AIR FORCE NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION--A BLUEPRINT FOR THE FUTURE

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AIR WAR COLLEGE
AIR UNIVERSITY

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A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY IN FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH REQUIREMENT

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MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: Air Force Noncommissioned Officer Professional Education-A Blueprint for the Future

AUTHOR: George G. Aitken, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

This report seeks to evaluate the evolution of Air Force Noncommissioned Officer professional military education. To do so, the report briefly examines officer professional education from the Prussian Kriegsakademie up to a description of the present Air Force officer professional military education system. The paper more fully reviews how noncommissioned military education has evolved--given this historical background. Finally, the author offers some thoughts on how Air Force noncommissioned officer professional military education could be modified to better serve its long term goal of educating men and women of the United States Air Force in the profession of arms.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel George G. Aitken entered the United States Air Force in 1967. He has served as commander, executive officer and as a personnel officer. He has worked at squadron, wing, major command, and separate operating agency levels. Lieutenant Colonel Aitken graduated from Ohio Wesleyan University in 1966 with a B.A. Degree in Economics. He received his Masters Degree in Systems Management in 1975 from St. Mary's University, San Antonio, Texas. He is a graduate of Squadron Officers School, the Air Command and Staff College, National Security Management, the Armed Forces Staff College (Class 69), and the Air War College, class of 1986.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Professional military education is defined as those educational activities which provide ... students with the broad service knowledge required to meet the greater responsibility inherent in their progression in rank.

Inspiration for the study leading to this report resulted from the author noting that there are voluminous documents on file at the Air University (AU) library on professional military education (PME). However, most reviewed noncommissioned officer (NCO) PME separately rather than as a part of an overall Air Force professional education system. The author does recognize there is an inherent "two-castes" system within the military and is not in favor of a single nondiscontinuous hierarchy. However, there are some similarities that exist between officer and NCO PME. It is the author's contention that to fully understand Air Force (AF) NCO PME today--and where it is going--one must first gain some insight into those similarities. This article provides this analysis by briefly reviewing, in historical perspective, early officer professional development within Europe and the United States. Then, the article reviews the development, over the last 33 years, of AF NCO PME--a significant step as prior to this time PME education had been virtually a system contained within the officer corps. Lastly, the author,
using this historical framework, addresses conceptual options for the future.
CHAPTER II
OFFICER PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

Foreign Influences

PME had its origins in Europe. It's generally recognized that modern PME is a descendent of the Prussian Kriegsakademie which was founded in 1810. Officers were admitted to this military school to study the art of war after about five years of military service. It was the primary institution of Prussian military professionalism. Emphasis was on the development of an individual's general understanding and broad theoretical ability rather than committing facts to memory. The French established their own Ecole d' Application d' Etat Major in 1818. In Britain, the Duke of York opened a school to educate officers for staff duty in 1799.1

Given this background, Major General Emery Upton was instructed by the Secretary of War in 1875 to visit Europe to review foreign military schools, their organization, tactics, discipline and army maneuvers. When he returned General Upton noted:

Abroad it is the universal theory that the art of war should only be studied after an officer has arrived at full manhood, and therefore most governments have established post-graduate institutions for nearly all arms of service. To be eligible an officer had at least eight years of service. Typical students were majors.2

Sister Service Schools

The United States' first approach to military education
was the establishment of the Artillery School of the United States Army at Fort Monroe, Virginia in 1867. In 1881, similar schools for the infantry and cavalry were established at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, by General William Tecumsah Sherman. This school was to later evolve into the Army Command and General Staff College.

The first naval school, the Naval War College, was established in 1884. Its leading advocate was Admiral Stephen B. Luce. Admiral Luce, the school's first commandant, hired a friend to teach, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan. Admiral Luce also desired that an army officer be assigned to the college to instruct on the art of war. He was assigned a young artilleryman, Lt. Tasker H. Bliss, who had been adjutant of the school at Fort Monroe and who—prior to this assignment—had been abroad to study current European thought. He later served as Chief of Staff of the Army in World War I.

The Army War College did not immediately follow. In fact, it did not become a functioning institution until 1904. The first class consisted of nine majors and captains, one of whom was Captain John J. Pershing. The school's creation was at the insistence of such individuals as General Emery Upton who said, "West Point is far superior to any academy abroad for preparatory training of officers. But once in service, we have nothing to compare with the war academies of Europe except the Artillery School."
No further developments occurred until after World War I. In 1919, the Navy established a board of three admirals to evaluate the overall plans for education of naval officers. The Knox-King-Pye Report essentially founded a pattern for the professional development of officers that remains true today. The board recommended a general line officer course for officers with five to ten years of service. The board also recommended splitting the existing Naval War College into junior and senior war college courses. The junior course was for individuals with fifteen years of service. It was to be preparation for the senior course which the officer would attend at approximately twenty years of service.  

**Air Corps Tactical School**

The Air Corps Tactical School, established in 1920 at Langley Field, was concerned with the employment of airpower. The school was established because while the Army and the Navy had their schools for tactics and strategy, the Army Air Service had no such school for aerial combat. Its purpose was to train air corps captains with ten years service to train officers to command and to have sufficient expertise to direct staff officers. In 1921, students of that school took part in the bombing exercises against then ex-German cruiser Frankfurt and the battleship Ostfriesland. After relocation to Maxwell Field, that school contributed to the tactical doctrine of high altitude
daylight formation bombing which had a significant influence in World War II.¹⁰

Before World War II, then, the formal training and education pattern for a career "air officer" consisted of flying training, followed by extended active duty with tactical squadrons and attendance at the Army Air Corps Tactical School. Selected officers had the opportunity to attend the Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. Lastly, the exceptional individual attended the Army War College.¹¹

**Air University**

Training Command...will provide all phases of individual training except the higher education carried on in the Air University and the unit training conducted in the ... combat commands.¹²

General Carl Spaatz

Air Force planners, then, were aware that Army officers first received training in their branch such as the Infantry, Artillery, or Air Corps followed by staff and senior level training. While they agreed with this "three tier" professional approach, they also made some changes. Rather than decentralize the three schools, they opted to centralize them at Maxwell to avoid duplication, conflicting operational theories and an absence of instruction in some areas.¹³ The advocates of an Air University felt that
... major commands would be so preoccupied with their primary mission that if the various schools that were to make up the Air University were scattered among them, the idea of an integrated and progressive plan would suffer. They had seen the idea suffer under the Army plan....

**Summary**

The purpose of this chapter was to show two things. First, that officer PME had considerable roots. Secondly, that senior Air Force planners determined that it was in the best interest of the new Air Force to have one major command wholly responsible for that system—AU. The evolution of NCO PME—without historical precedent—was to be considerably different. The consequences are addressed in greater detail in the next chapter.
CHAPTER III

NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

The Early Years—Academies/Leadership Schools

Regardless of individual duty assignment the effectiveness of the Air Force is directly proportional to the efficiency of its noncommissioned officers. The pattern of military discipline and airmanly conduct is largely set by his example.

That quote is taken from the 7th Air Division NCO Academy (NCOA) Yearbook, RAF, West Drayton, England. The course was originally established on 3 November 1952, at the direction of Major General John P. McConnell, 7th Air Division Commander. It's generally recognized as the first NCO PME school. The first class had 12 students, all seven-level master sergeants and it was 60 hours long. On March 10, 1953, Strategic Air Command (SAC) General Order 10 officially established the academy, effective 26 January 1953. Some of the course objectives were as follows:

To provide NCOs with an effective approach to the solution of those problems encountered in leadership.

To prepare the NCO to project more effectively his queries, recommendations, and solutions....

The second class graduated on 13 February 1953. General Curtis E. LeMay was the guest speaker. By the middle of May 1953, the curriculum had expanded to 150 hours and 60 students per class. Subsequently, SAC published SAC
Regulation 50-23 which formally established a program throughout the command. The school at RAF West Drayton continued to operate until December 1957 when it was discontinued due to a SAC functional realignment. However, SAC still does have the oldest NCOA--at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. It began in 1954. Others followed. For example, the Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) academy began in January 1955 and Military Airlift Command's (MAC) "MAC West," now at Norton AFB, California, began in Orlando, Florida, in October 1955.

NCO Leadership schools (NCOLS), like academies, were begun by SAC in the United Kingdom. The first, then known as an NCO preparatory school, was established at Upper Heyford in 1953. Taught at a lower level, these courses prepared junior NCOs to assume supervisory positions. By 1960, the Air Force had 60 NCOLSs and 10 academies.

AU, in those early years, was aware of these command initiatives. On 11 March 1954 Headquarters (HQ) Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) issued an NCO Study Board report that was two years in the making. The purpose of the report "was to study the NCO problem, to analyze all material available...and to make recommendations...." The report's findings included the following:

The board feels that the establishment of an elite NCO corps is a long range problem that must be backed by Air Force....It would require a school system that would do three things....
A. Provide training for the young potential leader. ...a primary course should train selected airmen 1st class as a prerequisite for NCO status.

B. Greatly standardize the basic leadership subjects now being taught in present NCO schools and/or academies.

C. Provide advanced training for selected senior NCOs in preparation for more responsible assignments.

Such a system would provide the general and professional education that has been lacking before. In short, it would be an "Air University" for airmen....

That same year, in December, HQ United States Air Force (USAF) advised AU to "collaborate" with Air Training Command (ATC) in a project to make recommendations for NCO training. In March 1955, HQ Air Command and Staff College (ACSC), after reviewing its internal report, replied directly to ATC and formally recommended nonconcurrence with any recommendation "which recommended" the assignment of the NCO training responsibility to the AU.7

On 7 October 1955, Brigadier General J. H. Wallace, AU Deputy Commander for Education, in reviewing the status of NCO schools and academies noted the following:

"The idea of NCO schools or academies seems to be...sort of generally accepted throughout the Air Force now, and I agree that it would appear proper for the AU to get into the act....AU in conjunction with other commands is in an excellent position to prepare the curriculum for some sort of an NCO Academy which could be used by all major commands with some modifications in accordance with their respective commands....this command has by default...handed this job to ATC."

No formal NCO PME school was established at AU until 1973.
Air Force Regulation 50-39

The first NCO PME regulation—published by HQ USAF in January 1957—was one page long with 10 pages of attachments. It stated the HQ USAF Director of Personnel Procurement and Training would "prepare and issue a standard minimum curriculum for each...course."9 The attachments gave very general outlines. The 1965 revision indicated that PME policy conferences would be convened "at least" every two years to review policies and command operations.10 AU is first mentioned in 1970 when given the task to "distribute" annual biographies to NCOLSs and academies.11 The 1973 edition stated AU was not only responsible for the leadership school and academy biographies, but for the new "capstone" school—the Senior NCO Academy (SNCOA) at Gunter AFS, Alabama.12 The 1978 version notes AU is responsible for the Academic Instructor School (AIS). In addition, it states AU will "help" commands and act as a "consultant" and that commands will conduct periodic workshops that will involve AU.13 The relevance of these points will be addressed in subsequent paragraphs and in the conclusion.

The Senior Noncommissioned Officer Academy

The SNCOA was established in 1973 as a result of the expanding roles and responsibilities of Senior and Chief Master Sergeants. As noted earlier, the school was placed under the operational control of AU. Up to this point, these senior NCOs had been attending command academies or
other specialized courses. For example, with the advent of the SNCOA, MAC discontinued its "executive" course which had been directed by General Jack Catton.\textsuperscript{14} Air Force, by 1973, had not only recognized NCO PME as an institution, it had dedicated a facility and faculty for the development of the Air Force's top NCOs. Its first class of 175 included future Chief Master Sergeants of the Air Force Thomas N. Barnes, James M. McCoy and Sam E. Parish.\textsuperscript{15}

**Leadership & Management Development Center (LMDC)**

In 1975 HQ USAF convened the Air Force Management Improvement Group (AFMIG). Its purpose was to examine and revitalize the leadership and management training provided to commanders and supervisors. The group formulated a five-part plan, part of which was to establish a LMDC and to broaden the Air Force PME system. LMDC had three objectives, one of which was to formulate a common Air Force approach to leadership and management education. LMDC was to utilize its specialized personnel to disseminate curriculum to all NCO PME schools and to monitor base level leadership and management education programs. In August 1975, the Chief of Staff, USAF, approved the establishment of LMDC at Maxwell AFB effective 1 October 1975. LMDC was placed under the control of AU because such placement would take advantage of the available research facilities, expertise and organizational development, availability of the Academic Instructor School (AIS), and the ability to integrate LMDC
activities into the total Air Force PME system. Lastly, part of the training was to be specialized training for the instructors who would deliver two new base-level NCO PME courses.

Phase I, the NCO Orientation Course, was designed to orient newly promoted Senior Airmen in the duties and responsibilities of NCOs. The concept was founded in the belief that entry into the NCO corps is an important career milestone. The course was intended to create an "awareness" of these new roles and responsibilities. Phase II, the Air Force Supervisors Course, was to show that entry into the NCO corps is a significant milestone and that supervision is an inherent part of an NCO's role. The other three phases were to continue to provide the appropriate PME for the designated grade and experience levels. This, then, was the structure of NCO PME in 1976.16

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<td>NCO ACADEMY</td>
<td>Technical/Master Sgt</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCO LEADERSHIP SCHOOL</td>
<td>Sergeant/Staff Sgt</td>
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<td>AF SUPERVISORS COURSE</td>
<td>Sergeant(SGT)/Staff Sgt</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCO ORIENTATION COURSE</td>
<td>Senior Airmen(SrA)</td>
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Quota Sharing

In 1979 the Defense Audit Service conducted an audit of command NCOAs and NCOLSs. The report noted that since these schools were established to satisfy command requirements, NCOs generally attended parent command's facilities. This often caused NCOs to bypass nearer schools even though it
was more costly to do so. Recognizing this, commands began exchanging quotas on a limited basis in FY 78. It could be argued that commands, in effect, decided that promoting economy was more desirable than simply maintaining command integrity.

The report went on to show that the quota exchange program should be expanded. For example, in FY 79 ATC and Air Force Communications Command (AFCC) agreed to share 42 academy quotas. During that fiscal year, ATC selected 93 of its NCOs at Keesler AFB to attend academies. However, only 29 of the 93 attended the AFCC academy at Keesler AFB. The remaining 64 attended the ATC academy on temporary duty (TDY) in San Antonio, Texas. The extra costs had to be substantial. For example, 47 NCOs on TDY from Beale AFB, California, attended the TAC school at Bergstrom AFB, Texas, rather than the MAC academy at Norton AFB. At that time roundtrip airfare was $356 to Bergstrom AFB compared to $76 to Norton. Overall, the report concluded the Air Force wasted $988,000 by requiring NCOs to travel to their nearest parent command school.

Regarding overseas NCOs, in FY 79 the Air Force had approximately 45,000 NCOs who were eligible to attend either Phase III or IV. Overseas school capacity at that time was 2,500 students. While training was delayed for approximately 42,500 NCOs, the audit report noted that 737 were returned to the United States costing about $383,000 in
airfare. That figure together with the previously cited figure amounted to a total of $1.4 million.\textsuperscript{17}

Since then the Air Force has sought to send NCOs to the installation that incurs the least cost. The January 1985 Annual NCO PME Quota Sharing Conference shows the following for FY 86.\textsuperscript{18} Of the fourteen agencies operating academies, quotas were allocated to 10,008 NCOs from 56,034 eligibles for an overall 17.9 percent opportunity rate. Of these quotas, 3139 or 31 percent were allocated to students of other commands or separate operating agencies. For example, MAC with a capacity of 1785, allocated 1002 or 56 percent to other Air Force agencies while maintaining a "command" opportunity rate of 18.1 percent. Conversely, United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE) allocated 233 of 1386 seats in order to have a "command" opportunity rate of 17.4 percent. In keeping most seats for its own NCOs, USAFE diminished the opportunity of eligible NCOs of other commands in Europe to attend while overseas. While USAFE NCOs enjoy a 17.4 percent opportunity rate, those of other commands have only a 7.4 percent opportunity for school. This can be contrasted to Goodfellow AFB, Kirtland AFB, Bergstrom AFB, Norton AFB, and Tyndall AFB which allocate 42.5, 48.9, 17.5, 64, and 19.8 percent of their seats to other commands and separate operating agencies.\textsuperscript{18} Clearly, some commands have shown improvement—others have not. This same analysis is possible for leadership schools.
Noncommissioned Officer Preparatory Course (NCOPC)

In April 1984 the NCO PME system was reorganized from five phases to four. This resulted from feedback that Phase I was not as effective as it could be. Many airmen indicated they would have given more consideration to reenlistment had the course been given earlier. The result was a new 60 hour program written by LMDC. The emphasis was military oriented—professional standards, traditions, and the evolution of the NCO corps. Social sciences and management were deemphasized. Prior to implementation, LMDC conducted six regional workshops worldwide to train former Phase I and II instructors. The success of this LMDC centrally prepared course was reaffirmed at Maxwell AFB in December 1984 during a NCOPC Workshop where only very minor changes were made. Command attendees included several Senior Enlisted Advisors and the Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force. All agreed this centrally written, standardized course was a great step forward for NCO PME.19

The importance of this method of developing curriculum will be shown in the next chapter. This, then, is the structure of NCO PME today.

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<td>Technical/Master Sgt</td>
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<td>NCO LEADERSHIP SCHOOL</td>
<td>Sgt/Staff Sgt</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCO PREPARATORY COURSE</td>
<td>SrA</td>
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Community College of the Air Force (CCAF)

CCAF began in 1972. It was founded on the basis that
NCOs are entitled to opportunities for professional development. CCAF periodically visits leadership schools/academies and grants college equivalency credit thru the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools. CCAF first evaluated the curricula of NCO PME in 1975. From May 1984-May 1985 a reaffirmation visit was conducted to insure school graduates received appropriate course credit for the subjects taught. Some of the findings were:

- TAC had some central control. The command controls part of the curriculum.
- ATC had complete central control. The command sends leadership schools complete lesson plans, does all test analysis.
- SAC had no central control of curriculum. Each school prepared its own material.
- MAC had no central control of curriculum. Each school prepared its own material.
- PACAF had strong central control. All curriculum is the same.
- USAFE had each school prepare its own curriculum. The command made staff visits.

With only educational goals and main points listed in AFR 50-39, any school can apply its own interpretation on how to meet the objective. Some interpretations are very broad in scope and others are very narrow. For example, counseling can range from simple directive, non-directive, or eclectic, to Reality Therapy or Rational Emotive Therapy. Although the leadership and management portion of the academy program was listed in AFR 50-39 as 65 hours, CCAF noted that commands actually taught a range of 61-74 hours. For example, the Communicative Skills portion ranged from 29 to 47 hours while the regulation listed 33 hours. Given the
variance in time allocated to specific areas and methodology, CCAF could have given nine semester hours credit to some NCOAs—ten to others. For NCOLSs the variance was between five and six semester hours. Given these circumstances, CCAF now gives NCOA graduates nine semester hours and NCOLS graduates five semester hours of course credit. To do otherwise would cause inter and intra command jealousy and impact command quota sharing. However, this wide range of emphasis by the different commands clearly demonstrates the need for a more consistent approach in determining what will be taught. A standard, centrally prepared curriculum would ease this dilemma.20

World Affairs Curriculum—Leadership Schools

The latest major development in NCO PME occurred in January 1985. HQ Air Force Manpower and Personnel Center (AFMPC), then the office of responsibility for AFR 50-39, wrote all the commands recommending a test program to develop consistent lesson plans for the World Affairs portion of the NCOLS curriculum. World Affairs is 18 hours of the 143-hour course. AFMPC hosted a World Affairs workshop, with command participation, to develop centrally prepared lesson plans all the NCOLSs could use. The proposal was based upon the premise that there are lots of instructors—using the overall course objectives in AFR 50-39—working independently to write the best possible curriculum. There were other considerations:
The overall success of the new NCOPC prepared by AU. Some commands had already begun to standardize their "command" curriculum, e.g., ATC, TAC, PACAF. There could be potential manpower savings with centrally prepared lesson plans. NCOs teach NCO PME on a transitory basis as most return to their primary duty after four years. It's essential they have the best plans available—to do the job right.
The "commands" all think they have the best program. In actuality some programs are good and some not quite so.
The NCOLSs teach NCOs who are weighing whether to make the Air Force a career.
There is a need to insure all NCOs receive the same learning experience regardless of where they attend school.

The "test" program is now being evaluated. However, as with any test there were some user concerns.

If the test program is successful, will all NCO Leadership School and NCO Academy curriculum areas also be standardized?
A. Will commands retain the authority to teach command unique curriculum...?
B. Can individual schools arrange curriculum hours in the order they deem appropriate for...flow?
C. Can individual schools rearrange main points between lesson plans, provided they teach all main points?
D. Will individual schools be allowed to develop their own test questions?
E. What type of system will AFMPC establish for replacing main points that become obsolete?

Noncommissioned Officer Education Today

What, then, has evolved since 1953? Fourteen agencies—not just SAC—teach PME programs consisting of 200 programs with approximately 750 instructors. AFR 50-39, now over 50 pages, describes standard entry and graduation criteria each school must follow. The number of days to complete the course, and the number of hours taught are
specifically delineated. HQ USAF sponsored workshops have caused command NCOLS and NCOA curriculums to be somewhat consistent. Commands all use the same evaluation system. As shown below, there are approximately 80,000 students graduating annually.

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<tr>
<th>SCHOOL</th>
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<th>PERCENT</th>
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<tr>
<td>1 SNCOA</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>1.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 NCOA</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58 NCOLS</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123 NCOPC</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>62.3</td>
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A breakout by type of school by command is at Appendix A. A breakout of authorizations by command is at Appendix B. It shows 50 percent of the total 748 authorizations are assigned to three operational commands—MAC, SAC, and TAC—those with approximately 100 authorizations or more. If one includes commands with 50 authorizations or more—ATC, AU, PACAF, USAFE—seven commands have 83 percent of the NCO PME manpower authorizations. Those seven commands teach 56 percent and 85 percent of all PME graduates annually respectively. AU, the recognized PME command, has 8 percent of the manpower and teaches 2 percent of the graduates. The fluctuation in percentages is easily explained as the SNCOA, the capstone school, has a high instructor to student ratio.22

**Summary**

The purpose of training is to teach a technique or skill, while that of education is to develop thinking and reasoning as well as knowledge.23

NCO PME began six years after the Air Force gained
independence. While officer PME had already been designated an AU responsibility, there was apparently confusion as to what NCO PME was—training or education. Operating commands were conducting schools as if it were unit training. HQ USAF, the Directorate of Procurement and Training, had asked ATC and AU to collaborate on this subject of "NCO PME training." However, AU apparently declined to get involved. Part of the reason may have been confusion over the fact the facilities were not all located at Maxwell AFB. Other reasons may have been sheer workload in those early years or a lack of perception as to what NCO PME would evolve into. The result was command oriented leadership/academies, varied curriculum, lack of strong central coordination, wasted dollars, and efforts such as quota sharing. Despite this early lack of involvement or AU recognition, the trend clearly has been toward AU, e.g., bibliographies, SNCOA, AIS, LMDC, consultant/helper, Phase I/II, and the NCOPC. Some would—with some degree of reservation—call this evolution standardization. Others would recognize that—just like officer PME—NCO PME is part of the total AF and that AU needs to play the dominant role—with command participation. The reason is insufficient integration leads to wasted resources, inconsistent lesson plan development and inconsistent teaching. The subject of consistency, along with increased AU involvement, will be addressed in the next—and final chapter.
CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

As noted in the Introduction, the purpose of this research was to show that there are ties between officer and NCO PME. Both, for example, use a "tier system" approach based upon rank and responsibility. It's hard not to draw the conclusion that AU is now not only associated with officer PME—but—NCO PME as well. AU is recognized as the PME geru of the AF—a position with respect to NCO PME that could (should) have been recognized over 30 years ago. The following comments, then, regarding NCO PME operations are not listed in any particular manner. All or some are achievable. They are intended to make a good program better.

Recommendations

--AU should assume responsibility for central curriculum development for all levels of NCO PME. They already have it for 124 of the 200 schools--62 percent of the schools and 64 percent of the annual graduates. They probably will receive responsibility for the centrally prepared portion of the NCOLS World Affairs curriculum once the "test" is complete. This recommendation will take the active involvement of both HQ USAF and AU--given the historical command pride (jealousy) in their separate
programs. It might be appropriate to enlist the support of key NCOs who have long been supporters of NCO PME such as the Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force. The CCAF dilemma, an off-shoot of the whole problem, would also be resolved if curricula were centrally prepared.

--The purpose of quota sharing--distribution--should be reevaluated in the interest of all AF eligibles vice "command" concern about artificial "opportunity rates." If all the programs belonged to AU, for example, it would be easier to have "theater" opportunity rates (Europe, Alaska, Pacific, United States). Since all individuals in overseas areas are transitory, the theater rate is more significant. All eligibles in an area should operate under similar conditions. Then all AF NCOs would have an equal opportunity for attendance--given their location. AFMPC could work an appropriate quota distribution system for NCOA/NCOLs--just as it does now for the SNCOA and the Squadron Officers School--quickly, easily and fairly using the eligible population through the personnel computer system. The system could be managed so those departing or returning from overseas receive their military education as deemed appropriate. Without AU involvement, theater NCO PME attendance does not seem plausible. It's doubtful overseas commands would allow "their" schools to be regionalized while US command schools continued to enjoy "their" high opportunity rates. Command pride (jealousy) would again be
too big a factor.

--AU should be tasked with conducting the workshops for curriculum development. LMDC was apparently given this charter during the AFMIG review. HQ USAF should be making policy, not developing curriculum. That's the function of AU. The goal should be to standardize the remainder of the NCOLS' curriculum--then that of the academies. Then, considering all schools are of equal quality, NCOs could attend the most cost effective one.

--AU should assume responsibility for all NCO PME instructors--regardless of location. ATC has field training detachments worldwide. AFCC has communications squadrons. AU could develop a similar program for the 750 worldwide NCO PME instructors. Commands now compete for instructors. With one command having an overall handle on what is going on, there may be more success in balancing the available instructor resource. The commands could retain control of the facilities and the associated operations and maintenance. The administrative requirements associated with per diem and TDY funding for NCOLS' and NCOAs could be submitted to HQ USAF by HQ AU rather than by all the commands, as it is being done now. This concept of operation is not unlike that of other commands, such as those noted above, that operate functions as a tenant unit on another command's host installation. It might help to dissipate the notion that AU is an ivory tower, not
completely integrated into the ongoing activities of the AF.¹

--With NCOA/NCOLES curriculum consistency there could be a manpower savings. The savings could be realigned to expand the LMDC central curriculum function or returned to fulfill operational requirements. Further analysis would be appropriate as the specifics are beyond the scope of this study.

**Summary**

Thanks to Generals McConnell and LeMay--and a lot of plain hard work--NCO PME has come a long way since 1953--that is for sure. AF leadership routinely attends NCO PME graduation ceremonies and applauds the results produced. However, unequal attendance opportunity, varied chains of command, and varied curricula skew an otherwise stellar program and disproportionately play to individual commandant and command parochial interests vis-a-vis the AF. If those who make inter command related decisions were to carefully look inside NCO PME--more positive changes would be made. We could do it a lot smarter if NCO PME had more AF balance--less emphasis on the "my school-my command" syndrome. Our founding fathers--having cut their teeth in the Army--recognized this over 40 years ago.

*If you plan for one year, plant rice; for ten years, plant trees; for a hundred years, educate men [then, provide the best education possible].²*  
Confucius
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NOTES

CHAPTER II (Pages 3-7)


8. Ibid., pp. 48-49.
9. Ibid., pp. 176-177.
10. Ibid., pp. 49, 181.
11. Ibid., p. 50.

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NOTES

CHAPTER III (Pages 8-21)


7. Disposition Form, Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel, Air University, to Chief of Staff, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Ala., subject: NCO Academy, 5 October 1955.

8. Disposition Form, Deputy Commander for Education, Air University, to Chief of Staff, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Ala., subject: NCO Academy, 7 October 1955.


15. NCO Preparatory Course, Leadership and Management Lesson Plans (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Leadership Management Development Center, 1 March 1985), pp 44-46.


19. Ibid.


NOTES

CHAPTER IV (pages 22-26)

1. Pittman, op. cit., p. 46.

2. Ibid., p. 1.
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GLOSSARY

AFMPC  Air Force Manpower and Personnel Center (Air Force Military Personnel Center, effective 1 January 1986)
AAC  Alaskan Air Command
ACSC  Air Command and Staff College
AF  Air Force
AFCC  Air Force Communications Command
AFLC  Air Force Logistics Command
AFSC  Air Force Systems Command
AIS  Academic Instructor School
ANG  Air National Guard
ATC  Air Training Command
AU  Air University
ESC  Electronic Security Service
LMDC  Leadership Management Development Center
HQ  Headquarters
MAC  Military Airlift Command
NCO  Noncommissioned Officer
NCOA  Noncommissioned Officer Academy
NCOLS  Noncommissioned Officer Leadership School
NCOPC  Noncommissioned Officer Preparatory Course
PACAF  Pacific Air Forces
PME  Professional Military Education
SAC  Strategic Air Command
SGT  Sergeant
SrA  Senior Airmen
SNCOA   Senior Noncommissioned Officer Academy
SPACECMD Space Command
TDY     Temporary Duty
TAC     Tactical Air Command
USAF    United States Air Force
USAFE   United States Air Forces Europe