THE 'WAR' AGAINST SUBSTANCE ABUSE: POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND A PLAN FOR ACTION (U) ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA  H E SEGAL 01 MAY 87

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THE "WAR" AGAINST SUBSTANCE ABUSE: POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND A PLAN FOR ACTION

BY

COLONEL HERBERT E. SEGAL

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1 MAY 1987

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA
The "war" against substance abuse is a multiagency, multilevel program, with recently heightened visibility and interest, which seeks to stem the supply and consumption of illicit drugs within the U.S. The program as it is evolving represents a major commitment whose coherence, relevance, and effectiveness are of great importance to all Americans. This paper reviews the policy and action plan development of the "war" through examination of the threat to our national and public interests, through consideration...
of an idealized set of objectives, and through discussion of applicable strategies and concepts of operation. This construct suggests that there is a definable threat to our interests and a straight-forward set of objectives which translates into a plan of action and thence into specific agency responsibilities. Analysis of the construct leads the writer to conclude that available resources ought to be preferentially applied to programs focused on interdiction proximal to US borders and on reduction of domestic consumption. The placement of overall programmatic responsibility at the Vice Presidential level is strongly recommended. The ultimate success of the "war" against substance abuse may depend on acceptance of the construct presented and on its implications in terms of command, control and coordination, clarification of agency responsibilities, and allocation of personnel and fiscal resources.
THE "WAR" AGAINST SUBSTANCE ABUSE: POLICY DEVELOPMENT 
AND A PLAN FOR ACTION

An Individual Essay

by

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Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
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The "War" Against Substance Abuse: 
Policy Development And a Plan For Action

There is a general consensus that "substance abuse" within our society has reached alarming proportions. Ninety-eight percent of adult Americans consider illegal drug use to be an important problem; seventy-three percent describe it as "one of the most serious problems facing the country", while only two percent consider it not important.¹ Beyond that basic agreement, there rages a substantial and muddled debate which has focused on the means by which the problem may be most effectively attacked. Such a debate must necessarily be preceeded by agreement on fundamental issues above "means" in the hierarchy of policy development. One may ask: are our national interests, objectives, and strategies to achieve them well defined, proper, and consistent? This paper seeks to develop and examine those issues which are central to the policy formulation process as it pertains to substance abuse.

The call for action against substance abuse has enjoyed high visibility and priority in the Reagan administration. A National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) on Narcotics and National Security identifies the international drug trade as a national security concern.² The Secretary of State has labelled control of narcotics production and trafficking a "top priority in our foreign policy".³ From the domestic viewpoint, substance abuse is perceived as "threatening the health and safety of all our citizens".⁴ Administration and Congressional concern, reflected most recently in the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADAA) of 1986, codify a commitment to action.⁵ These directives, pronouncements, and legislative initiatives represent, in part, an effort to define our interests in substance abuse and thus to guide policy formulation.
A correct assessment of the threat to our interests is a necessary precondition to building support within the electorate, to matching the intensity of interests with the available instruments of power and to sustaining the resource commitments implicit in the process.

Substance abuse poses threats to world and internal order. In source countries, the growth of drug severely disorders agricultural practice, distorts the economic environment, and creates conditions favoring the breakdown of authority and the rise of lawlessness and insurgency. It is an incipient threat to their citizens, especially the young, in whom addiction is an emerging problem.6

Within the United States, sale of drugs disorders the economy through the direct dollar cost, through the cost of related crime and violence, through the flow of dollars abroad, and through lost opportunities. It distorts the usual functions of government, whose resources must be redirected to enforcement and treatment efforts. It exerts a pervasive influence on the effectiveness of our workforce and on our society, particularly our urban society.7 It is a threat to which our citizenry is daily exposed and which in the writer's view has taken on a moral dimension.

A useful and important first distinction in a discussion of interests is to separate public interest and national interest. The public interest is defined as the well being of American people and enterprise within the territorial boundaries of the U.S.; it is the concern of federal, state, and local governments. The purview of national interest is the environment external to the U.S. and is the concern of only the federal government.
Each is heavily influenced by the other. The writer does not suggest that the cleavage between public and national interests is clear or precise, only that there may be substantial and meaningful differences in the constituencies that champion them. The public interest focus in substance abuse is on community impact and the efficiency of local efforts in law enforcement, treatment, and education. The national interest is represented by concerns over the destabilizing effects of narcotics trafficking and insurgencies on allied and friendly governments.

The public and national interests may be seen as complementary, describing as they do the demand and supply sides of the problem respectively. There may, as suggested above, be substantial differences in the constituencies representing these interests. Substance abuse as a local issue has high visibility; sixty-one percent of adult Americans, for example, reported in August 1986 knowing at least one cocaine user. There appears to be little dispute that substance abuse at the local level is a high priority issue. As a national interest issue, substance abuse must compete within hierarchies of interests and intensity factors. It is thus not unreasonable to suggest that action against allied or friendly countries or organizations contributing heavily to the American substance abuse problem might justifiably be subordinated to the achievement of other high-order interests.

A second point of inquiry is the durability of these interests. Public interest issues are of questionable durability, sometimes enjoying short but spectacular lives, whereas national interest issues tend to be relatively unchanging. From the domestic political standpoint, substance abuse has been described as "the epitome of the fad issue, a classic
really". Sustainment of national interests may also wane as the cost of pursing them increases relative to the results achieved. Given the moral nature of the substance abuse issue, and thus the imperative to resolve it, perhaps that support can be sustained.

The desirability of using influence or pressure to achieve or satisfy an interest is a political exercise, relevant to the discussion of both public interest and national interest issues. Debate in the public interest arena is often directed toward tangibles, eg. acquisition of a communications center for the constituency represented, perhaps at the expense of overall program efficiency. As a national interest issue focus is on the larger and less tangible matter of intergovernmental cooperation. The danger is that allies and otherwise cooperative countries might very well balk at placing their political and military institutions and some measure of their economic prosperity at risk to satisfy an American interest. It might be reasoned that since Americans now consume sixty percent of the world’s production of illegal drugs, attention should be focused on the internal environment. It can thus be argued that only when substance abuse issues attract an internal negative constituency in these countries can the United States expect them to act forcefully. Furthermore, the U.S. cannot expect countries to cooperate in narcotics control unless and until the rhetoric and the resource allocation in US foreign assistance programs ceases to swing like a pendulum.

Public interest and national interest constituencies have little common ground on which to develop and coordinate substance abuse programs. Stopping substance abuse, in the public interest view, is something com-
munities, states, schools, work places, and individuals must do for themselves... and who better to work effectively at the local level? That is not to say that efforts on supply reduction are not welcomed; within the national interest constituency there are activities and agencies substantially and effectively engaged in substance abuse programs. Unfortunately, fully funding all efforts flies in the face of budgeting realities. The two constituencies are traditional adversaries in the resource allocation process and demonstrate little understanding of the strategies and concepts developed by the other and little faith in the effectiveness of the means employed. Given the issues, forces, and dichotomies described, one must ponder the obvious questions: Can mutually supportive and agreed upon objectives and goals be formulated? Can coherent, supportable strategies be crafted so as to survive political compromise?

The viability of substance abuse policy requires, among other things, a clear conception of objectives and goals and priority among these, a design for achieving them or counting the threats to their attainment with available resources, and a method for determining that the tactics are being followed and are achieving the desired ends. The framework in which the questions posed above will be examined is that of the traditional corporate planning process.

In the corporate planning process, "objectives" and "goals" provide a statement of purpose and a description of the explicit targets of the policy. Both terms refer to a description of where the policy wants to go, an objective being a broad statement of purpose, while a goal is specific and concrete, with measurable results and a stated time period.
Strategies are defined here as amplifications of the broad directions taken to achieve objectives, the "how to". Tactics, here considered as concepts of operations, are the detailed specifications of how strategy will be achieved. Strategy is an upper echelon activity, long-term-oriented, affects many functional areas, is without much detail, and is relatively unstructured. Concepts of operation, in contrast, may be designed at lower levels, are oriented toward short-term results, are generally developed by functional area, and are very detailed, specific, and structured. "Control" the final phase of the planning process, documents and measures the gap between the plan and what actually happened.19

The 1984 National Strategy For Prevention of Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking describes a comprehensive approach in reducing the availability of illicit drugs and reducing the adverse effects of drug abuse on the individual and society.20 This approach defines activities which may be organized into five groups of objectives, namely foreign policy, law enforcement, education, treatment, and research objectives. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 codifies this division, it being

"an Act to strengthen federal efforts to encourage foreign cooperation in eradicating illicit drug crops and in halting international drug traffic, to improve enforcement of federal drug laws and enhance interdiction of illicit drug shipments, to provide strong Federal leadership in establishing effective drug abuse prevention and education programs, to expend Federal support for drug abuse treatment and rehabilitation efforts, and for other purposes."21

The most recent National Drug Enforcement Policy Board report contributes an enforcement strategy of five components: intelligence, international drug control, interdiction and border control, investigation and
prosecution, and diversion and controlled substance analogue regulation.

With the exception of "intelligence", which this writer considers to be concepts of operations rather than strategy, the components fit well into foreign policy and law enforcement objectives, listed above. Rather than accepting this listing, the present study suggests a potentially more usable alternative.

Objectives and goals, once developed with clarity and consistency, permit the planners to make explicit targets and develop a common understanding about what is to be achieved. In substance abuse programs, the definition of measures of success is difficult at best. The rhetoric of a "drug-free America" and the "elimination of drug abuse and trafficking" may very well impede the development of measurable goals (which are programmatically and politically defensible). Alternative formulations as "reducing the availability... and the adverse effects..." may serve. In addition, data available and potentially collectible permit a more satisfactory quantification of success in some areas than in others. Data confirming reduction in the proportion of Americans using or overdosing on drugs, testing positive for drugs, etc., would be taken as reasonable indicators of programmatic success. Destruction of crops and laboratories or seizures of couriers and drugs, without denominator data, give no such assurance. The difficulty inherent in the Department of State's certification requirement for producer countries to receive aid illustrates this problem. This distinction may strengthen the position of the public interest constituency in the resource allocation process.
These difficulties notwithstanding, the interests described may be transcribed into a comprehensive set of objectives and each objective thereafter into usable and effective strategies. One approach to the definition of objectives is to follow the pathway travelled by both the illicit drugs and the proceeds derived therefrom. The writer's study suggests that such routes may be segmented into seven functional areas, these being cultivating, manufacturing, staging and transhipping, exporting/importing (or smuggling), receiving and caching, preparing and distributing, and consuming.

From the steps in the pathway, an inclusive set of objectives might thus be defined: to reduce the cultivation of raw illicit drugs; to disturb the manufacture of drugs; to disrupt the movement of drugs to ports of egress; to interdict the routes of supply of drugs; to interfere with the preparing and distributing of drugs; to seize proceeds from the sale of drugs, to provide drug treatment and rehabilitation to the consuming public. An objective focused on primary prevention, to increase public awareness and educate the public on the desirability of drug avoidance, is also seen as appropriate. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the coordination of agency efforts, integration of intelligence gathering, sharing of information, evaluation of results, and preparation of records and reports is proposed as a separate objective, i.e. to coordinate agency efforts, integrate intelligence gathering, share information, evaluate results, and prepare records and reports.

Specific goals could now be developed from the above stated objectives; rather than doing so, derivative strategies, plans to accomplish the
objectives, will be discussed directly. An overarching, comprehensive national strategy has been established in which "...all individuals; all business, civic and social organizations; all levels of government; and all agencies, departments and activities within each level of government are called upon to lead, direct sponsor, and support efforts to eliminate drug abuse in families, businesses and communities." Such a statement, while noble and undoubtedly useful in a political context, does not aid in translating objectives into discrete or component strategies. Accomplishment of each objective requires both an understanding of personnel, equipment, and modus operandi critical to that step and a designing of strategies that precisely counter those elements.

To reduce the cultivation of raw drugs, one considers the actions to be taken against peasants and landowners and their supply of plant materials and agricultural implements and chemicals, in a subsistence-level agrarian system. Considerable energies have been devoted to developing and activating strategies to counter the cultivating of raw drug, given the logic of intercepting the flow of drugs as close to the source as possible. Crop location and eradication, carried out by military or paramilitary organizations, have been commonly employed. Such a strategy is passive in that it requires no cooperation on the part of the peasant-grower. A second strategy offers crop substitution and other incentives to those actively willing to abstain from growing raw drug. Incentives might include public works projects to improve living conditions or direct subsidies. Larger scale development, economic assistance, and agrarian reform must be planned and carried out by the central government.
Strategies to reduce the cultivating of raw drugs are viewed as inherently inefficient in that they require locating plots in widely dispersed and inaccessible areas and carrying out some level of action in those areas. This implies capabilities in intelligence, force structure, and transportation. The crop location and eradication strategy, while uncomplicated and appealing, can be counterproductive, as it pits the government against the peasant in a potentially violent confrontation and may very well drive the peasantry into the hands of local insurgents. Were eradication to be effectively accomplished by "silent" means, eg. by utilizing plant pathogens or herbicide spraying, such an objection might be overcome; with regard to the former suggestion, no report of relevant work was found.

Incentive, development, and reform strategies are costly and require national commitments, ordinarily supported by foreign aid; neither may be sustainable over the long term. Parenthetically, nowhere has this writer seen the suggestion that direct payments be made to peasants agreeing to cease cultivating raw drug (a program perhaps analogous to domestic agricultural subsidies). Additionally, the quantifying and certifying of success is nowhere more difficult than here, as earlier discussed. It seems prudent, then, that while anti-cultivating strategies, especially those of positive nature requiring peasant cooperation, may have an adjunctive role in the overall effort, they should not have primacy unless sufficient commitment and support can be assured.

To disturb the manufacture of illicit drug, one deals with actions to be taken against "chemists" and their staffs, perhaps armed, in clandestine
laboratories dependant on supplies of essential chemicals (and precursor chemicals if drugs are synthesized de novo) and on conversion equipment. Three strategies are derived from this objective, these being (1) identification and apprehension of the chemist, (2) location and destruction of the laboratory and its equipment, and (3) identification and interception of chemicals and conversion equipment.

Strategies to identify and apprehend chemists and to locate and destroy clandestine laboratories are dependent on capabilities in intelligence, appropriate force structure, and transportation, much as in the crop location and eradication described earlier. Where and when available, such a strategy may enjoy excellent, if transient success. Operation "Blast Furnance", for example,

"brought cocaine production to a virtual standstill in Bolivia. There was an exodus of known and suspected traffickers from Bolivia, a drop in the price of the coca leaves from $276 per hundred kilograms to $44, a virtual end to small aircraft traffic throughout the country, a reduction in the availability of US dollars, no harvesting of coca fields, and requests by farmers for assistance to plant alternative crops."27

An additional benefit of such a strategy results from the destruction of co-located airfields and the means of movement of manufactured drug. The identification and interception of chemicals and conversion equipment is a viable strategy when plants manufacturing such chemicals and equipment are known, licensed, and monitored and when importation and distribution of the chemicals and equipment are regulated. Insofar as this strategy can be accomplished through legislation and traditional regulatory and enforcement activities, and at a low level of violence, it has significant appeal.
To disrupt the movement of manufactured drug to ports of egress suggests actions be taken against traffickers, teamsters, likely armed, their trucks, boats and aircraft, and their staging ports or airfields. It may be at this stage that major drug traffickers first show themselves and that the funds to pay for cultivating and manufacturing appear. Derivative strategies are: (1) identification, arrest, and prosecution of the traffickers, and its corollary, development of a legal basis on which to extradite such individuals; (2) interception and seizure of manufactured drug; (3) confiscation of transportation and other assets; and (4) location and destruction of secret airfields, ports, etc.

Strategies to disrupt movement owe what success they enjoy to the existence of an intelligence apparatus, to the functioning of traditional law enforcement agencies, and to legislative processes. While not proximate to the cultivation of drug, strategies of disruption hold promise of greater effectiveness. Logic suggests that traffickers and their organizations may be attacked most effectively at this point, i.e. after everyone involved in cultivation, manufacture, and transport has been paid but before the drugs have left the country. Apprehension of significant individuals and assets may be possible for the first time. Furthermore, observable and quantifiable government cooperation here may form a better basis than crop eradication on which to make economic assistance contingent.

All strategies described thus far may be grouped as "supply strategies" and are linked to "demand strategies" by actions against the exporting and importing of drug or "smuggling strategies". Smuggling is dependant on the actions of pilots and other couriers and cargo handlers, sometimes with the
connivance of corrupt public officials. Conveyances utilized include aircraft and boats, individuals crossing international borders by vehicle or on foot, and subterfuges involving false baggage compartments, misrepresentation of commercial shipments, etc. Smuggling operations are, by their nature, well organized, highly coordinated, and communications dependant.

Interdiction of the routes of supply along our land, sea, and air borders requires strategies using a variety of intelligence, detection, and interception assets. Rhetoric bearing on the impossibility of "sealing" the borders ought not to deter the development of such strategies. Generically, a strategy against smuggling involves detection, interception, and apprehension of the smuggler directly or of his mode of transportation, seizure of the drug and other assets, and prosecution or deportation of the smuggler. Beyond this construct, smuggling techniques designed to breach the land, sea, and air borders are sufficiently different to merit separate strategies. Given the enormity of the area to be covered, these strategies ought to be fully coordinated, regionalized, and flexible - the last to add a degree of unpredictability helpful in avoiding patterns smugglers could key in on.

Strategies focusing on interdiction have occupied a prominent position in the anti-substance abuse campaign. To a degree this is because of the debate not on strategies but on concepts of operation and technologies to be employed, on the multiagency nature of such operations, and on the legal constraints both to the involvement of the military services and to the handling of bonafide refugees. Interdiction strategies have appeal in
that they are efforts to "seal" the borders, they are carried out by US agencies almost exclusively, they depend on high technology and high performance equipment already in the inventory, and they occur in areas in which the danger to the smuggler is relatively high and to the government forces relatively low. It is suggested that this appeal may be readily translated into political approval and funding at appropriate and reasonable levels. In terms of the quantities of drugs and the value of transportation assets which may be seized, interdiction may be the most efficient of strategies. It must be recognized that, given the success of interdiction, drugs destined for the US might simply be diverted elsewhere, thus, in a sense, exporting the problem worldwide.

To interfere with the preparing and distribution of drugs, one focuses partly, and for a second time, on the "chemist", his clandestine laboratory and essential equipment and chemicals. Organized criminal syndicates, possibly the sources of safe caches, protection, and financial means, may be identified at this juncture. Individuals of lesser importance, sometimes themselves addicted, comprise subordinate echelons of transporters, wholesalers, and retailers of drugs. Three separate interactive strategies are thus appropriate to the accomplishment of this objective.

Chemists may be identified and apprehended, their laboratories destroyed, and their suppliers of essential chemicals traced and cut off. Organized crime syndicates involved in drug trafficking may be attacked through the prosecution and incarceration of their members, the seizure of their supplies of drugs, the disabling of their money laundering operations, and the confiscation of their drug-related assets. Lastly, persons
involved in the transportation, wholesaling, and retailing (street selling) of drug are may be identified, apprehended and prosecuted, treated for addiction if present, and given every incentive to implicate others and identify those requiring treatment.

Strategies directed toward interfering with preparing and distributing comprise the first of four sets of demand strategies and bring substance abuse into the public view for the first time. The efficacy of state and local efforts, with or without federal assistance, is visible. The citizenry may, by personal observation, evaluate the success of these efforts based on the perceived levels of community violence, crime, and social disruption.

Adequate public funding support for police, prosecutorial, and prison assets which underpin this strategy must be obtained, largely from local tax dollars. The last requirement, adequate detention and prison capacity, has become a major constraint on the efforts of investigators and prosecutors. In 1986, for example, 37% of the 41,561 federal inmates were convicted drug offenders; this latter number is 50% greater than the rated capacity of the federal prison system. The 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act provides funds to correct this deficiency.29 Failure to provide adequately in these areas represents, in a sense, an abrogation of local responsibility and perhaps a call for cost shifting and concentrating on federal sector activities not requiring local funds.

The objective of seizing the assets from drug sales is an aspect of the substance abuse problem covered, to an extent, in strategies already
discussed. Seizure of assets is readdressed here for a structural reason: financial investigations call upon agencies and concepts of operation more easily discussed separately. To attack drug trafficking financially requires strategies concerned not only with the identification and seizure of drug-related assets, but with money laundering and bank secrecy, and with income tax evasion. Within these strategies there is the possibility of providing agencies with additional financial incentives resulting from their investigations and seizures.

Strategies directed toward the provision of health, education and human services are next considered. The objective of primary prevention, educating the public on the desirability of drug avoidance, calls for a school, club, or the workplace-based educational strategy. Such a strategy, as has been aptly stated,

"must be designed to have meaning for individuals at dramatically different stages of readiness and desire for change. It must encourage creative responses at the local level to fit each community's needs and resources with simultaneous national initiatives to raise awareness of drug abuse, mobilize citizen action and create an environment in which drug abuse is recognized as unacceptable behavior."

This strategy can be thought of as increasing in effectiveness the higher the prevalence of drug-using or drug-favorable behavior in the population under consideration.

The objective of secondary prevention, to provide drug treatment and rehabilitation to the consuming public, calls forth strategies to identify drug users, both casual and regular, to provide treatment for them, and to insure the existence of programs to prevent recidivism. Strategies to identify drug users depend on a comprehensive detection system which
includes random and directed drug testing, investigation of accidents and of unusual or criminal behavior, and review of illnesses with intoxication or withdrawal signs or symptoms. Providing treatment evokes a strategy of insuring the accessibility of both hospital beds dedicated to detoxification and of clinic space for outpatient therapy. A rehabilitation strategy is prospectively the most difficult of the three to formulate, given current recovery rates for cocaine addiction (33%) and heroin addiction (10%).

Having enumerated strategies which parallel the flow of drugs, one is tempted to move directly into the development of concepts of operations, and match those concepts with resources. Before doing so, however, the necessity to coordinate agency efforts, integrate intelligence, share information, evaluate efforts, and prepare records and reports, is to be considered as a separate objective. There is no question that each participating agency ought to perform such tasks internally so as to enhance its own efficiency and effectiveness and to identify opportunities to assist in other aspects of the overall effort. On a higher level, the writer believes that accomplishment of this objective requires more than the good will of collaborating agencies, that it requires a clearly identified hierarchy to effect control and resource allocation, to assign areas of authority and responsibility, and to evaluate adequacy of efforts.

Summarizing the discussion of substance abuse strategy, there is a useful division into supply strategies, smuggling strategies, demand strategies, and an overarching organizational strategy. The last is seen as an imperative which must be resourced and accomplished, in order that
efforts in the field be properly prioritized and supported. It is the opinion of the writer that generally smuggling and demand strategies ought to take precedence, in that order, over supply strategies. Accomplishment of supply strategies require economic and other incentives whose efficacy is questionable. They require collaborative enforcement efforts which may be counterproductive in a larger, low intensity conflict context. They prospectively alienate third world governments and people by translating a basically U.S. problem into internal instability. That is not to say that certain specific strategies, e.g. identification and interception of essential chemicals, don't have appeal. Smuggling strategies, conducted on the open seas or airspace or on U.S. territory, permit the unimpeded use of forces and technology in a setting highly unfavorable to the smuggler. Demand strategies bring the substance abuse problem squarely to the local level and focus the citizenry on its responsibilities and those of its elected and appointed officials.

A restatement of each objective with its related strategies is given in the Table.

Having discussed the threat, national interests, objectives, and strategy, the attachment of practical concepts of operation is the next logical step in the construct. Operating within supply strategies generally requires development of a local military and paramilitary force structure responsive to the larger issues of low intensity conflict and of a government sensitive to imperatives of agrarian development and reform. Development of a capable intelligence apparatus, likely from military and paramilitary organizations, must be accomplished so as to minimize the
<table>
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<th>TABLE: OBJECTIVES (0) AND STRATEGIES (S) IN THE &quot;WAR&quot; AGAINST SUBSTANCE ABUSE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(0) Reduce the cultivation of raw drugs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(S) Locate and eradicate crops: substitute crops: provide incentives and assistance.</td>
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<td>(0) Disturb the manufacture of drugs.</td>
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<td>(S) Identify and apprehend chemists: locate and destroy clandestine laboratories and equipment: identify and intercept essential and precursor chemicals.</td>
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<td>(C) Disrupt the movement of drugs to ports of egress.</td>
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<td>(S) Identify, arrest and prosecute traffickers: intercept and seize manufactured drugs: confiscate transport and other assets: locate and destroy secret airfields.</td>
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<td>(0) Interdict the routes of supply of drugs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(S) Detect, intercept and apprehend smugglers: seize drugs, transport and other assets: prosecute/deport smugglers.</td>
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<td>(C) Interfere with preparing and distributing of drugs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(S) Identify and apprehend chemists, destroy laboratories and cut off supply of chemicals: arrest and prosecute organized crime syndicate members, seize drug supplies, disable money laundering operations, and confiscate drug-related assets: identify, apprehend, prosecute, and treat if required transporters and sellers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(C) Seize proceeds from sales of drugs.</td>
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<td>(S) Identify and seize drug-related assets: prevent and disrupt money-laundering and asset-hiding schemes: identify and prosecute income tax evaders.</td>
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<td>(0) Provide treatment and rehabilitation to the consuming public detoxification and treatment: provide rehabilitative services and prevent recidivism.</td>
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<td>(C) Increase public awareness and educate the public on the desirability of drug avoidance.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(S) Identify segments of public at risk: design programs responsive to community needs and mobilize community resources: create an environment in which substance abuse is recognized as unacceptable behavior.</td>
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<td>(0) Coordinate agency efforts, integrate intelligence gathering, share information, evaluate results, and prepare records and,</td>
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<tr>
<td>(S) Enhance efficiency and effectiveness: identify collaborative opportunities: develop control and resource allocation processes: assign responsibility and authority: evaluate adequacy of efforts.</td>
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prospects of compromise. Development along these lines may require re-
direction of U.S. security assistance and foreign military sales efforts.
Liaison and training personnel from the U.S. and elsewhere, while assisting
in developing concepts and introducing equipment, operationally ought to
remain in the background.

Given the normally inaccessible location of crops and laboratories,
transportation assets to insert and extract government forces are also
essential. Transportation may be provided through cooperative efforts of
the U.S. or other allied forces or through the sale or grant of such assets
together with the appropriate training packages. The latter is considered
by the writer to be more appropriate, as it provides a test of the govern-
ment's will and interest in substance abuse, provides assets of wide
utility, and minimizes involvement of U.S. forces.

Crop identification and destruction are carried out by military and
paramilitary organizations, perhaps by themselves or with accompanying
laborers. Such operations must be treated as occurring in potentially
hostile areas, necessitating a requirement for security. Personnel so
engaged are ferried into and out of the area of operations by air or ground
convey. Manual uprooting and cutting of crops is inefficient, compared
with herbicide spraying or dispersal of biologic agents, when effective.
Unfortunately, no satisfactory agents are as yet available; research to
find agents with improved action ought to receive sufficient support. Upon
availability of such agents, additional ground and aerial spraying equip-
ment and training should be made available by grant or sale.
Operationally, the strategy of crop substitution depends on agriculturists identifying crops which may be successfully grown in a particular area and convincing the indigenous peasants to commit themselves to the new crop. Markets for the crop must be found and subsidies guaranteed if a predetermined return cannot be earned. Parenthetically, enforcement activities which narrow the price differential enhance the prospect of success here. Successful substitution of a low-return commodity for a high-return (drug) crop may also depend on other incentives, perhaps roads, water distribution systems, or land ownership, for example. Plans and backing for such incentives ought to be in place before crop substitutions are attempted. Cash subsidies might also be paid, as already suggested, to peasants who verifiably destroy their drug crops and let the land lie fallow.

The identification and apprehension of chemists and location and destruction of their laboratories follows the same operational pattern as the location and eradication of drug crops, in terms of forces and transportation assets required. It is, additionally, desirable to have the capability to analyze laboratory equipment and chemicals seized to determine their origin. This information is then made available to those implementing the strategy of identifying and intercepting such equipment and chemicals. This last effort is a multinational one, to identify all producers and locations of manufacture. Legislation may be required to authorize the conduct of sales records review of all producers, the control of exports and imports, and possibly the issuance of special licenses to produce or handle these items. A complimentary requirement that essential
chemicals somehow be adulterated in their manufacture to render them useless in the processing of drug, might also merit research; no efforts in this regard were found by the writer.

The identification, apprehension, and prosecution of drug traffickers, possibly related to insurgents, are classical special operating forces (SCF), police, and prosecutorial functions. Operationally, given the expected level of violence in such operations and the possibility of compromise of intelligence through corrupt personnel, the organization, training and utilization of elite, single mission units might very well be in order. US mobile training teams could be called upon to provide the required training. The seizure of manufactured drug might be entrusted to such units. These units also ought to possess the capability of properly identifying seized drug and destroying it as soon as possible to avoid it being put back in the pipeline by unscrupulous or corrupt officials.

The development of a basis for extradition of drug traffickers can be accomplished through bilateral negotiations. While extradition and prosecution in the U.S. has been front page news with the recent extradition of a Colombian national, it seems plausible that such actions might generate less rather than more cooperation and generate unacceptably higher levels of retaliatory violence against U.S. citizens.

The efficacy of the strategy of destroying clandestine facilities has been berated because of the speed with which these can be put back into operation. This problem might very well be amenable to new cratering or barrier technologies that U.S. forces may develop or possess. One might
also consider the employment of scatterable mine technologies, were likely legal and political challenges to these overcome. A decision to share such technologies within bounds imposed by security classification would seem appropriate. Seizure of transportation and other drug-related assets could be legislated by all nations, perhaps using U.S. statutes as models; assistance in this area ought to be continued through diplomatic and legal channels.

Operationally, implementation of smuggling strategies may be separated into component land, sea, and air strategies. The land strategy seeks to intercept couriers with drug grown in or transhipped through Mexico while traversing the Mexico–United States boundary. The problem here, and to a lesser extent at sea, has been complicated by the comingling of drug couriers with others professing to seek relief from dire economic circumstances or political oppression. The latter may enjoy some level of tacit approval or occasionally outright assistance by or from the American populace. Once these larger questions of immigration policy and priorities are resolved, operations against couriers, which might very well evolve into violent encounters, could proceed unimpeded.

Such operations are envisioned as requiring traditional military counter-infiltration techniques; present efforts ought to be augmented in that light. Military units, possibly from the Reserve Components, could patrol randomly chosen sections of the border, accompanied by a detachment of Customs Service or other officers empowered to arrest, search, and seize. The participation of the National Guard might very well mute political criticism of Central American deployments. The legal alternative
to accompaniment by bonafide enforcement officers, a drastic change of Posse Comitatus, is viewed as politically unlikely.

In conjunction, new electronic surveillance and night imaging equipment ought to be made available for field evaluation and use. Patrolling units would be supported by military communications and a quick-reaction force with sufficient transportation assets should the situation demand reinforcement. It may also be possible to utilize barriers with or without permanent listening posts along vulnerable border sectors.

Focusing next on air strategies, surveillance aircraft on permanent station would provide off-shore, initial contact with planes approaching the continental U.S. If such planes could not be identified through registration checks or if they met a developed profile, a high-performance chase aircraft would be alerted and would follow the suspect plane to its landing field. As this occurred, a quick reaction force, possibly military in makeup, with a law enforcement detachment, would be sent aloft to land behind the suspect plane and conduct an appropriate search (and seizure) operation. Local law enforcement officers would also be alerted and participate, as available. Should the landing site turn out to be a clandestine airfield, consideration might be given to permanently disabling it in some manner, i.e. with barrier material.

The timing of such operations is so exquisite that the most sophisticated C3I system, full cooperation of all involved agencies, and interoperability of their equipment is surely essential. In this regard, the U.S. Customs Service - U.S. Coast Guard confrontation is to be deplored.
It is the writer's view that the Coast Guard would provide better stewardship of the high dollar cost, high technology equipment which is necessary for successful interdiction operations. If one accepts the view that military forces, perhaps from air mobile units, might provide the most effective quick-reaction teams for these situations, it may follow that the Coast Guard, which is better prepared to interface with those forces, should be given the preferred role.

Sea strategy requires operations similar to those to be conducted in the air, at least as relates to identification and interception. Air and sea operations are not truly separate strategies but inter-related and mutually-supportive, with the same organizational imperatives. The extension of the sea strategy into the coastal waterways does suggest additional capability, that of shallow draft craft available to navigate Florida and south Georgia inland waters. One wonders, parenthetically, if U.S. Navy craft used in conducting riverine operations in Southeast Asia remain available and if the Navy has an enduring interest in this "brown water" mission. Such craft might either carry, or have available for deployment, a quick reaction team with a law enforcement detachment or capability. These teams would follow the smugglers, once landed, and conduct such activities as the situation warranted. Alternative or adjunctive operations might involve inserting, for an extended period, a team, perhaps of Special Forces, into a surveillance area suspected of being a landing zone. The team, again with attached law enforcement capability, would be on hand to "meet" drug cargoes and take appropriate actions.

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Implementation of smuggling strategies is to a significant extent hardware-dependent. High technology communications and intelligence gathering equipment, aircraft, and ships, are essential. Much of the equipment now in use is of military origin, on loan to the various agencies active in interdiction. Both the priority and sustainability of these efforts and the continuing requirement for military readiness training strongly argue that such an arrangement not be permanent.

A concern common to air and sea strategies is that, upon interception, drug-laden craft will alter their courses for safe havens in the Caribbean. Such possibilities must be anticipated with appropriate prior coordination and combined exercises.

The strategy of identifying and apprehending chemists and intercepting their equipment and supplies has already been discussed. Variations of the operations suggested to carry out this strategy, identification of production facilities, review of sales records, placement of import-export restrictions, and requirements for licensure, may all be appropriate within the U.S. Operations directed at the prosecution and incarceration of organized crime members have been codified into statute and have enjoyed recent success under Department of Justice auspices. The recent albeit unsuccessful Congressional proposal to institute the death penalty speaks to hardening attitudes in this area. Coordination of investigations and prosecution with state and local efforts takes place under the aegis of the thirteen regional offices of the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCLETF).
The prosecution, incarceration, and treatment of individuals of less importance, i.e. the transporters, wholesales, and retailers of drug are the responsibility of state and local law enforcement and public health professionals, using existing methods and organizations. Concern rests with the funding available and the size of the force necessary to carry out these operations as well as with their occasional compromise resulting from corruption. In specific circumstances, augmentation by federal resources is desirable and necessary. Certainly, continued Federal, state, and local cooperation within specified geographic areas of responsibility through the mechanism of Law Enforcement Cooperative Committees is to be encouraged and supported.\(^6\) It is the writer's impression that operations to accomplish strategies described in this and the previous paragraphs are well conceived, organized, coordinated, and accomplished, if somewhat under-resourced.

The identification and seizure of drug-related assets is a relatively simple matter, should such assets be present on apprehension of the traffickers themselves. Such assets are to be catalogued and properly impounded and stored. The identification of assets not present may require relatively sophisticated police and accounting methods. The assets seized have been diverse, to include gold and silver bullion,\(^7\) and one wonders whether management and disposal of such assets have returned top dollar to the government. Another derivative area of interest is the use of incentives or payback, which permits agencies which seize property, as a boat or airplane, to keep and utilize it or to plow back the drug dollars into their operations. Such incentives are obviously distinct from the equally compelling need to provide career incentives to personnel working in substance abuse law enforcement.
The trafficker's retention of large sums of drug-related cash presents a vulnerability to exploit. Under current legislation, deposits of large sums of money, defined as over $10,000, require reporting by the financial institution. Whether this amount is a proper threshold may be open to question. A related issue, the use of cash to purchase real estate, automobiles, etc., is not as carefully monitored, unless indirectly as the seller deposits the proceeds. Whether a requirement to produce a validated Taxpayer Identification Number or Social Security Account Number when making large purchases for cash would prove useful or drive the cash underground is an interesting question. The larger question — whether strengthened financial asset disclosure would prove useful in this arena — might also be explored. The still more encompassing question of who owns American-based assets and what sway they hold over the domestic economy is of some concern. 36

The related practice of money laundering has become an international issue to be addressed through revision of bank secrecy statutes. Cooperation with the U.S. in this area appears to be an appropriate test for nations wishing to maintain friendly relations and to continue receiving aid and assistance. A radical approach to this issue might involve printing "new" dollars, rendering overseas and cached drug dollars worthless.

A last operational approach to the financial disruption of traffickers is through investigation of the possible evasion of Federal income tax. A Memorandum of Understanding between the Departments of Justice and Treasury to facilitate such an approach is under negotiation. 35
Translating a drug education (primary prevention) strategy into operationally efficient programs depends on identifying and targeting at-risk populations. This can be done on a geographic basis by mapping drug-related crimes and arrests or drug addiction or overdose data. It can be done on a demographic basis, aiming at groups of appropriate age, for example, which have been shown to be at higher risk than the general population. High positivity rates in drug testing programs may also be of value. Alternatively, segments of private industry or discrete occupational groups, those representing workers responsible for public safety and utilities, for example, would receive information on drug avoidance.

The degree to which these or other groups would voluntarily devote their time to such efforts and support them without a concurrent drug testing program is an important question. Clearly there are legal hurdles to this proposal. It is suggested that if a domestic consensus on drugs exists and if a drug-free culture is a desired societal objective, drug-testing, particularly in the workplace, will ultimately be accepted as the price to pay for identification of populations at risk.

In a like manner, individuals requiring treatment services may be identified through investigations of accidents or criminal activity, clinical illness, or through drug testing, as discussed previously. One proposal not yet advanced to the writer's knowledge is that all persons arrested for crimes at or above a set threshold be tested. Operationally, implementation of this strategy requires support for laboratory capabilities which are widely distributed and of a relatively high level of sophistication. Different treatment regimes must be available to the casual
user, the regular non-addicted user, as well as to the addict. Such treatment should be available through appropriate outpatient or inpatient facilities which are part of the general mental health system. It is to be anticipated that the more comprehensive a detection program is, the larger the number of persons who will be identified for treatment. Since, based on current experience, a large proportion of these will utilize health services under Medicaid, additional budgetary provisions should be made. Corporate and other organized group health insurance and plans ought to have benefits ample enough to support the expected yields from detection programs. Treatment plans and financial support for followup rehabilitation complete the accomplishment of this strategy.

This presentation now turns to fundamental organizational questions. If the division of strategies and derivative concepts of operation outlined above can be accepted, the questions are: Who frames government policy, that is who prioritizes between competing strategies? Who directs the organization, resource allocation, and evaluation of agency efforts? Without such direction, can adherence to agreed upon operations, inter-agency communication and cooperation, and program evaluation efforts be effectively monitored? It is the writer's contention that no one of less than cabinet rank ought to perform this function. This follows from the current and continuing involvement of virtually every Executive Department. It seems reasonable, in this view, that the Vice President be designated as Director of Substance Abuse Programs. Such a suggestion is not only appropriate organizationally, but gives visibility and direction to an issue on which a political consensus has been achieved. An alternative,
Presidential appointment of a Cabinet-level equivalent Director, raises questions of Administration commitment and concern with political impact, should successes not come quickly or easily.

It is further suggested that, as a matter of almost equal importance, there be designated, as subordinate to the Vice President, principal deputies for supply strategies, interdiction strategies, and demand strategies. An element independent of these deputies, responsible for program evaluation, should also be designated. Present and prospective involvement leads one to propose that the Secretary of State be responsible for supply strategies, given that they are conducted overseas; the Attorney General (Drug Enforcement Agency) is presently responsible for the definition and management of such operations. If one accepts the premise that supply strategies ought to be planned and carried out within the larger context of a low intensity conflict environment, designation of the Department of State appears logical. It is further proposed that the Secretary of Transportation assume responsibility for interdiction strategies (air and sea), the Secretary of Treasury for interdiction strategies (land), the Attorney General for demand strategies (interfering with preparing and distributing and seizure of assets), and the Secretary of Health and Human Services for demand strategies (prevention and treatment).

Each principal deputy would be expected to form a Strategy Board, a working group comprised of federal agencies active in that area and insure that a coherent plan was developed, resourced, executed, and reported upon. Each such agency would be expected, in turn, to take on the proponency for assigned areas, i.e., develop concepts of operation, equipment require-
ments, and requests for resources which fully demonstrate its commitment to the substance abuse effort. These deputies would also be expected to develop appropriate liaison and cooperative efforts with related state and local activities. There is no doubt that such a reorganization would redirect and subordinate a number of efforts and supplant, for example, existing coordinating bodies, as the Drug Policy Board, chaired by the Attorney General. In the interest of presenting a coherent program to the taxpayer, avoiding duplication and interagency disputes, and generally managing the program to best effect, such a reorganization is highly recommended.

The writer has, in summary, attempted to define, in a hierarchical fashion, those considerations which translate into action against substance abuse. This has in no sense been an exhaustive review; some important aspects of a complete program, action on domestic-grown drug and diversion and controlled substance analogue regulation, have not been considered. The thesis is that only if the antecedents of action against substance abuse are clearly articulated and understood, will they receive both wide political and popular support and substantial government commitment. There is, in the writer's view, a threat which, despite its complexity, is a real and present danger to both world and internal order. There is an appreciation that, in substance abuse, public and national interests meet, despite differences in emphasis and priority. Issuing from these common interests, and using the framework provided by the flow of drugs, one can define an inclusive set of objectives.

The objectives, which describe what is to be accomplished, can be amplified with strategies, which are logically grouped into supply, inter-
diction, demand, and organizational components. It is suggested that while all are supportable and indeed necessary, supply strategies have relatively greater risk and lower likelihood of success. Strategies are then translated into concepts of operation. Organization and leadership of the overall substance abuse effort would be focused at the Vice Presidential level.

It has been argued that military participation in substance abuse efforts is counterproductive to preparedness. From the preceding exposition of strategies and concepts of operations, the writer suggests that military personnel, particularly those with low-intensity-conflict applicable skills, may make significant contributions to the accomplishment of supply and interdiction strategies. Activities are visualized as providing, within the security assistance and foreign military sales programs, the appropriate equipment and training to indigenous forces carrying out specific missions in substance abuses and in the larger imperative of low intensity conflict. In this context, military intelligence assets may also usefully be employed. Direct involvement in operations in source countries is seen as undesirable and potentially counterproductive. In interdiction strategies, it may be said that the detection and pursuit of smugglers into remote areas of the US is best carried out by military units whose mission, equipment, and configuration are suitable to the task. Such units would require augmentation with law enforcement detachments to avoid legal entanglements. Within this limit, military participation would serve as an affirmation of its commitment to help the citizenry resolve this compelling problem.
Implementation of the proposals advanced depend on the political will of the National Command Authority to act decisively in creating an appropriate organizational and funding climate, on the agreement of the Executive Agencies to clarify their present functional involvement and submit to a degree of resource sharing and program direction and evaluation. It depends on the Legislative Branch to mandate and support these efforts through the appropriations process. State and local support must be maintained at a level which signals a continuing commitment to act on the agreed upon strategies. Success depends as well on the continuing popular perception that substance abuse adversely affects the social well being, political and economic stability, and even the national security and thus is deserving of the mobilization and application of significant resources. Only with all these elements in place will the problem of substance abuse be surely purged from our society.
ENDNOTES


17. "Dollars alone won't win war on drugs." USA Today, 14 January 1987, p. 10A.


22. Strategy, p. 11.

23. Ibid.


31. America, p. 52.


34. Frank Ault, "Closing the Border to Drugs: Customs or Coast Guard Mission?," Armed Forces Journal International, November 1986, p. 46.


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