Soviet Political Perspectives on Power Projection

Francis Fukuyama, Scott Bruckner, Sally Stoecker

March 1987

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This Note analyzes the views of Soviet non-military writers and political leaders on the question of power projection in the Third World. Although Soviet writers do not broach the subject directly, they touch on power projection indirectly when writing on the themes of (1) the local political basis of revolutionary power; (2) external (Soviet Union) aid and assistance to Third World clients vs. competing domestic and military claims; (3) the role of "armed struggle" in promoting revolutionary change; and (4) the risky effects of Third World activism on relations with the United States. Each of these themes is examined in some detail. The author finds that only in discussions of armed struggle as a revolutionary strategy do the Soviets recognize greater opportunities for power projection, and this is restricted to Central America. Possible future Soviet policy is discussed.
Soviet Political Perspectives on Power Projection

Francis Fukuyama, Scott Bruckner, Sally Stoecker

March 1987

Prepared for
The United States Army
This study of Soviet political writers on the Third World was prepared as part of the project "Soviet Power Projection," within RAND's Arroyo Center. The project as a whole was undertaken by the Arroyo Center for the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DAMI-ZA) of the Army. Other parts of the project are intended to deal with Soviet military doctrine and capabilities for power projection. The present study, based entirely on open Soviet sources, complements these efforts by describing the perspective of writers on the Third World outside the Soviet military, including officials actively responsible for the formulation of policy in this area and authoritative statements by the top political leadership in the USSR.

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SUMMARY

This study analyzes the views of Soviet non-military writers and political leaders on the question of power projection in the Third World. Given the extraordinarily large quantity of materials published on the Third World in the Soviet Union every year, the study concentrated on the writings of senior figures in the Politburo and Central Committee Secretariat, and particularly officials in the CPSU Central Committee's International Department (ID). Special attention was paid to the ID because it is the successor to the Third Communist International (Comintern) and to a greater degree than the foreign ministry is the bureaucratic locus for policy formulation toward the developing world. It is currently headed by former ambassador to the United States Anatoliy Dobrynin, and before 1986 by former candidate Politburo member Boris Ponomarev. Responsibility for the Third World lies increasingly with Karen Brutents, whose writings, along with those of Rostislav Ul'yanovskiy, are analyzed in depth.

Soviet political writers never broach the subject of Soviet power projection openly, tending to downplay military aspects of Moscow's policy toward the Third World, but rather treat the following themes that touch on the question of power projection indirectly:

- The political basis of revolutionary power, that is, the acquisition and consolidation of political power on the part of local revolutionary parties and organizations

- Indirect discussion of external (i.e., Soviet bloc) aid and discussion of priorities and appropriate levels of assistance to Third World clients given the competing claims of the domestic Soviet economy and the military

- The role of armed struggle\(^1\) in promoting revolutionary change

- Acceptable levels of risk and relations with the United States.

\(^1\)"Armed struggle" in the context of Soviet discussions refers to the use of force by local revolutionary organizations rather than the direct application of Soviet power projection forces.
All four of these issues are interrelated; the Soviet willingness to support armed struggle in, for example, Central America is dependent on both the availability of resources and the Soviet calculation of the likelihood of an American response.

The Political Basis of Revolutionary Power. Soviet political writers on the Third World differ from many of their American counterparts by their emphasis on ideology and political organization by local revolutionary groups as the basis for power, rather than on overt instruments of military force. Soviet thinking on this question has gone through a series of stages corresponding roughly to the first four postwar general secretaries of the CPSU. Stalin supported only orthodox communist parties in the then colonial world, a policy that was overturned by Khrushchev in 1955 when he opened up Soviet policy to the so-called bourgeois nationalists, non-communist Third World countries headed by men like Nasser, Sukharno, and Ben Bella who were "objectively" anti-imperialist. This led to a great broadening of Soviet influence in the developing world, but was also problematic insofar as most bourgeois nationalists were highly unreliable as clients, unstable, and subject to sudden reversals.

The solution devised by Soviet theorists in the later Brezhnev years was to support overtly Marxist-Leninist groups and to encourage them to form formal vanguard parties, a course (it was hoped) that would institutionalize a pro-Soviet internationalist foreign policy and make revolutionary gains in some sense irreversible. This policy was then implemented in the mid to late 1970s as the USSR intervened on behalf of countries like Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan. While this "second generation" of clients proved to be more reliable than the first, they also proved to be weaker and in many cases subject to armed internal opposition movements.

In the fourth phase of Soviet policy, many theorists have recognized the weaknesses of the "second-generation" clients. Karen Brutents has suggested a new strategy as an alternative to promotion of Marxist-Leninist vanguard parties, which would involve a return to the Khrushchev-era emphasis on cultivating the anti-imperialism of large, geostrategically important Third World states like India, Mexico, and
Brazil, regardless of their ideological orientation. Brutents' strategy received strong endorsement in the party program adopted in February 1986 at the 27th party congress. There is some evidence that Brutents' strategy has already begun to be implemented--Gorbachev's visit to India in November 1986 and his scheduled trip to Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil in 1987.

External Aid. Although most Soviet political writers recognize the need to provide allies in the Third World with large quantities of military and economic assistance, there are increasing signs of reluctance to do so. This is probably due to a combination of factors, including the slowdown in the rate of growth of the Soviet economy in the late 1970s, coupled with the increasing Soviet "burden of empire" and the lower-than-expected political returns from many of Moscow's second-generation clients. A number of Soviet leaders and writers, including both the late Yuriy Andropov and current General Secretary Gorbachev, have suggested that clients will increasingly have to look to themselves rather than the Soviet Union for economic development requirements. Declining Soviet interest in providing economic assistance has been paralleled and justified by the recognition on the part of many Soviet economists that the traditional Soviet development model does not work. Rapid nationalization of foreign investment, protectionism, emphasis on "balanced" industrialization, and centralization of the economy have to some extent been rejected as development strategies in favor of a mixture of socialist and market-oriented measures much like the New Economic Policy followed by the Soviet Union during the late 1920s. This theoretical justification for going slow encourages economic growth but more importantly relieves the Soviet Union of responsibility for supporting client economies, as it did in the case of Cuba.

Armed Struggle and the Promotion of Revolutionary Change. There has been a continuous debate in the world communist movement over the relative merits of armed struggle and guerrilla war versus traditional methods of political agitation, party organization, and the cultivation of a mass base of support through peaceful or legal means as a means of promoting revolutionary change. In the past the Chinese and Cubans have favored the former strategy while the Soviets have supported the latter.
Greater openness to strategies of armed struggle emerged among Soviet theorists, however, in response to the overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile in the early 1970s, and then to the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua. The Soviets were at first taken by surprise by the Sandinista victory, though they welcomed it after the fact. With growing instability in Central America, many Soviet writers (particularly among the Latin Americanists) argued that Castroite or Guevarist approaches would yield better results. Although Soviet opinion on this issue has moved toward greater support for armed struggle, some of the initial enthusiasm for armed struggle has abated as a result of the foundering of the guerrilla insurgencies in El Salvador and Guatemala and the problems faced by the Sandinista regime.

Risk-Taking and U.S.-Soviet Relations. The primary factor limiting Soviet willingness to project military power around the globe has been fear of confrontation, escalation, and ultimately war with the West, and primarily the United States. Almost all Soviet writers and officials saw the U.S.-Soviet detente that emerged in the early 1970s as an opportunity for greater activism in the Third World, in part to counteract criticisms from the Chinese and others that they were selling out the interests of the world revolutionary movement. Soviet attempts to intervene in the Third World at the same time as they sought detente with the West proved to be counterproductive, however; events such as the invasion of Afghanistan proved destructive to issues central to the East-West relationship like arms control. Soviet theorists generally seem to believe that their ability to support friends and clients in the Third World has been restricted considerably as a result of American hostility, begun in the late Carter Administration and greatly increased under President Reagan. Although there is recognition that the USSR bore some responsibility for the breakdown of detente through its actions in the Third World, this is largely confined to those Soviet authors concerned with U.S. relations, and is not evident in the writings of members of the International Department.

Thus, three of the four themes analyzed (the political basis for revolutionary power, external aid, and the effects of Third World activism on relations with the United States) suggest that the Soviets
believe their options for projecting power in the Third World are more constrained than they were a decade ago. Only in discussions of armed struggle as a revolutionary strategy do the Soviets recognize greater opportunities for power projection, but this is restricted geographically to Central America. It is not clear that these constraints have as yet affected actual Soviet behavior, since Moscow's proclivity to intervene depends on the opportunities provided by local crises. The Soviets are also inhibited from serious retrenchment by their accumulated investment in established Third World clients. The most likely manifestation of current constraints may lie in a lesser willingness to exploit new opportunities to expand Soviet influence.
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1. INTRODUCTION

In addition to Soviet military officers who write on the use of force in the Third World, there is a wide range of non-military sources whose views we must consult to round out our understanding of the Soviet perspective on this issue. This is a very broad category: "non-military" sources include everyone from CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze through the working-level officials responsible for the day-to-day running of Soviet Third World policy, down to the host of writers in the specialized institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

One might raise the question as to why views of Soviet civilian writers on the Third World are relevant to a study of power projection, since, as we will see, their interests and point of view are highly political and almost never deal directly with military or operational issues. At the most general level, the answer is that it is civilians, and particularly the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party, who make Soviet policy, and not military officers. It is the views of this leadership which ultimately determine where and how force will be used in pursuit of Soviet national objectives. Whereas military journals contain lengthy doctrinal discussions concerning the use of force in "local wars" at the tactical and operational levels, questions at the strategic level inevitably have a strong political component relating to the ends which the instrument of military power is intended to serve. Only from non-military writers would one expect to find the following types of questions authoritatively addressed:

- How does the Soviet leadership define its objectives in the Third World?
- How do the Soviets see the role of force in promoting these objectives?
- What types of instruments do the Soviets have available for projecting power, including non-military instruments such as political-organizational skills and economic aid?
How are priorities set among different countries and regions, among types of regimes and clients, and, more broadly, between the Third World as a whole and central East-West issues such as detente and arms control?

What level of resources are the Soviets willing to allocate in support of Third World interests, including both military and economic assistance?

How much risk do the Soviets find acceptable, especially concerning possibility of direct conflict with the United States?

Obviously, open Soviet sources will only provide broad guidelines for actual policy and will not be useful for making detailed predictions of Moscow's future behavior. Documents like the CPSU party programs are intended to be authoritative attempts to define Soviet policy, but are phrased in such general terms that one could draw a wide variety of differing inferences from them. Other Soviet writings on the Third World, particularly those of academics, have usually reflected actual policy rather than preceding it, and in some cases there have been large discrepancies between theory and practice. Study of Soviet theoretical writings is useful primarily for understanding the intellectual context within which Soviet policy is made, and should never become a substitute for careful study of the latter. In this respect Soviet theoretical writings on political policy toward the Third World are comparable to writings on military doctrine: the latter present universal precepts for the conduct of military operations and provide insight into the way in which Soviet officers approach war, but give no guidance as to actual war plans.

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As will be argued below, there were periods when open Soviet discussions of the Third World actually preceded shifts in policy and could have been used predictively. The problem, of course, is to know when a given document anticipates rather than follows policy, something that is much easier to do with hindsight.
METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

Although there is an extraordinary amount of Soviet writing on the Third World, answering the above questions poses two specific difficulties. First, Soviet civilian writers never discuss power projection overtly. One would never, for example, find a Soviet author analyzing Soviet interests in a region like the Persian Gulf and then trying to define military requirements to defend them, in the way that their American counterparts might do. For political reasons Soviet writers tend to downplay the military aspects of their relationships with Third World countries, and speak only in general terms about "meeting the defensive requirements" of this or that client or "strengthening all-around cooperation" with an ally. Discussions of military aid, moreover, tend to be highly imprecise and qualitative, focusing on overall levels of support; they never delve into the actual mechanics of power projection or offer quantitative assessments of military issues. The Soviets always describe revolutionary change in the Third World as merely the product of local social and political forces, part of an inevitable historical process in which they and their allies play only a supporting role. Soviet authors never admit openly the intimidating and coercive aspects of Soviet military power, or the way it can be used to impose solutions favorable to the interests of the Soviet state and those of certain other Third World forces on local populations; they castigate Western observers who claim to see a larger strategy behind Soviet behavior, particularly one in which military force plays a role, and deny altogether the existence of a "Soviet military threat."

This is not to say that the Soviets do not address questions of power projection, or engage in oftentimes heated discussions of policy issues. The problem is that this debate is carried on esoterically, in a code whose terms are quite alien to most American observers. For example, the need for Soviet military intervention in support of a particular client will be discussed in terms of the prevalence of

2 Aside from political considerations, there is a much sharper distinction between military and non-military expertise in the USSR; the Soviets have very few American-style civilian "armchair strategists."
"internal" or "external" factors in bringing about "progressive transformations" in that country's socio-economic order. Discussion of recent setbacks to the Marxist-Leninist regimes in Angola and Afghanistan and the mistakes made by these countries' leaderships is often couched in terms of the question of whether they have made a "premature transition to socialism." Arguments over the "length of the transitional period" between feudalism and socialism have a bearing on the types of clients the USSR is likely to favor and the degree of military and economic support it needs to contribute to that client's development. The Soviets would never openly discuss the possibility of cutting aid to an ally, but would suggest in theoretical terms that economic development rests on the efforts of the country itself; whereas they do not talk about opposing U.S. intervention militarily, they speak of the impermissibility of "exporting counterrevolution." Interpreting this code is not difficult once one has read enough to understand the terms of the Soviet debate, but it is substantially less precise than the exoteric speech to which we are accustomed in the West.

The second methodological problem concerns how to use and adjudicate between the large number of available Soviet sources. There are hundreds, if not thousands, of articles, speeches, and statements on Third World topics issued each year in the Soviet Union. In spite of Soviet efforts to create the impression that they are speaking in a monolithic voice, Western students of the USSR have for a long time understood that different Soviet sources cannot all be treated as equally representative of the current Soviet "line," and that even in Stalin's time there were important nuances between different communications. The most authoritative statements are clearly those by the top political leadership, i.e., members of the Politburo or CPSU Central Committee secretaries, and above all by the General Secretary. But pronouncements at this level tend to be telegraphic and do not provide detailed guidance on Soviet views regarding policy on a specific issue like relations with the Third World. At the opposite end of the spectrum are the thousands of articles published on Third World topics, mostly by Soviet academic experts belonging to one or another of the specialized institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences, such as the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEiMO), the
Oriental Institute, the Institute of the International Workers Movement, the Latin American and African Institutes, and so forth. These publications cover many Third World topics in great detail, vary widely in quality and, within definite ideological limits, in point of view. Some pieces are highly propagandistic in content and are meant to support the current Soviet policy line, whereas others, while not openly contradicting that line or otherwise undercutting the interests of the Soviet state, attempt to be somewhat more analytical. Indeed, Soviet publications occasionally sponsor "debates" in which conflicting points of view are brought together directly.

Ultimately, the best means of interpreting this mass of information is to read everything, a course that was not possible given the time and resource constraints of the present study. Instead, we have adopted the following methodological short-cut: we have concentrated on the writings and public pronouncements of (1) the top Soviet leadership (i.e., Politburo- and Central Committee Secretary level), including authoritative policy documents like the accountability reports issued at CPSU party congresses every five years, and (2) officials within the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee International Department (ID). With regard to the latter, we have chosen to focus on the writings of two individuals, Rostislav Ul'yanovskiy and Karen Brutents.

There are several reasons for concentrating on the International Department (ID). Most Sovietologists agree that the ID has been the bureaucratic successor to the Third Communist International, or Comintern, throughout the greater part of the postwar period, and that it has had primary responsibility for contacts with what the Soviets call the "world revolutionary process," that is, all of the non-ruling Communist parties, national liberation movements, and revolutionary and subversive organizations seeking to overthrow Western or pro-Western governments. In this respect it has differed from the foreign ministry, which by function and historical tradition has emphasized relations with

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established governments and states. This bifurcation of responsibility between party and government has permitted the Soviet Union to support revolutionary groups while continuing to deal with the governments these groups are seeking to overthrow. There is evidence to suggest that under the tenure of Andrei Gromyko as foreign minister, the ministry he controlled was much more preoccupied with arms control and other issues of the central East-West relationship, and at times came into conflict with the ID over the relative priority to be accorded initiatives in the Third World.

Since Gorbachev's accession to power a number of important changes have occurred in the staffing of the International Department which suggest that the traditional distinction between it and the foreign ministry may be breaking down. In early 1986 the ID's longtime chief, Boris Ponomarev, was replaced by Anatoliy Dobrynin, a career foreign ministry official who was for over two decades the Soviet ambassador to the United States. Dobrynin brought with him Georgiy Kornienko, another career foreign ministry official, to serve as first deputy alongside Vadim Zagladin.4 The appointment of a career diplomat, and particularly one with such intimate knowledge of the United States and U.S.-Soviet relations, is almost certainly going to blur the distinction between the ID and the foreign ministry. One of the supposed complaints by foreign ministry types against the ID has been its staffing by relatively ideological officials who have made their careers in the party apparat and are not particularly sensitive to the implications of Soviet behavior in the Third World for U.S.-Soviet relations. This is hardly an error one would expect Dobrynin to make; and Dobrynin, a full member of the Central Committee, has the experience and stature to make his views heard.

4It is not clear what Zagladin's current role is or how responsibilities are divided between the two "first" deputy chiefs. In addition, Lt. Gen. Viktor Starodubov, formerly the Soviet commissioner at the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission monitoring compliance with strategic arms control agreements, has been brought into the ID as a deputy. See Wallace Spaulding, "Shifts in CPSU ID," Problems of Communism, Vol. 35, No. 4, July-August 1986, pp. 80ff.
The academic institutes specializing in Third World affairs are not policy-making bodies and the views expressed by their staffs are considerably less authoritative than those of ID officials. Nominally subordinated to the Academy of Sciences, these institutes frequently provide the International Department with research and analysis of policy-related issues. The Central Committee has drawn heavily on the institutes to staff the International Department, and prominent academics like Georgy Arbatov, Yevgeny Primakov, and Fedor Burlatskiy appear to have good connections and perhaps influence with the party leadership. Nonetheless, members of the institute staffs in the end remain academics and their writings, while providing a fairly accurate perspective on the way Third World policy issues are framed and discussed within the Central Committee, are not necessarily authoritative. Officials within the ID are in effect the highest Soviet bureaucrats with sole responsibility for the world revolutionary process, and represent the permanent institutional base on which political leaders like Gorbachev must draw for policy ideas on these issues. Hence the reasons for our concentration on this organization.

Our choice of Ul'yanovskiy and Brutents for closer examination is dictated by their bureaucratic positions. Under Dobrynin are six deputy chiefs, of whom Rostislav Ul'yanovskiy and Karen Brutents together have had responsibility for the Third World (Ul'yanovskiy has been primarily responsible for South Asia, including Iran, and black Africa, while Brutents covered the Middle East and Latin America). Fortunately for us, both of these individuals started their careers as academics, and have long publication histories on Third World topics. Ul'yanovskiy (born in 1904) is the older of the two, having begun as a specialist on India and as Comintern associate of Karel Radek in the 1930s. Ul'yanovskiy was purged along with Radek and spent over twenty years in the Gulag, reemerging only in the mid-1950s as deputy editor of the journal *Contemporary Oriental Studies.* He was brought into the International Department sometime during the early 1960s. Brutents, an Armenian, was born in 1924, and worked for a time at IMEiMO. He appears

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to have been a consultant to the International Department and joined the ID staff full-time only in 1975. Ul'yanovskiy is over 80 and, while he continues to write prolifically on Third World subjects, his official duties within the International Department have reportedly been taken over to an increasing extent by Brutents. Our study focuses on his work largely for historical reasons: for many years while Ponomarev was head of the ID, Ul'yanovskiy's writings reflected the twists and turns of actual Soviet policy perhaps more accurately than that of any other official. Karen Brutents, on the other hand, has frequently been out of step with prevailing views and policies. And yet, in terms of current and future policy, Brutents' writings are more relevant. As will be seen below, evidence from documents since Gorbachev's rise to power indicate that Brutents has been playing an increasingly important role in the formulation of Soviet Third World policy, and he may eventually emerge as the single most influential individual in this area. By focusing on Ul'yanovskiy and Brutents, we will of course be presenting a somewhat narrow range of Soviet Third World writers and spokesmen. Although a considerable oversimplification, one might be tempted to say that Ul'yanovskiy represents the past and present of Soviet policy toward the Third World, whereas Brutents represents its future.

MAJOR THEMES

Despite the absence of direct discussion on power projection, Soviet writings on the Third World touch on this question through treatment of one of at least four themes. These include:

- **The Political Basis of Revolutionary Power.** Most Soviet writers are preoccupied with questions relating to the acquisition and consolidation of political power on the part of local revolutionary parties and organizations, issues that have

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7 According to recent reports, Brutents has been given supervisory responsibility for the USA desk in the ID, usurping some of Zagladin's former functions. This report seems improbably, and it is unlikely that Brutents has given up his Middle Eastern and Latin American responsibilities. See Spaulding (1980), p. 80.
direct bearing on the Soviet Union's political influence and ultimately its ability to deploy forces abroad. Among the important questions debated in Soviet theoretical writings are the optimal forms of political organization for seizing and holding power, what types of Third World regimes and organizations the Soviet Union should support, and how the USSR can encourage Third World and global political development in ways conducive to its own long-term interests.

- **External Aid.** The Soviets understand that external resources in the form of military or economic aid are crucial to the success and survival of their Third World allies. Although few Soviets question the propriety of such assistance, there is considerable discussion over priorities and appropriate levels given the competing claims of the domestic Soviet economy and the military.

- **The Role of Armed Struggle in Promoting Revolutionary Change.** Throughout the history of the Communist movement there has been a continuous debate over the optimal means of promoting revolutionary change. In these debates, the Soviets have generally favored traditional means of political agitation, organization, and popular mobilization, while the Chinese, Cubans, and others have tended to favor emphasis on armed struggle. Armed struggle in this context refers to use of military force by the local revolutionary group, and not the projection of conventional military power by the Soviet armed forces. Nonetheless, Soviet support for this type of armed struggle does constitute a form of power projection and makes use of Soviet military instruments. The Soviet view on this issue is by no means monolithic, however, and the disputes with the Chinese and Cubans have been echoed within the Soviet Union itself.

- **Acceptable Levels of Risk.** Fear of confrontation with the United States and the risk of escalation to higher levels of conflict have arguably been the most important inhibitions on Soviet willingness to project power in the Third World throughout the postwar period. The Soviets have frequently
discussed not only the degree of acceptable risk given the current state of East-West relations, but also the relative priority of interests in the Third World relative to the central East-West relationship.

Soviet perspectives on each of these four topics have undergone a continuous evolution. At any given moment, moreover, there is no necessary unanimity of view on any of them among different Soviet leaders or theoreticians. The following sections will treat each of these themes in turn, tracing their evolution in Soviet thinking over the past fifteen to twenty years, explaining the current status of the internal Soviet debate, and concluding with speculation on future directions for Soviet doctrine and strategy.
II. THE POLITICAL BASIS OF REVOLUTIONARY POWER

Most Soviet observers of the Third World, whether military or not, have a highly bipolar view of politics in the global arena. That is, they see the essence of international relations as a long-term struggle between the socialist and capitalist socio-economic systems. Most events or trends in the developing world are understood in terms of how they affect the global competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, in which a gain for one means a loss for the other. Although some Western observers have noted a growing school of Soviet "globalists" who, like their counterparts in the West, believe that both superpowers face common threats posed by underdevelopment, overpopulation, dwindling natural resources, and environmental pollution, the dominant strand of Soviet rhetoric maintains that the Third World is an arena for the life-and-death struggle between competing social systems and concepts of justice. Except in certain limited spheres such as non-proliferation, actual Soviet policy has been far more competitive than cooperative in dealing with the West in the Third World.

The competitive side of Soviet thinking is widely recognized among Western observers. Indeed, there is a tendency among some in the West to see the Soviets as the ultimate players of realpolitik hardball, and to characterize Soviet foreign policy motivations in highly geopolitical/military terms, with Kremlin leaders planning pincer movements, flanking maneuvers, and the like. But while military plans and interests are a very important component of Soviet Third World policy, such terms drawn from the tactical-operational realm misrepresent Soviet perspectives and are indeed quite foreign to the

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2One important area where there has been some degree of tacit cooperation has been in the management of Third World crises that could lead to direct U.S.-Soviet conflict.
mode of discourse used by Soviet writers when discussing the Third World among themselves. There are two primary respects in which most Soviet writers, and particularly those outside the professional military, differ from this characterization of them.

The first has to do with their understanding of the primary instruments at their disposal with which to carry on their side of the competition. While many Western observers have, quite rightly, pointed to the growth of overt Soviet military capabilities—a blue-water navy, tactical transport aircraft, and airborne forces—and the development of proxy forces as important and innovative underpinnings for Moscow's ability to project power in the Third World, Soviet observers would tend to emphasize political organization and ideology on the part of their allied client states, revolutionary groups, and national liberation movements.

This emphasis on political organization and ideology at the expense of military capabilities is not surprising given the history of the Bolshevik movement and the Soviet Communist Party. The Bolsheviks came to power in November 1917 not because they were numerous or militarily powerful—indeed, they were one of the smaller parties represented in the Provisional government—but because of their superior discipline and political organization. Lenin's primary legacy to the Communist movement was the concept of a small, highly centralized elite party, which could be used as a highly effective means of seizing and consolidating political power. The utility of this concept was demonstrated by other disciplined, centrally organized parties since 1917. Thus Soviet writers outside of the military, when surveying the USSR's ability to "project power" around the world, would look first to their clients' political power base and the prospects for either consolidating or expanding it.

This is not to say that overt military instruments are unimportant to the Soviets; many Soviet clients, like the regimes in Angola and Afghanistan, would not be in power now were it not for the Soviet armed forces' ability to project power around the globe, regardless of the way

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3 The Nazi party in Germany, which came to power by retaining the same organizational principles but investing them with an entirely different ideological content, comes to mind.
in which they were organized internally. But political organization and ideology affect the staying power of these same allies, as well as the degree of cooperation the Soviets can expect from them. Moscow's ability to come to the aid of a client like Egypt militarily matters very little if that client proceeds to reorient its foreign policy toward the United States. Conversely, the closer the client regime is to the Soviet Union in terms of ideology and political organization, the more likely it is that it will cooperate with Moscow militarily.

The second characteristic of Soviet non-military writers that differs from the common Western characterization is their emphasis on long-term political influence as the primary stake in the global East-West competition, rather than military goals in any narrow sense. Reading Soviet writers one would gather the impression that Soviet policy and assistance to the developing world was totally disinterested, and that Moscow's only concern was for their independent political development and economic well-being. Much of this rhetoric is simply meant to serve propagandistic purposes, of course, putting Soviet policy in the best possible light. We know for a fact that the Soviets have attached strings to their aid, demanding access to military facilities and other types of cooperation.8 In the long run, moreover, political and military interests merge: good Soviet relations with a number of secure and stable Third World states located in geographically important parts of the world would be of great military value to the USSR in a future conflict with the United States.

On the other hand, it is clear that military advantage is only one consideration among several in determining Moscow's policy. The often expressed rhetorical Soviet concern for the well-being of like-minded revolutionary states reflects something real in their political perspective, since this concern serves long-term Soviet interests, both

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8One important motive for Moscow's cultivation of Egypt and Syria during the mid to late 1960s was to obtain naval support facilities after being kicked out of the Albanian port of Vlona in 1963. Similarly, the Soviets evidently bargained hard for access to Danang and Cam Ranh Bay in their negotiations with the Vietnamese prior to the signing of the 1978 Friendship and Cooperation Treaty. See F. Fukuyama, The Soviet Military and the Third World: Civil-Military Relations and the Evolution of the Power Projection Mission (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, R-3504-AF (forthcoming)).
political and military, as well. While Soviet leaders remain well-versed in the techniques of realpolitik, their regime remains at some level an ideological one in which questions of principle play a role. The success of Soviet-style Marxism-Leninism in the developing world is probably important to the Soviets as an end in itself, not least because the Third World is one of the few places where this type of ideology is still taken seriously. The spread of Soviet doctrine and institutions to young countries may well serve a legitimating function for the Soviet elite by proving that the Soviet system is still of relevance in the contemporary world. Thus the tendency on the part of some Western observers to attribute to the Soviets an extremely hard-headed geopolitical outlook can be misleading. Moreover, their hard-headedness takes a long view: Moscow has tended to place long-term political influence over concrete military advantages, as in the Horn of Africa where the Soviets proved willing to risk the sacrifice of a concrete military facility at Berbera, Somalia, in return for securing their position in Ethiopia, a larger and potentially more influential country.

In this section we will trace the evolution of Soviet views on the political basis for their power and influence in the Third World, beginning with the immediate postwar period. These views fall into four broad phases, the first three corresponding roughly to the tenure of the three postwar general secretaries of the CPSU. While Soviet policy entered a fourth, new phase toward the end of Leonid Brezhnev's term in office, its political contours have not yet matured and will depend heavily on choices made by Mikhail Gorbachev and his associates.

By this account, Soviet support for the MPLA in Angola or Frelimo in Mozambique was part of a larger strategy to gain control of southern Africa's raw materials. We think that closer examination of the situation would reveal that such concerns were a rather minor factor, and that Soviet writers are being quite frank when they explain that ideological motives, and not a grab for precious metals, explain their activities in southern Africa.
STALIN AND KHRUSHCHEV

Postwar Soviet policy toward the Third World began with Khrushchev's rise to power, the 1955 Soviet-Egyptian arms deal, and the 20th CPSU Congress in February 1956 in which Khrushchev announced the Soviet Union's toleration of "many roads to socialism," which provided an opening for the so-called anti-Western "bourgeois nationalists." But to understand this shift in Soviet concepts of acceptable political organization, it is necessary to review Soviet policy during Stalin's time.

Following the deepening of the Cold War and commencement of the period of the Zhdanovshchina after September 1947, Stalin and other Soviet spokesmen began to draw an extremely polarized view of the world, in which countries were divided into either the socialist or imperialist camps. Stalin's definition of the socialist camp was a fairly restrictive one, including only formal Communist parties tied to the Soviet Union. At that time, most of the Third World remained under colonial domination. Stalin tended to regard all non-Communist nationalists opposing the colonial system as no more than bourgeois "lackeys" of imperialism, and provided support only to orthodox Communist parties like the one in North Korea. With the exception of China and other Asian countries, these parties tended to be very weak, with the consequence that the Soviet Union had very little influence throughout the Third World.6

Khrushchev's major innovation was to accept a less rigid view of acceptable Third World allies, providing Soviet support to non-Communist, "bourgeois" nationalists. Khrushchev recognized a tremendous anti-Western potential in emerging Third World leaders such as Nasser in Egypt, Nehru in India, Sukharno in Indonesia, and Kwame Nkhrumah in Ghana. Each of these individuals openly rejected Marxism-Leninism--indeed, Egypt and Iraq persecuted local Communists--and pursued somewhat incoherent left-wing policies.

6This period has sometimes been characterized as one of relative Soviet quiescence, although in fact Moscow encouraged actions by a number of Communist parties in this period, including some in Southeast Asia and, of course, in North Korea.
domestically, but in foreign policy proved willing to accept Soviet aid and cooperated with Moscow in their overall political line. As Rostislav Ul'yanovskiy explained in Kommunist in 1962,

In contemporary conditions, as the CPSU program decrees, the national bourgeoisie in colonial, former colonial and dependent countries, detached from imperialist circles, is objectively interested in undertaking the basic tasks of anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution.  

The Soviets, in other words, recognized that the heterogeneous collection of non-Communist nationalists in the Third World had a common interest with the Soviet Union in opposing the West as a result of their resentment of their colonial experiences.

Soviet theoreticians were quick to embrace this new line and explain how this group of leaders, recently denounced by Stalin, would prove to be reliable allies of the Soviet Union. Stalin, after all, had a point: by conventional Marxist theory, states had to pass through a capitalist period of development (involving the creation, inter alia, of a large and well-organized industrial proletariat), before a socialist revolution became possible. Opportunistic cultivation by the USSR of countries at an essentially feudal level of development might ultimately backfire if they eventually followed a capitalist path of development.

The response of writers like Rostislav Ul'yanovskiy was to develop the theory of the so-called "non-capitalist path of development," under which it was maintained that Third World countries could make a direct transition from feudalism to socialism. Early proponents of this theory were highly optimistic (excessively so, as they later recognized) about the possibility of underdeveloped states skipping the capitalist phase altogether, making the transition to socialism in a relatively short period of time, and ultimately arriving at a full acceptance of orthodox Marxism-Leninism. In the early to mid 1960s, Ul'yanovskiy himself was not immune from these trends. He evaluated non-Marxist-Leninist countries like the United Arab Republic (UAR), Algeria, Ghana, Guinea,

\[7\text{Italics added. "Ekonomicheskaya nezavisimost' - blizhaishaya zadacha osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniya v Azii," Kommunist, No. 1, 1962, p. 106.}\]
Mali, and Burma favorably. Like many other Soviet observers, Ul'yanovskiy argued that Third World bourgeois nationalists would eventually evolve into orthodox Marxist-Leninists and accept the teachings of Soviet-style scientific socialism:

> We point out that although the revolutionary leadership of a certain country is not Marxist-Leninist, it possessed not only anti-imperialist, but also anti-capitalist potential, which, in the final analysis, logically and historically requires a gradual rapprochement of the leadership with scientific socialism.

Elsewhere he argued that "national democrats" (an alternative term for bourgeois nationalists) were studying Marxism-Leninism and working closely with Marxist-Leninist parties, concluding that "The national democrats' circles close to the left will eventually adopt Marxism-Leninism. There's no doubt about it." Interestingly, in light of the later debates over vanguard parties, Ul'yanovskiy in this period did not emphasize rigid party-organizational requirements for the successful transition to scientific socialism. Although he believed in the importance of traditional Marxist preconditions like the existence of a strong industrial proletariat and a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party, in some cases it was possible for the broad masses to choose "the path of noncapitalist development beginning the movement toward socialism in the absence of proletarian dictatorship and an organized vanguard party."

This optimism was shared at the time not only by other well-known Soviet writers on the Third World like Georgiy Mirskiy, but by the political leadership as well. Indeed, the opening to bourgeois nationalists was closely identified with Nikita Khrushchev, and much touted by the General Secretary himself.

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12 There is some evidence that the Soviets were looking for a more
downfall in 1964 we find Khrushchev seconding the rather extravagant claims of the more optimistic theoreticians: Algeria's Ben Bella was congratulated for "the determination of the Algerian people to embark upon the socialist path," while the UAR's Nasser was made a Hero of the Soviet Union and the country praised for achieving "a better life for the people through socialist reconstruction."1

BREZHNEV AND THE VANGUARD PARTY

Khrushchev's shift of Soviet policy away from orthodox communists to bourgeois nationalists had the effect of vastly increasing Soviet influence and prestige in the Third World. From a position of virtual isolation under Stalin, by the mid-1960s the Soviets had major footholds in the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, the Far East, and on the island of Cuba. This broadening of influence bore a symbiotic relationship to Soviet power projection capabilities: Moscow's ability to provide weapons and limited military support increased its political influence in crucial parts of the Third World, leading to new types of access for the Soviet armed forces. Thus, by the end of the 1960s the Soviet navy had anchorages or facilities in Egypt, Syria, and Somalia, and paid port calls as far from home as Cuba.

But there were certain critical weaknesses as well in the Khrushchevite policy of support for "bourgeois nationalists." In the first place, many of Moscow's Khrushchev-era allies proved highly unstable and vulnerable to sudden shifts in political fortunes. Soviet clients were overthrown in military coups in Indonesia and Algeria (1965), Ghana (1966), and Mali (1968). Egypt, Moscow's oldest and most important Third World ally, suffered a humiliating setback at the hands of a flexible policy toward the Third World even before Khrushchev's accession to the General Secretaryship; witness the tapering off of the Communist rebellions in Southeast Asia and Soviet probes for settlement of the Korean and Indochina conflicts in the last year of Stalin's life. Nonetheless, Khrushchev was the first to proclaim support for bourgeois nationalists loudly and publicly. For an account of his conflict with the Stalinist old guard on this issue—see Molotov being the primary example—see Uri Ra'anan, The USSR Arms the Third World (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969), chap. 4.

of Israel during the June War of 1967, drawing the Soviets into ever-deeper involvement, and eventually by the early 1970s left the Soviet camp altogether. Other clients like Iraq and at times Syria proved to be highly unreliable, receiving Soviet weapons and using them for purposes of which Moscow disapproved.

Soviet disillusionment with bourgeois nationalist clients began to appear in the mid 1960s. The Khrushchev-era optimism about the likelihood of a quick transition to socialism along the non-capitalist path of development gave way to increasing skepticism about the reliability of non-Communist Third World states. Looking back on this period in 1984, Ul'yanovskiy noted that "Excessively optimistic researchers wanted to see in the personalities of Nasser or Ben Bella a Chernyshevski who would change into a Plekhanov. Occasionally wishes were presented as reality." Writing on the 1969 meeting of International Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow, Ul'yanovskiy began to acknowledge that the non-capitalist path of development would not be a quick phase, but could last "an entire historical period" or "decades." Rather than expressing confidence that bourgeois nationalists would adopt scientific socialism, he stressed that many less-developed countries faced the problem of "voluntarism," or the leaping ahead toward socialism without sufficient preconditions.

Noting the setbacks in Ghana and Mali, he severely criticized Nkrumah's government and his "people's conventional party" (i.e., not a vanguard party) for lacking close ties to the masses. As Ul'yanovskiy notes,

To assume power is sometimes simpler than to secure the stability of a revolutionary regime; to proclaim a revolutionary program is simpler than putting it into practice and providing a reliable social foundation for its success.

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16 A year later in Kommunist he states: "Non-capitalist development is not a one day slogan; not a temporary political course, but a revolutionary strategy requiring an entire historical period." "Some Problems of Non-capitalist Development," Kommunist, No. 3, March 1971.
The problem with these Khrushchev-era clients was their insufficient institutionalization of political power and their consequent inability to make permanent revolutionary change. Leaders like Nkhrumah, Nasser, Keita, or Sukharno were charismatic individuals, often coming to power through military coups; their rule was highly personalistic and did not rest either on systematic ideologies and programs or on a disciplined party organization. As Ul'yanovskiy put it in 1984, "in a number of countries (Egypt, Mali, Sudan, Zaire, Ghana) [progressive forces] failed to create a revolutionary-democratic organization which would ensure the reliability of truly revolutionary-democratic accomplishments ... [relying instead] on a national leader who, in turn, relied on the army, the security organ, his clan or his tribe."18

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Soviet theoreticians began developing a two-fold solution to the weaknesses, one which came to be associated with the late Brezhnev period. The first aspect was the promotion of parties or national liberation movements which explicitly based themselves on Marxist-Leninist ideology;19 the second was the encouragement of these groups to transform themselves into formal vanguard parties, if not before coming to power then afterwards. In a remarkable convergence between doctrine and practice, the Soviet Union in the mid to late 1970s sought to implement the solution advocated by the theorists--i.e., promotion of Marxist-Leninist vanguard parties (MLVPs)--in actual policy. This led to the emergence of the so-called "second generation" of revolutionary democrats, parties or national liberation movements which, in contrast to the "first generation" of bourgeois nationalists, openly espoused Marxism-Leninism as their guiding ideology. This group included the MPLA in Angola, Frelimo in

17Socialism and Newly Liberated Countries (Moscow: Progress, 1974), p. 108. This line was to be echoed by Yuriy Andropov nearly a decade later in his June 1983 Plenum speech.
19Or scientific socialism; the term is synonymous for Soviet authors and will be used interchangeably here.
Mozambique, the Yemeni Socialist Party in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), the Workers' Party of Ethiopia, and the Congolese Labor Party in the People's Republic of the Congo. The emergence of these regimes appears to have reflected a premeditated policy on the part of the Soviet Union. Although Moscow did not "convert" these groups to Marxism-Leninism, it and its allies did play an active role either in bringing these groups to power (as in the case of Moscow's 1975 intervention on behalf of the MPLA), or in sustaining them there (as in the case of the Soviet intervention in 1977-78 on behalf of the Ethiopian Dergue, or its 1979 invasion of Afghanistan). Once in power, moreover, the Soviets encouraged these national liberation movements to transform themselves into formal vanguard parties. This occurred in Angola and Mozambique in 1977, the PDRY in 1978, and in Ethiopia in 1984.

Soviet writers developed the theoretical basis for this shift in policy at great length. The first aspect of the solution, support for overtly Marxist-Leninist groups, was in some sense a return to Stalin's preference for orthodox Communist parties, though in its Brezhnev-era incarnation this principle of selectivity among clients was applied much less rigidly.

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22 Soviet authors tend to speak of the emergence of the second generation as if it were an autonomous social phenomenon, of which they are simply observers.
23 This is one instance in which theory anticipated policy, and where a careful reading of Soviet journals in the late 1960s-early 1970s might have provided insight into future Soviet policy.
24 In contrast to Stalin, the Soviets in the 1970s continued to support first-generation bourgeois nationalists in countries like Syria, India, Iraq, and Libya, where there was no obvious Marxist-Leninist alternative. The Soviets today do not regard any of the new regimes which emerged during the 1970s as genuine socialist states or their ruling parties as orthodox Communist ones (with the exception of Cuba and Vietnam), and for this reason it is not clear than Stalin would have supported them.
equal, a self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist state would be more likely to cooperate with the Soviet bloc reliably than, say, an African socialist, pan-Arab nationalist, or Islamic Marxist one, no matter how left-wing their doctrines (Karen Brutents was an important exception, as noted below). The heterodox ideologies tolerated by Khrushchev were nationalist at the core and ultimately led to an unwillingness to cooperate fully with Soviet foreign policy on the part of the countries which espoused them. Scientific socialism unadulterated by nationalist biases, by contrast, is an explicitly internationalist doctrine. As one author notes, the second generation of self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninists "differs from the revolutionary-democrats of the 1960's (or national democracy) in that it more consistently speaks out from antiimperialist and anticapitalist positions, cooperates with the world communist movement and the world socialist system, and relies on the working masses." 24 Or, as Ul'yanovskiy put it, "In the practical aspect [groups or parties oriented toward scientific socialism] enhance cooperation with the socialist countries to a new level and deliberately promote the expansion of such cooperation. They do not mistrust the socialist commonwealth or fear a 'communist penetration.'" 25 The preference for scientific socialism was regarded as one of the most important characteristics of the new Soviet-supported regimes of the 1970s: "The left wing of contemporary revolutionary democracy, that is, those of its strata and groups that are going over to the positions of scientific socialism, is often defined as the 'second generation' of revolutionary democracy." 26

The second and perhaps more important aspect of the solution lay in the sphere of political organization. As one Soviet author put it,

Under the conditions of abackward country... no group of revolutionaries, even the most sincere and consistent, can secure the orientation toward socialism if the bulk of the

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Particularly during the 1970s, there was a great upsurge in Soviet writings on the subject of vanguard parties and their importance to the revolutionary development of Third World states. Vanguard parties were seen as a means of stabilizing revolutionary power and consequently pro-Soviet orientation by providing the local regime with a firm organizational base, "a well-organized party uniting representatives of the working people, supporters of the socialist road, a party free of pro-bourgeois and anti-socialist elements, a party guided by a progressive ideology." A vanguard party would institutionalize the socialist orientation and permit it to survive the whims or passing of individual Third World leaders like a Nasser or Sukharno, and would provide the Soviets with multiple points of entry as an alternative to the single leader at the top. Vanguard parties were seen as one way to make local revolutions in some sense irreversible, and to avoid the "voluntarism" of the Khrushchev generation of bourgeois nationalists.

Ul'yanovskiy was one of the principal proponents of the Marxist-Leninist vanguard party as an answer to the problems of bourgeois nationalism. As early as the late 1960s and early 1970s he was, moreover, pointing to the revolutionary potential of a number of national liberation movements in Africa which had adopted Marxism-Leninism and would become leading members of the second generation:

In many African countries, influential political organizations have been formed and are leading the struggle of broad people's masses for independence—in Angola, MPLA; in Mozambique, Frelimo; in Guinea-Bissau, PAIGC; in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, ZAPU; in South Africa, the ANC; and in South West Africa, SWAPO.... The majority of the organizations' active members, ideologically, are devout antiimperialists, revolutionary democrats, and allies of socialist orientation.18

It appears that Ul'yanovskiy saw in these groups a revolutionary potential qualitatively different from those of the earlier generation, resulting from their administration of national territory liberated at that time.

ANDROPOV AND SECOND THOUGHTS

By the time of Leonid Brezhnev's death in November 1982, the situation in the Third World looked considerably different from the Soviet perspective than it had a decade earlier. Moscow's client base had changed considerably following the turn toward MLVPs in the 1970s: in addition to older bourgeois nationalist clients like Syria, India, and Iraq, Moscow had taken on responsibility for a large number of "second generation" Marxist-Leninist regimes, increasing from three in 1964 to 17 two decades later.21 These states are listed in Table 1. As predicted by the theorists, these clients generally proved to be more reliable than those of the first generation. In the military realm they provided the Soviets with access to military facilities, such as the ports of Aden, Cam Ranh Bay, and Danang, and the anchorage off Masawa in Ethiopia. Politically, they cooperated with the socialist bloc in a variety of ways, supporting like-minded revolutionary groups and national liberation movements.22

18Kommunist, No. 11, 1969, p. 45-46.
21The three in 1964 were North Korea, North Vietnam, and Cuba. By 1984 the list expanded to include Laos, Kampuchea, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, the PDRY, Afghanistan, Benin, Guinea-Bissau, the People's Republic of the Congo, Madagascar, Nicaragua, Cape Verde, and (until 1983) Grenada.
22This cooperation was not total or uniform, however. For example, Angola cooperated with the Western Contact Group in the early 1980s as part of a Western-sponsored effort to settle the Namibian conflict, an
Table 1

SOVIET MARXIST-LENINIST CLIENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date of Coming to Power</th>
<th>Vanguard Party</th>
<th>Friendship Treaty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo-Brazzaville</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td></td>
<td>1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kampuchea</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDRY</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On the other hand, the second generation fared much more poorly as a group during their first decade in power. For reasons directly related to their Marxist-Leninist character, almost all of these states proved to be extremely weak and narrowly based politically, and unable to sustain meaningful economic growth. Indeed, so lacking were several of them in legitimacy that by the early 1980s five faced significant internal guerrilla wars on the part of indigenous "national liberation" movements. The Soviets for the first time found themselves bogged down fighting or supporting counterinsurgency wars in distant parts of the globe. The Soviet political leadership was well aware of the problematic character of their recent "achievements." Brezhnev's report to the 26th CPSU party congress, delivered in March 1981, had a distinctly more sober tone than the one he presented to the 25th CPSU in 1976. While he notes in the latter an increase in the number of countries having chosen the socialist orientation, he adds that "the development of these countries along the progressive path does not, of course, proceed uniformly," but is "taking place in complex conditions." As a whole, "the period after the 25th congress was not an easy one. There were many difficulties both in the economic development of the country and in the international situation." 

Largely as a result of this mixed record, Soviet theorists, as well as important members of the Soviet leadership, began to take a second look at the political development strategies undertaken during the Brezhnev years, and to posit other courses of action. Most important was a rethinking of the Marxist-Leninist vanguard party. Soviet writers (with some important exceptions, noted below) did not criticize the act which did not necessarily correspond to Soviet interests. In many cases the local state's support for like-minded revolutionary groups was undertaken out of that state's self-interest and self-conception rather than for the sake of solidarity with the Soviet bloc. See Francis Fukuyama, "The New Marxist-Leninist States and Internal Conflict in the Third World," in Uri Ra'anan et al., Third World Marxist-Leninist Regimes: Strengths, Vulnerabilities, and U.S. Policy (Cambridge: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1985).

3 These five were Afghanistan, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua.

concept of the MLVP itself as the theoretically ideal form of political organization for Third World states, but rather expressed increasing skepticism that it was either possible for existing revolutionary democratic groups to make a successful transition to true Marxist-Leninist vanguard parties, or that those groups which had already formally made the transition had really done so in practice. Moreover, countries of the second generation started out from an even lower level of political and economic development than their predecessors, making yet more complicated the bypassing of the capitalist stage. Many of the criticisms leveled by Soviet authors were reminiscent of those expressed of the first-generation states during the 1960s and early 1970s, only their targets this time were not the bourgeois nationalists but the new, self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninists.

Typical of the type of skepticism of Third World MLVPs expressed in the early 1980s is an article by Nodari Simoniya, a section head at the Oriental Institute in Moscow. Simoniya notes five preconditions which must be met before countries can successfully make the transition to full-fledged socialist societies, including the eschewing of "leftism" and a solution to national-ethnic problems, and implies that few, if any, of Moscow's Third World allies have managed to meet them. He openly criticizes the PDPA in Afghanistan, where "a part of the former Afghan leadership tried without justification to accelerate social transformations and to raise them immediately to the level of the people's democratic revolution." While he underlines the importance of vanguard parties, he takes a slap at countries like Angola and Mozambique by noting that the fact that they created formal parties "does not mean, of course, that such parties immediately become communist ones."35

Similar warnings about the dangers of mistaking declarative socialism for the real thing can be found in the writings of a wide variety of Soviet authors. Soviet writers have always been careful to note that, with the exception of Cuba and Vietnam, no Third World countries have as yet graduated into the ranks of "socialist" countries.

being relegated to the slightly lower status of "socialist oriented."

In a collection of essays by a number of prominent Soviet experts on the Third World, including both Ul'yanovskiy and Brutents, published in 1982, "the authors underscore the complex and contradictory nature of [the stage of socialist orientation] and warn about the dangers of attempts to 'accelerate it...into socialist ones, to identify it with socialist reconstruction and to thereby view national democrats as confirmed adherents of scientific socialism." Soviet authors are very careful to draw distinctions between radical socialist-oriented countries, including those with formal vanguard parties, and genuine socialist countries; of Third World countries, only Cuba and Vietnam are regularly included (with the Eastern European satellites) in the latter category. As one writer put it: "does the designation of the socialist-oriented states as 'communist' or even 'socialist' really correspond to the truth? Of course not. The leaders of Socialist Ethiopia, the only socialist-oriented country in Africa where the official state name contains the word 'socialist,' have repeatedly noted that it is not an appraisal of the existing social and political order but a goal sought by the people." 

It is perhaps not surprising to find Ul'yanovskiy, whose views have mirrored (and have presumably been partly responsible for) the major trends in Soviet Third World policy over the past three decades, also becoming critical of the self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist states of the

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3Kiva (1978, p. 46) is careful to distinguish between "vanguard revolutionary democratic parties and a party of the proletarian vanguard (i.e., a genuine Communist party); formation of the vanguard party is a step, but only a step, toward becoming a true Marxist-Leninist party.

3Irkhin (1985), p. 11. Irkhin goes on to say "Also unsound is the attempt to declare that the vanguard worker parties are communist." Irkhin's view of Ethiopia is somewhat disingenuous, as Mengistu Haile Miriam has on occasion referred to himself as "the Communist leader." See Paul Henze, "Communism and Ethiopia," Problems of Communism, May-June 1981.
late 1970s. In articles published in 1984, he criticizes the new, second-generation states for their generally poor party-organizational work, noting the need for a cautious transition to true socialism: "One should not strive to artificially turn [revolutionary-democratic] power into socialist power...while the objective situation, the level of development of the economy, the development of the class struggle of the workers...does not call forth a transition to a higher stage of power -- socialist power."39

In a 1985 book, Ul'yanovskiy seems to be moving to a more liberal definition of vanguard parties. He indicates that there are many ways of interpreting the term, and suggests that under certain definitions both the Congress Party in India and the anti-imperialist forces in Libya might be classified as "vanguards." Nonetheless, he goes on to note that a true vanguard party must be characterized by several specific features, including a program of movement along the path to socialism, thoroughgoing anti-imperialism, support of the working class, and a realization of the complications and length of the process of forming a Marxist-Leninist party.40

The kinds of reservations about MLVPs expressed by academics and even serving officials like Brutents and Ul'yanovskiy become much more interesting and significant when they are echoed by the senior political leadership. This is in fact what began to happen in the early 1980s, particularly after the death of Leonid Brezhnev. Brezhnev's passing and the succession process that followed permitted the airing of a number of themes concerning the Third World which collectively amounted to a critique of the Brezhnev legacy of active promotion of MLVPs and the economic and political costs this entailed.41 The most notable critic was the late Secretary General Yuriy Andropov himself, who in his June

39 "O revolutsionnoy demokratii, ee gosudarstve i politicheskoy sisteme," Voprosy Filosofii, No. 4, April 1984, pp. 28-29. Hereafter Ul'yanovskiy II. Similar points are made in the other article from 1984 cited earlier.
40 Pobedy i trudnosti natsional'nogo-ovvoditel'noi bor'by (Moscow: Politizdat, 1985), pp. 64-68.
41 Some of the other themes taken up by the senior leadership are discussed in Sections III and V below.
1983 Plenum speech echoed the line of many Soviet Third World theoreticians when he said: "It is one thing to proclaim socialism as one's aim and quite another to build it. For this, a certain level of productive forces, culture, and social consciousness is needed." While sympathizing with the states of a socialist orientation, he noted "the complexity of their position and the difficulties of their revolutionary development"—common Soviet euphemisms for poor performance on both a political and economic level.

BRUTENTS AND THE FUTURE

For the most part Soviet theoreticians have done no more than recognize the problems and shortcomings of the second generation of Marxist-Leninist client states. The MLVP did not prove to be the answer to the shortcomings of bourgeois nationalism, as some Soviet authors seemed to have believed in the early 1970s. It is not readily apparent what alternative form of political organization the Soviets have available to them as the basis for their strategy in the Third World. The one Soviet writer who seems to have a clear idea of where to go in the aftermath of the MLVP is Karen Brutents.

Brutents' writings over the years have been characterized by a consistent pessimism about the prospects for socialist revolution and progressive transformations in the Third World. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, his views of the shortcomings of existing bourgeois nationalist regimes were more or less consistent with other Soviet criticisms made at the time, if perhaps a bit more pessimistic. Brutents appears to have shared none of the Khrushchevian overoptimism about the prospects for a rapid transition to socialism along the non-capitalist path. This road, he cautioned, should not be misconstrued as embarking on a steady course of socialist development; it was instead "a

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42"Rech' General'nogo Sekretariya Ts. K. KPSS tovarishcha Yu. V. Andropova," Kommunist, No. 9, June 1983.

43The Soviets have not, of course, given up on MLVPs any more than they gave up on bourgeois nationalist clients like India during the heyday of the MLVP in the 1970s. The Soviets continue to give strong support to countries like Angola and Afghanistan, both of which have received steadily growing levels of support during the 1980s.
specific form of transition to socialism," and a "process of creating the essential prerequisites for the construction of socialism." Among the difficulties standing in the way of genuine socialist development were: (1) the "socio-political heterogeneity" of revolutionary democracy, i.e., the thinness, numerical and otherwise, of those committed to revolutionary change and anti-capitalist development; (2) the profound immaturity of the class prerequisites for progressive change, including the survival of feudal forms of class consciousness like family and tribal ties, caste, and religious prejudices; (3) the weakness and unreliability of the social bases of most revolutionary democratic organizations, namely, the peasantry and petty bourgeoisie; and (4) the weakness of revolutionary democratic parties and organizations. Brutents pays special attention to the obstacles standing in the way of strengthening vanguard organizations, including the revolutionaries' "non-class conception of their parties and their bias toward a 'peaceful' resolution, within the framework of the party, of social contradictions," and, more importantly, the nationalistic elements of their ideology which prevents them from making alliances with communist forces. For these and other reasons Brutents concludes:

Neither an idealization of revolutionary democracy, nor an excessive exaggeration of its role, nor a reluctance to see its weak aspects, its inconsistencies and vacillations, nor, on the other hand, a disregard for the existing correlation of class forces, or disparaging the role and significance of revolutionary democracy serves the interests of the liberation struggle in the Third World.**

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**"Epokha sotsializma i natsional'noye osvobozhdeniye narodov," Kommunist, No. 18, December 1967, p. 96.
**Brutents (1972), p. 119.
**Brutents (1974, pp. 39-41) also notes that nationalism draws revolutionary democratic organizations into diversionary attempts to suppress national minorities and ethnic groups.
Brutents, moreover, does not seem to take the Third World particularly seriously, either for its geostrategic weight in international politics or as an arena for the development of "advanced" social and economic institutions. He criticizes "left opportunists" and "nationalist ideologists" who have "clearly overrated the worldwide importance and revolutionary role of the national liberation movement," and notes that "the developing countries do not now have a great part to play in the technico-economic and military balance of strength in the world."

Where Brutents diverges from other Soviet writers on the Third World (including Ul'yanovskiy) is in his proposed solution to these problems. Whereas he recognizes the importance of Marxist-Leninist ideology and the need for a vanguard party, he is so extremely pessimistic about the likelihood that either will be properly adopted in the Third World that promotion of the MLVP never seems to have held much attraction as a practical policy.

Brutents' pronounced lack of interest in the second-generation Marxist-Leninist states is curious because he was elevated from a consultant to a full-time deputy chief of the International Department in 1975, the year of the Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola and the beginning of the period of intense Soviet involvement with precisely this circle of regimes. His new responsibilities as a Central Committee official and his apparent disregard for prevailing policies may explain the absence of any published writings between 1975 and 1977, although such reasons are not sufficient to explain why others like Ul'yanovskiy in the party hierarchy would want the services of someone who appears to be so out of line with the prevailing orthodoxy.

When Brutents returns to writing in the late 1970s-early 1980s, he lays out a rather different strategy toward the Third World, and indeed is the only major Soviet author to offer a meaningful alternative to the MLVP. Essentially, Brutents argues in favor of shifting Soviet emphasis...
away from countries that are ideologically correct but small and weak, to larger, geopolitically important Third World nations with "objective" anti-imperialist potential, including some that are capitalist-oriented. In some sense Brutents is arguing for a return to Khrushchev's support for bourgeois nationalists, but without the latter's bombastic claims that they would eventually evolve into orthodox communists. His interest in the anti-imperialist potential of the capitalist-oriented parts of the Third World has in fact been a consistent feature of his writing. In 1966 he was asserting that "It would...be an oversimplification to claim that even a partial solution of the problems of this revolution is impossible along the capitalist road, that nothing positive occurs in the countries where capitalism develops." But in the 1960s and early 1970s he was always careful to balance this interest in capitalist-oriented states with a full awareness of the problems and obstacles they posed to progressive development. By the early 1980s, however, he seems to be much more convinced of the anti-imperialist potential of this group of states. In a 1982 Pravda article, for example, he points out "the solid base for the Soviet Union's cooperation with those liberated countries where capitalist relations are developing but which pursue a policy of defending and strengthening national sovereignty in politics and economics." He further notes the Soviet Union's growing cooperation with large, non-Marxist-Leninist countries like India, Brazil, and Mexico, suggesting that they and not the socialist-oriented Ethiopias, Afghanistans, and Angolas ought to be the focus of Soviet attention. In a 1984 article he further amplifies this thesis, noting the existence of significant contradictions between many capitalist-oriented Third World states and the West, observing that "As long as it does not reach the monopolistic stage, even the development of capitalist relations in the liberated countries does not nullify [these contradictions] and does not directly contribute to consolidating the positions of imperialism."

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Brutents' lack of interest in MLVPs is evident from his choice of subject matter. In the decade following his entry into the Central Committee, he has never (in sharp contrast to Ul'yanovskiy) written on states of a socialist orientation per se; indeed, he never distinguishes clearly between them and the non-Marxist states of the first generation. Although his articles make perfunctory bows in the direction of the socialist orientation, his real interest lies in issues like the non-aligned movement and in the larger non-communist countries of the Third World like Argentina. Indeed, his 1984 article on the non-aligned movement is notable for its positive evaluation of the movement as a whole and its harking back to the 1955 Bandung conference, which inspired Khrushchev's turn away from narrow emphasis on communist parties.

Brutents' most recent articles continue to reflect pessimism over the prospects of socialist oriented countries, noting that "Even socialist oriented countries are to some extent not free from this dependence [on Western states] because of close ties with the world capitalist economy...". He is implicitly dismissive of the Soviet Union's role in the liberation process, shunning the self-congratulation that was typical of the Brezhnev era and suggesting that Soviet support could extend no further than the establishment of "friendly ties with liberated countries."

Brutents' views are of particular interest both because of his current institutional position, and because he is likely to inherit overall responsibility for the Third World within the Central Committee. It appears that his stature has increased considerably since Mikhail

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4 See "Dvizheniye nepripradineniya v sovremennom mire," MEiMO, No. 5, 1984; and "Konflikt v yuzhnoy atlantike: nekotoriye posledstviya i uroki," SSHA, No. 11, 1982.
5 Brutents also wrote on the non-aligned movement in 1974, stating that "its most important, distinctive qualities are apparent in anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, in solidarity with revolutionary (and, in particular, national liberation) movements, and in the pursuit of a policy of positive neutrality." See Brutents (1974), p. 117.
6 "Osvobodivshiesiya strany i antiimperialisticheskaya bor'ba," Pravda, January 10, 1986.
Gorbachev's coming to power. The new party program, which was drafted in October 1985 and adopted at the 27th CPSU party congress in February 1986, contains language endorsing the Brutents' strategy of moving away from MLVPs and cultivating large, geopolitically important countries. The program states:

The practice of the USSR's relations with the liberated countries has shown that real grounds also exist for cooperation with young states which are traveling the capitalist road. There is the interest in maintaining peace, strengthening international security, and ending the arms race; there is the sharpening contradiction between the peoples' interests and the imperialist policy of dictat and expansion; and there is the young states' realization of the fact that political and economic ties with the Soviet Union promote the strengthening of their independence. 57

It seems likely that this part of the program was drafted by Brutents himself.

It is still early to tell how a shift toward emphasis on capitalist-oriented states would be implemented, but Gorbachev has already moved Soviet policy in that direction. One of his early major foreign trips in his first two years in office was his visit to India in November 1986, and plans for him to visit several major Latin American countries, including Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil (as well as Cuba) in 1987 have been announced. 58 The Soviets already have substantial trade ties with Argentina and India, and it is likely that current levels to these and other large Third World countries will increase over the next few years. Beyond this, it is difficult to see how Moscow will be able to offer these countries anything qualitatively different: such nations do not need the arms and internal security assistance that forms the basis of Soviet relations with MLVP-ruled states; indeed, Brazil competes with Moscow in international arms markets. 59 The policy of expanding contacts

59 These issues, as well as a detailed look at actual Soviet resource commitments to Third World clients, is contained in Francis Fukuyama, Moscow's Post-Brezhnev Reassessment of the Third World (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, R-3337-USDP, February 1986).
with large capitalist-oriented Third World states fits nicely with some of the larger themes of Gorbachev's foreign policy, that is, the broadening and multilateralization of Soviet ties with powerful countries in the developed world, which has been associated with the man promoted by Gorbachev to head the Central Committee Propaganda Department, Aleksandr Yakovlev. At the same time, there has been a marked change in the Soviets' rhetorical emphasis on MLVP states. In Gorbachev's report to the 27th CPSU congress, the traditional section on the Soviet Union's relations with the "liberated countries" was omitted altogether, along with the usual salutations to countries like Vietnam and Cuba contained in earlier reports by the General Secretary. Indeed, the only Third World country mentioned by name was Afghanistan, in the context of reassurances that the USSR was seeking to withdraw. 

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III. EXTERNAL AID

The second major issue touching on power projection in Soviet writings on the Third World concerns the level of aid Moscow and the Eastern European members of the bloc are willing to provide in support of their clients. Soviet theorists understand that external assistance, both military and economic, is crucial in underpinning Soviet influence and the stability of their allied regimes. There are two primary issues: first, the tradeoff between Moscow's interests in the Third World and the needs of its own economy, and second, in the economic sphere, the appropriate model of development to be followed by Third World states.

RESOURCE PRIORITIES

Soviet theorists regularly congratulate themselves for the significant assistance that the countries of developed socialism, and particularly the USSR, provide progressive Third World states. What varies over time is the emphasis this external aid is given, and the prevalence of the countervailing thesis that economic development is the responsibility of Third World states themselves. During the Khrushchev period one finds numerous statements suggesting almost unlimited Soviet largess, past, present, and future. In later decades one finds an increasing number of cautionary notes to the effect that Soviet resources are not unlimited, culminating in the early 1980s with rather frank, high-level warnings that Third World clients will have to look after themselves. This trend seems quite natural given both the slowdown in the rate of growth of the Soviet economy in the late 1970s, and the increasing "burden of empire" acquired as a result of Moscow's expansionism during that same decade.¹

¹According to a recent RAND study, the costs of Moscow's Third World "empire" rose from a range of $13.6-21.8 billion in 1971 to a range of $35.9-46.5 billion in 1980 (measured in constant 1981 dollars). See Charles Wolf, Jr., K. C. Yeh, E. Brunner, A. Gurwitz, and Marilee Lawrence, The Costs of the Soviet Empire, R-3073/1-NA (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, September 1983), p. 19.
Ul'yanovskiy has always been a strong proponent of Soviet aid to the Third World, and his writings from the early 1960s are perhaps typical of the Khrushchevian tendency to promise substantial development assistance with few qualifications attached. Typical is the following statement from 1970:

Aid of socialist countries in economic, political, and military realms and in the sphere of guarding the gains of the national liberation movement is an important and necessary condition for contemporary non-capitalist development in many Asian and African countries. Ul'yanovskiy clearly sees military aid as a highly important type of support proffered to Third World states, "protecting progressive transformations that are being implemented in these countries and shielding revolutionary political regimes from encroachment by imperialists." Ul'yanovskiy, moreover, takes a hard line on the need to follow the Soviet model of development.

It is not clear what Brutents' view on the appropriate level of assistance to the Third World is. He seems to be fully aware that the success of the socialist orientation depends heavily on a high level of external assistance. Indeed, Brutents regards the socialist orientation in the Third World as so weak that at times he appears to believe that the only practical way for such movements to come to power is through the support of the international socialist community, i.e., the Soviet Union and its allies. He maintains that it is the strengthening Soviet

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3Socialism and the Newly Independent Nations (Moscow: Progress, 1974), p. 65. He also notes that "as for the forms of assistance, there is room for improvement and more careful thought." Elsewhere in this book (p. 22) Ul'yanovskiy points out that Vietnam demonstrates that "the aggressor can only be defeated by armed forces combining the effective use of modern weapons supplied by the working class of socialist countries."

position that is responsible for such progressive changes as have occurred to date:

it is quite obvious that the independence of most young national states in present-day conditions frequently rests upon what cannot be strictly called their own basis. In many highly essential aspects, it is frequently not so much a natural reflection of the internal situation in these countries as a product of the present balance of forces in the world arena.5

In another article he stresses that the "international situation" alone is responsible for "the rise in some countries of an anti-imperialist movement with a broad platform of national liberation even before the traditional class prerequisites have matured."6 On the other hand, since Brutents is no particular advocate of states with a socialist orientation, it is not clear that he wants the Soviet Union to spend more on their behalf; indeed, his recognition of their need for outside support may imply a criticism of their excessive cost. While Ul'yanovskiy stresses the importance of outside support, he does not lay the same stress on the correlation of forces as does Brutents.

Warnings that Soviet resources are not unlimited and that Third World countries will have to learn to take care of themselves have been provided by a variety of Soviet spokesmen, the most important being the late General Secretary Yuriy Andropov. In the June 1983 Plenum speech quoted earlier, Andropov stated:

Socialist countries express solidarity with these progressive states [i.e., the socialist-oriented countries], render assistance to them in the sphere of politics and culture, and promote the strengthening of their defense. We contribute also, to the extent of our ability, to their economic development. But, on the whole, their economic development, just as the entire social progress of those countries, can be,

of course, only the result of the work of their peoples and of a correct policy of their leadership.

This and other statements made by Andropov earlier in his career indicate a reluctance to support Third World clients at the expense of the domestic Soviet economy. Andropov died too soon to implement any changes in overall patterns of Soviet aid, and it is in fact difficult to discern shifts in Soviet aid flows since Brezhnev's death in November 1982. Given Gorbachev's background in domestic economic management and his general closeness to Andropov, it would not be surprising to find him holding similar views, although there is as yet no real evidence for this.

It is possible to find the sentiments expressed in Andropov's Plenum speech echoed by a variety of lower-ranking officials, particularly in the early 1980s. One early expression of this was made by Ul'yanovskiy himself, who contradicted statements made in the same article that seemed to favor high levels of assistance by asserting:

Developed countries of socialism, truly, are economically NOT in the condition to assume the responsibility of rendering necessary assistance for the economic reconstruction of dozens of countries liberated from colonial or semicolonial dependence--economic reconstruction is, above all, a matter for the people themselves.

Another variant of this theme has been to argue that the Soviet Union's real influence on the Third World comes about less through direct assistance than through the socio-economic model for development that it provides, and that therefore the USSR ought to look to its own economic development first. Recent examples of this line include

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8See "Moscow's Post-Brezhnev Reassessment of the Third World," pp. 60 ff.
speeches by Politburo member Gaidar Aliev during a 1983 visit to Hanoi,\(^{11}\) and Party Secretary Ivan Kapitonov. The latter, for example, stated in 1983 that "The party (i.e., the CPSU) is guided by Lenin's perspicacious tenet that we exert our chief influence on the world revolutionary process through our economic policy. Our every success in perfecting developed socialist society and further strengthening the power of the Soviet state is of international significance and serves the common cause of world socialism...."\(^{12}\) The International Department's chief, Boris Ponomarev, has taken up this subject on several occasions, beginning in the late 1970s. In a 1984 article he stated:

progressive forces in the developing world are becoming aware that the transformations of international economic relations on a democratic basis depends primarily upon the extent with which they themselves wage the struggle against neocolonialism and exercise control over the imperialistic monopolies... One cannot agree with the point of view that it is only an influx of resources from without that can guarantee the resolution of the burning problems of the developing countries.\(^{13}\)

Ponomarev has also spent a good deal of time debunking the notion that the Soviet Union owes an economic "debt" to the Third World as part of the "rich North." Attacking the Chinese charge to this effect, Ponomarev goes on to say that "Our country does not deny the logic of raising the question of acquiring additional funds from outside in order to finance the economic development programs of the former colonies. But an inflow of such external funds must also be considered in the context of making good the harm inflicted on the new states by the former metropolises...."\(^{14}\) In other words, the Soviet Union supports

\(^{11}\)Pravda, November 1, 1983.


\(^{14}\)Information Bulletin, Nos. 23-24, 1980, p. 64.
Third World demands that the West transfer resources, but refuses on grounds of principle to do so itself. This is a viewpoint shared by Brutents as well.

It seems reasonably clear that Gorbachev has associated himself with the Andropov line on resource issues, something which is perhaps not surprising in view of his background as an economic manager. Overall, Gorbachev concentrated in the first year of his administration on the question of domestic economic development, stressing the need for the USSR to become technologically competitive with the United States and other Western countries in the coming decade. This in itself suggests a downgrading in the priority of resources to promote the external empire. This was confirmed in the Party Program, which stated:

*Mainly through their own efforts* every people create the material and technical base needed for building the new society and strive to increase the masses' prosperity and culture. *To the extent of its abilities* the Soviet Union has given and will continue to give peoples traveling this route aid in their economic and cultural building, in training national cadres, in increasing defense capability, and in other spheres.\(^{15}\)

This language, with its emphasis on self-help and limitations on Soviet resources, echoes Andropov's Plenum speech, and is a clear signal to Soviet Third World allies that Moscow will be less forthcoming with resources for both economic and military purposes in the future. This point was underlined by Gorbachev's address to the 27th party congress, which eschewed all mention of Moscow's ties with the "liberated" countries altogether.\(^{16}\)

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\(^{16}\)See the text of Gorbachev's address in FBIS Daily Report, USSR National Affairs, 26 February 1986.
MODELS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

In addition to discussing the level of assistance to be provided, the Soviet theoretical literature on the Third World contains extended arguments on the development model Soviet clients are encouraged to follow. Soviet views on this issue have evolved considerably, away from the rigid application of the Stalinist development model to a mixed approach incorporating certain elements of liberal economic theory. This is relevant to power projection in that greater Soviet tolerance for eclectic economic theories provides a justification for limiting direct Soviet economic assistance to its less-developed allies.

The traditional Soviet model of economic development maintains that economic ties to developed capitalist economies, either in the form of trade or investment, are inherently exploitative, and that Western multinational corporations do not assist in development but rather exploit the natural resources of Third World. The Ricardian theory of comparative advantage and the international division of labor, under which most Third World countries end up as exporters of raw materials or labor, is held to be unjust because it locks the Third World country into permanent dependence on the capitalist world. The Soviets' traditionally preferred solution has aspects which draw on the USSR's own experience as a developing country. Its elements include: the drastic reduction of economic ties with the West through nationalization of Western property and investment; creation of a more or less balanced, autarkic industrial economy through import substitution and other protectionist measures; and the shifting of external economic ties to the socialist bloc, economic relations with whom are held to be "disinterested" and beneficial to the developing country. Moreover, the traditional Soviet economic development model encourages internal economic organization along Soviet lines, i.e., centralization of the economy (or at least its "commanding heights") under state control.

The problem with this model was twofold: first, it didn't work, and second, it proved to be extremely costly to the Soviet Union. Third World countries with socialist economies as a group have done much more poorly than their capitalist counterparts. By nationalizing Western interests and seeking "balanced" economic growth, they cut themselves
off from access to critical markets and sources of technology, and embarked on wasteful industrialization programs; to sustain growth rates, they have had to turn to the USSR and other developed countries of the Soviet bloc. The most extreme case of this was Cuba, where maintenance of the Cuban standard of living in the face of the cutoff of Western aid and trade and Castro's socialist reforms required ever-increasing subsidies on the part of Moscow, amounting in the early 1980s to some $5 billion per year. The Soviets have obviously regarded Cuba as worth the price in political and economic terms, but it is clear that the Soviet economy simply cannot sustain multiple Cubas.

In the Soviet theoretical literature there has been an increasing tendency to abandon the traditional Soviet development model in favor of a more eclectic one which combines socialist and market-oriented solutions. Although Soviet writers continue to maintain that autarkic development with its concomitant nationalizations and protectionism is desirable in the long run, their almost universal advice to developing countries on both a theoretical and practical level is to go slow and avoid massive disruption of ties to Western capitalist countries. Most Soviet writers are acutely aware of the dangers of premature imposition of socialist measures such as nationalization:

Experience in successfully solving economic development problems shows that the plans and the political and ideological measures in the countries with a socialist orientation must take into account the real possibilities and the consequences of their realisation. Hasty industrialization or attempts to organise peasants into cooperatives without due preparation, as well as premature nationalisation of foreign property, can have a damaging effect on the productive forces and the policy of socialist orientation.\footnote{Italics added. V. Solodovnikov and V. Bogoslovsky, \textit{Non-Capitalist Development: An Historical Outline} (Moscow: Progress, 1975), pp. 116-117.}

Many Soviet writers recognize the benefits offered by Western technology and capital, and even acknowledge the contribution of multinational corporations to certain aspects of development. Nationalization of foreign investment is no longer seen as the central problem for
developing countries; according to Brutents, "the question is not so much that of establishing national sovereignty over the economy and natural resources...as it is a question of realistically implementing this sovereignty by wisely exploiting these resources for national interests on the basis of the cadres and the technical experience of the country involved." 

Essentially, what Soviet authors are arguing for is a Third World version of Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP). Ponomarev, for example, refers explicitly to the example of the NEP as one applicable to developing countries, noting that "the leaders of countries with a socialist orientation see the solution in moving ahead gradually, avoiding any artificial imposition of social change...The experience of many socialist oriented countries shows that a useful role can be played by private enterprise--with corresponding supervision by the state." 

Consistent with this view, the international division of labor is no longer seen as exploitative, but as a necessary consequence of the character of the global economy. As noted by Simoniya, "It is by no means the aim of the expansion of economic ties with socialist countries to remove countries of socialist orientation from the existing international division of labor or to sever all their economic relations with developed capitalist countries." The Soviets themselves have seen the advantages of buying raw materials from less-developed countries (LDCs) in return for industrial goods, thereby perpetuating the division of labor. Both the harm that this may do to the LDCs and the altruistic character of Soviet economic ties with Third World have been minimized: "CEMA [Council for Economic Mutual Advantage] countries try to secure their own legitimate business interests on a basis of equality, mutual advantage, and a fair consideration of the needs of both parties." 

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Although Soviet writers continue to argue in favor of the superiority of Moscow's economic dealings with the Third World over those of the West (e.g., insofar as the USSR does not demand "bases" in return for aid—a rather disingenuous claim), an increasing number of Soviet authors appear to accept the fact that the socialist-oriented countries, along with the USSR itself, are for better or worse tied into a global capitalist economy and must maintain "normal" relations with that larger world.

The gradual discarding of many aspects of the traditional Soviet model of economic development has led certain Western scholars to assert that the older model has been abandoned altogether in favor of a Western-style "globalism," or that Soviet writers on the Third World are making an esoteric critique of socialism in the Soviet Union itself. Were the Soviet leadership to come to this sort of conclusion, the consequences for Soviet foreign policy would be great indeed: it would undercut the doctrinal and ideological basis for the "conflictual" view of international relations and U.S.-Soviet interactions in the Third World described at the outset of this study. Rather than offering a competing model for economic development, the Soviets would be willing to support "capitalist-oriented" economies among their client states and would find considerable common ground with the United States and other Western states in promoting the integration of the LDC economy into the global capitalist economic order. The U.S.-Soviet competition in the Third World would then be reduced to politics and political systems; but to what extent is it possible over the long run for single party Marxist-Leninist regimes to preside over open market economies?

It is premature to say that the Soviet leadership has actually rejected the traditional Stalinist development model. In the first place, it is not clear that "neo-liberal" theories of economic development are accepted generally among Soviet Third World specialists, much less among the leadership that actually makes policy. For all of

\[ \text{22 Ibid.} \]

the developmental economists who have implicitly rejected the traditional development model, one can find other equally authoritative statements of the traditional Soviet line; certainly the newer theories have not been officially sanctioned in documents like the party program.

And there are good reasons why they are not likely to be any time in the near future. An admission that Soviet-style socialism does not work in the Third World would ultimately be subversive of "real" or "developed" socialism in the USSR itself. Soviet theorists may argue that NEP-like policies may apply only to states at a much lower level of overall socioeconomic development, but they must still answer questions about whether markets and decentralized economic decisionmaking might not act as a powerful engine of development even in a developed socialist economy, and question the wisdom of the Soviet Union's own forced industrialization in the 1930s. Dropping the Stalinist economic development model undermines the Soviet case against "imperialist exploitation" and would remove the moral high ground that Moscow has claimed for so long. One would expect to see this happen in foreign policy only after the principle had been accepted in domestic policy. Such a development may yet occur in the post-Brezhnev USSR, as it seems to be happening in China, but there is no evidence that such a fundamental shift has occurred as of this writing.

If the expression of neo-liberal economic development theories are tolerated by the top leadership, it is probably not because they are recognized as being right in principle, but because they are convenient. Soviet economists who recommend against a Third World country's rapid

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2a For a recent example of this, see R. Ul'yanovskiy, "Robbery Under the Guise of 'Interdependence,'" Kommunist, No. 16, November 1981, where he states (p. 83): "the concept of 'interdependence' has been formulated for the sake of concealing the exploiting nature of the contemporary social division of labor in the capitalist economy and for the sake of perpetuating its one-sided nature, which is detrimental to the liberated peoples, and to prevent the developing countries from attaining economic equality."

2b These are terms used during the Brezhnev period to describe socialism in the Soviet Union and other advanced Soviet bloc states; they have apparently been dropped from the Soviet lexicon since Gorbachev's accession to power.
nationalization of foreign investments or withdrawal from the International Monetary Fund also save the USSR from assuming responsibility for that nation's economic well-being. The evolution of Soviet theories of development should thus be seen as an adjunct to the broader discussion of the relative priority of Third World and domestic economic needs.
IV. ARMED STRUGGLE AND REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE

Soviet political writers on the Third World address the question of military force directly only when discussing optimal strategies to be followed by local communist parties and national liberation movements in promoting revolutionary change, and the emphasis is placed on the use of force by local groups rather than by the USSR itself. The Soviets recognize that armed struggle is an important instrument in the pursuit of political power, as the Bolsheviks' own armed uprising in Petrograd in November 1917 demonstrated. The precise mix of military and peaceful means, however, has been a contentious tactical issue in the communist movement since before the Russian Revolution, with the left wing of the Bolshevik movement advocating heavy reliance on force, and the right arguing in favor of traditional non-military means such as the building up of a strong political party organization, the recruitment of a mass base of support, and the quest for political power within the framework of existing bourgeois political institutions.¹

Surprising as this may seem to American observers accustomed to thinking of Soviet strategy as highly militarized, the Soviets have never been strong advocates of armed struggle and have almost always taken the more conservative position in tactical debates within the world Communist movement. In the 1950s and 1960s it was first the Chinese and then the Cubans who took the lead advocating revolutionary strategies based in large measure on armed struggle as the primary means of acquiring power. Drawing on their own experiences, the Chinese argued in favor of a peasant-based guerrilla struggle in the countryside, whereas the Cubans developed the so-called foco theory, where the revolution would center around small armed guerrilla groups. Together with their talk of arriving more quickly at a purer sort of

¹Within the context of debates inside the communist movement, "left wing" positions have generally come to be associated with advocacy of armed struggle and rapid revolutionary change, and the "right" with a more cautious approach. The question is a tactical one, of course; the goals of both are identical.
communism than the Soviet Union, the Soviets found these "leftist" theories anathema and spent much of the 1960s trying to stamp out such deviations. On a policy level, the Soviets refused to back many of the small, armed guerrilla groups supported by Mao and Castro in this period. The Soviets adopted this posture not because they were more moderate, but because they understood that premature attempts to seize power through military force without the preparation of an adequate political base usually ended in failure. They regarded Castro as an adventurer who would lead the local groups to destruction and provoke an American reaction which would draw them into an unwanted superpower conflict. And indeed, they were right on both counts. All of the leftist groups in Latin America backed by Castro during the 1960s such as that of Che Guevara in Bolivia or the Colombian FAN ended in disaster, leading not only to these groups' personal destruction but to the imposition of military dictatorships in many Latin American countries. And the Soviet Union was never in a position to challenge American military power in the Western hemisphere.

The Soviet position on the role of armed struggle is not monolithic, however, and has shifted in response to external developments. Discussion of this issue has centered primarily around the specialists on Latin America, since this is the area where Castro first raised the doctrinal challenge, and since the relatively high level of development of many Latin American societies has made the choice between peaceful and military tactics a live one. Neither Ul'yanovskiy nor Brutents has written extensively on this topic, although Ponomarev has spoken at length on appropriate tactics for Communist parties. The prolonged tactical debates have tended to be argued out either in *Latinskaya Amerika, Rabochiy Klass i Sovremennyy Mir* (the organ of the Institute of the International Worker's Movement, or IMRD), and in the Soviet Communist Party's theoretical journal *Kommunist*.

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2 The Soviet preference for more traditional political methods also reflected something of the stodginess of the already rather mature Russian revolution, and resentment of the claims of newer revolutionary groups to have found a better path to communism.
THE CHILEAN EXPERIENCE

The two principal events which stimulated discussion on this subject over the past two decades were Salvador Allende's rise and overthrow by the Chilean military in 1970-73, and the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua in 1978. In the former case, Allende's Chilean Communist Party was a model for the type of revolutionary organization favored by the Soviets, i.e., an orthodox communist party run primarily by urban elements with a substantial working class base, which came to power as a result of a parliamentary election and its own successes in mobilizing the Chilean masses. The problems Allende experienced once in office and the Unidad Popular's vulnerability to the right wing reaction it provoked was a traumatic development for the Soviets, one they analyzed at great length over the next decade and which continues to inform their thinking.

In the immediate aftermath of Chile, a number of Soviet theorists began to argue that Allende's experience had discredited the conservative approach followed by the Unidad Popular and favored by the Soviet Union, and demonstrated the need for the type of armed guerrilla struggle favored by the Cubans. For example, Sergei Agayev, a section head at the IMRD, postulated that "in the course of the unarmed development of the revolution the readiness of the revolutionary forces for armed forms of struggle...is no less significant than during the course of the forced seizure of power." He pressed for an immediate revolutionary offensive that should be extended to European countries like Portugal and Spain, and maintained that the complete elimination of war could be achieved only under socialism.

But while Allende's defeat provided an opportunity for some to voice Guevarist or Castroite views, Agayev and people sympathetic to his views were rather isolated at the left end of the Soviet political spectrum; the vast majority of commentators, and most notably authoritative voices like that of Ponomarev, not only supported Allende's pursuit of a peaceful route to power, but faulted him for what

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were essentially left-wing deviations, e.g., pushing the Chilean economy toward socialist reforms too rapidly, thereby alienating certain elements of the middle class. The retrospective on Chile published in *The World Communist Movement* (a handbook published yearly and edited by Ponomarev's deputy Vadim Zagladin) criticized Allende in the following terms:

The revolutionary transformations implemented by the Unidad Popular Government brought about a sharp exacerbation of the political struggle and a rapid polarization of class forces... The revolutionary forces were forced to overcome both blunders which had come about in view of the lack of experience and mistakes made by political leaders and civil servants. Unidad Popular did not succeed in creating authorities for the precise and effective control of the country's economy.4

The book concludes that "The formation of a popular government is possible and feasible without a civil war"; legal and parliamentary means must be supplemented by "extraparliamentary demonstrations of the masses,"5 but no mention is made of the desirability of armed struggle.

NICARAGUA AND CENTRAL AMERICA

A similar sort of controversy broke out after the success of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua in 1979. No one in the Soviet Union on an official or unofficial level foresaw a revolutionary opportunity developing in Nicaragua or anywhere else in Central America in the late 1970s; indeed, up until six months before the actual overthrow of former President Somoza the Soviets were urging the small orthodox Communist party, the Nicaraguan Socialist Party, not to join with the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). The Soviets appear to have been taken by surprise by the FSLN victory, rushing to offer it political and material support only after the fact. The same had not been true of Cuba, which had given the FSLN weapons, money, and sanctuary ever since its founding in the early 1960s; Castro was said to have played a

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4V. Zagladin (1984), p. 329. The section on Chile was written by Yu. M. Kukushkin.
5Ibid., p. 332.
decisive role in unifying the three Sandinista tendencies prior to the uprising.

This unexpected windfall in Nicaragua and the growing insurgencies in El Salvador and Guatemala led to a prolonged rethinking of policy within the USSR. Many Soviet scholars became openly critical of the conservatism of past Soviet policy. For example, in a discussion on the lessons of Nicaragua sponsored by *Latinskaya Amerika*, the journal's editor Sergei Mikoyan stated that "As yet only the armed path had led to the victory of revolutions in Latin America. And the Nicaraguan experience affirms what had been considered refuted by some after the death of Che Guevara and the defeat of a number of other guerrilla movements." This view was supported by other "Guevarists" like the Latin American Institute's Kiva Maidanek.

This renewed interest in armed struggle as a revolutionary weapon was not limited to Latin Americanists. The same Sergei Agayev who had earlier asserted the bankruptcy of peaceful methods in connection with Chile wrote a series of articles and a book on Iran in the early 1980s which essentially argued that the Soviet Union should take a greater interest in the Marxist Fedayeen and the "Islamic Marxist" Mujahedeen, in place of traditional Soviet support for the orthodox communist Tudeh party. Labeling the former groups "left-wing radicals" and noting that they had placed heavy reliance in the past on armed struggle, Agayev argued that it was precisely they who were closest to the masses through their underground organizational activities, rather than the traditional communists whose organizations resembled "educational societies."

The recognition of the Soviet error with regard to Nicaragua and the subsequent upsurge in Soviet interest in the revolutionary possibilities of Latin America after 1979 did not constitute a clear-cut doctrinal shift toward Castroite or Guevarist doctrines of armed

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struggle and guerrilla warfare, however, any more than the debate following Allende's overthrow did the previous decade. The 26th party congress program was evenly balanced on this issue, stating that "There has been both armed struggle and peaceful forms of transition to a new social system, both a rapid coming to power by the working classes and processes which have extended over time." It is important to recognize that this type of tactical debate will never be resolved conclusively one way or another, and that it has gone on for as long as there has been a worldwide communist movement. The Soviets themselves recognize that there are no universal formulas, and that the appropriateness of one or another set of tactics will depend on the specific context of the country or region involved. While the center of gravity of Soviet opinion on the subject of armed struggle moved left in the immediate aftermath of Nicaragua, it has already begun to shift back to the right again as a result of factors like the floundering of the insurgency in El Salvador, the setbacks to the Sandinistas (including the successes of the U.S.-supported contras, and the United States' demonstrated ability to intervene in the Western hemisphere a la Grenada. Early hopes that a Sandinista victory would lead to a quick string of successes in Central America have evidently given way to the realization that further revolutionary change will require substantially more preparation and, hence, the sorts of "right-wing" policies traditionally prescribed by Soviet tacticians. Soviet political writings on this subject allow us to gauge the current climate of opinion in Moscow, although they do not predetermine future Soviet policy, which will be taken by the political leadership after careful consideration of the concrete situation facing them.

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V. RISK-TAKING AND RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

The final theme developed by Soviet political writers relevant to the question of power projection concerns their perception of the USSR's freedom of action in the Third World given the degree of risk posed by the international environment. There are several kinds of risks: the risk of incurring the displeasure of Third World states which might perceive the Soviet Union as an "imperialist" power, the risk of becoming bogged down in a local conflict (such as Afghanistan), or the risk of committing Soviet prestige to a weak and unstable client. But the most important risk that the Soviets face is the possibility of confrontation and conflict with the West, and particularly with the leader and most powerful member of the Western alliance, the United States. On one level this can mean the worsening of the atmosphere of East-West relations, and the undermining of other aspects of the central East-West interaction such as arms control, trade, and favorable Western public opinion. On a higher level, it can mean military confrontation, anything from a direct clash of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces through escalation all the way up to nuclear war. It is safe to say that fear of confrontation with the United States has been the single most important factor limiting Soviet willingness to project power around the globe, and that, with a few important exceptions, the USSR has behaved extremely cautiously whenever the prospect of conflict with the U.S. has arisen. In the Middle East, for example, the primary area of direct U.S.-Soviet engagement, the Soviets have generally threatened to intervene late during crises, at points where it had already become clear that there was very little possibility of a clash with the United States.

1The possibility of a Third World conflict escalating to nuclear war is rather small, although it must be borne in mind that the only real nuclear confrontation of the postwar era occurred over Cuba. The most likely venue now is the Persian Gulf/Middle East.

2For a fuller treatment of this argument, see F. Fukuyama, "Nuclear Shadowboxing: Soviet Intervention Threats in the Middle East," Orbis, Fall 1981.
DETENTE AND THE THIRD WORLD

Almost all Soviet theorists, including both Ul'yanovskiy and Brutents, believe that detente creates auspicious conditions for the Soviet Union to support the world revolutionary process. This is a particularly sensitive point for the Soviets, since pursuit of detente has traditionally led to charges by allies and clients within the communist and radical camp that the USSR is selling out their interests to improve its relations with the West. The Chinese, for example, attacked Khrushchev bitterly when he first broached the subject of "peaceful coexistence" with the West in the mid 1950s. Similarly, Sadat believed that the United States and Soviet Union had made a deal behind his back to freeze the status quo in the Middle East during the May 1972 summit, and expelled the Soviet advisors in Egypt the following July to force Moscow's hand.

It is not surprising then that many Soviet spokesmen argued vigorously in the early 1970s that detente not only did not mean lessened support for clients, but actually increased Moscow's ability to come to their assistance. It fell to Ponomarev as the chief liaison to the world revolutionary movement to assert that "detente and peaceful coexistence do not signify the political status quo." Indeed, he explained,

It is clear to communists...that peaceful coexistence does not remove the chief contradiction of the epoch -- that between imperialism and socialism. A complex process of the ruling bourgeoisie's adaptation to the new conditions of the antagonism toward socialism is underway. The line of toppling the socialist system is being replaced by the carefully worked out strategy of gradually weakening it..."

In other words, the struggle between socialism and imperialism would continue under the conditions of detente, but with considerably more favorable circumstances: "The change in the correlation of forces in favor of socialism has been the most important factor of the whole

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international situation," because "the might and authority of the Soviet Union" ensure that "the coming to power of the working class and the working people was not accompanied by just as grave and exhausting a civil war and armed intervention as had happened in Soviet Russia when it stood alone." In a similar vein Brutents, writing in *International Affairs*, stated that

Imperialist propaganda maintains that there is a contradiction between the Soviet Union's line for detente, and its relations with the newly independent countries and its support for national liberation movements. *This contradiction, however, is purely imaginary.* The point is not just that detente and peaceful coexistence apply to interstate relations. Detente does not and cannot change or repeal the laws of the anti-imperialist struggle, while the people's struggle for liberation and national statehood and the support they receive during it are in full agreement with the spirit and content of peaceful coexistence.6

Detente decreased the risk of war by lowering tensions between the United States and Soviet Union, and permitted the latter to devote more resources to Third World clients. As Ul'yanovskiy put it,

Successes with detente go hand in hand with the activization of the national liberation movement, with the deepening of the anti-imperialist struggle on all fronts. The peoples of these liberated countries understand that, in addition to stopping the arms race, disarmament would open before the "Third World" countries new economic horizons... the policy of detente does not signify conservatism in the world arena and correlation of forces.6

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THE LATE 1970S AND RETURN TO COLD WAR

The USSR's greater ability and willingness to support national liberation movements at the same time that it entered a period of detente with the United States was not only proclaimed by Soviet spokesmen, but put in effect as a matter of policy. The Soviet decision to support Sadat's launching of the October War was made only a year after Presidents Nixon and Brezhnev signed the "Basic Principles of Detente," in which they pledged not to seek marginal advantages for themselves, and the Soviet intervention in Angola followed two years after that. Indeed, the Soviet attempt to pursue the "class struggle" in the Third World played a major role in poisoning the relationship between the two superpowers and undercutting other elements of the central East-West relationship such as arms control. Soviet activities in support of Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Vietnam, and Afghanistan convinced large parts of the American public that the USSR was not serious about peaceful coexistence; Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 forced the Carter Administration to withdraw the SALT II treaty from Senate consideration and was the final nail in the coffin of detente. U.S.-Soviet relations began to deteriorate seriously in the last two years of the Carter Administration; poor superpower relations helped Ronald Reagan come to power in 1980, and were in turn exacerbated under the new Republican administration.

Under conditions of renewed East-West tensions that prevailed in the early 1980s, the Soviets took the entirely consistent position that the prospects for progressive forces in the Third World and their emergence as major actors on the world stage were much poorer. As Brutents, writing in 1984, explained, "In the past decade, as a result of the improved international relations climate, this process [of the Third World's emergence] made a certain qualitative leap. However, now its evolution is taking place under conditions of an aggravated world situation, growth of the hard 'force' element's role in the policies of imperialist powers, and the appreciable effect of the developing countries' deteriorating economic position and sharply increased financial dependence on the West."7 Blame for the worsening

international situation is placed squarely on the West, and particularly the United States, which is taking a "counteroffensive" against the progressive states in the Third World. Brutents explained that the early 1980s were characterized by "the imperialists' attempt to take the counteroffensive, to regain the positions they have lost in the course of their aggressive and militaristic policy." Another Soviet writer pointed specifically to the existence of what in the United States have come to be known as anti-Soviet national liberation movements: "in the last five years alone the forces of imperialism and its agents have undertaken armed provocations against such countries as Angola, Argentina, Afghanistan, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Benin, Libya, Iran, Nicaragua and the Seychelles."

The consequence of the "aggravated world situation" was a lessened ability on the part of the Soviet Union to assist its friends in the Third World. The primary argument made is that the arms race reduces the amount of money available to fund economic development. As Brutents elsewhere noted, "the developing countries can hardly count upon a radically improved economic situation while the arms race is progressing on such a gigantic scale and military expenditures are reaching astronomical proportions." Or in the words of another writer, the Soviet Union was being forced to bear an increasing defense burden which "cannot, of course, fail to limit our possibilities in economic cooperation with the Third World." To underscore this point, Ponomarev and others made various proposals to reduce superpower defense budgets and to devote the money saved to Third World economic development.

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8"A Great Force for Modern Times," International Affairs, No. 3, 1981, p. 74. See also his February 2, 1982 Pravda article, in which he asserts that the line of undermining ties between the liberated countries and the socialist states "has been appreciably intensified."


10"Dvizheniye neprisoedineniya v sovremennom mire," MEiMO, No. 5, May 1984, p. 33


This line served an obvious propagandistic purpose, but it is
doubtful the Soviets themselves believed that an end to the arms race
would lead to more development money. The rate of growth of Soviet
defense spending remained at a 4-5 percent level throughout the height
of detente in the early 1970s and began to drop to the 2-3 percent range
only later in the decade as U.S.-Soviet relations grew worse. As noted
above, the Soviets have many other reasons for not wanting to spend more
on the Third World, and the arms race probably served as a good excuse
for not doing more than they were inclined to anyway.

In addition to economic constraints, a number of Soviet leaders
seemed to believe that support for clients in the developing world had
become more dangerous, particularly in view of the belligerent anti-
Sovietism of the Reagan Administration. This theme was underlined by
Andropov himself in the June 1983 Plenum speech cited earlier, when he
asserted that the threat of nuclear war forced the USSR to "reappraise
the goals and activities of the entire communist movement."
Particularly as the USSR entered on its campaign to block deployment of
the Pershing IIs and GLCMs (Ground Launched Cruise Missiles) in Europe
in 1981-82, almost all Soviet writings on the Third World emphasized the
theme of the imminence of war and made a nod toward the peace campaign
by stressing how the arms race hurt the interests of the developing
world, and how LDCs desired above all a return to detente.

The more important question is whether the Soviets themselves
recognize the interconnection between their activism in the Third World
during the mid to late 1970s and the breakdown of detente with the
United States. There is some evidence that those writers primarily
concerned with U.S.-Soviet relations, arms control, and other East-West
problems did come to see the "objective" constraints on the Soviet
ability to pursue a regulated relationship with the United States while
in effect running wild in the Third World. Georgiy Arbatov, director
dte the USA and Canada Institute, and former Central Committee
consultants Aleksandr Bovin and Fedor Burlatskiy (whose ties with the
top leadership, including both Brezhnev and his successors, were said to
be very close) all at various times wrote about the need to insulate
U.S.-Soviet ties from conflicts in peripheral Third World theaters.1

1 See "Soviet-American Competition in the Third World," and
Aleksandr Bovin, "Difficult Roads of Freedom," Izvestia, November 12,
1984.
implicitly recognizing the damaging effects of past Soviet behavior. A similar understanding is nowhere to be found in the writings of either Ul'yanovskiy or Brutents, nor indeed of any of the other party bureaucrats working in the International Department who were presumably the institutional advocates of a forward Soviet policy in the Third World during the previous decade.

On the other hand, there was a clear understanding on the part of the Propaganda Department’s head Aleksandr Yakovlev and others of the importance of "multilateralizing" the Soviet Union’s ties to other important non-communist countries with ties to the United States, including the states of Western Europe, Japan, and China. Obviously, a highly confrontational Soviet policy in the Third World would not be conducive to cultivation of ties with this group of countries, but would instead tend to drive them into a tighter U.S. embrace.

By the middle of the 1980s, however, it appeared that Soviet views might be changing again in the face of the so-called "Reagan Doctrine" of U.S. support for anti-Soviet resistance groups. Evidence for this is not so much textual or doctrinal as it is derived from actual Soviet behavior. In most places around the world where Soviet clients were under challenge from U.S.-backed forces, the Soviets steadily but surely increased their material commitment. Major offensives against resistance organizations were conducted with evident Soviet backing (and, in several cases, participation) in Vietnam, Angola, and Afghanistan in 1984-86. Arms transfers to other clients under American pressure such as Nicaragua and Libya also increased in quantity and in terms of the quality of the weapons provided. Although the Soviets may have in some measure recognized the counterproductive aspects of their behavior in the late 1970s, the shoe was now on the other foot: they could not afford to let the United States believe that they were weak or on the defensive. Regardless of the Soviet reading of lessons from the immediate past, they probably felt they had to protect their status as a great power against an open challenge from a seemingly ascendant United States, and therefore had to show themselves determined to resist American pressure against their clients.
VI. CONCLUSIONS

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

In this study we have tried to trace the evolution of the views of Soviet political writers on power projection in the Third World over the past two or three decades, and in particular the thinking of certain key members of the Central Committee International Department who have special responsibility for policy in this area. Detailed analysis of the four themes presented here presents a highly complicated picture, reflecting the breadth and esoteric character of the Soviet discussion of these issues. Nonetheless, the following conclusion emerges fairly clearly: In the early 1980s, the Soviet leadership finds its ability to project power around the globe increasingly constrained. This emerges from at least three of the four themes we have discussed:

- **The political basis of revolutionary power.** Soviet writers are increasingly aware that one of their major strategic innovations of the 1970s, the Marxist-Leninist vanguard party, while possibly a more reliable anchor for Soviet influence in the Third World, had at the same time engendered a host of relatively new and unfamiliar problems that had to be weighed against their benefits. Promotion of Marxist-Leninist groups and their conversion into formal vanguard parties was intended to overcome clear-cut weaknesses of the "first-generation" bourgeois nationalist allies, by producing clients which were more reliable ideologically, less resistant to overt cooperation with the aims of Soviet foreign policy, and more stable in their long-term alignment with the USSR. While the "second-generation" Marxist-Leninist states have indeed lived up to expectations in these respects, many Soviet writers have quietly recognized that they have also proven to be, as a group, weak, narrowly based, lacking in national legitimacy, and in many cases subject to indigenous armed resistance.
movements. Many of these countries have shown themselves to be ideologically closer to the Soviet Union on a declarative level, but have had problems much like those experienced by the first-generation states in making the transition to what the Soviets regard as "real" socialism. Indeed, the troubles of the new clients of the 1970s are such that officials like Brutents have been able to openly recommend a shift in Soviet emphasis away from them and back toward large, geopolitically important states with "objective" anti-imperialist potential, regardless of their internal ideological character. But although Brutents seems to have a reasonably clear vision of where the future of Soviet Third World policy ought to lead, the Soviet foreign policy elite as a whole has seen sequential difficulties arise with each one of the strategies they have devised for anchoring their influence in the Third World, and seems confused as to what form of political organization will be optimal for their purposes in the future.

* External aid. Many Soviet officials seem to be increasingly reluctant to spend ever-increasing sums of money in support of Third World clients. This reluctance is rooted in the increasing costs that were incurred at the same time as the Soviet economy was experiencing a general slowdown, and has probably been compounded by the fact that Moscow has received a smaller than expected political payoff from its heavy investment in the Third World in the mid to late 1970s. The tendency to economize has also been justified by a recognition on a theoretical level that there are serious problems with the traditional Soviet model of economic development. The Soviets appear to understand all too well that they are not in a position to support a Third World client economically as it cuts its ties with the world capitalist economic system and undertakes a series of radical internal socio-economic transformations into a socialist economy. Thus, while the Soviets can offer clients military aid and other forms of internal and external security, they are finding themselves less and less competitive on the economic front.
Relations with the United States and the risk of war. Finally, the Soviets have found themselves constrained from projecting power around the world by the worsening of their overall relations with the West, and in particular by the attitudes and policies of the United States under the Reagan Administration. The superpower detente of the early 1970s in some sense allowed the Soviets to feel themselves free to undertake a more activist policy in the Third World. When the contradictions inherent in this two-track approach caused the policy to, so to speak, self-destruct, the Soviets found themselves preoccupied with problems like the Euromissile deployments on the central front and a more belligerent American administration which, rhetorically at least, seemed more willing to oppose their activities around the Third World. Whereas the internal U.S. debates over aid to Lebanon, El Salvador, and the contras in Nicaragua may be grounds for the Soviets to doubt the seriousness of the Reagan Administration's tough talk, the Soviets do appear to believe overall that Third World intervention is riskier.¹

The one theme that does not suggest a more constrained view of Soviet options is the increased openness to strategies of armed struggle and guerrilla war that emerged after the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua. After being caught off guard, many Soviet theorists and observers seemed to be much more optimistic about the revolutionary potential of Central America and perhaps other parts of Latin America. This optimism was, however, geographically limited to Latin America and did not apply, for example, to Africa, where most Soviet writers recognized that the potential for "progressive transformations" had deteriorated over the past decade. Moreover, even in Central America the Soviets appear to have backed away somewhat from their initial optimism and interest in theories of armed struggle as the war in El Salvador floundered and the contras gained momentum in Nicaragua.

¹In judging the pros and cons of greater support for a country like Nicaragua, the Soviets must have been inhibited to some degree by the U.S. intervention in Grenada.
THE FUTURE OF SOVIET POLICY

It is important to bear in mind that the present study has focused primarily on Soviet perceptions as reflected in the published literature on the Third World, not on actual Soviet policy. The fact that the Soviets say that they feel more constrained about their ability to project power around the globe does not imply that they will be so constrained in the future. All that the literature tells us is that Third World policy is currently under consideration in elite circles in the USSR. It is entirely possible that the balance of opinion may shift with changing leadership politics (particularly if Gorbachev falters or proves vulnerable to Politburo rivals like Ligachev), or that the circumstances which produced the constraints could themselves change, or that the Soviets will be faced with an opportunity whose payoff seems so great as to outweigh all other costs.

It is true that the Soviet Union has not projected its power on the scale of Angola, the Horn of Africa, or Afghanistan since the invasion of the latter country in December 1979. This does not necessarily reflect a conscious policy decision on the part of Moscow to pull back in the Third World or to undertake a more cautious policy. Soviet power projection has always been dependent on opportunities provided by local conflicts and instability. The Soviets did not create a revolutionary situation in Angola in 1975, but were the beneficiaries of the final breakdown of the Portuguese colonial empire. This type of event does not occur every day; Portugal’s was the last such empire, as Soviet commentators are themselves fond of saying, and the revolutionary struggle has entered into a new, more complicated phase where the issues were no longer simply national liberation from foreign colonial domination. A survey of the major crises of the early 1980s—the Lebanon war in 1982, the Falklands crisis, Central America, and Southern Africa—does not indicate obvious opportunities for the Soviets to have intervened or otherwise used their projection forces. In terms of resource transfers, there does not appear to have been a significant diminution in military aid, the Soviet Union having concluded major

\[2\] Economic aid was, of course, never terribly generous.
arms deals with India, Syria, Angola, and Iraq during the early 1980s, as well as supplying North Korea with modern aircraft for the first time since the Korean War.

The question thus arises as to how we might expect the constraints perceived by Soviet writers to be implemented in actual policy. The status quo is often difficult to change. It is, after all, one thing for Soviet officials responsible for management of the domestic economy to complain about the costs of supporting unreliable clients in the Third World, and another for the leadership to actually cut assistance levels in cases where the USSR has invested substantial amounts of prestige and developed a political stake. The most expensive and therefore obvious candidates for cutbacks are Cuba and Vietnam, since together they constitute perhaps two-thirds of current Soviet outlays for military and economic assistance. But Cuba and Vietnam also provide the USSR with the highest payoff, the former as a result of its wide-ranging activities in support of Soviet interests all over the Third World, and the latter through the basing facilities it has provided Moscow in Cam Ranh Bay and Danang. Soviet prestige is also the most heavily engaged in these countries, since they are the only developing countries considered to be genuinely "socialist."

If the Soviets consider Cuba and Vietnam to be sacrosanct, then cuts in assistance will have to be made among the second tier of Third World clients, countries like Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and the rest. Here again, there will be high political costs associated with Soviet efforts to economize: many these regimes are under armed attack from internal and sometimes external enemies, and would be in danger of falling in the absence of relatively high levels of Soviet assistance.3 The Soviets, moreover, have a fair amount of prestige invested in regimes like those in Angola and Ethiopia as a result of prior

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3Some observers have pointed to Mozambique as an example of Soviet retrenchment, since Moscow has apparently stood by while Maputo gradually slipped into the South African orbit in the early 1980s, particularly after the signing of the Nkomati Accord in March 1984. It is not clear what the Soviets could have done to prevent this. Politically it was never clear that Samora Machel and Frelimo wanted a higher level of Soviet and/or Cuban military assistance; an intervention by Soviet bloc forces in Mozambique would be very vulnerable to South African military action.
interventions, and could not easily tolerate their undermining or overthrow. The multi-billion dollar package of economic and military aid offered to the MPLA in Angola in 1983 shows Moscow’s commitment to defending it against the encroachments of Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA.

The most likely manifestation of constraints on future Soviet policy is therefore perhaps a reduced propensity to take advantage of new opportunities for expanding Moscow’s influence in the Third World. Exploitation of Third World crises is something of a luxury for the USSR, desirable but not essential to its survival or national security. As Brutents put it, whereas in the early days of the Soviet state "it was largely a matter of defense of the first socialist revolution against imperialism," today "it is a question of carrying on the offensive against imperialism and world capitalism as a whole in order to do away with them." In contrast to other areas of policy, the Soviets have a substantial margin of choice in how activist a stance they take. We can expect that just as in the past any given decision to project power and intervene in a local conflict will depend on factors such as geographical proximity, the Soviet stake in the area, and the likely U.S. reaction. There are many regions, particularly around the periphery of the USSR, where stakes will remain high and costs relatively low. But these factors being equal, our reading of the Soviet political literature suggests that the Soviet propensity to use force and to incur economic costs in the future will be considerably lower than it was in the decade of the 1970s.

To the extent that the Soviets do undertake new initiatives, they will probably be in the direction of the Brutents strategy as outlined above—that is, more extensive dealings with states like India, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. Gorbachev’s 1987 Latin American trip may be the model for such developments in the future. The Soviet Union will probably want to offer itself as an alternative pole of political and economic support when these countries clash, as they inevitably will, with the United States. The kind of relationship that the Soviets can hope to establish with these states will necessarily have to be less intimate than those with ideologically sympathetic states like Cuba and

Vietnam, being a more distant diplomatic dance rather than the embrace with arms and advisors that became familiar in the 1970s. There will be troubling aspects of such a policy from the U.S. standpoint. One need only consider the currently problematic state of U.S.-Mexican relations to imagine ways in which the Soviets could fish in troubled waters. Nonetheless, a Soviet Third World policy which focused on this sort of state rather than those led by MLVPs will necessarily have to entail lowered Soviet expectations as to the overall benefits to be gotten from Third World involvement per se. The issues in U.S.-Soviet relations in the Third World would increasingly turn to trade and the kind of political maneuvering familiar in relations among developed countries, rather than military power projection and the promotion of revolutionary change which have characterized Soviet policy in the past.
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