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CRISIS RELOCATION AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOSHUA L. KISER, AV

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7 APRIL 1986

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA
The protection of our civilian population has been considered a basic responsibility of our government since the writing of our Constitution. One of the purposes of the Union defined in the Preamble to the Constitution is "to provide for the common defense." It is difficult to think of defense without making every effort toward protecting what is most important: the lives of the people. The difficulty of providing adequate protection to the civilian population with some kind of civil defense program is magnified
by the technology available in the nuclear age. The United States expanded its civil defense program in the 1950's to include a measure of protection in the event of the explosion of nuclear devices. However, the history of the United States civil defense program has been generally characterized by inadequate funding and little interest at all levels of government. Most recently, our civil defense program has been associated and considered a component of our nuclear deterrence. Under the direction of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), our government will rely on crisis relocation as the primary means of protecting the population in the event of a nuclear attack or detonation. This plan envisions the evacuation of the population from high risk areas to safer host areas. Does crisis relocation provide our country with a credible component to our nuclear deterrence? Do our leaders and citizens have confidence in our nation's ability to protect our civilian population? Have our leaders been completely forthright in preparing the population for the possibility of a nuclear war? These and related issues are discussed in this essay.
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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

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Crisis Relocation and Nuclear Deterrence

by

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7 April 1986
The protection of our civilian population has been considered a basic responsibility of our government since the writing of our Constitution. One of the purposes of the Union defined in the Preamble to the Constitution is "to provide for the common defense." It is difficult to think of defense without making every effort toward protecting what is most important: the lives of the people. The difficulty of providing adequate protection to the civilian population with some kind of civil defense program is magnified by the technology available in the nuclear age. The United States expanded their civil defense program in the 1950's to include a measure of protection in the event of the explosion of nuclear devices. However, the history of the United States civil defense program has been generally characterized by inadequate funding and little interest at all levels of government. Most recently, our civil defense program has been associated and considered a component of our nuclear deterrence. Under the direction of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), our government will rely on crisis relocation as the primary means of protecting the population in the event of a nuclear attack or detonation. This plan envisions the evacuation of the population from high risk areas to safer host areas. Does crisis relocation provide our country with a credible component to our nuclear deterrence? Do our leaders and citizens have confidence in our nation's ability to protect our civilian population? Have our leaders been completely forthright in preparing the population for the possibility of a nuclear war? These and related issues are discussed in this essay.
### TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>i i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART II. CIVIL DEFENSE HISTORY</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART III. THE DEBATE FOR CIVIL DEFENSE</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART IV. CURRENT STATUS OF CIVIL DEFENSE</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is late in the 1990’s and Col Jim Resik has the best assignment of
his military career. After graduating from the Army War College two years
ago, he was fortunate enough to be selected for Brigade Command. He is now
commanding what he considers to be the best Infantry Brigade at Camp Swampy,
a small Army installation located in the Southeastern United States.
However, although things seem to be going well for Col Resik, the
international situation is approaching crisis proportions. The President of
the United States has notified the Soviet Union of his intentions for full
scale deployment of a space defense system. This system was initially known
as the Strategic Defense Initiative when it was conceived by the Reagan
Administration in 1983. Despite the President’s assurances that the system
will be strictly defensive in nature and that he is willing to share the
technology with other world powers, the Soviets are claiming that the United
States is preparing for a preemptive nuclear strike on their territory.
Military forces throughout the world have been placed on alert and Col.
Resik’s Brigade has been alerted for immediate deployment. For the last ten
days, the Brigade has been confined to the post and anxiously awaiting their
deployment instructions. It comes as a complete surprise when instead of
being ordered to Europe, they are ordered to immediately relocate to a
remote wooded area just thirty-five miles west of the installation. Enroute
to the new assembly area, Col Resik is informed by coded message to quickly
prepare his Brigade for an expected nuclear attack on Camp Swampy. However,
his immediate thoughts are his concern for the safety of his wife and three
small children who live off post in one of the small communities near Camp Swampy. Will they be warned? What will they do? Where will they go? He feels very confident about his ability of taking care of his Brigade, but he doesn't know who is going to take care of his wife and family, not to mention his parents who live just outside of Washington, DC?

Does the nation have a plan for protecting its most precious commodity, its people? In a situation such as the one described above, can our military officers be confident that the performance of their unit mission will not be impaired by the concern their personnel will have for the safety of their families? These are valid questions for the professional officer to ask. The purpose of this essay is to examine what has been and what is presently being done to provide for the protection of our civilian population. It will also review some of the considerations necessary to develop a civil defense policy, and specifically look at the validity of our current policy of crisis relocation as a component of our nuclear deterrence.
To better understand civil defense issues, it is necessary to provide a brief look at our civil defense history. Civil defense has been described by some as the basic animal urge for self-survival. With the advent of nuclear weapons, it has taken on an entirely different perspective than that held during World Wars I and II. With the Soviet explosion of their first nuclear weapon in August 1949, it marked not only the beginning of a nuclear arms race, but also the beginning of a stepped up civil defense program.

Until 1955, civil defense was largely engaged in the building of a better civil defense organization at all levels of government and developing the necessary program guidance. The principal concern in those days was the vulnerability of large cities to the effects of blast and fire caused by weapons in the kiloton range. The numbers of nuclear weapons available were relatively small and the perceived threat was defined in terms of the bombing campaigns of World War II where large cities were the principal targets. Rural populations were not considered to be in great danger and little effort was devoted to their protection. The main thrust was the organization of large volunteer pools to augment the services of local city governments "with firefighting, rescue, medical aid and emergency welfare teams." (OCD, 1971, p.2).

After 1955, civil defense policies and procedures were modified to meet increases in the number and size of nuclear weapons. Initial plans included an evacuation of the cities to fallout shelters in the rural areas.
However, this plan was soon discarded due primarily to decreased warning time resulting from the use of intercontinental ballistic missiles for delivery systems. At that time, it seemed that building a combination of blast and fallout shelters was the prudent course of action. Throughout the remainder of the 50's, very little positive action was taken to support a large increase in civil defense activities. There were many studies, committee meetings and reports, but relatively little meaningful activity.

With the election of John F. Kennedy and the ensuing 1961 Berlin crisis, a long range program to provide fallout shelters for the U.S. public was initiated. On 25 July 1961, Kennedy made a strong appeal for civil defense:

"In the event of an attack, the lives of those families which are not hit in a nuclear blast and fire can still be saved if they can be warned to take shelter and if that shelter is available. We owe that kind of insurance to our families, and to our country." (Kerr, 1983, p.119)

The significant difference in the Kennedy program over that of the Eisenhower years was the funding to support the civil defense budget. For the first time in the ten years that a formal civil defense program had been in existence, the full civil defense budget request was appropriated by Congress. It amounted to $207 million and was approximately one third of the total amount that had been appropriated in the previous ten years. The period from 1961 to 1965 marked the greatest progress achieved in identifying and establishing procedures for a nationwide fallout shelter system. However, these successes were soon replaced with the costs of the Vietnam War and the Great Society, as well as a growing reluctance to support additional civil defense funding.
In Feb. 1966, while addressing the House Appropriations Committee, Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, when asked why the administration did "not try to do something about it (the civil defense program), instead of cutting it back all the time," responded:

"We have made strenuous efforts in the past to obtain larger appropriations and have been unsuccessful. I think it wise, instead of wasting our time continuing to press for something we cannot accomplish, to spend our resources on other more fruitful activity," (Wigner, 1968, p.56)

Eight days later before the same Appropriations Committee Hearings, Secretary of the Air Force, Harold Brown stated:

"...the value of reducing U.S. casualties from 120 million to 60 million is in the minds of many people, including myself, somewhat questionable.....the overall tenor of the argument I have made is that deployment of an ABM, even if accompanied by shelters, by a large interceptor program, and all the other things that might go with it to reduce damage to the United States, still would leave resulting U.S. casualties so high as to make thermonuclear war an unacceptable course of action for us." (Wigner, 1968, p.74)

These statements point out the attitude of officials at the highest levels of government during this period and make it easier to understand the reduced emphasis of the civil defense effort. It points out a rather ambiguous federal policy position; appearing to support the program but not providing sufficient resources to do so. President Kennedy's civil defense achievements provided proof that the American public would support a vigorous civil defense program when the need, and the resulting benefits were sufficiently explained to the people. However, the actions taken by our national leaders in the mid to late sixties indicated that the issues of civil defense did not have the same priority that was given to them a few years before. It can be argued that our leadership was not completely
forthright in explaining to the public the national goals and objectives and
the possible repercussions to our national survival.

Throughout the remainder of the sixties and into the seventies, appropriation for civil defense funding continued a steady decline. From a high of 55% of the total DOD budget in 1962, the civil defense budget declined to only 10% in 1970. Throughout this period, the Vietnam War virtually monopolized resources and national attention. Even into the mid-1970’s when the Soviets achieved nuclear parity with the United States and intensified their own civil defense activities, the U.S. effort continued to decline. In their efforts at achieving detente and controlling the nuclear arms race, both the Nixon-Ford and Carter Administrations chose to pursue other priorities rather than a build-up of an active air defense and civil defense capability. America's population in the high risk counterforce target areas and urban centers were left hostage in the hopes that the Soviets would do the same and justify the strategy of mutual assured destruction (MAD).

The Soviets however, did not accept the logic of MAD and continued to add to their nuclear arsenal while at the same time continuing their civil defense preparations. There is ample evidence to believe that by the mid-seventies the "balance of terror" which had characterized the sixties had begun to tilt in the Soviet’s favor. In lieu of previous clear strategic superiority, American defense officials used terms such as "realistic deterrence" and "essential equivalence" to describe strategic forces. They also began to discuss the possibility of using our civil defense program in developing a "perception" of such equivalence by the Soviet Union, the American public, and other allies and adversaries around
the world. President Carter initiated a study in 1978 which led to a presidential decision (PD-41) in recognizing the role that civil defense could play in contributing to deterrence. However, in spite of the fanfare and rhetoric, the Carter Administration did little to aid the civil defense program. In fact, with the austere funding for civil defense throughout the Nixon-Ford and Carter years, the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency could do little more than meet its overhead expenses.

With the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, civil defense proponents at last felt hope for reviving the sputtering program. Reagan’s campaign promises had stirred the hopes of those who interpreted his strong national defense statements to include a strong civil defense. Reagan did, in fact, support the outgoing Carter Administration’s civil defense budget of $252 million. The budget was to support what was known as "Program D Prime." It was basically a model program that was designed to ameliorate the severe budget limitations of the Carter years with a policy that stated,

"if combining in-place protection and orderly evacuation from threatened areas is considered efficacious, and if a seven-year program is considered sufficiently gradual, then here is how it might be done." (Kerr, 1983, P.161)

This program, better known as Crisis Relocation, was designed to relocate the population at risk to safer rural areas in the event of an expected nuclear attack. The plan created a virtual storm of controversy and protest much like that stirred up when Kennedy had advocated a substantial increase in civil defense funding twenty years before. Many news articles denounced the plan, calling it "irresponsible" and "mad." Numerous community groups throughout the country demanded that their local governments refuse to participate in the program. The situation was aggravated by some arms of
the federal government questioning the capability of the program to be supported logistically and the requested funding was eventually cut by Congress from $252 million to $152.3 million. These events have combined to once again leave the future of a civil defense program in limbo.

III

The debate for civil defense has produced vast amounts of literature explaining numerous aspects of the argument. These arguments in one form or another have been voiced since President Harry Truman signed the Federal Civil Defense Act in 1950. Debates have raged over financial support, public apathy, excessive secrecy, civilian vs. military control, instability of the civil defense organization and inadequate legislative and executive support, to name a few. Much of the literature has described the inner turmoil faced by the public in trying to decide for itself how much support to give to the various civil defense programs. Surveys of public attitudes have shown multiple reasons for this apathy such as a feeling of futility, the absence of seeing a need for action, failure to perceive the threat of nuclear war, reluctance to think about the problem, the expectation that the military can in some way prevent the enemy weapons from reaching their targets and many other considerations. A common point of view is expressed as: "A principal contention between advocates and opponents has been the question of what life would be like after a nuclear war. Would the human race survive? If it did, would the living envy the dead?" (Kerr, 1983,
The polls also appear to indicate that the vast majority of the American people favor an adequate civil defense program but they really do not know what that entails. Those opposed to civil defense, although a relatively small percentage, are frequently among the most influential and vocal.

Some say that the public's failure to participate or demand a more effective civil defense system is due to a lack of understanding of the problem rather than apathy. Americans have been presented with conflicting assertions regarding the nuclear threat and have frequently been given contradictory advice on how to deal with it. Whether ill informed or confused about the programs, the public has left it to their elected and appointed officials to provide for their security. They have not demanded action except in those rare instances where they felt an imminent threat to their safety. For the most part, they have left the decisions to the legislative and executive branches of government. Consequently, due to this apparent lack of public concern, Congress and the President have supported only limited programs.

Possibly, this reluctance to take positive action (one way or the other) can be explained by the psychological responses many people display when threatened with nuclear war. Rather than a dereliction of official duty or an avoidance of one's moral responsibilities, the magnitude of the perceived threat to our virtual existence, may result in the most basic of human psychological reactions to danger, the mechanism of denial. We may recognize the threat posed by nuclear weapons without fully acknowledging their enormous destructive power. Also, we may appreciate their destructive power, but not fully understand the relationship to our survival.
Another aspect in managing the anxiety of a possible nuclear war is the myth of personal invulnerability. We think, "It will never happen to me." Our leaders may think, "It will never happen to us or our country." These thoughts are strengthened in the United States by subtle social factors such as our high standard of living, our advanced medical technology, our confidence in our military establishment and the sense of American historical tradition of always pulling through any crisis. Also, we have not had to face the actual horrors of war in our country such as those wars that have taken place in Europe, Asia, Africa, etc. These and other psychological factors may play a greater part in our civil defense policies than we realize.

One thing is certain, the nuclear arms race is continuing. How long can it go on? In "Reason and Realpolitik," Louis R. Beres states,

"The nuclear arms race cannot last forever. In a world already shaped by some 6000 years of organized warfare, it is hard to imagine that nuclear weapons will remain dormant amidst steadily accelerating preparations for nuclear war. Rather, the apocalyptic possibilities now latent in these weapons are almost certain to be exploited, either by design or by accident, by lapse from rational decision or by unauthorized decision." (Beres, 1984, p.2)

Others would argue that war is not inevitable. Modern war is not a war of the trenches, of bayonet attacks, of soldier against soldier. Modern war is a complicated institution of intermeshing social, economic, political and psychological factors. It requires complex organizations, detailed planning and preparations, and huge consumption of resources. The capability of launching nuclear missiles requires calm and analytical precision, not fear and passion. Because war has evolved into a social institution, it should
be capable of change, if not total elimination. The Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry (GAP) has said,

"In the course of history such widespread social institutions as slavery, duelling, ritual human sacrifice, and cannibalism have been almost totally eliminated. Yet these institutions, in their time and milieu, also seemed deeply rooted in human nature and destiny." (GAP, 1965, p. 230)

They would argue that war does not have to happen, that there are alternatives to open conflict involving the use of arms. They believe that man has the ability to substitute nonviolent force for violent force to resolve international conflicts.

IV

The current status of our civil defense strategy is largely tailored after the policies established during the Carter Administration. In August 1977, President Carter initiated a comprehensive study of the Federal Government's role in responding to natural, accidental, and wartime civil disasters. The study group consisted of officials from various agencies who borrowed professional staff from outside the Government, and an informal group of senior consultants with strong backgrounds in the field of emergency preparedness. The group was directed by Mr. Greg Schneider, White House Director of Special Projects.

The project became embroiled in a power struggle between the advocates of centralizing emergency preparedness of all types under the executive branch and those believing that the civil defense effort was related to the
strategic posture of deterrence and essential equivalence, and consequently should be controlled by the Department of Defense. However, the Defense Department's record on civil defense over the years put it in a poor position to argue for maintenance of the status quo. Attempts to modify the Department of Defense's concerns were submitted but they did not meet with the approval of Secretary Brown. The concerns of Secretary Brown were made known to the President but the move to bring civil defense into an all-hazard agency could not be changed. In an attempt to pacify Secretary Brown, arrangements were made for the Defense Department to maintain a policy-oversight role for civil defense. With these final arrangements of establishing the necessary coordination completed, on 19 June 1978, President Carter submitted Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978. With this plan and the appropriate executive orders, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was born and civil defense took on an "all hazards" readiness and response role.

During FEMA's one year start-up period, a significant Presidential Directive (PD 41) was implemented on 29 September 1978. The significant aspect of this decision was the linkage of civil defense with nuclear deterrence and stability, and the need for plans to relocate the population during times of international crisis. During testimony before Congress in 1980, FEMA's director, John Macy outlined the following civil defense choices for the government in terms of population survival in the event of an all-out nuclear attack:

1. "No Civil Defense: 20% survivors (44 million people)"
2. "Present program continued: 30% survivors (66 million)"
3. "Effective crisis relocation: 80% survivors (175 million)"

4. "Blast shelter system: 90% survivors (198 million)"

Although the fourth option could possibly save an additional 23 million lives, the administration chose option three. The price tag for option three was estimated to be approximately two billion dollars while option four would require almost sixty billion dollars.

As was stated in Part II, the plan for relocation of the population during a crisis was met with protest from those who expressed grave doubts about such a plan being able to work. Jerome Weisner stated in the book "The Counterfeit Ark."

"Crisis relocation is morally wrong; and it is operationally wrong. It promises what it can't deliver—survival for 80% of the relocated population. It lulls the U.S. into the belief that it can withstand a nuclear assault and go on to win the war while providing a signal to the Soviet Union that we harbor a first-strike strategy, thus encouraging the very thing CRP is promoted to preclude—a preemptive Soviet Strike."
(Leaning, 1984, p. XIV)

Certainly some of the aspects of CRP that have been accentuated by the press have raised legitimate questions. When the press places emphasis on postal service and pet food requirements after the calamity of a nuclear attack, one certainly has the tendency to question the validity of such a program. A better and clearly less emotional analysis of CRP has been made in Ronald Perry’s book, "The social Psychology of Civil Defense." He states,

"After much review of social science research, some examination of physical science studies, and some speculation, it seems appropriate to conclude that crisis-relocation planning certainly could become effective public policy as one part of strategy for managing the threat of nuclear attack. It would be inappropriate to say CRP is at
present an implemental policy itself or that the road to becoming implementable is necessarily short or easy." (Perry, 1982, p. 107)

How well crisis relocation would work in an actual nuclear emergency is a topic for speculation. There are a number of valid opinions and one is probably as good as another. One thing in this debate is certain, before the citizens will adopt any type of protective plan suggested by authorities, they must believe that the plan affords a greater degree of protection than any other alternative. Consequently, any federal program of crisis management must have strong leadership from the President and the Congress who must also be convinced that "their" plan will work. Without this type of leadership and the necessary programs to educate/convince the public and the civil defense cadre of the effectiveness of the protective measures taken, no program will work.

The civil defense debate has raged for thirty-five years and does not appear to have resolved many of the issues. It is apparent from this limited examination of our civil defense policies that we (the U.S.) have barely scratched the surface in instituting programs to minimize the destructive effects of nuclear weapons upon our population and industry. The reorganization of federal agencies made by the Carter Administration linked our efforts of civil defense and crisis relocation to a component of our nuclear deterrence. President Reagan has not only supported PD 41, but
has expanded the scope and substance of the policy with his endorsement of National Security Decision Directive 26 (NSDD 26) which calls for "the survival of a substantial portion of the American people in the event of a nuclear attack." As frequently occurs, political rhetoric does not always produce the anticipated results. In this case, both Presidents Carter and Reagan have indicated the need to make our nuclear deterrence more creditable by linking it with our civil defense program; however neither have been able to provide the necessary funding.

The extraordinary growth of nuclear weapons in both numbers and destructive power was not envisioned when we initiated the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. We did not realize until the mid to late 1950's the seriousness of our civil defense plight. It took time to discard outdated concepts and to keep pace with the threat of increasingly devastating weapons and improved means for their delivery.

Do we need a civil defense program? Is it logical to associate it with our deterrence strategy? These questions may seem very elementary to some and ridiculous to even contemplate to others. However, until they are answered, we may be wasting our national resources on programs and projects that could pay greater dividends if used elsewhere. Ronald Perry provides us with a logical answer to the above questions when he states,

"If one can visualize a single attack situation in which some people somewhere in the United States could survive, then there is a role for emergency managers and consequently for a civil defense program. No one likes to think of the possible consequences of nuclear war, or natural and technological disasters for that matter, but the emergency manager whose charge is protecting the public must carefully address such issues if he is to devise means of carrying out his charge." (Perry, 1982, p.105).
My research has shown that throughout the entire history of the civil defense program, virtually none of our elected officials have exhibited the leadership required to obtain the necessary protection for the civilian population. Unlike other nations who have made and continue to make significant investments in their civil defense programs, in comparison, the United States has accomplished very little. Countries such as Israel, Norway, and Switzerland spend more than $10.00 per capita on civil defense. Sweden spends about $8.80, the U.S.S.R. about $7.70, Finland and Denmark about $4.30, West Germany about $3.45, etc. In comparison, the United States' annual spending amounts to about 42 cents per capita. Even when all civil emergency preparedness activities for natural disasters are included, the amount is just over one dollar per capita.

It is easy to be sympathetic with our government's plight. Budget requirements, the federal deficit, grant-in-aid, revenue sharing, public assistance, social insurance, etc. constantly demand the attention of our leaders and our national resources. The "experts" are continually advising and giving their expert opinion on the folly of our civil defense program, regardless of the direction it is taking. The experts on civil defense have taken the exact same limited evidence and reached in some cases, the exact opposite conclusions. Obviously, no one can state with certainty what would happen in the event of a full-scale nuclear exchange between the superpowers. It has never happened before so we can only speculate on the possible outcome.

This uncertainty of the effects of a nuclear exchange may be one of the problems in developing a valid civil defense program. By necessity, civil defense planners have used a worse case scenario in developing their plans.
rather than a full range of nuclear attack possibilities. Many analysts have pointed out that a full-scale attack by any superpower may result in unacceptable consequences to the attacking nation even if the attacked nation does not retaliate. An attack by one nation may not be a full-scale assault and even if it is, the attacked nation may not use any or all of their remaining retaliatory capabilities. This argument that the entire nation might not come under a full-scale assault is, again, yet another argument for some type of civil defense program.

Although the American public has generally supported required protective measures, they have not done so without the real or perceived threat portrayed in crystal clear perspective. Resistance to public safety measures has been manifested in virtually every conceivable fashion from religious fatalism to outright interference by those who disagree with the stated policies or who might be burdened with additional financial requirements. Such things as reluctance to obtain obviously needed medical care because it is not "God's way", or resistance to building codes that would require additional outlays of capital are common even in today's "enlightened" society. However the greatest obstacle to civil defense programs, past and present, has been apathy. History has shown us that the American public has required strong evidence that protection was required, and even then usually vacillates about what should be done.

How real is the threat to our population? I personally believe it is very significant and continues to increase with the growing power of the Soviet Union and her allies. We continue to have basic differences between the Soviets long range goals and their methods for the accomplishment of those goals. There has been no apparent shift in their policy of world
domination that they have pursued for the last twenty five years. Unlike the United States, the Soviet people have little or no voice in determining their national policies. While leaders of the United States must answer to the American public, leaders of the Soviet Union answer to no one. Consequently, while there is an effort throughout the free world to reduce the levels of nuclear weapons, and raise the threshold of nuclear war, it is ultimately unrealistic to assume that the people of the Soviet Union can have any impact on the defense decisions of their government. When our civil defense policies are criticized for generating fear in the Soviet Union of a U.S. first strike capability, the Soviets continue to increase their own civil defense with little or no impact on the same perception in the United States. Because of this ever increasing disparity of the two countries civil defense capabilities, a very good argument can be made that the potential for nuclear war is being increased rather than decreased.

There seems to be a contradiction of values when the free world advocates of unilateral nuclear disarmament or nuclear freeze, recognize the threat of nuclear devastation, yet are totally unwilling to support providing shelter for the virtually defenseless public. One could argue that we are following the same basic course of appeasement that led us into WW II.

If we assume that the Soviet threat to our very existence is real, we must then determine the most effective course of action that will preclude the annihilation of our country and our way of life. Our government has chosen to base our nuclear strategy on the capability of a flexible response with our civil defense and crisis relocation programs as components of what we hope is a credible deterrence to war. Of course, for these programs to be credible they must be perceived by the Soviets as being capable of
performing their functions during a nuclear exchange between the two countries. Virtually everyone would agree that nuclear war would result in a terrible calamity for all of mankind. The Soviets are as cognizant of this fact as we are. However, merely being aware of this and being against nuclear war and nuclear weapons cannot be the end to our involvement in the debate. We must concentrate our efforts on insuring that a nuclear war never occurs. Thus, our objective must be to ensure the components of our deterrence are capable of performing their stated functions. Deterrence of nuclear war, not merely being against nuclear weapons, must be our focus if we are truly serious about maintaining our society.

Deterrence, in one form or another, has been the basic reason for stability between the U.S. and the USSR since the end of WW II. In the early 1950's deterrence between the two countries was influenced by several factors. The most important was the fact that the United States was clearly the most powerful nation in the world. Although we no longer had a nuclear monopoly after the Soviets exploded their first nuclear device in 1949, the United States' economic and military position was significantly superior to that of the Soviet's. In addition, the Soviet Union was still recovering from the devastation of WW II, and was really unable to mount a significant external threat. The overwhelming superiority of American air power and the proven willingness to use its nuclear assets provided the United States with a strong deterrence against any potential aggressor. This position of superiority was the basis for the U.S. adoption of "massive retaliation" as the response it would take if attacked by an aggressor. At this particular time in history, this strategy clearly provided the appropriate level of deterrence.
The 60's and early 70's saw continuing improvement in the Soviet's arsenal of weapons and their delivery systems. Increased tension developed between the two countries because of the perception that either side might be encouraged to strike first. It was believed that whoever struck first could possibly destroy his opponents weapons while receiving relatively little damage in return. Thus, in a crisis, if either side believed that actual hostilities might result, there would be an obvious incentive for the opponents to move first to preclude the destruction of their own weapons. At times, the U.S. has refuted the first use of nuclear weapons, but the Soviets are not considered to be so accommodating. In a 1978 speech published in Aviation Week and Space Technology, Professor Richard Pipes stated,

"American intellectuals who addressed themselves to the question of their (nuclear weapons) implications assumed from the beginning that there inheres in those monstrous tools of destruction a logic obligatory on all who possessed them. That logic, in their view, rested on several related propositions: (1) that nuclear weapons were so destructive in their immediate application as well as after effects that they threatened not only the victim of aggression but all humanity, the aggressor included; (2) that no defense was possible against them, and (3) that, for both these reasons, they could have no conceivable political or military utility—except to deter others also armed with them.

The Russians have learned over the centuries that the sacrifice of lives, territory and resources is not, in itself, fatal, provided that the political authority and its military arm remain intact to mount a counter-offensive at the appropriate moment.

Russian generals do not deny the possibility of conventional engagements between the major powers, but they look upon these as mere skirmishes in a protracted conflict in which the employment of strategic nuclear weapons will prove crucial. Soviet literature leaves no doubt that the Soviet Union intends to massively preempt (with nuclear weapons) the instant the leadership has arrived at the
conclusion that war is unavoidable. In their view, the laggard risks to lose at the very onset, no matter how long the ensuing war. This means that a decision to resort to strategic nuclear weapons is not one likely to confront them on its own merits; rather, it will follow from a decision to go to war.

... they regard a general war to be possible, and have concluded that in such a war nuclear weapons will decide the issue. ... It is the task of the Soviet diplomacy to avert war; it is the task of the Soviet military to win it, speedily and with the least losses, should diplomacy fail."


If one tends to subscribe to Professor Pipes argument, then it would seem logical that the obvious key to successful deterrence is to convince the Soviet hierarchy that more can be gained through diplomacy and peaceful coexistence than can be gained by war. Successful deterrence in recent years has been based on a number of factors including our perceived ability to retaliate in a manner that was unacceptable to the Soviet leadership. We have accomplished this with buried missiles that were expected to survive relatively inaccurate Soviet missiles, with ballistic-missile submarines that were considered invulnerable to attack, with long-range strategic bombers capable of penetrating Soviet airspace, and to a significant degree, our intelligence satellites that could keep track of Soviet strategic forces. Now our leadership has included our civil defense efforts as part of our deterrent strategy.

We have seen the Soviets improve their offensive and defensive capabilities in virtually all of these strategic areas. Their missile accuracy combined with the yield of their nuclear warheads raises grave questions concerning the survivability of our missiles located in silos. We read daily about former and current U.S. military personnel who are selling the Soviets some of our most vital secrets about the defensive techniques.
used by our ballistic-missile submarines. We are also aware of the massive efforts made by the Soviets to obtain other vital strategic secrets. The Soviets have over 1000 fighter/fighter-interceptors dedicated to a strategic defense of the homeland. They also have nearly 9,400 strategic surface-to-air (SAM) launchers and continue to develop and deploy improved SAM systems. We have watched the Soviets develop the only operational antisatellite (ASAT) system, and we are aware of their very vigorous research and development efforts in ground-based, airborne, and space-based directed-energy technology. An evaluation of the credibility of our population survival as a component of our deterrence strategy when compared to the Soviets massive civil defense program indicates this component is seriously lacking. It appears we have not provided sufficient resources for incorporating civil defense and crisis relocation as a component of our nuclear deterrence.

From all available evidence that I have reviewed in writing this paper, it appears obvious that both the United States and the Soviet Union would receive incalculable damage in the event of a limited or full-scale nuclear exchange. The important question is whether the Soviets perceive that they would receive sufficient damage to preclude their initiation of such an attack? The scientific and speculative evidence needed to answer such a question can be interpreted almost any way the "expert" desires to interpret it. Some will continue to warn that the total extinction of the human race would result while others will continue to make plans to deliver the mail and collect taxes during the "post-attack" phase. Everyone seems to agree that a nuclear war would be the worst event to ever happen to this world,
but few can agree on how much suffering and destruction the Soviets would be willing to accept to reach their goal of world domination.

In my opinion, it is clear that our national leadership has failed in their duty to prepare the country for the possibility of such a calamity, whether limited or full-scale. Specifically, I feel that our Presidents, both Democrat and Republican, have not been candid with the public or provided the necessary leadership in facing this very real issue. Even today, under the guidance of President Reagan who has been the advocate for a strong national defense, and when the relocation of our population has been recognized as a link in our defense strategy, a comprehensive, long-term program for an enhanced civil defense, with sufficient funding to implement it, has yet to be presented. Without such moral courage and the resulting emphasis and leadership, our Presidents may be gambling with not only the lives of the people, but with the nation.
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