A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing Terrorist Groups

Bonnie Cordes, Brian M. Jenkins, Konrad Kellen
With Gall Bass, Daniel Reiles, William Sater,
Mario Juncosa, William Fowler, Geraldine Petty
The Rand Publication Series: The Report is the principal publication documenting and transmitting Rand's major research findings and final research results. The Rand Note reports other outputs of sponsored research for general distribution. Publications of The Rand Corporation do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of the sponsors of Rand research.

Published by The Rand Corporation
A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing Terrorist Groups

Bonnie Cordes, Brian M. Jenkins, Konrad Kellen
With Gail Bass, Daniel Relles, William Sater,
Mario Juncosa, William Fowler, Geraldine Petty

June 1985
This report documents a study undertaken to develop a methodology for analyzing terrorist groups. A conceptual framework for analysis was devised and was then used to test several hypotheses concerning terrorist groups and their actions. The study also resulted in the creation of an extensive database of information on 29 selected terrorist groups.

The methodology described herein and the databases that have been developed to support the study should provide useful insights into the characteristics and behavior of terrorist organizations throughout the world.
SUMMARY

This report describes an analytical framework developed at Rand for studying the characteristics of terrorist groups and illustrates how that framework can be used to address broad questions about terrorists and their actions. This conceptual framework is based on data concerning 150 specific attributes of terrorist groups. These attributes fall into the following categories:

1. Organization
2. Leadership
3. Demography
4. Ideology, doctrine, and goals
5. Psychology, mindset, and decisionmaking
6. Funding and logistics
7. Operations and *modus operandi*
8. Communications
9. External relations
10. Environment and government response

Twenty-nine terrorist groups were studied to identify and categorize their attributes. A questionnaire was filled out for each group. Broad topics, such as the characteristics of terrorist leaders, were addressed through sets of smaller component questions. The responses to the questions were recorded in textual form, and those that could be represented by numerical values were later coded into machine-readable form for analysis. The sources and dates of all information were recorded. During the course of the study, the attributes of particular groups were modified whenever new, updated information became available.

Because research on terrorism is based largely on data concerning terrorist incidents, we developed extensive chronologies of incidents for the 29 groups. The chronology for each group contains complete information on events since 1980, and some earlier incidents are included that date back as far as 1968. For some groups, such as the Armenian and to some extent the Palestinian terrorist organizations, information on incidents was obtained from the Rand Chronology of International Terrorism. But for the most part, original sources were used, including local journals and personal reports.

To codify the data for subsequent computer analysis, we developed a codebook to elicit quantified answers to 281 data-specific attribute
questions. Of course, not all information we collected could be translated into computer-readable form without distorting the data. Accordingly, information on items such as the goals of a group were retained in textual form. The coded answers were keypunched and entered into a computer database.

In addition to the extensive chronologies on the tactical activities of the groups, we created a textual profile and a quantitative profile of each. To evaluate the completeness of our textual data, we compared the need for specific information with the availability of that information. We then tested the reliability and validity of the codified data by comparing codings of the same data performed independently by two analysts. Where coding efforts failed to meet an acceptable level of reliability, problem areas were identified and suggestions were made for improving future coding efforts.

Our next task was to develop a methodology for applying this analytical framework and our accumulated data to address broad analytical questions concerning terrorist groups. We were not attempting to find definitive answers to the questions; our intent was, rather, to demonstrate the applicability of the conceptual framework.

We developed 20 questions that represented the areas of primary interest about terrorist groups. We then attempted to apply our data-bases to two of these questions. The first question concerned identifying and ranking the possible perpetrators of an unclaimed terrorist attack or an attack claimed by several groups. Since we almost always know five things about an attack—where it occurred, the tactic used, the type of target, the nationality of the target, and the number of casualties—by grouping all past terrorist events with known perpetrators according to various combinations of these five factors, we can determine the proportion of times a particular group was the perpetrator of a particular type of incident. We can then compute “conditional probabilities” of each group being responsible for unclaimed (or multiply claimed) incidents.

The second question we addressed concerned the problem of identifying which groups are most likely to attack American targets. On the basis of information on cultural factors, ideology, motivations, and past activity of each group, we determined that the potentially most dangerous elements for Americans are ideologically motivated groups, especially in localities where violence is traditional and Americans appear to support oppressive political regimes.

Finally, we explored various ways in which our analytical framework could be used to develop new methodologies. As an illustrative case, we compare terrorist groups in terms of one specific characteristic, lethality.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Much of the credit for building the extensive databases used in this study goes to people other than the authors of this report. Karen Gardela, Bruce Hoffman, Sue Moran, and Eleanor Wainstein each contributed to building the analytical framework and determining the attributes of terrorist groups. Their experiences in gathering data and attempting to answer the attribute questions were valuable in determining the extent to which the framework can be used. Bruce Hoffman also provided editorial comments which helped smooth the edges of earlier drafts of this report. Janet DeLand edited the final report and did an excellent job of further condensing and clarifying the text. Patricia Ebener of Rand’s Data Survey Group is thanked for her expert guidance in directing the formatting of the codebook questionnaire. Finally, we gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Kevin McCarthy and Joan Petersilia, whose thorough and constructive reviews greatly improved the report.
CONTENTS

PREFACE .......................................................... iii
SUMMARY .......................................................... v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................. vii
FIGURES .......................................................... xi
TABLES .......................................................... xiii

Section
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................. 1

II. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK .......................... 3
   The Attribute List ........................................ 3
   The Codebook .............................................. 4
   Formulating the Major Questions ....................... 4

III. DATA COLLECTION AND EVALUATION ................. 7
   Data Collection ............................................ 7
   Evaluating the Textual Data ............................. 9
   Evaluating the Coded Data .............................. 10

IV. A METHODOLOGY FOR RANKING THE POSSIBLE
    PERPETRATORS OF UNCLAIMED TERRORIST
    EVENTS ...................................................... 15
    Why Do We Want to Identify the Perpetrators? ....... 15
    Analytical Approach .................................... 16
    The Databases ........................................... 18
    Trends in Claims ....................................... 23
    Attributes of Claimed and Unclaimed Events ......... 25
    Identifying the Perpetrators ........................... 26
    Classifying by Multiple Characteristics ............. 32
    Extrapolating the Results ............................. 39
    Extensions of the Methodology ....................... 39

V. AN ANALYSIS OF THE TARGETING OF AMERICANS
   BY SELECTED TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS ........... 45
   Terrorist Selection of Foreign Targets ............... 48
   Motivations and Timing .................................. 54
   Conclusions .............................................. 55
VI. SOME POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO DEVELOPING TERRORIST GROUP PROFILES ........................ 57
    Displays of Results ........................................ 58
    Comparing Terrorist Groups ................................ 58
    Measuring Lethality .......................................... 62

VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS ..................................... 66

Appendix
A. Attributes of Terrorist Organizations ..................... 67
B. Twenty Major Questions About Terrorist Groups and Pertinent Attributes ....................... 78
C. Priority Areas for Data Collection .......................... 113
D. Gaps in the Data Collection ................................. 114
# FIGURES

1. Lethality of selected terrorist groups .................................. 59
2. Sample histogram .......................................................... 60
3. Histograms of cumulative frequencies .................................. 60
4. Profiles of terrorist characteristics ..................................... 62
5. Frequency distribution of bombing fatalities ....................... 64
6. Cumulative-frequency distribution curve .............................. 65
TABLES

1. Terrorist groups included in Rand's attributes database .................... 8
2. Occurrence of individual and comparative errors ............................ 13
3. Frequency distribution: claim status ........................................ 18
4. Frequency distribution: fatalities ............................................. 19
5. Frequency distribution: number of injuries .................................. 19
6. Frequency distribution: perpetrators of one or more terrorist acts .......... 20
7. Frequency distribution: region of activity .................................... 21
8. Frequency distribution: tactic .................................................. 21
10. Frequency distribution: target nationality ................................... 22
11. Frequency distribution: year ................................................... 23
12. Percentages of terrorist events committed by each category of perpetrator, by fatality level .......................... 27
13. Percentages of terrorist events committed by each category of perpetrator, by nationality of target ....................... 28
14. Percentages of terrorist events committed by each category of perpetrator, by region of activity ....................... 29
15. Percentages of terrorist events committed by each category of perpetrator, by type of tactic .......................... 30
16. Percentages of terrorist events committed by each category of perpetrator, by type of target ....................... 31
17. Average probabilities of terrorist groups committing a given action, by attack characteristics ....................... 33
18. Average probabilities of terrorist groups committing a given action, by combinations of characteristics ....................... 34
19. Average probabilities of ascribing an event to the actual perpetrator and the four most likely perpetrators: all-characteristics model ................................................. 36
20. Average probabilities of ascribing an event to the actual perpetrator and the four most likely perpetrators: all characteristics except nationality ................................................. 37
21. Average probabilities of ascribing an event to the actual perpetrator and the four most likely perpetrators: all characteristics except region ................................................. 38
22. Average probabilities ascribed to perpetrators of unclaimed acts by type of conditioning characteristic ....................... 40
23. Average probabilities ascribed to perpetrators of unclaimed acts and the four most likely perpetrators: all-characteristics model .................. 41
24. Average probabilities ascribed to perpetrators of unclaimed acts and the four most likely perpetrators: all characteristics except nationality ............... 42
25. Average probabilities ascribed to perpetrators of unclaimed acts and the four most likely perpetrators: all characteristics except region .................. 43
27. Attacks on American targets by separatist, non-separatist, and transnational separatist groups, 1980–1982 ........................................ 47
29. Proportion of Americans involved in attacks against foreigners, 1980–1982 .................. 50
30. Probability of a group engaging in anti-American activity .................. 51
31. Terrorist incidents involving Americans, by type of tactic, number of casualties, and target type, 1980–1982 ........................................ 52
32. Age of terrorist groups at the time of first attacks on American targets .................. 54
33. Lethality values for selected groups .................. 33
1. INTRODUCTION

Recent events have demonstrated the continuing importance of detailed knowledge about terrorism and the need for improved understanding of this phenomenon. Research on terrorism to date has consisted largely of data collection and the development of chronologies of terrorist incidents. The Defense Intelligence Agency has created the STIF (Significant Terrorist Incident File), for example, and The Rand Corporation maintains a comprehensive, computerized chronology of international terrorism.¹

Less attention has been devoted to the more difficult problem of creating computerized databases on the characteristics and attributes of terrorist groups. Such information resides primarily on file cards, in folders of newspaper clippings, and in embassy cables, undigested intelligence reports, and individual case studies. This information cannot easily be retrieved, nor does it lend itself to systematic analysis.

Computerized databases are needed to

- Provide fast and easy retrieval of information on group personnel, tactics, capability, financing, etc.
- Enhance the capability to estimate terrorist intentions, by analyzing strategy, goals, morale, and organization and the ways in which these factors serve as indicators of future activity and cooperation with other groups.
- Enhance the capability to identify the groups responsible for unclaimed incidents.

Without such databases, it is not possible to systematically assess the relative capabilities of individual groups, to examine linkages among individual terrorist groups and patrons, to anticipate changes in tactics and target selection, or to identify the perpetrators of terrorist acts that are not claimed or that are claimed by several groups.

This report describes Rand’s attempt to develop a framework for analyzing terrorist groups, to create the necessary databases, and to apply the methodology to broad questions of primary concern in combating terrorism.

Section II of this report describes the development of our attribute list and its codebook variant, and discusses their uses in analyzing

terrorist groups. Section III outlines the data-collection and evaluation process. Section IV develops a methodology for applying the databases to identify the perpetrator of an unclaimed terrorist incident. Section V deals with assessing the likelihood that a particular terrorist group will attack American targets. Section VI explores various ways in which methodology can be developed to compare terrorist groups in terms of certain aspects, such as lethality. Concluding remarks are given in Section VII.
II. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

THE ATTRIBUTE LIST

We selected 150 attributes of terrorist groups for data collection and analysis. These attributes included the number of members in the group, the group's preferred tactics, and whether the group has received assistance from other groups. We then sorted the attributes into ten major categories:

1. Organization
2. Leadership
3. Demography
4. Ideology, doctrine, and goals
5. Psychology, mindset, and decisionmaking
6. Funding and logistics
7. Operations and modus operandi
8. Communications
9. External relations
10. Environment and government response

The entire attribute list is given in Appendix A.

Even when information is available, only about 60 percent of the attribute questions can be answered with a yes or no, a date, a simple list, a single word, or a simple sentence. Most of the questions pertaining to organization, demography, and operations can be answered with a yes or no, and this information can be coded for computerization. But questions pertaining to ideology and doctrine, mindset and decisionmaking, communications, external relations and government response, and organizational structure generally do not produce answers that can be easily coded.

Moreover, much of the information in our database is anecdotal. For example, the response to a question about a terrorist group's source of funds may contain descriptions of bank robberies, kidnappings for ransom, or extortion activities. Often, data may be suggestive of a response, but not conclusive enough to warrant a straightforward yes or no. Such questions occur particularly in the area of external relations.
THE CODEBOOK

Using the attribute list, we developed a codebook to elicit codified responses. For example, a question such as, *How many assassinations has the group carried out?* was converted into several questions: (1) *Has the group carried out assassinations or assassination attempts?* (2) *If so, how many?* (3) *If so, when?,* and so on. The 150 questions in the attribute list were thus disaggregated into a total of 281 data-specific queries.

Some questions, such as, *Are the goals [of the group] realistically obtainable?* may be amenable to a yes-or-no response, but that response represents a subjective judgment. Others, as noted above, are simply not amenable to codified responses. Thus, 58 of the 281 questions do not require coded responses.

FORMULATING THE MAJOR QUESTIONS

To ensure that our analytical framework would be applicable to practical real-world problems, we next attempted to identify broad questions about terrorist groups that represented the areas of primary interest. We developed the following 20 major questions:

1. What is the significance of the names chosen by terrorist groups? Why do some groups not claim or use different names for certain operations?
2. When is a particular group most likely to carry out an operation?
3. What targets will the group choose?
4. What tactics will the group employ?
5. Who is the perpetrator of an unclaimed incident?
6. Does a particular terrorist group represent a threat to the United States? Will it attack U.S. citizens or facilities? Will it carry out operations within the United States?
7. What U.S. actions might trigger attacks by a terrorist group against U.S. or friendly-nation targets?
8. Does the group pose a threat to a specific facility, program, or event?
9. What are the resources and capabilities of the group for carrying out an operation?
10. Will no-ransom policies deter the group from seizing hostages?
11. Will offers of amnesty induce many defections?
12. How is a particular group likely to react in a hostage episode?
13. How will a particular group react to an attack in a hostage situation?
14. Is the group likely to escalate its violence, that is, employ weapons or tactics that kill or endanger larger numbers of persons?
15. What is the level of technical sophistication of the group?
16. How important is external support (from sympathizers, other groups, or patron states) to any specific terrorist group?
17. What evidence is there of international links?
18. What are the vulnerabilities of the group?
19. Has the group demonstrated itself to be adaptive, to learn lessons, or to change directions?
20. What is the life cycle of a terrorist group?

Many pieces of information from the attributes list are needed to answer any of these broad questions. For example, the question, When is the group most likely to carry out an operation? draws from the sections of the attribute list dealing with organization, ideology, operations and modus operandi, external relations, and environment and government response. Twelve attribute questions contribute to the answer:

**Organization:**

1. Any significance of the name such as a significant date, signal event, mentor, etc.?
3. Have there been defections?

**Ideology, Doctrine, and Goals:**

4. What are the goals? Are there immediate versus long-range goals? Are they specific?

**Operations and Modus Operandi:**

5. Have there been any reports of terrorist operations by the group since 1968? Give number of operations per year, per tactic, and number of fatalities, if any.
7. Does the group operate on significant dates?
8. Are there seasonal campaigns?
9. Observable escalation or deescalation?
10. Has the group ever carried out operations on behalf of imprisoned comrades?
External Relations:
11. Are the estimated numbers of sympathizers increasing or decreasing?

Environment and Government Response:
12. Are any members of the group in prison? How many?

The goals of a group can indicate whether the group perceives some upcoming event—elections or trials, for example—as calling for an action or whether it is likely to try to obtain the release of imprisoned comrades.

The implicit hypothesis concerning trends in membership is that a terrorist group whose membership is shrinking may stage an operation to demonstrate that it is still in business, may try to have imprisoned comrades released, or may seek revenge for casualties.

As another example, the answer to the question, Will a terrorist group escalate its attacks to a much higher level of violence? requires an assessment of both intentions and capabilities. These appear as two separate questions in the list of major questions:

- Is the group likely to escalate its violence to a much higher level, that is, employ weapons or tactics that kill or endanger larger numbers of persons?
- What is the level of technical sophistication of the group?

Fifty-nine attributes pertain to a terrorist group's demonstrated willingness to kill, willingness to die, and inclination to innovate. Twenty-six attributes pertain to technical sophistication, access to funds, special training, etc. The pertinent attributes for answering each of the 20 major questions are given in Appendix B.
III. DATA COLLECTION AND EVALUATION

DATA COLLECTION

Most of the information in Rand's chronologies of terrorist events is derived from open sources, primarily press reports, journal articles, and books. Some classified information from earlier Rand research projects is also included, however, as well as information from personal contacts with foreign government officials. Data on international terrorist events have been computerized; information on terrorist groups is catalogued by group and by year in manual files.

We also created a new database containing all the available information on these attributes for the 29 terrorist groups listed in Table 1. The data-collection effort resulted in detailed profiles of each of the groups.

The data-collection process was constant and ongoing. Background research was done on each group to assess the causes and circumstances of each group's origins and to build chronological profiles of its past activity. Often the politics of a particular region had to be explored to understand the context of the group's struggle for their particular cause. In the cases of some long-standing groups, such as the PLO and the IRA, it was virtually impossible to create a complete list of past terrorist actions. To answer all the questions for each group was in some cases impossible. Some information was simply unavailable; some was incomplete or inconclusive. But we recorded whatever data we could obtain. In cases of conflicting information, the analyst used his or her best judgment; if both sources were convincing, the conflicting information would be entered as well. Occasionally, subsequent bits of information were obtained that refuted or supported these earlier contentions.

Of course, complete information could not be obtained on every attribute for each of the 29 groups. Moreover, entries changed with time in many cases; for example, the number of members in a group often varied significantly from year to year. Nevertheless, we wished to use as wide a range of attributes as possible, to permit the eventual examination of a wide variety of relationships among them.

The textual information recorded in our initial data collection was translated, insofar as possible, to a coded form to allow for statistical analysis. The date of each item of information was recorded, or if the
## Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)</td>
<td>Armenian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide (JCAG)</td>
<td>Armenian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR)</td>
<td>Chilean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement of April 19 (M-19)</td>
<td>Colombian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)</td>
<td>Colombian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action Directe (AD)</td>
<td>French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Army Faction (RAF)</td>
<td>German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP)</td>
<td>Guatemalan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT)</td>
<td>Guatemalan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Armed Forces of Guatemala (FAR)</td>
<td>Guatemalan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA)</td>
<td>Guatemalan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)</td>
<td>Irish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)</td>
<td>Irish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Brigades (BR)</td>
<td>Italian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Lines (PL)</td>
<td>Italian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Fateh</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As-Sa’iqa</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black June</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command (PFLP-GC)</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path)</td>
<td>Peruvian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)</td>
<td>Philippine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
<td>South African</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETA (Basque Homeland and Liberty)</td>
<td>Spanish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO)</td>
<td>Thai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dev Sol</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dev Yol</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit (MLAPU)</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
date was not available, we recorded the date of the source from which the information was taken. Information that was not amenable to coding was retained in textual form.

A chronology was also developed of each group's past terrorist activity, for later use in analyzing tactics, targets, volume of activity, and other aspects of a group's *modus operandi.* These incident files are comprehensive for events occurring since 1980, and they include some events dating back as far as 1968. The files contain over 2,000 terrorist events, both national and international.

This database comprises a textual file of information following the format of the attribute list; a coded version following the same format; and a coded chronology of past activity. Each level of this three-tiered information scheme contains unique information, along with corroborating material which supports the information from the other levels. For example, anecdotal information on a group can often be as valuable as conclusions reached on the basis of pre-coded, computerized data. But neither form of information is sufficient in itself; the textual version provides depth to the codified responses.

**EVALUATING THE TEXTUAL DATA**

**Identifying Priority Areas for Data Collection**

By keeping track of how often certain attributes were needed to answer the 20 major analytical questions about terrorist groups, we were able to identify the primary information analysts need (see Appendix C). This information includes the terrorist group's goals, its mindset, its sources of funding and equipment, operations and *modus operandi,* links with other groups or states, and the behavior of its members in prison. As mentioned above, some of this information is simply not available. Knowledge of certain aspects of a terrorist group—its mindset, for instance—requires a long-standing and sometimes intimate knowledge of the group.

**Identifying Gaps in Data Collection**

Comparing the priority areas for data collection with the areas of the attributes list where the least information is available revealed specific gaps in the data collection. We had the most difficulty finding information pertaining to the following categories of attributes:

- Demography: changes in age, the existence of definable generations within the group.
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING TERRORIST GROUPS

- Psychology, mindset, and decisionmaking.
- Funding and logistics: sources and levels of funding and equipment.
- Operations and modus operandi: how members are chosen for missions; specialized equipment used in operations.
- Communications: internal communications; the use of codes.
- External relations: links with other groups and possible infiltration of legitimate groups.
- Environment and government response: government policy in hostage situations.

The attribute questions needed to answer five or more major questions are listed in Appendix D, along with the attribute questions for which the least information is available.

Good estimates of terrorist strength and budgets are not easily found; and we know very little about terrorist decisionmaking, although such information may be extremely important in providing estimates of the level of future terrorist operations, the impact of arrests, etc. The identification of these gaps should provide the impetus to improved collection in these areas.

At this point, it is difficult to determine which gaps in information are crucial to decisionmakers. Although the analyst may prefer to know more, he often has a sense of what the missing information could be, particularly if he has had some previous exposure to the subject. Thus, an analyst's guess may be as valid in some cases as the hunch of an intelligence source. The more familiar the analyst is with the subject, the better equipped he or she will be to make the occasional necessary judgments.

EVALUATING THE CODED DATA

Our evaluation of the coded data was aimed at assessing the reliability of our coding efforts. Reliability is related to the more general issue of validity in data collection and analysis. Although validity is not considered here in depth, the concepts are compared and placed in a broad perspective. Several potential problem areas are identified and solutions are suggested for future data-collection efforts.
Reliability vs. Validity

Reliability in data collection may be defined as the consistent coding of a single item by more than one coder. Validity is the ability of an item to measure what it is intended to measure. Reliability is necessary, but not sufficient, for validity. In fact, there are various forms of validity, including content, construct, and predictive validity. Each of these has its tests and each presupposes reliability in data collection.

We addressed different forms of validity in our various uses of the data. We evaluated content validity by analyzing the data to ensure that items are consistent and reasonable, given other items in the database. Construct validity, the extent to which the data “make sense” in terms of the model or hypotheses of the project, was addressed by the area specialists who contributed to the attribute list. Predictive validity was tested by analyzing the data to derive a method for assigning responsibility for an unclaimed event to a specific group.

The present evaluation simply addresses reliability. The questionnaire could theoretically produce perfectly reliable responses that would have no validity. However, it is more likely that the higher the reliability of the data, the higher the validity will be. Reliability in data collection results from successfully communicating the meaning of the items collected and the reason for their collection. This is particularly true for questions that call for judgmental and/or interpretive responses.

Absolute reliability is impossible to achieve in collecting data on terrorism, because even the most precisely defined concepts in political conflict are subject to judgments when applied to empirically derived information. However, the level of reliability can be estimated and compared with that of similar data-collection efforts.

Instrument Complexity as a Potential Problem Area

The complexity of our data-collection instrument reflects the complexity of the subject of terrorism: Each questionnaire requires more than 1300 individual responses. The structure of the questionnaire, however, is even more revealing than its length. Most of the individual responses are keyed to 128 “lead” questions that determine whether a number of other related responses are required. Errors on lead questions thus will inevitably lead to a number of missed responses.

The questionnaire calls for a variety of response types. Forty questions must be answered with one or more names—of individuals, nations, terrorist groups, etc.—culled from data sources. The coder is also required to reduce data in a number of ways. Thirty-three
What Is an Acceptable Error Rate?

The length and complexity of the questionnaire dictate that a significant error rate will be found even under the best conditions. Well-written questionnaires of comparable complexity, coded by motivated and trained coders, typically yield intercoder reliability scores of 60 to 85 percent. Therefore, we selected, as an arbitrary goal, an acceptability range of 80 percent for "lead" questions, which are crucial in achieving reliability in subsequent questions, and 60 percent for all other types of questions.

Preliminary Procedures

Our goal was to assess the general magnitude of reliability of our data-collection effort. Although this is not a formal statistical study, we can gain considerable insight into its reliability by the judicious selection, recoding, and testing of several cases.

We selected eight terrorist groups at random, and subjected their questionnaires to blind recoding (i.e., subsequent coding by a second coder who has not seen the original coding). In most cases, the subsequent coders did not know who did the original coding. Neither coding was considered necessarily correct; items that did not have matching responses were counted as errors.

The two questionnaires of a single recoded group were completely reviewed to identify potential problems in the coding procedures. Using the results of that review, we defined categories of errors with which to collect reliability counts on the other questionnaires. These counts were made for each of the remaining groups on a sample of items from each category defined in the first review. Percentages of reliability were then computed for each question in the sample.

Coding errors fall into two broad categories: comparative errors and individual errors. Comparative errors are those in which there is no match between the questionnaires, but each answer is plausible on its

\[1\text{Data provided by Donald Trees, of Rand's Survey Data Processing Group.}\]

\[2\text{Action Directe; the Movement of the Revolutionary Left; the ETA; the Turkish groups Dev Sol, Dev Yol, and the MLAPU; and the Armenian ASALA and JCAG.}\]
own. Individual errors are patently incorrect responses—usually inappropriate or erroneous responses. Individual errors in our analysis include year dates falling outside this century and incorrectly coded skip patterns. We did not count blank or missed responses as individual errors.

Comparative errors included date discrepancies, name differences, numeric differences, and choice differences. By far the most common were date discrepancies, many of which resulted from either the lack of a date or a vague range of time mentioned in the original sources themselves. Numeric differences, i.e., discrepancies in the amount of things, such as number of members in particular groups, were also often the result of vagueness or incompleteness in the original document.

Choice differences occurred in matching discrete and continuous coded values. Coding continuous values (such as decisions among “never,” “almost never,” “occasionally,” “almost always,” and “always”) presents a special problem because the values may mean different things to different coders. These items typically have lower reliability than items requiring discrete or specific responses.

Finally, name differences resulted when the two coders produced different names in response to an item such as, Name the patron states of a terrorist group.

Simple descriptive statistics were computed for all of the identified problems. The results are presented in Table 2.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Error</th>
<th>Frequency of Occurrence (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular (i.e., date)</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skip pattern</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dates</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numeric Codes</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrete</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Names</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Problem Areas

Reliability estimates exceeded our expectations in almost every case, leading to the conclusion that our coding procedures are adequate for present needs. Analysis of the pattern of errors that were made led to the identification of several problem areas whose elimination could result in a significant increase in reliability.

The biggest problem areas stems from source dates. Date errors were frequent, and matching answers did not guarantee accuracy. Most of the problems seem to stem from the difficulty in identifying dates of information within source documents. Coding rules regarding date of information/date of source (specifying which date is to be used under which circumstance) did not effectively increase reliability. There are several possible solutions to this problem. The easiest would be to collect only the date of the source of information (when available), although this could compromise completeness in some cases. Another alternative would be to add items that score the meaningfulness of the coded data.

The next biggest problem area was target items leading to skip patterns. Although the error rate on these items was quite low, these errors lead to further errors of omission on subsequent items. In general, the coding of these items was within the range of our expectations. However, many of the skip patterns were complex and confusing. The crowding of items and the layout of the questionnaire did not facilitate quick understanding of the relationships between items in a skip pattern set. A redesign of the document could increase reliability.

Overall reliability could also be increased by better documentation of the coding procedures and rules, an increase in the time allotted for the training of coders, and the review of individual coding efforts by second individuals, focusing on the date items and target questions leading to skip patterns.
IV. A METHODOLOGY FOR RANKING
THE POSSIBLE PERPETRATORS OF
UNCLAIMED TERRORIST EVENTS

To help evaluate the applicability of our conceptual framework, we applied it to the problem of identifying the perpetrators of unclaimed terrorist attacks.

If we define terrorism as the use of violence to create psychological effects that will translate into political results, then to be truly effective, an act of terrorism must be seen or known about by an audience beyond the victim. The audience must know or have a good idea who is responsible for the act, and it must understand the message, that is, why the terrorists attacked that target. Claiming credit for an act of terrorism is the principal method by which terrorists attempt to specifically influence the behavior of their target audience. Without the claim, the act must speak for itself. It is therefore puzzling that nearly half of all terrorist incidents are unclaimed.

WHY DO WE WANT TO IDENTIFY THE PERPETRATORS?

Most of the unclaimed incidents are low-level actions, such as early morning bombings, that are not intended to cause casualties. Some of them, however, are major terrorist events. In these cases, the perpetrator's persisting anonymity enhances the confusion and tension surrounding the attack. Speculation abounds and theories of attribution are batted back and forth. Some of these attacks achieve more publicity than they would have if there had been a claim. For weeks afterwards the fear of a repeat performance remains—an unknown perpetrator always appears more sophisticated and capable, and altogether more mysterious and effective. Such a state of public alarm caused considerable concern in Paris during the summer of 1982. Because of a signed threat by the notorious terrorist Carlos, several major unclaimed attacks that occurred during the following months were attributed to him. The climate of fear and apprehension made the city a perfect arena for terrorist activity in the coming months. Indeed, over 30 terrorist attacks took place in Paris between May and September 1982.

1It is in this respect that terrorists differ most clearly from common criminals. The latter are interested only in loot, not in a cause, so they do not want to be identified as the perpetrators of an action they have committed.
To the extent that the terrorists really can hide their identity, they may appear to have conducted an action that served no purpose, like an advertising campaign that does not name the product. However, upon closer examination, unclaimed terrorist actions may serve their purposes very well. Terrorists may be fully satisfied if, after a bombing, the population merely engages in active speculation as to who was responsible. Since common criminals are not likely to be responsible for a bombing, which provides them with no gain and presents expense and risk, such an act will rightly be perceived by the population as being of terrorist origin. This may be even more true and also more effective in the case of other actions. If, for example, a judge who in the past has sentenced terrorists to long prison terms should be attacked, many people will conclude that the crime was perpetrated by a terrorist group, even if there is no trace of evidence. More effective still is the direct fear created by such an event occurring in the legal community. Finally, anonymity might serve the purpose of protecting terrorists against effective prosecution in case of capture. If an act is openly avowed, prosecution of members who are captured may be easier than would be the case if the action was unclaimed and left to “speak for itself.” Thus, there may be a tradeoff here for the terrorists.

No matter how paradoxical it may seem at first blush, terrorists’ actions are in fact often unclaimed, and society becomes intensely interested in uncovering who the perpetrators are. Not only is it useful for society to uncover unclaimed acts in order to cross up the terrorists and thereby gain a point in the fight against them, it also serves the obvious purpose of possibly leading to apprehension or neutralization of some sort. It is therefore important to design a methodology that will permit us to use all existing data to identify, or at least make informed guesses about, the perpetrators of unclaimed actions.

ANALYTICAL APPROACH

For every terrorist event, including unclaimed events, we can always expect to immediately know five pieces of information: where the action occurred, the tactic, the type of target, the nationality of the target, and the number of fatalities. Further investigation might reveal additional details such as as type of weapons or explosives used in the attack, numbers of persons involved, and other elements of a group’s modus operandi.

We begin by attempting to identify the likely candidates of an unclaimed event. Using Rand’s Chronology of International Terrorism, we identify the groups most likely to have carried out the action, on
A METHODOLOGY FOR RANKING POSSIBLE PERPETRATORS

the basis of location of attack, tactic, target type, target nationality, and fatalities.

We first examine the characteristics of all terrorist events of which the perpetrator is known. Then, pretending not to know the perpetrator, we try to determine how likely we would have been to identify the correct group on the basis of these identifying characteristics. This likelihood is expressed as a percentage which indicates a confidence level.

We then produce probability ratings for each of the possible perpetrators. Such ratings are particularly important in incidents where the list of candidates is long and where the characteristics of the event make several candidates equally likely. Thus, in asking whether a given set of characteristics is a useful predictor, we do not examine whether it enables us to guess the right group, but rather whether it makes our identification of the right group more probable.

We group events according to various combinations of the five known characteristics, then look at the proportion of incidents in which each group actually was the perpetrator, given those characteristics. For example, Palestinians committed 9 percent of all terrorist events recorded in Rand's Chronology of International Terrorism, but they committed 26 percent of all the events directed at Middle Eastern targets. Thus, we infer that nationality of target has value as a classification variable. We divide events by nationality, region of activity, type of target, tactic, and fatality level, and ask which of these characteristics are useful predictors of perpetrators.

Whether or not individual groups leave identifiable signatures, however, depends not only on who they are, but also on the frequency with which they choose particular event characteristics: For example, if the target is Middle Eastern, chances are good that the Palestinians made the attack. But how often do the Palestinians go after Middle Eastern targets? Such questions must be answered to ascertain whether the Palestinians do have a distinctive signature.

We address the signature question by computing for each group the average probability assigned to it by the characteristics of its own acts. If a group has a truly distinctive signature, and that signature is described by the characteristics we have selected, the average probability will be close to 1; if not, that probability will be close to the a priori probability we may have assigned the group.

Finally, we provide a stringent test of our methods, wherein the probability estimates are first obtained entirely from claimed events and are then used to predict the perpetrators of the unclaimed events. This, we feel, approximates the environment in which our methods might be employed.
THE DATABASES

To facilitate our analysis, we grouped the data into a limited number of categories:

1. Claim status
2. Number of fatalities
3. Number of injuries
4. Perpetrators
5. Region of activity
6. Tactic
7. Target type
8. Target nationality
9. Year

Claim Status. The Rand Chronology of International Terrorism contains four variables for claim status:

1. Self-evident: incidents such as hijackings or embassy seizures, where it is self-evident who the perpetrators are because they are physically present.
2. Claimed: incidents the perpetrators formally claim by means of prepared statements, communiques, telephone calls, etc.
3. Unclaimed but attributed: incidents that are unclaimed but attributed to a particular group by local authorities on the basis of intelligence, details of the attack, or other information. In the Rand Chronology, no attributions are made; the entries are merely quoted.
4. Unclaimed: incidents without claims or attribution.

For the purpose of this analysis, we have combined the first two variables into “claimed” and the second two into “unclaimed” (see Table 3).

Table 3
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION:
CLAIM STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Claim Status</th>
<th>Number of Incidents</th>
<th>Analytical Grouping</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-evident</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>Claimed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claimed</td>
<td>1,988</td>
<td>Claimed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attributed</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>Unclaimed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclaimed</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>Unclaimed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Number of Fatalities. Incidents are grouped into four categories of number of fatalities: 0, 1, 2, and 3 or more (see Table 4).

Table 4
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION: FATALITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Fatalities</th>
<th>Number of Incidents</th>
<th>Analytical Grouping</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,148</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>3+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;10</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of Injuries. Injuries are ignored in our analysis. First, information on injuries has been coded only since 1980, and therefore the database is incomplete; and second, injury information is effectively duplicated in the fatalities variable (see Table 5).

Table 5
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION: NUMBER OF INJURIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Injuries</th>
<th>Number of Incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1,603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;10</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Perpetrators. The many groups responsible for one or more terrorist acts have been assigned to 16 general categories to provide adequate numbers for statistical analysis (see Table 6).

Table 6
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION: PERPETRATORS OF ONE OR MORE TERRORIST ACTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terrorist Group</th>
<th>Number of Incidents</th>
<th>Analytical Grouping</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinians</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>Palestinians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italians</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Italians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Germans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>Irish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Spanish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>Asian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin Americans</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>Latin Americans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenians</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>Armenians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libyans</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Libyans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Middle East</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>Other Middle East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other European</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>Other European</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antinuclear</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminals</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmentalists</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strikers</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-directed</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Region of Activity. The countries of the world have been divided into seven regions for this analysis (see Table 7).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of Activity</th>
<th>Number of Incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>1,033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Sahara Africa</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tactic. Six basic terrorist tactics account for 96 percent of all terrorist activity: assassinations, kidnappings, bombings, hijackings, barricade-and-hostage incidents, and attacks on installations or facilities. All other types of attack are grouped into “other” (see Table 8).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tactic</th>
<th>Number of Incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kidnapping</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacks on installations</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hijacking</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombing</td>
<td>1,290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostage-taking</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assassination</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Target Type. Types of targets (e.g., diplomats, exiles, etc.) are grouped into 11 categories (see Table 9).

Table 9

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION: TARGET TYPE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Number of Incidents</th>
<th>Analytical Grouping</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomat</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>Diplomat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlines</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>Airlines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>Private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Utilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exiles</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>Exiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Religious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Target Nationality. The Rand Chronology began coding target nationality only in 1980. Prior to that, targets were grouped on a regional basis. Therefore, we have retained the regional coding for this analysis (see Table 10).

Table 10

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION: TARGET NATIONALITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Number of Incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Eastern</td>
<td>586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North American</td>
<td>794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Sahara African</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Year. The Rand Chronology dates back to 1968. For this analysis, we have grouped the 15-year period 1968–1983 into three 5-year periods (see Table 11).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Incidents</th>
<th>Grouping</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TRENDS IN CLAIMS

In the past few years, terrorists have been claiming credit for fewer of their violent actions. The tendency varies from group to group, but there is clearly a change in this important characteristic. An average of 60 percent of the incidents recorded from 1970 to 1979 were claimed; between 1980 and 1982, the proportion declined to 39 percent. Thus, unclaimed events are now more common than claimed events. However, we now know more about terrorism and are familiar with the “signatures” of various groups, so there is an increase in informed attribution of responsibility for the unclaimed attacks. As a result, less than half of the incidents are truly of unknown origin.

Although the overall volume of terrorist activity has increased, the number of easily attributable events such as hijacking or barricade-and-hostage situations has declined. Only 1 percent of the international terrorist incidents recorded in 1982 were barricade-and-hostage situations, down from 10 percent in 1979 and 1980. Hijackings have
shown a smaller decline—from 9 percent in 1980 to 7 percent in 1982. Typical targets of such attacks—e.g., airliners and embassies—have been hardened to the point that the risk of failure has been substantially increased. The decline in these self-evident types of actions may account for part of the overall decline in claimed incidents.

Terrorist groups have different patterns of claiming credit for their violent actions. Armenian terrorist groups are the most frequent claimers in Rand's Chronology of International Terrorism. The JCAG and the ASALA claimed credit for 82 percent of their 141 attacks, usually within a day of the action. ASALA also has shown unusual organizational efficiency in its use of claims, often following up on a local claim with a call to the press from its headquarters.

The Red Brigades also have a consistent claim record. They tend to view a claim as an opportunity to issue a political manifesto.

By contrast, Sendero Luminoso is more interested in action than words. It has never claimed responsibility for an action, although almost all terrorist activity in Peru is attributed to the group. Actions by Turkish groups, such as Dev Sol, Dev Yol, and the MLAPU, are also often attributed but rarely claimed. However, this may reflect government censorship more than the groups' unwillingness to claim credit for their actions.

The Palestinian terrorist groups are known for their consistent claiming and disclaiming attributes. Disagreements among radical and moderate factions have on occasion resulted in terrorist actions that were not desired by the PLO leadership. These incidents may be claimed by a specific group (such as the PFLP), then promptly disclaimed by the PLO. Sometimes a denial may be issued to increase the confusion surrounding an event.

An unusually strong negative public reaction to a terrorist act may induce a group to dissociate itself from the act, out of fear of losing perceived public sympathy and support for its cause. Action Directe has on occasion done this. As soon as casualties were announced by the news media after a terrorist action, a disclaimer followed the group's original claim.

Sometimes there is competition among groups, which makes certain claims unreliable. The IRA tries to make sure that it is credited with its own actions by maintaining a secret code with the authorities. This becomes a part of their identifying "signature." Puerto Rican nationalists often place their communiques close to the scene of the crime, usually in a nearby telephone booth. These "signatures" maintain the credibility of claims made by these groups, but they also allow authorities to become more and more knowledgeable about the group—their actions become windows to their way of thinking, just as their words spell out their ideology and goals.
ATTRIBUTES OF CLAIMED AND UNCLAIMED EVENTS

Do claimed and unclaimed events have contrasting overall attributes? To determine this, we examined the characteristics of all self-evident and formally claimed events separately from those of all attributed and unclaimed events.

Our comparison of the characteristics of the two categories revealed some obvious differences: Hijackings and barricade-and-hostage events are the types most likely to be claimed a priori, since the presence of the perpetrator makes his identity self-evident. Kidnappings are the type of action most often formally claimed, since the kidnapper usually must identify himself to accomplish his intended blackmail or extortion. Attacks on installations are the type of actions least likely to be claimed. These are usually hit-and-run attacks on embassies or government offices.

The differences between claimed and unclaimed events in terms of fatalities are not so obvious. Events with no fatalities are equally likely to be claimed or unclaimed, but a higher percentage of the events resulting in fatalities are claimed. In fact, events producing four fatalities are the most likely to be claimed; the likelihood decreases as the fatalities rise to five or more. Clearly, some terrorists intend their actions to have a fatal outcome, but they have a threshold they care not to—or dare not—exceed.

The nationality of the target does not appear to be a significant variable between claimed and unclaimed actions. European, Middle Eastern, and North American targets occur evenly in both types of actions. The region of the incident is also not shown to be an indicator; the percentages among areas vary more according to the volume of activity than to whether the incidents are claimed or not.

Actions targeting airlines are in the “most likely to be claimed” category, a not unexpected finding, since hijackings are the types of incidents most likely to be claimed. Curiously enough, however, when we exclude hijackings from consideration, attacks on airlines are still the most commonly claimed actions. A total of 503 attacks on airlines (hijackings and other attacks) were recorded between 1968 and 1982, 62 percent of which were claimed. When we eliminate hijackings, the number of airline targetings drops to 207, but the percentage of claimed actions declines only to 58 percent.

Actions against businesses and government officials and buildings are also highly likely to be claimed. Attacks on exiles, on the other hand, are least likely to be claimed. These have usually been attributed to state-directed assassins (such as those who participated in Qaddafi’s campaign against expatriated Libyans who did not support
his regime), and states do not tend to claim responsibility for actions labeled "terrorist" by the international community. This indicates that a type of terrorist activity is evolving in which the claiming of responsibility has no value. State-directed terrorism appears to be an effort on the part of some states to fight their opponents without open involvement, because taking public responsibility could lead to international friction and condemnation by other states and could result in sanctions. An increase in unavowed state-directed terrorist activity may be a factor in the apparent downward trend in the proportion of claimed incidents.

IDENTIFYING THE PERPETRATORS

Given an event and its associated characteristics, we attempted to derive "conditional probabilities" of each group in our sample being the perpetrator. Then, we examined the uniqueness of each group's modus operandi by computing the group's average conditional probability for its own claimed acts. The procedures for conditioning on a single event characteristic, as opposed to multiple characteristics, are relatively straightforward, so we shall discuss them first. The procedures for conditioning on multiple characteristics require additional methodology to compensate for small sample sizes.

Classifying by a Single Characteristic

As noted before, the Rand Chronology of International Terrorism supplies consistent coding for such characteristics as date, tactic, number of fatalities, and type of target. We grouped events according to these characteristics, then looked at the proportion of times each group was actually identified as being the perpetrator of an action.

Tables 12 through 16 show these conditional probabilities for each category of perpetrator. They highlight cases where the probabilities vary significantly from those computed by ignoring these characteristics. Thus, we find many cases where the event characteristics provide information about who committed the act.

For instance, Table 12 shows that Palestinian terrorists are known to be the perpetrators of 9 percent of the events examined, and that while Palestinians committed 32 percent of the acts with 3 or more fatalities, they were responsible for only 7 percent of the acts with no fatalities.

A second notable finding is that Libyans committed about 4 percent of the acts with 1 fatality, but only about 1 percent of the total attacks.
### Table 12
PERCENTAGES OF TERRORIST EVENTS COMMITTED BY EACH CATEGORY OF PERPETRATOR, BY FATALITY LEVEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terrorist Category</th>
<th>Number of Fatalities</th>
<th>All Events</th>
<th>Chi-Square</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libyan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Middle East</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other European</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan African</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total events</td>
<td>2,148</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 13
PERCENTAGES OF TERRORIST EVENTS COMMITTED BY EACH CATEGORY OF PERPETRATOR, BY NATIONALITY OF TARGET

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terrorist Category</th>
<th>Asian</th>
<th>European</th>
<th>Latin American</th>
<th>Middle Eastern</th>
<th>North American</th>
<th>Sub-Saharan African</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>All Events</th>
<th>Chi-Square</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libyan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Middle East</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other European</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan African</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total events</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>756</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>794</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>2,670</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 14
PERCENTAGES OF TERRORIST EVENTS COMMITTED BY EACH CATEGORY OF PERPETRATOR, BY REGION OF ACTIVITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terrorist Category</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Middle East</th>
<th>North America</th>
<th>Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
<th>All Events</th>
<th>Chi-Square</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libyan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Middle East</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other European</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan African</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total events</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>1,033</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>2,666</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 15
PERCENTAGES OF TERRORIST EVENTS COMMITTED BY EACH CATEGORY
OF PERPETRATOR, BY TYPE OF TACTIC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terrorist Category</th>
<th>Attack of Kidnap</th>
<th>Install</th>
<th>Hijack</th>
<th>Bombing</th>
<th>Hostage-Taking</th>
<th>Assassination</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>All Events</th>
<th>Chi-Square</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libyan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Middle East</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other European</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan African</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total events</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>1,230</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>2,670</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist Category</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
<td>Business</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Airlines</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Utility</td>
<td>Govt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libyan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Middle East</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other European</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Sahara African</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total events</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Their principal targets are exiles, and assassination is their primary tactic.

Region of activity (Table 14) produces vastly different probabilities, although the results are by no means unexpected. Palestinian and other Middle Eastern groups commit high proportions of the acts occurring in the Middle East. Asians counted for only 3 percent of the total acts, but 47 percent of those occurring in Asia. The findings were similar for Latin American and sub-Saharan African groups.

Conditional probabilities alone are not sufficient to answer the question of whether or not groups identify themselves by the characteristics of their own acts. We must have a way of combining the group's favored type of action with these conditional probabilities. For example, Latin American terrorists commit 42 percent of all kidnappings, but kidnappings comprise less than 25 percent of their actions, so they cannot so easily be identified by type of action.

Therefore, we took each act committed by a group and computed the average probability that the group itself, as well as each of the other groups, committed the act. Because we can vary the set of characteristics we condition upon, we obtain a different set of results for each set of characteristics we examine.

Table 17 shows these average probabilities for each group, for each set of characteristics. The table provides a rough indication of the uniqueness of a group's modus operandi. For example, knowing target type alone, we would assign German terrorists an average probability of 26 percent for their own acts, whereas the overall probability they would receive as one of 16 groups was only 6.25 percent. The average probabilities for Libyans by tactic or type of target and those for just about every group by region of activity are also increased dramatically.

CLASSIFYING BY MULTIPLE CHARACTERISTICS

The above approach, while useful, has serious limitations: We are often estimating a lot of conditional probabilities, often with only sparse data. Yet with an event characteristic that takes on many values, such as type of target, we must estimate well over 100 parameters for just 16 groups. If we attempted to condition on more than one event characteristic, the number of parameters would exceed 500. Only in cases where specific characteristics occur frequently would the conditional probabilities be reliable. Moreover, since we always know at least five characteristics of every action, we must combine results, using all event characteristics at once.

We sought a formula for conditional probabilities that did not rely on many parameters; certainly, the number of parameters could not
The simplest formula followed from the assumption that event characteristics were chosen independently of one another. According to the independence assumption, the outcome of any one selection (e.g., target type) does not influence the outcome of another selection (e.g., tactic). The probability of a joint outcome is thus the product of the individual probabilities, e.g.,

\[ \Pr\{\text{target: exile & tactic: bomb}\} = \Pr\{\text{target: exile}\} \times \Pr\{\text{tactic: bomb}\}. \]

This is admittedly an oversimplification, but it enables us to estimate the 128 probabilities corresponding to 16 levels of target type and 8 tactics by estimating only 16 probabilities for target type and 8 for tactic, then multiplying them together. Assuming that each group is equally likely a priori to have been the perpetrator of an action, we then compute the conditional probabilities of each group, given event characteristics, via Bayes’ theorem.²


### Table 17

**AVERAGE PROBABILITIES OF TERRORIST GROUPS COMMITTING A GIVEN ACTION, BY ATTACK CHARACTERISTICS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terrorist Category</th>
<th>Fatalities</th>
<th>Target Nationality</th>
<th>Region Activity</th>
<th>Tactic</th>
<th>Target Type</th>
<th>Prior Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libyan</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Middle East</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other European</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan African</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To the extent that the characteristics of events are not chosen independently, the above assumptions will decrease the predictive accuracy of our models. We can examine this effect empirically by reporting the average probability assigned by the model to the correct group. In many instances, we find that the predictive power of our multiple-characteristics model is much higher than that of the single-characteristic models. The independence assumption appears to approximate reality closely enough to help in prediction.

We must emphasize that we allow different groups to select the tactic, nationality, region of activity, target type, and number of fatalities at different rates; our only assumption is that each group chooses these characteristics independently.

Given the five characteristics of all the events carried out by the 16 terrorist categories in our data base, how many of each category's own actions, on average, would we attribute correctly? The average probabilities in percentage terms are given in Table 18 for certain combinations of conditioning characteristics. For example, knowing the characteristics of the events would enable us to correctly attribute 62 percent of the acts of Latin American terrorists. We would attribute

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terrorist Category</th>
<th>All But Prior Probability</th>
<th>All But Region</th>
<th>All But Nationality</th>
<th>All But Five</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libyan</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Middle East</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other European</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan African</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
to German terrorists 54 percent of their own acts; to Irish terrorists, 39 percent; and so on.

Tables 19 through 21 enable us to rank the most likely perpetrators of events. For example, if we take all acts known to be carried out by German terrorists (or a set of events with the same characteristics as those of actions known to be carried out by German terrorists) and pretend that we do not know the perpetrator, we would assign a 54 percent probability that the action was carried out by German terrorists, a 12 percent chance that it was carried out by Italian terrorists, and a chance of 7 percent or less that it was carried out by some other European terrorist group.

For events carried out by (or having the characteristics of events carried out by) Latin American terrorists, we would attribute a 62 percent probability to Latin American terrorists; a 12 percent probability to unknown terrorists; a 12 percent probability to U.S. terrorists; and all other probabilities, less than 6 percent.

Events having the same characteristics as Spanish terrorist attacks would be accorded a 29 percent probability of Spanish terrorist origins; a 20 percent probability of Irish terrorist origins; and a probability of other groups of about 10 percent. The variables in the analysis are too crude to pick up the fact that Spanish terrorists operate exclusively in Spain, while Irish terrorists operate mainly in the United Kingdom; the variable for region is simply "Europe," and the other characteristics of their events are statistically similar. We see this again in events carried out by Irish terrorists, for which we attribute a 39 percent probability to the Irish terrorists, a 19 percent probability to European terrorists, and a 10 percent or lower probability to others.

The apparent confusion between Irish and Spanish terrorists and the similarity in their modus operandi are intriguing, since Irish terrorists reportedly have shared weapons and training with Basque terrorists in Spain.

We see a similar effect in events of French terrorist origin, for which we assign a 25 percent probability to the French, a 14 percent probability to Italian terrorists, and roughly equal probabilities of around 9 percent to the Spanish, Armenians, and Germans. Again, much of the confusion might be due to the crudeness of the analysis, but it also suggests a similarity of modus operandi among groups known or suspected to have close relationships.
Table 19
AVERAGE PROBABILITIES OF ASCRIBING AN EVENT TO THE ACTUAL PERPETRATOR
AND THE FOUR MOST LIKELY PERPETRATORS: ALL-COMPARATIVE MODEL
(percentage shown in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actual Perpetrator</th>
<th>Most Likely Perpetrator</th>
<th>2nd Most Likely Perpetrator</th>
<th>3rd Most Likely Perpetrator</th>
<th>4th Most Likely Perpetrator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unknown (13)</td>
<td>Latin (16)</td>
<td>Unknown (13)</td>
<td>Other ME (9)</td>
<td>U.S. (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palest. (37)</td>
<td>Palest. (37)</td>
<td>Other ME (19)</td>
<td>Armenian (8)</td>
<td>Other (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian (21)</td>
<td>Italian (21)</td>
<td>German (17)</td>
<td>French (14)</td>
<td>Other Eur. (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German (54)</td>
<td>German (54)</td>
<td>Italian (12)</td>
<td>French (7)</td>
<td>Spanish (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French (25)</td>
<td>French (25)</td>
<td>Italian (14)</td>
<td>Spanish (9)</td>
<td>Armenian (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish (39)</td>
<td>Irish (39)</td>
<td>Spanish (19)</td>
<td>Other Eur. (10)</td>
<td>German (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. (67)</td>
<td>U.S. (67)</td>
<td>Other (9)</td>
<td>Latin (9)</td>
<td>Unknown (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish (29)</td>
<td>Spanish (29)</td>
<td>Irish (20)</td>
<td>Other Eur. (11)</td>
<td>French (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian (71)</td>
<td>Asian (71)</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan. (8)</td>
<td>Other Eur. (5)</td>
<td>Other (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian (24)</td>
<td>Armenian (24)</td>
<td>Other ME (10)</td>
<td>French (9)</td>
<td>Libya (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libyan (76)</td>
<td>Libya (76)</td>
<td>Other ME (6)</td>
<td>U.S. (4)</td>
<td>Unknown (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ME (24)</td>
<td>Other ME (24)</td>
<td>Palest. (21)</td>
<td>Armenian (11)</td>
<td>Unknown (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Eur. (16)</td>
<td>Other Eur. (16)</td>
<td>Spanish (12)</td>
<td>Other (9)</td>
<td>Irish (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan. (79)</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan. (79)</td>
<td>Other (7)</td>
<td>Unknown (3)</td>
<td>U.S. (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (27)</td>
<td>Other (27)</td>
<td>U.S. (14)</td>
<td>Latin (10)</td>
<td>Asian (8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 20
AVERAGE PROBABILITIES OF ASCRIBING AN EVENT TO THE ACTUAL PERPETRATOR AND THE FOUR MOST LIKELY PERPETRATORS: ALL CHARACTERISTICS EXCEPT NATIONALITY
(Percentages shown in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actual Perpetrator</th>
<th>Most Likely Perpetrator</th>
<th>2nd Most Likely Perpetrator</th>
<th>3rd Most Likely Perpetrator</th>
<th>4th Most Likely Perpetrator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unknown (12)</td>
<td>Latin (15)</td>
<td>Unknown (12)</td>
<td>Other ME (9)</td>
<td>Palest. (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palest. (32)</td>
<td>Palest. (32)</td>
<td>Other ME (18)</td>
<td>Other (7)</td>
<td>Unknown (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian (16)</td>
<td>Italian (16)</td>
<td>French (14)</td>
<td>Spanish (13)</td>
<td>German (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German (38)</td>
<td>German (38)</td>
<td>Irish (16)</td>
<td>Italian (12)</td>
<td>Spanish (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French (22)</td>
<td>French (22)</td>
<td>Spanish (13)</td>
<td>Italian (13)</td>
<td>Irish (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish (23)</td>
<td>Irish (23)</td>
<td>German (16)</td>
<td>Spanish (12)</td>
<td>French (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish (19)</td>
<td>Spanish (19)</td>
<td>French (14)</td>
<td>Italian (13)</td>
<td>Irish (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian (60)</td>
<td>Asian (60)</td>
<td>Other (8)</td>
<td>Sub-Sahar. (6)</td>
<td>Other Eur. (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin (54)</td>
<td>Latin (54)</td>
<td>U.S. (15)</td>
<td>Unknown (13)</td>
<td>Other (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian (16)</td>
<td>Armenian (16)</td>
<td>Italian (10)</td>
<td>French (10)</td>
<td>Other Eur. (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libyan (76)</td>
<td>Libya (76)</td>
<td>Other ME (5)</td>
<td>Palest. (4)</td>
<td>U.S. (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ME (20)</td>
<td>Other ME (20)</td>
<td>Palest. (19)</td>
<td>Unknown (8)</td>
<td>Other (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Eur. (11)</td>
<td>Other Eur. (11)</td>
<td>Spanish (9)</td>
<td>French (9)</td>
<td>Italian (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Sahar. (72)</td>
<td>Sub-Sahar. (72)</td>
<td>U.S. (12)</td>
<td>Latin (9)</td>
<td>Asian (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (30)</td>
<td>Other (30)</td>
<td>U.S. (12)</td>
<td>Latin (9)</td>
<td>Asian (7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 21
AVERAGE PROBABILITIES OF ASCRIBING AN EVENT TO THE ACTUAL PERPETRATOR AND THE FOUR MOST LIKELY PERPETRATORS: ALL-CATEGORIES EXCEPT REGION

(Percentages shown in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actual Perpetrator</th>
<th>Most Likely Perpetrator</th>
<th>2nd Most Likely Perpetrator</th>
<th>3rd Most Likely Perpetrator</th>
<th>4th Most Likely Perpetrator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unknown (9)</td>
<td>Unknown (9)</td>
<td>German (9)</td>
<td>U.S. (9)</td>
<td>Latin (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palest. (27)</td>
<td>Palest. (27)</td>
<td>Other ME (15)</td>
<td>Armenian (9)</td>
<td>French (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian (13)</td>
<td>Italian (13)</td>
<td>German (13)</td>
<td>French (9)</td>
<td>Unknown (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German (46)</td>
<td>German (46)</td>
<td>Italian (10)</td>
<td>U.S. (6)</td>
<td>Unknown (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French (18)</td>
<td>French (18)</td>
<td>Italian (10)</td>
<td>Armenian (8)</td>
<td>Palest. (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish (35)</td>
<td>Irish (35)</td>
<td>Spanish (18)</td>
<td>Other Eur. (10)</td>
<td>German (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. (31)</td>
<td>U.S. (31)</td>
<td>Other (11)</td>
<td>German (9)</td>
<td>Italian (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish (22)</td>
<td>Spanish (22)</td>
<td>Irish (17)</td>
<td>Other Eur. (11)</td>
<td>French (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian (31)</td>
<td>Asian (31)</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan. (12)</td>
<td>Other (11)</td>
<td>Other Eur. (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin (26)</td>
<td>Latin (26)</td>
<td>Unknown (9)</td>
<td>Italian (9)</td>
<td>Other (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian (19)</td>
<td>Armenian (19)</td>
<td>Other ME (11)</td>
<td>Palest. (9)</td>
<td>French (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libyan (75)</td>
<td>Libyan (75)</td>
<td>U.S. (4)</td>
<td>Asian (3)</td>
<td>Other ME (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ME (14)</td>
<td>Palest. (15)</td>
<td>Other ME (14)</td>
<td>Armenian (10)</td>
<td>Libya (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Eur. (12)</td>
<td>Other Eur. (12)</td>
<td>Spanish (12)</td>
<td>Other (9)</td>
<td>Irish (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan. (43)</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan. (43)</td>
<td>Other (10)</td>
<td>Asian (7)</td>
<td>U.S. (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (30)</td>
<td>Other (30)</td>
<td>U.S. (10)</td>
<td>Asian (9)</td>
<td>Latin (6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EXTRAPOLATING THE RESULTS

As a final test of our models, we examined whether they would assign a high probability to the perpetrator of an event that is not in our database. We did this by holding some of the events data back from the estimation phase, then using them in a prediction phase. It would not be unreasonable to hold back a random sample of data for such a test, but we deliberately chose a sample biased against our procedures, i.e., the sample of all unclaimed events. The bias follows from the expected different characteristics of claimed versus unclaimed events. We note that there is nothing in our methodology that implies this particular split. The division could just as well have been based upon year, or any other variable not used in the classification itself.

Table 22 shows the average probabilities assigned to each perpetrator by the characteristics of its own acts, for models involving all or nearly all characteristics (the counterpart of Tables 17 and 18). Tables 23 through 25 rank the most likely perpetrators of events committed by each group in the same way as Tables 19 through 21.

EXTENSIONS OF THE METHODOLOGY

Use of the Individual Group Files

The use of incidents data as a basis for identifying the perpetrators of unclaimed terrorist incidents has a number of limitations. It narrows the search by identifying and ranking the most likely candidates, but it cannot take it much further. For one thing, our major data source, the Rand Chronology of International Terrorism, codes only ten items of information, which may not be sufficient for a final level of analysis. But even ten items of information and the many possible variables lead quickly to a great number of combinations, dividing and subdividing the universe of events into tinier and tinier groupings.

We can theoretically elaborate the analysis by using information contained in our database of characteristics of the 29 selected terrorist groups. These files, known as the Group Files, for example, contain information on how many members of a group were usually involved in previous operations, what kinds of weapons the group uses, whether the group operate on significant dates, and so on. The Group Files contain responses to 43 questions that potentially could assist an analyst in identifying the perpetrator of an unclaimed attack. Most of these concern the group's operations and modus operandi.

**Table 22**

AVERAGE PROBABILITIES ASCRIBED TO PERPETRATORS OF UNCLAIMED ACTS BY TYPE OF CONDITIONING CHARACTERISTIC

(prior probability = 6 in all cases)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terrorist Category</th>
<th>Fatalities</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Region of Action</th>
<th>Tactic</th>
<th>Target Type</th>
<th>All But Charis.</th>
<th>All But Nationality</th>
<th>All But Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libyan</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ME</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Eur.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 23
AVERAGE PROBABILITIES ASCRIBED TO PERPETRATORS OF UNCLAIMED ACTS AND THE FOUR MOST LIKELY PERPETRATORS: ALL-PERSONALITY MODEL
(Percentages shown in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actual Perpetrator</th>
<th>Most Likely Perpetrator</th>
<th>2nd Most Likely Perpetrator</th>
<th>3rd Most Likely Perpetrator</th>
<th>4th Most Likely Perpetrator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unknown (4)</td>
<td>Latin (18)</td>
<td>Other ME (13)</td>
<td>Palest. (10)</td>
<td>Italian (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palest. (35)</td>
<td>Palest. (35)</td>
<td>Other ME (27)</td>
<td>Armenian (10)</td>
<td>French (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian (13)</td>
<td>German (33)</td>
<td>Armenian (18)</td>
<td>Italian (13)</td>
<td>French (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German (80)</td>
<td>German (80)</td>
<td>Italian (15)</td>
<td>French (9)</td>
<td>Other Eur. (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French (18)</td>
<td>Armenian (18)</td>
<td>French (18)</td>
<td>Palest. (18)</td>
<td>Other ME (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish (34)</td>
<td>Irish (34)</td>
<td>Spanish (17)</td>
<td>German (13)</td>
<td>French (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish (21)</td>
<td>Spanish (21)</td>
<td>Irish (21)</td>
<td>French (16)</td>
<td>Armenian (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian (56)</td>
<td>Asian (56)</td>
<td>Other ME (8)</td>
<td>Other (8)</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan. (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin (72)</td>
<td>Latin (72)</td>
<td>U.S. (11)</td>
<td>Unknown (7)</td>
<td>Other (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian (19)</td>
<td>Other ME (20)</td>
<td>Armenian (19)</td>
<td>Palest. (11)</td>
<td>French (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libyan (36)</td>
<td>Libya (36)</td>
<td>Palest. (17)</td>
<td>Other ME (12)</td>
<td>U.S. (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ME (32)</td>
<td>Other ME (32)</td>
<td>Palest. (22)</td>
<td>Armenian (11)</td>
<td>Libyan (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (14)</td>
<td>Spanish (16)</td>
<td>Other Eur. (14)</td>
<td>French (13)</td>
<td>Irish (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan. (31)</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan. (31)</td>
<td>Irish (15)</td>
<td>Palest. (11)</td>
<td>Other ME (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (8)</td>
<td>Palest. (22)</td>
<td>French (11)</td>
<td>Latin (9)</td>
<td>Libya (9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Probabilities were fit using claimed events only.
Table 24

AVERAGE PROBABILITIES ASCRIBED TO PERPETRATORS OF UNCLAIMED ACTS AND THE FOUR MOST LIKELY PERPETRATORS: ALL CHARACTERISTICS EXCEPT NATIONALITY
(percentages shown in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actual Perpetrator</th>
<th>Most Likely Perpetrator</th>
<th>2nd Most Likely Perpetrator</th>
<th>3rd Most Likely Perpetrator</th>
<th>4th Most Likely Perpetrator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unknown (4)</td>
<td>Latin (19)</td>
<td>Other ME (12)</td>
<td>Palest. (10)</td>
<td>Armenian (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palest. (31)</td>
<td>Palest. (31)</td>
<td>Other ME (23)</td>
<td>Asian (7)</td>
<td>Armenian (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian (14)</td>
<td>German (24)</td>
<td>Italian (14)</td>
<td>Armenian (14)</td>
<td>French (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German (44)</td>
<td>German (44)</td>
<td>Irish (14)</td>
<td>Italian (13)</td>
<td>Spanish (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French (15)</td>
<td>French (15)</td>
<td>Spanish (13)</td>
<td>Irish (12)</td>
<td>Italian (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish (20)</td>
<td>Irish (20)</td>
<td>German (20)</td>
<td>French (15)</td>
<td>Spanish (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish (13)</td>
<td>French (20)</td>
<td>Italian (16)</td>
<td>Spanish (13)</td>
<td>Armenian (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian (44)</td>
<td>Asian (44)</td>
<td>Other ME (13)</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan. (6)</td>
<td>Other Eur. (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin (68)</td>
<td>Latin (68)</td>
<td>U.S. (13)</td>
<td>Unknown (6)</td>
<td>Other (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian (12)</td>
<td>Armenian (12)</td>
<td>Other ME (11)</td>
<td>French (11)</td>
<td>Other Eur. (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libyan (36)</td>
<td>Libya (36)</td>
<td>Palest. (18)</td>
<td>Other ME (10)</td>
<td>U.S. (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ME (28)</td>
<td>Palest. (32)</td>
<td>Other ME (28)</td>
<td>Armenian (19)</td>
<td>Italian (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Eur. (10)</td>
<td>Spanish (12)</td>
<td>French (11)</td>
<td>Armenian (11)</td>
<td>Italian (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan. (23)</td>
<td>Irish (34)</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan. (23)</td>
<td>U.S. (8)</td>
<td>Armenian (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (3)</td>
<td>Libya (17)</td>
<td>Palest. (15)</td>
<td>Irish (13)</td>
<td>Latin (9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Probabilities were fit using claimed events only.
Table 24
AVERAGE PROBABILITIES ASCRIBED TO PERPETRATORS OF UNCLAIMED ACTS AND THE FOUR MOST LIKELY PERPETRATORS: ALL CHARACTERISTICS EXCEPT NATIONALITY
(percentages shown in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actual Perpetrator</th>
<th>Most Likely Perpetrator</th>
<th>2nd Most Likely Perpetrator</th>
<th>3rd Most Likely Perpetrator</th>
<th>4th Most Likely Perpetrator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unknown (4)</td>
<td>Latin (19)</td>
<td>Other ME (12)</td>
<td>Palest. (10)</td>
<td>Armenian (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palest. (31)</td>
<td>Palest. (31)</td>
<td>Other ME (23)</td>
<td>Asian (7)</td>
<td>Armenian (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian (14)</td>
<td>German (24)</td>
<td>Italian (14)</td>
<td>Armenian (14)</td>
<td>French (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German (44)</td>
<td>German (44)</td>
<td>Irish (14)</td>
<td>Italian (13)</td>
<td>Spanish (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French (15)</td>
<td>French (15)</td>
<td>Spanish (13)</td>
<td>Irish (12)</td>
<td>Italian (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish (20)</td>
<td>Irish (20)</td>
<td>German (20)</td>
<td>French (15)</td>
<td>Spanish (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish (13)</td>
<td>French (20)</td>
<td>Italian (16)</td>
<td>Spanish (13)</td>
<td>Armenian (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian (44)</td>
<td>Asian (44)</td>
<td>Other ME (13)</td>
<td>Sub-Sahar. (8)</td>
<td>Other Eur. (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin (68)</td>
<td>Latin (68)</td>
<td>U.S. (13)</td>
<td>Unknown (6)</td>
<td>Other (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian (12)</td>
<td>Armenian (12)</td>
<td>Other ME (11)</td>
<td>French (11)</td>
<td>Other Eur. (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libyan (36)</td>
<td>Libya (36)</td>
<td>Palest. (18)</td>
<td>Other ME (10)</td>
<td>U.S. (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ME (28)</td>
<td>Palest. (32)</td>
<td>Other ME (28)</td>
<td>Armenian (19)</td>
<td>Italian (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Eur. (10)</td>
<td>Spanish (12)</td>
<td>French (11)</td>
<td>Armenian (11)</td>
<td>Italian (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Sahar. (23)</td>
<td>Irish (34)</td>
<td>Sub-Sahar. (23)</td>
<td>U.S. (8)</td>
<td>Armenian (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (3)</td>
<td>Libya (17)</td>
<td>Palest. (15)</td>
<td>Irish (15)</td>
<td>Latin (9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Probabilities were fit using claimed events only.
Table 25

AVERAGE PROBABILITIES ASCRIBED TO PERPETRATORS OF UNCLAIMED ACTS AND THE FOUR MOST LIKELY PERPETRATORS: ALL CHARACTERISTICS EXCEPT REGION

(Percentages shown in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actual Perpetrator</th>
<th>Most Likely Perpetrator</th>
<th>2nd Most Likely Perpetrator</th>
<th>3rd Most Likely Perpetrator</th>
<th>4th Most Likely Perpetrator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unknown (4)</td>
<td>Italian (10)</td>
<td>German (10)</td>
<td>French (9)</td>
<td>Latin (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palest. (27)</td>
<td>Palest. (27)</td>
<td>Other ME (22)</td>
<td>Armenian (11)</td>
<td>French (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian (10)</td>
<td>German (27)</td>
<td>Armenian (15)</td>
<td>Italian (10)</td>
<td>Other Eur. (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German (54)</td>
<td>German (54)</td>
<td>Italian (13)</td>
<td>U.S. (8)</td>
<td>French (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French (12)</td>
<td>Palest. (24)</td>
<td>Armenian (18)</td>
<td>Other ME (17)</td>
<td>French (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish (31)</td>
<td>Irish (31)</td>
<td>Spanish (15)</td>
<td>German (12)</td>
<td>French (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish (18)</td>
<td>Irish (18)</td>
<td>Spanish (18)</td>
<td>French (13)</td>
<td>Other Eur. (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian (20)</td>
<td>Asian (20)</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan. (15)</td>
<td>Palest. (9)</td>
<td>Other (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin (23)</td>
<td>Latin (23)</td>
<td>Italian (12)</td>
<td>French (9)</td>
<td>Other Eur. (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian (17)</td>
<td>Other ME (19)</td>
<td>Armenian (17)</td>
<td>Palest. (14)</td>
<td>French (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libyan (45)</td>
<td>Libya (45)</td>
<td>U.S. (7)</td>
<td>Latin (6)</td>
<td>Asian (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ME (15)</td>
<td>Palest. (16)</td>
<td>Other ME (15)</td>
<td>Armenian (13)</td>
<td>Libya (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Eur. (10)</td>
<td>Spanish (17)</td>
<td>Irish (12)</td>
<td>French (11)</td>
<td>Other Eur. (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan. (11)</td>
<td>German (20)</td>
<td>U.S. (12)</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan. (11)</td>
<td>Armenian (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (5)</td>
<td>Libya (17)</td>
<td>Palest. (16)</td>
<td>French (14)</td>
<td>Other ME (7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Probabilities were fit using claimed events only.
We can use the Group Files in two ways. First, we can create a statistical profile of a group's *modus operandi* based upon responses in the files and try to match it with the information available about a particular incident. In this way, we would be dealing with only two or three of the most likely candidates identified by the analyst or through the use of the incident files. The second approach would be to create an interactive rule-based system that interrogates the user about the characteristics of the event and identifies the most likely perpetrator(s) based upon rules derived from the groups' *modus operandi*.

Even using the coded information in the Group Files, though, it would be extraordinarily difficult to correctly identify the perpetrators of unclaimed events or events claimed by previously unheard-of groups. The operations of new groups can easily appear identical to those of old groups. Intelligence sources, ballistics tests, documents found in hideouts, or the testimony of terrorists captured years later may provide the information that causes observers to lean one way or the other. It is doubtful that any coded database, no matter how comprehensive, would pick up such fine details.

**Using a Different Incident Database**

Our analysis of probable perpetrators of unclaimed terrorist events is based largely on the 2,670 incidents in Rand's Chronology of International Terrorism. Nothing in the methodology, however, is closely linked to this data base. A more detailed data base, such as the Group Files, might enable us to compare smaller subsets of groups.

The validity of the analysis rests upon the events reported being representative of future events and on the availability of a small but complete list of terrorist groups. (A catch-all category of "unknown" is legitimate, but the more diverse the members of this class are, the poorer the predictive power of the database will be.)
V. AN ANALYSIS OF THE TARGETING
OF AMERICANS BY SELECTED TERRORIST
ORGANIZATIONS, 1980-1982

American targets—private citizens, corporations, and agencies of the
government—have increasingly been the victims of terrorist violence
abroad. Which groups of terrorists are most likely to target Americans? The general level of activity varies from group to group (see
Table 26), and some groups are more lethal than others. But neither
levels nor types of activity indicate whether Americans are likely tar-
gets. Other indicators are needed to deal with that question. Thus we
have performed an analysis to determine whether we can predict which
groups might attack Americans and under what conditions.

One generalization can be made at the outset: For obvious reasons,
separatists, even the most violent, generally refrain from attacking
Americans (see Table 27). They are generally individuals residing in a
specific area, sharing a common culture, and chafing under the political
control of either another culture or an alien administration. Since the
U.S. government is not the oppressor, Americans are not targets. On
the contrary, the United States is a potential ally whose recognition
the separatists covet and whose economic aid would be invaluable.

The exception to this rule are the transnational separatists, who
have attacked American targets and are likely to do so in the future.
Transnational separatists, like traditional separatists, seek to establish
a nation where none presently exists. But they operate across national
boundaries, and they often use members of their own national popula-
tions living outside of the homeland as a base of support. Sometimes
these groups are not trying to create a new nation but to resurrect an
old one that no longer exists.

The most active transnational separatist movement is that devoted
to the cause of Palestine. Although Palestine has ceased to exist as a
political entity, Palestinians have remained in the “occupied” areas
under Israeli control, in refugee camps throughout the Arab world, and
elsewhere in the Middle East.

Palestinians have repeatedly attacked Israelis in Israel, and they
have also launched raids outside the region they seek to control. This
behavior pattern is not unusual—the IRA, for example, has attacked
British targets in West Germany. But the Palestinians have devoted
approximately one-third of their total activity to attacking foreigners,
Table 26
TERRORIST VIOLENCE, BY REGION, 1980–1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terrorist Group</th>
<th>Total Incidents</th>
<th>International Incidents</th>
<th>Attacks on Americans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Latin America</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIR (Movimiento de Izquierda</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolucionarias)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-19</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemalans (4 groups)</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SL (Sendero Luminoso)</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Europe</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INLA (Irish National Liberation Army)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL (Prima Linea)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETA (Basque Homeland and Liberty)</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BR (Brigate Rosse)</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD (Action Directe)</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF (Red Army Faction)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIRA ( Provisional Irish Republican Army)</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle East</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish groups (3 groups)</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Africa</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC (African National Congress)</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Asia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transnational</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenians (2 groups)</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinians (6 groups)</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*aTotal number of incidents, both domestic and international.

*bIncidents with an international element (target of a different nationality than that of attacker or target attacked in a country other than the home country of the attacker.

*cFor purposes of analysis, several groups were subsumed in these national and ethnic categories.*
primarily because Israeli counterterrorist activity has made it extremely difficult for them to attack targets within Israel. Thus, Palestinians have attacked Israeli, Jewish, and non-Jewish property and individuals abroad. Americans have suffered in some of these attacks, sometimes simply because they were in the vicinity. The 1982 bombing of Goldenberg’s restaurant in Paris, for example, killed Americans, as did the 1973 attack on Puerto Rican pilgrims at Ben Gurion Airport. Neither of these particular attacks was directed against Americans, but sometimes Americans are hit precisely because they are Americans and as such are perceived as allies of Israel and therefore fair game. The recent bombings of American companies in Spain in retaliation for presumed American support of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon indicate that private companies may henceforth be at risk for what is perceived as a hostile American foreign policy. Because these events occurred only in Spain, however, they might also be an isolated phenomenon.
Another transnational separatist movement is that of the Armenians who are seeking to regain a land which is now under the control of Russia and Turkey. Turkey is the principal target of Armenian ire because that country deported and massacred perhaps as many as 1 million Armenians during World War I. The Ankara government not only refuses to seek forgiveness for the massacre, it will not even acknowledge that it occurred. (Because of their left-wing ideology and their identification with the Palestinian cause, Armenian terrorists apparently have refrained from attacking Soviet representatives, even though the Soviet Union controls a substantial portion of the former Armenian nation.)

The Armenian groups have attacked Turkish and American targets both in the United States and abroad. Although official representatives of the Turkish government have been the most popular targets, Armenian terrorists have also assaulted Americans whom they suspect of favoring the Turkish cause. They have not attacked representatives of the American government, but they have bombed American firms, particularly airlines that service Turkey. These companies may be targeted because they provide access to Turkey for the world, although Armenian proclamations make it clear that left-wing hostility toward “imperialist” corporations is also a motive.

Armenians and Palestinians might launch future attacks against American targets out of frustration. Since neither group has been able to affect the occupying power directly, they strike out at anyone they believe to be an ally of their enemy. Both groups share a culture and operate in a part of the world where violence is a common method of expression. Thus, even though the United States cannot be considered the principal enemy, Americans may suffer, either as targets or as bystanders.

TERRORIST SELECTION OF FOREIGN TARGETS

Various terrorist organizations attack foreigners, including Americans, residing either inside the subject country or abroad. These organizations fall into three categories: (1) groups such as the RAF and Action Directe that have devoted a substantial portion of their activity to foreign targets; (2) groups such as the left-wing Turkish terrorist groups, M-19, and Sendero Luminoso that have devoted between 10 and 15 percent of their activities to attacks on foreigners; and (3) organizations such as the Guatemalans and M-19 that occasionally target foreigners residing in the home nation (see Table 28).

1The RAF and Action Directe have attacked foreigners residing in Germany and France, respectively, without crossing national boundaries.
A group that assaults foreigners is not necessarily apt to attack Americans. For example, based on past performance, there is less than a 5 percent chance that the FARC or M-19, the leading Colombian terrorist organizations, would target an American. In other nations, however, Americans would constitute the prime target if local terrorists were to attack foreigners. The RAF, Sendero Luminoso, and Turkish terrorist groups, for example, have a preference for assaulting Americans (see Table 29).

The percentages of attacks against foreigners, however, do not describe the entire situation, because they do not show the quality of the violence. Murder is obviously more significant than a symbolic bombing, and a symbolic bombing is more dangerous than a telephoned bomb threat. Unfortunately, the available statistics are not always specific. Nonetheless, past activities indicate not only that the RAF constitutes a danger to Americans, but that there are others—the Turkish groups, Action Directe, Sendero Luminoso, and the Guatemalan groups—which, while not statistically important, have inflicted damage on American targets (see Table 30).
Table 20
PROPORTION OF AMERICANS INVOLVED IN ATTACKS AGAINST FOREIGNERS, 1980–1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Percentage of All Attacks Directed Against Foreigners</th>
<th>Percentage of Attacks Directed Against Americans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenians</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinians</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action Directe</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INLA</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish groups</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SL</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIR</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemalans</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Brigades</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIRA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The figures for some groups are distorted. For example, there is no state of Armenia, and many individuals in Armenian terrorist groups are citizens of states other than Turkey. Thus, all the incidents involving Armenians are directed against foreigners, i.e., Turks, or those perceived to be Turkish allies. Likewise, the targets of the Palestinian groups are Israelis or those perceived to be allies of Israel. On the other hand, although the members of the ETA consider themselves Basques, they are Spanish citizens. Hence, when they attack what they view as the occupying force, they are conducting an act of domestic terrorism, unless the act occurs abroad.*
AN ANALYSIS OF THE TARGETING OF AMERICANS

Table 30
PROBABILITY OF A GROUP ENGAGING IN ANTI-AMERICAN ACTIVITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Likelihood of Attack (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SL</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-19</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenians</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemalans</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BR</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIRA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIR</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INLA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These probabilities were obtained by a simple extrapolation of past events. They do not take into account possible changes of circumstances or policies.

Not all Americans run equal risks as potential targets. The RAF and the Turkish groups have primarily targeted U.S. military personnel; the Guatemalan groups and Action Directe have assaulted diplomats and businessmen; others single out American businessmen. Also, some groups are more lethal than others (see Table 31).

What, if any, characteristics do these groups share? And does information about these organizations enable us to draw some generalizations that would help to predict the possibility of attacks on Americans? We have developed some hypotheses that offer insights into these questions.

Cultural Factors

All of the terrorist groups we studied operate in areas where political violence is endemic or where there is a long tradition of instability. Turkey, Peru, Colombia, and Guatemala are nations in which unrest is the norm. France and Germany, while apparently stable, have been
## Table 31
TERRORIST INCIDENTS INVOLVING AMERICANS, BY TYPE OF TACTIC, NUMBER OF CASUALTIES, AND TARGET TYPE, 1980–1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>No. and Types of Actions</th>
<th>Total Casualties</th>
<th>Types of Targets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Action Directe</td>
<td>2 attacks in inst. 6 bombings 2 shootings 1 threat</td>
<td>1 fatality 1 injured</td>
<td>6 diplomatic 5 business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenians</td>
<td>3 bombings</td>
<td>8 injured</td>
<td>3 airlines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC</td>
<td>2 kidnappings</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 diplomatic 1 priv. citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemalans</td>
<td>6 kidnappings 3 attacks on inst. 1 bombing 5 shootings</td>
<td>6 fatalities 1 injured</td>
<td>5 diplomatic 5 business 1 military 1 priv. citizen 1 gov't. official 3 religious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-19</td>
<td>1 kidnapping 1 threat</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 diplomatic 1 priv. citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>2 bombings</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2 business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Brigades</td>
<td>1 kidnapping</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>7 attacks on inst. 12 bombings 2 shootings 1 threat</td>
<td>42 injured</td>
<td>1 diplomatic 1 business 17 military 1 priv. citizen 2 transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sendero Luminoso</td>
<td>6 bombings</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3 diplomatic 3 business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF</td>
<td>1 kidnapping</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 priv. citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish groups</td>
<td>5 bombings 3 shootings</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 diplomatic 7 military</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
wracked by terrorist violence, and their democratic institutions have been disdained if not denigrated by various discontented groups.

Ideology

All the terrorist groups examined possess rigid authoritarian ideologies, primarily Marxist, which see class war and violence as a legitimate method of political expression. These groups, often led by educated, middle- and upper-middle-class youths, define the enemy as the wealthy or bourgeois who constitute an impediment to social reform. In some cases, terrorists believe that the national political process has not permitted change to occur. In others, although the political system appears to represent the will of the people, it does not elect leaders whom the terrorists favor. Consequently, they brand the system as corrupt and call for its destruction.

Identification of Americans as Allies of the National Bourgeoisie

Most of the terrorist groups identify the United States specifically as an ally of “the oppressive oligarchy” or as an “occupying force” that supports the status quo in their countries. Attacking the United States, they reason, could weaken the repressive regime and might even be equated with a war of national liberation. For this reason, American private citizens, diplomats, the military, and multinational corporations have all been targets. The anti-American violence varies from nation to nation and tends to be directed against American business more often than against U.S. diplomats. Interestingly, one Latin American nation with a history of violence, Chile, has not been the site of any attacks on Americans. This may indicate either government success in protecting American targets or a reluctance by terrorists to attack U.S. targets because there are other, more compelling targets.

Some groups attack American targets because they identify the United States as an ally of the government of the principal target nation or the national bourgeoisie. This hypothesis might explain the behavior of the RAF and Action Directe, although each organization has attacked only one category of Americans as targets: The RAF has assaulted military personnel and installations; Action Directe has attacked only multinational corporations, particularly those involved with computers. In both cases, the Americans are considered as either supporters or allies of the existing regimes. The U.S. Army is regarded as the occupying force in a war of national economic liberation, and American corporations are considered an element oppressing the working class.
MOTIVATIONS AND TIMING

While the reasons for which certain groups attack Americans remain unclear, certain trends have emerged: The time span between the formation of units and their first attack on an American target has diminished. There has been a telescoping effect, and newer groups are more willing than older terrorist organizations to assault U.S. targets (see Table 32).

In groups created before 1970, approximately 9 years elapsed from the time of formation to the first assault on an American target. Organizations created between 1970 and 1975 were in existence an average of approximately 6.1 years before attacking an American target. The post-1975 organizations undertook their first assault on an American target an average of 1.8 years after their formation. This is crucial, because it indicates that we must immediately consider all new terrorist organizations as potential attackers and take countermeasures when possible.

Many factors motivate terrorists to attack Americans. Proximity is extremely important. Terrorists will attack Americans only if they are within reach. Otherwise, guerrillas will direct their attention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Year of Formation</th>
<th>Year of 1st Attack on U.S. Target</th>
<th>Elapsed Time (yrs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGP</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFLP</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BR</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLAPU</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-19</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dev Yol</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASALA</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCAG</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dev Sol</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SL</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
elsewhere. The MNLF, which operates in the rural portions of the Philippine Islands, did not assault its first American target until 1982, more than ten years after its founding. Conversely, as Americans become more ubiquitous, they become easier prey for terrorists operating in rural areas.

As terrorism became more international in the 1970s, organizations that had tended to be insular in their target selection expanded their horizons. This change in part represented an outgrowth of a movement that tended to view its enemies as a series of conspiracies. The enemy was not simply the local political regime but a world movement—Zionism, multinational corporations, or world capitalism—which created a network of interlocking interests and hence constituted new targets. Similarly, terrorists, all suffering from the same oppressive forces, became de facto allies in the world struggle of liberation. In short, both targets and friends proliferated. The United States, as the principal ally of Israel, the purveyor of weapons to oppressive governments, the site of the multinational corporations, and the quintessential capitalist society, emerged as the principal enemy. By attacking Americans, terrorists could punish not only the "great Satan" but also its lackey: the local exploiters. Thus, for example, attacks have been made against U.S. personnel and installations in Guatemala, Iran, and Spain to protest American support of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon.

Other factors are also at work. Terrorists tend to copy each other. Thus when one guerrilla organization moves against Americans, others jump on the bandwagon. In the 1960s, when world opinion opposed U.S. involvement in Vietnam, anti-American sentiment increased. Even Guatemala, which heretofore had not constituted a danger zone, became a very dangerous area for American diplomats and military personnel.

CONCLUSIONS

Terrorist groups differ in tactics and targets. Some, like the MNLF or ETA, direct their hostility toward domestic targets, while others almost exclusively attack foreigners. Indigenous separatists generally refrain from assaulting Americans. Transnational separatists, while they have attacked U.S. citizens and property, generally do not constitute the greatest danger.

The most potentially lethal elements for Americans are ideologically motivated groups. The most dangerous elements are those that operate in a nation or area where political violence is traditional. The groups
most likely to attack Americans are those that espouse an ideology, generally but not exclusively Marxist, that condones class war and violence. Finally, and most significant, terrorist organizations that attack U.S. targets perceive that Americans are supporting an oppressive political regime and that their attack will somehow accelerate the fall of that regime. Groups that combine these characteristics—endemic political violence, espousal of a Marxist or other class-war ideology, and a traditional perception of the United States as oppressor—have a higher probability of attacking Americans.

Clearly, events can occur in a given area that will alter the possibility of attacks on Americans. The deployment of Pershing II missiles could increase the chances of attacks on Americans in Italy, a nation where few U.S. citizens have been attacked. The stationing of American advisors in El Salvador led to the assassination of a naval officer in a country where anti-American violence had tended to be rhetorical rather than physical. And the African National Congress, which has traditionally acted in a very restrained manner, recently bombed a government agency and a U.S. Air Force headquarters in South Africa, causing widespread damage and injuries to innocent people.
VI. SOME POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO DEVELOPING TERRORIST GROUP PROFILES

The analyses presented in Sections IV and V are illustrative of ways in which broad analytical questions can be addressed using the databases we have created. This section discusses some specific approaches to developing comprehensive profiles of individual terrorist groups.

Many of the responses to the codebook questionnaire are either numerical (i.e., yes or no, one or zero, tallies, counts (integers), or values in a continuous range) or convertible to numerical values. While not all data converted to numerical values represent quantities—some information, such as country of origin, may be given numerical code values—some measures of similarity (or dissimilarity) among groups can be put into numerical form. Moreover, data that represent quantitative information can be used to produce measures, i.e., indices of characteristics, traits, or other properties of terrorist groups. These indices can also be used as measures of comparison, and, perhaps more important, they can be used to generate and test hypotheses about whether or not certain features or characteristics are correlated with others.

The indices should range over a scale that has practical meaning for a variety of characteristics, such as:

- Local → global (international)
- Less ideological → more ideological
- Very homogeneous → very heterogeneous
- Fixed, narrow goal → varied, diffuse goals
- Less violent → more violent
- Not lethal → very lethal (many fatalities per action)
- Poorly financed → well financed
- Very independent → captive of wide political movement
- Rural → urban
- Left-wing → right-wing
- Small group → large group
- Nonmilitary → paramilitary
- Unsophisticated weaponry → very sophisticated weaponry
- Low level of activity → very high level of activity
- Very ethnic → no ethnicity
- Little cooperation with other groups → much cooperation with other groups

67
DISPLAYS OF RESULTS

With these indices, one can produce bar graphs of the component data for each group, along with the indices themselves. Figure 1 shows such a chart for the characteristic of lethality. For demonstration purposes, we selected four types of terrorist actions: assassinations or shootings, bombings, kidnappings, and assaults on installations. Numbers of fatalities produced by seven terrorist groups in such attacks were summed and divided by the number of acts in each class. Dividing the resulting lethality for these groups by the average lethality of a larger number of groups (in this case, 25) and weighting by the fraction of activity in each class, then summing, produced an index of lethality for each group. The detailed formulation of this application is discussed at the end of this section.

Any data that are represented on a scale (and any indices derived from such data) can also be displayed in histograms. Dividing each scale into a set of appropriately sized subintervals and making a tally of the numbers (scores) that fall in each subinterval produces a graph of "boxes" whose respective heights are the totals in each subinterval and whose widths are the widths of the respective subintervals. A sample histogram is shown in Fig. 2. Cumulative-frequency histograms can also be derived by successively adding the increments that are equal to the frequencies (heights) in the histogram of Fig. 2 to produce something that looks like Fig. 3. Smooth curves, of course, could be fitted and drawn to replace these boxy histograms.

The smoothed cumulative-frequency curve is useful for determining percentiles. For example, if the vertical scale is "normalized to unity" (i.e., the numbers on the vertical scale are divided by the maximum value) and a score is taken for the characteristics or index for a terrorist group on the horizontal scale, a vertical line drawn to the smoothed curve and a horizontal line drawn to the vertical scale meet at the percentile at which that terrorist group stands with regard to the data, characteristic, or index represented by the curve.

COMPARING TERRORIST GROUPS

To compare two terrorist groups for similarity or dissimilarity over a set of characteristics, one needs a measure of "distance." Characteristics are either qualitative or quantitative. Qualitative characteristics include country of origin, religion, ideology, rural versus urban, class (workers or students, etc.), and nonnumerical features that may be made numerical for codification but not for measurement purposes. Questionnaire items that can be answered yes, no, never, seldom, often,
Fig. 1—Lethality of selected terrorist groups
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING TERRORIST GROUPS

Fig. 2—Sample histogram

Fig. 3—Histogram of cumulative frequencies
or always are qualitative. Quantitative characteristics are those for which a measured or tallied score is obtained (e.g., numbers of bombings or killings per year, estimated size of group, estimated numbers of weapons of various types possessed).

To illustrate the methodology, let us assume that there are \( m \) qualitative features and that they are numerically codified by variables \( a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_m \). Thus, a yes or no answer on an item \( i \) whose symbol was \( a_i \) would have two possible values: \( a_i = 1 \) for yes or \( a_i = 0 \) for no. Similarly, let the number of quantitative items be \( n \) and let the items be designated \( b_1, b_2, \ldots, b_n \). These qualitative and quantitative items will not all have the same level of importance or significance when one tries to distinguish between terrorist groups, so an importance weighting must be attached to each variable. We assume the weightings are \( u_1, u_2, \ldots, u_m \) for variables \( a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_m \), and \( v_1, v_2, \ldots, v_n \) for variables \( b_1, b_2, \ldots, b_n \). Then a measure of the similarity or dissimilarity (a measure of "distance") between two terrorist groups, \( A \) and \( B \), that have the characteristics \( a_1(A), a_2(A), \ldots, a_m(A), b_1(A), b_2(A), \ldots, b_n(A) \) and \( a_1(B), a_2(B), \ldots, a_m(B), b_1(B), b_2(B), \ldots, b_n(B) \), respectively, is given by

\[
|a_1(A) - a_1(B)|u_1 + |a_2(A) - a_2(B)|u_2 + \ldots + |a_m(A) - a_m(B)|u_m \\
|b_1(A) - b_1(B)|v_1 + |b_2(A) - b_2(B)|v_2 + \ldots + |b_n(A) - b_n(B)|v_n
\]

(The vertical bars, absolute value signs, signify that the difference is to be taken between the two enclosed quantities, and the sign is to be kept if positive and changed to positive if it is negative.)

Another measure of similarity or dissimilarity between groups \( A \) and \( B \) could be obtained by replacing each of the differences that appear in the absolute value signs by the squares of the differences and taking the positive square root of the resulting sum. (Other measures of difference could be defined as well.)

How the weights are to be determined will require some experimentation or research. Groups known to be quite similar or dissimilar for reasons beyond the scoring characteristics can be put in pairs of their scores for \( a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_m, b_1, b_2, \ldots, b_n \) in one of the measures of difference above to derive an optimum set of values of the weights \( u_1, \ldots, u_m, v_1, \ldots, v_n \), using relatively standard fitting techniques. As new data and other intelligence are received, the optimum weights can be revised.
A less precise but perhaps more graphic representation of the differences between two groups can be shown on a graph similar to a bar chart for each of the two groups, as shown in Fig. 4.

We have not yet determined how to normalize the scales for each item \((a_1, \ldots, a_m, b_1, \ldots, b_n)\) so that these difference profiles are somehow matched to or indicative of the degree of similarity between the groups. The variability in each characteristic over all groups (standard duration, perhaps) and some measure of relative importance of the characteristic should undoubtedly be factors in adjusting the scales.

**MEASURING LETHALITY**

To illustrate the possibilities for comparing terrorist groups on the basis of a particular property, we examine here the characteristic of lethality for seven groups: the Provisional IRA, the RAF, the ETA, the PFLP and the PFLP-GC, the ASALA, and the JCAG. We are not comparing total numbers killed by each group, but we use those data in determining relative lethality. We compare a four-year time span—not necessarily the same four years for each group, but years that more or less overlap. The total numbers killed in four years by these seven groups are 122, 15, 251, 128, 202, 27, and 13 persons. We determine the lethality of the groups by determining the numbers of fatalities produced per incident in each class of incident. We also define a lethality index, that is, an appropriately weighted index for four classes of incidents for which we have some data on the probabilities of

![Fig. 4—Profiles of terrorist characteristics](image-url)
fatalities: assassinations or shootings, bombings, kidnappings, and assaults on installations.

Figure 1 showed the results in these four classes of incidents for the seven groups, the average for all groups for which we have some data, and an index of lethality for each group. The averages for assassinations or shootings were obtained from 26 groups (average = 1.55); for bombings, from 25 groups (average = 1.09); for kidnappings, from 14 groups (average = .716); and for assaults in installations, from 19 groups (average = 2.1). Standard deviations were also obtained but are not shown. (They were quite large, i.e., had high variability.) The individual averages over varying years in each class of incident are shown in Fig. 1. The numerical results used to produce this figure are given in Table 33.

The lethality index for each group was obtained by weighting the ratio of the lethality of each group in each class of incident to the average by the fraction of total incidents in each class for that group. For instance, the lethality index for the PFLP was computed as follows:

$$\frac{2.93}{1.55} \times \frac{14}{73} + \frac{1.41}{1.09} \times \frac{44}{73} + \frac{0.5}{0.716} \times \frac{2.09}{2.1} \times \frac{11}{73} = 1.33$$

The PFLP engaged in 73 incidents, including 14 assassinations or shootings and 44 bombings for which we have data.

We also obtained frequency and cumulative-frequency data for bombing fatalities as an illustrative exercise. The cumulative data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Attack</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Assassinations</th>
<th>Bombings</th>
<th>Kidnappings</th>
<th>Attacks on Inst.</th>
<th>Lethality Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IRA</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFLP</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETA</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFLP-GC</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>5.82</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASALA</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCAG</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
were obtained from accumulating the frequencies. The frequency graph was informally, not mathematically, fitted to histogram data; i.e., tallies were made in each subinterval of length 0.5 from 0 to 7.5. The result is shown in Fig. 5.

The cumulative curve was also roughly fitted and is shown in Fig. 6. Its utility lies in displaying at a glance which lethality percentile any individual group lies in with regard to any particular activity. For example, the PFLP-GC is at around the 95th percentile in bombings, the IRA at around the 80th percentile.

Indices for other characteristics such as internationality, age of members, rural/urban distributions, financing, etc., could enable hypotheses to be developed about whether two factors—say, ethnicity and lethality—are positively or negatively correlated, or not correlated at all. To do this, however, we need the indices for a statistically significant number of groups. On a more sophisticated level, multiple correlations are possible if sufficient data are available.

Fig. 5—Frequency distribution of bombing fatalities
Possible Approaches to Profiling a Terrorist Group

Fig. 6—Cumulative-frequency distribution curve
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The number of incidents in Rand's Chronology of International Terrorism has grown to such proportions that a reliable, computerized quantitative analysis is needed to apply the available information to important questions concerning terrorism. The analyst attempting to identify the perpetrators of an unclaimed action or estimate the probability that a particular group will attack American targets usually forms a preliminary opinion on the basis of the available information. But he must rely on a computer to express this probability with any degree of precision.

Systematic quantitative analysis is particularly useful in instances where two or more groups appear to be equally likely to have committed a particular unclaimed action. If the modus operandi and other relevant characteristics point to either group, statistical analysis can reveal which group in fact has the "edge." The statistical results can also provide a "second opinion" that may effectively supplement (or contradict) the expert's conclusions regarding the incident.

The principal limitations of our methodology are similar to those of other statistical efforts applied to human affairs. Their greatest virtue, precision in terms of percentages, may be misleading. Also, we can never include enough variables to cover all of the aspects of an incident. Finally, to the extent that prediction is the goal of the analytical effort, the element of change cannot be integrated into the analysis. Thus, terrorist groups that have, say, limited their attacks to local populations in a particular country may begin to attack U.S. targets if U.S. policy or actions should change in that country. Or a new generation of members in a terrorist group may change both the targets and the methods of the group. For example, the Revolutionary Cells in Germany, whose principal distinguishing feature for the past several years has been the avoidance of killing or even seriously injuring people, may, in the opinion of some observers, be about to adopt deadlier methods. Such changes would lead to atypical behavior, on the basis of the available data, and could skew any analysis intended to identify the perpetrators of an unclaimed act.

The principal advantage, however, of the conceptual framework is its ability to absorb new information as it becomes available, providing the basis for new analyses, both qualitative and quantitative.
Appendix A

ATTRIBUTES OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

Name of Group ________________________

A. ORGANIZATION

A1. Any significance of the name such as a significant date, signal event, mentor, etc.?
A2,3. Does the group use subnames for specific operations? List.
A4,5. Does it ever use different names? If different names, list.
A6. When was the group founded?
A7,8. Origins of the group: predecessors; a splinter from some other group; a result of a merger? List names of any original groups.
A9,10. Has the group produced offspring groups or splinters? What are their names?
A11. What is the group’s relationship with its offspring?
A12. Describe the organizational structure (for example: combat cells, support cells, columns, commands, etc.)
A13,14. Are there branches or separate operational elements in different parts of the world? If any, list.
A15,16. Number of members.
A20. Sources of recruits?
A21. Method of recruiting?
A22. Have there been defections?
A23. How are defectors treated by the group?

B. LEADERSHIP

B1. Name of leader(s) and any biographical details. (Use separate entries for each person, B1a, B1b, etc.)
B2. Names of other key members such as theoreticians, specialists, etc., and any biographical details. (Use separate entries for each person, B2a, B2b, etc.)

C. DEMOGRAPHY

C1. Nationality of members.
C2. Regional origins? (e.g., Basques, Sardinians, etc.)
C3. Median age of individual leaders.
C5. Median age of members—non-leadership.
C7. Observable changes in overall age of members (non-leadership): getting younger, older?
C8. Apparent duration of membership in the group. Any indication of previous membership in other groups?
C10,11. Are there, or have there been separate definable generations or cohorts within the group?
C12. Are the members mostly of urban or rural origin?
C14. Any dominant religious affiliation? For example, members of a specific sect.
C15. What percentage of the membership is full-time?
C16. What percentage of the membership is female?
C17–19. Educational level and areas of study: secondary schooling, university graduates, dropouts?
C20. Specialized skills: military experience; scientific or medical training; technical training.
C21,22. Any evidence of the presence of criminals within the group? If members have criminal records, what are the crimes?
C23. Physical and mental health.
C24. Any dominant ethnic origin?

D. IDEOLOGY, DOCTRINE, AND GOALS

D1. Ideology
D2. How well developed is the ideology? Are members well-informed or is it a matter of sloganeering?
D3. Are there thinkers or intellectual mentors outside of the group?
D4. What are the goals? Are there immediate versus long-range goals? Are they specific?
D5. Are the goals parochial (autonomy), nationalistic (revolution), or internationalist?
D6. Are the goals described by the group or must they be inferred?
D7. Are the goals realistically obtainable?
D8. Do the members envisage a long struggle? Are they millenials (a new world after chaos?)

E. PSYCHOLOGY, MINDSET, AND DECISIONMAKING

E1. Psychological characteristics of members per observers?
E2. Any evidence of cultural influences or national traits as they affect choice of tactics or targets?
E3,4. Who does the group pattern itself after?
E5. Who has the group ever considered its constituents?
E6. Does it appear that public attitudes have ever constrained targeting, tactics, volume of activity, or choice of weapons?
E7. Does the group see power as coming up from the people or descending from some heroic figure?
E8. Are group members inclined to surrender if cornered or fight until death? Are they suicidal? Will they take enormous risks?
E9. Do imprisoned members refuse to talk or do they cooperate with authorities by giving information?
E10,11. Is the group inclined to innovate or does it operate within a fairly limited repertoire? If innovative does it innovate in tactics, or targets?
E12. Describe the decisionmaking process. For example, democratic with a great deal of discussion among members; hierarchical with operational elements receiving orders from a headquarters?

F. FUNDING AND LOGISTICS

F1. Estimate annual budget.
F2. Sources of funding: bank robberies, ransoms, protection rackets, contributions from sympathizers, patron states, etc.
F3. Do the amounts raised from known sources equal the estimated size of the budget?

F4. How does the organization move money? Any accounts of laundering? Where is the money kept?

F5. Any evidence of investments, portfolios, etc.?

F6,7. Are any members salaried? If so, estimate amount per month for an average group member.

F8. How do members travel, infiltrate, avoid border or airport security?

F9. Sources of weapons: stolen from arsenals; purchased on the black market; provided by supporting states?

F10. Sources of explosives.

F11. Employment and sources of any other specialized equipment: receivers, transmitters, etc.

F12. Location and description of caches and inventories found by authorities.

F13. Have group members ever operated as commissioned mercenaries?

G. OPERATIONS AND MODUS OPERANDI

G1,2. Have there been any reports of terrorist operations by the group since 1968? Give number of operations per year, if known, per tactic, and fatalities, if any.
   A. Kidnappings
   B. Assaults on installations
   C. Hijackings
   D. Bombings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations
   F. Assassinations and shootings

G3. How many people were usually involved in each type of terrorist operation?
   A. Kidnappings
   B. Assaults on installations
   C. Hijackings
   D. Bombings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations
   F. Assassinations and shootings
G4,5. Has the group ever disclaimed responsibility for particular terrorist operations? Under what circumstances was responsibility disclaimed?
   A. Kidnappings
   B. Assaults on installations
   C. Hijackings
   D. Bombings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations
   F. Assassinations and shootings

G6,7. Has the group ever taken hostages? If so, has the group ever made demands for the exchange of hostages? What were the demands? disclaimed?
   A. Kidnappings
   C. Hijackings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations

G8. Has it ever imposed deadlines in hostage situations?
   A. Kidnappings
   C. Hijackings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations

G9-11. Has it ever killed hostages? How often? Has it ever killed hostages if deadline was not met?
   A. Kidnappings
   C. Hijackings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations

G12. Have group members ever surrendered in hostage episodes?
   C. Hijackings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations

G13. Has the group ever released some of the hostages during terrorist operations?
   C. Hijackings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations

G14. Identify types of targets for each tactic below, and indicate how long they have been targets.
    (Types: Diplomatic, business, military, police, airlines, private citizens, utilities, energy facilities, government, including politicians in and out of office, exiles, religious, maritime, nuclear material, towns, transportation, other terrorists, and other.)
   A. Kidnappings
   B. Assaults on installations
C. Hijackings
D. Bombings
E. Barricade and hostage situations
F. Assassinations and shootings
G. Credible threats, thwarted conspiracies
H. Guerrilla-type actions

G15. Give nationality of targets and indicate how long they have been targets.

QUESTIONS 16-20 SHOULD ONLY BE ANSWERED IF THERE WERE ANY REPORTS OF BOMBINGS BY THE GROUP SINCE 1968. IF THERE WERE NO BOMBINGS< GO TO QUESTION 21.

G16. What was the intent of the group's bombing actions: symbolic only, to cause property damage, public disruption, assassination, or indiscriminate?

G17. Give details of explosives used in bombings.
G18. Give details of timing and fusing devices used in bombings.

G19. Give details of location and timing of bombings.

G20. Does the group provide prior warning of its bombings?

G21. Describe any barricade and hostage incidents reported since 1968. Indicate the date and duration of each hostage episode carried out by the group, and the number of fatalities, and any other pertinent details.

G22,23. Have there been any reports of credible threats or thwarted conspiracies by the group since 1968? If so, indicate how many, if known, per year.

G24,25. Have there been any reports of guerrilla-type or large-scale military activities by the group since 1968? If so, indicate how many, if known, per year.

G26. How many people were usually involved in the guerrilla-type actions or large-scale military activities?

QUESTIONS 27-50 APPLY TO ALL TACTICS.

G27. Is there a strategy that is stated or can be inferred?
G29. Does the group operate on significant dates?
G30. Are there seasonal campaigns?
G31. Observable escalation or de-escalation?
G32. Dispersal or deployment of members within a country or internationally?
G33. How many members chosen for the missions?
G34,35. Proportion of activity that is international? Has this proportion changed over time?
G36. In what way is the group international: the group operates locally but selects foreign targets, or the group carries out operations abroad?
G37. If operations are carried out abroad, do operational elements go out from one country or do local elements carry out the operation?
G38. How far abroad does the group operate; list countries where operations have taken place?
G39,40. Area of operations: urban or rural?
G41. List known sanctuaries and how long they have provided sanctuary.
G42. What kinds of weapons have ever been used in the group’s operations?
G43. Does the group use special or improvised weapons or other equipment peculiar to the group?
G44. Has the group ever carried out operations on behalf of imprisoned comrades?
G45. Does the group ever use disguises in operations?
G46. Any use of diversionary operations?
G47. Are the group’s operations successful, according to what criteria?
G48. Number of fatalities attributed to the group over time.
G49. Amount of property damage attributed to the group over time.
G50. Does the group make an effort to avoid casualties?

H. COMMUNICATIONS

H1. By what means and in what language(s) do group members communicate internally? (Including while in prison.)
H2,3. By what means (above group spokesmen; communiques sent to the press; extorted publication of manifestos) and in what language(s) do the group members communicate externally?
H4. Does the group have any peculiarities of language or terminology?
H5. Does the group produce a high volume of literature?
H6. Does the group communicate only in connection with actions or does it communicate inbetween actions?

H7. Has the group claimed credit for all or most of the actions attributed to it?

H8. What methods has the group ever used for claiming credit?

H9. Does the group ever use any codes to insure the credibility of the communication?

H10. Is there coordination or orchestration of the group's communications?

H11. Is there a press office?

H12. Does the group communicate from several locations simultaneously?

H13. If the group makes demands, how are they communicated: through the operational team or to the media directly?

H14. Describe any propaganda victories the group may have achieved.

H15. How soon after the event has the group usually claimed credit?

I. EXTERNAL RELATIONS

I1. Does the group currently have an above ground support apparatus, such as a political party that provides it with support or explains its actions?

I2. How many active sympathizers currently support the group—people who participate in demonstrations, etc., but do not engage in illegal acts?

I3. How many sympathizers have participated in illegal acts in support of the group?

I4. Who are the group's current sympathizers? (Workers, nationalists, ethnic groups, peasants, students, etc.)

I5. Are the estimated numbers of sympathizers increasing or decreasing?

I6. What country is the group's principal adversary nation (PAN)?

I7. List other terrorist groups currently against the principal adversary nation. Give short descriptions of each group. Do any of them espouse the same cause?

I8,9. Has the group ever had formal relationships with other terrorist groups worldwide? Who, and when did this relationship exist?
I10,11. Has the group ever received verbal expressions of support from other terrorist groups? Who, and when was support received?

I12,13. Has the group ever attended conferences or international meetings with other terrorist groups? Who, and when?

I14. Has the group ever participated in training with other terrorist groups? Who?

I15–17. Has the group ever received assistance from other groups: arms, intelligence, technical support, training, etc.? Identify the groups, if any, and the nature of the assistance received.

I18–20. Has the group ever provided assistance to other terrorist groups: arms, intelligence, technical support, training, etc? Identify the groups, if any, and the nature of the assistance provided.

I21. Where were the training camps attended by the group held?

I22,23. Have members of the group participated in joint operations with members of other groups? Identify groups.

I24,25. Has the group ever carried out proxy operations on behalf of other groups? Identify groups.

I26,27. Have other groups ever carried out operations on the group's behalf? Identify groups.

I28–30. Identity of patron states? What is the nature of this support: arms, training, asylum, technical support?

I31. Is there any evidence that the group's operations have ever been guided or directed by patron states?

I32. Does the group currently have any relationships with the ordinary criminal underworld, narcotics traffic, recruiting in prisons, etc.?

I33. Has the group infiltrated any government organization?

I34. Has the group infiltrated any political activist groups or civil rights groups?

J. ENVIRONMENT AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

ALL QUESTIONS IN SECTION J REQUIRE RESPONSE WITH RESPECT TO:

A. PRINCIPAL ADVERSARY NATION

B. OTHER RELEVANT COUNTRY #1

C. OTHER RELEVANT COUNTRY #2

D. OTHER RELEVANT COUNTRY #3
AND SO ON, FOR AS MANY COUNTRIES AS NECESSARY.

J1. Does the country have a long tradition of ethnic or ideological conflict or of political violence.

J2. What is the form of the local government?

J3. Is the government stable?

J4,5. Has the military establishment become directly involved in combatting terrorism? In what areas? How many police, constabulary, etc., are directly involved in counter-terrorist operations? Are there special physical security measures in effect (such as, electronic monitoring of the border in Israel or of the streets in Belfast)?

J6. Has the government adopted repressive techniques such as arbitrary arrests, torture, etc.?

J7. Has specific legislation been directed against the terrorists?

J8. What effect have governments' anti-terrorist measures had on the general population?

J9. Have normal judicial processes been suspended for terrorists, such as being tried in special courts?

J10. Are there opposing terrorist groups?

J11. Have counterterrorist death squads, vigilantes, etc. appeared?

J12,13. Are any members of the group in prison? How many?

J14. Have the imprisoned members of the group attempted to continue the struggle? How? (Hunger strikers, suicides, riots.)

J15. Describe prison policy followed by the authorities and changes demanded by imprisoned members of the group.

J16,17. Are any other terrorists in prison? How many, from what groups?

J18. Are there political divisions on the issue of terrorism?

J19,20. Has the government ever offered pardons or amnesties to members of the group? Indicate date and circumstances when pardons or amnesties were offered, and reaction to them.

J21,22. Has the government ever offered pardons or amnesties to other terrorists? Indicate date and circumstances when pardons or amnesties were offered, and reaction to them.

J23. What is the government's stated policy on hostage situations?

J24. Does past performance correspond to stated policy?
J25. Has the government demonstrated a willingness to use force in hostage situations?
J26. Does the government exercise censorship over the news media in the coverage of terrorism?
J27. Has the government proposed political changes with respect to the perceived grievances?
J28. Has the government participated in international agreements to counter terrorism?
J29. Any cooperation from neighboring countries such as control of border crossings or aid in extradition of captured terrorists?

K. GENERAL

K1. Miscellaneous information that fits nowhere else.
K2. Sources—complete citations for sources abbreviated in entries. For example, Los Angeles Times to explain LAT in entries.
Appendix B

TWENTY MAJOR QUESTIONS ABOUT TERRORIST GROUPS AND PERTINENT ATTRIBUTES

1. What is the significance of the names chosen by terrorist groups? Why do some groups not claim or use different names for certain operations?

   A1. Any significance of the name such as a significant date, signal event, mentor, etc.?
   A2,3. Does the group use subnames for specific operations? List.
   A4,5. Does it ever use different names? If different names, list.
   A6. When was the group founded?
   A7,8. Origins of the group: predecessors; a splinter from some other group; a result of a merger? List names of any original groups.
   A9,10. Has the group produced offspring groups or splinters? What are their names?
   A11. What is the group’s relationship with its offspring?
   A13,14. Are there branches or separate operational elements in different parts of the world? If any, list.

C1. Nationality of members.
C2. Regional origins? (e.g., Basques, Sardinians, etc.)
C14. Any dominant religious affiliation? For example, members of a specific sect.

D1. Ideology
D4. What are the goals? Are there immediate versus long-range goals? Are they specific?
D5. Are the goals parochial (autonomy), nationalistic (revolution), or internationalist?

E3,4. Who does the group pattern itself after?
E5. Who has the group ever considered its constituents?
E6. Does it appear that public attitudes have ever constrained targeting, tactics, volume of activity, or choice of weapons?
TWENTY MAJOR QUESTIONS ABOUT TERRORIST GROUPS

F2. Sources of funding: bank robberies, ransoms, protection rackets, contributions from sympathizers, patron states, etc.

G1,2. Have there been any reports of terrorist operations by the group since 1968? Give number of operations per year, if known, per tactic, and fatalities, if any.
   A. Kidnappings
   B. Assaults on installations
   C. Hijackings
   D. Bombings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations
   F. Assassinations and shootings

G27. Is there a strategy that is stated or can be inferred?


G29. Does the group operate on significant dates?

G32. Dispersal or deployment of members within a country or internationally?

G34,35. Proportion of activity that is international? Has this proportion changed over time?

G36. In what way is the group international: the group operates locally but selects foreign targets, or the group carries out operations abroad?

G37. If operations are carried out abroad, do operational elements go out from one country or do local elements carry out the operation?

H6. Does the group communicate only in connection with actions or does it communicate in between actions?

H7. Has the group claimed credit for all or most of the actions attributed to it?

H8. What methods has the group ever used for claiming credit?

H9. Does the group ever use any codes to insure the credibility of the communication?

H10. Is there coordination or orchestration of the group's communications?

H11. Is there a press office?

H12. Does the group communicate from several locations simultaneously?

H13. If the group makes demands, how are they communicated: through the operational team or to the media directly?

H14. Describe any propaganda victories the group may have achieved.
H15. How soon after the event has the group usually claimed credit?

I1. Does the group currently have an above ground support apparatus, such as a political party that provides it with support or explains its actions?

I7. List other terrorist groups currently against the principal adversary nation. Give short descriptions of each group. Do any of them espouse the same cause?

I8,9. Has the group ever had formal relationships with other terrorist groups worldwide? Who, and when did this relationship exist?

I22,23. Have members of the group participated in joint operations with members of other groups? Identify groups.

I24,25. Has the group ever carried out proxy operations on behalf of other groups? Identify groups.

I26,27. Have other groups ever carried out operations on the group's behalf? Identify groups.

2. When is a particular group most likely to carry out an operation?

A1. Any significance of the name such as a significant date, signal event, mentor, etc.?


A22. Have there been defections?

D4. What are the goals? Are there immediate versus long-range goals? Are they specific?

G1,2. Have there been any reports of terrorist operations by the group since 1968? Give number of operations per year, if known, per tactic, and fatalities, if any.

A. Kidnappings
B. Assaults on installations
C. Hijackings
D. Bombings
E. Barricade and hostage situations
F. Assassinations and shootings


G29. Does the group operate on significant dates?

G30. Are there seasonal campaigns?
G44. Has the group ever carried out operations on behalf of imprisoned comrades?

15. Are the estimated numbers of sympathizers increasing or decreasing?

I8,9. Has the group ever had formal relationships with other terrorist groups worldwide? Who, and when did this relationship exist?

I22,23. Have members of the group participated in joint operations with members of other groups? Identify groups.

I24,25. Has the group ever carried out proxy operations on behalf of other groups? Identify groups.

J12,13. Are any members of the group in prison? How many?

J16,17. Are any other terrorists in prison? How many, from what groups?

3. What targets will the group choose?

A13,14. Are there branches or separate operational elements in different parts of the world? If any, list.

C1. Nationality of members.

C2. Regional origins? (e.g., Basques, Sardinians, etc.)

C13. Are the members mostly of urban or rural origin?

C14. Any dominant religious affiliation? For example, members of a specific sect.

C20. Specialized skills: military experience; scientific or medical training; technical training.

C24. Any dominant ethnic origin?

D1. Ideology

D4. What are the goals? Are there immediate versus long-range goals? Are they specific?

D5. Are the goals parochial (autonomy), nationalistic (revolution), or internationalist?

E2. Any evidence of cultural influences or national traits as they affect choice of tactics or targets?

E5. Who has the group ever considered its constituents?

E6. Does it appear that public attitudes have ever constrained targeting, tactics, volume of activity, or choice of weapons?

E7. Does the group see power as coming up from the people or descending from some heroic figure?
F2. Sources of funding: bank robberies, ransoms, protection rackets, contributions from sympathizers, patron states, etc.

F9. Sources of weapons: stolen from arsenals; purchased on the black market; provided by supporting states?

F10. Sources of explosives.

F11. Employment and sources of any other specialized equipment: receivers, transmitters, etc.

G6,7. Has the group ever taken hostages? If so, has the group ever made demands for the exchange of hostages? What were the demands?
   A. Kidnappings
   C. Hijackings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations

G14. Identify types of targets for each tactic, and indicate how long they have been targets.
   (Types: Diplomatic, business, military, police, airlines, private citizens, utilities, energy facilities, government, including politicians in and out of office, exiles, religious, maritime, nuclear material, towns, transportation, other terrorists, and other.)
   A. Kidnappings
   B. Assaults on installations
   C. Hijackings
   D. Bombings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations
   F. Assassinations and shootings
   G. Credible threats, thwarted conspiracies
   H. Guerrilla-type actions

G15. Give nationality of targets and indicate how long they have been targets.

G16. What was the intent of the group's bombing actions: symbolic only, to cause property damage, public disruption, assassination, or indiscriminate?

G27. Is there a strategy that is stated or can be inferred?

G32. Dispersal or deployment of members within a country or internationally?

G34,35. Proportion of activity that is international? Has this proportion changed over time?

G36. In what way is the group international: the group operates locally but selects foreign targets, or the group carries out operations abroad?
TWENTY MAJOR QUESTIONS ABOUT TERRORIST GROUPS

G37. If operations are carried out abroad, do operational elements go out from one country or do local elements carry out the operation?

G38. How far abroad does the group operate; list countries where operations have taken place?

G39,40. Area of operations: urban or rural?

G41. List known sanctuaries and how long they have provided sanctuary.

I1. Does the group currently have an above ground support apparatus, such as a political party that provides it with support or explains its actions?

I4. Who are the group's current sympathizers? (Workers, nationalists, ethnic group, peasants, students, etc.)

I5. Are the estimated numbers of sympathizers increasing or decreasing?

I6. What country is the group's principal adversary nation (PAN)?

J4,5. Has the military establishment become directly involved in combatting terrorism? In what areas? How many police, constabulary, etc., are directly involved in counterterrorist operations? Are there special physical security measures in effect? (such as electronic monitoring of the border in Israel or of the streets in Belfast.)

J23. What is the government's stated policy on hostage situations?

J24. Does past performance correspond to stated policy?

J25. Has the government demonstrated a willingness to use force in hostage situations?

4. What tactics will the group employ?

E1. Psychological characteristics of members per observers?

E2. Any evidence of cultural influences or national traits as they affect choice of tactics or targets?

E3,4. Who does the group pattern itself after?

E5. Who has the group ever considered its constituents?

E6. Does it appear that public attitudes have ever constrained targeting, tactics, volume of activity, or choice of weapons?

E7. Does the group see power as coming up from the people or descending from some heroic figure?
E8. Are group members inclined to surrender if cornered or fight until death? Are they suicidal? Will they take enormous risks?

E10,11. Is the group inclined to innovate or does it operate within a fairly limited repertoire? If innovative does it innovate in tactics, or targets?

F2. Sources of funding: bank robberies, ransoms, protection rackets, contributions from sympathizers, patron states, etc.

F9. Sources of weapons: stolen from arsenals; purchased on the black market; provided by supporting states?

F10. Sources of explosives.

G1,2. Have there been any reports of terrorist operations by the group since 1968? Give number of operations per year, if known, per tactic, and fatalities, if any.
   A. Kidnappings
   B. Assaults on installations
   C. Hijackings
   D. Bombings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations
   F. Assassinations and shootings

G4,5. Has the group ever disclaimed responsibility for particular terrorist operations? Under what circumstances was responsibility disclaimed?
   A. Kidnappings
   B. Assaults on installations
   C. Hijackings
   D. Bombings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations
   F. Assassinations and shootings

G6,7. Has the group ever taken hostages? If so, has the group ever made demands for the exchange of hostages? What were the demands?
   A. Kidnappings
   C. Hijackings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations

G14. Identify types of targets for each tactic, and indicate how long they have been targets.
   (Types: Diplomatic, business, military, police, airlines, private citizens, utilities, energy facilities, government, including politicians in and out of office, exiles, religious,
TWENTY MAJOR QUESTIONS ABOUT TERRORIST GROUPS

maritime, nuclear material, towns, transportation, other terrorists, and other.)

A. Kidnappings
B. Assaults on installations
C. Hijackings
D. Bombings
E. Barricade and hostage situations
F. Assassinations and shootings
G. Credible threats, thwarted conspiracies
H. Guerrilla-type actions

G27. Is there a strategy that is stated or can be inferred?
G31. Observable escalation or deescalation?
G44. Has the group ever carried out operations on behalf of imprisoned comrades?
G45. Does the group ever use disguises in operations?
G46. Any use of diversionary operations?
G47. Are the group’s operations successful, according to what criteria?
   I4. Who are the group’s current sympathizers? (Workers, nationalists, ethnic group, peasants, students, etc.)
   I5. Are the estimated numbers of sympathizers increasing or decreasing?
   I7. List other terrorist group currently against the principal adversary nation. Give short descriptions of each group. Do any of them espouse the same cause?
J12,13. Are any members of the group in prison? How many?
J14. Have the imprisoned members of the group attempted to continue the struggle? How? (Hunger strikers, suicides, riots)
J18. Are there political divisions on the issue of terrorism?
J23. What is the government’s stated policy on hostage situations?
J24. Does past performance correspond to stated policy?
J25. Has the government demonstrated a willingness to use force in hostage situations?

5. Who is the perpetrator of an unclaimed incident?
   A1. Any significance of the name such as a significant date, signal event, mentor, etc.?
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING TERRORIST GROUPS

A2,3. Does the group use subnames for specific operations? List.
A4,5. Does it ever use different names? If different names, list.
D4. What are the goals? Are there immediate versus long-range goals? Are they specific?
E2. Any evidence of cultural influences or national traits as they affect choice of tactics or targets?
G1,2. Have there been any reports of terrorist operations by the group since 1968? Give number of operations per year, if known, per tactic, and fatalities, if any.
   A. Kidnappings
   B. Assaults on installations
   C. Hijackings
   D. Bombings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations
   F. Assassinations and shootings
G14. Identify types of targets for each tactic, and indicate how long they have been targets.
   (Types: Diplomatic, business, military, police, airlines, private citizens, utilities, energy facilities, government, including politicians in and out of office, exiles, religious, maritime, nuclear material, towns, transportation, other terrorists, and other.)
   A. Kidnappings
   B. Assaults on installations
   C. Hijackings
   D. Bombings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations
   F. Assassinations and shootings
   G. Credible threats, thwarted conspiracies
   H. Guerrilla-type actions
G15. Give nationality of targets and indicate how long they have been targets.
G17. Give details of explosives used in bombings.
G18. Give details of timing and fusing devices used in bombings.
G19. Give details of location and timing of bombings.
G20. Does the group provide prior warning of its bombings?
G21. Describe any barricade and hostage incidents reported since 1968. Indicate the date and duration of each hostage episode carried out by the group, and the number of fatalities, and any other pertinent details.

G29. Does the group operate on significant dates?

G36. In what way is the group international: the group operates locally but selects foreign targets, or the group carries out operations abroad?

G38. How far abroad does the group operate; list countries where operations have taken place?

G39,40. Area of operations: urban or rural?

H7. Has the group claimed credit for all or most of the actions attributed to it?

H8. What methods has the group ever used for claiming credit?

H9. Does the group ever use any codes to insure the credibility of the communication?

H15. How soon after the event has the group usually claimed credit?

I7. List other terrorist group currently against the principal adversary nation. Give short descriptions of each group. Do any of them espouse the same cause?

I24,25. Has the group ever carried out proxy operations on behalf of other groups? Identify groups.

I26,27. Have other groups ever carried out operations on the group's behalf? Identify groups.

6. Does a particular terrorist group represent a threat to the United States? Will it attack U.S. citizens or facilities? Will it carry out operations within the United States?

A7,8. Origins of the group: predecessors; a splinter from some other group; a result of a merger? List names of any original groups.

A13,14. Are there branches or separate operational elements in different parts of the world? If any, list.

D1. Ideology

D4. What are the goals? Are there immediate versus long-range goals? Are they specific?

D5. Are the goals parochial (autonomy), nationalistic (revolution), or internationalist?

E2. Any evidence of cultural influences or national traits as they affect choice of tactics or targets?

E3,4. Who does the group pattern itself after?
E5. Who has the group ever considered its constituents?

G4,5. Has the group ever disclaimed responsibility for particular terrorist operations? Under what circumstances was responsibility disclaimed?
   A. Kidnappings
   B. Assaults on installations
   C. Hijackings
   D. Bombings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations
   F. Assassinations and shootings

G14. Identify types of targets for each tactic, and indicate how long they have been targets.
   (Types: Diplomatic, business, military, police, airlines, private citizens, utilities, energy facilities, government, including politicians in and out of office, exiles, religious, maritime, nuclear material, towns, transportation, other terrorists, and other.)
   A. Kidnappings
   B. Assaults on installations
   C. Hijackings
   D. Bombings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations
   F. Assassinations and shootings
   G. Credible threats, thwarted conspiracies
   H. Guerrilla-type actions

G15. Give nationality of targets and indicate how long they have been targets.

G27. Is there a strategy that is stated or can be inferred?

G32. Dispersal or deployment of members within a country or internationally?

G34,35. Proportion of activity that is international? Has this proportion changed over time?

G36. In what way is the group international: the group operates locally but selects foreign targets, or the group carries out operations abroad?

G37. If operations are carried out abroad, do operational elements go out from one country or do local elements carry out the operation?

G38. How far abroad does the group operate; list countries where operations have taken place?

G39,40. Area of operations: urban or rural?
TWENTY MAJOR QUESTIONS ABOUT TERRORIST GROUPS

14. Who are the group's current sympathizers? (Workers, nationalists, ethnic group, peasants, students, etc.)

18. Has the group ever had formal relationships with other terrorist groups worldwide? Who, and when did this relationship exist?

15-17. Has the group ever received assistance from other groups: arms, intelligence, technical support, training, etc.? Identify the groups, if any, and the nature of the assistance received.

18-20. Has the group ever provided assistance to other terrorist groups: arms, intelligence, technical support, training, etc. Identify the groups, if any, and the nature of the assistance provided.

22, 23. Have members of the group participated in joint operations with members of other groups? Identify groups.

24, 25. Has the group ever carried out proxy operations on behalf of other groups? Identify groups.

26, 27. Have other groups ever carried out operations on the group's behalf? Identify groups.

28-30. Identity of patron states? What is the nature of this support: arms, training, asylum, technical support?

31. Is there any evidence that the group's operations have ever been guided or directed by patron states?

7. What U.S. actions might trigger attacks by a terrorist group against the U.S. or friendly nation targets?

A13,14. Are there branches or separate operational elements in different parts of the world? If any, list.

C1. Nationality of members.

C2. Regional origins? (e.g., Basques, Sardinians, etc.)

C14. Any dominant religious affiliation? For example, members of a specific sect.

C24. Any dominant ethnic origin?

D1. Ideology

D4. What are the goals? Are there immediate versus long-range goals? Are they specific?

D5. Are the goals parochial (autonomy), nationalistic (revolution), or internationalist?

E2. Any evidence of cultural influences or national traits as they affect choice of tactics or targets?
E5. Who has the group ever considered its constituents?

G14. Identify types of targets for each tactic, and indicate how long they have been targets.
   (Types: Diplomatic, business, military, police, airlines, private citizens, utilities, energy facilities, government, including politicians in and out of office, exiles, religious, maritime, nuclear material, towns, transportation, other terrorists, and other.)
   A. Kidnappings
   B. Assaults on installations
   C. Hijackings
   D. Bombings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations
   F. Assassinations and shootings
   G. Credible threats, thwarted conspiracies
   H. Guerrilla-type actions

G15. Give nationality of targets and indicate how long they have been targets.

G27. Is there a strategy that is stated or can be inferred?

G32. Dispersal or deployment of members within a country or internationally?

G34,35. Proportion of activity that is international? Has this proportion changed over time?

G36. In what way is the group international: the group operates locally but selects foreign targets, or the group carries out operations abroad?

G37. If operations are carried out abroad, do operational elements go out from one country or do local elements carry out the operation?

G38. How far abroad does the group operate; list countries where operations have taken place?

G39,40. Area of operations: urban or rural?

G41. List known sanctuaries and how long they have provided sanctuary.

G44. Has the group ever carried out operations on behalf of imprisoned comrades?

I1. Does the group currently have an above ground support apparatus, such as a political party that provides it with support or explains its actions?
I8,9. Has the group ever had formal relationships with other terrorist groups worldwide? Who, and when did this relationship exist?

I10,11. Has the ever received verbal expressions of support from other terrorist groups? Who, and when did support received?

I12,13. Has the group ever attended conferences or international meetings with other terrorist groups? Who, and when?

I14. Has the group ever participated in training with other terrorist groups? Who?

I15-17. Has the group ever received assistance from other groups: arms, intelligence, technical support, training, etc.? Identify the groups, if any, and the nature of the assistance received.

I18-20. Has the group ever provided assistance to other terrorist groups: arms, intelligence, technical support, training, etc. Identify the groups, if any, and the nature of the assistance provided.

I22,23. Have members of the group participated in joint operations with members of other groups? Identify groups.

I24,25. Has the group ever carried out proxy operations on behalf of other groups? Identify groups.

I28-30. Identity of patron states? What is the nature of this support: arms, training, asylum, technical support?

I31. Is there any evidence that the group's operations have ever been guided or directed by patron states?

J28. Has the government participated in international agreements to counter terrorism?

J29. Any cooperation from neighboring countries such as control of border crossings or aid in extradition of captured terrorists?

8. Does the group pose a threat to a specific facility, program, or event?

A13,14. Are there branches or separate operational elements in different parts of the world? If any, list.

E2. Any evidence of cultural influences or national traits as they affect choice of tactics or targets?

E10,11. Is the group inclined to innovate or does it operate within a fairly limited repertoire? If innovative does it innovate in tactics, or targets?
F12. Location and description of caches and inventories found by authorities.

G1,2. Have there been any reports of terrorist operations by the group since 19*. Give number of operations per year, if known, per tactic, and fatalities, if any.
   A. Kidnappings
   B. Assaults on installations
   C. Hijackings
   D. Bombings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations
   F. Assassinations and shootings

G4,5. Has the group ever disclaimed responsibility for particular terrorist operations? Under what circumstances was responsibility disclaimed?
   A. Kidnappings
   B. Assaults on installations
   C. Hijackings
   D. Bombings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations
   F. Assassinations and shootings

G14. Identify types of targets for each tactic, and indicate how long they have been targets.
   (Types: Diplomatic, business, military, police, airlines, private citizens, utilities, energy facilities, government, including politicians in and out of office, exiles, religious, maritime, nuclear material, towns, transportation, other terrorists, and other.)
   A. Kidnappings
   B. Assaults on installations
   C. Hijackings
   D. Bombings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations
   F. Assassinations and shootings
   G. Credible threats, thwarted conspiracies
   H. Guerrilla-type actions

G15. Give nationality of targets and indicate how long they have been targets.


G29. Does the group operate on significant dates?

G30. Are there seasonal campaigns?

G31. Observable escalation or deescalation?
G32. Dispersal or deployment of members within a country or internationally?

G36. In what way is the group international: the group operates locally but selects foreign targets, or the group carries out operations abroad?

G37. If operations are carried out abroad, do operational elements go out from one country or do local elements carry out the operation?

G38. How far abroad does the group operate; list countries where operations have taken place?

I22,23. Have members of the group participated in joint operations with members of other groups? Identify groups.

I24,25. Has the group ever carried out proxy operations on behalf of other groups? Identify groups.

I26,27. Have other groups ever carried out operations on the group's behalf? Identify groups.

I28–30. Identity of patron states? What is the nature of this support: arms, training, asylum, technical support?

I31. Is there any evidence that the group's operations have ever been guided or directed by patron states?

9. What are the resources and capabilities of the group for carrying out an operation?

C17–19. Educational level and areas of study: secondary schooling, university graduates, dropouts?

C20. Specialized skills: military experience; scientific or medical training; technical training.

C21,22. Any evidence of the presence of criminals within the group? If members have criminal records, what are the crimes?

E1. Psychological characteristics of members per observers?

E8. Are group members inclined to surrender if cornered or fight until death? Are they suicidal? Will they take enormous risks?

F1. Estimate annual budget.

F5. Any evidence of investments, portfolios, etc.?

F11. Employment and sources of any other specialized equipment: receivers, transmitters, etc.
G1.2. Have there been any reports of terrorist operations by the group since 1968? Give number of operations per year, if known, per tactic, and fatalities, if any.
   A. Kidnappings
   B. Assaults on installations
   C. Hijackings
   D. Bombings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations
   F. Assassinations and shootings

G3. How many people were usually involved in each type of terrorist operation?
   A. Kidnappings
   B. Assaults on installations
   C. Hijackings
   D. Bombings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations
   F. Assassinations and shootings

G6,7. Has the group ever taken hostages? If so, has the group ever made demands for the exchange of hostages? What were the demands?
   A. Kidnappings
   C. Hijackings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations

G17. Give details of explosives used in bombings.
G18. Give details of timing and fusing devices used in bombings.
G19. Give details of location and timing of bombings.
G20. Does the group provide prior warning of its bombings?
G24,25. Have there been any reports of guerrilla-type actions or large-scale military activities by the group since 1968? If so, indicate how many, if known, per year.
G26. How many people were usually involved in the guerrilla-type actions or large-scale military activities?
G29. Does the group operate on significant dates?
G30. Are there seasonal campaigns?
G31. Observable escalation or deescalation?
G32. Dispersal or deployment of members within a country or internationally?
G37. If operations are carried out abroad, do operational elements go out from one country or do local elements carry out the operation?
G38. How far abroad does the group operate; list countries where operations have taken place?

G42. What kinds of weapons have ever been used in the group’s operations?

G43. Does the group use special or improvised weapons or other equipment peculiar to the group?

G45. Does the group ever use disguises in operations?

G46. Any use of diversionary operations?

G48. Number of fatalities attributed to the group over time.

G49. Amount of property damage attributed to the group over time.

H9. Does the group ever use any codes to insure the credibility of the communication?

I14. Has the group ever participated in training with other terrorist groups? Who?

I15-17. Has the group ever received assistance from other groups: arms, intelligence, technical support, training, etc.? Identify the groups, if any, and the nature of the assistance received.

I18-20. Has the group ever provided assistance to other terrorist groups: arms, intelligence, technical support, training, etc. Identify the groups, if any, and the nature of the assistance provided.

I21. Where were the training camps attended by the group held?

I22,23. Have members of the group participated in joint operations with members of other groups? Identify groups.

10. Will no-ransom policies deter the group from seizing hostages?

G6,7. Has the group ever taken hostages? If so, has the group ever made demands for the exchange of hostages? What were the demands?
   A. Kidnappings
   C. Hijackings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations

G8.

   A. Kidnappings
   C. Hijackings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations
G9-11. Has it ever killed hostages? How often? Has it ever killed hostages if deadline was not met?
   A. Kidnappings
   C. Hijackings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations

G12. Have group members ever surrendered in hostage episodes?
   C. Hijackings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations

G13. Has the group ever released some of the hostages during terrorist operations?
   C. Hijackings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations

J23. What is the government’s stated policy on hostage situations?

J24. Does past performance correspond to stated policy?

J25. Has the government demonstrated a willingness to use force in hostage situations?

J26. Does the government exercise censorship over the news media in the coverage of terrorism?

11. Will offers of amnesty induce many defections?

A15,16. Number of members.


A20. Sources of recruits?

A21. Method of recruiting?

A22. Have there been defections?

A23. How are defectors treated by the group?

C8,9. Apparent duration of membership in the group. Any indication of previous membership in other groups?

C21,22. Any evidence of the presence of criminals within the group? If members have criminal records, what are the crimes?

C23. Physical and mental health.

D4. What are the goals? Are there immediate versus long-range goals? Are they specific?

D5. Are the goals parochial (autonomy), nationalistic (revolution), or internationalist?
D6. Are the goals described by the group or must they be inferred?

D7. Are the goals realistically obtainable?

E1. Psychological characteristics of members per observers?

E8. Are group members inclined to surrender if cornered or fight until death? Are they suicidal? Will they take enormous risks?

E9. Do imprisoned members refuse to talk or do they cooperate with authorities by giving information?

G12. Have group members ever surrendered in hostage episodes?

C. Hijackings

E. Barricade and hostage situations

I1. Does the group currently have an above ground support apparatus, such as a political party that provides it with support or explains its actions?

I2. How many active sympathizers currently support the group—people who participate in demonstrations, etc., but do not engage in illegal acts?

I3. How many sympathizers have participated in illegal acts in support of the group?

I4. Who are the group's current sympathizers? (Workers, nationalists, ethnic group, peasants, students, etc.)

I5. Are the estimated numbers of sympathizers increasing or decreasing?

J4,5. Has the military establishment become directly involved in combatting terrorism? In what areas? How many police, constabulary, etc., are directly involved in counterterrorist operations? Are there special physical security measures in effect (such as electronic monitoring of the border in Israel or of the streets in Belfast)?

J12,13. Are any members of the group in prison? How many?

J14. Have the imprisoned members of the group attempted to continue the struggle? How? (Hunger strikers, suicides, riots)

J15. Describe prison policy followed by the authorities and changes demanded by imprisoned members of the group.

J16,17. Are any other terrorists in prison? How many, from what groups?
J19,20. Has the government ever offered pardons or amnesties to members of the group? Indicate date and circumstances when pardons or amnesties were offered, and reaction to them.

J21,22. Has the government ever offered pardons or amnesties to other terrorists? Indicate date and circumstances when pardons or amnesties were offered, and reaction to them.

12. How is a particular group likely to react in a hostage episode?

A20. Sources of recruits?
A21. Method of recruiting?
C14. Any dominant religious affiliation? For example, members of a specific sect.

C17-19. Educational level and areas of study: secondary schooling, university graduates, dropouts?
D2. How well developed is the ideology? Are members well-informed or is it a matter of sloganeering?
D4. What are the goals? Are there immediate versus long-range goals? Are they specific?
E1. Psychological characteristics of members per observers?
E2. Any evidence of cultural influences or national traits as they affect choice of tactics or targets?
E5. Who has the group ever considered its constituents?
E6. Does it appear that public attitudes have ever constrained targeting, tactics, volume of activity, or choice of weapons?
E8. Are group members inclined to surrender if cornered or fight until death? Are they suicidal? Will they take enormous risks?
E12. Describe the decisionmaking process. For example, democratic with a great deal of discussion among members; hierarchical with operational elements receiving orders from a headquarters?

G4,5. Has the group ever disclaimed responsibility for particular terrorist operations? Under what circumstances was responsibility disclaimed?
A. Kidnappings
B. Assaults on installations
C. Hijackings
D. Bombings
E. Barricade and hostage situations
F. Assasinations and shootings

G6,7. Has the group ever taken hostages? If so, has the group ever made demands for the exchange of hostages? What were the demands?
   A. Kidnappings
   C. Hijackings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations

G8. Has it ever imposed deadlines in hostage situations?
   A. Kidnappings
   C. Hijackings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations

G9–11. Has it ever killed hostages? How often? Has it ever killed hostages if deadline was not met?
   A. Kidnappings
   C. Hijackings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations

G12. Have group members ever surrendered in hostage episodes?
   C. Hijackings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations

G13. Has the group ever released some of the hostages during terrorist operations?
   C. Hijackings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations

G33. How are members chosen for the missions?

G37. If operations are carried out abroad, do operational elements go out from one country or do local elements carry out the operation?

G42. What kinds of weapons have ever been used in the group's operations?

H1. By what means and in what language(s) do group members communicate internally? (Including while in prison.)

H2,3. By what means (above ground spokesmen; communiques sent to the press; extorted publication of manifestos.) and in what language(s) do the group members communicate externally?

H10. Is there coordination or orchestration of the group’s communications?

H11. Is there a press office?
H12. Does the group communicate from several locations simultaneously?

H13. If the group makes demands, how are they communicated: through the operational team or to the media directly?

I1. Does the group currently have an above ground support apparatus, such as a political party that provides it with support or explains its actions?

I2. How many active sympathizers currently support the group—people who participate in demonstrations, etc., but do not engage in illegal acts?

I4. Who are the group's current sympathizers? (Workers, nationalists, ethnic group, peasants, students, etc.)

I5. Are the estimated numbers of sympathizers increasing or decreasing?

I15-17. Has the group ever received assistance from other groups: arms, intelligence, technical support, training, etc.? Identify the groups, if any, and the nature of the assistance received.

I18-20. Has the group ever provided assistance to other terrorist groups: arms, intelligence, technical support, training, etc. Identify the groups, if any, and the nature of the assistance provided.

I24,25. Has the group ever carried out proxy operations on behalf of other groups? Identify groups.

I26,27. Have other groups ever carried out operations on the group's behalf? Identify groups.

I31. Is there any evidence that the group's operations have ever been guided or directed by patron states?

J2. What is the form of the local government?

J3. Is the government stable?

J6. Has the government adopted repressive techniques such as arbitrary arrests, torture, etc.?

J7. Has specific legislation been directed against the terrorists?

J12,13. Are any members of the group in prison? How many?

J16,17. Are any other terrorists in prison? How many, from what groups?

J18. Are there political divisions on the issue of terrorism?

J23. What is the government's stated policy on hostage situations?

J25. Has the government demonstrated a willingness to use force in hostage situations?
J26. Does the government exercise censorship over the news media in the coverage of terrorism?

13. How will a particular group react to an attack in a hostage situation?
   E1. Psychological characteristics of members per observers?
   E8. Are group members inclined to surrender if cornered or fight until death? Are they suicidal? Will they take enormous risks?
   G8. Has it ever imposed deadlines in hostage situations?
      A. Kidnappings
      C. Hijackings
      E. Barricade and hostage situations
   G9-11. Has it ever killed hostages? How often? Has it ever killed hostages if deadline was not met?
      A. Kidnappings
      C. Hijackings
      E. Barricade and hostage situations
   G12. Have group members ever surrendered in hostage episodes?
      C. Hijackings
      E. Barricade and hostage situations
   G13. Has the group ever released some of the hostages during terrorist operations?
      C. Hijackings
      E. Barricade and hostage situations
   G17. Give details of explosives used in bombings.
   G21. Describe any barricade and hostage incidents reported since 1968. Indicate the date and duration of each hostage episode carried out by the group, and the number of fatalities, and any other pertinent details.
   G33. How are members chosen for the missions?
   J6. Has the government adopted repressive techniques such as arbitrary arrests, torture, etc.?
   J7. Has specific legislation been directed against the terrorists?
   J9. Have normal judicial processes been suspended for terrorists, such as being tried in special courts?
   J23. What is the government’s stated policy on hostage situations?
   J24. Does past performance correspond to stated policy?
J25. Has the government demonstrated a willingness to use force in hostage situations?

14. Is the group likely to escalate its violence, that is, employ weapons or tactics that kill or endanger larger numbers of persons?

   A22. Have there been defections?
   C14. Any dominant religious affiliation? For example, members of a specific sect.

D1. Ideology
D4. What are the goals? Are there immediate versus long-range goals? Are they specific?
D5. Are the goals parochial (autonomy), nationalistic (revolution), or internationalist?
D6. Are the goals described by the group or must they be inferred?
D7. Are the goals realistically obtainable?
D8. Do the members envisage a long struggle? Are they millenialists (a new world after chaos)?
E1. Psychological characteristics of members per observers?
E2. Any evidence of cultural influences or national traits as they affect choice of tactics or targets?
E3,4. Who does the group pattern itself after?
E5. Who has the group ever considered its constituents?
E6. Does it appear that public attitudes have ever constrained targeting, tactics, volume of activity, or choice of weapons?
E7. Does the group see power as coming up from the people or descending from some heroic figure?
E8. Are group members inclined to surrender if cornered or fight until death? Are they suicidal? Will they take enormous risks?
E10,11. Is the group inclined to innovate or does it operate within a fairly limited repertoire? If innovative does it innovate in tactics, or targets?

G1,2. Have there been any reports of terrorist operations by the group since 1968? Give number of operations per year, if known, per tactic, and fatalities, if any.
   A. Kidnappings
   B. Assaults on installations
C. Hijackings  
D. Bombings  
E. Barricade and hostage situations  
F. Assassinations and shootings  

G4.5. Has the group ever disclaimed responsibility for particular terrorist operations? Under what circumstances was responsibility disclaimed?  
   A. Kidnappings  
   B. Assaults on installations  
   C. Hijackings  
   D. Bombings  
   E. Barricade and hostage situations  
   F. Assassinations and shootings  

G6.7. Has the group ever taken hostages? If so, has the group ever made demands for the exchange of hostages? What were the demands?  
   A. Kidnappings  
   C. Hijackings  
   E. Barricade and hostage situations  

G8. Has it ever imposed deadlines in hostage situations?  
   A. Kidnappings  
   C. Hijackings  
   E. Barricade and hostage situations  

G9-11. Has it ever killed hostages? How often? Has it ever killed hostages if deadline was not met?  
   A. Kidnappings  
   C. Hijackings  
   E. Barricade and hostage situations  

G27. Is there a strategy that is stated or can be inferred?  
G31. Observable escalation or deescalation?  
G33. How are members chosen for the missions?  
G41. List known sanctuaries and how long they have provided sanctuary.  
G47. Are the group's operations successful, according to what criteria?  
G48. Number of fatalities attributed to the group over time.  
G49. Amount of property damage attributed to the group over time.  
G50. Does the group make an effort to avoid casualties?
I. Does the group currently have an above ground support apparatus, such as a political party that provides it with support or explains its actions?

II. How many active sympathizers currently support the group—people who participate in demonstrations, etc., but do not engage in illegal acts?

III. How many sympathizers have participated in illegal acts in support of the group?

IV. Who are the group’s current sympathizers? (Workers, nationalists, ethnic group, peasants, students, etc.)

V. Are the estimated numbers of sympathizers increasing or decreasing?

VI. Identity of patron states? What is the nature of this support: arms, training, asylum, technical support?

VII. Is there any evidence that the group’s operations have ever been guided or directed by patron states?

VIII. Has the military establishment become directly involved in combatting terrorism? In what areas? How many police, constabulary, etc., are directly involved in counterterrorist operations? Are there special physical security measures in effect? (such as electronic monitoring of the border in Israel or of the streets in Belfast.)

IX. Has the government adopted repressive techniques such as arbitrary arrests, torture, etc.?

X. Has specific legislation been directed against the terrorists?

XI. What effect have governments’ anti-terrorist measures had on the general population?

XII. Have normal judicial processes been suspended for terrorists, such as being tried in special courts?

XIII. Are there opposing terrorist groups?

XIV. Have counterterrorist death squads, vigilantes, etc. appeared?

XV. Are any members of the group in prison? How many?

XVI. Have the imprisoned members of the group attempted to continue the struggle? How? (Hunger strikers, suicides, riots)

XVII. Describe prison policy followed by the authorities and changes demanded by imprisoned members of the group.

XVIII. Has the government demonstrated a willingness to use force in hostage situations?
J26. Does the government exercise censorship over the news media in the coverage of terrorism?

15. What is the level of technical sophistication of the group?

A20. Sources of recruits?

B1. Name of leader(s) and any biographical details. (Use separate entries for each person, B1a, B1b, etc.)

B2. Names of other key members such as theoreticians, specialists, etc., and any biographical details. (Use separate entries for each person, B2a, B2b, etc.)

C17-19. Educational level and areas of study: secondary schooling, university graduates, dropouts?

C20. Specialized skills: military experience; scientific or medical training; technical training.

F1. Estimate annual budget.

F10. Sources of explosives.

F11. Employment and sources of any other specialized equipment: receivers, transmitters, etc.

G17. Give details of explosives used in bombings.

G18. Give details of timing and fusing devices used in bombings.

G42. What kinds of weapons have ever been used in the group’s operations?

G43. Does the group use special or improvised weapons or other equipment peculiar to the group?

H1. By what means and in what language(s) do group members communicate internally? (Including while in prison.)

I4. Who are the group’s current sympathizers? (Workers, nationalists, ethnic group, peasants, students, etc.)

I14. Has the group ever participated in training with other terrorist groups? Who?

I15-17. Has the group ever received assistance from other groups: arms, intelligence, technical support, training, etc.? Identify the groups, if any, and the nature of the assistance received.

I18-20. Has the group ever provided assistance to other terrorist groups: arms, intelligence, technical support, training, etc. Identify the groups, if any, and the nature of the assistance provided.

I28-30. Identity of patron states? What is the nature of this support: arms, training, asylum, technical support?
16. How important is external support (from sympathizers, other groups or patron states) to any specific terrorist group?

A15,16. Number of members.

C15. What percentage of the membership is full-time?

C20. Specialized skills: military experience; scientific or medical training; technical training.

F1. Estimate annual budget.

F2. Sources of funding: bank robberies, ransoms, protection rackets, contributions from sympathizers, patron states, etc.

F3. Do the amounts raised from known sources equal the estimated size of the budget?

F6,7. Are any members salaried? If so, estimate amount per month for an average group member.

F9. Sources of weapons: stolen from arsenals; purchased on the black market; provided by supporting states?

F10. Sources of explosives.

F11. Employment and sources of any other specialized equipment: receivers, transmitters, etc.

G41. List known sanctuaries and how long they have provided sanctuary.

I1. Does the group currently have an above ground support apparatus, such as a political party that provides it with support or explains its actions?

I2. How many active sympathizers currently support the group—people who participate in demonstrations, etc., but do not engage in illegal acts?

I3. How many sympathizers have participated in illegal acts in support of the group?

I4. Who are the group's current sympathizers? (Workers, nationalists, ethnic group, peasants, students, etc.)

I5. Are the estimated numbers of sympathizers increasing or decreasing?

I8,9. Has the group ever had formal relationships with other terrorist groups worldwide? Who, and when did this relationship exist?

I10,11. Has the group ever received verbal expressions of support from other terrorist groups? Who, and when was support received?
TWENTY MAJOR QUESTIONS ABOUT TERRORIST GROUPS

112,13. Has the group ever attended conferences or international meetings with other terrorist groups? Who, and when?

114. Has the group ever participated in training with other terrorist groups? Who?

115–17. Has the group ever received assistance from other groups: arms, intelligence, technical support, training, etc.? Identify the groups, if any, and the nature of the assistance received.

118–20. Has the group ever provided assistance to other terrorist groups: arms, intelligence, technical support, training, etc. Identify the groups, if any, and the nature of the assistance provided.

122,23. Have members of the group participated in joint operations with members of other groups? Identify groups.

124,25. Has the group ever carried out proxy operations on behalf of other groups? Identify groups.

126,27. Have other groups ever carried out operations on the group’s behalf? Identify groups.

128–30. Identity of patron states? What is the nature of this support: arms, training, asylum, technical support?

132. Does the group currently have any relationships with the ordinary criminal underworld, narcotics traffic, recruiting in prisons, etc?

17. What evidence is there of international links?

A9,10. Has the group produced offspring groups or splinters? What are their names?

A11. What is the group’s relationship with its offspring?

E3,4. Who does the group pattern itself after?

F2. Sources of funding: bank robberies, ransoms, protection rackets, contributions from sympathizers, patron states, etc.

F4. How does the organization move money? Any accounts of laundering? Where is the money kept?

F5. Any evidence of investments portfolios, etc.?

F9. Sources of weapons: stolen from arsenals; purchased on the black market; provided by supporting states?

F10. Sources of explosives.

F11. Employment and sources of any other specialized equipment: receivers, transmitters, etc.
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING TERRORIST GROUPS

G38. How far abroad does the group operate; list countries where operations have taken place?

G41. List known sanctuaries and how long they have provided sanctuary.

H2,3. By what means (above ground spokesmen; communiques sent to the press; extorted publication of manifestos) and in what language(s) do the group members communicate externally?

H10. Is there coordination or orchestration of the group's communications?

H11. Is there a press office?

H12. Does the group communicate from several locations simultaneously?

I1. Does the group currently have an above ground support apparatus, such as a political party that provides it with support or explains its actions?

I2. How many active sympathizers currently support the group—people who participate in demonstrations, etc., but do not engage in illegal acts?

I4. Who are the group's current sympathizers? (Workers, nationalists, ethnic group, peasants, students, etc.)

18. What are the vulnerabilities of a terrorist group?

A9,10. Has the group produced offspring groups or splinters? What are their names?

A11. What is the group's relationship with its offspring?


A20. Sources of recruits?

A21. Method of recruiting?

A22. Have there been defections?

C3,4. Median age of individual leaders.

C5,6. Median age of members—non-leadership.

C7. Observable changes in overall age of members (non-leadership): getting younger, older?

C8,9. Apparent duration of membership in the group. Any indication of previous membership in other groups?

C10,11. Are there, or have there been separate definable generations or cohorts within the group?
D7. Are the goals realistically obtainable?
E1. Psychological characteristics of members per observers?
E5. Who has the group ever considered its constituents?
E6. Does it appear that public attitudes have ever constrained targeting, tactics, volume of activity, or choice of weapons?
E9. Do imprisoned members refuse to talk or do they cooperate with authorities by giving information?
E12. Describe the decisionmaking process. For example, democratic with a great deal of discussion among members; hierarchical with operational elements receiving orders from a headquarters?
F2. Sources of funding: bank robberies, ransoms, protection rackets, contributions from sympathizers, patron states, etc.
F3. Do the amounts raised from known sources equal the estimated size of the budget?
F4. How does the organization move money? Any accounts of laundering? Where is the money kept?
F5. Any evidence of investments, portfolios, etc.?
G4,5. Has the group ever disclaimed responsibility for particular terrorist operations? Under what circumstances was responsibility disclaimed?
   A. Kidnappings
   B. Assaults on installations
   C. Hijackings
   D. Bombings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations
   F. Assassinations and shootings
G12. Have group members ever surrendered in hostage episodes?
   C. Hijackings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations
G33. How are members chosen for the missions?
G47. Are the group's operations successful, according to what criteria?
   11. Does the group currently have an above ground support apparatus, such as a political party that provides it with support or explains its actions?
   12. How many active sympathizers currently support the group—people who participate in demonstrations, etc., but do not engage in illegal acts?
I3. How many sympathizers have participated in illegal acts in support of the group?

I4. Who are the group's current sympathizers? (Workers, nationalists, ethnic group, peasants, students, etc.)

I5. Are the estimated numbers of sympathizers increasing or decreasing?

I32. Does the group currently have any relationships with the ordinary criminal underworld, narcotics traffic, recruiting in prisons, etc.?

J10. Are there opposing terrorist groups?

J11. Have counterterrorist death squads, vigilantes, etc. appeared?

J12,13. Are any members of the group in prison? How many?

J14. Have the imprisoned members of the group attempted to continue the struggle? How? (Hunger strikers, suicides, riots)

19. Has the group demonstrated itself to be adaptive, to learn lessons, or to change directions?

D4. What are the goals? Are there immediate versus long-range goals? Are they specific?

E10,11. Is the group inclined to innovate or does it operate within a fairly limited repertoire? If innovative does it innovate in tactics, or targets?

E12. Describe the decisionmaking process. For example, democratic with a great deal of discussion among members; hierarchical with operational elements receiving orders from a headquarters?

F11. Employment and sources of any other specialized equipment: receivers, transmitters, etc.

G1,2. Have there been any reports of terrorist operations by the group since 1968? Give number of operations per year, if known, per tactic, and fatalities, if any.

A. Kidnappings
B. Assaults on installations
C. Hijackings
D. Bombings
E. Barricade and hostage situations
F. Assassinations and shootings
G14. Identify types of targets for each tactic, and indicate how long they have been targets.
(Types: Diplomatic, business, military, police, airlines, private citizens, utilities, energy facilities, government, including politicians in and out of office, exiles, religious, maritime, nuclear material, towns, transportation, other terrorists, and other.)
   A. Kidnappings
   B. Assaults on installations
   C. Hijackings
   D. Bombings
   E. Barricade and hostage situations
   F. Assassinations and shootings
   G. Credible threats, thwarted conspiracies
   H. Guerrilla-type actions

G15. Give nationality of targets and indicate how long they have been targets.

G31. Observable escalation or deescalation?

G43. Does the group use special or improvised weapons or other equipment peculiar to the group?

G47. Are the group’s operations successful, according to what criteria?

20. What is the life cycle of a terrorist group?
   A6. When was the group founded?
   A7,8. Origins of the group: predecessors; a splinter from some other group; a result of a merger? List names of any original groups.
   A9,10. Has the group produced offspring groups or splinters? What are their names?
   A11. What is the group’s relationship with its offspring?
   A15,16. Number of members.
   A20. Sources of recruits?
   A22. Have there been defections?
   C7. Observable changes in overall age of members (non-leadership): getting younger, older?
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING TERRORIST GROUPS

C8.9. Apparent duration of membership in the group. Any indication of previous membership in other groups?

C10,11. Are there, or have there been separate definable generations or cohorts within the group?

C21,22. Any evidence of the presence of criminals within the group? If members have criminal records, what are the crimes?

G31. Observable escalation or deescalation?

I5. Are the estimated numbers of sympathizers increasing or decreasing?

J4,5. Has the military establishment become directly involved in combatting terrorism? In what areas? How many police, constabulary, etc., are directly involved in counterterrorist operations? Are there special physical security measures in effect? (such as electronic monitoring of the border in Israel or of the streets in Belfast.)

J6. Has the government adopted repressive techniques such as arbitrary arrests, torture, etc.?

J7. Has specific legislation been directed against the terrorists?

J9. Have normal judicial processes been suspended for terrorists, such as being tried in special courts?

J11. Have counterterrorist death squads, vigilantes, etc. appeared?

J12,13. Are any members of the group in prison? How many?

J14. Have the imprisoned members of the group attempted to continue the struggle? How? (Hunger strikers, suicides, riots?)

J19,20. Has the government ever offered pardons or amnesties to members of the group? Indicate date and circumstances when pardons or amnesties were offered, and reaction to them.
Appendix C

PRIORITY AREAS FOR DATA COLLECTION

This appendix displays how many major questions each attribute relates to. The attributes are identified by a letter and a number. The letter indicates the section of the attributes list (see Appendix A); the number is the number of the attribute.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attributes</th>
<th>Number of Relevant Major Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A23</td>
<td>A2,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B1</td>
<td>A4,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B2</td>
<td>A6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C13</td>
<td>C7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C15</td>
<td>C10,11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3,4</td>
<td>C24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C5,6</td>
<td>D6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C23</td>
<td>E9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2</td>
<td>F3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D8</td>
<td>F4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F6,7</td>
<td>G19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F12</td>
<td>G20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G3</td>
<td>G21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G16</td>
<td>G45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G24,25</td>
<td>G46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G26</td>
<td>G48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G50</td>
<td>G49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H6</td>
<td>H1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H14</td>
<td>H2,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I6</td>
<td>H7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I21</td>
<td>H9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J2</td>
<td>H13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J3</td>
<td>H15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J8</td>
<td>I10,11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J21,22</td>
<td>I12,13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J28</td>
<td>I32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J29</td>
<td>J10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J19,20</td>
<td>J26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix D

GAPS IN THE DATA COLLECTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject Area</th>
<th>Most Needed Information</th>
<th>Least Available Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>A13,14,20,22</td>
<td>A23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demography</td>
<td>C14</td>
<td>C7,8,9,14,23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>D1,4,5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychology, mindset, decisionmaking</td>
<td>E1,2,3,4,5,6,8</td>
<td>E1,2,5,6,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding, logistics</td>
<td>F2,10,11</td>
<td>F1,3,4,5,6,7,10,13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations, modus operandi</td>
<td>G1,2,4,5,6,7,12,14,15,27</td>
<td>G4,5,19,30,33,34,35,37,43,46,47,49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td></td>
<td>H1,4,5,6,8,9,10,11,14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External relations</td>
<td>I2,4,5,12,13,15,16,17,18,19,20,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31</td>
<td>I10,11,12,13,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment, government response</td>
<td>J12,13,14,23,25</td>
<td>J25,27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>