A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE USAWC CLASS OF 1940

BY

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15 APRIL 1987

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
The U.S. Army War College (AWC) course for the academic year 1939-40 was the last war college class prior to the United States entering World War II. The course began in September 1939 and continued until June 1940, coinciding with Germany's invasion of Poland and France. The basic question is what effect, if any, did the events in Europe have on the Class of 1940, and whether the course was effective in preparing the class for their wartime roles. (over)
Finally, the study questioned what could be learned today by reviewing the course of instruction and other archival records associated with this eventful AWC year. Archival records reviewed included lectures, committee reports, student papers, and oral histories available at the U.S. Army Military History Institute. It was concluded that the events in Europe did not have a direct effect on the conduct of the course, however, the course did effectively prepare the class for their wartime roles. Two-thirds of the class made general officer within six years of graduation and over ten percent commanded at the division level during the war.
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A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE USAWC CLASS OF 1940
A GROUP STUDY PROJECT
by
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ABSTRACT

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: AN OVERVIEW

On 15 September 1939 the Army War College (AWC) class of 1940 assembled at Fort Humphreys, District of Columbia (now Fort McNair), for the opening of the 34th session of the academic capstone in the Army's officer education system. Following MG J. L. DeWitt's opening remarks, Colonel Ned B. Rehkopf proceeded to outline the mission of the AWC for the new class. The mission of the AWC in 1939 was:

a. To train officers for the conduct of field operations of Army and higher echelons; and to instruct in those political, economic and social matters which influence the conduct of war.

b. To instruct officers in the duties of the War Department General Staff and of the Assistant Secretary of War.

c. To train officers for joint operations of the Army and Navy; and,

d. To instruct officers in the strategy, tactics and logistics of large operations of the past.

The bottomline, so to speak, he pointed out was "to train officers for high command or for duty on the staffs of the higher echelons". The AWC program of instruction had evolved from its early roots in 1903 and essentially remained true to the principles outlined by its founder.
Elihu Root. The AMC had been in continuous operation except for the period of World War I. The Class of 1940 was destined to be the last for nearly a decade.

THE FACULTY, INSTRUCTIONAL METHOD AND PROCEDURE

MC J. L. DeWitt was the Commandant when the Class of 1940 convened and the 17th officer to hold that position. Colonel Ned B. Rehkopf was the Assistant Commandant and had held that position since 1 June 1936. In addition to the Commandant, Assistant Commandant and Executive Officer, the staff and faculty consisted of a relatively small number of officers organized into five divisions paralleling the organization of the War Department General Staff (WDGS). The G1 Division was headed by Colonel H. W. Huntley, the G2 Division by Colonel W. H. Simpson, the G3 Division by Colonel Thompson Lawrence, the G4 Division by Colonel G. B. Hunter, and War Plans Division by Colonel E. P. King, Jr. The Library staff and the Historical Section rounded out the staff. Two junior instructors who made major impressions on the class were Majors Charles L. Bolte and J. Lawton Collins.3

The instructional methods utilized in 1939-40 were very similar to today's. Lectures were scheduled throughout the year. Guest speakers included distinguished officers from the WDGS as well as recognized experts in their fields, such as Douglas Southall Freeman, who lectured on the U.S. Civil
War. From time to time the faculty also lectured. Lectures were followed by a question and answer period and non-attribution was in effect, although the lectures, questions and answers were transcribed and filed. 

For all studies the class formed into command and staff groups or committees, the equivalent of today's seminar. Written reports were prepared by each group. When the study was completed, each committee would present all or a part of its solution to the class at large. Students were told that in presentation "eloquence is not required; but straight, clear thinking, clearly expressed. Clearness is the main essential; force and elegance are secondary". In addition to group study, each student was required to prepare an individual study known as the "General Staff Memorandum" (GSM) on a topic either of his choice or assigned by a member of the faculty. Generally, twenty percent of the class were engaged in writing a GSM at any given time. Committees were reorganized for each new course, which ensured complete class interaction.

Classes were scheduled from 0845-1200 and 1330-1615 hours Monday through Saturday with no afternoon session on Wednesday and Saturday. As is true today, the long lunch period was provided to allow time for physical fitness. Students were urged to keep fit and it was strongly suggested that the "first 45 minutes of the lunch period should be used for physical conditioning and the last 45
minutes for dining". Scheduled social activities were limited to one reception with the Commandant early in the year. Students resided throughout the Washington area thus making a more vigorous social program impractical. Softball held a special place in the hearts of many students (as it does today). Finally, time was set aside each week for a discussion of current events and important world affairs. Unfortunately there seems to be no record of these sessions in the AWC files.

THE CLASS OF 1940 IN BRIEF

The Class of 1940 began with a group of 98 U.S. Army officers and two Marines. The Navy officers ordered to attend had their orders rescinded prior to the start of the course (a Navy attitude toward officer education still partially true today). 97 of the Army officers were graduated as one officer died suddenly in May 1940 during the course. The class was made up of two Colonels, 29 Lieutenant Colonels, 36 Majors and, 30 Captains. Even though Majors and Captains were included in the class, the average age was 45.2 years. The only prerequisite was that the officer had completed the staff college course at Fort Leavenworth. Of this group, 67 or two-thirds of the class attained the rank of general officer by 1 January 1946. Certainly World War II had a lot to do with the rapid rise to flag rank, but one member of the class, Maxwell Taylor, who was a captain at the time and one of the youngest
members of the class, noted it was an exceptional group of people as well:

All are exceptional...this was just on the edge of World War II and if these officers had not gone to the War College, I suspect most of them would have got their stars about the same way, because they represented the available experience for an expanding officer corps.  

One member of the class, Clifton B. Gates, became Commandant of the Marine Corps and others like Maxwell Taylor and Lyman Lemnitzer also rose to the four star level. Thirteen members of the class commanded at the division level by the end of World War II. These officers included Anthony C. McAuliffe, Vern E. Prichard, William P. Dean, George P. Hays, and Verne D. Mudge. (For a complete list see Appendix 1)

THE PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION

The course of instruction was divided into two phases and patterned after the Clausewitz nomenclature. "Preparation for War" and "Conduct of War". Part one of the "Preparation for War" was conducted from 15 September 1939 to 31 January 1940 and included the G3, G1, G4, Mobilization and G2 Courses. Part one of the "Conduct of War" then followed and consisted of Analytical Studies and the Command Course held from 1 February 1940 to 30 March 1940. From 1 April to 21 May 1940 the War Plans Course completed the "Preparation for War" instruction and from 22 May to 18 June
1940 the "Conduct of War" phase was concluded with Preparation for Command Post Exercises and the Historical Ride. During the Historical Ride the class was to study and take a field trip to the major battlefields of the U.S. Civil War.

The Commandant's report for Academic Year 1939-40, known as the "Chronicles of the Army War College", provided some further insights about the last class prior to World War II. According to the report, there were no major changes in the course from the previous year. In the Mobilization Course, the study of mobilization from an Overseas Department perspective was added. In the Analytical Studies Course three new studies were added: 1) The influence of sea power on the causes and conduct of war; 2) The influence of public opinion on the conduct of war; and, 3) A study of Field Service Regulations. The Command Course was exactly the same as previous years. War Plans added a plan for Puerto Rico and during the Preparation for CPX, the class prepared plans for summer maneuvers of a large unit which were subsequently played as a two-sided map maneuver. Due to "the existing emergency" the Historical Ride was cancelled. Of this cancellation, Maxwell Taylor said:
The class was about ready to move out... when Hitler in a very untimely way launched a blitzkrieg in Europe... Somebody got cold feet in the War Department saying 'Why, we would look silly studying the battles of the Civil War when obviously the kind of war that General Grant and General Lee fought doesn't exist anymore, we're going to be criticized' and... they called off the whole business. I thought it was stupid then and I think even more stupid in retrospect. So I missed my chance of presenting the Second Battle of Manassas.10

The time normally devoted to the Historical Ride was given to a "Special Course" consisting of study of subjects of interest to the War Department.

PURPOSE FOR STUDY

Graduation was held on 20 June 1940. General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, made the graduation address and presented diplomas.11 The next class was not to convene until 1950 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. In 1951 the college moved to its current location at Carlisle Barracks.12 By the time the Class of 1940 completed the course, France had been invaded and was under German occupation. World War II was in full swing. What effect, if any did the events in Europe have on the Class of 1940? Was the class prepared for their wartime roles? Is there anything to be learned today from a study of this eventful War College year? These are the themes of this study project.
ENDNOTES


4. Rehkopf, p. 5.

5. Ibid., p. 9-10.

6. Ibid., p. 2.


CHAPTER II

THE ACADEMIC PROGRAM: PREPARATION FOR WAR, PART I

THE G-3 COURSE

The G3 Course was the first of the Army War College (AWC) "Preparation for War" curriculum presented to the Class of 1940. The course orientation lecture was presented by LTC Thompson Lawrence, the Director of the AWC G3 Division, on 15 September 1939 immediately following the Commandant and Assistant Commandant's opening remarks and general orientation for the school year. The purpose of the course as pointed out by LTC Lawrence was "to point out and illustrate the duties, responsibilities, and methods of the G3 Division of the War Department General Staff...focusing on organization, mobilization and training of our military forces."

The class was organized into nine committees for group study on topics of concern in the G3 functional area and lectures were presented throughout the course from 15 September to 14 October 1939 by distinguished guest speakers from the War Department General Staff (WDGS) and each of the Arms and Services (branches) of the Army.

The lectures provided an overview of the WDGS organization as well as the operations of the G3 Division.
Additionally, each Chief of Arms or Services lectured to the
class on his particular role in the War Department. Major
Generals Arnold, Herr, Lynch, Mauborgue, Danford,
Sunderland, Schley and Baker lectured on the Air Corps,
Cavalry, Infantry, Signal Corps, Field Artillery, Coast
Artillery, Corps of Engineers, and the Chemical Warfare
Service, respectively. Each of these presentations was a
standard "organization and functions" briefing with an
update on equipment. BG Adna Chaffee, Commander of the 7th
Cavalry Brigade, lectured on "Mechanization" and LTC Harry
Twaddle, Chief of the Mobilization Branch of the G3
Division, WDGS, lectured on mobilization. The lectures
concluded with Major General Delos C. Emmons addressing the
"GHQ Air Force", Captain Edward J. Poy, the AWC Naval
Instructor, addressing "Joint Army and Navy Training", and
Major S.R. Mickelsen from the Office of the Secretary of the
War Department, addressing the class on "General Staff
Memoranda" (GSM). He covered the importance of the GSM in
staff work at the War Department. This final lecture was
particularly germane as each member of the class was
expected to prepare a GSM sometime during the school year.

Early in the academic program the Class of 1940 was
asked to deal with some of the burning issues of the day,
the role of air power and the controversial subject of
"mechanization". MG Emmons lectured: "We must now think of
air warfare as a method of waging war distinct from land
warfare and sea warfare. The primary function of air power in his view was "the application of direct pressure against vital objectives within the homeland of the enemy". In making his case that all warfare is three-dimensional, he pointed out that "we watched England and France learn in one quick lesson that the best security against air warfare is superiority in offensive air weapons". With regard to mechanization, Adna Chaffee, now recognized as the father of the modern armored corps, made reference to the war that was currently on-going in Europe. "The successful campaign waged by the Germans against the Poles during the first two weeks of September 1939", he lectured, "has brought us face to face with the realization of the tremendous power and possibilities of the modern weapons of warfare both in the air and on the ground". Following a brief explanation of the German campaign and Panzer Division operations, he observed, "There is no longer any shadow of a doubt as to the efficiency of well-trained and boldly led mechanized forces in any war of movement ... they cannot be combatted by infantry and horse cavalry alone ... rapid expansion of mechanization may well be needed". His lecture also included proposed organizational structure for a mechanized infantry division and an armored division. The Class of 1940 was exposed to the "hot issues" of the Army from the very beginning. Within a few short months after graduation many of the class would find Chaffee and Emmons' comments on the mark.
Just as the Seminar is at the heart of today’s AWC learning experience, so it was with the committee work during academic year 1939-40. Thompson Lawrence in his orientation said it well, "The committee is a directed study group. Each committee is charged with devising a solution to the problem presented". And of the subjects for study, he commented, "All subjects assigned to committees for study, properly handled and followed through, should lead to definite improvements in our national defense". He told the class the subjects were of current interest to the War Department and the committee reports would be reviewed by the WDGS. The topics selected for study included the organization of the War Department, the military education system, the strength and composition of the Army, organization and equipment of large units, mechanization and defense against mechanization and aviation, the character and doctrine of employment of military aviation, consideration of tactics and techniques used in foreign armies, troop training, and organization for high command.

Each committee was required to make a detailed study of the subject and present their findings and recommendations in a written report and briefing to the student body. This format was followed throughout the year and no doubt, played a large role in the learning experience.

Several significant recommendations came out of these studies. The committee studying the War Department, for
example, recommended that the "Council of National Defence" (forerunner to the NSC) be reconstituted. The committee studying the organization of large units recommended that an anti-tank battalion be added to both infantry and cavalry divisions and that the current provisional corps and field army organizations be accepted. The committee studying mechanization issues concluded that organizing a heavy mobile armored division (Panzer style) was not justified, but that a mechanized cavalry unit larger than the 7th Cavalry Brigade was warranted. Possibly they recognized events in Europe as a foreshadowing of things to come. Their report stated: "in view of the present 'limited emergency', the time has arrived to produce satisfactory equipment in quantity—not ideal equipment in experimental numbers". Additionally, they recommended establishment of a permanent section within the WDGS to coordinate and supervise air defense measures. The committee studying aviation recommended the development of a "national air doctrine" as well as employment of military aviation in an offensive manner, and the committee studying tactics recommended that a War Department Tactical Board be established which would consist of the commandants of the War College and all other army schools to study tactical trends. They also pointed out a serious need to develop mechanized tactics, particularly against a mechanized enemy.
The G3 Course concluded with committee presentations to the student body, and the students were asked to critique the course. Many constructive comments were offered by the student body. Of particular note, the students felt lectures should be added on landing operations, corps area operations, training regular army divisions in the south and the organized reserve. Additional topics suggested for committee work included the advisability of establishing a separate Air Corps, the organization of the infantry division, as well as transition of the WDGS to a GHQ General Staff and set up in a theater of operations. It was also considered appropriate that a lecture be presented on committee organization and procedures. Finally, it was recommended that class work be scheduled on Wednesday afternoon in order to have the entire day of Saturday off (some things never change). With the G3 Course under their belts, the members of the Class of 1940 were well into "preparing for war".

**THE G-1 COURSE**

The G1 Course was the second major block of instruction in the "Prepartation for War" portion of the curriculum. It followed the G3 Course and was presented from 16 October to 8 November 1939. 17.5 instructional days were devoted to study of personnel issues. Of the five major staff section courses, the G1 Course received the least instructional
time, yet the class was asked to deal with some very
difficult problems in committee work. The purpose of the G1
Course was clearly articulated by Colonel H. W. Huntley,
Director of the AWC G1 Division, in the orientation lecture:

The scope and subject matter of the
course are designed to bring out facts
and conclusions regarding: 1) The manpower of the nation which is available
and the methods devised for the procurement of this manpower for military
service...to meet the requirements of our mobilization plans; 2) The utilization
of certain important classes of manpower during a major emergency; and,
3) Some of the major G1 problems that have a bearing on our readiness for war
and how these problems are being solved.20

As with the G3 Course, lectures were presented to
supplement committee work and to broaden the scope of the
course, but in this case the committee studies were intended
to be the meat of the G1 instruction. The students were
told:

The studies chosen for your consideration
include problems, the solution of which
are essential parts of our plans in the
preparation for war and the conduct of war.21

The lectures in the G1 Course provided the class with
exposure to the first speakers from the civil sector. In
addition to briefings on the G1 Division of the WDGS, the
Adjutant General Department and the National Guard Bureau,
the class heard Professor Henry P. Fairchild from New York
University speak on "Population as a Cause of War", Dr.
George Gallup of the American Institute of Public Opinion
spoke on the subject "Influencing and Evaluating Public
Opinion" and Dr. Douglas S. Freeman, noted author and journalist, addressed "Morale in the Confederate Army".22 The students learned how the selective service system was set into motion prior to and during World War I, and Dr. Johnson O'Connor of Stevens Institute of Technology, addressed the subject of "Aptitude Testing" particularly as it related to classification of personnel to accomplish certain military skills.23

Of all the civilian speakers, Dr. Freeman's lecture on morale may have made a lasting impression. He told the class, "the old story of our past wars shows again and again, far more casualties the results of inefficient staff work than the results of incompetent leadership in action".24 To achieve high unit morale, he urged the students to adopt and practice General Robert E. Lee's maxims: 1) Know your men; 2) Get good officers; 3) Be absolutely just, respect individuals, promote competence, remove the incompetent and never seek a scapegoat for error; and lastly, 4) Look after your men.25 Good advice in 1939 as well as today.

The class was organized into eight new committees for tackling the GI studies. The problems they considered were tough issues. Determine the manpower of the United States available for military service. What are the demands of industry and the civilian population in war? How should women be utilized and to what extent should civilians be
utilized in support military activities? These questions were handled by one committee studying "Utilization of Manpower". Another committee focused on "Procurement of Enlisted Manpower" and still another focused on "Procurement of Officer Personnel". A fourth committee studied morale from the viewpoint of high command in war. Their study reviewed the actions of Stonewall Jackson in the Valley Campaign as well as actions by the British and French Commanders-in-Chief during the First World War. Other committee work included a study of military government and civil population control; classification, reclassification and assignment; replacement operations and peacetime promotion and separation policy for the Regular Army.  

Each of the committees produced a written report and presented its conclusions to the student body at large just as had been done in the G3 Course. In general, the class judged the personnel policies of the War Department to be pretty sound. Their conclusions concerning the utilization of women and black soldiers, while shocking by today's standards, were commonly held beliefs in the mid-1930s. They concluded, for example, that black soldiers were less effective combat soldiers than whites, but given longer training and good leadership by white officers, they could render satisfactory combat service. And concerning women in the military, they felt women should be employed only as nurses in the armed forces.  

One significant
finding, however, was that the War Department had no detailed mobilization plan which addressed the employment of civilians with the military activities in the United States. The committee studying morale recommended that awards and decorations for meritorious service be presented immediately following the act (known today as "impact awards") and that a system of group or unit decorations be established. Finally, the committee studying promotion concluded "that an unsatisfactory promotion situation exists in the army", and action should be taken immediately to correct the problem. Several solutions were proposed.

It appears that the G1 Course made no effort to teach the class how to do a personnel estimate or to write the personnel annex to a war plan—but instead, it focused on the "larger problems" the Personnel Division of the WDGS had to deal with on a daily basis. There were no school solutions and the Class of 1940 was told "your recommendations should reflect your own conception of their (problems presented for study) solution". The G1 Course concluded on 8 November 1939 with the last committee presentation.

THE G-4 COURSE

The G4 Course began on 9 November and concluded on 9 December 1939. Just as with the G3 and G1 courses, the instruction was carried on by means of lectures, committee
studies, and conferences. The purpose of the course was to acquaint the students with the organization and functions of the Supply Division of the General Staff both of the War Department and of the larger field forces, and also with the statutory duties of the Assistant Secretary of War. A further purpose was to facilitate the students' G4 work in the preparation of war plans. According to the National Defense Act as amended by the act of 4 June 1920:

The Assistant Secretary of War, under the direction of the Secretary of War, shall be charged with supervision of the procurement of all military supplies and other business of the War Department pertaining thereto and the assurance of adequate provision for the mobilization of material and industrial organizations essential to wartime needs.32

Also:

Chiefs of branches of the Army charged with the procurement of supplies of the Army shall report direct to the Assistant Secretary of War regarding all matters of procurement.33

According to the War Department point of view, there were six distinct steps in the process of supply:

First - A determination of the Army's needs. Requirements.

Second - Arrangements to secure these needs from industry. Procurement.

Third - The transfer of the article from industry to the service. Reception.
Fourth - Grouping and listing of items to insure an orderly procedure.
Classification.

Fifth - Segregation at convenient or strategic locations to provide continuity of supply.
Storage.

Sixth - Transfer from the services.
Issue.

The following were the topics of the committee reports presented by the students:

Committee 1 - Organization of the War Department for Supply, Hospitalization and Transportation.

Committee 2 - Requirements for Supply, Hospitalization, and Transportation.

Committee 3 - Economic and Industrial Support for War.

Committee 4 - War Reserves.

Committee 5 - Supply and Transportation in the Zone of the Interior.

Committee 6 - Hospitalization and Shelter in the Zone of the Interior.

Committee 7 - Organization for and Methods of Supply, Transportation and Evacuation in a Theater of Operations.

Committee 8 - Transportation in Peace and War.

The students were given their committee assignments, and a schedule of lectures and conferences, and were counseled by the Course Director, Colonel Hunter:

Please note the Informal Conferences scheduled certain afternoons in the Lecture Hall. You are invited to attend such of these as you may desire. They are intended to facilitate the answering of questions by the various services and reduce the number of visits you would otherwise have to make to the
War Department. However, in no way do they lessen your obligation to visit the War Department when in your judgment such a visit is necessary for your work. 34

Lectures presented during the G4 Course included, "Organization and Functions of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War", by the Honorable Louis Johnson, Assistant Secretary of War; "The War Department Budget", by COL Howard K. Loughry, Chief, Budget and Legislative Planning Branch, W.G.D.S.; "Operations of the Quartermaster Corps", by MG Henry Gibbins, The Quartermaster General; "Operations of the Ordnance Department", by MG Charles Wesson, The Quartermaster General; "Operations of the Medical Department", by MG James C. Magee, The Surgeon General; "Railroads in War", by Mr. M.J. Gormley, Executive Assistant to the President, Association of American Railroads; "The Regulating Station", by COL J.R. Kilpatrick, Chief Regulating Officer, A. E. F.; "Operations of Ports", by COL P.L. Gerhardt, Consultant, Port Authority, New York; "Naval Logistics", by Captain Edward J. Foy, U.S.N., Instructor, Army War College; and finally, "Problems of Transportation in War", by COL William J. Wilgus, Deputy Director General of Transportation, A.E.F. The class was particularly fortunate in having several of the guest lecturers having had experience in World War I, which had ended just 22 years prior.
THE MOBILIZATION COURSE

Of all the courses presented in the "Preparation for War" curriculum at AMC, the Mobilization Course was the shortest, utilizing only 9.5 academic days. The course was conducted from 11 to 22 December 1939 and followed the G4 Course. The purpose of the course, according to LTC Thompson Lawrence, course director, was:

To study the subject (mobilization) as a whole from the point of view of the Chief of Staff of the Army and also study the separate mobilization problems of the nine corps area commanders and the overseas department commanders.

The class was organized into eleven staff groups, one representing the War Department, one representing each of the nine Corps Areas and one representing the Overseas Departments. For two weeks these staff groups studied the mobilization plans, regulations and procedures of their respective organizations.

The Mobilization Course had only one guest speaker. LTC Leon R. Cole, Assistant G1 for the Third Corps Area, presented the subject "Corps Area Mobilization Plans" on 12 December 1939. Mobilization was considered an important topic, however, because it was also addressed in the G1, G3, and G4 Courses. Additionally, mobilization was considered during the review of war plans later in the academic year. LTC Cole's lecture covered the background leading to the Protective Mobilization Plan (PMP) and the organization of
the Corps Area Service Command, the organization responsible for the PMP execution in each Corps Area. He covered the utilization of the Officer Reserve Corps, Regular Army Reserve and limited service personnel during mobilization and assignments for officers, as well as providing a guide for making mobilization plans. It was a very practical lecture that stimulated a great amount of student interest during the question and answer period. Student questions centered around organization, training and logistics problems. Concern was expressed that the PMP did not have enough detail to solve major problems. Cole argued the plan should remain general so as to retain flexibility. "Who knows," he said, "what will happen after the six divisions now being prepared with extensive training? We have wars going on in Europe that certainly are going to change the ideas of conduct of warfare. What effect on our tactics is this German drive through Poland going to have?" The topic was relevant for the time, December 1939, with mobilization for World War II commencing the following year.

The various staff groups were tasked to study the mobilization regulations and plans, determine procedures to be followed from a War Department, Corps Area or Overseas Department perspective, and make recommendations. One group determined that some active Regular Army units should be assigned to service schools to assist in training. The group also recommended that the Regular Army and the
National Guard should be expanded in order to permit activation of the most essential units required in the Initial Protective Force. It was unanimous that the administrative procedures associated with the mobilization process needed to be streamlined and that mobilization training should include yearly tests of the Corps Areas and subordinate plans. Lastly, it was recommended that the mobilization regulations be changed to specify the manner of determining readiness of a unit for active duty; a "validation" process was required. Though it was a short course, the Class of 1940 seemed to be unusually interested in the subject.

**THE G-2 COURSE**

The G2 Course was similar to the other courses in the "Preparation for War" phase of the academic year. It ran from 2 through 31 January 1940. Its mission was to acquaint the students with the functions and operations of the G2, War Department, in both peace and war and at echelons higher than the Army Corps in time of war. During this particular academic year, the course dealt with studies of national policies and interests of certain foreign countries with which the United States might have to become involved, as well as the capacities of those countries for waging war. These studies were known as surveys, and they provided information to be used during the War Plans Course, later in the year. They were, "to
establish facts about a country, without regard to any particular enemy, and as such, were different from an estimate of the situation, which had the purpose of arriving at what a country could or would do under a given set of circumstances.\textsuperscript{42} The survey was to be merely an inventory. For convenience, all matters considered in a survey were grouped under the same five general headings of factors used by the G2 Division, WDGS in collecting and filing information. These were:

1. The Geographical Factor.
3. The Political Factor.
4. The Economic Factor.
5. The Military Factor.\textsuperscript{43}

The survey was to include not only information on the strengths of a particular country, but also its weaknesses.

As the primary function of the Military Intelligence Division (G2) of the War Department was military intelligence, i.e. the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of military information, the instruction at the War College placed its primary emphasis in this area. The methods used to present this information included lectures, informal conferences, visits to the War Department, as well as the committee studies with their associated presentations by members of the class. The students were cautioned by the course director:
On account of the vast quantity of research material, and the limited time available, it is necessary to plan, on a time schedule, the selection of specific source material so as to avoid becoming submerged in statistical and other data and finding little or no time for thought and reflection.44

The surveys reflected the conventional wisdom of the times. Germany had invaded Poland in September, 1939 and the surveys were written the following January. France was thought to be the strongest military power in Europe, with 3,000,000 men under arms. They were thought to be well organized and trained, with able commanders and staffs, and possessing good fortified positions. As for the rest of the surveys, which dealt with the realm of the possible, there was a great deal of uncertainty as to which of the nations would be allies, and against whom, much less if the United States would or should enter the war. It was also unclear as to which side the Russians might be on. But, the Soviets were felt to possess a "doubtful" Army against a first class opponent.45 A total of 12 surveys were prepared:

Survey 1 - France.
Survey 2 - The British Commonwealth of Nations.
Survey 3 - Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey.
Survey 4 - Japan.
Survey 5 - Italy.
Survey 6 - Germany.
Survey 7 - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Survey 8 - The International Naval and Air Situations.
Survey 9 - Mexico.

Survey 10 - The Caribbean Area, including Bermuda, the Bahamas, the West Indies, the Central American countries, Columbia, Venezuela, and the Guianas.

Survey 11 - Equador, Peru, Chile, Bolivia, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay.

Survey 12 - Current International Estimate.

In a class called "Foreign News", which had the purpose of "Improving our understanding of the national policies and objectives of the important powers"46, the students presented summaries of foreign news of "international import"47, on designated Wednesdays and Saturdays.

Lectures given during the G2 Course included:

"National Interests and Foreign Relations", by Dr. S.K. Hornbeck, Advisor on Political Relations to the State Department; "The Situation in Europe", by COL Magruder, The Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, of the War Department;

"Government", by Professor W.S. Meyers of Princeton University; "The British Commonwealth of Nations", by Dr. Wm. Y. Elliott of Harvard University; "Japan and Her Army", by LTC Bratton, Chief of the Far East Section, Intelligence Branch, G2, War Department General Staff; "Naval Intelligence", by Captain Foy, U.S.N., of the War College Staff; "The Situation in the Far East", by Mr. Maxwell Hamilton, Chief, Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State;

"The Role of Soviet Russia", by Dr. Bruce Harper, Harvard University; "Latin America", by Mr. Lawrence Duggan.
Division of American Republics, Department of State; "The German Situation", by Dr. W.L. Langer, Harvard University; and "The International Situation", by Mr. H.V. Kaltenborn, Foreign News Commentator and Author.

ENDNOTES


4. Emmons, p. 11.

5. Ibid.


7. Chaffee, p. 31.

8. Lawrence, p. 2.

9. Ibid., p. 6.

10. Ibid.


18. Ibid.


22. Ibid., p. 5.


25. Freeman, p. 3-10.


31. Huntley, p. 4.

32. George B. Hunter, COL, "Orientation, Lectures and Conferences, Committee Directives and Organization, G-4 Course," lecture at AWC, 9 November 1939, AWC Archives, MHI, p. 2.
33. Hunter, p. 2.

34. Ibid., p. 8.


42. Simpson, p. 1.

43. Ibid., p. 2.

44. Ibid., p. 4.

45. Dr. B. C. Cooper, "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," lecture at AMC, 12 January 1940, AMC Archives, MHI, p. 3.


47. Ibid.
CHAPTER III

THE ACADEMIC PROGRAM: CONDUCT OF WAR, PART I

ANALYTICAL STUDIES

The Analytical Studies Course was the first course of instruction in the "Conduct of War" phase of the Army War College curriculum. It ran from 1 through 28 February 1940. As the course name suggests, this course concerned itself with comparatively indepth studies of a wide variety of topics, primarily concerned with war fighting. There was a heavy dose of historical perspective in this matter, as the student committees looked at features of the conduct of wars past. As Colonel Ned Rehkoph, the Assistant Commandant, pointed out in his introductory lecture:

The commander does not conduct war all by himself. Behind him is the civilian head of the nation, directing the conduct of the war, determining policies and national objectives, supporting the forces in the field with the means of combat, dealing with allied and neutral nations and conducting war by methods other than military.¹

Further:

Notwithstanding the failure of prophets to predict with accuracy, the nature of future wars, what man should do under those future conditions can best be learned by a study of what man has done.²
Speakers, both guests and members of the faculty, presented lectures on the following topics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Art of Thinking</td>
<td>Reverend Father Bittle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Foreign Policy</td>
<td>Dr. Samuel F. Bemis, Yale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Development of the American System of Neutrality</td>
<td>Dr. Frederick S. Dunn, Yale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives of the Union and Confederate Armies</td>
<td>Douglas S. Freeman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>General Hanson E. Ely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allied High Command and Allied Unity of Direction</td>
<td>General Fox Conner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Operations in the Russo-Japanese War and the World War</td>
<td>Captain Poy, USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British War Planning, 1914</td>
<td>Captain Poy, USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Operations in the Revolutionary and the Civil War</td>
<td>Major Bolte, AWC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium's Part in 1914</td>
<td>Colonel Paschal, AWC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means for Combat in the Messopotamia Campaign</td>
<td>Colonel Maloney, AWC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation in the Arctic</td>
<td>Dr. Vilhjalmur Steffanson</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Once again, the class was organized into committees which conducted studies and presented reports concerning the following:

- Foreign Policies of the United States
- National Political, Economic and Military Policies of Nations
- Relations of Statesmen and Commanders in the Formulation of Policies
The Influence of New Weapons on Tactics

The Influence of Sea Power on the Causes and Conduct of War

The Influence of Public Opinion on the Conduct of War

Joint Action of the Army and Navy

The Effect of New Field Service Regulations on Operations

Plans for War and Plans for the Initial Operations of Wars

As Colonel Rehkoph further pointed out:

We should therefore, study the situations that confronted commanders of the past, what means they had for solving their problems, and what should be the solutions with the means for combat available today. The mind enriched by study will more readily discover the best way for achieving its designs in the problems that may someday confront it. In your study you are directed to study more than one historical period in order that we may get away from the special circumstances and find those things which are applicable under changed and changing conditions of war.

A single one of these Analytical Studies, "Joint Operations of the Army and Navy looked at these battles and campaigns:

Yorktown (1781)
Vicksburg (1863)
Port Fisher (1865)
Port Arthur (1904-05)
Tsingtao Campaign (1914)
Gallipoli Campaign (1915)
The Command Course was one of the most important blocks of instruction in the "Conduct of War" phase of the AWC curriculum. LTC Thompson Lawrence described the course as one:

"designed to provide an opportunity for examining into the conduct of field operations of the army and higher echelons, and for investigating the organization, operations, tactics and strategy of the field army, and the organization and function of the groups of armies, theater of operations and the general headquarters."  

The course provided the instructional support for accomplishing the first mission of the Army War College, that being "to train officers for the conduct of field operations of Army and higher echelons". The course was presented from 29 February to 30 March 1940 and consisted primarily of lectures presented by the AWC faculty in conjunction with a continuing large scale map exercise problem designed to bring out the various learning objectives. The importance of this course was further reinforced as it ranked second only to War Plans in terms of instructional days, receiving 22.5 days.
The class was divided into several small command and staff groups. Each group played the role of a Field Army commander and his principal staff during the map problem. The map problem requirements were interspersed throughout the lectures and responsibilities within each group rotated with each new requirement. With regard to the use of a map problem at AWC, the course director pointed out that at other service schools there was a "school solution" and the exercises were used to instruct doctrine. "Here we are concerned only with a third primary purpose, the professional education which is a means to an end, an end which is, in essence, the successful conduct of operations in war". The class was flatly told, "there are no approved or college solutions". The Command Course was used as a foundation for the War Plans and Preparation for CPX Courses which provided the capstone for the college instruction.

The lectures during the Command Course provided the doctrinal basis for the map problem which continued throughout the course. Fifteen separate lectures were presented by the faculty. Generally, a different lecture was presented each day followed by a question period and the remainder of the day was devoted to group work. The topics were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Instructor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GHQ, The Theater of Operations and Group of Armies</td>
<td>LTC J.D. Patch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentration of Large Units</td>
<td>MAJ J.L. Collins</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Supply and Transportation in the Theater

G1 Functions in the Theater

Military Aviation

Anti-aircraft Defense in the Theater

Offensive Operations of Large Units

Cavalry in the Theater

Engineer Functions in the Theater

G4 Functions in the Theater

Signal Communications in the Theater

Hospitalization and Evacuation

GRQ Reserve and Army Artillery

G3 Functions in the Theater

The Army in Defense

LTC Malony

LTC Pascal

LTC Ryan

LTC Carrington

MAJ J.L. Collins

LTC Barnett

LTC Barnett

LTC Malony

MAJ C.L. Bolte

LTC Barnett

COL Huntley

MAJ C.L. Bolte

MAJ C.L. Bolte

As can be seen, the flavor of the Command Course was "big units" and "how to operate in a combat theater". No doubt the Class of 1940 struggled with "getting out of the foxhole" also.

This lecture series could be viewed as the next doctrinal step following the Leavenworth experience for these officers. Each lecture contributed to the students' greater understanding of the higher echelons of the Army and had several characteristics in common. Each lecture was rich in detail and description of the Army operating in the field. Each instructor used historical examples to reinforce teaching points. The Army's experience in World War I was cited heavily, and for the first time with any
consistency, the faculty began to address what was happening in Europe. In the first lecture on 29 February 1940, LTC Joseph D. Patch, utilized nearly eight pages of single spaced-typed, lecture notes to cite historical examples of how the General Headquarters was organized from the Revolutionary War through World War I. The World War I experience also figured heavily in several lectures as LTCs Carrington and Paschal explained how the G1 and G2 functioned, respectively, in the AEF. Another lecture addressed the German and Russian use of cavalry in that war, and Major Charles L. Bolte used examples from the "Great War" to address G3 functions in a theater of operations. By this time in the curriculum, each student should have had a keen sense of history and its contributions to professional military development.

Germany had taken Czechoslovakia in September 1938 and had invaded Poland in September 1939. By February 1940, Germany was preparing for the invasion of France. The term "blitzkrieg" had become a common word in the military vocabulary of the War College. In the college records there was no evidence that the United States was going to get involved, nevertheless, the influence of Hitler's Germany and his mighty war machine began to find its way into the Command Course lectures. Major J. Lawton Collins was the first to describe the German concentration for the invasion of Czechoslovakia. He had obtained the
information from the U.S. attache in Berlin who had been on the scene. Collins cross-walked the German preparations with each of the U.S. doctrinal concepts for "concentration" of troops. In order to add emphasis on proper planning, he said:

One point before we leave Czechoslovakia. It is apparent that this concentration did not result from an overnight situation or an overnight scheme, but required careful planning. Our military attache reported that military preparations began as early as May 1, 1938...a planning period of five months. So also would we have to crystalize our concentration plans under any strategic color plans (referring to the "Rainbow" series of plans), as soon as the political situation indicated the possibility of putting the...plan into effect.13

Collins was considered an outstanding instructor. It is not hard to see why he gained this reputation. He would command a corps within the next five years.

LTC Harry J. Malony, in addressing supply and transportation operations, challenged the class to consider the problems of mechanized units. He spoke of the German's Polish Campaign of September 1939:

One of the principal differences noted so far in the present war with World War (WWI) conceptions has to do with the employment of mechanized and motorized forces. In the Polish campaign, we have seen what havoc can be created by the exploitation of a penetration by mechanized forces, with energetic support of a superior air force... What of the supply problems with such units?14
The students were also told of the use of motorized engineers with the Panzer Divisions as they moved through Poland.\textsuperscript{15}

Even with this demonstrated interest in mechanization and motorized forces, the cavalry lectures continued to extol the virtues of the horse in the modern Army. Following that particular lecture, CPT Lemnitzer asked the instructor if there was any information available about how the Poles had used horse cavalry against the German "blitzkrieg". Possibly to avoid embarrassment, he was told the information was "not yet available".\textsuperscript{16} Heavy emphasis on historical example and an appreciation for current affairs served to undergird the lectures for the Command Course.

In addition to the "firsts" previously noted in the lectures, the continuing map exercise was the first large scale map problem to which the students were exposed. As an instructional tool, it was used in a unique way. The several requirements were sequenced within the lecture series to reinforce previous teaching points and set the stage for the following lectures. The general situation found "Blue", the U.S., pitted against "Red", a coalition of Mexico, Germany, and Japan in a theater in the southwestern U.S. and the lower Rio Grande area. The strategic plan provided for a "Blue" invasion of Mexico in the MONTERREY-SALTIMLO area. The student requirements tracked
the Third (US) Army as it concentrated and was employed in battle.

In the first requirement, student command and staff groups were to make recommendations on the organization of the theater as well as measures to be taken to improve transportation and communication nets prior to D-Day. In subsequent requirements, students developed the concentration plan for the Third Army, the plan for Third Army to cross the Rio Grande and Third Army's offensive operations in theater. Additional requirements focused on the use of aviation in theater, writing an intelligence plan, an anti-air defense plan, organizing the artillery for combat, and developing logistics plans. The final requirement was completion of the theater plan to include composition of armies, missions for the different armies and measures for coordination of offensive operations. Each of the solutions to the requirements, eight in all, were presented to the student body as a whole by selected staff groups.

The Command Course generated much discussion within the student body. Evidence of this interest was represented by a six-page memorandum from the course director to the Assistant Commandant answering the student's critique. Student suggestions generally centered on placing more emphasis on detail in the staff work and providing more time to complete the map exercise requirements. They also
suggested that officers who had held important command and
staff positions in war should be obtained to lecture during
the course. To this recommendation the course director
agreed, but added: "I do not know of any specific
individual, however, who does not already lecture to us here
who would add to the value of this course". Nevertheless,
the Command Course taught the Class of 1940 the mechanics of
campaign planning at the operational level of war, a skill
some would eventually find very helpful.

ENDNOTES

1. Ned B. Rehkopf, COL, "Orientation to Analytical
Studies Course", lecture at AMC, 1 February 1940, U.S.ArmY
War College Institutional Archives, U.S. Army Military
History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, p. 1.
2. Rehkopf, p. 4.
3. Rehkopf, p. 5.
4. Thompson Lawrence, LTC, "Orientation, Command
Course," lecture at AMC, 29 February 1940, AWC File Comd-1,
AWC Archives, MHI, p. 1.
5. Ned B. Rehkopf, COL, "General Orientation, The
Army War College Course 1939-1940," lecture at AMC, 15
6. Lawrence, p. 4.
7. Ibid., p. 3.
8. Joseph D. Patch, LTC, "GHQ, the Theater of
Operations and the Group of Armies," lecture at AMC, 29
9. Gordon deL. Carrington, LTC, "G-1 Functions in
the Theater of Operations," lecture at AMC, 4 March 1940,
AWC File Comd-5, AWC Archives, MHI, p. 1; Paul C. Paschal,
LTC, "G-2 Functions in the Theater of Operations," lecture
at AMC, 5 March 1940, AWC File Comd-6, AWC Archives, MHI, p.
1-3.

11. Specific examples are not cited, however, review of the AWC Archive files of AWC school year 1939-40 indicate the term used by both student and faculty in lectures, question and answer periods, and committee reports.


17. Thompson Lawrence, LTC, Memorandum For The Assistant Commandant, "Student Suggestions with reference to the Command Course, undated, AWC Course 1939-40, Unarranged papers, AWC Archives, MHI, p. 4.
CHAPTER IV

THE ACADEMIC PROGRAM: PREPARATION FOR WAR, PART II

THE WAR PLANS COURSE

The final part of the War College's "Preparation for War" instruction was the War Plans Course presented from 1 April to 21 May 1940. Of all the courses, it clearly ranked as the most important, receiving 37 academic days, fifteen more than its nearest competitor, the Command Course. The goal of the War Plans Course was to accomplish the AWC missions of preparing officers for duty on the War Department General Staff and to train officers for joint operations. The course was divided into two phases. The first phase was studies of the overseas departments (Hawaii, Philippines, Panama Canal Zone, and Puerto Rico) and Alaska. In the second phase students formulated four specific war plans. Colonel Edward P. King, Jr. was the Director of the AWC War Plans Division. Of the first phase, he said:

The purposes of the studies are to acquaint you with the matters the War Department General Staff must consider with respect to these overseas areas in the formulation of war plans, and to familiarize you with the terrain and adjacent waters which dominate the local defense plans of these places.
For this phase of War Plans, the class was divided into five committees. Each group had three sub-committees of six officers each. In phase two the class was reorganized into four command and staff groups, each responsible for a different war plan. Here again, the standard AWC format of lecture, student group study and student presentation to the student body at large, was used.

With a few notable exceptions the lectures associated with the War Plans Course played a minor role in overall course development. Three lectures were presented which addressed the Navy, its organization and equipment, and naval doctrine. From the joint perspective these lectures were important, however, the most important lectures were those presented by BG George V. Strong, the Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, WDGS, and the course director's lecture on the formulation of war plans. Two other significant lectures were presented. MG(Ret) William D. (Fox) Connor addressed the "Strategy of Supply" and BG Sherman Miles, Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, WDGS addressed "The Situation in Europe". BG Strong told the class: "The success of joint Army and Navy operations in war will depend very largely on the soundness and thoroughness of our peacetime training for these operations". He also provided a detailed description of the composition of a war plan. The students were told that the "Army Strategic Plan" was made up of a "Concentration Plan" and an "Operations Plan". Colonel King described a good war plan as one which:
concentrates men and material as and when furnished by the mobilization plans and launches them into well-considered operations in a theater skillfully chosen and organized for the accomplishment of our war aims.5

Perhaps MG(Ret) Fox Connor, who had been General Pershing's G4 during World War I, provided the class the best advice:

Anyone who aspires to be a good general staff officer should have instantly available, not only a thorough technical knowledge of his own arm, but a good general acquaintance with the fundamentals of the other arms and branches. However, when all is said and done, none of this will avail him much without sound common-sense and an ability to make clear, cold analysis of a problem.6

These lectures provided the doctrinal concepts and the foundation for the group work to follow. Finally, with regard to the situation in Europe in May 1940, as German forces were poised to launch into France on a war plan of their own, the class was not given many specifics, but it was told:

...the initiative still rests with Hitler; he controls the pattern of the war. He may continue to renounce the military factor for the psycho-political, which is his genius, or he may take the military offensive...The British Intelligence are very frank about Mr. Hitler. They say they know the German pretty well, they know how the German General Staff thinks, but they don't know how that man thinks. The Allies, I think, must for some time follow the pattern of the war which Hitler has so far dictated and the essence of it will remain morale.7

The war in Europe was still remote to the Class of 1940. General Miles' lecture gave no indication of American
intentions to enter the war. War planning, however, was soon to become a daily occupation for many of the class.

The real meat of the War Plans Course was found in the group study projects. During phase one the group studies focused on the overseas departments and Alaska. One group studied the defense of the Hawaiian Islands and were required to make recommendations to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. This study included an examination of existing forces and their employment, additional forces, both Army and Navy, required for defense, use of the Hawaiian National Guard and other defense related issues one of which was measures to be taken to guard against sabotage by the Japanese.

Similar studies of the Philippines and Puerto Rico were undertaken by other groups. Each of these groups were to plan for protection or evacuation of American civilians from the islands.

A fourth student group made a study of Alaska from the viewpoint of "political, economic, military, geographical and strategical aspects in a war in the Pacific involving the United States". They were to determine the role Alaska could play in such a war and what military steps should be taken in Alaska to improve the U.S. strategic position in the Pacific. The fifth student group made a study of the Panama Canal Zone. Their study directive stated:

Study and report upon the strategical aspects of the Panama Canal and deter-
mine the critical and vital areas within the Canal Zone. What types of attacks should our military and naval defenses of the canal be prepared to meet and which are considered most probable? Are the present defensive forces and installations located and based in the Canal Zone adequate to meet such attacks? If not, what augmentations in personnel, equipment, supplies and facilities should be made and when?

These studies were challenging and were very relevant to the world situation at the time. Additionally, they set the stage for writing the war plans during phase two of the course.

For the second phase, formulation of war plans, the class was reorganized into four staff groups. Each group developed and briefed a different plan. The first group worked on War Plan RED or the defense of the continental U.S. against a hostile coalition of Canada and the United Kingdom. Staff group two worked on War Plan ORANGE which addressed war in the Pacific. Staff group three developed War Plan PURPLE that envisioned operations in Brazil against a coalition of Germany and Italy, who were in violation of the Monroe Doctrine. And lastly, staff group four worked up War Plan RAINBOW X, which had the U.S. going to war with the Allies against Germany. For each of these situations the staff groups developed the joint estimate of the situation, wrote a joint plan, wrote the Army Strategic Plan to support the joint plan, developed selected theater plans in most cases, and wrote a supporting naval plan as well. With the possible exception of the War
Plan RED, each of the situations was reasonably plausible and in many ways prophetic, which may account for the zeal with which the problems were pursued. In this regard, ORANGE and RAINBOW X deserve further comment.

The situation for Plan ORANGE postulated that Japan, without official warning, would attack the Philippines and Guam to precipitate a war with the United States. Students were to assume that Germany and Italy would probably be sympathetic to Japan and that China would support the U.S. The study directive also stated: "The War Plan will be based upon the world situation as it exists at present".17 The group made several significant observations. First, they recognized that even though a war in the Pacific was essentially a Navy fight, control of certain islands was key. Their report read:

It is not difficult to conclude that there is a lot of geography between Blue (U.S.) and Orange (Japan), and as a result, the passive defense is very attractive proposition to both sides. As for the offensive, the side which holds the Hawaiian Group has a clear advantage.18

They concluded that the destruction of the Japanese Fleet was the primary mission of the Navy and the Army was in a supporting role. They further concluded that it would take the U.S. two and one-half years to mobilize, equip and train the force required to go on the offensive in that theater.19 As part of Plan ORANGE, the group developed a joint plan for the invasion and capture of the Truk Islands.
located some 3050 miles southwest of Honolulu. Truk was a
good place for a fleet base, it had good defensible terrain
and was believed to be a Japanese stronghold. It may be
coincidental, but the Class of 1940 was familiar with the
strategic significance of the Truk Islands well before World
War II, and had worked on a plan to capture them. The joint
estimate prepared by staff group two for this plan was 195
pages long, complete with maps and an amazing amount of
detail, no small accomplishment for the time available and
the tasks required.

RAINBOW X gave the class a situation in which the
British were on the verge of collapse in its war with
Germany and the U.S. entered the war on the Allied side.
The general situation further stated it was desireable to
create a theater in France by sending in an expeditionary
force in order to free up a portion of the allied forces for
other employment. In essence the plan developed by the
study group followed a parallel course with the U.S.
participation in World War I. The successive steps
envisioned a phased approach with the theater headquarters
deploying to France first, followed by combat service
support units, then the GHQ Air Force, and finally some 360
days after mobilization, the deployment of large combat
formations into France for training. After an appropriate
training period, U.S. forces would progressively relieve
French units to establish an American sector. Subsequent to
a weakening of Germany by blockade and other economic action, the Allies would initiate offensive action in the theater. If not a repeat of the World War I scenario, it was pretty close. The concept did not envision forced entry into the continent. The plan came under strong criticism by the Navy instructor primarily because the Navy plan was not well defined. The Army plan, however, had the same level of detail found in the other war planning groups.

In conclusion, the War Plans Course required the students to put into practice the theory and doctrine they had been taught throughout the year. One flaw in the program, however, was few of the plans envisioned forced entry into an area from the sea, thus amphibious planning at the college was deficient. Even though the situations presented were not exactly like what the future would hold, the student body was much better prepared to be war planners in World War II than their contemporaries who did not have the war college experience. During the course wrap-up the Assistant Commandant said:

Notwithstanding the remarks that have been made and are being made about never sending an Army to France again, I think this plan this morning (RAINBOW X) has immediate importance.

The next and final course in the AWC curriculum was preparing for field exercises of large units, a logical follow-on to war planning.
ENDNOTES


2. King, p. 2.

3. George V. Strong, BG, "The War Plans Division, War Department General Staff," lecture at AWC, 6 April 1940, AWC File 5-1940A-17, AWC Archives, MHI, p. 3.

4. Strong, p. 5.


18. Ibid., p. 5.

19. Ibid., p. 11.

20. Ibid., p. 67-74.


22. Ibid., p. 9-46.

23. Committee Report, "War Plan RAINBOW X," Notes of Discussion following presentation, 21 May 1940, AWC File 5-1940-9, AWC Archives, MHI, p. 3-5.

CHAPTER V

THE ACADEMIC PROGRAM: CONDUCT OF WAR, PART II

PREPARATION OF COMMAND POST EXERCISES AND FIELD MANEUVERS

The final course of formal instruction for the Class of 1940 was a course entitled, "Preparation of Command Post Exercises (CPX) and Maneuvers". 11.5 days were devoted to this last "Conduct of War" instruction commencing on 22 May and ending on 7 June 1940. The purpose of the course was to give the students practical experience in planning large scale CPXs and unit maneuvers. The class was divided into five study groups with each group representing the Third Army staff with augmentation from the IV Corps Area. Their mission was to "prepare detailed plans for the summer field maneuvers of the Third Army". After plans were briefed by the study groups, the exercise was to be played as a two-sided map exercise.

There were six lectures that supported this block of instruction. The lectures were presented by a combination of the faculty and guest speakers. These lectures were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Instructor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Orientation, Command Post Exercise</td>
<td>COL E.P. King, Jr.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The lectures addressed the various planning aspects of CPXing and conducting large scale maneuvers. No stone was left unturned as the role of the War Department General Staff to the major unit commander and even the umpiring system was articulated. Two significant points were made. One by a guest speaker and one by a faculty instructor, J. Lawton Collins. The guest speaker, Colonel James Marley, was an IG and apparently had witnessed several large maneuvers. His opening remarks should have gained the attention of every member of the class.

Not so many months ago Germany startled the world by the conquest of Poland in less than three weeks. A number of armies comprising several hundred thousand men were set in motion and executed a maneuver which appears to have been conducted with perfect timing and execution...A few days ago a joint operation in which the German Army, Navy, Air Force,...succeeded in occupying...Denmark and...Norway...We, as military men, must admit that those who planned and executed these operations are masters in their profession...How did the German forces arrive at this condition of efficiency? There is, of course, but one answer, Training...It is by means of command post exercises and maneuvers on a large scale that we provide that experience in practice so necessary to attainment of an efficient field force.
The Germans were good because they practiced, according to
Marley and the United States Army had to do the same thing.3

Major Collins' lecture should have also peaked the
interest of the class when he commented on the readiness of
units he had observed:

We are not ready to fight the Germans
or anybody else...we ought to give up
the idea of having an all-purpose
division. We are way behind any of
the German units in self-containment
(meaning support).4

Clearly his message was that we were not ready for war and
conduct of CPXs and large field maneuvers was the way to get
ready. Little did the Class of 1940 know, but war was
closer than many would have thought.

The committee work proceeded as planned. Each group
prepared detailed plans with scenarios, force lists, and
umpire assignments along with control measures. Nothing
unusual was noted, however, there was no documentary
evidence other than the Commandant's annual report to
confirm that the map exercise was actually conducted.5

The conduct of large scale maneuvers was viewed as the
way to get ready for the next war. "Individual expertness
is only supplemental to the more difficult problem of mass
organization and efficiency."6 The examples of German
combat operations were viewed as a model in large scale
maneuvers. There is little to suggest the Class of 1940 had
drawn any other conclusions. By the time this course was
completed, the Class of 1940 was able to deal effectively with large units.

THE HISTORICAL RIDE AND SPECIAL COURSE

The last days of the Class of 1940 were scheduled to be spent on the Historical Ride from 8 through 17 June 1940. The Historical Ride was a whirlwind tour of the Civil War battlefields and at each stop, selected students briefed the pertinent historical events that had occurred there and the lessons to be learned. It was one of the "highlights" of the AWC year. All the planning had been completed to include issuing student assignments. But because of pressure from the War Department the trip was cancelled in May. In place of the Historical Ride, the War Department provided several "issues" to the school for study. The class was divided into five committees for these "Special Courses".

The GI study group was asked to study the problem of maintaining a large body of young pilots when there was need for comparatively few Air Corps officers in the higher grades. Among the group's several recommendations was the creation of a new grade, "warrant officer" for junior pilots and utilization of enlisted pilots. The study was sent to the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps for review. The
answer: "This office does not concur in the conclusions reached relative to the use of enlisted or warrant officer pilots."9 Nevertheless, other recommendations were just as plausible and may have been accepted.

The G2 group studied the instructional program at the Intelligence School and the G3 group reviewed mobilization training programs. The G3 group also was tasked to develop an instructional pamphlet for training civilians in passive anti-aircraft defense.10

The G4 group had one of the more interesting topics, "Supply and Evacuation in Motorized-Mechanized Warfare". Their charter was to consider these problems in the context of the current European War. They came to some harsh conclusions.

It is apparent, from study of various sources of information, that the German system embodies the principle of self-containment of supply in the mechanized and motorized units far beyond the American conception.11

They analyzed the structure of the Panzer Division and concluded it was superior to our own mechanized organizations. The group subsequently recommended change to those organizations.12 There was no record of the War Department's review.

Finally, the War Plans group was to analyze in detail the application of the Protective Mobilization Plan to a designated current student war plan (Plan PURPLE). Among
this group's recommendations was "that an alternate plan be made which contemplates Japan allied with axis powers."13

On 11 June 1940 while these studies were on-going, the decision was made to cancel the War College and the Command and Staff School for the 1940-41 school year. The Class of 1940 graduated on 20 June 1940, with nearly forty percent being assigned immediately to the WDGS.14 The United States formally entered World War II in December 1941, some eighteen months later.

ENDNOTES


7. William H. Simpson, COL, "Memorandum For Faculty Advisors and Students Designated to Present Historical Ride," 1 May 1940, AWC File 10-1940 (Historical Ride), AWC Archives, MHI, p. 1.


14. See Appendix 1 for student assignments after graduation from AMC. 30 students were assigned to WDGS immediately following graduation.
CHAPTER VI

OBSERVATIONS AND IMPRESSIONS OF THE CLASS OF 1940

From this historical review of the Army War College (AWC) academic year 1939-40, some general observations and impressions about the "typical" AWC student of the inter-war era can be drawn. Specifically, these observations and impressions represent reaction to what the students wrote in General Staff Memoranda (GSM), committee reports, and the records of question and answer sessions following the lectures. Another extremely valuable source for these conclusions was a limited number of oral histories of both students and faculty members available from the U.S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks.

History alone tells us that this group of officers, the Class of 1940, were outstanding leaders. For most, their combat records were exemplary. Many made an indelible mark on military history during World War II. The fact that two-thirds of them made general officer by 1946 and thirteen commanded at the division level within five years of graduation from AWC, reinforces this point. What follows is a best guess about what these officers were like; what they thought about during that year, and what their concerns
were just prior to the World War II experience. The members of the AMC Class of 1940:

a. Were generally comfortable with the current War Department policies. There were innovative thinkers, but no "reformers".

b. Had no clear consensus on the big issues of mechanization and air power.

c. Were very familiar with, if not proficient in, employment of "large" units.

d. Were concerned with joint operations. Joint operations for the Class of 1940 meant Army-Navy interaction.

e. Were concerned with training of a mobilization force and expanding the Army rapidly during an emergency.

f. Developed extremely strong ties with their classmates and faculty instructors, and viewed the AMC experience as professionally broadening, but did not see it as a "key" to their career future.

g. Had a rich appreciation for the past and the value of military history. And finally,

h. Were concerned with events in Europe, but probably more from professional curiosity than concern that the
United States would soon become involved. In any event, they were ready to take on their roles when war came.

The officers attending the AWC during the 1939-40 session, though spread over four grades, Colonel through Captain, had an average age of 45. The oldest member of the class was 50 and the youngest 37. No attempt was made to reconstruct the complete careers of each of these officers, however, it was determined that at least seven of them had seen service in World War I (See data base at Appendix 1). Based on age alone it can be postulated that a majority of these officers had over 20 years of service. In a small, but expanding Army at the time, these officers had survived the "lean" inter-war years and literally were the "cream of the crop". They were the establishment. A survey of student papers, the GSMs, indicated approximately 30 percent recommended no change to the current War Department policies for the problems under study. The recommendations that were made seemed rather innovative for their time since many are realities today, but could not be considered radical even then.

Another indicator for this observation was the general tone and kinds of questions asked of the quest speakers. During the G3 Course, for example, each of the "Branch Chiefs" gave a presentation. There were several questions about current capability, but no challenging or penetrating ones. No one challenged the Chief of Cavalry, for instance,
on the continued value of the horse in light of growing mechanization throughout the armies of Europe. One officer did ask why the Poles, with all their horse cavalry, had not been able to stop the Germans, but most officers seemed to accept the speaker's comment that horse cavalry was the "essence of cavalry."² The Chief of Infantry addressed several changes in the structure of the Infantry Division which could have stirred controversy similar to today's Light Division, yet there were no challengers.³ These officers were good problem solvers, looking for growth and development in the Army. They were also pretty well satisfied with the manner in which business was conducted by the War Department.

Two issues facing the Army in 1939-40 were the future of mechanization and the role of air power. The AWC Class of 1940 apparently had mixed feelings on these subjects. On the one hand, there was great interest shown following BG Adna Chaffee's lecture and several GSM were supportive of further mechanization on an expanded scale. Speakers were asked about War Department plans to continue mechanization. Could the airplane be used effectively to defend against a mechanized enemy? What of industry's capability to rapidly produce armored vehicles? Captain Ed Barber's GSM, "Tactical Doctrine for the Employment of the Mechanized Force", is illustrative of support for mechanization. His study was directed at answering the question, "Is revision
necessary in doctrine for mechanized forces?" He concluded that the doctrine appeared sound, but because of Germany's success in Poland and trends toward mechanization in Europe, the whole issue "warrants a close study". Among other things he proposed several armored force organizations for field testing.⁴

One the other hand, Captain George Badger's GSM, "Development and Control of Tanks and Tank Units", suggested that no change in policy was needed. Tank development should stay with the Infantry and there was no need for a separate armored force.⁵ This attitude was further reinforced by one of the G3 Course group studies on the subject. The group concluded that a heavy, mobile armored division was not justified. They did, however, want modernization to continue.⁶ Another student's GSM addressed the desirability of converting all animal drawn transportation to the "motor truck". This was one of the better GSM which cited the recent German experience and their renewed interest in the horse for logistics use. He further cited British overreliance on motor vehicles in France in November 1939. He noted the need for the U.S. to have the capability to go into a theater which might require animal transport.⁷ In terms of an Army in change, the Army of 1940 was very similar to the Army of the 1980s, and many were reluctant to break with the past.
A similar case can be made for the issues associated with air power and its role on the battlefield. The two most senior members of the Class of 1940 were Air Corps officers. Their influence coupled with two lectures presented during the course, "The Air Corps" by MG Henry H. Arnold and, "The GHQ Air Force" by MG Delos C. Emmons, served to keep the role of air power before the class. In a question following Emmons' presentation, J. Lawton Collins expressed concern about the movement toward a separate air force and how much money the Army planned to spend on a long range bomber force. Both Emmons and Arnold espoused the distinct character of air warfare, and the committee studying "Military Aviation" recognized the need for a "national air doctrine". The class also suggested the topic of a separate air force be added to the G3 Course for study. Other questions following the Air Corps lectures raised concerns about the use of air power. The question of strategic bombing versus close air support was beginning to develop, but no strong opinions were noted in these comments.

The Class of 1940 was no stranger to the concepts of fighting "large" units. On several occasions they were required to plan operations for these units. The whole focus of the War Plans Course was aimed at echelons above Corps. The students planned maneuvers for a Field Army during the CPX Course, and during the Command Course, the
A map exercise was built around a Field Army in offensive operations. In October 1986, during a follow-up oral history session, Mrs. Charles L. Bolte remarked to her husband:

Didn't you say about the War College once that you'd learned one thing, and that was that big numbers didn't frighten you anymore?

General Bolte replied in the affirmative. Perhaps this might be one of the keys to understanding the rapid rise of many of these officers, because they understood, at this point in their careers, the "dynamics" of large units and the fundamentals of their employment.

In addition to appreciation for large unit operations, the Class of 1940 was concerned with joint operations of the Army and Navy. The War Plans Course helped to solidify this notion of "jointness" as student work groups were required to write the "Joint Plan" and the "Navy Plan" as well as the Army portion of war plans. Lectures addressed the importance of joint training and the role played by naval doctrine in national defense:

When statesmanship breaks down as a means of maintaining peace, and the people of our country through their duly elected representatives in Congress have decided that war is the last resort...the responsibility for bringing the war to a close...rests with the Army and Navy. The Congress and the people expect the armed forces to be victorious...To win a war we must hurt the enemy so badly that he wants to
quit... How can we hurt an enemy which is an Overseas Power? The answer is by gaining control of the sea.\textsuperscript{13}

The Class of 1940 had been exposed to their own version of the "Maritime Strategy".

Major John Bissell's GSM, "Joint Training Exercises" provided an example of concern for joint operations. He concluded that the Army and Navy were not doing enough together, and Army doctrine for amphibious warfare was virtually nonexistent. He recommended that regulations and doctrine be updated and that the two services develop a plan for joint training exercises in 1940.\textsuperscript{14} The need for more "jointness" was recognized then as it is today.

Another major concern, and perhaps the greatest one for these officers was the ability to rapidly expand and train the Army in time of emergency. The mobilization theme was the connecting thread running throughout the ANC academic program. It was addressed in practically every course. Student questions, as well as faculty comments, during each course made this apparent. One of the most interesting comments was made by J. Lawton Collins following the G3 lecture on artillery. After discussing artillery training during mobilization, he said:

\begin{quote}
To me, one of the biggest problems we have in this thing is to remember the big difference between our mobilization and a European mobilization: the Europeans mobilize to fight next week and we mobilize to get ready to fight.\textsuperscript{15}
\end{quote}
Several GSMs addressed the mobilization issue as well. Captain William F. Dean's student paper, "The Effect of the New Infantry Drill on the Time Required for Training of Replacements" addressed the training issue.\(^\text{16}\) Captain Maxwell D. Taylor's GSM, "Procurement of the Regular Army Reserve" considered the problem of expanding the Army.\(^\text{17}\) A related problem of concern to the class was the Army's continued role in supporting the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). Several GSMs focused on this issue, concluding that the Army had gained from the experience and the training provided helped to prepare the CCC personnel for ready reception into military service in event of mobilization.\(^\text{18}\)

Finally, the Mobilization Course itself, was a catalyst for this deep concern. Given the opportunity to study the current mobilization plans and having the benefit of the previous war's experience through lecture and interaction with the veterans in the class, mobilization concerns may have ranked along with mechanization and air power as "front burner" items for the Class of 1940.

The war college experience for these officers resulted in strong ties with classmates and instructors. Additionally, the experience was not viewed as a "stepping stone" to the second phase of a career, but as a "finishing" school, a logical follow-on to the Leavenworth experience. Oral histories of General Maxwell Taylor and General Lyman Lemnitzer attest to these observations. When asked about
turning points in his career, General Taylor cited his selection for Leavenworth as a junior officer and not AMC as key to his advancement. He even remembered the subject of his Leavenworth student project, but was unable to recall his GSM.19

The emphasis was on teamwork. The committee structure supported this concept. Frequent committee reorganization and the small class size ensured greater opportunity for interaction. General Lemnitzer, however, noted that the junior people like Taylor and McAuliffe carried the load in committee work.20 Since the social life was limited for these officers in the Washington area, daily association in group work at the college served to bond this group of officers.

The Class of 1940 had a deep appreciation for the past and understood the value of military history. Historical examples were cited in practically every lecture. The Historical Ride was considered a "highlight" of the course and its cancellation caused some discontent as previously noted. General Lemnitzer noted, "One of the great features of my war college year was that senior people from World War I came to speak".21 This is a lesson being relearned today.

The last observation about the Class of 1940 concerns their interest in the events in Europe during their War College year. No clear cut conclusions can be drawn. The
class was aware that Germany and the Allies were at war, but in late 1939 there was not, as yet, a national consensus that the U.S. should get involved. Guest speakers and faculty alike cited German exploits and student interest was readily apparent during question periods. It appears this interest was primarily one of professional concern and analysis, an attempt to understand what was occurring with a view toward making their own force better. There was no discussion about getting into the war. General Bolte made this point in response to a question concerning Allied warfare in his oral history:

There was no talk of fighting...we would sit in the auditorium and listen to Hitler making his speeches...there was recognition that the war was going on, but we were not actively involved in the process at all...it seems to me that the policy was that we were not going to get into it yet.22

It was not until the decision to cancel the AWC program for 1940-41 that the war loomed as a real possibility for the United States. In May 1940, President Roosevelt requested the authority from Congress to federalize the National Guard.23 Mobilization was officially underway at that time. In June, as the class was graduating, the Secretary of War directed the second major expansion of the Regular Army since World War I.24 The bottom line of these observations and impressions is that the War College experience served the officers of the Class of 1940 well.
1. AWC Course 1939-40, General Staff Memoranda, AWC File 1940-GSM, U.S. Army War College Institutional Archives, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.


22. Coffman, p. 5.


24. Kreidberg and Henry, p. 571. The first expansion was in September 1939 when the President approved increasing the peacetime strength of the Regular Army from 187,000 to 227,000. Expansion noted here was to 280,000.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

That we have come so far, in such a few short years since the graduation of the AMC Class of 1940 is, from time to time brought home when we review some of the student papers written in 1939-40. Take for example, "Comparison of the U.S. Triangle Division with the New Italian Division," by Major J.R. Burney, in which he states that the only significant difference between the two divisions is, "the absence of pidgeons, signal lamps, and war dogs in the U.S. division."\(^1\)

That we have not come so far, after all, CPT W.E. Dunkelberg in his GSM on Antitank Defense noted, "The Active Defense-two echelons of antitank defense, the first providing the minimum number of guns to cover the most likely approaches of mechanized attacks, the second echelon then moves to the critical portion of the front or flank after location of the enemy's main effort has been disclosed."\(^2\)

On the subject of officer quality in certain branches of service, Major Peter P. Rodes' GSM, "Should the Corps of Engineers be Charged with Peacetime Construction Throughout the Service," provides this insight:

The Official Army Register, January 1, 1939,
indicates that two of these officers are now 59 years old, one 55, one 61 and still a captain; and of the other 47, four are majors, the youngest in senior; only one, the captain is a graduate of a college and he holds a B.S. degree. The same document indicates that the Chief of Construction Division of the Quartermaster Corps is nearly 63 years old, served for more than 20 years in the Infantry and transferred to the Quartermaster Corps in the grade of Lieutenant Colonel, holds no college degree, and has not graduated from any of the numerous Army schools: the Executive Officer of this division is now in his 60th year, entered the Army as a 2d Lieutenant of Coast Artillery in 1908 and remained a member of that Corps until November 1932 when he transferred to the Quartermaster Corps, this officer graduated from a technical school prior to entering the Army and holds the degree of C.E. 3

To the common commander’s lament about not having enough transportation for his unit, Major W.H. Vinson’s GSM, "The Advisability of Supplying the Usual Needs of Tactical Organizations by Pooled Transportation Instead of Organic Transportation," cited a principle approved by the CSA in October 1938:

Vehicles which have heretofore been set up for purposes of transporting cargo such as rations, baggage, gas and oil and other items normally carried in the field trains will not be included as organic vehicles for regiments and lower units; vehicles of this type will be made available to regiments and lower units when as needed from a pool of vehicles under the control of higher commanders. 4

On weapons technology, it is interesting to note the primary antitank weapon of the time was a caliber .50 machine gun, its primary asset being mobility. The new 37mm antitank gun being developed, "is so admirably suited for
its purpose that no project for a more powerful larger caliber, antitank gun is contemplated at this time."5

The U.S. Army has come a long way, but the themes from 1939-40 outlined above, changing organizations, officer quality and professional development, use of scarce resources and integration of technology, are no strangers to today's War College student. Rarely a day passes when these and other topics are not discussed in seminar or informal conversation. It is very surprising, in fact, to note the many similarities between the college of 1939-40 and today's War College.

The Class of 1940 was prepared for World War II. It is difficult to draw firm conclusions as to why, but perhaps the process itself is key to understanding these officers' success. The process of professional officers coming together to study, by a variety of methods, the tools of their trade is today much like it was in 1939-40.

In reviewing the Army War College year of 1939-40, it appears today's college could benefit by reviewing the value of group work and the time allocated to solve group problems. The experience of the Class of 1940 may be instructive in this regard. By working within the context of a group and presenting solutions to the student body,
learning was facilitated and confidence was gained. The learning and confidence, no doubt, these officers needed for the trials ahead.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to describe just how the learning process takes place during the year spent at the Army (or any other) War College. It is certain, however, that generations of successful professional soldiers have been prepared for future service to their Army and to their country by their attendance, "in order to prevent war, not promote it."6

ENDNOTES

1. J.R. Burney, MAJ, "Comparison of the U.S. Triangle Division with the New Italian Division", 31 January 1940, AWC File 1940-GSM, AWC Archives, MHI, p. 3.


BIBLIOGRAPHY


COL Howard C Davidson A.C.
Source Commission: USMA Age: 49
Assign After AWC: Hickam Fld TH, CO
Other Sign. WWII Asg: CG, 14th Ftr Wg & 10th AF
Misc: Dir, AF Aid Society
Rank Attained by ’46: MG

COL Robert L Walsh A.C.
Source Commission: USMA Age: 45
Assign After AWC: ACSI, GHQ AF, Langley Fld
Other Sign. WWII Asg: CG, East Cmd USSTAF in USSR
Misc: Sp Asst to CG, AAF, Wash D.C.
Rank Attained by ’46: MG

LTC Cleveland H Bandholtz O.D.
Source Commission: USMA Age: 48
Assign After AWC: Raritan Arsenal, Metuchen, NJ
Other Sign. WWII Asg: -
Misc: Ret dsbl Jul 42
Rank Attained by ’46: COL

LTC Ray W Barker F.A.
Source Commission: OTF Age: 50
Assign After AWC: Ft Ord, CA
Other Sign. WWII Asg: US Deputy C/S COSSAC, OVERLORD
Misc: Officer’s Training Camp
Rank Attained by ’46: MG

LTC Ernest H Burt JAG
Source Commission: Direct Age: 47
Assign After AWC: OCSA, WDGS
Other Sign. WWII Asg: -
Misc: From Conn NG
Rank Attained by ’46: BG

LTC Lloyd H Cook INF
Source Commission: Direct Age: 47
Assign After AWC: Gen Staff Corps, AWC
Other Sign. WWII Asg: -
Misc: From VT NG
Rank Attained by ’46: COL
LTC John E Copeland INF
Source Commission: -  Age: 48
Assign After AWC: Ft Lewis, WA
Other Sign. WWII Asg: -
Misc: -
Rank Attained by '46: BG

LTC David Mcl Crawford S.C.
Source Commission: USMA Age: 50
Assign After AWC: 50 2d Corps Area, Gov's Is, NY
Other Sign. WWII Asg: Chrm, Jnt A-N Comm Bd
Misc: Chrm, Coord Comm Comb/Allied Comm Bd
Rank Attained by '46: BG

LTC Frank L. Sr Culin INF
Source Commission: ARC Age: 47
Assign After AWC: 7th ID; Cdr, 32d Inf
Other Sign. WWII Asg: CG, 87th ID, 3A, ETO
Misc: WWI Vet, 30th Inf (Aisne-Marne; Meuse-Argonne)
Rank Attained by '46: MG

LTC Claudius M Easley INF
Source Commission: -  Age: 48
Assign After AWC: OCSA, G-4, WDGS
Other Sign. WWII Asg: -
Misc: -
Rank Attained by '46: BG

LTC William C Foote CAC
Source Commission: USMA Age: 47
Assign After AWC: Asst G-1, 2d Army; 63 6th Corps Area
Other Sign. WWII Asg: Dir of Sup, Hq ASF
Misc: -
Rank Attained by '46: COL

LTC Floyd E Galloway AC
Source Commission: -  Age: 49
Assign After AWC: ACAF Sch, Maxwell Fld, Montgomery, AL
Other Sign. WWII Asg: -
Misc: -
Rank Attained by '46: BG
LTC John F Goodman INF
Source Commission: USMA Age: 48
Assign After AWC: Bde XO, 26th Div; Inf Instr, Mass NG
Other Sign. WWII Asg: CO, 364th Inf Rgmt
Misc: Ret Sep 46
Rank Attained by '46: BG

LTC Frank A Heileman CE
Source Commission: DirectAge: 48
Assign After AWC: OC/S, G-4, Constr Sec, WDGS
Other Sign. WWII Asg: Dir Supply, ASF; G4 AF W Pac
Misc: WWI Vet (Meuse-Argonne); From Missouri NG
Rank Attained by '46: MG

LTC Reese M Howell FA
Source Commission: USMA Age: 50
Assign After AWC: Cdr, 4th FA, Ft Bragg, NC
Other Sign. WWII Asg: CG, 9th Inf DIVARTY, ETO
Misc: Ret Jun 46
Rank Attained by '46: BG

LTC Dean - Hudnut FA
Source Commission: USMA Age: 48
Assign After AWC: PMS, ROTC Yale U
Other Sign. WWII Asg: Unk
Misc: -
Rank Attained by '46: COL

LTC Frederick R Lafferty Cav
Source Commission: - Age: 49
Assign After AWC: 12th Cav, Ft Ringgold, TX
Other Sign. WWII Asg: -
Misc: -
Rank Attained by '46: COL

LTC Otto F Lange INF
Source Commission: USMA Age: 48
Assign After AWC: Minn, Org Res dty
Other Sign. WWII Asg: ADC, 36th Div
Misc: G-3, 23d Corps
Rank Attained by '46: BG
LTC James A Lester FA
Source Commission: USMA Age: 48
Assign After AWC: Asst Cmtd FAB; OC/S, G-2, WDGS
Other Sign. WWII Asg: CG, 14th Corps ARTY
Misc: CG, Philippine Constab
Rank Attained by '46: MG

LTC Frederick - McCabe INF
Source Commission: - Age: 48
Assign After AWC: Ft Ord, CA
Other Sign. WWII Asg: -
Misc: -
Rank Attained by '46: BG

LTC Joseph I Martin MC
Source Commission: ARC Age: 45
Assign After AWC: Med Insp, HQ 6th Corps Area
Other Sign. WWII Asg: Chief Surg, 5th Army (Africa, Italy)
Misc: -
Rank Attained by '46: BG

LTC Fred W Miller INF
Source Commission: - Age: 48
Assign After AWC: HQs, 7th Corps Area, Omaha, NB
Other Sign. WWII Asg: -
Misc: -
Rank Attained by '46: MG

LTC Lehman W Miller CE
Source Commission: USMA Age: 48
Assign After AWC: Attache, Brazil
Other Sign. WWII Asg: CG, Engr Unit Tng Ctr, NC
Misc: C, Log Gp OPD, WDGS
Rank Attained by '46: BG

LTC Francis K Newcomer CE
Source Commission: USMA Age: 50
Assign After AWC: ADE, Miss Valley; Distr Engr, Vicksburg
Other Sign. WWII Asg: Theater Engr, CBI
Misc: -
Rank Attained by '46: BG

81
LTC Richard U Nicholas CE
Source Commission: USMA Age: 49
Assign After AWC: Dist Engr, HQs, 9th Corps Area, Ft Lewis, W
Other Sign. WWII Asg: Engr, 9th Army, ETO
Misc: -
Rank Attained by '46: BG

LTC Madison - Pearson AG
Source Commission: - Age: 49
Assign After AWC: 1st Armd Corps, Ft Knox, KY
Other Sign. WWII Asg: -
Misc: -
Rank Attained by '46: BG

LTC Vernon E Prichard FA
Source Commission: USMA Age: 47
Assign After AWC: C/S, 4th Armd Div; 27th Armd FA Bn, Ft Knox
Other Sign. WWII Asg: CG, 1st Armd Div, Italy
Misc: CG, 14th Armd Div
Rank Attained by '46: MG

LTC Thomas H.,Jr Rees Cav
Source Commission: USMA Age: 48
Assign After AWC: G-4, 9th Corps Area, Presidio, CA
Other Sign. WWII Asg: Port Cdr, India
Misc: -
Rank Attained by '46: COL

LTC James C Ruddell CAC
Source Commission: USMA Age: 46
Assign After AWC: Treas, USMA
Other Sign. WWII Asg: Member, Jnt A-N Pers Bd
Misc: Mem & Pres War Crimes Court Dachau
Rank Attained by '46: COL

LTC Richard G Tindall INF
Source Commission: Direct Age: 47
Assign After AWC: 12th Inf, Arlington
Other Sign. WWII Asg: Attaché Turkey, London
Misc: WWI Vet, 7th Inf (Aisne-Marne)
Rank Attained by '46: BG
LTC Philip S Wood INF
Source Commission: - Age: 48
Assign After AWC: HQs, 3d Corps Area, Baltimore, MD
Other Sign. WWII Asg: -
Misc: Gen Staff Corps
Rank Attained by '46: COL

MAJ Frank A.,Jr Allen Cav
Source Commission: OTC Age: 43
Assign After AWC: Public Relations Br, OC/S, WDGS
Other Sign. WWII Asg: Cdr, CCB 1AD (N. Africa); G2 6th Army G
Misc: C, Public Relations, SHAPE
Rank Attained by '46: BG

MAJ Robert L Bacon INF
Source Commission: USMA Age: 43
Assign After AWC: Inf Instr, PA NG, Philadelphia, PA
Other Sign. WWII Asg: Cdr, 359th & 379th Inf Rgmts, ETO
Misc: D-Day as C/S, 90th Inf Div
Rank Attained by '46: COL

MAJ Charles Y Banfill A.C.
Source Commission: FCDT Age: 42
Assign After AWC: O, Chf Air Corps; Engr Bd, Ft Belvoir, VA
Other Sign. WWII Asg: D, Intel, 325 Photo Wing 8th AF, ETO
Misc: Flying Cadet Program
Rank Attained by '46: BG

MAJ John T.B. Bissell FA
Source Commission: USMA Age: 46
Assign After AWC: WDGS, G-2, CI
Other Sign. WWII Asg: CG, 89th DIVARTY, ETO
Misc: -
Rank Attained by '46: BG

MAJ Charles C Blanchard FA
Source Commission: USMA Age: 43
Assign After AWC: 44th FA Bn, 4th ID, Ft Benning, GA
Other Sign. WWII Asg: Asst & Corps Arty Off, 10 & 14th Corps
Misc: T-SP
Rank Attained by '46: COL
MAJ Egbert F Bullene CWS
Source Commission: USNA Age: 44
Assign After AWC: Cdr, 2d Chem Bn, Edgwd Asl
Other Sign. WWII Asg: Cdr, CWS Unit Tng Ctr; San Jose Project
Misc: WWI Vet, Cdr, FA Btry
Rank Attained by '46: BG

MAJ Joel R Burney INF
Source Commission: ORC Age: 47
Assign After AWC: IG Dept, HQs, 6th Corps Area, Chicago, IL
Other Sign. WWII Asg: -
Misc: -
Rank Attained by '46: COL

MAJ John W Coffey O.D.
Source Commission: USMA Age: 42
Assign After AWC: London, Sp Obsvr; OC/OD, Washington, DC
Other Sign. WWII Asg: C, 00 AFHQ
Misc: -
Rank Attained by '46: BG

MAJ Clarence C Fenn JAG
Source Commission: ORC Age: 49
Assign After AWC: Ft Hamilton, NY
Other Sign. WWII Asg: -
Misc: -
Rank Attained by '46: BG

MAJ Stanley J Grogan INF
Source Commission: ORC Age: 48
Assign After AWC: ODC/S, WDGS
Other Sign. WWII Asg: -
Misc: Gen Staff Corps
Rank Attained by '46: COL

MAJ Morris C Handwerk CAC
Source Commission: ORC Age: 48
Assign After AWC: GHQ, AWC
Other Sign. WWII Asg: Cmd AA Ops invasion of Okinawa
Misc: WWI Vet
Rank Attained by '46: BG
MAJ George P Hays FA
Source Commission: Direct Age: 47
Assign After AWC: Cdr, 99th FA Pack, Ft Hoyle, MD
Other Sign. WWII Asg: CG, 10th Mountain Div (Italy)
Misc: WWI MH winner w/ 3ID
Rank Attained by '46: MG (LTG)

MAJ Stonewall - Jackson INF
Source Commission: - Age: 48
Assign After AWC: Inf Sch, Ft Benning, GA
Other Sign. WWII Asg: -
Misc: -
Rank Attained by '46: MG

MAJ Leslie W Jefferson CAC
Source Commission: - Age: 48
Assign After AWC: OC/CA, WDGS
Other Sign. WWII Asg: -
Misc: Gen Staff Corps
Rank Attained by '46: COL

MAJ Emil C Kiel A.C.
Source Commission: ORC Age: 44
Assign After AWC: OC/S, G-3, WDGS
Other Sign. WWII Asg: -
Misc: Gen Staff Corps
Rank Attained by '46: BG

MAJ Zim E Lawhon FA
Source Commission: - Age: 39
Assign After AWC: Ft Sam Houston, TX
Other Sign. WWII Asg: -
Misc: -
Rank Attained by '46: COL

MAJ John M Lentz FA
Source Commission: OTC Age: 43
Assign After AWC: Cdr, 24th FA Bn; 29th FA, Ft Benning, GA
Other Sign. WWII Asg: CG, XII Corps ARTY, ETO; G3 AGF
Misc: WWI Vet, 77th FA; Ltr on file MHI (GO action post WWII)
Rank Attained by '46: BG
MAJ James C Longino QM
Source Commission: - Age: 43
Assign After AWC: O/QMG, WDGS
Other Sign. WWII Asg: -
Misc: Gen Staff Corps
Rank Attained by '46: COL

MAJ Clarence A Martin INF
Source Commission: VMI Age: 43
Assign After AWC: 30th Div, Ft Jackson, SC
Other Sign. WWII Asg: -
Misc: -
Rank Attained by '46: MG

MAJ Louis LeR Martin Cav
Source Commission: USMA Age: 46
Assign After AWC: XO, 8th Cav, Ft Bliss, TX
Other Sign. WWII Asg: G-1, 19th Corps, ETO
Misc: -
Rank Attained by '46: COL

MAJ Henry J Matchett INF
Source Commission: Direct Age: 48
Assign After AWC: OC/Inf, WDGS
Other Sign. WWII Asg: -
Misc: From Minn NG; Gen Staff Corps
Rank Attained by '46: BG

MAJ Edwin T May INF
Source Commission: - Age: 43
Assign After AWC: Inf Sch, Ft Benning, GA
Other Sign. WWII Asg: -
Misc: -
Rank Attained by '46: BG

MAJ Floyd L Parks INF
Source Commission: Direct Age: 43
Assign After AWC: Fld Off Crs, CW Ctr, 66th Armd Regt
Other Sign. WWII Asg: C/S 1st Allied Abn Army. ETO
Misc: Tank Corps Officer Training Instr 1918
Rank Attained by '46: MG (LTG)
MAJ Frank J Pearson INF  
Source Commission: ORC  
Age: 48  
Assign After AWC: HQs, 2d Corps Area, Gov's Is, NY  
Other Sign. WWII Asg: -  
Misc: Gen Staff Corps; From Ga NG  
Rank Attained by '46: COL

MAJ Thomas H Ramsey QM  
Source Commission: USMA  
Age: 44  
Assign After AWC: O/QMG, WDGS  
Other Sign. WWII Asg: -  
Misc: -  
Rank Attained by '46: BG

MAJ Peter P Rodes FA  
Source Commission: USNA  
Age: 49  
Assign After AWC: 16th FA, Ft Myer, VA  
Other Sign. WWII Asg: ADC, 70th ID  
Misc: WWI Vet  
Rank Attained by '46: BG

MAJ Arthur H Rogers INF  
Source Commission: Direct  
Age: 47  
Assign After AWC: Org Res, 9th Corps Area, San Francisco, CA  
Other Sign. WWII Asg: -  
Misc: From S Dak NG  
Rank Attained by '46: BG

MAJ Robert O Shoe INF  
Source Commission: OTC  
Age: 48  
Assign After AWC: 29th Inf Rgmt, Ft Benning, GA  
Other Sign. WWII Asg: ADC, 40th and 24th IDs (SWPTO)  
Misc: Luzon and Mindanao Campaigns  
Rank Attained by '46: BG (MG)

MAJ George I Smith Cav  
Source Commission: Direct  
Age: 49  
Assign After AWC: OC/Cav, WDGS  
Other Sign. WWII Asg: -  
Misc: From Wy NG  
Rank Attained by '46: COL
MAJ Samuel D. Jr Sturgis C.E.
Source Commission: USMA Age: 42
Assign After AWC: Vicksburg Distr Engr
Other Sign. WWII Asg: C Engr, Hqs 6th Army, SWPA
Misc: New Guinea, Philippines Campaigns
Rank Attained by '46: BG

MAJ Harry F Thompson INF
Source Commission: ORC Age: 43
Assign After AWC: OC/S, G-1, WDGS
Other Sign. WWII Asg: -
Misc: Gen Staff Corps
Rank Attained by '46: BG

MAJ Francis P Tompkins Cav
Source Commission: USMA Age: 43
Assign After AWC: Mid East Obsvr w/ British; OC/Cav, WDGS
Other Sign. WWII Asg: WDGS & Hqs AGF, C, Intel Br
Misc: Dpty G-2, 1st Army Gp; Cdr, CC 7th Armd Div
Rank Attained by '46: COL

MAJ Wilbur H Vinson INF
Source Commission: ORC Age: 45
Assign After AWC: Nat Guaro Bureau
Other Sign. WWII Asg: -
Misc: Gen Staff Corps
Rank Attained by '46: COL

MAJ Webster H Warren CAC
Source Commission: - Age: 46
Assign After AWC: Instr NG, Seattle, WA
Other Sign. WWII Asg: -
Misc: -
Rank Attained by '46: -

MAJ Raymond E.S Williamson Cav
Source Commission: USMA Age: 45
Assign After AWC: O, AC/S G-4, WDGS
Other Sign. WWII Asg: ADC, 91st Inf Div
Misc: N. Africa, Italy (Rome-Arno, Po Valley)
Rank Attained by '46: BG
MAJ William L Wilson M.C.
Source Commission: ORC  Age: 37
Assign After AWC: Port of Embark, Brooklyn, NY
Other Sign. WWII Asg: -
Misc: Gen Staff Corps
Rank Attained by '46: COL

CPT George M Badger CAC
Source Commission: USMA  Age: 42
Assign After AWC: Sp Detail, G-1, WDGS; AWC
Other Sign. WWII Asg: CG, 56th AAA Brig, ETO
misc: -
Rank Attained by '46: BG

CPT Edward Barber CAC
Source Commission: -  Age: 39
Assign After AWC: G-1, WDGS
Other Sign. WWII Asg: CG, 59th AAA Brig, Siapan
Misc: -
Rank Attained by '46: BG

CPT Burns Beall INF
Source Commission: Direct  Age: 42
Assign After AWC: Ft Benning, GA
Other Sign. WWII Asg: -
Misc: From Va NG; Gen Staff Corps
Rank Attained by '46: COL

CPT Stuart A Beckley FA
Source Commission: USMA  Age: 40
Assign After AWC: LNO OCSO, Ft Monmouth, NJ
Other Sign. WWII Asg: FA, AGF Member Comm Coord Comm WD
Misc: Corps Arty Off & G-1, 9th Corps
Rank Attained by '46: COL

CPT Blackshear M Jr Bryan FA
Source Commission: USMA  Age: 39
Assign After AWC: OAC/S G-1, WDGS
Other Sign. WWII Asg: Asst PMG & D, Aliens & POW Div
Misc: Army PMG at end of WWII
Rank Attained by '46: BG
CPT Nathaniel A Burnell CAC
Source Commission: USMA Age: 42
Assign After AWC: G-3, WDGS
Other Sign. WWII Asg: CG, 52d AAA Brig, ETO
Misc: -
Rank Attained by '46: BG

CPT Clovis E Byers Cav
Source Commission: USMA Age: 40
Assign After AWC: G-1, WDGS
Other Sign. WWII Asg: CG, 32d Inf Div, SWPA
Misc: C/S, 8th Army (Philippine Campaigns, Init Lding Japan
Rank Attained by '46: MG

CPT James G Christiansen C.E.
Source Commission: USMA Age: 42
Assign After AWC: Engr Sec GHQ; AWC
Other Sign. WWII Asg: C/S, AGF
Misc: CG, MP Cmd AFWES PAC
Rank Attained by '46: MG

CPT Carter W Clarke S.C.
Source Commission: Direct Age: 43
Assign After AWC: Cdr, Alaska Comm Sys
Other Sign. WWII Asg: C, Mil Intel Svc, WDGS
Misc: Dep C, Mil Intel Svc
Rank Attained by '46: BG

CPT William F Dean INF
Source Commission: ROTC Age: 40
Assign After AWC: Ops & Trng Div, G-3, WDGS
Other Sign. WWII Asg: ADC & CG, 44th ID, ETO
Misc: C, Rgmts AGF; Asst to Sec of Gen Staff
Rank Attained by '46: MG

CPT Wilbur E Dunkelberg INF
Source Commission: USMA Age: 41
Assign After AWC: Cdr, Hq Co & MP Co, 8th ID, Ft Jacksc-, SC
Other Sign. WWII Asg: ADC, 95th Inf Div
Misc: CG, Cp Earle, Attu Is, Alaska
Rank Attained by '46: BG
CPT Claude B Ferenbaugh INF
Source Commission: USMA Age: 40
Assign After AWC: Eni Br, G-1, WDGS
Other Sign. WWII Asg: ADC, 83d Inf Div, ETO
Misc: CG, MDW by end WWII
Rank Attained by '46: BG

CPT William T. Jr Fitts INF
Source Commission: - Age: 42
Assign After AWC: G-3, WDGS
Other Sign. WWII Asg: -
Misc: -
Rank Attained by '46: COL

CPT Lester D Flory CAC
Source Commission: USMA Age: 40
Assign After AWC: Attache to Brazil
Other Sign. WWII Asg: Cdr, 63d AAA Brig
Misc: 0 AC/S G-4, WDGS
Rank Attained by '46: BG

CPT Henry I Hodges Cav
Source Commission: USMA Age: 40
Assign After AWC: G-3 Div, WDGS
Other Sign. WWII Asg: Cdr, 112th Inf Regt Cdr, ETO
Misc: C, Troop Mvts Br, Theater Gp, G-3, WDGS
Rank Attained by '46: BG

CPT Willard A. Jr Holbrook Cav
Source Commission: USMA Age: 41
Assign After AWC: OC/S, G-2, WDGS
Other Sign. WWII Asg: -
Misc: -
Rank Attained by '46: BG

CPT Oscar R Johnston INF
Source Commission: USMA Age: 42
Assign After AWC: Mbr. Sup and Proj Sect, WPD, WDGS
Other Sign. WWII Asg: C/S, 71st Inf Div, ETO
Misc: -
Rank Attained by '46: COL
CPT Maurice K Kurtz FA
Source Commission: USMA Age: 42
Assign After AWC: FA Bd, Ft Bragg, NC
Other Sign. WWII Asg: Cdr, CCA 14th Armd Div, ETO
Misc: -
Rank Attained by ’46: COL

CPT Lyman L Lemnitzer CAC
Source Commission: USMA Age: 40
Assign After AWC: Bn Cdr/Regt S-3, 70th AA Regt, Ft Moultrie, SC
Other Sign. WWII Asg: CG, 34th AA Brig, ETO
Misc: AC/S G-3, Allied Fcs Hqs
Rank Attained by ’46: MG

CPT Anthony C McAuliffe FA
Source Commission: USMA Age: 41
Assign After AWC: G-4 Div, WDGS
Other Sign. WWII Asg: CG, 101st Abn Div
Misc: Comd 101st at Bastogne
Rank Attained by ’46: MG

CPT Edward J McGaw FA
Source Commission: USMA Age: 38
Assign After AWC: Cdr, 1-20 FA, Ft Benning, GA
Other Sign. WWII Asg: CG, 63d DIVARTY, ETO
Misc: -
Rank Attained by ’46: BG

CPT Gerald S.C Mickle INF
Source Commission: USMA Age: 40
Assign After AWC: G-3, 3d ID, Ft Lewis, WA
Other Sign. WWII Asg: ADC, 75th Inf Div, ETO
Misc: CG, 101st Abn Div
Rank Attained by ’46: BG

CPT Verne D Mudge Cav
Source Commission: USMA Age: 41
Assign After AWC: Pers Div, G-1, WDGS
Other Sign. WWII Asg: CG, 1st Cav Div, SWPA
Misc: -
Rank Attained by ’46: MG
CPT James R Pierce INF
Source Commision: USMA Age: 40
Assign After AWC: G-3, WPD, WDGS
Other Sign. WWII Asg: Cdr, GIR 17th Abn Div, ETO
Misc: -
Rank Attained by '46: COL

CPT Albert - Pierson INF
Source Commision: SATC Age: 40
Assign After AWC: G-4 Div, WDGS
Other Sign. WWII Asg: ADC, 11th Abn Div, PTO, New Guinea
Misc: Student Army Training Corps
Rank Attained by '46: BG (MG)

CPT Eugene W Ridings INF
Source Commision: USMA Age: 40
Assign After AWC: G-3 Div, WDGS
Other Sign. WWII Asg: G-3, 14th Corps, SWPA
Misc: ADC, Americal Div
Rank Attained by '46: BG

CPT John B Sherman INF
Source Commision: USMA Age: 41
Assign After AWC: XO, Stu Trng Unit, Ft. Benning
Other Sign. WWII Asg: XO, G-5, SHAEF
Misc: -
Rank Attained by '46: COL

CPT Don G Shingler C.E.
Source Commision: USMA Age: 43
Assign After AWC: Cdr, 87th Engr Bn
Other Sign. WWII Asg: ETO Amphib Sec 1st Army
Misc: -
Rank Attained by '46: BG

CPT Maxwell D Taylor FA
Source Commision: USMA Age: 38
Assign After AWC: WPD, WDGS; Sp Msn L-A on Hemis Def
Other Sign. WWII Asg: CG, DIVARTY, 82d Abn; CG, 101st Abn, ET
Misc: -
Rank Attained by '46: MG
CPT Milton E Wilson QM
Source Commision: Direct
Age: 43
Assign After AWC: QM Sch, Schuylkill, Arsnl, Philadelphia, PA
Other Sign. WWII Asg: -
Misc: From Enl Res Corps
Rank Attained by '46: COL

COL Clifton B Cates USMC
Source Commision: -    Age: -
Assign After AWC: -
Other Sign. WWII Asg: CG, 4th Marine Div, PTO
Misc: Cmtd USMC 48-52
Rank Attained by '46: MG (GEN)

LTC Donald J Kendall USMC
Source Commision: -    Age: -
Assign After AWC: -
Other Sign. WWII Asg: -
Misc: -
Rank Attained by '46: COL