WEST EUROPEAN AND EAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVES ON DEFENSE, DETERRENCE AND STRATEGY
Volume IV—Portuguese Perspectives on Defense, Deterrence and Strategy

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**Title:** West European and East Asian Perspectives on Defense, Deterrence and Strategy

**Volume IV—Portuguese Perspectives on Defense, Deterrence and Strategy**

**Authors:**
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**Abstract:**
This report analyzes Portugal's status within the Atlantic Alliance with special reference to Schools of Portuguese Strategic Thought. The Portuguese tradition of alignment with the dominant maritime power and struggle in 1974-5 against a communist takeover have bolstered Portugal's commitment to NATO.

However, the dominance of the Portuguese Socialists in the ruling coalition has given Lisbon a more Europeanist outlook. Portugal does not wish to serve merely as an "aircraft carrier" for NATO, preferring to increase its contribution through force modernization with allied assistance. Fearing another Arab oil boycott, Portugal has adopted a highly restrictive policy with respect to the use of its facilities by the United States for out-of-area contingencies. Moreover, Spanish integration in NATO will be problematic for Portugal, which fears Spanish domination.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In marked contrast to Spain, Portugal was a founding member of the Atlantic Alliance and remains an integral member of NATO. A European state with an Atlantic coastline and orientation, Portugal's island outposts guard the approaches to the European continent. As such, Portugal forms an important asset in NATO's IBERLANT Command, and maintains an interest in ensuring the safety of the critical sea lines of communication (SLOCs) running from the North to South Atlantic.

Despite its Atlantic orientation, Portugal is committed to the defense of West Europe through NATO. However, the perception exists in Portugal that there is a lack of support by NATO allies for the requisite modernization of Portuguese defense capabilities.

Another critical element of the Portuguese contribution to NATO is the provision of key air bases to the United States and to the Federal Republic of Germany. These are Lajes, in the Azores, and Beja, in the Southern Alentejo region, respectively. Lajes plays an important role in U.S. Atlantic ASW and reconnaissance operations. The site of a U.S. Military Airlift Command, Lajes has also emerged as a vital refueling and transshipment point for U.S. forces en route to the Middle East, as well as to Central and Southern Europe. However, this latter
contribution has become controversial, particularly with regard to U.S. access for out-of-area contingencies. The current Socialist and Social Democratic coalition government of Mario Soares reserves the right to provide or deny the United States access on a case-by-case basis. Thus while Portugal might support anti-Libyan contingencies, the Portuguese would be reluctant to grant the United States the use of their facilities in the case of a Middle East confrontation involving the threat of another Arab oil boycott similar to the one imposed in the Yom Kippur War of October 1973. However, Portugal would probably be more willing than Spain to provide support for U.S. intervention in most out-of-area contingencies.

In April 1983, Portuguese voters turned out the governing Social Democratic/Christian Democratic coalition. The Socialist Party under Mario Soares gained a plurality, and formed a new governing coalition with the Social Democratic Party. With the ouster of the more Atlanticist Christian Democrats and the dominance of the more Europeanist Socialists in the ruling coalition has come a different emphasis for Portuguese defense policy. The Soares Government places a greater emphasis on European unity and the development of institutionalized European defense cooperation. This is in keeping with a conceptualization of Western Europe as an intermediary or "broker" between the two superpowers. The Atlanticist junior partners of the coalition, the Social Democrats, do
retain significant influence however, chiefly though the person of Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Carlos Mota Pinta. Thus, Portugal is likely to continue to emphasize its SLOC control and ASW roles and seek assistance from the United States for the requisite modernization of Portuguese naval and air forces.

Moreover, the Portuguese will undoubtedly remain opposed to the establishment of a fourth NATO (Iberian) command, which Portugal feels would provide Spain a dominant voice in military affairs on the Peninsula and overshadow Portuguese concerns. Thus, further Spanish integration in the military command structure of NATO may prove contentious with regard to Portugal. Meanwhile, as per the new 1983 bilateral agreement providing for U.S. access to Lajes, the Portuguese are likely to be strict in restraining support for out-of-area contingencies. Left-wing socialists of a National-Bilateral bent, and pressure on the left flank from the potent Portuguese Communist Party (which favors unilateral disarmament) will serve only to reinforce this trend.
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SECTION 1

INTRODUCTION

Portugal is a founding member of the Atlantic Alliance, and a country that has lived through a period of intense political struggle following the coup d'état of April 1974. Despite her trials, Portugal has been able to persevere in a democratic direction, and is today trying to define what precise role she has in Western security in order to set forth the guidelines of a national defense policy.

The National Defense Law that has been approved by Parliament, the "Major Strategic Options" project which was recently drafted, and especially the bilateral agreement signed with the United States, are essential components of national defense guidelines, but are still a long way from the necessary definitions. It is apparent that a more precise formulation of objectives and concrete policies is needed in discussing Portuguese defense options for the 1980s and 1990s.
The unquestioned strategic relevance of Portuguese territory has not, to this day, encouraged the consistent, in-depth analysis called for in defense and security matters. The absence of consistent doctrines makes it necessary that any analysis be accompanied by a description of fundamental trends of thought, in political and in military sectors, so as to rate their relative importance and influence on Portuguese strategic thinking.
SECTION 2
PORTUGUESE OPTIONS: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The security policy of Portugal has been determined over the last century by the necessity of maintaining an African empire. This explains Portugal's participation in World War I, the evolution of the Portuguese position in World War II, and Portuguese participation in NATO since 1949.

From 1961 to 1974, the main security concern of Portugal was exclusively directed towards Africa. The Portuguese armed forces were structures, equipped and trained for that specific mission -- to defend the colonies against the national liberation movements and their armed forces. Portugal's foreign policy is largely determined by the African wars. Needing all possible support from her allies to be able to sustain the wars in Africa, Portugal signed agreements accepting conditions that are today considered to be disadvantageous, all the more so since the wars are over and the empire dissolved. Two prominent examples are the 1973 base agreement with the United States and the 1969 fishing agreement with Spain.

In April 1974, with the so-called "Revolution of the Carnations," when the dictatorial regime that ruled Portugal since May, 1926, was overthrown -- and particularly since
November 1975, when Angola became independent -- a cycle of Portuguese history has come to an end. Portugal is back to the geographical configuration of the early days of overseas expansion: the mainland and the archipelagos of the Azores and Madeira, which were uninhabited at the time of their discovery at the beginning of the fifteenth century.

Ten years after the 1974 coup, and with the shock of a traumatic decolonization fading, Portugal's society and its political and military leadership have gained a clear perception of the real problems the nation is facing and of the necessity to define a post-imperial strategy, of reshaping the country's foreign and defense policies. There is a generalized awareness of the backwardness of Portugal, not only in relation to Europe, but even in relation to Portugal's neighbor, Spain. Portugal started her leap towards development (by modern standards) weakened by fourteen years of war, and in the wake of the 1973 oil crises. The economy is facing deep structural difficulties: a huge nationalized sector is accumulating enormous deficits every year, and there is a lack of competitiveness in the public and private sectors. External dependency on such essential supplies as energy and food is considerable: 85 percent for energy, 65 percent for foodstuffs. As a result, the Portuguese foreign debt is steadily increasing and is becoming increasingly difficult to service. In 1983, total foreign debt amounted to roughly $14 billion, against
reserves of some $7-8 billion. Energy dependence is almost exclusively due to oil imports (83 percent), that used to come mostly from Iraq, and are now purchased from Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E. and Kuwait, among others.

2.1 MILITARY POWER: ALMOST NON-EXISTENT

Equipped to fight wars in Africa -- wars of mines, machine-guns and light armored cars -- the Portuguese armed forces in 1984 are almost completely unequipped to guarantee the security of the national territory, or to contribute to the NATO missions they are or should be assigned.

The Navy. In terms of real capabilities, the Portuguese Navy is becoming obsolete. Its seven frigates and three submarines are more than a decade old. The frigates were delivered to the Navy in 1966-69 and are not equipped with helicopters. There is not one single minesweeper (The Military Balance: 1983-84 is inaccurate on this point), since the three existing minesweepers were converted into coastal patrol craft some time ago. There are also no oceanic patrol craft.

The program for the modernization of the Navy has met with great difficulties. The project of buying three Kortnaer frigates ($750 million) on the basis of a multilateral NATO program has not yet obtained the necessary financial clearance, and agreement between the countries that are supposed to finance the project seems problematic.
At present, these difficulties seem to be related to the Federal Republic of Germany in particular. The other two main objectives of the modernization program -- equipping the Navy with minesweepers and cutters -- have not yet been undertaken.

The Air Force. The degrees of modernization of the Air Force is higher by comparison with the navy or the army, although still very poor if compared with Spain's standards. Portugal has recently bought twenty A-7Ps and has another thirty on order from the United States, but Spain has meanwhile ordered 72 F-18s. While a radar system is being put into operation, the Air Force needs fighters and maritime patrol aircraft to complete its essential modernization program.

The Army. Numerically and politically the predominant branch of the armed forces, the Army is experiencing the greatest difficulties in defining a program of modernization. The number of troops shrank from 194,300 in 1974 to 38,600 in 1982, but the number of officers was not reduced in the same proportion. Consequently, the manpower pyramid is distorted, resulting in an irrational distribution of the Army budget, making it almost impossible to buy materiel. The distribution includes: military personnel: 72 percent; civilian personnel: 14 percent; equipment: 14 percent (of this 14 percent, 33.49 percent is spent on logistical infrastructure, which leaves only some 9 percent of the total budget for materiel).
As far as modernization is concerned, the army has three primary objectives: to flesh out its equipment -- especially in the air defense and transportation sectors of the only existing brigade; to form another brigade; and to acquire further air defense capabilities.

A poor country by NATO standards (if not for Turkey, Portugal would have the lowest per capita of the NATO countries), Portugal is nevertheless spending a comparatively fair amount on defense. In terms of defense share of the GNP, Portugal is slightly behind the 3.9 percent NATO Europe average (1970-1983). Yet, Portugal is in no position to increase military expenditure significantly. Therefore, it will not be possible to modernize and re-equip the Portuguese armed forces without significant allied aid.

In the present situation, the disproportion between the importance of facilities granted to NATO allies and the integral means of the Portuguese armed forces is such that, as a highly-placed commanding Portuguese officer pointed out, Portugal is in a position which bears similarities to that of Iceland. This is not commensurate with the necessities of the national defense, nor with those of the Alliance. The "void" of military power creates the perception in Portugal that in a crisis other forces besides those of Portugal would be required to fill the gap in NATO capabilities.
2.2 THE GROWING STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE NATIONAL TERRITORY

In the post-imperial period, and parallel to the deepening economic crisis, the strategic importance of Portuguese territory has increased, both in the East-West, and in the North-South, context. General Lemos Ferreira, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, says that "Portugal is a plaque tournante between North and South, East and West, and this has been demonstrated on several occasions." For Lemos Ferreira and for other Portuguese strategists, the functions of the Portuguese territory are expressed in the concept of "strategic triangle," one that stresses both the importance of each one of its three sides and of the territorial space it encompasses and is traversed by some of the most important sea and air lines of communication, such as those linking North America, the east coast of South America, the Mediterranean, and Southern Africa to Europe.

Portugal sits within a fundamental axis for the projection of American power towards Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Southwest Asia, key strategic regions of the world. On Portuguese territory, the Azorean islands have a key position from the American point of view. For that reason, the Azores fall under WESTLANT and not IBERLANT, as Portugal would wish.

For its part, Lisbon stresses the importance of the Portuguese strategic triangle in the context of East-West
confrontation. The very concept of a "strategic triangle" is based on Portugal's inherent strategic value, which includes the following functions:

- rapidly reinforcing Europe in case of war;
- in the particular case of the Azores, providing a base for the surveillance of the Atlantic and a center for ASW;
- providing a pivot position in relation to another very important strategic region formed by Greenland, Iceland, the Faroe Islands, and the UK; and
- in the case of Madeira, controlling the Strait of Gibraltar, in particular by its position in relation to Northern Africa.

To some extent, the strategic importance of Portugal has increased as a result of the expansion of Soviet naval power, which has brought an increased Soviet presence in the Northern Atlantic. To a greater degree, however, due to the recent emphasis on out-of-area contingencies in U.S. military planning, the West has to face growing threats in the peripheral zones, namely in those that are essential to the supply of raw materials to the Western industrial machine. The capability on the part of the Soviet Union for power projection directly or by proxy states, contributes to a re-definition of U.S. strategic planning. In accordance with the "Maritime strategy" of deployment from the U.S. territory of important military forces by air and sea to those regions where aggression needs to be deterred or countered, important logistic facilities are needed en
route. The growing strategic importance of Portugal is precisely due to the "en route" position of the country for the projection of U.S. power outside the NATO area, in particular for the most probable scenarios of conflict in the Middle East or Persian Gulf area. The Central Command Force, in its present form, obviously needs facilities in Portugal, Spain and Morocco.

Through recent agreements with Spain and Morocco, the United States has obtained complementary facilities in Saragoza, Moron, Torrejon and Rota, and at the air-naval base of Kenitra. But since Morocco is an Arab country, and in view of Spanish reluctance to allow U.S. use of facilities in Spain for "out-of-area" missions, there is increased American interest in obtaining additional facilities on Portuguese territory. This also would enable the United States to put some pressure on Spain, by acquiring alternative facilities in the region, in case Spain is denied access to the European Community and contemplates pulling out of NATO.

The Persian Gulf is 7,000 miles from the United States; the Lajes base, in Terceira, is 2,500 from the American east coast, and 1,000 miles from the Portuguese mainland coast, and 1,500 miles from the coast of Britain. If we bear in mind the flight range of air transport craft -- 2,140 miles for the C-141, 3,250 for the C-5A -- the access to bases in the region appears to be clearly
indispensable. It is worth recalling that in 1973, during the Yom Kippur War, the United States was denied the use of facilities in the UK, Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey.

2.3 THE LAJES AGREEMENT AND PORTUGUESE-U.S. SECURITY RELATIONS

The agreement between Portugal and the United States, signed on December 13, 1983, is seen in Portugal as reinforcing mutual understanding and solidarity between the two states in their commitment to Atlantic security, thereby initiating a new phase in the relationship between Portugal and the United States.

The sizeable military aid Portugal has obtained from the United States was seen as a sign that American policy towards the region was no longer to look upon Spain as the sole guarantor of regional security, but rather to ensure that Portugal has sufficiently equipped armed forces to meet her own defense requirements and the NATO missions incumbent upon the country. On the other hand, the economic aid that will be used in the Azores seems to testify to the recognition of the fact that stability and development are interrelated.

Four major factors were relevant to the outcome of the negotiations: enhanced "aggressiveness" of Portuguese diplomacy, the emergence of views on the U.S. side favorable to the recognition that national perceptions and regional
realities should not be underestimated, the growing strategic importance of Portugal (clearly stressed by Foreign Minister Jaime Gama in the first of the four notes that form the agreement), and the uncertainty of the evolution of Spain's participation in NATO.

In the present agreement, which in fact is a renewal of the Defense Agreement between Portugal and the United States signed in 1951, two points deserve special attention:

1. The affirmation of the "growing strategic importance of Portugal" (there is no particular mention of the Azores).

2. American recognition that Portuguese armed forces should be modernized in line with Portugal's refusal to be considered merely an "en route" country.

The agreement is operative effective February 4, 1984 and covers a period of four plus three years; either government can terminate the agreement in case the agreed measures are not implemented. In Portugal, this provision is regarded as a sort of insurance policy, first, because foreign aid has to be voted annually by the U.S. Congress, and also because the evolution of the economic situation can render the present compensations insufficient.

The agreement is exclusively concerned with the use of facilities in the Azores. These include Air Force Base no. 4 (Lajes), the airport of Santa Maria, the port of Ponta Delgada, and S. Miguel (fuel storage). This was due to Azorean pressures, that is, the Portuguese government complied with the preference of the Regional Government of
the Azores that negotiations for the use of facilities in
the Azores be discrete from the use of facilities in other
parts of the region.

2.4 SEEKING SOLUTIONS FOR THE NATIONAL CRISIS

In a position of weakness, concerning both economic
and military power, Portugal has realized that facilities
that have been, or are likely to be, granted to a powerful
ally can be under certain circumstances of conflict, vital
to that ally. The different attitudes towards major
strategic options are a consequence of this new awareness.
One attitude that is common to most of the leaders of the
democratic parties and to the military leadership, rooted in
what can be defined as pro-Atlantic internationalism or
modern nationalism, is that the geostrategic potential of
Portugal should not only be an important contribution to
Western security, but also the decisive trump for assistance
in the modernization of Portugal's armed forces.

Neutralism or narrow-minded nationalism is also
present in the democratic parties, although it is to be
found mainly in the military sectors. This includes
nationalism of Gaullist inspiration in the traditional
sectors of the Armed Forces, and pro-Third World or
non-aligned neutralism in the remaining sections of the
military which took power in April 1974, and in the
left-wing of the Socialist Party, which has supported
General Eanes' second run for the Presidency. Its sociological basis is wide, including the rural population as well as the urban leftists.
SECTION 3

THE PRO-ATLANTIC TRENDS: WHY PORTUGAL IS A SPECIAL ALLY

Portugal has undoubtedly been, amongst the European members of the Alliance, a very special member. As former NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns pointed out, Portugal is "one of the most faithful allies, a country that has never raised any problems". There are many elements that account for this behavior, some of the geopolitical nature and relatively permanent in the foreign and security policies of Portugal, others of a circumstantial nature, such as the involvement of Portugal in colonial wars from 1961 to 1974, which considerably restricted the country's potential in foreign policy. Among the historical and more recent factors that tend to reinforce a clearly pro-Atlantic and anti-Soviet choice by the Portuguese public, the following should be stressed:

- recent political experience of confrontation with the Communist Party and the Soviet Union, in Portugal and in Africa, and
- consciousness of the geopolitical tradition of alliance with the premier maritime power.

3.1 ANTI-SOVIET AND PRO-ATLANTIC SENTIMENTS

There is in Portugal a wide national consensus, comprising the political parties, the armed forces, the mass media and the public as a whole, which is pro-NATO and
favorable to an anti-Soviet strategy. The impact of the 1974-75 crisis on the Portuguese can never be over-emphasized. It is worthwhile to remember that while Europe was indulging in the policy of detente, Portugal was undergoing, in the words of Mario Soares, a Communist attempt "to the final assault of power, reaching the point of attempting a siege to the Assembly of the Republic, as if to take the Winter Palace of St. Petersburg in 1917." Yet, Mario Soares was never to become "the Portuguese Kerenskii," the grim role Kissinger had assigned him when he considered Portugal as a "lost cause," as the "anti-Communist vaccine of Europe."

However, to be able to thwart the Communist onslaught, the democratic forces were compelled to unite, to reject any possibility of compromise with the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), and to fight it decidedly in every key area, namely the media (deeply infiltrated by the Communists, where political/ideological blackmail was the rule) and the armed forces.

Through this anti-Communist struggle in 1974-75, the leading men in government, in the armed forces, in the media, and among the public in general acquired a profound and first-hand understanding of Soviet strategy and developed a firmly anti-totalitarian commitment. No one in Portugal was taken by surprise when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. From the experience of unity to defeat
Communism, the Socialist Party (social-democratic), the Social-Democratic Party (liberal, in European terms) and the Party of the Democratic and Social Center (Christian Democrats) attained broad consensus or common stands on many issues. These issues include:

- the necessity of Portugal's participation in NATO and in the defense of the West,
- the need for development of good relations with the United States and the African states, and
- membership in the European Community.

In the last general election (April 1983), the three democratic parties had a total ballot of 75.7 percent: Socialist Party (PS) -- 36.3 percent; Social-Democratic Party (PSD) -- 27 percent, Party of the Democratic and Social Center (CDS) -- 12.4 percent.

The sectors opposed to NATO existing inside these parties are almost exclusively limited to a few members of the minority wing of the PS (led by Salgado Zenha), this minority having joined against the leader of the Socialist Party, Mario Soares, in General Ramalho Eanes' second presidential campaign. It should be noted, however, that even the left minority of the PS (comprising 32.4 percent of the delegates to the last Congress, in September-October 1983, at which Mario Soares was re-elected Secretary-General with an 86.4 percent majority) is not anti-NATO. On the contrary, the anti-NATO PS members are a minority within the minority faction; most of the members of even the left
minority are in favor of NATO and support, generally speaking, governmental foreign and defense policies.

While in the opposition, the PS had already emerged as the most pro-Atlantic of the Western Socialist parties, a fact of which Mario Soares is proud. Jaime Gama has defined the position of the Socialist Party towards NATO in these terms: "The Socialist Party thinks that the fact of our participation in NATO must not be changed. On the contrary, the Portuguese positions should be more insistently brought forward within the Organization."

The PS won the last election, but not with a large enough majority to form a government alone. They went into a coalition with the PSD, led by Mota Pinto, presently the Vice-Premier and Defense Minister. The existing divisions within the PSD are related to national, not international, issues. (The opposition to Mota Pinto is led by Mota Amaral, President of the Regional Government of the Azores.) The PS-PSD government has repeatedly stated its commitment to a reinforced participation of Portugal in NATO; both leaders (Mario Soares and Mota Pinto) regard NATO as an anti-totalitarian alliance. Thus, for the Portuguese democratic leadership, which is to say, for the leadership of the PS, PSD and CDS, there is no shade of doubt that the definition of the central issue in Portuguese politics today is: "the confrontation that opposes, essentially, the democratic conceptions to the totalitarian conceptions of man, of society."
To the minds of the Portuguese political leaders, despite what happens in other peripheral countries, "faithfulness to the Alliance has become a fundamental factor in Portuguese politics." It can also be said that Portuguese leaders in general are more opposed to appeasement towards the Soviet Union than other European leaders, whom Mario Soares does not hesitate to term as "irresponsible when the issue does not concern them directly, with the aim of concentrating their left wings as is even the case with Francois Mitterrand and his positions regarding Central America, in spite of his clear policy with respect to NATO."

Another example of firm opposition to the Soviet Union is the "hard line" supported by the political leadership in East-West negotiations: "The Portuguese government is in favor of consensus and negotiations, but with one limit: that they be actually feasible, and not a mere excuse for softness and giving in on the part of the West."

3.2 PORTUGAL: A TRADITIONAL ALLY OF THE MARITIME POWER

The political experience in recent years is complemented by a constant factor in Portugal's foreign policy: alliance with dominant maritime power. This Atlantic perspective led Salazar, despite his ideological inclination towards the Axis, and despite the Friendship
Treaty Portugal signed with Spain in 1939, to grant facilities to the Allies in the Azores in 1943 and to defend, subsequently, "an alliance of the countries on the shores of the Atlantic."

It is important to stress that after having associated Salazar's views on foreign policy matters with the dictatorial character of his regime (and this was only natural since most of them came from the ranks of the opposition to Salazar), the democratic leaders of Portugal have now come to recognize that in foreign and security policies some constants can be identified that are independent from the ideological nature of the regime. Thus, the alliance between Portugal and the United States is seen today as a natural and logical continuation of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance initiated in 1383.

Policy-makers believe today that only by developing the Atlantic, the European and the African dimensions of Portugal's foreign policy, can Portugal safeguard autonomous political action as a modern state. The European option is regarded as a fundamental precondition to the development of Portugal, keeping "in relation to the United States a certain degree of independence." On the other hand, only through relations with the United States and Africa will Portugal be able to keep its national identity within Europe. The trend identified here is not therefore exclusively European, or exclusively Atlantic. It could be
defined as "Euro-Atlantic". In Ambassador Jose Gregorio Faria's view, the definition of Portugal as an "Euro-Atlantic nation reinforces Portugal's capacity in negotiating."

This is the dominant view within the military leadership, and General Firmino Miguel, the present Vice-Chief of Staff of the Army, stressed that membership in NATO was nothing more than "reaffirming the Euro-Atlantic vocation that geopolitical, geostrategic and cultural factors determine for Portugal." Due especially to reasons of "geographical position," it would be difficult for Portugal not to align, in geostrategic terms, with the "maritime power," even if that alignment could also be determined by other factors (political -- foreign and domestic -- economic, or psychological).

3.3 A GROWING NATIONALIST TENDENCY

If Portugal is a very good ally, it has not, from Lisbon's perspective, been treated as such. The importance of the facilities granted is not matched by the support that is considered indispensable for the modernization of the country's economy and armed forces. In 1982, Diogo Freitas do Amaral, the leader of the CDS at the time as well as the Vice-Premier and Defense Minister, stated during the NATO Defense Ministers meeting:
If the situation is not significantly changed, and soon, the Portuguese Government will be compelled to review the attitude within NATO and to reconsider the facilities that have been and are now granted to NATO members on the national territory.

A few months later, during the North-Atlantic Assembly meeting in Funchal, Jaime Gama would insist: "We must not be regarded as an aircraft carrier in the routes of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean." In November 1983, at a seminar organized in the Azores, the President of the Regional Government, Mota Amaral, would use much the same words: "We do not want to be a mere aircraft carrier".

The fundamental attitude is that, while willing to comply with U.S. requests for more facilities, Portugal refuses what has been classified as "Icelandization" and seeks to obtain in return aid for economic development and for defense. There are missions that the Portuguese armed forces could and should perform, and those missions Portugal should share with the allies.

This attitude can be summarized in the following formulation: As a democratic nation, Portugal will not refuse facilities to the allies within NATO, and Portugal will participate with a commensurate system of forces in buttressing allied defense. Moreover, as a country extremely dependent on energy resources from the Persian Gulf, and as a country that is close to Third World nations and committed to improve relations with Africa, Portugal cannot discard out-of-area responsibilities, in cases where Portuguese and U.S. interests are parallel.
Portugal also is prepared to openly accept her responsibilities, as Jaime Gama, the Foreign Minister, has stated:

. . . . I would also like to stress the role Portugal has had, in solidarity with the security of the Arab States, in particular those in the Gulf area, in granting facilities of a military nature, and this goes in the sense of the Arab objectives of stability and national and regional security, representing a positive contribution of Portugal in the context of luso-arab friendship.

Nevertheless, from 1980 the Portuguese Government made it clear that the use of facilities for out-of-area operations was subject to prior clearance, and this was stressed during the negotiations for the present U.S.-Portuguese agreement. "Under no circumstances can clearance for the use of the Lajes base be considered as automatic outside the NATO area." In case of a conflict in the Middle East pitting Israel against an Arab state (such as Syria), the situation will be altogether different. Portugal, it is said in official circles, will never again tolerate a situation similar to that during the Yom Kippur war. During his recent visit to Iraq, Foreign Minister Gama said that "Portugal will never be used against the Arab countries."

The willingness to contribute military forces to the NATO security system is also a result of the fact that in no case will Portugal allow Spain a position of regional hegemony. Portugal seeks to avoid a situation in which the Spanish armed forces would be assigned NATO missions that
should be performed by the Portuguese armed forces. Of course, Portugal remains concerned over potential challenges to stability in the North Africa/Sahara area, and, in this context, values the role Spain can perform in guaranteeing the security of the Balearic-Gibraltar-Canary axis. Should Spain join the military structure of NATO, Portugal would favor placing the Canary Islands (as a part of IBERLANT) under a new Spanish command under SACEUR, provided that the Azores also would be placed under IBERLANT.
Nevertheless, strategic thought in Portugal, as reflected in existing books and writings, is dominated by nationalist trends: neutralist-nationalism, and isolationist-nationalism. The isolationist-nationalist trend, quite significant in neighboring Spain, is rooted in geographical and historical factors. For the Iberian Peninsula has always behaved as a quasi-island, and some authors maintain that Portugal can be considered as a quasi-archipelago. One of the arguments in support of this thesis is that 95 percent of Portuguese exports and 85 percent of Portuguese imports come by sea.

In this peninsular quasi-island, separated from Europe by the Pyrenees and by Spain itself -- for Spain has always been a huge barrier cutting Portugal off from the rest of Europe -- the majority of the Portuguese have developed what an eminent Portuguese historian, Antonio Jose Saraiva, has called "islander spirit" as aligned islanders, but islanders nonetheless.

Portugal has always sought neutrality in European wars, and only got involved when directly affected, as was the case in the Napoleonic wars, or when the alliance with Britain made that absolutely necessary, in order to protect the Portuguese colonies, as had been the case in World War I.
In World War II, Portugal went from a position of "conditional neutrality" to one of "active neutrality," under pressure from the Allies, who needed the Azores for the Battle of the Atlantic. In any case, facilities in the Azores were granted in 1943 to the British and not the United States. This was the one condition made by Salazar, who would not, until the end of his political career, give up a certain feeling of distrust towards the United States.

Although Portugal was member of NATO from its inception, the nature of the non-democratic regime and the long lasting wars in Africa (1961-1974) drove Portugal away from her allies in Europe and North America. Salazar chose an isolationist foreign policy line, known as being "proudly alone," and based on fierce chauvinism, primarily anti-Spanish, but critical of the Western democracies which were accused of being a part of a conspiracy to deprive Portugal of her empire. Nationalism in its traditional right-wing form has today a negligible influence at the political level, but its influence is far from negligible at the ideological level, since it provides the sole consistent doctrine in foreign policy matters one that is clearly elaborated and based on geopolitical constants.

A cabinet minister under Salazar, Franco Nogueira, whose writings are currently in vogue, defined the major components of Portugal's foreign policy as follows:

- Amicable and yet cautious relations with the United States, never allowing the United States such a degree of "political freedom"
that it is "mitigated by some degree of uncertainty in regard to the use of the base" concerned. (The traditional right has firmly in mind the tense atmosphere in 1961-63 when the Kennedy Administration gave clear support to FRELIMO and its leader at the time, Eduardo Mondlane.)

- Anti-Europeanism. Nogueira says that joining the EEC "is a betrayal": Portugal in the EEC will become "a colony of Spain".

- Good political relations with Spain, which, however, is defined as meaning no relations at all, since the disproportionate size of the two countries "creates an element of real danger."

- Good relations with Britain, which is justified by alleged British opposition to the unity of the Iberian Peninsula.

These components clearly define an orientation of isolation towards Europe, particularly towards Spain, and towards the United States an orientation that could be defined as "cooperative neutrality".

Anti-Europeanism can also lead to pro-American views. Com. Virgilio de Carvalho wrote that "it is not surprising that Portugal, having completed the cycle of the Empire, would now cling to the geostrategic capacity of her territory, to the historical alignment with the dominant maritime power, in order to survive and to keep her freedom of action and her political weight, especially when she will have to accept something like the reversal of her history to join the European Community." Thus the "traditionalists" are modernizing: the United States could take the place of Britain in peninsular strategy. This trend is therefore opposed to the Euro-Atlantic option defined by the
democratic governments, in opposition to which they propose an exclusively atlantic option. A characteristic of the anti-European trend is that they consider Spain to be a real threat to Portugal. This attitude contributes to the development of a neutralist mentality. Although an attempt is made to make the most of the relations with the United States, this attitude, incapable of going beyond the limits of the nation-state, the one and only basic reference, is not appropriate in a world of growing interdependence.

Bilateral relations with the United States are not by themselves capable of creating a real European commitment of both Iberian States (particularly in the case of Spain). On the other hand, not joining the European Community would mean the defeat of the democratic leaders and the victory of the forces opposed to the European option: the traditionalist, the pro-Third Worlders, and the Communists. An exclusively American option, even if accompanied by an African component, would dangerously diminish the support for pro-Atlanticism.

4.1 THE LEFT-WING NEUTRALIST NATIONALISTS

Nationalist-neutralist doctrines are not the exclusive domain of the traditionalists. Left neutralism has significant weight in important sections of the armed forces, namely the Army and the Navy, and in the political circles that supported General Ramalho Eanes for his second
presidential mandate, and subsequently formed the MAD (movement for a more profound democracy) led by Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo, a former Prime Minister. The military factions that have supported Eanes formed the 25th of April Association, that includes in its membership the pro-Third World and non-aligned members of the former Council of the Revolution, has over 1,000 members in active service, and has as honorary chairman the President of the Republic.

The importance of this trend for the Communist Party is self-evident. The Communists support it by what means they can, which naturally include ideological nourishment. A good example of this is the monthly *Liber 25*, "a military review for civilians, a civilian review for the military." Although claiming a circulation of 4,000, it is practically unknown outside military circles; it is distributed by CDL, a completely Communist-controlled agency; and against the provisions of the National Defense Law, military officers on active service are among its collaborators, including former members of the Council of the Revolution, former members of the Socialist Party, and the editor of the Communist daily, *O'Diario*, Miguel Urbano Rodrigues.

Neutralist doctrines are abundantly expressed in *Liber 25*, as the following editorial passage suggests: "What is convenient for us is not to align with any of the blocs to spare them the means necessary to occupy our position. What is most convenient for us is to neutralize ourselves, that is, to keep a 'no trespassing' position

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towards both sides." In order to do that, Portugal would have to adopt a policy of neutrality. Alongside the defense of neutralism, it is worth noting, Liber 25 also defends unilateralist pacifism.

The neutralist attitude of this movement cannot be identified with isolationism: it has many similarities with pro-Third World nonalignment. It does not overtly question Portugal's membership in NATO. This has never been questioned, not even in 1974-75, during the troubled times when Vasco Goncalves was Prime Minister. The idea is one of neutrality within the Alliance (due to the constraints of geostrategic position): "Portugal has no potential enemies. It is true we are a member of NATO but that should not keep us from having good relations with Warsaw Pact member countries; in fact, some of them are our friends."

It should be noted that "the Captains of April," the Movement of the Armed Forces, was deeply permeated by the anti-imperialistic ideology of the liberation movements they were called upon to combat, similar to the phenomenon they occurred in France after the war in Algeria. The aforementioned MAD, the civilian component of this trend, is a mixture of pro-Third World nationalism, left-wing Catholicism, a confused political line that results in the absence of a political program, anti-party positions, and a bit of everything that allowed Eanes to wing his second presidential election.
4.2 THE NATIONALIST TREND OF GAULLIST INSPIRATION

Of all the Portuguese nationalist trends, the most important certainly is the military trend of Gaullist inspiration, which finds nourishment in the works of generals Beauffre and Gallois.

The perspectives of this trend can be found in many studies, lectures, and works of officers, some of them classified, but clearly summarized in a book by Brigadier General J. A. Loureiro dos Sanos published in May 1983: "It is worthwhile to mention that an ethnocentrical appraisal of national interests, provided it is realistic, cannot be considered dangerous. What is in fact dangerous for a nation-state is what we can define as an utopian-internationalist appraisal of national interests."

In praise of nationalism, "that still remains as a reference point to all those States that affect the world situation significantly," Loureiro dos Santos is suspicious of the "actors non-related to the nation-state," such as the "political internationalists" or transnational organizations.

This perspective involves a "tout azimut" strategy, considering the global threat coming from the East, but taking also into account the threat coming from Spain. "In fact, there is no guarantee that a different regime in Spain will not feel tempted to enforce Franco's plans to occupy Portugal in a few days." And the threat the allies themselves represent must also be taken into consideration, for "allies are often more dangerous than enemies."
Apart from the interservice rivalry present in any thesis coming from the military — which in this case tries to emphasize the role of the Army — this Gaullist trend does not regard NATO as a pluralistic defense community, but rather as one where U.S. strategic thought prevails upon the European allies. It is for this reason that the European allies are seeking autonomy whenever possible for in de Gaulle's words (quoted by Loureiro dos Santos) "nuclear weapons have rendered the alliances obsolete." Advocates of this perspective do not go as far as de Gaulle, recognizing geostrategic constraints and the lack of Portuguese power, but they do in fact emphasize a military planning contemplating the almost exclusive acquisition of equipment appropriate for national missions, and then, due to the interservice rivalry already mentioned, a territorial defense particularly of the "lines of invasion" from Spain.

4.3 PROSPECTS FOR THE NATIONALIST-NEUTRALISTS

The importance of the nationalist-neutralist trend was demonstrated in the results of the last presidential election, when General Eanes was elected against the will of Mario Soares (who lost majority support inside the Socialist Party at that time), and against the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats, the coalition that supported General Soares Carneiro for President. General Eanes had the support of the present minority of the Socialist Party,
of the military left, of large rural sections of the population, and of the Communist Party. Eanes had 56.6 percent of the votes to Soares Carneiro's 40.2 percent.

In spite of his support of the Atlantic Alliance, General Eanes' positions are marked by extreme ambiguity, which explains why he has the support of people in the traditional right and also the support of people who are to the left of the Socialist Party. But the trend General Eanes represents finds itself in a difficult political position, since General Eanes cannot run for the Presidency a third consecutive term, and has not yet been able to form a political party.

While the left-wing section of the armed forces, today under control, sees itself as the guarantor of democracy, the armed forces as institutions see themselves more and more, as in the past, as the guarantors of the moral and patriotic values of the Portuguese nation. General Eanes has tried to personify that role. For political reasons, however, the military leadership is increasing its distance from the President of the Republic and has repeatedly affirmed its subordination to the legislative organs.

4.4 THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE PACIFIST TRENDS

Compared to other countries in Europe, the pacifist trends in Portugal have much less weight or impact on public
opinion and their influence in governmental policies is almost negligible. Apart from the general anti-Soviet sentiment prevalent in Portugal, several factors contribute to the relative lack of pacifist appeal.

- The psychological impact of the end of detente and the growing fear of war have not been felt in Portugal. When the Helsinki difference took place, Portugal was undergoing a period known as "the hot summer of 1975," when the pro-Soviet forces launched a huge offensive culminating in the aborted coup of November 25, while a parallel Soviet-Cuban offensive was launched in Angola.

- In spite of its 18.2 percent ballot in the last general election (April 1983), the Communist Party is an isolated force. It influences precisely defined social sectors and has no influence on government policies, because it is totally incapable of influencing the majority of the Socialist Party.

There are nevertheless three major pacifist groupings in Portugal: the Communists, the neutralist and ecologist pacifists, and the Catholics. In analyzing their influences on public opinion in general, and on decision makers in particular, the interaction between the first two, and the overall influence of the latter should be taken into account.

The PCP pacifist grouping includes Marshal Costa Gomes (President of the Republic in 1974-76), before the first presidential election took place and now a leader of a Soviet-front, the World Peace Council; the Portuguese Council for Peace and Cooperation, a local branch of the WPC chaired by Costa Gomes, and formed almost exclusively by PCP members with a few members of the Socialist minority; the
so-called National Public Movement "No to Nuclear Weapons in Portugal," formed by members of the aforementioned Portuguese Council for Peace and Cooperation and by almost every organization where the PCP has some influence; and, last but not least, the party "The Greens," [sic] that is so clearly an offspring of the PCP that some of its members were included as candidates on the PCP lists for the last general election (when one of them was actually elected to Parliament). The slogans of these movements are more or less copied from similar movements abroad. One of the most recent: "One single missile suffices to destroy Portugal." This is one facet of a campaign designed to create panic and irrational fear of all things "nuclear."

The largest anti-nuclear demonstration in Portugal took place in January 1982: the "March for Peace," as it was called, rallied 10,000 people, but then lost most of its impact because it was too obviously Communist-controlled. The Socialists denounced it as being connected with "the diplomatic and military logic of the Soviet bloc." During the demonstration, an ecologist group called "Friends of the Earth" that carried flags protesting both the Pershing II and the SS-20 were beaten up by other demonstrators and prevented by force from joining the march. This is but one example of the almost total hegemony of the PCP over the pacifist movement, which in turn accounts for its lack of actual impact on the decision making process, the Socialist Party, the armed forces or the Church. Few can believe that
the Portuguese Communist Party -- that stood in favor of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the invasion of Afghanistan and the state of siege in Poland -- is in fact a pacifist party, one that strives for peace.

The ecologist pacifists and the conscientious objectors. Another reason for the lack of impact of the anti-nuclear campaigns is that they have no real objective or final point. Things would perhaps be quite different if nuclear missiles were to be deployed in Portugal.

The ecology groups -- which now number about 76 and the majority of whose members are in the 15-25 age group -- and the pacifists are organizing almost everywhere, in high-schools, universities, and sectors of the "counter-culture." Under a different form, that of conscientious objectors, they are also appearing in the Socialist and Social Democratic Youth Leagues.

The young Socialists and Social Democrats are not immune to the effects of the pacifist demagogy directed towards young people. In July 1983, the Social Democratic Youth withdrew support only at the very last minute to a festival significantly called "Give Peace a Chance," promoted and organized by the Communist Youth League. However, the Socialist Youth considered the festival as a part of a Soviet strategy, "to mobilize Western public opinion." However, the Socialist Youth also has ambiguous positions that led it to participate in anti-nuclear
demonstrations. Recent changes in its leadership might lead to a more clear pro-Western commitment.

There are grounds to believe that Portuguese pacifist tendencies will expand, although not beyond narrow limits. The one possible exception is the growing movement in the youth organizations of the democratic parties against compulsive military service, a trend that could in turn contribute to the spread of the idea that there is no need for national defense.

The Catholic Church. The position of the Catholic Church is in itself one of the major obstacles to the expansion of Communist influence in the peace movement. A conservative body, rooted in the traditional values of Portuguese history and society, having supported (with few exceptions) the colonial wars, the Church decidedly opposed the Communist assault in 1974-75, and remains as a counterposing force to the Communist expansion in the countryside.

Nevertheless, some Catholic groups (the so-called "progressives") are neutralistic, as in the case, for
instance, of ex-Premier Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo and other Catholics who are members of MAD. However, these are not the positions of the clergy, but of members of the Catholic laity.

The Church as a whole seems to be vaccinated against pacifism since pacifism in Portugal is so clearly of Communist origin. The Church asserts its awareness of the importance of the quest for peace, especially amongst the youth, and is preparing not so much for monopolizing that sentiment, but for preventing others from doing so. The Conference of the Portuguese Bishops has formed the National Committee "Justice and Peace" in the wake of the dialogues for peace launched by Pope John-Paul II.

But the Church has not yet succeeded in finding the right way to prevent fears of the danger of nuclear holocaust from being used by the supporters of unilateral disarmament, by those who invoke nuclear terror for their own purposes. The aforementioned movement "No to Nuclear Weapons" has not failed to make use of the statement of October 1981 issued by the Papal Academy of Science under the title "The Vatican for Nuclear Disarmament." There is a simple reason for this: in this document, as in other Catholic statements, there is no link between the search for peace and opposition to the very existence of nuclear armaments, on the one hand, and the present reality of the world strategic environment, on the other.
SECTION 5

THE TWO DOMINANT TRENDS IN PUBLIC OPINION: ISOLATIONISM AND PRO-ATLANTICISM

The results of opinion polls taken of the two fundamental issues in foreign affairs -- security and the Common Market -- confirm the strength of two interrelated characteristics in the mind of the Portuguese public regarding international politics: non-awareness verging on isolationism, and pro-Atlanticism. An analysis of the results of the polls demonstrates the unfamiliarity of the Portuguese people of the major international issues, their sideline position with regard to Europe, and their "islander" attitude. In the first place, people in Portugal are more indifferent to major international issues than in other European countries. The share of non-respondents ranges from 26 percent in the poll on NATO, to 50 percent in the Eurobarometer polls on EEC, to 65 percent in the poll on the U.S. versus USSR. The non-respondent average in other European countries is roughly 20 percent. But in Portugal, ignorance of the two major options for Portugal's foreign policy is apparent: 46.3 percent "don't know" what NATO is.

Moreover, people in Portugal voice what sociologists term as "localism." When categorizing their major concerns, inflation comes at the very top, with 51 percent. The danger of war (12 percent) or nuclear weapons (1 percent) are very low; few respondents cite them as a major concern.
In other European countries, the same type of questions get widely different answers, even in other peripheral countries, where people are nonetheless more cosmopolitan, where international affairs come into their everyday lives. According to polls in 1983, the danger of war was the primary concern of 37 percent of the Dutch, nuclear weapons hit 49 percent, inflation was only 10 percent. For the West Germans, the results were 28 percent, 38 percent and 16 percent, respectively. In Spain, danger of war was the primary concern of 39 percent, nuclear weapons of 30 percent, inflation of 7 percent.

Another symptom of this unconcerned attitude is the lack of enthusiasm with respect to the EEC. According to Eurobarometer, October 1983, 30 percent thought Community membership would be good for Portugal, 23 percent not very good, and 9 percent that it would be bad (only 61 percent voiced an opinion), while in Spain, 71 percent at least held an opinion on these questions (50 percent, 17 percent and 5 percent, respectively). Ignorance and unconcern on the part of the Portuguese people in regard to international issues is a consequence of geographical position, but it is also a consequence of the absence of discussion, be it in electoral campaigns, in Parliament or in the media.

5.1 MAJORITY IS FAVORABLE TO NATO AND DEFENSE EFFORT

The analysis of the polls sponsored by the IEEI on defense policy issues contributes to form a pro-Atlantic image of the Portuguese public, especially when compared
with opinions expressed in Spain and other European countries.

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<th>Port.</th>
<th>Neth.</th>
<th>FRG</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Greece</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stay in NATO</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Get out of NATO</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know/ don't answer</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
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Sources: Portugal: IBEI/Teor, May 1981
Spain El Pais, Oct. 20, 1981 (in the case of Spain, the question was to join or not to join NATO)
The Netherlands, Germany and Greece: APCA, Pacifisme et Neutralisme en Europe, p. 20

Despite the fact that the Communist Party of Portugal (18.2 percent of the ballot in the April 1983 general election) is one of the strongest in Western Europe (in electoral results, it comes second only to the Italian), and despite the fact that the Communists are among the most willing to voice opinions when interviewed in political polls, the share of respondents favorable to leaving NATO is the lowest in Western Europe.

Nevertheless, as is pointed out by sociologists, in a situation of crisis the Portuguese are sure to have a vigorous reaction. And the polls confirm this. Asked to choose between fighting in defense of their country or accepting Soviet domination, 40.1 percent chose fighting, and only 4.9 percent chose surrender; in this particular case the share of the "don't know" was cut by 10 percent. The will to fight voiced by the Portuguese is topped only by the Americans (14 to 1, against 8 to 1 in Portugal). Other
countries in Europe fall well behind (Italy -- 3 to 1; Germany -- 4 to 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Better to accept Soviet domination</th>
<th>Better to resist it</th>
<th>Don't answer/don't answer</th>
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<tr>
<td>G. Britain</td>
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<td>75</td>
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<tr>
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<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Newsweek/Gallup, February 1982 for Europe and the US IIEI/Teor, October-November 1983, for Portugal

Another trait of Portuguese society that should be observed is the very poor acceptance of Communist ideas by the youth. Young people of today, who have matured after April 1974, have not been contaminated by the almost hegemonic ideological influence of Communism on the "democratic" circle prior to the 1974 coup. Very much to the contrary, they fought in college or in high schools the atmosphere of intolerance sponsored by pro-Communist students and teachers. In contrast with the situation in other countries of Europe, Portuguese youth is more pro-NATO than the older generation. Single people contribute the highest share of pro-NATO respondents in IIEI polls (80.9 percent) while married people contribute the highest chair of anti-NATO respondents (21.5 percent). The overall result was 63.5 percent in favor, 16.3 percent against NATO (October-November 1983). This is one of the explanations...
why the development of "peace" movements in Portugal cannot be too significant, although the youth, especially the educated youth, is considered the ideal soil for neutralists and unilateralist tendencies in Europe and elsewhere.
SECTION 6

THE STRATEGY OF DENIAL

In view of the importance of NATO facilities in Portuguese territory, and in view of the possibility of additional provision of facilities in the near future (the use of Portuguese air force bases for AWACS is already being publicly mentioned), the most probable form of Soviet strategy in the region will be a strategy of denial. In case of open conflict, Soviet strategy could take the brutal form of surgical bombing or sabotage. But during the period of peripheral wars the West is currently experiencing, Soviet strategy takes an indirect approach, or a strategy of denial.

The target of this indirect Soviet strategy in the region is to make it impossible for the United States to have access to facilities in the region, or at least to create as many impediments as possible to that access, and to render insecure the air lines that cross the Atlantic Afro-Iberian region.

For the Soviet Union, this is the reason for the immediate strategic importance of the conflict in Western Sahara. The defeat of the King of Morocco, and the accession to power of "populist" formations -- which would be the foreseeable consequence of a victory of the Polisario front -- would create an atmosphere of instability in the
region with direct consequences for Portugal and Spain, mainly in the Atlantic archipelagos.

The situation thus created would be especially delicate for Spain, due to the uncertainty that would be created in the Spanish North African possessions, Ceuta and Melilla, and also due to the vulnerability of the Canary Islands, situated 150 km from the Western Sahara. It could also affect relations between the region as a whole and the United States.

In February 1978, Khaddafi declared that "there should be liberation movements in the islands occupied by Portugal" because the African islands belong to Africa, and "their freedom is interdependent." An attempt was made to bring up this matter during the OAU summit meeting at Khartoum in July 1978, but the matter was never discussed, in part because Khaddafi's statements were utterly ridiculous (the Portuguese archipelagos were uninhabited at the time of their discovery), and in part because the leaders of the former Portuguese colonies refused to discuss the matter. Nevertheless, the subject was raised again later, in December 1981, by the Foreign Minister of Zimbabwe, Mangwende.

In 1976-78, contacts between the feasable separatist movements of the Azores and of Maderia with Libya were reported, namely through meetings with the President of the Islamic Bank for International Development in Paris. If in the Azores and in Maderia these attempts at neutralization
have had no significant success to date, the same cannot be said for the Canary Islands, owing to their proximity to the Saharan conflict, the greater importance of the separatist movement there, the MPAIAC, led by Antonio Cubillo, and owing also to the discussions of the Canary question in the OAU, which recognized the MPAIAC as a liberation movement in 1968. The possible neutralization of the Canary Islands from the point of view of North American power projection is a typical example of the effects of an indirect strategy of denial.

The conduct of this strategy of denial does not come exclusively from without, through agents like Khaddafi, or from the foreseeable consequences of the Saharan conflict. It comes also from within, and is today one of the objectives of a pacifist movement that not long ago seemed to have difficulties in defining precise targets.

6.1 THE IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN

The PCP, with its campaigns for peace and disarmament, has until now experienced difficulties in mobilizing public opinion due to the lack of precise targets, as we have seen. At first, it tried to create a favorable opinion as to the major objectives of Soviet foreign policy. Along these general lines more precise objectives were then gradually delineated. At the moment, a major target seems to be to create difficulties for American
use of the Lajes facilities, which are known to be vital to the deployment of U.S. forces in Europe in case of war on the Central Front, and also to the projection of U.S. power toward the Middle East. The PCP has campaigned against the renewal of the Lajes agreement, alleging the presence of nuclear weapons in the Azores. The central objective being to make it difficult to arrange the use of Portuguese facilities for out-of-area contingencies, the PCP pacifist movement has three main goals:

- to prevent, or to try to prevent, the use of Air Force Base no. 4 (Lajes, on the Terceria Island);
- to prevent U.S. access to facilities in Air Force Base no. 11 (Beja, in Alentejo); and
- to activate the regional movement against allied access to the above mentioned and to other facilities.

In order to create difficulties for U.S. access to the Lajes base in terms of the Central Command forces, the procedure is to look for support in governmental circles interested in good relations with the Arab world, blurring distinctions between such countries as Libya and other Arab nations. The logic is very much the same as in Marshal Costa Gomes' statement:

It is not the NATO policies that are keeping us from having healthy relations with the Arab world, but an inexplicable subserviency toward the Reagan Administration. All things considered, this government is very much interested in good relations with the Arab world. We must act in good faith and in good logic. For to say this and then to allow our Azores bases to be used against those countries does not confer us credibility in the eyes of the Arabs.
In Beja, a so-called "no RDF in Beja" movement made its appearance, deliberately confusing the RDF and nuclear weapons: "In Beja, a four-day campaign took place against military nuclearization of the local air-base, a possibility that would ensue from its use by the North American Rapid Deployment Force. In the Azores, 1,300 personalities signed a manifesto against nuclear weapons." According to an Azorean daily newspaper, "it is no coincidence that certain radical formations choose as the center of all their activities in the Azores, specifically the Terceira, nor can the dynamism they demonstrate within youth or religious organizations be a coincidence."

6.2 OTHER KINDS OF DISAGREEMENT

Some time after the Lajes agreement was signed with the United States, the Azorean Federation of the Socialist Party (dominated by the minority of the PS) issued a press statement criticizing the Regional Government for the interest "with which it negotiated military facilities in the region giving away everything in exchange for financial contributions." Although "friendly relations" with the United States were not at stake, it protested against "the integral militarization of the islands and the international evaluation of the Azores as an operational platform for aggressive actions." These kind of statements do not trouble the national leadership of the Socialist
Party, which would dismiss them as being the product of youthful minds, or of the political need to affirm a position opposed to the Regional Government (PSD).

Another protest against the Lajes agreement came from a group of Catholic priests in the Azores, who strongly condemned it in a press statement. However, this position is not very significant, since these priests are not heads of any parish, precisely because they are connected with the left.

These two types of positions, although they cannot be totally discarded as unimportant, are definitely of minor influence in the Azores, where they have limited impact on the influential circles, at least for the moment.
SECTION 7
CONCLUSIONS

In order to implement the Euro-Atlantic option, Portugal is cautiously awaiting the EEC's final decision (the new deadline is January 1986). Meanwhile, the pro-European optimism of 1976-77 has given way to a more realistic approach to the consequences of EEC membership. In 1976, Mario Soares declared "there is no other alternative" to Europe. In January 1984, however, the same Mario Soares stated that "if Europe is not prepared to collaborate . . . Portugal will have to turn toward the United States, who are waiting their turn to show once again their superiority over the Old Continent." This bargaining position is also an indication as to the present state of the relations between Portugal and the United States and of the hopes that the Portuguese leaders place on those relations. The cooperation between the United States and Portugal, apart from the defense agreements, is also present in Southern Africa, namely in relation to Mozambique, where Portuguese and American diplomacy played an important part in the agreement between Samora Machel and the government of South Africa.

In the future, several factors are bound to influence the evolution of relations between Portugal and the United States, either in a positive or in a negative way. The following must be stressed:
The question of development. The hopes placed in the United States could be shattered if the United States were to fail to provide a significant contribution to the development of Portugal. The suggestion of a mini-Marshall Plan for Portugal should be implemented, primarily in support of concrete development programs.

The question of European integration. The integration of Portugal into the EEC might create tensions in Portuguese-American relations, in foreign policy areas where European and American positions are not always identical (the Middle East, for example). However, Portugal can also have a positive influence in the transatlantic dialogue.

Portuguese military power and Spain. It would be a gross mistake on the part of the United States to act as if Spain could undertake the defense missions that are incumbent upon Portugal. A balanced development of both Iberian States is the only way to remove the existing tensions in their relations. In the present situation, that would mean an increase in the defense role played by Portugal.

Modernization of the Portuguese armed forces. The security of the important logistical infrastructures within the Portuguese strategic triangle can only be guaranteed with efficiency by the Portuguese themselves. Any third parties that would attempt to guarantee that security would most probably meet with an hostile attitude in Lisbon. On the other hand, the contrast between facilities and means, if not corrected, would create an image of dependency, not of solidarity.

The question of out-of-area contingencies. Conflicting interests on the part of Portugal and the United States concerning the use of facilities on Portuguese territory for out-of-area contingencies is the worst possible foreseeable scenario for relations between the two countries. The repercussions of such a disagreement would be today much more serious than in 1973. To prevent the occurrence of a similar situation it is in
the interest of both Portugal and the United States to undertake bilateral consultations to discuss future contingencies, including the provision to Portugal of additional U.S. economic and military security guarantees.
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