INTERVENTION FORCES: AN AMERICAN NECESSITY?
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An Individual Essay

by

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INTRODUCTION

America has been required to respond to threats or acts of violence against her interests time and again throughout our history. World wars, regional conflicts and a thriving economy have projected America to center stage as the superpower in the free world since the end of World War II. In 1947, several years after the war, President Truman asserted before a Joint Session of Congress "the determination of the United States to help free people resist attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." This proclamation became known as the Truman Doctrine and projected the United States to the forefront in the containment policy against the spread of communism in the world.

President Truman's doctrine was reaffirmed in 1958 by President Eisenhower and again in 1980 by President Carter to crises during their administrations. The Truman Doctrine has essentially required America's military forces to be capable of deploying anywhere in the world to protect US interests or the interests of other free nations of the world. America's military capability has become a primary deterrence factor to the spread of Soviet interests since World War II.

DETERRENCE

America's emergence as a superpower has forced a change from the isolationism that had previously dominated America's view of the world. At the end of World War II, the US was the only nuclear military power, but now shares that awesome responsibility with another superpower, the USSR, along with lesser world powers. In the nuclear era, any world crisis improperly managed can develop into a nuclear confrontation. As the media reminds us, the baby boomers after World War II are now turning 40 years old. Over that
40-year period, America has managed to avoid and deter general war. The disquieting factor is that no one knows how much of deterrence has been luck. A quick review of a few crises listed on Chart 1 should remind us of the many potentially disastrous situations faced since sharing a nuclear superpower status with the Soviets.

1956 Middle East
1957 Hungary
1958 Quemoy
1958 Lebanon
1960 U-2
1961 Bay of Pigs
1962 Cuba Missiles
1964 Tonkin Gulf
1965 Dominican Republic
1967 Middle East
1968 Pueblo
1968 Czechoslovakia
1969 EC-121
1971 Bangladesh
1973 Middle East
1974 Grenada
1974 Cambodian Evacuation
1975 Vietnam Evacuation
1976 Mayaguez
1976 Lebanon Evacuations (June 6 July)
1976 Kenya/Uganda
1976 Korea
1977 Ethiopia
1978 Zaire
1978 Nicaragua
1978 Guyana
1979 Iran
1979 Yemen
1979 Nicaragua
1979 Cuba Brigade
1979 Iran Hostages
1979 Afghanistan

1980 Korea
1980 Cuba Blue Fire
1980 Iran/Iraq
1980 Poland
1981 Central America
1981 Poland
1981 Lebanon
1981 Gambia
1981 Gulf of Sidra
1981 Egypt (Sadat)
1982 Falklands
1983 Early Call
1983 Central America
1983 Chad
1983 Lebanon
1983 KAL 007
1983 Rangoon
1983 Grenada
1984 Iran/Iraq
1984 Eagle Look
1984 Intensive Look
1984 Venezuela Hijacking
1984 India
1984 Nicaragua
1984 Elbow Room
1984 Tehran Hijacking
1985 TWA Hijacking
1985 Hijacking of Achille Lauro

Chart 1
America has been lucky because the range of available responses for many of these crises was not adequate then and may not be adequate now. The ability to respond to a crisis without undue escalation is critical. A recent successful crisis response was the downing of the Egyptian jet with the hijackers of the *ACHILLE LAURO*. The forcing down of that jet by aircraft of the US Sixth Fleet was a restrained response that showed America's resolve to provide timely response to terrorists' threats. That is just one of the many threats Americans must be prepared to face on a regular basis.

**TERRORISM**

In the spectrum of war, terrorism is the lowest order of conflict but has the highest probability of occurring. Terrorist acts attract attention to the terrorists' cause while embarrassing specific agencies or governments. Acceptance of terrorism as a lower level of war has resulted in growing preparations to counter terrorism. Over the last 12 years, the United States has organized and improved her elite strike forces for countering certain types of terrorist attacks. Our awareness and preparation to wage this type of war is, in itself, a deterrence as our nuclear forces are deterrents for general war. Chart 2 shows the range and probability of conflict in the world. The high probability of terrorism, countered with few forces, appears to be inversely proportional to the low probability of general war countered by massive military forces. Our weakness appears to stem around the center of the spectrum of conflict where probability is still likely yet our capability of projecting US forces throughout the world is weak.
FORCES

The equipping, training and maintaining of our military forces to be capable of going anywhere, anytime, is an inherent task of our Armed Forces. As we look at today's increased lift capacity for both the Air Force and the Navy along with the Army's new Light Divisions, we have for the first time an opportunity to tailor a strike or intervention force in peacetime that is within the reality of existing resources. Our current forces, capable of rapid deployment, are programmed for multiple troop lists for the different theaters of conflict around the world. This complicates both their training and planning and makes them potentially responsive to several different chains of command. Considering the potential for problems in training, planning for multiple scenarios under various chains of command, it may be time to create an intervention force that is rapidly deployable to operate in the lower intensity spectrums of conflict. Recalling the problems with two previous deployments may support a need to create an intervention force with its dedicated lift and an established joint chain of command.

KOREA

During President Truman's term of office, strategic planners were still relying on our atomic bomb with its massive retaliation capability for any military response required. This was non-congruent with the Truman Doctrine of 1947, and it came to light very forcibly in 1950 with the North Korean invasion of South Korea. Massive retaliation did not fit the crisis in Korea; and America, with the billions of dollars of surplus military equipment and the three million combat veterans of World War II, was unable to rapidly project ground forces. Our strategy did not anticipate the
necessity for rapid deployment of forces and, needless to say, the time needed was bought with American lives. This lack of preparedness to project forces is a deficiency that seems to reoccur numerous times in the last 40 years.

Two rapid deployments that I would like to review are the Lebanon Crisis in 1958 and the Grenada Operation in 1983. These are but two of the many crises requiring our Armed Forces to plan for deployment of combat forces tailored to the limited lift. Relatively small, light forces have been available over the last 40 years, but for parochial, budgeting or other considerations have not always been available for deployment. Nor have these forces been adequately and uniformly maintained over this period. Historically, forces dedicated and trained for one crisis or area have a tendency to evolve into a permanent force or headquarters that soon becomes limited in scope. The rapid deployment forces of the late 1970's and the requirements placed on those forces and their associated headquarters have evolved into US CENTCOM of today, with some 300,000 troops involved. This force is hardly a rapid deployment force as would be envisioned in areas as Lebanon or Grenada, and probably many other areas of the world today.

The planning for an intervention force to be early deployed in a crisis must deal with specific units and be limited by the equipment, operational capabilities and available lift. Ideally the planner will become the executor, and each unit of each service involved trained and mutually respectful of each other's capabilities. The planning for a limited strike force is considerably different, and much more specific than the movement of a 300,000-man force along with all of its associated supplies. And I might add, it should be different and both types of planning are required by our Armed Forces.
The two deployments for review, Lebanon and Grenada, shed some insight into the difficulties of these ad hoc deployments. It also will help to define the need for a permanent intervention force with the unity of command necessary to routinely train and deploy when required. The United States needs a single command not limited to sea or air that can execute US policy anywhere in the world. The force should be small enough to respond without the callup of any of our Reserves or detract from the forces' programmed for NATO or other major commands. However, this small force could be used anywhere in the world to include NATO and specified commands as the spearhead of the bigger deployment process. It is interesting to note that the French have just completed forming a 47,000-man reaction force which is not only capable of being deployed in the European NATO scenario, but also capable of responding to contingencies abroad.

Lebanon, 1958

In the mid-1950's, the Middle East was suffering from instability characterized by the Suez Crisis and an expansion of Soviet influence throughout the area. The influence of the former colonial powers in the region had eroded to the point that the United States assumed the lead in conducting a diplomatic counteroffensive to stabilize the area and contain Soviet influence. The Truman Doctrine was expanded to include this region and formally became the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957. Key issues of the Doctrine are taken from President Eisenhower's request to Congress in January 1957.

...The action which I propose would have the following features. It would, first of all, authorize the United States to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.
It would, in the second place, authorize the executive to undertake in the same region programs of military assistance and cooperation with any nation or group of nations which desire such aid.

It would, in the third place, authorize such assistance and cooperation to include the employment of armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism.

The present proposal would, in the fourth place, authorize the President to employ, for economic and defensive military purposes, sums available under the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, without regard to existing limitations....

America's military planners began to focus on intervention contingencies for the Middle East well before the crisis developed in Lebanon. The Army's Continental Army Command (CONARC) was directed in June 1956 to create contingency plans for the region. Five months later, a trial plan, SWAGGERSTICK, was being staffed, calling for the deployment of two army divisions. Throughout 1956 and into 1957, the plan was refined. However, as it was a unilateral Army plan, it was not staffed with the other Services. It contained no commitment from the other Services needed to provide the lift to execute the plan. The plan was not given to JCS for staffing and, if it had been, it would not have received a sympathetic hearing from JCS whose strategic doctrine was still founded on the idea of massive retaliation.

Two years previous, the retiring Army Chief of Staff, General Matthew Ridgway, bluntly told the Secretary of Defense that the Army could not support America's diplomatic objectives without a fast-moving, hard-hitting joint force in which the versatility of the whole force was emphasized. Ridgway's successor, General Maxwell Taylor, used the plan, SWAGGERSTICK, to
point out the Army's deficiencies in these areas and to help his campaign for the Army to prepare for limited war.

General Taylor continued to work toward resolving the problem of contingency operations. Even in the face of the Secretary of Defense's reduction in force of 200,000 Army personnel in the spring of 1957 and with similar cuts to the other Services, General Taylor directed the creation of a CONUS strategic Army Corps in September 1957, with two Army divisions. This Corps, The XVIII Airborne Corps, was designated to do the operational and logistics planning so its forces could arrive at any objective within one month of receiving orders. The Strategic Army Corps was to encounter many problems during its development, but the most critical was mobility. This lack of mobility would keep XVIII Airborne Corps out of the Lebanon Crisis in 1958, first major American troop deployment since Korea.

In November 1957, JCS directed Admiral James Holloway, headquartered in London, to establish a specified command from contingency forces stationed in Europe for the possible intervention in the Middle East. JCS was willing to run the risk of temporarily weakening NATO defenses for an unlikely operation in the Middle East. In any case, at least joint forces were now being considered and being made available to the CINC, Admiral Holloway. Two Army battle groups from the 11th Airborne Division stationed in Germany, 110 C-119 Air Force aircraft for lift and Navy elements of the US Sixth Fleet were the forces made available for planning. All the Services, to include the specified command, created provisional or temporary organizations to deal with the Middle East contingency. In spite of the ad hoc approach, Operation BLUEBAT was formed.

Over a period of several months, a powerful and complex military structure was tailored for the Middle East. However, little attention had
been paid to what specific missions were entailed because of the assumptions that deployment meant combat. Fortunately, early in 1958, Admiral Holloway asked his planners to consider something less than all-out combat. This included the restoration of existing governments and peacekeeping.

As the situation deteriorated in the Middle East, the 2d Provisional Marine Force headquarters at Camp Lejune, North Carolina, deployed to the Mediterranean in May 1978. Other joint planners assembled for final plans in the Mediterranean. Army and Air Force components of the force continued as usual with their daily training and NATO mission requirements not directed towards the Middle East.

When the no-notice call came late on 14 July 1958 to activate the specified command and establish a US presence in Lebanon, the following morning all forces were taken by surprise. Of the three Marine battalion landing teams in the Mediterranean, none were available as they were enroute away from Lebanon for shore leave. The closest was diverted and lead elements barely arrived in Lebanon by the designated time. The Army forces who had been programmed for the Middle East contingency were involved in a NATO-directed alert in another area when the Lebanon crisis broke and were not available for the Middle East. A new unit was designated at that time—the 1st Battle Group of the 187th Airborne Infantry. The Air Force had similar problems assembling the necessary aircraft on short notice for the movement to Lebanon.

Over a period of time the US forces deployed to Lebanon grew to some 15,000 men who would be involved in the 102 days of US troops in Lebanon. Fortunately, at no time were US forces militarily opposed and especially at the critical early lodgement in Lebanon.
Virtually every after-action report on the operation has the caveat that had the operation been opposed, disaster would have occurred. Their arguments are that the problems encountered should have been resolved long before the order to execute was given. Only portions of one battalion could be inserted on that required first day. It was many more days before the remaining Marine and Naval forces could arrive in position and before the Army forces could be air-landed. This piece-mealing of forces, had the landing been opposed, would have been disastrous to both US and Lebanon interests in the Middle East.

GRENADA, 1983

Like the Lebanon deployment in 1958, the operation in Grenada was an unqualified success but it had the potential for many disasters. As a brief review or reminder to us of the operation, URGENT FURY, it began on 25 October 1983 with US Marine and Army Ranger forces capturing Pearls and Point Salines, respectively, on the island of Grenada. They were in turn reinforced by elements of the 82d Airborne Division, which was to relieve these forces and assume the overall mission of the island of Grenada. The mission statement given these forces was to protect and evacuate US and designated foreign nationals, neutralize Grenadan and Cuban forces, stabilize the internal situation, and maintain peace. This was to be done by US forces in conjunction with the Organization of East Caribbean States (OECS). This entire force came to be called the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force. By 30 October (D+5), there were 700 US and foreign nationals that had been evacuated from Grenada. No noncombatants were killed or wounded during the operation and US forces captured over 600 Cubans and 350 of the Caribbean military forces. On 10 November, the hostilities were declared
over though some forces were to remain to assist the Governor-General Sir Paul Stone with restoring democracy to the island.

The major problems in Operation URGENT FURY were repeats of the 1958 Lebanon operation. There was no existing command and control structure tailored to accomplish this size contingency operation. Forces were again made available on an ad hoc basis. Fortunately, the Marine Amphibious Force had been loaded and was enroute to replace the peacekeeping forces in Lebanon and so was available to be diverted to the island of Grenada where they accomplished their portion of the mission. There were no other Marines with sealift available. It is unrealistic to think that those forces would be immediately available or routinely available in any future conflict.

The use of the Ranger force was a good choice but the lift requirements for them and for the 82d Airborne Division were not adequately planned and thus created deployment problems during the operation. Worse, the 82d Airborne Division was employed without the use of its higher headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps. The Corps would have been a knowledgeable headquarters to help with the planning and taken some of the deployment and planning load off of the 82d Airborne Division. Also, the Corps could have handled the additional political mission requirements imposed on the deploying forces. Additionally, 82d forces were not consulted early enough in the planning process so they could influence the employment of their own force.

As background, in Mid-October when the situation was developing in Grenada, JCS directed the US Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM) to initiate planning for the evacuation of noncombatants in Grenada. A week later, a combat mission was added as a possibility. The mission would be to neutralize the Cuban and Grenadan forces, stabilize the country's situation,
and provide a peacekeeping force until the government could be restored. Later, an additional mission change was made the day before this operation was to be executed: to restore a democratic government in Grenada.

The multiple and changing missions created problems at the planning level. Unfortunately, the planners appeared to concentrate more on the follow-on missions than the deployment of the forces into the area and seizing control. The tactical plan was to take the Navy Carrier Battle Group, *USS Independence*, along with the Marine Amphibious Ready Group, which was previously mentioned as being enroute to Lebanon, and divert them to take over the northern half of the island. The southern half of the island was left to Army Rangers. Both the Marines and the Rangers would be relieved by the 82d Airborne Division. An intermediate staging base was selected in Barbados for the forces to build up essential logistical supplies and other elements necessary for the operation.

All of the Task Force tactical headquarters (those conducting the operation) were activated three days before the operation with the exception of the 82d Airborne Division. They were not notified until the night before (24 October) that they would be involved in the operation. Planning by the LANTCOM personnel did not include sufficient Army planners for the employment of the 82d, nor did they have on their staff personnel knowledgeable of the details involved in the deployment of Army airborne forces. Some of the planning problems associated with not having the right planners available could be attributed to the intense concern with security for the operation. This concern for security overshadowed many of the planning steps normally taken with this type of an operation.

The problems Army, Marine, Navy and Air Force personnel had in this operation were typical of problems encountered on joint operations such as
SOLID SHIELD, in which these same forces who were deployed routinely participate. The fire support procedures associated with using Naval gunfire and tactical air support from Navy aircraft, and the communications problems between these Services are all known and contingency solutions employed routinely on exercises. However, the people that are involved in the exercises down at the tactical level, the battalions, brigades, and the Marine Amphibious units, were not involved in the planning of the operation at the LANTCOM level. Thus, these lessons learned from so many exercises were not incorporated in the plans. When problems surfaced, the ingenuity of the individuals involved in the operation at the tactical level resolved most of the problems—but at the expense of American lives to accomplish the overall mission.

The following quote from the January 1981 Leavenworth Papers No. 3 describing the Lebanon intervention is equally applicable to the Grenada operation and quite probably to similar operations if undertaken today.

The intervention in Lebanon was one of 215 separate instances of American contingency force operations between 1945 and 1976, by one count, but for all this experience—in which more than one service often participated—the American military establishment in 1958 was still not very well practiced in joint operations and the deployment of forces over long distances. Looking back at the operations for contingencies in the Middle East after the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive in November 1957, one is impressed by the wave of "provisionalism" which dominated military planning as well as by a certain parochialism in the services. The vision of what was really three separate provisional military organizations—the Marines, the Army Task Force, and the Composite Air Strike Force—descending upon Beirut may have been unnerving to the hapless "rebels" in [Lebanon], but it would have been welcomed by a determined and professional enemy.

Since Secretary of the Navy Lehman announced strategic sealift as a primary Navy mission in March 1984, there has been a glaring omission of this important topic in any Maritime Strategy publication, to include the
lastest issue in January 1986. As a matter of fact, articles in that latest
issue outlining the maritime strategy by the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of
Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps omit any mention of
strategic sealift. What little assault lift is mentioned is totally
dedicated to Marine forces. They do not mention maritime assets being
available for deployment of Army and Air Force equipment or supplies.

Availability of strategic sealift for contingency planning and training
of Army forces is necessary to ensure mutual confidence in capabilities and
timely execution of deployments. The Navy's large ready reserve force of
some 135 ships now, and 190 by 1990, are a critical strategic asset that can
be used to quickly reinforce Army as well as Marine deployments. The
working relationship between the Air Force and the Army has traditionally
been good with mutual supporting views on deployment of forces. Army rapid
deployment forces along with the new light infantry divisions offer a new
option for JCS planners. The Army's new light infantry divisions offer a
rapid reinforcement capability to the existing airborne and air assault
forces. This reinforcement heretofore has not been available for deployment
by air to back up our airborne or air-delivered forces. They were too heavy
in the past. The old planning response for many contingencies was "as there
was no reserve available for an airborne division once deployed was to
simply delay action until sufficient Marine forces could be assembled,
loaded and deployed." This would take days and even weeks of deployment
time, all taking from the strategic surprise so often critical in mission
planning. See Chart 3 for deployment times by sea. This chart assumes the
ships are already available and loaded in port—a very generous assumption.
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<td>Western Pacific</td>
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</table>

\(^1\) Use Suez Canal – 6 days
\(^2\) Use Panama Canal – 13 Days
\(^3\) Use Suez Canal – 15 Days

Over the years, the outsized and bulk loads not suited for air deployment reduced the effectiveness of the existing armored, mechanized and infantry divisions so that they would not be feasible reinforcements by air of our early deployed airborne forces. In other words, if our airborne division was deployed and not adequate to do the job, there was a tremendous
gap before reinforcement units could be deployed by sea and over land to the objective area. This made planners focus more on the less responsive Marine forces, who often could not achieve strategic surprise and were limited to coastal operations.

**Air Force Lift Aircraft**

234 C141B
75 C5A
512 C130
821

**Civil Reserve Air Craft (CRAF)**

227 Passenger Aircraft (PAX)
67 Cargo Aircraft
294

Chart 4

Chart 4 shows the Air Force lift capability that could be made available to rapidly move Army and Air Force units to the target area. The over 800 Air Force aircraft and 300 aircraft of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) are poised to support a limited contingency operation, especially in the area of the Americas. So responsive a force in this area or any area offers
a degree of deterrence to would-be exporters of communism. The limited defenses of many small belligerent nations are centered on their coastal areas. The threat of sizeable forces being deployed well into the interior or to an adjacent country near the target area provides a significant increase in the defense of the belligerent nation.

**SUMMARY**

It has always seemed wasteful for units to spend inordinate amounts of training assets, planning and practicing cross-loading for combat assault when they are not programmed nor will they be used as early deploying assault forces. There is only so much lift capability and it must be used to the maximum. For a commander to insist on his unit being able to disembark in the objective area in fighting configuration as follow-on forces is an ego trip for him and a waste of assets for the movement planner.

The assets for intervention forces must be sheltered for training as well as actual deployment. For aircraft to bore holes in the sky and ships to steam in circles, all being used to train assault techniques to non-assault forces in this Brphan-Rudman-Hollings time is unsupportable.

A small, though predominantly Army, joint force of 25-30,000 should be designated, trained and made available to all CINCs without forward deployed forces. This force and its Army commander should be charged with the planning and execution for all initial assault lodgments until such times as large follow-on forces are available in theater. The assigned joint force as a minimum should include the 82d Airborne division; a Light Infantry Division; Marine Fire Support Element for Naval gunfire and Navy/Marine Air Support; and Air Force elements representative of MAC, TAC and SAC along with FAC with maneuver elements. Training would also need to be done in
conjunction with Air and Sea lift and MAU's afloat. All services should be put in a subordinate and supporting role for training and execution of this mission.

Funds, personnel and equipment exist now to create this intervention force. A reordering of priorities would be needed and a very strong guiding hand from the defense structure to insure parochialism is forced aside, ruthlessly if necessary. Not to do so with the potential threat to future deployments is negligence on the part of our leaders. The Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine leaders must be made to subordinate themselves to the needs of the intervention force commander. There is no chain of command problem as the intervention force commander is in charge, regardless of rank or service of the supporting force commanders.
Bibliography


Abbreviations

FAC - Air Force Forward Air Controller
MAC - Air Force Military Airlift Command
MAU - Marine Amphibious Unit (Reinforced Battalion)
SAC - Air Force Strategic Air Command
TAC - Air Force Tactical Air Command
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