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Ideological and Psychological Factors
in International Terrorism

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The actions of terrorist organizations are based on a subjective interpretation of the world rather than objective reality. Their perceptions of the political and social environment are filtered through beliefs and attitudes that reflect experiences and memories. The psychological and ideological factors that constitute the terrorists' worldview and influence their behavior are only part of a complex web of determinants of terrorist activity, one of which is surely a strategic conception of means and ends. It is clearly mistaken, however, to assume that terrorists act in terms of a consistent rationality based on accurate perceptions of reality. In fact one of the aims of terrorist organizations is to convince their audiences to see the world in their terms. An important aspect of the struggle between governments and terrorists concerns the definition of the conflict. Each side wishes to interpret the issues in terms of its own values.

Given this premise, that the way in which members of the terrorist organization see the world influences their behavior, it is essential to analyze the perceptions of self and environment held by terrorist organizations. Such systems of beliefs may be derived from numerous sources. The political and social environment in which the terrorist organization operates establishes one set of origins. In this category can be included both general cultural variables (history, tradition, religion, literature) which are imparted to individual members of society through socialization patterns, and formally constructed ideologies or political philosophies which are usually acquired in young adulthood. Ideologies are usually consciously learned rather than unconsciously assimilated.

Many people are exposed to the influences of culture or political ideas; however, only a few form the types of beliefs that seem to support terrorism. Beliefs also serve psychological functions for some individuals. The
psychological characteristics of terrorists make particular types of beliefs important as motivation and as possible sources of misperception and decision error. The situation in which terrorists operate is stressful and uncertain, making specific beliefs psychologically functional, durable, and resistant to change. Both cognitive processes and motivational factors encourage reliance on a rigid set of beliefs that and inhibit flexibility and openness. The dynamics of the group encourage cohesiveness and solidarity that further stifle challenges to the dominant beliefs in the terrorist organization.

Any psychological analysis must proceed with caution. It is important to be sensitive to cultural differences and not to assume that what is unusual by Western standards is also abnormal. The concepts of rationality and irrationality commonly employed in social scientific analysis are culture-bound. Terrorists rationally hold convictions the majority of society sees as deluded.

The policy implications of this analysis should be carefully drawn. In general, governments should avoid reinforcing the subjective reality of the terrorist. Their aim should also be to loosen the hold of the group over its members and to make them more responsive to reality. In hostage situations in particular, government decision makers must use their knowledge of terrorist perceptions and beliefs to persuade terrorists to compromise. To do this, the terrorist must be induced to look at a longer run future.

Terrorist Beliefs and Images

Members of terrorist organizations act in terms of organized belief systems through which information is filtered. As Ole Holsti (1967, p. 18) contended in a classic article almost twenty years ago, the belief system "may be thought of as the set of lenses through which information concerning the
physical and social environment is received. It orients the individual to his environment, defining it for him and identifying for him its salient characteristics."

There are several criteria for describing and classifying belief systems. The structure of a belief system may be "open" or "closed," depending upon receptivity to new information. Principles of cognitive consistency theories suggest that the more closed the belief system, the more likely it is that its adherents will reinterpret incongruent information so as to fit preexisting beliefs and images, discredit the sources of unwelcome news, or block out the objectionable message. Beliefs may be systematically organized and structurally related to each other, or only loosely fitted into a grouping that could scarcely be called a system. Their stability depends in part on whether they satisfy both cognitive and affective needs. Some beliefs are central to the structure of the belief system and to the individual, while others are peripheral and hence more easily but less consequentially changed. Finally, political analysts are most concerned with beliefs that are not congruent with reality and which then may lead to significant misperceptions and distortions. Actions are then not likely to fulfill the actor's expectations.

The content of terrorist belief systems has not yet been systematically studied. In contrast to the large body of theoretical work on the beliefs and perceptions of government decision makers, few analyses treat the terrorist worldview seriously (Jenkins, 1979). There are several reasons for this apparent neglect. One is that the study of terrorism is a relatively new field, still theoretically undeveloped. A second more serious obstacle to analysis is acquiring and interpreting data. The major decisions in crisis situations that foreign policy analysts commonly study, such as the choices
leading to World War I or the Cuban Missile Crisis, are well-documented. Extensive memoirs, minutes of meetings, texts of diplomatic cables, transcripts of conversations, or interviews with decision makers permit detailed reconstructions of events. Dealing with radical undergrounds is a different matter. Crises are often over before the perpetrators can even be identified. Issues of trust and confidentiality complicate interviews. Much of the literature terrorist organizations produce is propaganda, designed to influence a public audience, or ex post facto justification. Inaccessibility of information, due in no small part to government classification of data, also impedes academic research.

An exception to this general neglect is the study by Hopple and Steiner (1984) of the causal beliefs of terrorists. They employ content analysis to evaluate twelve factors as potential sources of action, applying the technique to 46 documents from the Italian Red Brigades, the German RAF, and the Basque ETA. The scope of their study is limited, but it indicates that the emphasis within belief systems changes over time (for example, increased attention to the government as the group ages) and that different groups stress different motivations. ETA scarcely mentions the masses at all, for instance.

A general framework for the analysis of the content of terrorist belief systems is necessary as a basis for case studies of individual organizations and as a means of comparing and classifying different types of terrorist groups. For example, this approach may indicate answers to important questions about the differences between left revolutionary and national separatist organizations. It may also aid in understanding what distinguishes terrorists from other political radicals, right or left, who do not turn to violence.

One of the most significant components of a belief system is the image of the enemy (Holsti, 1967). Extreme stereotyping is common to all conflict
situations, so it is not surprising to find it in the terrorist outlook. 
Dehumanization and reification of the enemy dominate thinking. The enemy is 
perceived in depersonalized and monolithic terms as the bourgeoisie, 
capitalism, Communism, or imperialism, rather than as human beings. This 
image may also differentiate between the people, who are good, and their bad 
leaders. Americans, for example, may be considered to be as oppressed by 
their imperialistic government as the citizens of the third world. In some 
cases, such as the West Germans, the present government is condemned by being 
identified indiscriminately with the Nazi regime. (This identification is 
strongly connected to the terrorists' need for a morally justifiable self-
image.) American allies are frequently equated with colonies and consequently 
denied autonomous identity.

Rightwing terrorists, whether neofascist or vigilante, seem less likely 
to see the government as an enemy. Instead they are prone to class or ethnic 
attributions. In Latin America, for example, intellectuals, professors, 
students, lawyers, and journalists are lumped together as the Left or 
Communists. In the United States, groups such as the Ku Klux Klan or the 
Posse Comitatus are racist and anti-Semitic. The prejudicial stereotyping 
behind these attitudes is overt.

Fascist terrorists often blame conspiracies of elites and despised 
classes, for example, bankers and Jews (Wilkinson, 1983). "Eurofascist" 
groups in contemporary Western Europe struggle against both capitalism and 
Marxism. While their conception of metaphysical justification is 
sophisticated (Sheehan, 1981), their image of the enemy remains vague. Anyone 
who poses a barrier to their aspirations for an organic state is the enemy. 
As Ferracuti and Bruno argue (1981, p. 208), "the enemy is nonhuman, not good 
enough. He is the enemy because he is not a hero and is not friendly to the
As interesting as their images of the enemy are terrorists' images of themselves. Most left revolutionary terrorists see themselves as victims, not aggressors. Their self-image is as representatives of the oppressed—workers or peasants—who are unable to help themselves. They are the enlightened in a mass of unenlightened. They are the elect, who recognize dangers that the masses do not. The struggle is an obligation and a duty, not a matter of voluntary choice. In the historical terrorist literature, two images present themselves. Often terrorists are considered morally superior, more sensitive, and more noble. Emma Goldman, for example, protested against the popular image of the anarchist terrorist as a lunatic or "wild beast," when "those who have studied the character and personality of these men, or who have come in close contact with them, are agreed that it is their super sensitiveness to the wrong and injustice surrounding them which compels them to pay the toll of our social crimes" (quoted in Laqueur, ed., 1978, p. 194). In contrast to this view stands the famous "Catechism of the Revolutionist" of Sergei Nechaev (Laqueur, ed., 1978, pp. 68-72). Here the revolutionary or terrorist is described as a "doomed man," implacably bent on destruction, merciless, hard, and unsentimental. Other people exist only to be used; the society that exists is "foul" and despicable in all its aspects.

The self-image of terrorists has apparently changed since the beginnings of modern political terrorism in the late nineteenth century. Members of the Russian People's Will, for example, were proud to call themselves terrorists. The resort to terrorism was openly debated in the Russian revolutionary movement. Many thought it a noble and exalted mission. With the passage of time, the image of the terrorist in society has become less positive. Most contemporary terrorists reject the label, reserving it exclusively for the enemy. This denial may be an interesting form of psychological projection.
Yet Carlos Marighela, whose "Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla" has become a classic of revolutionary strategy, describes some of the actions he recommends as as terrorist (1971, p. 62). So too does Joao Quartim, another Brazilian revolutionary (Kohl and Litt, eds., 1974, pp. 150-56). But they are exceptions. The image of "freedom fighter" or "national liberation front" has become a superior legitimizing device as global values have changed in the aftermath of anticolonial struggles. The term terrorist now connotes opprobrium.

Another question about the terrorist self-image is whether or not terrorists think of themselves in terms of self-sacrifice. Many terrorists of the left seem to define their role as that of sacrificial victim. Whether or not this image accords with reality, the notion of being willing to die for a cause is important to the identity of some individuals. When individual terrorists are unable to act in terms of this self-image, emotional conflict is bound to result.

Terrorists of the right also see themselves as an elite. The distinction between neo-fascist groups and simple reactionary or vigilante organizations who respond to visible threats to their dominant status is that neo-fascists seem to think of themselves as heroes. As with left terrorists, they see themselves as embodying a superior morality. Normal standards of behavior do not apply to them. In contrast, vigilantes see their status threatened by social change. Perhaps they, too, see themselves as victims of impersonal forces.

Clearly the struggle terrorists see themselves as engaged in is sharply delineated between black and white, good and evil. With revolutionary terrorists, the enemy is often seen as much more powerful, with many alternatives to choose from, while terrorists have no choice but terrorism--
which they see as a response to government oppression, not a free choice on their part.

Two other aspects of terrorist beliefs about the nature of the conflict are intriguing. The first is the widespread tendency to define the struggle in elaborately legalistic terms. Terrorists do not see what they do as murder or killing; instead they perform executions after trials. Their victims are usually termed traitors. If they are kidnapped they are held in people's prisons. This imitative adoption of the principles of justice of the adversary may be only a deliberate device to acquire legitimacy. But the myth of legality may be more than a facade. Terrorists believe that true justice is on their side. As Menachem Begin (1977, p. 108) explained about the Zionist struggle against the British, "in order to maintain an open underground you need more than the technique of pseudonyms. What is most necessary is the inner consciousness that makes what is 'legal' illegal and the 'illegal' legal and justified." The terrorist's sense of moral superiority is derived less from concrete historical facts than from transcendental values.

A second feature of the terrorists' view of struggle is their military imagery. Franco Ferracuti and Francesco Bruno (1983, pp. 308-310) have referred to terrorism as a "fantasy war," in which terrorists imagine themselves as soldiers. Many style themselves as armies, organized in brigades or commandos. The IRA persisted in this pattern long after it was operationally counterproductive. Military as well as legal symbolism may be expressions of a desire to imitate the enemy. These beliefs also contribute to the self-perception of power, invulnerability, and immunity. In a combat situation or war, ordinary rules do not apply. The soldier image is a method of separating the terrorist from the mundane.

An additional component of terrorist belief systems is the image of "the
people." Terrorists on the left appear to have an optimistic faith in the revolutionary potential of the masses but little practical grasp of public attitudes or mass political behavior. For example, despite left terrorists' contention that they are acting on behalf of the masses, the struggle they perceive may be only two-sided. Hopple and Steiner found that although the ETA portrays itself as a nationalist organization, there were few references to the masses. The inevitability of eventual popular support is assumed. Its absence in the present has to be ignored or rationalized away.

It is also important to ask what image terrorists have of the physical victims of violence. Victims among the "enemy" are not seen as individuals but as representatives of the hostile group. Indicative of the stability of such beliefs is the statement by Michael Collins (Taylor, 1958, p. 134), founder of the Irish Republican Army, which he issued after "Bloody Sunday," November 21, 1920, when fourteen men suspected of being British intelligence agents were killed. His victims, not all of whom were guilty of the sins of which they were accused, were described as "undesirables" who had to be destroyed. Collins professed to have "no more than a feeling such as I would have for a dangerous reptile. By their destruction the very air is made sweeter. That should be the future's judgment on this particular event. For myself, my conscience is clear."

But what of innocent victims—hostages or bystanders? If terrorists admit that such victims even exist, they may blame the government either for refusing to concede their demands or ignoring warnings. They often refuse to accept responsibility for violence. Zvonko Busic, a Croatian hijacker, also left bombs that maimed for life the New York City policemen who tried to dismantle them. In Knutson's (1981, pp. 133-35) analysis of his reactions, she found that he not only avoided guilt but was offended at the anger his
victims expressed at his trial. Since he had had no intention of hurting
them, their anger was unfair and vengeful. Unwanted consequences were simply
fate. In fact, Busic felt that he had suffered most and that his victims
should feel sorry for him.

Terrorist belief systems differ in terms of both content and internal
consistency. One integrative theme in terrorist belief systems is
millenarianism. There is a strong chiliastic tendency among terrorist
organizations. Wilson (1973) classifies some political organizations as
redemptive because their political purpose is the personal salvation of
members as much as changing the world. Personal redemption through violence
is also a millenarian theme. Violence may also be seen as necessary to bring
about the historical millenium. Furthermore, millenarian beliefs imply that
achieving political goals is likely only in the distant future. In the
present one must simply have faith in the struggle. Concrete gains are not
necessary to sustain the morale of followers as long as the promised future is
glorious enough. Compromise is out of the question.

David Rapoport (1985) argues that millenarian beliefs may lead to
terrorism when the millenium (conceived of as total liberation or historical
transformation) is thought to be imminent, when believers think that they can
act so as to hasten its coming, and when violating the rules of the old order
becomes imperative. Millenarians may also believe in the necessity of
withdrawing from secular or profane society to create a separate community of
believers. These beliefs can contribute to the "politics of atrocity" or
deliberate abandon of restraints, symbolic of the individual's depth of
commitment to destroying the old and adhering to the new. All ties to the
present must be severed so that there can be no return. Messianic worldviews
tend to divide the world into "good" and "evil" camps. No mercy can be shown
the evil that the enemy embodies. The righteousness of the good is absolute.
Believers need not be convinced that their actions will actually bring about the millenium because the righteous can be saved through personal actions regardless of political consequences. Setting a personal example of sacrifice of oneself or another may be sufficient. The full achievement of the organization's external goals is secondary. Any action in the service of the cause can be interpreted as a success. There can be no failure if all violence brings the millenium nearer.

Environmental Sources of Terrorist Belief Systems

Inquiry into terrorist belief systems is concerned not only with the content or nature of beliefs about world and self but also with how these conceptions are formed or determined. Terrorism must reflect the setting in which it occurs. It is rooted in specific historical, cultural, social, and political contexts despite the internationalization of target and locale. The problem is to ascertain how the members of terrorist organization, a minority of a given social group, are influenced by widely diffused macrolevel or environmental factors. Few of the people exposed to the same reality—religion, literature, history, ideology, current events—choose the path of terrorist violence. Receptivity to these cultural and political influences is highly uneven. Furthermore, any analysis that attempted to include all the possible environmental sources of political behavior would be exhaustive and meaningless.

A possible method of selecting decisive influences from the universe of social surroundings is to search for those that provide the individual with a place in a historical process, that suggest a model for action appropriate to acquiring this status, and that furnish a vocabulary and a framework for articulating beliefs and justifying them to an audience. Both cultural and
political environments can establish scripts or macronarratives that place present events in a historical continuity, linking the past to the future (see Himmelweit, et al., 1981, p. 191; Gergen and Gergen, 1983; Tololyan, 1985). In addition to providing such a universal explanation, these macronarratives must be directive, in the sense of answering the individual's problem of how to act in specific political situations and thus providing a role, or micronarrative. The macronarrative is an autonomous, comprehensive interpretation of reality, independent of current events, reaching far back into history and forward into the future to explain how events are related to each other. Within this essentially dramatic script is a role for the individual, a model for appropriate and justifiable action. (Gergen and Gergen (1983) argue that in psychological terms every individual self-conception is in terms of a narrative, but that not all need be directive.) These narratives are activated only under the types of political circumstances that make them salient and relevant. At other, noncrisis, times they lie dormant. These propitious situations may involve threats to strongly-held values, newly opened opportunities, or puzzles—events that are significant to the individual and his or her community but which cannot otherwise be explained.

The sources of these narratives or scripts may be cultural or political. The social, religious, literary, and linguistic traditions and myths ingrained in centuries of historical consciousness yields a pattern of socialization. Not only values but models of action are internalized and unconsciously assimilated. In ethnic cultures (or subcultures), especially in national communities struggling to preserve an autonomous existence in the face of majority pressure, one would expect to find strong cultural influences. The second important source of narratives is political ideology. Ideas or philosophies are usually learned or acquired from adolescence on.
They are explicitly elaborated and articulated as guides for political interpretation and action and often specify the circumstances under which they are appropriate. It seems logical to assume that ideologies would be stronger in homogeneous, nondivided, modernized, secular societies. Yet examination of cases reveals that reality is more complex than this dichotomy suggests.

That such myths, derived from centuries of experiences, deep in the recesses of the past and embedded in oral and written sources, should motivate separatist terrorism is understandable. Tololyan (1985) argues that terrorists are socially produced and can be understood only in terms of a specific cultural context. He finds the "projective narratives" of the culture critical to this understanding: stories of the past that instruct individuals on how to live and die so as to symbolize collective values and identity. The times and places that are relevant and meaningful to the terrorist may be in the distant past or the promised future, not the temporal present. The past constitutes a mediating force between the individual and the reality he or she experiences. Narratives convert historical facts into guides for political action, but the individual is not conscious of representing a symbolic model because these values have been thoroughly internalized.

Tololyan cites the importance of religion and literature, emphasizing that terrorist writings both allude to and are continuous with mainstream social discourse. All Armenians share a collective memory of injustice, experienced as families and as a nation. In confrontations with injustice specific patterns of action are both prescribed by narratives of resistance and understood as such by wider Armenian society. The particular cultural reality which nourishes terrorism stems from the Middle Eastern diaspora, in countries such as Syria and Lebanon where assimilation is the exception. Two
elements of the cultural experience dominate: the Genocide and the heroic
tale of Vartan (5th century A.D.). The model thus established of resistance
and martyrdom is incorporated into an ethnonational identity. A willingness
to accept risk and violent death is essential to faithfulness to properly
Armenian values. Social and self-approval are thus inscribed on people's
minds in these terms. Through terrorist actions, individuals can give their
lives meaning by linking them symbolically with cultural myths. Terrorists
can think of themselves as heirs to a noble tradition that others have
forsaken. Failure in the present does not exist; the only failure is not to
live up to the past. The individual terrorist's death may be necessary for
the salvation of a political collectivity that has no other representation.

Through this sacrifice traditions and narratives are reanimated, made
continuous with the present, and given political relevance.

Tololyan contends that these cultural narratives that dictate regulative
autobiographies stem from centuries of accumulated tradition. Yet relatively
recent events may raise behavioral models to the forefront of consciousness.
Myths or scripts may also be deliberately created to serve political purposes,
as may social traditions. The case of Irish terrorism illustrates this
proposition and demonstrates the often paradoxical effects of religion. Irish
nationalism and Catholicism have become synonymous, but this coincidence is
less than a century old. Early leaders of rebellion against British rule were
often Protestant, and their models of rebellion derived more from the French
Revolution and continental republicanism than from Irish history. In the late
nineteenth century this political and social rebellion was joined by a
specifically cultural revival. While the IRA as a successor to the Irish
Republican Brotherhood incorporated a mysticism, idealism, and asceticism that
has religious overtones, its violence is condemned by the institutionalized
Church. The image of martyrdom stems as much from the Easter Rising of 1916
as from Catholicism. Protestant terrorism against Catholics seems more religiously derived than IRA terrorism. Ulster Protestants also have a merged religio-political identity, with roots dating from the seventeenth century and the victory of the Orange over the Green, a victory celebrated in symbol and ritual annually. That a modern war of religion continues unabated in Northern Ireland cannot be explained by the nature of either Catholicism or Protestantism.

It is reasonable to propose that the same principle of non-accountability holds true for Shi'ite inspired terrorism in the contemporary Middle East. The legends of the Assassins of medieval Islam and the history of Shi'ism as a source of revolt against dominant political elites notwithstanding, religion acquired a modern relevance under specific political conditions. The defeats of 1967 and 1973 and the failure of the newly oil-rich states to reap equivalent political benefits could not be explained in terms of secular ideology. Modernization and secularization did not lead to political power but to moral corruption. With the impetus given by Khomeini's ascent to power in Iran, the answer to these troubles seemed to lie in a return to a purity of faith. That religious fundamentalism has emerged among both Shi'ite and Sunni persuasions (and has taken form on both the left and the right, in conventional political terms) shows that terrorism is not an exclusive province of Shi'ism, despite its emphasis on martyrdom.

Formal political ideologies are often identified as sources of terrorism (see Wilkinson, 1977). Contemporary terrorists often present themselves as followers of Marx, Lenin, Mao, Guevara, Fanon, Sartre, or Marcuse. Theories of revolution, anarchism, and fascism have been claimed as inspiration by practitioners of political violence in Western societies since the second half of the nineteenth century.

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It is difficult, however, to separate the influence of ideology from that of indigenous traditions and historical experiences, even in modern societies without ethnic cleavages. While the myth of resistance to an oppressive foe is strong in ethnic separatism, it is also influential in countries like West Germany and Italy. It cannot be pure coincidence that the Western societies most afflicted by terrorism in the 1970s were also those with a legacy of fascism in the 1930s and 1940s. In Germany particularly, the need to redeem the past and to act appropriately where the previous generation had not may have been an important motivation. The identification of existing elites with the Nazi leadership and the search for an external reference group, revolutionary movements in the third world, are indications of the influence of the past. In France, where actual resistance to the Nazis was more developed than in either West Germany or Italy, indigenous terrorist groups have followed a different, less destructive course. The majority of the French identify with the resistance regardless of the extent of actual, historical participation. De Gaulle was able to redeem French honor in a way that Brandt was unable to do in West Germany. French independence from the United States was probably an important factor.

The historian Gordon Craig (1982, pp. 210-12) finds in the activities of anarchist and terrorist groups among the German student movement of the late 1960s evidence of older cultural influences. The historical roots of terrorism go much deeper than the Nazi period, to the Romanticism of the early nineteenth century. Both terrorist and Romantic movements, their members drawn from the educated middle class, were based on a profound cultural pessimism. The modern rebels, terrorist and non-terrorist, shared with their predecessors of the nineteenth century and Weimar period three other characteristics: a flight from the real world into one of their own creation, a hostility toward theory and reason and a reliance instead on instinct, and a
firmer grasp of what they disliked about the present than what they proposed for the future. The retreat of terrorists from the world was more drastic and their contempt for reason more pronounced. Craig adds: "What is important to note is that the idealization of violence that was characteristic of the political Romantics of the 1920s was not only adopted by these middle-class rebels in the Federal Republic but made more consequential. For, if the terrorists had a guiding principle, it was that the use of the ultimately irrational weapon, violence, directed randomly at individual targets, would infect society with such unreasoning fear and anxiety that it would become paralyzed and inoperative and therefore ripe for a revolution that would destroy the false democracy and create a new society in the interest of the people and the working class" (p. 212).

Although terrorists adopt ideological terminology, most are practitioners, not intellectuals or theorists. Emphasis is always on action (or praxis) over talking (or theory). Many terrorists have broken away from larger revolutionary or nationalist organizations precisely because their members spent too much time debating ideas rather than acting on them.

The West German terrorist organizations—RAF, 2nd June Movement, and Revolutionary Cells—are often thought of as among the most ideological of contemporary terrorists. Yet a detailed study (Fetscher and Rosenthal, 1981) concludes that ideology is part of their rhetoric but not motivation. German terrorists have been eclectic, selectively appropriating what suits them from contemporary leftist ideologies. Usually the more realistic components of ideology are excluded. They see themselves, for example, as representatives of the third world fighting the Western metropolis in a global war. For terrorists, ideology serves the useful function of removing them from an increasingly incongruent reality. To some terrorists Marxism seemed
Rohrmoser, the co-author of the German study, tried to find a hidden logic in fragmentary terrorist ideological pronouncements and to create for them a synthetic and plausible ideology. He felt that one could link terrorist beliefs to modern Marxist interpretations such as the Frankfurt School, Marcuse, Sartre, and Lukacs, but that the connection was implicit. The terrorists, in Rohrmoser's view, are utopians who regard historical facts as deception. The future they seek to create is the source of their conception of their own rightness and popular legitimacy. Their conception of "the people" is imaginary. To them, present reality is evil; only in its destruction could there be personal fulfillment. Nothing exists between good and evil; compromise is betrayal. Rohrmoser argues that terrorists sought out Marxism-Leninism and its revisionist modifications to buttress beliefs that were already established. Ideology accorded them an automatic virtue as part of a preordained class struggle. They could not have persisted in their self-image of a revolutionary vanguard without the Marxist concept of true versus false consciousness, which allowed them to think that the masses were deluded by capitalist enslavements of consumerism and materialism. Their acts of terrorism represented an effort to compel reality to fit the image they had of it, for example, to make the German government fit a Nazi image. Terrorism also enabled them to think of themselves as saviors of the true Marxist inheritance that had been betrayed by the orthodox left. Rohrmoser noted, as has Wilkinson (1977) the contradictory elements in the terrorist ideological framework, as these self-consciously left revolutionaries echo Sorel's call to end decadence with violence.

This analysis suggests that terrorism is not a product directly of particular patterns of political thought or ideas. Instead terrorists may
first develop beliefs and then seek justification for them through the selection of fragments of compatible theories. The ideas that are most attractive include millenarian narrative structures that justify individual violence. Terrorist doctrines are not likely to be coherent or systematic. Terrorists seek in the ideas of others elements of confirmation for incompletely conceptualized beliefs and images. Ideology is used to articulate these beliefs to an outside audience which might otherwise dismiss the terrorist conception of the world as illusory. Perhaps for similar reasons of external justification, most separatist terrorist organizations also adopt Marxist terms of discourse. In the modern world it is difficult to distinguish ideology from culture. Marxism in particular has become part of twentieth century political education. Its terms and concepts may be part of the internalized value structures of both terrorists and publics.

In sum, the political and the nonpolitical environment shape terrorist behavior, and many elements of this environment are non-political. In specific conditions individuals deliberately or unconsciously assimilate models of appropriate action. These symbols, myths, or narratives have deep historical roots and be embodied in the institutions and cultural realities of a given society, or they may be of recent and calculated creation. From family traditions, religious observances, art and literature the individual learns how to live a life that will become meaningful in terms of the past and the future. The immediate political or personal consequences of such actions are often less important than their transcendent significance. Explicit political ideologies may play more of a role when strong cultural narratives are not present, but they appear to be justifications for prior beliefs rather than motivations. To terrorists ideology is secondary or even superficial but it represents an important reinforcement of extremist beliefs, making them
easier to sustain in the face of an unpleasant reality.

Psychological Functions of Terrorist Beliefs

Although most psychological analyses of terrorism are in agreement on the premise that there is no single terrorist personality or specific set of identifiable psychological traits, the individuals attracted to terrorism may exhibit characteristics that make them comfortable with extremist belief systems and violent behavior. Beliefs serve various psychological needs, which may differ among individuals. (This is not meant to imply that personality somehow stands in isolation from the individual’s environment; psychological predispositions obviously reflect patterns of socialization as well as early traits.) Particular belief systems may also be necessary to help relieve the negative effects of guilt and stress imparted by terrorism to a heterogeneous collection of individual personalities.

Such emotional predispositions are not in most cases pathological, although there is some evidence that terrorists of the right suffer more mental disorders than those of the left (Ferracuti and Bruno, 1981). Nor is the answer so simple as an attraction to violence or aggression per se. For one thing, the violence involved in terrorism is deliberate and premeditated and thus less likely to be emotionally satisfying to the impulsive personality. In addition, Knutson (1981) argued that many terrorists are actually ambivalent about the use of violence. This internal conflict may explain why it is necessary for terrorists to believe that they have no choice and that the enemy bears ultimate responsibility for violence. If Knutson’s argument is correct, then the avoidance of responsibility and shift of attribution common to terrorist belief systems (at least on the left) and the self-image of a victim rather than an aggressor may be important to
personality integration. Belief systems may reflect the terrorist's inability to accept his or her own violent tendencies. (See also Knutson, 1980, and Bollinger and Jager, respectively, 1981).

Possibly the structure of the terrorist belief system, portraying an all-powerful authority figure relentlessly hostile to a smaller, powerless victim may reflect early relationships with parents, particularly sons with fathers. (Cainly Feuer (1969) felt that terrorism was a psychological reaction of sons against fathers, an inevitable part of adolescent rebellion.) Some individuals may need to see the world in Manichean terms as a confrontation between good and evil in which only the child and the father are important figures. Their beliefs may actually reflect feelings of inferiority, low self-esteem, and helplessness. The need to be engaged in a fantasy war may also be a delusional means of self-aggrandizement. Kaplan, for example, argues that the self-righteousness of terrorist beliefs reflects personal insecurity (1981).

The terrorist image of the enemy may also result from projection, reflecting a lack of integration of the different elements of the personality. The young child is unable to accept the fact that he or she may be both good and bad. All the bad characteristics of the self—aggressive impulses, for example—are projected onto an external figure.

Eric Erikson's (1963 and 1968) concept of identity may also help explain the individual's attraction to terrorist belief systems. Failure to establish basic trust, the first developmental hurdle the child confronts, might make the individual hostile and suspicious, prone to see the world as threatening and filled with enemies. Erikson also notes that at the adolescent stage of identity formation, ideologies serve a functional role as protectors of a still precarious identity. Because adolescents need to believe in something
unambiguous outside themselves, they are susceptible to ideologies which provide certainty and remove hesitation. The future promise inherent in millenarian belief systems provides both hope for escaping an uncomfortable present and meaning for one's actions. Erikson also points out that the individual who has been deprived of something to have faith in—disappointed in parents and the previous generation, for example—experiences anger likely to gain outlet in ideologies that justify violence.

Bollinger (1981), who studied eight West German terrorists, tentatively supports this view. He found the terrorists of the RAF (admittedly not a representative sample) to have suffered developmental setbacks because of lack of familial and social support at critical periods. In particular, the failure to acquire basic trust prevented them from integrating aggressive impulses. Later failure to develop personal autonomy also created additional destructive tendencies. The child's world developed as a constant struggle for power with unresponsive parents. As young adults, these people were attracted to ideologies that posited inevitable hostility between a repressive government and a weak opponent. The child's rage at his or her helplessness was projected onto authority figures. Bollinger also claimed that belief systems based on violent resistance to an omnipotent enemy permit a process of collective identification both with victims and aggressors.

Erikson's concept of negative identity has also been used to explain terrorist behavior. In such cases, individuals who have been unable to find a positive, socially acceptable identity adopt roles which have been presented to them as most undesirable or "bad." Essentially the adoption of a negative identity is a rejection of family and society. Knutson's (1981) research supports Erikson's contention (1968, p. 303) that members of minority ethnic groups are likely to internalize the prejudicial image of themselves held by the majority. They internalize a "bad" stereotype. Knutson notes that the
assumption of a negative identity is a painful and difficult process, often a result of a severe disappointment in life that cuts off the route to a positive identity.

Explaining terrorist motivation through the concept of negative identity is problematic, however. Knutson admits that the negative identity of national separatists (such as Croatians) is not a complete rejection of the social values of the relevant majority. In minority subgroups many people hold traditional nationalistic values. The analysis of political culture as a source of terrorist beliefs and perceptions indicates that terrorists may be people who think of themselves as defending the traditional ideals of a national community. Terrorists from these cultures perceive their role as guardians of a threatened national identity, rather than as the personification of traits rejected by family and society. In traditional cultures seeking to preserve old ways against the encroachments of modernity, the rebels are those people who assimilate.

Perhaps the concept of negative identity is more applicable to radical groups in nondivided industrialized societies, such as West Germany or Italy. Post (1984, especially p. 243) has argued that there is an important distinction between "anarchic-ideologues" and "nationalist-secessionists" in terms of their respective mindsets. The difference is between terrorists who seek to destroy their own society, the "world of their fathers," and those whose intention is to uphold the traditions of their fathers. Terrorism may be "an act of retaliation" against parents for some, but for others an act of revenge against society because of harm done to parents. Terrorism can represent dissent toward loyal parents or loyalty to parents who dissented toward the regime. In practice revolutionary terrorism in homogeneous societies may develop from obedience to the ideals of one's parents (which may
not have been fulfilled) rather than rebellion. In Italy, West Germany, and
the United States it has not been uncommon for terrorists to be the children
of social critics (as Post also notes in the case of Italy, p. 246). These
may be contradictory motives, reflecting the conflict the child may feel,
which can only be reconciled in the type of extreme belief system that
supports terrorism and the search for an external, more moral, reference
group.

Another important function of the belief system for terrorists is the
neutralization of guilt. People who become terrorists are likely to
experience guilt for the commission of violent acts, so that it is necessary
that they maintain the belief that someone else is responsible and that normal
standards of moral behavior do not apply to them. The possibility that
victims may be innocent must be excluded from consideration. One's own side
is always right, the other always wrong. The need to ward off guilt, the
prompting of the conscience or super ego, may also explain the legalistic and
military imagery inherent in terrorist beliefs. Terrorists conceive of their
role as agents of higher authority—soldiers or administrators of justice—
rather than as independent persons, acting out of free will.

There are sources of guilt other than the commission of violence. The
child feels guilty and anxious for the hostility felt against the parent or
authority-figure, so that it is necessary to erect an ideological structure
that justifies a violent challenge against a wholly bad enemy. Terrorists may
also experience survivor-guilt when their comrades are killed or imprisoned.
Thinking of the deaths of fellow-terrorists in terms of sacrifices for a long-
term transcendental goal may be an essential means of coping with guilt
assumed by having lived when friends died. The need for a meaning beyond life
also grows from the fear of death, a realistic prospect for the terrorist.
Change in Terrorist Beliefs

The unrealistic yet rigid content of terrorist beliefs and the persistence with which believers cling to them encourage misperception. Terrorists seem to maintain their commitment to a subjective reality in the face of overwhelming amounts of disconfirming information. Theories of cognitive consistency imply that terrorists confront serious challenges to their beliefs, inconsistencies that require resolution if belief is to be upheld. Terrorists resist changing their beliefs despite disconfirming evidence. The problem is why and how inflexibility is the rule rather than the exception.

In general psychological studies show that belief systems, once established, are resistant to change. One reason for the stability of beliefs involves cognitive processing. The way in which the human brain processes information tends to reinforce preexisting beliefs and attitudes.

The most significant theories concerning the cognitive sources of misperception and the effects of misperception on foreign policy behavior have been proposed by Robert Jervis (1976). His hypotheses about government decision making can be adapted to the processes by which terrorists make choices. Jervis argues that the principle of cognitive consistency implies that individuals resist information that is discrepant with what they already believe to be true. Information is absorbed selectively, because people tend to recognize the familiar and thus isolate from the range of available facts only those that support their views. Selectivity prevails when the pattern demonstrated by the facts is ambiguous and difficult to interpret. Contradictory information will be ignored or reinterpreted as compatible with one's beliefs. When the facts are clear, the source of negative information may be discredited in order to permit disbelief.

Terrorists would thus in all honesty deny that there are innocent
victims, despite proof to the contrary. Claims of accidental victims would probably come from the government or the establishment press, so the source would be automatically devalued. Terrorists tend to believe only information from sources they trust, and the only trustworthy person would be someone who shared their beliefs. For example, a Tupamaro upon being asked if the movement had been destroyed by government offenses (having suffered 2000 captured) replied that these were "incorrect ideas" which clearly came from counterrevolutionaries, allies of the enemy, or defeatists who could think only in terms of quick solutions to historical problems (Kohl and Litt, eds., 1974, p. 303).

Decision makers are also unable to see value conflicts in their choices. The IRA, for example, is likely not even to recognize that bombing a crowded shopping area or a dancehall will result in Catholic victims, a consequence likely to alienate a potential or actual constituency. Rather than consciously choose between publicity and avoiding casualties among their own adherents or potential supporters, the IRA would deny that an urban bombing would cause Catholic deaths. After the incident, casualties would be explained in terms of British failure to evacuate the area after receipt of warning. Leila Khaled (1973, pp. 133-34), an early member of the PFLP, for example, was able to deal with the presence of children on the plane she hijacked by turning her thoughts to Palestinian children and pushing the idea of the potential consequences of the hijacking out of her mind. She admitted that she felt uncomfortable thinking of innocent victims and had to "rationalize" her distress. She was able to avoid coping with the conflict between two contradictory values because past injustice provided an alternative focus for her thoughts.

Certain types of images can help terrorists avoid dealing with the value
complexity inherent in political decisions. The "inherent bad faith" model of
the enemy, for instance, predicts that the adversary never acts in good faith.
Any apparently conciliatory gesture is interpreted as an attempt to deceive.
Hostile gestures confirm the truth of the stereotype.

For similar reasons, once leaders have reached a decision, it is
difficult to modify it. Decision makers often engage in "bolstering," or
attempts to justify a choice after a commitment has been made in ways that
have little relevance to its real merit. It is predictable in terms of
cognitive theories that terrorists committed to a given course of action will
resist change. Ideology may be useful in making a choice appear an inevitable
result of historical forces.

In addition to beliefs, decision makers process information in terms of
what are called evoked sets and the lessons of history, which represent
superficial comparisons between present circumstances and past events which
often lead to distortions or errors. People tend to perceive reality in terms
of a recent apparently similar experience, even though that experience may not
be appropriate. Expectations of the future are determined by the immediate
past or lessons learned at early formative stages of life. Thus Busic, who
had struggled against repressive Yugoslav police, saw American police in the
same light.

The theories just referred to are based on assumptions about how people
think and process information with the aim of reducing dissonance between
beliefs and fact. Other studies emphasize the motivational factors that cause
decision errors and misjudgments. They, too, can be adapted to explaining the
inflexibility and persistence of terrorist beliefs. For example, Janis and
Mann (1977) argue that making any consequential decision involves serious
emotional conflict. The need to reduce anxiety and to avoid fear and shame
means that people often strive to avoid the acceptance of new information that
might require innovation. Rather than adapting creatively to warnings that a present course of action should be changed, they engage in "defensive avoidance."

These tendencies are not dependent on prior psychological predispositions but on features of the situations decision makers confront. Ego involvement in prior commitments is always strong. The deeper the commitment to a given course of action, the greater the anticipated cost of changing it. The individual fears peer or reference group disapproval or loss of self-respect if a commitment is abandoned. Violating a set of beliefs and expectations in which a person has invested time and ego is psychologically costly. In addition, when confronted with information that indicates that a decision must be made, people are strongly tempted to act immediately in order to relieve stress rather than to continue a search for more satisfactory alternatives. Little judgment will be exercised. Stress is especially acute when the individual must choose between two unpleasant alternatives—for example, surrendering to a government or dying with one's hostages. The perceived magnitude of the losses a person anticipates from a choice also increases the intensity of emotional distress. The "unpleasantness" of these emotions impairs the ability to search for options and appraise the consequences of choices. In the face of serious threats, individuals who have insufficient time to find an alternative to a no longer feasible course of action are likely to fall into a condition of "hypervigilance," or panic. Being isolated from social support systems and forced into inactivity (as terrorists are in barricade and seizure incidents) also increases the likelihood of hypervigilance. People then make hasty judgments which they may later regret, since the drawbacks or negative consequences of the alternative have been ignored in a frantic rush to escape disaster. On the other hand, when no
escape route is perceived, the person may collapse into fatalism and indifference.

Ole Holsti's (1972) work on decision making during the first world war also notes the importance of time pressures in increasing psychological stress, which in turn impairs realistic and efficient decision making. He also alludes to the tendencies of decision makers in crisis situations to avoid assuming responsibility for unpleasant choices. As events led inexorably to war in 1914, each national leader felt that the responsibility for averting war lay with his enemy. Having lost control, he felt nevertheless that the adversary could change if he would. That he did not meant that he did not wish to, and thus that hostilities were inevitable and defensive action justified. Similarly, terrorists under pressure may need to cast responsibility for violence onto the government, perceived as "in control" and capable of determining outcomes.

Terrorists, particularly in hostage seizures, are involved in making decisions that involve momentous consequences. Not only do they accept personal risk, but the fate of the organization and the beliefs to which they are passionately committed is at stake. Their lives and personal reputations as well as the status of the organization and the security of its members will be affected by the consequences of their choices. Surely the emotional conflict they experience is acute. They might reasonably be expected to fall back on the simple decision rules dictated by their beliefs rather than debate alternatives until the least costly is selected. Beliefs will bind them to the commitments they have already made, and decision errors resulting from misperceptions will be frequent. They will be emotionally pressured to act precipitously rather than to spend painful time calculating consequences. Isolated in a hostage-taking episode they are likely to lash out destructively if they perceive that time is running out. The premises of the so-called
"Stockholm syndrome," that with the passage of time terrorists will feel an emotional affinity with their captives and become reluctant to harm them, are false if the decisional conflict theory is accepted. As stress intensifies, so may the irrationality of terrorist behavior. The cost of changing beliefs or courses of action promotes continuity to the point of counterproductiveness.

Michael, or "Bommi," Baumann, a minor but recanted West German terrorist, explained (1977, p. 98) that "the group becomes increasingly closed. The greater the pressure from the outside, the more you stick together, the more mistakes you make, the more pressure is turned inward—somewhere you have to even things out." There is "total pressure" until someone collapses. Only in collapse is there failure. To avoid the humiliation of collapse, terrorists may bring about their own violent demise—and with it that of their hostages.

Objections have been made to the general theory that individuals must cope with cognitive dissonance or that such decisions cause emotional distress. There is evidence that unconventional beliefs are not fragile but extraordinarily persistent (Snow and Machalek, 1982). Disconfirming facts may not challenge beliefs at all; people may not perceive the warnings or signals that indicate that their present course of action should be changed. The content of beliefs may make them resilient. For example, if a millenarian prophecy cannot be disproved, then it cannot fail to come true. The most resilient belief systems are both the least systematic and the least empirically relevant. Logical consistency is a drawback. Ambiguity about expectations is an advantage. If disconfirming evidence shows that one belief is untrue, then the rest of the belief structure can survive intact. When beliefs are unfalsifiable, disconfirming evidence is irrelevant. There is no need to acknowledge it and therefore no need to employ cognitive coping
mechanisms or to suffer emotional distress. Social scientists expect their subjects to engage in the same reality-testing procedures as they do, when actually belief is more natural than disbelief. Beliefs that are remote from reality exempt their holders from testing them.

An example of this incontrovertibility of belief comes from the Tupamaros (Kohl and Litt, eds., 1974, pp. 301-02). Tactical defeats, according to the Tupamaro interviewed, were actually proof of "real advances" indicative of a new level of struggle. Being seriously defeated by the Uruguayan army was evidence of the "state of war" necessary for a qualitatively new political position, which moved the confrontation from its previous state of equilibrium. That the popular struggle should be repressed was a sign of the historically irreversible nature of the revolution. Bloodshed only demonstrated the correctness of the road chosen.

Group Psychology and Belief Systems

The dynamics of interaction within the terrorist organization also make it difficult for individuals to challenge collectively-held belief systems or for the group as a whole to change. In particular, the tendencies toward cohesion and solidarity present in all primary groups lead to the suppression of dissent and the internalization of group standards and norms. Individuals become extremely dependent on the group and are psychologically unable to break away. Deliberate organizational strategies may be designed to enforce uniformity and to insulate the group from reality.

The importance of group explanations to terrorism is central. As in religious cults, the existence of a social infrastructure provides essential emotional support. The need to have other people agree with one's beliefs is also shown in the proselytizing drives that many groups engage in, an activity
common to millenarian movements. In hostage seizures, terrorists often expend a great deal of effort in trying to convince their captives of the righteousness of their cause.

For the individuals who become active terrorists, the initial attraction is often to the group, or community of believers, rather than to an abstract political ideology or to violence per se. Baumann (1977, p. 14) explained that his recruitment into a counterculture group came first, and that "things became political later." In their search for identity and personality integration, terrorists may seek a substitute for a family they may never have had. A substantial number of West German terrorists seem to have come from incomplete or broken family structures. They seek to belong and to maintain a collective identity that is more comfortable for them than trying to maintain individualism. Terrorist organizations in this sense form countercultures, with their own rules of behavior drawn from an unconventional belief system, resembling religious cults in many ways. They usually require the total obedience of members to group norms, which often dictate behavior in nonpolitical realms such as sexual practices. The Weathermen, for example, attempted to ban monogamy. Members of terrorist organizations are often required to accept not only a set of political beliefs but systems of social and psychological regulation. Political beliefs become part of a more comprehensive web of social and ethical rules.

Immensely strong forces promote cohesion and uniformity in such primary groups. Having entered a world of conspiracy and danger, the members are bound together before a common threat of exposure, imprisonment, or death. Theirs is truly a common fate. Each is responsible for the survival of the others and the group. Exposure to danger increases solidarity, as Janis' studies of soldiers in combat show (1968). Leaving the group or denying its
beliefs not only risks the social disapproval of the only community the individual respects, but it endangers the lives of the remaining members.

The leaders of groups also work to maintain the loyalty and collective identification of the membership. Challenges to beliefs are interpreted as challenges to the dominance of leaders, who are the guardians and interpreters of ideology. Internal conflict is deflected to the outside, toward the enemy, always an acceptable target for aggressive drives. Deviations from the group's way of thinking are seen as signs of lack of faith and commitment. Challenges to common beliefs are seen as betrayals of the group.

Despite these pressures for cohesion, disagreements exist within terrorist organizations. Factionalism is endemic in the Palestine Liberation Organization and ETA, for example. But it is hard to ascertain the extent to which internal conflicts are a result of changes in belief systems. Terrorists recruited into the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, for example, as opposed to Fatah, may be attracted to the revolutionary socialism of the former in contrast to the simple nationalism of the latter. This question has not been systematically studied, but it seems unlikely that the sole source of conflict can be traced to different perceptions of the world or the struggle. Rather, factions of terrorist organizations seem to disagree over the best means to achieve collective ends. Members of the group whose commitment is total will never perceive failure, but the more realistic believers may become disillusioned with the terrorist strategy. It is plausible that terrorists can subscribe to a relatively uniform belief system (and one, in fact, that may be compatible with different formal ideologies) yet clash over means, over personalities, or over organizational rivalries.

Policy Implications
Before asking what the policy implications of this argument are, it might be helpful to review the substance of U.S. policy toward international terrorism. American policy has been consistent since 1972, when in the aftermath of the Palestinian attack on Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics, President Nixon first created the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism. Its first principle is no concession to terrorist demands. This insistence does not preclude negotiations in the event of a hostage seizure, but it does mean that no major political concessions are allowable under any circumstances. The reason behind this operational goal is long term. The interest of the United States in preventing terrorism in the future can only be served by resisting it in the present. The assumption is widely accepted that submission to today's terrorist demands only increases the likelihood of terrorism in the future. Yet in hostage situations, this policy goal often comes into conflict with another purpose, the humanitarian objective of saving the lives of innocent victims.

Because passive resistance, even coupled with extensive protective security, neither halted terrorism nor enabled the United States to safeguard the lives of its citizens, the American government has moved to an active stance. Policy measures include military rescue attempts when hostages are seized. They also include efforts to strengthen deterrence against terrorism, a policy based not only on denying reward to terrorists (and encouraging others to resist concessions) but also on punishing aggression. The threats of retaliation or preemptive attack are methods of increasing the cost of terrorism. Apprehending and punishing individually responsible terrorists also serves the purpose of making the cost prohibitive, as well as the goal of upholding international law and civility.

American policy is based on explicit standards of rationality. It
presumes that denial of reward coupled with a credible threat of high cost will affect the terrorist's value calculus. The terrorist will perceive that terrorism does not pay. But terrorists may not think in terms of this framework of costs and benefits.

It is imperative that these policies be examined from the point of view of the adversary. Otherwise terrorist reactions to this policy cannot be predicted. The objective circumstances of a terrorist group—isolated from society, constantly threatened, deprived of reliable information sources and channels—and their dependence on rigid and often fantastical beliefs about their relationship to the world suggest that the terrorist's ability to adapt to reality is limited. Terrorists are as likely to act in terms of internal drives and motivations as in response to government offers of reward or punishment. They are not uniformly capable of evaluating a full range of alternatives or correctly anticipating the consequences of their choices. At the extreme, terrorists may exist in a state of collective delusion. The high cost of changing beliefs impairs creative adaptation to changing environmental circumstances. The terrorist organization, as a collectivity, is likely to be overconfident about successes and insensitive to failures, as well as impervious to evidence that contradicts central beliefs.

There are two principal policy uses for this psychological analysis of terrorist behavior. One is in the general area of understanding the causes of terrorism in order to predict future behavior and protect American interests against the threat. Government decision makers must be prepared to select appropriate security measures, especially to prevent surprise attack. They must find measures that will at a minimum restrict the destructiveness of terrorism and at a maximum bring it to an end. They must evaluate the effectiveness of policies of general deterrence. The second function of knowledge of terrorist beliefs is essentially that of crisis management: to
deal with hostage seizures in order to promote outcomes that will neither compromise the government's position of refusing concessions nor cost the lives of hostages. In both cases, government decision makers must try to influence the decisions terrorists make. To affect their behavior, messages and signals must be couched in terms of the view of the world they accept, however incredible this perspective may seem to the outside observer.

Nevertheless governments should strive to avoid reinforcing the subjective reality of the terrorist. If possible, actions should not confirm the terrorist's stereotypes of the adversary, their self-image, or the dismissal of victims. Contradictions between information about the world and terrorist belief systems must be obvious and preferably come all at once, so that the impact of incongruency is overwhelming (Jervis, 1976, pp. 308-10). Belief systems are unlikely to change if the evidence of their lack of fit is not compelling. It is also well to remember that the least important components of images are likely to change first. The most fundamental attributes of beliefs will be most resistant. At the same time, if beliefs are not logically consistent, then the components are separable. Changing one element will not mean a comprehensive change of outlook in the terrorist.

Governments should also realize that the depth of distrust terrorists have for them the message the government wishes to convey. What governments perceive as a clear and unambiguous communication may be misunderstood. (These findings may also suggest the utility of employing intermediaries.) Understanding terrorist belief systems can help the government predict receptivity to communications. In addition, in situations of high uncertainty and low trust, actions speak louder than words.

It may also be very difficult to convince terrorists that their strategies have failed. The more closed the belief system, and the more
unfalsifiable its predictions, the more likely it will be that terrorists will not perceive failure at all. If their view of goals is long term, for example, immediate setbacks may be discounted. If what matters to the individual is action that will win personal redemption rather than affect an outside audience, then evidence that nothing external has changed (e.g. the population has not abandoned loyalty to the government, or the United States has not relaxed its support of Israel) will not matter. Yet a hopeful sign is that factionalism in terrorist organizations may result from some members of the group having understood that their strategy has failed.

In dealing with hostage seizures, governments should recognize the dangerous effects of time pressures. As this analysis has noted, perceptions of lack of decision time are likely to force terrorists toward impulsive actions. They are also more likely to take rash steps when they see no acceptable way out of an intolerable situation. It is up to the government both to reduce time pressures—not to issue ultimatums, for example—and to offer an attractive alternative to killing hostages. The government must exercise great care in structuring and defining alternatives. If there is to be successful bargaining, a common interest must be established. A settlement point must exist that is preferable to no settlement at all. In this respect, we should consider a question raised by game theory. Is a hostage seizure basically modeled on the prisoner's dilemma, or on the game of chicken? In a prisoner's dilemma game, there are different outcomes, one of which will provide both sides with more gains than the worst possible outcome. The question is when parties to a conflict will choose it. In a game of chicken, the side most able to bluff—and perhaps the most irrational—wins. This preliminary analysis suggests that whatever the game, the players come to it with preconceived biases, derived from cultural, ideological, and psychological sources. There may not even be mutually comprehensible rules of
the game.

Government leaders should also remember that forcing terrorists to accept
the falseness of their beliefs (if this is possible) or denying them any way
out of a threatening situation may lead to emotional break-down. Panic may
result in complete passivity and hopelessness, or in frantic unreasoning
activity. As Baumann (1977, p. 99) explained, at the point of desperation
"there's no more sensibility in the group." In either case, hopelessness or
hyperactivity, extreme destructiveness may result. If terrorists cease to
care about the outcome, there will be no restraints on their violence.

In turn, government decision makers should also avoid misperceptions and
unrealistic expectations. Decision makers often mistakenly think that an
adversary will back down and are consequently surprised by the enemy's resolve
(Lebow, 1981, pp. 270-79). There is a tendency to assume that a desired
outcome is feasible because it is so badly wanted and to think that since
one's own side cannot back down, the other side will have to. Because
American policy makers know that the no concessions policy is not negotiable,
they may think that terrorists also understand this resolution and recognize
the necessity of compromise. It is also difficult for decision makers to
remain open to new information during a crisis, to learn as events proceed,
and to revise prior analyses of terrorist behavior. It may be wishful
thinking to suppose that terrorists will react to evidence of the government's
determination when they are actually driven by internal motivation, not
external opportunity. Perhaps it is preferable to start with the assumption
of subjective rather than objective reality.
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GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

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GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

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INTRODUCTION

Ladies and Gentlemen

Last week I was lecturing in Strasbourg on nonviolent strategy; today I would like to speak about terrorist strategy. Terrorism and Nonviolence look like absolute opposites, having nothing in common except that both aim at political change by extraordinary means. Nonviolent strategies in the tradition of Gandhi or Martin Luther King aim at reaching their goals by playing the game of politics cleaner than the opponent, by showing greater adherence to rules of decent human conduct than the other party to the conflict shows. Terrorists, on the other hand show lower than average rule observance; they hope to gain extra benefits in a political contest by playing dirtier than the opponent. There are policymakers in democratic countries who believe that the fight against terrorism should be conducted, if necessary, as dirty as it is waged by the opponents of the elected government if this is necessary to restore order. Undoubtedly much popular acclaim can be gained by playing it tough, by fighting fire with fire.

Personally I think that it can end with imitating the strategy of terrorists. In some respects terrorism has already entered normal politics. The nuclear balance of terror which turns civilian populations into nuclear hostages, is distinguished from ordinary terrorism only by the fact that the threat has so far not been consummated. Civilized nations have sometimes come into existence with the help of terrorist tactics. I have been told that George Washington once approved a plan to kidnap a British prince - a plan which did not work 1). In the grey zone between diplomacy and war where secret services operate, tactics of terror have never been absent from the repertoire of "special operations". Not so long ago David Lange, the Prime Minister of New Zealand labelled a French secret service sabotage operation against Greenpeace' Rainbow Warrior "an act of international terrorism" 2). A former Dutch minister of Defence used the same label when referring to this killing of a Dutch resident and just stopped short of asking whether it would not be appropriate to demand the extradition of the former French defense minister, Monsieur Charles Hernu. While I consider the label
terrorism as inappropriate in this particular instance, I think that even in the
fight against violent movements (which Greenpeace was not) counterterrorism is
not the right strategy to deal with foreign state-sponsored and non-state
transnational terrorism. Rather than imitating the strategy of terrorism,
democracies should, in my view, strive to attack the strategy itself on which
terrorism is based. A precondition for this, however, is to gain a proper
understanding of terrorist strategy, or rather, in plural, strategies. At present, I
think we do not yet understand well enough what the the strategies of various
types of terrorists are.

In the next hour I would like to address the question of terrorist strategies by
looking at their targeting practices and how these are linked to their short-term
objectives and long-term goals. In doing so, I will draw on some of my earlier
and present work, on the collective wisdom of colleagues in the field and on
declared objectives of terrorists themselves. I will also look at some of the
chronology data that were developed by my colleague Berto Jongman. These are
based on newspaper reporting on acts of terrorism, the main source being the

Before turning to this task a word on definition is necessary. I believe that
almost everybody is sick and tired to talk about definitions of terrorism. It has
been done so often with so little result that consensus is still far off even among
academicians. In political discourse terrorism is a label attached to almost any
conceivable action by an opponent. Combined with the prefix "international"
terrorism has become a psychological operations term filling the void created by
the worn out "international communism" label. The implicit guilt attribution to
the Soviet Union, however, has remained the same. In my perception there is no
such thing as international terrorism directed by Moscow. The search for
evidence linking incidents to masterminds in the Kremlin has, as far as I can
judge, not produced results commensurate with the energy put into the search.
This is not to deny that the Soviet Union arms and trains some liberation
movements, and that members of such movements not infrequently take recourse
to acts of terrorism. There is also ample evidence that Soviet and East European
secret services use tactics of terrorism to intimidate dissidents both at home and
abroad. What I want to say is that preoccupation with the role of the Soviet
Union should not blind us to the fact that it explains at best only a very small
segment of what is going on in the field of international terrorism. This is not
meant to belittle Soviet involvement abroad. I have recently completed a book on Soviet Military Intervention since 1945 which documents that there is practically a military intervention for every year since 1945 and that the degree of Soviet involvement has grown steadily for the Third World. Yet that is not international terrorism. Here I use the term "international terrorism" rather loosely: terrorism is international to me when it reaches the attention of the International Herald Tribune and when either perpetrators or victims or location give an incident a dimension where foreign nations become involved. In a questionnaire which I mailed to the research community in the field in preparation of a book tentatively titled Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors and Authors, I asked authors "What are, in your experience, the main goals and objectives of "international" terrorists?" The answer I liked best because I share this view came from Kenneth Robertson (University of Reading), who wrote: "This term is meaningless - no such group/s exist. This is a method not a goal or objective". In an attempt to be helpful to answer a deliberately suggestive question he added, and again I concur, "However to try and answer - goal is to broaden the conflict into a regional or international issue so as to place extra pressure on the state directly involved in the conflict." So much for international.

My definition of "terrorism" is less loose than the one on "international". By terrorism I understand a method of combat in which the victim is not the ultimate target. I distinguish between the target of violence - the primary victim -, a secondary victim which consists of persons suffering as a result of an act of aggression against the primary victim who is significant for him or her. I call this the target of terror. This is the reference group sharing victim characteristics or identifying with him. Since not everybody is experiencing terror, that is "an extreme form of anxiety... followed by frightening imagery and intrusive, repetitive recollection" (Frank M. Ochberg) additional categories of targets can be distinguished. There is a target of demands - the object of terrorist blackmail - or, where no explicit demands are made, a target for which the terrorist act is meant to serve as warning. Finally there are targets of attention - audiences to which the presence of terrorists is made clear for a variety of purposes. A simple murder generally involves only the perpetrator and his victim, there is a direct relationship and the killer - if he is not hired - wants something of the victim, usually his life. What makes terrorism so complex is that the terrorist actor can perform his deed to move, or remove, the
target of violence, but also to freeze or immobilize, a target of terror, or to move a target of demands, and to manipulate and impress a target of attention. The later might be his own terrorist movement or public opinion in general or just his own ego: I kill, therefore I am. It is this multiple and diverse target population which makes terrorism so confusing to the untrained observer who sees in it at first only "senseless violence", or the wanton "taking of innocent lives". However, there is a method behind terrorism, which, incidentally, is not the same as saying that the method works and brings about the intended results. The world is full of unintended consequences and the world of, at least nonstate terrorism, is even fuller of it. Nevertheless I start from the assumption that international terrorists are basically rational actors, not crazy people. I readily admit that this is not true for all terrorists. Some terrorist acts are not goal-directed rational acts, the majority, however, are based on rational choice and therefore are open to rational analysis. Yet at the same time I must admit that it is difficult to see at times the rationale behind a terrorist act, the relationship between more or less accidental victim and the goal of the victimization. Reviewing thousands of terrorist and quasi-terrorist attacks from the chronology of my colleague I come across instances of violence where no answer to the question why can be found. A stark example would be the deed of a nine year old boy who threw a handgrenade into a crowd of thousand fellow children to kill five of them in Thailand on March 25, 1981. The sources at my disposal to analyse terrorist incidents are very often insufficient to determine in what way targeting is linked to goals and objectives.

One of the problems for academic studies on terrorist strategies is the data problem. Except for terrorist movements of a more distant past, we have to rely on public data and in most cases on media accounts. As Philip Schlesinger has pointed out, the media more often than not reflect the official perspective of insurgent terrorism, that is the set of views and policy suggestions advanced by those who speak for the state. Depending on whether it is a authoritarian, communist or democratic state, the published data are slanted often in one way or another. Since the state is generally a party to the conflict with the terrorists, the facts made available to the public media are not infrequently instruments in the contest for the allegiance of the public. The oppositional perspective of those who perform acts of political terrorism against what they view as a repressive state or in favour of national liberation are less well covered in the mass media or not covered at all in countries where censorship is
taking place. Some media, especially the yellow press, offer a populist perspective on the subject of terrorism, a vigilante view pleading for order without due process of law in the 'war against terrorism'. Such media are sometimes also outlets of (dissident) official voices. The last perspective distinguished by Schlesinger, the alternative perspective, refers to the set of views and policy suggestions advocated by those who dissent from the official view of terrorism without accepting the legitimacy of violence within liberal democracies. This particular alternative perspective, which, in my view, should be the point of departure of academic research, has few media to provide data of an independent nature. Therefore, by and large, academic researchers have to work with data provided by official perspective sources counter-weighted only to a minimal extent by the written output of the non-state terrorists themselves. This data situation leads to an incomplete data set for an objective picture of terrorist strategies. It is a limitation from which few can escape. My discussion on targets, objectives and goals of terrorism draws on two main sources: the views of colleagues in the research field of terrorism, which I approached in connection with a sequel to my Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature, and the Chronology of terrorist acts developed by my colleague Berto Jongman.

TARGETS, OBJECTIVES, AND GOALS OF TERRORISM

What interests us here is the relationship between targeting of terrorists and the objectives aimed at. We distinguish, as mentioned above, between four targets - the target of violence, the target of terror, the target of demands and the target of attention. With objectives I refer to short-term aims, with goals I refer to long-term aims. We have to take into account the variety of terrorist actors. On the side of state actors we make a distinction between communist and non-communist state actors. On the side of the nonstate actors we distinguish between left- and right-wing, vigilante- and ethnic/nationalist terrorists. The first point I want to make is that all of these - not just left-wing terrorists - can and frequently do become international terrorists, though some are more likely to do so than others. Even vigilante terrorists are at times acting as international terrorists, especially when xenophobia plays a role. When we think of international terrorism we have been conditioned to think of left-wing terrorism mainly. Yet right wing terrorists are not by definition less
international in their targeting. Recently one could notice in the German Federal Republic increased anti-American agitation by right-wing nationalist groups. Acts of terrorism against American military personnel and installations are no longer the privilege of the violent left. In the 1970s one could already notice the strange pilgrimages of left- and right-wing German extremists to Palestinian training camps in the Middle East. The first group was driven by "anti-imperialism" while the second was attracted by anti-semitism. Both are now targeting American personnel and objects in Germany, the one for nationalist and the other for internationalist reasons.

State terrorists too have gone international. In fact, historically they were the first to do so as they were the first to have adequate means to do so. Today state actors use instruments of terrorism to reach emigre communities abroad which are considered dangerous. The long arm of Colonel M.Qadhafi has reached out to Libyan students in Germany, Great Britain and even the United States. The most visible international terrorists, however, are the ethnic and the left-wing terrorists. Since both right against the presence of foreign troops and representatives on soil they consider exclusively theirs, their terrorism is almost by definition international although local collaborators of the opponent are also a favourite target.

The targeting of terrorist organizations, both state and non-state, left and right, ethnic and vigilante, shows some similarities as well as dissimilarities. I have attempted to make a composite picture of the targeting practices of the various types of terrorists, thereby concentrating not solely on the international dimension.

Vigilante terrorism targeting: The targets of violence are alleged lawbreakers including terrorists, people with deviating habits, aliens and others considered to be subordinate races and classes or any other representatives of forces of change who threaten the status of the group whose interests are defended by the vigilantes. The target of terror are members of the same group or class as the victim, or potential supporters of the target of violence. It is for their benefit that the example has been made. In vigilante terrorism there is often no direct target of demands. The warning to the target of terror is the message and the demand is implicit: know your subordinate place. Sometimes there is a target of demands, namely the government which is considered to be too inefficient, forcing the vigilantes" to take the law in their own hands". In a sense, then, the demand is stability. The fourth target group, the target of attention which is not
terrorized, is public opinion, the public at large. It plays a lesser role in vigilante terrorism than in other types.

Vigilante terrorism goals and objectives: the goal is to maintain or restore group dominance, to demoralize the opponents, to revenge acts of the "enemy" which went unpunished by the government, in short social control and repression of groups challenging the "natural" order of society.

The acts of terrorism are at the same time meant to convey an image of strength which should facilitate disciplining, controlling or dissuading the target group. The old American Ku Klux Klan has put it in a nutshell in the statement that terrorism serves to maintain the supremacy of the white man by means of terror.

Comment: The link between targeting and objectives is visible in vigilante terrorism. Terrorism looks like a cost-effective method of freezing the challenging group into its place. Everyone who sticks out his neck to challenge the status quo is likely to become a possible target of vigilante violence. The process of leadership formation among the opponents can be seriously disrupted. Since vigilante terrorism has no goals beyond the enforcement of non-democratic order, the problem of a large gap existing between targeting and objective is absent.

The international dimension of vigilantism is visible when local death squads kill foreigners who are considered to be agents of (democratic) change. Examples can be found in South and Central America were American nuns and priests have been targetted. In practice it is often difficult to establish whether or not a vigilante death squad is acting on its own or with the tolerance or even encouragement of (sections of) the government. An example of this type of international vigilantism would be the killing of the American priest Rev. S. Rother in Guatemala on July 28, 1981. The activities of Protestants in Northern Ireland can also be considered to fall under vigilante terrorism. The targets, however, have so far not been foreigners though it is not inconceivable that American arms suppliers to the IRA might become targets. In Italy left- and right-wing terrorists have not only targetted government representatives and property but also each other and some of these acts can be seen as living a vigilant dimension. It is my estimate that international vigilante terrorism is likely to grow in the future. The inflow of legal and illegal immigrants and political refugees into the Western democracies has created tensions which have already produced acts of xenophobic vigilante terrorism.
Non-Communist state terrorism targeting: The borderline between vigilante terrorism and non-communist state terrorism is fuzzy, as Ted Gurr has observed when he posed the question whether or not such terrorism occurs with the im- or explicit approval of authorities. He maintains, and I would concur, that "if terrorist acts are patterned and persistent, if they are directed at opponents of a regime, and if authorities make no substantial efforts to stop them, the acts are prima facie state terrorism." 7). It is the sort of terrorism we see, among other places, in Central America, where both mass and middle class spokesmen challenge outdated forms of oligarchic rule or illegal military usurpations of state power. Targets of violence of authoritarian state terrorists are those who most eloquently by revolutionary or reformist methods challenge the legitimacy of the ruling elite: the representatives of democratic and socialist parties, progressive professionals, intellectuals, liberals, trade unionists and other dssidents. If the challengers of the regime target the elite, the authoritarian state targets primarily this counter-elite. Where there are ethnic, religious or other minorities (or majorities in minority positions), these also constitute favourite targets. The targets of terror are all the other nonmembers of the ruling elite, the populace and in particular the actual and potential opponents. There are generally no targets of demands and attention. Attention is something state terrorists are weary about. Hence the recourse to various forms of censorship, the most recent example being the South African apartheid regime's prohibition of violence-related newscoversage.

Non-communist state terrorism goals and objectives: the goal of terroristic activities such as torturing and the maintenance of concentration camps is repression of opposition in order to maintain state power in the hands of the threatened (minority) elite. Terrorism serves to enforce obedience by creating an climate of insecurity. The elimination of potential and actual leaders of opposition movements prevents others from rallying behind these, thereby consolidating the regimes' rule. Adolf Hitler has expressed this objective with singular candor when he said:

"I shall spread terror through the surprising application of all means. The sudden shock of a terrible fear of death is what matters. Why should I deal otherwise with all my political opponents? These so-called atrocities save me hundreds of thousands of individual actions against the protestors and discontents. Each of them will think twice to oppose us when he learns what is awaiting him in the (concentration) camp" 8).
Comment: Governance by terrorism, as for instance in Guatemala, almost uninterruptedly since 1954, is a tempting method of rule where insufficient normative and material power instruments are available to allow for a less brutal form of rule. The number of victims can go into tens of thousands. Guatemala alone has seen about ten times as many victims of authoritarian state and state-tolerated vigilante terrorism than there have been victims of so-called international terrorism 9. Authoritarian state terrorism also has an international dimension insofar as political leaders in exile are subjected to assassination and kidnapping attempts (e.g. the killing of Orlando Letelier by Cuban exiles of the OMEGA 7 group, commissioned by the Chilean DINA of General Pinochet). However, only when such incidents condense to a pattern and thereby are able to evoke chronic fear of sudden victimization among the opponents of a regime, is it appropriate to speak of terrorism, or international terrorism if exile communities are targeted. Given the fact that the majority of all nations are falling under the category authoritarian (some 100 nations, as contrasted to some 30 democracies and 20 communist regimes), there is ample room for extended international terrorist activities from this side. So far it has not caught the eye of researchers.

Right-wing non-state terrorism targeting: The targets of violence of right-wing terrorism are often nonspecific, involving civilians mainly (rarely military personnel). Bombs are exploded in public places, such as a railway station (the massacre in Bologna in August 1980) or a passenger train. There was, for instance, the bombing of the Naples-Milan train 904 on December 23, 1984, which killed 17 and injured several dozen persons. It was the twelfth attack against railroads in this area in a decade 10). While the notion is widespread that left-wing non-state terrorist are more discriminate in their targeting than right-wing terrorists - if only because the elites are smaller than the masses - this might be a misperception. In a comparison between German terrorist groups on the left and on the right of the political spectrum, Friedrich Neidhardt found that both exercised goal-directed terror, that is they were not aiming at the arbitrary killing of numerous human lives. On the basis of his limited material on right-wing groups he found no evidence for massacre theories with regard to terrorist groups on the extreme right 11). However, this might hold more for Germany and less for Italy where there were several massacres since the Piazza Fontana Massacre of December 12, 1969 (e.g. those in Italicus and Brescia in
1974) 12). Some of the specific targets of right-wing terrorism are left-wing leaders, intellectuals and traitors. The target of terror are regime opponents and more in general the society at large. Where there is a target of demands in right-wing terrorism it is often the military which is informally invited to stage a coup d'état. Sometimes acts of terrorism by right-wing actors have been staged in such a way as to create the impression that left-wing forces were behind bomb attacks. The purpose was also to bring the security forces to the point of taking state power. A target of attention is sometimes the government, sometimes the population as a whole, and sometimes other ultra-right groups abroad. The media, and potential sympathizers among the populace also figure as targets of attention. Generally, the search for public opinion support is less explicit than with left-wing terrorism due to the elitist authoritarian orientation of right-wing terrorism.

Right-wing terrorism goals and objectives: the long term goal of right-wing terrorism is a change in the political system and the seizure of state power. The goal is an authoritarian regime, sometimes with fascist traits. The short term objective of right wing terrorism is the discrediting of the government in existence, the elimination of leftist influences and the silencing of the opposition. Through random violence generalized fear is created in the hope that the population accepts demands for a strong regime which can restore order. The creation of a climate of collapse, the undermining of legitimacy to have been the main objective in the strategy of tension practiced by right-wing extremists in Italy in the period 1969-1974. The long-term goal is a nationalist, anti-communist, non-democratic regime which tolerates no liberalism or pluralism.

Comment: Right-wing terrorism, by targeting the populace rather than the regime in power is not in a position to seize power by itself. The restoration of a more conservative government, or preferably, a military coups by friendly forces, is often considered sufficient by right-wing terrorists. In this respect it covers some of the same ground as vigilante terrorism.

The international dimension of right-wing terrorism has, to my knowledge, never been adequately charted. In the annual report of the German Ministry of the Interior on espionage and extremism the existence of an International Neo-National Socialism is mentioned. It has links in France, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, but also in Ireland, Spain and the United States where much of the printed material appears to come from. Linkages between German neo-Nazis and Palestinian circles, the report holds, appear to be continuing 13). The degree to which such links are ideological only or involve operational elements is unknown.
to me. An organization like the Turkish Grey Wolves appears to be able to operate internationally, in part thanks to the Turkish immigrants in many West European countries. A terrorist like Ali Agca, who pulled the trigger in an assassination attempt against John Paul II on May 13, 1981, had close links to the neo-nazi National Action Party (Ulkuculer, known as Grey Wolves) in Istanbul, a party assumed to be involved also in drug trafficking with Western Europe. It is doubtful whether we shall ever know the true story behind Ali Agca's assassination attempt on the Roman Catholic Pontiff (as is also the case with the assassination of John F. Kennedy). In one of his many and contradictory statements to the Italian interrogators he said "My terrorism is not red OR black, it is red AND black." The dominant thrust of interpretations in the West has stressed the red or Bulgarian connection over the black neo-Nazi one but for neither interpretation is there conclusive evidence yet. Only those who believe what they want to believe will be satisfied with the circumstantial evidence which has emerged so far.

Ethnic/nationalist terrorism targetting: The targets of violence are members of the dominant or alien political authorities, especially the security forces and other representatives and tools of the ruling regime. Sometimes members of the dominant ethnic population are targeted; sometimes multinational enterprise personnel is selected. Other foreigners, including tourists have also been targets. Yet other targets of violence are members of one's own ethnic group, especially leaders who are either considered to be collaborators with the dominant regime or moderates. The targets of terror are generally the same as above, yet broader: whoever denies the nationalist/ethnic goals. As target of demands the dominating government and its allies can most often be identified. The targets of attention are the ethnic/or national group itself, of which the terrorists see themselves as avantgarde. The media, and through them, world opinion are the targets of attention.

If we look at the targetting of one particular ethnic terrorist movement, the Basque ETA, we find that the widespread notion that terrorists primarily target civilians and unarmed people, does not hold (see Table I).

Table I: Persons murdered by ETA between 15 October 1977 (date of the last amnesty) and 30 March 1981.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civilians</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armed and Municipal Police</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>57</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armed Forces</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guardia Civil</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>27</td>
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<td>70</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>98</td>
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ETA, founded in 1959 as a breakaway from the Basque Nationalist Party, has in the meantime more than 400 victims on its name. Its international dimension is mainly with France, whose government has until 1984 tolerated the preparation of operation on its territory by an estimated 200 Basque separatist living in France. When the French policy finally changed, ETA has begun to target French economic interests and property of French origin on Spanish territory (e.g. on August 9, 1984 bombs went off at two showrooms of Citroen, the car company, in San Sebastian; on May 4, 1984, a gasoline bomb was hurled into a French school, also in San Sebastian).

In the case of terrorism in Northern Ireland we see also international dimensions. While the majority of the roughly 2,500 murdered and more than 25,000 wounded of Northern Ireland since 1969 are local people (it has been estimated that about half of these were victims of Republican groups, more than one quarter of Loyalist groups and about one eighth of the security forces with the remainder not clearly attributable to one side or another), there are also foreigners who are victimized. On March 16, 1980, a West German industrial was killed by IRA members in Belfast. Faced with the difficulty to enter the British mainland, terrorist attacks have been carried out on British army targets in West Germany in February and March 1980.

The short-term objective of the IRA campaign of terrorism is to raise the costs of occupation for the British army and to bring the British public and ultimately the British government to the point where it is sick and tired of making further sacrifices in support of an intransigent Protestant majority. The limited accord reached between the British and Irish governments in November 1985 can perhaps be interpreted as a partial result of this strategy. For the first time in history, the Dublin government is given a say in the affairs of Northern Ireland. However, this is unlikely to be the turn of events expected by the Provisional IRA and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) terrorists. Their long-term goal, of course, is the reunification of Ireland 16). Since it is unlikely that the Protestant majority would accept that, a civil war between the majority and the minority
populations would have to be fought out which the Catholics could only win with the help of their friends in the South. How many friends the IRA has left in the Irish Republic is a question which they would do well to ask but which they are probably afraid to ask. One cannot help wondering whether such organizations like the IRA care to look far enough into the future. Basing themselves on the model of the British- EOKA confrontation in Cyprus, the Provos in Northern Ireland have apparently not learned from the sequence of events since 1974 when the Turkish armed forces intervened and undid all dreams of Enosis 17). They might end up without help from the Republic of Ireland when the showdown with the Protestants comes. This has already brought us to the question of goals and objectives.

Ethnic/nationalist terrorism goals and objectives: In general, the short-term objective appears to be the mobilization among the terrorists own reference group. Sometimes the provocation of repression from the dominant group is sought or at least not avoided. It is hoped that indiscriminate retaliation to their violence polarizes the dominant and the minority group. Through acts of disruption and destruction of property, the costs of a continued presence are raised to levels which must be unacceptable to the dominant regime. Sometimes, as in the case of the Armenian Asala (the Secret Armenian Army for the Liberation of Armenia), the objective seems to be primarily revenge for historical injustices. The long-term goal is self-determination, independence, sovereignty or at least a high degree of autonomy.

Comment: If the terrorists succeed portraying themselves as liberators of a subdued nation, if they manage to awaken a sense of separate identity, the likelihood of mass support is present. Given the generally greater attractiveness of nationalism over class-based identity, ethnic/nationalist terrorists can generally marshal more resources than social-revolutionary terrorists. Since they are carrying out a sacred mission of their fathers, inter-generation continuation of terrorist activity is also facilitated.

The international dimension of ethnic and nationalist terrorism is generally strong since the goal - the creation of a new nation - is bound to affect the international system. For this reason they can often count on the support of other nations interested in a restructuring of the international system. All told more than one hundred nations with more than two billion people have achieved political independence in the last forty years, trebling the number of
nationstates. However, if we look at the number of ethnic groups in the world we come close to one thousand, ranging from the Armenians and Kurds to the Sikhs, Tamils, and Moluccans. How many of these ethnic groups will succeed in their struggle for nationhood is impossible to say as is the question whether their struggle will take the form of terrorist violence or mass rebellion. However, it is safe to predict that ethnic and nationalist terrorism is likely to cause greater problems in the future than social-revolutionary class-oriented terrorism. Take the case of the Indian Sikhs who want a state of their own in the Punjab. In 1981 one of the leaders said that they were maturing:

"We finished with the organizational stage and are now involved in propaganda. Next will come direct action and then finally, full-scale confrontation. Like the PLO, we are seeking international recognition, and at home we are preparing to use terror, the political language of the 20th century". 18)

Shortly afterwards an 82-year-old Hindu newspaper editor who had written critically of resurgent Sikh separatism was killed. Since then we have seen the killing of the Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi on October 30, 1984, by two Sikh body guards of her. In the meantime more than 300 victims of Sikh extremism could be counted on the Indian subcontinent. The bomb explosion on board of an Air India Boeing 747 on June 23, 1985 over the Atlantic more than doubled this death toll and only good luck prevented the downing of another aircraft over the Pacific. In both cases Canadian Sikhs have been accused of these barbarous acts. The purpose of such an act of indiscriminate violence as the downing of a civilian aircraft is probably mere retaliation, in this particular case against the storming of the Golden Temple in Amritsar. A cruel irony was that a majority of the 329 passengers above the Irish Sea appears to be Sikhs. It is not likely to contribute to the long-term goal of an autonomous state for the Sikhs. It is not even likely to serve a particular short-term objective. Of course it provides publicity, which, whether positive or negative, is often considered an asset. It also polarizes a situation which is already critical. Yet ultimately it is not likely to amount to more than giving the perpetrators and those who identify with their cause, no matter how atrocious the deed, a sense of power. I will return to this theme of identification later in my presentation.

Communist state terrorism targeting: The targets of violence are dissidents, mainly at home but also abroad. Potential as well as actual regime opponents
have been targeted, independent of class background of the victims. In fact, frequent targets of violence and terror violence have been social-democratic workers and rival groups challenging the legitimacy of the regime on class grounds. The targets of terror are the domestic public and the emigré communities abroad. In cases of divided countries such as Korea and Germany, political figures on the other side of the fence have been targeted. One of the most serious recent incidents occurred in Burma where on October 9, 1983 four South Korean ministers and 17 other persons were killed by a bomb at the site of a wreath-laying ceremony which was also to be attended by the South Korean president, a plot carried out by North Korean Army officers. There is no specific and explicit target of demands or target of attention apart from the target of terror itself.

Communist state terrorism goals and objectives: The goal is to paralyze potential opposition so as to be able to continue party control over society indefinitely. The objective is to silence opposition at home and abroad. Attacks by Bulgarian and Romanian secret services on emigré dissidents, are a recurrent phenomenon. An example would be the February 4, 1981 incident in France in which two Romanians, P. Goma and N. Penescu, the one a dissident writer and the other a former minister, received parcel bombs in hollowed-out books, which, in turn, wounded a French explosives' expert. When such emigrants are attached to foreign broadcasting stations, these in turn can become targets. On February 21, 1981, the headquarter of Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty was the target of a bomb attack causing damage amounting to two million dollars. In that particular instance responsibility was claimed in a letter written in Polish by a group called Armed Secret Execution Organization.

Comment: Large scale mass terror of the Stalinist variant has disappeared in practically all communist countries. Draconian punishments for minor offences and softer individual control measures than downright torture have been taking the place of the red terror to eradicate resistance and to immobilize forces of dissent. Large prison camp systems presumably still act as a deterrent for dissent. The people in the camps can be said to be targets of violence with the remaining population figuring as targets of terror. In the late 1970s the camp population in the Soviet Union was estimated to be still as high as three million people, one third of the worst period of Stalinism.
The international dimension of Soviet state terrorism has become visible in the imposition of the same system of social control on the subdued countries of Eastern and Southern Europe, where deportations and labour camps were introduced and maintained for nearly a decade. The war tactics of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, resulting in the death or expulsion of one quarter of the population and the impoverishment of the rural population through scorched earth policies, can also be seen as a form of international terrorism. However, it is a borderline case: where the purpose of regime violence is not the control but the extermination or expulsion of large parts of the population, genocide becomes a more appropriate term.

Left-wing terrorism targeting: The literature treating terrorist targeting usually has left-wing terrorists in mind. For this reason, we are made aware of a greater variety of left-wing targeting than is the case with other types of terrorism. The targets of violence of left-wing nonstate terrorism are representatives of the state apparatus from ministers to judges and policemen, government employees and military commanders, diplomats and civil and religious leaders. Besides such representatives of the political power structure, businessmen, especially those associated with multinational corporations and managers from the military-industrial complex have been targeted. Journalists considered influential and opposing the methods and/or goals of the terrorists are also targets. A separate category are traitors from the movement itself. In terms of locations, buildings where government officials congregate are favourite targets: police stations, ministries and embassies. There is a second category of targets, consisting of those who can be considered to be in some way as being under the protection, or falling within the responsibility of a government. This would include the passengers of naval and air carriers, trains and buses, school buildings and even tourist resorts. Those dependent on the government but at the same time being least protected by it are targets because of easy access and vulnerability (they are unarmed).

Targets of terror are all those who share victim characteristics ("It might have been me","Will I be next?") or who strongly identify with the victim (e.g. a president whose daughter has been kidnapped). This can include large sectors of the public who are demoralized by seeing their representatives fall victim to faceless forces. The target of demands of left-wing terrorism can be the media which are expected to report certain statements (as in the case of the
occupation of the Columbian Supreme Court by a commando of M-19 in November 1985), wealthy people (for instance Armenian entrepreneurs who are expected to pay for the activities of one or several of the Armenian terrorist groups), the government (which is expected to release prisoners, grant safe passage, change domestic or foreign policy and the like). Demands are also made on sectors of the public (factory owners, political parties, prison officials, etc.). The single most frequent main target of demands are local or foreign governments. Targets of attention are groups or classes for which the terrorists purport to fight, the international proletariat, the poor, the imprisoned. Sometimes the target of attention are legal left parties who are considered to be not activist enough and hesitate to follow the path paved by the terrorists. In addition the media and public opinion, both national, and international are major targets of attention of left-wing terrorists.

One thing that is striking with left-wing terrorism is that the target of terror is often the least important of the four kinds of targets. It is not so much the creation of terror in one specific target group than the utilization of the act of violence for political blackmail and propaganda that seem to matter. The emphasis on these aspects also helps to explain the wide variety of possible targets.

Left-wing terrorist goals and objectives: The long term goals are generally identified as the imposition of a Marxist state following a revolutionary war in which capitalism and Western imperialism are defeated. In their own vision it is the liberation of the proletariat from capitalist exploitation, the creation of a regime based on social justice, the replacement of parliamentary democracy or authoritarian rule by some form of more popular government.

The short (and medium) term objectives vary greatly, ranging from publicity to raising the level of consciousness of the masses to the mobilization of like-minded people, from the creation of fear and instability to the humiliation of the powerholders, from obtaining ransoms through extortion, from the discouragement of industrial investment in an area to the mobilization of apathetic sectors of the public, from the creation of a revolutionary situation where none exists to the provocation of government repression which is hypothesized to rally the population behind the terrorists and/or the cause they stand for. The disruption of the law enforcement process, the intimidation of witnesses, also belong to the short term objectives. Sometimes the aim is to immobilize the security apparatus by tying up great numbers of agents for the
protection of targets identified on death lists, or to the protection of buildings and societal infrastructures. In this context one aim is to demonstrate the vulnerability of the government and shatter the image of strength and legitimacy surrounding it. The bombing of electric power supply lines to black-out towns is frequently attempted. The attrition of the opponent through countless needlepoint attacks is another objective. Where the victims of violence come from the terrorists' own ranks, as in the execution of alleged informers and traitors, the objective is the enforcement of discipline and conformity in the terrorist movement. Extermination of certain officials can also be an objective. Another objective can be the creation of a division in the enemy camp, the breaking up of alliances and the setting up of opponents up against each other. Yet another objectives is to demask the opponent by forcing him to show his "true" face. Acts of terrorism are often portrayed as punishment for alleged or real crimes against the populace or the terrorist movement. Here revenge plays a big role. Another very important objective is propaganda by the deed; the purpose being the acquisition of popular support and the winning of recruits for the terrorist movement. Where the target of attention are the terrorist movement or its sympathizers themselves, daring acts against the enemy serve morale-building.

Comment: It is striking how many purposes terrorism is apparently able to fulfill. Depending on the way the actual victims of terrorist violence are linked to the target of terror, the target of demands or the target of attention, different objectives can be aimed at. By activating the interplay between the three target groups terrorism can create multiple secondary effects which serve a variety of purposes. An unanswered question, however, is in how far effects can be planned with any precision.

The international dimension of left-wing terrorism is especially pronounced as its practitioners regard themselves as internationalists by vocation. They also regard the international environment as one shaped by international capitalism in general and the dominant economic power in this framework in particular. As the hegemonic power the United States and American citizens abroad have become prime targets. Diplomats, embassies and airlines are major targets of violence and terror. The government of the United States was at one time in 1984 receiving about 100 threats a week against embassies and other installations in foreign countries last year. The protection of all American objects abroad (about 10,600 at least) against terrorist targeting is an impossible task. A shift in targeting from property to people, and from individuals to groups of people has
been noticed. NATO officials, soldiers and installations have become a favourite targets for terrorists in Western Europe. According to one set of statistics American citizens and property were the target of 41 percent of the terrorist attacks around the world in 1983. This is probably too high a percentage since there were in all likelihood more than the 500 incident which formed the date base. As targets of demands and attention super- and medium-power governments which are seen as supporters of local oppressors are frequent targets. Journalists and media as conduits to foreign public opinion are major targets as well. The sort-term objective is often the drawing of attention to a particular grievance or cause which is deemed to require immediate world attention. It can also be the winning of concessions through coercive bargaining where property or hostages have been seized. The long term goal is to effect changes in the international system, to break the links between superpowers and local client regimes which are seen as repressive.

TERRORIST TARGETTING AND TERRORIST GOALS AND OBJECTIVES: THE SEARCH FOR THE (MISSING) LINK

From this long list of what appear to be the assumed and real functions and aims of terrorism one could easily gain the idea that terrorism is an all-purpose method of action. What is largely missing in the literature are analyses of the actual mechanisms of operation of the terror process linking targetting to assumed objectives and goals. This in turn is partly attributable to the relative absence of good and detailed case studies of the kind Martha Crenshaw has written about the Algerian struggle for independence. Crenshaw's study is one of a successful terrorist movement. There are, however, many movements which fared badly. The Tupamaros, for instance, and with them many other such movements in Latin America. In their case the strategy did not work but backfired in a way which was traumatic for the countries concerned: Uruguay, Argentina and to a lesser extent Brazil. While I personally have little doubt that terroristic regimes possess sufficient power instruments to achieve the envisaged effects with their tactics of terrorism on the home front, I have great doubts as to whether nonstate terrorists can rightfully expect to achieve what they hope to achieve. The hybris of expectations seems to be greatest with left-wing terrorists who work for nothing less than world revolution. Right-wing terrorists are generally content to provoke a coup d'etat by the armed forces and nationalist /ethnic terrorists demand a nation state or at least autonomy, a more
moderate goal. Yet even here the goal can be very hard to reach as the
Palestinian struggle indicates.

The information on targeting and goals and objectives has been obtained from
three main sources. The first approach consisted of a literature survey of what
authors on the subject of terrorism said on the matter 19). The second source
were the answers to a questionnaire mailed to authors in the field of terrorism
20). The Chronology of terroristic events for the five year period 1980-1984 was
an additional source. Use has also been made of an article by Nathan Leites 21.

How do the terrorists themselves see the link between targeting and objectives
and goals? Let us take the example of Al Assifa, the Syria and Bekaa-valley
stationed group which split from the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1973
when the Arafat more or less renounced international terrorism outside the
border regions of Israel. This group led by Abu Nidal has been involved in
assassination attempts on Israeli diplomats and in attacks on the Jewish
community in Western Europe. For this last purpose Palestinian students in
European appear to have been hired with generous fees. German neo-nazis might
also be involved. There was, for instance, a gun and grenade attack on a Jewish
synagogue in Vienna on August 29, 1981, in which two persons died and about
twenty were injured. One of the arrested terrorists revealed a plot backed by
Syria to kill Yasser Arafat in such a way that a trail of evidence could be
produced to implicate Iraq and Jordania in the assassination. In this Abu Nidal
(who was himself condemned to death by Arafat) did not succeed but his gunmen
have killed several PLO leaders in Paris, London, Brussels and Albufeira. At the
last-mentioned place, in Portugal, Dr. Issam Sarraj, the PLO representative
attending a Socialist International conference was shot dead on April 10, 1983.
In early 1985 several attacks in Jordania were associated with Abu Nidal, but
have also been claimed by "Black September", the group led by Aby Daoud. The
Abu Nidel group joined the move numerous Intifadah ("rebels"), under Abu
Moussa, who rose against Arafat in May 1983. Whether this loyalty is a
Palestinian one can be questioned. His long term goal is a Pan-Arabic
confederation based on the ancient Syrian empire and led by a Greater Syria
consisting of present-day Syria, Lebanon, Jordania, parts of Iraq and Palestine.
Being a Syrian himself Abu Nidal (his real name is, according to his own
testimony, Sabri Chalil el-Banna) this is not amazing. Given this orientation his
numerically small "Fatah Movement - Revolutionary Council" is supported by
Syria and Libya (until 1980 Iraq was a supporter too). He also claims to cooperate
with West European terrorist movements like the IRA and ETA, CCC, and RAF and Action Directe. He considers the Soviet Union to be a "true friend of the Arabs", but admits that it follows its own interests by recognizing Israel's right to exist. The targets of Abu Nidal's group include Jewish schoolchildren, restaurants and synagogues and diplomats. However, the majority of his groups victims are Arabs whom he considers traitors to the Arab cause since they have made contacts with Zionists and have shown a willingness to live no longer in conflict with the Jewish state. A third group of declared targets are those who in his view support Israel. A declared target of Nidal's group are the United States and the American president but so far, the group has never attacked an American target.

Abu Nidal admits that there is no quick solution to throw the Israelis out of the Middle East but he sees a historical parallel in the eventual defeat of the crusaders by Saladin in the Middle Ages. He sees his movement of assassins as a catalyst in a geographically and historically larger context. As he put it:

"Neither the Palestinians nor the PLO will ever be in a position to achieve a military victory over the Zionists. The victory over the Zionists can only be achieved by a panarabic strategy, all Arabs have to take part. As long as the Zionist entity exists, Arabs will be forces to unite to counter this danger. We, the Palestinians and Lebanese shall be the ignitor for the struggle of all Arabs against the Zionists. We shall start the big fire in the Near East" 23)

One of the terrorist attacks of Abu Nidal's group targeted the Israeli Ambassador in London, Schlomo Argov. On June 3, 1982, Argov was machinegunning with a Polish WZ-63 weapon which was said to have travelled from Warsaw to Baghdad and then to London in an Iraqi diplomatic pouch before it was handed to the assailants. This assault offered the pretext for Israel to invade Lebanon, an attack which destroyed most of the military infrastructure of the Palestinians in that country. On the face of it, the assassination was a boomerang.

However, for Abu Nidal who was at war with Arafat nearly a decade, this counted less than the subsequent difficulties met in Lebanon by Israel, France and the United States. It brought Syria deeper into Lebanon and, perhaps, one step closer to a Greater Syria, the long-term goal of Abu Nidal. This outcome could not be predicted by Abu Nidal (indeed he denies to see a cause-effect relationship between this particular assassination and the Israeli invasion).

The world of political action is full of unintended effects but sometimes some moves in the political chessgame can be predicted. A case in point is another assassination by Abu Nidal's group. In 1978 the Egyptian journalist Youssef
el-Sebai was murdered in Nicosia while attending the Soviet-sponsored Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization meeting. (TASS labeled it an "act of terrorism" 24). The assassination of this influential journalist and close friend of Anwar Sadat was, if we are to believe Abu Nidal, part of a plot to kill president Sadat. Sadat's personal security force chief, Major Nabil, was to be lured to intervene in Cyprus with his guard, thereby temporarily depriving Sadat of his shield. While the stratagem to separate Sadat from his bodyguard succeeded, the second and main phase of the plot, the plan to kill Sadat himself was not successful. Sadat survived this attempt on his life and Major Nabil was killed in Cyprus 25). Sadat was ultimately murdered by a fundamentalist group whose struggle for a revival of the pure Islam stands in contrast to Abu Nidal's more secular orientation.

What do these two examples tell us with regard to the relationship between targeting and goals? Abu Nidal himself has given an answer when he was asked whether he had come closer to his goal by his policies of assassination:

"For me this is not the question. If someone commits treachery against his country, his people, his nation, he gets the corresponding answer. That's the way all resistance fighters have acted. What has the French resistance done with is traitors?" 25).

"Killing traitors" is of course only short term objectives and does little to realize long term goals.

However, many, if not most acts of nonstate left-wing terrorism are aimed at tactical objectives such as the liberation of imprisoned colleagues through coercive bargaining. Acts of terrorism such as kidnappings have also been useful in raising funds for terrorists, in extorting concessions from the target of demands. As acts of revenge and deterrence, terrorist killings undoubtedly can be effective in achieving short term objectives. The question is whether long-term goals can be reached by terrorism alone. Paul Wilkinson has, I think correctly, concluded that beyond this tactical level nonstate terrorism is not likely to achieve strategic goals such as national liberation. He has noted the few major exceptions to this rule, Aden, Algeria, Cyprus and Israel - new nations created with terrorism as main, though not sole weapon 27). Other analysts, like Thomas Thornton, have also pointed out that "The military function of terror is negligible" (that) "it is a small-scale weapon and cannot in itself have any appreciable influence on the outcome of military action" 28).

However, the terrorists or some terrorists, at least, might see what they do as military activity. They certainly use military language, even their names (Red Brigades, P.A.F, Irish Republican Army) reflect this. They see themselves as
guerrillas, not as terrorists, quite wrongly in my opinion. I have tried to
differentiate guerrillas from terrorists in the following way: Some of the
operational techniques employed in guerrilla wars—such as the use of small,
lightly armed units harassing the opponent intermittently at times and places of
their own choosing while deliberately avoiding decisive battles—can also be
found among movements using terrorism only.

What seems to be different, however, is the widening of the targets considered
to be legitimate objects of threat and destruction that more terroristically
inclined movements appear willing to accept. Furthermore, and perhaps even
more important, there appears to be a lower degree of protection granted to be
one's own reference group. This, in turn is a function of the relation of the
armed group to the reference group. In the case of guerrillas they are generally
direct representatives of the reference group while insurgent terrorists are
unlike "fish in the water" since they are often self-chosen indirect
representatives of the reference group which has yet to be mobilized for the
'cause'. Thereby the deliberate exposure of the reference group to government
repression can be a mobilizing device. In term of targetting, guerrillas consider
as legitimate targets generally the security forces (military and (secret) police
of) the government, and infrastructures of these (supply lines, communication
network). Insurgent terrorists, on the other hand, tend to attack individual
exponents in the government camp, unarmed people or armed forces not in
combat situations; third parties which are neutrals, bystanders, noncombatants.
The infrastructure of the whole population is a target for sabotage and
destruction 29). In real life, such distinctions are harder to make. At times
terrorists might use guerrilla tactics while guerrillas might take recourse to
terrorism. The extend to which they live among the people, the prevailing
technique used and the internal disciplining within the movement for
transgressions of codes of conduct could be used as yardsticks for labelling. The
Mujahiddin Fighters in Afghanistan I would label guerrillas; UNITA in Angola is
in my view a terrorist movement while the "Contras" around Nicaragua are
falling somewhere in between. While war can be characterized as the clash of
two highly organized regular armed forces, guerrilla war is irregular warfare in
which nevertheless certain war conventions, like those dealing with the correct
treatment of prisoners, are respected by both sides. Terrorists recognize no
codes of conduct. To term their method of fighting combat is in a sense
misleading since often only one sided is armed and prepared for a fight.
Nevertheless analysts, including myself, have referred to terrorism as a "method
of combat", thereby conceptualizing the phenomenon in a "war model". In an earlier work of mine, *Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media*, I have tried to use a communication model of terrorism 30). Brian Jenkins has used the concept of "terrorism as theatre" to refer to this paramilitary dimension. If we go back to the sources of modern insurgent terrorism little more than one century ago, we find conceptualizations of terrorism as "propaganda by the deed" and "exemplary deed" 31). Martha Crenshaw has also stressed the role of violence as communication without giving up the terrorism as revolution model 32). Paul Wilkinson has contended that "the richest theoretical insights into political terrorism are to be gained from an analysis of terrorism as a distinctive mode of unconventional psychological warfare" 33). While I would hesitate to subscribe to this for state terrorism, I believe that a merger between the war and the communication model of terrorism is indeed the most fruitful approach to the phenomenon under observation. Analytically it seems to offers greater rewards than a "terrorism as communism" model which we find in the works of Jillian Becker and Claire Sterling and others (on theoretical grounds the two models are not incompatible). The choice of model is more than an academic exercise. Murray Edelman once said "that political debate is commonly misunderstood as a struggle about facts or among competing values, when what really is at stake is how to conceptualize an issue" 34).

In the following part of my presentation I would like to offer you a small case study on the origins of what has been termed Euroterrorism. Thereby I will make use of the psychological warfare model. By concentrating on the goals and objectives and the targeting of one particular group, the Red Army Faction, I also would like to introduce the concept of identification, which, in my view, stands central to a key process of terrorist strategy.

**CASE STUDY: FROM HUNGERSTRIKE TO EUROTERRORISM: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE STRATEGY OF THE GERMAN R.A.F.**

In recent months NATO installations and American personnel in Western Europe have been frequent targets of terrorist groups. In itself this is not new. Already on 17 December, 1981, an American general, James Lee Dozier, had become for 42 days a kidnapping victim of the Italian Red Brigades. On September 15, 1981, the U.S. Army commander General F.J Kroesoen was attacked by members of the
RF with a RPG-7 weapon and gunshots as he drove to work by members of the RAF. Two years earlier another NATO commander, Alexander Haig, nearly became a victim of an assassination attempt on June 25, 1979, in the Belgian place of Ooourg. However, there has been a clear intensification of anti-American, anti-NATO attacks in the last 12 months in West Germany but also elsewhere. In Portugal the Forças Populares 25 do Abril attacked on December 9, 1984 the Iberian command of NATO near Lisbon. On January 28, 1985 three NATO vessels were attacked by mortar fire in Lisbon. In Greece, the National Front group exploded a bomb in a bar at Glyfada near Athens on February 3, 1985, wounding 78 people, many of these American military men. In Belgium, the Combative Communist Cells (CCC) sabotaged the NATO pipeline system CEPS at six different places on December 12, 1984. On January 15, the same group launched a bomb attack against a NATO building in Brussels. In the German Federal Republic a bomb attack on the NATO school at Oberammergau failed on December 18, 1984. On April 4, 1985, a NATO pipeline in West Germany was sabotaged by a RAF commando calling itself 'Ulrike Meinhof'. On January 15, 1985, the German RAF and the French terrorist group Action Directe announced a fusion of their respective movements in a West European Guerrilla whose purpose is the fight against NATO.

This list, which is far from complete, could be taken as an indication that some sort of war is being waged in Western Europe against NATO and, in particular, against the American troops stationed here. For the victims of this violence - so far limited - this is true. However, in an important sense this is a fantasy war, to use an expression introduced by Franco Ferracuti, the Italian criminologist and expert on terrorism. He holds that:

"Terrorism...is fantasy war, real only in the mind of the terrorist. Fantasy war, of course, is only partial war, real for only one of the contestants who then adopts war values, norms, and behaviors against another, larger group. ...(...) Fantasy war becomes real only if acknowledged by the "enemy", and becomes terrorism when, unable to compel the enemy to accept a state of war, it must limit itself to harassing and destabilizing the enemy through the utilization and diffusion of fear." 36)

Fantasies can live a life of their own, or as W. I. Thomas put it "If people define situations as real, they are real in their consequences". The place where such fantasies are hatched are German high security prisons, and the minds who cultivate them are those of the second, third and fourth generations of German terrorists. On December 4, 1984, two of them, Brigitte Mohnhaupt and Christian Klar, announced the beginning of a hungerstrike during a court session. In the
following two months more than fifty acts of violence and sabotage occurred in Western Europe, all linked to this announcement. In France Rene Audran, a general, was killed and in Bavaria, Ernst Zimmermann, an important figure in the military-industrial complex, was fatally wounded. Echoes of this hungerstrike—the ninth of the RAF—were registered as far away as Cairo. In the Netherlands the German embassy and consulates were occupied for a short period of time and an intercity train Amsterdam-Munich was brought to a halt by young people who wished to inform the passengers about the hungerstrikes of the RAF members in German prisons. For a while so much publicity was generated in and around Germany by the hunger strikers and their supporters that those millions of people who suffered real hunger involuntarily in Africa were less newsworthy than those 37 terrorists and activists in German prison cells who had followed the appeal of Mohnhaupt and Klar.

How were these hungerstrikes linked to the terrorist actions in Western Europe? One RAF position paper analysing the effects, noted after the hungerstrikes were over:

"We have utilized the political effects, the mobilization which has picked up momentum thanks to the strikes of the prisoners, and we have developed the entire dynamism to the point of a breakthrough of the West European guerrilla" 37).

In order to understand the full implications of this statement we have to turn for a moment to the previous hungerstrikes and their utilizations as weapons of psychological warfare.

When we think of hungerstrike, Gandhi is one of the first names that comes to mind. His fasts were sublime moral appeals to the conscience of his target audiences. Their love for him, on the basis of his earlier record of services for the community, was such that they would have been grieved greatly if he had died from his self-suffering on behalf of the cause he was committed to. His last hungerstrike in January 1948, for instance, was meant to convince all Indians of the value of human life and aimed at restoring fraternal relations between the Hindi and the Muslim communities who were fighting each other.

Hungerstrikes have, however, not been confined to nonviolent political activists. Sergei Nechaev the nihilist prototype of the modern terrorist went on hungerstrike in late 1877, after four years of solitary confinement, in order to obtain books not in the prison library. Two years earlier, political prisoners in the same Russian prison went on a long hungerstrike. When some of them died from the consequences, the head of the police section was assassinated in
revenge. In 1879 political prisoners in the Fortress won the right to have visits from relatives every fortnight through a hungerstrike during which they resisted efforts to be fed by injection 38).

Some of the themes of these 19th century hungerstrikers recur in the 9 waves of hungerstrikers launched from West German prisons by RAF terrorists. Yet these hungerstrikers were much more complex, thanks mainly to the communication revolution which enlarged the size of the target of attention. The ostensible short-term object of these strikes was an improvement of the conditions of confinement. These conditions were enviable by the standards of the Peter and Paul Fortress. The German terrorists have a radio and sometimes also a television set in their cells and they are allowed to have twenty books at a time. In the beginning they could obtain practically every item they wished from the liberal German authorities. In Stammheim they were allowed to read books with titles like 'German Armoury Journal', 'Military Technique', 'Urban Guerrilla Warfare', 'Armed Insurrection', 'Radio Communication, Application and Possibility', 'The Modern Explosive Expert', etc. 39).

They were allowed up to four dailies, two magazines per week, and the use of a typewriter. They receive more mail and visitors than ordinary "nonpolitical" prisoners and have generally been kept in small groups rather than in solitary confinement over long periods like Nechaev who died in 1982 in prison 40). Nevertheless, family members and advocates of these prisoners have been busy propagating an image of unbearable conditions of imprisonment in which words like "isolation torture" and "annihilation" play an important role. The latent functions of such accusations against the German state become clearer when one turns back to earlier campaigns of hungerstrikers.

The reconstruction of this hungerstrike offers a number of important insights into

1. the way how idealistic young people can turn terrorist;
2. how terrorists devise a strategy in which the opponent is manoeuvred in a no-win situation;
3. the public media are involved;
4. psychological warfare is waged; and
5. targeting is linked to objectives.

The Rote Arme Fraktion (RAF), or Baader-Meinhof Gang in the terminology of the German authorities, was an offshoot of the student movement and the anti-Vietnam protest. By 1972 its leadership was imprisoned. This change in
circumstances affected the targeting of the group. Anti-American targeting (such as the attacks on the headquarter of the 5th U.S. Corps in Frankfurt on May 11, 1972 (1 killed, 13 injured), the attack on the headquarter of the American army in Europe in Heidelberg on May 24, 1972 (3 killed, 5 injured) shifted to anti-German state targeting. Until 1972 the RAF, identified mainly with the victims in Indochina, the Vietnamese National Liberation Movement and other liberation movements in the Third World. Once in prison, they offered a different identification object to their sympathizers: themselves. The RAF members in the underground were instructed to concentrate all their efforts on the liberation of the RAF leadership 41). The Vietnam war phase was succeeded by the Prisoners' Liberation phase. After two hunger strikes in 1973 (from January 17 to February 16, and from May 8 to July 29), a strategy evolved which first took clearer shape in the third hunger strike of imprisoned RAF members, lasting from September 13, 1974 to February 5, 1975. At that time Ulrike Meinnof, the journalist turned terrorist after having interviewed Gudrun Ensslin, for Konkret, a student magazine, went on hunger strike with the announcement that she and her colleagues were determined to "let the stone which the imperialist state has lifted against us, fall on his own feet". By this she meant that they planned to turn the misery of being imprisoned into the virtue of martyrdom. Three years later she committed suicide (according to the RAF it was murder) in the framework of the strategy developed. Her colleague, Gudrun Ensslin, the dominating figure in the group of prisoners, had coined the formula of using their own bodies "as our ultimate weapons". Unable to victimize others in pursuance of their goals - the creation of a repression-free socialist society after the success of an armed revolution - they turned themselves into victims while placing the responsibility for their suffering into the hands of the "fascist" German state which they accused of torture. In terms of our distinction between targets of violence, targets of terror, targets of demands and attention, the imprisoned RAF members portrayed the German state as terrorist, themselves as victims of violence, thereby hoping to evoke empathy from credulous audiences - targets of attention - on the Left. Horst Mahler, the Berlin lawyer turned terrorist through empathic identification, admitted after his second conversion - the "return to humaneness" (as another reconverted participant put it 42) - that the charge of torture was a "propaganda lie" meant to attract new members for the movement. The imprisoned terrorists "terrorized" themselves with self-imposed hunger strikes with the objective to use the public echo as their recruiting instrument. We have the testimony of Hans-Joachim Klein how the strategy worked in his
own case. He bought his first handgun when he heard that Holger Meins, one of the hunger strikers, died as a consequence of two months of starving. Later, when Klein gained more insight into the propaganda strategy of the RAF, he admitted that he found it difficult to see Meins merely as a victim of the capitalist system. The death of Meins in November 1974 fitted into the "new construction" which was based on "planned bodies", as Andreas Baader once put it 43). The reaction of the targets of attention to the death of Holger Meins was satisfactory from the point of view of the hunger strikers. Immediately after the news was spread, between November 9 - the day Meins died - and November 11, 1974, about fifty demonstrations took place in West Germany, directly linked to Meins' death. In front of court buildings in Bochum and Frankfurt three bombs were exploded and many other buildings and vehicles were damaged by sympathizers of the RAF. In Berlin, the President of the High Court, Guenther von Drenkman, was shot in his home by a group of young people on the Sunday after Holger Meins' death. One of the imprisoned RAF members, probably Ulrike Meinhof, defended this murder as "necessary, useful and exemplary" 44). Mobilized by the public media who had reported the news, young people in many places reacted. In the words of Horst Mahler, the weapon of the hunger strike was used by the RAF "as a whip against the Left to mobilized them for the interests of the guerillas" 45).

The mobilization of sympathizers for the goals of the RAF also appears to be the strategy of the ninth hunger strike since 1973. The mobilization potential of hunger strikes had in the meantime also been demonstrated by the hunger strike of Bobby Sands, begun on March 1, 1981, in the Maze prison in Northern Ireland. The self-imposed martyrdom of Bobby Sands and his nine colleagues mobilized about 40 percent of the Catholics behind Sinn Fein, the political wing of the Provisional IRA. In the same month the RAF had launched its eighth hunger strike in German prisons, which triggered off a number of bombings against German and American targets. On the occasion of their ninth hunger strike in December 1984 they made an explicit reference to the Irish example 46).

The objective of the 39 German hunger strikers was to bring about a process of conscientization among the target of attention, the German and European Left 47). In this sense the unlimited hunger strike was an identification offer: "see how we suffer for our common cause; aren't you ashamed of doing nothing while we are being 'tortured'. We act here, please act at your place." Some of the RAF members still at large were to help them in the attempt to mobilize the responsive parts of the public. In one of the strategy papers discovered by the
security forces in a so-called "conspiratorial flat" in Frankfurt, the author, Helmut Pohl, wrote:

"The practical approach we find best is that we - on the outside - open the offensive with assaults on the infrastructure of the military apparatus and that the prisoners do their attack with the HS (hungerstrike)." 48)

In his paper Pohl expressed the hope that such a level of activity could be generated outside the prisons that the authorities would be forced to make the demanded concessions, namely the unification of RAF and other extremist prisoners in large groups, a decrease of the surveillance and a lifting of the limitations on contacts with the outside world ("Kontaktsperre"). If their demands were agreed upon, it would have transformed the prison cells into headquarters for further struggle outside the prisons, creating as it were, a liberated zone in the belly of the "imperialist" beast. Yet that was probably not even the principal goal. One objective of the hungerstrike was to place the West German state into what game theory calls a "no-win" situation. The state would loose prestige if he granted the hungerstrikers what they ostensibly wanted, namely better terms of imprisonment. The German state would also loose if the hungerstrikers had to be fed artificially, that is, by forceful means. The state would thereby act against the manifest will of the prisoners and inflict bodily harm on them by attempting to feed the unwilling. The state would also loose if he allowed the hungerstrikers to die since this would be interpreted as proof that the state was indeed pursuing an "annihilation strategy", as the terrorists and their sympathizers claimed. Either way, by feeding or by not feeding the hungerstrikers, the German state would stand accused in the eyes of the unwitting public of torture (forceful feeding) or murder (neglect of feeding). In fact the RAF hungerstrikers were pretending to commit suicide in such a way that it would look like murder.

"Murder" and "Torture" call for revenge. Among the target of attention one group emerged, calling itself the "Knut Folker Commando" (the name was taken from one RAF hungerstriker). It announced that it would kill the prime minister and the minister of Lower Saxony if one of the prisoners was going to die in a prison in Lower Saxony. At about the same time a "Commando Holger Meins" (the name was taken from the first RAF hungerstriker who had gone all the way in his altruistic suicide in 1974) let it be known that it had placed Helmut Kohl and Helmut Schmidt, the present and past chancellors of the German Federal Republic, on its death list. These spontaneously emerging "commandos" were responding to the call issued by the imprisoned RAF members on December 4, 1984, a call emphasizing that "We want to... join with all those who have broken
with this system and take as point of departure the revolutionary struggle against prison, state, imperialism, and reason of state" (49). What they meant was the reverse: they wanted others - all the discontents in society - to join them. In their communiqué they admitted in so many words that "It has nothing to do with information about the existence of torture, it has to do with revolutionary counterpower and action." (50)

Outside the prison a communiqué was distributed wherein one could read that "all initiatives - demonstrations, propaganda actions, etc. are necessary to create the political pressure necessary to see our demands fulfilled". The crucial word in this communiqué was the "etc.". It could mean little else than what the RAF meant in 1977 when the call went out "to work with all strength available for the liberation of the prisoners". At that time in 1977 the objective was the freeing of the first generation of German terrorists, Andreas Baader, Gudrum Ensslin, Jan Carl Raspe and Irmgard Moeller who were already five years in prison. The murder of the attorney general S. Buback, of the banker J. Ponto and of the industrialist H.M. Schleyer were then the "etc.".

In 1985 there was only one prominent German who fell victim to this "etcetera". It was Ernst Zimmermann, the chairman of MTU, the engine and turbine firm. He was mortally wounded by gunshots at his house near Munich on February 1, 1985. The murder, perpetrated by young people who called themselves the "Patsy O'Hara commando" (after one of the Irish hungerstrikers), was taken as signal for ending the hungerstrike. Their "sacrifice" had produced a result weighty enough to stop without losing face. One group outside the prisons had called upon the hungerstrikers to end their fast. In its message, the group pleaded:

"We are asking you to terminate the strike. What this hungerstrike was able to achieve in terms of mobilization, it has achieved." (51)

If we look at this hungerstrike and this murder in terms of our four targets of terrorism, we find that one target of attention of the RAF hungerstrike - hitherto uninvolved sympathizers - turned into a perpetrator of violence, and that the target of violence - E. Zimmermann - was sacrificed on behalf of the imprisoned RAF members who thereby were in fact the primary target of attention. If this interpretation is correct, the German government and public were only secondary targets of demands and attention. As the hungerstrike gained momentum, the likelihood of such a sacrifice to move the imprisoned RAF leadership increased. The drama of people slowly dying for a cause invariably moves onlookers who will be impressed by the determination. Part of the audience will interpret this willingness to die as proof that the cause is a good
and just one. (In a sense it could be argued that hungerstrikers generate the same kind of power for the terrorist group that the altruistic sacrifice of Jesus Christ produced for the Church.) The success of hungerstikes as identification offer will depend on the degree of publicity given to the fact that prisoners are on hungerstrike. Here the role of family members, legal representatives and friends of the terrorists as transmission belt is crucial. As their identification objects are about to die, they are, for reasons which are understandable enough, driven to ever more feverish activities to bring the public media to a maximum coverage of the events. Solidarity gatherings are organized and people are invited to contribute all that is in their power to save the lives of their "political" prisoners. A number of these targets of attention will be moved to acts of arson, bombings and even murder as signs of protest, revolt and revenge.

One of the striking things about the many acts of violence performed during the hungerstrike period (December 4, 1984 - begin of February, 1985) is that most of these acts were so amateurish. The bomb attacks showed a lack of expertise which seasoned terrorists would not exhibit. This is an indication that most of these acts of violence were not performed by the 15 to 20 RAF members who were still at large but by their above-the-ground supporters (between 100 and 300 people according to police estimates) and by sympathizers (at best a few thousand people, organized in solidarity committees, anti-fascist groups, committees against torture, etc.) and by newcomers who had no organizational links with the RAF. They were thereby becoming terrorists themselves, moved by their identification with the "victims of the NATO prison system". In other words, these people were sucked into the terrorist movement by the mobilizing device of the hungerstrike.

In general terms, this process of recruitment has been described by Jerold Post, who wrote:

"The path to joining a terrorist group tends to be slow and gradual, from sympathizer, to passive supporter, to active supporter, and finally joining the group itself. The decision to join often follows failed efforts at adaptation - socially, educationally, and at work. There is a tendency for marginal, isolated, and lonely individuals with troubled family backgrounds to be attracted to the terrorist group, so that for many, belonging to the terrorist group is the first time they felt they truly belonged, and the group comes to represent family." 52)

Jerold Post observed that the path to joining the terrorist group was quite similar for groups as diverse as the Basque ETA, the Italian Red Brigades and the German Red Army Faction and in his "Notes on a Psychodynamic Theory of Terrorist Behavior" he suggests that
"The need to belong - the need to have a stable identity, to resolve a split and be one with oneself and with society... is an important bridging concept which helps explain the similarity in behaviour in groups of widely different motivations and composition". 53) 

In my view, the significance of the concept of identity can be upgraded in its explicatory power when it is incorporating the concept of identification. Together, these concepts can help us explain not only terrorist behaviour but also our own behaviour towards terrorism. The search for the (missing) link between terrorist targetting and terrorist goals and objectives is, this is my belief, most fruitfully conducted in the field of identification. It is for this reason that I would like to turn to the role of the mechanism of identification in terrorism. For convenience, I will again refer to the German RAF as illustration object.

THE IDENTIFICATION MECHANISM

The role of identification has, to my knowledge, not yet been the subject of research in the field of terrorism. Astute observers have, however, made some remarks that show recognition for this dimension. Grant Wardlaw has noted that "...an act will become to be seen as terrorist if people identify with the victim of the act". 54)

The term identification has a variety of meanings. In psychoanalysis it denotes a process, conscious or unconscious, in which the subject has the impression that he thinks, feels or acts like the object. In social psychology it refers to the more or less lasting influence one person can exert on the behaviour of another. For our purposes a passage from a work by the Finnish social psychologist Karmela Liebknecht, is helpful:

"Identification can mean at least two different things; a wish to become or remain like the other (individual or group), or a recognition of existing similarities, good or bad, between the self and the object of identification. (...) In a definition of a person's overall identity both of these meanings of identification have to be incorporated: A person's identity is defined as the totality of his self-construal, in which how he construes himself in the present expresses the continuity between how he construes himself as he was in the past and as he aspires to be in the future." 55)
With this in mind we can return to the subject of terrorism. There the use of identification is generally confined in the literature to the "Identification with the aggressor" (A. Freud), as manifesting itself in the positive attitude some hostages show towards their captors. This has also been referred to as "Stockholm syndrome", a term coined when a female Swedish hostage fell in love with her captor. Perhaps one could also label it the "Patty Hearst syndrome". Yet other identification processes are at work as well. The tremendous public interest in acts of hostage-taking seems to be due to the fact that many members of the audience emphatically identify with the fate of the victim. In psychology, empathy refers to one person vicariously experiencing the feelings, perceptions, and thoughts of another. The empathizer imagines as having the same experience as the other. In a mental process he takes the role of the other. If the other is hurt physically, he is hurt psychologically. He would like to extend his help to the other in an act of altruism, hence that some members of the public offer themselves as hostages in exchange for those actually in the hands of the hostage-takers. Where help is not possible, the empathizer experiences unpleasantness from which he might try to save himself by "freezing" himself psychologically.

Other members of the witnessing audience, often the target of attention of terrorist acts, will react differently, by identifying with the terrorist rather than with his victim of violence. By identifying with the aggressor, an observer can take on the strength of the feared terrorist and reduce his own feelings of vulnerability. An example would be the euphoric celebration of a car bomb attack in Southern Lebanon on April 9, 1985. The 16 year-old girl Sana Nhaydali who drove a car with 200 kilos of TNT into a concentration of Israeli troops in an altruistic suicide was hailed as a "martyr" and as a "bride of the South" 56). She became a hero, and an object of identification inducing others to imitate her. Imitation can be considered as a form of identification, as a modelling of oneself after a 'successful' person. In this case the 'success' is not an experience of individual but of collective survival.

Terrorism can be considered as a contest for identifications. Acts of shocking violence are staged with the objective of creating sharp fear in targets of demands and sharp polarizations among targets of attention. The outcome is strongly determined by the way the identification process goes. The direction of the identification process is not only determined by the attentive public's assessment whether or not the victim "deserves" what he gets. A number of
factors like race, class, nationality and party membership appear to be powerful
determinants. This identification process is not confined to terroristic acts; any
act of violence with an irreversible outcome is likely to produce polarizations
among witnessing audiences.

I would like to illustrate this by a reference to the assassinations of John F.
Kennedy and Martin Luther King and the American public reaction to these
non-terroristic murders. One study found that the news of the murder of the
Democratic president Kennedy in Dallas in 1963 produced different reactions
among Democratic and Republican voters. Among the Democrats in the sample,
64 percent said that they "felt as if the whole world was caving in". Only 5
percent of the Republican voters said that they shared this feeling. The violent
death of the nonviolent black leader in 1968 showed an even more pronounced
cleavage along colour lines. From a sample of black people 96 percent said that
they were "shocked, grieve, saddened or angry". Only 41 percent of white
people in the sample said that they felt the same. 59 percent of the whites in
the sample were indifferent or even admitted feelings of satisfac
tion when
hearing the news of the assassination of Martin Luther King - a feeling shared
by only 4 percent of the black people. Perhaps even more significant, no less
than 41 percent of the whites in the sample felt that King was to be blamed
himself for his being assassinated - because he started riots, etc. 57)

Such data indicate that an act of violence can polarize audiences, and produce
identification processes with the victim among most of those sharing common
characteristics while leaving others indifferent and yet others even satisfied.
Guilt attribution apparently occurs along similar lines. The media provide us
daily with identification offers and we more or less consciously take sides
wherever conflict and violence along lines relevant to our own situation occurs.
Identification with the winner or with the aggressor can make us feel powerful
vicariously, while identification with the looser or victim can make us feel weak
or revengeful. Do we share victim or victimizer characteristics, is he one of "us"
or one of "them", does the victim deserve it or not? These are questions we tend
to ask ourselves almost automatically and subconsciously and we come up with
answers like "Right or wrong - my country" or "The party is always right". When
we do not approve of the means utilized in a conflict situation but share the
goals of the aggressor we are apparently much more apologetic towards an act
of violence than we are when there is no goal consonance. When the perpetrator
of violence is one of "us" ("he is my son") we judge differently than when he is
not. Hence one man's terrorist is another man's patriot. Most people appear to be terribly selective in their outrage about acts of violence. Some of us tend to care more about Israel's right to exist as a state while others tend to care more about the Palestinian right to a state. Others only seem to care whether what happens in the Middle East helps the Soviet Union or the United States. In such a way occurrences for which we normally have little sympathy can be justified by referring to reasons of state or geostrategic considerations. Depending on factors like spatial and psychological distance or closeness, the process of taking sides whenever polarizing acts of violence occur can release strong impulses in us. Acts of violence, brought into the homes of hundreds of millions of people by television coverage, can stir some members of the witnessing audiences so much that they feel terrorized themselves. Others are incited to anger and in turn become violent actors by acts of imitation or revenge. In such a way new terrorists can be created.

Basically, this is the way modern insurgent terrorism came into existence a little more than one hundred years ago in Tsarist Russia. Leon Trotsky has given us a vivid description how terrorism was "invented":

"Before it was elevated to the level of a method of political struggle, terrorism makes its appearance in the form of individual acts of revenge. So it was in Russia, the classic land of terrorism. The flogging of political prisoners impelled Vera Zasuylich to give expression to the general feeling of indignation by an assassination attempt on General Trepov. Her example was imitated in the circles of the revolutionary intelligentsia, who lacked any mass support. What began as an act of unthinking revenge was developed into an entire system in 1879-81. (...) The most important psychological source of terrorism is always the feeling of revenge in search of an outlet." 58)

Trotsky's observation also fits the German RAF and helps us to explain their past and present strategy. Their social consciousness was awakened by their identification with the victims of the Vietnam war and with the poor in the Third World in general. As Jillian Becker put it:

"They got a regular stirring up from 'the media'. Pity and indignation rooted on behalf of story characters, existing or not. Learning about wars, exploitation, oppression in the same way as they learned about the fate of fictional victims, they felt strongly not because they were visionaries but because they were a generation of televisionaries." 59)

Horst Mahler, the co-founder of the RAF admitted that the televised massacres in Vietnam and the passivity of the German government with regard to the atrocities committed by its NATO ally drove them to acts of resistance and revenge:
"It was our moralism which led us to terrorism. Many of us (in any case Ulike Meinhof and Gudrun Ensslin) came the same way. The German nation again was passive. How could we escape from the society which once again mixed itself: in a war that of Vietnam? We had nothing to identify with in the West, so we identified with the Third World. (...) From that time on we no longer felt like Germans; we were the Fifth Column of the Third World in Europe. From now on we observed the simple antithesis; we were on this side, the police were on the other. We did not see by which lines of communication the people identified with the state." 60)

The Vietnam war, or rather the media portrayal of it, led to feelings of disillusionment and detachment with regard to the political leaders and the political system. Many of our generation have gone through this political alienation and know the feelings of powerlessness, distrust and hopelessness and estrangement.

To quote Horst Mahler, the most intellectual among the RAF founders, again:

"The young life which is demotivated by a sense of the absurd seeks in the commitment to a revolutionary movement... the salvation from nihilism and desperation. (...) If you think of it, it is a terrible thing if you cannot identify with your own people." (Emphasis added, AS) 61)

Many of the first generation RAF terrorists had a middle or upper class background. They rejected it and identified with the poor, the victims of war or with the German proletariat or what they held for it. Towards Peter Urbach, who joined the RAF in 1970, Horst Mahler said "You are our only proletarian". It so happened that this only working-class member was in fact an agent provocateur of the German ministry of Justice 62).

Today's third and fourth generation of RAF terrorists is still (or again) in search of the proletariat to be instigated to action. In one of their pamphlets they plead for a "reconstruction of the European proletariat". The problem of rallying the masses behind themselves was already one which occupied the 19th century Russian academic aristocratic terrorists. Lenin spoke derogatively of their terrorism as "a specific kind of struggle practised by the intelligentsia" 63). The Russian terrorists as well as the RAF terrorists were in search of a "revolutionary subject" whose awakening they could trigger off with their acts of violence. Privileged as they were themselves, they became spokesmen of those who had no voice. In his study on German terrorist careers Gerhard Schmittchen found that these started generally with an "identification with the powerless" 64). Identification with the powerless, the poor, the proletariat is bound to lead to frustration when these groups and classes are not responsive because they
have no class consciousness or a "false class consciousness" or cannot for other reasons identify with the identifiers who want to save them and the world. Within the RAF there were various views about the prime "revolutionary subject". Some thought more in terms of the German workers, while others looked more to the Third World. They were impressed by the Tupamaros and tried to copy their model of urban terrorism. They also identified with the Palestinian terrorists who triggered off a massacre during the Olympic Games in Munich 65). A dozen RAF members had already two years earlier gone to Jordania for a six-week guerrilla training. Yet they could not adapt to the spartan life of the PLO fedayeen. The Palestinians in turn could not follow the theoretical effusions of the German visitors 66). However, they both had a common enemy and that was a binding factor.

Identification leads to imitation and imitation to contagion. Hence the wave of terrorist incidents at certain periods. During the last hungerstrike of the RAF we have seen identifications with the RAF by other terrorist movements. In Portugal, the FP-25 dedicated some of its recent acts to the RAF and the same could be seen in France where Action Directe also used its bombs as support statements for the RAF. In the middle of January 1985 the RAF and Action Directe announced a kind of fusion and the creation of a common political-military front in Western Europe 67). This Euroterrorism has been taken at face value by some observers, as a sign that the terrorist threat has reached a new culmination. Whether or not this is true remains to be seen. It depends in part on the success of the last hungerstrike, on the number of new recruits it could mobilize for the terrorist underground. However, the fact that the national terrorist movements sought and identified with each other can also be interpreted as a sign of weakness rather than strength, namely as a confession that they could not rally larger sectors of the population behind them, despite the fact that there are millions of West Europeans without work and many of them without hope and subject to political alienation. That they do not identify with the terrorists is an encouraging sign when compared to the interwar period when fascist terrorists could shoot and bomb themselves from the streets into the seats of government at a time of economic crisis.

However, this lacking mass basis of West European terrorism (with some exceptions made for separatist groups like the Basques, the Corsicans and the Catholics in Northern Ireland) should not be an excuse for doing nothing except suppress the terrorist themselves. If the institutions of governments cannot
produce new and constructive visions of the future with which people can identify positively. Movements of all sorts, religious, revolutionary, terrorists are bound to try to fill the void with their visions of the future in the hope that majorities will identify with them rather than with petrified institutions who seem to care only for their own survival.

Arthur Koestler has once said that

"The longing to belong left without appropriately mature outlets, manifests itself mostly in primitive or perverted forms." 68)

In this sense those in power would act wisely if they would set new goals for mankind which could eclipse the goals and objectives of international terrorists.

Thank you for your attention.
NOTES TO "GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM"

1) Information from Jay Mallin.
2) As quoted by ZDF, the West German television, on September 9, 1985.
8) Herman Rauschnung. Gespräche mit Hitler. Wien, 1940, p.82.
9) Jan van der Putten. "Staatshoofd van Guatamala vergoelijk moordpartijen." Volkskrant, 6 November 1985, p.4.; speaks of up to 100,000 people killed and 38,000 "disappearances" for the period since 1954. On the other hand, one data base records 6,500 terroristic incidents worldwide with more than 3,500 people killed and about 7,600 injured in the decade 1974-1983.
14) Robert A. Friedlander. An Infinity of Mirrors: Mehmet Ali Agca and the "Plot to Kill the Pope". Gaithersburg, IACP, 1984, p.3.
15) Cit. Ibid., p.5.
17) Ibid. p.64.
18) Cit. I.H.T., as summarized in Jongman chronology.
26) Cit. Ibid.
32) Ibid. p.221.
33) Ibid. p.219.
37) Cit. Knipselkrant (Groningen) 1985, p.646.


47) Berliner Tageszeitung (taz), 5 December 1975, citing Brigitte Mohnhaupt, the leader of the R.A.F.


49) Cit. Knipselkrant (Groningen), 1984, p.1924.


53) Ibid., p.247.


I. QUESTIONS, METHODS, AND DATA

Methodologies in conflict analysis are techniques for ordering information systematically, and drawing inferences from that information about the patterns, trends, causes, processes, and outcomes of conflict. Since political terrorism is a type or strategy of conflict, the full armamentarium of techniques for conflict analysis are potentially applicable to it. The appropriate methodologies are exceptionally diverse: they include psychological and biographical analysis of individuals, comparative case studies of conflict episodes, econometric analysis of large sets of data on conflict and its causes, and simulations of conflict processes based on formal
models. "Methodologies" does not mean simply the analysis of quantitative data, although the most technically-sophisticated methods are those designed to generate and analyze quantified information. The term also encompasses systematic case studies, that is, case studies guided by an explicit theoretical argument or framework.

Questions First: Methodologies do not exist in abstract form. They assume the existence of an analytic question and a body of relevant information which bears on the question. The analytic question is logically prior: What kinds of ethnic and religious minorities are most likely to resort to oppositional terrorism? What is the relative importance of perceived deprivation versus ideological commitments as motivations for terrorist actions? What are the effects of a "no-concessions" policy on terrorists' later strategies? Given a specific analytic question of this sort, a methodology is designed or adapted to guide the collection of relevant information and its analysis. This "question first" procedure is in principle the preferred one in scientific and policy research because it maximizes the likelihood that the researcher will get valid answers to the question.

Data First: In practice the researcher often begins by confronting a body of previously-collected data. In this "data first" situation, the nature of the data constrains both the questions that might reasonably be asked and the methods appropriate to the particular combination of information base and analytic questions. For example, the two major publically-available compilations of global information on political terrorism are Edward Mickolus's ITERATE II dataset for 1968-77 (see Mickolus 1979, Heyman and Mickolus 1981) and the Rand Corporation's chronology of terrorist events from 1968 to present (see the bibliographies to Jenkins 1977 and Cordes et al.
Both are restricted conceptually to incidents which have international dimensions. Thus they cannot be used to answer questions about domestic terrorism, or about possible linkages between domestic and international terrorism. And since the unit of analysis is the incident, it is very difficult to use these data sources to analyze the probabilities of terrorist actions by different ethnic and religious minorities. To answer this kind of analytic question would require the researcher to merge information from a comprehensive databank on terrorist incidents (transnational and domestic) with information on a comprehensive databank on minorities (which does not exist).

**Method First:** There is a third, "method first" approach in which the researcher who is familiar with a particular methodology looks for questions and data to which to apply it. Factor analysis, Markov-chain analysis, and mathematical modelling are examples of techniques whose uses in conflict analysis have sometimes been dictated primarily by an interest in applying a technique. Of course these techniques have appropriate uses. But basic and applied research on conflict are better served if the question or the data determine the choice of method rather than vice versa.

Thus there are two basic considerations which help structure an intelligible discussion of methods for the analysis of terrorism:

1. **It is necessary to identify the kinds of analytic questions which are of greatest concern to scholars and policy-makers.** The alternative methods by which one might answer them follow from the nature of the questions. Parts II through VI below identify what I regard as the essential questions which should guide analysis, and discusses alternative methodological approaches to answering them.
2. Following from analytic questions and decisions about methods are implications about the kinds of substantive information and data which are needed. I am convinced by a review of the empirical literature on political terrorism that many, perhaps most of the important questions being raised cannot be answered adequately with the kinds of information now publicly available. Part VII summarizes the case for a more comprehensive system for gathering and codifying information related to oppositional terrorism.

In general one can distinguish five different levels of analysis at which questions are raised about political terrorism in its various manifestations: (1) global, (2) national, (3) group, (4) incident, and (5) individual. The questions raised at each level of analysis are rather different; so are the appropriate methods for answering them.

II. GLOBAL AND WORLD-REGIONAL ANALYSES OF TERRORISM

Trends: What are the trends in aggregate levels of terrorist incidents, globally and by world region? What are the trends in characteristics of terrorism: the types of groups involved, their tactics and targets, their likelihood of success?

Diffusion: What is the evidence for diffusion processes, for terrorism in general, for particular kinds of episodes, or for particular tactics? What kinds of diffusion processes are at work: what is the relative importance of imitation, external encouragement and assistance, foreign direction?

The Context of Interstate Conflict: To what extent is terrorism an outgrowth
or manifestation of larger conflicts among states? More specifically, to what extent is domestic or transnational terrorism centered on issues of north-south or east-west conflicts, rather than nationalism or specific internal political grievances?

To answer these kinds of questions presupposes the existence of a codified body of information on groups which use terrorist tactics, their ideologies and objectives; and data on incidents and campaigns of terrorism and their short-run outcomes. It is impossible to give reliable answers to "trends" and "diffusion" questions in the absence of such data. The empirical literature offers examples of popular and official impressions about trends which are inconsistent with the objective evidence, as documented by Wardlaw (1982: 51-52).

Graphic analysis is the simplest kind of trend analysis and has been widely applied to data on incidents in the ITERATE dataset and Rand chronologies, among others. The main limitation of the descriptive analyses I have seen is that they do not make sufficiently detailed distinctions among types and characteristics of incidents. It is clear that transnational terrorism has increased greatly in the last 15 years, but is that also true of the total volume of domestic and transnational terror? Or has there been a shift, globally or in particular regions, from domestic to transnational terrorism, in other words an internationalization of a preexisting strategy of conflict?

Trend analyses have looked at the distribution in time and space of particular kinds of terrorist tactics: bombings, hostage incidents, assassinations. Targets have been similarly studied. But I know of no
analyses of trends or distribution of types of groups using terrorist tactics; or of the changing relative importance of internal v. nationalistic v. transnational motives or objectives; or of success rates. The neglect of these latter kinds of analyses, like the neglect of comparisons between domestic and transnational terrorism, is not due to oversight but the lack of enough codified information.

Three somewhat different approaches to diffusion analysis have been used in the analysis of terrorism. (1) One is the application of statistical tests of randomness: the question is whether incidents are randomly distributed in space and time, and if not, how their distribution is structured. Published studies of transnational terrorism demonstrate the significance of both contagious and hierarchical processes in the spread of incidents within regions and among them (Midlarsky, Crenshaw and Yoshida 1980; Heyman 1980; Heyman and Mickolus 1981; Govea nd). (2) A second, related approach uses the results of statistical analysis (Markov-chain analysis specifically) to construct adjacency maps which show graphically the national and regional concentrations and diffusion of incidents (Heyman and Mickolus 1981). Both methods can be and have been applied to (a) the aggregate of all recorded incidents and (b) specific tactics such as skyjackings, kidnappings, and bombings. (3) The third, least-common approach uses mathematical techniques to examine the cumulative frequency with which new terrorist and other conflict tactics are used. Evidence from the analysis of success/failure rates in waves of skyjackings has been shown to be a function of the relative learning rates of parties to conflict (see Pitcher and Hamblin 1982 and the references cited there).

Transnational terrorism obviously is conditioned by, and in some
instances is an extension of interstate conflicts. Domestic terrorism may be similarly influenced by interstate conflict. In fact, the intensification of east-west and north-south conflicts is responsible for internationalizing some internal conflicts, just as the use of terrorist strategies internationally has a contagious effect on the tactics used in domestic conflicts. What methods are appropriate to the study of these issues? Empirically one can ask whether the emergence or intensification of particular east-west or north-south conflicts has altered trends in terrorism; or how they affect hierarchical diffusion patterns. An alternative approach would require the analysis of coded data (which do not now exist) on the motivations and ideological rationalizations of conflict groups, to determine whether they are influenced by shifts in the salience of current issues of international conflict.

III. THE NATIONAL LEVEL OF ANALYSIS:

COMPARISONS ACROSS TIME AND PLACE

Global and world-regional analyses can provide general knowledge about the trends in terrorism and about the transnational processes which generate or contribute to them, but they are not likely to provide the more specific understanding sought by most scholars and policy-makers. Geology provides an analogy: knowledge of plate tectonics on a global scale explains why the areas along the San Andreas fault are unstable, but does not make it possible to predict the timing, location or magnitude of California earthquakes: that requires more precise and localized analysis. Cross-national and longitudinal
analysis provide the first step toward more localized analysis of oppositional terrorism.

Distribution: In which kinds of countries is terrorism most prevalent? What are the nationalities most often targeted by terrorists?

Trends and Diffusion: Within countries that have relatively high levels of terrorism, what are the trends and diffusion patterns?

National Policies: What kinds of national policies appear most effective in minimizing the onset of terrorism? Which policies work best in extinguishing episodes of terrorism after they have begun?

Political Context: In what kinds of political systems are oppositional and state terrorism most likely? What are the relationships between government's use of coercion and violence, and the resort to oppositional terrorism? More generally, what kinds of conflicts are most likely to give rise to terrorist campaigns?

Consequences: What are the short- and longer-run effects of terrorist campaigns, especially large ones, on the structures and policies of governments? What are their effects on public opinion and on popular support for regimes and their officials?

There are two different general approaches to the systematic analysis of these kinds of questions. One is cross-national analysis which applies a familiar set of methods for the analysis of domestic civil violence specifically to terrorism. The basic objective is to identify the socioeconomic and political conditions which are associated with--theoretically, are causes of--terrorism. Some such studies use
quantitative techniques: cross-tabulations, correlation, regression, and causal-path analysis. Typically the dependent variable is some property of terrorism such as the number and intensity of incidents. The causal variables used in Hamilton's prototypical study of this kind (1981) include the type of political system, level of economic development, the extent of group discrimination and regional separatism, and governmental oppression (sanctions). Hamilton is especially concerned with the connection between oppression and terrorism. His evidence supports the general argument that "terrorism succeeds as short-term provocation, but succumbs to long-term oppression" (1981: 236).

More numerous than quantitative analyses are interpretive studies using comparative materials to assess general causal factors. One example is Targ's systematic attempt to specify the kinds of societies in which political terrorism is most common: he suggests that terrorism decreases as societies move from preindustrial to industrial, then increases again as they move on into a postindustrial phase (Targ 1979). In an intra-regional analysis of black Africa, Welbing (1979) asks why political terrorism has been uncommon in most African countries. The answers have to do with the character of African regimes and patterns of political repression and exclusion. These two studies are instructive examples of the kinds of systematic analysis that can be done of terrorism in the absence of large-scale data banks: they pose general theoretical questions, present suggestive information (tabulations of data, case studies), then draw out the general implications of that information. Good cross-national data on domestic terrorism would make it possible to address the same questions with more precision and with more definitive results.
There is no reason in principle why the cross-national approach could not be extended to deal with other questions identified above. Whereas Hamilton focuses on the nexus between terrorism and government coercion, one could equally well examine whether blanket policies of no concessions v. negotiation and concession strategies have any bearing on the future incidence of terrorism. This is the question asked in a recent study by Reuben Miller (1985) of the effects of harsh v. soft policies on the success and incidence of international terrorism in six target countries. The study is based on 115 cases from the ITERATE II dataset. National differences in responses are evident but do not appear to have consistent effects on the recurrence of terrorism. The study points toward the kinds of systematic cross-national research which could be done on a crucial policy question.

This is one facet of the larger question of the political circumstances which affect the likelihood of various manifestations of terrorism. It is widely observed that transnational terrorism is most likely to occur in Western democracies, though not in the United States (see Gurr 1979; Bell and Gurr 1979; Mickolus, Heyman and Schlotter 1980, 176; Cordes et al. 1984, 2-9). It is also the case that domestic oppositional terrorism is widespread in some autocratic and elitist political systems--though by no means all of them. The inference is that different types of terrorism are likely to characterize different types of political systems. Similarly, the specific characteristics of terrorist campaigns and their outcomes are likely to vary from one type of regime to another. Cross-national quantitative analysis is one though not the only technique suitable for studying these questions.

Longitudinal analysis is appropriate to the study of all the above aspects of terrorism in those individual countries where terrorist incidents
are common. There are many historical and interpretive studies of this sort. On the United States examples include Clarke's (1982) careful comparative study of assassinations (not necessarily "terroristic") and more general interpretive analyses by Bell and Gurr (1975), Homer (1979), and Johnpoll (1976). Such studies in effect are "country case studies" but few are systematic either in their use of data or of theoretical frameworks. Some country-specific data sets on terrorist incidents are reviewed in Schmidt (1983: 247-251). Wright (1981) has done a pioneering time-series analysis of data on sectarian and government violence in Northern Ireland from 1969 to 1976. It demonstrates the utility of several time-series techniques for the study of terrorism and,2 systematically, takes account of the complex relations between government coercion and oppositional violence. Unfortunately the study is inductive, rather than organized around a particular substantive or theoretical question, and as one consequence its results are very difficult to interpret much less apply. In general, the lack of systematic longitudinal analyses of terrorism in countries other than Northern Ireland can be blamed partly on the scarcity of reliable data, partly on scholarly inattention—but certainly not on lack of suitable methodologies.

The outcomes of terrorism is a subject on which very little national-level research has been done, systematically or otherwise. (For studies of incident outcomes see Part V. below.) Political terrorism is, after all, a purposive political strategy and all parties concerned presumably have an interest in a more precise understanding of its past and potential consequences. Both cross-national and longitudinal techniques are applicable to the topic. One difficulty is that systematic evaluations of the outcomes of political violence in general are a relatively new subject in conflict
analysis (see Gurr 1980b for a review). There are several distinct kinds of questions: whether the opposition group gains any of its objectives through violence; what kinds of policy changes (reforms, new coercive policies) are introduced in response to or in the aftermath of episodes of violence; and the more general effects of violence on society and economy.

One of the rare cross-national efforts to assess the utility of campaigns of political terrorism is Mack (1981), who uses five brief case studies. He concludes, inter alia, that anti-colonial terrorists have sometimes achieved their political purposes but that in Western democracies "revolutionary terrorism strengthens the very forces it seems to destroy" (1981: p. 216).

Another empirical approach is to look at the psychological effects of terrorism on its indirect or public targets. The nominal purpose of "terrorism" is to induce changes in the attitudes and political behavior of a wider audience: government officials, supporters of a regime, and larger publics. The question is whether it does so. Mack's analysis (1981) and more impressionistic evidence suggests otherwise. Low to medium levels of terrorism in Western societies appear to generate public hostility toward the perpetrators, as in the United States and West Germany. In Northern Ireland most people have adapted to living with the risk of chronic terror. Crelinsten has proposed the use of opinion surveys "to provide some measure of the extent of perceived terror, the effect of terror on basic values, and the effects of incidents on public pressure for government action" (1978: 121, cited in Warialp 1982: 163). Such studies would be most useful if carried provide some measure of the extent of perceived terror, the effect of terror on basic values, and the effects of incidents on public pressure for government action" (1978: 121, cited in Warialp 1982: 163).
intervals during and after a period of substantial terrorist activity. And they could be paralleled by more in-depth studies of official attitudes about the degree of threat and preferred responses.

It is essential to recognize, as Fromkin pointed out a decade ago, that terrorism is an indirect strategy "that wins or loses only in terms of how you respond to it" (1975: 69). This suggests again the need to examine carefully the effects of sustained terrorist contention on government policies, especially but not only in democracies. The Tupamaros' campaign of urban terrorism in Uruguay in the early 1970's led to the suspension of civil liberties and an end to democratic pretensions and the resort to new coercive policies that put an equality imperative on the Tupamaros (see Sloan 1979). Uruguay, however, offers the only contemporary case in which terrorism led to a structural change away from democracy. The prevailing response in Western democracies facing substantial terrorism has been to strengthen legal and police instrumentalities, not to suspend civil liberties or abolish democratic institutions. Arrests and prosecutions of terrorists have tended to increase as a consequence; whether harassment of nonviolent dissidents or other political abuses have also increased is a matter of dispute. This entire set of interrelated questions about the outcomes of terrorism is well worth careful comparative research, especially but not only in democratic societies. This is a basic causal model:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{increased} \quad \text{more restrictive} \quad \text{more political} \\
\text{terrorism} \quad \text{internal security} \quad \text{arrests, prosecutions} \\
\quad \text{policies} \\
\quad \text{decreases or increases} \\
in \text{terrorist incidents}.
\end{align*}
\]
increased public support for government?

increased public support for terrorist cause?

Which of the final outcomes is likely depends on a variety of factors which need specification: What kind of regime, facing what kinds of internal opposition? What kinds of more restrictive policies, and against whom are they used? A set of comparative and longitudinal case studies is the most promising way to begin research on the subject.

IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST GROUPS

Cross-national analysis (above) makes it possible to identify the kinds of countries and conflicts in which terrorism is likely to be used. At the group level of analysis the research questions are more narrowly focused. They also require a shift in perspective away from the search for abstract patterns in quantitative data. It is necessary, when dealing with specific groups and comparisons among them, to take a close and unbiased look at their situations, beliefs, strategic decisions, and internal dynamics. In other words such groups must be examined on their own terms, not merely as "security threats" but as organizations of real people, acting in concrete sociopolitical situations, with intense hopes and fears which the analyst must comprehend if s/he is to arrive at generalizations which have validity.

Socioeconomic Origins: What are the socioeconomic characteristics and political status of groups which are most likely to initiate terrorist
campaigns? What is the relative importance of hostilities based on religious and ethnic cleavages, group discrimination, economic inequalities, as motivations for terrorism.

Ideologies: What are the dominant themes in the ideologies of terrorist organizations? To what extent are their ideological views sharply distinct from political groups which do not resort to terrorist tactics?

Organization: What is the organizational structure of terrorist movements? How do their leaders exercise control and enforce discipline? How are decisions made about strategies and tactics?

International Linkages: What kinds of external encouragement and assistance are received by particular terrorist groups? What are the effects of external support on groups' strategies, tactics, and persistence?

Dynamics of Movements' Rise and Decline: What are the specific political circumstances in which groups choose terrorist tactics? Why do some groups persist in terrorist campaigns much longer than others? What conditions (concessions, repression, failure, exhaustion) lead to the disintegration of terrorist groups or basic shifts in strategies of political action?

Comparative case study is the ideal method for the analysis of these kinds of issues. By "comparative" I mean studies which use a common framework to study and contrast a number of groups. It is necessary to study several groups—the more the better, within the limit of resources—to ensure that a particular observed pattern or relationship is a common one rather than idiosyncratic to one group. Since there are enormous differences among groups using terrorist tactics, a necessary prior step to comparative analysis is to
categorize groups. Wilkinson (1979: 104) proposes a four-fold categorization that is a useful beginning point: (1) nationalist or ethnic minority movements; (2) ideological sects with revolutionary objectives; (3) exile or emigre groups with separatist or revolutionary goals in their country of origin; and (4) transnational groups with "world revolutionary" goals. We would expect that the origins, ideologies, organization, and dynamics of groups would vary systematically among these types. Merari (1978) has proposed a typology based on groups' "target population" and base of operations. Based on these distinctions, he specifies how goals and modes of operation are likely to vary among groups. Comparative case studies using such typologies could either be restricted to groups of one type (a "most similar cases" research design) or include cases of several or all types ("most different cases" design). The longer run objective is to do both, to maximize knowledge about similarities within types and similarities/differences among them.

It should be obvious case studies can do only as good as the information (data) available on units. There also are very substantial differences among case studies, which range from narrative description to rigorous theoretical analyses. Eckstein's 1975 essay on "Case Study and Theory in Political Science" makes a strong statement about how to do theoretically-guided case studies which should be required reading for anyone doing case studies of terrorist phenomena. Two examples of theoretically-guided case studies in conflict analysis are Weqse's comparative analysis (1969) of the causes of revolution in Brazil in 1964 and the Dominican Republic in 1965; and Dahlgren's retrospective study (1978) of the causes of the Chilean coup of 1973. Both studies made use of a theoretical model which required the authors
to make (that is, to code or estimate) data on a number of variables. Good case studies generally require more and better data than aggregate studies of patterns and trends.

The case-study literature on movements using terrorism is abundant. Comparative case studies which make systematic use of an analytic or theoretical framework are more rare. J. Bowyer Bell has written a series of excellent case studies (Bell 1974, 1976, 1978, 1979), some of them comparative, which are widely acknowledged for their "rare authenticity" (Schmidt 1983: 419). Bell knows his subjects well and communicates his understanding with great facility. But his studies also reflect an impatience with analytic frameworks and general theoretical questions, and as a consequence they contribute less than they could to cumulative knowledge and valid generalizations about terrorist movements. A contrasting approach is a recent, thus far unpublished study by Strinkowski (1985) of the organizational characteristics of three revolutionary terrorist movements: the IRA, the Irgun, and the Weather Underground. Strinkowski relies on secondary sources for an analytic comparison of these groups' processes of recruitment, decision-making, intelligence-gathering, operational control, and maintenance of internal discipline (for other relevant studies see Pike 1966, Bell 1974).

Much might be done to systematize information on terrorist movements. (1) One approach is to collect and code information on all oppositional groups which have used terrorist tactics. The intelligence community has such information but it is not publicly accessible. Researchers relying on news sources have compiled lists of groups involved in political violence, some narrow and some broad (for example Mickolus 1979, 170-176; Jongman 1983). Mickolus's list consists of groups which claimed responsibility for incidents...
and categorizes the incidents, but the published version provides no substantive information on the groups other than their names. Jongman's "directory" is the most comprehensive, identifying some 1500 groups and parties which have been either initiators or targets of "armed violence," but it is indiscriminately broad and relatively little information is provided (in the published compilation) on each group. Virtually none of the questions about terrorist groups at the head of this section could be answered using this compilation. (2) A second approach, not yet put in practice to my knowledge, would codify the information from in-depth case studies (such as those by Bell) in accordance with a general analytic scheme that specified theoretically-relevant variables and coding categories. The information bank might be structured similarly to the Human Relations Area Files—a codified set of information on world cultures derived from the field research of anthropologists. An information bank of this sort on terrorist movements would be far more selective than "directories" in its coverage of groups, but would characterize each in far greater depth.

A major component in any comparative analysis of terrorist groups is a careful dissection of their ideologies. A useful categorization of their ideologies is proposed by Lopez (1982, pp. 4-5): (1) minority nationalism, (2) social anarchism, (3) revolutionary Marxism, (4) "New Left" syndicalism, and (5) reactionary neo-fascism. The nature of ideological appeals influences who is attracted to a group and its potential for gathering widespread support. For example, minority nationalism has considerably greater potential appeal and potential staying-power in most multiethnic societies than, say, social anarchism. Since radical ideologies embody conceptions of the ideal society and identify those who stand in the way of its realization, they
structure the general strategies of conflict. The strategic and tactical elements of ideology also help determine how movements are organized and their choices of targets (see Merari 1978). Evidence about these components of ideology can be found in most good case studies of terrorist movements. The ideologies of left-wing terrorists in West Germany have been evaluated at great length in the first of five volumes on Analyse zum Terrorismus issued by the Minister of Internal Affairs (Fetscher and Konrader 1981). What is lacking is systematic and comparative content analysis of terrorist doctrines and how they affect support, persistence, organization, strategies, and targets.

There is also much that could be done using cross-national analysis to identify the kinds of groups most likely to initiate cycles of political violence generally and terrorism in particular. A number of empirical studies have shown that ethnic, regional, and religious minorities are disproportionately involved in rebellions, civil wars, and revolutionary movements (see Barrows 1976, Gurr and Lichbach 1979, Rabushka and Snepsle 1972). This is particularly true of minorities (and subjugated minorities) which are the objects of more or less systematic discrimination by dominant groups. Some of these groups, not all of them, respond by mounting campaigns of terrorism. Cross-national research on the correlates of past and present conflict should make it possible to specify which kinds of minorities, in which kinds of socioeconomic conditions, and in response to what kinds of political circumstances, have high potential for future terrorism. This research should have at least one result of direct policy relevance: it would make it possible to construct profiles of potentially terrorist groups which are analogous to individual-level profiles of potential skyjackers (Pickrel
The dynamics of groups' involvement in terrorist activities pose a large set of questions, some of them summarized at the beginning of this section, which appear not to have been studied at all in the literature on oppositional terrorism. It is worth elaborating on them here. Only some groups with revolutionary or separatist objectives rely primarily on terrorist strategies, and many of them have a history of using other kinds of political action. There are nonviolent as well as violent means toward these political ends, and also alternative violent means: coups d'état, urban uprisings, protracted guerrilla warfare. So in what circumstances are decisions made to use terrorism? Let me propose two sharply distinct etiologies: (1) Relatively large, widely-supported groups involved in long-term conflict make strategic shifts from other modes of political action to campaigns of terrorism. (2) Small groups, newly established or breakaways from older groups—including many of Wilkinson's "ideological sects"—choose terrorist strategies from the outset. The factors relevant to a general explanation of such strategic choices include the size and organization of the groups, their ideologies, the extent of their potential public support, external influence and support, the results of their previous political actions, and the opportunities inherent in the policies and weakness or strength of their governmental opponents.

The dynamics of group persistence and decline are equally complex. We need to know more about why terrorism is persistent and recurring among groups such as the Catholics in Northern Ireland, the Basques of Spain, and the revolutionary left in post-war West Germany; yet has been short-lived and easily suppressed among similarly-situated groups such as the Quebecois in Canada, separatists in the South Tyrol, and the revolutionary left in the
United States. Only part of the answer lies in government strategies of concession and coercion. The grievances, ideologies, and organization of the groups are equally relevant; so are broad patterns of public support and opposition for the cause.

Parallel to this general analysis of movements is the need for more fine-grained study of sequences of actions and counteractions. Terrorist tactics, like all other kinds of political action, involve a learning process (see Pitcher and Hamblin 1982). The issue for research is to determine how the consequences of particular episodes affect future tactics, including decisions about whether to persist with terrorism or to shift to other strategies.

In brief, to study the dynamics of the onset and decline of terrorist campaigns requires systematic research on almost all the more specific questions and issues raised at the group level of analysis.

V. THE ANALYSIS OF INCIDENTS

Many aspects of the study of terrorist incidents have already been considered. The study of sequences of incidents in their political context is part of the analysis of the group dynamics of terrorist movements. The study of the trends and diffusion of incidents in the aggregate is essential to the mapping of global and national patterns of terror. At issue here is the information sought through the comparative analysis of specific incidents.

Targets: What are the most likely and vulnerable targets of terrorist incidents? How can they be "hardened," or the risks to individuals
minimized?

**Incident Outcomes:** What are the outcomes of terrorist incidents? What kinds of outcomes or responses minimize the likelihood that incidents will be repeated or imitated?

**Negotiations:** What are the sequences of action in barricade and hostage-taking situations? What negotiating strategies by authorities minimize the risks to hostages?

**The Media:** What are the effects of the mass media’s treatment of terrorist incidents on public attitudes and on the contagion of terrorism?

These are among the most thoroughly studied questions in the empirical literature on oppositional terrorism. With regard to the study of targets, for example, Fattah (1981) has proposed a general typology, Shaw et al. (1977) discuss approaches to analyzing the extent of threat, and Karber and Mengel (1978) develop a conceptual framework for the study of terrorism targeted at the nuclear industry (Karber and Mengel 1978; see also Mullen 1980). There are also a variety of technical studies aimed at enhancing the physical security of specific kinds of targets (for brief reviews see Wardlaw 1982, 166-170; and Mickoijus, Heyman and Schlotter 1980, 176-177). Empirical research, however, is limited mainly to macroanalysis of types of targets in incidents of transnational terrorism (see Section II above) and to intensive microstudies aimed at protecting particular types of targets such as nuclear installations, commercial aircraft, and business executives. This leaves largely unstudied a broad middle range of questions. What kinds of targets are chosen by different kinds of terrorist groups? This issue is best studied at the national level of analysis, using data on both domestic and
transnational incidents (Part III above). A more narrowly focused question concerns the ways in which existing terrorist groups have altered their choices of targets in response to changing opportunities and risks. This is a topic best examined as part of the comparative analysis of groups (Part IV).

The pioneering empirical research on outcomes has been carried out by Brian Jenkins and his associates at the Rand Corporation, including studies of 63 kidnaping and barricade incidents between 1968 and 1974 and 48 embassy takeovers between 1971-80 (Jenkins 1980). They make it possible to estimate the terrorists’ likelihood of success and the results of various tactical responses. These studies are limited to transnational incidents, however. Assessment of patterns in the outcomes of domestic terrorist incidents should be a key objective in future data-collection efforts.

At the micro-level there is a great deal of lore and expertise on the conduct of negotiations in hostage-taking incidents. Some of this is derived from Rand’s comparative studies of incidents (for example Jenkins, Johnson and Ronfeldt 1977). Most of the literature is based on close observation of a relatively small number of cases and consists of prescriptions about negotiating tactics. Miller’s analyses are particularly well-grounded in case studies and first-hand observation (1979, 1980). Simulation is another approach, developed by Sloan (1980, 1981) to train potential negotiators to understand the dynamics of hostage-taking situations. The principal methodological criticism to be made of studies and prescriptions based on observation concerns the nonrepresentativeness of the cases from which the generalizations are derived. Clearly the effectiveness of different kinds of negotiating strategies depends on the psychological traits and political objectives of the parties there. It is also influenced by the cultural
backgrounds of perpetrators and negotiators. My suggestion for improved knowledge of hostage-taking situations is that comparative studies be carried out (using information on real episodes and simulations) of a substantial and representative sample of incidents, domestic and transnational. Wherever possible such studies should develop information (by retrospective interviews) with actors on both sides of the incident, including hostages and perpetrators as well as authorities.

Methods and frameworks used for analyzing the role of communications in the terrorism process are largely outside the scope of this paper. The flow of information about terrorist incidents is relevant to a number of the levels of analysis considered here. There is first the immediate, incident- and group-specific level of analysis: how the media treat the actions and demands of perpetrators in a particular episode. A comparative analysis of the Western media’s portrayal of terrorist incidents and purposes is Schmid and de Graaf (1982). One contingent question is what the consequences are for mass opinion: the extent of public knowledge about the initiators, and affective changes—whether of sympathy or antipathy toward the perpetrators, or a more generalized state of fear or anger. This is a question best treated at the national level of analysis, using opinion survey techniques, as Crelinsten has proposed (1978). A very different question concerns national and transnational contagion: the extent to which widely-publicized tactics and ideologies of terrorist movements strike a respondent chord among dissident groups or hostile loners elsewhere. Redlick (1979) has developed a conceptual argument about the transnational flow of information about terrorism and its effects on political action elsewhere. The statistical studies of diffusion, cited above (Part II), assume but do not test directly for the existence of such effects.
For general commentaries on the communication of information on terrorism see Schmid and de Graaf 1982; Schmid 1983, pp. 219-224; and Wardlaw 1982, pp. 76-86.

VI. THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL OF ANALYSIS

Some research at the national, group, and incident levels of analysis rests on crucial assumptions about the psyches of people involved in terrorism or affected by it. Potential terrorists are usually assumed to be motivated by ideological beliefs and to make rationalistic choices about strategies and tactics. Hostage-takers are expected to respond in predictable ways to the strategems of negotiators. Audiences are assumed to be informed, angered, frightened, or perhaps merely titillated by news of terrorist episodes. The only direct way to test the accuracy of any of these assumptions is to gather information directly at the individual level. These are some of the crucial questions raised in the literature.

Recruitment and Training: which kinds of individuals, from what backgrounds, are most susceptible to joining organizations using political violence? How are they recruited and socialized into the group? How are inhibitions against taking high risks or using personal violence overcome?

Motivations: What is the relative importance of perceived deprivation, rational choice, the belief in group solidarity in motivating members of terrorist groups? What are the differences in the psychological traits,
perceptions, and motives of leaders v. rank-and-file v. sympathizers?

Hostages: What are the psychological effects of being held hostage?

The motivational question is paramount because it underlies individuals' decisions about joining terrorist groups and their behavior once they are members. It is necessary to abandon at the outset a priori assumptions that all terrorists are mentally unstable, or victims of oppression, or agents of international conspiracies. Such ideologically derived assumptions predetermine the choice of evidence and as such are worse than useless guides to empirical research.

We should also be prepared to jettison some pet theoretical propositions, to the effect that all participants in political violence are motivated by discontent (Gurr 1970) or the rational pursuit of self-interest (Tilly 1978). It is more plausible, and fruitful for empirical research, to posit three general kinds of dispositions to political action: (1) a reactive disposition which is a response to perceived deprivation and threat; (2) a normative disposition which is a function of cultural experience, social beliefs (including ideologies) and peer reinforcement; and (3) a utilitarian disposition which is based on calculated assessment of the potential gains and risks of alternative courses of actions. The critical theoretical and empirical question is the relative importance of these kinds of dispositions for individuals in organizations using violence. The answers are variable: they will differ for any given individual in the course of his or her career in the organization, and will be influenced by his or her position in the organization. And the modal dispositions (their relative importance as well as their content) will differ among terrorist organizations and at different
points in their organizational life-cycles.

Methods for eliciting this kind of information are well established in the behavioral sciences but active members of violent political organizations are rarely willing to submit to systematic observation, structured interviews, or projective tests. Prospective and retrospective research is somewhat more promising. Survey techniques have been adapted to the study of samples of people with high levels of political activism, for example riot observers and participants in U.S. cities in the 1960s (for example Sears and McConkey 1973) and radical activists in contemporary West Germany (Müller and Göp forthcoming). Such studies can provide information on the dispositions prevailing in groups from which violent activists are most likely to be recruited.

The most detailed and focused information on terrorists, guerrilla fighters, and other users of violence comes from personal statements, interviews and autobiographies. Occasionally active revolutionaries have been studied, for example Soto's intensive analysis (1967) of a young Venezuelan revolutionary—a young man who had not yet been involved in violence. Some violent activists chronicle their ideas and activities in forms that eventually are accessible to behavioral scientists; a study which uses such materials is Helen 1974, but there it usually an element of self-justification in such statements and they seldom are revealing about day-to-day doubts and decisions (an exception is Quevra's diary of his Bolivian campaign 1968). Imprisoned terrorists and revolutionaries also can be interviewed, for example Neutzen's in-depth study of a Croatian ghoulacker (1981). Mori's interviews with imprisoned members of the Canadian FLN (1970), and Fire's research in active members of the Viet Cong (1966). Other
terrorists have written memoirs that can be used in secondary analysis: a half-dozen examples are cited in Schmidt 1983, pp. 270-271.

Research based on retrospective interviews and memoirs also is open to criticism because of the small numbers of subjects, doubts about their veracity, and the fact that they are not representative, either of the range of membership within particular organizations or of different types of groups using terrorism. Nonetheless the psychologically-informed analysis of this kind of individual data provides a degree of understanding that is inaccessible by any other research technique. And the results of such analysis are devastating to simplistic theories about the motivations, psychodynamics and personality types of members of terrorist and revolutionary groups (e.g. Kaplan 1978, Strentz 1981).

An alternative approach which has the advantage of generalizability is the "profile study" based on biographical and observable personal characteristics of a particular type of violent activist. One example is the FAA's work in developing a profile of potential skyjackers based on identification of traits of known skyjackers (Pickrel 1977; Schultz 1980, pp. 24-25). A second example is Russell and Miller's (1977) compilation of information on some 350 "known terrorists" from 18 groups active in different world regions. They use the data to portray the modal demographic characteristics, social background, education, recruitment, and political philosophies of their subjects.

These last two approaches--in-depth psychological analysis of individual terrorists and biographical profiles of large numbers of them--potentially complement one another. What is lacking, in general and in most of the studies cited, is the use of a conceptual framework that would make it
possible to structure and cumulate the information. Such individual-level research should be explicitly designed to provide answers to the kinds of questions raised here and at the group level of analysis: the kinds of social situations from which potential terrorists are recruited, their dispositions to action and how they change over time, the factors which influence their decisions and actions while members of violent organizations.

The three different kinds of dispositions identified above--reactive, normative, utilitarian--could provide the basis for part of a conceptual framework. Let me propose a specific theoretical argument as an an example of its utility. The proposal is that recruitment to terrorist activities proceeds through three stages. (1) At the first stage an existing organization which advocates political violence attracts potential recruits from young people in groups which already have intense grievances--an ethnic or religious minority, unemployed university graduates. Their grievances and the vague expectation that revolutionary action will resolve them provide the primary motivation for joining. (2) During the second stage, new members are socialized into the organization's goals and subjected to encouragement and pressure from new friends to accept the group's control of their lives. Normative dispositions become the major source of continued commitment, and alternatively of decisions to leave the organization at this stage. Peer pressures are also critical in inducting new members into acts of violence. (3) After the threshold of violence has been passed, however, the utilitarian mode of behavior becomes increasingly important. That is, members continue to carry out the group's missions both because of their commitment to the group--which is increasingly difficult to leave--and because they are persuaded, by leaders and by their own estimations, that the acts are
instrumental to the group's goals. This rationalistic mode of thought is likely to be dominant among leaders, in fact is one of the traits which determines tactical success and promotion of individuals into leadership positions.

This very general model of motivation and recruitment may prove accurate for some kinds of groups and individuals, not for others. The point is that this model, or others like it, should be used to structure the collection and interpretation of psychological evidence on violent activities from a variety of sources. It illustrates once again a point made at the beginning of the paper, that questions and theoretical framework should guide the collection and analysis of information.

Research on the psychological consequences of being taken hostage is considerably simpler than research on the motivations of the perpetrators because most hostages survive, most are willing to be interviewed, and many need and seek psychiatric help (see for example Ochberg et al. 1982, Miller 1980, and empirical work by Fields 1981). Interviews with victims can be instructive about the process of terrorization, i.e., its effects on target audiences. Its only potential utility for aiding our knowledge of terrorists is to provide information about how one distinctive type of terrorist acts under stress. I do not know of any published studies which make systematic use of information gathered from hostages to develop profiles or models of hostage-takers' behavior.

VII. CONCLUSIONS: A PRESCRIPTION FOR BETTER RESEARCH
The research questions raised in this paper are considerably more interesting and provocative than the empirically-based evidence to be found in the literature. With two kinds of exceptions there is an appalling lack of empirically-grounded research on oppositional terrorism. The exceptions are the incident-based analyses of transnational terrorism (mainly the work of Jenkins, Mickolus and their collaborators) and case studies of a few revolutionary and terrorist movements (to which Bell is the leading contributor). The paucity of systematic research on terrorism contrasts starkly with the abundant literature on international conflict, political protest, revolution, and coups (see the reviews in Gurr 1980 and Zimmermann 1983). While there is a great deal of speculative commentary about oppositional and state terrorism, and some attention to theorizing and conceptualization, there is little social-scientific or historical analysis of reliable evidence, and some of what has been published would not meet minimum research standards in the more established branches of conflict analysis.

I do not think that the problems of inadequate research on oppositional terrorism can be blamed on the lack of researchable questions or appropriate methodologies. Nor should it be attributed to a lack of social scientific talent: some very competent researchers have worked on aspects of the subject. In my view there are two more fundamental problems, one having to do with the ways in which the purpose of research on terrorism has been defined, the other with the lack of sufficient data.

The problem with regard to research purposes is that most research on oppositional terrorism aims principally at prophylaxis: how to control and respond to terrorists and terrorism. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with that objective, but in practice it has subtly but persistently distorted the
research process. Rather than doing hard and careful research on the etiology of terrorism, most researchers—including many of those doing empirical work—devote their attention to examining its trends, effects (outcomes, victims, media attention), and how best to respond (scenarios of hostage negotiation, analysis of national and international policies). In the language of social scientific analysis, most systematic research on terrorism treats groups and incidents as "independent variables" rather than "dependent variables" and focuses on their traits and consequences rather than their causes. To draw an analogy from medicine, another field of applied research, it is as if medical researchers were to concentrate their efforts on the epidemiology and treatment of disease without studying its causes. It is possible through systematic observation of the spread of diseases (or terrorist tactics) and how they respond to different treatments (or government policies) to arrive at some useful generalizations. But prevention and optimally effective "treatment" both require a reasonably complete and detailed understanding of etiology.

The other problem is the lack of enough reliable data for the analysis of the entire range of questions about terrorism: etiology, processes, and outcomes. Repeatedly in this paper I have referred to important issues that cannot be researched adequately because no one has invested the time and resources in compiling the necessary kinds of information. Let me highlight some of the omissions:

There are no current datasets on incidents of domestic terrorism. As a consequence there can be no analyses of their trends, diffusion, or of the relations between transnational and domestic conflicts.
There are no datasets which provide systematic information about the identities and characteristics of groups which use terrorist strategies. As a result we cannot specify with any precision what kinds of groups are most likely to use terror, or the circumstances in which opposition groups shift toward or away from the use of terror, or trace and compare the life-cycles of violent political groups.

There are no datasets with coded information on the outcomes of terrorist campaigns or on government responses to episodes of domestic terrorism. Therefore it is not possible to anticipate the effects of success or failure on terrorist groups, nor to test the effects of different kinds of government policies toward domestic terrorism.

There is no systematic compilation of information from case studies about ideologies, recruitment practices, organization, decision-making, or command and control in violent political groups. Therefore the ways in which they operate and how they are likely to respond to changing circumstances and counter-terror policies is largely a matter of speculation.

There is no system for cumulating information on the psychological characteristics, recruitment, and careers of members of terrorist movements. Therefore we have only impressionistic evidence about the kinds of people likely to join and lead terrorist organizations, and the kinds of incentives and threats which might induce them to alter their behavior.

One major recommendation follows directly from this analysis. There is a compelling need to establish procedures for the collection, codification, and
analysis of basic information on domestic and transnational terrorism. Such data should be gathered globally, for all countries and world regions. The procedures should be designed with the collaboration of a number of researchers who have done basic and applied research on the subject. The data should relate to four different levels of analysis: individual, incident, group, and national. The data should be gathered and codified as an ongoing activity, with simultaneous (re)coding of the same kinds of information back into the recent past (at least to 1968). The operation should be established in a non-governmental research center or institute, insulated from direct involvement in policy-making or operations. The institute should have its own research staff and visiting scholars. And its reports and codified information should be publically available to all researchers interested in the analysis of terrorism.
NOTES

1. Two recent surveys of empirical conflict research provide numerous examples of analytic techniques: Gurr 1980 and Zimmermann 1983. For detailed illustrations of the application of quantitative methods to problems of interest to intelligence analysts see Heuer 1978.

2. J. Bowyer Bell contends that, given the inadequacies of hard data on terrorism, case studies are to be preferred to quantitative comparative studies. See the discussion of case studies as a method for analysis of groups, below.

3. In Hickolus's usage terror is transnational "when, through the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its location, the nature of its institutional or human victims, or the mechanics of its resolution its ramifications transcend national boundaries" (1979: 148). He reserves the term "international" for transnational terrorism by groups controlled by sovereign states. Since such control is often unknowable (even to intelligence agencies), this paper uses the term transnational to refer to all political terrorism which involves (in Hickolus's sense) nationals of more than one state. A more narrow and seemingly precise definition is used in the Rand chronology, where international terrorism is defined "as incidents in which terrorists go abroad to strike their targets....It excludes violence carried out by terrorists within their own country against their own nationals, and terrorism perpetrated by governments against their own nationals" (Cordes et al. 1984, p. 1). The difference between these two definitions is at least partly responsible for the differences in aggregate numbers of terrorist events and deaths identified in the two sources (see Wardlaw 1982: 51-52). It
is clear from a comparison of the two definitions, and from common sense, that the international dimension or implications of terrorist acts is a variable. Disagreements about precise boundaries distract attention from more fundamental questions: What conditions influence the degree to which terrorism is transnational? And to what extent are domestic and transnational terror (however defined) similar or different in their dynamics? Of course these questions cannot be studied systematically by limiting data collections to incidents defined a priori as transnational.

4. This is not a criticism of ITERATE II or the Rand chronology. The point is that since they were designed to serve specific research purposes, particularly analysis of trends and characteristics of incidents, they are not well-suited to the analysis of some other kinds of questions, in particular the analysis of political context and causations.

5. One example of a theoretically-guided application of factor analysis is Rummel's pioneering study (1963) of the dimensions of internal and external conflict. An example of a "question-first" application of Markovian analysis (and other probability models) is Midlarsky, Crenshaw, and Yoshida's study of the contagion of terrorist acts (1980).

6. Let me make explicit several conceptual points which underlie this discussion: I regard terrorist incidents as tactics used in conflicts within countries and among them. This paper is concerned with oppositional terror, which is to say the use of terror against governments and other politically dominant groups. The tactic is not inherently revolutionary and is in fact used in the pursuit of a great many different kinds of political objectives (see Gurr 1979 for relevant empirical evidence). "Terrorism" is a doctrine about the efficacy of sudden, dramatic, and life-threatening violence for
inducing political change, and a strategy of political action which embodies that doctrine. Particular oppositional groups may rely exclusively on terrorist tactics—i.e., a strategy of terrorism—or use them occasionally along with other tactics, as many guerrilla movements do, or use them not at all. In conventional usage a "terrorist group" is any oppositional group which uses dramatic episodes of violence for political purposes. This obscures the very substantial differences among violence-prone opposition groups in their preferences about strategies and tactics. Some rely mainly on terrorist tactics, others do so only occasionally (see the discussion of the group level of analysis in Part IV, below).

7. An uncommon exception was the Canadian federal government's use of emergency powers in 1970-71 in response to terrorism by the Quebec Liberation Front (FLQ). The federal government of West Germany, where oppositional terrorism has been far greater than in Canada, has enacted a variety of anti-terrorist measures which according to Wardlaw "together probably amount to the most repressive anti-terrorist legislation in existence in a liberal democracy" (1982: 121).

8. For critiques of the "mental instability" approach to explaining the behavior of assassins and terrorists see Clarke 1982 and Corrado 1981. Representative of the psychodynamic approach is Kaplan 1978, which incorporates a more sophisticated version of the same kind of fallacy: that all people using terror have the same personality traits, including lack of self esteem and pursuit of absolute ends.

9. I assume but do not know that intelligence and law enforcement agencies have gathered some of the kinds of information listed here. Even if they have it is largely irrelevant for the research community, in part because
they collect information to fit their operational needs, not analysts' research designs; and, more important, because the information is ordinarily inaccessible to anyone outside the agencies.
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STATES, TERRORISM, AND STATE TERRORISM:
THE ROLE OF THE SUPERPOWERS

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...the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.

Thucydides
404 B.C.

There are no rules in [this ] game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the US is to survive, longstanding American concepts of "fair play" must be reconsidered. We must develop effective espionage and counterespionage services and must learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated, and more effective methods than those used against us. It may become necessary that the American people be made acquainted with, understand and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy.

Report of the United States Hoover Commission
1950

Terror is an outstanding mode of conflict in localized primitive wars; and unilateral violence has been used to subdue satellite countries, occupied countries or dissident groups within a dictatorship.

Thomas Schelling 1966

I. INTRODUCTION

This paper explores the context within which we may understand the persistence of state and in particular, superpower, violence and terrorism in domestic and international affairs. This analysis begins with an examination of the assumptions which underlie the traditional approach to the question of the state as actor in international relations. An expected utility approach to the choice of terrorist strategies and a brief introduction to the range of choices available to states in their international affairs follows. The relationship
between the structure of the state system and the role of violence in politics is then considered. Next, propositions which characterize the post World War II world as they apply to state behavior in the international system are presented. The fourth section discusses the basic patterns of superpower terrorist behavior in the international context. The final section of the chapter explores some possible options with which to break the persistence of the patterns of state terrorism discussed previously. This paper thus does not actually count events and test predictions of actual patterns. This task is sidestepped because there currently does not exist a comprehensive data set from which to draw such information (see Mitchell et al 1985, forthcoming for an analysis of the difficulties of creating such a data source).

The United States and the Soviet Union are the focus of analysis because (1) they have the greatest capability for and interest in the use of terrorism in the world; (2) they "set" the ground rules, the standards by which behaviors are judged, and by their behaviors legitimate behaviors within the international system; and (3) we know most about their behaviors, particularly about the United States.

Two primary questions underlie the analysis in this paper:

1. Why do states act as or support terrorists?
2. What can be done to raise the costs and lower the benefits of terrorist activities?

At this point it is useful to state that I have taken seriously the biblical injunction, invoked by the most prominent
political realist of our time, Hans Morgenthau, to speak truth to power. In the pages that follow, behaviors of the United States are discussed and evaluated as if these behaviors were performed by "any" nation and quite often compared with similar behaviors of the Soviet Union. At times U.S. terrorist behaviors are seen to be more extensive than other nations. It should be clear that this evaluation does not imply that Soviet terror is thereby less unacceptable. Criticism of the United States behavior in this area does not imply that the adversaries of the United States are favored or excused. Following the insights of Thomas Schelling (1966:16-17), the position taken throughout this paper is that whether the terrorism undertaken by governments saves lives or wastes them, American lives or the lives of our adversaries; whether punitive coercive violence is uglier than straightforward military force or more civilized; whether terror is more or less humane than military destruction; we can at least perceive that the actions that are being described are concerned with the manipulation of violence and the threat of pain and the promise of more. To understand why others confront us with this threat it is useful to look at how we and our major adversary employ this tool of the foreign policy arsenal.

While the following is not an examination of tactics and resources, it is a useful reminder as we consider state terrorism that while we recognize that terrorism has become simpler for insurgents because of advances in transport, communication, weaponry, electronic devices and access to the media, the resources of the state allow it to make far better use of these developments than can individuals. In addition, as the following
pages make clear, groups whose abilities have been enhanced by the above mentioned advances are also employed or utilized by the state for the state's purposes.

II. PERSISTENT ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE STATE, VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM

A. STATES

The dominant traditions and beliefs as to the proper role of states and state authorities that make decisions on their behalf, provide the context within which we commence our exploration of the persistence of patterns of state terrorism and state violence. Whether the analysis commences within the Hegelian or the utilitarian tradition in the modern era, it is quite common for it to end by exempting the state, and derivatively its agents from moral obligations. Walzer refers to this problem as the problem of Dirty Hands, the concept deriving its label from Sartre's play of that name.

It means that a particular act of government (in a political party or in the state) may be exactly the right thing to do in utilitarian terms and yet leave the man who does it guilty of a moral wrong. (Walzer, 1974:63).

While the utilitarian perspective on the state discusses the question of moral requirements, the tradition beginning with Hegel concludes that the state has no moral obligation. Cassirer argues:

Hegel exempted the state from all moral obligations and declared that the rules of morality lose their pretended universality when we proceed from the problems of private life and private conduct to the conduct of states... (Cassirer, 1946:265).

Officials of the state are thereby, both in their own view and in
the view of most observers, insulated from the moral requirements their actions might carry if they were acting as private citizens.

...the freedom from all restraints devolves on the central decision makers from a higher authority, the state, of which he is merely the servant (Kelman, 1973:45).

These freedoms from restraint are most often invoked on questions of national security. National Security is, of course, a familiar, if often abused, concept. Most international relations texts, particularly those in the realist tradition, introduce students to the concept in the first few pages. In these pages students learn that all nations have a common interest in the preservation of core values. These core values usually include protection from invasion and economic security. The ideal nation-state of the textbook world rests on the assumption that there exists fundamental consensus on the legitimacy of the state and its component parts. But not all states are stable. In the contemporary era most states are in fact fragile with an absence of consensus on fundamental values. Rulers of such states often define national security in a more inclusive manner than is suggested by the discussions concerning the traditional states of the texts. These rulers are not simply interested in the realist requirement of preserving the state, but also the current regime in power in such states.

Security, ... has traditionally been defined as the protection and preservation of core values. However in the case of most Third World States, the core values of the regime—with self preservation at the core of the core—are often at extreme variance with the
core values cherished by large segments of the population over which they rule (Ayoob, 1984:46).

Fragile state elites thus define national security as involving threats to their own rule. In authoritarian systems, which are also quite often fragile systems, rulers quite often adopt policies of terror to remain in power (see Perlmutter, 1981:20).

Ayoob (1984) also discusses the process whereby fragile regimes in the Third World transform political problems into military threats and thus subjects amenable to policies appropriate for threats to national security.

By turning a political (and quite often social and economic) problem into a military one, and by presenting the military threat as coming from external sources, regimes in the Third World quite often try to choose an arena of confrontation with domestic dissidents that is favorable to themselves, namely the military arena...political contests become, quite literally, life and death issues for the contestants (Ayoob, 1984:44-45).

When the violence of such terror tactics increases to the point that the aim is no longer coercion and intimidation, but rather elimination, the tactic is no longer terror but genocide. Genocide is not state terrorism because it does not seek to influence actors' behavior but rather to eliminate the actors. The aims of the two strategies of rule are often similar, however. Rulers employ the strategy which they consider useful to create a secure state. For example Horowitz (1976:189-190) argues:

Genocide is a fundamental mechanism for the unification of the national state. That is why it is so widely practiced in "advanced" and civilized areas, and why it is so difficult to eradicate.
Rubenstein (1975:91) adds:

Thus the Holocaust bears witness to the advance of civilization. I repeat, to the advance of civilization, to the point at which large scale massacre is no longer a crime and the state's sovereign powers are such that millions can be stripped of their rights and condemned to the world of the living dead.

As Horowitz (1976) argues, genocide and other instances of mass murder are common. These instances, which should in Michael Walzer's words, "shock the moral conscience of mankind" often fail to do so or take so long to shock us that millions perish before we react. The failure of the members of the state system to respond to genocidal states and mass murder within states allows the rulers of fragile states to ignore the possible costs of outside interference in their decisions (see the discussion of response and production costs below).

B. EXPECTED UTILITY: A COST-BENEFIT APPROACH TO STATE TERRORISM

Before discussing the conditions under which governments choose to employ strategies and tactics which involve violence and terrorism it is useful to clarify how I use these concepts. Violence will be defined in accordance with the liberal tradition as an act of physical harm. Terrorism will be considered as the:

The purposeful act or threat of the act of violence to create fear and/or compliant behavior in a victim and/or audience of the act or threat (Stohl,1984a:42).

An important key to the understanding of how terrorism differs from "ordinary" political violence is to recognize that in terrorism the act or the threat of the act of violence is but the first step. Terror is purposeful behavior designed to influence
targets beyond the direct victims of the violent act. It is a conscious strategy or tactic of influence and not merely death and destruction. The violence of terror seeks to influence others' behaviors not merely to eliminate victims.

Duvall and Stohl (1983:202) argue that an expectancy X value theory or expected utility model is useful for understanding a government's choice of terrorism as a tactic or strategy in domestic affairs. It may also be usefully applied to choices in international affairs. We argue that this utility theory may be expressed as:

\[ U_i = P_i (B - C_i) \]

where \( U_i \) is the expected utility from engaging in action \( i \), \( B \) is the benefit received from the desired state of affairs, \( P_i \) is the believed probability with which action \( i \) will bring about the desired state of affairs and \( C_i \) is the believed probable cost of engaging in action \( i \).

We argued that states might choose terrorism paradoxically both when they perceived themselves powerless--the sense that other instruments of rule were unavailable or less useful--and when they were in a situation of which we labeled confident strength--when the costs were perceived as low and the probability of success believed high in relation to other means. These calculations may, of course, be extended to the state's choice of other violent as well as non-violent strategies as well.

Further we argued that two kinds of costs, response costs and productions costs, can be distinguished. Response costs are
those costs which might be imposed by the target group and/or sympathetic or offended bystanders. The bystanders in the foreign policy realm may include domestic and foreign audiences, while the target in international as in domestic affairs may be wider than the attacking party may have planned.

Production costs are the costs of taking the action regardless of the reactions of others. In addition to the economic costs--paying the participants, buying the weapons and the like, there is the psychological cost of behaving in a manner which most individuals would, under normal conditions, characterize as unacceptable.

Discussing this problem in reference to domestic policy, Duvall and Stohl (1983:209) argued that the psychological costs that an actor can expect from perpetrating violence on an incidental, instrumental, victim involve two conjoining factors. The first factor is the extent to which human life is valued (or conversely, the strength of internalized prohibitions against violence in general). The second is the extent to which the victim can be or has been dehumanized in the mind of the violent actor. Where moral / normative prohibitions are weak and especially where victims can be viewed in other than human terms, the self-imposed costs of terrorist actions are apt to be low and hence the choice of terrorist actions more frequent.

Further we argued that the extent to which victims and potential victims can be dehumanized is affected by two important variables (for an extended discussion of this point see the seminal piece by Herbert Kelman, 1973). The first is the perceived social distance between the government and the victim.
population. The second is the extent to which action is routinely and bureaucratically authorized, so that personal responsibility is perceived, by all actors in the decisional chain, to be avoided. These production costs for terrorist action are apt to be lower for governments (a) in a conflict situation with those they define as "inferior," and/or (b) with a highly bureaucratized coercive machinery.

In the international realm these two important variables are often maximized. When inhibitions are lowered, it is easier for governments to employ terrorist strategies. The two superpowers, operating within a bipolar system, have created an overarching set of assumptions in which other nations and their peoples are defined as less important than the maintenance of the status quo itself. It is no longer necessary to perceive such peoples as racially or culturally inferior (although of course that is still part of the unspoken equation), rather these considerations are dismissed as less important than the survival of "The Free World", "The Socialist Community of Nations", or "The International System."

C. The State System

The dominant assumptions about the operation of the state system have derived from the realist school of international relations. This vision suggests that states reside within an international system which is akin to the Hobbesian state of nature, with both lacking "a political authority sufficiently powerful to assure people security and the means to have a felicitous life Beitz, 1979:21). "Thus states have the right (and
the responsibility in the realist tradition) to do what they must
to preserve their existence and may expect other states to behave
in the same manner. Charles Beitz argues that Hans Morgenthau,
the leading realist scholar of the past half century, seems to
claim that "a state's pursuit of its own interests justifies
disregard for moral standards that would otherwise constrain its
action (Beitz, 1979:21)."

Instability both within the international system and within
the member states remains a constant threat to the state within
the realist tradition. Realists believe that the state has the
obligation to bring order to the system and also to its component
state units. Statesmen reared in the realist tradition thus
prefer order to justice and thus

...when facing Goethe's dilemma- the choice
between justice and disorder on the one hand
and injustice and order on the other have
tended to prefer the latter
(Stoessinger, 1976:224).

The sovereignty of the territorial state is deemed by most
observers to grant the state the right to determine how it is
governed and to control the activities of individuals within the
state. The granting of legitimacy to regimes by other states
occurs when the regime is recognized as "the government." In the
case of irregular transfers of power (coups, revolutions,
interventions) this occurs by the continuance or the
reestablishment of diplomatic relations or the seating of the
regime's representatives in the United Nations. The granting of
legitimacy through recognition recognizes the right of the regime
to deal with internal problems as it sees fit, so long as those
problems do not threaten to create a security problem for other
states or the state system. This same process applies to the creation of a new state through the granting of independence by a colonial power, a successful secessionist movement or postwar settlements. The current situation of the competing governments of Kampuchea illustrate this process. The granting of recognition is not simply a de jure or de facto question but also a political one. Recognition of one of the regimes is not necessarily predicated on considerations of whether the regime actually has de jure or de facto power and authority or whether it is representative of the Cambodian people or of their interests but rather on what is perceived to be in the interest of the state making the decision. Thus, the United States recognizes representatives of the former genocidal regime (in alliance with two other competing groups) in opposition to the regime installed in Phnom Penh by invading Vietnamese troops.

The state and those who act on its behalf are not considered to have a moral obligation to interfere in the internal affairs of other states under almost any conditions.

Internal problems are considered permissible by dominant powers, as long as they do not threaten to draw the latter into direct confrontation with each other (Ayoob, 1984:47).

Further Kren and Rappoport argue:

...within certain limits set by political and military power consideration, the modern state may do anything it wishes to those under its control. There is no moral ethical limit which the state cannot transcend if it wishes to do so, because there is no moral-ethical power higher than the state. Moreover, it seems apparent that no modern
state will ever seriously interfere with the internal activities of another solely for moral-ethical reasons (Kren and Rappoport, 1980:130).

This principle of non-interference in the affairs of other states was not established because statesmen had ethical qualm about such behavior but rather grew out of the logical requirements of a system of sovereign states. As we know, the principle of non-interference is quite often broken, but not because of ethical considerations. In the normal course of events interventions are justified by the interveners on national security grounds. Moral and other non-security justifications are frequently explicated by interveners (see for example the analysis of the U.S. intervention in Chile by Johansen, 1980:232-255), but they are not the basis of the intervention itself. And while some hold that Nuremberg challenged the principle that the state and the individuals that act on its behalf are not subject to moral requirements, post Nuremberg developments in international law and organization have done little to increase the case that crimes against humanity undertaken within one's own borders are a fit subject for international intervention and justice.

It was the intention of the framers of the United Nations Charter that the organization would contribute to the decline of violence between states. Little attention was given to the problem of violence within states. Kuper argues that, as a result, not only does current international law fail to support international humanitarian intervention but also that the establishment of the United Nations has actually hindered the development of the principle.
...the sovereign territorial state claims, as an integral part of its sovereignty, the right to commit genocide, or engage in genocidal massacres, against peoples under its rule, and that the United Nations, for all practical purposes defends this right (Kuper, 1981:161).

Given the origins of the United Nations Charter this is not a surprising result. The Charter was composed by representatives of Sovereign states interested in creating an international organization that would protect the interests of states, not individuals. Friedlander (1983) points out that the charter descends from the view of Vattel that each state "has the right to govern itself as it thinks proper" while Nardin (1983:104) argues that the United Nations "is an attempt to govern the society of states through the consultation and agreement of the great powers." The framers of the charter were clearly interested in relations among states and not the activities of states in terms of their domestic affairs. Article 2 (7) of the charter states

(n)othing contained in the present charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state...

In summary, states and by extension those who act in their name, are, in the names of national security and sovereignty, permitted under the rules of the game to conduct their business within their state insofar as they do not interfere with or threaten the interests of other states. How they treat their populations is a purely "domestic" matter and not of concern to the other states in the system as long as such treatment does not interfere with the international system itself.
I: I. ON SYSTEMS AND THE STRUCTURES OF PERSISTENCE

A. The Bipolar System

We begin with some basic and familiar propositions which characterize the major operational principles of the current international system from the realist perspective.

1. "Two superpowers, each incomparably stronger than any other power or possible combination of other powers, oppose each other (Morgenthau, 1978:351)."

2. "In a world in which two states united in their mutual antagonism far overshadow any other, the incentives to a calculated response stand out most clearly, and the sanctions against irresponsible behavior clearly achieve their greatest force (Waltz, 1979:173)."

3. "The periphery of the balance of power now coincides with the confines of the earth... (Morgenthau, 1978:359)."

In short, these propositions argue that there are two military superpowers and that the two understand that it is foolish to resolve their differences by actually facing one another directly in a full scale war. Nonetheless, the two compete for power and influence on a global scale seemingly disregarding the risk such competition automatically entails.

This distribution of power and its consequences are familiar as the core of the concept of a bipolar system. There are recognizable consequential state interaction patterns within a bipolar system. A first consequence, as noted already, is that the two poles tend to define problems vis-a-vis one another and these problems are perceived as overshadowing all other aspects of the system. A second consequence is that the rest of the system is defined by the superpowers in terms of what those states which compose the remainder mean to the two poles and the
Page 16 not available
superpower officials, and quite often scholars examining the record, praise the controlled use of force and the introduction of the new "rules of the game" which seek to prevent, or at a minimum make more unlikely the direct confrontation of the superpowers.  

In the areas outside their direct control, the Superpowers have sought the advantages the structural conditions would predict. We should note that the label Superpower obscures the fact that for many years the Soviet Union simply did not have the capacity to militarily intervene in the Third World and did little more than send statements of encouragement, advisers and small arms and supplies to those engaged in revolutionary struggles. Although this has changed in the past fifteen years (see Porter, 1984), it is still useful to consider the Soviet Union as a junior partner in the Superpower condominium (see Jonsson, 1983). Further, the historical domination of the West in the colonial and recently colonial areas placed the U.S. in the role of defender of the status quo both within states and of the international system as a whole. While the Soviet Union has also developed an interest as a status quo power in systemic terms, it is only in the past few years that, with respect to the situation within the system of states, the Soviet Union has had more than Eastern Europe to "defend." The superpowers developed new "rules of the game" for the use of force after a period of tacit bargaining and accommodation. These rules create expectations of behavior which make it easier for the two powers to manage the international system by providing clues to the
basic acceptable parameters of action. One important set of rules involves the identification of, and behavior in, spheres of influence.

B. Spheres of Influence

In a bipolar world we expect certain patterns of behavior to develop vis-a-vis relations with the poles. In what were traditionally referred to as great powers spheres of influence it was assumed that great powers have "positions of local preponderance" and other great powers "avoid collisions or friction between them" in these areas (see Bull, 1977:219-225)

Through a process of thrust and reaction the two superpowers may be seen to have established an accommodation on behavior within their own clearly defined spheres of influence. This accommodation did not eliminate the use of violence but rather established rules and justifications to be employed. It is important to stress the enormous size differential between the U.S. and Soviet spheres. The Soviet sphere was limited to Eastern Europe, plus Cuba after 1962, and finally in the 1970s was extended to Afghanistan and Ethiopia (and some would argue after 1979 to Nicaragua as well). In this sphere when they deemed it necessary the Soviet Union has employed military force as the events in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in this decade make abundantly clear. The U.S. as the status quo power, in addition to Western Europe and North and South America seemed quite often to include much of Asia and Africa as falling within its sphere. As Franck and Weisband skillfully demonstrate, by 1968 the Brezhnev Doctrine and the Johnson Doctrine faithfully mirrored one another, and these verbal
rationalizations of interventionist behavior, while drawing ritualized diplomatic opposition, did not bring military responses on the part of the other superpower.

The analysis of Soviet and American verbal behavior in this study reveals that both we and they have committed ourselves very explicitly to an international system in which two superpowers exercise a kind of eminent domain, each within its own geographical region... (1972:9)

While American presidents promised no more Cubas, the Soviet leadership sought to prevent further Yugoslavias. If the superpowers could control the system, there would be no more Castros and no more Titos as symbols of opposition within the core areas of the spheres of influence. To exercise such control, mechanisms short of war were needed.

The Soviet Union's policy to compete short of war was enunciated in Khrushchev's January 1961 speech in which he called for support for "wars of national liberation." While in China the speech was interpreted as evidence of the "revisionist" and non-revolutionary character of the Soviet regime, the U.S. assessment was, in Kennedy's words that,

...(W)e are opposed around the world by a monolithic and ruthless conspiracy that relies primarily on covert means for expanding its sphere of influence (Gaddis,1982:208).

The conclusion was reached that to oppose such an enemy the United States had to engage in covert activities and to develop the capacity in the words of the military doctrine of the time, of "flexible response" for any eventuality. In fact, of course, as the opening quotation from the Hoover Commission testifies,
the United States had been groping for such a strategy since the end of the Second World War, but the Kennedy years saw the policy become part of declaratory policy as the "New Frontier" sought to "rationalize" the American use of force worldwide. In the beginning, the policy was applied in Southeast Asia, Latin America and the Congo. Later flexible response was to expand beyond all reasonable conceptions of flexibility to the quagmire of Vietnam. At the end of the 1960s, one of the "lessons" of the Vietnam experience was translated by Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger into the Nixon Doctrine. As enunciated by the President on Guam, July 25, 1969, the President suggested that nations in the peripheral world would now have to defend themselves with U.S. material support and encouragement, but primarily with their own troops. Thus, the United States sphere of influence would be maintained, but the defenders of the sphere would be local military forces with U.S. dollars and weapons providing the wherewithal for the defense.

Throughout the period, the underlying assumption guiding American policy makers with respect to instability in the periphery were that difficulties were to be defined as a superpower issue and part of the Soviet threat. While the United States engaged in numerous operations to destabilize foreign governments, these were seen as restorative, not revolutionary. That is, these efforts were defined as attempts to return the system to an earlier status quo, to reverse the revolutionary changes that had created regimes that were perceived to threaten the status quo in the Third World (e.g. Guatemala, 1954; Iran, 1953; Indonesia, 1958; Cuba, 1961).
In the past decade, the "successes" of the Soviet Union, limited though they remain, have brought about a situation where they too now have regimes in the Third World (beyond Cuba) that need to be "protected" e.g. Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia (and some in the West would contend, Nicaragua, although the Soviet Union has been remarkably silent on the matter). The Soviet Union is thus, for the first time in the bipolar era, faced with the task of defending regimes outside Eastern Europe and the U.S. is now openly supporting "freedom fighters" and "wars of national liberation" in those states considered to be located within the non Eastern European portion of the Soviet sphere of influence. Both superpowers have therefore developed much greater sophistication in arms supply and overt and covert mechanisms of support and destabilization.

IV. PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL STATE TERRORISM

In a previous work (Stohl, 1984) I identified three broad forms of state terrorist behavior in the international sphere. The terrorism component within each of these categories was defined as:

The purposeful act or threat of violence to create fear and/or compliant behavior in a victim and/or audience of the act or threat.

Terrorism as a form of coercive diplomacy constitutes the first. Here the aim is to make non-compliance with a particular demand, in the words of Schelling (1966: 15) "terrible beyond endurance." While the threat is openly communicated by the
actions of the state, the threat may be implicit and quite often is non-verbal. Coercive diplomacy is overt behavior. The parties to the conflict are fully aware of the nature of the threat.

Covert behavior categorizes the second form of state terrorism. There are two subcategories of covert terrorist behavior by states that need investigation. Clandestine state terrorism includes direct participation by state agents. State sponsored terrorism, whereby state or private groups are hired to undertake actions of behalf of the employing state. The clandestine services of the national state are responsible for these actions. Government agents operating across national boundaries may choose either national elites or the foreign society itself as the target. In this type of state terrorism, states may thus attempt to directly intimidate government officials through campaigns of bombing, attacks, assassinations and by sponsoring and participating in attempted coup d'etats. Alternatively, national states participate in the destabilization of other societies with the purpose of creating chaos and the conditions for the collapse of governments, the weakening of the national state and changes in leadership. The threats to the regime and the society are obvious, but there is an attempt at deniability nonetheless. It is the pattern of such behavior and the threat of such a pattern being initiated that constitutes the terroristic aspect of this type of action.

The third form of state terrorism involves assistance to another state or insurgent organization which makes it possible or "improves" the capability of that actor to practice terrorism both at home and abroad. This form is labeled surrogate terrorism.
as the obvious effect and intent of the assistance provided as the improvement of the assisted actor's ability to either carry out terrorist actions to maintain a regime's rule or to create chaos and/or the eventual overthrow of an identified enemy state regime. There are two forms that this type of terrorism may take. **State supported terrorism** exists when third parties undertake actions on their own which are subsequently supported by the interested state. **State acquiescence** to terrorism occurs when terrorism is undertaken by third parties and while not explicitly supported by the interested state, the actions are not condemned or openly opposed.

In this section each of these forms of terrorism are briefly examined for the United States and the Soviet Union with the purposes of (1) describing their behaviors and (2) detecting similarities and differences in the superpower modes of behavior in each of the three types of terrorism. It is argued that the probabilities of choosing surrogate, covert or overt coercive strategies depend on the differences for each case in the production and response costs. These costs and also the benefits will vary depending further on whether the target state is in the U.S. or U.S.S.R. sphere of influence or the periphery and whether they are friends or foes of either of the two Superpowers.

A. **COERCIVE DIPLOMACY**

The defining characteristic of coercive diplomacy as distinct from both diplomacy and traditional military activity is that the force of coercive diplomacy is used

"in an exemplary, demonstrative manner, in discrete and controlled increments, to induce"
the opponent to revise his calculations and agree to a mutually acceptable termination of the conflict George (1971: 18)."

We may speak of terrorism as a subset of coercive diplomacy when violence or its threatened use are present. Not all coercive diplomacy employs violence. For example, one may employ economic sanctions in an allowedly coercive manner as did the members of the United Nations with respect to South Africa without employing violent tactics. We will confine our analysis to the violence of coercive diplomacy whose central task was described by George (1971: 26) as:

> How to create in the opponent the expectation of unacceptable costs of sufficient magnitude to erode his motivation to continue what he is doing.

The willingness of the superpowers to employ force and to threaten its use in the post war period provides a context within which to understand their employment of terrorism as a strategy. Blechman and Kaplan (1978) and Kaplan 1981 provide parallel studies of the American and Soviet use of force in this period.

Kaplan's analysis of Soviet behavior illustrates a number of different purposes and tactics for coercive diplomacy available to strong nations. There were 158 separate incidents in which the use of U.S.S.R. armed forces or the threat of armed forces use were employed. Important patterns regarding each of these types of Soviet activities are summarized in Table 1. Kaplan argues that the U.S.S.R. pursued coercive diplomacy for expansionary purposes only once after 1951. This occurred when a "show of force" in 1975 in the form of a missile test in the Barents Sea was intended for the consumption of the Norwegian government.
On the other hand, the use of armed force to maintain fraternal communist regimes remains an important instrument of Soviet diplomacy. The U.S.S.R. has threatened intervention, placed ground forces in nearby positions, activated units, repositioned military units and participated in the active suppression of outbreaks against Eastern European regimes throughout the past three decades and has intervened with military force in East Germany 1953, Hungary, 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 to protect "orthodoxy" in Eastern Europe.

In the case of Poland in 1980-81, it was clear to all Poles that U.S.S.R. troop maneuvers and other diplomatic consultations with Eastern Europe units were orchestrated to indicate the necessity for limiting threats to orthodoxy in Poland.

The U.S.S.R. also used coercive diplomacy to "intimidate neighbors or react to perceive threats presented by neighbors." This pattern shifted from the early post war period when the concern was more clearly the intimidation of neighbors for U.S.S.R. perceived security needs to the more recent past when the issue has been the manipulation of threats to gain diplomatic advantage or reduce possible threats to the U.S.S.R. This use of the threat of armed force within the Eastern European sphere of influence is, of course, a conventional behavior pattern for a great power. Nonetheless, this "convention" involves the threat of the use of force for coercive bargaining purposes. It is meant to intimidate not simply the government whose behavior is being challenged at any one point in time but also the other fraternal governments and their populations. It should therefore, properly be placed within the terrorist subset of coercive diplomacy.
Soviet Union use of coercive diplomacy in the Third World appears very different from American usage. Kaplan records only one small action in the Third World after the autumn of 1962 in which the U.S.S.R. threatened military force. This involved the deployment of two warships near the coast of Ghana in 1967 after two Soviet trawlers had been seized. This is not to say that the Soviet Union has not been active politically in the Third World. Rather, it is simply to state that the Soviets appear to place little reliance on the threat of violence in their diplomacy in the third world. This represents an approach which is quite different from that of the United States.

The United States has also not been adverse to the use of force as a political instrument in the post World War II era. Blechman and Kaplan (1978) identify 215 incidents in which force was employed. The United States employed its armed forces as a political instrument to maintain friendly regimes, to provide third party support in conflicts, to assist allies in conflict, and to encourage parties to terminate their use of force. Table 2 illustrates the types of activities to which U.S. armed forces have been put. These U.S. actions, ranging in intensity and danger from threats directed to demonstrate support for the pro-Western governments of Greece and Italy in the early post war period to the Christmas bombings of North Vietnam in 1972 and the "Mayaguez" operation in 1975, illustrate the commonplace nature of great powers "using armed forces to pursue objectives abroad without going to war (Kaplan, 1981: 2)."

The United States has been far more active in the Third
World than the Soviet Union. This has been so, in part because the recognized (if not at times challenged) U.S. sphere of influence includes a portion of the Third World (Latin America and the Caribbean), but also because the United States, perceiving itself as the status quo power, often defined changes in government in the Third World as threats to the status quo. The U.S. thus sought to restore or protect regimes that were clearly pro-western and as this has been an area of much change and instability, the opportunities for intervention have been much greater. These two studies demonstrate once again that the range of actions open to a modern state, particularly a superpower with unlimited geographical range, is extraordinary.

We may see further evidence of this range of activities and also illustrate the process of coercive diplomacy and the threat of violence by briefly examining the two superpowers' latest coercive operations -- Nicaragua and Poland. Our purpose here is not to provide a definitive analysis of either interaction. Rather at this time we wish merely to report on the instruments and tactics employed as the two superpowers attempted to meet their objectives without recourse to war. In confronting Nicaragua the Reagan Administration appears to have had a number of objectives: to end Nicaraguan support to the FDR and FMLN in El Salvador (b) to distance the regime from Cuba and the Soviet Union (c) to protect capitalist enterprise still existent and (d) as time passed, to aid and abet the overthrow of the Sandinista regime itself. Familiar economic instruments of coercive diplomacy were employed against the regime: suspension of aid, blocking of loans in the InterAmerican Development Bank,
disruption of export trade and the concentrated diplomatic attack on the Sandinistas in international forums and in public statements emanating from the White House and the Department of State. But an examination of the New York Times for the period also reveals the following tactics the Blechman and Kaplan (1978) list of coercive force options which have been employed: providing a U.S. presence; patrol/reconnaissance/surveillance; movement of a target's military forces or equipment; and Interposition. In addition, the administration, also assisted in the mining of Nicaraguan harbors and has also been intimately involved in covert operations against the Sandinista, as we will discuss below. Nonetheless, the administration thus far has been careful to avoid a direct and open policy of war.

In Poland, the Soviet Union was faced with a situation it found unacceptable, another challenge to "orthodoxy" in Eastern Europe. The rise of Solidarity and the apparent inability of the Polish Communist Party and Polish government to easily manage the situation led to a situation in which the question of protecting the integrity of fraternal communist regimes was once again raised by the Kremlin. The Brezhnev Doctrine and the past interventions in East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia provide the context within which activities relating to the goals of reestablishing clear control and the elimination of challenges to the orthodox status quo may best be understood. Soviet behavior in this instance was clearly linked to the activities of the Polish authorities. While numerous observers speculated on whether or not the Soviet Union would actually invade and if the
cost benefit equation would favor such intervention -- given the threat of facing Polish troops on the battlefield defending their homeland -- the Soviets employed the traditional instruments for threats of the use of violence and the activation of coercive diplomacy: mobilization, troop maneuvers, joint exercises, warnings of Soviet intervention if the situation was not controlled, naval maneuvers by Warsaw Pact forces, landing operations on the Polish coast, border exercises and alerts.

These instruments were accompanied by the standard non-violent instruments of coercive diplomacy: statements of concern for the internal situation in Poland, assurances that the Polish regime would deal effectively with counterrevolutionary elements, and joint communiques by Warsaw Pact allies regarding their solidarity. These threats were clearly linked to the willingness of Polish authorities to use their own coercive strategies and instruments. When the military, after its takeover of the government apparatus, demonstrated anew its willingness to use force, the threat of Soviet and Warsaw Pact intervention receded until, with the imposition of martial law, the threats came to an end and were replaced by statements concerning the validity of the Brezhnev Doctrine.

One may argue that the coercive strategies adopted in these two cases illustrate the virtues of such a strategy, "achieving one's objectives economically, with little bloodshed, for fewer psychological and political costs, and often with much less risk of escalation (George, 1971: 19)". Saving lives is indeed a virtue. This virtue, however, does not alter the fact that the strategy is based on terror and the power to destroy if "proper"
responses are not engendered by the threats and/or the relatively low levels of violence employed. Coercive strategies which rely on the threat of violence are therefore state terror policies, regardless of whether or not they save lives or if we approve of them (see Schelling 1966:16-17). At the same time, it should be clear that U.S. and Soviet policy makers, confronted in both these cases with situations that they sought (and in the case of Nicaragua still seek) to radically alter, calculated that the costs, both response and production, were too great to justify a more directly violent approach. While both have the military resources to prevail the casualty figures and response costs of allies and others are simply too high to risk. Coercive terroristic based diplomacy is clearly a more economical approach, and one that allows for later escalation should it not bring an acceptable conclusion.

B. CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS

Whereas the terror of coercive diplomacy is obvious to all observers, even if many shrink from labelling the behavior as such, the terror of the clandestine apparatus of the state in international relations is often quite difficult to discern. Knowledge of these instances of international governmental terrorism is dependent on investigators uncovering and illuminating them and this process often occurs quite long after the fact. It is also the case that we outside the official intelligence apparatus (and it sometimes appears those within as well) are not ever comfortable with the accuracy or quality of the revelations of this type of behavior. This is most often not
the type of data that can be subjected to extensive validity studies by those outside the inner circles.

This type of terror in international relations, unlike the coercive diplomacy discussed above, is usually not directly aimed at producing compliance but rather fear and chaos. In addition to the message that the act conveys about vulnerability and the assets (personal and material) that are destroyed, it is hoped that as a result of increased fear and chaos, governments at some later point will be in a weaker bargaining position or will be more willing to make concessions, given the costs that have become apparent.

It is the threat of this type of behavior in general that serves to keep elites fearful of outside interference and produces public statements by Third World leaders regarding American interference that to the American public often, particularly before the Pike Committee report was made public in 1976 (see also Halperin et al. 1976), are dismissed as the ravings of unstable, paranoid or ideological opponents who seek merely to embarrass, or blame their internal difficulties on, the United States. The reaction by the United States media and public to the claims of Fidel Castro and Mu'ammar Qadhafi that the CIA had attempted to assassinate them are excellent cases in point. We have, at present, no direct knowledge in the case of Qadhafi (although recent leaks suggest an ongoing attempt to topple his government) but by now the attempts on Castro throughout the past two decades are well known (Hinkle and Turner, 1961).

The clandestine services of the U.S. have had much
experience in the past few decades in both forms of this type of behavior. The organization most often identified as responsible for such behavior is the Central Intelligence Agency. Marchetti and Marks (1974: 108) suggest that "the crudest and most direct form of covert action is called 'special operation'... by definition, special operations are violent and brutal." A partial listing of well-known CIA special operations indicates the range of such activities. In Guatemala, 1954, Indonesia, 1958, Iran, 1953, the Bay of Pigs, Cuba, 1961, the U.S. trained, equipped, and provided tactical assistance to groups attempting to overthrow established governments. Between 1970-1973, the United States worked on a number of levels to overthrow the elected government of Salvador Allende in Chile. In addition to non-terroristic strategies such as bribery after the election campaign, the U.S. embarked on a program to create economic and political chaos in Chile. The CIA was implicated in the assassination of Rene Schneider, the commander-in-chief of the Chilean Army, who was selected as a target because he refused to sanctions plans to prevent Allende from taking office.

The United States government attempted to foment a coup, it discussed coup plans with the Chileans later convicted of Schneider's abduction, it advocated his removal as a step toward overturning the results of a free election, it offered payment of $50,000 for Schneider's kidnapping and it supplied the weapons for this strategy (Johansen, 1980: 210).

After the failure to prevent Allende from taking office, efforts shifted to obtaining his removal. At least seven million dollars was authorized by the U.S. for CIA use in the destabilizing of Chilean society. This included financing and
assisting opposition groups and right-wing terrorist paramilitary groups such as Patria y Libertad (Fatherland and Liberty). Finally, in September 1973 the Allende government was overthrown in a brutal and violent military coup in which the United States was intimately involved. President Ford stated, "I think this was in the best interests of the people of Chile and certainly in our best interests (Halperin et al. 1976:28)." The message for the populations of Latin American nations and particularly the left opposition was clear: the United States would not permit the continuation of a Socialist government, even if it came to power in a democratic election and continued to uphold the basic democratic structure of that society.

In the last few years major U.S. efforts at destabilization of an increasingly less than covert nature have taken place as part of the strategy of destabilizing and overthrowing the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. The so-called "secret war" attracted so much attention that the House of Representatives voted on December 8, 1982 to halt covert activities abroad by the Central Intelligence Agency for the purpose of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua or provoking a military exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras. The legislation did not prohibit private organizations from conducting operations (although it did prohibit direct assistance by U.S. agencies to these private organizations. Responding to Administration pleas, the Congress in the summer of 1985 approved "humanitarian" assistance to these private groups. Such assistance provides a convenient semantic deniability. Recent testimony by Edgar Chammoro, a
former Contra leader, at the World Court (September 1985) makes clear that the lines between public and private, and between U.S. and Nicaraguan Contra as actor in the various covert activities were always unclear at best. The fiction of separateness like many of the other fictions in the case of U.S. actions directed against Nicaragua are maintained however, because it is safer in terms of response costs. While everyone now "knows" that the United States is intimately and directly involved the legal fictions may be maintained and direct responses may be avoided. In this way the utility of clandestine terror is illustrated for even the strongest of nations. It is not necessary for the state (or any actor) to be weak to employ terrorism or terrorist strategies which are normally associated with weakness, it is only necessary for the "rational" actor to conclude that such strategies are more cost-benefit effective.

But Nicaragua, while the best known current instance, is not the only nation in which U.S. agents have operated in the past few years. Leslie Gelb reports that the CIA is "secretly" aiding Iranian exiles (NYT, March 7, 1983: 1). The Washington Post (10/4/83) reports that the CIA is conducting a covert operation affecting Angola, involving support for Jonas Savimbi and his UNITA forces. It has been charged by the Soviets and administration officials have allowed the impression to be created that the U.S. is engaged in assisting the Afghans against the Soviet occupation (see Weinberg, NYT 10/2/83). It is also the case that the creation of organizational umbrellas such as Citizens for America, and Citizens for Reagan, which actively seek to channel support to anti-soviet insurgents creates the
clear impression that the United States government is supportive of private initiatives of Americans cooperating with various insurgent groups that are known to employ terror as an integral component of their military strategy. When such groups are headed by prominent Republicans such as Lewis Lehrman who not only claims to have the President's blessing but reads to an organizing meeting a letter from the President endorsing their purpose, it is clear that the line which separates public and private actions and aims is consciously blurred.

There are differential response and production costs associated with the use of private clandestine agents (It should be noted that the line between these agents as state sponsored versus state state supported terrorists may be easily blurred in the absence of reliable information. However, it should be clear that the distinguishing analytic criterion is temporal- was approval or instigation for an action granted prior to the decision to undertake the act? This clear demarcation breaks down when agents purposefully outline acceptable goals and ambiguous limits to the means with a knowing wink and nod).

It should be the reasonable conclusion of analysts in this field that the Soviet Union has been far less able (although we have nothing but our worst case suspicions to prevent us from believing that they are simply less willing) to intervene in the Third World on the scale that the United States has achieved in the past few decades. This is apparently the case for both overt and covert interventions. While much is made in the Western Media of the strength of the Soviet KGB and the threat that the Soviet
Union poses in and for the Third World, in much of the Third World the Soviet presence appears to be relatively benign. They have far less leverage than the United States and far less infrastructure within which to conduct covert operations.

Rubinstein, for example, argues that in Third World policy in general the Soviet Union appears opportunistic and responsive to local initiatives and conditions"... Unlike the United States, "the Soviets have not been well placed to meddle effectively in leadership quarrels and have wisely concentrated on maintaining good government-to-government relations, reinforcing convergent policy goals and providing such assistance as is necessary to keep a client in power. (Rubinstein, 1981: 214-235") This is not to argue that the Soviet Union does not involve itself in "Liberation struggles." It quite often is, and has assisted groups (e.g. the MPLA in Angola) they believe will be predisposed to them after achieving power. But assistance to such groups involves the use of a third type of state terror activity, surrogate terrorism, and should be distinguished from covert terror activities of direct intervention, whether they be of the clandestine state terrorist or state sponsored terrorist variety.
C. SURROGATE TERRORISM

The third form of state terrorism in international affairs, surrogate terrorism, involves assistance to another state or insurgent organization which makes it possible or "improves" the capability of that actor to practice terrorism both at home and abroad. The two forms that this type of terrorism may take. State supported terrorism which exists when third parties undertake actions on their own which are subsequently supported by the interested state and State acquiescence to terrorism identified when third parties which although not explicitly supported by the interested state conduct operations which are quietly approved (because they contribute to state objectives) and are not condemned or openly opposed.

1. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM - LINKAGES AND THE SUPERPOWERS ROLE

a. The Soviet Union

In his first news conference as President Reagan's newly appointed Secretary of State, Alexander Haig responded to a question (and a follow-up question) concerning strategic interests in Latin America by charging that the Soviet Union was "involved in conscious policies, in programs if you will, which foster, support, and expand this activity (international terrorism)" Mr. Haig indicated that the Soviet role included training, funding and equipping international terrorists (1981:5.) Mr. Haig was supported in this position by key members of the Reagan Administration such as National Security Adviser Richard Allen (see Miller, 1981: 4; and Secretary of Defense
Caspar Weinberger, 1981:). Haig's charges focused public attention on an issue which had found increasing attention in the second half of the 1970s, the role of states in the apparently increasing activities of terrorists who operated both within and across state boundaries. Questions had been raised as to how such organizations could operate so capably and suspicions grew that to do so, they needed complex infrastructure and state support. The obvious candidate for the role of state supporter was the Soviet Union. This conclusion was reached because the Soviets would receive the greatest benefits from a "program" which encouraged the destabilization of the west. In place of evidence for suspicions raised, the question Cui Bono (Who Benefits)? was substituted. If direct Soviet involvement could not be found because of the highly secretive and closed nature of Soviet behavior, it was argued that one should assume Soviet backing because of the benefits that would accrue to them and focus on surrogates and intermediaries with the tentacles of the plot leading back to the Soviet Union. Much of this searching was not conducted by scholars, but by journalists, and that work which was contributed by scholars was not placed within an international relations framework which might have proved useful in framing the issues.

There are two major thrusts in the interconnected argument concerning the role of the Soviet Union in international terrorism. The first concerns the question of cooperation and possibly organizational coordination among terrorists and the second Soviet involvement and possibly organizational control.
Despite the assurance with which Sterling, 1980; Haig, 1981; Demaris, 1977; and others spoke, there has been little publicly available evidence which demonstrates actual Soviet control and/or an actual organizational infrastructure. Few dispute the existence of working relations among some terrorist groups resulting in relatively low level cooperation regarding safe houses, travel documents, weapons information and the like. However, the cooperative network doesn't appear any more sophisticated than the "ordinary" criminal network that exists for the purchase of visas, weapons and silence throughout the world. That groups cooperate at this level should come as no surprise to anyone familiar with organized criminal or insurgent terrorist behavior.

It is a long leap to assert that this cooperation implies any coordinated effort or long-term policy agreement regarding revolutionary upheaval around the world. It is a leap nonetheless, that in the current American political climate many willingly make, particularly if they can connect the Soviet Union to the network. Indeed, some, such as U.S. Senator Denton of Alabama, for obvious political purposes, have gone so far as to suggest that American citizens do not find the link-up with the Soviet Union because the Soviet Union manipulates a gullable American press. It is argued that the Soviet Union has had such success in their "disinformation" program to convince Western news readers that they have had no part in international terrorism, that is is now difficult to find Americans willing to believe the Soviet role. Some go much further. Robert Moss, formerly of The Economist, is quoted approvingly by Charles
Horner for his identification 'of a conspiracy of silence' about the evidence of Soviet involvement in terrorism which operates in order to preserve the appearance of detente (cited by Horner, 1980: 40)." This conspiracy includes the news media and government officials. On the other hand, Claire Sterling simply cannot find an explanation. She, in despair, suggests: No single motive could explain the iron restraint shown by Italy, West Germany, and all other threatened Western governments in the fact of inexorably accumulating evidence... (1981a: 291)

The fact that the intelligence services have not been able to provide the evidence that these analysts all assume is there does not seem to provide a simple direct answer. But we should look further into the changes. Sterling, for instance, does not simply suggest, as did Secretary of State Haig, that the Russians are behind it all. Rather, she argues no matter what the original motive and organization of the terrorist movements in the Western world, the Soviet Union, through the Palestinians with the KGB as agent, has infiltrated and gained a key role in the various terrorist movements in the Western world.

"Direct control of the terrorist groups was never the Soviet intention. All are indigenous to their countries. All began as offshoots of relatively non-violent movements that expressed particular political, economic, religious or ethnic grievances (1980b: 19).

The heart of the Russian's strategy is to provide the terrorist network with the goods and services necessary to undermine the industrialized democracies of the west (1980b: 54).

While Ms. Sterling argues that: " The case rests on evidence
that everyone can see, long since exposed to the light of day (Sterling, 1981a: 292). ... nobody has yet provided unequivocal evidence that supports a simpleminded Soviet-culprit theory of terrorist control and neither are there any serious analyses of Soviet strategic objectives and the manner in which these ends would be served by support for terrorism (Wardlaw, 1982: 56).

Much of this argument against the Soviet Union rests on the assumption that the Soviet Union as an anti status quo power favors anarchy and disruption within the world system. Thus, the Soviet Union will assist those opposed to the Western States system and particular states, i.e., the status quo, because it is to their long-term advantage. Friedlander (1983) (citing Edward Marks, coordinator for Anti-terrorist activities U.S. Department of State), refers to this as the "fishing in troubled waters" thesis. The simpleminded approach to this argument is most clearly presented by Sterling.

In effect, the Soviet Union had simply laid a loaded gun on the table leaving others to get on with it. Why would the Russians do that? Well, why not? (Sterling, 1981a: 293)

A more sophisticated answer to the question why is given by Edward Luttwak.

"It was only when it became clear that the Soviet Union was ineluctably losing the support of the trade unions and left-wing mass movements of the West that the Soviet leaders began to accept terrorists as useful allies; with the Leninist programme of revolution by the working classes finally exposed as totally unrealistic... (Luttwak, 1983: 64).

In other words, Luttwak argues that Soviet leaders reversed the longstanding Leninist antipathy to terrorism, an antipathy
based on the belief that mass movements would not be built upon terrorist campaigns (see Terekhov, 1974: 20-22) when these mass movements were also deemed to be failures. While this is not evidence for the position it does at least have the virtue of providing an explanation for the possibilities of doctrinal shift.

Cline and Alexander (1984), in the latest salvo in what has become, with the continuing lack of new evidence, a mainly polemical battle depending primarily on assumptions of Soviet sources of conduct and the role of ideology in the decision making process assert, without seeming to worry if it makes a difference if the Soviet Union "benefits" from or "directs" terrorist activity:

"In the 1970s terrorism, whether backed directly or indirectly by the Soviet Union or independently initiated [my emphasis added], appeared to have become an indispensable tactical and strategic tool in the Soviet struggles for power and influence within and among nations. In relying on this instrument, Moscow seems to aim in the 1980s at achieving strategic ends in circumstances where the use of conventional armed forces is deemed inappropriate, ineffective, too risky or too difficult (Cline and Alexander, 1984: 6)."

Likewise, Cline and Alexander (1984: 55) also argue

"... it is obvious from the PLO documents[4] that there exists a carefully developed international terrorist infrastructure that serves Moscow's foreign policy objectives of destabilizing non-communist governments."

When all the charges and evidence are carefully reviewed, what can we conclude with confidence concerning Soviet involvement with Palestinian terrorists? The Soviets have trained, funded and equipped some Palestinians for what they

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would describe as guerrilla warfare. If the Palestinians are Marxists and have developed links with other Marxists and non-Marxist political organizations, governments and also terrorist organizations including most member states of the United Nations and all of the states in the Arab League. Radical Arab states who have purchased arms from the Soviet Union have made some of these arms available to Palestinians (Conservative Arab states who have purchased arms from the United States and other western states have also made arms available to the Palestinians). We can and should thus make the argument that the Soviet Union, by training Palestinian guerrillas and others in military techniques, weapons use, and tactics at bases within the Soviet Union and the Middle East must bear a share of the responsibility for the practices for which that training is employed. They may certainly be accused of State acquiescence to terrorism and under the loaded gun thesis of being an accessory before the fact. But this is a very different charge from that of direct responsibility and operational control and hence requires a different response set to try and control than direct involvement.

The response in the case of "Palestinian" terror is further complicated by the other parties which may also be labeled as accessories before the fact. Many of these parties have very different motives and concommitant anti-Soviet aims.

"Let us be clear about what we do not know. We do not know the extent, if any, to which the Soviets direct any terrorist organization. Moscow seems to have had great influence over the popular front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) but less over other factors within the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Most of the money for many terrorist groups probably comes, not
from the Soviet Union, but from wealthy Arab nations and from criminal activities (Wilson, 1981: 36)."

In the current ideological climate such skepticism and raising of questions regarding Soviet involvement has not been well received.

"Apologists [my emphasis] for Soviet foreign policy, on the other hand, are skeptical about direct and indirect Soviet control of terrorist groups. While admitting that Moscow approves of and gives some assistance to what it considers legitimate "liberation movements," or struggles of people for their independence, proponents of this view argue that the dynamics of modern terrorism are so uncontrollable as to make the Soviet leaders ambivalent about the usefulness of this form of warfare (Cline and Alexander, 1984: 5)."

However, it should be recognized that the Palestinian situation is unique in terms of the current international system. There is no question that, as other papers during this session will argue, the PLO as an umbrella organization of widely disparate political groupings, "united" only by their original aim of eliminating the state of Israel play a key facilitating role in any organizational linkages amongst terrorist groups. They, through their now long term access to money, materiel, diplomatic pouches and diplomatic cover, territorial bases and safe territories as well as whole nations, have provided to various European and Asian terrorist groups "fraternal" assistance and have been able to conduct truly "transnational" operations. But while many nations may acquiesce to their terrorist operations only a relatively few openly support, after the fact, terrorist operations and still fewer may be placed under suspicion of acting in a manner which raise their activities to that of state
sponsored terrorism.

b. The United States

Within the United States and within the literature of terrorism, there has been far less interest in the U.S. role in aiding, abetting, and funding international terrorism or in other words with the United States as a sponsor or acquiescer to terrorism, insurgent or state. While, of course, there is a critical literature concerned with the role of the Central Intelligence Agency and its covert operations, that literature is generally concerned with the activities of Americans in clandestine operations and not with the connection among "terrorist" organizations. In part, this is obviously the result of the current distribution of power within the world. The United States, as the premier status quo power simply does not have as many opportunities on choices to make in this area as would the Soviet Union. In the post world war two world, the U.S. has supported more regimes and governments, the Soviet Union more opponents and insurgents.

However, we should not conclude that the United States has had no cooperative arrangements with insurgent terrorists, nor involvement in their operations. CIA covert operations in Nicaragua, Angola, Iran, and Afghanistan obviously involve the U.S. with insurgents who would be labeled terrorist if they were opposing regimes friendly to the U.S.

There is an additional group of terrorist organizations (so identified by the FBI) with whom the United States has links. These groups are Cuban and much of the network descends from the ill-fated 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion. According to the FBI, the
most dangerous terrorist group operating within the United States in the 1970s was OMEGA 7, the clandestine operations arm of the Union City branch of the Cuban Nationalist Movement. In the IA's ITERATE transnational terrorism data base for 1969-79, Cuban exile groups are given responsibility for 89 separate terrorist incidents within the United States and the Caribbean area. Many of the actions involved attacks on Cuban and U.S.S.R. diplomatic personnel in the United States.

One clear international linkage provided by these Cuban organizations concerns their role in the assassination of Orlando Letelier, the exiled former foreign minister of the Allende regime. DINA, the Pinochet secret police in Chile, recruited OMEGA 7 members for help in the assassination. While there is no evidence, and I am not suggesting that the CIA was directly involved in the assassination of Letelier, organizations with which the CIA was intimately involved were. The linkage but not the responsibility for the particular action is clear. An organization that the CIA found useful for other purposes had become involved, without CIA help or approval, in the assassination of a former Ambassador a few miles from CIA headquarters. Hinkle and Turner (1981: 317) argue:

Cuban exile terrorism began with assassinations and bombings in the United States, picked up tempo during the 1970s and by the end of the decade had spun a murderous web linking Cuban exiles with elements of the American CIA, the Chilean gestapo known as DINA, the Venezuelan secret police, the Korean CIA and European paramilitary fascist groups.

Further, Hinkle and Turner assert that the CIA financed
covert forays against Cuba between 1964 and 1975 through the Castle Bank and Trust LTD, a CIA bank established in the Bahamas for such purposes. More recently, U.S. links with terrorists in Nicaragua have also involved connections with the Argentinians. Training centers were established by Nicaraguan groups within the United States and a blind eye was turned towards them (NYT, March 17, 1981: 14). Camps were also run by Panamanian and Cuban exiles for the purpose of overthrowing their governments (NYT, December 24, 1981: 14). In short, in addition to what Edward Herman (1982) describes as the "Real Terror Network," the organizational linkages and structural conditions which foster cooperative government linkages which promote state terrorism, the United States does appear to have established links with insurgent terrorist organizations. Both the literature on these links and the network of linkages themselves appear far smaller than those attributed to the Soviet Union. This relative lack of size may result from the reverse of the structural condition that we noted earlier, the United States supports relatively more governments, the Soviet Union relatively more insurgents and "wars of national liberation." But the relative size may also be reflective of the history of the "need" to support insurgents as opposed to governments. It is only six years since the Sandinistas took power and a decade since the MPLA came to power in Angola. While Fidel Castro has now controlled Cuba for twenty-six years, his original patrons did not include oil rich nations in addition to those with ideological affinity. While we should expect different levels of superpower involvement in the activities designed to support their respective clients related to the
numbers of actual opportunities to become involved, we should also recognize that the Soviet "Network of Terror" is as important as it is because the Soviets are not the only important patron and that a number of quite important international purposes are served by support of the PLO. No such overlapping interests are served by U.S. support of anti-Sandinista contras.

2. STATES AS SURROGATE TERRORISTS

Within the structures of dominance that exist in the international system, powerful states do not simply exert military force and threats to control all aspects of both the internal and external relations of subordinate states. Above I have discussed the intervention of relatively powerful states in the affairs of the less powerful. Powerful states also aid the less powerful states in their domestic and international affairs and these less powerful states, in turn, assist the powerful to pursue their objectives. The superpowers sell, grant, and otherwise provide favorable terms by which their coalition partners, allies, client states (and at times neutrals and even adversaries) obtain equipment enabling their regimes to continue and/or expand practices of repression and terrorism. I argue that in such cases the superpowers are practicing a form of surrogate terrorism which at the very least may be considered as state acquiescence and when the terror serves purposes which have discussed jointly spills over into state sponsorship. When the superpowers train the personnel that conducts the terror operations, consult with and advise (for "reasons of state") the
security services of "friendly" states in their use of terrorism, this tool is a form of surrogate terrorism.

a. States as Domestic Surrogates

The United States Army has directed a school of the Americas at the Atlantic entrance to the Panama Canal. Begun in 1946, the school has had more than 46,000 graduates who have returned to their nation's military forces. The current commandant, bristling at the suggestion that he commands what has been called a "school for juntas," argues that human rights training was now included in the school "even if it was just a question of teaching non-commissioned officers that it was more valuable in intelligence to keep prisoners alive than to kill them (see Ellman, 1983)." In 1974 Congress banned United States assistance to the police and internal security agencies of foreign governments. Before the ban more than 7000 high-ranking police, intelligence and internal security officers were trained at the International Peace Academy in Washington, D.C. The professionalization of Latin American police forces was the object of the International Police Academy and the International Police Services Inc., the latter a CIA sponsored organization which also had students from Asia and Africa (Langguth, 1978: 124). Graduates of the Academy often returned home to practice their trade with exemplary zeal.

While official IPA policy was against torture, etc. many students became proficient at interrogation while enrolled. Knowledge of the establishment of the Esquadrao da Morte (Death Squad) in Brazil did not immediately reduce American assistance to Brazilian security efforts. Similar efforts in other nations...
were accepted for long periods without sanction by the United States. The defeat of communism and instability was considered a greater benefit than the costs of "due process" violations and state sponsored and supported terror practices.

In the 1970s, death squads appeared in at least ten Latin American states whose military and police were supported and trained by the United States. In March 1984, the head of El Salvador's Treasury Police, one of the most notorious and brutal of the country's security forces, was accused of being a major figure in the organization of that nation's death squads and a paid operative of the CIA. While he denied both accusations, the CIA dug the ground out from below him, claiming there was nothing wrong with their paying such foreign nationals because of the useful services they perform for the agency and the United States (NYT, March 23, 1984: 7). It is interesting to note that the Henry Kissinger chaired Commission on Central America recommendations (1984) included a proposal to lift the ban on U.S. aid to national police forces. The commission argues that the ban "dates back to a previous period when it was believed that such aid was sometimes helping groups guilty of serious human rights abuses (cited by Goldberg, February 23, 1984)." The "Realpolitik" orientation of the commission's chairman leads back once again to the cost-benefit calculations that led originally to the congressional reaction against Mr. Kissinger's dismissal of human rights concerns (see Stohl et al 1984).

States are also quite willing to help provide other states the tools of the terror trade. Wright (1978), and Klare and Aronson (1981) make clear that the new technologies of repression
are widely available and widely distributed. The United States has been an active provider of the instruments of terrorism and repression to Third World client states to employ on their populations and also in quite a number of cases to train the security services of these societies in the proper employment of these instruments. It is also a lucrative trade and the U.S. government assists corporations in the marketing of their wares. Other Western governments similarly assisted their national corporations in this regard and the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, while exercising some control on the basis of ideological requirements, have sought needed hard currency by supplying small (and large) arms to willing purchasers.

When in November 1979 the Carter Administration informed the Shah of Iran that his administration would continue to back the Peacock Throne and sent tear gas, police batons, protective vests and other riot control equipment, it was clear that even a President reviled by his conservative critics for being "soft" and placing human rights above security was not going to deny the instruments of repression (which were used for terror purposes as well) to an ally in need. This followed, of course, upon the heels of Carter's post Black Friday (September 8, 1979) phone call to the Shah in which he reiterated U.S. support and hopes for continued liberalization following the imposition of martial law and the gunning down of somewhere between 700 and 2000 people (Rubin, 1981: 214). In the end, the Shah's use of terror fell short. Once the population en masse, had indicated they were not afraid to continue to die in order to rid themselves of the Shah,
threat of death that the security forces could present no
longer was politically meaningful.

On the other hand, the reaction of many American policy
makers and particularly those of the current administration is
important in this regard. The presumption appears to be that the
Shah's regime fell in the end because the Carter Administration
was unwilling to provide enough military hardware and possibly
the actual employment of American troops to prevent the
coup. The U.S. use of surrogate terror thus apparently also
fell short of providing the "proper ending." In short, the
failure of the Carter Administration's policy was not connected
to its unwillingness to use terrorism, rather it was its choice of
surrogate terrorism rather than direct and forceful military
intervention on the side of the Shah. The Carter people held too
long to the indirect support that their sponsorship and
acquiescence provided. The U.S. policy of surrogate terror was a
failure because the Shah was incompetent and lost the support of
key elements in society. Unwilling to pay the response and
production costs of shifting from a policy of surrogate terrorism
to direct military intervention, the U.S. paid the cost of losing
the continued benefits of the Pahlavi dynasty.

Successive United States administrations had assisted the
Shah as well as the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala,
Nicaragua under Somoza and numerous other repressive client
states because they concluded it was easier and less costly to do
so than to "do the job themselves." In other words, these
governments provided a mechanism by which the U.S. believed its
national interest would be served. Likewise the Soviet Union has
and continues to train and support its own surrogates in Afghanistan where its original surrogate government was not up to the task, in Ethiopia and, of course in Eastern Europe, where many of the current regimes have consistently challenged the bounds of their surrogate status, and, many would argue, in Cuba and more recently Nicaragua.

b. States As International Surrogates

In a bipolar world within which the polar powers have nuclear weapons, it has become obvious to most observers (including, after almost five years in office, the current occupants of the White House and Department of Defense) that it is impractical and undesirable to become involved in major wars, that the infinite cost of a nuclear holocaust outweigh the possible benefits of eliminating the opposing superpowers. In the post Hiroshima world to engage in war is truly to risk all. A conventional war may not easily slide into a nuclear holocaust if both sides have access to nuclear weapons, but much of American military strategy since the McNamara era has certainly maintained this to be the case.

The U.S. experience in Vietnam, the Soviet's experience in Afghanistan, and the recent ongoing Iranian-Iraqi war (reflect on the possible consequences had not Israel destroyed the reactor at Osiraq) should also have demonstrated that protracted, "low level" war may be equally unattractive as an instrument of national policy.

Some military experts (ignoring much of the reality of the existence of what has been discussed above) have therefore
recently argued that terrorism may become accepted as part of a nation's military strategy. As long as a decade ago Brian Jenkins (1975) worried that nations might employ groups as surrogates for engaging in warfare with other nations. These surrogates (both state and non-state actors), he argued, might be employed (1) to provoke international incidents, (2) to create alarm in an adversary, (3) to destroy morale, (4) to cause the diversion of an enemy's resources into security budgets, (5) to effect specific forms of sabotage, (6) or to provoke repressive and reactive strategies and hopefully the revolutionary overthrow of targeted regimes (what we may designate the Marighela strategy as applied by state rather than insurgent actors). We recognize that terrorism has become simpler for insurgents because of advances in transport, communications, weapons, technology and access to the media. We should also recognize that the vast resources of the state allow it to make far greater use of these developments than may individuals and insurgent groups.

Beginning with the Nixon Doctrine and extending into the Carter Administration there was much discussion of the development and employment of the forces of regional power centers to avoid direct U.S. military action in the Third World. Currently the United States appears to be building up the Honduran army to serve a surrogate role in the Central American region. The Soviet Union likewise, it may be argued, appears to employ state surrogates, particularly in Africa. While the reasons for Cuban involvement in Africa may be directly related to the policy prescriptions of Fidel Castro rather than Soviet
leaders (see Robbins, 1983 for an excellent analysis) there does appear to have developed a system whereby the Soviet Union and East Germany provide most of the technicians and advisers and the Cubans most of the foreign troops. These activities have been located entirely within nations friendly to these powers and as of yet they have not participated in overt military activities against other regimes. Their disposition combined with U.S. support for insurgents and regimes rather than direct participation in Africa reduces the likelihood that clashes in Angola, for example, would escalate so as to involve the Superpowers in a direct confrontation. We should expect more rather than less of this pattern in the future. Here as elsewhere in the consideration of terrorism as a strategy, the cost benefit analysis leads superpowers to choose a terror strategy rather than a straightforward traditional policy or direct military force.
V. CONCLUSION

The preceding pages argue that strategies and tactics of terrorism have become important foreign policy instruments of the superpowers. As in the domestic realm, the practice of terror, when identified as such, brings almost universal condemnation. But as in the domestic realm, when it is the state that is the perpetrator of the terrorist act, few even pause to label the action as such. States and proponents of their actions shrink from labelling what they themselves do as terror, preferring more "neutral" designations such as coercive diplomacy, or assistance to a friendly state in its pursuit of internal security.

The differences in the behavioral patterns of the superpowers may be seen as resulting from the structural constraints and opportunities presented them as the defenders of the current international system. While both require the survival of the system, and by implication the survival of their major adversary, they both seek advantages within that system. The current system finds the United States with more governments than the Soviet Union to aid and abet, while the Soviet Union is involved with a greater number of insurgent organizations and "wars of national liberation." The behavioral patterns may thus be dissimilar but this does not translate to a necessary difference in motivations or scruples. The superpowers, like other international actors, employ terrorism when they calculate that response and production costs are lower than probable benefits.

If the theoretical framework employed to guide this analysis is useful, the management of the problem of states and terrorism
will come in increasing the response and production costs of terrorism as a possible strategy within the foreign policy repertoire of states. The first step in such a process is the delegitimation of the option. It is necessary to tear away at the protective clothing that allows agents of the state and the public to ignore the human consequences that state terrorist behavior generates. If we may delegitimize such behavior, we increase the psychic production costs for state decision makers. By challenging the behavior and raising public awareness both at home and abroad we increase the possibilities of bystanders of the terrorism challenging the behavior. This will contribute to an increase in the response costs that decision makers will have to add to their decision calculus.

At one level, it is clear that the current administration recognizes the utility of this suggestion. Speaking to the American Bar Association on July 8, 1985, President Reagan identified five states, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Cuba and Nicaragua as "Terrorist" states and as states which sponsor terrorism. The President, in his speech, identified a number of "illegitimate" activities by these states—state approved assassination, backing terrorist groups, using agents or surrogates, secret arms agreements with terrorist groups and governments, harboring terrorists and the creation of confederation of terrorist states—"a new international version of 'Murder Incorporated'."

While the President was primarily interested in generating domestic support for tougher approaches to the problem of
international terrorism and in scoring a few propaganda points, the utility of raising the problem should not be lightly dismissed. However, the Presinet's position is undermined by the selective manner in which he designated terrorist states and by the unwillingness to provide direct evidence for his charges. The raising of the issue will obviously be more effective in pluralistic western societies than elsewhere in the international system. While these states are less likely to employ terrorist strategies within their own states, their acceptance of the international rules of the game has allowed them to actively pursue terrorist strategies abroad and also to ignore, except in political selected cases, terrorism by states and insurgents of which they approve. The administration's confusion over the proper response to the Israeli bombing raid on PLO headquarters in Tunis is a case in point. Was this an effective and acceptable counter-terrorism reprisal or was it an unacceptable attack on the territorial integrity of a friendly state? Did it properly serve notice to states that would harbor terrorists or did it go beyond the bounds of acceptable international behavior?

This paper has explored five forms of state terrorist behaviors. There is no magic formula by which to eliminate the problems posed by each of these forms. However, it should be recognized at the start of designing effective counter policies that each of the five forms requires a different level of information and response. All state terrorist behaviors cannot be managed or countered in the same way and while all states can operate at levels equivalent to insurgents, it is quite often the case that the costs of doing so are larger than the expected
benefits and thus they choose not to do so. It is our task to find useful procedures to increase the costs of terrorist operations across the board.
1. This paper is one of a series of papers which seek to examine the role of terrorism as an instrument of state policy (see Stohl 1983, 1984a, 1984b, 1984c; Duvall and Stohl 1983; Lopez and Stohl, 1985 forthcoming; and Mitchell, Stohl, Carelton and Lopez, 1985 forthcoming).

2. While realist analysis may move beyond these core propositions, I would argue that these propositions provide the fundamental framework from within which realists discuss strategic "realities."


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Support Mechanisms for
International Terrorism

DRAFT: NOT FOR QUOTATION OR ATTRIBUTION

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1. Introduction

There are seven essential prerequisites for mounting terrorism. There must be some main aim or motivation among the perpetrators, even if it ultimately amounts to little more than an intense hatred of their perceived enemies or a desire for violent revenge against some alleged injustice. There must be leaders to instigate and direct the struggle. In any sustained and significant campaign, there will also need to be some degree of organization, some training in the special skills of terrorism, and cash which helps to buy weapons and ammunition and other essential needs. Finally it is clearly vital for the terrorists that they should have access to the target country and the precise target/s selected within that country. Of course, we know of numerous groups which possess considerable resources over and above those listed above. Some succeed in building up large numbers of supporters/sympathisers among the general population. Many obtain the substantial advantages of sponsorship by one or more states. In certain circumstances, terrorists can attain sanctuaries or safe bases beyond the reach of security forces or opposing factions; for example, in the remote terrain of the interior. But these are bonuses for the terrorists. We know that the majority of terrorists operating in the contemporary international system do not have these advantages.

Exactly the same basic ingredients are required to mount a viable campaign of international terrorism. But unless the perpetrators restrict themselves to attacking foreign personnel and property within the terrorists' own country of origin, they will require significantly greater levels of organization, training, expertise, cash, and means of access to foreign states, to wage a full international campaign.
Let us identify some of the major types of support mechanism involved in contemporary international terrorism:

(i) Essentially Indigenous Movements. These groups are generally motivated by nationalism/separatism or an ideology of the extreme left or right. They tend to be deeply rooted in their own societies, confining their campaigns of violence almost exclusively within their own frontiers, though they do occasionally strike at foreign targets if they believe it will help their cause. For example, the Italian Red Brigades kidnapped the U.S. general, James Dozier, and assassinated Mr. Leamon Hunt, the former U.S. diplomat and head of the peacekeeping force in Sinai, though these attacks were a sharp departure from their normal practice.

There are two main ways, however, in which even the most indigenous movements can and do contribute to the international support mechanisms for terrorism. Through their ideas, propaganda and news of their exploits, they may exert considerable influence on the thinking and practice of foreign movements. For example, the IRA has given ETA and other European terrorists considerable practical help and expertise and inspiration over the years through bilateral links and multilateral conferences. Also the larger indigenous movements, such as the Red Brigades in their heyday, can serve as valuable conduits for obtaining fresh supplies of terrorist weaponry and explosives. The evidence of the 'repentant' terrorists shows how the Red Brigades' leaders regularly shared the latest influx of arms from their Palestinian comrades with other terrorist groups. The well-established indigenous movements, moreover, are not so dependent on state sponsors for cash and training resources. Groups like the IRA and ETA
can get most of the cash they need from armed robberies, ransom payments for the release of kidnap victims, so-called 'revoluntary taxes' and racketeering. They have also more than enough expertise by now to provide their own training in weapons, bomb-making, etc. Yet in the case of both the IRA and ETA, the terrorists are still able to exploit their long and insecure frontiers with neighbouring states for these purposes, and to gain safe havens. Thus, even in the clearest cases of purely indigenous terrorisms, inadequate bilateral border security on the part of the governments concerned directly contributes to the sustenance of international terrorism. This is one very good reason for welcoming practical bilateral agreements such as that between Mrs. Thatcher and Dr. Fitzgerald.

(ii) Mixed Indigenous and Multinational Groups and Alliances

The mixing of indigenous and international terrorist support bases can be easily illustrated in relation to the Shi'ite fundamentalist revolutionaries. In Iran, in Lebanon, and the other major centres of Shi'ite populations, there is a constant emphasis on achieving dominance of their religious ideas in their own societies. Yet simultaneously, and interdependent with these efforts, the Shi'ite movements, such as Islamic Jihad, are also consciously engaged in a wider 'holy war' to export Ayatollah Khomeini's ideas and practice to the whole of the Muslim world. For these wider purposes, the Shi'ite militants can call on an impressive support base in Iran in the form of religious ideas and propaganda, religious leadership, a fair degree of centralised coordination and organization, cash, weapons, and substantial training in the network of camps now dotted around Iran, and Iran's diplomatic and spying network.
Another interesting variant of the 'mixed' (i.e., indigenous and multi-
national) support base is the recently formed alliance of extreme left
terrorist groups in Western Europe against NATO and defense-related targets. 
It is clear that all the groups involved--Red Army Faction in West Germany, 
Direct Action in France, and the Fighting Communist Cells in Belgium--on 
the one hand continue to wage their own private wars against the governments, 
law enforcement systems and other key institutions in their respective states. 
Hence, the hunger-strike campaign of the RAF in early 1985, aiming, without 
success, to intimidate the FRG authorities into relocating all RAF prisoners 
in the same gaol.

Yet on the other hand, those who study the evidence surely cannot doubt 
that a genuinely new, if loosely coordinated, international alliance of 
these groups is attempting to mount a West European campaign against NATO. 
They are not organizationally integrated under a centralized leadership. But 
it is clear from their communique of 15 January 1985 (see Appendix A) that they 
have common aims. They believe they are fighting for the cause of 'pro-
letarian internationalism', attaching what they term the 'totality of the 
imperialist system' in its capitalist heartland. Of course, they are not 
Communists in the Moscow mould. They are more like anarchist communists, 
more clear about what they wish to destroy than what they are for. All the 
groups in this alliance are bitterly anti-American, anti-capitalist, anti-
NATO, anti-militarist, and anti-Zionist. Their leaflets and slogans all 
use similar jargon and declarations. They have clearly coordinated 
uniformly on common targeting. In the case of the murder of Gen. Audran 
in Paris, there is evidence of direct close operational cooperation between 
RAF and AD. And there is also some evidence that other groups, such as
FP 25 in Portugal and November 17 in Greece, are imitating the RAF and AD line and see themselves as part and parcel of the anti-NATO alliance.

By operating as an international alliance, these groups give themselves more surprise and flexibility in attacks, exploit weaknesses in NATO's international response, and are exposing new vulnerabilities. So far, there is no evidence that they are currently receiving any physical assistance from possible state sponsors, such as Warsaw Pact countries. This may come if the Soviet Union comes to see real advantages in injecting clandestine state sponsorship/support to help disrupt NATO. Mixed indigenous/multinational alliance support bases of this kind are probably the hardest of all for the NATO democracies to counter. The internationalisation of their strategy in itself creates a wider support mechanism.

(iii) Exile Groups

These groups are utterly dependent on their international support bases because they have been forced by political circumstances or necessity to operate entirely abroad. Well-known examples are the Armenian terrorist groups, such as the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), the South Moluccans in Holland, and the Croatians scattered in many western countries.

These groups can draw on invaluable local bases of support among sympathisers in the emigre populations of major western cities. These provide sanctuary, fund-raising, sources of weapons and sanctuaries. On the other hand, they are generally desperately conscious of their weakness in political and military terms, and find it impossible to gain state sponsorship. Few states wish to back a loser. They are also potentially vulnerable to police and political reaction by their hosts in the states to
which they have migrated. They can be fairly easily identified, and they risk a backlash against their small communities if they make trouble abroad.

Far more difficult, from the point of view of the authorities, are those groups which have support bases both among exiles and in their country of origin, as is the case, for example, in Britain with the Kashmir Liberation Front, the Tamils, and Sikhs. The United States has many more exile groupings in this situation. The problem in such cases is complicated by the dangers of retaliation, counter-retaliation, and communal violence leading to inter-communal feuding and killing in the countries of exile.

(iv) Indirect State-Sponsored Terrorism

Indirect state sponsorship occurs when a government decides to aid a particular movement or group on the grounds that it will serve the strategic and political interests of the sponsor. It is generally adopted as a policy for one or more of the following purposes: to redress an international grievance, to export revolution, to hunt down and eradicate exiled dissidents or to intimidate them into silence, to weaken an adversary state, and as an auxiliary weapon in a wider war of intervention or international war.

In the course of the Arab-Israel conflict on the issue of the Palestinians, many states have intervened by giving indirect sponsorship and help to factions of the PLO. The major funds of the PLO groupings are derived from the contributions of the rich Arab oil states. And there is abundant evidence of the very substantial military support given to Al Fatah and the other main PLO formations since the mid-1970s. The Soviets were happy to use Yassir Arafat and his movement as a stalking horse to try to quietly expand Russian influence in the Middle East. Documents captured in the 1982 war in Lebanon confirm also the substantial Soviet and
E. European stake in training of PLO members. This undoubtedly helped Moscow to capitalize on the conflicts and to build closer links with the rejectionist front states, such as Syria. But in 1982, it became clear that indirect sponsorship also has heavy costs: they could not control the behaviour of their clients. Yet they did not wish to risk a full-scale intervention on behalf of Arafat’s group in the siege of Beirut. Since 1982, they have seen the situation vastly complicated by the split of the PLO and the bitter struggles between the Musa and Arafat factions in Lebanon. They have found that state sponsorship is a costly and unreliable weapon which may backfire badly. They, too, have had their diplomats targeted by terrorists in Beirut, and elsewhere.

(v) Direct State Sponsorship

Some state sponsors have tried to obviate these dangers by resorting to direct state-controlled international terrorism, using their own hit-squads to assassinate opponents or disrupt or undermine adversaries. The Libyan and Iranian regimes blatantly flout international norms and laws by such behaviour. For example, Colonel Qaddafi openly boasts of his intention to murder President Mubarak and Western leaders. The Iranians are turning out hundreds of trained killers from a chain of terrorist camps in Iran to subvert the moderate Moslem states and to attack opponents in the West. They have proudly violated basic international norms of diplomacy and human rights.

2. Extremist Ideology as Key Element in the Support for Terrorism

It is important to emphasise that every international terrorist movement or group requires an extremist ideology or belief-system of some kind to nourish, motivate, justify, and mobilise the use of terror violence.
A fundamental task is to establish clear and appropriate criteria for identifying extremist political movements, parties and groups which may become the recruiting bases of terrorism. There are three major possibilities by no means mutually exclusive. There is the frequently utilised method of defining extremism in terms of electoral strength, opinion survey evidence, or other data indicating the extent of public support for specific movements and groups. This would appear to have the advantage of total objectivity; it is based on the assumption that political ideas, opinions and demands are definable as extreme on the clearly quantifiable basis that only small or insignificant minorities of citizens positively identify with them. There are considerable problems, however, in this approach. Is it really justifiable to discount the possibility of extremist political ideas and movements gaining mass support? For example, most liberal democrats would have regarded Hitler's National Socialist Party under the Weimar Republic as an extremist party, yet in the July 1932 German election they gained 37.4% of the vote, a larger percentage than the combined Socialist Parties achieved. Similarly, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Provisional Sinn Fein (PSF) have both taken very considerable proportions of the popular vote in recent elections in Northern Ireland, yet there is abundant evidence that these parties represent extreme militant Protestant Unionist on the one hand and extreme Republican Nationalist on the other. And if one is going to adopt the proportion of votes gained in elections as a criterion of extremism, where should the threshold for 'acceptability' be fixed? Has Rabbi Kahane's Kach Party become respectable or diminished its extremist character in Israeli politics simply because opinion polls now show that over 10% would consider voting for him in elections for the Knesset?
Another approach, explored by psychologists such as Hans Eysenck, favours identifying extremism in terms of the personality traits and attitudes of individuals as revealed in psychological testing. Unfortunately, there is no generally agreed method of measuring fanaticism by such methods. There is ample historical evidence that extreme movements have been led and sustained by what Eric Hoffer has termed The True Believer,¹ and it is certainly important to take into account the social and psychological processes which create the basis for fanatical attitudes and behaviour. For example, in his pioneering portrait of the personality of the fanatic, Hoffer suggests that the factors which permit a spirit of self-sacrifice are: identification with a collective whole, make believe, deprivation of the present and the inculcation of extremist doctrine. Among the key unifying agents at work in creating extremist mass movements, he identifies: the fanning of collective hatred, imitation, the use of coercion by the extremist movement and the systematic promotion of an attitude of suspicion and mistrust towards outsiders and exclusivism and dogmatic superiority within the extremist movement. In a remarkable passage, Hoffer describes the role of the fanatic in the development of the extremist movement:

Without him the disaffection engendered by militant men of words remains undirected and can vent itself only in pointless and easily suppressed disorders. Without him the initiated reforms, even when drastic, leave the old way of life unchanged, and any change in government usually amounts to no more than a transfer of power from one set of men of action to another. Without him there can perhaps be no new beginning......

Chaos is his element. When the old order begins to crack, he wades in with all his might and recklessness to blow the whole hated present to high heaven. He glories in the sight of a world coming to a sudden end. To hell with reforms! All that already exists is rubbish, and there is no sense in reforming rubbish. He justifies his will to anarchy with the plausible assertion that there can be no new beginning so long as the old clutters the landscape."
The comparative study of political extremism ignores such insights into the role of the extremist personality at its peril. Clearly they suggest an important dimension for research into both the origins of political extremist movements and the factors which help to sustain them.

However, concentration on the personality traits of individual extremists is not sufficient as a basis for identifying extremist movements in whole political systems. For this purpose, it is clearly important to adopt a third approach, a method of identifying extremisms in terms of the political ideology they express in relation to liberal democratic values and institutions. This has the great advantage of following logically from the history of political party classification in European legislative assemblies. It was after all during the French revolutionary period that the widespread practice whereby the extreme left sit on the left-hand side of the chamber, as viewed from the President's chair, and the extreme right on the right-hand side, originated. It is true that any attempt at the definition of extremism in ideological terms is bound to be normative. In the context of the Soviet State, it is the norm to regard liberal democratic ideas as extremist and potentially damaging or subversive to the system. However, in the Western liberal democracies, it would seem perfectly valid to define movements and groups as extremist to the extent that they consciously reject liberal democratic principles and methods and seek to replace them by regimes of their own design. An additional benefit of classifying movements in terms of their declarative political ideology is that a movement's or party's methods and tactics are to a large extent dictated by its ideological assumptions. Hence, a group such as PSF in Northern Ireland, which sees itself as an integral part of a strategy of violent overthrow of the
government, will inevitably favour, and openly encourage, violent methods, terrorism, etc., to undermine the existing system. Likewise, groups such as the Deutsche Aktionsgruppen and Aktionsgemeinschaft Nationaler Sozialisten in the Federal Republic of Germany are dedicated to promoting the racial hatred and violence against their opponents which is so aggressively asserted in their neo-Nazi ideology.

NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

Marxists like to lay claim to a monopoly of wisdom about ideology, claiming that Marx and Engels laid the foundations for a genuinely scientific study of ideas in their theory of dialectical materialism. But like Marxist theory in general, the theory that class ideology or false consciousness emanates directly from the material mode of production has been overwhelmingly rejected by modern social scientific research.

This does not mean that the concept of ideology has been dispensed with: it has been found as vital to the study of politics and society as, for example, the concepts of religion and culture. As one influential American scholar defines them:

(Ideologies are) articulated sets of ideas, ends and purposes, which help members of the system to interpret the past, explain the present, and offer a vision for the future. Thereby they describe the aims for which some members feel political power ought to be used and its limits. They may be deceptive myths about political life; they may be realistic appraisals and sincere aspirations. But they have the potential because they are articulated as a set of ethnically infused ideals, to capture the imagination. From a manipulative or instrumental point of view, they may be interpreted as categories of thought to corral the energies of men; from an expressive point of view we may see them as ideals capable of rousing and inspiring men to action thought to be related to their achievement. Values of this kind, consisting of articulated ethical interpretations and principals that set forth the purposes, organization, and boundaries of political life, I shall describe by their usual name, ideologies.
This brilliant brief characterization of ideology by David Easton in his *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* usefully reminds us that ideologies do appear to minister to certain profound social and individual needs. People do hunger for a sense of meaning and purpose. There is a deeply felt need to understand the meaning of human existence and history, and for some vision and collective goal for the future. There is a sense in which all societies and social groups require some basic doctrines or intellectual framework not only for their own personal life and conduct but also to structure their relations to their fellows and to provide some guidelines and rationale for their modes of political and economic organization. It is a fact attested to by many historians that these needs for meaning and for hopes of salvation (in earthly terms) are felt all the more intensely in periods of major social crisis inducted by dramatic social and political changes, threats to survival or welfare, and conflict.

The pretensions of political ideologies to fulfill these basic social needs, however false and dangerous they may prove to be in practice, undoubtedly go far towards explaining the continuing ability of ideologies to sustain the loyalty of their adherents and even to acquire fresh converts. Moreover, the inherently combative and crusading ethos of political ideologies in itself strengthens their hold on their activists and their organizational durability. Trotsky, in one of his many vivid insights into the nature of revolution, clearly recognized the importance of 'the struggle' as a means of strengthening the hold of ideological commitment. In *My Life* he observed:

For us the tasks of education in socialism were closely integrated with those of fighting. Ideas that enter the mind under fire remain there securely for ever.
On the other hand, in recent history we have seen the devastating military and political defeat of one aggressive and totally evil ideology, Nazism, and at least the partial containment of the spread of another expansionist political ideology, Marxism-Leninism. And at the intellectual level, totalitarian political ideologies have signally failed to drive out alternative belief systems and values.

It is very important to remind ourselves that ideology is not a synonym for belief systems and philosophies of all kinds. Religions do have many features in common with political ideologies. Both tend to be universalist and millenarian. Religious movements also tend to have their fanatical and zealous proselytizers, their charismatic leaders, their scriptural texts and their authoritative "codes" for personal action. Both tend to be resistant to fundamental changes in belief and yet are extremely prone to schismatization. Religious fanaticism also provides the basis of terrorist violence by certain groups. Yet, despite these similarities, there are some crucial differences. The religious are concerned primarily with the spiritual rather than the worldly, with the after-life rather than with building the Kingdom of God on Earth, with saving souls rather than revolutionizing international politics. It is a fundamental mistake to assume that religious faith automatically involves a commitment to active involvement in temporal affairs, political conflicts, and programmatic social and economic change. On the contrary, in most world religions, there are extremely influential elements promoting the idea of withdrawal from the distractions of the secular world.

Nor should we overlook the difference between the Weltanschauung or world outlook and the ideology proper. The Weltanschauung is a more general
philosophy. It is far less explicit and less dogmatic than an ideology. It does not claim absolute authority. It is not generally embodied in any organisation or movement, and it certainly does not demand obedience among followers.

It is thus perfectly possible to develop systems of thought of many kinds which are free from the most negative and potentially repressive qualities of ideology such as dogmatism, exclusivism, and enforced political activism. If we adopt the concept of ideology outlined here, it is certainly possible to argue that it is possible for societies and individuals to live without any dominant or consensual ideology. Indeed one can argue that it is an essential condition for the survival of any genuine intellectual freedom that this should be so. A society totally dominated by any particular ideology is a prison-house of the mind.

It is important to avoid the temptation of regarding all ideologies as being equally dangerous and potentially destructive to freedom and justice. We can and must engage in an informed and searching critique of the ideologies which some groups and regimes seek to promote at the expense of other ideas and belief-systems. What is the precise content of their ideological message? What does this reveal about the ideologies involved and how they see the world? What normative evaluation can we make about the kind of political, social and economic order they wish to institute? Are their methods and tactics commensurate with their aims? Do their intended means appear likely to involve even greater evils for society than the wrongs they claim to be redressing? How do their ideological beliefs square with real historical experience and our knowledge of human life and conduct? We must seek to make these judgements in as informed and responsible a way as possible. Above all, we must seek to improve the quality of public
education and debate on these important matters. It is hoped that the Aberdeen-PSI project will make a substantial contribution to improving this understanding.

FOUR MODELS OF POLITICAL EXTREMIST MOVEMENTS

If a strong case has been made out for an ideological basis for identifying extremist movements, parties and groups, we must now proceed to consider a system of classification to assess the comparative analysis of extremisms. Four main types of extremist movements can be clearly identified, and to assist in this process, it is proposed to deploy four ideological models which would have the merits of general applicability to the political systems of Western Europe and flexibility:

(i) The Extreme Left Model. For the purposes of this model, it is assumed that all extreme left movements are characterized by the following four ideological elements which, in combination, are exclusive to groups and factions of the extreme left. These are - a belief in extreme egalitarianism, extreme anti-racism, extreme anti-capitalism and extreme hostility to nuclear weapons and militarism.

(ii) The Extreme Right. Movements, parties and groups of the extreme right share the following common features:

- a belief in the desirability of authoritarian/dictatorial leadership, couples with blatant inequalities of power and wealth; a belief in the intrinsic superiority of their own race or national group and the need to make their own race or national group supreme over other groups within the state and abroad; extreme distrust of intellectuals and rationalist thought and a marked preference for instinctivism and the elevation of myth, illusion and instinct as tools of mass manipulation and extreme
pro-militarism and a belief in the necessity and desirability of war as a means of realising national/racial destiny.\textsuperscript{3}

It should be noted that both these types of ideological extremism share certain features in common - a violent hostility to liberal democratic institutions and values, a powerful authoritarianism and dogmatism in the treatment of their own members and towards society in general, and a strong potential for developing into a one-part regime if they achieve power. Some commentators have fallen into the trap of assuming that because the extreme left and extreme right share some common features, their ideological differences are relatively unimportant and membership between them is now virtually interchangeable.\textsuperscript{4} Historical evidence does not support the claim that membership of left and right extremisms is interchangeable, though there are some interesting exceptions. What can be said with confidence is that the distinguishing features of extreme left and extreme right ideology are a crucial part of the appeal of these movements, and furthermore largely determine the methods, tactics and policies followed by the extremist group within the democratic society. Hence, analysis of the ideological content and ideological changes within these extremisms is crucial in any comparative analysis of extremism.

(iii) Ethnic and Ethno-Religious Extremism. Ethnic and ethno-religious based extremist movements are among the most intractable and persistent challenges to the liberal democratic political systems. Their central identifying characteristic, in ideological terms, is their fanatical pursuit of national self-determination or 'liberation' and the expulsion of the political military and economic presence of their target 'colonial' regime. Where, as in the case of Northern Ireland, the ethnic division is reinforced by religious segregation, the resulting conflict tends to be even more
intense and destructive than in the case of purely ethnic conflict. The
ethnic extremism is able to mobilise mass support far more rapidly and
effectively than the extreme left and right. By claiming to fight for the
self-determination and basic civil rights of their entire ethnic con-
stituency, however spurious this is in reality, they are able to gather
greater popular support, legitimacy and propaganda impact at home and abroad,
even when they are confronting a legitimate and widely accepted democratic
state. A major feature of these ethnic extremisms, differentiating them
from the extreme left, is that they invariably resort to the tactics of
political violence and terrorism in the belief that the end of national
liberation transcends all other considerations and justifies any means to
achieve their goals. In addition, most ethnic extremist movements enjoy
the considerable advantage of exploiting a separate language and cultural
tradition which provides an ideal vehicle for unifying against the alleged
national 'enemy' and a ready-made channel for political propaganda, recruit-
ment indoctrination and organisation. The conflicts in the Basque region
of Spain, in Corsica and in Northern Ireland, demonstrate that ethnic
extremism is potentially far more destructive of public order and welfare
than the typical extremisms of the left and the right. However, it is
usually concentrated in specific regions or districts and does not, there-
fore, constitute a threat to the survival of the liberal democratic states
as such.
(iv) Single Issue Extremist Movements. These groups are characterized by
an obsession with the pursuit of a single policy aim or goal. For example,
anti-nuclear weapons, anti-civil nuclear technology, pro-conservationist,
pro-feminist, anti-abortion, pro-animal rights. Although fanatically
dedicated to a single issue, each of these groups nevertheless functions politically and seeks to target the political system. A worrying feature of single issue cause groups is that the more extreme among them now appear to have taken over the tactics of terrorism in place of traditional demonstration, protest and pressure group tactics. Thus in any study of political extremism in a liberal democracy, it is important to look at the implications of this development.

THE IMPACT OF EXTREMIST MOVEMENTS

It would be foolish to exaggerate the danger presented to the liberal democratic state by the different forms of extremism categorized above. Well established liberal democratic political systems have the enormous advantages of popular legitimacy and support for the upholding of democratic institutions and laws. While they are far from being perfect forms of political organs, they have nevertheless proved more effective than other kinds of political system at delivering the basic economic and social needs of their populations. There is no instance of a post-Second World War extremist movement succeeding in undermining the liberal democratic constitution of a West European state and substituting a regime of their own choosing.

Despite this reassuring inner resilience, liberal democratic pluralism is subjected to considerable stress and disruption by protracted and intensive extremist campaigns. There are worrying wider implications of extremism for democratic societies and politics, not least because it so frequently leads to terrorism and other forms of political violence. In particular, we must take account of the human rights problems raised both for the citizens of the host societies and the rights of members of extremist
groups. It is also important to consider the impact of extremism on the law and problems of law enforcement. How far are the emergency and special measures that have been introduced in several legal systems to deal with the special challenges of extremist terrorism, violence and incitement to racial hatred and violence compatible with democracy and the rule of law? The actual and potential economic costs and consequence for whole societies and for regions most seriously affected by extremist activity must also be analysed in a comparative context. Consideration must also be given to the problems of 'worst case' deployment of extremist mass movements and their potential for affecting the stability and governability of democratic systems under certain conditions.

The problems of liberal democratic response to extremist challenges must also be considered. In essence, the problem is that severe and protracted extremism, while in one sense proving the genuine freedom of ideas and political activity in a democracy, at the same time challenges the very basis of the idea of democratic pluralism. As Karl Dietrich Bracher expresses it:

Democracy is an agreement to tolerate different views and aspirations, and simultaneously to set limits to them. This characterizes, more clearly than purely formal constitutions and institutions (which may all seem to resemble each other), its difference from all forms of dictatorship. Pluralism means, above all, that the common will is not laid down in an authoritarian or totalitarian manner by the state, but that it is represented and determined by a readiness to set bounds to the plurality of intentions and forces: namely, precisely at the point where the existence of viability of that plurality, its freedom and reciprocal toleration itself are threatened or denied. And conversely, the democratic state can offer full scope for the plurality of aspirations, without being in jeopardy itself, only where that basic agreement is acknowledged. The controversial issue of the banning of parties arises precisely when political extremism calls the pluralist system itself into question.
3. Case Study: the Support Base of RAF

The RAF is the longest-established and most ruthlessly violent of all left wing terrorist movements in West Germany. It developed from a small residue of left wing extremists who emerged from the student protest of the 'new left' in the late 1960s. It first revealed its terrorist capabilities in the violent release of Andreas Baader from prison in May 1970, and the half dozen bombing attacks in Frankfurt, Hamburg, Karlsruhe, Heidelberg, Augsburg and Munich in May 1972, leaving four dead and 19 wounded.

The new generation of RAF terrorists currently active poses a dual threat. It is conducting an international strategy, which it calls the 'anti-imperialist struggle.' As recent attacks have shown, they are particularly aiming at U.S. installations and troops, NATO forces in general, and the forces of the Federal Republic. Simultaneously, the RAF is continuing its national 'struggle' against the West German government, legal systems, security forces and key establishment personalities and institutions.

Although the polemics and doctrines developed by Meinhof, Mahler and other first generation RAF terrorists are still influential, the movement has undergone some substantial changes in style and tactics since the huge defeats suffered by the group in 1977, culminating in the suicide of the terrorists' leaders in Stammheim prison following the Magadish hostage rescue.

Throughout the intensive German terrorist activity in 1977, the RAF depended upon a considerable back-up from supporters and sympathisers, including lawyers and others who maintained links between the imprisoned terrorists, those still active at large, and the circle of sympathisers.

This support base provided the essential mechanism to enable the RAF to continue its terrorist activities during and after its leaders had been captured.
by the police. A key constant support role has been the concerting of propaganda designed to persuade actual and potential sympathisers that the captured RAF members had been 'tortured' by special tactics of isolation and deprivation in the prison system. These allegations were nonsense, yet it is a comment on the intensity of their propaganda that they came to be quite widely believed in the FRG and abroad. This fuelled the bitter campaigns in support of hunger strikes by gaolled RAF terrorists. The supporters organized groups such as Red Help, Solidarity Committee for Political Prisoners, all of which had the useful additional propaganda benefits of maintaining enthusiasm for violent action and constant portrayal of the FRG as a 'neo-fascist' state.

This helps to explain how the RAF has managed to regroup and reemerge since 1984, despite the enormous blows suffered in 1982, when their three leading figures were arrested after the Bochum bank raid. Although the action of the authorities and the discovery of many caches of RAF weapons stifled their terrorist activities for awhile, between 15 and 20 remained as a hard-core around which a new struggle could be organized. Though there are still two older generation RAF personalities involved (Henning Beer and Inge Viett), new recruits--possibly as many as 15--have been found in the active terrorist commando cells.

In 1982-3, the RAF produced a new tract admitting many past errors and containing self-criticism and more generous comments on other left extreme groups. This showed a new attitude of greater political realism and less of the old arrogant elitism of the early pamphlets. In addition, they brought about a merger with the residue of the 2nd of June Movement, giving them a new injection of members and supporters in 1980. And bank raids such as that of 26 March 1984 at Würzburg have enabled the RAF to replenish its finances. This is important
because it has been estimated that it costs about $50,000 to train and maintain an RAF terrorist activist.

There has been a considerable development in the international thinking of the group. In July 1984, police found documents outlining a three-stage plan: (i) to attack key NATO facilities; (ii) to simultaneously launch a hunger strike to get all RAF prisoners moved to the same prison; and (iii) the assassination of which they called 'representatives of repression' in the imperialist system. It is clear now that, despite the complete failure of the hunger strike, the international aspect of this strategy is being maintained. The January 15 communique issued jointly with AD is, therefore, not a mere diversionary tactic, as some thought, but a formal announcement of an alliance against NATO which the terrorists themselves regard as highly important. In the recent phase of this campaign, RAF has committed some particularly brutal murders and some audacious attacks on U.S. and NATO targets.

This greater emphasis on international 'struggle' is a marked contrast with the earlier generations of RAF. The honeymoon of RAF and the Fatah in Jordan was short-lived, and after this it largely confined itself to the West German scene. Even the Lufthansa hijack to Mogadishu in 1977 was not an RAF plan; it was a PFLP action designed to simply exploit the opportunity of the Schleyer kidnapping. Hans-Joachim Klein and Gabriele Krocher-Tiedemann were recruited on a purely individual basis for the Carlos raid on the Vienna OPEC conference in 1975. Similarly, with the cases of Wilfred B'o'o'se and Brigitte Kuhlmann who participated in the 1976 hijack to Entebbe.

The only effort at a major international operation by RAF until the present anti-NATO campaign was the abortive plan to kidnap the former Swedish Minister, Anna-Greta Leijon, to try to force the release of terrorists in German gaols.
It seems likely that the new links between RAF and AD stem partly from the former's recognition that the AD is one of the most effective Marxist terrorist organizations in Europe, and the belief that both could enhance their striking power with an alliance. Even so, there is a constant problem that differences of political outlook, experience, personalities and language could jeopardize their cooperation in the long run.

In the short term, the RAF has gained considerably by augmenting their rather shattered indigenous resources by the new links with AD and other foreign terrorist groups such as the PFLP. In view of its setbacks on the domestic front, we may expect this new international support mechanism for the extreme left terrorists to lead to intensified and more and more lethal and destructive attacks on NATO and on U.S. targets in particular.


State sponsorship only accounts for about 25 percent of international and domestic terrorist incidents annually. In fact, this is a remarkably low proportion when one considers the ease with which states can organize this type of violence. States have vast resources of weapons, cash and manpower compared to private groups. They have their entire diplomatic and intelligence networks through which to operate. Indeed, the Soviet Union, which has always been ready to use international terrorism as a weapon of foreign policy, on an opportunistic basis, has the added resources of the Warsaw Pact and Cuban intelligence and diplomatic services and foreign communist parties and national liberation movements (see Appendix B). States can cheat diplomatic norms by smuggling arms through in the diplomatic bag. They can exploit the cover of legitimate trade, aid, and other forms of cooperation and contact to promote clandestine intervention in the affairs of foreign states, and to promote terrorism.
International terrorism would also appear to have many attractions. It is a relatively low-cost and low-risk alternative to costly conventional wars which could escalate to nuclear level. Recent history shows that terrorist violence can gain useful tactical objectives, such as publicity, creation of a climate of fear, the surrender of prisoners, and other major concessions.

Yet most rational rulers must also be aware of the possible dangers. He who lives by the bomb may die by the bomb. Most states have domestic or foreign enemies who could easily turn the same weapon against them. There is always the danger, as illustrated in 1982 in Lebanon, that a terrorist act will spark a retaliation leading to full-scale war with far heavier costs in life and property than terrorism could ever bring by itself.

Nor should we forget that all states, even dictatorships, have a vested interest in the benefits of trade and industrial growth and modernisation. If these might be put at risk or lost through provoking confrontation, many regimes would back away from more provocative uses of violence.

This analysis, if soundly based, leads one to conclude that while there is every need to be firm and resolute in defending the democratic community of states and their innocent citizens from the spread of state-sponsored terrorism, we should not exaggerate the danger or over-react in our policy. The more fitting response, I would argue, is a firm, judicious and precise use of the international framework of law. Any use of force should be compatible with the spirit of the law and proportionate to the offence and the danger it poses.

State-sponsored support mechanisms of international terrorism have, perhaps understandably, received rather sensationalist publicity from the mass media and some of our politicians. Those of us who are academics are, of course, not really surprised when states like the Soviet Union, North Korea, Libya and
Iran, which routinely use terror to suppress their own peoples, employ the same method in their external policy. We must look at the problem coolly and analytically.

But it is salutary to be reminded of the degree of frightfulness some regimes promote. For example, Iran, which has just formally totally renounced the whole UN code of human rights, is now continuing its bloody path by wholesale massacre of the Bahai minority. It is high time the West took up cases of persistent human rights violators with the ICJ, UN Human Rights Commission and other international fora, instead of simply trying to sell such countries more weapons.

On the other hand, it is also very unhelpful for Western governments and mass media to make damning allegations about state complicity in international terrorism, unless or until they are in a position to provide proof. It is notoriously difficult for even the best intelligence services to establish beyond doubt a link between an actual terrorist attack and the hidden hand of a state sponsor. Regimes are usually far too devious to reveal such connections. They deliberately seek to preserve 'plausible deniability.' Serious accusations by Western states, if later proved false, only tend to damage Western credibility and demoralize and confuse the public and provide excuses for inaction.

A second danger is that if our media and opinion leaders weave colourful and grandiose conspiracy theories around unpopular regimes, this will tend to divert the public and politicians from addressing the real problems of non-state sponsored terrorism (indigenous and international) discussed earlier in our paper, about which we have fuller facts but far too little firm national and international action.

Effective Western international cooperation at this level, in intelligence sharing and police and judicial cooperation, would be just the kind of message
to send to the state terror regimes. It would show both our will and capability in defending ourselves from this insidious type of threat. To cite just one small example, it would be a positive step if the U.S. Congress agrees to remove the political exception clause in America's extradition treaty with Britain, so that we can try to ensure that those IRA fugitives suspected of very serious crimes can no longer fine safe haven but will be brought to justice. If old democratic allies cannot agree that bombing and shooting in public places is an intolerable threat to the innocent, what chance have we got of arriving at some more general international agreement to tackle the state terrorist regimes? The art of self-defense in a democracy is knowing where our weakest points lie, and doing something to rectify them. France has still failed to ratify the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism and continues to refuse to extradite terrorist suspects wanted for serious crimes in other European Community democracies! Greece has been so lax in dealing with terrorist crime generally that Athens has become a happy-hunting ground for terrorists. In Britain, it has now been revealed, Lord Whitelaw, when Home Secretary in 1982, made a deal with hijackers at Stansted which is a clear abdication of the principle of no concessions to terrorists. We all have mistakes and failures in counter-terrorism to live down.

We must make sure that throughout the democratic community of states and our valued allies around the world, we do not create an extra mechanism of support for terror in the form of weakness, ambiguity and confusion. Let us put our own house in order before we start searching for instant panaceas for global terrorism.
References

1. New York, Harper & Row, 1951

2. Ibid., pp 142-3


POUR L'UNITÉ
DES REVOLUTIONNAIRES
EN EUROPE DE L'OUEST

FÜR DIE EINHEIT
DER REVOLUTIONÄRE
IN WESTEUROPA

JANVIER. JANUAR 85
Nous déclarons:

Il est, aujourd'hui, nécessaire et possible d'ouvrir, dans les centres impérialistes, une nouvelle phase du développement de la stratégie révolutionnaire authentique, et l'une des conditions à ce saut qualitatif est de créer l'organisation internationale de combat prolétarien dans les métropoles, son noyau politico-militaire: la guérilla ouest-européenne.

Nous déterminons cette décision, à partir de la situation globale objective;

La centralité de l'Europe de l'Ouest pour le redéploiement impérialiste, conséquence de l'ouverture d'une brèche dans le rapport de force international par les luttes de libération des peuples des pays de la périphérie, résultant du heurt entre l'accroissement des forces productives et des limites du marché mondial, amène une globalisation politique et militaire de la crise à l'ensemble des pays impérialistes.

à partir de notre réalité;

L'expérience des dernières années, qui ont vu, dans les métropoles, l'implantation et le développement de la politique révolutionnaire armée, ainsi que l'apparition en différents points de nouveaux foyers de lutte de libération. A partir de ces expériences, des débats ont été menés au sein du mouvement révolutionnaire, pour la construction d'une stratégie et d'une taktique révolutionnaire dans les métropoles, dont l'affirmation -pour la perspective communiste en E.O- se présente aujourd'hui comme inéluctable.
C'est à dire:
économie de guerre comme un des moyens pour
résoudre la crise.

Les traits de la domination du capital et de
son idéologie "bien être", "garantie sociale",
"droit au travail", sont brisés par la bruta-
ilité des mesures de restructuration: exclusion
de millions d'hommes du processus de production
par la robotisation et le redéploiement industriel
au niveau mondial.

Cela signifie clairement pour l'homme ici de
plus en plus d'exploitation, de misère, de
manipulation de masse par le contrôle social
et à travers l'idéologie dominante.

Les États impérialistes à partir de leurs
instabilités substantielles et d'une perte
progressive de leurs légitimités, ne peuvent
que vouloir démontrer leur volonté à dominer.
Ils sont aujourd'hui confrontés au fait de ne
plus bénéficier d'aucun consensus passif pour
imposer leurs mesures.

Agonie politique
C'est l'autre face de leur pouvoir. Cette agonie
résultat de l'antagonisme développé au
niveau mondial par le prolétariat et les peuples
opprimés dans leur combat contre l'impérialis-
me-, est le terrain sur lequel l'offensive du
pouvoir prolétair en Europe de l'Ouest doit
être le facteur essentiel à l'aggravation en
étendue et profondeur de la crise du système.

Les attaques contre les structures multinatio-
nales de l'O.T.A.N, contre ses bases et ses stra-
tèges, contre ses plans et sa propagande ont
constitué la première grande mobilisation en
vue de la constitution de la stratégie politi-
que prolétarienne en Europe de l'Ouest dans des
conditions politiques modifiées.

2
l'ouvoir absolu que la bourgeoisie veut reconstituer en recouvrant toutes les contradictions déterminées par des aspects nationaux ou économiques, de cette structure, qui pénètre et détermine tous les domaines de la société, et donc la solution de leur crise globale, est la généralisation de la guerre militairement;
- "Roll Back" contre les peuples victorieux en Asie, Afrique, Amérique Centrale à travers la création d'unité de "blitz krieg", les interventions contre les mouvements de libération des pays de la périphérie et la préparation concrète à une guerre contre les pays socialistes de l'Est. L'impérialisme combat et se prépare à combattre partout. Pour cela, il doit rassembler et développer ses forces, de plus en plus d'aspects de ce combat et de sa préparation sont générés, à travers une nouvelle répartition des rôles sous le contrôle U.S. comme "nouvelle politique de l'O.T.A.N.", par les États européens.
- L'implantation des missiles bien qu'essentielle n'en fut qu'un moment. La revitalisation de l'U.E.O., la création en France des F.A.R, la coopération en matière d'armement des partenaires de l'O.T.A.N, (y compris la France), les discussions pour une participation allemande à la force de frappe française et son intégration à l'O.T.A.N, l'intention clairement exprimée d'intervenir contre les mouvements de libération en tant que O.T.A.N,...., sont les aspects les plus concrets de leur capacité de réalisations militaires.
- Par ailleurs la contre-révolution ("counterinsur-
gency") comme politique commune traversant l'ensemble des pays de la chaîne impérialiste en tant que réactions à un antagonisme et prévention à un front révolutionnaire pouvant par une rupture remettre en cause leur stratégie, détermine la réalité objective qui doit rentrer en compte dans le combat des révolutionnaires.
- économiquement;
En partant du fait de l'unification de la stratégie impérialiste, les tâches essentielles de la guérilla communiste en Europe de l'Ouest, pour le développement de son projet historique dans la lutte contre l'impérialisme, sont:

MENER LE DEBAT POUR UNE LIGNE POLITIQUE REVOLUTIONNAIRE, INITIANT LA CONSTRUCTION DE L'UNITE DANS L'OFFENSIVE CONTRE LA MACHINE IMPERIALISTE.

DEVELOPPER UN PROCESSUS DE POLITIQUE DE CLASSE DONT LA DIALECTIQUE RASSEMBLE LES PRATIQUE ANTAGONISTES DANS UN MOUVEMENT CONTRE L'ANÉANTISSEMENT VECU CHAQUE JOUR.
CONSTRUIRE LE FRONT POLITICO-MILITAIRE EN EUROPE DE L'OUEST, EN TANT QUE PARTIE DE L'AFFRONTEMENT MONDIAL ENTRE PROLETARIAT INTERNATIONAL ET BOURGEOISIE IMPERIALISTE.

CE FRONT, COMME PROCESSUS OUVERT, ORIENTE VERS UNE ATTAQUE COMMUNE, DOIT BRISER, DANS LES CENTRES, LA STRATEGIE IMPERIALISTE PARCE QUE C'EST D'ICI QU'ILS DOIVENT SE CONSTRUIRE MILITAIREMENT ET ECONOMIQUEMENT AFIN DE MAINTENIR LEUR DOMINATION GLOBALE.

Le projet central dans la phase actuelle de la stratégie impérialise est la tentative de souder les états européens en une structure homogène, en un bloc dur, qui soit complètement intégré dans le noyau du pouvoir impérialiste: l'O.T.A.N. en tant que la structure de domination la plus avancée ici. Son redéploiement structurel articulé politiquement, économiquement et militairement, est, en tant que remise en cause de la phase antérieure de repli face à la poussée des mouvements de libération, projet déterminant ici.
Une mobilisation qui se renforce en tant que combat contre le système d'exploitation et de guerre, comme elle l'a démontré par ses attaques au Portugal, en Grève, en Belgique, en Espagne, en R.F.A., et en France...

Contre tout les débats idéologiques et les programmes abstraits "sur l'internationalisme" nous affirmons:
La stratégie de la guérilla est;
par sa détermination:
Partie et fonction de la guerre de classe internationale
par sa pratique:
Unité politique des communistes en Europe de l'Ouest, construction de l'attaque contre la totalité du système impérialiste,
La transformation matérielle de l'internationalisme prolétarien que la situation actuelle nécessite.
La stratégie révolutionnaire authentique en Europe de l'Ouest se déploiera dans l'attaque contre les projets centraux impérialiste; collectivité et cohérence des combattants, à partir de leurs conditions et possibilités particulières.
Unité, qui dans la destruction des structures impérialistes, conquiert le terrain sur lequel se développe la conscience et le pouvoir prolétarien.

LA GUERRILLA OUEST-EUROPEENNE EBRANLE LE CENTRE IMPÉRIALISTE !

ACTION DIRECTE
NOTE ARMÉE FRAC'TION
Pages 1+2 not available
We say it is now necessary and possible to initiate a new phase for the development of an authentic revolutionary strategy in the imperialist centers and as a condition for this qualitative jump create the international organization of the proletarian struggle in the cities, and its political-military nucleus: the Western European guerilla.

We determine this step through the objective situation: the central position of Western Europe for imperialist reconstruction after the collapse of the international balance of power through the wars of liberation in the South and the collision between increasing productive capacities and the limits of the world market, which has led to the global politico-economic-military crisis of the imperialist chain of states and has extended to the entire imperialist system.

And for ourselves out of the experiences of the last few years, in which the revolutionary armed policy has taken root in the cities, and in which new battles have developed at various focal points of the confrontation between imperialism and liberation, experiences, which have helped to crystallize the conscious common struggle for revolutionary strategy and tactics in the cities, and which pose the question of their execution for the communist perspective in Western Europe with great urgency today.
in other words - due to the unified imperialist strategy, the job of the communist guerilla in Western Europe for the realization of their historic project is now:

THE DISCUSSION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY POLITICAL LINE WHICH MAKES UNITY IN THE OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE IMPERIALIST MACHINE POSSIBLE;

THE PRACTICAL PROCESS OF DEVELOPING A PROLETARIAN POLICY IN THE CENTERS,

AN OPEN PROCESS, ORIENTED ON THE COMMON ATTACK, WITH THE GOAL OF BREAKING THE IMPERIALIST STRATEGY IN THE CENTERS THEMSELVES, BECAUSE THIS IS WHERE THEY HAVE TO REGENERATE THEMSELVES MILITARILY AND ECONOMICALLY IN ORDER TO SAFEGUARD THEIR GLOBAL DOMINATION.

The central project in the present phase of the imperialist strategy is the attempt to weld the Western European states together into a homogeneous structure - into a hard bloc, which is perfectly integrated into the nucleus of imperialist power:
NATO - as the most complete imperialist structure of oppression.
The bourgeoisie wants to regenerate itself in this political-economic-
military structure in order to turn back the clock to the time before
the offensive of the wars of liberation
and in order to superimpose it on all national or economically de-
termined contradictions:
as absolute power,
which permeates all social relationships -
totalization of war as a solution for its comprehensive crisis.
militarily
towards the outside as the capability to wage lightning warfare
against the wars of liberation in the South, to roll back the front
of the victorious nations in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and in con-
crete preparation for an attack on the socialist states in the East.
The "new NATO Doctrin" is nothing but:
offensive strategy
into which the European states have been tied as relief for the
American military machine, because it needs the concentration of
all forces and means for a war on all fronts.
The stationing of the nuclear missiles was only one step, albeit
a decisive one, in this scheme. The "reactivation" of the WEU,
the establishment of the FAR in France, the cooperation in the
armaments sector by the European NATO states including France,
the discussion of a German voice in the force de frappe and its
inclusion in NATO,
finally the clear intention to intervene, as NATO, against the
Third World -
these are concrete steps of military formation.

Towards the inside, as a reaction to the antagonism and as prevention
against the possibility of the revolutionary front in the centers,
which can be a real irritant to its strategy -
counterinsurgency as unified state policy of the imperialist chain, this
is what determines the real situation here and is a condition which
all revolutionaries must take for granted.

Economically, the objective is to subject European industry to the
absolute domination by U.S. capital, and to assure the global position
of the imperialist bloc - U.S.A., Japan, Western Europe - and the
conditions for the multinational capitalist system, by concentrating
research and production in areas of strategic importance for them -
new technologies, electronics, weapons... This is called:
wartime economy as a means for overcoming crises.

The pillars of the capitalist ideology and domination in the cities,
"prosperity", "social security", and "right to work", have already
crumbled under the brutality of the restructuring measures:
the elimination of millions of people from the production process
through industrial re-organization on a global scale and robotization.
It is clear -
that for the local population, this means only more exploitation,
misery, mass manipulation, and social control by the dominant ideo-
logy.

Due to their substantial instability and the progressive loss of
their legitimacy, the imperialist states can now only demonstrate
their power to dominate.
They are today confronted by the fact that they no longer have a
passive consensus for any of their measures.

Political agony:
that is the other side of their power.
As a result of the antagonism, which has been developed world-wide
by the proletariat and the oppressed nations in their fight against
imperialism, it is the terrain on which the offensive of proletarian
power in Western Europe can become a decisive factor for the worsening
of the profound crisis of the system.

The attacks against the multinational structures of NATO, against
its bases and strategists, against its propaganda and its plans,
were the first great mobilization for the development of the strategy
of a proletarian policy in Western Europe under changed political
conditions, a mobilization, which will continue to develop and grow
as a fight against the system which is characterized by exploitation
and war, as can be seen from the attacks in Portugal, Belgium, Spain,
Against all ideological debates and abstract programs "on internationalism" we say the strategy of the Western European guerrilla is - by its purpose: a section and function of the international class struggle - and by its practice: the political unity of the communists in Western Europe, the organization of the attack on the totality of the imperialist system - it is the material manifestation of proletarian internationalism required by today's situation.

Authentic revolutionary strategy in Western Europe will develop through the attack on the central imperialist projects - collectivity and coherence of the fighters from their special conditions and possibilities.

Unity, which through the destruction of the imperialist structures conquers the space in which proletarian consciousness and power will develop.

THE WESTERN EUROPEAN GUERILLA [ILLEGIBLE WORD] THE IMPERIALIST CENTER!

ACTION DIRECTE
RED ARMY FACTION
SOVIET SUPPORT APPARATUS FOR TERRORISM

CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE

- Politburo
  - Secretariat
    - Internat. Dept. Central Committee
      - Other Dopts
        - Satellite CPS
          - Intelligence Services
          - Embassies etc
        - International Front Orgs
          - Non-Bloc CPS
            - Illegal network agents of influence, informers, etc
              - Illegal agents
                - Council of Ministers
                  - Min. of Defence
                    - GRU
                      - Illegal agents
                        - Soviet Embassies
                          - Trade Centres
                          - Delegations at UN or other international bodies etc

Client 'national liberation' movements
  (Training, weapons + support provided to select groups)

Wilkinson - Support Mechanisms

Appendix B

P.W. Nov '85
TERRORIST ATTACKS
IN PALESTINE/ISRAEL

1920-1921

1929

1936-1939

1964-1966

- Forest burned
- Fields set alight
- Murder
- Vehicle blown up
- Orchard cut down
- Village burned down
- Gunfire on village
- Village or town abandoned

1949 Armistice Line
- Actions of the Mufti
- Fedayeen attack

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Appendix C

TRAINING CAMPS IN ARAB COUNTRIES FOR FOREIGN TERRORISTS

(source: Dr. Ariel Merari, CSS Tel Aviv University)
STATE RESPONSE TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:

SOME CAUTIONARY COMMENTS

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official policy of the Government of the Commonwealth of
Australia or any of its agencies.

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INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is a phenomenon that increasingly is coming to dominate our lives. It influences the way governments conduct their foreign policy and the way corporations transact their business. It causes changes to the structure and role of our security forces and necessitates huge expenditures on measures to protect public figures, vital installations, citizens and, perhaps in the final analysis, our system of government. It affects the way we travel, the places we go and the manner in which we live our daily lives. Our newspapers, radios and televisions saturate our every waking moment with the lurid details of the latest terrorist spectacular.

Democratic governments seem peculiarly vulnerable to what many believe to be a novel contemporary form of political violence. Small groups with little or no direct political power seem, by employing terrorist tactics, to be able to achieve effects on a target community which are entirely disproportionate to their numerical or political importance. But just how great a threat does terrorism pose? And if it is a threat, what exactly does it threaten? After all, although terrorism is bloody and getting bloodier (Cordes, Hoffmann, Jenkins, Kellen, Moran and Sater 1984), its track record as a cause of death and injury pales into insignificance beside such other causes of death as motor
vehicle accidents, which cause untold annual carnage but seem somehow to be 'accepted' as a lamentable, but inevitable, consequence of modern life.

Contemporary political terrorism came of age in the 1960s and 1970s. A wave of spectacular aircraft hijackings and embassy takeovers, together with an almost routine fare of bombings, assassinations, and kidnappings, ensured that terrorism was given constant media exposure. Public apprehension was heightened, minor tactical gains were made by the terrorists, and governments responded with increased security and a growing resolve not to accede to terrorist demands. But terrorism seemed to spread and emerge in new forms. Not only did insurgent or revolutionary groups employ terror tactics against targets in their own countries but, increasingly, took their cause to the world. Acts of terrorism associated with the Palestinian cause or the Armenian genocide issue, for example, occurred in countries far away from the source of the issue. Groups such as the Japanese Red Army, with no particular constituency and a vague goal of world revolution, saw the globe as their battleground. States themselves exploited terrorism to further their own foreign policy or internal political goals. International terrorism came to pose a threat which was often quite separate from the domestic terrorism which had hitherto been the main affliction of states under attack.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s the security authorities in a number of countries notched up major victories in counter-terrorist operations, prompting some commentators to claim that the 'war on terrorism' was being won. The hardening resolve of the authorities was demonstrated by such successes as Entebbe, Mogadishu, and Princes Gate. It was pointed out that the pressure exerted on democracies by groups such as the Palestine Liberation Organisation, the Red Brigades, and the Baader-Meinhof gang had been substantially reduced. In the Middle East, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the subsequent dispersal of the PLO, together with the PLO's own internal problems, were seen by some as limiting the scope of Palestinian terrorism for the immediate future. In Europe, the capture and imprisonment of large numbers of the Italian Red Brigades and the mopping up of the remnants of the Baader-Meinhof gang in Germany were predicted to bring a substantial reduction in terrorism on the Continent.

But that optimism has lately given way to a grim realisation that terrorism is indeed here to stay and is set to exert increasing influence on the world political scene. Since the early 1980s the number of international terrorist incidents has again been on the rise. In addition, the number of groups involved in terrorism continues to grow. In 1982, the State Department reported that 117 groups representing 71 nationalities claimed responsibility for terrorist incidents, the second-largest total since 1968. In Europe and the Middle East there has been a
resurgence of terrorism by groups thought largely to have been neutralised (Bolton, 1984; Hoffman, 1984; Horchem, 1985; Kellen, 1985; O'Ballance, 1985). Terrorism is far from defeated.

Not only is terrorism now increasing in incidence, it is also resulting in higher casualties. Since 1977, the number of international terrorist incidents resulting in fatalities has increased each year (Cordes et al., 1984). In 1984, the total number of incidents which were lethal or clearly intended to be lethal increased at least proportionally to the total number of incidents (Oakley, 1985). Ironically, the increasing number of casualties associated with terrorism is partially a result of successes in developing anti-terrorist methods. Established, major terrorist groups have largely abandoned the embassy takeovers and airplane hijackings of the 1960s and 1970s because of the successful response of governments to these methods. Increased security, refined hostage negotiation procedures, and an increased willingness on the part of governments to refuse to make major concessions and to use force if necessary to terminate terrorist sieges have made skyjackings and hostage-taking much less attractive options for terrorists. For many, resort to such methods now involves too many risks and too few rewards.

Paradoxically, however, we are also seeing the emergence of a new breed of fanatical terrorists willing to martyr
themselves for their cause. The result is a return to the time-honoured methods of the bomb and the bullet. The use of bombings and assassinations has meant that security forces have had less opportunity to mount successful counter-terrorist operations and that casualties have been higher. While relatively few hostages died in sieges or hijackings, the much more indiscriminate and destructive nature of bombings results in large numbers of deaths and injuries. Bombings such as those of the U.S. Marine headquarters in Beirut in 1983, with death-tolls in the hundreds, are still relatively unusual, but they are increasing and could well become standard terrorist practice.

In spite of the attention devoted to terrorism carried out by revolutionary or insurgent groups, however, it is not this brand of violence which poses the most serious threat to either internal stability or international affairs. That role is reserved for state-sponsored terrorism. The threat lies not in the terrorist act itself. The importance of such events as the murder of WPC Fletcher outside the Libyan People's Bureau in London or even the bombing of the U.S. Marines in Beirut, lies not so much in the horrendous nature of the acts themselves (which are rightly condemned), but in their implications for international relations. If such acts become too frequent and too effective; when state sponsored terrorism turns into a real threat to national interests, the conflict will almost certainly escalate into something more dangerous than mere terrorism. The
great danger is that terrorism may come to be seen generally as part of the armoury of states. If this occurs we face the spectre of a spiral of terrorism, pre-emptive action, punishment raids and reprisal terrorism conducted and financed by states with their vast resources. The potential consequences for international peace and stability are easy to imagine.

In addition to examining terrorism as a phenomenon of international relations, attention is increasingly being focused on the possibility of terrorism providing an alternative means to dominating situations that normally are influenced by conventional military forces. Many analysts see an emerging role for terrorism as a means of 'surrogate warfare' employed by states against other nations (Jenkins, 1984a; Kupperman, Alexander, Van Opstal and Williamson, 1984; Motley, 1984; Wright, 1984).

There is evidence of a trend towards the development of low-level conflict as an important part of the world strategic mosaic. Early predictions that low-level conflict would replace costly conventional wars (Halle, 1973) seem to have been somewhat overstated in that major conventional engagements still occur (e.g., the Arab-Israeli wars, the current Iran-Iraq struggle) and show little sign of becoming obsolete. But modes of conflict such as guerrilla warfare and terrorism continue to increase. What is more important is that they are being used not only by insurgents, but by states as well.
Possibly the increased use of low-level conflict is related to the diffusion of power in the world today (Sloan, 1982). Ethnicity and nationality compete as the basis for legitimate political authority. The number of independent states has grown considerably in the past three or four decades and a significant proportion of these nations are 'ministates' which are economically dependent and vulnerable to external pressure. Others may not be classed as ministates, but still feel unable to exert sufficient influence over their own affairs or those of their region because of the influence of larger powers. Resort to the tactics of terrorism, or the formation of alliances with terrorist groups, provides an option which allows such nations, which would otherwise be unable to mount challenges using conventional force, to carry out surrogate warfare against their opponents. Some analysts go further and suggest that even large nations may resort more readily to forms of low-level warfare, including terrorism, in the face of the massively escalating costs of conventional warfare. Once again, predictions of this nature over-emphasize the likelihood or the extent of this development. Nevertheless, the evidence is there of a trend in this direction and we should certainly be devoting more resources to the study of terrorism as an element of military strategy and to the development of appropriate military (as opposed to police) doctrine and countermeasures. Indeed, Jenkins (1984a) has pointed out how important the interaction of conventional war, guerrilla warfare and international terrorism is likely to be in the future.
If one wants evidence of the usefulness of the new strategy of terrorism one has only to look at recent events in the Middle East. Instead of (or as well as) using terrorism as an tactic to overthrow incumbent regimes, terrorists now seek to use it as an instrument to change the foreign policy of nation states. Look, for example, at the case of the hijacking of TWA flight 847 in June this year. What did the terrorists want? The call for the release of the 766 Lebanese, mostly Shiites, held by Israel was merely a pretext for an act with wider implications. Israel had already announced it would soon free the prisoners and it is doubtful that their perceived plight was ever the terrorists' primary concern. Instead, what was desired was the humiliation of the United States. Whether or not it appears that way to us, the message conveyed to the Middle East was that the U.S. was a blustering giant, full of rhetoric, invective and brave statements of intention, but incapable of or lacking the political will to take any real, effective action. The government that insisted it would not negotiate with terrorists was made to appear as if it had (and may, in fact, have) done just that. The President who had spoken so loudly about how he would never find himself in the situation Jimmy Carter did over the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran found himself in exactly that situation - and faced the same realities limiting effective action. The subsequent posturing of administration officials (for example, National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane's threat to bomb the 'nerve centres' of terrorism) and
statements by President Reagan (for example, asserting after viewing the film 'Rambo' that he would 'know what to do next time') only served to further underline the emptiness of American threats.

As with most other terrorist spectacles, the incident was cleverly choreographed to ensure maximum media coverage and maximum exposure of their propaganda worldwide. Indeed the novel and complex scenario which unfolded as the original terrorists were superseded first by Nabih Berri's Shiite Amal militia, and eventually by President Assad of Syria stands to date as the cleverest example of terrorist manipulation of the free world's news media. The result was an astonishingly successful propaganda coup, complete with statements of solidarity and sympathy from both some of the hostages themselves and from many journalists and commentators who while 'disagreeing with the terrorists' methods' found them 'understandable' and condemned Israeli actions and U.S. involvement in the region.

As an editorial in the magazine New Republic pointed out, there were also two major political impacts of the affair. First, the incident and its handling at least temporarily disrupted the relationship between the United States and Israel. Second, and perhaps the major aim of the exercise, the hijackers influenced the political atmosphere in the Middle East to disrupt the emerging peace process. The tentative moves being made by
Jordan's King Hussein (with U.S. encouragement) to bring Israel and the PLO into some kind of dialogue were brought to a halt by first the hijacking and destruction of a Jordanian airliner and then the hijacking of TWA 847. As New Republic put it:

"Talk of a settlement was all but silenced. The so-called moderate Arabs had been gaining stature. Now they are weakened, and the irreconcilable foes of Israel are strengthened. Consider who gained the most in the hostage crisis - Hafez al-Assad of Syria. He is the new force to be reckoned with. And his game is not to forge peace between Israel and its neighbours, but to make certain that peace does not break out (29 July 1985)."²

Subsequent events in the Middle East illustrate how complex a matter it is to take the firm action which is generally advocated as the antidote for terrorism and to ensure at the same time that the treatment has the desired effect. For all its moral virtues and for all its high appeal to domestic opinion in the United States, the forcing down by U.S. fighter planes of the aircraft carrying the Achille Lauro hijackers is still an action of uncertain benefits. Yes, it sent a message that the U.S. will not stand by and do nothing in the face of terrorism. But it also carried important costs. The most obvious, of course, were
the fall (even if only for a short time) of the Italian Government and the souring of relations with Egypt. But it also, in my mind, set an unfortunate precedent in showing a willingness to engage in actions which were either of doubtful legitimacy or were simply illegitimate under international law (depending on whose advice one accepts) in order to achieve a morally legitimate end. Particularly in view of the fact that it is entirely uncertain what effect, if any, the action will have on the incidence of international terrorism, the precedent could be an unfortunate one which could serve to undermine other U.S. initiatives to seek to find at least partial solutions within the framework of international law.

It seems, then, that we are entering a new era of terrorism with different aims. Terrorism as part of civil wars, or separatist struggles, or attempts to overthrow incumbent regimes will continue to form the backdrop. If handled properly, such terrorism is not likely to be the major component in any strategic successes gained by dissidents and certainly does not fundamentally threaten healthy liberal democracies. But state-sponsored international terrorism poses a different type of threat. Its aims are more precise, more restricted, and more achievable than those of terrorism conducted in a national context (which either aims at all-embracing ends, such as overthrowing a regime, or at achieving what in reality are impossible or highly improbable results, such as the establishment of an Armenian homeland). It is increasingly
obvious that international terrorism, particularly of the state-sponsored variety, can influence the foreign policy of nations, can disrupt and perhaps destroy political processes which are of importance to the international community, and does present a real threat to international order and stability. The challenge for the international system is to construct a flexible and imaginative counter-terrorist mechanism which can deal with this emerging threat and can mesh with the counter-terrorist machinery which individual states have established to combat terrorism aimed at their own national integrity. In order to meet this challenge we first need to assess the nature of the threat posed by international terrorism.

THE NATURE OF THE THREAT

In assessing the threat posed by terrorism, can we separate the media image from the reality – indeed are they the same or different? Certainly we seem to receive images of terrorism in a highly selective manner. Terrorism currently seems endemic in a number of regions of the world as a seemingly inevitable part of violent domestic conflicts. But little ongoing attention and, certainly, few headlines are devoted to many of these instances of terrorism. If an IRA bomb explodes in London killing some innocent victim we are inundated with news flashes, extensive news coverage, and interminable background analyses. A steady diet of bombings and assassinations in, say, the Lebanon, El Salvador, or Iran goes virtually unreported, however, unless a
hapless Westerner is one of the victims. The moral tone of reporting is similarly distorted. The bombing of a hotel in Brighton is reported in tones of moral outrage, whereas a bombing in South Africa is covered generally in value-neutral or even positive terms (we 'understand' the act as an inevitable response to 'intolerable' provocation' or an 'evil system of repression'). Spokespersons for various governments make distinctions between 'terrorists' and 'freedom fighters', whilst being unable to accept that similar distinctions with the opposite value connotations are made by governments from other political traditions or systems. As the leader in the campaign against international terrorism, the United States is particularly vulnerable to charges of such inconsistency. Obviously, U.S.-sponsored covert operations in such places as Nicaragua, Angola and Afghanistan involve the U.S. with forces who would be labelled terrorist if they were opposing regimes friendly to the U.S. The rapidity with which Syria was dropped from the official U.S. list of terrorist states following the involvement of President Assad in negotiating the release of American hostages in the recent TWA hijacking drama in the Lebanon is ample proof of how subjective and ideologically loaded a term 'terrorist' is. I must emphasise that to point out the inconsistency here is not to condemn support for some groups. But we must be clear that such support is support for terrorism in some cases. In order to gather widespread support for forms of terrorism that are largely condemned by the community of nations, however, leading states
should avoid the resounding moral language which can only smack of hypocrisy to many. While it may appeal to domestic audiences to denounce terrorists as 'animals', as 'roving bands of criminals' and as 'sick', such language does little to advance our understanding of terrorists or terrorism. There are many forms of violence, including those utilised by nations, which are equally reprehensible, yet which draw no such extreme condemnation. For many acts of terrorism, the motives are clear and specific. We may despise the morality of the acts, but the perpetrators are not irrational. The use of moralistic hyperbole provides too convenient an excuse for some nations to opt out of international cooperation and generates yet more sources of discontent and inflammatory rhetoric among those who would maim and kill for any cause. Leaving aside the superfluous morality and concentrating on a common response to a shared threat will produce more tangible results and lead into fewer irrelevant sidetracks.

Taking a more detached view of terrorism may help also to provide realistic assessments of the threat posed by different types of terrorism. We need a much more complex and sophisticated approach to terrorism which differentiates between different types, assigns varying degrees of threat, and produces individualised recommendations for countermeasures. The idea of a general policy against terrorism is inherently faulty - terrorism has to be countered in a discriminating, case-by-case way.
While there is a pressing need for sophisticated, well-exercised and capably-led counter-terrorist machinery, our counter-terrorist policy must necessarily remain at a general level if we are to have the flexibility which is necessary in order to deal imaginatively with the literally infinite range of possible terrorist scenarios. There is certainly an argument for enunciating a small range of policies such as 'no concessions' policies, or stating that options such as reprisals or military rescue operations will not be excluded from the counter-terrorist armamentarium. Such enunciation will serve some effect, but even here there may eventually be costs to be borne for stating these principles too loudly or in too strident terms. Clearly, there will be occasions upon which the political realities of a particular incident will make, for example, a 'no concessions' or a 'no negotiations' policy impossible to sustain and in such circumstances decision-makers should have the latitude to change direction in a timely fashion rather than have to capitulate in an embarrassing scene of public humiliation.

The issue of how strictly a state should delineate its counter-terrorist policy is intimately bound up with the issue of the language with which terrorism is discussed, particularly the moral tone of the language used. It is especially important for the credibility of a nation's counter-terrorist posture that there is a close match between words and deeds. Rhetoric may be a useful debating tool and may be an inevitable part of political
discourse, but great care must be taken to ensure that the rhetoric is not shown to be devoid of real meaning. In my judgment, the credibility of the United States has been damaged severely by the stream of overstatement, empty threats, distracting and partial characterisations, and careless asides on terrorism which has flowed from Administration spokespersons. President Reagan's comparison of Libya, Iran, North Korea, Cuba and Nicaragua as an international terrorist network comparable to Murder Incorporated and his famous quip that Americans would not tolerate 'these attacks from outlaw states run by the strangest collection misfits, looney tunes and squalid criminals since the advent of the Third Reich' may have been great theatre, but it was not great statesmanship. Other statements by U.S. officials have stressed the essentially anti-American nature of much modern terrorism - a view which naturally tends to create a siege mentality and an understandable tendency to hit back to defend honour and perceived vital interests. But this characterisation too is, in most cases, an over-simplification. While there are important anti-American elements to some terrorism, most is not an anti-American crusade and it should not be portrayed as such. Because of her status as a superpower, because of her global reach, and because of her dominant position in the world economy, America provides many of the most obvious and convenient targets for terrorist attack. As such, the United States suffers disproportionately as the target of international terrorism. But much of the anti-Americanism is symbolic rather than seriously
threatening. This is no consolation whatsoever to the growing list of American victims of terrorism, but it is an important factor which should temper the official response. Clearly, the United States is the leader of the global effort to counter international terrorism and carries the burden of an extra responsibility to set the appropriate tone and suggest the appropriate balance of the response to the foul crimes which are committed in the name of growing numbers of ideologies and issues. In my view, it is these issues of balance and tone which the Western democracies have yet to resolve.

Balance applies both to the balanced judgment as to the nature and level of threat posed by international terrorism to the vital interests or proper functioning of democratic states and to the balanced response to the assessed threat. The first issue is that of threat assessment. Just how much of a threat is international terrorism? Is the threat inherent in the terrorist acts themselves or is the threat partially, equally or more particularly created by some of the possible reactions to terrorism. The well-known intentions of terrorist theoreticians such as Carlos Marighela (Marighela, 1974) to provoke the authorities into heavy-handed over-reaction to domestic terrorism translate easily to the international scene. There is no doubt that the provocation of an ill-considered and emotionally-based over-reaction to international terrorism would equally serve the purposes of terrorist groups or their state sponsors. At the
same time, the failure to act resolutely will surely do considerable damage. At the extremes, irresolute responses to international terrorism may result in a small, ruthless and unrepresentative group dictating the policies and actions of states. At the least, public confidence in the ability of legitimate governments to provide for the security of its citizens will be undermined, with the very real possibility of the development of private initiatives to punish the offenders and the consequent further destabilisation of the international system (Crenshaw, 1983a; Nathan, 1981). The first balance we need to seek, then, is that between prudence and paranoia, between action and inaction, and most importantly, between paying too much attention to international terrorism and paying too little attention to it.

An essential element in discovering this balance is the ability and the willingness to distinguish between different types of terrorist threat. To date, states have been too ready to perceive international terrorism as a monolithic entity posing an immediate and real threat to vital state interests or to the survival of states or the international system. Even where it has been clear that some incidents pose less of a real threat than others, most states have, at least in their public utterances, been unwilling to distinguish between them. It is my contention that this failure has grossly exaggerated the real threat posed by terrorism, and has inflamed public reaction to
incidents to the point at which politicians now find their options severely constrained if not, in some cases, virtually pre-determined. Once again the parallels between domestic and international terrorism are apparent. While many governments address domestic terrorism in terms of a battle for the very existence of democracy, a very cogent argument can be mounted to support the proposition that 'terrorist groups are, by their very nature, and that of the strategies they pursue, incapable of posing any threat to democratic states ...' (Mack, 1981, p. 199, emphasis in original). Mack argues convincingly that while revolutionary terrorism can be effective under certain circumstances, the necessary conditions do not exist in democratic societies. As I have argued elsewhere (Wardlaw, in press), it is largely the exploitation of the terrorist image by the media and perceptions which flow from sensationalist coverage of terrorist spectaculars which are responsible for the widespread belief that terrorism poses a significant challenge to the survival of democracies. In many ways our perceptions of domestic terrorism and reactions to it fall within the category of a 'moral panic' (Hall, Chritcher, Jefferson, Clarke and Roberts, 1978) in which often there is a major discrepancy between the perceived threat and the reality. The great difficulty, of course, is to be able to divorce oneself sufficiently from the human tragedy and the barbarism of terrorism to be able to assess just what damage is done away from the scene of the horror.
The disjunction between the perception of and the reality of much terrorism serves to elevate terrorism to undeserved prominence on policy agendas and to grossly inflate the importance of terrorist groups. Indeed, as Cerny (1981) observes:

The potential power of these groups seems to lie not in their threat to overthrow society by force of arms per se, but in their ability, to symbolise the fragility and vulnerability of the social order and to force that order to subvert itself by eroding the liberal and democratic values upon which its own legitimacy is based (p. 92).

In the case of international terrorism, governments have often been the willing accomplices of the news media in generating and maintaining the hysteria which surrounds terrorism and have thus themselves been guilty of subverting the process of accurate threat assessment. The result has been that the issue of international terrorism has assumed monumental proportions. Let me be quite clear that I consider international terrorism to be a serious problem which deserves the attention of all nations. However, I believe much of the debate about methods of responding to terrorism has become unfocused because of our failure to distinguish one sort of threat from another and to articulate to the public why certain tactics used in certain circumstances may seriously impair a state's ability to conduct its necessary
affairs, why and which vital national interests are in jeopardy, and how the functioning of the international system may be threatened. By failing to make these distinctions and to argue through their consequences, we are consigned to viewing international terrorism as a much more potent force than it is in many cases. We underestimate the resilience both of democratic states and of the international system and thereby elevate terrorism to a position from which it is able to determine a state's foreign policy. In short, our crisis of confidence hands the terrorists or, more importantly, their sponsors, an unnecessary victory. Walter Laqueur summed up the need for the sense of perspective I am arguing for when he wrote of the importance of pointing out:

... the wide discrepancy between the facts about terrorism, which almost always fails, and the mistaken perceptions of an all-powerful, omnipresent monster ... Historically terrorism has been no more than a minor nuisance - tragic as far as its victims are concerned, but on the whole ineffective. To regard it as one of the gravest challenges to U.S. interests is not just a mistake. It is dangerous, for it focuses attention on a sideshow in a sideshow - some cutthroats from West Beirut or other such places, who may or may not be manipulated from afar; wretched figures of little consequence, the wrong enemy in the wrong place.
Thus my argument is that any policy for counter-terrorism, at any level, must make fundamental distinctions between types of terrorism. Any policy which assumes all terrorists to be fundamentally similar or to pose essentially similar threats will miss opportunities to intervene in some cases and will intervene inappropriately in others. What is needed is a more sophisticated analysis which allows us to respond differentially to terrorism and which recognises that terrorism is not the only or the greatest danger facing us. 'We need not an unconditional, singleminded commitment but intelligent wariness, a capacity to sort out contending priorities and a readiness to determine what resources it is prudent to bring to bear and what costs it is necessary to pay'.¹ Such a perspective may assist states to avoid making policy changes in response to international terrorism, which must assist in reducing the pay-off for this tactic. Indeed, one of the greatest dangers posed by international terrorism is that it can succeed in forcing policy changes by states. Accordingly, one of the signal ways of deterring terrorism is to demonstrate that terrorism does not change state policy. To be in the position of strength necessary to withstand the onslaught, however, states must carefully reappraise the justification for some present policies so that those likely to be the target of terrorist demands are those to which the state is highly committed. The withdrawal of United States Marines from the Lebanon following the bombing of the Marine component of the Multi-National Peacekeeping Force was
viewed by many in the Middle East as a victory for terrorism, vindicating the use of such tactics. But the decision to withdraw, although occasioned by the attack, was, of course, a result of a complex of factors including domestic dissent over the appropriateness of the commitment, lack of clear definition of the force's mission, and absence of a cogent and well-articulated policy on the Lebanon which would have heightened the political will to maintain the force in place. For all practical purposes, foreign policy succumbed to terrorism. The appearance of vacillation and weakness flowing from the decision to withdraw subsequent to the bombing serves only to underscore my contention that states must be committed to the policy which is the real target of a terrorist attack if they are to provide any true deterrent to future international terrorism. Of course, what undermines even this degree of commitment is that it is unlikely in reality to be uniform across states. Although the community of nations is coming to the realisation that no state is now immune from terrorism, it still remains true that it impacts less severely on some than on others. Further, despite general condemnation of terrorism many states have ambiguous policies with regard to particular groups or situations. Thus, as Jenkins (1984a) notes:

The relationship between governments and terrorists is not a simple conflict between terrorists and the state. Governments have variously - sometimes simultaneously -
tolerated, combatted, fomented, supplied, and exploited terrorist groups. Beneath the rhetoric of moral outrage is a labyrinth of secret wars, deals, direct action, and deliberate inaction (p.24).

While we all wish that cohesive international action against terrorism were possible and while all states of good will should continue to work towards this end, we must remain cognizant of the realities of individual state interests. The failure of the international community to act in concert (particularly of Western democratic nations which we presume to be more motivated to fight what their rhetoric says is a 'common enemy'), and the instances of backsliding when confronted with actual incidents of terrorism (due to economic considerations, fear, or sympathy with the cause, if not the methods, of some groups) all serve to ensure that terrorism will continue, even in the face of a hardline approach by some states. Nevertheless, there are signs of an emerging consensus which may lead to more unified international action in at least some circumstances. The recent refusal of a number of states in the Mediterranean area to accept the entry into their ports of the hijacked liner 'Achille Lauro' or the landing of the aircraft spiriting the hijackers out of Egypt (the plane subsequently being forced to land at a NATO base in Italy by U.S. Navy fighter planes) was an encouraging sign that even states which have stridently supported Palestinian
terrorism can now see circumstances in which it is in their own interests, and that of the international community, to condemn some acts of terrorism and to take steps to counter them. Indeed this was but the latest in a growing list of instances in which states have had to resolve value conflicts over support for elements of the international system versus support for particular ideologies. Crenshaw (1983b) believes that:

... the problem of terrorism emphasises the value to all states of fundamental norms that guarantee the safety of diplomatic and commercial exchanges. As terrorism comes more and more to involve attacks on diplomats, travellers and business executives, it provokes a clash between two competing sets of values, and it poses the question of whether the pursuit of anti-colonialism is worth abandoning traditional standards of state behaviour, such as diplomatic inviolability and the responsibility of host governments for the safety of foreigners. The consensus among states has moved gradually toward rejection of those forms of political expression which violate such basic trust (p. 28).

Even the Soviet Union, which has been loudly condemned for its sponsorship of international terrorism has felt constrained to
support some restricted initiatives when its own interests have been threatened (Goren, 1984). The recent kidnapping in the Lebanon of four Soviet diplomats and the subsequent murder of one of them may at least serve to alert the Soviets to the fact that they are increasingly likely to reap the whirlwind they helped to sow and may impel them to participate in a meaningful way in international initiatives against terrorism.

Although there are many cases which negate the positive impact of the instances I have cited, the undoubted fact of an increasing realisation of the potentially destabilising impact of terrorism on international relations and the tendency towards cooperation against terrorism, particularly on a bilateral or regional basis, are encouraging signs that some sort of cohesive response is possible. Our vision for the future of international cooperation can, therefore, be one of moderate hope. This middle course may not be very exciting, but it is realistic. Prescriptions for countermeasures must avoid the extremes of either the pessimism of many current commentators who see international terrorism as the leading threat to world peace or the visionary optimism of those who dream of an international legal order capable of resolving all the issues of definition, state sovereignty and appropriateness of response which so bedevil current proposals for international cooperation. In reality, neither extremely negative nor extremely positive outcomes are the most likely. Perhaps one could characterise the most likely outcomes as
extremely pedestrian. This view is expressed well by Carlton (1979) in his warning about the difficulties of predicting the future of terrorism:

... those who examine subjects such as war and violence may be consciously or subconsciously fascinated by apocalyptic possibilities and hence may tend greatly to underrate the evidence or trends that could lend themselves to unexciting conclusions. For example, the least diverting prediction for the future of terrorism would be one that foresaw neither uncontrolled escalation nor deescalation after a dramatic reassertion of authority by sovereign states, but rather one that foresaw a continuing untidy pattern of incidents largely unrelated to one another and each of only transient significance to an increasingly unconcerned world (p. 202).

Even so, the problem of international terrorism is serious enough, and there always remains the possibility of escalation to new forms of mass-destruction or mass-casualty terrorism as groups become more extreme, extensive media coverage becomes harder to ensure (because audiences become hardened to the consequences of lesser events), and states become more intransigent in their dealings with terrorists (Wardlaw, 1982).
Further, terrorism will occupy more of the attention of governments and military planners as an important part of the emerging pattern of imprecise, multi-faceted forms of warfare which may well characterise the future (Jenkins, 1984a).

As we contemplate the future of terrorism, a number of rather contradictory facts emerge. It is clear that there are some objective causes of terrorism and that some groups will not eschew the tactics of terror entirely while the underlying problems remain unresolved. This will be true however harsh the response to terrorism. In extreme desperation, extreme tactics will be used (and what is considered 'extreme' may not be objectively true nor may the response conform to our conception of a morally justifiable tactic of change). However, much international terrorism is not of this nature and will be less so, proportionately, as states make calculated decisions to engage in, sponsor or give support to international terrorism in furtherance of foreign policy objectives. This increase in state-backed international terrorism implies that the states involved have made some sort of cost-benefit analysis which has indicated that employing terrorism is cost-effective. This being so, it is clear that raising the costs of participation will change the equation and, eventually, the decision to become involved. The case of desperate or totally extremist regimes sponsoring terrorism without regard to the costs is highly unlikely. Even regimes such as those in power in Libya and Iran
which are routinely referred to as 'insane' or 'out of control' are forced to participate to some extent in the international system and unless they are willing to provoke an all-out military confrontation are thereby restrained to some extent in their support or use of terrorism. Certainly there is much extremist language emanating from Tripoli and Tehran but the resultant terrorism, although producing individual murders or more shocking mass casualties from vehicle bomb attacks, has not achieved the scale or scope promised by the speechmakers. In large part, this may be because even these regimes realise there is a point beyond which it is not worth their going. Thus we see the paradoxical situation in which it is claimed that the international system is too weak to fight international terrorism, yet the essential features of this system have themselves produced the restraints which have thus far prevented terrorism from assuming the monumental proportions of which the media are so fond of reporting. This observation leads one to suppose that we ought to be more imaginative in trying to find ways to exploit the reliance of states on international connections so that these might be threatened by the community of nations if one of its members is implicated in an act of international terrorism. Instead of turning hastily to talk of military reprisals perhaps we should put much more of our resources into making the international system work for its members. This may be emotionally less satisfying than some spectacular reprisal, but may be much more productive in the long term.
In discussing how we might use the system of international relations to fight terrorism we return inevitably to the questions of definitions, standards, and style of language. Let me reiterate that I believe that those who aim to lead the fight against international terrorism must first ensure that they set their own house in order. It is difficult for some states, for example, to accept criticism from the United States about lack of a willingness to extradite terrorists or failure to take action to prevent the training of terrorists on their soil when U.S. courts have denied the extradition to Britain of four men wanted for terrorist crimes in Northern Ireland and Sikh terrorists and others are trained in insurgency warfare techniques in schools operating openly and legally in America.

The second point is that we must be careful and, above all, consistent in our use of the term 'terrorist'. This word is used promiscuously by governments of all persuasions to embrace many things (guerrilla warfare, civil violence, ordinary crimes,) which are not by accepted definitions 'terrorist'. There is a corresponding lack of willingness to label a clearly terrorist act as much if it is committed by one's friends. In practical terms, for such purposes as reaching international agreements on terrorist crimes, it is sensible to avoid using the word terrorist at all and instead concentrate on specific acts (such as taking diplomatic hostages or hijacking aircraft) which most states can agree should be proceeded against whatever the motive
for them. But in political and everyday discourse the term terrorism will not be abandoned and it therefore behooves responsible states to encourage its rational and even-handed use. In particular this implies that an act committed by a friendly nation which fits the definition of terrorism should be condemned. We can expect no better from those we criticise about their response if we remain silent about some cases of terrorism, yet violently condemn others. This even-handedness need not degenerate into the morass which has become the debate on moral equivalence presided over by the ex-United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick (Kirkpatrick, 1984, 1985). Crenshaw (1983), for example, argues that '... we can develop a neutral definition of terrorism while retaining the ability to make moral judgments about its use in different political circumstances. Labeling an action "terrorist" is not in itself a moral claim' (p. 5). One can therefore, make moral distinctions about both the means and ends of terrorism. Further, it is simply not valid to assert that condemnation of behaviour which a neutral definition would label as terrorist, perpetrated by groups sponsored, for example, by both the U.S. and the USSR, is to say that there is a moral equivalence between the two societies or their ideologies. Let me say quite categorically that democratic values are morally superior to totalitarian ones.

That fact, however, does not lead me into blind acceptance of all the methods used or supported by democracies or their proxies. As Nye (1985) reminds us, 'a democracy can be good and
do evil - sometimes even when it is trying to do good' 7). To condemn terrorism used by a group of whose cause we approve does not imply condemnation of the cause or of the group's right to struggle. But we must be consistent and condemn similar acts regardless of their source. Certainly, all terrorist acts involving innocent civilian bystanders must be condemned on all occasions.

Part of the difficulty experienced by democratic states in taking the consistent approach I am advocating is that they feel that there may indeed be circumstances in which terrorism is justified or in which even democratic states must employ 'dirty' methods in order to combat effectively an enemy who refuses to 'play by the rules'. In extreme circumstances this may be true (I am thinking here particularly of the spectre of nuclear terrorism), but to adopt this mode of thinking in the absence of extreme threat is itself dangerous. Again we return to the issue of defining the seriousness of the threat. My contention is that we have reached nowhere near the level of threat from international terrorism which would justify employing similar tactics as terrorists in order to defeat them. Indeed, I consider that even if such a situation existed there would be little hope that resorting to such tactics would in fact eliminate the threat. It seems entirely likely that the situation would instead degenerate into one of international anarchy. In most conceivable circumstances the superiority of democratic states lies precisely in their adherence to higher standards. If the West is to claim that it
is morally superior then it must be held to higher standards. This indeed creates some asymmetries, some difficulties and possibly some dangers for us. But these are the costs we pay for what we hold dear. If we abandon our principles and our commitment to justice in panic and turn to the ugly and unprincipled tactics being used by extremists the world over, we have surely completed for them the job they began. It needs to be stressed, though, that adherence to democratic values does not imply weakness. It need not rule out the use of force, which can be justified and can be used in a principled manner. But we underestimate, I believe, the impact of calm resoluteness on other nations. We underestimate the psychological dimension in international relations. Sometimes a clear adherence to our own espoused standards will add to our stature. As Robert Hunter observed:

The United States is expected to behave by civilized standards - the Bulgarians, Soviets, and Libyans are not - and our meeting that test can be a strength of American foreign policy.7

It is my contention, then, that we can erect a principled and effective defence against the worst consequences of international terrorism. To do so, however, requires a realistic appraisal of the threat and a restrained approach to its discussion. We must avoid the notion of the simple fix. International terrorism is a
complex, dynamic phenomenon and must be matched by a similarly structured response. We must be realistic in the choice of aims for our counter-terrorism policies. For example, it is not realistic to expect that terrorism can be eliminated. There is no cure for terrorism. We must realise that no particular mode of response will provide the answer. Occasionally something works in a specific situation, but there is no guarantee that it will work next time or even if it works as an operation that its consequences in the long-term will be similar. In discussing terrorism, states, particularly those taking the lead in the international campaign against terrorism, will need to focus on rather narrow aspects of it if they are to attract widespread international cooperation. As Jenkins (1984b) pointed out:

... if the United States treats terrorism as a component of its global contest with the Soviet Union, or of its involvement in regional conflicts in the Middle East or Central America, it risks alienating allies who might be willing to cooperate in combatting terrorism but who differ with U.S. policy and methods for dealing with Marxist guerrillas, or who, for political or economic reasons, are reluctant to participate in America's battles (p. 4).

In short, definitions used by states in their public discussion
of terrorism should not appear to be aimed at sectional political interests and must be constant over time. There is a real danger in naming sponsor states unless action against them is possible and contemplated. The sheer number of states now explicitly or implicitly identified by the United States as sponsors of international terrorism makes the impact of such identification rather diffuse, particularly when some are friends of the United States and there is no chance of sanctioning them. The dropping of Syria from the official list of terrorist sponsor states, the confusion over the U.S. position on the bombing by Israel of the PLO headquarters in Tunis, and the reluctance to comment on the bombing of the Greenpeace ship 'Rainbow Warrior' in New Zealand by French agents are all equivocations which detract from the effort to gain international agreement to counter all forms of terrorism. Jenkins (1981) rightly claims that to single out some sponsors of international terrorism whilst remaining silent on other cases:

... would be to expose the entire effort to the suspicion of being purely politically motivated and hypocritical. Thus to be effective, we must formulate a more restricted definition of a state that aids international terrorism, and carefully marshall evidence to support any U.S. actions against those who we feel should have sanctions imposed on them (p. 4).
Tempering the way states discuss the involvement of other states in terrorism is most certainly not to imply that they should not reveal such sponsorship when they have evidence for it. Rather, it is to counsel that the facts be revealed without the rhetorical or moralistic elaboration which has tended to debase much of the discussion by states on this topic. As Oseth (1985) has warned in discussing U.S. counter-terrorist policy:

The line between an information program and politicized propaganda can be a fine one, but it must be respected if the US policy stance is to gain credibility internationally (p. 73).

Further, credibility will be undermined if strong statements are made (usually at different times) about who are the sponsor states and how sponsors should be punished. In the international context, deterrence, if one believes in it, should be aimed primarily at the sponsor, not the sponsored. But is anybody really going to do anything about Soviet sponsorship? Unless we are really prepared to bomb Tehran, Damascus, Tripoli, or Moscow, talk about bombing the nerve centres of terrorism does much to demonstrate the futility of the threat, and little to deter terrorism. Of course, if we were prepared to carry out such an act we would have committed two further grave errors. We would have elevated terrorism to such a position as to totally dominate international affairs and we would have fallen into the trap of
believing that the 'centres' are the cause of international terrorism - which they are not.

COUNTER-TERRORIST OPTIONS

In order to be confident of having an effective counter-terrorist system, individual states need to enunciate a set of principles based on an analysis of successful tactics used in the past, contained within the bounds of some basic assumptions about the sorts of actions acceptable in a democratic society, and capable of absorbing change as a result of research, intelligence and new data flowing from contemporary operational experience. Most states have now established a set of principles which determine the core elements in their response capabilities. In general, the elements of a successful counter-terrorist plan include good intelligence (including intelligence exchange arrangements with other states); adequate laws which give specific necessary powers to the authorities in declared emergencies; a closely-reasoned set of governmental responses to particular terrorist threats; a well-equipped and frequently tested counter-terrorist crisis management organisation; adequately trained and equipped police and military units; adequate protective security arrangements for vital points and individuals; and well planned and negotiated arrangements with the news media for coverage of terrorist incidents.
These features describe the basis of an adequate domestic counter-terrorist system. But what of the response to state-sponsored international terrorism? Here a whole new range of complex relationships and issues are involved. Any really effective system for countering state-sponsored international terrorism would require an unparalleled degree of international cooperation. A campaign to isolate a sponsor state, for example, inevitably runs into problems of the economic interests of boycotting states, its effects on other regional or international political issues, and the personal safety of the citizens of boycotting states who may themselves be retaliated against or used as hostage pawns. Such difficulties militate against the maintenance of a solid international front in dealing with any specific incident. While like-minded states may issue tough-talking declarations after summit meetings, it is surprising (or maybe not surprising) how many of them will feel that there are 'special circumstances' which make it 'inappropriate' for them to become involved in stern action on this occasion!

The recent TWA hijacking illustrated both the types of responses favoured by states and the practical difficulties of implementing them. There seem to be two types of knee-jerk reactions to major acts of terrorism. The first is to complain about lack of security and to call for vast increases in physical protection at airports or embassies or wherever the latest outrage has taken place. The second is to think in terms of retaliation or
retribution. Like all knee-jerk reactions, these contain valid elements but miss the point if thinking does not proceed beyond them.

Let us take security first. It is certainly the case that improved security at vital points or for individuals or groups who are potential targets can contribute to lower levels of some forms of terrorism. At the very least, governments owe their citizens a satisfactory level of security. Thus, it is desirable to maintain a high level of security screening at airports and it is necessary to improve the physical and procedural security at embassies. But we cannot place too much emphasis or too much reliance on physical protection. It is both limited and, eventually, self-defeating. We simply cannot defend all potential targets against terrorist attacks. Even with specific cases security faces the law of diminishing returns. Take airports, for example. We now have a very high level of screening and protection for aircraft and at and beyond the customs barrier in most countries. This has deterred many attacks, but one response has merely been to target the relatively less protected baggage and ticketing areas. The immediate response to the bombing of these areas at Frankfurt airport recently was to call for the same level of security there as applies at the customs barrier. But clearly the terrorist response to such a move would be simply to explode a device outside the airport at, say, the point where passengers are
dropped off by taxi or car. Even if airports could be adequately protected in total, it would just mean a shift of targets to, say, bus or train stations. Although it is an extremely difficult judgement to make, we must determine the point at which increased security is simply not effective.

As well as being ineffective in the long-run, extremes of security can also be counterproductive. Although protecting a military base against terrorist attack should be assigned a high priority (especially in areas of high terrorist threat) there comes a point beyond which the diversion of manpower into security functions may seriously interfere with the primary mission of the organisation. A similar problem faces proposals to increase security at diplomatic premises. Clearly there is a need for a high level of security. But turning an embassy into a fortress and restricting both access to diplomats and the freedom of those diplomats to move about the host nation can, in the extreme, severely damage the institution of diplomacy and the effectiveness of its mission. Anyway, as with any other target, making diplomatic premises more difficult to attack may result only in more sophisticated and dangerous attacks or to a change of target to diplomats themselves or to some other target altogether. Again, then, we are faced with the incredibly difficult problem of deciding on the balance between security and other interests. In fact, we are left, I believe, with the realisation that terrorism cannot be adequately defended against
and that we must accept that some casualties are the price we have to pay for the system of modern life whose fruits we enjoy. The problem is to keep those casualties as low as possible.

Apart from increased security, the most frequently voiced suggestions for reducing the incidence of international terrorism involve various military responses to incidents in an effort to deter future attacks. Such options are clearly high on the U.S. agenda at the moment, but decisions made in actual cases recently illustrate the limited application of military measures. Jenkins (1984c) has listed four major types of military response to terrorism. These are:

(i) preemptive operations - those actions, ranging from evacuation in a hostile environment to invasion, based on credible and accurate intelligence which could preempt a planned terrorist operation;

(ii) search and recovery operations - the use of one country's armed forces to recover from a hostile country, for example, a stolen nuclear weapon or nuclear material which might fall into terrorist hands;

(iii) rescue operations - the use of specially-trained units to extract hostages taken by terrorists where the local government cannot or will not carry out the assault, or
where it invites the target nation to do so on its behalf; and

(iv) retaliatory or punitive raids - where military forces either attack terrorist bases or targets upon the territory of sponsor states as punishment for a terrorist incident and as an example that such behaviour will not be tolerated.

We may add to Jenkins' list another category which we might call 'arrest operations', in which military forces are used to intercept and detain for trial those who have committed terrorist acts and have not been arrested in the state in which the offence was committed. Obviously, we think here of the arrest of the 'Achille Lauro' hijackers.

Jenkins' analysis of these options shows that the number of circumstances in which any of them could be employed appropriately is low, the chances of success are often low and there are often other factors (such as public opinion or relations with other nations) which effectively rule out their use even if they could succeed in their tactical goals.

Jenkins' analysis of the limitations on the use of military options should temper the enthusiasm of those who have rushed to embrace them as a panacea for terrorist ills. In addition to the
purely technical problems raised by options such as pre-emptive or retaliatory raids there are also, of course, a host of moral, legal and political issues raised. First there is the question of effectiveness. Is it possible, as Secretary of State Shultz suggests to use violent retaliatory tactics without creating 'a cycle of escalating violence beyond our control' (Shultz, 1984, p. 17). It seems entirely uncertain what the effects of such retaliation might be, but it is at least as likely that retaliation would almost inevitably provoke counter-retaliation, not only in the region which is the focus of the terrorism, but in the territory of the retaliating state itself. Certainly with respect to some forms of terrorism in the Middle East the risk is high that a retaliatory raid by the United States against a terrorist group or its sponsor would hasten the arrival of international terrorism to the continental United States.

Many policy makers, including Secretary Shultz, have turned to the Israeli experience as evidence that retaliatory policies would be effective. In his address at the Park Avenue Synagogue on October 25, 1984, the Secretary praised Israeli counter-terrorist policies claiming that 'no nation has made a greater contribution to our understanding of the problem and the best ways to confront it' (Shultz, 1984, p. 15). To say the least, however, there is far from unanimous agreement on the efficacy of Israeli retaliatory tactics. Doubts have been expressed by those who have served in the Israeli military forces (Alon, 1980) and
analysts known for their hard-line attitude to terrorism (Livingston, 1982). Evidence from an analysis of retribution raids by Israel against Palestinian targets also indicates that such techniques may not be as successful a deterrent as many seem to believe when measured in terms of changes in the level of terrorist activity (Hoffman, 1985). Finally, the pro-Palestinian literature is replete with anecdotal evidence of the extremism and hatred generated amongst the Palestinians who become the objects of the Israeli reprisal raids (see, for example, Frangi, 1983).

While the Israeli model has much to recommend it psychologically (it serves a vital function in demonstrating to a population under siege that they are not just helpless targets and to the terrorists that Israel cannot be attacked with impunity) and morally (Israel has certainly been the target of vicious and unprincipled attacks which entitle her to seek redress), there remains considerable doubt about the results. In both moral and practical terms the policy has had mixed outcomes. I believe that some of the reprisals have been unprincipled themselves, in that they have been disproportionate to the original act and have caused innocent deaths and injuries which could and should have been avoided. But the greatest shortcoming of the policy is that it has tended to become an end in itself. The satisfaction engendered by having struck back at the terrorists has stunted the motivation to strive for longer-term solutions. Schlomo
Gazit believes reprisals to be a useful tool for the political leadership because 'once the terrorist realises that he cannot impose his will on you, he will be much more prepared to deal'. However, he contends that Israel has not exploited this advantage and has not come up with the political solutions necessary to make serious inroads into the use of terror.

Given that there are serious doubts about the effectiveness of the Israeli retaliatory policy (Blechman, 1978), the moral and political costs must weigh more heavily, especially when a nation such as the United States contemplates embracing such a policy. Secretary Shultz was right to warn that 'we cannot allow ourselves to become the Hamlet of nations, worrying endlessly over whether and how to respond' (Shultz, 1984). The international community, and especially targeted countries, must take resolute action against terrorism. But as an editorial in the Milwaukee Journal also reminds us, it is equally important to devise methods of dealing with terrorism which avoid us becoming the Claudius of nations. That is, we must resolve the question, can a state fight villainy without becoming a villain? We must avoid letting a thirst for vengeance be quenched by turning to tactics which caused terror themselves, unless we can be sure that they are precisely targeted on the offenders and unless we can be sure (or as sure as humanly possible) that the act will have a deterrent effect and will not serve only to provoke further terrorism. I submit that the number of occasions
on which these criteria can be met will be very small indeed and it is misleading and counter-productive to suggest to the public that military methods in general and reprisals in particular will ever feature very largely in the fight against international terrorism. Anger and disgust are the legitimate reactions to acts of terrorism but they are no sound basis for foreign policy. Just as we do not allow the rape victim to determine the punishment for the rapist, so the international community must strive to temper the reactions of states which are victims of international terrorism. But as with the criminal justice system, the international system must support the victim and must take action against the offender lest frustration lead to the development of lynch law.

In addition to moral considerations, proponents of retaliation raids must also take into account some of the practical difficulties and political costs of the policy. The first problem is that retaliation, as well as serving to satisfy the desire to 'get even', is primarily aimed at deterrence. But who is this deterrence aimed at? The raid subsequent to a suicide bombing clearly will not deter other bombers, for they are prepared to die anyway. It may be aimed at the sponsors, but then the retaliator has the problem of deciding what will make an appropriate target. Will it be the terrorist base or will it be an unrelated facility in the sponsor country? How can the terrorists be identified and their bases targeted without causing innocent civilians to suffer? Where can the strike be launched
from? How can the launch-site be protected from counter-attack? What happens if members of the retaliatory team are captured? A policy of retaliation may also mean that future options are cut off. For example, the Syria that might have been targeted after the Beirut bombings is the same Syria that was called upon by the United States to help secure the release of the hostages from the TWA hijacking and has a role to play in stabilising the situation in the Lebanon. A policy of retaliation may merely serve to radicalise opposition and make it more dangerous and more fanatical. As well as encouraging counter-terror and increasing regional tensions, retaliation may also drive some sponsor states into, or further into, the arms of the Soviets, further destabilising the region and going against another, more vital, goal of limiting Soviet influence. The political costs may spread diffusely as even friendly governments fail to support the retaliatory action because their own interests in the region may be jeopardised by such endorsement. Retaliation must also bear in mind that some sponsor states can bear punishment more readily than we could and might well be able to exploit their suffering for propaganda purposes. For example, in the current context of the Iran-Iraq war and the degree of religious radicalism in Iran, what kind of retaliatory action would a nation have to mount in order to have a deterrent effect on Iranian-sponsored international terrorism?

Nations contemplating retaliation in the aftermath of a terrorist attack find themselves in an extremely difficult psychological
situation (Jenkins, 1984b). First, the opportunity to respond decisively diminishes as time passes — the level of emotional reaction decreases, the public pressure to act becomes less vociferous and there is a correspondingly increased necessity for accurate intelligence allowing very precise targeting with no innocent loss of life. Second, the frustration of being unable to respond rapidly, decisively, and successfully engenders a growing fear that the state will look (and be) impotent, with the increasing danger that ill-considered action will be taken just to avoid humiliation. To be politically viable, any retaliatory action needs to be immediate, thus reducing the likelihood that available intelligence will be of sufficient quality and precision to allow an accurate picture of who exactly was responsible. The danger lies in the possibility that we will cross some ill-defined 'threshold of tolerance' and launch a retaliatory raid merely because that threshold has been breached. Such a raid could well be counter-productive. Reacting in haste increases the dangers of any intervention. The costs of contested or failed interventions (Scalapino, 1983) may well exceed the potential benefits. The aborted mission to rescue the U.S. Embassy personnel held in Tehran, although not conceived in haste, illustrates well the costs of failure. It seems to me that this is one of the most cogent arguments against states making loud and frequent threats, without subsequent action. Continued hard-line rhetoric which minimises the real problems of effective and morally justifiable forms of retaliation may serve to inflame public opinion to such an extent that official options
are heavily circumscribed so that retaliation becomes inevitable, even if it may be inappropriate or its costs may eventually outweigh its benefits.

The problem of rhetorical oversell does not mean that threats are not useful. The declaration of National Security Directive 138 in 1984 should have had value in that it served notice that hard options would be considered. Its impact, however, has been considerably lessened by the wasteful use of threats since then, without the execution of those threats. If threats are to be made, they must be meaningful - they must be backed up by the political will, the authority and the ability to carry them out - and if some defined threshold is crossed, they must be carried out.

Although it is, of course, hard to gauge, it appears that most threats are (or become) public and may thus serve more domestic ends than external ones. However, states should not forget the value of private threats - warnings made on a confidential basis, government to government or through intermediaries. Indeed private threats may sometimes have more effect because of the avoidance of the loss of face which might accompany seeming to cave in to threats. Measures which allow sponsor states to change their policies without loss of 'prestige' or 'face' (Gilpin, 1981; Schelling, 1966) need therefore to be considered. Indeed diplomatic initiatives should also look for opportunities to 'coopt' sponsor states, as has happened with conservative Arab regimes (which supported terrorism until it began to threaten their own interests) and
even more radical states such as Syria (the TWA hijacking) and Somalia (which was 'sweetened' with the promise of West German aid into allowing the GSG-9 assault on the Lufthansa aircraft at Mogadishu in 1977). Isolating some sponsor states by threatening them vociferously before the world may sometimes be counterproductive because it distances these states from the traditional norms and values and reduces their value conflict over adherence to these norms versus support for terrorist tactics (Crenshaw, 1983b). Perhaps, instead, we should do more in a comprehensive way to 'define the limits' of state sponsorship in an effort to prevent opportunities from arising in the first place. Such a policy would encompass 'the entire spectrum of ... diplomacy, including economic aid, bilateral and multilateral negotiations, and conflict resolution' (Taylor and Townsend, 1984, p. 218).

This analysis points to the conclusion that retaliation by military means is both difficult to justify morally (because of the problems of accurate targeting and avoiding unconnected casualties) and difficult to implement practically (because of the logistic and planning difficulties or because of its negative side effects). Even so, there are bound to occur a small number of circumstances in which retaliation is both possible and appropriate or simply judged to be necessary. We certainly need to have available both the doctrine and the forces capable of meeting this mission, as well as being able to mount less controversial hostage rescue operations and to counter terrorism.
which may be employed in war or in situations short of war to
degrade the military's ability to deploy forces or weapons
(Jenkins, 1983). Even though there will be very few instances in
which military tactics will be appropriate and able to be
employed, the importance of exploiting those instances and the
devastating costs of failure mean that we should devote
considerable thought and resources to the need for the military
to develop high quality counter-terrorist doctrine and
capabilities (Kupperman, Alexander, Van Opstal and Williamson,
1984). The general trend towards the employment of various forms
of 'low-intensity conflict' make this a priority task for
military planners and should include the development of doctrine,
increased security and intelligence capabilities, expanded anti-
terrorist training, upgraded planning, command, control and
communications, and response capabilities. As well as the
development of specialist units, a particular emphasis should be
placed on training 'line' units in counter-terrorist tactics. In
this context we need also to address the question of moral
justification as a frame of reference for decisions about some of
the more controversial and unconventional alternatives available.
The conference on this topic convened by USN Chief of Naval
Operations, Admiral James D. Watkins, at the U.S. Naval War
College in 1984 provided a useful starting point for this
discussion (Watkins, 1984). Conference participants agreed that
in the area of Jus Ad Bellum (the right to respond to an act of
terrorism) several conditions must be met before a nation morally
may take action to prevent or respond to an act of terrorism by military means. These conditions are (i) there must be a just cause – self defence against an unjust aggressor or protection of legitimate state interests; (ii) the decision to use force must be made by a competent authority; (iii) military force must only be used as a last resort;12 (iv) the operation must have a reasonable likelihood of success; and (v) more good than evil must be seen as coming from the proposed response. In terms of Jus In Bello considerations, the conference agreed that the response, to be justified, must be proportionate to the threat and must be highly discriminate in its application.

The myriad difficulties associated with the use of military options such as retaliation may encourage those who favour 'hard' measures to turn to policies of covert action, working through proxies, or pre-emptive operations as possible attractive alternatives. However, the difficulties associated with these options present, if anything, greater obstacles to implementation than do retaliatory raids. Brian Jenkins argues that:

... while covert operations may be necessary under extraordinary circumstances, if we are obliged to use force in response to terrorism we ought to do so with the legitimately constituted armed forces of this country – openly, and with an unambiguous message as to who is responsible and why we are doing it.13
With covert operations involving violence there is always a chance that the agency involved will begin to make official policy itself. It is vital that governments maintain effective control over the response to terrorism, and not delegate authority to autonomous security bureaucracies (Crenshaw, 1983a) or let authority slip into their de facto control. There are good arguments for a properly-controlled unconventional warfare capability, but extreme caution must be exercised to ensure that it remains a 'tool of foreign policy, not a substitute for it' (Bair, Barrows, Goldman, Kinsman, McKay, Strong and Walsh, 1983, p. 80).

Working through proxies to conduct counter-terrorist operations is even more complex and dangerous. There are obvious problems of lack of control, possible unreliability, unpredictability, and the working to private or non-sponsor agendas. The dangers were illustrated graphically by the furore caused earlier this year by the alleged CIA backing for the Lebanese counter-terrorist unit which was responsible for the killing of around 80 persons as a result of the car bombing aimed (unsuccessfully) at Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, leader of the Shiite Party of God (Hezbollah), who had been implicated in earlier bombings of American facilities in the Lebanon. Regardless of later inquiries which cleared the CIA of involvement, the incident demonstrated the extreme damage which could be done by the media exposure of covert links which is almost certain to follow a counter-
terrorist failure. As Maynes (1985) puts it, 'pre-emptive covert actions that cross a certain moral threshold not only are wrong but also unwise because of the risk of exposure and popular repudiation' (p. 17). The message is clear - if counter-terrorist operations are legitimate they should be carried out under clear national control and responsibility. If they are illegitimate they should have no place in our counter-terrorist policies.

Pre-emptive raids carry excessive cost: except in extreme circumstances. Many of the same considerations of accuracy of intelligence, choice of target, trial of alternative methods, proportionality of the operation, and so forth as apply to retaliation raids apply also to pre-emptive ones. In addition, in many cases pre-emptive raids will be likely to be viewed by much of the world community as intervention in the affairs of a sovereign state, and will, therefore, be judged to be either illegal under international law or illegitimate, or both. To the extent that world opinion is important to an attacking state, this may be a major cost of a pre-emptive operation. Nevertheless, as with all military options, pre-emption cannot be excluded altogether as a legitimate response to international terrorism. But pre-emptive raids can only be used where there is a clear and serious threat to a state's vital interests, where the intelligence is precise enough and accurate enough to allow a strike with surgical precision, and where the costs and risks of
escalation are deemed necessary (Taylor and Townsend, 1984). Pre-emption, as with other methods, must never be contemplated to serve the propping up of some 'Ramboesque' image. As I have emphasised on a number of occasions in this paper, restraint within the bounds of law and morality may limit our action as democratic states, but it is the rule of law and morality that distinguish us from the terrorists. As Oseth (1985) says, these self-imposed restraints:

... inevitably limit the US capability to take pro-active measures. But this is a circumstance our society lives with constantly and knowingly even in domestic law and order matters. American citizens pay a price for valuing freedom, running risks that our major competitors refuse to endure. That is what distinguishes us from them, and it is a distinction that makes a difference. We believe that it is what civilizes our behaviour, disciplining our actions by elevating to highest priority the preservation of human dignity. Repressive societies do not have much of a terrorism problem. But they are repressive societies (p. 74).

If military operations against terrorism are either illegitimate, illegal, or able to be mounted in only a very few situations,
then surely measures such as economic sanctions offer an alternative? Perhaps so, but here too the evidence is that sanctions are often of dubious practical value (Ayubi, Bissell, Korsah and Lerner, 1982; Doxey, 1980; Kapungu, 1975; Schreiber, 1973). Bienen and Gilpin (1980) discuss a number of sanctions which might be employed against international terrorism, including trade embargoes, curtailment of investment, blocking borrowing through international agencies, denial of most favoured nation treatment, and slow down of technology transfer. They conclude that there are dangers attaching to the use of any of these options. They are ineffective if applied unilaterally, they may be counter-productive and they are very costly to the sanctioning states. However, they may be more effective if there is prior agreement to multilateral action in the event of a specific terrorist action, for example, at the Bonn Economic Summit in 1978, the major Western nations declared a willingness to suspend commercial airline services between themselves and any country harbouring hijackers.

Flores (1981) examined specific U.S. attempts to apply economic sanctions to terrorism. Many attempts so far have focused on cutting off aid to countries sponsoring or supporting terrorism. The difficulties here are that most terrorist states do not receive massive financial assistance from the U.S. and that using foreign aid as a lever of coercion has, in the past, inflamed passions and increased the resolve of the targeted government.
Exceptions to much of the legislation have, anyway, undercut its potential force. For example, the International Security Assistance Act of 1977 (U.S.) required termination of sales, credits, and guarantees under the Act to sponsors of terrorism, but a national security exception undermines it. Similar exceptions exist in the Omnibus Multilateral Development Institutions Act of 1977 and the 1978 amendment to the Export-Import Bank Act. Examining the problems with use of provisions in the Export Administration Act of 1979, Flores (1981) concludes that:

... the control of exports to ... terrorist-supporting countries is a symbolic act, not an instrument of coercion. In terms of costs and benefits, export controls seemingly make no sense as instruments to control international terrorism (p. 589).

Ayubi et al.'s (1982) review of economic sanctions in U.S. foreign policy is similarly pessimistic about their efficacy. They believe there exists a striking consensus that economic sanctions have not necessarily altered the positions of the targets in the long run, have been ineffective in the fulfilment of their objectives, and have often failed to achieve their avowed political purposes. The major impediments to success are the problems of coordinating sanctions between countries, ensuring enforcement, the development of self-reliance by the
target state, and the fact that peripheral effects of the imposition of the sanctions may distort their original intention. Nevertheless, Ayubi et al. claim that sanctions may have some positive effects. They provide a demonstration effect by indicating to the target state the seriousness with which the sanctioning state views their behaviour. They may also play a major part in mobilising other forms of opposition to the target state. One might also add that there are some situations in which non-application of sanctions may be more costly in terms of lack of credibility than the costs imposed by applying sanctions. In some cases of state-sponsored terrorism where the link is undeniable, the victim may simply not be allowed by public opinion to avoid taking some sort of sanction action - even if it economically hurts the sanctioning state.

The difficulties of gaining international cooperation on economic sanctions against sponsor states is illustrated by attempts to include terrorism on the agenda of the London Economic Summit held in June 1984. At that meeting, France reportedly was totally against including a discussion of terrorism and opposed any measures against terrorism which would damage French economic interests in countries likely to be the subject of sanctions (Wilkinson, 1984). Largely at the insistence of the British Prime Minister, terrorism was eventually discussed and the final communique did call for a number of measures against terrorism. However, the meeting failed 'to issue any binding resolution on
collective sanctions against states engaging in international terrorism' (Wilkinson, 1984, p. 297). It seems, then, that economic sanctions will only work in most unusual circumstances in which widespread international commitment to the decision would make them effective. Such circumstances will rarely occur and states will have to consider very carefully the advisability of embarking on sanctions unilaterally.

CONCLUSION

This paper has argued strongly that many of the 'hard' options for countering international terrorism are either escalatory or counter-productive in effect, or may be used legitimately and practically on so few occasions as to make it foolhardy for nations to look to these methods as the major ways towards control of terrorism. It has been argued that many of our problems with counter-terrorist policies stem from a lack of conceptual clarity and an unwillingness to make necessary moral, political, and strategic distinctions between different forms and acts of international terrorism. This lack of discrimination is particularly apparent in many official speeches on terrorism, which encourage exaggerated perceptions of threat, have often raised the issue of terrorism too high on foreign policy agendas, and have led to a focus on aggressive responses which has taken the impetus out of support for more mundane, but probably more effective, policy options. Analyses such as the present one will
be seen by some as pessimistic and weak, if not inviting the escalation of terrorism. I believe, however, that we have been making significant progress through the less glamorous alternatives and that it is essential that we throw our major effort into those, especially as they are consistent with democratic values and the rule of law. Clearly, the first line of defence is intelligence, and more resources need to be devoted to this area (Gazit and Handel, 1980; Ofri, 1984), particularly to human intelligence (HUMINT). We should continue to negotiate international agreements against specific terrorist tactics, rather than waste time on futile attempts to outlaw terrorism. Regional agreements (such as the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism) which attempt a reasonably comprehensive coverage of counter-terrorist measures are more likely to be reached, but here, too, problems such as those relating to the so-called 'political offence exception' make their operation very dependent on the individual circumstances surrounding any particular terrorist incident. The best hope of effective action is probably to be found in bilateral agreements and in less formal exchanges between the free nations' police, intelligence and military agencies. I believe much more needs to be done to seek imaginative diplomatic and political ways to place pressure on sponsor states, as well as to enforce existing provisions on such matters as abuse of diplomatic privileges. The whole area of psychological operations (PSYOPS) and the role it could play in disrupting the motivation of terrorist group
members, undermining internal cohesion and the credibility of terrorist leaders, and driving a wedge between terrorist groups and their sponsors or the civilian infrastructure has been largely overlooked and should be accorded a much higher priority for development. As far as terrorists themselves are concerned, we should make every effort to bring them to justice. This will involve negotiation of extradition treaties and intensified international legal cooperation but should also include resources being devoted to more novel suggestions such as the establishment of an organisation to track known terrorists, to disrupt their activities and to arrange for their arrest when the circumstances are appropriate. These and similar suggestions consistent with maintaining democratic values (see, for example, Wilkinson, 1981; Waugh, 1982; Maechling, 1984) need to be pursued with vigour and, above all, consistency. In addition, we must improve our doctrine and military capabilities to be able to respond appropriately with aggressive methods where their use is justifiable and will have beneficial outcomes (Cline and Alexander, 1985; Jenkins, 1985). Above all we must remember not only who we are fighting, but what we are fighting for. As Ambassador Anthony Quainton has noted, a central problem for a government fighting terrorism is that of how to maintain and strengthen its own authority while diminishing the legitimacy of the terrorists. A government faced with terrorism must, therefore, be concerned with both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of its policies. I believe George Ball’s warning
should stand as the touchstone for those who must decide on counter-terrorist policy. He admonished that we should:

... take care that we are not led, through panic and anger, to embrace counter-terror and international lynch law and thus reduce our nation's conduct to the squalid level of the terrorists ... For we would be tragically wrong to abandon those cherished principles of law and humanity that have given our country its special standing among nations.
NOTES

1. For arguments about the nature of the terrorist threat to democratic societies see Bell (1978); Crenshaw (1983); Dror (1983); Horowitz (1983); Mack (1981); Wardlaw (1982; in press); Wilkinson (1977).


6. Numerous books and articles in recent years have attempted to document, with varying degrees of success, the case for Soviet sponsorship of terrorism. See, for example, Alexander (1982); Cline and Alexander (1984); Francis (1981); Goren (1984); Halperin (1982); Sterling (1981). For trenchant criticism of some of these views, especially those of Clari Sterling, see Herman (1982) and Stohl (1983).


10. To retain the Shakespearian idiom: 'If it were done when 'tis done, then 'twere well it were done quickly' (*Macbeth*).


12. Admiral Watkins argues that other options must be exhausted before the military one may be tried. I would weaken this requirement to mandate that the alternatives don't have to be actually tried, but merely carefully evaluated. There seems little to be gained morally by trying a method which is bound to fail in the circumstances and in some cases such experimentation may produce a situation which then excludes the possible effective use of the military option.

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FUTURE TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Brian Michael Jenkins

When will it stop? Where will it all end? Will terrorism, having reached its peak in the mid-1980s, now gradually diminish as a worldwide problem? Or will we simply see more of the same with no great change in terrorist tactics or targets, or in the level of terrorist violence? Will terrorists continue to escalate their violence without changing their basic tactics? Or will terrorists, by the year 2000, employ chemical, biological, or even nuclear weapons, perhaps to hold cities hostage? The questions reflect our growing frustration, our deepening fears. We want an end to terrorism, once and for all. We fear that if it continues, terrorists will enter the domain of mass destruction. Our answers, though necessarily speculative, are nonetheless important, for they define our attitudes and shape our responses.

WILL TERRORISM PERSIST?

Several factors might lead one to think that terrorism will decline in the coming years. Previous waves of terrorism—in the late nineteenth century, at the beginning of the twentieth century, and again in the 1920s—have surged, then declined. At least some of the political issues that led to the rise of contemporary international terrorism in the late 1960s have been removed or resolved in other ways. The United States ended its participation in the Vietnam War more than a decade ago, thereby incidentally removing what had been a catalyst for political protest and some terrorist activity in North America, Western Europe, and Japan. (However, U.S. military intervention in some Third
World contest, such as in Central America or the Middle East, could spark a new wave of political protest and violence.) The urban guerrilla groups responsible for the rise of international terrorism in South America in the late 1960s and early 1970s have been suppressed by authorities, sometimes brutally. Those countries have since cautiously returned to democracy. Operating under greater constraints, authorities in Western Europe nonetheless substantially reduced domestic terrorist violence, although some of the groups survive. Of the original causes that led to terrorism in the late 1960s, the Palestinian issue remains a major source of international political violence in the mid-1980s.

One would hope that terrorism will gradually diminish; but it seems more likely to continue. After all, political violence in one form or another has existed for centuries. The waves of terrorist violence at the beginning of this century, when anarchists stalked heads of state, and again in the 1920s and 1930s were eclipsed only by the greater violence of two world wars. When World War II ended, terrorist activity reemerged. It accompanied postwar decolonization struggles in places like Palestine, Kenya, Cyprus, and Algeria, some of which continued up through the 1960s. Colonial liberation movements like the Jewish underground in Palestine and the FLN in Algeria provided inspiration and models for contemporary terrorist groups.

Modern theories of guerrilla war—which, of course, is not synonymous with terrorism but did contribute doctrinally to the use of terrorist tactics—developed during this same period, from the late 1940s to the early 1960s. World War II represented the culmination of state-organized violence. Since then, there has been a long range trend toward the "privatization" of terrorism.
All of these facts argue for the continuation of some kind of political violence outside of conventional warfare, but will international terrorism persist in its present form? Probably it will, for a number of reasons. International terrorism, as we know it today, not only grew from the unique political circumstances that prevailed at the end of the 1960s, but also reflects recent technological developments which have enhanced the use of terrorist tactics.

Modern air travel provides worldwide mobility of people, ideas, and conflict. Instantaneous access to a worldwide audience through the modern news media, particularly television, is another factor. This technology is only in its infancy, and at this point it may be uncontrollable in its appetite for news and its ability to broadcast events live from where they happen. As ABC's Pierre Salinger put it, stabbing the air with his cigar, "You ain't seen nothin' yet."

He was referring to the proliferation of inexpensive minicameras and remote satellite broadcasting capabilities which will enable the electronic media to cover the world as they now cover a football game. With so many images pouring in all over the world, the editorial function in television may be reduced to split-second decisions regarding which picture, which angle, to screen next. Television news may resemble the play-by-play coverage of sporting events, forcing political leaders, even more than now, to make instant decisions in public. Television is the battlefield of the future, one to which terrorism is uniquely suited.
The increasing availability of arms to anybody with the money to buy them is another permanent change. We are not talking about major weapons systems--ballistic missiles, intercontinental bombers, nuclear submarines, main battle tanks--but about increasingly powerful and increasingly accurate man-portable weapons. Terrorist use of automatic weapons has grown alarmingly in the last 10 years. Even ordinary street crimes are being committed with the newest submachine guns, weapons that boast enormous firepower. The number of machineguns in the United States alone is estimated to be in excess of 500,000. Right-wing extremists recently arrested in the midwestern United States were armed with automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades; they protected their redoubt with land mines. They were building their own tank. Police dealing with such terrorists, drug traffickers, criminal gangs, and barricaded suspects have been compelled to create specialized tactical response units equipped with armored vehicles, rapid-fire and heavy caliber weapons, and specialized explosives for breaching barriers and stunning defenders. Tactical operations are of necessity increasingly militarized.

Most authorities on terrorism believe that before the year 2000, terrorists will use shoulder-fired, precision-guided surface-to-air missiles to shoot down civilian aircraft. Guerrillas in Africa have already done so on two occasions. Terrorists have tried several times and failed. The guidance systems used in currently produced antitank weapons would permit political assassins to target a moving car in a motorcade from a distance of several kilometers.
The apparent inability of the world to limit or regulate arms traffic will impose greater demands on physical security or, alternatively, on regulating the people that might use those arms. The landscape of political violence has been permanently altered.

There also are economic incentives to use terrorist tactics. Kidnapping and extortion based upon threats of violence have become routine means of financing revolutionary movements.

Part of the terrorists' ability to survive the blows inflicted by governments may lie in the infrastructure that has grown up to support them. Increased cooperation among terrorists makes them more difficult to combat. There is emerging today a semipermanent subculture of terrorism. Individual terrorists can be arrested, terrorist groups can be "defeated," but governments find it extremely difficult to identify and destroy the resilient web of personal relationships, clandestine contacts, foreign connections, alliances with other groups, and suppliers of material and services that sustain the terrorist underground.

States have recognized in terrorism a useful weapon and some are exploiting it for their own purposes. To a certain extent, international terrorism has become institutionalized. State sponsors provide terrorists with resources and a sanctuary where they can retreat, recuperate, rest, and rearm. State sponsorship also means that an office or agency is designated to be in charge of relations with the terrorists. Like any bureaucracy, that agency competes for influence and budget, promises results, and resists dismantling. Having learned to use the new tool of terrorism, the agencies responsible for terrorist activity will have their own vested interest in continuing to use it.
WILL TERRORISM INCREASE?

Will terrorism increase? Despite the successes of some governments in combatting terrorist elements, the total volume of international terrorism, measured by the number of incidents, has increased. It traces an irregular line with peaks and valleys, but the trajectory is clearly upward.

Overall, the volume of terrorist activity has grown at an annual rate of about 12 to 15 percent. If that rate of increase continues, we could see between 800 and 900 incidents a year by the end of the decade—not an inconceivable prospect, given the other factors we have mentioned. While this is double the current volume of international terrorism, it is probably a level the world can live with. There are several other factors which suggest the likelihood of continued growth.

The increase in the volume of terrorist activity has been matched by the geographic spread of that activity—a slow, long-term trend. The number of countries experiencing some sort of terrorist activity has increased each year. In the late 1960s, international terrorist incidents occurred in an average of 29 countries each year. This average climbed to 39 countries in the early 1970s and 43 in the late 1970s. For the first three years of the 1980s, the average number of countries experiencing international terrorist incidents was 51, and for the period 1983 to 1985, it was 65.

Although a handful of nations—the United States, France, Israel, the United Kingdom, and Turkey—have been the favorite targets of terrorists (citizens of these countries account for approximately half of all the victims of terrorism in the 1980s), the number of nations
targeted by terrorists has also increased. In 1984, terrorist attacks were directed against the nationals of 60 countries.

Although it is difficult to monitor with any precision the appearance and disappearance of the many hundreds of groups that claim credit for terrorist actions--some of them are only fictitious banners--the level of international terrorist activity no longer appears to depend on just a few groups. Despite the virtual destruction of some terrorist groups and the decline in operations by others, the total volume of terrorist activity grows.

As international communications spread, as populations move or are pushed about--two features of the 1980s--we may see more local conflicts manifesting themselves at the international level through terrorist tactics.

Meeting to discuss the future course of terrorism, government officials and authorities on political violence identified many sources of social frustration and violence. There will be no shortage of sources of terrorism; rising population; increased poverty and scarcity; racial tension; inflation and unemployment; increased tension between the have and have-not nations; waves of refugees and immigrants moving from poorer states to wealthier ones, often bringing with them the conflicts of their home country, sometimes causing resentment among native citizens; rapid urbanization; the disintegration of traditional authority structures; the emergence of single-issue groups; the rise of aggressive fundamentalist religious groups or cults.

Yet the connection between socioeconomic conditions and terrorism is not established. Research has not been able to demonstrate a connection between poverty, scarcity, inflation or any other
socioeconomic indicator and terrorism. Indeed, countries experiencing the highest levels of terrorism are often, economically and socially, nations in their region or in the world, and often the least authoritarian.

As for the collapse of traditional authority structures, they are collapsing all the time—during the French revolution, during the industrial revolution, after the abolition of slavery, after World War I, after World War II, with the fall of the colonial empires, with the advent of transistor radios. And to be sure, all of these developments have been associated with a measure of violence.

WILL TERRORISTS ESCALATE?

Will terrorists escalate? Simply killing a lot of people has seldom been a terrorist objective. Terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead. Most terrorists operate on the principle of the minimum force necessary. They generally do not attempt to kill many, as long as killing a few suffices for their purpose.

Statistics bear this out. Only 15 to 20 percent of all terrorist incidents involve fatalities; and of those, two-thirds involve only one death. Less than 1 percent of the thousands of terrorist incidents that have occurred in the last two decades involve 10 or more fatalities, and incidents of mass murder are truly rare.

Arbitrarily taking 100 deaths as the criterion, only a handful of incidents of this scale have occurred since the beginning of the century. Lowering the criterion to 50 deaths produces a dozen or more additional incidents. This in itself suggests that it is either very difficult to kill large numbers of persons, or it is very rarely tried.
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<td>1985</td>
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<td>Bombing of marine barracks</td>
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<td>1978</td>
<td>Bombing of PLO HQs in Beirut</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>Bombing of Sofia Cathedral</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>Bombing of Palace</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Sabotage of Ammunition Ship</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Hijacking and crash of airliner</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Bombing of King David Hotel</td>
<td>91</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Bomb aboard airliner</td>
<td>88</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Bologna bombing</td>
<td>84</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Car bomb at post offices in Beirut</td>
<td>83</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Bomb aboard airliner</td>
<td>81</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Car bomb in Tifoli</td>
<td>75</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Bomb aboard airliner</td>
<td>73</td>
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<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>Bomb in marketplace</td>
<td>66</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Car bomb in Damascus</td>
<td>64</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Car bomb</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Bomb at Israeli military headquarters in Tyre</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Bombing of Beirut supermarket</td>
<td>60</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Bombing of French paratroopers in Lebanon</td>
<td>59</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Bombing of U.S. Embassy in Beirut</td>
<td>57</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Car bomb outside mosque in Beirut</td>
<td>56</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Bombing of train</td>
<td>55</td>
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<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Bombing of explosives trucks</td>
<td>54</td>
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<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Fatah attack on Israeli bus</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Bombing in Beirut neighborhood</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Airline truck by Sam</td>
<td>48</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Bomb aboard airliner</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Car bomb at PLO ammo dump</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Bombing of train</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Suicide car bomb Israeli headquarters in Tyre</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Wall street bombing</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Sri Lankan train blown up by Tamils</td>
<td>33</td>
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<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Grenade attack on airliner</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Bomb at Indian airport</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Arso at hotel in Manila</td>
<td>30</td>
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Unfortunately, as we have seen in recent years, things are changing. Terrorist activity over the last 20 years has escalated in volume and in bloodshed. At the beginning of the 1970s, terrorists concentrated their attacks on property. But in the 1980s, according to U.S. government statistics, half of all terrorist attacks have been directed against people. The number of incidents with fatalities, and multiple fatalities, has increased. A more alarming trend in the 1980s has been the growing number of incidents of large-scale indiscriminate violence: huge car bombs detonated on city streets, bombs planted aboard trains and airliners, in airline terminals, railroad stations, and hotel lobbies, all calculated to kill in quantity.

There are several explanations for the escalation: Like soldiers in a war, terrorists who have been in the field for many years have been brutalized by the long struggle; killing becomes easier.

As terrorism has become more commonplace, the public has also become, to a degree, desensitized. Terrorists can no longer obtain the same amount of publicity with the tactics they used 10 years ago. They may feel compelled to escalate their violence in order to keep public attention or to recover coercive power lost as governments have become more resistant to their demands.

Terrorists have become technically more proficient, enabling them to operate on a higher level of violence.

The composition of some terrorist groups has changed as the faint-hearted who have no stomach for indiscriminate killing drop out or are shoved aside by more ruthless elements.
The religious aspect of current conflicts in the Middle East pushes toward mass murder. As we have seen throughout history, the presumed approval of God for the killing of pagans, heathens, or infidels can permit acts of great destruction and self-destruction.

And finally, state sponsorship has provided terrorists with the resources and technical know-how to operate at a higher, more lethal level of violence.

At the same time, several factors work against escalation: Terrorists have self-imposed constraints, and there are technical ceilings. Unless they resort to more exotic weapons, terrorists are approaching limits to their violence. As shown in the figure below, the numbers of deaths in the deadliest terrorist incidents—huge bombs detonated in buildings, the bomb presumably detonated aboard an Air India jumbo jet, a deliberately set fire in a crowded Teheran theater—roughly equal those in the worst accidental disasters: hotel fires, explosions, airline crashes. Death on a larger scale is seen only in the slaughter of great battles or in natural disasters like earthquakes and floods. The most plausible scenarios involving chemical or biological weapons in a contained environment—a hotel, a convention, a banquet—would produce deaths in the hundreds. To kill on a larger scale, terrorists would have to possess large quantities of deadly substances and solve problems of dispersal, or they would have to resort to nuclear weapons. This raises questions of technical capacity and intentions.
A third limiting factor is security. Protective measures taken in the wake of the huge car and truck bombings in the Middle East are reducing the vulnerability of the most obvious targets to this type of attack. More stringent airport security measures may be applied on a permanent basis to prevent a repeat of the Air India bombing. Of course, terrorists can obviate security measures by shifting their sights to other, still vulnerable targets, but this forces them to become even less discriminate.

On balance, it appears that incidents involving large numbers of fatalities probably will become more common, with deaths in the hundreds remaining for the foreseeable future the outer limit of individual terrorist attacks.

LITTLE TACTICAL INNOVATION

"If I were a terrorist, I would..." This is the preamble to the most diabolical schemes. College students, business executives, housewives, and all manner of other nice people are capable of hatching absolutely horrifying terrorist plots. Real terrorists, by comparison, are unimaginative dullards, content to follow the same script over and over.

But terrorists don't see things the way most people do. Almost everyone assumes that terrorists would want to hold cities hostage with nuclear or chemical weapons, or knock out electrical grids to cause widespread blackouts. Those who study terrorists more closely are less certain that terrorists could, or would even want to do these things. And from what former terrorists tell us, terrorists themselves apparently contemplate such activity rarely, if at all.
Terrorists operate with a limited repertoire that has changed little and is not likely to change very much in the future. Six basic tactics account for 95 percent of all terrorist incidents: bombings, assassinations, armed assaults, kidnappings, hijackings, and barricade and hostage incidents. Looking at it another way, terrorists blow up things, kill people, or seize hostages. Every terrorist attack is merely a variation on these three activities.

Terrorists have limited technical abilities. With the exception of state-sponsored terrorist groups, they operate with limited resources. And while a lot of terrorists are highly intelligent, many of their operations betray gaps in planning, with whole chunks of logic missing, or premises that are unreal.

Terrorists see what they do now as sufficient, at least at the tactical level.

Looking at what terrorists have contemplated and discarded or tried and failed gives us some idea of the breadth of their imagination. They would like to have assassinated a number of high-ranking officials: the British Prime Minister, the President of South Korea, the entire cabinet of Chad, the gathered dignitaries at Golda Meir's funeral, the assembled senior leadership of Italy's Christian Democrat Party, the Commander of NATO. They considered kidnapping the Pope, but dropped the idea as too risky. They planned to seize 40 industrialists at a meeting in Vienna and a school bus filled with American school children in Europe. They would have hijacked an Italian cruise ship years before the taking of the Achille Lauro. They would have shot down civilian airliners in Germany, Italy, Kenya, British helicopters in Northern Ireland, taxiing
airplanes in Paris and Athens. They would have destroyed oil refineries in Rotterdam and Singapore.

Most of the tactics and operations they have considered are essentially more of the same.

What tactical innovations have terrorists produced since the late 1960s? The letter bomb (actually an invention of the 1940s for which Jewish extremists in Palestine get credit), the car bomb, the radio-controlled car bomb, the suicide vehicle bomb. There also have been innovations in fuzing and detonating devices: the barometric pressure fuze invented by the Palestinians to blow up airliners in flight, the long-term delay mechanisms used by the IRA in the attempt on Prime Minister Thatcher's life. And they have added several dimensions to hostage-taking: hijacking airliners to make political demands; seizing embassies; kidnapping diplomats to gain the release of prisoners; kidnapping corporate executives to finance terrorist operations.

These innovations could all be categorized as enhancements and variations, however; the basic tactics have changed little over the years. Indeed, the relative percentage of the various tactics has remained stable for a long time, except for a decline in barricade-and-hostage incidents. Seizing embassies was popular in the 1970s. It declined as security measures made embassy takeovers more difficult, and as governments became more resistant to the demands of terrorists holding hostages and more willing to use force to end such episodes, thus increasing the hostage-takers' risk of death or capture.

This is indicative of the level of innovation we are likely to see. Terrorists alter their tactics in an incremental way to solve specific problems created by security measures. If one tactic ceases to work,
they abandon it in favor of another one or merely shift their sights to another target. How might terrorists respond to the new security measures that have been taken to protect embassies against car bombs? They might resort to aerial suicide attacks, which are technically and physically more demanding. Or they might resort to standoff attacks, the traditional response to strong defenses. Or they might simply attack other, still vulnerable targets. Since terrorists have virtually unlimited targets, they have little need for tactical innovation.

There are several things that appear in the scenarios of most armchair terrorists that real terrorists have not done. With the exception of a couple of minor episodes, they have not attacked nuclear reactors. Terrorists have blown up computers and set fires in data processing centers, but they have not tried to penetrate computers in any sophisticated fashion to disrupt or destroy data.

Will we see a more sophisticated "white collar" terrorism, that is, attacks on telecommunications, data processing systems, or other targets intended to produce not crude destruction but widespread disruption? Perhaps, but disruptive "terrorism" of this type does not appear to be particularly appealing to today's terrorist groups. It is possible that terrorist incidents of this type will occur, but not very likely. Such operations are technically demanding, and they produce no immediate visible effects. There is no drama. No lives hang in the balance. There is no bang, no blood, They do not satisfy the hostility or the publicity hunger of the terrorists.

In sum, there is little to suggest major tactical innovations. Terrorist tactics for the foreseeable future will remain for the most part what they have been for the past 15 years. Minor innovations will
be devised to solve specific problems. Technical improvements may permit them to succeed where they have previously failed. Tactical innovations that appear to work will be imitated, and those seen as failures the first time out will be abandoned.

New government countermeasures might provoke more radical departures from the traditional terrorist tactics. Or innovations might not come from those currently identified as "terrorists," but instead from entirely new types of adversaries not yet identified: computer hackers who turn malevolent; ordinary criminal extortionists who turn political. But for the most part, the traditional tactics will predominate.

FUTURE TERRORIST TARGETS

The greatest advantage that terrorists have and will continue to have is a virtually unlimited range of targets. Terrorists can attack anything, anywhere, anytime, limited only by operational considerations: Terrorists do not attack defended targets: they seek soft targets. If one target or set of targets is well protected, terrorists merely shift their sights to other targets that are not so well protected. What changes will we see in terrorist targets?

Over the years, the range of targets attacked by terrorists has expanded enormously. They now include embassies, airlines, airline terminals, ticket offices, railroad stations, subways, buses, power lines, electrical transformers, mailboxes, mosques, hotels, restaurants, schools, libraries, churches, temples, newspapers, journalists, diplomats, businessmen, military officials, missionaries, priests, nuns, the Pope, men, women, adults and children.
The future targets of terrorists will be pretty much the same as those preferred today: representatives of governments and symbols of nations—in particular, diplomats and airlines, representatives of economic systems—corporations and corporate executives, symbols of policies and presence—military officials; and political leaders.

Will terrorists attack high-technology targets such as refineries, offshore platforms, or nuclear reactors? They already have, although in technically undemanding ways. Terrorists occasionally have blown up pylons and transformers, sometimes causing widespread blackouts. Guerrillas in Latin America have frequently attacked electrical power grids as a means of waging economic warfare against governments. Less concerned with economic warfare, urban terrorists have attacked electrical energy systems to get attention, to protest government or corporate policies, or to indirectly disable nuclear power plants. Terrorist saboteurs have also attacked pipelines, oil tank farms, and refineries, again with the objective of attracting publicity or protesting specific policies. These targets will remain attractive to some groups. However, apparently not all terrorists see value in attacking energy systems. There is no discernible trend toward more frequent attacks. Moreover, to seriously disrupt energy systems requires either a sustained campaign or larger-scale action at certain critical nodes. Targets such as nuclear reactors or offshore platforms are technically demanding and require knowledge and skills most terrorist groups do not possess.
Overall, attacks on high-technology targets must be anticipated as a feature of guerrilla warfare, but they are likely to remain only an occasional event in the realm of terrorism. State sponsorship, however, may alter targeting preferences.

TERRORIST WEAPONS

What weapons will terrorists use in the future? Terrorists now use what is readily available in the gunshops and arsenals or on the black market. They seek powerful, rapid-fire, concealable weapons. They use commercial explosives, and military stuff when they can get it. These suffice for current operations. Since terrorists generally do not attack defended targets, they have no need for more advanced arms. They now match the firepower of the authorities. Terrorists probably will use more sophisticated explosives, in larger quantities, although there is no great need to increase quantity. Terrorists in the Middle East have on several occasions built bombs containing more than 1,000 pounds of explosives. Car bombs with 200 or more pounds of explosives are not uncommon. Fifteen to 20 pounds of high explosives planted inside a large building will take its front off.

We will probably see increased use of standoff weapons--mortars, rocket launchers, rocket-propelled grenades--to overcome security measures. Finally, there remains a potential for the use of portable precision-guided munitions, which terrorists have already employed on several occasions.

Will terrorists resort to weapons of mass destruction? Will they employ chemical or biological warfare? Will terrorists go nuclear? Many people believe that nuclear terrorism of some sort is likely and
may be inevitable. Reflecting the results of a poll conducted among
1,346 opinion leaders in the United States, George Gallup, Jr., in his
recent book, *Forecast 2000*, wrote that "while a war between the
superpowers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, is a real cause for concern
[a disastrous nuclear incident involving terrorists in this country],
seems to be the most imminent danger."

I happen to think nuclear terrorism is neither imminent nor
inevitable, if by nuclear terrorism we mean terrorists employing stolen
nuclear weapons or a clandestinely fabricated nuclear explosive device
to kill or threaten to kill large numbers of people. Lesser terrorist
acts in the nuclear domain—the seizure or attempted sabotage of a
nuclear reactor, the dispersal of radioactive material, an alarming
nuclear hoax that may cause panic—are possible.

The question of nuclear terrorism involves an assessment of both
capabilities and motivations. It is conceivable that someone outside of
government who is familiar with the principles of nuclear weapons could
design an atomic bomb. However, the ease with which a private citizen
can build one, assuming he or she could somehow acquire the necessary
nuclear material, has been greatly exaggerated. But even if terrorists
can build a nuclear weapon, would they want to? Terrorism has certainly
escalated, but it is still a quantum jump from the kinds of things that
terrorists do today to the realms of nuclear destruction. Why would
terrorists take that jump?

As I said before, simply killing a lot of people is not usually an
objective of terrorism. Terrorists could do more now, yet they don't.
Why? Beyond the technical constraints, there may be self-imposed
constraints that derive from moral considerations or political
calculations. Some terrorists may view indiscriminate violence as immoral. The terrorists' enemy is the government, not the people. Also, terrorists pretend to be governments, and wanton murder might imperil this image.

There are political considerations as well: Terrorists fear alienating their perceived constituents. They fear provoking public revulsion. They fear unleashing government crackdowns that their groups might not survive. Certainly, in the face of a nuclear threat, the rules that now limit police authorities in most democracies would change.

Terrorists must maintain group cohesion. Attitudes toward violence vary not only from group to group but also within a group. Inevitably, there would be disagreement over mass murder, which could expose the operation and the group to betrayal.

Obviously not all groups share the same operational code, and as we have seen, certain conditions or circumstances might erode these self-imposed constraints.

What about chemical or biological weapons, which are technically less demanding than nuclear weapons? Although there have been isolated incidents, neither chemical or biological warfare seems to fit the pattern of most terrorist attacks. That is, neither produces immediate dramatic effects.

Terrorist incidents have a finite quality—an assassination, a bombing, a handful of deaths, and that is the end of the episode. That is quite different from initiating an event that offers no explosion but instead produces indiscriminate deaths and lingering illness, an event over which the terrorists who set it in motion would have little
control. For the near-term future--say, the next five years--any threats of chemical or biological contamination we see are more likely to be made by authentic lunatics or criminal extortionists than terrorists. There will be moments of alarm, however. Over the long term--the next 10 to 15 years--my concern is that chemical weaponry will be acquired by unstable, dangerous countries like Iraq, Iran, or Syria, and will increasingly be used in warfare. If chemical warfare becomes more commonplace, particularly in a region like the Middle East, we cannot dismiss its potential use by terrorists. The same is true of nuclear weapons, but probably over a longer time period.

Where will terrorism fit in the future of armed conflict? The current trend toward state sponsorship of terrorism probably will continue. As I have said before, limited conventional war, classic rural guerrilla warfare and international terrorism will coexist and may appear simultaneously. The Iranian revolution and its spread to Lebanon, which has involved the effective use of international terrorism as an instrument of policy, may provide a model for other Third World revolutions and revolutionary states, just as the Cuban model inspired a generation of imitators in Latin America. If it does, we are in for a lot of trouble.

We also may see international terrorism emerge as a new kind of global guerrilla warfare in which terrorist groups sally forth from the political jungles of the Third World to carry out highly publicized hit-and-run attacks, militarily insignificant but politically of great consequence, avoiding confrontations where they might run into well-equipped, well-trained, specialized anti-terrorist forces.
Terrorists now avoid seizing embassies in Western capitals. They hijack airliners, keep them on the move to evade any rescue attempt, and retreat with their hostages to sanctuaries like Teheran or Beirut. In the absence of government, as in Lebanon, or the presence of a hostile government, as in Iran, these sanctuaries lie beyond the reach of the world regime of treaty and law. If Iran defeats Iraq and the Gulf States fall, then the world's "badlands" might be centered in the Middle East, a crescent reaching from the Mediterranean to Persia.

Finally, what developments will we see in security? The "privatization" of violence has been matched by the "privatization" of security, as illustrated by the tremendous growth of private sector security expenditures. In the United States, a total of $21 billion is now spent annually for security services and hardware (as compared with $14 billion spent annually on all police). The figure will reach $50 to $60 billion a year by the end of the century. Private security corporations will grow to meet the demand.

We will see the further proliferation of inner perimeters, the rings of security that now surround airline terminals, government buildings, and, increasingly, corporate offices. From this last development, however, emerges a crude counterterrorist strategy. By protecting the most obvious symbols, terrorists' preferred targets, terrorists will be forced to become less discriminate in their attacks. That will create greater public outrage, which governments can exploit to obtain domestic support and international cooperation to combat the terrorists.
This survey offers a conservative view of future trends in terrorism. Terrorism persists. It may double in volume, but the world does not end in terrorist anarchy. Few changes are foreseen in terrorist tactics or targets.

Terrorists will escalate their violence, but they probably will not enter the Armageddon world of mass destruction. The media will increase in ability to cover terrorist incidents; we will see even more terrorism. The extraordinary security measures taken against terrorism will have become a permanent part of the landscape, of our life style. They will no longer attract comment. That may be the most insidious and perhaps the most worrisome development in the coming years. With the exception of a few particularly dramatic incidents, terrorism is becoming an accepted fact of contemporary life. Terrorism is becoming commonplace, ordinary, banal, and thereby somehow tolerable.
DEATHS FROM MAJOR DISASTERS

NUMBER OF FATALITIES

10

10³

10⁵

10⁷

10⁹

WORST TERRORIST INCIDENTS
WORST AIRLINE DISASTERS
WORST EXPLOSIONS
WORST FIRES
WORST MARINE DISASTERS
WORST FLOODS, TIDAL WAVES
WORST EARTHQUAKES