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The views, opinions, and/or findings contained in this report are those of the study group author(s) and should not be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy or decision, unless so designated by other official documentation.

The words "he," "him," and "men," when used in this report represent both masculine and feminine genders unless specified otherwise.
1. Approximately one year ago you directed that a systematic, comprehensive forward looking review of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) Program be conducted to determine changes required to insure the viability of the system in the 1990s and beyond. ROTC mission requirements, during this period, are programmed to increase significantly from the present production level of approximately 8,300 lieutenants per year to approximately 10,800. Concurrent with this increase in numbers, you also expressed a desire to improve the professionalism, motivation, physical fitness and educational levels of ROTC lieutenants. These must be accomplished during a downward trend in the ROTC market that is expected to continue until the mid 1990s.

2. The ROTC Study Group has concluded, that with change, the system is capable of successfully meeting the significant challenges posed by increasing out-year requirements and declining markets. We believe, that with change, ROTC will continue to be a viable source for approximately 75% of the Total Army's officer leadership beyond the year 2000.

3. Our review of the ROTC system also included a comprehensive review of the Junior ROTC (JROTC) program. No review of the ROTC system would be complete without addressing JROTC, since that program is managed and supervised by the Army's ROTC system. JROTC is important both to the Nation and the Army. The full potential of the Army's JROTC has not been exploited. We have recommended and in some cases implemented changes required to realize more fully the vast potential of JROTC to serve Army manpower needs as well as the citizenship and youth development needs of the Nation.

4. The enclosed report is a comprehensive summary of the details of our work and is designed to provide the rationale for our conclusions and recommendations. Hopefully it will facilitate a greater understanding of the formidable challenge facing ROTC and the unique nature of the ROTC system and provide a sound direction for its future viability.
5. It has been both an honor and a privilege for all of us on the ROTC Study Group to have been entrusted by you with the important responsibility of reviewing a system that produces approximately 75 percent of the Total Army's officer leadership.

Enclosure

WILSON E. BARNES
Colonel, GS
Director, ROTC Study Group
MEMORANDUM THRU VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY
FOR CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY

SUBJECT: ROTC Review--ACTION MEMORANDUM

1. Purpose: To obtain CSA approval of an action plan to accomplish a review of the ROTC program.

2. Discussion:

   a. The CSA has directed a review of the ROTC program to identify ways of improving professionalism, physical fitness and educational preparation of its graduates. The ROTC review is only one of several ongoing reviews to foster excellence in the officer corps. The ROTC program has undergone evolutionary changes in the past several years. The requirement to produce officers in the desired academic discipline mix, an ever increasing high technology environment, and a demand for excellence in our officer corps has moved ROTC from a random production mode to a qualitative mode. ROTC needs to produce some 12,000 officers annually to meet the accession requirements of the total force-5,000 for the Active Component and 7,000 to meet Reserve Component requirements. Annually, 75 percent of the Active Component's basic branch accessions will come from ROTC. It is essential that these officers, whether for the Active or Reserve Components, contribute to an Army of Excellence and provide competent leadership for our soldiers.

   b. The goals of this review are to determine necessary adjustments to the ROTC program to produce high quality leaders for the Army of the 90's. Major areas of study are as follows: Organization, Recruiting (include marketing, resources and incentives), Retention, Education/Training, and Entry/Commissioning Standards.

   c. The OPMS Study Group and the newly formed Officer Professional Development Study Group under LTG Bagnal will provide insights on the type of officer needed to lead our soldiers. The ROTC review will address the precommissioning phase of officer recruiting and training thereby integrating the total officer acquisition and development process. At Tab A is
DAPE-MPA-OA
SUBJECT: ROTC Review

the configuration of the ROTC Task Force. This Task Force will be separate from the Professional Development Study Group but ROTC education and training issues will be reviewed under the direction of the Director of the Professional Study Group to assure unity of purpose.

3. At Tab B is an outline of some of the issues for study during the ROTC review. This outline will be developed further during the initial stages of the review.

4. At Tab C are options for accomplishing the ROTC Review. The most desirable option is the formation of a full time study group under DCSPER direction of 7-10 people headed by an O-6. Request Director of the Army Staff provide funding (facilities, equipment, TDY, communications, etc.) for the ROTC study group.

5. At Tab D are milestones for completing the ROTC review.

6. With CSA approval DCSPER will initiate actions to begin the review.


3 Encl

ROBERT M. ELTON
Lieutenant General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff
for Personnel

LTC Nutt/52663
Typed by K.L. Babiak
The purpose of the study was to review all aspects of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps Program. To identify ways to ensure the viability of the program into the 1990’s and beyond. The report analyses all aspects of the ROTC program. Areas of emphasis include advertising, recruiting, incentives, organization, staffing, training and education. Special emphasis was placed on ROTC contribution in supporting the Reserve Forces. The Junior ROTC program was also included in the scope of the study.
## CONTENTS

Reserve Officers' Training Corps Study Group Report

Table of Contents

Volume 1—Main Report

| Title Page | i |
| Disclaimer | ii |
| Transmittal Letter | iii |
| ROTC Study Group Charter | v |
| Report Documentation Page | vii |
| Volume 1: Table of Contents | viii |
| Volume 1: List of Figures | x |
| Volume II-III: Table of Contents | xv |
| Volume II: List of Figures | xvi |
| Volume III: List of Figures | xvii |
| Distribution List | xviii |
| General Officer Steering Committee | xxi |
| Study Group Membership | xxiii |
| Executive Summary | xxv |

### Chapter Index

1. ROTC Marketing Analysis | 1-1 |
2. Advertising | 2-1 |
3. Recruiting | 3-1 |
4. Incentives | 4-1 |
5. Structure | 5-1 |
6. Staffing | 6-1 |
7. Automation | 7-1 |
8. Overview of Training and Education | 8-1 |
9. Academic Excellence | 9-1 |
10. Qualitative Management | 10-1 |
11. Camps | 11-1 |
12. Reserve Forces Issues | 12-1 |
Chapter Annexes

3-1 Memorandum-Recruiting Coordination ......................... 3-1-1
3-2 Lieutenant Requirement/Distribution ...................... 3-2-1
3-3 Statement of Work ........................................ 3-3-1
3-4 Recruiting and Retention Ideas .......................... 3-4-1
3-5 Manual Production Management System ................... 3-5-1
4-1 Scholarship Management .................................. 4-1-1
4-2 Estimated Yield of Lieutenant Production ............... 4-2-1
4-3 Statement of Work ........................................ 4-3-1
4-4 Educational Assistance ................................... 4-4-1
5-1 TRADOC MSC Proposal ................................... 5-1-1
5-2 ROTC Study Group Proposal-Reorganization ............ 5-2-1
8-1 ROTC Cadre Training ...................................... 8-1-1
8-2 Types of Cadet Training .................................. 8-2-1
8-3 Health Related Benefits for SROTC Cadets .............. 8-3-1
8-4 Proposed Legislation for Expanded Health Coverage for SROTC 8-4-1
10-1 Actions Supporting the 1985 Army Theme-"Leadership" 10-1-1

Main Annexes:

A. Consolidated Recommendations/Implementation Plan ........ A-1
B. Legislative History ........................................ B-1
C. Chief of Staff Weekly Summary Article .................. C-1
D. Bibliography ............................................... D-1
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGURE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-1</td>
<td>Estimates of Total Population</td>
<td>1-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>Estimates and Projections of Median Age</td>
<td>1-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>Distribution of U.S. Population by Age and Sex</td>
<td>1-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-4</td>
<td>18-24 Year Old Population</td>
<td>1-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>Regional Growth 1980-1990</td>
<td>1-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-6</td>
<td>Comparison of Majority-Minority Population Estimates</td>
<td>1-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-7</td>
<td>18-24 Year Old Hispanic Population</td>
<td>1-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-8</td>
<td>18-24 Year Old Black Population</td>
<td>1-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-9</td>
<td>High School Grads 1983-1999</td>
<td>1-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-10</td>
<td>Bachelors Degrees Conferred by Sex of Recipient (1982-1999)</td>
<td>1-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-11</td>
<td>Total College Enrollment for Full Time Students at 4 Year Institutions 1982-1999</td>
<td>1-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1</td>
<td>Ideal Advertising Model Objectives</td>
<td>2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-2</td>
<td>ROTC Advertising Management System</td>
<td>2-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>Advertising Communications Objectives</td>
<td>2-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4</td>
<td>ROTC Advertising Budget FY 85</td>
<td>2-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-5</td>
<td>Advertising Budgets FY 80-86</td>
<td>2-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-1</td>
<td>ROTC Recruiting Dilemma</td>
<td>3-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-2</td>
<td>ROTC Total Enrollment Trend</td>
<td>3-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-3</td>
<td>ROTC Enrollment Trends By Class</td>
<td>3-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-4</td>
<td>Basic Camp</td>
<td>3-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5</td>
<td>Advanced Camp</td>
<td>3-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-6</td>
<td>Production Trends vs Mission</td>
<td>3-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-7</td>
<td>Ideal Recruiting Model Objectives</td>
<td>3-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-8</td>
<td>Recruiting Fundamental Elements</td>
<td>3-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-9</td>
<td>Recruiting Missioning Process</td>
<td>3-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-10</td>
<td>Recruiting Force</td>
<td>3-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-11</td>
<td>TSC 1-IIIA Seniors</td>
<td>3-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-12</td>
<td>Ideal Recruiting System</td>
<td>3-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-13</td>
<td>How Will It Work (Mechanics of TRADOC/USAREC)</td>
<td>3-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-14</td>
<td>Mechanics of the Production Management System</td>
<td>3-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-15</td>
<td>Measurements of the Production Management System—Detachment Level Measurements</td>
<td>3-29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIGURE</td>
<td>PAGE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-2-7</td>
<td>3-2-3</td>
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<td>3-2-1</td>
<td>3-2-5</td>
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<td>4-1</td>
<td>4-3</td>
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<td>4-1-4</td>
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<td>4-1-5</td>
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<td>4-1-6</td>
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<td>4-1-7</td>
<td>4-1-17</td>
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<td>4-1-8</td>
<td>4-1-21</td>
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<td>4-1-9</td>
<td>4-1-22</td>
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<td>4-1-10</td>
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<td>4-1-11</td>
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</tr>
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<td>4-1-14</td>
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<td>4-1-15</td>
<td>4-1-30</td>
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<td>4-1-16</td>
<td>4-1-30</td>
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<td>5-6</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

xi
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGURE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11-4</td>
<td>1990 Camps (Four Camps)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-5</td>
<td>1990 Camps (One Camp)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-6</td>
<td>Computation of Required Camp Capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-1</td>
<td>Reserve Forces Duty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-2</td>
<td>Shrinking Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-3</td>
<td>RFD Propensity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-4</td>
<td>Cadre Comments form ROTC Study Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-5</td>
<td>Guaranteed Reserve Forces Duty Contracting Trends (GRFD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-6</td>
<td>Simultaneous Membership Program (SMP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-7</td>
<td>Early Commissioning Program (ECP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-8</td>
<td>ECP Total Growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-9</td>
<td>ROTC Production Projection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-10</td>
<td>Impact of Eliminating ECP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FIGURE
11-4  1990 Camps (Four Camps)          PAGE
11-5  1990 Camps (One Camp)
11-6  Computation of Required Camp Capacity
12-1  Reserve Forces Duty
12-2  Shrinking Market
12-3  RFD Propensity
12-4  Cadre Comments form ROTC Study Survey
12-5  Guaranteed Reserve Forces Duty Contracting Trends
       (GRFD)
12-6  Simultaneous Membership Program (SMP)
12-7  Early Commissioning Program (ECP)
12-8  ECP Total Growth
12-9  ROTC Production Projection
12-10 Impact of Eliminating ECP
13-1  Special Branch Determination
13-2  ANC Eligibility Criteria
13-3  Accession Differences Between USAREC and ROTC
13-4  Growth in the ROTC Nurse Program
13-5  Scholarship Types Comparison to Scholarship Availability
Reserve Officers' Training Corps Study Group Report
Volume II - III
Table of Contents

Volume II.................Junior Reserve Officers Training Corps (1916-1985)

Sections
Purpose.........................................................1
Background.....................................................1
New Course - Setting the Azimuth...............................17
Junior ROTC through 1992....................................33
Summary of Conclusions......................................34
Consolidated Recommendations..............................34

Annexes
A - DCSROTC HQS' Guidance to ROTC Regions (1982).........A-1
B - DCSROTC HQS' Guidance to ROTC Regions (1983).........B-1
C - Expansion Plans for all Services............................C-1
D - Cost of Army's 10 year Goals.............................D-1
E - Recommended Format for needed Data......................E-1
F - Proposed Annual Written Performance Appraisals for JROTC....F-1
G - Draft POI..................................................G-1
H - Proposed Goal to Double Program in POM 88-92.............H-1
I - Consolidated Recommendations.............................I-1

Volume III - ROTC Survey

Survey Analysis
1. Purpose.....................................................1
2. Background................................................1
3. Survey Results............................................4

Annexes
A. Statistical Tables and Graphs..............................A-1
B. ROTC Cadre Questionnaire...............................B-1
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGURE</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Expansion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Army JROTC Expansion</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Service Allocation of Junior ROTC Units</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Army JROTC Program Cost Data</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Junior ROTC Contributions (MSI, II)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Junior ROTC Contributions (MSIII, IV)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Class Characteristic Inventory (Class of 1988, USMA)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Class Characteristic Inventory (Class of 1989, USMA)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>JROTC Input to the Enlisted Force</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Ethnicity: JROTC Cadets</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Management Requirements for JROTC</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Section 2031, Title 10 USC (Cost FY 84)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>DCSROTC JROTC Staffing</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Air Force Staff Organization</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Chief of Naval Education and Training - NJROTC Staff</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Region Headquarters Staff</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Is JROTC Viable?</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Goals and Recommendations</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>JROTC Objectives (Army)</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>JROTC Objectives (First Region)</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Mission of the AF JROTC</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Sponsorship of JROTC Units</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>JROTC Instructional Materials Start Up</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Requirements for JROTC FY 87-92 (OMA)</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Ideal JROTC System</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## LIST OF FIGURES

(ROTC Survey)

**Volume III**

Description

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGURE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>16</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>20</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary of Defense .. 5
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff . 5
Office of the Secretary of the Army . 5
Office of the Under Secretary of the
Army .......................... 1
Asst Secretary of the Army (M&RA) ... 1
Chief, Legislative Liaison ............. 1
Chief of Public Affairs .............. 5
The General Counsel ................ 1

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The Chief of Staff .................... 5
The Vice Chief of Staff .............. 5
Director of the Army Staff .......... 5
The Inspector General ............... 2
Controller of the Army .............. 2
Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for
Personnel .......................... 10
Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations and Plans ............... 5
Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for
Logistics ............................ 2
Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for
Research, Development and
Acquisition ......................... 2
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for Intelligence ..................... 2
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US Army Corps of Engineers ...... 3
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Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation Agency .................. 2
Commander, US Army Military
Personnel Center .................... 5
Director, US Army Center of
Military History .................... 5
Office, Asst Chief of Staff,
Information Management Office .... 2

Director, Defense Technical
Information Center .................. 2
Director, The Auditor General ...... 2
Director, Office of the Adjutant
General Army Library
Management Office .................. 1

MACOMs

Commander, US Army Material
Command ............................. 2
Commander, Eighth US Army ........ 2
Commander, US Army Forces Command . 2
Commander, US Readiness Command
(RCJ1) ............................. 2
Commander, US Army Training and
Doctrine Command ................... 15
Commander-in-Chief, US Army Europe
and Seventh Army ................... 2
Commander-in-Chief, US Southern
Command ............................. 2
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Supreme Headquarters, Allied
Powers, Europe ...................... 1
Chief of Staff, Pacific Area
Command ............................. 2
Chief of Staff, US European
Command ............................. 1
Commander, HQ, US Army Information
Systems Command ................... 1
Commander, US Army Japan/IX Corps . 2
Commander, US Army Western
Command ............................. 2
Commander, US Army Criminal
Investigation Command .............. 2
Commander, US Army Health Services
Command ............................. 2
Commander, US Army Intelligence
and Security Command .............. 2
Commander, US Army Military
District of Washington .............. 2
Commander, Army Military Traffic
Management Command ................ 2
Commander, US Army Recruiting
Command ............................. 20
Commander, US Army Troop Support
and Aviation Material Readiness
Command ............................. 1
### SUBORDINATE COMMANDS

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<thead>
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**US Army Armament Munitions and Chemical Command** | ... | ... | ... | 1

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- **US Army Berlin Brigade** | ... | ... | ... | 1
- **US Army Communications-Electronics Command** | ... | ... | ... | 1
- **US Army Health Services Command** | ... | ... | ... | 1
- **US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center** | ... | ... | ... | 1
- **US Army Training Support Command** | ... | ... | ... | 1
- **US Army Southern European Task Force** | ... | ... | ... | 1
- **US Army 1st Personnel Command** | ... | ... | ... | 5
- **US Army 2d Armored Division Forward** | ... | ... | ... | 1
- **US Army 5th Personnel Command** | ... | ... | ... | 3
- **US Army 56th Field Artillery Brigade** | ... | ... | ... | 1
- **US Army 19th Support Command** | ... | ... | ... | 1
- **US Army 59th Ordnance Brigade** | ... | ... | ... | 1
- **US Army 193d Infantry Brigade (Panama)** | ... | ... | ... | 1
- **US Army National Training Center** | ... | ... | ... | 1
- **US Army 172d Infantry Brigade (Alaska)** | ... | ... | ... | 1

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Operations Division ............... 5
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Second ROTC Region Headquarters 5
Third ROTC Region Headquarters ... 5
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*Promotable during course of study.
**Membership changed throughout the course of the study.
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**OFFICERS**

<table>
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<tr>
<td>COL BARNES, WILSON E.</td>
<td>AR</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Area Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL STONEMAN, PHILIP</td>
<td>IN</td>
<td>Team Chief (Structure, Management, Automation)</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL CHRISTIAN, STEPHEN</td>
<td>TC</td>
<td>XO/Team Chief</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTC GRAHAM, ROBERT</td>
<td>IN</td>
<td>Team Chief (Marketing, Advertising, Recruiting)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTC KEPPELER, CLIFFORD</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTC MACKALL, CHARLES</td>
<td>FA</td>
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<td>LTC ONOSZKO, PETER</td>
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<td>LTC WELLS, MICHAEL</td>
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<td>ORSA/XO</td>
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<td>MAJ(P) DOWNES, ROBERT</td>
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<td>MAJ HERRON, PATRICIA</td>
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<td>MAJ NAIRN, ANGELINA</td>
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<td>CPT(P) ELIZONDO, FRANK</td>
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**ROTC IMPLEMENTATION TEAM MEMBERSHIP**

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<td>CPT MACAREVEY, PATRICK</td>
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### NCO/ENLISTED

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<td>Detachment SGM</td>
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<td>SFC Curtis, Robert</td>
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<td>ORSA</td>
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<td>81B</td>
<td>Draftsman</td>
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### DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY CIVILIANS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Study Group was chartered by the Chief of Staff, Army, in October 1984 to conduct a comprehensive review of the ROTC Program. The group focused on identifying ways to ensure the viability of the ROTC Program into the 1990s and beyond. Particular emphasis was placed on identifying ways to improve professionalism, motivation, physical fitness and educational levels; increase recruitment and retention; improve both organization and management systems; and the JROTC Program.

Throughout the conduct of the study, coordination was maintained with the Army, TRADOC and ROTC Staffs; the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard; and the other military services. The group was advised by a General Officer Steering Committee, which included representatives from academia and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. Input from the field was received through interviews, a survey of ROTC cadre, and visits to each ROTC Region. The Bureau of the Census and the National Center for Education Statistics provided valuable demographic and educational statistics. Assistance on demographic and other projections was also provided by the Futures Group, a consulting firm to the Department of the Army. The Army Research Institute helped with the development of human research and educational analysis. A comprehensive review was conducted of existing ROTC literature and related studies.

This report is organized into three volumes. Volume I examines the Senior ROTC Program, and contains a legislative history of ROTC and an article published in the CSA Weekly Summary. Volume II addresses the Junior ROTC (JROTC). Volume III contains data on the cadre survey.

The shrinking ROTC market poses a significant threat to ROTC at a time when ROTC mission requirements are increasing. College enrollment is expected to drop 15 percent between 1985 and 1995. Concurrently, the ROTC mission will increase by 25 percent to 10,800 lieutenants during that same period. Thus, ROTC cannot continue on the current course and expect to meet the Army's expanding needs.

Review of the ROTC Advertising Program indicated a need to increase funding. Two feasible courses of action were identified. Either the budgets for enlisted soldiers and commissioned officers could be consolidated so that an ROTC increase could be drawn from this consolidated budget, or the ROTC
advertising budget could be increased. The latter course was chosen. Increased funding has been programmed for FY88, from $11.1 million to $14.4 million. This funding will continue to increase until 1989 when it will level off at approximately $20 million. The report recommends that a portion of these additional advertising funds be devoted to marketing and advertising designed to attract personnel to Reserve Forces duty. Currently, there is a void in this area, and this is the portion of the ROTC mission which is increasing.

The study also recognizes the need to develop more efficient recruiting practices and to raise the sensitivity and visibility of the recruitment effort at all levels. A method of accomplishing this is to develop a more credible missioning system.

To improve recruiting efficiency, the Study Group recommended the adoption of an off-campus recruiting policy. This involves the use of USAREC as the principal high school recruiter for ROTC. This mission will be accomplished through a referral system that awards recruiting points to recruiters when their high quality referral prospects enroll in an ROTC program. This concept will greatly expand the visibility of ROTC on high school campuses. Off-campus recruiting does not preclude joint ROTC and USAREC efforts in high schools which happen to adjoin ROTC host campuses. Nor will this concept involve the use of USAREC recruiters on college campuses that currently are associated with an ROTC program. The cadre assigned to these detachments will continue to recruit on these campuses. TRADOC and USAREC have initiated a test of this concept.

In Annex 5 of the Recruiting Chapter there are a series of management charts designed to display production and quality indicators. Adoption of this, or a similar type system, will serve to increase the awareness and sensitivity toward mission accomplishment. This system will also help single-out high performance, as well as identify detachments that require additional recruiting training or greater assets.

Current procedures used to assign detachment recruiting missions require improvement. Interviews and survey results indicate that the existing missions lack credibility. Personnel at detachment level do not believe they can achieve their required missions given the available market. A detailed market analysis should be used to develop a mission model capable of generating specific active and reserve missions for each detachment. Both missions will be degree and gender specific.
Improvements in the recruiting system are linked to the need to revise ROTC incentives. The Study Group endorses a recent TRADOC proposal to establish an Education Assistance Allowance (EAA), designed to contract selected MS II cadets. Earlier commitments will improve retention of quality cadets. The EAA attacks the retention problem by offering graduated monetary incentive to cadets as they progress in the program from MS II to commissioning. The EAA Program is being staffed by ODCSPER in preparation for seeking Congressional approval in FY88.

Considerable effort was spent in determining the optimum placement and structural design for ROTC. This work led to the recommendation to establish ROTC as a Major Subordinate Command of TRADOC. Under this concept, administrative and logistical functions currently performed at each regional headquarters would be consolidated at ROTC Headquarters. This consolidation would allow region and area commanders to become more involved in recruiting and training functions. The study group identified the need to move area commanders from the region headquarters to their operational areas where they would be in a better position to help Professors of Military Science (PMS) in their training and recruiting programs.

Although a decision has been made to approve the MSC proposal, authority has not been granted to consolidate administrative and logistical functions. Planning for this consolidation should continue since this action would free the middle managers of the ROTC Program from administrative tasks and put them in the best position to help with the recruiting and training mission.

Results of the cadre survey and interviews indicate that officers serving in ROTC take great pride in their duties. However, there is a general perception that their contributions and the significance of ROTC duty are not recognized by selection and promotion boards. Research done by the Study Group validated some of these perceptions. The study recommendations in this area include providing instructions to promotion boards explaining the nature and importance of ROTC duty. It was also recommended that all field grade promotion and selection boards have a serving ROTC member. Both of these recommendations have been adopted.

Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) cadre members are also asked to make unique sacrifices because of the nature of ROTC duty. The duties they perform equate very closely to the duties performed by drill sergeants and recruiting NCO. Given this similarity, ROTC cadre NCO serving in detachments should be awarded Special Duty Assignment Pay (SDAP). This recommendation is being staffed prior to a final decision by the Chief of Staff, Army.
In another personnel-related area, the Study Group concluded that ROTC manning is insufficient to accomplish the expanded recruiting mission. The realities of the Army's manpower situation will not permit an increase in ROTC staffing. However, the Army must ensure that ROTC staffing does not fall below current authorizations. The USAR and the ARNG must continue to meet their AGR requirements. Manpower effectiveness within ROTC can be improved by expanding the functions of the officers and NCOs at detachment level. Traditionally, ROTC cadre have had specific functions to perform, such as teaching, cadet administration and logistics. Cadre performing these duties must take on expanded recruiting and retention functions.

One of the major local drawbacks to effective retention and recruiting research, as well as the management and administration of the ROTC Program, has been the lack of an effective automated management system. ROTC is in the process of purchasing hardware for an automated mission management system. Fielding of this system is fundamental to any improvements in the management of the ROTC system.

One of the major strengths of ROTC is its excellent training and education programs. To ensure continued excellence a proper balance between academics and military subjects must be maintained. The Army must resist the temptation to solve difficult officer training problems by shifting more military training to ROTC, or by adding academic course requirements to commissioning standards. Another form of encroachment on cadet academic time are requirements placed on cadets by the PMS. Neither the movement of subjects from MQS II to MQS I nor PMS required training is intended to take time from a student's academic pursuits, but they would. The primacy of a degree policy must be formally established. This concept of degree primacy has been approved by the Army leadership.

The Study Group endorses the concept of partnership between academia and the Army. The goal is to create an environment that mutually supports the ROTC cadet as he masters the cognitive skills required to obtain a degree and earn a commission.

The major shortcoming in the area of education and training is the absence of adequate feedback on the ROTC product—the commissioned officer. Currently, the only feedback on the performance comes from OBC performance. A need exists for additional feedback across time. To solve this problem, an Officer Longitudinal Research Data Base (OLRDB) should be developed. Information in this data base will help the Army fine-tune ROTC training and facilitate the
assessment of leadership potential, leader performance measures and leader-unit performance and will facilitate development of officer retention and attrition models.

The Study Group placed considerable emphasis on Reserve Forces issues. The two most significant issues were identifying ways that ROTC could meet its expanded Reserve Force mission and determining if the Early Commissioning Program (ECP) should be continued.

The Study Group found that the ROTC Program focuses extensively on producing active duty officers. ROTC cadre, who are mostly active duty personnel, recruit and train in their own "active" image. The accession system is also designed to give priority to filling active force requirements over Reserve Component requirements. Reserve Forces marketing, advertising and recruiting within the current ROTC system is very limited. Given the fact that the majority of the increased ROTC officer production will serve in Reserve Forces, it is clear that more emphasis must be placed on the mutually supportive requirements of both Reserve Force and Active Duty. This adjustment in program balance was approved and is being implemented by ROTC.

Volume II of this report addresses the JROTC Program. A good deal of refining is required in this program if it is to become the model of educational excellence that the Army leadership desires. A new mission statement for JROTC was developed in conjunction with Headquarters, ROTC. The newly-approved JROTC mission statement is:

"To help develop informed and responsible citizens, aid the growth of their leadership potential, strengthen their character through teaching of values associated with service life, acquaint them with the technology inherent to a modern Armed Force and promote an understanding of the historical role of the Citizen-Soldiers and their service and sacrifice to the nation, thereby creating an interest in military service as a career."

The Study Group prepared a POI to support the new mission statement and recommended establishing a "Total Army" sponsorship program for JROTC. This will serve to acquaint the JROTC with the Active and Reserve Force. In order to improve the management and quality control of the program, a series of recommended changes to JROTC regulations were identified. All study recommendations relating to JROTC were forwarded to Headquarters, ROTC. These have
served as the nucleus of the TRADOC-initiated JROTC Improvement Plan (JRIP) which has been submitted to the CSA.

Jointly, the ROTC Study Group; Headquarters, ROTC; and the Army Staff have made great strides in establishing an azimuth for ROTC as we move into the 1990s. Much has been accomplished; but much remains to be done if ROTC is to provide the quantity and quality of officers required for the "Total Army."
CHAPTER ONE

MARKET ANALYSIS

The mission of the Senior Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) is to recruit, select, motivate, train, retain and commission future leaders for the Total Army. The first essential step of this multi-dimensional mission is market analysis. It is necessary to identify what constitutes the recruiting market and where the various segments of this market are located. This is accomplished through market analysis.

This chapter examines overall demographic trends and projections to include minority population trends, and migration within the country. It reviews some educational trends that help define the ROTC market. This will serve to set the background and describe the environment in which ROTC must operate and provides insight into the production challenge confronting ROTC.

DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

The population of the United States is growing, yet the rate of that growth has slowed markedly since births rates peaked in the early 1960's. The significant population growth occurred in age groups that are now beyond ROTC eligibility. The age groups that form the ROTC market are in a downward trend. There are several indicators that reflect this: Total high school graduates, total college enrollment and number of bachelor's degrees awarded all trend downward with no reversal of these trends projected for the next 8-10 years.

The Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, middle series prediction, indicates that the population in the United States will increase by nearly 80 million people in the next 100 years, with most of that growth taking place by 2030 (Figure 1-1).
Although there is real growth it is important to note that the rate of growth continues to decline. This combined with the overall aging of the future population is particularly significant for ROTC. From a low median age of 27.9 years in 1970, the population is expected to age to a median age of 42.8 in 2080, (Figure 1-2).
ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS OF MEDIAN AGE
1950 - 2080

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL POPULATION-MEDIAN AGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimates:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projections:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2030</td>
<td>40.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2050</td>
<td>41.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2080</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: BUREAU OF CENSUS PROJECTIONS

FIGURE 1-2
Examination of Figure 1-3 shows a display of this age distribution.

PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF THE U.S. POPULATION BY AGE AND SEX

Percent Distribution of the U.S. Population, by Age and Sex

A. 1982

B. 2000

C. 2030

D. 2080

Source: Bureau of the Census

FIGURE 1-3
The 1982 pyramid reflects a young population with the majority of the population near the bottom of the pyramid. The pyramid will change significantly by the year 2000 because those born in the baby boom years will have reached age 35. The baby boomers will not skew the distribution so dramatically after 2030, and while the median age still increases, the rate is much slower. The entire population is expected to be healthier as a result of better nutrition, physical fitness, and breakthroughs in the prevention and treatment of disease. People will live longer than ever before.

Figure 1-4 looks at the population from which ROTC gets the majority of its cadets, the 18-24 age group. The trends through the year 2000 indicate a twenty percent reduction in the number of 18-24 year olds from 1985 to the low point in 1996. There will also be geodemographic changes in the population distribution.
MIGRATION

Migration from the urban metropolitan areas to the suburbs is continuing. The tremendous growth experienced in the Southeast and Pacific Coast regions is slowing. There is no growth in the country's industrial crescent. There appears to be a resurgence of growth in New England and the Midwest and a significant rapid growth in the Southwestern sun belt and the Mountain States.

REGIONAL GROWTH 1980-1990
Analysis by Masnick & Jackson
Harvard-MIT Joint Center for Urban Studies

FIGURE 1-5
ROTC must evaluate and analyze these migration trends from region to region in its market analysis efforts. Another important dimension of market analysis is the trend in minority demographics.

MINORITY POPULATION TRENDS

Demographic trends, as mentioned earlier, are changing the face of the United States. Demographic Imperatives: Implications for Educational Policy sponsored by the American Council on Education in 1983 stated the following about the implications of the projected trends, "An intermingling of growth and decline among various segments of the population, regional population shifts, and a new wave of immigration prophesy a much more pluralistic society, which will require substantially more diversified policies than it has in the past."

The scene that the demographic trends indicate is significant. As mentioned earlier, the majority population is growing older but the minority population is aging at a slower rate (Figure 1-6). The median age of the minority population will remain almost 5 years younger until minority birthrates decline and will not approach the "White" median age until 2030. The ROTC market cohort age group is projected to include more minorities, Blacks, Hispanics, (Hispanic is a term used to group together people of different nationalities who possess a common historical and cultural Spanish heritage) and Asiatic Americans, beyond 1990.
### MEDIAN AGE:

1950 to 2080

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL POPULATION</th>
<th>BLACK AND OTHER RACES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimates:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>25.3</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Projections:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2030</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2050</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2080</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>41.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** BUREAU OF CENSUS PROJECTIONS

**FIGURE 1-6**

Blacks and Hispanics constitute the overwhelming proportion of the minority population in the United States. In the 1980 Census, 11.7 percent of the total population was Black, 6.4 percent Hispanic, and 1.5 percent Asian. The Asian population growth of over 100 percent was the highest of all groups from 1970-1980, but this was the result of large immigration rather than increased birth rates. The United States is in the process of assimilating nearly 14 million immigrants who have arrived in this country over the last 15 years.

Hispanics are predicted to be the fastest growing minority in the country, and are expected to replace Blacks as the leading minority sometime
between 2005 and 2015. The median Hispanic age is a few years younger than that of the Black population. Since a high proportion of the Hispanics are entering the child-bearing years an increase in Hispanic birth rates can be anticipated. Additionally, large numbers of Hispanics entering the US are contributing to the growth in this subgroup. The Hispanics have strong regional ties. The following data on Hispanic population distribution is taken from *Demographic Imperatives: Implication for Educational Policy*.

a. Sixty percent live in one of three States: California, Texas and New York.

b. They represent more than 10 percent of the population in five states: New Mexico, 37 percent; Texas, 21 percent; California, 19 percent; Arizona, 16 percent; and Colorado, 12 percent.

c. The nine States with the largest Hispanic population contain 85 percent of all Hispanics and constitute the four areas of major Hispanic influence. These are:

1. Southwest: Ethnic Mexicans concentrated in the States of Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico and Texas comprise 60 percent of the total Hispanic population.

2. Northeast: Roughly 15 percent of the Hispanics, mostly of Puerto Rican origin are concentrated in New York and New Jersey.

3. Southeast: Six percent of all Hispanics, the majority of Cuban extraction, are located in Florida.

4. Central: The last area of Hispanic concentration is located in Illinois particularly by Chicago unlike the other areas it contains no dominant ethnic groups. Instead the 4.5 percent of the Hispanic population found here represent a mixture of many Latin American nationalities.
The distribution of the 18-24 year old Hispanic population is shown at Figure 1-7 as a percentage of the total 18-24 market in each State. The Southwestern region by far contains the largest percentage of Hispanics in this age group.

STATE COMPARISONS OF 18-24-YEAR OLD SPANISH-ORIGIN POPULATION

The Black population of this age group is also geographically linked. The States with significant percentages of Black young adults 18-24 are all in the eastern half of the country (Figure 1-8).
Geographic location is only one of several areas of concern in the market analysis of the ROTC target population. Because the ROTC cadet must be a college student, educational trends also become an important consideration in a market analysis.

**EDUCATIONAL TRENDS**

Educational trends and projections are important variables in ROTC with marketing analysis because the Army's goal is that all commissioned officers have bachelor's degrees and because ROTC is managed in partnership with academia. There are several indicators that can be used in analyzing educational trends. The ROTC Study Group examined three of the market indicators:
1. Number of high school graduates.
2. Full-time undergraduate enrollment at 4-year institutions.
3. Number of bachelor's degrees awarded.

These three indicators are critical indices of the ROTC market potential. All three trend downward and are not projected to reverse before the mid 1990's. The high school graduate projections (Figure 1-9) are projected to be the first to turn around but bachelor's degrees conferred trends will not reflect a reversal until afterwards (Figure 1-10) following a climb in college enrollment beginning in 1995 (Figure 1-11).

![HIGH SCHOOL GRADS 1983-1999](image)

SOURCE: Based on NCES and Census data.

FIGURE 1-9
BACHELOR'S DEGREES CONFERRED
BY SEX OF RECIPIENT
1982-1999

TOTAL COLLEGE ENROLLMENT
FULL TIME STUDENTS
4 YEAR INSTITUTIONS
1982-1999

SOURCE: BASED ON NCES AND CENSUS DATA

FIGURE 1-10

FIGURE 1-11
The number of high school graduates is expected to decrease about 20 percent from 1983 through 1993 at which time the trend reverses. Significantly lower percentages of Hispanics and Blacks graduate from high school than do Whites. There have been increases in absolute numbers of Black and Hispanic high school graduates in recent years. However, the percentage of those high school graduates attending college has decreased.

College enrollment is, influenced by the number of high school graduates. College enrollment will decrease by about 15 percent during this time period. Minorities, with the exception of Asian-Americans are underrepresented in college enrollments. There were 1.1 million minorities enrolled in full-time post high school institutions in 1980, about sixteen percent of the total enrollment. Women now comprise over 52 percent of college students. The National Center for Educational Statistics recorded racial/ethnic backgrounds of the freshman college class of 1982 are shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race/Ethnic Group</th>
<th>FEMALES</th>
<th>MALES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>89.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican American or Puerto Rican</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Indians</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other than above (includes Asian)</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The American Council of Education Demographic Imperatives states that Hispanics are concentrated in fewer than two percent of the 3100 Colleges and universities. This is because of the location of Hispanic population centers which are near these colleges. This is in contrast to the situation experienced by Blacks where about 20 percent of all Black students in college attend a Historically Black College (HBC). There are also many other colleges where Black students have become a majority in the past 25 years. Twenty-one of the Historically Black Colleges are host institutions for Army ROTC.
The last market measure is bachelor's degrees awarded. A valid marketing analysis must consider bachelor's degrees conferred. During academic year 1984-85, about 960,000 students attained a bachelor's degree. More than half of these were women. This analysis must account for nonresident students and those who do not meet medical, physical, moral and age standards. There are over 300,000 non-resident students enrolled in US colleges and universities and they accounted for about 2.5 percent of the degrees awarded. Non-resident aliens cannot be commissioned. There are also a certain percentage of students that do not meet physical or moral standards, but the size of these groups remain relatively constant over time. The trend for bachelor's degrees awarded is downward for the next 10 years.

CONCLUSIONS

Adequate market research and comprehensive analysis of that research can be invaluable to the success of the entire ROTC system. It can provide the basis for developing the advertising that will best attract the types of individual ROTC needs. It will provide the ROTC recruiting force with information that will help to define the best sales techniques and to develop approaches to use on the various segments of the population they are trying to recruit, and will provide the ROTC leadership with a sound basis to develop a credible mission management system. The market analysis can also play a part in determining which incentives are most likely to appeal to potential cadets from the various population segments. The recruiting chapter of this report outlines procedures for strengthening the ROTC market analysis and for using this analysis in conjunction with an automated mission model. The linkage between the market analysis and the mission model will optimize the ROTC recruiting effort during a time of a declining market.
This chapter examines the ROTC advertising program. It establishes what the ideal advertising program should accomplish, compares the current program to the ideal, and concludes with recommendations for improvement.

**IDEAL ADVERTISING PROGRAM**

ROTC advertising has undergone extensive study in the past two years. Some technical research done for the Army by two advertising consultants, Vernon Fryburger, Chairman of the Department of Advertising at Northwestern University's Medill School of Journalism and Professor Donald W. Jugenheimer of the University of Kansas' William Allen White School of Journalism and Mass Communication has been incorporated into this chapter. Work done in 1985 by the Army Audit Agency has also been included.

The ROTC Study Group began its research on advertising by identifying what the ideal ROTC advertising program should accomplish. ROTC advertising must provide timely information about the program to the appropriate audiences, using the most effective media. Figure 2-1 reflects other characteristics of the ideal advertising program.

**ADVERTISING SHOULD:**

- Support mission accomplishment for the total Army.
- Attract high quality students in the appropriate racial, ethnic and discipline mixes.
- Be adequately resourced at all levels.
- Be effectively managed at all levels.
- Promote awareness, understanding and support for ROTC.
- Be supported by trained personnel.
- Be appropriately integrated with market analysis and recruiting.

**FIGURE 2-1**
The ROTC advertising program receives its policy guidance direction and budget allocation from ODCSPER. This headquarters DA role ensures a consolidated and cohesive Army advertising message and theme. The current Army advertising position statement used to provide continuity to all recruiting advertising is:

"The Army has the most opportunities for men and women to experience personal growth, work with advanced technology, and serve America on a team of high quality people"

ROTC advertising integrates this theme effectively throughout its advertising efforts.

The ROTC advertising effort below HQ DA has three levels of focus; national, regional and local. ODCSROTC, assisted by the NW Ayer Advertising Agency, conducts the national program. Regional programs are executed by the four ROTC Regions, assisted by the Regional Account Managers (RAM). Each Instructor Group is responsible for a local program. Figure 2-2 outlines the functional responsibilities of each level in the ROTC advertising system.

ROTC ADVERTISING MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HD DA (DCSPER)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administers and conducts national program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develops and promulgates Army ad policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishes Army ad position statement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ'S FRACOC (DC3ROTC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provides guidance and support to ROTC, Inst Grp, DA's, and SFA's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinates activities with other CMD's, SVC's, Gov't and Civil Agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manages budget for program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocates funds to Regions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ROTC Regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop and publish ad plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocate and monitor funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct regional advertising to SFA's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitor Inst Grp ad programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct TIG for Inst Grp Pers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide guidance and assistance to Inst Grp</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ROTC Instructor Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop and publish enrollment plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administer local ad program</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE 2-2

2-2
The targets for ROTC advertising include high school juniors and seniors, college students and influence groups. The communication objectives for each of these audiences are shown in Figure 2-3.

**ADVERTISING COMMUNICATIONS OBJECTIVES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGET AUDIENCES</th>
<th>MESSAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS</strong>&lt;br&gt;MEN, 15-17 YRS PLANNING TO GO TO 4 YR COLLEGE/UNIV</td>
<td>• ARMY ROTC COULD BE A VALUABLE PART OF THEIR COLLEGE EDUCATION&lt;br&gt;• INCREASE LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE REGARDING ARMY ROTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COLLEGE STUDENTS</strong>&lt;br&gt;MEN, 18-19 YRS FRESHMEN OR SOPHOMORES IN COLLEGE</td>
<td>• INFORM OF OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE FUTURE&lt;br&gt;• INCREASE LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE REGARDING ARMY ROTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INFLUENCEHS</strong>&lt;br&gt;ADULTS, 35-54 YRS W/TEENS 15-17 YRS</td>
<td>• CREATE A POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ARMY ROTC&lt;br&gt;• INCREASE LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE REGARDING ARMY ROTC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE 2-3**

The primary media used for ROTC advertising are direct mail, magazines and public service announcements. To conduct this program, in FY85, ROTC was provided a budget of 9.4 million. The breakout of this budget is shown in figure 2-4.

**ROTC ADVERTISING BUDGET FY85**

**FIGURE 2-4**

2-3
The ROTC advertising budget is shown in Figure 2-5. The FY 85 allocating of 9.4 million dollars represented a significant increase in the ROTC advertising budget. For FY 86 ROTC was allocated 8.8 million dollars. Fy 85 and 86 advertising finding compared to earlier levels represent a sizable increase. However, they are considered inadequate for satisfying ROTC advertising needs.

**ADVERTISING BUDGETS FY80-86**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ROTC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 80</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 81</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 82</td>
<td>6.4</td>
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<td>FY 83</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY 84</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 85</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 86</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE 2-5**

This FY 85 and 86 increases in ROTC funding came after the production mission had been increased to 10,800 and as Professor Jugenheimer notes "is clearly a case of the budget trailing the mission increase." He points out that: "This is a case of the effect eventually bringing about the cause, rather than the logical cause and effect situation....it is usually assumed that advertising is done to bring about attitude changes and perhaps sales. In this situation the sales goals are being dictated without adding to the advertising to help bring them about, and the 'causal' portion of the relationship, advertising, is increased sometime after the fact. The advertising budget should be increased in advance of the sales goal (that is recruiting mission) increases, to account for the so called 'lag effect' of advertising."

The study group and ODCTROTC recognize that with the increase in funding there is a definite "lag effect" and ROTC will have about a 2,000
production shortfall against mission requirements in 1988.

The Fryburger, Jugenheimer and Army Audit Agency reports are all directed towards increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of ROTC advertising. One of the most significant recommendations that surfaced in these three studies involved restructuring the ROTC advertising and marketing organization and integrating these efforts more closely with USAREC advertising and marketing. The ROTC Study Group envisions the integration of the responsibilities for Total Army advertising and marketing to include the ARNG. These functions can be performed and directed more effectively in an integrated manner within ODCSPER.

The advantages of this course include:

a. Most efficient use of available funds by lowering overhead and reducing duplication of effort.

b. Most efficient use of the limited number of Army officers with real expertise in the marketing and advertising arena.

c. Most effective way to provide flexibility that would allow for moving funds to meet priorities and shortfall.

The disadvantages of such a consolidation include:

a. Loss of some responsiveness to needs of users at local level because of the emphasis on the national program.

b. The consolidation of ARNG advertising funds may be resisted by ARNG and require legislative change.

Consolidation of advertising and marketing offers the best prospect for enhancing the Total Army's officer and enlisted advertising and marketing effort at the lowest cost.
RESERVE COMPONENT ADVERTISING

The ROTC advertising program does a good job of attracting certain specific target populations such as science, engineering and nursing students. However, there is no program to attract students who may desire to serve in the Reserve Components. ROTC advertisers do not recognize the existence of a reserve market and consequently do not target advertising to attract cadets for Reserve Forces duty. The results of this philosophy can be seen in the declining numbers of students who request RFD. The increasing numbers of reserve component lieutenants expected to be produced by ROTC dictate that we change our philosophy and begin to advertise, up front, for cadets who want to serve in the reserves.

Study Group research determined that there is a Reserve Forces propensity market in our high schools and colleges. However, this group has not been targeted and is essentially unexploited. The recent ODCSROTC decision to increase the proportion of scholarships available to cadets who desire RFD supports a need to develop an advertising package aimed at this Reserve Component propensity group. Allocation of scholarships must be followed by an aggressive advertising campaign to sell this incentive and to send the message that ROTC wants to attract quality cadets who want to serve in the reserve forces.

NURSE ADVERTISING

It is recognized that each advertisement must have a specific message aimed at a single target group. Currently ROTC and USAREC duplicate efforts in nurse advertising since it is common to find both ROTC and USAREC advertising in the same issue of a college paper.

The target population of both organizations is the nursing student, with the only difference being that USAREC is focusing on juniors and seniors for direct commissions while ROTC seeks to attract freshmen and sophomores to join ROTC. Some savings appear possible if nurse advertising could be better orchestrated. The same ad could send the message that freshmen and sophomores should seek ROTC while juniors and seniors should look towards a direct commission through USAREC.
The backbone of ROTC advertising is the LEADS system. LCS Industries administers this system as a subcontractor of NW Ayer. The system serves as a clearing house for all students who request information on the ROTC program. Students replying to ads and indicating an interest in receiving information about ROTC are provided general information from LCS. The names and addresses of these students are then forwarded to the Instructor Group at either the school they indicated they would attend, or if they did not indicate a specific school, then the information is sent to the Instructor Group that is responsible for servicing the students zip code area. Once the Instructor Group receives these names and addresses it contacts students and provides more specific information.

The LEADS system automatically suspenses student names with the schools who are responsible for contacting them. Periodically the system requests a status on the student from the Instructor Group. The Instructor Group has the option of deleting the student from the system or indicating that he has enrolled in ROTC. The FY 84 summary data from LCS showed that out of 76,570 completed LEADS actions, 1,580 (2 percent) students enrolled in ROTC. The system is also used to measure the effectiveness of print advertising by measuring the number of inquiries generated by a specific advertisement and specific publication.

Study Group research revealed that the LEADS system is not viewed favorably at the Instructor Group level. It is considered to be time consuming and to generate more work than benefit. Many detachments delete the student from the system as soon as possible to avoid the need to conduct follow-up contacts with large numbers of students who have a low probability of joining the program.

There is an additional problem associated with assessing the level of awareness created by LEADS. The ROTCMIS currently does not contain the names and social security numbers of noncontracted cadets. Thus, ROTC cannot match data from LEADS to MIS, making it virtually impossible to accurately track the conversion rate of LEADS to cadets. The new automated Mission Management System, which will be introduced in FY87, must be able to interface with the LEADS system if ROTC is to get a valid measure of the effectiveness of the leads system. The real gauge of the LEADS system
effectiveness will be the number of LEADS that contract and ultimately become commissioned.

**DIRECT MAIL**

Jugenheimer and Fryburger both stressed the importance of direct mail. This medium offers a way of narrowing the focus of ROTC to specific target populations; such as students from a given high school or from a certain academic discipline within a college. It is very effective when used to target scholarship candidates. It is also one of the least expensive forms of advertising and can be greatly expanded with the fielding of the ROTC Mission Management System (MMS).

MMS has the ability to merge student names and addresses provided by school administrators with a prepared letter thereby generating personalized letters. The prototype MMS takes about 15 seconds to produce such a letter. In visits to First Region schools involved in the testing of MMS, PMS's and enrollment officers indicated MMS has significantly improved recruiting efficiency and effectiveness. This enhanced local direct mail recruiting and advertising capability is yet another reason for the expeditious fielding of the MMS at all host detachments.

**NW AYER REGIONAL ACCOUNT MANAGERS (RAM)**

As part of the advertising support provided by NW Ayer each region is provided a regional account manager. The role of the RAM is to advise the region commander on advertising matters, approve advertising expenditures, assist in developing regional and detachment programs, and place contracts for local advertising.

Visits to the regions indicate a general satisfaction with the performance of the RAM. However, the ROTC Study Group survey indicated that the potential benefits available from the services provided by the RAM are not reaching the individual Instructor Groups. In fact 50.7 percent of the PMSs responding to questions concerning how helpful RAM had been to their Instructor Groups indicated they were little or no help.
There is a need to review the function of the RAMs in relationship to the needs of the Instructor Group. If the RAM's focus is to be region level it appears he is generally doing an acceptable job. However, if his purpose is to support the detachments, survey results indicate that the RAM is not accomplishing this task.

TRAINING

Presently there are two cadre training courses being conducted. One is for Active Army officers and NCOs and is conducted at Ft. Benjamin Harrison, Indiana; the other is for Reserve Component officers and is conducted at Camp Joseph Robinson, Little Rock, Arkansas. The subject of advertising is not adequately addressed at either location. At Camp Robinson it is not addressed at all, while at Fort Benjamin Harrison it is the subject of a "Guest Lecture."

Since the responsibility for local advertising rests with Instructor Groups, officers assigned to these groups should receive instruction in advertising theory and practice. Budgetary constraints are so severe that ROTC cannot afford to waste money on futile and disjointed ad campaigns that lack a specific objective or that attempt to appeal to a broad range of people rather than concentrate on a specific target market. Ideally, a four to six hour block on this subject should be included in the instruction at both the Active and Reserve Component courses.

CONCLUSIONS

a. Considering the current funding and advertising system, ROTC is doing a reasonably satisfactory job of attracting highly qualified students.

b. ROTC advertising themes are consistent with the DA position statement.

c. National advertising products to support ROTC are of high quality and provide an excellent image of the Army.

d. The Army must either provide additional money to the ROTC advertising and marketing program to match the increased recruiting requirement or seek efficiency of scale by consolidating the functional responsibilities for Total Army personnel advertising and marketing.
e. Advertising is not targeted towards the Reserve Forces Duty aspect of the ROTC program.

f. ROTC and USAREC nurse advertising is duplicative and can be consolidated.

g. The ROTC LEADS System is generally not well accepted or managed at the Instructor Group level.

h. The ROTC Mission Management System should be capable of interfacing with the LEADS System in order to better measure the effectiveness of ROTC advertising.

i. The ROTC Mission Management Systems with its high speed direct mail capability will significantly enhance ROTC advertising at the local level once this system is fielded.

j. The majority of the PMSs stated in the ROTC survey that the NW Ayer Regional Account Managers are not providing Instructor Groups with help or assistance.

k. Training in advertising and marketing techniques provided at both the Reserve and Active ROTC cadre Training Courses is inadequate.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. The Total Army functional responsibility for advertising and marketing for both enlisted and officer personnel should be consolidated under the ODCSPER.

2. Advertising specifically targeted at personnel with a Reserve Forces Duty propensity should be developed and used by ROTC.

3. Nurse advertising should be reviewed with the view towards cost reduction by consolidating ROTC and USAREC advertising.

4. The Mission Management System should be capable of interfacing with the LEADS System.

5. The function of the Regional Account Managers should be reviewed to determine how they can provide the best possible support to Instructor Groups.

6. Increased training in local advertising strategy and procedures should be incorporated into the Reserve and Active cadre training courses.
CHAPTER THREE

RECRUITING

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines ROTC recruiting policies and procedures. It reviews enrollment and production trends and provides a historical perspective for the major ROTC recruiting initiatives implemented since 1970; identifies the existing recruiting challenges; assesses the potential of ROTC to accomplish its recruiting mission; introduces the ROTCSG Recruiting Model; explains the five subsystems within the model and uses the model as a framework for analyzing current ROTC recruiting practices. The chapter concludes with recommendations and outlines an implementation scheme.

BACKGROUND

To date, the decade of the 70s was the most difficult era for the Army ROTC Program. The anti-ROTC campus demonstrations in response to the Vietnam War presented ROTC with a most significant challenge. The unrest generated by the anti-war efforts caused twelve colleges to discontinue ROTC. More damaging to ROTC enrollment was the elimination by many schools of the mandatory requirement for student participation in the Basic Course. The curtailment of the draft, and the introduction of the Modern Volunteer Army, in 1971, served as a further disincentive for ROTC enrollment which dropped from 177,000 in 1966 to 33,000 in 1973.

Faced with this reduced enrollment, the Army began to place increased emphasis on ROTC recruiting and introduced several initiatives designed to increase enrollment, retention and production. The ROTC curriculum became more flexible, uniform regulations were relaxed, drill requirements were diminished, haircut policies were liberalized and adventure activities were introduced. In November 1971, cadet monthly subsistence allowance was raised from $50 to $100 and scholarship authorizations were increased from 5,500 to 6,500.
In July 1973 the newly established US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) assumed responsibility for the ROTC program. The Recruiting and Publicity Division at TRADOC was formed and tasked with the overall responsibility for advertising and marketing on a national level. The four ROTC Regions were established and each Region Headquarters included an Advertising and Information Division to accomplish Regional planning and to conduct recruiting publicity.

These recruiting efforts began to increase ROTC enrollment by the mid 70s. Despite this upturn, the Reserve Forces experienced a significant lieutenant shortage. In response, the Early Commissioning Program which had been initiated in 1966 for Military Junior Colleges was expanded. Under this expansion, cadets from all ROTC programs who were accepted by an ARNG or USAR troop unit and who had completed the Advanced Camp and the MS IV course, but who had not completed their studies for an academic degree, could be commissioned. Since 1978 more than 6,000 officers have been commissioned under this program.

Another program designed to enhance ROTC recruiting and to provide pre-commissioning training was the Simultaneous Membership Program (SMP) which was started in 1977. The SMP permits an ROTC cadet to serve as an officer trainee and receive drill pay as an E-5 in an ARNG or USAR troop unit at the same time he or she is enrolled in the ROTC Advanced Course.

The Expand the Base Program was initiated in August of 1979. It was intended to increase lieutenant production to 10,500 by FY 85 with the majority of these lieutenants going to the Army Reserve and National Guard. The program was also instituted in response to demographic market forecasts which projected a decline in the number of 18 year old males and college students during the 1980s and 1990s. This same forecast estimated that between 100 to 300 colleges would close due to declining student enrollment.

The Expand the Base Program had several key elements. The initial step was the establishment of an ROTC program through a cross-enrollment agreement at institutions which did not have ROTC. Secondly, those schools which were successful in the cross-enrollment mode and that offered a high potential for enrollment, were converted to Extension Centers. Additionally, some extension centers were selected for host status. Thirdly, in the Fall
of 1981 either a National Guard or Army Reserve Officer was assigned to each host ROTC detachment. This action was designed to forge closer ties among ROTC, the active Army and reserve Components as well as provide additional ROTC manning. The final step was the development of the Enrollment and Retention Course to prepare the Assistant Professors of Military Science (APMS) for campus recruiting activities.

Despite these recruiting initiatives, the Army entered the decade of the 80s with insufficient numbers of lieutenants to meet Reserve Component requirements. In 1980 Congress increased the scholarship authorizations for Army ROTC from 6,500 to 12,000. These scholarships were to be used to solve the Reserve Forces Officer shortages. They were phased in between school years 1981 and 1983 and with their introduction, ROTC began to allocate scholarships by discipline. The purpose was to use the scholarship program as a means to recruit additional quality cadets training in the science and technical disciplines required by the officer corps.

The Guaranteed Reserve Forces Duty (GRFD) Contract, introduced in SY 83-84, was also designed to improve officer fill in the Reserve Components. Initially, these contracts were used as a retention tool and not as an up front incentive. Of the 5000 GRFD contracts allocated each year to ROTC 3025 were used in SY 83-84 and 2250 in SY 84-85. In Sept 1984, the DCSROTC indicated in a letter to DA DCSPER that greater emphasis would be placed on the use of this contract. Preliminary reports for SY 85-86 reflect that less than 1000 GRFD contracts have been used. The declining appeal of this contract demonstrates the current active duty focus of ROTC; the need to better advertise and market reserve component option, and provides an insight into the challenge of recruiting cadets for the reserve components.

In October 1983 a high school recruiting effort known as "Operation Goldstrike" was initiated in the Fourth ROTC Region. This concept involved the deployment of a 2 man officer recruiting teams called "Goldminers." The Goldminers mission is to identify, motivate, and recruit quality students to enroll in Army ROTC in cities where ROTC has had minimal presence. These teams are currently working in 14 cities. The Goldminer concept was the first coordinated and targeted effort by an ROTC Region to systematically recruit in high schools. This concept of high school recruiting has great significance for the successful accomplishment of the ROTC recruiting mission.
In the fall of 1984 ROTC revised its recruiting strategy. The primary focus had been on attracting students who had graduated from high school and were entering college. Based on research conducted by Army Research Institute (ARI), it was determined that career decision paths for college-bound students begin to develop in the junior year of high school. It was recognized that if high school students had designed their college course of studies while in their senior year of high school they would be less receptive to ROTC recruiting once they arrive at college. The revised strategy is outlined below:

"The long-term recruiting strategy is high school recruiting that provides information in sufficient quantity to 4-year college-bound high school students so they can make an informed decision on whether or not to enroll in ROTC. The underlying concept of the long-term recruiting strategy is to align the 4-year college-bound high school student's career decision path with the ROTC recruiting effort. Once this has been accomplished, the student will then commit himself to the ROTC program."

"High school recruiting will be performed by detachment cadre in coordination with US Army Recruiting Command, the National Guard, and the recruiting efforts of their host institution. Detachment cadre will concentrate their efforts on key feeder high schools and those high schools with high go-to-college rates". (ROTC fact sheet Nov 1984)

In conjunction with this guidance each detachment was required to identify and began to recruit in 10 key "feeder" high schools.

This strategy and operational concept was formalized in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between ROTC and USAREC in Feb 1984. The MOU modified the ROTC strategy explained above slightly by establishing USAREC as the coordinator for high school recruiting efforts except in high schools where there is a Junior ROTC unit. In these cases, the Senior Army Instructor will be the coordinator. The goal of this MOU is not only to help ROTC and USAREC but to provide young men and women interested in Army service more complete information with which to make career choices. A copy of the MOU is at Annex 1 to this chapter.
In 1984 a pilot recruiting program called the "Gold Bar Recruiter" was started. This program allowed selected newly commissioned lieutenants to remain at their ROTC detachments for a maximum of 120 days to assist in the recruiting effort. These lieutenants work with high school graduates who are enrolling at ROTC host institutions and help the PMS through visits to Extension Centers, Cross-Enrolled Schools and Junior Colleges. They also become involved in telephone canvassing, direct mail campaigns and other advertising programs. These lieutenants help fill the critical summer recruiting void experienced at the Instructor Group when the majority of the cadre leave campus to support Advanced Camp.

In addition to attempting to improve overall recruiting recently there have been several initiatives to improve the recruitment of students with specific technical and scientific disciplines. The Department of the Army Scientific and Engineering Cooperative Program (DASE-COOP) started in SY 84-85 allows college students to work for an Army agency to improve job skills and earn funds to help finance their educations. Those who complete all requirements earn civil service status upon graduation and commissioning. Graduates entering the Active Army are, upon satisfying their active duty requirement, eligible to return to the agency for which they worked. Graduates entering the Army National Guard or the U.S. Army Reserve are normally employed by the agency which sponsored the co-op training or another Army laboratory or facility. This program is still currently being tested in the First ROTC Region.

The Technical Enrichment Program (TEP) is another ROTC program designed to meet the Army's future need for highly skilled full-time, Army funded master's degree program. Fields of study include robotics, artificial intelligence, computer-related cognitive science, composite materials (ceramics), human factors engineering, biotechnology, vertical life technology, physics, metallurgy, computer engineering, space systems engineering/operations, and other high tech and space related fields. Candidates must have an undergraduate degree which relates to one of the desired disciplines, be a recent college graduate, and be highly recommended by the chain of command. Participants, who complete the program, follow a single track career with successive assignments in areas where their academic skills are of maximum benefit to the Army.
The Reserved Scholarship Program was initiated in SY 85-86 and enables selected four-year scholarship applicants, for whom there are not sufficient four-year scholarships, to be offered a reserved three year scholarship. This scholarship would be effective in their MS II year if they enroll in ROTC as a Freshman and meet established scholarship criteria. Although it is too soon to measure the recruiting significance of this program it appears to have promise and offers the following added advantages:

a. Reduces scholarship administration.

b. Eliminates the possibility of a student using the first year of his four-year scholarship and then departing the program without a payback requirement.

c. Allows the PMS to evaluate and confirm the student's ability and motivation.

From the above, we gain insight into some of the initiatives that have been applied to the recruiting challenge faced by the ROTC program since 1970. The ROTCSG used these initiatives as a point of departure in its recruiting research and next considered the status of the system and the factors that impact on the ability of ROTC to meet the demands placed on it by the Total Army.

**CURRENT SYSTEM**

The dilemma faced by the current and projected ROTC recruiting status is depicted by Figure 3-1. The dimensions of the ROTC recruiting challenge became more defined as the ROTCSG analyzed the projections of college and high school enrollment. The focus of the Study Group's research on recruiting was centered on identifying steps the Army could take to create "elasticity" in the shrinking ROTC market. It was also necessary to determine if the ROTC mission was valid. The goal was to develop an optimal recruiting model which provides for mission accomplishment. Implicit in all recruiting research was the need to ensure that recruiting efforts focused on attracting quality cadets to the ROTC program. These quality cadets should represent appropriate diversity in terms of race, gender and academic discipline and required recruiting efforts must be cost effective. The concept that "quality attracts quality" was paramount throughout the group's research on recruiting. It was recognized that the ROTC community had
initiated many actions to improve recruiting. Ultimately, some of these initiatives have been expanded on and integrated into the Study Group's recommendations. With this overview it is appropriate to turn toward specific indicators of ROTC market trends.

ROTC RECRUITING DILEMMA

FIGURE 3-1

The Marketing Chapter highlighted several educational trends that will have a significant impact on ROTC production. These trends, all of which will occur between 1983 and 1991, include:

a. A twenty percent reduction in high school graduates.

b. A fifteen percent reduction in total college full-time enrollment.

c. An eight percent reduction in the award of bachelor degrees.

In addition to the above market trends, internal program trends were analyzed to gain some insight on production and enrollment. Figure 3-2
indicates that ROTC total enrollment trends for the decade of the 80s are declining. Since 1980 total ROTC enrollment has declined five percent from 64,535 to 61,231. This five percent decline in enrollment approximates the decline of total college enrollment of 6 percent during the same period.

![ROTC Total Enrollment Trend](image)

**FIGURE 3-2**

Figure 3-3 breaks out the total enrollment displayed in Figure 3-2 by MS class. The most significant factor reflected by Figure 3-3 is the overall decline of MS I enrollment. This decline has been attributed to a push for quality, data base impurities, a reflection of the economy, and a lack of appropriate emphasis on recruiting i.e. a failure to stress the importance of high school recruiting until SY 84-85. Since 1981 there has been a twenty three percent decline in MS I enrollment. This reduction of 10,000 MS I's is particularly significant, since MS I enrollment statistics indicate how interested entering college students are in the Army ROTC program and the effectiveness of ROTC high school recruiting.
FIGURE 3-3

Declining trends are also evident in the Basic and Advanced Camps. The principal lateral entry program available to students is the Basic Camp. This program allows students to enter the Advanced Course as an MS III upon successful completion of a six week Basic Camp conducted at Fort Knox. The key actions involved in this program are recruiting for the camp, completion of camp, and contracting. Basic Camp has a capacity of 4,800 students. Figure 3-4 displays recent trends of the Basic Camp attendance, completion and follow-up contracting. These trends are significant because Basic Camp offers the ROTC program the capability to produce an officer in two years. Research has found that cadets who are products of the Basic Camp do as well as four year program cadets at Advanced Camp and at OBC. The maximum use of Basic Camp is one of the few ways to increase ROTC lieutenant production in 1988 when a 2,000 officer production shortfall is anticipated. Use of the Basic Camp to increase officer production will be discussed later in this chapter.
Figure 3-5 reflects the trend of Advanced Camp attendance. Since 1983 there has been a reduction of 11 percent in Advanced Camp completions.
The final trend is the comparison of production requirements versus the projection of lieutenants production. This comparison is shown in Figure 3-6. Through 1982 the production mission had not been measured. The significant indicator is that production which had increased to 8,377 in 1985 has now leveled off and is declining. In 1988 there will be a shortfall in lieutenant production of more than 2,000 officers. This decline will occur despite the management initiatives outlined above that were designed to increase overall production and is reflective of the declining market and the need to improve recruiting and retention.

**PRODUCTION TRENDS VS MISSION**

![Graph showing production trends vs mission](image)

**FIGURE 3-6**

**RECRUITING MODEL.**

The analysis of ROTC production and enrollment trends, the increasing mission and the declining market indicate that there is a need to modify the current ROTC recruiting system. The approach taken by the ROTCSG was to identify what an ideal ROTC recruiting system should accomplish. This is shown in Figure 3-7.
RECRUITING

SHOULD:
• SUPPORT MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT FOR TOTAL ARMY.
• RECRUIT HIGH QUALITY STUDENTS.
• BE FLEXIBLE TO CHANGING NEEDS.
• PROVIDE SUFFICIENT ATTRACTION INCENTIVES.
• BE ADEQUATELY RESOURCED ($ AND MANPOWER).
• INCLUDE EFFECTIVE MISSIONING AND PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS.
• BE SUPPORTED BY TRAINED PERSONNEL.
• BE MUTUALLY SUPPORTIVE OF COLLEGE RECRUITING EFFORTS.
• BE APPROPRIATELY INTEGRATED WITH MARKETING, ADVERTISING
  AND ENROLLMENT SYSTEMS.
• BE RECOGNIZED AS ESSENTIAL TO SUCCESS.
• BE EFFECTIVELY MANAGED

FIGURE 3-7

Next, a model of the ideal recruiting system was designed. The recruiting model developed by the study group is shown in Figure 3-8. The study group used this model as a benchmark to measure current recruiting procedures and to determine what changes were required to develop the optimum recruiting system. The ROTCSG recognized the need to build on those recruiting initiatives that had been put in place and that were effective. Ultimately the recruiting system would be based "on state of art" computer capability. However, this computer capability is not in-place now and some recommendations affecting management at the detachment level require implementation in a manual mode until the ROTC Mission Management System is fielded.

Each of the recruiting fundamental elements will be examined in detail. The first element of the recruiting system to be discussed will be the missioning process.
The ROTCSG began to analyze the missioning process by establishing what the ideal missioning process would include. The process begins at HQDA where Total Army requirements are determined. The considerations used in developing the requirement include: end strength as programmed in the POM, projected officer inventories, required education levels and academic mix and Reserve Component readiness. Once established the mission must be sent to the field in a timely manner to ensure that responsible agencies can analyze requirements, make plans, and resource for mission accomplishment.

At ROTC HQ the ideal mission process includes an analysis of the mission in relation to the market and its disposition with respect to regions, areas and instructor groups. This analysis must provide for the exploitation of both the high school and college markets; the integration of Total Army recruiting resources and result in the development of a credible mission for each Region. This mission must accurately reflect the capability of each Region given the available market. The mission must mirror Total Army requirements, therefore, if 50 percent of ROTC production is for the Reserve Components the mission should task the Regions to produce a specified number of officers for the Reserve Components.

At Region and Area levels the missioning process is similar to that at
HQ ROTC but becomes more precise. It is also at this level that the Instructor Groups if necessary adjudicate their missions. The adjudication must be managed within each area by the Area Commander. The importance of adjudication is to help ensure that the valid realistic missions are assigned and that instructor groups are appropriately challenged and resourced.

With the above description of the ideal missioning process, the Study Group next examined the current procedure. Figure 3-9 depicts this process.

At DA level the document used to convey the production requirements to the field is the TOTAL ARMY OFFICER ACCESSION PLAN. This plan was last produced in 1983. A new plan is being finalized and will be released to the field in the second quarter of FY 86. In order to facilitate planning and resourcing this plan must be published annually.

The 1983 plan was adjusted in April 1985 because of questions concerning the accuracy of the requirement. The revision established the current mission. Following this revision the accuracy of the new mission has come into question. Thus, a situation existed where there was very little
credibility in the DA Total Army Officer requirement. The Study Group recognized that the validity of the lieutenant requirement impacted on the majority of the ROTCSG research areas and recommendations. It was therefore necessary to conduct an analysis of the lieutenant requirement and the procedure used to develop these requirements. The ROTCSG also examined the flow of officers within the Total Army System to identify distribution related problems that, if solved, would result in a reduction of the ROTC requirement.

This analysis is at Annex 2 to this chapter. The analysis accomplished the following:

a. Validated the current lieutenant production requirements.

b. Identified the need to continue to improve the flow of officers from the IRR to the National Guard and Army Reserve Troop units through the NG and USAR lieutenant management teams.

c. Identified the need to change AR 135-91 which establishes the military service obligation in order to require officers leaving active duty after three years to serve in either ARNG or Reserve troop units.

At ROTC HQ level the document used to transmit the mission from ROTC HQ to the Regions is the Operational Market Plan (1985-1986). Confusion generated by the 1983 mission is still evident in this plan because throughout the document the target for production is 12,400, not the adjusted mission of 10,800. The DCSROTC guidance establishes the basis of the ROTC program as a 4 year program; however, in computing mission requirements the production efficiency is based on the number of cadre assigned 2 years prior. This conflicts with the philosophy of the program, which is to emphasize the 4 year program.

The basis for developing the mission in the Operations Market Plan (1985-1986) is the projected cadre strength and required production efficiency which is the number of lieutenants commissioned in a given year divided by the number of officer cadre assigned to that detachment two years prior to the commissioning year. Some assumptions must be made in any long range projection or mission establishment. However, the concept of cadre production efficiency, particularly a ratio increase from 4.2 in 1981 to 5.4 in 1991 (which is the efficiency required to produce 10,800 lieutenants given programmed strength) does not appear sound for the following reasons:
a. **Historical basis.** Since 1981 the historical plot of cadre production efficiency has been 4.2 (1981), 4.5 (1982), 4.8 (1983), 4.1 (1984), and 4.1 (1985). The production efficiencies attained in 1982 and in 1983 were inflated by the implementation of the Commission of Completion Student Program (CCSP). Under this program cadets who had finished the ROTC program but who had not been commissioned were identified and commissioned. This action caused a spike in the 1982 and 1983 production statistics and created an inflated efficiency of 4.5 for 82 and 4.8 for 83. Since 1983 the average efficiency has not been above 4.1.

b. **Vulnerability to personnel turbulence.** Because cadre efficiency is based on assigned cadre strength, production is vulnerable to the personnel system's ability to maintain ROTC cadre strength at the required level. This is particularly critical since TRADOC eliminated ROTC exempted unit status in 1983. Complicating this is the increasing reliance on AGRs to serve as APMS. The NG and USAR assignment personnel indicate that they are having difficulty recruiting qualified AGR officers for ROTC.

c. **Need to include propensity to join ROTC in missioning considerations.** The current missioning procedure gives no consideration to the propensity of groups of students in certain sections of the country to join ROTC.

d. **Need to target students with Reserve Component propensity.** Despite the fact that approximately 50 percent of the production mission has been identified for the Reserve Components, the ROTC mission does not include a specified RFD mission. The ROTCSG found indications that there was a group of students with a Reserve Force propensity; however, this group has not been well defined or exploited.

e. **Need to address the declining market.** Under current procedure the plan is to reduce cadre strength until they are at the required efficiency. These reductions must be managed through attrition. If the detachment continues to fail to reach the required efficiency the viability standards will be called into play and the detachment will be considered for elimination. The adjustment of officer strength and reliance on viability standards are inappropriate methods for increasing production.

The ROTCSG determined that the missioning process can be significantly improved by the conduct of a comprehensive market analysis. This analysis would be designed to identify high school and college students who have a
propensity to join ROTC, as well as, those with a propensity for Reserve Force Duty. The Reserve Component dimensions of this analysis are particularly important given the fact that 50 percent of the ROTC mission is produced for the Reserve Forces. A Statement Of Work to support this analysis was developed and it is included as Annex 3 to this chapter. This Statement of Work requires the contractor to develop a model which will be able to generate a mission for each host detachment.

The concept of providing a mission from HQ ROTC to each detachment is forward looking and envisions that the computer capability of the Mission Management System at each detachment will facilitate the flow of information throughout the ROTC system. This Mission Management System is scheduled for fielding in FY 86 and 87. Even with the capability to gather information directly from detachment level there will be a role for the Region and Area Commander in the missioning process. They will be "fine tuners" and adjudicators of the mission provided to the detachments as well as the supervisors responsible for ensuring mission accomplishment by each detachment.

In summary, the ROTCSG sees the need for a missioning system grounded in a comprehensive, valid market analysis. Flowing from this analysis will be a mission generated computer model that interacts with each detachment in order to pull data from detachments into the central model in a timely and efficient manner. This exchange will result in a recruiting mission provided to the detachment that supports Total Army requirements and which each member of the detachment know they can accomplish. The next element in the recruiting model that will be discussed is the Recruiting Force.

RECRUITING FORCE

This portion of the Recruiting System deals with the Recruiting Force, those people responsible for interacting with students and for recruiting students into ROTC. This force is not all military as can be seen from Figure 3-10. This section identifies the force, documents the contributions they make and identifies ways this force can become efficient.
Instructor Group Cadre. One of the major motivators throughout the Army is pride. This sense of pride is what motivates the ROTC cadre members to recruit cadets for their program. The ROTC leadership continually stresses the requirement that everyone in the detachment must be a recruiter. The PMS must serve as the catalyst and integrate the efforts of the entire recruiting force in his area of influence. Each cadre member must arrive at the detachment with an understanding of the importance of recruiting and must have sufficient product knowledge to be an effective recruiter as soon as they arrive on campus. ROTC is doing an excellent job in preparing new cadre members to become recruiters through the TRADOC ROTC Orientation and Enrollment Program (TROEP Course).

There are two areas where the effectiveness of these courses can be improved. The first is administrative and involves the development of a better method for accounting for cadre who have and have not attended the TROEP courses. This recommendation is intended to ensure that all cadre members receive this excellent training. The second recommendation is a need for more ROTC product knowledge about Reserve Component Duty. This recommendation is based on comments in response to the ROTC survey and discussions with ROTC cadre members.
One of the most important tools that can help the detachment organize its recruiting efforts is the Marketing Action Plan (MAP). This plan allows the PMS to map out his recruiting year, to plan his division of labor and to allocate recruiting resources. The ROTCSG recognizes the importance of a viable MAP and found indications that there is a need for increased emphasis on the development and review of these plans at Region and Area levels.

Cadet. Cadets are some of the best recruiters available to attract other college and high school students. The ROTC program on any campus must have student appeal. There is no better way to gain and maintain this appeal than by having groups of highly enthusiastic cadets talking about their ROTC program and the benefits it offers. It is also important to recognize that quality cadets will attract other quality students. The successful ROTC programs seem more able to develop innovative and comprehensive ways to use cadets as recruiters.

Gold Bar Recruiters. The concept of the Gold Bar Recruiter has been outlined in the "Cadet" section. The Gold Bar Recruiter provides assistance when it is needed most - during the summer when there are only skeleton staffs at each host detachment and in some cases no cadre members at extension centers. The duties of the Gold Bar Recruiters must be well laid out and explained in detail because many times this new lieutenant will be working without cadre supervision. PMS's must also avoid the temptation to use the Gold Bar Recruiter in non-recruiting efforts such as end of year inventories, and preparing class materials for the next school year. The ROTCSG endorses expanded use of Gold Bar Recruiters provided end strength considerations are met. The activities of the Gold Bar Recruiter should be reflected in the Detachment Market Action Plan. Gold Bar Recruiters should be selected on their abilities to be effective salesmen who can communicate the ROTC recruiting message to potential cadets and parents.

USMA Liaison Officer. Throughout the United States there are 400 USMA Liaison Officers who interview and help prospective students prepare their applications for West Point. These LNO's are Reserve Officers who undertake this effort for retirement points. They are extremely well organized and yearly come in contact with thousands of students who desire to be
commissioned officers. Because of their extensive experience in dealing with West Point applicants, these LNO's know what a high school student's chances for acceptance to the Military Academy are. They also can get an insight into the students motivation to be an officer. Thus, the West Point Liaison Officers are in a unique position to provide excellent leads on students who may not be admitted into West Point but who would be outstanding ROTC cadets and ultimately excellent officers.

The exchange of information between USMA LNO and ROTC detachments appears to have increased in recent years. However, because of 3 year turnover of personnel within detachments there is a need to formalize and document this relationship. This can be done by developing lists of USMA LNO's by the areas they service and matching this up to Zip Code LEAD areas assigned to each ROTC detachment. USMA LNO's should also be provided phone numbers and addresses of all host detachments since many of the students coming into ROTC programs are drawn from across the entire country, and arrive from outside of this Zip Code breakdown.

**College Recruiters.** The declining college population is impacting on colleges and universities throughout the country in the same way it is generating shortages in ROTC production. Study Group discussion and visits with members of academia indicate that colleges and universities are recruiting as much as each service ROTC program. Army Advisory Panel members indicated that the retention rate in our four year colleges is estimated at 50 percent. The PMS should see these conditions as an opportunity to enhance ROTC recruiting. The very presence of a host ROTC detachment at a campus is a selling point for that school, particularly since 4 year scholarship cadets must attend these host schools.

A PMS can improve his recruiting coverage by developing a recruiting strategy in consort with and linked to the efforts of the host school. The PMS must initiate the move to be included in the various recruiting programs and trips sponsored by the school's admissions office. Any joint recruiting activities undertaken in conjunction with admissions personnel should be documented in the Marketing Action Plan to preclude loss of these initiatives when PMSs or enrollment officers change.
Centers of Influence. Centers of Influence are anyone or any group that can influence students to join ROTC. These include local civic leaders, politicians, high school counselors, college professors, clergy and local and national business leaders. The role of these business leaders is gaining in importance to ROTC. These leaders must be informed about the high quality cadet/student and ultimately Reserve Officer/employees that are associated with ROTC. The goal must be to increase Reserve Component acceptance by cadets through developing linkages with the business world which cause employees to actively seek out RC officers for employment. This concept is addressed in greater detail in the Reserve Forces chapter of this report.

The faculty and administrators at the ROTC sponsoring school are also excellent centers of influence. These people normally have greater longevity at a campus than the PMS and APMS. As a group, they come in contact with many more students than the ROTC cadre. These reasons alone make it strategically important to cultivate friendships and understanding of the ROTC program among the faculty and administration. An interesting example of how these centers of influence see an ROTC Program was sent to the Study Group by Dr. William J. Keppler, Dean of Arts and Science at Boise State University and the Civilian Aide to the Secretary of the Army; it is included as Annex 4 to this chapter.

Gold Miner Teams. The Gold Miner concept has been described at the outset of this chapter. The ROTCSG position is the Gold Miner Teams have not been in place long enough to allow an accurate evaluation. However, ROTC must evaluate this concept in terms of dollars and personnel costs compared to the effectiveness of recruiting cadets. This evaluation should be conducted during the next year. This is particularly significant considering the start-up cost of each team which was estimated at $60,000 and the diversion of ROTC officer cadre from the classroom to full time recruiting positions.

ARNG and USAR Commanders. The most significant dimension of the ROTC recruiting mission is the increasing numbers of lieutenants that must be commissioned for the NG and USAR. This fact gains in significance when one recognizes the current active duty focus of the ROTC program. To help in Reserve Force recruiting the ROTC system should more effectively harness and
integrate the efforts of NG and USAR commanders. These commanders may be able to provide lieutenants to help with reserve recruiting and cadet training and they can also work within their units to develop members of their command as potential ROTC cadets. They can also help by identifying ROTC scholarship candidates from their units, and in coordination with the PMS identify Reserve Scholarship opportunities to cadets who may want to compete for RFD scholarships.

The AGR assigned to each host detachment must serve as a bridge between the Reserve Component and the cadets in the program. Opportunities for recruiting success will be increased when the NG and USAR Commanders are working together with the AGR.

**In-service Recruiters.** The In-service Recruiters are 162 AGR NCOs assigned to selected MACOMs. These recruiters counsel all soldiers separating from active duty. Their goal is to enlist these departing soldiers into a TPU, the IRR or provide referrals to the National Guard. In addition to recruiting these soldiers for enlisted reserve duty, the In-service Recruiters also provide information on ROTC and the Simultaneous Membership Program.

There are several on-going actions designed to improve ROTC SMP recruiting by In-service Recruiters. The operating regulation for these recruiters AR 601-209 is being rewritten and will include a clarification and an expanded section on SMP eligibility. The intent of this section is to better provide for the selection of quality cadets into the SMP. Based on a change to AR 601-210 which eliminates the linkage between a SMP vacancy and a unit officer shortage and which allows a troop unit to have three SMP per unit officer. FORSCOM will have increased SMP spaces. These spaces are being placed on the Request Vacancy System (RVC) the automated system used by the In-service Recruiter to display options to soldiers they are counselling. MILPERCENT Separation Branch has coordinated the production of a film explaining the ROTC program which will be shown to all departing soldiers. This film will be available to all Separations Points in January 1986.

As the number of Army College Fund eligible soldiers increases the potential for additional recruiting production from the In-service Recruiters should increase. Discussion with several In-service Recruiters revealed that there is a need to provide addresses and telephone numbers for
ROTC detachments to support their ROTC recruiting effort. This can be accomplished by providing a directory of all ROTC host detachments to these recruiters. Another possible way of improving In-service Recruiter support of ROTC would be the development of an ROTC referral mission for these recruiters.

ARNG and USAREC Recruiters. The concept of Off Campus Recruiting directly relates to the integration and expanded use of ARNG and USAREC recruiters in support of ROTC. This aspect of recruiting and the role of the ARNG and USAREC Recruiter is included in the next section of this chapter on Recruiting Techniques.

RECRUITING TECHNIQUES

The ROTCSG came to the realization that many of the techniques currently in use, such as Gold Bar Recruiters and Gold Miners, offer promise for better recruiting. However, none of these techniques are sufficient in themselves to make ROTC viable in the 1990s and beyond. The Army must find a way to increase ROTC recruiting manpower and resources if it expects to recruit sufficient numbers of cadets from the current shrinking market.

Several other considerations influenced the study group research on ways to improve recruiting. These included:

a. A need to ensure that the recruiting focus is one of attracting high quality cadets.

b. A recognition that continued diversion of ROTC instructors from classroom and cadet developmental activities to recruiting will eventually have a negative impact on the quality of the ROTC lieutenant.

c. A realization that there is a need to become more efficient and to develop a more comprehensive high school recruiting program.

d. An acknowledgement that high schools are becoming overwhelmed by military, college and civilian recruiters and that a coordinated, integrated and restructured approach by the Army would best provide for continued recruiting access into the high schools.

The ROTC/USAREC MOU mentioned at the outset of this chapter, included as Annex 1 of this chapter, offers a framework for improving recruiting in the high schools.
A second initiative instituted by ODCSROTC in SY 84-85 also provides insight that helped the ROTCSG reach a conclusion on improving high school recruiting. This initiative was the identification of high-go-to-college schools that had ZIP Codes in the proximity of each Instructor Group. Using this list each Instructor Group was required to identify ten "feeder high" schools and recruit in each of these high schools. Based on this ROTC directive, the 314 ROTC host detachments are recruiting in approximately 3,140 high schools. In contrast, USAREC is currently recruiting in the majority of our nations 18,000 high schools. The focus of the USAREC recruiter is currently on those students interested in joining the Army in an enlisted status. However, these recruiters come in contact with thousands of students who are not interested in enlisted status but who do plan to enter college. At this time the Army does not have an effective program to capitalize on these contacts and exploit this high quality market of potential ROTC cadets. Figure 3-11 depicts the current flow of these high quality high school students and their interaction with USAREC recruiters.

WHERE DO THE TSC I-IIIA SENIORS GO

![Diagram of high school students' career paths]

FIGURE 3-11

3-24
The ROTCSG identified the need to get better ROTC recruiting coverage in our high schools. Also, the Army must design a program which causes and allows USAREC recruiters to sell ROTC to those students who do not desire to serve as an enlisted soldier. ARI research indicates that to be effective we must market and advertise ROTC early in the high school period because students are making decisions about colleges and college courses in their Junior year. The ideal recruiting system is conceptualized on Figure 3-12. Under this concept USAREC would be given a specified referral, scholarship sales and basic camp mission. USAREC would be responsible for all off campus high school recruiting, and for ROTC recruiting in Junior Colleges and Colleges that are not affiliated with a host ROTC program.

**FIGURE 3-12**
The Commander of TRADOC and USAREC have agreed to initiate a test of some aspects contained in the ROTCSG Off Campus recruiting proposal. Figure 3-13 is an extract from the above agreement outlining how the TRADOC/USAREC test will work.

**HOW WILL IT WORK**

1. **USAREC will provide data on individuals in three categories.**
   A. **High quality prospects (1,300/yr).** Male and female seniors who dropped out of delayed entry program to go to college and showed interest in the Army—physically, mentally and academically qualified.
   B. **Quality leads (3,200/yr).** Male and female mini-packets that include:
      - Positive intention to join ROTC
      - ADIT tested and scored TSC I-IV
      - Statement of good health
      - Statement of moral qualification
      - National Investigative Service screening
   C. **Referrals (13,200/yr).** Males and females stating "they are going to college and are willing to consider ROTC".

2. **PMO will work with the individuals in the three categories, select cadets and advise policymakers of results.

**FIGURE 3-13**

The ROTCSG position is that the scope of this test should be expanded to include missions for scholarship sales and Basic Camp recruiting. Ultimately increased scholarship sales would tie in to the ROTCSG recommendation for an early contracting incentive. This early contract concept visualizes using the four year scholarship application lists as a way to identify high quality students who would be offered an early contract into ROTC. The monetary value of this incentive is $1000 for the MS I and MS II year. Increased four-year scholarship applications generated by USAREC Off Campus recruiting will offer ROTC greater selectivity for the
recently proposed expansion of the three-year reserved scholarship to 3000 four-year applicants planned for school year 1986-87. The Basic Camp recruiting effort would also greatly assist USAREC in its effort to penetrate the Junior College market under the High Grad Program and would maximize the use of the Basic Camp which has a capacity for 4,800 but which has traditionally been under subscribed by about 1,000.

The key to an effective test of Off Campus Recruiting will be the conscientious and effective use of the ROTC LEADS system which will be the system used to track and account for USAREC referrals. ROTC cadre and ROTC HQ personnel have indicated that the LEADS system is not well maintained at detachment level. The importance of the LEADS system must be stressed to all ROTC detachments in conjunction with this test.

The USAREC/TRADOC test should be monitored by ODCSPER since it will provide information which ultimately could impact on areas such as ROTC incentives and perhaps indicates a need to look to alternate sources of commissioning in order to meet Total Army lieutenant requirements.

**PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM**

ROTCSG research identified a need for a production management system. This system will monitor and provide a management tool to measure ROTC production in terms of quantity, quality, cost and diversity. The need for a viable production management system is particularly important given current production shortfalls. The intent of this system is to provide visibility to all aspects of production. The very existence of this system and the visibility it provides will help increase production by allowing for more effective management.

The Mission Management System (MMS), the automated ROTC management system scheduled for fielding by FY 87, will facilitate the development of a production management system. However, by adopting a manual production system now the transition into an automated management system will be much smoother since cadre will be attuned to the importance of and the use of management data. Additionally, if the Army is required to reduce its budget there is a possibility that funding for the MMS may be deleted and ROTC will be forced to rely on a manual production management system.

Many of the ROTC personnel who were interviewed during the course of the
study suggested a need for this type of a system. Some Area Commanders have adopted prototype production management systems. The Fourth ROTC Region has implemented a manual system that measures production of the Goldminer Teams. The ROTCSG has incorporated the many suggestions provided from the field into the proposed production management system. A visualization of how the system will work and the benefits it will provide are shown in Figure 3-14.

PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
HOW IT WORKS

1. Identify key indicators of production applicable to each ROTC level of management:

   - Detachment
   - Area
   - Region
   - ROTC
   - HQDA

2. Indicators will measure production in terms of ROTC measures of effectiveness:

   - Quantity
   - Quality
   - Cost
   - Reversal

3. Develop a standard way to display these indicators in snapshot and trend format for each management level including HQDA and VCSA update.

   - System benefits to HQDA:
     - Provide standard data, trends, and snapshots on production
     - Facilitate early adjustment of production mission to other officer producing sources
     - Should ROTC downward trend continue, allow for trend analysis to develop predictions

   - System benefits for HQDA:
     - Focus attention on production
     - Timely isolation of production problems
     - Recognition for high performers
     - Facilitate phase in to automated MMS
     - Facilitate resource adjustments
     - Provide bases for mission adjustment
     - Provide indicators of training requirements

FIGURE 3-14

Annex 5 contains sample charts that can be used in a standardized ROTC production management manual system. These charts can be produced and distributed to each detachment in a manner similar to the MQS 1 training packages. This would provide a standard system to focus attention on ROTC production. There is a need for three versions of productive management charts. They would be used at Detachment and Area/Region level and by ROTC HQ to brief HQDA and the VCSA during updates on ROTC production.

The data collected and displayed in support of the production management system is readily available on DA Form 476, the Cadet Record, which is maintained within each detachment. Data required at Region and ROTC HQ
levels can be retrieved from the ROTCMIS. In addition to providing information on production, this system will also improve Cadet Management, Market Analysis, Incentive Program and Mission Assignment.

Examples of what will be measured at the detachment level are shown in Figure 3-15.

**PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM**

**EXAMPLES OF WHAT IT WILL MEASURE AT DETACHMENT LEVEL**

**QUANTITY:**
- Enrollment \( x \) MS level, X DISCIPLINE, \( x \) GENDER, \( x \) RACE
- Scholarship \( x \) MS level, X DISCIPLINE, \( x \) GENDER, \( x \) RACE
- Basic Camp \( x \) Quotas, \( x \) Fill, \( x \) Contract
- U. Production \( x \) Year \( x \) Compared to Mission.

**QUALITY:**
- SAT ACT \( x \) Average \( x \) MS Level, \( x \) Score Distribution.
- GSA \( x \) Average \( x \) MS Level, \( x \) Score Distribution.
- WSEREN DENTY READING TEST \( x \) Average \( x \) MS Level, \( x \) Score Distribution.
- GEN \( x \) MS Level.
- WALES \( x \) MS Level \( x \) TYPE.
- ACRE \( x \) MS Level.
- ADVANCED CAMP EVALUATION \( x \) Graded Events \( x \) Performance Across Time.
- OCS EVALUATE \( x \) Across Time.
- OCS \( x \) COMPLETIONS \( x \) COMMANDANT LIST \( x \) HONOR GRADS.
- BASIC CAMP PERFORMANCE \( x \) STUDENT PERFORMANCE INDICATOR.
- PLACEMENT CREDIT \( x \) MS Level \( x \) TYPE.
- ARMY COLLEGE FUND \( x \) MS Level.
- TOE \( x \) MS Level.
- ECE \( x \) NAME AND ACADEMIC STATUS.

* Indicators only due to system sensitivity to validity of standardized testing.

**FIGURE 3-15**

**INCENTIVES**

The final element of the ROTCGS recruiting model is incentives. This part of the model, is treated separately in Chapter 4.

**CONCLUSIONS**

a. Since 1970 ROTC has implemented many initiatives and programs designed to increase enrollment, retention and production. Despite these efforts, current yearly production has leveled at 8,300 and is projected to decline and result in major production shortfalls through FY 89.

b. ROTC will not be able to make its increasing mission without change in the current ROTC recruiting system.
c. The current missioning process requires improvement by the development of a missioning model that includes all of the required variable to make it valid.
d. The current mission model used by HQDA to produce an ROTC mission is accurate and reflects valid Total Army lieutenant requirements.
e. There have been distribution problems within the total Army system which adversely affects the flow of officers from the IRR to the NG and USAR troop units; however, both ARNG and USAR have established management teams at ARPERCEN to correct these problems.
f. The majority of officers being released from Active Duty have no obligation to serve in ARNG and USAR troop units because AR 135-91 does not require reserve duty in a troop unit when officers complete 3-years tours of active duty.
g. The current ROTC procedures for long range production projection and mission development do not provide an accurate projection of future ROTC production.
h. The recruiting force for ROTC represents an extensive number of personnel, both military and civilian. This force can become more efficient and effective by better integration and management. The Army is not maximizing the use of all available recruiting assets specifically USAEC recruiters, to support ROTC recruiting efforts.
i. Gold Bar Recruiters are a valuable asset to Instructor Groups and fill a critical recruiting void during the summer period when the majority of cadre are away from campus supporting Advanced Camp.
j. There is a need to give increased visibility and to measure ROTC effectiveness as expressed in terms of quantity, quality, cost and diversion. This visibility can be accomplished through the development and use of a Production Management System. This system will also ease the phase-in of this automated mission management system.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Total Army Officer Accession Plan. Publish the Total Army Officer Accession Plan annually. (ODCSPER)
2. **USAR and ARNG Management Teams.** The USAR and ARNG should continue to use the Officer Management Teams at ARPERCEN to reassign eligible lieutenants from the IRR to troop units. (USAR, ARNG)

3. **Modification of ROTCMIS.** ROTCMIS should be modified to permit officers assigned to control group OADO to be converted in this specific control group rather than reflecting them as members of the IRR. (ROTC)

4. **Military Service Obligation.** The Military Service Obligations in AR 135-91 should be reviewed from the perspective of changing the reserve requirement for officers who serve 3 or more years on Active Duty. Currently these officers do not have a follow on requirement to serve in a RC troop unit. (ODCSPER)

5. **Market Analysis.** An analysis should be conducted to better define the ROTC market. Particular attention should be given to identifying the Reserve Force Propensity group. (ROTC, ODCSPER)

6. **Mission Model.** Data from the above market analysis should be utilized in the development of an automated mission assignment model. This model will provide each detachment with a specified recruiting mission. This mission will be degree and gender specific and require will take into account all pertinent variables detachments require to produce specified numbers of lieutenants for both the Active and Reserve Components. (ROTC, ODCSPER)

7. **Goldminer Evaluation.** An evaluation should be conducted in order to measure the effectiveness of the Goldminer Teams. (ROTC)

8. **Gold Bar Recruiters.** The Gold Bar Recruiter program should be approved for expansion to provide these recruiters to each host and extension center. This expansion should be within the authorized officer end strength. (ROTC, ODCSPER)

9. **USMA LNO directory.** A directory of USMA Liaison Officers corresponding to the LEAD Zip Code breakout of each ROTC detachment should be prepared and USMA Liaison Officers should be provided telephone numbers and addresses of each ROTC host detachment. (ROTC, USMA)

10. **In-service Recruiter Directory.** In-service Recruiters should be provided the names, telephones, numbers and addresses for each ROTC host detachment in order to facilitate recruiting of soldiers who are being released from active duty. (ROTC, USAREC)
11. Off Campus ROTC Recruiting. The Army should establish a policy of Off Campus ROTC recruiting. Under this program USAREC would be responsible for conducting ROTC recruiting in high school, junior college and in colleges which are not affiliated with a host ROTC program. USAREC would be given a specified referral mission for applicants, scholarships candidates and basic camp. (ODCSPER, ROTC, USAREC)

12. Increased RFD information in TROEP. Comments from the ROTCSG Survey indicate a need to incorporate more information on Reserve Forces Duty in the TROEP course. Some cadre indicated they were unfamiliar with the details of RFD. Additional products knowledge appears needed in this area. (ROTC)

13. Adoption of a Production Management System. A manual production management system capable of providing visibility to ROTC production should be developed and adopted for use through all levels of ROTC and HQDA. (ROTC)
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN
COMMANDING GENERAL, US ARMY RECRUITING COMMAND
AND
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR RESERVE OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS
THE US ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND

SUBJECT: Recruiting Coordination

1. Purpose. The purpose of this Memorandum of Understanding is to initiate a mutual support program between the United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) and the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Reserve Officers' Training Corps (TRADOC, ODCSROTC) to enhance the opportunity for recruiting success by both Commands. The intent is to promote close and mutually supportive coordination at the lowest elements of both Commands.

2. Background.
   a. Both Commands, representing the US Army, seek prospects in high schools. One offers an opportunity for college-bound students to participate in the ROTC commissioning program. The other offers students an immediate job with future educational benefits.
   b. There has been a perception by some that the Commands are a competitor for the same prospects. This problem is compounded by the lack of incentives to encourage USAREC Recruiters and ROTC Enrollment Cadre to help one another. There has not been enough communication between the two organizations.
   c. Each agency is targeting a different market in the same location. USAREC desires to recruit high quality students who will not be going to or continuing in college immediately. ROTC desires to enroll high quality students who will be going to or continuing college or who are eligible for a scholarship and are not interested in USAR enlisted opportunities. There is little or no overlap in these two markets.

3. Need. A program is needed to promote closer coordination of the recruiting and enrollment efforts of both agencies in those high schools and colleges that possess a common market.
USARCPE-MM
SUBJECT: Recruiting Coordination

4. Scope. This understanding covers the coordinated recruiting effort between HQ USAREC and HQ TRADOC, ODCSROTC. The provisions of this understanding are applicable to all staff sections and subordinate elements of both agencies. This memorandum will operate under the broader umbrella of the Total Army Recruiting Program as directed by HQ DA DCSPER.

5. Specific agreements:
   
a. HQ USAREC and HQ TRADOC, ODCSROTC will:
      
      (1) Conduct market research and share the data, information and conclusions.
      
      (2) Share information on new and existing recruiting/enrollment programs and policies.
      
      (3) Conduct joint advertising efforts when appropriate.
      
      (4) Develop a referral credit system to reward successful recruiters who assist the other agency.
      

   
b. Recruiting Brigades and ROTC Regions will share information on recruiting initiatives and advertising objectives.

   
c. Recruiting Battalions and ROTC Areas will coordinate plans for joint local advertising programs.

   
d. Recruiting Companies and ROTC Detachments will:
      
      (1) Coordinate recruiting activities in the schools. USAREC recruiters will have the lead to coordinate recruiting in high schools except those high schools with Army Junior ROTC. In schools offering JROTC, the Senior Army Instructor (SAI) will facilitate the USAREC recruiters efforts in that high school. ROTC enrollment personnel will have the lead to coordinate recruiting in colleges.
      
      (2) Refer leads and prospects to each other as appropriate.
      
      (3) Exchange available diagnostic test scores as requested.
      
      (4) Coordinate local educator and influencer activities and participate jointly when feasible.

3-1-2
SUBJECT: Recruiting Coordination

e. ROTC Enrollment Teams will coordinate facility requirements with District Engineer and Recruiting Battalions.

f. Resources.

(1) This program will be managed to minimize administrative workloads at all levels.

(2) This agreement does not authorize additional personnel requirements or authorizations.

(3) Costs will be minimized by combining activities where possible without degrading recruiting effectiveness.

6. This Memorandum of Understanding is effective upon signature and will be implemented immediately.

JOHN P. PRILLAMAN
Major General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff
for ROTC

J. O. BRADSHAW
Major General, USA
Commanding

4 Feb 1985
This Annex outlines the procedures used by the ROTCSG to validate the ROTC lieutenant requirement and to examine the flow of officers within the Total Army System. These actions were undertaken as part of the ROTC Study in order to determine if the ROTC production mission was in fact valid.

**LIEUTENANT REQUIREMENT**

The *Total Army Officer Accession Plan* published in 1983 established the ROTC lieutenant production mission at 12,400 for FY 91. Based on a request from TRADOC the ODCSPER reviewed the ROTC mission in March 1985. This review lowered the ROTC requirement to 10,745 in FY 91. The reasons for this change included the availability of more detailed information on Reserve Component flow, upward substitution, individual overhead and an updated PERSACS projection.

The revised active force requirements as shown in Figure 3-2-1 (all figures for this analysis are on Foldout 3-2-1) Figure 3-2-2 for the USAR and Figure 3-2-3 for the ARNG. The significant increases in the ARNG and the USAR are caused by force modernization requirements and activations of new units in support of the Total Force Concept.

In analyzing the ROTC mission the ROTCSG investigated and verified each of the variables used to project the lieutenant requirement. These variables and the results of the research are listed below:

a. **PERSACS.** The source of all authorizations was the PERSACS. A review of a Sept 1985 PERSACS run indicated that there has not been a significant change in planned force growth and that the authorizations used to develop the requirement are still valid.

b. **Lieutenant Loss Rates for ARNG and USAR.** The lieutenant loss rates used to develop the requirements included three types of losses:
In a special report prepared by the Defense Manpower Data Center these three categories of losses were summarized for FY 84 for the ARNG and USAR. These losses were 22% for the ARNG and 30% for the USAR as depicted in Figure 2-4. The loss rates estimated for FY 85 that were used to project requirements were 21% for the ARNG and 27% for the USAR. This comparison of actual rates for FY 84 to the projected rates for FY 85 support the accuracy of the lieutenant requirement.

The last variable considered was the output from other lieutenant producing sources Figure 3-5. All other sources were found to be meeting their required rates of production.

The conclusion drawn from the above analysis was that the current lieutenant requirement Figure 3-6 is accurate and the model used to determine the requirement is valid. Figure 3-7 reflects the current ROTC lieutenant production mission.

**LIEUTENANT DISTRIBUTION**

In addition to validating the ROTC production requirement and the procedures used to establish these requirements an analysis was conducted of the flow within the Total Army. This analysis involved identifying and modeling where all ROTC lieutenants go once they are commissioned; a data collection effort was completed with the help of ROTC, ARPERCEN, MILPERCEN, ARNG and USAR to determine how the production and use of lieutenants is monitored and controlled; the final aspect of this analysis involved liaison visits to ROTC and ARPERCEN.

Figure 3-2-7 is the model which represents the flow of lieutenants within the total system. The conclusions reached by the ROTCSG analysis of lieutenant distribution succeeds the model on page 3-2-4.
LIEUTENANT DISTRIBUTION

**USAR TPU**
1 Oct 84
9,351
11,311
14,709
14,780
12,342
12,202
24,730
22,448
-1,244
-1,146
-1,446
-1,348
-1,142
-122

**USAR IRR's**
30 Oct 84
30 Jun 85
9,309
11,179
14,564
17,767
18,404
23,855

**ROTC**
Fy'85 commissions as of 3 Sep 85
Total w/degree: 10 degree
8,020
4,101
3,919

**NATIONAL GUARD**
1 Oct 84
1 Oct 85
30 Sep 30 Jun 84
84
84
85
85
85
85

**ACTIVE DUTY**

ED DELAY

**FIGURE 3-2-7**

3-2-3
a. There is a distribution problem but it has been identified and the ARNG and USAR are working to reassign eligible officer from the IRR to troop units. As of 3 Sept 85, there was a shortage of 3,556 company grade officers in ARNG and USAR troop units combined while there are 11,279 lieutenants in the IRR. However, MOBPERS requirements total 14,944 lieutenants which are filled from these IRR assets upon mobilization. Another important point to note is that of the 11,279 lieutenants in the IRR, only 2,000 to 3,000 have a unit service obligation which would require service in a troop unit. The USAR and ARNG have lieutenant management teams at ARPERCEN whose mission is to identify lieutenants in the IRR who have unit service obligations and assign them to units in the Reserve Components. This effort must continue as ROTC increases production of RFD lieutenants.

b. Current Military Service Obligation (MSO) in AR 135-91 does not support the flow of officers from active duty into RC troop units. As noted of the 11,279 officers in the IRR only 2,000 to 3,000 were available for mandatory assignment to RC units. These 2,000 to 3,000 officers are principally officers assigned to RFD without any Active duty beyond OBC Training. This is so because AR 135-91 which prescribes the MSO, says in effect that all officers who serve 3 or more years on Active duty do not have any obligation to perform the remainder of their MSO in a RC unit. Since there are no officers presently being ordered to Active duty for less than three years, none of the 1,200 - 1,400 officers being released from Active duty (REFRAD) each year is available for mandatory assignment to RC units upon REFRAD. AR 135-91 does mandate a four-year RC unit MSO for those officers who serve for two years on Active duty and the feasibility of rewriting AR 135-91 to provide for a 3-year RC unit MSO upon REFRAD for officers who are called to Active duty for 3 years is being examined by ODCSPER based on an ROTC Study recommendation.

c. Newly commissioned officers from ROTC on an Educational Delay are counted as non-unit IRR members by the ROTCMIS. This is not accurate and the ROTCMIS should be modified to allow these officers to be counted in their correct status.
STATEMENT OF WORK

Background: The ROTC program, the "Total Army's" largest source of officers faces serious challenges in the 1990s and beyond. ROTC is being asked to increase total production by 25%, produce more "hi-tech" oriented lieutenants and redirect its focus from Active Army to Total Army production. It is being required to accomplish this at a time when its market is shrinking, civilian industry has increased its demand for "hi-tech" skills and the other services exploit the guarantee of full-time jobs after college. This is further exacerbated by ROTC's limited fiscal and manpower resources. Present production and enrollment trends do not bode well for future mission accomplishment.

Historically, ROTC has been an active duty oriented program capable of meeting its mission with minimal resource expenditures. However conditions previously mentioned dictate that ROTC must do a better job of marketing itself, utilizing its limited resources and becoming more competitive. To accomplish this the study group believes that a 3 part project, which accurately determines the "market" at each institution, translates that data to a valid mission model and lastly identifies an incentive for that market, which would make ROTC competitive with industry and the other services, will help ensure mission accomplishment.

When determining the market particular attention should be devoted to identifying those with a Reserve Forces Duty (RFD) propensity. Further the resulting mission model must include such data as economic trends, population concentrations, location of Reserve Component units and motivational factors, correlated to each host instructor group. This will ensure that the recruiting effort can be targeted with a greater degree of efficiency and accuracy.

TECHNICAL OBJECTIVE:

a. Conduct a market analysis to determine what factors motivate high school and college students to join ROTC. Identify when key decisions are made, who and what motivates the decision, what students expect from ROTC and appropriate incentives.

b. Correlate data from first phase with geographic areas of "recruiting opportunity." Data must include key information on high schools, colleges and support the missioning process in terms of propensity to join, mix and Reserve Forces Duty (RFD) propensity.

c. Final product will be a missioning model that incorporates all research as well as existing Cadet Command variables and is credible to the entire ROTC community. The study will also produce a set of incentives which will provide Army ROTC with a competitive edge and still be affordable.
RECRUITING AND RETENTION IDEAS

Following are twenty-four recruiting and/or retention ideas developed by Dr. William J. Keppler, Dean of Arts and Sciences at Boise State University, Boise, Idaho, and Civilian Aide to the Secretary of the Army. Dr. Keppler developed the ideas following nearly eight years of working with the Boise State Military Science Department, as well as his own observations and academic experience.

1. Every officer and noncommissioned officer in the Department of Military Science must be a recruiter. There should be no attitude that "only training is my bag." During the registration period, everyone in the detachment is a recruiting officer or NCO.

2. The ROTC cadet is always top priority. This philosophy must permeate the entire atmosphere of the detachment. This simply means if a cadet has a problem assist as soon as possible within the policies and procedures of the college or university and within the established rules and regulations of the Army.

3. It is critically important to point out that retention of cadets is as equally significant as a recruitment of cadets. If that is not the case, a revolving door syndrome will occur.

4. The open door policy must truly exist and work. When cadets no longer believe they are no longer first, then the retention rate starts to decline. Cadre may sometimes have to go out of their way to assist and accommodate cadets with academic problems or even assist them in locating a part-time job.

5. There should always be in place a well thought out, well established plan for recruitment with a reasonable timetable for implementation. This simply means that all cadre sit down with the PMS to devise, organize, and implement such a plan. Such a plan should include places, times, and how long each cadre member would spend in the recruiting effort.
6. Each cadre member should know how to register a student for classes at the college or university and how to fill out an add, drop or change of schedule form. All cadre should be familiar with the core curriculum of general education and all the general rules of graduation for a baccalaureate degree. At least once a year the PMS should conduct a short course about the registration process and procedure for both the cadre and cadets who will be assisting in this important process.

7. Experiment with cadet or peer advising. Peer advising has been highly successful at many institutions if learning of the personnel are properly supervised, trained, and organized. It can promote collegiality and sense of unity.

8. The detachment should always have a "united front." Internal problems, both professional and personal, should never be discussed with the cadets. If there is dissension among the cadre, it will have a detrimental effect on the entire program.

9. Every ROTC detachment should be willing to provide classes to cadets on a to-be-announced (TBA) basis. This will undoubtedly result in some inconvenience for the cadre and some extra teaching classes, but it is at times necessary to accommodate cadets who for a variety of reasons cannot attend the normal class times. There should always be a TBA section listed in the class schedule for each military science year.

10. In recruiting students for ROTC, you can have thousands of brochures, posters, and flyers, but the one essential fact that remains the best way to recruit students is to talk with them on a one-on-one basis in the cafeteria, student union, or dormitory lobby. Always keep in mind, all written material is incidental to actually speaking with a student.

11. Concentrate recruiting efforts on those high schools that contribute the largest number of freshmen. For example, the state of Idaho has 107 high schools, but 51 percent of the students at Boise State University graduate from seven high schools all in the Treasure Valley. If attempts at recruiting are made at every school, too much valuable time is wasted with too little results.
12. Stress the excellent scholarships and fringe benefits available in the Army ROTC program. Specific scholarship information should be carefully focused on those students with high academic and leadership potential in target high schools.

13. All cadre should take and pass the physical training test with the cadets form time to time. This has a great impact on the attitude toward physical fitness. The rule is to teach by example.

14. An ROTC program must be willing to accept "average" cadets. Not every potential recruit is going to become an Eisenhower, Bradley, or a Patton. Sometimes there is a tendency to set standards, at least initially, too high. Military bearing can be learned with proper training and time if self-discipline and commitment are evident in a cadet.

15. ROTC cadre should cultivate and nurture friendships with the administration, faculty, and staff of the institution. This is termed entering the heart of the university. Remember ROTC is the university in the military and not vice versa. Administration here refers to admissions counselors, deans, registrar, academic advisors, veterans affairs personnel, dean of students and other like staff who are very critical to the academic success of a cadet.

16. The Army ROTC office should look professional and businesslike. Sometimes there is a tendency to look and work under austere conditions. The general public and potential cadets look at the appearance of an office area as their first and sometimes only meeting with the Department of Military Science and how the institution views ROTC. If the Department of Military Science facilities are pleasing and respectable, it is clearly a big plus for the Army and the institution as well.

17. When rejecting a cadet from the ROTC program, it should be conducted in such a fashion as not to make that rejected cadet an enemy of the ROTC program. Every reasonable attempt should be made to continue on speaking terms. In summary, when a cadet is removed, from the program, try to keep that individual an advocate rather than an adversary. That cadet may still
help you "recruit" if he or she feels positive about his or her experience in ROTC no matter how limited. (I have seen this happen from personal experience.)

18. Don't make the mistake of having the detachment become involved in campus problems, but especially campus politics. If the detachment becomes caught up in the middle of a controversial issue, the ROTC unit will lose support. It is clearly a no-win situation.

19. The PMS should cultivate an atmosphere of self-improvement among his cadre. Officers should enroll in either a master's degree program, language classes, or General Staff College courses through correspondence. Noncommissioned officers should also enroll in classes to work on a degree or enroll in the Reserve Noncommissioned Officers Course. (This idea should be secondary to accomplishing the other 23.)

20. Utilize all the expertise available to the Army - the National Guard/Reserve Organization-in achieving the goals of the Army ROTC Program. For example, SJA detachment teaches a military justice class in the advanced ROTC class. If a reserve officer has a certain knowledge or expertise that the detachment needs, use it.

21. Make ROTC a positive contributor to the institution but do not discuss the political intervention of the military abroad. If you are busy fighting political issues such as the military in El Salvador or in Nicaragua, you are wasting valuable time that could be more productively spent in recruiting good officers. You need to support the official position of the Department of Defense but you cannot accomplish anything being in the center of controversy. Further, most serious students do not want to join or belong to an organization that is controversial. Would you?

22. If there is another college or university in the area (within 100 miles radius or 90 minutes driving time) then an attempt should be made to develop a cross-enrolled or extension center of the detachment. This should be done within the priorities for the host detachment. You might be pleasantly surprised to find a small college that would be willing to support your program.
23. Utilize community leaders to their fullest in support of the Army ROTC Program. Corporate executives with prior military experience, retired military personnel, AUSA members, and Civilian Aides to the Secretary of the Army are all excellent sources of good support. They can assist in many ways, directly and indirectly, those who wear the Army green.

24. Most of all, always keep in mind the Army ROTC Program is an excellent program. You should take great pride in being affiliated with a program that produces three out of every four officers in the Army.
This annex consists of foldouts with charts recommended for use as part of a manual production management system. These charts are designed for use at Instructor Group, and Area level and by HQ ROTC. The use of these charts throughout ROTC will serve to increase the visibility of the key measures of effectiveness: quantity, quality and diversity.

Instructor Group: Charts at Foldout 3-5-1 to 3-5-3 are designed for use at instructor group level. The data source, frequency of update and benefit to be gained by using the chart is shown under each chart.

Area: Charts on Foldout 3-5-1 are intended for use by the Area Commander. These charts roll up significant data provided from each instructor group. Use of these charts will provide for the rapid and systematic comparison of production information on instructor group within an area. They also will provide the Region Commander with production information from the areas within the Region.

HQ ROTC: During the course of the ROTC study the need to develop a standardized methodology for projecting ROTC system wide production became evident. DCSROTC has used a steady state production model which is based on a cadre production efficiency factor and the number of cadre assigned two years prior to the commissioning year. Two years is considered the minimum time that it takes for a cadre member to impact a production. Assumptions made in this projection method are that production efficiency and the number of cadre assigned are both accurate. This method appears to be the best way to determine long range, greater than four year production projections.

Production projection of four years or less can be more precise if current enrollment figures and historical lateral entry and MS level retention rates are used to project production. Foldout 3-5-5 displays both these methods of projecting production.

ANNEX 5
Recommendations.

(1) That the recommended charts described in this annex be adopted for use as part of ROTC manual production management system.

(2) That ROTC adopt a standardize procedure for projecting production. Projections for four years or less should be based on current enrollment and historical lateral entry and retention data.
CHAPTER FOUR

INCENTIVES

This chapter examines ROTC incentives. It explains the purpose of incentives; provides a review of current incentives with special emphasis on subsistence and scholarships; and recommends an improved incentive package for ROTC.

The requirement for lieutenants is increasing as the Total Army emphasizes filling the shortages in its Reserve Component force structure. ROTC has been tasked to provide the majority of these lieutenants. The accomplishment of this mission will significantly challenge ROTC.

Demographic projections reflect significant downward trends in the ROTC cohort population in the out years. As mentioned in Chapter 3 (Figure 3-9, 3-10, 3-11), indices of projected recruiting potential, the number of high school graduates, college enrollment and number of baccalaureate degrees conferred are all declining. The projected upswing in these elements does not occur until well into the 1990s. The challenge for ROTC is to commission more lieutenants from a decreasing market of eligible students.

The ability to recruit and retain the necessary quantity and quality of students depends to a large degree on the incentives offered by the program. ROTC incentives are both intangible and tangible. Both types of incentives serve to enhance recruitment and increase retention within the ROTC program.

Intangible incentives do not equate to an immediate monetary gain, however, research shows that they are of importance in providing the mechanism for motivating cadets to enroll and remain in ROTC. Intangible incentives provide a vehicle for socialization and help instill a commitment to selfless service which is important in the development of an officer. Intangible incentives include leadership and management training, patriotism, uniforms, adventure and special training, enhanced employment opportunity, upward mobility, and guaranteed Reserve Forces Duty.

Tangible incentives on the other hand, provide a monetary gain to the cadet. Examples of tangible incentives are special institutional incentives such as free room and board for ROTC scholarship cadets or reduced tuition for ROTC cadets, a cooperative program, the Simultaneous Membership Program.
(SMP), the Early Commissioning Program (ECP); and scholarships and subsistence allowances. Scholarships and subsistence allowances have been the most influential recruiting tools for ROTC. However, even with these incentives ROTC enrollment and production trends are declining.

If incentives are tools that attract and retain prospective cadets then it is possible that the incentives currently available are not perceived to be either as valuable or as sufficient as they once were. A 1985 survey of the ROTC cadre overwhelmingly indicated that the current incentives package is inadequate. The cadre responded that an increase in subsistence allowance would be the best way to change the current incentive package in order to attract and recruit more nonscholarship students. In July 1985 the Army Advisory Panel on ROTC, recommended an increase in subsistence allowance. A review of the history of subsistence allowance and scholarships will provide a basis for developing a new incentives package.

HISTORY OF SUBSISTENCE

Cadet subsistence dates back to the inception of the ROTC program. The National Defense Act of 1916 established ROTC and stated:

"...when any member of the senior division...has completed two academic years...and has been selected for further training...he may be furnished, at the expense of the United States, with commutation of subsistence at such rate, not exceeding the cost of the garrison ration prescribed for the Army...during the remainder of his service in the Reserve Officers' Training Corps."

In 1916 the garrison rate was 90 cents per day. Thus, the allowance was set at $27 per academic month, and remained such for most ROTC cadets until 1964. Two exceptions involved Naval officer trainees. In 1946, the Navy was able to enact legislation which provided for a Navy-only Program, titled the Holloway Plan. This plan provided scholarship enrollees with tuition, books, and incidental costs, including a retainer pay of $50 per month. In 1962, a retainer pay of $50 per academic month was authorized for all Navy ROTC cadets.
This "retainer pay" was to help defray the cost of food, lodging and incidental expenses based on full room and board expenses at 85 percent of the rate of those colleges and universities with NROTC programs.

Uniformity was achieved in 1964 when retainer pay of $50 per academic month was authorized for each ROTC program. The rationale of Congress in raising the retainer pay from $27 to $50 was to compensate for the sacrifices required of the students in order to participate in ROTC and to serve as an incentive to attract more cadets to the program. In 1965, the term "subsistence allowance" was substituted for "retainer pay." In 1971, Public Law 92-171 raised the subsistence allowance to $100 for both scholarship recipients and members of the advanced program.

The proponents of this last legislative action attempted to connect the subsistence allowance stipend to an inflation index so that periodic evaluation and adjustment could be made without the requirement to return to Congress. Due in part to the run-away inflation of the 1970s, Congress rejected this proposal.

The purchasing power of subsistence allowance has declined drastically since 1971. The significance of this decrease can be seen when compared to other economic variables as those shown in Figure 4-1.

### Economic Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1916</th>
<th>64-65</th>
<th>70-71</th>
<th>80-81</th>
<th>1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subsistence Allowance</strong></td>
<td>$27.00</td>
<td>$50.00</td>
<td>$100.00</td>
<td>$100.00</td>
<td>$100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Current Value of Subsistence</strong></td>
<td>$50.00</td>
<td>$100.00</td>
<td>$48.33</td>
<td>$36.41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What Subsistence Should Be</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>(If tied to CPI)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>USMA Salary</strong></td>
<td>$50.00</td>
<td>$111.00</td>
<td>$217.00</td>
<td>$440.00</td>
<td>$480.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2LT's Base Pay</strong></td>
<td>$141.00</td>
<td>$222.00</td>
<td>$437.00</td>
<td>$990.00</td>
<td>$1165.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 4-1*
Although subsistence allowance has almost quadrupled since first offered its purchasing power has been eroded by inflation. Figure 4-1 reflects that the salary increases of a United States Military Academy cadet has increased by over 800 percent since 1916. A second lieutenant's pay has increased about 700 percent. Figure 4-2 compares subsistence increases with the salaries of USMA cadets and second lieutenants.

Other salaries have been raised to keep pace with inflation but ROTC subsistence allowance has not been increased since 1971. The major expense other than tuition, books and laboratory fees incurred by the ROTC cadet, is for room and board. Inflation has also caused these expenses to increase. As evidenced in Figure 4-3 the board rates and dormitory charges for one academic year for the average full-time resident has increased 2.6 times from $940 in 1970 to $2,475 in 1984.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Average</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1131</td>
<td>1286</td>
<td>1209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1582</td>
<td>1782</td>
<td>1682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1730</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>2212</td>
<td>2080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2146</td>
<td>2481</td>
<td>2314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>2290</td>
<td>2660</td>
<td>2473</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Estimated dollars for entire academic year for full time resident students.

Source: US National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics, Annual

FIGURE 4-3

When subsistence allowance was last increased during school year 1970-1971, the allowance of $100 per academic month equaled the average monthly resident student's expenses for room and board.
COMPARISON BOARD AND DORMITORY EXPENSES VS SUBSISTENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Expenses</th>
<th>Subsistence</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>% Not Covered</th>
<th>Worktime at $4.00/hour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1209</td>
<td>1,000*</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1682</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1854</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>854</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>2080</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1080</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2314</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1314</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>2475</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1475</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Subsistence increased from $50 to $100 per academic month in 1971.
Based on 10 academic months per calendar year.

FIGURE 4-4

For school year 1983-84, the subsistence allowance covered only 40 percent of these costs forcing each ROTC cadet to finance the difference of 60 percent or about $1,475. If the ROTC cadet must make up the shortfall of $1,475 between the cost of room and board and the subsistence allowance through campus work, at $4.00 per hour, the cadet would be required to work an additional 369 hours to meet expenses. (Figure 4-4).

The economic variables pointed out in Figures 4-1 and 4-2 support the need for an increase in subsistence allowance; however, the Military Services have been unable to often congressional support for an increase since 1971.

Subsistence allowance is authorized by statute, therefore any increase in subsistence allowance affects each of the Military Services. Previous Defense Department initiatives to Congress concerning increased cadet subsistence have been unsuccessful because the amount needed in the proposed increase could not be substantiated. In 1980 the Air Force initiated an action to increase the ROTC subsistence allowance but officials in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) did not support the proposal and stated they would not support any increase until there was evidence that the proposed increase would attract and retain students.

A part of the Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics (M,RA&L) research program for FY 1981 was a projected study of attrition in the ROTC program. OSD determined that this study would permit a more accurate assessment of the role played by subsistence allowance and the results would establish a basis for increasing incentives.

This study entitled "ROTC Subsistence and Attrition" was conducted by the Educational Testing Services (ETS) and the results were published in 1982. The study attempted to determine the influence of various ROTC incentives available to the Military Services by conducting a survey of approximately 6,000 students, most of whom were enrolled in ROTC. The study concluded that:

a. "Improvements are needed in the subsistence pay and financial benefits provided for ROTC students". The study suggested that consideration should be given to creating two levels of subsistence pay; one for scholarship students in the basic program, and a higher rate for all advanced program cadets. It was also suggested that subsistence allowance be established as a percentage of the base pay of a lieutenant and that subsistence pay be extended to a 12 month payment cycle. Finally, the study stated that consideration should be given to arranging federally guaranteed, low-interest loans to help Advanced Course students meet college expenses.

b. "Improvements are needed to strengthen commitment incentives for ROTC students". The study suggested that ROTC cadets be permitted to sign a contract during their second year (MS II). This would entitle the contracted sophomore nonscholarship student to draw subsistence allowance. Another recommendation, already implemented by ODCSROTC, was to move forward the payback requirement for scholarship students after a maximum of one year in the Basic program.

ETS acknowledged that one of the most difficult aspects of the study was determining an individuals' actual financial need relative to his perceived need. Students were asked to indicate if they thought they could complete ROTC without additional financial assistance. Half of the students enrolled in ROTC who participated in the study indicated that while they
hoped to complete ROTC and earn a commission, they might be unable to do so without an increase in subsistence. Seventeen percent said they definitely could not afford to finish without an increase, while 33 percent reported that they would be much more likely to earn a commission if subsistence was increased. Considered with other economic indicators, the survey results seem to indicate that the subsistence allowance received by the cadets is inadequate. If subsistence allowance were brought more in line with what it should be to have the same buying power as the 1971 subsistence payment, the monthly allowance would need to be raised to approximately $250.

THE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM

This section examines the ROTC scholarship program from an incentive perspective. Additional detailed information about the management and administration of the scholarships program is included at Annex 1 to this chapter. As an incentive the Army ROTC scholarship is designed to attract and retain for Army commissioned service, a consistent source of individuals with high intellectual capacity.

The ROTC scholarship program was initiated in 1964, with passage of Title 10, US Code, Section 2107. This law provided for a financial assistance program for selected members of each of the Military Services senior ROTC programs. The Army was initially allocated 5,500 scholarships. This was increased in 1983 to its current level of 12,000. This ceiling, as well as the ceilings allocated for the other Services, is established by statute.

Figure 4-5 shows a comparison of the Military Services scholarship allocation. Particularly significant, in this figure are the numbers of scholarships allocated to each service and the percentage of cadets in each program that are on scholarships.
### COMPARISON OF SERVICES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>1984</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer Production (ROTC, MA, OCS)</td>
<td>9985</td>
<td>7442</td>
<td>6645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROTC Production</td>
<td>8284</td>
<td>3283</td>
<td>1699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Total Commissions from ROTC</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROTC Production</td>
<td>50-60%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propensity of College Student to Join (1)</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>32/8% (NAVY/MC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Enrollment</td>
<td>67,727</td>
<td>24,883</td>
<td>10,811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of Scholarship Uses/Auth (1985/1986)</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>7500/9500</td>
<td>6000/8000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Cadets on Scholarship</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**FIGURE 4-5**

Figure 4-5 underscores the need for additional Army ROTC scholarships. Army ROTC is required to produce more lieutenants than either the Navy or Air Force programs. However, only 18 percent of the Army cadets have scholarships, compared to 30 percent for the Air Force and 87 percent for
the Navy. On the basis of equity alone the Army ROTC program should receive more scholarships. A second factor supporting the need for additional scholarships and an "Army-only" incentive is the low propensity (17 percent) of college students to join the Army as compared to the higher propensity of students to join the Air Force (43 percent) and the Navy (32 percent).

**ROTC Propensities**

Numerous studies have focused on the propensity of young persons to join the Armed Services as well as which Armed Service they are most likely to join. Historically, "Youth Attitudinal Studies" (YATS) indicate that given a choice among the Armed Services, the Army has generally been the last choice of high school students. A study conducted by UCLA in 1983 indicated a similar propensity for college students.

Another significant implication was revealed in a Rand study entitled Enlistment Effects of Military Educational Benefits, which tested various educational incentive programs. Some were tri-service and others were Army-only. The results indicated that if identical programs are offered by all Services the propensity to join the Army is the lowest. This result is important because this is essentially the posture in which the Army ROTC program finds itself. Each of the other Service ROTC programs has basically the same tangible incentives to offer, i.e., scholarships and subsistence allowance.

Study group research indicated that the best incentive would compensate for both the erosion of the purchasing power of the current subsistence allowance and compensate for the low propensity of students to enroll in the Army program.

**Improved Incentives Package**

Three changes are required to improve the ROTC incentives package. First, subsistence allowance must be raised. Secondly, scholarships authorizations should be increased. Thirdly, an "Army-Only" incentive should be adopted. The details involved in each of these changes are outlined below.
1. **Subsistence Allowance.** Initially, consideration was given to increasing subsistence allowance to $250 per academic month. This increase would provide the same purchasing power as $100 did in 1971. Since subsistence is authorized by statute and an increase for the Army cadet would also result in an increase for other services. An across the board increase of subsistence would still leave the Army at a disadvantage because of the low propensities of students to select the Army ROTC program.

Because of the propensity issue the study group elected to reduce the amount of increase for subsistence from $250 to $150 and recommend the adoption of an Army-Only program to compensate for the low Army propensity. An increase of subsistence to $150 would bring it to approximately the current enlisted rate for Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS). Future changes in subsistence allowance should be tied to the BAS rate. This would allow an automatic review and adjustment of this allowance.

2. **Increased Scholarships.** The number of Army scholarships should be increased because of the disparity in the various Service scholarship proportions. The number of applicants who apply for the limited number of Army scholarships is clear evidence that this program is a very positive incentive. The increase in additional allocations should be offered as two-year scholarships to non-enrolled students because two-year scholarships have the best completion rate and can impact on lieutenant production in the shortest time.

These new cadets would have to attend the Basic Camp in order to enter the Advance Course with a two year scholarship. Recent enrollment trends show that Basic Camp could absorb an additional 1000 cadets before its maximum limit is reached. An increase of 1500 scholarships is recommended. These scholarships would be phased in over a two year period and because of attrition, 775 scholarships could be offered each year there after.

3. **Army-Only Program.** The third proposal is to develop and implement an Army-only incentive. The Army's unique needs include the unfavorable propensity figures, the increased production mission and the Reserve Component Mission. Comparable arguments (mission vs propensity) were used by United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) when the Army-only enlisted incentives package was presented to and approved by Congress. The Navy set the precedent for a Service-unique officer incentive by
establishing the precommissioning officer incentive program for their non-ROTC engineering direct commissionees. The time is appropriate for consideration of an Army-only ROTC incentive.

The study group envisions an Army-only package consisting of two facets: early contracting and a monetary kicker. As mentioned in Chapter 3, there is a need to get better ROTC recruiting coverage in our high schools. Early contracting would meet this need. The opportunity to early-contract should be offered to quality MS-I students as they enter the system. Since little empirical data is compiled on students until they complete a year of college, early-contracting should be offered only to those high school seniors who have applied for a four-year scholarship. In SY 84-85 over 10,000 high school seniors applied for 1500 four-year scholarships and not been selected. The applicants were reviewed by a selection board and were listed by order-of-merit (OML). ROTC offered scholarships to the first 3000 on the OML to ensure the 1500 allocations were filled. An additional 1500 applicants were offered three-year advance reserve scholarships. As mentioned in Annex 1 to this chapter, this was a pilot program for SY 85-86. The winners for the three-year advance reserve scholarships were selected as entering freshmen but did not actually commence as scholarship cadets until their second year.

Although ODCSROTC has plans to implement the advance reserve program as policy for future years their policy design will not fully exploit the remaining number of quality students on the OML. The study group's early contracting proposal is to use the remainder of the list to offer nonselected scholarships applicants another option to enroll in the ROTC program.

This option will allow for increased penetration of the high school (HS) market for senior ROTC enrollment and will enable Army ROTC to attract and retain the interest of those quality HS seniors who applied but did not receive a scholarship. The concept of early contracting is depicted in Figure 4-6.
The concept of offering early contracting to scholarship applicants has the following advantages:

a. Early contracting would target quality high school seniors who apply for a four-year scholarship. These students would have been prequalified with a physical and a PMS interview.

b. ROTC would have sufficient information available in the applicant's packet to make an informed decision regarding early contracting for students remaining on the OML.

c. ROTC would have an additional incentive option to offer the scholarship applicants in the event of no selection.

d. It would require minimal administrative and/or managerial burden.

The applications are available. The selection board could be informed to recommend applicants for the early contracting program. In the nonselect letter the student would be informed of selection for this new program. The details of this new program would be included. These selection letters would be sent those recommended with an enclosure to be presented to the ROTC detachment upon enrollment at their school. To evaluate the immediate potential gain a mail-back-card could be inserted with the letter requesting
early indication of the student's continued interest or disinterest. If the selection authorization letter were lost the student could, contact the PMS upon registration in order to validate the selection with ROTC headquarters.

e. Early Contracting would entitle the nonscholarship Basic Course student access to subsistence allowance. This benefit would attract more students to the Army instead of the other services.

f. Early commitment to a program would increase retention. This was evidenced in four-year scholarship retention rates when the payback plan was changed from two years to one year.

Although this proposal would allow nonscholarship Basic Course students to draw subsistence allowance participation in this program would not increase the students military service obligation. Additionally, since four-year scholarship winners have a one year grace period before making a commitment prior to the payback provision being initiated, this same one-year grace period should apply to early contractees.

This proposal offers the ROTC recruiter an additional incentive other than scholarships to present to the high school market. The major disadvantage is that this proposal will require Congressional approval to implement. Implementation of early contracting should be initiated in the high schools as outlined above; however, the concept could be expanded to include offering the opportunity to early contract to MS is advancing into the MS I's year. This would allow the system time to evaluate those MS is who enrolled but who had not applied for a four-year scholarship. Students who met the criteria for early contracting at the MS I's level would be selected by the PMS. To ensure that it still is considered a competitive selection this opportunity should only be offered to a limited number of students.

The second facet of the Army-only package is a monetary kicker. The term "kicker" is used to describe the concept of a payment above and beyond what is received as subsistence allowance. An additional $100/per month would be paid to the MS III and MS IV Army contracted cadets. An Army-only kicker for the Advanced Course cadets would allow for a monetary differentiation between the two courses (Basic and Advance) which was recognized by the ETS study as a strong influencer for cadet retention. It would also serve to raise the total stipend received by the cadets in the
Advance program to the approximate amount the CPI indicates it needs to be to have the same value subsistence allowance had in 1971.

The early contracting proposal would help offset the recruiting and retention problems associated with the Basic Course and the kicker proposal would help offset the recruiting and retention problems associated with the Advance Course.

In summary, an Army incentive program should be developed to offset inequities vis-a-vis the other services. This package would include the authority to early contract cadets, and would pay the Advanced Course cadets an additional monetary kicker of $1000 per year. The Army has unique needs which are not recognized by the current incentives package. The Army needs a competitive edge in order to obtain its fair share of the declining market.

Each of these proposals will require Congressional action. The study group used what data and resources were available to determine reasonable estimates of the yield for this package (an analysis of the Study Group's yield estimates is located at Annex 2). In pursuing our estimates the study group was hindered by insufficient data. The study group was further deterred in its attempt to conduct research in order to gain supplemental data by a requirement to have prior approval of a burden hour allocation in order to survey nonenrolled cadets. For this reason the study group concludes that an experimental test should be implemented to determine exactly how much of a financial incentive is necessary to maximize the yield from a combination subsistence/kicker proposal as well the early contracting proposal. This test would provide Congress the most reliable data with which to support changing the current incentives package. A detailed description of this pilot test is at Annex 3.

**SCHOLARSHIP MANAGEMENT**

As a part of the study group research on incentives, a detailed study of the management and administration of the current scholarships program was conducted. The detailed results of those efforts are at Annex 1 to this chapter. A summary of the major conclusions from Annex 1 is provided below:
a. Scholarship advertising, marketing and recruiting has resulted in large numbers of applications for four-year scholarships. The potential interest in two and three-year scholarships has not been sufficiently exploited.
b. Increased emphasis on the ROTC four-year program in conjunction with the off-campus recruiting concept (as explained in chapter three) will increase the interest in the four-year scholarship program.
c. Many applicants who are not selected for a scholarship, still have extensive officer potential. Every effort must be made to encourage these nonselected applicants to enroll in ROTC as nonscholarship cadets.
d. The guaranteed two and three-year scholarships have excellent potential to improve retention and recruiting.
e. ROTC Instructor Groups have very small advertising budgets to support the two- and three-year scholarship recruiting effort.
f. A mix of scholarship offering provide the ROTC Instructor Groups with attractive and flexible recruiting tools.
g. ROTC has recognized the importance of maximizing the return on investment for scholarships.
h. Stringent recoupment efforts have been enacted and will save the Army money.
i. Allowing the four-year scholarship winner to attend the college or university of his or her choice, attracts scholarship applicants who would not otherwise have considered the Army.
j. The statutory requirement to ensure 50 percent of scholarship students are receiving in-state tuition is not being adequately monitored.
k. ROTC has effectively used scholarships to target academic discipline mix. Targeting social science and business majors places an unnecessary constraint on the system.
l. ROTC has made use of scholarships to encourage minority recruiting, but minorities are not receiving a representative share of scholarships.
m. The 15 percent ceiling on the award of scholarships to women may not be appropriate.
n. ODGR/ROTC has recognized the need to expand the number of scholarships for Reserve Forces Duty.
o. ODCSROTC uses scholarships to support Military Junior Colleges and Military Colleges but not JROTC. Dedicating scholarships to JROTC participants would strengthen that program.

RECOMMENDATIONS

*1. Increase subsistence allowance to $150 per academic month.
*2. Request a scholarship increased of 1500 two year scholarships.
*3. Adopt a "Army-Only" incentive centered on early contracting and an increased monetary incentive for advanced course cadets.
4. Place additional emphasis on marketing and advertising ROTC scholarships.
5. Monitor the statutory requirement for in-state tuition more closely and if following the intent of that law has a critical impact on the Army ROTC program request a legislative change.
6. ODCSROTC reevaluate the 15 percent ceiling on scholarships for women and award scholarships based on academic discipline regardless of gender.
7. Expand the scholarship program to open up scholarships for Reserve Forces Duty.
8. Award fifty scholarships per year to high school seniors who were outstanding participants in JROTC.
9. Award four year scholarships to Extension Centers as well as at host institutions.
10. Request burden hours to facilitate ODCSROTC's internal research efforts.
*11. The ROTC HQ developed a concept of Education Assistance Allowance EAA as the ROTC study concluded. Since this program offered similar incentive benefits as recommendations 1,2 and 3 above and appeared to have support of TRADOC and Army Staffs, the ROTC study group supports and recommends staffing and adopting of the EAA. See Addendum at Annex 3 for additional information.
SCHOLARSHIP MANAGEMENT

This Annex will examine the history and administration of the Army scholarship program and analyze how well it supports the various measures of effectiveness.

The purpose of the Army ROTC scholarship incentive is to attract and retain for Army commissioned service, a consistent source of individuals with high intellectual capacity. The scholarship program should be used as a tool to improve the ROTC system effectiveness. The key elements in measuring the scholarship effectiveness: numbers, cost, diversity and quality can all be influenced by management practices that are used to determine how to maximize the utility of the scholarships available. The fundamental focus in evaluating the Army ROTC scholarship program must be to examine how well the program is doing in using the scholarships at hand to provide the Army the required number of high quality lieutenants with the desired diversity in academic discipline, gender and minority representation in a cost effective manner.

History

In 1964, with passage of Title 10, US Code, Section 2107, Congress initiated a financial assistance program for specially selected members of the Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps. This program is commonly known as the ROTC scholarship program. It provides for the appointment of cadets who meet certain requirements to be provided payment of expenses for tuition, fees, books, and laboratory expenses. It also specifies that at least 50 percent of the cadets appointed must qualify for in-state tuition rates at their respective institutions and will receive tuition benefits at that rate.

ANNEX 1

4-1-1
The law provides for ordering to active duty those cadets who decline to accept a commission or who do not complete the four year ROTC program. In 1964, the Army was limited to 5500 cadets in the financial assistance program. This was increased to 6500 in 1971 and to 12,000 in 1980.

Also in 1980, Section 2107a was added to Title 10. This section provides for an additional financial assistance program dedicated to Military Junior Colleges (MJC). There are presently six MJC that qualify under this section and each is allocated a minimum of ten scholarships per year for selected cadets. These scholarships are in addition to the 12,000 authorized in Section 2107. The Military Junior Colleges are listed below:

1. Valley Forge Military Academy and Junior College
2. Georgia Military College
3. Marion Military Institute
4. Kemper Military School and College
5. Wentworth Military Academy
6. New Mexico Military Institute

Administration

AR 145-1 provides the regulatory guidance for the Army ROTC scholarship program, and TRADOC Regulation 145-16 provides administrative instructions for the annual scholarship programs.

There are presently 16 different scholarship programs. This section on scholarships will look at the those programs; scholarship recruiting, marketing and advertising; scholarship application, the selection process and the scholarship contract.

The distribution among the 16 programs for the 4800 scholarships to be issued for School Year 1985-1986 is shown in Figure 4-1-1.
1985-1986
ARMY ROTC
SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAMS
(projected)

3 YR PROGRAMS 31%
15% ALLOCATION PROGRAM
5% NATIONAL ENROLLED
5% NATIONAL NON-ENROLLED
2% ACTIVE DUTY
3% MINORITY RECRUITING INCENTIVE
2% QUALITY ENVIRONMENT
2% EARLY CYCLE
REGULAR CYCLE 14%
NATIONAL ENROLLED 14%
NATIONAL NON-ENROLLED 14%
RESERVE FORCES DUTY 12%
NATIONAL DUTY 11%
MIL. COLLEGE 1%
MIL. JR COLLEGE 1%
TOTAL OF 16 PROGRAMS

FIGURE 4-1-1
Scholarship Programs

The sixteen programs are described below:

a. Four-Year National Early-Cycle-awarded to highly qualified high school seniors in national competition. Announced in November of the awardees' senior year.

b. Four-Year National Late Cycle-awarded to highly qualified high school seniors in National competition. Announced in March of the awardees' senior year.

c. Four-Year Quality Enrichment-awarded only to those qualified high school graduates planning to attend one of the Historically Black Colleges hosting Army ROTC.

d. Three-Year National Enrolled-applicants presently enrolled in ROTC.

e. Three-Year National Nonenrolled-applicants not presently enrolled in ROTC but attending college.

f. Three-Year Active Duty-applicants are active duty Army soldiers with one year of college credits. Awarded in Army-wide competition.

g. Three-Year Allocation-allocation to ROTC Regions to provide nominees in specific desired academic disciplines.

h. Three-Year Minority Incentive-for institutions having the largest increase in MS III minority students over the previous year.

i. Two-Year National Enrolled-applicants presently enrolled in ROTC.

j. Two-Year National Nonenrolled-applicants not presently enrolled in ROTC, but attending college.

k. Two-Year Allocation-allocated to ROTC Regions to provide nominees in specific desired academic disciplines.

l. Two-Year Basic Camp-awarded to those applying at Basic Camp and based on camp performance and leadership qualifications.

m. Two-Year Active Duty-awarded to active Army soldiers who have completed two years of college.

n. Two-Year Reserve Forces Duty-awarded to members or potential members of the Army National Guard and US Army Reserve.

4-1-4
Two-Year Military College-awarded to students attending Military Colleges.

Two-Year Military Junior College (MJC)-awarded to high school graduates who signify their intention to enroll in an MJC.

Scholarships are generally granted for either two, three or four years. During school year 84-85, the distribution between these types was about 36 percent to the three-year program, 29 percent to the two-year program and 35 percent to the four-year program. Maintaining a variety of scholarship categories and time lengths for those scholarships enables ROTC to have this particular incentive available to support ROTC recruiting efforts at a variety of decision points within the four-year program. It is very important for ROTC to "get the word out" so that influencers and potential cadets are aware of these scholarships opportunities.

Advertising, marketing and recruiting are vital to the smooth, effective and efficient operation of the scholarship program. Scholarships can be particularly effective to get high quality individuals who might not have joined at all, to contract, as well as to provide a valuable incentive that can be targeted to specific problem areas to make up recruiting shortfalls.

DCSROTC has recognized the potential the scholarship program has to target specific Army needs. The most clear case of this is the shift in Army requirements to more technically oriented academic disciplines. Scholarships have been used to target those specific hard-to-get disciplines, and to facilitate a reorientation in the academic mix of the cadet population to one closer to the Army goals. Scholarships have also been used to improve the quality of the ROTC programs in Historically Black Colleges, Military Colleges and Military Junior Colleges, to encourage minority recruiting and to support a small program geared toward Reserve Forces Duty.

Scholarship Advertising

According to the ROTC Operational Market Plan for 1985-1986, the advertising plan for DCSROTC is designed to achieve a "reach of 80 and a frequency of 8" and will be conducted, "... with special emphasis on scholarship, high tech, and nursing programs at appropriate times throughout the year." The media chosen for this campaign includes direct mail,
magazines and public service radio. The most effective and efficient media appears to be the direct mail campaign. There is one Recruiting Publicity Item (RPI) for four-year scholarships that is a part of the Joint Service scholarship packet which is presented to high school guidance counselors. There is a second RPI that advertises all the different Army ROTC scholarships available. Scholarships are mentioned in various other RPI as well.

There are three audiences that are targeted for advertising: the high school market of juniors and seniors; the college students; and the parents, counselors and other influencers of these two age groups. The market for the four-year scholarship is in the high schools and for the two- and three-year scholarships, the market is on the college campuses. There are a small number of two- and three-year scholarships available to active duty soldiers, but little marketing and advertising is dedicated to this limited market.

Scholarship Recruiting

DCSROTC has recently placed increased emphasis on the four-year program. Research conducted by Army Research Institute (ARI) shows that high school students develop their career goal decisions early in high school. This has led DCSROTC to conduct recruiting and awareness campaigns in high school rather than wait until the student gets to college. This is a fundamental shift from previous reliance on the two year Basic Camp program. The four-year scholarship program is a keystone for this push into the high schools. The potential scholarship award will provide a strong "interest-getter" in those high school students DCSROTC plans to educate on the options and benefits of the ROTC program. The monetary attractiveness of the scholarship program will encourage the influencers to take note.

The competition for the four year scholarships is already intense. For school year 1985-1986 more than 10,000 applied for consideration. A stronger ROTC recruiting effort in the high schools, employing effective use of Gold-miner teams and USAREC (US Army Recruiting Command) recruiters will undoubtedly make the competition even more fierce in the future. ROTC must make a concerted effort to ensure that even those not awarded a scholarship stay favorably disposed to Army ROTC. These students can be encouraged to
enroll in MS I as nonscholarship cadets who will be able to apply for two and three-year scholarships in the future. DCSROTC has already designed one program to attempt to draw some of the highly competitive high school students who were not selected for four-year scholarships into the Army ROTC program. This is the Reserved Three Year Scholarship Program, whereby high alternates for the four-year scholarships are guaranteed a three-year scholarship, conditional upon their successful completion of MS I and various other physical, academic and performance measures. This program is being tested beginning with alternates from the school year 85-86 four-year scholarship selection board. The program has great potential and a similar program has been successfully used by the Navy. DCSROTC plans to offer this scholarship guarantee to 2000 applicants from the school year 86-87 four year competition. Other options to maximize the interest of the scholarship applicants should be pursued.

In addition to the Gold-Miner Teams and the US Army Recruiting Command recruiters, DCSROTC makes use of Military Academy Liaison Officers (MALO) to assist in recruiting for the four-year scholarships, as well as exploiting the contacts the Professors of Military Science and Assistant Professors of Military Science have been able to make in local high schools.

Recruiting for the two- and three-year scholarships is slightly different than for the four-year. The majority of the recruiting effort takes place on the college campus. The recruiters are primarily the ROTC Instructor Group cadre, and cadets already enrolled in the program. They are supported by the publicity materials and small advertising budgets available from DCSROTC. There are basically three major types of scholarships that the typical Instructor Groups has to sell: enrolled, non-enrolled and Basic Camp.

In the past, there has been a 60 percent ceiling on the number of enrolled scholarships awarded. DCSROTC is concerned that this ceiling is too high and that the majority of scholarships are rewarding those in the program rather than recruiting new cadets to join. This appears to be a valid concern. The percentage of contracted cadets on scholarship has increased with the introduction of the new scholarships authorized in 1980.

However, the total enrollment in Army ROTC has fluctuated during this period and in fact the total enrollment as of the opening enrollment report
for school year 1985-1986 was the lowest in six years including School Year (SY) 80-81 when only 6500 scholarships were available (Figure 4-1-2).

**ARMY ROTC ENROLLMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Year</th>
<th>Total Enrollment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985-1986</td>
<td>61487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-1985</td>
<td>65718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-1984</td>
<td>72759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-1983</td>
<td>73819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-1982</td>
<td>72463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1981</td>
<td>69663</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** DCSROTC.

At the same time, the percentage of the contracted cadets on scholarship has increased from about 32 percent of the contracted cadets to more than 50 percent of the contracted cadets as shown in Figure 4-1-3.
For SY 85-86, the number of nonscholarship contracted cadets was lower than at any time during these years.

The percentage of contracted cadets on scholarship has been growing and the nonscholarship population has been declining throughout the last five years.

Scholarship Marketing

Scholarship marketing has great potential to support efficient scholarship management. Insufficient resources have been available to ROTC to conduct a survey of the scholarship market. ROTC has been able to identify academic discipline production by university and in some cases has assigned the PMS a quota to submit a specified number of scholarship applications from designated academic majors.

After the potential scholarship applicant has been recruited, a lengthy administrative procedure begins to determine who is awarded the scholarship.
Scholarship Application/Selection Procedures

There are differences in the application and selection criteria for the various scholarships available. Scholarships are awarded to two categories of student: The enrolled cadet and the nonenrolled student. All applicants for four-year scholarships are nonenrolled students. Two-year and three-year scholarships can be awarded to either enrolled or nonenrolled students.

Four year scholarship applicants are evaluated using a scoring system that uses a Whole Person Score (WPS). The following are the weight values used in determining the WPS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WHOLE PERSON SCORE</th>
<th>Points</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SAT/ACT Scores</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Standing</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extracurricular, Athletic, and Leadership Activities</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAE</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: TRADOC REG 145-16.

FIGURE 4-1-4

Applicants must achieve a score of at least 850 on the SAT or a minimum of 17 on the ACT in order to be eligible for the scholarship competition. Leadership is counted 15 percent; extracurricular activities 10 percent; and athletic activities are 10 percent, and an additional 5 percent can be awarded for outstanding personal performance in any of the three areas. Points may also be awarded in these areas for students who worked after school and were consequently unable or limited in their participation in athletic and extracurricular activities.

Those applicants that are considered by DCSROTC to be competitive are scheduled for a physical examination and an interview board with a Professor of Military Science (PMS). At the time of the interview, a Physical
Aptitude Examination (PAE) will be conducted. The purpose of the board is
to estimate the applicant's potential as a Regular Army officer, and to
evaluate personal characteristics and attitude toward the military service.

These files, when complete, are seen by the scholarship selection board.
The board uses the Whole Person Score (WPS) as their primary tool. They may
adjust the WPS if they feel the applicant was particularly outstanding or
less competitive. The applicant must commit to a particular academic major.
Failure to keep that major can later be cause for removal of the
scholarship.

The Quality Enrichment Program (QEP) is a four-year scholarship program
that was developed to increase the number of highly qualified minority
officers produced by Historically Black Colleges by improving the overall
quality of the program at these schools. ROTC encourages attendance of
four-year scholarship winners at the 21 Historically Black Colleges that are
Army ROTC host institutions. Individuals of any race, creed or sex may apply
in this category. The number of QEP scholarships is determined annually.
QEP scholarships are not restricted by academic discipline targets, although
the selection board is advised of the importance of Science and Engineering
majors to the needs of the Army. For School Year 1985-1986, the goal was
166 QEP winners. The board selected 128. Thirty percent of the QEP
scholarships went to women. The applicant for the QEP scholarships submits
a regular four-year scholarship application and is considered in the
national scholarship competition. If the applicant is a national winner, he
or she will be able to use the scholarship at the college or university of
choice. If the applicant is not selected as a national winner, but
requested consideration for a QEP scholarship, the file will next be
considered in the QEP category. In order to receive the four-year
scholarship in this category, the applicant must have agreed to enroll and
remain enrolled in one of the 21 HBC. If the winner does not attend the
designated HBC, the scholarship will not be awarded unless a written request
from the applicant is approved by DCSROTC. Any unused QEP scholarships are
turned back into the national competition for award.

The selection for Basic Camp scholarships is based on camp performance,
demonstrated leadership ability, and academic achievement. Military Junior
College and Military College applicants must meet certain criteria. Those
who meet the standard compete against others for the scholarships dedicated to the Military Junior College or Military College they plan to attend.

Applicants for Reserve Forces Duty scholarships are identified through programs established by TAG/MUSARC, Commanders. Each Commander may nominate one primary and three alternates. Selection is based on a Whole Person Score consisting of: TAG/MUSARC Commander Ranking, Academic GPA, Institutional Nomination Board Score and the Army Physical Readiness Test (ARPT).

The number of applications for all scholarship programs has increased dramatically since the number of scholarships available was increased. The table below shows the number of applicants submitted for the basic categories of scholarships:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCHOLARSHIP APPLICANTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>4- YEAR</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SY 80-81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SY 81-82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SY 82-83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SY 83-84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SY 84-85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SY 85-86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: DCSROTC.

FIGURE 4-1-5

The 46 percent increase in scholarships has produced a 39 percent increase in applicants indicating possible new interest in the program, but as shown earlier, not a corresponding increase in program size.

**Scholarship Contracts**

Scholarship cadets execute a different contract than nonscholarship cadets. All ROTC graduates now have an eight year Military Service Obligation (MSO). The scholarship cadet has a different way of fulfilling the obligation than the nonscholarship cadet. The obligation for the
A scholarship cadet is eight years in a Reserve Component Unit, or four years on Active Duty and the remainder of the eight-year obligation in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). This is in contrast to a nonscholarship cadet who has a six-year Reserve Component Unit obligation followed by two years in the IRR, or a three-year Active Duty tour followed by five years in the IRR. There has been some discussion of changing the MOS to require those who serve on Active Duty to participate in a Reserve Component unit upon release from Active Duty. Discussion of this issue is in the Reserve Forces Chapter of this report.

A copy of the scholarship contract DA Form 597-3 is included as Appendix 1. The contract clearly spells out the individual's responsibilities for participation, performance and follow-on service obligation as well as advising the student of the scholarship benefits the Army has promised to pay.

Signing this contract obligates the student to participate in ROTC. However, to determine the value of the ROTC scholarship program that program must be able to stand the scrutiny of the four measures of ROTC effectiveness: Numbers, cost, diversity and quality. Each of these will be discussed in turn.

Scholarship Numbers

The scholarship program must be exploited to produce the largest number of quality officers possible. Review of the scholarship program shows that scholarship students generally have better retention rates than nonscholarship cadets in the Basic Course. The scholarship cadet is generally high quality. The scholarship program also has been effectively used by ROTC to target specific academic disciplines and to provide a recruiting incentive to attract new students to the program. Scholarships definitely have the potential to increase the number of cadets enrolled.

This section will discuss the effectiveness of the scholarship program in making the best use of the scholarships available in order to choose the appropriate mix of two, three and four-year scholarships to provide the Army the greatest possible yield per scholarship. The retention and attrition problems will be examined briefly as will the importance of the scholarship to the enrollment and attrition decision of the cadets.
Optimum Scholarship Mix

In the past, the DCSROTC leadership has used a "best guess" method to determine the optimum mix of two, three and four-year scholarships. Recently, DCSROTC undertook a major comprehensive analysis to determine the best method to maximize the return on investment for the scholarship. A need was recognized to give more weight to the lieutenant production "output" of the scholarship program rather than just the enrollment "input". This analysis has led to some significant changes in the mix and allocation of scholarships. Major reductions are planned in the number of four-year scholarships to be offered. At the same time, larger numbers of four-year applicants will be offered reserved three-year scholarships. This award will be conditional, based primarily upon their successful completion of MS I, and maintenance of an acceptable Grade Point Average. The same concept will be used to offer reserved two-year scholarships to selected individuals who compete for three-year scholarships but do not receive one. This plan appears to have a great deal of potential for increasing enrollment and improving production throughout the program.

DCSROTC analysis determined the best return production priority to be as follows:

a. Two year nonenrolled
b. Two year enrolled
c. Three year nonenrolled
d. Three year enrolled
e. Four year

Although the four-year scholarship is the least productive of the scholarship programs, this scholarship offering provides ROTC an inroad to the high quality, high school market. If Army ROTC backed out of this high school market, and left it to the other Services, the Army would at least lose some prestige and detract from any image the Army has as a proponent of educational excellence. It is very good publicity for the Army in the high schools when outstanding students become associated with the Army by virtue of these scholarship awards.

4-1-14
There has been some speculation that increases in scholarships serve to draw nonscholarship students as well as scholarship awardees. This does not appear to be reflected in the enrollment of the last five years as shown in Figure 4-1-3. The number of contracted students grew slightly initially but not of a magnitude comparable to the total scholarship increase.

The Army cannot assume that a scholarship award results in an officer produced because of the attrition that occurs in scholarship cadets. For 100 four-year scholarships awarded only 57 lieutenants will be produced. The next section will examine scholarship retention rates and compare them with the nonscholarship rates.

**Scholarship Retention**

Scholarships can be expected to increase retention. The additional financial assistance provided, and the early commitment made by the three and four-year scholarship cadets would imply a greater likelihood of staying in the program than would be true for the nonscholarship winner. The historical retention rates are shown in Figure 4-1-6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>陆军士官生保留率</th>
<th>4年</th>
<th>3年</th>
<th>2年</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>士官生入校到士官生</td>
<td>91.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>士官生入校到士官生3</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>89.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>士官生入校到士官生4</td>
<td>91.6</td>
<td>92.7</td>
<td>94.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>士官生入校到服役</td>
<td>94.0</td>
<td>94.0</td>
<td>94.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>士官生入校到服役2</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

来源：陆军士官生保留率

图4-1-6

What stands out in this figure is the very low retention of the nonscholarship cadet. There are many reasons for this attrition including medical disqualification, withdrawal from schools, academic/ROTC failure,
inaptitude for military service, personal hardship, financial problems, indifference/lack of interest and a wide variety of other reasons. The scholarship cadet quits for generally the same reasons as the nonscholarship cadet. However, the academic qualifications required to win the scholarship, and the financial aid received as the result of the scholarship, tend to minimize the number of scholarship cadets that quit for financial or academic reasons. The scholarship retention rates are dramatically better than the nonscholarship rates.

Beginning with SY 1983-1984, the latest point at which a scholarship cadet could drop the program without penalty or incurred military obligation changed from the beginning of the junior year to the beginning of the sophomore year. All two-and three-year scholarship recipients immediately incur an obligation upon contracting. Previously, four-year scholarship cadets were allowed two years and three-year winners were allowed one year in which they could drop the scholarship with no penalty and no payback required. This was extremely expensive for the program and the change in policy has improved the retention rates as well as saved money and allowed for more scholarships to be awarded.

These initiatives show promise in maximizing the efficient use of ROTC scholarships. However, there is no real incentive for DCSROTC to minimize scholarship cost.

Scholarship Cost

ROTC scholarships pay for tuition, on-campus laboratory fees, student activity fee, student union fee, library fee, health fee, transcript fee, student athletic fee, graduation fee, diploma fee, cap and gown fee and a flat rate for textbooks, equipment, and other academic supplies.

The only restriction regarding which college or university a four-year scholarship student attends is that "At least 50 percent of the cadets and midshipmen appointed under this section must qualify for in-state tuition rates at their respective institutions and will receive tuition benefits at that rate." Title 10 U.S.C.

The cost of the scholarship financial assistance was about 55 million dollars for School Year 85-86. The cost goes up as the colleges and
universities raise tuition rates. This equates to an average rate per scholarship cadet approaching $5,000 per year.

This section on scholarship cost will discuss three issues: recoupment, school cost and the in-state tuition rate requirement.

Scholarship Recoupment

The cadet contract for scholarship students requires that if the individual does not complete the military service specified by the contract, a debt to the United States is incurred. The amount of that payback is determined by the US Army using the following formula: Amount due equals Financial Assistance Provided multiplied by Unserved portion of Active Duty Obligation divided by Amount of Active Duty agreed or ordered to serve.

In 1980 Congress enacted legislation that mandated that ROTC cadets who voluntarily or as the result of misconduct did not complete their military obligation were to reimburse the government for the financial assistance that they received.

The scholarship contract was changed from previous versions to lift from the Instructor Group the burden of demonstrating that the cadet was willfully evasive upon signing the contract and planned to accept payment and drop out without serving a military obligation. DCSROTC has initiated a program of recoupment. Figure 4-1-7 reflects the improvement of this program since initiated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY 84</th>
<th>FY 85</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collection in full</strong></td>
<td>$66,275.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Initiated repayment plan</strong></td>
<td>37,025.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pending action</strong></td>
<td>116,040.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Court ordered repayment</strong></td>
<td>3,470.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>$222,800.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DCSROTC

FIGURE 4-1-7
DCSROTC must continue to make concerted efforts to ensure that cadets who default on their contracts are made to serve the required enlisted time or to pay the debt that they assumed when the contract was signed. Scholarship cadets must realize that ROTC takes its part of the contract seriously and expects the cadet to do likewise.

The recoupment process is a way for the government to regain some of the money it has expended. Some would suggest that a way for ROTC to save money would be to prevent or restrict enrollment in some of the more expensive schools.

**School Costs: Expensive versus Inexpensive Schools**

A question that frequently surfaced during the study group effort was "Why do we allow four-year scholarship winners to go to such expensive schools?" There is no incentive for ROTC to control the cost of its scholarship program. A statutory ceiling exists limiting the size of the program to 12,000 scholarships, but nothing exists to restrict the dollars expended to pay the bill for those 12,000 scholarships other than budget limitations. A scholarship at several private colleges and universities is worth well over $7,000 a year. The scholarships to many state supported schools, on the other hand, may be worth less than $1500. Substantial savings for the Army could be made by placing a dollar limitation on the scholarship award.

The question is really whether or not the Army is willing to pay the price to bringing commissioned officers from ROTC who are graduates of the more prestigious, albeit expensive, colleges and universities in the country. ROTC has decided the answer to this question is "yes" and proceeded to run its scholarship program with that in mind.

The four-year scholarship program plays a significant role in supporting and strengthening the ROTC program at several of the expensive private colleges and universities in the country. Elimination or reduction of the scholarship program at these schools would undoubtedly hurt the programs at these schools. The Army presence and the relationship that has been developed with the fine colleges and universities of the country is not something that should be given up lightly.

The ability to attend the college of choice is a critical part of the
scholarship incentive. Many students or their parents are able to come up with $1500 a year, but would find it difficult or impossible to support $7000-a-year tuition payments. This draws middle class and upper middle class students into ROTC as well as financially disadvantaged scholarship seekers. The Army Officer Corps needs this broad base to be representative of the country at large.

This leads to a closely related issue regarding the intent of Congress in the scholarship program.

**In-State vs Out-of-State Tuition Restriction**

As mentioned earlier there is a statutory requirement that 50 percent of all scholarship students receive the in-state tuition rate. DCSROTC has interpreted this in-state tuition rate to include those attending private colleges and universities since those schools have only one tuition rate and do not have out-of-state tuition rates.

The Study Group requested a legal opinion as to whether or not those attending private universities can be considered as qualified for in-state tuition in compliance with 10 U.S.C. 2107 (C). The legal opinion was that it is not appropriate to consider cadets attending private universities for such purposes. The basis for the determination was that the statute specifically requires that at least 50 percent of the cadets qualify for and receive the benefits of in-state tuition. Since no such benefit can be received from a private university, the legal opinion was that those cadets enrolled at private universities cannot be counted in satisfying the requirement of Title 10.

The third measure of effectiveness is diversity. This has been of increasing importance because ROTC has been given the mission not only to produce a certain quantity of lieutenants each year, but to produce a certain percentage in various academic disciplines. There is no minority mission specified, but there is an implied mission to recruit potential minority officers. To be effective the scholarship program must be able to provide for the diversity necessary to support the Total Army.
To be eligible for an Army ROTC scholarship, the statutory requirements are that the individual (1) be a citizen of the United States; (2) be specially selected for this financial assistance program under procedures prescribed by the Secretary of the Army; (3) enlist in the Reserve Component for the period prescribed by the Secretary of the Army; (4) contract to serve for the period required and; (5) agree in writing to accept an officer appointment. Under paragraph (2) above the Secretary of the Army can prescribe the selection procedures. The Army has used this provision to place additional requirements and constraints on scholarship winners to facilitate targeting Army needs. DCSROTC has used the targeting very effectively.

This section will discuss how DCSROTC has used the scholarship program to target academic disciplines, minority, gender, and the Reserve Component/Active Component mix of the ROTC program.

Scholarships: Academic Discipline Mix Targeting

In 1982, because of the Active Army requirement for hard-skill academic disciplines, DCSROTC was directed by ODCSPER to capture a variety of academic disciplines in the commissionees according to the following mix: 30 percent Business, 20 percent Engineer, 20 percent Social Science, 20 percent Science and 10 percent in other majors. In 1981, ROTC accepted the mission to produce Nursing graduates starting in 1983.

To change the academic mix of all commissionees to more closely meet the desired goal, DCSROTC has targeted most scholarships to academic disciplines in the percentages indicated in Figure 4-1-8.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic Discipline</th>
<th>Scholarship Targeting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Science</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurse</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: DCSROTC.

FIGURE 4-1-8

DCSROTC has been unable to meet the technical academic discipline mix goals but has made progress in that direction (Figure 4-1-9).
**ENGINEER**
(DA GOAL 20%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FISCAL YEAR</th>
<th>SCHOLARSHIP #</th>
<th>SCHOLARSHIP %</th>
<th>NONSCHOLARSHIP #</th>
<th>NONSCHOLARSHIP %</th>
<th>TOTALS #</th>
<th>TOTALS %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>910</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>863</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985(MSIV)</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>1,149</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986(MSIII)</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>1,320</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SCIENCE**
(DA GOAL 20%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FISCAL YEAR</th>
<th>SCHOLARSHIP #</th>
<th>SCHOLARSHIP %</th>
<th>NONSCHOLARSHIP #</th>
<th>NONSCHOLARSHIP %</th>
<th>TOTALS #</th>
<th>TOTALS %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>1,085</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>1,083</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>879</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>1,325</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>833</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>1,442</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985(MSIV)</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>957</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>1,797</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986(MSIII)</td>
<td>1,267</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>908</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>2,175</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**FIGURE 4-1-9**
There is some concern in the ROTC community that the academic discipline requirements are unreasonable. The basis for the DA academic mix goals is input from the officer specialty proponents and active duty requirements. These requirements for academic disciplines are not based upon technical expertise in a specific major but rather the analytical background that majoring in Science or Engineering develops. Many of these academic skills will not be utilized until the officer is working in a Functional Area as a Captain. Presently, in addition to the Science and Engineering fields, scholarships are given to Social Science and Business majors. These last two majors bring no special technical skills to the military. ODCSPER plans to modify the missioning of ROTC to set goals for Engineering, Science and Nursing majors and to consolidate the remaining disciplines into an "Other" category.

ROTC is given a mission for academic disciplines, but not for minorities. However, DCSRROTC has placed an emphasis on recruiting minority officers.

Scholarships: Minority Targeting

DCSRROTC receives no mission for minorities but has assumed a responsibility to encourage minority enrollment in ROTC. Two scholarship programs are specifically designed to support minority recruiting: The Quality Enrichment Program (QEP) discussed earlier, and the Three-year Minority Recruiting Incentive Program. However, neither of these scholarships are awarded solely to minorities.

The Quality Enrichment Program, provides four-year scholarships to winners who plan to attend Historically Black Colleges. There is no restriction on the race of those who compete for the award of these QEP scholarships. However, traditionally about ninety percent of them have gone to Black applicants.

The second program, the Minority Recruiting Incentive Program, rewards institutions that had the largest numerical increase in MS III minority participation from the preceding year. The institutions are divided into three categories based upon total student enrollment at each host. The categories are 1-3000, 3001-8000 and over 8001. The top 20 schools in each of the categories are awarded two three-year scholarships in addition to the
scholarships that would have been awarded through the other scholarship programs. These scholarships are designed to encourage the Professor of Military Science to recruit and retain minority cadets. The institution does not nominate individuals for this scholarship category. All winners in this category first competed for a national three-year scholarship and were not selected. The incentive scholarships are awarded to the two highest individuals left on the Order of Merit list from the winning school. If the school has insufficient three-year national scholarship applicants on the alternate list, the unused scholarships revert to the best qualified alternates regardless of institution.

Despite these two scholarship programs, review of the opening enrollment report for School Year 1984-1985 (Figure 4-1-10) does not indicate that a representative share of the scholarships are being awarded to minorities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RACE/ETHNIC</th>
<th>TOTAL ENROLLMENT</th>
<th>% ENROLLMENT</th>
<th>SCHOLARSHIP ENROLLMENT</th>
<th>% ON SCHOLARSHIP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WHITE</td>
<td>47556</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>9829</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLACK</td>
<td>14471</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1302</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HISPANIC</td>
<td>2508</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER/UNKNOWN</td>
<td>1183</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>65718</td>
<td></td>
<td>11586</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: ROTC OPENING REPORT SY 84-85

FIGURE 4-1-10

High standards for the award of scholarships must be maintained. Every effort must be made to locate and to encourage high quality minority students to apply for ROTC scholarships.
The targeting of scholarships to influence the male/female mix of ROTC is handled a little differently.

Scholarships: Targeting Gender

The DCSPER Accession Plan which transmits the ROTC mission does not include separate male/female target goals. There is a perception in DCSROTC that women are not a "recruiting challenge" and that sufficient women are already enrolled. The limitation on the number of female basic branch officers who can be accessed onto active duty is between 15-20 percent of all sources of commission not just ROTC. There is no restriction on the percentage of those women accessed that can be scholarship winners.

Since DCSROTC expects a significant shortfall in lieutenant production in 1991, better exploitation of the female market might help make up some of that shortfall. Presently ROTC has placed a 15 percent ceiling on the award of certain types of scholarships to females (excluding Nursing majors). This places an unnecessary constraint on the system even though it is recognized that the depth of penetration of the male market must be greater than is necessary in the female market.

The trend in female enrollment over the last three years has been relatively constant, with some growth in the percentage of females in the Advanced Course. (Figure 4-1-11, 4-1-12, 4-1-13)
## Enrollment by Gender

### SY 85-86

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MS I</td>
<td>22833</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>8197</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>31030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS II</td>
<td>9672</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>2735</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS III</td>
<td>7189</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1756</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS IV</td>
<td>7405</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>1692</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>47107</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>14380</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>61487</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ROTC Enrollment Report.

### Figure 4-1-11

## Enrollment by Gender

### SY 84-85

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MS I</td>
<td>24400</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>9268</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>33688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS II</td>
<td>10371</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>2626</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS III</td>
<td>7289</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>1760</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS IV</td>
<td>8349</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>1655</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50409</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>15309</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>65718</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ROTC Opening Enrollment Reports

### Figure 4-1-12
### ENROLLMENT BY GENDER

**SY 83-84**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS</th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MS I</td>
<td>27848</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>11052</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>38900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS II</td>
<td>11022</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>3025</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS III</td>
<td>7500</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>1585</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS IV</td>
<td>9012</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>1725</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>55372</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>17387</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>72759</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ROTC Opening Enrollment Reports.

### FIGURE 4-1-13

The number of females on scholarship over the same period is shown at Figure 4-1-14.

### ROTC SCHOLARSHIP ENROLLMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SY 85-86</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>SY 84-85</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>SY 83-84</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MALE</td>
<td>9205</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>9100</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>8197</td>
<td>80</td>
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<tr>
<td>FEMALE</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>2486</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>11860</td>
<td></td>
<td>11586</td>
<td></td>
<td>10260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ROTC Opening Enrollment Reports.

### FIGURE 4-1-14

4-1-27
The females appear to be receiving a fair share of the scholarships although closer review shows that female Nursing majors make up a sizeable portion of the female scholarship winners. For example, for 85-86 there were 770 Nursing scholarships in effect, 688 (89 percent) of which were held by females.

Scholarships: Targeting Reserve Forces Duty

One area of shortfall for which DCSROTC is increasing the targeting emphasis is Reserve Components Duty. Although over 40 percent of the ROTC mission is designated for the Reserve Components, applicants desiring Guaranteed Reserve Component Duty may presently compete for only about 6 percent of the available scholarships. There are 208 Reserve Forces Scholarships that are allocated each year: two 2-year scholarships are available to each state Adjutant General (TAG) and two 2-year scholarships for each Major US Army Reserve Command (MUSARC). There are also 50 scholarships given for Reserve Component Duty to Basic Camp graduates each year. Up to 60 scholarship awardees per year, under the provision of Title 10 paragraph 2107a for Military Junior Colleges, may also have Guaranteed Reserve Forces Duty (GRFD) contracts although these scholarships are not designed to support Reserve Components. This provides a total potential availability of 318 scholarships per year for GRFD cadets of which only 258 are dedicated to Reserve Forces.

DCSROTC has recognized that production for Reserve Component Duty represents too large a portion of the ROTC mission to support with such a small percentage of the scholarship program. To open up the scholarships to support the Total Army, DCSROTC has developed a plan to award up to fifty percent of the scholarships available to applicants requesting Guaranteed Reserve Forces Duty Contracts. This change will accomplish three things. First it will serve to alter the present perceptions that Army ROTC is an active duty program only. It will also give ROTC an attractive incentive to apply to the Reserve Component propensity market, which was discussed at length in the Recruiting Chapter. Third, it will provide more high quality lieutenants to the Reserve Components.
Scholarships: Special Categories

DCSROTC designates the award of some scholarships to encourage enrollment and to strengthen the ROTC Program at Military Junior Colleges and Military Colleges. These schools receive this financial and moral support because of the particularly significant contribution they make to the development of character, citizenship and patriotism in their students.

The Junior ROTC (JROTC) program in the nation's high schools has the potential to develop these same characteristics in the young people enrolled. There is a comprehensive discussion of the JROTC program in the JROTC Chapter of this report. The designation of some of the ROTC four-year scholarships to JROTC participants would do a great deal to lend credibility to the JROTC program and to strengthen the Army image in high schools with JROTC units. Both the Air Force and Navy have set aside scholarships to support their JROTC programs.

Another way that the scholarship program is used to support particular institutions is reflected in the present policy that prevents the award of four-year scholarships to any college or university which is not a host institution. As the result of Army initiatives to expand the ROTC base (discussed previously in the Recruiting Chapter), extension centers have taken on a very important role in the Army officer production and development system. Several extension centers produce more lieutenants per year than are produced from the Host that supports them. A Host institution does not necessarily provide more money or institutional support to the ROTC effort than the extension center does.

DCSROTC has requested authority to award four-year scholarships to students attending extension centers because of the contribution these schools make to the ROTC program. This action has been returned to DCSROTC for an impact analysis.

The final indicator of program success that will be discussed is the most important - the quality of the officer produced.

Scholarship Quality

The 55 million dollars that ROTC spent on scholarships should reasonably be expected to "buy" a quality individual. There are clear indications
that, in fact, ROTC is getting an exceptional student for its scholarship
dollar. Unfortunately there has never been a longitudinal study to track
how well the scholarship cadets actually perform on active duty. One of the
quality indicators ROTC does maintain for scholarship cadets is graduating
GPA (Figure 4-1-15).

**QUALITY COMPARISON GRADUATING GPA**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 YR Scholarships</td>
<td>3.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 YR Scholarships</td>
<td>2.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 YR Scholarships</td>
<td>2.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonscholarships</td>
<td>2.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>2.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Colleges</td>
<td>Not Avail</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** DCSROTC.

**FIGURE 4-1-15**

As discussed earlier, the number of applicants for the four-year
scholarship greatly exceeds the available scholarship offerings. This
enables ROTC to be very selective in its four-year scholarship awards. A
view of the profile of the four-year winner clearly demonstrates the quality
of the students' high school performance (Figure 4-1-16).

**4-Year Scholarship Winners**
**School Year 85-86**

**TOTAL SAT AVERAGE - 1210**
**VERBAL - 590**
**MATH - 621**

**Percentage**
**TOP 15 PERCENT OF CLASS** 79%
**NUMBER 1 OR 2 IN CLASS** 17%
**VARSITY LETTER WINNERS** 82%
**PRESIDENT OF STUDENT BODY OR**
**SENIOR CLASS OR OTHER CLASS OFFICIALS** 81%
**NATIONAL HONOR SOCIETY MEMBERS** 63%

**SOURCE:** DCSROTC.

**FIGURE 4-1-16**

4-1-30
All of the scholarship categories have quality indicators built into the application requirements in addition to the competitive nature of the selection procedures. These criteria may vary between the scholarship categories. For example, the allocation program applicants must have an academic GPA of at least 2.7 to be considered unless they are an Engineering, Nursing or Physical Science student in which case the required GPA is 2.5. For the national two and three-year programs, the minimum GPA for an applicant is 2.0. However, competition ensures that the GPA for the awardees is higher than the submission minimum. At the time of scholarship award for the two and three-year programs, the average GPA is usually 3.0 or better.

A key aspect of the Army scholarship program that enhances the quality of the awardees is the ROTC policy that merit rather than need is the driving force in the selection process. The ROTC scholarship is one of the very few scholarship programs based solely on merit considerations. The attractive financial benefits of the ROTC scholarship, brings in applicants who would not be competitive for most scholarship programs because their parents make too much money. This makes these scholarships popular with parents as well. Removing the constraint that the applicant must justify need and must submit financial statements, enables the Army to be very selective in the scholarship awards.
# Army Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps Scholarship Cadet Contract

**Data Required by the Privacy Act of 1974**

**Authority:** Title 10, USC Section 3012.

**Principal Purpose:** To explain obligation and participation requirements and to enroll student in ROTC Scholarship Program.

**Routine Uses:** Record is to be maintained in the Military Personnel Records Jacket as confirmation of enrollment, obligation and participation requirements.

**Disclosure:** Disclosure of information requested in DA Form 597-3 is voluntary. However, applicable portions must be completed if applicant is to be enrolled in the ROTC Financial Assistance Program.

## Explanation to the Student

If you want to enter into this contract, you must read and understand all of its terms and conditions. If you want to accept these terms and conditions, you indicate your acceptance by signing the agreement in the space provided below. As part of this contract's obligations you will be administered an oath of enlistment and you will sign an enlistment contract (Department of Defense Forms 4/1 thru 4/3). If you are under 18, a parent or guardian must also sign this document. You will be given copies of all these documents and you should keep them with your important papers.

## Preamble

This preamble outlines some of the important points of the contract that follow but it is not part of the contract.

This contract is a legally enforceable agreement between you and the Army. In this contract you and the Army make specific promises to each other. The contract is divided into the following four parts:

- Part I contains the promises you make to the Army.
- Part II contains the promises the Army makes to you.
- Part III is to be used by your parent or guardian if you are not of legal age.
- Part IV is used by your Professor of Military Science to confirm your enrollment in the scholarship program.

The Army promises to provide you with all the training required by law and regulation as a prerequisite for commissioning as an officer. The Army also promises to pay certain reasonable costs involved in your education. These costs include tuition, certain fees, a flat rate which you use to purchase your books, supplies and equipment and a subsistence allowance. A list of these items is found in Part II of this contract. The Army will pay these costs while you are enrolled in the ROTC Program. If you successfully complete all the required training and meet all other requirements for commissioning, the Army will offer you an commission as an Army officer.

You promise to complete the education as specified in this contract. You also promise to complete the Army’s required ROTC Program, including Advanced Camp and all training specified by the Secretary of the Army for commissioning. You understand that this contract requires military service as either an officer or as an enlisted member. However, if you fail to complete the entire period of military service required under the contract, you remain indebted to the United States for some or all of the monies paid by the United States toward your education. The amount is determined by the US Army using the formula which appears in Part I of this contract.

## Contract

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Student’s Name (Last, first, Mi)</th>
<th>Social Security Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date Education Commences</td>
<td>Completion Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic Major in which Degree is to be Attained</td>
<td>Address of Record</td>
</tr>
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</table>

## Part I

**Agreement by Scholarship Cadet Enrolling in the Senior ROTC Program**

1. As the scholarship recipient listed above, I hereby certify that I understand and agree to do the following:
   a. I will enlist in a Reserve Component of the United States Army, incurring a basic military service obligation of eight years. This obligation may be met in a variety of methods outlined later in this contract.
   b. I will enroll and continuously and faithfully pursue a degree in the academic major listed above. I further understand that if I change to another academic major unless I request (a request that may be denied) and receive the written consent of my Professor of Military Science (PMS). I also understand that if I change academic majors without the written consent of the PMS I will have breached the terms of this contract and the provisions of paragraph 1r(1) below will apply.
c. I will remain a full-time student at the institution listed above while in pursuit of my degree. I understand that a full-time student is defined as one being enrolled in sufficient academic courses to attain sophomore, junior, senior academic status at the end of each academic year as defined by my scholarship's duration. This includes the required Army ROTC classes which may be part of or in addition to those courses required for my degree.

d. I agree to obtain my degree on or before the completion date of this contract.

e. I agree to maintain a minimum semester/quarter academic grade point average of 2.0 or higher until the completion of the academic requirements for my degree. If my academic discipline or the school I am attending requires me to maintain a lower minimum academic grade point average than a 2.0, I agree to do so until the completion of the requirements for my degree. If I fail to do so, I agree to maintain an ROTC semester/quarter grade point average of 3.0 during my ROTC classes. (The 2.0 and 3.0 are on a scholastic scale ranging from zero points for failure to a high grade of 4.0. Other systems will be converted to this scale.)

f. I agree to successfully complete a minimum of one semester of a foreign language, the prescribed military science courses, to include ROTC Advanced Camp and any other training that may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Army as a requirement for commissioning.

g. I understand that I cannot transfer to another school while I am under the terms of this contract without the written consent of the host institution. If I am a 2 or 3 year scholarship recipient I may transfer to a ROTC host institution, extension center, or cross-enrolled school. I also understand that the transfer is contingent on the requirements listed below.

1. I must remain academically aligned (MS II/SOPH, MS III/JR, MS IV/SR):

2. I cannot change academic majors without the written permission of the PMS.

h. I understand and agree that in order to fulfill all the terms of this agreement I must meet the requirements of the Army Weight Control Program for body weight in addition to the physical fitness requirement of the Army Physical Readiness Test. These requirements, in addition to all other requirements are prerequisites for commissioning. I further understand that these requirements are subject to change, and I agree to keep myself informed on such changes through regular contact with the Professor of Military Science (PMS).

i. I agree to successfully complete a minimum of one semester of a foreign language, the prescribed military science courses, to include ROTC Advanced Camp and any other training that may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Army as a requirement for commissioning.

j. Upon completion of all requirements, I will:

1. Accept an appointment, if offered, as a commissioned officer in the US Army, and serve on active duty for at least two years with the remainder of my eight year obligation served in the Reserve Components. If commissioned as a regular officer and my regular commission is terminated before the eighth anniversary of the date of my commissioning, I will accept appointment, if offered, in the US Army Reserve or National Guard, as the case may be, and not resign such reserve commission before that anniversary.

2. Accept an appointment, if offered, as a Reserve commissioned officer in the US Army Reserve or National Guard and serve until the eighth anniversary of the receipt of the appointment, unless otherwise extended under the terms of Subsection (d) of Section 2108 of Title 10, United States Code, and under such terms and conditions as the Secretary of the Army may prescribe. I will have a period of active duty of up to one year to attend an Officer Basic Course.

k. I understand that I may apply for and accept appointment as a second lieutenant in the Regular Army, if tendered, or accept appointment in the United States Army Reserve or the Army National Guard if not selected for the Regular Army. I understand that I have the opportunity to request service on active duty or service with a Reserve Component Unit. I also understand and agree that my service obligation in return for the financial assistance provided under the scholarship program shall be determined by the Army according to its needs at the time of my appointment and shall consist of one of the following periods of service:

1. Five years on active duty followed by three years in the Reserve Components. (This option is only available to individuals who receive a five year scholarship to complete the required undergraduate study.)

2. Two, three or four years on active duty followed by service in the Reserve Components for the remainder of my eight year military service obligation.

3. A short period of active duty (up to one year) for the branch qualification which is followed by service in a Reserve Component Unit (monthly drill periods and two week annual training periods) for the remainder of my eight year military service obligation.

l. I understand that the commitment point after which I may not voluntarily withdraw from the scholarship program without penalty varies by scholarship as follows:

1. A four or five year recipient cannot voluntarily withdraw after beginning the first Military Science class of the sophomore year; MS II, i.e., the second year of the scholarship.

2. A three year recipient cannot voluntarily withdraw after beginning the first Military Science class of the sophomore year; MS II, i.e., the first year of the scholarship.

3. A two year recipient cannot voluntarily withdraw after beginning the first Military Science class of the junior year; MS III, i.e., the first year of the scholarship.

m. If, subsequent to the commitment points listed above, I fail to abide by the terms and conditions set forth in this contract and am disenrolled, I understand that the Secretary of the Army may order me to active duty as an enlisted member, and I will serve on active duty for the periods listed below:
and/or ROTC requirements because of conscientious objection, resignation for any reason from the Army or withdrawal from the
vice obligation will be determined by the terms of this scholarship contract.

Above and that I pursue the completion of the ROTC Program. This contract requires continuous performance on my part. If I desire
order me to active duty for one of the periods described in paragraph m.

I understand that the Secretary of the Army may order me to reimburse the United States as described in paragraphs n and o or may
is terminated, I will remain acadet in ROTC. My status as a cadet ends only when I am disenrolled from the program. If I am disenrolled
clude misconduct or failure to meet physical, mental, moral or other prescribed commissioning requirements.

(8 years).

(1) If I have entered MS II as a 3, 4, or 5 year scholarship recipient, or MS III as a 2-year scholarship recipient, and this contract
is terminated, I will remain a cadet in ROTC. My status as a cadet ends only when I am disenrolled from the program. If I am disenrolled
from the ROTC Program for any reason or fail to complete the educational and/or ROTC requirements specified in this agreement, I
understand that the Secretary of the Army may order me to reimburse the United States as described in paragraphs n and o or may
order me to active duty for one of the periods described in paragraph m.

(2) I understand that this contract requires that I diligently pursue the attainment of the degree in the academic major noted
above and that I pursue the completion of the ROTC Program. This contract requires continuous performance on my part. If I desire
to extend the operation of this contract or if I desire to take a leave of absence from the continuous performance of this contract, I
understand that I must first obtain a written permission from the PMS. Failure, on my part, to adhere to these conditions is breach
of this contract. I further understand that the PMS is required to obtain a voluntary extension of my enlistment by an amount of time
such leave of absence would extend beyond my eight year period of enlistment.

(3) I understand that, if because of my failure to maintain the required academic standards or for any reason I am forced to
elect to abandon my ROTC scholarship but I remain enrolled in the ROTC program as a nonscholarship cadet, I will be required to
repay all scholarship benefits I had received prior to such change in status, if for any reason I fail to qualify for commissioning or fail
to accept an appointment, if offered. I further agree that if at any time during the term of this contract I revert from scholarship to a
nonscholarship status, or if I fail to qualify for commissioning, I further agree that if at any time during the term of this contract I revert from scholarship to a
nonscholarship status, or if I fail to qualify for commissioning, or fail to accept an appointment if offered, my active and inactive ser-
vice obligation will be determined by the terms of this scholarship contract.

s. As used in this contract, "voluntarily" includes, but is not limited to, failure to complete the service obligation or educational
and/or ROTC requirements because of conscientious objection, resignation for any reason from the Army or withdrawal from the
educational program. The parties specifically agree that the following acts, although not all inclusive, are expressly defined to be in-
cluded in the term "voluntarily" as that term is used in this contract.

(1) Refusal of the cadet to initiate the application for a commission at the time that the cadet completes the ROTC Program.

(2) Refusal to accept a commission at the time it is offered to the cadet.
(3) Without having first obtained the prior written consent from the PMS, dropping ROTC from the normal course load of the cadet, reducing the course load to a level below that of a full time student, as that term is defined by this contract, dropping out of school, transferring to another institution of advanced education without the written permission of the PMS, feigning a disqualifying physical condition, or deliberately concealing a disqualifying condition during the application process, failing ROTC course work while maintaining an overall grade point average adequate for degree attainment, voluntarily withdrawing from Advanced Camp or entering the officer production program of another armed service.

t. As used in this contract, "misconduct" includes, but is not limited to, misrepresentation (i.e., failure to reveal a physical, mental or moral disqualifying factor), failure due to separation because of homosexuality, drug abuse, alcohol abuse, criminal conduct, civil confinement, unsuccessful completion of an established weight control program, and moral or professional dereliction.

u. If I am fulfilling my obligation to Reserve Component duty as outlined in i(3) and an appropriate unit assignment is not available or becomes unavailable in either the United States Army Reserve or the Army National Guard, I agree to participate as a member of the Individual Ready Reserve. For the purposes of my contractual obligation, time participating as a member of the Individual Ready Reserve shall be deemed equal to time participating in a unit of the United States Army Reserve or Army National Guard.

v. As an enlisted member or as a commissioned officer in the Reserve Component of the Army of the United States or upon my transfer or assignment thereto, I may be ordered to active duty without my consent for the duration of a war or national emergency declared by Congress and for six months thereafter, or for twenty-four (24) consecutive months during a national emergency declared by the President, or under any other conditions and for such periods of time as are presently or hereafter authorized by law.

w. The agreements in this contract are the only promises by both parties. Anything else anyone has promised is not valid and will not be honored.
PART II
AGREEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

2. In consideration of the above named cadet's agreement to the terms of this ROTC Scholarship Cadet Contract, the Secretary of the Army agrees to:
   a. Pay for a period of __________ academic years the following:
      (1) Tuition (covers only courses required by the institution and ROTC for attainment of the degree in the academic major shown above).
      (2) On-campus laboratory fees (only those for the use of the laboratory, breakage and for materials consumed during the class periods (less precious metals)). Also includes laboratory fees for catalogue specified classes, e.g., aviation/aerospace flight training where training is mandatory for academic major and degree.
      (3) Student activity fee.
      (4) Student union fee (if not included in student activity fee).
      (5) Library fee (if not included in student activity fee).
      (6) Health fee (not health insurance).
      (7) Transcript fee.
      (8) Student athletic fee (for use of the institution's athletic facility, not for the purchase of tickets).
      (9) Graduation fee.
      (10) Diploma fee (if not included in graduation fee).
      (11) Cap and gown fee (if not included in graduation fee.)
      (12) A flat rate (by academic discipline grouping, e.g., engineer, physical science, business, other) for textbooks, equipment, and other academic supplies not covered above. (You may use this money to buy any books, supplies, and equipment you feel you need for the pursuit of your academic endeavors. Any items that you believe you need which would exceed this rate must be purchased with your own money.)
   
   NOTE: Under the terms of this contract, items 1-12 are considered financial assistance and will be used to determine the amount reimbursable to the Government if repayment is required. Travel from your home of record to the school listed above is not paid by the United States Army and such costs must be paid by you (2 year and 3 year scholarship recipients only, as they are already on campus).

   b. Pay a subsistence allowance at the rate prescribed by law or regulation during the period of this contract, but not for more than
      50 months for a 5-year scholarship.
      40 months for a 4-year scholarship.
      30 months for a 3-year scholarship.
      20 months for a 2-year scholarship.
   
   NOTE: Subsistence allowance is not considered in determining the total cost if repayment is necessary.

   c. Pay, at the rate prescribed by law for cadets of the United States Military Academy, for the period that the cadet is in attendance at the ROTC Advanced Camp or Ranger School.

PART III
CONSENT OF PARENT OR GUARDIAN TO ENROLLMENT IN THE ROTC AND ENLISTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE

(To be completed if applicant is a minor at time of enrollment in the ROTC Financial Assistance Program)

3. I certify that I am the applicant's parent or legal guardian, and that the applicant's date of birth as shown above is correct.

4. I hereby consent to applicant's enrollment in the Reserve Officers' Training Corps and to enlistment in the US Army Reserve.

5. I have read and thoroughly understand the above statements of terms under which the applicant is being enrolled. I relinquish all claims to applicant's service and to any wages or compensation for such service. I understand that the applicant will be subject to all of the requirements and lawful commands of the officers who may from time to time be placed over the applicant, and I certify that no promise of any kind has been made to me concerning the applicant's assignment to duty or appointment as an officer as an inducement to me to sign this contract.

SIGNATURE OF PARENT OR GUARDIAN
SIGNATURE OF WITNESS
DATE

PART IV
CONFIRMATION OF ENROLLMENT AS A ROTC SCHOLARSHIP CADET

(AND OF ENROLLMENT IN THE ROTC PROGRAM, IF NOT PREVIOUSLY ENROLLED)

6. On the basis of the above executed contract (Part I) and the above named student's selection for the award of the financial assistance indicated in Part II above, and the executed consent of the parent or guardian (Part III above, applicable) I have selected and enrolled in this student in the ROTC Program on __________

(Effective date of enrollment)

SIGNATURE
DATE
Purpose

This Annex outlines the procedures used to estimate what yield (lieutenant production) the ROTC Study Group expects from the modified incentive package.

Why Yield Data

Based on current ROTC production, the Army, in the 1990s, will have a shortfall of approximately 2500 lieutenants per year. The modified incentive package must prevent this shortfall. If implemented what will be the predicted yield of these new proposals? Will these modifications provide the Army the required number of needed LTs? These are questions that need to be answered. There is a paucity of information to support yield of ROTC incentives. There has been no study published to quantify the yield of various ROTC incentives currently available. The Rand Study was an experimental model using a control group to evaluate and quantify different USAREC, not ROTC, incentive proposals, all of which were linked to educational programs. The ETS study conducted on ROTC students did reveal that there was overwhelming evidence that enrollment and retention could be increased as a result of increasing the monthly stipend however the researchers did not establish what monetary amount would produce the best yield. This was a major limitation of that particular study. Yield predictions are of upmost importance in justifying a package, therefore the Study Group felt a need to be able to determine the yield of this proposal in order to convince the Army as well as Congress of the importance of the incentive package to ROTC and the Army.

Description of the Modified Package

A modified package had to target different populations. The incentives had to be diverse enough to appeal to different groups in different geographical areas with different needs and yet be flexible enough to allow
entry at different points in the ROTC system. For this reason the study group's incentive package is multi-dimensional and includes three proposals:

1. Increase subsistence allowance to $150/academic month for all cadets.
2. Increase the Army scholarship allocation by 1500.
3. Develop an Army-only incentive program which would include
   A. Early-Contracting (10 percent of MS I's)
   B. Kicker payment of $1000/year to Advance Course cadets.

The rationale for increasing subsistence allowance was based on the facts that:
1. Inflation has caused the value of subsistence allowance to decrease dramatically.
2. Original Congressional intent was for the allowance to be the same as the garrison ration (BAS).
3. An increase would better offset student expenses.

Since the "Kicker" incentive is also a monetary stipend the yield of the subsistence allowance increase will be covered at the same time the yield from the Kicker proposal is discussed.

The rational for increasing scholarships is as follows:
1. Scholarships attract high quality students.
2. Scholarships have the most reliable data when determining yield.
3. Two year scholarship has best turn around time.
4. Two year scholarship has highest retention rate.

The yield potential of this proposal is described in Figure 4-2-1.
Current retention rates have established that for every 100 two year scholarships awarded 88 percent of the students complete the program. Based on this retention data it is projected that out of an increase of 1500 scholarships 775 can be awarded each year. Upon achieving a steady state ROTC could expect to produce 680 additional lieutenants each year as a result of this proposal.

The third proposal is for the development of an Army-only program. This Army-only program consist of two facets, early contracting and a monetary kicker. The yield projection for the early contracting segment will be addressed first.

The early contracting proposal describes a concept that is difficult to quantify. The current retention rate for a nonscholarship cadet from MS I through commissioning is 8 percent. The Army spends approximately $23,000 on a cadet who wins a four scholarship (subsistence allowance included). How many more nonscholarship cadets would ROTC retain if they were given the opportunity to early-contract and thereby receive an additional $2000 over the duration of the program? A model for analyzing this gain in retainability is depicted below in Figure 4-2-2.
This potential yield was very low however, research has shown that there really is not a direct relationship between the amount of money given and retention. Another way of expressing yield for this proposal was to look at the gain in retention obtained by ROTC when the payback grace period changed from two years to one year, thereby requiring an earlier commitment from the scholarship cadets. When this new payback policy was initiated ROTC found the historical retention rate of their four year scholarship program (57%) increased by 8 percent. This increase in retention appears to be directly related to the requirement for an earlier commitment. It would be logical to assume that a similar rate of increase would be seen in the nonscholarship population if early-contracting were implemented. The average enrollment of the MS I class has been approximately 30,000 students. The remaining number of competitive qualified applicants remaining on the OML after selection for four year and three year advance reserve scholarships is approximately 3000 or 10 percent of the MS I enrollment. To maximize this OML and capitalize on the concept of early-contracting the
study group recommends that this opportunity be offered to approximately 
3000 or a maximum of 10 percent of the MS I enrollment. Figure 4-2-3 
reflects the anticipated yield of early contracting using 10 percent of the 
MS I class as a fixed variable and showing both the higher potential yield 8 
percent and the lower potential yield of 4.6 percent.

### DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY ROTC STUDY GROUP

#### RATIONALE FOR INCREASE OF LT's

**DUE TO EARLY CONTRACTING**

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<th>CURRENT MS SCHOLARSHIP RETENTION</th>
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<tr>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE 4-2-3**

For purpose of yield and costing 8 percent was used as the standard gain 
from the early contracting proposal, therefore the anticipated yield of 
this early contracting proposal would be, at a minimum approximately 300 
Lieutenants per annum.

The second segment of the Army-only program is the proposal for a 
monetary kicker. The yield for the subsistence allowance increase and the 
yield from the monetary kicker proposal are discussed together since they 
both result in a monthly financial gain.

4-2-5
The study conducted by the ETS had one major flaw. In sampling the students on monetary incentives the students all, of course, said they needed more money. The information on how much more was required to influence their decisions to favor Army ROTC was not questioned. Therefore, for some perhaps, an additional $50./month would have been sufficient and for others it would not have been enough. However, the ETS was able to show that of the students that attrited, 5 percent specifically said they would have stayed enrolled (and were qualified to stay) if they had received more money. Accepting the assumption that additional subsistence allowance plus the "kicker" would probably give the cadet sufficient monies to meet his needs, a follow-on conclusion would be that the five percent that attrited could possible be retained. Figure 4-2-4 reflects a mathematical calculation applying these assumptions in determining potential yield.

\[
\text{YIELD:} \\
\text{SUBSISTENCE & ADDING A KICKER}
\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY 1991</th>
<th>AVE ENROLLMENT</th>
<th>ATTENTION RATE</th>
<th>ATTRITED NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MS I</td>
<td>37850</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>= 23746</td>
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<tr>
<td>MS II</td>
<td>14685</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>= 9884</td>
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<tr>
<td>MS III</td>
<td>8561</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>= 1005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS IV</td>
<td>7271</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>= 587</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[\text{X6100} \times 1800 = \text{1845.75 = 1800} \]

\* NONSCHOLARSHIP STUDENTS ONLY

\* PROJECTED INCREASE IN ENROLLMENT AS IDENTIFIED BY ATTRITION STUDY

** PROJECTED INCREASE IN ATTRITION AS IDENTIFIED BY ATTRITION STUDY

FIGURE 4-2-4

Applying the historical attrition rates to the projected 1991 average enrollment figures would reveal a population of approximately 37000 who attrited. Retaining, at a minimum, 5 percent of this population would produce a potential gain of 1800 Lieutenants. The study group believes this is a very conservative estimate. The use of the 5 percent figure was the
most valid of the percentages since these students actually left the program. Of those who remained active in ROTC 50 percent said they hoped to complete but may be unable to do so without an increase, 33 percent said they were more likely to finish with an increase and 17 percent said they definitely could not afford to finish without an increase. Had the Study Group used one of these other percentages yield data would be considerably higher but since this was a snapshot view, probably not as valid.

In summary the study group anticipates that implementation of its modified incentive package proposal would result in a gain of approximately 2700 officers.

No incentive package increase would be complete without looking at what this increase will buy for the Army but also what will it cost. In order to understand the relative cost the current cost of the system must be compared to the proposed system. Figure 4-2-5 shows this comparison.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RECOMMENDED INCENTIVE PACKAGE COST PER LT</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRESENT SYSTEM 1985</td>
<td>PROPOSED SYSTEM 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COST OF INCENTIVE PROGRAM</td>
<td>$82.7m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUMBER OF LTs PRODUCED</td>
<td>8300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COST PER LT</td>
<td>$10,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Based on 1986 constant dollars

FIGURE 4-2-5

The proposed incentive package would raise the average cost of each lieutenant by approximately $2500. The average cost gives the cost of the package divided by the number of lieutenants produced to the number
anticipated will be produced. A marginal cost would give specifically how much more those additional lieutenants were going to cost per lieutenant. Figure 4-2-6 show the marginal cost data of each of the proposals.

**Table: POTENTIAL YIELD VERSUS COST**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY 1991</th>
<th>POTENTIAL LT YIELD</th>
<th>AVERAGE ANNUAL COST OF PROPOSED INCREASE</th>
<th>MARGINAL COST/LT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARMY-ONLY PROPOSAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KICKER-SUBSISTENCE</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>$20,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EARLY CONTRACTING</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>$16,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCHOLARSHIPS</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>$12,941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2780</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>* $18,701</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This is not a summation. Number is derived by: \( \frac{\text{AVG Annual Cost of Proposed Increase}}{\text{Potential LT Yield}} \)

**FIGURE 4-2-6**

The marginal cost is highest for the increased monthly financial incentives (subsistence and kicker) proposal than it is for the others. This is because yield estimates for these proposals are conservative thereby increasing the cost per lieutenant. If the yield data was less conservatively interpreted the cost for this untested proposal would decrease. The scholarship proposal is the most cost effective. The yield data for this proposal is the most reliable since RQTC maintains excellent historical data on the results of this program.

The ROTC Study Group recognizes that the yield predictions for the incentive proposals, less scholarships, are in essence estimates based on the best currently available data. However, after reviewing the available literature and conducting limited research the study group found there was significant evidence that allowed us to make these reasonable estimates of the potential yield of the incentive package. In an attempt to better quantify the yield estimates the study group sought counsel with other experts available to us (DCSPER PA&E personnel, West Point Social Science Research Division) however, there was just insufficient data available to our experts for them to obtain significant results from their attempted regression models. The dearth of analytical justification forced the Study Group back to the "reasonable estimates."

4-2-8
The cost of each of the proposals over several years is detailed in Figure 4-2-7. These dollar amounts are, as with previous charts, based on 1986 dollars.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>88</th>
<th>89</th>
<th>90</th>
<th>91</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SCHOLARSHIPS</td>
<td>4.5m</td>
<td>8.8m</td>
<td>8.8m</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBSISTENCE</td>
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<td>12.2</td>
<td>12.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>KICKER</td>
<td>21.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>EARLY CONTRACT</td>
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<tr>
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<td>43.0m</td>
<td>47.6m</td>
<td>48.8m</td>
<td>50.6m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE 4-2-7

In view of the current environment of fiscal constraint the best "reasonable estimates" are inadequate justification for Congress to spend what we expect the program would cost. A way to further validate the yield prediction would be to experimentally test the concepts or conduct an independent survey of ROTC and non-ROTC students.

The Army could attempt to obtain Congressional approval using these reasonable estimates as a prediction of yield or seek to implement a test which would provide more valid data. An experimental test model would provide the most reliable and defendable data. A brief description of how the Study Group sees this experimental pilot being conducted is detailed in Figure 4-2-8.
PROPOSED PILOT TEST

EARLY CONTRACTING  PURPOSE:  1) TO TEST CONCEPT OF EARLY CONTRACTING AS A MEANS OF INCREASING ENROLLMENT OF HIGH QUALITY HIGH SCHOOL SENIORS.

2) TO TEST IMPROVED RETENTION CONCEPT OF EARLY COMMITMENT.

METHOD: HIGHLY QUALIFIED SCHOLARSHIP APPLICANTS WHO DID NOT RECEIVE A SCHOLARSHIP WILL BE OFFERED THE OPPORTUNITY TO EARLY CONTRACT. THE NUMBER OF EARLY CONTRACTS WILL NOT EXCEED 500. UPON CONTRACTING CADET WILL RECEIVE SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCE.

KICKER  PURPOSE:  TO TEST THE ELASTICITY OF YIELD OF VARYING AMOUNT OF MONETARY INCENTIVES.

METHOD: A REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE OF SELECTED COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES WILL BE IDENTIFIED TO OFFER VARYING MONETARY INCENTIVES TO ADVANCED COURSE CADETS. CADET SAMPLE SIZE WILL NOT EXCEED 500 FOR EACH VARIABLE.

1. SOME COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES WILL OFFER A $500 YEAR INCENTIVE.

2. SOME COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES WILL OFFER A $1000 YEAR INCENTIVE.

3. SOME COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES WILL OFFER A $1500 YEAR INCENTIVE.

THESE MONETARY INCENTIVES WILL BE IN ADDITION TO THE TRADITIONAL SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCE OFFERED TO ADVANCED COURSE CADETS.

FIGURE 4-2-8

This proposed test would provide valid yield data of our early contracting proposal as well as determining exactly how much of a financial incentive is necessary to maximize the yield from the combination subsistence/kicker proposal. It may be that it really is not necessary to offer the Advance Course cadets the full $100 kicker. Perhaps an increase of only $50 would serve the purpose. A more detailed description of the pilot test is included as a Statement of Work which can be found at Annex 3.

Unfortunately there are drawbacks to a pilot test. First, it would require a minimum of two years to fully measure the benefit. Interim measurements could be made and utilized but a complete cycle should be completed in order to scientifically test the concepts under review.

4-2-10
Secondly, Congressional approval would be necessary to implement the test since the test would be exceeding the authority of the current incentive statute. Obtaining Congressional approval would in itself be a laborious process and require top Army leadership interest and support to insure Congressional action in as expeditious a manner as possible so that implementation could be achieved by SY 86-87. Lastly, conducting a pilot of this magnitude would cost approximately 4.9 million dollars.

The second alternative, that of a survey, would not be as costly. The study group received an estimate of $300,000. This alternative would not take as long to administer nor would it need Congressional approval to conduct. If the concept of a test were approved today (Jan 86) a contractor could be located and the survey conducted and results analyzed by SY 86-87. This is important because of the lead time required to submit proposals requiring funding in the budget cycle. The earliest the incentive package could be considered by Congress, regardless of yield data, would be in the legislative contingency budget for FY 88. This budget request would be submitted to Congress in December of 1986.

The Study Group's recommendation of the test issue is twofold. First proceed with the survey and obtain those result. While this is being accomplished continue to petition the system for the more valid test which is the experimental model. If implemented by SY 86-87 the interim results of this pilot test could be ready when the budget request for this package was presented to Congress and could be used to modify or further substantiate the survey data. Providing Congress with this data will enable them to decide whether the yield is worth the cost.
STATEMENT OF WORK

Background: The ROTC program, the "Total Army's" largest source of officers faces serious challenges in the 1990s and beyond. ROTC is being asked to increase total production by 25%, produce more "hi-tech" oriented lieutenants and redirect its focus from Active Army to Total Army production. It is being required to accomplish this at a time when its market is shrinking, civilian industry has increased its demand for "hi-tech" skills and the other services exploit the guarantee of full-time jobs after college. This is further exacerbated by ROTC's limited fiscal and manpower resources. Present production and enrollment trends do not bode well for future mission accomplishment.

Historically, ROTC has been an active duty oriented program capable of meeting its mission with minimal resource expenditures. However conditions previously mentioned dictate that ROTC must do a better job of marketing itself, utilizing its limited resources and becoming more competitive. To accomplish this the study group believes that a 3 part project, which accurately determines the "market" at each institution, translates that data to a valid mission model and lastly identifies an incentive for that market, which would make ROTC competitive with industry and the other services, will help ensure mission accomplishment.

When determining the market particular attention should be devoted to identifying those with a Reserve Forces Duty (RFD) propensity. Further the resulting mission model must include such data as economic trends, population concentrations, location of Reserve Component units and motivational factors, correlated to each host instructor group. This will ensure that the recruiting effort can be targeted with a greater degree of efficiency and accuracy.

TECHNICAL OBJECTIVE:

a. Conduct a market analysis to determine what factors motivate high school and college students to join ROTC. Identify when key decisions are made, who and what motivates the decision, what students expect from ROTC and appropriate incentives.
b. Correlate data from first phase with geographic areas of "recruiting opportunity." Data must include key information on high schools, colleges and support the missioning process in terms of propensity to join, mix and Reserve Forces Duty (RFD) propensity.
c. Final product will be a missioning model that incorporates all research as well as existing Cadet Command variables and is credible to the entire ROTC community. The study will also produce a set of incentives which will provide Army ROTC with a competitive edge and still be affordable.
ADDENDUM

On 8 November, 1985 the ROTC Study Group recommended to CSA the adoption of an incentive package designed to attract sufficient cadets to enable ROTC to commission an additional 2,500 lieutenants and produce the required 10,800 officers annually. This package consisted of the following:

(1) Early contracting from high school into MS I.
(2) An increase of subsistence from $100 to $150 per month.
(3) An Army only kicker consisting of a monetary incentive of $100 per academic month.
(4) An additional 1,500 two-year scholarships.

A recommendation for a test was also made to better validate the yield of this package. TRADOC nonconcurred with the ROTC Study Group proposal and subsequently submitted a new incentive proposal called the Educational Assistance Allowance (EAA). EAA uses the principle of early contracting from MS I into MS II and monetary incentives which reimburse cadets for mandatory classes taken in support of the ROTC program. EAA would provide $1,000 to MS II cadets, $1,200 for MS III's and $1,400 for MS IV's. This allowance would be in addition to the $100 a month subsistence allowance for MS III and MS IV cadets (A TRADOC fact sheet on EAA is attached).

ODCSPER, ROTC Study Group and TRADOC representatives have met several times to review the ROTC incentive proposals, to identify common elements of both recommendations, to develop a stronger rationale to support yield, and to develop a consolidated recommendation on incentives. All agree that the term EAA, as linked to reimbursing cadets for required courses, would be more sellable than the term Army Only Kicker. Although there is agreement that a monetary incentive and an early contracting program will significantly increase production, there is uncertainty about exact yield.

To date no precise empirical basis has been found to support an educated guess of a yield of 2500 (the delta between the present production levels and the 1990 mission). The ROTC Study Group has discussed the feasibility of a test of its initial incentive package proposal with the Army Research Institute (ARI) and the ODCSPER Studies Division. Both felt that a study by the RAND Corporation could provide the yield data needed to support a
request to Congress for funds for the incentive package. TRADOC does not believe a study is needed and they do not desire to wait for the study results to begin processing the PDIP for EAA. Study group coordination with OTJAG indicates that legislation is needed before early contracting can be implemented.

Given the similarities of both plans, the ROTC Study Group supports proceeding with the TRADOC incentive proposal. However, since it will take at least 2 years to obtain Congressional approval and because yield is uncertain, the ROTC Study Group recommends pursuing a study of EAA by the RAND Corporation. The results of this study could be used to refine the incentives package and to support a request to Congress for funding of that package. DAPE-MPA is the ARSTAF proponent for staffing the TRADOC EAA PDIP and for tasking the study effort.

Enclosure
MEMORANDUM THRU CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY
FOR CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON

SUBJECT: Proposed Legislation to Authorize Educational Assistance Allowance for ROTC Nonscholarship Cadets—ACTION MEMORANDUM

1. Purpose: To have drafted legislation that will make changes to law to authorize the payment of an educational assistance allowance to some nonscholarship ROTC cadets.

2. Discussion:
   a. A need for an incentive to increase nonscholarship ROTC cadet enrollment in the ROTC program, and therefore increase ROTC officer production was identified by the ROTC Study Group. The TRADOC/DA coordinated program to accomplish this is an Educational Assistance Allowance for certain MS II nonscholarship cadets and all MS III and IV nonscholarship cadets. The concept and objectives of this program are outlined at TAB A.
   b. No similar proposal has been introduced to the Congress.
   c. The estimated annual cost is $43.1M. Cost and budget data are at TAB B.
   d. Both, Departments of Navy and Air Force, would be affected by the enactment of this legislation. Their comments are at TAB C.
   e. Proposed legislation is consistent with DoD and DA positions to correct the current situation.
   f. OASD(FM&P), OASA(MRA), DACS-DPZ-A, TRADOC(ATCC), OTJAG, and OCLL have no objection to this legislative proposal.
DAPE-MPA-OA
SUBJECT: Proposed Legislation to Authorize Educational Assistance Allowance for ROTC Nonscholarship Cadets--ACTION MEMORANDUM

3. Recommendation: That the submission of subject legislation be approved.

Encls

ROBERT M. ELTON
Lieutenant General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff
for Personnel
Legislative proposal to authorize the payment of an Educational Assistance Allowance (EAA) to Nonscholarship ROTC cadets

1. Objective: Increase nonscholarship cadet enrollment and cadet retention rates in order to meet Army officer production requirements.

2. Background:
   a. Actions are ongoing to rebuild the four-year ROTC program which has suffered from the inability to recruit and retain sufficient nonscholarship basic course (Military Science (MS) I and II) cadets.
   b. The capability to retain these cadets during the basic course so they continue to the advanced course and are commissioned is limited. While there is no retention device or incentive for this population, it is this element of the market which will allow officer production requirements to be met. Competing with ROTC's need to attract and retain the nonscholarship cadet are disincentives such as an increase in tuition costs and in the Military Service Obligation from 6 to 8 years, compounded by the additional course requirements of ROTC. Reduction or the unacceptable low retention rate is the fundamental element of the rebuilding process.
   c. This problem can be resolved by enacting a program to provide an educational assistance allowance (less than full scholarship cost) to selected ROTC nonscholarship cadets.
   d. Currently, ROTC nonscholarship cadets are required to participate in ROTC courses of instructions and take 5 additional subjects in the program (regardless of academic discipline) without reimbursement. The EAA Program proposes to make direct lump sum payments to partially offset the cost of these requirements. Inherent in this program is the need to contract cadets at the MS II level and subject them to recoupment if they fail to comply with the terms of the contract (i.e. qualify and accept a commission if offered).
   e. The program would be administered as follows:
      (1) Selected MS II nonscholarship cadets: lump sum EAA of $1,000 upon contracting for approximately 10,831 cadets per year meeting or exceeding the established quality criteria for contracting.
      (2) All MS III nonscholarship cadets: lump sum EAA of $1,200 for approximately 8,618 cadets per year. Same criteria as outlined in 2.e.(1) above.
(3) All MS IV nonscholarship cadets: lump sum EAA of $1,400 for approximately 7,927 cadets per year. Same criteria as outlined in 2.e.(1) above.

The EAA will be in addition to the present $100 per month subsistence allowance for MS III & MS IV nonscholarship cadets. Subsistence allowance ($100 per month) requires authorization for MS IIIs contracted under this program. Additionally, if approved, the EAA will be added to the Army Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps Nonscholarship Cadet Contract as a reimbursable financial assistance (to be repaid if the terms of the contract are not met; or the cadet can be called to active duty as an enlisted member).

f. In concert with current management and advertising initiatives, EEA will attract sufficient number of nonscholarship cadets to meet the DA assigned officer production mission in the outyears at approximately 35 percent of the cost of ROTC scholarship cadets. This program will increase lieutenant production by 590 in FY90 and 1,550 thereafter.

g. If not resourced, ROTC retention rates will remain low. Current production trends predict a 2200 production shortfall by FY92.

h. This proposal will, at a reasonable cost, provide a strong inducement for cadets to commit themselves to ROTC training and, through the ROTC contract, a means for the Army to maintain the student's commitment.
BASIS FOR COST AND BUDGET DATA

Educational Assistance Allowance (EAA) Program.

1. Based upon required participation in this program, MS II through MS IV, it is estimated that the following cost per FY will be incurred if the proposed legislation is adopted.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY88</th>
<th>FY89</th>
<th>FY90</th>
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<td>8.3</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
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</table>

TOTAL (million): 33.5, 39.4, 42.2, 43.1, 43.1

Basis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<td>5247</td>
<td>5930</td>
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<td>7927</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Factors:

- MS II: 2K per cadet (includes subsistence allowance)
- MS III: 1.2K per cadet (does not include subsistence allowance)
- MS IV: 1.4K per cadet (does not include subsistence allowance)

2. Monies have been identified in the legislative contingency fund for this legislative proposal.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, OFFICER ACCESSION BRANCH (DAPE-MPA-OA)

Subj: ROTC EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE ALLOWANCE (EAA)

Ref: (a) DAPE-MPA memo Ser 52661 of 28 mar 86

1. As requested by reference (a), your proposal to provide ROTC nonscholarship students an educational assistance allowance has been reviewed and I believe it has potential to attract significant numbers of students into the ROTC program, particularly at state-supported schools.

2. I would recommend that the legislative language authorize the EAA for all three Services and that the amount of the allowance be written as up to your specified amounts.

3. It is requested that the Navy be afforded a formal comment of the legislative proposal. I commend your staff for this innovative proposal.

B. F. FOLSOM, JR.
Captain, U. S. Navy
Head, Education Programs
and Resources Policy Branch
REPLY TO
ATTN OF:

DPPE

SUBJECT
Educational Assistance Allowance, ROTC Nonscholarship Cadets,
(Your DA Form 2496, 28 Mar 86)

TO: DAPE-KPA-OA

1. Air Force does not object to a legislative proposal which
would allow Army to pay an educational assistance allowance to
nonscholarship ROTC cadets.

2. Air Force does object to any legislative change which would
require Air Force to pay an educational assistance allowance to
nonscholarship ROTC cadets. Air Force objection is for the
following reasons:

   a. This program would cost Air Force an additional $9.1
      million/year in a time of ROTC budget reductions.

   b. Air Force is meeting production goals and currently does
      not need to increase production.

   c. The program would require contracting nonscholarship
      students before being able to observe their performance at field
      training.

3. The AF/DPPE point of contact is Lt Col Jim Hogan, 50318/77.

JOSEPH C. RAMSEY, JR, Colonel, USAF
Chief, Education Programs Division
Directorate of Personnel Programs
CHAPTER FIVE

STRUCTURE

This chapter examines the ROTC structure. It includes a brief historical background of the evolution of ROTC's organization since 1960, highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the current structure, develops several courses for improving ROTC's organization and concludes with recommendations for restructuring ROTC.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The Army ROTC organization was established as a result of the National Defense Act of 1916. Since its inception over 70 years ago ROTC has undergone periodic reviews averaging about one every 10 years. The current ROTC structure has evolved from these reviews. In the past, ROTC commissioned primarily reserve officers and was managed by Chief of Reserve Components (CORC) at Headquarters Department of Army (HQDA). During the 1960s the program, still managed by the Reserve Components, began to commission officers with a two- or three-year active duty service obligations. The ROTC organization was very layered and positioned within headquarters organizations so that the offices that had responsibility for Reserve Components were also responsible for ROTC. A typical organizational diagram for this period is shown in Figure 5-1.
In the mid-1960s the Comptroller of the Army (COA) was chartered to review the ROTC management system. This review identified the following three major areas of concern:

a) Excessive reserve orientation and image for an Active Component oriented program.

b) Excessive structural layering resulting in extremely slow communications and response.

c) Limited visibility of the program managers, particularly general officers, who performed ROTC duties on a part-time basis.

The COA ROTC Study of 1965 resulted in several significant organizational changes. An ROTC Division headed by a brigadier general was established within ODCSPER to provide centralized policy formulation and direction. Headquarters Continental Army Command (HQCONARC) assumed responsibility for operational management of ROTC. The commanding general of each Continental United States Army (CONUSA) was given command responsibility for the supervision and support of the ROTC Instructor Groups. The organizational diagram at Figure 5-2 shows this revised structure. Note that the Army Corps have been dropped from the chain of command.

PRE-STEADFAST
DCSPER 1966

SEC ARMY
CSA
CONARC
CONUSAS
SROTC
NDCC/JROTC

FIGURE 5-2
This reorganization eliminated some of the reserve image, increased program visibility at HQDA's level and provided ROTC two full-time general officers. Other supervision was accomplished by four deputy commanding generals located at each CONUSA. Five brigadier generals commanded ROTC camps as a part time responsibility.

The weaknesses under the COA reorganization included a continued slow response to guidance because of layering and the placement of ROTC within staff organizations having major responsibilities other than ROTC. There was an excessive span of supervision from each Army headquarters to the CONUSA ROTC instructor groups. In one instance a colonel was responsible for supervising, evaluating and rating 97 Professors of Military Science. Although, general officer involvement increased under the COA reorganization, detailed guidance and attention to the many widely scattered ROTC Instructor Groups continued to be limited. The view from academia was that there was still insufficient general officer visibility in the program. This organization continued with few changes until the STEADFAST reorganization for the Army during the early 1970s.

CURRENT STRUCTURE

The next major revision of ROTC came in 1973 as part of the Army's reorganization effort under STEADFAST. The objective was to provide an efficient and effective ROTC organization capable of producing the quality and quantity of officers needed to meet Army needs. This reorganization was designed to reduce headquarters and staff layering, improve command supervision, reduce intermediate levels of management, enhance recruiting and advertising and increase visibility for the ROTC program on campus. The vertical organization resulting from this reorganization is shown at Figure 5-3.
The Steadfast organization improved the visibility, effectiveness and responsiveness of the ROTC management system. General officer staffing under this organization included a major general as the Deputy Chief of Staff for ROTC (DCSROTC) and four brigadier general region commanders. The addition of these general officers improved supervision, added prestige to the program and allowed for greater interaction with the academic community. Headquarters layering, response time and span of control were reduced.
The STEADFAST management organization for ROTC has remained largely unchanged since 1973. The most notable change was the redefining of the supervising deputy positions at each region. This change resulted in the establishment of the Area Commander concept. Currently, with only two exceptions, Area Commanders (Colonels) supervise their areas from the region headquarters. This supervision is accomplished with minimal staff support. The current region boundaries, headquarters locations, and numbers of SROTC units are shown in Figure 5-4.

**CURRENT**

![Figure 5-4](image)

**Figure 5-4**

Figure 5-5 depicts the current management structure. A description of the functions performed at various levels within the structure follows.
1. The **ASA M&RA** - provides general policy guidance, production goals, and guidance for resource support for all precommissioning programs.

2. The **ARSTAF** - develops and formulates policy, plans, programs, budgets, and allocates resources; establishes lieutenant commissioning mission and monitors mission accomplishment. The mission and resources flow to TRADOC and informal coordination occurs with ODCSROTC.

3. **TRADOC** - The MACOM which formulates policy and ensures that the lieutenant commissioning mission is met. It also plans, programs and budgets resources.

4. **DCSROTC** - Commander of ROTC, formulates and implements policy, plans, programs and budgets; executes and manages resources, manages production and monitors all programs.

5. **REGION** - Brigadier Generals command each of the four ROTC regions. They command and supervise Instructor Groups within their regions, provide senior level interface with college officials and monitor mission accomplishment. The First, Third and Fourth Region Commanders are responsible for commanding and conducting Cadet Advanced Camps. The Second
Region Commander commands the Basic Camp and Nurse Summer Training Program (NSTP).

6. AREAS - The four regions are further divided into 18 areas. Area Commanders (Colonels) supervise Instructor Groups within their areas. They assist in mission accomplishment, exercise quality control and are responsible for inspecting cadre and cadet training. Two area commanders, both in First Region, are located in their areas (Ft. Dix & Ft. Devens). All others operate from region headquarters. Area Commanders are also responsible for the Goldminer Teams which conduct high school recruiting for SROTC within their areas.

7. INSTRUCTOR GROUPS - Subordinate to the Area Commanders are the Instructor Groups. Host Instructor Groups may have subordinate extension centers and cross-enrolled schools. There are 314 Instructor Groups supervised by Colonel or Lieutenant Colonel Professors of Military Science. The Instructor Groups recruit, train and commission lieutenants to meet established requirements for quality and quantity. There are 106 extension centers and approximately 1032 cross-enrolled schools. An extension center is a 4 year degree producing institution generally more than 50 miles or a one hour drive from a host. The cadre assigned to extension centers come from Region resources. Logistical and administrative support is provided by the host Instructor Group. Cross-enrolled institutions establish an agreement with a host which allows students to attend ROTC at that host schools. No additional cadre are required or assigned to the cross-enrolled campus.

ROTC Instructor Group cadre are often the sole representatives of the U.S. Army in many communities across the nation. As such, the Instructor Groups are the focal point for members of the civilian community needing information or assistance from the U.S. Army. Instructor Group cadre are frequently asked to provide survival assistance, notification of next of kin, participate in funerals, and various other ceremonies. They serve as guest speakers and provide information to the media about the Army.

8. JROTC - Approximately 825 JROTC units are supervised by either Region Headquarters, Area Commanders or Senior Instructor Groups. For further discussion of the JROTC program see the JROTC section of this report.
ANALYSIS of CURRENT ORGANIZATION

The study group's evaluation of the present system determined that the structural organization of ROTC supported mission accomplishment until about 1983. It incorporated expansion of both the Senior and Junior ROTC programs and furthered the partnership with academia at the institutional level. However, ROTC does not appear to be on the correct course to make mission in the 1990s. This evaluation pointed out structural problems in the management organization, some of which were recognized in past studies but remain unresolved. Two of these "old" issues are mid-level management and supervision and program visibility, particularly from academia's perspective.

Current structural weaknesses include excessive span of control, inappropriate division of labor, failure to provide for accomplishment of all functions and the absence of a centralized personnel management capability. The present functional alignment does not provide for economy of scale in marketing, advertising and off-campus recruiting nor does it facilitate ROTC-Total Army coordination and mutual support.

ROTC's vertical organization with its own general officers and area commanders has increased contact between supervisory and management levels of the Army and academia. However, campus visits by region and area commanders occur only once or twice each year. There is limited, if any, contact between the Army and academia at different levels such as Departments of Education, and non-governmental Professional Education Associations and Councils. Such contact is vital to the development of a true partnership between ROTC and academia.

Mid-level management at region and area level has improved during successive reorganizations, but problems remain. Decentralized logistics and administrative functions are labor intensive and time consuming. They detract from the mid-level managers ability to concentrate on the operational mission, which includes recruiting, training, retaining and commissioning lieutenants. The magnitude of the management challenge is increased by the consolidation of mid-level managers in four regional headquarters which are separated by time, distance, and an archaic communications system from the over 1400 campuses which are affiliated with ROTC.
One of the weaknesses in the existing system is its failure to integrate the management of advertising, marketing, and recruiting with other Army organizations having similar missions and functions. These functions are currently divided between ROTC, USAEC, and the National Guard Bureau. Although these functions are discussed in detail in the recruiting and marketing chapters they are surfaced here from a structural perspective. The Study Group, Army Audit Agency and studies completed by advertising consultants Fryburger and Jugenheimer all indicate a need to change how and where these functions are managed and performed within the organizational structure.

Other systemic structural deficiencies not maximally supporting ROTC's ability to accomplish its mission are highlighted in Figure 5-6.

WHY REORGANIZE
SYSTEMIC STRUCTURAL DEFICIENCIES AND NEEDS WHICH IMPEDE ROTC OPTIMAL MISSION FORMATION:

DCS ROTC
- IS NOT A COMMAND
- IS STRUCTURALLY INHIBITED IN ITS SPAN OF COMMAND AND CONTROL
- LACKS CERTAIN GENERAL AND SPECIAL STAFF CAPABILITIES
- LACKS FULL AUTOMATION (ROTCMS INTERFACE) TO REDUCE DUPLICATION, LAYERING, AND ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN

REGIONS
- LACK FULL AUTOMATION (ROTCMS) TO IMPROVE EFFICIENCY
- LACK THE STRUCTURAL MEANS TO PROPERLY COORDINATE/INFLUENCE TOTAL ARMY-ROTC INTEGRATION
- LACK THE STRUCTURAL MEANS AND PLACEMENT OF THE MEANS TO INFLUENCE/COORDINATE WITH ACADEMIA AND INDUSTRY
- LACK THE STRUCTURE TO BEST INFLUENCE PRODUCTION, RECRUITING AND TRAINING MISSIONS

FIGURE 5-6

The preceding Figure points out that ROTC is not a command and lacks certain essential general and special staff capabilities. Region headquarters are not organized to devote their primary efforts toward the operational mission.

5-9
Figure 5-7 highlights the structural deficiencies at the area and Instructor Group level.

WHY REORGANIZE

AREA COMMANDERS
- INSUFFICIENT NUMBERS
- ON HAND AC’s ARE NOT LINKED, RESOURCED, STAFFED, GEOGRAPHICALLY LOCATED TO REST:
  - INFLUENCE PRODUCTION
  - INFLUENCE RECRUITING
  - INFLUENCE TRAINING
  - ENFORCE QUALITY CONTROL
  - DEVELOP MUTUAL ROTC-TOTAL ARMY SUPPORT
  - POSITIVELY INFLUENCE CRITICAL ACADEMIC SUPPORT

INSTRUCTOR GROUPS
- CANNOT EXPEND FULL ENERGY TO RECRUIT, TRAIN, RETAIN QUALITY CADETS
- EXPEND TOO MUCH TIME IN ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS
- LACK FULL AUTOMATION (ROTCMS)
- LACK A SUPPORTIVE/CLOSE FIRST LINE SUPERVISOR/LEADER SUPPORT SYSTEM: BE SET UP TO SUCCEED.

FIGURE 5-7

Area Commanders are not deployed in their areas to carry out the operational mission. Instructor groups are overburdened with administrative actions and are separated from their first line supervisors.

The STEADFAST reorganization stood the test of time for about ten years however, there is need for a new organizational structure. This has been induced by changing environmental factors such as the "Zero Draft" provision of the All Volunteer Army, increased reliance upon the Reserve Components, Force Modernization, technological advances, declining demographic trends and changes in attitudes and life styles. These changes have been and will continue to be compounded by increasing constraints on resources. All these factors impact on the way that ROTC does business and underscore the need to change its organizational structure.
ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURES

With the need for change established, the problem of what to change and how to change it remained. The study group developed what it considered to be an ideal structure, capable of the ROTC system's 1990s mission realities. It was determined that the ideal structural organization should provide for the successful accomplishment of the items shown in Figure 5-8.

STRUCTURE

SHOULD:
• SUPPORT MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT
• SUPPORT FUNCTIONS ACCOMPLISHMENT
• ADHERE TO ORGANIZATIONAL PRINCIPLES
• BE RESPONSIVE TO ENVIRONMENT
• SUCCESSFULLY COMPETE FOR SEVERELY CONSTRAINED RESOURCES
• FACILITATE ROTC-TOTAL ARMY COORDINATION
• OPTIMIZE ROTC AND ACADEMIA RELATIONSHIP
• EFFECTIVELY SUPPORT JROTC

FIGURE 5-8

The ideal structural organization, fashioned in an unrestricted environment, will support mission accomplishment. In the case of ROTC the structure must support the recruiting, training, retaining and commissioning of the required number of high quality lieutenants to meet Total Army needs in 1990 and beyond. The study group philosophy of reorganization is shown in Figure 5-9.
PHILOSOPHY

- Be unilateral.
- Be accompanied by automation.
- Improve the capability for ROTC mission accomplishment.
- Be time phased.
- Limit mission decrement.
- Be sensitive to austere Army resource realities.
- Save manpower assets for the Army.
- Address political sensitivities.

FIGURE 5-9

A list of the requirements that the study group felt needed to be optimized in any reorganization of ROTC is provided in Figures 5-10 and 5-11. The points in Figure 5-10 were presented to and then rank ordered by the members at the Third General Officer Steering Committee Meeting in August 1985.

GOSC RANK ORDERING CONSIDERATIONS

1. Optimize ROTC's ability to successfully compete for resources
2. Optimize retention, leadership/mentorship and training
3. Facilitate ROTC-total Army integration and coordination
4. Optimize marketing, advertising, recruiting
5. Align all precommissioning training for operations and policy
6. Improve HODA level accessibility
7. Improve access to Army analytical/research capability
8. Facilitate interservice coordination and cooperation.

FIGURE 5-10

5-12
This list concentrates on factors which are external to the ROTC organization such as where ROTC fits into the overall Army organization and what relationships should exist between ROTC and the rest of the Army, as well as other Department of the Defense agencies. Although the recommendations will address many of these considerations, no realistic reorganization recommendation can accommodate them all. In fact some of these requirements can be more easily met through means other than structural realignment, such as memoranda of understanding, exchange of liaison officers, electronic interface or regularly scheduled coordination meetings and conferences.

A list of requirements internal to ROTC and which the structural reorganization recommendations must address is shown in Figure 5-11.

REORGANIZATION
GOSC CONSENSUS

CONCEPT APPROVED IN TOTO

THE ROTC STRUCTURE SHOULD BE REORGANIZED TO INCLUDE ALL OF THE FOLLOWING:

- Establish as a command with full functional capabilities
- Consolidate admin and log function at HO RO TC
- Eliminate one region
- Focus region and area commanders on operational mission "power down"
- Deploy area commanders with staff

CONSENSUS OF 7.6 (10)

FIGURE 5-11

The study group presented this set of requirements to the Third General Officer Steering Committee Meeting and an overwhelming majority supported the accommodation of all of these considerations in the reorganization of the ROTC structure. The salient points are the establishment of a fully functional ROTC command, reduction of overlap and duplication and placement of mid-level managers in the position to most efficiently execute their operational mission.
Many different options were considered in order to find a course of action which would best restructure ROTC.

Figure 5-12 shows the options which the study group felt met the above guidelines.

![Structure Repositioning Diagram]

**FIGURE 5-12**

**Restructuring Options**

Eight options are shown in Figure 5-12; however, only five appeared to offer reasonable chance for success. These options were ROTC as a Field Operating Agency of JDCSPER, as a Major Subordinate Command of PERSCOM or TRADOC, functional realignment or internal reorganization. The internal reorganization was developed by the study group in conjunction with ODCSROTC and technically supported by the US Army Manpower Requirements and Documentation Agency (USAMARDA). This plan would make ROTC a stand-alone command. Each of the best options are discussed in more detail below.

a. **Field Operating Agency of JDCSPER** - An ROTC FOA has been discussed in various staff papers and studies over the last three years. Advantages and disadvantages are summarized in Figure 5-13.
During an IPR with the CSA in May 1985 the study group acknowledged favoring this option. It seemed to best support those requirements necessary to give ROTC the capability to make mission.

However, subsequent to the May IPR other alternatives surfaced. The initiation of the Army Personnel Command concept and the move to limit the growth of ODCSPER FOAs had a major impact on the viability of this option. Additionally, the establishment of ROTC as a stand-alone command or as an FOA of ODCSPER would require significant increases in manpower. Since ODCSROTC is not an independent command and lacks capabilities to support itself, the ODCSPER community would have had to expand in order to accommodate and support an ROTC Command. Numerous support agreements with other Army agencies would also be necessary to provide for functions not included in the ROTC command nor available from ODCSPER. Although recruiting, advertising, marketing and other personnel community functions and ties would have been enhanced, this course would have sub-optimized the training and education functions now so successfully supported by the TRADOC community. This option also generated significant organizational sensitivities and even after successfully overcoming these and other disadvantages, concerns remained as to its marketability and support within the Army leadership.
b. MAJOR SUBORDINATE COMMAND OF PERSCOM - ROTC as a PERSCOM Major Subordinate Command (MSC) became an alternative during July 1985. The potential advantages and disadvantages of this course are shown in Figure 5-14.

MSC OF PERSCOM

ADVANTAGES

\* FACILITATES THE INTEGRATION AND COORDINATION OF MAJOR MARKETING, ADVERTISING, RECRUITING, ACCESSIONING AND PRECOMMISSIONING SOURCES UNDER ONE COMMAND.

\* ROTC MARKET BASE BROADENED

\* ROTC CADRE NOW CAPABLE OF REDIRECTING/REFOCUSING EFFORT WITH RELIEF OF OFF-CAMPUS RECRUITING MISSION.

\* FACILITATES ROTC-TOTAL ARMY COORDINATION AND SUPPORT.

DISADVANTAGES

\* TRANSITION TURBULENCE

\* POTENTIAL TRANSFER/LOSS OF SCARCE ROTC MANPOWER

\* SUB-OPTIMIZES THE EDUCATION AND TRAINING FUNCTIONS

\* POLITICAL SENSITIVITIES

FIGURE 5-14

ROTC Study Group members participated in several PERSCOM planning sessions which led to the development of the concept of an Army Personnel Command. Since the items necessary to make the ROTC system viable in the outyears were encompassed by PERSCOM it appeared that the inclusion of ROTC as an MSC of PERSCOM would have been ideal, because ROTC would then become affiliated with organizations performing like functions. The study group had reservations about separating the functions of training and recruiting. Since PERSCOM was to be a monolithic organization confined to personnel community interests, the study group could not envision how the training functions of ROTC would be accommodated under this option.

There was only moderate interest on the part of PERSCOM organizers in accommodating the whole of ROTC within PERSCOM. The reasons given were sub-
optimization of the education and training functions and organizational sensitivities which might threaten the overall PERSCOM concept. There was concern by the study group and TRADOC/ODCSROTC that the manpower savings required for development of PERSCOM might place an even greater burden on ROTC's already constrained manpower resources. It must be remembered that the most critical resource to ROTC is manpower since it is a recruiting, training and education oriented organization. Another unanswered question was what would happen if the PERSCOM concept were not approved. Thus a potentially viable concept for dealing with some of ROTC's significant weaknesses appeared neither to be feasible from a resource standpoint nor marketable to the TRADOC and PERSCOM communities.

c. FUNCTIONAL REALIGNMENT - One of the simplest options for consideration is functional realignment. Under this concept a particular function is isolated and accommodated in the most supportive organizational environment available. The advantages and disadvantages of this course are shown in Figure 5-15.

FUNCTIONAL REALIGNMENT

ADVANTAGES
• Isolates only problem functions for change

DISADVANTAGES
• Does not resolve myriad of structural problems
• Political sensitivities

FIGURE 5-15
Functional areas within ROTC requiring help would be relocated to another organization already performing and resourced for the particular function. For example, instead of relocating the entire ROTC organization into PERSCOM as an MSC the responsibility for certain functions such as advertising, marketing and recruiting would be realigned to the PERSCOM organization. This option alone would not resolve the significant internal organizational deficiencies of the present ROTC structure.

Functional realignment does overcome some of the organizational sensitivities associated with a complete relocation of ROTC; however, other concerns were raised. Chief among these was the wisdom of separating responsibilities between two commands. The study group position was that this objection could be overcome with a proper division of labor and clear definition of responsibilities. This option was a key part of the final recommendations and will be discussed later in more detail.

d. MAJOR SUBORDINATE COMMAND OF TRADOC - This concept was presented in the form of a feasibility study which was briefed to the study group and subsequently submitted to the CSA for approval. A summary of this plan is found in Figures 5-16, 5-17, and 5-18.

**STRUCTURE**

**ESTABLISHMENT OF ROTC AS A MAJOR SUBORDINATE COMMAND OF TRADOC:**

**GOAL**

- To develop the most effective and efficient organization and command/control structure for recruiting, training and commissioning.

**OBJECTIVES**

- To establish ROTC as a strong, independent organization fully capable of performing its mission.
- To improve the training and recruiting of ROTC cadets by pushing decision making to the lowest practical echelon in the command resulting in a reduction of administrative and routine workload at those levels and a concentration of effort in mission operations and by consolidating/centralizing administration, logistics and other routine support functions to achieve economies of scale without stifling decision making and operations at the lower echelons.

**FIGURE 5-16**

5-18
STRUCTURE

ADVANTAGES

• Saves manpower 39 authorizations
  to include 1 go space
• Provides resources to Ft Benjamin
  Harrison for cadre training
• There is potential for additional
  manpower savings at a later date
• "Change of scenery" for ROTC will
  be therapeutic

DISADVANTAGES

• Does not optimize marketing,
  advertising, recruiting
• Does not resolve gross mid-level
  management supervision deficiencies

MAJOR COMPONENTS OF TRADOC MSC PROPOSAL

• Creates a command structure (MSC)
• Re-locates ROTC to Ft Knox
• Abolishes 2nd ROTC region QGs,
  Ft Knox
• Consolidates administrative,
  personnel and logistics
  functions from region QGs
  to QG, ROTC
• Standardizes and reduces region
  QGs (manpower)
• Deploys 6 of 19 proposed area
  commanders.

FIGURE 5-17

IMPACT

• Environmental - insignificant
• Economic
  • No significant change to
    personal income
  • Employment
  • Business volume
• No significant impact on
  surrounding communities
• Any economic changes can be
  readily absorbed by local
  economies concerned

• Resources
  • Manpower
  • Off - 33
  • Enl - 9
  • Civ - 5
  • Total - 49

• Funding
  • OMA 1.26 million

• Construction
  • No new construction
  • Renovation: 567 - 9

FIGURE 5-18
The TRADOC MSC plan includes many necessary changes to improve the internal structure of ROTC. It can accomplish these changes and provide a 7.5 percent savings in manpower authorizations over the current system. It appears to provide the potential for long term manpower savings after implementation of the concept. The advantages and disadvantages of the MSC are shown in Figure 5-19.

**MSC TRADOC**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ADVANTAGES</th>
<th>DISADVANTAGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Streamlines ROTC organization for efficiency of operation.</td>
<td>1. Exceeds manpower utilization thresholds prescribed by the 5-19 at headquarters, including area level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Expands roles, such as region commanders, to include personnel and training.</td>
<td>2. Creates personnel, equipment, and facilities duplication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Better facilitates region and area commanders to act as Regional Operations and Training.</td>
<td>3. Impacts personnel functions of functional support at front installations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Streamlines the organization with a 7.5 percent manpower saving and includes elimination of one general officer position.</td>
<td>4. Increases manpower requirements at forts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Centralizes administrative, personnel, and logistics functions at headquarters.</td>
<td>5. Affects additional planning and time to replicate personnel and equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Maintains economy of scale in special staff and shops at colocating MSC at a major front installation familiar with ROTC responsibilities and workings.</td>
<td>6. Maintains similar mission responsibilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. NO CREATE POTENTIAL FOR ADDITIONAL, LONG-TERM MANPOWER SAVINGS.</td>
<td>7. ee M LIMI E D E M PLO Y M E N T OF AREA COMMANDERS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. PRESERVES CURRENT ROTC CAMP SYSTEM BY MAINTAINING A ROTC HEADQUARTERS AT EACH CAMP.</td>
<td>8. DOES NOT OBTAIN MARKETING, ADVERTISING, AND RECRUITING.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE 5-19**

Analysis of this proposal by the study group raised several major reservations. The TRADOC proposal addressed the critical areas of advertising, marketing and recruiting, through some internal shifting of functions from one level to another and through consolidation of these functions at Headquarters ROTC. The proposal however, does not integrate these functions with other Army organizations already performing similar functions, such as USAREC.

The other concern with this proposal is the limited deployment and staffing of the Area Commanders. The study group believed that the limited deployment of Area Commanders did not adequately address the problem of mid-level management.
The overall TRADOC MSC concept draws support from TRADOC, ODCSROTC and most of the Region Commanders. Since the concept includes a headquarters relocation as well as personnel realignments, political sensitivities have and will continue to be surfaced. For further details of the TRADOC MSC Option see Annex 1 to this chapter.

e. **ROTC STUDY GROUP PROPOSAL** - The final option is one developed by the study group in conjunction with ODCSROTC and USAMARDA. This proposal is summarized in Figure 5-20.

**ROTC STUDY GROUP PROPOSAL**

**RECOMMENDATIONS:**
- THAT THE ROTC STRUCTURE BE REORGANIZED
- MAKE IT A COMMAND
- PROVIDE FULL FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITIES AT HQ ROTC COMMAND
- CONSOLIDATE ADMIN AND LOG FUNCTIONS AT HQ ROTC COMMAND
- ELIMINATE ONE REGION HEADQUARTERS
- FOCUS REGION AND AREA COMMANDERS TO OPERATIONAL MISSION
- "POWER DOWN"
- DEPLOY AREA COMMANDERS WITH STAFF

**FIGURE 5-20**

The study group recognized the need for ODCSROTC to be a stand-alone command and consequently developed its own option. The proposal provides full general and special staff capabilities for Headquarters ROTC. The multitude of administrative and logistical functions currently decentralized to regions and below are centralized at Headquarters ROTC. The four regions are realigned and reduced to three. Due to a realignment of functions each of the three remaining region headquarters is reduced in strength. The
elimination of one and the slimming down of the remaining three region headquarters provides most of the necessary manpower to accomplish other changes. Shown at Figure 5-21 is the proposed ROTC command organization. A detailed description can be found in Annex 2 to this chapter.

ADVANTAGES OF THE ROTC STUDY GROUP PROPOSAL:

a. Provides ROTC command the capability to be fully operational and accountable.

b. Provides flexibility to cope with the changing environment.

c. Centralizes certain functions allowing regions, areas, and instructor groups to maintain a "forward leaning" operational mission production orientation.

d. Provides a structure that supports increased efficiencies of required functions and reduces duplication.

e. Provides a manageable span of control.

f. Improves first line management supervision.
g. Provides increased opportunities for Total Army-ROTC integration and cooperation.

h. Increases command presence on campus, with industry and community sectors.

**DISADVANTAGES OF THE STUDY GROUP REORGANIZATION PROPOSAL:**

a. Requires more manpower than presently authorized for ROTC.

b. Generates political and organizational sensitivities.

c. Imposes civilian personnel transfer of functions at four installations.

d. Requires facilities to staff and deploy Area Commanders and may require additional facilities for expanded ROTC headquarters.

e. Requires additional one-time funding to relocate personnel and equipment.

f. May cause temporary mission decrement.

g. Creates additional automation requirements for deployed Area Commanders.

This proposal provides maximum flexibility in determining which regions to eliminate. It also gives planners the latitude to relocate HQROTC or to maintain it in the Ft. Monroe area. This plan provides an ideal structural organization; however, attempts to develop it further from a resource feasibility standpoint were discontinued with the introduction of the TRADOC MSC concept.

The TRADOC and ROTC Study Group options are very similar. After careful analysis the study group decided to support the majority of the TRADOC MSC proposal rather than continue to research and document its original proposal. The study group recommendations on structure which were presented for CSA decision on 8 November 1985 are shown in Figure 5-22.
STRUCTURE RECOMMENDATION

PROBLEM:
ROTC IS NOT ORGANIZED TO PROVIDE THE MOST EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE STRUCTURE TO SUPPORT THE REQUIREMENT TO COMMISSION 10,800 LIEUTENANTS FOR TOTAL ARMY IN 1990's AND BEYOND

BACKGROUND:
• ROTC NOT A COMMAND
• LACKS FULL FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY
• EXCESSIVE DUPLICATION OF FUNCTIONS
• LABOR INTENSIVE
• DOES NOT OPTIMIZE MARKETING, ADVERTISING AND RECRUITING
• INADEQUATE MID-LEVEL SUPERVISION
• VIOLATES SOME ORGANIZATIONAL PRINCIPLES

OPTIONS:
• FOA OF DCSPER
• MSC OF PERSCOM
• FUNCTIONAL REALIGNMENT
• MSC OF TRADOC

RECOMMENDATIONS:
THAT CSA APPROVE:
TRADOC PROPOSAL FOR ROTC MSC LESS THE FOLLOWING:
MARKETING, ADVERTISING, OFF CAMPUS RECRUITING AND THE LIMITED DEPLOYMENT OF AREA COMMANDERS.
• A FUNCTIONAL RE-ALIGNMENT OF MARKETING AND ADVERTISING TO PERSCOM/DCSPER
• A FUNCTIONAL RE-ALIGNMENT OF OFF CAMPUS RECRUITING TO PERSCOM/USAREC
• DEPLOYMENT OF ALL AREA COMMANDERS INTO THEIR AO's

FIGURE 5-22

RATIONALE FOR STUDY GROUP EXCEPTIONS TO TRADOC PROPOSAL.

The ROTC Study Group supported the TRADOC proposal with three significant exceptions. These are the functional realignment of marketing, advertising and off-campus recruiting. Additionally, the study group supported full deployment of area commanders.

Advantages of the study group recommendations are:

a. Establishes ROTC on a MSC. Eliminates one region and provides in-house resources for redistribution.

b. Facilitates the integration and coordination of major marketing advertising and off campus recruiting efforts.

c. Expands the ROTC market base.

d. Improves first-line management and supervision by fully deploying area commanders with staff.

5-24
e. Centralizes administration, personnel, and logistics at Headquarters ROTC.
f. Focuses region and area commanders towards operational mission.
g. Achieves economy of scale and saves seven percent in manpower authorizations.
h. Creates potential for additional long term manpower savings.
i. Increases command presence on campus, with industry and in community sectors.
j. Facilitates ROTC-Total Army coordination and support.
k. Preserves current ROTC camp system by maintaining an ROTC Headquarters for each camp.

Disadvantages of the study group recommendation are:
a. Creates personnel, equipment and facilities turbulence.
b. Exceeds manpower dislocation threshold established by AR 5-10.
c. Increases BASOPS requirement at Ft Knox. May be offset by reduction at ODCSROTC and other Region Headquarters.
d. Creates potential for temporary mission decrement.
e. Requires slightly more manpower than TRADOC MSC proposal- additional personnel to support deployed Area Commanders.
f. Generates political sensitivity.

The internal reorganization of ROTC with a manpower authorization savings is accomplished even with the full deployment of Area Commanders with minimal staff. The command is established and fully functional organically or through support arrangements with TRADOC staff or post activities. It focuses region and area commanders attention on their operational mission. This new structure will better accommodate the shift towards the Reserve Forces portion of the Total Army lieutenant commissioning mission by facilitating coordination and mutual support between all components. By freeing region and area commanders from administrative responsibilities the new organization will increase the opportunities for commanders to supervise Instructor Group PMSs and cadre. The increased presence of general officers and colonels on college campuses will increase the Army's visibility with academia, thereby eliminating this long standing concern.
DEPLOYMENT OF AREA COMMANDERS

During the 6 May 1985 IPR the CSA indicated that commanders belong "up close to the action, in the foxholes, in order to lead and influence." Interviews with three of the four Region Chiefs-of-Staff indicated that they support full deployment of Area Commanders as long as they received some staff support and were eventually tied into the ROTC automation system. The majority of the area commanders indicated that in the present configuration they cannot visit their assigned instructor groups more than once each year. Cadre survey comments confirm these points. Given almost no staffing, a myriad of administrative and logistical functions, and the vast distances involved, it is no wonder that the current organization has significant problems. The map at Figure 5-23 shows some of the travel challenge. Winter weather and remote locations lacking easy access by air add to this challenge.

DISTANCES BETWEEN REGION HQ AND INSTRUCTOR GROUPS

![Map showing distances between Region HQ and instructor groups](image)

FIGURE-23

5-26
The study group developed a notional deployment plan for Area Commanders using the proposed region boundaries in the TRADOC MSC plan. The deployment criteria requires the Area Commander to be involved in expanded roles as the first line supervisor, coordinator with the Total Army, community influencer, and local Army representative. Selected locations consider the density of SROTC and JROTC units in the area, the availability of ground and air transportation, access to an active or reserve component facilities, and availability of previously leased DA or DOD facilities. A deliberate attempt was made to collocate the Area Commander with different segments of the Total Army community where possible. Three Area Commanders who are adjacent to region headquarters would remain at region headquarters. Area Commanders could be located at Ft. Sheridan-USAREC and Fourth Army Headquarters; St. Louis-ARPERCEN; Tallahassee-near Headquarters Navy ROTC Pensacola and Headquarters Air Force ROTC at Maxwell AFB; Ft. Meade-First Army Headquarters; and San Francisco-near USAREC Battalions, major reserve component headquarters and centers of civilian influence. The following series of maps at Figures 5-24, 5-25 and 5-26 graphically portray the notional deployment plan. Onetime cost would be minimal if personnel are phased in through normal assignment rotations and by use of existing facilities.
The difference in the number of deployed Area Commanders—19 by the TRADOC MSC proposal and 21 by the study group proposal—and size of staff is not significant. The important point is that all area commanders with a minimum staff should be located in their assigned area of responsibility. Once the reorganization takes place and sufficient adjustment time elapses (about one year), appropriate manpower staffing standards can be developed and implemented.

MARKETING, ADVERTISING AND RECRUITING

The other major difference between the TRADOC MSC proposal and the study group recommendation is the realignment of the functional areas of marketing, advertising, and off-campus recruiting. One of ROTC's most significant challenges is to attract and recruit sufficient numbers of quality cadets in a declining market with constrained resources.

Several studies and evaluations were made of ROTC's advertising, marketing and recruiting functions. A summary of comments and recommendations are shown in Figures 5-27 and 5-28. These studies strongly support the economies of scale and reduction of duplication that consolidation offers.

JUGENHEIMER STUDY

NO PERSON SHOULD HAVE TO WORK FOR TWO BOSSES OR TO SERVE TWO MASTERS, YET THAT IS THE SITUATION HERE. DCSPER SETS THE GOALS AND TRADOC PROVIDES THE TOOLS. TRADOC DOES NOT SEEM TO REALIZE THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM AND THE COMPLEXITY OF THE TASK, BECAUSE IT IS NOT TRULY A TRAINING TASK. ROTC ITSELF MAY INDEED BE PRIMARILY A TRAINING MISSION, PREPARING FUTURE OFFICERS FOR LEADERSHIP RESPONSIBILITY. BUT THE TASK OF FINDING AND SIGNING THESE YOUNG PEOPLE IS NOT A TRAINING MISSION. IT IS A RECRUITING MISSION.

FIGURE 5-27

5-29
The study group's recommendations on recruiting are slightly different than those cited in the previous figures. Since Instructor Group cadre are already in place on the campus there would be no advantage to have another recruiting force, USAREC, actively engaged on the same campus pursuing an identical mission. However, it is entirely feasible to have USAREC accomplish the off-campus mission in selected high schools and colleges without any Army ROTC affiliation. This approach would consolidate functions and task USAREC—already resourced, trained and on the ground—to assume this facet of the recruiting mission.

There are some in the Army community who say NGOs cannot recruit officers. The study group found that the Navy Recruiting Command uses Senior Petty Officers effectively for their NROTC recruiting mission. Survey comments and field interviews indicate that many ROTC NCO cadre are already very actively involved in recruiting cadets. USAREC and TRADOC have initiated a test of the Off Campus recruiting concept using NCOs. The results of this test will ultimately determine the feasibility of this recommendation.

In summary the restructuring recommendation involves:

a. Functionally realigning marketing and advertising to ODCSPER and USAREC.

b. Functionally realigning off-campus recruiting to USAREC.

c. Deployment of all area commanders.
IMPLEMENTATION:

The Implementation Team must closely monitor the proposed recommendation as it moves through the DA staffing process towards a decision brief to the CSA. The Implementation Team must also be prepared to comment on the staffed proposal and support study group recommendations as required. Implementation team should attend and be prepared to input and defend recommendations at all major briefings.

Since the CSA approved the MSC proposal concept plan, the remaining actions required by AR 310-49 must be completed. Actions to relocate personnel, a Congressional and public notification process must occur in accordance with AR 5-10.

The milestones in the TRADOC MSC concept plan at Annex 1 should be updated based on HQDA staff and CSA action and then may be used as a guideline to establish future critical dates and actions. If 1 October 1986 continues as a valid operational date, then the next significant date will be the manpower survey for 1st or 2nd quarter FY 88 to establish valid manpower staffing standards for the new ROTC system.
This Annex provides a graphic depiction of the TRADOC proposed Major Subordinate Command. This MSC would provide for the accomplishment of all required functions either through organic assets or TRADOC provided support. This proposal was developed by TRADOC Studies Branch in coordination with ODCSROTC and TRAMEA. Depicted below is an overview of the present ROTC System and the starting point for the development of the TRADOC MSC proposal.
Depicted here are the salient features of the proposed reorganized ROTC Command:

a. Eliminates 2nd ROTC Region
b. Establishes HQ ROTC Command at Ft Knox
c. Combines 2nd & 3rd Regions with Headquarters at Ft Riley
d. Standardizes and reduces region Headquarters
e. Consolidates personnel/admin at Headquarters ROTC
f. Deploys Area Commanders on a limited basis

PROPOSED ORGANIZATION

FIGURE 5-1-2
The next series of slides portrays the reorganized ROTC Command and its regions.

**REORGANIZED ROTC**

HQ ROTC (FT BRAUN)  (PROPOSED ORGANIZATION)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command Sergeant Major</th>
<th>Lt.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Off.</strong> 1</td>
<td><strong>Civil</strong> 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Audit/SGO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Off.</strong> 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong> 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Off.</strong> 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong> 9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AE</th>
<th>AUDIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Off.</strong> 1</td>
<td><strong>Civil</strong> 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong> 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FELA/AUDIT DIV</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong> 2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sargent Major</th>
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<tbody>
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<td><strong>Total</strong> 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RES/REC DIV</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong> 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRAINING DIV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Off.</strong> 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong> 36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Off.</strong> 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong> 37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes 1 aide, 1 sgo, 1 admin specialist, and 7 secretaries.
** Includes +5 (2 off, 3 civ) as staff for the basic camp cell.

**FIGURE 5-1-3**

1ST ROTC REGION (FT BRAUN)  (PROPOSED ORGANIZATION)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commander</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Off.</strong> 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA COMMANDERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Off.</strong> 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong> 12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAMP COORD DIV</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Off.</strong> 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong> 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SR ROTC BR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Off.</strong> 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong> 12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JR ROTC BR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Off.</strong> 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong> 13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Total of seven area commanders. Two area commanders are deployed at forts dix and devens with staff of (+1 off, +1 civ).

**FIGURE 5-1-4**
* Total of Eight Area Commanders. Four Area Commanders are deployed - one at Oklahoma City and three at location to be determined with staff up (+1 UFF, +1 CIV).

FIGURE 5-1-5

4TH ROTC REGION (FT LEWIS) (PROPOSED ORGANIZATION)
Listed below are the TRADOC identified advantages and disadvantages of this proposal:

**PROPOSED ROTC HEADQUARTERS' ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES**

**ADVANTAGES:**

a. Streamlines ROTC organization for efficiency of operation.
b. Establishes ROTC as MSC, eliminates a Region Headquarters and provides in-house resources for redistribution.
c. Facilitates Region and Area Commanders opportunity to evaluate operations and training.
d. Accomplishes the reorganization with a 7.5 percent manpower authorization savings to include elimination of one General Officer position.
e. Centralizes administrative and logistics workload at ROTC Headquarters.
f. Achieves economy of scale in special staff and BASOPS by collocating MSC at a major TRADOC installation familiar with ROTC responsibilities and workload.
g. Creates potential for additional long-term manpower savings.
h. Provides central location for command and control to include on-site visits to ROTC activities.
i. Preserves ROTC camp system by collocating a ROTC headquarters with each camp.

**DISADVANTAGES:**

a. Exceeds manpower dislocation thresholds prescribed by AR 5-10 at Fort Monroe requiring HQDA waiver.
b. Creates personnel, equipment, and facilities turbulence.
c. Imposes civilian personnel transfer of function (TOF) action at four installations.
d. Increases BASOPS requirements at Fort Knox (manpower, funds, facilities, etc.) Offset by reductions at Forts Bragg, Lewis, Monroe, and Riley.
e. Requires additional one-time funding to relocate personnel and equipment.
f. Disrupts continuity of operations on a temporary basis.
Figure 5-1-7 reflects proposed manpower authorizations for the reorganized ROTC Command. Particularly significant is the fact that the proposed organization provides an overall manpower authorization saving of 39 spaces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROPOSED</th>
<th>HQ ROTC (FT KNOX)</th>
<th>33</th>
<th>19</th>
<th>223</th>
<th>275</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REGION #1 (FT BRAGG)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGION #3 (FT RILEY)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGION #4 (FT LEWIS)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ TRADOC STAFF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5(*)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BASOPS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FT BEN HARRISON PMS SCHOOL</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| TOTAL FY 86 (PROPOSED REORGANIZATION) | 135 | 44  | 301 | 480 |
| DELTA = TOTAL SAVINGS | -33 | -9  | =3  | -39 |

* INCREASE TRADOC STAFF FOR HQ ROTC WORKLOAD.

NOTE: REDISTRIBUTION OF MANPOWER FIGURES CITED ARE BEST ESTIMATES WHICH MUST BE VALIDATED BASED ON WORKLOAD.

FIGURE 5-1-7

To accommodate the increased workload at the ROTC HQ and the accompanying decreased workload at the regions the BASOPs changes depicted in Figure 5-1-8 are required.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BASOPS REALIGNMENT HQ ROTC</th>
<th>INSTALLATION</th>
<th>MILITARY MAN YEARS</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>MER</th>
<th>= REQUIREMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PRESENT</td>
<td>PROPOSED</td>
<td>DELTA</td>
<td>MER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FT BRAGG</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>-26</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>.054 = -1.404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FT LEWIS</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>-11</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>.054 = -594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FT MONROE</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-17</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>.154 = -2.618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FT RILEY</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>.054 = -108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL BASOPS TRANSFERRED TO FT KNOX</td>
<td>-4.724 = -5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FT KNOX</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>+6</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>.087 = 522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADDITIVE - MILPO (MILITARY RECORDS)</td>
<td>4.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADDITIVE - CONTRACTING</td>
<td>5.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL BASOPS INCREASE AT FT KNOX</td>
<td>9.522 = 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LESS BASOPS TRANSFERRED</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL BASOPS IN-HOUSE TRADE-OFF</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE 5-1-8

5-1-6
The bottom-line resource cost for reorganization of ROTC into a TRADOC MSC is outlined in Figure 5-1-9.

**RESOURCE SUMMARY**

* **PERSONNEL CHANGES**
  - **OFF**
  - **ENL**
  - **CIV**
  - **TOTAL**
  - -33
  - -9
  - +3
  - -39

* **FUNDING (OMA) ($000)**
  - **ONE-TIME**
    - $1,160
  - **RECURRING (SAVINGS)**
    - $-440

* **CONSTRUCTION:**
  - **NEW CONSTRUCTION:** NONE.
  - **RENOVATION OF CURRENT FACILITIES:** $500-900K
  - **REORGANIZATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE SPACE AT FORT KNOX WILL ACCOMMODATE HEADQUARTERS ROTC ON A TEMPORARY BASIS.**

**FIGURE 5-1-9**

**TENTATIVE MILESTONES**

- **October 85** - Decision - CSA approves ROTC MSC concept and waiver of AR 5-10 criteria.
- **D+1** - Public announcement - OCPA
  - Provisional reorganization approved - CG, TRADOC
  - Hiring Freeze at ODCSROTC, 1st, 3d, and 4th ROTC Regions - CPO,
  - DCSPAL Servicing CPOs
- **D+30** - Complete Detailed Implementation Plan - ODCSROTC, ODCST, ODCSPAL,
  - ODCSRM
- **D+31** - Begin Implementation
  - Identification of internal and external manpower trade-offs - ODCSROTC, ODCSRM
  - Preparation of TDA documentation - ODCSROTC, ODCSRM
  - Notification of civilian personnel: transfer of function - Servicing CPOs

5-1-7
Divert inbound officers from ODCSROTC, 1st, 3d, and 4th ROTC Regions to HQ, USAROTC Command as necessary - DCSPAL, MILPERCPN

Develop civilian position descriptions - ODCSROTC

Jan - Mar 86 - Initial TDA documentation of USAROTC Command (TDA 0287 and 0188) ODCSROTC, ODCSRM

April 86 - Activate USA ROTC Command (Prov)

April - September 86 - Phased functional transfers from HQ TRADOC and Region headquarters to HQ USAROTC Command:

I. Commander, Command Group, Advance Party - April 86
II. Personnel and Admin - April 86
III. Cadet Management - May 86
IV. Advertising and Media/PAO - June 86
V. Training - July 86
VI. PA&E - July 86
VII. Resource Management - September 86

(Note: Transfer of civilian staff to be continuous with phased transfers)

1 October 86 - USAROTC Command (Prov) operational. (Note: If 0287 TDA is approved by HQDA, organization will not be provisional)

1st/2d Quarter FY 88 - Manpower Survey, or APORS/MS3 effort to scrub manpower and establish staffing standards.

It should be noted that the tentative TRADOC Milestones were delayed due to the 8 November 1985 ROTC Study Group briefing to the CSA. During the briefing the CSA asked that TRADOC forward a concept plan for staffing. The plan with ARSTAF recommendations, to include ROTC Study Group input, was to be briefed to the CSA for a decision in mid-February 1986.

In order to compensate for the delay TRADOC was instructed by ODCSOPS to prepare a complete implementation plan in accordance with AR 310-49. The plan was forwarded with supporting documentation to arrive at HQDA NLT 6 January 1986, where it is pending decision by the CSA.

Prior to the CSA decision brief a pre-briefing was conducted for Mr. Spurlock the ASA (M&RA). During the briefing, he mentioned to the DCSOPS, LTG Vuono that he had major reservations about the TRADOC MSC proposal. Subsequently, it was determined that the TRADOC proposal, as written, was not viable and would not be briefed to the CSA. However, it was determined that a modified MSC concept could be implemented. TRADOC
would be authorized to form the ROTC MSC at Fort Monroe, but could not
consolidate functions by reducing personnel at regions. TRADOC was also
informed that after operating ROTC as an MSC for a time it should resubmit
its request to implement other aspects of the initial TRADOC MSC proposal if
it would further enhance the performance of the ROTC organization.
This Annex provides a graphic portrayal, with supporting comments, of the ROTC Study Group Proposal to reorganize ODCSROTC into a command with full functional capability. This new organization will be able to better support the accomplishment of the mission to produce 10,800 lieutenants for the Total Army in the 1990s and beyond.

This option was developed in close coordination with ODCSROTC Resource Management Directorate and with technical assistance from USAMARDA.

Figure 5-2-1 depicts the proposed ROTC Command. It consists of a headquarters, three Regions and 21 Area Commanders and an equal division of the 825 JROTC and 314 host Instructor Groups among the Area Commanders. The division of the JROTC and SROTC units is notional, actual numbers of units will be determined by the designation of area boundaries.
Figure 5-2-2 depicts the organization of HQ's ROTC, its general and special staffs. Personnel are assigned based on the functions to be performed. Personnel numbers were determined by using approved staffing standards wherever they existed. Since this is a new organization with consolidated functions some personnel authorizations are best estimates.

HEADQUARTERS ROTC REORGANIZED

REORGANIZED ROTC HEADQUARTERS
NOTIONAL CONCEPT

FIGURE 5-2-2
Figure 5-2-3 lists proposed functions to be accomplished at the newly established Headquarters ROTC.

HEADQUARTERS FUNCTIONS

0 COMMANDS ROTC.
0 ESTABLISHES ROTC POLICY IN ACCORDANCE WITH DA DIRECTIVES.
0 PLANS, PROGRAMS AND BUDGETS (ADVERTISING).
0 EXECUTES PORTIONS OF THE BUDGET, MANAGES RESOURCES EFFECTIVELY.
0 DIRECTS MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.
0 MANAGES PRODUCTION AND PROVIDES ARMY LEADERSHIP WITH TIMELY ACCURATE INFORMATION.
0 MANAGES SPECIAL TRAINING, SCHOLARSHIPS, WAIVERS, ACQUISITION INCENTIVE PROGRAMS, AND ACCESSIONING AND COMMISSIONING PACKETS.
0 MANAGES/OVERSEES JROTC AND EFFECTIVELY INTEGRATES IT INTO SROTC PRODUCTION AS APPROPRIATE.
0 ESTABLISHES AND MAINTAINS CLOSE AND CONTINUOUS LIAISON AND COORDINATION WITH ACADEMIA (HIGH SCHOOLS, COLLEGES, PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION).
0 CONDUCTS MARKET ANALYSIS.
0 MANAGE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS.
0 LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT.
0 CADET AND CADRE MANAGEMENT.
0 OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS - SCHOOLS CONTRACTS/AGREEMENTS.
0 UCMJ AUTHORITY.

FIGURE 5-2-3
Figures 5-2-4 through 5-2-11 provide a further breakout of each directorate into divisions as well as a recapitulation of personnel requirements for the ROTC Headquarters.

HQ ROTC Command

COMMAND GROUP
NOTIONAL CONCEPT

FIGURE 5-2-4
FIGURE 5-2-5

PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION & LOGISTICS DIRECTORATE
NOTIONAL CONCEPT

FIGURE 5-2-6
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT DIRECTORATE
NOTIONAL CONCEPT

TRAFFIC DIRECTORATE
NOTIONAL CONCEPT

FIGURE 5-2-7

FIGURE 5-2-8

5-2-6
OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE
NOTIONAL CONCEPT

OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE
01 01

OPERATIONS DIVISION
07 06

ADVERTISING MARKETING DIVISION
01 06 20

DIRECTOR
1 1 2
OPERATIONS DIV
7* 6 13
ADV. MARKETING
1 20 21
TOTAL 9 27 36

* INCLUDES 2 NURSES

FIGURE 5-2-9

JROTC DIRECTORATE
NOTIONAL CONCEPT

JROTC DIRECTORATE
(UNSTRUCTURED)
03 09

JROTC
3 .9 12
TOTAL 3 9 12

FIGURE 5-2-10

5-2-7
The reorganized Region Headquarters with a listing of major functions and staffing requirements is shown at Figure 5-2-12.

- COMMAND REGION (LESS ADMIN & LOG).
- DIRECTS AND MONITORS MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.
- COMMANDS BASIC/ADVANCED CAMP.
- EXECUTES POLICY.
- EXECUTES PORTIONS OF THE BUDGET.
- ARTICLE 15 AUTHORITY.
- EFFICIENTLY MANAGES PRODUCTION.
- PROVIDES JROTC WITH TIMELY AND ACCURATE MANAGEMENT INFORMATION.
- ESTABLISHES AND MAINTAINS CLOSE AND CONTINUOUS LIAISON AND COORDINATION WITH ACADEMIA (HIGH SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES) AND MAJOR NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE COMMANDS WITHIN THE REGION.
- RESPONSIBLE FOR REGION MAIL AND DISTRIBUTION.
- RATES SUBORDINATES.
- MANAGES REGIONAL PHYSICAL SECURITY PROGRAM.
- MANAGES LIMITED ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS - CONGRESSIONALS ETC. RECOMMENDATIONS.
- PROCESSES SCHOOL CONTRACTS (JROTC AND JRTC).
- RESPONSIBLE FOR QUALITY CONTROL.
- RESPONSIBLE TO PLAN, COORDINATE AND EXECUTE SUMMER CAMP.
- AUTOMATION MANAGEMENT.
- IG INVESTIGATIONS AND INQUIRIES.

FIGURE 5-2-12

5-2-8
Figure 5-2-13 depicts the staffing and functions of a deployed Area Commander. Actual staffing numbers will depend on the numbers of SROTC and JROTC units assigned to each Area Commander.

REORGANIZED ROTC AREA
NOTIONAL CONCEPT

- **Area Commander**
  - Executes policy.
  - Responsible for overall mission of assigned units.
  - Exercises quality control in enrollment, contracting, and accessioning.
  - Responsible for Cadet and Cadre training.
  - Reviews certain admin actions.
  - Monitors sufficiency of admin log support.
  - Rates subordinates.
  - Establishes and maintains close and continuous liaison and coordination with Academia (High Schools and Colleges) and National Guard and Reserve units in the area.
  - Participates in Basic/Advanced Camp.
  - Participates in Regional Biannual Inspections.
  - Monitors Instructor Group Officer Nominations.

**Figure 5-2-13**
Figure 5-2-14 provides a summary of manpower authorizations presently available within ODCSROTC and Region Headquarters.

**TOTAL REGION AND DCSROTC MANPOWER BY DIVISIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Enlisted</th>
<th>Civilian</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADMIN</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPERATIONS</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAINING</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDMT</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* FY '86 AUTHORIZATIONS

Source: OCSROTC

**FIGURE 5-2-14**

A comparison of manpower requirements between the present ROTC System and the ROTC Study Group proposed system is depicted in Figure 5-2-15.

**STAFFING PROPOSED MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS**

**COMPARISON**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Enlisted</th>
<th>Civilian</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ ROTC</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ REGION</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AREA COMMANDER</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>170</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVAILABLE*</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIFFERENCE</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+69</td>
<td>+72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* FY '86 AUTHORIZATIONS

**FIGURE 5-2-15**

5-2-10
Lastly, Figures 5-2-16 and 5-2-17 depict possible benefits and impacts of the study group proposal.

**REORGANIZATION**

**BENEFITS:**

- Provides ROTC command the capability to be fully operational and accountable
- Provides flexibility to cope with the changing environment/moving train
- Centralizes certain functions allowing regions areas, and instructor groups a forward leaning operational mission production orientation
- Provides a structure that supports increased efficiencies of required functions - duplication reduced
- Provides a manageable span of control
- Improves first line production/management supervision
- Provides increased opportunities for total army ROTC integration/ cooperation
- Supports improved command influence/presence on campus, with industry, and community sectors - enhances RFO.

**FIGURE 5-2-16**

**REORGANIZATION**

**IMPACT**

- Causes functional realignment
- Requires redistribution and additional manpower requirements, authorizations, permissions
- Requires facilities for expanded ROTC command headquarters
- Requires facilities for the staffed and deployed area commanders
- Reduction of facilities to support region headquarters
- Increased BASOPS support for ROTC command headquarters
- Reduction of BASOPS support for region headquarters
- Requires the fielding of the ROTC MMS automated system
- Creates additional automation requirements for deployed, area commanders
- Transition turbulence
- Generates political concerns

**FIGURE 5-2-17**

5-2-11
CHAPTER SIX

STAFFING

This chapter examines ROTC staffing. It describes current staffing and management practice, manpower standards and the acquisition process. It outlines ways to improve the integration of all manpower resources, the image of ROTC duty and the quality of personnel assigned to ROTC.

CURRENT SYSTEM

ROTC is staffed from the five sources shown in Figure 6-1.

FIGURE 6-1

The Active Army provides over 1,700 officers and 1,300 NCOs. The ARNG and USAR are programmed to provide over 600 AGR officers. There is a large retired force of some 2,000 who work in the JROTC program. The civilian force is represented by over 700 DACs and some 200 civilians who are hired by the Host Institutions to support the ROTC program on their campus.

Although institutional hires and retirees are included as a manpower source neither of these assets come under Total Army control. Institutional hires are host assets and may be withdrawn by the host schools. Retirees are also a form of institutional hires who are certified by the Army but employed and contracted by the schools or school districts which sponsors the JROTC program. Retirees cannot be hired or fired by the Army.
Until 1981 ROTC was an excepted unit, filled to 100 percent of authorized officers and NCOs. Because of increased Army-wide manpower demands and constraints ROTC is now supported at 89 percent of officer authorizations. This personnel reduction occurred simultaneously with a major expansion on the ROTC officer production mission in support of the "Total Army."

The inception of the "Total Army" concept expanded the focus of ROTC from active-only to both active and reserve component production missions. This expansion increased ROTC's lieutenants production mission to an annual requirement of 10,500 lieutenants. The majority of the increase will go into the Reserve Components. It was quickly determined that ROTC would need additional manpower in order to accomplish this expanded mission.

In response the Army developed the "Expand the Base Concept." This program increased the number of campuses on which ROTC was represented and envisioned adding 860 personnel. Given the constraints on active duty manpower and considering the reserve nature of the expanded mission it was determined that the personnel cost for "Expand the Base" would be shared with the Reserve Components. In 1982 the first Reserve Component Active Guard-Reserves (AGRs) arrived in ROTC and are still a part of the ROTC system. Because of continued constraints on Army manpower the "Expand the Base" program was terminated in 1983.

The personnel turbulence and associated management problem generated by the drop in ODP support and the growth from the Expand the Base program were exacerbated by the lack of a centralized ROTC personnel management system. Active Army personnel and DA Civilians are managed at four separate regions, reservists are managed at ARPERCEN and ARNG assets are accounted for at each region. Retirees as pointed out earlier are certified by regions and managed at their high schools. Institutional hires are not accounted for at any single location. In short there is no centralized management of ROTC personnel.

**IDEAL SYSTEM**

Prior to conducting research, the ROTC Study Group developed an ideal staffing system model. A listing of ideals for the staffing system are shown in Figure 6-2.
STAFFING SYSTEM

SHOULD PROVIDE FOR:

a. MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT
b. FLEXIBILITY TO MEET CHANGING NEEDS IN TIMELY MANNER
c. PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS BASED ON WORKLOAD AND THE MARKET
d. 100 PERCENT MANNING OF REQUIREMENTS
e. HIGH QUALITY PERSONNEL
f. ACCOMMODATION OF THE LEGITIMATE NEEDS OF ACADEMIA
g. TOTAL ARMY MANPOWER INTEGRATION
h. SATISFACTION OF NEEDS OF ASSIGNED PERSONNEL
i. ADEQUATE JROTC MANPOWER

FIGURE 6-2

The study group compared this ideal against the present staffing system and identified several areas requiring improvement. These areas included:

a. The need to develop manpower standards and streamline the acquisition process.
b. The need to better integrate all manpower resources.
c. The need to improve the image of ROTC duty and the quality of personnel assigned to this duty.

MANPOWER STANDARDS AND THE ACQUISITION PROCESS

Until 1981 ROTC's manpower requirements were determined by conducting yearly work station surveys at each Instructor Group. These results were then compared against the staffing guide and the appropriate number of personnel were assigned. However constraints on manpower caused the Army to seek a better method of determining requirements. Consequently engineered staffing standards were developed. These were mathematically derived formulae that considered all aspects of each work station. In 1981 ROTC became the first Army element to be measured and staffed using the new engineered standards.
Since those first standards were completed in 1980 and implemented in 1981 the ROTC "landscape" has changed dramatically. The mission had increased by 50 percent, the number of active officers assigned has decreased, and many new programs requiring additional manpower have been initiated. Figure 6-3 shows some of the factors that have impacted heavily on manpower needs since 1980.

**FACTORs IMPACTING ON STAFFING**

a. ALL VOLUNTEER ARMY  
b. PRODUCTION MISSION INCREASE  
c. INCREASED RESERVE COMPONENT MISSION  
d. EXPANDED SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM  
e. ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE MIX  
f. DECLINING DEMOGRAPHICS  
g. DECLINING ATTENDANCE AT ROTC BASIC CAMP  
h. DECLINING PROPENSITY TO SERVE IN THE ARMED FORCES  
i. MINORITY RECRUITING CHALLENGE  
j. INCREASED EMPHASIS ON HIGH SCHOOL RECRUITING  
k. MILITARY QUALIFICATION STANDARDS 1 (MQS 1)  
l. DIAGNOSTIC/ACHIEVEMENT TESTING

**FIGURE 6-3**

Much has changed since the development of the ROTC staffing standards in 1981. These changes have made the 1981 work standards invalid.

Compounding the lack of a valid staffing standard, is a slow unresponsive system for identifying, documenting and filling ROTC officer requirements. Figure 6-4 depicts a typical acquisition cycle for an ROTC Cadre officer.
An in-depth look at the manpower cycle revealed considerable duplication of functions as the basis for the assignment delay. The study group recommendation to consolidate Region Personnel Management functions at ROTC HQ will eliminate some duplication. The timely fielding of the Mission Management System will reduce time required to process personnel management actions. A key player in the ROTC personnel cycle is MILPERCEN. Discussion with MILPERCEN joint activities and JASA Branch indicated support for a shorten cycle but surfaced concern that the pool of available replacements would be reduced if assignments are required to be made outside of the summer fill cycle. Some of the study groups initiatives, particularly those relating to ways in which the work force can be better integrated, will help alleviate the existing manpower shortages.

INTEGRATION OF ALL MANPOWER SOURCES

Although well deserved in light of the increased mission it is highly unlikely that ROTC will receive additional Active Army personnel. Some of
the circumstances that adversely impact on increasing ROTC staffing include a capped end strength, emphasis to reduce TDA authorizations and the need to provide officer and enlisted personnel to man the newly created light divisions.

Several alternatives were developed to compensate for the lack of available Active Army personnel and to provide more efficient use of personnel. These alternatives include the increased use of AGR officer and enlisted personnel, use of retirees to supplement ROTC Instructor Group staffing and use of university contracted personnel to provide administrative and logistical support to Instructor Groups. Generally, the study group explored ways to restructure and better integrate responsibilities. Each of the alternatives are summarized.

a. Use of Additional AGRs. The AGR program is intended to improve Reserve Components troop unit readiness. ROTC is an Active-Reserve partnership with over 50 percent of ROTC commissionees assigned to Reserve Components. In order to increase the numbers of the AGRs authorized for ROTC duty Congress and the Reserve Components must recognize that the use of these AGRs will ultimately increase the number of lieutenants serving in reserve units thereby improving the readiness of these units. Congress must not perceive this expansion as a way to circumvent Active Army end strength.

Additional AGR support should not be restricted to officers but should also include NCOs. In many cases USAR and ARNG NCOs are better prepared to succeed in ROTC than active duty NCOs. As an example, AGR supply NCOs work with a supply system similar to the one used in ROTC while Active Army NCOs must learn the ROTC supply system while on the job. ODCSROT has recognized the advantages of adding AGR NCOs to the ROTC force and has requested funding for AGR NCOs as a TRADOC PAAR issue. Positions for present and future AGRs should not be limited to APMs or supply and administrative sergeants. Since ROTC is a partnership between the active and reserve elements of the Total Army AGRs should be assigned at each level within ROTC. Utilization of AGRs at ROTC Headquarters and on region staffs, as well as, Area Commanders and as PMSs will assure a Reserve Component voice in the operation of the program which produces the majority Reserve Component officers.
b. **USE OF RETIREES.** Use of retirees was considered as an additional source of ROTC personnel. Four options were examined. These included recall to active duty, the JROTC model, Army hybrid, which is similar to JROTC model, and the use of volunteers. Each option was judged against a criteria that would not result in an increase of Army end strength and would ensure Army control over these personnel. None of the options examined met the criteria since the above personnel had to be activated as either officers or DACs to ensure Army control. Thus, the end strength criteria was violated.

c. **Use of University Contracted Personnel.** This concept involved the use of Army funds to pay the Host University for contracting out administrative and logistical support. The TJAG review of the option pointed out that Title 5 USC prohibits the Army from maintaining maximum control over non-government employees. Additionally, since some administrative and logistical positions are now filed by DAC replacement of these personnel even through the attrition process would violate the public law which prohibits the Army from a reduction in-force for the purpose of hiring a different labor force to do "Army Work." This course was eliminated because it violated public law.

d. **Integration of Functions.** The study group recognized that it may not be possible to increase ROTC staffing. The study group believes that ROTC could achieve economies of scale by expanding the role of the personnel in each of its detachments. Historically, ROTC has used the personnel at detachment level as specialists or technicians responsible for a somewhat narrow area. For example, officers teach specific classes or subjects; NCOs serve as administrators, logisticians, and drill instructors while DAC may focus on administration or logistics.

Considering the limited manpower available to ROTC this specialization may not fully support mission accomplishment. A better integration of functions is needed. By way of example ROTC NCOs could be integrated into recruiting and the retaining mission; these same responsibility could be shared by each officer. This cross-leveling of responsibilities can be equated to task organizing for combat. The objective is to accomplish all missions as professionally as possible.

Associated with this integration of functions is a need for a manpower
survey to identify the proper grade and manpower source (officer, NCO, DAC) for each position within a detachment. The need for this survey is particularly accurate given the many new programs that have been adopted during the past several years.

**IMAGE AND QUALITY**

Results of the ROTC study group survey, field interviews and the OPMS survey, all indicate that ROTC suffers a negative image. It appears that the causes of this negative image include quality of assigned cadre, and a perception that ROTC duty is not career enhancing.

Figures 6-5 depicts the results of the ROTC Study Group survey. The active Army's Officer Corps believes that an assignment in ROTC does not enhance an officer's career. Many view it as wasted time which puts them behind their peers professionally. MILPERCEN NCO assignment personnel echo the same concerns about their NCOs. Some NCO requirements for ROTC, other than those in the Southeast, are particularly hard to fill.

![Figure 6-5: ROTC Duty is Career Enhancing](image)

**FIGURE 6-5**

6-8
Fifty-one percent of the General Officers, 67 percent of the Field Grade Officers and 44 percent of the Company Officers who responded to the OPMS survey indicated that they did not feel that either ROTC, Recruiting or Readiness Region duties were career enhancing.

Several factors influence this attitude. For example, promotions to Colonel in ROTC are well below the Army average and are one half to one-third the rate of those assigned to USAREC. This reality fuels the perception held by many that ROTC is a "boneyard" for Lieutenant Colonels or a retirement assignment. This perception causes senior personnel to warn subordinates that ROTC is a "dead end" and damaging to one's career to work for a "non-select" PMS.

Another perception often reinforced by assignment officers is that ROTC duty is an easy assignment which allows more time for family and pursuit of advanced degrees. Reality is very different. Faced with shortfalls in meeting mission, ROTC cadre are discovering there is very little time to pursue other interests. As one officer commented in the study group survey: "I saw more of my family when I was in a battalion."

The quality of assigned personnel is often cited as the heart of ROTC's problem. The study group found that the quality of captains and majors assigned to ROTC is well above average. However, the concern over lack of quality at the PMS level may be real. This concern over the quality of Professors of Military Science is not new. The Army Advisory Panel on ROTC Affairs has expressed this same concern on several occasions. Using selection rates to Colonel as the indicator of quality, MILPERCEN made a commitment to improve quality by achieving the Army selection rate of 90 percent to Colonel for Professors of Military Science. MILPERCEN has not been able to fulfill this commitment.

A former Deputy for Military Personnel Policy and Programs, OASA(M&RA) expressed concern that the lack of quality PMSs would adversely affect the units critical mission to recruit, retain, train and commission 75 percent of the Army's leadership. He said that to improve the quality of the PMS, the following three areas must be addressed: the selection process, the assignments system and the expectations for success.

He suggested that the individual responsible for the mission be given more authority in the selection of the PMS. Then the assignment system and the officer's expectations must be brought in concert with each other. To
remain competitive for promotion to Colonel the personnel management system requires that certain gates be met. Little time is available for a PMS assignment. This fact combined with the perception that PMS duty is the "kiss of death" to one's career reduces an officer's expectations and limits the individual's future in the Army. This expectation can be reinforced by non-promotion or non-selection and may prompt the individual to initiate a "replacement expectation." This expectation results in preparation for a second career or retirement, distracting the dispirited officer from diligently pursuing success in his ROTC program.

Humans are "beings" of expectation, who perform best when they can anticipate greater good from their work for all, including themselves. PMSs need to be able to expect a reasonable chance of success in the important role they perform. The CSA echoed this feeling when he said that it took special people to do the critical ROTC job and maybe the system was at fault for not recognizing the efforts of those assigned to ROTC duty. As a result the CSA directed that ROTC be represented on all Colonel promotion and selection boards.

This perceived lack of recognition for ROTC personnel is not limited to the Officer Corps. The ROTC NCO is also a victim. The NCO is being pulled from the mainstream and asked to perform duties for which he may not have been trained and which are alien to him. The NCO is being asked to be a recruiter, drill instructor, counselor, and mentor for cadets as well as to become an active member of an academic environment which is probably totally foreign and may at times be hostile. The NCO may not be accepted into the academic community at many universities because he lacks academic credentials. In some cases this results in the NCO being denied the privileges accorded to officer cadre.

To alleviate these problems the study group researched the feasibility of paying the Instructor Group NCO Special Duty Assignment Pay (SDAP). The research indicated that SDAP for ROTC NCOs is legal and that the extent of the duty is within the parameters required for the designation of the NCO positions for SDAP.

The ROTC cadre views ROTC duty as a wasted assignment, one which has no value toward career development and in fact could be damaging to future success. To combat this belief several ideas were surfaced. The first of these was the development of an "ROTC only" functional area (additional
specialty). Study Group research found this to lack any upward mobility (promotions) to Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel because of the scarcity of positions at these levels. MILPERCEN believed that this limited upward mobility would hinder the development of the functional area.

A variation of the above recommendation called for the establishment of a generic instructor functional area. This new functional area would include all service school instructors, department chiefs, ROTC officers, and USMA non-permanent instructors. Prior to 1982 a specialty code for instructors (SC28) existed, but was deleted as a separate code and included in Operations, Plans and Training (SC54). The reason for the deletion was a fear that it did not provide for positive career development under OPMS. Discussion with the OPMS Implementation Team indicated that an instructor functional area was not reviewed during the OPMS study. The consolidation of specialty code 28 into 54 has not benefited ROTC instructors. There is sufficient justification to conduct a review of SC54 to determine if a separate functional area for instructors should be added to this SC. For example a SC54B.

The last of the ideas put forward to combat the negative image was to guarantee branch or specialty assignments to officers departing ROTC duty. Discussions with MILPERCEN revealed that most Captains and Majors are being returned to branch assignments. However, the overwhelming number of Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels do not return to their branches but rather are sent to functional area assignments. The explanation for this is that there are simply more branch requirements for Captains and Majors than for Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels. The reality is that the majority of officers go back to either branch or functional area assignments. This fact should be publicized to the Officer Corps.

CONCLUSIONS

a. ROTC's manpower staffing standards are outdated, inaccurate and lack credibility.
b. The lack of credibility of staffing standards provides little support for ROTC's articulated needs.
c. The dwindling market and rising mission dictate a need for the
assignment of quality personnel in sufficient numbers to accomplish the mission.
d. Limited resource realities dictate that ROTC will not receive 100 percent of its requirements; however, it can not afford to continue to lose personnel.
e. ROTC, like USAREC, is selling and the selling of any product is manpower and labor intensive.
f. With a limited manpower pool ROTC cannot afford to wait an excessive time for replacement personnel.
g. ROTC is a partnership between the Army and academia. To strengthen this partnership, academia must continue to participate in the personnel cycle.
h. ROTC does not possess a consolidated personnel management system.
i. AGRs are not fully incorporated into all aspects of the ROTC system.
j. A greater role for the Reserve Components would provide them a greater voice in the running of a program which produces the majority of its officers. It would also provide a positive picture of the reservists for all to see.
k. ROTC NCOs are not fully integrated into the entire spectrum of the Instructor Group's area of responsibility. Full integration, particularly in the recruiting area, is necessary since ROTC will probably not receive additional manpower.
l. The use of retirees within SROTC and ROTC headquarters is not a viable solution for increasing ROTC manpower.
m. The use of university contract hires for administrative and logistics positions is not a viable option for increasing ROTC manpower.
n. ROTC possesses no system to determine personnel source and grade mix for its positions.
o. There is Army-wide perception that ROTC duty is neither challenging nor career enhancing.
p. Promotions to Major and Lieutenant Colonel for those assigned to ROTC duty are at or above the Army average.
q. Promotion to Colonel for those assigned to ROTC duty is well below average.
r. ROTC NCOs are recruiters, trainers, mentors and counselors. These are roles which the NCO is neither prepared for, nor trained to accomplish.
s. Current SROTC NCO job descriptions and Army-wide perception of ROTC NCO duty are erroneous.
t. Duty in ROTC is not properly recognized or rewarded.
u. A functional area solely for ROTC instructors is not viable.
v. Most cadre receive branch or functional area assignments immediately after ROTC duty.
w. ROTC cadre perceive ROTC duty as one of the Army's most important duties.
x. MILPERGEN assignment officers help to perpetuate the myth of ROTC as an easy assignment by selling it as family, masters degree and "break from troops" time.
y. ROTC NCOs play a vital role in the education process of the cadet.
z. The organization responsible for the production mission has little input in the selection of its "Leaders" the PMS.
aa. A PMS assignment is viewed as the "kiss of death" and an indication that there is no future remaining in the Army.
bb. The Army Advisory Panel on ROTC Affairs is concerned with the quality of the PMS.
cc. MILPERGEN has not delivered on its commitment to the AAP that the ROTC promotion rate for Lieutenant Colonel to Colonel would equal the Army average.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Measure the entire ROTC system, from HQROTC through the Senior Instructor Group, to establish valid staffing standards. This measurement should take place 1 year after reorganization. USAMARDA/TRAMEA has accepted the tasker and has tentatively scheduled the measurement for FY 88.
2. ODCSROTC and TRADOC should investigate ways to reduce the time involved from identification to fill of officer requirements.
3. The ROTC program should be granted excepted unit status at present ODP (officers) and authorization (enlisted, AGR, DAC) levels.
4. The concerns of academia expressed through the Army Advisory Panel concerning selection and assignment quality of personnel to ROTC should receive the highest priority possible.
5. Integrate AGRs throughout the ROTC system from ODCSROTC and region staffs to Area Commanders and PMSs.
6. ODCSROTC should investigate the feasibility of integrating Reserve Component NCOs into the staffing system.
7. ODCSPE should coordinate with OCAR and the NGB in an effort to increase the number of AGR personnel assigned to ROTC.
8. The ROTC community must ensure that the total integration of NCOs into the entire mission of the instructor group be articulated and practiced. All NCOs must be recruiters, retainers, trainers, mentors, role models and instructors as well as administrators and logisticians.
9. ROTC must develop a personnel system that accurately accounts for institutional hires.
10. During measurement of staffing standards, an appropriate mix of personnel (eg AGR, Active, officers, NCO, DAC) required to support ROTC should be developed.
11. The CSA should promulgate a statement on the importance of the contribution being made by ROTC cadre.
12. The important contribution made by ROTC cadre be documented and included as guidance to DA selection boards.
13. All field grade promotion and selection boards should include ROTC representation.
14. The concept of SDAP for ROTC cadre NCOs assigned to ROTC Instructor groups should be approved.
15. A selection board process for PMS duty should be developed so that the organization (ROTC) tasked with the mission can have a part in the selection of its key leaders.
16. The feasibility of establishing an all encompassing instructor functional area should be investigated after completion of OPMS implementation.
17. The current policy that directs, where possible, that ROTC cadre receive branch assignments after ROTC duty should be publicized to the Officer Corps.
Chapter Six highlights the staffing shortages existing in ROTC. This shortage is compounded by many administrative requirements which must be accomplished at every level of ROTC without the aid of an effective automated management system. This chapter describes the current and projected ROTC automated systems.

**CURRENT SYSTEM**

ROTC is organized into four regions, 18 areas, 314 hosts institutions, and 106 extension centers. Its operations are spread across the entire nation and are extremely decentralized. There are numerous administrative requirements that must be consolidated manually at each level within the system. ROTC must provide information to numerous other systems. Figure 7-1 depicts the many systems requiring ROTC input.
Because of lack of any automated system at detachment level and the many requirements for data, there is a great deal of administrative duplication of effort at this level. This data must be gathered manually and sent to region via the US mail. The magnitude of these administrative requirements can be seen in the ROTC study group survey data shown in Figure 7-2.

**KUTC STUDY GROUP SURVEY RESULTS**

**THE MAJORITY OF MY DUTY TIME IS SPENT IN?**

- **FIELD TRAINING** ................. 5.7%
- **COUNSELING** .................... 8.6%
- **RECRUITING** ..................... 15.4%
- **CLASS INSTRUCTION** ........... 20.2%
- **ADMINISTRATIVE DUTIES** ........ 50.1%

**FIGURE 7-2**

During the late 1970s and early 1980s ODCSROTC realized the compelling need to automate and began the research and ground work to acquire an automated system. Automation would free Instructor Groups from the increasing administrative burden and provide accurate and timely management.
data to key ROTC managers, as well as to key external elements of the Total Army's officer personnel system.

During Fiscal Year 1981, a mission element needs statement was developed and approved by the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs). The ASA(M&RA) also approved the charter for the ROTC Mission Management System (ROTCMMS) Project Manager/Project Officer. During September 1983, the approval for an ROTCMMS demonstration model was given. Simultaneously, a contract was awarded to develop a functional description (FD), data requirement documents (RD) and system/subsystem specifications (SS) for the ROTCMMS.

With the approval of the demonstration, the seven school test was initiated. Figure 7-3 is a diagram of the flow of information during the test.

**AUTOMATION DEMONSTRATION MODEL ROTC MMS**

- Georgetown University
- Hampton University
- VMI
- William and Mary College
- Campbell College
- Norfolk State University
- North Carolina State

FILE TRANSFER

1st ROTC Region

HQ TRADOC

FIGURE 7-3
The purpose was to demonstrate the feasibility and methodology for inputting and passing data. This was to be a small scale test of the actual system. The seven test schools, all within the First ROTC Region, were equipped with computers that were directly connected to the computer at 1st ROTC Region. The test called for demonstration of the word processing and telecommunications possibilities. It was soon determined that the effectiveness of the computer was directly proportional to the interest exhibited by the Instructor Group cadre as well as by the level of expertise of the operator.

In those schools where the interest was high, the capacity of the machine was soon reached and the capabilities fully exploited. Initial results of the test program indicated that the administrative burden was reduced by about 50 percent. This significantly increased the efficiency and productivity of the Instructor Groups involved in the test.

During March 1984 the draft functional description was provided to the project manager. Simultaneously an action memorandum was drafted. It requested that the assistant Secretary of the Army (FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT) approve Army acquisition of the ROTCMMS. This request was approved by the ASA(PM) in November 1984 with the following stipulations:

a. ROTCMMS must interface with systems such as ARADS, ATRRS, JUMPS, and VIABLE as well as with the systems at MILPERCEN, ARPERCEN and the National Guard Bureau.

b. A requirement was established for Defense Data Network (DDN) communications protocols in the ROTCMMS specifications.

c. Prior to release of ROTCMMS specifications to the vendor community, United States Army Information Systems Command would review the specifications to ensure compliance with Army standards and that the specifications do not restrict competition.

d. TRADOC develop and demonstrate a fully operational prototype.

During June 1984, the contract for Phase II of the demonstration model was awarded. This contract was subsequently extended through FY 85 and FY 86. As the demonstration model progressed, the functional description, data requirement document, and system/sub system specifications were further refined, delivered and accepted in mid-1985.

Concurrently with the refinements to the FD, RD and SS an Agency Procurement Request (APR) requesting Delegation of Procurement Authority...
(DPA) was submitted by TRADOC (ODCSROTC) to the Information Systems Selection and Acquisition Agency (ISSAA) for processing. ISSAA approved the concept and forwarded it to GSA for final approval. In April 85 GSA approved and provided the DPA to Ft. Hood Procurement (TRADOC West Contracting Activity).

A statement of work and final performance specifications were completed in June 1985. Delivery of the final procurement package to Ft. Hood was accomplished in the last half of 1985. Award of the contract is scheduled for the March-April 1986 time frame. The live test is to be conducted from June through August 1986 with a September determination on full system procurement. Fielding of the final ROTCMMS is programmed from September 1986 through September 1987. This deployment would consist of hardware, communications and basic software. The development and deployment of a full software package is expected to require approximately six additional years. In view of ROTC's need to manage and track an increased production mission, provide accurate production data to the Army leadership and quantitatively justify its resources and programs, a six year delay in software deployment is unacceptable.

The ROTCMMS funding trek from inception to present programmed deployment has been a rocky one at best. The ROTCMMS was initially funded for lease as one of the FY 82/83 Command Operating Budget Unfinanced Requirements. Subsequent DA and Congressional decisions funded, partially funded, then withdrew funding, finally withdrawing the leasing authority. The Vice Chief of Staff restored the FY 85 OMA and added OPA purchase funds. These funds also were withdrawn, reprogrammed and withdrawn again. During March 1985 the OPA purchase funds were converted to OMA. Subsequently, the total funds dedicated to ROTCMMS were 1.3 million maintenance and support and 5.7 million for purchase. During the August-September 1985 time frame, the OMA purchase monies were again converted back to OPA funds. With this conversion the ROTC budget again underwent a funding change. The FY 86 OMA was entirely cut, FY 87 funding was reduced to .7 million and FY 88-91 remained intact at 1.3 million. The OPA funding for MMS was folded into the TRADOC automation budget and cut by 1.7 million. This action was taken without the knowledge of the ODCSPER automation Staff Action Officer or the ROTC PDIP action officer. ROTC was totally unaware of the actions being taken and consequently was not prepared to defend its program.

7-5
Intervention by the ROTC Study Group on behalf of the ROTCMMS resulted in a coordinated effort by the Assistant Chief of Staff, Information Management (ACSIM), ODCSPER automation, ROTC PDIP coordinator, and ODCSROTC to revitalize the ROTCMMS. Results of the initial meetings were restoration of all funds in the OPA account and a continued effort to gain restoration of the OMA funds.

The initial steps have already been taken for the development of a system that will be able to provide the ROTC command with accurate, real-time data. However, some concern have been raised as to the exact management of the program and its usefulness at the detachment.

Discussions with those involved in the development of the system indicate that the initial software package is specifically designed for headquarters utilization. However, as a result of the present demonstration, a software package for specific PMS/Instructor Group utilization is being developed. The ROTCMMS will be designed so that the Instructor Group has a one-time data entry requirement. Requests for information by outside agencies would be extracted directly from the system. The ROTCMMS project manager is closely monitoring the system to ensure that the final purchase provides the Instructor Group with enough machine capacity to handle any foreseeable expansion.

There are some areas of concern as ROTCMMS enters its final phase of development. Identification and funding of equipment to support the deployment of area commanders is first among these concerns. Other areas are the establishment and development of an Officer Longitudinal Research Data Base and a JROTC "add-on" capability to the MMS.

Deployment of some of the area commanders from the region headquarters will generate additional hardware requirements to ensure that these deployed commanders have access to accurate and timely data. Presently there is no proposal or funding to automate these area commanders. ODCSROTC has recognized this need and is proceeding to justify and request funding. As we move into a period of severe limitations on resources, the ROTC system will be forced to more effectively justify its resource needs. To do this will require a great deal of data. The software package for ROTC must provide this capability.

The establishment of an officer longitudinal research data base will provide the Army with better insights into the factors motivating
individuals to join ROTC and remain in the Army. It will provide invaluable data for key resource decisions. This will allow ROTC to better use its limited resources to meet mission.

Lastly, the ROTCMMS must incorporate a module on Junior ROTC. Presently there is minimal management data on a program that reaches some 130,000 high school aged individuals and employs over 2000 retirees. Today's ROTC system does not follow through on the utilization of a major recruiting resource. Inclusion of a JROTC module into ROTCMMS would provide the Senior program and the Army with better access to an increasingly shrinking market. This system would allow for more efficient use of limited resources and improve ROTC recruiting.

CONCLUSIONS

a. The lack of automation at Instructor Group locations prohibits efficient use of time and manpower.
b. Due to manpower resource constraints, productivity enhancement through technology is the only viable solution that will provide the Instructor Group with the extra manpower necessary to accomplish the mission.
c. The proposed pace of acquisition of software packages for ROTC MMS is unacceptable if ROTC is to meet its mission in the 1990s and beyond.
d. The present automation project does not account for the results of impending organizational structural changes (i.e., deployment of Area Commanders).
e. In order to insure the ROTC systems viability, procurement of the system must be given highest priority at all levels.
f. The present system proposal does not provide for all necessary data to support an Officer Longitudinal Data Base.
g. The present system proposal does not incorporate a module for JROTC.
h. Without automation, ROTC will remain manpower and time intensive.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The pace of development and acquisition of the ROTCMMS software package should be accelerated.
2. The funding for the ROTCMMS should be closely monitored to ensure no further delays.
3. Ensure that the fielding milestones established by ODCSROTC and ODCSPER Systems Planning and Integration Branch are met.
4. Plans and a funding request should be initiated to incorporate all anticipated structural changes, specifically automation for the deployed Area Commander.
5. The data elements required for the establishment of the Officer Longitudinal Data Base should be incorporated into MMS.
6. A JROTC Module should be developed for the ROTC MMS.
CHAPTER EIGHT

OVERVIEW OF THE ROTC TRAINING SYSTEM

This chapter presents an overview of the ROTC training system. It includes a brief history of the training system and details of the two and four year programs, special training, cadre training, branch affiliation and ROTC training liability coverage. It includes recommendations on each of these subjects.

BACKGROUND

In the period following WWII, a great number of veterans entered college under provisions of the GI Bill and many of them signed up for the ROTC program. At colleges where there was a strong connection between the major field of study and one of the branches of the Army, the ROTC detachment was considered branch material. There were also non-branch material detachments that presented only general military science subjects. The subjects of the ROTC summer camps paralleled those of the Instructor Groups, and in 1948 there were 16 different camps. Most were branch material and a few were general military science.

In 1950, the ROTC began to move away from the concept of strict branch material training by requiring the addition of some general military subjects to the POIs of the branch material schools. The replacement of more and more subjects continued until 1956 when the entire POI of ROTC units was prescribed to be general military science.

Traditional ties between some schools and certain branches persisted through the 1970s. However the POI was specified as general military science, even if it had the flavor of the traditional branch affiliation. Cadets receiving commissions from the former branch material schools had the right to request assignment to any branch which did not require special qualifications. Along with the change to general military science for on-campus instruction, the Advanced Camps also ended branch material training. With the change of ROTC control from CONARC to TRADOC in 1973, and establishment of the four ROTC regions, the number of Advanced Camps was
reduced to three which were located at First, Third, and Fourth Region headquarters. That arrangement remains to the present.

THE IDEAL SYSTEM

As suggested in the Rand Report of April 1979, the overall measures of effectiveness for the ROTC program are quality, quantity, diversity and cost.* If the training, education and retention program is to support the overall ROTC program, it must be judged in terms of the same measures of effectiveness. In order to make the task more manageable, the study group described what an ideal system should do and compared it to the existing system. The following paragraphs discuss each of the descriptors of the ideal system:

a. Provide necessary military skills and education. The system must provide each cadet with the basic knowledge of military subjects which will form a common starting point for new lieutenants in their first assignment, usually their Officer Basic Course. Because the Military Qualification Standard I (MQS I) contains a listing of the military skills and professional knowledge subjects that a new lieutenant must possess, MQS I should be the basis for the POI.

b. Provide essential leadership development. The system must provide cadets with an understanding of what leadership is, historical information about successful and unsuccessful leadership styles and methods, opportunities to practice, and evaluation with remediation as appropriate.

c. Be adequately resourced. The system must ensure that the instructor groups are adequately resourced with personnel, dollars, material, and

access to training facilities to permit them to meet the cadets' training needs and expectations. The cadet-to-instructor ratios must permit sufficient individual contact for cadre to assess the cadets' abilities and improve weaknesses. Wherever possible, the training should involve hands-on training with the actual piece of equipment currently used on active duty. Where the campus or surrounding area do not permit, military training areas must be available for training in small unit tactics and military skills best taught outside the classroom.

d. **Thoroughly evaluate cadets.** The system must evaluate the entire spectrum of cadet performance and potential, to include basic educational skills, college grades, grades in ROTC classes, leadership skills and potential, summer camp performance, and all-around potential to serve as an Army officer.

e. **Retain a high percentage of quality cadets.** In view of the decreasing market as shown by the demographics, and the difficulty of attracting sufficient high quality students to the program, the system must retain a large percentage of high quality cadets in order to accomplish the mission of producing the proper number of qualified lieutenants for both the active and reserve components.

f. **Have proper diversity of commissionees.** Commissionees must represent the broadest possible spectrum of the nation's population. The system must ensure minority and female representation as well as provide for required diversity of academic disciplinary mixes. However, care must be taken in the pursuit of numbers so that some individuals are not programmed for failure if they are lacking the basic skills to do the job of a lieutenant. Training must be sensitive to individual abilities, and if necessary, special programs should be used to develop those cadets and ensure that they are able to perform and compete with their contemporaries.

g. **Have reasonable measures of effectiveness for each part of the program in order to judge success.** Any programs that are initiated or continued for the purpose of retaining or improving the quality of cadets should have clearly stated objectives and measures of effectiveness to determine if they should be continued or modified.
h. **Have challenging and rewarding training.** In order to attract and retain highly qualified cadets the system must deliver a standard of training that challenges each individual cadet, regardless of ability. It must meet the cadets' expectations which have been formed as a result of ROTC advertising, knowledge of the Army in general, or personal sense of adventure. For selected cadets, the challenge should extend to additional Army training such as Airborne or Ranger School.

i. **Provide socialization and mentorship.** The system must socialize cadets into both the ROTC and the Total Army. Cadets who feel a part of the ROTC program are far more likely to stay enrolled than those who are not able to identify with the other cadets and cadre members. Socializing the cadets into the Total Army through cadre contact, orientation visits to Army installations and Reserve Component units, and attendance at Advanced Camp on an active duty post, will provide them a better understanding of what Army officers do and how they live. This will have a positive effect on retention. The most frequent contact between the cadet and the Army is through the Assistant Professor of Military Science. The APMS serves as a mentor to cadets, and provides the understanding necessary to develop the leadership potential of each cadet.

j. **Provide career information to cadets.** The system must provide sufficient information to allow cadets to make intelligent choices concerning such service options, as Regular Army appointment, branch selection, and a service career with the Reserve Forces.

k. **Allow multiple entry points for cadet enrollment.** The procedure for enrolling cadets must permit students who did not choose ROTC the first term of their freshman year to join anywhere up to their junior year through such programs as Basic Course compression and the Basic Camp. It must allow credit for previous military experience gained through prior service on active duty or in the reserve forces, or for JROTC.

l. **Provide continued cadre training.** In order to augment the individual knowledge and experience of the cadre, and the training received at the start of the ROTC tour, the instructors must receive sustainment training to ensure that they are current with changes in Army doctrine, and retain and improve their skills as instructors and recruiters.
Having defined the ideal system, the study group reviewed the ROTC's training and education system to determine how well it has done. Some problems were found and recommendations have been made for improvement. It should be noted, however, that ROTC has done a commendable job of preparing cadets for commissioning. Comments from commanders in the field indicate that ROTC lieutenants are generally well grounded in basic educational skills, physically fit, and motivated for service.

RETENTION STRATEGY

The retention program for ROTC is inextricably entwined with the training and education program. The foundation for effective retention is meaningful and dynamic training which challenges the cadets, is presented on a level comparable to other college classes and meets cadet expectations. Along with the regular classroom material, the ROTC training subsystem presents the challenges of special training such as Airborne, Air Assault, and Northern Warfare Training for selected cadets. Factors which bind the program together are socialization and the mentorship that cadets receive from ROTC cadre.

ROTC detachment cadre members are the single most important factor in a cadet's decision to remain in ROTC. Cadre act as role models for the cadets and show by their own life styles what cadets can expect to find in the Army. Socialization of cadets into the ROTC program through activities such as orientation visits to installations and Advanced Camp provide cadets with a feeling of belonging found in only a few other college activities. The mentoring given by cadre members improves cadet performance in both ROTC and other classes with the overall result that the Army gets a better lieutenant.

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

ROTC is a four year program. However there are provisions for lateral entry which involves the awarding of placement credit for prior military experience. Cadets may attend Basic Camp and receive placement credit for the first two years of ROTC. Each of these facets of the program are discussed.
The Four-Year Program. The four-year program is the backbone of the ROTC program. It comprises the Basic Course (freshman and sophomore years), the Advanced Course (junior and senior years), and the Advanced Camp (during the summer between the junior and senior years). The program of instruction is based on the MQS I which will be discussed in Chapter 9, "Academic Excellence."

Some of the characteristics of the four-year program are very large numbers of freshman cadets, high attrition rates prior to contracting into the Advanced Course, and a relatively small number of commissionees compared to the starting size of the class. The attrition rate for nonscholarship cadets from the first term of the freshmen year to graduation, four years later, is approximately 90 percent. For example, the opening ROTC enrollment report for the fall of 1979 showed 36,249 freshmen; but only 3,432 non-lateral entry four-year cadets graduated and were commissioned in FY 83, for a retention rate of 9.5 percent. The 1980 class numbered 41,074; but only 3,476 graduated and were commissioned in FY 84, for a retention rate of 8.5 percent. To some extent, the retention is actually lower than the 9.5 percent and 8.5 percent shown in these two examples because some of the 3,400 commissionees each year did not actually start in their first freshman semester, but began one or two semesters later and doubled up on the basic course classes to catch up with their class group.

There are several reasons why the four year attrition is so high. A major portion of the overall loss is due to the across-the-board attrition of college students from initial enrollment to graduation. A check with the National Center for Educational Statistics revealed that data for college drop-out rates are non-existent, but informal estimates range from 40 to 50 percent. Another segment of students who drop ROTC are those who were unsure of their desire to join ROTC, but were recruited on a trial basis, with the option of dropping out later. It is certainly not in the best interest of the Army to retain students who have neither the aptitude nor the attitude to successfully complete the program.

Another major reason for loss of Basic Course cadets is that the opening enrollment report includes students who have no intention of seeking a commission, but who sign up for ROTC because their school requires it, or as an expedient to avoid other less desirable courses. Some of the traditional
military schools that now admit students who are not seeking a commission still require students to take at least two years of ROTC. Kansas State University allows students to take ROTC in lieu of physical education, and the University of Kentucky requires the ROTC department to admit any student wanting to take ROTC even if he is not qualified for military service.

While the large freshmen and sophomore enrollment exacts a price in the form of instructors' time and administrative support, this process benefits the Army in two ways. First it allows the Army, through ROTC, to pass on some knowledge of its purpose and operations to a large number of people in a manner not unlike the citizenship training aspects of JROTC. Second, it allows the ROTC instructors to identify promising students with a potential for leadership.

The four-year program plays an important role in trying to meet ROTC's production mission. Based on data obtained from the ROTC Management Information System, 42 percent of those commissioned in FY 83 and FY 84 were four year program cadets.

One of the most important aspects of the four year program is that having the cadets in class for four years allows the cadre of the ROTC detachment ample opportunities to observe their abilities and mentor their progress through the college years. This extends beyond the ROTC classroom, because it is in the best interest of the Army to obtain lieutenants who are well-grounded in basic educational skills, as well as military skills and professional knowledge subjects. The instructors of MS I classes are able to diagnose basic educational skill deficiencies early, to direct cadets to university classes or programs that will improve those skills, and to monitor their progress in overcoming deficiencies.

Lateral Entry Programs. Significant effort is expended trying to recruit students into the four-year program. For the past two years 42 percent of the commissionees have come from that source. The other 58 percent of the commissionees are students who elected not to take the ROTC program in their freshman year. This group of students enters ROTC through the lateral entry programs. There are two primary avenues of lateral entry—the two year program and award of credit for previous military experience.
The Two-Year Program. The two-year program has accounted for approximately 21 percent of the commissionees in the last two years. The two-year program substitutes attendance at the Basic Camp for the two years of the Basic Course. This camp is conducted at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and has a maximum capacity of 4,800 cadets. The maximum capacity was approached in 1983 with 4,601 cadets reporting, but the attendance has dropped by approximately 500 each succeeding year, because of the systems inability to recruit cadets to fill all Basic Camp quotas. In most cases, students are recruited for the two-year program during their sophomore year and attend the Basic Camp during the summer between their sophomore and junior years.

The Basic Camp mission is to bring students to a level of military training and education which will qualify them for enrollment in the Advanced Course. The camp is conducted in a format very similar to the basic training given to new Army recruits. The camp relies heavily on the use of drill sergeants from basic training units as instructors at the camp. The basic training program of instruction is modified, however, to include all of the MQS I subjects that are taught in the Basic Course, with an emphasis on leadership development. Students are given hands-on training, and wherever possible, training is conducted outdoors. In recognition of the need to motivate cadets to sign a contract and enter the Advanced Course, the MQS I subjects at camp are augmented with many hours of training that are not necessarily a part of on-campus training. Cadets receive basic rifle marksmanship to include night firing, both administrative and tactical bivouacs, physical training, individual tactical training, a combat indoctrination course, an infiltration course, and several types of "Adventure Training."

Based on statistics over the last nine years, the completion rate for cadets attending the Basic Camp is 90 percent. Of those who complete the camp, however, only 66 percent sign a contract to join the Advanced Course (60 percent of the total reporting to camp). This statistic suggests that the failure to contract one third of the camp graduates represents a significant loss of students who had shown enough interest to sign up for the camp and actually attend six weeks of military training. Increased emphasis on mentoring these students both at the camp and on campus could improve the contracting rate.
Previous Military Experience. The second major category of lateral entry program is credit given for previous military experience. Cadets may be granted advanced standing in recognition of previous training which has covered MQS I subjects. This allows the program to be used as a recruiting tool and eliminates the requirement for training that may be redundant and unnecessary for some cadets.

AR 145-1 permits credit to be given for the entire Basic Course for students with prior military service. The student may have been on active duty or in the reserve forces of any service, but there is a requirement to have attended basic training for that service or component. Prior service cadets have accounted for 30 percent of the commissionees in the last two years.

The remainder of lateral entry cadets are those who receive advanced standing due to experience gained through the JROTC, the National Defense Cadet Corps, or attendance at any of the US service academies. The amount of credit given varies with the amount of prior experience and MQS I subjects covered. The credit granted may not exceed two years for the Basic Course; all cadets must take the entire Advanced Course and Advanced Camp.

The size of the lateral entry programs comprising 58 percent of the commissionees has the potential to create a significant problem for the PMS because of the widely different training backgrounds of the cadets entering the Advanced Course. The key to solving this problem rests with the PMS who is tasked with determining the amount of placement credit to be given. If there is any doubt concerning the preparation of the cadet, the PMS has the option of reducing the credit given, and requiring the cadet to take one or more of the classes in the Basic Course.

Comparison of Two-Year and Four-Year Programs. In an effort to compare the performance of 2 year program cadets to 4 year program cadets, Advanced Camp performance and Advanced Course retention were analyzed. It seemed reasonable that cadets who had attended a six-week summer camp before their junior year would have a tremendous advantage at the Advanced Camp. Reports of camp cadre support the idea that Basic Camp cadets arrive initially better prepared for the rigors of Advanced Camp compared to other cadets. A review of the Camp OML showed that the four-year cadets did slightly better,
with 38 percent in the top third compared to 25 percent of two-year cadets were in the top third. Looking at the scores for specific graded areas such as land navigation, marksmanship, and physical training, it was not possible to tell where there was a difference. There was no significant difference between the retention rates for the two groups.

**SPECIAL TRAINING**

In addition to the instruction that cadets receive while at college and at the summer camps, selected cadets may attend one of several special training courses. The courses are intended primarily for recruiting and retention purposes, but also provide an opportunity for cadets to receive training that they may not be able to obtain on active duty. Figure 8-1 lists the special training currently used by the ROTC, and the approximate number of cadets who will receive the training in SY 1986.

**ROTC SPECIAL TRAINING**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Cadets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Assault Training</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airborne Training</td>
<td>2,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Warfare Training</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flight Orientation and Training</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadet Troop Leadership Training</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold Bar Bound</td>
<td>****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranger Training</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurse Summer Training</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE 8-1**
Air Assault Training is conducted at Forts Campbell, Rucker, and Hood, as well as Schofield Barracks. Courses are conducted through the summer, and each class lasts two weeks. The training is the same as that given to active duty soldiers, and teaches the basics of airmobile operations. At the end of training, cadets receive the Air Assault Badge which may be worn on their uniform after commissioning. While it is possible for cadets to attend the school during the same summer as their Advanced Camp, the course is used mainly as a retention device aimed at keeping freshmen in the program and getting sophomores to sign an Advanced Course contract. In order to qualify, the cadet must be able to pass the APRT. Cadets receive travel, board, and room at government expense, but receive no pay or per diem.

Airborne Training is conducted at Forts Benning and Bragg. The course at Fort Benning lasts three weeks, and is the same POI as that given to active duty soldiers. Cadets may attend any time during the summer provided training quotas are available. The course at Fort Bragg lasts only two weeks because there is no 250-foot tower and no "Tower Week." Cadets may attend the Fort Bragg course either before or after Advanced Camp. At the end of the training, cadets are awarded Airborne Wings. As with Air Assault, Airborne Training is intended primarily as a retention device to keep cadets motivated to stay in the program and sign a contract at the appropriate time. Cadets must be able to pass the APRT to be eligible for training. Cadets receive travel, room, and board, but no pay or per diem.

Northern Warfare Training (NWT) is conducted at Fort Greely, and lasts three weeks. All 75 cadets attend one class presented during the middle of the summer, so it is not possible to attend both the NWT and Advanced Camp in the same year. The training is intended as a retention device and is aimed primarily to persuade sophomores to enter the Advanced Course. No badge is given for successful completion of NWT. To be eligible, the cadet must be able to pass the APRT and be POR qualified. As with the two previous training courses, cadets receive travel, board, and room, but no pay or per diem.
Flight Orientation and Training is a four week course presented at Fort Rucker. The course is an evolution of an older cadet flight program that previously was conducted at airports near the local colleges. In the older program, the Army would contract for fixed wing instruction for cadets who would agree, in turn, to attend active duty flight training if selected for it. The new program uses Army instructors to provide training in rotary wing aircraft, and as before, cadets must agree to accept active duty flight training if it is offered to them. In the past few years, the flight cadets have received priority in branch selection to aviation branch. Training is intended as a retention and motivation device; however, since cadets already under contract attend following their Advanced Camp, the program's effects on recruiting are rather long term. To be eligible, cadets must pass a flight physical and the flight aptitude test. Following training they receive the ROTC cadet flight wings. Cadets are given travel, board and room, but no pay or per diem.

Cadet Leadership Training (CTLT) is a practicum in leadership for selected senior cadets. It is conducted immediately following Advanced Camp and is available only to those cadets who have successfully completed camp. Training takes place with both Active and Reserve units and lasts for two or three weeks, depending on the type of unit. In arranging the training, TRADOC and FORSCOM try to select units that are doing an active part of their training schedule rather than units that are standing down for maintenance following training. Cadets perform the duties of a platoon leader and receive the most realistic leadership training of their ROTC curriculum. The program is limited to approximately 2,000 cadets each year. TRADOC is considering ways to increase CTLT quotas.

Gold Bar Bound is the newest ROTC special training course. It was conducted at the National Outdoor Leadership School in Sedro Woolley, WA, on a test basis during the summer of 1985. Instruction was done by a private contractor, but an ROTC cadre officer accompanied each group of cadets to observe and evaluate. The purpose of the program was to improve retention
by motivating cadets completing their sophomore year to contract into the Advanced Course. The first classes were run with four cycles of nine or ten cadets (a total of 37 attended). To be eligible, cadets had to meet contracting standards. The Fourth ROTC Region which is operating the test program used three methods to measure the effectiveness of this program; cadre interviews with cadets at the end of training, cadet responses on a survey and the cadet contracting rate.

The results of this pilot program are being analyzed carefully within the context of the overall retention effort before a commitment is made to expand it.

**Ranger Training and Nurse Summer Training** are the two remaining programs of special training. Each of the courses is an alternative to attending the regular ROTC Advanced Camp and will be discussed in Chapter 10, "Camps."

**CADRE TRAINING**

Newly assigned cadre to ROTC duty should receive an orientation "...as soon as practicable after reporting for duty." This guidance from AR 145-1 applies to PMS and instructor personnel (APMS). The policy is executed via cadre training and orientation programs conducted at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana and at Camp Robinson in Little Rock, Arkansas. Reserve Component (RC) APMS training is held at Camp Robinson. Training of NCOs (supply and administration) is done on a space-available basis at Fort Harrison, but is essentially the responsibility of each region. This training program was established under a Memorandum of Understanding between HQ ROTC and the US Army Soldier Support Center, executed in March 1984.

**CADRE ORIENTATION TRAINING.** There currently are two major elements to the cadre orientation program at Fort Harrison: TRADOC Orientation and Enrollment Program, TROEP and Instructor Training Course (ITC). TROEP is a two-week, two-phased program. The first phase covers product knowledge and what ROTC duty is all about. It also includes training on the Leadership Assessment Program (LAP). Phase two consists of the Marketing Center Management Course (MCMC) for the PMS, and the TRADOC Enrollment and Retention Course (TERC) for APMS and NCOs.
The ITC portion of the program is taught by contract personnel from International Telephone and Telegraph. This portion was first introduced in FY 85, and is a two-week course attended by all instructors, including the PMS. The RCAPMS course at Little Rock Ark., is two weeks long and primarily designed to prepare Reserve Component personnel for ROTC duty. In addition to receiving the same program information, students undergo physical conditioning and receive orientation and in-processing for active duty service. A summary of the overall Army ROTC cadre training program is at Annex 8-1.

Cadre Training Strategy. Currently, formal training is accomplished for the PMS/APMS at Fort Harrison. Once the cadre return to their instructor groups, there is no systematic approach to sustainment training program for the cadre. The Army strategy for training is embodied in Chapter 2 of AR 350-1. It calls for initial training as well as unit training. Training in units consists of performance-oriented individual and collective training. As performance indicators are continually developed and refined, ROTC's ability to assess the performance of its instructor groups should improve. The introduction of automation at Instructor Group levels will increase this capability. Once performance has been assessed, a system needs to be in place to affect resolution of training problems. USAREC, employs a system of mobile training teams to assist when shortcomings in performance are identified, or when there are significant changes to policies and procedures requiring a more centralized effort from USAREC HQ.

Consolidation of Cadre Training. There are two issues here. The first has to do with consolidation of like training conducted at Fort Harrison for USAREC and ROTC cadre. USAREC training at Fort Harrison includes two recruiter courses; one basic, and the other targeted for nurse recruiting. Although there are differences in the recruitment of enlisted versus officer personnel, there may be sufficient similarities to warrant consolidation. A consolidation proposal was staffed at Fort Harrison by TRAMEA; however, both USAREC and ROTC cadre training personnel objected to it.
The second issue deals with the feasibility of combining the Active and Reserve Component cadre training programs at Fort Harrison. Several factors need to be taken into account:

a. RCAPMS require special processing as new Active Guard and Reserve members.

b. Special emphasis is placed on review of basic military skills and physical readiness for RCAPMS.

c. The RCAPMS course consists of contract training conducted by Sales Management Training of Atlanta, Georgia, and paid for by the National Guard. Student and instructor travel and per diem expenses are also funded by the National Guard.

Any combination of these schools would have to accommodate the above factors. The RCAPMS would have to be scheduled for their own period of training and in-processing. It is doubtful that the NG funding would continue. Additionally, TRADOC would have to arrange for new contract training, or an increase in the staffing at the current ROTC School at Fort Harrison. There are potential benefits in terms of Active and Reserve Component socialization but these might well be offset by prohibitive cost increases for TRADOC as well as inherent political sensitivities.

**Training Management.** HQ ROTC publishes a letter of instruction each year on the TRADOC Orientation and Enrollment Program. It contains scheduling and quota guidance, as well as necessary administrative instructions. The ROTC School at Fort Harrison tracks attendance, receiving by-name input from the regions in advance of the training. Attendance statistics from 1982-1985 are at Figure 8-2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>PMS</th>
<th>APMS</th>
<th>NCO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ROTC School Fort Harrison, Indiana

**FIGURE 8-2**

8-15
There is no current requirement for the ROTC School to report attendance figures to HQ ROTC. ODCSROTC does not keep track of the number of new PM3/APMS/NCOs trained each fiscal year compared to how many were assigned. The ROTC system, therefore, is not fully aware of what percentage of new cadre ever receive their initial training, which is a key element in insuring that cadre are properly trained for these duties. This situation will change once HQ ROTC has access to the ATTRS system which will occur in the summer 1986.

HQ ROTC and MILPERCEN have recently changed the procedures used to send in bound cadre to the TROEP course. In the past many cadre attended this course in a TDY and return mode. Beginning in the summer of 1986 these personnel will attend the course TDY enroute to their detachments.

**BRANCH AFFILIATION**

The Army's accession goal for the discipline mix of new lieutenants has been to obtain 20 percent of graduates for both engineering and hard science majors. These academic majors were determined to be important because of the Army's increasing emphasis on high technology. Since the accession goals by academic major were first developed in 1983, commissioning of science majors has moved steadily closer to the 20 percent figure and is expected to meet it in 1985. Production of engineer majors has progressed to only slightly more than half of the goal. Both of these goals are in jeopardy due to declining numbers of engineering and science majors and an increase in the competition for recruiting quality graduates with these majors.

In an effort to increase the number of high tech commissionees, ROTC has instituted a test Affiliation Program which is intended to attract engineering and science majors to ROTC. The concept was proposed in July 1983 by MG Schumacher, Commander of the Army Signal Center at Fort Gordon, Georgia, and was intended to focus the support of several of the high tech associated branches on selected colleges to assist the PMS with recruiting and mentoring.

The ROTC Affiliation Program is currently associated with the Corps of Engineers and the Signal Corps. A memorandum of understanding was signed.
between the DCSROTC and the commander of each of those branch schools in March 1984, and the program was implemented in August 1984. Under provisions of the MOU, each branch would be associated with five schools. Figure 8-3 is a list of the schools involved in the program.

ROTC AFFILIATION PROGRAM SCHOOLS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps of Engineers</th>
<th>Signal Corps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Penn State University</td>
<td>Georgia Institute of Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina State University</td>
<td>Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa State University</td>
<td>Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Missouri, Rolla</td>
<td>University of Arizona</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johns Hopkins University</td>
<td>University of Florida</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE 8-3

The schools were selected for their strong programs in engineering and science, but not necessarily on the viability of the ROTC program. The concept of the Affiliation Program is to attract new students to ROTC by correcting the students' misconceptions about the Army's use of their technical skills, and by providing information about the opportunities for technically qualified personnel in the Army.

Another advantage would accrue to ROTC by using branch support to persuade academic advisors, faculty, and school administrators that military service is a viable career goal for high tech students. This supports the requirement for some lieutenants with high tech skills in all branches. The concept of branch affiliation has been used in ROTC in the past, when commissionees from branch material ROTC detachments were restricted to that branch when commissioned; this is not a facet of the current Affiliation Program.

Under the terms of the Affiliation Program, each affiliated school has been assigned a PMS and one APMS from the proponent branch. The technical orientation of the PMS make them better equipped to communicate with the
engineering and science faculty of their colleges, and to coordinate the needs of ROTC with curriculum requirements of students. The APMS is better qualified to provide the cadets with information based on personal experience regarding the employment of high tech skills in Army assignments.

The ODCSROTC has listed the following three measures of effectiveness for the Affiliation Program:

a. Support activities from proponent to school. This includes tours to active Army installations, support for recruiting drives, and special training.

b. Influencer contacts on campus, to include guest lecturers, conference participation, and correspondence with faculty members.

c. Increased enrollment of high technology students.

If the first year of the program were to be judged based on the above measures of effectiveness, the report would not be good. Activity on the part of the branch proponents has been extremely limited because neither proponent had budgeted funds to cover the cost of school year 1984-1985 at the time the concept for test of the Affiliation Program was approved. In an effort to get the program underway, the Engineer School sent two representatives to visit each of their affiliated schools to coordinate plans for implementation. They also provided Corps of Engineers literature to each college, and the Engineer School Commandant visited two of the colleges for graduation and cadet social events. The Signal Center hosted a conference at Fort Gordon for their affiliated schools to discuss plans for implementation of the program, but made no direct contact with any cadets at the schools.

There were other administrative actions taken during the first year of the program. A sixth school, Clarkson College was added to the other five Signal Corps affiliated schools, and a proposal is being considered to add five schools affiliated with the Ordnance Corps. Work was begun on assignment of proponent branch personnel to the PMS and APMS slots; the change, where necessary, was to be done by attrition. Seven of 11 PMS and nine of 11 APMS are of the proper branch in school year 1985-1986; all PMS and APMS will be of proper branch in school year 1986-1987.

Planning and coordination of the Affiliation Program has continued for school year 1985-1986. Both proponents have budgeted funds and scheduled
activities for the year. The Signal Center has budgeted $50K in support of the program. They will work with the PMS to schedule two guest speakers for each school in order to provide both military and civilian perspectives on the technology being used in the Army. The Center will send a team of personnel to each school to advertise the Signal Corps. They have planned to provide support to each of the colleges that will be participating in the Junior Science Symposium. The Center will sponsor trips for cadets to visit Signal Corps R&D activities, and for school faculty, other than the Military Science Department, to attend Army sponsored seminars such as the Armed Forces Communications Electronics Association's Seminar. All of the branch PMS and APMS will be hosted at the Tactical Communication Conference in December, and for a Signal Corps Update and Affiliation Program review in the spring. Another feature will be a visit of a team from officer assignments branch at MILPERCEN to discuss Army career options for all branches.

The Engineer School has budgeted $41K to support the program for this school year. They have prepared and distributed a video tape showing Engineer lieutenants in their jobs, talking about how their college training is being used. The film covers divisional and construction engineers, topographic engineering, and district engineers. The Engineer School will send a briefing team to each affiliated school to provide information to both cadre and cadets, and also sponsor cadet visits to the facilities at Fort Belvoir. They will assist ODCSROTC, where possible, in arranging allocations for spaces in Engineer units for Cadet Troop Leadership Training and the Cadet Technical Specialty Program.

**MEDICAL LIABILITY COVERAGE FOR TRAINING**

In view of the increasing popularity of training programs that fall under the general heading of Special Training, more attention is now being paid to resolving the issue of medical liability coverage. In 1981, the Army staff, on behalf of DOD, began work on preparation of a legislative package that would provide this needed coverage not now available to all cadets in ROTC.

Currently, contracted cadets are covered for required ROTC training such as Advanced Camp and Basic Camp under the Federal Employees Compensation Act.
(FECA) and are eligible for SGLI and Veterans Benefits. There is, however, no Federally underwritten coverage for cadets who take part in training activities such as Airborne, Air Assault, or Northern Warfare Training. The current medical coverage provided for required and special ROTC training is outlined at Annex 8-2. A more detailed summary of current and proposed medical coverage provision for ROTC is at Annex 8-3.

As previously mentioned, the Army has taken the lead in getting the legislative package to Congress. The proposed legislation (Annex 8-4) would amend Titles 5 and 38, United States Code. The package is currently under the control of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), whose role is to coordinate the staffing with other federal agencies. The two agencies involved in this issue are the Veterans Administration and the Department of Labor. Comments by both of these agencies have been received and the legislative proposal is now being prepared by OMB for submission to Congress.

In the interim, a proposal was submitted by HQ TRADOC that called for Army funds to purchase group medical and life insurance for ROTC cadets participating in voluntary field training. However, a review by the Office of the Judge Advocate General and the Fiscal Policy Division of the Office of the Comptroller of the Army determined that the government has no authority to purchase group medical and life insurance without specific statutory authority.

CONCLUSIONS

a. CTLT provides the most realistic leadership training available to ROTC cadets. The program is limited in size due to the cost and availability of training slots in units.

b. Gold Bar Bound is a special training program aimed specifically at retention of sophomores into the Advanced Course. Before a decision is made to expand this program its effectiveness is being analyzed.

c. There is no ROTC-wide system for cadre sustainment training.

d. There is a potential for economies and efficiencies in consolidating selected recruiting portions of the ROTC School and the USAHEC cadre training program.
e. There is a potential for economies and efficiencies in consolidating RC and AC ROTC cadre training at one location.

f. There are shortcomings in ROTC's ability to measure the effectiveness of its cadre training program.

g. Based on the Affiliation Program's measures of effectiveness, it is not possible to show any progress during the first year, especially in the area of increased enrollment of cadets with engineering and hard science majors. The year was used to plan and coordinate the program's initiation for this school year, the funding problems that delayed last year have been resolved, and a full schedule of support is planned for this year.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Continue to increase CTLT as slots and funding can be made available. A goal of five to ten percent increase each year is reasonable. TRADOC and FORSCOM must coordinate the availability of units that can provide platoon leader positions for cadets in the program.

2. Before committing additional resources to the Gold Bar Bound program, a rigorous examination of it should be made to verify the number of quality MS-IIIIs that were contracted solely and directly as a result of this program.

3. ROTC develop a more comprehensive cadre training program that includes both initial training and sustainment training that follows the cadre through their entire ROTC tour of duty.

4. TRADOC re-examine the feasibility of selectively consolidating like portions of training conducted by ROTC and USAREC at Fort Harrison, Indiana.

5. ROTC examine the feasibility of consolidating RC and AC ROTC cadre training at a single location.

6. ROTC develop measures of effectiveness for its cadre training program.

7. The ROTC Affiliation Program should continue for at least two more years, in order to measure the effect of the program on enrollment of students with high tech majors.

8. The ODCSROTC should consider the addition of other branches, such as the Ordnance Corps or Chemical Corps, if their assistance will support the primary goal of increasing the enrollment of high tech students.
ROTC CADRE TRAINING

- HQDA - Orientation should be done as soon as practicable after reporting for duty (AR 145-1)
- TRADOC - Memo of Understanding between SSC and DCSROTC (May 84)
  Purpose: to establish ROTC cadre training program at Ft Ben Harrison
  Implementation: DCSROTC ltr, 30 April 84

- TRADOC Orientation and Enrollment Program (TROEP)
  Ft Benjamin Harrison, 2 wks
  Week 1: - all attend
    2½ day orientation (DCSROTC instructors)
    LAP training (2½ days)
  Week 2: - PMS training
    Marketing Center Management Crse (MCMC)
    Commo skills, marketing
    Civilian contract tng (25hrs); SSC training (15hrs)
    APMS training
    Training Enrollment and Retention Crse (TERC)

- Program change for FY85
  - Instructor Training Crse (ITC)
    2 weeks, Ft Harrison
    Contract Instruction
    In conjunction with TROEP, not part of TROEP

- Reserve Component APMS training
  Camp Robinson, Arkansas; 2 weeks
  USAR and ARNG

ANNEX 8-1
### TYPES OF TRAINING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of Individuals</th>
<th>Advanced Camp</th>
<th>Ranger Camp (In Lieu Adv. Camp)</th>
<th>Basic Camp</th>
<th>Cadet Troop Leadership Training</th>
<th>Airborne</th>
<th>Air Assault</th>
<th>Northern Warfare</th>
<th>Flight Orientation</th>
<th>FTX &amp; Other Training Conducted SIG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic Course Enrolled Cadets</td>
<td>SGLI¹ MED²</td>
<td>SGLI¹ MED²</td>
<td>SGLI¹ MED²</td>
<td>SGLI¹ MED²</td>
<td>SGLI¹ MED²</td>
<td>SGLI¹ MED²</td>
<td>SGLI¹ MED²</td>
<td>SGLI¹ MED²</td>
<td>SGLI¹ MED²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Camp Attendees</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Participating Students (Conditional, Audit &amp; Other Non-Enrolled Students)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aliens</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Course Enrolled Cadets (Except Aliens)</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadets in the SMP⁶</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES NO</td>
<td>YES NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers Commissioned Under CGSP Under CGSP</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTES:**

1. Cadets (except Aliens) attending Advanced Camp, Ranger Camp (in lieu of Advanced Camp), and CTILT are eligible for Servicemen's Group Life Insurance coverage (SGLI) for period of training plus 120 days after completion of training. Aliens and Basic Camp Attendees are not eligible for SGLI.

2. Cadets attending Advanced Camp, Ranger Camp (in lieu of Advanced Camp), CTILT, and Basic Camp attendees are entitled to sick call, emergency treatment, hospitalization and are covered under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA).

3. Cadets attending Airborne, Air Assault, Northern Warfare, Flight Orientation and Training conducted by the SIG are not eligible for SGLI.

4. Cadets attending Airborne, Air Assault, Northern Warfare, and Flight Orientation are eligible for sick call, emergency treatment and hospitalization until such time as appropriate disposition can be accomplished. Care will be without charge except for subsistence. Cadets attending foregoing training are not eligible for FECA.

5. Cadets, participating students, and officers commissioned under CGSP injured while participating in FTX, training, and recreational activities conducted by the SIG may receive medical treatment (subject to the availability of space, facilities and staff) by a Army Medical Treatment Facility. Hospitalization will only be furnished on a temporary basis until appropriate disposition can be accomplished, individuals are not eligible for FECA.

6. Cadets in the SMP, while participating in any type of training connected with ROTC, are entitled to the same SGLI and Medical Coverage as the Advanced Course enrolled cadets. Additionally, they are eligible for full-time SGLI coverage during the entire period of their participation in the SMP regardless of the type of training (Airborne, Air Assault and etc.). SMP members injured while training with their reserve component unit or on annual training are entitled to military medical benefits.

Note: "Advanced Camp, Ranger Camp, and CTILT"
SUBJECT: Health Related Benefits for SROTC Cadets

ISSUE. What health related benefits do enrolled and nonenrolled cadets and students participating in Army and ROTC sponsored activities have?

FACTS.

1. Currently, SROTC cadets who are:
   
   a. enrolled in the SROTC program and who are disabled or killed in line of duty during or on authorized travel to or from mandatory training (advanced camp); or

   b. reservist (i.e., cadets who have enlisted in the USAR as contracted scholarship, MS III and MS IV cadets) and are disabled through disease or injury or are killed in line of duty while on active duty training (as described in 10 and 38 U.S.C.); or

   c. reservist and are injured or killed in line of duty while on inactive duty training (as described in 10 and 38 U.S.C.) such as airborne, air assault, or northern warfare training, and FTX (mere attendance at an educational institution is not inactive duty training); are entitled to the benefits listed below:

   (1) Veterans Benefits (through the Veterans Administration)
      
      (a) Disability Compensation—Monthly payments ranging from $66 to $3,697 depending upon the degree of the veteran's disability. Additional amounts are payable for dependents if the veteran is 30% or more disabled. Reservists who receive this benefit are required to make an annual report to the VA on the number of days for which they receive drill and training pay. (38 U.S.C. Chapter 11)

      (b) VA Medical Care—Medical care in a VA facility or at VA expense is provided for service-connected disabilities. (38 U.S.C. Chapter 17)

      (c) Dependency and Indemnity Compensation (DIC)—Monthly payments are based on the deceased veteran's military pay grade and are payable to unremarried surviving spouses and dependent children. Parents can receive DIC benefits only if they can meet a "need" standard set by Congress. (38 U.S.C. Chapter 3)

      (d) Burial Benefits—A veteran whose death is service-connected is entitled to burial in the National Cemetery System. There is also entitlement to an amount not to exceed $1,100 towards the cost of the individual's funeral and burial expenses unless the cost of the burial is paid by the Army or by FECA. (38 U.S.C. Chapters 23 and 24)
SUBJECT: Health Related Benefits for SROTC Cadets

(e) Ancillary Benefits—Depending upon the type and degree of the service-connected disability, ancillary benefits such as vocational rehabilitation, an automotive and/or adaptive equipment, or a clothing allowance are available. (38 U.S.C. Chapters 11, 31, and 39)

(f) Serviceman's Group Life Insurance (SGLI)—$35,000 or a lesser amount at the cadet's option. SGLI is only available to the cadet attending advanced camp. It is not available to alien students or other ROTC students, or to 2-year program applicants attending basic camp. (18 U.S.C. Chapter 19)

(g) Service Disabled Veterans' Insurance, if cadet incurs a service-connected disability as a result of disease or injury during training (38 U.S.C. Chapter 19)

2. Death gratuity (through the U.S. Army). One-time payment of between $800 and $3,000. (10 U.S.C. Chapter 75)

3. Medical care (through the U.S. Army) (10 U.S.C. Chapters 55 and 355)

(a) If the cadet (reservist) is ordered to active duty (including active duty training) for a period of more than 30 days and is injured or disabled through disease incurred in line of duty or is ordered or called to active duty or inactive duty for any period of time and is disabled from injury in line of duty during that active duty the cadet is entitled to the hospital benefits provided to members of the Active Component of the Army.

(b) If the cadet (reservist) is on active duty for 30 days or less and becomes ill or contracts a disease in line of duty or while traveling to or from that duty, the cadet is entitled to medical and dental care appropriate to the treatment of his illness or disease until the resulting disability cannot be materially improved by further hospitalization or treatment. The cadet is entitled to subsistence during the period of hospitalization.

(c) If the cadet (reservist) is on active duty training and contracts a disease or becomes ill in line of duty during that training or if the cadet incurs or aggravates an injury while traveling to or from inactive duty training, the cadet is entitled to medical care and subsistence as described in l.c.(3)(b) above.

4. Social Security (through the U.S. Government) for reservist on active duty for training (as defined in 38 U.S.C.) and members of SROTC ordered to annual training duty for 14 days or more or while performing authorized travel to or from that duty. Social Security benefits are not available for inactive duty training. (42 U.S.C. Chapter 7)

2. Applicants for membership (non-reservist) in SROTC attending basic camp or members of SROTC who are engaged in flight or in flight instructions (except reservists involved in a flight or in flight instructions while on active duty
training whose entitlements are as listed in para. 1 above) are entitled to the following benefits under the Federal Employees Compensation Act: (5 U.S.C. Chapter 81)

a. The same benefits that are prescribed for a civilian employee of the United States who is injured in the line of duty. The Secretary of Labor has jurisdiction in each case. For purposes of computing compensation payable under this paragraph, the monthly pay of the cadet is deemed to be $150 dollars.

b. Death gratuity payable only to those individuals who entered ROTC under the revised "two-year rule" (i.e., attend basic camp subsequent to their entry into the program as an MS III cadet) and are killed during basic camp (i.e., payable to those who are reservist at the time of death).

3. Benefits available to all members of SROTC (contracted--reservist and enrolled--MS I & MS II cadets):

Army medical treatment facilities (subject to the availability of space, facilities, and the capabilities of the professional staff) are authorized to provide in-patient care to ROTC cadets and students who are injured or become ill while participating in Army-sponsored sport, recreational, or training activities (this applies to participating students and for voluntary training--e.g., airborne, air assault, and northern warfare training, FTX, etc.). Hospitalization is furnished only on a temporary basis until appropriate disposition can be accomplished. Such individuals may be given medical examinations and immunizations if needed. Hospital care will be furnished without charge except for subsistence. Medical expenses beyond the emergency medical care (temporary hospitalization) will be at the cadet's expense unless the cadet is otherwise entitled to medical care as described in paragraph 1 above. The cadet may, however, apply for reimbursement of medical expenses under FECA (subject to approval by the Secretary of Labor).

4. Proposed Legislation (TAB A)

a. Other action has been taken to provide medical and related benefits from the Department of Labor (FECA) or the Veterans Administration for all ROTC cadets depending on the cadet's status within the ROTC program, i.e. applicant for membership and noncontracted cadets (FECA benefits); and contracted cadets (reservist/member) (VA benefits). The bill also provides for payment of compensation for injuries under FECA at a higher pay rate than currently available.

b. The legislative proposal's, DOD 99-51, purpose is to amend Titles 5 and 38 U.S.C. to provide members of SROTC expanded health coverage for disabilities incurred during training.
c. The essence of the legislative proposal is to provide VA benefits (an increase to previous FECA coverage) for those ROTC cadets, "members," who have enlisted in the USAR (i.e., contracted scholarship or nonscholarship); and to provide FECA coverage for those students, "applicants for membership," enrolled in ROTC, but not enlisted in the USAR (i.e., MSI and MSII cadets and those students who will attend basic camp). This legislation does provide FECA coverage for those non-reserve MSI and MSII cadets who participate in voluntary training (i.e., airborne, air assault, northern warfare training, FTX, and other training directed by the Professor of Military Science).

d. The legislation is currently at General Counsel, OSD.

5. An additional question has been raised concerning students who are not enrolled in ROTC (participating, potential recruit, etc.), but have an interest, and become injured during an Army or ROTC sponsored activity (e.g., rappelling, an FTX, an orientation visit to a military installation, etc.). Such a student is not covered under the provisions of paragraphs 1-3 above except hospitalization as stated in paragraph 3.a. above. This situation is viewed akin to that of the civilian visitor to the military installation for an open-house, a demonstration, recruitment, etc. Such a visitor is not entitled to receive Government benefits in the event of an injury, nor is the family entitled to death gratuity. The ROTC community has raised questions on the propriety of setting aside monies to cover the possibility of an accident or injury to the prospective ROTC applicant. Given that this category of students is more difficult to define and that a similar category of civilians who may visit the military installation have only their personal insurance for protection, no additional action is projected on the part of DCSROTC or DMPM at this time.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity and RIC</th>
<th>Benefits Upon Injury/Death</th>
<th>Military Medical Treatment Facilities</th>
<th>Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act (FELA)</th>
<th>VA Medical and Disability</th>
<th>VA DIC</th>
<th>VA (Total) Benefits</th>
<th>Social Security Benefits</th>
<th>Military Death Grant</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private Activities on or off campus with no RIC direction</td>
<td>ALL RIC</td>
<td>MRRH, CHD</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attending Candidate instruction</td>
<td>ALL RIC</td>
<td>MRRH, CHD</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary off campus local FDX (other than Flight or Flight Training) Authorized by PMS</td>
<td>Non-Scholarship M1 and M2 (No UDR Status)</td>
<td>MRRH, CHD</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>(see note 1)</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
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<td>NO</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scholarship M1 and M2 (UDR Status)</td>
<td>MRRH, CHD</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Scholarship M3 and M4</td>
<td>MRRH, CHD</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attending an RIC approved Flight or Flight Training</td>
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<td>YES</td>
<td>(see note 1)</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
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<td>Scholarship M1 and M2 (UDR Status)</td>
<td>MRRH, CHD</td>
<td>YES</td>
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<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Attending or Travelling to or from Basic Camp</td>
<td>Applicable only to RIC Applicants (No UDR Status)</td>
<td>MRRH, CHD</td>
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<td>NO</td>
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<td>MRRH, CHD</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scholarship M1 and M2 (UDR Status)</td>
<td>MRRH, CHD</td>
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<td>NO</td>
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<td>NO</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>MRRH, CHD</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Non-Scholarship M3 and M4 (UDR Status)</td>
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<td>NO</td>
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</table>

NOTE 1: Emergency medical care is authorized on a space available basis on a temporary basis until appropriate disposition can be accomplished.

NOTE 2: In some cases an enrolled RIC matter (with enlisted UDR status) attends Basic Camp after entry into the Advanced Program. Under these circumstances, the care would be the VA benefits and military death grant in lieu of the DIC benefits. He would also be entitled to Social Security benefits.

8-3-5
MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL COUNSEL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ATTN: Director, Legislative Reference Service

INFORMATION TO: CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
Department of the Navy

DIRECTOR, LEGISLATIVE LIAISON
Department of the Air Force

SUBJECT: DOD 99-51, Proposed Legislation, "To amend titles 5 and 38, United States Code, to provide members of the Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps expanded health coverage disabilities incurred during training."

1. Reference is made to proposed Department of the Army legislation which was forwarded to your office on 15 March 1985 requesting a Resolution of Differences, and phone conversation of 14 March 1986 wherein Department of Defense gave Department of the Army clearance on the proposal provided the Department of Labor and Veterans Administration suggestions were incorporated into the proposed legislation.

2. Attached is a revised legislative proposal incorporating Department of Labor and Veterans Administration suggestions. It is requested that the attached revised legislative proposal be forwarded to OMB for clearance.

FOR THE CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON:

Enclosure
Dear Mr. Speaker:

Enclosed is a draft of legislation "To amend titles 5 and 38, United States Code, to provide members of the Senior Reserve Officers Training Corps expanded health coverage for disabilities incurred during training."

The proposal is a part of the Department of Defense Legislative Program for the 99th Congress, and the Office of Management and Budget advises that, from the standpoint of the Administration's program, there is no objection to the presentation of this proposal for the consideration of the Congress. The Department of the Army has been designated the representative of the Department of Defense for this legislation. The Army recommends that the proposal be enacted by the Congress.

Purpose of the Legislation

The purpose of this legislative proposal is to provide coverage of compensation for work injury or death to applicants for membership and members of the Senior Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) program who are not provided disability or death coverage under chapters 11 and 13 of title 38, United States Code. It also establishes the pay rate plus statutory allowances, if any, upon which the disability benefit would be based.

ROTC is essentially a four year program conducted at an accredited civilian educational institution designed to provide courses in the military sciences to prepare selected college graduates for service as Regular or Reserve commissioned officers. The military education provided by the ROTC program is divided into two progressive educational phases, basic and advanced training. Students enrollment in the basic phase, usually the first two years, may be elective or compulsory as provided by state law or the authorities.
of the institution where the student is enrolled. Participation in the advanced training, usually the third and fourth years, is totally voluntary and contingent upon the selection of the individual for such training by the sponsoring armed force. Students participating in advanced training are required to enlist in a reserve component of the sponsoring armed force while students participating in the basic phase normally are not. Thus, there are two categories of individuals who participate in the ROTC program, those who are in the ROTC commissioning program and incurred a military obligation, i.e., reservists, and those who have not, i.e., non-reservists.

The motivated and patriotic volunteers who make up the applicants for, and members of, the ROTC undergo numerous and sometimes dangerous training exercises. Each year deaths or serious injuries result from these exercises.

Currently, reservists who are injured while performing "required" military training are considered eligible for Veterans' Administration (VA) compensation. Additionally, non-reservist members of the ROTC engaged in training exercises considered "mandatory" for commissioning under chapter 103 of title 10, United States Code, also are eligible for disability compensation under chapters 11 and 13 of title 38, United States Code, based upon Public Law 97-306 (VA benefits). This law also made these benefits the exclusive remedy for members of the ROTC injured during such training. All other ROTC members who are injured or killed during training are not eligible for federal death or disability coverage, except those individuals killed or injured while engaged in flight or flight instruction under chapter 103 of title 10. Those individuals are eligible for Federal Employees Compensation Act (FECA), coverage under section 8140 of title 5, United States Code.

All of the training exercises ROTC members participate in are not considered required training for reservists, flight training, or mandatory training for commissioning under chapter 103. Accordingly, a member of the ROTC injured or killed during one of these exercises is not eligible for federal disability or death compensation. Even though they are not required to participate, many do. Many programs are designed to
attract volunteers by presenting fun, outdoor, and realistic training activities.

Since the individuals volunteer for the training, the cost of the exercise is greatly reduced. These training exercises, apart from the economical benefit gained for the government, provide the student with valuable experience which aids in his development as an officer, while allowing the military instructors an opportunity to evaluate the student outside the classroom environment.

Disability and death compensation coverage is needed to rectify what is now a confusing and unfair circumstance wherein individuals who are injured or who die during training may be denied disability compensation merely because the training they were engaged in was not considered required reserve or mandatory training for commissioning. The proposal ensures there is no situation in which a ROTC member's line-of-duty disability or death from injury incurred during authorized practical training is not compensable, either under FECA or VA benefits. VA compensation would be available to an ROTC member who has made a reserve commitment and is disabled from an injury incurred during authorized voluntary training or who is engaged in a training exercise that is mandatory for commissioning under title 10. FECA benefits would be available for the ROTC member who has not made such a reserve commitment or is merely applicants for membership in the ROTC, but are disabled from an injury incurred while participating in such voluntary training exercises. The knowledge that all applicants and members of the ROTC are protected by FECA or veterans' disability or death compensation, depending on their reserve status, will not only eliminate a valid concern for those training but also serve as a fair benefit for those motivated and patriotic individuals.

The instant proposal also makes a technical change to section 8140 of title 5, regarding the manner of computation of an award under FECA for an injury, would update the current provision that computes awards on a basis of $150 per month. The instant proposal would change the $150 basis to the statutory provision designating the computation of the pay (currently $461.40 under the provisions of 37 U.S.C. 203(c)(1)) that the cadets and midshipmen would receive, if paid.
The technical change is made to cause the computation of awards for compensation for injuries to this class of persons covered by FECA to be on the same basis as most other classes of persons covered under FECA.

Cost and Budget Data

The enactment of this proposal will cause no apparent increase in the budgetary requirements for the Department of Defense. The Veterans' Administration and the Department of Labor estimate that the proposal, if enacted, would entail a cost of approximately $1 million dollars in Federal compensation per fiscal year.

Sincerely,

Enclosure
A B I L L

To amend titles 5 and 38, United States Code, to provide members of the Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps expanded health coverage disabilities incurred during training.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 8140 of title 5, United States Code, relating to compensation for work injuries for members of the Reserve Officers Training Corps, is amended--

(a) by inserting after "who", "is not enlisted in the Reserve component of an armed force under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the military department concerned and" in paragraph (a);

(b) by revising section 8140 paragraph (a)(2) to read--"(2) while performing authorized travel to or from, or while attending, under the auspices of the Secretary of the military department concerned, field training or a practice cruise conducted by the Secretary of the military department concerned or his designee that is not compensable under chapters 11 and 13 of title 38.";

(c) in paragraph (c) by deleting "deemed $150" and inserting in lieu thereof "the amount of pay entitled under the provisions of section 209(c) of title 37 for attending field training or practice cruises to satisfy the requirements of section 2104(b)(6)(B) of title 10 for admission to advanced training."; and

(d) by adding at the end of the section the following new
subsection:

"(g) For the purpose of this section "applicant for membership in the Reserve Officer Training Corps" includes any individual who is ordered to, or is attending field training or a practice cruise as described in section 2104(b)(6)(B) of title 10, and who

(1) is matriculated in a school, college, or university where a unit of the Senior Reserve Officer Training Corps is established;

(2) is enrolled in a course of study involving instruction in the Reserve Officer Training Corps during a semester or other enrollment period; and

(3) is not enlisted in a reserve component of an armed force under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the military department concerned.".

Sec. 2. Section 101 (23) of title 38, United States Code, is amended--

(1) in clause (a), by striking out "law; and " and inserting in lieu thereof "law, except as provided in clause (C);";

(2) in clause (b), by striking out the period and inserting in lieu thereof a semi-colon and "and";

(3) by inserting a new clause (C) as follows:
"(C) duty performed on a voluntary basis by a member of a Senior Reserve Officers Training Corps program in a reserve status, when authorized by the Secretary concerned as practical field, sea, or air training for leadership development."; and

(4) by inserting in subclause (ii) in the last sentence, after "inactive status", "(except as provided in clause (C)),".

Sec. 3. The amendments made by this Act shall apply only with respect to deaths and disabilities resulting from injuries incurred or aggravated after September 30, 1986.
SECTIONAL ANALYSIS

Section 1(a) amends that portion of chapter 81 of title 5, United States Code, that provides coverage of that chapter relating to compensation for work injuries suffered by Federal employees during the performance of their duties by clarifying which individuals of the Senior Reserve Officers Training Corps are authorized coverage under Federal Employees Compensation Act. This section excludes individuals enrolled in a reserve component of the United States armed forces from coverage under Federal Employees Compensation Act.

Subsection (b) of the amendment expands the coverage of section 8140 to include those applicants for and members of the Senior Reserve Officers Training Corps who are injured or killed while traveling to, or from, or while attending training under the auspices of the Secretary of the Army or his designee if the injury or death is not compensable under chapters 11 and 13 of title 38.

Subsection (c) of the first section is a technical amendment to update and make comparable the basis on which the compensation for the work related injury is based under chapter 81 of title 5. The amendment would change the current stated amount of $150 for such basis to the actual amount the cadet or midshipman would be receiving by referencing the current payment authority (37 U.S.C. 209(c)). Section 209(c) of title 37 references section 203(c) of title 37 which states the dollar figure currently applicable to be $461.40.

Subsection (d) of the amendment clarifies the individuals provided coverage under Federal Employees Compensation Act by defining the term "applicant for membership in the Reserve Officers' Training Corps" to include all individuals enrolled in the Reserve Officer Training Corps program who are not members of a reserve component under the authority of the Secretary of the military department concerned when they are ordered to or attending field training or a practice cruise as described in section 2104(b)(6)B of title 10.

Section 2 amends that portion of chapter 1, of title 38, United States Code, that defines "inactive duty training" for the purposes of establishing veterans death or disability benefits. The amendment would characterize the duties performed by reserve members of the Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps on a voluntary basis during practical field, air, or sea training as inactive duty for training if authorized by the secretary of the sponsoring military department or his designee.

Section 3 is an effective date clause specifying that the amendments made by this Act are prospective and apply only for injuries or deaths occurring after September 30, 1986.
CHAPTER NINE

ACADEMIC EXCELLENCE

Undergirding much of the overall issue of quality in ROTC is the environment created on the campuses where the Army meets Academia. That this environment should be characterized by academic excellence is perfectly normal. It is what college life is all about. A recent university president described ROTC's impact on the college environment as follows: "ROTC is not the presence of the military in the university; it is the presence of the university in the military."

This study has defined academic excellence as the creation of an environment that is mutually supportive of the ROTC cadet's mastery of the basic academic and cognitive skills required to obtain a degree and earn a commission in the U.S. Army. This theme is not new and it has been the focus of other major studies. The Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO) study reached two important conclusions in this regard:

a. Precommissioning learning in the coming era must provide the foundations for continued learning throughout an officer's military career.

b. The earning of a baccalaureate degree sets the proper quality standard for precommissioning education, and general education in the liberal arts or sciences provides enough focus for most officers.

The Army Science Board Summer Study 1984, entitled "Leading and Manning" reinforced the need for a sound academic base for officers:

a. Essential knowledge, skills, and abilities include the ability to apply analytical processes to decision-making; general problem solving skills; mathematical skills; and written and oral communication skills. Foundations for these skills are developed in pre-commissioning education.

b. A disciplined, systematic acquisition of basic intellectual skills in pre-commissioning education enables post-commissioning education to achieve a higher quality, reduce time and energy expended in remedial work, and enhance the officer's professional development.

Through the many interviews conducted with top Army leadership at selected Corps and Division headquarters, and several TRADOC proponent schools, the ROTC Study affirms the notion that the quality of lieutenants produced by ROTC is improving. That notwithstanding, there are concerns in
the area of basic educational skills that have a direct bearing on academic excellence. These shortfalls in 3R's capabilities of college age students reflect, to a degree, the overall status of education in our society.

These concerns were succinctly expressed by the OPMS Study Group in its final report. "Commanders and school commandants indicate that a significant number of new lieutenants are deficient in the basic education skills: reading, writing, oral communications, and mathematics." Chapter 10 on Qualitative Management provides a detailed discussion of these deficiencies and actions ongoing to help resolve them.

PARTNERSHIP

The resolution of these 3R's deficiencies and the creation of the proper environment of excellence for ROTC hinge on the recognition and full appreciation of the fact that ROTC is truly a partnership between the Army and Academia. Like any good partnership, each partner must fulfill certain agreed upon roles, such as those spelled out in the formal contract that establishes ROTC at a given school (DA Form 918-1). The ROTC partnership model shown in Figure 9-1 incorporates some of these roles and adds new ones to emphasize the Army's need to take the initiative in creating the best possible environment for developing our future officers.

ACADEMIA-ARMY: ROTC PARTNERSHIP

ACADEMIC EXCELLENCE:

CREATION OF AN ENVIRONMENT THAT IS MUTUALLY SUPPORTIVE OF THE ROTC CADET'S MASTERY OF THE BASIC ACADEMIC AND COGNITIVE SKILLS REQUIRED TO OBTAIN A DEGREE AND EARN A COMMISSION IN THE U.S. ARMY

FIGURE 9-1
The value of this model, in a large sense, rests with its ability to relate to the real world in which ROTC operates. This ideal representation of the Army-Academia partnership does, however, have its own set of constraints. From academia's perspective, constraints on academic excellence might include the financial health of the school or the quality of its faculty. From the Army's standpoint, this model operates within and is affected by the condition of the four measures of ROTC system effectiveness: quality, diversity, cost, and numbers. Other factors also have an impact on the model's viability, such as demographic and market trends, the image of the military in society and the Army's emphasis on acquiring more officers with science or engineering degrees.

Academia is expected to provide strength to the partnership by granting academic credit for ROTC courses; by providing personnel, equipment, and monetary support to the ROTC instructor group; and by the attitudinal backing of the university administration and faculty. This support could result in improved recruiting and lead to increased academic credit for the ROTC program. The principle role for the Army in this partnership is to recognize the importance and priority of the students' pursuit of a quality undergraduate degree. Secondly, the Army must provide a challenging military science program of instruction that reinforces the cadets' mastery of the necessary basic academic and cognitive skills. Finally, it is incumbent on the Army to maintain the initiative in the partnership.

**PRIMACY OF THE DEGREE**

Primacy of the degree must be the foundation for the Army's actions in support of academic excellence. The importance of a solid academic background to our officers throughout their career has already been stressed. It is not a new idea. Implementing guidance for the 1970 ROTC Program of Instruction (POI) highlights the Army's respect for this principle:

The Army recognizes that it is an institutional prerogative to specify the academic courses which a student must pursue in order to obtain his degree. There is no intent by the Army to infringe on this prerogative in any manner. In cases where a cadet is pursuing a discipline which is narrowly restricted with few electives, the PMS should resolve any conflict in favor of the cadet's degree requirements.

9-3
By and large, the attainment of a college degree has been accepted as one of the primary requirements for appointment as an officer. It is the pursuit of a quality degree that brought the students to college in the first place. The Army should resist the temptation to solve difficult officer training problems by shifting more military skills training to ROTC, or by adding more academic course requirements to the list of precommissioning prerequisites.

The average college student is subjected to pressures of varying intensities throughout his/her academic experience. To a great degree this pressure aids in producing a top notch student and officer. Some control, however, needs to be exercised by both the Army and Academia lest these pressures become counterproductive. Not all the pressures on cadets result from Army policy. The academic world today has many of its own pressures. The "back-to-basics" movement is being felt throughout our education system, as a renaissance in educational excellence, manifested by such issues as competency testing for secondary schools, merit pay for teachers, and diagnostic/placement testing in colleges. In addition, the demands of rapidly changing technology place a premium on students competing for jobs in an increasingly "hi-tech" society. Many degree programs have requirements that take the student well beyond the traditional four years and leave little time for electives such as ROTC.

Pressures from within the Army result from an accumulation of excellent initiatives and programs, many designed to produce a better officer. Among these are Military Qualification Standards (MQS), foreign language study, 3R's emphasis, Advanced Camp preparation, and non-MQS training. ROTC today is paying a great deal of attention to competencies in the basic educational skills. This reflects the overall back to basics trend in our society and is a response to criticism from some field commanders about the abilities of their junior officers.

The DCSROTC has emphasized the need to be mindful of pressures placed on cadets from well-meaning training initiatives in his 15 May 1985 ROTC Commander's Notes: "...Training must be in digestibly moderate amounts to allow the college student (taking ROTC) more than enough time for a full campus life and academic achievement."

In view of resurging support for academic excellence as evidenced by various studies and reports from field commanders, a need exists to
strengthen the partnership between the Army and Academia. Additionally there is a need to adopt a policy establishing the primacy of the degree. A recommended policy is:

The attainment of a college degree should be recognized as the highest priority for ROTC cadets. The Army should carefully weigh any increases in ROTC precommissioning requirements that would significantly interfere with a cadet's attainment of a degree.

ACADEMIC CREDIT

Host institutions are required to treat ROTC like any other academic department with regard to academic credit. The formal contract (DA Form 918-1) states this as a mutual understanding: "...and that academic credit for military professional subjects will be judged by the institution under the same procedures and criteria as for other institutional courses."

Records on the status of academic credit at the various host schools and extension centers are maintained by the region headquarters. There is no ROTC-wide status at HQ ROTC. The last survey of the entire system was prepared under direction of HQDA in 1982. It provided information on (1) schools that gave no credit, (2) schools that gave credit only for the Advanced Course, and (3) schools that gave credit only for the Basic Course. Another survey was initiated by the ROTC Study Group that solicited information on academic credit as follows: (1) no credit at all, (2) some credit for some MS courses, and (3) full credit for all MS courses. Responses were received from 302 host instructor groups. Of the 314 host institutions, only two do not grant any credit whatsoever. These are St. Lawrence University in New York and Princeton University in New Jersey. One fact clearly emerged: The fullest possible picture of the academic credit status in ROTC is extremely complex. Schools vary their formulas and procedures for awarding credits, with different colleges within the same university often applying their own criteria. It is painfully obvious that Army ROTC has barely scratched the surface in this area, in spite of some detailed record-keeping at region level. The Army must have a more complete picture of the credit status across ROTC. Failure to be proactive in this area has potentially negative implications for recruiting. Students with an
already full curriculum may be unwilling or unable to take on a non-credit overload for ROTC. The adage "if you can't measure it, you can't manage it" is applicable. The status of academic credit has yet to be fully measured across the ROTC system.

Both the Air Force and the Navy require that status reports be submitted each year to their ROTC HQ. HQ NROTC conducts an intensive review of academic credit issues during tri-annual detachment inspections. The Air Force has established a goal of 12 credits toward graduation for the Professional Officer Course (Advanced Course). Beginning in February 1985, engineering schools which grant three or less credits and other schools which grant less than nine credits are targeted and placed in an intensive management program. Forty schools are currently targeted and quarterly progress reports are submitted to HQ AFROTC. As was mentioned earlier, academic credit is but one measure of support provided by the institutions which sponsor ROTC. The two other significant examples of support are in the areas of resources and attitude.

RESOURCE SUPPORT

Equally as complex as academic credit is the issue of resource support provided to ROTC by the host institution. There are contractual requirements spelled out on DA Form 918-1. These include provision of classroom and office space, office equipment, storage space, and "...other required facilities in a fair and equitable manner in comparison with other departments of the institution and to pay the costs of utilities and maintenance thereof." The ROTC survey of academic credit previously mentioned was part of a comprehensive survey to gain a broader look at the support provided to ROTC by Academia. In addition to academic credit, information on attitudinal support and resource support was compiled. Data was received on 302 of the 314 host institutions and 100 of the 106 extension centers. Resource data was collected in two categories:

a. Direct support which consists of discretionary funds given by the school directly to the PMS to improve his ROTC program.

b. Indirect support in the form of monies specifically allocated to pay for such things as secretarial or clerical support, transportation support,
audiovisual support, computers, and word processing equipment. A summary of the survey results on resources is shown on Figure 9-2.

### ACADEMIC EXCELLENCE

#### ACADEMIA'S RECORD

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**NOTES:**

1. GEORGETOWN, ST LAWRENCE, PRINCETON
2. RANGE FROM $54K BYU TO $50 PROVIDENCE
3. 289 SECS, 60% STUDENT HIRES VEH, STIPENDS

**FIGURE 9-2**

(Note: Effective school year 85-86, Georgetown University will award academic credit)

PMS discretionary funds ranged from $0 to $54,000. Overall, the survey results revealed that nearly two million dollars in discretionary funds were made available to ROTC during school year 84-85. All but twenty-five host schools provided some amount of discretionary funds to their PMS. Of these twenty-five, all but four provided some form of indirect resource support. The picture of indirect support is much more complex. The survey results led to the conclusion, as in the case of academic credit, that ROTC is barely scratching the surface in measuring and assessing the impact of this important source of resources. There are, for example, nearly two hundred secretaries, both full and part time, provided to instructor groups by the hosts and extension centers. Approximately five percent of the schools
provide transportation support, and almost ten percent of the instructor groups are furnished computers by their sponsor schools. The Army, of course, cannot completely control the resources given to ROTC instructor groups that lie beyond the scope of the contract. ROTC can, perhaps, do a more effective job in managing and distributing scarce resources if a more complete resource profile were known. Knowing that the PMS at BYU, for example, receives $54,000 a year from the school may have an impact on the amount of Army funding support required.

**ATTITUDINAL SUPPORT**

This third aspect of support is less defined but probably more important than the other two already discussed. This is a key ingredient in the success of the partnership and the creation of an environment of excellence. Of the 199 instructor groups that responded to this part of the survey, seventy-nine percent reported their perception of their school's support for ROTC as positive. Three percent indicated negative attitudinal support and eighteen gave responses of neutral. This information was supported in the ROTC Study Group survey of ROTC cadre. Eighty-two percent of the PMS' reported that the relationship between their instructor group and the school were good to excellent. The following excerpt from the *Educational Record*, a journal of higher education, exemplifies the kind of attitudinal support ROTC should enjoy:

The ROTC merger of the Military and Academe is in the best interests of society, the nation, the military services, and the campus. For the host school, enrollment projections can be enhanced by having a sprightly ROTC program. For the military, the campus is the best place to seek large numbers of qualified young people who can be encouraged to serve as officers in the armed forces. Together, academe and the military encourage the development of character, leadership, and other virtues for the benefit of all society.

LESLIE F. MALPASS  
PRESIDENT  
WESTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
CHALLENGING POI

The ROTC Program of Instruction is one of the strongest aspects of the entire ROTC system. The basis for the ROTC POI is MQS, which was briefly described in paragraph 4b of this chapter. One of the early assumptions of the study was that "significant revision of the MQS I training system will not occur until its first graduates can be properly evaluated." This study did not, therefore, undertake to review the list of Military Skills requirements, or the Professional Knowledge Components of MQS I for purposes of "validating" them. By strict definition the first MQS I manual became effective June 1984. Using the two year program, cadets who started during school year 84-85 and 85-86 would be the first to complete the MQS I POI. As this is still months away, it is premature to recommend changes that are not based on some measure of officer performance. The current POI for ROTC is described by TRADOC Circular 145-83-2. It is also outlined in a more general fashion in a pamphlet entitled "Senior Division Program of Instruction - Army ROTC," published by HQ, TRADOC in August 1984. The predecessor to the current POI was implemented in school year 1970-71. The MQS I based POI is, by comparison, more standardized, but there still is considerable flexibility for the PMS to build a program suited to his particular situation. The replacement of the 1970 POI with the current POI was the direct result of RETO. The point here is not to say whether or not MQS is the appropriate basis for ROTC's training system, but rather that the POI revision process for ROTC until very recently has been more reactive than proactive.

In January 1983, HQ TRADOC (ODCST) published a letter which outlined guidance for the continued development, management, distribution, and implementation of MQS. As prescribed in this letter, ODCSROTC:

a. Serves as the program manager for MQS I.
b. Submits MQS I taskings of service schools for content of manuals or development of training support packages to ATSC.

c. In coordination with DCST develops MQS I policies regarding qualification procedures which will interface with MQS II and MQS III.
d. Studies feasibility of developing diagnostic tests to be used by TRADOC service schools in assessing officer training provided through MQS I.
e. Develops a plan to monitor the effectiveness of MQS I programs in coordination with DCST.
f. Develops and submits a decision paper to CSA through Commanding General TRADOC and DA Office Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER) on implementing the MQS I program.

g. Develops an MQS I TRADOC Administrative and Certifying Circular and provides data for a DA Administrative and Certifying Common MQS Regulation.

The first of these responsibilities is most key to the issue of ROTC POI revision. As the process is currently developing, 9 percent review of MQS should occur every two years. Key players are ODCSROTC, ODCST, ATSC (Army Training Support Center, Fort Eustis), and the various proponent schools. In this review process, changes to MQS I must be approved by ODCSROTC, the program manager. To support the revision process, ODCSROTC gathers input from ROTC cadre during the Biannual Formal Inspections (BFI) of the detachments and from initial and follow-up surveys (beginning FY 86) of cadre training attendees. TRADOC Circular 145-83-2 is currently under revision. It is expected to become a TRADOC regulation. Inclusion of these procedures for reviewing and revising the ROTC POI in the new POI regulation should enhance the management of this program and assist the PMS in his understanding of the total ROTC system. In a related development the Deputy Chief of Staff for Training at HQ TRADOC has begun a review of the ROTC POI to ensure alignment with the Systems Approach to Training under TRADOC Regulation 350-7.

Of the other services, the Navy appears to have the most rigorous review/revision process. Instead of a single POI document like MQS, the Navy manages each Naval Science course separately. Selected Professors of Naval Science (PNS) are designated course coordinators. It is their job to maintain liaison with HQ USN in Washington and initiate periodic surveys of all 64 NROTC units to solicit input on which to base the review. The course coordinator and several cadre instructors for his particular course are brought together at HQ, NROTC to conduct the review. Each Naval Science course undergoes such a review every three years. For Air Force ROTC, changes to Aerospace Science (AS) courses are reviewed as necessary. Broad program guidance is received from HQAF in Washington. Action officer meetings are held at HQ, AFROTC semi-annually to review and revise portions of the AFROTC POI. Every two years, an 06 level review of POI issues is held.
INITIATIVE

There are a number of ways that the Army can exercise greater initiative in its relationship with Academia. It is too much to expect that improvements in the quality and quantity of officers produced through ROTC will be sparked solely by actions on the part of Academia. In this regard, the Army has a great deal to gain by becoming the proactive partner.

Currently there exist forums where the Army and Academia meet to discuss issues of mutual concern. Among these are the Army Advisory Panel (AAP) on ROTC and the Historically Black College (HBC) Conference. There are other educational conferences where ROTC should be represented. However, there does not appear to be an overall scheme for ROTC involvement in such conferences and associations at the national, regional, state, and local levels. The implications of such encounters in promoting good relationships with academicians are obvious. This partnership with academia must also not ignore unique schools which have made important contributions to ROTC such as the Military Colleges and Military Junior Colleges. A strong policy statement on academic excellence will send a clear message to the academic community that the Army is serious and wants to become more involved with academia. The need for such a renewed initiative by the Army can be summed up in the following remarks, extracted from an article written for the Educational Record, which highlighted ROTC in its winter 1985 issue:

I know the Army appreciates the support and understanding that it has received from the education community in the past. The need now is to expand and sustain the effort; to foster cooperation, mutual respect, and understanding; and to join together in a strong commitment to leadership of excellence for our armed services.

LTG (Retired) DEWITT C. SMITH, JR.
The Educational Record
American Council on Education Journal

CONCLUSIONS

a. As demonstrated by reports of commanders in the field, by diagnostic testing, and the conclusions of other high level studies, the Army should
place more emphasis on the ROTC cadets' pursuit of quality degrees which reflect mastery of basic academic and cognitive skills.
b. There is no ROTC-wide system for monitoring progress in attainment of academic credit for ROTC courses.
c. There is no ROTC-wide system for reporting resource support provided by the hosts and extension centers to the instructor groups. This information might enable a more efficient management and distribution of scarce resources.
d. ROTC already takes part in civilian educational conferences and associations, as well as the AAP on ROTC and the HBC Conference. There does not appear to be an ROTC-wide integrated plan for ROTC interface with Academia at all levels.
e. ROTC has accomplished a great deal in defining the process for reviewing and revising the ROTC POI. This process has not yet been captured in such a form that would provide the greatest benefit, especially for the PMS.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. An Army policy for Academic Excellence in ROTC should be approved as follows:

   The attainment of a college degree should be recognized as the highest priority for ROTC cadets. The Army should carefully weigh any increases in ROTC pre-commissioning requirements that would significantly interfere with a cadet's attainment of a degree.

2. An ROTC-wide system for monitoring the status and influencing the attainment of academic credit for ROTC should be established. This should be supported by the ROTC Mission Management System.

3. An ROTC-wide system should be established for monitoring the status of resource support provided by host institutions and extension centers. This system would increase efficiency in the management and distribution of scarce Army resources to ensure equitable distribution among detachments.

4. ROTC should continue development of its relationship with civilian educators through an integrated program of formal and informal interface with academia at the national, regional, state, and local levels.
5. The ROTC POI revision process should be aligned with the Systems Approach to Training and captured in writing as part of the new TRADOC Regulation 350-XXX (replacement for TRADOC Circular 145-83-2) on the ROTC POI.
CHAPTER TEN

QUALITATIVE MANAGEMENT

This study endorses the definition of quality as outlined in the BE-KNOW-DO philosophy of leadership contained in FM 22-100, and as further developed by the Professional Development of Officers Study (PDOS) in terms of precommissioning goals. Quality is one of the four factors used to measure the effectiveness of the ROTC System. Other factors are quantity, cost, and diversity. Within ROTC, quality is further defined by the standards that must be met for enrollment, contracting, and commissioning cadets.

The ROTC assessment system measures and manages the quality of ROTC commissionees. Assessment for purposes of this study is defined as the continual process of estimating the value or worthiness of cadets to become commissioned officers. The person who shoulders the greatest responsibility in this assessment process is the Professor of Military Science (PMS).

If the ROTC assessment system is to be effective in identifying cadets with good potential to be successful commissioned officers, it should:

a. Span the period of an ROTC cadet's life from enrollment to commissioning.

b. Establish valid standards for enrollment, contracting and commissioning.

c. Apply these standards to ensure that only cadets who achieve the desired level of "quality" are allowed to continue in the ROTC program and be commissioned.

d. Consist of measures of effectiveness that provide feedback from both inside and outside of the ROTC system to provide the element of quality control of the ROTC assessment system.

e. Reinforce the role of the PMS.

f. Allow for early diagnosis and remediation of individual weaknesses.

QUALITATIVE MANAGEMENT MODEL

The ROTC qualitative management model is shown at Figure 10-1. Quality
affects and is affected by quantity, cost and diversity. All four factors must be appropriately balanced to ensure a smooth running ROTC system.

**ROTC QUALITY MODEL**

![Diagram of ROTC Quality Model](image)

**FIGURE 10-1**

Individual assessment should occur from the time a cadet is enrolled and continue until attrition from the program or commissioning. The assessment system should continue to operate beyond the individual's commissioning. Tracking performance and retention data of ROTC commissionees over time will provide for improvement in the quality of the program's output. The quality model provides for early diagnosis and development of basic educational as well as other skills, including psychomotor and personality attributes. The basic education component is already functioning through the ROTC Achievement Testing Program, which will be discussed in detail later. This diagnosis and development dimension also demonstrates the Army's interest in ensuring that the academic quality is maintained for officers commissioned through ROTC and that the full potential of the Nation's human resources are exploited.

The remediation of identified weak areas is an individual responsibility. The Army of Excellence emphasizes the need for individuals to be committed to self-improvement. This desire for self-improvement must be inculcated in our future officers during the precommissioning years. The cadre's role is not only to instruct, but also to encourage cadets to take
advantage of all available resources—special programs, evening classes, tutoring and then monitor their progress in developing the necessary basic skills. This is part of mentoring. This early diagnosis and development works well with the four-year program cadet who can achieve the desired skill level prior to entry into MS III contract status.

Less fortunate in this regard are the cadets who enter ROTC through Basic Camp, prior service or JROTC. The assessment system must evaluate their level of development as well. This is made more difficult in view of the fact that many students are well into their major field of study by their junior year. This will impact on time available for remedial coursework, which is usually oriented to incoming freshman students rather than upperclassmen. Two year program cadets may not be willing to undergo remediation.

In view of the numbers of cadets who laterally enter the ROTC program, all these factors must be taken into account in evaluating the potential for a successful developmental program. Figure 10-2 reflects statistics on lateral entry for 1983 and 1984 as an indication of the magnitude of the combined lateral entry programs. Numbers shown are ROTC commissionees who entered ROTC through other than the four-year program.

ORIGIN OF ROTC COMMISSIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1983</th>
<th>1984</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic Camp</td>
<td>1608</td>
<td>1930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JROTC</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior Service</td>
<td>2469</td>
<td>2410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90 hr Summer Compression</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4820</td>
<td>4811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Total ROTC Commissionees)</td>
<td>8256</td>
<td>8284</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TRADOC (ATRO-R)
ROTCMIS JUN 85

FIGURE 10-2

At contracting, the level of mutual commitment between the Army and the cadet increases significantly. The cadet agrees to fulfill a certain military obligation as a commissioned officer, and the Army begins paying a
monthly subsistence allowance. It is during this period from contracting to commissioning that cadets undergo their most rigorous training and evaluation. A significant portion of their leadership evaluation occurs at Advanced Camp. And it is in the final two precommissioning years that the beginnings of commitment to a career of selfless service are forged.

**HISTORY OF ROTC QUALITATIVE MANAGEMENT**

The Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO) study concluded that enrollment standards were not uniform among the three major commissioning sources—ROTC, USMA and OCS. Requirements for entry into ROTC were described as lax. The comparison here is somewhat misleading due to the uniqueness of the ROTC program. The enrollment standards cited for ROTC were those applicable to the academically aligned, non-scholarship freshman. The first two years of the four-year program are frequently and appropriately viewed as a means for students to try out ROTC with no strings attached. The commitment is sealed on entry into MS III contract status at the beginning of each cadet's junior year. There are no upper quotas on MS I and II enrollment; in fact, high enrollment in the first two years is an indication of a successful program. Applicants seeking entrance to OCS or USMA, on the other hand, must compete for the limited spaces available.

The attrition data portrayed by RETO has been interpreted by some to suggest that ROTC was the least efficient officer producing source. First year attrition for ROTC was 54 percent compared with 24.9 percent for USMA. BIOC attrition was 10.5 percent. This simply reflects ROTC's enrollment philosophy as discussed above. ROTC will always suffer in this sort of comparison as long as students are invited to enroll in ROTC on a trial basis. This study has found nothing to support the idea that entrance into ROTC for non-scholarship freshman students should be made more restrictive. ROTC is unique in that it is not a completely Army-run program, like USMA and OCS. ROTC coexists on a civilian university campus in partnership with academia. This is a key factor to be considered when comparing all three commissioning sources and is discussed in detail in Chapter 9, Academic Excellence.

RETO offered two recommendations for standardization of entrance requirements for the three major commissioning sources. First, RETO
recommended that the United States Army should move immediately to further develop the medical, physical fitness, and mental Assessment Center concept for full implementation during FY 81. The Assessment Center concept called for consolidation of mental, physical, medical and leadership entry requirements for ROTC co-located with Armed Forces Entrance Examination Stations (now called Military Enlistment Processing Stations). USMA and BIOC agencies for the preselection procedures were to continue unchanged under this concept. This proposal was not adopted due to the administrative and logistical costs. Documented rationale for this decision could not be found. In the future as the Army moves to operate more cost effectively in its recruitment operations, this idea should be explored in greater detail for implementation.

RETO also recommended that a screening system be developed that incorporates academic, medical, physical fitness, and mental testing for entry qualification to all precommissioning programs. This recommendation is embodied in the current ROTC Precommissioning Assessment System (PAS). Instead of altering the enrollment standards for the non-scholarship freshman student, PAS prescribes standards for entrance into MS III contract status.

The PAS was implemented for ROTC in School Year (SY) 81-82. It has also been adopted for OCS and USMA with some variations. Figure 10-3 compares elements of the ROTC Precommissioning Assessment System with the RETO prescribed screening process. The overall ROTC Assessment System developed from RETO was designed to be implemented in three phases: screening, development, and testing. In Phase I, screening, the prospective MS III cadet undergoes an assessment using five components to determine his suitability for contracting. This phase has been implemented by the PAS. Phase II involves the remediation of identified weaknesses and is accomplished by the individual outside the context of the ROTC Program of Instruction. Phase III is the certification phase which occurs just prior to commissioning. Although phases II and III were never formally implemented under the ROTC Assessment System, they have been adopted in the ROTC Achievement Testing Program, begun in SY 84-85. This program will be discussed later in this chapter.

ROTC's current assessment system, the PAS, addresses only the contract screening of cadets. As discussed earlier, the ideal assessment system
spans the full life of an ROTC cadet. PAS, therefore, is not the total answer and should be expanded in scope. A single program vehicle for assessment makes more sense than a series of isolated programs such as those in existence today. ROTC currently has several programs that could be combined under PAS. Among these are the Quality Assurance Program, implemented in response to a high OBC failure rate in FY 80, and the Achievement Testing Program, implemented in FY 84 in response to complaints about academic capabilities of new lieutenants. Both of these programs could be addressed under PAS, using the ROTC quality model (Figure 10-1) as the ideal description of qualitative management. Recently, two more quality dimensions have arisen that warrant inclusion in the overall assessment system. Both of these—basic educational skills and English as a Second Language (ESL)—will be dealt with later in this chapter.

**COMPARISON: RETO RECOMMENDATION AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION FOR ASSESSMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASSESSMENT COMPONENT</th>
<th>RETO PRESCRIBED SCREENING PROCESS</th>
<th>PRECOMMISSIONING ASSESSMENT SYSTEM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACADEMIC</td>
<td>SAT or ACT required for RIOPC, ROTC, USMA RIOPC candidates should achieve two years of college</td>
<td>OFFICER SELECTION BATTERY (OSR) REPLACES ACT/SAT/CEB (CADET EVALUATION BATTERY)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDICAL</td>
<td>STANDARD MEDICAL EXAM; NO EXCEPTIONS UP AR 40-79</td>
<td>STANDARD MEDICAL EXAM (UP AR 40-50) (THIS REQUIREMENT WAS IN EFFECT ENTRY INTO MS III CONTRACT STATUS PRIOR TO RETO RECOMMENDATION)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHYSICAL FITNESS</td>
<td>PHYSICAL APITUDE EXAM (PAE) FOR USMA AND ROTC APRT FOR RIOPC</td>
<td>PAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYCHOLOGICAL</td>
<td>PRE-SELECTION INTERVIEW PAPER AND PENCIL TEST</td>
<td>STRUCTURED INTERVIEW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEADERSHIP</td>
<td>LEADERSHIP LAB INVOLVING SIMULATIONS</td>
<td>LEADERSHIP ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (LAP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE 10-3**

**QUALITATIVE MANAGEMENT COMPONENTS**

This section does not attempt to analyze all the standards which a cadet must meet to remain in ROTC and receive a commission. The focus of the
study was narrowed to components with clearly identifiable weaknesses which have the greatest impact on qualitative management—academic, physical, medical, and leadership. These components have been taken from those portions of AR 145-1 that deal with criteria for ROTC enrollment, retention, and commissioning. Each component will be dealt with in terms of appropriate background, current standards, new issues, recommendations and impact. Comparative data from ROTC programs of the USAF and USN is also included.

Academic Standards. The current academic standards are displayed at Figure 10-4. In addition, this section will consider the 2.0 GPA standard, academic retention and waivers, the Officer Selection Battery (OSB), basic educational skills concerns, the Achievement Testing Program, and English as a Second Language (ESL). Information on other services' academic standards is at Figure 10-5.
CURRENT ACADEMIC STANDARDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scholarship</th>
<th>Non-scholarship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Enrollment</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General: be enrolled (or accepted) in a university or college that has ROTC.</td>
<td>General: be enrolled full time at university or college that has ROTC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 year scholarship</td>
<td>2 year program: have attained 2.0 GPA (Grade Point Avg.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>possess scholastic potential (SAT 850/ACT 17 are minimums)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/2 year scholarship:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>current &quot;C&quot; average (2.0 GPA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MJC candidates: 115 GST</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(General Screening Test)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contracting</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All: 2.0 GPA (entry into adv crse)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selected: all cadets for whom English is a second language (primarily from Univ of Puerto Rico) must achieve a score of 70 on the English Comprehension Level Test (ECLT) (Interim Change 101 to AR 145-1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commissioning</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All: baccalaureate degree (except Early Commissioning Program cadets), 2.0 GPA, MQS certification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selected: all cadets for whom English is a second language must achieve 80 on the ECLT.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AR 145-1

FIGURE 10-4
### OTHER SERVICES ACADEMIC STANDARDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NROTC²</th>
<th>AFROTC³</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ENROLLMENT</strong></td>
<td>FULL-TIME STUDENT</td>
<td>FULL-TIME STUDENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONTRACTING</strong></td>
<td>2.0 GPA</td>
<td>HOST GPA STANDARD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AFOQT SCORE 15V/10Q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMMISSIONING</strong></td>
<td>DEGREE 2.0 GPA</td>
<td>DEGREE HOST GPA STANDARD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTES**

1 - Non-scholarship only

2 - NROTC governed by CNETINST 1533.12C

3 - AFROTC governed by APR 45-10

**FIGURE 10-5**
a. GPA STANDARD. The Study Group Cadre survey revealed that nearly 60 percent favored the current 2.0 GPA standard for commissioning. Approximately 40 percent believed the standard should be higher than 2.0 (ranging from 2.1 -2.8). Survey results are shown in Figure 10-6.

The 2.0 GPA standard for commissioning is not a guarantee of uniform academic excellence. Schools vary in quality and a 2.0 GPA has a different meaning from one school to the next. This is an obvious condition that is further reflected in the variance among schools in SAT/ACT requirements for enrollment. ROTC's Achievement Testing Program goes beyond the 2.0 GPA and will eventually apply valid standards in the 3R's based on nationally recognized tests. At this time there is no requirement to change the 2.0 GPA requirement. The 2.0 GPA was addressed by the OPMS Study Group which reached the same conclusions.
b. Academic Retention and Waivers. Scholarship cadets are, of course, contracted and must maintain a 2.0 GPA. There is no GPA requirement for advancement from MS I to MS II for non-scholarship cadets. The standard retention criteria of a 2.0 GPA applies to Advanced Course cadets. During MS III/IV only one waiver is permitted for a maximum deviation of 0.1. A cadet can only drop below a 2.0 GPA for one term during the Advanced Course. Waiver approval authority is vested at HQ TRADOC with the Commander, ROTC. Although not an academic waiver, per se, a 2.5 GPA is a pre-requisite for submission of any other waiver. All subordinate commanders (PM3, Area, Region) can disapprove a request for academic waiver.

c. Officer Selection Battery (OSB). The primary mental qualification specified by AR 145-1 (Change 12, 1 Mar 82) was the Cadet Evaluation Battery (CEB). A score of 80 was required for gaining MS III contract status. For admission to MS III at a Military College or Military Junior College, a minimum score of 850 on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) or 17 on the American College Test (ACT) is required. If these scores are not available the CEB was to be administered. Under the initial PAS concept a new mental screen, the Officer Selection Battery (OSB), was to be implemented in SY 82-83 as a replacement for the SAT/ACT/CEB. It was to become the sole mental screen for entry into MS III contract status. The OSB was developed by the Army Research Institute (ARI) over a four-year period beginning in 1979. In February 1982, a message was sent from HQ ROTC directing that the OSB not be used as a mental screen for Fall 82 contracting, delaying its implementation until SY 83-84. This additional time was needed to allow for proper validation of the OSB prior to implementation.

For SY 83-84, the OSB was to be administered to all cadets prior to contracting, replacing the CEB. In order to meet that goal the OSB was to be given to all scholarship applicants in the summer of 1982 (SY 83-84, 4yr, early cycle) to help validate the OSB. For these applicants, the SAT/ACT was to remain the primary scholarship mental screen. Presumably, comparison of OSB and SAT/ACT scores would serve to validate the OSB and establish the minimum score. A subsequent message to the ROTC community announced that the OSB implementation was postponed until SY 83-84, and further, that the CEB, which was deleted as a requirement for contracting commencing with the Fall 1983 enrollment period, was to be reinstated. The result was that the
CEB was to be used for contracting during fall 1983. This latest guidance appears to have been contradictory; exactly which test (OSB or CEB) was to govern SY 83-84 contracting was still unclear. This conflict was resolved with the issuance of the PAS Implementation Policy for SY 83-84, in a 7 October 1983 letter from HQ ROTC to the four regions. This specified the CEB/SAT/ACT combination as the mental screen for SY 83-84 contracting. This letter also moved the OSB implementation date to 1 February 1984, making it the sole mental screen for SY 84-85 contracting. On 6 February 1984, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) (ASA(M&RA)) directed that the use of the OSB as a mental screen be postponed pending additional research on its validity and impact on minority officer production. It was retained as a diagnostic instrument.

At the March 1984 Historically Black Colleges Conference, the keynote address given by the Honorable Delbert L. Spurlock, ASA(M&RA), cited his concerns over use of the OSB as a mental screen:

"...artificial barriers that seek to roll back minority gains in the Army or which deny its positive impact are contrary to our nation's commitment to pluralism and constitutionality."

He further said that the Army should consider all possible alternatives to the OSB:

"But I do want to assure you that the issue is open; that we should look at all alternatives to the measurement of excellence as it is developed by you and your officers."

In his 6 April 84 memo to the Director of the Army Staff, Mr. Spurlock again articulated his position regarding the use of the OSB as a mental screen:

"...the use of paper and pencil tests as sole criteria for selection where the performance based evidence or measurements are available is unacceptable."

At about this same time TRADOC was in the process of implementing the Achievement Testing Program for ROTC. This program included the use of the OSB as a diagnostic instrument (desired score 90) during MS I and for
program certification during MS IV. The MS IV OSB test results (qualification score never established) would be used to determine final eligibility for commissioning, not as a sole disqualifier, but combined with other officer potential indicators such as Advanced Camp performance before the final commissioning decisions were made.

At the April 1984 Army Commanders' Conference, the OSB issue was again raised. At this time the ASA(M&RA) directed that OSB scores remain with the instructor group due to their sensitivity for minorities. TRADOC expressed concern that lack of OSB data at HQ ROTC level would hamper quality selection. TRADOC was tasked to develop a data collection policy that would permit TRADOC access to OSB results without linking the results to specific institutions. This was accomplished and HQ ROTC has begun to receive OSB results.

On 27 September 1984 the ASA(M&RA) approved the Achievement Testing Program for implementation. The use of the OSB as a diagnostic test in MS I would continue. The use of the OSB as an MS IV certification examination prior to commissioning was approved in concept for SY 86-87 at the same time this approval that the standards and procedures for use of the OSB as a certifying instrument be briefed to the ASA(M&RA) in the summer of 1986. In its October 1984 final report, the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) Study Group recommended that ODCSPER readdress the use of the OSB with the ASA (M&RA) with the recommendation that:

a. The OSB be used as a diagnostic instrument in MS I and MS II/noncontract status.

b. ROTC establish/sponsor a remedial training program for MS I and MS II cadets who fail to score at least 97 on the OSB.

c. A score of 97 on an alternate version of the OSB be used as a qualification standard to enter MS III/contract status.

d. Appropriate waiver provisions be established to allow applicants with other outstanding qualifications and leadership potential to enter MS III/contract status with scores of less than 97 on the OSB.

This issue is considered closed by the OPMS implementation team based on the results of the 27 September 1984 meeting with the ASA(M&RA) noted above. With the elimination of the OSB, CEB, SAT, ACT screening criteria the current situation is that a 2.0 GPA is the only mental screen applied at the time of a cadet's contracting in MS III. The OSB appears to have been
tacitly approved for use as a component of the commissioning criteria pending establishment of a valid test score, and final review and approval by the ASA(M&RA).

d. Basic Educational Skills. This is the first of two new dimensions for inclusion in the PAS. Concern over ROTC commissionees' achievement of acceptable levels in the basic educational skills of writing, reading, and mathematics surfaced most recently in 1983. This was in response to concerns expressed by Army field commanders that newly commissioned lieutenants had deficiencies in basic skill deficiencies. The Vice Chief of Staff, Army echoed these concerns, particularly those regarding reading capability levels of officers. He asked what ROTC was doing to ensure that commissionees read at the twelfth reading grade level. The following taskings came out of the 1983 TRADOC Commanders' Conference:

"Develop program to improve communicative skills for officers---Establish precommissioning screening and instruction---Increase instruction and testing in OBC, OAC, CAS3, CGSC---Use diagnostic tests with remedial training for students below standards."

At the March 1984 HBC Conference it was agreed that a concerted effort be undertaken to improve basic skills. This was spurred by higher than average OBC failure rates from open enrollment schools including some of the HBC's and demonstrated weaknesses of some officers from these schools in communicative skills. In April 1984, as TRADOC's Achievement Testing Program was gathering steam, an HBC ad hoc Committee held its first meeting to formulate plans for skill development programs at the HBC's using existing programs as a start point. At about the same time HQ, ROTC initiated the Leadership Enrichment Program (LEP) which was also known as Instrumental Enrichment. Its goal was to improve cognitive and communications skills as part of the ROTC Basic Course, and appears to have been targeted at the HBC. It was slated for implementation in SY 84-85. In March 1985 LEP was terminated by HQ, ROTC, which could not afford to dedicate the required resources due to the emergence of the Achievement Testing Program. At the March 1985 HBC Conference, the Enhanced Skill Training program was approved for implementation. This program consists of an Army-funded contract training program of basic educational and cognitive
skills. Separate contracts will be established for each participating HBC. The program is set for implementation in SY 85-86, with 19 of 21 HBC participating. The funding requirement is about $2.5M annually. HQ ROTC is providing funds through internal reprogramming for FY86. Funding for FY 87-91 has been set aside under Program Development Incremental Package (PDIP) 1U6F, entitled Wedge of Minority Skills, with staff proponency under HQDA, ODCSPER.

e. **English as a Second Language (ESL).** In addition to basic educational skills achievement in reading, writing, and mathematics, another dimension concerns that segment of our population for whom English is a second language. For purposes of ROTC qualitative management, this discussion will focus on the hispanic population which includes the large portion of the ROTC market found on the two campuses of the University of Puerto Rico (UPR).

It has been generally accepted that the ability to communicate in English is an essential part of Army life. A recent test (SY 83-84 MCET) of English ability among MS IV cadets revealed that hispanics scored significantly below their white counterparts. Earlier, in response to a significant OBC failure rate for hispanic Second Lieutenants, chiefly for reasons of English ability, HQDA, ODCSPER in February 1982 initiated a program that provided up to 16 weeks of ESL training between commissioning and attendance at OBC for second lieutenants who had not achieved a score of 80 on the English Comprehension Level Test (ECLT).

The ECLT is a paper and pencil instrument developed by the Defense Language Institute English Language Center (DLIELC) at Lackland AFB, Texas. (The Air Force is the DOD Executive Agent for the Defense English Language Program.) A score of 80 on the ECLT has been generally recognized as the minimum proficiency for success in an English speaking environment. This score was also independently validated by ARI. This program has provided training for about 150 officers (2LTs) per year, the vast majority from UPR. Interim Change Number 101 to AR 145-1 (which expired 23 September 1984) contained the following language proficiency requirements:

1. An ECLT of 65 prior to attending Basic Camp.
2. An ECLT of 70 as a prerequisite for entry into MS III contract status.
3. An ECLT of 75 in order to attend Advanced Camp.
4. An ECLT of 80 prior to commissioning.

The final draft of the revised AR 145-1 requires that prior to enrollment in MS III the ECLT is to be given to cadets who have English as a second language. No minimum score is specified. The revised AR 145-1 also calls for an ECLT of 80 as a pre-requisite for commissioning. There is a conflict in HQDA policy as expressed by AR 145-1 and AR 621-5. As previously mentioned AR 621-5, published September 1985; requires officers to achieve a score of 80 on the ECLT prior to attendance at OBC, as opposed to being a commissioning requirement as covered by AR 145-1.

The ROTC Study Group favors a commissioning requirement on ESL. The Air Force generally has higher standards in this area, and has recently added a speaking/listening comprehension component. The Navy has no service-wide English Language program or standards for ROTC graduates. English standards in the other services for ROTC are shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Contract</th>
<th>Commission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFROTC</td>
<td>ECLT 80</td>
<td>ECLT 90, C/S Rating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NROTC</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Several Army initiatives have been taken to improve the English abilities of ROTC cadets prior to commissioning. The Puerto Rican National Guard operates the English Technical Language School (ETLS) at Fort Allen. It is an intensive summer program conducted once per year varying from four to eight weeks. Cadets may attend voluntarily or be selected for attendance by their PMS. This program recently came under criticism in an Army Audit Agency (AAA) report (#3086-200), Subject: ROTC Program in First ROTC Region, Fort Bragg, NC. In AAA's view, ETLS is not the most effective means for improving English capability.

All Military Science classes at UPR are conducted in English. Although the majority of college courses at UPR are taught in Spanish, UPR does require 12 hours of English spread over the first two years of college. High school students receive four years of English training with concentration on reading and writing skills, which covers two of the four primary language skills. These are, in order of difficulty (most to least), speaking, listening comprehension, writing, and reading. The most recent initiative involves non-resident, DLIELC - approved, English language
training during the Advanced Course. This is done at a cost of approximately $200K per year (PDIP 1U6R). This program, designed as a recruiting and retention initiative for POM 86-90, was approved by the VCSA in March 1984 for resourcing and execution.

Physical Standards. Figure 10-7 outlines the physical requirements for enrollment, contracting, and commissioning of ROTC cadets. Additional issues include the establishment of a single physical contracting standard, the need for a formal sustainment program, and waivers.

Having noted the emergence of a dual standard for contracting, there is a need to clarify the philosophical basis for the requirement. The contracting standard should either measure trainability or ability and be measured by either the Physical Aptitude Test (PAE) or the APRT. The PAE is a measure of potential or trainability and is the standard for entry into USMA. The APRT, on the other hand, measures current physical ability. A single standard of measurement is needed. It appears that the APRT alternative was introduced in response to complaints from Instructor Groups about the difficulties of administering the PAE.

CURRENT PHYSICAL STANDARDS:

**Enrollment**

- **Scholarship:** Physical Aptitude Exam (PAE)
  - Male 450/Female 350 minimums
  - Army Physical Readiness Test (APRT) 180 min
  - (60 per event minimum)

- **Non-scholarship:** none

**Contracting**

- Two choices (PMS decision)
  - **PAE**
  - APRT (Basic Camp cadets must pass APRT at camp; this satisfies the contracting requirement)

- *PAE/APRT - no strict minimums apply, only goals*

**Commissioning**

- APRT (180 minimum, 60 per event)
  - The last formally directed (HQ ROTC) APRT occurs at Advanced Camp.

**FIGURE 10-7**

10-17
The other services have given specific program guidance regarding physical fitness standards to their ROTC Instructor Groups. The Navy physical fitness test is administered twice a year to all midshipmen (contract and non-contract alike). The Air Force requires each contracted cadet to be tested annually, within 45 days after the start of the school year.

The Army has not published similar specific guidance regarding sustainment of physical readiness. This condition is exacerbated by two factors. The Army training philosophy described in AR 350-1 is two-fold and calls for both initial and sustainment training and second, MQS I contains a military skills task entitled "Establish Physical Readiness Program". The cadet is to learn how to build and maintain physical readiness in a unit. Without an ROTC-wide sustainment program of its own, ROTC is not providing the best possible role model in this area.

A review of current waiver policy letters and AR 145-1 reveals no latitude in the form of waivers for commissioning physical fitness requirements. If the physical fitness standards are not met, the cadet cannot become commissioned. Retention waivers are not an issue as there is no system-wide prescribed physical fitness sustainment program.

Medical Standards. The current medical standards for the US Army are shown at Figure 10-8.

**CURRENT MEDICAL STANDARDS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enrollment</th>
<th>Scholarship</th>
<th>Non-scholarship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3,4 yr - AR 40-29 and Chapter 5 of AR 40-501</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Statement by physician (DA Form 3425-R)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracting</td>
<td>2 yr - AR 40-29 and Chap 5 of AR 40-501</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AR 40-29 and Chapter 2 of AR 40-501</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissioning</td>
<td>Same as for contracting. The medical exam given at Advanced Camp satisfies the commissioning requirement.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE 10-8
Since September 1980, medical waiver approval for entrance and retention of cadets has been maintained at HQ, TRADOC level. The TRADOC surgeon reviews each case and provides a recommendation for a decision by the CG, TRADOC. This authority cannot be delegated. The latest draft revision of AR 145-1 states that medical waiver approval will be vested in the ROTC Commanders. Requests for medical waivers, unlike other waivers, cannot be disapproved at any level below the Commander of TRADOC. A pilot "Power Down" project that gives more decision-making authority to the PMS. Twenty schools are involved. In the medical waiver area, the PMS must coordinate with the TRADOC surgeon but has the authority to approve/disapprove medical waiver requests.

Leadership Standards. Leadership standards are inextricably linked to other ROTC standards for enrollments, contracts and commissions. The employment of these standards at each phase require subjective assessments of each cadet's leadership potential.

a. Enrollment Phase: Measuring leadership potential begins with the decision to award a scholarship to an incoming cadet. AR 145-1 (revised) says that leadership potential "will be emphasized as a very important factor for selection and continuation of a scholarship." This is accomplished through consideration by cadre members of such things as demonstrated academic excellence, extra-curricular activities, personality, appearance and physical fitness. Non-scholarship ROTC candidates are evaluated much the same way, but there is no similar specific regulatory requirement to do so.

b. Contracting Phase: There is no leadership "gate" through which cadets must pass to enter the ROTC Advanced Course. However, evaluation of leadership potential is continuously conducted by each PMS and other members of the Instructor Group. AR 145-1 states that "leadership potential will be emphasized as a very important factor in selections for the Advanced Course." The same requirement applies to the Basic Camp.

c. Commissioning Phase: Selection of a cadet to be commissioned confirms that the cadet has demonstrated leadership potential in a variety of observed situations overtime. Especially significant precursors to this decision are the leadership evaluation at Advanced Camp and the results of any Leadership Assessment Program exercise.
The Leadership Assessment Program (LAP). This program was developed from a RETO recommendation for an Assessment Center concept and was discussed previously. It has evolved as part of the Precommissioning Assessment System (PAS) and is designed to assess leadership potential at the contracting point through simulation techniques. LAP was developed by ARI from 1980 to 1982, and was implemented for ROTC during SY 82-83. LAP is conducted using a series of five simulation exercises:

1. **In basket.** Participant acts on 21 letters, memos, and requests that have accumulated on a predecessor's desk.

2. **Assigned-role Leaderless Group Discussion.** Participant attends a special meeting of the Post Maintenance Review Board and must present and defend his or her unit's request for additional maintenance funds.

3. **Oral Presentation.** Participant is required to make an oral presentation on the results of the Maintenance Review Board.

LAP is not administered to all cadets. LAP was designed to develop a picture of the prospective MS III cadet in terms of 12 enabling skills, including initiative, judgment, oral communication, delegation, sensitivity, and others. Basic Course cadets are not required to undergo LAP. It is mandatory for two general categories of cadets: (1) lateral entry cadets except prior service cadets with an RE code of ono and MJC graduates that the PMS has not previously observed or evaluated, and (2) cadets identified as marginal performers at either Basic or Advanced Camp. Assuming that the 12 enabling skills are important to all Advanced Course cadets, it is not clear why Basic Course cadets are not assessed with LAP. Nothing in the ROTC POI seems to suggest that Basic Course cadets undergo any special evaluation of these enabling skills. As for the marginal performers, it is questionable whether or not a single, day-long LAP session will materially alter the PMS's assessment of their leadership potential.

LAP assessor training for PMS/APMS is incorporated into the first week of cadre training, or TROEP (TRADOC Orientation and Enrollment Program), conducted at Fort Harrison, Indiana. Based on comments received from the Study Group survey, ROTC cadre are widely divided on the benefits of LAP. Thirty-five percent liked it as is, 38 percent said it should be discontinued, and 27 percent said it should be administered to all cadets. Many cadre commented that LAP is time consuming and merely reinforces their own assessments of the cadets.
On balance, LAP appears to be a negative rather than positive approach to leadership assessment. Because of its selective nature, LAP has fallen short of meeting the intent of the RETO recommendation to develop a leadership laboratory package using simulations and/or the Training Extension Course mode to gauge the leadership potential of future ROTC officers. Nothing in RETO suggests that this gauging should only apply to selected cadets.

The Center for Army Leadership (CAL), which is part of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, has developed a Lieutenants' Task List that is intended to replace the current leadership block of instruction in MQS I. This task list was presented at a Precommissioning Leadership Conference in early April 1985, at the U.S. Military Academy. This task list considers nine leadership components, many of which align with the 12 enabling skills which form the basis of the LAP philosophy, as seen in Figure 10-9.
LEADERSHIP SKILLS

CAL^1 LEADERSHIP COMPONENTS

TAKING CHARGE
COMMUNICATIONS
TEACHING AND COUNSELLING
SUPERVISION
PLANNING
DECISION MAKING
SOLDIER TEAM DEVELOPMENT
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
LEADERSHIP DOCTRINE AND THEORY

LAP^2 TWELVE ENABLING SKILLS

INFLUENCE
INITIATIVE
ORAL COMMUNICATIONS
PRESENTATIONS
WRITTEN COMMUNICATIONS
INFLUENCE^3
SENSITIVITY
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL
DELEGATION
PLANNING AND ORGANIZING
PROBLEM ANALYSIS
DECISIVENESS
JUDGMENT
INFLUENCE^3
DELEGATION^3
SENSITIVITY^3

1-CENTER FOR ARMY LEADERSHIP
2-LEADERSHIP ASSESSMENT PROGRAM
3-REPEATED ITEM

FIGURE 10-9

MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

Just as the overall ROTC system requires the application of measures of effectiveness (quality, numbers, diversity, cost) the Qualitative Management subsystem also must be evaluated. A two dimensional approach will assess ROTC cadets as a group during their development (internal feedback) and the ROTC graduate officers by their performance (external feedback). Generally, the current measures of effectiveness for quality do not provide ROTC a broad enough basis on which to make significant shifts in policies and procedures in the area of qualitative management.

10-22
a. **Internal Feedback.** Several measures of effectiveness are used within the ROTC system. Aside from the established standards for enrollment, contracting, and commissioning, many other measures exist; however, they are not woven into a system-wide process for assessing the health of the ROTC program.

The ROTC Commander and Region Commanders use varying measures of effectiveness in judging the quality of their particular programs. One of the regions recently announced that it had begun a new quality control program. Indicators of quality included waiver submissions, academic alignment, disenrollment rates, cumulative GPA, and OSB test scores. In his letter to the ROTC Commander, the region commander opens with a statement that sums up the situation: "ROTC currently does not have a quality measurement language." The ROTC system lacks a system for measuring effectiveness in order to help manage quality.

b. **External Feedback.** The only system-wide measure of effectiveness coming from outside the ROTC community is the Officer Basic Course (OBC) failure rate. Tracking of OBC failures began in earnest in FY81, on the heels of an unacceptably high number of OBC failures from ROTC in FY80. The 260 failures approximately doubled the number experienced in FY79. Seventy percent of the FY80 failures were academic.

ROTC responded by implementing the Quality Assurance Program (QAP), which had the objective of excluding from ROTC those who did not possess the requisite mental, leadership, and physical qualities needed to perform as commissioned officers. Figure 10-10 outlines the ROTC QAP. QAP also called for dismissal of those who, by their performance in the classroom or Advanced Camp, demonstrated they were not officer material. Initial written guidance on the QAP seems to have been provided in a letter from the ROTC Commander to the regions that addressed ROTC commissionees' performance at OBC in FY82. Since the QAP began its primary focus has been on gathering statistics and preparing reports on all OBC failures. There is no reporting mechanism, for example, for ascertaining how many cadets were disenrolled under QAP, which would have been an indicator of program effectiveness.
FIGURE 10-10

Analysis of OBC failure statistics has been limited to developing trends that show whether or not the number of failures for academic or other reasons is on the rise. This information is then provided to the regions for use as they deem appropriate. The program appears to have lost much of its identity and now consists solely of keeping track of OBC failure statistics.

In support of the Army theme of Leadership for FY 85, ARI began to develop an Officer Longitudinal Research Data Base (OLRDB). (See Annex 10-1). The Army currently has no system for assessment of officer performance over time. LTC Jerome Adams, assigned to USMA, has embarked on a longitudinal study of USMA graduates that will soon be expanded to gather data on other commissioning sources. This can be an invaluable source of feedback. Statistics on retention, for example, might provide insight into the factors which influence officer commitment.

Much of the data required for the OLRDB is currently available but is simply not being captured. ARI is in the process of screening available
data sources, such as the Officer Master File (OMF) and various ROTC files to lay the foundation for the OLRDB. Additional sources of longitudinal performance data to be considered include OBC/OAC performance (to include positive as well as negative feedback), HQDA suitability board results, conditional voluntary indefinite board selection results, school selection results, and promotion board results.

CONCLUSIONS

a. Standards for enrollment into the Basic Course are generally satisfactory.
b. The current PAS does not cover the full scope of assessment.
c. The 2.0 GPA requirement for contracting and commissioning should remain unchanged.
d. Evidence suggests that junior officers are experiencing difficulties in oral and written communications, mathematics, and to a lesser degree, reading comprehension.
e. The Army has made progress in support of HBC Enhanced Skill Training (3R's).
f. A concept plan for establishment of academic standards in 4th Qtr FY 86 has not yet been developed.
g. The Army lacks a statement of job-related 3R's competencies required by new lieutenants.
h. There is a conflict in regulatory guidance regarding English as a Second Language training.
i. There is a dual standard for contracting in the physical dimension of assessment.
j. There is no clear philosophy for contracting in the area of physical readiness since both ability and trainability criteria are being applied.
k. There is no system-wide written policy guidance for sustainment of a cadet's physical readiness in the Advanced Course, except for the Advanced Camp APRT requirement.
l. Medical standards for enrollment, contracting, and commissioning are satisfactory.
m. Assessment of leadership prior to contracting is generally accomplished by observation and informal evaluation by the ROTC cadre.
n. Leadership assessment is emphasized more strongly during the Advanced Course, especially through performance at Advanced Camp.
o. LAP, as currently evolved, does not provide uniform leadership assessment of all cadets prior to MS III.
p. ROTC cadre are widely split in their opinion of the value of LAP.
q. It is not clear which skills should be used in conjunction with ROTC precommissioning leadership development/assessment: the 12 enabling skills of LAP or the nine leadership components developed by CAL. Attempts to integrate the two have only recently begun (October 1985).
r. Aside from the enrollment, contracting, and commissioning standards in effect for assessing cadets individually, there are no ROTC-wide measures of effectiveness of overall system quality.
s. The only ROTC-wide external measure of effectiveness on the quality of the ROTC graduate is the OBC failure rate.
t. ROTC lacks a longitudinal system for measuring effectiveness that could provide feedback to the ROTC community on the performance of its graduates over time. The ARI-developed OLRDB is a step in this direction.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Expand the scope of PAS to cover the period from enrollment to commissioning, to include the Achievement Testing Program and English as a Second Language.
2. Maintain the current scope of the Achievement Testing Program but provide PMs more flexibility by allowing the PMs to use tests given by the host school in diagnosing weaknesses.
3. Develop the concept plan for establishment of 3R's standards; establish academic standards as disqualifiers.
4. Resolve the conflict between AR 621-5 and AR 145-1 regarding ESL; establish ESL standards at commissioning, to include listening comprehension and speaking components.
5. Establish a single standard for assessment of the physical dimension at contracting.
6. Provide written guidance regarding sustainment of the ROTC cadet's physical readiness; include twice-yearly APRT after contracting.
7. Conduct a review of the LAP within the context of the Lieutenants Task List for leadership to determine the most effective means for providing consistent development and assessment of cadet leadership.

8. Expand assessment system measures of effectiveness, both internal and external to ROTC; include more longitudinal tracking of ROTC graduate performance.
ACTION CODE: PER1-RL-003  AS OF: 14FEB85

AGENCY: PERI-RL (Dr. Rachford, 274-8293)

ACTION: Develop an Officer Longitudinal Research Data Base (OLRDB) as a tool for current and future leadership research by the Manpower and Personnel Research Laboratory (MPRL) at the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI).

SUPPORTS FUNCTION: ARMY-WIDE/LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT
a. Recruitment, assignment, and retention.
b. Education, training, and development.
h. Integration of technology.

WHEN: FY 85-88

TO OR FOR WHOM: ACTIVE ARMY/OFFICERS-CADETS/COMMISSIONED/ALL

HOW/COSTS: CORE PROGRAM
Currently no Army data base exists which contains the key precommissioning, training, performance, and personnel information necessary for the planned program of leadership research at ARI. The OLRDB will contain these key data elements formatted for manpower and personnel research.

An operational core OLRDB, based on the Officer Master File (OMF), will be running in FY86. Precommissioning data will be added in FY87. Performance data will be added in FY88.

IMPACT: Researchers at ARI will use the OLRDB for programmed research to develop: instruments and techniques for assessing leadership potential, leader performance measures, leader-unit performance links, models of officer retention and attrition, and models of officer career paths.

MARKETING PLAN: Not applicable.

ANNEX 1
ONGOING RESEARCH

Building the Officer Longitudinal Research Data Base (OLRDB)

A longitudinal data base on US Army officers is a necessary tool for current and future research efforts regarding officers to be performed by the Manpower and Personnel Research Laboratory (MPRL) at the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI). This research includes development of: assessment instruments for commissioning decisions, assignment and development of officers; performance measures for validating predictor measures and evaluating training; models of officer retention and attrition; and models of career paths and experiences.

Currently no data base exists which contains the specific personnel, precommission, training, and performance information necessary for these research purposes. Indeed few current Army data bases are historical, and past records are—for the most part—unavailable.

To overcome the difficulties noted above—and accomplish its research program—the Leadership and Management Technical Area (LMTA) is developing the Officer Longitudinal Research Data Base (OLRDB). This work is covered in the Letter of Agreement (LOA) between ARI and the Center for Army Leadership (CAL) and will be included in a new LOA with the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC).

The form of the OLRDB will be a set of "flat" files from which relevant variables and samples can be easily extracted and used with statistical packages. Naturally, privacy and security protection will be built in.

Building a working OLRDB has several subtasks, the first will be to create a core data set of accurate identifying information and critical variables. A contract to do this will be awarded this summer (4Q FY85). Other data from existing sources (such as the Officer Master File and ROTC files) will be integrated into the OLRDB as quickly as possible. One of the most time consuming aspects of building the OLRDB will be cleaning the data before integrating it into the data base. Those problems that cannot be resolved by back-tracking through MILPERCEN and the data collection system will have to be identified for researchers who might use the data. Creating standard procedures for updating the data base and editing the files is another major task, as is writing a user manual and data dictionary.

Although there are some data bases from which to begin constructing the OLRDB, much of the most relevant data—on training and performance—is either not being collected or is not automated. Helping the army to recognize the usefulness of data collection and providing technical advice on how to capture and automate data is another aspect of developing the OLRDB. This will become a part of the job every MPRL researcher working on officer issues.

A working prototype of the OLRDB is expected to be available by 4Q FY86.

(Doug Rachford, Leadership and Management Technical Area, Manpower and Personnel Research Laboratory, 274-8293, AV 284-8293)
CHAPTER ELEVEN

ROTC CAMPS

ROTC summer camps provide an opportunity for cadets to receive a concentrated period of training, evaluation, and leadership development in a field type environment. There are two categories of summer camps, basic camp and advanced camp. The Basic Camp is for students entering the 2-year ROTC program; Advanced Camp is attended by all cadets. While both of these camps stress training, evaluation, and leadership development, there are significant differences between their missions that will be discussed in detail.

BASIC CAMP

The 2-year program is a form of lateral entry into the ROTC which allows students to join the Advanced Course without having attended the Basic Course. The mission of the Basic Camp is to bring 2 year program students to a level of military training and education which will qualify them for enrollment in the Advanced Course. The Basic Camp is conducted at Fort Knox by the Second ROTC Region. Its maximum capacity is 4,800 cadets, of which 900 spaces are programmed for female cadets. The capacity is achieved by using six cycles so that not all cadets begin at once, and no more than half the total cadets are in camp at any one time. Each company area is used twice. The major portion of the Basic Camp training is done by drill sergeants from the basic training companies at Fort Knox, with the Basic Training program of instruction altered to provide an emphasis on leadership development. Each cadet company is administered by an ROTC cadre officer, and each platoon has both a drill sergeant and an ROTC cadre NCO to evaluate cadets and assist with instruction.

The program of instruction is based on MQS I, with the same military skills and professional knowledge subjects specified for the Basic Camp as would have been covered in the Basic Course. The emphasis is on physical conditioning and hands on, practical training. Wherever possible, classes are held outdoors with classroom time kept to a minimum. While the Basic
Camp POI is based on MQS, there are significant differences between the experience of Basic Camp and that of the Basic Course.

The RETO study noted that Basic Camp and the Basic Course were not similar experiences. The Basic Camp has over 200 hours of instruction and practical application as part of a six week long camp; the Basic Course has a minimum of 90 contact hours. Basic Camp cadets live an Army experience of training, billets, peer interaction, and socialization to an active duty post; Basic Course cadets attend class one or two hours per week with occasional, voluntary attendance at weekend exercises and voluntary participation in cadet extracurricular activities.

RETO faulted ROTC because Basic Camp and Basic Course cadets were not similarly prepared going into the Advanced Course. The situation remains now as it was then, the two experiences are not the same. There is, however, a very good reason why Basic Camp has many more hours of training and many additional subjects. In the 2-year program, ROTC takes college students with no previous ROTC experience other that six weeks of Basic Camp motivates them to sign a contract with the Army agreeing to attend classes, accept a commission, and serve either on active duty or in the Reserve Components (RC). By comparison, the Basic Course cadets can base the same decision on two years of training and mentoring by ROTC cadre.

A second area in which RETO faulted ROTC was in the redundancy of training between Basic Camp and Advanced Camp. Other than the administrative functions that were duplicated between the camps, the common training subjects were, drill and ceremonies, physical training, land navigation, and tactics. It should be noted that all of these are subjects which require repetition in order to achieve and maintain proficiency.

The POIs for the Basic and Advanced Camps were compared in an effort to determine if redundancy exists with MQS 1. Redundancy among subjects taught at the two camps still exists. These include basic rifle marksmanship, land navigation, drill and ceremonies, physical training, and tactics. Again, these subjects require repetitive training to achieve and maintain proficiency. The subjects used in the Basic Camp which are in addition to the minimum required by MQS I are chosen specifically to provide an exciting and challenging experience to the 2-year program cadets and influence them to sign an Advanced Course contract.
If redundant material must be removed, another option is to delete it from the Advanced Camp. But this creates an additional problem because the training deleted from Advanced Camp will be missed by the 4-year program cadets who do not attend the Basic Camp. A proposal is currently under review by the DCSROTC which would resolve the problem of redundant training for 2-year program cadets, and incomplete training for 4-year program cadets. The Two-Camp concept would have all cadets attend both Basic Camp and Advanced Camp.

Using the Two Camp concept, all field type training would be moved from the campus to one of the two camps. Because the subjects would be both trained and evaluated at camp, the PMS would not use on-campus time to prepare the cadets for camp. The Basic Course would be required only for 3- and 4-year scholarship cadets, and would be voluntary for others. The plan would also permit earlier contracting of selected sophomores. There would be some benefits for the ROTC program with this system; fewer cadre would be required to recruit and instruct Basic Course cadets, and more cadre would be available to recruit and mentor Advanced Course cadets. Cadets entering the Advanced Course would have a more common background of experience and training. The plan would also increase the opportunities for leadership development, training, and evaluation by having the cadets attend two camps.

While the Two Camp concept may solve some problems for the ROTC program, disadvantages also exist. The Total Army must pay a tremendous bill in both dollars and manpower to allow all cadets to attend two camps. This increase will be in addition to the cost of expanding the current Advanced Camp capacity to support the production mission in the outyears. Reducing contact hours with the cadets on campus will have the negative effect of reducing the PMS' opportunities to mentor and evaluate the cadets. Efforts to provide a common background of training at Basic Camp would not apply to the historical 30 percent of commissionees who are prior service and would not attend Basic Camp. Many leadership opportunities for MS IV cadets to help prepare the MS IIIIs for camp would be removed. The subjects remaining to be taught on campus would be mostly on professional knowledge or military skills associated with administrative type duties leaving little in the way of exciting, hands-on, adventure type training to keep the cadets' attention in the classroom. Training by the PMS would suffer in comparison to the excitement of the camps.
The ROTC Advanced Camp is required of all cadets regardless of their method of entry into the ROTC program. It applies to 4 year cadets as well as those enrolled through one of the lateral entry programs. The camp is normally attended during the summer between the MS III and MS IV years, but in special cases attendance may be delayed until after the MS IV year. Cadets in the latter situation are normally commissioned at the end of camp following successful completion of all requirements; historically, MS IV's are approximately 10 percent of the total camp attendance.

Advanced Camps are conducted at three locations: by First Region at Fort Bragg, by Third Region at Fort Riley, and by Fourth Region at Fort Lewis. For the past four years, First Region has hosted 40-45 percent of the total cadets at Advanced Camp. The remainder of cadets have been divided between Third and Fourth Regions in a proportion agreed upon by TRADOC and FORSCOM, generally based on the posts' ability to support the camps in any given year. The change of proportion of cadets at the three camps has been accomplished by sending First, Third, and Fourth Region cadets to their own camp, and sending Second Region cadets to a combination of the other three camps.

The purpose of the Advanced Camp, according to AR 145-1 is to supplement the on-campus classes with more instruction and practical experience in tactical and technical subjects. The emphasis is to be on leadership training through problem analysis, decision making, and troop leading experience. There is further amplification of the camps' purpose in TRADOC Reg 145-1. This supplement to on-campus training is to be conducted in a field environment with emphasis on operations at the platoon level. The camp is to be physically and mentally challenging, must provide socialization into Army life, and give the PMS an additional source of evaluation of the cadets' leadership ability and potential. In general, ROTC has accomplished its advanced camp mission very well.

As the study group looked at Advanced Camp early on, it was apparent that the capacity of the three camps would not support the requirement for the 1990s and beyond. The required capacity would be 14,260 cadets, based on a production mission of 12,400 lieutenants. The estimate of maximum total camp capacity was 10,800. As will be shown later, the production mission was
reduced and the study group found the maximum capacity to be greater than the earlier estimate. The camp options that were explored will be reported here for reference.

At the first GOSC meeting on 5 Apr 85 the study group indicated its intention to consider five options for the format of Advanced Camp. They ranged from no camp at all to four camps achieved by adding one to the current three. At the 6 May 85 IPR for the Chief of Staff, Army, the same five options were briefed. The guidance from the Chief of Staff was to consider only the options of one, two, three or four camps, and to stop consideration of the "no camp" option. Advanced Camp was considered too important for cadet development to be discontinued.

These are the options that the study group has looked at for future camps: a single national camp, expanding the use of only two of the current sites, expanding the use of the current three sites, and adding another camp without expanding the current sites. Some of the criteria considered were standardization of training and evaluation, cost of TDY for cadets, cadre, and support personnel, availability of ranges and training areas, availability of support personnel, impact on Active and Reserve Component training at the posts considered, and the indoctrination or socialization of the ROTC cadets to life on an active duty Army post that has TOE troop units rather than TDA training units.

Standardization of training and evaluation is important to cadets because their camp evaluation is one of the items considered in RA, active duty, and branch selections. A single national camp provides for maximum uniformity in training.

A single national camp maximizes the cost of travel for all personnel, and also adds TDY and transportation costs for the supporting FORSCOM division personnel and equipment. Multiple camps reduce travel costs, and avoid the need to move support troops away from home station.

Each of the current sites has sufficient ranges and training areas to support Advanced Camp. As ROTC enrollment increases, however, there is a price to be paid in terms of scheduling the training for Active and Reserve units in order to ensure that readiness is not degraded. While a single national camp at a new site frees the divisions for other missions, a significant impact will be felt by the Reserve Component units being displaced from that training site. Conversely, expansion at the current
sites would continue to share the impact of ROTC Advanced Camp throughout the Total Army, just as the Total Army will benefit from adequate production of new lieutenants.

Each of the current sites has sufficient personnel to support ROTC Advanced Camp at the minimum required level. As indicated in the previous paragraph, there is a price to be paid; the divisions providing support are not available to perform other FORSCOM missions. While it may detract from unit training, the time spent with ROTC can be a valuable adjunct to individual training because the NCO's are acting as both leaders and trainers, and the troops are performing missions that are part of their overall training mission. The current format does place a burden on the same three divisions year after year, but the other option would create the problem of having to start from a zero point with new support troops each year. Quality training for the ROTC cadets demands that the current format be continued so that the lessons learned in previous years can be used in preparation for each new camp.

The socialization of ROTC cadets to an active duty Army post is a very important consideration. For the 40 percent of commissionees who will serve on active duty, the post provides an orientation to the life they will live the following year. For the 60 percent who will serve in the Reserve Components, the summer camp may provide the only experience they will ever have with an active duty post (other than a training center). The fine programs that the posts have, in which some of their active duty units sponsor a cadet company or battalion, permit the cadets an insight to the entire spectrum of Army life, from day to day duty activities, to seeing officers quarters and other post facilities.

Expansion of the current three camps was taken as the baseline because the cost would be an extrapolation of the current costs. The cost of the 1984 Advanced Camp in dollars and manpower is shown in Figure 11-1. The cost of pay and allowances for active duty and Reserve Components personnel is not included in the dollar cost because it is not budgeted by ODCSROTC and the personnel would have to be paid regardless of where they worked or took their summer training. These personnel are included in the manpower cost, however.

In making the extrapolation of 1984 costs to 1990, several assumptions were made. First, the total number of ROTC cadre would not change. Second,
RC personnel and one quarter of active duty support personnel would be used for the administrative support duties that remain constant as the number of cadets increased, and the other three quarters of active duty support personnel would increase in proportion to the number of cadets. Third, that the efficiency of the existing camps would remain constant as the number of cadets changed. Last, that costs of an additional camp would be based on an average of the efficiencies of the three existing camps.

1984 CAMPS

THREE CAMPS 9,257 CADETS

DOLLAR COST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BRAGG</th>
<th>RILEY</th>
<th>LEWIS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cadre Travel &amp; Per Diem</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>1,795</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOE/TDA Travel &amp; Per Diem</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>44</td>
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<td>Cadet Pay, Travel, Per Diem</td>
<td>4,544</td>
<td>3,118</td>
<td>1,571</td>
<td>11,233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visitor Travel &amp; Per Diem</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Pay &amp; Per Diem</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>813</td>
<td>1,501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Support Costs</td>
<td>10,221</td>
<td>5,410</td>
<td>3,725</td>
<td>19,356</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td>16,291</td>
<td>9,123</td>
<td>6,726</td>
<td>$34,140K</td>
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MANPOWER

<table>
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<th>RILEY</th>
<th>LEWIS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ROTC HQ, Cadre, RA LTS, CIV</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>96.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORSCOM AD &amp; USAR + IRR &amp; NG</td>
<td>138.3</td>
<td>95.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>USACC</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSC</td>
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<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td>184.8</td>
<td>123.5</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>388.6K M.D</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE 11-1

Three Camps. The first step in the comparison was to extrapolate the 1984 three camp data to 1990 by using the assumptions in the previous paragraph. The summary of costs is shown in Figure 11-2. The following is a list of the advantages and disadvantages of the three camp option:
Advantages

a. Continues socialization on an active duty post.
b. Maintains the current level of cadre and cadet travel.
c. The cadre structure is already established.
d. The support base is already established.
e. Provides the greatest flexibility for TRADOC and FORSCOM to shift the cadet load from post to post.

Disadvantages

a. Increases the requirement for FORSCOM troop support at the current sites.
b. Causes some disruption to current level of RC annual training support.

1990 CAMPS

THREE CAMPS

11,770 CADETS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DOLLAR COST</th>
<th>BRAGG</th>
<th>RILEY</th>
<th>LEWIS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CADRE TRAVEL &amp; PER DIEM</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>1,795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOE/TDA TRAVEL &amp; PER DIEM</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>CADET PAY, TRAVEL, PER DIEM</td>
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<tr>
<td>VISITOR TRAVEL &amp; PER DIEM</td>
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<td>42</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER PAY &amp; PER DIEM</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>813</td>
<td>1,501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRECT SUPPORT COSTS</td>
<td>11,364</td>
<td>6,551</td>
<td>6,066</td>
<td>23,981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>17,948</td>
<td>10,922</td>
<td>13,313</td>
<td>$42,183K</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MANPOWER

| ROTC HQ, CADRE, RA LTS, CIV | 45.9 | 31.4 | 29.1 | 106.4 |
| FORSCOM AD & USAR + IRR & NG| 150.2 | 105.1 | 79.6 | 334.9 |
| USACC                        | 0.1  | 0.1  | 0.1  | 0.3   |
| HSC                          | 1.1  | 1.0  | 1.5  | 3.6   |
| TOTALS                       | 197.3 | 137.6 | 110.3 | 445.2K M.D. |

FIGURE 11-2

11-8
There is some degradation of medical services to the military communities at Forts Bragg and Riley. Use of the tiered system will spread the administration of physicals over a longer period instead of doing them all the first weekend.

The study group feels that the most significant advantages are the flexibility to shift Second Region cadets between the three camps as FORSCOM and TRADOC requirements change from year to year, and that socialization is continued. The most significant disadvantage is that the disruption of three active duty posts and supporting divisions will be continued.

Two Camps. The next option considered was the use of two camps achieved by deleting one of the existing camps, in this case Fort Riley. Fort Riley was chosen because Forts Bragg and Lewis could theoretically handle the entire load by using tiered training and two cycles. The costs are shown at Figure 11-3.

### 1990 CAMPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TWO CAMPS</th>
<th>11,770 CADETS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BRAGG</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOLLAR COST</td>
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<tr>
<td>CADRE TRAVEL &amp; PER DIEM</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOE/TDA TRAVEL, PER DIEM</td>
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<td>CADET PAY, TRAVEL, PER DIEM</td>
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<td>VISITOR TRAVEL &amp; PER DIEM</td>
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<td>OTHER PAY &amp; PER DIEM</td>
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<tr>
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<td>TOTALS</td>
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<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tr>
<td>ROTC HQ, CADRE, RA LTS, CIV</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>54.9</td>
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<td>FORSCOM AD &amp; USAR + IRR &amp; NG</td>
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<td>117.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>USACC</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSC</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>230.5</td>
<td>174.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE 11-3**

11-9
Advantages
a. Relieves the support requirement on one FORSCOM division.
b. Permits reuse of billets for a second cadet company.
c. Reduces problems of uniformity of training and evaluation.
d. Eliminates the disturbance on one active duty post, and frees it for AC and RC training.
e. Continues socialization.

Disadvantages
a. Increases cadet and cadre travel costs.
b. Lengthens total camp time due to use of two cycles.
c. Promotes "burn out" of instructors and evaluators if they keep the same job for both cycles.
d. Promotes turbulence in training if the instructors are switched between cycles.
e. FORSCOM troop support must be increased at the two remaining posts.
f. Reduces the possibility of a two week leave for cadre members at the end of camp, creates an adverse effect on families.

The two-camp option is the least costly in dollars and manpower, continues socialization, and eliminates the disruption at one active duty post. The plan leaves no flexibility, however, for movement of cadets between camps as other FORSCOM missions might require. Both sites would be filled to maximum capacity each year.

Four Camps. The addition of one camp appeared to the the least desirable option. Neither FORSCOM nor TRADOC could recommend one of their posts as a site for the additional camp. The new camp would have to draw ROTC cadre support from the other three camps, and yet there would be no appreciable decrease in the troop support required at the other three camps. The costs associated with this plan are indicated in Figure 11-4. This option seems to combine the disadvantages of all the others into one.
## 1990 CAMPS

### FOUR CAMPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BRAGG</th>
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<th>LEWIS</th>
<th>CAMP X</th>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>DOLLARS COST</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cadre Travel &amp; Per Diem</td>
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<td>451</td>
<td>364</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOE/TDA Travel &amp; Per Diem</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>61</td>
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<td>14,132</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>46</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Pay &amp; Per Diem</td>
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<td>813</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>1,989</td>
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<td>3,725</td>
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<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
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<td>9,061</td>
<td>8,525</td>
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### MANPOWER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>FORSCOM AD &amp; USAR + IRR &amp; NG</th>
<th>USACC</th>
<th>HSC</th>
<th>TOTALS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35.1</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>174.5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>27.4</td>
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<td>0.8</td>
<td>123.7</td>
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<td>0.9</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>0.8</td>
<td>121.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>108.4</td>
<td>385.3</td>
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<td>3.5</td>
<td>497.6K M.D.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### FIGURE 11-4

#### Advantages

- a. Relieves the requirement to expand the current camps and causes further disruption on those posts.
- b. Decreases total cadre and cadet travel expenses. continues socialization.

#### Disadvantages

- a. Adds a major event to another post.
- b. Places additional load on the total FORSCOM commitment.
- c. Reduces the total ROTC cadre available at the other camps.
- d. Has the highest total annual operating cost.
- e. Will disrupt RC annual training at an additional site.
6. Requires an additional two to three thousand support troops.
7. May decrease uniformity of training and evaluation.
8. Creates potential MCA or OMA bill for facilities upgrade.
9. Requires one additional camp planning and operational headquarters.

The major disadvantages of the four-camp option are the cost, disruption at an additional post, and addition of a planning and operational headquarters.

**One Camp.** The final option to be considered was creation of a single national camp. The location of such a camp is yet to be resolved, however, because none of the active duty posts has the capacity to support the entire population and there is no unused Army training area with the capacity to support the camp. The site for a single camp will require a tremendous cost in MCA and OMA dollars as well as a significant disruption of Reserve Component training.

### 1990 CAMPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ONE CAMP</th>
<th>11,770 CADETS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td><strong>DOLLAR COST</strong></td>
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<td>Cadre Travel &amp; Per Diem</td>
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<td>TOE/TDA Travel &amp; Per Diem</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Cadet Pay, Travel, Per Diem</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Direct Support Costs</td>
<td>16,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td>$42,369K</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MANPOWER</th>
<th></th>
<th><strong>TOTALS</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ROTC HQ, Cadre, RA LTS, CIV</td>
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<td>373.6K M.D.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FORSCOM AD &amp; USAR + IRR &amp; NG</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACC</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSC</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>373.6K M.D.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The estimated dollar and manpower costs are shown in Figure 11-5. It should be noted that the manpower cost is for ROTC cadre, Reserve Component personnel, post support personnel, and the divisional troops required to support camp. It does not address the division personnel required to support the division. A RC training post would not have the base operations capacity to support all the cadets, cadre, and divisional troops, so virtually the entire division would be required to support the camp. The following is a listing of advantages and disadvantages:

**Advantages**

a. Provides maximum uniformity of training and evaluation.

b. Removes a "big event" from three FORSCOM posts.

c. Permits the rotation of support among seven or eight divisions.

d. Reduces the planning effort to one headquarters.

**Disadvantages**

a. Maximizes the cost of cadre and cadet travel expense.

b. Stops cadet socialization to an active duty post.

c. Creates a problem with a "learning curve" if the support division is rotated each year.

d. Has a drastic effect on the Reserve Component annual training at any site to be used for the national camp.

e. Requires a significant MCA and OMA bill at any site chosen.

f. Requires the movement of support troops away from home station to the site of the national camp.

The biggest advantage is that the one-camp option provides for complete uniformity of training and evaluation. It also removes the disruption from three active duty posts, but at the cost of disrupting Reserve Component training. Major disadvantages are movement of division troops away from home station, and the problem of a learning curve for the support troops as the task to support camp is passed from division to division. This option also fails to provide the cadets with socialization to an active duty post.

On the basis of the considerations outlined above, the study group would have recommended the three-camp option of expanding at the current locations. As the study evolved, however, there was a recomputation of the production mission for the out-years that significantly reduced the required camp capacity. The study group also found that the maximum capacity of the three camps was greater than previously indicated. The following discussion will explain how both requirement
and capacity have been determined.

**ADVANCED CAMP CAPACITY**

In an effort to determine the ability of the current camp format to meet future needs, the issue has been broken into two parts, the required capacity and the projected maximum capacity; they will be discussed in turn.

**Required Capacity.** The required capacity of Advanced Camp can be predicted with accuracy only one year in advance. Based on the number of juniors who enter the Advanced Course, an accurate estimate of the number who will attend camp the next summer. Projections beyond one year which are based on enrollment and expected retention rates tend to give unsatisfactory results.

The maximum Advanced Camp capacity required for the mid-term can be estimated based on the production mission. Historical data shows that 87 percent of the cadets attending Advanced Camp in a given summer are commissioned the next year. The losses are due to the following:

a. Camp dropouts (medical, attitude, etc)

b. Cadets who fail camp and are not allowed to return the next year.

c. Cadets who drop out of school/ROTC during their senior year.

The reciprocal of 87 percent (1 divided by 0.87) is 115 percent. This number can be multiplied by the production mission for any given year to determine how many cadets must attend camp the summer before. In computing and applying the 115 percent factor, the nurse mission and the Ranger cadets are subtracted from the total production mission because those cadets attend camps other than the Advanced Camp. The following is an example of the computation of the camp capacity required for 1991:

1991 Mission = 10,745

Nurse Mission = 435

Ranger School = 75

Required capacity = 1.15 X (10,745 - 435 - 75) = 11,770

The same procedure can be employed to compute the maximum required camp capacity for the years 1986 through 1990. Based on current information, the production mission beyond 1991 is the same as 1991. Figure 11-6 shows a summary of the calculations.
Computation of Required Camp Capacity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>86</th>
<th>87</th>
<th>88</th>
<th>89</th>
<th>90</th>
<th>91</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Production Mission</td>
<td>9,126</td>
<td>9,215</td>
<td>9,529</td>
<td>9,696</td>
<td>10,187</td>
<td>10,745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production From Camp Graduates</td>
<td>8,695</td>
<td>8,705</td>
<td>9,019</td>
<td>9,186</td>
<td>9,677</td>
<td>10,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Required Camp Capacity The Year Before</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Production x 1.15)</td>
<td>10,011</td>
<td>10,372</td>
<td>10,564</td>
<td>11,129</td>
<td>11,770</td>
<td>11,770</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE 11-6

Projected Maximum Capacity. Estimating the actual capacity of the three Advanced Camps is very difficult because there is more to be considered than just the capacity of the billets in which the cadets will live. Also to be considered are the availability of ranges and other training facilities, the number and timeframe of support troop availability, and the ability of the post to provide medical, communications, and base operations type support to arrive at a maximum camp capacity.

On the basis of information provided by the TRADOC ODCSROTC, the capacity estimated for the three Advanced Camps in 1986 will be a total of 10,720 cadets, broken down as follows:

- Fort Bragg 4,000
- Fort Riley 3,520
- Fort Lewis 3,200
- TOTAL 10,720

Information provided by HQ FORSCOM supports the data from TRADOC, with some clarifications:

a. Fort Bragg - current maximum capacity is 4,160. The capacity could be increased to 4,680 as early as 1986 or 1987 if the restationing of SOCOM is approved, or by 1988 if reorganization of the 82nd Airborne Division is approved. Either of these options will provide buildings in the immediate area of the current ROTC barracks. If the additional barracks are to be reconfigured to match the other cadet barracks, it can be done at a cost of approximately $100,000. With the completion of MCA projects planned for

11-15
FY88 and FY90, permanent party personnel will vacate some billets immediately adjacent to the current ROTC area. These buildings will be made available for use by ROTC and Reserve Component training as needed.

b. **Fort Riley** - the maximum capacity is 3,600, limited by a combination of cadet billet space, transportation capability, and available CTA 50-901 equipment. The camp uses 100 percent of the individual ranges for three weeks and 60 percent of the post's training and maneuver areas for four weeks. Further increase of ROTC camp will degrade the status of training for the 1st Division.

c. **Fort Lewis** - the nominal capacity of the camp is 3,200 cadets based on the use of the current billet area for cadets. There is, however, billeting space is available for an additional 1,000 cadets in a noncontiguous area. Use of those 1,000 spaces for ROTC will delay or preclude the training of an estimated five company-size Reserve Component units. Increase of the capacity to the 4,200 maximum will require a reprioritization of post effort from support of Active and Reserve Component training to ROTC training in order to provide the soldiers necessary to handle that number of cadets.

The FORSCOM input shows a total maximum capacity of 11,960 at the three current ROTC camp sites, sufficient capacity to handle the production mission forecast for the out-years. In view of the uncertain rate of growth of ROTC production, the option of expanding the current camps will provide the greatest flexibility to both TRADOC and FORSCOM, allowing them to move cadets from region to region in response to other missions. While this scheme presents a satisfactory solution to the problem of camp capacity for the near- and mid-term, it does not necessarily address the far-term solution.

Each of the current camps (and possible national camp locations such as Fort Chaffee) rely on WWII era wooden buildings to house cadets and some portion of camp support personnel. These facilities are at least 40 years old now, and repeated renovations cannot extend their usable life indefinitely. All of these building will have to be replaced eventually with some type of permanent or semi-permanent facilities. None of the three posts has begun programming the MCA projects that will be required to provide new facilities when they are required in the 1990s.
STANDARDIZATION OF TRAINING

Cadets receive supervision, instruction, and evaluation each time they are in leadership positions, and the cadets' overall camp evaluation reports written by the platoon evaluators are provided to the PMS for inclusion in the cadets' whole person scores. These scores are important parts of the overall selection process for Regular Army, active duty, and Reserve Forces duty. Because of the importance of these evaluations to the cadets' careers, it is imperative that the camp experience for training and evaluation be as uniform as possible.

Training conditions vary widely at each of the three Advanced Camp sites. Variations in the topography and climate affect the type of training that can be planned and the execution of the training schedule. Variations in the type of supporting infantry division (airborne, mechanized, motorized) have an effect on the doctrinal orientation of the support troops. The interaction of two corps commanders, three division commanders, and three region/camp commanders results in variations in the approach to training at each location.

To reduce the effects of training at three separate camp locations, ODCSROTC has instituted a program to standardize the training and evaluation of cadets. The following seven items are standardization objectives for the three camps:

a. Emphasis on developing and evaluating leadership skills. It was felt that in some cases there was too much emphasis on teaching and grading the MQS I military skills; the change would use MQS subjects as a vehicle to develop and evaluate leadership skills.

b. A final Field Leadership Exercise (FLX). Each camp would end the training and evaluation of cadets with an FLX that would provide a final, common, graded exercise to evaluate cadet leadership skills. This would replace a combination of several other evaluation schemes that, in some cases, would end cadet evaluation approximately two-thirds of the way through camp.

c. Prescribed time and performance standards for all POI tasks. For the first time, all three camps would use exactly the same list of POI items, with the number of hours of instruction prescribed, and common performance standards for all cadets to meet.

d. Standardized ammunition usage for each cadet. In 1984, the per
capita cost of ammunition used at Fort Bragg was 61 percent greater than that at Fort Lewis. The new standard would qualify and familiarize all cadets with the same types of weapons and numbers of rounds, and would also make capability exercises more consistent among the three camps.

e. **Building block approach in the sequence of instruction.** This effort would combine several subjects from the POI into blocks, in order to assure a rational sequence of training that allows cadets to learn the basics of a subject prior to attempting more advanced applications. Prior to this, POI subjects were arranged to make the schedule of class hours work out, often without regard for the sequence of instruction.

f. **Standardized nomenclature for units of instruction.** This will facilitate discussion and comparison of instruction among the three camps. It will also provide a common vocabulary and background for comparing evaluation reports from the three camps.

g. **Standardized cadet evaluation system.** All three of the camps will use the same form, leadership dimensions, grading system, and procedures to evaluate cadets. The result will be more uniform comparison of these evaluations when cadets are placed in a single OML for selecting branch, RA, OTRA, and Reserve Component duty assignments.

**ADVANCED CAMP ALTERNATIVES**

There are two alternatives to Advanced Camp for selected cadets—Ranger School and Nurse Summer Training. Ranger school is used primarily as a retention and motivation device for cadets interested in Ranger training. Selection to attend the school in lieu of Advanced Camp is a reward for the cadets who have demonstrated their abilities and motivation in cadet activities. Candidates are recommended by their PMS and then compete for selection at both region and ODCSROTC level. There is no attempt to assign quotas to the regions, but to select the 75 best cadets from all of ROTC to attend the school.

Attendance at Ranger School has been limited to 75 cadets as a compromise of several factors. In the middle 1970s, as many as 350-400 cadets were sent each summer, but the dropout rate was very high. The current selection procedure and smaller number has reduced the dropout rate almost to zero. The smaller number also allows ROTC cadets to be
integrated into classes with other soldiers without causing a significant disruption to the school's ability to meet active duty requirements. Keeping the number small has also made those selected a very exclusive group which has increased the program's value as a motivator.

In order to receive credit for Advanced Camp, the cadet must successfully complete the Fort Benning phase of Ranger School. A comparison of the Ranger POI and the MQS I subjects to be taught at Advanced Camp reveals that Ranger School does not cover all MQS I subjects, but the high quality of cadets selected should negate the effect of that minimal loss of training.

The other alternative to Advanced Camp is Nurse Summer Training. The program is limited to cadets identified as part of the nurse program, but is not required for those cadets; they may choose to attend the regular Advanced Camp. Nurse Summer Training is conducted in two phases; the first is one week at Camp Perry, Ohio, which emphasizes field training, and the second is a five week clinical practicum at one of 30 Army medical treatment facilities in CONUS and Hawaii.

CONCLUSIONS

a. More subjects are covered in Basic Camp than in the Basic Course, but Basic Camp has an additional mission of getting cadets to contract after only six weeks of training with the Army. There is some repetition between Basic Camp and Advanced Camp; however, the subjects are of the type that require repetition to achieve and maintain proficiency. The disparities and overlaps noted above have definite purposes, and should be continued.

b. The Two-Camp concept creates more training gaps than the overlaps it is supposed to fix. Removal of all field type training subjects to one of the two camps will leave the detachments with nothing but classroom material to present, and an on-campus program that will provide neither excitement nor challenge for the cadets.

c. The current three-camp format has sufficient capacity to handle the number of cadets required to meet future production missions. The current posts, however, have buildings that will have to be replaced in order to continue to support ROTC and Reserve Component training for the future. A decision now to continue with the three-camp format for the future will
allow the posts to begin planning the MCA programs required to replace the buildings in the far-term.

d. The current ODCSROTC standardization effort is eliminating many of the inconsistencies among the three camps, and will help to make the Advanced Camp cadet evaluations better tools for Department of the Army selection boards.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Do not change the orientation of the Basic Camp, or try to limit the POI to exactly match that of the Basic Course. The additional subjects are required to help motivate the 2-year program cadets. Do not try to eliminate the overlap between Basic Camp and Advanced Camp for subjects that require repetitive training to maintain proficiency.

2. Do not implement the Two Camp concept. Continue the program with the current mix of 4-year and 2-year programs in order to allow the maximum possible opportunities for students to enroll in ROTC.

3. Accept the current three-camp format as the Total Army plan for meeting Advanced Camp capacity requirements in the long-term. TRADOC and FORSCOM must coordinate the requirements in the out-years and set the capacity for each camp. FORSCOM must begin planning the MCA projects to provide facilities for expansion.

4. Continue with the current program to standardize training and evaluation at the Advanced Camps.
CHAPTER TWELVE

RESERVE FORCES ISSUES

This chapter examines two major Reserve Forces issues identified during the ROTC study. The first portion of the chapter reviews in detail the production of officers for Reserve Forces Duty (RFD). The second portion deals with the Early Commissioning Program (ECP) and highlights; the use of Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) officers as Assistant Professors of Military Science (APMS); the Simultaneous Membership Program (SMP); and the mandatory assignment of reserve officers to units in the Army National Guard or US Army Reserve.

As the United States assumed a more significant leadership role in the post-World War II era, the requirement to attract highly educated officers increased. This has been coupled with the heightened level of technological sophistication experienced by our society. Thus, additional young men and women with college degrees are required by the Active Army. By the mid-1970s, about 75 percent of the officers on active duty were commissioned through ROTC.

At the same time, reliance on the Reserve Components has increased. Both the Army National Guard and Army Reserve are viewed as key mobilization assets that will play a major role in any future conflict. For example, four active divisions now have ARNG or USAR round out-brigades and a major portion of the USAREUR rear area support and coordination effort is now the responsibility of the ARNG and USAR.

As the Army develops and refines the Total Army concept, the logical conclusion is that the officers of the Reserve Components must be as well educated and technologically sophisticated as their active duty counterparts. Because of this, ROTC has been designated by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel as the Total Army's primary source of officers. This is depicted in Figure 12-1. The idea is that ROTC will slowly supplant the Federal and State OCS systems over a period of time.
It should be noted that this production mission makes Army ROTC unique among the various armed services ROTC programs. Although the letter "R" in ROTC stands for "Reserve", the Air Force and Marine Corps do not rely on their ROTC systems to produce the overwhelming majority of second lieutenants for their Reserve Components and the Navy has only recently tasked their ROTC program to produce about 100 reserve ensigns annually.

Over the years, ROTC has been able to provide the required number of officers for the Active Component. However the major challenge facing the ROTC system is the production of quality lieutenants in sufficient quantity to meet the Reserve Component (RC) requirements.

There are two principal complicating factors that contribute to the production shortfall of Reserve Forces Duty (RFD) lieutenants. One factor is the demographic situation described in Chapter One and the other is the historical and traditional orientation of the ROTC system towards the production of active duty officers. Both are inextricably linked to each other. Both will be discussed in detail.

The demographic outlook for the nation with regard to the 17-to-20-year-old college population is one of continuing decline through the middle of
the 1990s as shown in Figure 12-2. Further complicating ROTC's mission, is the fact that the reserve forces ROTC production requirement will increase from 3,700 in 1986 to 5,100 in 1991.

SHRINKING MARKET

![Total 17-20 Year Old Market](chart.png)

**FIGURE 12-2**

Even if ROTC could produce the required numbers of officers from the shrinking market it would still be faced with the dilemma produced by the geographic distribution of Reserve Component Troop Program Units. The branching and assigning of lieutenants in the Reserve Components is largely a function of the location of units in relationship to the location of potential unit members. It is conceivable that in a populous area, all lieutenant vacancies could be fully subscribed, leaving some lieutenants located in the same area unable to join a unit. Conversely, in areas that are sparsely populated reserve units are likely to be understaffed; Virginia serves as a good example. In the Washington suburbs of northern Virginia, the shortage of officers is not a problem while it is a problem in rural southwestern Virginia. Resolution of the situation is impeded since the Army cannot require an RFD officer in Boston, for example, to re-locate to Montana in order to fill a reserve unit vacancy.

In addition to the demographic and geographic aspects; the ROTC system's orientation towards the production of active duty officers heavily impacts
on its ability to produce large numbers of quality Reserve Component officers. The systemic orientation of ROTC toward Active Duty production is manifested in several ways:

- Lack of RFD management
- Lack of RFD advertising and marketing
- Scholarship policy
- Cadre attitudes
- GRFD contract decline

Each of these points will be discussed in turn.

Currently, each Instructor Group (IG) is assigned a production mission broken down by academic discipline. However, there is nothing in this process that tasks a PM3 to produce specific numbers of RFD officers.

Data from several studies suggest that there is a viable market composed of individuals who would be amenable to being recruited for RFD. Figure 12-3 summarizes this data.

**RFD PROPENSITY**

1. 50.5 percent of non-prior service males with a positive propensity to enlist in the RC express a desire to be officers - 1982 RC attitude study, Arbor, Inc.

2. 33 percent of surveyed MS IIs who left the ROTC program reported that if a GRFD contract had been offered, the likelihood of their contracting would have been increased - 1984 MS II ROTC demographic survey, ARI.

3. 39 percent of MS IIs who left the program surveyed said they would have been likely to have contracted if guaranteed Reserve forces duty contracts had been offered - 1983 ARI retention survey.

**FIGURE 12-3**

A significant aspect to consider is the fact that none of the referenced studies was intended to define the RFD officer market. The Arbor study dealt with developing a profile of potential RFD enlisted members while the ARI studies were intended to find out why students left the ROTC program.
No market analysis of this potential segment has ever been conducted. Consequently, the system does not know who the potential RFD officers are, where they are or what motivates them.

In a similar vein, there is no advertising material specifically oriented toward RFD. The simple fact is that the target audience cannot be expected to buy a product about which there is a paucity of readily available information.

Another indication of the active duty orientation of the ROTC system is the distribution of scholarships. Currently, of the 12,000 authorized ROTC scholarships only 258 per year are dedicated to RFD. This is an inequitable distribution when one considers that more than half of the ROTC production mission in FY 91 is projected to be for RFD officers. It should be noted that ODCSROTC is developing a policy whereby eventually 50 percent of the 12,000 scholarships could be awarded to cadets seeking RFD.

The active duty orientation of the ROTC system is further reinforced by the ROTC cadre. Figure 12-4 is representative of the comments received by the ROTC Study Group from ROTC area commanders and cadre as part of a survey conducted by the study group in the spring of 1985.
CADRE COMMENTS FROM ROTC STUDY SURVEY

WHAT WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO SELL RESERVE FORCES DUTY TO POTENTIAL CADETS?

"CURRENTLY THE PERCEPTION IS IF YOU ARE SELECTED FOR RESERVE DUTY YOU ARE A SECOND CLASS CADET."

"RFD IS A NO-GO WHEN YOU ARE WORKING W/CADETS WHO WANT TO GO ONLY TO ACTIVE DUTY...THERE IS NO COORDINATED EFFORT TO SELL RFD."

"ALL OF THE ABOVE WOULD HELP. I AM VERY UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THIS MISSION. IF WE DO THIS; I'D RECOMMEND SOMEBODY GO BACK AND STUDY PRE-WWII ROTC HISTORY. WHAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT IS ROTC AS IT EXISTED AND FUNCTIONED IN THE 1930S."

"DON'T SELL RFD, IT IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE."

"I DON'T THINK ANY OF YOUR IDEAS WILL BE ENOUGH TO MAKE IT WORK. A JOB AFTER GRADUATION HAS GREAT RECRUITING VALUE. WE NEED A SYSTEM LIKE THE OTHER SERVICES THAT REQUIRES ALL OFFICERS TO SERVE ON ACTIVE DUTY FOR AT LEAST TWO YEARS BEFORE GOING TO THE RESERVES."

"HARD TO SELL ADVENTURE, LEADERSHIP TRAINING AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY AT THE SAME TIME YOU ARE SAYING GO RFD. THOSE INTERESTED IN LEADERSHIP ADVENTURE DON'T WANT RFD. WE ARE BEING ASKED TO WORK AGAINST OUR BEST SALES INTEREST IN SELLING RFD."

"WHY CAN'T THE RESERVES PRODUCE THEIR OWN OFFICERS - WE JUST END UP GIVING THEM OUR LEFTOVERS OR DISAPPOINTING GOOD CADETS WHO WANTED ACTIVE DUTY."

FIGURE 12-4
The cadets entering the ROTC program are overwhelmingly oriented towards service on active duty. This fact is depicted in Figure 12-5.

**GRFD CONTRACTING TRENDS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Contracts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SY 83-84</td>
<td>3025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SY 84-85</td>
<td>2250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SY 85-86</td>
<td>Less than 1000*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE

**FIGURE 12-5**

As can be readily seen, GRFD contracts have been decreasing since the inception of the guaranteed RFD contract. In fact, more cadets want active duty than there are active duty lieutenant requirements. Thus, selection for active duty is very competitive and a lower quality of officer is generally selected for Reserve Forces Duty. Thus, the selection procedures also reinforce the concept that RFD is a second class option for those who are less than the best.

The problem of producing officers for the Reserve Components has been recognized by ODCSROTC and there are several initiatives that have been proposed or acted upon. Three of the most significant are: the use of Active Guard & Reserve (AGR) officers as Assistant Professors of Military Science (APMS), the Simultaneous Membership Program (SMP) and the Early Commissioning Program (ECP).

As the RFD mission was being introduced into ROTC, it was decided to assign either an Active National Guard or Army Reserve officer to each host Instructor Group. This was carried out incrementally with the first group (about 100 of 314 AGR officers) being assigned to Instructor Groups in the spring of 1982. The AGR APMS program provided the PMS with his own Reserve Component policy advisor as well as an officer who could provide a reserve presence. The AGR APMS was intended to be at the forefront of the RFD recruiting effort.
The Simultaneous Membership Program (SMP) has helped to balance the focus of ROTC by reorienting ROTC towards the Total Army. The SMP cadet holds dual status as an ROTC cadet and as an officer trainee in an Army Reserve or Army National Guard unit. SMP cadets are not obligated to serve in the Reserve Component and may be considered for active duty on an equal basis with their contemporaries. However, many SMP cadets become RFD officers. For those ordered to active duty, the SMP provides valuable first hand Reserve Component experience in addition to obvious leadership training. Figure 12-6 provides a description of this program.

**SIMULTANEOUS MEMBERSHIP PROGRAM (SMP)**

**FUNCTION:** Enables Advanced Course ROTC Cadets (MS III and MS IV) to be members of a Reserve Component unit simultaneously with ROTC participation.

**GUIDELINES:** SMP Cadets must be members of a Reserve Component unit assigned against an existing officer vacancy as an officer trainee.

SMP Cadets must be contracted MS III or MS IV.

Applies to freshman through senior or graduate student if enrolled in MS III or MS IV.

SMP Cadets have an option to apply for active duty following degree completion.

Army ROTC Scholarship recipients are ineligible for SMP participation.

**Program Size:** USAR: 2399 ARNG: 2429 Total: 4828 *

*(As of 30 April 1985)*

**FIGURE 12-6**
The last initiative designed to assist in RFD production is the ECP program. It has had a tremendous impact on both the ROTC system and the Reserve Components. However, it is not without controversy. Positions taken by the various commands (TRADOC and FORSCOM) and agencies (NGB, OCAR, ARPERCEN) that deal with this program range from immediate discontinuance to preservation of the program in its entirety. A full discussion of the ECP is included later in this chapter.

Other actions that ODCSROTC has taken to re-align the system toward Total Army production include the elimination of the ceiling on the number of GRFD contracts awarded and the initiation of an action to increase the number of scholarships earmarked for cadets deserving RFD.

Earlier it was mentioned that the distribution of lieutenants in the Reserve Components is a problem from a geodemographic standpoint. Although this is not specifically an ROTC system problem, it does impact on the ability of ROTC to produce lieutenants for the Reserve Components. While the Army cannot relocate an officer in order to fill a unit vacancy, more efficient management of lieutenants within the same geographic area is possible. The USAR Lieutenant Coordination Office and the ARNG Lieutenant management Team at ARPERCEN have started the process of mandatory assignment of lieutenants in the IRR to troop program units. However, AR 135-91 seriously limits this effort and consequently provides very few lieutenants with active duty officer experience for assignment to Reserve Component units.

Under the provisions of AR 135-91, officers can be assigned to RFD or be called to active duty for two, three, four or five years. The regulation further states that only RFD officers or those who served less than three years on active duty are required to serve in a reserve troop program unit. However, the present policy is that lieutenants are not called to active duty for less than three years. Thus, virtually no officers are being released from active duty (REFRAD) with a requirement to serve in a Reserve Component unit. This has two negative effects. First, the pool of lieutenants who can be mandatorily assigned to troop program units is limited to officers being assigned to RFD without active duty. Secondly, the flow of lieutenants, in to these units with active duty experience is not very great.
CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing discussion enables the following conclusions to be drawn about the Reserve Forces Duty aspects of the ROTC program:

a. The market is declining
b. The requirements are increasing
c. ROTC systemically favors active duty production over Total Army production
d. Active duty requirements are being satisfied
e. ROTC mission shortfall will increase at least through FY 88
f. The entire production shortfall will be absorbed by the Reserve Components
g. RFD branching is a function of where reserve component troop program units are located
h. AGR APMS are needed
i. The SMP is a good program
j. There are few lieutenants with active duty experience available for mandatory assignment to RC units
k. ODCSROTC has initiated action to shift toward Total Army production

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. A statement and policy guidance affirming equal importance of both the reserve and active component dimensions of production, numbers and quality be issued. A policy statement from the senior leadership of the Army is vitally needed to spearhead the orientation of ROTC toward Total Army officer production.

2. Conduct a market analysis in order to fully define the potential RFD market. There is a strong need to conduct a market analysis that can identify who the potential RFD officers are, something about them such as civilian career aspirations and family background, what motivates them and where they are to be found. This market analysis and the profile information should be performed by a contractor.
The results of this analysis would provide the basis for the four recommendations described below.

3. **Refine the TRADOC mission assignment model.** Using the data provided by the market analysis in the preceding recommendation, a realistic RFD component can be introduced as part of the mission assignment model. Simply put, ROTC would know who the potential RFD officers are and where they are located. As a result of this, the ROTC detachments could be assigned credible RFD officer production missions.

4. **Implement an effective production management system.** A management system is needed that takes full advantage of available ADP technology and tracks not only the progress made toward mission accomplishment but also the commissioning, and accessioning of the individual officer.

5. **Increase recruiting efforts for Cadets who desire Guaranteed Reserve Forces Duty (GRFD).** Ideally, up to 50 percent of the newly contracted cadets in any year should be recruited specifically for RFD.

6. **Develop advertising and recruiting materials to support the RFD recruiting effort.** Since 50 percent of the lieutenants produced by ROTC will be assigned to Reserve Components, advertising for RFD must be developed to support the recruiting of RFD officers. This recommendation is based upon the conduct of a thorough market analysis that defines who the potential RFD officers are and what motivates them.

7. **Ensure improved distribution of lieutenants to RC units continue.** The USAR Lieutenants Coordination Office and the ARNG Lieutenants Management Team at ARPERCEN have started the process of mandatorily assigning lieutenants to USAR units and referring lieutenants to individual states for assignment to ARNG units. This management process is working and should be continued.

8. **Increase scholarship opportunities for cadets selecting RFD.** As part of the Incentive package the study group recommended that an additional 1500 two year scholarships be made available to cadets selecting RFD.
9. Implement a promotional campaign to sell prospective employers on the outstanding potential of ROTC cadets. RFD lieutenants need civilian jobs after college but simultaneously need to attend a resident OBC within a year of commissioning. The key ingredient here is the employer. Two mutually supporting courses of action are recommended:

a. That the National Committee for Employer Support to the Guard and Reserve (NCESGR) initiate a campaign through its state level organizations to make employers aware that there is an available pool of motivated college graduates with good leadership and management training and experience.

b. That ROTC initiate center of influence (COI) activities for business and industry leaders such as group visits to ROTC Advanced Camps.

These courses of action have as their aim the fostering of a positive disposition towards the employment of ROTC officers. This in turn will increase the attractiveness of RFD as the market for ROTC is expanded.

10. Continue ongoing actions to initiate the RC Experience Enhancement Program (RCEEP) and/or reinstate OBY II and conduct a review of the military service obligation provisions of AR 135-91. These initiatives will increase the number of lieutenants in RC units that have active duty experience. This is a critical area identified by the Army Reserve Forces Policy Council.
EARLY COMMISSIONING PROGRAM

The Early Commissioning Program (ECP) is designed to allow ROTC Cadets to be commissioned prior to completing the requirements for a baccalaureate degree. A synopsis of this program is shown in Figure 12-8.

EARLY COMMISSIONING PROGRAM (ECP)

FUNCTION: ENABLES NON-ACADEMICALLY ALIGNED ROTC CADETS TO RECEIVE A RESERVE COMMISSION PRIOR TO RECEIVING A DEGREE.

GUIDELINES: APPLIES TO ALL ROTC CADETS WHO COMPLETE MS IV AND ADVANCED CAMP PRIOR TO RECEIVING A DEGREE.

ECP OFFICERS ARE ASSIGNED TO ARMY NATIONAL GUARD - ARMY RESERVE TROOP PROGRAM UNITS - INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE (PRIORITY OF EFFORT TO FILL ARNG/USAR TPU).

ECP OFFICERS ARE NOT DEPLOYABLE ASSETS UNTIL THEY COMPLETE A RESIDENT OBC.
ECP OFFICERS ARE REQUIRED TO COMPLETE UNDERGRADUATE STUDIES.

ECP OFFICERS ARE AUTHORIZED UP TO THREE YEARS TO COMPLETE THEIR UNDERGRADUATE DEGREE STUDIES (AN ADDITIONAL EXTENSION OF UP TO 12 MONTHS CAN BE APPROVED).

ECP OFFICERS HAVE THE OPTION TO APPLY FOR ACTIVE DUTY FOLLOWING DEGREE COMPLETION.

PROGRAM SIZE: ARNG: 1312 USAR-TPU: 1433 USAR NON-UNIT: 2763
TOTAL: 5508 *

* (As of 30 April 1985)

FIGURE 12-7
Traditionally, ROTC commissioning implied the concurrent award of both commission and degree. The notable exceptions occurred in wartime. In 1966 during the Vietnam conflict, cadets at the Military Junior Colleges (MJC) who had completed MSIV were commissioned as second lieutenants and called to active duty. In the wake of the anti-military reaction to the Vietnam conflict, the Reserve Components started to experience critical shortages of lieutenants. As a way of addressing this problem in 1978 the ECP was devised whereby cadets who had completed MSIV and the Advanced Camp could be commissioned prior to receiving a degree provided they served in a Reserve Component unit and were slotted against a valid TOE or TDA lieutenant vacancy. However, the number of completion students, those who had completed ROTC but had not yet completed the requirements for a degree, began to increase. This increase occurred mainly for two reasons. ROTC cadets were receiving advanced placement credit for the basic course and cadets were taking more time to complete the requirements for a baccalaureate degree. Advanced placement for the Basic Course can be awarded for prior enlisted service (defined as completion of enlisted basic training), successful completion of one year at any service academy, or successful completion of three years of JROTC.

Students often require more time to complete their studies because high technology disciplines are rapidly moving toward five-year programs and students either fail courses which need to be retaken, transfer between institutions or between academic majors, causing a loss of accrued credit hours which need to be made up.

The underlying problem manifested by this increase was that unless the student has a Reserve Component unit vacancy against which he or she could be assigned, he or she could not be commissioned. According to ODCSROTC, approximately 1,000 completion students per year were being lost to the system because they dropped out of school or transferred to another school and accountability was lost. In terms of subsistence payments alone this represented an annual loss of one million dollars.

Under the guidance of the DCSPER the "Commission of Completion Students Program" (CCSP) was initiated in 1982. The object was to gain a measure of control over the completion students without requiring them to join a RC unit. Subsequently, the term CCSP has been discontinued, and all cadets commissioned prior to degree completion are referred to as ECP officers.
Figure 12-8 illustrates the growth of the program and the surge effect the creation of CCSP had around 1982. Although ECP is still in a state of growth, it is anticipated that the total program size will reach a steady state of around 6,500 officers in FY 86 or FY 87.

![ECP Total Growth Chart](image)

**FIGURE 12-8**

The ECP is an extremely complex issue since there are as many advantages as there are disadvantages in maintaining the program.

**ADVANTAGES**

a. The program provides officers to RC units. Figure 12-7 shows that over 2,700 lieutenants in ARNG and USAR units are ECP officers. Although the degree of dependence on the ECP varies regionally, some Army National Guard Adjutants General rely very heavily on ECP as a source of officers. For example, in 1984 California received 95 percent (74 of 78) of its ROTC lieutenants as ECP officers; Tennessee received 85 percent (68 of 80) and Louisiana received 78 percent (31 of 40). The situation is similar in the USAR. The feeling among the state AGs and MUSARC (Major USAR Commands) commanders is that a lieutenant without a degree is better than no lieutenant at all.
b. The program provides a measure of control over completion students. Figure 12-7 shows that 2,763 ECP lieutenants are not assigned to units. Prior to 1982, these officers would not have been commissioned. By commissioning this group, the Army assigns them to USAR Control Group (OADO) (Officer Active Duty Obligor) in St. Louis and is able to maintain formal contact with the ECP officers. This has been instrumental in reducing the confusion that previously existed with regard to completion students who were neither officers, enlisted members, or ROTC cadets.

c. The program is a recruiting incentive. As ROTC recruits from among more and more students with prior military service, the idea of advanced placement and subsequent early commissioning has become a major incentive. ODCSROTC has estimated that around 500 officers per year would not have enrolled if ECP was not available.

DISADVANTAGES

a. The program causes the perception of a double standard. Although over 93 percent of all ECP Officers eventually receive degrees, under current policies, only officers commissioned with degrees can be considered for active duty upon commissioning. Thus the perception follows that a lower calibre of officer is being relegated to the Reserve Component.

b. The program distorts Reserve Component unit readiness picture. The provisions of the ECP are such that the completion of a degree should be the paramount activity for ECP officers. For this reason, the completion of a resident OBC is normally unattainable since the length of OBC and the scheduling of the classes does not neatly coincide with the summer break period in most academic calendars. Thus, the overwhelming majority of ECP officers do not attend an OBC until after degree completion and, as a result, are not deployable. This is a major area of concern to state AGs and MUSARC commanders. TRADOC has taken measures to develop an eight week Reserve Component OBC for all branches except specialty branches, Air Defense Artillery, Finance Corps and Aviation. This will ensure the deployability of ECP officers upon mobilization and will alleviate a major deficiency associated with the ECP.

A major factor bearing on ECP is the fact that the ROTC production is projected to experience significant shortfalls through FY 89 as shown in Figure 12-9.
In view of the shortfall, any analysis of the ECP must consider what the program contributes to total ROTC production and the effect of eliminating or reducing ECP would have on that production. Figure 12-10 demonstrates the immediate impact elimination of the program would have upon production.
Ideally speaking, those who would normally be ECP officers would be commissioned upon award of a degree. However, the table cannot depict how many of those completion students would become "lost to the system" as was the case prior to 1982; or how many would not join ROTC if early commissioning were not available.

The Study Group recognized a need to obtain input from the field and queried HQ FORSCOM, NGB, OCAR, AND RCPAC on their position regarding ECP. The position of TRADOC had already been submitted in a separate action and subsequently, the Army Advisory Panel on ROTC (AAP) developed a position on the issue. The positions varied from "eliminate ECP immediately" to "continue ECP." Given the projected ROTC production shortfall the study group considered all points of view and developed the position that ECP should be continued through the foreseeable future.
CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing discussion enables the following conclusions to be drawn:

a. The ECP size has grown dramatically and is still in a state of growth.
b. There are both advantages and disadvantages associated with the ECP.
c. Reserve Component commanders prefer lieutenants without degrees to no lieutenants at all.
d. The overwhelming majority of ECP officers (93 percent) complete their studies and are awarded degrees.
e. The Reserve Components rely heavily on ECP officers as a source of lieutenants for Troop Program units.
f. The ECP must be viewed in light of total ROTC production.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The adoption of the following recommendations will provide firm control over ECP officers while maximizing their deployability in the event of mobilization:

11. Encourage Academic Alignment. By implication, MS-I cadets should be freshmen, MS-II cadets should be sophomores, MS-III should be juniors, and MS-IV should be seniors. For reasons previously discussed, this track has become somewhat skewed. However, the premise remains that inherent to a commission obtained through ROTC is the award of a baccalaureate degree. As the name implies, the ECP is an affirmation that although a reserve commission may be awarded at anytime, the complete product remains a lieutenant with a degree. Therefore, whenever practical, academic alignment should be strongly encouraged. TRADOC has recognized this; and in an initiative promulgated by ODCSROTC on 6 December 1984, it became a command policy that in order to be contracted as an MS-III Cadet, prospective MS-III cadets must have achieved at least an academic sophomore standing with a 2.0 cumulative GPA. Exceptions to this policy are recognized for military junior college cadets and Army College Fund recipients. Because of the reliance on the ECP by the Reserve Components, any move toward academic alignment must be closely monitored by both ODCSPER and ODCSROTC to ensure that the number of cadets excluded from the ECP are (as a minimum) replaced by lieutenants with degrees.

12-19
12. Require all ECP officers with more than eight months remaining prior to degree completion to attend a Reserve Component OBC. One of the major problems with the ECP is the inability to deploy ECP lieutenants. In order to be deployable, a lieutenant must have completed OBC for his or her branch. However, since the intent of the ECP is to facilitate the degree completion process, very few ECP officers can complete the regular active duty OBC during the summer vacation period because the OBC course length and scheduling is in conflict with the academic calendar. Many OBCs take longer to complete than the time available during the summer vacation period. Also, the TRADOC schools do not schedule class dates to coincide with civilian academic calendars.

TRADOC is bringing on-line an eight-week RC OBC for all branch OBCs with the exception of specialty branches, Air Defense Artillery, Finance Corps, and Aviation. The Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, Engineer and Signal Schools are expected to be on-line with their Reserve Component OBC by the summer of 1986 with the remainder, less the exceptions, coming on-line by the summer of 1987. These OBCs will branch qualify ECP officers during the summer months which, in turn, will make the ECP officers deployable. The intent is to send all ECP officers to an OBC regardless of whether or not the ECP officer is assigned to a troop program unit. ECP officers who are expected to complete their degree requirements either during the summer or fall immediately following their commissioning are not included in this recommendation.

13. Assign non-unit ECP officers to ROTC Instructor Groups. An intent of the ECP, as defined by the VCSA on 8 November 1985, is the maximum utilization of ECP officers through participation in Reserve Component units. The extent to which this can be done involves the availability of unit vacancies within a reasonable commuting distance of the ECP officer's residence. Currently no attempt is being made by ARPERCEN to control this, but it can be done similarly to the way the lieutenant management teams are assigning RFD lieutenants with degrees to troop program units.

Experience has shown that the management of ECP officers who are assigned to Reserve Components units is not a problem. However, the management of ECP officers who are not assigned to units is a problem. The Officers Active Duty Obligor Branch at ARPERCEN has responsibility for
controlling all ECP officers. The PMS at each Instructor Group is responsible for monitoring the ECP officers at the institution or institutions which are served by his/her instructor group. The term "monitor"; however, has little real meaning since the PMS cannot order ECP officers to take the PT test, or to be weighed, or to assist with recruiting or training activities. On the other hand, those ECP officers who are assigned to units are subject to the discipline of the unit to which they belong. Furthermore, they are receiving a considerable amount of on-the-job-training and do contribute to the overall readiness of their units although most are not branch qualified.

The study group recommends that as many ECP officers as feasible be assigned to units and that this be managed by ARPERCEN in a manner similar to the assignment of RFD lieutenants with degrees.

The feasibility depends on the available unit vacancies and the type of unit concerned. Obviously it would be less than optimum if all the lieutenants in a highly deployable unit were ECP officers. Also, the assigning of ECP officers to units should not close out unit vacancies that would be available to RFD officers with degrees or lieutenants being released from active duty.

Those ECP officers not assigned to units should be assigned on orders to the PMS. Steps in this direction have already been initiated by ODCSPER; and effective September 1986 Early Commissionee Augmentation Units (ECAU) will be activated at each Instructor Group. Each ECP officer not assigned to an ARNG unit or Reserve TPU will be assigned to an ECAU. ECP officers assigned to the ECAU will be paid for two required training assemblies per year. These will be used for the purpose of administering the PT test and recording height/weight data. Additional paid voluntary training assemblies may be performed to assist the PMS with recruiting and training activities. The study group recommends that this initiative be continued and developed to its maximum potential as a method of exercising PMS command and control over non-unit ECP lieutenants.
ANNEX A

This annex consists of a consolidated list of study group recommendations and the agency responsible for implementation. This listing serves as a base document. It will be modified as the implementation effort progresses.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM NO.</th>
<th>ACTIONS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-1*</td>
<td>Consolidate marketing and advertising under OD/CSPER.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-2</td>
<td>Develop and target advertising at RFD propensity group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>Consolidate ROTC/USAREC Nurse advertising.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4</td>
<td>Ensure ROTC MMS interfaces with Leads.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-5</td>
<td>Review functions of Regional Account Managers (RAMs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-6</td>
<td>Increase advertising training in TROEP.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APPROVAL AGENCY/ (DATE)</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION AGENCIES</th>
<th>TARGET COMPLETE DATE</th>
<th>NONCONFIRM/ MODIFY</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>DCS/PER</td>
<td>DAPE-MA-OA</td>
<td>DAPE-ZXN</td>
<td>Apr 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>Aug 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCS/PER</td>
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<td>DAPE-ZXN</td>
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<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>Oct 86-Jan 88</td>
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<td>TRADOC</td>
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<td>TRADOC</td>
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<td>MA</td>
<td>Oct 86</td>
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*Recommendation 2-1, 3-11 and 5-3 all relate to ongoing USAREC/CDT Command recruiting test.
<table>
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<th>ITEM NO.</th>
<th>ACTIONS</th>
<th>APPROVAL AGENCY/DATE</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION AGENCIES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3-1</td>
<td>Publish &quot;Total Army Accession Plan&quot; annually.</td>
<td>DCSPER</td>
<td>DAPE-MP</td>
<td>MPA-OA</td>
<td>Jul 86</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-2</td>
<td>Continue use of USAR and ARNG management teams.</td>
<td>DCSPER</td>
<td>DAPE-MP</td>
<td>MPA-OA</td>
<td>Closed</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-3</td>
<td>Modify ROTCMIS to distinguish officers in the OADO control group from those in the IPR control group.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>OA</td>
<td>Closed</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-4</td>
<td>Review AR 135-91 for possible change to MSO. Establish TPU requirement for officers who serve 3 years.</td>
<td>DCSPER</td>
<td>DAPE-MP</td>
<td>MPA-OA</td>
<td>Aug 86</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3-5</td>
<td>Conduct a market analysis to better define the ROTC market.</td>
<td>IMP TM</td>
<td>OPI-R</td>
<td>OPI-R</td>
<td>Jun 87</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-6</td>
<td>Develop mission model.</td>
<td>IMP TM</td>
<td>OPI-R</td>
<td>OPI-R</td>
<td>Jun 87</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-7</td>
<td>Evaluate &quot;Goldminer Team&quot; concept.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>Dec 86</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-8</td>
<td>Approve an increase in Gold Bar Recruiters.</td>
<td>DCSPER</td>
<td>DAPE-MP</td>
<td>MPA-OA</td>
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<td>3-9</td>
<td>ROTC Directories for USMA LNOs.</td>
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<td>3-10</td>
<td>ROTC Directories to Inservice Recruiters.</td>
<td>DCSPER</td>
<td>DAPE-MP</td>
<td>MPA-OA</td>
<td>Jul 86</td>
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<td>3-11</td>
<td>Adopt coordinated USAREC/ROTC off-campus recruiting policy.</td>
<td>DCSPER</td>
<td>DAPE-MP</td>
<td>MPA-OA</td>
<td>Apr 87</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-12</td>
<td>Increased RFD information in TROEP.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>TE</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-13</td>
<td>Adopt a production management system.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
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<td>Staffing</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITEM NO.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4-1*</td>
<td>Increase subsistence to $150 per month.</td>
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<td>4-2*</td>
<td>Request scholarship increase of $1500 two year scholarships.</td>
<td>---</td>
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<tr>
<td>4-3*</td>
<td>Adopt an &quot;Army Only&quot; incentive for ROTC.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4-4</td>
<td>Improve scholarship marketing and advertising.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>Instate tuition analysis to determine if they are 50%.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>CM</td>
<td>Closed</td>
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<td>4-6</td>
<td>Reevaluate female scholarship content (15%)-award scholarship by discipline regardless of gender.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>CM</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>4-7</td>
<td>Increase Reserve Force Duty scholarship.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>CM</td>
<td>1st Qtr FY 87</td>
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<tr>
<td>4-8</td>
<td>Dedicate 50 scholarships to JROTC.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>CM</td>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4-9</td>
<td>Award 4 year scholarships to extension centers.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>CM</td>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4-10</td>
<td>Request burden hours to support surveys and research.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Closed</td>
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<tr>
<td>4-11</td>
<td>Staff ROTC's Educational Assistance Allowance proposal.</td>
<td>DCSPER</td>
<td>DAPE-MP</td>
<td>MPA-OA</td>
<td>Jul 86-Mar 87</td>
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</tbody>
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*These recommendations have been incorporated into ROTC Cadet Command's EAA incentive proposal. (4-11)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM NO.</th>
<th>ACTIONS</th>
<th>APPROVAL AGENCY/ (DATE)</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION AGENCIES</th>
<th>TARGET COMPLETE</th>
<th>CUR/ MODIFY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5-1</td>
<td>Establish ROTC as an MSC of TRADOC. Consolidate administrative and logistics functions.</td>
<td>ODCSOPS</td>
<td>DAMO-FD</td>
<td>CLOSED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-2</td>
<td>Deploy Area Commanders.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>CLOSED</td>
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<tr>
<td>5-3*</td>
<td>Functionally realign marketing, advertising and off-campus recruiting.</td>
<td>---</td>
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*Covered in Recommendations #2-1 and #3-11.
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<th>IMPLEMENTATION AGENCIES</th>
<th>TARGET COMPLETE DATE</th>
<th>NONCONCUR/ MODIFY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6-1</td>
<td>Measure ROTC to establish valid staffing standards.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC-RR</td>
<td>TRAMEA</td>
<td>May 88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-2</td>
<td>Streamline officer acquisition cycle.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>RR</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>6-3</td>
<td>Establish ROTC as an excepted unit at present ODP and authorization levels.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>RR</td>
<td>N</td>
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<td>6-4</td>
<td>Respond to Army Advisory Panel concerns on quality of assigned personnel.</td>
<td>DCSPER</td>
<td>DAPE-MP</td>
<td>MPA-QA</td>
<td>Aug 86</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>DAPC-OPD-J</td>
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<tr>
<td>6-5</td>
<td>Integrate AGRs throughout ROTC System.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>RR</td>
<td>Staffing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-6</td>
<td>Investigate feasibility of integrating Reserve Component NCOs into staffing system.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>RR</td>
<td>Staffing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-7</td>
<td>Increase the number of AGRs assigned to ROTC.</td>
<td>DCSPER</td>
<td>DAPE-MP</td>
<td>MPA-QA</td>
<td>Aug 86 (Plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-8</td>
<td>Change detachment NCO job description to reflect NCO role as recruiters, retainers, mentors and role models in addition to traditional administrative and logistics duties.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>RR</td>
<td>Sep 86</td>
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<tr>
<td>6-9</td>
<td>Develop a personnel system to account for institutional hires.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>RR</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
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<td>ACTIONS</td>
<td>APPROVAL AGENCY/(DATE)</td>
<td>IMPLEMENTATION AGENCIES</td>
<td>TARGET COMPLETE DATE</td>
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<tr>
<td>6-10</td>
<td>Develop correct mix of personnel (ex AGR, active, officers, NCOs and DAC).</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC-RR</td>
<td>TRAMEA</td>
<td>May 88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-11</td>
<td>CSA promulgate statement on importance of the contribution being made by ROTC cadre.</td>
<td>IMP TM</td>
<td>OPI-R</td>
<td>OPI-R</td>
<td>May 86</td>
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<tr>
<td>6-12</td>
<td>Develop guidance for promotion and selection boards on the importance of ROTC duty.</td>
<td>DCSPER</td>
<td>DAPE-MP</td>
<td>MPD-OP</td>
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<td>6-13</td>
<td>Require all field grade promotion and selection boards to have ROTC representation.</td>
<td>DCSPER</td>
<td>DAPE-MP</td>
<td>MPD-OP</td>
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<td>6-14</td>
<td>Approve the concept SDAP for ROTC NCOs.</td>
<td>DCSPER</td>
<td>DAPE-MP</td>
<td>MPD-EP</td>
<td>Staffing</td>
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<tr>
<td>6-15</td>
<td>Institute a PMS selection board.</td>
<td>MILPERCENT/ TRADOC</td>
<td>ATPL-PO</td>
<td>ATPL-PO/ DACP-OPD-J</td>
<td>Staffing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-16</td>
<td>Determine feasibility of developing an instructor functional area.</td>
<td>DCSPER/ MILPERCENT</td>
<td>DAPE-MP</td>
<td>MPD-OP/ DACP-OPI</td>
<td>Staffing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-17</td>
<td>Formalize and publicize policy that directs, when possible, that ROTC cadre receive branch assignment after ROTC duty.</td>
<td>DCSPER/ MILPERCENT</td>
<td>DAPE-MP</td>
<td>MPD-OP/ DACP-OPD-J</td>
<td>Staffing</td>
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<tr>
<td>7-1</td>
<td>Accelerate pace of development of ROTC MMS software.</td>
<td>ODCSPER</td>
<td>DAPE-PSS</td>
<td>ATCC-OA</td>
<td>Oct 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-2</td>
<td>Monitor the funding of MMS to preclude further delay in purchase.</td>
<td>ODCSPER</td>
<td>DAPE-PSS</td>
<td>MPA-P</td>
<td>86-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-3</td>
<td>Comply with established MMS fielding milestones.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>OA</td>
<td>Oct 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-4</td>
<td>Plan and fund for automation support for deployed Area Commanders.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>OA</td>
<td>Oct 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-5</td>
<td>Incorporate data needs of Officer Longitudinal Data Base in MMS.</td>
<td>ARI</td>
<td>PREI</td>
<td>RL</td>
<td>1st Qtr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-6</td>
<td>Develop JROTC module for MMS.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>OA</td>
<td>Oct 88</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>8-1</td>
<td>Increase the number of CTLT spaces.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>TT</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-2</td>
<td>Conduct an evaluation of Gold Bar Bound.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>TT</td>
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<tr>
<td>8-3</td>
<td>Develop comprehensive cadre training program including initial and sustainment training.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>TE</td>
<td>Oct 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-4</td>
<td>Reexamine feasibility of selectively consolidating recruiting training currently given separately to USAREC and ROTC at Ft. Harrison.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>TE</td>
<td>Closed</td>
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<tr>
<td>8-5</td>
<td>Examine feasibility of consolidating RC and AC cadre course (TROOP).</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>TE</td>
<td>Jun 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-6</td>
<td>Develop measures of effectiveness for cadre training.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>TE</td>
<td>Sep 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-7</td>
<td>Continue affiliation program for 2 years to ensure honest evaluation.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>TT</td>
<td>Jun 88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-8</td>
<td>Determine feasibility of adding other branches to the affiliation program.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>TT</td>
<td>Jun 88</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>9-1</td>
<td>Establish an Army policy endorsing Academic Excellence.</td>
<td>IMP TM</td>
<td>OPI-R</td>
<td>OPI-R</td>
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<tr>
<td>9-2</td>
<td>Establish a system to monitor status of academic credit.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>TE</td>
<td>Oct 87</td>
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<tr>
<td>9-3</td>
<td>Establish a system to monitor resource support provided by Host Schools.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>RB</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>9-4</td>
<td>Continue to develop relationships with civilian educators at national, regional, state and local areas on both a formal and informal basis.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>TE</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
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<tr>
<td>9-5</td>
<td>Adopt systems approach to reviewing ROTC POI. Include in new TRADOC Reg 350-XX.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>TE</td>
<td>Sep 86</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>10-1</td>
<td>Expand the scope of PAS to include period from enrollment to commissioning, certification achievement testing and English as a second language.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>TE</td>
<td>Oct 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-2</td>
<td>Maintain scope of Achievement Testing Program but provide PMS more flexibility diagnosing weaknesses by allowing test even by host schools to be used by PMS.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>TE</td>
<td>Closed</td>
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<tr>
<td>10-3</td>
<td>Develop a concept plan for 3Rs standard to include use of 3Rs standards to disqualify cadet from commissioning.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>TE</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-4</td>
<td>Resolve conflict between AR621-5 and AR145-1 regarding ESL; establish ESL standards at commissioning include listening and speaking.</td>
<td>DCSPER</td>
<td>DATE-MP</td>
<td>MPA-CS</td>
<td>Closed</td>
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<tr>
<td>10-5</td>
<td>Establish a single standard for assessment of the physical dimensions at contracting.</td>
<td>DCSPER</td>
<td>DAPE-MP</td>
<td>MPA-CS</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>10-6</td>
<td>Establish cadet physical readiness standards to include twice yearly APRT after contracting.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>TE</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>10-7</td>
<td>Conduct a review of LAP within context of Lieutenant Task List for leadership to determine the most effective means for providing consistent development and assessment of cadet leadership.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>TE</td>
<td>Staffing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-8</td>
<td>Expand assessment system measures of effectiveness, both internal and external to ROTC, include more longitudinal tracking of ROTC graduate performance (OLRDB).</td>
<td>Incorporated in Task 7-5</td>
<td>(null)</td>
<td>(null)</td>
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<tr>
<td>11-1</td>
<td>Do not change the orientation of Basic Camp or limit POI to exactly match the Basic Course.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>TT</td>
<td>Closed</td>
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<tr>
<td>11-2</td>
<td>Do not implement Two Camp Concept. Continue with 4 year and 2 year program.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>TE</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-3</td>
<td>Accept current three camp format. Begin planning for camp expansion in outyears.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>TT</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-4</td>
<td>Continue current advance camp standardization program.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>TT</td>
<td>Closed</td>
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<tr>
<td>12-1</td>
<td>CSA issue policy statement and guidance affirming equal importance of both the reserve and active component dimensions of production, numbers and quality.</td>
<td>IMP TM</td>
<td>OPI-R</td>
<td>OPI-R</td>
<td>May 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-2</td>
<td>Conduct a market analysis to define RFD market.</td>
<td>Incorporated in Task 3-5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jun 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-3</td>
<td>Develop mission model to include RFD.</td>
<td>Incorporated in Task 3-6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jun 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-4</td>
<td>Develop and implement RFD production management system.</td>
<td>Incorporated in Task 3-13</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Staffing</td>
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<tr>
<td>12-5</td>
<td>Increase RFD recruiting efforts.</td>
<td>Incorporated in Tasks 3-5, 3-6, 3-13, 4-5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Staffing</td>
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<tr>
<td>12-6</td>
<td>Develop advertising and recruiting materials for RFD.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>Aug 86</td>
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<tr>
<td>12-7</td>
<td>Continue USAR and ARNG Lieutenant distribution efforts.</td>
<td>Incorporated in Task 3-2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>12-8</td>
<td>Increase RFD scholarships.</td>
<td>Incorporated in Task 4-7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1st Qtr FY 87</td>
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<tr>
<td>12-9</td>
<td>Initiate a promotional campaign to &quot;sell&quot; prospective employers on ROTC cadets.</td>
<td>DCSPER</td>
<td>DAPE-MPA-OA</td>
<td>DAPE-ZXA</td>
<td>Staffing</td>
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<tr>
<td>12-10</td>
<td>Continue to staff RCEEP and OEBVII and review AR135-91.</td>
<td>DCSPER</td>
<td>DAPE-MP</td>
<td>MPA-OA</td>
<td>Jun 86</td>
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<tr>
<td>12-11</td>
<td>Encourage academic alignment.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>CM</td>
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<tr>
<td>12-12</td>
<td>Require all ECP officers with more than eight months remaining prior to degree completion to attend an RC OBC.</td>
<td>DCSPER</td>
<td>DAPE-MP</td>
<td>MPA-OA</td>
<td>Jun 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-13</td>
<td>Assign non-unit ECP officers to ROTC Instructor Groups.</td>
<td>DCSPER</td>
<td>DAPE-MP</td>
<td>MPA-OA</td>
<td>May 86</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CSA promulgate a new mission statement for JROTC.</td>
<td>IMP TM</td>
<td>OPI-R</td>
<td>OPI-R</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>That the CSA authorize a Total Army sponsorship program for JROTC.</td>
<td>TRADOC/DCSPER</td>
<td>ATCC/DAPE</td>
<td>ATCC-TT</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>That AR145-2 be changed to reflect new mission statement and the</td>
<td>DCSPER</td>
<td>DAPE-MP</td>
<td>M*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sponsorship program.</td>
<td></td>
<td>MPA-OA</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>That the JROTC POI be revised to reflect a shift toward technology.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>TT</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>That a separate JROTC element (division) be established at HQ ROTC.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>TT</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>That a new system for identifying and selecting future JROTC hosts be</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>TT</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>established.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>That AR145-2 be changed to reflect new JROTC selection system.</td>
<td>DCSPER</td>
<td>DAPE-MP</td>
<td>MPA-OA</td>
<td>Sep 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>That JROTC cadre management system be developed.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>TT</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>That AR145-2 be amended to reflect new cadre management system.</td>
<td>DCSPER</td>
<td>DAPE-MP</td>
<td>MPA-OA</td>
<td>Sep 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>That a comprehensive, logical system for the evaluation and update of</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>TT</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JROTC POI be developed.</td>
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*3 Mission has been added, sponsorship has not.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>That AR145-2 be ammended to recognize the importance of summer camps in the JROTC POI.</td>
<td>DCSPER</td>
<td>DAPE-MP</td>
<td>MPA-OA</td>
<td>Sep 86</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>That a listing of items required to be funded so as to ensure a viable program be determined.</td>
<td>TRADOC/ DCSPER</td>
<td>ATCC/DAPE</td>
<td>ATCC-TT/ DAPE-MPA-OA</td>
<td>Closed</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>That JROTC and its &quot;product&quot; be integrated into the Total Army Acquisition System.</td>
<td>DCSPER</td>
<td>DAPE-MP</td>
<td>MPA-OA</td>
<td>Jul 86</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>That JROTC uniform needs be reviewed annually.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>TT</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>That new legislation to support payment of travel and subsistence to JROTC cadets be submitted.</td>
<td>DCSPER</td>
<td>DAPE-MP</td>
<td>MPA-OA</td>
<td>Aug 86</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>That annual interservice JROTC meetings be continued.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>ATCC</td>
<td>TT</td>
<td>M</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>That all services keep JROTC data in standard formats.</td>
<td>DCSPER</td>
<td>DAPE-MP</td>
<td>MPA-OA</td>
<td>Aug 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>That AR145-2 be ammended to reflect the management of the JROTC MMS module.</td>
<td>DCSPER</td>
<td>DAPE-MP</td>
<td>MPA-OA</td>
<td>Sep 86</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JROTC RECOMMENDATIONS WITHIN OTHER CHAPTERS:</td>
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<td>4-6</td>
<td>That 50 scholarships be dedicated for JROTC graduates.</td>
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<td>7-6</td>
<td>That a JROTC module for MMS be developed.</td>
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

1. Morrill Act of 1862:

The first federal legislation establishing military training in civilian colleges was the Morrill Act of 1862. This act set up colleges in each state "...Where the leading object shall be, without excluding other scientific and classical studies, and including military tactics, to teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts,..." There was no process to commission the graduates of these schools nor was that the intention. Rather the intent was to have an unorganized pool of the citizenry of the country which had received military training and would be available for commissioning should a major emergency or other national peril require it. There was no standard way of administering this program although subsequent legislation provided for the assignment of active Army officers to the several colleges as professors of military science.

2. The National Defense Act of 1916:

This act substantially reorganized the War Department. Among other things, it established the Reserve Officer's Training Corps in sections 40-53 of the act. A section by section summary follows.

Section 40: Authorized the establishment of Senior ROTC at all civil institutions requiring four years of collegiate study for a degree and at all institutions not conferring a degree but rated by the War Department as essentially military schools. Junior ROTC was authorized to be established at all other public or private educational institutions.

Section 41: Institutions at which ROTC was established had to have an officer of the Army detailed as professor of military science and tactics and had to have at least 100 physically fit males participating in the ROTC program.

Section 42: Any institution that required the first two years of ROTC to be a prerequisite for graduation other than those mentioned in section 40 was also authorized an ROTC Program.

Section 43: Authorized Secretary of War to prescribe standard courses of theoretical and practical military training for ROTC. Further, no senior or junior program could be established at any institution that would not devote at least three hours per week per academic year to such military training.

ANNEX B
Section 44: Set forth the following criteria for participation in ROTC:

a. Individuals had to be students at the institution offering ROTC.

b. Individuals had to be at least 14 years old.

c. Individuals had to be physically fit.

Section 45: Authorized the detailing of active and retired officers for ROTC duty. There was an upper limit of 300 active officers established. No active officer with less than five years commissioned service could be detailed to ROTC duty. In peace time, no retired officer could be detailed without his consent. Retired officers below the grade of lieutenant colonel or colonel detailed would receive full pay and allowances. Retired officers in the grade of lieutenant colonel or colonel detailed to ROTC duty would receive the full pay and allowances of a major. No officer, retired or active, above the grade of colonel could be detailed to ROTC. The limit of the ROTC tour for active officers could not extend beyond four years.

Section 46: Authorized the detailing of active and retired NCO's to ROTC duty. There was an upper limit of 500 active NCO's established. Retired NCO's could not be detailed without their consent and while so detailed received full pay and allowances.

Section 47: Secretary of War was authorized to issue necessary animals, arms, uniforms, equipment, and means of transportation at public expense to institutions participating in ROTC. Such institutions were required to issue a bond for the care and safe keeping of said U.S. property.

Section 48: Secretary of War was authorized to established training camps of not longer than six weeks per year. Secretary of War was authorized to transport and subsist ROTC cadets at said camps at public expense. Secretary of War was authorized to use the regular Army, such other military forces as Congress authorized and government property to conduct ROTC training at such camps.

Section 49: The President was authorized to appoint as Reserve Officers any graduate of Senior ROTC who:

a. Completed the requirements of Section 50 of this act.

b. Participated in such practical instruction subsequent to graduation as prescribed by the Secretary of War.
c. Reached the age of 21

d. Agreed to serve as a reserve officer for 10 years after the date of appointment.

Also, the President was authorized to appoint as reserve officers any graduate of Junior ROTC who in addition to satisfying all the above requirements:

- Satisfactorily completed the courses of military training prescribed for the senior division.

The total number authorized for commissioning could not exceed 50,000. This section also stipulated that if a graduate went on to post-graduate education he could not be commissioned until he completed his post-graduate studies.

Section 50: Authorized subsistence allowances for any cadet in the Senior ROTC who completed the first two years of Senior ROTC and who was selected by the institution president and the PMS for further training. Such cadets were required to devote five hours per week military training, agree to attend summer camp, and to remain in ROTC for the remainder of his course at the institution.

Section 51: Any physically fit male citizen of the U.S. between the ages of 21 and 27 who was graduated from an institution offering military training with an assigned Army officer as PMS prior to the enactment of this act was also eligible for commissioning as a reserve officer.

Sections 52 & 53: Deal with which officers the President could call to active duty and forbade retirement to reserve officers.

COMMENTARY: ROTC, as we know it today was started by this act. Particularly significant to the interpretation of the purpose of Junior ROTC is the provision of Section 49 which (in effect) allowed the ultimate commissioning of JROTC graduates who completed a course of military instruction prescribed for the Senior ROTC. What this meant was that such Junior ROTC graduates received a certificate of eligibility for a reserve commission and could be commissioned at age 21. This is substantiated by hearings in the Senate Armed Services Committee on 5 August 1964 in a discussion between Senator McIntyre and BG Kenan, Deputy Chief, Office of Army Reserve Components.
3. The ROTC VITALIZATION ACT OF 1964 (current Chapters 102 & 103 of Title 10, United States Code)

This legislation has been amended several times since 1964 and is the current legislation in effect. Chapter 102 deals with Junior ROTC and consists of one section. Chapter 103 deals with Senior ROTC and consists of twelve sections. Analysis and commentary of each chapter follows:

Chapter 102 - Junior Reserve Officer's Training Corps

Section 2031 - Junior Reserve Officer's Training Corps

a. This paragraph authorizes the Secretary of each military department to establish JROTC at public or private high schools. No more than 200 can be established in any one year and there can be no more than a total of 1,600 JROTC units nationwide. A single school can have more than one unit.

b. This paragraph prescribes requirements institutions must meet in order to maintain or establish a JROTC unit.

(1) Minimum of 100 physically fit students of at least 14 years of age who are citizens or nationals of the U.S. in the unit.

(2) Have adequate facilities for classroom, storage, space for arms and equipment, area to conduct drill.

(3) Must have a curriculum of at least three years duration.

(4) Limits membership to students who maintain acceptable standards of conduct and academic achievement.

c. This paragraph prescribes the support the Secretary of each military department will provide the JROTC program.

(1) Provide officers and NCO's to institutions with JROTC.

(2) Provide texts, equipment and uniforms.

(3) Establish standards of performance for JROTC units.

d. This paragraph allows retired officers and NCO's to be employed as administrators and instructors, in lieu of or in addition to active officers and NCO's.

(1) One half the difference between retired pay and allowances and full pay and allowances to be borne by the Federal Government; the other half to be borne by the institution.
(2) Retired officers and NCO's employed on JROTC duty are not considered to be on active duty.

Amendments to the original law are as follows:

1966 and 1967 amendments made minor grammatical and syntax changes

1973 amendment allowed females to participate

1976 amendment increased the total number of JROTC units authorized from 1,200 to 1,600

1978 amendment allowed American nationals as well as citizens to participate thus opening the program to American Samoans who are not U.S. citizens.

COMMENTARY: As written, the law does not state the purpose of JROTC nor the intent of Congress in establishing JROTC. This information is found on page 4 of Senate Report #1514 dated 20 August 1964 which states: "An effectively administered Junior ROTC program can make important contributions to the production of qualified officers and enlisted members of the Armed Forces. There is some evidence that persons who have had Junior ROTC training volunteer for the Armed Forces in larger numbers than those who have not had such training. In addition, the Junior ROTC program encourages the development of leadership, discipline, and patriotism in our young people." Thus, there exists no legal restriction in using JROTC as a marketing source for the Senior program. The only caveat is that JROTC per se is not a primary source of officer production nor should it be thought of or used in such fashion.

Chapter 103 - Senior Reserve Officer's Training Corps

Section 2101 - Definitions: This section defines the terms "program", "member of program", and "advanced training" as used in this chapter.

Section 2102 - Establishment:

a. This paragraph established the ROTC for the purpose of preparing selected students for commissioned service in Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

b. This paragraph prescribes the responsibilities of the institution:

(1) PMS must have academic rank of professor

(2) Institution must fulfill the terms of its agreement with Armed Service involved.
(3) Institution must adopt as part of its curriculum a 2-year, 4-year or both course of military training.

c. This paragraph allows ROTC to be compulsory or elective as the state or institution authorities wish.

d. This paragraph prescribes criteria for the establishment and maintenance of ROTC units.

(1) Must be requested by the institution.

(2) Request must be approved by the Governor of the state in which the institution is located.

(3) Must have not less than 40 students enrolled in ROTC.

AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 2102

1977 Added paragraph (d)

1978 Females in military colleges may participate in ROTC although their participation is not mandatory.

1983 Appropriation legislation requires a minimum of 17 MS III students at each unit unless it is the only unit in the state.

Section 2103 - Eligibility for membership

a. Individual must be a student at an institution that has an ROTC unit. However, a student at an institution that does not have ROTC may be a member of an ROTC unit at another institution.

b. Persons from foreign countries may be enrolled in ROTC with approval of the appropriate secretary of a military department.

c. Students of medicine, dentistry, pharmacy, veterinary, and other allied medical sciences may enroll in ROTC.

d. A commissioned officer of a reserve component who is a student of medicine, dentistry, pharmacy, veterinary, or other allied medical science may enroll in ROTC.

NOTE: Appropriation legislation since 1955 has required a loyalty oath to be executed by all formally enrolled students.
Section 2104 - Advanced training, eligibility for:

a. This paragraph authorized advanced training.

b. This paragraph prescribes the enrollment and continuation criteria for eligibility for advanced training.

(1) Must be a citizen of the United States.

(2) Have been selected for advanced training.

(3) Enlist in a reserve component of the armed forces.

(4) Execute a contract with the appropriate secretary of a military department.

(5) Agree in writing that he will accept an appointment, if offered, as a commissioned officer.

(6) Must complete either the first two years of a Senior ROTC curriculum or attend the basic camp.

(7) Agrees in writing to complete advanced camp within two years of admission to the advanced phase of ROTC.

c. Members of ROTC who do not meet the above criteria will be terminated from enrollment.

d. This section does not apply to scholarship cadets or foreign cadets.

NOTES: Section 209 of Title 37 prescribes subsistence allowances for cadets enrolled in this section.

Amendments: This section was amended in 1984 to delete the "Two years remaining in college" rule.

Section 2105: Advanced training; failure to complete or accept a commission:

This section provided that any cadet enrolled under Section 2104 who fails to complete the prescribed training or who does not accept a commission can be ordered to active duty in an enlisted status for no longer than two years.

Section 2106: Advanced Training; commission on completion:

a. Anyone who satisfactorily completes the academic and military requirements of the program may be appointed as a regular or reserve officer.
b. Dates of rank for officers appointed in May or June will be the same as those commissioned from West Point. Dates of rank for cadet commissioned in months other than May or June will be established by the secretary of the military department concerned.

c. Credit toward computing length of enlisted service will not be given to any cadet in the advanced phase of ROTC.

Section 2107: Financial assistance program for specially selected members:

a. This paragraph authorizes the awarding of scholarships to eligible members of the program. Such individuals cannot be more than 25 years old by June 30 of the calendar year in which they are to be commissioned unless they served previously on active duty, in which case the age limit is increased to 29.

b. Criteria for eligibility is as follows:

(1) U.S. citizenship required.

(2) Specially selected.

(3) Must enlist in a reserve component.

(4) Must sign a contract.

(5) Must agree in writing that he will either accept a regular or reserve commission and serve on active duty for four or more years.

or

(6) Accept a commission and serve in a reserve component for eight years.

NOTE: The reserve component service can be either active or inactive duty.

c. The scholarship pays for all tuition, books, and laboratory fees only. At least 50% of all scholarship recipients must be eligible for in-state tuition rates.

d. Scholarship cadets may be commissioned upon completion of the program even if they are under 21 years of age.
e. The dates of rank for officers appointed in May or June will be the same as those commissioned from West Point. Dates of rank for cadets commissioned in months other than May or June will be established by the Secretary of the Army.

f. Scholarship cadets failing to complete the program or who decline to accept a commission may be ordered to active duty for up to four years.

g. Credit toward computing length of enlisted service will not be given to any scholarship cadet.

h. Not more than 12,000 Army cadets will be scholarship awardees.

Amendments: 1971:

Only 20% of scholarships can be awarded to members of the two year program.

Stipulated that 50% of all scholarship recipients be eligible for in-state tuition rates.

Increased the number of scholarships from 5,500 to 6,500.

Amendments: 1980:

Extended the age limit to 29 years old by 30 June of the calendar year in which they were appointed for members of ROTC who had prior enlisted service in a reserve component.

Added the provisions of subsection B.

Required the written agreement condition for four years service.

Increased the number of scholarships from 6,500 to 12,000.

Section 2107A Financial Assistance Program for specially selected Members:

a. (1) Authorizes the awarding of scholarships to eligible members of the program in military junior colleges. Such individuals cannot be more than 25 years old by June 30 of the calendar year in which they are to be commissioned unless they served previously on active duty in which case the age limit is increased to 29.

(2) To be considered a military junior college, the institution must be military in nature and have a post secondary program that does not award baccalaureate degrees and meets such other requirements established by the Secretary of the Army.
b. To be eligible a cadet must:
   (1) Be a citizen of the United States.
   (2) Be specially selected.
   (3) Must enlist in a reserve component.
   (4) Must sign a contract.
   (5) Must agree in writing to accept a reserve commission if offered one.
   (6) Must agree in writing to serve in a reserve component for not less than eight years (this service can be on active or inactive duty).

c. The scholarship pays for all tuition, books, and laboratory fees only.

d. Military junior college scholarship cadets may be commissioned as reserve officers upon completion of the program even if they are under 21 years of age.

e. The dates of rank for officers appointed in May or June will be the same as those commissioned from West Point. Date of rank for cadets commissioned in months other than May or June will be established by the Secretary of the Army.

f. Scholarship cadets at military junior colleges failing to complete the program or who decline to accept commission may be ordered to active duty for up to four years.

g. Credit toward computing length of enlisted service will not be given to any military junior college cadet.

h. (1) Secretary of the Army will award not less than 10 scholarships at each military junior college provided there are that many eligible cadets.

   (2) The Secretary of the Army may award more than 10 scholarships at each military junior college if there are more than 10 eligible cadets.

i. The military junior college scholarships do not count against the 12,000 referenced in Section 2107.
Section 2108 Advanced standing; interruption of training; delay in starting obligated service; release from program.

a. Secretary of the Army may give advanced standing to anyone who has served on active duty or is a member of the armed forces.

b. Eligibility for advanced standing may be determined by participation in any military training that is substantially equivalent in kind to that received in the basic phase.

c. Portions of the prescribed course of military training for which an individual has received credit.

d. Graduate students may be admitted to ROTC Educational delay for graduate study or degree completion for military junior college graduates if authorized.

e. The Secretary of the Army can terminate the enrollment of cadets in the interest of the service.

Amendments:  1980:

Authorized education delay for graduates of military junior colleges.

Section 2109 Field Training; practice cruises

a. The Secretary of the Army is authorized to prescribe and conduct field training which members of the ROTC program must complete prior to their being commissioned.

b. The Secretary of the Army may:

   (1) Transport members of ROTC to such training or pay them a travel allowance in lieu of transportation.

   (2) Furnish medical attention and supplies and admit cadets to military hospitals while they are at such training.

   (3) Furnish subsistence, uniforms and equipment to ROTC cadets while at training.

   (4) Use any member(s) of the armed forces or civilian employees and any United States property to conduct such training.

Section 2110 Logistical Support

a. The Secretary of the Army may issue to institutions having ROTC or to Army officers at such institutions:
(1) Supplies, transportation, arms, ammunition, textbooks, and educational equipment.

(2) Uniforms or monetary allowances in lieu thereof.

b. The Secretary of the Army may provide or contract with civilians to provide flight training and necessary resources to conduct flight training.

c. The Secretary of the Army may transport ROTC cadets or prospective cadets to and from installations to undergo medical exams or make visits of observation and to furnish such cadets with subsistence, quarters and necessary medical care including hospitalization while making such visits.

d. The Secretary of the Army may authorize ROTC cadets to participate in aerial flight or cruises in naval vessels.

e. The Secretary of the Army may expend such funds as he deems necessary to run the ROTC program.

f. The Secretary of the Army shall require from institutions to which equipment is issued a bond or other indemnity not less than $5,000.00.

Amendments: 1976:

At one time annual reports to Congress on the status of flight training were required. This amendment changed the report due date from January to April.

This amendment struck out the flight training annual report requirement.

Section 2111 Personnel; administrators and instructors

This section authorizes the Secretary of the Army to detail regular or reserve members of the Army for instructional and administrative duties at institutions with ROTC programs.
CHIEF OF STAFF WEEKLY SUMMARY ARTICLE

(U) ROTC For The 1990s And Beyond

From Lexington and Concord through the present the defense of the country has rested with the citizen soldier. As early as 1862 Congress recognized a need for military education as part of the college curriculum. However, it was not until 1916 that the Reserve Officers' Training Corps was established by the National Defense Act. Since that time ROTC has provided a base of thousands of qualified officers who have served their country admirably.

From its inception ROTC's role has been viewed as one of civilian influence over officer development. ROTC is the basis for a strong partnership between academia at both the college and high school level. This partnership provides the Army exposure to a large number of people who otherwise might never come in contact with the Army. Most importantly the Army receives officers who are college graduates and have a broad range of experience and expertise in scientific, economic, political and social science fields. This dependence on officer leadership produced from civilian institutions helps to perpetuate the country's desire to rely on citizen soldiers rather than a military elite.

However, today's ROTC system is not as viable. Changes in defense policy, scarcity of resources and a changed "Total Army" mission are just a few of the things which impact on ROTC's ability to succeed.

ROTC Challenge

ROTC faces a major challenge through the end of this century. The "baby bust" which followed the post World War II "baby boom" is upon us. The high school population, college enrollment, and number of baccalaureate degrees conferred are projected to continue to decline into the next decade. The demand for well educated young people who can deal with high technology is skyrocketing. Colleges are placing increasing demands on the students as they change curricula to keep up with the growth in technology. These competing demands, and the required 30 percent increase in lieutenant production (8,400 lieutenants commissioned in 1985, to 10,800 required in 1991) make the Army's task of attracting quality students more difficult.

The success of the ROTC program must be judged in terms of four measures of effectiveness. First, it must produce the number of lieutenants that will meet the Army's accession goals. Second, the lieutenants must possess the highest ethical standards, and the appropriate basic educational and military skills to perform their duties as Army officers. Third, the lieutenants must represent a demographic diversity that assures representation by race, ethnic grouping, gender, geographic origin, and academic discipline. Fourth, the program must be cost effective. While efforts have been made in the past to emphasize one area or another, that approach must be avoided in favor of a solution that emphasizes...
all four measures of effectiveness. The following paragraphs outline what the Army must do to meet the challenge and to ensure the success of ROTC through the 1990s.

Total Army Orientation

The decision to accept no growth in Active Army end strength and to emphasize the Total Army concept has significant implications for ROTC. Today, many National Guard and Army Reserve units in rural areas have severe shortages. To relieve these shortages and support the expanded Reserve Component mission the ROTC program will be required to produce 2400 more commissionees annually by 1991; the majority of these lieutenants will be required for the Reserve Components.

The present Army ROTC program has a distinctly active duty focus. A deliberate effort is being made to adjust this focus and place equal emphasis and priority on the Reserve dimension of military service to the Nation. Considering the magnitude of the Reserve Forces Duty (RFD) production increase and confronted with the declining market and the negative demographic trends previously mentioned, efforts will be intensified to recruit, train, and commission enough quality lieutenants for the Reserve Components. The readiness of the Army relies heavily upon ROTC's ability to meet commissioning requirements for the Total Army.

The Army Staff is proceeding with several initiatives designed to enhance the flow of officers to the Reserve Components (RC) while simultaneously increasing the active duty experience of the Reserve Component officer force. The Reserve Component Experience Enhancement Program (RCEEP) would allow up to 1,700 Reserve Forces Duty (RFD) lieutenants to receive two years active duty experience with Active Component TO&E units. After completion of the two year active duty tour, RCEEP officers will serve in Army National Guard (ARNG) and US Army Reserve (USAR) units. The reinstatement of the Obligated Volunteer II (OBV II) Program would enable an additional 1,000 officers to enter active duty annually and initiate a flow of unit obligated lieutenants to the Reserve Components. The Army staff is also analyzing the advisability of changing the military service obligation to require service in a Reserve Component unit for officers serving only three years of active duty. The Reserve Forces Distribution System ensures that all obligated RFD lieutenants are assigned to units. The Army National Guard Lieutenants Management Team and the US Army Reserve Personnel Center Lieutenants Coordination Branch make this system work. Both are collocated at St. Louis, MO. These proposed and ongoing initiatives are expected to maximize the flow of officers to Reserve Component units.

Incentives to Enter and Remain in ROTC

ROTC's ability to attract and retain the necessary quantity of quality students depends largely on the incentives offered by
the program. The intangible incentives of patriotism and leadership opportunities are not, in themselves, sufficient to bring in and retain the number of cadets required to meet Army needs. The current package of tangible incentives includes 12,000 scholarships (in force at one time) and a monthly subsistence allowance of $100 for all contracted cadets.

The Army faces very stiff competition for quality students who possess leadership potential. The competition for engineering and science students is especially difficult since industry offers higher starting salaries than that of a second lieutenant. The lower propensity of college students to join Army ROTC versus other service programs places the Army at a disadvantage in competing for those students interested in a military career. In view of these challenges, the Army is developing a strong package of tangible incentives to attract enough of the Nation's best youth to meet our needs. The 5500 increase in scholarships to 12,000 has been an important step in the right direction. It has brought a comparable growth in the number of contracted high quality students. Incentive proposals being considered include offering selected underclassmen the opportunity to contract early and an Army only Educational Assistance Allowance to give an incentive to Army ROTC cadets not available to cadets of the other services.

Excellence in Education

One of the strategic goals identified by the Professional Development of Officers Study (PDOS) for the Officer Professional Development System stated the standards for commissioning as follows:

"The Army commissions only those individuals who attain established prerequisites, are of good character, and are worthy of the special trust placed in those charged with the protection of the Nation."

ROTC is charged with overseeing the selection and precommissioning development of the majority of the Army's junior leaders. The Army and academia work together in partnership to create an environment that is mutually supportive of the ROTC cadets' mastery of the basic academic and cognitive skills required to obtain a degree and earn a commission in the US Army.

Academia provides support to the partnership through academic credit for ROTC courses; personnel, equipment and monetary support to the ROTC instructor groups; and the additional support of the university administration and faculty. The keystone of the Army's role is recognition of the importance of the students' pursuit of a quality undergraduate degree. It is pursuit of a degree that brought the student to college in the first place. The Army must resist the temptation to solve difficult officer training problems by shifting more military skills training to ROTC, or by adding additional academic course requirements to commissioning standards.
It is Army policy that the attainment of a college degree should be recognized as the highest priority for ROTC cadets. The Army should carefully weigh any increases in ROTC pre-commissioning requirements that would significantly interfere with a cadet's attainment of a degree. By fostering this attitude of academic excellence, ROTC and the Army stand to gain a higher quality officer. The Army Science Board Summer Study for 1984 entitled Leading and Manning underscored this theme of excellence:

"A disciplined, systematic acquisition of basic intellectual skills in pre-commissioning education enables post-commissioning education to achieve a higher quality, reduce time and energy expended in remedial work, and enhance the officer's professional development."

To properly fulfill its other partnership roles, the Army provides a challenging program of instruction (POI), and enhanced career opportunities for the school's graduates. TRADOC will ensure that the POI is consistent with Army doctrine and is designed to progressively develop the cadets' leadership attributes as described by the "Be-Know-Do" philosophy of leadership defined by the Professional Development of Officers Study (PDOS) in terms of pre-commissioning goals. Special attention will be given to the communicative skills and when a need exists mathematics enhancement, and English as a second language. ROTC will ensure a presentation appropriate to a college level course. ROTC cadre will continue their outstanding endeavor to mentor their charges and develop the cadets' commitment to the Army ethos.

The quality of its graduates is one of the primary measures of the effectiveness of ROTC training. The assessment system is the ROTC program vehicle for measuring and managing the quality of ROTC commissionees. Assessment within ROTC is the continual process for estimating the suitability of cadets to be commissioned officers. The Professor of Military Science (PMS) of each ROTC instructor group is the key assessor who makes the determination as to which cadets eventually receive a commission. The Army supports the PMS by ensuring that the assessment system: spans the ROTC cadet's life from enrollment into ROTC, entry into contract status, and for commissioning; consists of measures of effectiveness that provide feedback from both inside and outside the ROTC system; and allows for early remediation and development of individual weaknesses. The ROTC cadre members monitor and provide counseling as the individual cadets develop their skills and values. Qualitative management is affected by the other three ROTC system measures of effectiveness (diversity, quantity, and cost). They must be appropriately balanced for a smooth running ROTC system.
The cornerstone of ROTC's ability to meet the challenge of producing the majority of the Army's officer corps is the officer cadre assigned to ROTC duty. At 1,400 colleges and universities associated with Army ROTC, approximately 2,000 officers are recruiting, motivating, training, retaining, and commissioning the future leaders of the Total Army. Their duties and contributions to the force are extremely important.

When the Army selects an officer for ROTC duty, the officer is being told that he or she has the Army's mandate to perpetuate the officer corps. To recruit the best and the brightest students from America's colleges and universities and then to train them is a challenge commensurate in importance to any that exists in fielding an Army of Excellence. Recent officer surveys reveal a perception that an assignment to ROTC duty is not career-enhancing or as challenging as other duties. It is time for the Army to realize that ROTC duty is difficult and meaningful. To emphasize the importance of ROTC duty, Army leadership has directed that a member of the ROTC community be part of the officer selection board process for promotions and schools. As a matter of policy, future selection boards will receive written and verbal guidance about the challenges and demands of ROTC duty. Recruiting and developing future leaders is one of the greatest challenges facing the Army.

The structure of the organization is essentially that which was established by the Steadfast Reorganization in 1973. The Expand the Base program of the early 1980s has added new ROTC detachments and has assigned Active Guard and Reserve officers to the
ROTC cadre. These improvements have resulted in a significant increase in enrollment and production. However, increasing requirements and a changing operational environment have emphasized the need for modifying the ROTC structure. Future manpower and fiscal constraints dictate that ROTC be streamlined using advances in technology to enhance productivity, and by more closely integrating ROTC marketing, advertising and recruiting into the Total Army marketing, advertising and recruiting effort. The Army has reorganized ROTC establishing it is a major subordinate command (MSC) of TRADOC, with possible further reorganization if the first effort proves successful. Further the concept of USAREC assisting ROTC in its recruiting is being tested. This should facilitate ROTC's ability to produce the required officers for the 1990s and beyond. Any further integration of marketing and advertising functions will be held in abeyance until results of the test can be analyzed.

One effort to employ technology to enhance productivity is the fielding of a computer network, the ROTC Mission Management System (ROTCMMS), which will provide an information link between Headquarters ROTC, the region headquarters, each of the ROTC instructor groups, and other Army agencies which use ROTC data. The Mission Management System will reduce the administrative burden at the instructor group by automating many of the repetitive reports and administrative tasks. The objective is to make the system responsive to the PMS and the instructor group.

Management

ROTC must have an effective management system to maximize the potential of the restructured organization and efficiently steward the resources allocated to it. ROTC leadership will be proactive in seeking ways to incorporate productivity enhancing technology and to identify innovative recruiting and training approaches.

Mission management is critical for ROTC. It cannot rely on the Department of Defense and Department of the Army viability standards as the only measures to judge the viability of ROTC detachments and to identify poor performers. The Army must be able to track performance against trends in terms of the four ROTC measures of effectiveness and to identify signs of future problems. ROTC does not now have a system wide set of longitudinal performance indicators, nor does ROTC report its program costs by detachment. The ROTC Mission Management System (MMS) will provide ROTC the capability to establish the desired data base and to generate graphs and reports depicting trends. Headquarters ROTC is working with the US Army Military Personnel Center to develop a system which will determine the quality of ROTC graduates based on the performance of the lieutenants it produces. As the Mission Management System (MMS) fielding progresses, the ability to follow trends on a more real time basis will improve. Improvements in production management coupled with the streamlining of the organization will considerably improve ROTC's ability to meet the re-
quirements of the Total Army into the 1990's.

Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps (JROTC)

Junior ROTC has been serving the Nation alongside the Senior ROTC program for over 65 years by developing citizenship, patriotism, and leadership in the Nation's high school youth. The JROTC program is a cooperative effort on the part of the Army and host secondary schools to provide students opportunities for total development. It provides the first contact many young Americans have with the Army. Although not a source of lieutenants for the US Army, JROTC is an important seedbed of support for the Nation and the military. It has the enthusiastic support of Senior Army officials. In coordination with TRADOC, Department of the Army has begun several initiatives toward program improvement. These initiatives include a comprehensive mission statement to provide direction for the program; a TRADOC JROTC Improvement Plan (JRIP) designed to improve program management and operations; and a new program of instruction (POI) consistent with the Army's goal of being the leader in education excellence. All these efforts exploit the JROTC program's potential for marketing the Army's image and for developing interest in military careers. JROTC will be a model of citizenship, leadership development, and academic excellence.

SUMMARY

ROTC is the source of the majority of the Army's future leadership. The Army must ensure that ROTC is kept on a sound footing to be able to meet the requirements of the National Guard and the Army Reserve as well as the Active Army. The officers selected for ROTC duty are among the Army's best, chosen to ensure the selection and development of high quality lieutenants. The Army leadership is committed to providing that ROTC cadre with the structure and resources with which to meet their mission. The Army leadership is also committed to building a strong seedbed of support through a dynamic JROTC program. Between an active JROTC and a viable Senior ROTC program, the Army will be able to project a positive image throughout the nation.
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INCENTIVES PACKAGE

1. SUBSISTENCE-INCREASE OF $50./MO FOR ALL TRI-SERVICE CADETS

2. SCHOLARSHIP-INCREASE OF 1,500 2YR SCHOLARSHIPS DEDICATED TO RFD

3. ARMY-ONLY PROGRAM
   A. EARLY CONTRACTING-10% OF SELECTED MS I's (FROM SCHOLARS LIST) TO BE EARLY CONTRACTED
   B. KICKER-ADD'L $1,000./YR TO BE Paid TO ADVANCED COURSE CADETS

WHY ARMY ONLY?

WAY TO FILL THE SCHOOLHOUSE PLAN 1

EARLY CONTRACTING (EC) YIELD

YIELD SCHOLARSHIPS 680

HISTORICAL 4 YR SCHOLARSHIP RETENTION 57%
1-yr Scholarship Retention 55% 102
Improvement 5%
3. ARMY-ONLY PROGRAM
   A. EARLY CONTRACTING-10% OF SELECTED MS 1's (FROM SCHOLARSHIP LIST) TO BE EARLY CONTRACTED
   B. KICKER-ADD'L $1,000./YR TO BE PAID TO ADVANCED COURSE CADETS

WHY ARMY ONLY?

- LOWEST PROBABILITY TO JOIN
- GREATER MISSION
- REQUIREMENT FOR RESERVE MISSION
- USES SET PRECEDENT FOR ARMY-ONLY ELIGIBLE INCENTIVE PACKAGE
- USES SET PRECEDENT FOR SPECIAL OFFICER INCENTIVE PACKAGE

HOW TO FILL THE SCHOOLHOUSE PLAN 1

EARLY CONTRACTING (EC) YIELD

YIELD: SUBSISTENCE & ADDING A KICKER

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EXPECTED GAIN

- SCHOLARSHIP STUDENTS ONLY

- SCHOLARSHIP STUDENTS ONLY

FY 91 EC IN YIELD (EC 2,183 75 15)

HISTORICAL 4 YR SCHOLARSHIP RETENTION 57%
NEW 4 YR SCHOLARSHIP RETENTION 35%
IMPROVEMENT 22%

YIELD EC 300

OTHER BENEFITS

- SCHOLARSHIP INCREASE OF 1,500 2YR SCHOLARSHIPS DEDICATED TO RFD

POTENTIAL YIELD VERSUS COST

RECOMMENDED INCENTIVE PACKAGE COST PER LT

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COST OF INCENTIVE PACKAGE INCREASE

- SCHOLARSHIP INCREASE OF 1,500 2YR SCHOLARSHIPS DEDICATED TO RFD

- SCHOLARSHIP INCREASE OF 1,500 2YR SCHOLARSHIPS DEDICATED TO RFD

- SCHOLARSHIP INCREASE OF 1,500 2YR SCHOLARSHIPS DEDICATED TO RFD

- SCHOLARSHIP INCREASE OF 1,500 2YR SCHOLARSHIPS DEDICATED TO RFD

- SCHOLARSHIP INCREASE OF 1,500 2YR SCHOLARSHIPS DEDICATED TO RFD

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- SCHOLARSHIP INCREASE OF 1,500 2YR SCHOLARSHIPS DEDICATED TO RFD

- SCHOLARSHIP INCREASE OF 1,500 2YR SCHOLARSHIPS DEDICATED TO RFD

- SCHOLARSHIP INCREASE OF 1,500 2YR SCHOLARSHIPS DEDICATED TO RFD
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AUTHORIZATIONS INCLUDE BASIC BRANCHES NURSES, MSC, AND MEDICAL SPECIALISTS.
LOSS INCLUDED ATTRAITION AND PROMOTION.

**USAR**

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AUTHORIZATIONS INCLUDE BASIC BRANCHES NURSES, MSC, AND MEDICAL SPECIALISTS.
LOSS INCLUDES ATTRAITION AND PROMOTION.
THS O/H DIRECTED BY SEC ARM.

**FIGURE 3-1**

**FIGURE 3-5**

**LT ACCESSION**

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**FIGURE 3-6**
REQUIREMENT ANALYSIS

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AUTHORIZATIONS INCLUDE BASIC BRANCHES, MSC, AND MEDICAL SPECIALISTS
LOSS INCLUDES ATTRITION AND PROMOTION DIRECTED BY SEC ARMY

FIGURE 3-2

AUTHORIZED GROWTH + LOSSES = THIS FACTOR

SUMMARY ACCESSIONS

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FIGURE 3-3

ROTC MISSION GOALS

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FIGURE 3-4
BASIC BRANCHES NURSES, LISTS 
AND PROMOTION 
IN ARMY

**LIEUTENANT ATTRITION**

**FY84**

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**FY91**

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**LS**

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<td>10,745</td>
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**Figure 3-4**

2,999 Lieutenants (22% of assigned strength)

3,387 Lieutenants (30% of assigned strength)
### Basic Camp

**Quota, Report, Completions, Contracts**

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<td>38</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FREQUENCY:** Annually  
**SOURCE:** Instructor Group Basic Camp Records  
**VALUE:** Measure effective use of Basic Camp Program

---

**Qualified Market x Discipline**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Business</th>
<th>Engineer</th>
<th>Science</th>
<th>Social Science</th>
<th>Nursing</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>HOST SCHOOL</td>
<td>EXTENSION CENTER</td>
<td>CROSS ENROLLED SCHOOLS</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FR SOPH</td>
<td>FR SOPH</td>
<td>FR SOPH</td>
<td>FR SOPH</td>
<td>FR SOPH</td>
<td>FR SOPH</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FREQUENCY:** Annually  
**SOURCE:** School Registrar  
**VALUE:** Comparison to enrollment statistics will identify recruiting potential and voids.

---

**Product Mission x Discipline**

**FREQUENCY:** Each semester  
**SOURCE:** Area Mission to Instructor Group Enrollment Records  
**VALUE:** Provides a snapshot of mission

---

**Enrollment School x Mission**

**FREQUENCY:** Each semester/quarter  
**SOURCE:** Area Mission to Instructor Group Enrollment Records  
**VALUE:** Provides a snapshot of mission.

---

**Foldout**
### ENROLLMENT Chart

**School x MS Level**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MS I</th>
<th>MS II</th>
<th>MS III</th>
<th>MS IV</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Each Semester/Quarter
- Instructor Group Enrollment Records
- Provides snapshot status of enrollment

**Scholarship Enrollment Chart**

**School x MS Level**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MS I</th>
<th>MS II</th>
<th>MS III</th>
<th>MS IV</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Host School</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extension Center</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross Enrolled Schools</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Frequency: Each Semester/Quarter
- Source: Instructor Group Scholarship Vouchers
- Value: Provides snapshot status of scholarships

### Production Projection

**Mission x Discipline x MS Level**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBJET</th>
<th>ELITE</th>
<th>SCIENCE</th>
<th>SOCIAL</th>
<th>NURSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Each Semester/Quarter
- A mission to Instructor Group and Instructor Up Enrollment Record
- Provides a snapshot of projected production vs ion.

### LT Production

**Mission, Production, Projection**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MISSION</td>
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<tr>
<td>PROJECTED</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Frequency: Annually
- Source: Instructor Group Commissioning Records and Enrollment
- Value: Tracks and projects production across time

Foldout 3-5-1
### Enrolment Gender x MS Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MS I</th>
<th>MS II</th>
<th>MS III</th>
<th>MS IV</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Host School</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Extension Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cross Enrolled School</td>
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<tr>
<td>Male</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FREQUENCY: EACH SEMESTER/QUARTER  
SOURCE: CADET RECORD (TRADOC FORM 476)  
VALUE: PROVIDES A SNAPSHOT OF CADET CORPS BY GENDER AND AN INSIGHT INTO POSSIBLE RECRUITING OPPORTUNITIES.

### Enrollement x Race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MS I</th>
<th>MS II</th>
<th>MS III</th>
<th>MS IV</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Black</td>
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<td>Oriental</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

FREQUENCY: EACH SEMESTER/QUARTER  
SOURCE: CADET RECORD (TRADOC FORM 476)  
VALUE: PROVIDE A SNAPSHOT OF THE RACIAL COMPOSITION OF CADET CORPS AND FACILITATES COMPARISON WITH RACIAL DIVERSITY OF THE SCHOOLS IN THE PROGRAM.

### Scholarship Enrolment Gender x MS Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MS I</th>
<th>MS II</th>
<th>MS III</th>
<th>MS IV</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Host School</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Extension Center</td>
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<td>Cross Enrolled School</td>
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<td>Male</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

FREQUENCY: EACH SEMESTER/QUARTER  
SOURCE: INSTRUCTOR GROUP SCHOL  
VALUE: PROVIDES A SNAPSHOT OF CAMPUS SCHOLARSHIP RECRUITMENT BY GENDER AND AN INSIGHT INTO POSSIBLE RECRUITING OPPORTUNITIES.

### Scholarship Enrolment x Race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MS I</th>
<th>MS II</th>
<th>MS III</th>
<th>MS IV</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Black</td>
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<td>Hispanic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oriental</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FREQUENCY: EACH SEMESTER/QUARTER  
SOURCE: INSTRUCTOR GROUP SCHOL  
VALUE: PROVIDES A SNAPSHOT OF THE RACIAL COMPOSITION OF SCHOLARSHIPS IN THE PROGRAM.

ASSISTS IN REFINING CAM RECRUITING PROGRAM.
### SCHOLARSHIPS X DISCIPLINE X MS LEVEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BUSINESS</th>
<th>ENGINEER</th>
<th>SCIENCE</th>
<th>SOCIAL SCIENCE</th>
<th>NURSE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HOST SCH</td>
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<tr>
<td>EXT CTR</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CROSS ENRLC</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A separate chart is required for each MS level.

### FREQUENCY:
Each semester/quarter

### SOURCE:
Instructor Group Scholarship Vouchers

### VALUE:
Provides a snapshot of scholarship programs by discipline and assists in refining campus scholarship recruiting program.

---

### ROLLMENT X RACE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MS II</th>
<th>MS III</th>
<th>MS IV</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

### ER/QUARTER
Instructor Group Scholarship Vouchers

### SNAP SHOT OF THE RACIAL
OF SCHOLARSHIP ENROLLMENT AND
REFINING CAMPUS SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM.

---

FOLDOUT 3-5-2
### GPA MS LEVEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MS I</th>
<th>MS II</th>
<th>MS III</th>
<th>MS IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.0</td>
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<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.0</td>
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<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Frequency:** Each semester/quarter  
**Source:** Transcript  
**Value:** Provides aggregate display of GPA for cadet corps and facilitates management by exception of cadets with GPA below accepted standards.

### OSR DISTRIBUTION AVERAGE BY MS LEVEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MS I</th>
<th>MS II</th>
<th>MS III</th>
<th>MS IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Frequency:** Annually  
**Source:** Detachment records  
**Value:** Provides aggregate display of OSR cadet corps and facilitates identification of cadets who may require immediate action.

### DISTRIBUTION AVERAGE ACT COMPOSITE SCORES BY MS LEVEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MS I</th>
<th>MS II</th>
<th>MS III</th>
<th>MS IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Average</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Frequency:** Each semester/quarter, for new cadets  
**Source:** Transcript or test report  
**Value:** Provides aggregate display of ACT scores and facilitates early identification of cadets with academic potential.

### DISTRIBUTION AVERAGE SAT SCORES BY MS LEVEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MS I</th>
<th>MS II</th>
<th>MS III</th>
<th>MS IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>400</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>700</td>
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<tr>
<td>500</td>
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<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>700</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>Average</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Frequency:** Each semester/quarter, for new cadets  
**Source:** Transcript or test report  
**Value:** Provides aggregate display of SAT scores and facilitates early identification of cadets with academic potential.
## NELSEN DENNY TEST BY MS LEVEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MS I</th>
<th>MS II</th>
<th>MS III</th>
<th>MS IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOUND SYLLABLES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>13-15</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ROOT WORDS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>0-6</td>
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<td>8-11</td>
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<tr>
<td>16-18</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SYLLABICITY</strong></td>
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<td>0-7</td>
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<tr>
<td>14-15</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FREQUENCY:** ANNUALLY  
**SOURCE:** DETACHMENT RECORDS  
**VALUE:** PROVIDES AGGREGATE DISPLAY OF NELSEN DENNY TEST SCORES AND FACILITATES IDENTIFICATION OF CADETS WHO MAY REQUIRE REMEDIAL READING INSTRUCTION.

### APRT MS LEVEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MS I</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>310-319</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>580-589</td>
<td>590-599</td>
<td>600-609</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FREQUENCY:** EACH SEMESTER/QUARTER  
**SOURCE:** CADET RECORD (TRADOC FORM 476)  
**VALUE:** PROVIDES AGGREGATE DISPLAY OF SCORES, AND FACILITATES IDENTIFICATION OF CADETS WHO MAY REQUIRE REMEDIAL READING TRAINING AND PROVIDES FEEDBACK ON EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DETACHMENT FITNESS PROGRAM.

## ADVANCED CAMP PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>APRT</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>JOB PERFORMANCE</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MARKSMENSHIP</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LAND NAVIGATION</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TAX (GOING-GO)</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**FREQUENCY:** ANNUALLY  
**SOURCE:** ADVANCED CAMP REPORTS  
**VALUE:** PROVIDES AGGREGATE DATA ON CADET PERFORMANCE AT ADVANCED CAMP WHICH CAN HELP THE INSTRUCTOR GROUP REFINE ITS INSTRUCTION IN ORDER TO ENSURE CADETS ARE WELL PREPARED FOR ADVANCED CAMP.

### WAIVER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>STATUS</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**FREQUENCY:** AS EACH WAIVER IS SUBMITTED  
**SOURCE:** INSTRUCTOR GROUP RECORD  
**VALUE:** PROVIDES A DISPLAY OF WAIVER REQUESTS THAT HELPS ENSURE THAT CADETS ARE NOT SACRIFICED FOR QUANTITY.
APRT MS LEVEL

| Frequency: | Each Semester/Quarter |
| Source: | Cadet Record (TRADOC Form 476) |
| Value: | Provides aggregate display of cadet APRT scores, and facilitates identification of cadets who may require remedial physical training and provides feedback on overall effectiveness of the detachments physical fitness program. |

| OBC PERFORMANCE |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Graduates</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Graduates</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honor Grades</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Commandants List</td>
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| WAIVER |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Approval Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| Frequency: | As Each Waiver Is Submitted |
| Source: | Instructor Group Records |
| Value: | Provides a display of each cadet waiver and helps ensure that cadet quality is not being sacrificed for quantity. |
### AREA ENROLLMENT x HOST x DISCIPLINE x MS YR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HOST SCHOOL</th>
<th>BUSINESS</th>
<th>ENGINEER</th>
<th>SCIENCE</th>
<th>SOCIAL SCIENCE</th>
<th>NURSE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tbody>
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A separate chart is required for each MS level.

### AREA PROJECTED PRODUCTION VERSUS MISSION

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>BUSINESS</th>
<th>ENGINEER</th>
<th>SCIENCE</th>
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<th>NURSE</th>
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</table>

A separate chart is required for each MS school year.

### AREA SPECIAL TRAINING PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HOST SCHOOL</th>
<th>AIRBORNE</th>
<th>AIRMOBILE</th>
<th>NORTHERN WARFARE</th>
<th>FLIGHT ORIENTATION</th>
<th>RANGE</th>
<th>CTLT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>COMP</td>
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### Production vs Mission

|------|------|---------|------|---------|------|---------|------|---------|------|---------|------|---------|

### Area Basic Camp Contracting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Host Schools</th>
<th>Allocated</th>
<th>Arrived</th>
<th>Completed</th>
<th>Contracted</th>
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**Total**

### Area Camp Performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Nav</th>
<th>Marksmanship</th>
<th>Job Performance</th>
<th>Tax QO/NO-JO</th>
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### Area Officer Basic Course

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Host</th>
<th>Attended</th>
<th>Completed</th>
<th>Failed</th>
<th>Honor Grad</th>
<th>Commandant's List</th>
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**Total**

Foldout 3-5-4
### Historical Production Efficiency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>4.0</th>
<th>4.1</th>
<th>4.2</th>
<th>4.3</th>
<th>4.4</th>
<th>4.5</th>
<th>4.6</th>
<th>4.7</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 81</td>
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### Retention Rate by MS Class

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>MS I</th>
<th>MS II</th>
<th>MS III</th>
<th>MS IV</th>
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<tr>
<td>SY 78-79</td>
<td>33.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>SY 81-82</td>
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<tr>
<td>SY 82-83</td>
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<tr>
<td>SY 83-84</td>
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### Lateral Entry Source

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>SY 84-85</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BASIC CAMP</td>
<td>2,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JROTC</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIOR SERVICE</td>
<td>739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90HR ON CAMPUS</td>
<td>128</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUMMER PROGRAM</td>
<td>126</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCT NG</td>
<td>338</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCT RESERVE</td>
<td>470</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNKNOWN</td>
<td>145</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,263</strong></td>
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</table>
TERM (GREATER THAN 4-YEARS OR MORE) PROJECTIONS

TRADOC/PRODUCTION PROJECTION

LONG-TERM (WITHIN 4 YEARS OR LESS) PROJECTIONS

LATERAL ENTRY SOURCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>SY 84-85</th>
<th>SY 83-84</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BASIC CAMP</td>
<td>2,393</td>
<td>2,635</td>
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<tr>
<td>JROTC</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>142</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRIOR SERVICE</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1200 HR ON CAMPUS SUMMER PROGRAM</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JROTC NG</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JROTC RESERVE</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNKNOWN</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>130</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
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PRODUCTION PROJECTION RATIONALE

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 87 LT</th>
<th>FY 88 LT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MS II SY 84-85 OPENING</td>
<td>7,501</td>
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<tr>
<td>MS I SY 84-85 OPENING</td>
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<td>LATERAL ENTRY</td>
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FOLDOUT 3-5-6