CSI Historical Bibliography No. 3

THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR

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and annotated by
the CSI Research and Teaching Committees

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PREFACE

Combat Studies Institute developed this bibliography in response to a growing interest by the Army in the operational level of war—defined in FM 100-5, Operations (1982), as the planning, conducting, and sustaining of larger units to obtain strategic goals within a theater; the operational level of war is new to the U.S. Army. Previous manuals have denied the existence of anything between strategic and tactical operations. Only recently has the necessity or desirability of an intervening level of war been accepted. This bibliography has been assembled to assist students of war in learning more about this newly adopted combat arena.

The line between the tactical and operational levels of war is blurred at the corps and division levels. Therefore, some of the works included here may seem to deal more directly with tactical considerations than operational concerns. In large part, this is due to the newness of the concept. Prior to 1962, many combat operations that we would now define as operational were labeled as tactical, and reporting of them covered both levels without distinction.

The history of the operational level of war as a distinct subject for study can be traced as far into the past as the Grand Tactics of the Napoleonic era. Campaigns that would now be labeled operational can be found far back in history, and at least one entry concerns the actions of Scipio Africanus against the Carthaginians in the third century B.C. While these older entries show that there has long been an operational level of war—a level first recognized by the German and Soviet General Staffs—only recently has the U.S. Army realized the significance of studying and planning at this level. As a result, the majority of U.S. entries are very recent ones.

The personnel reviewing and annotating these works have tried to indicate the level and value of each entry. Due to the press of time, it has not been possible to annotate every title submitted. Those works that were readily available from the Combined Arms Research Library, the Defense Technical Information Center, or through interlibrary loan have been annotated. Other entries that were unavailable have been included, nonetheless, as being of potential value. Section II (French language works) and section IV (Russian language works) have been given without annotations. Many of the items in section III (German language works) do have brief annotations. Translations of titles have been provided in all language sections when possible. Where foreign language entries also exist in an English version, they are included in that section. Those works that have a double entry are so noted. No classified items are included in this bibliography.

Elizabeth R. Snoke, Librarian, Combat Studies Institute, initially assembled this bibliography in response to a requirement by Brigadier General William A. Stofft, then a colonel and director of CSI. Annotations were prepared first under the direction of Lieutenant Colonel Cary L.
Bounds, chief of the Research Committee and then of Major Andrew N. Morris, research fellow. Those contributing annotations were Dr. Robert H. Berlin, Dr. Gary J. Bjorge, Lieutenant Colonel Bounds, Dr. George W. Gawrych, Major Gary B. Griffin, Major Scott R. McMichael, Major Morris, Captain Thomas P. Odom, Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Ramsay III, Dr. William G. Robertson, Major Claude R. Sasso, and Lieutenant Colonel Gary H. Wade.

We owe special thanks to a few individuals who contributed numerous entries in this bibliography: Colonel Robert A. Doughty of the History Department at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point for items in the English and German sections; Lieutenant Colonel David M. Glantz, formerly of CSI and now director of Soviet doctrine in the Center for Land Warfare of the U.S. Army War College for the entire Russian language section and many translated Russian items in the English section; and Dr. Robert M. Epstein, formerly of CSI and now with the School of Advanced Military Studies of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, whose own work and contacts at the French staff college produced most of the French language entries.
NOTES ON DOCUMENT LOCATIONS

Many of the works cited in this bibliography are available in large public and university libraries or in U.S. military research libraries. However, a number of them exist only in special libraries or special offices. A library or other source symbol and call numbers have been provided for most items in this bibliography. The libraries and source symbols are listed and defined below. Entries from the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) that have a call number preceded by an M are in the process of being recataloged, so those call numbers listed in this document may eventually be changed. Some of the items cited in the French section are apparently only available in Europe and are rare books.

Libraries seeking to obtain items bearing a CARL call number in this bibliography should seek other general locations of the items on their OCLC interlibrary loan terminals. The Combined Arms Research Library makes every effort to fill interlibrary loan requests, but the library's main mission is to meet the needs of the Command and General Staff College students and faculty, and it will not readily loan items designated for use in classes or with research projects.

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DTIC ......... Defense Technical Information Center
Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA 22314

LC .......... Library of Congress (entries taken from the book catalogs)

MHI .......... U.S. Army Military History Institute
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013

OCLC ....... Online Computer Library Center, Inc.
Dublin, OH 43017

West Point ... U.S. Military Academy Library, West Point, NY 10996
(entries taken from the library's four-volume subject catalog)
Section I
ENGLISH SECTION


This book focuses on General Franz Halder, the chief of the German General Staff in the early years of World War II. Addington claims blitzkrieg was believed to be the final evolutionary step in warfare, deriving from the old Prussian doctrine of Kesselschlacht (battle of encirclement and annihilation) modified to apply to new weapons. He looks in depth at German logistical shortcomings, especially among the non-motorized elements, claiming the German Army was not prepared for either the Russian winter or the wetness, as shown by the large number of horses they still used. Considerable discussion of operations and decision making at the highest command levels is included.


This operation entails a combined arms army entering battle on the march, a river crossing, and a penetration and envelopment. Alferov details both the planning, forces, and weapons employed by the 4th Guards Army.


Alger focuses on military thinkers and philosophers. He discusses the evolution of the principles of war from Sun Tzu to the present day, emphasizing the post-Napoleonic era.


Allan assumes what would now be termed a high-intensity conflict with a full exchange of nuclear weapons. He postulates that an exploitation and occupation of the enemy's territories will be necessary to ensure victory even after a complete strategic exchange. To accomplish this, he advocates field armies that can survive the initial exchange if given adequate warning. He anticipates that the main problems will be logistical, not operational, and sees solutions in sea and air power.

This book views World War II from General Eisenhower's point of view. The account starts when Eisenhower is called to Washington, D.C., in December 1941 to work for General Marshall and closes with the victory in Europe. Ambrose analyzes Eisenhower's strategic and operational decisions as a theater commander (Mediterranean) and then as supreme commander of Allied forces in western Europe. Based on Eisenhower's point of view, this is a valuable, though somewhat one-sided, study.


This article reviews Soviet tank army operations in World War II. Anan'ev focuses on exploitation and pursuit operations, with some discussion of other operations. He provides general examples. This is a broad, somewhat vague, overview.


Angsten looks in some detail at the question of what to do with bypassed enemy forces as the corps conducts a deep attack. Looking from a corps commander's perspective, he addresses the question of task organizing divisions and the numerous problems involved in deep attack. He recommends that follow and support forces be eliminated and that brigade-size elements maintain contact with bypassed units while a "main objective force" goes for the deep objective.


Arnold reviews Operation Bagration, a Soviet attack in June and July 1944 that destroyed German Army Group Center, as an example of the way the Soviets intend to attack NATO. He compares the battle with current Soviet positioning, weapons, and tactics.


This work is both military history and an analysis of post-World War I military science. In that regard, some elements of the book are more important than others, especially in their relationship to a study of the
operational art. Following a brief biography of Foch's career up until 1905, the French field marshal's prewar writings and his principles are reviewed in depth. Many of these precepts are timeless in their application. The spirit of the offense is also emphasized in an analysis of Foch's theories on the roles of advance and flank guard, the main battle, and the general organization of combat formations. Most of the book, however, discusses the battles and campaigns of the Franco-Prussian War and World War I. This battle analysis is accomplished largely at the operational level and is beneficial to the reader.

Balck, Wilhelm (William). Development of Tactics—World War. Translated by Harry Bell. Fort Leavenworth, KS: The General Service Schools Press, 1922. CARL 940.37243. The original work is listed in the German language section of this bibliography.

Balck devotes this volume to examining changes in the German art of war that were influenced by World War I. The work is of limited value.


This is a turn-of-the-century work that defines strategy and tactics and then looks at the three current combat arms (Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery) and how they operate. The majority of this volume concerns the organization and tactical operation of infantry. This book is of interest historically but is of little current value.


Barclay argues that individual and small-unit tactical skill is as important as the ability to handle equipment. He feels that more time should be devoted to tactical training (as opposed to equipment training) because he feels tactics are more difficult to learn. Consequently, he advocates the use of long-service troops in any future European war to ensure the proper employment of tactics.


This is an analysis of the impact of leaders and leadership in battle. The focus is on the British high command in North Africa in 1940-43 and the strategic and operational decisions made there. The second edition incorporates revelations made public since the release of Enigma information.
after the publication of Barnett's first edition in 1960. Barnett is especially critical of Montgomery, but he examines all the senior leaders in the course of his study and discusses the organization and training of both the British Army in general and the 8th Army.


This volume contains four biographies of senior commanders in World War I. Barnett looks at Colonel General Helmuth von Moltke, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, General Henri Philippe Pétain, and General Erich Ludendorff. He emphasizes the "decisive effect of individual human character on history." The focus is on the attempts of these commanders to adapt to the new conditions of war for which their prior education and training had not prepared them.


This is a study about the defeat in 1870 of the French Army of the Rhine, which was widely considered to be the best army in Europe. Baton feels it was defeated because it was consistently surprised. The lack of security was due to the bad organization and employment of French cavalry, weak command and control by senior leaders, and poor training prior to the war with Germany, principally in the colonial wars in Algeria.


Bayerlein's article presents a good general overview of the German invasion of Russia from 1941 through the end of the war on the Eastern Front in 1945. Bayerlein participated in most of these actions and focuses his narrative on the armored units, such as the 3d Panzer Division, which he commanded in 1943-44. Included in this article is considerable discussion of special problems, such as the cold, and the measures taken to overcome them. He also profiles the Russian soldier of that war.


This short article looks at two Russian operations that were similar to those envisioned for current Soviet OMGs. One was against the Turks in 1877, the other against the Japanese in 1905. The analogy to an OMG is close, and the lessons are valuable. There is some discussion of the operational level of war.

Belloc discusses Marlborough's campaigns at Blenheim, the Lines of Brabant, Ramillies, Oudenaarde, and Malplaquet. The work is of some value as a discussion of Marlborough's strategic campaigns, which included maneuvers we would now define as operational.


This monograph looks at the strategic doctrine of Israel. The authors consider the "conditioning factors" that shape Israeli strategy and the "political and military elements" in the society and the army that influence doctrine and the "operational elements" of strategic doctrine. They find that the latter includes an emphasis on offensive operations involving preemption, speed, the indirect approach, exploitation of "macro-competence" by commanders, and combined arms operations.


Bennett examines the Allied invasion of Europe in 1944 and the subsequent campaign that lasted into early 1945. He focuses on the use of intelligence provided by Ultra to the commanders. Interesting from its point of view, this work includes actual examples of Ultra messages, with examples chosen to demonstrate how proper use of intelligence led to operational success and bad use to disaster.


Published in 1906 and revised in 1909, this is a German cavalry commander's attempt to set doctrine. The work is translated and commented on by a British proponent of cavalry. In his work, Bernhardi emphasizes that cavalry must, as its first priority, defeat enemy cavalry by shock. Following that, other tasks, such as reconnaissance and feints, may be conducted. He gives options available to commanders in all types of operations. The concluding chapters concern organization and training. Bernhardi's work is historically important but of little practical use.


This volume was written by von Bernhardi immediately following World War I. He advocates offensive action conducted by professional leaders
leading a totally mobilized nation. He predicts a rejuvenated Germany able to conduct such a war. He discusses all elements of modern war, from tactics and strategy to politics and economics, and closes by advocating secret preparation for war as necessary and justified.


This book is a highly acclaimed scholarly work that traces the changes in British military thought from 1904 to 1945. Although the book does not directly address the operational level of war, it has much to say regarding the subject, particularly in terms of combined arms integration, blitzkrieg, and the place of artillery on the battlefield. It should be noted, however, that the book is primarily concerned with the application of firepower, not maneuver.


Bitner studies Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, a German theater commander and the only long-term Luftwaffe commander of German army units. He focuses on Kesselring's decisions prior to and early in the Anzio campaign in February 1944. Specifically, Bitner looks at the German decision to commit the army group reserve and Kesselring's involvement in the counterattack on 16 February. Answers resolved in Bitner's thesis include how Kesselring affected operations and how he dealt with his seniors in Germany. This is a valuable operational work with lessons applicable to current U.S. Army operations.


In some instances, the operational art is best personified by the amphibious-waterborne envelopment. This article covers the 77th Infantry Division operation at Ormoc, where the purpose was to gain control of the Luzon-Formosa-China coast triangle in preparation for the blockade, aerial softening, and eventual invasion of the Japanese homeland. Conducted in late 1944 as operations in the Philippines intensified, this operation was part of a larger operation. The maps are detailed and the battle action carefully explained. This is a good historical example demonstrating maneuver warfare in the Pacific.

Blumenson considers corps commanders to be tacticians concerned with finding the best means to attain objectives. He looks at three commanders and analyzes their campaigns and leadership styles. Not much information is presented on the operational art, but this article is a good introduction to the multitudinous roles of corps commanders in a major war.


This is a large study that focuses exclusively on General George S. Patton, Jr. By publishing many of Patton’s letters and writings, Blumenson attempts to find the man behind the myth. Blumenson’s perceptive narrative ties the papers together to the times and circumstances. The higher operational commander would derive considerable value from these papers written by a master of the art.


This is an engineer-oriented discussion of the seizure of the Remagen Bridge in March 1945. The capture, German efforts at destruction, and subsequent bridging operations in the 1st U.S. Army area are described.


This report describes the evolution and reorganization of American and allied larger units in five different theaters from World War II to Vietnam. Although operations are not discussed in any detail, the study analyzes the functions and missions of larger units and provides some illuminating conclusions regarding how these units have been organized and employed.


Written in 1951, this is a valuable narrative by General Bradley concerning “how war is waged on the field from the field command post.” Bradley looks at World War II from his perspective and discusses in considerable detail the decisions made, the personalities involved, and the operations conducted. Though limited by the fact that it was never updated after the declassification of Ultra, this work is of value regarding operations by larger units.

This study looks at the theories of Clausewitz, Jomini, Mahan, Mitchell, Douhet, and Liddell Hart for common threads. It summarizes and analyzes the basic theories of each. In brief, all of these men believed in offensive action; all believed in mass; and all believed these forces must be applied in attacking the enemy's ability and will to wage war in order to win. These men valued maneuver and surprise, saw lines of communication as important, and realized the value of psychological factors.


This is a brief primer on large unit operations. It consists of a full-page color schematic map accompanied by a brief discussion of a type of operation. The tactics are of World War I vintage. This is of little current use.


Brown looks at Soviet views concerning the question of using nuclear weapons in Europe. He demonstrates that the Soviets have always preferred conventional war but assumed the United States would use nuclear weapons in any conflict. Since they acquired deterrent weapons in the mid-1960s, they have increased their emphasis on conventional weapons. Given a choice, Brown feels the Soviets will fight with "conventional means alone as long as the survival of the Soviet state is not threatened." He feels that the Soviets do not view a final, cataclysmic war as inevitable, but rather as too risk


Burne attempts to answer the question "What wins battles?" He summarizes his answer in terms of four "Strands of War": the "quality and capability of the commander; the quality and capability of the troops;" and "Morale" and "Resources." He studies these strands using eight principles of war that are similar to our own. Burne examines strategic principles and attempts to show that the use of interior lines is no guarantee of success. The remainder of the book consists of thirteen examples from Kadesh in 1268 B.C. to Tunisia in 1943 that illustrate his points.


This turn-of-the-century work by a German lieutenant general attempts to summarize the developments in strategic (including operational) thought during the nineteenth century. Caemmerer examines war as it changed under the impact of the French Revolution and Napoleon, then focuses on the works of Jomini, Clausewitz, Willensen, and less well known military pundits to analyze their contributions to the art of war. He finishes by discussing the impact of new technology (railroads, breech-loading weapons), contrasting von Moltke's campaigns with Napoleon's and describing the latest writings on his subject prior to publication.


Callahan's brief book analyzes the struggle between the Japanese and British Armies for Burma in the 1940s and also the contentions between the chief generals and politicians on the Allied side. This is an excellent study on how strategy is shaped by politics and is also a tribute to the old Indian Army. Operational lessons are here but are not the principal focus of the book.


Cameron examines the destruction of the Republic of Korea's II Corps in November 1950. He finds that the success of the Chinese Communists was due to their ability to concentrate forces while their enemy was overextended and hampered by guerrilla forces on their lines of communication. Other key elements fostering Chinese success were good reconnaissance, night attacks, and the trapping of Koreans behind their own defensive lines. This is a valuable work.


This book contains short but authoritative biographies of forty-three of the dominant military commanders of the twentieth century. The value of this book for the student of the operational level of war is that it provides analyses of the command styles, ideas, and techniques of many of the wartime commanders who proved to be experts in operational art. Among the more noteworthy entries are those on von Rundstedt, von Manstein, Wavell, Zhukov, Rommel, Guderian, Slim, MacArthur, and Patton.
Cate, Paul E. "Large-Unit Operational Doctrine." Military Review 58 (December 1978):40-47.

Writing in 1978, Major Cate called for the U.S. Army to develop operational doctrine for echelons above division. In this article, he stresses that such doctrine must incorporate three main principles—preconceived maneuver, the indirect approach, and concentration of decisive forces in time and space. Many of the field manuals published in the 1980s have directly addressed the author's concerns.


This is a somewhat confused and general view of the evolution of land warfare from the Sumerians in 3000 B.C. to the Vietnam War. It includes numerous excellent photographs and diagrams to illustrate the points Chandler is trying to make, though the organization of the book is somewhat less successful. The work is an interesting introduction to its subject but is of little practical value to the study of the operational level of war.


A distinguished military historian, David G. Chandler presents in this work one of the most acclaimed biographies of John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, as a military leader. All of Marlborough's battles, campaigns, and sieges are described. Although methods of warfare have radically changed, many of the methods employed by Marlborough and described in this book are valid to operational art today, such as seizing the initiative, seeking offensive action, deception, cooperation between arms, management of time and space, and immediate pursuit. Deriving these lessons from Chandler's operational histories, however, requires hard study.


This section of Chandler's classic and highly readable The Campaigns of Napoleon evaluates Napoleon's philosophy of war, his strategic and battle methods, and the sources of his ideas. While Napoleon was not an original military thinker, he refined the ideas of others to develop sophisticated combined arms attacks against enemy armies. Chandler assesses Napoleon as a strategist and master of the operational art. Grand Tactics in the Napoleonic era comprised the science and art of handling men, horses, and guns during the crucial moves when close contact had been established with the enemy. Using numerous diagrams and illustrations, Chandler clearly and vividly explains how Napoleon used Grand Tactics to achieve victory.
Chandler provides a good, general description of the famous battle, the events leading up to it, and its consequences. With excellent maps and an expert knowledge of the battleground, he analyzes the campaign and the battle at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.


In addition to being the best English-language biography of Zhukov, Chaney's work also presents excellent accounts and maps of the major operations in which Zhukov was involved.


Chernykh examines the record of the 6th Guards Tank Army from 1943 to 1945. He emphasizes that the standard use of a tank army as a second echelon during offensive operations was modified when necessary. Thus, the 6th Guards Tank Army was often used in the first echelon to overcome enemy defenses more quickly and to increase the depth of breakthroughs. Chernykh encourages further study of this unit by modern commanders.


This Soviet study contains case studies of actual Soviet Army operations in World War II in each of over forty different types of operations, e.g., defense in the mountains, river crossings, and repelling counteroffensives.


In The Battle for Stalingrad, Marshal Chuikov provides a unique viewpoint on the battle that many historians regard as the turning point in World War II. Chuikov's role in the defense of Stalingrad was paramount. Commanding the 62d Army, he withstood the fierce attacks of the German Sixth Army and Fourth Panzer Army for several months during the fall of 1942 and participated in the ultimate destruction of these German forces in January 1943.
As Commander of the 62d, 64th, and 8th Guards Armies, Marshal Chuikov compiled one of the most illustrious records of Soviet commanders in World War II. This book, the second volume in Chuikov’s memoirs, describes several of the most important battles on the Eastern Front, including the Belorussian, Vistula-Oder, and Berlin campaigns. Chuikov’s analyses of these huge operations, though biased, are invaluable for the student of operational art as practiced by the Soviet armed forces.


Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) is generally viewed as the greatest writer on the art of war. His masterpiece, On War, although unfinished at the time of his death, is a systematic study of war. The nuclear strategist Bernard Brodie said of Clausewitz’ study, "His is not simply the greatest, but the only great book about war." Reading On War requires patience and intellectual effort, but this effort will be rewarded by a better understanding of war and its relationship to society. Clausewitz’ analysis of friction in war is essential for understanding military operations. The Howard-Paret translation is the edition for modern officers to read.


Colby examines the campaigns of Marlborough, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon and derives lessons for modern soldiers in the use of maneuver and mobility. His work is of limited value today.


In this article, five army commanders--Lieutenant Generals W. D. Crittenberger, John R. Hodge, Leroy Lutes, Stephen J. Chamberlin, and Joseph M. Suring--offer their views, in brief comments, on the necessity and uses of mobility at all three levels of war. Foot, wheeled, track, and air mobility are all considered.

This carbon copy is a translation of a book written by an instructor at the French Ecole Supérieure de Guerre shortly after World War I. Major Daille's focus is on the French First Army, commanded by General Debene's. The author's emphasis is on the problems of command concerned with the Battle of Château-Thierry in July and August 1918. His secondary emphasis is on the use of maneuver and reserves.


This book is devoted to discussions of Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig's role and actions as one of the leading British commanders in World War I. Its focus is on the strategic and operational levels of war. Unfortunately, it contains only three maps and the descriptions of military operations are not as lucid as one would like.


Dayan's involvement in the 1956 Arab-Israeli War is described in this noted work. The book is also necessary background for understanding developments leading to the 6-Day War in 1967.


This article briefly describes Field Marshal von Manstein's brilliant handling of the Soviet winter counteroffensive in January-February 1943. Fighting superior Soviet forces from several directions, the Germans fought over a huge area and assumed both an offensive and defensive character. The campaign is an excellent example of the practice of the operational art. It is particularly valuable regarding its insights on risk taking, wide maneuver, use of mobile reserves, synchronization of widely separated operations, and the forecasting of results of operations over time.


These volumes contain analyses concerning the French defeat in 1870, with proposals for a change toward the German military system. Colonel Derrecagaix uses many pre-World War I German operational concepts and terms.

The author's purpose is to demonstrate advances in Soviet military art as manifested during the Belorussian operation. Front- and army-level operations were conducted both simultaneously and successively. Careful and creative preparations are hailed as keys to success.


DeVries' article addresses the dialogue in the early 1980s on maneuver warfare and reviews the military reform criticism of the 1976 version of FM 100-5, Operations. The author prescribes steps that the U.S. Army must take to ensure general understanding of how maneuver and the operational art are linked. Nine operational examples are cited.


This two-part article summarizes Soviet doctrine from an operational viewpoint. The keys to Soviet success in a confrontation with NATO are surprise, speed, and forcing NATO forces off balance so that they are forced to react to Soviet initiatives. Strategy dictates overall direction, while tactics are kept simple and predictable. While this implies little room for initiative at the small-unit level and may create massive casualties in some units, the Soviets believe long-term casualties will be lower and success quicker if they can implement their operational concepts.


This excellent article describes how an Operational Maneuver Group (OMG) may be used by the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany in a European war. Dick points out that the OMG is well suited to achieve the Soviet objectives of surprise and high-speed advance that would lead to a quick win in Europe. He believes that the OMG is intended to crumble NATO's defenses from within, causing a political collapse. The article also addresses the weapon systems and force structures likely to be found in an OMG.


These five biographies and campaign histories of famous military commanders comprise the Great Captains series produced in the 1890s by Lieutenant Colonel Dodge. Each of them follows a similar pattern in terms of length and style. Besides providing a campaign history, each book also functions as a treatise on the art of war as practiced in the respective time period. Useful for the investigation of how operational art and strategy were practiced by the masters, the books contain numerous maps, charts, and drawings.


The central theme of this article is that understanding and practicing the operational art is essential to AirLand Battle doctrine. The author addresses the questions of offensive maneuver, intelligence, depth, interdiction, and risk. He insists that NATO forces must seek to disrupt the Soviet commander's operational plan and deny him his operational goals.


C. N. Donnelly is a prominent British expert on the Soviet Army. In this article, he discusses the intents, purposes, capabilities, targets, and methods of Soviet formations that can be expected to operate in NATO's rear during wartime. He discusses airborne and heliborne assault/air-land forces, naval infantry, long-range reconnaissance units, and raiding units of combined arms armies. He concludes that the USSR has the capability to damage the NATO rear severely and will do so in coordination with conventional operations in a quick-war strategy.
The Soviet Operational Maneuver Group (OMG) is a much discussed and disputed organization that is intended, the author maintains, to play a decisive role in the achievement of Soviet operational and strategic goals. Donnelly discusses the context in which the OMG will be employed, describes its link to World War II mobile units, and demonstrates that the use of the OMG represents a significant change in Soviet operational strategy.


This article was published shortly after the 1982 edition of FM 100-5, Operations, was fielded. The author discusses the four basic tenets of AirLand Battle—agility, initiative, synchronization, and depth—and cites what he considers to be inconsistencies in the doctrine. His most severe criticism is that the U.S. Army's operational concept is not completely followed in the two chapters of FM 100-5 dealing with defense.


Dufour’s text on the art of war was translated at the U.S. Military Academy and used there in instruction on military art in the nineteenth century. The book covers nearly every aspect of warfare common to that time period and includes frequent sketches, diagrams, and historical examples to complement the text. It shows a strong Napoleonic influence and does not reflect the operations of the American Civil War.


Dyke’s very interesting, but short, article proposes the organization of essentially pure armored corps and armored armies to be used in a European war in both a mobile defensive and offensive role. The basic building block for these large armored formations would be a streamlined armored division. In a strategic defense, Dyke proposes that infantry divisions form strong hedgehogs from which armored corps counterattacks would be launched. On the offense, armored corps and armies would strike deeply to seize enemy centers of control and supply. Airborne operations behind enemy lines would complement these deep armored strikes.

This Rand paper is a good study on Soviet preparations and conduct of the Manchurian campaign in August 1945. The study focuses on the operational art but includes useful tactical details as well. Surprise, intelligence, logistics, deception, force structure, precombat training, engineer support, combined arms operations, and air operations are among the many subjects covered in this excellent report. The authors also try to relate the lessons of this campaign to current quick-war strategy.


General Eisenhower’s unique perspective gives the reader great discernment into the strategy and operations in the western theater during World War II. His work addresses political, diplomatic, and military concerns and gives many of his personal and professional insights into operational planning and execution. Operations Torch, Husky, Overlord, Anvil-Dragoon, Avalanche, and many others are discussed.


Elliot-Bateman argues that a failure to understand the military philosophy of Mao was at the root of the French defeat in Indochina and also for what he describes as "the American failure in South Vietnam." He quotes extensively from the writings of Mao and General Vo Nguyen Giap and examines how their theories have fared in practice in China, Malaya, and Vietnam. His objective is to reveal their "secrets of war," thus precluding a military defeat of free world forces in the Far East.


This is an excellent translation of Elze’s classic study of the Battle of Tannenberg. This translation relies primarily on original documents of the Great General Staff, battle reports, and war diaries. It shows how the battle situation changed on a daily, almost hourly, basis—events evolving, rather than following a preconceived plan. Volume two contains many of the original documents upon which the narrative is based, including von Prittwitz’ orders, reports on telephone conversations with Eighth Army headquarters, extracts from war diaries of XX Corps, von Hindenburg’s order intercepting Russian radio messages, and aviation reports. These are referred to throughout the narrative by document numbers. The only thing absent from the original study are the maps, which may be found, however, in the original German version, also available at CARL.
CARL 940.5421 E68ro.

This superbly researched work recounts the history of World War II Eastern Front operations from Stalingrad to Berlin. Erickson, who is considered one of the foremost scholars on Soviet military history, has used German, Soviet, and east European sources to present one of the most detailed accounts of the war yet written by a Western scholar. Although it has a limited number of maps, this book and Erickson's previous volume, The Road to Stalingrad . . . ., are classics in the field.


Professor Erickson's work provides one of the most comprehensive treatments of Eastern Front operations in World War II. This volume discusses the prewar maneuvering on both sides, the German encirclement battles of 1941, and the Soviet counterstrokes at the great battles of Moscow and Stalingrad. His ninety-six-page (primary source) annotated bibliography attests to his thoroughness. His object is to reveal the nature of the Soviet system at war and cut through the "persistent mythology" that still clouds the history of the Great Patriotic War.


An excellent analysis of Soviet combined arms operations at the tactical and operational levels of war. Erickson's manuscript synthesizes Soviet historical practice with current developments in doctrine and force structure. He describes clearly the evolution of combined arms formations in the Soviet armed forces and evaluates their employment on the Eastern Front.


This article addresses the renewed Soviet emphasis in recent years on the study of "relatively prolonged conventional operations." Erickson suggests that the Soviet modernization and expansion program has gone a long way in correcting their historically traditional "tactical and operational weaknesses." A Soviet shift toward increasing tactical flexibility is also briefly discussed. However, the article's main focus is on the Soviet's concentration on the conventional breakthrough--on their unrelenting neutralization and annihilation of the force being pursued. Implementations in organizational structure, weapons systems, and logistics are also reviewed, as are the more persistent shortcomings within the Soviet operational art that continue to exist despite their numerous operational and material improvements.

This study delves into the much-admired character and leadership skills of General Joseph W. Slim. It concentrates on the Burma campaign from the retreat of the Burma corps to India in 1942 to their successful return following the defeat of the Japanese India offensive at Imphal and Kohima. The brilliant advance of the Fourteenth Army to the Irawaddy and ultimately to Rangoon in 1944-45 is analyzed in a well-written account that includes twenty-one maps and forty-eight illustrations.


Cyril Falls is one of the most respected and prolific military historians of this century. In this book, he examines the final Palestinian-Syrian campaign of World War I and, in particular, the "brilliant cavalry operations" of General Allenby's army in the Megiddo or "Armageddon" campaign of 1918. Falls sets the wartime stage, elaborates on the shock action, surprise, determination, and boldness evident in the campaign of September and October 1918, and then discusses the lessons learned. The operations of Lawrence of Arabia, Marshal von Falkenhayn, Kress von Kressenstein, and Jemal Pasha are all discussed in the process.

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This work, compiled by Cyril Falls and others, was directed by the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence and represents Britain's official History of the Great War for the year 1917. It presents the British operations of 1917 in great detail against the broader context of operations on the Western Front. Thus, General Allenby's offensive at Arras is shown to comprise five battles occurring in a period of just over three weeks. These are discussed at length in eleven of the book’s twenty-two chapters. The appendices, consisting of fifty-two original documents and twenty-three maps, are contained in separate bound volumes. An additional twelve maps of a larger size are contained in a separate case.


This multivolume work is a part of the British official History of the Great War. It records the history of British military operations in Macedonia. Unlike a similar study of the Palestine campaign, Falls makes a conscious effort to place the military history in its political context.
This is necessary since this was a joint theater of operations with British, French, Serbian, Italian, Russian, and Greek troops all serving together under French leadership. Since the British were not at the forefront in the final victorious offensive over Bulgaria, it might be assumed that the main effort was only sketched out. To the contrary, however, Falls has provided considerable detail on all major operations, even when Anglo-Greek forces played a subsidiary role. Each volume contains maps and original documents, and there is also a bound volume of fifteen maps and a separate map case for larger maps.


This volume, a collection of four lectures on modern war, was presented at Cambridge in the early years of World War II. Cyril Falls' brief work directly addresses several key aspects of the operational art in the context of modern total war. After a discussion of the doctrine of total war in which the classic concepts of Clausewitz and other famous military theorists are analyzed, Falls examines the operational theories and practices employed in modern blitzkrieg warfare. The importance of initiative and the offensive spirit are stressed. Falls highlights these two concepts as the best means of turning a mechanized attack. The passive defense, as a modern theory and in its application, is rejected by Falls as being seldom, if ever, effective. The work closes with notes on mountain fighting (from both a tactical and an operational perspective) and on the subject of strategy (which equates to our current definition of operations).


This short book is an attempt by Falls to examine modern war and the way war has evolved to its 1943 condition. He dissects war by looking at the principles and elements common to war and analyzes how policy is set. He then goes into more detail in chapters on strategy (what would now be called the operational level), tactics, war at sea and in the air, and national leadership.


Based on twelve years of research, including personal collaboration with Joseph D. Rosvich, Patton's enlisted "confidential secretary," and many interviews with Patton's German adversaries in World War II, this work has been termed a "monumental, definitive biography" of General George S. Patton, Jr. Although the maps are limited and there are no footnotes, the narrative is extremely well written and gives a vivid picture of Patton's operational techniques and personality.

Lieutenant Colonel Fitzgerald's article is an in-depth analysis of Soviet planning to destroy the German's Army Group Center in Belorussia in June 1944. He presents the operational concepts considered by the Stavka (Soviet command), the timetable, the coordination made with partisan forces, and the nature of the German defenses. Then he describes the magnitude of the secretive Soviet troop and logistical buildup and the superior force relationships achieved by the Soviets using typically detailed tables designating, among other things, the width of the front penetration zones, the units involved, and the designated mobile groups used in exploitation. He does not analyze the results, but rather the process, by which the Soviets successfully planned their great victory in Belorussia.


This book contains a sketch of the military career of Marshal Ferdinand Foch. More important for a study of the operational art is the description of his tactical and operational precepts, which are presented in a condensed form. Although somewhat brief and general, this work contains an excellent overview of early operational theory and judgments on the application of fundamental concepts in European wars during Foch's era. Despite its datedness, historical lessons can be learned from this work. It provides an excellent foundation for the further reading of more detailed and lengthy volumes written on the art of war by the World War I French field marshal.

Foch uses historical examples and considerable depth to discuss some principles of war. His discussion of security is valuable to the reader interested in the maneuver of larger units. There is considerable discussion on the effect of morale and will. The work is of limited value.

Fontenot uses the "imperatives" of combat as defined in FM 100-5 (1982)—agility, initiative, depth, and synchronization—to analyze Soviet and U.S. operations in World War II. He analyzes the Soviet invasion of Manchuria in 1945 and the United States Army breakout from Normandy (Operation Cobra) in 1944 to find similarities and differences in doctrine and its application in the field. He finds an operational-level void in U.S. operations that led to the failure to close the Falaise gap. U.S. generals had not thought through the series of battles (the operational level) and were forced to improvise once tactical success was achieved. This operational immaturity on the U.S. Army's part must be redressed if success in any future European war is to be gained.


This is a ground-breaking article defining Grand Tactics (the operational level of war) and calling for the U.S. Army to develop a doctrine for it. This has, of course, already been done, but Colonel Franz's article is still valuable in bringing definition to the operational level of war by citing Soviet, German, and Israeli concepts and employing historical examples to make his point. He is a leader in this realm.


Since comprehending maneuver is an integral part in understanding the operational level of war, Colonel Franz discusses its definition and defines the art creatively, using figures to explain concepts. He also uses historical examples, in particular the advance of the XV Corps (U.S.) following the Saint Lô breakout on the Normandy front in World War II, to show the dynamics of maneuver as it relates to freedom of action and initiative at the operational level.


In this insightful presentation, World War II German operational doctrine becomes the vehicle for demonstrating some of the key concepts of AirLand Battle doctrine. Rommel's Gazala center-offensive (May-June 1942) and von Manstein's Kerch counteroffensive (May 1942) are the historical examples used to illustrate how commanders with inferior forces
were able to seize the initiative after halting their enemy's offensive. In both cases, a deep attack threatening lines of communication is launched on the enemy flank and rear, while holding attacks and feints occupy enemy attention to their front.


General Fuller examines generalship in world war and concludes that it has become impersonal, distant, and more a product of staff decisions than true command. He contrasts what he sees as the diseased state of generalship during and after World War I with examples of brilliant personal leadership in earlier wars. Although brief, this work contains an interesting theory of command, stressing the importance of a personal, creative style of leadership.


The first half of this book provides background on Alexander's life and times along with a "strategical narrative" of his conquests. The second part, which is the unique part of this work, analyzes his generalship based upon terrain and other military considerations. His great battles, sieges, and small wars are all viewed in detail, and the result is what Liddell Hart referred to as the "masterpiece" of all Fuller's books.


This work is divided into three sections: the origin, strategy and tactics of the Civil War; Grant's career as a subordinate general from Ft. Donelson to Chattanooga; and finally, Grant's campaigns as General-in-Chief. Grant's campaigns are considered in detail to bring to light his tactics and strategy. Fuller views Grant as a great strategist and a model of integrity for future generations of American youth.


This forty-page pamphlet was adapted from an introductory course taught at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. It is a good example of an analysis of a military campaign conducted at the operational level.

This article is an analysis of the leadership style of Rommel as reported by his chief of staff in North Africa. While not directly relevant to the operational level of war, it is instructive about the leadership techniques and procedures used by a master of the art.


This article analyzes the operational lessons learned from the battles in front of Moscow in 1941. Key lessons include the absolute requirement for depth to the defense and the necessity of counterstrikes, with emphasis on surprise and mass.

Based on both Japanese and Soviet sources, this meticulously researched work provides a theater-level case study of Soviet "lightning warfare" in Manchuria in August 1945. It discusses strategy, organizational structures, and the conduct of the multifront series of operations that ended fourteen years of Japanese rule in Manchuria. Lieutenant Colonel Glantz' work reveals much about the Soviet operational level of war. The numerous maps, tables, and illustrations complement this excellent work.


This companion volume to Leavenworth Paper no. 7 examines eight selected divisional and army-level operations that show the flexibility and initiative of the Soviets in a variety of circumstances. Thus, Lieutenant Colonel Glantz considers Soviet operations in heavily wooded mountains, arid mountains, and swampy lowlands and analyzes army penetration operations, the reduction of a fortified region, joint ground and riverine operations, and forward detachments in deep operations. This in-depth study is accompanied by a series of excellent tables, maps, and illustrations.


Lieutenant Colonel Glantz' short article clarifies the Soviet concept of the operational level of war by examining its historical basis. Quotations from Soviet military theorists like M. N. Tulkachevsky, A. A. Svechin, and V. D. Sokolovsky trace Soviet doctrine in the operational art from the late 1920s to the present. Eight functions of Soviet operational art are presented, demonstrating the complete integration of this concept into Soviet military science.


This article presents a penetrating analysis of the development and maturation of Soviet operational formations from their inception in the theory growing out of the cavalry experience of the Russian Civil War (1918-21) to the present day operational groupings. He shows how Soviet operational groupings matured in World War II, were modified by the Zhukov-led military reorganization completed in 1957 (with its emphasis on the nuclear battlefield), and began a return in the 1970s to conventional combat techniques. His analysis of Soviet echelonment techniques and their rationale and the evolution of forward detachments and mobile groups provides great insight into the Soviet conception of the operational level of war.

This contemporary article directly addresses several vital issues pertaining to the conduct and application of the operational art. It focuses on the aggressive defensive operations of Eighth Army's 10th, 13th, and 30th Corps during the critical summer of 1942 (preceding the decisive battle at El Alamein). The article outlines General Sir Claude Auchinleck's attempts to restore the lagging offensive spirit of the Eighth Army by adapting a combined arms-oriented mobile defense with the intent of seizing the initiative from Rommel's Africa Corps and decisively defeating it.


Golubovich focuses on the organization and training of reserve armies during the second half of World War II, making reference to a number of specific cases along the way. He concludes with the suggestion that this experience can help promote combat readiness under modern conditions.


Graham analyzes Frederick's campaigns in 1756, 1757, and 1758 and compares them with Joseph Johnston's Peninsular and Atlanta campaigns in 1862 and 1863. He looks at both commanders at the operational level to find similarities and differences. The analysis of reasons for success or failure is good, though the choice of the commanders is not appropriate because of the differences in political power and ability to set strategic goals of the command vs. Graham shows that Frederick's ability to seize the initiative was critical to his success in a strategic defense while outnumbered, whereas Johnston's failure to gain the initiative and his inappropriate reactions to his enemy's moves were damaging to the Southern effort.

This book contains a rather general description of the Eighth Army campaigns in North Africa prior to the time that this army entered Tunisia and was amalgamated into the 18th Army Group. The effective use of highly mobile armored strike forces, especially in the exploitation and pursuit phase of operations, is described. The difficulties of desert warfare and the constraints imposed on highly mobile forces by logistics are shown. There are numerous maps and photos.


This volume, the successor to volume 2, which was titled "Operations--General, encapsulates British thinking on the operational art prior to World War II. Philosophical in tone and general in content, it includes chapters on campaign planning, command and control, offense, defense, and withdrawal operations. It does not detail specific operational techniques or procedures.


This study compares the personalities and military activities of Generals Thomas and Bragg. The discussion concerning how they performed as commanders touches on various aspects of the operational level of war, including intelligence, logistics, density of command, and pursuit.


Gross analyzes historical examples to determine the crucial logistical factors limiting the extent of operational-level offensive operations in World War II. Based on this, he analyzes the TOE of the current heavy division to determine if it could sustain itself in such a situation. He finds one of the main problems to be fuel but still believes there is adequate capability in the heavy division to maintain an offensive in a European scenario.


This book is the autobiography of the man responsible for creating the German armored force before World War II and then leading that force to its greatest victories in northern France and the Soviet Union. Guderian
discusses the development of his tank doctrine and describes his experiences as the commander of a highly mobile armored strike force. Hitler's interference in army operations and war production is discussed. The latter portion of the book details Guderian's efforts to defend against large-scale Soviet offensive operations on the Eastern Front. There are numerous maps.


Major General Haig, Inspector-General of Cavalry in India, discusses the various roles of cavalry in the course of describing a number of staff rides undertaken in India between 1903 and 1906. The value of organizing cavalry into large units the size of divisions and even corps is discussed. Napoleon’s use of cavalry in large units to facilitate operational maneuver is generously praised. Numerous maps are included.


This book discusses various principles of military operations using historical examples from the Napoleonic era, the American Civil War, and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. Emphasis is placed on the importance of maneuver and supply. There is one chapter devoted to examining the effect of terrain on military operations and another chapter on the Russo-Japanese War. There are many maps.


This group study project presents a plan for using conventional forces to defeat Warsaw Pact forces attacking western Europe. The plan envisions the use of a rapid flanking movement through Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland in combination with an amphibious landing in northern Poland to achieve a deep envelopment of Warsaw Pact armies in Germany. The detailed discussion of how this plan could be implemented is a good study of the factors involved in large-scale maneuver at the operational level of war. Numerous maps and tables embellish the text.


This short article describes the role of the 4th Armored Division, (XII Corps, Third Army) in the envelopment and capture of Nancy, France, in
September 1944. The campaign is seen as an example of what can be accomplished by fast-moving armored formations operating in the rear of enemy formations.


This book contains a general discussion of the principles of warfare, from leadership to supply. The need to maintain initiative and achieve mobility is stressed.


While describing 12th Army Group operations from the Normandy breakout to the closing of the Ruhr Pocket, Colonel Heiborg states the case for using highly mobile, heavy armored units to rapidly exploit enemy disorganization.


This book contains a series of essays published between 1891 and 1903. Edited posthumously, Henderson's essays consider questions of strategy, tactics, military theory, and military history. This work provides a glimpse of the most advanced military thinking in Britain at the turn of the century and provides insights into operations, combined arms theory, and officer education that are relevant today.


This article describes the German move into the Balkans in the spring of 1941 from both a strategic and an operational perspective. The rationale behind the various Twelfth Army operational maneuvers and the reasons for the success of those operations are discussed.

Higgins analyzes the writings and operations of these two World War II generals to determine how they were alike and where they differed. He isolates six tenets that characterize these two leaders: concentrated artillery; air-ground coordination; envelopment or encirclement of the enemy; high speed; calculated flank and logistical risk; and personal, forward command. The discussion develops these points to illustrate where they were used properly and where they were misused. He finishes with implications for today's Army.


These volumes represent a major contribution to the study of World War II. They show the importance of good intelligence to military operations and provide insights into the problems of intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination. The areas covered are Europe, North Africa, and the Mediterranean.


The official Soviet six-volume history of World War II, the works should be used by any serious student of large operations on the Eastern Front. The volumes are available through DTIC.


This is an important article that defines the necessity to relearn the lessons of operational-level combat at the highest levels. Taught in the 1920s and 1930s to both Command and General Staff College and Army War College students, the art of moving and maneuvering large units was ignored following 1945 until the emphasis was readopted in 1982. Holder calls for the schools to take the lead in training both the students and the senior commanders of today in the fundamentals of operations, so that they can operate effectively in present and future events.

This book is an excellent account of the Battle of Verdun. World War I trench warfare comes alive in Horne's description of the German and French Armies struggle to achieve the elusive breakthrough that would allow them to maneuver and gain victory. The impact of this battle on the French and German nations and on military doctrine is discussed. Illustrations include photographs, maps, and fortification plans.


This book describes in great detail the German attack on France in 1940 and French efforts to repel the invaders. What emerges is a picture of what can be achieved at the operational level of war when proper doctrine and good planning are combined with commanders who are ready and willing to exploit every opportunity for penetration and deep maneuver. Numerous photos and maps accompany the text.


This examination of Australian generalship during the early years of World War II in the Pacific pays particular attention to interpersonal relations and the ability of Australia's military leaders to cope with the psychological pressures imposed on them by their own superiors as well as by the Japanese. American generals such as MacArthur, Eichelberger, and Sutherland appear frequently in the narrative. There is a good description of the New Guinea campaign.


Captain House's study examines the development of combined arms doctrine, tactics, and organization at the division level and below. Historical examples from World War I through the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 show how combined arms doctrine has changed in response to the opportunities and challenges posed by technological change. This study describes the complexity of using combined arms effectively on the modern battlefield and discusses recurring issues in doctrinal development.

Howard's thesis shows the importance of maintaining freedom of action while on the defensive. The value of unity of command, intelligence, and an aggressive spirit is illustrated.


This article describes the ways in which an effective logistical system contributed to Wellington's operations in Spain. Comparisons are made with British logistics in World War II.


This item consists of four short papers presented to the "Theory of Combat Workshop" held at the Naval Postgraduate School, 10-11 July 1979. The papers discuss the need for a theory of combat and the difficulties encountered in establishing combat models.


Ionin's article presents a general description of the changes in Soviet defensive doctrine that occurred during World War II. The importance of the corps link of control, defense in depth, greater firepower, and maneuver forces is mentioned.


This article discusses Soviet offensive and defensive doctrine primarily on the tactical level, but there is some mention of operational level concerns. The Soviet doctrine of using rapid maneuver to destroy enemy forces is described.

Jacobs discusses the historical development of the concept of "operational art" in the Soviet Union and concludes that this concept does not "advance the military art." In his opinion the traditional division of war into strategy and tactics is sufficient for the analysis of military operations.


This second of a three-volume biography of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur covers the period from December 1941, when the Japanese attacked the Philippines, to 2 September 1945, when the Japanese surrendered aboard the battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay. The biography focuses on MacArthur as a soldier and commander and on the campaigns in the southwest Pacific area of operations. Considerable information on the operational level of war in the Pacific emerges from this well-written and thoroughly researched biography.


In this last volume of James' definitive biography of General MacArthur, attention is paid to the reconstruction of Japan and other events that happened after 1950. The chapters on Korea show MacArthur's skill as an operational commander, especially his personal impact on the planning and conduct of the Inchon landing. More time, however, is devoted to his personal struggles and conflicts with the Washington, DC, leadership—a situation that eventually led to his being dismissed.


Dated, but still interesting, this book explains the principles of campaigns using examples from the nineteenth century and the Boer War. James was a British officer writing for his fellow officers, and his work was used as a text in some Army schools. He stresses the importance of political considerations in the conduct of war. He realizes the value of modern fire to enhance the fighting power of small units and to increase the effectiveness of the defensive. This is a clearly written and perceptive book. Unfortunately, Douglas Haig, commander of the B.E.F. in World War I, failed to heed some of its lessons.

This book is written for the divisional commander. It is a translation of Japanese tactical thought from the 1929 era. Though it is not addressed to corps-level operations, its sections on command philosophy and combined arms operations are of value to the student of the operational level of war.


This is a research report prepared by a USAF colonel while a student at the Air War College. The report traces the changes in air interdiction doctrine and strategy from 1945 to 1977. The author assesses how the lessons of World War II interdiction were applied during the Korean War, the interdiction strategy of the United States in Vietnam, and approaches to interdiction of the 1970s. The author flew combat tours in Southeast Asia. He believes that, owing to restrictions, air interdiction in Vietnam served mostly as a bad example of the use of air power. Interdiction in future wars, according to the author, should be used only on selected occasions rather than in sustained campaigns because of political restrictions and strike resource availability.


Jomini was a participant in and observer of the campaigns of Napoleon. The Art of War was first printed in 1838. It is concerned with the problem of the validity of general ideas in military science and develops principles of war, operational art, and strategy. Jomini's theoretical writings have been a staple of military education for over a century and a half. While this translation is not without flaws, it is preferred to the translation by Winship and McLean.


This is a history of the campaign of 1815 by the great French military thinker and author, Jomini. The work traces Napoleon's efforts from his escape from Elba to the end of his career. Jomini assesses the political and military events of the period including the Battles of Ligny and Waterloo. The work provides evidence of why Napoleon was a master of the operational level of war, even in defeat.
Jomini was the most celebrated and influential student of Napoleon. This massive history details the campaigns of Frederick the Great in the first volume and the first wars of the French Revolution in volume two. Important sections of this work explain Jomini's concept of lines of operation and the principles of war. There are descriptions of how battles and campaigns in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were conducted. Included in the volumes are an index and an atlas of battle maps.


Karpushin looks at the methods used to resupply the 1st Guards Tank Army in a major operation in July-August 1944. He discusses the establishment of forward supply points, medical facilities, and engineer units and how they functioned as the battle progressed. This is most valuable as an examination of the problems that arose in this operation and how they were solved to permit the offensive to continue.


Available through DTIC, this history records the contribution of Soviet artillery to operations on the Eastern Front. As such, the book illuminates the interplay of combined arms during most of the major operations in the east.


This and the following twelve volumes are a series written to illustrate the necessity for adherence to timeless principles of war as they apply to the operational art. Each book is brief and serves as an excellent introduction to the campaign addressed in its title. Although Kearsey claims to be addressing strategy and tactics, in fact, most of his work
directly concerns the maneuvering of larger units—what we now term the operational level of war. His principles of war are British but are similar to those used by the U.S. Army and are equally applicable when analyzing a campaign.


A Study of the Peninsular Campaign up to and Including the Battle of Salamanca, Illustrating the Principles of War. London: William Kelly, 1928. CARL M946 06 J3.


The German campaign in Poland in 1939 was not planned as a blitzkrieg operation because fast-moving mobile warfare was not a completely accepted doctrine. However, the success of the panzer force in Poland, described in this brief, concise, and excellent article, supported the case of proponents of blitzkrieg warfare. In Poland, the German panzer force and General Guderian were able to show their mastery of the operational level of war. The author of this article used material collected while writing Department of the Army Pamphlet no. 20-255, The German Campaign in Poland.


While based on British military-civilian relationships of the 1950s, this book has applicability today. The author is concerned about the use of armed force in the nuclear age. His focus is primarily concerned with war at the strategic level.


This article is particularly interesting for its discussion of the development of forward detachments. The authors note the importance of having the "optimal composition" of units to provide sufficient power and mobility to operate effectively deep in the enemy's lines. A number of specific cases are highlighted for discussion.

Major General Kiryan declares that during World War II the Soviet Armed Forces accumulated considerable experience in carrying out operations on an army scale using combined arms armies. Armies acted either independently or within the mission of the front of which they were a part. Army operations depended upon artillery and air support, particularly after 1943. Echelonment of forces and actions by mobile groups were important factors in successful Soviet operations. Methods for offensive operations at army level evolved during World War II and led to the theory of operational art employed by the Soviets after the war.


This article provides a general assessment of Soviet encirclement operations during World War II. The focus is at army level. Kobrin's thesis is that during World War II, encirclement of German armies was one of the most resolute forms of Soviet offensive operations. Despite the diverse conditions under which encirclements were attempted, the Soviets were usually able to achieve sufficient mass to accomplish the main offensive mission. Operations were carried out in depth, and surprise was usually achieved. The author claims that encirclement continues to be a basis for developing modern military operations.


This brief article explains Soviet use of tank armies in offensive operations during World War II. The tank armies served to greatly increase the scale of operations owing to their massive employment, high speed, and achievement of great depth. The article describes the organizational structure of Soviet tank armies and tells how a tank army's commitment to action was prepared. Tank armies used mobility and power to break through to the operational depth and encircle the enemy.


Using examples from the Soviet Army's World War II experiences, the author shows that independent operations by tank and motorized infantry units and subunits had an important tactical and operational role. Independent operations were advocated by Soviet theorists in the 1930s and used successfully in World War II. Effective reconnaissance, surprise, maneuver, and the indirect approach combined to make Soviet independent operations work in World War II, and the author believes such operations continue to be practical.

Kozlov presents a somewhat dated look at Soviet theoretical concepts and classifies the structure and branches of military science. The decisive role of nuclear arms is central to all considerations.


General Kuh was Chief of Staff of the German First Army during the initial period of World War I. He wrote this study at the urging of and with the assistance of the U.S. Army. His coauthor was General von Bergmann, who acted as army G-4 during the operations. The book provides a thorough examination of army and corps organization, movement, and supply in the German Army's invasion of France in 1914. Those interested in supplying an army while it is constantly on the move will find this a useful work.


This is a book about war and the leadership of men in wars beginning with Gideon in biblical times and concluding with Montgomery at Alamein. Each chapter focuses on a different era of history and highlights the role of individual commanders. Although the analysis is sometimes superficial and there is no documentation, Laffin's book provides an interesting summary of the conduct of war. Both military thinkers and masters of the operational level of war are reviewed here.


This research report by five students at the National War College evaluates the U.S. Army's AirLand Battle doctrine and the SHAPE Follow-on Force Attack Concept. The report assesses doctrinal considerations regarding the relationship between deep attack and the forward battle, the allocation of airpower, and procedures for air-ground coordination. The author also examines potential Soviet countermeasures to U.S. doctrine. The author believes that despite differences, AirLand Battle and SHAPE concepts can be complementary. The report relies on secondary sources.

The authors discuss lessons learned during World War II for planning and coordinating operations of large units, including war gaming, successive versus parallel planning, and high-level centralized direction.


The author's purpose is to assess the achievements and mistakes of Wavell as a military commander, but the work, in many ways, is a study in personality. There is, however, a brief discussion of Wavell's role (both positive and negative) in Compass, which provides a good example in the operational level of war.

Montgomery as Military Commander. New York: Stein and Day, 1972. CARL 940.54 L672m.

Lewin traces Montgomery's controversial career from World War I through the interwar years, ending in the final days of World War II. Certain elements of Lewin's study are obviously more applicable to the study of the operational art than others. The chapters on Alamein and the 21st Army Group's operations in central Europe touch upon several key operational issues, especially as they apply to the conduct of large-scale combined and joint operations. Montgomery's leadership style and command and control techniques are also closely analyzed. Consequently, the work not only contains lessons learned on the operational art (as exercised by the famous British military leader) but many lessons concerning leadership of large formations.

Levin presents a popular treatment of Rommel as a successful military commander. He provides excellent maps and stresses Rommel's brilliance in conducting armored warfare. Many of Rommel's tenets are discussed, such as the need to thrust deeply into the enemy's rear, the disregard of one's flanks while attacking the enemy's, and the imperative of momentum. The author also assesses Rommel's leadership and command and control.


This book is a detailed and tedious account of Field Marshal Slim's military operations in Southeast Asia, although a critical analysis is generally wanting. The author's treatment, however, improves when discussing the last phases of the war in Burma.


A good analysis of the military thought, career, and times of this famous French general. Liddell Hart portrays Foch as an antithesis to Napoleon, i.e., a single-minded general who learned lessons through experience that coalesced and culminated late in his military career. There is a good deal of critical analysis of campaigns in western Europe.


This two-volume set of memoirs constitutes an important source for understanding Liddell Hart's thought and his opinions of others in the field of military history, theory, and practice. Any appreciation of Liddell Hart's work must take into consideration these memoirs, which provide useful insights into the author's character and personality and how they affected his ideas and studies.


Sensitive to the United States' situation in NATO, Liddell Hart argues that future warfare in Europe must be based on fluidity of force and controlled dispersion of forces rather than on their concentration. Such tactics, with a concomitant organization, were used by the Germans in France in the last phases of World War II. This tradition goes back to the tactics of Napoleon, which involved multiple envolements.
This study is a superb analysis of Sherman, whom Liddell Hart considers a model general in the planning and conduct of military operations. The author critically traces Sherman's development as a military commander, ending his treatment with the Atlanta campaign and subsequent engagements. This book is important, for many writers consider Sherman a master of operational art. The reading of this study should be balanced, however, by using Sherman's papers, a practice the author did not follow in a thorough manner.


This volume contains a series of lectures given by General Loizeau at the French Ecole Superieure de Guerre and translated for use at the Command and General Staff School. Loizeau uses historical examples through 1914 to show how corps can use maneuver to achieve decision.

This discussion of Soviet defenses on the Kursk salient purports to demonstrate the increasing sophistication of Soviet military art as the war progressed. Among other features, the Soviet counteroffensive (Belgorod-Kharkov) shows the successful employment of tank armies as mobile groups.


Arguing against the American military mind-set rooted in wars of attrition, the author instead advocates a mastery of the operational level of war as characterized by the relational-maneuver method of operations, a method whose main principles are avoidance, deception, elusiveness, and momentum. To illustrate his points, Luttwak uses two examples--the classic German blitzkrieg and the Finnish defense in depth for Lapland. The latter example deserves serious attention.


This standard history of the Israeli Defense Forces provides an excellent analysis of the evolution of tactics, strategy, command and control, organization, and military behavior of the Israeli armed forces since the country's independence in 1948. The book offers numerous examples of deep battle, exploitation, and indirect approach, including information on the classic push of Israeli armor to the Suez Canal in 1967. Appreciating Israeli achievements in the planning and conduct of operations is vital, for this demonstrates that the operational art has been practiced by forces smaller than corps.


These two authors contrast two basic types of warfare: wars of attrition and wars of relational maneuver. The German blitzkrieg and the Finnish defense in depth are contrasted as two basic styles of warfare--the latter category being one of relational maneuver.


Luvaas examines how the French, British, and Germans studied the Civil War and explains why they drew the lessons that they did. His conclusion is that military history studied superficially only serves to confirm one's
principles rather than to aid one in the discovery of new insights. This book is worthy of consideration by those who recognize the value of studying the past for applications to the present.


This is a self-serving book that provides meager details about MacArthur’s battle record in the Pacific and Korea.


This excellent and succinct article provides a historical overview of army corps. Beginning his discussion with Napoleon, the author analyzes subsequent developments in the French and German Armies and summarizes developments during World War I, the interwar period in France and Germany, and World War II. He explores the reasons for various changes and the effects of reforms on command and control, logistics, and tactics.


This is a standard work on the subject, but it falls short of offering a conceptional framework for analyzing battles with the operational level of war in mind. Nevertheless, the reader can draw his own conclusions on the basis of the rich details provided by the authors.


Manstein provides a brief sketch of the problems and methods of German retreat from the Soviet Union in 1943 and 1944. It is recommended that Manstein’s book be used for a much fuller treatment of this subject.


This work by an outstanding (many say the best) German general in World War II constitutes essential reading. Field Marshal von Manstein provides illuminating details and a critical analysis of German military operations.
in Russia, although he underestimates achievements made by the Soviets in the conduct of operations and lays too much blame on Hitler for German failures. Von Manstein's recapture of Kharkov was the most brilliant operational performance of his career. Although successful in offense, this German commander has gained deserved recognition for his orderly withdrawal of German forces from the Soviet Union.


Maryshev outlines the conduct of the Lwow-Sandomierz operation, paying special attention to the development of offensive thrusts, the regrouping of tank armies, and the crossing of the Vistula River. He stresses the importance of this experience in the development of Soviet military art.


The authors discuss the evolution of counterattacks by the Soviet Army in World War II at the operational level. They also describe the importance of such operations, determine lessons learned, and point out the necessity of such operations in the future.


This work is a strategic and operational analysis of Napoleon Bonaparte's Jena campaign. Although now somewhat dated, it remains a useful case study of Bonaparte's operational methods.


The author uses a methodology similar to his Jena volume to analyze Bonaparte's strategy and operational methods in the Ulm campaign.
This work provides a clear and concise operational account of the first forty days of World War I on the Western Front that culminated in the Allied victory on the Marne. This is an excellent short study of a campaign from the perspective of the operational level of war.

This brief, undocumented, but perceptive analysis of the operations of the Allied armies on the Western Front during the final four months of World War I is written by a well-known British officer and military commentator. The focus is on the strategic and operational levels of war.

A military biography of Lee written by a noted British military historian, this volume covers the eastern theater of the American Civil War from a strategic and operational perspective. Relatively brief, it provides a good background for a more detailed study of Lee's campaigns.

McMahon evaluates the leadership and war-fighting styles of these two generals by viewing each from the perspective of his army's World War II doctrine, then looking for similarities and differences between the men. He then derives implications for the U.S. Army and its AirLand Battle doctrine within the context of NATO.

The Battle of Jassy-Kishinev involved almost two million men and resulted in the capitulation of Romania and Bulgaria. As an example of maneuver warfare in difficult terrain, it has great value to the student of the operational art. In just ten short days, two Soviet fronts crushed the four Axis armies of Army Group South Ukraine and drove up to 400 kilometers.
deep into the Axis rear. The article is worthy of study for many reasons, not the least of which is the Soviet style of creating large encirclements simultaneously with the conduct of exploitation and pursuit.


Primarily a study of the personal attributes and characters of fourteen general officers in the German Army in World War II, this book touches peripherally on operational questions. Its utility, therefore, is limited to a consideration of the effects of personality on operational questions.


This is a classic operational study of most of the German armored battles of World War II. The author participated in these campaigns as an officer of the German General Staff.


Marshal Meretskov's experiences as an army and front commander in the northern sector (Leningrad, Finland) of the Eastern Front and in Manchuria are described in this book. The book is useful for the information it contains regarding large operations in the difficult terrain and subarctic climes of northern Russia.


This article has direct application for the employment of tactical air forces (1 British Corps) in an attack on echeloned Soviet forces in central Europe. Outlining intelligence and targeting responsibilities for deep attack at both corps and division level, the author recommends a number of procedural and well as organizational changes to improve the responsiveness and effectiveness of tactical air power within the British Army and Royal Air Force. Despite the author's focus on the British tactical system, his arguments can be applied successfully to current American doctrinal issues on the same subject.

This article addresses the use of the General Reserve in operational maneuvers. Utilizing several case studies from the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, it makes some good generalizations about the use of reserves.


In this book, the commander of the Australian Army Corps describes his unit's participation in operations on the Western Front in 1918. It is an excellent study of the operations of one corps in World War I.

Morin, Michael J. "Does NATO Need a New Conventional Operational Strategy?" Study project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, May 1980. DTIC and CARL ADA-093055.

This paper argues that NATO should adopt an operational strategy of mobile engagements in depth instead of the current operational concept of forward defense, with its linear dispositions and insufficient reserves. A well-reasoned argument in purely operational terms, the paper does not address the political implications of such an alteration in operational concepts.


This book is a strategic and operational case study of the Norwegian campaign of 1940—the first occasion on which all three elements of modern war (land, sea, and air) were fully involved. Written by a major general of Royal Marines, it covers the Norwegian campaign fully and analytically, drawing upon sources from all the combatants. The book also compares the Norwegian campaign with the Guadalcanal campaign of 1942.


Mrazek's work is an attack on the lack of creativity and imagination shown by soldiers in their attempts to solve military problems "by the
book." (The Vietnam war being a prime example.) The author discusses the "creativity gap" between soldiers (professionals) and guerrillas (amateurs).


This bibliography addresses the areas of strategy and tactics. It is divided according to three periods: pre-World War I, interwar, and World War II and after. Its entries are not annotated. A subject index is provided as the last section of the book.


An excellent operational analysis of the Marne campaign of 1914, this book argues that "the German failure was not due to the defective plan so much as it was due to defective command and execution." The concluding chapter is especially good in its analysis of the operational principles used and abused in the campaign.


Its title notwithstanding, this work is a textbook on operational principles as envisioned in 1921. Naylor makes excellent use of historical examples to reinforce his points.


This brief article provides an account of the operations of the 4 1/2 Corps of the Imperial Russian Second Army at the famous battle of Tannenberg in late August 1914. The problems created by faulty operational planning at army level and the inflexible leadership of Russian commanders at both army and corps echelons resulted in a decisive Russian defeat at the hands of a greatly outnumbered, but doctrinally superior and better organized and equipped, German force. The problems of exercising operational level command and control over widely dispersed maneuvering corps offer timeless lessons. Also illuminating is the Russian failure to maintain a focus on the primary objectives of their ill-fated East Prussian campaign.

The importance of seeing the battlefield is stressed in this brief article on the three-corps-size Russian First Army's campaign in East Prussia in the late summer of 1914. The article not only dispells several historical myths about the controversial World War I campaign, but it also explains the problems of seizing the initiative, counterattacking, and executing a vigorous pursuit after a force has been on the operational defensive. The importance of taking risks and adopting an offensive mind-set, in spite of not knowing the continued offensive capabilities of the enemy, are dealt with. Many operations within this campaign have contemporary application to both the theory and the practice of the operational art.


This book is a theoretical discussion of maneuver in a nuclear environment. Although it primarily emphasizes tactical maneuver, the work also gives some attention to the operational and strategic levels of war.


In this highly acclaimed book, General Palmer focuses on America's war in Vietnam. Written by one of the principal players in much that happened, the account has been generally acknowledged as one of the best accounts of the war.


This book won the Frunze Prize for military scholarship in the Soviet Union in 1973. It is a valuable source of information and analysis on the large operations conducted outside the borders of the Soviet Union during World War II. In addition to the well-known Belorussian and Vistula-Oder campaigns, the book also describes operations in the southern sector of the front: Yassy-Kishinev, Budapest, Belgrade, Slovakia, Vienna, and Prague are some of the battles described in detail. Politically biased rhetoric is a minor problem throughout the book.

Brief as it is, this volume is George Patton's own account of his operations in World War II. As such, it illuminates many operational concepts and details from the commander's perspective.


Primarily a study of the tactics of the French Army during the eighteenth century, this closely reasoned and heavily documented work argues that the tactical changes of the Napoleonic era were evolutionary rather than revolutionary. It contains a limited but useful amount of material on the development of grand tactical (operational) concepts.


On the basis of preliminary investigation, the authors offer an analysis of the preparation and conduct of combined arms and joint offensive operations employing ground, air, and naval forces. They note the increase in the number of such operations late in the war. Characteristics of the operations were encirclement and annihilation of large enemy groupings, fragmentation of the front of enemy defenses, and the annihilation of remaining formations.


General Ridgway commanded the Eighth Army and Far Eastern Command during the Korean War. Although this book does not focus on the operational level of war, it provides a viewpoint on operations from the corps level and higher. The strategy of the war is also covered in some detail.

General Ridgway's autobiography provides valuable background information for the application of the operational art of war at division, corps, and army levels.


Romanus has written an interesting historical article on the evolution of the corps as a maneuver element. The article focuses on the corps and its function in the operational art of war.


The title suggests the thrust of this 120-page book: the evolution of doctrine in the U.S. Army from 1973 to 1982. Debates regarding the active defense, the reemphasis on the NATO battlefield, and the concepts of the extended and the integrated battlefield are among the major subjects examined by Romjue. The book also describes the thought and influence of many of the most important doctrinal thinkers of the period--Starry, DePuy, Morelli, Meyer, Luttwak, Wass de Czege, and others.


This work is a collection of Rommel's World War II notes and letters with an introduction and remarks by Liddell Hart and concluding comments by Rommel's son, Manfred, on the events surrounding Rommel's death. The book contains a section on "The Rules of Desert Warfare." Rommel provides his reflections on the military art, some of which concern concentration in time rather than in space, the effect of speed outweighing number, flexibility as a means to surprise, security provided by audacity, the value of indirect rather than direct reply to an enemy's moves, and the inadvisability of unprincipled expediency.


A useful discussion on the existence of the Soviet Operational Maneuver Group (OMG), the article argues that NATO should be considering doctrine to
counter an OMG-type threat instead of arguing about the terminology of the force. The article also includes a discussion on the Soviet view of the differences between tactics and the operational art.


Published in 1972, this book quickly assumed an important place in the field of Soviet publications on operational art. Purporting to be based on scientifically derived, objectively verifiable laws of warfare, this work can be disagreeable because of its heavy Marxist rhetoric. Nevertheless, its strong historical foundation and its in-depth consideration of the ideas of mobility, high tempo, mass, surprise, initiative, and survivability mark it as an important study. Colonel Savkin presumes throughout the book that the battlefield will be a nuclear one. This book is must reading for serious students of the operational and tactical levels of war in that it is an authoritative Soviet statement on the nature of today's nuclear battlefield.


This report is based on the Soviet experiences of World War I and the Civil War. It explores the concept of successive offensive operations. This concept has three parts: initial operation, pursuit operation (or intermediate operations), and final operation. These operations merge into a single offensive operation, the aim being no longer the gradual destruction of the large enemy grouping by several operational efforts but rather its complete destruction in the course of one operation.


Although this is primarily a study in tactics, there are some valuable lessons to be drawn from this study of a successful corps commander. Schmidt focuses on General Walton H. Walker and his impact on the operations of XX Corps from initial training through the end of the Lorraine campaign.
The authors of this outstanding book had as their purpose the documentation of the development of Soviet military art as derived from basic Soviet sources. The book is divided into six chapters covering the years 1917-41, 1941-53, 1953-59, 1960-68, 1969-73, and 1974-80. Each chapter is a collection of individual articles by Soviet authors, each article addressing some question regarding the development of Soviet military art. Not all the articles address the operational level of war, although many do. Among the questions discussed in the book are the evolution of combined arms ground combat; the relationship of a society, its culture, and its economy to warfare; the impact of nuclear technology on the battlefield; and the integration of air, ground, and naval operations. The authors also precede each chapter with their own analysis and summary of important military developments during the time period under consideration.


Seaman provides an excellent example of operational maneuver. His article describes a World War II combined force of American and French units of the 6th Army Group that time their attack with the movement of German general reserves to create a pocket.


This excellent history focuses on the strategic and operational levels of war. It relies heavily on Western sources but provides a relatively unbiased account of the war on the Eastern Front. Although the book is 600 pages long, it does not address the operational level of war per se, but approaches it through its detailed description of military operations and campaigns. Unfortunately, the work suffers from a lack of maps. It does, however, provide excellent discussions of strategic, political, and economic issues.


The article provides a historical example of a double pincer movement along the Don River. Selle blames the final positions of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad on the rigidity of Hitler's orders.

This is a personal biography of General Patton by a friend and commander who served under him in both world wars. It is of limited value to the operational level of war except to show how Patton motivated his soldiers and how he led his various units.


This brief but interesting article proposes the immediate formation of air-mechanized brigades and divisions equipped with air-mechanized main battle air vehicles (MBAVs-heavy attack helicopters). These units would also contain infantry in an air assault role with organic transport helicopters. Their operational deployment in central Europe is described. The authors contend that these units can be created from existing assets and would function well in an aggressive defensive doctrine. The authors stress that these units would be ideal as an operational reserve and would be well suited for the engagement of Soviet operational maneuver groups, attacks on Soviet second echelons, or deep attack in an offensive operation.


Shevchuk looks at the operations of ad hoc operational groups established by the Soviets to conduct a counteroffensive against German forces around Smolensk in the summer of 1941. He emphasizes the importance of these operations in the maintenance of the strategic defense then being conducted. The failure of these troops to achieve their initial objectives is explained as due to a lack of air support in the face of strong enemy air attacks, inadequate time to plan, and a lack of sufficient troops and equipment.

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This is an interesting discussion of Gen. A. P. Belov's highly successful extended deep raid into the German rear with the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps from 17 November 1941 to 10 January 1942. Belov's forces linked up with the forces of IV Airborne Corps (dropped in the German rear) and local partisan forces. They successfully disrupted the German rear for seven months as the most successful of several operational groups formed by the Soviets in the Battle of Moscow. This group was the predecessor of later, better organized Soviet mobile groups.

Shtemenko, S. "How the Last Campaign to Defeat Hitler's Germany Was Planned" [Kak planirovalas poslednyaya kampaniya po razgromu hitlerovskoy germanii]. Voenno istoricheskii zhurnal [Military history journal], no. 5, 1965:56-72. Translated by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (Army), Washington, DC. DTIC AD-626287.

The article discusses the General Staff's reactions to Stalin's strategic and operational decisions. It specifically addresses how the final World War II campaigns were planned from the Soviet perspective.


Shutov summarizes the Soviet view of tank army meeting engagements from World War II. The article contains interesting observations on fire support, organization, broad maneuvers on the battlefield, the dynamics of combat operations, and initiative.


This work by Colonel A. A. Sidorenko of the Frunze Military Academy was one of the most important Soviet doctrinal works of the 1970s. It is concerned almost exclusively with the operational level of war. Espousing the firmly held Soviet view that the offensive is the decisive form of military operations, this book assumes that victory in future battle will depend on offensive action in a nuclear environment. Sidorenko describes how the Soviets would conduct offensive campaigns under conditions of widespread destruction, contamination, and fluid, unfixed battle lines. The book includes discussions on the subjects of massing forces and fires, wide maneuver, pursuit, exploitation, river crossings, surprise, and night operations. This study is one of the most basic and important texts available on the Soviet operational art under nuclear conditions.
Using the reminiscences of a tank corps' commander, Major General A. S. Burdeynyy, and other documents, the author describes preparations and planning for the tank corps' role in the Belorussian operation. It is shown how carefully laid plans went swiftly awry and the corps' actual operations were quite changed from what was originally intended. How the corps commanders coped with the changes and fought successfully against German forces occupies the remainder of the article. This is a good example of corps operations in adverse circumstances.


This clear, accurate, straightforward memoir is by one of the best Allied practitioners of the operational art of war in World War II. Slim's Burma campaigns are masterful examples of leadership in war.


The article discusses logistics for the World War II Burma campaign. Highlighted are logistic difficulties, improvisations, and solutions. This is good background material for corps- and army-level logistic operations and planning.


Sokolov discusses the growth of Soviet communications units during World War II. He details their expansion; the consolidation of their state, general staff, and army communications facilities; and the use of their radio and air liaison to assist command and control.

The last three pages of this 1964 article contain the author's definition of the military art and a discussion on its three components: strategy, operational art, and tactics.


This 1955 article reflects the requirement for the larger-unit commander to be aware of the need for a third level of warfare--the operational level. The author suggests we borrow from our European allies and establish the command, staff, and communications systems needed for a corps commander to influence the tactical battle. Providing the means to fight the tactical battle is not enough, however; recognizing the operational level of battle is a necessity so that a system can be structured to allow the corps commander to deal with actions off the battlefield that directly affect actions on the battlefield. Steinmetz describes the operational level of battle in terms of building a bridge to a mobile far bank. The situation is constantly changing, and with only a consideration of the two fixed levels of war--tactics and strategy--any solution is at best a temporary patch job. The author proposes the adoption of a term that deals with this high-speed, rapidly changing situation--the operational level of war. This is an excellent early article proposing the adoption of the term.


This article is a consideration of the planning for Third Army's assault crossing of the Rhine that began on 22 March 1945. Primarily considered from an engineer's perspective, the article details bridging requirements, enemy capabilities, use of local resources, troop training, and lessons learned. This is a detailed article reflecting Army-level bridging operations in an assault.


This article analyzes the Soviet threat to the corps logistical center (the general support center). The author points out the Soviet capability to launch strikes on this vital center by specialized airborne tactical units and long-range aviation. Strategic surveillance devices will be used to target command and logistical centers, and tactical and operational deep strikes will be conducted to disrupt support operations of the major
maneuver units. Submarine-launched ballistic missiles will be used to destroy port facilities. The author points out that probable targets for Soviet deep strikes would be the armaments and combat vehicle facilities of the corps general support centers. This would seriously hamper support of sustained operations. As a final word, the author stresses the importance of the combat service support commander's maintaining tactical as well as technical proficiency. This article alerts the operational planner to this added dimension of the Soviet threat to successful, sustained combat operations.


This early-war propaganda piece primarily focuses on the tactical level of war. Prepared by Soviet authors, the work is heavy on pedantic phraseology and light on usable material. The beneficial portions of the work are the sections on tanks, airpower, and paratroops. There is also one short article on a long-term raid in the enemy rear. In addition, this work will give the reader an insight into Soviet propaganda writings and the Soviet perspective during the early days of World War II.


This succinct article traces the evolution of "echelons above corps" (EAC) and calls for the establishment of a command echelon above the corps. Colonel Stuckey emphasizes the "joint" and "combined" aspects of EAC procedures and the role of the unified command. He strongly supports one or more echelon above corps to enhance command and control capability of Army forces. To fill the requirement, doctrine would have to be established, organization outlined, and JCS Publication no. 2 changed to reflect the new concepts.


This reference consists of two volumes prepared by members of MacArthur's staff. Volume 1 describes the operations of forces under General MacArthur from the Japanese attack on Luzon in 1941 through the surrender in 1945. Volume 2 covers Japanese operations in the Pacific from prewar preparations in 1941 through the end of the war. Volume 1 has a supplement, but it is not relevant to wartime operations as it covers the MacArthur era of postwar occupation of Japan. This reference has a good reservoir of data on the southwest Pacific area of operation at the theater level. Operational lessons can be gleaned from this narrative.
This series was published at Fort Leavenworth as an instructional aid for instructors and officers of the Army to foster their understanding of the organizational structure of larger units. Primarily oriented on unit organization, the various volumes address specific levels, i.e., corps, field army, and army group, discussing troop allocation and missions at the various echelons. The primary value of these works are for historical background on the various echelons. Volume 3, A Group of Armies, contains a practical exercise entailing offensive and defensive operations and is accompanied by a map exercise. The practical exercise also requires the user to estimate the means required to support the operation. These works could be useful in providing guidelines for preparing practical exercises for current operations (format, organization, etc.).


Tanksley examines the Soviet’s Operational Maneuver Group (OMG) and focuses on its roles, missions, strengths, and vulnerabilities. He explores the implications for and impact on U.S. AirLand Battle doctrine of the OMG and recommends ways to properly counter its threat by proper use of our doctrine.


Colonel Taran describes the planning and development of a complete communications network for the 1st Tank Army’s campaign in the Belgorod-Kharkov operations of August 1943. The network supplied multiple communications routes of several types to and from the highest and lowest levels of command in the army. He describes how the effective communications contributed to the success of the army’s offensive operations.

This twelve-volume set includes every article printed in the fifty-issue series of the Southeast Asia Analyses Report. The report represents a month-by-month analysis of Vietnam War activity, including forces and manpower; Viet Cong-North Vietnamese operations; Allied ground, naval, and air operations; RVNAF; casualties and losses; population security; war costs and inflation; and construction and port operations in South Vietnam (DTIC abstract). Users will find portions of this work beneficial for understanding operations from 1965 to 1972. The author makes use of a large number of charts that reflect statistical data. This is a good overall reference work containing much data. Specific application to the operational level of war is lacking in this work, but it provides a good overall survey of the designated years.


Blitzkrieg as it evolved in World War II was operational warfare at its most effective. Tiberi looks at types of operational warfare (attrition and maneuver) then analyzes the way the Germans and Soviets used these concepts against each other. He believes the Germans were successful because they succeeded in making the total force assimilate the blitzkrieg concept and achieved outstanding harmony between the tactical and operational levels of their forces. The Germans lacked an equivalent harmony between the operational and strategic levels, an area where the Soviets excelled, and this led to their ultimate defeat, despite their early successes and general tactical supremacy.


Produced in 1980, this work contends that the United States does not have a viable tactical nuclear doctrine and needs to establish one for appropriate situations. Although of peripheral interest to the conventional war planner, this work examines the parameters of tactical nuclear conditions in the U.S. and Soviet structures. Tomhaye focuses on such issues as release, sufficiency, and other conditions that would have to be considered should tactical nuclear weapons enter the picture. Included is an analysis of USSR and Warsaw Pact capabilities. All of these issues are discussed from the viewpoint of the operational level of war.


Colonel Troxel, an instructor at CGSC at the time this article was written, presents a type corps with a fictional commander placed in a position of conducting a corps-level advance to contact. The article is fairly comprehensive, following the commander through the various aspects of
the operation. The commander organizes the leading elements with strong armor forces to drive in and destroy the enemy's security forces while maintaining a flexible mobile force. The commander recalls a historical example (VIII Corps on the Brittany peninsula in 1944) and uses the lessons of that event in his planning. This is followed by a war-gaming of possible enemy actions and a general discussion of formations and force structure. Although dated, this article still reflects pertinent aspects of corps-level operations.


Trufanov commanded the Fifty-first Army during the counteroffensive that isolated the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad in 1942. His account is of interest as a study in command and decision making but is of little other value.


Although primarily a political military consideration directed at the strategic level, the sections in this work on the Burma campaign and the maneuver of large units during the various campaigns are interesting commentaries on the operational level of war. The reader should pick and choose those parts of this book applicable to the operational level of war (primarily the World War II section).


The author contends there is and always has been a traditional pattern of war. From these consistencies, the student, through the study of military science, can forecast the nature of the next war and determine whether it will be a war of maneuver or linear stagnation. Careful study is required to forecast such events. In the text, Tuker discusses maneuver warfare, how it declined and resulted in static linear warfare, and how it experienced a resurgence in World War II. A number of historical examples are provided.

This volume contains reprints of two manuscripts originally produced under the direction of the Historical Division, U. S. Army Europe. Ms no. T-26, "The ZITADELLE Offensive, 1943" was written by General of the Infantry Theodor Busse and others in 1947; Ms no. T-31, "Collapse of Army Group Center, 1944," was written by Generalmajor Peter von der Groeben in 1947. Two campaigns are analyzed: The Battle of Kursk (July 1943) and the Belorussian campaign (June-August 1944). The accounts display a German bias but are otherwise useful as studies of the operational level of war.

The Art of War Colloquium has reprinted several other similar volumes on German operations on the Eastern Front.


Work on the manual began at the U.S. Command and General Staff College in late 1980. The manual reflects a departure from the doctrine of the 1970s and states a positive, offensively oriented approach. The active defense of the 1970s is replaced by AirLand Battle. The manual relates the three levels of war: tactical, operational, and strategic. Emphasis is on the tactical level of war.

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These pamphlets are two in a large series of manuscripts prepared by German general officers for the Historical Division, U.S. Army, Europe, after World War II. These two pamphlets are the only ones that concern the operational level of war. They contain excellent maps and astute analysis, although the German perspective must be critically appraised by today's readers.

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Center of Military History. The United States Army in World War II. [Series]. Washington, DC, various dates.

This series of "green books" is the massive official recounting of the operations of the U.S. Army during World War II. Divided into subseries that address every theater as well as technical and medical operations and special studies, the series covers the war in detail from the actions of companies and platoons to the highest decision-making level, from mobilizing the nation for war to supplying our allies. Included in the numerous volumes are details of the planning and execution of operational-level campaigns in every theater in which the U.S. Army fought the enemy.
The United States Army in the Korean War. [Series]. Washington, DC, various dates.

The purpose of this series is to accomplish for the Korean War what the green books listed above have done for World War II. The contents of the few books published in the series are similar.


This short study contains a number of very good maps and provides a valuable review of the operational and strategic conduct of the war in Korea.


This is a small book published by the Military Intelligence Service and based on a French General Staff study done immediately after the fall of France. While not dwelling on the operational level of war, the data is relevant, as the German armor concepts were the backbone of the blitzkrieg idea. The booklet emphasizes the transition of a tactical weapon (tank) into a vehicle to gain strategic goals, the essential nature of combined arms action, and the fluid nature of deep-strike battle. Command and control, organization, offensive and defensive operations, and duties of the various echelons are addressed. Only the German developments are considered.


One of a series of wartime publications by the Military Intelligence Service, this work is based on information prepared by the four U.S. officers allowed to attend the German Staff School between 1935 and 1939. The booklet reflects the teachings of the Kriegsakademie (War College) and covers numerous aspects of tactical doctrine. Major sections of the booklet concern terrain estimates, concealment, combat intelligence estimates, field orders, marches, types of battle (offense, defense, delay, retirement), and employment of field artillery. An appendix shows examples of four different German combat orders. This is good background reading for developing an understanding of the operational level of war.


Prepared by the Historical Sub-Section of the AEF General Staff, this survey focuses on the tactical aspects of World War I German doctrine.
Great detail is presented on almost every aspect of tactical operations, including a section on the use of aviation. This is background reading. No specific implications for the operational level of war are evident.


This is an excellent survey by a respected author relating the problems of moving and supplying armies and how this movement and supply are affected through time by changes in technology, organization, and other relevant factors. The work also investigates the effects of logistics on military operations during the last centuries. Although the evolutional period is of interest, the portion on World War II will be of most importance to those concerned with current operations. Other parts of the survey will shed light on the effects of logistics on the operational level of war, but the reader must be discerning to appreciate those parts.


After Zhukov, Marshal Alexander Vasilevsky was the most experienced and capable Soviet commander during World War II. This book describes his experiences as chief of the General Staff, Stavka representative, front commander, and theater commander during the Manchurian campaign. Vasilevsky had few equals as a practitioner of the operational art and his memoirs deserve careful examination.


This is a propaganda tract that still contains some valuable information on Giap's philosophy of war. It is a selection of his writings, interspersed with friendly interviews, in which Giap lays out how the Communists organized and conducted their wars against the French and the United States armies.


Although one could question this entry's relevance to the operational level of war, it provides significant insights into the nature of leaders, especially of commanding generals. Wavell discusses generalship, leadership, and command at the general officer level. He includes a number of historical examples, discussing both successful and unorthodox leaders. This is good background reading for an officer's professional development.

This book evaluates the evolution of northern generalship through the careers of McClellan, Sherman, and Grant. It is as much an analysis of character as of leadership. The book's value is that it links these two personal characteristics to the ability of generals to conduct war at the operational level.


The study of Maneuver in War is useful in examining the operational level of war. It provides a systematic approach for analyzing maneuver. Certain conclusions reached by the authors are questionable because of lessons learned in World War II; consequently, the work should be approached as a valuable piece of historical theory, rather than as a bible on maneuver.


The author's purpose in this piece is to demonstrate the continued importance of the use of Grand Tactics in a nuclear environment. In developing his argument, Wilson draws on the record of past commanders such as Moltke, Guderian, and Montgomery. Wilson concludes that a knowledge of Grand Tactics is now the principal responsibility of "commanders who know their business." This responsibility has been increased by the threat of the use of nuclear weapons.


In Flanders Fields: The 1917 Campaign is a highly critical assessment of British generalship, particularly that of Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig. The author feels that the sheer weight of evidence supports his rather severe conclusions. According to Wolff, the 1917 Flanders campaign was a campaign of attrition. As such, it is a prime example of a war conducted without a full grasp of the impact of technology on war. To a student of the operational art, the campaign demonstrates the dangers of ignoring that art.


This article centers on the destruction of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad and the key decision makers involved: Hitler, von Paulis, and
von Manstein. The author's thesis is that von Manstein, the commander with operational responsibility for von Paulis' rescue, was never given an opportunity to effectively exercise his command. A combination of Hitler's micromanagement and von Paulis' hesitancy ruled out any chance of success at Stalingrad.


Wynne's book traces the German development of the defense in depth. A composite of his earlier published articles, the book is well written. It clearly shows, from the German perspective, the evolution of the defense in depth and its effectiveness in adding an element of offense to a stagnant defensive war. This style defense, as Wynne points out, would serve as the defensive doctrine of the British Army in 1939. The book does deal with large-unit tactics and is of value in studying the operational art.


Yale's article is an excellent piece on Napoleon's staff organization. Napoleon selected his staff from combat-experienced commanders. Yale points out that Napoleon's use of aides-de-camp as staff observers-special commanders was critical to his ability to exercise direct influence on developing the battle. This practice allowed Napoleon to receive accurate information and to act on it quickly. Yale recommends study of Napoleon's system as a "basis for the application of modern electronics" in speeding information flow.


As its title indicates, this work advocates the value of lightning war as an instrument of national strategy. The book is more of an essay than a historical work. While the authors use historical examples to support their thesis, the result is not a detailed history of the development of mobile war. This work does include analyses of past masters of the blitzkreig and their techniques of command and control. The writers also make use of fictional operations to illustrate the applicability of their ideas to future conflicts. To students of operational war, the work is of value in that it presages the shift from a defensive philosophy to that of the AirLand Battle. On the negative side, the authors may go too far in dismissing the possibility of future involvements in counterinsurgency warfare. This, however, can be directly linked to the book's publication date.

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This article is a brief overview of the great Stalingrad counteroffensive of November–December 1942. It generalizes on the basic Soviet style of encirclement operations and identifies some of the important features of the campaign. However, the report lacks detail and analysis.


This thesis is tied heavily to the notion of winning the first battle. It provides a comprehensive examination of surprise attack doctrine and associated defensive countermeasures. Historical examples cited are the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and the 1940 Battle of France.


Desmond Young provides an interesting insight into the background and character of Rommel as a man and soldier. His interviews with Rommel's subordinates clarify many questions with regard to Rommel's grasp of the operational art. Rommel clearly was a master of Grand Tactics. The book's weakness lies in its absence of maps to support Young's analysis.


Zeitzler examines two major withdrawal operations on the Eastern Front: that of Army Group A from the Caucasus and that of Army Group Center. His analysis, of necessity, includes Hitler's role in interfering with these operations. Though concerned with army-level operations, the essay tends to concentrate on the tactical mechanics of withdrawal operations. Zeitzler does address the German Army Chief of Staff's long-term operational goals in planning the operations.

This article discusses the mid-1970 reorganization of the corps structure as the largest tactical and administrative headquarters. It also describes the corps' newly assigned combat service support mission as well as its increasingly difficult command and control problem. Overall, it is an interesting look at the ideas that led to the abolishment of field army headquarters in the U.S. Army.


This article examines the expansion of Soviet obstacle use, particularly while on the defense during World War II. The authors enumerate the types and numbers of mines and other obstacles that were employed by the Soviets at differing times and at tactical, operational, and strategic depths. The provision of adequate numbers of various types of engines is stressed as of key importance in the Soviet's ability to construct these obstacles. The use of mines to protect the flanks of an offense is also discussed.
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GERMAN SECTION


Excellent memoirs of a successful World War II armored officer.


Entwicklung der Taktik im Weltkriege [The development of tactics in the World War]. Berlin: R. Eisenschmidt, 1920-22. The English translation of this work is listed in the English language section of this bibliography. Both works are under CARL 940.37243.

Napoleonische Schlachtenanlage und Schlachtenleitung [Napoleonic preparation for and conduct of battle]. Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1900. CARL M944 05 H1 D.


This is a popular biography of General Heinrich Hoepner, German World War II armored commander and anti-Nazi figure.


A skilled historian, Burdick has written the definitive source on creating and deploying the African Corps in 1941.


Erfurth, who was both a German general and a doctor of philosophy in history, wrote one of the better histories of the German General Staff.


This is an early yet reliable academic history of the German armed forces High Command.


These volumes are not really a diary but rather the daily notes and observations of the chief of the German General Staff from 1939 to 1942.


Haupt wrote a popular account of the encirclement battle of Kiev in 1941.


This work is by one of the most highly respected German historians.


One of the finer tank commanders has written an excellent study.


Hubatsch's work is the best source on the subject.


Hubatsch's compilation is a required source.


This is the best work on the subject.

Kissel, Hans. Battles in Russia, 1941-1944. Frankfurt am Main: E. S. Mittler, 1956. LC D764 K52. Not in OCLC.


This is a required source on the subject.


Liss was the commander of the Intelligence Branch West.


This is an excellent source.


These are the memoirs of one of Germany’s outstanding field commanders.


This is the official history of the war by the Federal Republic of Germany's Military History Center. Ten volumes are projected for publication.


Philippi and Heim have written one of the best one-volume accounts.


This set comprises the official German history of World War I and is an invaluable source.

Reinhardt, Klaus. Die Wendez Vor Moskau Das Scheitern der Strategie Hitlers im Winter 1941/42 [The reversal at Moscow: The miscarriage of Hitler's strategy in the winter of 1941/42]. Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1972. CARL 940.5421 R369d.

This is the best book on the 1941 Battle of Moscow.


Cannae is the classic work on the doctrine of the battle of annihilation.


These are World War I memoirs written by one of the finest German staff officers and the subsequent creator of the Reichsheer.


Tippelskisch was the chief of German Army Intelligence.


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Tur, M. "Iz opyta presledovaniia vo frontovykh nastupatel'nykh operatsiiakh" [From the experiences of pursuit in front offensive operations]. Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal [Military history journal], March 1967.


Vremennyi polevoi ustav krasnoi armii (PU-42) [Temporary field regulations of the Red Army]. Moskva: Voenizdat, 1942. Translated by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, U.S. Army General Staff.