The War Will Not Subside: The Pacific Theater in a NATO-Warsaw Pact War

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THE WAR WILL NOT SUBSIDE: THE PACIFIC THEATER IN A NATO-WARSAW PACT WAR

Kenneth G. Weiss
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ABSTRACT

This paper considers the role of the Pacific theater in a NATO-Warsaw Pact War. It argues that the Pacific theater has been neglected in such a conflict because most war scenarios envision a struggle lasting no more than 30 to 60 days. As a result, the conflict is over too quickly in most scenarios for the interrelationships between the NATO and Pacific theaters to develop conceptually. However, in a long-war scenario, the Pacific theater’s importance in the course and outcome of such a conflict becomes apparent. The military, industrial, and technological potential of the Pacific nations, especially China and Japan, combined with the U.S., constitute a reserve of strength capable of containing or reversing any Soviet success in a conventional conflict in Europe. This paper concludes that (a) current strategy or doctrine based on the refusal to repudiate the “first use” of nuclear weapons has lost much of its credibility as a deterrent, and (b) the tacit or explicit adoption of a long-war strategy to counter Soviet capabilities in a short war should be considered.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Pacific Theater and U.S. Political and Military Goals.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Causes</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Containment or Isolationism?</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deterrence, Short War, Long War</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Triple Entente: China, Japan, and the U.S.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Pacific Strategy</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications for U.S. Peacetime Strategy</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

Despite many efforts at change, the U.S. strategic and military outlook remains Eurocentric, with a NATO-Warsaw Pact War as the centerpiece of a cataclysmic event. Appreciation of the global impact of such a war—specifically its impact on the balance of power in the Pacific and the impact of that balance on developments in a European war—has been insufficiently considered. The reason for this is simple: strategists have tended to focus on short-war scenarios based on the military balances in Europe. The impact of the global balance on prewar developments and possible long-war scenarios has been given much less attention. The considerable potential of the Pacific balance to affect the Soviets' willingness to risk war is frequently noted but seldom analyzed. Geographical realities force the Soviets to include possible Asian developments in their plans for a NATO-Warsaw Pact War. In turn, the Japanese and Chinese may fear that a Soviet victory in such a war will leave them open to Soviet attack or intimidation. Thus, the longer the war, the more onerous Soviet Asian commitments will become and the more likely other nations, especially East Asian ones, will become involved. Even in a short war, the Pacific will be significant because after Europe is devastated, access to Pacific Basin industry and resources will constitute the war's real prize. As it stands now, the U.S. is the "glue" in a (very) loose anti-Soviet grouping in the Pacific that includes Japan, China, South Korea, the ASEAN, and ANZUS nations. Thus, U.S. actions will have an important effect on developments in the region during a NATO-Warsaw Pact War, and those developments will have an impact on the war in Europe.

This paper takes a preliminary look at the political and military impact of a NATO-Warsaw Pact War on the Pacific Basin countries, especially China and Japan. It also looks at the role of U.S. armed forces, particularly the Navy and the Marine Corps, in supporting U.S. political and military objectives. Specifically, it discusses how the U.S. Pacific Fleet could contribute to an effort to form a united front in East Asia against the Soviet Union and how that and other PACFLT activities might affect developments on the Central Front during a short or long war.

This is a tall order. This paper takes only a broad look at each topic. Rather than concentrating on facts and figures, it emphasizes ideas and concepts that require further study and evaluation.

The paper looks at what U.S. political and military goals in the Pacific should be in a European war; the impact of such a war on China and Japan; the strategy the U.S. should pursue in the Pacific; and the implications of all these issues for current foreign and military policies.

The ideas expressed in this paper were first written in an essay in August 1984, which received wide circulation and discussion.

Old Chinese proverb: The tree may prefer calm, but the wind will not subside.
The role of the Pacific theater* in a European war has been generally treated as an afterthought. For example, some authorities believe efforts to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities outside Europe would only distract attention from the Central Front. General Hackett's two books on the Third World War, which are generally thought to reflect NATO thinking on the subject, have little to say about the Pacific. It has even been argued that a NATO-Warsaw Pact War would be confined to Europe because there was no longer a British Empire to "kick around." The "swing strategy," the idea of shifting forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic theater, reflected the general disregard of the Far East in a war for Europe.

Nevertheless, the Pacific theater is becoming more important in strategic thinking. The Soviet military and naval buildup in the Far East since the mid-1960s has highlighted the importance of China and Japan in tying down Soviet forces in both peace and war. The swing strategy has been largely scrapped, although probably not forgotten, in an effort to persuade Japan (and other friends in the region, including China) that the U.S. would not sacrifice the East to save the West.

In spite of the increasing recognition of its importance, however, the Pacific theater has yet to be integrated into a coherent strategy for a NATO-Warsaw Pact War. The reason for this is apparent: strategic thinking is dominated by short-war scenarios. General Hackett's alternative to victory in a 30-day conventional war is peace on Soviet terms. Members of the U.S. defense community, presumably including the Navy, tend to envision a war that lasts no longer than the Soviet drive to the Rhine, about 30 to 60 days. (Unlike Hackett, they fail to envision a resolution of the conflict.) Indeed, NATO and the U.S. Pacific Command seem to be preparing for different wars. Because the conventional balance favors the Soviets in Europe, NATO holds out the possibility that the allies might resort to nuclear weapons to halt a conventional attack by the Soviet Union. Thus, NATO has refused to abandon a "first use" nuclear option, even though Moscow's buildup in strategic, theater, and tactical nuclear weapons has rendered NATO's nuclear threat less and less credible. U.S. commanders in the Pacific, on the other hand, favor a conventional war because U.S. naval forces enjoy an edge in that area over the Soviet Pacific Fleet. In short-war scenarios, the conflict is over too quickly for the interrelationships between the two theaters to develop conceptually. So NATO and the Pacific Command tend to plan for two separate wars.

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* The term "Pacific theater" is used here to denote CINCPAC Command's region of responsibility, which includes both the Pacific and Indian oceans.
But short-war scenarios are only a symptom of the problem. The real problem is the failure to establish a connection between U.S. political and military goals in such a war and U.S. strategy. Once the U.S. has a clear understanding of its goals in the war, it can establish the relationship between the Pacific and European theaters.

FIRST CAUSES

An awareness of the "first causes," or underlying premises, of U.S. security policy is important in understanding what U.S. political and military goals might be in a NATO-Warsaw Pact War.

Before and after World War I, U.S. foreign policy was based on isolationism—a policy of avoiding European entanglements while barring outside intrusions in the Western Hemisphere and pursuing commercial advantage everywhere. This policy was successful in the 19th century largely because the advanced nations of Europe were caught up in their own disputes and because Great Britain prevented any one nation from dominating the continent. Britain did so in the belief that her security would be endangered if any one country could harness the continent's industry and resources against the home island. Britain's navy, in turn, protected the sea lanes, upon which the country's empire, trade, and prosperity depended. With Britain bearing the burden of world order, the U.S. was free to neglect international security problems and concentrate on developing its economy and commerce. But London's ability to play a world role was severely challenged by the First World War and was ended by the Second. America's "free ride" ended in 1945 when it assumed Britain's role in maintaining world order.

U.S. foreign policy was no longer based on isolationism but on containment. Containment, as described by its prophet George Kennan, is very similar to Britain's policy. The U.S. must prevent the Soviet Union, which emerged from the war as the major threat to America's security, from dominating the Eurasian continent, especially the other three centers of military and industrial power: Great Britain, the Rhine Basin, and Japan. The U.S. should also maintain a sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere; secure access to the world's industrial, raw material resources; and gain overseas bases vital to such a policy.

John Lewis Gaddis quotes Kennan as saying:

Our safety depends on our ability to establish a balance among the hostile or undependable forces of the world: to put them where necessary one against the other; to see that they spend in conflict with each other, if they must spend it at all, the intolerance and violence and fanaticism which might otherwise be directed against us, that they are thus compelled to cancel each other out and exhaust them—
selves in internecine conflict in order that the constructive forces, working for world stability may continue to have the possibility of life.\textsuperscript{12}

This was necessary to achieve the fundamental objectives of our foreign policy, which are the following:

1. To protect the security of the nation, by which is meant the continued ability of this country to pursue the development of its internal life without serious interference, or threat of interference, from foreign powers; and

2. To advance the welfare of its people by promoting a world order in which this nation can make the maximum contribution to the peaceful and orderly development of other nations and derive maximum benefits from their experience and abilities.\textsuperscript{13}

Containment then provided the rationale for a forward defense policy: Soviet hostility would be tamed by American strength and patience. As a result, the U.S. broke with tradition and made extensive security commitments abroad. The U.S. has formal defense pacts with more than 40 nations, including collective security treaties like NATO, the RIO Pact, and ANZUS, as well as bilateral arrangements with countries like Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, and South Korea. The U.S. also has numerous informal security ties with countries like Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and China. These security commitments are underwritten by America's nuclear and conventional potential as well as the troops, planes, ships, and bases located around the globe.\textsuperscript{14}

This forward defense strategy is designed to deter Soviet aggression and uphold U.S. interests. But what if deterrence fails? Has containment failed?

**CONTAINMENT OR ISOLATIONISM?**

Even if the deterrent aspect of containment fails, an invasion of Western Europe would represent a desperate effort by the Soviet Union to break out of containment—whatever the precipitating cause in various scenarios: opportunism vis-a-vis Yugoslavia as in Hackett's *Third World War*; a need for Gulf oil as in Clancy's *Red Storm Rising*; or internal troubles in the Soviet Union or Eastern bloc. It would signify Moscow's failure to undermine containment through diplomacy, intimidation, or ideological example. However, it would also represent a determination by the Kremlin that the "correlation of forces" favored the Soviet Union, and that containment could be broken by military action.

The U.S. then would be faced with the stark choice of pursuing containment by other means or retreating back into isolationism. Certainly, its first reaction would be automatic: an attack upon U.S.
troops in Europe would compel a decision to fight. But the decisions of how long the U.S. would fight and at what level of combat it would fight would remain—at least partly—matters of choice.

The Soviets would not make these choices easy. As James McConnell points out, the Kremlin plans to fight a war on terms favorable to it. As the Soviet Union's strategic, theater, and tactical nuclear capabilities have grown to the point that they have largely neutralized the U.S. advantage in these areas, the Soviets have put increasing emphasis on a NATO-Warsaw Pact war fought entirely at the conventional level. Because the Soviets enjoy a decided edge in conventional capabilities, the U.S. and its NATO allies will be forced to decide whether to use nuclear weapons. The idea of using nuclear weapons raises the specter of a Europe and perhaps an America devastated beyond recovery. If the Soviet Union can put NATO in the position of having to decide on suicide or defeat, NATO might well accept defeat.

Of course, the Soviets would be taking a terrible risk in pursuing a war under such an assumption. However, as Geoffrey Blainey points out, wars result from misperception: the belief on one side that victory is possible and on the other that defeat can be avoided. Besides NATO's refusal to make a "no first use" declaration regarding nuclear weapons, the West has evinced little determination to actually use such weapons in extremis. If the stakes were high enough, however unlikely that may be, the Soviets might well be willing to take such a risk.

The risk would be based not only on a military judgment but on a political one as well: that military action would collapse NATO into its constituent parts and drive the U.S. back to its own shores. Adam Ulam suggests that Moscow has been waiting since World War II for Washington to fulfill Roosevelt's prophecy—that the U.S. would withdraw from the continent following an Axis defeat. For the Soviets, then, the prospect of forcing the U.S. to return to its historic policy of isolationism would be a strong incentive for war. Indeed, in Hackett's scenario, the alternative to a NATO victory in a short conventional war is the collapse of the alliance and an end to U.S. power in Europe.

But isolationism is no longer a viable foreign policy for the U.S. As already mentioned, isolationism flourished in favorable historical circumstances that no longer exist. No country is now strong enough to play a role like Britain's and contain a Soviet Union in the flush of victory. The U.S. would be forced to either continue the war after the Soviets reached the Rhine or alter its political system to sustain a level of security sufficient to deter attack or intimidation. Without allies to share the burden of military spending, security would cost much more. The military would play a much larger role in American society and decision-making process than it currently does. Bereft of allies, the U.S. would become a military state on the order of Israel. But unlike Israel, the U.S. would not have Washington to look to for support.
Is this scenario farfetched? Hardly. After Germany defeated France in 1940, the U.S. boosted military spending, introduced conscription, enacted lend-lease legislation to help Britain, and took increasing responsibility for the defense of the Western Hemisphere. Unlike 1940, of course, the U.S. now has nuclear weapons. But after defeat in Europe, U.S. nuclear capabilities might not be sufficient to deter blackmail or intimidation over the long term. Indeed, defeat would increase U.S. reliance (and thus spending) on nuclear weapons for defense. But conventional defense would not be neglected either because Soviet encroachments in the Western Hemisphere would have to be countered by other than nuclear means. After all, U.S. isolationism in the 19th century was never meant to imply isolation from the other countries of the Western Hemisphere (or from the nations of the Pacific). Indeed, defeat in Europe might force the U.S. to declare a new Monroe Doctrine for this hemisphere.

Furthermore, 19th-century isolationism never meant commercial isolationism. Whether the world economic order of relatively free movement of trade, capital, and resources established by the U.S. after World War II would survive a U.S. defeat in Europe is debatable. Even if it did survive, it would do so in a substantially altered form. Soviet lordship over a devastated Europe would force the U.S. to rely on Asia and Latin America for trade and investment. Even now, U.S. trade with the Pacific Basin countries outstrips its trade with Europe. However, a victorious Soviet Union is likely to see access to Asian goods, resources, and technology as one of the fruits of victory. If the Soviets were to gain such access on favorable terms, Soviet economic performance would improve; this would enhance Soviet military capabilities. Moreover, if the Soviets succeeded in denying U.S. access to the Pacific Basin, U.S. economic performance might decline; this would place additional burdens on the American society's ability to pay for its defense.

Thus, defeat in Europe, even one formalized in a peace treaty, is likely to make the Pacific a new battleground for U.S.-Soviet contention. In the end, there is no escape from a policy of containment. If it fails in Europe, it must succeed in Asia. As Kennan foresaw, the U.S. must seek countervailing sources of strength to limit the Soviet threat to the U.S. and thereby preserve America's independence and democratic institutions. After a European defeat, those sources of strength could be found only in Asia, specifically China and Japan. Outside Europe, only China and Japan, in cooperation with the U.S., would have the requisite manpower, economic strength, and geographical location to contain or defeat the Soviet Union in the event of a catastrophe on the Western Front. Since isolationism is not a viable alternative, "real" peace would not follow a Soviet advance to the Rhine. The struggle would continue in one form or another.

DETERRENCE, SHORT WAR, LONG WAR

The U.S.'s willingness to continue the struggle in the form of a protracted conventional war could have important implications for
deterrence. The adoption of a long-war strategy could offset the Soviet advantage in a short war and thereby enhance deterrence.

Soviet conventional superiority on the continent has posed a problem for NATO planners since the inception of the alliance. Until recently, Moscow's conventional strength was largely countered by U.S. superiority in strategic and tactical nuclear weaponry. By the late 1970s, the Soviet Union had caught up with the U.S. in numbers and sophistication of both strategic and tactical weapons. Moreover, the U.S. has now deployed Pershing II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) in Europe and Peacekeeper (MX) missiles in the U.S. to offset the Soviet's superiority in intermediate-range nuclear weapons (SS-20s and Backfire bombers) and counterforce strategic weapons (SS-18s and SS-19s). These deployments have sparked controversies that have undermined the credibility of a "first use" doctrine by the West.24

Furthermore, all efforts to build up NATO conventional forces to adequate levels have failed so far. The Lisbon goal of 1952, which envisioned the creation of 96 divisions in 2 years, fell far short of the mark. Although the adoption of the flexible response doctrine in the 1960s called for a boost in conventional strength, the plan's force requirements were never achieved. In the late 1970s, NATO allies agreed to a 3 percent per annum increase in defense spending, but this has been slowed by the recession. Even the recent substantial increases in U.S. spending on defense cannot hope to offset both the prior and current increments in Soviet defense spending. In fact, the promising technological developments in deep-strike conventional weapons have been slowed by squabbles over their cost.25

Yet, it is worth remembering that NATO was not conceived as an integrated alliance capable of repelling a Soviet conventional strike. The alliance was originally meant to be a "guarantee pact." Deterrence was based on a U.S. assurance to oppose any Soviet effort to occupy Western Europe. In other words, Moscow, unlike Germany in the 1930s, was put on notice that the U.S. would repeat its effort in World War II and mobilize its considerable capabilities to defeat a Soviet invasion. Indeed, no permanent commitment of U.S. troops to the continent was envisioned at the signing of the NATO treaty. In a sense, Soviet victory in a conventional attack was conceded at the outset. Deterrence was based on America's potential capabilities (including its very limited nuclear one) in a war of uncertain duration rather than actual allied strength in Europe.26

NATO then has come full circle. It is increasingly a guarantee pact based on the potential capabilities of the alliance as a whole, and particularly those of the United States, rather than a military organization based on the actual capabilities of its members. However, the situation on the ground is arguably more serious than in the 1940s. The Soviets, in fact, drew down their conventional forces as rapidly as the U.S. did after World War II in order to concentrate on rebuilding Soviet society and industry shattered by the war.27 On the other hand, the potential capabilities of U.S. allies and friends have
grown exponentially since World War II. Western Europe alone has a GNP larger than the Warsaw Pact,\textsuperscript{28} Even if the Soviets were to succeed in occupying much of West Germany in a short campaign, most of Europe's economic strength would be available to the alliance if the allies managed to hold at the Rhine. Indeed, West Germany east of the Rhine would be largely devastated and of little industrial benefit to the Soviet Union. Even if Europe west of the Rhine suffered economic losses (or were also lost), the U.S. would have access to Japan's economic and technological strength, which is second only to the U.S.'s own.\textsuperscript{29} Moreover, Japan's economic strength is supplemented by that of the newly industrializing countries in Asia and Latin America.\textsuperscript{30} Finally, unlike in the late 1940s, China presents a major military threat to the Soviet Union in Asia.

In a long conventional war, the U.S. would have the time to enlist the strength of its friends and allies to more than offset any gains the Soviets might have made in a short conventional campaign in Europe. A long-war strategy would pit U.S. strength against Soviet weaknesses—the potential capability of the U.S. and its allies to wage a protracted war against an economically, industrially, and technologically inferior foe. As General Vessey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, pointed out recently, "We're not building a force to march out against the Russians and defeat them. We're building a force that, in conjunction with our allies, will deter a war and keep the peace."\textsuperscript{31} Thus, a long-war strategy would strengthen deterrence by negating any Soviet political and military gains achievable in a short conflict. A short war would not break NATO. It would not force the U.S. back into isolationism.

Moreover, a long-war strategy would shift the decision to risk nuclear escalation back to Moscow. The Soviets have indicated that they fear an all-out nuclear exchange would leave their country so devastated that it would be an easy prey for China in a postnuclear conflict. Indeed, they also seem well aware of the implications of a long conventional war. As McConnell points out, they have been considering their options in a protracted conflict.\textsuperscript{32} They have also begun to consider their strategy in a two-front war in which one front clearly involves Asia.

So the adoption of a long-war strategy is not a panacea. It does not mean that the U.S. and its allies can neglect their defenses, especially since the Soviets are already thinking about how they can win a long war. But it does mean that the U.S. should review its strategy for fighting such a war. This strategy should be designed to sustain the U.S. in a protracted conventional conflict and to encourage China, Japan, and others to support the U.S. in the war. Moreover, the U.S. and its allies should improve those capabilities that would help them in a long war.

But would China and Japan support the U.S. in such a conflict?
Despite very different cultures, histories, and political systems, China and Japan's foreign and military policies are, like those of other nations, influenced by changes in the balance of power. The growth of strength in the region have narrowed the differences in perceptions of the Soviet threat among the U.S., China, and Japan.

The extent of that narrowing is extraordinary when one recalls the differences in the three countries' viewpoints in the early and middle 1960s. For the U.S., the cold war with the Soviets reached a climax in this period. A series of crises occurred in U.S.-Soviet relations between 1959 and 1965: the U-2 affair, the building of the Berlin Wall, the Bay of Pigs incident, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and, of course, the Vietnam War. For China, the U.S. remained the principal foe, despite a significant deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations in the 1960s. Indeed, in 1965, some Chinese leaders argued that China should unite with the Soviet Union to counter U.S. intervention in Vietnam. For Japan, it was a period of security without responsibility. Japan could bask in U.S. protection afforded by the mutual defense treaty while many of its pacifist-oriented citizens could revile its renewal in 1960. As a result of the controversy, President Eisenhower was forced to cancel his plans to visit Tokyo that year.

On the other hand, President Reagan visited not only Japan in 1983 but also China in 1984. In Japan, the President was hosted by Prime Minister Nakasone, a former Director General of the once-suspect Japan Defense Agency. Indeed, opinion poll after opinion poll now demonstrate widespread public support for the Japanese self-defense forces. Despite some disappointment over the amount of Japanese defense spending, U.S. officials, such as Assistant Secretary of Defense Armitage, have expressed appreciation for the improvements the Japanese have made in their defense forces. Moreover, the U.S. and Japan have increased their level of military cooperation. Japanese military units regularly participate with U.S. ones in joint exercises. Indeed, Japanese forces have also joined in RIMPAC exercises, which include the military forces of Australia, New Zealand, and other Pacific nations. Finally, in recent years, Japan's budget for defense has risen while other parts of its budget have declined.

In Beijing, the President met with China's defacto leader, Deng Xiaoping, a man the Soviets have designated one of their primary foes. During the visit, the U.S. agreed to sell commercial nuclear technology to China. The Soviets were clearly unhappy with the advance in Sino-U.S. relations. In an apparent fit of pique over the President's visit and Sino-Vietnamese tensions in Indochina, the Kremlin postponed Deputy Premier Ivan Archipov's May visit to Beijing the day before it was scheduled to begin. Moreover, as a result of Secretary of Defense Weinberger's trip in 1983, China's Defense Minister Zhang Aiping visited the U.S. in June to discuss Sino-U.S. military cooperation. During the visit, the two governments announced that they "agreed in principle" on U.S. cooperation in improving selected Chinese anti-tank and anti-air
capabilities. The Chinese officials termed the Reagan and Zhang visits a success, and the Soviets stepped up their criticism of China's policies. The Soviets have also begun paying an unusual amount of attention to China's efforts to improve its military capabilities. Although the Archipov visit went ahead later that year, the Soviets and Chinese remain wary of each other.41

Moreover, Sino-Japanese relations have improved greatly since the 1960s.42 Normal relations were established in 1973 replacing unofficial trade as the principal means of contact.43 Japan is now China's largest trading partner with two-way trade amounting to nearly $20 billion.44 In the fall of 1983, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang visited Japan. As the Japan Economic Survey put it:

It is difficult to overstate the importance of the Hu visit to Japan-China relations. His very presence was significant in that it was his first visit to a country aligned with the West. Statements issued during the talks reflected support for a Japanese defense buildup that would supplement the U.S. role in the region. China's leaders unconcerned or even supportive of Nakasone's strong pro-U.S. outlook, looked to this visit in part to solidify triangular relations among the PRC, Japan, and the United States.45

In return, Prime Minister Nakasone visited Beijing in March 1984. Unlike other Japanese prime ministers, Nakasone emphasized global issues as well as economic ones in his discussions with the Chinese. China and Japan agreed that the Soviet Union represented the greatest threat to security in Asia and that both countries would gain by developing their ties to the United States. Japan also agreed to support China's Four Modernizations with a seven-year $2.08 billion credit. Moreover, the visit of China's Defense Minister Zhang Aiping to Tokyo in July 1984 may represent a significant first step in developing military ties between China and Japan. (Of course, the Japanese and Chinese will remain wary of each other for the foreseeable future, but that does not preclude the development of limited security ties.)46

The shift in the balance of power is responsible for this dramatic change in Chinese and Japanese attitudes towards the U.S., the Soviet Union, and each other. While U.S. strength in the Pacific declined with the end of the Vietnam War, Soviet forces in the Far East increased from approximately 22 divisions in 1965 to 53 divisions today. Likewise, the number of Soviet combat aircraft in the Far East increased from less than 1,500 to more than 2,000; warships increased from less than 600 to more than 800.47 The Soviets have also modernized their forces in the region to include SS-20 missiles, Backfire bombers, and Kiev-class carriers.48 Both the Chinese and Japanese have noted the shift in overall capabilities away from the U.S. and NATO towards the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.49
Furthermore, the growth of Soviet military power has been accompanied by Moscow's tendency to bully China, Japan, and other Asian nations. For example, in the Ussuri crisis of 1969, the Soviet Union tried to intimidate China into settling differences with Moscow on Soviet terms. In 1978, the Kremlin signed friendship treaties with Vietnam and Afghanistan partly in an effort to encircle and contain China. Moscow supported Vietnam in Hanoi's invasion of China's client Kampuchea. When China invaded Vietnam in retaliation, the Soviets deployed forces and sent military aid in support of Hanoi. To intimidate Japan into abandoning plans to sign a peace treaty with China containing an antihegemony clause, the Soviets in 1978 deployed military forces for the first time to the northern islands claimed by Japan. When Nakasone promised to improve Japan's defenses in a 1983 visit to Washington, Moscow threatened to make Japan's "unsinkable aircraft carrier" into a nuclear wreck. And both China and Japan were alarmed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

On the other hand, the decline of U.S. power in the region also drew China and Japan closer to the U.S. After President Nixon pledged to withdraw troops from South Vietnam and to limit U.S. involvement in future conflicts in the Guam Doctrine of 1969, China began to view the U.S. as a declining power in East Asia and thus a suitable partner to oppose Soviet hegemonism. The fall of South Vietnam in 1975 and the Carter administration's proposal to draw down U.S. forces in Korea in 1977 awakened Japan to the fact that security was no longer a "free good." Moreover, instability in the oil markets and in the Persian Gulf since 1973 jolted Tokyo into realizing that U.S. forces might be otherwise committed if general war broke out. Both countries worried that the Soviets were trying to gain control of the sea lanes to the Persian Gulf and drive the U.S. out of Europe and Asia. The Defense of Japan 1977 declared:

Along Japanese oil tanker routes in the Indian Ocean, more than 20 Soviet ships were constantly observed during 1976, most of which belonged to the Soviet Pacific Fleet which is based in Vladivostok...No doubt this activity was also directed at reducing American naval control of these areas and at increasing the political and psychological influence of the Soviet Union on Asian nations through expanded Soviet naval presence.
As the *Defense of Japan* 1984 puts it:

Moreover, backed by its military buildup, the Soviet Union is trying to expand its influence to the Middle East, Africa, Southeast Asia, Central America, and others. These regions are unstable because of many elements of trouble, such as territorial, ethnic, religious, and ideological problems and are suitable targets for Soviet advance. For the West-Camp nations, on the other hand, these regions are sources of supply of oil, which is essential for their survival and prosperity, and various other natural resources and energy, and, therefore, the maintenance of peace and stability of these regions is vital to the peace and stability of the world.61 (Emphasis added.)

The Chinese Communist Party paper *Hongqi* (Red Flag) echoed Japanese sentiments even more explicitly in 1982:

[The geographical situation of the USSR] makes it imperative for the Soviet hegemonists to establish for themselves a "bow-shaped navigation line" in the east that links the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Southwest Pacific, the Sea of Japan, and the three continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa, if the Soviet navy wants to enter the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean to scramble for supremacy with the United States. The establishment and control of this navigation line will not only link their Black Sea Fleet with their Pacific Fleet and enable them to support one another, but will also enable the Soviet hegemonists to close up the channel through which the U.S. Pacific fleet enters the Indian Ocean, reduce the strength of the United States in the Far East, and threaten China from the seas.62 (Emphasis added.)

As a result, both China and Japan have adopted more assertive naval strategies designed to protect their neighboring waters. For example, Chinese naval deployments are designed in part to counter the Soviet presence in the China seas.63 The Japanese have promised to acquire the wherewithal to protect Japan's SLOCs for 1,000 miles out, to close the straits to the Soviets in wartime, and to control Japan's air space.64

However, both Japan and China realize that they need the U.S. to help contain Soviet power. Unlike in the 1960s, both countries approve
of U.S. efforts to improve its military capabilities. As the 1983 issue of the Defense of Japan puts it:

However, the accumulated effect through the consistent military buildup has been particularly conspicuous in recent years, and the East-West military balance may become tipped in favor of the East camp if the situation is left as it is.... In perceiving this situation, the United States has started overall modernization of its forces and has improved its preparedness in order to maintain and strengthen its deterrent power, and other West-camp nations have been also striving to strengthen their defense capability according to their positions.

In turn, the Chinese press paid close attention to the press conference held in Bangkok by the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command in December 1983:

[Admiral Crowe] noted that what the Soviet Union has done in this part of the world has aroused much concern in the Western world. "It is necessary to deter Soviet aggression in this part of the world. In the past three years we have seen continued improvement of our strength and modernization of the naval and air forces in these regions," he said.

And as one U.S. official put it during Reagan's trip: "There was no question in the private meetings about the Chinese concern for what the Soviets are doing in Afghanistan, and they did not object in any way to our arms buildup. It's the reality of the Soviets that made dealing with the Chinese possible."

If the shift in the balance of power has forced the Chinese and Japanese to improve their own defenses and to rely on the U.S., then a fundamental change in that balance, such as a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, should propel them towards the U.S. The reason is simple: China and Japan know the consequences they would face should the USSR defeat NATO. As one Chinese analyst put it, "China is not and will not be an ally of the United States.... Being an ally does not necessarily make one a resolute and trustworthy partner. On the contrary, a partner within an antihegemonic United Front may contribute more than some allies. In the worst case, when the Soviet Union succeeds in edging the U.S. out of the Eastern Hemisphere, the People's Republic of China will definitely be the last on the old continent to fall." And as a Chinese military officer in Washington said recently, "When war comes, we will be with you."
The Japanese also realize that their security is bound up with Western Europe. As Nakasone put it in an interview with Le Monde:

In addition, the fact that Japan is trying to improve its defense forces while respecting the Constitution and remaining faithful to its fundamental defense policy has, I think, positive effects on the maintenance and strengthening of confidence in the Japanese-American security agreements. Consequently, this contributes to the Western nations' security of Asia and, consequently, of the whole world....

I am convinced that the maintenance of firm solidarity among the three poles—Japan, the United States, and Europe—is now the most important element of world peace and prosperity. I would like to pursue a diplomacy and world policy based on these three poles.70

But would the Soviets represent a threat to China and Japan after winning a defacto or dejure victory in Western Europe? The answer is almost certainly yes. Like the Germans in World War II, the Soviets would surely be tempted to eliminate the threat on their eastern flank. Germany's invasion of Russia in 1941 was not just a fascist ideological crusade against communism.71 Rather, it represented a logical outcome of the German victory in the West in 1940. Consider the situation in 1940 to 1941: England was winning the Battle of Britain; the United States was moving towards supporting London; the Soviet Union was increasing its military strength. If Germany had stood still, Berlin could have found itself in a worse position than it was in before the war. Hitler was forced to attack Russia before his potential enemies could coalesce against him.72 A Soviet victory in a NATO-Warsaw Pact war would produce a similar situation whether or not the war was formally ended. The U.S. would continue mobilizing. China and Japan would have little choice but to improve their military strength, no matter what happened in Europe. The Soviets could find themselves in a worse situation than they were in before the war.

There is also evidence that Moscow senses the logic of the situation. As already mentioned, the Soviets have indicated that they fear a strategic conflict with the U.S. would leave the Soviet Union exhausted and prey to the Chinese.73 In regard to a conventional conflict, Soviet military writings have begun to pay attention to problems involved in fighting a two-front war.74 Moreover, it should be remembered that the Soviet Union moved its forces eastward to destroy the Japanese Kwantung army in China after Germany surrendered in 1945.75 At the very least, if the Soviets were victorious in the West, they would try to intimidate the Chinese and Japanese into accepting a Soviet version of security in East Asia. And they might very well be
compelled to deal militarily with Japan or China before the balance shifted against them.

So there are strong reasons for China and Japan to fear a Soviet victory in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict and to oppose the Soviet Union in it. However, as noted earlier, wars occur when one side believes victory is possible and the other believes defeat can be avoided. China and Japan will help the West only if they believe the U.S. will support them effectively in the conflict. Thus, U.S. strategy in the Pacific must be geared to demonstrating that the U.S. is determined to carry on the struggle regardless of what happens in Europe. In this way, defeat can be avoided.
A PACIFIC STRATEGY

The implications of a long-war strategy in the Pacific would be very different from those of a short-war strategy. They have different objectives. Short-war strategies in the Pacific have generally looked for ways to punish the Soviets immediately while gaining a position of strength for the peace negotiations. A long-war strategy should be geared to buying time until the U.S. and its friends and allies in the Pacific can actualize their potentially superior power. At the same time, it should demonstrate U.S. staying power and encourage friends and allies to do more for themselves.

Thus, a long-war strategy would not necessarily seek early entry for China and Japan into the war. In the initial stage, it would look to China and Japan to hold down Soviet forces in the Far East while providing the West with the wherewithal for continuing the war. It would look to China and Japan to build up their strength to the point that they were strong enough to contribute to defeating the Soviets, separately or together, or to the point that the Soviets were tempted to preempt.

Is this farfetched? Not at all. A long-war strategy turns an apparent weakness in the Pacific into a strength. The Chinese, after all, are not allies. They are disposed to lean towards the West, but they are probably not likely to join the war early on. The Japanese, on the other hand, are allies, but the mutual security treaty does not oblige them to join the U.S. in the war until they themselves are attacked. Moreover, their constitution positively forbids them to enter a war until they are attacked.

In a short war, Chinese and Japanese nonbelligerency would be a disadvantage early on because the war would be over before they could have a real impact. In a long war, their nonbelligerency could be an advantage early on. This is not remarkable when one considers how the U.S. viewed China and Japan before Pearl Harbor. After the outbreak of war in Europe, the U.S. stepped up its support for Chiang Kai-shek's struggle with the Japanese in an effort to pin down Japan in China. While the U.S. was inching ever closer to war against Germany, it hoped to force Japan out of China and Southeast Asia, deter a Japanese attack on British and Dutch colonies (important to the British effort against Germany), break off Tokyo from the Axis alliance, and apparently turn Japan into an armaments supplier for the allies. (Moreover, after Pearl Harbor, the U.S. never insisted on the Soviet Union's attacking Japan before Germany was defeated—when Moscow was strong enough to do so.)

Needless to say, circumstances in the Pacific militated against this strategy in World War II. But circumstances clearly favor such a strategy today. Japan is an ally and a technological giant, but Tokyo
is weak militarily. China is united and a friend, but its large military establishment is not yet a match for the Soviets.\textsuperscript{81} The Chinese may very well be able to pin down more Soviet troops as a pro-U.S. nonbelligerent than it could if it entered the war early on.\textsuperscript{82} Japan can be more easily protected by the U.S. from direct Soviet attack than China. But Japanese nonbelligerency could free U.S. assets to secure objectives more in keeping with a long-war strategy.\textsuperscript{83} Moreover, it would give both China and Japan time to shift to a war economy and mobilize their forces.\textsuperscript{84}

Needless to say, nonbelligerency does not mean strict neutrality. Until 1941, the U.S. was ostensibly neutral. In actuality, before Pearl Harbor, it supported Britain with lend-lease aid, bases for destroyers swap, and naval escorts for British shipping.\textsuperscript{85} Portugal also was neutral. Nevertheless, it allowed its longtime British ally to use naval and air bases in the Azores in 1943 and extended the privilege to the U.S. soon afterwards.\textsuperscript{86} So Japanese nonbelligerency does not necessarily mean that the U.S. could not use its naval and air bases in Japan—as long as they were used ostensibly in the protection of Japan under the aegis of a mutual security treaty predating the conflict.\textsuperscript{87} (Such use could be supported by a legal argument similar to the one Portugal used in granting Britain access to the Azores.\textsuperscript{88}) Moreover, this arrangement would have a tactical advantage: U.S. bases in Japan would be safe from Soviet attack as long as the Soviets respected Tokyo's neutrality. Nonbelligerency would also still allow China and Japan to protect the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the surrounding seas as the U.S. did for Britain before Pearl Harbor.\textsuperscript{89} Even mining the straits around Japanese waters might be justified as a measure designed to protect Japan rather than being condemned as an attack on the Soviets.\textsuperscript{90} China, in turn, could assert its power against Vietnam. (After Spain declared a state of nonbelligerency,\textsuperscript{*} it seized part of Tangier, Morocco, in World War II.\textsuperscript{91}) The point is that Japan and China can make an important contribution to the war effort without actually being belligerent early on. This contribution alone might force the Soviets' hand in the Far East.\textsuperscript{**92}

However, as mentioned earlier, Japanese and Chinese non-belligerency could free U.S. assets early in the war for objectives more suitable to a long war. These objectives should demonstrate U.S. staying power while encouraging China and Japan to do more in their own defense. Securing the SLOCs to China and Japan and to the Persian Gulf oil resources is such an objective. In a 90-day war, oil reserves do not present a serious problem, because enough stocks are in reserve.\textsuperscript{93}

\* It is, of course, not necessary for Japan and China to declare a legal state of nonbelligerency when a defacto one will do just as well.
\** The Chinese and Japanese would, of course, be aware of that risk. But, as has been already mentioned, they are also very conscious of the consequences of a Soviet victory in the West.
However, in a long war, access to oil resources in the Persian Gulf could prove crucial to sustaining Japan's economy. And Japan's economic power would be crucial to mobilizing the U.S.'s and China's potential military power over the long term.*

Soviet military literature has also begun to pay more attention to the importance of the sea lanes in a long war. Soviet naval strategy apparently is moving away from a strictly pro-SSBN role towards an emphasis on SLOC interdiction. (Indeed, the Soviets also seem more interested than in the past in targeting U.S. SSBNs in a conflict.) Moreover, Soviet recognition of the importance of the Far Eastern SLOCs in a war is indicated by their increased presence in the South China Sea.

Therefore, despite the naval difficulties envisioned, the U.S. should secure the SLOCs to the Gulf. This means dealing with the Soviet submarine threat in the Far East by (a) forcing Soviet submarines on the defensive in the forward area, (b) securing the SLOCs with convoys protected by naval and air assets, or (c) using a combination of (a) and (b). It also means dealing with the Soviet political and military threat in the Indian Ocean area by demonstrating U.S. staying power in the region to China, Japan, and friends and allies in the Mideast. This does not necessarily mean committing sizable assets to the task. It could be done by eliminating Soviet naval and air forces athwart the SLOCs in the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia (the latter, perhaps, in tacit cooperation with the Chinese). The U.S. also could station a P-3 squadron (maritime patrol craft armed with Harpoons) in the region. Such a presence would demonstrate that the U.S. would remain in the region. Neutralizing Ethiopian and South Yemeni air capabilities in the region might also be useful. As the war continued, the U.S. could insert forces in the area as opportunity permitted, taking advantage of Soviet preoccupation with the Western Front. Moreover, U.S. diplomacy should seek to forge regional alignments (perhaps including Israel) to help bar Soviet aggression in the area and to permit the operation of U.S. forces in the region.

Such a strategy could be risky because it puts pressure on the U.S.'s capability to sustain operations so far afield. But it has the advantage of being designed to sustain China and Japan (and NATO allies fighting on) over the long haul, thus putting pressure on them to help the U.S. in such nonbelligerent acts as previously mentioned and preparing them to intervene if the Soviets should move in the Southern Theater of Military Operations (TVD).** (Indeed, the U.S. could

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* The Chinese are as concerned as the Japanese about Soviet ability to sever the West's SLOCs to the Persian Gulf and elsewhere.
** One should keep in mind that it is U.S. weakness as well as its strength that has helped to enlist current levels of Japanese and Chinese support against the Soviet Union.
encourage both Chinese and Japanese governments to station troops at the invitation of some Persian Gulf countries to serve as a trip-wire. Current Chinese and Japanese involvement in the Iran-Iraq war suggest that they might be willing to do so. Such a possibility is difficult to imagine in peacetime, but in a world war, countries tend to overcome certain inhibitions rather quickly. In turn, Chinese and Japanese support would put pressure on the Soviets to move either directly against the U.S.'s Far Eastern supporters or indirectly through the Persian Gulf. In either case, the fact that Japanese and Chinese interests would be at stake would make a decision for war by either or both governments more acceptable to their people. After all, it might not be enough for China's and Japan's governments to intervene on the side of the West; the enthusiastic support of their people would be important in any conflict with the Soviets. Allies like Italy in World War II are of dubious value.

Thus, the U.S.'s Pacific strategy should be designed to support China and Japan, encourage them to do more in their own defense, and force the Soviet hand in the Far East as Japan and China gain in strength and in value to the U.S. war effort.

* So far, the Soviets seem more fixated on the Far Eastern theater than on the Southern theater as a potential second front.
The implications of a possible long-war conventional strategy for the U.S. in peacetime are many. The following list is not meant to be exhaustive.

- A long-war strategy might mean the tacit or explicit adoption of a "no first use" nuclear strategy. Although some European governments, especially France's, would be upset by the prospect of such a policy, it would be a popular decision with the European public. Such a policy would put more pressure on Europeans to improve their conventional capabilities. It would also better integrate the U.S.'s Pacific and NATO strategies: Early first use is contemplated in the European theater but not in the Pacific. Moreover, it might help counteract the political advantage the Soviets extract from their superior conventional capabilities in a short war. A long-war strategy does not mean the U.S. should neglect nuclear weapons development and strategies for their use. (Indeed, "no first use" might also make Europeans less fearful of the outbreak of nuclear war and thus make them more willing to accept current improvements in NATO's theater nuclear capabilities for deterrent purposes.) The purpose of such a doctrine is to put the onus of escalation on the part of the Soviets, and thereby enhance deterrence or at least limit the war to conventional weapons. But the Soviets might be tempted to escalate in any case, so the U.S. must have strong nuclear deterrents, including a more powerful one in the Pacific theater where the Soviets have gained an advantage in theater nuclear weapons.

- The U.S. must continue efforts to increase military cooperation with Japan and China. Even small steps like discussions of strategy and tactics increase the psychological commitment of Japan and China to the Western cause. It is worth remembering that Britain's support for France in World War I began with discussions concerning military planning. Moreover, Britain did not become an ally of France before the German attack in 1914.
The U.S. and its allies must continue efforts to reduce dependence on Persian Gulf oil supplies. Moreover, further research should be done, if it has not already been done, on the extent of U.S. and allied dependence on Persian Gulf oil over a protracted period of wartime rationing. Research should also address the extent to which China could serve as an alternative energy supplier for Japan and others.

The Navy should continue its emphasis on logistics, readiness, and sustainability—crucial elements in the conduct of a long war.

The Navy should consider buying more SSNs for deployment in the forward area. In this way, the Soviets will have fewer General Purpose Forces to devote to an anti-SLOC campaign.

Alternatively, the Navy could consider the following:

- more emphasis on aircraft carriers or land-based naval air support to protect convoys.

- a combination of SSNs and air assets for SLOC protection and a forward area campaign.
CONCLUSION

In the U.S.'s ongoing rivalry with the Soviet Union, the U.S. is engaged as much in a war of doctrines or strategies as in a race for armaments. As Thomas Schelling put it:

There is then, something that we might call the "inherent propensity towards peace or war."...It is weapons, organization, plans, geography, communications, warning systems, intelligence, and even beliefs and doctrines about the conduct of war that together have this influence. The point is that this complex of military factors is not neutral in the process by which war may come about.103

It is possible that a military strategy or doctrine based on the refusal to repudiate the "first use" of nuclear weapons has lost much of its credibility as a deterrent, and that the tacit or explicit adoption of a long-war strategy to counter Soviet capabilities in a short war should be considered.

What the content of such a long-war strategy might be requires further consideration. But surely, naval supremacy would be a key component, and the Pacific theater a key element, in that strategy.
For example, this view predominated at a conference on naval strategy held at the Center for Naval Analyses in October 1982.


3. This view was expressed by Dr. Peter Vigor of the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst in a presentation on "Western Analyses of Soviet Military Strategy" to the Strategy Forum of the Center for Naval Analyses, in the fall of 1982.


6. For example, this view predominated at a conference on naval strategy held at the Center for Naval Analyses in October 1982. See also Alan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States (New York: The Free Press, 1984), 581.

7. The credibility of extended deterrence has long been a problem for the Western alliance. See Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981). Yet, many European (and non-European) foreign policy elites continue to prefer nuclear to conventional deterrence. For example, recent statements by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev expressing a desire to eliminate nuclear weapons have provoked some Europeans to sing the praises of the nuclear peace. For example, see the editorial "The Long Nuclear Peace," The Economist (22 February 1986), 15-16. See also The Washington Post (17 February 1986), A1. For one endorsement of the European View, see William F. Buckley, "Don't Give Up the Nukes," The Washington Post (6 March 1986), A23.
8. Foley, "Strategic Factors in the Pacific."


10. For the origins of British foreign and security policy, see R.B. Wernham, Before the Armada: The Emergence of the English Nation, 1485-1588 (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1966). It is interesting to note that the British often preferred isolationism to continental activism, but the exigencies of their geopolitical situation generally made it difficult, if not impossible, for them to pursue an isolationist policy.


12. Ibid., 29.

13. Ibid., 27.

14. For an account of the evolution of U.S. foreign and military policy after World War II, see Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 471-573. No effort has been made here to judge the relative strength of U.S. multilateral, bilateral, and informal security ties. These various defense arrangements are merely cited to illustrate U.S. security policy since World War II.


16. This is implicit in Schelling's analysis of the Cuban missile crisis: "The problem was to find some action that would communicate the threat, an action that would promise damage if the Russians did not comply but minimum damage if they complied quickly enough, and an action that involved enough momentum or commitment to put the next move clearly up to the Russians...A blockade was thrown around the island, a blockade that by itself could not make the missiles go away. The blockade did, however, threaten a minor military confrontation with major diplomatic stakes--an encounter between U.S. naval vessels and Soviet merchant ships bound for Cuba....
Physically, the Navy could have avoided an encounter; diplomatically, the declaration of quarantine and the dispatch of the Navy meant that U.S. evasion of the encounter was virtually out of the question. For the Russians, the diplomatic cost of turning freighters around, or even letting one be examined, proved not to be prohibitive. "Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 81-82.

17. As Schelling points out, "There is undoubtedly a good deal to the notion that the country with the less impressive military capability may be less feared, and the other may run the riskier course in a crisis; other things being equal, one anticipates that the strategically 'superior' country has some advantage. But this is a far cry from the notion that the two sides just measure up to each other and one bows before the other's superiority and acknowledges that he was only bluffing. Any situation that scares one side will scare both sides with the danger of a war that neither wants, and both will have to pick their way carefully through the crisis, never quite sure that the other knows how to avoid stumbling over the brink." Schelling, Arms and Influence, 98-99.


22. In fact, the U.S. tended to pursue an activist course in the Pacific, especially towards China and Japan—either by design or circumstance—before World War II. See Akira Iriye, Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1967). For example, Waldo Heinrichs points out, "From 1835 onward the United States Navy stationed a permanent force in East Asian waters. This
East Indies Squadron, later the Asiatic Squadron, was composed of a handful of assorted vessels that cruised singly up and down the China coast. The British kept as many as nine times the number on the same station. Nevertheless, the American squadron landed marines on at least eight occasions in China before the Boxer upheaval [1900], and its value as an enforcer of treaty rights was readily apparent to American diplomats in Peking.” (Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., "The Use and Threat of Force," in Michel Oksenberg and Robert Oxnam, Dragon and Eagle—United States-China Relations: Past and Future [New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1973], 162-163.) And, of course, Commodore Perry's "black ships" helped "open" Japan in 1853. The Philippines were also a prize of the Spanish-American war of 1898.


26. See Osgood, NATO, the Entangling Alliance for an excellent account of the origins of NATO. As Millett and Maslowski point out, "Truman's rearmament policy rested upon the assumption that if deterrence failed, a war with the Soviet Union would be a protracted struggle in which nuclear weapons might open, but not close, the war." (Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 493.) In turn, Adam Ulam argues the Soviets were impressed by America's potential capabilities: "But Stalin, probably more than any other contemporary national leader, tended to gauge military power by a country's indices of industrial production--so much so that he declared in 1946 that only when the USSR reached an annual output of 60 million tons of steel could it achieve a measure of military security. In 1945 the actual figures were 12.3 million tons for the Soviet Union, as against

27. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, 400-404.

28. The GNPs of the NATO nations of Western Europe in 1983 were (in billions of U.S. dollars): Belgium, $87.8, Denmark, $54.6; France $564.3, West Germany, $699.0, Greece, $40.9; Italy, $350.7, Luxembourg, $3.3, Netherlands, $143.8, United Kingdom, $507.5, Iceland, $2.2, Norway, $35.4, Portugal, $23.0, Spain, $190.1, Turkey, $57.7. The GNPs of the West European nations of NATO totaled $2,778.3 billion. In contrast, the Soviet Union had a GNP in 1983 of $1,843.4 billion. Even when the combined GNPs of the Soviet allies in East Europe were added to that of the Soviet Union, the Western European nations of NATO had a greater combined GNP--$2,778.3 billion compared to $2,565.2 billion. The Soviet Union's allies in East Europe had a combined GNP of $721.8 billion in 1983: Bulgaria, $52.7, Czechoslovakia, $121.0; East Germany, $153.2; Hungary, $73.3; Poland, $212.9; Romania, $108.7. Of course, the United States and Canada decisively swing the economic balance in favor of NATO. The U.S. had a GNP in 1983 of $3,297.8 billion, and Canada had a GNP of $299.4 billion. Thus, the combined GNP of NATO in 1983 totaled $6,375.5. NATO therefore had a combined GNP more than 2-1/2 times that of the Warsaw Pact. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1986 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), 842-843.

29. Japan had a GNP in 1983 of U.S. $1,137.8 billion. Ibid.

30. The GNPs for some newly industrializing countries in Asia in 1983 were (in billions of U.S. dollars): China, PRC, $401.0, China, Taiwan, $52.2; Indonesia, $93.5; South Korea, $80.7; Philippines, $41.6; Malaysia, $27.3; Thailand, $39.5. The GNP for Australia was $149.5 billion, and for New Zealand, $21.8. Ibid.


38. For a review of U.S.-Japanese military cooperation, see *Defense of Japan 1984*, 161-182. Although Japanese opinion has changed in favor of the Self Defense Force as a result of the Soviet threat, that does not mean that the Japanese favor the use of force except in self-defense.

39. Ibid., 179.


41. See Kenneth G. Weiss, "The Sea is Red: The Sino-Soviet Rivalry and its Naval Dimension," Center for Naval Analyses Professional Paper 421, May 1984; Kenneth G. Weiss, "Dragon at Sea: China's Navy in Strategy and Diplomacy," Center for Naval Analyses Research Memorandum 86-2, December 1985, for a more elaborate discussion of Sino-U.S.-Soviet relations. Although Zhang Aiping's visit was announced during Weinberger's trip to China along with the exchange of trips by Premier Zhao Ziyang to the U.S. in January 1984 and President Reagan to China in April, the Zhang Aiping trip probably would not have taken place if the Zhao and Reagan visits had not been considered a success. Indeed, the Chinese did not announce the time of Zhao's visit until May 30. Xinhua, 28 September 1983; Xinhua, 30 May 1984.
42. For a discussion of Sino-Japanese relations in the postwar period, see Barnett, *China and the Major Powers*, 88-152.

43. Ibid.


46. *Far Eastern Economic Review* (5 April 1984), 12-13; see Beijing, Xinhua, 7 July 1984, FBIS: China, 9 July 1984 for the beginning of Zhang Aiping’s visit to Japan.


48. Ibid.


51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.


56. For Japan, see the Diet resolution of 13 March 1980: "To respect every country’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence is the basis of the very spirit of the charter of the United Nations, and is also the dominant principle which is indispensable for maintaining justice and order in the international community.

"The recent Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, however, runs counter to this principle and is an unforgivable act of outrage which threatens peace and security of the world...."
"Thus the government (of Japan) should demand that the Soviet government act in accordance with this resolution which calls for an immediate, unconditional and complete withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, and at the same time make utmost efforts continuously to maintain peace in the world on the basis of the U.N. resolution." Cited in Defense of Japan 1980 (Tokyo, Japan: Defense Agency, 1980), 44. For China, see Weiss, "The Sea is Red"; Weiss, "Dragon at Sea."


59. For example, Defense of Japan 1980 states on page 46, "The U.S. decision to keep sending two carrier battle groups to the Indian Ocean and its vicinity since November last year [1979], seen from the viewpoint of the military balance in Northeast Asia which is greatly concerned with the security of Japan, may considerably affect the mode of U.S. naval presence and the overall military balance in Northeast Asia should the emergency measures be continuously put in effect for quite a long time. However, in order to safeguard the oil supplies from the Middle East and their stable shipping to the Western democracies including Japan, it is considered to be an indispensable measure." In a conversation with this author (Tokyo, Japan, 19 November 1985), one Japanese Foreign Ministry official pointed out that the fact that the U.S. Navy was stretched thin was helpful in gaining greater defense efforts from the Japanese government: While he was worried when the U.S. had two carriers in the Indian Ocean and none in the Pacific, he was less so when there was only one in the Indian Ocean. He believed that too many U.S. forces in the Pacific might make the Japanese more complacent. He also stated that there were no other U.S. forces that could perform a forward presence mission in the Indian Ocean, and that the situation there still required such a presence.


62. Beijing, Hongqi, 1 February 1982, FBIS: China, 18 February 1982, Cl. See also Beijing Review, 23 April 1984, FBIS: China, 2 May 1984, A6-A7 for additional evidence regarding China's view of SLOCs. See also Weiss, "Dragon at Sea."

63. See Weiss, "The Sea is Red"; Weiss, "Dragon at Sea."


69. This remark was made to and cited by Dr. Ronald Montaperto, Defense Intelligence Agency, in a presentation on "The PLA in the Era of Reform" at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C., 18 April 1984.


71. The German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 originated in a dispute over Eastern Europe. The Germans tried to persuade Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov in November 1940 that the British Empire was finished and that the Soviets should take the Central/South Asian portion of the British Empire while the Germans would predominate in the Balkans. The Soviets balked at German dominance there, and Molotov asked, Why, if the British were finished, were they in a bomb shelter seeking protection from a British air raid on Berlin? After the Molotov meeting, Hitler finalized plans to invade the Soviet Union in December 1940. (John L. Snell, Illusion
and Necessity: The Diplomacy of Global War 1939-1945 [Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1963], 62-69. John Toland, Adolf Hitler, [New York: Ballantine Books, 1976], 880-885. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, 297-313.) Only at a conference on 14 June 1941 did Hitler give an ideological content to the coming war with the Soviets. Churchill cites the German General Keitel as saying, "Hitler's main theme was that this was a decisive battle between the two ideologies and that this fact made it impossible to use in this war [with Russia] methods, as we soldiers knew them, which were considered to be correct ones under international law." Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), 368.

72. As Snell puts it: "The aim [of Germany's attack] was clearly expansionistic, but it is possible that the decision to move against Russia was motivated more by concern for the future than from absolute confidence in victory. The USSR was obviously building up its position in Central-Eastern Europe; in the West, by 1942 tremendously increased aid from the United States would be reaching Great Britain, even if the United States stayed out of the war. Explaining his attack on the USSR to Mussolini, Hitler would write on June 21, 1941, that he 'finally reached the decision to cut the noose before it can be drawn too tight.' Anxiety as well as large ambition may thus have led to the irrational military gamble." (Snell, Illusion and Necessity, 68-69.) Toland cites German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop as saying: "The Fuehrer is absolutely right to attack Russia now....The Russians would certainly themselves attack us, if we did not do so now." Toland, Adolf Hitler, 920.


74. McConnell, "The Soviet Shift in Emphasis," Vols. I and II. See also Garrett and Glaser, "Soviet Strategic Perceptions in Peacetime and Wartime." Moreover, the Soviets revealed their concern regarding the implications for a two-front war of the Sino-U.S. agreement to normalize relations in early December 1978 by re-establishing the Soviet Far Eastern Theater of Military Operations (TVD) later that month or in early 1979. The Far Eastern TVD was first established in 1945 to provide the command structure for the Soviet attack against the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria in August 1945. (See Weiss, "The Sea is Red."). Indeed, the Soviets took
advantage of the 35th anniversary of the Manchurian campaign to reissue excerpts of the memoirs of the commander of the operation and to warn in the newly written introduction: "Today, the imperialists are again fanning a campaign of slander about a 'Soviet threat' to bring back the days of the cold war, to revive international tensions. In this context, the lessons of the past are of special importance. They teach the peace-lovers to be vigilant, constantly to expose the schemes of imperialism and to foil them." See A. Vasilevsky, "Rout of the Kwantung Army," Supplement to Soviet Military Review, 8, 1980.


80. Indeed, U.S. diplomacy towards the Soviet Union in World War II was driven, in part, by the need to obtain Moscow's participation in the war against Japan after the European war was over. See the discussion of the Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam conferences in Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence.

81. See Weiss, "The Sea is Red"; Weiss, "Dragon at Sea."
82. If the Chinese attacked without adequate preparations and equipment, they might be defeated; this would release Soviet troops for the Western Front. This conclusion is implicit in Hua Di, "Chinese Comprehensive Strategic Doctrine."

Although the Soviets moved troops, planes, and tanks from the Far East to save Moscow in December 1941, they could never be sure the Japanese would not attack; therefore, they rebuilt their forces in the Far East and maintained them at 750,000 men (or about prewar levels) throughout the struggle with Germany. (John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad [Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984], 237-240, 271-272.) The Soviets implicitly acknowledge that they feel tied down by the Chinese, when they cite Vasilevsky, the Soviet commander of the Manchurian campaign in 1945, as saying: "Even during the most difficult months on the Soviet-German front we were compelled to keep 30-40 divisions on the Far Eastern frontier. The Kwantung army deployed in Manchuria and constantly spearheaded against the Soviet Far East doubled its strength in the summer of 1941. On 25 November 1941, Germany and its allies, including Japan, extended the Anti-Comintern Pact in Berlin. On instructions from Tokyo the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact signed in April 1941 was being constantly violated...." Vasilevsky, "The Route of the Kwantung Army."

83. As one Japanese analyst points out: "During the course of studies on joint operations, the Japanese side showed the greatest interest in the reinforcing of U.S. forces in the event of aggression against Japan. On the other hand, the U.S. side exhibited major interest in the use of U.S. bases in Japan. This indicates a difference of attitude on defense cooperation between Japan and the U.S. Japan's main interest in defense cooperation is in assuring the U.S. defense commitment to Japan whereas U.S. emphasis is upon Japan's contribution to the U.S. global strategy assuming the possibility of Soviet invasion to be low." (Sakanaka, "Perception Gap Between Japan and the United States on Defense Cooperation.") In other words, if Japan were an active belligerent, U.S. forces might be more tied to the defense of Japan—if only to reassure the Japanese and maintain access to U.S. bases in Japan—than if Japan were a nonbelligerent.

84. In regard to a military buildup in a crisis, the Japanese are already promoting a certain amount of self-sufficiency in their military industrial base through
emphasis on the research, development, and production of their own equipment. (See Defense of Japan 1984, 270-275. See also "Japanese Defense: Out of the Closet," Japan Economic Institute Report, 19A, 17 May 1985.) The Chinese, in turn, are emphasizing economic modernization over defense modernization because they believe the danger of "hegemonic" war has declined, but they have indicated that priorities would be reversed if a global war broke out. Moreover, they also suggest that they do not believe China could avoid some involvement in such a struggle. As Huan Xiang puts it: "...Today both the United States and the Soviet Union correspondingly are stepping up their deployment of actual combat weapons in every theater. For the Soviet Union, fighting in the European theater and the Asian and Pacific theater in the past meant fighting on two fronts; for the United States, fighting in the Atlantic and in the Pacific also meant fighting on two fronts. Today, fighting on two fronts has gradually become one unified scheme of action. This means to say that while fighting in Europe, war will be going on in Asia, and vice versa. And deployment of their commands is developing in this direction...On the other hand, the United States and Soviet Union have made continuous contacts...Therefore, the chance of an outbreak of war is not great...Based on the above analysis, it is estimated that the international diplomatic and strategic patterns formed at present will not undergo great changes by the end of this century, but, of course, we cannot rule out the possibility of small changes. In war and peace, we should base our work on preparations for an outbreak of war. Therefore, we must strive to modernize our Army and exert our efforts to win time to build a powerful industrial foundation in our economy so as to make our economic work in the future really capable of raising the living standard of the people in peacetime and of shifting to the track of war immediately in wartime." Shanghai, Shijie Jingji Daobao, 9 July 1984, FBIS: China, 26 July 1984, K9-K12.


86. Weiss, "The Azores in Diplomacy and Strategy, 1940-1945."

87. Of course, there is always some doubt about what an ally will do in a contingent situation. With the Japanese, there is also a cultural problem. As Dr. Nathaniel Thayer, a confidant of Prime Minister Nakasone and head of the Asian Studies program at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies once told the author, "the Japanese have a lot of difficulty dealing with hypothetical situations. When asked a
hypothetical question, the Japanese have a tendency to say anything that comes to mind. But give them a practical problem and they will come up with a practical solution." (Conversation with author in 1984, confirmed in conversation of 25 February 1985.) However, one analyst argues that Japanese strategists can be divided into four groups: political realists, unarmed neutralists, Gaullists, and military realists. Of these groups, only one has a practical policy for a contingent situation like a NATO-Pact war—the military realists. Unlike the others, the military realists are primarily concerned with a "war scenario involving a direct U.S.-Soviet military clash in Europe or in the Middle East which could expand into a global war..." To deal with such a threat, "the military realists advocate strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance for both ideological and geopolitical reasons." (Mike M. Mochizuki, "Japan's Search for Strategy," International Security [Winter 1983-1984], 168-175.) Since the military realists are the only ones with a practical policy for dealing with a NATO-Pact conflict, their recommendations are likely to dominate Japanese decision-making in such a situation. Thus, U.S. bases in Japan will probably be available for U.S. use in a NATO-Pact war. Moreover, as one Japanese Foreign Ministry official told the author when asked if Japanese bases would be available for the U.S. in a conflict that did not involve an attack on Japan directly: "This is something of a theological problem." The official referred to the experience of Vietnam. In that conflict, Japan objected to flying strikes from Japan, but did not object to the use of Japanese bases as transit points for attacks mounted elsewhere. (Conversation with the author held in Tokyo, Japan, on 19 November 1985.) However, the implication of note 83 is that the bases are likely to be available to the extent that the Japanese are convinced that the U.S. can adequately help defend or limit any Soviet attack on Japan.

88. Notes 83 and 87 suggest that the legal fiction implied in the Azores example is not an outlandish suggestion. See also Weiss, "Azores in Diplomacy and Strategy, 1940-1945."

89. There are other historical precedents. Although the Soviets and Japanese largely adhered to their nonaggression pact between April 1941 and August 1945, relations between Tokyo and Moscow were not smooth. For example, the Soviets complained: "On instructions from Tokyo the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact signed in April
1941 was being constantly violated. In December 1941 the Japanese opened artillery fire at our merchantman 'Simeropol,' 'Sergei Lazo,' 'Svirstroy' and 'Krechet' and sank the 'Perekop' and 'Maikop'...By 1945 the number of Soviet merchantmen held up by the Japanese reached 178." Vasilevsky, "Rout of the Kwantung Army."

Moreover, the Japanese and Chinese would not be infringing on their nonbelligerent status very much by protecting the SLOCs in the region. The U.S. is likely to be the only active belligerent in the area early in a NATO-Pact war. So only U.S. flag shipping and non-U.S. flag shipping carrying contraband cargo would be legally endangered. Protecting non-U.S. flag shipping—most trade is carried by non-U.S. flag ships—from Soviet interference would not violate Chinese, Japanese nonbelligerent status. In the course of protecting shipping protected by the canons of war, the Chinese and Japanese would also be in a position to lend discreet assistance to U.S. naval/merchant ships and other ships carrying cargo to/from the U.S. and to annoy Soviet naval/merchant ships in the region. Indeed, U.S. flag commercial vessels are likely to be engaged in directly supporting the war effort in the Pacific and especially in the Atlantic and will probably enjoy direct U.S. protection. However, Japanese/Chinese help in keeping the SLOCs open will materially help thwart Soviet efforts at intimidating them and others, thus keeping the Pacific region pro-U.S. and anti-Soviet.

90. This could reasonably follow from the logic presented in notes 83 and 87.


92. The Soviet justification for declaring war on Japan in 1945 suggests this possibility. (Vasilevsky, "The Rout of the Kwantung Army.") Such a scenario is given further credence when the Soviets complain: "Caspar Weinberger, the U.S. Defense Secretary, quite openly confirmed the Pentagon's ambitions in Asia, when he stated that U.S. policy in Asia 'may influence the global alignment of forces more essentially' than U.S. efforts in other regions of the world. In implementation of its plans in Asia, the White House counts not only on its 'traditional' allies (Japan, South Korea, and others), but also on China. During his recent visit to the PRC, President Reagan made it unequivocally clear that the United States is ready for a 'close partnership' with Peking on the basis of a 'community of interests.'


94. Although Tokyo has diversified oil import sources and reduced reliance on oil for energy consumption, Japan remains tied to OPEC. Tokyo relied on OPEC countries for 73.3 percent of its oil in 1985. ("Japan's Oil Appetite Continues to Shrink," Japan Economic Institute Report, 7 February 1986.) Of 3.6 million barrels a day imported in 1983, about 66 percent of that came through the Strait of Hormuz. (The Washington Post, 23 May 1984, A28.) Paradoxically, the current fall in oil price may ultimately reduce Japan's conservation and diversification efforts, further tying Japan (and other countries as well) to the Persian Gulf. For a discussion of the energy situation and how it affects Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, see Joseph A. Yager, The Energy Balance in Northeast Asia (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1984).

95. For the Soviet anti-SLOC emphasis, the author is indebted to the observations of Charles C. Petersen. See also Dean Wheatstone, "The Soviet Anti-SLOC Debate in Open Literature," Naval Post-Graduate School Thesis, March 1985.


99. Reportedly, the Chinese are providing arms to Iran through North Korea. No doubt the Chinese are anxious to restore their relations with Iran, which were damaged by the fall of the Shah in 1978-1979, and sustain Iran as a bulwark against Soviet influence in Southwest Asia. Moreover, they are also apparently providing Iraq with arms in an attempt to reduce Iraqi dependence on Soviet weapons. (Of course, the Chinese probably also see an opportunity to earn hard currency through arms sales to these countries. But Chinese actions almost always have a political content as well.) The Washington Post (3 April 1984), A1.


100. Others, of course, have advocated the adoption of a "no first use" policy. Most prominently, McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, Gerard Smith, “Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance,” Foreign Affairs (Spring 1982), 753-768. But that conclusion was a surprise to the author and only came to him after thinking about the Pacific theater in a NATO-Pact war.

101. See note 7.


103. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 234.