WEST EUROPEAN AND EAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVES ON DEFENSE, DETERRENCE AND STRATEGY

Volume II—Western European Perspectives on Defense, Deterrence and Strategy

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A survey of contemporary West European perspectives on defense, deterrence and strategy, with special emphasis on the role of nuclear weapons deployed in, or assigned to, the NATO area. Changes have occurred during the past decade in the relative military strength of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, particularly as a result of the substantial growth in Soviet nuclear-capable systems and conventional forces assigned to Europe, and the momentum manifested by the Soviet Union in its deployments of intercontinental ballistic missiles. There has also been a substantial shift in West European thinking and attitudes about nuclear-capable systems and conventional forces assigned to Europe, and the momentum manifested by the Soviet Union in its deployments of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The survey is based upon an examination of current and recent defense literature and other research of elite perspectives held in Belgium, Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and The Netherlands on such issues as the future of the British and French nuclear forces generally, and especially nuclear weapons, both in a broader "Euro-strategic" framework and on the Central Front in the 1980s. 

All other editions are obsolete
18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continued)

Flexible Response  Low Countries  "Peace Movement"
France           National Deterrent Forces Schools of Thought
Great Britain    NATO/Conventional/Nuclear Threshold West Germany
INF

19. ABSTRACT (Continued)

national strategic nuclear forces; the role of the U.S.-strategic nuclear forces in the
deterrence of conflict in Europe; the prospects of raising the nuclear threshold by the
deployment of new conventional technologies; the impact of strategic defense initiatives
on U.S.-NATO security; and the modernization of NATO intermediate-range nuclear capabil-
ities, especially in light of the continuing deployment of the Soviet Union of new genera-
tion "Euro-strategic" forces targeted against Western Europe. For each country, a broad
spectrum of thought on deterrence and strategy has been examined and, to the extent possi-
ble, categorized according to distinct Schools of Thought in each country, ranging accross
a broad spectrum of political, strategic and military opinion from staunch support of
deterrence and defense to support of unilateral disarmament and political accommodation
with the Soviet Union.

The overall objective of this study is to identify and assess the continuities and
 discontinuities of security perspectives among West European countries (especially con-
cerning NATO's nuclear options) and, on the basis of this analysis, to examine the pros-
pects for maintaining, or strengthening, the consensus upon which European security is
based.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

For the countries surveyed in this report, the following schools of strategic thought have been identified and evaluated:

Britain

I. Strategic Deterrence -- which seeks to deter aggression at the upper end of the escalatory ladder, assigns high budgetary priority to a national strategic nuclear force, and favors the acquisition of Trident (D-5) as well as NATO INF modernization. This group has advocated cuts in conventional force expansion in an effort to cover the costs of an advanced strategic deterrent. It represents the policy of the Thatcher Government.

II. Battlefield Deterrence -- which would assign budgetary priority to the strengthening of battlefield nuclear and conventional capabilities while relying on U.S. strategic deterrent forces. In the wake of the Falklands War, there is a growing appreciation in School II of the need for stronger nonnuclear forces -- especially naval power -- for use in extra-NATO contexts, as well as in the European theater.

III. Balanced Posture -- which seeks as long as possible to steer a middle course between Strategic Deterrence and Battlefield Deterrence, despite the budget dilemma involved. Though still committed to Trident procurement, School III has become increasingly opposed to further cuts in the Royal Navy, especially in view of recent events in the South Atlantic.

IV. Unilateral Disarmament -- which rejects in principle all defense policies based on the use or threat of invoking nuclear weapons, and thus opposes Trident acquisition and cruise missile deployment, while favoring deep cuts in all military spending.
France

I. **Strategic Deterrence** -- Proportional deterrence based upon a countercity targeting policy in which the massive employment of French nuclear forces is called for should French sovereignty be threatened. Employment of tactical nuclear weapons is envisaged as a precursor to a strategic strike. President Francois Mitterrand espouses the perspectives represented in School I, whereas the left wing of the Socialist Party (CERES) holds to the minimalist deterrence concepts developed in School IV below.

II. **Graduated Deterrence** -- Proportional deterrence with the development of options to strike selected industrial aimpoints. At the theater level, this school emphasizes an enlarged sanctuary concept in which the approaches to France could be defended by the employment of French nuclear and/or conventional forces.

III. **Battlefield Deterrence** -- Proportional deterrence at the strategic nuclear level, with an emphasis on the development of nuclear and nonnuclear defense options at the battlefield theater level.

IV. **Minimal Deterrence** -- Proportional deterrence at the strategic nuclear level based upon the deployment of sea-based nuclear forces, with the phasing out of French tactical nuclear systems and a decreased emphasis on French conventional and theater forces.

Federal Republic of Germany

I. **Strategic Deterrence** -- which sees an overwhelming Soviet military and thus political threat to Western Europe; emphasizes defense over deterrence; is apprehensive over U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic relationship and perceives Eurostrategic imbalance;
supports INF modernization as means of ensuring "strategic coupling" with the United States; supports, in theory, Extended Battlefield concepts, but doubts their practicality; shows some interest in strategic defense concepts, but fearful of potential consequences for Europe's "coupling" with the United States. This school of thought represents the policy of the government of Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

II. Balanced Posture -- which sees Soviet assertiveness and its impact on other destabilizing factors as dangerous to world peace; places dual emphasis on detente and defense; perceives imbalance in Eurostrategic systems; maintains that U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic balance is stable; supports European conventional collaboration, but not a European deterrent; supports modernization of NATO conventional defenses; envisions no nuclear role for the Federal Republic, but wants to modernize INF; views strategic defense as destabilizing. This school of thought represents the policy of the former Schmidt Government.

IV. Minimal Deterrence -- which sees a defensive-oriented Soviet assertiveness exacerbated by U.S. hostility; emphasizes arms control over defense modernization; maintains that Soviet forces in Eastern Europe are "defensive"; perceives the U.S. as great a threat to European security as the Soviet Union; opposes European integration because of its implications for FRG relationships with the East (GDR); argues that U.S.-Soviet "parity" is irrelevant so long as both nations deploy "second-strike" nuclear forces; views strategic defense as destabilizing; supports a "security partnership" between FRG and the Soviet Union.

IV. Unilateral Disarmament -- which sees a greater threat in U.S. hegemony than from the Soviet Union; emphasizes detente over defense; maintains that Soviet forces in Eastern Europe are "defensive"; perceives the United States as the main threat to peace; opposes creation of a European nuclear deterrent and INF modernization; supports the denuclearization of Europe; views the Soviet/Warsaw Pact nuclear and conventional superiority as irrelevant; views strategic defense as destabilizing.
Belgium and The Netherlands

I. Right-of-Center Elites -- who are concerned over the tilting military balance (theater more than global) and who favor strengthened nuclear and conventional forces for NATO.

II. Center Elites -- who are less concerned about tilting balances but wish to maintain deterrence; who would link INF modernization to the rate of progress in East-West arms negotiations; and who, while increasingly disenchanted with the notion of battlefield deterrence with short-range nuclear weapons, support-strengthened conventional capabilities. This school of thought represents essentially the position of the Belgian and Dutch governments.

III. Left-of-Center Elites -- who show virtually no concern over the global or theater balance or threat of Soviet attack; who assign a much higher priority to arms negotiations with Moscow than to strengthening NATO; who strongly oppose both INF modernization and the development of U.S. neutron weapons as unnecessarily provocative and who favor (in the Netherlands) significant reduction of present levels of nuclear weapons on the national territory, and the elimination of certain "nuclear roles."

IV. Antinuclear Elites -- who reject all nuclear strategies as immoral; who categorically oppose U.S. neutron weapons, INF modernization, and most defense activities; and who are much more critical of U.S./NATO than Soviet/Warsaw Pact nuclear weapons policies.
PREFACE

This Report represents a study of "European Perspectives on Defense, Deterrence and Strategy" conducted by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis since 1979. The Institute has surveyed West European political and military thought and writings, as well as defense developments, with special emphasis upon the period since the mid-1970s.

The most distinctive feature of the study is its categorization of West European strategic theoreticians, prominent governmental policymakers, political party leaders and other relevant figures into "schools of thought" -- four each for West Germany, Britain, France, Belgium and The Netherlands. This approach is utilized as a means of categorizing for the purpose of comparing the ideas and proposals of the broad spectrum of thought in Western Europe on defense issues. The grouping of West European perspectives into such "schools of thought" represents a device for conceptual clarity.

The value of such an approach lies primarily in the capacity it affords for drawing together similar, but not always identical, perspectives within and among the countries surveyed. The use of "schools of thought" as an analytic device for this study represents an approach chosen by the authors of this study rather than anything intrinsic
to the data examined. With such caveats in mind, the categories, or "schools of thought," provide an analytic approach that will be of utility to the policymaker and others who seek to identify the major perspectives and their spokesmen in the West European security debate of the 1980s.

This study is based on an extensive examination of government and official party documents, books and monographs, articles in journals, articles and accounts in newspapers, and unsigned editorials. It is based also upon interviews with most of the representatives within the alternative schools of thought surveyed, many of whom have participated in seminars organized under the auspices of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis.
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SECTION 1
BRITISH PERSPECTIVES

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Since World War II, British perspectives on defense, deterrence and strategy have passed through three distinct stages of development. The first -- which corresponded roughly with the decade after 1945 -- was a period in which Great Britain strove to maintain an extensive military establishment in keeping with her status as a major world power with global commitments. Viewed in the contemporary context of "deterrence" versus "warfighting" capabilities, the British military clearly belonged to the "warfighting" category, with a special emphasis on the projection of conventional forces to regions outside Europe, where Britain maintained vital economic and political interests. This was a period as well when Britain -- as a founding member and staunch advocate both of the Brussels Treaty Organization and the Atlantic Alliance -- stressed her "special relationship" with the United States, together with her role as an important, if not indispensable, link between Washington and Western Europe.

British defense perspectives entered a second phase, however, in the mid-1950s, when Britain's military forces were transformed to take account of her gradual shift from the position of a global power to the status of a regional,
European power. The changing focus of British security interests -- that is, from the Third World to Europe -- also coincided with the rise to prominence of a concept of strategic deterrence based upon the maintenance by Britain of a national nuclear force. This nuclear orientation, which led in time to the Macmillan Government's decision to acquire a Polaris system, can be traced as well to the growing cost of conventional forces (especially with respect to manpower), and to the Suez Crisis of 1956, which called into question Britain's ability to project effectively military power beyond NATO boundaries. The nuclear "new look" also reflected the preferences of the "British Gaullists," who became increasingly vocal in British politics during the late 1950s and early 1960s (especially in the Conservative Party), and favored a tilt toward Eurocentric, as opposed to Atlanticist, approaches to defense. For these people, strategic nuclear weapons -- in addition to providing an all important qualitative substitute for military quantity -- seemed to guarantee an essential measure of political independence from the United States.

Finally, a third phase in the evolution of British strategy began with the announcement in 1968 that British forces "east of Suez" would be withdrawn by the end of 1971. This withdrawal, started under the Wilson Labour Government, was slowed but not reversed by Heath's Conservative Government, and was essentially completed under
the Wilson-Callaghan Labour Government, except for a small garrison in Hong Kong. The motivation, it should be noted, was much more financial than a conviction that Britain's defense efforts should be concentrated on NATO. Nevertheless, the pullback of forces from "east of Suez" did enable Britain to bring the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) up to its full authorized strength of 55,000 by the mid-1970s, despite the commitment to an increasingly troubled Northern Ireland. It is also likely that the cost savings so achieved contributed at least indirectly to British nuclear force modernization programs -- such as Chevaline* -- aimed at maintaining a credible strategic deterrent throughout the 1970s and 1980s. To some extent, then, the retraction of British deployments overseas allowed Great Britain to retain -- albeit on a more limited basis and within a more confined geographical scope -- a relatively balanced spectrum of military capabilities.

Despite encouraging signs of a minor recovery, the overall rough shape of the British economy today is a major element of the national defense debate, as it affects perceptions of what Britain can and cannot afford. Growth continues at an annual rate of 2.5 percent since the depth of the recession in 1980-81 when the gross national product shrank 5 percent. While inflation under Thatcher has

* The Chevaline Program was based on the requirement for British nuclear warheads to penetrate Soviet ABM defenses and strike targets in Moscow.
decreased from 22 percent to 5 percent, bringing interest rates down and increasing fixed investment, unemployment has increased from 6 percent to 13 percent. (269) Living standards for those employed have remained relatively stable under Thatcher despite a tax structure expected to take in 39.1 percent of the gross national product in 1983-84; wages minus taxes have risen 2.7 percent in real terms. However, despite the fact that the rate of increase of unemployment has declined from 50 percent in 1979-81 to 11 percent in 1981-83, real personal disposable income fell by .1 percent owing to the rising unemployment levels. (226)

Forecasts for 1984 concur that the British economy will continue to grow by 2-3 percent, with inflation and unemployment fairly stable. Even a growth rate of 3 percent -- the Treasury's (and the highest) prediction -- would not allow a clear downward trend in unemployment to emerge. To place this in perspective regarding the European context, the OECD predicts British inflation for 1984 will be lower than the 7.5 percent European average, while British growth will exceed the 1.5 percent expected in Europe overall. Moreover, while unemployment in Britain will probably remain roughly constant, the European average may rise to 12 percent by mid-1985. (268) However, it is important to realize that Britain spends more in absolute terms than any other member of NATO besides the United States, and is also spending more per capita and as a proportion of the GNP than
any other leading European NATO member. For example, in 1982, Britain's defense expenditure of £15.7 billion were followed by those of the Federal Republic of Germany, with £14.6 billion, and of France, with £14.3 billion. (144)

Therefore, in today's economy, a balance -- between nuclear and conventional, strategic and theater, quality and quantity -- is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain and to rationalize. Indeed, spiraling defense costs and scarce financial resources forced the Thatcher Government to undertake a wholesale review of the UK defense programs, aimed primarily at economizing wherever possible.

Thus, the £250 million cut in planned defense spending authorized in July 1983 was followed by a similar cut of £168 million for 1984. This meant that while overall defense spending, including "Falklands money" (for replacing lost equipment and rebuilding stocks), went up roughly 6 percent in real terms over 1982-83, the real growth excluding Falklands spending was only .5 percent. Moreover, the plans for 1983-84 call for only a 2.5 percent increase in the overall defense budget, although this includes a 4 percent increase in non-Falklands spending. The British Government, which had originally insisted that it would meet its 3 percent defense spending growth target (agreed NATO-wide in 1977) 'exclusive of Falklands spending, is now emphasizing selectively the statistics for these two years which appear to support its claim that the 3 percent
target has been met, by including Falklands expenditures for 1982-83 and excluding them for 1983-84. However, if inflation estimates stand, planned spending of £17 billion in 1983-84 will actually work out to be a 3.5 percent increase. In any event, Defense Secretary Heseltine has affirmed that the British Government will cease its formal pledge to an annual 3 percent increase after the current commitment expires in March 1986. British defense spending in 1986-87 is expected to increase only 4 percent over 1985-86, and as inflation for 1986-87 is targeted at 3 percent, the increase in real terms will be only 1 percent. This could even translate into a decrease in real terms if inflation runs higher than expected. This will certainly set a negative example for other NATO members.

Apart from economic considerations, socio-political constraints related to an active antinuclear movement in Western Europe increasingly may narrow British choices. Moreover the Falkland Islands conflict is likely to have a considerable long-term impact on arms procurement in Great Britain in ways that are not yet entirely clear, especially insofar as the Royal Navy is concerned. As a partial guide to future developments, then, it makes eminent sense to examine more closely the opinions of British defense-minded elites, categorizing them into various schools of strategic thought and assessing their relative political weight.
1.2 SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

Broadly speaking, one can identify in Britain four major "schools of thought" on defense, deterrence and strategy. The first -- which may be termed the "strategic deterrence" school (School I) -- places particular emphasis on the capacity to deter conflict at the higher levels of the escalatory ladder. It contains within its ranks, therefore, those who have been the principal proponents of a British strategic nuclear force, and currently enjoys substantial support within the Thatcher Conservative Government, especially from the Prime Minister herself and from the Secretary of State for Defense, Michael Heseltine. Perhaps drawing their inspiration from French Gaullist theory, those who belong to School I put forward one fundamental thesis: namely, that Britain can maintain, by reason of nationally owned and controlled nuclear weapons, a degree of independence and freedom of action in defense policy, as well as in international politics, that would not otherwise be possible. Along these lines, advocates of School I recently have argued that Britain's possession of national nuclear forces during the Falkland War helped to insulate London from any prospect of superpower (especially Soviet) pressure which, it will be remembered, at least contributed to the failure of British arms in the 1956 Suez Campaign.\(^{7}\) Not surprisingly, then, in a defense budget squeeze, School I would give priority to strategic force modernization, preferably through acquisition of a Polaris
follow-on system based upon Trident II technology. Indeed, in presenting the defense budget estimates to Parliament in July 1982, then Defense Minister Nott explicitly underlined the centrality of Trident to the security of Great Britain,\(^{(6)}\) a position confirmed by his successor, Michael Heseltine.

Part of the British reasoning for sustaining a credible national deterrent most probably stems from the growth in concern with respect to the efficacy of the American nuclear guarantee, especially now that the Soviet Union has achieved strategic parity with the United States.\(^{(89, \text{p.}17)}\) Great Britain, it has been argued, needs her own strategic force in order to "hedge her bets" against the day when the U.S. deterrent might fail to protect America's allies in Western Europe. Perhaps for this reason, adherents of School I have stressed time and again that any British strategy without a nuclear component is "merely an adjunct to someone else's strategy."\(^{(7, \text{p.}1056)}\)

However, rather than to call U.S. reliability directly into question, advocates of School I, in presenting their case for a national nuclear force, generally emphasize the importance of reducing the risks of any Soviet miscalculation. As the Thatcher Government put it:

We need to convince Soviet leaders that even if they thought that at some critical point as a conflict developed that the U.S. would hold back, the British force could still inflict a blow so
destructive that the penalty for aggression would have proved too high. (12, p.5)

And as Defense Minister Heseltine stated:

We are in the business of defense and deterrence. There is no way in which we would forego the options one way or another. To do that would simply show the Soviets where they might have the chance of attacking successfully. (201)

Viewed from this perspective, the British deterrent is not meant to reassure NATO allies who fear that American strategic forces may become decoupled from the defense of Europe; rather, its main mission is to convince the Soviet Union that such decoupling -- if ever it were thought to exist -- could not possibly be exploited to Moscow's advantage.

Central to School I's concept of British strategic deterrence is the requirement that Britain's nuclear forces retain the capacity to strike targets in Moscow. This is why the members of this school gave wholehearted support to the Chevaline project mentioned earlier (which was begun under the Conservative Heath Government), and why they continue to prefer a British offensive capability based upon ballistic, as opposed to cruise, missiles. By the late 1980s, they argue, Soviet air defenses will be designed to counter a U.S. cruise missile force, which will be far larger than any national deterrent based on the cruise missile that could be fielded by Britain. A smaller British cruise missile force, therefore, might not be capable of inflicting upon the Soviet Union sufficient damage to
constitute an effective strategic deterrent, if it must be expected to penetrate Soviet air defenses, designed to counter a much larger American force. In addition, since a British cruise missile force also would be dependent on targeting data -- especially terrain correlation information acquired by satellite photography -- which only the United States could provide, it would necessarily be targeted in conjunction with the American Strategic Air Command and, as a result, would not provide Britain with even the option of an independent capability. Such prior constraints upon British strategic decision-making, needless to say, would be totally unacceptable to the adherents of School I.

With respect to nuclear deterrence at the theater level, however, School I theorists are more favorably disposed toward cruise missile strategies. Indeed, there is considerable (if not unanimous) support in School I for the deployment by NATO of ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and Pershing IIs -- the so-called intermediate nuclear forces (INF) -- as a counter to Soviet Eurostrategic systems, such as the SS-20 and the Backfire bomber.* As a

\* Some who belong to School I -- most notably Lord Chalfont and Sir Peter Hill-Norton (a former Chief of Staff) -- do not support the modernization of nuclear forces at the NATO theater level. Such forces, in the opinion of Chalfont, are not helpful, because the threat of their use is not a viable deterrent to NATO's principal worry -- a sudden conventional attack by Warsaw Pact forces. He also believes that a major effort to maintain a nuclear option at the battlefield level is misdirected, because the very idea of a nuclear exchange confined below the strategic level is impractical. Once nuclear weapons are exploded on the NATO
matter of fact, support for INF modernization would seem to
be a natural outgrowth of School I's general preference for
nuclear weapons as a qualitative substitute for quantitative
shortfalls among the NATO allies, especially at a time when
budgetary constraints are likely to require deeper cuts in
British general purpose forces, if plans for the
modernization of Britain's strategic deterrent are to
proceed on schedule. School I would therefore prefer
Reagan's "interim agreement" proposal to his "zero-zero
option."

With the emphasis in School I on the upper rungs of
deterrence, "Emerging Technologies" intrinsic to the "deep
strike" strategies advocated by General Bernard Rogers,
among others, are being strongly resisted by School I
advocates. Noting the high cost of such technologies,
School I is cautious to avoid straining existing programs,
and prefers to focus its support on deployment of
INF. However, the preference for INF is not uncondi-
tional, even among members of School I. The issue of dual
key control of the GLCMs is particularly contentious. "Dual
key" would mean some sort of physical control of the
missiles by Britain to ensure absolutely a British veto over
their employment from British territory. Some 40 to 50 Tory

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battlefield, the conflict would quickly escalate to the
strategic level. For this reason, Chalfont concludes,
Britain ought to concentrate on contributing to deterrence
at the upper rungs of the escalatory ladder.

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backbenchers of the extreme right are pressuring Thatcher to obtain such a system. As Mr. Timothy Renton, Conservative MP from Mid-Sussex stated: "The vast majority of British people want us to have an independent nuclear deterrent, but are concerned at the prospect of such a deterrent based on British soil not being under sovereign British control. (262) His assertion is borne out by opinion polls, one of which showed 89 percent favoring dual key to 4 percent preferring sole U.S. control. The point is especially telling, as 30 percent of those polled who were opposed to INF stated they would be more inclined to accept GLCMs under a dual key system. (195) This alarming mistrust of the United States among the broad strata of the British populace was addressed by Conservative MP Alan Clark, who said: "It is only by establishing a genuine British decision over those intermediate weapons that you will start to separate the ordinary, decent people, who have anxieties about this weapons system, from the cranks and the subversives." (221)

Britain once enjoyed a veto over the use by the United States of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world under clause 2 of the Quebec Agreement of 1943. This veto was negotiated away in late 1947 and early 1948 in an effort to restore technological collaboration (which was not forthcoming until the mid-1950s). However, the British voice was partially restored in an arrangement by Atlee and Truman in 1951, which was reaffirmed in 1952 by Churchill and Truman in a communique which said in part:
Under arrangements made for the common defense, the United States has the use of certain bases in the United Kingdom. We reaffirm the understanding that the use of these bases in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision by Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government in the light of the circumstances at the time. (165)

The Thatcher Government has relied heavily upon the 1952 Agreement, the details of which it made public for the first time in early 1983, in making its case against a dual key system. In referring to U.S. Navy Poseidon submarines based at Holy Loch in Scotland and U.S. Air Force F-111 bombers stationed at Oxfordshire, Heseltine stated: "We have an arrangement as to how those can be used. That arrangement we believed was good enough, has stood the test of time, to apply to cruise." (195) Mrs. Thatcher has emphasized that this veto is absolute. She said: "The phrase goes further than 'joint consultation.' The phrase is that use of those bases comes by 'joint decision,' which means that it is a decision of both after consultation." (262) The point has also been made that the United States offered dual key control at the time of the joint NATO decision in December 1979, but that Britain rejected dual key on the grounds of expense, as it would have involved partial British purchase of the system. "It would have put something on the order of £1 billion on our defense budget, therefore £1 billion of defense equipment that we could not have somewhere else," according to Heseltine. (195)
Despite these arguments, Labour, the SDP and the Liberals all insist on dual key control in the event of GLCM deployment. Moreover, many Conservative MPs remain unconvinced. Concern has been raised that bombers and submarines carrying nuclear missiles would not actually launch them from British territory, as cruise missiles would be launched. Hence, GLCMs might more directly invite retaliation in the event of conflict. Moreover, preemption would be possible, in which case Britain might be struck in a nuclear attack. Finally, although this point is played down by the Government, cruise missiles would not actually be fired until launchers had been dispersed from bases, beyond direct British control. As stated by Conservative MP Alan Clark: "Are not the arrangements formulated some 30 years ago for subsonic aircraft and freefall bombs totally inappropriate for those missiles with electronic triggers and targets?" (262)

The dual key issue has undergone a recent resurgence in the wake of the U.S. intervention in Grenada. General British irritation at the allegedly inadequate, or at least minimal consultation undertaken by the United States with Britain before the joint intervention has provided the dual key lobby -- including not only the opposition parties, but also elements of the Conservatives -- a prime opportunity to rekindle the issue. This is especially so considering the fact that, coincidentally, the initial cruise missile
components arrived in the United Kingdom shortly after the intervention, in order to meet the initial operational date in December as planned. Thus, the Grenada incident has been used as an illustration of the alleged unreliability of the United States concerning joint consultation, as would be required in the event of a possible launch of the GLCMs from British soil by the United States.

Public reaction in Britain demonstrated a direct connection between the Grenada operation and the issue of dual key and consultation regarding the GLCMs. A MORI poll in the Sunday Times of October 30, 1983, showed 73 percent thought the United States would fire the missiles even if the British Government objected, while a Harris poll for Weekend World indicated that 87 percent favored a dual key mechanism on the GLCMs. This comes despite the fact that the United States was under no obligation whatsoever to consult Britain concerning Grenada, while on the other hand there has been a written agreement for years obliging consultation on matters concerning American nuclear weapons on British soil.

As the matter stood, under the Grenadian constitution, the Queen had delegated full state powers to the Governor General, Sir Paul Scoon, in the absence of her presence on Grenadian soil. Thus, approval of the government of Mrs. Thatcher for an intervention would not be
necessary, especially inasmuch as Scoon requested it. None-theless, as Grenada is a Commonwealth country, British ties are strong and resentment is high that Mrs. Thatcher's advice opposing intervention was not followed.

The embarrassment of the British Government was especially acute as the British were not informed of President Reagan's preliminary decision of October 23 to accept the request of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States to intervene. British ignorance allowed the Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, to tell the House of Commons the day before the intervention that there was no reason to anticipate any such action. While the British were reluctant initially to condemn the intervention, public concern appears to have provoked a more stern Government response. Prime Minister Thatcher declared on the BBC World Service, "If you are going to pronounce a new law that wherever communism reigns against the will of the people ... the United States shall enter, then we are going to have really terrible wars in the world."(255) While she stated she was pleased that the people of Grenada were now free and that the people of the Eastern Caribbean were more secure, she said: "Does that mean you are entitled to go into a whole list of other countries? I think the answer is 'no'."(255) Despite the fact that Mrs. Thatcher disapproved of Western countries using force to "walk into other people's countries," she made it clear that the United Kingdom would be sympathetic to calls for a multinational
peacekeeping force for Grenada once "the United States has cleared the island of the present resistance." (255)

While the Government professed that the Grenada situation and the dual key issue were not related, it felt obliged to bring the missile question before the House of Commons. Opening the debate by calling for endorsement of a motion supporting deployment of cruise missiles in Europe in the absence of agreement with the Soviet Union on the "zero option," Mr. Michael Heseltine, the British Defense Secretary, made a strong case against linking Grenada to the GLCMs. He insisted that yielding to public pressure on dual key at this late date would demonstrate a lack of trust in the Alliance that was "the bastion of our defenses." He stated:

If we are to impose physical control on American weapons now, with all the political undertones that implies, in order to meet British public opinion, what possible argument is there to American public opinion that they should provide us with the absolute freedom to use the British independent nuclear deterrent without a dual key system? (257)

Heseltine noted that use of the British deterrent would have incalculable consequences for the United States, which had therefore demonstrated its trust of Britain. Conceding that he felt the disagreements between the United States and Great Britain concerning the intervention in Grenada involved "a sincere and damaging disagreement of judgment between two close allies," Heseltine stated:

It is inconceivable that in the flow of world events such disagreements do not arise. But in the last resort we face a common threat and we
have evolved a common defense. And the quicker that any doubts about that are set aside, the clearer our deterrents will become."(257)

The British opposition parties, far from being so sanguine, seized the opportunity the Grenada incident provided to criticize sharply the Government for its opposition to "dual key." Denis Healey, speaking for Labour, led the attack on the Government's position. Healey -- who had raised no similar objections to American aircraft, armed with nuclear weapons, operating from the United Kingdom during his tenure as Secretary of State for Defense -- expressed concern that "for the first time in our history missiles will be deployed on our soil without the ability of the British Government to prevent them from being fired."(202) Healey described Mrs. Thatcher as the "obedient poodle of the American President" and said she should "get off her knees" to join Western states in coming out more strongly against the intervention,(185) which he claimed presented an "unanswerable argument" for dual key control of cruise, inasmuch as it called into question the American willingness to gain British approval before firing any GLCMs.(257)

Dr. David Owen, SDP leader and former Labour Foreign Secretary, stated that more urgent diplomacy by Britain and the Commonwealth countries should have forestalled the intervention.(154) He called upon Geoffrey Howe, the current Foreign Secretary, to state formally before the
House of Commons and before the United Nations Security Council that the intervention was not justified under the U.N. Charter. (Britain abstained in the Security Council on the vote condemning the action.) (185)

David Steel, leader of the Liberal Party, took an even stronger tack against the Government. Steel stated that the intervention was not "validated by international law or by the Charter of the U.N.," and said that "in the light of these events, [the Government] should not rely on undertakings dating back to the Atlee-Truman era and relating not to missiles but to bombers." (185) He moved an amendment urging the Government to negotiate immediately on the basis of the United States offer for the installation at British expense of a dual key system for any cruise missiles based in the United Kingdom. The Amendment stated that "without weakening its bargaining position" NATO should continue the INF talks and that the British Government should persuade the United States to build on the "walk in the woods" formula discussed by Ambassador Nitze and his Soviet counterpart. Steel said that Healey's case against the Government was "totally shot through" by the fact that the Labour Party would discard the bargaining counter of the dual track decision before negotiating. (177) However, despite the flack in the House of Commons and the tide of British public opinion, the Thatcher Government has moved to put the Grenada incident behind it. A summit in Bonn in
early November between Prime Minister Thatcher and Chancellor Helmut Kohl resulted in a communique which stated that it was time to "look to the future" with hope for Grenada to make good use of its chance to return to democracy. The two leaders agreed that the Atlantic Alliance had "not in any way been impaired by what happened in Grenada," and Mrs. Thatcher said that "the wider alliance is in good heart and good health."(206) The decisions of the British Government both to consider the Grenada incident a closed chapter in Atlantic relations and to refuse to accede to pressures for a dual key system are likely to stand, despite the fact that the opposition has managed to score a few points in the short run. Far from feeling pressure on its flank from dual key advocates within the Conservative Party, the Government has been subjected to pressures from its MPs in support of the United States. A motion explicitly approving the intervention was tabled in the Commons with two former Ministers among its sponsors. Moreover, at a closed meeting of the backbench 1922 Committee, the Government was accused by Sir Hugh Fraser, another former Minister, of being inept in holding a debate on GLCMs at the exact time of mistrust being manifested over the United States' actions.258) Thus, while the Grenada incident is likely to be dredged up during the next election campaign, Government opposition to "dual key" is likely to stand through deployment of the missiles in Great Britain
and through the INF negotiations, certainly while the Conservatives remain in power.

Concerning conventional forces, the Falklands War has had immediate ramifications for British naval planning. There is a recognition that the British seaborne invasion would have been impossible were the attack to have taken place after another two years of the planned naval force reductions, as the carrier Invincible and the assault ships Intrepid and Fearless would not have been available. Prior to the conflict, Secretary Nott's white paper on defense, The Way Forward, was to have slashed the Navy's running escorts by 25 percent, from 58 active vessels (with 3 in mothballs) to 42 (with 8 in mothballs) by 1989. In the aftermath of the Falklands, the Navy and others have pressed for substantial increases in the number of surface ships. While Nott to some extent resisted such pressures, preferring to give more emphasis to the undersea role, a position confirmed by his successor, Heseltine, lessons of the Falklands have been translated into British naval planning in the short term, as enumerated below.

1. The need for Airborne Early Warning (AEW) against stand-off weapons and low-flying aircraft was underscored by the successes of Exocet and Argentine bombing runs. The range and capability of Sea Harrier radar was limited; the consequent lack of adequate radar-controlled cuing and vectoring for
intercepts was evident as the Task Force had to rely only on tactical ship radar systems.\(^{(14)}\)
As Argentine pilots flew low, warning time was reduced even further.

- Sea King helicopters are being fitted with Search-water surveillance radar, while an additional six such Sea Kings are being purchased. Moreover, a new helicopter, the EH-101, is being developed in cooperation with Italy as a follow-on model for the 1990s. The first delivery is expected in 1989. Also, Nimrod aircraft with long-range early warning capability are being put on station for out-of-area duties. However, owing to the poor fuel economy of Sea King and the limited fuel capacity of British carriers, continuous surveillance will not be possible. Serviceability and provision for space for sufficient Sea Kings aboard carriers also pose problems.

2. The task force faced a significant problem operating out of range of ground-based air cover.

- In addition to replacement of battle losses, seven Sea Harrier aircraft and at least twelve Phantom F-4 J aircraft will be purchased, while six wide-bodied tankers will be constructed to increase air-to-air refueling capability and
therefore serve as a significant force multiplier for out-of-area missions.

3. Point defense of vessels against surface-skimming missiles and low-flying aircraft was sorely lacking. Combined with lack of AEW this contributed significantly to damage incurred by the Task Force.

- General Dynamics' Vulcan/Phalanx point defense gun systems are being installed. Seawolf, a close-in-fast-reaction antimissile missile also effective against low-flying aircraft, had been deployed with only two of the Task Force vessels. Now, eight Type 22 frigates with Seawolf are either in service or under construction; the four replacement vessels will have Seawolf or equivalent; and the next generation of frigate, Type 23, will also be so equipped. It should be noted that the Seawolf is very subject to saturation, as it has a short range and hence cannot deal sequentially with weapons approaching simultaneously; and has limited refire capacity (only two 6-round launches per Type-27 vessel; reloading is by hand and hence is impractical while the ship is under attack). Therefore, Seaguard or GBG30 point defense weapons will probably be added to all Type 42 destroyers as well as to the carriers,
amphibious assault ships, and the light cruiser command ship. Meanwhile, the Shield ECM system is under development as a possible supplement.

4. Nott's defense cuts would have allowed Britain’s assault troop capability to continue in a state of benign neglect. However, the value of marines and paratroops has been underscored by their demonstrated performance in the Falklands conflict. A true rapid deployment force capability is now sought.

• The 5th Infantry Brigade, the main British intervention unit, had consisted of a two-battalion parachute regiment, an infantry battalion and a few engineers. An armored reconnaissance regiment is being added, which will be augmented by an artillery regiment, a squadron of helicopters and some additional engineers. Fitting of station-keeping equipment to a number of Hercules aircraft earmarked for deployment of the brigade will give it parachute assault capability by 1985. Taken with the 3rd Commando Brigade Royal Marines, this will provide significant out-of-area assault capacity to the United Kingdom.

5. The utility of helicopters in providing mobility and logistic support was amply demonstrated in the campaign.
In addition to replacements, the RAF will get five more Boeing Chinook helicopters, each capable of carrying eighty troops. Four of the six Tristar tankers being purchased will be given capability to carry up to one hundred twenty troops, even while refueling.

6. The Falklands War has had a significant impact in at least delaying the planned contraction of the British surface fleet.

The four ships to have gone into the "standby squadron" by April 1985 are now to be maintained in the front line fleet, while the four ships lost are being replaced by new heavyweight Type 22 frigates, rather than the austere Type 23 which would cost half as much (this may be partially explained by the fact that Type 22 frigates will not be quicker to produce, and the ships are required as soon as possible). Two Type 22 vessels are scheduled to be in service by early 1985. Meanwhile, the order for the first of the Type 23 frigates is being placed; the vessel is expected to be in service by 1988-89. At least eight Type 23s are expected to be built. The assault ships Fearless and Intrepid and the carrier Invincible, which proved vital to the campaign, are to be retained, thereby seemingly strengthening the case for
retaining more escort vessels. However, the plan remains to cut five frigates and destroyers between 1985 and 1989. Heseltine has stated that no changes were being planned.

7. An additional arrow in the quiver of the anti-Trident partisans in the importance of attack submarines, as demonstrated by their valued performance in the conflict. The speed of British SSNs allowed early establishment of the 200-mile exclusion zone. Moreover, after torpedoing the General Belgrano, they bottled up the entire Argentine surface fleet. However, construction of the four Trident submarines at Vickers' shipyard at Barrow-in-Furness will compete with the attack submarine construction program until 1992. Dr. David Owen expressed concern over this point in Parliament, asking whether there would not be an insufficient number of SSNs in service because of the Trident program. Nott responded that the Government would accelerate deployment of a new class of attack submarine after the "pause" in the SSN program. This will be the new Type 2400, the first for which was placed in November 1983. Built at a cost of £100 million, it will replace the Oberon class, which is slower, noisier, and able to dive less deep. Besides torpedoes and submarines mines, Type 2400 will also carry antiship guided
Also, in the wake of Mrs. Thatcher's resounding victory, continuance of Trident construction is assured for the life of the current Parliament.

There is a second school of thought in Britain -- designated here as the "battlefield deterrence" school (School II) -- which places greater emphasis on the ability to deter at the lower rungs of the escalatory ladder, and looks askance, for this reason, at the reductions in conventional forces called for in the recent Defense White Papers. (22, p.4) In point of fact, in a defense budget crunch, School II -- which draws most of its support from centrist elements in the Labour Party, as well as from the new Social Democratic Party (and its Liberal Party allies) -- would accord highest priority to the maintenance of British forces-in-being assigned to the NATO Central Front. (89) In the view of the Falklands crisis, there is also a growing appreciation in School II of the need to improve Britain's maritime forces -- including surface, sub-surface, naval air, and logistical support units -- for use both in NATO and extra-NATO contexts. (256) However, its supporters reject Mrs. Thatcher's "fortress Falklands" concept as overly expensive. Moreover, while they are perfectly prepared to maintain (and perhaps to extend) the present Polaris force, most School II advocates are willing as well to rely on the U.S. extended deterrent as the
principal counter to Moscow at the strategic level.\textsuperscript{(59, pp.2-17)} As a result, given Britain's present financial quandary, they are prone to consider the preservation of a national nuclear force beyond the lifetime of Polaris as a waste of money that could be better spent on conventional forces.\textsuperscript{*}

The Liberal Party has gone even further on this issue, declaring its opposition to maintenance of Polaris even in the short term. Liberal Leader David Steel had stated that "the Liberal Party has always been against the independent nuclear deterrent" and declared that Polaris should be "phased out as soon as possible."\textsuperscript{(139)} This was at variance with the policies of the SDP, which favors retention of Polaris at least through the next Parliament. The Liberal-SDP Alliance therefore adopted the compromise position that Polaris should be assigned to NATO, requiring no independent use by Britain,\textsuperscript{(138)} and should be included in the INF talks.\textsuperscript{(217)} No doubt this course of action may seem all the more compelling since -- according to School II-- no independent use of a British deterrent is really feasible. Implicit in this reasoning is a rejection of School I's contention that national nuclear forces might be able to play a useful deterrent role beyond the NATO theater.

\textsuperscript{* Unless the United States were to keep its Polaris production lines open beyond the mid-1980s, or Britain were to create an independent production capacity, British SLBM stocks could not remain operational beyond 1993, due to a lack of solid fuel replenishment.
In setting forth their case, therefore, those who belong to School II have been especially critical of the "opportunity costs" associated with the Thatcher Government's commitment to Trident. In recent years, substantial increases in military pay, they argue, have already reduced to inadequate levels the funds available for the purchase of military equipment; but, with the Trident decision, which promises to absorb anywhere from 15 to 40 percent of the new equipment budget, problems related to material resupply might well become intolerable. This is true, School II suggests, particularly when it is noted that 88 percent of the procurement budget is to be spent on work that has a development content and is liable to rapid cost escalation. (15, pp.146-147) By way of illustration, School II claims as well that the Thatcher Government's decision to procure the D-5 Trident II missile, rather than the C-4 Trident I system, will raise total Trident costs by at least as much as 20 percent, and perhaps as high as 50 to 60 percent.* For these and other reasons, the Social Democratic Party (a proponent of School II) launched an unsuccessful Parliamentary drive in July 1982 to reject Trident, a move which the Social Democrats believe would

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* These additional costs would be tied primarily to the Trident II requirement for larger submarines and a bigger warhead development program. It is worth noting, however, that the Treasury supports the Trident II option for the very negative reason that it postpones the commitment of funds: the first expenditure under a D-5 program would come a year or more later than that required for the C-4.
allow Great Britain to increase defense spending by 3 percent for a much better balanced military force.

None of the above is meant to suggest that all School II advocates are categorically opposed to Polaris replacement. As implied earlier, among moderate Labourites and Social Democrats (most notably SDP Leader David Owen), there is still some support for a follow-on system. Their arguments, however, appear to be more solidly based than School I's on political, as opposed to military, considerations: namely, (a) a desire for status within the Atlantic Alliance and in arms control negotiations; and (b) concern lest France becomes the only European nuclear power, a development that substantially could erode the status of Britain within the European Economic Community (EEC). Yet, for these purposes, they argue, a system much less sophisticated than Trident, based on cruise missiles and capable of hitting a major city or cities in the Soviet Union -- even if not Moscow -- should be more than adequate. As Dr. Owen wrote in 1980:

... If in 1990 there were still felt to be a need, for European political reasons, which have always been more important than military reasons, for Britain retaining its own deterrent, then we should consider purchasing cruise missiles to be fired from the existing torpedo tubes of our hunter-killer submarines. This would provide the U.K. with an ability to threaten a second strike, capable of inflicting unacceptable damage of a few Soviet cities in the unlikely event of a breakdown in NATO, or even more unlikely, of a uniquely threatening situation developing for the U.K. in a general East/West war

...(58, pp. 26-27)
More recently, Dr. Owen has linked his opposition to Trident procurement to the revival in 1982 of U.S.-Soviet talks on the limitation of strategic nuclear arms. He has argued in particular that it was patently absurd for the Thatcher Government to suggest that the future of Trident could be held separate from the START (not INF) negotiations. Indeed, if President Reagan succeeds in achieving deep cuts in the superpower nuclear arsenals, the British and French deterrents would be equivalent to 10 and 15 percent, respectively, of the lower level of 5000 U.S. nuclear warheads. (7, 269) Under these circumstances, Owen opines, it is likely that the British and possibly even the French would be pressured to make a contribution to the reduction of strategic nuclear forces. With this prospect in mind, the costs of Trident, as opposed to a cruise missile system, seem even less acceptable.

It also should be noted that in contrast to School I, proponents of School II are satisfied with the cruise missile option, because they hold fast to the belief that a British threat or use of nuclear weapons is possible only in conjunction with the United States and NATO. The fact that a British cruise force would be dependent on the provision of targeting data by the United States, therefore, is of little consequence. So, too, faith in the inadequacy of a cruise deterrent is reinforced in School II by the fact that its adherents reject the notion that American strategic
forces could ever be decoupled from the defense of Western Europe. They would most likely agree with Dr. Michael Howard of Oxford University in his statement that

...the United States is coupled to Europe, not by one delivery system rather than another, but by a vast web of military installations and personnel, to say nothing of the innumerable economic, social and financial links that tie us together into a single coherent system. (88)

There is, however, another less obvious reason why those in School II may prefer a British cruise missile option: simply put, since the deployment of such a force would inevitably be more tightly tied to NATO than a Trident force, it accords with School II's overarching view that Britain would be better off to concentrate her contributions to nuclear deterrence at the theater, rather than at the strategic level. It is for this reason as well that one finds within School II a substantial degree of support for the 1979 NATO decision to deploy intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). Indeed, given their commitment to graduated deterrence through a strategy of flexible response, School II analysts implicitly endorse the need for nuclear options on the NATO battlefield. (15) To be sure, they also favor the deployment by NATO of a greater conventional force so that the initial response to Soviet attack need not necessarily be nuclear. Thus, Dr. Owen has floated the idea of a "modest increase" in the British armed forces, by encouraging voluntary service schemes, to contribute to a
highly trained mobile reserve force. In January 1984, at a meeting of the SDP's policy-making Council for Social Democracy, Owen added: "We need more precision-guided conventional munitions, better equipment and improved airlift capacity for greater mobility."(239) Also, many School II spokesmen, particularly among the SDP, want to raise the nuclear threshold, not by adopting a "no-first-use" pledge with respect to theater nuclear weapons, but through negotiating with the Soviets the more reasonable (and presumably easier to achieve) goal of "no early use." David Owen in particular has led the SDP to adopt a platform supporting a tactical nuclear free zone involving the territory of East and West Germany and Czechoslovakia, to decrease NATO adherence to an early use of nuclear weapons.(242) In explaining its endorsement of the INF concept, School II stresses the political/deterrent -- as opposed to military/warfighting -- aspects, particularly its potential use as a prod to induce the Soviet Union into theater nuclear arms control negotiations.

There is a substantial proportion of School II supporters among the members of the SDP-Liberal Alliance. In the SDP they are preponderant, as is reflected in an SDP paper of October 1982 calling for support of NATO's dual-track decision.(251) William Rodgers, a founding member of the Social Democratic Party and a former "shadow Defense Minister" for the Labour Party, said a failure to support
GLCM deployment in Britain would "undermine the unity of NATO and end at a stroke any bargaining power with the Soviet Union over the SS-20." (109) Rodgers stated that he would be unable to serve as Defense Minister in a government unilaterally opposing GLCM deployment. * Dr. David Owen, the current SDP leader and former Labour Foreign Secretary, has said that it must be made clear to the Soviets in the INF negotiations that failure would mean deployment of the cruise missiles. (238)

The Liberal Party, whose top leadership espouses School II tenets, does however contain a vocal minority (roughly one-third) of unilateralists. Liberal Leader David Steel, in rejecting the Andropov proposal to deploy 162 SS-20s and redeploy the rest, stated: "We must achieve more than that; the Russians must know that NATO stands united and prepared to deploy unless we get it." (120) Therefore, he called for a freeze on deployment of INF only after genuine reductions had been negotiated, not before. Earlier, the Liberal Party Conference had voted its opposition, by 754 votes to 485, to any deployment of GLCM in Britain, in the face of an amendment proposed by the leadership to defer deployment of cruise while a balanced reduction of weapons was being negotiated. Steel had reserved the position of the Liberal MPs in the wake of this

* (215). This is presently moot as Rodgers lost his seat in the June 1983 elections.
vote, declaring that it would "not, of course, dictate any unilateral action our part." (215)

In view of these divisions, the SDP took the lead in modifying its position towards a compromise situation. In January 1983 the SDP published a policy paper advocating deferral of a decision on INF pending the outcome of the Geneva talks. Meanwhile, to make the decision to deploy more palatable, it supports a dual key arrangement. This move was probably due in large part to the overwhelming approval in Britain for such a system. The Alliance election manifesto, which was negotiated over a period of several months by a joint working party, essentially adopted the new SDP position, stating that a decision on deployment must take into account the negotiating positions of both parties, the attitude of other NATO countries and whether a dual key system had been approved. (217)

However, in the aftermath of the election, the Alliance's consensus has broken down. David Owen, fearful that an out-and-out merger of the SDP with the larger Liberal party would result in a loss of identity for his party and an end to his leadership position has carefully differentiated the two Alliance partners. This policy was affirmed by the SDP annual assembly in September 1983, which voted to postpone a merger "until at least after the next election." (175) Thus, while a majority of both parties want improved Alliance cooperation, only 25 percent of the
SDP favors joint selection of candidates, compared with 84 percent of the Liberals preferring it; and while a majority of Liberals want joint policy-making, only 33 percent of the SDP is so disposed. (284) Owen has backed away from the Alliance compromise position, and has moved toward a more firm commitment in favor of INF deployment, by withdrawing the "dual key" reservation (although continuing to stress its utility). (240) He called for an accelerated deployment timetable for GLCMs in the Federal Republic of Germany, but paired this with a call to delay introduction of Pershing II's as a counterweight to forestall additional SS-20 deployments. (104) Owen also reiterated his belief "that Britain needs a minimum deterrent strategy," involving national nuclear forces, under any circumstances. Owen has added that he believes disarmament negotiations might help reconcile the Alliance partners, regarding the cruise and Polaris issues, (239) and has at any rate set a deadline of early 1987 for an agreed SDP-Liberal Alliance defense policy. (193)

Under Dr. Owen's leadership, the 340-member SDP Council has endorsed the "walk in the woods" formula for INF concocted by Ambassador Nitze and his Soviet counterpart, which would reduce Soviet SS-20s in return for reductions in cruise deployment and no deployment of Pershing IIs. It has opposed Trident, supported retention of Polaris and, in a significant gesture to the Liberals, called for a freeze on
further deployment of cruise pending the outcome of negotiations (while endorsing the deployment already made and opposing the idea of sending any back). (73) This reflects the tendency of School II advocates to carve out a "middle ground" with respect to issues of nuclear deterrence.

Drawing together elements both of School I and School II, there is a third school of thought in the British defense debate -- the "balanced posture" school (School III) -- which places emphasis on the need for a spectrum of capabilities from the battlefield to the strategic nuclear level. This school, which had included within its ranks a goodly proportion of the Thatcher Government (such as former Foreign Minister Francis Pym), as well as a majority of the Conservative Party "backbenchers" in Parliament, (such as Keith Speed, Anthony Buck, Winston Churchill, and Edward Heath), believes that Britain must maintain a substantial force contribution (at all existing levels) to NATO, while modernizing its capabilities to deter conflict in Europe. They also point to the need for contributing, if possible, to the defense of NATO interests outside of Western Europe, perhaps as part of the American Rapid Deployment Force concept. With respect to the deployment of forces beyond the North Atlantic area, Britain, they suggest, together with France, can and should make significant contributions in regard to ships, logistics, aerial surveillance, some combat aircraft, communications, intelligence, and expert knowledge based on historical on-the-ground experience.
So, too, School III places emphasis on the requirement for maintaining a core capability to defend unique British interests overseas, unilaterally if need be. The conflict over the Falkland Islands, which placed a premium on such capabilities, has seemingly strengthened the hand of School III. As noted already, the lessons of the Falklands War are being translated into detailed hardware decisions. It seems likely, moreover, that the arguments advanced by School III against the Thatcher Government's earlier plans to reduce the navy may have longer term implications. Former Defense Minister Nott certainly catered to School III's position when, in the July 1982 Parliamentary debate, he announced plans for the replacement of most (if not all) of the ships, naval aircraft and related equipment lost in the South Atlantic, together with the reversal of the plan to sell H.M.S. Invincible to Australia. Given the resurgence of the Navy lobby among School III parliamentarians, Heseltine will have to be even more solicitous of their views in the future.

Still, the Trident decision is not without support in School III, for the distinguishing characteristic that most fully differentiates this school from School II above is its emphasis on the requirement for a new generation British deterrent force capable of penetrating Moscow ABM defenses. In this respect, School III supporters share the preferences of School I for an advanced ballistic missile system -- such
as Trident II -- as a follow-on to Polaris. It would be foolhardy, they argue, to procure a lesser system (e.g., Owen's cruise missile option), if the Soviet leadership is to remain convinced that it would not be able to capitalize from a real or perceived decoupling of U.S. strategic forces from the defense of Western Europe. (8, p.13) Moreover, in the opinion of School III, it could be sending the "wrong message to Moscow" for Britain to give up her distinctive deterrent capabilities at a time when the military buildup in the Soviet Union continues to proceed apace. (23, p.12) In fact, in an effort to enhance the British deterrent at the strategic level, School III calls as well for a more robust civil defense program.

However, in keeping with their advocacy of a balanced force posture, as well as their concern that the coupling between varying levels of deterrence in the escalatory ladder remain credible, School III analysts are also apprehensive over the tilting nuclear balance at the NATO theater level. It is essential, in their opinion, that the Soviet SS-20s be countered effectively lest Moscow achieve a critical measure of dominance at crucial points in the chain of escalation, thereby placing the onus for further and possibly suicidal action on the shoulders of the West. Wholehearted support for the INF program described above, therefore, remains a central tenet of School III. If this program could be buttressed with at least some of the
conventional force modernization efforts called for in School II, together with an improvement in NATO's capacity to survive chemical warfare, those who belong to School III would be happier still. As always, the problem is money, and School III has yet to reflect a consensus among its members, as to precisely where they would and would not be prepared to cut in the coming defense budget squeeze.

Finally, in stark contrast to the three schools discussed so far, there is a fourth school of thought in Britain, popular among the Labour Left (which now dominates the Labour Party), in a segment of the Liberal Party, and among most major union executive committees, which feels certain that it has found the answer to the budgetary dilemmas confronting School III. Supporters propose the complete -- and if necessary unilateral -- rejection of nuclear weapons on both the theater and strategic level. Britain, they suggest, could take an all-important first step in this direction by foregoing Trident and allowing the national deterrent to wither away through technological obsolescence. Such action, they believe, may even be so dramatic as to cause other nuclear powers to follow suit. For obvious reasons, then, this group has been dubbed the "unilateral disarmament" school (School IV).

School IV has also been actively involved in the campaign to block deployment by NATO of intermediate nuclear forces (INF). These weapons, School IV argues,
are particularly destabilizing and immoral, because they appear to make the idea of a limited nuclear war confined to Europe more plausible and, therefore, more likely. In so doing, it has been suggested, actual deployment of INF might even hasten what its proponents fear most -- the decoupling of the U.S. strategic nuclear guarantee from the defense of Western Europe. As an alternative to the INF and similar programs, adherents to School IV offer the Utopian vision of a European nuclear free zone "from Portugal to Poland."

The catalyst for the recent popularity of School IV in Britain was the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). Founded in the late 1950s, the unilateralist group had faded after the Cuban missile crisis, and the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963. In 1979, for example, CND had only 3,000 national members. In the wake of the INF decision, it grew to over 85,000 national members in 1983, and has claimed the support of 250,000. These figures were made credible by the mass demonstrations CND has been able to sponsor. The resurrection of CND may be attributed to several factors, but its primary motivator was apprehension inspired by increasing awareness of an eroding theater nuclear balance in favor of the Soviets and a perceived Western shift to a nuclear warfighting posture, one which relies upon limited nuclear war in the European theater. In this context, GLCMs are perceived as weapons deliberately designed to decouple, to allow the United States to fight a nuclear war in Europe.
while sanctuarizing itself. Worse still, GLCMs launched from the United Kingdom are seen by antinuclear supporters as inviting Soviet response on the strategic level against Britain. Thus, in this perverse yet logical perceptual framework, missiles in Britain pointed at the adversary are seen as more dangerous than missiles in the adversary's territory pointed at Britain. The crux of this formulation is a fundamental mistrust of the United States.

The philosopher king of the antinuclear movement in Britain, Edward P. Thompson, a member of European Nuclear Disarmament (END), a sort of think tank for CND, has helped articulate the latent anti-American sentiment expressed by the supporters of the British antinuclear movement. Thompson, a self-claimed "dissident Marxist," perceives the division of post-War Europe to be a deliberate partition by the United States and the Soviet Union, which has forestalled the outcome he prefers, a united socialist Europe. Within this frame of reference, Thompson articulates a perception of the United States as the aggressor state and the greatest threat to the peace after World War II: "The cause of freedom and the cause of peace seemed to break apart. The 'West' claimed freedom; the 'East' claimed the cause of peace."

Perhaps Thompson finds it easy to reconcile domestic liberalism with colonial expansionism as he can find a direct analogy in Britain's own legacy. In deploring American domination of Britain, Thompson remarks:

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Atlanticism has outlived the rationale of its moment of formation: neither the socialist nor the European liberal tradition can consent easily any more with an overarching American hegemony, whose priorities are, ever more nakedly, determined by the reproductive needs of American capital. (63)

Equating INF deployment with American domination and interest in decoupling, Thompson states:

European war is to be one "choice" or "option" for U.S. strategists, although what might appear to be limited on one side of the Atlantic might appear to be spasmadic and apocalyptic on the other. (125)

In essence, then, Thompson claims the United States is using Britain in a selfish manner, as an expendable shield. Consequently, he writes:

It makes no sense at all for decisions as to the siting of missiles -- and as to the ownership and operation of American missiles on European soil -- to be taken in the Pentagon, when these decisions affect the very survival of Europe. (63)

However, Thompson does not see hope for salvation in the East, which he views as a military/industrial entity mirroring that of the West, although apparently merely responding to the West's arms buildup and posturing. Rather, he looks to the antinuclear movements of the West -- such as CND -- to alter the situation: "The counter-thrust cannot come from the other, but only from within the resistance of peoples inside each bloc." (63) Thus, Thompson provides a careful intellectual rationale for unilateral nuclear disarmament, but, more importantly, he verbalizes the latent
anti-American sentiment spurring the supporters of the British antinuclear movement.

CND itself serves as an umbrella group for a motley assortment of antinuclear factions, ranging from professional organizations to women's activist groups. Included among its supporters are 15,000 communists (approximately 85 percent of the 18,000-member Communist Party of Great Britain). These are matched by 20,000 Quaker supporters, according to the CND General Secretary, Monsignor Bruce Kent. (Kent is a pacifist, and reckons that roughly a quarter of CND is likewise.) Yet there were in 1983 five communists on the elected National Council of CND, which has twenty members, demonstrating a disproportionate amount of communist influence at the top.

Moreover, Kent underscored the importance of the CPGB to CND by appearing before the former's annual conference on November 10, 1983. Affirming that "My appearance here is something I owe you and we owe you for what has been happening over the last few years," Kent stated: "We are partners in the cause for peace in this world." The anomaly of a cleric declaring himself to be a partner with Marxists was underscored when Kent thanked the Morning Star -- the communist newspaper which, unlike the CPGB's Executive Committee, has been moving towards Stalinism -- for its "steady, honest and generous coverage of the whole disarmament case." This prompted Defense Secretary Heseltine to observe:
Whether it be the Chairman advocating an onslaught on Conservatives in marginal [parliamentary] seats or the General Secretary enthusing over the support of the Communist Party, few doubt the left-wing influences at work.\(^{(234)}\)

CND's main thrust is simple and clear: unilateral nuclear disarmament by Britain and removal of all U.S. nuclear facilities from the United Kingdom. Msgr. Kent sums it up: "The British deterrent is not independent, and above all it is not credible."\(^{(173)}\) Kent supports George Kennan's proposal for an immediate 50 percent reduction of U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals, stating, "If you have massive overkill, the very notion of balance is absurd."\(^{(173)}\)

CND's own anti-American tilt was demonstrated by its response to President Reagan's zero option proposal. A statement issues from its London headquarters said Reagan's offer "was mainly about propaganda and not about disarmament." Ironically, Reagan's approach was criticized for being unrealistic:

The essential point is that President Reagan had not offered to remove one single weapon from Europe. He has offered to stop the siting of an entirely new generation of weapons (cruise and Pershing), neither of which are yet in existence.\(^{(166)}\)

Thus, CND stated, the Soviets were unlikely to respond positively by dismantling their own weapons. In essence, then, CND feels prospects for pressuring the Soviets to disarm are unrealistic, while at the same time CND itself pressures the West to disarm unilaterally.
Reagan's "interim agreement" was not met with a more positive response. "We're not impressed at all with Mr. Reagan and his so-called offers," said Kent. Another member of CND's Executive Committee said simply, "The offer was made in the hope it would be rejected." To add to this, CND appears reflexively to blame the United States for the arms race across the board. CND expanded its attacks on the United States in a conference denying Soviet use of chemical weapons in Southeast Asia or Afghanistan. "It seems hypocritical to us for the United States to say the Russians are using chemical warfare when it's the U.S. that's the greatest international culprit," Kent stated. "The effect of Agent Orange used in Vietnam is the same as any yellow rain," he said, ignoring the fact that the American defoliants were not deliberately being used to kill people. It may easily be seen that CND's platform and statements are motivated by an anti-American hostility.

CND has received a great deal of legitimacy through the support of various church groups, most notably Methodists and Quakers. Church support has provided the antinuclear movement with a great deal of legitimacy, since this tends to mitigate charges that CND is merely a leftist amalgamation. Perhaps most significant in this regard has been a Church of England working party report entitled The Church and the Bomb, commissioned by the Board for Social Responsibility of the General Synod. This report was
welcomed by CND as an "exciting step forward in the growing concern about nuclear weapons."(148)

The report is based upon an analysis of "just war" theory as applied to the nuclear age. A war is determined to be just if it meets criteria regarding (1) resort to war and (2) the conduct of war. Nuclear warfare was held to fail on both counts. Concerning resort to war, the working party first noted their belief that the criterion for a reasonable hope for success would not be met, as "Most experts ... think that there would always be a considerable likelihood that war between nuclear powers would escalate into general war."(43, p.95) Moreover, the working party felt the evils and damage nuclear war would entail would be disproportionate to the harm it would prevent: "What injury or injustice would be so great that it would be reasonable to avert it in such a way and at such a cost?"(43, p.96)

Concerning the conduct of war, the working party found nuclear warfare equally unsupportable. Just war theory requires that noncombatants not be attacked directly, a criterion the party felt would be blatantly breached in nuclear warfare and disproportionate to any legitimate end. In fact, even limited and isolated use of nuclear weapons was judged to be unacceptable as "any use at all of nuclear weapons would be very likely to lead to a general nuclear war."(43, p.97)
The key underpinning of the working party's support for unilateral nuclear disarmament was its perception of the ineluctable relationship between the morality of nuclear warfare and that of nuclear deterrence. Proceeding under the assumption that nuclear warfare is in fact immoral, the working party described nuclear deterrence as a conditional pledge to act immorally, that is that "... the West has implicitly agreed to act immorally in certain possible circumstances." (43, p.98) The report goes on to remove the moral distinction between conditional intent and act:

... a conditional intention implies that one has consented in one's mind to act immorally. For moral theology, sin is completed in act but begins in consent, and the consent to act immorally, even though the act is never performed, is already sinful. (43, p.98)

Three of the six members of the church working party were actually converted to unilateralism on the strength of this proposition, which they found to be unanswerable. Consequently, the working party advocated unilateral nuclear disarmament by Britain.

The report was discussed and rejected by the General Synod in February 1983. In opening the debate, the Bishop of London, Dr. Graham Leonard, Chairman of the Church's Board of Social Responsibility and a prominent advocate within the Church of the British nuclear deterrent, criticized the report on several grounds. Dr. Leonard, analogizing between pacifism and unilateral disarmament, remarked that what might be morally right as the choice of
an individual ought not to be advocated as a national policy as this would demand that others not sharing the same conviction would also bear the consequences. Unilateral nuclear disarmament would allow nuclear weapons to lie solely in the hands of those having "no scruple about their use, either in war, or as blackmail." Thus, he supported nuclear deterrence, stating people "must not simply wait passively for Armageddon, nor seek a peace which was no peace, in which evil could prevail unchallenged and unchecked."(172)

The Most Reverend Robert Runcie, Archbishop of Canterbury, also weighed in against the report, declaring:

Since I believe that the unilateralist approach would undermine disarmament negotiations in progress without exerting exemplary influence, I cannot accept unilateralism as the best expression of a Christian's prime moral duty to be a peacemaker.(142)

Runcie feared the international consequences concerning Britain's Alliance structure should unilateralism be pursued, stating it would have a "traumatic effect on the Alliance on which the peace and stability of Europe has rested since World War II," and would strengthen American "advocates of isolationism,"(164) especially in view of the "moral inconsistency in seeking to remain within an alliance which accepts a policy of nuclear deterrence while declining to take one's share in the means by which that policy is sustained."(142) In concluding, Mr. Runcie
implicitly attacked the air of moral superiority often manifested by antinuclear activists, both within and outside the church:

Principle is not the exclusive possession of those attracted to larger gestures; it also belongs to those whose moral sense expresses itself in a painstaking precision and care about detail which I have found among those actually involved in disarmament negotiations. (164)

The proposal by the Bishop of Salisbury, the Right Reverend John Baker, Chairman of the working party, was defeated by 338 to 100.

Nonetheless, the Synod narrowly approved an amendment by the Bishop of Birmingham, the Right Reverend Hugh Montefiore, endorsing a "no-first-use" posture. Dr. Montefiore stated that a commitment by both sides to such a posture would remove at one stroke the possibility of nuclear blackmail. When pressed by Dr. Leonard to say what he would do if the West was being overrun by large conventional forces, Dr. Montefiore said to loud applause that he would not use nuclear weapons first, whatever the consequences. (190) The amendment stated that the Synod "judges that even a small-scale first use of nuclear weapons could never be morally justified in view of the high risk this would lead to full-scale warfare;" and "believes that there is a moral obligation on all countries (including the members of NATO) publicly to forswear the first use of nuclear weapons in any form." (163) In addition to this
concession to the unilateralists, the Synod carried another motion calling upon the dioceses to "study and pray about the issues raised in the report The Church and the Bomb." (219) Thus, while defeating the spirit of unilateralism in the church, the synod failed to exorcise it completely. This has meant that the report, while not approved, still carries significant weight and legitimacy. This is most significantly evidenced by the large grass roots support church members provide CND.

The CND position has largely been adopted by the Labour Party's mainstream elements or "legitimate left," as well of course by its radical fringe. This trend led to the selection of CND founding member Michael Foot as Party Leader, and the radically antinuclear defense platform that led the Labour's resounding defeat in the June 1983 general election. Labour's percentage of the vote, which has fallen in eight of the past eleven elections, sank to its 1918 level, which antedated the eclipse of the Liberals and the implementation of universal suffrage. (159) Reduced to just 207 seats in the 650-seat House of Commons, Labour's grass-roots membership is at its lowest level (roughly 275,000) since the Second World War, or one third of its 1973 level, while the Party is in debt to the tune of over L 500,000. (155)

In the wake of this debacle and Foot's resignation, Labour picked Neil Kinnock, a charismatic and politically
adept "mainstream" Labourite as Party Leader. Kinnock, himself a longtime member of CND, has affirmed his continued commitment to School IV: "I intend that the government I plan to lead will achieve in five years the denuclearization of Britain." He has resolved to remove all British and American nuclear weapons from British soil during the span of the next Labour government, stating that the British "are not masters of our own foreign policies because of our excessive state of obligation to the American Government." (214) He has affirmed that he would never employ Britain's independent nuclear deterrent, even in response to a nuclear attack, and has repudiated the American nuclear guarantee, stating "that's the way for all of us to get killed." (74)

Despite his frequent statements in support of unilateral nuclear disarmament, Kinnock has attempted to restrain the ultraleft elements in Labour, largely so as to restore some measure of party unity. He supported School II advocate and "multilateralist" Roy Hattersley, who has largely replaced Healey as the banner carrier of the Labour "right," for the post of Deputy Party Leader. (Hattersley himself opposes Trident and GLCM deployment, prefers to abandon even Polaris "if it can be negotiated away," but draws the line at American "nuclear" bases in Britain.) (196)
When Labour's annual conference of October, 1983 voted overwhelmingly for the next Labour government to "unconditionally scrap all nuclear weapons systems" and to remove all American "nuclear bases," Kinnock pressed unsuccessfully to fudge the question of timing and to delete the word "unconditionally," feeling it left too little room to maneuver. (He then voted for the resolution anyway.)

Kinnock also claimed rather disingenuously that a resolution rejecting British membership in "any Pentagon-dominated military pact based on the first use of nuclear weapons," which also passed with a large majority, did not refer to NATO.

Perhaps more significantly, in formulating the shadow cabinet, Kinnock divided the senior portfolios among the Labour "right" and soft-left mainstream, virtually excluding the most militant elements. This reflects the failure of the hard left to dominate the Labour Party's National Executive Committee (NEC), despite its gains in that body, largely owing to the influence of Labour's trade union power brokers, who have been taking a turn towards moderation since the devastating June 1983 election. (The NEC now contains twelve "rightists," nine "soft leftists," and eight "hard leftists.") Moreover, by quietly licking its wounds, and following Kinnock's lead in promoting party unity (at least on the surface), the Labour Party according
to most polls is pulling almost even with the Conservatives. Thus, the British Labour Party is continuing its evolution from social democracy to neo-Marxism and the domination of School IV attitudes on defense.

Of course, this is not to imply that School IV would countenance the conventional, nonnuclear improvements to British military forces called for by Schools II and III. In point of fact, those in School IV are generally in favor of massive reductions in defense expenditures across the board, primarily -- so they argue -- as a means toward broader social welfare funding; and while School IV critics of conventional force modernization have kept a lower profile in the post-Falklands War defense debate, there is no reason to suspect that they have altered their views. For example, in addition to phasing out the Polaris force, specific policies advocated in the recent election by Labour's National Executive Committee included: reducing the British Army of the Rhine to about 30,000 men, together with reductions in equipment and home forces; cuts in maritime power, including cancellation of the second and third ASW cruisers and Sea Harriers, and stretched out programs for fleet submarines, destroyers and frigates; cancellation of the multirole combat aircraft Tornado; and an overall defense budget cut of 30 percent.

Meanwhile, at the grass roots level, at its November 1982 annual conference, CND voted to adopt tactics of civil
disobedience and "nonviolent direct action" (NVDA) through strikes and other means to counter deployment of INF. (Additionally, the CND slogan "NATO out of Britain, Britain out of NATO" was revived, a position reaffirmed overwhelmingly at the December 1983 annual conference in Sheffield.) Implementation of the NVDA campaign has proceeded in a sophisticated manner. A well-organized civil disobedience program over the 1983 Easter weekend was followed by more subtle action against Tarmac and MAN-VW, manufacturers of the silos and launch vehicles for cruise, respectively.* CND is also attempting to persuade 154 local British councils which have adopted "nuclear-free zones" to boycott the firms for local council projects. CND is also organizing a telephone, letter and picket campaign against the two companies, and intends to target subcontractors as well.

More politically significant was the CND "peace canvas" designed on the surface to stimulate interest and concern regarding nuclear issues, but actually focusing on defeating Conservative candidates in the June 9 general election. CND's 1200 participating local groups were instructed not to "neglect any opportunity that CND may have as a movement to stop Mrs. Thatcher from winning a new pro-nuclear majority in the House of Commons."[*223]

* MAN-VW is the British subsidiary of the German firm, MAN, which is actually constructing the launch vehicles.
In retrospect, CND's last resort to a campaign of nonviolent direct action was a confession of political failure, if not political impotence, although the anti-nuclear movement has succeeded in generating significant support among diverse elements who find in CND an outlet through which to express their various complaints with British society. These range from the genuine moral concern of pacifists and others with the threat of nuclear weaponry, to disaffected youth and radicals discontented with the nature of modern British society, to interest groups such as feminists and labor unions which have jumped on the anti-nuclear bandwagon to draw attention and support for their own tangentially related causes. CND has essentially succeeded where it had failed in the 1950s and 1960s, by capturing the Labour Party and, through direct political action (the "peace canvas") attempting to bring CND's platform into the British Government.

However, the rejection of the Labour Party in the June 1983 general elections demonstrates conclusively that the broad spectrum of the British populace repudiates the unilateralist approach taken by CND. Mrs. Thatcher remains as Prime Minister; Trident will be built; and cruise missiles are being deployed in Britain. This foregone conclusion has frustrated CND and led it to adopt the tactics of "nonviolent direct action" which split the movement in the 1960s and helped lead to its destruction.
CND's leadership, aware of the mistakes of the past, is managing the NVDA campaign very shrewdly by conducting risk-free and legal operations against the GLCMs, such as the phone-in campaigns, to supplement its civil disobedience activities. This allows a broader segment of CND's supporters to participate in the NVDA campaign in some manner than would otherwise be the case. However, while CND as an organization may well retain its cohesion as a result of these tactics, nonetheless its NVDA campaign has undoubtedly limited its appeal to the British populace at large, alienating many tacit sympathizers, as reflected in the election results as well as in opinion polls. For example, despite substantial support for some of CND's positions, polls show a reversal in such support as regards INF deployment. Britons favored cancellation by 54 percent to 36 percent in support, as of January 1983, while in May 1983 52 percent approved and only 34 percent were opposed, should the Geneva talks fail.(223) Thus, CND's NVDA campaign is not only an admission of political defeat and the inability of CND to realize its goals through the democratic process, but is also isolating CND from British society.

This has become increasingly apparent with the spectacular failure of CND's Labourite proxies in the general election, underscoring their lack of support among the British public at large and the unreality of their
position. However, even more devastating to CND's momentum has been its utter failure in blocking deployment of the GLCMs, which first arrived on November 14, 1983, and became operational in early January 1984. The much-touted "hot autumn" of 1983, in which CND attempted to pressure the British Government with "direct action" protests at Greenham Common and Parliament, generally drew crowds numbering only in the hundreds and little outside support, with the exception of a mass rally in October. E. P. Thompson, who had boasted that "The peace movement will attempt to make the Greenham Common base inoperable . . . There will be a peaceful guerrilla campaign of resistance," now states that "there has been a death of sorts" of the British antinuclear movement.

To be sure, national membership of CND rose in 1983 from 50,000 to 85,000 although this probably reflects increasing commitment on the part of local affiliates rather than any indication of a broadening of CND's appeal at large. Moreover, decreasing Governmental concern was clearly indicated in late 1983 with the scrapping by Defense Secretary Heseltine of the special unit he had established earlier in the year to monitor and contend with CND. Additionally, the Government felt secure enough to begin a crackdown, on the eve of the mass CND demonstration, on local "nuclear-free zone" authorities by introducing tighter
regulations concerning their civil defense responsibilities. (235) This was in keeping with a Gallup poll published at around the same time showing that fewer than a quarter of the British electorate favored unilateral nuclear disarmament, with a majority even of Labour supporters polled opposed to it. (235) Finally, in early April 1984, even the Greenham Common women's "peace camp" was swept away by the authorities, who burned squatters' tents as "health hazards" (after giving warning for evacuation). Ironically, in the wake of this overall rollback, the leadership of the British antinuclear movement (particularly in CND) is trying to focus attention on the new "deep strike" strategy advocated by the United States. Thus, the practical policies advocated by the Reagan Administration to raise the nuclear threshold are paradoxically coming under attack by the British antinuclear movement, whose spokesmen claim the new quick counterattack posture would actually mean that nuclear weapons would be used even earlier than is now expected. The antinuclear movement is again demonstrating its overall antimilitary posture by opposing even credible alternatives to increased reliance on nuclear weapons. Moreover, Msgr. Kent now supports a broader CND campaign against Trident and Polaris, as well as efforts to bring civil disobedience cases before juries to test CND's assertion that all warfare is illegal. (141) It seems obvious, however, that this diffusion of CND's efforts will
prove counterproductive, especially as its general goals are certain to alienate many who supported CND's more narrow anticruise objective.

As a final note on the return to normality of British society regarding nuclear issues, it seems that only 20 percent of the viewing audience tuned into "The Day After," while the number of MORI respondents saying they were worried about nuclear war actually fell marginally after viewing. Thus, it would appear from all indications that flirtation among the British populace with the ideas espoused by School IV has decreased markedly, although to be sure an enhanced understanding of, and general concern regarding, nuclear issues remain. As Minister Heseltine put it:

The vast majority of the British people are clearly committed to the principles of NATO. The activities of a small minority will not affect the resolve of governments on both sides of the Atlantic to continue with policies which have preserved the peace for so long. (199)

1.3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS

From this brief survey of British defense perspectives, it is possible to draw several implications for U.S. nuclear policy with respect to Britain, Western Europe and NATO.

(1) Within Schools I and III there is a broadly based consensus in support not only of intermediate
nuclear force (INF) modernization, but also for the stationing of such systems -- specifically 160 GLCMs -- within Great Britain. As the Conservative Party, in which Schools I and III predominate, has been returned with a substantial majority in the June 1983 election, GLCM deployment in Britain will continue.

(2) The ambiguous position within School II on unconditional GLCM deployment as a result of the shifting SDP-Liberal position would appear to have little immediate impact upon deployment in view of the small number of seats the Alliance obtained in the new Parliament, although this may change in the long term if the electoral system is reformed along "proportional representation" lines, which would give the SDP-Liberal Alliance a greater share of seats after the next national election.

(3) Among these three schools there is no consensus on strategic nuclear missions to be performed by British national nuclear forces. The principal debate in Britain on this issue has resolved around whether or not to build or acquire a follow-on system to the existing Polaris A-3 capability and, if so, what form that should take. Despite the cost of the Trident system, Mrs. Thatcher's victory seems to ensure its acquisition by Britain, at least during the life of the current Parliament. While the position of School III
adherents in the Conservative Party was strengthened following the Falkland Islands conflict, the difficult shape of the British economy and the magnitude of Mrs. Thatcher's victory imply that Mrs. Thatcher and Mr. Heseltine will be bolstered in their support of the School I position.

(4) From the U.S. perspective, the optimal force posture for Britain would consist of a nuclear capability based principally upon theater nuclear systems, and in particular, the ground-launched cruise missile. Failing that, a nuclear force based on SLCMs, as advocated by David Owen, would seem most acceptable, combining as it does both theater and potentially strategic functions. The outcome of the election appears to foreclose these options. Within the debate in Britain, moreover, there is disagreement as to whether a clear distinction can be drawn between theater nuclear systems designed for missions in support of NATO and a national strategic nuclear force whose principal mission would be to inflict unacceptable levels of destruction upon Soviet cities. It is acknowledged, for example, that systems designed principally for use in the NATO theater (School II's preference) could be assigned, in extremis, a series of strategic missions (as called for in Schools I and III), provided they were under British national control. In contrast, it will
not be feasible, or probably even techni-
ally possible, to retarget a Trident strategic force for use in a
theater nuclear context as required by NATO in the next
decade.

(5) The United States can assume deployment of INF in Britain will proceed on schedule during the life of the current Parliament. A majority of Britons approve GLCM deployment, should the Geneva talks fail, while the election results demonstrate that a majority at least tacitly accepts deployment in any event. It should be remembered that Britain already has long experience with land-based theater nuclear forces, having served as the home base for American F-111s and Royal Air Force Vulcans assigned to a NATO nuclear role. This prior nuclear experience, as well as the existence of a British strategic deterrent, should make it easier for British authorities, compared to their counterparts in continental NATO countries, to contain and defuse political resistance to cruise and Pershing II deployment. While civil disobedience inspired by CND may be a problem, its practical effect will be limited. Moreover, such tactics will tend to limit the support CND and its position will have among the general British populace.

(6) Nevertheless, in Britain, as in other West European countries, and especially the Federal Republic
of Germany, progress toward greater arms control has often been viewed as central to East-West relations. The United States cannot assume that a future Labour government, under its present leadership, oriented as it is toward the unilateralist school (School IV), would adhere to the more practical, in-office defense policy tradition of its predecessors, who generally pursued the School II approach. Although the position of Labour members of School II may well be enhanced by the electoral debacle Labour has suffered, the future composition of the leadership remains uncertain, especially as a renewed wave of defections to the SDP cannot be ruled out. Moreover, the SDP-Liberal Alliance maintains an ambivalent stance on INF. As a trump in the hands of INF supporters has been the leverage deployment would garner in the INF negotiations, the United States should demonstrate this by continuing present efforts in Geneva to negotiate with the Soviet Union the mutual limitation of INF. Success at Geneva or at least demonstration of American commitment to the "two-track" approach would help defuse a potential future campaign issue and help forestall renewed unilateralist pressures should the government change after the next British election.
A graphic representation of the British Schools of Thought and their distinguishing characteristics with reference to major policy issues

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2.1 INTRODUCTION

The defense debate in France has been ongoing for two decades since the enunciation of proportional deterrence and the development of the French force de frappe. In its current phase, this debate comprises two aspects: first, over strategic doctrine, which began in 1976 as a result of statements by French government officials concerning changes in French security perspectives; and second, over force posture, particularly with respect to the relationships among French strategic and tactical nuclear systems and conventional force deployments. With the presentation by the government of Socialist President Francois Mitterrand of a four-year programme loi for defense for the fiscal years of 1984-1988, the outcome of this current phase of the defense debate in France can be expected to influence greatly the structuring of French nuclear (and consequently conventional military) forces for the year 2000 and beyond.

While there is little question, under a Mitterrand Socialist government (with Communist participation) that France will continue to emphasize the independent character of its foreign and defense policies with the modernization of the independent French nuclear force, there are apparent among French defense and strategic thinkers different perspectives with regard to the future structuring of French
strategic-military forces and programs. In this regard, increasingly the focus of debate concerns the extent to which France should participate in collaborative efforts designed to promote greater unity within Western Europe on defense and national security issues. Even among avowed Gaullists such as the "right-wing" Mayor of Paris, Jacques Chirac,(106) there is growing appreciation of the need to evolve a "Europeanization" of NATO if the deterrent posture of the West is to be maintained.

In France, today, there is evinced a growing anxiety over the future of the Federal Republic of Germany, especially its securities to the West. In recent years, the upsurge of pacifist sentiments in the Federal Republic has contributed to French fears of the potential for development of neutralist policies by the West German government. French anxiety over the evolution within West Germany of a neutralist outlook in foreign policy has been enhanced by widespread skepticism over the future of the U.S. security commitment to Western Europe. While the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent guarantee has long been questioned by most French strategic analysts, the viability of the American commitment to defend Western interests, as symbolized in the deployment of U.S. ground forces on the Continent, is also being subject to intense debate in France. Because a majority of French strategists recognize that the U.S. security commitment to Western Europe, but especially the Federal Republic of Germany, is indispensable
to stability on the Continent, many regard greater European defense collaboration as an adjunct, not a substitute, for the U.S. extended deterrent guarantee. These same analysts hold to the Gaullist conception that France's own strategic deterrent force is credible only when viewed as a deterrent capability for the national sanctuary, i.e., France. The development of a European deterrent, with West German participation, challenges the traditional Gaullist view, renewing debate in France over the French role in Europe.

The contemporary defense debate in France is complex and encompasses the future orientation of French foreign and national security policy. To a great extent, resolution of France's role in Europe will influence the continued evolution of the Atlantic Alliance as the basis of providing for peace and stability in Europe. For the purpose of analysis four "schools of thought" can be conceptualized in France on the issue of French strategic-military forces. It should, however, be recognized that the concept of schools of thought represents an analytic tool for organizing and assessing the French defense debate, and that the characteristic perspectives attributed to each of the designated "schools" represent broad generalizations of commonality in viewpoint which may, in fact, obscure subtle differences within each grouping. * Even so, the categorization of

* Such differences are explored and discussed in greater depth in the report entitled, "French Perspectives on Defense, Deterrence and Strategy," prepared for the Defense Nuclear Agency in 1981 and available on a limited basis if requested.
separate schools of thought -- conceptualized here as Strategic Deterrence (School I), Graduated Deterrence (School II), Battlefield Deterrence (School III), and Minimal Deterrence (School IV) -- provides a theoretical framework for the identification and evaluation of the range of strategic-military perspectives apparent in France today.

Each of the four schools of French strategic thought has been conceived on the basis of a set of assumptions about the emerging international environment, the most important of which pertains to trends in the U.S.-Soviet strategic-military balance and the role of France in European political, economic and security relationships. Before examining in greater depth the assumptions and perceptions that are unique to each of the four schools, some general observations, common to all, can be made regarding French views of the international environment. In general, the French perceive a significantly changed strategic environment as compared to the early 1960s when the United States was assumed to be stronger militarily than the Soviet Union. Most French strategists would agree that over the last decade the growth and modernization of Soviet strategic-nuclear and theater (nuclear and nonnuclear) forces have occurred at a time of perceived waning in U.S. military power and global prestige, contributing to a force imbalance in Europe that redounds to Soviet interests. The growing imbalance of theater forces -- nuclear and
conventional -- in Europe, together with the attainment of strategic parity by the Soviet Union with the United States, contributes to, and even enhances, the rationale for the deployment of national deterrent forces in Europe.

Even in the 1960s, when the United States was perceived in France to have clearcut nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union, a consensus developed among French analysts that so long as the territory of one superpower was vulnerable to a nuclear strike by the other superpower, another independent nation could no longer rely upon the security guarantees of a superpower ally. (18, 19, 49, 57, 62, 87) This is to say, from the French perspective, a U.S. commitment to defend French interests (or those of any American ally) with nuclear weapons when its own territory could be threatened directly with nuclear retaliation was perceived to be of declining credibility. From the French perspective, the codification of superpower strategic parity in SALT I reaffirmed the basic precepts set forth by the late French President Charles de Gaulle (and others) upon the withdrawal of French forces from NATO's integrated military command. Together with the perception of a changed superpower strategic relationship, the widespread presumption that French and U.S. interests often diverge on a number of issues -- for example, the energy crisis, North-South relations and the threat posed by Soviet-backed forces
in the Middle East, Africa and Central America -- has reaffirmed the conviction that the nuclear independence of France continues to be the principal basis on which to sustain that nation's security interests. Endorsement of this view by France's Catholic Bishops in their Pastoral Letter entitled "Waging the Peace," underlined the national consensus in support of an independent French national nuclear force."(133, 174) In contrast to the position of French Protestants (who comprise less than 6 percent of France's population) in opposition to France's deployment of nuclear weapons, the Catholic Bishops persuasively argue that it is the moral imperative of a nation to provide for its own defense and "it is to avoid having to wage war that one wants to show oneself capable of waging it." "Deterrence is effective as soon as it represents a threat sufficient to discourage aggression."

2.2 SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

It is not surprising, therefore, that all major schools of strategic thought in France support the force de dissuasion,* for which prominent defense correspondent

* Those in France who do not support the force de dissuasion are the left wing of the Socialist Party (CERES) and a minority of "radical leftists" grouped broadly under the umbrella of the Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche (MRG) -- a political party which attracts a small percentage of the French population but is not without influence, having elected in 1981 14 deputies to the National Assembly. At
Michel Tatu has succinctly stated the rationale:

What is needed is more, not less, uncertainty in Soviet minds about allied reactions in case of aggression and that can be achieved only by more diversification and pluralism in the nuclear decision-making process. Broadly speaking, the answer to the Soviet military buildup is not the continuous reinforcement of one "camp" under American leadership, but the addition of new, independent but friendly, centers of power in order to complicate the task of Soviet planners. (62, p.4)

The differences among the schools relate to the force posture and employment options best suited to maintain the credibility of the French deterrent force. Whereas virtually all French strategic analysts adhere to a concept of proportional deterrence, or the notion that a weaker nation can deter a larger, stronger one from aggression by virtue of the deployment of comparatively few nuclear weapons, differences are apparent in the enunciation of targeting concepts and with respect to the interrelationships among strategic, as well as tactical, nuclear forces and conventional weapons systems.

Those who can be identified with "Strategic Deterrence" (School I) emphasize the retaliatory threat of use of French nuclear forces (strategic and tactical) to deter any attack upon, and to preclude large-scale conventional battle in, France. (29, 31, 49, 56) In its original and purest form, this school -- whose members can

the local level, the MRG had over 160 Department Councillors, presided over 8 Departmental Councils, and had around 10,000 Municipal Councillors. (53, pp.275-280)
be identified with the mainstream of the Socialist Party and the Rassemblement pour la Republique (RPR) -- have insisted that France's deterrent must be completely independent and that its credibility extends only to an attack upon the sanctuary -- namely, French national territory. School I thus sets forth clearly a rationale for France's strategic nuclear posture based upon an anticities or countervalue targeting doctrine. The planning concepts associated with Strategic Deterrence (School I) emphasize the deployment of survivable nuclear retaliatory systems, while assigning to tactical-nuclear and conventional maneuver forces the role of a "tripwire" prior to a strategic-nuclear employment. To implement their concept of strategic deterrence, proponents of School I have, in the past, supported the deployment of a triad of strategic-nuclear weapons launchers -- the Mirage IV-A bombers, IRBMs on the Albion Plateau, and SSBNs/SLBMs--to complicate enemy targeting.

* Currently France deploys 36 of the 1200 km range (or 2500 km refueled inflight) Mirage IV-A medium bombers, which can deliver the 60-70 kiloton AN-22 nuclear bomb, 18 land-based IRBMs (sol-sol Balistique Strategique, SSBS), all of which have been upgraded to deploy the S-3 one megaton warhead and possess an operational firing range of 3500 kilometers, and five SSBNs (sous-marin nucleaire Lanceur d'Engins -- SNLE), four of which have 16 M-2 SLBM launcher tubes and deploy a single megaton warhead. As there are only four M-20 sets of 16, the fifth SSBN cannot be deployed at the same time. A sixth SSBN, l'Inflexible, is under construction and scheduled for deployment in 1985. It will be equipped with a new SLBM, the M-4, which has an operational range of about 4000 km and 6-7 150 km reentry vehicles (MRV) which will possess an improved penetration capability because of hardening and the incorporation of electronic countermeasures, deemed essential in view of...
options and in this way ensure the survivability of a portion of France's retaliatory capability.

Identified primarily with the Union pour la Democratie Francaise (UDF), the political party of former French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, School II, the Graduated Deterrence School, differs from the Strategic Deterrence School I in that it would not wait until the "hexagon" -- the national territory of France itself -- is directly threatened with attack, but would seek to "test" the intentions of advancing enemy forces by employing conventional arms, tactical nuclear weapons, or even a portion of France's force of long-range strategic-nuclear weapons, before French borders are breached. By such action, it is contended, an aggressor would be put on notice that further action would lead to a full-scale retaliatory attack against the enemy homeland. Thus, in contrast to proponents of School I, analysts of the Graduated Deterrence School (II) argue that tactical-nuclear weapons, while inextricably linked to French strategic-nuclear systems, nevertheless may be employed in the context of a European battle before the sanctuary is threatened.

anticipated developments in Soviet strategic defensive programs. At present, the total megatonnage of the French SSBN force is 83 megatons with at least 86 warheads operational at a given time. As a third SSBN is at sea for approximately two hundred days per year, the total number of targets covered reaches 102 during that period. After 1985, the number of targets covered by the French SSBN force will increase to at least 150 because of the deployment of the 6 RV M-4 missile. See (42).
directly to warn an enemy that vital French interests are being threatened and thereby creating the prospect of a French strategic employment against the U.S.S.R. \(18, 19, 98\)

Fundamental to this view is the assumption that a violation of the territorial integrity of any West European nation, but in particular that of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), impinges upon the basic security interests of France and must, therefore, be resisted by the French in cooperation with their European neighbors. The alternatives, at least as conceived by some analysts, would be to accept a Germany which is de facto neutral, or to stand by while the FRG developed its own independent nuclear capability. \(86\) Neither option would be in the interests of France or Western Europe, and neither would be politically or militarily acceptable to the French populace in general. As explained by Guy Mery, Chief of Staff under President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, the deterrence concepts of School I were too narrow in scope and insufficient to parry any but the most direct forms of aggression and to take into account the growing interdependence of West European nations. Mery and others of School II favored an active strategy of defense based on the idea of an...
...enlarged sanctuary that would permit France, while guaranteeing the integrity of our national territory, to intervene with all or part of our forces throughout the zone where the security of that territory could be most immediately endangered, that is, schematically, Europe and its approaches, including, in particular, the Mediterranean basin. (36)

The blurring of distinction between France and its approaches in Europe gave rise to the suggestion that the French deterrent had been extended to cover West Germany as well. While Mery in subsequent statements did not exclude the possibility of using French nuclear forces in defense of the Federal Republic of Germany, neither did he suggest an automatic commitment by France to defend German territory with the use of its nuclear weapons. (124, 102, 189) The phrase "with all or part of our forces" allowed Mery a wide degree of latitude with regard to the specifics of French defense planning.

The debate in France over the Giscard d'Estaing/Mery concept of the "enlarged sanctuary" and the role of tactical nuclear weapons in French strategy gave rise to the third school of thought designated "Battlefield Deterrence." As its name implies, the Battlefield Deterrence School (III) places greater emphasis on battlefield and theater -- as opposed to strategic -- nuclear weapons, and on tactical planning concepts, than either the Strategic Deterrence (I) or the Graduated Deterrence (II) Schools. Even though proponents of School III support the proportional deterrence concept articulated in the Strategic Deterrence School (I),
it is their contention as well that the Soviet Union (and its Warsaw Pact allies) have developed a formidable array of theater capabilities -- nuclear and nonnuclear -- which could be used to wage a campaign against Western Europe without necessarily resorting to the threat or potential use of medium- or intermediate-range nuclear weapons, such as the SS-20 IRBM. In presenting the case for the deployment by France of new generation tactical nuclear weapons, including **Hades** and the enhanced radiation warhead, representatives of School III emphasize the warfighting capabilities (and hence the deterrence potential) of such systems. (82, 83) Embracing the School III concept that in order to deter, a weapon's potential use must be credible, Jacques Cressard, former Secretary of the Finance Commission of the National Assembly, has stated that:

They (battlefield nuclear weapons) must consequently be militarily efficient. Stopping an enemy, they could avoid at the same time the recourse to the threat of using our strategic nuclear force, except to respond to a similar menace. (19)

It is the contention of School III, therefore, that unless France is willing to increase significantly its conventional force levels -- an option that is now fiscally and politically constrained -- greater thought must be given to the role of theater and shorter-range battlefield nuclear weapons, which might be used against second-echelon targets (including Soviet reserve forces), as well as against targets of opportunity in the forward battle zone.
Given this orientation, it is not surprising that School III analysts attach great importance to the development of the enhanced radiation weapon (ERW) -- also known as the neutron bomb -- as an additional means of offsetting the overwhelming superiority of Soviet armored forces. Others in School III have even gone on to suggest that an accurate, terminal-maneuvering ERW warhead could provide the basis for a strategic defense of France at medium and low altitudes against enemy aircraft. Or, deployed on surface-to-air launchers, ERW warheads might also serve as the basis for an antiballistic missile defense system or antitactical ballistic missile force. (82, 83, 90, 94, 99, 230)

Underlying the views of those identified with the Battlefield Deterrence School (III) is the perception of a Soviet capability for surprise attack and the need for France to deploy forces capable of reacting quickly, and with precision, against a massive enemy armored thrust into Western Europe. (19) In the view of those of the Minimal Deterrence School (IV), the fourth identifiable grouping within French strategic-military circles, such analyses are faulted because they allegedly "misunderstand" the nature of the Soviet threat and intentions with regard to Europe. Soviet strategic and long-range theater nuclear forces are viewed with less concern by members of School IV. For some in this group, such forces are even considered to be "defensive" in nature, deployed by the Soviet Union in response to perceived threats emanating from U.S., NATO, and even
Chinese force deployments.\(^{(62, 57)}\) To minimal deterrence advocates, comprised principally of elements from the left-of-center branch of the Socialist Party (not CERES, however) and center-leftists from the Union pour la Democratie Francaise (UDF), war deterrence in Europe can best be sustained by the deployment of survivable strategic-nuclear systems. School IV would retain the SSBN/SLBM force, but phase out the Mirage IV-A bombers and land-based missiles. It would support the dismantling of tactical nuclear weapons, and at the same time decrease the total size of conventional maneuver forces. In place of a large conventional army, School IV analysts have proposed the deployment of mobile, conventionally-armed forces for potential use outside of France.\(^{(57, 102)}\) This proposal is based on the assumption that reliance upon proportional deterrence as the sole guarantee of French security is no longer adequate, due to the increasing likelihood of threats to French interests emanating from non-European theaters, principally in Third World areas. While similar in some respects to School I, the major differences between the Strategic (I) and Minimal (IV) Deterrence Schools lie in their respective conceptions of the numbers of SSBN/SLBMs necessary to sustain France's deterrence potential and in their respective need to ensure strategic survivability by the deployment of redundant weapons platforms. Thus proponents of School I, while emphasizing the role of the SSBN fleet, nevertheless are convinced of the necessity of
developing a mobile land-based strategic system (SX), whereas analysts of School IV are not. Moreover, whereas School I supports the modernization of French tactical nuclear forces (principally by the development of the longer-range Hades) as a means of strengthening the escalatory chain, School IV does not. The defense emphasis of members of the Minimal Deterrence School (IV) is in the Third World areas or extra-European threats whereas that of the Strategic Deterrence School (I) is on France's strategic deterrence role, although there is an appreciation of the need to bolster France's "external assistance" capabilities.

2.3 THE PROGRAMME LOI 1984-1988

Based upon the strategic concepts of the Strategic Deterrence School (I), the French Government under Francois Mitterrand has developed a four-year military program which emphasizes the priority role of France's deterrence capabilities in the French force structure. In presenting the military program to the French Defense Council, French Minister of Defense Charles Hernu stated that while "[t]he armed forces as a whole are part of an overall deterrence strategy, the main priority remains the nuclear sphere."(92) Specifically, the programme loi seeks to strengthen the French strategic deterrence posture by augmenting the capabilities of the submarine-based leg of the French Triad of nuclear forces and, at the same time,
enhancing the survivability of the land-based IRBM and manned-bomber forces.

The priority given to the sea-based leg of the Triad in the new defense program reflects the perception of many French strategic analysts that the SSBN/SLBM fleet remains the most survivable and hence the most credible element of France's deterrent posture. Indeed, concern about the vulnerability of French land-based intermediate range ballistic missiles, 18 launchers of which are deployed in fixed silos on the Albion Plateau in Haute Provence, France, has engendered renewed debate over the future of the land-based missile force in France's deterrent posture. Based upon a perception of the threat posed by the Soviet deployment of the triple warhead SS-20 counterforce missile, the Mitterrand Government has provided funds in the *programme loi* for the development of a semimobile, land-based intermediate-range missile, designated **SX**, as a possible replacement for the fixed-based S-3 IRBM force.** The SX, which is scheduled for deployment in 1995, is also viewed by some in France as providing a more survivable weapons platform to perform the missions that are currently assigned

* The 18 French IRBMs (sol-sol Balistique Strategique, SSBS) have all been recently upgraded to deploy the S-3 one megaton warhead and possess an operational firing range of 3500 kilometers.(81)

** The SX is described as a three warhead missile deployed in cannisters which can be transported on standardized trucks or by transall aircraft.(93)
to the Mirage IV-A bomber force. The French Defense Council, in October 1981, had already decided to phase out (from 1985-1990) of deployment the major portion of the French strategic bomber force based on a widespread perception of the system's vulnerability resulting from the increasing sophistication of the Soviet/Warsaw Pact air defense environment.*

At the strategic-nuclear level, the modernization and survivability of France's SSBN/SLBM force emerges as a clear priority in the programme loi. Over the life of the program, the French will see the deployment in 1985 of a sixth SSBN, the Inflexible, deploying the M-4 limited footprint MRVed warhead, and the construction of a new generation ballistic missile submarine as was decided in the October 1981 Defense Council meeting. The seventh SSBN is now scheduled to come into service in 1988 and would deploy a new generation SLBM, having an improved range (over 4,000 kilometers) and more sophisticated penetration aids to counter the possibility of a "breakout" by the Soviet Union in its strategic defense (ABM) capabilities.** In this regard members of the Strategic Deterrence (I), Graduated

* At the same time, however, it was decided to retain 15 Mirage IV bombers for deployment of a new generation air to ground nuclear missile (ASMP). (93)

** This missile has been designated the M-5, but its prototype development is not expected before 1999, even if a developmental decision was provided for in the current programme loi. (93)
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Deterrence (II), and Minimal Deterrence (IV) Schools were particularly worried about President Reagan's reference in a recent speech to U.S. efforts in the area of strategic defense. Most French analysts view the "High Frontier" concept with skepticism and worry that any developments in the ABM/BMD area will undermine the concept of deterrence and render French nuclear deterrence forces "useless." (101) This is not to argue, however, either that French and other European criticism of the High Frontier concept is correct or that it should be a determining factor in American decision-making with respect to the future of strategic defense.

Even as proponents of School I tend to emphasize the importance of French strategic-nuclear systems over tactical-nuclear and conventional forces, in the period just ahead it is clear that the structure of the French deterrent force, with its tactical nuclear component, will be unchanged. This can be attributed in part to the lack of consensus within the ruling Socialist Party on the role of tactical nuclear weapons in French defense policy. For this reason, and based on a perception of strategic imbalance in Europe, the new programme loi provides for the development of a new generation tactical nuclear weapon (Hades) as a successor system to the Pluton, as well as for the deployment of a dual-capable medium-range bomber, the
Mirage-2000N, which will be equipped with the new generation ASMP as will the Navy's Super-Etendard aircraft.*

Even as proponents of the Strategic Deterrence School (I) hold to the view that to endorse the use of French tactical nuclear weapons outside French borders or in the context of the "European battle" would dilute the essence of the proportional deterrence concept, the decision of the Mitterrand-Mauroy Government to pursue development of new generation tactical nuclear weapons is justified on the basis that such new systems will reinforce the proportional deterrence concept by providing nuclear systems which, if invoked, would not threaten German territory and, in the case of Hades, by virtue of its longer range capability (as compared to Pluton) would threaten, depending on its location at launch, that of the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia or Poland.

With the increasing pressures on the French economy, the necessity for choice with regard to establishing priorities in the defense area is more likely to increase rather than decrease in the short term. As a result, the programme loi, on the basis of a Defense Council decision, calls for the restructuring of French ground forces while drawing out or eliminating some of the reequipment programs that had already been funded, but at levels below current

* The air-to-surface medium-range missile ASMP will have a 75-100 kilometer trajectory, depending on the altitude from which it is launched.
costs because of inflation and the declining purchasing power of the French franc.

According to Defense Minister Charles Hernu, the reorganization of the army is based on a perception of the need to attain in French ground forces greater versatility, increased mobility and firepower. (92) The key to attaining greater versatility and mobility in French forces lies in the reorientation of the command structures and unit composition. On this basis, the programme loi calls for the creation of rapid action forces which will comprise, under a single and newly created command, the 11th Parachute Division, the 9th Marine Infantry Division, one Infantry Division, one Light Armored Division, and a newly-formed airborne unit equipped with combat helicopter regiments and their support systems. (92) This force d'action et d'assistance rapide (FARR) will have a manpower strength of 50,000 troops which could be deployed with in Europe or overseas.* The price of the reorganization will be the reduction of 22,000 troops in the overall strength of the

* The new FAAR force of 50,000 men will not draw from the 50,000 troops of the II Corps already stationed in West Germany. In addition to a military staff (Headquarters) and a logistical brigade, the French II Corps is comprised principally of three armored divisions: the first armored division at Trenes, the 3rd armored division at Fribourg, and the 5th armored division at Landau. Under the programme loi it is envisaged that each of the armored regiments of these three divisions will be increased to deploy four tanks according to the Soviet model, so that together the six armored regiments will deploy a total of 420 AMX-30 tanks instead of 324 as is now the case. (186)
army (currently 312,000 men), representing a reduction of seven percent. The Navy and the Air Force will each lose 3500 men. These reductions in manpower, while not as great as had been feared, nevertheless reinforce the view of many in France -- especially among Schools II (Graduated Deterrence) and III (Battlefield Deterrence) -- that France is moving toward a disproportionate, and in their view, dangerous, reliance on nuclear weapons.

Holding to this view, General Etienne Copel, Vice-Chief of Staff of the French Air Force, recently resigned his commission upon the publication of his book, Vaincre la Guerre, which suggests that the basis of French defense planning -- i.e., reliance on a national nuclear force -- is fundamentally wrong and would, in the long run, lead to disaster for France. Copel asserts that the nature of the threat to Western Europe has changed, with the deployment by the Soviet Union of "Eurostrategic" forces which have the effect of nullifying the deterrence potential of U.S. theater nuclear forces and French and British strategic nuclear capabilities. Consequently, Western Europe faces a formidable Soviet conventional threat based upon the deployment of massed armored forces incorporating new technologies and chemical munitions. Copel's prescription is the strengthening of French (and NATO) battlefield defensive weapons systems, including widespread deployment of the enhanced radiation warhead, which he sees as
providing the potentially most important contribution to European security in the years ahead.

Not surprisingly, Copel's formula has revitalized the debate in France over the ERW, refocusing public attention on that contentious issue at a time when the French President appears to be moving toward a deployment decision. Mitterrand, backed by his Defense Minister Charles Hernu, has held to the position that deployment of the ERW in limited numbers (probably for use on the Hades launcher) is not inconsistent with current French strategic thought which eschews any indication of a commitment to a "warfighting" posture. The Socialist Party, however, is badly divided on the issue, with many members opposed to any ERW deployment.

Renewed controversy on the ERW issue comes at a bad time for the French government which faces increasing opposition within the Armed Forces over the manpower reductions and the restructuring of the French conventional force posture. The French Defense Minister dismisses criticisms of the government's programs on the basis that the programme loi's equipment programs for conventional forces will substitute new weapons technologies and hence greater firepower for manpower. From his perspective, the ground forces form an integral element of France's deterrent posture by providing capabilities for the defense of French interests both in Europe and overseas. Hernu and others of School I conceptualize French national interests
in terms of three circles, according to which the first
corresponds to the "Hexagon" or France; the second to the
areas immediately adjacent to France, i.e., Europe and
France's Mediterranean and Atlantic approaches; and the
third to French interests overseas, especially Africa and
France's overseas territories. (171) From the perspectives
of the Strategic Deterrence (I) and Minimal Deterrence (IV)
Schools, French nuclear forces can perform in a deterrence
role only in the first circle or over French territory.
however, once war breaks out it may be conceivable,
according to the Strategic Deterrence School (I), to employ
French tactical nuclear weapons before French territory is
invaded to deter an aggressor from breaching French
borders. The Graduated Deterrence (II) and the Battlefield
Deterrence (III) Schools place great emphasis on this latter
concept, with both Schools going so far as to support the
suggestion that the French deterrence posture should extend
a protective guarantee beyond French borders or into the
second circle (i.e., over the Federal Republic of Germany).

2.4 THE ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPON AND THE EUROPEAN BATTLE

Significantly, the programme loi makes no reference
to a French decision to deploy the Enhanced Radiation Weapon
(ERW), probably because of the lack of consensus in France
and especially among the members of the Socialist-Communist
government, on the role of tactical nuclear weapons in
French strategic thought. Even though a deployment decision is expected to be taken in the near future by the Mitterrand-Mauroy Government, an official announcement is viewed with anxiety by the Defense Council because of its alleged implications for France's European defense posture and her perceived ties to NATO. For Graduated Deterrence (II) and especially Battlefield Deterrence (III) School members a decision by the French government to deploy the ERW would imply a commitment to participate in the "forward battle" or the defense of West Germany. In response, French Minister Charles Hernu noted that the FAR troops "were meant as a deterrent, and did not indicate an increased willingness on the part of France to be drawn in to a frontline conflict." (68) The fact of stationing this force in a forward position does not mean that France accepts the principle of automatic engagement in a frontline battle, but instead that it will intervene in a deterrent capacity during a crisis, in order to defuse it and prevent it from degenerating into a conflict.

Nevertheless, many within the Gaullist RPR, the Socialist and Communist Parties view the development of the FAR as a subterfuge for the reintegration of French forces into the integrated command structure of the Atlantic Alliance. Others, particularly military professionals and strategists, continue to perceive the development of the FAR as a means of effecting defense budget cuts for French
conventional forces without incurring contentious debate within the armed services. Supporters of the FAR dismiss both charges on the grounds that France, like other European countries, found it necessary to restructure its national force posture in the face of changes that have occurred in the European security environment, and because France's interests outside of Europe were increasingly coming under threat, as in Central Africa and the Persian Gulf for example.

The debate over France's role in the defense of Western Europe was heightened by recent remarks of General Charles de Llamby, commander of the First French Army. General Llamby, who is tasked with the assignment of preparing for the formation of the Rapid Assistance Force (FAR), stated that he was engaged in a study to determine that force's potential and procedures for action in Europe. As part of his study General de Llamby is seeking to "draw a distinction between what is necessary for national," independent action and use of the force in conjunction with NATO logistics and reinforcement systems. In a National Assembly debate on the 1984 French military budget, the concept of closer French-NATO and French-U.S. ties generated controversy, in particular from members of the opposition and the left-wing of the Socialist Party. The strength of the combined right- and left-wing opposition to what is perceived to be the loss of French sovereignty forced the
government to emphasize its support for French independence and its commitment to keep France outside NATO's integrated military command. An alternative view in support of France's participation in the "forward battle" has been expressed by prominent members of the Union pour la Democratie Francaise (UDF) -- the centrist party of former President Valery Giscard d'Estaing. Giscard has himself recently advanced a call for a greater contribution by France to the defense of Western Europe, including French participation (with Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany and Britain) in a European Rapid Deployment Force under a unified command.

Giscard's concept of a European Rapid Deployment Force is not judged seriously by a majority of French strategists who argue that its realization is not possible until European political unity is achieved and until that time French independence must be maintained, especially in the area of defense. The national consensus in France in support of French autonomy in foreign and national security policy remains strong and is certainly a factor in the decision-making process of the Mitterrand Government as concerns nuclear weapons policies. Thus, on this basis and from the perspective of the Strategic Deterrence School (I), deployment in limited numbers of the enhanced radiation warhead would augment France's Proportional Deterrence posture because of its incorporation of technologies that
would allow the use of lesser explosive yields to accomplish the same task (i.e., escalatory options) as is now performed by Pluton. It is further argued by some members of School I that deployment of ER weapons could result in a diminished potential for destruction of territory. The dangers, they concede, of a French decision to deploy such weapons is that they could be perceived as providing France with a nuclear warfighting option and that France would be "dragged" into the "Forward Battle." To guard against such a prospect the Mitterrand Government is likely to emphasize a limited deployment of enhanced radiation weapons, probably to be deployed on the Hades launchers. Such a deployment is not perceived by the Mitterrand Government as contributing to a change in French strategic doctrine -- away from strategic deterrence of the sanctuary and toward the development of theater, warfighting options.

2.5 FRENCH REACTION TO THE ANDROPOV PROPOSALS

The broadly based national consensus in support of the French deterrent force led members of all four Schools of Thought to reject the proposals put forth in May 1983 by the now deceased Soviet President Yuri Andropov to count French and British strategic-nuclear launchers against SS-20s in a proposal that would prohibit NATO from deploying the 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles and the 464 Ground Launched Cruise missiles as provided in the Atlantic Council
decision of December 1979. While the present French government, like the Minimal Deterrence (IV) School, ultimately seeks balanced East-West disarmament as a policy goal, it recognizes that neither unilateral French disarmament nor the counting of French forces in the INF negotiations would, at this time, contribute to French security interests. So long as the United States and the Soviet Union deploy nuclear forces, France will maintain her independent deterrent capabilities.

Specifically, the French found the Andropov offer unsuitable on the basis that no valid comparison could be made between French and U.S. and Soviet strategic forces. Most important in this regard, as pointed out by French strategic analysts, is that the Soviet SS-20 is a MIRVed, three-warhead, counterforce system whereas French and British strategic forces are countercity, single warhead weapons. In the words of Jacques Huntzinger, foreign affairs spokesman for the French Socialist Party, "it is totally unacceptable to compare Soviet counterforce, first-strike weapons with French and British deterrent

*The British and French total of 290 warheads (64 British Polaris submarine-launched missiles each with three warheads, plus 18 French S-3 land-based missiles and 80 submarine-launched M-20s) is already rising towards a new total of perhaps 482, as the Royal Navy's Polaris is fitted with the new Chevaline multiple warhead believed to contain six individual bombs instead of Polaris' three. By the late 1980s, the French Navy will have increased its deterrent submarine force from five to six boats and installed the new M-4 missile in them with the
forces of last resort."(117) While most French analysts welcomed the apparent change in approach by the Soviet Union with regard to an emphasis on warheads instead of launchers as the major unit of counting at the Geneva INF negotiations, they nevertheless view the disparity between U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces, on the one hand, and British and French strategic forces, on the other hand, as being so great that until such time as the superpowers achieve significant reductions in their respective INF forces, France will remain outside of any U.S.-Soviet arms negotiation.

To many analysts within and outside of France, the French rejection of the Andropov proposal to include French strategic forces in the INF talks clearly demonstrates that, rhetoric aside, French strategic forces can be seen only as weapons of last resort to deter aggression -- conventional or nuclear -- against French national territory. It can even be suggested that one of the implications of the Andropov proposals has been to drive a wedge between greater

multiple warheads. Assuming the M-4 has a triple warhead, like Polaris, the joint British and French force will then total 690 warheads.

By the early 1990s, the number will rise again under present plans as the Royal Navy adopts the Trident D-5 missile with 14 warheads on each launcher, bringing the joint total to 1202 warheads . . . The present overall total of South European-based warheads is about 1350, rather more than the eventual Anglo-French total, but the Russians have already said they will dismantle the (older, single-warhead) SS-4s and 5s (sic) as the new missiles (SS-20s) are deployed, so the more significant figure is 1050 SS-20 warheads."(121)
European defense cooperation, especially the budding rebirth of Franco-German defense collaboration. By France's insistence that its national deterrence forces cannot be included in the Western totals in the Geneva negotiations on the basis that the French weapons comprise a last resort capability, the Federal Republic of Germany (and the rest of NATO Europe) cannot presume to rely on the French to guarantee its security. If the Andropov proposals have value, it lies in the fact that the United States remains indispensable to the security of Western Europe, but especially to the Federal Republic of Germany.

2.6 POLICY IMPLICATIONS

From the foregoing, brief examination of French security perspectives, several policy implications can be drawn for France and its future role in the defense of Western Europe.

(1) While the emphasis of the programme loi is on the modernization of French nuclear forces, France's economic problems may force some hard choices with regard to delays in initial operating capacity of even some nuclear weapons systems. In this regard it is important to note that the French Atomic Energy Commission -- the body charged with the responsibility for France's nuclear testing programs -- is fiscally
constrained in the new French military budget. While it is unlikely that fiscal constraints will affect the M-4 SLBM testing program, they could affect the development of a successor warhead (the M-5) as well as the SX and Hades systems. Such constraints on the French testing program could lead the French to seek greater cooperation with the United States in the use of U.S. testing facilities.

(2) Given the priority emphasis of the French on their deterrent capabilities and based on an anxiety about the future ability of French nuclear weapons to threaten credibly the Soviet Union, the programme loi provides for extensive research into penetration aids and chaff devices as well as initial work on the development of depressed trajectory technologies. The perceived importance of these two programs has increased, in recent weeks, since President Reagan's speech of March 23, 1983, in which he alluded to the U.S. development of "exotic" antiballistic missile technologies. French anxiety over a U.S. or Soviet ABM Treaty abrogation or renegotiation has further reinforced the perceived necessity of research into new technology penetration techniques. It has also, in some sectors of the French strategic community, raised an interest in exploring France's development of ABM capabilities, although for financial and
psychological reasons (having to do with the credibility of the French deterrent force) this is not a popular option for the majority of French analysts.

(3) The fiscal constraints in the AEC budget raise the prospect that the Enhanced Radiation warhead -- whose testing program has been virtually completed -- will be produced for deployment on the Hades launcher.

(4) Likewise, for financial reasons the number of Hades launchers has been reduced from the planned number for procurement of 180 to about 120, while the number of dual-capable air-to-surface medium-range missiles has also been cut to 60.

(5) The proportion of equipment funds devoted to fundamental research for primary studies (études amont) is increased slightly over 1983 -- from 5.8 to 6.0 percent of program authorizations, in an apparent effort to help stimulate the French industry. Priority will be given to the areas of electronics and composite materials since the French seek, over the next four years, to enhance their warhead and command, control and communications systems.

(6) With systems' vulnerability of increasing concern to the French, silo hardening and the modernization of antisubmarine warfare technologies are funded in the programme loi. Over the 1984-1988 period the French plan to deploy three additional nuclear-
powered attack submarines and to augment their air defense capabilities with the purchase of an airborne early warning system, perhaps the U.S. Boeing A-3 AWACs.

(7) With the priority emphasis accorded French nuclear forces in the 1984-1988 "programme loi," equipment programs for French conventional forces are likely to be sacrificed or drawn out beyond 1988, especially if the French economy continues to stagnate.

(8) For this reason, only one nuclear powered aircraft carrier is funded (to replace the Clemenceau). (It is now said that a replacement for the Foch will be funded after 1988.) However, to strengthen naval support for the programme loi the government has also included in its budget procurement funds for 12 additional surface warships.

(9) Also funded is a new generation combat aircraft and preliminary research on a main battle tank to replace the aging AMX-30. For economic reasons, however, it is hoped that development of a new tank will be undertaken in collaboration with another European country specifically the Federal Republic of Germany, although the West German Leopard II tank has just come on line and the prospects of German expenditure on a new battle tank are, at this time, unlikely. Not funded in this budget are the necessary lift capabilities to support the use of French FAAR forces overseas. Should
a contingency arise in which the French government would seek to deploy its rapid action assistance forces in Chad, for example, it is likely that, as in the past, the French will seek assistance from the United States in the form of use of U.S. heavy-lift aircraft.

(10) Because of the financial constraints on French conventional force equipment programs France's contribution, should a political decision be made, to the "forward battle" in Europe is questionable. What is certain, however, is that the current French government will be reluctant to support any change in the NATO strategy for the defense of Western Europe based upon the concepts articulated in the U.S. Army's AirLand Battle. French Defense Minister Charles Hernu has explicitly rejected the second-echelon attack concept because, in his view, and in the view of the Strategic Deterrence School (I), this would dilute the essence of the French deterrence strategy. At a practical level, the AirLand Battle concept is also thought to be too expensive.

(11) Even though the French Communist Party abstained from voting on the programme loi (because of a reference in an annex document to the Soviet threat to Western Europe), the defense budget passed the vote in the National Assembly on May 20, 1983, with little opposition from the left wing of the majority Socialist
Party. Thus for the remainder of his Presidency, Francois Mitterrand's Socialist government (with Communist participation) will seek to maintain and modernize France's independent nuclear deterrent capability even if it means the weakening of French conventional forces.
TABLE 2.

A graphic representation of the French Schools of Thought and their distinguishing characteristics with reference to major policy issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party Identification</th>
<th>Strategic Deterrence School I</th>
<th>Graduated Deterrence School II</th>
<th>Battlefield Deterrence School III</th>
<th>Minimal Deterrence School IV</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mainstream Socialist Party</td>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>Left-of-Center Socialist Party (but not GEPES)</td>
<td>Some UDF</td>
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<td>Mainstream Party</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mainstream RPR</td>
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Distinguishing Characteristics
- Massive employment of French nuclear forces for deterrence of aggression against France
  - Emphasis on "test" concept
  - Emphasis on battlefield defense options
  - Opposes "conventional" defense of Europe
  - Supports enlarged sanctuary concept
  - Support for European defense collaboration outside of NATO
  - Supports EW & INF deployment
  - Emphasis on SSBM/SLBM modernization
  - Supports development of FAR
  - Opposes Strategic Defense

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distinguishing Characteristic</th>
<th>Strategic Deterrence School I</th>
<th>Graduated Deterrence School II</th>
<th>Battlefield Deterrence School III</th>
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SECTION 3
WEST GERMAN PERSPECTIVES

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Perhaps more than any other NATO country, security perceptions and attitudes in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) are conditioned by historical and geographical elements. Situated in the center of Europe, the Germans have been forced throughout history to struggle with the question of whether to seek security by turning to the East or to the West, or indeed by even going it alone; whether to achieve security through passive accommodation or assertive power. These vulnerabilities, moreover, have served to sharpen the contrast between two German foreign policy "models." The "Bismarck model" envisions Germany in a balancing role between East and West European power constellations, but emphasizes its overriding interest in strong political and military relationships with the East. The "Stresemann model" similarly advocates a balancing position (Schaukelpolitik), but stresses Germany's basic identification with the West. And while the Federal Republic of the 1980s differs significantly from the Germanys of Bismarck and Stresemann, geographical factors continue to exert a predominant influence on security perceptions in Bonn. The Federal Republic of Germany is subject to unique geopolitical pressures that stem not only
from its geographical position as a Central European NATO state bordering the Warsaw Pact, but from its status as a nation divided between two hostile military blocs.

Apart from geography, however, it is possible to identify six interacting variables which have played a decisive role in the formation of West German defense perspectives in the post-World War II era. These are: (1) the military-political threat from the East, (2) the transatlantic relationship with the United States, (3) the West European political context, (4) national German objectives, with emphasis on the lingering, if distant, aim of German reunification, (5) the balance of arms, particularly nuclear arms, between East and West, and the corresponding Western military strategy, and (6) the role of detente, and particularly arms control, in dealing with the Soviet bloc. Domestic factors have largely determined how these variables are evaluated and weighed; thus party politics is an important additional element in formulating German security policy.

This proposition is supported by even a brief survey of the three principal periods in the FRG's postwar evolution. The "Adenauer Era," 1949-1963, featured the dominance of Adenauer's version of a "Stresemann model," which placed far greater emphasis on Germany's identification with the West to the point of abandoning Schaukelpolitik by integrating the FRG into the Western community of nations. This strategy, supported by a decisive majority of the Christian
Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU) in the Bundestag, was reinforced by a clear recognition of the external military threat from the Soviet Union, punctuated by recurrent East-West crises in Europe. Perceptions of the arms balance led to active support for Western military strategy, and Adenauer's approach was also eased by the essential harmony which existed among the other key variables -- transatlantic ties, West European integration, West German national objectives, and the limited scope of arms control.

Between 1964 and 1969, however, there was a transition period which witnessed a progressive disruption in the harmony described above. Most importantly, perhaps, the general West German perception of the threat lowered gradually with Khrushchev's detente strategy. So, too, the transatlantic relationship suffered under the strains between Bonn and the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, particularly with the American effort to raise the conventional/nuclear threshold culminating in the adoption by NATO of the Flexible Response Doctrine in 1967. At the same time, the "European alternative" was dimmed by Gaullism. The harsh fact of the Berlin Wall, built in 1961, cut progressively into the credibility of Adenauer's formula for achieving reunification through Western integration, i.e., through a close alliance with the West. These changes, in turn, boosted the fortunes of the Social Democratic Party (SPD).
With the formation of a governing coalition between the SPD and the small Free Democratic Party (FDP) in 1969, the "Brandt-Schmidt era" began to take shape. A basic community of NATO policies was sustained under successive SPD defense ministers, but West German security perceptions -- particularly at the party elite levels in Bonn -- came increasingly to be influenced by political-ideological themes associated with the SPD. The SPD-FDP concluded treaties with the Soviet bloc (Ostpolitik) which placed stronger emphasis on West German national objectives -- namely, on de facto normalization of relations with the Soviet bloc and expanded contacts with East Germany -- and less on European integration. In the more specific realm of defense policy, the nuclear components of NATO strategy came to hold lessened priority. Increased importance was attached to arms control in Europe as a quasi-alternative to NATO military armament and modernization. Up to the end, the Schmidt Government was under heavy pressure from the left wing of the SPD to reverse its approval of NATO's plan to deploy intermediate nuclear forces (INF) in West Germany.

Left-wing SPD opposition to INF and NATO policy in general was in part responsible for the Schmidt Government's collapse. Unrestrained antinuclear, pacifist and neutralist voices within his own party undermined the Chancellor's image, while gradually alienating both his centrist Free Democratic allies and many traditional SPD voters. Schmidt became isolated in his own party as the debate over how the
SPD should respond to the antinuclear movement gradually shifted SPD policy away from Schmidt's aloofness to Willy Brandt's strategy of attempting to absorb it. Brandt's taboo on denouncing the antinuclear movement paralyzed Schmidt's efforts to maintain a majority of SPD support for the deployment side of the NATO double-track decision. Moreover, the continuing economic recession and the alienation of unions and local and state SPD leaders from Schmidt's style of leadership caused major strains in the SPD. Thus there can be little doubt that the erosion of rank and file approval of the deployment of INF was a major factor in Schmidt's eventual downfall and in the subsequent rise of the anti-INF national left faction of Willy Brandt, Hans-Jochen Vogel, and Egon Bahr.

At the same time, the CDU/CSU's more cohesive front on security issues improved that party's poll-ratings, helping it to regain power in October 1982 in tandem with the Free Democrats, who finally left Schmidt's battered coalition. In its first five months, Chancellor Helmut Kohl's new government changed the "accents" of Bonn's policies by voicing firm support for closer cooperation with the United States and France, but it did not alter the basic orientation of the Federal Republic in foreign affairs. With respect to the major issue of NATO INF, the CDU/CSU-FDP's views corresponded closely to the substance of Schmidt's policies (indeed more closely than did those of many in the SPD itself) so that continuity was clearly
visible in the pledge to deploy if the Geneva negotiations did not produce an arms control agreement which satisfied Alliance criteria for equity. Although Kohl publicly gave more unambiguous backing to President Reagan's "zero-option" proposal for theater arms reduction than did Schmidt, his government had an equal interest in a new U.S. negotiating initiative. Even if the left-wing peace movement could exert less direct pressure on the CDU/CSU than it could on the SPD, antinuclear sentiment in general had made it vital for Kohl to convince Germans that efforts to avoid deployment of more missiles were being made, especially if the coalition was to hold on to power in the March 1983 elections. Other more conservative members of the new governing party were inclined to deviate substantially from that course by de-emphasizing arms control or downplaying Bonn's relationship with the Soviet bloc -- major elements of the party's foreign policy statements while it was in opposition -- but they were also restrained by the need to preserve coalition unity and avoid alienating voters before the upcoming vote.

Despite its convincing election victory, the CDU/CSU-FDP government remains susceptible to public, if not internal, pressure for disarmament, but must also take into account the suspicions many of its own members have of arms control and detente in general (a more detailed assessment of likely future developments is included below in the section on "Policy Implications"). Because of this close
relationship between domestic politics and security issues, it behooves the United States to pay closer attention to the principal schools of strategic thought in the Federal Republic, and to their current political party affiliation.

Four distinct schools of thought are apparent in the Federal Republic of Germany. Each school's members share distinctive perspectives on most of the six key variables in German security: the nature of the Soviet threat, the value of the transatlantic relationship, the extent of intra-European coordination, the objectives concerning Germany's divided status, the nature of East-West arms balance, and the role of detente and arms control. Leading figures involved in making West German security policy fall within one of the four schools, depending more on their approach to these six variables than their party affiliation. There is however, a strong correlation between certain parties and individual schools of thought.

3.2 SCHOOL I: STRATEGIC DETERRENCE

The first school of thought, "strategic deterrence," is predominant in Bonn's new governing coalition, the CDU/CSU-FDP, and has some influence among certain circles in the SPD. Although supporters of this school have recently become more open to the idea of good relations with the Eastern bloc, they still emphasize the importance of strategic deterrence and conventional defense over detente.
They are apprehensive over the imbalance of U.S.-Soviet nuclear strategic forces and are particularly concerned that the Soviet buildup of intermediate-range nuclear missiles (SS-20s) has adversely affected the nuclear balance in Europe. Thus they strongly support INF modernization as a means of ensuring the strategic coupling of Western Europe with the United States. They theoretically accept the concept of extended battlefield nuclear deterrence, but they have doubts about its practicality and its negative impact on the political consensus of opinion on the strategy of nuclear deterrence. There is, however, strong opposition to strategic defense concepts. The belief is widespread in this school that any attempt by the United States to develop strategic defense systems would possibly create a nuclear sanctuary in the United States, thereby decoupling the strategic defense of Western Europe from that of the United States.

Within the school there are differences between "fundamentalist," anti-Soviet conservatives and more pragmatic detente-minded conservatives, but all believe that the major concern for West Germany's freedom and physical existence lies in the threat of Soviet military domination. By existing in peace and freedom, Western Europe and in particular the Federal Republic pose dangers for the Soviet Union; in addition, Moscow sees an opportunity for self-aggrandizement through its pressure on Europe. The Kremlin's goal is to blackmail Western Europe into political
and economic concessions by brandishing Soviet power. This adds up to a Soviet strategy that is bold in goals but measured in means. CDU advisor Dr. Hans Ruhle emphasizes the consistent Soviet reliance on Lenin's version of Clausewitzian principles -- military pressure as the continuation of policy -- and conservative leader Franz Josef Strauss calls the Kremlin leaders "shrewd Realpolitikers," not irrational conquerors. (123, p.12; 90, p.199)

Moscow's drive for hegemony in Europe explains the Soviet military buildup. The achievement of strategic parity with the United States, followed by a theater force expansion -- the SS-20 and Backfire -- are designed to intimidate the West and break its will to resist Soviet coercion. By the same token, the Soviet desire to destabilize the West accounts for Moscow's vigorous drive for world power. Proponents of the First School, such as Hans Graf Huyn (CSU), point out that although Russia is a classical land power, it has constructed a global navy. This maritime buildup and Soviet intervention throughout the Third World are designed to strangle the West's economic lifelines. Soviet pressure in the Persian Gulf is particularly dangerous for NATO, given Western dependence on imported oil. (33)

For members of the First School, East-West detente does not mark a de-escalation of Soviet pressure. On the contrary, while preaching peace, Moscow used the past decade of relaxed tensions to exploit weaknesses in the Western
The spirit of concession in which detente was initiated and later preserved revealed an inaccurate perception of Moscow's threat, especially among West Europeans. From the October 1973 Mideast War through Afghanistan and Poland, Moscow had demonstrated that detente was a tool in its power game which should cause Europeans to question "the credibility of the [Soviet] declarations." Moscow's effort simultaneously to woo and intimidate the West could dangerously confuse and divide the Alliance. For the Europeans to ignore clear evidence of Soviet design and pursue a detente on their own, as an "interpreter" between East and West, as a third party between the superpowers, would leave them isolated and vulnerable to Soviet pressures. Manfred Worner of the CDU/CSU stresses that the West's detente "must be of one piece" and Europeans must trust the United States to take their interests into account in its own dealings with the Soviet bloc. (161)

School I has traditionally been wary of the Brandt-Schmidt government's policy which hoped to arrive at a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union and diplomatically legitimize Moscow's ally, the German Democratic Republic. Easing the human cost of Germany's division was considered to be a worthy diplomatic goal, and School I believes that Bonn's reliability as a treaty partner is vital. Thus the Ostpolitik must be honored, and during the CDU/CSU's first months in office, official relations with the Soviet bloc,
and especially East Germany, remained cordial and business-like.

Since the deployment of INF, however, a number of representatives of School I, including Franz-Josef Strauss, have dropped that school's long-standing demand that improved ties with the German Democratic Republic never entail unreciprocated concessions or agreements that give the appearance of undermining the Federal Republic's constitutional obligation to seek eventual reunification. (100; 119; 180) In what constitutes a revolution in School I attitudes toward inter-German policy, Franz-Josef Strauss helped arrange a $1 billion special credit loan to the GDR in the summer of 1983 without receiving any immediate concessions from the Honecker Government. Since that time the Kohl Government, which contains many prominent members of School I, has embarked on a policy of revitalizing an inter-German policy that had for the most part lain dormant in the last year's of Schmidt's chancellorship. (270) School I's new approach to inter-German policy represents a fusion of elements from the Eastern policies of Schmidt's SPD-FDP coalition and Kohl's CDU. Like Schmidt and Brandt, the new Ostpolitiker of School I accept the need for improved trade, financial and human ties with the GDR. Unlike them, however, they are pressing the claim that the Federal Republic has a special obligation to resolve the
so-called "national question" of German reunification. This dual approach is official policy of the Kohl Government, but a substantial number of adherents of School I, particularly in the CDU's conservative coalition partner, the Bavarian-based Christian Social Union (CSU), refuse to go along entirely with the detente policies of the new government. With the notable exception of Strauss, "fundamentalist" conservatives in School I have tried to slow down the Kohl Government's opening to the East by insisting that better relations with East Berlin not be seen as finalizing the borders recognized by West Germany's treaties with the Eastern bloc.\(^{(176)}\)

Although School I has changed its attitude toward detente, it still believes in the necessity of maintaining a credible Western nuclear deterrent and conventional capabilities strong enough to deter both Soviet aggression and Soviet political intimidation.\(^{(131)}\) School I adherents believe that U.S. efforts to restore an equilibrium at the highest level of deterrence are vital. Strategic deterrence is the most effective guarantee of West German security because it threatens the Soviet Union with the most unacceptable consequences of aggression. The credibility of strategic deterrence is not only an American concern, but a European one as well, for the more closely linked the strategies of nuclear deterrence in Europe and the United States are, the less vulnerable West Germany is
to Soviet political intimidation and possible Soviet aggression. In this context, Manfred Worner, appointed Defense Minister in October 1982, has commented that:

The vulnerability of the U.S. arsenal of land-based ICBMs is provoking serious concern. For the foreseeable future... only survivable ICBMs fill the NATO requirement of keeping open the options of first and selective use of nuclear weapons. Because of a variety of factors, even improved U.S. SLBMs could not adequately substitute for ICBMs in such missions. There is thus a "legitimate" European stake in the maintenance by the United States of a survivable force of ICBMs.(136, p.13)

In assessing the implications of U.S. Minuteman vulnerability for European confidence in the American nuclear guarantee, CDU Chairman Chancellor Helmut Kohl has voiced the concerns of School I as follows:

The USA may well be able to live for a fairly long period of time in a position of significant inferiority vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in the nuclear strategic sector. But in the case of Western Europe, whose military strength compared with the Soviet Union is marked by inferiority in both the nuclear and conventional sector, the situation would become intolerable in such a development and the political outcome incalculable.(4, p.24)

Although they consider the notion of nuclear freeze to be an "internal matter" for the United States, School I representatives voice cautious opposition to the idea and emphasize their preference for arms reductions. At the same time, without opposing plans for expanded U.S. antiballistic missile defense planning, they have described the idea as "future-music."
As a result of the worsening strategic balance, there
has been a growing appreciation in School I for the
deterrent role that might be played by British and French
national nuclear forces. To some extent, this has led to a
convergence of CDU and FDP interests in exploring the
prospects for broader European defense collaboration. Some
consideration has been given to the development -- in close
coordination with the United States -- of a strategic
nuclear potential under European control. Shortly after
taking power, the CDU/CSU-FDP government discussed closer
bilateral nuclear cooperation with France. Since then
Franco-German weapons co-development schemes have been
successfully launched and official channels have been
established to coordinate the defense strategies of France
and West Germany. (151) Chancellor Kohl has stated that he
plans to raise the issue of creating a European "pillar" in
NATO at the next meeting of the European Economic Community,
and he has expressed a willingness to increase the infusion
of state funds into European cooperative high-technology
military projects. It should be noted, however, that such
proposals do not reflect a desire in School I for a European
strategic deterrent independent of the United States. As
Manfred Worner has been careful to stress, "concepts of a
self-contained and independent defense of Western Europe are
illusionary and dangerous."

In any event, it is the deterioration of the NATO
position at the theater level which is most distressing to
School I adherents. According to Worner, even under optimistic assumptions with respect to NATO warning time and mobilization, the conventional superiority of Warsaw Pact forces over their NATO counterparts could range, in a number of alternative battlefield scenarios, between 2-1 and 3-1. This is true, he noted, especially in view of the Warsaw Pact's improved capacity for launching a surprise attack, either from a "standing start" or a "moving start." Furthermore, the more protracted the battle, the more drastically the conflict would shift to the disadvantage of the West, given its numerical inferiorities, the limited depth of NATO territory and the vulnerability of the Alliance's arms supply lines. Worner observes that:

It is impossible . . . under present circumstances to come up with a realistic scenario of conventional conflict in Central Europe that holds any prospect of a successful outcome for NATO --- that is, the restoration of the territorial status quo ante. Achievement of this potential through a genuine conventional balance in Europe is effectively foreclosed. No NATO country is today prepared, or in a position, to pay the financial -- and, in the final analysis, political costs that are entailed. (134, pp.14-15)

Thus School I spokesmen have limited faith in the ultimate efficacy of "conventional deterrence:" they would ideally like to see reliance on tactical nuclear missiles reduced by a conventional modernization program that, with new technologies, would theoretically enable NATO to deny Soviet "second echelon" forces access to the battlefield in a war scenario, but the fact that they acknowledge all the above
problems militates against such a plan. Moreover, School I fears "conventional deterrence" planning might imply that NATO was moving away from its formal commitment to forward defense and turning West Germany, theoretically, into a battlefield, alienating Germans from NATO.

While recognizing these inherent limitations on conventional defense, School I nonetheless believes Bonn should attempt to make, where possible, a significant contribution and push for maximal cooperation in this field. Thus in 1983 it raised the German defense budget by one percent over the previous weapons. Moreover, School I warned of the danger of a worsening theater nuclear balance well before Chancellor Schmidt picked up this theme in his celebrated London speech in October 1977. The CDU/CSU's Volker Ruhe calls the SS-20 a Soviet effort to obtain military, psychological and political hegemony. (111) Nor should it be surprising that School I has been in the forefront of the campaign to counter the Soviet Union's mounting SS-20 arsenal with the deployment by NATO of intermediate nuclear forces (INF). Indeed, Worner, for one, has argued for a substantially larger force than the 572 Pershing II and GLCMs approved by NATO in December 1979. Before becoming Minister of Defense, he declared that even if other European NATO members were to refuse to accept the actual installation of such missiles, the Federal Republic of Germany should do so on a bilateral basis with the United States. (10, p.15470) Worner's and the Defense Ministry's
strong support for a "weapons mix" of cruise and Pershing II missiles in the days prior to the deployment of INF was a crucial counterweight to the FDP-controlled Foreign Ministry's tendency to favor an interim solution which entertained the possibility of rejecting the Pershing IIs. Since the time of deployment Worner has hailed the coming of the new missiles as a victory for NATO and as a sufficient nuclear response to the Soviet buildup of SS-20s.

In setting forth School I's argument in favor of theater nuclear modernization, Worner is quick to point out that it is not simply a question of matching the Soviet Union weapon for weapon. In fact, it is the political ramifications of failing to respond to the SS-20 that need to be better understood in the West. For these missiles, Worner warns, are part and parcel of a new "Hostage Europe" strategy set in motion by Moscow. To be more specific:

The Soviet Union currently is preparing systematically the next strategic era -- the continental or "Eurostrategic" era -- in which she creates regional imbalances of conventional and nuclear sorts beneath the level of strategic-nuclear parity. If she succeeds in this, not only will she be guaranteed in the long run the domination of all of Europe, but Europe's role of conventional and, above all, nuclear hostage will give her opportunities for blackmailing the United States. This strategic shift must be recognized on both sides of the Atlantic. (112, pp.48-49)

Hence the need for INF modernization as a vital stabilizer at the Eurostrategic level. A credible INF deterrent must
be (1) under U.S. control, linking it unambiguously to America's strategic nuclear umbrella, (2) accurate and of a sufficient size to confront the Soviets (without threatening them with a first strike), and (3) deployed on German soil, assuring Moscow that it will be used. For these reasons, School I rejects all Soviet assertions that the Anglo-French systems constitute a NATO deterrent: they are currently second-strike, "last-resort" unilateral deterrents, and are not designated for Germany's defense. School I spokesmen stress that Europe asked for and needs INF, and that the United States, far from forcing new weapons upon the Alliance to serve any interests of its own, is incurring a greater share of the risks involved in nuclear deterrence by offering the missiles. Given its view of theater forces, School I flatly rejects proposals that NATO renounce first use of nuclear weapons: such a change in policy would concede a military advantage to Moscow, with its overwhelming conventional edge.

For School I, arms control cannot be a substitute for Western military strength. Beginning with Adenauer's 1954 renunciation of nuclear weapons, the Federal Republic of Germany has shown its sincere desire for reducing the threat of an arms race, but Moscow has rarely responded positively. Future arms control policies must be realistic, "comprehensive and controlled, mutually balanced." Nuclear arms reduction measures must be designed to ensure an equilibrium. Thus, this School held that the Reagan "zero
option" was the most acceptable outcome of theater nuclear talks at Geneva. But, although it rejects as naive and dangerous any unilateralist demands, School I recognizes the need to preserve a pro-NATO consensus by pursuing realistic arms control vigorously and seriously. Prior to the deployment of INF, adherents of School I were willing to consider an interim agreement at Geneva so long as the Pershing II missiles were not left out of the "weapons mix." Since the beginning of deployment in December 1983, members of this group have expressed their desire to resume nuclear arms control talks, but they have as a rule been less demanding than other schools in calling for the inclusion of INF in a new round of START negotiations. School I, however, has been quite vocal in its support for the resumption of Mutually-Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) Talks in Vienna and for continuation of the Conference of Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSE) in Stockholm. (152)

According to School I, a firm commitment to the Atlantic Alliance represents an absolute requirement for West German security. Members of School I share a conviction that "the North Atlantic Alliance remains indispensable to the prevention of war and the preservation of freedom." They believe that an underlying mutual interest links the Allies: Western Europe has an unquestionable need for U.S. military support, and, to preserve its global role, the United States needs Western Europe. Reinforcing these
common interests, however, are common principles: the United States and Europe are "a community of destiny" as protectors of Western democracy. The relationship must be based upon mutual trust and solidarity. Western Europe cannot advocate a division of labor that leaves the most difficult tasks and the greatest share of the security burden to the United States, and Europeans must encourage a confident, assertive American policy. Similarly, Europe cannot allow itself to be separated from the United States by Soviet ploys, such as the 1983 proposal of a Warsaw Pact-NATO nonaggression pact designed to liquidate "the bloc system." At the same time, School I acknowledges that political and budgetary constraints limit Bonn's ability to give the United States more than stronger rhetorical support for its actions outside the NATO area.

At the same time, School I reflects the view that the transatlantic security partnership can be immeasurably strengthened by West European integration. A politically and economically unified Western Europe will be more than the sum of its parts; an integrated community better able to preserve the region's socio-economic fabric and political harmony would make the Atlantic Alliance's "second pillar" a reality. \(131, \text{p.91}\) As CDU official Alfred Dregger pointed out, the European Community "prevents discord among West European states which might invite Soviet involvement, and its peaceful economic integration ostensibly precludes Western militarism, another pretext for Soviet aggression."
In most CDU/CSU party programs, the Community is thus listed with NATO as a guarantor of German security. Expanded European political military cooperation in the form of greater joint efforts within NATO can be useful, but Europe alone could not entirely assure its own security, nor should it attempt to set itself up as a rival to the Atlantic partnership. Thus, although School I is the strongest advocate of close Franco-German military and political ties, there is no longer a truly "Gaullist" camp espousing a European deterrent or a European bloc, as Franz Josef Strauss once did in the 1960s.

3.3 SCHOOL II: BALANCED POSTURE

The second school of thought, security through a military relationship with the West balanced by a detente relationship with the East, or "balanced posture," was the dominant security perspective of the Schmidt-Genscher Government. It commands influence in the moderate wings of both the FDP and SPD and in Germany's establishment media (Die Zeit, Suddeutsche Zeitung), and since the onset of a vigorous detente policy by the Kohl Government, its influence even extends into the pragmatic wing of School I.

School II maintains that the Soviet Union's military buildup and foreign policy constitute a major destabilizing variable in an increasingly dangerous world. They believe Soviet leaders are aware of the internal weakness of
Moscow's empire, and that this weakness causes the Soviet Union to exploit Western weaknesses and to assert itself as an emerging predominant global power. The Soviet military buildup is an indispensable tool of this policy. It is designed to remind Western Europe that Moscow's grip will remain firm, and that the Soviet Union intends to keep NATO under pressure and off balance. Helmut Schmidt warns that "the Soviet Union aims . . . at creating dependence around itself and in other parts of the world, dependence on the Soviet leadership, dependence in the political, military and ideological fields." (249) Nevertheless, Moscow's power game in Europe and elsewhere, protagonists of School II content, cannot be viewed in isolation. However pervasive Soviet influence is, it is only one of many factors contributing to instability in the world.

For School II, only a balanced approach is sufficient to deter Soviet aggression and maintain stability in the world. The West should adopt not only a policy that displays strength and determination to resist Soviet pressure and aggression but one that also seeks cooperation in areas of mutual interests, especially in nuclear arms control. Trade links, open lines of communication and, when circumstances warrant, an active "crisis management" policy will, it is claimed, provide the Soviet Union with incentive to show restraint. (50, pp.222-225) For this reason, School II spokesmen like Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher have placed a high priority on preserving the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe as a permanent mechanism for maintaining detente in Europe.

Although School II stresses the need for global stability and presents its own approach as a comprehensive one, the detente half of the balanced policy has very specific application to German security. As a divided nation, Germany has a special stake in maintaining detente. A policy based on balanced East-West relations can preserve peace in Europe and prevent Germany from becoming a battlefield. In the short term, detente purportedly helps Bonn to overcome the effects of Germany's division by expanding contacts with its Eastern neighbor (an entirely unilateral approach could never achieve these ends, let alone lead to reunification). The incorporation of inter-German relations within a broader equilibrium can contribute to detente in Europe as a whole and to improved relations between the superpowers; the Schmidt Government even explored the idea of joint East German-West German disarmament positions. In the words of Foreign Minister Genscher, while he was a member of the Schmidt Government: "We follow this [German] policy out of our responsibility for peace in Europe." In this view, the East German regime must be accepted as a security partner in a limited sense, even though the two regimes have sharply different foreign policies and domestic political systems.

Detente comprises only one part of School II's security policy of balanced posture. Western security in
the School II view rests also on "adequate military strength in the Alliance to ensure its defensive capability and to deter any attack on a member state or any political blackmail." (84, p.43) Military strength is designed to ensure that an equilibrium exists between East and West. It is said to provide an incentive for peaceful conflict resolution, and thus for credible detente. Former Defense Minister Apel pointed out that these two elements of Germany's balanced relationship are mutually dependent:

There is no either-or of defense preparedness or detente -- there is only one thing -- and that is security. Both elements of security policy -- defense and detente -- must be seen as complementing one another into a single unity. (134)

The position of School II on the role of conventional forces has been shaped primarily by the guiding philosophy of Helmut Schmidt. The former Chancellor has been one of the staunchest supporters of NATO conventional strength as a means of avoiding undue reliance on nuclear weapons. An early advocate of flexible response strategy, Schmidt has emphasized the need to keep any potential conflict below the nuclear threshold for a long enough period of time to allow both for negotiations to end the conflict and for consultations among NATO allies about the initial use of nuclear weapons. The following excerpt from Schmidt's 1962 book Defense or Retaliation neatly summarizes this approach:

One must refrain from driving one's enemy to the point where he is forced, as a last resort, to use his nuclear weapons. One must therefore have
alternative weapons so as to be able to fight a limited war. If the threat of strategic annihilation is no longer suitable for deterring an adversary from less than all-out aggressions, then lesser threats also are necessary. The point of having the means for fighting limited war is not just to make war possible, but rather to avoid the fatal dilemma into which the West is in danger of drifting, of having to choose between yielding in the face of attacks or encroachment and world devastation. (61, p.17)

In order to widen the range of nonnuclear options, there is a general recognition in School II of the need for some modernization of NATO conventional forces. There is acknowledgment as well that the Warsaw Pact currently enjoys certain advantages over the West, especially with respect to the relative sizes of ground troop deployments. For the most part, however, School II adherents consider these advantages to be of marginal importance to the overall balance. Therefore, they do not feel compelled to match the Warsaw Pact man-for-man or weapon-for-weapon in order to render a conventional defense more credible.

However, as with School I, there is a recognition that despite financial and political limitations, Germany's conventional contribution must not decline. Former Defense Minister Hans Apel struggled (unsuccessfully) to meet Alliance agreements on increased spending, pushed for an expanded naval shipbuilding program, supported -- at great costs -- new weapons systems, above all the Tornado, and attempted to meet a long-term, systemic shortage of military
personnel by considering extended time for service, tightening exemptions for conscientious objection and even drafting women. School II also attempted to take concrete steps in burden-sharing by introducing the Host Nation Support program by which Germany would take over the logistical work for U.S. soldiers in a war scenario by activating 90,000 reservists. Beyond the Central Front, School II stresses German aid to Turkey and even approves of some arms sales to certain controversial Western clients in the Third World.

Conventional forces are vital but, consistent with School II's perception of the nuclear arms race as this century's overriding threat, military equilibrium is primarily determined by the balance of terror. School II adherents believe that, although American nuclear superiority is gone, there now exists a situation of overall strategic parity. Cognizant of the predominantly psychological dimensions of deterrence, School II nevertheless views strategic parity as an acceptable framework within which superpower relations can be stabilized for the benefit of European security and detente. Indeed, the stronger the voices in the United States about the growing vulnerability of American land-based ICBMs, the more School II proclaims the alleged durability of strategic parity. In this vein, Theo Sommer, a former official in the Defense Ministry of Helmut Schmidt, has argued that the perceived vulnerability of the U.S. Minuteman/Titan force could never be exploited
by Moscow, because the United States retains the ability to respond with the sea-based portion of its nuclear triad. In short, "strategic parity" is considered synonymous with strategic stability, and that stability is deemed to exist irrespective of quantitative changes in the military balance or technological innovation in weapons systems. (This explains the endorsement by School II of the SALT II Treaty: if strategic stability cannot be disturbed by numbers or technology, neither can it be undermined by an arms control agreement.) For this reason, there is skepticism about U.S. proposals for expanded development of ballistic missile defense, which School II believes could give the appearance of an American effort to gain nuclear superiority and a first-strike capability.

Only an American theater nuclear force based in Western Europe would restore the credibility of deterrence -- and thus the equilibrium -- by maintaining the vital link between Western Europe and America's strategic nuclear umbrella. Such a deterrent could be based at sea, but School II adherents accept the NATO concept that land-basing enhances the credibility of strategic-nuclear deterrence. In any case, School II sees NATO's nuclear component almost solely in its role as a core element of geopolitical equilibrium and deterrence (some School II members even make it clear they support INF largely because it is a test of loyalty to the Alliance). Accordingly, the military applications of INF are de-emphasized and tactical nuclear
weapons, above all the enhanced radiation weapon (ERW) or "neutron" bomb, are treated warily, and there is increasing support for eliminating many "battlefield" nuclear systems. Neither in the case of INF nor in the question of ERW, however, do School II members view the peace movement and unilateral disarmament pressure lightly. They believe that antinuclear activism, whatever its motivations, can cripple Bonn's credibility as a security partner to the Western alliance and thus weaken Germany's capacity to preserve equilibrium and detente. (138)

For School II, arms control plays a vital role in safeguarding both deterrence and detente. Arms control can reduce the level of armaments necessary for mutual deterrence based upon a more secure political-military equilibrium between East and West. Since both sides will strive for balanced arms limitations, such negotiations can "ratify" parity and hence the equilibrium. Thus, as noted before, School II endorsed SALT II and, while formally backing American START proposals, continues to suggest a compromise designed to sustain mutual perceptions of parity will be needed. Concerning theater nuclear arms reductions talks, School II believed throughout the INF debate that Moscow would reduce its own weapons levels only once it was certain that NATO and West Germany were serious about stationing INF in Western Europe. Nonetheless, largely for political reasons, School II spokesmen like the SPD's Horst Ehmke supported a plan for partial deployment in 1983 which
excluded the Pershing II missiles. School II press representatives, politicians, and even Schmidt himself, believed that the Soviets demonstrated some flexibility in the INF negotiations prior to their termination by the Soviet Union, and they continually urged the United States to reciprocate without renouncing the ultimate goal of a "zero option" as outlined by President Reagan. They were also willing to accept an interim solution, again perhaps excluding the Pershing II missiles. In talks on conventional arms limitation, School II, while acknowledging the overwhelming Soviet edge, sought real reductions and eventual parity. For School II, arms control has a corresponding political dimension as well, for such negotiations are said to contribute to detente by maintaining channels of East-West communication in normal times and especially in times of crisis. (250)

School II's policy of balanced posture requires close cooperation with the United States. Only a transatlantic relationship ensures that the military equilibrium will be credible. School II members generally espouse trust in the strength of America's commitment to European security, asserting that Washington recognizes the mutual interest in transatlantic ties. Given U.S. domestic pressures and America's global interests, however, it has often proven difficult to develop a coherent, cohesive Atlantic policy; the "neutron" bomb controversy is often presented as an example of American unpredictability. School II implicitly
assumes that Germany's task is to help the Alliance overcome the unpredictability in U.S. policy through "substantive and effective consultations" which are "a mainstay" of European-American relations. (1, p. 2) Some of its members criticize the Kohl Government for not asserting German interests in Washington.

The School II perspective sees the need for coordinating Bonn's security policies with those of its neighbors, but it does not support a highly active policy of European integration. It is necessary perhaps to develop a joint European approach to a military equilibrium and to the preservation of detente, but in operational terms, this largely entails defense collaboration. School II rejects any notion of a European independent deterrent, for it is convinced that it would lack credibility. Moreover, it downplays the notion of Franco-German nuclear cooperation, as well as the idea of strengthening the Western European Union. As far as the European Community itself is concerned School II -- above all Foreign Minister Genscher -- has pushed for active political cooperation, even security cooperation, so that European members of NATO can put themselves on a more equal footing with the United States.

3.4 SCHOOL III: MINIMAL DETERRENCE

School III holds influence among a numerically small but growing group that has recently become the dominant
voice within the Social Democratic Party. In their conception of national security, supporters of this school put more emphasis on arms control agreements than on the modernization of NATO nuclear forces. There is a tendency to view strategic deterrence as destabilizing, believing that minimal nuclear deterrence is adequate to maintain the current rough balance of NATO and Warsaw Pact nuclear forces. Thus the suspicion of NATO nuclear modernization, which they believe to be both unnecessary and destabilizing. Since nuclear weapons are considered exclusively as "second strike" deterrent forces, and not as weapons for conducting warfare, there is no need to match the size and quality of the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal. The plausibility of nuclear deterrence, most advocates of School III insist, is not nearly as important in maintaining peace as the commitment to an all-European collective security concept based on East-West detente.

Many members of the SPD leadership, excluding Helmut Schmidt and his immediate circle, actively advocate a "security partnership with the East," that is, a policy that attributes equal weight to the security relationship with the West and detente with the East. Though Helmut Schmidt uses the term in a general sense, it has been defined and emphasized quite differently by Egon Bahr, Willy Brandt, and, to some extent, Herbert Wehner, an historically important SPD figure in security affairs, as well as relative newcomers such as SPD Bundestag faction leader Hans-
Fochen Vogel, SPD security expert Karsten Voigt, Hans Koschnick and Peter Glotz. These protagonists of School III are now the most influential figures in determining security policy for the SPD, forming a new majority opinion between the increasingly isolated Schmidt faction on the right and the vocal but politically weak socialist faction on the left. Their approach to security issues is very often one of seeking a middle ground between the SPD's moderate and leftist factions, of attempting to reconcile these two groups by promoting security options that the antinuclear activists in the left wing of the party will find attractive and the moderates in Schmidt's wing will tolerate.

Advocates of minimal deterrence see only an indirect Soviet threat to Western Europe. They share the view that the Soviet Union is passionately committed to peace, and that aggressive and repressive Soviet actions can be explained largely by Moscow's exaggerated insecurity complex. They emphasize that Soviet anxiety has historical roots in the country's inherent physical vulnerability and encirclement by hostile states, and that Moscow's arms buildup and interventions abroad are fundamentally defensive, designed to preserve a precarious Soviet geostrategic position. The desire of the Soviet Union to be seen as a superpower and the simultaneous recognition of its own internal economic, political and nationalistic troubles are said to create a need for appearing assertive in foreign policy.
In the perspective of School III, however, one major danger to German security does exist. By miscalculating Soviet motives and intentions, the West -- meaning above all the United States -- may overreact to Soviet actions, launch a new Cold War, and consequently back Moscow against the wall. The exacerbation of Soviet paranoia could lead, School III believes, to a superpower confrontation whose locus would be Europe. (127)

Detente is thus the key in School III's concept of West German security. Egon Bahr, who was the intellectual architect of Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik, developed the phrase "change through rapprochement" to describe the SPD's Eastern policy. An active policy designed to take the other side's interests into account and institutionalize diplomatic ties by means of negotiations, Bahr maintains, can ease Soviet insecurity and thus eliminate the misunderstandings said to be so dangerous to peace in Europe. (70) In crises like Afghanistan, the West should assist the Soviet Union in withdrawing from the dilemmas created by its military involvement there, rather than react disproportionately with measures certain to destroy the channels of communication between East and West. Seeking peace and security through detente is deemed to be far preferable to the "illusion that only force can change [any given East-West crisis] situation." (127, pp.73-79) Moreover, Bahr believes, the West can ease Soviet repression not by "verbal radicalism" but only through détente. In this view, the Helsinki Final
Act was a prerequisite for the emergence of Solidarity because it loosened the Communist Party's grip on Polish society. This Polish experiment with liberalism failed allegedly because of a conservative backlash in Poland released by the demise of East-West detente. By displaying greater understanding of Soviet foreign policy, the West can supposedly soften or deter political confrontations. Therefore, School III often sympathizes with Soviet proposals for a formal East-West "nonaggression" pact. West Germany and the Eastern bloc should, in Bahr's words, "achieve security with one another, not against one another." (11, p.5) In other words, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies must be accepted as partners in maintaining the security of Europe.

Divided Germany benefits in particular from an East-West security partnership. Supporters of School III usually maintain that both German states have a special responsibility in avoiding superpower confrontation in Europe, and therefore enjoy a special security relationship that somehow stands apart from their respective alliance commitments. Good inter-German relations are necessary for the purpose not only of promoting stability in Europe but of keeping the road open for the eventual reunification of Germany. Although most adherents of School III do not presently favor a neutral policy for West Germany, many of them do envision the possibility of Germany's being reunified at some point in the future as the result of a gradual process of denuclearization and military disengagement.
Karsten Voight's comment that the "plausibility of our peacekeeping policy is even more important for our security than the plausibility of military deterrence," sums up the Minimal Deterrence School's view of the arms balance and the role of strategy. (113, p. 195) It holds that the overall strategic nuclear balance between East and West is now and will remain stable and that only a minimal nuclear deterrent is required to dissuade the Soviet Union from committing aggression against West Germany and the NATO Alliance. This conclusion comes not from any careful comparison of the capabilities of both sides, but from the assumption that both sides recognize that nuclear war would be joint suicide. Nuclear weapons exist solely for the purpose of maintaining deterrence, and are not to be considered as weapons for the conduct of warfare (enhanced radiation weapons supposedly abolish this distinction and are thus unacceptable). Therefore, the mere possession of many nuclear weapons, or indeed for the West even a minimal deterrent, is all that is necessary for ensuring mutual deterrence. Steps to enhance deterrent capabilities are superfluous and even potentially dangerous because they may create tensions which are the ultimate source of war. The West can tolerate the current balance, even with a Soviet advantage, but steps to restore a Western edge or even parity would be dangerous if the Soviet Union were to become overly threatened in the process. The long-term overriding aim of School III is gradually to replace the system of
nuclear deterrence with a detente security arrangement between East and West.\(^{(128, \text{p}.111)}\) Bahr made this clear when he stated, "If there could be common [East-West] security . . . the doctrine of deterrence could thereby be replaced; however, the doctrine of deterrence is still valid but only so long as there is nothing better."\(^{(71, \text{p}.35)}\)

Advocates of School III by and large reject NATO's first-use doctrine, and they are highly suspicious of battlefield nuclear weapons. School III protagonist Karsten Voigt favors a no-first-use declaratory policy because he believes that it will raise the nuclear threshold during a crisis.\(^{(129; 205)}\) He advises against deploying battlefield nuclear weapons because he assumes that they will not only serve to escalate a conventional conflict quickly to the nuclear level but will also do unacceptable damage in case of war against the German civilian population; they will also, Voigt contends, make a nuclear war limited to Europe more possible. School III supporters like Voigt, moreover, generally assume that modernizing defense technologies is destabilizing. Modernization supposedly raises the risk of a Soviet preemptive strike against nuclear systems that threaten Warsaw Pact forces with enhanced targeting capabilities and shorter flight times.

School III is also opposed to the stationing of chemical weapons on West German soil.\(^{(20; 28)}\) Members of this group feel that using chemical weapons on West German territory would have catastrophic consequences for the
civilian population, and that the Bundeswehr lacks the necessary controls over the decision to use such weapons. There is broad agreement between School III and the anti-nuclear movement (School IV) in opposing the deployment of U.S. binary chemical weapons in West Germany. The Soviet Union's buildup in chemical warfare capability is not taken very seriously by School III, and there is a consensus that unilaterally abolishing NATO's right to deploy chemical weapons would be viewed by the Soviet Union as a confidence-building measure. A chemical-free zone, this group believes, will supposedly reduce tensions and perhaps induce the Soviet Union to abolish its chemical weapons on its own.

For School III, arms control agreements and an East-West security partnership represent complementary steps toward peace. Aside from active support for SALT II, it endorses a comprehensive test ban. Willy Brandt has proposed that the German parliament endorse the nuclear freeze plan, which Karsten Voigt has called a "sensible initial step toward mutual and substantial reductions."\(^{252, \text{p.31}}\) According to Bahr, the removal of short-range tactical nuclear weapons by negotiation from West Germany would help to prevent the outbreak of war by miscalculation. Bahr has also demonstrated considerable support for Swedish Premier Olaf Palme's proposal establishing a 150 kilometer zone as a "useful first step" toward denuclearization. The main principles governing School III's concept of arms control are to strive for the
long-range goal of denuclearizing Europe, but only on the basis of some mutually agreed conventional stability, and to accept limited unilateral disarmament measures if they contribute to stability and a reduction of tensions. The arms control process is considered to be the principal carrier of East-West detente and a vital interest to the national security of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Prior to the beginning of INF deployment, School III viewed the NATO double-track decision with ambivalence. Formally its proponents supported the Brussels decision, but for very specific and conditional reasons. From the East-West partnership perspective, INF modernization was useful not so much to maintain a Eurostrategic balance as to ensure the future of arms control. Thus School III members perfunctorily endorsed modernization but also emphasized the need for arms control, thereby hoping to prod both Moscow and especially Washington into reaching an arms control agreement. School III members warmly welcomed all Soviet arms control proposals but were often quick to dismiss U.S. proposals as being deceptive and disingenuous. (241; 145) They called for U.S. concessions such as cancelling the Pershing IIs and substituting sea-based cruise missiles for the planned land-based systems. In practice, School III often defended the antinuclear movement, believing that its demands improved the prospects for arms control agreements, and insisting that "Pacifists have a place in the [INF] debate." (11, p. 5)
Yet prior to deployment School III had a second motivation for backing the INF plan. Members of this school, most of whom are in the SPD, realized that their goal of building an East-West security partnership would never be realized under conservative rule. Giving lip service to the NATO double-track decision was thus seen as a necessary sacrifice to preserve SPD unity and to enhance its chances for regaining power by not alienating the moderates around Schmidt. This desire not to estrange SPD moderates was balanced by an equally strong desire to re-absorb left-wing Social Democrats who had defected to the Greens. These conflicting objectives often led SPD leaders in School III to pursue a "this as well as that" (sowohl-als-auch) policy, namely, a policy that appeared to encompass the demands of both pro- and anti-INF forces. In the March 1983 elections, for example, SPD Chancellor candidate Vogel pledged to make missile deployment "superfluous" through negotiations and promised that his party would station INF only under the "most extreme circumstances." The United States was criticized for not ratifying the SALT II Treaty and for undermining the spirit of the double-track decision by contending that serious negotiation on INF would begin only after the deployment was underway. Insisting that deployment was not automatic, and adopting a stance that "neither counts missiles nor throws them away," this school hoped to develop a security policy that would appeal to Social Democrats on all sides of the political spectrum.

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This ambiguity of the Social Democratic Party, however, ended in November 1983. In a vote of 400 to 14 an SPD party conference in November passed a resolution opposing the stationing of INF on West German soil. This vote represents not only a rejection of Helmut Schmidt's security policies (and thus the rise of Willy Brandt, Egon Bahr and Hans-Jochen Vogel as the key leaders of the SPD) but the demise of the consensus on nuclear strategy that has ruled in the FRG since 1960. It revealed, moreover, the following: (a) that SPD leaders such as Willy Brandt never took the deployment side of the NATO double-track decision seriously, (b) that a majority in the SPD viewed the double-track decision exclusively as a means of starting an arms control process, and (c) that contrary to what many SPD leaders claim, the vote was not aimed solely at INF but at the United States' nuclear strategies and its perceived antidetente foreign policy toward the Soviet Union as well.

In sum, the SPD's rejection of INF deployment represents the triumph of School III in SPD security policymaking. The "minimal deterrence" concept of School III rests not only on a deep suspicion of nuclear weapons on West German soil but on the perceived need to assert the Federal Republic's independence in foreign affairs. Although he borrowed the phrase from Schmidt, Vogel made "in German interests" the theme of his 1983 SPD campaign, and he more explicitly directed this at the Federal Republic's relationship with America. Germany's place, as shown by
Willy Brandt's offer to mediate between the superpowers during the Afghanistan crisis and his harsh criticism of U.S. policy outside of Europe (and a refusal to support "out-of-area" NATO measures), is often described by School III in terms that suggest a desire for equidistance between Washington and Moscow. Vogel has spoken of the need to bring German influence to bear on both superpowers, and he refuses to admit that either the United States or the Soviet Union bears a larger responsibility for fomenting world tensions. From this perspective, West European integration would be as counterproductive as subordination to the United States. Both would diminish the prospects for improved relations with the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic. School III links INF to the national theme by stressing that without a negotiated settlement, Moscow will deploy more missiles in East Germany and further exacerbate the nation's division.

3.5 SCHOOL IV: UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT

The fourth school of thought in this survey has been designated as "unilateral disarmament." It commands no influence in the present government. Its spokesmen include Erhard Eppler, Oskar Lafontaine and Petra Kelly, and its supporters are found in the left wing of the SPD, including members of parliament and youth auxiliaries of the SPD, and in groups specifically associated with the "peace movement,"
including pacifist Protestants, various communist groups generally independent of the Soviet Union, and the Green Party, a loose left-wing amalgam of ecological protest groups with varying programs and differing levels of impact from region to region. Unilateralist disarmament has sympathizers in the popular press and attracts widespread media attention. As with School I, there are differences in approach between pragmatic unilateralists, who are mainly SPD politicians, and fundamentalists, who are for the most part in the Greens and various pacifist religious organizations, but both share roughly common security perspectives.

The unilateral disarmament school perceives no inherent threat to German security from the Soviet Union. Its proponents attribute international tensions to a quest for hegemony by the United States that has allegedly provoked Moscow into creating a defensive power bloc in Eastern Europe. Although the United States is more often than not blamed for the creation of the power blocs in Europe, and for the high level of East-West tensions as well, it is not alone in threatening the world with nuclear extinction. Known universally as the "superpowers," both the United States and the Soviet Union are blamed for threatening Europe with war. Europe is seen by School IV as the object of superpower hegemonic control and as a potential battlefield for superpower conflicts. It is very often described as a potential battlefield on which the United States and the Soviet Union can wage war to settle
neo-imperialist disputes in the Third World without risking destruction of their own territories. The threat to European security, then, derives not so much from a single enemy as from the circumstances surrounding the power bloc system in Europe. (41, pp.12-13) Thus the dual objective of not only removing all nuclear weapons from Europe but of disengaging Europe from the two superpower military alliance systems.

Since School IV's assumptions are so thoroughly apocalyptic and existential, their mode of analysis and conclusions are more emotional, utopian and self-consciously revolutionary than those of defense analysts in the other three schools of thought. They assume that the mere presence of nuclear weapons in large numbers presents mankind with a threat of such tremendous proportions that it renders all traditional concepts of defense, deterrence and the balance of power inadequate. Military strategies of all kinds are believed to represent the ideological superstructures of an exploitative social system that allegedly requires the rationale of military defense to protect itself not so much from external enemies as from internal social subversives. School IV advocates argue that military-industrial power elites long ago decided to justify their demands for ever higher arms budgets by proclaiming the need for equilibrium. By manipulating their sophisticated, often fabricated defense data, military-industrial elites supposedly attempt to ensure that no definition of a balance
will ever be achieved. Spokesmen like Erhard Eppler refer to "the ideology of equilibrium" -- a supposedly logical and rational justification for what is in fact a drive for power. Although the U.S. and German governments speak of equilibrium as promoting deterrence, School IV claims that U.S. countervailing strategy, the ballistic missile defense program, and the building of enhanced radiation weapons provide evidence of a desire for first-strike or limited nuclear war capabilities. (47, pp.82-90)

In the School IV perspective, there must be an immediate and unconditional end to the arms race. Events have moved beyond the point where traditional approaches to arms control are useful. The arms control agreements of the past decade have intensified rather than restrained the arms race; the Geneva talks were considered a facade for a weapons buildup. Only comprehensive and unilateral measures will cut through the self-perpetuating dynamic that is said to be behind the buildup of weapons of mass destruction. School IV proponents contend that the West can end the arms race by withdrawing from it, and the process should begin with West Germany and Europe leading the way by rejecting U.S. nuclear missiles on their soil.

The proposals of this group include unilateral steps to eliminate atomic weapons from German soil and the creation of a Central European nuclear-free zone. Such steps will be sufficient to persuade Moscow of a serious Western intention to end the arms race, thus compelling the
Soviets to reciprocate by destroying the image of Western encirclement the Kremlin uses to justify an arms buildup to its citizens.

Although the security strategies of School IV vary in detail, they reject the notion of nuclear weapons on German soil. The stationing of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe only increases the likelihood of the United States fighting a conflict limited to Europe ("counter-experts" on defense in School IV refer to NATO's new INF as first-strike weapons). The nuclearization of Europe makes it not only America's launchpad, but also a prime Soviet target. (55, pp.161-68)

Fundamentalist unilateralism holds that West European territory should not only be nuclear free, but that Europe should separate itself entirely from security based directly on any nuclear weapons. Such a step would minimize the risk of European involvement in superpower conflict. Under such circumstances defense planning of any sort would become irrelevant. If by chance the need for military forces should arise, sophisticated and entirely defensive conventional technology, guerrilla defense or entirely passive resistance (i.e., social defense) would allegedly suffice. For pragmatists like Eppler this means in the short run there should be at the very least a moratorium on the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe. SPD leftists insist that their interpretation of the double-track decision as a vehicle for negotiation, not deployment, is correct, and that their party was right in reversing its decision to support the missile deployment.
In the unilateralist perspective, German security is threatened, not guaranteed, by a close relationship with the United States. Its sheer power and total unpredictability make America a danger to peace. The U.S. military presence in Europe has stemmed not from the wishes of West European governments but from the selfish economic greed of the United States. Therefore, U.S. threats to withdraw troops from Western Europe are sometimes welcomed and in other cases not believed, for it is assumed that the United States ultimately needs Europe more than Europe needs the United States. According to School IV, German interests have been subordinated to those of the United States. Green leader Rainer Trampert remarked "we do not have any right to self-determination. What exists is the right of determination by the United States." For arguments' sake, pragmatic unilateralism holds that if the United States intends to defend Europe, it can do so without stationing nuclear weapons on West European territory, since the ultimate basis for deterrence lies in the security guarantee provided by the American strategic nuclear force. Fundamentalist unilateralists, on the other hand, simply demand the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Western Europe. Unilateralists distrust U.S. motives in the deployment of INF, believing that these nuclear missiles are intended primarily to upgrade the United States' ability to wage nuclear war in Europe, and not to increase the credibility of extended deterrence in Europe. They believe that the NATO double-
track decision was designed to do precisely the opposite of what the U.S. government claims it was intended to do. They maintain that it is a ploy to decouple the strategic defense of the United States from Europe (that is, to make "tactical" nuclear strategy in Europe carry the brunt of American strategic deterrence), and not the result of intentions to bind the fortunes of Europe and the United States in case of nuclear war. These perspectives are often reinforced by ideological predispositions against American mainline political culture and U.S. foreign policies in the Third World, particularly in El Salvador.

One of the most respected of these defense analysts in School IV is Horst Afheldt, a strategist at the Starnberg Institute who is known for developing military strategies based on an exclusively defensive posture. Afheldt believes that the NATO doctrine of nuclear deterrence is "irrational" because it can only threaten the Soviet Union with a policy that would, if implemented, lead to the total destruction of Western Europe. He thus proposes a renunciation of all offensive military weapons as well as tactical nuclear weapons, and he suggests stationing U.S. strategic nuclear missiles for Europe at sea. The West German Army would, furthermore, be reorganized into "techno-commando" units ranging from 26 to 36 men in each group (an army of 10,000 units would thus be comprised of around 360,000 men), and it would be equipped with "high-tech" defensive weapons such as smart antitank guns and sophisticated antiaircraft.
missiles. The idea is to make the "price of entry" as high as possible without risking the destruction of West German cities.

Another popular defense strategy in School IV is called "social defense" (soziale Verteidigung), devised mainly by the West Berlin political scientist and peace researcher Theodor Ebert. Ebert's starting point in formulating his theory is that the Federal Republic, because of its economic structure, dense population and geographical location on the East-West border, is indefensible by military means. If an attack should come, he proposes a defense policy of passive noncooperation and civil disobedience to deprive the aggressor of the aims he hoped to gain by invasion. Unlike Afheldt, who wants to deter attack by making the price of entry too high, Ebert plans to deter an attack (or at least to foil it after it has occurred) by convincing the opponent that the price of staying is too high. Economic sabotage and massive non-cooperation (such as occurred in the German resistance to the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923) are deemed adequate countermeasures to prevent the occupying force from achieving its war aims.

Another military strategist active in School IV is Alfred Mechtersheimer, a former Bundeswehr general who is closely tied to the Greens. During the March 1983 elections Mechtersheimer outlined his critique of American nuclear policy in a campaign booklet by the Greens.
contends that (1) the new American deterrence policy described by Presidential Directive 59 increases the danger of war in Europe because it escalates the level of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union; (2) planning a limited nuclear war makes nuclear war more thinkable, and therefore more likely; (3) the ever-increasing effectiveness of American nuclear weapons represents a "remilitarization of strategic weapons," a process driven by the accelerating development of military technology; (4) the new American strategy of a tactical nuclear arms buildup in Europe raises the risk of war because it lowers the sense of security in the Soviet Union; (5) improving the credibility of nuclear deterrence in Europe only leads to preparing for actual war in Europe; and (6) America's motive for deploying intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe is to enhance U.S. targeting of Soviet military installations and not to control nuclear arms.

Another former general who has written defense proposals for the Greens is retired General Hans-Joachim Loser. Loser recommends the following defense proposals: (9, p. 159) (1) calling a European security conference to reduce the number of troops between the Urals and the Atlantic; (2) placing American intermediate-range missiles in submarines; (3) reducing the military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact and NATO alliance by 50 percent; (4) erecting a "red" zone free of tanks, fighter aircraft, and nuclear weapons from the Weser-Lech line in West Germany to a line
from Berlin-Leipzig-Prague in East Germany; and (5) establishing a "blue" nuclear-free zone from eastern France to Kaliningrad. If nuclear deterrence fails, Loser suggests that the Federal Republic employ a "zonal defense" strategy (raumdeckende Verteidigung) to defend itself from the Soviets without destroying its own population centers. (60, p.58) No attempt would be made to defend centers of concentrated population while the defense of the rest of West German territory would be reduced to guerrilla-like harassment of Soviet occupation forces. Nuclear weapons would not be used under any circumstances and no effort would be made to deploy heavy armaments such as tanks and artillery.

Loser, Mechtersheimer, and Afheldt have close ties to the Greens, that is, they contribute defense analyses to Green publications and participate in peace forums conducted by the Green party. But what, it may be asked, is the official foreign policy of the Green party itself? In the March 1983 elections the Greens formulated a party program in which they outlined their proposals for a "policy of peace." (5, pp.18-19) In it they demanded that the military alliances in Europe be dissolved. (5, p.19) Declaring that an "Ecological foreign policy is a pacifist policy," the Greens recommended the following proposals for an "active German peace policy:" (1) rejection of the decision to install American intermediate-range nuclear missiles in West Germany; (2) creation of a nuclear-free
zone in Eastern and Western Europe; (3) withdrawal of all foreign troops from occupied territories (i.e., West Germany and Eastern Europe); (4) dismantling of the West German armaments industry; (5) abolition of the West German Army and military conscription; (6) prohibiting the sale of war games, toys, books and films which the Greens deem to be violent; (7) unionizing soldiers in an all-volunteer civil guard; and (8) sponsoring a "worldwide denunciation of all politicians, scholars, military strategists and military technicians who plan, set up, operate or support technology that is applicable to weapons systems of mass destruction and genocide." (5) In case of war, the Greens warned that those responsible for its outbreak and execution will be brought to trial before an international court of justice. In the meantime, the Greens propose that the Federal Republic defend itself from the Russians by organizing a "social defense" strategy of passive resistance. (5; 9, p.25) As for the Americans, the Greens would demand that the Federal Republic pass a self-defense law to prohibit the use of American nuclear weapons on German territory. (5, p.19) As Green leader Petra Kelly has concluded, "The strategy of 'social defense' provides an answer not only to what we must do if the Russians come, but also what we can do if the Americans stay."

A final word should be said about the role of the national question in security concepts and disengagement
proposals of School IV. A minority in the antinuclear movement see the peace issue as a vehicle for mustering popular support behind the cause of national reunification. Peace activists such as Peter Brandt, Herbert Ammon and Heinrich Albertz are the major figures in this wing of the peace movement, but they by no means represent a majority viewpoint. (52, pp. 23-31) Most advocates of School IV are far more interested in total nuclear disarmament in Europe than in the national question per se. Nevertheless, a majority of School IV proponents do envision the reunification of Germany as a possible and welcome result of the military disengagement of Europe from the NATO and the Warsaw Pact Alliances. For them, overcoming the division of Germany is equated with overcoming the division of Europe as a whole. Moreover, very often advocates of School IV see the two German states as having a mutual interest in preventing nuclear war, an interest derived more from their common national heritage than from any state or political interest. School IV is, in this respect, quite close to School III's position on the role of the national question in nuclear disarmament: Reunifying Germany, if it ever comes about (and most members of Schools III and IV do not expect it in the near future), will be predicated on the prior denuclearization and military disengagement of the two German states from the current military alliance systems in Europe.
3.6 POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The foregoing analysis of West German security perspectives holds several broad implications for U.S. nuclear policy toward the Federal Republic specifically and toward Western Europe as a whole:

(1) While many West Germans recognize that American superiority in strategic nuclear weapons is lost probably forever, they believe that the existence of U.S.-Soviet "parity" continues to deter an intercontinental nuclear exchange between the two superpowers. The other side of this belief, however, is a growing fear -- most explicit in Schools I and II -- of a "decoupling" between the U.S. deterrent and West European security. The decoupling issue, moreover, has been skillfully used (primarily by advocates of School IV) as an argument against the refurbishing of NATO theater nuclear forces. If the United States cannot, or will not, use its strategic nuclear forces for the defense of Europe, it is reasoned, then theater nuclear forces -- particularly INF systems -- enhance the prospect that future war will be confined to Europe, with the territory of both superpowers being spared.

(2) Largely for this reason, there is strong preference (at least within Schools I and II) for a viable conventional NATO capability -- and for setting the nuclear threshold as high as possible. Despite some efforts in this
direction, there is an equally clear recognition of the current lack of feasibility of the conventional alternative, particularly in view of the unwillingness of most West European governments to allocate the necessary funds.

(3) Given the constraints on conventional force deployment, there is agreement within Schools I and II that some form of American nuclear presence on German soil remains essential. For School I the general preference remains ground-launched, as opposed to sea-based, systems. This is related, in turn, to the notion in the Federal Republic that nuclear weapons deployed in the path of a potential invasion signal a greater readiness of use, and thus a greater deterrent credibility, than more remote sea-based systems.

(4) Unilateralist pressures from leftists and the Greens have subsided somewhat since the deployment of INF began, but they will continue to exert influence on School III proponents in the SPD and also serve to force the Kohl Government to adopt a high public profile in supporting the resumption of U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations on INF and START. The size and influence of the antinuclear movement has apparently peaked, and it has lost momentum because of its failure to stop the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles on West German territory. School II adherents in the SPD will continue to woo the antinuclear movement by supporting some of its demands and by tabooing criticism of it, but they not move much closer than they
already have to School IV in their conceptions of military defense and nuclear strategy. The lasting legacy of School IV, however, will be the extent to which it has focused popular attention on the declining credibility of nuclear deterrence in Europe. It will continue in this capacity to some extent, but with the decline of the antinuclear movement, the most influential voice in the critique of NATO nuclear strategy in the future will most likely be School III.

The leadership of the antinuclear movement is splitting over tactics and over the proper response to the independent peace movements in the Eastern bloc. Anti-nuclear activists in the FRG are beginning to be more critical of the Soviet Union, describing it as a captive of "militarist" policies. Focus is shifting away from INF to nuclear strategy in general and to the NATO Alliance itself. The "AirLand Battle" concept has been attacked by the peace movement leader Jo Leinen as representing an "aggressive" strategy, and chemical weapons are beginning to receive more attention in the peace movement's propaganda. The major reasons for the decline of the peace movement appear to be as follows: (a) the Kohl Government's policy of inter-German detente is depriving the peace movement of the East-West tensions necessary for antinuclear alarmism; (b) latent ideological conflicts, such as between the communists and the Greens, are beginning to emerge as the consequences of failing to block INF deployment begin to
erode the morale of the movement's leadership; and (c) the ideological rigidity and political amateurishness of anti-nuclear leaders are turning disputes over tactics into clashes over principles.

(5) On December 6, 1983, Secretary of Defense Weinberger and Defense Minister Worner signed an agreement to co-develop a new air defense system for the FRG. Other co-production schemes are either in planning or have already been agreed upon, including a Franco-German plan for an antitank helicopter and an agreement to develop a new European jetfighter. A new trend in co-developing and co-producing weapons systems is definitely underway in the Atlantic Alliance, especially in Western Europe. It will most likely continue so long as economic incentives and sufficient political will in the FRG and France persist.

(6) Progress in weapons co-development, however, must be weighed against the political pressures to reduce defense spending and to abandon or gradually move away from the NATO doctrine of nuclear deterrence. Not only is the antinuclear movement still alive, it now has at least the sympathy of the SPD. The 1984 defense budget will grow only 3.7 percent, barely keeping up with inflation, and Defense Minister Worner is still unable, for political reasons, to come to terms with the problem of manpower shortages the Bundeswehr will face in the coming decades. The Kohl Government, under pressure from Foreign Minister Genscher, will very likely urge the United States to merge the INF and
START talks if the Soviets should decide to return to the negotiations. Moreover, proposals by West German Foreign Ministry officials calling for the participation of France and Great Britain in new arms control negotiations indicate that the FRG may not only press the United States to make concessions to entice the Soviets back to the bargaining table, but, if negotiations resume, perhaps raise many old problems (such as the question of France's and Great Britain's nuclear forces) which many in the Reagan Administration believed the actual deployment of INF had settled.

(7) Verbal commitments by Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand toward greater European defense cooperation have increased over the past year. Kohl has stated that he plans to raise the issue of creating a European "pillar" in NATO at the next meeting of the European Economic Community. He has mentioned the possibility of increasing the infusion of state funds into European cooperative high-technology military projects. He has welcomed Mitterrand's various overtures for better defense cooperation with the FRG, including Mitterrand's plan not only for upgrading official defense contracts in the Western European Union but for dropping the organization's restrictions on West German armaments. Kohl apparently hopes to use the European security cooperation issue as a way of revitalizing the fractious European Economic Community, and, possible, as a means of creating broader domestic support for the idea of bolstering
conventional defense. Moreover, as in the past, West Germany is reaching out to France at a time when the reliability of the U.S. nuclear commitment is perceived to be uncertain. Despite talk of closer Franco-German nuclear cooperation under the CDU/CSU-FDP government, opposition to any direct and explicit German participation in nuclear decision-making remains firm. Similarly, this bilateral cooperation will not lead to the creation of a European deterrent independent of the U.S. strategic nuclear guarantee.

(8) Prior to INF deployment, West German attitudes toward nuclear weapons and detente were the major variable in efforts to restore the credibility of NATO's deterrent. To be sure, School I and II advocates in the Kohl Government fully endorsed the "dual track" plan, and the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition was much less susceptible to direct unilateralist pressure than its predecessor (most FDP leftists have by now abandoned that party). Nonetheless there was little question going into the 1983 election that even after March 6, Kohl would have every interest in serious, visible NATO efforts to avoid or minimize the missile deployment through an arms control agreement. Only in this way could the Chancellor demonstrate that with his government in power, NATO -- and the United States -- would not, as critics charged, ignore German antinuclear sentiment and automatically deploy more missiles. Thus Kohl assumed a serious Alliance arms control effort would undercut School IV's unilateralist
appeal and minimize public support of sympathy for the peace movement's planned civil disobedience, while isolating the SPD, which had by this time already begun to drift away from Schmidt's School II and toward the School III position of Vogel, Bahr and others. Effective NATO arms control was seen as demonstrating support for Kohl's claim that a conservative government could pursue German interests in harmony with the Alliance.

Given these considerations, few were surprised that Kohl capitalized on his election victory within a week by pointing out that the time was ripe for progress in arms control. He emphasized that the convincing display of public support for his government would convince Moscow that Germany was determined to deploy if necessary, and would thus make Moscow more amenable to a compromise. Turning westward, he encouraged the United States to take the initiative, labeling the zero-option an "ultimate objective" and calling for an interim proposal. The Chancellor apparently would have welcomed a settlement along the lines of the "walk in the woods" plan formulated by U.S. and Soviet negotiators. In this respect, he seems to lean more toward the School II arms control approach of Foreign Minister Genscher and not the strict School I option, a stance further indicated by the reappointment of Genscher as Foreign Minister as well as the optimistic talk surrounding his visit to Moscow. He seems to have overcome the opposition of some School I fundamentalists in his party,
particularly CSU Chief Strauss, who have long been skeptical of the prospects for INF arms control.

(9) A similar balance between School I and School II views appears likely in another area of Kohl's security-related policy. While careful not to over-emphasize Bonn's eastern ties to the point where they interfere with its Alliance commitments, Kohl aims to continue a business-like relationship with Moscow and East Berlin -- exemplified by his trip to the Soviet Union and Bonn's support for loans to East German -- despite pressure from School I fundamentalists for a tougher approach. Kohl's efforts to make East and West Germany an "island of detente" are designed partly to calm the public mood in the wake of INF deployment. Long-term motivations range from a genuine interest in the eventual reunification of Germany to the perceived need to promote stability at a time when U.S.-Soviet tensions are high and the reliability of the U.S. nuclear commitment to West Germany uncertain. The motivations of the Honecker Government, on the other hand, are economic and political. Honecker undoubtedly wants more swing credits from Bonn -- credits which Moscow is unwilling to give him -- and by maintaining good relations with Bonn despite the deployment of INF, he apparently hopes to gain more independence from Moscow in return for his role as Moscow's window to the West. Moscow apparently views East Berlin as a valuable lightning rod of "divisible detente" in the Atlantic Alliance.
Continuity with Schmidt's policies will also be seen in the limited buildup of conventional forces, and little more than rhetorical support for U.S. "out-of-area" activities.

(10) Despite the strong commitment of the CDU-CSU government to INF deployment and a strong Alliance position vis-a-vis Moscow, it must work within a political context increasingly influenced by attitudes such as those represented by Schools III and IV. Even as late as 1982, School II and its firm backing for NATO's INF plan had been sufficiently strong within the SPD to block easily all motions (such as the 1982 Munich party conference) for a moratorium on, let alone for complete renunciation of, missile deployment; the need to maintain party unity had obliged School III adherents to acquiesce. But in opposition and throughout 1983, School III waxed at the expense of School II. Despite clear signals of voter dissatisfaction with its leftward drift, the SPD under Vogel and Bahr's guidance began blaming the stalled INF talks largely on Western intransigence, insisting that the Anglo-French forces be accounted for, demanding the elimination of the Pershing II, and calling for a sea-based alternative to INF, and -- failing such Western concessions -- urging that deployment be delayed, that is, advocating a moratorium. Observers estimated that when the SPD finally voted in November 1983, it would overwhelmingly advocate a moratorium on deployment. This SPD shift away from the School II
approach to INF put pressure on the Kohl Government. Bahr and Vogel frequently charged that Bonn, by its oft-stated preparedness to deploy, its alleged suggestions that talks could succeed only after the missiles were in place, and its overall submissiveness to the United States, had only hardened Washington's unwillingness to negotiate seriously. They declared that "automatic" deployment had never been envisioned and would be disastrous, forcing Moscow to deploy its own missiles in East Germany and thus accelerating the arms race as well as the end of Ostpolitik. School II also used the specter of violent mass protests to oppose the deployment policy.

School III in the Social Democratic Party has begun to diversify its criticism of NATO nuclear policy, and by expressing support for NATO itself, it has tried, moreover, to prevent the Alliance from becoming an issue in the security debate. Some leaders of the SPD still advocate a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, a ban on chemical weapons in Europe, and a critical reassessment of the "AirLand Battle" doctrine; and there is a general consensus in School III that reducing tactical nuclear weapons in Europe should be a top priority in arms control negotiations. But the SPD is also trying to avoid the impression of supporting the antinuclear movement's attack on West Germany's membership in the Atlantic Alliance. Vogel's advisor Egon Bahr has not been successful in persuading SPD leaders to adopt his plans for a nuclear-free zone for
European countries that do not control them. All indications are, then, that the SPD has reached the limit of its recent drift toward the security policies of School III.

In this and other indirect ways, as well as in direct ways, School III encouraged School IV antinuclear activity within the SPD, where unilateralists advocated renouncing the deployment permanently and called for a general trade union strike to block the missiles. The Greens and all other groups affiliated with the peace movement publicized their own plans for disrupting the deployments throughout 1983 and early 1984. Under these kind of constraints, the Kohl Government -- despite its decision to deploy -- understandably desired a continuing, credible NATO bargaining stance that could undercut the expansion of antinuclear protest and "restrict it to the hard core." In the present decade, therefore, far greater attention than was necessary a generation ago will have to be given to the "public relations" aspects of any decision to deploy new generation nuclear systems in Western Europe and the conduct of overall East-West relations. This holds true especially for the Federal Republic of Germany which, in comparison to other NATO countries, remains geographically and politically more exposed to the threat posed by Soviet-Warsaw Pact military power.
### TABLE 3. A graphic representation of the West German Schools of Thought and their distinguishing characteristics with reference to major policy issues

#### WEST GERMANY

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<tr>
<th>Schools of Thought</th>
<th>Strategic Deterrence</th>
<th>Balanced Posture</th>
<th>Minimal Deterrence</th>
<th>Unilateral Disarmament</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Free Democratic Party (FDP)</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party (SPD)</td>
<td>Greens Social Democratic Party (SPD), left</td>
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<td>Christian Social Union (CSU)</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party (SPD), moderates</td>
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<td>Petra Kelly Erhard Eppler Oskar Lafontaine Rainer Trampus Gert Bastian</td>
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<td>Distinguishing Characteristics</td>
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<td>Perception of Arms Control</td>
<td>U.S. Relations</td>
<td>European Integration</td>
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**Arms Balance**

- Unquestioned deterrence and conventional strength; support INF deployment
- Equilibrium of arms relative security; support INF deployment
- Arms balance irrelevant, need only minimal deterrent; ambivalent on INF deployment

- No arms, minimal arms or "social defense" system; support INF deployment
SECTION 4
BELGIAN AND DUTCH PERSPECTIVES

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Belgian and Dutch perspectives on defense, deterrence and strategy are of considerable political importance because the Low Countries have always played a pivotal role within the Alliance, often acting as brokers to work out compromises among the larger West European powers (with whom they are also associated within the European Economic Community) and between the West European powers and the United States. A wide spectrum of opinion in both countries continues to support NATO as essential to stability and the security of Western Europe -- as well as to national security -- at much lower cost than would have to be borne if the protective Alliance were not there. But unique historical and contemporary situational factors affect Belgian and Dutch perspectives and policies, making them different in some respects from the perspectives and policies of Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany.

1) Both Belgium and The Netherlands have an historic tradition of neutrality -- shorter and more imposed by outside powers in the case of Belgium; longer and more a matter of voluntary choice in the case of The Netherlands. (62, pp.21-30; 54, pp.12-15) Within recent years,
there seems to have been a gradual drift toward a neutralist outlook among some left-of-center segments of opinion -- a trend much more pronounced in The Netherlands than in Belgium.

2) Both countries played a leading part during the late 1940s in calling for the creation of a West European/Atlantic regional defense organization. Both delegated most of their national defense responsibilities to NATO, and gradually turned their attention increasingly to business and away from military problems. Defense issues have not preoccupied the Low Countries as much as they have the three larger powers. It should be pointed out, however, that the Dutch have retained a somewhat greater interest in defense matters than the Belgians. Although more moralistic, more neutralist and more antinuclear, the Dutch are quite proud of their armed forces, especially their navy. They have several institutes that are interested in military-strategic questions, whereas the Belgians have none beyond the Institut Royal Superieur de Defense Nationale.

3) Neither country -- at least until rather recently -- developed a tradition of strategic theorizing on its own in the nuclear age. This undoubtedly is a reflection of the fact that, unlike Britain and France, the Low Countries do not possess their own nuclear forces, and unlike West Germany, their territory does not comprise part of the line of "first encounter," even though they are "Central
European states in MBFR negotiations and they do maintain forces in the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) on the Central Front in Germany. Up to the late 1970s, the two smaller powers generally did not see themselves as able to have much effect on the development of NATO strategy. Consequently throughout most of the postwar period the strategic debate has been less intense and the strategic "schools of thought" are still much less sharply defined in the Low Countries than among their three larger European allies. Only a few of their strategic writers (e.g., Klaas de Vries in The Netherlands and General, now Senator, Robert Close in Belgium) have attracted attention beyond their national borders. (130, pp.251-255) Since the late 1970s, however, the situation has been changing. Former Chancellor Schmidt helped to enhance the influence of Belgium and The Netherlands by insisting that the deployment of NATO's new INF be a shared task at a time of rising antinuclear sentiment in Western Europe.

4) In both Belgium and The Netherlands, economic problems have been dominant in politics during the last year or so -- more important than defense and security in the thinking of voters. The Netherlands held national elections in May 1981 and again in September 1982, while Belgium held them in November 1981. In view of the problems of unemployment, wage cuts, inflation, devaluation (of the Belgian franc), budgetary deficits and industrial strikes, the electorate in neither country was very enthusiastic about
defense expenditures in general. Belgium has had to cut training time for pilots, withdraw its conventional missiles from West Germany, and it has refused to replace its last four Nike squadrons with Patriot antiaircraft missiles—all for budgetary reasons. (247) The responsible leaders of the larger political parties, therefore, were reluctant to make nuclear weapons the central campaign issue despite the interest in the subject aroused by leftist party factions, churches, peace organizations and the media. As a matter of fact, the governments in both countries had always sought to avoid situations in which a controversy over defense could affect the tenure or the electoral fortunes of a governing coalition. The nuclear weapons question, however, has figured more prominently in Dutch than in Belgian politics since the spring of 1981.

5) A few significant differences between Belgium and the Netherlands should be noted. Historically, Belgium was divided by language and Holland by religion. But whereas Dutch Protestant-Catholic tensions have been reduced in recent decades, the chasm between the two language communities in Belgium—Francophone and Flemish—has widened in the last decade. The ecumenical trend in The Netherlands (where the three principal religious parties have merged into the CDA), has combined with a self-righteous Dutch tradition of emphasizing high moral standards in foreign policy to produce the most highly organized antinuclear
movement in the Atlantic Alliance. In Belgium, which does not share Holland's moralistic tradition, growing opposition to INF and to nuclear weapons in general had derived partly from the spillover influence of Dutch television in the Flemish-speaking region, and also from a leftward shift by the Flemish Socialist Party, faced with the prospect of declining electoral support, in an effort to attract the younger post-social revolution generation.

6) In both Belgium and The Netherlands, governmental decision-making on INF modernization and defense in general has been greatly complicated by the nature of a multiparty political system. Both governments depend on the preservation of fragile coalitions to deal with urgent economic problems and (in Belgium) a serious language problem. One observer's comment about Dutch politics applies to the Belgian situation as well: "Coalition, as practised here, is an ever-changing pattern, in which role-reversal is the norm. The enemies of today are the trusted colleagues of tomorrow." During the years following the double-track decision, several governments have tried to survive by temporarizing on INF deployment, pending the outcome of East-West arms control negotiations, to which all attach great importance.

Because of the strength of antinuclear sentiment in The Netherlands, the government in December 1979 -- while officially concurring in the collective NATO decision on INF
modernization and subsequent reaffirmation of it by NATO Ministers -- postponed the national decision concerning the deployment of 48 cruise missiles on Dutch soil. The coalition government of Christian Democrats (CDA) and Liberals (VVD), headed by then Prime Minister Andries van Agt, informed NATO that The Netherlands would take the deployment decision at the end of the two-year period (i.e., in December 1981) -- a period which would provide an opportunity to assess the prospects for European arms control negotiations. The VVD strongly favored deployment, but van Agt, faced with the threat of defection by the CDA left and the collapse of a fragile coalition (which ruled by a 2-vote majority), felt compelled to compromise even though he and CDA party leader Rudd Lubbers favored accepting the missiles.

Election campaigning in May 1981 again demonstrated the intricate relationship between INF and coalition politics. The VVD held to its support of the missile plan, while most CDA leaders confirmed their commitment to decide about deployment in December 1981. NATO's political cohesion was a factor many CDA leaders used to justify their formal adherence to the deployment. Left-wing opposition Laborites (PvdA) clamored for the complete elimination of Holland's nuclear tasks, including INF, despite the more moderate stance of PvdA Chief Joop den Uyl. The D'66 Party of Han Terlouw rejected INF "under present circumstances,"
but did not unconditionally exclude the prospect of deploying NATO missiles.

With success for the left, particularly D'66, in the May 1981 elections, a new center-left coalition was formed by van Agt, including the CDA, D'66 and PvdA. It could hold together only by agreeing to postpone the deployment decision beyond the December 1981 deadline, but without implying steps incompatible with NATO's decision.

Squabbling over economic policy collapsed the van Agt coalition and, after a minority cabinet, prolonged bargaining and new elections, a center-right CDA-VVD government was formed under Ruud Lubbers in October 1982. (The national elections had greatly strengthened the Liberals, Holland's strongest INF backers; D'66, which had been ambiguous on the deployments, suffered substantial losses.) The new government announced its support for the two-track plan along with its hope for substantial progress toward negotiated reductions in Geneva.

Over the past year and a half, the government of Prime Minister Rudolphus Lubbers has had to cope not only with severe economic recession and strikes caused by 18 percent unemployment, but with an intensification of anti-INF opposition as well. (103) Lubbers postponed the parliamentary debate over INF until June 1984, partly to await the results of the Geneva talks and partly to put off facing the possibility of a cabinet crisis. Despite the
growing pessimism about INF deployment, however, the Dutch government began preliminary preparations for accepting its allotment of INF, selecting Woensdrecht in the southern part of Holland as the site for the stationing of 48 cruise missiles in 1986. After the Soviet Union walked out of the negotiations in Geneva, Lubbers began raising the prospect of reducing The Netherlands' nuclear responsibilities in NATO in exchange for the deployment of a lower number of cruise missiles on Dutch soil. Caught between pro-deployment pressure from other NATO countries on the one side and considerable antideployment dissent from the antinuclear movement, the Labor Party and his own antinuclear left wing on the other, Prime Minister Lubbers had pursued a course in 1983-84 of seeking more time to negotiate a settlement that would satisfy NATO without causing the downfall of his government.

In Belgium, the same tenuous process of coalition-building has substantially affected official INF policies, although the country lacks Holland's virulently religious or ideological antinuclear opposition. In December 1979, the center-left government of Christian Social (PSC-CVP) Wilfried Martens supported INF but announced its intention to review the plan at six-month intervals in the light of progress in arms control. Although the government continually pledged to stick by INF, it never spelled out the criteria for arms control success. Part of the reason
for this ambiguity was pressure from the coalition's Socialist partners, especially the Flemish Socialists under Karel Van Miert and Guy Spitaels.

Bickering over budget issues, Wallonia's collapsing steel industry, and tension between the two language communities made the reformation of the center-left coalition after the 1981 elections unlikely. The successes of the pro-INF Liberals made a center-right government of Christian Socials and Liberals under Wilfried Martens possible. Despite considerable opposition to the deployment of INF in Belgium, not to mention the worst bout of labor unrest since 1960, the Martens Government has still managed to maintain its approval of the NATO plan to station 48 cruise missiles near Florennes, Belgium. (147, p.63) Martens faces not only economic recession and public unrest over an economic austerity program but severe criticism of his position on INF from the antinuclear movement, the Socialists and the left wing of the Christian Socials. Notwithstanding problems with the economy and the antinuclear movement, Prime Minister Martens' coalition has generally shown considerable staying power. The government received a resounding endorsement of its pro-INF policy in December 1983, when the Belgian Parliament defeated a resolution 112 to 84 demanding the outright rejection of the INF deployment plan.
4.2 SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

At the risk of oversimplification, it is possible to define four separate schools of strategic thought in Belgium and The Netherlands. The first may be designated the "right-of-center elites" (School I). These are the traditional conservative, defense-knowledgeable elites, including the leading figures of the Liberal People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) in The Netherlands and its counterpart in Belgium, the Freedom and Progress Party (PVV-PLP). Representative figures in The Netherlands are Christoph van der Klaauw (Minister for Foreign Affairs 1977-81), Ed Nijpels and Hans Wiegel (VVD leaders), and highly respected defense experts General Gerard C. Berkhov, Dr. W. F. van Eekelen (State Secretary of Defense), and U. J. Neuman, Director of the moderately conservative Netherlands Institute for Peace Questions (NIVV). This school also includes some conservative Christian Democrats (e.g., J. Van Iersel in The Netherlands), some members of the Flemish Nationalist Volksunie and FDP parties in Belgium, and such prominent military analysts as General (now Senator) Robert Close and Major General Pierre Cremer, Commandant, Institut Royal Superieur de Defense "rationale. School I, therefore, finds its political support primarily among Liberals and the more conservative wings of the religious and (in Belgium) nationalist parties.
School I has always been in favor of a strong reliance on U.S. strategic forces to deter any Soviet military aggression in Europe. It wanted a U.S.-dominated Alliance and opposed all Gaullist or other initiatives designed to foster European defense cooperation at the expense of Atlanticism, and has traditionally backed U.S. policy around the world (some members like Close advocate a European intervention force for out-of-area crises).(246)

This school welcomed the presence of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) on the soil of Belgium and The Netherlands because when the United States enjoyed strategic and tactical nuclear superiority, TNW were seen clearly as strengthening the deterrent. TNW also precluded the necessity of a costly conventional buildup. But its enthusiasm for battlefield deterrence based on short-range TNW has waned since SALT codified parity, leading to an erosion in the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee. Of all the schools, then, this one is the most concerned over the shifting military balance, and it is not at all upset over the collapse of SALT II or the Reagan Administration's pledge to strengthen defense. It has been moderately but increasingly disturbed throughout the SALT decade by the adverse tilt in the strategic balance between the superpowers, and has become even more worried in recent years over the deteriorating theater balance. Indeed, the right-of-center school has some representatives (e.g., General Close) who take seriously the possibility of overt...
Soviet attack, even though it is not considered the likely or the preferred Soviet strategy. They are fearful as well that the Soviet military buildup may hasten and deepen the process of "Finlandization," which has been underway for several years.

Coming back to the question of TNW, even though advocates of School I find the deterrent utility of such weapons reduced and their potential for warfighting extremely frightful, nevertheless School I is less ready than other groups in the Low Countries to make unilateral reductions in TNW. School I would be willing to use TNWs as counters in hard bargaining with the Warsaw Pact. According to School I, NATO already is suffering from enough serious gaps and asymmetries; it should not voluntarily create more. If anything, NATO should be building up its battlefield capabilities (and, in Close's view, complementing that with civil defense and "popular deterrence" on the Swiss model).\(^{(246)}\) Some low-yield TNW with only a 20 km range, School I argues, could be highly effective against oncoming massed Warsaw Pact forces; their mere availability to NATO would force the Pact armies to disperse. Not surprisingly, then, most supporters of enhanced radiation warheads (ERW) in the Low Countries identify with School I.

This School is also the strongest source of Dutch and Belgian support for intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) modernization. Indeed, "right-of-center" elites wish to
proceed as early as possible with deployment of cruise missiles in order to redress the theater military imbalance and to acquire leverage with which to conduct meaningful negotiations with Moscow. Both Liberal parties have expressed unambiguous support for deployment, if talks fail to produce an equitable reduction in force levels.

The second major school of thought draws together the "center elites" (School II) who have generally controlled the Prime, Foreign and Defense Ministries in the coalition governments in the Hague and Brussels for many years up to 1983. This School now consists of the dominant portion of the recently merged Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) in The Netherlands (including most of the former Catholic Peoples Party and the former Christian Historical Union, but not the former Anti-Revolutionary Party which is antinuclear), as well as some members of the D'66 and the Christian Social Party (CVP-PSC) in Belgium, along with the greater part of the nationalist language-community parties in Belgium. It also included until 1980 a few of the elder statesmen of the Labor Party in Holland (PVDA) -- men such as Max van der Stoel (former Minister of Foreign Affairs), Joop den Uyl (former Prime Minister), and Bram Stemerdink (former Defense Minister), all of whom have been stout supporters of Nato, but who have found the Labor rank and file drifting farther away from their own responsible policy outlooks, and have
been compelled to shift toward School III. The outstanding Dutch spokesmen for School II would be CDA leaders Andries van Agt, a frequent Prime Minister until 1982, present Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers, present Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek, and former Defense Minister Willem Scholten, as well as Hans van Mierlo from D'66, Defense Minister in the 1981-82 center-left coalition. In Belgium, the outstanding School II figures would be current and past Prime Minister Dr. Wilfried Martens and several of his predecessors in that post, all fellow Flemish Social Christians: Mark Eyskens, one-time Defense Minister Paul Van den Boeynants, and present Foreign Minister Leo Tindemann. Other prominent School II figures include two former Foreign Ministers, Walloon Social Christian Charles-Ferdinand Nothomb and Walloon Socialist Paul-Henri Simonet. Also associated with this School are strategic analysts on the staffs of foreign and defense affairs institutes -- notably Sam Rozemund, Deputy Director of NIVV; Jerome L. Heldring, Director of The Netherlands Society for International Affairs (NGIZ); and Dr. Peter Baehr, Director of the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR).

In their general outlook on the international strategic situation -- the need for NATO and U.S. strategic deterrence, the unfavorable trends in the global and theater balances, the specter of Finlandization, and so forth -- the representatives of School II do not have much difficulty
communicating with those of School I, (248, p.F1) but School II seems less worried. Its spokesmen have criticized the quality of U.S. political leadership and diplomacy but they are less pessimistic than School I about the military balance, and they tend to place somewhat greater stress upon the problems of the Soviet bloc which inhibit Moscow from attempting to exploit too vigorously the manifest vulnerabilities of NATO.

The most noticeable difference between Schools I and II is over the role of TNW and the issue of INF modernization. School II has become much more uncomfortable at the prospect of TNWs being retained for possible battlefield use. A 1979 Report by NIVV, the institute closely associated with the CDA, noted that the shift from massive retaliation to flexible response had led to the infiltration of nuclear weapons into all levels of military planning, thereby lowering the nuclear threshold to a dangerous degree. If the Dutch government is to reduce the role of nuclear weapons (as a former Labor Cabinet set out to do in the mid-1970s), this would entail, the Report said, the step-by-step abolition of tactical short-range nuclear weapons. Van Agt's Cabinet, in an effort to preserve a middle position in the face of a growing antinuclear position, committed itself to this goal. One reason it places a high priority on the Geneva INF talks is the hope that some success there could lead to expanded discussions
of TNW reductions. School II calls for the strengthening of conventional warfighting capabilities so that nuclear roles may be replaced by nonnuclear ones. Paradoxically, governments dominated by this group have felt pressured to cut conventional defense expenditures to ease budgetary pressures, although both Belgium and Holland continue to spend a larger share of their GNP on defense than several other NATO members, while the Dutch in particular have been able to purchase new weapons and their unionized army meets higher performance standards than many critics insinuate. Not surprisingly, there is in School II strong opposition to the development and deployment of ERW, the so-called "neutron bomb." In 1978 CDA Defense Minister Roelof Kruisinga resigned because the Cabinet did not unanimously reject ERW.

On the question of INF modernization, whereas School I strongly favors it, School II -- while generally recognizing the need to restore a sense of security and political stability in Western Europe -- has been more willing to temporize on the question of deploying the cruise missiles in Belgium and Holland called for in the NATO 1979 decision -- that is, 48 GLCMs in each country. School II adherents in the Dutch and Belgian governments try in their public rhetoric to manifest a balanced concern for security and arms control, implying that cruise missile deployment should proceed gradually (not suddenly) while East-West
negotiations are well under way. (81, p.319) But some of their statements, no doubt calculated to placate opposition criticism and to hold delicately assembled coalitions together, can easily be read to mean that they assign a higher priority to arms control than to Alliance security, although they would hasten to deny that the two concepts can be separated and set against each other. For example, Dutch Foreign Minister van den Broek justified the Dutch vote against a nuclear weapons freeze in the United Nations by stressing that such a measure might weaken arms control by undermining the double decision's credibility. Reflecting this approach is the following statement made in 1979 by former Belgian Foreign Minister Henri Simonet:

In principle, priority should be given to the negotiation of arrangements about arms control rather than feeding endlessly the spiral of the arms race in an area which has the highest armaments concentration in the world. (116, p.434)

Members of School II thus placed great hope on the Geneva negotiations on INF, and viewed the credible threat of deployment largely as a tool for pressuring the Soviets to reduce their intermediate-range nuclear missiles, a stance which separates them from their School I allies. They hoped for an outcome that would make it possible for NATO to reduce substantially or eliminate altogether the missiles it now plans to deploy in Europe. While endorsing Ronald Reagan's "zero option" as an ultimate goal, School II
cautiously pushed for -- and was delighted to see -- an American interim proposal. To spur negotiations, they tried to put Soviet offers and counteroffers in the best possible light, and they advocated including the Anglo-French missiles in the INF negotiations in Geneva. (236) School II stresses that Holland is not committed, but must leave open the possibility of deployment in order to further facilitate negotiations, (179, 184) and it has continued to resist strong pressure from West Germany, France and the VVD to state an unequivocal determination to deploy. Former Premier van Agt, ever mindful of the requirements imposed by factional and coalition politics, proposed keeping with the NATO timetable by preparing the missiles sites on time, but delaying actual deployment -- presumably to extend the time for negotiations. (266) The CDA has indeed stressed the fact that its only firm intention currently is to ready the INF sites, and even refers to varying levels of preparation, beginning with mere "administrative" measures which should arouse relatively little opposition. School II delegates add another such distinction, one between "passive" and "active" steps to ready the sites, with the former presumably less threatening to their consciences and political images. This type of ambiguity has earned the CDA criticism for "surpressing its sense of political clarity:" "'Yes, unless,' 'Yes, provided that,' 'No, unless,' and 'No'" are said to characterize Dutch policy under School II. (229)
Since the Soviets walked out of the INF negotiations in Geneva, Dutch supporters of School II have been forced to take a less ambiguous position on the question of INF. The Lubbers Government has already postponed the decision on INF three times, but with the June 1984 deadline for reaching a decision fast approaching, it has begun to be more specific on its attitude toward deployment. As part of a compromise package with NATO, Prime Minister Lubbers has discussed the possibility of reducing the number of cruise missiles in Holland if an arms agreement is not reached with the Soviet Union by 1986. He would also like to rid Holland of 8-inch nuclear artillery shells, nuclear mines and possibly the Neptune submarine systems as well. With 63 percent of the Dutch population reportedly against the deployment of INF, and with the Cabinet and the governing coalition of Liberals and Christian Democrats divided on the issue as well, Prime Minister Lubbers has fallen back on a compromise position that envisages minimum deployment to satisfy NATO and token gestures of unilateral disarmament to appease his antinuclear critics. Dutch advocates of School II are slowly shedding some of the ambiguity of former times, for it is becoming increasingly clear that full deployment of INF in the Netherlands is becoming a remote possibility.

The Belgian School II, while slightly more resolute about its obligation eventually to deploy, also prevaricated prior to the Soviet walk-out in Geneva. The tendency for
this group was to give the Geneva negotiations a chance to succeed and to consider limited deployment before the termination of the talks "in the realm of possibilities." (194) Prime Minister Wilfried Martens outlined Belgium's options in this way:

We have accepted in essence three theses: First, that there must be negotiations. We have always stressed the negotiations aspect ... If the results are total, there will not be any installations at all and the Russians will therefore destroy their SS-20s.

If the results are not total, but only partial, then ... one will install on both sides a certain number of missiles, but in a controlled and limited manner. Belgium will install its number ... depending on the result of negotiations.

The second possibility is that there is no result from these negotiations, and in this case -- and this is very important -- we have accepted today that Belgium will take in solidarity with its allies all the measures that have been agreed upon within NATO. But, and I must say this, too, before taking steps within NATO, the government itself will evaluate the situation at that moment. (218, p.Fl; 97)

The "second possibility: has indeed come to pass, but the Belgian government has not yet made a clear-cut decision on INF. Nevertheless, as he demonstrated by blocking a parliamentary move against the missiles, Prime Minister Martens not only has a greater margin of parliamentary support for his policies than Prime Minister Lubbers, but is himself much more willing to stake his government's prestige on accepting Belgium's full allotment of cruise missiles.
The third major school of thought in the Low Countries includes primarily the "left-of-center" elites (School III). This school lost much of its influence over official Dutch policy when, following the 1982 elections, a center-right coalition replaced the center-left one. It consists of the bulk of the Labor/Socialist Parties in Belgium and The Netherlands. For the Dutch PvdA, which anticipated the leftward, antinuclear drift of other North European Socialists, NATO missile modernization must be viewed in a framework not of the balance of power but of changing U.S. targeting doctrine (PD59). School III also includes a number of left-of-center members of the CDA, such as the Defense Minister under Lubbers, Job de Ruiter, who, while not wishing to be identified with the emotional ideological approach of the antinuclearists (School IV) nevertheless share some of their positions, especially opposition to the introduction of new nuclear weapon systems and advocacy of a unilateral reduction in the number of short-range TNW both in the Alliance and in the Netherlands. A few prominent parliamentarians from CDA (e.g., Anton Frinking and Joop de Boer) probably have to be counted in this group, even though for reasons of party and coalition solidarity they voted to support the government on INF in December 1979 and found the Reagan "zero option" speech of November 1981 reassuring. Brinkhorst of D'66 also
belongs in this category. The leading theoretical spokesman for this school of thought is the PvdA analyst Klaas de Vries.\(^{(166)}\)

The typical member of School III does not profess much concern over either the strategic or the theater balance. Assuming that strategic parity prevails (if, indeed, the United States does not still enjoy a slight edge), the members of this School -- paradoxically enough -- exude a somewhat greater degree of confidence in the efficacy of the U.S. strategic deterrent than do those of School II, and much greater than those of School I. Their view has been described as one of faith in American massive retaliation. School III opposes the neutron warhead (ERW) and INF modernization as both unnecessary and likely to provoke the Soviet Union, and some members even seem to be willing to tolerate a degree of Eurostrategic weapons imbalance favoring the Soviet Union.\(^{(162)}\) School III is adamant in its demands for a reduction of nuclear weapons -- especially of the short-range variety. So dangerous and militarily worthless are these regarded that many members of this School would withdraw them unilaterally, without requiring any concessions from the Warsaw Pact in MBFR. Most members of School III would insist that they are loyal to the basic concept of the Alliance and NATO defense, but they would prefer to see NATO strategic emphasis shifted from nuclear to conventional, and are proud of having pushed for the "shift study" within NATO.
The fourth school of thought in the Low Countries is composed of the "antinuclear elites" (School IV). In recent years, this group has garnered a considerable following in The Netherlands, where the main impetus for the antinuclear campaign is spearheaded by the Interchurch Peace Council (IKV) led by Mient-Jan Faber. Created in 1967 through the joint initiative of the Dutch Reformed Church and the Catholic organization Pax Christi, the IKV seized upon the "neutron bomb" issue in 1977 to launch a formidable political antinuclear campaign. That was 15 years after the Netherlands Reformed Church had unequivocally condemned any use of nuclear arms, declaring that under no circumstances should Christians participate in a nuclear war. (45, p.1) The Protestant Churches moved toward pacifism, anti-nuclearism, and opposition to defense budgets more rapidly than the Catholic Church, with its traditional emphasis on the idea of the "just war." The Second Vatican Council (1963-65) had condemned the use of nuclear weapons in a countercity strategy, but stopped short of condemning nuclear deterrence which produced "peace of a sort."

In the last twenty years, the younger Christian clergy have shifted the emphasis from individual to social morality -- from marriage and sex to poverty and war. Paradoxically, the political influence of the Churches -- in elections and parliaments -- has seemed to increase while church attendance has declined. The significant initial
impetus for the antinuclear movement in Holland came from the Churches, not from the PvdA. Indeed, Max van der Stoel, while Minister of Foreign Affairs in a Labor government, said in 1975 that removing nuclear weapons from Dutch territory would lead to a more dangerous rather than a safer situation, and he rejected unilateral denuclearization and a no-first-use pledge. (122, p. 10)

The motto of the antinuclear movement is: "Help clear the world of nuclear weapons . . . let it begin with The Netherlands." It promotes a crusading spirit, and seeks to convince Christians that to put reliance on nuclear arms is tantamount to worshipping false gods, for it substitutes the threat of terror and killing for love of God and neighbor. Its most devoted adherents disdain strategic-technical arguments over the military balance as being irrelevant to the dimension of religious faith and moral behavior. Instead of building up bargaining leverage, School IV would prefer to encourage overall arms reduction by setting an example, i.e., unilateral Western measures. Many members repeat the Soviet argument that a balance now exists in Europe and that new NATO INF would upset the central strategic balance.

The IKV campaign has helped to rekindle the traditional pacifist tendencies of the Labor Party, which for a quarter of a century had supported NATO's nuclear strategy. A new Socialist Politics "watchdog" Committee
(WESP), headed by Piet Reckman and Ineke Holierook (from the PvdA's Red Women Movement) keeps reminding Laborites that the missile issue is one of the party's main "fighting points." The IKV has also generated strong antinuclear feeling within the Christian Democratic Appeal, especially with the Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP) wing; ten ARP "dissidents" nearly collapsed the government in 1979 by resisting the double-track decision, and five of these "reemerged" in 1982 to announce their unconditional rejection of INF deployment on Dutch soil.\(^{115}\) Mient Jan Faber, head of the IKV, recognizing that the Atlantic Alliance remains popular with more than 70 percent of the Dutch people (even though polls have found 60 percent of them antinuclear in one way or another), insists that the campaign is not anti-NATO, but only antinuclear. Since the Soviet walkout in Geneva, the IKV has downplayed tactics of popular protest such as mass demonstrations and has concentrated instead on influencing the political parties and the up-and-coming parliamentary debate on INF. Unlike other countries, Italy for example, which have an even greater popular revulsion to the deployment of INF than The Netherlands, the latter is unique in that the antinuclear movement can bring pressure to bear on the antinuclear wings of all major parties (with the exception of the Liberals).\(^{114, \text{pp.1566-67}}\) The antinuclear movement and the IKV are powerful in Holland not so much because they
have broad popular support, although this is doubtlessly a factor, but rather because they have constituencies in the Dutch political and religious establishment, namely, in the parties and the churches.

Finally, the IKV has done much to spread antinuclear sentiment to other parts of Western Europe, especially to the Federal Republic and, increasingly, France. Indeed, French consulates and French airlines in The Netherlands and Belgium have been the favorite targets of "militant Dutch peace groups" which denounce French nuclear policy and eschew the overwhelmingly nonviolent tactics of other School IV representatives. (140)

4.3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS

By mid-1984, the Right-of-Center (School I) and Center (School II) elites were still in control of Dutch and Belgian security policy, but in The Netherlands at least the direction taken on nuclear issues remains uncertain. Much depends on the several factors mentioned at the outset: (a) public opinion's susceptibility to neutralist and pacifist views as expressed by adherents to the antinuclear (School IV) movement; (b) the continued vulnerability of heterogeneous coalition governments, particularly in the face of pressing economic difficulties; and (c) the degree to which factions inside the coalitions, especially in The Nether-
lands, can undermine the unity of the government's support for the NATO deployment plan. With these three basic principles in mind, likely trends in the debate on security policy in the Low Countries can be summarized as follows:

(1) The fall of 1981 appeared to mark a high point in the popularity of Holland's peace movement, which had grown in leaps and bounds ever since the antineutron weapons campaign of 1977-78. On November 21, 1981, 350,000 persons took part in a peace demonstration in Amsterdam. Subsequent rallies have not achieved that size. What is more, although the demonstrations greatly strengthened the credibility of IKV and thus School IV perspectives, their success in influencing political parties has not always been universal. Clearly, the Liberals remain firmly attached to School I views and, although under-represented in the current cabinet, their popularity and influence have increased substantially. Federal elections in October 1982, for example, gave the VVD nearly one-quarter of the vote, and at that time polls showed a marked rightward shift by Dutch youth. Aiding the VVD's resurgence has been a more conservative climate created by developments ranging from Polish martial law to the "Surinam Shock," i.e., repressive measures taken by the left-leaning government of the former Dutch Colony in Latin America. The new conservative climate has not only led to a new willingness to question the leftist orthodoxy that all Third World ills are attributed
to Western imperialism and neo-colonialism, but even to a greater respect among the young for military service. (178, p.30)

The Dutch CDA has clung to its traditional policy on nuclear issues in principle, but because of increasing pressure to at least give the appearance of reducing Holland's reliance on nuclear weapons, Prime Minister Lubbers has been forced to equivocate on NATO nuclear policy in practice. The policy of the CDA is still largely a School II approach, but because Prime Minister Lubbers has raised the possibility of minimizing The Netherlands' nuclear tasks, the direction the Dutch government will take on nuclear issues in general and on INF in particular remains uncertain. Prior to the termination of INF negotiations in Geneva, CDA support for INF deployment had been ambiguous, that is, designed largely to facilitate a favorable outcome of arms reduction talks. Now that those negotiations have proven to be fruitless, the tendency in the CDA and in School II has been to maintain the principle of nuclear defense of Holland by accepting INF, albeit in fewer numbers than originally planned, but to appease the antinuclear sentiment in the country by implying that The Netherlands would prefer an elimination of all tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons on Dutch soil. The sacrifice of the latter is considered to be a necessary symbolic price to pay for fulfilling the much more important task of presenting the Soviet Union with a solid front on INF.
The impact of School IV views on the left of center parties, Labor and D'66 is more marked, yet both parties remain largely adherents of School III, with some leading members leaning to School II. When the PvdA was in government, militant left-wing members unalterably opposed INF and neutron weapons, while moderates -- particularly then Foreign Minister van der Stoel -- supported the American opening position at Geneva and pointed out that "the 1979 dual decision is a fact." (183) D'66 was more unified, but more ambiguous. Former Defense Minister van Mierlo of D'66 approved inspection of sites for INF deployment but said from that the government's final position on the issue should not be deduced. (170)

After the PvdA lost its place in government in early 1982, many members began to take a more unequivocal stand against deployment, which boosted the Party's poll ratings and increased its share of the seats in the autumn elections by three. Yet several Labor leaders continued to resist a full, formal acceptance of School IV views, and thus the PvdA stance, while more hostile, retained some ambiguity for political reasons:

In the subtle maneuverings around active and passive preparations, which have a lot to do with the present cabinet formation negotiations, the PvdA would probably like to make it clear that what is most important is the best possible Netherlands contribution to a security policy with the major objective of reducing nuclear arms levels. For this, a "clear No" from the PvdA to
the deployment of 48 cruise missiles would not be out of place, although many observers in The Hague are saying that the PvdA will have to make do with a "No in effect." (210)

(2) Cabinet instability, although lessened by the formation of clearly center-right coalition, will continue to determine how strong the official Dutch support of INF is. Economic matters will, in turn, greatly affect the solidity of The Hague's governments. Unemployment rates over the 18 percent mark must be reduced for a Dutch coalition to earn continued public approval and maintain its cohesion. Prime Minister Lubbers' plan to reduce Holland's staggering budget deficits by drastically cutting back on public spending may have to be postponed if union unrest should threaten his already thin parliamentary majority. (203, 52) As the centrist bloc, the CDA is indispensable to the existence of any coalition. In 1982, it chose to bring the rising VVD back into government, but should the relatively monetarist and pro-INF policies of the Liberals be discredited, cabinet instability would again be a major problem. If the result is reentry of Labor or D'66 into the government, the official position on INF will grow more substantially ambiguous, even hostile.

As unstable as Dutch government support for NATO nuclear policy is, it would be wrong to conclude that public opinion on nuclear and defense issues has changed dramatically in the past decade. Belief in the necessity of
military forces has declined only slightly since 1963 in The Netherlands. Whereas in 1963 around 95 percent of the public believed that the Dutch armed forces were "necessary" or at least a "necessary evil," in 1982 the figure had dropped to 82 percent. (78, pp.146-47) Neither have attitudes about defense spending changed all that drastically in the past decade. In 1974 around 44 percent of the public believed defense spending should be decreased, while in 1981 the figure was around 35 percent. (78, p.150) Moreover, as Richard C. Eichenberg states, "From 1969 to 1982, an average of about 75 percent prefer to remain in NATO, and the percentage favoring withdrawal has never exceeded 16 percent." (78, p.156)

Unconditional opposition to nuclear weapons, on the other hand, has increased in the past four years because of intense scrutiny of NATO nuclear doctrine by the media. But opinion polls show that hostility to nuclear weapons in general is only slightly greater in Holland than in West Germany and France, and is even less so than in Italy. (78, p.155)

It is instructive, therefore, to note Eichenberg's following conclusions:

If the Netherlands is unique, it would seem it is in the impact of opinion rather than in levels of support and denial. On the INF issue, the visibility and intensity of opposition have prevented the Dutch government from final adoption of the NATO position, whereas other "recipient" governments have remained committed despite heavy domestic pressure. As we have seen, the hesitancy of the Dutch government
occurs despite the fact that a potential majority -- however slim -- is receptive to arguments concerning Soviet deployments and Alliance coordination. (78, p.158)

Second, the widespread recognition that governments must embark on a course of severe budgetary retrenchment suggests that substantial amounts of political capital must be reserved for considerable debate that will surely follow. (78, p.158)

In other words, nuclear and defense budgetary debates have arisen at a time when parliamentary majorities in The Netherlands are marginal. Moreover, the existence of antinuclear minorities within the ruling parties themselves make INF and defense spending particularly volatile issues because they provide the sentiments of Schools III and IV an outlet within what is otherwise a centrist government dedicated largely to Schools I and II.

(3) In Belgium, peace movement activities and the influence of School IV have traditionally been less significant than in Holland. The largest Belgian antinuclear demonstrations came in October 1981 and the spring of 1982, but School IV pressure has been manifest only in the opposition Flemish Socialist Party. As in Holland, the current center-right coalition of Martens adheres to a School II perception, with reinforcement from School I. Both Belgian Liberal parties, strengthened in the 1981 national and 1982 provincial elections, express strong support for deployment. The Social Christians have held to their original formula which hinges on the outcome of arms
control talks, yet they reject antinuclear pressure and have pledged to deploy should the talks fail to produce substantial cuts. Former Social Christian Foreign Minister Charles Ferdinand Nothomb put his party's view this way in a letter to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and U.S. Secretary of State Haig in November 1981:

Only a precise and verifiable arms limitation agreement, involving the disarming of the 250 SS-20 missiles, of 750 nuclear warheads, threatening Western Europe, will make it possible to restore the balance at the lowest possible level and remove the need to deploy corresponding weapons in Western Europe. (232)

Belgium's opposition parties are less susceptible to School IV influence than Holland's PvdA. Most Flemish and Walloon Socialists hold to a left-of-center (School III) view, and resisting INF ranks low on their list of priorities.

(4) Direct antinuclear pressure from School IV activists is less significant in Belgium than in Holland, but the instability of coalition governments is perhaps a more important factor in the Belgian case than the Dutch case. Belgium not only suffers Holland's severe economic troubles, but must confront the inherent problem of tension between the language communities, which limits coalition cohesion. Disputes over an administrative problem between Flemings and Walloons nearly toppled Martens in early 1983, and the center-right government's austerity policies, marked by the relatively monetarist influence of the Liberals, will continue to dissatisfy many Walloons -- especially
Socialist-oriented Walloons -- who feel only federal support can save the region's troubled steel industry, but any national aid will alienate the Flemings, from whose pockets the financing would come. Although there were some scattered signs of a recovery in early 1983, if the center-right's economic policies fail, not only will cabinet cohesion be endangered, but the delicate regional balance may be upset.

Yet the current Belgian opposition places relatively slight emphasis on INF and, at any rate under no foreseeable circumstances could the Socialists govern without one of the relatively moderate center parties -- the Flemish Peoples Union, or the Social Christians. Thus even the inherent divisiveness and instability of Belgian coalition politics is unlikely to turn the country away from at least a center or School II perspective, and at least qualified support for INF.

In conclusion, the prospect of INF deployment in the Low Countries remains unclear. Belgium is expected to deploy given the strength of Schools I and II and the weakness of School IV, but worsening economic problems, ethnic tensions and the spillover effect of a possible negative decision in The Netherlands reduce the odds. As for The Netherlands itself, School IV's relative strength compounds the indecisiveness of the CDA, divided as it is into three camps on security questions. Although clearly many Dutch
politicians in Schools II and III, including Prime Minister Lubbers himself, will support deployment of INF out of a desire not to weaken Holland's "role and voice within NATO,"(267) they will most likely not accept Holland's full allotment of 48 cruise missiles. It is possible that the current trend toward reducing Holland's nuclear tasks in NATO will lead to an outright rejection of INF altogether, but given Prime Minister Lubbers' concern about the opinion of his NATO allies, a compromise plan is much more likely.

Such a plan, however, should not be expected to mollify the government's antinuclear critics in School IV, who will remain opposed to the deployment of INF no matter how few cruise missiles end up in the final package. The decision to deploy will, in the end, be decided by cabinet and parliamentary swing votes within the governing coalition. If lukewarm supporters of INF within the coalition feel that a pro-INF vote in the June parliamentary debate will jeopardize the existence of the government, they will most certainly vote against full deployment. A compromise package that accepts fewer cruise missiles and a reduction of Holland's nuclear responsibilities, on the other hand, will most likely win approval in the June parliamentary debate.
TABLE 4.

A graphic representation of the Belgian Schools of Thought and their distinguishing characteristics with reference to major policy issues

| BELGIUM |
|----------------------------------|--|--|--|--|
| **Schools of Thought** | **Political Party Identification** | **Belgian Liberal Party (PVV-PLP)** | **Christian Social Party (CVP-PSC)** | **Flemish Socialists (SP)** | **Communist Party** |
| | | Conservative Christian Social Parliamentarians | Francophone Parties | Socialists (SP) | |
| **Right-of-Center Elites School I** | **Center Elites School II** | **Left-of-Center Elites School III** | **Anti-nuclear Elites School IV** | | |
| **Distinguishing Characteristics** | Rely on U.S. strategic deterrent | X | X | X | X |
| | No interest in European deterrent | X | X | X | X |
| | Supports INF modernization and cruise missile deployment in Belgium | X | X | X | X |
| | Favors arms control over INF modernization | X | X | X | X |
| | Favors "zero option" and "interim solution" | X | X | X | X |
| | Favors moratorium on NATO missile deployments | X | X | X | X |
| | Favors stronger conventional capabilities for NATO | X | X | X | X |
| | Opposes battlefield nuclear deterrence | X | X | X | X |
| | Favors unilateral nuclear disarmament | X | X | X | X |
TABLE 5

A graphic representation of the Dutch Schools of Thought and their distinguishing characteristics with reference to major policy issues

| THE NETHERLANDS | |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                 | Right-of-Center | Center | Left-of-Center | Anti-nuclear |
| Schools of      | Elites School I | Elites School II | Elites School III | Elites School IV |
| Thought         |                 |       |               |               |
| Political Party | Dutch Liberal   | Christian | Dutch Labor    | Communist      |
| Identification  | Party (VVD)     | Democratic | Party (PvdA)  | Party of      |
|                 | Calvinist Party (SGP) | Appeal (CDA) | Left wing of CDA | Netherlands    |
|                 | Calvinist Political |        | Radical Party | (CPN)         |
|                 | Union (GVP)     | (except for left wing) | PPR | Pacifist Social |
|                 | Conservative    | Democrats '85 | Democrats '85 | Party (PSP)   |
|                 | Christian       |         |               |               |
|                 | Democratic      |         |               |               |
|                 | (CDA)           |         |               |               |
|                 | Parliamentians  |         |               |               |

Distinguishing Characteristics

- Rely on U.S. strategic deterrent
- No interest in European deterrent
- Supports INF modernization and cruise deployment in Netherlands
- Favors arms control over INF modernization
- Cruise deployment if talks fail
- Favors "zero option" and "interim solution"
- Favors moratorium on NATO missile deployments
- Favors stronger conventional capabilities for NATO
- Opposes battlefield nuclear deterrence
- Favors unilateral nuclear disarmament

| | X | X | X | X |
| X | X | X | X |
| X | X | X | X |
| X | X | X | X |
| X | X | X | X |
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