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TERRORISM: CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE - THE SEARCH FOR NATIONAL STRATEGY

BY

DOUGLAS H. DEARTH

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22 APRIL 1986

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013
Terrorism: Challenge and Response - The Search for National Strategy

Douglas H. Dearth

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013

22 April 1986

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Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism, Anti-Terrorism, Strategy, National Strategy, Intelligence, Deterrence, Retaliation, Preemption, Crisis Management, International Terrorism, Domestic Terrorism, Military Options

The fundamental issues are the lack of agreed upon definitions of terrorism among U.S. government agencies and the resultant lack of coherence in U.S. policy and strategy to respond to the threat. Government and academic definitions were examined, and were found to be inadequate for strategy formulation. A new theoretical typology of international and domestic terrorism is postulated, and the political and military implications of the functions of positive intelligence and counterintelligence in supporting (continued)
counterterrorism and antiterrorism strategies, respectively. A typology of response options is presented, indicating the limitations of defensive and crisis management procedures, as well as the costs and risks associated with offensive measures. The U.S. must formulate and execute an offensive strategy, employing military options of retaliation, elimination, and pre-emption. The ultimate goal of offensive and defensive strategies is to achieve effective deterrence against the terrorist threat. Both conventional and special operations forces have complimentary roles to play in the execution of an effective offensive counterterrorism strategy.
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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

TERRORISM: CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE - THE SEARCH FOR NATIONAL STRATEGY

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Douglas H. Dearth

Dr. Michael I. Handel
Project Adviser

US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
22 April 1986

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This Individual Study Project was produced under the sponsorship of the US Army War College Department of National Strategy. The author wishes to thank Dr. Michael I. Handel, Professor of National Security Affairs in the Department of National Security, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Dr. Handel guided the research and writing effort, giving freely of his time and advice in assisting in formulation of the theoretical constructs presented in this paper, and assisting in the publication process. The author also wishes to thank Mr. Anthony C. Nelson of the Foreign Intelligence Directorate, Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. Mr. Nelson, a long-time friend and colleague, read major portions of the draft and provided extensive comments and valuable insights into the intelligence and operational aspects of counterterrorism strategy. In the final analysis, the views and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US Army War College, the Department of Defense, or the US Government.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The subject of terrorism has gained the considerable attention in recent years of governments, academicians, and the media. It has become a frequently dominant concern of American and many foreign government decision-makers and policy implementers. Yet, considerable ambiguity persists in the perceptions of these officials, as well as academic commentators, concerning the issue, the nature of the threat, and the proper response to it. The American government's approach to the problem has been ideologically oriented and intellectually uncritical. Academic literature on the subject, while increasingly voluminous, has not contributed significantly to clarification of fundamental conceptual and policy dilemmas. Much of the current literature and commentary simply focuses on the spectacular aspects and manifestations of the phenomenon. Other studies make elaborate attempts at quantification of events, without dealing critically with strategic issues. Media treatment frequently is simply sensationalist.

The lack of a commonly accepted and unemotional definition of terrorism has contributed to governmental confusion, avoidance, and ineffectiveness in formulating appropriate policy responses. Little
thought has been given to clarifying, in strategic terms the nature of the threat. Organizational tinkering seems to have substituted for critical strategic analysis. The American Military Establishment, while perhaps not consciously avoiding the issue, has not contributed significantly to resolving this impasse. Indeed, there is no coherent political and military strategy for dealing with the threat. While intelligence is commonly acknowledged as the key to understanding and combating terrorism, the American Intelligence Community has retained traditional philosophical and operational precepts that are inadequate to the challenge. Military Intelligence, in particular, has been remiss in this regard.

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

This paper will examine the definitional issue and the nature of terrorism as a mechanism of oppositional violence in the international arena. A new operational typology will be proposed, designed to delineate more clearly the nature of the problem in political and military terms. The primary focus will be upon the international arena.

The contribution of the Intelligence Community will be examined in terms of its proper role in supporting the distinctly different operational requirements of counterterrorism and antiterrorism. Critical differences between the roles and functions of positive intelligence and counterintelligence will be highlighted, and the difficulties of international intelligence cooperation will be discussed.
A number of possible response strategies will be proposed, designed to support a range of necessary and plausible military options in dealing with international terrorism. The costs and risks of an offensive counterterrorism strategy will be examined. In this context, the plausibility of counterforce and countervalue strategies, and the contributions to be made by conventional and special operations forces in both roles, will be discussed.

Conclusions and recommendations will focus on national-level policy, operational, and organizational issues and their strategic implications for the US Defense Establishment. These will include: the need for a unitary definitional approach to terrorism by the government, the adoption of a comprehensive operational typology of terrorism, a realignment of intelligence resources, a clear-cut counterterrorism strategy for employment of military forces in support of a range of policy options, and general organizational requirements for supporting this strategy.

The fundamental question of the criticality of terrorism as a strategic threat to the United States will be addressed. This study will not focus in detail on historical or regional terrorist issues or phenomena, except as they serve to illustrate a given point. References to foreign perceptions, policies, and counterterrorist actions will be used only as points of general comparison with those of the United States.
CHAPTER II

DEFINING TERRORISM

THE IMPORTANCE OF DEFINITION

It has been the fashion among writers, particularly academics, over the past several years to begin articles or books on the subject of terrorism by asserting the newness of the phenomenon. Suffice it to say that the barrage of academic and official commentary on terrorism during the past 20 years clearly indicates that terrorism is not new. Further, the existence of numerous national and international efforts at framing legal codes to deal with the problem of terrorism date to at least the 1930s. Indeed, there is a wealth of historical examples of terrorism, and evidence of public concern about their occurrence, in Europe and the United States during the 19th and early 20th centuries. Even earlier prominent examples predate the modern age.

A second starting point of modern commentary on the subject of terrorism is to assert the vitally important of the issue to the United States and the concomitant requirement to arrive at an appropriate and adequate, or at least sufficient, definition of the phenomenon. A clear definition, or at least a clear understanding of definitional issues, indeed is necessary for governments to deal adequately with the
operational problems posed by terrorism. The reasons for this requirement for clarity of understanding will be developed in the following arguments. The centrality of the terrorism issue to American strategic interests is, to some degree, arguable and will be addressed at some length later in this paper.

The issue of terrorism is considered currently, and has been for several years, by many commentators to be a rather "sexy" topic; the term has come to be used in, at best, loose and, usually, emotional and perjorative ways by all concerned in government, academia, and the media. Policy-makers, operators, and commentators alike treat terrorism as something apart, to be approached in a special and, for the government and the military especially, secretive manner.

This paper will argue that, except for certain operational aspects, the issue of terrorism needs to be approached as any other national security, foreign policy, or threat issue. Terrorism needs to be demythologized if it is to be rationally handled as an important national policy issue. This rational, unemotional approach is most important for the Intelligence Community, if it is to provide the best possible policy-making and operational support to the National Command Authority and the Military Services.

THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION

Having argued for the central importance of clear definition of the phenomenon of terrorism, it is now necessary to survey the academic and authoritative literature on the subject to understand the complexity of the problem. At the outset, it should be stated that there is little
agreement on definition, hence much of the confusion over what to do about it. Approaches vary considerably. Some definitions concentrate on where it occurs, others on the types of perpetrators and their motivations, others on how it is conducted, and still others on how it is operationally supported. Governments, including the United States, tend to label any unconventional oppositional violence as terrorism. Gazit and Handel aptly summarize this point:

Any regime will view insurgent operations against it as illegal and will view the participants as criminals, accrediting no legitimacy to their struggle. It is not surprising, therefore, that all insurgent warfare is defined by its opponents as terrorism and the active participants as terrorists.2

Furthermore, as one prominent commentator, Brian Jenkins, points out,

Once a group carries out a terrorist act, it acquires the label terrorist, a label that tends to stick; and from that point on, everything this group does, whether intended to produce terror or not, it is henceforth called terrorist.3

This argument is more than rhetorical. During his recent visit to Yugoslavia, Secretary of State Shultz engaged in an impromptu debate during a joint news conference with his host, Foreign Minister Raif Dizdarevic, concerning the October 1985 hijacking of the cruise ship Achille Lauro. Secretary Shultz condemned the incident as one of terrorist murder. In response, the Minister said that Yugoslavia distinguishes between terrorism and "the struggle against colonialism, against aggression, and racism," adding that "when speaking of terrorism, one must also view the causes that lead to it." He then went on to reiterate Yugoslavia's support of the Palestine Liberation
Organization as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.6

Similar controversy over definitions exists within the US Government. The US Department of Defense, for instance, has more than one definition of the term, although there are, thankfully, some common threads among and between official definitions. DOD Directive 2000.12 defines terrorism as:

the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a revolutionary organization against individuals or property, with the intention of coercing or intimidating governments or societies, often for political or ideological reasons.7

The US Army, however, defines the term as:

the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence, to attain political, religious, or ideological goals through fear, intimidation or coercion. It usually involves a criminal act, often symbolic in nature and is intended to influence an audience beyond its immediate victims.8

There are some striking similarities and dissimilarities in these two official definitions. Both agree, as would virtually all academic definitions, that terrorism involves overt violence or the coercive threat of it. The DOD Directive clearly states that terrorism is "unlawful;" the Army Regulation says it "usually involves a criminal act." The Army clearly believes a terrorist act is for political, religious, or ideological goals; while DOD thinks it is "often" for political or ideological reasons (perhaps an interesting reflection one way or the other on how the Government views events in the Middle East in recent years, particularly those attributed to Muslim fundamentalists). The Army definition clearly acknowledges the possibility of symbolic or indirect violence against a secondary target.
intended to influence a primary target or wider audience. DOD would not quibble with this point, but is less precise.

Perhaps the most striking difference between these two authoritative definitions is that the DOD Directive clearly states that terrorism is employed by a "revolutionary organization." This statement would seem to reflect a decidedly ideological approach to the issue and, interestingly, a rather narrow one. The connotation is immediately (although perhaps not accurately) one of "leftist" "revolutionary" action against a legally constituted authority or government, probably one supported by the United States. The further inference from the overall DOD definition is that "terrorism" is equated with "revolution," and that they are both illegal. Certainly, there are many who would subscribe to this equation, but it is problematic that this is precisely what the Defense Department meant in promulgating the definition. The Army definition is mute on this particular issue, which not only saves it the potential misstep, but, more importantly, leaves open the issue of the identity of the perpetrator and/or supporting nation-state.

The purpose of the above exercise is not simply to engage in pedantic hair-splitting, nor is it meant to be unduly critical of Defense and Army efforts to grasp doctrinally an issue of considerable complexity. Indeed, academic commentators on the subject generate the same sort of problems, and the media are, if anything, even less careful in treating the subject. Rather, it is to illustrate the sometimes subtle, and often not so subtle, issues that can arise from efforts to define operationally the phenomenon of terrorism. I say operationally define, because such official definitions from the Department of Defense and the US Army presumably are meant to impart to subordinate
organizations and commanders the nature of an important threat to US interests; and presumably on the basis of that threat definition, organizations and commanders are meant to understand and detect the threat and to do something about it, defensively or offensively. As will be examined in detail later, such operational influences are perhaps most pronounced in their impact upon the Intelligence Community in its collective role of definer of the threat, collector of threat and counter-threat information, and supporter of military and paramilitary operational planning and execution.

The State Department takes a less complicated approach to the definitional issue. Acknowledging the difficulty of the definitional problem, the State Department consciously attempts to strike a non-controversial stance by defining terrorism as:

premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents.

The State Department goes on to describe "international terrorism" as "terrorism involving citizens or territory of more than one country."  

CIA's National Foreign Assessment Center defines terrorism as:

The threat or use of violence for political purposes by individuals or groups, whether acting for, or in opposition to established governmental authority, when such actions are intended to shock or intimidate a target group wider than the immediate victims.

For analytical purposes at this stage, the CIA definition seems perfectly good as a departure point, being basically neutral, nonemotional, and nonideological. It should be noted, however, that both the State Department and CIA definitions belie a preference for viewing the problem as one of indirect violence, which may not capture
the full potential of terrorism as a political weapon. Both definitions, unlike those of the Defense Department and the US Army, explicitly account for the state use of terror.

TERRORISM ON THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

It is generally accepted by official and academic commentators that terrorism occupies the lowest rung (or leftmost position) on a graphical depiction of the spectrum of conflict. (See figure 1.) The highest (or rightmost) position, that is to say the most intense form of violence or conflict, is occupied by nuclear war. Next highest (or intense) is conventional war in its various forms, perhaps with a high band, or most intense subcategory, reserved for chemical and biological war. Below conventional warfare is a broad band or spectrum category called unconventional war, which includes in one order or another (largely depending on the whim, prejudice, or perspective of the commentator) revolution, insurrection, civil war, and various forms of paramilitary conflict (e.g., insurgency, guerrilla war, and perhaps "wars of national liberation," if one will accept the term). In current parlance, this unconventional warfare portion of the spectrum is termed "low-intensity conflict."

This categorization of the overall spectrum of conflict also is often overlaid with the distinction between unlimited and limited war. This distinction, while it perhaps has utility for purposes of certain kinds of discussion, often tends to confuse rather than enlighten. Unlimited war originally (in modern parlance, not in Clausewitzian terms) included nuclear war and very intense kinds of conventional war on the model of World War I and pre-Hiroshima World War II (i.e., war which was
FIGURE 1.
characterized as geographically widespread, perhaps even global in sweep, and involving very intense violence and the application of very nearly all of the resources of the principal nations involved). Limited war was meant to encompass the lower end of the conventional warfare spectrum and perhaps the more intense versions of unconventional conflict, such as major insurgencies. This theoretical construct began to get rather confused with the advent of tactical nuclear weapons. That is to say that our desire to keep the issue of nuclear war neatly on the far end of the conflict spectrum as a concept signifying the most total and destructive type of armed conflict has been frustrated by technological innovation. This neat conceptual distinction between limited and unlimited warfare is also confounded by the specter of the potential use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists.

The conceptual distinction between unlimited and limited war also became confused by historical events, or at least our post-event interpretations of them. As Harry Summers pointed out in his perceptive and penetrating analysis of Viet Nam strategy in Clauswitzian terms, in that conflict, which was touted by military and civilian commentators of the time as a limited conventional war, there was a critical asymmetry to the war in strategic terms between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.\textsuperscript{13} Whereas the US saw the war as limited (i.e., a war fought with limited resources for limited objectives), the North Vietnamese were fighting an unlimited war (i.e., the mobilization and application of virtually all their resources for a comprehensive goal: the unification—or conquest, if you like—of Viet Nam). More on this theme later.

Regardless of one's particular preference for order within the
spectrum band of unconventional war or low-intensity conflict, the lowest (or least intense) category is normally reserved for terrorism. The idea is that terrorism generally is thought of in terms of relatively isolated incidents, few perpetrators, reasonably few targets or victims, relatively unsophisticated weaponry, generally limited destruction, and subnational goals or objectives. On the surface of it then, one would wonder why the issue commands such intense interest on the part of governments and societies.

The rather simple answer is that those events commonly lumped together, properly or improperly, as terrorism seem to be becoming more numerous, therefore involving more (or busier) perpetrators, therefore more targets and victims, often more sophisticated hardware, and greater destruction; perhaps we are not so sure about the ambitiousness of the perpetrators goals and objectives.

Indeed, if in fact the magnitude of events, actors, victims, mechanisms of violence, and tangible evidence of destruction is growing, there may be justification for not relegating what we call terrorism to the bottom of the ladder of conflict. Further, the issue of widespread state support for terrorist incidents and their perpetrators (and the necessary corollary of national or subnational goals and objectives), along with a perceived growing magnitude of event elements, would seem to argue for at least lumping terrorism into that broad band on the spectrum called unconventional warfare or low intensity conflict, and not bothering with (or getting confused by) a special subcategory on the spectrum of conflict called "terrorism." This is not to say that operational and policy concerns will be ameliorated by such a definitional sleight-of-hand. The simplest way
out of this analytical corner would be to acknowledge that terrorism can appear as a kind of tactic, and perhaps as a strategy, at any level on the spectrum of conflict. If we are ever faced with the specter of nuclear terrorism, we would have to acknowledge the phenomenon of a "terrorist strategic weapon."

To carry this point one step further and to pick up once again on Summers' point about the asymmetry of conflict between seemingly mismatched adversaries, terrorism perhaps should not be treated strictly as a form of limited war or low intensity conflict. If we view terrorism as a form of warfare, we might argue convincingly that, at least for certain perpetrators (i.e., militarily weak revolutionary or irredentist groups), terrorist actions are the most they can do with the relatively limited resources at hand. Furthermore, if their goals and objectives are not easily ameliorated by political and military means, then these groups can be said to be waging total or unlimited war, albeit unconventionally.

On the other hand, if terrorist actions are undertaken directly or indirectly by states possessing credible military power, it could be said that they are indeed employing terrorism as a limited unconventional form of conflict, either to maintain a rather high threshold for overt war, or perhaps simply because this form of conflict is rather inexpensive compared to results. In this case, the normal paradigm fits.14

A few final words on the schema of the spectrum of conflict scale. It is commonly held that the "risks" attendant to conflict vary directly with its intensity. That is to say that unlimited war, especially were it to involve the use of weapons of mass destruction, carries with it
extremely high risk for states conducting it; whereas unconventional warfare (with the terrorism/counterterrorism model at the lower end of that band of the spectrum) carries very low risk. The opposite is thought to be true concerning the likelihood of conflict occurring (i.e., the lower the intensity of a conflict model and the lower its risk, the more likely it is to occur). The probability issue is obvious and valid. On the other hand, the risk issue may work counterintuitively. In an era when terrorism/counterterrorism has become an issue of "high policy," the risk relationship might prove to be as difficult to grasp as the asymmetry of the limited/unlimited war issue illuminated by Summers.

The idea of low risk attendant to conducting terrorism in the international arena seems obvious, as does the conduct of counterterrorist operations by the victimized state. If a target state raises the issues of terrorism to a level of high policy, however, investing considerable political leadership prestige and national resource currency in combatting it, and loses, I would argue that the political and military risk can be considerable. The current administration's investment in countering "terrorism" in Lebanon might be a case in point. The concept of risk does not always have to be related directly to that of national survival. Conversely, if a target state interprets another state's use of terrorism against it as warfare, acts accordingly by waging large-scale conventional war against that state in response, and inflicts crippling damage upon the resources and prestige of the offending state, the risk for the original perpetrator can be said to be significant.
A TYPOLOGY OF TERRORISM

With these relatively simple illustrations, we can see that conventional ways of looking at the problem of defining and categorizing the phenomenon of terrorism can present some rather formidable difficulties in how governments approach the issue in terms of threat analysis and operational response.

Let us now turn to another sort of definitional and conceptual construct for understanding terrorism. Commentators have for years used the term "international terrorism" in discussing the issue. In very recent years, observers (particularly those in the US Government) have become transfixed with the term "state-supported terrorism."

"International terrorism" obviously is used to distinguish the phenomenon from "domestic terrorism," which for a nation with a sense of relative security, stability, and well-being is merely base criminality and therefore not a serious problem. (Not so, of course for those countries in the throes of political disintegration, such as Lebanon. The scope and duration of Britain's experiences in northern Ireland also go beyond the bounds of conventional domestic criminality.) Since, as discussed above, we don't really have a good definitional and operational grasp of what "terrorism" is or is not, making loose distinctions within the category rapidly leads to even more trouble. Indeed, to make matters worse, the Central Intelligence Agency some years ago began using the term "transnational terrorism." The term "state terrorism" has been in vogue for many years to signify (generally) those particularly violent actions a government takes within
Its boundaries against its own citizens, a reasonably straightforward concept, but a term nonetheless often loaded with ideological meaning.

For Jenkins, "international terrorism comprises those incidents...that have clear international consequences...," such as second country locale of the event, targets with connections with a foreign state, events involving international airline flights, hijacking domestic flights to foreign countries, etc. While admitting conceptual problems, Jenkins' definition excludes purely domestic phenomena, even if they may have recognized international consequences, and events occurring during "wars." Further problems of consistency arose for Rand concerning hijackings and activities of separatist groups. In an attempt to get around some obvious difficulties in quantitatively addressing the issue, Rand chose to define terrorism:

"by the nature of the act, not by the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of their cause." The issue of state support was also not of primary importance. For Jenkins and Rand Corporation, "all terrorist acts are crimes," and "one man's terrorist is everyone's terrorist." Jenkins and the Rand Corporation, while making a genuine and serious effort to confront the issue, chose to address the problem of definition in the process of quantification, a particularly sticky methodology, and one that still yields no operational definition. In attempting to ignore perpetrators and causes, they lose critical perspective, as will be explained below.

The CIA early on attempted to confront this aspect more directly, making the following key distinction. "International terrorism" includes those acts "carried out by individuals or groups controlled by a sovereign state." On the other hand, "transnational terrorism" is:
carried out by basically autonomous nonstate actors, whether or not they enjoy some degree of support from sympathetic states.\textsuperscript{21}

Milbank admits that the governmental patronage common to both categories causes problems; however, the key issue in analyzing any given event becomes the identity of the decisionmaker, i.e., the responsible entity. This obviously is a helpful distinction in the policy and operational contexts.

Interestingly, another CIA analyst, writing later, uses the identical definitions, but changes the labels! That which Milbank calls "international," Mickolus calls "interstate terrorism!" and that which Milbank calls "transnational," Mickolus calls "international!"\textsuperscript{22} Although it is most disconcerting to have writers from the same agency take such divergent views, this shift of focus might prove useful.

AN OPERATIONAL TYPOLOGY

In an effort to sort out some of these difficulties, it is necessary to establish a new typology, or set of categories, to support threat analysis and operational response. Working from the basic and rather neutral State Department and CIA definitions cited earlier, the following is meant to provide a contextual guide for determining the type and fundamental nature of the threat. The operational implications of this typology will be discussed in subsequent chapters. The basic, initial approach to the phenomenon must be event-oriented. That is to say that a government must determine that a given incident, or more likely a set of incidents, of a violent nature is meant to punish, damage, or intimidate some target. In order to understand the threat
more fully and clearly, however, the event must be analyzed in terms of the "actor-target relationship" and the "patron-client relationship."

The relationship between the target and the actor, or perpetrator, is the key to understanding the fundamental issue. This relationship, of necessity, involves the motivation of the actor, that is to say the perpetrator's "cause." Jenkins' reluctance to enter this fray is understandable; however, I believe it is necessary if one is to avoid the very perjorative labelling to which Jenkins is so sensitive. This actor-target relationship is crucial to political and military understanding of the problem in operational terms.23

The patron-client relationship is important for the same reason. It is first of all necessary to determine whether or not a relationship exists; and if such a relationship exists, why it exists and how it operates. Again, the issue of motivation or cause is central in operational terms.24

**International Terrorism**

International terrorism is taken to mean any terrorist action which has tangible international implications. Basically, I would accept Rand's simple definition, but without any restrictions on its application. On the other hand, I would argue that the term means nothing beyond the obvious. Operationally, it is only important what type of international phenomenon is being examined.

**Transnational Terrorism.** I would define transnational terrorism as that which is conducted by a nonstate or substate entity against any second nation target either inside or outside the borders of the state with which is at least geographically identified, conducted primarily
for its own cause, with or without support of any state. Its purpose primarily is to influence the policies or actions of the target state.

This is one type of international terrorism that immediately comes to the popular mind. Examples of this phenomenon would include: An attack on the US Embassy in a given country by a local dissident or revolutionary group, intended to persuade the US to alter its support for that country’s government; or an attack on US interests in Country “X” by a group from Country “Y,” intended to alter US policies concerning Country “Y.” It also could include second-hand proxy operations by groups not directly connected to the principal sponsor or any target, whether for ideological or mercenary reasons.

Transnational terrorism also includes that which is conducted by a nonstate or substate entity against the state with which it is geographically and geopolitically identified, conducted for its own cause, with or without support of any other state, outside the borders of the state with which it is geopolitically identified. Its purpose is to extend the venue and effectiveness of its antigovernment oppositional activities. This type of international terrorism would be represented by an action conducted by a political or ethnic oppositional group against its government in a second country, or by means of an international airliner or seaborne hijacking.

State-Supported Terrorism. I take state-supported terrorism to mean terrorist action actively sponsored by a state, either through mechanisms of that state or through a nonstate semiautonomous actor, conducted outside the borders of that state against subnational political or population groups identified with that state.

This definition does not fit that used by the current
administration. By my definition, state supported terrorism would include assassination of an exiled dissident political figure from Country "X," outside the borders of that state either by the intelligence services of that state or by a surrogate actor, intended either to simply eliminate a potential rival for power, or to intimidate an expatriate political element or ethnic group to cease antigovernment agitation.

**Interstate Terrorism.** Interstate terrorism is that action undertaken by the state, either directly by mechanisms of that state or through a nonstate semiautonomous actor, against another state's interests, conducted inside the target state, inside the sponsor state, or internationally (i.e., in a third country or via airborne or shipborne hijacking).

This category is generally what the current administration means by its use of the term "state-supported terrorism." The purpose in coining another term for this particular phenomenon is not to add to the confusion, but to differentiate between various types, targets, and motivations for a state's use of terroristic measures. Examples of this sort of activity include: Attacks upon US interests by Country "X" within that country, in Country "Y," or even within the US, either directly by the security services of that state or through the use of nonstate surrogates of whatever nationality or identification.25

**Domestic Terrorism**

Domestic terrorism is taken to mean any such action conducted within national boundaries that has no tangible international implications in terms of actor-target or patron-client relationships. As with "international terrorism," only the types of domestic terrorism have any
particular significance in operational terms.

**State Terrorism.** State terrorism is that action undertaken by the state directly against any sub-element of the society, conducted within the boundaries of that state. The distinction between this phenomenon and what I call state-supported terrorism is important, however. The international ramifications are not necessarily obvious and tangible. That is not to say that there is no important foreign interest in the issue, as will be discussed later.

This is a rather straightforward definition, generally accepted in the academic literature. It refers to the exceptional use of violence and intimidation by the government of a country against any element of the society. Put another way, it is simply political tyranny.

**Particularistic Terrorism.** Particularistic terrorism I take to mean that action undertaken by a nonstate, subnational element of society against either the national government or another nonstate element of that society, conducted within the borders of the state with which the actor is identified.\(^{26}\)

This is perhaps the most insular, or non-international, of the categories that I am purposing. On the other hand, it most closely approximates, or can be a tactic in, such forms of domestic violence as insurgency, revolution, and civil war, which obviously can gain at least some international significance. Examples include terrorist violence undertaken by a political, ethnic, or religious group against the central governmental authorities, or against other such entities within the society.\(^{27}\)
CHAPTER II

ENDNOTES

1. Three such international conventions were framed in the 1930's, probably the best known being the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, signed in Geneva in November 1937. Earlier efforts date to the Mexico City Treaty of 1902. The complete texts of such international agreements up to 1978 can be found in Yonah Alexander, et al (eds), Control of Terrorism: International Documents. For a summary of these documents, see also John Dugard, "International Terrorism: Problems of Definition," International Affairs, January 1974, pp. 67-81.

2. Shlomo Gazit and Michael Handel, "Insurgency, Terrorism, and Intelligence," in Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Counter-Intelligence, ed. by Roy Godson, p. 128.


4. Ibid.


8. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 190-52: Counter Terrorism and Other Major Disruption on Military Installations, p. Glossary 2 (hereafter referred to as "Army Regulation 190-52").


11. Cline and Alexander, in their latest collaboration, present a similar argument for the importance of a single governmental definition of terrorism; however, they unaccountably opt for the Army's definition in Army Regulation 190-52. See Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander, Terrorism as State-Supported Covert Warfare, pp. 31-32.
12. Note that the State Department's definition is clear that the target of terrorism is "non-combatant." It is particularly interesting that the Vice President's Task Force on Terrorism completely avoids the definitional issue. I would argue that this fact reinforces my thesis. This allows the Administration to continue to deal with the problem in emotive and ideological terms, lumping any event or group it chooses into the "terrorism" category. For a discussion of practical pitfalls to this approach, see Chapter III, pp. 30-32.


15. The political price paid by the Carter Administration for the failure of the military rescue operation in Iran in 1980 is a prime case in point.


17. Jenkins, p. 3.

18. Ibid., pp. 3-7.

19. Ibid., pp. 2-3.

20. Ibid.


23. Farrell points out that "the physical manifestations of an act do not necessarily make it terrorism.... The outward manifestations are not the only gauge of what is and is not a terrorist act. More often it is the 'why' behind the act itself." See Farrell, ibid., p. 48.

24. The analytical situation is even more complicated than that portrayed. As Richard Shultz points out, typology can be analyzed in terms of: causes, environment, goals, strategy, means, and organization. See Richard Shultz, "Conceptualizing Political Terrorism: A Typology," Journal of International Affairs, Spring/Summer 1978, pp. 7-15.
25. The requirement for this definitional distinction between state-supported terrorism and interstate terrorism is reflected in the confusion exhibited by Cline and Alexander. They take the standard approach to state-supported terrorism, and insist that it is a criminal act. The most objectionable aspect of their thesis, however, is that state-supported terrorism is only conducted by state opponents of "pluralistic states with representative governments, particularly if they are friendly to the United States." This blatantly ideological approach to the issue will not stand the test of theoretical reasoning, let alone empirical inquiry. The involvement of the French Secret Service in the covert attack on the Greenpeace ship in New Zealand in 1985 is a prime recent case to the contrary, both in terms of perpetrator and primary (nonstate) target. See Cline and Alexander, Terrorism as State-Sponsored Covert Warfare, p. 32.

26. I realize that this is an awkward term. It is meant to convey the idea of narrow-gauged political or ethnic programs, frustrations, and appeals, as reflected in Thompson's term "age of particularisms." See Thompson, ibid.

27. Some commentators prefer to take another sort of functional approach to the typological problem. Wilkinson posits, and Shultz follows up on, three fundamental categories: "Revolutionary terrorism," "subrevolutionary terrorism," and "establishment terrorism." The category of "establishment terrorism," or "repressive terrorism," includes what I call "state terrorism" and "interstate terrorism." The "revolutionary" and "subrevolutionary" categories, while academically useful, tend to blur the operational distinctions I wish to make for purposes of government decisionmaking. See Paul Wilkinson, Political Terrorism, especially pp. 32-44; and Shultz, ibid., pp. 9-11.
CHAPTER III

OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEFINITION

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

Reading and Misreading the Situation

Any government that perceives itself to be the target of a serious terrorism threat faces a number of difficult ancillary and a priori issues and questions in attempting to frame a policy response. The following commentary is meant specifically to address the issue from the perspective of the United States, although it perhaps may have more general applicability. Perhaps the first and most basic question goes to the heart of the definitional problem: What is the general nature of the threat? How the government answers this question is determined in great part by official definitional assumptions. If the terrorist threat is defined in ideological terms, as the US Department of Defense does, then the government immediately could launch into a preset series of assumptions about the nature of the adversary. That is to say, if the terrorist threat is presumed to be "revolutionary," the adversary will be categorized neatly and simply. The government can define the threat to be "criminal," and another series of reasonably simple assumptions immediately follow.
There are two kinds of policy problems that flow from these sorts of assumptions. One is the improper identification of the threat. The threat might be terrorist, as defined in the foregoing chapter, rather than revolutionary or criminal. The government, then, will miss (or ignore) entirely the message intended to be communicated by the perpetrator. Hence, the second problem. The government is likely to employ in reaction the kinds of policy tools designed for use in counterrevolutionary warfare or anticriminal law enforcement. Chances are high that these tools will be inadequate to, or improper for, the task or combating terrorism. A corollary to this situation is that the government risks denigrating the political message of true revolutionary movements by dismissing the phenomenon as mere terrorism, and therefore not worthy of serious political analysis. Again, the counteraction tools employed likely will be inappropriate to the task.

It will be argued here that governments need to do some more serious thinking about the general phenomenon. That is why I have accepted, and would argue strongly for, a basic, unemotional, nonideological operational definition that characterizes terrorism generally and simply as a form of oppositional violence intended to punish or intimidate. Then it is necessary to examine the threat initially in terms of the actor-target relationship. Some countries have a rather simpler time of it at this level of analysis. Israel, as a prime example, tends to label all oppositional violence conducted against the state and its interests, short of open conventional war, as terrorism. The conceptual and operational analysis problem for Israel really is quite simple. Israel knows full well who its enemies are and what their goals and motivations are: at a minimum a drastic change in national policy
concerning governance of the occupied territories, and at the most the virtual destruction of the state and Jewish society. In short, the nature of the threat is known, the perpetrators are generally known, and the intent of the threat is starkly clear. A state of declared war exists. Therefore, the only serious policy response issue is one of tactical details.

The issue for the United States generally is far more complicated. In the modern age, we may have to assume that we are often targeted simply because of who we are, or are perceived to be: the most visible symbol of Western civilization, the strongest Western military power, a nuclear power, the symbol of the international capitalist economy, the frequent supporter of European colonialist powers, a former colonial power ourselves, the supporter of the status quo in the international order, etc. Hence, any attack upon the US will guarantee international political attention to a cause or perceived wrong. Even more simply, the very extent of American commercial, diplomatic, military, and even tourist presence throughout the world will virtually guarantee that an American citizen, official or private, will be somewhere where he or she can become an inadvertent or unintended victim of terrorist activity.

When any given terrorist event is perpetrated against the United States and its interests, it might not be clear immediately why we were the target. That is why I would argue that event analysis, which is an immensely popular pursuit among some academics and many government (particularly counterintelligence) organizations, is of limited value, except for tactical implications at a much later phase of the counter and antiterrorist process. Rather, it is the campaign, not the specific event, that is important for the policy maker. To carry the
point further, it is not particularly enlightening to the policy maker that "x" number of bombings, "y" number of kidnappings, and "z" number of assassinations or other dastardly deeds were perpetrated against Americans or American interests during a certain time period in Western Europe, Latin America, or the Middle East. Such statistics might be of some value to those dealing with the nature and priority of Embassy physical and personnel security measures; but given the rather minor impact that this program will have upon the State Department, let alone the national, budget, they really tell the national-level decision maker very little.

Therefore, we must strive to understand whether or not a prolonged, concerted, and damaging campaign of terror is being waged against American personnel, facilities, and interests, and most importantly, why such a campaign is being waged. The decision maker needs to know and understand in a rather specific fashion who is waging terror against us, and for what purpose. The reasons for such actions may ultimately be deemed to be either irrational or irrelevant in practical terms or in our perception, but we need to understand them in unemotional terms, nonetheless.

Regardless of the fury and frustration generated in the American government and among the public by terrorist outrages, the point must be borne in mind that American survival is not likely to be at stake, in the absence of the use, or threat of use, of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist actors. On the other hand, the risks attendant to American responses to a "terrorist" threat might not necessarily be low. The national decision maker must come to some fundamental conclusions, based upon the "why" of the threat, so as to frame a rational and appropriate
policy response. I would argue that the "why" of the threat makes a

great deal of difference in policy terms. There will be times when a
campaign, undertaken either by an autonomous or semiautonomous group or
instrument of a sovereign state, virtually constitutes a war against
this country. If the decision maker determines, on the basis of good
analytical support, that this is the case, issues of international and
national law, international and domestic public opinion, and appropriate
use of military force immediately come into play.

It is for these reasons that I would argue that the use of the
typology outlined in the preceding chapter is of use to the
Intelligence Community and national decision makers. We need to know
and understand whether or not we are the primary target of a terror
campaign, a secondary target, merely a target of opportunity with little
further import, or an unintentioned or unfortunate bystander in someone
else's drama, before we commit national prestige and resources to
responding to the problem.

Perhaps the best, and most tragic, example of a lack of
understanding of this issue in definitional, policy, and operational
terms was the government's response to the bombing of the US Marine
Corps barracks at Beirut International Airport in October 1983. The
Marines had been deployed to Lebanon the preceding year as part of a
Multi-National Force to assist in restoring confidence in the weak
national Lebanese Government and to act as a benign, tranquilizing
influence in the intensified Lebanese Civil War, which had festered for
several years. As the situation deteriorated for the Lebanese Armed
Forces, they were being reconstituted under American patronage, in terms
of equipment, training, and advisory presence. At a critical tactical
juncture, the US fleet offshore employed naval gunfire in support of the Lebanese Army, which in turn had entered the fray to bolster the sagging fortunes of sectarian Christian Phalange militia forces against Druze and Palestinian fighters in the battle of Suq al-Gharb in the hills southeast of Beirut. Within days, a fundamentalist Shia Muslim sect (allies of the Druze and Palestinians) conducted a bombing attack against the Marine barracks at Beirut International, and simultaneously attacked French Multinational Force elements in Beirut. The US Government immediately branded the action a terrorist attack, altered the rules of engagement for the Marine contingent, intensified naval gunfire, launched carrier-based airstrikes against Druze and Syrian positions east of Beirut (with the loss of aircraft and crew) and seriously contemplated other actions against the principal perpetrators.

The National Command Authority completely misread the situation. The attack against the Marines at Beirut International was an unconventional warfare attack against a deployed military force, an element (CTF-62) of a larger force (CTF-60) which had become an active and partisan participant in the Lebanese Civil War. I would argue that once American military forces are committed, however unthinkingly, as active combatants in an ongoing armed conflict, there is no honest policy or public relations recourse to the position that one's forces or interests have been unfairly attacked. That is not say that the perpetrators of the Beirut attack were (and are) not a subnational group that has conducted on other occasions terrorist attacks against American interests for political, ideological, and religious reasons. It is simply to say that this particular spectacular incident was not a terrorist act, and to hype the event and casualty bean counts to bolster
the administration's political rhetorical campaign against international terrorism is, in itself, bad theatre. Further, the government's decision to engage actively in the Lebanese Civil War and its reaction to the outcome was bad policy, in that the net result was to make the country appear impotent in the face of a "terrorist" onslaught.\textsuperscript{3} 

To take this argument another step, it is necessary to understand the political context in which terrorist actions occur. Once a domestic political situation has deteriorated into open civil war or widespread insurrection or insurgency, the fact that terrorist acts are conducted as part of the general political disintegration is simply not of real significance. If American personnel and interests are targeted because, for instance, the US supports the incumbent government, then that is simply the potential price of doing business in such an environment.\textsuperscript{4} This is particularly true if the United States is actively involved in providing military or paramilitary support, equipment, and advice to the government under attack. The phenomena of bombings of American military quarters in Saigon during the 1960's would fit this situation. So, too, perhaps would the occasional targeting of American interests in the 1980's. In Honduras and El Salvador, for instance, widespread domestic violence has passed for "normal" political discourse for decades. This is not to say that the United States certainly would not want to take actions to protect its personnel, facilities, and interests in the region. Once these actions take on an offensive nature, however, the United States then becomes a direct participant in the conflict, rather than an innocent victim of illegitimate violence.
Domestic Terrorism

Let us look at this proposition in the context of the typology outlined in the preceding chapter. "Domestic terrorism" was divided into two subcategories: "state terrorism" and "particularistic terrorism." Considering these typologies only in the foreign milieu, I suggest that these phenomena are not likely to be of direct concern to the United States. That is to say that the use of exceptional violence by a foreign state against some portion of its population or by some subnational element of a state against that state is not likely to be of primary concern to US foreign policy interests; and these situations would not pose a tangible threat to the US. They might well be of foreign policy interest for humanitarian or ideological reasons, but they likely would not rate as a high policy priority simply because of the terroristic nature of the actions. In the case of particularistic terrorism against or within an allied or friendly state, the issue could take on some importance, once a campaign of terrorism grew into full-fledged insurrection, thereby endangering the viability of a government in which the US has some strategic interest. (The Philippines might be a current example.) In the case of oppositional violence undertaken by one subnational ethnic or religious group against another, there is even less likelihood of drawing official US policy interest, unless the situation becomes so destabilizing to the country as to threaten the political viability of the state, and hence perceived regional or strategic US interests. Lebanon is probably the sole example of such a situation today, to which our attention has been considerable. Sikh-Hindu violence in India elicits no such concern.
It is difficult to conceive of a situation in which the US government would elevate an issue of "state terrorism" (i.e., tyranny) to a level of high policy. We have never done so in the past, despite well-documented and widespread abuses of human rights and violations of standards of human decency. The use of domestic state terror employed by the Soviet Union, the Peoples' Republic of China, the states of Eastern Europe, Kampuchea, Argentina, etc. against their own populations have not been sufficient over the years to move the Executive, the Legislature, common or elite public opinion, or the media to call for exceptional government action in the interests of American national security. The conduct of war against Nazi Germany was not undertaken to halt known internal abuses, but to counter a serious and wider international threat to world order. The accusations of "crimes against humanity" were not made until after the successful attainment of strategic military and political goals. This is not say that we do not care about such events, it's just that we do not care very much; although statements of strong concern might be expressed for humanitarian and foreign and domestic propaganda reasons (e.g., on the issue of South Africa). The United States is not about to take on the Soviet Union in more than rhetorical combat over the fate of political or ethnic victims of state violence (i.e., state terrorism). In short, such issues are kept "in perspective."

In summary, the issue of "domestic terrorism" in the international arena is not likely to be of great significance to American policy. If the phenomenon is state terrorism, we will tend to call it tyranny or oppression and condemn it if conducted by our enemies and temporize if conducted by our friends or allies. If the phenomenon is
particularistic terrorism, we will tend to call it insurgency or some other category of limited unconventional war (or communal strife) and respond politically depending upon our general view of the friendliness or strategic import of the government involved. If the government is not the direct victim, we will tend to ignore the issue entirely.

International Terrorism

It is the broad issue of "international terrorism" that will engage American policy interest. In the preceding chapter, "international terrorism" was divided into three subcategories: "transnational," "state-supported," and "interstate." In recent years, most quantitative studies of international terrorism would indicate a high probability that the United States or one of its important allies would be the primary or secondary targets of such attacks.5

In defining my typology, I indicated the significance of divergence with other accepted definitions. The crucial distinctions among and between these definitions hinges upon the actor-target and patron-client issues and their impact on strategic and operational understanding of the problem by policy makers and policy implementers, as well as their intelligence support organizations.

In transnational terrorism, it is the actor-target relationship that is primary. The actor is a nonstate or a substate entity, e.g., an element of a national security apparatus. The cause of the actor is of primary importance. Patronage is either not involved; or it is incidental in political, operational, and tactical terms.

In interstate terrorism, it is also the actor-target relationship that is primary. The crucial difference, however, is that a state is
both the actor and the target; to the extent that a nonstate actor is involved, it is involved only as a surrogate instrument of state power. Patronage, therefore, is incidental in political and operational terms, but of some import in tactical terms. That is to say that the fact that a nonstate surrogate actor conducted the operation is not important in assessing the real blame. The surrogate may only be of tactical concern in executing an offensive reaction.

State-supported terrorism is the most complex. The actor-target relationship obviously is important, but so too is the patron-client relationship. Because of the patronage issue, we now have at least two states involved (the patron of the client actor and the primary, and perhaps the secondary, state target or targets), in addition to the principal actor, the client nonstate entity.

Let us now examine the national policy implications of these three threat types. They all present the policy maker with difficult and often murky challenges. When presented with a "transnational" threat, we must determine first of all whether the United States is the primary or secondary target. Is the terrorist campaign directed primarily at the United States in a purposeful effort to influence or alter significantly American policy towards a given national regime or regional issue, or are actions conducted against American interests in a highly visible campaign to damage another country? This distinction is an important one for American intelligence analysts and policy makers. A clear understanding of this issue will help in framing the appropriate policy response toward the perpetrators and the second country involved. In either case, the degree to which the United States wishes to become embroiled in a domestic or regional dispute is at issue. Furthermore,
although the issue of third country patronage has been defined as incidental, it will become important for strategic and operational reasons in terms of sovereignty issues.

"Interstate terrorism" also presents problems of discriminating analysis. Since international terrorism in general is a clandestine form of conflict, distinguishing interstate terrorism from another variety will likely prove difficult, especially if it is conducted through a nonstate surrogate group. It is important that American policy and intelligence officials not delude themselves that a purposeful campaign of violence is not being conducted by a sovereign state by assuming it is being undertaken for vague or unintelligible reasons by some "unaffiliated" group of hooligans. Interstate terrorism is a form of warfare conducted between sovereign states, and the target will tend to be either the United States or one of our friends or allies. This situation, once understood, will present US policy makers with important executive, legislative, and judicial issues.

"State-supported terrorism," again, presents perhaps the most complex analytical and policy problems, given the centrality of both the actor-target and patron-client relationships. The issue of active state support presents the same difficulties as encountered with interstate terrorism. On the other hand, the problem of the actor-target relationship is perhaps less critical for US policy, since the target is not a country, US or allied. Sovereignty is nonetheless an issue because of the international venue of the action or campaign.

In more concrete terms, what does all this say about the operational implications of terrorism at the political level? Domestic terrorism may present some delicate foreign policy concerns; but since the United
States is not directly involved, by the definitional typologies set out, it will not often be a high policy issue. There can often be spill over effect. If a foreign state over time engages in such a odorous campaign of domestic oppression and tyranny that the United States and the international community can no longer ignore it, some form of political and economic sanctions might be invoked; but that is about the extent of it. The Ugandan regime of Idi Amin or the Khmer Rouge regime in Kampuchea during the 1970's are perhaps the best examples of this phenomenon. A campaign of terror by one substate segment of a society against another is rarely the sort of thing that engages the policy attention of great powers (e.g., Sikh-Hindu or Hindu-Muslim violence in India), unless perhaps the victimized minority is amply represented and politically important in another society.

The United States should be alert to significant campaigns of domestic terror that threaten the stability of friendly, or even nonaligned or pro-Soviet regimes, because of the problems, or opportunities, these situations might present. It is only when we are drawn into these situations, thus becoming a potential target ourselves, that we become more critically interested. When this occurs, the situation becomes international in nature; and the problem is different. I would only caution that, when a campaign of domestic, particularistic terrorism grows into a recognizable insurgency, revolution, or civil war, the situation should not be described by the United States as terrorism, regardless of the nature of specific actions. This has been the propensity of the current administration in regard to events in Central America in recent years.
I would contend that if the United States government is to say anything meaningful to itself, its domestic policy elites, and foreign observers (both friend and foe), it must make intelligible its understanding of the various kinds of international terrorism challenges and threats, if it is to frame reasonable responses and have them be successful and accepted. The United States must understand and communicate to itself and others the nature of the threat in order to undertake countermeasures commensurate with that threat.

A campaign of interstate terrorism directed against the United States is a form of war, no more and certainly no less. It is incumbent upon the American policy maker to understand the nature and extent of that threat, and if the extent of the threat is deemed to be of sufficient magnitude or seriousness, the United States must act accordingly, being mindful of all of the legislative, legal, and military implications of such an action. If a campaign of interstate terrorism is directed against an ally, the same understanding of impact and implications is necessary, bearing in mind the nuances involved in the indirect nature of the threat to American interests.

A serious campaign of transnational terrorism involving the United States as the ultimate target involves a more complicated set of analyses and threat perceptions. Because of the nature of the actor-target relationship, we have the option of understanding the terrorist actors rationale or goals in conducting the campaign, and thereby reassessing the nature of our involvement in a given country and region. Although the coercive nature of the campaign is likely to be repugnant, the United States has the option of altering its policies so as to avoid being a longterm target. If the decision is made that the established
policy is sound, then the country must gird itself for a campaign of either open or covert warfare to counter or neutralize it, again bearing in mind all of the domestic and international ramifications.

In contending with a campaign of state-supported terrorism, the United States is faced with a more subtle policy challenge. So long as the campaign is not being waged within the United States, the problem can be treated as international hooliganism and a problem for the state or states in which such acts are perpetrated. On the other hand, the involvement of a patron state supporting violence in what may be a friendly or allied state, in the international arena generally, or possibly against a subnational group with which we have some affinity can be of policy importance, especially if American citizens become even incidental victims of the violence.

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS

It is now necessary to turn briefly to the implications for the Military Establishment of the phenomenon of terrorism, of the impact of the manner in which national policy makers define the problem, and of the impact of the military's view. The very fact that official definitions of terrorism differ in rather important ways among the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Department, and the US Army says something about how we conduct foreign and defense policies in this country.6 If the national policy makers cannot decide and clearly communicate whether the issue of terrorism is a high policy or low policy issue, and if they cannot decide whether we are faced with a significant challenge verging upon open warfare or with a
relatively insignificant irritant in the international arena, it is not unexpected that the Military Establishment would be less than cohesive in its view of, and reaction to, the problem.

One is seriously tempted to conclude from the military's doctrinal approach to the issue of terrorism that the Defense Department would rather not deal with the issue at all. Defining the problems as "criminal" reduces it to a law enforcement issue, rather than one requiring the attention of senior decision makers and commanders. Leaving the problem to military counterintelligence organizations also serves to keep it out of the mainstream of military thought and attention. It is also interesting to note that only the Army's special operations forces have taken a serious interest in the issue. These elements have always been an object of suspicion in a conventionally-minded military establishment.

Domestic terrorism not involving the United States need not be, in its simplest terms, of particular interest to the Defense Department. Domestic terrorism within the United States falls within the purview of the Department of Justice, with the organizational lead on hijacking incidents falling to the Federal Aviation Administration. A campaign of domestic terrorism directed specifically against Defense personnel and installations would be a defensive concern for DOD; these issues will be addressed elsewhere in this paper.

Given the increased official and public awareness of, and concern for, the international terrorist challenge, the military needs to understand the typology of the terrorist threat as outlined above and the policy makers' interpretation of them. Leaving aside for the moment
the Defense Department's role in threat perception and threat analysis, I will address here only the role of and impact upon the Military Establishment in operational terms. 8

If national decision makers raise the issue of interstate terrorism to the level of high policy by recognizing that a form of open or covert warfare is being waged against either the United States directly or against an important friend or ally, the Defense Establishment will be obliged to organize, train, and equip for offensive and defensive operations to deal with the threat on a number of operational levels. This may include both single service and joint service operations, and possibly combined operations with allies. These operations may be conventional, paramilitary, or special in nature.

The impact of transnational and state-supported terrorism upon the military will involve similar issues. The even more nebulous nature of these phenomena will more likely drive military options to the lower range of the conflict spectrum, but the complexities of military planning, training, and operations are no less. Even so, the potential problem of operating against nonstate organizations that are conducting purely terrorist operations is qualitatively different than many issues involved in the newly repackaged strategy of counterinsurgency now called "low intensity conflict."

The military is also faced with the extreme difficulty of framing a response to terrorism conducted against its personnel and facilities in the First World. Undertaking military operations against the terrorist threat in Western Europe, for instance, encounters very practical difficulties, legal constraints, and important political difficulties in the context of the NATO alliance. In Europe, the American military is
reduced to taking passive defensive measures and relying upon the effectiveness of local authorities and their political interpretation of events.

For the Defense Establishment to address terrorism counter-action policy concerns constructively, it does not help to define doctrinally the threat of terrorism as "revolutionary" or "criminal." Whether given terrorist groups are revolutionary or criminal is simply not relevant to the military. To understand the operational threat and to construct successful and acceptable offensive and defensive responses is difficult enough, and this challenge is not served by ideological interpretations.

As the military is called upon to protect itself and national interests throughout the world, it must develop both defensive and offensive strategies to cope with the terrorist challenge. In terms of doctrinal definition, the US Army has confused the issue. In its policy guidance to installation commanders, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) defines the issue as follows:

Terrorism Counteraction is an umbrella term which encompasses both antiterrorism (proactive) and counterterrorism (reactive) measures. It is TRADOC policy to prevent terrorist incidents through protective and preventive measures and to respond with military force, when required to quickly terminate any special threat situation on a TRADOC installation.10

While one can only applaud the intent of this policy directive, the fundamental confusion of doctrinal concepts is less than reassuring. To define protective and preventive (i.e., essentially defensive) measures as "proactive" and the active (i.e., offensive) use of military force as "reactive" reveals the depth of the problem in the Military...
Establishment. These issues will be developed in some detail in subsequent chapters. 11

CHAPTER III

ENDNOTES


2. These concepts will be dealt with in detail in Chapters IV, V, and VI.


4. The current administration clearly would not agree with this premise.

5. At this point, I should indicate my lack of acceptance of virtually any specific statistics on terrorist incidents. How one defines the issue obviously determines how one counts what is and is not terrorism. For instance, the figures cited by the administration and others for 1983 indicates a very high count, especially in the Middle East. As indicated earlier, however, I would not include the deaths of some 241 US military personnel at Beirut International Airport.

6. See the discussion in Chapter II.

7. See Chapters IV, V, and VI.

8. See Chapter IV on the role of intelligence.

9. See Chapter II.

11. See Chapters IV, V, and VI.
CHAPTER IV

THE PRIMACY OF INTELLIGENCE

THREAT DEFINITION AND WARNING

It was suggested in the first chapter that the Intelligence Community has a key role to play in the terrorism problem. Indeed, it has been called the "first line of defense." Intelligence should be a primary source of input to national decision makers, as they attempt to understand the nature of the terrorism issue and the identification of the challenge (the threat), and to formulate an effective response to it. Intelligence must also play the central role of providing forecasting, or indications and warning. And finally, Intelligence should provide crucial operational support to decision makers and military forces in the event of a decision actively to counter terrorist elements and their supporters. The foregoing discussion should serve to illustrate the lack of success Intelligence has had in the definitional stage. While the Central Intelligence Agency has been involved in the process for some years and has made valiant efforts to support the national decision maker, the results have been problematical in the threat definition process. In this regard, the impact of the Defense Intelligence Community has been nil. For the most part, the issue of terrorism has been left largely to counterintelligence organizations at
various levels in the Defense Establishment.  

The academic literature on the subject of intelligence and terrorism is scant. For the most part, commentators limit themselves to injunctions about policy makers and policy implementers requiring more and better intelligence to support decisions and operations. In general, the need is thought to be greatest in the field of human intelligence. The difficulty in rectifying this deficiency is widely acknowledged. The following discussion will focus upon the Intelligence Community's appropriate role in the definitional issue, in providing threat warning, and its contribution to operational responses of a defensive and offensive nature.

The Intelligence Community has left the field of terrorism threat definition largely to the academicians and the policy makers. Little attempt has been made by the intelligence agencies to lead the policy makers to address threat issues in this arena in a useful manner. The problem has been treated as if all concerned intrinsically understood the phenomenon. Such enlightenment clearly has not been the case. Policy makers have been left to their own devices in taking seemingly politically expedient, and essentially ideological, approaches to the problem, thus driving intelligence agencies to focus considerable time and resources in chasing "terrorists" in the thickets of civil war, insurrection, insurgency, and revolution. The discussion at the outset of Chapter III concerning the US response to the attack on the Marines in Beirut perhaps is the most striking illustration of this point.

A key element of the intelligence contribution to any threat problem is warning. As Ofri points out:

From the perspective of intelligence organizations, most terrorist attacks can be regarded as extreme
cases of potential surprise attacks. In trying to provide early warning, the Intelligence Community faces all the problems of a military surprise attack in highly accentuated form.  

There are two kinds of warning responsibilities. Strategic warning involves a relatively broad scope prognosis of a threat (e.g., the enemy will be prepared to initiate hostilities within the next 96 hours and probably intends to do so). Its value and function is to provide the commander or decision maker with enough prior knowledge of enemy intentions and time to formulate a counter action, either defensive or offensive (including preemption) as he chooses. Tactical warning, on the other hand, is meant to provide specific and detailed threat information (e.g., the enemy will attack at 0600 hours tomorrow in a certain strength against a certain point).

The warning function is always the greatest burden on intelligence organizations from the tactical to the strategic level. Despite elaborate efforts to frame and monitor intelligence and warning indicators, they seldom work. Conversely, as Handel points out, surprise attacks almost always work. It must be remembered that warning (either strategic or tactical) is not achieved until the decision maker or commander accepts the intelligence warning assessment and takes some related decision (including opting for inaction). I would argue that if the Intelligence Community is even moderately efficient in terms of both collection and analysis, strategic warning of attacks conducted as part of a previously recognized terrorist campaign should be achievable, generally with enough specificity and lead time for at least defensive measures to be invoked. Forecasting the
occurrence of isolated, one-time events or the onset of a campaign is much more difficult. The achievement of tactical warning, as is often the case in purely military situations, is likely to be a matter of luck and circumstance; or in any case, it is likely to come so close to the event as to be virtually useless. This is a function of the nature of the threat, the difficulty of applying collection assets, and the priority of attention the subject is likely to receive in the set of global national foreign policy interests. In general, however, strategic warning could be sufficient to avert disaster through defensive means and to allow time to consider and invoke preemptive counteraction in a campaign context.

The difficulty of achieving adequate warning in any context runs deeper. As Handel points out, failure of intelligence to warn results from: deliberate deception by the enemy, noise in the environment, and self-generated errors. Deception and noise are nearly unavoidable. What he calls self-generated problems include: development of rigid analytical concepts, the need for consensus building, bureaucratic friction, communications problems, and politicization of the intelligence process. The dangers of inflexible concepts and politicization of intelligence as regards the terrorism problem are reflected in, and perhaps heightened by, the definitional problems discussed earlier. The difficulties of rigid concepts are also involved, as is bureaucratic friction, in ways that will be delineated below.

COUNTERTERRORISM VERSUS ANTITERRORISM

Since it is in large part the function of Intelligence to do threat
analysis, I am treating the "counterterrorism vs. antiterrorism" issue as an intelligence problem, rather than a political and military policy issue, which in large measure it is. I do so because the impact of, and confusion about, this conceptual and operational dichotomy is most directly reflected in the Intelligence Community. It is my belief that had Intelligence properly defined the problem to decision makers and operators at an early stage, the kind of fundamental misperceptions displayed in the TRADOC policy memorandum quoted in the preceding chapter would not have been possible.9 This type of confusion is not uncommon in the academic literature, as well. For instance, Arie Ofri equates "active defense" with preventive or preemptive strikes.10

"Counterterrorism" measures are, by my definition, those positive actions undertaken through the use of offensive force to attack the source of a terrorist threat, either through preemption of terrorist actions, destruction of terrorist forces, or in retaliation for actions already taken.

"Antiterrorism" measures are defined here as those essentially passive actions undertaken through defensive means to protect prospective targets of terrorist threat, by deterring or dissuading the attacker or by neutralizing the effect of the attack.

While many commentators on this issue would not agree with the definitional terms used in this dichotomy, there is support in the literature.11 Interestingly, the Department of Defense also makes the appropriate distinction between antiterrorism being defensive and counterterrorism comprising offensive measures.12 Once again, the disconnect between Defense Department guidance and US Army doctrine is striking.
Both counterterrorism and antiterrorism strategies should, and can, satisfy the concern expressed in the preceding chapter about the need for the Government's approach to the issue to be campaign-oriented, at least in the sense of being directed to the longterm. Although an antiterrorism campaign can focus on widespread, ongoing activities (such as upgrade of defensive measures at American diplomatic and military facilities abroad, more effective baggage searches at airports, etc.), antiterrorism by its very nature is oriented largely to "point defense" of targets in operational terms.\(^1\) As Arie Ofri puts it, "passive defense can be regarded as 'target hardening.'"\(^1\) These two distinct types of terrorism countermeasures are generally supported by distinctly different types of intelligence disciplines.

**POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE VERSUS COUNTERINTELLIGENCE**

For many years (in fact, until quite recently), virtually the entire terrorism issue has been handled within the Intelligence Community and within the Services as a counterintelligence problem. This situation has resulted largely, I believe, because, on the one hand, there has been a reluctance on the part of positive foreign intelligence people to get involved in what was seen as a dirty and ill-defined issue; and, on the other hand, because counterintelligence people, who show a general propensity to treat their discipline as one that specializes in particularly clandestine and nefarious endeavors, have jealously guarded their prerogatives. Another explanation might result from the definitional issue. The Army defines terrorism as an essentially criminal activity, and the government in general until very recently
responded to the terrorist threat in decidedly defensive terms. This being the case, counterintelligence was the natural locus in which to place responsibility.

For antiterrorism measures, which are defensive and largely passive in nature, counterintelligence indeed should have the lead on the issue. Counterintelligence techniques and training have always focused upon, among other things, operational, physical, information, and personnel security measures and training. Such is not the case, however, for counterterrorism measures.

Counterterrorism, as an offensive operational discipline, requires the developed methodologies, instincts, training, and experience of positive intelligence organizations and people. Positive intelligence, which encompasses by far the majority of the personnel, organizational, and collection resources of the Community, is concerned with the entire range of issues in the international geopolitical arena. This includes: domestic and international politics, military and civilian economic processes (including overt and covert arms manufacture and transfers), military affairs, biographies, energy and natural resources, scientific and technological developments, demographics, geography and topography, commercial and military transportation and logistics infrastructure, etc. In short, positive intelligence encompasses the entire international arena and all of the sorts of issues and expert disciplines required to analyze foreign developments and to support policy and operational requirements to conduct hostilities.

If the policy maker is attempting to understand political, military, economic, and social developments in a foreign country or region, that analysis is going to come from the positive foreign intelligence
disciplines outlined above. As with any significant strategic issue, terrorism countermeasure strategy requires the application of collection disciplines across the spectrum: human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), photographic intelligence (PHOTINT), and an array of more exotic technical means. Positive foreign intelligence deals with the tasking, exploitation, and evaluation of all of these collection disciplines on a routine basis. The counterintelligence craft (by virtue of the nature of the business and the inclinations, talents, and training of its practitioners) depends most heavily upon HUMINT, to some degree upon SIGINT, and almost not at all on PHOTINT and the other technical means. Further, because of the particular interests of the counterintelligence practitioner, HUMINT and to some degree SIGINT, collection tends to be conducted differently (essentially more limited in scope) than that which supports positive intelligence analysis.

This issue is beginning to be understood by senior management in the Intelligence Community. The trend was started in October 1981, when the Central Intelligence Agency formed an Office of Global Issues to handle those issues of a demonstrably "transnational" nature. A key element of this new organization is a branch dealing with terrorism and counterterrorism matters, thus placing analytical responsibility squarely in the hands of positive intelligence analysts. CIA's example is now finally being followed by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), which recently transferred the principal responsibility for terrorism and counterterrorism issues from its Office of Security, a counterintelligence organization, to the newly-expanded Conflict Analysis and Operational Intelligence Support Division of the Foreign
Intelligence Directorate. DIA's functional realignment came only after nearly four years of intense internal debate and over a year of parallel operations by counterterrorism analysts in both the positive foreign intelligence and counterintelligence fields. The final decision was made after repeated demonstrations of the superiority of the positive foreign intelligence discipline in supporting policy making and military contingency planning on counterterrorism issues.

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE VERSUS DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE

In order to round out this discussion of the role of the Intelligence Community, it is necessary to treat briefly the differences between foreign and domestic intelligence operations and responsibilities. Domestic intelligence is conducted, by law, only by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the Department of Justice. Other domestic law enforcement organizations (such as the Drug Enforcement Administration, etc.) also play a role; but the FBI is the sole member of the national Intelligence Community with a specific intelligence collection and terrorism countermeasure responsibility in the domestic arena. The Military Services' responsibilities are strictly limited to defensive measures at military and associated installations and facilities. Collection against domestic terrorist groups, or even against foreign terrorist elements operating within the United States, is an FBI responsibility. The FBI's role, as with any law enforcement organization, is oriented primarily toward apprehension and prosecution. Although the issue is not yet resolved, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) may also have some role to play in crisis management involving terrorist actions in the domestic arena.
Foreign intelligence, on the other hand, is the purview of the CIA, INR, DIA, and appropriate elements of the Military Services. CIA, DIA, and the Services have both positive intelligence and counterintelligence responsibilities in the foreign sphere. Foreign intelligence includes all of those functional and geographical elements of positive intelligence outlined in the foregoing discussion, as well as those counterintelligence functions related to the international arena.

Two closely related elements of counterintelligence which properly belong in both the foreign and domestic sphere are the disciplines of espionage and counterespionage. The latter clearly comprises a defensive set of measures intended to defend, dissuade, and frustrate the penetration and collection efforts of foreign states, either by the FBI in this country or by the CIA and elements of the Military Services operating abroad. Espionage, while technically a positive measure, is a counterintelligence function, in that it is most commonly directed at the intelligence assets and organizations of a foreign country.

INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION

The requirement for, and benefit of, increased international cooperation on terrorism issues has been recognized for several years by American policy makers and intelligence practitioners. The extent and quality of such cooperation is limited, however, by a number of impediments. First of all, the very transnational nature of the phenomenon makes it more difficult than more conventional intelligence problems. International intelligence sharing is not generally the kind of program that is conducted for purely altruistic reasons. Such arrangements between governments often are established as part of a
range of bilateral cooperative programs on international issues. It is seldom an element of bilateral relations between nations who are not on solid and positive terms with one another.

Intelligence sharing among peers, in or out of formal alliances, often is conducted on a different basis than that between great powers and their client states. For instance, the US maintains a historic and deep set of intelligence relations with the United Kingdom. This relationship dates to our combined military staff cooperation during World War II. On the other hand, intelligence relations with other North Atlantic powers, such as France, Italy, or the Federal Republic of Germany, while close, in general are not likely to be as detailed and open. The intelligence exchange component of cooperation within the North Atlantic treaty organization (NATO) naturally focuses on the Soviet and Warsaw Pact nuclear and conventional military threat, as well as the espionage threat. The ability to extend such cooperation in the NATO context into the field of terrorism will not necessarily be greeted with enthusiasm by certain members, such as Greece. The difficulty is not all one way, and the reluctance might not always be on the side of the Europeans. While American intelligence organizations might be willing to cooperate actively with West Germany on the Beider-Menhof and Red Army Faction problems or with Italy on the Red Brigade threat, the extent to which they are politically able to assist Britain on the IRA threat is probably at issue.

American intelligence arrangements with the principal Middle Eastern states with which we have friendly relations are limited in scope, both geographically and functionally. Given the sharp antagonisms that exist between many states in the region, the conduct of intelligence exchange
becomes particularly tricky. Much the same sort of situation also holds in our relationships with nations in other regions. Further, the enthusiasm of certain rigorously neutral states, such as Austria, for cooperation on terrorism might be limited.

Because of the relative wealth, extent, and technological sophistication of American intelligence collection assets, our intelligence relationships with many countries tend to be decidedly one-sided. Therefore, the US is often in the position of providing intelligence to certain countries simply as a sign of good faith and the value we place on the overall political relationship, or in furtherance of some particular policy interest, such as a given military threat to a friend from a neighboring state. In short, little by way of beneficial and genuine exchange occurs from the American perspective.

On the subject of terrorism, the difficulties become even greater, primarily because of the highly political and value-laden nature of the issue. For instance, Israel might be completely willing and desirous of an intense and detailed intelligence exchange with the US on the issue of terrorism; however, our two approaches to the definition of the terrorist threat might be sufficiently divergent to inhibit American willingness for a full and unlimited exchange of intelligence. Our intelligence relationship with Saudi Arabia or Egypt certainly would be limited by such considerations. Further, open antagonisms between Israel and its Arab neighbors obviously serve to condition the openness with which we can deal with any of them on such an issue as terrorism. Indeed, the Arab states may feel particularly constrained because of our close relationship with Israel. It is questionable that the subject can even be broached with hope of beneficial results with countries with
which the US has limited or conditioned relations, such as the communist states of Easter Europe, except perhaps in special circumstances (e.g., information on threats to heads-of-state). The recent difficulties with Yugoslavia, a communist state with which the US has enjoyed generally good relations, described earlier serve to illustrate the political difficulties of extending cooperation on legal issues regarding terrorism, let alone on intelligence cooperation. Greece may be another case in point.

Given these kinds of perceptual and political problems, it should be evident that the most the US generally can expect by way of international intelligence exchange relationships is some cooperation on defensive, antiterrorism issues. That is to say a sharing of threat-oriented or warning information. There are enough countries that have experienced terrorist attacks against their interests or on their territory that a basis for antiterrorism cooperation clearly exists. The real difficulty will be confronted on issues of positive, proactive, counterterrorism strategy. Whereas many countries might be willing to be forthcoming in sharing threat information of a general or even specific nature, there will not be many who are willing to assist the US in conducting foreign military, paramilitary, or covert operations against terrorist actors, whether national or subnational. Any such cooperation in the intelligence field that may be garnered likely will be limited severely to country-by-country collaboration, and then usually on a case-by-case basis.

While international cooperation might be achieved with other countries on the level of intelligence exchanges, despite the difficulties outlined above, operational cooperation is another matter
entirely. For instance, the United States might be able to trade upon its political and alliance relationship with a NATO country to gain cooperation in identifying terrorist threats. That does not necessarily translate, however, into operational cooperation from that country, either directly or in terms of physical access in the accomplishment of a counterterrorist action. US military forces got away with using the Siganella airbase in Sicily to force down an Egyptian airliner carrying the perpetrators of the Achille Lauro hijacking in 1985, with either grudging or belated Italian government acquiescence. Doing so again could damage bilateral American-Italian relations or wider NATO relations. While Algeria might have been willing to cooperate on a certain level during the TWA hijacking in 1985, such cooperation did not extend to allowing American counterterrorist forces access to Algerian territory to deal directly with the problem. Looked at another way, to what extent would the United States operationally cooperate with, or actively abet, a British action against the IRA?

CHAPTER IV

ENDNOTES


2. For the National Security Agency, terrorism issues are handled much like any other. The issue for NSA is primarily technical and, therefore, does not involve the sorts of philosophical issues that bedevil the rest of the Community. NSA does, however, face certain legal issues and limitations in the application of its collection assets to the terrorism problem.

3. A detailed discussion of collection issues will not be pursued, so as to avoid classification considerations.
4. One of the few official Army writings on this issue is MAJ Alex Wylie's *Intelligence: Its Role in Counterterrorism*. This counterintelligence-oriented piece still does not get to the heart of the matter of intelligence organizational problems.


7. The warning problem is exacerbated even more than usual as regards terrorism. Terrorists may frequently change their plans at the last moment, or they may improvise variations to their plans. Because of the inherently clandestine and less predictable nature of their activities, the detection problem is greater than it is for conventional operations.

8. Ibid., pp. 99-105


11. See, for instance: Schlomo Gazit and Michael Handel, "Insurgency, Terrorism, and Intelligence," in *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Counterintelligence*, ed. by Roy Godson, pp. 130-131. The authors make the distinction between "defensive-passive strategy" and "active counterstrategy. I would disagree, however, with their inclusion of denial operations as an element of an active strategy. It could be considered active defense.


13. This generalization also would apply to terrorism awareness training (commonly, and properly, identified as an antiterrorism function) for diplomatic and military personnel, in that this training "campaign" is meant to protect them and the installations with which they are associated as prospective targets, by having the effect of deterring, dissuading, and neutralizing.

15. A good, succinct discussion of the difficulties of employing various collection means against terrorism can be found in Ofri, pp. 46-48.

16. It is interesting to note that DOD Directive 2000.12 only mentions intelligence responsibilities for collection and threat analysis in the context of counterterrorism offensive measures.

17. CIA, having a covert foreign collection function, had a third contender for locus of responsibility for terrorism issues. This organizational innovation coincided with that of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which also has formed an Office of Global Issues.

18. This is less true as regards human intelligence than the technical disciplines.

19. Other countries, however, could have HUMINT access in certain areas that are particularly difficult for American organizations to achieve.
CHAPTER V

STRATEGY FORMULATION IN RESPONSE TO TERRORISM

THE IMPORTANCE OF OPTIONS IN STRATEGY FORMULATION

A political decisionmaker at any level, when confronted with a difficult challenge, first and foremost wants "options" to cope with the problem. The decisionmaker would much prefer to have a range of potential actions to consider, any one of which will address, to some degree of acceptability, at least the surface issues involved in the challenge. The decisionmaker would also like to have some sense of the probability of success to be expected from the implementation of each of the possible actions. Such is obviously the case with the challenge presented to American national leaders by the terrorist threat.

The challenge of terrorism is particularly difficult, because of its amorphous and illusive nature. Perhaps more than any other national policy challenge, terrorism presents the policymaker with a wide range of value-based issues. There are issues of internal security, issues of international order, fundamental issues of the proper use of state power, issues of the right to and scope of political dissent, etc.

The difficulties posed by the threat of domestic terrorism are particularly difficult for a liberal democratic society. Governmental responses to widespread or especially flamboyant campaigns of oppositional
violence within the society touches at the very heart of a democratic nation's view of itself. The strategic advantage possessed by a strong liberal democracy is the spirit, fabric, and structure of its legal system (despite certain tactical disadvantages inherent in a system characterized by institutional legal restraint). Perhaps the most prominent contemporary examples of this phenomenon are the Italian response to the internal threat presented by the Red Brigades during the late 1970's and early 1980's and the British experience in Ulster since 1970. The Canadian experience in dealing with the Quebec terrorist challenge in the 1970's is another useful example, as too is the West German response to the assault of the Baader-Meinhof Gang during the same period. In virtually all of these cases, societies with strong democratic institutions have fought internal terrorist threats successfully without serious erosion of civil liberties. The United Kingdom still faces a continuing challenge to governmental authority in Northern Ireland. By my definition, however, the Ulster situation has long since gone beyond simple domestic terrorism and has taken on all the attributes of full-scale insurrection. Italy and Germany also have not completely eradicated internal security threats from the Red Brigades and Red Army Faction, respectively.

I will not deal at length here with the issue of state response to domestic terrorism, except as it relates to American interests in the international arena. Suffice it to say that subrevolutionary terrorism basically is an antiterrorism problem to be dealt with primarily through regular (that is not to say necessarily routine) law enforcement procedures and organizations. The principal concern for a liberal
democracy is to strike an appropriate balance between the extremes of submission to terrorist threats and demands on the one hand, and the resort to counterterror and ruthless repression on the other. The literature is replete with commentary on the domestic response issue, both for the United States and for other democracies.2 In the international arena, the issues and problems are no less difficult; but they are in some ways qualitatively different. There is no authoritative and well-defined international legal code or structure to deal with the problem, despite the efforts of decades.3 The United Nations has shown a notable reluctance to address the issue in a constructive manner, primarily because of the value-loaded definitional problem. Third World countries, in particular, have been reluctant to cooperate on this issue, primarily because of the residue of their anticolonial experience and the ongoing controversies over the issues of "wars of liberation" and "self-determination." There also has been a lack of multilateral cooperation, even between some of the most commonly victimized First World states, because of the same problems of political interpretation.

SOFT-LINE VERSUS HARD-LINE OPTIONS

Political decisionmakers face two fundamentally divergent options in confronting the threat of international terrorism. They can take a "soft-line" approach, attempting to temporize with the perpetrators, acceding to their demands, consciously attempting to relegate the problem to one of "low policy," and hoping to deflect (or outright reject) the onus of responsibility in the matter. This approach may not
necessarily constitute a policy of appeasement, so much as simply one of avoidance. On the other hand, national leaders can take a "hard-line" approach to the issue, essentially accepting the challenge to national security and prestige and international order, raising the issue to one of "high policy," rejecting compromise, and undertaking vigorous unilateral or multilateral measures to respond to the threat.\(^4\)

When a terrorist action occurs, perhaps the natural tendency is to assume that it is an isolated, aberrant incident, best dealt with as expeditiously as possible, hoping for a minimum of damage to immediate victims, national prestige, and national and international order. For most states in the international arena, except Israel, this approach has seemed to characterize the responses of their decisionmakers. In the absence of a concentrated analytical and collection effort by a nation's intelligence community, and a coherent analytical and policy approach to the issue by the national leadership, both of which recognize that a "campaign" of terrorist violence is being waged for recognizable purposes, such a "soft-line" approach is rather understandable and, indeed, almost attractive. There is no indication, however, that such an approach pays in the long run.

Such an approach is also understandable when a country concludes, accurately or otherwise, that it is not the true target of the terrorist action. For instance, Greece has a rather consistent record of acceding quickly to terrorist demands perpetrated on its territory. Athens International Airport is the crossroads of international air travel in southeastern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, it is a natural venue for terrorist actions, but no threat is meant to Greek citizens or the Greek Government by, for instance, Palestinian groups...
attacking Israeli or other targets aboard international airliners. From the standpoint of the Greek Government, therefore, there is no justification for needlessly endangering its own citizens by taking a hardline policy when relatively simple demands are made, especially if no significant domestic constituency is energized to protest the government's actions or the original terrorist event. This sort of soft-line policy is essentially a defensive and evasive one. Such an approach, however, has not spared Greece from further violence.5

Governments can also take a soft-line approach to terrorist incidents conducted on its territory for more overtly political reasons. While a government may not specifically condone the use of terrorist violence, the government and society may take a rather sanguine, if not openly supportive, view of the political rationale for the action. The Yugoslav reaction to American protests of its actions in the wake of the Achille Lauro hijacking in October 1985 is a case in point.6

The French approach to this issue is perhaps even more relevant, in that it is a country with a strong, self-conscious history of democratic traditions. France has long perceived itself as a refuge for international political dissidents of whatever stripe. France is also the venue for a very high number of international terrorist incidents. Yet the French government and policy elites, until fairly recently, have seemed to be relatively tolerant of the situation, unless France itself were the direct target of the violence. This approach is not defensive in the same way as the earlier example of Greece, nor is it necessarily consciously evasive of the issue. To the contrary, it is perceived as a rather positive expression of French national political values of
toleration. There are some indications, however, that France is stiffening its approach to this situation.  

The most prominent example of the "hard-line" approach to international terrorism undoubtedly is Israel. Israel is one of the most visible targets of such violence, and in almost all cases is the primary target of terrorist actions in which it is involved. Most of the actions directed against Israeli interests are perpetrated by Palestinian groups, or their allies, for fairly well-defined motives. The Israeli government long since has recognized the threat to its fundamental national interests posed by this campaign, and has consciously and consistently taken a hard line approach. Israel has a declaratory policy of non-negotiation, preemption, and retaliation; and it has conducted a fairly consistent, if not always discriminating, counter-campaign against what it judges to be the emanation or manifestation (if not always the source) of the threat. For this policy and related actions, Israel has gained both widespread international admiration and condemnation. Its more spectacular military counteractions, such as the raid on Entebbe, Uganda, in July 1976, often are touted as the epitome of proper policy and military precision. On the other hand, its air raid on PLO headquarters in Tunis in late 1985 was viewed by many as international outlawry and abuse of power. Domestically, the Israeli government is widely supported for its basic policy position, at least by the Jewish segment of the population.

Perhaps the most interesting, and anomalous policy position of a country which becomes a venue, if not specifically a target, of international terrorism is that form of passivity which falls between the normal typologies of soft-line and hard-line. Two prominent
examples come to mind. In 1977, members of a terrorist group hijacked a West German airliner, ending up eventually in Mogadishu, Somalia. The Somali Government, acceding to a West German request, allowed the German counterterror paramilitary organization to undertake a solution to the problem by force. The most interesting aspect of this incident was that the Somali government, at the time a left-leaning Third World Soviet ally, allowed a Western nation military access to its territory to attack a leftist proto-revolutionary group, without a word about issues of national sovereignty.

The recent Maltese Government acquiescence to an Egyptian military counteraction against a group that hijacked an Egyptian civil airliner to Malta provides a rather poignant example of a small, militarily weak, politically ambivalent state caught by its geography in the game of international politics. Malta is closely linked to Libya and allegedly allows free reign to Libyan terrorists, and has had contentious relations with Egypt and a number of Western countries. Yet it acceded to the Egyptian request to be allowed to take military action on Maltese territory against perpetrators alleged by Egypt to have been controlled by Libya.10

THE IMPACT OF DEFINITIONS ON OPTION FORMULATION

Just as there are discernable rationales for nations to take a soft-line to terrorist actions (e.g., policy avoidance, as in the case of Greece, or active—Yugoslavia—or passive—France—expressions of ideologies or political values), so too are there varying reasons for nations to take a hard-line response.
Perhaps the theoretically strictest rationale would be exhibited by an authoritarian state which institutionally brooks no meaningful political opposition, particularly violent opposition. Political dictatorships and oligarchies come immediately to mind. It is interesting to note that the Soviet Union's experience as a target of international terrorism so far has been extremely limited; but one can easily imagine the Soviet response if faced with a campaign of ethnic or right-wing ideological terrorism directed against it in the international arena. The same probably could be said of the other communist regimes of Eastern Europe. Russia's recent experience (and muted public response) as a victim in Beirut does not provide an adequate measure by which to judge; the kidnapping of its Embassy officials (and the murder of one of them) was an isolated incident, so far not part of an apparent concerted campaign.11

A national political leadership that insists upon (or falls into the analytical trap of) unsophisticated ideological definitions of terrorism also runs the risk of becoming authoritarian in responding to the challenges posed by the phenomenon. Like the dictatorship that countenances no opposition, even a democratic nation can fall into the trap of institutionalizing violent responses to any challenge if pushed far enough, particularly if the issue becomes a strong enough (e.g., left-right) domestic political controversy.

I would argue, however, that it is perfectly reasonable that a nation could decide, on the basis of thorough and rational analysis, that a given terrorist challenge constitutes a virtual state of war against the nation and its interests. Israel has taken this position in response to the Palestinian challenge, and for good reason. The threat
demands (political rationale) of the Palestinian armed elements have been thoroughly analyzed and debated, and it has been decided that there is no politically acceptable or viable constructive response that can be made to accede to those demands. The very existence of the society is at issue. Therefore, the war is acknowledged by both sides, deterrence becomes an inoperable concept in the long run, and the carnage continues at an "acceptable" level. It is only the uninvolved or tangentially involved in the international arena who are embarrassed and intimidated by the situation.

The problem for the United States, faced as it is with a seeming multiplicity of challenges in this and other areas, is to be more discriminating in its approach to the issue. The manner in which a nation defines the threat determines in large measure the nature of its preferred responses. If the national leadership defines terrorism in broadly ideological terms (i.e., conducted by "revolutionaries"), and a hard-line response posture is preferred, the entire response structure (policy making and implementation) will find its efforts directed at too many targets, most of which really have nothing to do with the central issue. The application of the operational typology of international terrorism outlined earlier could help guide the primary collection, analytical, policy, and countermeasure efforts to those threats that impinge most directly upon American strategic interests.

Interstate terrorism presents the most direct (though not necessarily the most readily discernable) challenge to our interests, because it constitutes a state of war. Transnational and state-supported terrorism threats are, in a sense, more subtle and are more easily confused with, or subsumed by, wider kinds of unconventional
warfare. Chasing "terrorists" can lead the country into a quagmire of someone else's rebellion, insurgency, bilateral squabble, or societal disintegration, if we do not assess properly the rationale for the violence being directed against us. We can decide to become involved in such conflicts for valid policy reasons, but we should be careful not to become enmeshed inadvertently because we thought we were chasing terrorists.

CHAPTER V

ENDNOTES

1. I will not deal with the legal issues posed by terrorism. There is ample literature on the subject. For a good summary, see Alona E. Evans and John F. Murphy, Legal Aspects of Terrorism, especially Chapter 12, pp. 553-575 and the Appendix, pp. 631-668 (particularly pp. 654-665).


3. The argument can be made that international law is clear enough, but enforcement certainly is not likely to be addressed in any meaningful way by international bodies. The recent United Nations General Assembly resolution adds nothing to international efforts.

4. This dichotomy is essentially that described by Paul Wilkinson in his "Terrorism versus Liberal Democracy: The Problems of Response," Conflict Studies, January 1976, pp. 7-10. Wilkinson uses the terms "soft line" and "tough line," but he does not attempt to distinguish states' motives for either approach.

5. There is some indication that Greek public opinion may be hardening on this issue in the wake of the adverse publicity incurred by the Greek Government during the TWA jetliner and Achille Lauro ship hijackings in late 1985.


8. It should be remembered that Egypt, too, has taken a hard-line policy when its own interests have been directly threatened. It has engaged twice in international armed forays against terrorists, in Cyprus and most recently in Malta, albeit with controversial results.

9. It is questionable whether Israel's numerous reprisal air raids on Palestinian paramilitary camps in the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon are in any real sense "surgical." On the other hand, it does not matter very much if the Israeli Air Force attacks, for instance, a PFLP-CG camp in retaliation for a "terrorist" attack on Israeli interests actually conducted by the DFLP. In the minds of the Israeli military and political leadership, both groups have it coming for past offenses, and popular political expectations are fulfilled. Much more care generally is taken, however, when reprisals are conducted in other geographical areas.


11. The Soviet Government might have been relieved of this particular problem by Syrian intervention in the issue, or it might have taken covert actions in its own behalf that have not yet come to light. There is some informed speculation that the latter was the case.


13. The problem might not be readily discernable because of the use of surrogate actors and other operational details allowing plausible denial of responsibility.
CHAPTER VI

A TYPOLOGY OF STRATEGIC RESPONSE

Let us now examine the manner in which a government comes to develop a strategic response to the terrorism challenge. There was a time when, in the absence of any demonstrable and concerted threat, the government did not take terrorism seriously. For the United States in the post-war era, this situation held prior to the advent of the wave of airline hijackings in the mid-to-late 1960's and the initiation of Palestinian armed international action around 1970. Since there was no demonstrable threat, obviously there was no need for a special policy. There was no overriding need for coordination of governmental agencies, no requirement for concerted government action, and therefore no need for new doctrinal definitions.

POSTURING

Once hostile actions begin to occur, a problem is perceived, albeit indistinctly; but the actions might appear to be rather random in nature. No real pattern to the actions is perceived, and there is not yet a developed sense that the country is a consistent target. Events are dealt with on an ad hoc basis. Perhaps there are long temporal gaps between incidents.

The first impulse of a great power, particularly a Western
democracy, when faced with diffuse, violent challenges to its international political interests is to posture. Since there is no readily identifiable oppositional organization, especially in the absence of a recognition of interstate terrorism, such posturing takes the form of political rhetoric, from stern but statesmanlike warnings to stridence and bombast. Government and popular reactions betray confusion and emotion. The likelihood of the government's bluff being called is extremely high, as we have seen.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Let's assume that the terrorist attacks continue, but the full extent of the threat either has not developed or has not yet been fully recognized. Events still are handled on an ad hoc basis, but the incidents become serious enough to require government action of some kind. The government tends to handle the problem through the development of crisis management procedures. This is a way of mobilizing and employing government assets, but the emphasis is upon short-term crisis resolution. It is not yet a military problem. The perceived transitory nature of the phenomenon precludes the purposeful and consistent application of such assets as intelligence collection resources and the development of specialized military capabilities. The recognized requirement for crisis management does lead to increased levels of intra-governmental organizational cooperation.

Crisis management does not comprise a strategy in the true sense; rather, it is more of a purely operational, ad hoc, reactive set of actions and procedures designed to cope with events as they happen. Crisis management includes procedures for dealing with hostage-taking.
and barrier situations such as hijacking and embassy seizures. This form of problem solving does involve considerable prior planning, training, and organizational and political skills in order to be successful. This option must always be capable of immediate implementation, but does not necessarily require political commitment beyond the immediate event, unless negotiated obligations have been incurred. This "non-strategy" is the one that has been adopted, consciously or otherwise, by most Western countries, including the United States.

DETERRENCE

Defense

When the nature and extent of the terrorist threat becomes more fully realized, the natural impulse is to attempt to devise ways in which it can be prevented. Initially, the government focus is upon those largely defensive measures intended to negate the effects of terrorist attacks. The government begins to talk about and develop concepts of deterrence, but the initial emphasis is distinctly upon the defense and what was described in the preceding chapter as "antiterrorism." The fundamental conceptual difficulty with employing defense as a deterrent strategy against terrorism is that one never can be quite sure that the quality of the defense is being communicated adequately to the attacker. Both the inadequacy of the physical defense and the inadequacy of communication will likely contribute to the failure of defense as a pure and effective strategy against the terrorist. Frustration with the almost inevitable failure of defense will serve to push decisionmakers across a threshold, leading to the
development of offensive strategies and supporting capabilities.

**Offense**

Deterrence is perhaps the most complex response strategy. It is far more than "posturing." Deterrence is an overarching umbrella strategic concept. It involves both counterterrorist and antiterrorist elements. Deterrence requires a combination of strong antiterrorism target-denial measures, as well as a credible and well-advertised counterterrorist capability. The obvious purpose of a deterrent strategy at any conflict level (nuclear, conventional, or unconventional) is to convince one's opponent that one has the capability (physical and psychological) of withstanding the opponent's attack, the capability to counterattack with devastating effect, and the complete willingness to do so if provoked. The issue of credibility is at once the strength and the weakness of deterrence strategy. That is to say that one's opponent must understand and believe the strength of one's capabilities, intent, and resolve. The extent of the opponent's understanding cannot be influenced solely by the would-be deterrer. There is also the issue of congruent values, or rather lack thereof. If the opponent does not share sufficiently the deterrer's perception of the impact and effectiveness of counterviolence, deterrence is not likely to work. A shared perception of the counteractor's determination to act is also quite important.2

**Retaliation.** It is the fervent hope of the government facing a concerted terrorist challenge that defensive measures will be sufficient to deter such attacks. If defense clearly does not work, government must escalate its response. The response strategy option of retaliation
is a quite common impulse when a nation has been subjected to the damage and attendant frustration of a terrorist action or campaign, but there is little historical evidence so far that it has any particular impact on the perpetrator. The intent is to punish the terrorist actor and to serve as a deterrent against future attacks. In fact, it seems that a retaliation strategy has the most impact upon the counteractor and the target society, in that it serves as a form of catharsis. Israel has been caught in this quandary for many years; it has rather consistently retaliated against terrorist groups worldwide, thus satisfying elite and public opinion, yet the attacks continue. Retaliation is likely to fail as an effective strategy for the very reason that deterrence is so hard to achieve: absence of congruent values between target and actor. In Israeli military circles, there has been a long-running disagreement between the operations people, who favor retaliatory actions, and the intelligence people, who point out the hollowness (if not counterproductiveness) of such a strategy. A retaliation strategy employed by a society with a less homogeneous set of values and perceptions also runs the risk of engendering considerable political divisiveness among the public and opinion elites.

Elimination. If retaliation fails to impress the terrorist actor sufficiently, the government must move to a different conceptual and operational level of deterrence. A more positive, or proactive, strategic approach is required. A strategy of elimination and eradication requires a long-term view of the problem and a sustained commitment to it. This option has as its goal the identification of the terrorist actor, and the application of full-fledged offensive action designed to neutralize completely the opponent's capability and
willingness to conduct further violent acts. If the opponent is a terrorist state actor engaging in covert warfare, the target state has the option of reacting in kind. Justification for such a policy would be difficult to obtain politically in both domestic and international terms for the United States, in the absence of some particularly dastardly deed, such as perhaps the assassination of a national leader. Conduct of such a total campaign against a subnational group would also be extremely difficult to justify and sustain, for political and practical reasons.

If the strategy of elimination and eradication is adopted as government policy and works as it is intended against any given source of terrorist violence, the problem in one respect is resolved. Other threats undoubtedly will remain. This option, however, does not represent the pinnacle of counterterrorist strategy. Until this option is invoked and succeeds operationally (probably in more than an isolated case), the nation is still likely to be victimized by continuing terrorist attacks. The likelihood of collateral damage in foreign countries is high, with attendant foreign and domestic political costs. It also requires a long-haul national commitment, politically and operationally, to any given campaign of counteraction. It is doubtful that an elimination strategy has been considered seriously by the US government, and its adoption for counterterrorist targets other than small operational cells is problematical. This strategy may be more practical in political terms for certain other countries.

Preemption. The offensive strategy to which governments should aspire is preemption, but it is one of the most difficult response options to attain. It involves the clear prior identification of a
terrorist actor and his intended action with sufficient strategic warning so as to be able to mount effective counteraction (military, political, or a combination) to disrupt the opponent's planning to a critical extent. This strategic option is probably the most difficult for the Intelligence Community to support effectively, and, therefore, for the Defense Establishment to conduct successfully.  

COSTS AND RISKS OF OFFENSIVE DETERRENCE

Once a proactive counterterrorist campaign is begun, the risks increase dramatically. An escalatory spiral of violent action and counteraction can be quite costly, and a decisionmaker cannot know with certainty where it will all end. Retaliation, elimination, and preemption can be costly in terms of military assets, domestic political support, and international political reaction. If a government is responding to interstate terrorism, it risks becoming involved in open international warfare, with all the attendant ramifications.

The escalatory ladder of deterrence strategy responses outlined above ideally is not a linear and unidirectional construct. It is portrayed here in escalatory terms for purposes of illustration, and to suggest that the government likely will go through an escalatory process in order to discover and achieve the right approach to the problem. (See figure 2.) Once true strategic deterrence is achieved, either against a given terrorist threat or (hopefully) against the range of terrorist threats, the government then regains the political and operational advantage of exercising "options" in response to future events. Once the government attains the ability generally to "preempt" terrorist threats, then invoking "retaliatory" actions against the
TYPOLOGY OF OPERATIONAL RESPONSE TO TERRORISM

- Preemption
- Elimination
- Retaliation
- Active Defense
- Passive Defense
- Posturing
- Avoidance
- Appeasement
- Accommodation

Time and Experience

Figure 2.
occasional terrorist success can more likely be said to contribute genuinely to overall deterrence strategy. Until a preemption posture is achieved, however, retaliation only serves as a form of "catharsis" and post hoc "punishment." Flexibility is the optimal strategic posture.

An elimination strategy against state-supported terrorism, in a sense, can be a melding of retaliation and preemption policies. It can have as its goal the inflicting of punishment on the actor, or it can be designed to change the system of support for the perpetrator before the next terrorist action can be undertaken. The difference between retaliation and elimination is one of ultimate intent. I make the distinction between elimination and preemption, so as to indicate that preemption is an action taken on the basis or reasonably certain intelligence that a specific action is about to be executed against one's interests by a given actor.

THE ISSUE OF LINKAGE IN OFFENSIVE ACTION

Once political decisionmakers and military commanders have reached the stage in strategy formulation that they are willing to invoke offensive counteraction, they will be most interested in the issue of linkage. The political leaders will require that definitive linkage be established between the perpetrator of a terrorist attack and the act itself. This is required in order for the leadership to fully and (hopefully) conclusively convince domestic and international opinion of the justification of the counteraction. The more conclusive the proven linkage, the more likely American political decisionmakers are to approve the use of counterviolence. Military commanders will require conclusive proof of linkage between the terrorist event and the
perpetrator in order to conduct proper operational planning and to convince their political masters of the appropriateness of military action and to bolster their claims of the effectiveness of their proposed plan of action.

Obviously, only an effective, properly organized, and properly directed intelligence effort has any chance of providing the kind of conclusive proof of linkage between a terrorist event (or campaign) and those who conducted it. This requirement, while difficult for the Intelligence Community to support under the best of circumstances, becomes particularly difficult in regard to transnational terrorism. This difficulty is enhanced by the murkiness of operational connections between sponsoring states and their nonstate surrogates, as well as the tight security normally practiced in covert operations. When the issue involves interstate terrorism, both political and military leadership will require virtually ironclad assurance from the Intelligence Community of the rightness of their analytical conclusions.

When the government is operating only at the level of crisis management, linkage is not a significant issue. The only intent of the government is to bring the particular incident to a satisfactory (i.e., non-lethal) conclusion as rapidly as possible with a minimum of further embarrassment.

Once the government reaches the stage of considering seriously the implementation of a deterrent strategy, the issue of linkage obviously takes on overriding importance. Again, linkage is important for operational planning, political justification, and communication to the would-be terrorist actor. The importance of proven linkage between a terrorist action that has already occurred and the perpetrator or
sponsor of the action is critical if the government is going to devise, approve, and conduct offensive counteraction (whether in retaliation or for the prosecution of a campaign of elimination and eradication). The justification required (both tactically and politically) to support a preemptive strategy is even more paramount, not to mention difficult to acquire.

CHAPTER VI

ENDNOTES


2. Communication and perception depend in part upon the "rationality" of the opponent. The rationality of one's opponent, of necessity, must be assumed, if one is going to be rational in formulating one's own perceptions and responses. For a discussion of this issue, see Martha Crenshaw, "Ideology and Psychological Factors in International Terrorism," in Symposium on International Terrorism, pp. 1-41.


4. A purely defensive strategy requires only those charged with devising effective physical defensive measures have some understanding of the nature of the threat. Linkage, per se, is not a central concern.
CHAPTER VII

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF STRATEGIC RESPONSE OPTIONS

THE MILITARY QUANDARY IN OPTION FORMULATION

Just as national policymakers require options when confronted with a particularly difficult decision problem, so too do senior military officers. As regards the subject of terrorism, senior leaders of the Defense Establishment in the United States are in at least as much trouble as their political superiors. The foregoing discussion dealt at length with the basic and considerable confusion the leadership in this country has exhibited in understanding the fundamental nature of the terrorist threat, with resulting confusion over what to do about it. The Defense Establishment is in a dual quandary in this regard. Its definitional understanding of the phenomenon not only is at variance with that of the political leadership, but there are differences between the Defense Department and the Army as to the nature of the problem.

The leadership of the Defense Establishment also is in a quandary of yet another sort. As Stephen Sloan succinctly discusses in a recent issue of an official US Army publication, the military has framed no meaningful doctrine for counterterrorism operations. Without a coherent doctrine for dealing with terrorism, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Secretary of Defense, therefore, are exceedingly
hardpressed to formulate and present options and alternatives for consideration by the national political leadership. As Sloan points out and as discussed in Chapter II, the military prefers to treat terrorism as a criminal activity and not as an element of armed conflict in what can ultimately be viewed as a protracted campaign of intense political warfare.2

To the extent that counterterrorism is considered at all in terms of operational doctrine, it is treated as an element of regional insurgencies under the overall rubric of low intensity conflict. Although some progress is being made, military doctrine simply does not deal well with the phenomenon of nonterritorial, transnational terrorism.3

To the extent that the military has attempted to come to grips with the counterterrorism issue, essentially it has been in the arena of reactive measures; and it has managed to confuse in fundamental ways the conceptual distinction between "action" and "reaction," as discussed in earlier chapters.4

COUNTER-FORCE AND COUNTER-VALUE RESPONSES

Before discussing the more mechanical issues of the employment of military forces against terrorism in terms of the strategic response typology, it is necessary to deal in broad theoretical terms with the general purpose of military action. In simplest terms, the active application of military power against an adversary at any level on the spectrum of conflict is intended to achieve one of two purposes. In the broadest terms, of course, military power is meant to defend, deter, punish, or destroy. We are dealing here with the ways in which military power are used to punish or destroy, and therefore hopefully to achieve
deterrence or abatement of the threat. As with the application of military power directly against an adversary at any level on the spectrum of conflict, the use of military action against terrorist actors should be meant to achieve either counter-force or counter-value results.

A counter-force strategy is intended to inflict damage at some desired level or intensity directly upon the armed forces of the adversary in order to destroy that force or to neutralize or degrade its effectiveness. For instance, in the case of a transnational terrorist organization, the application of counter-force power would be designed to attack and punish that organization directly through violent action. That means to kill, wound, or capture its leadership and personnel, to destroy or disrupt its operating bases or support facilities, and otherwise to disrupt its terrorist operations. This is the strategy and tactics used frequently by Israel, for instance, when its Air Force bombs a Palestinian paramilitary base in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley that is known or strongly suspected to harbor terrorist organizations.

In the context of action against interstate terrorist organizations, the situation is in some ways similar. The victim state would apply military power directly against that portion of the perpetrator government’s apparatus that is conducting terrorism against it. The important difference in counter-force military action against an interstate terrorist actor is that such a tactic would not involve striking that portion of the offender’s military establishment not directly implicated in terrorist actions. This distinction would not apply, however, if the reacting state were to choose to elevate the conflict to full-scale war.
A counter-value strategy for the employment of military power, on the other hand, is more indirect approach. A counter-value strategy involves the use of military force against a target or objective that the opponent values highly for some reason not necessarily having to do directly with the conflict issue. The target of countervalue operations is frequently civilian or quasi-military in nature. This concept normally is used in the context of nuclear or general conventional war theory, but it is equally applicable in the context of a terrorism/counterterrorism conflict. For instance, the military power of a state (nuclear or conventional) may be applied to an opponent's civilian population centers, rather than directly against military forces or installations.

The German air raids on London and the massive Allied air attacks on the German cities of Dresden or Cologne during World War II, or indeed the American atomic bomb attacks on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, are prominent examples of the employment of counter-value military force. The purpose of the German and Allied actions was to demoralize the civilian population of the adversary and thereby to weaken the resolve of the opposing government to continue resistance. The purpose of the American atomic attacks on Japan was to force immediate war termination through shock action, thereby avoiding the need for prolonged and costly conventional military operations on the Japanese home islands. The targets, however, had nothing to do with Japan's military establishment.
TERRORISM: CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE THE SEARCH FOR NATIONAL STRATEGY (U) ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA
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The employment of counter-value military action against an interstate terrorist actor could involve attacks against important elements of the opponent's conventional forces, rather than against that portion of its state apparatus engaged in terrorist operations. Key infrastructure targets such as transportation or communication nodes also might serve the purpose. The purpose of counter-value military action can be twofold, especially in counterterrorist operations. In the classic theoretical context, destruction of a state's expensive, high technology air force in retaliation for its sponsoring or conducting terrorist attacks would be designed to inflict unacceptable pain and damage on the government in order to punish past offenses, and thereby to deter future actions by impressing upon the enemy the extent to which one is willing to go to achieve security. The second purpose may be to impress, punish, and deter the opponent sufficiently by striking an accessible target, when the desired primary counter-force target cannot be located with certainty or precision, or when it is invulnerable.5

Decisionmakers must be mindful of the possibility of backlash to counter-value policies. If such an operation were designed to damage the offending government in such a manner as to undermine regime support among its conventional military forces or the general population, it may result in just the opposite reaction. The popular reaction in Britain to the German terror bombings in 1940 and, perhaps to a lesser extent, the German popular reaction to Allied bombing of its cities later in the war serve as excellent examples of the counter-intuitive results of such strategies.
The viability of counter-value strategy against transnational nonstate terrorist actors is far more problematic. The very simple fact is that a transnational terrorist organization is not a government, and therefore likely does not have readily recognizable and vulnerable physical assets. It might be possible, however, for a government to use nonmilitary means to damage a transnational terrorist organization's operational viability, if, for example, that organization had achieved enough sophistication to possess extensive financial assets (such as does the PLO).

The application of counter-value military operations against civilian populations, either those of an interstate or transnational terrorist actor, is not likely to be a credible policy option. While the legality and morality of attacks on population centers might at least be arguable in some quarters in large scale conventional war, the use of such a tactic against the perpetrators or supporters of terrorism would be entirely counterproductive and self-defeating politically for the government conducting them (particularly a Western democracy). The criteria of proportionality and discrimination must be observed.

**CONVENTIONAL VERSUS SPECIAL OPERATIONS OPTIONS**

The options which the Military Establishment have to present to political decisionmakers in terrorism crises can take the form of conventional or special operations. Conventional forces obviously have an important role to play in supporting defensive strategies. They need, first of all, to protect military installations and personnel throughout the system as primary potential targets; and conventional military forces can provide, if required, antiterrorism defense of
civilian governmental and nongovernmental facilities, as well. In a
defensive mode, it would seem that special operations forces (such as
the Army's Special Forces and Rangers, the Navy's SEALs, and special Air
Force units) have little utility beyond limited point defense of their
own assets.

In the offensive mode, both conventional and special operations
units would seem to have important roles to play. In essentially
reactive counterterrorist operations, such as hostage rescue and barrier
situations, the utility of conventional forces is probably limited to
employment of last resort. The nature of these situations is such that
the training of any given conventional military organization would not
be readily applicable. That is to say that if a given hostage-taking or
barrier situation were to develop with such rapidity that time did not
allow for deployment and employment of trained special operations forces
to deal with the matter, and conventional units were immediately
available, then they may well have to be used in an effort to reduce the
risk to lives or especially important facilities. Normally, however,
the most desirable situation would be to contain the situation, possibly
with conventional forces, until specially trained counterterrorist units
could be deployed to the scene to deal with it.

Retaliation strategy theoretically is supportable by both
conventional and special operations forces. (The conceptual and
practical difficulties of counter-value operations against a nonstate
transnational actor were discussed earlier.) Both types of forces
conceivably could conduct either counter-force or counter-value
operations against an interstate terrorist actor. The level of damage
likely to be desired in counter-value attacks against another state
(e.g., destruction of a country's air force or a key infrastructure target) might argue for the employment of conventional forces. If decisionmakers were willing to consider, and lawmakers were willing to sanction, specific targeting of the opponent's leadership, more specialized kinds of forces might be preferable. For American leadership, a key concern will be to avoid unnecessary collateral damage, thus arguing for considerable precision, regardless of the tactical mode employed.

Both conventional and special operations forces, in theory, could support elimination and preemption strategies. The basic nature of these strategies, however, involve very specific operational requirements, due to the desired results and the characteristics of the opponent. First of all, elimination strategy, by its very nature, calls for the application of counter-force, rather than counter-value, tactics. So, too, does preemption strategy in practical terms. It is theoretically plausible, for instance, to conduct a crippling attack on Libya's air force in order to send a strong deterrent message, having clear and unambiguous intelligence of an impending Libyan terrorist attack against US interests. The international and domestic political ramifications of such an action would be devastating and self-defeating, however.

A number of other issues determine the suitability of employing conventional or special operations forces. The most obvious one is that of organization and training. Conventional forces, for the most part, are not trained to fight in a specific active counterterrorist environment, nor are they likely to be organized to fight other than large-scale operations against similarly arrayed and equipped military
formations. Special operations forces in the United States and elsewhere, on the other hand, have been specially and specifically trained, organized, and equipped to deal with terrorism situations.

The common wisdom that special forces are more suited to counterterrorism operations than conventional forces must be questioned, however, when one considers the nature of the military problem. A counter-value operation to destroy or severely damage some military or infrastructure asset of a country sponsoring or engaging in terrorism likely will argue for the use of conventional air and naval forces. In such a case, the issue is not one of exotic counterterrorism training, but rather an issue of suitability of assets to mission.

A similar problem arises when one considers the issue of denied area operations. Military planners must consider the issue of permissive versus nonpermissive environment. For instance, if a counterterrorist operation (whether for retaliation, elimination, or preemption) is being considered against a terrorist group located in the territory of another country, it is quite likely that US forces will not have ready access to the area on the ground, so as to stage a surgical punitive attack. Any country, friendly or otherwise, is not likely to take kindly to violent action by another state on its territory. Consider the situation in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley in late 1983 and since. The area, while ostensibly Lebanese territory, is controlled by Syria. When the United States and France undertook retaliatory attacks against alleged Shiite perpetrators of bombing attacks against the Multi-National Forces in Beirut, conventional air strikes were employed. While use of special operations forces undoubtedly was considered, the nonpermissive tactical environment made it too tough a problem to insure a successful operation.
and extraction. Even Israel, which certainly has easier access to the area on the ground, as well as trained and experienced special forces, prefers conventional airstrikes over special operations in the Bekaa. The operational imperatives tend to be achievement of surprise and insurance of minimal casualties to the attacking force.

Even for a nonpunitive operation such as a hostage rescue, the question of unopposed access if not always simple. In the case of the target being a transnational group not supported by the host country, access is problematical. Somalia and Malta have allowed foreign forces access to their territory for hostage rescue. Cyprus, Algeria, and Lebanon have not. If the target is a transnational group that is supported by the host country, either overtly or covertly, the problem is even worse. In a situation in which a counterterrorist action is contemplated against a national interstate actor (i.e., a sovereign country) that exercises credible military control over its own territory, the environment obviously will be nonpermissive.

It would seem, then, that a nonpermissive environment probably argues for stand-off conventional operations. A responding government always has the option, in theory, of either going into another country covertly with special forces (with attendant risk of discovery and failure) or of establishing opposed access with conventional forces and then attacking a terrorist target with conventional or unconventional forces (with uncertain chances of success and an almost certain domestic and international public and official outcry).

One of the greatest difficulties in supporting counterterrorist operations, as has been pointed out earlier, is that of adequate and timely intelligence. Let us consider this issue briefly in the context
of force suitability and force selection. Given the centrality of linkage in the political decision to undertake offensive action, forces to be employed require up-to-date and accurate information of the identity, location, and status of the terrorists. Providing that sort of information to conventional air forces is one sort of challenge. Providing the kind of exotic, minute, on-the-ground details required by special operations forces is quite another. Acquiring reliable and timely information of this sort (e.g., construction composition of buildings, types of locks, direction and extent of door swings, numbers and watch patterns of security personnel, source and type of power or other services, etc.) is nearly impossible, especially on short notice. This sort of information can only be gained by HUMINT sources; such sources rarely will already be in place, and they seldom can be developed on short notice. Unless the government is planning an action on a long-term basis, adequate and timely intelligence will usually be found wanting for special operations. Therefore, so long as the "hot-pursuit syndrome" is operative in retaliation strategy, special forces options seldom are going to be thought satisfactory.

A related issue is that of force readiness. With the exception of selected ready reaction forces (i.e., ready brigades of the 82nd Airborne Division), peacetime conventional ground forces are seldom prepared to go anywhere to do anything on very short notice. Air Force assets, other than strategic bombers, are generally too far away from potential targets to be employed directly on short notice. They require operating bases within a few hundred miles of the target, at least; and that probably requires host country or third country acquiescence. Naval combat forces (including naval air assets), while perhaps prepared
for immediate action in the sense of force readiness, may not be located anywhere near the target, unless prior threat warning or unrelated other circumstances happened to place them there. In general, then, special operations forces should be more ready to be deployed and committed to action in a counterterrorist role than conventional forces. As indicated above, however, a paucity of required intelligence may neutralize their effective employment. Therefore, constant combat readiness for any given terrorist contingency, even by redesignated and tailored special operations forces, simply may not be possible. The reported difficulties of getting such American forces into the Mediterranean region to deal with the Achille Lauro incident in late 1985 may be a reflection of this problem.8

CHAPTER VII

ENDNOTES


2. See ibid, p. 47, and Chapter II, pp 7-8 above.

3. See Headquarters, Department of the Army FM 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict, January 1981; and Special Warfare Center Field Circular 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict, June 1985, Part Three. Interestingly, FM 100-20 does not address terrorism or counterterrorism as a discrete phenomenon. There are only a handful of passing references in the context of insurgency and law enforcement issues. On the other hand, Field Circular 100-20 reflects some advance in the Army’s approach to the issue in the intervening four years. A separate and rather lengthy section of the document is devoted to terrorism, and its relevance to any level of conflict is acknowledged at the outset.

4. See Chapter III, pp. 43-44; and Chapter IV, pp. 49-54.

5. It might, of course, be necessary to neutralize a country’s air defense assets (a counter-value target) simply to get at a counter-force terrorist target.

7. Extensive aerial-refuelling is an option in order to extend the range of tactical aircraft, and could even be required for strategic bombers.

8. For offensive counterterrorist operations, there is a third type of force option. "Paramilitary" operations might be employed using CIA clandestine assets, with or without Military Service assistance. While this issue is relevant to this paper, I prefer to limit this discussion to use of military force. Suffice it to say that such operations, by their very nature, will be necessarily of a relatively small-scale nature. There might be also be a temptation to employ surrogate paramilitary organizations in a counterterrorist role, this option is fraught with practical and political pitfalls. See ibid., pp. 53-54.
CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

NATIONAL POLICY ISSUES

The purpose of this study has been to address the issues of policy and strategy raised for this country by the threat of terrorism, and to place them in proper perspective. The focus has been upon international terrorism. The intent has been to demythologize the issue by treating it as an element within the range of traditional concerns of national politico-military strategy. I have attempted to clarify what I see as problems of definition and threat perceptions, as well as their policy and operational implications. The intent has been to bridge the gap between the theoretical and the practical issues involved.

The basic premise has been that the fundamental confusion within the US government over policy and operational definitions of terrorism have resulted in a lack of coherent response. In terms of national policy perspective, I have argued for the adoption of the Central Intelligence Agency's definition of terrorism:

the threat or use of violence for political purposes by individuals or groups, whether acting for, or in opposition to, established governmental authority, when such actions are intended to shock or intimidate a target group wider than the immediate victims.1
This definition has a number of advantages over others in use elsewhere in the government and among academic sources. It is neutral, unemotional, and nonideological. It therefore avoids the pitfalls of confusing the issue with perjorative terms such as "criminality" and "revolution." It also allows for more precise definition in both domestic and international settings.

For operational purposes, I have proposed a new typology for both domestic and international terrorism. The intent is to help intelligence analysts, military operators, and policy makers to better understand the threat phenomena in an effort to frame more effective counteractions to the threat. International terrorism I have subcategorized as "transnational," "state-supported," and "interstate." Domestic terrorism I have delineated as "state terrorism" and "particularistic terrorism." These operational definitions are intended to focus analysis upon the actor-target and patron-client relationships. They are at variance to some degree with commonly accepted and official definitions.

I have argued for a less rigid approach to terrorism as a conflict type. Terrorism is a phenomenon that cannot be characterized or compartmented easily and neatly on the traditional spectrum of conflict. It can occur throughout the range of unconventional warfare or low intensity conflict. In theory, it can occur in what has heretofore been viewed as an unlimited warfare context, if special weapons are ever involved. On the other hand, I have argued that terrorism is a distinct conflict type and should not be confused with politico-military situations that clearly have developed into insurgencies, civil wars,
and insurrections. To do so is to risk falling into an ideological approach to the problem, which is bound to confuse policy on both counts.

This paper has focused on three important aspects of the contributions of the Intelligence Community: threat definition, warning, and operational support. I have argued for closer involvement of the Intelligence Community in the threat definition process, in order to better support the policy-maker and the military establishment. General acceptance of the operational definitions proposed would facilitate that dialogue. I have suggested that the focus of the Intelligence Community should recognize more clearly the distinctly different requirements of "counterterrorism" and "antiterrorism." Counterintelligence organizations should concentrate upon the unique requirements and procedures of essentially defensive "antiterrorism," and foreign intelligence analytical resources should be focused upon policy and operational support of more offensively-oriented "counterterrorism." It should be remembered, too, that intelligence must provide the "smoking gun" required to support a retaliation policy. While improvements in, and enhanced concentration of, appropriate intelligence collection and analysis assets should allow for some degree of success in providing "strategic warning" in the context of a terrorism "campaign," little practical success can be anticipated in gaining "tactical warning" in other than the most fortuitous circumstances. This is especially true in the case of isolated incidents or the start of a new (or not yet recognized) campaign. Widened international arrangements for exchange of intelligence are desirable and possible, but they will be constrained by differing
national political perspectives on the problem. Further, intelligence cooperation cannot be transferred readily into operational cooperation against terrorists for the same reasons.

I have argued that how a nation defines terrorism will guide the manner in which it responds to the problem. A "soft-line" approach results from either a predisposed ideological identification with terrorist goals or a desire to avoid involvement or responsibility. A "hard-line" policy response requires not only a clear view of the threat, but also considerable governmental and popular commitment to offensive counteraction. These criteria are particularly difficult to achieve in a democracy. A typology of strategic response options has been suggested. I have proposed that the United States to date has resorted to a defensive (essentially target hardening or target denial) strategy, as well as "posturing" and "crisis management," in dealing with terrorist actions. Such an approach has not, and cannot, provide adequate solutions to the problem. Despite considerable rhetoric and some organizational tinkering, the government has not been able to frame, or at least demonstrate, an offensive strategy. While effective defensive measures can contribute to "deterrence," I have argued that the government must develop and implement a range of offensive measures, if there is any hope of achieving true deterrence against terrorism. Those offensive measures were identified as: "retaliation," "elimination," and "preemption." Preemption, while the most difficult to achieve and support, represents the apex of counterterrorism strategy. Considerable political and operational costs and risks are also associated with such a policy, however. The most obvious risk is that of counter-retaliation and escalation. An
offensive strategy requires a long-haul commitment to a counteraction campaign."

Implementation of an offensive counterterrorism strategy requires the use of military power. Many commentators have strongly held views that military force should only be employed as a last resort, if for no other reason than to ensure popular domestic support. I have suggested that defensive measures have not worked, and that posturing and crisis management cannot be effective in the long run. The United States is approaching a threshold, at which point effective offensive power must be used if deterrence is to be achieved.

As with more traditional modes of warfare, application of military power can be against "counter-force" or "counter-value" targets. The propriety of these tactics will depend in large measure on the identity and nature of the terrorist actor. Both are difficult to employ against independent or semiautonomous groups. Either can be dangerous when applied to state actors or state supporters. Both conventional and special operations forces have a role to play in offensive counterterrorism actions. While special operations forces would seem to be best suited to the counterterrorism role, the nature of the problem will more likely dictate use of conventional forces. Denied area operations likely will preclude the use of special operations forces, requiring the use of conventional air and naval assets in a stand-off role. On the other hand, only specially trained units are appropriate in dealing with hostage-taking or barrier situations.

Neither conventional nor special operations forces are likely to be "ready," in any sense of being instantaneously employed in a "hot pursuit retaliation" role. An "elimination" strategy is the only one
which retains totally offensive options, thus allowing the nation to strike at the place and time of our choosing. Abandonment of the "hot pursuit" mentality would give counterterrorism more flexibility for retaliation. "Preemption," in the pure sense, is extremely difficult to achieve, because it is tied to explicit warning. Nonetheless, "deterrence" is the ultimate national goal.

ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES

I have addressed the issue of governmental response to terrorism from the organizational perspective on three levels: policy making, intelligence support, and military support. On the national policy making level, little of a strictly organizational nature needs to be done. The national decisionmaking structure has been sensitized to an adequate degree to the seriousness of the threat. It should not be overdone. All that is required is to ensure that the decisionmaking chain of command is streamlined, so that those bureaucratic entities essential to effective action are directly involved, and those ancillary to the problem are prepared to support as required. Those organizations with nothing tangible or meaningful to provide should be isolated from the problem for security and efficiency.

Primary responsibility for coordination of Executive programs is vested, properly, in the National Security Council's Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism, chaired by the State Department Director of the Office of Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning. Appropriate elements of the Departments of Defense, Energy, Treasury, and Transportation are represented, as are the CIA, NSC, FBI, and the Office of the Vice President. Necessary Congressional involvement and coordination in
the issue is probably best ensured by minor changes in the organization and orientation of the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence. Additional committees are not needed. Nonetheless, Congressional support for an aggressive national strategy is essential.

Within the Intelligence Community, a proper allocation of responsibility needs to be drawn between the positive intelligence and counterintelligence functions. The latter should concentrate upon antiterrorism; the former should be focused more effectively upon counterterrorism. At the national level, these realignments are either established or underway in the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. The National Security Agency can and will respond as required, given the legal parameters currently in effect. Aside from the unending demand for enhanced collection input, the principal shortcoming at this time is the technical means to provide timely operational intelligence to counteraction forces. This primarily involves improved methods of secure crisis management intelligence support communications from Washington to the military commands and operational forces. The difficulty among intelligence organizations is within the Military Services. I have suggested that a serious reexamination of the Army's organization, doctrinal, and procedural approach to terrorism and counteraction needs to be undertaken.

On the military operational level, progress has been made in recent years. The organization of the special operations forces has been aligned so as to attempt to address more effectively the terrorism problem on a joint service basis. The streamlining of the chain of command, as evidenced by the creation of the Joint Special Operations Agency (JSOA), is proper. JSOA is the executive agent for planning and
direction of service special operations forces for counterterrorism, as well as other missions. It has a direct line through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the National Command Authority. 5

The problem is one of timeliness of response. Plans reportedly are underway to preposition elements of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in geographical areas of highest threat, rather than in a central location in the United States, so as to decrease on-site response time in the event of terrorist actions. 6 A small team in each theatre may be appropriate as a start, with special concentration of another element in the Mediterranean area under EUCOM control, given the number of incidents arising in this area in recent years. The challenge for these prepositioned elements is not only achievement of effective short reaction times, but the provision of timely and adequate operational communications, logistics, and intelligence support to the forces. Streamlined national-level command-and-control of these dispersed forces will be a problem, however.

Plans have been explored to unify the various service special operations forces into a Defense Special Operations Agency, perhaps under a civilian chief. 7 This is unnecessary, and certainly would be counterproductive. The Military Services are required to man, train, equip, and support their special operations forces. Furthermore, creation of a rival paramilitary organization would create damaging distrust and competition within the Defense Establishment. Service special operations forces have several unconventional warfare responsibilities besides counterterrorism. Many of these missions are in support of conventional forces. Separating these forces from their parent services would only damage these operational relationships.
I have suggested, however, that conventional forces likely will have a prominent role in counterterrorism actions. The challenge for the Military Establishment is how to streamline the mechanisms for employment of conventional forces in such contingencies. As discussed earlier in this paper, conventional land, sea, and air forces required for use in situations characterized by severely time-constrained planning, deployment, and employment conditions will not likely be adequately prepared or positioned. There may be no good answer to this problem. If special operations forces deployment and reaction times are improved to deal with crisis reaction problems, as well as retaliation and preemptive requirements when they are able, use of conventional forces for retaliation and elimination simply may have to be on a less time-sensitive basis. I advocated a long-haul approach to counterterrorism campaigns; this may argue for reducing the crisis dimensions of counteraction when conventional forces are determined to be the appropriate response mechanism. The problem of using conventional forces in a time-sensitive preemptive role, however, would not be solved.

IS TERRORISM A STRATEGIC THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES?

A key issue for analysts and policy makers on the subject of terrorism is whether or not the phenomenon presents a strategic threat to the security of the country. The answer is: no, or not yet. It is not likely to become so, unless a serious terrorism campaign is mounted within the United States or unless a major ally, such as Britain, Germany, Italy, or Japan is strategically threatened by terrorist action. The possibility of such an event does not seem likely at the
present time, although Italy was challenged severely by the Red Brigade threat several years ago. Some commentators on the future of terrorism assert that it surely will be directed at targets within the United States, and that the threat will become more lethal. If these prognoses are correct, all things being equal, I suggest that attainment of an effective and credible offensive deterrence strategy is all the more imperative.

To decide that terrorism is not a strategic, or survival, issue for the country is not to denigrate the issue. It is a significant problem, probably even a vital one in certain cases. The decisionmaker will be in a quandary, however, as to whether to make terrorism an issue of "high policy" or "low policy." I would argue that the policy maker can do either, and the approach probably will depend upon the intensity of the threat, or at least the real or perceived intensity of the damage, in any given time period. The government's reaction apparently also will depend on what other significant issues might be involved. For instance, the Administration has chosen to downplay well-documented Syrian involvement in state-supported and interstate terrorism, presumably because Syria is perceived to be important in the Middle East peace process. On the other hand, Libya is loudly and frequently blamed, regardless of the quality of the evidence in some cases, for involvement in such actions, in part because Libyan adventurism on other fronts is politically objectionable.

The current administration, in general, has chosen to characterize terrorism in an extremely broad and ideological fashion. The issue has been raised, incorrectly I think, to one of East-West conflict. To do so tends to confuse political issues and raise high expectations, both
within the government and the public. To invoke high policy concerns and associated emotions requires that the government act accordingly. To raise an issue, particularly a threat issue as emotive as terrorism, to such a level of public political conscience requires that the government's actions are in consonance with its rhetoric. I would suggest that it is bad politics to raise public consciousness, concern, and expectations over emotive issues such as terrorism and counterterrorism, and then decide that the problem is too tough. The terrorism problem is not going to be "solved," regardless of policy, procedural, and organizational improvements, because of the basic nature of the phenomenon. I have attempted to provide some thoughts on how the government can "cope" more effectively with these issues.

CHAPTER VIII

ENDNOTES


2. See Postscript.

3. I do not wish to imply that the government is unaware of these issues. In April 1983, the President signed National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 138, which endorses the principle of preemptive, as well as retaliatory, action. For an unclassified discussion of NSDD 138, see COL James B. Motley, "Terrorist Warfare: A Reassessment," Military Review, June 1985, pp. 51-51.


5. Ibid., p. 61.

7. Wilson, *ibid.*

CHAPTER IX

POSTSCRIPT

As this monograph goes to press, events are transpiring that bear directly on the subject of terrorism, American perceptions of the challenge presented by terrorism, and the manifestations of a search for national strategy to respond to the threat. On 5 April 1986, a West Berlin discoteque frequented by American military personnel was bombed, causing the deaths of one American and a Turkish national, as well as the wounding of scores of people, many of them American. On 14 April, American air and naval air forces conducted reprisal air attacks on a number of military and alleged terrorist-related facilities in and around Tripoli and Banghazl, Libya. The American Government claimed to have incontrovertible evidence of Libyan Government responsibility in the planning, direction, and conduct of the Berlin attack on American personnel and interests.

The information cut-off date for research on this paper was mid-March 1986. The substantive research began in October 1985, and most of the writing and drawing of conclusions and recommendations was accomplished during the period November 1985 through February 1986. While following recent and ongoing events with considerable interest, I
have chosen not to update the paper with specific references to these latest occurrences.

I find nothing thus far in public information to contradict any major finding in the paper. Indeed, key elements of the foregoing presentation seem to be borne out by current events. Libya was discovered to have planned and conducted an act of international terrorism of what I call the "interstate" variety, and is alleged to be planning several others. The United States exhibits all the indications of having crossed the threshold predicted, moving beyond the defensive, posturing, and crisis management stages. A deliberately-planned offensive "retaliatory" counterterrorism attack was mounted, after careful sifting of information yielded intelligence analysis of clear "linkage" to the Libyan Government.

Intelligence cooperation undoubtedly was undertaken with allied and friendly governments concerning Libyan activities in Europe. While intelligence cooperation was forthcoming, even minimal operational cooperation was not achieved, except for British approval for the use of a base by American aircraft stationed there in a NATO role. France and Spain would not grant overflight of their territory to facilitate the mission, thus complicating American military mission planning and execution. Considerable public criticism is being voiced by European governments, opposition parties, and publics.

Conventional air force, naval air forces, and command-and-control assets were used, undoubtedly because of the tactical difficulty of getting at the Libyan mainland. It is not known if the planning process considered use of special operations forces; but the situation as it is known mirrors that posited in Chapter VII concerning the difficulty of
using special forces in such a tactical environment. Both "counter-force" and "counter-value" targets were stuck, the latter probably to suppress enemy air and air defense threats to facilitate the attack on the former. High priority was given to minimizing collateral damage.

While the current action matches that suggested in the paper to a gratifying degree, a single operation does not constitute a trend. It is obvious from Libya's alleged overt and covert reactions (the former involving an attack on an American facility located on an Italian island in the Mediterranean; the latter calling for further terrorist attacks on American and British interests) that the issue is not finished. It remains to be seen whether the American Government is prepared to continue the pressure for the long-haul. The Administration says that it is.

Further, having read correctly the situation regarding Libyan conduct and sponsorship of terrorism, the Administration has yet to demonstrate that it has gotten beyond an ideological approach to the overall issue. Published Defense Department guidance, much less US Army doctrine, has not yet changed. The need for definitional clarity, governmental unity of effort, and doctrinal development remains.
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