry out the attacks.

Accordingly, terrorism employs well thought out strategies and tactics designed to exploit specific institutional weaknesses of democratic nations. In brief, terrorism is war—cost effective war, low-intensity war, psychological war, war that permits aggressor nations to plausibly deny that they are really aggressors, but war nonetheless. Livingstone and Arnold state it concisely when they say,

Many observers believe that World War III has already begun. It is a protracted conflict composed of thousands of nameless engagements and hit-and-run attacks by terrorists and other state-sponsored proxy forces, their targets most often the liberal democracies of the West and their allies in the developing world. Although it is strategic warfare on the cheap, its stakes are no less significant or meaningful to the United States and the other nations of the West than a direct clash between the two superpowers. Indeed, the cumulative impact of low-intensity violence in the world today has the power to rewrite the geopolitical map of the globe, to deny the West access to vital straits and raw materials, and to isolate and transform the liberal democracies of the West into embattled garrison states fighting for their survival. (4:2-3)

In December 1983, the Report of the DoD Commission on the Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, popularly known as the Long Commission Report, made clear the significance of terrorism as a strategic weapon. It concluded that "terrorist warfare can have significant political impact and demonstrates that the United States and specifically the Department of Defense is inadequately prepared to deal with this threat. Much needs to be done, on an urgent basis, to prepare U.S. military forces to defend against and counter terrorist warfare." (5:1) Commenting on this report, James Motley said,

In effect, the commission argued that contemporary terrorism has become an important part of the spectrum of warfare that requires that the U.S. military develop new concepts, to include identifying the enemy, determining the magnitude of the threat, measuring U.S.
vulnerability to terrorist attacks, and determining how U.S. military forces might be employed to deter terrorist attackers. Events of 1984 and 1985 (and 1986) have validated the Defense Department commission conclusions....(6:77)

Fred C. Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, testifying to Congress, said,

At present, the threat of terrorism derives principally from groups and nations that espouse two distinct ideologies—communism and Iranian Islamic fundamentalism. Both use terrorism as a form of warfare, below the threshold of open military attack. And they use terrorism in the knowledge that democracies—whom they have chosen as their main enemies—are especially vulnerable to this form of warfare.... Terrorism is at bottom a form of warfare, and it is directed against the United States and its friends.... Sending a terrorist team across a border to attack one’s neighbor is no different in principle from sending an army.(7:1,6)

In the fiscal year 1986 military posture statement to Congress, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated,

...Terrorism against the United States...continues to pose a formidable challenge.... The threat from international terrorism has never been greater.... In addition to the renewed activity of terrorists indigenous to countries in Western Europe, the threat is growing from Muslim transnational groups which originate in the Middle East and are influenced by Iran, Libya and Syria. These groups pose a significant threat to U.S. interests both in the Middle East and in Europe."(8:94-95)

We could extend this informed testimony to great length, but we believe we have made our point. Terrorism is a cost-effective form of warfare that is seriously damaging Western democracies and we have not yet found a way to effectively counter the threat. How has this state of affairs come about? What historical factors have led to the growth of international terrorism and have enabled it to come to exert such a great influence on our world?

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

World War I began the break-up of the great colonial empires. Germany was defeated, the Ottoman Empire ceased to exist. World War II dramatically accelerated the dismantling of most remaining empires. France and England
were greatly weakened, Germany was defeated and split in two. Japan was disarmed. Only the United States and Russia remained powerful. Only Russia continued to pursue empire. This dramatic change in the balance of power unleashed destabilizing forces around the globe. A power vacuum was created in Europe which Russia moved quickly to fill. In short order, the people of East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania were absorbed into a Russian empire.

Farther east, only aggressive United States action--clearly stated in the Truman Doctrine--forced Stalin out of Iran and kept him out of Greece and Turkey. Communist expansion--like Tsarist expansion before it--was launched with a vengeance.

At the same time, the weakening of the old colonial powers resulted in often violent anti-colonial movements. As a result, hundreds of small, self-governing nations--many of which were poor, unstable, and racked with ancient rivalries--were established throughout what we now call the Third World.

Also at the same time, the horrors of the holocaust in the concentration camps of Germany and the pogroms in Russia added new fuel to the fire of the Zionist movement. Jews were committed to establishing a homeland so they would never suffer so again. The allied powers, perhaps in part because of compassion for the suffering of the Jews, supported--or at least acquiesced to--the partitioning of Palestine. The Arab-Israeli conflict was born.

The United States emerged from World War II virtually unscathed and stronger than ever. In 1947, about 50 percent of the Gross World Product was produced in the United States. (9:144) Our economy was booming and we held the monopoly on nuclear weapons. We were launched onto the stage of world leadership--ready or not. We were the only Western nation with the power to contain the Soviet Union and to help preserve world order. We readily assumed the task of fostering--as much as possible without substantial sacrifice--growth, prosperity and democracy around the world. The Marshall Plan for rebuilding Europe is the clearest example of that commitment. Our goal was a stable world order.

The principal underpinning for this new role was brilliantly outlined by George F. Kennan, then director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, in his article in Foreign Affairs entitled "Sources of Soviet Conduct." It is worth quoting at some length, as it remains relevant
today. He said,

...It will be clearly seen that the Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographic and political points, corresponding to the shifts and manoeuvres (sic) of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed out of existence. The Russians look forward to a duel of infinite duration. (10:576)

At that time, we held no illusions about Soviet conduct or intentions. In discussing the concepts basic to the Soviet regime, he further said,

The first of these concepts is that of the innate antagonism between capitalism and socialism.... It has profound implications for Russia's conduct as a member of international society. It means that there can never be on Moscow's side any sincere assumption of a community of aims between the Soviet Union and powers which are regarded as capitalist. It must invariably be assumed in Moscow that the aims of the capitalist world are antagonistic to the Soviet regime.... If the Soviet Government occasionally sets its signature to documents which would indicate the contrary, this is to be regarded as a tactical manoeuvre (sic) permissible in dealing with the enemy (who is without honor) and should be taken in the spirit of "caveat emptor." Basically, the antagonism remains. It is postulated. And from it flow many of the phenomena which we find disturbing in the Kremlin's conduct of foreign policy: the secretiveness, the lack of frankness, the duplicity, the wary suspiciousness, and the basic unfriendliness of purpose. These phenomena are there to stay, for the foreseeable future. There can be variations of degree and of emphasis. When there is something the Russians want from us one or another of these features of their policy may be thrust temporarily into the background; and when that happens there will always be Americans who will leap forward with gleeful announcements that "the Russians have changed," and some who will even try to take credit for having brought about such "changes." (10:572)

At that time, we held no illusions about the fact that a significant part of the battle would be psychological in nature--focused on "winning the hearts and minds" of other people. Kennan said the United States,

...Must continue to expect that Soviet policies will reflect no abstract love of peace and stability, no real faith in the possibility of a permanent happy coexistence...but rather a cautious, persistent
pressure toward the disruption and weakening of all rival influence and rival power.

...Exhibitions of indecision, disunity and internal disintegration within this country [the U.S.] have an exhilarating effect... At each evidence of these tendencies, a thrill of hope and excitement...[add] a new jauntiness... in the Moscow tread; new groups of foreign supporters climb on to what they view as the band wagon of international politics; and Russian pressure increases all along the line in international affairs. (10:582)

At that time, we held no illusions about the cost and difficulty of helping rebuild Western Europe, helping Japan recover, enforcing the Monroe Doctrine in Central and South America, helping to seek peace in the Middle East, and helping to contain communism in Southeast Asia. However, we took on the tasks and most of our efforts succeeded. As former President Richard M. Nixon stated,

Looking back over the thirty years since Kennan's words were written, it is clear that his analyses were prophetic. Eight countries in Europe and two in Asia became communist between 1945 and 1949. But in the twenty-five years from 1949 to 1974, with the policies of containment fully in place, only two--North Vietnam and Cuba--turned communist. Few foreign policies have been followed as effectively. (11:306)

In short, containment worked. We achieved unprecedented peace in Western Europe, the rebuilding of Japan, the preservation of South Korea and Taiwan, and increasingly closer relations with China. Keeping offensive missiles out of Cuba by threat or force, we ensured relatively stable conditions in the Western hemisphere. Containing Soviet communism required sacrifice of blood and treasure and demanded protracted, unrelenting effort. But it worked. It stopped overt Soviet aggression except within its own sphere of influence (recall Soviet military action in East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 to stop domestic liberalization). Direct Soviet aggression seemed to be relatively well checkmated. However, their goals had certainly not changed.

SOVIET USE OF THE INDIRECT APPROACH

Speaking of Russian thinking, George Kennan said,

But we have seen that the Kremlin is under no ideological compulsion to accomplish its purposes in a hurry... Here caution, circumspection, flexibility and deception are the valuable qualities; and their
value finds natural appreciation in the Russian or the oriental mind. Thus the Kremlin has no compunction about retreating in the face of superior force.... Its political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal. Its main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power. But if it finds unassailable barriers in its path, it accepts these philosophically and accommodates itself to them. The main thing is that there should always be pressure, unceasing constant pressure, toward the desired goal.(10:575)

Early on, it was clear to Kremlin leaders that it would take many years of effort to catch up with the United States. Military power was the only route they could take to gain equal power, as their economy could not begin to compete. Accordingly, they embarked upon an unprecedented peacetime military build-up. However, even in this sphere of their greatest strength, they could not afford to confront the United States directly, as evidenced by Khruschev's backing down from President Kennedy over emplacing offensive missiles in Cuba. While building their strength, it was necessary for them to develop other less direct strategies for expanding their power and influence while disrupting that of the West.

At this time, complex forces were interacting in the world. The United States far surpassed the rest of the world in technology: nuclear weapons, transportation, communications, modern weaponry; the American economy was overwhelmingly powerful; and Americans were firmly committed to containing communism. However, the decolonizing Third World was unstable. Population was increasing. The gap between poor and rich was widening. Modern revolutionary doctrine had been well articulated and was being widely promulgated by the communists. Radical Islamic religious fundamentalism was beginning to appear. The displaced Palestinians were becoming more radical, and oil wealth from Arab nations was financing their running warfare against Israel. Direct communist expansion was blocked, but the conditions favoring an indirect approach in the Third World were ideal. As B.H. Liddell Hart, the brilliant military historian and strategist put it,

The H-bomb is more handicap than help to the policy of "containment." To the extent that it reduces the likelihood of all-out war, it increases the possibilities of "limited war" pursued by indirect and widespread local aggression. The aggressor can exploit a choice of techniques, differing in pattern but all designed to make headway while causing hesitancy....
We have moved into a new era of strategy.... By carrying destructiveness to a "suicidal" extreme, atomic power is stimulating and accelerating a reversion to the indirect methods that are the essence of strategy.... Now, the atomic deterrent to direct action on familiar lines is tending to foster a deeper strategic subtlety on the part of aggressors. (12:xviii-xix)

In our view, the key elements of Soviet strategy were--and are--clear. First, avoid nuclear confrontation with the United States. Kremlin leaders do not wish to die or to see their society destroyed. Second, avoid any conventional war which might escalate to nuclear confrontation with the United States, but prepare for that war just in case. Use that power to coerce neighboring powers, as has been true historically. Also, conduct other wars of limited scope as the need arises. Third, act so as to gradually erode Western influence in the world in order to move the correlation of forces in a direction favorable to the Soviet Union. Fourth, support and encourage any destabilizing elements which will weaken the West, for that in itself will accelerate the inevitable march of history which demands the destruction of capitalism. Fifth, target disruption at the center of gravity of the West--the coherence of their political and social systems. The historic inability of democracies to achieve consensus, documented since Plato, and to pursue sustained, long-term international political goals and strategic objectives must be exploited. The end result of this strategy will be a divided, demoralized West deprived of access to critical resources, deprived of access to key geographic choke points around the world, and increasingly isolated--U.S. economic power will decline and Europe will be Finlandized.

Many experienced observers share our view. Brian Crozier states, "for more than twenty-five years the countries of the Western Alliance have been preparing themselves against the dread possibility of a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. This is a war which the strategists have called...the Third World War has never come and may never come. Meanwhile, the real Third World War has been fought and is being fought under our noses, and few people have noticed what is going on." (13:3)

Sir Robert Thompson, the British expert on guerrilla warfare and terrorism said,

When World War III is discussed most people think of it in terms of a nuclear exchange between Russia and China or between Russia and the United States, either of which would drag us all in, but it is quite pointless
to think in terms of winning the war by that means....
The thesis, therefore, which I wish to propose is that we have been in World War III for the past 25 years and that the long range Soviet goal is to win it without a nuclear exchange. This requires that eventually there should be a strategic surrender by the United States, brought about either politically and psychologically by a loss of will and purpose or politically and militarily by maneuvering the United States into a vulnerable and untenable global situation, or a bit of both. (14:101)

The two primary instruments employed to bring about this strategic surrender are revolutionary warfare--called wars of national liberation by the communists, and international political terrorism.

Before discussing revolutionary warfare and international political terrorism in more detail, we must make one point very clear. We are not of the "red-under-every-bed" mentality. When we describe the Soviet strategy and its implementation, we are not describing a colossal, all-knowing puppet master who sits in Moscow and controls guerrilla and terrorist movements around the world. First of all, the world is more complicated than that. Such control is probably impossible. It is also unnecessary. The Soviet Union can achieve their strategic objectives merely by sponsoring the disruption of targeted nations, with the added benefit of being able to plausibly deny their involvement. The Soviet Union, East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Libya, Iran, Syria, South Yemen, Cuba, Nicaragua and others train, organize, fund, arm and equip guerrillas and terrorists in training camps around the world. This "seed corn" is then planted, and although the garden is often tended by Moscow through intelligence operatives, the stalks of disruption grow on their own.

REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE

A thorough discussion of revolutionary warfare is beyond the scope of this paper. However, a few brief comments are needed to show the manner in which modern terrorism evolved, to a large degree, from contemporary guerrilla warfare. The strategy of terrorism derives from key strategic and tactical insights gained by Mao Tse-tung in conducting guerrilla warfare in China. Mao, an avid student of military strategy and tactics, evolved a highly successful form of warfare from a series of battlefield experiments he conducted during his war with the forces of Chiang Kai-shek.

Prior to Mao's writings, guerrilla warfare consisted
primarily of a collection of tactics that a small group of resistance fighters could employ against vastly superior armies. The impact was more harassing than decisive. Through Mao, the nature of guerrilla warfare changed dramatically. It became the most comprehensive and violent theory of war developed in recent centuries, and it worked--in China, in Vietnam and elsewhere.

Mao saw guerrilla warfare as only one indispensible part of a system of interlocking psychological, economic, guerrilla and regular military elements. Although his forces were inferior to Chiang's, both in number and in firepower, he focused on the application of psychological and political power. Demanding impeccable personal behavior toward friendly peasants in sharp contrast to their harsh treatment by government officials, and high political motivation among his guerrillas, he built support among the Chinese peasants which let his survive militarily and wage protracted warfare designed to wear down his enemy. As Brian Jenkins of RAND Corporation notes,

Mao's concept of a "people's war" freed strategists from thinking about warfare exclusively in terms of more soldiers and better armaments. It allowed determined revolutionaries who lacked conventional military power to take on militarily superior forces with some hope of ultimately defeating them. Mao suggested that guerrillas must aim for and depend upon the political mobilization of the people who would be mere bystanders in a conventional military conflict; he thus introduced a relationship between military action and the attitude and response of the populace. This added a new dimension to conflict: instead of evaluating results primarily in terms of the physical effect that military action had on the army, some strategists now indicated that the psychological effect action had on the people watching the battle or hearing of it may equal or even exceed in impact the actual physical damage inflicted on the foe. (emphasis added by authors) (15:8)

For Mao, terror was an important tool. He used it against enemy soldiers, against government representatives in the villages, against unpopular landlords and their families, and against other opponents. However, because its effect was localized and limited, it was not his major tool. Gradual progression to full scale conventional war after his enemy was weakened remained his primary goal.

In our time, terrorism has assumed much greater impact and importance in the war to destabilize the West. We will discuss the results for this greatly amplified impact below, but first we offer a few comments about the present degree
of success of the low-intensity warfare strategy being employed against the West.

In an analysis of conflict in the twentieth century, one author reports that there have been 127 conflicts between 1900 and 1967. Eighty of these occurred since 1945. Of these 80, only 28 were conventional conflicts. Forty-six were civil wars and insurgencies. Six others were coup d'état and riots. (16:18) "In the past 15 years, 32 countries have experienced some form of guerrilla warfare. And this does not include the terrorist problems in Western Europe, Latin America, and North America, or the continuing Palestinian terrorist campaign against Israel." (15:7) Clearly, conflict is extensive. Much of that conflict is sponsored, though not necessarily controlled, by communist nations and their supporters. They have won--for now--victories in Cuba, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. This element of Soviet strategy appears to be working reasonably well, although fortunately their inability to be of real help to developing nations, coupled with their rude treatment of people in countries where they have made some inroads, have cost them many losses, both diplomatically and through failed revolutionary movements: Greece in 1949, the Philippines in 1953, Malaya in 1960, the Congo in 1962, Egypt in 1972, Oman in 1975, Somalia in 1977 and Grenada in 1983.

Much more disturbing is the gradual erosion of will among the American leadership elite that appears to have come about since the early 1960's. Remember President Kennedy's inaugural address?

Let the word go forth, from this time and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans--born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a cold and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage--and unwilling to witness the slow undoing of those human rights to which this nation has always been committed, and to which we are committed today.

Let every nation know, whether it wish us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend or oppose any foe in order to assure the survival and success of liberty. (17:538)

To many, these words now sound strident, too ambitious, impractical--even bellicose. But then, college professors, newsmen, business leaders, congressmen and common folk alike cheered and had no doubt. To quote the
editors of the 1962 book in which the address appeared (one professor from Columbia University and the other from the University of Wisconsin). "...it was a brilliant statement of American ideals and objectives, recognized at once as such, both at home and abroad, and without regard for party." (17:538)

Now, many doubt that the Soviet Union really intends to expand its power and influence at our expense. Now, many question the need for America to provide foreign aid to help other nations to prosper and grow—especially if that help includes supplying arms and training for their self-defense. Somehow sale of arms has come to be seen by many as immoral no matter how those arms are to be employed. Now, most doubt the need for Americans to ever spill blood "to assure the survival and success of liberty" in nations under attack by guerrilla or terrorist forces. Now, there is evidence that many American leaders—particularly in our universities, our media and our Congress—lack the will to remain in "a duel of infinite duration."

The Soviet Union has specifically targeted our center of gravity—the coherence of the United States' political-social system—and their efforts appear to be having an effect. We will document this view more fully in Chapter V.

**INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL TERRORISM**

Simultaneously with the increase in American indecision and erosion of will, international political terrorism has taken on a new aspect. Its effectiveness has been substantially magnified, and it has assumed an increasingly important role in the indirect war being fought against the United States and our allies. What is modern terrorism and how has it changed?

Terrorism itself is not a new phenomenon. The sicari, a Jewish Zionist religious sect, committed terrorist acts against the occupying Romans in Palestine between 66 and 73 AD. The assasins, a Muslim religious sect, murdered opponents throughout the Muslim world during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The assasins were fortified for their missions by ritual smoking of hashish, by a religious doctrine that declared their enemies as unrighteous agents of the devil, and by promises of a martyr's high place in paradise if they died for their cause. Ayatollah Khoumeini's tactics are not original. The Middle East has known terror for centuries.

Robespierre's Reign of Terror during the French Revolution in the late eighteenth century, when the word
"terrorisme" was first coined, systematized terrorism and for the first time made it an organized element of government--complete with an emotional political philosophy. During the latter years of the nineteenth century, Russian revolutionaries developed philosophies and tactics which still inspire terrorist groups today. However, although earlier applications of terrorism were disruptive and did pose problems for authorities, the activity was usually confined to the nation in question and had little international impact.

Contemporary terrorism represents a quantum leap in effectiveness in comparison with the terrorism of earlier centuries. Terrorist philosophy, tactics and the socio-political environment in which it operates have all changed, and these changes have had their effect. However, the most dramatic increase in the effectiveness of terrorism can be attributed to technological change. The specific technological developments which have most amplified the power of terrorism are jet aircraft, modern communications and modern weaponry. Moreover, as societies have become more technologically advanced, critical functions tend to be concentrated at fewer and fewer key junctions (e.g., electric power grids, large water supply and purification points, huge airports, computer networks, financial clearing houses and districts, etc.). These can be more easily attacked with widespread, devastating results.

Grant Wardlaw states, "the advent of the jet airliner...has brought with it mobility and a significant increase in the range of possible targets within the reach of any particular group.... The emergence of transnational terrorism involving terrorists of different nationalities planning, training for and executing acts of political terrorism has been greatly facilitated by air travel." (3:25)

The most dramatic technological change--the one which has done more than any other to enhance terrorists' effectiveness--has been the sensational development of communications technology. The combination of television, hand-held video camera technology and satellite communications opened new vistas for terrorists which their predecessors could not imagine. Wardlaw notes.

The organization, orientation, and technical sophistication (particularly in the field of satellite technology) of the news media have significant implications for the style and range of terrorist activities to which society may be prey. Media coverage of a terrorist operation is often the major objective of the perpetrators. The insistence of many news directors that they have a social obligation to
present the news "as it happens" without restriction or censorship, while ignoring its potential consequences makes it very easy for the terrorists to stage events with assured worldwide audiences. (3:25)

The third technological development magnifying the power of terrorism has occurred in the realm of weaponry. Modern light infantry weapons--many of them easily concealable--now deliver so much concentrated firepower that a small terrorist band can wreak havoc in an airport, aircraft, shopping center or synagogue in a matter of seconds. Other weapons offer nearly limitless possibilities for violence. To ensure the impact of this change is clear, we will review modern weapons developments at some length.

**FIREARMS.** A quick survey would find the following firearms in use by terrorists: M-16 rifles (courtesy of Vietnam); AKM and AK-47 rifles (courtesy of the U.S.S.R.); 45-caliber Thompson submachine guns; 9-millimeter parabellum pistols, machine pistols, assault rifles and submachine guns. The Czech-made Scorpion submachine pistol and related submachine guns are among the most popular. The Scorpion weighs only three and one-half pounds and fires 7.65-millimeter rounds at a rate of 840 rounds per minute. It is built to carry a silencer. Equally popular is the Israeli-made Uzi, thought to be the most widely used submachine gun in the world. With performance comparable to the Czech weapons, it can be fitted with bayonet, grenade launcher and spotlight. It is often modified to fit into a briefcase. Heckler and Koch, Ingram and Beretta have developed even more powerful small weapons. The new AM 180 shooting system turns one man into a virtual army. One version comes in a self-contained briefcase with a sound suppressor. It fires through the side of the briefcase, laying down 177 .22-caliber rounds in six seconds--chewing up concrete blocks. Another version has a laser dot sight--it fires where you look. Concealable, semi-automatic shotguns which hold eleven rounds of double-0 buckshot are also used. Guns have been built into canes, umbrellas, books, cameras, briefcases, cigarette packs, cigars, toys, shoes and luggage. Night vision devices are also coming into use. Manufacturers are working on plastic handguns which would be undetectable by metal detectors.

**BOMBS AND EXPLOSIVES.** In addition to firearms, a wide variety of bombs and explosives are available. These include TNT, plastic explosives, gun cotton, picric acid, nitroglycerin explosives (including dynamite), and more. Plastic explosives (C-3, C-4 and Cyclonite) are so stable, versatile and deadly that they are most favored by terrorists. They can be concealed in just about anything and can be used as letter bombs, shaped charges, car bombs,
and suitcase bombs. Terrorists are limited only by their imaginations and the training they receive from sponsoring countries. Existence of critical nodes like electric power stations, telephone switching stations, dams, oil tank farms and similar vital points offer great potential for severe disruption. Bombs are set off by electric, chemical, mechanical and flame devices. Often, the destruction caused by the explosive force is augmented by use of nails, ball bearings, flechettes, nuts, bolts, scrap metal and glass. Even common fertilizer—ammonium nitrite—mixed with gasoline has been used to produce powerful bombs. Patron nations often supply the explosives, detonators and the training.

MISSILES AND ROCKETS. Terrorists have been apprehended with sophisticated shoulder-fired, wire-guided and heat-seeking missiles. Most popular is the Soviet SA-7 surface-to-air missile. Rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) have also been used in several attacks. Most popular is the Soviet-made RPG-7 grenade launcher. The Armbrust 300, made in West Germany, and the U.S.-made Light Armor Weapon (LAW)—self-contained, one-shot disposable anti-armor weapons—are also thought to be in the hands of some terrorists.

NUCLEAR/CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. No attempts have yet been made by terrorists to employ weapons of mass destruction. Most experts believe that they will not employ such weapons because the intense backlash or public opinion would hurt their cause and result in legislation giving law enforcement and counterterrorist authorities new and extraordinary powers to find and eliminate them. We hope those experts are correct. There is relatively little that a terrorist group could do with a nuclear weapon except excite public opinion, although that may well be enough to drastically alter current nuclear policy and deployment patterns. Security is good and the weapons are failsafe. The chances of their constructing a crude bomb are also reasonably remote at this time. Issuing threats to spread radioactive materials would be a much more likely course of action, but such actions are also not expected to occur.

Should a decision to escalate to mass destruction be made, it is much more likely that chemical or biological weapons would be used. Many ingredients can be purchased from laboratories, farm supply stores, and chemical factories today. Chemical dumps offer a ready storehouse for other toxic or carcinogenic materials. Highly toxic weapons could be manufactured in a home basement by a graduate chemist or biologist. (18:99-110) Concentration of water supplies and purification systems offer highly vulnerable targets with potential for devastating results.
Central heating and air conditioning systems offer another vulnerability.

This dramatic increase in mobility, destructive power and ability for terrorists to communicate their bloody message in riveting form to millions of people has occurred at a time when Western democracies have become much more uncertain about how to respond to the threat. As the nature of terrorism has changed, so has the nature of the responses we are willing to take to curb their violent acts. In our history, we issued letters of marque and other permits to have pirates hunted down and killed or captured. We did so with international cooperation. We posted "wanted dead or alive" posters all over the Old West. We hired bounty hunters to capture or kill outlaws. We organized vigilantes to insure community security. Now, our changed perceptions of social justice and moral behavior--forged in peaceful universities, churches and neighborhoods quite removed from the harsh reality experienced by much of the rest of the world--have moved us toward unwillingness to use violence at the very time that systematic, choreographed violence is being increasingly targeted against us with deadly effect. We will discuss this dilemma more in Chapter V.

Where are we then? How can we summarize what we believe to be true about international political terrorism? First, international political terrorism is not a natural social response to frustration with an unjust world order. It is not irrational, random behavior carried out by crazies. It is a sophisticated method of conducting indirect, low intensity and low cost warfare against western democracies and our friends in the Third World. It is designed to achieve the national objectives of expansionist states. Strategies and tactics are well thought out. This indirect strategic warfare grew out of the success of the United States' policy of containment of communism. Overt communist aggression was relatively well checkmated through actions taken by the United States and our allies to contain that aggression.

Accelerating social, economic, political and technological change, however, unleashed new forces in the world. These changes include jet travel, communications systems linking the world like a giant nervous system, weapons developments, daily clashing of cultures that are centuries apart in world view, increasing gaps between rich and poor, population explosions in many poorer countries and more. Taken together, these forces created an unstable world order--a state of disequilibrium--in which small disturbances create amplified effects, just as that last milligram of salt creates precipitous change in a supersaturated chemical solution. Such disequilibrium
provides a perfect medium for the prosecution of low intensity warfare, and that warfare is successfully destabilizing democratic governments and terrorizing our people.

The two primary instruments of that war effort are guerrilla warfare and international political terrorism. Both instruments rely more on psychological and political tactics than on violent encounters, although the violence is indispensable. The tactics are so successful that Americans and some of our allies are not even sure the war is taking place—despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Without Pearl Harbor-like attacks, Americans are reluctant to respond with violence. Equating the use of force with immoral conduct—no matter what the reason for that use of force—is particularly widespread among our intellectual elite, and that elite defines the terms we use to perceive the reality of our world. They choose the pictures we see on television and they create many of the images we carry in our heads.

In light of all we have said, what can we expect? Is terrorism going to get better or worse?
CHAPTER IV

IS TERRORISM GOING TO GET BETTER OR WORSE?

Unfortunately, a careful observer of contemporary low-intensity warfare must conclude that international political terrorism will worsen over the next twenty years. Western liberal democracies and their friends will be increasingly jeopardized, both by attacks from without and, possibly, by unwise internal responses to those attacks. The destabilizing conditions which foster low-intensity warfare and terrorism will not improve; in fact, they will probably worsen. The strategic goals pursued by the Soviet Union and other states which sponsor terrorism will probably not change appreciably. These states will continue to encourage and exploit instability in our world in order to expand their power and influence. The technology of violence will continue to develop at a dizzying pace, as will the vulnerabilities of high technology societies.

The only potential counterweight which might contain the probable increase in low-intensity warfare would be development of more effective countermeasures by Western democracies and their friends in the Third World. These countermeasures would have to be coupled with the will to carry them out for a protracted period of time—in "a duel of infinite duration." Our reasons for reaching this unpleasant but highly probable prognosis are detailed below.

We live in a time of accelerating change, disorder and discontinuity. Alvin Toffler, the brilliant futurist, said,

Humanity faces a quantum leap forward. It faces the deepest social upheaval and creative restructuring of all time....

Until now the human race has undergone two great waves of change, each one largely obliterating earlier cultures or civilizations and replacing them with ways of life inconceivable to those who came before. The first great wave of change—the agricultural revolution—took thousands of years to play itself out. The second wave—the rise of industrial civilization—took a mere three hundred years. Today history is even more accelerative, and it is likely that the third wave will sweep across history and complete itself in a few decades. We, who happen to share the planet at this explosive moment, will therefore feel the full impact of the third wave in our lifetimes.

Tearing our families apart, rocking our economy, paralyzing our political systems, shattering our values, the third wave affects everyone. It challenges
all the old power relationships, the privileges and prerogatives of the endangered elites of today, and provides the backdrop against which the key power struggles of tomorrow will be fought. (1:10)

THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM IN TRANSITION

DIFFUSION OF POWER. Our international political system is not immune from this accelerating change; in fact, it personifies it. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security advisor, captured this reality when he said "an old world order is coming to an end and the shape of a new world order is yet to be defined." (2:209) The bipolar world (the United States and the Soviet Union) which existed after World War II has now become much more complex. Although the United States and the Soviet Union remain the dominant centers of power, changes in the international system have enabled less powerful nations linked to the superpowers to conduct their affairs with increasing independence--particularly in the Western world. Nuclear proliferation, internal politics, trade competition, energy problems, ancient hostilities among allies and more have moved nations toward greater pursuit of self-interest--often at the expense of collective interest. As a result, many new centers of power and influence have emerged.

Western Europe and Japan are increasingly independent of--and often in competition with--the United States. America's once-overwhelming international power has declined greatly since 1947. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has become much more fragmented over the last 25 years. The Sino-Soviet split broke up the once monolithic communist alliance. Economic growth and resurgent nationalism have weakened the bonds holding Warsaw Pact members despite the shadow of the Russian Army. In short, power relationships among the developed nations are highly complex and changing.

DECOLONIZATION AND THE RISE OF THE THIRD WORLD. The complexity of the international system has been increased by an order of magnitude through the decolonization process. Kegley and Wittkopf state,

Since World War II there has been an enormous increase in the number of independent nation-states. By 1980 the United Nations had 154 members, a more than threefold increase over the original 51 members. For the most part expansion has been accomplished by the postwar breakup of the vast British, French, Spanish, and Portuguese empires....

...We forget both the magnitude and speed of the decolonization process. In the postwar ebbing of the
tidal wave of imperialism that swept the world a century ago, more than seven dozen territories today containing a billion and a half people have been freed from colonial rule. Such a spectacular move toward political emancipation is unparalleled in history.

The consequence of the proliferation of new states is the rise of the Third World. These nations...lack the capabilities shared by the superpowers and the industrialized nations of Eastern and Western Europe.... Aside from its relative lack of "power," the Third World is different in another sense: it comprises nations whose interests and objectives are often dissimilar from those of the older, more established nations.(2:188)

NONSTATE ACTORS. Moving the international political system yet one more order of magnitude toward complexity has been the rise of nonstate actors. International intergovernmental organizations (e.g. NATO, Organization of American States(OAS), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), etc), nongovernmental organizations (International Red Cross, World Bank, World Court, etc) and multinational corporations (British Petroleum, Fiat, Toyota, ITT, IBM, Ford Motor, Standard Oil, Texaco, Mitsubishi, Elf Aquitaine, Du Pont, etc) have exploded onto the scene. "Their rising prominence has also made the international environment more complex by proliferating the number of political actors engaged in efforts to resolve international policy issues to their own satisfaction."(2:200) These organizations pursue their interests outside of the control of nation-states, but they do not hesitate to involve governments in seeking solutions to problems that result from their activities.

In brief, the international system is far from being orderly, stable and in equilibrium. It is seething with change, diversity, disorder and instability.

TURBULENT INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS

The international economic order is also unstable. World trade patterns are changing as political allies compete more and more intensely and as the cheap labor of Third World nations eliminates jobs in the developed nations. International financial and monetary systems experience constant challenge and instability. The very structure of the world economic system itself is increasingly challenged by Third World nations, who see the rich nations growing richer as they grow poorer. Kegley and Wittkopf report,

The stark reality of the gap...is illustrated by the fact that in 1978 the nations in Latin America, Africa,
and Asia (excluding Japan) comprised 72 percent of the world’s population but accounted for only 17 percent of the world’s GNP. Conversely, North America, Europe (including the Soviet Union), Japan, and Oceania, making up only 28 percent of the world’s population, accounted for 83 percent of its GNP (World Bank Atlas:1980:i0). Translated into human terms, the disparity... reflected in such statistics indicates that nearly three-quarters of the earth’s inhabitants have a bleak present and future virtually unknown--and incomprehensible--to Americans.(2:189)

Even intensified international efforts by developed nations--should they occur--to help Third World countries improve economically cannot be expected to alleviate the probability of violence over the next two decades. In even the best of circumstances, economic progress will be slow, with periods of rapid growth followed by periods of economic stagnation. Expectations of increasingly educated and aware peoples do not follow such a pattern. Although real economic gains may be evident in many Third World nations, they are not keeping pace with the expectations of their people. The resulting dissatisfaction and frustration, again exacerbated by the quality of life depicted on television screens in even remote corners of the world, often result in radical elements of society choosing violence and terrorism to take what they believe to be their rightful share of power and wealth.

SCARCITY OF ENERGY AND GLOBAL RESOURCES

Confronted by the complexity, turbulence and long-term problems we have described, many Americans--including members of Congress--throw up their hands in frustration and opt for a modern form of isolationism. Such a view is appealing, but completely unrealistic. We are so inextricably linked to the other nations who share our planet that no degree of isolation can be achieved.

Most obviously, the economies of the United States and our allies cannot be sustained without oil and critical strategic minerals which are owned by other nations. Nearly half of the world's energy needs are met by oil. Some of our key allies (Japan, France, Italy, Germany, Belgium and others) depend on the world oil market for nearly 100 percent of their needs. After some improvement in our own dependence after the OPEC oil embargo in the 1970s, we again import about half of the oil we require to sustain our economy and standard of living.

Our modern technology--both defense and industrial--cannot be sustained without access to certain
strategic minerals and metals which we do not possess. Our Japanese and European allies are completely dependent on other nations for all of these minerals, and we depend on other nations for many of them. We cannot meet our own needs in bauxite, chromium, cobalt, gold, manganese, nickel, platinum and zinc. Much of our present technology simply cannot operate without them.

These minerals and metals must be obtained from such nations as Guinea, Brazil, South Africa, Zaire, Zambia, Chile, India, New Caledonia, Philippines, Peru, Indonesia, Malaysia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela, the U.S.S.R. and China. As is obvious, many are troubled Third World nations and others cannot be depended upon to support our strategic and economic interests. Moreover, the resources we must have can only be supplied across vulnerable sea lines of communication—particularly in the regions of the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.

It should be obvious that a "Fortress America" living peacefully in splendid isolation from the trials and tribulations of a messy and violent world is a bankrupt idea.

POPULATION AND URBANIZATION

The political, developmental, economic and resource problems we have discussed are greatly intensified by population growth in the Third World. According to analyses conducted by the Overseas Development Council, during the decade of the 1960s and the decade of the 1970s, the economic output of developing countries grew at a more rapid rate than that of the developed countries. However, the per capita income of developing countries continued to decline rapidly in comparison to the developed countries. This is a direct result of the often explosive population growth in those underdeveloped nations. Segley and Wittkopf state,

The greatest population increases have occurred, and will continue to occur, in the developing countries, where the medical and agricultural revolutions have most dramatically affected the incidence of death.... The dismaying but obvious inference is that those nations whose economies are least able to support a standard of living above the poverty level are those with the greatest increase in the number of people for whom to care. (2:190)

The combination of vaccinations to prevent childhood diseases, insecticides to end malaria, antibiotics to
control infections, agricultural changes to ease malnutrition and other technological advances dramatically reduced mortality in developing nations in less than one generation. Beliefs and human behavior do not change that rapidly. The way of life and often the religious beliefs of the developing nations favor large families. Moreover, the problem of population growth feeds on itself. William Petersen indicated.

Some 25 percent of the populations of industrial countries are under 15 years old, contrasted with about 40 percent in less developed countries as a whole, and a full half in a few of them. With so young a population and other things equal, fertility is much higher, for in such countries reproduction is a function mainly of adolescents and very young adults. The more the population grows, in other words, the greater the tendency for it to grow faster. (4:547)

In many nations, the carrying capacity of agricultural lands has been exceeded. Young people have no choice but to leave the land and migrate to the cities to seek some means to sustain their lives. Many developing nations are simply unable to keep pace with the rate of urbanization they are experiencing. Their urban areas are flooded with masses of young, unskilled and destitute countrymen who build shacks which ring the cities and draw on scarce resources to provide marginal services and largely nonproductive, menial employment. This growing accretion of young, unemployed, dissatisfied people in larger and larger slums gobbles up scarce resources and chokes off the productivity of the major cities of the developing world, providing fertile ground for the seeds of revolution.

NATIONALISM, IDEOLOGY AND BELIEFS

Each factor we have discussed—accelerating change, international complexity and conflict, economic instability, energy and natural resource scarcity, population growth and urbanization—adds pressure on the structure of world order. This pressure is further increased by the catalyst of competing and revolutionary human belief systems.

NATIONALISM. Nationalism increased greatly in the world during the process of decolonization, and it still fuels much human conflict. Many of the boundaries which define new nations were drawn by former colonial regimes for administrative convenience or for European political reasons. These once arbitrary divisions are now accepted and defended with great national pride by the leaders of the new nations. However, these borders frequently cut through the heartland of traditional ethnic, tribal and religious
groups—often generating intense conflict with the new governments on both sides of the border. Ethnic conflict fuels low-intensity warfare and terrorism around the world—Armenians, Moros, Basques, Kurds, Croatians, Corsicans, Irish, Sikhs and many more conduct terrorist campaigns against nations they wish to dismember.

**IDEOLOGY.** Marxist-Leninist ideology—which speaks of full employment; providing the worker the product of the sweat of his brow; the destruction of the rich and dividing of the riches among the workers; the belief that the end of capitalism is "scientifically" inevitable as part of the evolution of history; and the belief that terrorist and revolutionary violence, no matter how extreme, is moral so long as it accelerates the march of history—appeals to and motivates many of the young and poor in developing countries. Provision of arms, training, political indoctrination, and specific plans of action by the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other communist nations increases its appeal. The totalitarian baggage that comes with such aid is often not appreciated at first, or is not considered to be as important as the overthrow of the existing government and improvement of life now.

**RELIGIOUS BELIEFS.** Religion remains a major force in world affairs. It is both a unifying and a divisive force. In any case, religions can mobilize millions of people around the world—for good or ill. One need only recount the impact of the Catholic faith in Poland, the Philippines, Latin America, and Northern Ireland; or the impact of the Muslim faith in Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and elsewhere to appreciate its power. Shiite Moslem fundamentalism has emerged as a major force exciting war and terrorism around the globe.

**SINGLE ISSUE GROUPS.** More recently entering the stage of violence are single issue groups that are emotionally committed to their causes and willing to use terror in pursuit of their goals. Some of these groups include the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), antinuclear activists, antiabortion activists, radical environmentalists and more. The newest of these groups are just beginning to employ terrorism and violence to achieve their ends and will probably continue to do so. Russell, et al, express this clearly when they write,

"Many issues and conflicts...today have the potential for developing opposing views so resolutely held that terrorism appears a thinkable tactic in their furtherance. These include such areas as energy and its nuclear sector, the environment, ethnic conflicts and minority rights, labour disputes, inflation, and..."
various types of shortages, to name a few. Again, consistent with the activist bent away from absolute rights and wrongs, the decision to engage in terrorism becomes one of weighing relative values. Is it more acceptable to endure the foreseen destruction of the ecological balance, for example, than to terrorize one segment of society in order to draw attention to a more costly possibility (morally and possibly financially)? In short, will ends justify violent means? (5:21)

FUTURE TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

Thrown into the seething cauldron of change we have described is the greatly magnified capability for violence provided by new technology, along with the increasing vulnerability of complex modern societies. What can we expect to occur in the future based upon what we know of emerging new technologies?

TRANSPORTATION. We have spoken of the role of jet aircraft travel in helping to make terrorism an international phenomenon. Although we expect terrorists to continue to exploit jet travel, we see no new transportation technologies on the horizon which will further expand this mobility. This force multiplier seems to have reached a plateau.

COMMUNICATIONS. Although the communications revolution is still in full stride, we see no technological breakthroughs coming which will further magnify the power of terrorism. Human choices about how to use communications technology, however, may well continue to intensify its impact.

We are, in effect, part of a world organism linked together by a nervous system of instantaneous communication. Television is being introduced to even the most remote areas of our world. One of the authors of this paper spent weekends in Turkey hunting wild boar in the mountains. He stayed in isolated villages connected only by mud paths. The homes had no running water, no indoor toilets, they were heated by burning animal dung, sheep and cattle lived on the first floor, the families lived on the second, the attic was a hayloft—-but we watched television at night, complete with commercials hawking the finest wares of westernized civilization. This situation is increasingly true in every corner of the world. The disparity between rich and poor is highlighted daily in villages everywhere.

A detailed discussion of the tremendous impact of television—some state controlled, some state sponsored, some private enterprise—is beyond the scope of this paper. However, we must briefly discuss the methods of television
journalism employed by the western democracies, for the
impact is profound. Investigative reporting and creation of
dramatic visual images are strongly held precepts of
television journalism. News crews reach more and more
remote areas, but only in nations where the governments are
free enough to permit them to visit. They rarely are able
to scrutinize the most totalitarian and most brutal, like
Cambodia, Afghanistan, Laos, Vietnam and others. Reporters
question, probe, investigate, ferret out problems and
injustices and amplify them for maximum emotional appeal.
Such footage raises ratings and earns promotions. Emphasis
is normally on the negative, since slow but steady progress
and accomplishment do not have emotional impact like
corruption, hunger, failure, injustice, starvation, violence
and death. Criticism is continual. Problems are
highlighted with passion, but solutions are not sought or
proposed--for that is not the business of journalism. Even
in healthy societies, relatively scarce problems are
highlighted so frequently that they become perceived to be
widespread--like teen suicides in America.

More and more violent conflicts among previously
unheard of groups are reported, adding to the pervasive
sense of violence and danger. More and more people learn
the tactics and the efficacy of violence in gaining
recognition and political attention. Leaders and government
are castigated for their failings, not recognized for their
accomplishments; for nothing has a better chance of making
prime time coverage than scandal, corruption, or abuse of
power. This atmosphere greatly increases the difficulties
of both leading and following in an increasingly complex and
dangerous world. Under current conditions, we see no
solution in sight to this systemic dilemma, particularly in
America.

WEAPONS. Remarkable developments in military and
private weapons will continue to add to the power of
terrorists. Precision guided munitions (PGM) with stand-off
capability and increased destructive power are beginning to
appear in their inventory. North Korea and some Middle East
training camps are already providing instruction. Weapons
of mass destruction (radiological, biological and chemical)
are potentially available, but thus far terrorists have
chosen not to use them as they believe the results of mass
killing would be counterproductive to attaining their
political ends. Many authors believe it is just a matter of
time before this self-restraint ends. Others disagree.
What is clear is that a resort to weapons of mass
destruction will open a whole new arena of low-intensity
warfare--an arena in which the lives and civil liberties of
western democracies may both be endangered.
VITAL NODES, VITAL NETWORKS. The final factor adding to this already dismal forecast is the fact that vital elements of our societal network are becoming concentrated at fewer and fewer critical but vulnerable nodes. Livingstone says,

The more complex and interdependent the society and its infrastructure, the more vulnerable it usually is to the designs of "technoaggressors." The complexity of our modern world affords violence-prone nonstate actors with unparalleled and previously unimaginable opportunities for mischief. A very few people who know how the system works can inflict tremendous damage on it. Our overbuilt cities and their slender lifelines--water, power, sewers, communications--are especially vulnerable to terrorists... However, the threat does not end with the city. Whole societies and their complex economies, food production and distribution systems, communication networks, energy production, and storage and transport systems present the contemporary terrorist with unparalleled opportunities for disruption.(6:126)

Brian Jenkins emphasized the same point, but calls attention to the interconnectedness of our systems. He stated,

We are reaching the point of industrialization and population growth when the technical interdependencies of modern society--food on fertilizer on energy on fuel on transportation on communications--are so great and the margins of surplus so slim that a minor disruption in any single area can have tremendous effects on nearly everything else.(7:164)

THE FUTURE AND THE RESPONSE

What have we learned at this point? Will international political terrorism get better or worse? A sober assessment of trends suggests the following conclusions:

1. Terrorism will continue and may well intensify. Brian Jenkins says "terrorism will persist as a mode of political expression. More nations may adopt terrorist tactics, employ terrorist groups, or exploit terrorist incidents as a way to wage surrogate warfare...."(8:4)

2. Terrorism will become increasingly effective. Jenkins believes "the Soviet bloc will undoubtedly continue to support terrorist groups around the world, since Soviet policy indorses open support of 'national liberation organizations.' For subnational groups not
so classified, the Soviet Union may channel support through satellite countries or other terrorist groups." (8:4) This will provide terrorist groups full support of established intelligence networks, military training, equipment, supplies, diplomatic pouches, documents, transportation, safe houses, and funds.

3. **Terrorism may become increasingly destructive.**

Terrorists may or may not choose to use radiological, biological or chemical weapons of mass destruction. Access to these weapons is possible. If they choose, they may use these materials "to extort extraordinary political concessions, and even a well-perpetrated hoax involving such materials could endanger public safety." (8:4) Such a choice would escalate terrorism to a whole new arena of conflict.

4. **Whether, when or how Western democracies will respond to reduce the impact of international political terrorism remains an open question.** Grant Wardlaw, speaking of western democracies says,

"The great liberal hope is that the objective causes of terrorism will be attacked. Thus the focus might be on the redistribution of power and wealth, the provision of adequate social services and the settlement of just claims for ethnic, religious and social rights, for example. These are good goals which should be pursued with vigour.... However, the reality is that these goals will not be achieved, probably ever and certainly not quickly enough to suit those who are disadvantaged by the fact that they are not attained." (9:183)

If, in fact, terrorism is systematic low-intensity warfare being waged against the United States and other western democracies, if it is likely to become a more serious--perhaps catastrophic--problem in the future, if most of the actions we are taking are not likely to work soon enough--if at all, why aren't we giving the problem more priority? Why have we not arrived at a clear view of our national interest in this matter? Where are our clearly stated and followed national objectives and policies? Where is the integrated strategy employing all of our instruments of power--economic, political, diplomatic, legal, psychosocial, scientific, technological, military--to counter this threat? In short, why aren't we doing better at stopping it?
CHAPTER V
WHY AREN'T WE DOING BETTER AT STOPPING TERRORISM?

ANCIENT INSIGHTS

Some of the problems western democracies experience in coping with indirect warfare--revolutionary wars and terrorism--derive directly from the nature of democracy itself. It is instructive to take a brief detour to look at some ancient wisdom concerning this matter. Between 400 and 350 BC, Plato wrote his magnificent work The Republic. His insights are still relevant today. Discussing democracy, he noted that under this form of government the city is "full of freedom and frankness--a man can say and do what he likes.... And where freedom is, the individual is clearly able to order for himself his own life as he pleases.... Then in this kind of State there will be the greatest variety of human natures.... This, then, seems likely to be the fairest of States, being like an embroidered robe which is spangled with every sort of flower." (1:436-437) Plato pointed out that the State is not one but many, like a bazaar at which you can buy anything. Each may do as he wishes. He described democracy as a pleasing, disorderly sort of government distributing equality to all regardless of their individual ability.

Plato, who personally disliked democracy as a form of government, then dwelt on the weaknesses. He spoke at length of the tendency of democracies to move inevitably toward an excess of liberty. In explaining that process Plato used an analogy, describing the behavior of a young man living in a democracy. He spoke of conflicts in belief caused by advocates on all sides: "...then there arises in his soul a faction and an opposite faction, and he goes to war with himself. It must be so." (1:440) Sometimes order prevails, but new desires, passions and disorders well up. Passion confuses truth. Falsehoods and illusions take over. In frustration, democrats "...return to the country of the lotus-eaters, and take up...dwelling there...." (1:441) Withdrawing from the harsh realities of the world, in that land they occupy themselves with intoxicants, sensual and material pleasures, living by pursuing the fad of the moment.

Yes, I said, he lives from day to day indulging the appetite of the hour; and sometimes he is lapped in drink and strains of the flute; then he becomes a water-drinker, and tries to get thin; then he takes a turn at gymnastics; sometimes idling and neglecting everything, then once again living the life of a philosopher; often he is busy with politics, and starts
to his feet and says and does whatever comes into his head; and, if he is emulous of any one who is a warrior, off he is in that direction, or of men of business, once more in that. His life has neither law nor order; and this distracted existence he terms joy and bliss and freedom; and so he goes on." (1:442)

Everything focuses around the latest fad. Nothing is pursued for long. With the conflicting advocates and internal battles, no one course can be sustained for an extended period of time.

Drawing on his knowledge of previous democracies in the ancient world, Plato believed that the disorderly and excessive expression of liberty led inevitably to tyrannical subjugation of the people.

...and above all...see how sensitive the citizens become; they chafe impatiently at the least touch of authority and at length, as you know, they cease to care even for the laws, written or unwritten; they will have no one over them.... Such, my friend, is the fair and glorious beginning out of which springs tyranny....

The excess of liberty, whether in States or in individuals, seems only to pass into excess of slavery. Yes, the natural order.

And so tyranny naturally arises out of democracy, and the most aggravated form of tyranny and slavery out of the most extreme form of liberty. (1:445)

Plato went on to describe how excessive liberty and differences in native talent lead to three classes: the rich, the middle class and the very poor. Democratic disorder, greed, disunity and conflict turn to violence and anarchy, and the most ruthless wielder of violence, murder and oppression assumes the rule of the people and retains it by totalitarian control. (1:446-450) Could any of these dynamics, written primarily about the city states of ancient Greece, be applied to the nations in our world?

Two thousand two hundred and thirty years later, Alexis de Tocqueville visited the United States (1831). He sought to understand egalitarian democracy in order to learn its shortcomings and help strengthen it as it grew in France and elsewhere in the world. His brilliant insights also continue to have meaning today. His prophetic observations on America and Russia, written more than 80 years before the revolution, said,

There are at the present time two great nations in the world, which started from different points, but seem to tend towards the same end. I allude to the Russians
and the Americans....
All other nations seem to have nearly reached their natural limits...but these are still in the act of growth. All the others have stopped, or continue to advance with extreme difficulty; these alone are proceeding with ease and celerity along a path to which no limit can be perceived. The American struggles against the obstacles which nature opposes to him; the adversaries of the Russians are men. The former combats the wilderness and savage life; the latter civilization with all its weapons. The conquests of the American are therefore gained by the ploughshare; those of the Russians by the sword. The Anglo-American relies upon personal interest to accomplish his ends, and gives free scope to the unguided strength and common sense of the people; the Russian centers all the authority of society in a single arm. The principal instrument of the former is freedom; of the latter, servitude. Their starting-point is different, and their courses are not the same; yet each of them seems marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe.(2:142)

Commenting on the difficulty of carrying out long term foreign policy in a democracy, Tocqueville said,

Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which are peculiar to a democracy; they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those in which it is deficient. Democracy is favorable to an increase of the internal resources of a state; it diffuses wealth and comfort, promotes public spirit...; all these are advantages which have only an indirect influence over the relations which one people bears to another. But a democracy can only with great difficulty regulate the details of an important undertaking, persevere in a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy or await their consequences with patience....(2:130-131)

We digressed briefly to works of ancient philosophy and nineteenth century political science to clearly make several points. First, democracies inherently have difficulty agreeing on the nature of a problem and in arriving at an agreed upon solution to that problem. This is particularly true in the realm of foreign policy. Secondly, once a decision is made on a specific course of action, it is difficult to sustain that decision over a long period of time. It is impossible to keep decisions and actions secret. Third, most people in democracies tend to focus on short-term self-interest and day-to-day affairs, paying
little attention to global ideology, strategic questions or subtle international relations. Fourth, nothing in the nature of democracies guarantees that they will outlast tyranny. Only rigorous effort at balancing freedom and responsibility will hold the center together and prevent disintegration. Much depends upon perceptive, wise and effective leadership. This need for leadership cannot be overstated. At times of crisis Athens had Pericles, the United States had Washington, Lincoln, and Roosevelt, England had Churchill. Without Pericles, Athens foundered. Without effective emperors, Rome foundered. Nothing guarantees that good leadership will always be available. Finally, the competitive dynamics we observe between the Russian way of life and the American way of life are not new. Russian totalitarianism, militarism and expansionist designs have a centuries-long history. They were obvious to Tocqueville over 150 years ago—80 years before the Soviet Union even existed. American internal dissent, difficulty in agreeing on the "details of an important undertaking," and inability to persevere over the long haul were also obvious over 150 years ago. None of these characteristics are new. Some of these characteristics are in the very nature of the beasts, and it will take conscious effort, vision, strong will and superior leadership to overcome our weaknesses and counter our adversary's strengths. With these long-perspective thoughts in mind, let us move on to consider why the United States is not doing well in stopping the low intensity warfare, including terrorism, now being waged against us.

AMERICA'S INTELLECTUAL ELITE

Echoing Plato, Richard Nixon said,

One characteristic of advanced civilizations is that as they grow richer and fatter, they become softer and more vulnerable. Throughout history the leading civilizations of their time have been destroyed by barbarians, not because they lacked wealth or arms, but because they lacked will; because they awoke too late to the threat, and reacted too timidly in devising a strategy to meet it. (3:251)

During our first two centuries of development, the United States was relatively isolated from the incessant wars of Europe and Asia. Two great oceans and nonthreatening neighbors on two sides insulated us. We come to see war as an aberration—an interruption to the normal business of daily life. We stepped into several wars to ensure that the freer societies won, but we did not bear the brunt of these wars. We demobilized as quickly as possible after victory.
Americans have no concept of protracted conflict being a normal aspect of existence. On the other hand, Russia and many Asian and other Third World nations, based on their histories and on their ideologies, have accepted the reality of such protracted struggle. In the case of the U.S.S.R and some other states, they have incorporated protracted conflict into their overall strategies.

As we have discussed, the United States was thrust into a position of world leadership after World War II. We developed great power, but we did not bring with it the depth of experience or world view that earlier great nations had forged through centuries of power struggles and conflict. We were—and many of us still are—naive about the threat and level of violence which exist in the world. Fortunately, we had strong leaders during and after World War II, many of whom were "tempered by war, disciplined by a cold and bitter peace," who developed and carried out containment policy. However, not having had a long tradition of conflict, our understanding of the use of power in international affairs did not run deep. We were not blessed with such leadership during and, for much of the time, after the Vietnam War.

Although Richard Nixon brought great discredit upon the Presidency and pitched the nation into the morass of Watergate, some of his reflections written in later years are worth contemplating. We must not commit the ad hominem fallacy of dismissing the ideas because of the man who propounds them. He said,

William F. Buckley, Jr. once remarked that he would rather be governed by the first 100 names in the Boston telephone book than by the faculty of Harvard University. This reflects a shrewdly perceptive analysis of American strengths and weaknesses. The people as a whole often lack sophistication, but they have a good, gut common sense, and when necessary they can draw on an enormous reservoir of courage and good will. But too many of America's intellectual and cultural elite have shown themselves to be brilliant, creative, trendy, gullible, smug and blind in one eye: they tend to see bad only on the Right, not on the Left. Extremely sophisticated about ideas in the abstract, they can be extremely simplistic and naive about the realities of the actual global conflict we find ourselves engaged in. "War" is "bad," "peace" is "good," and posturing with words is everything.

The nation's immediate problem is that while the common man fights America's wars, the intellectual elite sets its agenda. Today, whether the West lives
or dies is in the hands of its new power elite: those who set the terms of public debate, who manipulate the symbols, who decide whether nations or leaders will be depicted on 100 million television sets as "good" or "bad." This power elite sets the limits of the possible for Presidents and Congress. It molds the impressions that move the nation, or that mire it.

(3:259)

Nixon cited Vietnam as a case in point where the American power elite depicted government after government in South Vietnam as corrupt and not worth supporting, ignoring how bad the alternative would be. They also said,

it was the wrong war in the wrong place (as if any war were ever the right war in the right place). They said Thieu was a corrupt dictator. They said that by aiding South Vietnam, we were only bringing death and destruction. They said Vietnam was unimportant and not worth saving. Since then the flood of refugees from Vietnam and the tragic fate of the people of Cambodia have torn at the consciences of many." (3:266)

Nixon also spoke of the Shah of Iran and President Somoza of Nicaragua who "met the same fate, with the United States greasing the skids for their downfall. While still our U.N. ambassador, Andrew Young nominated the Ayatollah Khomeini for sainthood and praised Cuban troops as providing 'stability' in Africa." (3:259)

Nixon, correctly, cited these examples as classic misunderstandings of the nature of the power struggles in which we were--and are--engaged. "There is none so blind as he who will not see--and this has been the condition of much of America's intellectual establishment.... Unfortunately, as Hugh Seton-Watson points out, 'Nothing can defend a society from itself if its upper 100,000 men and women, both the decision makers and those who help to mold the thinking of the decision makers, are resolved to capitulate....' If America loses World War III, it will be because of the failure of its leadership class." (3:262-263) He continues,

The issues that confront us are complex and the answers are by no means all clear. But this increases rather than decreases the need for calm, rational examination of alternative courses and alternative consequences. It also increases the need for the most meticulous care in insuring we decide on the basis of fact, not fantasy.

The defining characteristic of today's intellectual and media elite is that it swims merrily in a sea of fantasy. The world of television is
essentially a fantasy world, and television is today’s common denominator of communication, today’s unifying American experience. This has frightening implications for the future.

Ideas that fit on bumper stickers are not ideas at all, they simply are attitudes. And attitudinizing is no substitute for analysis. Unfortunately, too often television is to news as bumper stickers are to philosophy, and this has a corrosive effect on public understanding of those issues on which national survival may depend. (3:264)

Although passionately written, substantive issues are raised by Nixon. First of all, there is an intellectual elite which wields vast influence on our perceptions through their leadership in our media, our universities, our churches, some of our businesses and some of our Congress. They are well-intentioned, loyal Americans, but they have grown up in an environment isolated from the harsh reality which exists in many parts of our world. Much of their knowledge is abstract. They have been shielded from the often violent experiences of many other leaders in many other nations; as a consequence, they are uncomfortable with the use of power to achieve national goals. They often assume that most of mankind shares the moral views, values, orderliness and aspirations of suburban America. They believe we can negotiate differences in good faith, agree on a compromise, all parties will abide by the decision, and peaceful solutions will prevail. This view is, truly, naive. Despite its naivete, the view sets the agenda for American debate and American actions; this has significant consequences, one of which is that we do not cope well with terrorism and other forms of low-intensity warfare.

PERCEPTIONS AND WILL

We are not coping well with terrorism and low-intensity warfare in large measure because a significant portion of our leadership elite does not realize—or believe—that we are really at war. As discussed in Chapter III, the international arena has changed dramatically. We live in a world where great power is wielded by the United States and the Soviet Union. However, Third World nations, multinational corporations, religious movements, revolutionary ideology, population explosions, urbanization, poverty, economic conflict, energy/mineral shortages and gluts and more create a confusing, disorderly world. This confusion is compounded by the ambiguous relationships and contentiousness within our nation and among our allies. The world is indeed a difficult arena in which to make decisions.
These factors, coupled with our disastrous experiences with regard to Vietnam, have significantly altered the perceptions among our leadership elite of what can and should be done to preserve our national security. Far too often, the perception dictates that we not get involved—although we are already involved by dint of the fact that all of us ride on the same little blue planet. For example, we have let the Soviet Union walk into Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf with virtually no opposition. We are even unsure of whether or not to support the Contras of Nicaragua in our own vital hemisphere. Uncertainty, ambiguity and conflict have eroded our national will and our political resolve. Moreover, one can now reliably predict that—no matter what the justification—any Presidential decision to employ American military forces overseas will create domestic political turmoil and serious political opposition among our leadership elite—particularly if the conflict lasts more than a few days. Congress will declare possible violation of the War Powers Act—said act being a commentary in its own right about our unity of purpose.

Demonstrations against the use of violence will take place, well covered by television. Newspaper editorials from our most influential papers will express opposition in strident terms. Television networks will declare the action yet another government crisis and report it in breathless terms. Reporters and camera crews will seek to obtain the most emotionally powerful images possible to beam to our homes at dinner time. Bodies of dead soldiers on both sides will be shown. Collateral damage and killed and injured civilians will be sought out and highlighted. Interviews will be conducted with grief-stricken families at graveside, asking them how they feel right now and whether or not the President should have sent their son or daughter to die on foreign soil. The interviews will conclude with two lines of bumper sticker philosophy spoken in a tone that implies great insights have been provided. Ambassadors or other spokespersons from the opposing side will be given air time to explain their side of the conflict to the American people and to call our President an international outlaw. Church leaders and university professors will hold forth on talk shows about the sanctity of human life and the immorality of warfare no matter what its purpose.

This political reality makes it difficult to plan for and execute decisive military action at any level of conflict less blatant than the bombing of Pearl Harbor or the launching of a blitzkrieg through the Fulda gap in Germany. This political reality makes it virtually impossible to plan for and execute decisive military operations to stop insurgencies in foreign lands or
state-sponsored terrorist attacks on Americans. Most simply do not recognize such acts as being indirect strategic warfare against the United States.

Dr Sam C. Sarkesian, Professor of Political Science at Loyola University says,

The irony of the U.S. position is that the challenges posed by low-intensity conflicts are largely separate and distinct from American perceptions of war. ...the American political system and its instruments for carrying out political-military policy are placed in a highly disadvantageous position with respect to low-intensity conflict.

In the American scheme of things, war tends to be viewed as a technological and managerial conflict in which face-to-face combat...involving masses or troops...is subordinate to the ability to bring to bear sophisticated weapons on the battlefield through electronic commands and machine-oriented strategy and tactics to disrupt or destroy enemy formations. (4:8)

The problem is, guerrillas don't usually attack in formations. Terrorists don't even have formations. Their attacks, although exceedingly violent, are much more indirect.

Dr Sarkesian continues,

Seeing conflicts through conventional lenses heavily influenced by the Judeo-Christian heritage, Americans tend to categorize wars into good and evil protagonists. It follows that the character or the enemy must be clear and the threat to the United States immediate and challenging. U.S. involvement must be clearly purposeful and in accord with democratic norms. This "Pearl Harbor" mentality is more-or-less reflected in America's current posture. (4:8)

Sarkesian points out that low-intensity warfare "creates a morality and ethics of its own..." that do not "...conform to democratic norms, nor...follow the established rules of Western warfare. These are neither splendid little wars nor gentlemanly encounters. They are dirty, unconventional, no-holds-barred conflicts. Revolutionaries justify any means that contribute to their ends." (4:8)

Dr Sarkesian continues, "the center of gravity of such conflicts is not on the battlefield per se but in the political-social system..." of the nations involved. "Thus, the main battle lines are political and psychological rather than between opposing armed units." (4:9)
As we have indicated, Americans are particularly vulnerable to political-psychological attack. For example, we tend to set higher standards for our friends than we do for our adversaries. We expect nations with different backgrounds, different problems, different cultures and different levels of development to implement American-style democracy and human rights policies immediately as a condition of our aid. If they do not—and usually they cannot, particularly if under terrorist or guerrilla threat—we move to withdraw our support. We have somehow forgotten that the actions of the communist regimes seeking to replace them have historically proven far worse than the acts of those from whom we have withdrawn our support on moral grounds. Stalin’s elimination of millions of Russians and Jews, Mao’s execution of more millions of Chinese, Castro’s subjection of thousands of Cubans to firing squads, Vietnam’s extermination of large portions of its population, the Pol Pot brutalization and massacre of the people of Cambodia followed by Vietnam’s invasion and use of mass starvation tactics on that same nation, the brutal Soviet/Afghani tactics—including chemical warfare—being employed to subdue the mujahedin all come to mind.

Richard Nixon said,

Exerting more pressure on friendly regimes that provide some rights and do not threaten their neighbors than we exert on hostile regimes that provide no rights and do threaten their neighbors is not only hypocritical, it is stupid. Alliances are arrangements of convenience. Allies do not have to love one another or even admire one another; it is enough that they need one another. Being joined in an alliance neither obliges nor entitles us to deliver condescending lectures in political morality to our partners. The “moral imperialists” who insist that other nations be re-created in our image as the price of our friendship do freedom no favor.

I do not suggest that we abandon our commitment to human rights in our relations with our friends. But to be effective, we need to adopt a policy of realism. And to do this we must make a simple but crucial differentiation in our minds between the long view and the short view, between the ideal goal and what is immediately feasible. (3:302)

DIFFICULT DECISIONS

We have some tough facts to face. The world is a violent place. Much of it does not like us or share our values. We are engaged in a struggle to maintain those
values and our way of life. This struggle manifests itself across a spectrum of conflict, consisting of two major categories of warfare: nuclear and nonnuclear. The nonnuclear element of the spectrum includes conventional war and low-intensity armed conflict. Low-intensity armed conflict—including guerrilla war and international terrorism—is the element of conflict we are least prepared to deal with, but it is the most likely to occur. (5) To achieve the degree of success in curbing low-intensity warfare that we have achieved in curbing nuclear war and conventional war, we must develop an integrated strategy based on clear national goals and objectives. Our national policies, strategy and operational procedures must be targeted to achieve these goals and objectives. Our strategy, including tactics and alliances, may not always be in accord with currently held perceptions of American democratic values, morality, and ethical behavior. However, we must make controversial decision points clear, decide on a strategy and be prepared to carry out that strategy over the long haul. In order to bring about a coherent, long-term commitment, significant portions of our leadership elite must "adopt a policy of realism" and begin to see the world as it is, not as they wish it to be. Quoting Sarkesian,

If American involvement is justified and necessary, the national leaders and the public must understand that low-intensity conflicts do not conform to democratic notions of strategy or tactics. Americans must understand the dilemmas they face in supporting an existing counterrevolutionary system. Neither revolution nor counterrevolution is likely to be democratic. Neither is likely to conform to democratic ideals of just and humane behavior. The conflict is focused on political-psychological factors. All of the ingredients for a "dirty," ungentlemanly, terror-oriented conflict are there; and participation is likely to be protracted and increasingly costly.

American national will and political resolve must be rooted in the concept of democracy and the moral and ethical expectations of the American people. It is difficult to establish and maintain national will and political resolve in response to low-intensity conflicts. A sophisticated understanding of both the nature of revolution and counterrevolution and the requirements for an effective American response must be developed. (our emphasis) It will not be easy because such conflicts are complex, contradictory, and ambiguous in nature. (American policy may support nondemocratic regimes in the name of democracy). Making the matter even more confusing is the fact that segments of the media promote simplistic solutions and
project distorted images of both the nature of low-intensity conflict and the U.S. response. Some elected officials and special groups advocate their own particular interpretations. Political biases and ideological orientations of various groups...distort and confuse the issues. (4:15)

The challenge is difficult, the issues emotional and complex, but we must get on with it.
CHAPTER VI
WHAT CAN WE DO ABOUT IT?

Despite the complex and difficult nature of low-intensity war, including international political terrorism, as a nation we can do much to counter it if we will. The military has special responsibility in this regard. Because military leadership will play a key role in intensifying our efforts, there must be established in that group, as a key first step, a clear understanding of the nature of the problem we face.

Certainly, all senior military leaders clearly understand the nature of the nuclear and conventional threats posed by Warsaw Pact forces. However, few senior leaders seem to fully grasp the nature of the threat posed by terrorism and other forms of low-intensity warfare. As in the rest of society, the inappropriate quantitative analysis syndrome we described in Chapter II is widespread. The reality described in these pages is simply not widely perceived or understood within the American military today. Terrorism is treated as one more independent phenomenon, like religious beliefs, population growth, or economic instability, which influences American national security policy. It is not perceived to be a central war-fighting issue.

This concept paper is a modest attempt to begin to correct that lack of understanding. We are aware that such a statement may sound presumptuous, but we do not intend it to be so. We recognize that this is a limited and preliminary statement of the problem, written under conditions of too little time, no funding for on-site validation and coordination of concepts, with very little access to key authorities presently involved in working the current programs. Nonetheless, we believe our basic concepts are valid. It was our intention to raise what we consider to be important questions, to identify critical issues, and to point out some possible new directions which might be considered in prosecuting a war which many do not even realize we are fighting.

To begin to prosecute this low-intensity war effectively, five deliberate steps must be taken.

FIRST: IDENTIFY AND UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEM.

Briefly put, the problem is that we are already in World War III, but we do not recognize it as such and are not fighting it coherently at the low end of the spectrum of conflict. Richard Nixon wrote,
We can lose World War III or we can win it.

We can lose it by defeatism: by imagining that the contest is unwinnable or unworthy. We can lose it by waking up too late to the importance of the conflict.... We can lose by disdaining allies that are imperfect, or contests that affront our sensibilities. We can lose by self-indulgence, by telling ourselves that the sacrifice can wait until tomorrow, by postponing hard decisions until the need becomes so obvious that the decision comes too late. We can lose through a sort of "paralysis by analysis," concocting overly intellectualized rationales for each new Soviet advance, and using these as an excuse for inaction....

America and the West need to be jolted into a sense of urgency. We no longer have the margin for error that we had even a few short years ago. (1:321)

Under President Reagan's military restoration program, we are making good progress in meeting the nuclear and conventional war threats. However, we are making little progress in coping with low-intensity warfare and political terrorism. The evidence we have presented makes this point clear.

The political, economic, social and technological conditions which help spawn low-intensity warfare are probably going to worsen, at least for the rest of this century. Terrorism can be expected to spread and intensify if we do not begin to take effective action. The actions we must take will remain controversial and will not solve the problem quickly. We will be required to fight the war for a protracted period of time. To do so will require public support, but the American public does not now understand the reality of our situation. American leaders must take action to provide that understanding. As Nixon indicated,

We cannot prevail by the short-term expedient of declaring a sudden emergency, and creating the illusion that the challenge can be dealt with quickly and then put behind us. The challenge we face will not end in a year, or a decade; to meet it we have to prepare ourselves for a sustained level of will and fortitude. Victory in this struggle will come through perseverance, by never giving up, by coming back again and again when things are tough. It will come through the kind of leadership that in one crisis after another raises the sights of the American people from the mundane to the transcendent, from the immediate to the enduring. (1:342)
SECOND: DETERMINE THE GOAL

The goal of the United States ought to be to TAKE ACTION TO REDUCE THE IMPACT OF LOW-INTENSITY WARFARE, INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL TERRORISM, ON OUR NATION, OUR PEOPLE, OUR ALLIES AND OUR FRIENDS. This action must be realistic and effective but remain within the bounds of our fundamental national values. In order to accomplish this goal, we must formulate a comprehensive national strategy employing all the instruments of national power. As part of that effort, we must formulate a comprehensive military strategy, devoting sufficient brainpower, resources and effort to warfare at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, as we routinely do to nuclear and conventional preparations.

THIRD: INFORM AMERICAN LEADERS AND THE PUBLIC

In democracies, particularly the American democracy, public understanding, awareness and support are the sine qua non of effective action. This is particularly true in so controversial an area as low-intensity warfare, which will demand blood, sweat and treasure for "a duel of infinite duration." It is a military responsibility to identify and articulate the military threat to our civilian leadership, especially when the threat is as subtle as the terrorism which confronts us. It is the responsibility of our civilian leaders—both executive and legislative—to articulate that threat to the public.

In this regard, some excellent groundwork has been laid at very senior levels. The clearest and most eloquent statement of the problem was made by Secretary of State George Schulz in a speech in October 1984. Discovering that speech was a high point in the preparation of this paper. It so brilliantly captured the complexities we have personally observed and have been attempting to articulate that we included it in its entirety at Appendix A.

Some excerpts which serve to recapitulate and reinforce our main points are: (Topic headings inserted by authors)

[On the Nature of Terrorism, the Need for a Coherent Strategy, and American Will:]

We have learned a great deal about terrorism in recent years.... What once may have seemed random, senseless, violent acts of a few crazed individuals has come into clearer focus. A pattern of terrorist violence has emerged. It is an alarming pattern, but it is something that we can identity and, therefore, a threat that we can devise concrete measures to combat. The knowledge we have accumulated...can provide the basis for a coherent strategy to deal with the...
phenomenon, if we have the will to turn our understanding into action.

We have learned that terrorism is, above all, a form of political violence. It is neither random nor without purpose.

We must understand, however, that terrorism, wherever it takes place, is directed in an important sense against us, the democracies—against our most basic values and often our fundamental strategic interests.

(On Terrorism and Totalitarianism:)

If freedom and democracy are the targets of terrorism, it is clear that totalitarianism is its ally. The number of terrorist incidents in totalitarian states is minimal, and those against their personnel abroad are markedly fewer than against the West. And this is not only because police states offer less room for terrorists to carry out acts of violence. States that support and sponsor terrorist actions have managed in recent years to co-opt and manipulate the terrorist phenomenon in pursuit of their own strategic goals.

Today, international links among terrorist groups are more clearly understood. And Soviet and Soviet-bloc support is also more clearly understood.

We also now see a close connection between terrorism and international narcotics trafficking.

(On the Soviet Connection:)

We should understand the Soviet role in international terrorism without exaggeration or distortion. One does not have to believe that the Soviets are puppeteers and the terrorists marionettes; violent or fanatic individuals and groups can exist in almost any society. But in many countries, terrorism would have long since withered away had it not been for significant support from outside.

(On the Threat to Democracies:)

The magnitude of the threat posed by terrorism is so great that we cannot afford to confront it with half-hearted and poorly organized measures. And we have to recognize that the burden falls on us, the democracies—no one else will cure the disease for us. Yet clearly we face obstacles, some of which arise precisely because we are democracies.

And it is an unfortunate irony that the very qualities that make democracies so hateful to the terrorists—our respect for the rights and freedoms of the individual—also make us particularly vulnerable. Precisely because we maintain the most open societies, terrorists have unparalleled opportunities to strike us.

We will have to find ways to fight back without
undermining everything we stand for....

[On the Need for National Commitment:]

It is time for this country to make a broad national commitment to treat the challenge of terrorism with the sense of urgency and priority it deserves. The essence of our response is simple to state: violence and aggression must be met by firm resistance. This principle holds true whether we are responding to full-scale military attacks or to the kinds of low-level conflicts that are more common in the modern world.

[On Deterrence and the Terrorist Challenge:]

We are on the way to being well-prepared to deter an all-out war or a Soviet attack on our principal allies; that is why those are the least likely contingencies. It is not self-evident that we are as well-prepared and organized to deter and counter the "gray area" of intermediate challenges that we are more likely to face--the low-intensity conflict of which terrorism is a part....

...Terrorism, which is also a form of low-level aggression, has so far posed an even more difficult challenge, for the technology of security has been outstripped by the technology of murder....

[On American Failure to Understand:]

Much of Israel's success in fighting terrorism has been due to broad public support for Israel's antiterrorist policies. Israel's people have shown the will, and they have provided the government with resources, to fight terrorism. They entertain no illusions about the meaning or the danger of terrorism. Perhaps because they confront the threat every day, they recognize that they are at war with terrorism....

But part of our problem here in the United States has been our seeming inability to understand terrorism clearly.... We have to be stronger, steadier, determined, and united in the face of the terrorist threat. We must not reward the terrorists by changing our policies or questioning our own principles or wallowing in self-flagellation or self-doubt. Instead, we should understand that terrorism is aggression, and, like all aggression, must be forcefully resisted.

[On the Need for a More Aggressive Approach:]

We must reach a consensus in this country that our responses should go beyond passive defense to consider means of active prevention, preemption, and retaliation. Our goal must be to prevent and deter future terrorist acts, and experience has taught us...that one of the best deterrents to terrorism is the certainty that swift and sure measures will be taken against those who engage in it. We should take steps toward carrying out such measures. There should
be no moral confusion on this issue. Our aim is not to seek revenge but to put an end to violent attacks against innocent people, to make the world a safer place to live for all of us. Clearly, the democracies have a moral right, indeed a duty, to defend themselves.

A successful strategy for combatting terrorism will require us to face up to some hard questions and to come up with some clear-cut answers.... We now recognize that terrorism is being used by our adversaries as a modern tool of warfare. It is no aberration. We can expect more terrorism directed at our strategic interests around the world in the years ahead. To combat it, we must be willing to use military force.

(On the Need for Public Understanding:)

What will be required, however, is public understanding before the fact of the risks involved in combatting terrorism with overt power.... Public support for U.S. military actions to stop terrorists before they commit some hideous act or in retaliation for an attack on our people is crucial if we are to deal with this challenge....

To be successful over the long term, it will require solid support from the American people....

If we are going to respond or preempt effectively, our policies will have to have an element of unpredictability and surprise. And the prerequisite for such a policy must be a broad public consensus on the moral and strategic necessity of action. We will need the capability to act on a moment's notice. There will not be time for a renewed national debate after every terrorist attack. We may never have the kind of evidence that can stand up in an American court of law. But we cannot allow ourselves to become the Hamlet of nations, worrying endlessly over whether and how to respond. A great nation with global responsibilities cannot afford to be hamstrung by confusion and indecisiveness. Fighting terrorism will not be a clean or pleasant contest, but we have no choice but to play it....

If we truly believe in the values of our civilization, we have a duty to defend them. The democracies must have the self-confidence to tackle this menacing problem or else they will not be in much of a position to tackle other kinds of problems....

We must confront the terrorist threat with the same resolve and determination that this nation has shown time and again throughout our history. There is no room for guilt or self-doubt about our right to defend a way of life that offers all nations hope for peace, progress, and human dignity.(2:1-6)
This brilliant speech, which captured so much of the reality we face and which identified so many of the hard choices we must make, was instantly attacked from many quarters. According to Neil Livingstone,

The Defense Department position was in sharp counterpoint to the bellicose rhetoric of Secretary of State Shultz on the subject of terrorism.... He (Secretary Shultz) also chided the naysayers and faint of heart at the Pentagon who constantly raised the ghost of Vietnam as justification for adhering to a no-risk, high-threshold policy with respect to projecting force into the Third World or aggressively combating terrorism.... Shultz's remarks set off a heated controversy. Even Vice-President George Bush took exception to some of the secretary of state's strident statements. The Baltimore Sun declared "Shultz Off Course," and the Philadelphia Inquirer labeled his speech "How Not to Fight Terror," as other newspapers across the country lashed out at his tough rhetoric. Shultz, however, refused to back off his attack or to be intimidated by Congress and the media....

Although no consensus emerged from the debate that raged in the wake of Shultz's pronouncements, most of the issues had at last been laid on the table. (3:115)

Events since that time, particularly the positive public reaction to the April 1986 American raid on Libya in retaliation for the terrorist bombing of La Belle Disco in West Berlin, suggest that some of the ideas we have expressed may be becoming more widely understood and appreciated. Most important to military members, Secretary Weinberger now clearly recognizes the nature of the low-intensity warfare threat and has expressed it concisely and forcefully in his January 12, 1987 report to the Congress. Again, because of the importance of the ideas expressed, we have included the text of the section on Conventional Deterrence and Low-Intensity Conflict in Appendix B. Here we will provide only selected excerpts from his comments. Secretary Weinberger said, (Topic headings supplied by authors)

(On Terrorism as Protracted Warfare:)

Today, the United States confronts several forms of ambiguous aggression in what is popularly referred to as Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC). While terrorism, subversion, and insurgency are as ancient as conflict itself, the growing intensity with which we are pursued by our adversaries in the post-World War II era requires a commensurate increase in the attention we
devote to them. Indeed, these forms of ambiguous aggression have become so widespread that they have become the "warfare of choice" over the last 40 years. They represent a long-term challenge to our security, a permanent aspect of the "long twilight struggle" between democracy and its enemies.

[On Deterrence and Terrorism:]

...the very success of our efforts in deterring nuclear and major conventional aggression has driven Soviet efforts, and those of other hostile states, toward more ambiguous forms of aggression.

[On the Third World:]

These efforts have been aided, and the challenge we face expanded, by the comparatively recent proliferation of Third World states that coincided with the decline of the great European empires following World War II. These new states, in many cases, have encountered economic, political, and social problems that make them ripe for internal upheaval or external exploitation and subversion.

[On the Indirect Approach:]

...low-intensity warfare, be it terrorism, insurgency, or subversion, represents a cost-effective means of aggression for advancing their [the Soviet Union and other hostile states] interests, while minimizing the prospect of a forceful response by the United States and our allies.

...the Soviet Union is eager to exploit this instability directly or through its proxies, to promote terrorism, subversion (as in Grenada, Ethiopia, Afghanistan in 1978, and South Yemen) and insurgency, thereby undermining U.S. security interests through this "indirect approach".

[On the Need to Integrate All Instruments or Power:]

Furthermore, we are working to integrate our military strategy, to an unprecedented degree, within an overall interagency and intergovernmental approach to address the problem in its political, economic, and social dimensions.

[On Protracted Conflict:]

This approach requires a long-term effort on our part. Insurgencies are typically protracted conflicts, and therefore our strategy must be designed for the long haul.

[On State Sponsorship and the Military Response:]

When terrorism becomes international in scope or is aided and abetted by state sponsors, however, the threat posed to U.S. citizens and security interests may require an American military response.

Unlike nuclear war or a major conventional war, we must concern ourselves not only with deterring ambiguous aggression, but with actively combatting it,
for it is going on all around us. To some extent, it is the product of our success in preventing wars at higher levels of intensity that has forced our adversaries to pursue these wars in the shadows. With their high mixture of political, economic and social elements blended into a military threat, these forms of ambiguous aggression demand the closest coordination between the United States and its allies, and within our government itself. A multidimensional threat demands a comprehensive response....

(On the Need for Long-Term Support:)

If the Congress provides us the resources and the unswerving support to execute this strategy over the long haul, the "long twilight struggle" will favor the cause of democracy and freedom. If we fail, these forms of aggression will remain the most likely and the most enduring threats to our security. (4:56-62)

Clearly, key national leaders are now coming to understand the strategic implications and nature of low-intensity warfare. It is absolutely essential that this understanding be spread throughout, at least, the officer corps of the United States military. The message must also be spread to Congressmen and to the American public. To begin to accomplish this, we recommend that a professionally authored White Paper on Terrorism be published by the White House to clearly communicate the reality of low-intensity warfare to the American people.

FOURTH: PROPOSE SOLUTIONS

The military services must play a key role in proposing the solutions to low-intensity warfare and terrorism. As a nation, what can we do? What ought we to do? We, as military leaders, must help identify and confront the tough decisions which must be made. These tough decision points cannot be debated only behind closed doors, for an uninformed public will not support difficult choices which it does not understand. Our history should make that fact clear to us all. What are some of those difficult decisions?

DECISION 1. We have established the fact that terrorism is active warfare against the United States. Should we carry that war to the terrorists and the states which sponsor them? The premise of this concept paper is that the United States and other western democracies have for too long merely reacted to terrorism. We believe, for reasons we have articulated, that it is time to formulate and employ sophisticated, integrated and more aggressive strategies. Livingstone and Arnold point out,
It is time, in short, to carry the war to the terrorists. The alternatives are poor. Although the necessity of good physical security is readily admitted, hiding behind a shield of security guards, thick walls, and hardened cars and waiting for the terrorist enemy to strike is bad policy doomed to failure. Similarly, withdrawing in the face of a terrorist challenge or capitulating to their demands is also rejected as an untenable and self-destructive policy.

Taking the war to the terrorists, however, is much easier said than done. (3:8)

The American Congress and the public must come to understand both the necessity for and the difficulty of an offensive strategy to combat terrorism.

DECISION 2. Given that terrorism and other forms of low-intensity warfare are "dirty," what tactics and techniques are permissible for democracies to use in fighting that warfare?

a. Propaganda. Disinformation. Deception and "Dirty Tricks." Should we employ these tactics which are so often used against us? In a largely psychological war should we not employ psychological tactics? What are the consequences if we do or do not employ them? If employed, do we target terrorist groups themselves or do we also target sponsoring nations? For example, should undercover agents sell defective equipment and weapons to terrorists, so that detonators and weapons explode in their faces—killing the killers rather than their intended victims? Should we sponsor indigenous forces which oppose governments that sponsor terrorist attacks against us? Americans and their leaders must make these tough choices.

We recommend that such tactics be employed to sow anxiety and confusion amid the terrorists' ranks, thereby reducing their capability to kill Americans and our friends. Key Executive Branch leaders and members of the Congress must monitor these actions to ensure they stay within acceptable bounds, but they also must take great pains to ensure the secrecy of specific activities so that our agents do not die.

b. Preemption. Should the United States, based on intelligence reports, strike with force to prevent anticipated hostile terrorist actions against us? This is a very difficult issue. Since a preemptive strike would be designed to protect American people from a terrorist attack, it first seems an appealingly simple choice. However, in the shadowy realm of terrorism, how can a nation prove to
the rest of the world that it is not the aggressor—striking under some other pretext? How good is the intelligence? Could it be wrong? Even if it is correct, can proof of terrorists' plans be released without jeopardizing sources? If we can't persuasively prove an action was taken to save lives—or if a mistake was made—what would be the public opinion consequences among the media, the Congress and among our allies? If intelligence suggested the terrorists were armed with chemical or biological weapons, or planned to strike a nuclear plant, how would that change the equation? The public must understand beforehand the difficulties involved in such a decision, so that support becomes more likely.

We believe preemptive strikes should be an integral part of our strategy, but these tough issues must be confronted and allowed for in the decision process. Preemption should be used only as a last resort, employing the minimum amount of force necessary, and be used only after all other options have failed—but we should be prepared to carry it out whenever deemed appropriate by the National Command Authority.

c. Reprisals. Should we adopt the policy of unilaterally punishing another state which has sponsored an illegal action against Americans? Basically, should we continue to conduct Libyan-like raids when we have hard evidence they have perpetrated terrorist acts? There are many historical precedents for such actions and, under certain circumstances, they are permissible under international law. If no peaceful means or compensation exist, should we retaliate? Critics argue that such actions are cruel; that collateral damage, injury, and deaths will probably occur; that such actions are themselves merely terrorism of a different kind which will only encourage more violence. Are such raids worth the risk? What would have happened to public opinion if Qaddafi's defenses had shot down half of our attacking force in the Libyan raid? These choices are complex and difficult.

We believe we should be prepared for and take retaliatory action when the circumstances warrant. Such action may well serve as a deterrent to future attacks, thereby saving American lives. Such reprisals should be based on solid evidence, be carried out within several days of the terrorist event, use the minimum amount of force necessary, and be as carefully targeted on the specific offending forces as possible. Indiscriminate retaliation against a people or a nation is not acceptable conduct, and we should never take such action. However, the American public must be prepared for some loss of life, both of military members and of some innocent people who are merely...
associated with members of terrorist groups.

d. Retribution. Whether or not to take retribution against terrorists and terrorist groups is one of the most difficult unresolved questions we have to face. Tactically, there is little question that it could be an effective measure. Terrorist groups that have lost their leaders have been immobilized for long periods of time. Strategically, such retribution is more questionable. Morally, and in terms of public opinion, many experts believe it is an improper course of action.

Favoring retribution, Dr. Glen St. J. Barclay or the University of Queensland argued, "the basic reality of terrorism is that it is in fact an act of war. Terrorism is politically motivated violence and that is what war is. It is also what crime...is not." He stated that terrorists should be "treated as the combatants engaged in acts of war" who would not be entitled to the safeguards of the Geneva Convention unless "they wore a distinctive and recognized uniform while...carrying out their terrorist activities, which of course they never do." He urged that security forces "take no prisoners," and that captured terrorists be placed under a suspended death sentence "to be carried out in the event of somebody's attempting to secure their release by further terrorist operations.... The whole purpose of such actions would be to render terrorism illogical by rendering it counterproductive." Dr. Barclay maintained "the appropriate weapons for retribution are likely to be the knife and the handgun rather than the aircraft carrier and the long-range bomber." (5:37) He further argued,

Governments that employed the kind of strategy suggested above could not be accused of abandoning their own moral credibility by employing the same methods as the terrorists. They would in fact be doing exactly the opposite. It is the essence of terrorism that it targets the innocent. The only logical methods to use against terrorism are those that target the guilty. And there is no comparison in moral terms between the guilty and the innocent. (5:37,43)

Neil Livingstone proposed that the United States seriously consider creating a unit like the Israeli "Wrath of God" which tracked down and assassinated the terrorists who killed the Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972. He stated "this force would carry the war to the terrorists, turning the hunters into the hunted by disrupting their lines of communication and supply, gathering intelligence, infiltrating their organizations, sabotaging their weapons and plans, exposing their
operations to friendly governments, and buttressing normal police investigative and assault tactics." (3:127) He argued that international terrorists are the least likely felons to be caught and punished, encouraging more and more terrorist acts. Such an American team could remedy that situation. He said,

"Keep running after a dog," goes the old saying, "and he will never bite you." By taking the war to the terrorists, it will be possible to keep them off balance, sow suspicion within their ranks, undermine their sources of support, and erode their confidence. They will be forced to stay constantly on the run and to expend scarce resources for their own security that might otherwise have gone to buying arms and underwriting new operations.

A policy designed to target the actual terrorists responsible for specific crimes is infinitely more humane than blasting heavily populated villages in reprisal air raids or shelling them with 16-inch guns from a battleship. By targeting clearly identified terrorists and relentlessly pursuing them, it will be possible to ensure that the guilty are punished and the innocent spared. (3:128)

Brian Jenkins, however, disagreed with any policy that even raises the possibility of assassination. He said,

...Assassination in my view is a dumb idea.... For government officials to even discuss assassination risks impropriety.... There is right and wrong, and there is good and evil....and we are the good guys....

Against assassination are moral and legal constraints, operational difficulties and practical considerations. Assassination is morally wrong.... Assassination is illegal. In the mid-1970s, President Ford issued an Executive Order: "No person employed or acting on behalf of the United States government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination...."

In combatting terrorism, we ought not to employ actions indistinguishable from the terrorists themselves.... Assassinations or terrorists could justify further actions against us.... Our opponents would have the advantage.... Our leaders are particularly vulnerable. They are open, exposed, public.... The replacement for the person we kill may be even worse.... In the long run, it doesn't work.

Sometimes blood must be spilled for one's country. Military force may be a necessary response to terrorism, at times requiring aggressive covert operations and possible casualties—commando assaults on terrorist training camps, for example.
The death of a terrorist leader during an attack causes no qualms. There is still a crucial difference between a covert military operation and assassination—the cold-blooded selection and murder of a specific individual.

Being at war, openly engaged in military hostilities, would make a difference. Short of war, however, assassination has no place in America's arsenal. (6:7)

As is obvious, retribution—an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth—against terrorists remains a controversial and unresolved issue which must be discussed fully before such action could be considered for inclusion in the American counterterrorism strategy.

There are a variety of other issues, discussion of which is beyond the scope of this paper. These include offering of bounties for known terrorists—dead or alive, ensuring the proper balance between internal security needs and civil liberties/privacy of our own people, and determining how far the United States should go to help other parties in their fight against terrorism and subversion. Even now continued aid to the Contras in Nicaragua is in jeopardy. Our efforts in Honduras and El Salvador are challenged. We abandoned the people of South Vietnam, and for awhile, the friendly forces in Angola. We were slow to begin helping the Afghani mujahedin. Many other issues remain.

DECISION 3. Perhaps the toughest question of all, far beyond the scope of the military to resolve, concerns the role of the media in the problem of terrorism. This is a very difficult problem in the American democracy. A comprehensive discussion is beyond the scope of this work, but a brief review of the issue is important.

The media, particularly television, are the amplifiers which permit terrorist groups to broadcast their messages of fear to the international audience. Even responsible voices have attacked the media for being "a terrorist's best friend." (7:104) Other critics accuse the media of serving as propaganda agents and de facto assistants to terrorists. The National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals has stated, "In many ways, the terrorist is the very creation of the media." (8:9) Livingstone says,

Terrorism must have publicity to succeed.... Thus, to be able to intimidate vast numbers of people with violent acts of limited duration and consequence requires first that the act become a media event—only then will it take on political significance and
gravity. Once it is a media event it can be pressed
onto the consciousness of the public and used to
dramatize the grievances of the terrorist group and to
win public support. (9:60)

There is little doubt that the nature of television
coverage of terrorism stimulates other groups and
individuals to commit similar acts using copied tactics—the
so-called contagion factor. Film makers and some reporters
romanticize colorful terrorists and revolutionaries e.g.,
Che Guevara, Fidel Castro (in his earlier years), Carlos the
Jackal, Bernadette Devlin and others. European television
has done much to romanticize Moumar Qadaffi.

All too often the media are specifically manipulated by
a terrorist group, and under the pressure of getting the
story, the reporter and the network or newspaper tacitly
cooperate. The search for the emotional and unusual often
drives television reporters to highlight insignificant
groups with radical messages, giving them public exposure
and magnifying their apparent importance far beyond the
reality of their actual power and influence. In fact, some
terrorists appear to be at least partially motivated by
their hunger for public attention. Often, news reports hype
minor incidents to a level that implies a crisis is
occurring.

Sometimes reporters, in their urge to provide on-scene
coverage of major stories, become active participants in
those stories rather than mere observers—often to the
detriment of the law enforcement officials involved in
coping with the situation. Particularly grieves violations of
this sort occurred during the Hanafi Muslim siege in
Washington, D.C. a number of years ago. Journalists are
also criticized for the distasteful way they intrude into
the private grief of families at funerals, into reunions of
former hostages with their families, and into other personal
situations—seeking visually powerful and emotional footage.

Behavior of this sort does not result just from bad
taste and lack of professionalism among journalists and
their superiors. The nature of the media themselves and
their role in our society contribute to much of the problem.
If one does not sell papers or earn good ratings on
television, one’s job will be lost. Documentary-like
assessments of the nature and impact of terrorism will never
capture the attention of the audience as powerfully as
sensationalized violence. Terrorism is one of the most
extreme forms of violence—often coupled with high drama and
tragic endings. It takes great self-control to practice
restrained, responsible reporting under these circumstances,
particularly when competitors are not doing so and are

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Periodically, angry observers of the role of media in amplifying terrorism call for limited censorship, particularly in times of crisis. Arguments hinge on the belief that proper exercise of freedom demands responsible behavior. Such demands could become overwhelming if weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, radiological) were involved. However, we must remember that terrorism is designed to disrupt our society and curtail our freedoms, creating injustice, over-reaction and unrest. Censorship of the press by the government would put at risk one of our most cherished values and means of societal and governmental self-correction. The Watergate affair documents this fact vividly. (9:57-66)

The authors are still sanguine enough to believe that, with proper understanding of the threat, media leaders can regulate themselves. The idea of self-regulation is angrily rejected by many media leaders. They believe that their freedom to report the news is an absolute right which must prevail over all other rights. They do not believe it is their role to prevent violence or disruption. They are there to report information to the public no matter what the consequences. In our view, such an attitude is mistaken. First of all, it does not recognize that the media do not serve as merely a conduit for reality, they shape stories and infuse their views by the nature of the decisions they make of what to tell, how to tell it and what context to place it in. Secondly, the "conduit" view subjects the media to manipulation by terrorists and puts them at risk of being censored by those who would control the news--particularly in a mass destruction scenario or one involving public hysteria during intensified terrorist attacks.

A number of media authorities share this view. For example, W.B. Jaehnig, an American professor of journalism said,

The problem lies in journalism's moral neutrality posture, which prohibits the development of an ethic oriented toward the maintenance of the community, its standards, values and culture. Traditions that prescribe an inflexible "watchdog" role for the press, or emphasize the publication of terrorist rhetoric when the community itself feels intimidated, appear self-defeating. Clearly, judgements must be made by journalists that differentiate between the wars of ideas fought within the legitimated institutions of the community, and struggles fought outside these institutions which rely on violence rather than
Agreeing, Neil Livingstone said,

"...What is needed...is a commitment to better and more responsible management of news relating to terrorism, including the adoption by the news media of a strict professional code, governing the treatment of violence and terrorism by both print and electronic journalists, including stiff sanctions for abuses.

News reporting should not be regarded as a footrace to ascertain who is the swiftest; such an approach serves both the public and the journalistic profession poorly. Rather, emphasis must be placed on the content and manner in which the news is delivered. While we live in a world of instantaneous communication, this does not necessarily mean that we must capitulate to the technology, at the risk of losing control of the medium, and report the news straight from the source as it happens, in its rawest, unedited form. Such an approach confuses news with theater.

...the mass media should seek to provide more, not less, information to the public regarding the tragic and sobering facts of terrorism.... Only in the full light of balanced inquiry and reporting can terrorists be seen for what they really are.

Modern terrorism promises to be the ultimate test as to whether the mass media can function effectively, conscientiously, and in the public interest without resort to limitations on its freedom being imposed. The failure of the media to take adequate steps to police themselves surely will result in increasing support for government intervention to regulate the industry. (9:76)

The leadership elite of our nation—in the Executive Branch, the Congress, the universities, the board rooms and similar power centers—must join together and begin to resolve these difficult issues, and many more which we have not even addressed. However, incomplete debate must not be used as an excuse to avoid tough decisions now. We must get on with implementing a more effective approach.

FIFTH: DECIDE AND IMPLEMENT

National leaders, including military leaders, must implement a comprehensive and coherent strategy designed to cope with the type of low-intensity warfare that political terrorism represents. This strategy must bring to bear the full range of national instruments of power in a flexible but integrated manner. Tough decisions must be made and we must act.
In the next chapter, we will offer a few observations and ideas for national consideration. They are by no means comprehensive or complete. To make them so would far exceed our present resources and available time. In Chapters VIII and IX we will provide more specific suggestions for the Department of Defense and the Air Force.
CHAPTER VII
TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE U.S. STRATEGY

LACK OF COHERENCE

Virtually every federal department and agency, and many state and local agencies, operate some sort of program designed to cope with terrorism. Many perform outstanding work. However, like the three blind men touching the elephant—one describing it as a wall, one a column and one a thick rope—the various agencies have been unable to agree upon what terrorism really is. Not surprisingly, they have also been unable to agree on how to most effectively combat the problem.

This lack of coherence and agreement is understandable, given the complex and shadowy nature of the problem. Even such thoughtful and informed students of terrorism as Arnold and Livingstone appear to have given up on formulating a comprehensive strategy. In the process of listing thirteen current U.S. "strategies" presently being employed, they said,

"Terrorism is a dynamic phenomenon, and its sprawling, multinational character and the involvement of states complicate the task of the policymaker who looks for neat, all-encompassing solutions. ... The task of designing and implementing national policies to deal with terrorism is overwhelming in its scope and permutations and argues less for a general all-embracing strategy to address the problem than a multitude of less-ambitious component strategies.... It is fair to suggest that there is an improvised, even jerry-built, quality to the strategies that have evolved to date.... Moreover, despite the best efforts and intentions of policymakers in the United States and abroad, it is perhaps inevitable that the situation will persist for the indefinite future. (1:229)"

We strenuously disagree. Arnold and Livingstone, along with many others, have confused strategy with tactics. Since they do not normally think in military terms, such confusion is understandable. Military thinkers have no such excuse.

We believe our nation and our government desperately need a unifying vision of the nature of terrorism and a unifying grand strategy for combating it. Without such a strategy, the multitude of programs and responses will remain uncoordinated and fragmented.
The grand strategy of the United States must systematically employ every element of national power to achieve national objectives. Under this unifying concept, the tactics employed can and should be diverse; they can and should involve nearly every federal agency. But each agency's effort must be targeted to achieve specific national objectives, and the effectiveness of those efforts should be measured by how well they contribute toward accomplishing those specific objectives.

The 1985-1986 Vice President's Task Force on Combating Terrorism (2) made an excellent start in pulling American efforts together. Many sound recommendations were made and key organizational changes were initiated. However, being the product of representatives from fourteen governmental agencies, a lack of consensus remained evident. The Task Force still could not describe the elephant. For example, the agencies could not agree on such a basic issue as whether terrorism is warfare or crime. The report said,

Some experts see terrorism as the lower end of the warfare spectrum, a form of low-intensity, unconventional aggression. Others, however, believe that referring to it as war rather than criminal activity lends dignity to terrorists and places their acts in the context of accepted international behavior.

While neither the United States nor the United Nations has adopted official definitions of terrorism, Americans readily recognize the bombing of an embassy, political hostage-taking and most hijacking as terrorist acts. (2:1)

The Task Force could not identify the amount of resources being devoted to fighting terrorism. The report said,

...a precise identification of U.S. Government resources devoted to terrorism alone is difficult. At present more than 150 specific activities to combat terrorism are carried out by various federal departments and agencies.... While it is extremely difficult to break out specific activities from those agencies that perform multiple functions, about $2 billion was spent in 1985 to combat terrorism both at home and abroad. The total number of people...in 1985 was approximately 18,000. (2:10)

The Task Force spoke of difficulties in providing domestic protection to diplomats and foreign visitors. It
said "...occasional coordination problems occur among

*The mistaken notion that describing terrorism as war causes one to treat terrorists as combatants instead of criminals is often cited. It is based on lack of knowledge of the law of armed conflict. Briefly, the nature of terrorists' acts and the manner in which they carry out these acts place them clearly outside the category of a privileged combatant. Therefore, they are almost always more properly treated as criminals.
agencies of the federal and local governments....Decisions to resolve the problems of overlapping jurisdiction are complicated and require comprehensive study."(2:11)

The Task Force also sponsored "a special group interview project...to document the attitudes of the American public." The results indicated "with regard to the policy on terrorism, most responded that there was no cohesive policy, but said there should be one."(2:17)

**PROMISING CHANGES**

Despite some important lack of consensus reflected in the report, it--along with some legislative changes which have since taken place--offers the potential for an organizational structure that may be able to make hard decisions and act to pull together the U.S. effort against terrorism. First of all, the report called for the establishment of a full-time National Security Council position with support staff to coordinate the national program. We believe that full-time expertise and leadership at the White House level are essential. Coupled with legislation establishing a new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and a new unified Special Operations Command to be headed by a four-star general, this organizational structure offers promise for beginning to integrate American efforts--if we do it correctly. There is some risk that the offensive elements of counterterrorism will become but one more tactic in a still uncoordinated strategy, but that need not be the result.

We urge that the leaders of this new organizational structure, working with other lead agencies of the federal government, make development of a national grand strategy for combating terrorism a priority order of business. An unclassified version of that strategy should be published as part of the White Paper on Terrorism we have recommended in an earlier chapter.

Outlining a grand strategy for combating terrorism far exceeds the bounds of this paper, but we will suggest some considerations which should be taken into account.

First of all, our national program should be built around a specific goal like: TAKE ACTION TO REDUCE THE IMPACT OF LOW-INTENSITY WARFARE, INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL TERRORISM, ON OUR NATION, OUR PEOPLE, OUR ALLIES AND OUR FRIENDS. In developing national objectives, a grand strategy, and supporting policies, all elements of power must be considered.
We will examine a number of potential policy response options to the problem of terrorism as it affects U.S. interests and citizens. For the purpose of clarity, this section will review those response options which employ elements of power falling into the economic, political/diplomatic, legal/legislative, intelligence, scientific/technological, and military categories. It is sometimes difficult to neatly divide the various policy options into categories as there is often much interplay among them to obtain the desired effect. For this reason, liberties have been taken to arbitrarily divide options into categories to make this analysis more readable. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the importance of international cooperation.

**ECONOMIC SANCTIONS**

There are a variety of economic sanctions which can be employed to combat international terrorism. Whether or not economic sanctions should be employed depends upon such factors as their likely effectiveness and the economic, political and diplomatic consequences for the U.S. (3:1) Economic sanctions may have the effect of pressuring a target country into action or inaction and may also provide support to neighboring U.S. allies who normally are forced to cope with countries which support or foster terrorism. There is no question that economic sanctions may have severe negative impacts upon U.S. manufacturers and upon the U.S. global trade position, but sanctions "demonstrate our resolve and show that we are prepared to accept economic losses, if necessary, in our battle against terrorism." (3:1)

Statutory authority exists giving the President the power to take several actions against countries which actively promote terrorism or give sanctuary to terrorists themselves or those who support international terrorism. "These include terminating assistance and arms sales, imposing import and export controls, suspending Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) credits, and, upon declaration of a national emergency, prohibiting financial transactions." (3:3) Currently, Libya, Syria, Iran, Cuba and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) are identified as countries who have consistently provided support to international terrorism. (3:3)

The effect U.S. economic sanctions have on the target country depends on such factors as "the availability of similar products from other countries, and alternative markets for the target country's products." (3:1) This policy option is greatly enhanced with international cooperation and, likewise, greatly reduced when cooperation is lacking. If the U.S. is the main source of a type of
export, the effect is, or course, also enhanced. "Export controls tend to have the greatest economic impact over the short term, as current sources or supply are interrupted and the target economy struggles to adjust." (3:1)

One of the potentially adverse effects on the U.S. is the direct costs borne by lost trade which, although having minimal impact on the U.S. economy at large due to its size, can affect unevenly certain segments of our industrial society depending upon the type or commodity. Indirect costs usually are in the form of a drop in trade with the U.S. by other nations for fear U.S. firms will not be reliable suppliers. Future designs of equipment may, in fact, delete U.S.-provided components to ensure no restrictions are placed on production and distribution of the final product. (3:2)

Economic sanctions carry with them a strong political or diplomatic statement that the U.S. is willing to support its words with deeds. However, the negative side is that our allies may not perceive the same benefits as we in the imposition of sanctions, thereby creating strained relations in the international arena. "Many allies have substantial commercial interests as well as citizens who might be placed in jeopardy by imposing sanctions." (3:3)

One U.S. effort to discourage terrorism through economic sanctions was a Senate bill which would deny "to Syria, Iran and Libya special trade privileges reserved for nations friendly to the United States." (4:3) The bill would double tariffs these nations pay on exports to the U.S. by revoking their Most Favored Nation Status. (4:3) This type of economic action and those above have, as do all policy options, their limitations. Economic sanctions cannot very well be applied directly against terrorist groups but must be applied against nation states which support or sanction terrorists. The United States should, however, have specific criteria for deciding whether or not to employ economic elements of power and a clear plan for integrating them with other appropriate actions.

It is clear economic sanctions are most effective when applied in concert with other nations to enhance the intended punishment. "Economic sanctions and other forms of countervailing pressure impose costs and risks on the nations that apply them, but some sacrifices will be necessary if we are not to suffer even greater costs down the road." (5:6)

POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC OPTIONS

The range of policy response options within this area
are indeed numerous; so a representative sampling will be presented including both defensive and offensive measures the U.S. Departments of State and Transportation have at their disposal.

Diplomatic or political sanctions taken based upon firm evidence that certain states are sponsors, supporters, or safe havens for terrorists are almost certain to gain immediate international acceptance and support as opposed to the implementation of a military force option. These actions focus immediate international attention on the misdeeds of the target state and pose the least direct danger to lives and property. (2:14) "These could range from international condemnation to cutting off diplomatic relations (as the U.S. and Britain did with Libya). Political pressures signal to the terrorist state that the victim is not only unwilling to yield but is prepared to expose the offender to public censure." (6:52)

Actions such as forcing states to reduce their diplomatic presence or actually closing their embassies have the effects of encouraging other nations to take actions regarding the target state and forcing the target state itself to cease using its diplomats, embassy, and diplomatic pouch for terrorist purposes. The embassies and diplomatic pouches of several Middle Eastern states have been used to supply weapons, passports, and money to terrorists, all the while safe behind their grant of diplomatic immunity. "Without embassies, the effectiveness of terrorism in the West would be sharply diminished." (6:52) Actions of this nature should not be taken hastily, but violators of the Vienna Convention, which established the spirit and intent for the use of diplomatic establishments and privileges, should be exposed by any nation having evidence of another using its diplomats to support terrorism. Further exposure in the U.N. General Assembly through resolution would provide additional notice to the world audience of a state's complicity in supporting terrorists. (2:24) "Surely we can preserve the good purposes of the doctrine of sovereign and diplomatic immunity without cloaking terrorists in those privileges." (7:12)

With the urging of our Department of State, other nations may agree to treaties which further define unacceptable behavior for diplomats and prohibit the presence in the West of diplomats from states sponsoring terrorism. "Diplomatic title must not confer a license to murder." (7:12) Recently, a terrorist tried in West Berlin, Germany, was shown to have been supported by the Syrian government in a bombing he carried out in West Berlin. In addition to expelling several diplomats and severing low interest loans to Syria, the West German government did not
plan to replace its Ambassador to Syria. "The West German government also stopped honoring a type of Syrian passport that it suspects has been used by terrorists. The moves amounted to a formal downgrading of diplomatic ties between the two countries." (8:55)

In a similar multinational action taken against Syria for its support of terrorism by all members of the European Common Market except Greece, all arms sales were banned, all high-level visits were suspended, and increased surveillance of Syrian diplomatic missions and the operations of the Syrian airlines were instituted. The effort was designed to make it "clear that Syrian support for international terrorism is unacceptable." (9:1A)

When airport security is lax, conditions often exist which lend to aircraft hijackings and other airport disasters as perpetrated by terrorists. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) of the Department of Transportation routinely sends teams of security experts to study security at airports worldwide. Should deficiencies to standards set by the International Civil Aviation Organization exist, the host nation is asked to remedy the situation and, if insufficient action is taken, a travel advisory is issued warning travelers of unsafe conditions. In June 1985, "President Ronald Reagan advised U.S. citizens against flying to Athens, Greece." (10:26) In a matter of days, Greek authorities agreed to conditions satisfactory to the U.S. Such travel advisories have a severe impact on a country such as Greece that counts heavily on tourism for income. In 1986, "Manila International Airport in the Philippines became the first foreign airport declared security deficient under a new U.S. law" (the 1985 International Security and Development Cooperation Act). (11:8) In addition to passengers being notified in writing of this type of situation, the news media are asked to publicize the deficiencies to put additional pressure on host nation governments to correct the deficiencies. (11:8)

Another factor which may very well necessitate some type of security advisory is the fact that the Palestine Liberation Organization has recently "purchased control of the duty free shop at Tanzania's Dar es Salaam International Airport and was negotiating for similar shops in Zimbabwe and Mozambique." (12:17) The fact this may serve as a means to transfer weapons of PLO terrorists aboard transiting aircraft cannot be overlooked.

From a defensive standpoint, the availability of new and more sophisticated equipment to detect weapons and explosives should be sought out by the FAA especially for higher risk airports in the U.S. "Three-dimensional
scanners and detectors that can spot plastic explosives and pick out suspicious bottles as well as weapons" should be sought out and installed. (10:26) Another example of improving an airport's defensive security posture is to tighten security in transit lounges. "At present, even many security-conscious airports don't insist on searching passengers in transit." (10:26) In short, improving airport security will continue to require significant attention by the U.S. and any other country determined to defend against this avenue of terrorism.

Although the defensive or antiterrorism programs sponsored by the U.S. Department of State such as increased security enhancement in the construction or facilities abroad, residential security and security awareness training of personnel are all very important, the Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATAP) probably holds the greatest possibility for affecting host nations and improving their ability to protect Americans abroad. (13:4) The ATAP’s objectives "are to enhance cooperation with and improve the organization of foreign governments in the antiterrorism field." (14:6) The improved cooperation with the U.S. by those governments who have participated in the program and the better understanding of our problems gained in this cooperative effort should be most valuable. This is especially true when one realizes the responsibility for the security of Americans abroad and preventing or responding to terrorist incidents involving Americans rests with that host government and its antiterrorism or counterterrorism agencies.

The ATAP has three phases which begin with briefings in the U.S. to officials of interested governments. A U.S. team then visits the foreign nation and areas of cooperation are agreed upon. Lastly, specific training and information are shared with the foreign government. U.S. Embassy officials remain involved through each phase, which improves ties with host government officials. (15:30)

Thus far the ATAP has successfully stimulated general interest and support for specific U.S. policies. "It has helped us strengthen our policy dialogue with such states as Turkey, Greece, Egypt, the Gulf states, Israel, and Colombia. To date 32 countries have participated in some aspect of the ATA Program, with a total of over 1,800 participants.” (16:8) One caution must be noted. On occasion the participants from other nations have been left somewhat on their own in traveling to and through the United States. Some have not been favorably impressed. Many are on terrorists "hit lists" and are accustomed to being provided good security at home. In its absence, they are uncomfortable. Many speak limited English, and their
attempts to find taxis, rooms, transportation and food in New York, Washington and other large American cities can only be described as frustrating. Good hosting of these senior law enforcement officials must be provided in all cases or we risk creating negative rather than positive results.

LEGAL OR LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS

Despite the fact that at times the legal or legislative option for dealing with the problems posed by international terrorism proves to be most useful, such as the exercising of extradition treaties to return terrorists to a country to face a legitimate criminal justice system, this option faces considerable problems due to the lack of international legal consensus in defining terrorism. Additionally,

"by accusing the victims of illegality, skilled terrorists benefit from a double standard of legal expectations. The terrorists themselves justify their most heinous crimes on the basis of their own law, which is sometimes Marxist, sometimes Islamic, but always tolerant of terrorist violence. The victims, and especially the West, are held to the strictest and narrowest interpretation of individual law prohibiting the use of violence." (17:65)

Despite these difficulties, the U.S. should and must continue to strive for international consensus in the exercise of legal policy options as well as making use of unilateral legal options wherever and whenever possible to deter future acts of terrorist violence.

After the hijackers of the cruise ship Achille Lauro were captured, "the United States immediately pursued extradition of the hijackers for violating a provision of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, which is the implementing legislation for the U.N. Convention Against the Taking of Hostages." (17:78) Although this law may be very useful, it fails to address other types of violence beyond the taking of American hostages. "A more general law is needed." (17:77) But more importantly, a workable definition of terrorism and what constitutes terrorist acts must be agreed upon internationally.

"Some states remain reluctant to criminalize what they regard as a useful--and therefore legitimate--weapon in the struggle against colonialism. Others may anticipate the need to use it some day themselves, or at any rate to defend its use by their allies and clients. Still others understandably feel no urgency to do much about it, so long as it represents a problem
for rivals but not for themselves." (18:24)

Although there are many states who do not find it in their best interests, the U.S. must strive for international acceptance of a workable definition so that terrorism may truly be made an international as well as a federal crime.

Further, bilateral and international treaties which "bar terrorist training, logistical or financial support for terrorism, and prohibit safehaven for terrorists" (17:78) should be sought as further support for those nations who are serious in their efforts to deal with the terrorist problem. Those nations who refuse to become partners in these treaty efforts could very well be subjected to sanctions of various types for noncompliance.

The U.S. should continue to pursue the legal avenue of extradition treaties for dealing with terrorists. However, the definition of terrorism for these treaties is most critical in that it must be "depoliticized." "Successful extradition is obviously essential in dealing with terrorism, but the legal systems of most states (and the constitutions of some) provide for asylum to be granted to those claiming that the offense they committed abroad, however criminal, was politically motivated." (18:24) The U.S. and Italian authorities have now agreed upon extradition procedures that will treat terrorists in the same way as drug dealers, thereby "criminalizing" acts of terrorists and avoiding any loophole of political motivation. (19:10)

Yet another legal option which could be selectively exercised is the use of a declaration of war against states sponsoring terrorists and their acts of violence directed against U.S. citizens and interests. "This is the real usefulness of a declaration of war--it is an expression of reality. Terrorist acts against the United States are acts of war." (17:79) Such use of this option would clearly inform the international community of the view that states sponsoring terrorism are considered aggressors and will be dealt with accordingly. "Finally, in the case of Libya and Iran, which already consider themselves at war with the United States, it gives the United States political parity with the belligerents and provides the legal predicate for U.S. retaliation." (17:80)

If a declaration of war is determined politically to be too severe an action, there may be a middle course. That is, the declaration of a state of armed conflict. The legal implications of this approach are presently being examined by Richard J. Erickson, Lt Col, USAF at the Air University Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education.
Declaration of a state of armed conflict, while not as severe as declaring full scale war against a sponsoring nation, would place all parties on notice that terrorist activities have escalated beyond the realm of the peacetime environment. Henceforth, actions by the United States with regard to a state sponsoring terrorists would no longer be based on international peacetime criminal statutes but would be based upon the laws of armed conflict.

Under these laws, extradition agreements are no longer necessary. If it is clear that the sponsoring nation is failing in its duty to prevent hostile attacks from being launched from within its borders against the interests and people of the United States, the use of armed force would be authorized. American military forces could take action to apprehend and return offenders to the United States for prosecution. Host nation agreement would not be needed. Other military actions could also be taken in compliance with the laws of armed conflict.

A particularly attractive aspect of this approach is that the terrorists would still be treated as criminals in a court of law. They would not achieve prisoner of war status. This point is frequently misunderstood, as it was by some members of the Vice President's Task Force. Briefly, to be treated as a privileged combatant rather than as a criminal, a person must carry out his operations in compliance with the laws of armed conflict. The laws of armed conflict prohibit kidnapping, hostage taking, wanton actions against innocents and other terrorist tactics. Those who violate these prohibitions are liable for prosecution as criminals. Additionally, terrorists do not openly bear arms, in uniform, in clear support of a nation. In brief, military force can be legitimately used against terrorist forces and sponsoring states, but the terrorists themselves can be treated as criminals by the law.

Yet another legal avenue of approach makes use of a nation's investigative resources targeted on terrorist support structures. Once again, international cooperation and the sharing of information are the key ingredients but, for example, public exposure to international scrutiny and sanction of those nations whose banks and arms support terrorists may create some difficulty for both terrorists and their support structures. "The PLO's intelligent financial policy has left them with a wide-ranging portfolio that covers everything from banks to property, chicken farms, fine huge estates in Africa, apartment blocks, factories and other semi-legitimate or conventional businesses." (21:31) Investigative resources properly applied may be successful in uncovering and damaging
networks that finance terrorist activities worldwide. Italian authorities have had some success in learning how Libyan "diplomats" formerly assigned to Libyan Peoples’ Bureaus in Rome used their bank accounts to finance the purchase of weapons and otherwise support terrorist operations. (22:1)

Lastly, other legislation which would facilitate the work of U.S. federal agencies in their respective roles to combat terrorism should be examined. For example, legislation providing additional financial incentives for information relating to terrorists and legislation which would ensure terrorists and their supporters could not use such avenues as the Freedom of Information Act to identify FBI informers should be explored as useful domestic tools in advancing the fight against terrorism. (2:26)

INTELLIGENCE OPTIONS

This particular policy option serves two main purposes. First, within certain agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the capability exists to conduct offensive covert operations and collection activities which target terrorist organizations. These covert operations satisfy a variety of objectives. Secondly, a variety of agencies within the U.S. government collect, analyze, and disseminate information to other agencies or consumers who are able to make decisions and take actions based upon the data provided. So then, intelligence as a policy option has one purpose of gathering information by technical and other means, bearing on terrorist organizations, training facilities, arms transfers, terrorist personalities and the like. Its second purpose is broader but starts with the first. This second function of advising other agencies, military services, and the like—both foreign and domestic—of the imminence of a terrorist attack by sponsors of an attack, and more serves as a warning causes other offensive policy options to become defensive measures to be taken.

"Success in combating terrorism involves the availability of timely and accurate information. An approach to assuring this is to enhance technical intelligence on terrorist groups and sponsorship states."

Although an intelligence action in the midst of the crisis...
massive cuts in personnel, significantly weakening our intelligence capabilities abroad. In fact, it is possible the most significant problem the U.S. currently faces in responding to terrorism today is the lack of an effective intelligence gathering capability. (23:17) "If the United States hopes to win the insidious war waged by state-sponsored terrorism, or at least reduce the number of U.S. casualties in that war, it needs to continue to rebuild and revitalize its intelligence capability. While satellites and other technological gadgetry are necessary to collect intelligence to fight conventional and nuclear wars, accurate and timely human intelligence is necessary to wage the war against terrorism." (24:13)

One of the ways the Congress can assist intelligence and counterintelligence agencies (other than the CIA) is to take action to exempt them from disclosure requirements as mentioned in the previous section dealing with legal or legislative options. This should assure foreign agencies and sources so vital to the U.S. intelligence effort that their identities will be protected when providing information regarding terrorism. (24:14) Congress should also make sufficient funds available for the various intelligence agencies to recruit and train personnel necessary to carry on this battle against international terrorism.

One of the goals of an intelligence agency in fighting terrorism is to penetrate groups and networks to determine their plans, identify their members and leaders, and "mount operations to sow seeds of suspicion among the cadres and among the leaders" as well as to "identify new technical capabilities." (25:2) This penetration is an ideal offensive act not always achieved, especially considering the nature of many of the existing terrorist groups in the Middle East today. "Now, terrorist groups are very tough nuts for intelligence to crack. They are small, not easily penetrated, and their operations are closely held and compartmented. Only a few people in the organization are privy to specific operations, they move quickly, and place a very high premium on secrecy and surprise." (15:37)

One of the ways intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies involved in fighting the problem of terrorism can improve their success rate is to cooperate better with each other and share more information on terrorism. As mentioned earlier, such efforts as the U.S. State Department-led ATAP initiative have had very beneficial effects in the area of international cooperation. "No one nation is going to be able to do it alone. It has to be done in a broadly collaborative way, with close day-to-day cooperation between the intelligence, security,
and police services of nations around the world." (15:37)

A good example of an improved sharing of information concerns the 12 governments of the European Community. They have "agreed to pool their intelligence about terrorists so their police forces can 'search out the vital links in terrorist operations and disrupt them.'" (26:1) Furthermore, these governments have also agreed to "create a new and speedy communications system to 'target the major leaders and organizers' of terrorism." (26:1)

The secondary purpose or advisory role fulfilled by the intelligence community provides the needed input for the proper execution of other policy options and defensive actions. "Offensive measures are required to fight terrorism and intelligence is required for the planning and execution of offensive measures." (24:14) However, intelligence information, regardless of its importance, has no value if it cannot be rapidly provided to key decision makers who initiate offensive measures. "All terrorism-related intelligence collection and analysis must be directed toward production and dissemination of clear, concise and accurate threat warnings and assessments to decision makers in time for them to take necessary action." (2:14)

SCIENTIFIC/TECHNICAL ELEMENTS

A comprehensive discussion of potential scientific and technical elements which could be applied in the right against terrorism would constitute a study in itself. We merely wish to emphasize that the scientific/technical capability and power of the United States far exceed anything available to terrorists or to their sponsoring states. The United States should take advantage of this competitive edge and significantly expand its efforts in this area. Lacking a grand strategy, the U.S. is now working far below capacity. We will provide a few cases in point.

EXPLOSIVES. The United States presently has the capability to mark all explosives manufactured in the U.S. with microtaggants--chips of multilayered melamine plastic resin laminates--which enable law enforcement agencies to trace exactly what person purchased the explosives used in any bomb attack. By 1980, about one percent of all U.S.-made explosives were so marked, increasing manufacturing unit costs about one percent but significantly enhancing investigatory results. In 1973, two bills were introduced in Congress to make such tagging mandatory. Strong lobbying efforts by explosives manufacturers, attempting to hold down costs of their products, resulted in
defeat of the bills and in Congressional direction to even stop further testing. We believe this decision needs to be reviewed in light of the concept of terrorism we have described.

It seems plausible that if all U.S.-made explosives were traceable, many of the explosives favored by terrorist groups would become more risky to use. Such action could drive terrorists to use less effective and harder-to-handle explosives. Pursuit of agreements with other nations to require such tagging would further increase the risk to terrorists of being identified. At the least, investigators could determine which nations were not involved in selling the explosives--making tracing of responsibility considerably simpler.

AIRPORT SECURITY. Presently, U.S. airport security relies on old technology X-ray machines and low paid, often bored, security guards. Stowed baggage is not even checked. Modern technologies (e.g., dielectric analysis devices, nitrogen detection systems, thermal neutron activation devices and more) are on the shelf which could greatly enhance the effectiveness of our screening programs without appreciably slowing passenger processing. Additionally, the U.S. has not yet developed a means to detect the new dense plastic weapons that are soon to be produced. Since most of these high technology weapons will be made in our country, our Congress or an appropriate regulatory agency ought to mandate that passive detection devices be molded unalterably into the plastic. The U.S. should encourage our allies to mandate similar action. (27:37,81)

COMPUTER-ASSISTED INVESTIGATION. As far as we have been able to determine, the United States is not taking full advantage of the capability which sophisticated computer technology can lend to tracking and capturing terrorists. The Federal Criminal Investigation Department (BKA) in Weisbaden, West Germany, has broken new ground in this area with its computer named "Komissar." Basically, this system stores every available scrap of information on terrorists--in exhaustive detail. Analytic teams specializing in individual groups or even individual terrorists use sophisticated programs to identify behavior patterns, modus operandi, contacts, favorite foods and restaurants, vacation preferences, and other meaningful data. The system has been instrumental in many arrests or top terrorists in Germany and elsewhere around the world. Combined with specialized apprehension teams and international cooperation, we could considerably increase the pressure on individual terrorists and their supporters. (28:103)
These few ideas barely scratch the surface of the creative initiatives which the United States could take to increase the risk to terrorists. The central point to be made is that we must exert pressure systematically on every available pressure point. We have to apply our strengths against the weaknesses of the terrorists and their sponsors. Again, we emphasize that a coherent strategy is needed to ensure that the vastly superior scientific and technological strength the United States possesses is employed effectively in the battle against terrorism. We can outthink and outperform our adversaries, if we will.

THE MILITARY ELEMENT

As we have argued, terrorism is a sophisticated form of warfare against the United States, our allies, and our friends. It attempts to weaken ties between the United States and our allies; to extend Soviet, Eastern bloc and surrogate influence in the Third World; and to increase regional instability by promoting wider conflict. These terrorist initiatives have global implications, potentially limiting American access to vital resources and areas of the world. The heart of terrorist action is violence. The need for a wide spectrum of tailored military responses, therefore, should be self-evident. In ensuing chapters of this report, we will address the military element or national power and its proper application to cope with international political terrorism.

NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Regardless of the policy options chosen to respond to an existing condition of terrorism, international cooperation is vital to success. "International cooperation offers the best hope for long-term success. Without a viable, comprehensive, cooperative effort, terrorism and its supporters will benefit from the uncoordinated actions of its victims." (2:12) One example of a formal mechanism for international cooperation in combatting terrorism is the Summit Seven. This organization has as members the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Italy and Japan. Joint declarations of unity emphasizing common concerns have been issued as follows: Bonn, 1978; Venice, 1980; Ottawa, 1981; and London, 1984. Member nations agreed in the 1978 declaration "to terminate civilian airline service to any country failing to prosecute or extradite a hijacker." (2:12)

The United Nations General Assembly also serves as a formal international body to discuss international cooperation in the fight against terrorism. Although resolutions are largely symbolic in nature, they nonetheless
may be important in demonstrating and developing agreement among various nations that acts of terrorism and state sponsorship of terrorism are not acceptable in the international arena. (2:12-13) The U.S. State Department is the lead agency sponsoring the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program which provides training, equipment, and other assistance to foreign governments (2:13). This is but another formal initiative to enhance international cooperation in the fight against terrorism.

Informal day-to-day cooperation on an international scale is also critical. No one police agency, foreign ministry, or intelligence service will be successful in this endeavor working alone. "It has to be done in a broadly collaborative way, with close day-to-day cooperation between the intelligence, security, and police services of nations around the world." (15:716)

At times international cooperation is frustrating and difficult, but that is by no means cause for abandoning the effort. Even though international agreements exist, nations may fail to observe them. "Washington and other capitals should swallow their skepticism and keep trying to make cooperation work." (10:28) One of the reasons international cooperation is difficult results from the fact that particular policy responses are viewed differently by different nations. It is imperative that all nations weigh the pro and con arguments before exercising a particular policy response option. In some instances this may mean the U.S., for example, will decide to take actions which are contrary to another nation's interests and bear the consequent strained relations. In other instances, a nation may, in fact, refrain from taking a policy course to preclude more serious repercussions. In short, responses to terrorism cannot be made in an international vacuum. (29:12)

One of the key differences in viewing terrorism as a problem has been the "European tendency to view terrorism as a 'political' problem ... while the United States tends to regard it as an 'apolitical' phenomenon which must be uncompromisingly confronted either in legal or military terms." (30:14) Once again, international cooperation has succeeded in resolving some of the problems in this regard. "On December 9, 1985, the General Assembly (U.N.) unanimously adopted a landmark resolution condemning all acts of terrorism as 'criminal,' thus ending a 13-year struggle." (23:16) This does not mean, however, there is total acceptance of this definition by all nations.

Another difficulty facing the workability of international cooperation is the fact that terrorism affects the world unequally. "Only five nations...are the targets
of more than half of all international terrorist attacks. Thus, not all see the problem with the same urgency."(31:27)

A key factor vital to the success of our program to deal with the problem of terrorism is the requirement to possess a wide range of policy options, guided by a coherent national strategy, for responding at any time. Furthermore, it is critical that the U.S. government possess the flexibility and the will to exercise any number of defensive and offensive measures at any time. Each and every terrorist incident will be different in any number of ways, to include which terrorist group is responsible, how it affects our interests, other nations involved, the fate of victims, and more. "In that kind of situation, the more flexibility one has in the long-term struggle against terrorism the better."(32:9) Further strengthening such flexibility is the knowledge on the part of those responsible for terrorist incidents that the U.S. possesses military forces capable of supporting the effectiveness of nonmilitary options when necessary.(7:11)

Successful implementation of policy options to deal with terrorism and the threat it poses requires international cooperation, a coherent national strategy, and a willingness to be flexible in the application of any combination of response options. "Only the steady, unwavering application of all forms of pressure against terrorists and their more easily found sponsors will have any lasting effect."(33:98)
CHAPTER VIII

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE/JOINT SERVICES ROLE

Among the ingredients currently lacking in the military sector with regard to low-intensity warfare in general and terrorism in particular are an integrated strategy and proper coordination among the services. This brief chapter outlines some of the problems we see and several suggested approaches to resolving them. Its fundamental purpose is to contribute to an understanding of the whole issue of terrorism and the military role.

COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES

Over the last two years, Secretary Weinberger has emphasized employing competitive strategies to achieve long-term security. He has repeatedly announced his "intention to make them a major DoD theme for the remainder of this administration."(1:65) In his FY1988 report to Congress he stated,

The central idea of competitive strategies is simple enough: aligning enduring American strengths against enduring Soviet weaknesses. Even within their strengths we should seek weaknesses--chinks in their armor--that we can exploit, thereby rendering Soviet military power less potent over time.

By adopting competitive strategies we force the Soviets [and their Warsaw Pact allies and Third World client states] to perform less efficiently or effectively. Our competitive strategies thereby enhance deterrence by making significant components or the Soviet force structure or their operational plans obsolete. This forces them to make difficult decisions. (1:66)

Secretary Weinberger discussed the application of those strategies to antisubmarine warfare, offensive air power (penetrating bomber force, advanced tactical fighter force and more), the AirLand Battle, and the Strategic Defense Initiative. He continued,

As productive as these competitive strategies appear, we undoubtedly can do more. We must continue to adopt the competitive strategy approach in our weapons development, in our operational planning, and in our military doctrine. This is really the only way we can overcome Soviet numerical advantages and deal with the other military advantages their political system gives them.

It is relatively easy to apply the concept of
competitive strategies in developing new technologies. To achieve the maximum leverage from these technologies, however, we must also develop operational concepts....

A formidable challenge in making our defense programs more competitive is intellectual, since it requires, in some cases, a rethinking of established practices....

An even more formidable challenge is institutionalizing this approach. We have developed competitive strategies conceptually and are working at identifying an initial set of those strategies. But we must also ensure that we set in motion a lasting effort to include these strategies in our defense strategy and policy formulation over the long term. (1:68)

The authors agree unequivocally with these principles. Moreover, we strongly believe that they must be applied to warfare at the low end of the spectrum—guerrilla war, subversion and international political terrorism—with the same vigor they are applied to conventional and nuclear warfare. Specifically,

1. We must align "...enduring American strengths against enduring Soviet weaknesses," and against those of other Eastern bloc and Third World surrogate states in order to effectively counter low-intensity warfare.

2. We must "...adopt the competitive strategy approach in our weapons development, in our operational planning, and in our military doctrine" for low-intensity warfare.

3. We must "develop operational concepts" and "new technologies" to deal with terrorism.

4. We must rethink much of our approach. "A formidable challenge...is intellectual, since it requires...a rethinking of established practices...." we have employed in dealing with terrorism and other kinds of low-intensity warfare.

5. In order to cope with the problems which low-intensity warfare, including international political terrorism, pose for the United States, we must accept the "formidable challenge...[of]...institutionalizing this approach.... But we must also ensure we set in motion a lasting effort...in our defense strategy and policy formulation over the long term...."
UNRESOLV'D PROBLEMS

In our view, a great deal remains to be done to formulate and implement a comprehensive United States strategy—including the military strategy—to combat terrorism. While much of the effort must extend beyond the Department of Defense, as we have discussed, we also believe that much of the intellectual stimulus for developing a comprehensive strategy could well come from the Department. In fact, it ought to, as the problem is to a significant degree military and paramilitary in nature.

At the upper end of the spectrum of conflict, the U.S. military has analyzed the global interests and commitments of the United States and our allies. American military leaders have compared and contrasted the global posture to the threats we face, also specifically outlining complicating national and international factors which affect our ability to act. All of these elements have been rigorously taken into account during the determination of our national security objectives. Our U.S. military strategy has been tailored to achieve those specific national security objectives.

As an integral part of this process, sound nuclear and conventional military doctrine—the fundamental principles by which force is employed—has been developed.

Sound military doctrine is essential to the successful implementation of U.S. strategic concepts. Joint doctrine ties together the capabilities of the Services, guiding the development, deployment, and employment of forces. Effective joint doctrine helps prevent duplication and gaps in Service capabilities and aids in the translation of plans into execution. Likewise, combined doctrine provides a standardized reference for military operations with our allies, enhancing interoperability and effectiveness. (2:4)

Military strategy and doctrine shape resource allocations, force structure, tactics, training, and other key elements of military capability. We do not believe that such systematic planning and programming have been applied to cope with the threat of international political terrorism—largely because it has not been properly understood.

We believe the organizational changes we discussed earlier—creation of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and establishment of the United States Special Operations Command—offer great opportunity to begin to resolve many of
the issues we have described. However, it is obvious that important problems remain.

For instance, although the Congress mandated that DoD establish the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, it would not increase the number of assistant secretaries authorized to the Secretary of Defense. Understandably, Secretary Weinberger is apparently not pleased with having to reorganize the entire Office of the Secretary of Defense to meet new tasking with no new manning authorizations. Instead of a clear Congressional mandate to move out smartly, there is organizational debate and controversy over how to do more-with-less and micromanagement. (3:12)

Another source of concern to us is that the United States Military Posture FY1988 report prepared by the Joint Staff does not yet, in our view, fully recognize terrorism to be a form of systematic warfare being waged against the United States. The clear views we have quoted earlier from Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger do not appear to be reflected in the report by the Joint Staff. Although international terrorism is mentioned, it is included as a separate "Topic of Special Interest" along with "Military Support to Drug Interdiction" and "European Troop Strength." It is described as a "threat" which "...continues to pose formidable challenges." (2:92)—a nearly exact quote from the FY 1986 posture statement. The analysis is largely quantitative in nature—how many facilities and victims hit, trend lines, measures of lethality, etc. Actions taken are described in terms of defensive measures. Thus, it appears that inappropriate quantitative analysis and defensive-only orientations remain alive and well. We do not see evidence that the concept of terrorism we have been outlining is widely known or accepted among senior military members. As a result, insufficient effort is being expended to develop coherent strategy, doctrine, operational concepts, and tactics and to integrate them with projected force structure.

Our observations are reinforced by discussions with other senior officers and faculty at the Air Force’s Air War College. Here, too, international political terrorism has been primarily conceived of as an ancillary issue that influences formulation of national security policy. It is not, in most cases, seen to be a proper matter for inclusion in the mainstream of strategic thought and war-fighting. When it is addressed in terms of war, it is usually in a rhetorical sense only—like "war on poverty" or "war on drugs." The concept of international political terrorism as a specific indirect war-fighting strategy—brought into
being by the effectiveness of containment at the higher
levels of conflict—which is effectively damaging the
strategic security interests of the United States, has just
not sunk in. We hope this is changing.

SOME SUGGESTIONS

While it is changing, there are some more day-to-day
areas of concern we wish to share. First of all, within
each of the military services there are efforts underway to
create and promote useful antiterrorism and counterterrorism
programs. One important concern is the apparent absence of
mechanisms to coordinate and compare these efforts to ensure
everything possible is being done to create effective
defensive and offensive programs which complement, as
opposed to duplicate, each other. Each military service
must develop defensive programs (antiterrorism) which will
best defend that service's personnel and equipment from the
terrorist threat as it exists in those parts of the world
where U.S. forces are stationed. Additionally, each service
has forces and equipment assigned to it which could be used
and, at times, have been used to respond to acts of
terrorism (counterterrorism) under the military force policy
option. However, we sense a void when it comes to
day-to-day coordination in developing a strategy to combat
this type of on-going low-intensity warfare referred to as
terrorism. It is entirely possible that the new unified
Special Operations Command soon to be established will, in
fact, serve the purpose we have outlined. But initial
impressions seem to indicate that it may intend to restrict
its activities to Special Operations alone; this will not
serve the integrating function we so strongly recommend.

On the defensive side, there are U.S. Air Force and
U.S. Army offices at the respective service headquarters
which bear some responsibility for coordinating, overseeing
and managing antiterrorism efforts. However, these offices
have virtually no linkage into the counterterrorism elements
of the services, nor do they coordinate closely with each
other. It is essential that all services establish a
specific focal point for antiterrorism matters to facilitate
significant coordination among the services as to the
various defensive programs they are pursuing. Such
coordination could at least produce a healthy exchange of
doctrinal and educational materials, ideas, and ongoing or
proposed programs which, in turn, may save valuable
resources through prevention of wasteful duplication.

Most importantly, to support our thesis for a
comprehensive strategy to combat terrorism using all
instruments of power, we believe there is a definite need
for coordination among the services of their defensive and
offensive capabilities. Such coordination or linkage would serve to strengthen the defensive programs through mutual exchange of information. Additionally, the coordination of offensive capabilities should prove valuable in strengthening the counterterrorism capabilities the services possess so they will be prepared to serve the nation in the most professional and competent manner possible when called upon to do so.

The joint service approach to defensive and offensive coordination also provides the avenue for exercises to test the capabilities of our defensive programs and our offensive forces in a variety of scenarios; this would afford considerable potential benefits to participating services. Antiterrorism defenses could be regularly tested in exercises using counterterrorist forces on the attack. Both would learn. In short, we believe there needs to be a coordinating mechanism for offensive programs and defensive programs which each of the services should possess.

SUMMARY

In summary, at some levels of American leadership—in government, in universities, in corporations—terrorism is beginning to be seen for what it is. That is, international political terrorism is increasingly becoming recognized to be a sophisticated method of conducting indirect, low-intensity warfare against western democracies and other nontotalitarian states. Within the Department of Defense, this recognition is taking place to some degree, but much more needs to be done. Secretary Weinberger has initiated a process of long-term strategic thinking which could be directly applicable to development of an effective strategy for fighting low-intensity warfare, including terrorism. However, such strategic thinking has not yet been applied to the lower end of the conflict spectrum. Moreover, we see some disquieting indications that the nature and urgency of the terrorism problem are still not widely understood or appreciated among some of those who would be charged to develop and implement an effective strategy.

On the positive side, a new organizational structure is being formed that can—with proper understanding of the nature of the problem and the willingness to reach out to direct a comprehensive, coordinated program—begin to reverse our present inability to cope with terrorism. This paper has been written to enhance that effort.
CHAPTER IX
THE AIR FORCE ROLE

The fundamental mission of the United States Air Force is to procure, train, organize and equip aerospace forces for employment "in deterring war, defending the United States and its allies, and conducting warfare." (1:3-2) The Air Force has been performing this mission effectively for threats along the mid- to high-intensity range of the conflict spectrum. However, the Air Force has been slow to respond to the far different but pressing requirements of low-intensity conflict. As former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Noel C. Koch stated at a symposium in March 1985, "at minimum, we can see no enthusiastic embracing of the role of air power in low-intensity conflict." He criticized an alleged Air Force intent to give the responsibility for special operations missions to the Air Force Reserve. (2:42). As we have indicated, we believe much of this tendency to treat low-intensity conflict as a lesser priority derives from a mistaken concept of the nature and effectiveness of guerrilla warfare and, especially, international political terrorism.

The perception that the threat is relatively small, understandably, has had an adverse influence on the Air Force's capability at the low-intensity end of the spectrum of conflict, including the terrorism arena. Over the last ten to fifteen years, the Air Force has developed a respectable antiterrorism program, although improvement is certainly still needed. However, only quite recently has the Air Force begun to increase its ability to contribute significantly to counterterrorist operations. Moreover, the two elements of a comprehensive approach--the defensive and the offensive--are still not integrated or properly coordinated.

This chapter briefly discusses how the Air Force has approached its defensive (antiterrorism) and offensive (counterterrorism) missions. We review the general approach being taken, the organization and direction, and the initiatives underway in terms of both defensive and offensive measures to meet the terrorist threat. We make recommendations throughout. Obviously, there will be significant limitations on content due to the classification of relevant materials and capabilities, but we believe we provide an overall picture which will be useful.

ANTITERRORISM

As with all the military services, the USAF bears the responsibility for developing a solid defensive or
antiterrorism (AT) program. Although every unit and person in the Air Force has some degree of responsibility in defending against terrorism, the two main organizations involved in operating programs are the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) and the Air Force Office of Security Police (AFOSP), along with the trained personnel they provide to commanders at all levels. This section addresses the antiterrorism program and the various levels of Air Force activity at which some part is played in contributing to the overall effort. What follows is not meant to be all-inclusive but rather to provide some thoughts which may facilitate a more organized and methodical approach to the problem of defensively confronting the threat to USAF personnel and resources around the world. Some of the ideas presented may already be in practice at some locations and others may apply only in specific circumstances.

There are several important functional components to a well balanced antiterrorism program, and the following must certainly be among them:

- Credible, reliable and timely intelligence
- Education and training
- Modern tactics and techniques
- Up-to-date equipment and devices
- Solid plans and programs

HEADQUARTERS, USAF

It is important to have a single focal point at the Headquarters, USAF level where assurances can be made that the above functions are receiving the proper attention and funding and that all antiterrorism programs are carefully integrated and coordinated. We believe such a potential focal point exists in the form of the USAF Office of Antiterrorism (AF/IGT). However, we believe the role of the office needs to be expanded to take on the added responsibilities these functions entail. For example, one of the key elements to any solid antiterrorism program is antiterrorism awareness training and education. Such a program includes, but is not limited to, areas like personal and family protection, travelling by air, the nature of terrorism today, and host government responsibilities. We see significant value in the development of a basic, high quality AT education program at HQ USAF which may then be supplemented as necessary by the major commands and bases to tailor it to the specific threat(s) encountered in a particular geographic location.

The same rationale may be appropriate for guidance concerning physical security precautions to be taken at the base level as well as the value of security vulnerability
surveys. We believe that a requirement should be levied Air Force-wide for base security officials to analyze their bases and their environments through the eyes of a terrorist. Joint AFOSI and SP teams should conduct vulnerability surveys and develop a prioritized target list. Skilled forces from other services could assist in this effort, particularly Army and Navy counterterrorist forces. These lists should detail the most likely terrorist targets, should identify the weaknesses of those targets, and should serve as the basis for allocation of funds and resources to fix deficiencies. The lists should also provide the basis for employment of AT forces and tactics to defend those targets.

By serving as the USAF focal point, AF/IGT should also serve as the office to coordinate USAF AT matters with other services and DoD offices. Likewise, it should also serve as a coordination point or clearing house for the exchange of ideas within the USAF among commands which run the gamut of the AT program. Such coordination may prevent the duplication of effort, prevent reconstruction of unsuccessful programs, and conserve valuable personnel and financial resources. The purpose of this office should not be to create bureaucratic reporting requirements or any additional work for USAF commands and installations worldwide. Rather the concept is an office that can set the standards for the USAF AT program and assist bases worldwide in developing and maintaining the most up-to-date AT programs possible. Further, as this office would have continuing contact with AT and CT focal points in the other services, it may then be in a position to stimulate and facilitate initiatives for the use of CT forces to exercise base level AT responses.

These are far from exhaustive suggestions. We include them merely as examples to amplify our major point. There is a need to pull together and intelligently coordinate all elements of our approach to countering terrorist activity. The White House needs a focal point to help marshall and focus all elements of national power in a coherent manner. The Office of the Secretary of Defense needs a focal point to draw together Defense Department efforts. The new unified command must go beyond just special operations concerns and link up with antiterrorism elements of the programs. The Air Force, as does each service, needs a focal point to coordinate service activity coherently. Each of these elements must talk and work with each other regularly, guided by a comprehensive national as well as a military strategy. There is much work to be done to build a responsive system of this nature.

MAJOR COMMAND/NUMBERED AIR FORCE LEVEL

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At this level, one primary responsibility should be to ensure the various bases continually receive the necessary information to tailor their AT awareness training, physical security measures, and terrorist incident response measures to the particular threat(s) within that geographic region. In other words, if terrorists operating in a particular region change their tactics, then training programs and physical security measures must be altered accordingly. Positive, productive AT initiatives should also be upchanneled for wider dissemination as well as be shared within the theater or command.

The main task of major command AT program managers is to ensure high quality, comprehensive programs are operating in their area of responsibility. Very close linkage with Inspector General (IG) teams is essential. IG teams can and must provide real-world assessments of program effectiveness, but their criteria must be in accord with the guidance provided by the major command staff. Achieving this linkage takes continual effort. Discretionary and supplemental funding and resource support for base programs must be provided by major commands. Physical security standards must be set and enforced at this level. Travelling assistance teams can help assure all base programs are operated effectively. Temporary duty assistance should be provided as the threat demands.

Problems identified at one base which may be applicable to all must be promptly disseminated. Major projects to correct weaknesses must be supported from this level, such as hardening of petroleum, oils and lubricants (POL) facilities command-wide, installation of new sensor systems, installation of improved devices for storing special weapons, correction of standard building designs which do not take security into account, and more.

Major commands can also exercise both AT and CT forces by organizing and sponsoring force-on-force exercises where CT forces attack AT forces to determine weaknesses in both.

The major command and numbered air force AT and CT program managers are critical linchpins between the general policy staffers at Headquarters, USAF and the base level leaders who are performing the mission. High quality thinking, planning, coordination, oversight, communication and integration of effort are critical. Whether there will be fragmented, ineffective approaches in an area of operations or a well-integrated system combatting terrorism is often determined at the major command and numbered air force level.
BASE LEVEL

At the base level, the most important part of the AT effort takes place. One of these important elements is the face-to-face education and training of USAF members concerning the terrorist threat that affects USAF personnel and their families in the part of the world in which they are assigned. Usually done via a base introduction program, the briefings should provide the most up-to-date information available concerning such areas as background of terrorist groups, the threat, tactics used, whether the threat changes on or off the base, and more. Written materials designed to inform as opposed to excite should be made available to the military member for sharing with adult family members. It is critical that military members and their dependents understand the correct procedures for reporting suspicious incidents or possible observations of terrorists. Base officials should support this educational effort and ensure significant new information regarding a terrorist threat is disseminated as quickly and widely as deemed necessary.

It is vitally important that key base officials responsible for the AT program fully understand the strengths and weaknesses of the physical security equipment and tactics in use on the base. (3:46) Such equipment and tactics should be randomly tested to ensure their workability and adequacy. We stress the fact that practice should be random. For example, if an installation entrance is being surveilled by a terrorist organization for possible penetration, randomly intensified security checks may very well discourage the attempt due to the unpredictability or heightened security measures. Also at random, persons entering the base could be filmed on video camera or be photographed. Both practices increase the risk to potential terrorists.

Occasional exercises are also very worthwhile to test a base’s strengths or weaknesses and could be carried out by “borrowed” personnel or a “red force” chosen from assigned personnel. (4:36) Even more important is the ability to exercise with host nation security forces when stationed in overseas areas. The response to terrorist incidents occurring in overseas areas is normally the responsibility of the host government, as it involves the protection of Americans from a domestic threat.

Another “must” from the perspective of the authors of this paper is the use of some forum or working group composed of key base officials responsible for AT efforts to tie all program elements together. These officials should meet regularly at overseas bases, where appropriate, to discuss changes in the terrorist threat, proposed security
upgrades, appropriate terrorist incident responses, proper personnel notification procedures and more. Such representatives as the base commander, base civil engineer, chief of security police, AF Office of Special Investigations detachment commander, public affairs officer, and fire chief should be part of this group. Each has an area of expertise to lend to the AT mission, and a forum of this nature can produce definite benefits for the base population. When it is necessary to allocate resources, for example, "security planners must weigh probable threats against possible threats." (5:44) This forum should have the experts who can facilitate that decision. Delegation to a lower level of participants results in square-filling meetings, not in increased security. Additionally, those facilities requiring security vulnerability surveys can be identified and procedures can be initiated to have them conducted by competent authorities. Whenever it is feasible to do so, local law enforcement or military officials who have AT responsibilities should be invited to participate.

Overseas bases located in the same city as the U.S. embassy should have key AT personnel participate on the country team, at least at the subcommittee level. This proves absolutely essential to providing comprehensive and coordinated security for American personnel overseas. We recommend that AT personnel from all services participate in a small working group which includes the Embassy's Regional Security Officer, Central Intelligence Agency (if applicable), and military AT leaders. This working group should lay the groundwork and plans for quick action in a crisis. In the experience of one of the authors, such an arrangement proved invaluable in protecting the American community when, in the spring of 1986, Libyan terrorists attempted to launch a terrorist attack on American women and children in Turkey after the U.S. raid on Libya.

Again we stress our theme. Coordination and common understanding of the threat--at least among senior leaders--are absolutely essential. We have personally observed serious mistakes made in high-risk environments due to limited awareness and coordination--one of which would have proven disastrous except for excellent last minute police work by a host nation. We have seen houses leased by the U.S. government for American families which included underground parking garages with no entry control. This leasing took place during a period when car bombs were a recognized tactic. We have seen recreational facilities leased in high risk off-base environments where distinguished visitor quarters could be reached with a small ladder, the windows had no security devices, and there was no effective entry control to the building.
We have seen large hotel-like buildings leased for housing transient military families, even though the building and associated shopping area were within line-of-sight of a Libyan Peoples' Bureau which was suspected to have been used as a haven for an assassin and an armory for terrorist attacks. We have seen major military construction projects designed with absolutely no consideration given to security. Civil Engineer/Security Police coordination remains a problem, at least at base level. We have seen social events authorized in high-risk facilities for convenience, even when specific threats were known. We have seen senior U.S. officials refuse authority to arm security forces deployed to counter a threat because carrying loaded weapons, even within our own facilities, "creates an bad impression."

None of these examples are unusual in our experience. They merely reflect a conceptual failure. Many American leaders--military and civilian--simply do not understand the nature and threat of terrorism. They view it as an ancillary concern and make decisions accordingly.

INDIVIDUAL LEVEL

At the individual level, we hope the education and training provided concerning the lowering of one's profile as a terrorist target are actually practiced. This of course applies to other family members as well. We would hope through the formal briefing and reading materials provided, USAF members would employ common sense and practice basic personal security precautions consistent with the threat and whether they live on or off base. Key concepts when living off base include keeping a low profile in order to blend in with the local population, being suspicious of persons requesting access to your residence, remaining unpredictable by varying the time you leave your home for work and the route you take to work each day, and reporting suspicious incidents to the security police or AFOSI. (6) Although different in some respects, other precautions should be followed when travelling by air or living on a base in a foreign country. "The best the AT operator can hope for is that his efforts will cause terrorists to judge potential targets as too costly to attack." (3:44)

Excellent family protection workbooks which provide detailed guidance, including checklists to follow, have been produced. Military Airlift Command Pamphlet 208-2, published 1 January 1986, is one of the best; it is attached at Appendix C.
In the area of counterterrorism, there does not appear to be the same kind of well-defined program that we find with antiterrorism. Granted, the requirement is more ambiguous, the decisions involve different—perhaps more complex—factors, and the application of resources is not at all a clear-cut matter. Dr. Stephen Sloan has called it “fighting in the gray area of conflict” and notes that “...because modern terrorists operate in a multidimensional medium, in a condition of neither war nor peace, where the adversary and his supporters may not be clearly detected, existing forces face serious problems in conducting offensive operations on an inherently ambiguous battlefield.” (7:26) Despite the problems, like the other services the Air Force has the responsibility to derive the concepts and capabilities to contribute effectively in offensive operations against terrorism when needed. This segment reviews Air Force efforts in devising doctrine and building a force structure for counterterrorism.

**DOCTRINE.**

For all practical purposes, the Army has taken the lead in developing doctrine for low-intensity warfare. In late 1984, USCIN CRED asked the Chief of Staff of the Army to launch a thorough study of low-intensity warfare “as a starting point for a joint, combined, and multi-agency approach to undertaking and coping with this form of conflict.” (8) The Strategic Studies Institute of the Army War College took on part of the task, but at the same time a joint project was established to conduct a review of low-intensity conflict. The latter effort produced a two-volume report in August 1986, which contains a substantial treatment of “terrorism counteraction.” (9) The Air Force was represented in the project group, and one spin-off apparently was the formation of a joint Army-Air Force Center for Low-Intensity Conflict (CLIC) at Langley AFB, Virginia. Both Tactical Air Command and Military Airlift Command are involved in the CLIC along with the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The CLIC hopes to expand/modify the Army’s Field Manual 100-20 into a statement of joint doctrine for low-intensity conflict. As of now, the work has not been completed.

In 1985, HQ USAF/XOXID drafted a revision to AFM 2-5, Tactical Air Operations—Special Air Warfare, which addressed counterterrorism operations. (7:15) As of this writing, the manual has not been finished. With National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 138 providing since 1984 the charter for taking offensive measures against terrorism (10:40), and the DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 providing further impetus, we believe Air Force doctrine on
low-intensity warfare in general, and counterterrorism in particular, should be devised and promulgated as a matter of highest priority.

ORGANIZATION AND FORCES.

In the Air Force, the low-intensity warfare mission generally falls to special operations forces (SOF) whose functions include unconventional warfare, psychological warfare, foreign internal defense (counterinsurgency), security assistance support and counterterrorism. Military Airlift Command has established the 23rd Air Force as the organizational entity responsible for USAF SOF development and preparedness, but it has been only in recent years that the Air Force has begun to push for SOF improvements and airlift upgrades necessary to field a responsive capability in this dimension. Since 1984, there has occurred a revitalization of SOF, and that effort continues with the DoD’s defense program for FY1988/1989. According to Secretary Weinberger’s Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1988 (Executive Summary):

Our program corrects major special operations airlift shortfalls by procuring or modernizing aircraft to support contingency and wartime SOF taskings. This includes procuring additional MC-130 Combat Talon II aircraft and MH Pave Low helicopters to support infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply missions; AC-130 Spectre gunships to provide precise, day/night, adverse weather fire support; and navigation and avionics upgrades for the AC-130H and MC-130E aircraft in the present inventory. (11:48)

Additionally, SOF units have increased by 50 percent since 1980 and will continue to increase through Fiscal year 1992. Dedicated aircraft will have quadrupled in the Air Force and Army and tripled in the Navy between 1980 and FY 1992.

The JCS instituted the Joint Special Operations Agency (JSOA) in 1984 to provide advice on special operations matters and to attempt to coordinate the various efforts of the services. That agency will apparently be superseded by the new unified Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) just now being organized. The Air Force has identified 23rd Air Force as the Air Force component while initial planning and configuration take place. As USSOCOM becomes organized, many critical questions must be addressed. Is our force mix correct? Are we postured for the right tasks? Who will develop counterterrorism strategy, doctrine and tactics? How will it be validated?
In reviewing a recently published book on terrorism, Colonel (USA-Ret) Harry Summers summarized what the authors proposed should be done about it:

**Recommended countermeasures include improved intelligence, increased cooperation with allies, economic and security assistance to those threatened by terrorist activities, political and diplomatic pressures and economic sanctions against terrorist sponsors, information campaigns and foreign broadcasts to bring public opinion to bear, and, as a last resort, employment of military force. Such military force would range from clandestine counterterrorist infiltrations, to covert support of foreign counterterror military operations, to overt U.S. military preemptive operations, to overt U.S. military operations against identified terrorist bases and forces.**

Summers also notes that the major shortcoming in the work, as it is in most contemporary works, is that "the strategies devised to counter such wars...were formulated almost exclusively from the perspectives of social and political science." He notes that similar strategies failed on the battlefield in Vietnam, and that "we are in danger of repeating that same disastrous mistake. Although widely acknowledged as a form of war, terrorism is rarely analyzed from the perspective of military science." We agree. We also believe that the time has never been better to forge new, coherent directions in counterterrorism. With the new USSOCOM materializing under a four-star Commander-in-Chief, with the creation of a J-7 Directorate on the Joint Staff focusing (among other things) on special operations doctrine, with the forthcoming appointment of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, and with the establishment of a separate budgetary major force program (P-11) for SOF (DoD Reorganization Act), it is time to thoroughly and immediately reexamine the Air Force role in counterterrorism on our own initiative and to plan accordingly.

A major concern, already sufficiently voiced, is that counterterrorism programs will continue to operate with little or no integration of effort with antiterrorism programs. Development of an integrated strategy--which we recommend be a first order of business--would probably fix that potential problem. We believe the counterterrorism component of our forces is rapidly getting better. What we need now are the strategy, doctrine, force employment principles, rules of engagement and public support for using them.
CHAPTER X

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

International political terrorism has been effectively destabilizing our government, threatening our national interests and those of our allies, creating international disruption, disturbing and changing the behavior of many of our people, restricting some of our freedoms, and lowering the quality of our lives. As a nation, we have not done well in coping with it. Terrorists' success rates are high, and, with only a few exceptions, our responses to their activities have not been effective. Our failures partly result from our failure to understand what is actually taking place.

We simply have not faced up to the fact that international political terrorism is a sophisticated method of conducting indirect, low-intensity warfare against western democracies and other nontotalitarian states. It is a calculated national policy employed by a number of aggressive states seeking to expand their power and influence. Many informed observers believe we are already in World War III, but simply fail to recognize it.

There are several reasons why terrorism has grown in importance and power. First, the American policy of containment of communism has worked. At the nuclear and conventional levels, war cannot now be profitably waged. Therefore, the Soviet Union, Eastern bloc nations and Soviet surrogate states had to rely on cheaper, safer, but still effective indirect strategic approaches to bringing about international revolution and the demise of capitalism and democracy.

Secondly, the unstable world order created by the breaking up of the old colonial empires and establishment of many small nations with a multitude of problems created fertile ground for employment of the indirect strategic approach. Revolutionary warfare and terrorism are elements of that indirect strategy. The strategy has worked, at least for now, in Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Nicaragua, Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Afghanistan. It has failed to work in many other locations, but efforts continue around the world.

The third reason international political terrorism has so greatly increased in impact is primarily technological. Jet airliner travel, increased mobility, the communications revolution--particularly satellite technology and television--have drastically amplified the power of terrorists to conduct violent theater targeted at a
worldwide audience. Their violent shocking power has been further enhanced by the development of new, small but powerful weapons and high explosives.

A careful review of international political terrorism and other forms of low-intensity warfare suggests that such conflict will probably intensify. Western liberal democracies will be increasingly jeopardized, both by attacks from without and, possibly, by unwise internal responses to those attacks.

We live in a time of rapid change. The present international order is unstable, and it appears that it will continue to be so for the indefinite future. Third World nations, international governmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations and multinational corporations all swing their weight on the international scene. The economic order and the monetary system are unstable. Third World countries are suffering under a crippling burden of debt. Energy and global resource shortages are likely to worsen. Western democracies simply cannot afford to be cut off from these resources—or our economies will be destroyed. Isolation is not a realistic option. We must remain involved.

Population in the Third World is continuing to grow far too rapidly, erasing the economic gains these nations have made, leaving many worse off than they were twenty years ago with no relief in sight. With the carrying capacity of agricultural lands exceeded, young people are flocking to the cities. Here they overwhelm available services, creating slums which are perfect breeding grounds for revolution.

Nationalism remains strong. Revolutionary ideology is aggressively spread by the Soviet Union and its supporters. Radical Islamic fundamentalism has emerged on the world scene and threatens to further destabilize the Middle East. Having learned the tactics of terrorism, single issue groups—radical environmentalists, antinuclear activists, and others—are resorting to violence more frequently. No resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is in sight.

Future technological developments in transportation, communications and weaponry will probably further add capability to small groups of terrorists. The concentration of vital services of our complex societies at fewer and fewer critical nodes—power grids, water systems, communication networks, computer grids—makes us more vulnerable.

We can expect terrorism to continue, to probably
intensify, and to become increasingly effective (unless we change the manner in which we deal with it). It may also become increasingly destructive—the possibility exists that chemical, biological or radiological weapons may be used.

Part of the reason we are not doing better at stopping this worsening form of indirect warfare rests in the nature of democracy itself. Throughout history, democracies have had difficulty deciding on a course of action and persevering in that course of action over an extended period of time. People living in democracies often focus on short-term self-interest, paying little attention to long-term problems and confusing international relationships.

Overcoming this natural tendency has, in all ages, demanded superior, insightful leadership to bring democracies to follow an effective course of action. At this point in American history, for a variety of reasons—not the least of which is our experience in Vietnam—insightful and courageous leadership is in short supply. Many of America's intellectual elite have convinced themselves that all the world embraces the mores of an American suburb—where reasonable people are willing to work out reasonable solutions to solvable problems without resort to violence. Many learned the wrong lessons from Vietnam, concluding that the use of force is always wrong and we should never get involved in conflict outside of our borders. This intellectual elite—in the universities, in the media, in the churches, in many parts of government and business—sets much of the agenda for our nation and shapes public perceptions.

Presently, most Americans do not understand that we are already in World War III. The world view of many of our leaders precludes us from even beginning to fight it effectively, particularly since there has been no clear signal like Pearl Harbor to announce the beginning, set the moral tone and pull public opinion together. Worse yet, World War III is "dirty," ambiguous, persistent, and insidious.

Americans have some tough facts to face. The world is a violent place. Many people do not like Americans or share our values. We are engaged in a struggle to maintain those values and our way of life. That struggle manifests itself across a spectrum of conflict ranging from nuclear to low-intensity warfare. Low-intensity warfare—guerrilla warfare, subversion and international political terrorism—is the type of conflict we are least prepared to deal with, and it is the most likely to occur.
To achieve the degree of success in curbing low-intensity warfare that we have achieved in curbing nuclear and conventional war, we must develop an integrated strategy based on clear national goals and objectives. Our national strategy, policies and operational procedures must be targeted to achieve these goals and objectives. Our strategy, including tactics and alliances, may not always be in clear accord with currently held perceptions of American democratic values, morality and ethical behavior. However, we must make controversial decision points clear, make the hard decisions, and be prepared to carry out our strategy over the long haul.

If we face these facts, there is much we can do. First, American leaders have to make the commitment to take action to reduce the impact of low-intensity warfare, including international political terrorism, on our nation, our people, our allies, and our friends. Next, American leaders must inform the American people of the reality of our situation. Without public support, progress will be illusory. A promising start has been made by Secretary Shultz, Secretary Weinberger and Vice President Bush's Task Force on Terrorism. Some very tough questions—legal, moral, political, and military—must be surfaced and debated by the American people. The leadership elite of our nation—in the Congress, in the universities, in the board rooms, and in other similar power centers—must begin to confront and resolve these difficult issues.

Meanwhile, our national leaders must make tough decisions and design a comprehensive, coherent national strategy designed to combat low-intensity conflict and terrorism. That strategy must bring to bear the full range of national instruments of power in a systematic, integrated way. Economic, political, diplomatic, legal, scientific, technological, psychosocial and military elements of power must all be focused on reducing the impact of terrorism.

There are some promising signs. The Vice President's Task Force and current legislation laid an organizational framework which could potentially build and implement an effective national strategy. However, there are some countervailing indications which suggest our efforts could continue to remain fragmented. The authors believe many of the roadblocks might be overcome by providing Americans a clearer picture of the nature and threat of this indirect method of strategic warfare being waged against us. If most Americans shared a clear definition of the problem, gaining support to develop and implement a grand strategy to combat the threat might become considerably easier.

At this time, strategic thinking in the Department of
Defense lends itself perfectly to developing a more aggressive strategy. Secretary Weinberger's focus on competitive strategies and long term approaches offers much promise, but many problems remain unresolved—mostly as a result of misunderstanding of the nature of the threat and concomitant lack of responsive military strategy, doctrine, operational concepts, and tactics targeted at that threat.

As these issues are being resolved, there remains much that the Air Force at all levels can do to improve direction, planning and current programs. Much of the creative development of strategy, operational concepts and tactics can start at the grass roots level. The authors have suggested a number of actions, but the most dramatic improvement will hinge upon Air Force leaders taking major initiatives to integrate and coordinate all elements of existing antiterrorism and counterterrorism programs.

In the final analysis, the American people, the Congress and more of the senior leadership of the federal government must come to understand that the United States is a target in a long-term, low-intensity war. Terrorism is presently one of the most effective strategies employed in that war. Necessary steps must be taken to build a proper strategy to fight it. The process will not be easy. There is much inertia to overcome and many tough issues to confront in order to win public support, but we must get moving.

The sooner we understand that we are being victimized by an insidious form of warfare, the sooner we will take the steps necessary to build and execute a strategy to combat it in an integrated fashion—using all the instruments of national power. Only then will we make terrorist groups and their sponsoring states begin to pay the price and, perhaps, reconsider the value of this form of warfare.

Based upon our conclusions, we offer the following recommendations:

NATIONAL

1. Our national leadership must publicly accept the fact that we are at war with terrorists and the nations which support them. Although it is shadowy, low-intensity warfare, the results strongly affect U.S. vital interests, U.S. citizens, and U.S. property. Leadership for the development of a coherent strategy integrating the various instruments of national power (both defensive and offensive capabilities) must come from the most senior levels of our nation and must clearly state national objectives regarding terrorism.
2. We recommend that a full-time National Security Council position with support staff be established to coordinate a national program, as suggested by the 1985-1986 Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism. We believe that full-time expertise and leadership at this level are essential.

3. As a first order of business, we recommend that the leaders of the National Security Council staff, working with other lead agencies of the federal government, develop a national grand strategy for combatting terrorism. This grand strategy must systematically employ every element of national power to achieve specific national objectives. Economic, political, diplomatic, social-psychological, legal, legislative, intelligence, scientific, technological and military elements must be integrated and applied. Decisions must be made regarding the use of propaganda, disinformation, deception, dirty tricks, preemption, reprisals, retribution, and other similar measures.

4. Critical to a successful strategy will be congressional and public support. This must be secured through a sound educational approach which objectively presents the view of terrorism in the proper context as well as the need to aggressively fight it. We strongly urge that a top-quality White Paper on Terrorism be published by the White House. This publication should be followed up with an extensive public education campaign.

5. The National Command Authority should continue to enhance U.S. intelligence collection capabilities regarding terrorist groups targeting U.S. interests. Increased emphasis should be placed on gathering information through human sources which will enhance our flexibility to execute an aggressive strategy stressing both offensive and defensive measures.

6. The National Command Authority, the State Department and other appropriate agencies should continue to take action to enhance international cooperation in training, multilateral agreements, and the sharing of information and technology with all nations interested in successfully fighting the war against terrorism. This is a difficult, frustrating initiative which will progress slowly, if at all, but it cannot be neglected. Concurrently, the United States and other friendly nations must continue to take all reasonable actions to alleviate the conditions in the world which help stimulate the growth of terrorism, e.g., poverty, ignorance, injustice, population explosion, etc.
7. We recommend that the National Security Council staff or other appropriate agency sponsor a series of discussions involving the media, public representatives, and governmental agencies. These forums should address the role of the media in low-intensity conflict and terrorism, with a view toward enhancing media responsibility and self-regulation. This also is a very difficult issue to confront, but public discussion offers the only reasonable means of stimulating greater professionalism and responsibility by the media.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

8. The entire Department of Defense must accept the fact that terrorism is a form of warfare and apply Secretary Weinberger's concept of competitive strategies to fighting it. We should align American strengths against the weaknesses of our opposition. We must develop integrated strategy, doctrine, and tactics to deal with terrorism. One important step would be to insure linkage among and between AT and CT elements within DoD. The recent reorganization offers great promise in implementing this recommendation.

9. Appointment of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and establishment of the United States Special Operations Command should proceed rapidly. It is essential that these agencies work closely with the National Security Council staff and other lead agencies to ensure a comprehensive national grand strategy is developed. It is also essential that these new agencies not restrict their attention to counterterrorism issues only. Both the offensive and defensive elements of the war against terrorism must be considered and employed. All special operations forces should be provided formal education in the indirect approach to warfare, with special emphasis on international political terrorism and its tactics.

10. Each of the services should have focal points at the headquarters level responsible for coordinating all aspects of AT and CT efforts. A formal mechanism should be established to ensure they coordinate and interact.

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

11. Headquarters, USAF should place high priority on developing the appropriate strategy, doctrine and plans for the application of Air Force forces in low-intensity conflict, with specific focus on terrorism.

12. Hq USAF should consider taking formal organizational measures to more closely link
counterterrorism and antiterrorism offices of primary responsibility. The points of contact for counterterrorism should coordinate closely with the Air Force Office of Security Police (AFGSP), the Air Force Antiterrorism Program (AF/IGT), and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI). An oversight committee which meets regularly may prove sufficient. This group should provide oversight of the development of antiterrorism and counterterrorism doctrine and should critically review the plans which are created to cope with terrorism. The primary role of this committee should be to foster integration of Air Force efforts.

13. We recommend that the functions of AF/IGT be expanded to include responsibility for developing basic AT education materials, acting as a focal point for AT initiatives, and funding. Basic training should be augmented or tailored to local conditions at the major command or theater command level. AF/IGT should pursue with AFOSI and AFGSP the possibility of requiring systematic security vulnerability surveys in all areas of the world where there is a terrorist threat. The target lists derived from these studies should drive the allocation of funds and resources to harden higher risk facilities. However, such a program must be locally managed, or at least be controlled from no higher than major command. Hq USAF also should mandate that security officials be involved in civil engineering planning. Such involvement should be a significant inspection item.

14. Major Commands, particularly overseas, must take action to ensure high quality programs are operating in their areas of responsibility. Close linkage with Inspector General personnel is essential. Major Command and Numbered Air Force program managers must serve as the active linchpins between the general policy staff and the base level operators. Providing staff assistance, training, resources, and general integration of base level efforts are essential.

15. At the base level, especially in overseas environments, establish a working group approach with key players to remain abreast of terrorist threats, plan responses to terrorism, plan security upgrades, and take such other actions as are necessary to insure the base operates a fully integrated and coordinated program. Incorporate AT personnel into the country team, where appropriate.

16. Emphasis should be given to exercising AT initiatives, preparations, and forces at the base level by using host nation forces wherever possible. Counterterrorist
forces and local volunteer "red" forces can also be used.

17. Continue to provide solid, useful AT training to our personnel overseas, stressing awareness and good personal security habits. Place Inspector General emphasis on this program to upgrade all programs to the quality of the best.
NOTES

CHAPTER II (Pages 4-17)

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CHAPTER III (Pages 18-34)


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CHAPTER IV (Pages 35-45)

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CHAPTER VI (Pages 58-75)

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CHAPTER VII (Pages 76-94)


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CHAPTER VIII (Pages 95-100)


NOTES

CHAPTER IX (Pages 101-110)

1. Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the USAF.
Following is an address by Secretary Shultz before the Park Avenue Synagogue, New York, October 55, 1984.

Someday terrorism will no longer be a timely subject for a speech, but that day has not arrived. Less than 2 weeks ago, one of the oldest and greatest nations of the Western world almost lost its Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, to the modern barbarism that we call terrorism. A month ago the American Embassy Annex in East Beirut was nearly destroyed by a terrorist truck bomb, the third major attack on Americans in Lebanon within the past 2 years. To list all the other acts of brutality that terrorists have visited upon civilized society in recent years would be impossible here because that list is too long. It is too long to name and too long to tolerate.

But I am here to talk about terrorism as a phenomenon in our modern world—about what terrorism is and what it is not. We have learned a great deal about terrorism in recent years. We have learned much about the terrorists themselves, their supporters, their diverse methods, their underlying motives, and their eventual goals. What once may have seemed the random, senseless, violent acts of a few crazed individuals has come into clearer focus. A pattern of terrorist violence has emerged. It is an alarming pattern, but it is something that we can identify and, therefore, a threat that we can devise concrete measures to combat. The knowledge we have accumulated about terrorism over the years can provide the basis for a coherent strategy to deal with the phenomenon, if we have the will to turn our understanding into action.

The Meaning of Terrorism

We have learned that terrorism is above all, a form of political violence. It is neither random nor without purpose. Today, we are confronted with a wide assortment of terrorist groups which, alone or in concert, orchestrate acts of violence to achieve distinctly political ends. Their stated objectives may range from separatist causes to revenge for ethnic grievances to social and political revolution. Their methods may be just as diverse: from planting homemade explosives in public places to suicide car bombings to kidnapings and political assassinations. But the overarching goal of all terrorists is the same: they are trying to impose their will by force—a special kind of force designed to create an atmosphere of fear. The horrors they inflict are not simply a new manifestation of traditional social conflict; they are depraved opponents of civilization itself, aided by the technology of modern weaponry. The terrorists want people to feel helpless and defenseless; they want people to lose faith in their government's capacity to protect them and thereby to undermine the legitimacy of the government itself, or its policies, or both.
totalitarian states is minimal, and those against their personnel abroad are marked fewer than against the West. And this is not only because police states offer less room for terrorists to carry out acts of violence. States that support and sponsor terrorist actions have managed in recent years to co-opt and manipulate the terrorist phenomenon in pursuit of their own strategic goals. It is not a coincidence that most acts of terrorism occur in areas of importance to the West. More than 80% of the world’s terrorist attacks in 1983 occurred in Western Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. Terrorism in this context is not just criminal activity but an unbridled form of warfare.

Today, international links among terrorist groups are more clearly understood. And Soviet and Soviet-bloc support is also more clearly understood. We face a diverse family of dangers. Iran and the Soviet Union are hardly allies, but they both share a fundamental hostility to the West. When Libya and the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] provide arms and training to the communists in Central America, they are aiding Soviet-supported Cuban efforts to undermine our security in that vital region. When the Red Brigades in Italy and the Red Army Faction in Germany assault free countries in the name of communist ideology, they hope to shake the West’s self-confidence, unity, and will to resist intimidation. The terrorists who assault Israel—and, indeed, the Marxist Provisional IRA [Irish Republican Army] in Northern Ireland—are ideological enemies of the United States. We cannot and we will not succumb to the likes of Khomeini and Gadhafi.

We also now see a close connection between terrorism and international narcotics trafficking. Cuba and Nicaragua, in particular, have used narcotics smugglers to funnel guns and money to terrorists and insurgents in Colombia. Other communist countries, like Bulgaria, have also been part of the growing link between drugs and terrorism.

We should understand the Soviet role in international terrorism without exaggeration or distortion. One does not have to believe that the Soviets are puppeteers and the terrorists marionettes; violent or fanatic individuals and groups can exist in almost any society.

would long since have withered away had it not been for significant support from outside. When Israel went into Lebanon in 1982, Israeli forces uncovered irrefutable evidence that the Soviet Union had been arming and training the PLO and other groups. Today, there is no reason to think that Soviet support for terrorist groups around the world has diminished. Here as elsewhere, there is a wide gap between Soviet words and Soviet deeds, a gap that is very clear, for instance, when you put Soviet support for terrorist groups up against the empty rhetoric of the resolution against so-called “state terrorism” which the U.S.S.R. has submitted to this year’s UN General Assembly. The Soviets condemn terrorism, but in practice they connive with terrorist groups when they think it serves their own purposes, and their goal is always the same: to weaken liberal democracy and undermine world stability.

The Moral and Strategic Stakes

The stakes in our war against terrorism, therefore, are high. We have already seen the horrible cost in innocent lives that terrorism violence has incurred. But perhaps even more horrifying is the damage that terrorism threatens to wreak on our modern civilization. For centuries mankind has strived to build a world in which the highest human aspirations can be fulfilled.

We have pulled ourselves out of a state of barbarism and removed the fronts to human freedom and dignity that are inherent to that condition. We have sought to free ourselves from that primitive existence described by Hobbes where life is lived in “continual fear and danger of violent death...nasty, brutish, and short.” We have sought to create, instead, a world where universal respect for human rights and democratic values makes a better life possible. We in the democracies can attest to all that man is capable of achieving if he renounces violence and brute force, if he is free to think, write, vote, and worship as he pleases. Yet all of these hard-won gains are threatened by terrorism.

Terrorism is a step backward; it is a step toward anarchy and decay. In the broadest sense, terrorism represents a return to barbarism in the modern age. If the modern world cannot face up to the challenge, then terrorism, and the
Obstacles to Meeting the Challenge

The magnitude of the threat posed by terrorism is so great that we cannot afford to confront it with half-hearted and poorly organized measures. Terrorism is a contagious disease that will inevitably spread if it goes untreated. We need a strategy to cope with terrorism in all of its varied manifestations. We need to summon the necessary resources and determination to fight it and, with international cooperation, eventually stamp it out. And we have to recognize that the burden falls on us, the democracies—no one else will cure the disease for us.

Yet clearly we face obstacles, some of which arise precisely because we are democracies. The nature of the terrorist assault is, in many ways, alien to us. Democracies like to act on the basis of known facts and shared knowledge. Terrorism is clandestine and mysterious by nature. Terrorists rely on secrecy, and, therefore, it is hard to know for certain who has committed an act of terrorism.

Democracies also rely on reason and persuasive logic to make decisions. It is hard for us to understand the fanaticism and apparent irrationality of many terrorists, especially those who kill and commit suicide in the belief that they will be rewarded in the afterlife. The psychopathic ruthlessness and brutality of terrorism is an aberration in our culture and alien to our heritage.

And it is an unfortunate irony that the very qualities that make democracies so hateful to the terrorists—our respect for the rights and freedoms of the individual—also make us particularly vulnerable. Precisely because we maintain the most open societies, terrorists have unparalleled opportunity to strike at us. Terrorists seek to make democracies embattled and afraid, to break down democratic accountability, due process, and order; they hope we will turn toward repression or succumb to chaos.

These are the challenges we must live with. We will certainly not alter the democratic values that we so cherish in order to fight terrorism. We will have to find ways to fight back without undermining everything we stand for.

Combating Moral Confusion

There is another obstacle that we have created for ourselves that we should overcome—that we must overcome if we are to fight terrorism effectively. The obstacle I am referring to is confusion.

We cannot begin to address this monumental challenge to decent, civilized society until we clear our heads of the confusion about terrorism, in many ways the moral confusion, that still seems to plague us. Confusion can lead to paralysis, and it is a luxury that we simply can't afford.

The confusion about terrorism has taken many forms. In recent years, we have heard some ridiculous distortions, even about what the word "terrorism" means. The idea, for instance, that denying food stamps to some is a form of terrorism cannot be entertained by serious people. And those who would argue, as recently some in Great Britain have, that physical violence by strikers can be equated with "the violence of unemployment" are, in the words of The Economist, "a menace to democracy everywhere." In a real democracy, violence is unequivocally bad. Such distortions are dangerous, because words are important. When we distort our language, we may distort our thinking, and we hamper our efforts to find solutions to the grave problems we face.

The confusion has been, however, a more serious kind of confusion surrounding the issue of terrorism: the confusion between the terrorist act itself and the political goals that the terrorists claim to seek.

The grievances that terrorists supposedly seek to redress through acts of violence may or may not be legitimate. The terrorist acts themselves, however, can never be legitimate, and legitimate causes can never justify or excuse terrorism. Terrorist means discredit their ends.

"We have all heard the insidious claim that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." When I spoke on the subject of terrorism this past June, I quoted the powerful rebuttal to this kind of moral relativism made by the late Senator Henry Jackson. His statement bears repeating today: "The idea that one person's 'terrorist' is another's 'freedom fighter,'" he said, "cannot be sanctioned. Freedom fighters or revolutionaries don't blow up buses containing non-combatants; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don't set out to capture and slaughter school children; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don't assassinate innocent businessmen, or hijack and hold hostage innocent men, women, and children; terrorist murderers do. It is a disgrace that democracies would allow the treasured word 'terrorism' to be used, associated with acts of terrorists."" So spoke Scoop Jackson.

We cannot afford to let an Orwellian corruption of language obscure our understanding of terrorism. We know the difference between terrorists and freedom fighters, and as we look around the world, we have no trouble telling one from the other.

How tragic it would be if democracies were to lose confidence in their own moral legitimacy that they lost sight of the obvious: that violence directed against democracy or the hopes for democracy lacks fundamental justification. Democracy offers the opportunity for peaceful change, legitimate political competition, and redress of grievances. We must oppose terrorists no matter what banner they may fly. For terrorism, in any guise, is an enemy of freedom.

And we must not fall into the death trap of giving justification to the unacceptable acts of terrorists by acknowledging the worthy-sounding motives they may claim. Organizations, such as the Provisional IRA, for instance, play on popular grievances, raw political and religious emotions, to disguise their deadly purpose. They find ways to work through local political and religious leaders to enlist support for their brutal actions. As a result, we even find Americans contributing, we hope unwittingly, to an organization which has killed—in cold blood and without the slightest remorse—hundreds of innocent men, women, and children in Great Britain and Ireland; an organization which has assassinated senior officials and tried to assassinate the British Prime Minister and her entire cabinet; a proscribed Marxist organization which also gets support from Libya's Qadhadhi and has close links with other international terrorists. The Government of the United States stands firmly with the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Ireland in opposing any action that lends aid or support to the Provisional IRA.
many forms. When 2 Americans and 12 Lebanese were killed at our Embassy in Beirut last month, we were told that the bombing happened because of a vote we cast against the United Nations, or because of our actions in Lebanon, or because of the civil state of our relations with the Soviets, or because of our support for terrorism. We were advised by some that if we could stop terrorism—if we want to—then end to these vicious murders—then what we need to do is change our policies. In effect, we have been told that terrorism is in some measure our fault, and we deserved to be attacked. I can tell you here and now that the United States will not be driven out of Beirut by four or 24 or 100 terrorist killings. The international community cannot permit itself any certainty as to the real meaning of terrorist violence in the Middle East or anywhere else. Those who truly seek peace in the Middle East know that war and bloodshed are no answer. Those who seek to legitimize and support terrorism are finding themselves the target of terrorism. Whether they are Arabs or Israelis, none of the great tragedies of the Middle East, in fact, is that the moderates on the Arab side—those who want to live in peace with Israel—are threatened by the radicals; that the terrorist government and organizations like the PLO have shown that they are more common in the modern world. On the way to being well prepared to deter an all-out war or a Soviet attack on our principal allies, that is why these are the least likely contingencies. It is not self-evident that we are as well prepared and organized to deter and counter the “gray area” of intermediate challenges that are more likely to face—the low-intensity conflict of which terrorism is a part. We have worked hard to deter large-scale aggression by strengthening our strategic and conventional defenses, by restoring the pride and confidence of the men and women in our military and by displaying the kind of national resolve to confront aggression that can deter potential adversaries. We have been

our policies in the Middle East in the face of the terrorist threat? Not Israel, not the moderate Arabs, not the Palestinian people, and certainly not the cause for peace. Indeed, the worst thing we could do is change our policies under the threat of violence. What we must do is support our friends and remain firm in our goals.

We have to rid ourselves of this moral confusion which lays the blame for terrorist actions on us or on our policies. We are attacked not because of what we are doing wrong but because of what we are doing right. We are right to support the security of Israel, and there is no terrorist act or threat that will change that firm determination. We are attacked not because of some mistake we are making but because of who we are and what we believe in. We must not abandon our principles, or our role in the world, or our responsibilities as the champion of freedom and peace.

The Response to Terrorism

While terrorism threatens many countries, the United States has a special responsibility. It is time for this country to make a broad national commitment to treat the challenge of terrorism with the sense of urgency and priority it deserves.

The essence of our response is simple to state: violence and aggression must be met by firm resistance. This principle holds true whether we are responding to full-scale military attacks or to the kinds of low-level conflicts that are more common in the modern world. We are on the way to being well prepared to deter an all-out war or a Soviet attack on our principal allies, that is why these are the least likely contingencies. It is not self-evident that we are as well prepared and organized to deter and counter the “gray area” of intermediate challenges that are more likely to face—the low-intensity conflict of which terrorism is a part.

We have worked hard to deter large-scale aggression by strengthening our strategic and conventional defenses, by restoring the pride and confidence of the men and women in our military and by displaying the kind of national resolve to confront aggression that can deter potential adversaries. We have been

with many forms of low-level aggression, has so far posed an even more difficult challenge, for the technology of security has been outstripped by the technology of murder. And, of course, the United States is not the only nation that faces difficulties in responding to terrorism. To update President Reagan's report in the debate last Sunday, since September 1, 41 acts of terrorism have been perpetrated by no less than 14 terrorist groups against the people and property of 21 countries. Even Israel has not rid itself of the terrorist threat, despite its brave and prodigious effort.

But no nation had more experience with terrorism than Israel, and no nation has made a greater contribution to our understanding of the problem and the best ways to confront it. By supporting organizations like the Jonathan Insti-
But part of our problem here in the United States has been our seeming inability to understand terrorism clearly. Each successive terrorist incident has wrought too much self-condemnation and dismay, accompanied by calls for a change in our policies or our principles or calls for withdrawal and retreat. We should be alarmed. We should be outraged. We should investigate and strive to improve. But widespread public anguish and self-condemnation only convince the terrorists that they are on the right track. It only encourages them to commit more acts of barbarism in the hope that American resolve will weaken.

This is a particular danger in the period before our election. If our reaction to terrorist acts is to turn on ourselves instead of against the perpetrators, we give the redoubled incentive to do it again and to try to influence our political processes.

We have to be stronger, steadier, determined, and united in the face of the terrorist threat. We must not reward the terrorists by changing our policies or questioning our own principles or wallowing in self-flagellation or self-doubt. Instead, we should understand that terrorism is aggression and, like all aggression, must be forcefully resisted.

The Requirements for an Active Strategy

We must reach a consensus in this country that our responses should go beyond passive defense to consider means of active prevention, preemption, and retaliation. Our goal must be to prevent and deter future terrorist acts, and experience has taught us over the years that one of the best deterrents to terrorism is the certainty that swift and sure measures will be taken against those who engage in it. We should take steps toward carrying out such measures. There should be no moral confusion on this issue. Our aim is not to seek revenge but to put an end to terrorist attacks against innocent people, to make the world a safer place to live for all of us. Clearly, the democracies have a moral right, indeed a duty, to defend themselves.

A successful strategy for combating terrorism will require us to face up to some hard questions and to come up with some clear-cut answers. The questions involve our intelligence capability, the doctrine under which we would employ force, and, most important of all, our public's attitude toward this challenge. Our nation cannot summon the will to act without firm public understanding and support.

First, our intelligence capabilities, particularly our human intelligence, are being strengthened. Determination and capacity to act are of little value unless we can come close to answering the questions: who, why, and when. We have to do a better job of finding out who the terrorists are: where they are; and the nature, composition, and patterns of behavior of terrorist organizations. Our intelligence services are organizing themselves to do the job, and they must be given the mandate and the flexibility to develop techniques of detection and contribute to deterrence and response.

Second, there is no question about our ability to use force where and when it is needed to counter terrorism. Our nation has forces prepared for action—from small teams able to operate virtually undetected, to the full weight of our conventional military might. But serious issues are involved—questions that need to be debated, understood, and agreed if we are to be able to utilize our forces wisely and effectively.

If terrorists strike here at home, it is a matter for police action and domestic law enforcement. In most cases overseas, acts of terrorism against our people and installations can be dealt with by the host government and its forces. It is worth remembering that just as it is the responsibility of the U.S. Government to provide security for foreign Embassies in Washington, so the internationally agreed doctrine is that the security of our Embassies abroad in the first instance is the duty of the host government, and we work with those governments cooperatively and with considerable success. The ultimate responsibility of course is ours, and we will carry it out with total determination and all the resources available to us. Congress, in a bipartisan effort, is giving us the legislative tools and the resources to strengthen the protection of our facilities and our people overseas—and they must continue to do so. But while we strengthen our defenses, defense alone is not enough.

The heart of the challenge lies in those cases where international rules and traditional practices do not apply. Terrorists will strike from areas where no governmental authority exists, or they will base themselves behind what they expect will be the sanctuary of an international border. And they will design their attacks to take place in precisely those "gray areas" where the full facts cannot be known, where the challenge will not bring with it an obvious or clear-cut choice of response.

In such cases we must use our intelligence resources carefully and completely. We will have to examine the full range of measures available to us to take. The outcome may be that we will face a choice between doing nothing or employing military force. We now recognize that terrorism is being used by our adversaries as a modern tool of warfare. It is no aberration. We can expect more terrorism directed at our strategic interests around the world in the years ahead. To combat it, we must be willing to use military force.

What will be required, however, is public understanding before the fact of the risks involved in combating terrorism with overt power.

* The public must understand before the fact that there is potential for loss of life of some of our fighting men and the loss of life of some innocent people.
* The public must understand before the fact that some will seek to cast any preemptive or retaliatory action by us in the worst light and will attempt to make our military and our policymakers—rather than the terrorists—appear to be the culprits.
* The public must understand before the fact that occasions will come when their government must act before each and every fact is known—and the decisions cannot be tied to the opinion polls.

Public support for U.S. military actions to stop terrorists before they commit some hideous act or in retaliation for an attack on our people is crucial if we are to deal with this challenge.
the techniques to use power to fight the war against terrorism. This capability will be used judiciously. To be successful over the long term, it will require solid support from the American people.

I can assure you that in this Administration our actions will be governed by the rule of law; and the rule of law is congenial to action against terrorists. We will need the flexibility to respond to terrorist attacks in a variety of ways, at times and places of our own choosing. Clearly, we will not respond in the same manner to every terrorist attack. Indeed, we will want to avoid engaging in a policy of automatic retaliation which might create a cycle of escalating violence beyond our control.

If we are going to respond or preempt effectively, our policies will have to have an element of unpredictability and surprise. And the prerequisite for such a policy must be a broad public consensus on the moral and strategic necessity of action. We will need the capability to act on a moment’s notice. There will not be time for a renewed national debate after every terrorist attack. We may never have the kind of evidence that can stand up in an American court of law. But we cannot allow ourselves to become the Hamlet of nations, worrying endlessly over whether and how to respond. A great nation with global responsibilities cannot afford to be hamstrung by confusion and inaction. Fighting terrorism will not be a clean or pleasant contest, but we have no choice but to play it.

We will also need a broader international effort. If terrorism is truly a threat to Western moral values, our capacity must not paralyze us; it must give us the courage to face up to the values are united, so, too, must the democratic countries be united in defending them. The leaders of the industrial democracies, meeting at the London summit in June, agreed in a joint declaration that they must redouble their cooperation against terrorism. There has been followup to that initial meeting, and the United States is committed to advance the process in every way possible. Since we, the democracies, are the most vulnerable, and our strategic interests are the most at stake, we must act together in the face of common dangers. For our part, we will work whenever possible in close cooperation with our friends in the democracies.

Sanctions, when exercised in concert with other nations, can help to isolate, weaken, or punish states that sponsor terrorism against us. Too often, countries are inhibited by fear of losing commercial opportunities or fear of provoking a bully. Economic sanctions and other forms of countervailing pressure impose costs and risks on the nations that apply them, but some sacrifices will be necessary if we are not to suffer even greater costs down the road. Some countries are clearly more vulnerable to extortion than others, surely this is an argument for banding together in mutual support, not an argument for appeasement.

If we truly believe in the values of our civilization, we have a duty to defend them. The democracies must have the self-confidence to tackle this menacing problem or else they will not be in much of a position to tackle other kinds of problems. If we are not willing to set limits to what kinds of behavior are tolerable, then our adversaries will con-
APPENDIX B

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'S ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS
FISCAL YEAR 1988 (EXCERPT: pp 56-62)

...8. LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

Today, the United States confronts several forms of ambiguous aggression in what is popularly referred to as Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC). While terrorism, subversion, and insurgency are as ancient as conflict itself, the growing intensity with which they are pursued by our adversaries in the post-World War II era requires a commensurate increase in the attention we devote to them. Indeed, these forms of ambiguous aggression have become so widespread that they may have become the "warfare of choice" over the last 40 years. They represent a long-term challenge to our security, a permanent aspect of the "long twilight struggle" between democracy and its enemies.

The increased prominence of terrorism, insurgency, and subversion has several causes. One is that, for better or worse, nuclear weapons have made great power confrontations highly dangerous. The implicit recognition that even if, by their thinking, a nuclear war could be "won," it would exact incalculable costs, has made the Soviet Union look for other means to advance its aggressive designs. Coupled with our nuclear deterrent has also been our conventional deterrent, which has yet to be challenged in Europe and which, with the South Koreans, successfully blocked communist attempts to subjugate South Korea. Thus the very success of our efforts in deterring nuclear and major conventional aggression has driven Soviet efforts, and those of other hostile states, toward more ambiguous forms of aggression.

These efforts have been aided, and the challenge we face expanded, by the comparatively recent proliferation of Third World states that coincided with the decline of the great European empires following World War II. These new states, in many cases, have encountered economic, political, and social problems that make them ripe for internal upheaval or external exploitation and subversion. The rampant growth in the international arms trade, coupled with the increased lethality of weapons, have combined to reduce the costs to countries planning to use LIC. All this occurred as the United States' world role increased, both as a consequence of our emergence as the de facto leader of the free world after World War II, and because of our rapidly expanding network of political, economic, and social relationships within an environment of increased global interdependence. This, of course, has made us more vulnerable to these forms of aggression. Indeed, today there seems to be no shortage of adversaries who seek to undermine our security by persistently nibbling away at our
interests through these shadow wars carried on by guerrillas, assassins, terrorists, and subversives in the hope that they have found a weak point in our defenses. For them, low-intensity warfare, be it terrorism, insurgency, or subversion, represents a cost-effective means of aggression for advancing their interests, while minimizing the prospect of a forceful response by the United States and our allies.

In a sense, we face a dual threat. First, there are the political, social, and economic instabilities endemic to many Third World nations which make them ripe for exploitation by radical or disenfranchised internal elements. Often these elements foment hostility focused on the so-called "neocolonialist" West, particularly the United States. Secondly, the Soviet Union is eager to exploit this instability directly or through its proxies, to promote terrorism, subversion (as in Grenada, Ethiopia, Afghanistan in 1979, and South Yemen) and insurgency, thereby undermining U.S. security interests through this "indirect approach."

Essentially, we are also faced with another conflict potential, different from either nuclear war or more traditional, conventional military operations. We must combat this threat to our security by assisting those friendly states that rely on our help at a time when our defense resources are already stretched to their limit. But we all should recognize that here, as elsewhere, the most cost-effective defense for the United States is to help others. Thus, an "economy of force" strategy is mandated.

Furthermore, we are working to integrate our military strategy, to an unprecedented degree, within an overall interagency and intergovernmental approach to address the problem in its political, economic, and social dimensions, as well as its military form. Finally, each major kind or low-intensity warfare requires its own strategic approach, since more traditional forms of deterrence are not likely to dissuade those who practice these subtle, ambiguous methods of aggression.

(1) COMBATTING INSURGENCIES

The problems of decolonization and nation building associated with the emergence of Third World states from colonial rule has led in many cases to political, social, and economic instabilities that threaten the survival of legitimate governments, and compromise U.S. security interests. These conditions also exist in older independent nations of the Third World. Generally, these instabilities, combined with popular dissatisfaction and the target government's inability to respond effectively, lay the groundwork for exploitation by internal elements who seek to effect through violence what they cannot change through peaceful, orderly means. Frequently in these instances we
find the Soviet Union and its surrogates capitalizing on a nation’s misfortunes by supporting these insurgents in their attempts to overthrow the existing order. When they have succeeded, as we have seen, the result is the imposition of a far more odious form of government, as occurred in Vietnam, Cuba, and Nicaragua.

In other examples, insurgencies secure support by promising freedom from repression, and then impose far more repressive governments than any the world has seen since the Middle Ages. Iran is the prime example in this category, and the lesson for the United States is that we should be reluctant indeed to join an apparently popular revolution against a government friendly to the United States, as was the Shah’s government in Iran, and only after asking ourselves whether the people involved actually will benefit by any change in rulers.” In the Philippines, we satisfied this test and the results now more than justify our actions.

Our response to all these challenges generally has been, and should be, to assist friendly governments threatened by externally supported insurgents in alleviating those legitimate grievances levied against them. At the same time, we are helping the host country regime combat those insurgent groups whose aim is not reasoned reform, but rather the seizing of power to impose their own agenda by force. Since the root problems of insurgency are primarily political, social, and economic, assisting the host country combat the military threat is but one element in a comprehensive strategy that must address the conflict’s multiple dimensions. The key to success in this kind of war is the host country’s willingness to make those changes and reforms required to preempt the insurgents’ cause thereby frustrating their attempts to intimidate the people and cripple the economic infrastructure.

This approach requires a long-term effort on our part. Insurgencies are typically protracted conflicts, and therefore our strategy must be designed for the long haul. It is not so much our objective to help these nations win battles against insurgent military forces as it is to assist their military in buying the time necessary for needed reforms to take root and flourish under governments friendly to the United States. Unless the host government succeeds in eliminating the underlying causes of insurgency, any military successes won in the field will prove fleeting.

Our specific role is to work with the other appropriate U.S. government agencies and host country organizations, as necessary, to integrate our effort into a comprehensive strategy to combat the insurgency when that is indicated, and, where possible, identify at an early stage those conditions that foster insurgency. Our support typically involves training indigenous host country forces, providing assistance in technical areas like communications and intelligence, and ensuring that the armed forces have the
equipment needed to exploit the training they receive.

In discussing the proper "Uses of Military Power" in last year's Annual Report and in earlier speeches, I noted that the United States should not treat lightly the prospect of employing American combat forces. From the point of view of one who bears a large part of the responsibility for the lives of American troops, I do not believe the country is ill-served by the requirement that, before we commit military personnel, our national interests be so heavily involved that the only way left to serve those interests is by the commitment to combat of our troops. This caution is especially relevant when contemplating their use to assist regimes threatened by insurgency. For one thing, the deterioration of the host country's situation that could result in a call for U.S. troops is, in itself, an indication that the regime is not making progress in enacting needed reforms. Without this kind of commitment on their part, any military effort on our part will ultimately prove fruitless. Nor will the American people or their elected representatives in the Congress sustain support for regimes that refuse to do what is needed while the lives of American servicemen are at risk. For this reason we must also have a clear grasp of how the regime targeted by insurgents represents a long-term and absolutely vital interest to our security. Without this condition, we stand little chance of prevailing in a protracted conflict. This also ensures that we will commit the requisite resources to sustain our strategy over the long haul.

Also, we must have a clear understanding with the country we seek to assist, and within our own councils, of how our forces will work to achieve clearly defined strategic objectives. The assisted nation must seek to assume the full burden for its defense at the earliest possible moment. Indeed, this is the ultimate measure of our strategy's success. In the past six years we have done much to enhance our special operations forces and general purpose forces to operate effectively in this unique conflict environment. Yet this effort does not eliminate the need to constantly reassess the relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed. If the host regime will not address itself to the task at hand, U.S. combat forces cannot be expected to remain indefinitely. Finally, we should commit combat forces only as a last resort, after diplomatic, economic, and other political options have been exhausted.

The history of the past 40 years indicates that, whether it goes by the name of insurgency, a war of national liberation, or revolutionary warfare, this kind of ambiguous aggression poses a major threat to U.S. security interests. This threat defies a strictly military solution, although there is a clear military dimension to the conflict. Given its ambiguous and protracted nature, and the decisive role
played by the regime targeted by insurgents, we must have a unique strategy and force capability to counter it.

Of course, we oppose those who seek to impose totalitarianism in the Third World, but we must recognize that there are many who fight to restore the liberty and independence they have lost to communist aggression. These peoples, be they from Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, Cambodia, or other countries suffering the effects of totalitarian oppression, deserve our support: not only because it is right, but because as President Kennedy observed, "If men and women are in chains anywhere in the world, then freedom is endangered." Thus, as President Reagan has stated, our policy is not "just the prevention of war, but the extension of freedom as well." We are prepared to support those who fight for freedom, not only because it is morally right, but because it is one of the best ways to safeguard the security of the world's democracies.

(2) COMBATTING SUBVERSION

While insurgency involves protracted warfare to achieve its ultimate goal of toppling a government, subversion involves actions taken by an external power to recruit and assist indigenous political and military forces to overthrow their government through a coup d'état. The Soviet Union has utilized subversion as a means of ambiguous aggression since Lenin's time. Some of their more recent successes include Ethiopia and Afghanistan. Had we not responded promptly and forcefully, Grenada would have been added to the list. This form of low-intensity aggression is not limited to the Soviet Union; it has also been embraced by others, among them Qaddafi's Libya and Castro's Cuba, in attempting to advance their aims.

The key to combating this subtle form of aggression, which manifests itself in open conflict only at the last possible moment, is the quality and reliability of a nation's indigenous military forces along with its legitimate political institutions. Although we in this country take for granted the supremacy of civilian authority, this is frequently not the case in many Third World states. Nevertheless, a cornerstone of our strategy to combat subversion concerns our efforts to enhance the capabilities of friendly nation military forces, and to assist them in effecting those reforms that augment their professionalism and emphasize the importance of an apolitical military leadership supportive of free institutions. Countering subversion requires a long-term commitment to creating shared values through exchange programs, training and education, civic action, and related activities. This kind of preventive medicine wards off penetration and subversion of the military by hostile powers bent on effecting a violent change in the established order.
In so doing, it reduces the likelihood that our combat forces will ever be requested by a legitimate government under attack by indigenous forces influenced by malevolent external powers. Although we seek to counter subversion through the methods noted above, the United States has, in the past, responded effectively with force to blunt this kind of aggression in Lebanon (1958), the Dominican Republic (1965), and Grenada (1983), and retains the capability and the will to do so again should it be deemed necessary. Surely, no one can contend that it is to our advantage to allow communist-sponsored subversion to convert a friendly government into a communist enemy, and particularly not in our own hemisphere.

(3) COMBATTING TERRORISM

It is safe to say that nothing has so outraged the world's civilized peoples in recent years as the senseless acts of violence carried out by terrorist groups representing radical political and religious views. In its domestic form, terrorism is properly the province of the police forces of a nation. When terrorism becomes international in scope or is aided and abetted by state sponsors, however, the threat posed to U.S. citizens and security interests may require an American military response. This response may occur at two levels. At a lower level, it involves our actions to deter acts of terrorism and, if deterrence fails, to deny the terrorists their objectives. Deterrence in this case, frequently requires that we not only convey our ability and willingness to punish the perpetrator, but that we convince the terrorist that his objective cannot be achieved; that is, deterrence through denial as well as through the threat of retaliation. Unfortunately, in free societies it is difficult, if not impossible, to impose the kinds of restrictions that might guarantee the denial of all potential targets to terrorists. Nevertheless, we have undertaken numerous active and passive defensive measures to make our military forces, especially those overseas, less attractive targets for terrorist groups. At the same time we have developed highly trained units that are capable of assisting friendly governments defeat terrorist acts that are already under way, as in the case of hostage seizures.

When terrorism is sponsored by the leaders of sovereign states as a tool of aggression, however, it moves beyond the realm of an internal police matter to a higher level—that of international conflict involving state-to-state confrontation. Here the situation differs from individual acts of terrorism, as we saw this past April when we identified Libya as clearly responsible for an act of terrorism against our military personnel in West Berlin. The military operations executed by U.S. forces in response
to this act of aggression were conventional in nature. They were carried out with exceptional skill, daring and effectiveness, in the best traditions of all our forces. The action demonstrated many things, one being that we are ready, on very short notice, for very difficult actions involving the solution of particularly complex logistical problems. The Libyan action was not carried out by the kind of special operations forces that are involved in combattting specific terrorist acts while they are in progress and, in a sense, this is even a greater tribute to our conventional forces. It also involves the closest coordination at the interdepartmental level and with our allies. The objective of the Libyan operation was both to strike at terrorist support bases, and to teach the state of Libya that providing terrorist groups with the support necessary to conduct their international campaign of aggression against the United States carries with it a terrible cost. Thus, our strategy for precluding and combatting terrorist acts involves a range of general purpose forces as well as special operations forces.

(4) SUMMARY

Unlike nuclear war or a major conventional war, we must concern ourselves not only with deterring ambiguous aggression, but with actively combatting it, for it is going on all around us. To some extent, it is the product of our success in preventing wars at higher levels of intensity that has forced our adversaries to pursue these wars in the shadows. With their high mixture of political, economic and social elements blended into a military threat, these forms of ambiguous aggression demand the closest coordination between the United States and its allies, and within our government itself. A multidimensional threat demands a comprehensive response. Other sections of this report consider, in detail, how the Defense Department is improving special operations forces and general purpose forces to contribute to the Administration's national strategy for combatting low-intensity aggression. If the Congress provides us the resources and the unswerving support to execute this strategy over the long haul, the "long twilight struggle" will favor the cause of democracy and freedom. If we fail, these forms of aggression will remain the most likely and the most enduring threats to our security.
HERE IS MSGT JUDD'S SUCCESS STORY

According to the AFOSI debriefing, MSgt Judd credited knowledge gained in an OSI briefing with saving his life.

“He advised he had maintained the suggested eight-foot distance between his vehicle and the one in front of him while stopped at the light. This gave him maneuverability. He maintained alertness to what was going on around him and varied his routes. Also, following his briefing procedures, he always kept either to the extreme right or extreme left; therefore, preventing him from being boxed in. When he saw the motorcycle with two persons drive up next to the right front door, he paid close attention to them. He saw the motorcycle passenger using his left hand draw a .45 caliber automatic, that appeared to be uncocked, from the waist of his trousers. He immediately swung the steering wheel left and pressed the gas all the way down. He jumped the median and escaped down the wrong side of the road. As he was swinging the wheel he heard one loud report from the weapon and felt something in his right hand. (He was wounded there, and the right front window of the vehicle was shattered.) His immediate acceleration accounted for the two shots AFOSI found through the back of the station wagon. One shot going through the window and seat back, then apparently wounding him in the shoulder/back area. This also accounts for the low shot which went through the license plate and back rear door. The police recovered five cartridge casings at the scene. It is likely that the terrorist fired two more shots which did not hit the vehicle at all.”

There is no doubt that this terrorist assassination attempt was foiled by the quick and decisive actions of the intended victim. You can make the difference. You owe it to yourself, your family, and the nation to become aware of the potential of your adversaries and to take reasonable actions to protect yourself.
It is unlikely that this trend will reverse itself. As attacks continue, and news coverage increases, the tendency is to accept terrorism as commonplace. If the terrorists are to continue to draw the media attention their cause requires, their acts must become more spectacular.

How far the escalation will go is a matter for speculation. Terrorism could continue, more or less unchanged, slowly increase or it could take off like a speeding train in the form of mass casualty attacks like that on the Marine Corps compound in Beirut.

WHO ARE THE TERRORISTS?

Most terrorists are 18 to 28 years old, come from upper middle class families, have had some college education, are politically-oriented, and embrace communist or anarchist philosophies. Many terrorists are women; they often become the most ruthless killers within the group.

Other terrorists are mercenaries who, for the most part, have at least partially embraced the cause of world communism, such as the infamous Carlos. Also, right wing or reactionary terrorists have surfaced to counter the growing threat they see from leftist led groups.

Regardless of their affiliation, terrorists usually work within a group which has a definite organizational structure and hierarchy. The first or command element often consists of the older and more experienced terrorists who establish the organization’s objectives.

The second element is comprised of the operators or shooters. Sometimes former criminals or ex-military personnel, these individuals actually conduct the planned attacks. They are often prone to irrational actions, giving little consideration to captives or hostages.
WHO ARE THESE PEOPLE?  
WHY ARE THEY TRYING TO KILL US?

TERRORISM IS NOT NEW

Terrorism and political violence are not new. They have plagued the earth for hundreds of years. What is new is the worldwide news coverage and the frightening intensity of the violence we face today.

In the 1970's, seizing embassies and kidnapping diplomats or business executives were common terrorist tactics. Positive steps to provide better security resulted in a decline in embassy takeovers and kidnappings. Then there was a corresponding rise in assassinations and bombings.

Now, large-scale attacks like the bombings of the American Embassy and the Marine Corps compound in Beirut have become the favored tactic. The random killing of innocent bystanders, as seen in the devastating bomb attacks on the Horse Guards parade in London and the railway station in Bologna, is also common.

Evidence of this trend is borne out by a few basic statistics. Early in the 1970's, 80 percent of terrorist attacks were against property and only 20 percent against people. By the 1980's, one half of all attacks were against people. Fatal incidents have grown 20 percent each year, with multiple fatalities increasing dramatically in recent years.

YES, IT'S INCREASING

Despite a slight decline in the total number of worldwide terrorist incidents during the 1980's, there has been a 13 percent increase in the number of deaths. Total terrorist activity has increased an alarming 400 percent since the Munich Olympics.

TERRORISM AND TERRORISTS
THREE RULES FOR THE 80'S

KEEP A LOW PROFILE
Your dress, conduct, and mannerisms should not attract attention. Make an effort to blend into the local environment. Avoid publicity and don't go out in big groups. Stay away from civil disturbances and demonstrations.

Vary your route to and from work and the time you leave and return home. Vary the way you dress. Don't exercise at the same time and place each day, and never alone or on deserted streets or country roads. Let people close to you know where you are going and what you'll be doing.

BE UNPREDICTABLE
Watch for anything suspicious or out of place. Don't give out personal information over the telephone. If you think you are being followed, go to a preselected secure area. Immediately report the incident to the Security Police or OSI.

REMAIN VIGILANT
Terrorism may seem like mindless violence committed without logic or purpose...it isn't. Terrorists attack soft and undefended targets, both people and facilities, to gain political objectives they see as out of reach by less violent means.

It is not possible to completely protect everything all of the time. Success in terrorist defense must come from a security team of men and women from every specialty, a team with husbands, wives, and family members all working together.

This workbook details actions you can take to reduce your vulnerability. These actions stem from the practice of three basic rules. Keep a low profile, be unpredictable, and remain vigilant. I urge you to study it, decide how the actions apply to your individual situation, and how you can best implement them.

DUANE H. CASSIDY
General, USAF
Commander in Chief

MESSAGE FROM CINCMAC
ANATOMY OF AN ASSASSINATION

Tuesday, 23 Dec 75: Mr Richard Welch, CIA Station Chief, Athens. Weapon: .45 caliber automatic.

ASSASSINATED!

Tuesday, 15 Nov 83: Captain George Tsantes, USN, JUSMAGG, Athens. Weapon: Same .45 caliber automatic.

ASSASSINATED!

Tuesday, 3 Apr 84: MSgt Robert Judd, USA, JUSMAGG, Athens. Weapon: Same .45 caliber automatic.

ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT.

BUT UNSUCCESSFUL!
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The third terrorist element is composed of idealists usually assigned to logistical and support tasks. They meet the physical needs of the group, distribute propaganda, and guard prisoners. The idealist is not normally violent and sometimes exhibits a sense of reasonableness within the group, balancing the ruthlessness and fanaticism of the other members.

**HOW TERRORISTS STRIKE**

The violence they practice is calculated and rational. Their immediate objectives, mainly psychological, are to generate fear among the people, induce a general loss of confidence in government, and provoke the authorities to adopt repressive measures, causing greater disruption within society. By using terrorist violence, ineffective political groups or governments are able to strike at their stronger enemies, usually with little likelihood of retaliation.

The more common types of violence committed by terrorists are bombing, hijacking, kidnapping, and assassination. Car bombs and more recently truck bombs driven by suicide assassins are now favorite weapons.

A wide variety of armament is readily available to most terrorist groups, including handheld automatic weapons, machine guns, recoilless rifles, rocket launchers, explosives, and incendiary devices. Surface-to-air missiles are also most probably in the terrorist arsenal. With weapons such as these, the possibilities for target selection and type of attack are very nearly limitless.

Terrorist operations are seldom based on chance. They are meticulously planned and executed within a tight schedule, against lightly defended or unprotected targets. Both target selection and attack planning are based on lengthy surveillance.

Attacks are usually rehearsed several times and may be aborted when the group encounters the unexpected or when they lose control of the situation.
These operational concepts have produced an impressive success record. In over 18 thousand incidents, since 1970, 91 percent of all terrorist attacks have been successful.

BUT THERE IS HOPE!

Depressing? You bet it is! But there is hope. Your actions can directly alter this negative equation. If you practice the three basic rules,

KEEP A LOW PROFILE
BE UNPREDICTABLE
REMAIN VIGILANT

you can significantly improve your chances of avoiding altogether a personal encounter with terrorism.
HOUSE, HOME, AND FAMILY

Familiarize your family with the local terrorist threat and necessary protective measures and techniques in this workbook. Review these measures regularly. Ensure everyone in the family knows what to do in an emergency.

TIPS FOR THE FAMILY AT HOME

_____ Restrict the possession of house keys. Change locks if keys are lost or stolen and when moving into a previously occupied residence.
_____ Lock all entrances at night, including the garage. Keep the house locked, even if you are at home.
_____ Personally destroy all envelopes or other items that reflect your name and rank.
_____ Develop friendly relationships with your neighbors.
_____ Do not draw attention to yourself by noisy parties or playing loud music; be considerate of neighbors.
_____ Avoid frequent exposure on balconies and near windows.

BE SUSPICIOUS

_____ Be alert to public utility crews and other foreign nationals requesting access to residence; check their identities through a peep-hole before allowing entry.
_____ Be alert to peddlers and strangers.
_____ Write down license numbers of suspicious vehicles; note descriptions of occupants.
_____ Refuse unordered packages.
_____ Treat with suspicion any inquiries about the whereabouts or activities of other family members.
_____ Report all suspicious activity to Security Police or OSI.

TELEPHONE SECURITY

_____ Post emergency numbers on the telephone.
_____ Security Police: ______________________________
_____ Local Police: ______________________________
_____ Fire Department: __________________________
_____ Hospital: ________________________________

HOUSE, HOME, AND FAMILY
Do not answer your telephone with your name and rank.
Report all threatening phone calls to security officials.

WHEN GOING OUT

Travel in groups as much as possible, avoid high risk areas and disturbances, and vary movements so as not to be predictable.
Try to be inconspicuous when using public transportation and facilities. Dress, conduct, and mannerisms should not attract attention.
Avoid public demonstrations; do not be curious.
Stay away from controversial meeting places; visit only reputable establishments.

SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS FOR CHILDREN

Never leave young children alone or unattended. Be certain when they are left, they are in the care of a trustworthy person.
Instruct children to keep doors and windows locked, and never to admit strangers.
Teach children how to contact the police or a neighbor in an emergency.
If it is necessary to leave children at home, keep the house well lighted and notify the neighbors.
Know where your children are all the time—morning, noon, and night.
Advise your children to:
Never leave home without advising their parents where they will be and who will accompany them.
Travel in pairs or groups.
Walk along busy streets and avoid isolated areas.
Use locally approved play areas where recreational activities are supervised by responsible adults and where police protection is readily available.
Refuse automobile rides from strangers and refuse to accompany strangers anywhere on foot...even if the strangers say mom or dad sent them or said it was okay.
Report immediately to the nearest person of authority (teacher, police) anyone who attempts to molest or annoy them.
Don’t hide keys outside house.

Use a timer (appropriate to local electricity) to turn lights on and off at varying times and locations.

Leave radio on. (Best with a timer.)

Hide valuables.

Notify the police or a trusted neighbor of your absence.

RESIDENTIAL SECURITY

Exterior grounds:

Do not put your name on the outside of your residence or mailbox.

Have good lighting.

Control vegetation to eliminate hiding places.

Entrances and exits should have:

Solid doors with deadbolt locks.

One-way peep-holes in doors.

Bars and locks on skylights.

Metal grating on glass doors and ground floor windows, with interior release mechanisms that are not reachable from outside.

Interior features:

Alarm and intercom systems.

Fire extinguishers.

Medical and first-aid equipment.

Other desirable features:

A clear view of approaches.

More than one access road.

Off-street parking.

High (6-8 feet) perimeter wall or fence, capped with barbed wire or other barriers to hamper climbing over these obstacles.
SUSPICIOUS PACKAGES OR MAIL

____ Suspicious characteristics to look for include:
   ___ An unusual or unknown place of origin.
   ___ No return address.
   ___ An excessive amount of postage.
   ___ Abnormal or unusual size.
   ___ Oily stains on the package.
   ___ Wires or strings protruding from or attached to an item.
   ___ Incorrect spelling on a package label.
   ___ Differing return address and postmark.
   ___ Appearance of foreign style handwriting.
   ___ Peculiar odor. (Many explosives used by terrorists smell like shoe polish or almonds.)
   ___ Unusual heaviness or lightness.
   ___ Uneven balance or shape.
   ___ Springiness in the top, bottom, or sides.

____ Never cut tape, strings, or other wrappings on a suspected package. Never immerse a suspected letter or package in water. Either of these actions could cause an explosive device to detonate.

____ Never touch or move a suspicious package or letter.

____ Report any suspicious packages or mail to security officials immediately.

DOMESTIC EMPLOYEES

____ Conduct a security background check with local police, neighbors, and friends.

____ Inform employees about security responsibilities.

____ Instruct them as to which phone or other means of communication to use in an emergency.

____ Do not discuss travel plans or sensitive topics within employee's hearing.

____ Discuss duties in friendly, firm manner.

____ Give presents or gratuities according to local custom.

SECURITY PRECAUTIONS WHEN YOU'RE AWAY

____ Leave house with lived in look.

____ Stop deliveries or direct to a neighbor's home.

____ Don't leave notes on doors.
Travel with companions or in convoy when possible.
Avoid isolated roads and dark alleys.
Know locations of safe havens along routes of routine travel.
Habitually ride with seatbelts buckled, doors locked, and windows closed.
Do not allow your vehicle to be boxed in; maintain a minimum 8-foot interval between you and the vehicle in front; avoid the inner lanes.
Be alert while driving or riding.
Know how to react if surveillance is suspected or confirmed.
Circle the block for confirmation of surveillance.
Do not stop or take other actions which could lead to confrontation.
Do not drive home.
Get description of car and its occupants.
Go to nearest safe haven. Report incident to Security Police or OSI.
Recognize events that can signal the start of an attack, such as:
Cyclist falling in front of your car.
Flagman or workman stopping your car.
Fake police or government checkpoint.
Disabled vehicle/accident victims on the road.
Unusual detours.
An accident in which your car is struck.
Cars or pedestrian traffic that box you in.
Sudden activity or gunfire.
Know what to do if under attack in a vehicle.
Without subjecting yourself, passengers, or pedestrians to harm, try to draw attention to your car by sounding the horn.
Put another vehicle between you and your pursuer.
Execute immediate turn and escape, jump curb at 30-45 degree angle, 35mph maximum.
Ram blocking vehicle if necessary.
Go to closest safe haven.
Report incident to Security Police or OSI.

COMMERCIAL BUSES, TRAINS, AND TAXIS
Vary mode of commercial transportation.
Select busy stops.
GROUND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

Criminal and terrorist acts against individuals usually occur outside the home and after the individual's habits have been established. Your most predictable habit is the route of travel from home to duty station or to commonly frequented local facilities.

VEHICLES

___ Select a plain car, minimize the "rich American" look.
___ Consider not using a government car that announces ownership.
___ Safeguard keys.
___ Auto maintenance:
   ____ Keep vehicle in good repair. You don't want it to fail when you need it most.
   ____ Keep gas tank at least 1/4 full at all times.
   ____ Ensure tires have sufficient tread.

PARKING

___ Park in well lighted areas.
___ Always lock your car...even when it's outside your house.
___ Don't leave it on the street overnight, if possible.
___ Never get out without checking for suspicious persons. If in doubt drive away.
___ Leave only the ignition key with parking attendants.
___ Don't allow entry to the trunk unless you're there to watch.
___ Never leave garage doors open or unlocked.
___ Use a remote garage door opener if available. Enter and exit your car in the security of the closed garage.

ON THE ROAD

___ Before leaving buildings to get into your vehicle, check the surrounding area to determine if anything of a suspicious nature exists. Display the same wariness before exiting your vehicle.
___ Before entering vehicles, check for suspicious objects on the seats. You may also look underneath the seats.
___ Guard against the establishment of routines by varying times, routes, and modes of travel. Avoid late night travel.
Don't always use the same taxi company.
Don't let someone you don't know direct you to a specific cab.
Ensure taxi is licensed, has safety equipment (seatbelts at minimum).
Ensure face of driver and picture on license are the same.
Try to travel with a companion.
If possible, specify the route you want taxi to follow.
ACTIONS IF ATTACKED

____ Dive for cover. Do not run. Running increases the probability of shrapnel hitting vital organs or the head.
____ If you must move, belly crawl or roll. Stay low to the ground, using available cover.
____ If you see grenades, lay flat on the floor, feet and knees tightly together with soles toward the grenade. In this position, your shoes, feet and legs protect the rest of your body. Shrapnel will rise in a cone from the point of detonation, passing over your body.
____ Place arms and elbows next to your ribcage to protect your lungs, heart, and chest. Cover your ears, head with your hands to protect neck arteries, ears, and skull.
____ Responding security personnel will not be able to recognize you from attackers. Do not attempt to assist them in any way. Lay still until told to get up.

ACTIONS IF HIJACKED

____ Remain calm, be polite and cooperative with your captors.
____ Be aware that all hijackers may not reveal themselves at the same time. A lone hijacker may be used to draw out security personnel for neutralization by other hijackers.
____ If traveling on a tourist passport, remember that this is only a shallow attempt to conceal your military affiliation.
____ Surrender your tourist passport in response to a general demand for identification.
____ Discretely dispose of any military or U.S. affiliated documents.
____ Don’t offer any information; confirm your military status if directly confronted with the fact. Be prepared to explain that you always travel on your personal passport and that no deceit was intended.
____ Don’t draw attention to yourself through sudden body movements, verbal remarks, or hostile looks.
____ Prepare yourself for possible verbal and physical abuse, lack of food, drink, and sanitary conditions.
____ Keep a positive attitude.
____ If permitted, read, sleep, or write to occupy your time.
____ Discretely observe your captors and get a thorough physical description. Include voice patterns and language distinctions, as well as clothing and unique physical characteristics.
____ Cooperate with any rescue attempt. Lie on the floor until told to rise.
TRAVELING DEFENSIVELY BY AIR

Air travel, particularly through high risk airports or countries, poses security problems different from those of ground transportation. Here too, simple precautions can reduce the hazards of a terrorist assault.

MAKING TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS

- Use office symbols on orders or leave authorizations if the word description denotes a high or sensitive position.
- Get a threat briefing from OSI or your security officer prior to travel to a high risk area.
- Use military air, MAC military contract, or U.S. flag carriers.
- Avoid scheduling through high risk areas; use foreign flag airlines and/or indirect routings to avoid high risk airports.
- Don’t use rank or military address on tickets, travel documents, or hotel reservations.
- Select window seat; they offer more protection since aisle seats are closer to the hijackers’ movements up and down the aisle.
- Rear seats also offer more protection since they are farther from the center of hostile action which is often near the cockpit.
- Seats at an emergency exit may provide an opportunity to escape.
- Avoid off-base hotels, use government quarters or “safe” hotels.

PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION

- Don’t discuss your military affiliation with anyone.
- You must have proper identification to show airline and immigration officials.
- Consider use of a tourist passport, if you have one, with necessary visas, providing it’s allowed by the country you are visiting.
- If you use a tourist passport, consider placing your official passport, military ID, travel orders and related documents in your checked luggage, not in your wallet or briefcase.
- If you must carry these documents on your person, select a hiding place onboard the aircraft to “ditch” them in case of a hijacking.
- Don’t carry classified documents unless they are absolutely mission-essential.
Travel with companions or in convoy when possible.

Avoid isolated roads and dark alleys.

Know locations of safe havens along routes of routine travel.

Habitually ride with seatbelts buckled, doors locked, and windows closed.

Do not allow your vehicle to be boxed in; maintain a minimum 8-foot interval between you and the vehicle in front; avoid the inner lanes.

Be alert while driving or riding.

Know how to react if surveillance is suspected or confirmed.

Circle the block for confirmation of surveillance.

Do not stop or take other actions which could lead to confrontation.

Do not drive home.

Get description of car and its occupants.

Go to nearest safe haven. Report incident to Security Police or OSI.

Recognize events that can signal the start of an attack, such as:

- Cyclist falling in front of your car.
- Flagman or workman stopping your car.
- Fake police or government checkpoint.
- Disabled vehicle/accident victims on the road.
- Unusual detours.
- An accident in which your car is struck.
- Cars or pedestrian traffic that box you in.
- Sudden activity or gunfire.

Know what to do if under attack in a vehicle.

Without subjecting yourself, passengers, or pedestrians to harm, try to draw attention to your car by sounding the horn.

Put another vehicle between you and your pursuer.

Execute immediate turn and escape, jump curb at 30-45 degree angle, 35mph maximum.

Ram blocking vehicle if necessary.

Go to closest safe haven.

Report incident to Security Police or OSI.

COMMERCIAL BUSES, TRAINS, AND TAXIS

Vary mode of commercial transportation.

Select busy stops.
LUGGAGE

- Use plain, civilian luggage; avoid military looking bags, B-4 bags, duffel bags, etc.
- Remove all military patches, logos, or decals from your luggage and briefcase.
- Ensure luggage tags don't show your rank or military address.
- Don't carry official papers in your briefcase.

CLOTHING

- Travel in conservative civilian clothing when using commercial transportation or when traveling military airlift if you are to connect with a flight at a commercial terminal in a high risk area.
- Don't wear distinct military items such as organizational shirts, caps, or military issue shoes or glasses.
- Don't wear U.S. identified items such as cowboy hats or boots, baseball caps, American logo T-shirts, jackets, or sweatshirts.
- Wear a long-sleeved shirt or bandage if you have a visible U.S. affiliated tattoo.

PRECAUTIONS AT THE AIRPORT

- Arrive early; watch for suspicious activity.
- Look for nervous passengers who maintain eye contact with others from a distance. Observe what people are carrying. Note behavior not consistent with that of others in the area.
- No matter where you are in the terminal, identify objects suitable for cover in the event of attack. Pillars, trash cans, luggage, large planters, counters, and furniture can provide protection.
- Don't linger near open public areas. Quickly transit insecure ticket counters (especially El Al), waiting rooms, commercial shops, and restaurants.
- Avoid processing with known target groups.
- Avoid secluded areas that provide concealment for attackers.
- Be aware of unattended baggage anywhere in the terminal.
- Observe the baggage claim area from a distance. Do not retrieve your bags until the crowd clears. Proceed to customs lines at the edge of the crowd.
- Report suspicious activity to airport security personnel.
TAKEN HOSTAGE? YOU CAN SURVIVE!

The chances of you being taken hostage are truly remote. Even better news is the fact that survival rates are high! But should it happen, remember your personal conduct can influence treatment in captivity.

PREPARING THE FAMILY

____ Have your family affairs in order, including an up-to-date will, appropriate powers of attorney, and measures taken to ensure family financial security.
____ Issues such as continuing the children’s education, family relocation, and disposition of property should be discussed with family members.
____ Your family should know that talking about your military affiliation to non-DOD people may place you in greater danger.
____ They must believe the U.S. government will work to obtain your safe release.
____ Don’t be depressed if negotiation efforts appear to be taking a long time. Remember, chance of survival actually increases with time.

STAY IN CONTROL

____ Regain your composure as soon as possible and recognize your fear. Your captors are probably as apprehensive as you, so your actions are important.
____ Take mental notes of directions, times of transit, noises, and other factors to identify your location.
____ Note the number, physical description, accents, habits, and rank structure of your captors.
____ Anticipate isolation and efforts to disorient and confuse you.
____ To the extent possible, try to mentally prepare yourself for the situation ahead. Stay mentally active.

DEALING WITH YOUR CAPTORS

____ Do not aggravate your abductors.
____ Attempt to develop a positive relationship with them.
____ Do not get into political or ideological discussions.
____ Comply with instructions, but always maintain your dignity.
____ Be proud of your heritage, government, and military association, but use discretion.

HOSTAGE SURVIVAL
KEEP OCCUPIED

_____ Exercise daily.
_____ Read anything and everything.
_____ Eat what is offered to you. You must maintain your strength.
_____ Establish a slow methodical routine for every task.

BEING INTERROGATED

_____ Take a simple, tenable position and stick to it.
_____ Be polite and keep your temper.
_____ Give short answers, talk freely about nonessential matters, but be guarded when conversations turn to matters of substance.
_____ Don’t be lulled by a friendly approach. Remember one terrorist may play “Good Guy” and one “Bad Guy”. This is the most common interrogation technique.
_____ Briefly affirm your belief in basic democratic principles.
_____ If forced to present terrorist demands to authorities, in writing or on tape, state clearly that the demands are from your captors. Avoid making a plea on your behalf.

HOW ABOUT RESCUE?

_____ Drop to the floor and be still.
_____ Avoid sudden moves.
_____ Wait for instructions.
_____ Once released, avoid derogatory comments about your captors; such remarks will only make things harder for those still held captive.
FAMILY DATA

Police agencies need timely and accurate information to effectively work for the release of hostages. Keep this data on hand, ready to give to the Security Police or OSI.

MILITARY MEMBER

Full Name:  
Nickname:  
SSN:  
Rank:  
Position:  
Home Address:  
Phone:  
Place of Birth:  
Date:  
Citizenship:  
Race:  
Height:  
Weight:  
Build:  
Color of Hair:  
Hairline:  
Color of Eyes:  
Glasses (Prescription):  
Distinguishing Marks:  
Languages Spoken:  
Medical Requirements or Problems:  
Medication Required and Time Intervals:  
Provide Three Signature Samples:

________________________________________

________________________________________

________________________________________

Attach two 8x10-inch photographs, one full length front view and one full length side view. Attach one complete fingerprint card (FP 258).
SPOUSE

Full Name:

Nickname: SSN:

Home Address: Phone:

Place of Employment:

Position:

Place of Birth: Date:

Citizenship: Race:

Height: Weight:

Build:

Color of Hair: Hairline:

Color of Eyes: Glasses (Prescription):

Distinguishing Marks:

Languages Spoken:

Medical Requirements or Problems:

Medication Required and Time Intervals:

Provide Three Signature Samples:


Attach two 8x10-inch photographs, one full length front view and one full length side view. Attach one complete fingerprint card (FP 258).
FIRST CHILD

Full Name:

Nickname: SSN:

Home Address: Phone:

School or Place of Employment:

Grade or Position:

Place of Birth: Date:

Citizenship: Race:

Height: Weight:

Build:

Color of Hair: Hairline:

Color of Eyes: Glasses (Prescription):

Distinguishing Marks:

Languages Spoken:

Medical Requirements or Problems:

Medication Required and Time Intervals:

Provide Three Signature Samples:

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Attach two 8x10-inch photographs, one full length front view and one full length side view. Attach one complete fingerprint card (FP 258).
SECOND CHILD

Full Name: 

Nickname: SSN: 

Home Address: Phone: 

School or Place of Employment: 

Grade or Position: 

Place of Birth: Date: 

Citizenship: Race: 

Height: Weight: 

Build: 

Color of Hair: Hairline: 

Color of Eyes: Glasses (Prescription): 

Distinguishing Marks: 

Languages Spoken: 

Medical Requirements or Problems: 

Medication Required and Time Intervals: 

Provide Three Signature Samples: 

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Attach two 8x10-inch photographs, one full length front view and one full length side view. Attach one complete fingerprint card (FP 258).
THIRD CHILD

Full Name:  
Nickname:  SSN:  
Home Address:  Phone:  
School or Place of Employment:  
Grade or Position:  
Place of Birth:  Date:  
Citizenship:  Race:  
Height:  Weight:  
Build:  
Color of Hair:  Hairline:  
Color of Eyes:  Glasses (Prescription):  
Distinguishing Marks:  
Languages Spoken:  
Medical Requirements or Problems:  
Medication Required and Time Intervals:  
Provide Three Signature Samples:  

Attach two 8x10-inch photographs, one full length front view and one full length side view. Attach one complete fingerprint card (FP 258).
FOURTH CHILD

Full Name:

Nickname: SSN:

Home Address: Phone:

School or Place of Employment:

Grade or Position:

Place of Birth: Date:

Citizenship: Race:

Height: Weight:

Build:

Color of Hair: Hairline:

Color of Eyes: Glasses (Prescription):

Distinguishing Marks:

Languages Spoken:

Medical Requirements or Problems:

Medication Required and Time Intervals:

Provide Three Signature Samples:

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Attach two 8x10-inch photographs, one full length front view and one full length side view. Attach one complete fingerprint card (FP 258).
FIFTH CHILD

Full Name:

Nickname:  SSN:

Home Address:  Phone:

School or Place of Employment:

Grade or Position:

Place of Birth:  Date:

Citizenship:  Race:

Height:  Weight:

Build:

Color of Hair:  Hairline:

Color of Eyes:  Glasses (Prescription):

Distinguishing Marks:

Languages Spoken:

Medical Requirements or Problems:

Medication Required and Time Intervals:

Provide Three Signature Samples:

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Attach two 8x10-inch photographs, one full length front view and one full length side view. Attach one complete fingerprint card (FP 258).
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## OTHER RESIDENCES

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## ORGANIZATIONS

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☆G.P.O.: 1986-655-109
DON'T PANIC! TRY THIS CHEERFUL THOUGHT

Let's put the terrorist threat in perspective. Terrorism is indeed a frightening subject. The media trumpets every incident and terrorism seems to be everywhere... it is not. We need to be informed, but there is no reason to live in fear.

As a practical matter, you are many hundreds of times more likely to be injured from a fall at home (off a chair or ladder) or be killed in an automobile accident than to ever be involved in a terrorist incident. The chances of you or your family becoming victims of terrorism are very, very slight and like accident prevention you can reduce the risk even further.

You and your loved ones are a vital part of the security team. Practice the techniques and proven security habits in this booklet and you will not be the soft target terrorist prefer. Remember these three rules for the 80's:

ONE—KEEP A LOW PROFILE
TWO—BE UNPREDICTABLE
THREE—REMAIN VIGILANT

It's true! Individual alertness and use of common sense are the best deterrents to terrorist attack. Together we can do it!

Samuel E. Stocks

SAMUEL E. STOCKS, Colonel, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff, Security Police

POC: Lt Col Robert B. Soucy
Director of Antiterrorism
Scott AFB IL 62225-5001
AUTOVON 576-6647

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A FINAL WORD
END
Feb.
1988
DTIC