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STUDENT REPORT

GUATEMALA, A TROUBLED CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRY

MAJOR WALTER DUANE WOOD

“insights into tomorrow”

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REPORT NUMBER 86-2770
TITLE GUATEMALA, A TROUBLED CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRY

AUTHOR(S) MAJOR WALTER DUANE WOOD, USAF

FACULTY ADVISOR MAJ. CHARLES F. HOLSEN, ACSC/EDCM

SPONSOR MAJ. LLOYD MANSFIELD, USAFSOS/EDIL

Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment of requirements for graduation.

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
AIR UNIVERSITY
MAXWELL AFB, AL 36112
Guatemala is a Central American country which has been the recipient of U.S. involvement in its internal political affairs since 1954. It is also a country which is believed by many in the U.S. to be of vital strategic importance to the U.S. This study evaluates the U.S. involvement in Guatemala, starting with the CIA in 1954, to the present. It examines the influence of Marxist guerrillas in Guatemala and their potential for coming to power. In addition it evaluates the strategic importance of Guatemala to the U.S. and provides associated foreign policy recommendations to insure that Guatemala remains a friend of the U.S.
Guatemala is a Central American country which has a dual history. To the average American, it is of little or no importance to the U.S. However, it is also a country which has seen the direct involvement of the U.S. government in its internal politics since 1954. This report examines the history of that involvement, beginning with the CIA-sponsored coup of the freely elected government of President Jacobo Arbenz in 1954. It looks at the influencing factors for that intervention, such as Guatemala's economic value to a major U.S. company, and the influence (albeit small) of the communists in the Arbenz government. The report also examines why Guatemala is of strategic importance to the U.S. in the overall balance of world power. In addition, the influences the Marxist guerrilla movement has had and will potentially have on Guatemala is addressed. The report concludes with recommendations for U.S. foreign policy actions with Guatemala.

The interrelationship and interdependence of the U.S. with other countries of the world, and particularly those in its own hemisphere, is of significant importance to the U.S. foreign policy development. It is a subject which behooves those in government to study. It is through this study and examination that hopefully greater insight can be gained about world affairs. The end result should then be greater stability in the unstable world in which we all live.

The author expresses sincere appreciation to Major Charles F. Holsen for his frequent guidance and to Major Lloyd Mansfield for his honest and beneficial critique. Their assistance proved invaluable in the development of this report.
Maj Walter D. Wood entered the Air Force in 1971, receiving his commission through the Reserve Officer Training Corps program at the University of Nebraska. Upon completing the Communications-Electronics Maintenance Officer School, he was assigned to the 1836 Electronics Installation Squadron at Wiesbaden AB, Germany. In that unit, he served as the Branch Chief of the Inside Plant and Outside Plant. He later functioned as the Digital European Backbone Project Officer, responsible for the upgrade of the DOD microwave system throughout northern Italy and southern Germany. His next unit of assignment was the Northern Communications area at Griffiss AFB, New York, where he was the Chief of the Installation Control Division. Following that, he held the position of Executive Officer to the Commander, Continental Communications Division. His most recent assignment prior to becoming a student at ACSC, was at Hurlburt Field, Florida, where he was the commander of the 2068 Information Systems Squadron.

Major Wood holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Nebraska, and a Master of Science degree in Business Administration from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. He has completed Squadron Officer School by correspondence, Air Command and Staff College by seminar, and National Security Management by correspondence.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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REPORT NUMBER 86-2770

AUTHOR(S) MAJOR WALTER D. WOOD, USAF

TITLE GUATEMALA, A TROUBLED CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRY

I. Purpose: To determine if the U.S. is deeply involved in Guatemala, to determine the strategic importance of Guatemala to the U.S., to determine if Guatemala has the potential to become another Central American Marxist state, and to develop recommendations for U.S. foreign policy with regards to Guatemala.

II. Problem: The U.S. has always felt that it has a vested interest in the countries of Latin America and the type of governments that governed those countries. That interest originated with the Monroe Doctrine and then evolved from its concern with the spread of communism after World War II. Consequently, the U.S. has attempted to influence what type of governments came into power in Guatemala in modern history. Part of this interest also stemmed from the U.S. economic concerns in Guatemala, and the perceived strategic location of Guatemala. To complicate the relationship of the U.S. and Guatemala, Marxist guerrilla movements have experienced various levels of influence since 1960. Those movements have hurt the Guatemalan economy and have also resulted in government reprisals against the people of Guatemala. Those government reprisals have taken the shape of human rights violations, which in turn influenced U.S. foreign policy actions with Guatemala. As Guatemala is an important Central American country, it is necessary to understand the past and present relationships and issues between it and the U.S. A better understanding should result in an improved future for the foreign policy relations between the two countries, and in turn enhance stability in the Western Hemisphere.
III. Data: The U.S. government has been involved in the internal politics of Guatemala for over three decades, starting with a Central Intelligence Agency-backed coup of the legally elected government of Jacobo Arbenz in 1954. The official rationale for the U.S. involvement was that Arbenz was placing some communists in his government and the U.S. was worried about a communist take-over of Guatemala. However, the land reforms being implemented by Arbenz which were affecting the large economic interests of the U.S.-based United Fruit Company also influenced the initiation of the coup. The result of the coup was over 30 years of oppressive military rule, and the rise of Marxist insurgencies in Guatemala. The U.S. provided massive amounts of military aid during the 1960s and early 1970s, as compared to other Latin American countries, under the premise that the aid was necessary to fight the spread of communism in Guatemala. During Jimmy Carter's term as President, human rights violations in Guatemala reached their peak and as a result, all U.S. military aid and sales to Guatemala were "officially" cut off. However, when Ronald Reagan became President, he attempted to persuade Congress to restore U.S. military aid and sales to Guatemala, meeting with limited success in the FY 85 budget. As the U.S. aid to Guatemala has had its peaks and valleys, so has been the success of Marxist guerrilla movements in Guatemala. The guerrilla movement began in 1960 and became very strong in the mid-1960s. However, through a combination of U.S. military advisors and a massive anti-guerrilla campaign on the part of the Guatemalan Army, the guerrilla movement had been put in complete disarray by 1969. It gained new strength in the mid-1970s to early 1980s, as it received logistical support from Nicaragua and Cuba. However, it was again significantly reduced in strength by an intensive Guatemalan Army anti-guerrilla campaign in 1982 to 83. In December 1985, Guatemala began a new chapter in its history. It elected its first civilian president in over 15 years and its first freely-elected president in over 30 years, Mr. Marco Vinicio Cerezo Cerevalo. Mr. Cerezo has publicly indicated his support for democracy, so his election was a welcome change from the past authoritarian military leaders of Guatemala.

IV. Conclusion: The U.S. has been involved in Guatemala for over 30 years, both covertly and overtly. That involvement was justified by the U.S. government on the basis of halting the spread of communism in the Western Hemisphere. U.S. economic interests in Guatemala also contributed to the U.S. involvement. Guatemala is of vital strategic importance to the U.S. in terms of the protection of the Caribbean sea lanes of communication, and its geographic proximity to the vast oil reserves of Mexico. Those two factors alone cause the U.S. government to be interested in Guatemala. It is also
important to include the intangible factor of the U.S.'s ability to influence the type of governments that come to power in the countries in its own backyard, the Western Hemisphere. Fortunately for the U.S., the most recent military leader held a free presidential election in December 1985, with the result being the election of Mr. Cerezo. Mr. Cerezo subsequently has publicly proclaimed his support for democracy in Guatemala and other Latin American countries. Therefore, the future for good U.S./Guatemala relations appears excellent. Although the Marxist guerrilla movement in Guatemala has in the past experienced peaks and valleys in its influence and military strength, it currently is not a powerful force, neither as a political nor a military entity. Consequently, it does not appear that it will endanger the potentially positive U.S./Guatemala foreign relations.

V. Recommendations: Based on its most recent history of economic problems (1979 to 1985), Guatemala is in dire need of economic assistance. Since it currently has the guerrilla movements under control, it does not need a large influx of military weapons into the country. What the U.S. should therefore do is provide economic aid and nonlethal military aid to Guatemala. It is also important for the U.S. to continue a constructive dialogue with Mr. Cerezo, to insure his country does rebound economically and in addition, becomes a strong democracy. A country that is not torn by economic strife and social discontent is one that's not ripe for exploitation and takeover by the communists. The stronger Mr. Cerezo can make his democratic government, with some assistance from the U.S. and other nations, the stronger Guatemala will be both in Central America, and the world arena. The end result will benefit the people of Guatemala and the people of the U.S.
Central America, the area south of Mexico, made up of the countries of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, is an area which in the past has been of little importance to the average U.S. citizen and many in U.S. government. "It has for years been overlooked by the U.S. public and policy makers alike, and has often been of more interest to editorial cartoonists than to editorial writers" (4:IV). However, with the advent of the Marxist Sandinistas coming to power in Nicaragua in 1979, and the large U.S. military involvement through foreign military sales (FMS) and aid which increased from $162.1 million from 1950 to 1979, to $372.7 million from 1980 to 1983, and the large joint military maneuvers conducted in Honduras (such as Big Pine I and II), the American public is now more cognizant of Central American affairs (21:5-7). Just why the U.S. is interested in Central America was best stated by Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger:

We look at Central America and the Caribbean with obvious military and strategic concerns:

- Nearly half of our foreign trade -- both imports and exports -- pass through the Caribbean sea lanes.
- About two-thirds of our imported crude oil transits these same routes.
- Were a war in Europe to occur, much of our resupply and reinforcements to NATO would flow from Gulf ports.
- Soviet combatants from Cuba and backed by the growing Cuban arsenal, could threaten to disrupt our Naval deployments throughout the Atlantic (32:3).

Most of the current focus on Central America in the U.S. news media has been on El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras. Very little has been published about Guatemala and its relationship to the security of the U.S. However, many believe that "Guatemala may be the most important country between Panama and Mexico. Its population of over 7 million is the largest in the region, its economy is the most powerful, and U.S. investment is the highest in the region -- about $221 million" (3:62). Guatemala is geographically situated so that it has access to both the Pacific Ocean and Caribbean, and thus is of vital strategic importance to the sea lanes of communication. It also has oil reserves of eight billion barrels, which are adjacent to the even richer 75 billion barrels of proven Mexican oil reserves. This makes Guatemala a very lucrative target for the Soviet Union and its satellite, Cuba (10:210).
The U.S. became involved with the politics of Guatemala, most notably starting in 1954 with a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)-backed coup of the Jacobo Arbenz Guzman government (1:13-17). Since then the U.S. has given aid to the ruling military governments of Guatemala under the auspices of fighting communism in Central America. The Guatemalan governments, in turn, have used their power and U.S. aid to not only fight Marxist guerrillas, but to also violate the human rights of Guatemalan citizens (1:ch.1,2,3,6,7). Those violations reached a peak during the Jimmy Carter administration which led to the elimination of all U.S. military aid to Guatemala during his term.

To gain a better understanding of the U.S./Guatemala relationship, it will be necessary to trace the evolution of U.S. involvement in Guatemala. Next the complex issues that gave rise to both the Marxist guerrilla insurgency and military rule over the past 30 years will be reviewed. Finally, the future trends of Guatemala will be explored by examining the outlook of a continued Marxist guerrilla insurgency and military rule, and what that might portend to U.S. vital interests and the likely responses/recommendations of the U.S. government. However, to better appreciate all those aspects of U.S./Guatemala relations, it will first be necessary to examine in greater detail, the people, socio-economic status, and economy of Guatemala.
Chapter Two

THE SETTING

PEOPLE

Guatemala has the largest population of all five Central American countries; in 1983, it stood at 7.7 million (35:1). This population is composed of Indians who are direct descendents of the Maya Indians, Ladinos, who are Westernized descendents of the Maya Indians, and Mestizos, who are of Spanish-Indian descent. The majority of the population is rural, residing primarily in a crescent-shaped area running from the northern border on the Pacific, along the coastal plains, and through Guatemala City to the Caribbean (35:3). The reason that part of Guatemala is the most populated is because it is the area of the most fertile land for food producing crops, coffee, and commercial agriculture.

Education in Guatemala is mandatory for 6 years, but as of September 1984, only 48% of the people were literate (35:1). This literacy rate has increased ten percent in the past 10 years, largely due to literacy campaigns implemented by the Guatemalan government (8:6). However, the largest problem still exists with the Indians, because of the remote highland areas in which many of them live.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS

Guatemala is a land of many poor and very few rich people. The per capita income in 1984 was only $1,185 (35:1). However, "...of the nation's entire population, 65 percent earn less than $2,400, while only 3 percent are near or over the $12 thousand mark ... International observers of Guatemala's social scene suggest that about one-third of the nation lives in extreme poverty" (8:5). The highland Indians are the worst off as their annual income is less that $200, and the lowest 20 percent of the population earns less that 10 percent of the per capita income (37:15). The land distribution is even worse, as only 3 percent of the farm families own 80 percent of the land. In fact, 90 percent of the rural populace live on plots of land that are too small to support a family, and 25 percent of the rural families don't even own land (35:14-15). In terms of absolute wealth, 5 percent of the population earns about one-third of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). That is the most uneven distribution of wealth in Central America (37:15).

Unemployment and under-employment are also problems in Guatemala. The 1983 figures indicated that 45 to 50 percent of the work force was affected by
unemployment and under-employment (37:15). The causes of that can be attributed to the poor state of the Guatemalan economy and to the Marxist guerrillas in Guatemala.

THE ECONOMY

The economic history of Guatemala is one of peaks and valleys. During the 1950s, 60s and 70s, Guatemala experienced continued economic growth. In fact, "the average annual growth rate was 4 percent during the 1950s, and 6 to 7 percent during the 1960s and 1970s. During this period Guatemala greatly expanded commercial agriculture for export, created a light industrial base oriented towards the domestic and Central American markets, and added enormously to the infrastructure and capital stock of the country" (34:4). The economy of Guatemala, in that 30 year period, was the largest in all of Central America (34:4).

After the 30 years of economic prosperity, Guatemala began its economic downturn in 1980, primarily because of lack of foreign exchange (34:4). "Scarcity of foreign exchange has become the chief constraint on the economy. Four factors contributed to the loss of the foreign exchange earnings and recession: (1) loss of foreign markets for Guatemala's agriculture mainstays and for manufactured exports; (2) large fiscal deficits; (3) the guerrilla insurgency; and (4) inability to borrow in private capital markets" (34:3). To appreciate this economic downturn and lack of foreign exchange, it is necessary to examine in further detail the four contributing factors.

The loss of the foreign markets can be traced back to the world recession in the early 1980's. Coffee, cotton, and sugar are Guatemala's agriculture mainstays, and the 1981-1982 earnings for these three commodities was down 21 percent from the previous 3 years' average. On the industrial side, Central America is the primary customer for the bulk of the manufactured products. After 1980, the Central American Common Market (CACM) members began to tighten up on imports to protect their own industries, due to the world recession. That action hurt Guatemala, causing 1983 exports to the region to be 27 percent below the 1980 peak (34:6). The combination of all those factors created large fiscal deficits for Guatemala. In addition to loss of foreign markets, the guerrilla insurgency has also impaired the economy.

The guerrilla insurgency has had a negative impact on Guatemala, because it has inflicted severe harm on the tourist industry and has even dried up private investment (8:4). In 1979, tourism brought in $81.6 million in foreign exchange; however, that dropped to only $10 million in 1984 (9:100). Private investment decreased because of the instability of the country, and the perceived danger by foreign concerns of living and working in the country (34:2). Private investment has further been limited by Guatemala's inability to borrow from banks in other countries.

Guatemala's inability to borrow from foreign financial institutions has certainly crippled its economy. "Since August 1981, Guatemala has received only one significant credit from private sources ... an insured medium-term
trade credit of $75 million from Trafco/AIG Political Risk, Inc./Saloman Bros. completed in July 1983” (34:7). Normally, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is looked upon in world financial circles as the "court of last resort" for a country to borrow money from. However, the IMF has, since 1984, suspended all agreements with Guatemala (33:44). The IMF took that action because it was dissatisfied with the actions Guatemala was taking to correct its financial problems (33:44).

Those four factors, coupled to the world wide recession contributed to Guatemala's poor economic health. Prospects for improvement are not good, considering the GDP decline from 1980 to 1983, with it being two percent in 1983 (35:1). The Guatemalan government has taken some internal actions to resolve the dilemma, but more intensive efforts are required on their part (33:44). The "court of last resort," the IMF, has not given up completely on Guatemala because "... on January 28, 1985, the IMF conducted a preliminary review of the economic situation within Guatemala, but as yet, new agreements have not been reached" (33:44). The agreements reached between Guatemala and the IMF will certainly help determine Guatemala's economic future.

Guatemala is definitely a country of contrasts. As shown, its wealth and land ownership distribution is certainly skewed and less than 50% of its population are literate. In addition, its economy has been one of peaks and valleys. Why then would the U.S. even be interested in such a country? To answer that question, it is necessary to go back to 1954 and examine the United Fruit Company/CIA actions which caused the U.S. to become directly involved in the internal politics of Guatemala.
Chapter Three

HISTORY OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN GUATEMALA

GUATEMALA AND THE CIA - 1954

A CIA-sponsored coup in 1954 of the Guatemalan government, headed by Jacobo Arbenz, is a subject about which most Americans know little. However, that U.S. involvement in Guatemala was probably the last success in a long defense of the Monroe Doctrine in its purest form (2:6). The reasons for the involvement of the CIA-backed coup can be linked directly to a U.S. commercial company, the United Fruit Company (UFCO) which was -- and still is -- the largest single landowner in Guatemala (3:63).

The UFCO had been operating in Guatemala since 1904. It had built a huge empire on the production of bananas. By 1954 it owned about 550,000 acres on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, the only railroad, and the hydroelectric power plant which provided energy to the majority of Guatemala's populace. The UFCO was so powerful, it has been described as a country and government unto itself (7:65-75). For almost 50 years, the UFCO had free reign in its operation in Guatemala, until Jacobo Arbenz was elected President and began to implement his land reform program.

On 13 November 1950, Jacobo Arbenz became only the second president elected under a democratic constitution in Guatemala's 133 years of independence (7:9,46). "He was a nationalist hoping to transform an oligarchic society... he was determined to carry through the reform program on which he had been elected" (7:49). He wanted to transform Guatemala into a modern capitalist state, and to wrest control of the economy from the U.S. corporations controlling it. His strategy was to limit the power of foreign companies through direct competition rather than through nationalization (7:53).

Arbenz's method of achieving the competition was to construct: (1) a seaport on the Atlantic coast to compete with UFCO's Puerto Barrios; (2) a highway to the Atlantic as an alternate route to the UFCO railroad; and (3) a state-run hydroelectric plant to offer cheaper energy than the U.S.-controlled electricity monopoly (7:53). Those changes were accepted by the foreign companies in Guatemala; however, Arbenz's program of agrarian reform was not accepted by the UFCO, and the large landowners in Guatemala. It marked a turning point for Guatemala and could be considered as the reason for the future downfall of Arbenz's presidency because it put him in a confrontation with the UFCO (7:54).

When Arbenz took office, only 2 1/2 percent of the population owned 70
percent of the arable land in Guatemala; therefore, he considered land reform necessary (3:63). Under his agrarian reform, the government was allowed to expropriate only uncultivated portions of large plantations. Farms smaller than 223 acres were not subject to the law nor were most farms up to 670 acres. The value of the land that was expropriated was to be determined from its declared taxable worth as of May 1952. The combination of two factors: (1) the land value determination; and (2) the fact that uncultivated lands would be expropriated, greatly disturbed the UFCO (7:54).

Arbenz's agrarian reform program affected 387,000 unused UFCO acres. Not only did the large amount of acreage outrage the UFCO, they also disagreed on the proposed compensation. Arbenz proposed paying the UFCO $3/acre, as that was the declared tax value, but the UFCO wanted $75/acre (1:14-15). The UFCO took its case to the U.S. State Department. At that time the Secretary of State was John Foster Dulles, who had strong ties to the UFCO (7:76). He then began to try to pressure Guatemala into paying the UFCO what they wanted for their land. When Guatemala refused, forces in the U.S. State Department and CIA began examining ways to overthrow President Arbenz.

The fact that Arbenz allowed the Communist party to exist in Guatemala and that he appointed a few communists to government positions helped raise the fear that Guatemala would become a communist-controlled country. John Foster Dulles was quoted as saying Arbenz was instituting "a communist-type reign of terror" (3:63). Shortly thereafter, the U.S. cut off aid to Guatemala, and with the approval of President Eisenhower, began planning the overthrow of President Arbenz (1:15).

On 17 June 1954, the CIA-sponsored invasion of Guatemala began (7:1). It was code-named "operation success." The CIA's Flying Tigers began flying C-47 and P-47 sorties over Guatemala City and other main cities in Guatemala. They even strafed the President's Palace in Guatemala City. By 27 June, President Arbenz was forced to surrender lacking any support from his army and their refusal to distribute arms to the Guatemala militia. Thus, the CIA with an army of less than 300 men, had toppled a legally-elected government (2:6).

The CIA hand-picked successor to Arbenz was Colonel Castillo Armas. He was an anti-communist who completely changed all the programs implemented by Arbenz. He canceled the land reforms, smashed labor unions, and eliminated much of the communist-influence in the country (3:64). However, it is not the changes implemented by Col. Armas that are most remembered nor most important about his era in Guatemalan history. What is most important is the perception throughout Latin America that the CIA-sponsored coup was seen as one more example of the U.S. using its power to control the politics of smaller countries (3:64). Arbenz's downfall fortified reactionary forces in Central America and insured that future movements for social change would be more extreme and more anti-American than in the past (7:203).
EVOLUTION OF GUATEMALA: 1954 - 1978

The coup of 1954 reinstated the rule of the army in Guatemala which was to endure for 31 years. Col. Armas lasted only 3 years as President, then was assassinated in 1957. However, in the power struggle that followed, General Ydigoras Fuentes came to the fore and was President until 1963 (2:6). It was during the regime of Gen. Ydigoras that U.S. Army Green Beret units introduced civic action programs in the wake of the Cuban revolution. The Green Berets were also used to teach the local forces to be more effective against the guerrillas. In addition, the CIA used Guatemala as a training ground for the anti-Castro Cuban exiles in their preparation for the Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961 (1:19).

The U.S. looked upon Guatemala as its showcase in Latin America and thus proceeded to provide support in terms of U.S. FMS and U.S. military aid. From 1950 to 1979 it totaled $60.5 million, which was more than double that provided to any other country in Central America during the same time period (21:5). That figure included the training of 3,073 cadets in U.S. military training facilities. All that U.S. assistance helped to build the most effective military machine in Central America, in a country which was continuously led by the military, not civilians (1:20).

From 1963 until 1978, army generals were in command of the Guatemalan government, and they continuously received financial and military assistance from the U.S. That support was provided on the premise that it was required to fight the spread of communism in Central America. However, there were evidences of human rights violations during this period. It was during the regime of General Romero Lucas Garcia (1978 to 1982) that the human rights violations came to the forefront. As a result, President Jimmy Carter implemented drastic changes in the U.S. foreign policy with Guatemala (1:26-55).

GUATEMALA AND THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION

Prior to Jimmy Carter being elected President in 1976, human rights, or lack thereof, was becoming a severe problem for the Guatemalan populace. From 1968 to 1970, some 2,800 individuals died as a result of right-wing death squads. If that number was compared to the U.S., it would be as if the U.S. had in 3 years lost over 130,000 leading lawyers, trade unionists, and political workers (2:10). The problem with human rights violations continued throughout the 1970s. From 1971 to 1973, there were estimates that from 3,500 to 15,000 people were killed by government troops (7:249). Concern began to mount in the U.S. Congress. In 1976, Congressional hearings were held on the state of human rights in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. In 1977, Jimmy Carter began his term as president and that is where the U.S. and Guatemala began to part ways (2:10).

Jimmy Carter was a strong supporter of basic human rights, so shortly after his inauguration, the U.S. State Department officially stated its condemnation of Guatemala in this area. Rather than allow itself to be forced to moderate
its position, Guatemala announced it would not accept any more U.S. military equipment. Congress then retaliated by passing the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1978, that "officially" cut off further military sales to Guatemala until the human rights situation improved (2:10).

That cutoff of American military sales was not as all-inclusive as it may have appeared. During the last 2 years of Carter's term, more than $34 million worth of U.S. military equipment found its way to Guatemala through the Department of Commerce and U.S. private companies (1:147). The military sales ban did not apply to deliveries of military equipments from previous years' agreements. It also did not apply to new cash sales by private U.S. companies even though those companies required a State Department license. Through that loophole, thousands of small arms, ammunition, military vehicles, and communications equipment were sold to Guatemala (21:13). The largest amount of equipment sold was a $20 million order for two Lockhead L-110-20 transport planes, updated versions of the Hercules paratroop carrier (1:147). All of those sales further showed the dichotomy in Jimmy Carter's human rights policies and its effect on Guatemala (21:13).

The official condemnation of Guatemala did nothing to force the Lucas government to change its policy on human rights of the people of Guatemala. In fact, terror began to escalate especially in 1980. Corpses began to appear at the rate of ten a day, disfigured by torture, strewn along roadsides, in storm drains, and under viaducts. By 1981, the body count during Lucas' term of office had reached 6,000 (1:44). That devastation of human life still had a limited effect on the real U.S. relations with Guatemala.

While the Jimmy Carter administration publicly condemned Guatemala, the continued sales of military arms showed that not everyone within the Executive Branch agreed with Carter's position, namely the State Department. The small arms, ammunition, and vehicles could not have been sold to Guatemala without the tacit approval of the State Department. It also appeared U.S. military advisors were never withdrawn from Guatemala during the sales ban (2:10-11). So, even though Jimmy Carter publicly condemned Guatemala, his administration indirectly and unofficially continued to support the ruling military in Guatemala. What Jimmy Carter did succeed in doing was to alienate Guatemala through his public condemnation of it, and because of that, Guatemalans looked forward to the "changing of the command," and Ronald Reagan assuming the Presidency of the U.S.

RONALD REAGAN AND GUATEMALA

If Ronald Reagan was elected in 1980, Guatemalans felt they would have a friend in the White House to help them fight the left-wing rebels in Guatemala. During the pre-election period of 1980, Reagan met with an envoy of "Amigos del Pais", a right-wing Guatemalan organization comparable to the John Birch Society. In that meeting, Reagan said "Hang on 'til we get there. We'll get in and then we'll give you help. Don't give up. Stay there and fight. I'll help you as soon as I get in" (1:147). Reagan based his view on advise he was receiving from his foreign policy counselors. They were concerned about the
growing number of left-wing regimes in the Caribbean. They attributed their assessment to the weakness of the Carter Administration and the strength of the international communist conspiracy. They did not want to see Guatemala become ruled by a left-wing government (2:12).

When Reagan took office in 1981, he tried to persuade Congress that the U.S. should normalize relations with Guatemala. However, Congressional resistance held. On 31 July 1981, joint hearings of the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs and that of the Human Rights and International Organizations confirmed that the situation in Guatemala was just as wretched as ever (1:148). However, the Reagan administration had already begun to sidestep Congress in continuing the flow of military equipment to Guatemala (1:151).

In June 1981, fifty 2 1/2 ton trucks and 100 jeeps were sold to Guatemala, through the Department of Commerce, under the guise of being "dual-use" -- military and civilian -- equipment. To make this $3.2 million sale possible, the Commerce Department removed the items from a list of equipment forbidden for gross human rights violators and included them in a newly created list of items permitted for "Control of Regional Stability" (21:13). In addition to those vehicles, more than 20 Bell "civilian" helicopters (at a cost of over $20 million) were sold to Guatemala from 1980 to 1982. Some of those sales had official approval by the Department of Commerce in 1980 and 1981. Many of the helicopters were fitted with machine guns and other weapons for counterinsurgency purposes and were also used to transport troops to fight guerrillas. In addition, from 11 January to 31 March 1982, over 20 Guatemalan Air Force pilots received flight training at Bell Company facilities in Fort Worth, Texas. During this continual shipment of arms, the Reagan administration was trying to convince Guatemala to alter its human rights policies (1:151-152; 21:13).

Envoys of Reagan tried to persuade the Lucas regime to come to a four-point understanding, under which the U.S. would resume military equipment deliveries, restart Pentagon training for the police and security forces, stay silent on death squad killings, and hold open the possibility of direct U.S. troop involvement in an emergency. However, Lucas refused to agree to any such arrangement, and in doing so completely frustrated the Reagan administration (1:148). What helped turn the tide in favor of the Reagan administration was a coup of the Lucas regime on 23 March 1982 by General Jose Efrain Rios Montt (8:13).

The Rios Montt regime's assumption of power provided the Reagan administration with another opportunity to persuade Congress to renew military aid to Guatemala. The Reagan defense of Rios Montt rested on three aspects: (1) the moral image of anti-corruption and evangelism of Rios Montt; (2) the promise of a democratic apparatus; and (3) the removal of the worst urban human rights violations (1:150). Congress, however, did not acquiesce to administration demands until the end of 1982. At that time, persuaded by the military successes of Rios Montt against the guerrillas, Congress began to relent. In January 1983, the State Department was able to push a request through the House Foreign Affairs Committee for $6.3 million worth of military equipment. The package contained communications equipment, and spare parts for
UH-1H helicopters, A-37 planes, C-47 transport planes, and vehicles. The sale was not finalized until January 1984 because of Guatemala's lack of funds. However, it was extremely significant because it marked the end of an official 5 year ban on all U.S. military sales to Guatemala (1:151; 21:13).

The Reagan Administration continued its quest to renew military aid to Guatemala in 1983, when the Rios Montt regime was overthrown by General Oscar Humberto Mejia on 8 August 1983 (2:15). However, it was not until October 1984, that the Reagan Administration succeeded in getting $300,000 in military aid approved for FY 85. This was the first time in 7 years that Guatemala had received U.S. military aid. The $300,000 was allocated for training of Guatemalan military officers at U.S. facilities. Congressional aides stated the aid was approved as a token of encouragement to Guatemala as a result of its 1 July 84 elections for a constituent assembly. When Gen. Mejia first took office, he promised to hold free elections, and the 1 July 84 election was the first honest election to have been held in Guatemala in almost 30 years (13:12A).

The Reagan Administration continued to push its support for Guatemala during 1985. On 20 Feb 1985, Mr George A. Fauriol, Senior Fellow, Caribbean Basin Studies, Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, testified on behalf of the Reagan Administration before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs. In that hearing, Mr Fauriol stated "The cornerstone of U.S. policy in Central America has been the promotion of economic and political stability. It is clear that Guatemala is on the road to democracy; U.S. economic and security assistance should not be denied as this nation attempts major structural reforms through a political opening, but instead it should be encouraged by the United States" (33:45). As further evidence of Reagan's support for Guatemala, in the FY 86 budget he requested $77 million in economic aid and $10.3 million in military aid. Of the $10.3 million in military aid, $10.0 was FMS credit and $300,000 was for use in training Guatemalan military officers at U.S. bases, matching what was appropriated in FY 85 for training of Guatemalan officers (13:12A; 36:Appendix C).

The U.S. has been involved with Guatemala both overtly and covertly for over 30 years. The reason behind this involvement was to stop the spread of Marxism in the Western Hemisphere. How the Marxist guerrilla movement in Guatemala evolved, what the current Marxist threat is in Guatemala, and what the most recent Guatemalan governments have been doing to combat the Marxist guerrillas is the next topic of examination.
Chapter Four

GUERRILLA WARFARE IN GUATEMALA

EVOLUTION OF GUATEMALAN GUERRILLAS: 1960 - 1975

Clandestine armed activity aimed at the overthrow of the Guatemalan government has a 26 year history. It has its beginning in an aborted military coup in November, 1960, by some army officers. The leader of the coup was Colonel Rafael Sessen Pereira, and his closest associates were 19 year-old Second Lieutenant Luis Turcios Lima and 22 year-old Lieutenant Mareo Antonio Yon Sosa. However, in only 4 days the coup failed, forcing leaders to flee to Honduras (1:62-65; 2:8).

In 1961, Turcios Lima and Yon Sosa returned to Guatemala. They then entered into an alliance with the Guatemalan communist party, known as the Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT). On 16 February 1962, Turcios Lima and Yon Sosa formed the first guerrilla front, naming it Alejandro de Leon November 13 Revolutionary Movement (MR-13), in honor of their comrade killed by the police in 1961. The formulation of MR-13 was later labeled as "the conscious beginning of guerrilla war in Guatemala" (5:138).

The MR-13 attempted to wage guerrilla warfare; however, they were ineffective largely due to their poor planning, poor strategic orientation, and a lack of organizational structures (6:55). In December 1962, a new guerrilla group called the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) emerged and it was a combination of the MR-13 and several other guerrilla movements. The FAR began to evolve into an effective organization. By 1966, it was estimated to consist of at least 6000 soldiers, posing a serious threat to the survival of Gen. Ydigaras' regime (1:63).

Concerned about the threat posed by the FAR, the U.S. sent U.S. Army Green Beret units to assist Guatemala in its fight against the FAR. The combination of U.S. military advisers and a massive anti-guerrilla campaign by the Guatemalan Army succeeded in reducing the FAR in 1969 to an organization that was in complete disarray. It was not until 1972 that the Guatemalan guerrillas began to become a force again (1:69; 2:9).

In 1972, a group of 16 guerrillas met in northwestern Guatemala, in a desolate area known as Ixcan. After long debates, they formed a new guerrilla organization called Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP). They developed a new strategy under the following three principles: (1) establish a guerrilla base and political infrastructure in a remote, but populated area; (2) involve the Indian population in the armed revolutionary struggle; and (3) pursue a second,
equally important "front" in the international community (7:18-19; 8:74-75). The EGP had no confrontation with the Guatemalan military for almost 3 years, instead, they concentrated their efforts on building support among the poor Indian and Ladino farmers of Ixcan (1:76). However, in 1975 the EGP initiated their first operation, by assassinating a wealthy landowner in Ixcan. That murder resulted (the next day) in the deployment of hundreds of government paratroops to the Ixcan region. That confrontation began the second chapter of guerrilla warfare in Guatemala (1:77).

GUERRILLA WARFARE: 1975 - 1982

The EGP gradually built up its power base through 1975 to 1980, and by 1980 was the largest and most powerful of all guerrilla organizations in Guatemala. By then, its political-military organizations were firmly entrenched on several regional fronts, and in more than half of the country's 22 departments, above all in the Indian highlands (1:103). In late 1980, the EGP was joined in the armed struggle by three other groups: (1) Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA); (2) the FAR; and (3) a dissident faction of the PGT. Together they formed a fighting force, the Guatemalan National Revolution Unity (URNG), estimated by the U.S. State Department as 3,500 active combatants, plus 10,000 organized in the Local Irregular Forces (FIL) and another 30,000-60,000 actively involved supporters (1:104). At times the guerrillas operated in columns of as many as 200, systematically attacking and destroying government municipalities, police stations, military outposts, and other symbols of public authority (37:21). However, the Guatemalan government was not the only recipient of guerrilla violence.

The guerrillas, on numerous occasions, directed their violence against Guatemala's civilian populace. On 2 December 1981, a group of guerrillas set fire to and destroyed an artisan shop and factory in Guatemala City. The result being that 200 Guatemalans were without a livelihood. They bombed civilian buses killing innocent passengers (8:30). The guerrillas also resorted to kidnappings, raising an estimated $40 million (18:108). On a national scale, the guerrillas have had a dramatic effect on the Guatemalan economy.

Tourism in the past had been the third-largest industry in Guatemala. However, as a result of the ongoing guerrilla threat, tourism suffered a 50% drop in earnings from 1980 to 1981. The cotton and coffee growers, the dynamos behind the country's remarkable economic growth in the 1960's, complained that the Guatemalan army couldn't protect them. The guerrillas used scorched-earth tactics to destroy stability and government control (18:113; 31:50). Even the capital city was affected in February of 1982, when within hours of an announced declaration of unity by the URNG, a series of bomb blasts almost blacked out Guatemala City (28:24). It was during that time period of increasing guerrilla activity, that evidence began to mount that the guerrillas were receiving assistance from sources outside of Guatemala.

Indisputable evidence began to mount throughout 1981 and 1982 confirming the guerrillas were receiving support from Cuba and Nicaragua. When the four
guerrilla groups met in late 1980 and formed the URNG, it was done in Managua, Nicaragua with Cuban officials and Nicaraguan Sandinistas present at the signing ceremony. The U.S. State Department obtained copies of the actual secret agreements which made clear the guerrilla groups considered themselves a revolutionary vanguard. Moreover, the document established Marxist-Leninism as the ideological parameter of the Guatemalan revolution. In the fall of 1981, the leadership of the four guerrilla organizations were called to Havana, Cuba to work further on developing effective unity (16:74). In the 4 March 1982 edition of Pravda, the Soviet Union praised the unifying action taking place in Havana. The Soviet newspaper went on to say that the guerrilla movement in Guatemala had found new strength through the unification action (4:111). However, the assistance provided by Cuba and Nicaragua was more than just a place to hold meetings and ideological support.

During 1981 and 1982, there was additional proof of Cuban and Nicaraguan support in the form of captured arms and confessions of captured guerrillas in Guatemala. In April and July of 1981, Guatemalan security forces captured large caches of weapons at safehouses in Guatemala City. These weapons were M-16 rifles that originally had been shipped to Vietnam in the late 1960's. Guerrilla vehicles were captured which bore recent customs markings from Nicaragua (8:31). Captured guerrillas stated they received guerrilla training in both Cuba and Nicaragua. Also, a Nicaraguan defector, Miguel Bolanos, an intelligence officer in the Sandinista state security apparatus, indicated that up to 200 Guatemalan guerrillas had been trained in special camps within any 2 or 3 month period. He additionally stated that the Sandinistas were smuggling arms acquired from Vietnam, Bulgaria, or the Middle East to Guatemala on a periodic basis (8:32). It was through that external support and by their own organizational structure that the Guatemalan guerrillas reached their zenith in power in 1982. However, that was soon to change, when the Guatemalan government launched a new campaign against the guerrillas on 1 July 1982 (37:22).

GUATEMALA VS. THE GUERRILLAS: 1982 - 1985

When Gen. Rios Montt became the President of Guatemala in March 1982, the guerrillas posed a definite threat to the security of Guatemala (1:113). However, it was his counterinsurgency campaign called "Plan Victoria 82" that turned the tide against the guerrillas. That plan had three essential elements. The first was to increase the number of men under arms and deploy and maintain larger numbers of smaller units throughout the "zones of conflict." The second element was to expand and intensify efforts to establish civilian defense forces (CDFs) in the highlands. The final element of the counterinsurgency strategy was to initiate a socio-economic assistance plan in the "zones of conflict" (37:23). The "Plan Victoria 82" campaign lasted less than 6 months (July - December 1982). However, it was during that time period that, with a mobilized expanded army, fighting in smaller units throughout the highlands, and with the support of several hundred thousand CDF "patrulleros" and the Committee for National Reconstruction (CRN) which assisted some 300,000 rural inhabitants directly affected by the violence, that deaths rose sharply. In addition, the largest wave of refugees arrived in Mexico, and the power of the guerrillas was severely damaged (37:24).
Rios Montt started his "Plan Victoria 82" using military strategy borrowed from U.S. recommendations of the mid-1960s, formalized in a Program of Pacification and Eradication of Communism. Planners for the U.S. Embassy Military Group had called for combining psychological warfare with regular and irregular tactics aimed at confusing and creating the belief that in Guatemala there was a war between the peasants and the guerrillas (1:134). The key to the operational aspects of that strategy was to substitute military manpower for mobility. The strategy hinged on the tactical combat groups operating out of Chimaltenango, Quiche, and Huehuetenango departments in central and northeastern Guatemala. To augment those forces, the military mobilized 5,000 reservists and former soldiers. This allowed the government to put more men in the field, thereby increasing the number of patrols available to fight the guerrillas. The Guatemalan Air Force (GAF) was also used on a limited basis to provide logistics support (37:24, 28-29). The second part of the military portion of "Plan Victoria 82" involved a concept known as strategic hamlets (1:137).

In the first phase of strategic hamlets, the army began repopulating abandoned towns, starting with the largest. They also destroyed any hamlets that were too remote to control in the long term or were deemed impossible to recover from the guerrillas. In the resettled areas, the army and security forces consolidated their presence, establishing new barracks and bringing in increased numbers of National and Treasury Police units. After the army had gone into an area, the former villagers were then pressured into going back. Anyone who refused the order to return risked being treated as a subversive, resulting in their home, land, and livestock being confiscated. Rios Montt believed that permanent militarization of the rural areas was necessary, because by pulling out of an area, the army would only leave the villages to be taken over again by the guerrillas. The government continued to expand the strategic hamlet operation, and by May 1983, the high command was opening new command centers all over the country, aiming to consolidate a system of regional military bases in all 22 departments. The success of the strategic hamlet program can be attributed to not only the military, but also to the involvement of the civilian populace, through the associated "rifles and beans" program (1:137).

The government through the CRN was able to involve the civilian populace in the fight against the guerrillas through "the rifles and beans" program. That program linked development projects to the establishment of local CDFs. The idea had originated in the Lucas regime, but the Rios Montt government took the additional step of linking it to the socio-economic development programs. Through that strategy, the military mobilized almost 300,000 local peasants in the primary zones of conflict such as the Ixil Triangle, Quiche, the department of Chimaltenango, and the western municipalities of Baja Vera Paz. However, the "rifles and beans" program was not a total voluntary service provided by the peasants to the government (37:26; 1:139).

All able-bodied men between the ages of 15 and 60 in the zones of conflict were required to serve on the CDF patrols. Each of the patrols consisted of 10 to 14 men and required men to serve 1 day out of 3, guarding any local
installation of strategic value (bridges or electric powerlines), setting roadblocks, and searching the surrounding hills for suspicious individuals. Control of the local population was greatly enhanced by the patrols; because, if an individual wanted to move to another area of the country, he had to first ask the army for permission to leave the CDF. The reward for the patrol members was food and limited deliverance from the repression. The penalty for refusal was to be considered a subversive which then resulted in the confiscation of their homes, lands, livestock, and possible death. Besides the CDFs and "rifles and beans" program, the CRN was also responsible for implementing the socio-economic assistance plan in the zones of conflict as part of "Plan Victoria '82" (1:138).

In the socio-economic aspect of "Plan Victoria '82" the tactics used were similar to the military's successful civic-action programs against the guerrillas in the 1960s. Under this, the CRN attempted to address the needs of the families most affected by the violence in the highlands. CRN technicians estimated that almost 50,000 families (250,000-300,000 individuals) desperately needed food and shelter in July 1982. In providing the materials, the CRN hoped to encourage confidence in the government, help stabilize the area, and to get the local population involved in solving their own socio-economic problems. The CRN utilized organizations called Command Institutional Coordinating Committees (CIC) to implement that program. The CICs were not so much for the benefit of the populace as it may have appeared on the periphery (37:25-6; 1:138).

The CICs replaced the old Indian parish councils which had been banned by the army. The task of the CIC was to plan and manage all community activities, from granting permission to hold a dance and organizing villagers into forced "public works" labor gangs, to planning the introduction of new economic development programs and distributing available resources to the community in liaison with the local military officers. Herein lay the key to the CIC. Each CIC was rigidly under the control of the military, answering only to the local garrison commander. Its members were named by the local army commander, and the army held veto power over all CIC decisions. The CICs were really established for the benefit of the army, not the populace. However, they did help to make "Plan Victoria '82" a success in destroying the power of the guerrillas (1:138-9).

The Guatemalan Army used a very simple method of determining whether or not they were successful in converting the various highland villages away from the control of the guerrillas. In the army high command headquarters in Guatemala City and provincial garrisons, pins of four colors were used to classify the various villages. A red pin meant the village was under the influence of guerrillas, pink and yellow pins meant the village inhabitants were considered suspect, and a green pin meant the government considered the village to be safe. During the 6 months of "Plan Victoria '82," from 3,000 to 10,000 inhabitants of the red villages were killed and their huts became charred hulls. Hundreds of thousands became war refugees in Mexico or just hid in the remote areas of Guatemala. In the first year of Rios Montt's rule, the number of green village greatly increased (1:135-136). Through the combination of military operations and the voluntary/involuntary assistance from the local
populace in the zones of conflict, the Guatemalan government was able to effectively quell a real threat posed to their country by the guerrillas. The amazing aspects of this success were that they accomplished it in only 6 months, and without the military assistance of any major superpower. However, there were resulting problems for Guatemala, namely with their neighbor to the north, Mexico.

The open border with Mexico became a major concern for the Guatemalan Army fighting the guerrillas along the frontier (37:29). As a result of some of the atrocities caused by both the military and the guerrillas during "Plan Victoria 82" up to 100,000 Guatemalan Indians fled the country to become refugees in Mexico (1:155). Many of these were within a few minutes or hours of walking distance from the Guatemalan/Mexican border. The EGP looked at those refugee camps as both sanctuaries and as a source of new soldiers for the guerrilla forces. The Guatemalan Army obviously recognizing the problem, attempted to correct it by raiding the refugee camps in Mexican territory. Those raids so angered the Mexican government, that by 1984, they took the initiative and gained control of the refugee camps. That step by the Mexican authorities virtually eliminated operational use of the camps by the guerrillas (37:29-31). It was also during that period that Gen. Mejia overthrew Rios Montt (Aug 83). Gen. Mejia, through successful diplomatic overtures, also helped to defuse the border problem (37:31; 2:15). However, despite those actions, the guerrillas were still a problem, albeit, a small one for the Guatemalan government.

The period of early 1983 was a time for taking stock of the previous years' setbacks for the guerrillas. Their strategic rearguards in Ixcan, northern Huehuetenango, San Marcos, and Peten, proved impossible nuts for the army to crack. The guerrillas embarked on a new campaign of continual harassment of the army (1:167). Those harassments continued throughout 1983 and 1984. During the fall of 1984, the guerrillas mounted armed actions in seven of Guatemala's 22 departments, with particularly fierce fighting in the Department of San Marcos. Nevertheless, the military held its own during those encounters, and the guerrillas showed no indications of regaining their previous strength (26:111).

Even into 1985, the guerrilla force only totaled about 2,500 and it limited itself to hit-and-run raids in remote areas (20:28). The civil defense patrols estimated to number between 400,000 to 900,000, continued to play an important part in combatting the insurgency. The army, for its part, succeeded in eliminating the guerrillas' urban base, and brought much of the highlands under government control. However, a low intensity conflict does remain ongoing (33:41; 26:111). Thus, in the 26 years of guerrilla warfare, there have been successes for both the guerrilla forces and the Guatemalan military. However, the initiative today belongs to the military with guerrillas no longer posing a real serious threat to the stability of Guatemala. That does not mean the Marxist guerrillas have been permanently eliminated from Guatemala. Their potential to become a dangerous force still exists, given the right conditions of political instability in the country, which is why the U.S. is concerned about the stability of Guatemala. U.S. concern is better understood when one examines the strategic values/interests Guatemala has to offer.
Chapter Five

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF GUATEMALA TO THE U.S.

GUATEMALA’S STRATEGIC LOCATION

There are many within the U.S., especially in the Pentagon, who argue that in the traditional discourse of strategic planning, a country’s strategic value is determined by two variables: its geographical location in relation to vital transportation arteries; and its deposits of raw materials (1:145). Guatemala fits those parameters with one minor, but extremely important, exception concerning raw material deposits. Although Guatemala possesses modest resources, it is her close proximity to Mexico’s extensive petroleum resources (the fourth largest in the world) that enhances her strategic importance to the western hemisphere. For those reasons the U.S. is concerned about the future of Guatemala and does not want it to become another Marxist dictatorship like that which exists in its Central American neighbor, Nicaragua.

Collapsing democracies in Central America are seen as threatening to the U.S. by eventually toppling the governments of Panama and Mexico. The Kissinger report, which provides a comprehensive rationale for the Reagan Administration’s Central American policy, focuses on the danger to Mexico. One of the key strategic advantages enjoyed by the U.S. over other nations of the world has been the security of its borders. If the Mexican government was replaced by one hostile to the U.S., that geostrategic advantage would be lost, threatening the entire global position of the U.S. Therefore, the U.S. cannot afford to let Guatemala fall to communist forces, as it would be seen as the last country to fall before Mexico. Moreover, the jungle-covered mountains of northern Guatemala would provide ideal locations from which to launch guerrilla forays into Mexico (3:72; 24:14). If Guatemala fell to a Marxist regime, followed in turn by Mexico, the entire world’s balance of power would be threatened.

Until now, the U.S. has planned its worldwide strategy on the assumption that its strategic rear was secure and did not require a large diversion of military forces for its protection. It is the “safe” environment at home that permits the U.S. to concentrate so much manpower, equipment, and attention on Europe. If Guatemala fell to the Marxists, the U.S. might be required to divert military forces to help protect the remaining Central American democracies. That diversion would, in turn, impact the U.S.‘s ability to fulfill its commitments to Europe and the rest of the world. Furthermore, the fall of Guatemala to the Marxists would also impact the strategically important sea lanes of the Caribbean (19:45).
SEA LANES AND RAW MATERIALS

The Caribbean Basin sea lanes are vitally important to the strategic interests of the U.S. In the event of a Soviet/Warsaw Pact armed attack in Europe or the Middle East, as much as 70 percent of U.S. seaborne reinforcements to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would transit the sea lanes leading from the Gulf Coast, and the Panama Canal. The Soviets are aware of the strategic importance of the Caribbean sea lanes and the interdiction aspect of the sea lanes in time of a conflict, as Soviet Navy Fleet Admiral Sergei Gorshkov addressed it in some of his published writings in 1979. The Soviets already have a submarine port in Cuba and a potential air support base in Nicaragua. If Guatemala entered that equation, then the Soviets would have even more latitude in interdicting not only the flow of U.S. military personnel, but potentially also the flow of the U.S.'s raw materials.

That danger was already proven by the Germans when during World War II, they sank more allied tonnage in the Caribbean than any other location in the world, and they had no support bases in the Caribbean (24:15; 19:45).

The sea lanes of the Caribbean are extremely important as a supplier of raw materials to the U.S. defense industry and the entire U.S. economy. In 1984, nearly two-thirds of all crude oil and one-half of other foreign cargo imported into the U.S. transited through those sea lanes. Jamaica and several other basin countries supply 85 percent of the bauxite to the U.S. In addition, nearly 40 percent of the U.S. alumina is provided by basin countries, on the sea lanes. Guatemala possesses some of those raw materials vital to the U.S. (19:45-6; 29:14).

Guatemala has oil reserves officially estimated to be at eight billion barrels (10:210). It also has a 60 million ton reserve of nickel, which in combination with the oil reserves, makes it a potentially valuable source of raw materials to the U.S. However, it is Guatemala's association with Mexico's valuable oil reserves that is important. Mexico supplies 33 percent of the crude oil currently imported by the U.S. Moreover, Mexico has proven oil reserves of 75 billion barrels and a likely 25 billion barrels not yet tapped. Guatemala's oil reserves are right across the border from Mexico's oil reserves. If the Guatemalan oil reserves were to fall to a Marxist government, then the valuable Mexican oil reserves would also be in danger of possible sabotage or invasion (13:26; 19:46; 10:210). However, raw materials are not the only stake the U.S. has in Guatemala.

The U.S. is the leader of the free nations of the world through the maintenance of U.S. military and economic power and world respect for that power. Its credibility worldwide is at stake in an area so close to the U.S. as Central America and Guatemala. Nicaragua has gone to a Marxist government, and the U.S. can ill afford a similar occurrence in another Central American country. A triumph of Marxist forces in the U.S.'s strategic rear would be read as a sign of U.S. impotence -- the inability to define its objectives, maintain a clear and consistent policy, and defend its interests successfully (19:46; 25:35). That is why Guatemala is of strategic importance to the U.S.

Now the question to be answered is what can the U.S. do in its foreign relations policy to insure Guatemala continues to be an ally of the U.S.
Currently, the economy of Guatemala is not in a healthy state. Therefore, a program of large-scale economic assistance is required. Guatemala needs an infusion of resources to halt the hemorrhaging of its economy (33:31). In FY 1985, Guatemala received $73 million in economic aid. In FY 1986, $77 million was requested (36: Appendix C). That amount should not be decreased; instead, it should be increased if Guatemala is to return to economic prosperity. Economic aid would also strengthen the government of the newly elected civilian President, Marco Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo (12:3). In addition to direct economic aid to Guatemala, the Reagan administration's Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) proposed certain actions to help all countries in the Caribbean to include Guatemala.

President Reagan's CBI is composed of three basic elements. The first is the elimination of tariffs on all area products except textiles during a period of 12 years. The second is tax incentives encouraging U.S. investment in those countries (as Guatemala) that welcome private investment. The third aspect was an emergency FY 82 appropriations of $350 million to assist countries whose foreign exchange was critically scarce (11:40). The CBI program should be continued since it will certainly assist Guatemala's economic recovery. In addition to direct economic support, there are U.S. proposed educational system programs which would have a long term positive effect on not only Guatemala's economic health, but also on the relationship between the people of the U.S. and Guatemala.

In January 1984, the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America made several recommendations for improvements of the existing situation in Central America. Important among those were two dealing with the education of all Central Americans, both in their countries and in the U.S. The Commission recommended a U.S. Teachers Corps go to all Central American countries with the goal of achieving literacy of 100 percent (36:1; 30:371). Such an initiative would be very beneficial to Guatemala because its literacy rate is only 48 percent (35:1). More importantly, the Commission recommended that the U.S. sponsor 10,000 Central American students through scholarships at U.S. colleges. In February 1985, the Agency for International Development (AID) provided scholarships for 7,000 Central Americans to study at U.S. universities. The first as well as future groups of students will continue to come from primarily lower income families (36:7). These scholarships will certainly enable more Guatemalans to learn about the democratic government of the U.S. That program
should be expanded because its potential worth is immeasurable (36:7). In addition to educational programs, health delivery programs were also recommended for improvement by the Commission (30:371).

Under the chairmanship of Henry Kissinger, the Commission recommended improvement of health delivery programs to combat disease and malnutrition. The Commission also made recommendations on housing, water, sewage, and electric power. The recommendation stated the U.S. should develop and implement a comprehensive program for Guatemala, rather than try to implement a series of piecemeal programs. To insure all this proposed American aid is effectively used, the U.S. should also provide Guatemala with limited military aid (30:371).

Guatemala was able to successfully quell the guerrilla movement during 1982-3 without large-scale U.S. military assistance. Therefore, massive military aid is not necessary. What Guatemala does require is an initial, and then continued resupply of non-lethal resources. This should take the form of communications equipment, vehicles, and critical spare parts for its helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. All these resources would vastly improve the mobility of the Guatemalan Army, especially important in its ongoing conflict with the guerrillas. By improving mobility, the Guatemalan Army could respond more effectively in its fight with the guerrillas (33:52-3). However, to achieve the most effective results, the U.S. must not be the only country that provides economic and military assistance to Guatemala.

Any effort which will be truly successful in improving the status quo of Guatemala must be a combined effort involving the U.S. and other countries of the world. The U.S. needs the assistance of other strong countries in Latin America and Europe to effect a permanent solution to Guatemala's troubles (15:10; 17:76). If the financial troubles would be solved and the country's standard of living raised, then two related benefits would result. First, Guatemala's populace would be happier and more content because their standard of living was improved. Second, there would be a negative effect on the guerrilla movement, since it thrives in a country that has very few rich and very many poor, with no hope for the poor of improving their future. To determine if those goals can be achieved, it is important to hypothesize on the future of Guatemala/U.S. foreign relations.

FUTURE GUATEMALA/U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS

On 9 December 1985, Guatemalans freely elected Marco Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo, as their president. He became Guatemala's first elected civilian president in 15 years and the first Guatemalan leader elected in 30 years in an election not considered fraudulent (12:3). He is the leader of the Christian Democratic Party which is considered to be center-left in its politics (22:3). Mr. Cerezo will undoubtedly set the tone for the future of U.S./Guatemala relations. The day before the election, he stated Guatemala would need $300 million in aid during the first 6 months of the new government (22:3). Since he became President of Guatemala, Mr. Cerezo has stated additional views on aid from the U.S., and the U.S.'s involvement in the politics of Central America.
In December 1985 during Mr. Cerezo's first visit to Washington, D.C. as the President-elect of Guatemala, he told Reagan administration officials that he wanted strong U.S. backing for democratic development, but had no immediate desire for military aid. He told reporters, "If they propose to give me military aid I am going to tell them to delay it" (14:8). Mr. Cerezo later stated he was not opposed to aid for the armed forces, but wanted to control the matter himself after taking office in January 1986. Mr. Cerezo additionally addressed the subject of U.S. economic aid. He stated he wanted to assume the Presidency first, before making any decisions on U.S. economic aid for Guatemala. The subject of U.S. involvement in Central America arose during Mr. Cerezo's visit to Washington, D.C. and during a later visit to Managua, Nicaragua (14:3; 23:6).

While in Washington, D.C., Mr. Cerezo refused to endorse the Reagan Administration's policy of supporting rebels fighting to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. During a visit to Managua, Nicaragua, just ten days later, he stated he opposed "any policy of aggression against any Central American country" (23:6). However, he endorsed the opposition party of the Marxist government of Nicaragua when he visited the headquarters of the Social Christian Party and greeted organizers as "longtime companions in the struggle for democracy" (23:6). Mr. Cerezo added that Christian Democrats shared a desire "that peoples of Central America should be free to choose their own leaders by peaceful and democratic participation" (23:6). He said, "I can tell you with all my heart that I respect and admire the struggle you are waging here in Nicaragua, which is an example for Latin America" (23:6). Mr. Cerezo appeared to be endorsing peaceful changes in Central America, not violent changes, with the end result being democracy.

The future of U.S./Guatemala foreign relations appears to be positive. Mr. Cerezo has stated his support for democracy, and he certainly has the backing of the Guatemalan people, having received 68 percent of the votes cast in the December 1985 election. An estimated 73 percent of eligible voters went to the polls in that election (12:3). What the U.S. can and should do is not to impose its own solution on the politics of Guatemala, but to assist it in finding its own preferred developmental formulas. By a combination of economic aid and limited nonlethal military aid (as specified by Guatemala), U.S./Guatemala foreign relations should continue to develop into a positive relationship that is beneficial to both countries and to the security of the Western Hemisphere.
Chapter Seven

SUMMARY

FINDINGS

The history of Guatemala for the past 30 years has been one of turmoil involving guerrilla insurgencies, oppressive military dictatorships, economic problems, and direct and indirect intervention of the U.S. in the governments of Guatemala. The results of all these factors has been that the Guatemalan people have not been free people, and many of them have been persecuted and even killed.

The U.S. government began its direct involvement in the affairs of Guatemala with the CIA-backed coup of the legally elected Arbenz government in 1954 (2:6; 7:1). The U.S. continued to interact overtly with Guatemala throughout the 1960s to 1977. However, after Guatemalan human rights violations became an issue during Jimmy Carter's term as President, U.S. military aid was officially cut off to Guatemala (2:10). At that time the U.S. began to supply military arms to Guatemala on a more covert scale. They did it under the rationale of fighting the spread of communism in Central America. When Reagan became President, he renewed efforts to officially restart military aid to Guatemala but the U.S. Congress disapproved his requests. However, it was during the 1980 to 1984 time period that Guatemala received their largest supply of military equipments from the U.S. through the use of legal loopholes (1:147, 151; 21:13). Finally in 1985, the U.S. Congress agreed to provide Guatemala $300,000 in military aid, the first time in 7 years it had done so. Congress provided the aid on the premise that human rights violations were decreasing in Guatemala, and to assist the Guatemalan army in their continued fight against the Marxist guerrillas (13:12A).

The Guatemalan Army and Air Force have been fighting Marxist guerillas since 1960 (1:62; 2:8). Since then, the guerrilla movement has experienced peaks and valleys in its strength. It was very strong in the mid-1960s. However, through a combination of U.S. military advisors and a massive anti-guerrilla campaign on the part of the Guatemalan Army, the guerrilla threat had been put into complete disarray by 1969 (1:69; 2:9). The guerrilla movement gained new strength in the mid 1970s to early 1980s. But when Rios Montt implemented his "Plan Victoria 82" during the last 6 months of 1982, the guerrillas' strength was significantly reduced (37:23-31; 1:137-139). It was also during the early 1980s that physical proof and sworn statements verified the guerrillas were receiving assistance in the form of arms and training from Nicaragua and Cuba (8:31-2; 37:22). Those countries and the Soviet Union are interested in Guatemala partly because of its strategic importance and their
desire to spread Marxism. However, their support has not greatly aided the guerrillas because, at the current time, the guerrillas do not pose a significant threat to the government of Guatemala.

The Soviet Union shares the U.S. interest in the strategic value of Guatemala (19:45). However, the U.S. can ill afford for Guatemala to fall under Marxist rule. That would affect our strategic rear and could also potentially threaten the valuable oil resources of Mexico (13:26; 19:46; 10:210). Guatemala is also of strategic importance to the U.S. because of the sea lanes of communication which traverse by its shores (19:45-6; 29:14). If a Marxist government ruled Guatemala as one already does in Cuba and Nicaragua, then the potential would exist for cutting off or limiting our access to raw materials. But more importantly, it could hinder and possibly stop U.S. troop reinforcements to Europe or the Middle East in time of an international crisis (24:15; 19:45). Guatemala is also important to the strategic interests of the U.S. because the loss of another Central American country to Marxist rule would have a very negative impact on our reputation as democracy's world leader and thus would hurt us in the foreign policy arena (19:46; 25:35).

RECOMMENDATIONS

Guatemala has just elected its first civilian president in 15 years. He is also the first Guatemalan leader in 30 years elected in an honest election (12:3). Since he is a strong supporter of democracy in all countries, it appears that Guatemala has the potential to become a stable Central American neighbor of the U.S. Based on past history, Guatemala is in need of economic aid and nonlethal military aid. However, Guatemala must formally request the aid. Therefore, it is imperative that the U.S. continue the constructive dialogue with Mr. Cerezo, and work with him on developing his country both economically and as a strong democracy. The U.S. should be willing/able to enter into a mutually beneficial, long term and stable, consistent relationship with Guatemala. The U.S. must stop its history of inconsistent policies, as those policies have the potential for creating an unstable political environment in countries such as Guatemala. The U.S. cannot afford another Marxist government in its back yard. Guatemala certainly does not appear to currently have any potential for becoming one, and yet, to insure that potential remains nil, the U.S. should continue to offer economic and military aid to Guatemala. In addition, the U.S. should encourage other countries in Latin America and Europe to assist in the development of Guatemala. The stronger Mr. Cerezo's democratic government is, the stronger Guatemala will be both in Central America and the world arena. The end result will benefit the people of Guatemala and the people of the U.S.
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