EL SALVADOR: THE PROSPECTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL REVOLUTION

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This study is an examination of the revolutionary process in Central America and the Caribbean in general, and El Salvador in particular. First, there is a comprehensive review of global and regional theories concerning revolutionary causes and outcomes; second, the regional cases of Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, etc. in Central America, and Nicaragua are analyzed to test these
theories; and finally, the El Salvadoran case is analyzed to determine the prospects for a successful revolution.

The results of the El Salvadoran Revolutionary process have shown that the prospects for its success are extremely remote. The revolutionary movement has failed to garner support from the bourgeoisie and upper-class elements, and the regime has maintained its base of support both domestically and internationally. However, it suggests that the potential for regime deterioration remains, and while the prospects for success are limited, stable peace will require resolution of structural, socioeconomic, and political problems that have plagued El Salvador throughout its history.
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Glaucio Ary Dillon Soares, Chairman
Professor of Latin American Studies

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

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Professor of Latin American Studies

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

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This thesis was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Center for Latin American Studies, to the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, and to the Graduate School and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

December 1986

Terry L. McCoy
Director, Center for Latin American Studies

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UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

1986
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by

P. Kenneth Keen

December 1986

Chairman: Glâucio Ary Dillon Soares
Major Department: Latin American Studies

This study is an examination of the revolutionary process in Central America and the Caribbean in general, and El Salvador in particular. First, there is a comprehensive review of global and regional theories concerning revolutionary causes and outcomes; second, the regional cases of Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Nicaragua are analyzed to test these theories; and finally, the El Salvadoran case is analyzed to determine the prospects for a successful revolution.

The Nicaraguan Revolutionary victory in 1979 followed two decades of unsuccessful attempts throughout the region. El Salvador has become the main revolutionary battleground of the 1980s and illustrates the internationalization of contemporary revolutionary movements. On one hand, the United States declared it was "drawing the line" to communist expansion in El Salvador, and on the other hand, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation (FMLN) front drew upon international support to launch attacks against the government. However, this thesis demonstrates that internal political factors, such as the development of revolutionary unity and repressive actions
on the part of the regime, play a prominent role in the strength of
the revolutionary movement.

The results of the El Salvadoran Revolutionary process have shown
that the prospects for its success are extremely remote. The
revolutionary movement has failed to garnish support from the
bourgeoisie and upper-class elements, and the regime has maintained
its base of support, both domestically and internationally. However,
it suggests that the potential for regime deterioration remains, and
while the prospects for success are limited, stable peace will require
resolution of structural, socioeconomic, and political problems that
have plagued El Salvador throughout its history.

Chairman
El Salvador is on the threshold of establishing a democratic government. In 1984, the first civilian president since 1931 was elected to office. A 1979 coup d'état ended nearly 50 years of military rule, while the political process slowly moved toward what some have called a "transition to democracy." However, this transition process is opposed by the strongest revolutionary movement in Latin America today. Since 1979, over 50,000 Salvadorans have died in the war. In 1984, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation (FMLN) front claimed to control over 20% of national territory. Will the FMLN become the next successful Latin American revolutionary movement?

Cuba led Latin America into the revolutionary era of the 1960s. Nicaragua followed in the 1980s, and El Salvador is the most likely candidate to continue the trend in the 1990s. Since the Cuban Revolution in 1959, numerous revolutionary movements have either failed completely or gradually diminished in importance. While some only lasted months, others trace their roots back over 20 years of struggle. The FMLN is not the oldest, only existing 14 years, but is by far the largest movement since 1960. The obvious questions are why do some revolutionary movements succeed and others fail? What promotes revolutionary activity in some countries and not others?
Central America and the Caribbean provide fertile ground for such an analysis. They present cases of revolutionary failure (Guatemala--1960s), success (Cuba, Nicaragua), little or no activity (Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Honduras), and on-going struggles (El Salvador, Guatemala).7

The objective of this thesis is to analyze the prospects for a successful revolution in El Salvador. In order to develop a framework for such an analysis, Chapter II presents the conceptual and theoretical foundations of studies of revolutionary causes and outcome. These rely upon global and regional theories. This model, and the subsequent proposition and hypotheses, are then applied to the regional cases of Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Nicaragua (Chapter V). This regional analysis provides a test of the model. This section summarizes the distinguishing characteristics among those countries experiencing revolution and those with little or no revolutionary activity. It outlines key factors in the causes and outcomes of the revolutionary process, mapping the most viable route to revolutionary success.

Chapters VI through X proceed to apply these factors to the case of El Salvador. Chapter VI reviews the historical background and roots of the revolution. The structural, social, economic, and political conditions leading to the crisis of the 1970s and the formation of the coalition between the FMLN and the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FOR) in 1980 are analyzed. This is followed by an analysis of the 1980s and the three major components of the model of revolutionary outcome, the revolutionary movement, the regime, and international support. The conclusion will dissect the prospects for
success by analyzing the potential for regime deterioration and extension of the revolutionary coalition. The goal of this thesis was to clarify and analyze the dynamics of the El Salvadoran process and to contribute to a better understanding of the complexities of contemporary revolutionary movements.

Notes

1 "Threshold" is defined to mean a beginning point.


4 See Comandancia general del frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, Situación revolucionaria y escalada intervencionista en la guerra salvadoreña (Morazán, El Salvador: Ediciones Sistema Radio Venceremos, 1984), p. 9. They claim to control 5,000 sq. kms., El Salvador has 21,935 sq. kms., and 70 municipalities. There is no doubt they control considerable portions of the country, but the strategic and economic importance of those areas is certainly debatable.

5 Since 1960, 11 countries have had revolutionary movements that are commonly referred to as more than just a group of terrorists. These include Peru, Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and El Salvador. Today only four of these face revolutionary movements of any significance: El Salvador, Peru, Colombia, and Guatemala. For surveys of these movements see William E. Ratliff, Castroism and Communism in Latin America 1959-1976 (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976); and Georges Fauriol, ed., Latin American Insurgencies (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985).

6 Estimates range from a high of 2,000 to 11,000 armed insurgents in the 1979 to 1986 period. Today estimates by Salvadoran and United States sources give a strength of 3,000 to 5,000. See Table 7-1.
Karl Kautsky wrote "there are few concepts over which there has been so much contention as that of revolution . . . few things are so ambiguous."¹ Some definitions of revolutions are precise and narrow, while others are less rigid and classify them into distinct types.² Charles Tilly provides an excellent discussion on the complexities of the term "revolution," but rather than discuss the polemics of the concept it seems sufficient to define revolution as it was applied in this thesis.³ Here, the term was used to mean a phenomenon in which a group or groups strive through mass violence to overthrow the political regime as a step toward overall social change.⁴

Theoretical explanations for the causes, origins, and outcomes of revolutions have gone through several phases since 1900.⁵ An examination of the literature reveals the number of students studying causes of revolution far exceeds those examining the question of what determines the outcome.⁶ The purpose of this chapter is to review the state of the literature on revolution, causal and outcome, and present a model of revolutionary outcome based upon these theoretical explanations.
Theory

Causal

Conditions leading to revolution have been divided into two classifications: "preconditions" or "objective conditions," and "precipitants," "subjective conditions," or "accelerators." Preconditions stimulate a revolutionary atmosphere while precipitants provide the spark. Preconditions are normally more structural in nature and range from demographic (increasing population, land concentration) to economic adversity, prosperity, or adversity preceded by prosperity (Davies), to social structure of the society (Johnson, Moore, Paige, Skocpol). Also included are political factors such as limited political participation (Tilly) and psychological factors (Gurr). While theories of revolution encompass both classifications, most theoretical work has been concentrated in the area of preconditions.

Preconditions. These theories are often grouped into four categories: structural-functionalist, frustration-aggression, political science/pluralist interest-group conflict, and agrarian and elite structure. Chalmers Johnson's structural-functionalist approach explains revolution as a result of the products of stresses and strains within societies. Society is treated as a system whose smooth functioning depends on maintaining an equilibrium. A disruption of equilibrium results in a state of "dysfunction" and promotes revolution. "Dysfunction" can be generated by many sources including an uneven impact of technology, modernization, or growth of a new religion or ideology.
Whereas Johnson relies upon the social system to explain revolution, the contributions of James Davies and Ted Gurr are based on individual motivations (frustration-aggression theory). In 1962, Davies proposed that "revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal." By 1969, he placed more emphasis on the dynamics of frustration and aggression, but still applied economic indicators as measurements of that frustration. This theory is commonly called the "J-Curve." As done by few others, Davies also addresses cases where indicators show that a revolution should have occurred but did not, such as in the United States in 1933. His explanation for this exception was "the vigor with which the national government attacked the depression in 1933, when it became no longer possible to blame the government." He introduced an intervening variable, in this case the action of the government, which can advert a revolutionary crisis.

Gurr explains the circumstances under which "relative deprivation" occurs and, in turn, may lead to aggressive behavior toward political targets. "Relative deprivation" is defined as a perceived discrepancy between what people believe they are entitled to (value expectations) and what they think they are capable of attaining (value capabilities). Gurr's theory is complex, outlining some 80 hypotheses that include many intervening variables (the role of ideologies, legitimacy, and the effectiveness of the political system). However, for Gurr, deprivation is the key determinant of internal violence. Some critics note that he does not measure deprivation with attitude data (due primarily to its unavailability).
but with indicators of short-term economic and political deprivation (trade, inflation, Gross National Product growth rates), and persisting deprivation (religious divisions, economic and political discrimination). Thus, they claim the correlation between violence and deprivation may in fact be due to other variables such as social change.17

Charles Tilly presents a contrasting view to the frustration-aggression theory. He expounds three immediate causes of revolutionary situations: (a) the appearance on the scene of contenders who make claims to the control of the government and have goals incompatible with the existence of the incumbent regime; (b) these new contenders gain support from a significant segment of the population; and (c) the incumbent regime is unable, or unwilling, to suppress these new contenders.18 He treats revolution as the "ultimate" political conflict between competing interest groups. However, Tilly concentrates upon the latter phases of the revolutionary process--conflict between the revolutionary groups and the government. He acknowledges that there are many conditions which may give rise to a revolutionary situation. These include demographic pressures (population growth, urbanization, etc.), changes in value systems, modernization, and others; however, the critical element in a revolutionary situation is conflict between competing interest groups that cannot be controlled.

The last theorists to be reviewed are those who examine the agrarian and elite structure as well as the revolutionary potential of peasants. It is often pointed out that most revolutions have occurred in predominantly peasant societies. El Salvador certainly qualifies.
Barrington Moore noted that "the process of modernization begins with peasant revolutions that fail" and "it culminates during the twentieth century with peasant revolutions that succeed." In a comparative analysis of eight societies, which covers an agrarian to an industrial way of life, Moore concludes that a communist revolution is most likely when there are weak links between peasants and landlords. Also, the elimination of the peasant, through industrialization, removes the base of support for the evolution of this style of revolution.

In a very detailed study, Jeffery M. Paige points out that a mass peasant revolution most likely occurs where landlords draw their wealth and income from land ownership, but peasants gain their livelihood from a form of wage payment--either sharecropper or migratory labor. Eric Wolf and James Scott take a different view arguing that the peasants most likely to participate in revolution are village-dwellers who possess landed property. Theda Skocpol not only finds discrepancies in Paige's work regarding which peasants are more likely to become revolutionary, but also questions the use of "income sources" as valid predictors of the political interests and capacities of agrarian classes. Skocpol emphasizes the role of specific agrarian and elite structures as preconditions for revolution, rather than discontent of individuals (Gurr's theory). She claims revolutions have occurred only in "agrarian-bureaucratic" societies. Skocpol stresses the importance of peasant organization, amount of governmental control exercised by the landed class, and international pressures in the revolutionary process.
However, peasants in and of themselves do not make revolutions. Wolf, as well as others, emphasize that evidence indicates peasants without outside leadership cannot "make" a revolution. Gerrit Huizer, in a study of the revolutionary potential of peasants in Latin America, wrote "practically all cases of peasant movements known to be strong have had [urban] allies." The 1932 uprising in El Salvador is a case in point where urban workers and intellectuals were crucial in organizing the peasant movement.

Precipitants. Thomas Greene, Chalmers Johnson, and Harry Eckstein outline several factors that provide the spark to a revolution. These precipitants range from economic (sudden crisis), to social (fragmentation of different sectors--Armed Forces, formation of revolutionary groups, and resort to armed struggle), to political (sudden political "closure," increased repression), as well as the "demonstration effect" or "concurrent revolutions." These are not deterministic characteristics of what promotes a revolution. In fact, some of these same factors often are considered obstacles to revolution. The use of repression by a regime often reduces the possibility of a revolutionary situation, while "easing up" can promote further conflict. Therefore, depending on the situation, repression may be both an obstacle and a precipitant to revolution.

There is no clear, concise method to determine relationships between preconditions and precipitants. It is generally accepted that the presence of preconditions does not necessarily lead to revolution, and what sparks a revolution in one country may have little effect in
another. This point is further explored in the regional analysis (Chapter V).

Summary. While there is considerable divergence in the theory on what makes a revolutionary situation, there are, nevertheless, areas of overlap. Most refer to the underlying causes of revolution as socioeconomic and/or structural in nature, with several emphasizing political factors as the critical element in the process. Clearly, theoretical explanations for the causes of revolution are neither unified nor sufficiently advanced to provide a definitive answer. However, they do provide clues to possible explanations that guide the researcher in the study of the phenomenon. Summarized, these areas include

(a) Preconditions
--Social structure
--Potential discontent of individuals/groups
--Emergence of new contenders and organizations
--Regime response to opposition

and

(b) Precipitants
--Crisis events.

Outcomes

Once the revolutionary process is underway, what are the "critical" factors shaping its outcome? Why do some succeed while others fail? Success means the revolutionary actors obtain complete power by overthrowing the previous regime, thus enabling them to try to achieve the desired changes. Failure means defeat to the point that there is little hope of gaining political power.30
No theoretical consensus on revolutionary outcome has been developed. In 1943, Chorley noted few attempts seem to have been made to assemble the historical facts of various revolutions in an endeavor to deduce from them whether there be any general laws which govern the practical conduct of a revolutionary outbreak and account for its success or failure. Unfortunately, little progress has been made, particularly in the latter area. In 1974, Russell found little theoretical work had been done on the "determinants of the outcome of rebellion and related phenomena." However, with the success of the Sandinistas in 1979, there has been renewed interest in the area, particularly as it pertains to Latin American revolutions. This area is represented by those analyzing outcome based upon a global (drawing upon a large number of cases or worldwide orientation) versus regional (in this case Latin America) perspective.

Global. Tilly has identified several sets of conditions that appear to be proximate causes in the outcome of revolutions: (a) "The presence of a revolutionary situation [multiple sovereignty], (b) Revolutionary coalitions between challengers and members of the polity, and (c) Control of substantial force by the revolutionary coalition." Tilly's central theme in determining the revolutionary outcome is the extension of the revolutionary coalition and mobilization of various sectors of the society. He states, "if no such coalition [between members of the polity and the contenders] exists, that diminishes the chance that a revolutionary coalition will win--that there will be any transfer of power at all." Russell, in her study of 14 twentieth-century mass rebellions (seven successful, seven unsuccessful), establishes a scale for the
disloyalty of the regime's armed forces and concludes successful rebellions had extremely high disloyalty scores. Russell found some overlap in that some rebellions failed even with wide support from the armed forces. Others were not so clear. For example, defections from Batista's armed forces were few and late. However, a general pattern evolves that supports the conclusion that no transfer of power is likely in a revolutionary situation if the government retains complete control of the military once the inflammatory situation develops.

One aspect Russell does not analyze is the efficiency of the armed forces in confronting a rebellion, or revolutionary movement. This factor could be as important, if not more so, than disloyalty of the forces. Although the two appear to be related, it is not always the case. Even if the armed forces have a high loyalty score, it does not necessarily follow that they are efficient in carrying out their duties, in this case, conducting operations to eliminate the threat to the regime.

**Regional.** Based upon individual case studies of Latin American guerrilla movements in the 1960s, Richard Gott saw the primary reasons for revolutionary failures as United States intervention and lack of unity among the revolutionary organizations. One constant theme found in Gott's analysis as to why unification was so elusive was the differing ideological orientations of the groups.

Others saw it differently. In studying the influence of the United States military assistance and reasons for revolutionary failures in Guatemala, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Uruguay, Cesar D. Sereseres states "the primary factors in successful counter-insurgency were the domestic political conditions and
policies" not "military victories based upon United States military assistance." Sereseres notes that in a case by case study, the military considerations were less important than domestic political conditions. The inability of the guerrilla organizations to generate popular support combined with action by the governments to increase communications with the affected rural areas and/or reacting to the needs of the peasants were the primary reasons for failures of these movements. Still others believe the critical variable in the outcome is the legitimacy of the government and its use of violence against the revolutionary organization. Even though repressive measures may be an effective short-term, counter-insurgency tactic, in the long-run they often lead to popular support of the revolutionaries.

In a 1984 article, "Why Revolutions Succeed and Fail," Robert H. Dix concludes there is little data to show a strong correlation between socioeconomic variables and the success or failure of revolutionary movements in Latin America. Dix argues that two of the most critical variables are the nature of the incumbent regime and the ability of the revolutionary group to establish a broad-based opposition coalition beyond peasant-intellectuals. Heinrich-W. Krumwiede also emphasizes the importance of building a revolutionary coalition both internally and externally. Concerning the internal dimension, he notes "the chances of overthrowing an existing regime grow when the reduction in the size of the regime coalition corresponds to an expansion of the antiregime coalition." Krumwiede also links the ruling techniques of the incumbent regime with its ability to maintain a coalition against the opposition.
**Summary.** As illustrated, there is no agreement regarding which variables are "critical" in determining the outcome of the revolutionary process. However, based upon these analyses, the key variables appear to be a combination of the incumbent regime (political process, legitimacy, use of violence), loyalty and ability of the armed forces, the revolutionary organization (unity, force capability, and its ability to develop a coalition), and international support (changes in support levels).

Generalizations become difficult and caution is necessary when applying these theories to individual cases. As Theda Skocpol warned, "one cannot mechanically extend the specific causal arguments that have been developed for France, Russia, and China into a general theory of revolution." However, without some framework, the analytical process ends. Given the necessity of such a framework, and with this warning in mind, a model of revolutionary outcome, based upon these theoretical foundations, is presented.

**Model of Revolutionary Outcome**

Figure 2-1 outlines a model of revolutionary outcome with three major components, the regime, revolutionary movement, and international support. These factors represent the most likely explanations that have been identified or extrapolated for the success or failure of a revolutionary movement. It is a confrontation between two contenders for power: the incumbent regime and the revolutionary movement, acting in conditions of a revolutionary situation with certain primary variables impacting upon their ability to determine the outcome.
FIGURE 2-1
MODEL OF REVOLUTIONARY OUTCOME
Regime

The loyalty and capability of the armed forces and characteristics of the regime facing revolutionary movements are essential components when studying the outcome of the revolutionary process. The inclusion of violence in the definition of a revolution, overthrow of the regime through violent means, indicates the importance of the armed forces in preventing its success. They are the principle obstacle to success in revolutionary armed struggle. However, it does not necessarily follow that the armed forces are the critical element in the revolutionary process, and all other factors are of secondary importance.

The exact relationship the regime plays in the final determination of revolutionary outcome is unclear. Students of the revolutionary process have emphasized the importance of building a broad coalition between non-revolutionary and revolutionary groups as a key factor to success. These groups are distinguished by their means of opposition. While non-revolutionary groups do not actively take up arms against the government, revolutionary groups, most often referred to as guerrilla organizations, actively bear arms against the regime. Non-revolutionaries may include unions, civic organizations, business groups, political parties, etc. This classification encompasses groups closely allied with the revolutionaries as well as those which staunchly support the regime. The common trait is they do not take up arms against the government.

While the impact of governmental action on various groups within society may be understood, its impact on determining what pushes non-revolutionary groups into the revolutionary camp is not. Recent
emphasis, particularly concerning Latin America, has been on the availability of a common figure for various groups to target their opposition. The obvious cases of Cuba (Fulgencio Batista) and Nicaragua (Somoza clan) highlight this characteristic. Compilation of other revolutions within Latin America indicates that while authoritarian regimes have been the victims of revolutionary successes (Mexico, Bolivia--1952, Cuba, and Nicaragua), the cases of failure vary. In the 1960s and 1970s, non-authoritarian, as well as authoritarian, regimes defeated revolutionary movements. While the type of regime cannot be ignored in its role of coalition building, apparently it does not play a determining role.

The atmosphere established by the incumbent regime through the political process, its social and economic programs, and its "governing" techniques are important in determining the reaction of different sectors of society to revolutionary movements. While certain sectors may continue to support the incumbent regime, others may withdraw that support. Growing politicization of certain groups (church, peasantry, labor unions), defection among the ranks of the urban middle class, as well as segments of the economic and political elites, can have a devastating impact on the regime's ability to defeat the revolutionaries. Whether the regime offers its political opposition some opportunity for political articulation, organization, mobilization, and gives them the right to participate in elections, even with limited fraud, is important in determining support for revolutionary groups.

The type and nature of the regime, plus the coercive power of its armed forces, provide the important link between the regime and the
non-revolutionary groups. The interactions between these groups and the regime determines their propensity to join in a coalition with the revolutionaries. This is certainly not a predetermined relationship and varies from case to case. Whether these non-revolutionary groups join a revolutionary alliance also depends heavily upon the nature of the revolutionary movement.

**Revolutionary Movement**

A "strong" revolutionary movement is based upon the unity of the organizations composing the movement and their ability to develop a coalition with non-revolutionary groups. Factors which may influence this ability include the ideology of the various organizations. The split between the various factions of revolutionary organizations, those who associated themselves with Cuba versus the Moscow-oriented communist party, in Colombia and Venezuela during the 1960s, serves to illustrate this point. For example, in Venezuela, a split between revolutionary leaders advocating continuance of armed struggle and the Venezuelan Communist Party led to open criticism by leaders on both sides.51

Strength lies not only in numbers, which unity and coalition building improve, but also in political and economic power. This can be obtained most effectively by drawing elements of the middle and upper class into a coalition. In this way the movement can reach its fullest potential. As Thomas Greene states, "few, if any, successful revolutionary movements--those that seize and consolidate state power--have relied upon the support of a single class or class
The broader the coalition, the stronger the organization.

International Support

International support entails not only assistance provided but the impact of that support as well. Due to inconsistency in the literature regarding its importance, the role of this support in the model is represented as an intervening variable. Skocpol illustrates the importance of international pressures but few others have emphasized its consequence. In the Latin American context, this variable is best represented by the support or lack of it, provided by various actors. External support includes military and economic assistance, international organizational loans, and diplomatic support to the incumbent regime; as well as training, monetary, diplomatic, and material assistance to the revolutionaries. The impact of this assistance is analyzed through changes in government's military force levels and efficiency, level of revolutionary activity/control, and revolutionary organizational structures.

Discussion

It is nearly impossible to derive definitive conclusions based upon the state of theory as it pertains to the revolutionary process. The factors of revolutionary causes, as well as outcome, cannot be packaged into one neat bundle and applied to all cases. These factors often are interrelated and act upon each other in varying ways,
depending upon the country. The degree to which one variable is more
critical than another is not clear and must be treated within the
context of each case.

Notes

1Karl Kautsky, The Social Revolution (Chicago, 1902), as cited by
Isaac Kramnick, "Reflections on Revolution: Definition and

2Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies
(London: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 264; and Theda Skocpol,
States and Social Revolutions (London: Cambridge University Press,
1979), p. 33, provide examples of precise definitions.

3Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, MA:

4Mostafa Rejai, The Comparative Study of Revolutionary Strategy
(New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1977), pp. 7-8. This
definition is chosen not to mean other events in Latin America that
may not qualify are not revolutions, but rather to distinguish what
concept is being referred to within the context of this thesis. This
definition possibly closer fits those who use the term social
revolution versus political revolution as it implies a transformation
of both the state and social structures.

5See Jack A. Goldstone, "Theory of Revolution: The Third
Generation," World Politics 32 (April 1980): 425. It must be
remembered not all theorists agree on what constitutes a "revolution"
and each offer their theory of causes based upon their concept. Of
course Karl Marx's theory of revolution, based upon class-based
movements growing out of objective structural contradictions, was
developed prior to 1900. Other works that provide beneficial reviews
of the state of the literature are Krammick; Skocpol, pp. 3-18;
Stephen J. Andriole and Gerald W. Hopple, Revolution and Political
102-104; and D.E.H. Russell, Rebellion, Revolution, and Armed Force:
A Comparative Study of Fifteen Countries With Special Emphasis on Cuba

6Ibid.; also see Harry Eckstein, "On the Etiology of Internal

7Eckstein, pp. 140-143, outlines "preconditions" and
"precipitants." He uses the term "internal war" which encompasses
revolution as it is being used here. Marxist scholarship sometimes
uses the terms "objective" and "subjective" conditions, while Chalmers Johnson used the term "accelerators." For simplicity and organization, I have chosen Eckstein's terms.


10Tilly.


12Johnson, pp. 91-93.

13Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," pp. 5-6. This short-term economic reversal following a long period of improvement combines Tocqueville's theory (revolutions are a product of an improving economic situation) with Marxist notions that revolutions result from increasing economic degradation.


16Gurr, pp. 13, 24.

17Goldstone, p. 431; Andriole and Hopple, p. 104.

18Tilly, p. 200.


20Ibid.

21Paige, p. 11.


23Theda Skocpol, "What Makes Peasants Revolutionary?" Comparative Politics, 14 (April 1982): 358-359. Skocpol provides an excellent review and critique of these theories.
25 Wolf, p. 212.
27 One of the best accounts of this period is Thomas P. Anderson, Matanza: El Salvador's Communist Revolt of 1932 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1971).
29 Eckstein, pp. 154-155.
30 Heinrich-W. Krumwieden, "Regimes and Revolution in Central America," In Political Change in Central America: Internal and External Dimensions, eds., Wolf Grabendorff, Heinrich-W. Krumwiede, and Jorg Todt (London: Westview Press, 1984), p. 11, has suggested using a "graduated concept" of success whereas the mere existence of a movement is success. It then transforms through stages of success: obtain a share of power, complete overthrow of the regime, establish revolutionary regime, and consolidate a regime. Elsewhere (Greene) this is identified as stages of a revolutionary movement. I intend to simplify the definition of success by choosing the "stage" at which the revolutionaries have seized power, overthrown the regime, thus clearing the way for them to achieve their goals.
31 Katherine Chorley, Armies and the Art of Revolution (London: Faber and Faber, 1943) as cited by Russell, p. v.
32 Russell, p. 11.
34 Tilly, pp. 211-212.
35 Ibid.
36 Russell, pp. 72-74. By rebellion Russell means "a form of violent power struggle in which the overthrow of the regime is threatened by means that include violence" (p. 56). She equates successful rebellion to revolution.

Ibid.


Dix, p. 425. The socioeconomic indicators used were Gross National Product per capita, percent labor force in agricultural, urbanization, literacy rate, distribution of income and land; dependency as measured by debt service as percent of GNP, U.S. economic and military aid, U.S. investments, exports. Cases under examination were Cuba, Nicaragua, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Peru, Paraguay, Venezuela, and El Salvador.

Ibid.

Krumwiede.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 18.

Skocpol, Social Revolutions, p. 288.

Tilly, pp. 52-53, points to Lenin's call for a broad coalition in 1901. He discusses this in some detail. The terms non-revolutionary and revolutionary groups are applied here, rather than "challengers" or "members of the polity" that Tilly uses, to easier identify the distinction in the actors of the coalition. The emphasis here is on mode of opposition rather than relationship to the regime.

See Midlarsky and Roberts.

The failures are based upon a survey of revolutionary movements since 1960. The failures include Peru, Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, and Argentina. I would argue the movements in Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru today are not continuations of the movements of the 1960s and early 1970s, but different movements. It is recognized that this is debatable, particularly since some of the leaders today were part of the 1960s revolutionary era.

Krumwiede, p. 22.
51 See Ratliff, pp. 87-132; and Gott. These splits in some instances include Maoist groups, those adhering to the revolutionary strategy of the Chinese Communist Party, pro-Soviet Communist Party, and pro-Castro groups.

52 Greene, p. 39.

53 Certainly the international dimension includes other aspects such as dependency and international disruptions (wars, economic crisis). However, from the literature it appears the distinguishing characteristic within Latin America is the support provided.
CHAPTER III
PROPOSITIONS

This analysis of the prospects of a successful revolution in El Salvador accepts several assumptions. First, direct intervention by another nation is most unlikely. It is recognized that the likelihood of direct intervention, meaning the deployment of combat forces, within the Central American context is certainly debatable. However, this added dimension to the situation would obviously overshadow other factors under consideration. The Dominican Republic in 1965 is one example. Therefore, the analysis will not consider escalation of the situation to the level of direct intervention or tie current events in Nicaragua, the "Contra" issue, with the El Salvadoran revolutionary process.

The second assumption is that socioeconomic variables are not critical to the success or failure of the revolution, even though they may help to explain its causes. An analysis of various statistical data relating to socioeconomic variables does not indicate any characteristics that can be associated exclusively with the success or failure of modern Latin American revolutions. Dix shows this by comparing socioeconomic variables dealing with economic development levels (gross national product per capita), national modernization (gross national product originating in the manufacturing sector), urbanization, literacy, distribution of income, and land distribution among countries experiencing revolutions such as Cuba, Nicaragua,
Guatemala, Venezuela, Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. This can be further tested in the regional analysis (Chapter V), which includes negative cases, those having no revolutionary activity.\(^2\)

Based upon the model of revolutionary outcome, the following proposition and supporting hypotheses have been developed. The central proposition is that the prospects for a successful revolution are based upon the revolutionaries' ability to develop a "strong" revolutionary movement, while concurrently eroding the regime's base of support. This is based upon the following hypotheses with respect to the revolutionary movement, regime, and international support. It is my contention that these key elements are linked.

**Revolutionary Movement**

A "strong" revolutionary movement is necessary to overthrow the regime. Supporting hypotheses include the following:

(a) Unity is a key factor in the strength of a revolutionary movement.

(b) A broad coalition is a critical element in the strength of a revolutionary movement.

(c) Ideologies of various groups impede establishment of revolutionary unity and a coalition.

Without unity the efficiency of the revolutionary movement is severely reduced. It has long been the goal of revolutionary leaders to unite the different factions to work together rather than against one another. Clearly, Cuba and Nicaragua were able to develop this type of revolutionary organization while many revolutionary failures have had chronic problems in developing unification. A coalition must strive to include not only marxist elements but non-marxist as well,
to consolidate the government opposition. Of course this implies that no one particular class is hegemonic, and therefore an alliance is necessary to obtain sufficient broad-based support to overthrow the government. It is not the "mass" of support that appears critical, but rather a cross section. Literature on successful revolutions illustrates the small percentage of the total population actually involved in the movements.\(^3\)

Bringing together marxist and non-marxist elements raises the question of the emphasis on ideology in the movement. As the cases of Cuba and Nicaragua have demonstrated, these coalitions were developed in an atmosphere of "nationalistic" or "pro-democratic" fervor rather than a hard-line marxist-leninist ideology. It was only after the revolutionary movement achieved power that the marxist-leninist ideology became hegemonic.\(^4\)

**Regime**

The regime is a determining factor in the formation of a coalition between non-revolutionary and revolutionary groups.

Additional hypotheses on regime type, nature, and armed forces included these:

(a) Authoritarian--Personalist regimes are more likely to lead to a broad revolutionary coalition.

(b) The nature of the regime determines its base of support and those sectors most likely to mobilize against the government.

(c) Disloyalty of the armed forces is critical for revolutionary success.

(d) Highly capable armed forces are essential in defeating a revolutionary movement.
Historically, upper classes rarely join lower classes in an assault against the state.\(^5\) However, as the Nicaraguan revolutionary movement demonstrated, it is not unimaginable for portions of the upper class to enter into a revolutionary coalition with the lower classes. In both Cuba and Nicaragua the political opposition was stymied and a "tightening" of the political system occurred with no apparent end in sight. In cases of failed revolutions there was a diversity of political conditions. Colombians and Venezuelans had evolved a democratic system after 1957 and 1958, respectively; the Peruvians had a newly elected president in 1963, although the army remained very influential; and Guatemala had a newly elected civilian president in 1966, admittedly far from democratic, in addition to the army which remained a strong influence.

**International Support**

International support can play an intervening role in the revolutionary process. Other hypotheses include the following:

(a) Withdrawal of international support from the regime can enhance the likelihood of revolutionary success, given internal weaknesses of the regime.

(b) International support to the regime can maintain the regime's coercive power, thus extending the government's survival.

(c) International support to the revolutionaries can prolong the struggle, or shorten it, in favor of the revolutionaries.

External involvement, excluding direct intervention, can only be a "critical" element in the revolutionary process on a short-term basis.\(^6\) In response to the Cuban Revolution and the Latin American revolutionary movements in the 1960s, U.S. policy took two approaches:
(a) an Alliance for Progress to promote social reform, economic development, and political democracy and (b) the building of Latin American military forces. An examination of the data reveals that although external support to the incumbent regime or revolutionaries at "critical" moments may prolong the struggle or prevent immediate success by either side, eventual defeat or success of the revolutionaries is based upon internal dimensions. If international support were "critical," the Guatemalan revolutionary movement in the early 1980s should have been successful.7

In addition to the mere fact of assistance being provided is another dimension of the effects of that support and its impact on the outcome. Cuba provides an excellent example. Even though $2.5 million (US) in United States military assistance was provided from Fiscal Year 1957 to 1958 (fifth in Latin America), it appears to have had little impact on the ability of the armed forces to defeat the guerrillas.8 These direct or indirect effects can be "critical" factors as they may finance the building of a military institution with the capability to take control and the desire to govern.9 Of course, the reverse may be true as well. In cases where international support and pressure are based upon a liberalization of the political process it may result in a non-authoritarian regime.10 Therefore, the amount of support as well as its effects must be considered as possible impacts on the type of regime.

Notes

1This does not mean the United States will not escalate support, military and economic assistance, in response to known or suspected support to the FMLN. It does mean that I do not feel the U.S. will
deploy combat forces, a la Grenada, to El Salvador without the introduction of external forces on behalf of the FMLN. To clarify direct intervention: I am referring to the direct use of combat forces, not in a training or advisory role, to defeat the opposing military force.

2 Dix, p. 425; Bill R. Summerhill, III, "A Comparative Study of Political Change and Political Revolution in Central America, 1930-1985" (Senior Thesis, University of Florida, 1986): 78-91. Summerhill's data go farther than Dix's in this argument as he includes control cases (little or no revolutionary activity—Mexico, post-1960, and Costa Rica) and additional variables. I will add to this by including the Dominican Republic and updating data as necessary.

3 See Greene, pp. 47-48. He discusses the criticality of mass support and, based upon data of revolutionary movements between 1940-1962, concludes there is no apparent relationship between the success or failure of the movements and "mass" support.


5 Midlarsky and Roberts, p. 181.

6 "Critical," in this case, means being able to show that external support is vital in relation to the outcome. That is, one element or the other could not have achieved victory, or been defeated, had it not been for the international support received.

7 Following 1977, international support, primarily United States support to the Guatemalan regime, drastically declined. At the same time the revolutionary movement was re-emerging and reportedly receiving support from abroad. See Office of Planning and Budgeting Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, Agency for International Development, U. S. Overseas Loans and Grants--Assistance from International Organizations (Washington, DC: Author, 1980), p. 48; and Sereseres, "The Highlands War in Guatemala," in Fauriol, p. 111.

8 See U.S. Congress, Senate, "Military Aid to Latin America Is Defeating the Alianza Para El Progreso," The Congressional Record (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 15426-15432. At this time aid was provided for hemispheric defense and emphasis was not on internal security. There is little indication that the aid improved the capability of the Cuban armed forces in guerrilla operations. In March 1958 aid was suspended.

9 Latin American military officers taking power in the 1960s often had received U.S. training. Brazil (1964) and Peru (1968) are two such examples.
With the recent exception of Haiti, there is little evidence to indicate that international support or pressure has been a significant variable in the withdrawal of authoritarian regimes in Latin America. See Edward Lewis Constantine, Jr., "A Theory of Withdrawal of Military Governments in Latin America" (Master's Thesis, University of Florida, 1978), pp. 7-23. Recent events in the Phillipines serve as an interesting case. Although it is too soon to tell, it appears this change has had little effect on revolutionary activity. I have no data to indicate what effect the change from a Marcos government to a popular Aquino regime has had on the revolutionaries' support base.
CHAPTER IV
THEORETICAL-COMPARATIVE APPROACH

The study of revolutions has encompassed those who developed theories based upon a comparative-historical method and those generalizing from a large number of cases. This approach will use existing theoretical formulations, based upon global and regional cases, to examine the case of El Salvador. The validity of the model of revolutionary outcome, outlined in Chapter I, remains questionable. Therefore, applying the model to selected cases that have common characteristics with El Salvador would be useful in evaluating its applicability. Fortunately, Central America and the Caribbean provide an excellent laboratory for this purpose.

Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Cuba prove quite useful for such a task. With the exception of Cuba, the time frame for this comparative analysis will be 1959 through the 1980s. These cases provide several methodological advantages: (a) all countries, theoretically, existed in potentially revolutionary situations (to be shown in Chapter V); (b) excluding Cuba and the Dominican Republic, all have common historical links; (c) while there are considerable differences in demographic conditions, all are comparatively small nations; (d) all are basically monocultural export countries; (e) all fall within the "sphere" of United States influence; and (f) they provide examples of revolutionary success (Cuba and Nicaragua), failure (Dominican...
Republic, Guatemala--as defined earlier in Chapter I), and marginal revolutionary activity (Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, and Honduras).³

The proposition and supporting hypotheses offered in Chapter II are clustered around three variables: the revolutionary movement, regime, and international support. However, prior to examining these factors the foundation of the revolutionary situation must be established. The following discussion centers around how these variables will be analyzed and what data will be used in this analysis.

**Revolutionary Situation**

The context of the revolutionary situation must be examined. This is done not as a critical element in success or failure of the movement, but to outline the existing structural, socioeconomic, and political conditions in which the revolutionary actors seek to overthrow the existing regime.⁴ It becomes increasingly significant when analyzing actions of non-revolutionary groups during a revolutionary crisis. Changes from the pre-revolutionary period may be key in those groups taking a radical anti-government stand. Some statistical indicators for structural, social, economic, and political conditions may prove helpful in determining the "preconditions" and "precipitants" leading to a revolutionary situation. These include income distribution, land concentration, changes in gross domestic product (GDP), GDP per capita, consumer price and real wage indices, a physical quality of life index, economically active population, political process, and repression. A regional comparative analysis
should isolate those conditions distinctive to revolutionary success, failure, or no revolutionary activity. Data for such an analysis are readily available, with the possible exception of repression. Lacking verifiable reports concerning the repressive nature of a government, works by Hugh Thomas, Edelberto Torres-Rivas, and John A. Booth can provide some insight. Following the outbreak of revolution, different factors become more critical in determining its success or failure.

**Revolutionary Movement**

The strength of a revolutionary movement is based on its ability to threaten the security of the incumbent regime (its size—combat forces, military actions, "controlled" areas), sufficient economic and political power to threaten the regime (calls for strikes honored, international pressure on government to negotiate), unity of revolutionary forces, and most importantly, establishment of a broad coalition. Introduced as an intervening variable is the role of ideology (Marxist-Leninist, Maoist, Orthodox Marxist, Nationalist, etc.) in establishing unity and a coalition.

Unity is achieved when the major revolutionary groups make a proclamation, forming a unified organization, and begin operating in association with one another. A broad coalition exists when non-revolutionary elements of the upper class, as well as the middle class, create an alliance with the revolutionary organization.

The movement of non-revolutionary groups can be determined by the mobilization and radicalization of various sectors of the society.
against the regime, formation of new political groups or alliances, call for strikes against the government, desertion of elites (renounce loyalty to regime), and the ultimate act of joining a coalition with the revolutionaries. This essentially represents the erosion of the regime's base of support with the ultimate effect of strengthening the revolutionary movement.

Fortunately, writings on Latin American guerrilla and revolutionary movements have received extensive attention. Data from journalistic interviews of revolutionary leaders provide information on the revolutionaries, their ideology, organizational problems, and development of coalitions. This, in conjunction with news accounts, articles, and books by revolutionaries, provides ample resources to analyze the strength of various movements. These data can be compared to United States Government documents, such as Congressional hearings and State Department reports, that may offer a different perspective.

Regime

In attempting to explain how the regime is a determining factor in the formation of a coalition between non-revolutionary and revolutionary groups, three areas must be examined: (a) the type of regime, (b) the nature of the regime, and (c) the coercive power of the armed forces. These factors seek to determine the structural strengths and weaknesses of the regime. The analysis should indicate how these can affect non-revolutionary groups.
Type of Regime

The regime will be categorized as either "authoritarian"--"non-authoritarian," or "personalist"--"non-personalist," by examining the political process and method of obtaining power. An authoritarian regime is defined as "political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism" and a personalist regime is one that is presided over by a single, caudillo-type figure.

The political process can be further defined as being either "open" (non-authoritarian), one which allows for an electoral process where multiple parties participate and the power is not monopolized by a single party, group, or individual; "semi-open" (authoritarian), where "rules of the game" may be established so that groups within the economic and/or political elite are allowed to hold certain positions in the government, may permit multi-party system, have some type of elections, concede to certain pluralist interests, but the party, group, or individual who controls rules and maintains an upper hand on the political power; and "closed" (again authoritarian), the system is shut down to all opposition, with or without elections, power is dominated by a single party, group, or individual. Indicators, such as electoral results and the participation of opposition groups can be used to measure the political process. How the regime rules then becomes the nature of the regime.

Nature of the Regime

This encompasses the government's social and economic programs and its governing "techniques." Under social and economic programs,
the key items include programs that may be beneficial to one sector of society (land reform, wage laws, taxes). These indicate those programs most likely to generate conflict among various sectors of the society. Whether the government seeks to continue or alter existing programs, which favor certain sectors of society, can provide insight into why non-revolutionary groups abandon the regime. If programs are instituted, their effectiveness needs to be examined. This is accomplished by examining changes in land tenure, wage indexes, and tax structure.

The governing "techniques" concentrate on certain freedoms (press, organizational, expression), corruption in government, and repressive measures. Any changes in these indicators during the revolutionary period are of particular interest, since they may be potential casual factors for mobilization of anti-regime groups.

Armed Forces

The model of revolutionary outcome encompasses two characteristics of the armed forces, loyalty and capability. The loyalty of the armed forces can be determined by applying Russell's methodology used in a disloyalty scale. The disloyalty score involves three components: degree of disloyalty, timing of disloyalty, and the proportion of armed forces disloyal at a particular time. While she provides data on Cuba only, information on the other cases can be obtained from historical works and news accounts during periods of the revolutions. The intent here is not to
replicate Russell's scale, as it is beyond the scope of this study, but to attempt to explain the loyalty of the armed forces in the same manner.

Capability of the armed forces, as it relates to their ability to conduct counter-insurgency operations, is measured by their size, training level, equipment, and performance against the guerrillas. Although data are available for the different countries on their armed forces' strength, composition, and efficiency they are not consistent from one source to another. Data on strength and composition come from various sources. Most of these data are generated by global organizations. When possible, sources drawing upon country statistics are used.

The military's training level and performance are best determined by its combat record. While casualties can be used as an indicator, when available, they are often unreliable. Better evidence includes analyses of encounters with the guerrillas, whether it was offensive or defensive action, and who won tactically. This gives an indication whether the armed forces were primarily defending key locations, which could indicate a weakness, or pursuing the guerrillas. Certainly, defensive strategy may be necessary, but without offensive action the revolutionaries cannot be militarily defeated. Data, although not comprehensive, can be obtained from historical works as well as news accounts. A comparison of these data, when taken in conjunction with their loyalty, provides an indication as to the criticality of the armed forces in defeating the revolutionary movement.
International Support

International, or external, support refers to that assistance rendered to the incumbent regime, or revolutionary organization, originating outside the country. The examination not only concerns support provided, but the impact of that support.

Indicators of external support to the regime include military and economic assistance, international organizational loans, diplomatic support, and direct intervention by an external force on behalf of the regime ("advisors" and training teams, not combat units). While several of these indicators can be measured in quantitative terms the latter two cannot. Substantial data are available for military, economic, and international support to the governments. However, evidence of direct military support, in the form of armed forces, is often questionable. It is frequently claimed by the guerrillas, but rarely acknowledged by the United States or host country. Reported accounts from multiple sources can be used to validate these instances. Diplomatic support can be readily ascertained by historical or news accounts of the events.

Support to the revolutionaries is measured using such indicators as direct intervention, arms and/or equipment provided, training, monetary, diplomatic, and propaganda support. Due to the lack of sufficient data, quantitative comparisons are not possible. While most of these indicators are self-explanatory, diplomatic and propaganda support need further elaboration. Diplomatic support refers to foreign governments, or international organizations, that provide diplomatic recognition to the revolutionary movement, safe havens, or asylum to its members. Propaganda support is access
granted to communication networks, or organizations, that perform this function for the revolutionaries.

A wide variety of sources have been used in order to avoid concluding that support was provided upon the claim of one actor (whether the U.S. government or revolutionaries). Unless multiple sources were found to substantiate claims of support, or it was acknowledged by the donor or recipient, this assistance was not considered in the final analysis.

The sources used to provide the necessary data are primarily secondary sources. These data include works of individual scholars and accounts by revolutionaries themselves; accounts by many involved in the movements, although not as leaders, who have since written scholarly works based upon their accounts; and United States government documents. Even with the variety of sources, it is difficult to quantify this support, as it rarely coincides. In most cases, the best that can be said is that sufficient evidence indicates when support was or was not provided.

The "possible" impact of assistance provided is analyzed through changes in the government's military force levels and efficiency, economic growth, and political change, while impact on revolutionary movements is through changes in levels of revolutionary forces and organization (unity, coalitions).20 A causal relationship between the support provided and the variable used to measure the impact of that support it is not always apparent; therefore, "possible" is used as a caveat. By this analysis, insight as to the extent international support plays an intervening role in the revolutionary process can be determined.21
Summary

The revolutionary process is certainly not as well defined as this procedure may indicate. There is considerable interaction among the institutions and actors involved in the process. However, it appears that a comparative analysis, using the stated indicators, would test the model adequately, thus leading to a better understanding of these interactions.

Using this theoretical-comparative analysis, concentration of key variables can be applied in examining the prospects for a successful revolution in El Salvador.

Notes

1A few of the best comparative-historical analyses are Skocpol and Moore; while some works based upon more general categories are Tilly and Gurr. I make no claims of having reviewed all the theoretical works on revolution. I hope that the ones discussed are the most useful in examining the case of El Salvador.


4The importance of the revolutionary situation in determining the outcome is discussed in several theoretical works reviewed in Chapter I. These include Tilly, p. 212; Skocpol, pp. 161-164.

5According to Dix, pp. 423-446, there should not be distinction among the socioeconomic variables. A summary of statistical data on pre-revolutionary Cuba can be found in Susan Schroeder, Cuba: A Handbook of Historical Statistics (Boston: G.K. Hall and Co., 1982). Other data collected from Mario Monteforte Toledo, Central America: subdesarrollo y dependencia, Vol. II (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1972); and James W. Wilkie and Adam Perkal, eds., Statistical Abstract of Latin America (Los Angeles:


7 Under these terms, a revolutionary movement can achieve unity, even if small splinter groups operate outside the umbrella organization.


10 These can be obtained from Monthly Review, Estudios Centroamericanos; and reporting in the New York Times, Granma, Tricontinental, Bohemia, Revolución, and Verde Olivo. Joaquín Villalobos, Why Is the FMLN Fighting? (San Salvador, El Salvador: International Information Command of the Salvadoran Revolution, 1984), is one example of a publication by an FMLN leader. The Comandancia general del frente Farabundo Martí para la liberación Nacional provides publications such as Con el tiempo a nuestro favor (San Salvador, El Salvador: Ediciones Sistema Radio Venceremos, 1985); and Situación revolucionaria. Additional proclamations are obtained from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service--Latin America, as translated from the Radio Venceremos.

12 Midlarsky and Roberts, p. 181.


14 Ibid.

15 Russell, pp. 71-74. Russell collects data on 14 rebellions using historical sources and a variety of indexes. She scales the disloyalty score from 0 to 4 in three categories (degree of disloyalty, timing, and proportion of armed forces), adds these scores, and arrives at her disloyalty score. Russell's process is more complex than this, but this represents the basic premise.


Office of Planning and Budgeting Bureau for Programs and Policy Coordination, Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants--Assistance from International Organizations (Washington, DC: Author, 1966-1984); Data Management Division, Comptroller, DSAA, United States Department of Defense-Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts (Washington, DC: Author, 1985). Military assistance includes Foreign Military Sales financing program, Military Assistance Program deliveries/expenditure, International Military Education and Training Program deliveries/expenditures, and any credits sold to the Export-Import Bank with a Department of Defense guarantee; Economic assistance is from numerous programs such as Agency for International Development assistance, Food for Peace, and other official development assistance like the Peace Corps; Assistance from International Organizations include the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development IBRD, International Development Association [IDA], International Finance Corporation [IFC], Inter-American Development Bank [IDB], United Nations Development Programs [UNDP-SF and UNDP-TA], other UN programs such as UNICEF, and the European Economic Community [EEC].

One source that offers this evidence is Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, The C.I.A. and the Cult of Intelligence (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974).

Data for these indicators can be drawn from earlier sections on the regime and revolutionary organization.

Since three cases (Cuba, Guatemala, Nicaragua) do not provide sufficient quantity to obtain results with statistical significance, the analysis will be primarily qualitative.
CHAPTER V
A REGIONAL ANALYSIS

The cases chosen here provide certain commonalities, as well as diversities, that are most useful for this analysis. In addition to the two cases of revolutionary success, several cases offer examples of failure, or little or no revolutionary activity (see Table 5-1). Guatemala first experienced revolutionary activity in the early 1960s, but by 1970 that movement had been defeated. However, in the mid-1970s, a resurgence of revolutionary activity arose and today these organizations have formed a united front. Therefore, this case provides an example of failure and ongoing activity. The Dominican Republic experienced sporadic revolutionary activity from 1959 through the 1970s, with what has been referred to as a full-scale "revolution" in 1965, which ended in failure following United States intervention. While here the term "crisis" will be used in referring to this period, the analysis will accept this event as a case for examination of the revolutionary situation. Beyond this instance of an all-out effort, revolutionary activity has not been on the scale experienced in Guatemala. The Dominican Republic was among the first countries in Latin America where an attempted invasion was made by Cuban-supported insurgents and periodic activity continued into the 1970s. Honduras and Costa Rica have been relatively slow in the development of revolutionary groups, as they have emerged only in the late 1970s and 1980s.
TABLE 5-1
CASES OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Success</th>
<th>Failure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cuba (1953-59)</td>
<td>Guatemala (1962-70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua (1961-79)</td>
<td>Dominican Republic (1965)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ongoing</th>
<th>Marginal Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala (1975-     )</td>
<td>Dominican Republic (1966-83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador (1972-    )</td>
<td>Honduras (1959-83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Costa Rica (1959-83)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze these cases in an attempt to differentiate the key factors which promoted revolutionary movements in some and not others, as well as to test the model of revolutionary outcome on the cases of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. The Dominican crisis of 1965 is not included in the analysis due to the overriding effect of direct intervention.

Revolutionary Situation

Frustration and discontent are common in most governments as changes in society affect different groups in varying ways. However, only rarely has this unrest led to revolution. The difference can most often be traced to the existence of catalyzing events, or precipitants, that stimulate a revolutionary situation. The precipitant in the regional cases being analyzed has been the emergence of revolutionary groups which were able to take advantage of socioeconomic and political preconditions to develop a revolutionary
movement in order to challenge the regime for power. The response of the regimes to this mobilization of oppositional forces varied from case to case; some were able to forestall a revolution while others intensified its growth.

The following sections will argue that while socioeconomic and structural conditions explain a great deal of frustration and discontent among various sectors of society, and make some countries very vulnerable to revolutionary activity, it is the political factors that provide the spark which ignites the revolutionary fire. In all regional cases, to varying degrees, regime oppositional forces led groups in contesting poor socioeconomic and/or political conditions. Each regime responded differently to this opposition. In Cuba, Dominican Republic (pre-1965), Guatemala, and Nicaragua, few concessions were made, routes of peaceful change were closed, and regime reaction led to a revolutionary crisis. In the cases of Costa Rica, Honduras, and Dominican Republic (post-1966), the responses have been more moderate and allowed some measure of oppositional participation.

Historical Framework

The Central American nations have certain common features dating back to 1823 with the formation of the federated Central American Republic. They all experienced considerable internal and external conflicts, normally between liberals and conservatives. With the exception of Costa Rica, a military presence in politics developed and most of the period between 1840 to 1945 was under the rule of military
dictatorships. The Dominican Republic has a similar background with a military dictatorship becoming entrenched by 1930. Cuba emerged under the presence of United States intervention and continually faced political instability. Fulgencio Batista ended nearly 20 years of political maneuvering when he took control in 1952 through a coup d’état and subsequently ruled with dictatorial powers during the pre-revolutionary era.

The international role of the United States has been a common factor, especially since the late nineteenth century. The United States has played a direct role in the political history of Cuba, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. It also has affected Costa Rica and Honduras, but to a lesser extent. This role has changed from one of active pursuance of economic and security interests (up to 1930s), to good neighbor policy, to hemispheric defense measures following WWII. After the Cuban Revolution in 1959, it shifted toward internal security measures and the containment of communism.

While these countries are relatively small geographically, they vary considerably in population density (see Table 5-2). However, this distinguishing feature has no relationship to the amount of revolutionary activity, as the differences are most pronounced among the cases within each category (success, little or no activity). The majority of the economically active population work in the agricultural sector and until recently, with the exception of Cuba, the population was principally rural.
## Regional Overview: Demographic Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Costa Rica</th>
<th>Dominican Republic</th>
<th>Honduras</th>
<th>Guatemala</th>
<th>Cuba</th>
<th>Nicaragua</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Area (km²~1,000)</strong></td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>48.44</td>
<td>112.09</td>
<td>108.89</td>
<td>114.52</td>
<td>139.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Millions</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>5.8(c)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>5.15</td>
<td>7.1(d)</td>
<td>1.49</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>6.92</td>
<td>8.6(d)</td>
<td>2.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>6.24</td>
<td>4.37</td>
<td>8.40</td>
<td>9.7(d)</td>
<td>2.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Density (km²)</strong></td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>162.2</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent Urban</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>57.0(c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960 (a)</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>34.0</td>
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<td>38.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>60.3(d)</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>36.5</td>
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<td>53.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
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<td>57.0</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>57.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economically Active (b)</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Population (EAP)</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>1953</td>
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<td>1960</td>
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<td>61.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>--In Agriculture</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>37.0(e)</td>
<td>62.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>30.0(e)</td>
<td>44.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>21.1(e)</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>--In Industry</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>21.0(e)</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>26.3(e)</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>27.8(e)</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
- (c) refers to data from 1953 in Cuba, which represents the population active 14 years of age or older.
- (d) data is actually from 1979.

Preconditions for Revolution

Traditionally, theories of revolution have highlighted socioeconomic and/or structural conditions (the social system, perceived discontent of the populace), as well as political conditions (emergence of new contenders, and the regime's response), as promoting a revolutionary situation. One of the conditions emphasized is the agrarian structure. The relationship between the landed class and the peasant, and conditions that may lead to peasant participation or support of a revolutionary movement, also must be considered.

Agrarian structure. All these societies have been, and remain, primarily agrarian based. This does not imply that the rural sector has played, or potentially could play the only, or primary, role in stimulating a revolutionary situation. However, the cases here that erupted into revolution all had peasant participation. In examining the agrarian structure the analysis will center on sources of inequality, occupation of agrarian workers, and the economic "elite."

Several works have referred to the inequities in land distribution as having political consequences. Several approaches are used to show this inequity. One method, the Gini coefficient, can obscure data since it does not distinguish among size categories. It deals with relative sources of deprivation only and ignores absolute levels of inequality. Another technique, while still dealing primarily in relative terms, is to measure inequality by comparing the percentage of the total number of farms, within categories of farm size, with the total area they occupy. If most of the farms are small and consist of a low percentage of the farmland, the land tenure
system is considered to be highly concentrated and unequal. For example, from Table 5-3 1964 data on Guatemala show 68.3% of the land is controlled by 3.7% of the largest farms, and 18.7% of the land is controlled by 87.4% of the smallest farms. The data are presented to illustrate the situation prior to and around the time revolutionary activity arose in most of the cases (early 1960s). However, where possible, data for the 1970s are presented to determine if any changes are occurring. The immediate generalization derived from these data is that all the cases suffer from land inequality, that is, the majority of the land is in the hands of a few. In every case, less than 8% of the farms control over 50% of the land, most much more! Additionally, with the exception of the Dominican Republic, equality does not appear to be improving, at least in the cases of Costa Rica and Honduras. Nevertheless, some useful distinctions also can be noted.

These data provide insight into basic land tenure distribution, but would have little impact on the revolutionary potential of peasants if all were maintaining their basic needs. Data that reflect the size of the farm based upon its capability to support a family can be useful in this area. Table 5-3 shows that in Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, and Honduras, there are an extremely high number (67%-88%) of small farms. These data are particularly significant when analyzing the area needed to sustain a family as well as the number of families living on what has been called "sub-family" farms, or those too small to support a family or provide full employment. Land tenure studies in the 1960s identified farm size for many Latin American countries in relation to their ability to adequately provide
### TABLE 5-3

#### AGRICULTURAL LANDHOLDERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Farm Size In Hectares</th>
<th>1955</th>
<th>1963</th>
<th>1973(a)</th>
<th>1955</th>
<th>1963</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Under 6.9 Ha.</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Under 9.9 Ha.</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>41.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10-19.9 Ha.</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20-99.9 Ha.</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100+ Ha.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Under 6.9 Ha.</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Under 4.9 Ha.</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.4-31.4 Ha.</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.0-31.5 Ha.</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31.5-503 Ha.</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>503.1+ Ha.</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Under 6.9 Ha.</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>27.5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Under 4.9 Ha.</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>7-34.9 Ha.</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>32.6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22.4-337.1 Ha.</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>350+ Ha.</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>27.5</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>500+ Ha.</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>1950</td>
<td>88.4</td>
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<td>7-22.3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22.4-337.1 Ha.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>447.2</td>
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<td>0.2</td>
<td>28.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1946</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>11.2</td>
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<td>17.7</td>
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<td>25-99.9 Ha.</td>
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<td>24.1</td>
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<td>100-999.9 Ha.</td>
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<td>10.9</td>
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<td>50.4</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1000+ Ha.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Under 6.9 Ha.</td>
<td>34.8</td>
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<td></td>
<td>7-34.9 Ha.</td>
<td>26.1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35-349.9 Ha.</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>41.2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>350+ Ha.</td>
<td>1.5</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>500+ Ha.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

for the needs of the family. The categories identified were the (a) sub-family; (b) family, provide adequate support for the family; (c) medium sized multi-family farms, those providing employment and a living for several families and hired workers; and (d) large multi-family farms, those with a large number of families or hired workers. Since various factors, such as quality of the land, affect the output capacity of the farm, the size of the farm in each of these categories varies from country to country. A sub-family farm in Costa Rica ranges from 0.7 to 3.42 hectares, 0.7 to 7.0 in Guatemala and Nicaragua, and an average of 4.2 hectares in Honduras. The important factor here is the number of farms existing in the sub-family category. Data on the 1960s show that in all cases, except Costa Rica and Cuba, more than 50% of the farms existed in the sub-family size. Land appears to be nearly as concentrated in Costa Rica as in Nicaragua (1963 data), roughly half the farms under seven hectares encompass approximately 3% of the land. However, while the concentrations are similar, the quality of land is vastly different. The Costa Rican on a small farm fares much better than his neighbors. Generally these data reveal that while land distribution was not equal in all cases, certain countries, such as Costa Rica and Cuba, fared better than the others. There is no apparent distinguishable pattern among these cases based upon equitable land distribution and revolutionary activity. Cuba, Nicaragua, and Guatemala do not stand out as the three most inequitable and those countries of marginal activity are not the most equal.

Some theorists, such as Jeffrey Paige, have suggested income sources as predictors of the revolutionary potential of peasants.
(Chapter II). Table 5-4 shows the occupational categories of the agricultural sector of these regional cases. These data appear to support Skocpol's analysis that questions the use of "income sources" at all, as predictors of the political interests and capacities of agrarian classes. While the Dominican Republic and Honduras have fewer wage laborers than Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Cuba, Costa Rica provides the case in question, as it has over 50% in this category. The issue of the agrarian structure can be further clarified by a review of each case, its economic elite, and demands made upon the system by the peasantry.

It has been noted that a distinguishing feature among the Central American societies is the lack of a distinctive economic "elite" in Costa Rica and Honduras. This does not mean that they do not have an "elite," but that in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, the elite are more pronounced in that they have more of an exclusive association.

A large sector of family-sized farms, roughly 37.5% of all farms in 1963, evolved in Costa Rica, and consequently the evolution of a traditional landed oligarchy never occurred. The small proprietor has been described as the "backbone" of the Costa Rican society. Even though this feature of the society may be disappearing the relationship between the "patron" and the peasant has been more or less a cordial one.

While the Honduran agrarian structure is certainly different from Costa Rica, it has been characterized as having "no oligarchy in the accepted sense of the term." Traditional landowning families do exist, along with a class of urban elites, but as James Morris has
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Employer</th>
<th>Self-Employed &amp; Family Worker</th>
<th>Wage Labor</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>1950(a)</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1963(b)</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>1960(c)</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1970(d)</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>1974(e)</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1950(a)</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1973(f)</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1971(g)</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Administrator &amp; Foreman</th>
<th>Rancher/Farmer &amp; Family Worker</th>
<th>Wage Labor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1952(h)</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>63.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

noted they have been unable to "produce and maintain a solid landowning aristocracy."\textsuperscript{16} This absence of a distinct oligarchy has been identified as a factor in the lack of social polarization.\textsuperscript{17} The peasantry consists predominantly of small farmers (over 60% of the farms are less than five hectares). Since the 1950s, the rural sector has become more organized in placing demands on the national government. Effective unionization began in the mid-1950s with a strike that promoted unions in various sectors to include peasant groups.\textsuperscript{18} The church played a role in this process and assisted in the formation of the first legalized peasant organization in 1963.\textsuperscript{19} Following the \textit{coup d'état} in 1963 these movements were repressed, but reemerged in the late 1960s. The issue of land reform played a role in politics throughout the 1970s. In the years following the military \textit{coup} in December 1972, several decrees dealing with land reform were issued.\textsuperscript{20} Of all the lands awarded from agrarian reform measures from 1962 to 1980, over 51% transpired during the period 1973 to 1975. However, it was not without resistance, as actions by landowners sought to limit these activities.\textsuperscript{21} Peasant demands and confrontations, sometimes violent, continued throughout the 1970s into the 1980s. The one common feature of these confrontations was that they continued to be resolved within the established institutional framework. The response of the government to the demands of the peasant associations allowed for a measure of flexibility in the system.

Nicaragua and Guatemala, while different, developed a class of economic "elites" different from those of Costa Rica and Honduras. Guatemala is distinct with its large Indian population. These
Indians, along with landless ladinos, have generally provided the local planters with a cheap labor source. Until the mid-1900s this rural labor force was totally reliant upon the large landholders or "old families." This relationship changed with mobilization of the rural sector and land reforms of 1944 to 1954.\textsuperscript{22} This period saw an increase in mass lower-sector organizations and a retreat of governmental protection for the landowners and employers. However, these changes were reversed after 1954. The total number of peasant organizations operating between 1944 to 1954 was 665, from 1955 to 1967 it was 93.\textsuperscript{23} In a study of the post-Arbenz period, Adams highlights the shift that occurred placing new limitations on labor and campesino organizations, and the reconstitution of the landowners' influence. One consequence was the return of much of the land that had been expropriated during the agrarian reform law of 1952. Of particular interest was the use made of the national fincas by the Ydígoras government (1957-1963) and land expulsions. On 2 June 1958, it was announced that all people living on United Fruit Company land must vacate. This led to incidences of violence as many of these peasants had occupied the land for several generations. The Melvilles found numerous reports of violence and expulsions of peasants during 1960 in the province of Izabal (area where the revolutionary movement established itself in 1962).\textsuperscript{24} Thus, by the late 1950s and early 1960s the society was in a state of flux.

In Nicaragua, there is little doubt that wealth has been concentrated at the top, particularly following the Somoza family's rise to power. During the Somoza era, Nicaragua's economic elite was similar to landowning classes of other Latin American countries, but
it was not a consolidated oligarchy. There was the traditional elite of "old families" and landowners, but it also included groups of the business sector, and public officials. At the very top were those deriving their wealth from the Somoza regime, with the Somoza family on top of the pyramid. Booth maintains that the economic elite supported or remained ambivalent toward the regime from the 1930s to the 1970s, because they realized that this was the only route to maintain and increase their wealth. However, as will be demonstrated later, this relationship faced changes with the earthquake of 1972, which placed additional strains on the society. During this period, prior to the 1970s, the peasants were never able to effectively organize. However, this began to change in the 1970s, as religious groups set out to train peasant leaders and organize projects within various communities.

The structure of the Cuban economic elite and peasantry was different from the Central American cases due to its sugar-based economy and the presence of foreigners. The plantation economy of sugar produced an economic elite of sugarmill owners (primarily foreigners) and a large rural proletariat. Most "campesinos" were wage laborers (63.6% in 1952) rather than squatters ("precaristas"), or traditional peasants tied to a "patron." The economic elite was not made up of traditional landowners (the sugar plantations were owned by companies initially belonging to North Americans and later primarily Cubans), but rather, as Thomas argues, they were "rich as capitalists, not men of land." Since the landed class was not tied to the land, the application of Paige's theory to Cuba, as it relates to revolution, is not appropriate.
Several students of the revolution have pointed to certain unique characteristics of the peasantry in the Oriente province who supported Fidel Castro. This area was unique in that 83.4% of Cuban squatters lived there, and 52.8% of farms were under one hectare, less than that required to sustain a family, and well within the limits of a sub-family size farm. In this area squatters accounted for 22.3% of the farmers (nationally, 8.6% of farmers were squatters). Even though, as illustrated earlier, national data indicated a small percentage of farms were sub-family size, it varied considerably within the country. Dominguez characterized this situation by saying Castro's movement had settled in the "only area of Cuba where he could have found insecure peasants facing hostile landowners and government." Attempts of guerrilla forces to conduct similar infiltrations during the following decades in neighboring Dominican Republic met with failure.

Society, in what today is called the Dominican Republic, developed as a two-class system from the beginning of the colonial period. The "elite" consisted of "noblemen" who not only virtually controlled the wealth, but the administration of government as well. Like Cuba, the beginning of large-scale sugar production in the 1800s forever altered the process of land concentration and social structure. Out of this process arose (or reemerged) a wealthy, landed aristocracy, as well as an elite business sector. These two groups mixed and intermarried to form an oligarchy. However, with the rise of General Rafael L. Trujillo in 1930 the power of the elite was broken. By 1961, a consolidated oligarchy did not exist, it was comprised of the "old families," business-commercial sector, high ranking military leaders and other "trujillistas" who derived their
wealth from the Trujillo regime. Trujillo became the largest landowner, by some estimates owning 50 to 60% of the country's best farming and grazing land.36

Like Cuba, a rural proletariat of cane-cutters and mill workers arose following the rise of the sugar industry. However, unlike Cuba, most of the peasants participated in subsistence farming and the percentage of wage laborers remained relatively low (29.7% in 1970). Wiarda describes the peasants as either "infarmers," those who are part of the national economy, being near routes of transportation, and the "outfarmers," those with little contact with the outside world. Late-1950s estimates put the "infarmers" at approximately 30% of the rural population.37 Since the peasant was not seen as a threat to the regime and had no organizational structure, which was forbidden by law, Trujillo made no concerted effort to control them. His use of propaganda to boost his image and an "agrarian reform" program, giving away less-fertile areas, aided in keeping the peasants passive toward governmental authority. All these factors may have led to the peasant being less receptive to radicalism or revolutionary ideas. With Trujillo's demise, the early 1960s saw a change as various political parties attempted to capture the benefit of support from a large peasant class at election time.38

While the early 1960s marked the mobilization of the peasant class and brought it into closer contact with national events, the peasant still remained primarily a passive force. Juan Bosch's Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) gained the support of the peasants in the electoral victory of 1962, but was unable to deliver promised reforms to raise the standard of living that was advocated in
his campaign. When, after only seven months, Bosch was overthrown on 25 September 1963 the peasants remained aloof. Nevertheless, this period had changed forever the context of the countryside.

Even with these mobilization efforts, the countryside remained relatively unorganized and weakly linked to mechanisms to exert pressure at the national level. Wiarda offers interview data that indicate a lack of peasant knowledge and participation in any kind of political organization or program with the exception of political parties. This was the situation as the crisis of 1965 approached. The peasants played a minimal role in this crisis and up until 1978, remained supporters of the conservative elements, Joaquín Balaguer and the Reformist Party (PR). This is evidenced by the continuous electoral support of the PR by the rural sector.

In summary, the agrarian structures of each country have provided certain reasons to stimulate unrest among the peasantry. However, in some cases, Costa Rica and Honduras, the system has been more open to peasant demands or they have felt more secure in their position. If one tries to equate the existence of such a structure with potential violence, then virtually every agrarian society should be in revolt. Revolutions involve members from various sectors of the society. One possible explanation for individuals to resort to armed struggle is discontent due to socioeconomic and political conditions.

Socioeconomic factors. Data on these regional cases indicate that if inferred changes in socioeconomic conditions can generate "relative deprivation--RD," or a situation where there is a perceived discrepancy between what an individual expects to get and what he actually receives, then the assertion that RD can lead to a
revolutionary situation has a certain amount of validity. However, in this regional analysis it falls short of explaining the existence or absence of revolutionary activity.

Table 5-5 shows that the cases under examination grew in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) for most of the analytical period, up to 1980. Although data on Cuba are insufficient for comparative purposes, there is apparently no relationship between economic development, as measured by total or per capita GDP, and revolutionary activity. Per capita levels in Nicaragua and Guatemala exceed those in the Dominican Republic and Honduras, but trail those of Costa Rica. Levels of modernization, as measured by GDP contributed by industry, show some similarities, as the cases of success (Cuba and Nicaragua) have comparable GDP contributed by industry. However, the cases of marginal activity vary, with Costa Rica showing a level similar to Nicaragua and Cuba. In general, all these regional cases experienced economic growth and increased their industrial production up through the 1970s. As the economy grew, those within society could reasonably expect an improvement in their standard of living. However, as a survey of the individual cases, and social and income distribution data, indicate, economic growth does not necessarily translate to equality or a rise in living conditions at all levels of society.

One measure of potential discontent is the individual's share of income. Like land distribution, there are several approaches used to show income inequality. A familiar technique for this purpose is to measure inequality by the extent to which the income share of a group or households differs from their population share. Table 5-6
### TABLE 5-5
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND MODERNIZATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Costa Rica</th>
<th>Dominican Republic</th>
<th>Honduras</th>
<th>Guatemala</th>
<th>Cuba</th>
<th>Nicaragua</th>
<th>L.A. Mean</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total GDP (In 1982 dollars, millions) (a)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1263.2</td>
<td>2053.1</td>
<td>1065.5</td>
<td>3299.2</td>
<td>[100]</td>
<td>1211.4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2249.4</td>
<td>3368.5</td>
<td>1733.9</td>
<td>5637.2</td>
<td>[88]</td>
<td>2361.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>3893.8</td>
<td>6585.3</td>
<td>2763.4</td>
<td>9769.2</td>
<td>[98]</td>
<td>2574.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>3486.7</td>
<td>7235.4</td>
<td>2705.9</td>
<td>9298.2</td>
<td>[90]</td>
<td>2832.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita (In 1982 dollars) (b)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>956.9</td>
<td>596.6</td>
<td>536.0</td>
<td>841.4</td>
<td>[101]</td>
<td>806.0</td>
<td>958.8</td>
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<td>1970</td>
<td>1313.1</td>
<td>787.8</td>
<td>640.1</td>
<td>1082.8</td>
<td>[88]</td>
<td>1237.9</td>
<td>1297.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1765.9</td>
<td>1203.4</td>
<td>746.2</td>
<td>1413.2</td>
<td>[94]</td>
<td>1062.9</td>
<td>1844.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1466.2</td>
<td>1212.7</td>
<td>665.3</td>
<td>1235.3</td>
<td>[90]</td>
<td>1088.7</td>
<td>1673.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent Change GDP (a)</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>1956-1957</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>1958</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961-1970</td>
<td>6.0</td>
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<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971-1975</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976-1980</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981-1983</td>
<td>-3.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>% GDP Contributed by Industry (b)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-70</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-80</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-82</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>% GDP Contributed by Agriculture (++) (b)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-70</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>28.7</td>
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<td>1971-80</td>
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<td>31.3</td>
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<td>24.3</td>
<td>11.5</td>
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<td>1981-82</td>
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<td>24.0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: (+) Cuban data are tentative at best and are used to show relative change only. Total GDP is based upon a base year of 1950 = 100, years are 1952, 1953, 1957, and 1958; GDP per capita uses a base year of 1950 = 100 and the periods reflected are 1950-52, 1953-55, 1956-57, and 1958. Percent change GDP is computed based upon the estimates of the above indices. (++) Agriculture includes forestry and fishing.
### TABLE 5-6

**INCOME DISTRIBUTION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Dominica-</th>
<th>Republic</th>
<th>Honduras</th>
<th>Guatemala</th>
<th>Cuba</th>
<th>Nicaragua</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Rica</td>
<td>Republic</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poorest 20%</td>
<td></td>
<td>1953</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--1966 to 1971 (a)</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Towards 1980 (b)</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30% below mean</td>
<td></td>
<td>1953</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--1966 to 1971</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Towards 1980</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30% above mean</td>
<td></td>
<td>1953</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--1966 to 1971</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Towards 1980</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richest 20%</td>
<td></td>
<td>1953</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--1966 to 1971</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Towards 1980</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: The 1966 to 1971 data are based upon "household" population. Costa Rica uses national coverage, Dominican Republic is urban (Santo Domingo) coverage, and Honduras and Guatemala are rural coverage.

expresses this in terms of income shares of the lowest 20%, 30% below the mean, 30% above the mean, and top 20%. Caution must be exercised as some of the data are not comparable since surveys were based upon different coverages. However, it can provide some idea of relative inequality for each case. Generally, it appears all cases suffer from
inequitable income distribution since nearly 50% of the income was held by 20% of the population, while the bottom 20% held less than 9%.

However, this only expresses distribution in relative terms. In 1986, Paul Sigmund commented on the question of income distribution:

I get terribly tired of the discussion of deciles. Can't we get beyond that? There is something else behind deciles--things like absolute levels of income. Anyone who has been out in the countryside of Cuba and of Costa Rica (as I have) can see an astounding difference in the two countries. One can say that income distribution is bad in Costa Rica, but the absolute level of the standard of living in the countryside in Costa Rica is much higher than that of the people living in the countryside in Cuba.42

In dealing with this regional analysis, his comment is very apropos.

Table 5-7 attempts to show these absolute levels of income.

Table 5-7

PER CAPITA INCOME LEVELS
(Dollars at 1970 Prices)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Dominica-</th>
<th>Costa Rica</th>
<th>Republic</th>
<th>Honduras</th>
<th>Guatemala</th>
<th>Cuba</th>
<th>Nicaragua</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poorest 20%</td>
<td>--Towards 1980</td>
<td>276.7</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>111.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30% below mean</td>
<td>--Towards 1980</td>
<td>500.8</td>
<td>140.0</td>
<td>202.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>178.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30% above mean</td>
<td>--Towards 1980</td>
<td>883.8</td>
<td>254.6</td>
<td>364.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>350.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richest 20%</td>
<td>--Towards 1980</td>
<td>1165.2</td>
<td>796.3</td>
<td>1133.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1199.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: "The Crisis in Central America," CEPAL Review, 22 (April 1984): Table 3 [ECLA data].
 Upon examining Table 5-7 it becomes immediately obvious that while distribution may be "skewed" in each country, the poorest 20% in Costa Rica have nearly as much income as 50% of the population in Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. While similar data are not available for the Dominican Republic, a study by Chenery using per capita income as a measure of absolute inequality, illustrates that in 1969, except for Costa Rica, it fared better than all the other cases. Another important distinction is the relative difference between the income of the poorest and richest 20% in each country. The Honduran "rich" fall far short of their neighbors.

Turning to social indicators, there is clear evidence of distinction among these cases. Table 5-8 displays four social indicators that are among those used commonly to determine social development. That is, a country with a higher literacy rate, lower infant mortality rate, higher life expectancy, and higher consumption of daily calories per capita, is considered more socially developed. With the exception of calories per capita, Costa Rica, pre-revolutionary Cuba, and the Dominican Republic, consistently have higher levels of development. Guatemala and Honduras must be considered the least developed. Improvements in these areas slowed down during the 1970s and two countries, Honduras and Nicaragua, showed a decline in two of the four indicators from 1971 to 1979. However, these data provide little in the way of a relationship between social conditions and revolutionary activity. But these data do not reveal all the underlying conditions relevant to the revolutionary situation.
### TABLE 5-8

SELECTED SOCIAL INDICATORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Costa Rica</th>
<th>Dominican Republic</th>
<th>Honduras</th>
<th>Guatemala</th>
<th>Cuba</th>
<th>Nicaragua</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Literacy (15 Years and Older)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>76.4(b)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>77.4(c)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-64</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-73</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>87.1(c)</td>
<td>57.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-79</td>
<td>89.8</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>96.0(c)</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-82</td>
<td>89.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>87.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-55</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>79.0(a)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-60</td>
<td>81.6(a)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>130.7</td>
<td>33.4(c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-72</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>117.6</td>
<td>84.7</td>
<td>38.7(c)</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-80</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>117.0</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>19.6(c)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy at Birth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-55</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>58.8(b)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-60</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>61.8(c)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>62.0(d)</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>65.1(c)</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-75</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>70.9(c)</td>
<td>52.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>71.8(c)</td>
<td>56.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Calories Per Capita (a)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2740-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2870.0(c)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-63</td>
<td>2153.0</td>
<td>1872.0</td>
<td>1936.0</td>
<td>1903.0</td>
<td>2410.0(c)</td>
<td>2185.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-71</td>
<td>2408.0</td>
<td>1971.0</td>
<td>2152.0</td>
<td>2063.0</td>
<td>256/0(c)</td>
<td>2546.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-81</td>
<td>2653.0</td>
<td>2131.0</td>
<td>2135.0</td>
<td>2138.0</td>
<td>2866.0</td>
<td>2188.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pre-revolutionary Cuba had one of the highest per capita incomes in Latin America. In fact, in 1958, per capita income in Cuba was the third highest among countries of Latin America. However, per capita income fluctuated considerably during the years 1950 to 1958, going from $350 (US) in 1952 down to $307 in 1954, rising back up to $374 in 1957, then falling back down to a 1952 level of $356 in 1958.

Still, following a trip to Cuba in December 1958, Congressman Allen J. Ellender reported that everyone interviewed “agreed that Cuba had never in its history enjoyed more prosperity than now.” The data indicate this may have been a superficial view from the top, as conditions had been deteriorating since early 1958 (GDP and income levels were falling) and were much worse in the Oriente province, where Castro’s forces were headquartered.

There are data on Cuba that indicate conditions were not as great as some national-level statistics suggested. The 1952 census shows a striking difference between rural and urban living conditions, with conditions in the Oriente province (location of Castro’s headquarters in 1957-1958) being the worst. The census reveals that 75.4% of homes in rural areas were made of palm or wood thatch, 66.2% had earth floors, only 8.1% had electricity, and 90.5% had no tub or shower. A comparison of a survey (among 1000 peasants) done in 1957 on income levels, expenditure patterns, food intake, educational and health standards, with the 1952 census reveals little change among the peasant population. Additionally, the literacy rate in the area of the Sierra Maestra was 30.4% compared to a national level of 76.4%.
Wiarda's data on rural conditions in the Dominican Republic at the end of the Trujillo era, reflect widespread poverty with little hope for improvement and no possibility of upward mobility. Being isolated from the world, the peasant's only hope for improving his lot was to move to the city. This resulted in migration to the capital, Santo Domingo, and an unemployment rate reaching 40%. However, as discussed earlier, the countryside was awakened following Trujillo's death by a vigorous campaign of promises for future improvements, resulting in a situation of rising expectations. A similar situation was transpiring in the urban areas. In a 1962 survey by Lloyd A. Free, these new hopes and desires were illustrated. He found that roughly 66% of the people desired improved standards of living as a national aspiration, they had a high degree of political awareness, and a situation of general frustration and discontent existed. Lowenthal illustrates the situation in the year before the 1965 crisis as one of severe economic hardship. The principal export crops of sugar, cacao, and coffee were bringing the lowest prices in recent years. Additionally, the government was doing little in the way of relief projects. Such was the situation preceding the 1965 crisis.

John A. Booth has effectively argued that revolutionary activity in the 1970s in Central America is best explained by "relative deprivation" of various sectors in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador. Two indicators he uses to measure this are consumer price index (CPI) and real wage index (RWI). He states that while all (Central America) experienced declines in their earning power (RWI) in the early 1970s, only Costa Rica and Honduras showed a recovery in the
mid-1970s.\textsuperscript{54} While these data may help to explain revolutionary activity in the 1970s, they do not explain the cause of the movement. With the exception of El Salvador, all the movements began in the late 1950s or 1960s.

Using a consumer price index (CPI), Table 5-9 illustrates that Nicaragua and Guatemala continued to rise proportionally greater in the latter part of the 1970s than Costa Rica, Honduras, or the Dominican Republic. However, during the period these movements began (early 1960s), the CPI was low, in fact lower in those cases experiencing revolutionary activity. Also, data on Cuba show that prices decreased during the period of revolutionary activity.

While Booth's data on real wages show a definite pattern among his cases of revolutionary activity (Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador) for the 1970s, the inclusion of the Dominican Republic does not follow the pattern of Honduras and Costa Rica (which recovered after 1975). Real wages in the Dominican Republic (using a base year of 1970 = 100) continued to decrease after 1971 (102.4), dropping to 77.5 in 1978, and falling below the wage levels of 1965.\textsuperscript{55} Similar data on Cuba computed by Domínguez show a steady increase in real wages from 1953 to 1957, with a slight decrease in 1958.\textsuperscript{56} A closer examination of commercial and industrial wages in 1958 shows a significant difference in national data and the Oriente province. Following March 1958, real wages began falling. However, the decline was much sharper in the Oriente, with only the months of August and December showing any improvement. Nationally, while a decline started in March, a sharp deterioration did not occur until September.\textsuperscript{57} By
all accounts, 1957 was Cuba's best economic year ever, while 1958, for various reasons, was the worst in many years.

**TABLE 5-9**

**VARIATION IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Costa Rica</th>
<th>Dom. Republic</th>
<th>Honduras</th>
<th>Guatemala</th>
<th>(a) Cuba</th>
<th>(b) Nicaragua</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean Annual Percent Change</td>
<td>1950-52</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>[98.0]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>[100.0]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1954-57</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>[97.0]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1950-60</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1961-70</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971-75</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1976-80</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1981-84(c)</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In summary, these indicators of socioeconomic conditions demonstrate levels of potential discontent in all regional cases. In applying Ted Gurr and James Davies' theories of political aggression, each of these countries appears vulnerable, some much more than others, to revolution. Growth occurred in each country, while land
and income remained concentrated in the hands of a few, and living conditions in the rural sectors remained poor. While Cuban patterns of gross domestic product, income, cost of living and wages declined in 1958, and varied in the late 1970s for the other cases, the situation at the time of the rise in revolutionary activity showed no such characteristics. Given these circumstances, national data do not conclusively show why revolutionary activity arose in some cases and not others. For example, conditions in Honduras have continued to deteriorate, in all indicators except real wages, while only marginal revolutionary activity has occurred. While inequality was common in pre-revolutionary Cuba, the lower levels of the social structure improved during the Batista period, at least up to 1958. However, in examining available regional data of the area where the movement thrived, the socioeconomic causes appear more valid. At the same time there are sub-national data from other areas showing similar discrepancies that did not spawn a revolutionary movement. Therefore, socioeconomic conditions, in and of themselves, are insufficient to explain the existence of revolutionary activity.

This analysis questions Dix's hypothesis, as well as the assumption in Chapter III, that socioeconomic variables are not critical to the success or failure of revolution. In both Cuba and Nicaragua, socioeconomic conditions declined in the periods just preceding the success of the revolution. In the 1960s, in Guatemala, this did not occur. However, if defining critical means the factors are exclusively associated with one event (success or failure) rather than the other, the hypothesis appears valid. Guatemala faced an economic downturn in the early 1980s (Table 5-5), but the movement has
yet to succeed. This suggests that while a cause and effect relationship may exist between underlying socioeconomic conditions and political events it may not necessarily translate to success or failure for the movement. Therefore, a simple line-up of socioeconomic variables is not sufficient in determining revolutionary causes and outcome. These findings stress the importance of examining the roots of the revolution in El Salvador, as well as the continuing changes in the socioeconomic situation. Given these underlying conditions, the next section addresses the political dimension in identifying the differences among the cases.

**Political preconditions.** There are few statistical indicators for political preconditions, but a review of the political processes, emergence of new power contenders, and the reactions of the regime provide some insight as to why a group, or groups, may discard the peaceful pursuit of social change for the violent overthrow of a regime.

The most obvious similarity among the cases of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Guatemala is the existence of authoritarian type regimes. Cuba and Nicaragua both had "authoritarian-personalistic" regimes under Batista and Somoza, respectively. Batista came to power in 1952 in a coup d'état after realizing the electoral process would not deliver him the presidency. While Cuba was not a bastion of political harmony before 1952, it had developed a certain amount of flexibility and pluralism. Since the 1930s, the military had not involved itself in politics and the electoral process had gained some legitimization. Batista's coup ended that and the military became the mainstay of the regime. Batista held elections in 1954; he had no
opposition, and in November 1958, the elections were branded "obviously fraudulent." Therefore, the political process was "closed."

By his actions Batista alienated the two main political parties, the Auténticos and Orthodoxos, which apparently had a majority of the voter support. A survey on the upcoming, but never held, 1952 presidential elections, published in December 1951, showed the Auténticos had 33.8% of voter support, the Orthodoxos had 30%, and Batista (United Action Party) had a mere 14.2%, with most of this support from the lower class. Shifts in the political elite are evident from the results of the 1954 elections. The lowest percentage (12%) of reelected representatives since 1936 was recorded. Batista even generated discontent and division within the military by recalling old, retired military associates. This created friction between the professional officers and those obtaining political favoritism. These clashes resulted in at least three major conspiracies (April 1953, April 1956, and September 1957) to overthrow the regime.

Among the main opposition that confronted Batista's regime was the student movement, in which Castro had forged struggles of his own in the 1940s. However, those who would join Castro on 26 July 1953, in his ill-fated assault against the Moncada barracks, were primarily from a lower middle class or working class background, very few having any higher education. Some, like Castro, had been identified with the Orthodox Youth Movement. Castro provided the motivation behind his resort to armed struggle in his self-defense speech, History Will Absolve Me. Although he mentions downtrodden socioeconomic
conditions (unemployment, agrarian structure, education, and welfare),
his main emphasis was that the Batista government had achieved power
unconstitutionally, discarded constitutional organs, was corrupt, and
initiated widespread repression.

The repressive response of the soldiers at the Moncada barracks,
in addition to the government reaction, proved to be a rallying cry
for oppositional forces. While it is often noted that the incidences
of repression by the Batista government were significant, they were
also inconsistent.67 The torture and murder following the Moncada
attack became well known, but then was followed in May 1955 by an
amnesty program which released Castro, his brother, and 18 followers.
Political and civil rights and freedom of the press also were
restricted. But like repression, it was inconsistent. Even though
censorship existed for various periods, Castro was able to gain access
to the press. Communication between Castro and his supporters flowed
vigorously while he was in prison.68 Ted Gurr has noted that a little
repression can be the most destructive force a regime can implement to
itself.69 Castro established himself in Mexico, planned, and in
December 1956 implemented, an invasion of Cuba by landing in the
Oriente province with a force of some 82 men.

The political process in Nicaragua had a much longer tradition of
authoritarianism with the Somoza family ruling the country from 1936
until the Sandinista victory in 1979.70 The period, 1956-1963, under
Somoza's eldest son, Luis, offered some liberalization and increased
political aspirations. From 1963 to 1967, the presidency was held by
Reñé Schick and Lorenzo Guerro, followed by Somoza ("Tachito") García.
As the elections of 1971 approached there were hopes that the Somoza
era would end. Dr. Ramiro Sacasa decided to seek the presidential nomination of the Liberal Nationalist Party (PLN), which was the ruling party in 1971, but Somoza maintained control. Following the 1974 elections, in which all viable opposition was prevented from participation, Sacasa joined Pedro Joaquín Chamorro in forming the Democratic Liberation Union (UDEL), a bourgeois opposition group.71

While the political process remained "closed," opposition was tolerated to a degree. Oppositional voices came from the conservative parties, who sometimes contested elections against the liberals, the newspaper La Prensa, and university intellectuals.72 La Prensa was owned by the Chamorro family and Pedro Joaquin Chamorro has been its editor since the 1940s. The Somozas continually tolerated harsh criticisms until press censorship was initiated between 1974 and 1977. La Prensa picked up its criticisms and was met with attacks by supporters of the regime.73 University autonomy was basically respected by the regime. While it allowed student groups to flourish, they did not go unchecked. It was the reaction (imprisonment and exile) against past and present students, and oppositional leaders following the 1956 assassination of Somoza García, that served to further frustrate the hopes for peaceful opposition of several members of this group.74 Several who suffered at the hands of the regime included Pedro Joaquín Chamorro and Tomás Borge, leading members of the opposition to Somoza in the next two decades. The Cuban Revolutionary victory in 1959 served as an example to the young radicals when they set out to organize oppositional forces to confront the regime. One source claims that there were 23 different uprisings in Nicaragua from mid-1959 to 1961.75 One group was the National
Liberation Front ("Sandinista" was added later), founded in 1961 by Carlos Fonseca Amador, Tomás Borge Martínez, and Silvio Mayorga. While the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) arose during this period when the political process was "closed" it remained an obscure revolutionary movement until the 1970s, unlike others during this period (Peru, Venezuela, Guatemala, Colombia). Although the FSLN managed to survive, the National Guard kept it off balance.

The National Guard effectively dealt with the guerrillas throughout the 1960s, delivering them severe blows in 1963, 1967, and 1969-70. Mobilization efforts in the late 1960s and early 1970s extended to peasant unions and middle and upper class opposition. By 1972, the revolutionary movement had been confronting the Somoza regime for over 10 years and did not appear any closer to victory. Apparently political "stagnation," the example of revolutionary success in Cuba, and the response of the regime, promoted the birth of the revolutionary movement. In nearby Guatemala, at the same time the guerrilla movement in Nicaragua was attempting to take up arms against Somoza, some ex-military officers returned from self-exile. In February 1962, guerrilla forces, organized under the leadership of Marco Antonio Yon Sosa and Luis Augusto Turcios Lima, went into action against the Ydigoras government. This stimulated the beginning of a revolutionary movement that was not considered finally defeated until 1970. But what led to the emergence of this new contender?

As mentioned earlier, the constitutionally elected government of Jacobo Arbenz ended in 1954 when, assisted by the United States, Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas invaded from Honduras. While it could be argued this event indirectly led to the revolutionary crisis of the
1960s, it was actually an abortive revolt in 1960 that stimulated the emergence of the revolutionary movement. In 1957, Castillo Armas was assassinated and after several months of dealing, General Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes was elected. The next few years were turbulent and as a result of a failed military revolt against the Ydígoras regime, in November 1960, several officers involved fled to Mexico, Honduras, and El Salvador.81 One cause of the revolt was a growing discontent among the military since Castillo Armas' death.82 Rose presents data that show a shift in power to an older generation of officers had occurred, during the Ydígoras government, thus limiting the mobility of those expecting promotions or high positions during the Castillo Armas era. Another reason, and often considered the primary one, for the coup, was the position of the government in allowing the United States to use Guatemala as a staging base for the upcoming "Bay of Pigs" invasion.83 In early 1961, Yon Sosa, Turcios Lima, and Alejandro de Leon reentered Guatemala in search of a way to continue the struggle.84

Adolfo Gilly's 1965 report on the guerrilla movement in Guatemala, while not entirely objective and romanticizing the guerrillas somewhat, provides some interesting insights into the evolution of the movement. It appears the rebel officers received some support from the peasantry in their initial days following the failed revolt and subsequent flight into Honduras and El Salvador. As Kinzer and Schlesinger suggest, they may also have been encouraged by the peasantry support of the rebels during the revolt.85 Whatever the reason, they returned to organize and lead the peasantry in a revolution. The peasants certainly had sufficient motives to support
such a cause since the regimes of Castillo Armas and Ydigoras had implemented repressive tactics to dismantle programs of the 1944-54 period. In February 1962 the guerrilla forces, under the name of Guerrilla Movement Alejandro de León-November 13, called for a national rebellion and went into action in the area of Izabal, northeastern Guatemala.

Just prior to their declaration there had been congressional elections (December 1961) that resulted in widespread claims of fraud. It was in this political atmosphere that their call went out. This act stimulated the mobilization of other groups and by March three oppositional political parties demanded Ydigoras' resignation. Also students took to the streets, resulting in a backlash of repression in which 20 students were killed, and 200 injured. However, Ydigoras persisted and, with United States assistance, launched a counterinsurgency campaign. The die was cast as remnants of these organizations challenged the regime throughout the 1960s. This movement was defeated by 1970, but by 1975, a revitalization occurred.

The new round of revolutionary activity roughly coincided with several events. First, oil was discovered in western Guatemala, thus opening up this heavily Indian populated area for the first time. It also enhanced government corruption and resulted in relocation of the populace. This created unrest among the Indians. Consequently, a new group of revolutionaries were quick to take advantage of the situation. Second, in 1974, a non-official candidate, General Efraín Ríos Montt, won the election. However, fellow military officers were unwilling to allow him to assume the presidency and instead supported
the official candidate. Following 1974, the labor unions grew significantly, and by 1976 had increased their memberships over 250% from 1974 levels. An earthquake struck Guatemala in February 1976, resulting in over 25,000 deaths and widespread destruction, which increased hardship in the populace, both urban and peasant. All of these events bred frustration and discontent. Revolutionary organizations again sprang up and were met with severe repression. The first of these, the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), launched its initial attack on 12 December 1975. By most accounts, the Laugerud regime (1974-1978) was not as repressive as earlier regimes, but by 1977, repression began to mount.

From 1978 to 1982 political unrest mounted as guerrilla activities increased and the revolutionary movement unified. At the same time right wing death squad activities intensified. Elections were held in March 1982, followed by an "internal coup" that installed General José Efraín Ríos Montt as president. General Ríos Montt announced reforms and war against corruption. Additionally, he embarked upon an intensification of the counterinsurgency program. By some reports, the Ríos Montt offensive left 5,000 to 10,000 "campesinos" dead and moved nearly a million from their homes into "model villages." Another coup d'etat ousted Ríos Montt in 1983 and by late 1985, elections were once again held. For the first time since 1966, a civilian, Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo, became President. However, it still remains unclear how much control the military has relinquished. The political process in Guatemala has remained "closed" since the 1960s, with the most recent move, and the administration of Julio César Méndez Montenegro (1966-1970), as being
"semi-open" in that elements outside the military were allowed to ascend to the office of President.

The Dominican Republic of the early 1960s offers a case where the breakdown of the political process resulted in a revolutionary crisis. Eight months after Trujillo's death in 1961, Joaquín Balaguer relinquished the government to a Council of State, which was interrupted shortly by a coup d'état which survived two days in January 1962. By December 1962, the Council of State arranged for the first free and honest election to be held in the Dominican Republic in 38 years. It resulted in the election of Juan Bosch, a democratic socialist of the Revolutionary Democratic Party (RPD), who was inaugurated on 27 February 1963. Bosch won by a comfortable margin (two to one) and gained control of the National Assembly. However, his popularity soon deteriorated as no true reforms were immediately forthcoming, as promised, and members of the armed forces, church, and landowners were alienated. Bosch was accused also of including communists in his government and being "soft on communism." The result was a coup d'état on 25 September 1963, after only seven months in office, which sent Bosch into exile, and established a three-member civilian Junta government ("Triumvirate"). This coup was led by Colonel Elias Wessin y Wessin, a staunch anti-communist reactionary. In the next year and one-half, there were several changes within the Triumvirate government. One noteworthy occurrence is the resignation of its first president, Emilio de los Santos, on 22 December 1963. This occurred following the massacre of approximately 15 members of a small revolutionary organization, Revolutionary Movement 14th of June (1J4), who had surrendered to an army patrol.
This group had gone to the hills in November 1963 to fight a guerrilla war against the government. Their leader, "Manolo" Tavarez, was among those killed. Donald Reid Cabral emerged as the leader of the government. His moves against the military, and suspicion that he wanted to become the elected president, led some to conclude that his overthrow was imminent. On 24 April 1965 a portion of the armed forces ("Constitutionalists" or "rebels") revolted, attempting to restore the constitutional regime of 1963 (Bosch). The situation quickly turned into a civil war between the "loyalists" (or government forces), which included most of the armed forces and those supporting the government, and the "constitutionalists," a small portion of the armed forces with a large number of armed civilians. The situation deteriorated and on 28 April 1965 the United States intervened and effectively controlled the outcome. These events lent credence to the assumption that direct intervention was an overriding factor in the success or failure of a movement (discussed in Chapter III).

The Organization of American States created an Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) and by September a provisional president was installed. The situation was defused to the point that by June 1966, elections were held in which Juan Bosch was easily defeated by Joaquín Balaguer, the one time "trujillista." He obtained 56.5% of the vote to Bosch's 36.8%. Balaguer was reelected in 1970 and 1974, but eventually lost to a candidate of the PRD in 1978. The elections of 1978 were a turning point as the presidency was passed constitutionally from one civilian to another for the first time since Trujillo's death. This process continued with another PRD candidate.
being elected in 1982, and in 1986, Balaguer once again became president.

Only marginal revolutionary activity has occurred in the Dominican Republic since 1966. Several infiltrations, similar to Castro's in Cuba in 1956, occurred in 1973 and 1975, but they did not receive peasant support, nor did they generate widespread mobilization.98 This was not due to political harmony among the oppositional groups, but rather it was still recognized, and hoped by some, that peaceful solutions were still possible, and no revolutionary group was able to survive long enough to mobilize support. Wiarda warned in the mid-1970s that he was doubtful whether all these ... revolutionary tendencies can much longer be held in check ... a revolution of very bloody proportions ... is gathering storm in Santo Domingo and could explode at any time in a way that is liable to make the 1965 upheaval look like a 4th of July celebration.99 Were it not for the peaceful handoff of the presidency in 1978, his doubts may very well have materialized.

While Balaguer ruled within a constitutional framework, the political process from 1966 to 1978 cannot be considered "open." As defined in Chapter IV, it was continuously controlled by the president and the elections of 1970 and 1974 were marred by suspected fraud.100 However, Balaguer was a master politician and was able to co-opt many of his potential adversaries. Oppositional groups, such as the PRD, labor movement, and student groups, remained weakly organized and fragmented. Those who remained in strong opposition suffered from repressive tactics in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The early 1970s appear to be the most severe, with political violence reaching a peak
in 1971-72.\textsuperscript{101} However, data indicate it tapered off, and by 1977-78 the Dominican Republic received high marks from international human rights organizations.\textsuperscript{102} Since 1966, with the exception of a state of emergency declared after the 1973 landing of armed insurgents, freedom of the press has generally been recognized.

In Honduras a series of authoritarian regimes ruled throughout the 1960s and 1970s, a large organized labor movement existed, but repression was not unknown. Yet, it was not until the late 1970s that revolutionary groups made their presence known.

From 1963 to 1980, measuring political stability through the number of unconstitutional changes of government, Honduras is the most unstable of all these regional cases (Honduras had 4 coups from 1963 to 1978), transferring power through elections only in 1965 and 1971. However, the elections in 1965 were characterized as "obviously fraudulent" and even though in 1971 the military turned over the presidency, they did not relinquish control.\textsuperscript{103} Of course, next door in Guatemala, elections were used to perpetuate military rule and revolutionary activity flourished. Like Guatemala, the military remained at the helm of government for most of these two decades. From October 1963 to March 1975, General Oswaldo López Arellano was in control, even with the brief period in 1971-1972 of civilian rule. He had become chief of state after a 1963 \textit{coup d'état} and was elected president in 1965. After the 1971 election of a civilian, Ramon Ernesto Cruz, General López Arellano remained as the chief of the armed forces and on 3 December 1972 launched a \textit{coup}, which reestablished his control. After 1975, he was followed by two military rulers with the latter, General Policarpo Paz García,
relinquishing control to civilians in 1982. The return to civilian rule in 1982 has been associated with the discontent of the people in the mid-1970s, the revolutionary success in Nicaragua, and pressure from the United States for the military to turn over power to civilians. Even though the political process was "closed" for most of the period from the early 1960s to 1982, it allowed for a means of peaceful opposition and did not resort to widespread repression, even though atrocities, such as the 1975 round-up and murder of peasant leaders and two priests in Olancho, have occurred.

Anderson identifies the existence and relative freedom of the National University, the press, and unions as important assets in the nature of the Honduran authoritarian regimes. As discussed earlier, unionization began in the 1950s. Mobilization efforts increased in the 1970s with the organizing of the General Central of Workers (CGT). These organizations have been an effective means of contesting government action. Demands for land reform met with success, even if limited, as indicated by data from the mid-1970s. Recent revolutionary activity has developed partly due to growing movements within its Central American neighbors.

With the establishment of an "open," democratic system in the late 1940s, Costa Rica provides a sharp contrast to the other cases. Even before 1948 Costa Rica's political system had experienced less authoritarian regimes than its neighbors. After nearly three decades of peaceful, constitutional changes in government, Costa Rica has become the shining example of democracy within Latin America. Mobilization efforts increased in the 1970s, but union membership remained low. Response to strikes and violence during the 1970s was
moderate by most standards. Labor disputes were certainly not uncommon, but deaths in such instances were rare. The lack of armed forces decreased the regimes' coercive capability and the police have reacted with restraint. Like Honduras, the rise of regional revolutionary activity has increased the incidence of violence and the organization of such groups in Costa Rica.

This rather broad overview of these regional cases illustrates several distinguishing characteristics that have provided the precipitants to the rise of revolutionary movements in Cuba, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic crisis of 1965. The absence of such events allowed the Dominican Republic (after 1966), Honduras, and Costa Rica to continue into the 1980s with little or no revolutionary activity.

**Summary: Precipitants to Revolution**

The Dominican Republic crisis of 1965 stemmed from the political breakdown in 1963 that provided the necessary motivation for forces to challenge the regime. In the cases of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Guatemala political events led to the formation of an organization(s) that turned to armed insurrection in order to overthrow the regime. In all these cases the authoritarian nature of the regime, through its reaction to this opposition, led to further mobilization and growth of the movement.

Similar crises have been avoided in the Dominican Republic (after 1966) and Costa Rica, where revolutionary activity remains at low levels. However, in Honduras, where such crises have occurred,
the reaction of the regime has enabled oppositional groups some measure of articulation and until the late-1970s, no revolutionary organizations appeared on the scene.

The political precipitant in Cuba was Batista's coup followed by his reaction to growing opposition. In Nicaragua it was the reaction of the Somoza government to increased opposition and a failed coup in Guatemala in 1960. Each revolutionary group was provided with the recent example of revolutionary success in Cuba. Once in existence, all these movements were able to exploit preconditional factors and develop a revolutionary movement. The reemergence of revolutionary activity in Guatemala appears to be linked to the increasing socioeconomic crisis of the mid-1970s and the revolutionary leaders' ability to take advantage of these circumstances. Based upon this regional analysis, it appears the distinguishing characteristic between those cases of revolutionary activity and marginal activity lies more in political than socioeconomic events. However, social and economic problems were endemic to all these cases and the causal link between those problems and political conditions is difficult to ascertain. Therefore, even within this regional context, it remains inconclusive whether socioeconomic or political problems are the actual cause of the revolutionary crisis. It seems all are at the roots of the problem, but certain governments, through their actions, have been able to forestall such a crisis. Therefore, for purposes of this thesis, an understanding of these structural, socioeconomic, and political conditions will be pursued in the case of El Salvador. One aspect quite often overlooked in the theory is the need to examine the socioeconomic situation at the sub-national level in order to uncover
any discrepancy that may be hidden by national level statistics. Cuba offers an excellent example, where province conditions versus national help explain potential reasons for the support of the movement.

Few of these preconditional or precipitant conditions provide distinct features among those that succeeded versus those that failed. Beyond Cuba and Nicaragua, both having personalistic type dictators, few distinguishing characteristics are evident. The next section analyzes these revolutions (Cuba, Nicaragua, and Guatemala) using the model of revolutionary outcome proposed in Chapter II, with respect to the revolutionary movement, regime, and international support.

**Revolutionary Outcome**

**Revolutionary Movement**

The contention here is that unity among the revolutionary organizations and the development of a broad coalition between these groups and non-revolutionary organizations is one distinguishing feature between revolutionary success and failure. More than that, the ideology of the guerrilla organizations affects the development of such a relationship. When both are present, a "strong" revolutionary movement develops that has greater prospects for success.

**Cuba.** In 1953 Fidel Castro failed in his attempt to take over an army barracks and was subsequently jailed. He was released in 1955 and went into exile in Mexico only to return on 2 December 1956 with 31 armed insurgents to carry on the struggle.¹¹⁰ This daring feat and subsequent operations led to Batista's flight and Castro's seizure of power on 1 January 1959.
In Cuba, the organizational structure of the revolutionary movement was never clearly defined, nor totally unified. However, data indicate that all the revolutionary groups, those engaged in armed struggle against Batista, operated within the unified goal of ousting Batista. The two most significant organizations were the 26th of July Movement (M-26-7), including an urban underground network and rebel forces in the Sierra, and the Revolutionary Directorate (DR), a group of insurgent youth on and off the university campus who also established a front in the Sierra of Escambray. By 31 December 1958, most of the groups operated under the control of Fidel Castro, the leader of the Rebel Army.111

Perhaps the most well known revolutionary group in the Cuban Revolution is the 26th of July Movement (M-26-7). Its name was drawn from the 1953 date of Castro's ill-fated attack on the Moncada barracks. During his exile, mostly in Mexico, the organization developed urban underground cells under the leadership of Frank Pais. Without a doubt, this network of support was a major factor in Castro's survival in the Sierra in 1957. Not only did they provide material support, but in March 1957 they also furnished the rebel forces with approximately 50 recruits, some experienced fighters. The M-26-7 was formally announced on 19 March 1956 when Castro publicly resigned from the Ortodoxos.112

While Bonachea makes reference to an attempt at unification of these various organizations in October 1957, few others do.113 By May 1958 the M-26-7 brought the urban underground movement under the control of a National Directorate. This Directorate was under the command of the rebel forces, now called the Rebel Army, and was led by
Fidel Castro. 114 A formal pact was signed in Caracas on 20 July 1958 forming an opposition front against Batista. The pact included nearly all the revolutionary and non-revolutionary organizations, with the exception of the communists and several "electoral" political parties. They formed a "Junta of Unity," which included representatives of the M-26-7, DR, ex-President Carlos Prio Socarrás, student group leaders, trade union leaders, and professional associations. It was more a declaration of common purpose, the defeat of Batista through armed insurrection, than a formal chain of command. It named Castro as the Commander-in-Chief of the revolutionary forces, but in reality did not eliminate rivalry among various organizations. 115 It did add some measure of respectability to the movement and called for all forces of the country to subscribe to its declarations as well as enter into discussions with them. Shortly thereafter, the People's Socialist Party (PSP) sent Carlos Rafael Rodríguez to the Sierra. He was received warmly by some, but with suspicion by others, including Castro. 116 Rodríguez reported back to the PSP, then returned to the Sierra where he stayed until the end. Documentation clearly indicates the small role the communist party played in the revolution and was most likely trying to maneuver itself into a more favorable position without totally committing to the revolutionary movement. 117

Suárez traces the evolution of Castro's political behavior from his days as a law student at the university until his declaration on 2 December 1961 that he was Marxist-Leninist. 118 He summarizes the ideological foundation of the movement by saying, "it is apparent that a typically 'Fidelista' confusion dominated the movement in the
ideological field. As a minimum, Castro was recognized by most as being nationalistic and anti-Batista. This was enough for most to join him, particularly by late 1958. After the failed April 1958 strike, Castro sought to de-emphasize any link with socialism by stating

never has the 26 July talked of socialism or of nationalizing industries . . . we have proclaimed from the first that we fought for the full enforcement of the Constitution of 1940.

In 1965, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez stated that during 1958, Castro could not disclose the true intentions of the revolution because it would have driven upper class support they were receiving back to the Batista camp. Castro certainly received middle and upper class support, as well as the peasant support which made up most of his Rebel Army.

The majority of the non-revolutionary groups that joined Castro's movement added their support in 1958. These included professional associations (Havana Bar and National Medical Association), sugarmill owners and farmers in the Oriente, plantations of the West Indies Sugar Corporation, cattlemen, bankers, and industrialists. The support they provided included funds, payment of taxes, and loan of equipment. At the end of 1958, the associations of sugarmill owners and growers confronted Batista with demands for his resignation.

As the data in Table 5-5 indicate, GDP increased from 1953 to 1957, but decreased in 1958. Using an index of 1950 = 100, GDP went from 88 in 1953 to a high of 98 in 1957, before falling to 90 in 1958. Continued frustration and discontent with Batista's regime was certainly a factor, as will be discussed, in driving this support to Castro. However, Castro's assurances, or absence of indication
otherwise, that his rise to power would not destroy the structure of the society which they defended, cannot be ruled out as a factor in establishing these relationships.

While middle class support, via the underground movement, was provided from the beginning, the majority of the upper class support did not come until the last six months of the struggle. The significance of this support is difficult to determine, but it came at a critical time for the revolutionary movement. In March 1958, when Castro declared "total war," the force level of the revolutionary movement was at its peak having increased remarkably since the landing on 2 December 1956. The Rebel Army was estimated to be approximately 300 to 600 (March-May 1958) and they controlled roughly 2,000 square miles of territory in the province of the Oriente (4.5% of national territory). On 9 April 1958, Castro's call for a strike was a total failure and in May, Batista made an all out drive to move the fight to Castro in the Oriente. Batista's effort was a miserable failure and for the next six months Castro's ranks swelled. Given these factors, the proposition that unity and a broad coalition are critical to the "strength" of a revolutionary movement must be considered.

In analyzing the "strength" of the revolutionary movement on 31 December 1958, a review of its size, unity, and coalition needs to be completed. While numerous sources provide varying data on the Cuban Rebel Army, Neill Macaulay's analysis, based upon previous estimates by seven different sources including Fidel Castro, is the best comparative study available. He summarizes saying that by 20 December 1958 Castro's forces operating in rural areas totaled
approximately 7,250. This is based upon sub-totals of 20 columns operating in four of Cuba's six provinces. Estimates of Castro's forces in mid-1958 only ranged from 300 to 600. Unity was derived from Castro's leadership of the Rebel Army as well as coalitions with various organizations, as previously mentioned.\textsuperscript{126}

Nicaragua. The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) was initially formed in 1961 by Carlos Fonseca Amador, Silvio Mayorga, and Tomás Borge. They all had been university students who became involved in student mobilization efforts in the 1950s. Shaped by the frustrations encountered in these efforts, an increased exposure to radical thought (Marxism), discontent with the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN), and the recent success of the Cuban Revolution, the path of armed struggle was pursued.\textsuperscript{127} From 1961 to 1963, with approximately 20 guerrillas, they confined themselves to operating in the isolated northern areas, not fully developing a rural following or an urban support organization. Influenced by Che Guevara's "foco" theory, the establishment of a guerrilla operations zone, the first FSLN "foco" was attempted on the Río Coco in 1963, but without the benefit of an effective support apparatus. This effort was short-lived as their attacks on a few National Guard posts were ineffective and by October they retreated into Honduras. One member of the front, Rigoberto Cruz (also known as Pablo Ubeda), worked at mobilizing peasant support in the eastern mountains of Matagalpa throughout the mid-1960s. Meanwhile an alliance was established with the PSN in which the FSLN worked in poor urban areas of Managua and Leon pressuring the government for improved social services. Not completely satisfied with these efforts, they turned to organizing the
unions. In November 1966, frustrated with these rather dull, non-productive undertakings, the Sandinistas broke with the PSN and returned to revolutionary tactics.128

The FSLN turned to urban warfare, bank holdups, and another attempt to reestablish itself in the countryside by forming an organization in the northern area around Pancasan. The population in the area was apathetic, and when the National Guard went on the offensive they effectively routed the Sandinistas. After these failures and the death of Che Guevara in 1967, the FSLN modified their strategy. Urban organizational activities increased in order to support guerrilla warfare in the countryside. Destruction of an urban support base in 1969 and the capture of Fonseca Amador in Costa Rica in 1970 were further setbacks. However, even though membership was still estimated to be less than 100, the FSLN had managed to establish a following within the countryside as well as urban support cells.129 As political turmoil and opposition increased, 13 FSLN commandos raided a 1974 Christmas party in honor of U.S. Ambassador Shelton and took 30 hostages. The result was $5 million in ransom, wide sympathetic support and encouragement of FSLN leaders, a three-year period (1974-1977) of repressive backlash, and a split within the FSLN occurring in 1975-1976.130

The FSLN split into three factions (GPP--prolonged popular war, TP--proletarian tendency, and Terceristas or third force) was primarily over revolutionary strategy.131 The GPP called for continued guerrilla warfare in the countryside. The TP, while agreeing with the GPP on the strategy of a prolonged war, called for a concentration on urban organizational activities and believed in the
revolutionary potential of the proletariat class. The Terceristas (largest of the three) favored immediate initiation of widespread urban insurrections. The GPP and TP opposed the Terceristas strategy. The ideologies of these organizations varied as the TP and GPP were primarily marxist, while the Terceristas developed a more moderate stance. While this issue has received considerable attention since the Sandinista victory, it certainly seems valid to conclude that at the very least the ideology of the FSLN at the time, like Castro to a certain degree, was ambiguous. What seems important is the perceptions of the non-revolutionary groups toward the FSLN. Data indicate they either believed or wanted to believe the FSLN would follow a moderate course. David Nolan traces the marxist tendencies of Carlos Fonseca and Tomás Borge. However, by assuming the name of Sandino, who was a nationalist and had cast off communism, the FSLN enhanced its nationalistic image. Kinzer, reporting in February 1979, wrote that while Somoza called the FSLN "Sandino-Communists," they called themselves "nationalists and anti-Somozists." He says their ideology is "hazy, perhaps intentionally."

While the three organizations continued to operate independently, they did meet periodically to develop common strategy. Still by August 1978, the GPP and TP maintained their strategy of building a mass support base. However, the Terceristas, led by Daniel and Humberto Ortega Saavedra and Edén Pastora, decided it was time to strike. Pastora led what was perhaps the most dramatic incident of the revolution by attacking the National Palace, and taking hundreds of hostages including 62 members of the Chamber of Deputies. It resulted in some ransom money and the release of 60 prisoners
(including Tomás Borge); however, the real benefit was the outflow of support for the FSLN. The image of Pastora, leader of the "Army of the South" and a nationalist with democratic ideas, was boosted as well.\textsuperscript{135} The military action of the Terceristas proved to be a catalyzing effect as events began to escalate. However, unity among the groups was still not accomplished.

In December 1978, the FSLN issued a joint communique announcing a provisional unification. However, final unification did not occur until 7 March 1979 when a nine man Joint National Directorate was formed.\textsuperscript{136} By June, the FSLN "controlled" the northern third of the country and by 5 July, 80\% of the national territory was held by the FSLN. Troop strength had increased from approximately 700 in the summer of 1978, to several thousand in late 1978, and finally by 18 July 1979, reached approximately 5,000.\textsuperscript{137} Another critical aspect of the Sandinista victory was the ongoing coalition efforts since mid-1978 between the FSLN and various non-revolutionary organizations.

The mobilization efforts of oppositional non-revolutionary organizations escalated following the 1972 earthquake. These included the Democratic Liberation Union--UDEL (made up of both middle class and bourgeois groups), the Group of Twelve--"los Doce" (included lawyers, businessmen, a priest, and several academics), and several political parties (Nicaraguan Democratic Movement, Social Christian party, and several Conservative groups).\textsuperscript{138} In August 1978 these organizations joined and created the Broad Opposition Front (FAO). By September 1978, FAO pursued negotiations as the United States mediated efforts between them and Somoza, but as it became apparent Somoza would not resign before his term expired in 1981, the "Group of
Twelve" withdrew from FAO in October. The remaining groups of FAO broke off negotiation in January 1979. The FSLN was able to take advantage of this and formed the National Patriotic Front on 1 February 1979. This created a broad coalition including the United People's Movement--MPU (formed in late 1978 and early 1979, which included 22 unions and civic and political organizations), the "Group of Twelve," and various other anti-Somoza groups. This broad coalition was made possible by the Terceristas de-emphasizing marxist-leninist rhetoric and recognizing the strategic advantage of bringing as many forces as possible to bear on Somoza.

Guatemala. The revolutionary movement of Guatemala in the 1960s, unlike the cases of Cuba and Nicaragua, pronounced radical programs, suffered from internal struggles, and never was able to develop a coalition with non-revolutionary groups. This is not to say that various groups did not unify or that they did not have support from non-revolutionary organizations; however, unification efforts were a constant battle and resulted in several splits and reorganizations. Coalitions with any significant upper class groups were never achieved.

As mentioned previously, Turcios Lima and Yon Sosa formed the Alejandro de Leon-13 November Revolutionary Movement (MR-13) and initiated action on 6 February 1962 by attacking two army posts and a United Fruit Company Office. Following the attack, President Ydígoras said the guerrilla strength was about 100 and their tactics were "very smart." Indeed, both these ex-Army officers had received counter-insurgency training from the United States, one at the School of Americas and the other at the U.S. Ranger course.
However, this should not be overrated. In the coming years they would demonstrate varying degrees of organizational, strategic, and tactical skills. Turcios Lima was more conscious of the need to develop a unified front and made considerable efforts in that area. His untimely death in an automobile accident in 1966 was a definite blow to the movement. 142

By December 1962 three groups (MR-13, the "20 October" forces of the Guatemalan communists--PGR, and the "12 April" student group) joined to form the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR). 143 The next few years were filled with in-fighting as Yon Sosa moved the MR-13 farther away from the FAR and began to develop links to the Trotskyite Revolutionary Workers Party of Mexico. 144 During the 1963-1964 period, the MR-13 went from a nationalist and anti-imperialist orientation to an acceptance of socialism as the goal of the struggle. In 1965 Gilly reported

the Guatemalan "guerrilleros" of MR13 fight today for the Socialist revolution and for a government of workers and peasants ... a guerrilla movement has sprung up in Guatemala that openly declares its Socialist objectives. 145

Meanwhile Turcios tried to reconcile differences within the FAR by calling for a new program and reorganization. 146 However, in December 1964 Yon Sosa separated from the FAR and Turcios tried to reorganize the FAR. By mid-1965, the reorganization was complete as the PGT recognized the FAR, and Turcios, as the organization in charge of carrying out armed struggle. It was Turcios Lima who represented the Guatemalan revolutionary movement at the Tricontinental Conference in Havana. 147 Following Turcios' death in 1966, César Montes, still active today, took over the leadership of the FAR.
There are few indications that any real attempts were made to forge an alliance with any upper class non-revolutionary groups. Given the tactics of 1965-1966, it made such a possibility particularly remote. During this time the guerrilla organizations initiated a kidnapping campaign against wealthy individuals and assassination of those they considered a threat. They had clearly established their ideological preference toward socialism, disagreeing only on revolutionary strategy. The number of guerrillas throughout this period was limited to a few dozen in the early 1960s but rose to a high of 300 to 500 in 1965-1966. The revolutionary movement never was able to establish "controlled" areas, but did receive support from portions of the countryside, and operated primarily out of the northeast provinces of Izabal and Zacapa.

The FAR and PGT did not oppose the presidential elections in March 1966, and ended by supporting Julio César Méndez Montenegro, the first civilian elected president since 1945. As it turned out, he would oversee the defeat of the revolutionary movement. Later, in 1967-1968, Montes joined with Yon Sosa in merging the FAR and MR-13, thereby splitting the FAR and PGT. However, by 1969, the FAR and MR-13 were again split. Thus, the relationship between the guerrilla movements and the communist party was one of fluctuations with short periods of cohesiveness. By 1970, the movement had basically dissolved, as intense internal battles were ongoing and Mexican soldiers killed Yon Sosa while he was in exile. The reemergence of a movement in the 1970s recognized these weaknesses. In 1982 the three leading revolutionary organizations and sectors of the communist
party formed a united front (Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity—URNG) and appeared to be seeking a broad coalition, similar to the one formed by revolutionaries in El Salvador in late 1980. The Guatemalan revolutionary movement of the 1980s is much "stronger" than that of the 1960s. It has formed a united front and developed alliances with non-revolutionary oppositional political parties. Much of the activity is in the western portion of the country, and it is believed a majority of the revolutionaries are Indians. The force levels, while reported to be insignificant in the late 1970s, were estimated to be above 5,000 by 1982. However, like the 1960s, the guerrillas in Guatemala remain at odds with each other and under intense pressure from government forces.

Summary. Based upon the analyses of these three cases of revolution, clearly the proposition that a "strong" revolutionary movement, including unity and a coalition, is necessary to overthrow the regime, is valid. The number of revolutionaries versus government forces does not explain the outcome of the revolutionary process. The often used formula in counter-insurgency warfare advocating that the tactical advantage lies with the armed forces if a ratio of ten-to-one (ten soldiers for every guerrilla) is maintained, does not explain the failure of the armed forces to defeat the revolutionaries. While both the Nicaraguan and Cuban armed forces lost the tactical advantage in the last six months, based on this criterion, it does not explain the failure of the Cuban drive in mid-1958, when 12,000 troops were sent against Castro's 300 to 600. The ability of the movement to increase their force levels, and theoretically achieve the tactical advantage,
is enhanced by unity of the guerrilla organizations and coalition building.

In both cases of success the movements achieved victory only after some form of unification and a coalition with non-revolutionary groups had been reached. The Guatemala revolutionaries suffered from fractionalization, rivalry, and polemics. The role of the communist party was minimum in both cases of success. This lack of communist support and nationalistic ideology appears to have enhanced the development of a coalition between non-revolutionary and revolutionary groups. Considering recent developments in Guatemala, unity among the revolutionary groups does not appear to be the missing link, since it has not resulted in success. However, a distinction should be made between the unity that existed in Cuba and Nicaragua versus Guatemala. In Cuba, Castro's leadership prevented in-fighting and his hegemonic position was accepted virtually by all. In Nicaragua, the coming together of the three revolutionary organizations was a reunification of a group that had split, rather than a unification of separate groups with different origins.

**Regime**

While many aspects of the regimes ruling Cuba, Nicaragua, and Guatemala during the periods of revolutionary activity were discussed earlier, the focus here is on those activities which appeared to affect the willingness of non-revolutionary groups to align themselves with the revolutionary movement. The aspect of armed forces' loyalty and capability is discussed as well.
Cuba. Previously, the role of the peasantry was reviewed as well as their willingness to support the revolutionaries. However, yet to be shown is why the middle and upper class groups were willing, in 1958, to move toward a coalition with Castro's forces. It is my contention that they did this, in part, due to the actions of the regime. These actions were not economic programs that undermined the interests of these groups, but continued political deterioration, including repressive tactics, and finally a decreasing economic situation in the latter part of 1958.

As discussed earlier, the political atmosphere in Cuba, prior to Castro's landing in December 1956, was one of increasing control by Batista, weak legitimacy, friction within the military, and inconsistent repressive tactics. Oppositional groups tried to apply pressure on Batista to call for elections or resign. One such effort was that of Cosme de la Torriente, an old-time (83 at the time) politician. In 1955, he tried to negotiate with Batista to hold elections in 1956. These efforts failed and all the non-revolutionary oppositional groups, less the communist party, met in November 1955 to attempt to apply pressure on Batista, but he saw no reason to hold elections until 1958. This inaction brought increasing discontent and protests, which were met with repressive tactics. One result was the death of the president of the Orthodox youth group.\textsuperscript{153} Batista finally agreed to meet with De la Torriente. By January 1956, it had been agreed that negotiating committees would meet to begin negotiation efforts. However, by March the efforts of the "Diálogo Cívico" had broken down.\textsuperscript{154} The opposition called for Batista's
resignation as all efforts to negotiate any type of compromise failed. There was no reason for Batista to seriously consider such a move.

Several events in 1957 increased strains on Batista's regime and this base of support. In March, a group of revolutionaries attacked the Presidential Palace with the intent of killing Batista. It was a daring, but foolhardy effort that Castro had not pushed. The result was the loss of over 40 revolutionaries and an upsurge in repression. The police quickly combed the city for anyone who may have supported or participated in the event. The morning after the event, Dr. Pelayo Cuervo, an Ortodoxo ex-Senator and nominal president of the Ortodoxo party, was found murdered. Supposedly, he was to become provisional president had the plot succeeded. This sent a signal to all oppositional leaders that no one associated with such activities was safe. Another event in September resulted in widespread claims of torture and allegations of people being buried alive. This was the failed revolt of the Navy, with assistance from the M-26-7 and others, in Cienfuegos. It was the largest action in the revolution up to that time. Although the rebels could only hold the Navy base and town for a short period, it resulted in several actions that eventually precipitated the call for an end to United States military assistance. In order to defeat the rebels, Tank and Armored Regiments were employed. Since this equipment had been furnished in accordance with United States-Cuba arms agreements which forbid its use in such circumstances, this was a breech of those agreements. The cry went out from various quarters for the United States to stop sending military assistance.
Negotiation efforts picked up again in early 1958 as the Roman Catholic bishops of Cuba and professional associations sought a truce between Batista and Castro. Efforts by the church were initiated following the death in February of four young Catholics, supposedly on their way to join the rebels, at the hand of the police. The Bishops called for the formation of a government of national unity. This time Batista would only agree to invite the Organization of American States (OAS) and United Nations to observe elections, tentatively scheduled for the summer of 1958. Castro rejected any plans formulated as being too pro-Batista. These failed efforts continued to frustrate those groups searching for an end of the Batista regime without supporting the path chosen by the revolutionaries.

In March 1958, what some have called the decisive blow to the Batista regime, a U.S. arms embargo was, in effect, formally initiated. As will be demonstrated later, the effect was more psychological and politically damaging than militarily. It encouraged several oppositional groups to take further steps against the regime. Raul de Velasco, president of the Cuban Medical Association and chairman of the Civil Co-ordinating Committee immediately called for Batista to resign and the formation of a new government. Other groups, such as the trade unions, came to the U.S. Ambassador seeking to clarify the United States' position, as their support for Batista could be at stake. Due to the disruptive situation, the elections were postponed to November. Still, these interests groups had not completely abandoned the regime. Up to this point, the economy had
continued to perform well and Batista's economic programs, for the most part, had been to their advantage.

In the area of economic programs, Batista had reversed several trends developed by earlier administrations that supported the workers at the expense of the business sector. From 1938 to 1949, Supreme Court decisions in cases of worker or employee dismissals won by the worker versus management was 63 to 43, respectively. From 1950 to 1958, this trend shifted as management won 793 while workers won 266. Batista also virtually stopped "interventions" in private enterprise which made management settle disputes in terms favorable to the workers. While this created discontent among some workers, an erosion of real wages did not occur until the latter part of 1958, thus easing tensions with workers. This continued support of Batista is evidenced by the failure of the April 1958 strike. However, as the economic situation worsened (real wages declined), there were fewer and fewer reasons to support a regime that was incapable of dealing with the crisis. The height of this failure came in the summer of 1958 when Batista made an all-out military effort to destroy Castro's forces. This failure was due to ineffective leadership resulting in an armed forces ill prepared to fight a guerrilla war.

The problem of leadership in the armed forces began following Batista's rise to power in 1952. Batista's coup d'état naturally resulted in a shifting of positions. The end result was the accelerated promotion of some at the expense of others. Many of these officers, who were so fortunate, were Lieutenants and Captains. Being immediately promoted to Colonel, or General, left a considerable gap in the professional education of the officer. Additionally, General
Tabernilla, Chief of Staff, brought back on active duty many officers dismissed during the Grau administration (1944-1948), and placed them in key positions, thus insuring the loyalty of those around him. These maneuvers not only created conflict within the armed forces, but a professional leadership vacuum at top levels of the armed forces.

In 1953 and 1955, the armed forces underwent a reorganization that increased their size considerably. Table 5-10 shows the growth of the Cuban armed forces and its equipment as of 1958. In 1958, according to Statesman's Year-book data, it was the sixth largest armed forces in Latin America. However, the increase of strength levels did not necessarily translate to a more effective fighting unit. While this increase in force levels may be beneficial in maintaining a hold on key installations, it did little toward combatting the revolutionaries. The most potentially damaging weapon available, the Air Corps, was rarely effectively employed.

This is not to say the Cuban armed forces were totally inept; with a little luck, they nearly destroyed Castro's forces following the landing on 2 December. Of the 82 who initially landed, within a week 70 of them had been captured or killed by Batista's troops, with only 12 reaching the Sierra Maestra. From 5 to 7 December, the Army effectively employed air strikes, artillery, and infantry units in operations against the insurgents. However, Batista, declaring that the revolt had been put down, did not allow the Army to pursue those remaining free. Additionally, no concerted effort was made in the first six months after the landing to engage the guerrilla forces. This was a time when they certainly were vulnerable. This lack of initiative enabled Castro to recover and strengthen his forces, as
TABLE 5-10
CUBA: ARMED FORCES STRENGTH/SELECTED EQUIPMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Armed Forces 1,000s Per 1,000(+)</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Corps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952(a)</td>
<td>20.2 3.5</td>
<td>7 Police Regts.</td>
<td>7 Frigates Vessels</td>
<td>20 B-26 Bombers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955(b)</td>
<td>25.0 4.0</td>
<td>1 Inf. Regt.</td>
<td>2 Escort Vessels</td>
<td>17 F-47 Fighters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958(c)</td>
<td>40.0 5.9</td>
<td>1 Arty. Regt.</td>
<td>1 Patrol Vessel</td>
<td>7 T-33 Trainer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 Motor Launches</td>
<td>1 Survey Ship</td>
<td>33 Trans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30 Coast Guard</td>
<td>Vessels</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: (+) Indicates the number of armed forces per 1,000 people.

well as establish himself among the local populace—a key factor in his survival. Meanwhile the Army had been attempting to pacify the peasants in the Sierra and close off the area. In June 1957, a plan was drafted to relocate peasants and launch a major size force in the Sierra Maestra to drive out Castro. Within 48 hours of its implementation, Batista decided instead to seal the area off and attempt to starve them out.169 A futile effort in an area such as the
Oriente. This failure of the command structure allowed Castro to virtually choose the time and place for any military encounters. The result was demoralizing for Batista's forces.

The last major effort of the Army came in the summer of 1958, when over 12,000 troops and tanks, with aerial and naval support, moved into the Oriente province for an offensive operation against a guerrilla force of roughly 300 to 600. It included many fresh recruits with little training and, consequently, was soundly defeated. Most accounts indicate this failure was due to inept leadership at the command level, poor use of available assets (such as air support), inadequate intelligence, inferior tactics (using mass assaults instead of small patrols), and insufficient training. Additionally, Castro's practice of treating and releasing prisoners served to erode troop morale among the armed forces. This tactical failure by the armed forces must have boosted the morale and image of the revolutionaries as well as placing serious doubts in the minds of Batista supporters with regard to his competency of securing the nation.

From the beginning, there was conflict and discontent in the top ranks of the military. However, by and large, Batista's forces remained loyal until the failure of the final offensive. From that point forward, there are several accounts of desertions, failure to obey orders, and a general lack of discipline. Following Castro's landing there was one major revolt in the military, as previously mentioned, at the Navy base of Cienfuegos in September 1957. Russell concluded that by 1958, between 10-25% of the Cuban armed forces fought on the side of the rebels. However, this estimate placed Cuba with a very low disloyalty score when compared to 13 other
rebelling. The end was evident in mid-December 1958 when General Tabernilla reportedly told Batista, "the soldiers are tired and the officers do not want to fight, nothing more can be done." It is not clear what the causal factors were that stimulated the middle and upper class groups to join Castro. It seems valid to conclude that to a certain degree it was a combination of all the above events. However, at the roots seem to be Batista's unwillingness to legitimize his regime. The decaying economic conditions added discontent to an already volatile situation. While portions of the armed forces used repressive tactics against vulnerable targets, Batista did not allow the military to take decisive action against guerrilla units at key moments and they were incapable of doing so at other times. Thus, he could no longer protect many of the interests of these groups. Castro became the most viable choice.

Nicaragua. As discussed earlier, any hopes of a political opening vanished after the 1974 elections. Anastasio ("Tachito") Somoza Debayle, now the "authoritarian-personalistic" leader of Nicaragua, kept the doors of political participation "closed." However, the deterioration of the regime began two years earlier, after the devastating earthquake on 23 December 1972. With the crisis situation, Somoza reasserted his authority by pushing aside the three-man Junta government and ruling by decree. The subsequent two years uncovered the immense corruptive and repressive nature of Somoza and the National Guard as they took advantage of the plight of the country by enriching themselves. Somoza's display of exceptional greed marked a change from the previous family pattern of allowing others
within the upper class to share in the wealth. Somoza ventured into areas of the economy that had previously been left to others. A banker was quoted as saying,

after the earthquake, Somoza got too greedy . . . he took over the cement business, he took over all construction, and he funneled all the foreign reconstruction aid to his own companies. He violated the rules of the game that his father and brother had always followed.175

This period marks an obvious turning point in the Somoza dynasty.

From 1974 to 1977 a state of siege existed that was characterized by limiting basic freedoms (civil, political) and increasing repressive measures. Repression mounted against both those in the countryside, where the FSLN operated, as well as non-revolutionary oppositional groups.176 Mobilization of oppositional forces from various sectors of the society sprang up. During this period, the regime's base of support evaporated, and previous supporters such as the Catholic church increasingly turned away from the regime. However, it was not until 1977 to 1979 that the majority of middle and upper class groups completely abandoned the Somoza regime.

In 1977, the state of siege was lifted and the voices of opposition rang out. La Prensa, edited by Joaquín Chamorro, published reports of corruption and abuses of human rights. In October 1977, "The Group of Twelve" asked Somoza to resign and endorsed the FSLN. Then finally, on 10 January 1978, Chamorro was assassinated. This has often been referred to as the catalyzing event for the desertion of the regime's upper class support. It triggered protest marches, a two-week general strike, and increased polarization.177 However, many of the non-revolutionary opposition groups such as the UDEL still did not endorse the FSLN as a viable alternative. They were holding out
for some type of compromise. In late August 1978, the UDEL called a strike to demonstrate their opposition of Somoza and demanded a new government; however, unlike the "Group of Twelve," they still were concerned about the Sandinista's position toward capitalism. A highly successful attack against the National Palace by the FSLN, led by Edén Pastora, on 22 August, like the Christmas party in 1974, led to another round of confidence and popularity among the populace for the revolutionaries. The strike, called by UDEL, started on 3 September, a day after the commandos were flown to asylum in Panama and Venezuela.

The United States' efforts to negotiate a settlement between Somoza and the FAQ (UDEL, "Group of Twelve," and other opposition groups) from September 1978 to January 1979 ended, as Somoza, like Batista, refused to resign. Thus, any hope for a peaceful solution to the crisis was abandoned.

Unlike Cuba, the economic situation went through ups and downs in the last years of the revolutionary struggle, but it had steadily dropped since 1977 (both real wages and gross domestic product). Percent change in per capita gross domestic product in 1977 was 2.8% and -10.2% in 1978. Real wages, using an index with 1973 = 100, went from 106 in 1976, to 97 in 1977, and to 88 in 1978. Economic programs since the industrialization "boom" of the 1960s had consistently benefited the upper class. As previously noted, even with economic growth, income distribution remained highly concentrated (see Table 5-6). No such projects as agrarian reform were ever pursued.
In supporting the regime the National Guard had performed quite well. They had continuously launched offensive operations against the guerrilla forces with great success. One of the reasons they were fairly effective against the FSLN, up through the mid-1970s, was that the guerrillas apparently never numbered more than 100 and lacked substantial support in the countryside. However, after 1977 the National Guard's record became less impressive.

Like the Cuban Armed Forces, the Nicaraguan National Guard nearly doubled its forces during the revolutionary period, 1963 to 1979 (see Table 5-11). Although data vary, apparently the majority of the increase came after September 1978, following the FSLN's bold attack on the National Palace. Its growth was primarily in infantry troops which were needed to combat the guerrilla threat. Also, in Nicaragua, during the last few months of the war, the National Guard, a force between 10,000 to 13,000, was facing a Sandinista force of approximately 5,000 to 7,000. This was in sharp contrast to what Batista faced in Cuba (40,000 troops to 7,250 guerrillas). Compared to other Central American countries in 1979, only Costa Rica's armed forces were smaller. However, Nicaragua spent more, as measured by military expenditures as percent of gross domestic product, through the 1970s than any other Central American nation.

The effectiveness of the armed forces did not necessarily mean it lacked internal friction or leadership problems. Somoza cultivated those around him and the leadership of the National Guard was not necessarily based upon professional ability, but rather, like Batista's Army, upon loyalty to Somoza. Corruption among senior officers bred discontent in the junior ranks. However, Somoza
TABLE 5-11
NICARAGUA: ARMED FORCES STRENGTH/SELECTED EQUIPMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Armed Forces(a) 1,000s Per 1,000</th>
<th>National Guard</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>12 Coastal</td>
<td>4 B-26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Companies</td>
<td>Patrol Bombers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>Motorized Detach.</td>
<td>4 T-28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>Motorized Engs.</td>
<td></td>
<td>4 T-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.0 (Reserve)</td>
<td>Anti-Aircraft</td>
<td>48 Other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Battery</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


realized the importance of maintaining the loyalty of all the armed forces and rewarded them with handsome pay raises. In 1972, he gave officers a 50% raise and enlisted 150% with miscellaneous benefits that enabled them to maintain a relatively high standard of living.185

No instances of internal revolts, mass desertions, or a breakdown in discipline occurred, at least until the very end. There are few reported instances of disloyalty until 1979. Even then little real data are furnished. Rather, statements such as "the National Guard suffered from deteriorating morale and discipline, high casualties, and desertions" are reported.187 On 7 July a call was made for
reserves to report for active duty, but few responded. Also in July, the Commander of Masaya retreated while under attack from the FSLN, even after receiving direct orders from Somoza to hold his ground. There were reports of the National Guard in the countryside preferring to remain in their quarters at night, thus allowing the FSLN free roam. However, by and large, it appears the National Guard remained loyal until the end. Even though the National Guard basically adopted a defensive posture in the last three months, they also were able to push the FSLN out of Managua in early July and put up stiff resistance in the town of Leon as well. Perhaps the Guardsmen felt their very survival was at stake; certainly the FSLN had made it no secret that they must be replaced. When Somoza left, the National Guard crumbled as many fled to Honduras and El Salvador.

The coalition established in Nicaragua to oppose Somoza was broader and more organized than that in Cuba. Like Cuba, a deterioration of political and economic conditions led to the increased erosion in the regime’s base of support and the refusal of the dictator to compromise led to a no-alternative solution.

Guatemala. While the regimes during the period of revolutionary struggle in Cuba and Nicaragua were of the "authoritarian-personalistic" type, Guatemala was based upon authoritarianism that changed its head of state through constitutional and non-constitutional means. From 1954 to 1985, with the exception of Julio César Méndez Montenegro (1966-1970), military officers occupied the office of president. A pact between Montenegro and the military enabled the latter to maintain a great deal of authority within the government. Coups of 1963 and 1982 illustrated that if these
presidents went beyond what the leaders of the military desired, they were deposed. Here, the examination was on the period 1962 to 1970 and during the revolutionary movement of the 1960s, to determine what actions the regime took, if any, that may have affected non-revolutionary groups. As already discussed, the Guatemalan revolutionaries were unable to establish any coalitions with middle or upper class groups, such as the business sector or members of the economic "elite."

There are several characteristics that distinguish Guatemala from the two other cases. First, during the period of 1961 to 1970 the national economy prospered, mean annual percent change of gross domestic product was 5.5%, and the consumer price index remained very low (0.8% annual change, although it increased in the latter part of the decade—see Tables 5-5 and 5-9). The other factor was the electoral process, which in 1966 resulted in the election of the first civilian president in over 20 years.

The rise of revolutionary activity in 1962 was shortly followed by a coup d'état in 1963, led by the minister of defense, General Enrique Peralta Azurdia. Peralta recognized the guerrillas only as "bandits" and beyond "reactive" measures to any guerrilla operations, he made no real efforts to eliminate them. The electoral process was essentially "closed" as Peralta, who was ruling by decree, banned political parties. In July 1964, he permitted new constitutional assembly elections, but required participating parties to have 50,000 members and government approval. However, to the surprise of many, the electoral process opened up somewhat with the 1966 elections, with two military and one civilian candidate. The Revolutionary Party
(PR) and Julio César Méndez Montenegro won. Méndez Montenegro's election did not mean the army was relinquishing control, since they still extracted certain conditions for their support. One was a free hand in dealing with the guerrillas.

Following the offer and refusal of amnesty to the revolutionaries, the army went into action. At the same time, a group of right-wing "death squads" started operations that began a period of violence that, while having its peaks and lows, still is evident today. As the repression increased, so did the level of violence by the guerrillas. There were estimates of 2,000 dead from political violence in the first three months of 1968. Torres-Rivas estimated that roughly 15,000 died from 1967 to 1970.191 These factors combined with the Army's counter-insurgency campaign, which included civic action as well as combat operations, and factionalism within the revolutionary movement, eventually led to the demise of the guerrillas by 1970.192

The Guatemalan revolutionary movement, in the 1960s, never advanced to the stage that the Cubans or Sandinistas achieved with established coalitions with middle and upper class groups. That stage is the point where mobilization of oppositional forces confront the regime from various sectors of society. The peaceful transition of power in 1966 may have been a factor, at least the changing of appearance, thus avoiding a dictator image of a Somoza or Batista.

In order to understand some factors at work in the development of the regime's support base, it is helpful to examine the relationship between the upper sector interest groups and the government in the
1960s. A study of the evolution of these groups from the 1920s to 1966 aids in this analysis. Data reveal that from 1944 to 1957 there was one upper-class interest group formed per year. From 1958 to 1962 it increased to four per year, and from 1963 to 1966 there were 10.3 groups formed per year. During the 1960s these groups included all major economic sectors (vegetable oils, agricultural associations, industry, sugarcane producers, small producers and operators, transport groups, national association of coffee, and others). This, taken in conjunction with previous data that showed the significant decrease of peasant organizations after 1954, indicate a radical reversal in government relationships with different sectors of the society. Adams likens the relationship between government and the upper sector groups in the 1960s to the relationship Arevalo and Arbenz had with the lower sector organizations. The era of Arbenz was not too far in the past and one can speculate the economic "elite" must have realized the revolutionary groups were not a viable alternative.

Even though two of the top leaders of the revolutionary movement were ex-military officers, the military remained extremely loyal to the regime and was very effective in its encounters with the guerrillas. Changes in troop levels of the Guatemalan military illustrate the shift in a build-up toward confronting revolutionary activity in the late 1960s (see Table 5-12). Increases in United States military assistance during this period (see Table 5-15), as well as domestic military expenditures, went primary toward the training and equipping the armed forces.
TABLE 5-12
GUATEMALA: ARMED FORCES STRENGTH/SELECTED EQUIPMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Armed Forces(a) 1,000s Per 1,000</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 Infantry</td>
<td>4 Coastal</td>
<td>B-26 Sqd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bns.</td>
<td>Patrol</td>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>Craft</td>
<td>F-51D Sqd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M-4</td>
<td>1 Gunboat</td>
<td>T-33 Jet</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Anti-</td>
<td>T-6 Trainer</td>
<td>(40 A/C)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>Company</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Yon Sosa indicated that he quickly abandoned the idea of recruiting military officers for his cause. He turned instead to the peasants for support when he realized their discontent. Beyond the initial group of officers who revolted, there is little indication that desertions to the guerrilla forces were of any significance. Unlike Cuba and Nicaragua, the officer corps was more professional in the sense that its loyalty was to fellow classmates, the institution, or the nation, rather than an individual. The opportunity for mobility was available to those who demonstrated the professional expertise. There were sufficient benefits, pay, and opportunity for mobility to maintain a loyal force.

The Army's operations against the guerrillas proved to be effective. After 1966, they were constantly on the offensive, and
maintained a presence in those areas (the northeast) occupied by the guerrillas. A combination of "get tough" tactics, local spy networks ("comisionados militares"), arming local civilian irregular forces (sometimes of dubious quality), and civic action projects in the guerrilla-infested areas, effectively pushed the revolutionaries out of the countryside. Pablo Monsanto, in reference to the FAR, relates that after the 1966-1967 offensive, there were only six guerrillas remaining in the mountains.198

Summary. As this analysis relates to the hypotheses proposed in Chapter III, several modifications become necessary. The hypotheses concerning the type and nature of the regime appear valid in this regional analysis and thus applicable to El Salvador. Political illegitimacy, corruption, and actions of the regime eroded the regime's support in Cuba and Nicaragua. Meanwhile, in Guatemala, a regime change occurred, changing faces not necessarily control, and allowing some measure of diffusion of the opposition. The application of repression acting as a "double edge sword" is apparent among these cases. In Cuba and Nicaragua, its application served to polarize oppositional forces against the regime, while in Guatemala, it effectively shut down much of the opposition. Nevertheless, the movement reemerged.

With respect to the armed forces, several problems are evident. Distinguishing between the importance of the capability versus the loyalty of the armed forces is most difficult. Each obviously enhances the other. However, in this brief analysis, capability rather than loyalty appears to be the most significant factor in the role of the armed forces. These cases do not validate the claim that
the disloyalty of the armed forces is critical for revolutionary success. Both Batista's armed forces and the Nicaraguan National Guard had relatively few defections, until the latter stages of the conflict, and even then no mass defections occurred, but the revolutionary movements succeeded. However, the capability of the armed forces does seem essential in defeating a revolutionary movement. In Cuba, the effectiveness of Batista's forces in combat against the guerrillas was very poor. The Nicaraguan National Guard had a much better record, but still, in the latter months, limited itself in defending positions instead of aggressively pursuing the revolutionaries. In Guatemala, the military, after 1966, consistently pursued the guerrillas. Like revolutionary force levels, the numbers of soldiers in uniform do not directly correspond to military success.

International Support

Few would argue that the role played by international actors, particularly the United States, in the internal political development of Latin American countries has not been significant. This role, by all external actors, becomes even more critical when the country faces a revolutionary crisis. However, the "criticality" of that support is often debatable. The attempt here is to test the hypothesis that international support plays an intervening role, rather than the "critical" factor, in the outcome of the revolutionary process. To do this a causal relationship must exist between support provided, or withdrawal, and the outcome.
For purposes of this discussion, reference was made to a specific span of time, as it relates to the revolutionary movement (see Table 5-13). The "before" period indicates the years prior to the initiation of armed struggle by the revolutionary groups, excluding Castro's attack in 1953. The "during" phase is the period of ongoing activity. In the case of Nicaragua, the period of 1962 to 1977 was one of sporadic activity and data are outlined to examine any pattern within this period as well. The "before" period will be used to provide a base to determine changes in support levels to the regime in the "during" phase, thus revealing possible linkages to changes occurring during that phase.

TABLE 5-13
REVOLUTION AND PERIODS OF SUPPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>During</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1952-56</td>
<td>1957-58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1953-61</td>
<td>1962-79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1953-61</td>
<td>1962-70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One would expect those countries facing an insurgency movement to receive increasing portions of assistance, and even a larger increase than other Latin American countries not faced with such situations,
during the period they were confronting such a threat. Tables 5-14 and 5-15 show United States and international organization assistance to Cuba, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. These data are computed using 1972 as a base year and show percentage change from one period to another.

During the initial years of revolutionary activity military assistance levels increased significantly in each case. Although the military assistance levels varied during the period, of the revolutions, they remained above the pre-revolutionary period and decreases were generally less than the Latin American average decrease. From March to December 1958 in Cuba, and late 1977 to July 1979 in Nicaragua, are the exceptions as military assistance was virtually halted. Economic and international organizational assistance varies from case to case. Cuba received relatively little compared to the other cases, and economic assistance decreased after 1957, at a time it was increasing in Latin America as a whole. With the Alliance for Progress in the 1960s, Guatemala and Nicaragua fared much better. Even though the levels of aid were inconsistent, showing decreases during periods of revolutionary activity, assistance was never withdrawn completely. These data do not provide all the types of international support nor sufficient information to determine the effects of this assistance. A review of each case is helpful in fully understanding the role of international support.

Cuba. An examination of arms received by Batista's regime since 1952 shows a build-up of armaments suitable for a small army, but also the procurement of items, such as seven tanks, whose cost effectiveness against guerrillas is debatable, at best. But at that time the procurement of U.S. arms was based upon a hemispheric
### TABLE 5-14

**MEAN ANNUAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO LATIN AMERICA AND CUBA (1953-1959)**

(In 1972 Dollars, Millions) (+)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period (Fiscal Year)</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Cuba</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1953-56</td>
<td>1953-56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Econ Asst.</td>
<td>471.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-74.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Asst.</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int'l Org. (a)</td>
<td>190.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

- The fiscal year, at this time, covered from 1 July to 30 June; therefore, FY1959 is from 1 July 1958 to 30 June 1959.
### TABLE 5-15
MEAN ANNUAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO LATIN AMERICA AND SELECTED COUNTRIES (1953-1979)
(In 1972 Dollars, Millions) (+)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period (Fiscal Year) (++)</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Guatemala</th>
<th>Nicaragua</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1953-61</td>
<td>1953-61</td>
<td>1953-61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Econ Asst.</td>
<td>657.6</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-36.7</td>
<td>-150.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Asst.</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>746.2</td>
<td>413.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int'l Org. (Loans)</td>
<td>190.4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>-63.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Econ Asst. (continued):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period (Fiscal Year) (++)</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Guatemala</th>
<th>Nicaragua</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Econ Asst.</td>
<td>1516.9</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>130.7</td>
<td>-32.1</td>
<td>-131.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Asst.</td>
<td>120.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>105.3</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>413.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int'l Org. (Loans)</td>
<td>374.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>222.8</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>60.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Econ Asst. (continued):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period (Fiscal Year) (++)</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Guatemala</th>
<th>Nicaragua</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1967-70</td>
<td>1967-70</td>
<td>1967-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Econ Asst.</td>
<td>1396.0</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>-8.0</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>-32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Asst.</td>
<td>88.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>-26.8</td>
<td>-24.3</td>
<td>-24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int'l Org. (Loans)</td>
<td>1226.7</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>92.2</td>
<td>60.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Econ Asst. (continued):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period (Fiscal Year) (++)</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Guatemala</th>
<th>Nicaragua</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Econ Asst.</td>
<td>1026.3</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>-26.5</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Asst.</td>
<td>105.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>-31.3</td>
<td>-24.3</td>
<td>-24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int'l Org. (Loans)</td>
<td>1792.8</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>92.2</td>
<td>60.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Econ Asst. (continued):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period (Fiscal Year) (++)</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Guatemala</th>
<th>Nicaragua</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1977-79</td>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>1977-78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Econ Asst.</td>
<td>705.2</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>-31.3</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Asst.</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>-66.6</td>
<td>-100</td>
<td>-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int'l Org. (Loans)</td>
<td>2677.7</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: (+) Data from sources have been converted to 1972 dollars using implicit price deflator for gross national product outlined in U.S. Department of Commerce, Business Statistics 1984 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 212. (++) TQ Denotes the transitional quarter (1 July-30 September 1976) that was required when the Fiscal Year was changed from 1 July-30 June to 1 Oct.-30 Sept.
defense policy rather than internal security. Regardless, these supplies of arms helped upgrade a force of 20,000 that in 1952 had basically WWI vintage equipment. Reorganization of the armed forces in 1953 and 1955 brought about some structural changes with an increase in personnel reaching levels of 40,000 by 1958 (see Table 5-10). However, most of the increases came in 1957-58 and were recruits who had received little training prior to being placed into combat units.

Since constraints on U.S. assistance at the time were based upon the premise that it could be used only for purposes of hemispheric defense, pressure started to mount for Batista not to use U.S. aid in his war against the guerrillas, or for the U.S. to cut that assistance. It appears arms shipments stopped about December 1957 and eventually in March 1958, an arms embargo was announced, stopping a shipment of 1900 U.S. Garand rifles bound for Cuba.

Procuring arms did not present a great problem as Cuba was able to obtain them from Italy, France, England, Switzerland, and Israel. Also following the embargo, the dictator Trujillo filled an "emergency request," rushing five plane loads of arms and ammunition to the Cuban Army.

The U.S. embargo has often been cited as the "critical" factor that led to Batista's defeat. Batista himself said Cuba protested U.S. embargo of arms shipment more for political reasons than military, as arms still could be purchased from Europe or the Dominican Republic. Most observers have concluded that the most significant effect of the arms embargo was the psychological impact it had in favor of the insurrection.
International support for the 26th of July Movement and Fidel Castro was certainly a factor in his ability to overcome the Batista forces. Whether it was "critical" is debatable. Support to Castro from various sources has been well documented, although like all revolutions much likely has been left uncovered. Funds came from Mexico, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, and an extensive exile community network in the United States. Reporting by journalists, such as Herbert Matthews, gave unquantifiable aid.\textsuperscript{205}

Earl E.T. Smith, Ambassador to Cuba during the revolution, testified before a Congressional Sub-Committee that "without the United States, Castro would not be in power today."\textsuperscript{206} He was not only referring to the arms embargo, but maintained that the U.S. State Department was supporting Fidel Castro. He claimed that by giving asylum to Cuban exiles such as Carlos Prío Socarrás, an ex-President, and ignoring evidence of Castro's ties to the communists, they had allowed Castro to come to power.

Certainly Carlos Prío aided Castro's cause. After coming to terms with Castro, he obtained assistance from General Trujillo. Through this support, an invading force of over 100 men was able to obtain eight tons of weapons, and via the Dominican Navy transported them to Cuba, where they eventually made their way to the M-26-7's headquarters.\textsuperscript{207} Prío also provided up to $250,000 to Castro, of which the first $50,000 enabled him to purchase the boat, "Granma," that would carry him back to Cuba.\textsuperscript{208}

Support within the United States came from various groups such as the Committee in Exile and the Junta de Liberacion Cubana (made up of various religious and professional groups such as the Masonic Lodge,
the Cuban Associations of Lawyers, Dentists, and Doctors) in Miami. Castro himself traveled in the United States soliciting support. Using interview data, Morán-Arce outlines the method used for shipment of arms and munitions from the U.S. to Cuba. Certainly the flow of arms, material, and men was coming from the United States. Reportedly, support also came from such countries as Costa Rica, where in March 1958, President José Figueres provided a C-46 transport plane loaded with weapons for Castro.

Even with this aid it is doubtful whether Castro could have survived very long in the Sierra without the network of support within Cuba. The apparatus of Frank Pais and the underground movement was extensive and provided the means in which much of the external support could be delivered, and subsequently put to effective use. This included such tasks as purchasing arms from the United States Guantanamo Naval Base.

Following the Cuban Revolution, the rules changed for supporting and combatting revolutionary movements in Latin America. Cuba would shortly become the leading actor behind many of these movements while the United States changed its policy of assistance, from hemispheric defense only to one of maintaining internal security.

Guatemala. As mentioned, generally, economic and military assistance from the United States and international organization loans increased during the period of revolutionary activity. Of particular note was the large increase (746%) in military assistance during the first four years of revolutionary activity from the previous period (1953-61). Closer examination reveals that roughly 85% of this aid went towards the purchase or maintenance of material, while the
remainder was used to train personnel, both in-country and overseas. The United States Army Schools of Americas (USARSA) was one of the major training facilities used to train both enlisted men and officers in various skills, including counter-insurgency warfare. Up to 1977, Guatemala had 1,574 graduates; Nicaragua 4,427. Guatemala was also the recipient of direct United States aid in the form of U.S. Army Special Forces personnel. Direct involvement in Guatemala was not uncommon and it seems likely that this support led to the involvement of U.S. personnel in combat operations. Also, Guatemala from 1964 to 1973 received $29 million of its $30 million dollars in arms imports from the U.S.

The U.S. assistance provided little change in the structure or level of the Guatemalan armed forces. Its major contribution seems to have been in developing an efficient logistics system, advising and supporting a civic action program, and an increase in the professionalism of the Armed Forces through raising their level of competence.

Unlike other revolutionary movements in Latin America during the 1960s (Venezuela, Bolivia), the movement in Guatemala began without any apparent international assistance. However, they soon developed links with other revolutionaries in the hemisphere. In September 1962, Yon Sosa, along with Turcios Lima and Luis Trejo, went to Cuba to become schooled in the art of guerrilla warfare. Shortly after the FAR was formed in December 1962, reportedly, the General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI) in Cuba gave about $250,000 to these revolutionary groups with $200,000 going to Yon Sosa. And, in 1964, a supply of rifles uncovered by an Army raid was traced back to Cuba.
In addition to any money from abroad, Turcios and Yon Sosa's guerrilla groups were quite capable of obtaining their own funds. Yon Sosa claimed to have obtained $100,000 from kidnappings and robberies, while in 1965, Turcios's group netted some $300,000 in ransom.\textsuperscript{219}

No data were uncovered to indicate that direct intervention on behalf of the revolutionaries by any international source, such as Cuba, ever occurred in Guatemala. Beyond the one shipment of rifles, no other data exist for a large supply network. However, data do indicate that Yon Sosa had connections within Mexico and it was through this contact that much of his support was funneled.\textsuperscript{220} Like other movements at the time, propaganda support was provided through different international marxist journals, as well as Tricontinental and Pensamiento Critico.

Nicaragua. Prior to 1977, except for the 1967 to 1970 period, assistance increased (see Table 5-15). Ironically, it was during the 1967 to 1971 period that the FSLN suffered some major blows at the hands of the Guardia with several "focos" being defeated. The 1971 to 1976 period showed an increase of 87.4\% in military assistance, far above the Latin American mean and increasing the aid to Nicaragua above that of any other period. Only slight changes occurred in the armed forces from 1971 to 1977, with force levels (7,000 men) and equipment remaining virtually the same; most aid went toward training programs. Nicaragua, through extensive use of in-country and overseas training programs, maintained a fairly high level of professional training for its junior leaders. Even though Nicaraguans have not attended USARSA since 1979, it remains (as of 1984) the Latin American
country with the most graduates (4,693) since the school opened in 1946. In 1977-78, military and economic aid throughout Latin America decreased due to a changing U.S. policy toward human rights violations. In Nicaragua, the decrease in military assistance did not occur till FY78 (decreased from a total of $2.2 million in 1977 to $0.26 million in 1978--1972 dollars), and occurred mostly in the area of material. In fact, the number of Nicaraguans training at United States facilities in 1978 was higher than any previous year. As mentioned, it was during this period, with increasing activity from the FSLN, the armed forces began a build-up. By 1979 all further assistance was terminated, with the exception of economic assistance that had already been appropriated.

The United States was not alone in providing support to the Nicaraguan government. During the period 1966 to 1975, $10 million of $11 million imported arms to Nicaragua came from the United States. From 1975 to 1979 this changed drastically as the United States furnished only $5 million of the $30 million of arms imports. Reportedly these weapons were supplied by countries such as Portugal, Israel, and Spain. As Table 5-15 indicates, loans from international organizations continued through 1979, but took a sharp decrease (-43.2%) in 1979.

One of the founders of the FSLN in 1963 was Carlos Fonseca Amador, who had been trained and schooled in the art of guerrilla warfare in Cuba. Like other movements in the 1960s, the FSLN received Cuban assistance, but from all indications it was primarily propaganda and moral support.
It appears that an external support apparatus began to operate following the lifting of the state of siege in 1977.226 By U.S. State Department accounts, a Cuban official from the American Department made several trips to Nicaragua in 1977 and early 1978, and worked to unify the opposition groups. At the same time a supply network was set up that included the countries of Panama and Costa Rica. Costa Rica provided a safe haven for the guerrillas and a convenient rearming point. According to the State Department Cuban advisors began to train and equip the FSLN in Costa Rica in 1978.

The role of numerous Latin American countries in providing both active and passive support to the FSLN has been well documented.227 This eventually included the withdrawal of recognition of the Somoza Government by Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia, and recognition of the Revolutionary Junta Government headquartered in San José, Costa Rica. Mexico, which had been a center of fund-raising for the FSLN, broke diplomatic relations in May 1979.228 In addition to this type of support, it appears direct support in the form of a Brigade from the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) in El Salvador and the Victoriano Lorenzo Brigade, an internationalist brigade of revolutionaries primarily from Costa Rica and Panama, participated alongside the FSLN in 1979.229 The State Department states that Cuba helped organize, train, equip, and advise this unit. Additionally, Cuban advisors allegedly were wounded while in combat with units of the FSLN.

It is indeed difficult to quantify this support. In April 1979, a U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency representative from the Latin American Branch said
Outside support has been the major contributing factor that has permitted the Sandinista National Liberation Front to remain a viable force and develop sufficient military capability to continue to challenge the Somoza Government.

In discussing Costa Rican assistance to the FSLN, John A. Booth states:

Without the sanctuary, the training camps, and the moral, diplomatic, and logistical support of Costa Rica, the Nicaraguan rebels would undoubtedly have required much longer to oust Somoza, had they been able to do so at all.

He goes on to discuss support in general and says:

Without such support for the insurgents and without the erosion of foreign support for the regime, the overthrow of the Somoza dynasty would surely have taken much longer.

The effectiveness and impact of international support is very subjective and does not easily lend itself to measurement by any single indicator. To conclude that an increase in support to the regime results in changes in the armed forces (both size and efficiency) seems valid. However, to infer a direct relationship exists between external support and indicators such as political change, economic growth, and social conditions is certainly risky. It suffers from a variety of problems, including economic cycles that affect these variables over time. While realizing foreign support does not play the only role, or even the major role, in the changes of these indicators, it seems valid to contend that support to the regime that enables it to put domestic money to other use possibly had some impact in these areas. The analysis is based not upon comparing amounts of change, but rather if change occurred, therefore inferring that this change took place in part, due to international support.
With respect to political change, international support and influence had little effect upon Batista and Somoza in bringing about some type of negotiated settlement. And the 1966 elections in Guatemala certainly did not occur based solely upon external influences. The impact on the internal economic situation, comparing the percentage change of gross domestic product (see Table 5-5) and support levels, is inconclusive. For example, when combining economic assistance and international organization loans, international support to Nicaragua was inconsistent from 1962 through 1979, economic assistance decreased from 1967-1970 and again in 1977-1978. However, as Table 5-5 indicates, the GDP grew at a rate above 5% per annum up until late 1978. While a direct relationship may not exist between these economic variables and international support, it can be argued that the economy would have declined even farther without this assistance.

The most direct relationship is to the armed forces. There is no doubt United States military assistance, in all cases, enabled the armed forces to expand and increase their capability. This increase in capability does not necessarily translate to a more effective military, as Cuba appears to demonstrate. However, the analysis here did not determine the effectiveness of the Cuban armed forces before aid was provided, only during the resolution; therefore, any conclusion on this effect would be invalid.

The impact of international support on the revolutionary movements was that it enabled them to potentially expand their operations. While this cannot be shown quantitatively, there are examples of events following periods of increasing international
support. The development of unity and coalitions in Nicaragua occurred as more international actors provided their support to the revolutionaries. Still, there are too many other unknown variables (stockpiling of material, strategy) and insufficient data to determine the exact impact of this aid. The best that can be said is it provided the revolutionaries with the means and motivation to continue the struggle.

Summary. Can it be said international support was a "critical" factor in the revolutionary process? A short review of the data suggests there is no apparent relationship between the dollar amount of military assistance and the outcome of the revolutionary process. Cuba received more military assistance annually than Guatemala during their respective periods of revolutionary activity. However, annual military assistance per 1,000 armed forces during the respective revolutionary periods show that Guatemala received $.26 million (1972 dollars) while Nicaragua received $.20 million, and Cuba $.095 million. A key element may be the withdrawal of international support at a critical moment. This "timing" factor of withdrawal apparently did not affect the military capability, since other means of support were obtained. The major impact was erosion of the regime's base of support at a time of crisis. Therefore, the hypothesis concerning the withdrawal of international support enhancing revolutionary success appears valid. While the quantity of international support needs to be addressed, specifically as it applies to El Salvador, this analysis indicates the concentration should be on impact of that support and any withdrawal of international support.
International support to both Castro and the FSLN assisted in increasing and maintaining their coercive power (arms, munitions), thus enabling them to continue the struggle and eventually achieve victory. While the support network in Cuba was international, it was very limited compared to the FSLN support mechanism. This illustrates the increasing sophistication of revolutionary movements. The movement in Guatemala never received extensive external assistance. Nevertheless, these data do not provide evidence of its "criticality," meaning the movement or the regime could not have succeeded without the support. They do support the hypothesis that international support plays, as a minimum, an intervening role.

General Summary

In examining the model of revolutionary outcome in this regional context, it becomes apparent that the main propositions and hypotheses are valid, thus applicable in analyzing the prospects for a successful revolution in El Salvador. However, the analysis did highlight several weaknesses within the model. First, loyalty of the armed forces among the cases was secondary to their capability. Loyalty does not necessarily translate to victory over the revolutionary movement. Second, the timing of withdrawal of international support emerged as a potential key variable.

To a certain degree, the revolutionary process operates in a clandestine environment involving many actors. Due to this environment, the links between these actors are not always clear. This regional analysis highlights this ambiguity by demonstrating that
each of the main players (revolutionary movement, regime, international arena) have a role in the revolutionary process. While it is not always clear what the causal relationships are between these groups, it is clear that they all play a role in the establishment of a "strong" revolutionary movement. Therefore, to understand the dynamics of the revolutionary process, an examination of all these elements must be considered. However, before such a task can be undertaken, the conditions at the roots of the revolution must be examined.

Notes

1 The defining of Guatemala as a failed revolutionary movement by 1970 is based upon the decline of the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), who had broken with the Guatemalan communists (PGT) in 1968. By 1970, they had been defeated to the point that they had little hope of gaining political power. Pablo Monsanto said the defeat of early the guerrilla movement "was a political defeat, not a military one." The remnants of these early failures reemerged in the mid-1970s. See Pablo Monsanto, "The Foco Experience: The Guerrillas' First Years," in Guatemala in Rebellion: Unfinished History, eds., Jonathan L. Fried et al. (New York: Grove Press, 1983), p. 261; Gott, pp. 69-71, 83.

2 This attempt took place on 14 June 1959 by a group of exiles and Cuban supporters. The Trujillo government had little problem in defeating it. In 1959, other plans, supported by Cuba, for invasions into Nicaragua and Haiti also were made. See Andrés Suárez, Cuba: Castroism and Communism, 1959-1966 (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1967), pp. 63-66; Thomas, Cuba: Pursuit of Freedom, p. 1228.

See Woodward.

According to G. Pope Atkins, *Arms and Politics in the Dominican Republic* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), pp. 6-8, from 1814 to 1916, there were 48 presidents and 29 coups. Since 1844 authoritarian regimes have dominated Dominican political history.

Thomas, *Cuba: Pursuit of Freedom*, pp. 605-775. After the 1933 coup d'état Batista played a direct, President from 1940-1944, or indirect role in government.


This argument has most recently been explored in explaining the crisis in Central America. Land concentration may even be greater than these data show because a single family may own several large farms. See Mark J. Ruhl, "Agrarian Structure and Political Stability in Honduras," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 26 (February 1984): 33-68; Midlarsky and Roberts, pp. 169-192.

Gini coefficients for these regional cases can be found in Bruce Russett, ed., *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1964), Table 69; Mario Monteforte Toledo, *Subdesarrollo y dependencia*, Vol. I (Mexico City: Universidad nacional autónoma de Mexico, 1972), p. 199. The scale ranges from 0 to 1 with 0 being the most equal. These two examples illustrate the difficulty in comparative analysis using this index.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Russett</th>
<th>Monteforte Toledo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>0.892</td>
<td>0.5430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>0.860</td>
<td>0.4446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>0.795</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>0.792</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>0.757</td>
<td>0.5553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>0.757</td>
<td>0.3680</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Ibid., p. 130. Data on the Dominican Republic and Cuba were not provided and could not be located in other CIDA publications.

This is computed based upon detailed data of farm size from Table 5-3 and information on area needed to sustain a family unit for each country.

One reason generally noted for this is the fact that the working class did not consist of a conquered race or imported slaves. They were individuals accustomed to being free and had the same cultural heritage as the emerging coffee "elite."

Anderson, "Honduras," In Needler, p. 76.


For an excellent survey of this period see Thomas Melville and Marjorie Melville, Guatemala: The Politics of Land Ownership (New York: The Free Press, 1971), pp. 21-58; Richard N. Adams, Crucifixion by Power (Austin, TX: University of Texas, 1970), p. 145. These changes came primarily in the 1950-54 period with the rule of Jacobo Arbenz as he pushed to build a strong base of support among the "campesinos." Unions were organized and a 1952 agrarian reform law was passed.

Adams, Crucifixion by Power, p. 452.

Melville and Melville, pp. 138-143.


Ibid., p. 98.

Ibid., p. 118. One such organization was formed in 1969 by Jesuits (the Evangelistic Committee for Agrarian Reform Promotion--CEPA). This later evolved into a political organization with an anti-Somoza stance.

Jorge I. Domínguez, Cuba: Order and Revolution (London: The Belknap Press, 1978), p. 424. Thomas estimates that there were 200,000 families of peasants, of which 140,000 were very poor, and 600,000 rural workers; also 400,000 urban proletariat, 200,000 petty bourgeoisie, and 650,000 unemployed.


31 Computed from 1946 Census as cited by Domínguez, p. 435.

32 Ibid.


34 Wiarda, p. 358.


36 Ibid., p. 594.

37 Ibid., pp. 608-609.

38 Ibid., pp. 611-617.

39 Ibid., p. 650. Data show only 12 of those interviewed (total of 68) participated in FENHERCA (organized vanguard of the PRD in the countryside), and only eight knew about it. However, nearly half, 31 of 68, were members or participants in political parties, and another 21 had knowledge of them.

40 Of 28 provinces in the Dominican Republic, seven are primarily urban (over 50% urban population). In the 1966 elections the PR lost 5 provinces, all urban; in 1970, they only lost one (urban); and in 1974, they won all the provinces. In 1978, the PR not only lost all the urban provinces, but 9 of the 21 rural provinces as well. Campillo Pérez, Elecciones Dominicanas (Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic: Secretaria de Estado de Educacion, 1982), pp. 449-480.

41 As mentioned in Chapter II, Gurr and Davis, "The J-Curve," have argued this point.


47 Bianchi in Seers, Table 18.


49 Wiarda, p. 600. He gives a vivid description of the conditions as well as results of various surveys. In general, they had no available water, electricity, or outside contact; few religious institutions, widespread illness, and thatch huts for homes.

50 As cited in Wiarda, p. 607.


53 John A. Booth, "Toward Explaining Regional Crisis."


55 Data computed using unweighted averages in all sectors reported in James W. Wilkie and Adam Perkal, eds., *Statistical Abstract of Latin America*, 23 (Los Angeles: University of California Latin American Center Publications, 1984), Table 1405.

56 Domínguez, p. 75.

1950 = 100  
1953 = 99  
1957 = 121  
1958 = 115

57 *Ibid.*, Table 4.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jan.-Feb.</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>Oriente</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>102.5</td>
<td>112.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar.-July</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>86.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.-Dec.</td>
<td>92.2</td>
<td>80.6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Examination of regional socioeconomic data of Nicaragua and Guatemala, where the revolutionary movements received most of their support, revealed no significant differences between the national statistics. 

Meaning the political system was limited, not responsible, political pluralism.

Dominguez, p. 113.

Ibid., pp. 123-124. He says elections had been honest and decisive since 1939. However, it was a system that was filled with violence and corruption (p. 112).

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 113; Thomas, Cuba: Pursuit of Freedom, pp. 789-797. This opposition was not a united front against Batista. Both groups suffered from internal strife.

Election results cited in Dominguez, p. 105; Carl John Regan, "The Armed Forces of Cuba, 1933-1959" (Master's Thesis, University of Florida, 1970), p. 130. The Navy and Air Force were also hostile to Batista and both were involved in the 1957 plot. It resulted in Navy bases being occupied by the Army.

Dominguez, p. 112; Thomas, Cuba: Pursuit of Freedom, pp. 793-796, 809-822, 825. Of about 150 participants, Thomas says only 5 had completed higher education. He also agrees with a statement Castro made that 90% of his followers were "workers and farmers." Few were from the province of Oriente.

This was the name of a pamphlet published in 1959 that was supposedly the text of Castro's self defense speech. Dominguez, p. 116; Thomas, Cuba: Pursuit of Freedom, pp. 847-850.

Ibid., pp. 840-841.

Ibid., pp. 840-845.


Anderson, Politics in Central America, pp. 149-164; Booth, The End and the Beginning, pp. 51-75. Anastasio Somoza Garcia ruled from mid-1936 to 1956, when he was assassinated. His son Luis Somoza Debayle was President from 1956 to 1963, when due to unrest in the country, he relinquished the presidency to a civilian, Rene Schick. Schick died in office and was followed by Lorenzo Guerro. In 1967, the youngest son, Anastasio "Tachito" Somoza, took control and ruled until 1979. In 1971 he released executive power to a three person Junta, which technically held power till 1974, but Somoza maintained control, particularly after the 1972 earthquake.

Ibid., pp. 99-103. The MPDC, Popular Christian Democratic Movement, took over leadership of the conservative opposition in 1962. They pulled out of the 1962 elections, but ran in 1967. The MPDC lost due to fraud, but Somoza co-opted them with a share of Congress and government positions. After the MPDC agreed to join the Junta in 1971 the conservative opposition split into various factions.

Ibid., pp. 103-104.

Ibid., p. 109; Anderson, Politics in Central America, p. 153. Tomás Borge was one of those victims of this backlash.

Millett, p. 226.

Nolan, pp. 23-25.


Booth, The End and the Beginning, pp. 97-126. The 1972 earthquake was a key factor in further polarizing Somoza opposition.

For a thorough description of the evolution of the revolutionary movement of the 1960s, see Gott, 39-120; also Monsanto in Fried et al., pp. 262-264.


Ibid., pp. 237-239.

Rose, pp. 8-11. According to Rose there were two blocs of officers who participated in the revolt, those who were trained and made rank during the Arevalo-Arbenz period (CPTs-COLs) and younger officers (mostly LTs). From this latter group came the future leaders of the revolution.

Schlesinger and Kinzer, p. 239.

Gott, p. 48.

See Schlesinger and Kinzer, p. 239; Adolfo Gilly, "The Guerrilla Movement in Guatemala," Monthly Review (May 1965): 9-39, provides one of the most detailed accounts of the movement at that time. He is obviously sympathetic to the guerrilla cause, but still provides information that helps in understanding the origins of the movement.
144


87 Gott, pp. 50, 52. Named after their fellow revolutionary, who had been captured in July 1961 and killed by the police, and the date of the failed revolt in 1960 (13 November).

88 Gilly, p. 11.

89 Anderson, Politics in Central America, pp. 28, 29, 31.

90 Ibid., pp. 31-32; Torres-Rivas, pp. 554, 563, 568. Offers data that show a sharp incline in political violence after 1977.

91 Events include the reported massacre of peasants at Panzos (May 1978), riots over bus fares (Oct. 1978), and occupation of Spanish Embassy (Jan. 1980). For a brief overview, see Guevara, pp. 230-234.


94 Wiarda, pp. 24; Kelso, p. 23.

95 Kelso, p. 31.

96 The "constititutionalist" or "rebels," both terms are used depending on the position of the author, consisted of a small groups of military conspirators, the IJ4, the PSP, and the MPD, all "radical" type groups. However, they were far from a united force. This was never achieved, and in fact, the "radical" groups, who were not unified among themselves, did not trust a victory by the military conspirators. See Kelso, pp. 42-47, 63-65.

97 Pérez, p. 450.

98 The most well known group was the "Agupacion politica 14 de Junio" (APIJ4), referred to as "castocistas." They were mostly students and young radicals. They had joined the Constitutionalist in April 1965 and during the Balaguar era employed terrorist tactics. They suffered heavy losses in 1967 against police and later much of their leadership joined legal political parties. Two infiltration attempts were made, like Castro's in Cuba, in the 1970s. One was in 1973, led by ex-Colonel Francisco Alberto Caamaño Deno, a leader of the Constitutionalist in 1965, when 10 guerrillas landed. Within a
month they had all been captured or killed. The other was in June 1975 when two survivors of the 1973 attempt, plus one other, landed. They obtained little support among the populace and by October all had been killed or captured.

99Wiarda, pp. 1825.

100This summary based upon Ibid., pp. 1171-1233. According to the 1966 constitution the president appointed all provincial governors and congress provided no checks and balances.


103Morris, Tables 3.1, 3.2; Anderson, Politics in Central America, pp. 113-120.


105Anderson, Politics in Central America, pp. 117-118. The officer in charge, plus a sergeant, were tried, convicted and imprisoned for the murders. However, after serving less than two years, they were given amnesty.

106Ibid., pp. 139-140.

107Morris, p. 79.

108Woodward, pp. 149-224.


113 Bonachea and San Martin, p. 160. They make reference to a committee that was formed and endorsed unity between the M-26-7 and the DR, which published the "Tampa Declaration." I found no other source that identified this particular meeting and attempt at unification.

114 Suárez, p. 25.


116 Suárez, p. 28. It is often noted how Raul Castro and most likely Che Guevara welcomed Rodríguez, while Castro remained rather distant.


123 Domínguez, pp. 124-125, 129; Bonachea and San Martin, pp. 84-823, 103-105, 207, 263.


125 Macaulay, pp. 284-295. Estimates ranged from 300 to 8,000. Castro gave two different estimates. In 1958 he gave a figure of 7,300, then in 1966 said the Rebel Army had only 3,000.

126 Thomas, *Cuba: Pursuit of Freedom*, p. 941, gives a figure of 40,000. This seems accurate when compared with *Statesman's Yearbook*, p. 893.

127 For a discussion of their student days, the various factors influencing their ideological foundation, see Nolan, p. 18.
128 See Ibid., pp. 22-28; Booth, The End and the Beginning, pp. 139-150.


130 Ibid.; Booth, The End and the Beginning, pp. 142-144; Nolan, pp. 50, 62, 71, 74.

131 Ibid.


133 Ibid.

134 Booth, The End and the Beginning, pp. 164-165.

135 The Southern Front, led by Edén Pastora, played an important role in the final offensive and the ultimate victory. It continually put pressure on the National Guard and in the final months drove from Costa Rica fighting the National Guard in basically a conventional war.

136 Nolan, pp. 97-98.

137 For controlled area and strength, see Booth, The End and the Beginning, pp. 145, 175, 177. Strength, see Kinzer, p. 18, and Gorman, pp. 136-139. Figure presented includes Sandinista guerrilla forces (2,500), popular militia (2,500), and foreign support (500).

138 Gorman, p. 136.

139 Nolan, pp. 72, 95-97; Booth, The End and the Beginning, pp. 154-155.


141 Ibid.

142 Examples of these earlier errors are provided by Gott, p. 86; Alan Howard, "With the Guerrillas in Guatemala," New York Times Magazine, 26 June 1966, pp. 1-25; Adams, Crucifixion by Power, p. 268. Also Pablo Monsanto recognized these earlier failings, see Monsanto in Fried. For Turcios Lima's efforts at unification see Rose.

143 Rose, p. 27.

144 Ibid., p. 51.

145 Gilly, p. 11.
Rose, pp. 51-58; Gott, pp. 78-79.


Rose, p. 74.


Ibid., pp. 874, 982.

Ibid., pp. 912, 930.

Ibid., p. 964. Thomas cites one allegation of 200 wounded being buried alive, which Batista himself said was between 40-50. Thomas says the truth was somewhere between 50-200.

Thomas reports casualties as 67 surrendered and tried, another 70 prisoners shot.

For a brief discussion of these negotiations, see Domínguez, p. 125.


Ibid.


Ibid., p. 83. This group was the Cuban Labor Confederation (CTC), under Secretary-General Eusebio Mujal.

Domínguez, pp. 90, 552 (n. 58).
Regan, pp. 115-116, offers data that show few of those promoted to Colonel and General had ever held a staff assignment, while most had attended a company grade (LT-CPT) officer course, only two attended the Escuela Superior de Guerra (Majors and above).

See Regan, p. 121. For data on reorganization see Gaceta Oficial, 1953, ley-decreto, No. 975, el 9 de julio de 1953; ley-decreto, No. 1941, el 18 de enero de 1955.

Estimates of number of personnel in Latin American armed forces in 1963 would place Cuba (using 40,000) as number six also. See Barber and Ronning, pp. 226-227.

Account taken from Thomas, Cuba: Pursuit of Freedom, pp. 897-902; and Regan, pp. 131-132. The Army's luck was that Castro's guide betrayed him on 5 December, making it possible for the Army to locate him.

Ibid.

Dominquez, p. 437; Regan, p. 133.

Regan, pp. 139-142; Thomas, Cuba: Pursuit of Freedom, pp. 996-1000.

Suarez, p. 29; Dominquez, p. 126; Bonachea and San Martin, pp. 229-240.

Russell, pp. 74, 119. Her score is based upon degree of disloyalty (willing, unwilling, neutral, active, fought with rebels), by the time they fought with rebels (never, beginning, half-way through, end), by proportion of armed forces disloyal (percentage). Each of these factors is scaled from 0-4. Listed are the cases and scores.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Successful</th>
<th>Failures</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan--1929 (18)</td>
<td>Austria--1934 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania--1924 (40)</td>
<td>Burma--1954 (36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia--1952 (16)</td>
<td>Columbia--1948 (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil--1930 (24)</td>
<td>Cuba--1912 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China--1949 (20)</td>
<td>Honduras--1933 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba--1958 (10.5)</td>
<td>Italy--(0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico--1911 (14)</td>
<td>Spain--(0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Millett, pp. 236-237.

Kinzer, p. 12.

177 Kinzer, p. 12.

178 Ibid.

179 Nolan, p. 95.


181 Booth, The End and the Beginning, pp. 66, 78.

182 Ibid., p. 91. Data gathered from news reports indicate the National Guard strength went from roughly 7,500 in September 1978, to nearly 12,000 in July 1979. The most common figure reported for the armed forces was between 9,500 and 10,000. See "Grumbling Is Heard in Nicaraguan Army," New York Times, 20 March 1979, p. 1; "Nicaragua Crumbles as Rebels Prepare," New York Times, 21 March 1979, p. 1.


185 Millett, pp. 123, 234, 243; Booth, The End and the Beginning, p. 92.

186 Ibid.

187 Booth, The End and the Beginning, p. 175.

188 See Kinzer, pp. 8, 12; "Somoza Lashes Back," Newsweek, 9 July 1979, p. 38; Articles in New York Times (20, 21 March; 8 May; 7 July 1979), Miami Herald (8 May 1979), Los Angeles Times (3, 7 July 1979), and Financial Times of London (4 July 1979).


190 See Adams, Crucifixion of Power, pp. 210-211.


192 For counter-insurgency campaign see Gott, p. 99; Rose, p. 79; Jenkins and Sereseres, pp. 578-580.

193 This was a study done by Marvis Ann Bryant, "Agricultural Interest Groups in Guatemala," as cited by Adams, Crucifixion of Power, pp. 331-333.

194 Ibid., p. 327.
Jenkins and Sereorses, pp. 576-577.


Monsanto in Fried, p. 263; Jenkins and Sereorses, pp. 579-580.


Ellender, pp. 514-515; Smith, pp. 84-108.


Bonachea and San Martin, p. 201; Smith, pp. 90-91.


Smith, pp. 134-137.

*Bohemia*, 29 Nov. 1959, p. 89; Bonachea and San Martin, pp. 77-79; Morán-Arce, p. 60.

Bonachea and San Martin, p. 66.

Ibid., p. 198.


Morán-Arce, p. 140, describes the placement of weapons in cars shipped from Key West to Havana and in the clothes of young militia women going as tourists for a weekend. He also states in Feb. 1958 that air shipments began from Florida to the Sierra and 16 trips were made with 1000 lbs. of armaments on each trip.

Bonachea and San Martin, pp. 205-206.


215 Reported in Rose, pp. 88-89; Gott, p. 98; and personal contact with Special Forces NCOs who served in Guatemala in the 1960s. Also Latin America (Interpress Newsletter), 15 September 1967, reported S.F. personnel in Guatemala and that the U.S. was flying sorties (missions) from Panama against the guerrillas.

216 Jenkins and Sereseres, pp. 577-579.

217 Rose, p. 25.

218 U.S., Congress, Communism in Latin America, p. 120; also reported in Gott and Rose.


220 Rose, p. 25.

221 USARSA, Letter.

222 Ibid. For example, the number of Nicaraguan personnel trained at U.S. School of Americas in 1978 (calendar year) was 203. Previously, the highest had been 103 in 1975.


224 Booth, The End and the Beginning, p. 127.


226 Accounts here taken primarily from U.S. Department of State, "Cuba's Renewed Support"; Booth, The End and the Beginning, pp. 131-132. While Booth outlines in detail the support given by Latin American countries, he gives only a minor role to the Cubans, unlike the State Department papers.

227 Ibid.


231Booth, The End and the Beginning, p. 132.

232Ibid., p. 274.
CHAPTER VI
ROOTS OF THE REVOLUTION

Historical Background

The socioeconomic conditions leading up to the El Salvadoran crisis in the 1970s are indeed drastic. It is a country, roughly the size of Massachusetts, that in 1980 was the most densely populated in Latin America (see Table 6-1). Equalitarian land distribution is recognized as one of the worst in the hemisphere with over 70% of the land being controlled by roughly 5% of the population in 1971. A review of the physical quality of life index shows a rise in the quality of life from 1961 to 1973, followed by deterioration by the mid-1970s. From 1961 to 1980 income distribution worsened for everyone except the richest 20% of society (see Table 6-2). According to estimates of the National Planning Council (CONAPLAN) between 1973 to 1977, 8% of the population received approximately 50% of the national income and 58% of the population had less than $10.00 (US) per month at their disposal.¹ Surely these conditions would breed economic discontent among certain sectors of the society. But how did El Salvador arrive at this point? And was this sufficient to bring about a revolutionary crisis? The purpose of this chapter is to reach back and review the events that lead to polarization of the society and birth of a revolutionary movement in 1972. The 1972-1980 period
### EL SALVADOR: DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Year/Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Area (KM2--1,000)</strong></td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population (a)</strong></td>
<td>1930(e)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1961(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1980(c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millions</td>
<td>1.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density (Km²)</td>
<td>68.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent Urban</td>
<td>38.3</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Economically Active Population (EAP) (+)</strong></td>
<td>1961(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (Percent)</strong></td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--In Agriculture</td>
<td>60.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--In Industry</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--In Mining</td>
<td>0.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>--In Construction</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--In Commerce</td>
<td>6.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>--Transport &amp; Comm.</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Services</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Elec., Water, Other</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted Physical Quality of Life</td>
<td>1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index (PQLI) (+) (d)</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes: (+) EAP is based upon more exact population figures, therefore, percentages may not correspond to rounded figures. (++) PQLI includes three items: life expectancy at age 1, infant mortality, literacy of persons age 15 and over (lower the number, the better quality of life).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
will be discussed to identify the elements that led to escalation of the revolution and unification of revolutionary organizations.

**Independence to 1932**

Civil strife has permeated the history of El Salvador since the implementation of its first constitution in 1841. Data portraying the frequency of coups illustrate the long history of unconstitutional political change in El Salvador. From 1841-1866, El Salvador underwent 42 successful coups, and from 1890 to 1932 four more were experienced.

Obviously, stability (even a stable dictatorship) has not been a hallmark of Salvadoran politics. The military's direct involvement at the presidential level dates back to 1858 when General Gerardo Barrios, a Liberal, was elected. However, the battle lines were not drawn between the military and civilians, but instead between Liberals and Conservatives. By 1871, the Liberals were firmly implanted in the presidency and remained there until the late 1920s. This resulted in relative stability until 1931, when civilian rule was snuffed out with a coup d'état. Even though relative calm existed until 1931 many factors led up to the peasant revolt in 1932. This revolt is commonly called the "Matanza" and resulted in the death of over 10,000 Salvadoreans. One of those who instigated it was Augustín Farabundo Martí, leader of the Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS), who was tried and executed.

A changing society. To understand the rebellion of 1932, as well as the current crisis, it is necessary to examine the significant social changes that occurred from 1870 to the late 1920s.
1870, indigo was the dominant export crop of El Salvador. But since the mid-1800s, coffee had been slowly gaining ground. From 1870 to 1875, coffee export revenues nearly tripled and for the first time surpassed indigo. Realizing the potential of this new wealth, the government initiated steps to increase coffee production.

To facilitate the production of coffee, Liberals began transforming Salvadoran society. The most significant of these changes occurred in land ownership. The most suitable lands for the cultivation of coffee were also the areas with the highest density of Indian population. Therefore, it was necessary to dismantle the system of land ownership in these "villages," the "ejido" and communal lands. This was accomplished through a series of government proclamations and laws passed from 1879 to 1882. At the same time incentives for planting coffee were provided. The result was that by 1912 the ownership of land had been placed in the hands of individuals, rather than communities. While in some villages much of their lands were lost to outsiders, in others a peasant class was formed. Although no major uprisings occurred, this period was not without problems as there were several revolts directly linked to these losses of land. This increased awareness of the need for security forces in the rural areas. As a result the government consolidated private armies of landowners into a rural police, which in 1895 became the National Police.

As the peasant lost his land he was left with little recourse but to work on a coffee plantation. These workers, known as "colonos," would settle on a coffee plantation and, in exchange for their labor, would receive a plot of land and wages in cash or kind. However,
due to the productivity of the land it became more efficient and profitable to turn all the land over to coffee, thus relegating the "colono" to a plot for a hut only. This made his quality of life much more vulnerable to outside forces. In the 1920s, the acreage planted in coffee expanded, while at the same time, due to a sudden drop in coffee prices in the late 1920s, the land became increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few as more and more small owners sold or were forced out.

By the 1920s, society consisted of a small group of economic elite and a very large lower class. Descriptions of the social stratification during these years are provided by Alejandro Marroquín and Abel Cuenca, who describe three major groups and 11 social classes. Using job classifications in the 1930 census, Marroquín estimates that 95.4% of the population were "lower class," 4.4% were "middle class," and 0.2% were "upper class."

During these same years, union organizations were being formed and an increasing mobilization of urban workers and students was underway. By now, the oligarchy, which in El Salvador is commonly called the "fourteen families" or "Las Catorce," was firmly in control.

Although the underlying causes of the "Matanza" are found in the social and economic conditions, it was perhaps the political factors that ignited it. The reign of "white terror" in late 1930 and early 1931, unfulfilled political promises of 1931, the coup of December 1931, followed by corrupt municipal elections in January 1932 all exasperated these socioeconomic problems. Although a communist revolution was averted by the timely arrest of key leaders, it was too
late to stop a rebellion. The "Matanza" would remain a cloud over the peasants' aspirations to organize for generations to come.

Dictatorship to Reformism (1932-1948)

From 1931 to 1944, the country was ruled by a military dictator, General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez. Hernández had come to power through the coup of December 1931. During his reign, until 1944, political opposition all but disappeared and peasant organizations were banned.

Economically, little changed to alter the structure of society. Coffee remained king and little progress was made toward industrialization. Most banking reforms served to protect private (particularly coffee) rather than public interests. Measures were taken toward nationalization of the privately owned public utilities companies and the right of eminent domain over all municipal power companies. After compensation to previous owners, they were operated by the National Electricity Commission.

Martínez centralized local government and frequently intervened in municipal politics. The government did pledge to provide land and housing to those who could not afford them otherwise. However, as some studies have pointed out, few Salvadoran families received land through Martínez's land distribution program and those who did were not provided with "credit, tools, or technical assistance."

Due to these economic policies which bred discontent among the Salvadoran bourgeoisie, growing opposition among military officers, and an attempt by Martínez to change the succession laws to enable his
continuance as president for a fourth term, a coup was attempted on 2 April 1944. The attempt failed, but it touched off a wave of protests by students and labor element that eventually led to Martínez's resignation.

General Andrés Ignacio Menéndez was appointed to serve as president after Martínez's departure. Menéndez soon reversed some existing policies, once again allowing urban labor to organize. The major change was a call for free elections.

The door was open for civilian participation in the governmental process with the rebirth of political parties hoping to gain power in free elections. However, the military staged a coup d'état on 21 October 1944. It was led by the director of the National Police, Colonel Osmin Aguirre y Salinas and resulted in the election of a hand-picked candidate, General Salvador Castañeda Castro.

Little changed during the Castañeda regime. No new economic measures were undertaken and no political concessions were made. However, it was during this era that an institutional conflict among senior officers emerged over the issue of the political future of the armed forces. This conflict stemmed from the willingness of some to hold free elections as well as discontent over inter-generational mobility. While Menéndez apparently was willing to hold free elections, other senior officers felt differently as evidenced by the ease with which Aguirre y Salinas took power.

Inter-generational conflicts were evident as early as 1939, when a plot to overthrow Martínez, involving twenty Captains, Lieutenants, and two Generals, was uncovered. These conflicts became increasingly serious through the 1940s and can be traced to the
emergence of a new group of officers from the new Military School, which began commissioning officers in 1930. All this came to a pinnacle in 1948 when Major Oscar Osorio was called upon to lead a civilian-military Junta following the "Majors" coup. This coup came about when Castañeda, like Martínez in 1944, announced his intentions to remain President. Elam maintains that as a result of the coup, the ranks of the senior officers' corps were decimated. This becomes apparent when reviewing the changes of key leadership positions in the military after the coup.34

After the old generation of officers was eliminated, mobility greatly increased. What emerged was the "tanda" system, where classmates of key military figures were favored for top positions.35 This becomes apparent when reviewing data of presidential successions since 1948, ministers of defense, and their graduating classes.36 This system still exists today. After 1948, conflicts stemmed primarily from institutional disputes over the issue of whether civilians should control the presidency, the amount of power to be given the middle class groups, and reaction to economic pressures.37 Although the military ruled they failed to control society, particularly the economic sector.

From Economic Boom to Political Bust (1948-1972)

During the subsequent presidential election of Major Oscar Osorio in 1950, who was elected with 60% of the vote, there was active opposition. The military had created an official political party, the Party of Democratic Revolutionary Unification (PRUD), modeled after the Mexican Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI).38
Certain social reforms were manifested as the country's first social security legislation was passed and a constitution was adapted that provided for public health programs, women's suffrage, and extended social security coverage. The initial steps towards encouraging industry were taken with the enactment of laws which exempted import tariffs on equipment, raw materials, and taxes for those establishing certain new industries. However, during the 1950s, the "fourteen families" blocked any social legislation on land reform and continued to maintain their control of the economy. Policies were adapted to modernize the industrial sector, and a series of dams, hydroelectric plants, and a highway system were built. Additionally, Osorio granted urban workers the right to strike, while still withholding the privilege from the rural sector.

President Lemus, who succeeded Osorio in 1956 in a "questionable" electoral process, was not nearly as successful as his predecessor, as resistance from the coffee growers and their allies eroded what social gains had been made. Initially, Lemus had been more open to political freedom than Osorio, but as 1960 drew nearer and he was confronted with an increasing radical opposition, he began to use repressive tactics. This was met with increasing opposition, both military and civilian, and eventually led to the closure and occupation of the university in August/September 1960 where a number of students were injured. The university would come to play an important role in future revolutionary activities.

For some this move against the university was too much. In October 1960 a coup led by a group of leftist army officers and civilians overthrew Lemus, but three months later a counter-coup by
another group of officers resulted in the creation of a Civilian-
Military Directorate. The economy flourished as the 1960s proved to
be a time of growth and prosperity for most. The Central American
Common Market was created and El Salvador not only improved in
industry, but emerged as a leading exporter of goods and agricultural
products. By 1967 some even declared that El Salvador's economy had
reached that "take-off point," after which the economy could virtually
continue to generate healthy growth. 42

From 1961 to 1970, the economy grew at a steady rate with a 6%
mean annual growth in gross domestic product. Real wages in industry
climbed until 1966, then started falling slightly while agricultural
wages rose sharply during this same period. 43 This was due partly to
the 1965 agricultural minimum wage law. However, this law produced
some ill side effects. It apparently caused the number of "colonos"
to drop one-third from 1961 to 1971. 44 The number of landless
families rose from 11.8% in 1961 to 29.1% in 1971 (Table 6-4). 45
White explains one side effect of this law resulted in making it
financially more attractive for the landowner to reduce the number of
"colonos" to the number needed at the slowest time of the year. It
also pushed women and children out of work since they had to be paid a
minimum wage as well. 46

As evidenced in other Latin American countries, economic growth
and prosperity do not necessarily translate into equality. As Table
6-2 indicates, the poorest 20% of society became poorer, but the
middle sectors did benefit through the 1960s. The result of this
"economic boom" was the development of small industries and an
increasing urban middle class. 47
TABLE 6-2

EL SALVADOR: INCOME DISTRIBUTION, 1961-1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poorest 20%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30% below mean</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30% above mean</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richest 20%</td>
<td>63.3%</td>
<td>58.1%</td>
<td>50.8%</td>
<td>66.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top 5%</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Adding to the problems of the rural workers, modern technology in coffee cultivation made it possible to reduce the number of permanent laborers, requiring only a large number of workers for short periods of harvesting. Thus, as one observer noted, "a mobile rural proletariat of seasonal workers grew up."48

At the same time the emergence of numerous political parties occurred which advanced the views of opposition groups. While there were numerous parties prior to 1964, the most prominent being the Party of Renovating Action (PAR), they never held any seats in the National Assembly.49 In 1964, there was a political opening with proportional representation in the National Assembly. The opposition party that emerged as the most influential was the Christian Democratic Party (PDC).50
An examination of the national voting data from 1962 to 1972, showing political parties and votes received during national elections, demonstrates the erosion of support of the government party, now the National Conciliation Party (PCN), and increasing support of the Christian Democratic Party. While there was a steady increase in both registration and participation, this appears less significant than an increasing level of competition between the major opposition parties and their final unification in 1972 (see Table 6-3). Although this does not adequately demonstrate the complexities of the political maneuvering during this period, it nevertheless shows the potential threats confronted by the PCN.

The regimes of Colonels Julio Rivera, 1962-1967, and Fidel Sánchez Hernández, 1967-1972, employed similar tactics to those used by Osorio in the 1950s. Despite the government's proclamation that the time had come to stop the exploitation of man against man, little changed. Measured suppression with controlled economic concessions continued. Although there was increasing political participation, they never yielded control of the presidency or national assembly. Even with the loosening of political control, organizations in rural areas were still forbidden. While little substantial evidence of repression exists, Salvador Cayetano Carpio, Secretary General of the Salvadoran Communist Party in the 1960s and founder of the Popular Liberation Forces in 1970, provides accounts of illegal imprisonments. White also offers some accounts of executions without trial. However, on the whole, it appears quite mild as others, in urban areas, were allowed to protest and hold illegal strikes.
TABLE 6-3
EL SALVADOR: NATIONAL VOTING TREND, 1962-72

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Registration</th>
<th>PCN</th>
<th>PDC</th>
<th>UNO(++)</th>
<th>PAR</th>
<th>PPS</th>
<th>FUDI</th>
<th>BLANK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+1962</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>92.0%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>58.6%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>53.4%</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+1967</td>
<td>39.5%</td>
<td>37.1%</td>
<td>54.4%</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>40.7%</td>
<td>38.6%</td>
<td>47.1%</td>
<td>43.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+1972</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>334,600</td>
<td>324,756</td>
<td>16,871</td>
<td>94,367</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: (+) Indicates presidential elections. (++) UNO (National Opposition Union) was formed in mid-1971 as a result of unification of the PDC, MNR (National Revolutionary Movement), and UDN (Nationalist Democratic Union--organized in 1970). The PCS (Salvadoran Communist Party) supported the UNO, but could not legally participate in it.

By 1969, El Salvador found itself at war with Honduras. This resulted in "thousands dead and at least 100,000 Salvadoreans homeless. Even though the war in 1969 provided a temporary escape valve for the mounting tensions, by the presidential elections of 1972, the political atmosphere was tenuous. After the 1948 coup, a pattern had been established where the economic elite controlled the economy while the military maintained control of the presidency. As Table 6-3 shows, this had been accomplished easily prior to 1967, somewhat less so in 1967, but still an easy victory.
But the unification of the opposition in 1972 presented a new problem.

The elections of 1972 were a watershed as the PDC's candidate, José Napoleón Duarte, had been declared the winner, but a "recount" subsequently overruled his victory. Therefore, the aspirations that reforms could be attained through the electoral process were shut down. Why was the PDC unacceptable? Beyond the fact that it altered the civil-military relationship that had evolved since 1948, land reform had been openly discussed. This was a measure that would assuredly alter the distribution of power within El Salvador.

An attempted coup on 25 March 1972 was dissolved only after the rebels controlled San Salvador and President Sánchez Hernández was taken prisoner. As the coup was being crushed, Duarte took refuge in the residence of the Venezuelan Embassy's first secretary, but still fell into the hands of government forces. Eventually, after being submitted to torture tactics, Duarte was allowed to go into exile where he remained until late 1979.

By this time Salvador Cayetano Carpio had been working two years establishing an organization to take up armed struggle against the government. The FPL, which was founded on 1 April 1970 by eight dissident members of the Communist Party, now went into action. This initial group was not based in the countryside, however, but rather in the urban areas, drawing its support primarily from students, teachers, and to a lesser extent, from the urban working class. Only in the mid-1970s did the movement extend to the countryside drawing upon peasant support.
Preconditions

Thus far, the examination has been of the historical background leading up to the 1970s. Here the analysis will attempt to review the structural, socioeconomic, and political conditions that appear to be at the roots of the revolution. Italo López Vallecillos has noted that

the armed struggle, as the solution to the salvadoran problem, took form in this decade [1960s]. It is the answer of the students, workers, teachers, and urban and rural laborers against the forms of economic and political domination in the country.  

Social Structure

Agriculture sector. El Salvador remains primarily a country made up of country people (60.6% rural in 1971). Even with gains in other sectors the importance of agriculture in the Salvadoran economy is indicated by the agricultural sector generating 28.4% of the gross domestic product in 1971 and employing 54.2% of the workers. Additionally, in 1971, 57.5% of the exports were agricultural.

Some rural workers live on large plantations as full-time workers, "colonos," some own or rent small plots, and many work as seasonal wage laborers. They may even combine these roles throughout the year. As mentioned earlier the 1965 minimum wage law and modernization led to a decrease in full-time workers. By 1975 out of a total 607,497 agricultural workers only 225,000, or 37%, worked the entire year. Burke has noted that during February through October the underemployment rate is well above 50% and in some months as high as 80%. 

As previously stated, changes in patterns of land ownership started occurring before the turn of the century and they became increasingly worse. By 1971, 5.2% of the families owned 72.6% of the land while at the same time 29.1% of the families were landless (see Table 6-4).

TABLE 6-4
EL SALVADOR: AGRICULTURAL LANDHOLDERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Farm Size in Hectares</th>
<th>% Total Number of Families 1961</th>
<th>% Total Number Hectares 1961</th>
<th>% Total Number of Families 1971</th>
<th>% Total Number Hectares 1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Landless (+)</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less 1 Ha.</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-1.99 Ha.</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4.99 Ha.</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9.99 Ha.</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10+ Ha.</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>72.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: (+) The number of families without land is the residual of total rural families minus those using land, according to the 1961 and 1971 censuses of population and agriculture.

Pressure on the land had intensified following the 1940s when the expansion of cotton along the coast took place. The result was less land for the cultivation of subsistence crops. In a study by William
Durham there is a close correlation between yearly totals of land licensed for cotton production and the rise of maize imports from 1930 to 1971.\textsuperscript{65} Also, the total area planted in sugar cane increased from 8,500 hectares in 1961 to about 33,200 in 1975. As compared to four subsistence crops (corn, beans, rice, and sorghum), the three major export crops accounted for 31.3\% of the area cultivated in 1961 and 35.2\% in 1971.\textsuperscript{66} Data also clearly show that the country's most profitable production, coffee and cotton, takes place, primarily on the large estates, over 100 hectares.\textsuperscript{67}

Additional pressures on the rural sector were added after the 1969 war with Honduras. El Salvadorans had been migrating to Honduras for generations and by one estimate there were over 12,000 Salvadorans in Honduras by the late 1920s,\textsuperscript{68} by 1969 estimates reached 300,000.\textsuperscript{69} The war closed the migration "safety" valve. More importantly, it added roughly 130,000 homeless, landless, peasants back into an already strained environment.\textsuperscript{70}

As the landless rate rises it follows that a larger portion of the rural workers will come to depend more and more on wage labor. What does it take for them to survive? Earlier in Table 6-2 it was pointed out that the poorest 20\% got poorer, but was the subsistence level being maintained? According to Burke, for a family of six, in 1975 it took 1,332 colones/year (approximately $532.80) in order to satisfy the basic needs.\textsuperscript{71} Table 6-5 shows that using this level approximately 74\% of the rural families live below this minimum level.
TABLE 6-5
EL SALVADOR: INCOME SOURCES FOR THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR, 1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Farm Size in Hectares</th>
<th>% Total Number of Families</th>
<th>Average Yearly Income</th>
<th>From Wages</th>
<th>From Cultivation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Landless</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>791.96</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>48.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less 1 Ha.</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>1002.56</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>68.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-1.99 Ha.</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>1386.84</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>81.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4.99 Ha.</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>2576.60</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>94.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In a recent study, Jenny Pearce provides an interesting, although not unbiased, view of the peasant in El Salvador. In 1984 she traveled through the Chalatenago department, portions occupied by the guerrillas, interviewing some of the peasants. Offering but one snapshot view of the peasant life in El Salvador, she shows the uncertainty that exists in his life. The conflicting relationships between the landlord and peasant, most landlords want nothing more than a return on their property, a few show compassion. Her impressions are of a group (the peasants) with plenty of reason for discontent while waiting for the organizational networks to be established in order to express their desires.

Although not widespread these networks began taking root in the 1960s. With the inspiration of the Union of Christian Workers (UNOC) the Christian Federation of Salvadoran Peasants (FECCAS), the first major group established since the "Matanza," was organized in the
departments of San Salvador, La Libertad, and Cabañas in 1964. The FECCAS group had its earlier ties with the Social Christian movement and politically supported the Christian Democratic Party in the 1960s. It grew slowly and by some estimates had no more than 1,500 members by the early 1970s.\(^7\) In the mid-1970s FECCAS allied with the Peasant Workers Union (UTC), a smaller group in Chalatenango. The FECCAS-UTC group became more radicalized throughout the 1970s as they began to occupy lands and press for demands. After 1974 the Catholic Church would play an influential role in its activities, as leaders in the Christian Base Communities, various urban organizations, and FECLAS joined together in organizing the United Popular Action Front (FAPU). It would later align itself with a guerrilla organization.\(^4\)

The government allowed the creation of a group to address peasant problems. The Salvadoran Communal Union (UCS), a peasant association, began organizing in the early 1960s.\(^5\) The leadership underwent training programs administered by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) as part of the Alliance for Progress. In the mid-1960s the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) provided training as well. Since unions were still illegal in the rural areas all these groups had to proceed with care. In early 1968 the first of peasant unions were set up in the departments of La Paz and Usulatán. The UCS attempted to ease the rural problems by establishing cooperatives (co-ops). By mid-1968 the UCS had organized 20 co-ops with 4,000 members.\(^6\) Montes indicates that the UCS support base increased in the departments of Santa Ana, Ahuachapán, Usulután, San Miguel, La Unión, Sonsonate, and Morazán. By mid-1970 they had an estimated 70,000 members.\(^7\)
Montgomery identifies two major differences between the UCS and the other peasant organizations during the 1970s as ideological and structural. Ideological in that the UCS was established to control the peasants, satisfying expectations to a point, while the FAPU, among others, wanted to change the system. The structure was different because most UCS leadership was picked by those outside the peasant community. However, by 1980 the UCS became more radical as well, as it became a target of repression.

The church. Following the Second Latin American Bishop's Conference held in Medellin, Colombia, in 1968 "liberation theology" began to flourish in Latin America. It stressed that the Lord sided with the poor in their struggle for dignity. Poverty was not due to the will of God, but rather the greed of the rich. These views led to changes in the Salvadoran Church in the 1970s. Jenny Pearce credits José Alas, a priest of Suchitoto, Chalatenango, with establishing the first "Comunidades de base" (Christian Base Communities). Alas stated, "we organized the peasants to defend themselves." Although not prominent in the 1960s the church would play a vital role during the 1970s. The training of lay leaders in establishing the Base Communities was done through centers. One source gives a figure of 15,000 leaders being trained during the 1970s.

The university. In 1966 a private university, the Central American University José Simeón Cañas (UCA), was organized. White states this new university was established primarily "because of disquiet among some sectors of the economic elite and of the church over the 'Marxist bias' of the University of El Salvador," which was under the rectorship of Fabio Castillo (1963-1967). The UCA,
operated primarily by Jesuits, let the oligarchy know in no uncertain terms in 1970 that it was not an instrument of the economic elite as it took a strong position in favor of agrarian reform. By 1975 the university had established itself as political opposition to the government.

Urban sector. By the 1971 census the economic active population outside agriculture in El Salvador was 45.8%. During the "economic boom" of the 1960s manufacturing production increased by 24% while manufacturing employment only increased by 6%. The inability of the sector to expand employment did not allow an adequate escape mechanism during a period when landlessness increased and many more peasants had to turn to wage labor. It also inhibited consumer demand that in turn would have stimulated other growth. As shown on Table 6-1 growth of employment has been primarily in the service sector, normally lower paying and temporary jobs.

Although the constitution of 1950 established various reforms, including the worker's right to organize unions and strike, they were often met with repressive tactics. Legality of union activities is subject to the interpretation of the government. Trade unions are divided on left-right political lines. The unions of the 1970s can be traced back to 1957 with the founding of the General Confederation of Salvadoran Workers (CGTS). Since it had links to the Communist Party, thus was seen as a threat, the Lemus Government founded the General Confederation of Trade Unions (CGS) in 1958. According to Menjívar the CGTS, up through 1960, was subjected to constant repression and struggle against the government. One source put the strength of the CGTS in 1960 at 4,000 members and 11 unions.
By 1963 the CGS had an estimated two-thirds of trade-union membership with 63 unions and 20,000 members; this would change by 1976 (see Table 6-6). In 1965 the CGTS merged with a number of smaller unions to form the United Federation of Salvadoran Trade Unions (FUSS). In addition to FUSS there are a number of other unions on the left.

### TABLE 6-6

EL SALVADOR: GROWTH OF TRADE UNIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Unions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CGS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Rafael Menjivar, Formación y lucha del proletariado industrial salvadoreño (San Salvador, El Salvador: UCA Editores, 1979), Tables 10 and 12.

A 1968 teachers' strike further radicalized the trade union movement. According to hearings before a subcommittee in the House of Representatives some 1,000 persons were arrested, several were killed, and at least 30 detainees disappeared. Although active in the late 1960s the leftist trade unions were not unified and did not appear to represent a majority of the urban workers.
Using national level indicators for the period leading up to 1972 it has been shown that El Salvador was prospering. However at the worker level, particularly the rural worker, this prosperity was not being realized. While other sectors of society improved, his piece of the pie certainly did not get bigger, and possibly decreased.

Politically there was greater participation and polarization as the ruling party was faced with a stronger, more organized opposition. The Communist Party, although illegal, gave support to the opposition and unification followed in the wake of the 1972 presidential elections. Although repression was not unknown, it was not significantly greater than in some previous eras and was less so than in others.

Summary

By 1972 El Salvador was a country with a long history of authoritarian rule, controlled by an economic elite and ruled by the military. The situation of the peasant in the countryside had not improved even as the country showed significant economic growth. At the same time the middle sectors of society seemed to be improving their lot, as evidenced by income distribution and physical quality of life (Tables 6-1 and 6-2). Organizational networks were well underway in most sectors of the society to express their desires to the state. The military, although showing internal conflicts from time to time, remained unopposed as the coercive power. Meanwhile a disenchanted
leader of the Communist Party took it upon himself to organize forces to topple the government through armed struggle. What was the spark that ignited the fires of revolution in 1972?

Precipitants

The single event of 1972 that appears to have turned the tide toward revolution as the only path to change was the political "closure" that resulted from the fraudulent presidential elections. Although the ground work for the FPL had been underway since 1970 it was not till after this event that its leadership felt the timing was right. Salvador Cayetano Carpio stated in reference to forming the FPL that

this historical necessity arose after a long process of ideological struggle within the traditional organizations when it became evident that they [Communist Party] stubbornly refused to lead the working class and the people in general in the new stages of struggle that needed to be undertaken . . . we'd reached the conclusion that after so many years of military dictatorship, the electoral course was closed in our country and that the unions, in themselves, were not effective means for leading the people to liberation.

Carpio is quoted at length because it is apparent that the existence of the revolutionary movement at this time was due in large part to his leadership and determination. He clearly states political motivations and discontent over his struggle within the Communist Party in the 1960s. The formation of the movement at a critical moment resulted in a struggle that has been ongoing for 14 years, not particularly long in the history of revolutionary struggles.
Economic Factors

While the economy did well in the 1960s, the 1970s proved to be quite different. After 1977 the economy went into a tail spin with 1979 showing a -1.6% change in gross domestic product. From 1979 to 1982 the mean annual percent growth in GDP was -6.3%, as compared to over 5% the previous 10 years (Figure 6-1). At the consumer level, indicators such as real wages become important.

Figure 6-2 indicates the fluctuations in a real wage index for the period. The 1973 to 1975 period stands out as sharp declines in real wages were evident. Evidence of discontent can also be seen by examining data on industrial disputes for this period. Figure 6-3 shows the cumulative disputes and the number of people involved. Although the strike data should be treated with caution, as it is a reflection of what the government reports (as presented here), it nevertheless can indicate periods of unrest and discontent. The cumulative data indicate the period with the greatest tensions to be 1976-1979, with all sectors of industry, except services and trade, experiencing labor disputes in 1977.

As indicated earlier the situation in the countryside deteriorated as the number of landless peasants doubled from 1971 to 1975. At the same time there is an erosion in the physical quality of life index.

Many factors contributed to this decline, but generally two major events (in addition to internal violence) are credited with the change in the economy: (a) the petroleum price increases by OPEC in 1973-74 caused prices to increase in 1974 and 1975, therefore real wages decline; and (b) in 1979 another sharp increase in petroleum prices

FIGURE 6-1

EL SALVADOR: PERCENT CHANGE IN GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1970-83
FIGURE 6-2
EL SALVADOR: REAL WAGE INDEXES
(1970 = 100)


Note: ---- Agricultural Minimum Wage (AW)  ----- Average Manufacturing Wage (MW)
Workers (W) (S) Strikes

85,000- 105-
80,000- 75-
60,000- 50-
40,000- 25-
20,000- 12-
10,000-
5,000-
4,000-
2,000- 1,000-


FIGURE 6-3
EL SALVADOR: INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES, 1971-81
combined with a world recession that reduced the prices for coffee, cotton, and sugar exports further strained economic growth.\textsuperscript{91} Evidence presented by V. Bulmer-Thomas indicates that by 1982 the economic situation had deteriorated to a 1959 level. Using 1950 as a base year, he calculates that the gross domestic product per capita in 1959 was $192 (US), while it was $289 in 1979, by 1982 it had declined to $196.\textsuperscript{92}

Political Factors

With political "closure" in 1972 the Molina Government, recognizing the increasing tensions, attempted to make some reforms. The most sought-after reform measure, land reform, was reconsidered. Guillermo Ungo, Duarte's running mate in 1972 and current President of the FDR, wrote in 1976 that the government attempts "marked a new stage." He saw the Salvadoran Institute of Agrarian Transformation (ISTA) project, created in a 1975 law, as one aspect of a process where the military government was trying to lessen the domination of the economic elite.\textsuperscript{93} However, it met sudden death as the oligarchy managed to make the program ineffective. At the same time, violence, on both the left and right, increased.

After the 1972 election of Molina repressive tactics against political parties, universities, popular organizations, and unions became apparent. In July the National Assembly issued a decree removing the University of El Salvador's autonomy. The main university and its associated branches were then closed and occupied by security forces.\textsuperscript{94} It was not reopened until September 1973. During the 1970s incidences of political violence are normally
associated with the elements of the revolutionary forces or right-wing organizations. Several of these are organizations such as the Democratic Nationalist Organization (ORDEN), founded in the 1960s by Colonel José Alberto Medrano, Anti-Communist Armed Forces of Liberation by Wars of Elimination (FALANGE), began operating in 1975, and the White Guerrilla Union (UGB), began operating in 1972. The UGB, under the leadership of Robert D'Aubuisson, was linked to most of the suppression of the peasants. These organizations, supported by the oligarchy, drew their membership primarily from retired or off duty security forces, but recruited individuals from various sectors of the society (peasants to middle class). As this violence increased so did mobilization efforts to confront the government. It was during the 1972 to 1977 period that most of the revolutionary and popular organizations were formed and society became increasingly polarized (see Figure 7-1).

The electoral process remained "closed" throughout the 1970s as electoral fraud in 1974 and 1976 legislative elections showed few signs of being curtailed. The presidential election of General Carlos H. Romero in 1977 was no exception. Romero came to power with the intent to bring peace and order, regardless of the social cost. Baloyra states that ORDEN now operated with orders directly from the executive.

Although the data for a government's repressive measures are nearly always open to questions of reliability, most accounts consider the Romero period (1977-1979) a time of stepped up repressive tactics against political opponents. Following a visit to El Salvador in January 1978 to investigate the human rights situation, Thomas P.
Anderson, as part of a team accompanying U.S. Representative Robert Drinan, stated "the level of repression and of the violation of human rights is today higher than it has been in any other period since 1931."

101 These generalizations are supported by data presented by Vallecillos comparing political violence during the Molina and Romero governments (see Table 6-7). While Romero only had a little over two years in office, July 1977 to October 1979, there is an increase of 282% in political violence initiated by the government from the Molina era. During the same period violence initiated by the guerrillas increased by 141%. The result was increased radicalization as violence was met with violence. The targets of right-wing political violence included many oppositional groups, but of significance was the targeting of church officials. This brought outcries from domestic and international circles.

102 By July 1979 the situation intensified. In neighboring Nicaragua the Sandinistas had just overthrown one of the longest standing dictatorships in Latin America. Like Nicaragua, El Salvador's military assistance had been cut off by the United States in 1977 due to human rights conditions. The message was clear to the young officers, something had to change before they met the same fate as the Guardia Nacional, and a coup d'état overthrew Romero on 15 October 1979, forming a junta government.

103 The events of the next 12 months cannot be fully dealt with here but what evolved resulted in two transformations that completely polarized the revolutionary situation. First was the unification of the revolutionary left and second their coalition with the Democratic Revolutionary Front which eliminated much of the legal political opposition of the government.
TABLE 6-7
EL SALVADOR: POLITICAL VIOLENCE, 1972-1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Molina 1972-77</th>
<th>Romero 1977-79</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initiated by Government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Assassinations</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>1176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded by Security Forces</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosecuted for Political Offenses</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disappeared</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Terrorist Acts</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priests Killed</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiated by Guerrillas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacks</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killing Security Forces</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killing Paramilitary Personnel</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded in Guerrilla Attacks</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidnappings</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The "demonstration effect" of the Sandinista victory cannot be ruled out as providing a boost in morale and recruitment for the revolutionaries. However, the coup caught the revolutionary organizations off guard and each reacted somewhat differently. This lack of unity resulted in the inability to take advantage of a potentially vulnerable situation. The first Junta Government lasted only till January 1980 as the progressive members resigned. Baloyra outlines the reasons for the breakup of this first Junta, pointing to the fact that political violence had increased since the coup, instead of decreasing, and it
was becoming clear to Junta members and cabinet ministers that the military had not lived up to their proclamation. One member of this first Junta, Guillermo Ungo, and several ministers (Rubén Zamora, Enrique Alvarez, and Salvador Samayo), would later become leaders within the FMLN-FDR.

At the same time the guerrilla organizations, with the aid of Cuba, unified. The 1980 assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero served to fully polarize the non-revolutionary groups and on April 11 the Democratic Front (FD) was formed, including those groups who had broken from the first Junta. Less than a week later the FD joined several long-time radical groups, including the Communist Party, in creating the Democratic Revolutionary Front.

Summary

While the precipitant for the revolution in El Salvador can be traced to the political "closure" in 1972 the revolutionary fire was kept burning by a deterioration in the economic sphere and stepped up repression. The die was cast when the first Junta Government was unable to open up the political system, thus fully polarizing the situation.

If one is willing to accept that socioeconomic and political indicators can be used to infer "relative deprivation" then Ted Gurr's thesis explains a great many of the causal factors of the El Salvadoran Revolution. Even without these data, statements of revolutionary and non-revolutionary political leaders ring of discontent and frustration in trying to deal within the "rules of the
game" to bring about change. Whether these are the motivations for the majority of the participants is not certain. Clearly the peasants, workers, teachers, priests, etc., had reason enough to be discontented. Whether that was sufficient to make a commitment to armed insurrection is debatable.

In the final analysis, structural conditions that perpetuated discontent among various sectors of the society are at the roots of the revolution. However, even that would not have been sufficient for a revolutionary crisis. The organizational leadership and dedication of a group of leaders started the revolutionary fire. The inability of the political and economic leadership of the country to open the system has kept it going. Thus, traces of various theories of revolution run through the case of El Salvador.

Notes


3 Fernando Flores Pinel, "El golpe de estado en Salvador, un camino hacia la democratización?" Estudios Centroamericanos, 34 (Oct.-Nov. 1979): 892. Also data on unsuccessful attempts can be obtained from Elam and Mariano Castro Morán, Función política del ejército salvadoreño en el presente siglo (San Salvador, El Salvador: Impreso en El Salvador, Centroamérica, 1984). Things did not improve from 1944-61, as there were 5 successful coups.


5 Ibid., pp. 88-96.

6 Morán, pp. 78-97.
Anderson, Matanza, pp. 136-146. While some sources say the death toll was over 30,000, Anderson has effectively argued that perhaps 10,000 is a more realistic figure.

David Browning, El Salvador: Landscape and Society (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 162. While in 1870 indigo exports were $2,619,749, coffee was only $663,347. In 1875 coffee exports rose to $1,673,157 while indigo was $1,160,700. The decline in indigo was due in part to the rise in analine dyes, reducing the demand for indigo.

Ministerio de Hacienda. Statistics by department show the concentration of the Indian population in the western region where coffee plantations prospered.

Browning, El Salvador, pp. 184, 205, 208; White, pp. 73-94; William Durham, Scarcity and Survival in Central America (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1979), pp. 42-46. Ejido land is that land available for community members to clear, cultivate, and then abandon; while communal lands are available for all villagers to gather firewood and graze animals.

Browning, El Salvador, pp. 191, 205, 208, 213-214. He offers evidence that indicates in the coffee producing areas (west) the land was coming under the control of large landowners while the east remained primarily in individuals' hands.


White, pp. 117-118.

Ibid.


Marroquín, pp. 117-118. For example, "Upper Class" includes bankers, industrialists, and successful planters.
18 Anderson, Matanza, pp. 28, 36.

19 Baloyra, El Salvador in Transition, pp. 7-8, 22-30; Wilson, pp. 62-64. Baloyra provides excellent analysis of the El Salvadoran Oligarchy.

20 Anderson provides excellent analysis of the Matanza and Marroquin does an in-depth probe of the depression years.

21 Anderson, Matanza, pp. 41-68, 80-89.

22 Wilson, p. 256.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 White, p. 104; Marroquin, p. 145.

26 White, pp. 103-104.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.; Elam, p. 115.

30 White, p. 189.

31 Elam, pp. 112-115, 124-126. The inter-generational conflict stemmed from a new law passed in 1945 placing officer billets and positions on a pre-war status. While senior officer positions returned to those of pre-WW II, junior officer slots were dramatically reduced. There were 172 fewer captains, lieutenants, and sub-lieutenants than in the prior period.

32 Ibid., p. 55

33 Ibid., p. 15. Junior officers played key roles in attempted coups on 2 April 1944 and 10 July 1945.

34 Ibid., pp. 126, 140-142; Morán, pp. 201-208.

35 The "Tanda" (classmate) system refers to linkages between those officers of the same graduating class at the Military Academy. There were also alliances between tandas.


37 For example, in 1955 Osorio proposed that a civilian be his successor. He was immediately informed by a "large contingent" of army officers that a civilian candidate was not unacceptable. Finally José María Lemus was chosen. See Elam, p. 150.

39 White, pp. 105-106; Elam, pp. 146-147; Rafael Menjívar, *Formacion y lucha del proletariado industrial salvadoreño* (San Salvador, El Salvador: UCS Editores, 1979), p. 91.

40 Montgomery, p. 12.

41 White, p. 106; Elam, pp. 153-155.


44 White, pp. 118-119.


46 White, pp. 118-119.

47 Menjívar, pp. 86-87.


50 López Vallecillos, "Rasgos sociales," p. 865; Elam, p. 164; Weber, gives an excellent analysis of the PDC.

51 PCN was formed as the official party after 1961.

52 Morán, p. 226.

53 White, pp. 108, 115 (no. 65).

54 White, p. 108.

55 Montgomery, p. 80.


57 Ibid.


These accounts taken from interviews with Carpio contained in Menendez, pp. 13-68, and Harnecker, pp. 125-137.

Author's translation from López Vallecillos, "Rasgos sociales," p. 866.


Durham, p. 32.


Ibid., Table 311-05.

Wilson, p. 129.

Burke, p. 59.


Burke, p. 481.


Ibid., pp. 100-101.

Montgomery, pp. 117-123.

Pearce, pp. 92-97.

Ibid.


These accounts are from Penny Lernoux, *Cry of the People* (New York: Doubleday, 1980), pp. 36-41.

Pearce, p. 103.

Montgomery, p. 103.

White, p. 239. Castillo was the opposition presidential candidate in 1967.

Montgomery, p. 107.

Karush, p. 69.

Menjívar, p. 91; Monteforte, pp. 128-129.

Menfívar, p. 93.

Monteforte, p. 128.

Menjívar, p. 99.


Menéndez, pp. 16, 35.


V. Bulmer-Thomas, "Economic Development Over the Long Run in Central America Since 1920," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 15 (November 1983): 272, 279. He also shows that the 1929-1934 depression was not as severe, measured using per change of GDP, as the 1979-1982 period.


Montgomery, pp. 88-89; López Vallecillos, pp. 869-870.

CHAPTER VII
REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

Thirty-eight years transpired after the Matanza (1932 revolt) before strategical and ideological differences within the Communist Party (PCS) led to the birth of El Salvador's first revolutionary organization. Salvador Cayetano Carpio led less than a dozen dissident youths from the PCS and formed an organization that eventually became the Popular Forces of Liberation (FPL) Farabundo Martí, taking the name of the Communist leader who organized the revolt of 1932. From this meek beginning arose a movement that challenged the government throughout the 1970s and attempted to overthrow the regime in a "final" offensive in January 1981.

While Chapter VI traced the roots of the revolution, the purpose of this chapter is to analyze the movement to determine its "strength." Certain characteristics of the El Salvadoran revolutionary movement point to ultimate success, in accordance with the propositions outlined in Chapter III. Clearly the Farabundo Martí National Liberation (FMLN) front has created a larger base of support than the failed cases previously mentioned. It has obtained unification to a certain degree, and its armed forces are larger than Castro's were and the Sandinista's until possibly the end. Table 7-1 represents a sampling of various reported strength figures of the revolutionary movement from 1979 to 1986. While a variety of agencies have reported these data, they all stem from two authorities. One are
### TABLE 7-1
REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT FORCE LEVELS (+)

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>3500-</td>
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<td>4000-</td>
<td>9000-</td>
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<td>4500</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>11000</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>b</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>10000</td>
<td>6000</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>f</td>
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<td>6000</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>9000-</td>
<td>5200</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: (+) These data represent combatants, those normally directly involved in combat operations, and support personnel. Support personnel include communications, sanitation, supply, cooks, and administrative personnel living in the base camps.
the data from the United States' government or the El Salvadoran armed forces (sources a, b, and c in Table 7-1), and the other comes from sporadic reports from leaders of the movement (sources d, e, and f). Quotes from news articles have generally accepted the government data. The most revealing statistics were provided by Napoleón Romero García, a leader of the Popular Forces of Liberation (FPL) who was captured on 11 April 1985, which included data by organization.² The sources indicate that the revolutionary forces reached a peak in 1984, 9,000 to 10,000, and have declined since then.

The FMLN gained international support (see Chapter IX) far beyond the cases of failure and developed a sophisticated support network. At the same time the movement has yet to obtain the ingredients for a "strong" revolutionary movement. It has obtained very little support from the middle class business sector, let alone any of the economic elite, and thus, are missing the key ingredients for the developments of a broad coalition. Its unity has been superficial, for most of the period, and the coalition with the political non-revolutionary social democratic groups has been constantly strained.

Evolution

Although the nucleus of the revolutionary movement emerged from the Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS), it did not play a key role in the evolution of the movement. The PCS was founded in 1930 by Augustín Farabundo Martí, but faded from El Salvadoran history after the failed insurrection of 1932. It began to reassert itself, still illegally, in the 1960s by working through mass organizations. However, its membership remained insignificant. United States
government sources estimated that in the mid-1960s the party had approximately 200 members.¹³ Like other communist parties in Latin America it was content to pursue political means to effect social change.

The organizational structure of the El Salvadoran revolutionary movement is indeed complex and has evolved from a series of internal and external struggles since 1970 (see Figure 7-1). As repression of the opposition intensified in the mid to late 1970s a ballooning effect took place as several popular and guerrilla organizations appeared on the scene.

**Guerrilla Organizations**

When Salvador Cayetano Carpio resigned from the post of Secretary General of the Communist Party on 1 April 1970 and formed the Popular Forces of Liberation (FPL), he was 50 years old. Before he joined the Communist Party in the late 1940s he studied at the Catholic seminary for a period of time, worked as a laborer, a baker, and a union organizer.⁴ Certainly the Cuban Revolution and the "foco" theory had an impact on Cayetano Carpio, but his course was somewhat different. For two years the FPL had no name, but worked on building a political and military base formed from radicalized members of the Christian communities, students, teachers, and union activists.⁵ With the support of workers, Cayetano Carpio began in the urban area and did not expand to agricultural workers and peasants until 1974. The reason was to avoid "erroneous plans" of the failed revolutionary organizations of the 1960s.⁶ As "Marcial," Cayetano Carpio became known as the Ho Chi Minh of Central America. He held firm in his
FIGURE 7-1

EVOLUTION OF SALVADORAN OPPOSITIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Legend: Guerrilla Organization  Break-away Group
Popular Organization  Associated Orgs
Umbrella Organization  Joined Coalition

belief that the revolution would have to be Marxist-Leninist based, and adapted the strategy of a "prolonged popular war." While "Marcial" was establishing the FPL, another group of young revolutionary leaders were forming at the National University.

In 1972, this group, composed primarily of radical students including young communists and some Christian Democrats, formed the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP). After the 1972 electoral fraud, the appeal of the revolutionary groups increased and the FPL assumed its name and began visible guerrilla operations. While "Marcial" and the FPL were devoted to the strategy of a prolonged popular war, the ERP believed that insurrection could be sparked by dramatic armed attacks. Its tactics included kidnappings, bombings, and assassinations. The ERP was able to increase its funds and gain publicity, but at the same time, became isolated from the populace.

Due to the dissatisfaction over policies and strategy within the revolutionary groups, between 1972 and 1975, different sectors split off and formed several new organizations. Factionalism within the ERP split the organization in 1975. The execution for treason of the poet Roque Dalton, head of the political faction in the ERP, resulted in the founding of the Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN). Supposedly this was because of his insistence that the political aspect be followed, rather than the military. Also, Dalton was accused of being a spy for the Central Intelligence Agency as well as the Cubans. During the 1970s the ERP and FARN spent much of their time trying to eliminate each other.

In January 1976, another revolutionary group was formed by Francisco Jovel, also known as Roberto Roca. He maintained that a
successful revolutionary movement must encompass all of Central America. He formed the Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (PRTC), intending to promote this cause in all five countries. By 1980 this concept was overcome by several events, including the Nicaraguan success, and this idea was abandoned. Many of its members had been involved in the student groups that formed the basis of the ERP, while others were from unions.  

By the end of 1979, even the Communist Party under Shafik Handal had abandoned its opposition to armed struggle and formed the Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL). While the guerrilla organizations were confronting the regime with limited success it was actually the growth of the popular organizations beginning in 1974 that placed increasing pressure on the system.

Popular Organizations

The church played an important role in the evolution of the "mass" organizations. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Archbishop of El Salvador, Luis Chávez y Gómez, promoted peasant co-ops and encouraged the organization of illegal peasant unions. From such groups as the Christian Federation of Salvadoran Peasants (FECCAS), formed in the 1960s, came a new breed of popular organizations in the 1970s. The United Popular Action Front (FAPU), Bloque or Popular Revolutionary Bloc (BPR), 28th of February Popular Leagues (LP-28), and the smaller Popular Liberation Movement (MLP) were formed between 1974 and 1979. By 1980, the strength of all these groups, plus the Communist Party version, Nationalist Democratic Union (UDN), were estimated to exceed 100,000.
The FAPU, formed in 1974, represented a new trend in the El Salvadoran revolutionary process. In 1975, it joined in an alliance with the FARN. Other guerrilla organizations quickly followed suit as the FPL aligned itself with the BPR which was formed by a splinter group from the FAPU in 1975. Subsequently, the ERP formed the 28th of February Popular Leagues (LP-28) in 1978. Their expression of discontent through protest marches and acts of disobedience resulted in attacks from the right (ORDEN, UGB). These groups opposed the government on a scale beyond the capabilities of the guerrilla organizations. They drew support from various sectors including peasants, radicalized clergy, agricultural workers, professors, trade unions, and student organizations.\textsuperscript{15}

The association and distinction between the guerrilla and popular organizations is an important one in understanding the El Salvadoran revolutionary movement. The popular organizations represent broad fronts that were subversive in that they were not granted legal recognition by the regime. Ferman Cienfuegos, an FMLN-FDR leader, describes the popular organizations' role as bringing about the political development of the masses.\textsuperscript{16} While some of the popular organizations (LP-28) were formed as political tools by the guerrilla groups (ERP), others have demonstrated greater autonomy (FAPU, BPR). During the 1970s and 1980s, they supported the guerrilla organizations by politicizing the populace, recruiting personnel, and placing pressure on the government by occupying embassies as well as organizing strikes and marches to protest government policies.\textsuperscript{17}

Even though the organizational structure of the revolutionary movement was developing, each faction was approaching the problem in a
slightly different way. This diversification prevented success on any large scale; unity among groups was the missing link. Divisions centered on the course of action to be followed. This eventually became a main obstacle in securing unification. The "prolonged popular war" strategy of the FPL versus the call for an immediate insurrection by the ERP remained the wedge between these two groups. This was graphically demonstrated following the coup d'état in Oct. 1979. Some of the organizations, including the Communist Party, either joined the junta or maintained contact with sectors of the military. The ERP and LP-28 called for immediate insurrection. While the FPL and BPR were skeptical of the Army's ability to reform, they offered no support to such an insurrection.18

Unity and Coalition Building

In 1979 the Nicaraguan Revolution illustrated the importance of unity as well as a broad coalition with non-revolutionary groups. The impending collapse of the Romero dictatorship raised the hopes of a guerrilla victory. However, when Romero fell the unification process was not evident as some groups decided to participate in the first junta government.

On 22 January 1980 the creation of the Revolutionary Coordination of the Masses (CRM) was announced. This new umbrella organization included the popular organizations, BPR, FAPU, LP-28, and the UDN (see Figure 7-1). The MLP was initially excluded, but was allowed to join later in May. Meanwhile the Democratic Front (FD) was formed. This group included Christian Democrats, who had resigned from their party
rather than serve in the government formed in January 1980. This organization consisted of social democrats led by Guillermo Ungo, and a small association of professionals. This provided the opportunity to unify both marxist and non-marxist factions of the leftist oppositional groups. The Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR) was founded on 1 April 1980 to merge the two umbrella organizations, the FD and the CRM. The FDR, which has often been compared to the FAO in Nicaragua, elected multimillionaire, Enrique Alvarez Córdoba, as its first president. Following the assassination of Alvarez, Guillermo Ungo, José Napoleón Duarte's running mate in 1972 and member of the first Junta government after the 1979 coup, became the FDR president.

In May 1980, the leaders of the FPL, ERP, FARN, and the FAL formed the Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU). This alliance was brittle because strategic arguments continued. The FARN wanted to pursue splits in the military; however, the other organizations resisted this effort. More significant was the FARN's objections to a majority rule principle that the FPL, ERP, and FAL wanted to implement. The FARN argued that the DRU should coordinate actions while "every component organ continues existing individually." This confrontation led to FARN walking out on the DRU. However, the FARN returned in November 1980 agreeing to the principle of majority rule. Additional debates over the strategy of all-out insurrection pitted the FPL against other members. The FPL eventually went along with plans for an all-out insurrection and offensive in early 1981. The DRU fell short in serving to coordinate and execute military operations. This function was fulfilled in November 1980 when the
PRTC joined the other four guerrilla organizations to form the Farabundo Martí National Liberation (FMLN) front.\textsuperscript{22} It soon became apparent that a coalition existed between the FMLN and FDR. In January 1981 the FMLN-FDR presented its platform that proposed, in general terms: (a) overthrow of the military dictatorship, of the oligarchy, and U.S. imperialism; (b) to end the overall political, economic, and social power of the great lords of the land and capital; (c) assure democratic rights and freedoms to the entire populace; (d) create a new army; and (e) institute various reforms.\textsuperscript{23} Shortly after the final offensive in January 1981, the FMLN and FDR announced in Mexico the formation of a Political-Diplomatic Commission. A coalition had been established between the two which would represent the revolutionary movement in the international arena.\textsuperscript{24} Joaquín Villalobos, ERP leader, conceded that by the time the revolutionary movement was prepared or unified to launch the final offensive in January 1981, the most opportune moment had passed. While the populace was ready for action in March-April 1980, the movement was not. The people failed to respond in January 1981 and the guerrilla organizations were not militarily prepared without their support.\textsuperscript{25} They retreated to the mountains—the FPL to its strongholds in Chalatenango, the ERP to Morazán, and the FARN to Guazapa Volcano.\textsuperscript{26} Rather than reinforcing the need for a unified effort sharp divisions remained between the FPL, Cayetano Carpio, and the ERP, Villalobos. According to Villalobos, he called for a major offensive that could spark an insurrection when the March 1982 elections approached, but the FPL did not respond.\textsuperscript{27} The elections
were a defeat for the revolutionaries, and it was then recognized that the main problem was how to militarily break the Army. This meant increasing coordination in their activities.

In April 1983 an internal power struggle in the FPL resulted in the death of its leader, Cayetano Carpio, as well as his second-in-command, Mélinda Anaya Montés. This transpired due to (a) Cayetano Carpio's continued hard-line stance and (b) the increasing influence of Anaya Montes, not only in the FPL but also among other members of the FMLN. The result was the purging of the FPL and the split of a group, the Salvador Cayetano Carpio Revolutionary Workers' Movement, that consists of a small urban group who were strong supporters of Cayetano Carpio. Although this group apparently has broken completely from the FMLN it does not represent a threat to the unity of the organization. In fact, this change in the FPL enhanced the chances of unity among the revolutionary organizations.

Beginning in April 1983, the potential for unity increased, but problems still plagued the process. The People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) tactics of forced recruitment of peasants in 1984 and kidnapping of mayors in the spring of 1985 were not accepted by all members of the FMLN as necessary or beneficial to the movement. Also on 19 August 1985 the Clara Elizabeth Ramírez Front (FCER), a faction of the FPL, issued a communique proclaiming their opposition to the position taken by the General Command of the FMLN in its 7th Revolutionary Council held in July. They claimed it failed to follow the original principles and strategy, "prolonged popular war," of the FPL. However, by late 1985 unification of the major guerrilla organizations apparently was making progress. Examples of this include events
surrounding the kidnapping of President Duarte's daughter, Ines Guadalupe Duarte Duran. The operation was carried out by an FAL faction, reportedly without the prior consent of the General Command of the FMLN. However, the FMLN took responsibility and the FPL assisted the group in the negotiation process. While this shows continued independent operation of various factions, it also shows a concern on the FMLN's part to present an image of a united movement. At the same time, discussion continued on the formation of a single revolutionary party.

From August to December 1985 various reports surfaced proclaiming the intention of the FMLN to establish a single revolutionary party. Announcements by Joaquin Villalobos, Shafik Handal, Communist Party leader, and a FARN leader, made it clear that their objective was to convert the movement into one "revolutionary party." One academic analyst said "never has there been such a statement of commitment by the FMLN." However, no such unification process has yet transpired and available data do not provide sufficient evidence to conclude that a change has occurred in the operational methods of the various organizations since these announcements. Some of the events that indicate a move toward further unification of the revolutionary organizations are also driving a wedge between the existing coalition of the FDR and FMLN.

In early 1986, elements of the FDR openly moved back to El Salvador to test the possibilities of a political "opening." This move would have been unthinkable a few years ago, particularly since four leaders of the FDR, including its president, had been murdered in late 1980. This occurred after a series of events in 1985 that
highlighted disagreement within the FMLN-FDR coalition. In response to the announcement by the FMLN to form a single revolutionary party, officials of the FDR said they would not join such a party. In August 1985, Rubén Zamora, an FDR leader, said that reports of such unity had been misread. He maintained that the five divergent revolutionary organizations of the FMLN remained separate and their only agreement was a common interpretation of the FMLN's military rule.

Initial indications of divisions between the FDR and FMLN publicly surfaced in mid-1985. This came after an element of the FMLN killed 13 people, including four U.S. Marines, in a San Salvador Cafe--Zona Rosa. The MPSC, a major component of the FDR, called the Zona Rosa attack an act of terrorism. The kidnapping of Ines Guadalupe Duarte Duran also exposed tensions between the guerrillas and politicians. While the kidnapping may have had some short-term gains for the revolutionary movement, by creating friction between the president and the Army and bringing the government to a virtual standstill, the FDR viewed it as politically damaging, both domestically and internationally. Additionally, representatives of the FDR in West Germany, Costa Rica, Washington, and Nicaragua have either returned to El Salvador or taken other positions. While this evidence does not prove a breakdown of the FDR itself or the FMLN-FDR coalition, it does indicate a fragile situation.

Since 1981, the FDR has failed to draw additional support from the middle-class business sector or upper-class organizations, such as the Salvadoran Industrialists' Association--ASI, Productive Alliance--AP (Business Group), or landowners and cattlemen, even though these
groups have continuously opposed the El Salvadoran government.\textsuperscript{43} Therefore, the coalition has not broadened to the extent that existed in the Nicaraguan and Cuban revolutions. One obstacle is the ideological foundation of the movement. Unlike the revolutionary organizations of the Nicaraguan revolutionary movement, the FMLN groups have made no move to moderate their ideological doctrine.

**Ideology**

Although the guerrilla and popular organizations have been characterized as encompassing Marxist ideologies from "Trotskyist to Castroist to Orthodox Marxist to Marxist-Leninist,"\textsuperscript{44} it is said the ideology generally followed is the Marxist-Leninist doctrine with a common "anti-oligarchical" and "anti-imperialist" theme.\textsuperscript{45} There are ample data, such as statements by the leaders of the various organizations, to support this characterization.\textsuperscript{46}

Up to 1985 the FMLN avoided proclaiming itself to be marxist. In August 1985 the FMLN pointed out "yes there are marxist-leniinists" in the organization, but "within the FMLN there are different types of thinking."\textsuperscript{47} However, in December 1985, the New York Times reported that in a September FMLN publication revealed to a reporter, the revolutionary movement proclaimed it was "trying to construct one Marxist-Leninist party . . . and its direction is toward socialism."\textsuperscript{48} While other publications of FMLN-FDR have not revealed such overt statements, "internal" captured documents refer to the goal of forming a Marxist-Leninist party.\textsuperscript{49} As a minimum, the movement has remained "revolutionary" in its open declarations. Since 1981 few changes have
been made to the FMLN-FDR platform. The initial calls for the
dissolution of the Army have been modified to accept the existence of
two armies with the eventual merging of the rebel forces and El
Salvadoran Armed Forces following the establishment of a provisional
government.50

The FMLN has made it clear that it does not see its revolution as
being subservient to any other power, such as Cuba or the Soviet
Union and has stated that the El Salvadoran Revolution is the most
significant revolutionary process to occur in Latin America.51
Changes in military strategy have occurred, as the military and
political situation changed, and after six years of in-fighting the
movement appears to have settled for a war of attrition. This
generally follows Cayetano Carpio and the FPL's prolonged popular war
concept, but also calls for the realization of the need for large-
scale offensive operations to keep the enemy off balance.52 Since
1984 a corner-stone of the FMLN-FDR struggle has been their principle
of "dual power." This has been primarily a political battle, using
the negotiation process to verify its legitimacy, but relying upon the
existence of "controlled" areas as proof of the validity of the
principle.

**Dual Power**

The "Dual Power" phenomenon was first advanced by the FMLN-FDR in
early 1984 after zones of "control" were established (see Figure 7-2).
In January 1985 the General Command of the FMLN argued that the
negotiation process in October-November 1984 legitimized the principle

FIGURE 7-2
FMLN CONTROLLED AREAS, 1981-1985
of dual power due to the government's recognition of the need for
dialogue. The principle attempts to raise the issue of the existence
of two powers in El Salvador. Some would argue against this.53

Figure 7-2 outlines those areas that the FMLN claims to have
"controlled" militarily, politically, and economically from 1981 to
1985. No sources from the Salvadoran or U.S. government were found
that acknowledged the existence of such areas. However, the
establishment of such areas is undeniable. What remains questionable
is the extent of the FMLN's control. In 1984 the FMLN claimed to
control more than 5,000 square kilometers and 70 municipalities,
roughly 20% of the national territory. The FMLN also announced their
control of 28 municipalities in the department of Chalatenango.54 In
1985, the FMLN asserted that during the 1984 elections, "in one-third
of the country (80 municipalities) elections could not take place due
to disruption by the FMLN."55 This can be verified using electoral
returns from the March 1984 elections as well as an assessment of the
extent of FMLN "control." Election results should indicate the lack
of elections in FMLN "controlled" areas, or a greater percentage of
null (nulos) votes cast in those areas, versus other departments
within the country.

Table 7-2 shows the number of municipalities in each department
where elections were not held and the percentage of null votes.
Clearly, the departments where the FMLN claimed to exercise control
were the ones in which electoral polls were not established. While
the percentage of municipalities that did not hold elections was 22%,
these data do not support the FMLN claims of control over 28
municipalities in Chalatenango or that 80 municipalities did not hold
### TABLE 7-2
EL SALVADOR: POLLING LOCATIONS OF MARCH 1984 ELECTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Number Municipalities</th>
<th>Elections Not Held</th>
<th>Null Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chalatenango</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morazán</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Miguel</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Unión</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usulután</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabañas</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Ana</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Vicente</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuscatlán</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Salvador</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Libertad</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sonsonate</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Paz</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahuachapán</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Computed from Consejo Central de Elecciones El Salvador Computos Oficiales (San Salvador, El Salvador: Author, April 1984), pp. 1-15 [Xerox copy].

Note: Departments underlined are those the FMLN claim to exercise some measure of "control," based upon Figure 7-2.

Data on null votes offer little insight. One problem is that the category nulos includes not only ballots spoiled by the voter, but also those which were declared null and void because of some official or technical irregularity. However, one distinguishing feature was that the two departments having the highest percentage of null votes were also areas where the FMLN claimed to have zones under their control (Figure 7-2). Nevertheless, elections...
were still held in all municipalities. This may indicate some support at the polls, even though they did not prevent elections from taking place.

While it may be argued that the areas controlled by the revolutionaries are the least important economically, it still remains that a significant portion of the country is under their influence (22% using this method), even to the degree the government cannot exercise political power. This provides legitimacy to the claim of "dual power."

**Summary**

While the revolutionary movement in El Salvador has established itself as a recognized power contender it has yet to achieve the status of a "strong" revolutionary movement. The movement must be considered unified in that it has formed a unified organization and has demonstrated that its groups operate in association with one another. However, this unification effort has had its limitations and various revolutionary organizations have continued to operate with varying degrees of independence.

As the unifying effort appears to be progressing the FMLN-FDR coalition appears to be weakening. The Marxist-Leninist ideological doctrine of the movement limits their potential for broadening the coalition with other non-revolutionary groups. Late 1983-early 1984 was apparently the strongest period for the movement. Unity was advancing, the FMLN-FDR coalition remained intact, and its strength was at an all-time high. Since that time the coalition has weakened,
force levels have decreased, and unity is still only an unfulfilled desire. An examination of the regime provides some explanation for these changes.

Notes

1Menéndez, pp. 16-17; Harnecker, pp. 134-135.

2U.S. Department of State, "Captured Documents and Briefing of Napoleón Romero Garcia," 1985 [Xerox copy], pp. 4-5. In late 1984 the number of combatants and support personnel, by guerrilla organization, were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FPL</th>
<th>PRTC</th>
<th>ERP</th>
<th>FAL</th>
<th>FARN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1700</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>2300</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>5200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


4See interviews by Menéndez, pp. 14, 16, 18, 35; Harnecker, pp. 125-126.


6Carpio said he was deeply influenced by the failure of the 1960s. He said "we needed to leave that formula behind, and so, for the first while, we didn't ask for aid of any kind . . . we didn't feel that we had in practice lived the revolutionary life." See Menéndez, p. 19.


8Menéndez, pp. 90-93; Leiken, "The Salvadoran Left," pp. 113-115; Montgomery, p. 121; "The PRS-ERP: A Significant Force in the Struggle," Granma, 18 May 1980, p. 8. Baloyra, El Salvador in Transition, p. 161, gives another version saying the ERP evolved out of a split in the FPL in 1971. However, all others maintain it was formed separate from the FPL.


12For a review of the church's role in the revolutionary movement, see Montgomery, pp. 97-117.

13Montgomery, pp. 122-128; Baloyra, El Salvador in Transition, pp. 67-73. For a description of all these organizations, their ideology, membership, and goals, see Lopez, "Fuerzas sociales," pp. 572-575.

14Estimates vary, but by the early 1980s, the BPR was the largest with 60,000-80,000 members; FAPU had 15,000-40,000; LP-28 had 5,000-15,000; UDN about 25,000; and the MLP about 1,500. For early 1980 data, see Segundo Montes, El Salvador: las fuerzas sociales en la presente coyuntura (San Salvador, El Salvador: UCA Publicaciones, 1984), pp. 27; for 1979 data see Montgomery, pp. 125-126; and Baloyra, El Salvador in Transition, pp. 70-71.

15Ibid. The popular organizations include the support of the General Association of Salvadorean University Students (AGEUS), Association of Salvadorean Bus Owners (AEAS), National Union Federation of Salvadorean Workers (FENASTRAS), Federation of Workers' Unions in the Food, Clothing, Textile, and Related Industries of El Salvador (FESTIAVTSCES), Revolutionary Union Federation (FSR), Unitary Salvadorean Union Federation (FUSS), Independent Movement of Professionals and Technicians of El Salvador (MIPTES), Union of the Institute of Salvadorean Social Security Workers (STISS), and Textile Union of United Industries, Inc. (STIUUSA).


21Montgomery, p. 131.


This commission consisted of seven members. Two from the FDR and one political representative from each guerrilla organization. Montgomery, p. 140; Baloyra, El Salvador in Transition, p. 161.

According to Villalobos March-April 1980 was the most opportune moment for the "final" offensive. By Jan. 1981 the repressive-reformist nature of the regime had altered the conditions. Divisions within the military had been resolved, thus the hope that some sectors of the Army would rebel did not materialize.

Interview with Marta Harnecker. See Harnecker, p. 138.

Villalobos does not refer directly to the FPL's lack of action, but he states "all the forces did not have the same political evaluation of this situation," which in essence means the FPL since they had little to do with these operations.

Ibid., p. 158. Villalobos does not refer directly to the FPL's lack of action, but he states "all the forces did not have the same political evaluation of this situation," which in essence means the FPL since they had little to do with these operations.


This is based upon a review of various sources such as the New York Times and Foreign Broadcast Information Service--Latin America. One well-known scholar of the El Salvadoran Revolution recently said the guerrilla organizations still basically operate as separate groups. See Enrique Baloyra, "Negotiating War in El Salvador: Politics of End Game," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 28 (Spring 1986): 23-49.

See "FDR Activist Return Legally," Latin American Weekly Report, WR-86-06, 7 Feb. 1986, p. 11. These are leaders and activists of the MPSC, one of the major organizations of the FDR. The MPSC leader, Rubén Zamora, denied this move indicated a split in the FMLN-FDR coalition or in the FDR itself.

Montgomery, p. 140; Baloyra, El Salvador in Transition, p. 113.


Since 1981, the make-up of the FDR has remained fairly stable. Some additional working class organizations apparently joined the popular organizations in 1986, but as of yet no alliances have developed with the middle-class business sector that have strongly protested recent government economic policies. Chapter VIII will also address this issue.


Montgomery, p. 154; Comandancia general del frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberacion Nacional, Con el tiempo a nuestro favor, p. 18.

Comandancia general del frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, Con el Tiempo a nuestro favor, p. 18.

LeMoyne, "Salvador Rebels Trying to Unify," p. 1. Reportedly the rebel document is titled "Strategic Appreciation of the Situation," dated September 1985 and issued in the name of the FMLN, but not the FDR. This was a document that came out of the 7th Revolutionary Council meeting in June or July in Morazán. I have been unable to obtain this document. Documents I have obtained since that date do not refer to the establishment of a "Marxist-Leninist" party, but rather to a "revolutionary" party.


Comandancia general del frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, Situación revolucionaria, pp. 9-10.

For discussion of the chronology of changes in the FMLN strategy see "Guerrillas Revive Urban Tactics," Latin American Weekly Report, WR-85-11, 22 Mar. 1985, p. 2; "Salvador Rebels Change Tactics," Washington Post, 17 May 1985, p. 3. From 1972 to 1981 the tactics of the guerrillas centered on urban warfare concentrating on creating an atmosphere of chaos through kidnappings, assassinations, extortions, and bank robberies. This created a climate of repression. Organizations, particularly the FARN, obtained considerable ransom money. From Jan. 1981 to early 1985 the revolutionary organizations concentrated on guerrilla warfare to include large scale operations. Since then they have shifted back to urban tactics, but occasionally launch large scale attacks to prove they still have this capability. Thus, they have implemented a war of attrition.

These data are based upon March 1984 electoral returns rather than the April runoff election.

Prior to October 1979, an "authoritarian" regime existed in El Salvador that maintained a "closed" political process. Enrique A. Baloyra has described the system of government that existed before 15 October 1979 as fitting the model of "reactionary despotism," or one that is "monopolized by a reactionary coalition that maintains an exclusionary political regime in which actual or potential opponents are denied basic citizens' rights."¹ The 15 October 1979 coup d'état dissolved that system and the government moved toward a "non-authoritarian" regime that, in 1984, elected the first civilian president in over 50 years. This political process has been filled with violence and still does not include the participation of all opposition forces. However, the government has enacted important reform measures and the incidences of repression that characterized the regimes of the 1970s and early 1980s have steadily declined. The military has remained loyal to the government and greatly increased its effectiveness as a professional armed forces. This chapter will outline the characteristics of the El Salvadoran regimes from 1979 to 1986 and their effects on the outcome of the revolutionary process. This includes identifying and discussing non-revolutionary groups, the political process, attempts at reform, repressive tactics, and the armed forces. What have been the effects of changes instituted by the regime on non-revolutionary groups?
The Political Game

The first year following the 1979 coup the government was in a state of fluctuation, and by the end of 1980, the Junta Revolucionaria de Gobierno had been reshaped four times (see Table 8-1). In January 1980, after the first Junta dissolved, the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) decided to join and nominated José Antonio Morales Ehrlich and Hector Data to the second Junta. Dr. José Ramón Avalos Navarrete was chosen as the fifth member. The formation of this new Junta, with the greater participation of the PDC, was not received warmly by either the right or left. Such groups as the Salvadoran Industrialists' Association (ASI) and the National Conciliation Party (PCN) attacked the PDC. The ASI criticized the PDC for excluding the private sector and the PDN believed the whole process was being manipulated by the communists. Meanwhile, the popular organizations had formed the Revolutionary Coordination of the Masses (CRM). In early 1980, the CRM joined several oppositional non-revolutionary groups in forming the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR), and eventually they aligned themselves with the guerrilla organizations (FMLN). But who are the non-revolutionary groups that have yet to enter into a coalition with the FMLN-FDR?

Non-Revolutionary Groups

The alliances developed following the 1979 coup have remained fairly stable. The following is a brief overview of the principal non-revolutionary groups that could play a role in broadening the revolutionary coalition. The terms left, center, and right are used
**TABLE 8-1**
REGIMES (Oct. 1979-1986)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Junta Members or President</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
             |                                             | Col. Jaime Abdul Gutiérrez  
             |                                             | Guillermo Manuel Ungo  
             |                                             | Román Mayorga Quiroz  
             |                                             | Mario Andino |
             |                                             | Col. Jaime Abdul Gutiérrez  
             |                                             | José Antonio Morales Ehrlich  
             |                                             | José Ramón Avalos Navarrete  
             |                                             | Hector Data Hirezi |
             |                                             | Col. Jaime Abdul Gutiérrez  
             |                                             | José Antonio Morales Ehrlich  
             |                                             | José Ramón Avalos Navarrete  
             |                                             | José Napoleón Duarte |
| 4th Junta (+) | Dec. 1980-May 1982 | José Napoleón Duarte  
             |                                             | Col. Jaime Abdul Gutiérrez  
             |                                             | José Antonio Morales Ehrlich  
             |                                             | José Ramon Avalos Navarrete |
| Provisional President | May 1982-June 1984 | Alvaro Magaña |
| President   | June 1984-      | José Napoleón Duarte |


Note: (+) José Napoleón Duarte served as President of the Junta from 22 December 1980 until Alvaro Magaña was chosen Provisional President in May 1982. Col. Gutiérrez served as Vice-President of the Junta.
in the traditional sense and no further ideological identity will be presented. Rather, the position of various groups in relation to the regime is analyzed.

By early 1981, the left consisted of the FMLN-FDR. The remainder of the political spectrum includes groups in the center, on the right, and the "disloyal" right. Generally, the political alliances have been the Christian Democratic Party (POC) with the military, supported by segments of the petite-bourgeoisie, organized urban labor, some peasant unions, and part of the church. The right has included members, or ex-members, of the armed forces as well as conservative segments of the private sector, and the "disloyal" right has been comprised of ex-members of the armed forces and segments of the traditional oligarchy. Table 8-2 shows a sampling of the groups which represent the major political parties as well as some of the larger interest groups.

While these groups are represented as being center, right, or "disloyal" right, this does not mean they have not supported each other on various issues. In March 1980, the National Association of Private Enterprise (ANEP), which in early 1980 reportedly represented 37 agricultural and industrial trade associations and joined the AP when it was formed in July 1980, supported the Junta Revolucionaria de Gobierno. Its president condemned those who oppose changes and do not see the need for reforms. This did not represent unconditional support for the government, but did indicate a willingness on their part to accept some reform measures. By July 1980, the AP, representing a broadbase of the private sector that included small entrepreneurs as well as the business sector, expressed concern over
### TABLE 8-2

**POLITICAL ALLIANCES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alliance</th>
<th>Political Groups</th>
<th>Interest Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Left</strong></td>
<td>Democratic Front--FD (+)</td>
<td>Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front--FMLN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Coordination of the Masses--CRM (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>National Unity of (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Salvadoran Workers--UNTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Center</strong></td>
<td>Christian Democratic Party--PDC</td>
<td>Majority of Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Salvadoran Communal Union--UCS (Peasant Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Union of National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Workers--Campesinos--UNOC (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Right</strong></td>
<td>National Conciliation Party--PCN</td>
<td>Productive Alliance--AP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Popular Salvadoran Party--PPS</td>
<td>(Business Groups)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Salvadoran Authentic Institutional Party--</td>
<td>Portions of Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PAISA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>&quot;Disloyal&quot; Right</strong></td>
<td>Nationalist Republican Alliance--ARENA</td>
<td>Portions of Military Front of Agriculturalists of the Eastern Region--FARO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Death Squads&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Notes:** (+) See Chapter VII for various groups. (++) Formed in 1986.
lack of representation in the government and wanted to be involved in matters affecting economic development. They claimed to be a loyal opposition, not of the extreme right or left, and not against such measures as the agrarian reform, but expressing deep concerns over banking reforms.\(^5\)

The term "disloyal" right refers to the "core elements of the deposed reactionary coalition who have been conspiring to derail the process begun in October 1979."\(^6\) The key actor in this group has been ex-Major Roberto D'Aubuisson, who formed ARENA in November 1981. The "disloyal" right sought to destabilize the government and to eliminate the possibilities of establishing a broad government coalition. The tool they most often used was political violence—"death squads"—striking out at targets of the left, center, and right. After ARENA's defeat in the 1985 elections, D'Aubuisson resigned as leader of the party; however, he still vowed not to end his role in Salvadoran politics.\(^7\) The FARO, composed of landowners and cattlemen, and others, who have considerable to lose from agrarian reform measures, defend traditional export agriculture. While they share the common interests of groups of the right, the FARO has been more radical in their positions, and also have been connected to the violent groups of the "disloyal" right.\(^8\)

The military continues to be a major factor in El Salvadoran politics. As such their alliance and support of the PDC has been a critical element in the survival of the Junta governments and the Duarte government.

The PDC was formed in 1960 by Julio Adolfo Rey Prendes, Guillermo Ungo, and José Napoleón Duarte, all leaders in the political life of
El Salvador today. Traditionally, the PDC has been a party of middle-class professionals with a substantial following in urban areas, particularly in San Salvador. The strength of the PDC remains in the urban areas, among such groups as UNOC; however, some peasant unions (like the UCS) support them as well. Many unions belong to the popular organizations and some support the PDC, while others, such as the National Unity of Salvadoran Workers (UNTS), oppose government policies but have not joined the revolutionary organizations. The UNTS was formed in 1986 and is the nation's largest labor coalition. In April 1986, they organized an estimated 70,000 marchers to protest an economic reform package.

Since 1979, the critical issues among these non-revolutionary groups have been reform measures, obtaining political power to have an input into economic policies, and the control of political violence. These led to the destruction of the first Junta and continue to be key factors in political alliances.

Political Process

On 25 February 1980, the PDC Attorney General Mario Zamora, brother of Rubén Zamora, was killed, and on 3 March, Hector Dada resigned from the Junta. José Napoleón Duarte, who had returned from exile in October 1979, stepped in to take his place. This increased the friction within the PDC and led to the resignation of many progressive members of the party, some joining the mass organizations, while others (Rubén Zamora) formed a splinter group, the Popular Social Christian Movement (MPSC). In April, the MPSC joined with
other organizations to form the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR).

On 24 March, after three months of intense civil unrest, increasing violence, and political polarization, Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero was assassinated by a right-wing "death squad." Political violence continued to escalate. Gabriel A. González estimated that political assassinations averaged 12 per month in 1978, 64 per month from January to September 1979, 150 per month from October to December 1979, and 331 per month from January to March 1980 (see Table 8-3). Data compiled by the Salvadoran Commission on Human Rights (CDHES) and the Socorro Jurídico of the Archbishop's office indicated that 689 political assassinations had occurred between 1 January and 13 March 1980. These sources base these data on events reported to them by eye witnesses or second-hand accounts. The level of violence would continue throughout 1980, reaching an average of over 700 deaths per month in the last six months of the year. The increase of violence was a result of increased activities of both the violent left and "disloyal" right, but, during 1980, the most serious threat to the government came from the right rather than the guerrilla forces.

Since the 1979 coup, the "disloyal" right made a continuous effort to regain control of the government. On 3 December 1980, Colonel Majano, the leading military reformist, was ousted from the Junta by the military. It appeared that the "disloyal" right was succeeding in its goal. However, on 6 December, Duarte and Morales Ehrlich threatened to resign unless members of the military associated with D'Aubuisson were removed. They also insisted that Colonel
## TABLE 8-3

**POLITICAL VIOLENCE, 1978-1980 (+)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Gabriel A. González (a)</th>
<th>Socorro Jurídico/CDHES (b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Total</td>
<td>147</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Monthly</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan.-Sept.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Total</td>
<td>580</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Monthly</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Total</td>
<td>450</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Monthly</td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan.-Mar.</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Total</td>
<td>992</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Monthly</td>
<td>331</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr.-Oct.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Total</td>
<td>5458</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Monthly</td>
<td>779</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Compiled from (a) Gabriel A. González, "Genocidio y guerra de exterminio en El Salvador," Estudios Centroamericanos, 35 (Oct.-Nov. 80): 983-991; (b) Estudios Centroamericanos, 35 (Mar.-Apr. 1980): 396-397.

**Notes:** (+) Gabriel A. González's data are based upon his own estimates from news accounts, Socorro Jurídico, and individual reports; Socorro Jurídico is associated with the Archbishop's office; CDHES, the Human Rights Commission of El Salvador, is not affiliated with the Salvadoran government.

Nicolás Carranza, the deputy minister of defense, and Colonel Morán, head of the Treasury Policy, who had been associated with the political violence, be demoted. The result was a reorganization of the government that made Duarte president of the Junta, Gutiérrez,
vice-president, demoted Carranza, and on 31 December 1981, removed some supporters of D'Aubuisson from active duty. This measure of success did not eliminate the danger of the extreme right, but did advance the alliance between the military and the PDC. The situation radicalized in 1980 and 1981 began with the Farabundo Martí National Liberation front launching a "final offensive."

The ability of the Junta governments to survive these crucial years (1979-1982) enabled an election to be held. Realistically, few had illusions that elections would end the war, but they could offer "hope" and legitimize a government facing a deteriorating situation. The economy had declined to its lowest level in 1981, with a negative growth rate of -9.3% in gross domestic product. The military defeat of the left seemed unlikely since the FMLN had established control of certain areas of the countryside. Most observers of the Salvadoran elections agree that the elections were fair, but some questioned their validity since they occurred during a time of virtual "civil war."

Critics of elections in El Salvador have referred to them as "elections without choice." This infers that since parties of the left do not participate, there is little choice between those of the center and right. Before the 1982 elections, the FDR was recognized by the central electoral council as a representative political force; however, the FMLN was not since they had actively engaged in armed insurrection. By declining to participate in elections, the FDR pointed to the inherent danger of assassinations, which certainly must be considered valid due to the events of late 1980 when most of their leadership was murdered. Even though the left has not participated,
the choice had been between reformist elements who have made some efforts towards a negotiated settlement and those who would return to the establishment of a "reactionary coalition." The concern of the populace and a measure of their attitude toward the electoral process and the revolution can be seen in a survey done by the Universidad Centroamericana Simeón Cañas (UCA). The opinion surveys encompassed a sample of 1588 students (mean age 21.8 years) and over 2000 urban middle, working, and lower class individuals (mean age 36.1 years). Only approximately 2.3% of the respondents believed in a military solution to the revolution. Among the students, 51.4% saw negotiations and a dialogue as the best means of solving the crisis. It seems obvious that the electorate wants peace. In this respect there has been some choice. The PDC at least has been willing to talk with the revolutionaries which is something the right violently opposes.

Six parties participated in the 1982 elections and two more registered for the 1984 and 1985 elections (see Table 8-4). However, all the elections have been dominated by three major parties (PDC, ARENA, and PCN). Certainly, the electoral process operated under constraints, such as non-participation of the FMLN-FDR, under "war" conditions, and with a large number of refugees (some estimate over 10% of the population) outside the country. Nevertheless, this process has legitimized the government, in both domestic and international circles.

In March 1982 a constituent assembly (60 members) was elected with the job to write a new constitution, select a provisional president, and organize presidential elections. Much was written
TABLE 8-4
EL SALVADOR: ELECTORAL RESULTS, 1980s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(+) Parties</th>
<th>Constituent Assembly 1982 (a)</th>
<th>Presidential 1984 (b)</th>
<th>Municipal/ National Assembly 1985 (c)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Votes % Seats</td>
<td>Votes % Seats</td>
<td>Votes % Seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDC</td>
<td>543,150 40.3 24</td>
<td>549,727 43.4</td>
<td>505,338 52.4 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARENA</td>
<td>395,086 29.3 19</td>
<td>376,917 29.8</td>
<td>286,665 26.7 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCN</td>
<td>258,305 19.1 14</td>
<td>144,556 19.3</td>
<td>80,730 8.3 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>152,216 11.3 3</td>
<td>95,076 6.5</td>
<td>92,498 9.6 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Valid</td>
<td>1,348,759 100.0 60</td>
<td>1,266,276 100.0 60</td>
<td>965,231 100.0 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDC</td>
<td>752,625 53.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARENA</td>
<td>651,741 46.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Valid</td>
<td>1,404,366 100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


About how these elections were a victory for the "disloyal" right since a coalition of the right represented a majority in the Assembly (36 seats) and Roberto D'Aubuisson was elected its president.23 However, due in part to pressure from the armed forces and the United States, Dr. Alvaro Magaña, an independent, was selected as provisional...
president. On 2 May 1982, three vice-presidents, one each from the three major parties, were sworn in with Magaña. Even if the election of 1982 was a victory for ARENA, they did not gain control of the government from 1982 to 1984. Alvaro Magaña joined with members of the PDC, ARENA, PCN, and PPS in working out a platform for the new government. The agreement, known as the "Pact of Apaneca," established a Political Commission consisting of Magaña, the three vice-presidents of the Constituent Assembly, the foreign minister, the minister of defense and public security, and additional representatives of ARENA, the PCN, and the PPS. The Magaña government made limited gains, but was unable to control the political violence and some reform measures were blocked; however, it did prevent the complete takeover of the government by the extreme right (ARENA). This was accomplished through a series of political maneuvers worked out among Magaña, the PDC, PCN, and PPS, as well as being supported by the armed forces. One major accomplishment of the Magaña government was to oversee the process leading to the 1984 presidential elections.

These elections were contested by eight candidates, with the front-runners being D'Aubuisson and Duarte, neither of whom received a majority. A runoff was held in May, and Duarte won with 53.6% of the vote. In 1985, the PDC unexpectedly swept the elections, obtaining 33 seats in the National Assembly and winning over 75% of the municipalities. The right (ARENA, PCN, PAISA) requested a nullification of the elections. Not only did the central electoral council deny the request, but the armed forces chief-of-staff, General Adolfo Oneciforo Blandón, and minister of defense, General Eugenio...
Vides Casanova, came out in support of the election outcome. This decreased obstruction in the National Assembly to Duarte's policies and was a major victory for the PDC.

In analyzing results of the three elections, based upon support to the PDC or ARENA with such variables as areas with greater guerrilla activity (see Chapter VII) or agrarian reform, several observations become apparent. In all three elections the PDC won in the departments of San Salvador, where they received 53.2% in 1982 and 59.9% in March 1984, Santa Ana and La Libertad. While San Salvador has traditionally been a stronghold of the PDC, the latter two were among the departments that benefited the most from the agrarian reform implemented under the Junta governments (see Figure 8-1). With the exception of Usulután and Ahuachapán, which supported ARENA in 1982, all the departments with more than three estates expropriated by Phase I of the agrarian reform law of 1980 voted for the PDC in all the elections. On the other hand, ARENA did best in the departments of Cabañas (42.2% in March 1984) and Cuscatlán (42.1% in March 1984), isolated rural departments which benefited little from agrarian reform. Also the majority of those departments with portions under "control" of the FMLN voted for the PDC, although there were exceptions, such as Cabañas and Usulután (1982 elections).

On the whole the elections have resulted in the establishment of political legitimacy for the government during a time of crisis. They also have worked toward opening up a system that was once "closed." Some of the rebels acknowledged in mid-1985 that there had been a political opening under Duarte. The "hope" of winning power through the electoral process is still available, and in 1986, the FDR showed

**FIGURE 8-1**

EXPROPRIATION OF AGRICULTURAL ESTATES
signs of testing the "political" possibilities as activists of the Popular Social Christian Movement (MPSC) moved back into El Salvador. At the same time, the avenue remains open for non-revolutionary groups that may oppose the government, but have not joined the rebels. This is in sharp contrast to situations in Cuba and Nicaragua during their respective revolutions.

**Reform and Repression**

**Reform**

Table 8-5 shows some of the major reform measures that have been implemented since October 1979. In responding to their mandate, the first two Junta governments prepared and/or enacted a series of reforms. A measure of success of these reforms is illustrated by the reaction of the economic "elite," and sectors of the right. They immediately attempted to block their implementation or get them repealed. Of particular concern was the long sought agrarian reform program. The need for agrarian reform in El Salvador is clear, but it has encountered difficulties from both the landowners and the insurgents. Groups of the "disloyal" right turned to tactics of intimidation and murder to discourage peasant participation while guerrilla "war taxes," plus attacks against the economy, impeded progress. Insufficient data and the absence of field research make it difficult to perform a complete analysis of the actual effects of the program, but it is possible to summarize the major components of the reform and discuss its implication within the context of the revolutionary process.
TABLE 8-5
REFORM MEASURES, 1979-1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Froze all titles to farms over 100 hectares</td>
<td>7 Dec. 1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Nationalized domestic and export trade of coffee</td>
<td>2 Jan. 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Agrarian reform measures</td>
<td>6 Mar. 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Nationalized banks and savings and loans</td>
<td>7 Mar. 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) &quot;Land-to-Tiller&quot; or Phase III of Agrarian reform</td>
<td>28 Apr. 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Judicial reform</td>
<td>June 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Economic Stabilization Package</td>
<td>23 Jan. 1986</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Agrarian reform includes more than a simple redistribution of land. It requires a shift in the system of land tenure and uses as well as financial and technical assistance in order for it to be effective. The first step after the 1979 coup in initiating agricultural reform was the freezing of all titles to farms over 100 hectares. It gave the government the authority to control the disposition of those lands that would potentially be most affected by reform.35

El Salvador's agrarian reform is now in its sixth year of implementation. Its effectiveness has been disputed, and the critics claim few have benefited.36 It is true the program has benefited far fewer than originally envisioned, the progress has been slow, and its future is uncertain. However, the political ramifications of the
Agrarian reform must be considered, and evidence shows it has made fundamental changes in the ownership of agricultural land. Briefly, the program involved three phases. In March 1980, Phase I was implemented that expropriated 262 private farms in excess of 500 hectares, plus 66 properties of less than 500 hectares, and converted them into 328 cooperatives, which represented about 240,000 hectares or 15% of the total agricultural land. This measure benefited workers and dependents who were resident or employees on the expropriated estates. Figure 8-1 shows the number of expropriated estates (in 1980), by department, as compared to the 103 estates acquired from 1932 to 1979, which represented 5% of agricultural land.

Considering the Salvadoran history of agrarian reform in the last 50 years, this was a radical reform measure. By 1986, the Agency for International Development reported that Phase I had transformed 469 large farm properties into 517 cooperatives, benefitting over 230,000 people.

Phase II applies to medium-sized farms between 100 and 500 hectares that are worked with hired laborers. This phase was stalled by legislation in 1982 that blocked its implementation. If carried out, it could affect nearly 1,700 properties or roughly an additional 25% of the land in farms. Many of these size farms may be affected by the 1983 constitution, which only gives landowners with properties in excess of 242 hectares until December 1986 to sell their properties or face expropriation without compensation. The failure of the government to carry this phase forward has been seen by many critics as a lack of commitment to agrarian reform and it still remains to be seen if the government will move forward in this area.
Phase III is the land-to-tiller program which benefits former renters and sharecroppers by granting them the land they have farmed. By applying for a title for the land, up to a maximum of seven hectares, the individual farmer can become the owner. Beyond the resistance of the traditional landowners to this measure, this phase falls short of meeting the basic needs of the small landholders. While it is possible for a family to provide for itself from a seven hectare holding, the average smallholding applied for under Phase III has been approximately 1.5 hectares, thus requiring additional means of income. By 1986, 96,000 hectares of farmland had been granted to 65,782 beneficiaries.\(^{42}\)

Other problems encountered include abandonment of cooperatives, financial difficulties in instituting Phase I, rural landlessness cannot be adequately solved within the program, and the number of applicants under Phase III is below the number who could be taking advantage of the law.\(^{43}\) The reform's three phases only currently affect 26% of the rural poor and 22% of the farmland.\(^ {44}\) However, the government, supported by the military, has taken steps in carrying out agrarian reform which was a clear deviation from the historic alliance that once existed between the oligarchy, or economic "elite," and the military.

Other reforms, such as nationalization of agricultural trade and banks, affected other sectors of the elite. These reforms were of sufficient impact and importance to stimulate a violent attack upon the Junta Revolucionaria de Gobierno in the media by organizations of the right and "disloyal" right. The opposition came from coffee growers and processors, bankers, as well as sectors of the business
community. These measures, along with agrarian reform, helped maintain support among the peasantry and the urban labor. By 1986, the regime faced various opposition groups, but none of these groups had moved toward establishing a coalition with the revolutionaries. However, the economic situation was taking its toll.

From 1979 to December 1985 the agricultural minimum wages had not changed, manufacturing wages had increased 44%, and public employees had received an increase of 29.3%. Meanwhile the consumer price index had increased 150%. However, the economy as a whole was starting to show signs of improvement. The gross domestic product, after decreasing -9.3% in 1981, had finally showed a modest increase of 1.5% and 1.6% in 1984 and 1985, respectively. The United States Embassy-El Salvador Economic Counselor estimated that the economy in 1986 may achieve a growth rate of up to 2%, which would be the highest rate of growth since 1978. The reason for this increase, he said, was "the announcement on January 21, 1986, by President Duarte, of a much needed economic stabilization program." This package is the most sweeping economic measure taken since the reform measures of the early 1980s and represents President Duarte's first significant economic move since taking office. However, it has met criticism from sectors that previously supported programs of the government.

The program seeks to bring about a measure of economic stabilization, but initially achieved what was referred to as "the impossible--the discovery of common ground between the forces of left and right." Is this the beginning of broadening the coalition between non-revolutionary groups with the guerrilla forces? First, an examination of the package.
It has been labeled as a "stabilization and economic reactivation program." In order to accomplish this, the package attempts to eliminate the fiscal deficit through an additional tax on coffee, 50% devaluation of the colon (down from 2.5 colones per dollar to 5), raising interest rates to 15%, limiting monetary and credit expansion, and stimulation of exports and production. Additionally, a one-year ban on certain luxury imports was announced. The program also raised petrol prices, approximately 47%, and public transport fares increased 20%. In order to offset some of the impact of these changes, raises in public and private sector wages, supported by price controls on basic goods, medicines, plus freezing rents, water, and electricity rates were incorporated. For example, wage increases included the agricultural minimum wage (up 53.8%), manufacturing and services (up 15.4% to 27.3%--varied with location), and an average increase of 4.9% for public sector employees with salaries below 3,500 colones per month. While Duarte was reluctant to devalue the currency, arguing the poor will suffer and the rich will gain by increased profits from exports and price rises, his advisors stated that it was necessary in order to compete on the international market.

While in the long term the package may prove to boost the economy, in the short run, the government is facing increased opposition. Most business groups voiced their dissatisfaction with the economic program, but the most pronounced opposition came from the workers. The Popular Democratic Unity, a coalition of unions that had supported Duarte, joined the newly formed National Unity of Salvadoran Workers (UNTS) who came out in staunch opposition to the program. This is not to say all the working-class abandoned Duarte, as the UNOC
staged a march, with estimates ranging from 40,000 to 80,000 workers, in the capital to show their support for the government. However, in the first six months of 1986 several strikes and marches were held to express their discontent. An important element in the decision of various non-revolutionary groups in establishing an alliance with revolutionary forces is the reaction of the regime in the face of criticism. In this respect, the Duarte government has shown restraint and negotiated settlements with these organizations rather than sending in the troops. Examples of peaceful demonstrations and work stoppages include a work stoppage in April of approximately 50,000 city workers and 300,000 in the rural areas; and, in May, UNTS organized a march through San Salvador of between 15,000 and 25,000 workers, without incident. Another example is a strike, from May to June, by 1200 telecommunication workers (ANTELI) which ended, after 51 days, in an agreement over wages and working conditions with the management. However, the attempt to limit the abuse of authority had been made since mid-1984, when the security forces had shown restraint in handling several kidnappings and robberies, as well as the government demonstrating a willingness to grant certain demands of the workers. A review of repressive tactics and political violence indicates that while violations of these kind continue, significant improvements have been made.

Repression

It has been well documented that since 1979, political violence, meaning violent acts resulting in the death, injury, imprisonment, or
disappearance of non-combatants (civilians) for political motives, has been used by the left and right. The extent to which members of the government and armed forces are involved is uncertain, but evidence clearly indicates that some individuals of the military have been involved in these activities. The important element here is not "who" commits the act, but rather, has the government sanctioned the use of repressive tactics or attempted to control its application? In the case of El Salvador, two areas become important. One is the data on political violence, and the other is attempts to bring to justice those suspected of committing such acts.

Determining the reliability of data on political violence in El Salvador is an extremely difficult task. All information sources are subject to distortions due to data collection problems as well as subjective interpretations. No one source is reliable in that there is no way to verify to what degree the data reflect all cases of political violence. Some sources, such as those based upon press reports, appear more valid than others because they can be confirmed by witnesses, police reports, and family members. However, even these are questionable as it is often not clear whether the act was a political motive or a violent crime, or if they were confirmed. This analysis will draw upon five sources, over varying periods between 1981 and 1985, to illustrate that even with the differences in reporting, there is a common trend (see Table 8-6). These are the primary sources quoted by groups on both sides of the political spectrum. The U.S. State Department maintains that the primary difference between their data, collected from press reports, and that of human rights organizations, is that the human rights groups include
### TABLE 8-6

**POLITICAL VIOLENCE, 1981-1985 (+)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>(a) Press Reports</th>
<th>(a,b,c) Socorro Jurídico</th>
<th>(a,b) CDHES</th>
<th>(a,b) UCA</th>
<th>(a,b) Tutela Legal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,331</td>
<td>13,353</td>
<td>16,276</td>
<td>11,929</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>1,112</td>
<td>1,356</td>
<td>994</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,630</td>
<td>5,969</td>
<td>4,740</td>
<td>4,300</td>
<td>2,322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun.-Dec.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>-50.7</td>
<td>-55.3</td>
<td>-70.9</td>
<td>-63.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,677</td>
<td>5,373</td>
<td>4,929</td>
<td>1,867</td>
<td>5,219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>-36.2</td>
<td>-9.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>-56.6</td>
<td>31.1(++)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>2,505</td>
<td>2,242</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>2,290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan.-June</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>-52.3</td>
<td>-53.4</td>
<td>-54.5</td>
<td>-43.3(++)</td>
<td>-56.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>1,655</td>
<td>1,543</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan.-June</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>-52.8</td>
<td>-33.9</td>
<td>-31.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-1985</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 81-</td>
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<td>Jan. 81-</td>
<td>June 82-</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 85</td>
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<td>June 84</td>
<td>Dec. 86</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>28,855</td>
<td>29,730</td>
<td>18,622</td>
<td>11,976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>-92.9(++)</td>
<td>-87.6</td>
<td>-90.5</td>
<td>-91.2</td>
<td>-46.1(++)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Notes:** (+) Press Reports compiled by U.S. State Department; Socorro Jurídico became Socorro Jurídico Cristiano in May 1982 after being replaced in the Archdiocese by Tutela Legal; CDHES, the Salvadoran Government; UCA, the Jesuit-run University of Central America, stopped compiling statistics after June 1985; Tutela Legal is the legal aid office of the Archbishop of San Salvador. (++) Percent change computed based upon monthly average.
not only civilian casualties, but guerrillas killed in combat operations, and therefore are inflated. Nevertheless, all data clearly indicate a high level of repression existed. Political violence is far from being eliminated, but all sources recorded a significant decrease from 1981 to 1985, with the number of victims dropping between -46.1 to -92.9%.

One element affecting this trend has been the efforts by the government to control the activities of the various groups involved in political violence. This includes removing individuals within the military associated with these groups, restructuring the security forces, and investigating and apprehending those involved. Within the first month after he was elected in May 1984, Duarte took several actions to "improve the climate of security" and to bring the security forces under control of the government. These actions included disbanding a Treasury Police unit that was commonly linked to the "disloyal" right "death squad" activity; removing Colonel Nicolás Carranza, also linked to the "disloyal" right, from his position as Treasury Police chief; bringing the control of all security forces (Treasury Police, National Police, and National Guard) under the command of the minister of defense; and removing LTC Mario Denis Morán, linked to "death squad" activity, from his position as commander in southern La Paz. Nevertheless, these officers were not prosecuted or removed from active service. They were reassigned to overseas posts, a common punishment for Salvadoran officers embarking upon "subversive" activities not sanctioned by their superiors. These were important steps in signaling the regime's intent to reduce such
activity, but the links remain as the individuals were, in essence, sent into a "golden" exile, and LTC Denis Morán was promoted to full Colonel in February 1986.56

Other important steps were taken in 1986 with the dismantling of a kidnapping ring in April that included the arrest of former Army Lieutenant Isidro López Sibrián. Lt. López Sibrián had been implicated in the murder of two United States citizens and theISTA president in 1980, but was never brought to trial. LTC Roberto Mauricio Staben, commander of one of the elite counter-insurgency battalions (ARCE Battalion), also was arrested in the "kidnap-for-profit ring" case, but he was released due to lack of evidence.57 If Lt. López Sibrián is brought to trial, it will be the first major move to prosecute a commissioned officer accused of criminal activities.58

Apprehension and prosecution of individuals for crimes of political violence have been rare. Cases such as the murder of Archbishop Romero, Attorney General Mario Zamora, and the FDR leaders in 1980 are reminders of an inadequate system. Justice is still an illusion. However, steps to reform the judicial system began in June 1985, with the establishment of a 10-member Revisory Commission to conduct a thorough review of the system and identify solutions to the problems. Another unit was established to oversee a specially U.S. trained unit assigned to investigate major criminal cases.59 The exposure of the kidnapping ring in April 1986 was the result of the work by this newly created investigative unit. However, the real test comes in the prosecution of such cases. While the issue of the prosecution of military officers, who may have been tied to past
abuses of power, remains in question, eventually it must be confronted. When a case appears that implicates senior officers and provides sufficient evidence of corruption or links to criminal activities, such as political violence, the whole governmental process will be tested.

In summary, it is evident that the regime has taken steps to control groups, both within and outside the government, that abuse power and attack the civilian populace for personal motives. The government has shown the non-revolutionary groups, which have been subjected to these acts of repression, that it can make advances in this area. However, the major steps are yet to come and it remains to be proven, to the people of all sectors, whether the regime has sufficient power to bring about justice.

**Armed Forces**

The element of conflict within the armed forces, over support of the government or the interests of the "disloyal" right, has been a potential destabilizing factor. Since this could affect the outcome of the revolution by creating changes in the regime, thus increasing the likelihood of broadening the revolutionary coalition, this aspect will be examined in addition to the loyalty and effectiveness of the El Salvadoran armed forces.

Unlike the period from the 1930s to 1979, since 1979 conflicts within the military have not been generational, but rather specific action that was necessary to ensure the very survival of the institution. With the fall of Somoza and the destruction of the
Nicaraguan National Guard, there was a threat to the survival of the armed forces as an institution. The 15 October 1979 coup d'état was planned and organized by the Young Military (LTC and below) who formed a Military Coordinating Committee to work with civilian allies. This group selected senior officers whom, they felt, would carry out basic reforms. However, following the coup, conflicts in the military erupted and could be identified among three groups: (a) one group was the Young Military who had created the Permanent Council of the Armed Forces (COPEFA--Consejo Permanente de la Fuerza Armada) and were associated with Colonel Adolfo Majano, who was a member of the Junta; (b) a second group, identified with Colonels José Guillermo García, minister of defense, and Jamie Abdul Gutiérrez, member of the Junta, supported certain reforms, but were more closely associated with the right and took a "hard-line" approach to the left; they eventually gained control from the Young Military; and (c) the third, a group from the security forces, aligned with the "disloyal" right, such as ex-Major Roberto D'Aubuisson, wanted to reinstitute the regime of the "reactionary coalition." Sixty members of this group were purged from the armed forces following the 1979 coup, but they continued to maintain contacts within the military.

These conflicts continued, but did not erupt into open confrontation until 1983. In January 1983, Colonel Sigifredo Ochoa Pérez, commander of the northern province of Cabañas and one of the most respected tactical commanders of the war, refused to obey an order from the Minister of Defense General García to leave his position to become the military attache to Uruguay. Colonel Ochoa saw the transfer as being politically motivated and called for General
Garcia's resignation, calling him "corrupt, arbitrary and capricious." The rebellion was seen as an open confrontation between the high command and supporters of the "disloyal" right. A major issue was the tactics used in the counter-insurgency campaign. In early 1983, the armed forces were in a state of expansion, and the majority of the armed forces were tied to the defense of strategic positions. Success against the guerrillas had been limited and General García had continued to employ the traditional method of large scale operations, rather than small unit, offensive operations. Colonel Ochoa had been praised as being very successful at employing small units in guerrilla "controlled" areas. The rebellion ended after six days when Colonel Ochoa relinquished his command, accepting an assignment to Washington, DC. However, within three months, General García was replaced as the Minister of Defense by General Carlos Vides Casanova, reportedly as the result of an agreement reached to end Ochoa's mutiny. Following General Vides Casanova's appointment, a new wave of Brigade Commanders and Chief of Staff, General Adolfo O. Blandón, were assigned. This marked a shift toward a more aggressive pursuit of the guerrillas. In 1984, Colonel Ochoa returned to command the Fourth Brigade with the responsibility of the Chalatenango province, one of the strongholds of the guerrillas. In early 1986, he was reassigned to Washington.

Even though García's ousting was seen as a victory for the "disloyal" right, that has not been the case. As illustrated by the 1984 renovation of the security forces and personnel shake-ups, General Vides Casanova and General Blandón supported moves by the government to reduce political violence and the removal of officers.
associated with "death squad" activities. Since the changes in the high command, the armed forces have become more effective in confronting the guerrillas.

Armed Forces' Effectiveness

Primarily due to the realities of its survival as an institution, and the war against the Farabundo Martí National Liberation (FMLN) front, the armed forces of El Salvador have undergone a complete transformation since 1979 (see Tables 8-7 and 8-8). This transformation has occurred, in part, due to United States military assistance (Chapter IX) and has promoted El Salvador from one of the smallest armed forces in Central America in 1979 to the second largest by 1985.\[71\]

From 1979 to 1985, by conservative estimates, the El Salvadoran Army increased in size over 300% (see Table 8-7). The Army has expanded into six Brigades with a reaction force of five Immediate-Reaction Battalions (1200 men each) and an Airborne Battalion that is officially part of the Air Force (see Table 8-8). From 1980 to 1985, over 21 newly formed battalions went through training programs in the United States, Honduras, and El Salvador.\[72\] Also, great strides were launched in the basic training of the individual soldier. In January 1984, a National Training Center (NTC) at La Unión was opened.\[73\] The NTC offers a standardized level of training (6-8 weeks) to all troops. Previously the amount of marksmanship and other basic training essential to preparing the soldier for combat varied; now, all recruits receive the "basic level" of training required.
### TABLE 8-7

EL SALVADOR: ARMED FORCES STRENGTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>National Guard</th>
<th>National Police</th>
<th>Treasury Police</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979(a)</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>N/A(+)</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>10,630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982(b)</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>25,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983(c)</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>2,350</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>34,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985(c)</td>
<td>38,650</td>
<td>2,350</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>52,650</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: (+) N/A: Data not available.
### Table 8-8

**El Salvador: Armed Forces Selected Units/equipment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Navy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>3 Defense Zones</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 Infantry Brigades</td>
<td>21 Fighter/Ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6 Battalions</td>
<td>Attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Artillery Brigade (6 Batteries)</td>
<td>13 Trainer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Cavalry Battalion</td>
<td>17 Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Engineer Battalion</td>
<td>4 Helicopter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Anti-Aircraft Battalion</td>
<td>1 Airborne Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 Commando Companies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1985(a)</td>
<td>6 Defense Zones</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6 Infantry Brigades</td>
<td>41 Fighter/Ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>37 CS Bns (+)</td>
<td>Attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Light Brigade</td>
<td>14 Observation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 Battalions</td>
<td>17 Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Artillery Brigade (9 Batteries)</td>
<td>16 Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5 Immediate-Reaction Battalions (1200 men)</td>
<td>40 Helicopters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Cavalry Regiment</td>
<td>1 Airborne Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Engineer Brigade</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Anti-Aircraft Battalion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 Military Police Companies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 Special Forces Groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 National Training Center</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Note: (+) CS Bns are Countersubversion Battalions organized along the lines of such units used in Venezuela (Cazadore concept).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Although the capability to airlift these units is in short supply, the Immediate-Reaction Battalions, including the Airborne Battalion, are an effective counter-insurgency force. An example of this capability was illustrated on 27 June 1984, by a highly successful air mobile counter-attack launched by the Airborne Battalion against an estimated 1000 guerrillas, who had overrun 400 government troops defending the Cerron Grande hydroelectric dam. Their swift action demonstrated a new capability in reenforcing remote areas of the country. Since the major units of the Army are spread throughout the country, FMLN forces could previously conduct such operations without the threat of any counter-attack.

Some credit for this increased effectiveness belongs to General Blandón. After recognizing the need for fundamental operational changes in 1983, he reorganized the Joint Staff and instituted changes in tactical operational procedures. This included planning long-range offensive actions, conducting Joint Operations with the Air Force and Navy, use of ready reaction forces, and small scale operations in guerrilla "controlled" areas. Examples of these changes are evident by operations conducted in 1984, 1985, and 1986. In their annual reports issued each July, the El Salvadoran armed forces reported an increase of 75% in offensive operations in the July 1984-June 1985 period over the previous year. While the needed sources are not available to validate the data, a review of available sources do substantiate the claim that the armed forces have become more offensively oriented since late 1983.

Changes in the Salvadoran Navy have resulted in increasing its capability in interdiction and small-boat operations. This has been
carried out by increasing the number of small boats, the training of a Commando Company, and activating a Marine Battalion.78

The Air Force has grown not only in quantity, but quality as well. A fleet of 10 UH-1H helicopters, each capable of transporting 11 soldiers, was added in 1981, and by 1985, they had a total of 40. Within weeks following the 27 January 1982 guerrilla attack on Ilopango Airport, that destroyed numerous aircraft including six UH-1H helicopters, the United States provided another 12 UH-1Hs, three fixed-wing transport planes (C-123), eight light attack aircraft (A-37B), and four observation planes (O-2A).80 More than equipment, qualified aviators and maintenance personnel have increased the combat capability of the Air Force. By 1985, there were approximately 51 fixed-wing and 60 rotary qualified pilots.81

**Loyalty**

As discussed, following the 1979 coup conflicts within the military were partially based upon the extent of the reform measures. Some officers, such as Colonel Majano, were labeled as being sympathetic to the left, and by December 1980, had been removed from the Junta. One of the guerrilla organizations, the Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN), actively pursued splits within the military.

On 10 January 1981, when the "final offensive" was launched and the call went out from the FMLN for the military to join, only five officers and 53 soldiers deserted.82 Colonel Adino Vladimir Cruz and Captain Francisco Emilio Mena Sandoval, assigned to the Second
Infantry Brigade at Santa Ana, allowed the guerrillas to penetrate the defenses of the garrison and led soldiers who would defect to the guerrillas' side. Another officer, LTC Bruno Navarrete, issued a proclamation at the time of the offensive, in which he invited the army to join the guerrilla struggle. It appears that only CPT Sandoval remained active with the guerrillas, appearing in their literature, and supposedly running a training camp.83

Beyond the 1981 desertions, most disloyalty occurred in 1983. An 80-man engineering platoon surrendered to the guerrillas in early 1983, and several reports stated that "many government troops have decided recently to surrender rather than die."84 However, beyond these occurrences and some reports of informants among the ranks of the military, the armed forces have remained extremely loyal.

Summary

Clearly the level of professionalization has improved since 1980. The increase in the number of soldiers has not been at the cost of less effective units, but rather, soldiers are more highly trained and the units have become more efficient. They operate on a much more competent level and have shown increasing combat capability since 1984. While conflicts within the military have subsided, the potential for divisions remains.

Within the armed forces, a new breed of younger officer is being born. Since 1979, due to the revolution, the military academy has ceased to function in the traditional manner, requiring larger cadet classes and transferring them to combat units after the first year.85 This "war" generation of officers, who are not drawn to the ties of a
"tanda," have yet to make their mark on the institution. Whether they will become the backbone of an institution that continues to accept civilian leadership and a transition to a democratic system of government remains to be seen. While it is unclear what impact this generation will have on the military institution, it is almost certain to have some effects.

Notes


6 Baloyra, El Salvador in Transition, p. 106.

7 Ibid., pp. 106-107; Marlise Simons, "D'Aubuisson, Salvadoran Rightist, Steps Down as His Party's Leader," New York Times, 30 Sept. 1985, p. 4. In early 1980, D'Aubuisson travelled to the United States and Guatemala to obtain support for a "right-wing" coup. He was also conspiring with military officers. In May 1980, an attempt for such a coup was averted and D'Aubuisson was arrested, but he was soon released and went on to form ARENA.

8 Ibid., p. 72.

9 Webre, pp. 33, 182.
"Widening Split," Latin American Weekly Report, pp. 4-5. Francisco Acosta, the international representative of the UNTS, acknowledged they were a group of the left, but denied links with the FMLN. The government claims they are little more than a front organization for the guerrillas. The UNTS claim to have 500,000 members.


Montgomery, p. 115.


González, p. 987.


Ibid. No sources were found that identified the names or ranks of the supporters of D'Aubuisson were removed from active duty. Baloyra says "the nucleus of hard-core supporters" were removed while Moran mentions 60 being relieved from active duty.

In an early 1985 survey, only 0.4% of students and 15.6% of urban respondents said that elections were the best means to resolve the revolution. See Ignacio Martin-Baro and Victor Antonio Orellana, "La necesidad de votar actitudes del pueblo salvadoreño ante el proceso electoral de 1984," Estudios Centroamericanos, 39 (April-May 1984): 256.

Baloyra, El Salvador in Transition, p. 168. One observer for the British Parliament, who was very critical of the validity of the elections, said the administration of the election was "not too bad." See Chitnis, "Observing El Salvador," p. 979.


Montgomery, p. 186.

Three surveys were conducted. The first was in January 1984 with students, the second from 3-22 March of an urban population in four departments (San Salvador, La Libertad, Santa Ana, Sonsonate), and the last from 8-15 April, again of an urban population, in six departments (adding San Vicente and Cuscatlán). For results, see Martin-Baro and Antonio Orellana, pp. 254-258.


28 In December 1982, Magaña fired ARENA Health Minister Fernando Berrios Escobar for failing to follow directions. ARENA challenged Magaña, so he called for the entire cabinet to resign. Nevertheless, ARENA refused, but the POC, PCN, PPS, and the military came out in support of Magana. Finally four ARENA ministers resigned. See Ibid.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Cooperatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>La Libertad</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahuachapán</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chalatenango</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usulután</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Vicente</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuscatlán</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Paz</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Miguel</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabañas</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sonsonate</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Unión</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morazán</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Ana</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Salvador</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


34Browning says that by mid-1982 FINATA (National Financial Institute for Agricultural Lands) reported 4,682 Phase III applicants had been evicted by their former landlords. Also according to reports of political violence, peasants were predominantly the victims of such attacks. See Browning, p. 421; González, pp. 986-987; Estudios Centroamericanos, 36 (Dec. 1981): 1194; Estudios Centroamericanos, 41 (Jan.-Feb. 1986): 145.


37Browning, "Agrarian Reform," p. 414. Other data give varying statistics. Simon and Stephens, p. 31, say the number of cooperatives were 282 in mid-1981 and increased to 326 by the end of 1981.

38Ibid.


41See Agency for International Development, "Land Reform"; Browning, "Agrarian Reform."

42Ibid.

43For example, by 1986, 50 cooperatives had been abandoned; the agrarian debt was estimated at 800 million dollars; and some estimate that the number of tenant and sharecropper could be as high as 150,000, of which only about 50% have taken advantage of Phase III. See Ibid.

44Agency for International Development, "Land Reform."


Ibid.


These estimates are provided in "Widening Split," Latin American Weekly Report, p. 5. Other available sources did not provide these data.


58Other armed forces personnel have been tried and convicted for human rights abuses. Perhaps the most well known case is the five national guardsmen who were "eventually" (1984) convicted of the 1980 murder of three U.S. nuns and one lay worker. See Lydia Chavez, "5 Salvadorans Are Found Guilty in Slayings of U.S. Churchwomen," New York Times, 25 May 1984, p. 1.


62Ibid.


64Chavez, "Rebellious Salvadoran," p. 4.

65Colonel Ochoa was a classmate of Roberto D'Auguisson at the Military Academy.


69One of the new Brigade Commanders was Colonel Domingo Monterroso, who was assigned the eastern region in November 1983. He obtained a reputation as an outstanding tactician as the commander of an Immediate-Reaction Battalion. In 1984, his expertise and
relentless pursuit of the guerrillas gained considerable notoriety. In October 1984, he was killed in a helicopter crash during an offensive operation in Morazán.


77 "El Salvador Reports Military Casualties Down," Washington Times, 10 July 1985, p. 5. The defense minister said in the period 1984-1985, 250 fewer soldiers died than the previous year, even though offensive operations had increased 75%. He went on to say 75 large-scale operations, 20,447 offensive patrols, and 6,700 ambush and night missions were carried out in the last year.

78 This claim is based upon a survey of limited sources, primarily the weekly newspaper El Salvador News-Gazette, from 1981 to 1985. I counted only major operations of Battalion size (over 350 men) or more. Several problems are encountered with this. One, quite often the offensive operation was in response to a guerrilla operation and had few effects. Second, sometimes the operation was 350 men for a week and other times it was 5,000 men for over 30 days. Nevertheless, an attempt was made to determine the level of offensive tactics, disregarding its motive and length of time. The results were the following: 1981--3; 1982--3; 1983--5; 1984--8; and 1985--10.


81. Although the increase in aircraft supports these data, I have been unable to verify this figure in any other source. "The Armed Forces of El Salvador," p. 2.


83. An interview with Sandoval by Radio Venceremos is contained in Senal de libertad, 3 (Oct.-Nov. 1984): 19-23. CPT Sandoval was one of the officers very active in the 1979 coup.


85. United States Defense Attache Office-El Salvador, "ESAF Military Academy: Past, Present, and Future," Message from USDAO to DIA Washington, DC, 25 June 1985 [Xerox copy]. According to this report, the average class before 1979 was 15-20 graduates per year, in 1985 200 graduated. The cadets also provide 50% of the front line platoon leaders.

86. The "Tanda" (classmate) system refers to linkages between those officers of the same graduating class at the Military Academy. Since the classes after 1979 have increased in size and do not spend four years together at the Academy, the traditional ties of the "tanda" may become weaker.
CHAPTER IX
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

International support for both the regime and the revolutionary movement in El Salvador has reached a level beyond all other cases examined in this study. Before 1979, little international support was provided to either the government or the revolutionaries. However, following the Sandinista victory in July 1979, the Salvadoran coup d'état in October 1979, and the change of the United States administration in January 1981, the Salvadoran internal crisis assumed international proportions. It is now clear that the FMLN-FDR received substantial support from outside sources, although not to the extent initially claimed in February 1981 by the Reagan administration, and that the Salvadoran regime was virtually "rescued" by United States assistance.

When analyzing assistance to the El Salvadoran government it is important to put the size of its economy and armed forces into perspective. It is a country with one of the smallest economies in Latin America, having a gross domestic product (GDP) in 1980 of $3,858.4 million (1982 dollars) and the fourth smallest per capita GDP in Latin America.1 In 1979, the armed forces were tied as being the second smallest, per 1,000 people, in Latin America.2 The data, which include a total of approximately $1.84 billion in United States economic and military assistance from 1980 to 1985,3 support the claim
that international aid has been a major part of the regime's ability to prevent a revolutionary victory.

At the same time, in 1979, the revolutionary movement was little more than five lightly armed competing guerrilla groups, with popular organizations providing support, that at best had little international backing and controlled no national territory. Evidence clearly shows that assistance in the form of command and control headquarters, arms, munitions, training, encouragement, and political backing greatly enhanced the revolutionary movement's efforts toward defeating the regime. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the support provided, or withdrawn, and its effect on the outcome of the revolutionary movement.

Revolutionary Movement

Support to the El Salvadoran revolutionary movement has taken many forms. The extent of the "foreign" role in the movement has been a point of heated discussion. In the early 1980s, some claimed that the survival of the FMLN-FDR was based upon "Soviet-Bloc" support, while others said there was little evidence of this linkage and what support was provided was not "critical" to their survival. Since then, substantial evidence has been provided to support the claim that the FMLN-FDR received support from outside sources. Evidence of this support comes from United States' government sources, statements of guerrilla leaders who defected or were captured and their documents, acknowledgments of world leaders and diplomats who provided this support, and statements from FMLN-FDR leaders themselves. However,
the available data are insufficient to indicate the movement would fold if this support ceased, even though it would certainly limit its ability to conduct military operations. Basically, assistance comes in two forms: political and military.

**Political Support**

In 1986, Guillermo Ungo, one of the vice-presidents of the Socialist International (SI) and FDR leader, acknowledged the significance of the support provided by the SI. Ungo stated that the SI has provided "a strong incentive to us." It has been a voice of respectability for the movement in the international arena. Socialist International campaigned for dialogue and urged the El Salvadoran government to accept the FMLN-FDR as full-fledged parties. Others also called for recognition of the revolutionaries.

On 27 August 1981, Mexico and France issued a joint declaration to the United Nations Security Council President recognizing the FMLN-FDR as a "representative political force." They called for restructuring of the El Salvadoran Army and said the guerrillas had a right to participate in negotiations to end the conflict. However, many Latin American countries condemned this act as "intervention." In addition to Mexico and France expressing support for the revolutionaries by withdrawing diplomatic support to the El Salvadoran government, West Germany removed its ambassador in 1981. Mexico, due in part to its proximity, served as a primary source of political and diplomatic support for the FMLN-FDR throughout the early 1980s; it functioned as the home of political leaders of the revolutionary
movement and as a headquarters for the FDR as well as serving as a meeting place for its political leadership.\textsuperscript{12}

This type of support has provided respectability to the revolutionaries in the international arena. After the 1984 presidential elections the international appeal of the FMLN-FDR wavered. In 1984, Germany reestablished diplomatic relations with El Salvador, and in October 1985, Mexico did likewise.\textsuperscript{13}

While the Socialist International continues to support dialogue with the FMLN-FDR, as most countries do, they have become less critical of the El Salvadoran government. In June 1986, at their annual conference, the SI toned down its support for the revolutionaries. One SI vice-president, former Costa Rican President Daniel Oduber, said that the Socialist International had come to recognize the historical context of the Salvadoran situation, and the political process that put Duarte in power was as legitimate as those in Nicaragua or Mexico.\textsuperscript{14}

 Military Support

Following the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua, international efforts escalated to help the Salvadoran revolutionaries attain power.\textsuperscript{15} Cuba and Nicaragua became the center of these efforts. It is clear that Cuba played a significant role in the 1979 to 1981 period by coordinating supply networks and encouraging unification of the various guerrilla organizations. In late 1979 and early 1980, Fidel Castro brought together, in Havana, leaders of the El Salvadoran fragmented revolutionary movement. The result was the formation, in May 1980, of the Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU).\textsuperscript{16}
The U.S. State Department's "white paper," based on a collection of documents captured in November 1980, outlines the significant amount of arms and munitions provided throughout 1980 by various countries, such as North Vietnam and Ethiopia. Documents support the claim that over 130 tons of arms and military material, only one-sixth of the quantity one document said was promised to the DRU, arrived in Nicaragua on 26 September 1980 and was awaiting shipment. Additionally, these documents established that a logistic network was operating in Nicaragua to infiltrate the weapons and equipment into El Salvador by land, air, and sea.

The "white paper" immediately came under close scrutiny. While Ralph McGehee, an ex-CIA employee, claimed the documents were a complete forgery and noted that the past record of the CIA clearly supports that these documents "can only be the product of yet another CIA forgery operation," he offers no evidence except that the CIA had done these sorts of things in the past. If they were forgeries, they were very poorly done, as critics pointed to the obvious flaws in the documents. More sophisticated analyses pointed to discrepancies in the actual documents and the summary offered by the government, as well as misinterpretations of the influence of the Soviet Union and Cuba. Even the architect of the "white paper," Jon Glassman, acknowledged that mistakes in analyses had been made, but added that the basic conclusions, that there was considerable external involvement, were well founded. Rather than forgeries, it seems more likely that an over-emphasis was placed on areas that the documents did not fully support. At the very least the "white paper" had flaws that placed into question its validity. However, it
presented evidence of Cuban and Nicaraguan involvement that had not previously been brought to light. The quantity of arms, munitions, and other material, outlined in the "white paper," was more than sufficient to equip a 3,000 man force.\textsuperscript{20} In April 1981, Castro validated the basic claims of the "white paper" when he disclosed to German Social Democratic leader, Hans-Jurgen Wischnewski, that Cuba had shipped arms to Salvadorean guerrillas.\textsuperscript{21}

Since 1983 little evidence of "massive" arms shipments has been uncovered. Nevertheless, statements of defectors and captured revolutionaries, particularly in 1985; captured documents and material; and evidence from aerial photographs indicate the existence of a support network, and of extensive training of FMLN-FDR members overseas.\textsuperscript{22} When Nidia Diaz, a political-military section chief of the Central American Workers Revolutionary Party (PRTC), was captured on 18 April 1985, she was carrying documents that revealed several facets of international support after 1983. No one has claimed that these documents were forgeries, and Diaz supposedly acknowledged their authenticity. The documents included a list of 20 FMLN-FDR members who, in 1984 and 1985, were selected for training in Vietnam, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and the Democratic Republic of Germany.\textsuperscript{23} They indicate that, in mid-1983, Nicaragua took initial steps to expel FMLN leaders and cut back the logistical support structure, but by November, they had backed away from this posture. The solidarity committees and organizations in the United States and Europe also were relevant sources of international support.\textsuperscript{24} In November 1984, in response to the West German renewal of relations and aid to El
Salvador, an "Arms for El Salvador Campaign" was launched by the West German peace movement in which Ana Guadalupe Martínez, FMLN-FDR leader, was presented $1.3 million dollars.\textsuperscript{25}

Summary

The impact of international support became apparent for the first time during the launching of the "final offensive" in January 1981. The political and military support rendered, in 1980, by various countries, aided in the capability of the FMLN-FDR to move forward in its attack against the government. Joaquín Villalobos said the reason the movement did not launch such an offensive in April-May 1980, when conditions were more favorable for such an attack, was that

we did not have the necessary logistics nor the required armed apparatus . . . we did not have the degree of unity in the revolutionary movement necessary to generate the conditions to rapidly create that armed apparatus.\textsuperscript{26}

By late 1980, these differences had been resolved and needed arms received, due in part to international support.

This support enabled the movement to build-up a military capability that established "controlled" zones and to win acceptance in the international arena as a viable oppositional force that must be considered in any settlement of the crisis. Eventually, in 1984, the first round of negotiations between the regime and revolutionaries was conducted. Whether the FMLN-FDR is dependent upon external support is doubtful, but certainly this assistance has enabled them to advance toward their goal of recognition as a political force in the short-run, and ultimate success in the long-run.
Support for the Regime

International support for the government of El Salvador has come from various nations and organizations. As mentioned, several countries withdrew diplomatic support in 1980 and 1981, but unlike the case of Nicaragua, where numerous Latin American countries withdrew recognition of the Somoza government in 1979, Mexico was the only Latin American country to take that step in the case of El Salvador. By October 1985 they had reestablished relations. Similar to other cases of revolution in Latin America, the United States has played the major role in providing military and economic assistance to the government.

Since the 1960s, United States assistance programs fluctuated with policy changes toward the region. After initial bursts of aid enacted in the 1960s to meet increasing internal threats, programs began to be cut back (see Tables 5-14 and 9-1). Following the Vietnam War and the election of President Jimmy Carter, the United States' policy changes toward Latin America affected the quantity and type of assistance to all Latin American nations. President Carter adopted the "global" approach, removing the United States from past relations and placing increasing emphasis on human rights. A good example of this was the change in the number of American military personnel assigned as military liaison officers in Latin America. It decreased from 532 in 1970 to 115 in 1980. This was due to U.S. concern in extra-hemispheric affairs as well as tensions between the Carter administration and some Latin American countries suspected of human rights violations. Table 9-1 clearly shows this shifting policy by
TABLE 9-1
MEAN ANNUAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO LATIN AMERICA AND EL SALVADOR (1967-1985)
(In 1972 Dollars, Millions) (+)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period (Fiscal Year) (++)</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>El Salvador</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Econ Asst. (In 1972 M)</td>
<td>1396.0</td>
<td>1026.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Asst. (In 1972 M)</td>
<td>88.2</td>
<td>105.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int'l Org. (Loans) (In 1972 M)</td>
<td>1226.7</td>
<td>1792.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>46.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Asst. (In 1972 M)</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>156.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int'l Org. (Loans) (In 1972 M)</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>41.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>557.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: (+) Data from sources have been converted to 1972 dollars using implicit price deflator for gross national product outlined in U.S. Department of Commerce, Business Statistics 1984 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 212. (++) TQ denotes the transitional quarter (1 July-30 September 1976) that was required when the Fiscal Year was changed from 1 July-30 June to 1 Oct.-30 Sept.
depicting the economic and military assistance provided from 1967 to 1985. It also provides information on international organizational loans during this period.

Generally, El Salvador followed the pattern of economic and military assistance being provided to Latin America as a whole. However, it received greater increases of military assistance in the early 1970s. Like other countries facing revolutionary movements, El Salvador received an increase in military assistance during its initial years of revolutionary activity, FY1971 to FY1976. However, by FY1977, this aid had virtually stopped (see Table 9-1). International organizational loans remained fairly stable during the period, with a slight decrease in FY1979.

Following the Sandinista victory in July 1979, a new policy toward Central America was considered necessary. In El Salvador, following the 1979 coup d'etat, it became increasingly important to encourage the new government to implement promised reforms, prevent a "rightist" coup, and avert an open revolution.29 In FY1980 (1 Oct. 1979-30 Sept. 1980), the United States provided $58.4 million (current dollars) in economic assistance and $5.9 million in "nonlethal" military aid, excluding arms and ammunition.30 For FY1981 (1 Oct. 1980-30 Sept. 1981), $126.5 million in economic assistance and $5.4 million in military aid (nonlethal) were originally scheduled.31 On 5 December 1980, due to the discovery on 2 December of four United States' churchwomen who had been kidnapped and murdered, aid was suspended.32 While economic assistance was reinstated two weeks later, military aid remained suspended until 16 January 1981. Therefore, on the eve of the FMLN's "final offensive" launched on 10
January 1981, the United States withheld further military aid until an investigation determined responsibility for the murders.

James Petras' assertion that the failure of the guerrilla offensive was due, in part, to "massive infusions of U.S. arms to the regime's forces" is invalid, since the United States had not supplied arms to El Salvador since 1977. His assertion was further negated by the presence of an arms embargo during the initial days of the offensive. In Chapter V, the "timing" factor of withdrawal of international support, or the removal of support to a regime at a critical moment, was mentioned as a possible explanatory element in the erosion of the regime's base of support, thus leading to a stronger revolutionary movement. What can be stated of the withdrawal of U.S. assistance from El Salvador between 1977-1979 and late 1980?

From 1977 to 1979, the regime's base of support certainly eroded. This is evident from the increasing mobilization of the popular organizations. However, during this period, the revolutionary movement had not advanced to a level that was a serious military or political threat to the government. The military's coup d'état, in October 1979, enabled the regime to reestablish itself and to increase its domestic support, as well as reinstate United States' assistance. Late 1980 apparently was a more "critical moment" as the Junta government was going through internal changes, the revolutionary movement had established a unified command, and alliances with sectors of the democratic left had been established. Had this withdrawal of military aid continued more than 41 days, it is not inconceivable that the revolutionaries could have succeeded in the coming months or years. However, unlike the cases of Nicaragua and Cuba, assistance
was reestablished. It also should be noted that the withdrawal of aid in December came under President Carter's policy. It was well known that the upcoming inauguration of Ronald Reagan would change this policy; therefore, this move was possibly seen as nothing more than a temporary setback. However, on 16 January, as an immediate response to the guerrillas' final offensive, President Carter authorized the delivery of arms and ammunition, valued at $5 million, to El Salvador for the first time since 1977. This aid also included leasing six U.S. Army helicopters, with trainers, to El Salvador.

As expected, with the inauguration of President Reagan, policy changes resulted in requests to Congress for increased assistance. These increases were partially made possible due to the release of the "white paper" on 23 February 1981; another $25 million in military assistance was provided in March, bringing the total to $35.4 million for FY1981. This assistance included the dispatch of 56 advisors, four additional helicopters, small arms, mortars, and ammunition.

Since 1981, the Reagan administration has provided substantial aid. Table 9-1 depicts this aid, in 1972 dollars, reflecting not only massive increases, but also the scale of aid in comparison to the remainder of Latin America. El Salvador received over 50% of the military assistance, and nearly 25% of the economic assistance, sent to Latin America between 1980 and 1985. The military programs primarily provide equipment and services on a cash, credit, or grant basis. This aid has not only included arms, ammunition, and logistical support, but also the training of thousands of Salvadoran soldiers. The significant impact of this aid is undeniable.
Economic assistance has always exceeded military assistance; it grew from $58.4 million in 1980 (90.4% of total assistance) to $432.2 million in 1985 (76% of total). Even with substantial economic assistance, the FMLN strategy of economic sabotage, which according to U.S. Embassy estimates resulted in over $1 billion damage to the economy, prevented the country from realizing the full potential of this aid. Certainly, without this aid, the economic situation would have deteriorated more.

The impact of this aid can be seen in at least two areas: First, changes within the armed forces and, second, political pressure to maintain a government that would carry out reforms while curtailing political violence. As demonstrated in Chapter VIII, the El Salvadoran armed forces made considerable changes between 1979 and 1985 (see Tables 8-7 and 8-8). These included (a) structural changes within the Army, going from a three Brigade size force to a six Brigade force with Immediate-Reaction forces; (b) training of individual soldiers and officers, established National Training Center and increased the number of cadets through U.S. training programs; and (c) doubling the air power capability of the Air Force, twice the number of fighter aircraft and established an airmobile capability. Financing these changes was due in part to United States military assistance, as it represented approximately 31% of the total military expenditure from 1980 to 1984.

United States political influence in El Salvador, unlike Cuba and Nicaragua where it failed to bring about change in the regime, has affected decisions within the government. Some claimed that United States' influence was key in the selection of Alvaro Magaña, an
independent, as the Provisional President in 1982. One of the more obvious moves by the United States was the pressure placed on the Salvadoran government to curtail "death squad" activity. By late 1983, the "death squad" controversy reached a climax. The problem was highlighted by the killing of 10 labor union members and kidnapping of a high Foreign Ministry official in October, plus the ongoing unresolved case of the four American nuns, who were murdered in December 1980.

Between October and December 1983, several high ranking U.S. government officials visited El Salvador and emphasized the need to take action against "death squad" activity. The visitors included Henry A. Kissinger, who in October made a trip as head of a presidential commission on Central America and expressed the concern of the White House and State Department of recent "death squad" activities; Elliot Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights; and finally Vice-President George Bush, who in December flatly told the Salvadoran government unless they controlled "death squad" activity "you will lose the support of the American people."

During his trip, Bush supported remarks made the previous month by Ambassador Deane P. Hinton, who said the "death squads" were the work of "fascist" groups and undermined United States military and economic aid.

In late November, before Vice-President Bush's trip, the government transferred 21 military and police officers, plus two key Salvadoran security officers suspected of involvement in "death squad" activities. These changes were seen as initial steps in response to U.S. pressure. After Bush's trip, Defense Minister Carlos Vides
Casanova said he was "in accord" with the vice-president and announced that measures were being taken to address this problem. Further advances in this area were made after the May 1984 presidential election of José Napoleón Duarte. This included restructuring the security forces and transfer of more high ranking officials suspected of links to the "death squads."

Summary

In El Salvador, more than any other case examined in this thesis, international support has clearly enhanced the ability of both parties to achieve their goals. Obviously, international support, to either side, is important in their struggle. Any erosion of that support weakens their position and strengthens their adversary. Support to the El Salvadoran government has increased the regime's military power and capability while stressing the need for continued reforms. International support to the revolutionaries has enabled them to prolong the struggle on the battlefield and establish a political presence in the international arena.

Unlike the cases of Cuba and Nicaragua, withdrawal of international support from the El Salvadoran government has not been a factor in the revolution. Threats from the U.S. Congress to curtail or cut-off assistance for failure to make progress in human rights violations and reforms were prominent up through 1984. However, since the elections in 1984 and 1985, these protests have essentially abated. From 1980 to 1985, the international supporters of the FMLN-FDR remained fairly stable, but apparently began to erode following
the 1985 presidential elections. Despite this there is little reason to believe the supply networks have dried up.

Notes

1Inter-American Development Bank, 1984, p. 420.

2U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [ACDA], 1983. Jamaica was smaller and Mexico tied.


Most of the FMLN-FDR publications, such as Senal de libertad, give a Mexico City and Managua, Nicaragua, address for their headquarters.


Ibid., pp. 40-80, 90-94 [Documents E, F, G, I]. Reference to "amounts" of material include 1.9 tons of medical supplies provided by the German Democratic Republic; 60 tons of arms from North Vietnam; "several thousands weapons" from Ethiopia; "promises" of ammunition from Nicaragua; and Guerrilla logistics committee informs its Joint General Staff that 130 tons of arms and other military material supplied have arrived in Nicaragua for shipment to El Salvador, according to this report, this represents one-sixth of the commitments to the guerrillas.

For a review of the "white paper" and its critics see Mark Falcoff, "El Salvador: The U.S. White Paper Reexamined," In Small Countries, Large Issues, ed., Mark Falcoff (Washington, DC: American Institute for Public Policy Research, 1984, pp. 34-44. While the State Department summary said 200 tons of 800 tons promised were delivered to El Salvador, the document only refers to 130 tons. The critics of the paper include Ralph McGehee, John Dinges, James Petras, and Jonathan Kwitny.

Ibid., pp. 58-60. Some of the items included were 1,620 x AR 15 rifles (similar to U.S. M16), 1,500 x M1 rifles, 1,000 x M14 rifles, 162 x M3 machineguns, 150 x Tompson submachineguns, 192 x 9 mm pistols, 12 x 81 mm mortars, 20,000 uniforms.


Such organizations in the United States include the El Salvadoran Information Center (E.S.I.C.), San Francisco, California, and Casa El Salvador (locations in California, New York, Washington, DC, New Jersey).

An accounting of this campaign is reported by Guadalupe Martínez in Senal de libertad, 4 (Jan.-Feb. 1985): 30.

Harnecker, pp. 138-139.


In November 1980, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, President-elect Reagan's top advisor, was quoted as saying "all of the countries of Central America seem to be quite vulnerable to communism, and we are going to have to help them." Newsweek was predicting that Reagan would lift the 1977 ban on arms sales and quotes Kirkpatrick as saying, "our whole military-sales and training assistance policy is overdue for review." These were excerpts from an article appearing in El Salvador. "Reagan Spokesman Says Central America Needs Help," El Salvador News-Gazette, 30 Nov.-6 Dec. 1980, p. 1.

It is not clear exactly how many have been trained, but a rough estimate of the major activities includes, as a minimum, the following (1980-1985):

Trained at United States School of America-----------3,446
Trained as Part of a Battalion in U.S.--------------2,400
Trained as Part of a Battalion in Honduras----------2,450
Trained as Part of a Battalion in El Salvador---------3,050
Total--------11,346

"Duarte Asks Congress to Approve War Tax," Gainesville (Florida) Sun, 3 Oct. 1986, p. 16.

Calculated using military expenditure levels and military assistance provided. The percentage represents the percent military assistance is of the total El Salvador spent on military expenditure. Data from Office of Planning and Budgeting Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, Agency for International Development, United States Overseas Loans, 1983, p. 47; World Armaments and Disarmaments, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI] Yearbook 1985 (London: Taylor and Francis Ltd., 1985), p. 277. Percentage by years are the following:

1980-- 3.5%
1981--17.2%
1982--34.3%
1983--33.2%
1984--67.0%


CHAPTER X
CONCLUSION

This study focused on theories of revolution, causes, and outcome. We performed a regional analysis to determine the validity of these theories. This was necessary in order to better understand the dynamics of the revolution. The analysis underscored the socioeconomic roots of the revolution, but indicated that political factors, such as a regime's reaction to emerging opposition groups, were key in distinguishing between cases with revolutionary activity and those with little or no activity.

While our model of revolutionary outcome certainly does not close all the gaps of how and why a revolutionary movement wins or loses, it offers a framework within which cases can be studied. The regional cases of Cuba, Guatemala, and Nicaragua clarified the distinctive characteristics between revolutionary success and failure. It highlighted the importance of building a "strong" revolutionary movement that bridges the gap between marxist and non-marxist groups by developing a broad coalition that includes middle and upper-class elements while, at the same time, eroding the regime's support.

The purpose of this final chapter is to relate the findings and implications in the case of El Salvador to the theories discussed in earlier chapters. It will conclude with an analysis of the prospects for a successful revolution.
Theory vs. Reality in El Salvador

Socioeconomic problems were at the roots of the revolution in El Salvador and political factors provided its spark. However, El Salvador, more than any other case examined, can be considered a classic example that fits most all theories that attempt to explain the causes of revolution.\(^1\) Chalmers Johnson would surely see the El Salvadoran society in a state of "dysfunction," if not by 1972, certainly by the late 1970s. The political closure in 1972, followed by an increase in repression against the populace and economic decline in the 1970s, fits both James Davies and Ted Gurr's theories dealing with frustration and aggression. Barrington Moore's analysis that a communist revolution is most likely when a weak link exists between peasant and landlord certainly applies. Moore, in noting that industrialization can take away the base of support for the revolutionaries, hits upon one reason why, in El Salvador, there is greater participation of the peasant. While industry grew in production in the 1960s, it was unable to create employment for landless peasants and, thus, did not provide an escape mechanism. Skocpol's observations on the importance of the peasant organization and leverage the landed class has in the government applies as well. El Salvador does not present new causes of revolution, but one that had ample causes by 1972, and was just waiting to explode. Events following 1972 merely added fuel to the fire.

El Salvador substantiates theories concerning the revolutionary movement and regime, while highlighting the increasing role of international support. The development of a broad revolutionary
coalition and the ability of the regime, through its actions to limit the growth of this coalition, are clearly limiting factors to the success of the Salvadoran revolutionary movement. Since the armed forces have remained loyal to the regime, Russell's theory which maintains that in an unsuccessful rebellion the armed forces have extremely high loyalty scores is supported. Additionally, the armed forces have increased significantly their capability and effectiveness in fighting the war. While much of this credit belongs to their leadership, a great deal also is due to international support. Unlike the revolutionary movements of the 1960s, during which Cesar Sereseres says United States assistance was not a primary factor, in El Salvador this assistance must be considered a major factor in the ultimate outcome, as should the international support for the FMLN-FDR.

The El Salvadoran Revolution is not just another Latin American revolution, but rather one that has politically and militarily advanced beyond any other in Latin American contemporary history. The United States has thrown down the gauntlet and said it was "drawing the line" against communist expansion. That line is in El Salvador. What then are the prospects for a successful revolution in El Salvador?

Prospects for Success

It was found that even though the revolutionary movement has mobilized over 5,000 armed insurgents and established legitimacy to its claim of "dual power," it still lacks the ingredients of a "strong" revolutionary movement. Since 1980, the revolutionaries have
failed to broaden their coalition to include bourgeois and upper-class groups, and the six year coalition between marxist and non-marxist elements is showing signs of decay.

At the same time, the regime's base of support has remained stable and the capability and combat effectiveness of its armed forces have improved. A regime transition is underway that has legitimized the government through the electoral process at the legislative and presidential level. Opposition has survived and the transfer of power through the electoral process is still open. Reform measures were undertaken that altered historical alliances between the regime and the economic "elite." These characteristics of the regime have limited the "strength" of the revolutionary movement. Additionally, international actors intervened on behalf of both the government and the FMLN-FDR. While this support has been advantageous to both, the effects of military assistance have clearly been in favor of the regime.

From this analysis it can be surmised that the prospects for success of the El Salvadoran revolutionary movement are remote. However, it seems premature to suggest an FMLN-FDR victory is "impossible." One needs only to recall that the Sandinistas were seen as "losers" and pronounced as terminally ill after failures of late 1977 and early 1978. This analysis suggests that a revolutionary victory in El Salvador depends upon circumstances that would lead to regime deterioration and the possibilities of an extension of the revolutionary coalition, thus strengthening the revolutionary movement.
These possibilities would be maximized by the deterioration of the regime and the alliance with the military, leading to an authoritarian form of government. This could come through a military coup d'état or "rightist" coup backed by the military. It would certainly lead to a stronger bond between the FMLN and FDR and possibly convince many of the union and peasant organizations currently supporting Duarte's government that the best option is the FMLN-FDR. International support for the FMLN-FDR would surely soar. Whether the bourgeoisie and portions of the upper-class would join a revolutionary coalition may depend upon the exact nature of the authoritarian government (headed by the extreme right or a coalition between the military and the right), the backing of the United States, and the ability of the revolutionary movement to modify its Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Several factors could lead to circumstances of reinstalling an authoritarian government in El Salvador. Issues currently confronting the government that could make such a situation feasible are a worsening economic situation, brought on by international events, such as the recent earthquake, continued war damage to the economy, discontent among the military over the inability of the government to deal with the economy, moves by the regime toward "power sharing" with the revolutionaries or agreeing to their demands as proposed in the negotiation process,³ as well as extensive prosecution of military officers on human rights abuses. Currently, neither the regime nor the military have made moves that indicate an erosion in their alliance. However, addressing the above issues will put it to the
test. Meanwhile, six years of intense war, without an end in sight, make the desire for a return to peace that much stronger.

One inference that can be derived from surveys and the presidential election results of 1984 (discussed in Chapter VIII, and taken by the Universidad Centroamericana Simeón Cañas--UCA) is that the population desires peace.\(^4\) This is one indication of the impact of the revolution, which is seen as a stalemate and has touched the lives of nearly all Salvadorans. The desire to see a peaceful end to the conflict will increase, and the means for the people to express this demand is through the electoral process. Pressure in this manner may assist in finding a political solution where a military stalemate exists. Therefore, the ultimate success or failure of the revolutionary movement could well depend upon the military's continued support of the government as well as its willingness to allow the political transition and opening to continue. If this occurs, the prospects for a successful revolution will remain negligible, but the revolution will not be defeated until further steps are taken to resolve long-term socioeconomic and political problems including the political and military stalemate that exists between the regime and the FMLN-FDR.

Notes

\(^{1}\)These theories were outlined in Chapters II and III. Available data do not support Jeffery Paige's theory that says a mass peasant revolution is most likely to occur where landlords, in export sector economies, draw their wealth and income from land ownership, but peasants gain their livelihood from a form of wage payment. The Salvadoran revolutionary movement is not based in the export sector economy and sufficient information is not available to determine to what extent peasants from this area support the revolution.

3. Although talks of negotiations began in 1981, the first round was not held until October 1984 in the village of La Palma, and the second the next month at Ayagualo. The third round was to have been on 19 September 1986, but fell apart the week prior to scheduled talks. The government is demanding that the guerrillas lay down their arms and join the political process, which the FMLN-FDR rejects, saying that is the same as surrendering. The FMLN-FDR want to join a provisional government that would arrange elections and also want their fighters to become part of the armed forces. President Duarte has rejected these demands as unconstitutional. For a discussion of negotiations and power sharing proposals, see James LeMoyne, "Salvador Dispute Snags Parley Plan," New York Times, 16 Sept. 1986, p. 6; "Salvador to Renew Peace Talks," New York Times, 24 Aug. 1986, p. 4; Baloyra, "Negotiating War in El Salvador"; Piero Gleijeses, "The Case for Power Sharing in El Salvador," Foreign Affairs, 61 (Summer 1983): 1048-1063; Tomas P. Campos, "Las primeras vicisitudes del dialogo entre el Gobierno y el FMLN-FDR," Estudios Centroamericanos, 39 (Dec. 1984): 885-900.

4. The results of the survey are discussed in Chapter VIII, p. 230. This, taken in conjunction with increased voter turnout for the May elections and support of the PDC among those of the right, who had voted for parties other than ARENA, in the March elections, indicate that not all the right condone violence. For election results, see this thesis, Table 8-4, p. 231, and for survey results, see Martin-Baro and Antonio Orellano, pp. 254-258.


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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

P. Kenneth Keen was the son of [insert name]. After graduation from [insert name], he entered Northwest Missouri State University in 1970 and transferred to Eastern Kentucky University in 1971. He received the degree of Bachelor of Arts in mathematics in 1974 and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the United States Army.

He has served with the 7th Infantry Division, Fort Ord, California; the 3rd Battalion 7th Special Forces (Airborne) Group, Fort Gullick, Panama; and the 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Assignments include those as a Rifle Platoon Leader, Special Forces Detachment Commander, Rifle Company Commander, Battalion Operations Officer, and Division Civil-Military Affairs Officer. He is a graduate of Airborne and Ranger schools, Defense Language Institute Portuguese Language Program, Special Forces Officer Course, Infantry Officer Advance Course, Underwater Operations, and the Jumpmaster Course. From June 1985 to December 1986 he pursued his work toward the Master of Arts degree under the United States Army Foreign Area Officer training program.

Major Keen is married [insert name].