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PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN URBAN WARFARE
LESSONS FROM THE 1982 MIDDLE EAST WAR

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This report examines the planning, organization, operations, and effectiveness of Israeli psychological operations (PSYOP) during the 1982 campaign in Lebanon and draws implications for U.S. forces in future conflicts. The report clearly establishes the criticality of effective tactical and strategic PSYOP mated to the overall strategy, especially in the conduct of limited warfare operations.
19. The campaign to eradicate the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Lebanon presented numerous problems to Israeli forces that are representative of highly politicized limited conflicts. The report fully illustrates the difficulty of addressing effective PSYOP to diverse audiences especially when the intended audiences cannot be isolated from each other, such as in a city.

The Israelis focused PSYOP on destroying the enemy's will to resist, avoiding alienation of numerous third-party factions, and minimizing adverse public opinion within Israel and abroad. Tactical PSYOP communications were largely limited to traditional leaflets, radio broadcasts, and military demonstrations. Because the majority of the fighting occurred in cities in the presence of a large civilian population, PSYOP in urban areas was especially critical in the attempt to separate combatants from noncombatants. In this regard, the Israeli PSYOP had some success.

However, initial PSYOP gains were inadequately supported by civic action programs. More importantly, Israel failed in its strategic PSYOP efforts, via the news media, to alter adverse public opinion at home or abroad. This was exacerbated by the fact that certain Israeli officials misled the public, and even members of the government, regarding the true target of the operation. Under the guise of a limited operation in southern Lebanon, Israel targeted the entire PLO in that country, specifically by striking at Beirut. The subsequent lengthy siege of Beirut provided the international media with the horrifying images of war inherent in any urban battle zone. The result of this and other factors was a political failure for Israel that PSYOP planners (also misinformed about the true objective) were unprepared to counter even if given the means to do so.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Arab Deterrent Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBU</td>
<td>cluster bomb unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFLP</td>
<td>Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>headquarters</td>
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<td>IAF</td>
<td>Israeli Air Force</td>
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<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israeli Defense Forces</td>
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<td>INF</td>
<td>Israeli Naval Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>killed in action</td>
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<tr>
<td>km</td>
<td>kilometer (s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAF</td>
<td>Lebanese Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>LF</td>
<td>Lebanese Forces</td>
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<td>LNM</td>
<td>Lebanese National Movement</td>
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<td>m</td>
<td>meter (s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>mm</td>
<td>millimeter (s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOBA</td>
<td>military operations in built-up areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOUT</td>
<td>military operations on urban terrain</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFLP</td>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Army</td>
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<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organization</td>
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<td>PSP</td>
<td>Progressive Socialist Party</td>
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<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>psychological operations</td>
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<td>SA</td>
<td>Syrian Army</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
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<td>U. S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

Despite the importance of communications in achieving military objectives in cities, particularly in cases of limited war, there has been no study of the role of psychological operations (PSYOP) in these environments. The absence of serious attention has impeded the development of doctrine in the field of PSYOP and has also precluded optimal utilization of PSYOP in urban combat.

The purposes of this report are (1) to identify the issues that military forces engaged in combat in urban areas in the Third World will confront; (2) to review and assess organizational and operational problems associated with such situations; (3) to consider and evaluate the approaches taken toward overcoming some of these problems in the case studied; and (4) to determine the implications and make recommendations for U.S. doctrine and policy concerning the use of psychological operations in Third-World urban area combat.

This research considers the use by Israeli military forces of PSYOP in urbanized areas of Lebanon during the period of active hostilities, June through August 1982. It is based on review of substantial quantities of communications such as (1) leaflets, (2) broadcasts, (3) public speeches, (4) loudspeaker operations, and (5) military operations undertaken principally to influence perceptions. Because PSYOP is "the planned or programmed use of the total spectrum of actions to influence attitudes and actions of friendly, neutral, and enemy populations important to national objectives," the research team used the operating assumption that anything intentionally affected those attitudes was PSYOP. The Israeli government refused to provide material for this study.

Because the battle is highly political as well as military, PSYOP is critical. Influencing the behavior of city residents and of hostiles, both military and civilian, is the focus of the panoply of PSYOP—from military movements and actions to communications and civil affairs. Due to the visual impact of modern communications and the active involvement of the international public in the Western democracies in public decisions, and due to the nature of city fighting, the impact of the urban battles on the viability of the overall campaign is critical. Communications of the nature of the combat can thus be critical. This reality places an even heavier burden on
PSYOP to ensure that "news" does not become in fact hostile propaganda. Israeli PSYOP in Lebanese urban areas merits study because the Lebanon case is characteristic of the communications complexity of most Third-World environments, and because these are the most likely environments in which U.S. forces will find themselves engaged.

FINDINGS

Israeli PSYOP in Lebanon was ineffective, especially in urban situations. War news enjoyed some credibility, and information for civilians to escape combat was partially successful in separating combatant and noncombatant populations in the southern cities. However, the overall goals of psychological operations at the tactical level, at the campaign level, and at the international level, were not attained. Domestic PSYOP, like international PSYOP, proved woefully inadequate, in large parts because of the deception involved in the war itself.

The urban nature of the battlefield in Sidon, Tyre, and Beirut played a key role in the conduct of military operations, including psychological operations.

This urban defense posed a problem to the Israelis. They had to first identify and isolate the Palestinian forces in order to concentrate forces and firepower to destroy them—all while minimizing civilian casualties. Israeli psychological operations supported this objective by concentrating on separating combatants from noncombatants in the densely populated urban areas.

Planning for Israeli MOUT PSYOP was poor in the sense that the city of Beirut was an unintended theater from the PSYOP planner's standpoint. The problems of planning derived from overall faulty management of the war at the strategic and general headquarters level. PSYOP was planned for a small operation in southern Lebanon, but this was not the war that was fought. The result was a significant mismatch at the strategic level affecting the domestic Israeli audience and the international audience. The city (Beirut) as a likely source of casualties, the city as a heavily populated civilian area, and the city as the first Arab capital Israeli forces had actually threatened to take, were all considerations in generation both Israeli and international opposition to the move.

Tactical PSYOP planning was far superior to strategic PSYOP planning, especially regarding the target audiences and their values. Intensive interaction with the audiences in Lebanon gave Israeli planners some "feel" for the values and priorities of these audiences. Detailed tactical
knowledge of facts, awareness of key communicators and problems, and intelligence on individuals were all good to excellent.

Use of PSYOP situations and technologies was acceptable. Inadequate use of resources to tell the PSYOP story appears to have characterized Israeli performance much more accurately, especially in the city.

Leaflet and loudspeaker operations went to a great extent as planned. Leaflets had an especially pronounced effect on the civilian population at the outset of the fighting, and until well into the period of the Beirut siege. Israeli leaflets attracted considerable attention. Leaflet dispersion proved to be something of a problem in the built-up areas.

Loudspeaker operations worked well in many areas, but encountered technical problems in city use. The use of noise in the refugee camps to drown out communication by loudspeaker was very effective, if the reactions of the audience to questions posed by international media are any example.

Military movements operations were used to communicate intent to the PLO leadership and played an extremely significant role in persuading the PLO to withdraw from the city, convincing Palestinian leaders that the IDF was prepared to accept such casualties and opprobrium as might be entailed in such an assault.

The use of blockades by Israel against the besieged Palestinians was a particularly poor tactic from an international PSYOP standpoint.

The long-term objectives of Israel in Lebanon mandated effective civil affairs and military government operations to demonstrate Israeli intentions to those groups and establish or maintain rapport. Israeli civil affairs operations were not well organized and suffered from the antipathy of many individual soldiers toward Arabs. Civil affairs operations were not planned with the care and detail required.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The absence of distinct American doctrine for the conduct of PSYOP in cities is a significant gap in readiness. Cities are the centers of population, mass communications, and economic resources, and hence are the centers of political power. In the current era of highly politicized limited conflict, the psychological struggle,
rather than the contest of arms, is decisive. Indeed seeking victory by military force is often self-defeating. This is especially true in cities where violence creates powerful images of suffering that are immediately exploited as political propaganda. It is this environment of limited conflict that U.S. forces are most likely to be committed. It is here that our effective PSYOP capability is most critical.

It is important that the PSYOP planners at the JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) and each of the military components, as well as in the unified commands, be provided with sufficient lead time to conduct in-depth analysis of specific target groups for PSYOP purposes.

PSYOP planners should understand the psychological vulnerabilities of each distinct target group as related to overall military and political operations. Furthermore, military planners should be aware of the most efficient and meaningful methods of reaching each target group with PSYOP messages through mass media channels, as well as face-to-face communications, and actions. If the operation is to be successful, the PSYOP planner must have a great array of current technical and professional knowledge related to the psychological and communications atmosphere relevant to each significant target group.

Coordination of intelligence and PSYOP must be improved so that PSYOP personnel can carry out their functions more effectively with the kinds of information that are required to conduct credible psychological operations.

The commander of the psychological aspects of the war should report directly to the theater operations officer or the CinC (Commander in Chief). He should be given access to the CinC with respect to the approval of PSYOP objectives and programs. It is also important that direct coordination be authorized with political officers (Department of State) and senior USIA (U.S. Information Agency) advisors.

Military psychological operations units and staffs must be organized to perform the full scope of operations needed for political warfare. The scope is much more profound than the traditional loudspeaker and leaflet operations used for past military operations. Units must be functionally organized and staffed with quality professionals to

- prepare meaningful propaganda messages intended for diverse target groups and to be disseminated by printed media,
• prepare meaningful radio broadcasts involving news, propaganda comment, instructions, and entertainment—all programs must be in the language and format meaningful to distinct target groups,

• prepare meaningful telecasts involving news, propaganda comment, instructions, and entertainment—all programs must be in the language and format meaningful to distinct target groups,

• prepare meaningful loudspeaker tapes involving news, propaganda comment, and instructions meaningful to military as well as civilian targets, and

• write, collect, edit, and publish news bulletins, newspapers, or news programs for distribution by radio and television, or international news outlets.
INTRODUCTION

Scope and Purpose of Study

This study was initiated as a means to begin to fill in a gap in readiness in the field of psychological operations (PSYOP) that is also important in the conduct of effective military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT). Specifically, there is at present no fully developed doctrine for the conduct of PSYOP in cities. In World War II and in recent conflicts, the effectiveness of communications with urban noncombatant populations, as well as with friendly, neutral, and hostile combatants in and around built-up areas, has often had a significant impact on the ultimate outcome of the conflict.

The present study is intended to identify some of the generic communications problems confronting military forces engaged in combat in urbanized terrain, including planning for such operations prior to engagement, implementing the plans and conduct of hostilities, and political issues arising from the periods of hostilities. In addition, consideration of the specific case chosen is intended to provide some idea of the degree to which both the fragmentation of Third World countries and the contemporary communications environment have complicated urban PSYOP. Finally, the report is intended to raise issues that may be suggestive of desirable changes in American approaches to PSYOP management.

BACKGROUND: PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN URBAN WARFARE

Psychological Operations

Psychological operations (PSYOP) is one of the means governments use to promote their interests and realize their objectives. We define psychological operations as the planned or programmed use of the total spectrum of human actions to influence attitudes and actions of friendly, neutral, and enemy populations important to national objectives (McLaurin, 1982, p. 2). This definition is adapted from U.S. Army usage. Thus, the purpose of PSYOP is to influence behavior, specifically to influence behavior in such a way as to serve national interests. Governments have used PSYOP as far back as recorded history takes
us, but it has only recently come to be regarded as a distinct governmental activity that should be performed by specially trained professionals.

PSYOP relies on the process of human communication. It is, after all, no more than the communication of messages, whether explicitly or implicitly. Leaflets or radio broadcasts are examples of explicit messages; naval visits or military exercises or even operations may be implicit messages. In each case, the idea is to affect something by means of messages that would otherwise have to be accomplished by the use of force, or would perhaps not be accomplished at all. PSYOP is intended to influence the behavior or attitude of a target or audience—but always to serve national interests.

PSYOP in Urban Warfare

There is a role for psychological operations in all potential functional and geographical conflict environments. That is, whether the conflict be political or military, and whatever the geography and terms of the conflict, PSYOP constitutes an additional tool in the hands of the conflict parties. In most cases, the more political the conflict, the more powerful PSYOP is as a resource relative to other resources. Even in conflicts that have progressed to the point of hostilities, however, PSYOP can be a valuable asset in the hands of a military commander, more so if the conflict remains over political issues. Similarly, PSYOP can contribute whether the target is purely military (enemy forces) or mixed (combatants and noncombatants, friendly to hostile) or purely civilian (friendly to hostile).

For a variety of reasons, urban terrain is an especially difficult environment in which to use PSYOP effectively in support of military operations. However, recent military operations in the Third World demonstrate that urban warfare is an important, probably decisive, element in situations in which U.S. forces may be deployed to hostile environments. In retrospect, it appears that many observers "overlearned" from the experience of the civil war in China, concluding erroneously that the countryside would thenceforth be decisive in determining the outcome of conflicts. Instead, we have found in active combat situations such as Vietnam, in peacekeeping postures such as in the Dominican Republic, and in the large and hazy cases in between (such as Lebanon) that as important as the countryside may be in creating the conditions for political change, the final change comes not in the countryside but in the city. More careful research reflects that even such "rural" revolutions as Castro's in Cuba in fact could not have succeeded without urban pressure. Certainly, it is well-accepted that military operations in Europe will have to contend with urban agglomerations. Recent cases of limited or highly political war suggest that the role of PSYOP is most important in these
instances, and therefore the challenges of urban PSYOP must be seen as central to the accomplishment of U.S. objectives in conflict.

PSYOP in Lebanon

When Israeli forces intervened in Lebanon in June 1982 they did so after an extended period of preparation. This preparation period allowed ample time to identify, consider, address, and attempt to resolve the fundamental problems the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) were likely to encounter on the ground in Lebanon, e.g., difficult terrain, diverse population groups with very different attitudes towards Israel, the presence of Syrian forces, and so forth. Despite the volatility of the Lebanese political scene, the varying attitudes of diverse population groups, and to a great extent domestic and foreign leaders, were relatively predictable. The strategic problems were well-known, and the tactical obstacles and course of events and combat could be and were anticipated more or less correctly. PLO fighters in organized units offered substantially less resistance than expected in the south, even in the cities, but overall, the campaign proceeded along expected lines, and the military outcome was as forecast.

BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT: ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING

Environment

The Lebanese theater of war was a complex one. Numerous studies of the conflicts in Lebanon that have raged for over a decade demonstrate that the alignments and issues have been kaleidoscopic in nature (see, for example, Deeb, 1980; Gordon, 1983; Haley & Snider, 1979; Pakradouni, 1984; Rabinovich, 1984; Salibi, 1976; Tueni, 1985). In this section are described (1) the nature of the military environment, (2) the nature of the sociopolitical environment, and (3) the range of audiences with which Israeli planners had to contend, and something of their concerns and interrelationships.

The Military Environment

The military equation was quite unbalanced in favor of Israel. The military adversary was officially limited to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), but in fact included and was intended by senior officials to include Syrian Army elements deployed in Lebanon as an Arab Deterrent Force (ADF), Palestinian regulars not subject to PLO control, and a host of militias hostile to Israel, including notably Amal, the Murabitoun, the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), the Syrian Social Nationalist
Party (SSNP), and the Organization for Communist Action in Lebanon (OCAL). Even the aggregate of these forces was negligible in firepower, training, command and control, and in many cases, motivation. On the ground, the Palestinian forces were by far the largest element confronting Israel and, except for a number of operations carried out in eastern Lebanon, the only forces to put up any resistance worthy of the name. At least two "hostile" groups, for reasons discussed below, cooperated with Israel in one or more ways. They presented no significant military obstacle to the achievement of Israeli political and military objectives in the conflict—depending upon the level of costs Israel was prepared to sustain and the of planning for the effort.

Israel's allies included the Lebanese Forces (LF), principally north of Beirut, and the Free Lebanon Army of ex-Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Major Saad Haddad in the South. However, these allies were political, not military; they played little or no role in military operations conducted by Israel in Lebanon in the 1982 war. Both groups were militias armed, financed in varying degrees, and equipped by Israel.

Lebanon, immediately prior to the Israeli invasion, can be seen as divided into several zones. Mt. Lebanon, or the Christian heartland north and east of Beirut, was under the complete control of the Lebanese Forces. The government of Lebanon operated in this zone at the sufferance of the LF. The North and East of Lebanon, from the Syrian borders to Mt. Lebanon, were controlled by Syria. The Shuf, southern continuation of the Lebanon mountains, was not clearly controlled by anyone, but was dominated by the PSP, a largely Druze militia-party. The coastal plain from Beirut south to the border and the area south of the Shuf was divided in its control among several forces; the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which controlled in fact only its immediate areas; the Free Lebanon Army, which controlled a sizable strip; and the Palestinians, the dominant force in the entire area. A Shi'a militia, Amal, had begun to fight the Palestinians in the late 1970s to defend local Shi'a interests against Palestinian depredations and to reduce Palestinian presence in Shi'a areas. While most of the South is Shi'a, and although virtually all Shi'as bore allegiance to Amal, stringent limitations in firepower, experience, organization, and command and control precluded Amal from being a territorial force. Lebanon, south of Beirut, can be considered an anarchic area in the sense that government presence and influence were virtually nil.

The PLO and related forces (Palestine Liberation Army [PLA] and the Palestinian guerrilla organizations and militias and home guards) comprised between 10,000 and 20,000 men, with some tens of antiquated tanks, and hundreds of pieces of artillery. They had no air force and no combat navy. The Lebanese militias allied with the Palentinians were much less well-armed. Only some of those in the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) actually
took part in any operations against the IDF. They included—using the inventory numbers rather than systems and personnel actually employed—at most 4,000 men, a handful of tanks, and limited artillery. The militias too were without air or naval power. Syrian forces in Lebanon comprised about 30,000 men, but increased to about 50,000–60,000 after the invasion, with standard organization for Syrian Army units. These figures include Syrian forces deployed to Lebanon during the combat there. In addition, the Syrian Air Force carried out missions in Lebanon. (The Syrian Navy did not attempt to deploy.) All forces hostile to Israel were heavily endowed with antiair and antitank (AT) assets. The Syrians also had surface-to-air missiles, SAM-6, in a number of positions in eastern Lebanon.

The Sociopolitical Environment

With the breakdown in government and society in Lebanon from 1975 to 1981, people sought the protection of a group with firepower. All political authority was as legitimate as its ability to physically defend itself. (For a breakdown of the principal political groups, see Appendix A.) Christians in the LF zone tended to look with great sympathy to Israel, as did many Christians in the southern areas, especially those along the border and those in the Free Lebanon Army Area. They saw Israel as their protector against the Palestinians, and in some cases against other groups or against Syria. The Druze community, which is split among Israel, Lebanon, and Syria, retained close but covert ties to Israel and flexible but overt ties to Syria. Shi'as in the South also had an ongoing and successful, but far more covert, relationship with Israel. The Palestinians had no relationship with Israel, but had relatively cooperative relations with the Sunni community and excellent relations with a number of external Arab countries. The Palestinians in Lebanon were divided between those who followed Yasser Arafat and the main, traditional line of Fatah, and more extremist groups of diverse orientations that chafed under the Israeli-Palestinian cease-fire negotiated by U.S. Envoy Philip Habib in 1981.

It would be misleading to suggest that the conflict in Lebanon was a sectarian one, although it had taken on a significant sectarian coloration by 1982. Nevertheless, the largely Christian and Shi'a SSNP supported the predominantly Sunni Palestinians, for example, and Shi'as in fact fought on all sides in large numbers. However, because identity groups are based first and foremost on sectarian affiliation in Lebanon, it is necessary to provide some background on these groups and their political cultures.

The Christians had been largely united behind the LF control. They tended to place the blame for what happened in Lebanon on the Palestinians (see Deeb, 1980; Pakradouni, 1984; Salibi, 1976; Tuenti, 1985; Tabbara, 1979). Christian militias were supported by Israel. Christians tended to see Lebanon as a
haven for Christianity in the Middle East, and to believe that Muslims (without distinction) would ultimately try to eliminate this haven and create a Muslim society. Christians were found in all social classes, and across the entire political spectrum, leading both radical secular parties (such as the Lebanese Communist Party) and extremist religious groups.

The Druze community, which once dominated Lebanon, was very small by 1982. As in the case of the other communities, survival was the key concept of the Druzes. Throughout Lebanese political history and before, the Druzes always had a paramount leader on each side of every issue so that no matter what the final results, the Druzes would not lose. A very close-knit community, the Druzes had a clear-cut social and political order to which all deferred. All Lebanon's Druzes lived in the Shuf area, and most were lower or lower middle class.

The Sunnis, the most populous Muslim group in the region, were also the key partner, with the Maronite Christians, in forming the Lebanese political system. However, whereas all other communities in Lebanon had significant territorial control, the Sunnis, primarily urban merchants, inhabited in large numbers only the three great coastal cities of Beirut, Sidon, and Tripoli. (The 'Alawis are a minority religious group based in Syria. About 12 percent of the Syrian population, they have nevertheless controlled the government and armed forces since the mid-1960s. Between 1976 and 1985 about 40,000 'Alawis were quietly settled [with Syrian government encouragement] around Tripoli, where they established their own [Syrian-supported] militia.) Moreover, the PLO was more powerful in Sidon, Amal was becoming more powerful in Beirut, and Syrian-'Alawi power threatened the Sunnis even in Tripoli. (In Tripoli, the PLO acted increasingly as the military arm of the Sunni community against both Syria and the 'Alawis that migrated to Tripoli from Syria.) Thus, the Sunni community saw itself as one of the two most powerful communities in Lebanon even as it was becoming the least powerful of the major communities. The Sunnis as a group were middle class, and those in Beirut were particularly cosmopolitan.

The Shi'as were Lebanon's poorest community, and by 1982 its largest. They had grown rapidly to their plurality position through a combination of high fertility and substantial return migration from Africa. Originally from the South and Beq'a Valley, in both of which areas they were the predominant group, the Shi'as had been forced to migrate in large numbers to Beirut by the early 1980s, as result of Israeli bombing raids in the South and political pressures in the Bequ'a. Traditionally tribal and feudal in political culture, the Shi'as had undergone a rapid and far-reaching process of social and political mobilization in the 1970s and 1980s (Norton, 1984, Chapter 7 provides a good discussion of this process). Their new aspirations were best symbolized by the growth of their organization-militia, Amal, to national prominence.
Audiences

The audiences Israeli psychological operations might have addressed in order to assist the realization of Israeli political and military objectives in Lebanon were local, national, international, and domestic (Israeli).

Local Audiences

By local audiences we mean the audiences in the area in, adjacent to, or near where military operations are being conducted. Thus, Israeli PSYOP in regard to the Shi'as of the South might have to take on different themes from those chosen for the Shi'as around Beirut or in the Beqa'a. Similarly, Christians in the South or around Sidon had interests and needs distinct from those of Mt. Lebanon, as the latter had from those of the Shuf. In this section we shall consider the following local audiences: Christians (border strip, South, Shuf, heartland, Zahle, North); Army of Free Lebanon; LF; Druzes; PSP; Sunnis (Sidon, Beirut); Shi'as (South, Beirut); Amal (South, Beirut); LNM (South, Beirut); Palestinians and the PLO (South, Beirut); and Syrian Army/ADF (East, Beirut).

The Christians in the border strip were not really an issue. They have lived since the early 1970s in a situation in which they are virtually part of Israel. The border is "open" to them. They see the IDF as their protective shield and strenuously oppose the Palestinians or others who would trespass on their land and carry out acts that might provoke some kind of Israeli retaliation. The other southern Christians are spread widely in the South. Some have reached similar arrangements with Israel, cooperating in providing intelligence, facility support, and other assistance to the IDF. In other cases, villages were linked (often covertly) to the LF. While many individual Christians of these two areas identified with and supported the Palestinians' cause, the bulk did not. Virtually all opposed any Palestinian use of their lands to attack Israel. These villages and those guarded by the Haddad militia often became victims of Palestinian attacks. The Christians in the Shuf generally identified publicly with Druze or secular leadership, though privately many followed the course of national politics with great sympathy for the LF. In order to coexist with the Druzes, it was necessary to cooperate with the groups that had the firepower. For all intents and purposes, one could argue that the Shuf Christians did not (want to) take a stand on national issues involving non-Lebanese forces. We have indicated that the Christians of the heartland (Mt. Lebanon) were strongly allied with Israel through the LF. Moreover, Bashir Gemayel had had extensive discussions to coordinate LF actions with Israeli operations. While the LF was strongly anti-Palestinian, it was also very anti-Syrian. Bashir Gemayel had insisted that an IDF
move into Lebanon would serve no purpose if it did not evict the
Syrians. The Zahle Christians were neutralized by a strong
Syrian presence nearby and by their isolation in a Shi'a area.
The Northern Christians around Tripoli (actually, Zgharta)
continued to follow the pro-Syrian position of Suleiman Frangish.
In the event, because Israeli operations only progress to
approximately the Beirut-Damascus Road, the Northern and Zahle
Christians were never a "local" audience for Israeli PSYOP.
Despite the differences depending upon diverse circumstances, as
a community, the Christians were seen by Israel as "friendly," not hostile.

The Army of Free Lebanon, composed of Christians (who
occupied most of the officer ranks) and Shi'as (many enlisted),
was about 2,000-strong. Its geographical area was limited to a
border strip, and it was essentially an anti-Palestinian force.
The militia—for it was no more than this—was more than just
"friendly"—it was completely subservient to Israeli will.

The Lebanese Forces' position was well-known and is
presented above. Many Lebanese Forces' commanders had been
trained by Israel, and Israeli leaders, particularly senior
military leaders and military intelligence, had great influence
over these individuals. Certain units of the LF could be
operated virtually as adjunct Israeli forces. The LF, whatever
its limitations and disappointments, was considered friendly by
Israel.

The Druze faith encourages dissimulation when it serves the
purpose of community interests. Thus, Druze leaders in Lebanon
speak as if their orientation were toward the Arab, Islamic
world. And indeed Druze leaders have been prominent among many
of the revolutionary organizations in Lebanon. However, the
Druzes have, in fact, cooperated quietly with Israel. Israeli
leaders never looked upon the Druzes as hostile. Even when
Druze-Syrian cooperation is greatest, much of the Druze community
remains in close touch with Israel, often through its
coreligionists in Israel. The most powerful elements of the
religious leadership of the Druze community are heavily
influenced by Israel. The PSP is considered a Druze militia,
although in June 1982 there were also Christians in it. It was
responsive to the PSP leader, Walid Jumblatt, but many PSP
members, including local commanders, were more loyal to Israel or
other Druze leaders (including the late Majid Arslan) in June
1982 than to Jumblatt. Ultimately, the militia is a Druze
militia and will act in accordance with the decisions reached by
the Druze leadership as to community interests.

The Sunnis were presumed to be hostile by Israel. Despite
the merchant tradition in Beirut, and to a great extent in Sidon
and Tripoli, Sunni communities in these cities still tended to
identify with the Palestinians, the more so since they were the
only community without a community militia. Moreover, the Sunnis
had consistently supported the Palestinians, Israel's principal
enemy in Lebanon, and remained close to Syria. Thus, Israeli leaders did not see any Sunni community as friendly or neutral, except to the extent that they did distinguish between combatants and noncombatants.

By contrast, some Israelis had developed effective working relationships with Shi'as in the South, less so with those in Beirut, and virtually no relationship with those in the Beqa'a. Shi'as after all formed a considerable part of the Army of Free Lebanon (the Haddad militia). Moreover, the Amal militia, which was certainly broadly representative of the Shi'a majority in the South, cooperated to a limited degree with and is believed to have received some arms from Israel. The common interest of the Shi'as and Israelis was clear—eliminating the presence of the Palestinians in the South and their depredations and provocations. Because many of the Shi'as in Beirut originated in the South, from which they fled as a result of Israeli attacks in retaliation against Palestinian provocations, some number of Beirut Shi'as can also be said to have held deep anti-Palestinian feelings. Israeli experts felt that the Shi'as were, if not friendly, still a population they did not want to alienate.

The Lebanese National Movement was the principal Leftist, antigovernment, pro-Palestinian grouping in Lebanon. Amal, originally part of the LNM, had left the organization in 1976, and remained closely identified with the Syrian government's position (except on the degree of anti-PLO activity in the South). The rest of the LNM remained almost slavishly associated with the PLO in its actions and postures. Although purporting to be a revolutionary movement of the masses, the LNM, in fact, had little popular support. The close relationship between the LNM and the PLO meant that in Israeli eyes the LNM was hostile.

The PLO was wholly representative of the Palestinian population in Lebanon, but this reflects the fact that it was an "umbrella" organization, meaning that the constituent groups making up the PLO—e.g., Fatah, the PFLP, the DFLP, the ALF, Saiqa, and so forth—pursued their own ideological and operational paths with relatively little interference from the PLO. Whether "moderate" or "extremist," the PLO was considered implacably hostile by Israel. While Palestinian refugees in Lebanon could be divided into combatants and civilians, Israelis considered both enemies, and they (and many Lebanese) wished all Palestinians would leave Lebanon. Palestinians were resident in large numbers in camps outside the major cities of Beirut, Sidon, and Tyre, but also lived in Sunni quarters of the cities.

Some PLO elements were legitimately considered PLO in that they wore two hats—that of their group and that of the PLO. This is true, for example, of the PLO leadership cadres around Yasser Arafat (chairman of the PLO Executive Committee), most of whom were also members of Fatah. The PLO operated on several
levels. It organized the logistics of defense for civilians and combatants. The PLO also coordinated the action of various organizations and militias—Lebanese as well as Palestinian.

Beirut served as the capital of the Palestinian movement. In Beirut were located not only the military headquarters of the PLO, but, in addition, administrative, information, research, communications, logistics, welfare, medical, recruiting, training, and political centers. In addition, Beirut area facilities included small ports used by the PLO and its constituent organizations. The southern regional headquarters of the PLO was in Sidon.

The Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) was the "regular" army of the PLO. The PLA was constituted on the basis of brigade formations, and grew rapidly in Lebanon in 1981 and 1982. Military ranks were introduced in mid-1971, and independent artillery units in 1973, principally in the South. However, the PLA was not a single organization, though nominally subordinate to the PLO, in fact the PLA was responsive to different masters. PLA units based in Syria were completely controlled by Syria. Indeed many officers and soldiers in such units were sometimes Syrian. PLA units were deployed as part of the ADF (see below). By contrast, several PLA brigades were actually responsive to PLO direction. All PLA fighters were considered hostile.

At the moment the IDF initiated its movement into Lebanon, elements of the 85th and 62th Syrian Brigades were in Beirut. The Syrian Army was in Lebanon as an Arab Deterrent Force (ADF). The ADF was created by the Arab League to retroactively sanction the Syrian presence in Lebanon in 1976-1977. Most Syrian armed forces personnel had withdrawn from Beirut by the time the siege of Beirut was in place. There were no Syrian units in the South of Lebanon along the coastal road. However, Syrian Army deployments in the East lay in some cases substantially south of the Beirut-Damascus Highway that remained critical to the supply of Syrian forces in Lebanon. Battles between Israeli and Syrian forces in eastern Lebanon did not take place in urban areas.

National Audiences

By national audiences were refer to the same groups to a great extent as noted in the previous sections. However, local audiences are appropriate to tactical PSYOP, whereas national audiences may be more appropriate to strategic or campaign PSYOP. The hostile audiences in this case included Syrians, Palestinians, most Sunnis, and some Shi'as. Neutral audiences included some Sunnis and Shi'as and some Druzes, as well as the Lebanese Army and the Lebanese government. Friendly audiences included the Christians associated with the LF and others in Mt. Lebanon, those associated with the Army of Free Lebanon, and those in such towns as Zahle; some Druzes who have worked with Israel; and the Shi'as associated with Amal.
International Audiences

The principal hostile international audience was expected to be the Arab world. Israel was not concerned with the attitudes of the Arab world, anticipating hostility regardless of Israel's approach. The United States and Europe were thought to be ambivalent toward an Israeli military move, and be seen as friendly neutrals. South Africa and Jewish communities in the West were expected to be supportive of Israeli actions in Lebanon.

Domestic Israeli Audiences

It is not clear that a great deal of planning went into psychological preparation of the domestic audience. The ambitious plan for the invasion of Lebanon was initially presented to and rejected overwhelmingly by the Israeli cabinet. Opposition to a major military effort in Lebanon was widespread. Nevertheless, the elements of the Israeli leadership that pushed strongly for the invasion in its broadest sense appear to have been largely insensitive to domestic opposition. They probably expected protests from Peace Now, a dovish grouping of Israelis, and perhaps generally less support from the Ashkenazim (Western or European Jews) than they might have liked. On the other hand, they apparently anticipated much greater support from the majority Sephardim (Oriental Jews most of whom have come from, or been born to those who emigrated from, Arab countries). Whereas they may have anticipated lukewarm support from the Labor Alignment (political opposition) and academics, they seem to have believed they would receive complete support from Likud (the dominant party in the government coalition). In the event, there was virtually unanimous support in Israel for a limited operation in the South, but strong opposition to the campaign as its dimensions became clear and as its champion, Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon, was found to have played "fast and loose" with facts, intentionally deceiving both the public and the cabinet (Schiff & Ya'ari, 1985).

THE ISRAELI WAR EFFORT IN LEBANON

Overview of Military Developments

Objectives

The objectives of senior Israeli military leaders—which is to say, for all intents and purposes, Defense Minister Ariel Sharon and Chief of Staff General Rafael Eytan—was to destroy the PLO in Lebanon. Some have argued that this objective was really political, that is, it was intended to advance political
goals (whether in Lebanon or the West Bank); others argue that it was in fact a smoke screen for economic objectives (water resources in southern Lebanon). Whatever the ultimate political, economic, or other intent, the military goal was clear enough—to force the PLO to leave Lebanon. It was also thought (at least by the defense minister) that this goal, even apart from ensuring the security of northern Israel from Palestinian shelling, would necessarily conduce to the emergence of a friendly government in Lebanon and a peace treaty with that country (Schiff & Ya'ari, 1985).

Planning

Planning for the operation in Lebanon began over a year before the operation actually took place. Planning considered several different approaches to reducing the threat of PLO shelling of northern Israel, only one of which, "the big plan," envisaged a full-scale IDF assault all the way north to Beirut and across the Beirut-Damascus Highway. While this was merely one among several contingency plans, a number of planning officers felt from the outset that this was the only plan that made sense from a military standpoint. It was assumed by planners that any such operation would receive the approval of the cabinet and the senior IDF staff as a whole.

The cabinet did not approve the "big plan," and a number of senior staff officers, including the head of military intelligence, also opposed it. Consequently, the defense minister and chief of staff were forced to advocate, and feign proceeding on, a more limited approach even though in fact they intended all along to carry out the more ambitious plan. This duplicity prevented efficient planning in that a number of plans for operations around Beirut could not be pursued as far as they might, since the IDF was allegedly not going that far. These constraints limited planning for PSYOP as well as other forms of support, essentially precluding detailed consideration of PSYOP north of Sidon.

Resources

The IDF has long engaged in PSYOP, and has been more sensitive to sectarian differences in the Arab world than most non-Arab countries (van Dam, 1982, pp. 356-365). Israeli political history reflects consideration of using the religious differences in Arab countries, particularly Lebanon, to serve Israeli interests and to effect significant political change. Israeli PSYOP similarly reflects countless efforts to highlight sectarian issues among Arab audiences.

The resources Israel brought to the Lebanon campaign were not at all insignificant. In addition to the typical equipment—loudspeakers, leaflets, radio broadcasts—Israeli specialists in
military communication were prepared to and did use rumor, military operations and movements, and many other techniques to influence the thinking of the variety of audiences in Lebanon. Complete Israeli air superiority ensured free rein for leaflets, and PSYOP personnel were attached to every unit. Israel has no shortage of psychologists and psychiatrists, and these too were utilized on some occasions.

Course of Operations

Speculation about an Israeli invasion of Lebanon was widespread throughout late 1981 and early 1982. The precipitating incident leading to the outbreak of large-scale warfare was an assassination attempt on the life of the Israeli ambassador in London. Israeli retaliatory bombing led to PLO shelling of northern Israel. Thus, the cease-fire negotiated by American Envoy Philip Habib broke down. The invasion of Lebanon, planned in detail well in advance, followed.

Although the minister of defense and chief of staff intended from the outset to push forward all the way to Beirut, and in fact to drive Syrian forces from Lebanon (by the force of events rather than the force of arms, it was hoped), initial aims were presented as limited to senior military officers, senior political officials (including the cabinet), the Israeli public, and the rest of the world (particularly the United States). Even the senior Israeli commander on the ground, General Amir Drori, was never told officially of the more ambitious scope of the operations, though he surmised as much based upon conversations an analysis in a previous planning position.

Israeli ground forces moved northward across the border in several columns—along the coast, inland, and in the east. (See map, Appendix B.) The middle column swung toward the coast, and joined the coastal column to move from Sidon to Beirut. These troops were reinforced by an amphibious landing at the Awwali River (just north of Sidon). Meanwhile, the column moving north along the easternmost tangent met and fought with Syrian forces at several points. However, the IDF attempted to move in such a way as to persuade the Syrians to withdraw without a battle. An early cease-fire was declared with the Syrian forces, but IDF units continued to move forward during this and subsequent cease-fires, creating pressures on the Syrians to fire ("violating" the cease-fire) or withdraw. The same tactics were later used against the PLO in Beirut.

Eventually, the fighting in Beirut, which was largely isolated from other battles by the 14th of June, 8 days after the invasion began, settled into a siege by the encircling Israeli forces. This was quite in contrast to Israel’s practices in previous wars, which had (except in some cases during the Israeli war of independence in 1948-1949), stressed rapid movement, initiative, and attack. It also contrasted starkly with the
treatment of the other two Lebanese cities the IDF encountered on its move northward, Tyre and Sidon. In both those cities, the IDF endeavored to move around or through the urban areas quickly, and to avoid allowing the primary attacking forces to become bogged down in the cities.

Israeli air and naval superiority were used to great benefit, as the IAF and INF attacked concentrations of PLO or Syrian forces, assisted in resupply, prevented hostile forces from escaping, evacuated wounded personnel, and overcame logistic bottlenecks.

Thus, the Lebanon war can be seen as having fallen into distinct phases and campaigns. The campaign in the east was primarily against the Syrians, with the PLO coordinating with the Syrian Army and providing little opposition apart from that army. The campaign along the coast, up to and including Beirut, was principally directed against the Palestinians, with Syrian Army units contributing only when they were cut off from the bulk of their own forces. The initial phase was a war of movement along both axes, but in which most of the fighting was done along the coast. The second phase was the battle to encircle Beirut. A third phase then ensued in which Israeli and Syrian forces fought in the East over the Beirut-Damascus road. The fourth phase was the siege of Beirut itself.

Once the encirclement of Beirut was completed, and the battle of Beirut became siege warfare, senior IDF officers understood that they had entered a stage in which the key to victory was psychological. That is, the goal was both to destroy as much of the PLO as possible without entering into a long and costly city battle, on the one hand, and ultimately to persuade the remnants of the PLO to withdraw from Lebanon, on the other. This second part of the Israeli objective was clearly psychological in nature. "Salami" military tactics, highly visible military movements, efforts to persuade the civilians to leave the city, and a wide range of other techniques described more fully below were all part of a general strategy designed to convince the PLO that the IDF was prepared to fight in the city if necessary in order to ensure that every trace of the once-dominant PLO presence was eradicated.

Urban Warfare Situations

Lebanon's four major cities are Beirut, Tripoli, and Sidon and Tyre. Israeli forces never entered or neared Tripoli, but were involved in all three of the other cities. Consequently, this report addresses PSYOP experience in Beirut, Sidon, and Tyre to a very large extent. While interactions in other built-up areas—e.g., Jezzine—did take place, most of these settlements are not large enough to be considered truly "urban."
The largest city in Lebanon as well as its capital, Beirut was long considered the "Paris of the Middle East." However, a decade of warfare has completely altered the city. The old downtown area, including many of the suqs (Arab marketplaces), is a museum of destruction, its famous buildings war-scarred and deserted. The once-bustling port and modern hotel districts are also but a shadow of their former selves. The city has been divided in half since fighting began in 1975, with the dividing line—the so-called "Green Line"—linking with the Beirut-Damascus Highway.

THE ROLE FOR ISRAELI PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF MOUT

Psychological Operations Objectives In Mout

PSYOP Objectives Directed to Military Audiences

The overall psychological objectives and tasks in urban combat environments directed to military audiences are similar to those in other military environments. They are the following:

- to induce the enemy soldier to surrender or defect
- to lower the morale of the enemy by exploiting basic emotions and uncertainty
- to provide instructions in regard to surrendering and other related topics
- to provide political information
- to provide war news

It can be most difficult to conduct PSYOP directed to military and civilian target groups in urban areas due to following circumstances:

- The physical environment provides for more stringent supervision and control by security and political personnel.
- Technical problems associated with loudspeaker and leaflet dissemination and in broadcast and telecast reception occur in cities.
- Hostile forces can more easily conduct counterpropaganda programs or actions.
- It is a highly competitive communications environment.
Inducing Surrender or Defection. The act of a hostile soldier in surrendering is the ultimate objective of successful PSYOP communications. A propaganda message should appeal (directly or indirectly) to the enemy soldier or fighter to surrender. The psychological approach and techniques used to persuade hostile soldiers or fighters to surrender must be

- relevant to the tactical situation
- sensitive to the culture and temperament of the target audience

A variety of communication techniques can be used to persuade hostile soldiers to "give up." Some of these are the following:

- a certification of safe-conduct by the military commander (the "safe-conduct pass")
- direct testimonials of safe-conduct and good treatment from soldiers and fighters
- indirect testimonials of safe-conduct through interviews or letters
- the use of monetary or other rewards to induce surrender

Persuasive appeals to self-preservation (save your life; time is of the essence; you are in a difficult situation; you have no chance of escape; you have only one alternative).

In using persuasion to induce surrender, the PSYOP communicator should have empathy or a "feeling of understanding" for the hostile soldier or fighter. The persuasive message can be direct or indirect, but generally should not be abrasive in tone.

Israel faced a variety of adversaries in Lebanon—the Syrians, the PLO, and Lebanese militiamen hostile to Israel—and consequently resorted to various techniques to induce surrender or its equivalent, ceasing to fight. Some examples of the content of Israeli messages used in Lebanon follow.

A special call to armed individuals in South Lebanon:

The fighting in south Lebanon is coming to a decisive end. The noose is closing around the terrorist neck. You who still hold arms, stop and think. One option is to keep your arms and remove yourself from the area of the battle. The other option is to surrender to Israeli forces. If you decide to surrender, take the following actions:
a. Lay down your arms and remove all ammunition from your person.

b. Stand in an open area while holding a white flag or object. Remember the Israeli Defense Forces treat their prisoners with respect and safeguard their rights. Don't gamble with your lives and don't dig your own graves.

(Lebanon Voice of Hope [under Haddad control], 8 June 1982. Emphasis added.)

You who are armed---stop and think. The IDF has almost achieved fully its objectives in southern Lebanon and is now carefully and minutely combing every bit of the region. Over the past 24 hours, a large number of your comrades surrendered to our forces after having abandoned their weapons. Now, they are receiving water, food, and medical aid as they need it.

You who are armed--stop and think. It is evident to you that no useful purpose can come from your resistance to the IDF. It has been proved that your commanders and officers have fled, leaving you without food or water.

You who are armed--stop and think. If you are hiding out of fear of death, you must realize that the IDF does not harm unarmed people. This is in accordance with age-old IDF traditions. However, the IDF finds all who carry weapons.

You who are armed--remember that the IDF treats its prisoners humanely. This might be your last chance to remain alive. Leave your weapons, raise your hands, and surrender to the IDF. Surrender and be safe.

(Jerusalem in Arabic, 10 June 1982.)

The bizarre salutations reflect concern in the IDF about the multiplicity of identities of armed individuals hostile to the IDF. The message is clearly meant to refer to hostile militiamen as well as Palestinians. The reluctance to use "fighters" at the early stage may be a function either of Israeli unwillingness to confer any fighting quality on adversaries seen as "terrorists" or the conscious belief that such a recognition might steel the "fighters'" determination to "fight." However, some appeals did use the term "fighter" (see below). Much less reticence was shown vis-à-vis Syrian targets.

The Voice of Israel has learned that a senior commander in the Fatah organization in Lebanon and one of Arafat's senior aides has turned himself in to the IDF in Sidon. Arab affairs correspondent Aharon
Barne'a reports that the man is known by the pseudonym of Salah Ta'amri, and his rank in Fatah is lieutenant colonel. His real name is Asad Sleiman 'Abd al-Qadr, and he is married to the former Jordanian queen, Dina, the divorced wife and cousin of King Hussein. Lt. Col. Salah Ta'amri was a member of the limited command of Fatah and acted in southern Lebanon for about 10 years as the commander of the organization in Sidon. His main headquarters was in the Fakahani quarter of Beirut. In addition to his duties as the Fatah commander in southern Lebanon, he was also responsible for the Fatah youth organizations and in the past was the commander of the Fatah organization in Karameh, Jordan, until the IDF operation there in 1968.

When war broke out in Lebanon he was in Beirut, and he reached Sidon on the second day of the war. He remained in the city even after it had been occupied by the IDF until he decided to turn himself in to our force. His wife, Dina, the former Jordanian queen, was in Sidon with him, but she managed to get to Beirut following the IDF's entry, from where she went to Damascus, and, later, by air, to Cairo, where she is now living in a villa owned by King Hussein.

Lt. Col. Salah Ta'amri said in a talk to our correspondent, Aharan Barne'a, that he turned himself in to the IDF after he was convinced that the PLO's stage of military struggle had ended following the IDF's operation in Lebanon.

(Jerusalem in Hebrew, 15 July 1982.)

The third radio appeal is an example of an indirect approach to surrender based on the account of a senior PLO commander. In a situation such as Lebanon in 1982, the propagandist must be sensitive to the political and psychological environment. Every effort must be made to portray surrender as a reasonable and prudent alternative. The timing of the message is interesting and suggests the intended audience was domestic as well as Palestinian, because by 15 July there was already very substantial opposition to the Lebanon operation in Israel.

To the Palestinians, the message shows that even the senior-most leaders, those close to Arafat and the Muslim Arab countries that have supported the PLO, recognized there was no hope. (Despite the Jordanian civil war in which the Jordanian army fought the PLO, Jordanian ties with Fatah, the mainstream of the PLO and an organization that had tried to work with the Jordanian government, were acceptable at the clandestine level. Key Fatah leaders and King Hussein remained in close contact.) That the leader was a member of Fatah is also critical, because Arafat, head of Fatah, was the very symbol of PLO resistance in Beirut.
To the Israelis, the message suggested that the move into Lebanon was fruitful. That Ta'amri turned himself in after the IDF had captured Sidon and was besieging Beirut suggests that a simple move into southern Lebanon would not have sufficed, that it was the magnitude of the effort, the fact that the IDF was going to drive the PLO from Lebanon, that compelled him to surrender. And it was precisely on this point that dissent in Israel hinged: Only a small fringe group questioned the move into Lebanon; it was the move to Beirut that many assailed.

Persuasion should be based on themes that argue the adversary

- should not be afraid to surrender
- has no alternative to surrender
- will be treated fairly and with respect
- fought bravely and safeguarded his honor
- must realize this is his last chance, that living is better than dying.

The city environment can provide emotional nurturance to defenders, particularly those who are natives or long-time residents of the city. Its familiar buildings and places, abundant protection and shelter, the image of strength and resistance of its heavy structures—all these may reassure a besieged group of defenders. City resources for food, water, and necessary supplies are often adequate to support defenders for extensive periods, rendering impractical a blockade to force the defenders out. Thus, PSYOP in cities will usually have to accompanied by forceful military operations designed to demonstrate the inevitability of defeat.

Exploiting Basic Human Emotions. In the political and military environment of Lebanon, emotional appeals played a dominant role in all aspects of credible PSYOP communications. The "emotional content" of most propaganda is high, and is meaningful when it is related to actual needs of a particular target group. The propagandist must ensure that he arouses emotions that clearly benefit the military commander. If used properly, emotional appeals can accelerate the process of persuasion. One objective of PSYOP is to use emotional appeals that will lower the morale of hostile targets and influence their behavior and conduct in a manner favorable to the military commander. Among the emotional appeals used in PSYOP messages in Lebanon were the following:

- the fear of death
- the fear of isolation
- suffering and pain
- uncertainty about the welfare of fighters' families
- the fear of IDF's superior military forces
- the fear of having no options

Fear is a powerful tool, and despite the structural protection and resource base available to defenders, aspects of the city can be used to heighten fear. Structural density may reduce the lethality of advance, but it increases the shock value as a result of echoing and ricochets in areas subject to intense fire.

Uncertainty is also great in a city. The defender's hope, and often his belief, is that the attacker will not be prepared to accept the casualties inherent in urban warfare. He draws succor from his fellow defenders, each one signifying the force and hence casualty multiplier effect of the city. The attacker must overcome this psychological defense structure. As this report indicates, the IDF used a combination of intense aerial bombing, military movements, radio broadcasts, military operations against the populace allied with the defender, and rumor, and some military operations to persuade the defenders (the PLO) that the IDF was prepared to take whatever casualties were necessary to achieve the objective of removing the PLO from Beirut.

A recurring element of the psychological concerns of the PLO in Lebanon was the security and welfare of the family members of the fighters. This consideration proved to be a critical factor in the almost fanatic resistance inside some of the camps in the South, and was also a principal issue in the camps near Beirut. (The negotiations leading to the end of the siege and the withdrawal of the PLO from Beirut focused extensively on security for the families of the PLO fighters.)

The psychological strategy for communications directed at the Syrian forces was based on the objective of persuading the Syrians to withdraw from Lebanon. The IDF did not desire to directly engage the Syrian forces if this could be avoided. Consequently, IDF PSYOP stressed basic emotional appeals (topics) to persuade the Syrian soldier that

- the IDF did not want to kill Syrians
- he should escape—while time remained
- he should escape under cover of darkness
- he should leave the battlefield and save his life while there was time
he would soon be surrounded and would then be unable to escape.

his commanders were unable to really help him in these dilemmas.

The following messages reflect the tenor of IDF communications to Syrian armed forces.

Commander of the Syrian 85th Brigade

I address this appeal to you, from one military commander to another: The IDF has been forced to enter Lebanon in order to expel all their regular armed factions that disrupted security and calm and caused terror and destruction.

The IDF undertook the responsibility of carrying out this task quickly and with precision and force. They have large forces from the navy, army, and air force committed to the Beirut city area, including a huge number of tanks. These forces out number your own. In a short time we shall capture the city.

I tell you that I do not doubt your courage. But at the same time, you have the responsibility to protect your soldiers from death and care for the future. This takes even more courage, and as an experienced commander, you know that any attempt to throw your forces against the IDF, with its greater manpower and firepower, will be the same thing as committing suicide and will cause unnecessary bloodshed.

However, I want to tell you that it is not our intention to fight the Syrian Army or to confront the [PLA] units of Hittin or Qaddissiya that are under your command.

We therefore issued orders to our forces to permit you and your troops to leave the city without hindrance and to use either of the following routes for your withdrawal:

1. Fayadiyyeh-Kahale-'Aley

2. Khalde-Bshamoun-'Ain Anoub-Souq el-Gharb-'Aley

These routes are indicated on the map on the following page. I promise that our forces have received orders to
ensure your exit from the city along the prescribed routes in an honorable manner within a few hours following your receipt of this statement.

Major General Amir Drori
Commander, Northern Command

(Translation of Arabic-language leaflet dropped by IAF on Beirut, 10 June 1982. A map followed.)

Statement to the officers and men of Syrian armored units in al-Bekaa:

The missiles which were supposed to form an umbrella over your heads have been destroyed. Dozens of Syrian Air Force planes have been destroyed before your eyes. The IDF is now carrying out intensive military pressure against you, and you will soon be besieged. You have no way to escape.

Syrian officers, Syrian soldiers, stop and think. Use the opportunity to flee from the Bekaa before the siege is tightened around you.

Syrian officers, Syrian soldiers, stop and think. Any reasonable person is aware of the consequences of your situation and knows there is no way to survive except by immediate evacuation of the Bekaa.

Syrian officers, Syrian soldiers, save your neck from the noose while you are still free.

(Jerusalem in Arabic, 10 June 1982.)

Syrian Soldier under attack, stop and think. Today, you have again had first-hand evidence of the IDF's iron grip. Our forces have responded with force to your commanders' provocative activities in the Bhamdoun and Dahr al-Baydar areas.

Syrian Soldier, the desperate position you and your fellow soldiers have reached is a function of the hasty decisions made by your commanders.

Syrian Soldier, stop and think. The IDF does not want bloodshed but was forced to strike with an iron hand in order to stop the Syrian command's provocations. The IDF grants all those besieged Syrian soldiers a final chance to escape under the cover of darkness. Syrian Soldier, use tonight's darkness and save your life. There is still a chance for you to escape. Remember that the Syrian forces' formations in the Bhamdoun-Dahr al-Baydar area have fallen and that your commanders can no longer save you.
Syrian Soldier, harbor no illusions: leave the battlefield and save your life while it is still possible.

(Jerusalem in Arabic, 24 June 1982.)

IDF PSYOP exploited the air victory that resulted when the IAF destroyed Syrian advanced fighter aircraft and sophisticated, Soviet-made surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) in the Bekaa Valley. The psychological propaganda exploitation of the destruction of the missiles emphasized to Syrian ground forces that

- the Syrian Air Force had been destroyed
- Syrian ground forces had no longer any air cover
- the Syrian Army could hardly fight without air cover, especially with the IAF active over the skies of the battlefield
- the Syrian Army would therefore soon be surrounded, that time was of the essence, and that Syrian soldiers should escape while they could.

In its effort to increase its psychological pressure, Israeli aircraft dropped leaflets that stressed the dangerous and hopeless situation of the Syrian missile forces. The objective was to demonstrate to the Syrian forces that resistance was foolish without air support and air cover. Again, the basic emotions that PSYOP messages exploited were the fear of death and the unknown with the objective of confusing and destabilizing individual soldiers—and at a very minimum depressing his morale.

The distinction between officers and men that is often apparent in the messages directed to both the PLO and the Syrians is a theme that often appears in PSYOP communications. However, it was undoubtedly stressed by Israeli planners who know that PLO senior officers are selected and promoted not on ability but on loyalty to the PLO leadership; and that Syrian officers have never been known for their decision-making ability or flexibility, they too being promoted first and foremost on the basis of loyalty or sectarian affiliation. Moreover, Israelis were aware of the religious divisions in Syria, and may have hoped to use the officer-enlisted distinction in order to get at the sectarian loyalties, since a disproportionate number of Syrian officers in key units are often Alawi.

Neutralizing the Syrian forces was also a means to enhance the isolation of the PLO. No state in the Arab world portrays itself as the protector of the Palestinians more than Syria. And certainly, the PLO had no more powerful Arab ally than Syria. The effect of the early cease-fire between Israeli and Syrian forces was also seen as a means of increasing the "fear of isolation" of the PLO, trapped in the city of Beirut, away from the Syrians or any other protector.
Providing Instructions and Special Appeals. In combat environments, confusion, uncertainty, and misinformation prevail. A task of military PSYOP is to increase (or decrease) the level of confusion and uncertainty in the ranks of hostile populations. Another task of PSYOP is to provide a degree of order and understanding in regard to those activities and issues that benefit the military commander and his operations.

It is to be expected that indoctrination and propaganda emphasized that surrender or capture was equivalent to torture or death—"the Israelis do not take prisoners." Surrendering is a very emotional and tense situation. It is the task of military PSYOP to explain and instruct the hostile soldier or fighter in the methods and protocol of surrendering. If possible, the fear and tense emotions connected with "giving up" should be moderated. Clear instructions that are reasonable and credible should be issued by appropriate commanders and through PSYOP communication media applicable to the tactical situation.

In addition to instructions and information about the advantages and procedures for surrendering, military PSYOP sends instructions to hostile forces concerning a variety of agreements or events such as

- the evacuation of noncombatants
- the evacuation of the wounded
- the removal of dead bodies
- cease-fires or truces
- "undeclared" truces for holidays

An example of such instructions follows.

The IDF today completed all the tasks entrusted to it in southern Lebanon. Therefore, the opportunity exists for a large number of Israeli units to extensively clean the area without failing to mop up and purge every square centimeter of the territory.

Fighters, stop and think. Hundreds of your fellows have surrendered and are benefiting from good treatment. They received the food, water, and medical care they required. The IDF has considered the fact that you may be afraid of coming to harm when surrendering to our forces. The IDF command promises not to hurt any armed element who surrenders himself and his weapons.
Fighters, stop and think. The IDF gives you a final chance to surrender and to save your life. Do each of the following:

1. Drop your weapon and turn yourself in to the nearest IDF unit.

2. If you are afraid to surrender, send a representative you trust, such as a notable, an elder, or a child, to secure a pledge from the IDF that you will not be hurt.

Fighters remaining in the field, stop and think. Is there any reason to lose your life when the battle is over? Turn yourself in immediately to the IDF to return again to your home and family. Give yourself up and you will be safe.

(Jerusalem in Arabic, 1 June 1982.)

Giving Political Information. To a large extent the war in Lebanon was a political war and views (and emotions) in regard to politics were important, indeed vital, to all elements of the population. Inasmuch as morale and determination of the fighters and soldiers were stimulated and determined by the political environment, it was essential that military PSYOP address the political issues.

PSYOP supports diplomatic negotiations and political objectives of the national command authority. The PSYOP apparatus must accomplish this objective in a very credible and genuine manner.

Military commanders use the PSYOP apparatus (organization) and media (instruments) to disseminate and communicate political messages and war news to hostile, neutral, and friendly forces in the theater of operations.

In Lebanon the "will to fight" and the "will to resist" were directly related to political/religious indoctrination and persuasion. In such an environment, the military commander and his PSYOP organization should have a very thorough and realistic understanding of the political/religious circumstances.

All channels of communication available to military PSYOP are used to transmit political messages and war news. Extreme care must be taken to ensure that the content, sources, and channels of the political messages are consistent and credible.

The IDF repeatedly stated that the primary objective of its military operations was to destroy the PLO infrastructure in Lebanon and to remove all PLO fighters from the territory of that
beleaguered country. This message was communicated over and over again to the full range of PSYOP audiences. Some examples follow.

We harbor no enmity to any Lebanese. Our enemy is the [PLO] swindler. The one who violated the sovereignty of Lebanon is the swindler. The one who set Lebanon on fire and destroyed it is the swindler. The one who robbed Lebanon's independence is the swindler. The one who made the Lebanese suffer thousands and thousands of dead and martyrs is the swindler. Let it be understood by us that our enemy is the swindler and not any other Lebanese. We shall go to them as brothers. We shall go to them to unite the ranks and rebuild Lebanon.

(Message from Saad Haddad carried on Voice of Hope, date unknown.)

Armed Palestinians, the war in Lebanon has not ended but will continue until the last armed Palestinian leaves Lebanese territory. The Israeli government has expressed a willingness to give you and your leaders a chance to find an honorable way out of the trouble by allowing you to leave besieged West Beirut preserving your life and the lives of your leaders. The Israeli government and army have opened the best way for the elements of the terrorist organizations and their leaders to leave Lebanon.

Armed Palestinian, stop and think. The IDF is extending to you and to your leaders the last rope to save yourselves and is granting you the chance to return to your loved ones in peace and safety. You must choose between imminent death in Lebanon and a dignified life outside Lebanese territory.

(Jerusalem in Arabic, 30 June 1982.)

Presenting War News. Another significant objective of military PSYOP is to disseminate war news (both good and bad) in a fast, effective, and credible manner to hostile, neutral, and friendly groups in the theater of operations.

Most news operations are complicated enterprises. They require the systematic coordination of collection, selection, editing, publication (for print), and dissemination. The PSYOP organization in the field is responsible for ensuring that the news is edited so it has the desired "slant" and impact for the military and civilian audience in the theater of operations. PSYOP managers must decide whether to

- run the news operation into established local channels,
- develop independent channels,
use a combination of the two,
or, where appropriate, do all three.

In some cases, of course, there might not be a choice.

Recording events and actions on film or tape, whether still photos or videotapes, is an activity of vital importance to psychological operations. In the media environment of the 1980s, visual presentations have added impact to all PSYOP, both to friendly and hostile audiences, and both domestic and international. It is essential for high-impact operations that military PSYOP establish adequate in-theater facilities to gather, edit, and distribute or publish photos and videotapes of military and psychological actions and events. Distribution by high-tech electronic means should be considered; in many cases the speed in getting the story to the world in pictures could make the difference between PSYOP success and failure.

News operations can be the core of effective PSYOP in that they can increase the credibility of the total campaign. Generally, news items and reports can be verified from neutral sources—events occur and they will be reported. All military operations (victories and defeats) should be reported promptly and in a manner that serves the long-term interests of the operation.

The efficient and prompt reporting of news from the viewpoint of the military commander involves such topics and such features as the following:

- military progress and operations
- specific military victories
- specific military defeats
- atrocities
- military personalities
- rumors
- "human interest" topics
- humanitarian topics
- (factual) reporting of political decisions
- foreign news
Propaganda newspapers, magazines, and radio and television news broadcasts are especially important when fighting in urban areas. In the past, news operations were the most effective element in the overall PSYOP campaign conducted in urban or siege conditions.

**PSYOP Objectives Directed to Civilian Audiences**

Psychological objectives and tasks directed toward civilians in urban environments are complicated by the very nature of the environment—a high concentration of noncombatants. In Lebanon, the situation was further complicated by the diversity of the audience, as discussed previously.

It is the responsibility of military commanders to ensure that civilian casualties are reduced to a minimum. It is the job of the military psychological operations apparatus to ensure that the commander has appropriate channel of communications to the civilian audiences in his theater of operations. The purpose of PSYOP directed to civilians is not only to ensure that casualties are limited, but to keep the civilian population from interfering with military operations.

The objectives of Israeli psychological operations in Lebanon were

- to warn civilians about impending military operations
- to provide instructions related to safety and military operations
- to increase (or decrease) psychological tension
- to provide political information and news

**Warning About Impending Military Operations.** In Lebanon in 1982, the success of PSYOP directed to the civilian population was of equal if not more importance than PSYOP directed to military groups. One reason is that the international media gave significant coverage to civilian casualties and destruction of civilian property.

Fighting in urban areas provided PSYOP planners in the IDF with a profound challenge—how to limit the number of civilian casualties. In conventional warfare, noncombatant civilians would generally be evacuated, in most cases women, children, and the elderly population would be given sanctuary. However, in the political/religious environment of Lebanon, civilians were encouraged by the PLO (and even forced in some cases) to remain in the battle area.
The war in the East against the Syrians was fought as a classic military campaign, with few civilians in the battle area or used as hostages. What happened in Sidon, Tyre, and Beirut was different. The IDF made a modest attempt to warn civilians of impending operations, and Israeli PSYOP urged civilians to evacuate the combat areas; nevertheless, the number of civilian casualties was high. Some examples of IDF messages that urged the civilians to leave combat areas follow:

Israeli forces will shortly be entering the towns to wipe out terrorist resistance. In order to carry out this mission, Israeli soldiers will employ the most modern and effective weapons. The IDF will do everything in its power not to harm noncombatants but will eliminate anyone bearing arms. We have no quarrel with the citizens of Lebanon, only with the terrorists bringing destruction to your good land. If there are terrorists in your home or in the vicinity ask them to immediately lay down their arms and go away from your homes. If you are unable to do so, get away from them as quickly as possible so you will not be harmed without reason. Keep away and save your lives.

This is a warning for your safety.

(Message from the IDF to southern Lebanon residents, Voice of Hope in English, 8 June 1982.

The IDF is getting ready to complete its purge of what is left of the dens of the terrorists who are besieged in Sidon. The IDF is exerting every effort to avoid harming defenseless citizens in accordance with old traditions. However, the IDF will root out anyone bearing arms. The destiny of the terrorists besieged in your city was inevitable when their leaders abandoned them and took flight.

Inhabitants of Sidon: your brothers, residents of Tyre, responded to the IDF appeal and evacuated their city to give our forces the chance to purge it of the terrorists' dens. The residents of Tyre began returning to their homes last night after their security and safety were guaranteed more than ever before.

Inhabitants of Sidon: The IDF will exert every effort to avoid hurting you or any defenseless civilians. For your own sake and for your safety leave the area of danger immediately. The IDF will allow you to return to your homes in security and with dignity as soon as possible. Remember, your life is in your hands. He
who warns is excused [for what happens to those who fail to heed the warning.]

(Jerusalem in Arabic, 9 June 1982.)

To the citizens of Sidon, the terrorists' center:

1. Sidon is the center of the terrorists and will be attacked.

2. The IDF asks citizens of the city to leave it immediately to save loss of life.

3. We will not hurt the people who leave without weapons.

4. For those who do not leave within 2 hours, the city will be shelled.

(From a leaflet dropped on Sidon, 8 June 1982.)

In Tyre and Sidon, the Israeli warning leaflets urged civilians to evacuate the cities and to go to the beach. Unfortunately, there were inadequate facilities on the beaches to care for a mass of refugees or to attend to the sick and wounded. Military planners must realize that when fighting in urban areas, appropriate and adequate provisions must be made to feed and care for civilian refugees. The PSYOP plan should consider all aspects of public welfare in regard to refugee populations. For example, messages should be explicit and contain instructions in regard to

- evacuation routes (providing maps)
- care for sick and wounded
- registration and security
- instructions in regard to exposing combatants who are with or disguised as refugees
- instructions about obtaining food and sanitary facilities.

IDF leaflets and radio messages urged the civilian population to persuade the PLO fighters to surrender--instructions were issued by the "Voice of Israel in Arabic to the civilian population of southern Lebanon. The noncombatants were asked to try to persuade the PLO fighters to lay down their weapons quickly and were warned not to hide behind the PLO fighters. "Do not," the instructions specified, "allow them to be the cause of harm to you or your children." Residents were asked to hang white flags from balconies and windows of their
houses. They were also asked not to leave their villages, since roads were likely to be shelled. (See, e.g., Barukh Me'iri report in Ma'ariv, 7 June 1982, p. 16.)

Other PSYOP instructions (by leaflets, loudspeakers, and radio) were issued in an attempt by the IDF to return life in occupied areas to a normal routine.

1. All the employees in the liberated areas are requested to return to normal work. All electricity, water, and telephone workers in particular are requested to begin repairing the networks. Problems should be conveyed to military officials for resolution.

2. Again we appeal to refugee residents of all liberated villages, particularly the residents of al-'Ayshiyah, Sa'adiyat, Jiyah, and Damur, to return quickly to their villages to begin the reconstruction. They can refer to [IDF] commanders in current areas of residence to ensure their quick return.

(Saad Haddad, Voice of Hope in Arabic, 12 June 1982.)

Additional leaflets and radio broadcasts urged the civilians in southern Lebanon to supply information concerning the location of PLO fighters and Israeli prisoners. One such message on 25 June 1982 stated,

Citizen, if you are in a position to supply information concerning the terrorists and the prisoners they are holding hostage you will receive a special reward from the Israeli Defense Forces.

(Leaflet written in Arabic and distributed in southern Lebanon.)

Increasing Psychological Tension to Induce Desired Behavior. An important objective of IDF PSYOP was a campaign conducted against the civilian population to get out of the cities, especially those areas controlled by the PLO. The tension and terror of combat situations increased the psychological pressure on the civilian inhabitants of West Beirut. The IDF used a variety of psychological techniques and methods to increase the psychological pressure in order to imply the civilian population to (1) evacuate, (2) move to safe locations, or (3) avoid supporting the PLO:

- mock air raids conducted over Beirut, including breaking the sound barrier
• troop and equipment movements unrelated to actual combat needs but carried out in order to impress continual movement on observers
• artillery fire on selected targets
• naval fire on selected targets
• selected acts of terror by agents in Beirut
• the use of flares and noisemakers at night
• blockades of essential supplies, including food, water, and fuel
• interruptions of utilities, including telephone and energy

Leaflets and radio messages from the Israelis appealed to the civilian population to leave West Beirut along selected "safe exits."

To the residents of West Beirut: Many thousands of your brothers have seized the opportunity given to them and have left West Beirut. They now live in freedom and safety.

The cease-fire provides an opportunity which must not be missed for the residents of Beirut to save their lives and the lives of their loved ones. You who are now in Beirut: Remember that time is running out and that the more you delay, the more the dangers to your safety and the safety of your loved ones increase. Remember that the army, the IDF, reaffirms that it is not concerned with hitting innocent civilians or those who do not bear arms against it. Act quickly, and save your life and the lives of your loved ones before it is too late.

(Text of leaflet dropped by IAF on Beirut, 28 June 1982.)

The first incidence of leaflet-dropping over Beirut resulted in a substantial reaction by a segment of the city's population, and many people responded by trying to exit West Beirut. However, once this element was gone, the vast bulk of the population remained for a variety of reasons, not least of which was fear of losing their possessions and their homes to Palestinian and Shi'a refugees for the South. The unwillingness of the Beirut population to abandon their residences in the face of what appeared to be a massive threat of destruction surprised the Israelis.
Giving Political Messages. We have noted that the war in Lebanon was clearly a complex political struggle, some of which involved a struggle for power within Lebanon by non-Lebanese groups (such as the PLO and the Syrians) and by various factions often based on religion. The IDF in its military propaganda emphasized the following limited objectives:

- destruction of the PLO and its infrastructure in Lebanon
- support of "Free Lebanon" (at least ad interim pending the emergence of a new, strong, national, unified central government
- creation of pressures that would compel the withdrawal of Syrian forces.

Brother Lebanese, I would like to clarify one small point for you, that is, what is happening today in the South. You all know that we have learned a great deal in the past 6 or 7 years. We have also paid a great deal in blood as a result of the actions of the terrorist swindlers. Not only we, but also the Lebanese who live in the occupied areas [i.e., areas controlled by Syria and the PLO] have learned. They have suffered a great deal, perhaps even much more than we have suffered. We do not forget the international acts of terrorism the swindlers have carried out and are carrying out against our brothers, the Israelis.

We know very well that more than 90 percent of the Lebanese would like to get rid of the swindlers by any means. We in turn have never thought of harming any Lebanese wherever he may be. We have never considered ourselves as the enemies of any Lebanese. We have always considered that the foreign swindler is our enemy. He is the one who destroyed and burned Lebanon after robbing it and dispersed its citizens and spread evil in Lebanese society and gave Hell to the Lebanese.

For this reason, and the recent fighting we have avoided as much as possible pressuring the Lebanese under occupation. We have always avoided shelling areas close to Lebanese residential areas. We have done the impossible so our shells will fall on the swindlers and their positions and their weapons. Therefore, we announce to you that the Army of Free Lebanon is currently participating side by side with the Israeli Defense Forces in the battle against the swindlers in order to hit and destroy the swindlers' war machine to protect Lebanon and the Lebanese.

Let everyone understand that all the war operations have not been and will not be directed against any
Lebanese, but against the common swindler enemy. Let those who are in their houses stay in their houses. As I said before, whoever raises a Lebanese flag will be saved.

(Speech by Saad Haddad in Arabic, Voice of Hope, 6 June 1982.)

I would like to say a few words to tell you that this war, which is intended finally to bring peace for the Galilee, here in Lebanon we call the operation "Freedom for Lebanon." You have to know that this operation is approved by 90 percent of the Lebanese, because the Lebanese...found themselves in a very bad situation under the Syrian and terrorist occupation and became...desperate...to get rid of the occupation and they were waiting for a miracle. So, for this, on behalf of 90 percent of the Lebanese, I thank the State of Israel, the government of Israel, the people of Israel, the army of Israel, which are sacrificing not only for Israel but also for the freedom of Lebanon.

(Speech by Haddad, Voice of Hope, 11 June 1982.)

THE CITY AND ISRAELI PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Apart from the planning, resources, and operations in Lebanon, a number of events and developments related to PSYOP in cities affected or were affected by the nature of the campaign. This section deals with several of those issues, specifically (1) the impact of MOUT on the campaign, (2) the impact of MOUT on international PSYOP, and (3) the impact of MOUT on domestic PSYOP.

The Impact of Urban Warfare on the PSYOP of the Campaign

By "campaign PSYOP" we mean the impact of PSYOP on the conduct of the overall military campaign in the theater of operations.

The campaign in the southern cities moved through them so quickly that little impact of the MOUT element per se was felt in either. That is, PSYOP effect of fighting in cities did not alter the nature, intensity, or outcome combat to any appreciable degree in either Sidon or Tyre. This is especially true since both cities were largely abandoned by PLO senior officers and forces, with only isolated groups providing the resistance.

The Israeli capture of Sidon and Tyre did have any effect--several effects really--on the fighters in Beirut. At the
outset, the speed with which the southern cities fell and the disarray of the PLO's C\(^2\) links led to a major morale problem. Had the IDF moved directly into Beirut in mid-June, it might have been able to capitalize upon that effect. However, IDF change in tactics improved PLO morale and increased PLO willingness to resist. The belief that the PLO could inflict high casualties on the IDF led some to conclude they could prevent an IDF victory, others to believe they could redeem Arab/Palestinian honor in resistance. (Honor is an especially important psychological value in Arab society.)

The heavy shelling of the Palestinian camps, which did not distinguish between combatant and noncombatant, steeled Palestinian resolve. Stories about the humiliations to which Palestinian captives in the South were subjected also reinforced the urge to resist. This last does not appear to be an urban phenomenon, but it was precisely the close contact and accessible communications that the city provided that facilitated the spread of these attitude sets and emotions.

There appears to have been relatively little planning and structure in Israel's PSYOP for Beirut, as far as distinguishing between audiences is concerned. It is not at all clear that any coherent plan existed for this purpose. Possibly, IDF PSYOP personnel had not evaluated the population well enough to understand the subtle but very important differences between the views of Sunni Lebanese and Sunni Palestinians, or between various groups living in or near the camps that were not Palestinian. However, the IDF operated very differently with regard to Shi'as, with whom it cooperated extensively, and Sunnis. And certainly Israelis believed they would be welcomed by the Christian community (which was largely true for the Christians of East Beirut, but not nearly so true for those of the West.) One exception to this observation is the purposeful Israeli shelling of non-Palestinian areas, which seems to have been intended to, and did, persuade Lebanese Muslims to try to influence the Palestinians to withdraw from Beirut.

International PSYOP Impact of Urban Warfare

International support is important to all countries. Israel, which is isolated in the Middle East, is something of a pariah state in that relatively few countries are willing to maintain visibly close and cooperative relations with Israel. Apart from the United States, the countries with the closest relations are often other pariah states—e.g., South Africa and Taiwan. It could be argued that, given this background, the international image of Israel did not occupy a principal place in the deliberation of Israel's political and military leaders; that "international image" was written off from the outset of the invasion. This supposition is inaccurate.
No Israeli doubts the international and domestic Israeli importance of Israel's image in the United States. Indeed, those like General Sharon who insist little heed should be paid to the United States are specially objecting on the basis that too much attention is devoted to American concerns in Israel. It is not merely that the United States provides enormous quantities of military and economic assistance to Israel—between one-third and one-quarter of Israel's military budget is financed by the United States. Rather, the emotional closeness of much of the Israeli public to relatives and friends, to expatriate communities, and to the tradition of close relations between the two countries all translate into considerable political significance in Israel. How many Israelis see Israel is related to how Americans, or at least how many American Jews, see Israel.

Despite this relationship, it is remarkable that little thought was given in advance beyond the field of military operations—in the Arab world, the United States, or the West as a whole. No preparation was undertaken in spite of the "open secret" of the imminent outbreak of hostilities and in spite of the widespread and important role of Jews, many in close touch with Israel, in Western media. Indeed, the arrogance of the statements of Prime Minister Begin, and of the statements and general attitude and carriage of Defense Minister Sharon, alienated many Americans at an early stage.

As if this lack of preparation and erroneous tenor were insufficient, Minister Sharon's and Chief of Staff Eytan's management of the war significantly exacerbated the PSYOP problem. In order to deceive Israeli public and cabinet opinion, Israeli forces moved toward their objectives rather than employing the highly mobile and indirect approach they would have preferred but that would have revealed the plan to go all the way to Beirut. Thus, the government insisted until well after the encirclement of Beirut was completed that it merely sought a 40-km security zone to protect northern Israel from rocket attacks. Indeed, the claim of a 40-km limit remained days after Israeli forces had reached Beirut. This embarrassed both Israel's defenders in the United States and the U.S. government, which had operated on the basis of the validity of the 40-km limit in its statements.

The fact that the ultimate obstacle to the victory of the IDF—or so it appeared at the time—was a city was critical. Had the issue been merely the crossing of the 40-km line, it is arguable that no hue and cry would have been raised, especially since little concern was evinced over the fate of the few scattered settlements between Sidon and the southern approaches to the city of Beirut. When serious combat involved Damour, however, it was apparent not so much that the IDF would take Beirut as that the 40-km line was a hoax. If movement northward was not quite as rapid as the IDF would have liked, it was still too rapid and too unopposed to have been unintended.
The siege of Beirut created a public relations nightmare for Israel. No one expected the Arab states to accept any Israeli role in Lebanon, and so their protests at the invasion were never taken seriously in Jerusalem. However, Beirut was a different matter. There, film crews photographed daily the horrors of war. War is ugly, and any war in any inhabited city is repugnant to the eyes and sensibilities of nonbelligerent populations. Not surprisingly, then, American and other Western publics watched with concern, then upset, and ultimately outrage at the barbarism they thought they saw daily and nightly on their television screens, a phenomenon already known to Americans who had watched similar scenes, but not usually in urban settings, in Vietnam.

This report is not an appropriate forum for the assessment of the nature of reporting and management of news in combat situations. However, it is quite clear and understandable that, leaving aside for the moment his convictions, the average reporter or correspondent seeks "newsworthy"--i.e., dramatic--scenes for his art. The personal feelings of a reporter may also enter into the nature or direction of a story, and the city provides myriad opportunities to enhance the dramatic tragedy of any attack by any military operation in an urban center. However central it may be in the institutions of the belligerent on defense, a city is first and primarily a noncombatant zone. Of these nuances of communication the foreign home audience is generally ignorant, mesmerized by the visual horror it sees. Certainly, this was the case in Lebanon, and particularly in Beirut.

The case of Israel in the cities of Lebanon may be an extreme, but it is not at all unique. Over the years of intermittent violence in the Middle East, reporters assigned in Arab cities tended to identify with the Arabs, while those posted to Israel often reflected Israeli views. It might even be said that in the case of several major news sources reporters on each side of the Arab-Israeli division saw their duty as "balancing" the reporting on the other side within their publication or programming. It is also true that the PLO had learned very well the arts of "winning over" reporters. The Palestinians had a story to tell, a story of injustice and tragedy to which none could be insensitive, and they learned not only to be very persuasive but, as well, to provide the amenities and environment best designed to maximize the identification of many reporters with the Palestinians and their cause.

When Israel forbade foreign journalists assigned to Israel to accompany the IDF into Lebanon, the country effectively left the reporting of the Lebanese invasion to the journalists based in that country, journalists who, for the most part, were far from unbiased. Even if the invasion had been limited to the South, the slant of the reporting on the invasion would have been predictable. It is clear, however, that had the IDF stopped in the South the impact would have been much less significant.
The adequacy of planning for international PSYOP was early evident when traditional friends of Israel in Europe and the United States raised their voices, along with those who normally criticized Israeli policy in the region, in opposition. Eventually, Israeli leaders quietly dispatched some of their most effective communicators to the United States, first to understand the magnitude and parameters of the protest, then to try to contain it. The process of PSYOP damage control was a long one, and extends well beyond the temporal scope of this report in both Europe and the United States. Throughout the hostilities in Lebanon and for at least 6 months thereafter, the dominant American and European view was clearly hostile to Israel's invasion and war management.

It is unclear whether preparation of public opinion in the United States and Europe would have borne any fruits in terms of impact on the weight of public opinion concerning Israeli action. The contrast between American and European public reaction to Israel's 1978 invasion of Lebanon, on the one hand, and the 1982 invasion, on the other, together with the distinct increase in hostile public sentiment in the Beirut phase of 1982, suggests strongly that it is combat in cities that creates particularly strong public reactions. The crescendo of American protests seemed to parallel the continuation and intensification of the Beirut siege to a very large extent. Meanwhile, despite significant quantities of information, much of it very hostile to Israel and some of it quite shrill, concerning Israeli combat action in the cities of Sidon and Tyre, the American and European reaction was limited. Why?

Sidon and Tyre were not generally covered by the media. Sidon was the southern headquarters of the PLO; Tyre had been virtually a free-fire zone for years. Few reporters ventured that far from Beirut, and almost none spent the night in either city. Means to transmit video images from both cities were lacking except through Israel. By contrast, reporters and correspondents were resident in West Beirut. Most stayed at the Commodore Hotel, whose ownership enjoyed a close relationship with PLO. As Israel neared PLO headquarters in Beirut, it also neared the communications headquarters, and most of the reporters there were sympathetic to the besieged. They did not concoct the news, buy any dispassionate assessment of the reporting of the news as contrasted with the realities of the siege would display a bias toward the dramatic. Most of Beirut proper was spared any significant damage—the principal exceptions being the area near the museum and the nearby hippodrome area. Other sectors received infrequent or no damage—the Minara area was hit by naval gunfire, for example, even though no Palestinians lived there. Yet, this is hardly the impression left by the media.

By contrast, the areas south of the city as it was technically delineated, particularly the Fakahani district and the refugee camps, were hit very badly or completely destroyed. The massive destruction of these areas—which are also
predominantly civilian—precludes any suggestion that the war was fought without violence. The issue is not that firepower was used, or used ineffectively, or used inappropriately; it is that the reporting clearly implied that most of West Beirut was subject to intense fire. That is simply not true. IDF PSYOP failed to demonstrate that damage was very limited and centralized. This problem has been a recurrent one in PSYOP since mass media gained access to the front lines with real-time photo and televised reporting. It is one that has affected the United States, and it is a problem that needs to be addressed for the future.

Domestic PSYOP Impact Of Urban Warfare

Even clearer was the impact on domestic public opinion of the battle for Beirut. Unlike the rest of the world, Israeli opinion overwhelmingly supported the invasion—up to the 40-km line. The move to Beirut therefore placed the entire operation in a completely different context and polarized Israeli opinion. While even the opposition supported the move into the South, the Beirut stage of the war brought about a marriage between the mainstream Labor/Ashkenazi populace and the small but vociferous peace movement. Israeli television coverage, not unlike that in the United States, created an impression of the brutality and inhumanity of the war in the city. While on the one hand in Israel there existed a very different impression of the Palestinians from that obtained elsewhere, on the other hand there was a greater familiarity with the non-Palestinian Lebanese population as well. Little pity may have been spent on the Palestinians, especially the fighters, but the apparent destruction of Lebanon, once the only Arab country where Israelis could easily travel and interact with Arabs, that was communicated by television caused a certain degree of remorse. Moreover, the image portrayed by television that Palestinian refugee civilians were also being pounded relentlessly by Israeli military power—an image that was much more accurate, incidentally, than that of the infrastructure of Lebanon being destroyed—was painful as it seemed to support what Israel’s critics were charging.

A few of Israel’s own reporters did accompany the IDF into Lebanon. This was a distinguished group, including Israel’s premier military correspondent, Ze’ev Schiff of Ha’aretz, and equally well-known and highly respected Hirsch Goodman of the Jerusalem Post. Most of the Israeli press is pro-Labor, and once again it could have been predicted that these correspondents would not see the "big plan" favorably. Their criticism did in fact feed the antiwar movement, although most of the criticism was leveled after the war was over, in keeping with personal identification of these reporters with IDF personnel and with the security interests of Israel. Despite the claims of anti-Israeli
spokesmen, the Israeli press has provided some of the best reportage and most trenchant critiques of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

EVALUATION OF ISRAELI MOUT PSYOP IN LEBANON

This chapter consists of an evaluation of Israel's psychological operations in urban settings in Lebanon. Planning, resources, operations, and effectiveness are considered.

Planning

Planning for Israeli MOUT PSYOP was poor, though poorer than for PSYOP on other terrain only in the sense that the city of Beirut was an unintended theater from the PSYOP planner's standpoint. In a real sense, the problems of planning derived from overall faculty management of the war at the strategic and general headquarters level. That is, PSYOP was planned for a small operation in southern Lebanon, but this was not the war that was fought. To the extent that PSYOP planning for the larger operation had been carried out, it could still not be used for political reasons addressed earlier in this report. The result was a significant mismatch at the strategic level affecting the domestic Israeli audience and the international (i.e., Western and especially U.S.) audience.

The fact that Beirut was a large, heavily populated city made all the difference in this respect. Had the IDF been moving northward only into lightly populated areas north of the 40-km line, it is unlikely that any major hue and cry would have arisen in Israel—or, perhaps the United States. Note that the political opposition mobilized against the move northward only when the IDF reached the outskirts of Beirut. Note too that it was against the IDF entering Beirut that their arguments were made. The city as a likely source of casualties; the city as a heavily populated civilian area; the city as the first Arab capital Israeli forces had actually threatened to take—all of these were considerations in generating both Israeli and international opposition to the move.

Tactical PSYOP planning was far superior to strategic PSYOP planning, especially regarding the target audiences and their values. Intensive interaction with the audiences in Lebanon gave Israeli planners some "feel" for the values and priorities of these audiences, although Israelis seem to have a less adequate grasp of values and overall trends and operating principles than one might have expected. Certainly, however, detailed tactical knowledge of facts, awareness of key communicators and problems, and intelligence on individuals were all good to excellent in the South. Around Beirut, the failure to distinguish between audiences as much as possible and the inherent impossibility of
persuading non-Palestinians and Palestinian noncombatants to leave relegated some important urban PSYOP objectives to marginality.

Use of PSYOP situations and technologies (see below) was acceptable. While the Israeli government has indicated that it felt the techniques and approaches employed were new and unique to psychological operations, we find little evidence of new, sophisticated, or even particularly insightful planning or operations. Indeed, inadequate use of resources to tell the PSYOP story appears to have characterized Israeli performance much more accurately, especially in the city.

Resources

Unfortunately, we have little information on Israeli PSYOP resources deployed in Lebanon, so it is difficult to evaluate resources issues connected with PSYOP.

What is clear is that resources in Lebanon were not employed extensively. Open hostility between the Shi'a community and the Palestinians throughout southern Lebanon and the southern suburbs of Beirut was well-known. Communication in the Shi'a community is effected in many ways but religious channels are probably the most effective. These do not appear to have been used in any organized or systematic manner. Mosques were of course not directly usable by Israel, but channels of communications with the religious leadership, which was a new phenomenon among the Lebanese Shi'a, did exist and Amal represented the vast majority of Shi'as.

Other means of communication apparently not used were posters and graffiti. Over the years of fighting Lebanon, posters and writing on walls had become a major form of communication, although much more limited than in, say, the China of the Cultural Revolution period. In Lebanon, all posters have political content, and most reflect the death of some "martyr" or other. Posters are an easy and important means of communications in some cities, and the Israeli failure to use them can only be seen as an important missed opportunity. Similarly, graffiti is ubiquitous, and little systematic effort was apparently made to exploit this mode of communication. Israel's wall-writing legacy in Lebanon seems to be largely confined to directions (so Israeli soldiers would not get lost) in Hebrew.

Nor did Israeli forces use local radio broadcast facilities that existed either in the South or around Beirut. This is all the more surprising considering Israel's wealth in Arabic-language-capable personnel and the duration of the siege of Beirut.
Operations

Leaflet and loudspeaker operations went to a great extent as planned. Leaflets can be presumed to have had an especially pronounced effect at the outset of the fighting, and until well into the Beirut siege period. Despite problems of timing (such as dropping leaflets warning of attacks and routes of escape only after attacks had begun and escape routes in some cases were inaccessible), most of the leaflets were delivered in a timely manner and to the right audiences. Judging from international and Syrian reaction, and by the reaction of those sympathetic to the Palestinians, Israeli leaflets attracted considerable attention. Leaflet dispersion proved to be something of a problem in the built-up areas, but this was anticipated.

Loudspeaker operations worked reasonably well in many areas, but also encountered technical problems in city use. The use of noise in the refugee camps to drown out communication by loudspeaker was very effective (as it has been in other environments), if the reactions of the audience to questions posed by international media are any example.

The IDF intentionally spread rumors to influence PLO thinking and expectations. Little is known about the organization or thrust of the effort, and it would be foolish to hazard a guess concerning effectiveness under these circumstances. Several successes were mentioned by different respondents.

Military movements and operations were used to communicate intent to the PLO leadership. Considering the inherent credibility problems the IDF faced in the siege of Beirut, particularly, the movements and operations played an extremely significant role in persuading the PLO to withdraw from the city, convincing Palestinian leaders that the IDF was prepared to accept such casualties and opprobrium as might be entailed in such an assault. This component of PSYOP functioned effectively.

The long-term objectives of Israel in Lebanon required effective and cordial relations with indigenous Lebanese population groups inside as well as outside the cities. These objectives in turn mandated effective civil affairs/military government operations to demonstrate Israeli intentions to those groups and establish or maintain rapport—to, as was said in Vietnam, "win the hearts and minds of the people." In practice, however, Israeli civil affairs operations were not well-organized and suffered from the antipathy of many individual soldiers toward Arabs, especially Palestinians. Civilian affairs operations do not seem to have been planned with the care and detail required, and although public attention and high-level responsibility were associated with the programs, their
Effectiveness, judged by the reactions of the local populace, which was far less hostile than portrayed by international media at the outset, was marginal or worse.

From a management standpoint, the supply of food, clothing, and shelter was erratic and inadequate, certainly for the Palestinians but even for Lebanese. The issue of housing was complicated by policy questions never fully resolved in Israel or as between Israel and Lebanon—e.g., is it really advisable to reconstruct refugee camps in which the Palestinians will again be thrown together and where their collective desperation will cause resentments to fester and build to violence again? Some Israelis and Lebanese originally felt that dispersing the Palestinian refugees into the civilian Lebanese population would substantially reduce the possibility of a rearming of concentrated Palestinian groups and even reduce the psychological climate of extremism fostered by concentration. The result of vacillation in policy decisions was that very little housing was provided to replace that which had been destroyed, and Palestinians and poor Shi'as and other Lebanese were left without shelter. Eventually, out of desperation and in deteriorating security conditions, they began to rebuild inside the area of the camps.

The use of blockade by Israel against the besieged Palestinians was a particularly poor tactic from an international PSYOP standpoint. To the eyes and ears of the world, it was little understood that the purpose of the blockade was to force Lebanese civilians out, since they had nowhere to go. The only thing apparent was that Israel was "starving" and denying needed medicine to Lebanese and Palestinian noncombatants. The PLO fighters had ample stores of food, ammunition, and medicine, so only the civilians felt the blockade. (Even had this not been the case, it is far from clear that the adverse public reaction would have been different.) While the IDF did force some Lebanese to leave West Beirut, the limitations on this tactic should have been obvious to any planner, since West Beirut had had problems for years during the war with "squatters." Civilians did not wish to leave their homes and belongings if it meant they effectively lost them forever to looters and squatters.

Effectiveness

On balance, Israeli PSYOP in Lebanon was ineffective, especially in urban situations. War news enjoyed some credibility, especially among Christians, and information for civilians to escape combat was partially successful in separating combatant and noncombatant populations in the southern cities. However, the overall goals of psychological operations at the tactical level, at the campaign level, and at the international level, were not attained. Domestic PSYOP, like international PSYOP proved woefully inadequate, in large part because of the the deception involved in the war itself.
The battles in Sidon and Tyre were relatively short, and PSYOP played little role in their military outcomes. Therefore, it is in the area of civil affairs--PSYOP as a follow-up to military operations to help realize the political and other objectives of the military effort--that one must evaluate PSYOP to a great extent in these locales. During and after combat, Israeli PSYOP in the South seems to have been undistinguished. It did little to capitalize upon the potentially strong current of support or sympathy for Israeli policy among the numerically predominant Shi'as or other Lebanese victimized and oppressed by Palestinian occupation. Civil affairs experiences encountered numerous difficulties that could have been overcome with strong government backing in Israel, a backing that was absent.

PROBLEMS SUGGESTED BY THE IDF EXPERIENCE

The impression that one gains from a cursory review of the IDF PSYOP in built-up areas is that it performed relatively well at the tactical level in Sidon and Tyre and reasonably well in the battle of Beirut. At the strategic level, the evaluation is less clear. What is clear is that with the proliferation and ubiquity of international mass media, the magnitude of the stakes and number of parties involved in warfare have been dramatically increased. The battle must be waged not only near the FEBA (forward edge of the battle area) but also around the world. It was easy to overlook both the tactical significance and the universality of this lesson in Vietnam because of the duration of the historical experience and the nature of the sociological processes associated with it in the United States. Subsequent events have made it clear, however, that the introduction of U.S. combat forces into populated areas will be a media event and will inevitably stimulate psychological dynamics that will be used to support or frustrate the realization of national objectives. If the basic PSYOP issues are not identified and addressed both conceptually and empirically, it is unlikely that the strategic goals of any U.S. urban combat action in the contemporary period will be accomplished.

Audience problems that confronted Israel should be carefully considered by the United States. The most far-reaching changes have taken place in the nature of the audience even though the reason for this change is to some extent technological. What is remarkable about most Third-World environments in which U.S. forces are likely to intervene is the multiplicity of audiences. They will include local forces--hostile, neutral, and friendly; the noncombatant local or immediate population, which is also likely to have hostile, neutral, and friendly components; possibly national audiences (in the country of operations)--hostile, neutral, and friendly--that are not immediate to the actual combat zone; regional attitudes, elite and mass that likely will also comprise hostile, neutral and friendly

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components; the Third World as a whole, where decision elites' views and those of key interest groups are decisive; U.S. "allies" whose public opinion will also be hostile and neutral, as well as friendly, as we must now recognize; and U.S. public opinion, which is the proper responsibility of public affairs rather than PSYOP.

The proliferation of audiences is to some extent the growth of our sensitivity to these audiences. The people were always there. What has happened is that the ubiquity of mass media in major cities and the shock factor of the visual media in particular have provided both the initial stimuli, the information foundation, and the logistic networks to organize and articulate and therefore give effect to opinion, making some issues with special visual or emotional value especially salient where they were much less so before.

The problem of the unintended audience has been almost infinitely compounded, then (Linebarger, 1976, Vol. 2, pp. 666-668). How do we target differentially hostile, neutral, and friendly audiences? How do we distinguish between the various levels, since a message addressed to hostiles in the combat zone may be quite counterproductive if it strikes hostiles in allied countries, for example? This complex of issues was critical for Israel in Lebanon because of extensive ties with three sectarian groups--the Shi'as, the Druze, and the Christians--and because of the close proximity in which different communities live.

Another consideration that must be anticipated is that of hostile propaganda--and this at several levels. What kinds of preparations are necessary to counter this propaganda at each level and for each audience? It is reasonable to expect that efforts will be made by American adversaries to expose friendly and neutral audiences at various levels to U.S. communications targeted at other levels and audiences--the conscious of the "unintended audience." This brings up the old issue of "inoculation." What is the state-of-the-art in persuasive communications research relative to this issue? Since we can safely forecast the problem, how can we "inoculate" against it or, short of that, use other techniques to minimize the effectiveness of the enemy weapon? These are not merely theoretical questions, but operational issues confronted by planners and operators prior to the war.

No less important are questions about the media. The rapid spread of media and media facilities is especially pronounced in cities where offensive military activities are also most difficult. Urban facilities (e.g., the logistic infrastructure to support satellite communications) are generally the key to the availability of visual images and audio images as well. Operations in and around cities are therefore especially subject to uncontrolled communications. However, with time all combat operations can be covered from the nearest support facilities. What techniques and plans can be developed to preclude or control
access to combat areas? to preclude, control, or influence communications from the combat zone to communications support facilities near (or in advance) of the FEBA? to preclude, control, or influence transmission from such facilities and to preclude, control, or influence messages received by the audiences at other points in the process?

At the same time, it is equally important to ensure the receipt of messages supportive of the military effort by the various levels and types of audiences. What methods can be used in the contemporary era to maximize the effective transmission of these communications?

Finally, it is clear that the fact of censorship is itself news. How can the fact of security information control be weighed in such a manner that managers are able to determine what to control, how much to control, and when and where and how to control—in other words, to achieve optimal rather than maximum results from the PSYOP effort?

Implications for the United States

The Israeli war in Lebanon was a political war. Its implications for U.S. Army psychological operations on the urban battlefield are evident and profound. While this report has studied the period of active military operations in Lebanon to the exclusion of the more extensive period of guerrilla warfare and terrorism, the fact that Israeli leaders envisaged goals that they were not prepared to fight at any cost to attain demonstrates conclusively the importance of allocating to PSYOP the proper importance in military operations.

The urban nature of the battlefield in Sidon, Tyre, and Beirut played a key role in the conduct of military operations, including psychological operations. The Palestinians' defense of the camps in the South, and of Beirut in the North, was built around the urban nature of the terrain. No less were psychological operations affected by the city environments. Israeli PSYOP had to concern itself with separating combatants for dense concentrations of noncombatants in a way that would not obtain in nonurban circumstances. The importance of civil affairs elements of PSYOP also resulted from the fact that Sidon and Tyre were cities.

More important was the impact of the city warfare on the perceptions of Israelis in Israel and on the minds of other audiences important to the attacker. Although the conflict between the announced and real goals of the campaign seriously undermined the credibility and impact of Israeli PSYOP, the visual impact of the media portrait of combat in the cities, particularly Beirut, was by itself a major factor in the
political crises that emerged between the United States and Israel and in the widespread domestic and international public opposition to the operation.

In considering the implications of the Israeli war in Lebanese cities for American PSYOP, the following elements must be addressed, specifically with respect to their adequacy for operations in Third-World environments such as Lebanon:

- planning
- command and control
- organization and personnel

It is not the purpose of this study to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the above fundamental elements as they may be relevant to U.S. Army psychological operations; consequently, only general comments are provided here as a guide for future analysis and study.

The Israeli experience in Lebanon—and our own experience there following the end of active hostilities between the IDF, on the one hand, and the Palestinians and Syrians, on the other—should confirm what 40 years of postwar experience has already demonstrated:

The most likely environments in which U.S. forces will find themselves engaged are in the Third-World.

While much of the combat in Third-World environments will take place in jungles or "the countryside," the decisive battles in military terms will be in cities. The international political status and control or denial of key lines of communication continue to be determined in cities.

Because the battle is highly political as well as military, PSYOP is critical. Influencing the behavior of the city residents and of hostiles, both military and civilian, is the focus of the panoply of psychological operations—from military movements and actions to communications and civil affairs.

Due, in part, to the visual and emotional impact of modern communication and the active involvement of the international public in the Western democracies in public policy decisions, and due, in part, to the nature of city fighting, the impact of the urban battle on the viability of the overall campaign is central and can be decisive. More specifically, the communication of the urban battle can be decisive. This places an even heavier burden on psychological operations to ensure that "news" does not become in fact hostile propaganda to be exploited by adversaries.

Recent low-intensity warfare defeats increasingly the likelihood of future engagements of this type. The Israeli
problems following the battles studied here in Lebanon, and American experiences there and elsewhere ensure that disinformation, terrorism, sabotage, and subversion will be Preferred techniques in the Third World. These techniques are best used in cities where targets are abundant, routes of approach plentiful, and psychological impact through exposure great.

Planning

It is important that PSYOP planners at the JCS and each of the military components (as well as in the unified commands) be provided with sufficient lead time to conduct in-depth analysis of specific target groups for PSYOP purposes. The psychological operations planner must be aware of the full scope of the military and political operations. In Lebanon, military PSYOP planners had addressed two different contingencies (amidst a range of others)—a small and a larger plan. The distinction between these two approaches was fundamental. Yet, while the military leadership purportedly conducted the more limited plan, in fact it was being used merely as a means to carry out the more ambitious one. PSYOP for the two plans was fundamentally different, however. (And not just PSYOP—troop movements and other elements of the operational plans varied markedly as between the two.) To conduct PSYOP for the small plan while the army was carrying out the larger plan essentially undermined any possibility to conduct effective PSYOP at the international level.

In Lebanon, the 40-km (smaller) operation would have avoided the entire problem of Beirut, and PSYOP problems in Sidon and Tyre, while significant, were overwhelmed by the magnitude of the Israeli military victory there. However, the inclusion of Beirut as the real terminal point of the operation magnified the importance of effective urban PSYOP, precisely the PSYOP Israeli planners had not counted on in the limited plan.

PSYOP planners should understand the psychological vulnerabilities of each distinct target group as related to overall military/political operations. Furthermore, military planners should be aware of the most efficient and meaningful methods of reaching each target group with PSYOP messages through mass media channels, as well as face-to-face communications and actions. If the operation is to be successful, the PSYOP planner must have a great array of current technical and professional knowledge related to the psychological and communications atmosphere relevant to each significant target group.

Coordination of intelligence and PSYOP must be improved so that PSYOP personnel can carry out their functions more effectively with the kinds of information that are required to conduct credible psychological operations. Problems of
intelligence management in Lebanon were clear for Israel, and far clearer for the United States later. Yet, PSYOP is based upon good intelligence.

The absence of distinct American doctrine for the conduct of PSYOP in cities is a significant gap in readiness. Cities are the centers of population, mass communications, and economic resources and hence are the centers of political power. In the current era of highly politicized limited conflict, the psychological struggle, rather than the contest of arms, is decisive. Indirectly seeking victory by military force is often self-defeating. This is especially true in cities where violence creates powerful images of suffering that are immediately exploited as political propaganda. It is this environment of limited conflict that U.S. forces are most likely to be committed. It is here that our effective PSYOP capability is most critical.

Progress in addressing the issue of public information through cooperative programs with leading media organizations is a step in the right direction, although the Lebanon experience suggests that much more careful and far-reaching coordination is required to ensure that the American public receives accurate and timely information that will keep it informed, and is not subject to the manipulation of hostile foreign propaganda.

The nature of communications in cities differs from nonurban communications. The channels are different and more numerous. The speed of communications is different and more rapid. The sources are different and more varied. And friendly, hostile, and neutral audiences are more frequently and extensively intermixed or proximate. This compounds the problem of the unintended audience, but the fact that each audience has its own communications patterns reflects the fact that it is possible to deal with each, if not separately, at least specifically.

The varied interests and perspectives of the geographically proximate and intermixed communities in Lebanon were discussed in the first section of this report. Dealing with those different perspectives is not easy, but appears to be eminently possible. Complex social and sociopsychological environments like that of Lebanon abound in the Third World, and should be anticipated wherever U.S. troops are deployed. Use of key communicators and specialized communications channels that reflect local usages is critical to maintain credibility and, even more fundamental, to be heard. Such key communicators and specialized channels virtually always exist in built-up areas. If they are not co-opted for the attacker, they will certainly be used by his adversary. Thus, they should be exploited or destroyed.

Command and Control

The commander of the psychological aspects of the war should report directly to the theater operations officer or the CinC.
He should be given direct access to the CinC with respect to the approval of PSYOP objectives and programs. It is also important that direct coordination be authorized with political officers (Department of State) and senior USIA advisors. Since PSYOP messages reflect the position of the U.S. government concerning political objectives, and of the theater commander in respect of military objectives, direct access to the theater commander for guidance and approval of objectives and programs is important to the timely implementation of meaningful psychological operations.

Organization and Personnel

Military psychological operations units and staffs must be organized to perform the full scope of operations needed for political warfare. The scope is much more profound than the traditional loudspeaker and leaflet operations used for past military operations. Units must be functionally organized and staffed with quality professionals to perform the following:

- prepare meaningful propaganda messages intended or diverse target groups and to be disseminated by printed media,
- prepare meaningful radio broadcasts involving news, propaganda comment, instructions, and entertainment--all programs must be in the language and format meaningful to distinct target groups,
- prepare meaningful telecasts involving news, propaganda comment, instructions, and entertainment--all programs must be in the language and format meaningful to the distinct target groups,
- prepare meaningful loudspeaker tapes involving news, propaganda comment, and instructions meaningful to military as well as civilian targets, and
- write, collect, edit, and publish news bulletins, newspapers, or news programs for distribution by radio and television, or international news outlets.
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