Preconceptions, Predilections, and Experience:
Problems for Operational Level Intelligence and Decisionmaking

by

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12 May, 1986

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ABSTRACT

PRECONCEPTIONS, PREDILECTIONS, AND EXPERIENCE: PROBLEMS FOR OPERATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE AND DECISIONMAKING by Lieutenant Colonel Lanning M. Porter, USA, 40 pages.

This study examines intelligence at the operational level of war. Current U.S. Army intelligence doctrine fails to recognize an operational level intelligence function separate and distinct from tactical or strategic intelligence functions. Neither does it identify the characteristics of intelligence at the operational level. Doctrine states that intelligence at the operational level of war is merely the fusion of tactical and strategic intelligence.

This monograph posits that the fusion of tactical and strategic intelligence is inadequate for the operational commander and that the very proposition reflects a serious void in military thinking. This study looks at several military actions at the operational level, outlines the peculiar characteristics of intelligence associated with those actions and suggests a number of considerations for those who deal with intelligence at the operational level of war. Conclusions include:

Among the conclusions to be drawn from this paper are: the U.S. Army lacks a refined operational intelligence perspective; the operational art demands that an operational intelligence perspective be thoroughly developed and examined for its doctrinal implications; and doctrine needs to be reexamined and rewritten to describe adequately the characteristics and functions of intelligence at the operational level of war. This operational intelligence perspective then needs to be promulgated to commanders and intelligence officers at all level of the military and throughout the intelligence community.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The existence of an operational level of war suggests the concomitant existence of operational level functions to support it. Moreover, those functions must be distinguishable from similar functions at the tactical and strategic levels of war. Just as the logistics function, for example, differs at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, other functions such as intelligence change as well. FM 100-5, Operations, FC 100-16-1, Theater Army, Army Group, and Field Army Operations, FM 100-16, Support Operations: Echelons Above Corps, and other doctrinal literature appears to recognize that intelligence at the operational level is somewhat unique; that is, it is somehow different from tactical or strategic intelligence. These documents lay an excellent foundation for the development of operational level intelligence perspectives and doctrine, but they do not describe the intelligence function nor do they describe the characteristics of intelligence at that level. Recent proposed changes to FC 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, acknowledge the operational level of war, but the authors hesitate to recognize an operational level intelligence function that is separate and distinct from tactical or strategic intelligence functions. Neither do they identify the characteristics of operational level intelligence (hereafter called simply "operational intelligence," even though that term may have a different connotation to some readers).
Operational level planning and decisionmaking during war require operational intelligence. Presently, the subtle but crucial differences between strategic, operational and tactical intelligence are not well perceived, hence, they lack adequate definition in our doctrinal literature. Military intelligence theory and doctrine need to be examined more closely and adjusted to correct this deficiency. The Army must develop an operational intelligence perspective and express it in current doctrine, particularly intelligence doctrine, if we are to support the operational commander.

The hypothesis of this paper is that operational decisionmaking requires intelligence that is significantly and substantively different from either tactical or strategic intelligence. The characteristics of intelligence and the intelligence function itself at the operational level of war are different from those at the tactical and strategic levels. While many current military intelligence concepts, such as the intelligence cycle, may remain valid at all levels of war, other concepts and doctrinal issues clearly need adjustment if the operational commander is to have the intelligence he requires.

The methodology used in this study will be to examine present doctrine in search of a definition of operational intelligence. In some cases, extended quotes will be used to allow doctrinal documents to speak for themselves. The author will use historical examples to determine some of the probable characteristics of operational intelligence and outline some of the more critical and immediate requirements for doctrine, organization, and procedures.
to support the operational commander. That discussion will include an analysis of the dilemma facing modern staff officers and commanders who must make recommendations or decisions with little reliable intelligence and either a plethora or a paucity of information which is highly subject to interpretation, especially at the operational level. The paper will conclude by offering some suggestions for further study.

This study will contribute to a better understanding of the peculiar characteristics of operational intelligence and thereby demonstrate how the operational intelligence perspective must differ from the tactical and strategic intelligence perspectives. The study will identify some shortcomings which need to be considered and overcome as operational intelligence doctrine is developed. The study will suggest several principles and characteristics of operational intelligence for consideration by doctrine developers and writers.

II. CURRENT U.S. ARMY OPERATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE DOCTRINE

The foundation for operational intelligence doctrine is clearly laid in FM 100-5, Operations. Hints at what the intelligence function should be are also found in the following extended excerpt from that manual.

Units with operational responsibilities perform intelligence operations and analyses for the campaign, its major operations, as well as its battles. These actions take a larger view of the theater and of the enemy..., to include air and naval formations. They cover the entire theater of operations, its airspace as well as contiguous waters.

As in tactical level analysis, numbers, types, mobility, morale, and equipment of enemy forces are considered. Additionally, operational level commanders
take into account the enemy’s doctrine and patterns of large unit operations, the personalities and idiosyncrasies of his senior commanders. Campaign planners also review the influences of alliances... the differences in quality and capabilities of troops of different nationalities... and the enemy’s dependence on external support and particular facilities. Most important, because of the scope and duration of campaigns and major operations, and the consequently broad range of enemy options, operational intelligence must attempt to probe the mind of the enemy commander. It must see the theater through his eyes, visualize which courses of action are open to him, and estimate which he is most likely to adopt.

Operational considerations of terrain also differ. Most theaters of operations are separated from others by considerable distances or major physical features such as mountain ranges, large rivers, or even oceans. Terrain within a theater possesses an inherent geological structure which aids operational analysis. River valleys or basins, plateaus, river deltas, peninsulas, mountain or highland regions, plains, and islands all have operational significance.

Large unit commanders and their staffs must be able to visualize the theater of operations in the rough terms of localities. The intelligence estimate must set those localities in their proper relationship to permit the commander to direct operations far beyond his field of view and to plan well into the future.

In preparing the campaign intelligence estimate, staff officers make use of the reconnaissance and surveillance assets of all services, allies, and national agencies. They also use all available human sources from agents to guerrillas and long-range reconnaissance units and the meteorological and geographical references on the area.

The areas emphasized above clearly demonstrate that the thrust of operational intelligence is unique. The idea of an operational perspective is amplified in FC 100-16-1, Theater Army, Army Group, and Field Army Operations, which states:

The theater campaign plan is primarily strategic in perspective and covers long-range mission planning. It translates national and alliance strategies into a theater military strategy designed to progressively destroy the enemy’s war-making capacity and his will to make war....The theater army, as the Service component command must divide its planning efforts between the strategic and operational levels...Both the army group
and the field army echelons focus their planning efforts at the operational level. They are sufficiently removed from the mainstream of strategic and tactical planning responsibilities so that their energies may be directed to long-range operational planning. The corps have major operational and tactical responsibilities. They are responsive to the long-range operational requirements either imposed by senior headquarters or which they determine based upon mission analysis, and to the tactical planning requirements for subordinate forces that are designed to have immediate effect on the enemy. Army echelons below corps are primarily concerned with tactical planning.²

This same document notes that the army group general staff is "generally stronger in the G2 and G3 (as compared with the G1 and G4 divisions). Its heaviest orientation is toward planning."³ Some of the components of the intelligence function at the operational level also are described; e.g. "provide the commander near real-time information and intelligence on enemy capabilities that can affect the land campaign and the conduct of the AirLand Battle." Emphasis is placed on collecting information and intelligence beyond the corps area of operations. The Air Force surveillance and reconnaissance effort forms part of the overall intelligence gathering process. The products of these efforts have broad operational and tactical applications and assist the field army in long-range planning as well as near-term battle management.⁴ This field circular also describes the function of the echelons above corps (EAC) intelligence support that will be assigned to operational level headquarters.

FC 34-1, the Army's keystone intelligence manual, on the other hand, fails to own up to a discrete operational intelligence function with characteristics and perspectives different from those of tactical and strategic intelligence.
Recent changes to the coordinating draft state that the planning and conduct of campaigns is supported by "the integration of tactical and strategic intelligence." The manual goes on to state the following:

"The production of intelligence in support of campaigns seldom results from collection specifically aimed at producing operational intelligence. It is the fusion of tactical and strategic intelligence (emphasis mine) as well as integration of intelligence produced by other components of joint or combined forces which provides the detail in sufficient depth of the battlefield to plan and execute operational campaigns."

Thus, it is obvious that, according to the most recent intelligence doctrine, the operational commander is expected to "make do" with tactical and/or strategic intelligence or a fusion of the two--none of which is geared to his specific and usually critical needs.

Both history and the modern context of war clearly show that the ends for which the strategic commander and tactical commanders collect intelligence often are vastly different from the ends sought by the operational commander. The ways and means of tactical intelligence collection are of relatively little use to the operational commander who must look far beyond the bounds of the tactical battlefield. Strategic collection means are scarce and jealously guarded. They may not be available or responsive to the operational commander who finds himself at some distance from the focus of national attention, but whose intelligence needs are critical nevertheless. Moreover, the same intelligence can lead the strategic commander to one conclusion at his level, the operational commander to another at his, and the tactical
commander to yet another. It seems reasonable, therefore, that
the doctrinal proposition that all the operational commander needs
is a "fusion of strategic and tactical intelligence" is probably
wrong and should be reconsidered.

Our doctrine, as found in FM 100-5, describes the unique
nature of the operational level of war. Doctrinally, operational
commanders and staffs find themselves in an environment where they
must plan future operations before the outcome of present ones are
known. "Hard" intelligence about the future strength of the enemy
currently engaged cannot be discerned. Other enemy forces may not
have arrived on the battlefield. Yet, current doctrine expects
the operational intelligence officer to learn the enemy's intent
when circumstances may dictate that the enemy may not even know it
himself. The environment at the operational level is further
characterized by low degrees of confidence in the large amounts of
unprocessed battlefield information and the subjective treatment
of that information by its recipients.

Because the operational commander is primarily concerned with
future rather than present military events, he has less reliable
intelligence upon which to base his estimates, planning guidance
and decisions. He and his intelligence officer work primarily in
the realm of assumption and prediction rather than knowledge and
ground truth. In this unique realm, and particularly with regard
to the intelligence he receives, the operational commander is
especially susceptible to preconceptions, prepossessions,
predilections, experience wrongly interpreted, deception, and
self-deception. Paradoxically, it is also in this setting that
doctrine demands that the operational commander be provided with the clearest intelligence picture possible so he can devise the well developed plans required to move large units around the battlefield to place them at the decisive point at the decisive moment. That commander, therefore, must be provided with intelligence doctrine, structure, organization, procedures, and equipment particularly suited to optimize his use of bona fide intelligence and decrease his susceptibility to the large amounts of subjective information with which he must necessarily deal. It should be obvious, then, that the current intelligence doctrine (as written in the draft FC 34-1) which calls for a simple fusion of strategic and tactical intelligence at the operational level is not automatically sufficient. Indeed, it reflects a serious void in our thinking.

III. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF OPERATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE

Any number of historical case studies demonstrate the value of having an adequate operational intelligence perspective. Others reveal the disastrous results that can come from failure to do so. The following are some of the more notable examples.

NORMANDY

Certainly, the Allied invasion of Europe over the beaches of Normandy in WW II provides singular examples of operational intelligence properly used. The German intelligence perspective, on the other hand, revealed a number of shortcomings which ought
to concern modern commanders, military intelligence planners, operators, and doctrine writers.

Concerns for the weather, moonlight, and tides were crucial elements of the Allied invasion plan. Allied intelligence, using a variety of sources, to include ULTRA, had identified and located the German ground and air forces capable of reacting to the Normandy operation. The Allies also had learned that the Germans were of different opinions over where the invasion would come. The Germans had retained large forces facing the Pas de Calais beaches and were further concerned about the possibilities of an Allied invasion in Norway. All of these indicators suggested that the Allied deception plan for the Normandy landing was working. The Allies also knew that the enemy operational commanders would be Generals von Runstedt, Rommel, and Blaskowitz and knew something of their fighting styles.

German intelligence was not doing so well. The Germans were convinced that the invasion would come at Pas de Calais. They were not to be dissuaded. Von Rundstedt remarked after the war, "I thought the invasion would come across the narrower part of the Channel.... The Somme-Calais area seemed to us so much better, strategically from your point of view--because it was so much closer to the Rhine...." B. H. Liddell-Hart notes: "His ([Von Rundstedt's]) reasoning suggested that his calculation was governed by a preconceived view, based on the assumption that the Allies would take what was theoretically the best line, regardless of the practical difficulties. I remarked to him that, for the same reasons, it was likely to be the most strongly defended
sector—surely a good reason why the Allies were likely to avoid it."¹⁰

While Allied deception was extensive and German agents had been turned by Allied counterintelligence, the fact remains that the Germans, according to Townsend, relied on indications and translated them into Allied intentions to invade at Pas de Calais rather than go for hard intelligence on location and strength which would have told them Normandy was the only possible invasion.¹¹ Townsend also notes that the "intelligence system and philosophy of the Germans made the allied counterintelligence job easier than it would have been had they ignored indications and looked for essentials in the only place they can be found; occupying space as real things, and not located in someone's imagination."¹² The Germans believed they could predict Allied intentions. They were fooled. The German lack of an adequate operational intelligence perspective allowed the Allied invasion to succeed and led ultimately to Hitler's defeat.

KHARKOV

The third Battle of Kharkov, while not as well known or studied as the Normandy invasion, provides additional interesting insights into the successful and unsuccessful uses of operational intelligence. The battle was part of a larger campaign between German and Soviet forces on the Eastern Front during the months of February and March 1943. The Soviets had defeated the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad and were advancing toward the Don River in early 1943. They had managed to open a 200 mile gap in the German line from Voroshilovgrad to Belgorod and were pushing
toward the industrial city of Kharkov with the intention of advancing beyond that city, turning south, and trapping von Manstein’s army group between the Don and Dnieper rivers and the Black Sea. Hitler was determined to hold onto this territory, known as the Donetz basin, but von Manstein, outnumbered by a ratio of eight to one, looked at the map, and, with the benefit of experience and familiarity with past Soviet behavior, concluded correctly that the Soviets had the capability to trap and destroy his force. He also saw an opportunity to lure his enemy into taking extreme risks whereby von Manstein could, with inferior numbers, conduct a counterstroke and inflict a decisive defeat on the Soviet force. On 6 February, von Manstein flew to the Wolfschanze to confer with Hitler. After a four hour discussion, he convinced Hitler that it would be necessary to give up territory east of the the Mius River. With little apparent intelligence on precise enemy plans or intentions, he began to plan and to move his forces into position to take advantage of what was to become a Soviet lunge toward a decisive defeat.

The Soviets, heady with recent successes and aware of their superiority in numbers, began to convince themselves that the Germans had only one alternative to certain destruction—withdrawl to the west of the Dnieper River. Stalin had that idea firmly in his mind. General Vatutin, Commander of the South-West Front and Colonel-General Golikov, Commander of the Voronezh Front, reinforced this idea with similar estimates of their own. Soviet reconnaissance, picking up rearward movement of German units, tended to "confirm" the withdrawl of von Manstein’s forces behind
the Dnieper. This mistaken preconception was reinforced when General Paul Hauser, disobeying orders from Hitler, pulled his SS Panzer Corps out of beleaguered Kharkov, giving the city up to overwhelming Soviet forces. Sensing the inevitability of a sure success, the Soviets quickly planned to press an attack by the South-West and Voronezh Fronts, the principal feature of which involved a penetration by an operational group commanded by General Popov and the 6th Soviet Army.

On 12 February, German monitoring platoons produced their first decoded Soviet message traffic. They had intercepted radio traffic between Popov’s and Vatutin’s headquarters and those of their regimental commanders. This intelligence allowed von Manstein to follow Soviet movements and, indeed, to learn Soviet intentions. Von Manstein was aware that the spring thaw was rapidly approaching. Keeping an eye on his map and the enemy situation, he waited until the Soviet 6th Army and Armored Group Popov were fully committed before launching his counterstroke on 19 February. Using the mobility of his Panzer corps and other units, he was able to envelop the Soviet forces, cut their lines of communication, and destroy them piecemeal as they ran out of food and fuel. Ironically, the Soviets continued to be self-deceived by their interpretation of German battlefield movements. As late as 21 February, the Soviet 6th Army continued to receive such messages as, "Movements of enemy forces discovered by aerial reconnaissance between Stalino and Prokovskoye confirm our view that the enemy is continuing his withdrawal towards Zaporozhye."
The Germans destroyed the Soviet 6th Army and Armored Group Popov and opened a 120 kilometer gap in the Soviet line. Von Manstein’s forces continued their offensive, rolling over every force the Soviets placed in their way. They continued until they recaptured the city of Kharkov and were forced to halt, not by Soviet forces, but by the spring thaw and the accompanying mud. The Germans destroyed three Soviet armies and parts of a fourth as well as Armored Group Popov. "Fifty-two divisions and brigades, including twenty-five armored brigades had vanished from the situation map in Soviet headquarters."\(^1\)

Why was von Manstein so successful and why did the Soviets fail so miserably? Part of the answer can be found in their operational intelligence perspectives. Von Manstein\(^1\) used his knowledge of likely Soviet behavior to develop his estimate of Soviet capabilities and their likely courses of action. Nevertheless, he retained flexibility and used intelligence to locate and follow Soviet forces with the purpose of timing his counterstroke. The Soviets, on the other hand, became overly wedded to a preconceived notion about what German "intentions" had to be. Soviet intelligence analysis apparently did not consider the full gamut of German capabilities and it allowed subjective elements to drive the "analysis" such that it "confirmed" the preconceived ideas of Soviet leaders from Stalin down. Moreover, Soviet intelligence appears to have been overreliant on "Werther" and the "Lucy" Ring, a single, but usually excellent, source located within the German High Command. "Werther" and the "Lucy" Ring had no access to the planning or the intentions of the
Germans, as all the discussion and planning for this operation occurred in von Manstein's headquarters rather than Hitler's. The Ring was, therefore, reporting some negative perceptions at Hitler's headquarters rather than von Manstein's actual plans and intentions which were further misinterpreted, not only by the Ring, but by the Soviet leadership as well. In this case, the intelligence was generally good. The subjective perceptions of the intelligence were fatally flawed.

**KURSK**

The situation was quite different just one month later as Hitler began preparations for Operation Citadel, the German offensive against Soviet forces in the Kursk salient. The "Lucy" Ring alerted Moscow almost as soon as the operation was conceived. Soviet Marshals Zhukov and Vasilevsky at STAVKA and the Soviet Front commanders, Vatutin, Rokossovsky, Malinovsky, and Popov, perhaps having learned their lesson from the Battle of Kharkov, were very careful to combine information from "Lucy" with intensive reconnaissance of the German front line and intelligence from other sources to determine the extent of German capabilities. Both Rokossovsky and Vatutin had concluded that the Germans were planning an offensive against the Kursk salient and both had sent their assessments to STAVKA by 12 April 1943. On that date, Zhukov and Stalin agreed that the main effort for the Soviet summer campaign would be concentrated in the Kursk area. Planning began for a Soviet defensive to destroy German forces before launching a counteroffensive to the west.
Hitler issued the operations order for Operation Citadel on 15 April. Details of the German plan became available to Soviet planners in May. Soviet efforts to build formidable defenses in depth proceeded apace. Central and Voronezh Fronts comprised a total force of ten infantry armies, two tank armies, and two air armies in the first line, with three tank corps, a cavalry corps, and a rifle corps in reserve. Behind, in a second defensive line, was the Steppe Front with four infantry armies, one tank army, and one air army with three cavalry, two tank and one mechanized corps in Front reserve. Huge amounts of artillery--some 19,300 guns and 920 Katyusha rocket mortars--were deployed forward to support the defense of the salient. The defensive system of the Central and Voronezh Fronts alone extended 110 miles from front to rear in six belts.18

The Soviets, probably because of "Lucy," believed the German offensive would begin in May and were well prepared by the end of that month. When Hitler changed the date to June, then to July, the Soviets used the time further to improve their defenses and to train their troops.

At Kursk, it was the Germans who deluded themselves into selecting the wrong course of action. They had no equivalent of "Lucy" in the Soviet headquarters, and therefore had little if any idea about Soviet plans. Von Manstein was sure that the Soviets would launch an offensive through the Kursk salient in an attempt to cut off and destroy his Army Group South. He and others initially interpreted reports of the massive Soviet buildup as a preparation for that offensive. He believed the Soviet plan could
be disrupted by a series of German attacks in May, immediately after the ground had hardened following the Rasputitsa or spring thaw. It was not until late June and into July, that von Manstein realized the extent of Soviet defensive preparations. At that point, von Manstein was unable to convince Hitler, von Kluge, and others that the plan for the German offensive ought to be abandoned. Hitler and the others continued to believe (or wanted to believe) that the Soviet buildup was in preparation for an offensive rather than extensive preparations for defense in depth. Jeffrey Jukes describes the situation thus:

The imaginative genius that had characterized German operations of 1939-41 had vanished, and the mechanical nature of Hitler’s planning was fully visible. Only the belief that such a large force as theirs could not fail sustained them; and many of them no longer believed even that. For they knew that the Red Army of 1943 was not that of 1941, and many of them had watched with apprehensive sickness as the Soviet build-up in the salient grew larger and larger. They had tried to ward off the sickly feeling that the Russians knew what was coming, by arguing, as had Kluge and Manstein, that the Soviet concentration of force was there to launch an offensive, which could be disrupted only by going ahead with Citadel—an argument which could be dispelled by one look at the air photographs, for surely no army assembling for an imminent attack would spend three months digging itself into defensive positions over a hundred miles in depth. But to admit this was to admit that the gamble had failed, in that surprise had been lost. So most of them kept their silence.¹⁹

The fact is that the Germans were almost totally ignorant of the massive Soviet defensive preparations for the defense of the Kursk salient until very late. Both Kluge and von Manstein believed that a German offensive could succeed, but that belief was based not on intelligence, but on their experience. The German attempted to double envelop the Soviet forces in the Kursk
salient ended in disaster.

This successful intelligence perspective on the part of the Soviets and the concomitant failure by the Germans led to the catastrophic loss of two German army groups which, in turn, allowed the Soviets to begin their relentless drive to ultimate victory.

**BURMA**

Field Marshal Sir William Slim's operations in the Burma theater are particularly instructive. Slim had to worry about the war on land, sea, and in the air. Slim's 1943-44 defeat of the Japanese in Burma depended on a thorough understanding of Burma's terrain (geography) and contiguous waters. To develop an appreciation for the terrain of his theater, Slim personally drew sketches of principal terrain features—in essence reproducing a topographic map from memory. He was forced to plan and time his major operations around the weather—the monsoons which prohibited movement and operations for both Allied forces and the Japanese for months at a time.

Slim's estimative process contained some interesting features. He would begin by conferring with his Brigadier General Staff, Major-General Administration, and his Air Force counterpart to come up with two or three courses of action based on their appreciation of the situation. These would be given to the staff for study and comment. The staff could propose other courses of action as well.
He explains further that:

The results of the planners' examination of the proposals were put up to me as a short paper, largely in tabular form, and from it I decided on the main features of the plan to be followed. At this stage I usually discussed with the intelligence officer whom I had selected to represent the Japanese command at my headquarters—a key appointment—what the enemy's reactions to this plan were likely to be. I was, of course, kept daily in the picture of the Japanese actions, intentions, and dispositions, as far as we knew or could surmise them, but I intentionally waited until I had selected my plan before considering the enemy response to it, as I intended him to conform to me, not me to him. A consideration of these possible Japanese moves never, I think, caused a major alteration in a plan, but they did affect such things as the location and expected tasks of reserves.

Slim, writing particularly of intelligence, outlined his concerns as an operational level commander:

I had throughout been conscious that, improving as our intelligence was since 1942, it was far from being as complete or as accurate as that in other theaters. We never made up for the lack of methodically collected intelligence or the intelligence organization which should have been available to us when the war began. We knew something of the Japanese intentions, but little of the dispositions of their reserves, and practically nothing about one of the most important factors that a general has to consider—the character of the opposing commander. I had all the information I could obtain about Lieut. General Kawabe, my opposite number, who as Commander-in-Chief, Burma Army Area, controlled all Japanese land and air forces in Burma, but it did not amount to much on which to build up a picture of how his mind would work (emphasis mine). At this time, from what I had seen of his operations, I could only expect him to be, like most Japanese commanders I had met, a bold tactical planner of offensive movements, completely confident in the superiority of his troops, and prepared to use his last reserves rather than abandon a plan.

Slim commented on the need for the operational commander to think ahead:

It often happens that, when the first phase of a
hard fought campaign has been successfully completed and
the second is in full swing, the commander will be as
much occupied in preparations for the next stage as with
the actual fighting in progress. This was so with me
during the pursuit to and over the Chindwin. My mind
and my time were largely filled with plans and
preparations for the great battles that must follow the
establishment of our bridgeheads over that river. Nor
was I the only one so employed... an orgy of planning
broke out at all levels.**

Slim, by his own admission, fell into the trap that many of
his contemporaries on all sides and in all theaters had
experienced. He tried to predict enemy intentions. He was
seldom, if ever, successful. After crossing the Chindwin River,
Slim pursued the Japanese south. He divined that the Japanese
intended to defend north of the great bend of the Irrawaddy and
planned to attack them there. His forces were deployed and the
attack nearly begun when he discovered, to his great surprise,
that the Japanese were disposed not north of the Irrawaddy, but
south. He was headed for a disastrous defeat! It was only
because he was such a dynamic leader blessed with a superb staff
and subordinate commanders that he was able to reconfigure his
force, moving an entire corps from his left wing all the way
around to the right over incredibly rough terrain. He managed to
surprise and defeat the much larger Japanese force. What did Slim
do next? As he states, "The first thing to do was to discover, or
at least re-estimate, what was now the Japanese intention"!!! He
writes further that Lieut. General Kawabe had been removed. "I
knew that Kimura had replaced him, but, partly through wishful
thinking and partly through lack of information about the new man,
I had concluded he would have much the same characteristics and
faults as his predecessor. In this I was wrong."³

Slim was successful because he had trained his force and possessed superb subordinate commanders and staff. He had a very good operational intelligence perspective with the singular fault that he continued to try to predict enemy intentions even after repeated failures to do so had caused him untold grief. Slim never appeared to recognize this as a shortcoming.

THE ARDENNES

Any number of operational intelligence successes and failures are evident in studies of the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes in December, 1944. German efforts against the Allies were frustrated by Hitler himself. Charles V.P. von Luttichau in Command Decisions writes of Hitler's decision to proceed with the Ardennes offensive, despite good intelligence and the recommendations of his subordinate commanders to scrap or modify the operation. Luttichau states, "If the events to be recounted seem to defy military logic, it was, in part because the founder of a Reich that was to last a thousand years was a fanatic whose intuition had long since triumphed over sound reasoning."³

The failure on the Allied side to detect German offensive preparations can be attributed to poor analysis and fixation on preconceived enemy intentions over capabilities, rather than lack of information. Certainly, Allied attitudes toward the intelligence and information which was available were as important as the intelligence and information itself. Eisenhower states he and Bradley understood the risk appearing in the Ardennes and
chose to proceed with their ongoing offensive rather than stopping to defend in the Ardennes. Russell Weigley suggests Bradley's own cautious nature caused him to mirror image and impute caution to the Germans. Patton, operating to the south of the Ardennes, accepted the intelligence, recognized the threat even though it was outside his area of operations, and directed his staff to begin planning for an attack north. The First Army G2, Col Dickson, can be faulted because he accepted a flawed 12th Army Group intelligence estimate. Generals Hodges and Middleton certainly were blithe with respect to any intelligence they received, and apparently were not overly concerned with collecting any. Bradley and others thought that von Rundstedt was in command of German forces because he was the senior German general. They failed to recognize that Hitler was in command of the Ardennes campaign (in contrast to Kharkov where the Soviets thought he was when he really wasn't). This may have affected the way the Allies interpreted the German buildup and subsequent offensive.

Charles MacDonald, writing about ULTRA, reveals one of the flaws in Allied thinking. He states:

What ULTRA had failed to do was to be specific, to say exactly why Hitler was shifting fighter aircraft westward and building a large reserve with panzer and SS panzer divisions as its core. Allied commanders had come to expect ULTRA to be specific, to tell them not only what but when and where. When neither ULTRA nor their other intelligence sources told them those things, they failed to penetrate Hitler's masterful deception scheme to parade the assembly of Sixth Panzer Army in the north while preparing secretly to attack in the Ardennes.

He goes on to say, "Allied intelligence officers had committed the most grievous sin of which a G2 is capable. They
had looked in the mirror for the enemy and seen there only the reflection of their own intentions." As a result they were surprised by the German counteroffensive. The German counteroffensive ultimately failed in spite of the successful deception and the Allied failure to recognize the effort before it was launched. The point is that nearly every Allied G2 and commander apparently reacted or responded to the same information in different ways. The failure was one of a collective lack of intellectual operational intelligence perspective.

VIETNAM

More recently, the U.S. experience in Vietnam reveals some lessons about operational intelligence. General Bruce Palmer cited a number of examples of faulty intelligence perspective. Concerning collection and analysis, he noted that the Army had no intelligence capability focusing on the ground war. In the early 1950's, the Army had developed a good order of battle on enemy forces in Southeast Asia. In the late 1950's, however, anticipating the loss of some analytical capabilities with the formation of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Army had shifted that responsibility to U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC) in Hawaii. DIA, with an Air Force officer in charge, showed little interest in the ground war. USARPAC, believing that MACV (organized in 1962) was collecting and analyzing enemy ground order of battle, ceased its work. It was not until 1965 when an experienced Army officer was assigned as J-2 MACV, that work on ground order of battle was resumed in earnest--this after a hiatus
of six years.³⁰

All this, however, was simply a manifestation of a much larger problem. Since the major commanders in the field were never sure exactly what kind of war they were fighting and since a war had never been declared, there was little, if any, central direction given to the intelligence effort. Palmer notes that there was no unity of effort in intelligence collection, analysis, or dissemination. Intelligence was fragmented among a number of agencies with no head to coordinate it. CIA, DIA, the individual service security agencies, J-2 MACV, all had their own efforts and their own agendas. The theater commander lacked the authority to bring it all together. This fractured U.S. effort was mirrored in the South Vietnamese intelligence organizations as each U.S. agency trained and worked with its host nation counterpart. The result was frequent disagreement on the most fundamental issues. For example, prior to the Tet Offensive in 1968, the various agencies could not agree on the numbers of main forces, guerrillas, and part-time guerrillas (a difficult task in any event). The problem was ostensibly solved when the various parties met at CINCPAC headquarters where the appropriate compromises were made and enemy strength figures agreed upon.³¹ Apparently no one recognized that deriving enemy strengths by conference, compromise, and consensus, rather than by coordinated collection and confirmation, revealed a fundamental shortcoming needing rapid and forceful correction. Other problems centered around the requirement that information derived from signals intelligence (SIGINT) had to be corroborated by "hard"
intelligence, e.g. a prisoner of war report or captured document, which often took months to obtain.

Much of the U.S. problem in using intelligence effectively in Vietnam was the result of conscious and unconscious enemy efforts to obscure their activity. General William E. DePuy observed that "the ambiguity of intelligence engineered by our opponents, is a major deterrent to early and effective operational planning—not to mention early action." This statement is particularly applicable to what, in current parlance, is known as Low Intensity Conflict (LIC).

CENTRAL AMERICA

The operational intelligence perspective is just as applicable in LIC as it is in more conventional situations. The problems associated with that perspective in a LIC situation may be more complicated, however. Having an intelligence organization and structure that suits the commander's needs is part of that perspective. Currently, this is manifest at U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), which is responsible for U.S. military efforts in Latin America. SOUTHCOM has neither the intelligence structure nor the organic capability to support its own commander. With a number of crises in Central America, SOUTHCOM has been forced to rely on a number of ad-hoc solutions to its intelligence problem. These include borrowing tactical intelligence units and assets from CONUS to serve temporarily in the SOUTHCOM area and the formation of the Central America Joint Intelligence Team (CAJIT) at the Pentagon. Maintaining tactical intelligence units away
from their home station is extremely costly, but the real issue is not expense. The vital question for the SOUTHCOM commander concerns the availability of borrowed intelligence assets when their parent unit receives a mission requiring its own intelligence resources. The ground, air, and naval intelligence assets belonging to XVIII Airborne Corps, CINCLANT, and the Air Force will likely be taken away from SOUTHCOM should a crisis occur almost anywhere else in the world since both LIC and SOUTHCOM fall relatively low on the list of military priorities. Likewise, the strategic assets dedicated to the present SOUTHCOM problem are temporary and could be removed at any time.

The CAJIT provides a nexus for all source intelligence that is largely unavailable outside Washington D.C. It was established, interestingly enough, to perform largely tactical and operational intelligence functions at the national level! It is interesting to ponder why it is easier to perform tactical and operational intelligence functions at the Pentagon than at the operational theater headquarters. Modern communications allow significant intelligence to be passed quickly between the CAJIT, SOUTHCOM, and other intelligence consumers, but the CAJIT still does not belong to the operational commander. Without adequate assets of his own, the operational commander is forced to borrow or beg tactical or strategic assets to meet his operational intelligence needs.

IV. RECENT EXPERIENCE FROM WARGAMES

A recent School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) Southwest
Asia Exercise conducted at Fort Leavenworth provided first hand acquaintance with other aspects of the operational intelligence perspective. The exercise required the introduction of a Joint Task Force (JTF) consisting of a three division U.S. Army corps, a USMC Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB), and air and naval forces into Iran and its adjacent waters. The initial effort was to eliminate a rebel threat to the existing Iranian government. The U.S. forces were concentrated at the ports of Bushehr, Bandar Abbas, and Chah Bahar. They were pressing inland when Soviet forces suddenly invaded Iran to halt the U.S. advance. Soviet forces from the Transcaucuses Front pushed southeast down the Esfahan and Yazd corridors, forces from the Turkestan entered from northeast Iran, and forces in Afghanistan threatened to enter Iran from the southeast.

As U.S. forces advanced north from Bandar Abbas, they concentrated at the city of Kerman where they took up a defensive posture against the Soviet threat from Turkestan. Forces moving north from Bushehr took up defensive positions in the vicinity of Esfahan/Yazd. Marine forces were to advance north from Chah Bahar to prevent Soviet forces from moving to Kerman. The U.S. JTF main effort was to destroy Soviet forces around Kerman. Soviet forces in southeast Iran coming out of Afghanistan captured the attention of the INDCOM staff and commander, however. This forced the JTF headquarters to dedicate nearly one entire day (nearly three days of exercise play) to thinking about a secondary effort. In the meantime, the rest of the theater was ignored. The cause of the disruption centered on the intelligence staff which was attempting
to predict whether the Soviet force out of Afghanistan would turn south to meet the Marines or proceed northwest to attack the flank of the JTF force defending Kerman. In the final analysis, Soviet action by the forces from Afghanistan would have affected the battle very little, but the time lost placed the remainder of the U.S. force in jeopardy from other Soviet forces coming from other directions.

Among the valuable lessons learned was that tactical crises can dominate the attention of the unwary operational level headquarters and delay more important campaign planning. This easily can lead to defeat of much greater forces if the operational command fails to keep the proper focus. Operational commanders and intelligence officers must guard against being overly concerned with the current battle as there is little they can do directly to influence its outcome.

V. AN OPERATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE PERSPECTIVE

Based on this rather cursory examination, it seems clear that there is an operational intelligence perspective which must obtain if the operational level of war is to succeed. That perspective certainly must be understood by commanders, intelligence officers, and operators at the operational level, and it must be understood as well at the tactical and strategic levels. To obtain that perspective, one must appreciate the somewhat unique characteristics of operational intelligence. Most importantly, that perspective must be developed well before forces become involved in war and before the operational commander arrives in
his assigned theater. What are some of the components of this perspective? The following are just a few general principles that have been suggested in the foregoing discussion.

1. Intelligence Preparation for War

First, there must be a recognition that strategic objectives are achieved by operational successes. Long before the war begins, national leaders and intelligence planners and operators must insure that an intelligence infrastructure exists to support a future operational commander. HUMINT assets must be identified, agents placed, and wartime reporting channels planned and tested. Equipment and force structure to support operational commanders must be procured, tested and fielded. Operational intelligence doctrine should be written and understood, not only by Army leaders, but by all the agencies that will be involved in wartime intelligence support. Interagency agreements need to be worked out and procedures established before war is declared. LIC, for example, is a special case wherein operational level intelligence functions must be performed without a declaration of war. The operational commander must have the assurance that he will be supported by all the necessary intelligence agencies and assets. Slim in Burma, Palmer in Vietnam, and Nutting/Gorman/Galvin in Latin America have told us that this has not occurred to one degree or another and that this lack of perspective has made their jobs infinitely more difficult. Most of these agreements must be formulated at the national level prior to hostilities as the operational commander is not likely to be in place or will lack
the author to accomplish these tasks in peacetime.

2. A Vision: Future Orientation

A second characteristic of operational intelligence is that it deals more with the future, or with an extended view of the present with the present itself. It deals with future enemy actions. It must allow or assist the commander to "see" the battlefield as it might look several days or weeks hence. It is, therefore, much more predictive and anticipatory in nature than tactical intelligence, for example. It is concerned more with planning than with current operations. Whereas tactical intelligence commonly operates in the realm of things that can be seen and count operational intelligence generally deals in the hazier realms of hypothesis and assumption. The operational intelligence officer must assist in planning future operations before the outcome of present operations is known. He must attempt to account for future capabilities not only of forces currently in combat, but of forces that may not even appear on the battlefield for weeks or months. He is dealing with information and intelligence in which his confidence is not very high.

3. Subjective Considerations

Not only must operational intelligence be concerned with relatively objective information and "hard" intelligence, it must also be concerned with the more subjective attitudes about the information. As the historical examples clearly show, information or intelligence may not be nearly as important as the
attitude with which it is received. Intelligence must be believed to be effective. It must compete with preconceived ideas, experience, predilections, and prejudice. Preconceived ideas on the part of intelligence officers and commanders must be overcome. Commanders may wish the battle to go in a certain direction, and if care is not exercised, may tend to "confirm" a commander's predilection. The Soviet commanders at Kharkov, the Germans at Kursk, and the Allies in the Ardennes fell into this trap.

Commanders may feel more comfortable with past experiences with their enemy than they are with current intelligence about him. They may misinterpret that experience in new situations and may ignore valuable intelligence that calls for different decisions. They may ignore qualitative changes in the enemy that make the current situation dramatically different from their previous experience. Von Manstein at the Battle of Kursk and Slim on the Irrawaddy are prime examples of commanders who allowed experience to drive their decisions when good intelligence would have served them better.

Additionally, the operational intelligence officer must be particularly sensitive to the politics of decision-making. This is especially true when working with other services and allies, or even with different echelons of the same service. Intelligence can easily take a back seat to political considerations if the operational commander is not alert. The Vietnam experience provides excellent examples of decisions made on the basis of politics, e.g. having a relatively uninterested Air Force
intelligence officer in charge of ground order of battle when the main effort was a ground contest, or allowing numerous U.S. and indigenous intelligence agencies to carve out and protect turf at the expense of timely, accurate, coordinated intelligence operations in support of the theater commander. Much of the problem may be that we have yet to figure out whether intelligence is an end or a means to an end. Operational intelligence seems much more susceptible to these kinds of subjective sidetracking than either tactical or strategic intelligence. Dealing with the subjective aspects of intelligence is perhaps the most important intelligence function at the the operational level. It also is the least understood.

4. Susceptibility to Deception

Commanders and intelligence officers who harbor preconceived ideas, predilections, and experience are particularly susceptible to enemy deception efforts. Deception has a far greater effect on the outcome of war at the operational level than at the tactical level where it can be overcome, or at the strategic level where it is much more difficult for the enemy successfully to achieve. Operational intelligence must deal with sophisticated, well-planned, long-term deception campaigns. The operational intelligence perspective must include the thought processes, mechanisms, and procedures to recognize and cut through enemy deception. This includes prevention of self-deception as outlined in the previous paragraph. Von Rundstedt and Hitler were their own worst enemies prior to and immediately following the Normandy
invasion because they deceived themselves as much as they were poorly served by their intelligence apparatus.

5. Commander's Relationship with and Expectations of his Intelligence Officer

Another characteristic of the operational of intelligence is that the relationship of the intelligence officer and the commander must be particularly close and non-threatening. The G-2 or the J-2 should be the commander's intelligence officer at least as much as he is the command's intelligence officer. The commander and his G-2 must recognize the limitations of what the intelligence officer can and should do. They should also have very well in mind what the intelligence officer cannot and should not do.

Both need to understand that the intelligence officer must do everything he can to look into the future and assist the commander in developing his estimate of the situation and plan future operations and campaigns. However, the intelligence officer rarely, if ever, can predict enemy intentions with any degree of surety. Prediction of enemy intentions connotes a degree of precision generally beyond the reach of most intelligence staffs. If history teaches anything, it is that prediction of enemy intentions is risky business. Taking risk is the purview of the commander, not the intelligence officer. The intelligence officer might make some assumptions about enemy intentions but he should not impose risk on the commander by actually predicting enemy intentions unless he really knows what they are.
The Soviets were fortunate to have the "Lucy" Ring. Most operational commanders will not have a similar luxury. The Normandy invasion was a disaster for the Germans because they tried to divine enemy intentions. The Ardennes was a potential failure because the Allies relied on what they thought were enemy intentions. Slim courted disaster time after time by attempting to project enemy intentions. The Soviets at Kharkov were convinced von Manstein's intent was to withdraw. Faulty prediction of enemy intentions probably has led to more major military failures than any other intelligence shortfall. It ought to be stopped. The idea that the intelligence officer can or should predict enemy intentions should be eliminated from our doctrine. Both the commander and the intelligence officer must understand that the intelligence officer, after all is directed, collected, processed, and disseminated, if asked to predict enemy intentions, will be guessing unless he has a highly reliable agent inside the enemy headquarters. The intelligence officer should never be put in the position of having to guess. No one should operate under any illusion that the intelligence officer's guess is any better than anyone else's. It is the commander's job to guess and take the calculated risk, if that is required.3 The intelligence officer will be much more valuable if he is engaged in assisting the G-3 and the commander to create future opportunities by identifying enemy centers of gravity and predicting decisive points in future battles.

6. Focus on the Enemy Commander
It is important for the operational intelligence effort to focus on the enemy commander. At the tactical level, it would be impractical and probably meaningless to know the enemy commander. He probably has yet to develop a fighting style of his own, or at least one that would be recognizable to the intelligence collector or analyst. At the operational level, on the other hand, understanding the opposing commander can provide clues to the course of future battle. In most cases, the enemy commander will have developed a fighting style. He will have demonstrated what he demands of his troops and how well they will perform for him. Patton, von Manstein, Zhukov, Vatutin, Kawabe, Giap, Guderian, Bradley, Slim, Montgomery, and a host of others were recognized for their particular manner of conducting campaigns.

Understanding the enemy commander and how his mind works lends a certain amount of predictability to the battlefield. It will help the friendly commander develop his plan, perhaps tell him how to best use deception. This focus on the enemy commander is stated in some of our doctrinal literature, but needs emphasis, in fact. We should not only be compiling detailed files on the Soviet operational level commanders we may face, but we should also be getting acquainted with guerrilla leaders in Latin America, terrorist leaders, potential allies, and foes in Third World countries as well. My experience is that U.S. leaders in Vietnam and in SOUTHCOM today are not studying their opponents. Neither are their intelligence officers.

7. The Search for Quality as well as Quantity
Operational level intelligence must be oriented to pick up on qualitative differences in the enemy force as well as quantitative differences. The Germans generally failed to recognize that the Soviet army of 1943-44 was vastly improved over the one they fought in 1942-43. The army Slim used to defeat the Japanese was not the same army that was pushed out of Burma earlier. The North Vietnamese army that defeated South Vietnam in the early 1970's was qualitatively different from the one the U.S. fought in the 1960's. These qualitative differences generally do not fall under the purview of tactical intelligence because they require time to develop and to detect. While knowledge of these changes is important at the strategic level, it is key to the operational commander's fight and must be considered in his campaign planning. The role of the enemy commander in forging qualitative changes is a crucial one and should be an element of concern for the operational intelligence officer.

8. Intelligence at Different Levels: Who Drives the Train?

A further characteristic of operational intelligence is that it must tie in with strategic and tactical intelligence without becoming overly influenced by either. Prior to the Battle of Kharkov, Hitler was concerned with Soviet efforts to recover the Donets Basin. That strategic outlook prompted his instructions to von Manstein to retain the area. Von Manstein, on the other hand, recognized that he could not hold with the forces he had available. He also realized, however, that by giving up terrain, he could lead the Soviet armies into a trap, destroy them, and
recover the Donets Basin with his counterstroke. In this case, Hitler's strategic point of view, based on his intelligence, conflicted with von Manstein's operational requirements. Von Manstein, by doing a great deal of homework and using a great deal of personal tact and diplomacy was able to convince Hitler that, in this case, the operational perspective was the one that would best achieve the strategic end.

At the lower end of the operational art, the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) Southwest Asia wargame demonstrated how tactical intelligence robs the operational level of its initiative. The operational commander can only react to tactical intelligence. Tactical intelligence tends to suck the operational commander into the vortex of tactics where generally he does not belong. It robs him of the initiative. Tactical intelligence passed to the operational level can distract the command and, in fact, can paralyze operational planning and operations.

9. Weather

The operational intelligence perspective must include a different appreciation for weather than that found at either the strategic or the tactical levels. Campaign planning hinges on weather. Weather considerations are important at all levels, but at the operational level they may determine whether the campaign will succeed or fail. The Normandy campaign depended on tides, winds, moonlight, and weather all being ideal at the time of the operation. For the Germans in the Ardennes, the timing was
determined by the probability of cloud cover to prevent Allied air operations. For Slim, the monsoon prohibited friendly and enemy operations for months at a time. He had to plan his campaigns so they could be completed during the dry season. Germans and Soviets on the Eastern Front were greatly inhibited by winter and totally stopped by mud during the spring thaws. Both sides planned operations to take advantage of enemy hardships caused by the weather. Weather can be equated to, indeed, may be more reliable than, additional friendly combat forces for the operational commander who uses it wisely. How many aircraft or air defense units would have been required to provide the same protection as the cloud cover used by the Germans in the Ardennes? How many armies would have been required to halt von Manstein’s Kharkov counterstroke as effectively as the mud he encountered? Slim realized that if he could complete his drive for Rangoon before the onset of the monsoon, the Japanese would not be able to drive him back and that victory would be assured. In his case, the monsoon was more valuable and effective than the combat power of several divisions.

10. Terrain or Geography?

For the operational intelligence officer, "geography" is probably a better term than "terrain." Mountain ranges, rivers, and coasts can be translated into combat power equivalents by the astute planner. The Germans used the Ardennes for that purpose. SAMS students took advantage of the Zagros mountains of Iran to conduct economy of force operations and exploited the Esfahan and
Yazd corridors to canalize Soviet forces advancing from the Transcaucuses. Slim employed the rivers of Burma as main supply routes for his army. He used the mountains of the Arakan Yoma and the Irrawady River to protect his flanks during the offensive to take Rangoon. Tactical intelligence rarely deals with terrain on such a grand scale, whereas operational intelligence must do so as a matter of course. At the operational level the scope of terrain considerations demands that the intelligence officer look beyond terrain and into geography.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

There is an operational intelligence perspective that is separate and distinct from that found at the tactical and strategic levels. Operational intelligence is sufficiently different from tactical and strategic intelligence in scope, content, and concept, that it deserves further study. While such concepts as the intelligence cycle and intelligence preparation of the battlefield may remain generally valid at all levels, there are certain operational considerations that must be applied if the commander practicing the operational art is to be supported to the fullest. That we have not succeeded in obtaining that perspective can be seen in our performance in Vietnam, our need to form a CAJIT in the Pentagon for CINCSO, and our lack of intelligence preparation for the recent Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada.

It seems clear that much more thought and effort must be devoted to the operational intelligence perspective and its doctrinal implications. For example, our doctrine insists that
intelligence can and should predict enemy intentions when history demonstrates emphatically that it cannot and should not do that—particularly at the operational level.

Much is being done to improve our ability to handle the objective facets of intelligence, i.e. collection, analysis, dissemination, and direction. Little is being done, however, to examine how to handle the subjective facets. How can the J-2 overcome a preconception in the mind of his commander when it flies in the face of good intelligence? How can he keep intelligence from "confirming" a prepossessed notion? How can he keep from being deceived? How can he be kept from deceiving himself?

Much work needs to be done to acquaint commanders and intelligence officers at all levels of all services and in all intelligence agencies with the doctrinal requirements that must be in place to obviate a recurrence of a six year hiatus in collection and analysis of ground OB as occurred in Vietnam. Interagency and interservice agreements must be in place so we will have a unity of intelligence effort when the war—declared or undeclared—starts. This is particularly true in areas where the U.S. might become involved in LIC.

In short, operational intelligence needs to be explored in much more depth than can be accomplished with this short paper and the limited research that went into it. Just as some of the historical figures discussed above had to deal with their preconceptions, predilections, and experience vis-a-vis the intelligence they received, so must we deal with ours vis-a-vis
modern operational intelligence perspectives and doctrine.
**ENDNOTES**


4An attempt to address the operational level intelligence function and tasks to be performed can be found in James V. Dixon, "Intelligence at the Operational Level of War," (unpublished research paper, The National War College, Washington, D.C., February, 1986).

5FC 100-16-1, pp. 5-36 to 5-37.


8Subjective treatment may include skepticism, caution, naivete, mirror imaging, imposition of a preconception, total acceptance, or any one or combination of a number of mental or emotional reactions to the information.


15The sources I used for this example do not reveal the role
of von Manstein's intelligence officer.

16Ibid., pp. 224-227.
17Ibid., p. 83.
18Ibid., pp. 53-54.
19Ibid., p. 83.
21Ibid., p. 221.
22Ibid., p. 373.
23Ibid., p. 390-391.
26Russell F. Weigley, op. cit., p. 463.
27Ibid., pp 459-464.
29Ibid., p. 79.
31Ibid., pp. 78-79.
33School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), Southwest Asia Exercise, 11-20 December, 1985. Exercise players consisted of students and faculty from SAMS, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.
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