LOGISTICS SKILL DEVELOPMENT
IN THE RESERVE COMPONENTS

Donald W. Srull
Edward D. Simms, Jr.
Dayton S. Pickett

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LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE
6400 Goldsboro Road
Bethesda, Maryland 20817-5886

86 6 10 192
PREFACE

In a study completed in October 1982, the Logistics Management Institute examined the extent of Department of Defense dependence on National Guard and Reserve logistics units. That study documented the fact that Guard and Reserve logistics units are required immediately and in great numbers to support the combat forces already deployed and those required for any sustained operations. To fulfill their vital wartime responsibilities, many Reserve Component logistics units during peacetime must be fully staffed, trained, equipped, and interoperable with the combat forces they support.

This study, sponsored by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), evaluates the adequacy of training programs and policies governing the development of technical logistics skills in the Guard and Reserve. It consists of this report and four separately published working notes on technical skill training in the Reserve Components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. Users of this study should review, in addition to this report, the following four working notes:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>REFERENCE</th>
<th>PUBLICATION DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Technical Skill Training in the Army Reserve Components</td>
<td>RA401-1</td>
<td>September 1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Skill Training in the Reserve Components of the Air Force</td>
<td>RA401-2</td>
<td>April 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Skill Training in the Naval Reserve</td>
<td>RA401-3</td>
<td>July 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Skill Training in the Selected Marine Corps Reserve</td>
<td>RA401-4</td>
<td>September 1985</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Executive Summary

LOGISTICS SKILL DEVELOPMENT IN THE RESERVE COMPONENTS

With U.S. military forces dependent on the Reserve Components for immediate logistics support in any future operations, the capability of individual reservists to perform such support missions without postmobilization training is vital. Under the Total Force Policy, therefore, many reserve logistics personnel need to acquire and maintain the same skills as active personnel, and at the same levels of proficiency.

The unique environment in the Reserve Components, however, makes technical skill training of reservists extremely difficult. Compared to their Active Component counterparts, reservists have limited and interrupted training time available. Reserve logistics units are widely spread geographically, often great distances from supported units and work facilities. Mission-related workload is usually not available during normal weekend drills. To the extent that technical skill reserve billets can be filled with people already trained and having relevant experience (from prior active military service or their civilian jobs), some of the training requirements are reduced. Even with this help, the reserve training challenge is both formidable and substantially different from that of the active forces. The problem is made even more difficult when the training depends heavily on on-the-job training and on-the-job experience, as it does for many logistics specialties. Thus, it would seem appropriate—even necessary—to adopt different training approaches and programs for reservists to achieve the required levels of expertise. Nevertheless, each of the Services follows essentially the same approach to train reservists that it follows to train active force personnel.

Based on the Total Force mix of Active and Reserve Components, the trainability of reserve

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1In this report, the term "reserve," in lower-case type, is generic, including both National Guard and Reserve Forces of the Military Departments.
personnel, and the reserve training environment, we have concluded that:

- The present approach to technical training throughout DoD is designed primarily for the Active Component and is not well suited in many cases to the needs of the Reserve Components. Many deficiencies flow from application of active force training concepts to reservists who train in an entirely different environment.

- Present training practices are seriously inadequate for the Army Guard and Reserve.

- Current Reserve Component training strategy and practices may be adequate for the Navy and Air Force as long as the present force mix (predominant fraction of billets in Active Component) and recruiting practices (high levels of education and experience of new accessions) continue.

- Present Marine Corps Reserve training practices, although similar to the Army's, may be adequate due to the Marine Corps' relatively lower dependence on selected reserve logistics units.

In our view, a fresh, overall look at reserve logistics training is needed, followed by design and implementation of a more effective and workable training strategy tailored explicitly to the needs of the Reserve Components. To design and implement such a strategy will require innovation and additional resources.

As a first step, we recommend that the ASD(RA) sponsor a periodic major review (e.g., biennial) of Reserve Component training. In the past, Office of the Secretary of Defense knowledge of overall reserve training programs has not been adequate to exercise oversight and provide policy guidance. A first DoD-wide conference for this purpose should be held in FY86 to review current reserve training approaches, issues, opportunities for improvement, and procedures for exchanging ideas among components, and to develop a framework and timetable for implementing an improved training strategy.

As a second step, the ASD(RA) should make sure that training improvement initiatives are reflected in Defense programs and budgets and can be tracked. To do this will require that reserve training improvements are called for in the Defense Guidance, and that the POM Preparation Instructions (PPI) and Budget Guidance call for visibility of key program resources.

The early benefit from correcting present deficiencies in reserve training will be enhanced readiness and improved capability of Reserve Component logistics units. The ultimate benefit will be
upgrading of the initial combat effectiveness of the forward deployed Active Force as well as the combat sustainability of the Total Force.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE ................................................................. ii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................. iii

CHAPTER

1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................... 1- 1
2. FINDINGS ............................................................. 2- 1
   Reserve Component Logistics Jobs .................................. 2- 1
   The Incumbents ..................................................... 2- 2
   Skill Training Strategies ......................................... 2- 5
   Service Initiatives ................................................ 2- 7
   OSD Role ............................................................ 2- 7
3. CONCLUSIONS ......................................................... 3- 1
   Discussion .......................................................... 3- 1
   Summary of Conclusions ........................................... 3- 2
4. RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................. 4- 1
1 INTRODUCTION

The U.S. military is dependent, more than ever, on the Reserve Components for immediate
logistics support of forces already deployed, as well as forces required to sustain operations of any size.
While the Total Force Policy affected most aspects of military operations, its greatest impact has been
on the logistic support structure.¹ This means that many reservists are now required to be able to
perform critical support missions without postmobilization training. The training of these reserve²
personnel to high levels of proficiency during peacetime, therefore, is an essential requirement
implied by the Total Force Policy as currently implemented.

This study was designed to assess how well current strategies for training reservists can be
expected to satisfy the stringent requirements now imposed by the Total Force Policy and current war
plans. The objective was to recommend to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) any
actions that may be needed to improve reserve logistics skill training to acceptable levels.

Our approach involved consideration of the three main elements of all individual military skill
training:

- The job skills required
- The people to be trained in those skills
- The methods and programs for conducting the training

We compared our findings for these elements in the Reserve Components to what is found in the
Active Components

To make a realistic assessment of the approach to technical logistics skill training in the
Reserve Components, we examined, in detail, seven logistics occupational specialties in each of the

²In this report, the term "reserve," in lower-case type, is generic, including both National Guard and Reserve Forces of the Military Departments.
four Military Services. The specialties chosen vary in technical complexity, all are important to mission accomplishment of the units concerned, all involve heavy reliance on Reserve Component personnel, and, in each case, postmobilization training cannot be relied upon. From a training standpoint, these skills are representative of the entire range of logistics skills in the Services.

Critical to the success of any training program are the abilities and backgrounds of those to be trained. We found that there is a wide range of opinions about the trainability of the current reserve population. For the purposes of this study, we attempted to quantify any significant differences in trainability between the active and reserve personnel now occupying positions in the selected logistics skills. In this way one could judge whether any significant differences existed, and, if they did, whether they would make the training of reservists more or less difficult than training their active duty counterpart. We analyzed the incumbents on the basis of civilian education, entry aptitude test scores, amount of active military experience, military experience in the same or related skill, and related civilian occupations wherever such information was available. In addition, we analyzed the number of full-time people assigned to these positions in reserve units, since full-time incumbents' opportunity for training is significantly greater than that of drilling reservists and since full-time people can also act as a nucleus of technical expertise in the conduct of on-the-job training.

Finally, we examined and compared all four Services' general approach and specific programs to provide initial skill training and sustainment training to reserve logistics personnel and we reviewed the characteristics of the training environment peculiar to the reserve forces. The study examined only the programs dealing with the development and sustainment of these essential logistics skills of enlisted personnel, rather than the training programs for general management/supervisory skills or collective unit proficiency.

In the following chapters, we present our findings and conclusions.

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3 All Military Services provide for the continued support and training of their reserve forces by the means of a full-time adjunct staff. Even though the personnel mix, level, and formal assignments of those staffs vary among the Services, civilian technicians, Guardsmen, and Reservists on active duty tours, and members of the regular Armed Forces comprise the full-time staffs in unique mixes and arrangements (including the nature of their formal relationship to the reserve unit they serve). The mixes, arrangements, and levels are discussed in detail in working notes.
2. FINDINGS

RESERVE COMPONENT LOGISTICS JOBS

The seven jobs selected for study within each of the Services involve a wide range of skill complexity and require that high levels of proficiency be maintained during peacetime. The skills are listed in Table 2-1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
<th>MARINES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Machinist (44E)</td>
<td>Machinery Repairman (MR)</td>
<td>Machinist (427X0)</td>
<td>Repair Shop Machinist (2161)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jet Engine Mechanic (68B)</td>
<td>Aviation Machinist's Mate (AD)</td>
<td>Jet Engine Mechanic (426X2)</td>
<td>Jet Engine Mechanic (6024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopter Electrician (68F)</td>
<td>Aviation Electronics Technician (AT)</td>
<td>Navigation Systems Specialist (328X4)</td>
<td>Helicopter Mechanic (6112)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Control Specialist (76P)</td>
<td>Storekeeper (SK)</td>
<td>Inventory Management Specialist (645X0)</td>
<td>Logistics/Embarkation Specialist (0431)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank Repairer (63H)</td>
<td>Boiler Technician (BT)</td>
<td>Ground Equipment Specialist (326X0)</td>
<td>Amphibious Trucked Vehicle Repairer (2142)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire Control Repairer (45G)</td>
<td>Electronics Technician (ET)</td>
<td>Weapon Control Systems Mechanic (321X2)</td>
<td>Intermediate Automotive Mechanic (3522)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watercraft Operator (61B)</td>
<td>Boatswain's Mate (BM)</td>
<td>Ground Radio Specialist (304X4)</td>
<td>Radio Technician (2861)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2-1
Table 2-2 shows the distribution within the Total Force of the selected skill billets between the Active Component and Reserve Component. These specialties account for a total of 45,000 authorized billets in the Reserve Components.

**TABLE 2-2. LOGISTICS BILLETS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
<th>MARINES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These percentages reflect the different approaches the Military Services have taken in assigning essential logistics missions to the Reserve Components and indicate the especially heavy dependence of the Army on logistics units from the Guard and Reserve. For example, over half of the critical nondivisional logistics units required by the Total Army currently are assigned to the Reserve Components. These units will provide in-theater ammunition, fuel, maintenance, and transportation services to enable the combat divisions to conduct operations. Most of these units are required by war plans to be operational in-theater within 60 days of mobilization and will be supporting the early combat operations of the forward-deployed and rapid reinforcing active component divisions.

**THE INCUMBENTS**

Variations affecting the trainability of the incumbent population are summarized in Table 2-3. No data are shown for aptitude scores achieved by incumbents because, in all Services, Guard/Reserve aptitude scores were substantially the same as those of their Active Component counterparts in each specialty.
TABLE 2.3. INCUMBENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
<th>MARINES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High School Graduate or Higher</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior Active Service, Any Skill</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior Active Service, Related Skill</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-Time Support</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Related Civilian Occupation</td>
<td>NM</td>
<td>NM</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>NM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: NM = Data not maintained in the Service.

Army

In addition to having the largest fraction of its early-deploying logistics support units in the Reserve Components, the Army also appears to have the most difficult training challenge with respect to the incumbent population in these skills. The Army has the lowest percentage of high school graduates, the lowest percentage with prior active military service, the lowest percentage with related active military experience, and the lowest percentage of full-time support personnel assigned to these positions. Since the majority of billets authorized for these skills are assigned to the Reserve Components, this Service is limited in its ability to recruit large numbers of Army veterans with relevant active duty experience.

A RAND Corporation 1984 study note on "Attrition During Training in the Army Reserve and Army National Guard," prepared for the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs, reported that members of the Guard and Reserve who had not completed high school were much more apt to leave the Army during initial skill training (by as much as a factor of 2.8 to 1) than those who held high school diplomas. The Army's problem with non-high-school graduates is compounded by the fact that among recent accessions (E1 through E4) in these logistics billets the percentage of non-high-school graduates appears to be much higher than for the total incumbent population. This group of new soldiers ranges from a low of 25 percent nongraduates among Army National Guard Aircraft Engine Repairers to a high of 50 percent among Army Reserve Aircraft Electricians. The high probable attrition rate of this group places a heavy burden on the
training system to provide and sustain the required levels of trained personnel. Table 2-4 summarizes these data.

**TABLE 2-4. NON-HIGH-SCHOOL GRADUATES IN THE ARMY: E1 – E4**

(Seven Technical Skills)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MACHINIST (44E)</th>
<th>FIRE CONTROL REPAIRER (45G)</th>
<th>WATERCRAFT OPERATOR (61B)</th>
<th>TRACK VEHICLE REPAIRER (63H)</th>
<th>AIRCRAFT ENGINE REPAIRER (68B)</th>
<th>AIRCRAFT ELECTRICIAN (86F)</th>
<th>SUPPLY SPECIALIST (76P)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>E1-E3</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARNG</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>E4</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARNG</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*NOTE: ARNG = Army National Guard; USAR = U.S. Army Reserve; IDA = Insufficient Data Available.*

**Navy**

A sizable fraction of the Navy’s logistics force structure in some support activities is assigned to the Selected Reserve (e.g., over 90 percent of the Cargo Handling Battalions are in the Naval Reserve). Even though the Navy has only 14 percent full-time support in these fields—higher than the Army’s 11 percent but less than half the Air Force’s 30 percent, the Navy has an advantage from a training standpoint in having the highest percentage of personnel with related prior active service. This percentage will probably decline, however, as the Naval Reserve acquires more non-prior-service personnel through the Sea and Air Mariner (SAM) program. This will present new training challenges.

**Air Force**

Because a large part of the Air Force’s force structure is in the Reserve Components, many logistics specialists will have to deploy immediately in most contingencies, without time for
postmobilization training. The Air Force has the largest fraction (98 percent) of high school graduates in these specialties, the highest percentage of full-time support, and substantial percentages of logistics specialists with prior related active service and/or related civilian occupations. All of these factors combine to make the training requirements easier to fulfill.

**Marine Corps**

The seven specialties studied are required for sustained combat operations of the Fourth Marine Division and the Fourth Marine Aircraft Wing. Also, the Marine Corps Selected Reserve logistics units in the Fourth Force Service Support Group may be required to support active Marine Amphibious Forces upon mobilization. Active and Reserve personnel in these logistics jobs are remarkably similar in all important characteristics. Only a small percentage of reserve personnel have prior related active service (16 percent), and small numbers of full-time support personnel (14 percent) are available. Because Active Marine Amphibious Forces are currently structured to be self-sufficient logistically, the dependence on Reserve logistics specialists is much less than is found in the Army. This relatively lower dependence means that the Marine Corps may have an opportunity to provide additional training for many of its Reserve logistics specialists after mobilization occurs.

**SKILL TRAINING STRATEGIES**

Although the overall strategy for training Reserve Component logistics personnel is not formally stated in any official documents, all four Military Services follow the same basic approach as in training active force logistics personnel: Initial skill training is identical to that of the Active Components, and sustainment training relies heavily on supervised on-the-job training and on-the-job experience (OJT/OJE) in the unit. Advanced skills are added by continuing OJT/OJE, and by more formal schooling in some cases.
Active and reserve personnel should acquire and maintain the same skills under Total Force Policy, but the different environment in the Reserve Components makes it difficult, and, in some cases impossible, for reservists to succeed under the current approach to training.\(^1\)

In the reserve training environment, personnel have limited time available for training—limited not only to the normal 38 days of training per year but also limited to times when training facilities or work opportunities are available for meaningful mission training. Those 38 days are frequently interrupted by weeks of inactivity, during which military skills erode. Reserve logistics units are mostly small, scattered, and often remote from opportunities for OJT/OJE. The lack of a peacetime workload related to the unit wartime mission (except in aviation units) creates even more difficulty in sustaining individual skills. Opportunities for mission-related workload often occur during annual training only. As a result of all of these conditions, little effective sustainment training actually takes place for many logistics specialties.

Finally, personnel in the Reserve Components are not geographically interchangeable among units by a central authority as they are in the Active force. This unique aspect of the Reserve Components has at least two implications with respect to individual training of technical skills:

- The impact of losing a trained, high-skilled member of a reserve unit, especially if it is a low density skilled position (e.g., 1 or 2 positions per unit), is severe. Unlike the process followed for an active unit, the reserve unit must acquire a replacement from locally available resources. That recruit must then attend initial skills training before filling the needed billet. The time required to replace such losses with qualified people can be extremely long.

- In low density skills, the opportunity for career progression within a single unit can be extremely limited. This can encourage trained, skilled people to transfer to other skill positions having better promotion potential, but requiring additional and different training. Even when a member of the Guard or Reserve moves from one city to another, he or she may have no opportunity to join a unit offering the same job or a similar job because no unit requiring that skill exists in the new locale.

\(^1\)One example of this mismatch is the planned use of midcareer formal technical schooling. These courses are designed basically for Active personnel and are often too long for attendance by remotely located reservists who hold full-time civilian employment. As a result, in several Army skills in which over 50 percent of total Army billets are in the Reserve Component, less than 5 percent of the school seats are occupied by reservists.
All of these differences in the reserve training environment compared to the Active Component are in conflict with a de facto training strategy that: (a) requires longer and more continuous training time than is normally possible for reservists, (b) relies heavily on day-to-day unit mission taskings to provide continuous opportunities for specialists to gain experience and skill in a supervised way, and (c) depends on a centrally managed personnel system to deliver a trained individual to a unit quickly when a vacancy occurs.

Recognition of these basic environmental parameters is essential to development of a workable training strategy for the Reserve Components.

SERVICE INITIATIVES

All four Services are considering, or are at various stages of introducing, measures to improve the training of technical logistics specialists in the Reserve Components.

The Army, for example, is considering development of additional "exportable" training packages, greater use of training devices and simulators, and establishment of regional technical training centers. Navy initiatives include using Fleet Training Centers on weekends to train Reservists, constructing courses in modules to fit Reserve time schedules, and locating Reserve Readiness Centers to provide technical training on a recurring basis. Air Force Field Training Detachments, whose original mission was to provide technical skill training on new weapon systems or support equipment, are increasingly supporting Reserve Components on a regional basis. To improve and standardize on-the-job training, the Marine Corps is developing an Individual Training Standards System for each occupational field.

These improvements will be beneficial, but tend to deal with isolated segments of the training problem, one at a time, and lack an overall framework, goals, or priorities. Even full implementation of them all (which is uncertain) would fall short of solving the extremely difficult problems of technical training in the reserve environment.

OSD ROLE

OSD has not routinely exercised management oversight or provided policy guidance in the training of military personnel of the Reserve Components. Since 1974, the principal vehicle for
reporting DoD training activities for OSD has been the Military Manpower Training Report (MMTR). The MMTR is Congressionally mandated; it focuses on input resources, specific training activities, and training loads reflecting areas of traditional Congressional interest. Produced annually, it reflects decisions already made within the Services' budget submissions. Even within this limited context, the coverage of reserve training is minimal and illustrates the imbalance of management attention given to reserve training compared to the attention given to active training. The document does not describe or document overall training strategies, training requirements, or training effectiveness. It is therefore not suitable in its present form as a management tool for OSD review and oversight of training policy or programs for the Reserve Components.

To date, OSD has not initiated substantive program or budget reviews on overall Reserve Component training matters and has published no guidance to the Services on training priorities or resource allocations for use during the annual planning, programming, and budgeting cycle.
3. CONCLUSIONS

DISCUSSION

The Services' training programs for logistics specialists in the Guard and Reserve do not adequately reflect important and unique aspects of the Reserve Components themselves. In this respect, training of the Reserve Components can be improved in each of the Military Services. The relative management emphasis and resources devoted to Reserve Component training have not been in balance with those devoted to Active Component training. In general, the approach followed by all Military Departments has been to design and build training programs to satisfy the needs of the Active Component and then, with some modifications, to use those same programs to train reservists. In the past, this approach may have been adequate, but, under present circumstances, individual programs designed to work in the Active Component training environment are often impossible to execute in the Reserve Component environment at the level of effectiveness implied by war plans. This de facto strategy falls short of making sure that Reserve Component training programs will produce what is now required of them.

The most serious and immediate logistics training problem facing the Reserve Components exists within the Army, where force structure ratios heavily weighted toward reserve units and early operational dependence on the Guard and Reserve, demand decisive action. Though the Army has produced a number of worthy projects and initiatives directed at specific Reserve Component training deficiencies, there is no integrated or cohesive "game plan" for attacking and solving the overall problem. The problem is complex and large. Solving it will require a combination of new ideas, significant increases in resources, and greater management attention and emphasis.

Reserve Component training in the Air Force and the Navy presents less difficult challenges, primarily because large proportions of their Guard/Reserve enlisted populations have related active military experience. In both of these Services, however, the proportion of experienced prior-service enlisted personnel is declining. Overall, integrated training strategies within the Air Force and
Navy will eventually be required. The Marine Corps, with its lower personnel strength and limited dependence on its Reserve early in an emergency, appears to face a training challenge that is small in scale and more amenable to solution. As with each of the other Services, however, the Marine Corps suffers from the lack of an integrated strategy to address and solve technical skills training problems unique to the reserve. Except for the Marine Corps' lower dependence level upon its Reserve, its Reserve Component training problem is similar in most respects to the Army's.

In the past, OSD has not had sufficient information concerning overall reserve training programs to exercise oversight or to develop policy guidance that may be needed to identify and support required improvements.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The findings discussed earlier lead to the following conclusions:

- Under the Total Force Policy, heavy reliance on early deployment of Reserve Component logistics support units and personnel has created significant new training challenges.

- All Services rely on training approaches and programs designed for the Active force: these fail to recognize adequately the essential differences between the Active and Reserve training environments.

- The most serious, difficult, and urgent individual training problem is in the Army Guard and Reserve.

- Present reserve training initiatives are commendable but are generally fragmented and inadequate to solve the basic problems discussed in this report.

- Increased exchange of information and experience among the Services concerning innovative training concepts and programs would be beneficial.

- OSD has had inadequate information concerning overall Reserve Component training and the effectiveness of that training.

- OSD does not regularly conduct reviews of overall Reserve Component training priorities or allocations of resources.

- OSD has not issued policy guidance on training strategy or resource priorities to assure adequate training of Guard and Reserve personnel.
4 RECOMMENDATIONS

Training technical logistics personnel of the Reserve Components and maintaining their skills is difficult. That fact, coupled with the essential contribution of these reservists to any future military operations, suggests an urgent need for greater attention by management and higher priorities to the resources allotted. We believe that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) [ASD(RA)] should initiate several actions to help correct deficiencies in Reserve Component training. The actions we recommend have two objectives: to help establish reasonable management and resource priorities for resolving Reserve Component training problems and to assure the development and implementation of effective program fixes.

**ACTION 1:** Sponsor a periodic major review (e.g., biennial) of Reserve Component training.

A first DoD-wide conference in FY86 for this purpose would identify and review:

- Overall goals
- Current strategies and major training issues
- Methods for exchanging training ideas among components
- Required improvements in current strategy and policies
- Objectives and timetables for improvement.

**ACTION 2:** Introduce Reserve Component training improvement objectives into the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) through inclusion in the Defense Guidance, Program Objective Memorandum (POM), Preparation Instructions (PPI), and subsequent program and budget reviews.

These two actions are closely related. Though the recommended review in Action 1 would establish goals and objectives toward which the Services agree to work, implementation will require follow-through into the resource allocation process. This would assure that appropriate resources are included in Service requests and are supported by both the Services and OSD during the PPBS cycle. Action 2 would provide this link by drawing attention to program resources in POMs and budgets.
This study evaluates the adequacy of training programs and policies governing the development of technical logistics skills in the Guard and Reserve. It consists of this report and four separately published working notes on technical skill training in the Reserve Components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. This final report addresses the DoD-wide policy issues involved, while the working notes describe the specific training programs used by the Services.

With all Military Services dependent on the Reserve Components for immediate logistics support in any future operations, the capability of individual guardsmen and reservists to perform such support missions without postmobilization training is vital. Under the Total Force Policy, reserve logistics personnel should acquire and maintain many of the same skills as active personnel.
19. ABSTRACT (Continued)

The unique environment in the Reserve Components, however, makes technical skill training of reservists extremely difficult. Reservists have limited and interrupted training time available. Reserve units are widely spread geographically, often great distances from supported units and work facilities. The problem is made even more difficult when training depends heavily on on-the-job training and on-the-job experience, as it does for many logistics specialties. Thus, it would seem appropriate — even necessary — to adopt different training approaches and programs for reservists to achieve the required levels of expertise. Nevertheless; each of the Services follows essentially the same strategy to train reservists that it follows to train active force personnel.

In our view, a fresh, overall look at reserve training is needed, followed by design and implementation of a more effective and workable training strategy tailored explicitly to the needs of the Reserve Components.