JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL

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HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT, EVOLUTION AND CURRENT SIGNIFICANCE OF JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL. STUDY TRACES ORIGINS OF THIS MOVEMENT TO RABBI ABRAHAM ISAAC KOOK THROUGH THE GUSH EMUNIM AND INCLUDES AN IN DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE BOOK THE ZIONIST REVOLUTION BY HAROLD FISCH AND NUMEROUS ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN THE MONTHLY JOURNAL NEKUDA, A PERIODICAL WHICH SERVES AS A FORUM FOR THE VIEWS OF JEWISH SETTLERS ON THE WEST BANK.
JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL

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Executive Summary

Jewish Fundamentalism in Israeli Society

Since its emergence in the aftermath of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Jewish fundamentalism has become the single most important force in Israeli politics. It expresses the beliefs and powerful commitments of 20% of the Israeli Jewish public. Its maximalist territorial demands and its rejection of a negotiated accommodation with the Arabs, which lie at the core of its political program, appeal to an additional 20% to 30% of the Israeli public.

Jewish fundamentalism is defined in this study as a Jewish belief system which requires urgent efforts by its adherents radically to transform Israeli society in conformance with transcendental imperatives. Thus ultra-orthodox Jews, who emphasize ritual and private observance and who do not seek radical and rapid change in Israeli politics and society, are not included. On the other hand, secular ultra-nationalists, whose commitments to the expansion and transformation of Israel flow from the Bible and from integral-nationalist historical principles, are included. Indeed secular ultra-nationalists comprise as much as 20% of the Jewish fundamentalist movement and an equal if not greater proportion of its leadership.

Organizationally the Jewish fundamentalist movement is most comprehensively represented by Gush Emunim (the Bloc of the Faithful). This is a network of 10,000 to 20,000 activists dedicated, as a minimum goal, to the permanent incorporation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip into Israel. These skilled and sophisticated political cadre are united by a coherent ideology which stimulates sustained self-sacrificing behavior—including the settlement of remote areas under difficult conditions. The core of Gush Emunim is in the more than 150 settlements established in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights since 1967, but the recruitment pools for the movement within Israeli society include the religious youth movement "Bnei Akiva," a network of paramilitary field seminaries, the religious educational system, new immigrants, and many middle class Israelis with strong political commitments to an irredentist version of Labor Zionism or to Revisionist Zionism. Though officially non-partisan, Gush Emunim is represented in the national political arena by several Ministers and twenty to twenty-five Members of Parliament, drawn from half a dozen political parties.

Although Yesha (the Association of Local Councils in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza District) gives Gush Emunim a semi-official governing body, "the Gush" is more accurately understood as an umbrella organization comprised of many overlapping groups dedicated to specific objectives (settlement, propaganda, land development, immigration, political outreach, security, etc.).

The Worldview of Jewish Fundamentalists

In essence Jewish fundamentalism represents a basic reversal of
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traditional Zionist theory. The product of nineteenth century alienated, persecuted, and secular Jews, Zionism's original objective was the transformation of the Jewish people into a "normal" people, concentrated in its own land, accepted on equal terms by the community of nations. Jewish fundamentalism arose in the aftermath of the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War. With the emotional upsurge that followed the conquest/liberation of the central portions of Biblical Israel in 1967, and the international pariah status to which Israel was relegated after the 1973 war, this message of divinely ordained "abnormality" struck responsive chords. Its message was that Jews could not be a "normal" people, that God and/or the Bible had ordained a unique and world historic purpose for the Jewish people, and that its destiny could and would only be fulfilled via heroic efforts, against worldwide opposition, to liberate the entire "Land of Israel." Zionism, as a movement to rescue Jews from persecution, was rejected. In its place fundamentalists offered the "Zionism of Redemption."

In The Zionist Revolution, Harold Fisch, a member of the religious intellectual core of Gush Emunim, has presented a clear and systematic presentation of the Jewish fundamentalist position. Using this book as an exemplar, the worldview of the movement is analyzed and seven basic propositions are identified. These core beliefs provide the system of meaning within which Jewish fundamentalists interpret daily events and make political calculations.

1. The Jewish people is unique. By virtue of its Covenant with God it is utterly and permanently abnormal.

2. Muslim/Arab opposition to Israel is absolute and qualitatively different from "normal" politically based rivalries. Its abnormal, fanatical quality is consistent with and proof of the unique destiny of the Jews. It is linked to the valid recognition that Zionism represents a fundamental spiritual challenge to the entire non-Jewish world. Arab hostility to Israel represents an intensification of age old anti-semitism corresponding to the escalation of the Redemptive process which Israel's creation and expansion constitutes. The Palestinian movement is the epitome of this rejection of God's plan for the world and is fundamentally suicidal.

3. The international obloquy to which Israel is subjected is proof of Jewish chosenness and of Zionism's effectiveness as a spiritual challenge to the Gentiles and as God's instrument for bringing about the Redemption of mankind. Zionism entails, not the return of the Jews to the family of nations, but the fulfillment of the Biblical prophecy that the Jews shall be "a nation that dwells alone."

4. No process of negotiation and compromise can bring peace. Treating the conflict as a normal political problem ignores the essentially metaphysical character of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Such negotiated compromises that may be attained can only be temporary and will merely delay the completion of the process of Redemption and the arrival of permanent, worldwide, and complete peace.

5. Jewish rule over the Land of Israel is of decisive importance. The
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fulfillment of Jewish destiny involves a partnership among God, the Jewish people, and the Land of Israel. The central role of Jewish contact with and sovereignty over the "Completed Land of Israel" play decisive roles in the spiritual rehabilitation of the Jews and the advance of the Redemption process. Accordingly, virtually no sacrifice is too great to consolidate Jewish control over portions of the Land of Israel now under Israeli control.

6. History and politics are the vehicles of Redemption and the manifestation of God's will. The Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War accelerated the Redemption process. Advancing it to completion requires careful interpretation of contemporary political developments, understood as the vehicle for God's will to be manifest to his people. In combination with properly understood sacred texts the political requirements of the moment can become known.

7. The survival of Israel and the fulfillment of the Jews' Redemptive mission depend exclusively on the faith and dedication of Jews. Israelis who oppose the absorption of the West Bank and Gaza or who advocate negotiated compromises with the Arab world are contaminated by the doubts and spiritual weakness of Western, liberal democratic culture. Such values must be replaced by authentically Jewish, God, Land, and Bible centered beliefs which can unite the people in its confrontation with the Gentile world and help it mobilize the inner resources necessary to fulfill the terms of the Covenant.

The Range of Disagreement within the Jewish Fundamentalist Movement

Within the parameters of the worldview comprised by these beliefs, substantial disagreement exists on six issues. Based on analysis of hundreds of articles written by fundamentalist activists during the last seven years the range of disagreement on these six issues is delineated.

1. Leadership and Source of Transcendental Authority

Until his death in 1982 Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda Kook was accepted by virtually all Jewish fundamentalists as the leader of the movement. Even secular ultranationalists accepted his charismatic authority in many spheres. For many of the founders of Gush Emunim Tzvi Yehuda attained the stature of a prophet, whose contact with the divine will was direct and knowable only by him. Conflicting interpretations of Rabbi Kook's views, along with the interpretation of certain sacred and exegetical texts, play an important but not decisive role in the legitimization of opposing views within the movement. Although some elements within Gush Emunim claim direct contact with God's will, most activists take their cues from their own Rabbis or model their behavior and opinions after certain of the pioneering activists who established the first Gush Emunim settlements, most of whom had close personal ties with Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda Kook. The secular ultranationalist wing of the movement emphasizes the Bible, as the product of the "genius of the Jewish people," as the transcendental source of authority for their views, as well as their belief that their expansive, militant, and "visionary" understanding of Zionism is the authentic legacy of its founders.
2. Territorial Scope of the Whole Land of Israel

In principle most Jewish fundamentalists believe that Israel's rightful borders extend north into Lebanon, east into Jordan, and south into Sinai. Those who have publicly advocated the operationalization of those beliefs, including the settlement and absorption of southern Lebanon, have been severely criticized by the majority on tactical grounds. The mainstream view is that for the foreseeable future Israel should be content to rule what it now has under its jurisdiction. Serious differences do exist over the suggestion that Israel might extend formal recognition to Arab sovereignty over the East Bank of the Jordan in return for Jordanian or Palestinian acceptance of Israeli rule of the West Bank. Certain Rabbis and politicians who had been clearly associated with Gush Emunim, and who after the Lebanon War have expressed a theoretical willingness to share parts of the West Bank with the Arabs, have been treated by most fundamentalists as having betrayed the movement.

3. Pace and Political Dynamics of the Redemption Process

The single most important disagreement within the movement is between the "vanguardists" and the "consensus builders." The vanguardists believe the advance of the Redemption process is still in some doubt, but could be brought to its culmination rapidly if the necessary steps are taken. For the vanguardists Gush Emunim's function remains that of speaking the pure truth about what is required, and defying the state and the majority of Israelis, if necessary, to make sure the process continues. The consensus builders believe that the accomplishments of the last decade make it virtually impossible for Israel to leave the West Bank and Gaza but that completion of the Redemption process will be lengthy and complex. For the consensus builders the most important task is to ease the psychological transition for most Israelis as they confront the irreversible territorial, political, and cultural transformation of the country. From this perspective tactical flexibility, the quiet strengthening of settlement, ideological conversion, gradual action (with due concern for public opinion), and saying "only what can be heard," are imperative.

4. Attitudes toward Israeli and International Opposition

Opposition to the influences of Western/Gentile culture and liberal democratic norms ranges from virulent repudiation of substantial segments of the Israeli/Jewish public seen as beyond rehabilitation, and expressed beliefs by some Gush Emunim activists that productive dialogue with the Labor Party is still possible. The mainstream belief is that a kulturkampf is inevitable with the "nowist, meist, pseudo-democratic left," but differences exist as to how violent and disruptive that struggle is likely to be. While some openly accept the possibility of a civil war, others believe that everything possible must be done to prevent the situation from deteriorating into protracted intra-Jewish violence. Though the most Jewish fundamentalists fault the Jewish terrorist underground on tactical and moral grounds, the overwhelming majority of the movement sympathizes with their efforts, supports amnesty for them, and blames the inadequacy of government policies for their actions.
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Many Gush activists call for a sharp reduction in Israeli dependence on American assistance. Some have advocated closer ties or even an alliance with the Soviet Union if and when American pressure toward territorial compromise becomes too substantial. Virtually all reject the notion of a "Judeo-Christian tradition" and view Western cultural, social, and political norms as antithetical to Redemptionist Zionism.

5. Policy toward and Eventual Status of Local Arabs

A relatively wide range of disagreement exists within the Jewish fundamentalist movement over policy toward the "Arabs of the Land of Israel." While only a few notorious examples exist of activists who have made genocidal suggestions with respect to Palestinian Arabs, approximately one third of the movement shares the belief most explicitly espoused by Meir Kahane that the expulsion of the Arab population, on both sides of the Green Line, is a requirement of Israel's survival and Zionism's success. The mainstream view is that hundreds and perhaps thousands of Arabs should be deported as part of a struggle against terrorism and stone-throwing, but that forcible expulsions should not be seen as the solution to the "demographic problem."

For most fundamentalists the solution to the internal Arab problem lies in creating a truly Jewish centered state which will be, inevitably, an unattractive place for non-Jewish inhabitants. For economic, cultural, and political reasons they will eventually decide to leave. The fundamentalist mainstream believes that political equality between Jews and Arabs is inappropriate and dangerous. Annexation of the West Bank and Gaza must therefore be implemented in a way which effectively prevents citizenship from being extended to the mass of their Arab inhabitants. A recurring theme in the debate over the Arab problem is also the need to reduce the status and political rights of the Arab minority inside Israel proper.

Some 10%-15% of the movement appears to be uncomfortable with the harsh attitudes toward Arabs that prevail in fundamentalist circles. But occasional admonitions to "love thy neighbor as thy self" are met by choruses of ridicule and accusations of betrayal.

6. Prospects for Peace

Four schools of thought exist on this issue, but all agree that a negotiated compromise cannot end the Arab-Israeli conflict. One view is that a constant state of war, punctuated by bloody fighting, will continue until the Redemption process is completed, the Temple is rebuilt, the Messiah arrives, and universal and permanent peace is established. From this perspective the only "peace" worth seeking will be that attending the internal unity and harmony of the Jewish people.

For secular ultranationalists who share these same basic beliefs, the Arab-Israeli conflict is viewed as a modern version of the Hundred Years War. Its roots lie in the warped psychological and cultural development of the Arab/Muslim world and in the anti-semitic inclinations of Gentiles. To survive Israel must turn itself into a modern day Sparta and train its youth to expect constant warfare.
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A somewhat different approach is espoused by those who see elements of rationality at work within the Arab world and who advocate various short-term alliances (with Maronites, Kurds, cooptable Palestinians, South Lebanese Shiites, or Druse). These opportunities to enhance Israeli security and lower tensions can be exploited through unofficial, informal channels. They do not require and should not involve formal recognition of Arab claims or public commitments by Israel to abide by the terms of signed treaties.

One additional perspective suggests that a more formal modus vivendi can be reached with Egypt and even Syria. But this is the view of a relatively small minority. More prominent are arguments advocating official Israeli recognition of Palestinian Arab rule of the East Bank in return for the abandonment of Arab claims to the "western Land of Israel." Ideologically this position is a difficult one to advance within fundamentalist circles since it involves the formal sacrifice of Jewish territorial claims east of the Jordan River. Analysis of the debate on this question suggests that the "Jordan is Palestine" position is primarily a polemical device, not a seriously developed political option.

Present Trends and Future Implications: Israel and the United States

Despite its success, Gush Emunim and the wider circles associated with it are not gathering strength at this time. Nor are Jewish fundamentalists about to take control of the government. Indeed the movement faces serious practical problems as it seeks to advance toward accomplishment of its longer range objectives. These include disappointing reductions in the flow of recruits from religious seminaries, severe cutbacks in the scale of public subsidies for settlement, failure to establish meaningful employment opportunities for most settlers in the West Bank and Gaza, continued reliance on unskilled and semi-skilled Arab labor, and difficulties in efforts to increase Jewish immigration. Indeed the movement's very success has presented it with serious practical problems, including absorption and political mobilization of non-ideologically motivated settlers and strains between religious and non-religious elements.

Despite the overall coherence of its worldview and the impressive dedication of its large activist core, the movement is dangerously split on a variety of tactical questions, summed up in the division between vanguardists and consensus builders. This reflects the basic problem of a leadership vacuum, since the death of Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda Kook in 1982. Clear symptoms of this leadership problem are the shock and disarray with which the movement reacted to the arrest of the Jewish terrorist underground as well as the broad and growing support for drastic change in the status of the Temple Mount.

The rapidly growing demand to "Judaize" the Temple Mount, now part of mainstream opinion within Gush Emunim, is perceived as extremely dangerous by those within the movement who would prefer gradually to build a new fundamentalist consensus in Israeli society. Without a charismatic leader to legitimize a temporary compromise on this highly emotional but politically explosive issue, precipitous action to advance the Redemption process and
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destroy chances for peace negotiations (including the destruction of the Muslim shrines now located on the Haram el-Sharif or the construction of a large synagogue in the area) would have unpredictable and dangerous consequences—for Gush Emunim, for Israel, for the Middle East as a whole, and for the United States.

The very substantial possibility that the status quo on the Haram el-Sharif will be forcibly changed is, within the next two to three years, the single most important threat to United States interests in the Arab-Israeli sphere. In the longer term it is concluded that the success of the fundamentalist movement in establishing its political supremacy in Israel would destroy the "special relationship" that has existed between the United States and Israel since 1967. Whether achieved via cultural transformation, through gradual and legal means, or via a right-wing/clericalist seizure of power to restore order in the wake of violent political conflict among Jews, the ascendancy of Jewish fundamentalism would pose profound challenges to American foreign policy and security interests.
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Purpose and Scope of the Study

Israel has changed dramatically during the last fifteen years. Ultranationalist and religious (Jewish) fundamentalist beliefs, attitudes, and political programs, which were regarded as crackpot extremism by the vast majority of Israelis in the late 1960s, are currently embraced by 20% of the Israeli-Jewish population. Another 10%-15% is now willing to consider these policies and opinions as acceptable, even if they do not fully embrace them. Yet another 10%-15% gives strong support to the key fundamentalist demand that no territorial concessions be made in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.1

This movement, represented most generally but not comprehensively by the umbrella organization known as "Gush Emunim" (Bloc of the Faithful), is the single most important political development in Israel since the creation of the state. Its slogan is "The Land of Israel, for the People of Israel, According to the Torah (Bible) of Israel." Its support of Menachem Begin's Likud coalition of right-wing parties in 1977 was important in ending the thirty year political domination of Zionist/Israeli politics by the centrist, pragmatic, Labor Party. Its utter devotion to the establishment of Jewish sovereignty over the "Whole Land of Israel" is largely responsible for the settlement of the West Bank and Gaza, increasing the number of Jewish residents in these areas from 3,500 in 1973 to approximately 60,000 in 1986. Attendant upon this effort, and the cultural and ideological campaigns associated with it, has been an unprecedented polarization of Israeli society along religious and political lines. This gulf has become so wide, and the struggle between the two sides so bitter, that both protagonists and judicious observers have warned of the real potential for outright civil war.

The purpose of this study is to explain the worldview of this most dynamic segment of contemporary Israeli society by analyzing both consensual beliefs among Jewish fundamentalists, as well the range of disagreement that has existed within the movement.

The study is divided into three major sections. The first section, entitled "Jewish Fundamentalism in Israeli Society," begins with an explanation of terminology and a specification of the boundaries of the phenomenon under investigation. This is followed by an account of the political and organizational development of fundamentalist groups and ideas linked particularly to five key events: the Six Day War of 1967 and the Yom Kippur, or October War, of 1973, the 1977 Likud election victory, and the 1982 Israeli evacuation of the Yamit district in northeastern Sinai, and the Lebanon War (1982-83). The primary focus will be on Gush Emunim as an umbrella group encompassing and related to many others. Profiles of both political parties and non-party groups that have grown out of Gush Emunim, or are related to it, will also be discussed.

The second section of the study, entitled "The Worldview of Jewish Fundamentalism: The Breadth of Consensus and the Range of Disagreement," analyzes the basic beliefs shared by the movement's adherents and the assumptions about national and international politics that flow from them.
Included within the rubric of this analysis will be the approaches taken by both religious and non-religious "fundamentalists." Once the character of shared perceptions, commitments, and beliefs has been established, the analysis moves to a survey of the very substantial differences that exist over a variety of politically relevant questions.

The third and final section of the study, entitled "Present Trends and Future Implications," identifies recent developments which may signal short or intermediate term change in the trajectory of the fundamentalist movement. The possible influence of Jewish fundamentalism on Israeli foreign policy, and the likely consequences for US interests of Israeli policies radicalized by fundamentalist influence, will be briefly discussed.
Jewish Fundamentalism in Israeli Society

Definitions, Terminology, and Historical Background

"Fundamentalism" is commonly defined in strictly religious terms, often referring to the undeviating belief in a precisely rendered catechism or a religious tradition dedicated to the literal interpretation and implementation of particular scriptural texts. The presence in Israel of non-religious, ultranationalist elements within the Jewish "fundamentalist" movement, and the clear separation required between certain pietistic, ultra-religious Jewish groups, who do not share the ideological, Messianic, or political commitments of those associated with the politically ambitious, ultranationalist fundamentalist movement, requires the application of a broader, but carefully construed definition of "fundamentalist."

For the purposes of this study a belief system is fundamentalist insofar as its adherents regard its tenets as uncompromisable injunctions carrying a direct transcendental sanction to participate in the rapid and comprehensive reconstruction of society. Such a definition conceives of fundamentalism, not in either/or terms, but as a phenomenon with several dimensions which may be found to vary independently.

In the Israeli case it is important to distinguish among three groups as candidates for inclusion within the purview of this study:

1) pietistic "ultra-orthodox" religious Jews (known as the "Haredim" or the "Haredi community" whose highly segregated lives revolve around the careful fulfillment of thousands of rules contained within the halacha (code of Jewish law);

2) neo-orthodox "national-religious" Jews whose lifestyles represent an attempt to integrate relatively strict observance of the halacha with full participation in a modern society;

3) non-religious "ultra-nationalist" Jews whose total commitment to the fulfillment of Biblical promises to the Jewish people and to the achievement of maximalist Zionist ambitions serves as a kind of secular religion.

In large measure group (1), the "ultra-orthodox," will not be analyzed as part of the Jewish fundamentalist movement in Israel of interest from the foreign policy point of view. Ultra-orthodox Jews presently comprise approximately 5% of Israel's Jewish population, divided into various sects with loyalties to rival spiritual leaders. As a whole, this community is a continuation of what was the vast majority of nineteenth century Jewish religious orthodoxy. It rejected Zionism as heretical in its focus on returning Jews to the Land of Israel in the absence of divine intervention.

With significant and fiercely anti-Zionist exceptions, ultra-orthodox Jews have come to terms with the State of Israel as a setting within which they can enjoy a subsidized and protected existence. Still, the world Agudah
organization (the traditional political arm of the ultra-orthodox) has refused to join the Zionist movement. Nor has the leadership of the Haredi community sought to transform Israeli society except in ways that directly impinge on its particular concerns, e.g., the banning of automobile traffic from Haredi neighborhoods on the Sabbath and the exemption of their young women and of Yeshiva (seminary) students from service in the army.

A relatively recent trend among the Haredim, toward violent efforts to expand the sphere of their influence over specific neighborhoods, change the operating hours of theatres, and protest the content of public advertisements, is a phenomenon whose origins are complex, and not entirely separate from the larger fundamentalist movement under consideration here. But its ambitions for radical change are not directed toward territorial or other macro-political issues. For this reason, except insofar as trends within the Haredi community are influencing Gush Emunim and related groups, increased haredi activism will not be analyzed in this study.

In contrast, during the last fifteen to nineteen years the great bulk of the national-religious movement (group 2), and virtually all of the non-religious ultra-nationalists (group 3), have sought to transform Israeli society in line with essentially uncompromisable imperatives understood to come relatively directly from transcendental sources. These are the two groups whose alliance has produced the movement analyzed in this study as "Jewish fundamentalism."  

The basis of this alliance was created as a result of the Six Day War in 1967, with the reopening of the territorial question in Zionist/Israeli politics. Its consummation was signalled seven years later, in the wake of the Yom Kippur War, by the establishment of Gush Emunim in 1974. This network of settlers and religious activists quickly overshadowed and then absorbed the ultranationalist "Movement for the Whole Land of Israel," established by an ad hoc group of Revisionist figures, a few Rabbis, and a large number of well known personalities traditionally associated with the "activist" wing of Labor Zionism.  

Although most Labor Zionists accepted the British decision to separate Transjordan (the East Bank) from the Palestine mandate, and thus from the area within which the promised "Jewish National Home" might be established, the Revisionist Party, under the leadership of its founder, Zev Jabotinsky, left the Zionist movement and declared unswerving devotion to the principle of establishing Jewish sovereignty on "both banks of the Jordan." Within the dominant Labor Zionist movement commitment remained strong to the principle of establishing a Jewish state in all of "the Western Land of Israel" (i.e., between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea). But when, in 1947, the Zionist movement was offered the possibility of a Jewish state in part of this area, David Ben-Gurion and the pragmatic Mapai (Workers of Israel) Party, in coalition with religious Zionists and the centrist "General Zionists," accepted the proposal.

This acceptance was accomplished over the strenuous objections of activist Zionists and of the Revisionists. But with the consolidation of Israel's borders along the 1949 armistice lines, the larger territorial

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ambitions of Zionism, even in relation to the Biblical heartland of the ancient Jewish kingdoms (the West Bank and East Jerusalem), faded from operational objectives to politically irrelevant, nostalgic slogans. Nor, before 1967, was there any substantial element within the "national religious" camp, represented by the National Religious Party, that advanced programs for radical change in the political, ideological, or territorial basis of the state.

Contemporary Origins of Jewish Fundamentalism

As is widely recognized by political actors, scholars, and other observers, the 1967 war was a watershed in Zionist/Israeli political history. The juxtaposition of a terrifying period of siege and depression in May of 1967, combined with a lightning military victory and a dramatic, emotionally exhilarating reunion with the Old City of Jerusalem, Hebron, Beit-El, and other locations of Biblical importance, triggered an upsurge of romantic Zionist and religious sentiment. This corresponded with a challenge, already underway in the mid-1960s, by an idealistic "Young Guard" within the National Religious Party, dissatisfied with the compromising attitude and Tammany Hall style politics of the Party's aging leadership. Soon after the Six Day War the Young Guard, led by Hanan Porat, Zevulun Hammer, Yehuda Ben-Meir, and Rabbi Haim Druckman, emerged as the dominant faction within the National Religious Party. It did so in the vibrant aftermath of the war by projecting images of patriotism, pioneering settlement, and religious observance.

Politically, if not organizationally, this was the beginning of Gush Emunim. Its phenomenal success required unprecedented levels of cooperation between religious and non-religious activists, dedicated to the practical political task of incorporating the whole "Land of Israel" into the "State of Israel." This cooperation, and Gush Emunim's success, are in turn understandable only on the basis of three interrelated factors:

* the ideas developed by Palestine Jewry's first Chief Rabbi, Abraham Isaac Kook (d. 1935);

* the leadership and ideological elaboration of those ideas by his son, Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda Kook (d. 1982);

* the political ascendance of Revisionist Zionism, under the leadership of Menachem Begin and his Herut Party-dominated Likud coalition.

Rav Abraham Isaac Kook (Rav Kook the elder)

Even that minority of Orthodox Rabbis who supported the Zionist movement at its founding in 1897 did so despite grave misgivings about the appropriateness of working side by side with Jews who had abandoned observance of the halacha. When the Zionist movement developed and added educational and cultural programs to its agenda, many of them left the movement. Most of those who remained sought to emphasize an interpretation of Zionism as a mundane "rescue" effort for Jews based on the heightened need for a "secure refuge" that became apparent amid renewed persecutions in Russia and Eastern
Europe. Religious Zionism thus explicitly denied any spiritual significance to the Zionist program. Mizrahi, the religious Zionist party, voted in support of Herzl's 1903 proposal to accept Uganda as an alternative to Palestine. Despite the fact that the state to be created might be governed by Jews, it would represent in the eyes of religious Zionists no more than another "host" environment within which the righteous remnant of observant Jewry, maintaining a more or less hostile attitude toward non-religious Jews, could preserve its existence.

The majority of religious Zionists maintained this attitude until 1967. In radical contrast to this view, most Jews in the national religious camp, following the lead of the party's young Guard, now embrace Zionism and the State of Israel as the central factor in the long awaited process of Redemption. This will entail the return of all Jews to the Land of Israel, extension of Jewish rule over the entirety of the "promised land," re-establishment of the legal dominance of the halacha, re-construction of the Temple in Jerusalem, and the appearance of the Messiah. It is difficult to overemphasize the extent to which this stance represents a revolutionary reversal of traditional orthodox Jewish attitudes toward political action as a whole, and Zionism in particular.

Though triggered by the events of 1967, this dramatic reversal has its roots in the efforts of Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, appointed in 1921 to serve as Palestine's first Ashkenazic "Chief Rabbi" by the British. He served in that capacity until his death in 1935. His efforts to give organizational expression to his radical re-interpretation of secular Zionism came to nought, but the legend of his saintly holiness and the power and originality of his ideas served more than 30 years after his death as the theoretical, ideological, and halachic foundation for the emergence of Jewish fundamentalism.

Drawing on long-standing but repressed doctrines of Jewish mysticism, Rav Kook argued that the Redemptive process was a dialectical one that would of necessity require the involvement of non-religious Jews. Nor, he argued, would it be necessary for these secular and even explicitly anti-religious Zionists to believe that what they were doing had or would have any divine or redemptive value. Simply by settling in the Land of Israel, working its soil, and developing its potential for habitation by larger numbers of Jews, the Zionist movement was carrying out the divine plan—a plan to redeem, not only the Jewish people, through its restoration in its own land and the coming of the Messiah, but through them the gentile nations as well.

Central to his message was a mystical affirmation of the holiness of the actual, physical, Land of Israel—Palestine.

Eretz Yisrael is not something apart from the soul of the Jewish people; it is no mere national possession, serving as a means of unifying our people and buttressing its material, or even its spiritual, survival. Eretz Yisrael is part of the very essence of our nationhood; it is bound organically to its very life and inner being. Human reason, even at its most sublime, cannot begin to understand the unique holiness
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of Eretz Yisrael; it cannot stir the depths of love for the
land that are dormant within our people. What Eretz Yisrael
means to the Jew can be felt only through the Spirit of the
Lord which is in our people as a whole, through the
spiritual cast of the Jewish soul...

To regard Eretz Yisrael as merely a tool for establishing
our national unity...is a sterile notion; it is unworthy of
the holiness of Eretz Yisrael...The hope for the Redemption
is the force that sustains Judaism in the Diaspora; the
Judaism of Eretz Yisrael is the very Redemption.5

Living and working in the holy land was a "Mitzvah" (divine injunction)
equivalent in value to all the other religious commandments combined. On this
basis religious Jews could joyously tolerate the lack of religious observance
by most Zionists, confident that exposure to the holy land, complemented by
the sensitive and tolerant persuasion of religious Jews, would lead eventually
to acceptance of the halacha and understanding of the redemptive meaning
of Zionism by the as yet non-religious Zionist majority.

Rav Tzvi Yehuda Kook (Rav Tzvi Yehuda)

Secular Zionists honored Abraham Isaac Kook for offering a basis for
cooperation between religious and non-religious Jews. But they ignored his
proposals for establishing institutions for the spiritual guidance of the
Zionist enterprise. The Yeshiva which the elder Kook had established in
Jerusalem to carry on his work, Merkaz HaRav (The Rabbi's Center), slipped in
stature; this despite the presence there of his son, Tzvi Yehuda. Indeed
Merkaz HaRav barely managed to survive into the 1960s as an ordinary seminary
with no more than twenty students.

However, in the mid-1960s the younger Kook, Tzvi Yehuda, attracted an
important following among an elitist group of graduates of the National
Religious Party youth movement, Bnei Akiva. This secretive, exclusive
fraternity of idealistic young men called themselves Gahelet (Embers).6 Like
his father, Tzvi Yehuda communicated to his followers a mystical, romantic
interpretation of Zionism, redolent with the language of Messianism and
Redemption. But Tzvi Yehuda went substantially beyond Rav Kook the elder in
his willingness to specify concrete steps which would advance the Redemption
process toward its glorious conclusion. Tzvi Yehuda's particular emphasis was
on the sanctity of the State of Israel itself, the holiness of its army, its
economy, and all its endeavors. For him, the State of Israel was the actual
instrument of divine salvation. The great challenge facing it, and the Jewish
people it was in the process of redeeming, was the redemption of the whole
Land of Israel—a process which for Tzvi Yehuda was coextensive with the
establishment of Israeli legal jurisdiction and sovereignty over territories
ruled until 1967 by Israel's Arab neighbors.

An important incident occurred some three weeks before the outbreak of
the Six Day War which helped instill in his disciples an incontrovertible
belief in the divine source of the guidance they received from Tzvi Yehuda.
As recounted by his disciples, Tzvi Yehuda was delivering a commemorative sermon "in the midst of which his quiet tone suddenly rose to crescendo, bewailing the partition of historic Eretz Yisrael."7

Nineteen years ago, on the very night that the decision of the United Nations to create the State of Israel was handed down, as the entire people rejoiced...I was unable to join in their happiness. I sat alone--quiet and depressed. In those very first hours I was not able to accept what had been done, that terrible news, that indeed "my land they have divided" had occurred! Yes, where is our Hebron--have we forgotten it?! And where is our Shechem, and our Jericho, where--will we forget them?! And all of Transjordan--it is all ours, every single clod of earth, each little bit, every part of the land is part of the land of God--is it in our power to surrender even one millimeter of it?!8

Asked by his students if it was permissible to view the military parade planned for Independence Day 1967 in Jerusalem, Tzvi Yehuda is said to have responded: "Of course, know that this is the army of Israel that will liberate the Land of Israel."9

The Rise of Revisionist Zionism

From 1935 to 1967 the Labor Party sought to protect its political paramountcy within Zionism and the State of Israel by ostracizing the Revisionist movement, and its post-WWII leader, Menachem Begin. The underground, maximalist "National Military Organization" (Irgun), led by Begin, was forcibly disbanded in 1948. When Begin organized the Herut (Freedom) Party and entered the Parliamentary elections, he was denounced by Ben-Gurion and other Labor leaders as a fanatic, a fascist, and a dangerous demagogue. As Prime Minister for most of the first 19 years of Israel's existence, Ben-Gurion expressed his willingness to accept any political party as a partner in the government "except the Communists and Herut."

Between 1949 and 1965 Herut remained at the margins of Israeli politics, participating in no governing coalitions and garnering no more than 14% of the vote in any of the five elections between 1949 and 1961. With the return to the 1949 armistice lines after Israel's conquest of Sinai in 1956, those lines appeared to have crystallized into permanent borders. The old Revisionist slogans emphasizing maximalist territorial objectives were still raised, but they sounded strange and increasingly irrelevant to most Israelis.

In 1965 Herut made its first important move toward power by joining with the center-right Liberal Party to form "Gahal." Gahal received 21% of the vote in 1965. More importantly, during the crisis that preceded the 1967 war, Menachem Begin was coopted into Levi Eshkol's Cabinet as a full partner in the "Emergency Government." He left the government three years later in protest over the cease-fire agreement with Egypt, but Begin's participation in the Six Day War Emergency Government legitimized his struggle for political power and
paved the way for the electoral success of Likud, a combination of Gahal with several smaller right-wing parties.

Discredited by scandals and shaken by the losses suffered in the 1973 war, the Labor Party was thrown out of office in 1977. Under Begin's leadership Likud organized a coalition government with the Gush Emunim dominated National Religious Party. In 1981 Begin won a second electoral victory. In the wake of severe economic difficulties, the Lebanon War debacle, and Begin's resignation as Prime Minister, Likud's electoral performance slipped. In 1984 it was forced into a "national unity government" with the Labor Party. In October 1986, Yitzhak Shamir, Begin's successor as head of Likud, assumed the Premiership.

With the formation of the Likud government in 1977 key ministries and other governmental and non-governmental organizations connected to settlement and land acquisition were placed under the control of individuals strongly sympathetic to Gush objectives. The densely populated Arab areas of the West Bank, intended as bargaining chips and kept largely clear of Jewish settlers by previous Labor governments, were especially targeted for settlement—just as Gush Emunim had been advocating. Although the 1977 election campaign was not fought on the issue of the territories, virtually all Israelis knew that for Menachem Begin and a majority of the Likud leadership, there was no higher priority than consolidating Israel's permanent control of "Eretz Yisrael hashelema" "the completed (whole) land of Israel"—especially the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. From 1977 until 1984 the government poured more than one billion dollars into Jewish settlement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and various support activities.

In sum, Rav Kook the Elder provided the doctrinal basis for cooperation between religious and non-religious Jews toward maximalist Zionist territorial objectives. For an idealistic but frustrated young religious elite, Rav Kook the younger provided charismatic leadership and authoritative imperatives linking specific political events (e.g. the Six Day War) and concrete political programs (Jewish settlement and annexation of the occupied territories) to the divine plan for the final Redemption. Finally, the political ascendancy of the Zionist right-wing provided Jewish fundamentalism with the status, self-confidence, and large scale economic resources the movement needed to attempt the actual implementation of its program.

The Evolution of Gush Emunim

The Six Day war re-opened the question of borders, rekindled mass interest and excitement in the "Whole Land of Israel," and helped Menachem Begin escape from the political wilderness into the Israeli political mainstream. Thus it served as the catalyst in the combination of factors, described above, which lay behind the emergence of a redemptionist, visionary, and territory centered Jewish fundamentalist movement.

Soon after the Six Day War discussions began among young Rabbis and rabbinical students associated with Rav Kook as to how settlement in the "liberated areas" might be advanced. Such meetings produced little in the way
of organized activity, but the urge to settle the West Bank for ideological, as opposed to security purposes, did lead Rabbi Moshe Levinger, a disciple of Rav Kook and a future leader of Gush Emunim, to establish a small illegal presence in a hotel in the middle of Hebron during the spring festival of Passover in 1968.

The government was caught by surprise. Internally divided, depending for its survival on the votes of the National Religious Party, and reluctant to forcibly evacuate the settlers from a city whose Jewish presence had been massacred thirty-nine years earlier, the Labor government permitted this group to remain within a military compound. After more than a year and a half of agitation and a bloody Arab attack on the Hebron settlers, the government agreed to allow Levinger's group to establish a town on the outskirts of the city. That town is now one of the largest Jewish settlements on the West Bank—Kiryat Arba.

As a model for later actions by Gush Emunim to use the "creation of facts in the field" as a powerful political weapon, Levinger's success was important. But aside from Begin's Herut Party, the only significant organized effort to push Israel toward permanent incorporation of the recently occupied territories was the "Movement for the Whole Land of Israel."11 This was an elite organization of well-known writers, intellectuals, poets, generals, kibbutz leaders, and other personalities prominent in the pre-1948 Zionist struggle. Founded two months after the Six Day War, it reflected the militant, "activist," romantic, and Land of Israel centered background of most of its organizers. It adopted a platform calling for the rapid settlement and permanent absorption of all the territories. Its manifesto, filled with historical imagery, was devoid of religious language and sentiment:

The whole of Eretz Yisrael is now in the hands of the Jewish people, and just as we are not allowed to give up the State of Israel, so we are ordered to keep what we received there from Eretz Yisrael.

We are bound to be loyal to the entirety of the country—for the sake of the people's past as well as its future, and no government in Israel is entitled to give up this entirety, which represents the inherent and inalienable right of our people from the beginnings of its history...12

Despite the presence of one or two Rabbis among the scores of signatories on this document, the organization was a manifestation of secular ultranationalist Zionism. It aspired to be neither a mass based movement nor a political party, but a respected pressure group whose main objective was to influence government policy via newspaper articles, books, and personal contacts with government ministers. After the 1973 war it was rapidly eclipsed by Gush Emunim, which did aspire to lead a mass movement for the purpose, not merely of changing government policies toward the territories, but of transforming the cultural and ideological coloration of society. On the basis of Kookist injunctions to tolerate the religious non-observance of Jews active in the settlement and redemption of the Land of Israel, Gush Emunim absorbed many of the members of the Movement for the Whole Land of Israel. By 1977 the Movement had virtually ceased to exist.
The actual founding of Gush Emunim and the beginning of its serious effort at political mobilization took place in 1974. It is not inappropriately viewed as the religious expression of a wave of intense and pervasive discontent which many Israelis felt after the "Earthquake"--the popular epithet adopted to refer to the Yom Kippur War of October 1973. This emotional upsurge produced a variety of populist movements. Unusual in Israel's highly institutionalized party dominated political system, these were loosely structured grassroots organizations, led by well-educated but disillusioned young army officers with impeccable credentials as war heroes. Focusing at first on technical errors made by military, intelligence, and political figures before and during the Yom Kippur War, these groups made short-lived attempts to build a political base for a technocratic, progressivist political movement.13

But it was in that same atmosphere of crisis, of grassroots mobilization dedicated to remaking Israeli society in a manner that could justify the losses in the 1973 war, that Gush Emunim also arose. The Yom Kippur War was the first major conflict in which substantial numbers of orthodox Jews participated within regular combat units. Famous for their "knitted skullcaps," these soldiers came mainly from the recently created "Yeshivot Hesder" (field seminaries) in which young religious Jews were permitted to integrate half-time study of sacred texts with regular service in the army. This participation gave religious sabras self-confidence and legitimacy within the wider secular society. Amidst the psychological confusion of the post-Yom Kippur War period, a generation of young religious idealists, whose pride had always suffered by the honor granted to kibbutzniks and other secular Jews for serving in the army, felt empowered to offer their own analysis of Israel's predicament, and their own solution. But their analysis was not technocratic, it was theological. Their solution was a spiritual rejuvenation of society whose most important expression and source of strength would be settlement on and communion with the greater, liberated Land of Israel.

Early Activities of Gush Emunim

In 1973 a small group of religious zealots formed a garin (nucleus for a new settlement) called "Elon Moreh." Its intention was to establish a Jewish settlement in the heart of "Samaria," the northern bulge of the West Bank, densely populated by Arabs. In the spring of 1974, another, somewhat overlapping group of Rabbis, religious war veterans, and hawkish "young guard" political activists in the National Religious Party, most of whom had been strongly influenced by Rav Tzvi Yehuda Kook, established an organization they named "Gush Emunim." The express purpose of this "non-partisan, extra-parliamentary" organization was to advance what one of their number, Hanan Porat, termed the "Zionism of Redemption." After two unsuccessful but, for their supporters, inspiring attempts to establish a settlement near Nablus, the Elon Moreh garin agreed to join with the group known as "Gush Emunim." In August 1974 a secretariat was formed and a statement of principles along with specific plans for political organization and action were approved. The immediate task was to mobilize mass opinion against the willingness of the Labor Government to disengage from territories captured from Syria in the 1973 war. This in turn was seen as but the beginning of a struggle against the
official policy of the Labor Party to withdraw, in the context of peace negotiations, from territories held by Israel since 1967.

One of the first organized actions of this group was to support a hunger strike staged by members of the "Movement for the Whole Land of Israel" to protest the Government's apparent willingness to make concessions on the Golan Heights as part of the disengagement agreement with Syria. When non-religious supporters of this movement from a Golan settlement set up an unauthorized settlement in May of 1974, they were joined by Gush Emunim members wearing "knitted skullcaps" and determined to set a precedent of non-religious/religious cooperation in the establishment of protest settlements.

But their primary focus was on the West Bank heartland—"Judea and Samaria." This directly contradicted government policy. Although the Labor Party did invest substantial resources in settling the Golan Heights, the Jordan Valley, the greater East Jerusalem area, and the Gush Etzion area, the government continued to resist Gush Emunim demands to create a large Jewish presence in the heavily populated highlands of the West Bank. The Labor Party had intended to keep this area, as well as a corridor to Jericho through which Arab contact with Jordan was possible, free of Jewish settlement in anticipation of their eventual return to Arab rule.

From mid-1974 until the ouster of the Labor Party from power in May 1977, Gush Emunim's primary efforts were directed toward challenging this policy and laying the groundwork for a Jewish settler presence in precisely those areas targeted for return to Arab hands. With the blessing and participation of Rav Tzvi Yehuda Kook, the dramatic involvement of whole families, and the skillful use of the symbols associated with Jewish holidays and with the legendary "illegal" struggle by Labor Zionism to settle the Galilee during the British mandate, a total of eight attempts were made in 1974 and 1975 to evade army roadblocks and establish a settlement in the Nablus area. Seven times these were foiled by the army, but each time the numbers of those involved in the effort, the extent of media attention, and their level of public support grew. Their attempts also attracted visits of support to their temporary encampments by influential political personalities, such as Menachem Begin, Ariel Sharon, and Geula Cohen. Finally, on the holiday of Hanukah in December 1975, some 2,000 Gush supporters succeeded in establishing a settlement in Sebastia. After prolonged confrontation with the Labor Government of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Minister of Defense Shimon Peres, the settlers received permission to maintain their presence in the nearby army camp of Kadum. Gush demonstrated its political muscle and mass base in May 1976 with the participation of 20,000 supporters in its first annual Independence Day "March" through the heart of the West Bank.

Confrontation, Settlement, and Success: the Organizational Elaboration of Gush Emunim

United in spirit if not in detailed doctrine behind Rav Tzvi Yehuda Kook, Gush Emunim greeted the 1977 Likud victory with enthusiasm. Its expectations were heightened that the country was moving rapidly toward the Redemption. Indeed some supporters of Gush Emunim felt that with the ascendance of a
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religious-nationalist governing coalition, continued political activism was necessary. Several small Gush settlements that had received de facto recognition by the previous Labor governments were immediately granted official status. Even before he took office, Prime Minister designate Menachem Begin visited Kadum, there dedicating a Torah scroll (containing the five Books of Moses), and declared that there would be "many more Elon Moreshs."

In September 1977 a plan to settle 1-2 million Jews in the West Bank within twenty years was announced by Ariel Sharon, the new Agriculture Minister and head of the Israel Lands Administration. It re-directed infrastructural investments, residential construction, and land acquisition away from Jerusalem and the Jordan Valley toward the highlands. The first version of a similar document, the "Master Plan for Judea and Samaria," was issued in 1978 by Mattitiyahu Drobles, Chairman of the Land Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency and closely associated with Gush Emunim. Within four years the Likud government built twenty settlements in areas previously considered off-limits by Labor governments. Expenditures on these projects averaged $100 million per year and the number of settlers living in the West Bank, minus the Jordan Valley and East Jerusalem, increased from approximately 3,500 in April 1977 to 18,500 by mid-1981. Virtually all of this increase took place in highlands, not in the Jordan Valley. Following its second election victory in 1981, the Likud dramatically increased settlement related expenditures and accelerated programs of land acquisition and infrastructural development beyond the already hectic pace achieved in the previous four years. By the end of its second term, in August 1984, some 113 settlements were spread over the entire West Bank, including half a dozen sizeable towns. 46,000 Jewish settlers lived in the West Bank, with housing and services under construction to absorb 15,000 additional settlers each year.

Despite the enormous resources which both Likud governments put at the disposal of Gush Emunim, after a brief honeymoon the relationship between Gush Emunim and the Likud government turned stormy. With Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977, the Camp David Accords of 1978, the Egypt-Israel peace treaty in 1979, and levels of West Bank Arab political mobilization and anti-settler violence that Gush perceived as intolerable, the expectations of many Gush leaders and rank and file members were shattered. In the fall of 1979 Gush Emunim attacked the Begin cabinet for abandoning the Sinai and setting the stage, with its autonomy plan, for what it feared would be the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.16

By this time Gush Emunim had entered an intense period of institutional elaboration and internal political realignment. In addition to the repeated disappointments it experienced vis a vis Likud government policy, it was seeking to cope with new kinds of issues which progress in the actual implementation of its visionary program entailed. Before 1979, although thousands of Israelis identified with Gush Emunim and shared a powerful commitment to the permanent incorporation of the whole land of Israel within the Jewish state, an organizational basis for carrying out Gush programs or translating the fervent commitment of its activists into entrenched positions of political power was absent. To a large extent Gush leaders blamed their
failure to stop the Camp David Accords and the subsequent failure, in April 1982, to prevent the withdrawal from Yamit, on the absence of effective, sophisticated political organization that could arouse masses of Israelis not directly involved in settling the territories.

From 1977 to 1984 Gush Emunim used the resources provided to it by Likud governments to expand its operations. From a rather loose association of settlement activists, ultra-nationalist Rabbis, writers, publicists, and military figures, it developed into an umbrella movement containing an elaborate array of interdependent organizations, each specializing in particular aspects of the overall Redemptionist struggle or in appeals to the particular viewpoints of one or another constituency. These organizations have drawn most of their recruits from a mass base comprised of many overlapping segments of Israeli society:

- West Bank, Gaza Strip and Golan Heights settlers;
- Graduates of the State-Religious school system (which educates approximately 30% of Israeli Jewish youth);
- Participants in and graduates from a dozen Yeshivot Heider;
- Teenage members of Bnei Akiva (the NRP's influential youth movement with some 29,000 members);
- "activist" Labor Zionists, especially from the Kibbutz Hameuchad movement;
- veteran Ashkenazic members of Herut.

While the above groups have provided the leaders and activists of Gush Emunim, the electoral strength of Likud, translated into support for the program of the movement, has largely been based on the votes of Sephardic Jewish entrants into Israeli politics. In the late 1970s their resentment against effective exclusion from the Labor and Ashkenazic dominated Israeli establishment found increasing expression in the adoption of maximalist, anti-Arab political positions.

The closest thing to an overall representative body that has emerged is the Association of Jewish Local Councils in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza District—Yesha. Based in the Gush settlement of Ofra (in the West Bank northeast of Ramallah), Yesha began as an association of representatives from various regional councils established by groups of West Bank and Gaza settlements with the assistance of the Ministry of Interior. It developed into a representative body of all Gush settlements. An important coordinative body, it lobbies on behalf of settler interests and Gush programs with government ministries, the military government, and Jewish Agency offices; provides administrative resources and political guidance; and has played a key role in the design of zoning and development plans for the expansion of Jewish settler access to land and the regulation of Arab municipal growth.

In December 1979, Yesha launched Nekudai, a monthly journal edited from
then until now by Yisrael Harel—a professional journalist and Gush Emunim activist who has also served as Yesha's general secretary. Nekuda quickly developed into the primary forum for expression of settler opinion and the deliberation, on an "in-house" basis, of all salient issues confronting Gush Emunim.

When the Camp David Accords were signed in 1978, which Gush Emunim bitterly but unsuccessfully opposed, a crisis for Gush supporters was precipitated within both Herut and the National Religious Party, both of which officially backed the Accords. One result was the formation of Tehiya, the first political party traceable to Gush Emunim, though neither officially endorsed by it nor supported by a majority of Gush members. Tehiya was founded as an independent party comprised of both religious and non-religious ultranationalists. Instructively it originated in a meeting held in March 1979 at the home of Ray Tzvi Yehuda Kook—an event attended by several key religious figures in Gush Emunim, some prominent members of Herut, and leaders of what was left of the Movement for the Whole Land of Israel. Discussions were held concerning the implications of Begin's "betrayal" of the cause and the failure of Gush Emunim and other ultranationalist elements to prevent it.

Ray Kook's endorsement of Yuval Neeman—Israel's leading nuclear physicist and a secular ultranationalist—to head the new party, and his emphasis on the overwhelming significance of the "Land of Israel" dimension of the Redemption process, overcame both severe personal rivalries and religious differences within the group.

The Land of Israel is neither religious nor secular. It belongs to the whole Jewish people. The religious and secular frameworks should be discontinued. Today the Land of Israel is the focal point for the redemption. Both the religious and secular camps should compromise on any controversial issues.17

On this basis, and without including any religious language or mention of religious law beyond a vague call for "return to our Jewish heritage and a revival of the spirit...of pioneering Zionism," Tehiya was formed. In the elections of 1981 it received 44,500 votes and placed three deputies in the Parliament: Yuval Neeman; Geula Cohen; and Hanan Porat.

While Yesha and Nekuda strove to keep Gush Emunim united by avoiding a formal endorsement of Tehiya, bitter disputes erupted between those who continued their activity within the NRP and the Likud, despite their support for Camp David, versus those who desired to build up Tehiya as the dominant and official expression of Gush Emunim. It was against this background that, in 1980, the activity of Gush Emunim, per se, came to a virtual halt. However, between 1980 and mid-1982, two other organizations emerged along side of Tehiya to give concrete expression to the movement's continued vitality: Amana and the Movement to Halt the Retreat in Sinai.

Amana was actually begun in 1976 as Gush Emunim's own small settlement organization. As such it marked the beginning of Gush's transition from a
fringe group specializing in protest demonstrations and illegal political "happenings," to a broad movement including within its purview practical efforts to establish and consolidate viable Jewish settlements. In the spring of 1980, however, with Gush Emunim's informal "secretariat" of leading personalities effectively disbanded, Amana announced that for all intents and purposes it was Gush Emunim, and could speak on its behalf. After the shock of Yamit's evacuation, Gush Emunim formally reconstituted its secretariat, but Amana remained. By the spring of 1983 Amana had ten full time staffers as well as representatives in Europe and the United States.

Amana played a particularly important role in the months before the May 1981 elections. As they approached a debate raged within Gush Emunim over which if any of the political parties to support. Meanwhile, fearing, as did Likud, that a Labor victory would revive the Allon Plan, both Amana and Yesha cooperated closely with the Likud government to establish as many settlements and to seize as much land as possible before the elections. Much to the relief of Gush Emunim the Likud won the May elections, but that did not interrupt the government's intention to complete the withdrawal from Sinai by April 23, 1982, including the evacuation of 5,000 Jewish settlers from the Yamit district, in fulfillment of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty.

Indeed it was opposition to the evacuation of Yamit that led to the establishment of another important Gush Emunim related organization—the "Movement to Halt the Retreat in Sinai" (MHRS). The first groups to mobilize against the withdrawal were businessmen and farmers living in Yamit. Having moved to the Yamit district with official encouragement and lavish government assistance, they had established a comfortable and profitable life. Their organized opposition dissolved, however, amidst prolonged and, for Gush Emunim, embarrassing negotiations over just how generous the relocation and compensation packages awarded by the government would be.

In the spring of 1981 the MHRS was formed. Leading roles in the MHRS were taken by two overlapping groups: Gush activists from Tehiya and Yesha, fearful that evacuation of Jewish settlements in Sinai in return for peace would set a dangerous precedent for the West Bank and Gaza, and a number of Rabbis committed to the principle that Yamit was an integral part of the "Land of Israel" whose abandonment would severely interrupt the process of Redemption. The primary objective of the MHRS was to stop the withdrawal through mass mobilization of public opinion. The fall back position, if the primary objective proved impossible to achieve, was to engineer such a dramatic and painful clash between the government and settlers opposing withdrawal that the memory of the psychological and political trauma would inhibit any future government inclinations to evacuate settlements elsewhere.

In August 1981 Yesha passed resolutions urging West Bank and Gaza settlers to join actively in the movement. Hundreds of Gush Emunim settlers from the West Bank infiltrated into Yamit, taking up residence in houses evacuated by settlers who had accepted compensation. In September the MHRS launched a country-wide petition campaign to express what it claimed was the opposition of most Israelis to implementing the withdrawal from Sinai. The petition was widely circulated but the movement's declared goal of one million signatures does not appear to have been met. In March 1982 an anti-
withdrawal rally was held at the Western Wall in Jerusalem which drew more than 40,000 demonstrators. The final stage of MHRS activity was an attempt to concentrate 100,000 opponents of withdrawal in Yamit itself to confront the army on April 22, when it was to receive the order to complete the evacuation.

Instructively, in its effort to rally wider sections of the public behind the struggle to stop the withdrawal, the MHRS employed appeals designed to obscure the spiritual/redemptive ideology that motivated most of its leadership. MHRS propaganda and public statements instead focused on the security dangers that would be associated with the withdrawal, the undependability of Egyptian and American guarantees, and the contradiction of Zionist pioneering values that abandonment of the settlements would represent.20

However, truly widespread public support to halt the withdrawal process was not forthcoming. In the weeks preceding April 22, the MHRS manage to concentrate no more than several thousand supporters (mostly Yeshiva students) in Yamit to resist the army. Fully televised confrontations occurred, including some pushing and shoving, but despite reports of extremist groups ready to resist with arms and explosives, and despite threats by supporters of Meir Kahane to commit suicide if the operation was not halted, the evacuation was completed by unarmed soldiers without serious injury. Many of the evacuees, including leading figures in Gush Emunim such as Benny Katzover, Moshe Levinger, and Haim Druckman, formed a new organization "Shvut Yisrael" (Israel's Return), dedicated to returning Jewish rule to the Sinai. The Yeshiva Hesder located in Yamit, along with several groups of Yamit settlers belonging to this organization, were re-established in settlements across the border in the Gaza Strip.

In subsequent years Gush Emunim has attempted to turn the anniversary of the "uprooting of Yamit" into a national day of remembrance and re-dedication. But neither the "national trauma" associated which it sought to inflict, nor the yearning for a return to Sinai which it has sought to engender, has taken hold beyond its own ranks.

**Gush Emunim in the Aftermath of Yamit and the Lebanon War**

Within Gush Emunim the failure of the MHRS was traumatic. It occurred just six weeks after the death of Rav Tzvi Yehuda Kook and just six weeks before the outbreak of the Lebanon war. Both of these events sharpened emerging divisions within the movement. In this context the evacuation of Yamit precipitated a severe crisis of confidence within Gush Emunim, a re-evaluation of the movement's hitherto primary focus on the establishment of "pioneering" settlements, and another series of organizational experiments.

In symposia sponsored by Gush Emunim to discuss the meaning and implications of the Yamit "disaster,"21 some argued that the failure was due to the overconfidence displayed by many religious leaders that in the end God would intervene to prevent the evacuation. Others argued that in fact it was the spiritual imperfection of the Yamit settlers that explained the debacle. Others simply blamed it on the inscrutable will of God.
The political conclusions drawn from the episode were of two opposing varieties. Many Gush militants identified the key problem as a failure to integrate the fundamentalist movement's efforts with the concerns of the Israeli mainstream. They advocated a broadly gauged campaign of political and cultural outreach to Israelis not actively involved in the fundamentalist movement. The second kind of conclusion emphasized the undependability of the government and the Israeli public where matters of Redemption were concerned. This analysis stressed the imperative of acting purely and decisively, to establish or destroy political facts according to the will of God, regardless of the temporary opposition of most Israelis or the government.

These two conflicting conclusions regarding the implications of Yamit strengthened two opposing trends in the development of Jewish fundamentalism in Israel in the 1980s:

1) political and cultural outreach;

2) direct action and violence.

The balance of this section will concern these two trends.

Political and Cultural Outreach

According to the first interpretation, the failure in Sinai was due to the isolation of Gush Emunim from the wider Israeli public--an isolation that explains why Gush was caught of guard by the enthusiasm with which so many Israelis greeted Sadat's visit to Israel and the subsequent Camp David Accords. This meant that the effort to "save Sinai" did not get off the ground until it was too late. To prevent the repeat of Yamit in Judea and Samaria much larger numbers of Jews had to be persuaded to settle in the territories than could be mobilized from the ranks of Gush Emunim itself, and a great deal more emphasis had to be placed on effective political organization and ideological and cultural outreach within Israeli society as a whole.

This approach led to a flurry of attempts to revitalize Gush Emunim's organizational structure and to create new political parties for the pursuit of fundamentalist objectives. Also associated with this trend toward closer contact with the wider Israeli public was a dramatically new policy toward the problem of increasing the number of Jewish residents in the West Bank beyond some decisive "point of no return." This new policy, energetically implemented from the fall of 1982 through the winter of 1984, entailed the investment of truly gigantic amounts of public money in the subsidization of garden suburbs on the West Bank. By offering rapid transportation to jobs located in metropolitan areas and spacious homes at cut rate prices, tens, and eventually hundreds of thousands of non-ideological, upwardly mobile Israelis would thereby be attracted to live in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.22

Of greater significance for this analysis are the many political, administrative, and personal realignments that took place in the wake of Yamit--reflected efforts to build effective political structures for the mobilization of public support.
Rabbi Haim Druckman is credited with having coined the name "Gush Emunim" at a meeting of its early leadership in his home in February 1974. A fervent, very observant, and mystically inclined leader of the NRP's Young Guard, Druckman was number two on the Party's list for the 1981 Knesset elections but opposed his party's support of the Camp David Accords. He played an active role in the MHRS and threatened as early as January 1981 to bolt from the NRP in protest against the planned evacuation of Sinai. In March 1983 Druckman left the NRP to establish his own party "Matzad" (the Religious Zionism Camp). Druckman's appeal was directed to the Yeshiva wing of the NRP, in particular the religiously observant participants in the Yeshivot Hesder. Early in 1984 Druckman was joined by Hanan Porat, who left Tehiya because of its secularist stance and who failed in his own, short-lived attempt to found a new political movement in the spirit of the Rav Kooks--Orot (Lights). Attempting to build a more broadly based religious--ultra-nationalist movement, Matzad joined with an ultra-orthodox party, Poalei Agudat Yisrael (Pagi), whose fiercely anti-Arab stance and support of settlement in the West Bank were allowed to compensate for its officially "non-Zionist" character. This new alliance entered the July 1984 parliamentary elections under the name "Morasha" (Tradition), emphasizing the religious side of Gush Emunim's appeal. In head to head competition with Tehiya and Likud, it received only 21% of the votes cast by Gush Emunim settlers in 1984, thereby placing only two deputies in the Knesset.23 In July 1986 Morasha came to an end with its re-division into Matzad and Pagi.

The secularist emphasis in Tehiya, which prevented Druckman from entering that party, and which drove Porat from it, was strengthened by its alliance with the "Movement for Zionist Renewal" (Tzomet), founded in 1983 by the just retired Chief of Staff--superhawk Raphael Eitan. The 1300 activists who formed Tzomet were drawn from the ranks of "activist" Labor collective and cooperative settlements. The platform of the movement emphasized its commitment to Jewish sovereignty over the whole Land of Israel, including the Golan Heights, the need to respond to the "traitorous" behavior of the dovish left during the Lebanon war, and a Spartan philosophy of militarism, discipline, and pioneering austerity. In 1984 Tzomet joined the Tehiya Party in a joint list for the Knesset. Eitan was placed in the number two position, between Yuval Neeman and Geula Cohen. Thus the first three positions in Tehiya's 1984 Knesset list were held by secular ultranationalists. Rabbi Eleazar Waldman, in the fourth position, was the most prominent religious figure still associated with the party and the only one elected on the Tehiya ticket to the Knesset in 1984. In Gush Emunim settlements Tehiya received 23% of the vote.

By 1984 then little was left of Gush Emunim's original norm against the active participation of its leadership in political parties. Still, in the wake of the Yamit disaster and the gradual withdrawal from Lebanon, Gush Emunim made repeated attempts to construct some sort of overall administrative-political framework. The most recent attempt followed the political fragmentation of the fundamentalist movement in the 1984 elections. In August 1984 Yesha adopted a wide-ranging and detailed list of by-laws specifying its political objectives and institutional structure. It identified the Yesha council as "representing the settlers and settlements of
Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, in the public political arena on a non-partisan basis." In February 1985 the formation of a 50 man secretariat for Gush Emunim itself was announced along with a ten member Action Committee, and the appointment of a new General-Secretary--Daniella Weiss, a member of the original Elon Moreh garin and a religious activist in Tehiya. Plans for an "Educational Council" of Rabbis and other learned men were also announced. In its editorial praising these developments Nekuda noted just how disorganized Gush Emunim had become.

The public as a whole responded to these developments with surprise. It appears that Gush Emunim, even in the absence of orderly and coordinated activities, is seen in the eyes of the public as gigantic, well-organized, and ideologically influential...It appears that only within the the movement itself was it known that in recent years Gush Emunim carried out no organized activities and that most of the key personalities who served as its leadership had found other political or public frameworks within which to pursue their spiritual and political objectives.

The single most divisive issue to emerge within the Jewish fundamentalist movement since its inception, and the immediate catalyst for the creation of the Gush Emunim secretariat, was the question of the organized use of illegal violence. According to Gush Emunim official spokesman Noam Arnon, had it not been for the new organizational effort, the arrest of the Jewish terrorist underground in April 1984 would have destroyed the movement.

The bitter controversy that erupted within our camp following the arrests was liable to have been, God forbid, the final split, the decisive schism, from which we would not have been able to recover as a broad, united movement. ...but at the last possible moment, and with the help of God, Gush Emunim revived itself.

Analysis of the debate inside of Gush Emunim over the origins, consequences, and implications of the machteret will provide valuable insights into the Jewish fundamentalist worldview and the range of acceptable disagreement within it. In the following portion of this study, however, I simply present a brief description of the phenomenon itself.

Direct Action and Violence

The second kind of conclusion drawn from the Yamit episode by many Jewish fundamentalists led, not in the direction of mass settlement or conventional political and educational action to mobilize political support and build a new Israeli consensus, but toward confrontative postures combined with dramatic and especially violent extra-legal actions. The proliferation and growth of groups implementing such strategies reflect the deep distrust toward the Israeli government which the Camp David peace process as a whole, and the Yamit evacuation in particular, engendered within the Jewish fundamentalist movement. The general intent of those who have responded to the events of
1982 in this manner has been twofold: 1) to eliminate opportunities for a negotiated peace agreement that otherwise might be exploited by what they would perceive as faint-hearted or traitorous Israeli governments; and 2) to do so by means of actions which would themselves advance the process of Redemption. Of particular importance in this context have been the rise of Meir Kahane and his extremist "Kach" movement, a dramatic escalation in attacks by underground Jewish terrorist groups against Arabs and dovishly inclined Jews, and a rapidly building campaign to change the political and religious status quo in sensitive locations such as the city centers of Nablus and Hebron and the Temple Mount in the Old City of Jerusalem.

The existence of various vigilante and terrorist groups within the fundamentalist movement can be traced to the shocked reaction of many of its activists to the Camp David Accords and the implementation of the withdrawal from Yamit.27 Since 1979, at the behest of Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan, Jewish settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip have been integrated into regular reserve units responsible for patrolling local Arab areas. With weapons, ammunition, and training readily available, and a sympathetic political climate created by Chief of Staff Eitan and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, attacks on Arabs and Arab property became commonplace. In June 1980, following an Arab attack on Hebron settlers that left six Jews dead, unknown assailants planted car bombs which severely injured the Mayors of Nablus and Ramallah. The Yamit evacuation, frustrations associated with the Lebanon War, and rising levels of Arab militancy in the territories, accelerated the activities of the Jewish terrorist underground, setting the stage for another major action in July 1983, in which three Arabs were killed in an attack by masked gunmen on the Islamic College in Hebron.

But these were only the most spectacular in a wave of less serious "vigilantism and terror which swept through the West Bank and the city of Jerusalem from 1980 through 1984. During that period the Israeli press reported more than 380 attacks against individuals, including 23 deaths, 191 injuries, and 38 abductions. Hundreds more attacks were directed at property--automobiles, homes, and shops. Forty-one attacks on Muslim and Christian religious institutions were counted.28 Broadly speaking this violence was carried out by three distinct but inter-related groups.

Meir Kahane and "Kach":

Meir Kahane is a fiery American-born Rabbi who founded the Brooklyn based Jewish Defense League. Under investigation by the FBI he left the United States in 1971 and created a another movement in Israel--Kach. In 1980 he was arrested and held in administrative detention by the Israeli authorities for six months, apparently on suspicion of participating in a plot to destroy the Muslim shrines on the Temple Mount. He endorsed and is suspected of having been behind the activities of a shadowy group or groups known as "TNT" (Terror against Terror) which claimed responsibility for a long series of violent attacks against West Bank Arabs, Christian missionaries in Jerusalem, and dovish Israeli Jews. He has publicly praised violent attacks against Arabs and has led his followers repeatedly to Arab villages, addressing the residents as "dogs" and warning them to leave the country.
In three unsuccessful attempts to run for election to the Knesset he appealed to Jewish voters on an overtly racist platform, proposing laws that would forbid intimate contact between Jews and Arabs and promising to rid the country of its Arab population through intimidation, discriminatory legislation, and enforced servitude. In 1984, drawing support mainly from poor, undereducated Sephardic Jews, he received 29,907 votes, sufficient to put him into the Knesset. Although Kach has established two small settlements on the West Bank, it received only 3-6% of the vote in Gush Emunim settlements. But in 1985 Kahane's support in Kiryat Arba, the largest of all Gush Emunim settlements, was substantial enough to give Kach two seats on the local council and a role in its governing coalition.

Temple Mount Related Incidents:

The small plateau behind the Western Wall in the Old City of Jerusalem is reputed to be the Biblical "Mount Moriah," where, according to Genesis, Abraham offered Isaac as a sacrifice. It is where both Solomon's Temple and Herod's Temple were built. Indeed the Western Wall itself is a section of the outer courtyard of Herod's Temple, the only portion of the structure that remains intact. The plateau is sacred for Muslims as well as for Jews. Mohammed is said to have ascended to heaven from it. The magnificent "Dome of the Rock" was constructed upon it to mark the exact spot of his ascent. The el-Aksa Mosque, also located on the plateau, is the third holiest shrine in Islam—following those in Mecca and Medina. While Jews refer to the area as the "Har Habayit" (Temple Mount) Muslims call it the "Haram el-Sharif" (Noble Sanctuary). Traditionally, religious Jews have been barred by the halacha from entering the Temple Mount since the exact location was unknown of the "Holy of Holies," into which entry by anyone other than the High Priest was strictly forbidden. Supervision of the Muslim shrines has thus been left largely to Muslim authorities in Jerusalem.

But since 1967 at least five separate groups, with a total estimated membership of 1500, have sought to change that. Their objectives range from building a Jewish synagogue on the site to exercising full Jewish sovereignty, restricting Arab/Muslim access to the area, and even replacing the Muslim shrines with a rebuilt Temple. Most of their activities are peaceful, but in addition to two acts of arson and murder on the Temple Mount by deranged individuals in 1969 and 1982, a number of illegal and/or violent attempts to change the status quo on the Temple Mount have been made.

In May 1980 a plot to blow up the el-Aqsa Mosque was uncovered by the police. A large cache of explosives was discovered on the roof of a Yeshiva in the Old City of Jerusalem. The conspirators were two soldiers with links to Kach and to Gush Emunim. Roni Milo, a leading Herut politician, served as the lawyer at their trial. Simultaneously Meir Kahane and one of his lieutenants were arrested and held, as noted earlier, for six months in administrative detention.

In March 1983 several dozen religious zealots were arrested after a Muslim guard on the Temple Mount heard digging underground. Equipped with
Lustick

arms, shovels, and diagrams of the underground passage-ways leading to the area, the group appears to have planned to seize the Temple Mount and hold public prayer services there. Participants included soldiers and Yeshiva students from Kiryat Arba and Jerusalem. Most of those arrested were discovered in the home of Rabbi Yisrael Ariel, a prominent activist within Gush Emunim, known for his extreme views. Ariel was the number two candidate on the Kach list in the 1981 elections. Gush Emunim leaders such as Hanan Porat, Moshe Levinger, and Eleazar Waldman, who appeared to have had prior knowledge of the operation, criticized its modus operandi, but expressed support for the group's objectives.

On the night of January 27, 1984, a small group of still to be identified intruders were interrupted by an Arab guard. When police reinforcements arrived the intruders had escaped, but their intentions were apparent from what they had left behind—thirty pounds of explosives, fuses, detonators, and twenty two grenades. Bombs had been prepared with considerable expertise, suggesting the participation of army veterans with demolition experience.

The Gush Emunim Underground:

By far the most serious effort to destroy the el-Aksa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock was undertaken by a group of Gush Emunim activists from the West Bank, a group belonging to the same underground network that carried out the attack on the Arab Mayors in June 1980 and the Islamic College attack in Hebron in July 1983. The plot to destroy the Muslim shrines was carefully and systematically developed over a period of four years, between 1978 and 1982. An army officer with a high level of expertise in explosives was involved. Sufficient munitions to carry out the operation were stolen from the IDF.

Details of this conspiracy were uncovered following the arrest, on April 27, 1984, of twenty-five Gush Emunim activists, mostly West Bank settlers. They were charged in connection with the placement of bombs under five Arab buses. The bombings were thwarted by the police at the last minute. During the interrogation and trial of the accused, the responsibility of this group for the attack on the Arab Mayors and on the Islamic College was established. Several among this group were also charged and convicted in connection with the 1978-1982 plot to attack the Temple Mount—an operation that was aborted in 1982 for what those involved explained were "political reasons."

What is so significant about this network of Jewish terrorists is that virtually all of them were respected members of the Gush Emunim mainstream, with close and in some cases very personal ties to the leadership of the movement. They included one Rabbi (director of a religious school in Kiryat Arba), a former Secretary-General of Gush Emunim, a former member of Gush Emunim's secretariat, the head of the "Committee for Renewal of Jewish Settlement in Hebron," several officers in the army reserve, the son of one of the founders of Gush Emunim, a Nekuda reporter, and one certified war hero. Indeed in their backgrounds as soldiers, pioneering farmers, political activists, and observant Jews they corresponded in almost every detail to the Gush Emunim ideal. Nor, apart from one or two individuals, did they express serious regrets about their deeds. One of the organizers of the network, and
its leading theoretician, was Yehuda Etzion, now serving a seven year prison sentence for his role in the attack on the Arab mayors and in the conspiracy to blow up the Haram el-Sharif. At his trial Etzion said that he had been "privileged to cut off the legs of some of the murders."32

The initial public reaction of Gush Emunim to the arrests was one of stunned silence and official statements, by the Yesha Council, of the unacceptable nature of the alleged behavior of the accused, the importance of emphasizing the responsibility of the government for controlling Arab violence, and the need for a thorough process of soul-searching within the movement to determine how terrorist attacks on Arab women and children could be carried out by "good religious boys"--"some of our best comrades."33

But as details of the activities and histories of the accused became known, it became clear to most observers that leading figures within Gush Emunim, including Rabbi Moshe Levinger and Rabbi Elazar Waldman, must have provided at least tacit approval for their actions. Indeed rather quickly the publicly expressed sentiment within Gush Emunim, and the wider publics from which it has drawn support, shifted. The activities of the underground were portrayed as an understandable and perhaps even necessary reaction to the failure of the authorities to provide for the personal security of Jewish settlers--particularly in regard to stone-throwing against settler vehicles on the roads of the West Bank. Settlers and politicians from Tehiya, Morasha, and Likud, flocked to the prison where the accused were held to express their sympathy and support. An organization of settlers quickly formed to provide legal and financial assistance to the defendants and their families. Debates continued for a long time inside the movement over the implications of the affair. But within two months the Yesha council and the editorial board of Nekuda admitted that they had come under severe attack from within Gush Emunim for their "hasty" condemnation of the maachteret. They immediately threw their support behind the effort to provide moral, financial, and political support to the defendants.34 In July 1985 both Yesha and Nekuda joined the families of the defendants in a demand for a blanket pardon. From July 1984 to April 1986 Nekuda also published a series of five lengthy articles by Yehuda Etzion, written in his prison cell, presenting an elaborate ideological, political, and theological justification for his actions.

The material presented heretofore suggests how complex and differentiated are the various components of ideology, organization, tactics, and leadership that have comprised the Jewish fundamentalist movement in Israel since its inception. It has been a tumultuous period in Israeli politics, and it has been no more stable for the fundamentalist movement than it has been for any other segment of Israeli society. Nor has one organization, including Gush Emunim at its most coherent, ever included within its scope all the radical national-religious and secular ultranationalist activity that must be considered part of the phenomenon. In the following section the focus shifts to an identification of the unifying elements within the "worldview" of Jewish fundamentalism--elements that give it a coherence that might seem surprising in light of its organizational fragmentation and the heterogeneity of those groups within Israeli society from which it has drawn support.
THE WORLDVIEW OF JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM:

THE BREADTH OF CONSENSUS AND THE RANGE OF DISAGREEMENT

The worldview of Jewish fundamentalists in Israel is worthy of careful study in part because it is so radically different from that of most Americans, and even of most Israelis. It is crucial to understand that the perceptual and ideological categories shared within the movement serve not some ethereal, symbolic purpose, but actually guide interpretation of daily events and constitute the fundament of political calculation and action.

The shape and the boundaries of this belief system will be established in two complementary ways. First an overall depiction of Jewish fundamentalist ideology will be presented. Several scholars have referred to this ideology as "the New Zionism."35 As should be apparent from the previous section, it is also legitimate and convenient to refer to it as "Gush Emunim's thinking" or the "ideology of Gush Emunim." Secondly, a systematic analysis will be presented of the range of disagreement within the Jewish fundamentalist movement, based heavily but not exclusively on analysis of articles, essays, editorials, and interviews published in Nekuda. The assumptions about what everyone in the movement agrees on will be implicit in these disagreements. The analysis will also provide a basis for comments in the concluding portion of the study about the range of possible developments to be expected within the Jewish fundamentalist movement itself and the implications of those developments for Israeli foreign policy and US-Israeli relations.

The Zionist Revolution, by Harold Fisch, as Exemplar

The overall worldview of the movement is well documented in an important book written by Professor Harold Fisch, The Zionist Revolution: A New Perspective.36 Born in Great Britain, Fisch received his Ph.D. in English literature in the United States and emigrated to Israel in 1957. He worked as Professor of English at Bar-Ilan University and served as Rector. Founded by the National Religious Party, Bar-Ilan is the only university in Israel sponsored by religious Jews. In 1967 Fisch helped establish the Movement for the Whole Land of Israel. In 1970 he founded the Institute for Judaism and Contemporary Thought and in 1977 attended the 32nd UN General Assembly as a member of the Israeli Delegation.

The Zionist Revolution is one of the very few, if not the only book length attempt by a member of the core religious leadership of Gush Emunim to outline the movement's overall perspective. To be sure, it cannot be understood, in all its detail, to represent the conscious and articulated sentiments of all those who support or identify with the fundamentalist movement in general or Gush Emunim in particular. But the central ideas which it contains are those which organize the perceptions, sentiments, and actions of virtually all Gush Emunim activists. Even the non-religious ultranationalists associated with the movement share the basic beliefs.
outlined in Fisch's book, albeit re-interpreted in certain respects to obscure
the role of a personal God. For the much larger number of Israelis on the
periphery of fundamentalist organizations, but who share the objectives and
attitudes of Jewish fundamentalism, Fisch’s ideas can be understood as an
unstated, non-elaborated, but coherent body of doctrine which effectively
guides their understanding of politics and much of their political behavior.37

Fisch’s argument can be analyzed in terms of seven basic beliefs, each of
which will now be explained and illustrated.

The Abnormality of the Jewish People

Zionism arose simultaneously in the late nineteenth century in both
Eastern and Western Europe. The analysis of the "Jewish problem" and its
solution, propounded independently by Leo Pinsker in Czarist Russia and
Theodore Herzl in Austria, Germany, and France, was anchored in the bold
conviction that anti-semitism could be utterly eliminated if Jews were granted
the opportunity to become a "normal" people. In the Hebrew phrase, Jews were
to become "goy kekol hagoyim," a nation like all the other nations. What set
Zionists apart from Jewish advocates of socialist, Yiddishist, religious, or
assimilationist solutions to the gathering crisis of European Jewry was that
Zionists ascribed anti-semitism and its tribulations to the structural
abnormality of Jewish existence as a diaspora people. Living scattered among
other peoples, a minority everywhere, the Jews appeared to gentiles as a
weird, mysterious, and even ghostly presence. Antisemitism was traceable to
the abnormal mode of existence of the Jews and to the fears and passions which
under the circumstances Jews naturally provoked among the gentiles.

According to this view Jewish life, both on the individual and collective
level, had been distorted by the abnormality of Jewish diaspora existence and
the degradation and persecution associated with it. By concentrating Jews
once again in their own land, where they would constitute a majority of the
population, they could undergo a process of normalization that would be
reflected in a national culture and personality no different in its
fundamentals from that of any other. With remaining Jewish minorities in
other countries standing in the same relationship to their "host" countries as
the German minority in France or the French minority in Germany, anti-semitism
would fade and eventually disappear.

Harold Fisch's argument is an unusually explicit exemplar of Jewish
fundamentalism's radical reversal of this basic Zionist proposition. The idea
"that the Jewish nation is a normal nation and ought to be treated as such by
the so-called international community...is the original delusion of secular
Zionism."38 Authentic Zionism, for Fisch, entails rejection of classical
Zionism's use of other nations as models for how the Jewish people should
behave and what it would and should become. Jews are not and cannot be a
"normal" people; they are, in fact, irrevocably "abnormal."

Jews are not only different from all other nations as each nation is
different, one to another; Jews are different from all other nations in the
very meaning of their existence as a collectivity. The eternal uniqueness of
the Jews is the result of the "Covenant" (which Fisch usually capitalizes)
made between God and the Jewish people at Mount Sinai—a covenant that was arrived at freely, in real historical time, and has eternal and inescapable consequences for the entire world. The terms of the Covenant, and its implications for the Jewish people are seen as explicitly delineated in the Bible. Fisch gives particular prominence to the following quotations:

And I will establish my covenant between me and thee and thy seed after thee in their generations for an everlasting covenant, to be a God to thee and to thy seed after thee. And I will give to thee and thy seed after thee the land in which thou dost sojourn, all the land of Canaan for an everlasting possession; and I will be their God.39

And I shall walk among you, and will be your God, and you shall be my people.40

They shall dwell in the land where your fathers dwelt that I gave to my servant Jacob; they and their children and their children's children shall dwell there forever, and my servant David shall be their prince forever. I will make a covenant of peace with them; it shall be an everlasting covenant with them; and I will bless them and multiply them, and will set my sanctuary in the midst of them for evermore. My dwelling place shall be with them; and I will be their God, and they shall be my people.41

The Covenant marks the Jews as God's chosen people—a chosenness that bears with it both suffering and reward. As a "kingdom of priests and a holy nation" (Exodus 19:6) the Jews will forever be God's blessing upon the world. They will also be "immune to the Spenglerian laws of decline and dissolution."42 But the Covenant also subjects the Jews to "outrageous slings and arrows" and makes of them "a suffering servant."43 Thus, unlike Herzl, Pinsker, and the rest of classical Zionist ideology, Fisch does not believe that anti-semitism, and attendant Jewish suffering, can be eliminated. They are part of God's plan and an inescapable part of the Covenant.

The Covenant is not one possible interpretation of reality: it is reality itself as Israel experiences it. There are millions of Jews who try to escape it, but it seems that it is impossible for them wholly to do so...They are in a manner coerced, subject, willy-nilly, to the strange destiny which is its theme. "I will cause you to pass under the rod," declared the prophet, "and bring you into the discipline of the Covenant." (Ezekiel, 20: 37)44

The Meaning of Arab Opposition to Israel

As befits an "abnormal" nation, the conflicts which it encounters with its neighbors are not normal either. In their analysis of the Arab conflict with Israel, if not always in their propaganda, most Israeli leaders have sought to explain Arab hostility in practical terms—as a conflict which stems
from misperceptions and/or specific and mundane political, social, cultural, and historical circumstances. Accordingly, as those perceptions and circumstances change, opportunities for ending the conflict can materialize and should be awaited, identified, and exploited. But for Fisch, and the Jewish fundamentalist movement as a whole, Arab hostility is but the most recent manifestation of anti-semitism. Zionism's success in concentrating Jews in their ancient homeland has not and will not eliminate anti-semitism, it has just shifted its geographical focus to correspond with the shift in the "covenantal center of gravity" from the Jewish diaspora to the Jewish state.45 Arab anti-Zionism, in keeping with all manifestations of anti-semitism, is therefore not a political phenomenon whose intensity is subject to change as a consequence of internal or external changes in the Arab world.

Classical Zionists, according to Fisch, "long refused to recognize this, seeking to assure themselves and the international community that this was a 'normal' international dispute."46 But the Arab-Israeli conflict is not and cannot be a 'normal' dispute.

To recognize the Arab hostility to Israel as diabolical, as a continuation of Hitler's war against the Jews, involves a recognition of the essential abnormality of the Jewish condition, and a recognition, also, that this abnormality has not ended with the establishment of a Jewish state.47 The struggle with the Arabs is neither rational, nor even political. Nor is it based on misapprehensions, of Arabs by Jews or of Jews by Arabs. It is metaphysical. The chronic conflict reflects the Arabs' profound understanding of the religious claims which Israel makes upon the world and the challenge those claims represent to Islam.

For the modern secularized imagination of the West and of many Zionists it is difficult to grasp fully the concept of a 'holy war', a Jihad, as a twentieth century reality. But for the Arab world the crusade against Israel has never been other than a holy war...a religious war...The enemy is Judaism, for the claims on which a 'Jewish state' is based are manifestly religious in origin, just as the aims on which such a state is founded cannot be understood except with reference to Jewish messianic beliefs.48

Fisch dismisses the Palestinians as the exact opposite of the Jewish people. The Jews are authorized by the living God and creator of the universe as a legitimate, eternal people with unalienable rights to the entire Land of Israel/Palestine. The Palestinians have absolutely no legitimate claim to nationhood or to any part of the country. They have experienced no real suffering, and have drawn together as an entity only out of opposition to the Jews. Theirs is a "suicidal" struggle for the elimination of the state and people of Israel. As such Israel must recognize the Palestinians as the most destructive and dangerous emanation of Arab hostility, and stand ready to destroy them as they seek to fulfill their collective "death-wish."49

Israel's International Isolation as Proof of Jewish Chosenness
Israel's international pariah status and the wildly irrational opprobrium that Fisch says the world community continuously heaps on the Jewish state provide yet more evidence of the Jewish people's special divine destiny—"a theological sign of election." The possibility that Israel's policies might be deservedly opposed by its neighbors or by important segments of the international community is a hypothesis Fisch simply does not entertain. Fisch, and the Jewish fundamentalist outlook which he represents, substitute for the traditional Zionist slogan ("What counts is not what the gentiles think, but what Jews are!") something quite different: "What counts is not what gentiles think, but what Jews are!" Israel's maximal territorial and political ambitions are accepted, axiomatically, as right because Jews are the chosen people of God. Given that, the state of Israel, by attracting outrage and persecution, merely continues the traditional role of the Jew in world history—"that of a barometer for registering the moral state of the nations."51

Indeed Fisch positively revels in whatever signs of escalating hatred of Israel and of Jews he can find. "The pressure on Israel," he writes, "especially from the United States, is unbelievably great."52 This pressure, along with the Vatican's refusal to recognize Israel, and the United Nations resolution of 1975 equating Zionism with racism, are interpreted to represent the world community's endorsement of and participation in the "politicial" and genocidal program of the Arabs.53 More significantly the involvement of the entire world in the struggle to destroy Israel attests to the cosmic importance of the Jews, and of their state, as the focus for the divine drama pitting good against evil. Israel's isolation magnificently confirms the empirical reality of the Covenant between the Jews and their God by fulfilling the prophesied destiny of the Jews as "a people that dwells alone and that shall not be reckoned among the nations." (Numbers, 23:9)54

The Impossibility of Arriving at a Negotiated Peace

The scale and pervasiveness of gentile hostility to Israel, reflecting as it does, the underlying spiritual tension which God introduced into the world via his Covenant with the Jews, cannot be assuaged through negotiation or compromise. It makes no difference whether the political efforts to achieve peace entail direct contacts between Jews and Arabs or whether there is some sort of international mediation or orchestration of the "peace process." Such efforts are bound to fail.

Those Israelis who have pursued what they believe to be options for peace make the silly mistake of thinking that the conflict is a normal one, about borders and political rights. Especially before 1973 "the Israeli side was confused; it was still attempting to deceive itself that this was a conflict susceptible of solution by the ordinary means of international mediation."55 So-called Israeli "moderates" also ignore what Fisch considers "the simple lessons of the past."

...the route of concession has been tried repeatedly in Zionist history without bringing peace any nearer. Again and again the Zionist leadership, and later the state of
Israel, have sought an accommodation with the Arabs based on some political or territorial compromise. They have been rebuffed each time.56

Writing soon after Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977, Fisch was nonetheless convinced that there existed "no real movement for accommodation with Israel on the basis of a recognition of the legitimacy of a Jewish-Zionist state in Palestine, in however limited a territorial space."57

There are two kinds of peace which are possible. The first is a temporary peace based on Arab and international perceptions of Israeli power. This kind of peace cannot last forever, it does not signify Arab abandonment of the destruction of the Jewish state, but it can be maintained without a negotiating process involving territorial or political concessions. It is the sort of peace which Menachem Begin predicted Israel would enjoy when at the height of Israel's apparent success in the Lebanon War he declared that the land would enjoy the Biblically ordained "forty years of peace" because of Arab fear and disarray.58

The second kind of peace, "real peace," is that which will accompany the completion of Israel's inheritance of the whole land. That will precede the coming of the Messiah to rule over a united Israel. As part of this process of Redemption all nations "will marvelously acknowledge the truth which it is Israel's task to bring to the world, that message of justice and peace of which the holy mountain is the visible symbol."59

Thus the issues at stake in the Arab-Israeli conflict are infinitely profound and consequential. Territorial and political problems are but superficial aspects. Negotiated compromises which are implemented may appear to be successful, in the short run. But by obscuring the ever present threat of annihilation and by abandoning territories, not only is Israel weakened and endangered, but the imperatives which God has placed upon the Jewish people to "inherit the land" are contradicted. This, in turn, delays the eventual Redemption, not only of Israel but of the entire world.

The Cardinal Importance of the Land of Israel

Gush Emunim's official slogan is "The Land of Israel, for the People of Israel, according to the Torah of Israel." The primacy of the Land in this triple commitment is also characteristic of Fisch's book, whose Hebrew title is "The Zionism of Zion," referring to the motive of Jewish return as a positive expression of the Jews' love of the land of Zion, rather than a desperate attempt to find a refuge from persecution in the diaspora. Indeed, the Covenant between God and the Jewish people is actually a contract with three partners.

The Covenant rests on a triad of relationships: God, land and people. The land is holy only because God chooses to dwell in it and chooses that we should dwell in it with him. Take away the theological dimension and Zionism itself turns to ashes.60
Just as the Covenant is rooted in actual historical time, so too must it be fulfilled in one chosen place—the Land of Israel where "there and there alone can Israel perform its service as 'a kingdom of priests and a holy nation." 61 Other nations may feel special ties to the beauty of their homelands or monuments built there. Some even feel that theirs is a special, divinely favored land. In particular Fisch mentions the belief by many American pioneers that by moving westward they were "responding to a divine call, fulfilling a divine destiny." 62 Though these sentiments may be genuinely expressed by others, the fact is, according to Fisch, that only the Jews have a relationship to their land which is divinely ordained.

One implication of this belief is that justifications advanced by some Israelis for the need to maintain Jewish rule of this or that piece of the Land of Israel are largely inappropriate. Neither security considerations nor economic or demographic necessities are decisive. Nor should the world think that Jews believe their right to the whole land is based on such essentially changeable, conditional, criteria. The entire land of Israel is the "Promised Land." That fact and that alone is what Jews must rely on in the face of Arab and gentile opposition to its habitation and rule by Jews.

The covenant between the people of Israel and its God, which includes the promised land as an integral part, is an important objective within the entire scheme of creation. It is from this fact that the linkage between the people of Israel and its land is rooted—in the transcendental will of God who created all in his honor. 63

Among themselves Jews should stop making distinctions which portray some parts of the land as more important than others.

There are those who think of the Land of Israel as divided into three parts: the state of Israel before the Six Day War; the area of our historical rights; and the area that we have conquered for ‘merely’ security needs. All such distinctions are devoid of reality. The entire land of Israel as it is now constituted in our hands is one entity—the promised land. In this context, from both the semantic and halachic perspectives, the promise and our security are part of the same thing, indeed they are one word. And from this perspective every area that we have conquered from our enemies, and that we may conquer in the future, is meant to guarantee the existence and life of the people of Israel, for now and forever. 64

Nor is it permissible for Jews to accept the idea, even in principle, that if sacrifice of part of the land would help to save Jewish lives by avoiding armed conflict, then territorial compromise is allowable. To the three commandments to which the Rabbis have traditionally attached the provision that they shall not be broken, even at the point of death (murder, idolatry, and incest), Fisch, and Gush Emunim as a whole, add the abandonment of parts of the Land of Israel to foreign rule. 65

Current History as the Unfolding of the Redemption Process

For Fisch, as for Gush Emunim, God speaks to his people through the
vehicle of history. Political trends and events contain messages which provide instructions, reprimands, and rewards. Political and historical analysis, properly undertaken, thereby becomes equivalent to the interpretation of God's will. In combination with religious texts this analysis guides the continuing the struggle toward Redemption. Jews, according to Fisch, "are actors in a drama which we do not write for ourselves, but we have to act our part and come in on our cue." This general approach is well illustrated by Fisch's interpretation of the divine messages delivered to the Jewish people by three events which he labels "moments of truth": the Holocaust, the Six Day War, and the Yom Kippur War.

The Holocaust, the destruction of six million Jews by Nazi Germany during World War II, is characterized as an example of God's discipline—"a commandment written in blood upon the soil of Europe." It instructed his people that the Emancipation, in which so many Jews had placed their hopes for a future of equality within a liberal democratic Europe, could not provide Jews with an escape route from the burdens of their Covenant with God. Referring to the refusal of most Rabbinic authorities to give their blessing to Zionism before the onset of the Holocaust, Fisch expresses the hope that present day Rabbis will not make the same mistake by minimizing the cosmic significance of contemporary political struggles, especially the struggle to achieve permanent Jewish control over the whole Land of Israel.

We can hope that the Torah greats of our generation will not make the same tragic error of their predecessors in the early days of Zionism. If we have learned to hear the voice of the God of Israel speaking to us from the fire of history, please let us not close our ears today and act as if there is no religious significance to the great and wonderful events of our time...

Indeed, stresses Fisch, it is "(not) only in darkness and disaster that the God of Israel speaks, demanding an answer. He speaks also through great acts of deliverance." Among these the most important are the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War.

The Six Day War he compares to the crossing of the Red Sea by the Israelites on their way out of Egypt. The war was "a truly religious moment" containing "the experience of miracle, of sudden illumination." It was, according to Fisch, "a triumph...by which (the Jews) were not only delivered from mortal peril but also restored to Jerusalem and to the cities of Judah." The message directed to his people by the Six Day War was God's awakening of Israelis to feel themselves as Jews, separated from and threatened by the gentile world, but reconnected to their land, hearkening to "the revelation...of the full meaning of the Jewish calendar which binds us to a past echoing with ancestral obligations and a future promise and redemption."

The Yom Kippur War of 1973, the third "moment of truth," Fisch interprets as God's admonition to his people to reconcile themselves to the abnormality of their condition, their radical separation from the gentile world, and the acceptance of a "covenant destiny." Emphasizing the date of the attack, on...
Lustick

Yom Kippur, the worldwide isolation of Israel which Fisch argues attended the oil embargo, the genocidal intent of the "Arab onslaught," and the United Nations General Assembly resolution equating Zionism and racism, Fisch interprets the meaning of the conflict as a final and unarguable contradiction of the political stance of Israelis who had argued, since 1967, for territorial compromise as a path to peace with the Arabs.

Launched on Yom Kippur, at the most sacred hour of the Jewish year, it was a challenge to the Jewish calendar and all that it stood for, namely, the whole historical pilgrimage of the Jewish people, its covenant destiny. A metaphysical shudder, as it were, passed through the body of Israel...It was not so much an act of aggression as a blasphemy. It challenged the Jewish people at the root of its existence. Like the Assyrian invader at the time of the prophet Isaiah (chapter 37), the enemy had 'reviled and blasphemed the Holy One of Israel'...No longer was it possible to affirm with any confidence that we were engaged in a normal conflict with a normal enemy.

The Faith and Ideological Dedication of the Jews as Decisive Factors

As noted earlier, Fisch does not believe that opportunities for reaching a negotiated peace with the Arabs exist. Accordingly, he believes that the deep division within Israeli society between "hawks" and "doves" is irrelevant in regard to the prospects for peace or war. On the other hand, the fierce Israeli debate over the future of the occupied territories is of critical importance. It represents a struggle between a Zionism which distorts and abandons Jewish history in a vain search for normalcy, and an authentic Zionism which embraces the "scandal of biblical reality" and accepts the lonely destiny of the Jews as God's covenant people.

Only a "fuller Zionism, one that includes in itself the mystery of holiness and the dream of salvation," can provide the Jews of Israel with the strength they will need to survive against a hostile and unredeemed world. A renewal of such faith will require secular Jews in Israel to emerge from the "complex spiritual crisis" presently affecting them, and to return, if not to orthodox Judaism, then to an inspired and providential understanding of the Zionist mission. This, in turn, will entail forgetting about "world opinion" and abandoning their "cheap imitation of the culture of the West." Pseudo-sophisticated political calculations must be cast aside in favor of a purer, simpler faith in the destiny of the Jewish people to rule the whole Land of Israel and to fulfill, thereby, the terms of its covenant with God.

Fisch identifies Gush Emunim as that force within Israeli society which represents the reformulation of Zionism in the "covenantal" terms which he advocates. Rejecting the search for a "reasonable accommodation to circumstances," Gush Emunim activists "avow the absoluteness and transcendence of the Jewish bond with the Holy Land and the Holy City, and affirm, even in defiance of current political trends, that history will finally justify them." Despite what appear to be enormous obstacles to Gush Emunim's
struggle to achieve the "spiritual rehabilitation" of the Jewish people, eventually success will come. For the Jewish people's pursuit of its destiny is ultimately determined, not by men alone, but by "the inexcusable ability of those events through which the unseen Guardian of Israel, now as at all times, addresses his word to us."80

The Range of Disagreement within Jewish Fundamentalism

It has been convenient to depict the worldview of Jewish fundamentalism via systematic analysis of one primary text--The Zionist Revolution by Harold Fisch. But even among activists within the movement there is, on most important issues, a substantial range of disagreement. Careful examination of these disagreements will show that they occur within the parameters of the worldview described above. More importantly, the debates within the movement reveal the forces which drive it, the stresses to which it is subject, and the trajectories it may trace in the future.

Six issues have been chosen for analysis. Together they encompass most of the critical disputes within Gush Emunim over the past three and a half years. For each issue the "mainstream" opinion will be identified and the support for it characterized in comparison with opposing views, located along a continuum appropriate to the issue under discussion. The six issues are:

1. Leadership and source of transcendental authority
2. Territorial scope of the whole Land of Israel
3. Pace and political dynamics of the Redemption process
4. Attitudes toward internal and international political opposition
5. Policy toward and eventual status of local Arabs
6. Prospects for peace

Leadership and Source of Transcendental Authority

Until his death in 1982 Rav Tzvi Yehuda Kook was acknowledged by most Gush Emunim activists as the leader of the movement. Through him, authoritative interpretation of his father's writings--particularly the latter's magnus opus, Lights ("Orot")--was possible. His remarks before the Six Day War, described above on pp. 7-8, were understood and reported by his students as akin to prophecy. His advice and guidance was sought on issues pertaining to where and how to establish illegal settlements, what political frameworks to construct and support during elections, and how to manage of relations between non-religious and religious Jews within the movement.
But Tzvi Yehuda was very old and wrote very little. His manner of speaking was elliptical and filled with allusions to Rabbinic texts and authorities unfamiliar to most Israelis, and even most Gush supporters. This meant that even during his lifetime he served more as a charismatic focus for the respect and devotion of activists within the movement than as its effective leader. Since his death, anecdotes about his life, his commentaries and homilies (as transmitted by his students), as well as the writings of his father, have been used by various leading elements within Gush Emunim to support contradictory positions on many issues.

Within Gush Emunim the leadership vacuum which Tzvi Yehuda's death created has been widely acknowledged. For example, in May 1983, an important Gush Emunim conference was held to discuss the movement's future a year after the Yamit evacuation. Rabbi Yaaacov Ariel, head of the Yeshiva in the settlement that hosted the conference, spoke of the need to shift from dependence on a charismatic leader who was no longer present, to some form of collective leadership.

As long as Rav Tzvi Yehuda was alive, there was a natural leadership, but since his death, and perhaps since he stopped giving his opinion on specific matters, controversies began....Rav Tzvi Yehuda spoke also for and against, and you could never know which position he would support and which oppose. Thus the argument over who continues the way of Rav Tzvi Yehuda can lead nowhere. There can be no continuation of people like the Rav.

The fact that most of those invited, are here, shows that there are plenty of opinions. After the death of Rav Tzvi Yehuda it is not possible to find a single leader, rather all together our public may perhaps be able to do what formerly one man could do.81

Most activists within the movement, aside from trying to strengthen Yesha and reconstruct a Gush Emunim Secretariat to act on their behalf, find their own leaders among the pioneering elite who founded the first West Bank settlements, such as Hanan Porat in Gush Etzion and Beni Katzover from Elon Moreh, and among the Rabbis who teach in the Yeshivas in which they have studied or who live among them in the settlements. Several of these Rabbis, mostly students of Rav Kook, have become public personalities, especially Haim Druckman, Moshe Levinger, Eleazar Waldman, Yoel Ben-Nun, Yehuda Amital, and Yisrael Ariel. But many Rabbis, whose influence as spiritual leaders over Gush activists is very great, often do not occupy public positions. Nor do their names commonly appear in the media. The intimate relationships they build with their students and followers are based on regular contact, constant study of sacred texts, and close consultation in matters of religious and personal life. These relationships also create opportunities to wield enormous influence over their followers in matters pertaining to politics and the advancement of the struggle to settle and annex the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The rabbis of Gush Emunim legitimize their opinions on the basis of their
interpretation of the halacha. Of particular importance for the guidance of Gush Emunim, as reflected in the number of times their work is referred to in debates over the proper course of action, are the writings of Rabbi Moshe Maimonides (Maimonides=Rambam) (1135-1204) and Rabbi Moshe ben Nachman (Nachmanides=Ramban) (1194-1270). Aside from Orot, by Rav Abraham Isaac Kook, and key Biblical passages, the writings of Maimonides concerning the earthly struggle to bring about the coming of the Messiah, and those of Nachmanides, concerning the imperative of Jewish rule over the whole of the Land of Israel, are the most important religious sources of Gush Emunim ideology.

But if most Jewish fundamentalists act according to transcendental injunctions mediated through role models, the guidance of spiritual leaders, and the semi-authoritative interpretation of sacred texts, there are those within the movement who claim authority to act out of a more direct sort of contact with God's will. The most significant and influential example is Yehuda Etzion—the ideological spokesman for the most prominent segment of the Jewish terrorist underground.

Etzion is a veteran of one of the earliest Gush Emunim settlements in the West Bank—Ofra. He is not a Rabbi. In 1984 he was arrested and charged with participating in the car bombings of two Arab mayors, the attack on the Islamic College in Hebron, and a plot to blow up the Muslim shrines on the Temple Mount. At his trial he proudly admitted the truth of the charges, but challenged the right of the court to pass judgement on his acts. In his statement to the court, reprinted in full in Nekuda, Etzion explained his motives and those of his fellow conspirators as grounded in their belief that God had placed upon them a personal responsibility to advance the Redemption process through radical action. Referring to the re-building of the Temple, Etzion declared:

I have seen myself as responsible to carry out actions which I would characterize as the purification of the Temple Mount, the only holy place of the people of Israel, from the structure now located upon it, on the site of the holy of holies, the building known as the Dome of the Rock.

In long articles published in Nekuda, Etzion argued that the divine imperative for Jews to build the Temple could not be ignored. He compares his response to God's "painfully obvious" commandment to rebuild the Temple to Abraham's unhesitating willingness to offer his only son as a sacrifice, when commanded to do so by God, even though Abraham could see no useful or rational purpose to his action.

Though quoting Rav Kook the elder as the inspiration which guided him to the realization of his responsibility, Etzion characterized his actions and those of his comrades as directly authorized by God through the Torah, and proven to be so by the purity of their intentions.

The commandment that pounded in the heart of Joshua and the generation who captured Canaan, in the heart of David and Solomon, and their generation, the word of God in his Torah, is thus, as it was first purely stated, what motivates us.
...The source of our authority will be our volunteering for the holy because we only come to return Israel to its true purpose and destiny of Torah and Holiness...we are looking for the complete renewal of the true official authority—the Sanhedrin and the appointed from the House of David—we are those who nurse from the future, from which we gain our authority for the generations.

Etzion's commitment to radical and violent action to "push the end" places him on the extreme edge of the fundamentalist movement in terms of the directness with which transcendental authorization is experienced and the immediacy with which divine commandments are to be implemented. The prominence his articles were given in Nekuda triggered considerable criticism from more mainstream writers. But several authors expressed strong support for his views and his tactics. Herzl too was considered irrational and crazy when he proposed the idea of a Jewish state. So argued Aviva Segal, rejecting calls for "realism" and predicting that when the Temple is rebuilt, Etzion will be honored as a prophet.

At the other end of this particular spectrum within the fundamentalist movement is its non-religious wing. Although it includes no more than 20-25% of Gush Emunim activists, the secular ultra-nationalist camp has produced some of the movement's leading ideologues, polemicists, and politicians, such as Israel Eldad, Yuval Neeman, Geula Cohen, Eliyakim Haetzni, and Raphael Eitan. This group did see in Rav Tzvi Yehuda Kook a leader whose emphasis on the land of Israel and settlement, as opposed to religious observance, created valuable opportunities to harness the efforts and devotion of tens of thousands of religious fundamentalists in support of their maximalist Zionist program. Indeed, as noted earlier, Tzvi Yehuda was instrumental in establishing Tehiya--with which most secularly oriented fundamentalists are affiliated.

Following Tzvi Yehuda's death, latent tensions pertaining to the level of personal religiosity of Gush Emunim leaders and settlers surfaced. Rabbi Haim Druckman's efforts to establish Matzad as a political alternative to Tehiya and Hanan Porat's decision to abandon Tehiya in favor of a religiously oriented political framework were reactions to the domination of Tehiya by secular activists who refused to incorporate reference to God or the Torah in the charter and political propaganda of the party.

On the other hand Tehiya is not anti-religious. It continues to support efforts to establish mixed, religious and non-religious, Gush Emunim settlements. It is Tehiya policy not to desecrate the Sabbath in public. Rabbi Waldman, ranked fourth on Tehiya's list for the Knesset in the 1984 elections, is a prominent member of the party. Geula Cohen, ranked third on the party's list, has admitted that the spiritual confidence of religious Jews, derived from their faith in God and their belief in the Torah, is a more effective ideological basis for the fundamentalist movement as a whole than the integralist nationalism which she, Yuval Neeman, and Raphael Eitan represent. "All members of Tehiya," she has said, "believe that we are living at the beginning of Redemption even if no one knows its exact definition."
But for the secular wing of the Jewish fundamentalist movement neither the direct word of God, nor authoritative interpretation of sacred writings, nor the guidance of revered Rabbis constitute the legitimizing basis for belief and action. Appeal is made instead to the Bible, as the historic product of the Jewish people's creative genius, and to expansive Zionist visions of the Jewish people's destiny to rule the entire land of Israel. Of particular importance are the writings and speeches of Yitzhak Tabenkin, the historic leader of Ahдут Avoda and Kibbutz Hameuchad, and the doctrines developed within Lehi—a mandate period terrorist group that split from the Irgun under the leadership of the legendary poet and martyr, Abraham (Yair) Stern. (Lehi included both Geula Cohen and Israel Eldad as key members.) The following excerpt from an interview with Ephraim Ben Haim, a disciple of Tabenkin active originally in the Movement for the Whole Land of Israel, and now in Tehiya, illustrates how these Jewish fundamentalists understand the transcendental, if not strictly religious imperatives to which they respond.

Question: Doesn't all the talk of divine promises and Messianic redemption bother you?

**Ephraim Ben Haim:** I'll tell you how I deal with all that. For me the Bible is the holy thing. In my eyes it is more holy that in those of a religious man. Because it is the fruit of the Jewish genius. Perhaps the word, "holy" is not correct, but I don't know how to express this any better.

Regarding the promised borders: I don't believe that God said anything to Abraham. I see in the promised borders the geopolitical mission of the people of Israel for its generations. ... it doesn't bother me that they (the religious) believe their source is divine."

Now, the matter of redemption: first of all you should know that ...some of the religious, the enlightened ones, such as Akiva (second century Rabbi who led the last Jewish revolt against the Romans—IL), rejected the idea that only the angels could bring redemption...That is to say the days of the Messiah are not a mystical thing, abstract. ...I certainly think that we are living in a special period. If someone sees it as a Messianic period, and if in his heart of hearts has some mystical feeling about it, that doesn't bother me.90

**Territorial scope of the whole Land of Israel**

Many of the most extreme positions with respect to the destined borders of the state of Israel are espoused by members of the non-religious wing of the fundamentalist movement. Israel Eldad is famous for his advocacy, throughout the 1950's and 1960s, of a Jewish state stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates. Although in recent years he has scaled down his objectives to focus on those areas Israel currently controls, others within the secular
ultranationalist wing of the movement continue to pursue their vision of an Israel stretching broadly across the entire fertile crescent.

One of these is Yaacov Feitelson, former mayor of Ariel (the largest settlement in the northern bulge of the West Bank, who is closely associated with Arik Sharon's faction within Herut. Feitelson has refused to place specific limits on Israel's eventual borders, but envisions its domain as stretching across the entire region.

I am speaking of a tremendous vision. We are only in the infancy of the Zionist movement...Israel must squarely face up to the implementation of the Zionist vision--a vision that has not changed since the days of Herzl. As is known Herzl never indicated what the borders of the state were to be...in his time the settlement of the Syrian desert was discussed. I say that Israel should establish new cities throughout the entire area. I mean really the whole area of the Middle East, without limiting ourselves: we should never say about any place: here we stop.91

Ora Shem-Ur founded the "National Circle," a movement which competed unsuccessfully in the 1984 Knesset elections. She is a journalist for Yediot Acharonot, Israel's largest newspaper. Shem-Ur takes a long view of Israel's security needs, arguing that it must expand in order to survive into the next century.

Israel must become a larger nation. If in the future Israel will not reach tens of millions, it will not be able to hold out militarily against the hundreds of millions of Arabs who will then surround it...Israel must already begin looking now for additional territories to secure her future development.

Only control by Israel over vast areas of the Syrian and Arabic deserts in the north, and the Sinai Desert in the south, will enable the IDF to contain invading Arab armies.92

Within the religious majority of Gush Emunim there is also an important group of Rabbis who stress maximalist programs of territorial expansion based on the various descriptions of the Land of Israel found in the Bible. Traditionally such aspirations have been directed toward the East Bank of the Jordan, where the Israelite tribes of Reuven, Gad, and Mannaseh were located. Thus Rabbi Eleazar Waldman opposes the idea propounded with much fanfare by Yitzhak Shamir and Ariel Sharon that the East Bank, now ruled by King Hussein, become the Palestinian homeland. For Waldman, Hanan Porat, and others, such proposals may have some tactical utility, but they oppose any formal agreement to relinquish the East Bank, since it is part of the Land of Israel, to non-Jewish rule.93

But if Transjordan has been the primary focus for expansionist ambitions within Gush Emunim, the Lebanon war encouraged many others within the movement
to discuss Biblical imperatives toward territorial expansion in other directions as well. In September 1982, at the climax of the Lebanon War, Nekuda published a transcript of a study session on the location and meaning of the borders of the Land of Israel. The session was conducted in Ofra, the West Bank settlement where the headquarters of Yesha are located and where reside many of the founding members of Gush Emunim. Quoting extensively from the Book of Joshua and Kings 2, the borders of the Land of Israel are traced to include all the territory north of Israel up to the Orontes River in southern Turkey. The public settlement of Jews devoted to "inheriting the land," in any part of the territory ever conquered by or promised to the ancient Israelites, is interpreted as sufficient to transform that territory into a part of the "holy Land of Israel."94

In October 1982 Jewish fundamentlists published a book entitled This Good Mountain and the Lebanon, arguing that Lebanon is part of the Land of Israel. Rabbis Dov Lior, Yaacov Ariel, and Yisrael Ariel, were among those who declared southern Lebanon to be the lands of the Israelite tribes of Zevulon, Naphtali, and Asher. Yisrael Ariel characterized the borders of the Land of Israel to include Lebanon up to Tripoli, Syria, part of Iraq, part of Kuwait, and Sinai.95 In October 1982 he called for the annexation and settlement of most of Lebanon, regardless of the cost.

Beirut is part of the Land of Israel--about that there is no controversy, and being that Lebanon is a part of the Land of Israel we must declare that we have no intention of leaving. We must declare that Lebanon is flesh of our flesh, as is Tel Aviv or Haifa, and that we do this by right of the moral power granted to us in the Torah.

Our leaders should have entered Lebanon and Beirut without hesitation, and killed every single one of them. Not a memory or a trace should have remained. ...We should have entered Beirut at any price, without regard to our own casualties, because we are speaking of the conquest of the Land of Israel...We should immediately divert the waters of the Litani to the Jordan...96

However, despite the general perception within Gush Emunim that recognition of Arab political rights in Jordan represents a painful, if temporary, compromise of Jewish territorial claims,97 most within the movement are made uncomfortable by public appeals to Biblical or halachic imperatives regarding the acquisition of areas beyond those captured by Israel in the Six Day War. Rabbi Ariel and others who raised territorial demands during the Lebanon war were severely criticized for doing so, though, as we shall see, mainly on tactical grounds. The dominant view within the Jewish fundamentalist movement is that the task of this generation is to insure the establishment of permanent Jewish control of "Judea, Samaria, the Gaza District, and the Golan."98 For virtually all of those who would be included within what Gush Emunim spokesmen generally refer to as "our public," the "Western Land of Israel" is the irreducible minimum for fulfilling the purpose of Zionism and the religious obligation to "settle and inherit the Land." Aspirations to extend Jewish rule over the Sinai and parts of the East Bank
should not be forgotten, and may some day become politically relevant, but in the meantime may be compromised in the effort to consolidate Jewish rule west of the Jordan.

Within this mainstream view, the most important source of disagreement is whether or not to move quickly toward formal annexation. The declaration of Israeli sovereignty in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza is a formal part of Tehiya's platform, and the party has introduced resolutions to that effect in the Knesset. But many, if not most within the movement, prefer to wait until a very substantial shift in the demographic balance is achieved through massive Jewish settlement and Arab emigration.

What may be termed a "dovish fringe" also exists within Gush Emunim. Shaken by the losses that many Yeshivot Hesder sustained in the Lebanon war, a number of Rabbis and other well known leaders of the movement began speaking of the need to consider peace and the saving of Jewish lives as valid reasons to delay demands for exclusive Jewish rule of all the territories. Among those who have taken positions of this nature are Zevulon Hammer, Yehuda Ben-Meir, Rabbi Yehuda Amital, Yochanan Ben-Yaacov, and Rabbi Aharon Lichtenstein. The positions of these individuals range from accepting administrative autonomy for West Bank and Gaza Arabs without formal Israeli sovereignty, as a more or less permanent solution, to an apparent willingness to relinquish certain densely populated Arab areas to Jordan and/or Egypt. Most generally they involve a re-emphasis on the value of the people of Israel as greater than the Land of Israel. In the words of Rabbi Amital:

If opportunities for a genuine and final peace with the Arabs materialize, after which emigration of Jews from the Land might stop and a massive immigration of Jews might begin, and if we are faced with the choice of more Jews in the Land of Israel, with less holy land under Jewish rule, or fewer Jews in the Land of Israel and more holy land under Jewish rule, we should choose the first option.

The radical character of such beliefs in the fundamentalist context is reflected in the banning of Zevulon Hammer, Minister of Education and Culture in the Begin government, from most Gush Emunim settlements following remarks suggesting that although settlements should never be abandoned, autonomy and other negotiated arrangements to bring peace to the area should not be ruled out. Amital's opinions triggered a wave of angry letters and articles challenging his right to be considered part of Gush Emunim and the editors' decision to allow such heresy to appear in Nekuda's pages.

Pace and Political Dynamics of the Redemption Process

As suggested under above, Jewish fundamentalists share a common belief that the contemporary period has special world historic significance. Most think of it in terms of a process of Redemption which has begun and which will culminate in the establishment of "Malchut Yisrael" (the restoration of the authority of the House of David over the whole Land of Israel) and the
arrival of the long awaited Messiah. Intricate debates take place over the exact schedule of events in this redemptive process.

The esoteric elements in this debate are relatively unimportant. But crucial divisions do exist within the fundamentalist movement between "vanguardists" or "truthtellers," on the one hand, and "consensus builders," on the other. Associated with dramatically different political strategies and postures, these contrasting perspectives are closely associated with differences in expectations concerning the pace and political dynamics of the Redemptive process.

The vanguardists believe that although the process of Redemption has begun, and may be completed in the near future if the proper steps are taken, its fulfillment is in serious jeopardy. In this context dramatic action is often required to "create facts" necessary for the continuation of the process, even if such action is opposed by the vast majority of Jews as irrational or illegal. It is imperative that the "truth be spoken," no matter how unsettling or unpopular, so that the people learn to trust Gush Emunim as zealots dedicated above all to Redemption, unsullied by calculations of political expediency.

Thus the vanguardists emphasize the decisive role of human effort in fulfilling God's will. They reject the notion that certain aspects of the process, such as the restoration of the Sanhedrin or the rebuilding of the Temple, must await the miraculous intervention of God or his angels. With bold action rooted in faith, and justified on the basis of their appreciation of the higher law to which they are responding, the vanguardists claim to act in the tradition of authentic Zionism, a minority movement which ignored accusations of unrealism to bring divinely supported visions into reality. Rather than wait the generations it would take to convince Israelis to act decisively, the vanguardists see the function of Gush Emunim as acting on behalf of true, but as yet unappreciated Messianic imperatives.

The establishment of Gush Emunim settlement across the Green Line, and the effective erasure of that line, required a few to take upon themselves the responsibility for determining the fate of the western Land of Israel in our generation...without the permission of the elected government of Israel, and even in the face of its bitter opposition.102

Just as Rabbi Akiva judged Simon Bar Kochba, leader of the last revolt against the Romans, as the Messiah despite the absence of any "miraculous" signs, so too must Gush Emunim treat its struggle to liberate the entire Land of Israel from foreign rule as the crucial struggle. Indeed anyone of their number, in principle, could be the Messiah himself.103

Politically, many of the vanguardists are associated with Tehiya. They have argued, within Gush circles, against the principle of voting for the Likud in parliamentary elections as the "lesser of two evils." Before the 1981 elections the Likud came under heavy criticism for officially supporting the idea of autonomy for Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza, though an even
greater fear was that a Labor victory would curtail the resources available for Jewish settlement in the areas. Beni Katzover, a vanguardist prominent within Tehiya, argued against calculations of political expediency.

Our strength must be that we speak the truth, our truth, to the people. We must concentrate on the ends not the means...If we say that the Likud is a lesser of the evils and therefore we should support it, this means we accept autonomy. How can we say to the people that we are speaking our truth when we can be seen to accept autonomy? ...The biggest enemy of the Land of Israel is confusion, blurring of the truth.104

Also typical of the vanguardist approach, is Katzover's belief that settlement in the territories does not yet suffice to prevent their return to Arab rule. A member of the original Elon Moreh settlement nucleus in 1974 that eventually settled in Sebastia, Katzover has repeatedly called on Gush Emunim to "return to Sebastiya," i.e. to the strategy of spectacular and extra-legal actions designed to create facts, raise the consciousness of the people, and sabotage what he and other vanguardists see as the all too likely possibility that a territorial compromise might be reached.105

Vanguardists were in the forefront of the struggle to stop the withdrawal from Yamit, favoring explicit and implicit threats of violence. "Don't wait," warned Rabbi Yisrael Ariel,

for the exterminator to sneak up on the settlements of Judea and Samaria, perish the thought, don't wait for the moment when the cranes arrive at Kedumim and Elon Moreh, take Yamit as an example and the moment that they come to uproot a planting, to attempt to demolish houses, let every individual abandon a house and do battle in Yamit in order to save Judea and Samaria, in order to save all of the Land of Israel!106

Ariel himself was arrested for urging soldiers in Yamit to disobey orders.

One of the most articulate spokesmen for the vanguardist camp is Eliyakim Haetzni, an attorney and fiery polemicist in Kiryat Arba whose writings appear more often in Nekuda than those of any other author. In 1985 Haetzni founded "Elisha," "Citizens for Judea, Samaria, and Gaza," whose purpose was to mobilize political opposition to the Hussein-Peres peace initiatives underway at that time. He also published a book, entitled The Shock of Withdrawal from the Land of Israel, which argues that Jews faithful to the Land of Israel have the right to resist and even overthrow the State of Israel if it betrays Zionism and the Jewish people by agreeing to relinquish portions of the homeland to Arab rule.107

Haetzni is a founding member of the Yesha council. In October 1985 Yesha passed a resolution reflecting Haetzni's views that warned the Israeli government against entering negotiations over the fate of the occupied territories.
The proposals and plans of the Prime Minister constitute a clear and absolute abrogation of Israel's role as a Zionist state. We warn any regime in Israel which implements such proposals that we will relate to it as an illegal regime as General de Gaulle treated the Vichy regime of Marshal Petain, which betrayed the French people.108

Haetzni and others have leveled withering criticisms at Gush Emunim leaders for failing to fulfill their vanguard function. Rejecting the official Gush Emunim argument that the Jewish terrorist underground arose in response to a failure of the government to protect settlers from Arab violence, Dan Tor blames the underground on the "leadership vacuum" in Gush Emunim. According to Tor, Gush Emunim failed completely at Yamit, abandoning its revolutionary mission for a business as usual approach in which its so-called leaders served as "lackeys" for the government.109 By refusing to speak the truth about the liberation of the land of Zebulon and Naphtali in Lebanon it demonstrated that "whoever betrayed the southern portion of the Land of Israel will not have the moral strength to conquer its northern portion."110

Another vanguardist, Baruch Lior, has attacked Yesha for its reluctance to emphasize demonstrative settlement in the most sensitive locations--Nablus, Hebron, and on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem--as the most effective means of "pushing the end."

It is possible that we will be in the minority...then we must emphasize that the truth does not derive from majorities...we must focus the tremendous debate on three places--Hebron, Shechem (Nablus), and the Temple Mount--with acts of settlement and a wide-ranging propaganda effort...but first Yesha must take on the struggle for the Temple Mount, and break its conspiracy of silence: sometimes it seems as if the Yesha Council accepts the "extra-territoriality" of Jerusalem: we don't speak about the Temple Mount, because 'we have a problem with the Temple Mount.' We must place Jerusalem at the head of our struggle, strengthen the hand of those faithful to the Temple Mount...and build a synagogue and a Yeshiva directly upon it.111

If such efforts should not succeed in preventing movement toward a territorial compromise, Lior advocates a kind of unilateral declaration of independence by the settlers.

We will deny the country's right to the name 'State of Israel.' We will continue to maintain a state of the Jews in the heart of our land and engrave on its flag the duty of ingathering the exiles and of settlement.112

However, the very attacks by the vanguardists on the leadership of Gush Emunim, reflect the fact that since 1982 the center of gravity within the
movement has shifted from vanguardism to "consensus-building." Unlike the vanguardists, who conceive of the Redemption as a relatively rapid process (hence their common identification of the present period as "the generation of the Redemption"), the consensus-builders portray it as a process likely to take decades, generations, or even centuries.

Our kingdom, like the entire process of redemption, we build little by little...from the conquest of the land by Joshua (to the Kingdom of Saul, David, and Solomon), hundreds of years passed...and we don't even yet have all of the Land of Israel nor the Kingdom of David. This is only the beginning of the Kingdom--a Jewish government--as if in the period of the Judges.

But despite its length, the consensus-builders consider the process of Redemption to be well underway. They express confidence that the settlements established and under construction in the territories have created a virtually irreversible state of affairs which makes territorial compromise all but impossible. The task that remains for Gush Emunim is to help the majority of Israelis to accustom themselves to the new reality, to prepare them, spiritually, ideologically, and politically, for the unfolding process of Redemption, and to provide leadership and inspiration during the setbacks that are bound to occur. This means avoiding extremist slogans and confrontational actions which alienate many Israelis and impede the creation of a new consensus supportive of Jewish sovereignty over the whole Land of Israel as an objective more important than peace or a high standard of living.

The most important slogan of the "consensus-builders" is a phrase they attribute to Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda--"kama kama"--little by little. The position of Rabbi Yehoshua Zuckerman, director of the Merkaz HaRav Yeshiva in 1984, is typical of this approach.

Remember the teaching of our Rabbi, Rav Tzvi Yehuda Kook, may he rest in peace, concerning faith in our state. This faith does not permit slogans such as "Messiah now," "peace now," or "holiness now." The Redemption comes little by little by the same power that created our state, and we shall work, managing to move forward along the path toward it, despite all its complexities.

Rather than speaking the truth at all costs, most Gush spokesmen and strategists emphasize the need to "say only that which can be heard" by the public at large. The primary task, in their eyes, is an ideological-educational one, and must be performed gently, over a long period of time. This was, for example, the overall conclusion of an important ideology and strategy oriented symposium convened by Gush Emunim one year after Yamit and in the midst of the debacle in Lebanon. Great damage had been done, it was agreed, by those in Gush Emunim who had spoken loudly of the importance of settling and annexing portions of Lebanon identified as within the promised borders of the Land of Israel.

Today our problem is how to educate the people...It is
very important for our youth to learn where the borders of
the Land of Israel are, but the transmission of this truth
must be gradual. We must return to what we have learned in
the house of study from Rav Tzvi Yehuda, little by
little...In order to bring our ideas to the public, it is
impossible to express them in all their fullness...the ear
cannot hear too great a noise.116

It is time, argued Professor Yosef Ben-Shlomo, Chairman of the Jewish
Philosophy Department at Tel-Aviv University, for Gush Emunim to establish its
hegemony over the entire Zionist movement. This will entail maintaining a low
profile for some long term goals, elaborating an "ideological
manifesto...highlighting only those objectives that the people of Israel agree
with deep in its soul," and then launching a comprehensive educational,
ideological, and cultural campaign for the final defeat of secular, dovish
Zionism.117

Rabbi Moshe Levinger of Hebron is one of the most important advocates of
the consensus building approach. In view of the unpopularity of the Lebanon
war, he advised against discussing the question of whether or not Lebanon is a
part of the Land of Israel.118 Levinger has also tried to reassure Jewish
fundamentalists that despite Yamit, budget cuts for settlements, the outcome
of the Lebanon War, and the Labor Party's return to power in 1984, the future
is secure.

The public that is faithful to the Land of Israel has
begun to worry. Perhaps, in spite of everything, the Yamit
precedent will be repeated, God forbid, in parts of Judea,
Samaria, and Gaza. I must say, taking full responsibility,
that such demagogic comparisons are totally unjustified.119

Levinger goes on to argue for continued support of the Likud's participation
in the government, despite an apparent settlement freeze, intensified efforts
to convince all Israelis of the ideological and spiritual centrality of the
Land, calm faith in the future, and dedication to building a "normal" life in
the territories without recourse to needless confrontation with the
authorities.

The most prolific exponent of the consensus building approach, and the
most sophisticated, is Rabbi Yoel Ben-Nun. Alone among Gush Emunim leaders
Ben Nun regularly publishes articles in the left of center press.120 His
articles in Nekuda constitute a running battle with Eliyakim Haetzni.

For Ben-Nun the lesson of Yamit is that "It is impossible to succeed
without the support of the decisive majority of the people. We must go with
the people and not against it--nor against large parts of it."121 The process
of Redemption, he counsels, is a long one, dependent ultimately on the will
and miraculous action of God to come to completion. What contribution Gush
Emunim can make cannot be discovered halachically, but can be calculated only
on the basis of pragmatic political concerns.122 Given the enormous progress
made by the settlement movement, the primary task at the present juncture is
to engage in a prolonged "Kulturkampf" with the dovish left with the aim of
constructing a new consensus on the boundaries and character of the Jewish state. Simple declarations of Israeli sovereignty over the occupied areas will not do what only the ideological conversion of masses of Israelis to the cause of Jewish fundamentalism can accomplish.123

Thus "The days of Sebastia and Yamit," when Gush Emunim's mission was to act as a vanguard, "are gone and will not return." By panicking over every problem, agitating fiercely for more and more money for settlements, exaggerating threats to the personal security of settlers, and justifying actions by the Jewish terrorist underground, the vanguardists discourage more settlement and cause Gush Emunim to appear as a special interest group, separated from the mass of Israelis. This endangers the fulfillment of the Redemption by interfering with the political task of building a new consensus.125 Confident of the long term strength of Gush Emunim, he condemns all elements within Gush Emunim that support independent or radical actions based on challenges to the legitimacy of the state in pursuit of Redemptionist ends. Ben-Nun asserts instead the decisive importance of engaging in a wide-ranging, respectful dialogue to reconstruct a consensual basis for the authority of the state. "There is nothing more urgent at this stage than to renew the authority of the state based on a public consensus."126

Attitudes toward Israeli and International Opposition

As illustrated in the thought of Harold Fisch, Jewish fundamentalism conceives of a radical distinction between the Jewish and non-Jewish worlds. Though completion of the Redemption process will benefit all of mankind, until that time arrives, few if any Jewish fundamentalists consider gentiles as dependable friends or partners. But within the movement differences exist regarding the cultural and political threats seen to emanate from the gentile world, especially the western democracies.

Virtually all Jewish fundamentalists reject the notion of a "Judeo-Christian tradition" constituting the basis for a western civilization in which Jews authentically share. Instead they contrast the materialism and shallowness of the West, with the discipline, historicity, and spiritual depth of Judaism. Democracy and equality, regardless of race, religion, or ethnic background, may be appropriate values for Europe and America, but they do not apply to the Israeli context, where Jews must carry out a mission which they, and only they can perform.

If in Europe and the United States a moral and democratic mission requires equality of rights for all, it is clear and obvious that in Israel what must determine rights to vote and to be elected to public office must be identification with and participation in the struggle of the people of Israel to accomplish its mission.127

But there is a very substantial body of opinion within Gush Emunim that goes further than this, identifying the influence of Western, liberal democratic culture on the Jewish people as the source of its current problems. The most fervent exponent of this viewpoint is Moshe Ben-Yosef (HaGar).
Lustick

There is no Western culture—neither American, Russian, German, nor French—that is not foreign to the culture and history of Israel. Along with Haetzni and Ben-Nun, he is one of the most published authors in Nekuda and for the last two years has had his own column. For Ben-Yosef, the European enlightenment which "emancipated" the Jews was actually a great catastrophe, making it "impossible for Jews to live in any foreign land" while simultaneously "thrusting upon the Jewish people the experience of self-annihilation (via assimilation)." By destroying the organic-religious social unity of the past, Europe's new liberal democratic culture exposed Jews, as an ancient God-centered tribe, to a new form of systematic anti-Semitism, culminating in the Holocaust. Tragically, the Zionist movement adopted liberal nationalist norms, in vain imitation of the West. Gush Emunim and "maximalist Zionism" remain the Jewish people's last and only hope to preserve its unique culture and destiny by conducting a "war of extermination against Western culture, which has brought the greatest of holocausts upon us—the Liberal holocaust." This will require severing as many ties with the West as possible.

We must finally put an end to the kind of Zionism which rejects the implementation of real Zionism—the future of the people is in danger! Otherwise, by means of a bureaucratic democracy transferred from the Western industrial countries, the beggars who live off the wealth of others will build, from Eilat to Metula (i.e. within the Green Line—IL) a boutique for strictly European merchandise. That is to say, by means of the dictatorship of the secretariat of the party they are seeking favor in the eyes of the intellectuals of the Behemoth—from the left and the right—in the lands of the uncircumcised.

Ultimately, what is required, to save the Jewish people from the cultural imperialism of the West is to force the halacha and maximalist Zionism upon the people, using state power to do so.

Our survival as a sovereign Jewish national kingdom...requires a different approach to the implementation of the halacha in a democratic society and, indeed, a revolutionary understanding of the halacha itself. For this we shall need an uncompromising leadership...that lives the Zionist revolution from its very sources and also understands the Western conception of the world in which we have become trapped.

Accordingly Ben-Yosef saves his most vitriolic language, not for gentiles, but for Israeli opponents of Gush Emunim, especially those who object to the fundamentalist movement on liberal democratic grounds.

It is a mistake to think we can avoid the catastrophe of a kulturkampf, we are already engaged in it. ...the main
representatives of cultural degeneracy in the Land of Israel (in addition to the media and the educational establishment) are "Shinui" and the Movement for Citizen Rights (a dovish, civil libertarian political groups--IL). They are typical of the decadence of a society that has disowned the Biblical tradition--by means of scientific progress, aesthetics, and the most elaborate and costly ethical system in history. Instead they demand that permissiveness be established as the cultural reality of Israel.135

Kahanism is but a festive overture to the real fascist dictatorship that is being prepared for us in the academies of anarchism by the big brothers of the left...136

Though few opinion leaders within the Jewish fundamentalist movement are as vituperative as Ben-Yosef or as willing to discuss publicly the establishment of a theocratic dictatorship, even fewer take issue with his attacks on Western culture. Ellyakim Haetzni, Tzvi Shiloach, Meir Kahane, Amiel Unger, Israel Eldad, and many others regularly condemn Israeli doves as "Meists," "nowists," "Hellenizers," "fifth columnists," "traitors," and carriers of western materialism and spiritual decadence.137 Against a background of Labor Party efforts, from 1984 to 1986, to exercise the "Jordanian option" before the Likud's return to power, the expression of such sentiments was extended to include the personal vilification of Peres, Eban, Weizmann, and other leading foreign policy moderates, as well as discussion of the inevitability of, and even the need for, civil war.

Haetzni, for example, portrays Peres as the "second Reheboam," referring to the son of Solomon, whose policies triggered a civil war and the secession of ten tribes from ancient Judea.138 Haetzni relies heavily on the precedent of the Maccabean War against the Syrian Greeks as, first and foremost, a "civil war, between Jews and Jews (Hellenizers vs. those faithful to the land and culture of Israel)."139 He also insists that any government ceding territory would thereby negate Zionism and its own claim to legitimate authority, warning that

if the state withdraws the army, the police, and the Israeli administration from Judea, Samaria, and Gaza--scores of thousands of Jews will remain, perhaps joined by thousands more from within the country and the diaspora, in an emergency mobilization to save the land. ...And if, amidst the shedding of blood, the government tries to evacuate 100,000 Jews from their homes by force, a civil war will break out.140

Among the large number of Gush adherents who share Haetzni's views, most would express them less explicitly.141 They tend to emphasize the horror of the possibility of "a split in the people," even while warning that the excesses of the dovish-left could well bring it about.142 Within this body of opinion, debate is over tactics, for example: whether to take up arms against Israeli troops enforcing a withdrawal order, engage in violent provocations in order to sabotage the process, or remain behind to be dramatically slaughtered by the Arabs.
More importantly, perhaps, what separates some Gush Emunim attitudes toward their Jewish opponents from others is the extent to which rehabilitation of their antagonists is thought possible. While most are prepared to write off the Peace Now leadership and the small liberal parties, the movement as a whole seems undecided as to whether or not the Labor Zionist movement, previously the bedrock of Israeli society, is salvageable. Compare the tone of these two quotes from editorials published in *Nekuda*.

Now that Gush is entering its second decade, its greatest challenge and responsibility is to renew the battle for the support of the people....But not only to reinvigorate Likud supporters and supporters of Gush Emunim. We must redouble our efforts within the ranks of the Labor settlements, where there exists a silent majority that continues to appreciate the pioneering work of Gush.143

The Labor Party has been transformed into an out and out leftist party that supports the establishment of a Palestinian state... Labor's explicit hostility toward us is destroying the basis for dialogue...the Labor Party, that was the leading institution in critical areas pertaining to the upbuilding of the state—settlement, immigration, and security—today, in almost every area, adopts positions of retreat and faithlessness....indeed the Labor Party has now endorsed the right of the Palestinians to the Land of Israel.144

The uncertainty within the movement regarding limits to intra-Jewish conflict was also illustrated by an important episode at the end of 1985 (referred to above pp. 43-44). When, following Haetzni's advice, the Yesha Council issued its October 1985 declaration of intent to resist any government move toward territorial compromise, Ben-Nun and other Rabbis condemned the decision as politically damaging. Ben-Nun also declared he was withdrawing from all public activities on behalf of Yesha until the resolution was retracted. Instructively, by the beginning of 1986 Yesha had tactfully "reinterpreted" the meaning of its controversial declaration.145

Gush Emunim members who espouse the most moderate position on this issue place "love of all Israel" or "the unity of the people" on a par with and not subordinate to protection of the territorial integrity of the homeland. Threats of violent opposition to the government, accordingly, are criticized on ideological as well as tactical grounds. This is a sentiment more common among some of the religious leaders of Gush Emunim than among the secular ultranationalists. It is often expressed as an affirmation of Rav Tzvi Yehuda's teaching concerning the literal holiness of the state and people of Israel, despite their shortcomings. Moshe Levinger is representative of this substantial body of opinion.

In light of the great mission of the State of Israel...dedicated to the final victory of good over evil...the state of Israel is holy. The Torah, the
Yeshivas, and the synagogues, as well as buildings, industry, agriculture and all productive enterprises—all are holy, even though there are different levels of holiness. But also the responsible governmental institutions are holy...as are, in a special way, the army and the police, who guard the state.146

Rabbis Yoel Ben Nun, Yehuda Amital, and Aharon Lichtenstein, have so emphatically opposed challenges to state authority, and have been so expressive of their concern for maintaining the unity of the people, that Haetzni and others have suggested they may no longer be able to be counted within the "camp of those faithful to the Land of Israel."147

But if a substantial range of attitudes exists within the Jewish fundamentalist movement toward Jews who are not within it, relatively few differences exist regarding the international, gentile, community. Expressions of support, from some American ultra-conservatives, retired American military officers, or Protestant fundamentalist groups are appreciated. In general, however, the gentile world is treated warily. Europe is seen as a spinelessly responsive to Arab oil interests and Palestinian terrorism. Israel's economic and military dependence on the US is characterized as liable to facilitate dangerous pressure on Israeli governments to accept some sort of territorial compromise. Virtually all Gush Emunim adherents support lowering the Israeli standard of living in order to reduce dependence on the United States. Significantly, both Haetzni and Ben-Nun, representing, as I have indicated, diametrically opposed viewpoints within the movement, agree that linking Israel's fate with gentile political actors, be they Lebanese Christians, Americans, or Russians, should be avoided except for reasons of short-term expediency. Thus, in reaction to the Reagan initiative, Haetzni suggested joining the Soviet Bloc; Ben-Nun has argued for Israeli withdrawal from the "western world democratic front," against the continued purchase of sophisticated and expensive American arms, and in support of renewed ties with the Soviet Union.148

To be sure, Gush spokesmen occasionally do appeal for increased US support for Israel on the basis of a joint struggle against the Soviet Union. Virtually all such appeals are made for reasons of expediency. They are not taken seriously within the movement itself. An excellent example of this "double discourse" is a book by a leading Gush intellectual, Mordechai Nisan—American Middle East Foreign Policy: A Political Reevaluation. In this book, addressed to US policy-makers, Nisan argues that "America and Israel represent the 'chosen' societies that carry the most noble dreams of civilization." The 1982 war in Lebanon, he asserts, "provided the most recent evidence for the identity of American and Israeli interests on global and regional issues."149

But in an article directed to a supportive Jewish audience, Nisan characterizes Israel's relationship to the US as a colonial one, and advocates Israeli policies of violence, extremism, and intransigence instead of "surrender to America."150 A similar view of the United States, as an imperialist power committed to dismembering Israel for the benefit of sinister domestic interests, found expression in a February 1983 Nekuda editorial.
The pressures the United States has placed on Israel to surrender the gains of the Peace for the Galilee War, and the American political offensive, designed in cooperation with Hussein, Arafat, and their collaborators, are meant to return Israel to its "natural dimensions," that is, to the lines of 1967. The corporation that controls the President of the United States—the Bechtel Corporation—has personal and economic interests in Saudia Arabia, the Persian Gulf and in other Muslim countries. The American President, totally dependent on this clique, has been converted to an antagonistic stand toward Israel's interests.151

In sum, Jewish fundamentalists are divided over how to relate to Jewish opposition, but except in terms of style and emphasis, virtually all display a distrustful antagonism toward gentiles. With respect to one group of gentiles, however, the local Arab population, Jewish fundamentalists are, deeply divided.

Policy toward and Eventual Status of Local Arabs

One of the most extensively and explicitly debated issues within Gush Emunim concerns the policies appropriate for dealing with the large Arab majority that lives in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the substantial Arab minority that lives within the 1949 borders of Israel proper.

No evidence exists of concrete plans to carry out genocidal policies toward the "Arabs of the Land of Israel." Nevertheless analysis of the range of disagreement within the Jewish fundamentalist movement over the Arab question must begin with the fact that a number of Rabbis supportive of Gush Emunim have offered halachic opinions which provide the religious/legal basis for such policies. The substance of these opinions pertains to the identification of the Palestinian Arabs, or of the Arabs in general, as "Amalekites."

According to the Biblical account the Amalekites harassed the Jews during their wandering in the desert, preying upon weak and helpless stragglers. As a consequence God commanded the Jewish people not only to kill all Amalekites, men, women, and children, but to "blot out the memory of Amalek" from the face of the earth. Traditionally great enemies of the Jews, such as Torquemada and Hitler, have been identified as descendants of Amalek. Accordingly, the most extreme views within Gush Emunim on the Arab question, views quoted extensively by Israeli critics of the movement, speak of the Arabs as descendants of the Amalekites.152 These critics reacted strongly when Haim Druckman greeted the crippling of two Arab mayors on the West Bank by quoting the Book of Deborah ("Thus may all Israel's enemies perish!"). Druckman was defended by a Gush veteran, Haim Tsuria.

In every generation there is an Amalek. In our generation, our Amalek are the Arabs who oppose the renewal of our national existence in the land of our fathers.153
But despite such rhetoric and occasional halachic disputations over whether an Arab can be killed in the absence of provocation (in view of the presumption of the need for self-defense) no important group within the movement publicly advocates genocide.\textsuperscript{154} On the other hand, it appears that at least one third of Gush Emunim shares the views of Meir Kahane on this question, advocating the merits of various techniques for expelling most or all local Arabs. (See Appendix) The following passages are representative of this approach.

Coexistence between a Jewish majority and an Arab minority in the Land of Israel, that does not endanger the historical objectives of the Jewish people, and the existence of Israel as a Jewish state, is problematic.

...If we want to avoid unremitting bloodshed, there is only one solution—the transfer of the Arab population of the Land of Israel to the Arab states....This solution is a humane solution compared to the "final solution" which the Arab world plans for us.\textsuperscript{155}

The goal of good neighborly relations with the Arabs of the Land of Israel is not only illusory, but it contradicts the meaning of the settlement enterprise in the Land of Israel. We have come to the land to inherit it because it is our land, and not the land of hundreds of thousands of Arabs living in it like a malignant and painful tumor—a cancer within the heart of the state.

...we must settle within densely populated Arab areas, expropriating their land, and insulting their national feelings...constantly we must explain to ourselves and our people that Arabs or Jews can live in the Land of Israel—but not both peoples together.\textsuperscript{156}

Demographic research shows that within 40 years Arabs will be a majority in the state of Israel, and that within 80 years they will be a majority within the borders of the 'Green Line.' Abandoning Judea, Samaria, and Gaza will not solve the problem, but only postpone it for a number of years. Clearly, if we do not bring about the departure of the Arabs, the day will come when they will be able, democratically, to destroy the state of Israel.\textsuperscript{157}

\textsuperscript{158} I am more extreme than Kahane regarding encouragement of Arabs to leave the country. First of all, I favor paying the Arabs to leave the country. But that is just the carrot, not the stick. Gentlemen, this is a Jewish state and I favor negative means of encouragement as well...I know the difficulties involved in such policies, but it is the genuine solution and must be implemented completely and systematically.

We must deal with the Land of Israel branch of the Arab
people to make sure that it will lose every time something happens that hurts our life in the Land of Israel. We must induce them to leave here. They must be made to feel that the land is slipping away beneath their feet...For the good of our peace, their peace, and the peace of all Israel, not only for the settlers of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, and for our future in this land, for there to be any future at all, there is no place for Arabs with us here.

...We must find a new way, a new revolutionary way to deal with the Jewish-Arab conflict.159

Although these sentiments gain ground within Gush Emunim in periods of violent Arab attacks on Jews, commitment to the expulsion of the Arab population as a radical solution to the demographic problem is not a dominant view within the Jewish fundamentalist movement. Vigilantism and various other "iron fist" techniques against "trouble-makers" or in response to specific Arab actions, do have strong support. A poll of 455 settlers conducted during 1981-82 showed that two-thirds of those questioned expressed agreement or strong agreement with the statement: "It is necessary for settlers to respond quickly and independently to Arab harassments of settlers and settlements."160 In another such period, the summer of 1985, Yesha called for a crackdown on the Arab population, recommending closure of Arab newspapers and universities, dissolution of Arab cooperatives and youth organizations, loosening of restrictions on settler use of weapons, and prosecution of all known PLO supporters.161

Thus while the overwhelming majority of Gush Emunim members favors the deportation of hundreds, or even thousands of Arab "agitators" and stone-throwers (along with their families), most do not believe that such direct measures can or should be used to address the structural problem of the size of the Arab population relative to that of the Jews. Mainstream opinion within Gush Emunim toward the Arabs who live in the West Bank and Gaza is that strict enforcement of security laws, effective bans on Arab political and cultural activity, closure or direct Israeli supervision of Arab educational institutions, and minimal personal relations between Arabs and Jews, can create an environment within which settlement can flourish, annexation proceed, and the demographic problem gradually alleviated. The general expectation, sometimes stated and sometimes not, is that deprived of opportunities for political, cultural, and economic development, and discovering the area to be ever more thoroughly "Judaized," demographically meaningful numbers of Arabs will emigrate.

This stance is expressed accurately, and unselfconsciously, in the photograph used as the cover of the January 13, 1984, issue of Nekuda, an issue concerned particularly with the Arab question. (For a photocopy of this cover see Appendix.) Above the caption "A Moment of Co-Existence," a Gush settler, in military uniform, leads an elderly, blind Arab refugee across a road. The settler's machine gun is slung across his waist. He holds a club in one hand and the Arab's hand in the other. This is, in fact, what most Gush Emunim adherents consider the proper relationship of Jews to Arabs in the Land of Israel—the Jews as young, dominant, strong, armed, in control, and fully alert; the Arabs as old, helpless, docile, dependent, and ultimately irrelevant.162
Within this mainstream perspective there are disagreements on specific points. Some argue that a separate, subordinate, but formal legal status should be imposed on Arabs to eliminate the ambiguity of their residence in Israel without citizenship. Others, such as the Tehiya Party, hold out the theoretical possibility of citizenship for West Bank and Gaza Arabs, but on conditions (thorough security check, knowledge of Hebrew, three years national service, declaration of loyalty to Israel as a Jewish-Zionist state, etc.) designed to make its acquisition virtually impossible. Some argue that "cooperative" Arabs can be used as allies within the Arab population to help stabilize the situation. Others condemn all attempts to forge political alliances with Arab elements. Some stress the need to deprive Arabs of employment opportunities in Jewish settlements by hiring only Jews for construction and custodial work. Others respond that Arab labor is still necessary; that such demands are impractical. Some discuss the need to reduce the political status of Arabs inside the Green Line to conform to that of Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza; others consider such steps unnecessarily provocative.

A small minority within Gush Emunim, whose contributions to Nekuda on this issue comprise some 10%-15% of the articles published on the subject, is critical of the negative attitudes toward Arabs which they say predominate within the mainstream of the movement. In an article entitled "Do Not Hate!" Miriam Shiloh, for example, recounts violently anti-Arab songs and slogans popular among Gush Emunim youth. Such attitudes are wrong and dangerous, she warns. She gives an example of Arabs who helped her family during an auto accident and argues that Rabbi Akiva's dictum be followed—"to love thy neighbor as thyself."

The modal response to articles delivering such messages is condemnation of the naivete which such sentiments reflect and outrage that such opinions should be expressed publicly in the pages of Nekuda given Arab terrorist provocations and the damage likely to be done to the Gush Emunim's image.

Most authors of articles solicitous of Arab rights and sensibilities, are not leaders of the movement, though fluctuations in the editorial line of Nekuda suggest that some of their opinions are shared by key activists. They tend to urge greater concern for the study of Arabic and the development of positive personal relations with the Arab inhabitants. Politically they emphasize formal rights to citizenship that should be extended to loyal Arabs and opportunities which they should eventually be granted to participate within whatever political system is based in Amman. In the view of most of these writers, the Jews must consider themselves strong enough to have "compassion" toward the Arabs, and not be overtaken by an ultimately dehumanizing hatred toward them.

But some prominent personalities within the movement, with diverse stands on other issues, have argued that a less antagonistic relationship to the local Arab population is important for tactical political purposes. Haetzni has, from time to time, supported the idea of finding Arab elements willing to cooperate politically and administratively with the settlers. Yisrael Harel, editor of Nekuda, has suggested that Arabs in the Gaza Strip, though
not the West Bank, might be granted some form of cultural autonomy. Yoel Ben-Nun and Yaacov Feitelson have contended that radical answers to the Arab problem are not available, and that unless arrangements can be created for a calm and normal life together with the Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza, Israeli opponents of annexation will be assisted in their struggle against it. Thus Ben-Nun has warned repeatedly against complaining too vociferously about Arab stone-throwing and against discussion of expulsion as a solution to the Arab problem. Such talk, he argues, encourages the belief that "no sort of co-existence between Jews and Arabs can occur," which in turn supports arguments for disengagement from populated Arab areas.

If it is true that no co-existence is possible, and if the public becomes convinced as well that there isn't any real possibility that a large portion of the Arab population will abandon the land, by one means or another, then the natural conclusion to be drawn will be a Jewish state within smaller borders—not an internal struggle with a large Arab population.

Ultimately, however, despite substantial disagreements about what if any rights Arabs have or should have in the Land of Israel, complete agreement exists within the movement regarding the contention that Arabs have no rights over any part of it.

Prospects for Peace

Virtually no Jewish fundamentalists anticipate that a negotiated, comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict is possible. Some do fear that an Israeli-Jordanian deal could be struck, but none believe it could serve as the basis for a stable solution to the Palestinian problem or a lasting peace. Indeed differences within the movement regarding peace prospects are narrower and less intense than those associated with any of the five issue areas already discussed. Still, four opinion clusters can be identified.

At one extreme, some religious leaders of Gush Emunim who combine literal interpretation of the Bible and the halacha with a strong sense of Messianic immediacy, argue that a state of war will continue until the re-establishment of the "Kingdom of Israel," the rebuilding of the Temple, and the arrival of the Messiah. According to Hanan Porat:

Tidings of peace will come to the world only from the Mountain of the Temple of God, and only when the Torah will go forth from Zion and the word of God from Jerusalem.

In a lengthy response to religious arguments for territorial compromise, Porat declared unequivocally that just as Joshua was enjoined by God to fight wars and suffer Jewish casualties for the sake of the "repair of the world" so too must present day Israel understand that "the value of the Land of Israel exceeds that of peace."
We are not commanded, at the outset, to make war upon and destroy the non-Jews living in the Land...but if the peoples who control the Land at present do not accept the presence of the people of Israel and their sovereignty over the Land of Israel, then...we are commanded to conquer the Land by war, even at a high price.178

According to Gideon Aran, similar beliefs predominated among the leadership of the Movement to Halt the Retreat in Sinai.

The MHRS thinks that not only does the peace of its opponents conceal war within it and but also that it is intertwined with collective humiliation and cultural assimilation. But even if it would preserve national honor, moral purity, and security for the state and its inhabitants, such a peace would still be unacceptable.179

In keeping with their view of world history as secondary to the unfolding relationship between the Jewish people and God, these circles understand "peace" in terms of "completedness." (In Hebrew the two words "shalom" and "shlemut" are closely related.) Jews must work toward a complete and final peace by striving, not for non-belligerent relations with non-Jews (the continuation of which is to be expected until the fulfillment of the Redemption), but for a pervasive sense of "completedness" or harmony "within the Jewish people as a whole, between the people and its whole land, and between the Jews and their God."180

Closely related to this perspective, albeit framed in strictly secular terms, is the view that for all intents and purposes peace with the Arab world is impossible. The Arab-Israeli conflict is characterized as a contemporary version of the 100 years war. Its roots lie in Arab psychological and cultural fixations, Muslim religious imperatives to Jihad, anti-semitism borrowed from Europe, and chronic instability encouraging irrational but politically necessary hatred of Israel.

...pan-Islamic doctrine incorporated in the ideology of Pan-Arabism; the dogma that Jews must be kept in inferior status to Islamic people, and the widespread adoption of Christian and Nazi anti-Semitism--constitute what must be recognized as nothing less than a virulent form of militant Islamic-Arab religious racism....the prime instrument of Arab ideological unification...

(another) major factor in explaining the Arabs' rejection of any Jewish national rights in the Middle East lies in the complex web of internal (domestic) and inter-state Arab and Muslim conflicts, fears and jealousies which generally determine the policies and actions of the Arab world.181

In light of the overdetermined and intransigent nature of Arab enmity, no adjustments in Israeli policies can possibly advance the prospects for peace.

The concept of a "compromise" does not exist in the
political lexicon of Islam, and the Arabs today envisage no other termination of their campaign than Zionism's complete uprooting.

...While Arab acquiescence today seems to be a dream...objectively, and notwithstanding the theoretical acrobatics indulged in by persons of good will and by various professors of political science--no solution looms on the horizon for the "problem," however it may be defined.182

It remains for Israel to avoid becoming entrapped in doomed attempts to find a compromise solution to the Palestinian problem. Israel must establish and preserve an overwhelming deterrent, waging preventive war when necessary, until, with the passage of several generations and following sweeping changes in the Arab world, a peace based on Israeli control of the whole Land of Israel might perhaps be achieved. One of the best known and bluntest exponents of this point of view is former Chief of Staff Raphael Eitan.

If we are deemed weak, this would invite war. If we are thought of as strong and patient, this will remove the danger of war...The Syrians want what all the Arabs want, to annihilate Israel. They do not want a small piece of Israel, nor do they want a large piece of it, or only some part. They do not want this and they do not want that. They simply want to liquidate Israel.

(I) do not believe in any negotiations with the Arabs...183

Eitan's theme within Tzomet, the political movement that he founded, has been the need for Israel to constitute itself as a modern day Sparta, prepared to fight wars for the foreseeable future.

The root of the problem is the extent of the readiness of the coming generation to fight. The solution must be to begin now, in the kindergartens. We must educate the children so that they will give on their own the spiritual-moral answer to our enemies, or, to the extent necessary, to strike with the fist. But we must begin to teach them in kindergarten. Once the youth reaches the army it is already too late.184

From this perspective signs of Arab moderation, even if credible, should be ignored for the foreseeable future, until the complete fulfillment of Zionist objectives. This may entail war. According to former IDF general Abraham Yoffe, long-time head of Israel's Nature Reserve Authority and a founder of the Whole Land of Israel Movement, "The will of the people is expressed in war. That is the whole Torah."185 In response to a question about Arab "moderation" Yoffe declared:

We are here in the Land of Israel no more than as a "pioneer at the head of the entire Jewish people." The
State of Israel, as presently constituted, does not represent the fulfillment of Zionism. This is a state on the way. ...Our duty is not completed: ...The state must provide a refuge for the Jewish people as a whole. The Arab people will never accept this idea!186

A more sanguine view of the political, as opposed to strictly military options open to Israel in pursuing an acceptable peace, is based on an image of some, if not most, Arabs and Muslims as rational enemies with differentiated, identifiable, finite interests. Although similar to fundamentalists holding the views already discussed in their commitment to an overwhelming Israeli military deterrent as the sine qua non for peace in the area, several Gush Emunim figures have suggested that a carrot and stick policy toward selected Arab and non-Arab groups within the Middle East can produce informal arrangements to serve Israeli interests while preventing war. Thus in 1976 Tzvi Shiloah suggested establishing territorial continuity between Israel and an independent Maronite enclave in Lebanon. In addition to the Maronites he identified the Kurds, the Alawites, and the Druse as potential allies of Israel against "Arab repression.”187 In 1982 Eliyakim Haetzni argued for a comprehensive set of informal alliances with various groups in Lebanon, including Palestinians south of the Awalli River, to keep that country fragmented, weak, and effectively dependent on Israel.188

The disastrous outcome of the Christian-Israel alliance during the Lebanon War, however, has done much to undermine the credibility of this approach within the fundamentalist movement. Haetzni's view, for example, appears to have been changed. In January 1985, he sharply attacked military and political echelons for not having conducted a scorched earth policy in Lebanon, including the utter destruction of Beirut and the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Shiites from Southern Lebanon.189 In April 1986 he warned that Israeli weakness in Lebanon and signs of indecisiveness on the Golan Heights would mean war with Syria in the near future.190

Nevertheless, some fundamentalists have continued to suggest that various avenues of political opportunity do exist in the Arab world. The best known proposal, associated mainly with Herut circles, but supported by influential personalities in Tehiya, is the idea of Transjordan as a Palestinian homeland, if not a state. But although this proposal is used extensively for polemical purposes, many in the movement have abiding ideological qualms about formally surrendering Jewish sovereignty claims over large portions of the East Bank. Nor, in view of the apparent stability of the Hashemite Kingdom, have advocates of this idea come up with specific measures Israel might take to implement it.

Yoel Ben-Nun and Moshe Levinger have both suggested that Israeli diplomatic initiatives be focused on Syria with the aim, via contacts mediated by the United States, of achieving de facto agreements to stabilize the Lebanese situation and the Northern front.191 In contrast to most fundamentalist commentary on Egyptian-Israeli relations, which emphasizes the outrageousness of Egyptian behavior in light of formal treaty commitments to "normalize" relations with Israel, Meir Har-Noi has recently argued that Israel should accept the "cold peace" with Egypt as a justification for not
moving toward negotiations on other issues and as a means of protecting the domestic political position of Husni Mubarak.192

In the final analysis, however, such voices within Gush Emunim, seeking useful opportunities for Israeli political or diplomatic activity in the Arab world, are lost within the unremitting chorus of declaration, warning, and debate over how best to prevent or sabotage initiatives which might lead to peace negotiations. Insofar as Gush Emunim adherents concern themselves with Israeli policy toward Arabs outside the Land of Israel, this is their concern and the focus of their analysis.

Such analyses pour forth in great volume and intensity whenever negotiating initiatives appear to be moving forward. As these initiatives fade, so does discussion of Israeli foreign policy toward the Arab world. Eliyakim Haetzni is the most prolific of Gush Emunim authors regarding the dangers associated with various Israeli, Jordanian, Egyptian, European, or American attempts to move the peace process ahead. Somewhat more representative of this dominant frame of mind, however, is Amiel Unger's systematic presentation of an uncompromising but polemically attractive negotiating position which Gush Emunim can endorse in order to rally public opinion against negotiations, should they begin, and insure their failure, should they continue.

Unger explicitly rejects suggestions made by Ben-Nun and Levinger that a de facto agreement with the Syrians is possible. Such discussions, about Assad, the "godfather of Lebanese terrorism," weaken Israel's rejection of negotiations with the PLO. Those who believe that there are some Arabs more willing and able to come to terms with Israel than others are suffering from dangerous illusions. "There is no difference in this regard between Amman, el-Bireh, and Iksal in the Galilee." By including Israeli Arabs as part of the Arab enemy Unger is able to suggest a "negotiating position" which can sound reasonable to many Israelis, while being so far from the Arab position as to prevent the "Sadatization" of Arafat.

If Israel is pressured to speak with a "joint" delegation of Arabs, it should include Meari and Toufik Ziad (Israeli Arab Members of Knesset--I.L.). And if they speak of borders, the borders that we should speak about are from 1921, before 2/3 of the Land of Israel was given to Abdullah.

...If the Arabs demand areas free of Jews, we will make symmetrical demands--areas free of Arabs. Whoever demands evacuation of Susia will have to submit to the demand to evacuate Sakhnin and whoever wants Tekoa to be free of Jews will be pressured to agree to pay in Um El Fahm (Jewish settlements on the West Bank and Arab villages in the Galilee--I.L.).193

Thus the range of disagreement within the Jewish fundamentalist movement with respect to the prospects for peace extends up to but certainly not beyond the point of achieving, within the context of an overwhelming Israeli military
deterrent, temporary and informal arrangements to preserve, in fact if not in principle, Israeli rule over the entire western Land of Israel.
The Abiding Importance of Jewish Fundamentalism in Israeli Political Life

Twelve years after its appearance the Jewish fundamentalist movement must be assessed as the single most important political force on the Israeli scene. In sheer numbers the Labor Party and its economic, social, and cultural affiliates is far larger. But to a large extent the Labor Zionist movement has lost the ideological vitality and political elan which supported its dominant position for so long within Zionist and Israeli politics. While the Likud has had impressive electoral success in recent years, it is severely factionalized. Dedicated above all to continuing their participation in a governing coalition, its leaders share little beyond strong nationalist convictions. Dependent on the volatile opinions of the recently mobilized Oriental Jewish sector of Israeli society, deserted recently by an important moderate wing of the Liberal Party, and suffering still from Menachem Begin's resignation, the Likud faces an uncertain future. Presently the two rival blocs each attract the support of 30%-35% of the electorate. This awkward distribution, combined with the fragmentation of the liberal left and the traditional religious sector, makes it unlikely that a coalition government will soon emerge based on a coherent program for addressing Israel's most imposing problem—the future of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The Jewish fundamentalist movement is well positioned to exploit this unsettled political environment. The Likud relies upon it to legitimize its foreign policy and to provide necessary coalition partners. Gush Emunim can also make effective appeals to "activist" elements within the Labor movement, since it alone can credibly project an image consistent with the "pioneering" mythology of Labor Zionism. It has also demonstrated its ability to attract leadership talent, youthful cadres, and votes from what up until 1984 had been the dominant political force among religious Jews—the National Religious Party. Most important it has repeatedly proven its capacity to generate well organized political action simultaneously over a wide variety of issues, sustained in terms consistent with if not corresponding to consensual Israeli political opinions.

Despite its success it would be a mistake to characterize the fundamentalist movement as ideologically and programatically united, or as a political juggernaut gathering strength from year to year and threatening soon to achieve a dominant position in Israeli society. In this study I have outlined the very important differences that exist within it. Although these differences exist within the framework of a distinct, coherent, and potent worldview, they have complicated efforts to build a united organizational framework for political action. In addition the very success of the movement, in expanding settlement in the occupied territories and attracting different types of Israelis to those settlements, has created difficult practical problems.
Practical Problems Associated with Fundamentalist Success

As explained above Gush Emunim is comprised of a religious majority and an important non-religious minority. In general Gush Emunim settlements have been established either as "religious" or "non-religious." Attempts to build "mixed" communities have mostly failed. Along with differences over the extent to which veteran settlers should be allowed to screen newcomers for social, cultural, and economic compatibility, conflicts in the educational and recreational spheres over religious issues has interfered with Gush efforts to attract and absorb additional settlers.196

Indeed simply attracting more settlers has been a more serious problem than Gush Emunim originally anticipated. By 1983 it was clear that no more than 20,000 to 25,000 ideologically motivated Jews could be drawn from inside of Israel to establish and populate settlements located far from Israeli Jewish centers and characterized by "pioneering" standards of living. The expectation that the Yeshivot Hesder located in the West Bank would produce steady streams of dedicated young settlers has not been fulfilled. Since 1982 the overwhelming majority of these graduates have left the West Bank to pursue education and career opportunities inside Israel proper.197 To be sure, since early 1983 massive public subsidies and luxury housing have attracted many more settlers. Although the numbers are not increasing at the rate anticipated by the planners in 1983, still the number of settlers in the West Bank (excluding expanded East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip now exceeds 60,000 and is likely to grow by at least another 10,000 to 15,000 in the next two years.

But while Gush Emunim activists live primarily in the "rural" settlements established in the 1970s, more than 70% of Jewish residents of the West Bank now live in urban areas, including the new townships built to attract non-ideologically motivated Israelis.198 This means, for example, that Yesha, originally founded as an association of local councils of rural settlements, finds itself unable to speak with confidence on behalf of the majority of West Bank settlers. Indeed a significant proportion of the inhabitants of new townships such as Maale Adumim, Ephrat, and Ariel neither shares the worldview of Jewish fundamentalism as outlined in this study, nor follow, automatically, Gush Emunim's lead in political disputes. This was particularly evident during the controversy over Yesha's 1985 resolution declaring any Israeli Government ready to compromise on the West Bank issue as traitorous.199

Additional problems relate to Israel's severely straitened economic circumstances which have led to sharp reductions in the scale of expenditure on settlement and infrastructure. For both economic and psychological reasons this has hampered the achievement of Gush objectives regarding the number and distribution of new settlements and settlers. In response to what it regards as a de facto "freeze" on settlement related expenditures, Gush Emunim has sponsored the formation of a parliamentary lobby, comprised of twenty members of parliament with strong political and ideological connections to the fundamentalist movement. The purpose of the lobby is to act as advocate and watchdog for the interests of the settlers. As several Gush leaders have
noted, however, this effort contradicts the larger purpose of the movement to be accepted in the eyes of the Israeli public, not as a separate selfish interest group like any other, but as the self-sacrificing representative of the nation as a whole.200

Another practical problem which Gush Emunim has not responded to effectively, but which is aggravated by the economic crisis afflicting Israel as a whole, is the task of increasing the proportion of Jewish settlers employed inside the West Bank. Only 21% of employed settlers work inside their settlements.201 Indeed on a typical day in most settlements more Arab men can be found (mainly working on construction and maintenance) than Jewish men. Of those settlers who do work inside their own locality the vast majority are employed, directly or indirectly, in public service (schools, administration, religious councils, political work, etc.). Of the commuters, the decisive majority travels to metropolitan areas inside the Green Line.

As noted, the Yeshivot Hesder, inspired and largely staffed by Gush Emunim Rabbis, have not been a source of large numbers of "pioneering" settlers. But this is just one aspect of a more general recruitment problem that has begun to surface for the movement in precisely that sector, religious youth, within which its greatest successes have been registered. There is increasing evidence that within the Merkaz Harav Yeshiva, and others that have served as channels for the development of Gush elites and cadre, a trend toward ultra-religiosity and other-worldly concerns has replaced the national-religious ethos associated with Gush Emunim. Alluding to the black garb worn by ultra-orthodox (largely non-Zionist) Jews, this trend is referred to within the movement as "blackening." It seems associated, in part, with the natural thrust toward increasing rigidity and purity of observance entailed in the fundamentalists' acceptance of the absolute authority of Jewish law. It is reflected in increasing opposition among Rabbis in these Yeshivas to the participation of their students in the armed forces or in any other activity which reduces the time and energy they can devote to ritual observance and the study of sacred texts.202

Within Bnei Akiva, the national-religious youth movement that has been the single largest recruitment pool for Gush Emunim leaders and activists, increasing sensitivity is apparent to criticism by ultra-orthodox Jews. Compromises with secularists, contends Agudat Yisrael, contradict Jewish law and lead to sin. Gush Emunim is also increasingly attacked in these circles for cultivating a form of "idolatry" in its attitude toward the special sanctity of the "Land of Israel." Although the struggle for the permanent absorption of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza was still the top priority item at the most recent national convention of Bnei Akiva, the range of points of view on other issues was unprecedentedly wide. A distinct shift was also noted toward an emphasis within the youth movement on social, cultural, and religious issues not directly connected to annexation and settlement of the territories. This was interpreted in part as a response to the outcome of the Lebanon War, in which, for the first time, significant numbers of Yeshiva graduates and students were killed in combat, and in part to the shock of the arrest and trial of the Jewish terrorist underground for acts which many religious leaders condemned as directly contrary to Jewish law.203
The Leadership Problem and the Struggle for Jewish Control of the Temple Mount

The difficulty which a large proportion of fundamentalist activists have in accepting and implementing a "consensus-building" strategy toward the wider Israeli public is the single most substantial threat to the accomplishment of Gush Emunim objectives. In this respect Jewish fundamentalism in Israel illustrates a broader problem that must confront any such movement. The element which gives fundamentalism its vitality—the unshakeable belief that a supreme authority requires immediate and sustained action toward political goals—contains within it a dangerous tendency toward extremism. Since the world can never reproduce the pure form of a religious vision, the ambitions of fundamentalists must be compromised in order to be consolidated. But compromise of transcendental imperatives can only be legitimized by the decisions of charismatic leaders who can impose their own interpretation of the practical meaning of those imperatives. In the absence of such leadership it is to be expected that severe tensions will arise between fundamentalists willing to compromise in order to consolidate political gains vs. those for whom pure and absolute imperatives permit no compromise.

In this context it is possible to appreciate just how serious a blow Rav Tzvi Yehuda Kook's death was to the political development of Gush Emunim. No leader with his charisma or moral authority, acceptable to both the religious majority and the secular ultranationalist minority of the movement, has emerged to replace him. Nor do candidates for such a leadership position appear on the horizon.

The implications of Tzvi Yehuda's absence are apparent in the burgeoning effort within the movement to assert Jewish rights over the Temple Mount in Jerusalem (known as the Haram el-Sharif [Noble Sanctuary] by Muslims) as a prelude to the removal of the Muslim shrines and the reconstruction of the Temple. The ideological imperative to do something to express Jewish attachment to and aspirations for the "Har Habayit" (Temple Mount) is impossible for any Jewish fundamentalist to ignore, especially given the site's location in "united Jerusalem," its centrality in Jewish history and Jewish law, and its current status as (virtually) an Arab-Muslim autonomous zone. In recent years discussion of the tactical advantages of creating an Israeli consensus for rejecting the status quo on the Temple Mount, as a way to foil various proposals to advance negotiations by including the formula: "Muslim rule over Muslim holy places," has helped increase the intensity of fundamentalist demands for change. Both those who argue that redemptionist Zionism requires a dramatic change in the status of the Temple Mount and who wish to prepare the way for the rebuilding of the Third Temple, as well as those who contend that political prudence requires patience in dealing with this sensitive issue, quote Tzvi Yehuda to support their positions. Others, who make the most radical demands, for the destruction of the Muslim shrines and the immediate construction of the Temple, openly reject what they view as the mistaken inclination of Tzvi Yehuda and his followers to wait for miraculous divine intervention before acting to rebuild the Temple.
Substantively, no single issue contains greater potential for splitting the movement and for deflecting it from politically productive activities than the strong and growing commitment within it toward the Judaization of the Temple Mount. On the other hand, no single trend within the movement contains more potential for precipitating rapid and radical change consistent with its overall worldview. Indeed there is virtually no event more likely to achieve a profound realignment of public attitudes within Israel, to precipitate a civil revolt in the occupied territories, to disrupt the Egyptian-Israeli relationship, and/or to trigger threats of a major Arab-Israeli war, than a government supported fundamentalist initiative to "Judaize" the Temple Mount. According to Doron Rosenblum, a prominent Israeli newspaper columnist, the destruction of the Muslim shrines on the Temple Mount is "only a matter of time." The aftermath, he predicts, will be horrible:

...the immediate cancellation of the peace agreement with Egypt; ...spontaneous demonstrations in every Arab country; news bulletins on American networks announcing declarations of war by the entire Arab world...mobilization of the reserves amidst ...reports of tensions on all four fronts; the flow of Egyptian forces into Sinai; firing in the Golan and the Jordan Valley; dogfights with Iranian, Saudi, Libyan, Iraqi, and Syrian planes; ...rumors of the massacre of Syrian Jews;...guerrilla war in the occupied territories between Arabs and settlers; "massacres" that will be called total anarchy; intervention by the superpowers and war that will go on for months or even years.20

Space does not permit full analysis of this complex matter. In brief, recent archeological finds and the decisions handed down by certain leading Rabbis have ended a situation in which fundamentalists anxious to avoid the political explosiveness of the Temple Mount issue could do so by referring to halachic restrictions against Jews entering the area. (see above p. 22) Partly as a result of these developments, partly as a result of the desire by many in Gush Emunim to do something so decisively repugnant to the Arab world that peace negotiations would forever be prevented, and partly as a result of the very logic of fundamentalist ideology, the Temple Mount issue has emerged from the realm of crackpot utopianism to occupy a central place in the political activity of the mainstream of Gush Emunim. My survey of articles, interviews, essays, and editorials in Nekuda indicates that in 1982 only two substantial items were published in that journal concerning the Temple Mount. In 1983 five items were published; in 1984 six; and in 1985 nine different items appeared with the Temple Mount as an important focus. Four items concerning the Temple Mount were published in just the first three months of 1986.207 In those same months a series of demonstrative visits to the Temple Mount by sympathetic Members of Knesset (including prayers, photographers, and challenges to the Muslim authorities) ignited furious Arab reaction. On the anniversary of the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem, in June 1986, 12,000 fundamentalists marched in protest from Merkaz Harav Yeshiva to the Temple Mount beneath banners reading "The Temple Mount is the Heart of the People." Amidst violent clashes a detachment of soldiers and policemen succeeded in preventing one hundred of these demonstrators from forcing their way onto the site.208
Within a Jewish fundamentalist frame of reference the argument of those demanding a change in the status quo is difficult to refute. Why, it is asked, should Jews consider the "Western Wall," which was nothing but the outer courtyard of Herod's Temple, a particularly holy place? What sort of authentic redemptionist Zionism is it whose adherents stand at the Western Wall, on the edge of the Temple Mount itself, and hypocritically commemorate the Temple's destruction by fasting and bemoaning the plight of Jews "unable" to "return to the Mountain of the Lord and rebuild the Temple?" If Jerusalem is truly the united sovereign capital of Israel, it is argued, then why in the very holy center of Jerusalem, on the Temple Mount, do Arab Muslims hold sway, preventing Jews from raising their flag, building a synagogue, or even praying publicly?

After a vigorous assertion of the vanguardist position, Baruch Lior, of the Land of Israel Academy, identifies the Temple Mount as the "heart of the struggle" and attacks Gush Emunim as a whole and Yesha in particular for ignoring the travesty of the status quo.

The matter of the Temple Mount is most paradoxical. Indisputably the widest sort of consensus exists within the people of Israel with regard to Jerusalem...about Jerusalem, we are agreed, there shall be no discussions....But how strange it is that when we speak of the Temple Mount we lapse into illogic. The Western Wall is recognized as 'the holiest site of the Jewish people' and no one explains that, in essence, it is the Mount that is holy and that the wall is peripheral....The Yesha Council must first end its conspiracy of silence and then commit itself to the struggle for the Temple Mount.209

Yesha and the mainstream of Gush Emunim do indeed appear to have responded positively to such criticism. While Moshe Levinger, Israel Eldad, and others have warned of the dangers of moving too far and too fast toward these objectives,210 Nekuda itself published two editorials warning of radical and violent steps likely to be taken by Jewish fundamentalists if the government does not act swiftly to change the status quo.

Today only a relatively small number are active in the struggle to implement Jewish rights on the dearest and holiest place of all. It is clear, however, that the people will be unable to tolerate the anomaly and that the struggle will unavoidably expand. It is the responsibility of the government of Israel, with the help of the Chief Rabbinate, to give special attention to dealing with this holy and emotion laden matter before it explodes.211

Those in the Government and the Chief Rabbinate who pay only lip service to 'the basic rights of the people of Israel to the Temple Mount'...must bear responsibility for the fire liable to erupt from the burning fuse and which, God forbid, may ignite a terrible religious war, whose
echoes would reverberate from one end of the earth to the other.

...The public in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza has spoken of these matters for two years...We warn those whose errors determine, even if unintentionally, that day after day the Temple Mount remains in Muslim hands. We warn them that Jewish eyes and souls yearn for the Temple Mount and that they, with their own hands, are stoking the fires which will erupt to solve the problem, and not by normal, natural, or legal means.

We issue this warning to all the organs of the Government of Israel and also to the Chief Rabbinate of the Land of Israel.212

These editorials evince an escalating commitment by the mainstream of the fundamentalist movement to alter the status quo on the Temple Mount in some dramatic fashion—either by replacing Muslim guards with Israeli police, organizing public Jewish prayer services on the site, building a large synagogue there, treating it as a "settlement area," and/or preparing it for the reconstruction of the Temple.

Jewish Fundamentalism and the United States

Since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, but especially since 1967, when the United States replaced France as Israel's primary arms supplier and source of economic support, the US-Israeli relationship has been a special one. Its specialness derives largely from the unusual extent to which historical memory and perceptions of common moral, political, and cultural purposes have shaped American policies toward Israel. In the long run, the peculiar prominence of this factor is an important reason to expect the relationship to undergo serious strain as a consequence of the kind of radical cultural, religious, and political change Israel has been experiencing.

Certainly in the last decade the overall shift of Israeli policy away from strict security concerns, toward commitments to fulfill the ideological agenda advocated by Jewish fundamentalists, has embarrassed successive American governments. It has also greatly complicated American efforts to establish intimate, stable, and operationally significant military and political relationships with Arab countries in the eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. Repeatedly the United States has found itself at loggerheads with NATO allies over diplomatic initiatives in the area, in large measure because the "special relationship" with Israel has made it difficult to adapt to changes in the Arab world as a whole and among the Palestinians in particular.

With the return of Yitzhak Shamir to the Premiership, it is likely that over the next two years, or however long the Likud dominated version of the national unity government remains in power, American policy in the area will (once again) be confronted by an Israeli government dependent on Gush Emunim and active on its behalf. As noted above, there are also strong reasons to fear that the Temple Mount issue could come to a boil during this period.
This is particularly the case if the fundamentalist movement suspects that the Likud will not form the succeeding government.

In the long run the United States must concern itself with the consequences of an Israel torn between radically opposed conceptions of itself. The internal strain associated with dramatic swings of the Israeli political pendulum are likely to be reflected in a spasmodic pattern of foreign policy as each side tries, before being displaced from power, to either demonstrate toughness, achieve decisive breakthroughs, or foreclose negotiating options.

Less likely, though not at all inconceivable, is that Gush Emunim will succeed in its overarching goal of transforming Israeli society into a fundamentalist state. Israel is already radically different from the image which most Americans have of it, an image which, however mistaken, supports the close ties that exist between the two countries. But aside from the apocalyptic wing of American Protestant fundamentalism—which not only welcomes but even finances Temple Mount related efforts of Gush Emunim213—most Americans, including most American Jews, would find it difficult to identify with and support a fundamentalist Israel. Such a transformation could occur gradually, as the norms and values of Gush Emunim are absorbed by wider circles of Israelis. Such processes are likely to be accelerated by the escalating cycles of terrorism, violence, and hatred, that annexation of the territories is likely to produce, and by cultural, religious, and social developments within Jewish-Israeli society.

But instead of exerting long run influence through gradual processes, the Jewish fundamentalist movement might also succeed in transforming Israeli society following a breakdown of parliamentary democracy. Israel is, indeed, so deeply divided on key territorial and ideological issues, and has such a short and essentially weak tradition of constitutional democracy, that successful challenges to the regime cannot be ruled out. The most often discussed scenario of this sort is that of popular but unscrupulous right wing politicians joining with ambitious military commanders to "restore order and sanity" amidst chronic, polarized, and increasingly violent intra-Jewish struggles. Gush Emunim would provide these elements with necessary political support and ideological legitimacy.214

Whether established gradually or suddenly, the emergence of a fundamentalist Israel would destroy the special relationship with the United States. Decoupled from the United States, opposed in principle to a negotiated peace, unfettered by the norms of liberal democracy, animated by Redemptionist imperatives, and disposing of a large and sophisticated nuclear arsenal, such an Israel would pose challenges to American foreign policy and security interests at least as profound as those resulting from the Islamic Revolution in Iran.
1. See Appendix for public opinion data pertaining to the breadth of identification with and support for beliefs and policies associated with Jewish fundamentalism.

2. Ehud Sprinzak has argued that a better term for the movement under consideration here is "Zionist fundamentalism" in order to emphasize the non-inclusion of pietistic ultra-orthodox Jews. However I prefer "Jewish fundamentalism" because, as is explained on pp. 26-27, the movement represented by Gush Emunim is most importantly characterized, not by a return to Zionist fundamentals, but a complete rejection of classical Zionist ideology in favor of what are seen as irreducibly and irrevocably Jewish imperatives. See Ehud Sprinzak, Gush Emunim: The Politics of Zionist Fundamentalism in Israel (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1986). Amnon Rubinstein, in The Zionist Dream Revisited: From Herzl to Gush Emunim and Back (New York: Schocken Books, 1984), argues as I do.

3. In Zionist parlance "activism" refers to a that wing of the socialist Zionist movement represented by the Achdut Haavodah Party and its agricultural settlement organization, Hakibbutz Hameuchad. Tinged with mystical overtones of communion between Jews and the soil of the Land of Israel "activist" Zionists have traditionally attached particular importance to territorial expansion, tough policies toward the Arabs, and maximal extension of Jewish settlement and sovereignty.


8. From the text of notes to the address of Rav Tzvi Yehuda Kook as published under the title "This is the State of which the Prophets Dreamed," in Nekuda, No. 86 (April 26, 1985) pp. 6-7.


10. For example: the Agriculture Ministry, the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Settlement, and the Land Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency (an arm of the World Zionist Organization).

11. Actually much of the planning and financing of the Hebron-Kiryat Arba operation, was provided by the Movement for the Whole Land of Israel. Amnon Rubinstein, The Zionist Dream Revisited: From Herzl to Gush Emunim and Back (op. cit., pp. 99-100.


13. The origins of the Democratic Movement for Change, led by Yigal Yadin, can be found in this milieu. Although it managed to garner nearly 12% of the vote in the 1977 Parliamentary elections, internal divisions destroyed it. Amnon Rubinstein's small liberal-dovish party, "Shinui" (Change) is all that is left of this movement.

14. "Judea" and "Samaria" are the Biblical names for the general areas south and north of Jerusalem (respectively). Historically they include substantial portions of pre-1967 Israel, but do not include the Jordan Valley. For political purposes, and despite the geographical imprecision involved, the annexationist camp in Israel prefers to refer to the "West Bank" (i.e. the area between the Green Line and the Jordan River) as "Judea and Samaria."

15. Gush Etzion is an area south of Bethlehem which was one of the only areas containing Jewish settlements captured and held by the Arabs in the 1948 war. Former residents made a dramatic return to the area soon after the Six Day War and the Labor Party declared its support for settlement there.

16. At the same time (November 1979) Moshe Dayan resigned as Foreign Minister to protest what he perceived as the Begin government's commitment to annexing the West Bank.


19. Yechiel Orio, "Talmi Yosef: The Stubborness of a Few, Nekuda, #34
20. Gideon Aran, The Land of Israel between Religion and Politics..., op. cit., p. 12.

21. The word generally used is "Hurban," meaning "sacrifice." It is the traditional term used to refer to the greatest of all catastrophes in Jewish history—the destruction of the First and Second Temples. More recently it has been used, as well, to refer to the Holocaust.


23. In 1984 the Likud received 48% of Gush Emunim settler votes, Tehiya 23%, and Morasha 21%. The extent to which the NRP has been hurt by the defection of Porat and Druckman, and the doubts raised about maximalist Gush Emunim demands by Zevulon Hammer and Yehuda Ben Meir (former Young Guard leaders who have remained inside the NRP) is reflected in the Party's dismal electoral performance in 1984. It placed only 4 deputies in the Knesset, receiving a mere 4% of Gush Emunim settler votes. Nekuda, No. 77, August 31, 1984, p. 4.


27. See Gideon Aran, op. cit., pp. 1-4; and Ehud Sprinzak, op. cit., pp. 6-7.


30. See below, pp. 66-68, for further discussion of the Temple Mount issue and its ramifications.

31. It is ironic but instructive that Etzion, engaging in apparently friendly conversation with an Arab, was pictured in June 1980 on the cover of a
special issue of Nekuda dedicated to friendly relations with the Arabs. The caption of the picture read "Who is hurting co-existence?" In fact the issue appeared very close to the day of the bomb attack on the Arab mayors that Etzion, five years later, would be convicted of helping to organize.


34. Nekuda, editorial, No. 77, August 31, 1984, p. 4.


37. See Appendix for data on proportion of Israeli Jews whose views conform to the basic elements of Jewish fundamentalism as discussed in this section.


42. Ibid., p. 19.

43. Ibid., p. 108.

44. Ibid., p. 18.

45. Ibid., p. 104.

46. Ibid., p. 92.

47. Ibid., p. 165.

48. Ibid., pp. 92-93. Fisch goes on to quote approvingly from proceedings of the Fourth Conference of the Academy of Islamic Research held at Al Azhar University in Cairo in 1968. A major theme of the Conference was the impossibility understanding Zionism except as a political instrument of Judaism as a religion.
49. Ibid., p. 157, 159, emphasis in original.

50. Ibid., p. 101.

51. Ibid., p. 114.

52. Ibid., p. 162.

53. Ibid., pp. 131-135, 160-162.

54. Ibid., p. 18-19.

55. Ibid., p. 93.

56. Ibid., pp. 163-64.

57. Ibid., p. 163.


60. Ibid., p. 20.

61. Ibid., p. 20.

62. Ibid., p. 21.


64. Ibid., p. 163. This is actually a quote from an editorial written by Fisch for Zot Haaretz in 1971.


67. Another excellent example of this approach to Jewish history, combining interpretation of religious texts with political and historical commentary, is an article by Rav Tzvi Yehuda Kook entitled "Zionism and Biblical Prophecy." Tzvi Yehuda divides contemporary Jewish history into four "stages of Redemption." The rescue of surviving European Jews and their transfer to the Jewish state was the first stage. The exercise of Jewish sovereignty over the whole land of Israel and its settlement comprises the second stage. "Restoring the purity of the soil..." by working the land and "possessing" it is the third stage. The fourth and final stage will
bring the full Redemption to Israel and to all of mankind, and will come in proportion to the extent to which Jews embrace and observe all the religious ordinances. Religious Zionism: An Anthology, Yosef Tirosh (ed.), (Jerusalem: World Zionist Organization, 1975) pp. 167-179.


69. Ibid., pp. 18 and 86-87.


72. Ibid., pp. 77 and 87.

73. Ibid., p. 87.

74. Ibid., p. 95.

75. Ibid., p. 94.

76. Ibid., p. 166.

77. Ibid., p. 169.

78. Ibid., pp. 165, 168, and 169.

79. Ibid., p. 166.

80. Ibid., p. 169.


82. An excellent example of the active participation of these Rabbis in doctrinal and text-based disputes with concrete political implications is the fervid debate carried out among Rabbis Yisrael Ariel, David Hanshke, Yehuda Zoldan, Yocharan Fried, David Stiu, and Yoel Ben Nun in the pages of Nekuda between May 1984 and May 1985 over whether or not the Jewish terrorist underground represented a dangerous distortion of Rav Kook the elder's message and/or a phenomenon halachically classifiable as a "revolt against God." (Illustrative of this prolonged and intricate debate are Yisrael Ariel, "Was It Indeed a Revolt against Heaven?" Nekuda, #73, May 1984, pp. 16-17; Yehuda Zoldan, "Patience of Redemption," Nekuda, #76, August 10, 1984, pp. 22-23; David Hanshke, "What Has Happened to the Lights of Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook?" Nekuda, #79, October 1984, pp. 12-13, 28; and David Stiu, "The 'Lights' are Not Out!" Nekuda, #84, March 1, 1985, pp. 18-20.

84. Nekuda, Yehuda Etzion, "From the Law of Existence to the Law of the Objective" p. 23, #75, July 6, 1984; "To Finally Wave the Banner of Jerusalem," #93, November 22, 1985, p. 22.

85. Yehuda Etzion, "Finally to Raise the Banner of Jerusalem," Nekuda, #93, p. 23.

86. Yehuda Etzion, "From the Banner of Jerusalem to a Movement of Redemption," Nekuda, #94, December 20, 1985, p. 28.

87. Aviva Segal, "If it is Forbidden for Yehuda Etzion to be a Prophet, Then It Is Forbidden for You Too, Yedida," Nekuda, #92 October 23, 1985, p. 24. For a major defense of Etzion's views see Dan Tor, "To Continue and To Push the End," Nekuda, #96, February 21, 1986, pp. 12-13.


93. Personal interview with author, Kiryat Arba, April 30, 1984. See Jerusalem Post Supplement, March 25, 1983, pp. 4-5. This was also Menachem Begin's position, maintaining loyalty to the traditional slogan of the Revisionist movement, still officially valid, "Both banks of the Jordan—this one is ours and that one is also!"


95. Maariv, March 18, 1983.


97. Yoel Ben-Nun's formulation is this regard is typical: "We shall not forget 'our Transjordan,' but we know well that the people of Israel, in its current circumstances...is hardly able to integrate the western Land of Israel, that we have in our hands (to say nothing of the lands of Naphtali and Asher in Lebanon). That is hard to understand and to swallow, but 'This also is from God.' "The State of Israel vs. the Land of Israel?" Nekuda, #72, April 16, 1984, p. 31. See also Yuval Neeman, "National Goals," in On the Difficulty of Being an Israeli (Hebrew), Alouph Hareven
98. For most purposes the expanded East Jerusalem area was annexed in June 1967. Israeli law was applied to the Golan Heights in December 1982, but discussions disturbing to Gush Emunim continue within the Labor Party over the possibility of a territorial compromise with Syria.


100. Rabbi Yehuda Amital, "In the Trap of Perfection," Nekuda, #52, December 24, 1982, p. 10.


102. Dan Tor, "To Continue to Push the End," Nekuda, #96, February 21, 1986, p. 13. This article is dedicated to "Yair" (Abraham Stern, leader of the pre-state Jewish terrorist organization known as Lehi, or "the Stern Gang"), whom Tor calls "the greatest pusher of the end of the generation of the Redemption.


107. Ellyakim Haetzni, The Shock of Withdrawal from the Land of Israel (Jerusalem: Elisha, January 1986); For a similar argument see Baruch Lior, of the Land of Israel Academy, "To Prepare the Generations for Prayer and War," Nekuda, April 5, 1985, pp. 11-12.

108. Resolutions quoted by Rav Moshe Shapira, "The State of Israel vs. the State of Yesha," Nekuda, #93, November 22, 1985, p. 11. When another settler publication, Aleph Yud, published an article in October 1985,
calling openly for armed struggle against the Peres government, it was suspended by government order.

109. The term used, "shtadlan," has a particularly distasteful meaning in Zionist parlance, referring to the kowtowing "court Jews" of the diaspora who traditionally protected Jewish communities by serving at the beck and call of the gentile ruler.

110. Dan Tor, "All the Flags have been Folded," Nekuda, #79 (September 1984), p. 11.


113. See, for example, Eliyakim Haetzni, The Shock of Withdrawal from the Land of Israel, op. cit., p. 10.


116. Remarks by Yaacov Ariel, Rabbi of the Neve Dekalim settlement where the symposium was held. Nekuda, #59, June 10, 1983, p. 17.


118. Interview with Moshe Levinger, Nekuda, #83, February 1, 1985, p. 7.

119. Moshe Levinger, "With Alertness and Security," Nekuda, #93, November 22, 1985, p. 9. For the same argument see also Rabbi Yoel Ben-Nun, "Not to Be Nervous and Not to Be Made Nervous," Nekuda, #68 January 13, 1984, pp. 4-7

120. He is a regular contributor, for example, to the left of center news magazine Koteret Rashit.

121. Yoel Ben-Nun, "For Security and Faith; against Screams of Crisis," Nekuda, #85, April 5, 1985, p. 11.

123. Yoel Ben-Nun, "The State of Israel vs. the Land of Israel?" Nekuda, #72, April 16, 1984, p.29. See also Yoel Ben-Nun, "Not to Be Nervous and Not to Be Made Nervous," Nekuda, #68 January 13, 1984, pp. 4-7.


127. Rabbi Moshe Levinger, "We and the Arabs," Nekuda, #36, November 27, 1981, pp. 15. (emphasis in original). For a clear statement of the notion of the unique "mission" of the Jews, which overrides all other considerations and which makes them unique as a people see Moshe Simon, "The People Denies Its Destiny," Nekuda, #91, September 15, 1985, pp. 6-7, 36.


130. Ibid., p. 31.


132. Interview with Moshe Ben-Yosef (Hagar) by Ofra Amitai, Nekuda, #100, July 11, 1986, p. 28. For the detailed argument see Ben-Yosef, "The Struggle for Survival against the Liberal Holocaust," Nekuda, #80, November 23, 1984, pp. 20-22.

133. Amitai interview with Ben-Yosef, Nekuda, #100, op. cit., p. 28.

134. Moshe Ben-Yosef (Hagar), "The Emancipation has already Destroyed the Third Commonwealth," Nekuda, #94, December 20, 1985, p. 15. Ben-Yosef believes a reformed halacha, springing from nationalist-tribal imperatives, can be imposed within Israel, and blames the official Rabbinate for impeding the process. "In a Struggle for Survival against the Liberal Holocaust," Nekuda, #80, November 23, 1984, p. 22. Ben-Yosef himself is not an observant Jew.


136. Moshe Ben-Yosef (Hagar), "Where is the Border?" Nekuda, #95, January 21, 1986, p. 23.


139. Eliyakim Haetzni, "Even Now a Civil War is Liable to Erupt," Nekuda, #82, January 4, 1985, p. 18 (emphasis in original).


141. In a poll of 539 Gush Emunim settlers in 1981-82, two-thirds responded that they either agreed or strongly agreed that according to Jewish law death must be chosen before acceptance of withdrawal from the West Bank. Support for this principle was evenly divided between religious and non-religious settlers. David Weisburd, "Deviance as Social Reaction: A Study of the Gush Emunim Settlements in Israel" (Yale University, Department of Sociology: Ph.D. dissertation, 1985), pp. 222 and 224.


146. Rabbi Moshe Levinger, "Don't Throw Away the Old Banners," Nekuda, #97, March 25, 1986, p. 7. For similar arguments, opposing any sort of intra-Jewish or anti-state violence and for maintaining the utmost tolerance toward Jewish critics, see Rabbi Yaacov Ariel, "The Authority of the Halacha," Nekuda, #74, June 21, 1984, pp. 20-21; Eliezer Shavit, "Democracy


151. Editorial, Nekuda, #54, February 4, 1983, p. 2. For an image of Israel as Finland or North Vietnam, willing and able to fight either superpower to the death, see Ora Shem-Ur, The Challenges of Israel op. cit., p. 62.


154. In 1985, for example, an extended debate was published in the pages of Nekuda on the proper lessons to be drawn from the Biblical incident in which Shimon and Levy organized a slaughter of the inhabitants of Schechem (Nablus).


159. David Rosensweig, "Peace for the Galilee War: The Wrong Address," *Nekuda*, #63, December 23, 1983 p. 23. This article sparked a wide debate in Israel proper and among the settlers. Letters to the editor in *Nekuda* on the issue were mostly supportive of Rosensweig. See in particular *Nekuda*, #69, February 3, 1984, pp. 28-29.


161. "We Must Block Terror," *Nekuda*, #90, August 23, 1985, p. 5.

162. In the next issue of *Nekuda* one settler wrote on behalf of several who had joked among themselves at the embarrassing truth contained in this photograph. *Nekuda*, #69, February 3, 1984, p. 29.

163. For one of the only systematic presentations of this position see Dan Be'eri, "Autonomy for the Arabs of the Land of Israel," *Nekuda*, #87, May 24, 1985, pp. 10-11, 25.

164. When 539 Gush Emunim settlers were polled in 1981-82, 64% disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement: "If Judea and Samaria are officially annexed, the local Arabs should be granted Israeli citizenship and given the right to vote." Only 13% agreed or strongly agreed. David Weisburd with Vered Vinitzky, "Vigilantism as Rational Social Control: The Case of the Gush Emunim Settlers" from op. cit., p. 81. For Tehiya's outlook see Yuval Neeman's discussion of the future of the Arab population (emigration, refugee resettlement outside the Land of Israel, and resident status for most of those that remain) in "National Goals," in Alouph Hareven (ed.) On the Difficulty of Being an Israeli (Jerusalem: Van Leer, 1983) pp. 264-266.


166. For these opposing perspectives see, for example, Yakki Fried, "Diary of a Terrorist," *Nekuda*, #33 August 28, 1981, p. 9; Amiel Unger, "Yesha after the Subsidies," *Nekuda*, #58, May 17, 1983, pp. 22-23; and a letter from Aharon Baruchin, "Who Will Build?" *Nekuda*, #91, September 15, 1985, p. 2.

168. In the previously cited 1984 survey of opinions of settlers of American background the following responses were given to a general question about policy toward local Arabs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leave as is except for troublemakers</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offer citizenship. If refuse leave or remain second class</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Must find way for peaceful coexistence somehow</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide economic incentives for them to leave</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force them out</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divide the territories</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


175. This is a very common formulation. For an example see Ariel Sharon's remarks to a settler audience in Hebron, transcribed from Jerusalem Domestic Service (radio), May 19, 1986, in FBIS, May 21, 1986, p. 16.


177. Ibid., p. 28 (emphasis in original). "Repair of the world," is a
concept in Jewish mysticism referring to the Jewish task of completing and uniting a fractured cosmos in order to help bring about the final redemption.

178. Ibid., p. 28.


185. Interview with Avraham Yoffe, in The Book of the Whole Land of Israel, Ben-Ami (ed.) op. cit., p. 192. See also the interview in this volume with General Aharon Davidi, "The War Aims of the People of Israel," pp. 199-203.

186. Ibid., p. 188. Concerning the likely use of Israeli military force, during the next 60-70 years, to block the straits of Hormuz and blockade Arab ports against receipt of arms shipments see Ora Shem-Ur, The Challenges of Israel, op. cit., pp. 58-79.


194. Opposed by Gush Emunim in 1984 because of a perceived softening of the NRP's line on the permanent absorption of the territories, the NRP's representation in the parliament dropped from 6 to only 4.

195. Recently, for example, Gush Emunim launched a nation-wide petition campaign in favor of amnesty for all Jews imprisoned for "nationally motivated" offenses. Coordinated by a special directorate drawn from the Gush elite, expressions of support have been elicited from more than fifty parliamentary deputies, extensive and sustained appeals have been directed toward the President, while hundreds of well prepared workers scoure the country for signatures on a petition in favor of blanket amnesty. By late September more than 300,000 signatures had already been gathered. Moshe Hurvitz, "How They Pressure the President," Koteret Rashit #199, September 24, 1986, pp. 13-15, 47.


204. See, for example, Yoel Ben-Nun, "Yes, We Need Soul Searching," Nekuda, #73, May 25, 1984, p. 14; and Yisrael Ariel, "Was there Really a Revolt against God?" Nekuda, #73, May 25, 1984, p. 16.


206. Doron Rosenblum, "The Temple Mount Will Be Blown Up," Koteret Rashit, #131, June 5, 1985, pp. 20-21. Rosenblum bases his prediction on the record of success which he ascribes to Gush Emunim in transforming "the criminal to the crazy, the crazy to the odd, the odd to the mistaken, the mistaken to the good, the good to the excellent, the excellent to the accomplished reality, and the accomplished reality to the consensus view."

207. See Appendix for a photocopy of the picture that accompanied one 1984 article on the Temple Mount by Yehuda Etzion, "From the Laws of Existence to the Laws of Destiny," Nekuda, #75, July 6, 1984, p. 26. The picture is a photograph of the Old City of Jerusalem with a rebuilt Temple in the place of the the Dome of the Rock and the El-Aksa Mosque.

208. See the official Gush Emunim advertisement for the Rally, signed by the four most important Temple Mount related organizations, Nekuda, #99, May 30, 1986, back cover; and Israel Domestic Service, FBIS, June 6, 1986, P. II.

translated in JPRS, NEA-85-148, December 18, 1985, pp. 56-59.) Medad, a leader of two separate Temple Mount related groups, published an article in Nekuda, prior to the Yamit evacuation, arguing that the evacuation could and would be halted only if a Jewish takeover of the Temple Mount would be effected immediately. Israel Medad, "The Temple Mount is in Our Hands--the Time Has Come," Nekuda, #39, February 5, 1982, pp. 4-5.


APPENDIX

Glossary

Achdut Haavodah—socialist-Zionist party founded in 1919; emphasized "activism" toward national and territorial objectives; merged with other socialist-Zionist parties in 1968.

Agudah Yisrael—ultra-orthodox political organization founded in 1912; anti-Zionist to non-Zionist

Amana—(Covenant) the settlement-building arm of Gush Emunim

Ariel, Yisrael—Rabbi, number two on Rabbi Kahane's Kach list in 1981 elections; lives in Jerusalem; known for his extreme views

Ben-Nun, Yoel—Rabbi, leading activist within Gush Emunim; veteran of Ofra settlement near Ramallah; regular contributor to Nekuda; consensus-builder

Ben-Yosef (Hagar), Moshe—passionate polemicist; regular contributor to Nekuda; secularist; lives in Tel-Aviv; advocates imposition of a reformed halacha on all Israelis

Bnei Akiva—(Sons of Akiva) youth movement of the National Religious Party

Cohen, Geula—a Herut firebrand; veteran of Irgun and Lehi, bolted from Herut to help found Tehiya; Member of Knesset; non-religious, ultra-nationalist

Druckman, Haim—Rabbi, a founder and leading activist within Gush Emunim; Member of Knesset from the National Religious Party, more recently of Morasha

Eretz Yisrael—Land of Israel (Hebrew)

Green Line—1949 Armistice Line separating Israel from Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan

Haetzni, Eliyakim—lawyer, veteran settler in Kiryat Arba; Gush Emunim activist; polemicist; regular contributor to Nekuda; secular, vanguardist in orientation

Halacha—the entire corpus of Jewish religious law

Hakibbutz Hameuchad—socialist-Zionist settlement movement with "activist," i.e., expansionist, nationalist, emphasis; descended from the political party Achdut Haavodah
Lustick
Jewish Fundamentalism

Har Habayit--(Temple Mount); Biblical Mt. Moriah, southeastern corner of the Old City of Jerusalem; Jewish term for the Haram el-Sharif

Haram al-Sharif--(Noble Sanctuary); Muslim Arab term for the Temple Mount; on which site are located the Dome of the Rock and the el-Aksa Mosque

Haredim--ultra-orthodox Jews; non-Zionist or anti-Zionist

Irgun--also known as Etzel (the National Military Organization) underground military/terrorist arm of the Revisionist movement during the British mandate; commanded by Menachem Begin

Jabotinsky, Vladimir (Zev)--founder of Revisionist Zionism; mentor of Menachem Begin

Katzover, Beni--founding member of Gush Emunim; participant Sebastiya settlement; leader of the Nablus area settlers; Tehiya activist; religious

Kiryat Arba--largest Jewish settlement in the West Bank; overlooking Hebron

Knesset--Israel's Parliament

Kook, Abraham Isaac--first chief Rabbi of Palestine (1921-1935); originator of theories of Religious Zionism which form the ideological basis of contemporary Jewish fundamentalism

Kook, Tzvi Yehuda--Rabbi, son of Abraham Isaac Kook; leader and charismatic guide of Gush Emunim activists; director of Merkaz Harav until his death in 1982

Lehi--"Freedom Fighters for Israel," also known as the Stern Gang; a terrorist underground group specializing inn assassination during the British mandate; led by Abraham (Yair) Stern; split from the Irgun

Levinger, Moshe--Rabbi, a founder of Gush Emunim and of Jewish settlement in Hebron along with his wife, Miriam Levinger

Machteret--underground; Jewish terrorist groups associated with fundamentalist movement uncovered in 1984

Merkaz Harav--"The Rabbi's Center;" the Jerusalem Yeshiva founded by Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook; subsequently led by his son, Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda Kook; center for the development of Jewish fundamentalist thinking

Morasha--political party founded in 1984 by Haim Druckman combining religiosity with ultra-nationalism

Neeman, Yuval--Israel's leading nuclear physicist; secular ultranationalist; a founder and the leader of Tehiya; former Minister, presently a
Lustick
Jewish Fundamentalism

Member of Knesset

Nekuda—(Point); the monthly journal of Yesha; internal ideological journal and news magazine of Gush Emunim; began publishing in 1979

Orot—Lights; multi-volume work of Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook; mystical presentation of his religious Zionism; also the name of a short-lived political movement established by Hanan Porat in 1984

Porat, Hanan—charismatic founding member of Gush Emunim; veteran settler of Kibbutz Gush Etzion; religious, mystical orientation

Sebastia—ancient Biblical site and location, near Nablus, of the first successful attempt by Gush Emunim (1974) to establish an illegal settlement

Shechem—Biblical name of Nablus, largest city on the West Bank after East Jerusalem

Tehiya—political party founded in 1979 by Gush Emunim activists; comprised of secular and religious fundamentalists; led by Yuval Neeman

Tzomet—Movement for Zionist Renewal; founded after the Lebanon War by former Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan; merged with Tehiya in 1984

Waldman, Eleazar—Rabbi, head of Yeshiva in Kiryat Arba, elected to the Knesset on the Tehiya list

Yamit—the district of northeastern Sinai inhabited before its evacuation by Israel in April 1982 by 5,000 Israeli settlers; included a city by the same name

Yesha—Hebrew acronym for Judea, Samaria, and Gaza; also the name of the Association for Jewish Local Councils in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza District; in Hebrew "Yesuha" means "salvation"
Polling Data Illustrative of Israeli Attitudes on Pertinent Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Belief</th>
<th>Percentage Agreement/Disagreement Among Specified Public</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Territorial Compromise:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regarding the West Bank (held by Israel since the Six-Day-War in 1967), what is the biggest concession you would be willing to make in order to arrive at a peace agreement with the Arab countries?</td>
<td>&quot;no concessions.&quot;</td>
<td>1/75 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If Israel had to choose between peace and annexation of the territories held since the 1967 war, which would you choose?</td>
<td>chose &quot;annexation&quot;</td>
<td>7/84 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In peace negotiations with the Arabs Israel should suggest territorial compromise against suitable security guarantees</td>
<td>disagreed</td>
<td>9/86 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are you in favor of a peace agreement with Jordan according to which Israel will give up territory in Judea and Samaria?</td>
<td>said &quot;no&quot;</td>
<td>3/86 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are you in favor of a peace agreement with Jordan according to which Israel will give up territory in Judea and Samaria?</td>
<td>18-29 said &quot;no&quot;</td>
<td>3/86 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Attitudes toward Settlement of the West Bank:

- **Should Jewish settlement be allowed in Hebron?**
  - 46.3% of Jewish Israeli public said "yes" 3/80

- **Should we continue with Jewish settlements in all of Judea and Samaria?**
  - 31.2% of Jewish Israeli public agreed 3/81

- **Do you support or oppose relinquishing any settlements in the West Bank?**
  - 50% of Jewish Israeli public opposed 9/84

### Attitudes toward Arabs:

- **There cannot be peace between us and between all the Arab countries.**
  - 37.3% of the Jewish Israeli public agreed 1981

- **A Jewish group should be created to fight terror.**
  - 18.7% of the Jewish Israeli public agreed 1984

- **Agree with the ideas of the Kach movement of Meir Kahane regarding the Arab minority.**
  - 42.1% of 600 Israeli/Jewish high school students agreed 1985

- **I support anyone who acts to get the Arabs to leave Judea and Samaria.**
  - 38% of Jewish Israeli public agreed 9/86

### Attitudes toward Redemption:

- **Believe in the coming of the Messiah.**
  - 36% of Israeli Jewish public believed 1974

- **The idea of rebuilding the Temple before the coming of the Messiah.**
  - 18.3% of Jewish Israeli public supported 5/83
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Jewish Fundamentalism

The idea of razing 25% of Oriental Muslim shrines to rebuild the Third Temple supported 5/82 15

Miscellaneous:

The Jewish people is a Chosen People agreed 1974 16

Willing to sharply reduce standard of living in order to end Israeli dependence on America "Yes" 6/80 17

The Committee for Solidarity with Beir Zeit (a left-wing Jewish group with ties to West Bank Arabs--IL) should be outlawed agreed 3/83 18

The policy used by the government to keep order in the territories should be made harder agreed 5/83 19

A Cohen (descendant of the Priestly caste) must not marry a divorced woman agreed 3/86 20
NOTES TO APPENDIX


3. Poll conducted by Hanooh Smith, Jerusalem Post, October 2, 1986.


9. Haaretz, April 8, 1981


15. Poll conducted by PORI, as reported in the Middle East Research Institute, MERI Special Report, Vol. 2, No. 1 (May 2, 1984).

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and Civil Definition of the Collective Identity," (manuscript, circa 1983) p. 16.

17. Poll conducted by Modi'in Ezrahi, Jerusalem Post, June 10, 1980.


20. Poll conducted by Hanooh Smith, reported by the American Jewish Committee, News from the Committee," April 17, 1986.
"A Moment of Coexistence"
(see p. 54)
"The Rebuilt Temple"
(see note 207)

The caption reads: "Naturally, when the peoples of the world come to learn from us, they are attracted not just by holiness—the Land of Israel—but by the holy of holies."
END
1-87
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