WEST EUROPEAN AND EAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVES ON
DEFENSE, DETERRENCE AND STRATEGY
Volume I—Main Report

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16 May 1984

Technical Report

CONTRACT No. DNA 001-81-C-0198

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Prepared for
Director
DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY
Washington, DC 20305-1000

DTIC ELECTED APR 1 0 1986 S E D

DTIC FILE COPY
### WEST EUROPEAN AND EAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVES ON DEFENSE, DETERRENCE AND STRATEGY

**Volume I-Main Report**

**1. TITLE (Include Security Classification)**

WEST EUROPEAN AND EAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVES ON DEFENSE, DETERRENCE AND STRATEGY

**2. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)**

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.; Jacqueline K. Davis; James E. Dougherty; and Charles M. Perry

**3a. TYPE OF REPORT**

Technical

**3c. TIME COVERED**

From 821201 to 840515

**4. DATE OF REPORT**

1984, May 16

**5. PAGE COUNT**

90

**6. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS**

DNA 001-81-C-0198

**7. NAME OF FUNDING ORGANIZATION**

Defense Nuclear Agency

**8a. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)**

Washington, DC 20305-1000

**8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)**

DNA 001-81-C-0198

**9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER**

DNA 001-81-C-0198

**10. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)**

DNA-TR-84-109-VI

**11. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION**

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc.

**12. NAME OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATION**

Defense Nuclear Agency

**13. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)**

Central Plaza Building 675 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02139-3396

**14. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL**

Betty L. Fox (202) 325-7042 DNA/STTI

**15. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)**

This report provides a summary, analysis and categorization of the perspectives of defense elites in Western Europe, together with an examination of such perspectives in the People's Republic of China, with special emphasis on nuclear capabilities and directly related security issues. In Europe, attention is focused on Great Britain, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, The Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.

As a distinctive feature of this report, four schools of strategic thought have been developed for each of the European countries under study. Based upon a comprehensive assessment of the defense views held by strategic theoreticians, prominent government policymakers, political party leaders, and others active in the defense debates of Western Europe, these schools of thought provide a unique tool for identifying and evaluating key issues and spokesmen in the West European security debate of the 1980s. The overall objective of this study is to identify and assess the continuities and discontinuities of security perspectives among West European countries (especially concerning NATO's nuclear
18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continued)

- Chinese Nuclear Doctrines
- Elite European Perspectives
- New Conventional Technologies
- "Peace Movement"
- Schools of Strategic Thought
- US-PRC-USSR Triangle
- National Deterrent Forces

19. ABSTRACT (Continued)

...weapons options) and, on the basis of this analysis, to examine the prospects for maintaining, or strengthening, the consensus upon which European security is based.

In its assessment of Chinese security perspectives, this report focuses on the evaluation of the PRC's strategic approach to international affairs and on the effects of recent personnel and organizational changes in the Chinese hierarchy on the PRC's foreign and defense policies. Emphasis is placed on China's nuclear perceptions and strategy, as well as upon key issues of conventional defense, especially the need for modernization. The study also examines the perspectives of PRC elite on such issues as: the U.S.-Soviet strategic equation and its implications for the military balance in the Asian-Pacific region; arms control and disarmament schemes, especially with respect to nuclear weapons; the credibility of the U.S. protective guarantee for allies in East Asia; trends in the regional nuclear power balance, including the question of nuclear proliferation in Asia; and the prospects for future Sino-American cooperation.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report provides a summary, analysis, and categorization of the perspectives of defense elites in Western Europe, together with an examination of such perspectives in the People's Republic of China, with special emphasis on nuclear capabilities and directly related issues. In Europe, attention is focused on Great Britain, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. As a distinctive feature of this report, four schools of strategic thought have been developed for each of the European countries under study. Based upon a comprehensive assessment of the defense views held by strategic theoreticians, prominent government policymakers, political party leaders and others active in the defense debates of Western Europe, these schools of thought provide a unique tool for the identification and evaluation of key perspectives and their spokesmen in the West European security debate of the 1980s.*

* The policy perspectives, principal spokesmen, and political influence of each of the schools of thought for these seven European countries are described in detail on pages 3 to 7 and pages 27 to 29 of this report.
Analysis of politico-military trends in Western Europe and the People's Republic of China yields the following major conclusions relevant to U.S. defense policy and force structure planning.

WEST EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

Doubts about NATO military doctrine have spread in Western Europe. This is due in large part to the inadequacy of NATO conventional forces relative to Soviet-Warsaw Pact capabilities, which serves to heighten the prospect for escalation by NATO to nuclear weapons in order to repel an attack. In particular, the continued erosion of NATO's conventional and theater nuclear posture raises fundamental questions about the utility of flexible response in its present form.

- There is discussion within NATO Europe about "no early first use" of nuclear weapons, which is focused on Emerging Technology (ET) "force multipliers" for conventional defense, as well as on Airland Battle 2000 concepts, whose purpose would be to raise the nuclear threshold.

- These concepts emphasize surprise and mobility; more firepower-intensive units that are less manpower reliant; and extensive use of new microelectronic technologies to enhance target acquisition, accuracy, surveillance,
and reaction speed, as well as the acquisition by NATO of new technologies for battlefield surveillance, for the substitution of firepower for manpower both on the ground and in the air, and for launching counter-offensives behind Soviet-Warsaw Pact lines.

- West European attention -- and criticism -- has been concentrated on proposals for the acquisition of capabilities to strike Soviet-Warsaw Pact second echelon theater reserve and strategic reserve forces with conventional munitions as these forces advance to replace the first echelon.

- European, and particularly West German, attention centers on improving readiness of forces designed to halt first echelon Warsaw Pact forces, as well as the provision of greater defense-in-depth.

- Most European NATO members are unwilling to meet the 4 percent annual growth rate (or even the agreed 3 percent rate) in defense spending that General Rogers suggests is necessary for acquisition of emerging technologies.

- The result is to produce Alliance trends that, on the one hand, include reluctance to contemplate escalation to the nuclear level under the prevailing strategic and Eurostrategic nuclear balances, and on the other hand, in the case of Britain and France, to emphasize nuclear weapons at the expense of conventional forces.

- Antinuclear "peace movements" continue their activities, particularly in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands, although on a diminished level since the beginning of INF deployment. Nevertheless, the polarization of the defense debate within Western Europe -- in particular in the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as in Britain and the Netherlands -- is
likely to persist in the years just ahead. Antinuclear protest movements represent a phenomenon that is based upon the value structures of "post-industrial societies," as well as the "national question" in the case of the Federal Republic of Germany.

• The dual-track policy that combines INF modernization with further arms control initiatives is perceived as necessary in undercutting antinuclear sentiment. In the FRG, for example, the Kohl Government gives full support to INF deployment, while at the same time pursuing a form of Ostpolitik which seeks to establish an "Island of detente" between East and West Germany.

• In part because of a lack of understanding of the potential role of strategic defense, there is substantial European opposition to the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative for its alleged effects on the penetrativity of the British and French national nuclear forces; its implications for nuclear deterrence; and the perception that the United States, but not Western Europe, could be protected, with attendant consequences for transatlantic strategic coupling.

• Among the elites surveyed, somewhat greater support exists for development of an anti-tactical missile (ATM) capability, although skepticism exists in Europe regarding its technical feasibility.

• The present centrist coalition government in Belgium supports INF deployment (although perhaps in reduced numbers) as long as deployments in the Federal Republic of Germany proceed on schedule.

• In the Netherlands, however, the prospects for INF deployment are diminished by deep divisions within the
governing centrist coalition and its member parties and within broader public opinion. Prime Minister Lubbers fears that a strong stand on INF deployment would cause the collapse of his government, and would likely bring to power the anti-INF Labor Party. Therefore, members of the Dutch cabinet have suggested "compromise" to appease members of the ruling coalition who seek to reduce Dutch nuclear responsibility in NATO. Their proposal is for 10-12 cruise missiles to be kept outside the Netherlands in peacetime, possibly in the Federal Republic of Germany, to be deployed to the Netherlands during a crisis. This option is unlikely to gain acceptance either within NATO or among anti-INF members of the Dutch Parliament.

As a result of the foregoing, NATO confronts security dilemmas that hold major implications for U.S. defense planning. These include:

- A perceived need to raise the conventional threshold without a commensurate willingness to devote substantially greater resources to conventional forces in NATO-Europe.

- A fracturing of the defense consensus in certain West European-NATO countries that diminishes support for NATO modernization, especially at the nuclear level, but also raises fundamental questions about the ability and willingness of European-NATO members to contribute to an increased conventional defense.

- Demographic trends that enhance the difficulties of conventional defense, unless technology becomes a substitute for greater or even existing manpower levels.
Wariness over the cost and perceived effectiveness of advanced technology even though it offers a potential substitute for certain nuclear capabilities and for scarce manpower.

Growing interest, nevertheless, in a form of deterrence based upon greater conventional means to counter a Soviet-Warsaw Pact strategy that does not distinguish clearly between conventional-nuclear thresholds.

SPANISH PERSPECTIVES

The ruling Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) originally opposed the June 1982 decision of the previous centrist government to join NATO, preferring instead a policy of neutrality. When the PSOE won the general election of October, 1982, it adopted a more noncommittal posture:

- As a signatory of the North Atlantic Treaty, Spain will continue to participate in NATO for the time being. Spain is represented in such committees as the High Level Group, the Special Consultative Group on Euromissiles, and the Eurogroup.

- However, the military integration process has been "frozen" by the Spanish Government. Spain does not currently participate in the force structure and its commands, or in its infrastructure. Spain has not signed certain important NATO conventions, such as the statutes for forces and personnel.
Moreover, Spain has disassociated itself from the INF "dualtrack" decision, preferring not to sanction the installation of any new missiles in Europe. There is broadly-based opposition to the stationing of any nuclear-armed forces in Spain.

The Spanish Government is committed to calling in spring 1985 a national referendum on NATO membership, against which Spanish public opinion is running. According to the Spanish Constitution, such referenda are only of a consultative nature, but the Socialist Government would be hard pressed to disavow its commitment to abide by the results.

Moderate elements within the PSOE, including Prime Minister Gonzalez, prefer to use the issue of NATO membership as a bargaining chip with which to achieve entry on favorable terms to the EEC, and possibly to gain concessions on the Gibraltar issue. Such elements apparently have delayed the referendum on NATO membership in order to be able to sell it as part of an overall agreement. They appear to hope that a satisfactory application of the "dual-track" decision on INF (presumably one which involves agreed Soviet-American limits on deployment) would help bring about a favorable response on the referendum. Britain has indicated that its support for Spain's EEC entry is dependent upon Spanish policy on the future of Gibraltar. Thus there is a form of three-way "linkage" that includes NATO, the EEC, and Gibraltar.

In view of Spain's uncertain status within NATO and its decision to "freeze" its military integration, programs designed to promote Spanish contributions to NATO of a more active nature -- such as modernization and integration of Spanish forces within NATO, or their redeployment to the Central Front -- will be postponed.
PORTUGUESE PERSPECTIVES

In marked contrast to Spain, Portugal was a founding member of the Atlantic Alliance. A European state with an Atlantic coastline and island outposts, Portugal forms an important geographic and political asset in NATO's IBERLANT command, with a strong interest in ensuring the security of the critical sea lines of communication (SLOC's) running through the Atlantic. The Portuguese tradition of alignment with the dominant maritime power -- historically Britain -- serves to strengthen Portugal's present link with the United States. Moreover, the struggle in 1974-75 against a communist takeover during the Portuguese Revolution bolstered the pro-Western commitment of the democratic Portuguese parties.

The fall in April 1983 of the more Atlanticist Christian Democratic Government, and the present dominance of the more Europeanist Socialists in the ruling coalition, has altered somewhat Portugal's defense policy. The government of Prime Minister Mario Soares places greater emphasis than its predecessor on West European unity and the development of some form of institutionalized European defense cooperation. However, the Atlanticist junior
partners of the coalition, the Social Democrats, retain significant influence, chiefly through the Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Carlos Mota Pinta, with implications for the current Portuguese defense perspectives:

- Portugal does not wish to serve merely as a provider of territory for NATO military installations. Portugal has earmarked one airmobile army brigade for NATO, although this unit is poorly equipped and would require extensive modernization and additional "lift" capabilities. Because there is an existing Portuguese commitment to deploy the NATO tasked brigade to Italy in a European conflict, Portugal seeks sufficient military modernization to transform what has traditionally been a colonial army into a modern defense capability. Moreover, Portugal is likely to continue to emphasize SLOC control and ASW and to seek assistance from the United States for the modernization of Portuguese naval and air forces. However, the perception exists in Portugal that there is a lack of support by NATO allies for Portuguese defense modernization.

- Another critical element of the Portuguese contribution to NATO is the provision of key military facilities to the United States and to the Federal Republic of Germany. These are Lajes, in the Azores, and Beja, in the Southern Alentejo region, respectively. Lajes plays an important role in U.S. Atlantic ASW and reconnaissance operations. Beja is used as a training base for the air force of the Federal Republic of Germany. Lajes has furnished a vital refueling and transshipment point for U.S. forces en route to the Middle East, as well as to Central and Southern Europe. However, Portugal would be reluctant, and perhaps unwilling, to grant use of facilities in the case of
Middle East confrontation involving the threat of another Arab oil boycott. In accordance with the 1983 bilateral agreement providing for U.S. access to Lajes, Portugal has adopted a highly restrictive policy with respect to the use of facilities on its territory by the United States for out-of-area contingencies.

- Portuguese willingness to contribute military forces to the NATO security system is also a result of Portugal's opposition to allowing Spain a position of regional hegemony. Portugal seeks to avoid a situation in which Spanish armed forces would be assigned NATO missions that could be performed by Portuguese armed forces. Portugal remains concerned over potential challenges to stability to the North Africa/Sahara area, and, in this context, values the role that Spain can perform in enhancing the security of the Balearic-Gibraltar-Canary triangle. Portugal opposes the establishment of a fourth NATO (Iberian) command in which Spain would be the dominant member. Should Spain join the military structure of NATO, Portugal might favor placing the Canary Islands (as a part of IBERLAN) within a new Spanish command under SACEUR, provided that the Azores also would be placed under IBERLAN. However, Spanish integration within the military command structure of NATO will continue to provide a contentious issue for Portugal.

CHINESE PERSPECTIVES

There are ongoing differences within the Party and People's Liberation Army elite over the priority to be accorded domestic and foreign threats, and on the
policies to pursue to reduce China's military weaknesses. These differences have been especially sharp between the "reformist wing" (now in ascendance) led by Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, and a more "orthodox wing," which attracts those who rose to prominence during the Cultural Revolution. Nevertheless, an apparent consensus prevails on the following core elements of China's national strategy.

- Avoid overdependence on foreign alliances, relying as far as possible on indigenous resources.
- Combine with other powers who share parallel interests to combat a common threat, such as Soviet "hegemonism."
- Protect China from external attack through a combination of deterrence, including a capacity for nuclear retaliation, large conventional forces, a potential for mass territorial defense and survival against invasion, and a latent strategic link with the United States.
- Avoid encirclement (especially a multifront, multienemy war), and refrain from military action unless China can control the scope of conflict (as in India in 1962 and Vietnam in 1979).
- Recover territory (Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macao) as circumstances permit, without renouncing the right to use force, but pursuing reunification by peaceful means.
- Gain stable access to foreign trade and modern technology (especially from the United States, Western Europe and Japan), in order to facilitate Chinese modernization and long-term security.
In the triangular relationship (US, USSR and PRC), China has altered both its strategic views and tactics and has maneuvered skillfully to advance its own interests:

- In recent years, China has proclaimed a more "independent" foreign policy oriented toward the Third World, damping its anti-Soviet rhetoric and increasing its criticism of the United States (especially in respect to Taiwan).

- This "evenhanded" Chinese public treatment of the two superpowers does not reflect China's actual assessment of the strategic situation or the implications for its security. Indeed, China has expressed "grave concern" over the buildup of Soviet military capabilities in Asia (including SS-20s, ground forces and maritime units). China's conventional and strategic forces are deployed preponderantly against the Soviet Union.

- Beijing's more independent line represents the pursuit of tactical equidistance between Moscow and Washington, largely to improve China's bargaining position and maneuverability within the strategic triangle.

China purports to view the nuclear balance primarily in global rather than regional terms, and as an element of the superpower rivalry. Consequently, Beijing has not supported American policies on a large number of arms control issues, including the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT):
For the public record, China expresses extreme skepticism that U.S.-Soviet strategic arms reduction talks (START) actually will slow the arms race, and suggests that both sides have used arms control as a means of achieving military advantage.

While urging a nuclear freeze for the superpowers, China evinces little interest in such a proposal for itself, as it would be placed at a disadvantage in relation to other nuclear powers. Beijing's nuclear policy pronouncements assert the "defensive" nature of the Chinese weapons program, while calling for pledges of no-first-use and non-use against nonnuclear states by all nuclear powers.

The PRC has presented itself as the Third World advocate in U.N.-sponsored arms control meetings. China's accession to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in October 1983 -- which entails acceptance of significant safeguards and nuclear inspections -- together with recent verbal assurances of Chinese interest in nonproliferation, may represent the beginning of a shift in Chinese policy on proliferation issues.

Public statements to the contrary, China continues to favor NATO's double-track decision to deploy INF if arms control negotiations with Moscow fail. China can be expected to oppose strongly any agreements that would reduce the number of Soviet SS-20s deployed against Western Europe, while leaving Soviet deployments in Asia unchecked.

Even though China now distances itself from U.S. warnings about Soviet expansionism, concern over Soviet threats to Chinese security remains a major factor in Beijing's view of the Sino-American relationship, which has
undergone significant improvement since the fall of 1983, symbolized by the exchange of visits in 1984 between Premier Zhao and President Reagan, together with agreements on nuclear energy cooperation, Chinese access to advanced technology and some weapons systems, and the resolution of various trade and investment issues.

Once generational succession occurs -- and at least a measure of military and economic modernization is achieved - the alternative strategies available to China's new elite will be perceived to increase. They will include the potential return of the PRC to a Mao-like policy of simultaneous opposition to both the Soviet Union and the United States, or even the development of a more genuine detente with the Soviet Union.

- However, the prospects for a substantial improvement in Sino-Soviet relations are diminished by the present difficulty, and probable impossibility, of resolving differences between Beijing and Moscow on such contentious issues as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviet-supported Vietnamese military operations in Cambodia and Laos, the stationing of Soviet SS-20s targeted against China, and the continuing modernization of Soviet forces deployed on the Sino-Soviet frontier.

- Present trends point toward a China that seeks maximal independence from both the United States and the Soviet Union, while attempting to benefit technologically from links with the United States and other industrially advanced countries.
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SECTION 1
WEST EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

1.1 INTRODUCTION

This report surveys and examines major currents of strategic thought in Western Europe and Northeast Asia, focusing in particular on the following eight countries: Great Britain, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, The Netherlands, Spain, Portugal and The People's Republic of China. For each of these countries, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis has identified national perspectives on a range of nuclear and non-nuclear defense policy issues with the objective of conceptualizing schools of thought for comparative, analytical purposes. Where feasible and appropriate, public attitudes toward questions of military strategy have been highlighted, together with the perspectives of defense and foreign policy elites. The analysis contained in this report, moreover, has been drawn from four larger Institute studies on Western Europe, China, Spain and Portugal, which are appended as companion volumes to this report. What follows then, is a summary overview of the principal findings and conclusions set forth in these four more detailed studies.

Western Europe today manifests a diversity of perspectives on defense, deterrence and strategy, especially...
with respect to the most appropriate balance between conventional and nuclear forces. Such perspectives represent a deepening cleavage within several West European countries, notably the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and to a lesser extent, Britain. In France, the defense debate has been far less divisive. Except for the left wing of the French Socialist Party, elements of the Communist Party, and the Movement des Radicaux de Gauche (MRG), there is a national consensus in support of an independent French defense capability based primarily upon the possession of a strategic nuclear deterrent force.

In its study of Britain, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium, the Institute has surveyed and categorized a broad spectrum of contemporary thought in each country, with special emphasis upon: changes in the U.S.-Soviet strategic nuclear balance and their implications for the deterrence of conflict in Europe; the emerging debate over strategic defense, including anti-ballistic missile (ABM) and anti-tactical missile (ATM) systems in Europe; the evolving military relationship between NATO and the Warsaw Pact; issues associate with the modernization of NATO theater nuclear forces, and, in the cases of Britain and France national nuclear capabilities; the opportunities for building a more robust "conventional option" for NATO; the implications for Alliance strategy and national force postures of conflicts outside of the NATO
area; and the potential of the so-called "peace movements" to influence the national defense debates and hence NATO strategy and force postures in each of the five countries. Separate "schools of thought" have been delineated for each country, encompassing political parties, including those in government and in opposition; prominent individuals and research organizations engaged in defense analysis; members of the media who contribute to the shaping of informed thought on defense; and those groups that have become the most vocal critics of defense in Western Europe, especially the antinuclear movement.

1.2 SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

For the countries surveyed, the schools of thought may be summarized as follows:

Britain

I. Strategic Deterrence -- which seeks to deter aggression at the upper end of the escalatory ladder, assigns high budgetary priority to a national strategic nuclear force, and favors the acquisition of Trident (D-5) as well as NATO INF modernization. This group has advocated cuts in conventional force expansion in an effort to cover the costs of an advanced strategic deterrent. It represents the policy of the Thatcher Government.

II. Battlefield Deterrence -- which would assign budgetary priority to the strengthening of conventional capabilities while relying on U.S. strategic deterrent forces. In the wake of the Falklands War, there is a growing appreciation in School II of the need for stronger nonnuclear forces -- especially
III. Balanced Posture -- which seeks as long as possible to steer a middle course between Strategic Deterrence and Battlefield Deterrence, despite the budget dilemma involved. Though still committed to Trident procurement, School III has become increasingly opposed to further cuts in the Royal Navy, especially in view of recent events in the South Atlantic.

IV. Unilateral Disarmament -- which rejects in principle all defense policies based on the use of threat of invoking nuclear weapons, and thus opposes Trident acquisition and cruise missile deployment, while favoring deep cuts in all military spending.

France

I. Strategic Deterrence -- Proportional deterrence based upon a countercity targeting policy in which the massive employment of French nuclear forces is called for should French sovereignty be threatened. Employment of tactical nuclear weapons is envisaged as a precursor to a strategic strike. President Francois Mitterrand espouses the perspectives represented in School I, whereas the left wing of the Socialist Party (CERES) holds to the minimalist deterrence concepts developed in School IV below.

II. Graduated Deterrence -- Proportional deterrence with the development of options to strike selected industrial aims. At the theater level, this school emphasizes an enlarged sanctuary concept in which the approaches to France could be defended by the employment of French nuclear and/or conventional forces.

III. Battlefield Deterrence -- Proportional deterrence at the strategic nuclear level, with an emphasis on the development of nuclear and nonnuclear defense options at the battlefield theater level.
IV. Minimal Deterrence -- Proportional deterrence at the strategic nuclear level based upon the deployment of sea-based nuclear forces, with the phasing out of French tactical nuclear systems and a decreased emphasis on French conventional and theater forces.

Federal Republic of Germany

I. Strategic Deterrence -- Which sees an overwhelming Soviet military and thus political threat to Western Europe; emphasis on defense over detente; apprehensive over U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic relationship and perceives Eurostrategic imbalance; supports INF modernization as means of ensuring "strategic coupling" with the United States; supports, in theory, Extended Battlefield concepts, but doubts their practicality; some interest in strategic defense concepts, but fearful of potential consequences for Europe's "coupling" with the United States.

II. Balanced Posture -- which sees Soviet assertiveness and its impact on other destabilizing factors as dangerous to world peace; dual emphasis on detente and defense; perceives imbalance in Eurostrategic systems; maintains that U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic balance is stable; supports European conventional collaboration, but not a European deterrent; supports modernization of NATO conventional defenses; no nuclear role for the Federal Republic; modernization INF views strategic defense as destabilizing.

III. Minimal Deterrence -- which sees a defensive-oriented Soviet assertiveness exacerbated by U.S. hostility; emphasis on arms control over defense modernization; maintains that Soviet forces in East Europe are "defensive"; U.S. as great a threat to European security as the Soviet Union; opposes European integration because of its implications for FRG relationships with the East (GDR); U.S.-Soviet "parity" irrelevant so long as both nations deploy "second-strike" nuclear forces; views strategic defense as destabilizing; supports a "security partnership" between FRG and Soviet Union.
IV. Unilateral Disarmament -- which sees a greater threat in U.S. hegemonism than from the Soviet Union; emphasis on detente over defense; maintains that Soviet forces in East Europe are "defensive"; perceives the United States as main threat to peace; opposes creation of a European nuclear deterrent and INF modernization; supports the denuclearization of Europe; Soviet/Warsaw Pact nuclear and conventional superiority is viewed as irrelevant; views strategic defense as destabilizing.

Belgium and the Netherlands

I. Right-of-Center Elites -- who are concerned over the tilting military balance (theater more than global and who favor strengthened nuclear and conventional forces for NATO.

II. Center Elites -- who are less concerned about tilting balances but wish to maintain deterrence; who would link INF modernization to the rate of progress in East-West arms negotiations; and who, while increasingly disenchanted with the notion of battlefield deterrence with short-range nuclear weapons, support strengthened conventional capabilities. This school of thought represents essentially the positions of the Belgian and Dutch governments.

III. Left-of-Center Elites -- who show virtually no concern over the global or theater balance or threat of Soviet attack; who assign a much higher priority to arms negotiations with Moscow than to strengthening NATO; who strongly oppose both INF modernization and the development of U.S. neutron weapons as unnecessarily provocative and who favor (in the Netherlands) significant reduction of present levels of nuclear weapons on the national territory and the elimination of certain "nuclear roles".

IV. Antinuclear Elites -- who reject all nuclear strategies as immoral; who categorically oppose U.S. neutron weapons, INF modernization, and most defense activities;
and who are much more critical of U.S./NATO than Soviet/Warsaw Pact nuclear weapons policies.

1.3 POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF THE SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

These schools of thought can be compared by reference to their perspectives on key defense issues, and to their relative political strength as measured by their impact upon the policies of governments which must be responsive to fluctuations in public opinion. At present, the relative influence of the various schools may be ranked as follows:

In Great Britain, the predominant view of the Thatcher Government is that of School I (Strategic Deterrence), although there is considerable support in the Conservative Party as a whole for the Balanced Posture School (III). In particular, given the conflict over the Falkland Islands, School III's arguments against a reduction in British maritime forces may now carry greater weight. In sharp contrast is the growing identification of the British Labour Party with School IV (Unilateral Disarmament). The Battlefield Deterrence School (II) is preferred by the new Social Democratic Party, elements of the Liberal Party and the right-wing of the Labour Party.

In France, the Mitterrand Government and the mainstream of the Socialist Party adhere primarily to the tenets of School I (Strategic Deterrence), as do members in the French Gaullist party, Rassemblement pour la Republique (R.P.R.). Within the left wing of the Socialist Party, however, there is substantial interest as well in the Minimal Deterrence School (IV). Former French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing and most of his supporters in the Union pour la Democratic Francaise (U.D.F.) are advocates of Graduated Deterrence (School IV) concepts. The French Communist Party (PCF), the far left of the Socialist Party (known by the acronym), and the Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche (MRG), are outside all four schools, and advocate unilateral
disarmament policies, although for reasons of political expediency, the Communist Party in 1977 endorsed the French deterrent force.

In the Federal Republic of Germany, the new Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) led government of Chancellor Helmut Kohl generally advocates policies of the Strategic Deterrence School (I). Leading members of Kohl's Free Democratic Party (FDP) coalition partners and moderates in the opposition Social Democratic Party (SPD) subscribe to the Balanced Posture School (II) themes. But School IV or Unilateral Disarmament pressures within the FDP and SPD, and against both parties from the "Greens" and peace movement, have caused the Minimal Deterrence School (III) to gain the upper hand in the SPD.

Finally, in the Low Countries, the governing coalitions draw together primarily Right-of-Center (School I) and Center (School II) elites, with some influence from the Left-of-Center (School III) elites. In Holland, the heterogeneous Christian Democratic Appeal adheres largely to the Center (School II), although some of its members are Left-of-Center (School III); its partner in the government formed in October, 1982, the increasingly influential Liberal Party, espouses a Right-of-Center (School I) perspective. In Belgium, the governing Christian Social and Christian Peoples parties fall mainly into the Center (School II); their allies after the 1981 elections, the increasingly important Liberal parties, adhere mainly to Right-of-Center (School I) views. The Dutch opposition parties -- Labor D'66 and Radicals -- espouse Left-of-Center (School III) views, influenced by Antinuclear (School IV) pressures. Similarly, the Belgian Socialist opposition favors the Left-of-Center (School III) and, within the Flemish Socialist group, Antinuclear (School IV) tenets.

The defense perspectives of these schools -- and to some extent their political popularity -- can be explored more fully by reference to the following major nuclear policy issues.
1.4 THE ROLE OF BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES

The perceived importance of the national deterrent force is central to the defense postures of Britain and France, according to the Strategic Deterrence (I) and Balanced Posture (III) Schools in Britain and the Strategic Deterrence (I), Graduated Deterrence (II), Battlefield Deterrence (III), and Minimal Deterrence (IV) Schools in France.

Both in Britain and France, the Strategic Deterrence School (I) emphasizes the modernization of the national deterrent force over a conventional force buildup. In both Britain and France, most adherents of the Strategic Deterrence School (I) emphasize the linkage between strategic and theater nuclear forces, and generally view the use of the latter as warning of the imminent employment of national strategic weapon systems. They attach as well highest priority to the modernization of the national deterrent force over a conventional force buildup. In both Britain and France, most adherents of the Strategic Deterrence School (I) emphasize the linkage between strategic and theater nuclear forces, and generally view the use of the latter as warning of the imminent employment of national strategic weapon systems. They attach as well highest priority to the modernization of their respective SSBN/SLBM force which is based primarily on the development
of French technologies, thereby reinforcing the independent nature of the French nuclear force.

In this regard, there is a consensus among French strategic analysts over the need to modernize the French sea-based ballistic missile force. This includes the development of a new technology (seventh) SSBN (quieter, faster, and deeper-diving), as well as a modern warhead, having greater accuracy (limited MIRV footprint) and an increased penetration capability (to offset a potential Soviet ABM "breakout"). For Britain, it is worth noting that many advocates of School II (Battlefield Deterrence) are willing to support a SLCM (as opposed to a Trident) follow-on to Polaris, precisely because they cannot conceive of an independent, non-NATO use of the British strategic deterrent.

The major difference between the British and French schools lies in their respective approaches to Atlantic and European defense cooperation. While British employment options are designed independently on a national basis, they are coordinated with those of NATO; the French, however, do not coordinate their targeting policy with NATO, and this leaves open the question of French participation in the forward defense of West Germany, even though elements of the French II Corps remain stationed in the FRG and the Mitterrand Government has decided to augment its logistical infrastructure (in cooperation with NATO) and intervention capabilities for possible use in the European theater (as
well as outside of Europe). Schools I and IV in France hold that the French deterrent force is credible only for the deterrence of conflict in French national territory (the sanctuary); whereas Schools II (Graduated Deterrence) and III (Battlefield Deterrence) emphasize the importance to French security of the approaches to France (enlarged sanctuary) and on this basis concede the potential for employment of French nuclear forces before French national territory is threatened directly.

Because of the broadly-based perceived importance in both Britain and France of the maintenance of national deterrent forces, it is not surprising that defense elites in both countries rejected Soviet calls for the inclusion of the Communist party and have supported the Soviet call for inclusion of British and French nuclear forces in the INF negotiations, engendering speculation that the PCF wishes to inhibit France's nuclear modernization programs. The majority of French analysts rejected the position of the PCF, with some suggesting that this is a ploy to provide "legitimate" grounds for the withdrawal of the Communist Party from the Government. Responsible defense elites in both France and Britain do acknowledge that it may be appropriate at some point in the future to consider inclusion of their respective national nuclear forces in some type of multilateral, strategic weapons negotiation, but for the time being, the force disparity between U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces, on the one hand, and those of Britain
and France, on the other hand, make the inclusion in INF negotiations of "third country" nuclear forces impossible.

In general, defense experts in countries without strategic nuclear forces -- Schools I and II in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Low Countries -- are now more favorably disposed toward British and French strategic forces than they were in the years when De Gaulle was challenging the nuclear dominance of a strategically superior United States in the Alliance. They are not displeased with the British decision to acquire Trident, because they do not wish to see France become the sole possessor of nuclear weapons in the European Community.

Concerning the inclusion of British and French nuclear forces in the INF negotiations, there is wider disagreement in the Federal Republic and the Low Countries. Most adherents of School I -- the strategic Deterrence School in West Germany and the Right-of-Center School in Belgium and the Netherlands -- are opposed to the idea. It is true, of course, that some School I advocates feel the Soviet Union was justified in raising the issue. However, for those who hold this view, the appropriate forum for consideration of "third country" forces is not the INF talks, but the START negotiations, since the British and French forces are strategic weapons.

The Balanced Posture School (II) in the Federal Republic of Germany, on the other hand, is divided on the issue of including European national nuclear forces for
INF. Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, a key proponent of School II views, generally argues against such inclusion, while at the same time indicating an appreciation of why the Soviet Union is concerned about British and French capabilities.

In Belgium and Holland, however, School II (Center Elites) support for the inclusion of British and French nuclear forces in INF has been much stronger. Since the Soviet walkout, moreover, considerable support has been building in School II, both in the Low Countries and in the Federal Republic, for merging the INF talks with the START negotiations. Not surprisingly, School III and IV in all three countries -- the Minimal Deterrence and Unilateral Disarmament Schools in West Germany, and the Left-of-Center Elites and Antinuclear Elites in Belgium and The Netherlands -- have favored for some time the inclusion of French and British nuclear forces in arms control negotiations, at either the INF or START level.

1.5 THE ROLE OF THE U.S. EXTENDED DETERRENT AND STRATEGIC DEFENSE

Both the Strategic Deterrence (I) and the Balanced Posture (III) Schools in Britain endorse the independence of the British nuclear force, but both schools also emphasize the importance of cooperating with the United States and NATO in force modernization programs and in developing nuclear employment options. In contrast, all of the schools
of thought in France endorse the autonomy of the French nuclear deterrent, although there are in each of the four schools varying degrees of support for a European deterrent, but only when the necessary political institutions evolve.

The preference of the British Battlefield Deterrence School (II) for reliance on the U.S. extended deterrent is similar to the attitudes of the Strategic Deterrence (I) and Balanced Posture (II) Schools in the Federal Republic of Germany. However, should the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee be seriously undermined, School I in the Federal Republic, associated primarily with the CDU/CSU government, would be more willing than the Balanced Posture School (II) at least to consider the need for a separate European strategic deterrent. Support for a broad Atlantic framework, with a strong European component, is found among adherents of the Battlefield Deterrence School (III) in France, and to a lesser extent, in the Graduated Deterrence School (II) which represents the strategic thought of former President Valery Giscard d'Estaing.

Moderate defense elites in the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium and The Netherlands (School I and II) are somewhat concerned over the changing global strategic balance. Their confidence in the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee has waned. This had been due more to political than to military factors. It is not that they see the United States as slipping into a seriously inferior military position (although there are misgivings on this
score), but rather that they lack confidence in U.S. political-diplomatic leadership and are critical (not always with justification) of American policy.

Most responsible European defense elites are apprehensive about the future of the U.S. extended deterrent if the United States develops strategic defensive capabilities based on exotic laser and directed energy technologies, as was called for in President Reagan's speech on March 23, 1983. In Britain and France, in particular, opposition to the strategic defense concept is widespread, probably due to perceptions that it could cast in doubt the credibility of small nuclear forces, and because of a failure in Europe to appreciate the ways in which strategic defense may enhance deterrence. There is fear among West Europeans, moreover, that, in providing the United States with a protective shield against nuclear attack, the American strategic defense initiative eventually will lead to the decoupling of U.S. and West European security. Paradoxically, at the same time, there is some support for the NATO development of ATM directed against Soviet shorter-range ballistic missiles like FROG, SCUD, and Scaleboard. There is interest, too, in development of ATM directed against the SS-20, although widespread doubts persist among Europeans over its practical feasibility. With the exception of School II (Battlefield Deterrence) in France, virtually no other school under study accepts the prospect that an ATM can be made to work.
THE ROLE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS (TNW)

The Battlefield Deterrence School in France (III), together with the Strategic Deterrence School (I) in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Balanced Posture School (III) in Britain, generally support the deployment of TNW and attach great importance to the development of the enhanced radiation weapon and new generation theater of Flexible Response for NATO, based as it is on the maintenance of credible nuclear and conventional options at the theater level. Although less explicitly in favor of deploying additional TNW (and especially the ERW) in NATO forward areas, the Federal Republic's Balanced Posture School (II) also tends to view tactical and battlefield nuclear weapons as necessary components of flexible response, and therefore as enhancements to extended deterrence. School II in Britain (Battlefield Deterrence) also espouses continued support for the flexible response strategy, but there is growing interest in this School -- especially in the SDP under David Owen's leadership -- in raising the nuclear threshold in Europe by strengthening conventional defenses and seeking agreement on a tactical nuclear free-zone of some depth on the NATO central front.

The French Battlefield Deterrence School (III) and the British Balanced Posture School (III) would consider the first use by NATO and France of tactical nuclear weapons
against targets in Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union. There is also some support for this concept within the ranks of the Graduated Deterrence School (II) in France, the Strategic Deterrence School (I) in the FRG, and the Battlefield Deterrence School (II) in Britain. Members of the Strategic Deterrence School (I) in France support the modernization of tactical nuclear weapons, but only in the context of a deterrence concept that calls for a capability to warn an enemy of an impending strategic-nuclear employment.

For members of all these schools, with the possible exception of School I in France, tactical nuclear weapons employment concepts need not be inconsistent with the views of U.S. analysts who support second echelon targeting. Neither are they necessarily inconsistent with the U.S. Airland Battle Concept, although most defense elites in Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany are skeptical of the cost estimates and potential for developing the emerging technologies that are necessary to implement the targeting requirements of Airland Battle.

Centrist and defense-knowledgeable elites in the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands (Schools I and II), however, have become increasingly disenchanted in recent years with battlefield nuclear deterrence, and the presence of U.S. short-range nuclear weapons on their soil. Those weapons, once seen as contributing to deterrence, are now viewed as a source of
increasing danger if they are part of a strategy that calls for a "low nuclear threshold". In particular, the Dutch government has been formally committed for eight years to reducing the nuclear weapons in NATO and on their national territory. Antinuclear forces (and to some extent School III -- Minimal Deterrence -- in the Federal Republic of Germany) have learned to take full advantage of this rising tide of apprehensiveness, arguing that the TNW systems threaten to escalate a conventional conflict to a limited nuclear war confined to Europe.

1.7 NATO MODERNIZATION OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF)

In Britain, the Strategic Deterrence School (I) and the Balanced Posture School (III) endorse the NATO dual track decision of December 12, 1979. However, the problems perceived in Britain of insufficient consultation by the United States with regard to the Grenada operation have reinforced interest even in these schools in a dual key system for INF, which would physically ensure a British veto on employment. Support for such a system predominates in School II (Battlefield Deterrence), which is ambivalent on the dual track decision in any event. This is largely due to the need of the Social Democratic Party-Liberal Party Alliance to placate the Liberal left -- which adheres to School IV (Unilateral Disarmament), rejecting the notion of stability through nuclear deterrence -- also calling for a
dual key in the case of deployment while continuing to oppose the dual track decision in toto. However, the Thatcher Government's staunch support for the dual track policy precludes adoption of the dual key option for the life of the current Parliament.

In France, the Strategic Deterrence (I) and the Minimal Deterrence (IV) Schools are opposed to tactical nuclear systems in general, because they are perceived to dilute the deterrent capacity of the strategic nuclear deterrent force. Members of School I, however, could support INF modernization as a means of making available a more credible capability for demonstration of the French willingness to employ strategic nuclear weapons. It is only in this context that School I could support the deployment (in limited numbers) by France of the Enhanced Radiation Warhead. The left wing of Mitterrand's Socialist Party (CERES) is opposed to all nuclear weapons deployment and espouses positions close to the Unilateral Disarmament School in Britain (IV) and in the Federal Republic of Germany (IV).

The relative importance of arms control negotiations over the deployment in Europe of INF by NATO has emerged as a contentious political issue in all of the countries surveyed, although less in France where the focus of debate is on the national deterrent forces. In the FRG, the so-called "missile debate" already has produced a split within the Social Democratic Party (SPD), contributing both
to the fall of the Schmidt Government and to a substantial weakening of the Balanced Posture School (II) influence in the SPD. As a matter of fact, the rise of the Minimal Deterrence School (III) to dominance in the SPD has caused that party to reject deployment.

The prominence of Strategic Deterrence (School I) and Balanced Posture (School II) protagonists in the CDU/CSU-FDP government in the Federal Republic, however, has brought full support for the deployment of INF on West German soil. Nevertheless, while the Kohl Government is likely to remain committed publicly to full deployment, because of ongoing pressures from Schools III and IV (the antinuclear movement) it also will feel the need to demonstrate its strong support for arms control negotiations. The Kohl Government, in fact, has emerged in recent months as the principal European advocate of the idea that an arms buildup in the West must be accompanied by a continuation of dialogue and arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union. Moreover, the existence of School II proponents in the governing coalition -- drawn largely from the ranks of the FDP -- may result in official West German demands for the inclusion of INF in START talks, should the latter ever resume.

Such policies, it is worth noting, reflect the Kohl Government's intention of balancing between the need to strengthen West Germany's security ties with the Western Alliance and the political necessity of satisfying domestic
demands for the continuation of detente. In turn, this shift toward a detente policy by conservatives in the CDU-CSU is reflected most poignantly by a determined effort to improve inter-German defense perspectives. The Social Democratic Party's rejection of INF deployment and the subsequent rise of a majority in the party who are skeptical of the doctrines and strategies of nuclear deterrence mark the decline of a consensus on nuclear strategy that has ruled in the FRG since 1960. The Kohl Government believes, therefore, that a dual track policy of modernization and arms control will serve best to undercut and thereby contain antinuclear sentiments in the SPD and peace movement which threaten to undermine the security of the Federal Republic of Germany.

In contrast to the steadfastness of Chancellor Kohl and his supporters, two politically pivotal allies, Belgium and the Netherlands, have become hesitant about nuclear weapons and strategies in the face of growing antinuclearism fanned by religious groups and leftist parties. This is especially true in Holland, where the ability of the antinuclear movement and left-of-center parties (Schools III and IV) to influence the sustainability of thin parliamentary majorities, makes it unlikely that the Dutch government will support the full deployment of INF forces (48 cruise missiles) scheduled to be stationed on Dutch soil.

Prior to the termination of INF negotiations in Geneva, support for INF deployment among the governing
parties (primarily identified with School II's centrist views) had been ambiguous, designed largely to facilitate a favorable outcome in the arms reduction talks. Now that those negotiations have proven fruitless, the tendency among government leaders (notably Prime Minister Lubbers) has been to maintain the principle of a nuclear defense of Holland by accepting INF, albeit in fewer numbers than originally planned, but to appease the antinuclear sentiment in the country by implying that the Netherlands would prefer an elimination of all shorter-range battlefield nuclear weapons on Dutch soil. The sacrifice of the latter is considered to be a necessary symbolic price to pay for fulfilling the much more important task of presenting the Soviet Union with a solid front on INF. A compromise deal with NATO in which Holland's nuclear responsibilities in the tactical field will be reduced, and a lesser number of cruise missiles deployed, is the likely outcome of the parliamentary debate on the INF issue in June 1984.

It is possible, of course, that the current trend toward reducing Holland's nuclear tasks in NATO will lead to an outright rejection of INF altogether. In fact, Dutch cabinet leaders have most recently developed a new option dubbed "crisis deployment," which envisages the acceptance of GLCM's on Dutch territory only in a state of crisis. The intention seems to be to find a face-saving way to accept the missiles "in principle" but not in practice. Nevertheless, given Prime Minister Lubbers' desire not to
Weaken Holland's role and voice in NATO, a compromise formula allowing at least limited deployment is the preferred (and still the most likely) option. In addition to fewer cruise missiles, such a compromise might well include the replacement of Nike surface-to-air missiles with Patriots armed with non-nuclear warheads, together with the removal from Holland of NATO's nuclear mines and its Neptune submarine system.

Belgium, which manifests less opposition to nuclear weapons in ideological and religious grounds than does Holland, delayed its cruise missile deployment decision largely because of coalition fragility in the face of economic and linguistic community problems. The government managed to block a parliamentary vote that would have cancelled deployment, but since the Soviet walkout in Geneva no final decision has been reached. Full deployment of cruise missiles is by no means a foregone conclusion in Belgium, but it is far more likely than in Holland, given the strength of Schools I and II (Right-of-Center and Center-Elites) within the governing coalition. The current opposition places relatively slight emphasis on INF issues and, at any rate, under no foreseeable circumstances could the Socialists (who constitute the principal contenders for power) govern in Belgium without one of the relatively moderate center parties (Flemish People's Union or the Social Christians). Thus, even the inherent instability and divisiveness of Belgian coalition politics is unlikely to
turn the country away from a Center or School II perspective, and at least qualified support for INF.

1.8 NATO CONVENTIONAL OPTION AND EUROPEAN DEFENSE COLLABORATION

School II (Battlefield Deterrence) in Britain, School II (Balanced Posture) in the Federal Republic of Germany and School II (Center Elites) in the Low Countries emphasize the development of a conventional option for NATO, and, at the same time, greater nonnuclear defense collaboration among the European NATO allies. Whereas all four schools of thought in France support increased European defense collaboration, only School III (Battlefield Deterrence) emphasizes such cooperation within the context of the Atlantic Alliance. The other three French schools support greater European defense collaboration, but under strictly European auspices, most notably the West European Union (WEU). If the Federal Republic of Germany is involved, defense elites in France would prefer to work through the various European Community (EC) fora, or, alternatively, through an ad hoc framework.

It is important to note, however, that none of the French schools seek Europeanization at the expense of the U.S. extended deterrent. With the notable exception of the French Communist Party, CERES and radical leftist parties, virtually all French strategic analysts and policymakers concede the importance of the United States in providing for
the defense/deterrence of nonnuclear Europe. In part, this is due to the "national" nature of British and French nuclear forces and of the disparity between U.S. and Soviet strategic arsenals, on the one hand, and those of Britain and France, on the other hand. In part, it is due as well to the widespread skepticism in Western Europe as to the feasibility of developing a "credible" conventional option for NATO.

In this context, there is little real support for increasing national defense budgets to provide for enhanced conventional forces for NATO. Moreover, in light of the adverse demographic trends apparent in the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and the United States, in particular, there is doubt as to whether the manpower requirements for a credible NATO conventional option (as opposed to continued reliance on flexible response) could ever be met. Nor is there much sympathy among West European defense elites for the very concept of conventional deterrence which they tend to view as testimony of an American intention to drawdown the U.S. commitment to the defense of Western Europe.

Nevertheless, efforts to enhance Franco-German defense collaboration, especially for the design and production of new conventional military technologies, steadily have increased over the past few months. Chancellor Kohl apparently hopes to use the issue of European security cooperation as a way of revitalizing the fractious European Economic Community, and possibly as a
means for creating broader domestic support for bolstering conventional defense. Rather than as a sign of more explicit West German preference for a conventional deterrence option, however, this trend probably should be read as a reflection of the Federal Republic's tendency to reach out to France (and the concept of a "European" pillar to the Atlantic Alliance) at a time when the reliability of the U.S. nuclear commitment is perceived to be uncertain. For its part, the Kohl Government will continue to resist any suggestion that improving West European defense cooperation lessens the need for U.S. nuclear and conventional forces in Europe.
SECTION 2
SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE PERSPECTIVES

2.1 INTRODUCTION

For Spain and Portugal schools of thought have also been developed based upon Spanish and Portuguese perspectives on: the East-West military balance; each country's role in the defense/deterrence of Western Europe; "out-of-area" issues; and each nation's ties to the United States. The geographic setting, levels of prosperity, and socio-cultural heritage particular to Spain and Portugal have contributed to the development of Spanish and Portuguese schools of thought that are quite different from those developed for Britain, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium.

2.2 SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

For both Spain and Portugal, four schools of thought can be conceptualized.

School I: Atlanticist

This School emphasizes each country's ties to the United States and NATO Europe and perceives a threat to Western interests in the growth of Soviet military power. Within this School there is support for Alliance modernization programs, especially as they affect the ability of NATO to protect the vitally important sealanes of the Atlantic Ocean and the approaches to the Mediterranean. This School supports
the continuation of each country's bilateral relationship with the United States, although in Spain, and to a lesser extent in Portugal, there is minimal support either for the U.S. use of local military facilities in "out-of-area" contingencies, or for the American stationing of nuclear weapons at these facilities. This School is represented by members of the former centrist party in Spain, the UDC, and by the Social Democrats and the Social Democratic Center Parties in Portugal.

School II: Europeanist

This School emphasizes the role of Western Europe in acting as a "broker" in superpower relations. Members of this School are less supportive of the transatlantic tie and seek to develop for Western Europe its own institutional frameworks for dealing with security issues. In both Spain and Portugal, the mainstream of the Socialist Party is represented by this School. In Spain, School II is associated with the Socialist government's desire to call a national referendum on Spain's membership in NATO and her application to join the European Communities. On security issues this School, in both Spain and Portugal, seeks greater cooperation with other Mediterranean and North African countries. It also emphasizes North-South issues and (for Spain) ties to Latin America.

School III: National Bilateral

This School emphasizes the unique national interests of both countries and seeks to develop national security policies on the basis of national considerations. Membership in NATO and the European Communities is shunned by this School. The United States is perceived to be as great a threat to Spanish and Portuguese interests, respectively, as the Soviet Union. This School, which includes most of the left wing of the PSOE in Spain, advocates a European nuclear-free zone and the abrogation of bilateral treaty ties to the United States. It also supports the dissolution of blocs in
Europe and seeks to cut national military forces to the minimal level necessary for a territorial defense role.

School IV: Unilateral Disarmament

This School supports the dissolution of "blocs" in Europe and emphasizes a European nuclear-free zone. Members of this School, in both Portugal and Spain, consider the United States -- and not the Soviet Union -- the principal threat to European security interests. Not surprisingly, members of this School, including the Spanish and Portuguese Communist Parties, also support unilateral disarmament in Western Europe. Hence, this School opposes the U.S. extended deterrent concept and the establishment of foreign bases on Spanish and Portuguese territory.

In both Spain and Portugal, Atlanticist School I represents perspectives on defense and national security issues that are most compatible with the interest of the United States. Members of this School in both countries support Spain's membership in NATO and the maintenance of close relations with the United States.

Whereas in both countries the perspectives of School I dominated the national defense debates in the late 1970's, currently the European School (II) is favored by the Spanish and Portuguese Socialist governments. School II in Portugal is represented by the current Prime Minister Mario Soares, and Foreign Minister Jaime Gama. Like their Spanish counterparts, including Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez (PSOE) and former Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez (CDS), they emphasize greater European unity and the concept of Western Europe as a "broker" between the superpowers. In Spain,
School II supports the linkage of Spanish membership in NATO to the issues of the EEC and Gibraltar; while in Portugal, School II views are manifested in support for a linkage between Portugal's membership in NATO and European issues, including membership in the ECs. In both countries, a refusal or delay in their respective applications for membership in the European Communities would likely result in the emergence of the National Bilateral School (III) as the predominant perspective of both countries' Socialist governments.

Currently School II predominates in both countries, although elements of School III have substantial influence. In Spain, the government emphasizes Spain's role in Europe and is likely to continue support for an eventual referendum on NATO membership. In fact, Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez has announced that the national referendum on Spanish membership in NATO will take place in the spring of 1985. It is the position of the Gonzalez Government that Spain's membership in NATO is tied to Madrid's membership in the European Communities. If Spain enters the European Communities before the referendum takes place, it is likely that the Spanish government will campaign actively for a favorable referendum on NATO membership. Alternatively, if Spain's entry into the European Community is not resolved by 1985, then it is likely that the result of the Spanish referendum will be to reject membership in the Atlantic
Alliance. In this event, the fact that there are advocates of Schools III and IV within the PSOE will continue to militate against further Spanish integration within NATO.

Thus, programs designed to promote Spanish contributions to NATO of a more active nature -- such as modernization and integration of Spanish forces within NATO, redeployment of Spanish ground and air forces to the Central Front, and augmentation of tasks for the Spanish Navy -- will have to be placed on the back burner for the immediate future, barring a defeat of the PSOE in the national elections or an unlikely revision of its platform. Therefore, attention must be paid to possible Spanish contributions of a more passive nature -- such as provisions of staging, logistic and prepositioning facilities -- that capitalize upon Spain's geographic position, rather than upon its armed forces.

The outcome of the Spanish referendum on NATO will affect Spain's desire to renegotiate the U.S.-Spanish bilateral Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Understanding. This could have profound implications for the defense/deterrence posture of the United States, especially if further restrictions are placed on U.S. nuclear weapons transit and maintenance in regard to Spanish bases and military facilities. It could also hamper U.S. power projection to Southwest Asia and, in turn, affect future negotiations with Portugal on American use of, and access to, Lajes and the development of a new base on
mainland Portugal. For this reason, a closer scrutiny of Spanish and Portuguese perspectives is warranted.

2.3 SPANISH PERSPECTIVES

Before the establishment of democratic institutions, in the mid-1970s, Spanish strategic thought was dominated by a narrow concept of national defense defined as the protection of Spain's territorial integrity and sovereignty against internal and external enemies. According to the prevailing perception, communism represented the primary threat while Morocco was considered another focus of conflict, in view of Moroccan claims to the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla on the North African coast. Thus, political control and protection of the frontiers were the two main objectives; and the Army, among the three services, was the preferred and hence the primary instrument, as it was intrinsically capable of accomplishing both aims. The Navy and the Air Force were considered supplementary arms of national security, charged principally with providing tactical and general support for the Army against any potential external threat, particularly regarding North Africa.

Parallel to these trends in strategic thought (controlled and extolled by the Army and by the Francoist military establishment), there developed a school of thought which perceived Spain as primarily a maritime nation, which
had depended on the security of its surrounding seas to protect itself and to exert power throughout its modern history. This current of strategic thought was fervently promoted by the Navy, thus leading to debate on security matters and challenging the main tenets of the Army-backed established doctrine. This perspective helped as well to put Spain's security in a broader context, intertwined with that of other maritime nations of Europe and America. The outward-looking Navy, though politically very conservative and never at variance with the doctrines and deeds of the Franco regime, became wedded to the idea of defense within an alliance of maritime powers. Thus, the Navy was the first Spanish service which embraced NATO doctrines and procedures, even before the question of membership in NATO was taken up by Spanish political forces.

The relaxation of social controls, which characterized the last years of the authoritarian Franco regime, eased restrictions and promoted discussion of the broadest aspects of defense issues. Later, the institution of democracy allowed an intense scrutiny of the role of the armed forces in a democratic society, calling into question the central position held by the military in the Spanish body politic. As yet, however, the strategic debate has not substantially progressed toward the definition of a defense policy which properly integrates both internal and external security considerations, though the 1982 debate on NATO membership revealed and developed incipient perspectives on
the need for such a policy. Additional stimulus for public awareness of the importance of security matters has been provided by the ideological orientations of the major Spanish political forces. Each party has tended to align itself with a particular broad political strain present in the European political spectrum. Centrist and rightist perceived first of all the Soviet threat and supported allied defense; leftist parties emphasized detente, the dissolution of blocs and the revision or cancellation altogether of the Spanish-American bilateral relationship.

In summation, one can make the following general observations regarding current strategic perspectives in Spain:

- Neutralism has waned but not disappeared from Spanish national consciousness.
- There is a confused identification of the North African Maghreb area as a source of potential conflict.
- There is no strong, clear public perception of a direct Soviet threat to Spain, although the public identifies itself on this issue according to general ideological alignment; Those embracing liberal democratic ideals certainly see a general threat against Western democratic societies, while extreme rightists share this view, but disavow any democratic leaning.
- The general perception that the internal threat is graver than anything that could possibly come from beyond Spanish frontiers has been justified by the rapid increase in terrorist activities -- especially in the Basque areas -- in recent years.
The reformist, internationalist outlook among some strategists in Spain has been incorporated into the Plan Estratégico Conjunto (PEC, Joint Strategic Plan), which is the centerpiece around which revolves the organization of the Spanish defense effort. It is drawn up, at the request of the Minister of Defense, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Junta de Jefes de Estado Mayor, JUJEM). The main doctrinal focus behind the PEC was elaborated, interestingly enough, with Spanish membership in NATO held in mind. This was made clear when the JUJEM declared its support for joining the Alliance, before the June 1982 parliamentary debate approving Spanish entry. No doubt this distinct pro-NATO imprint still inspires the document, though the JUJEM carefully reserves open criticism of the Socialist Government's decision to put the issue to a popular referendum.

As far as threats to Spanish security are concerned, the PEC highlights Spain's traditional concern over potential threats from Northern Africa, primarily Moroccan claims on Ceuta and Melilla, or interference with Spanish sovereignty by the Maghreb countries. The PEC also identifies the threat the Warsaw Pact poses for Spain, a threat which could materialize through a Soviet invasion of Europe that reaches the Pyrenees. This notion reflects the army's typical approach to defense and to the protection of the Spanish territorial sanctuary. For the Army, the Pyrenees are the first line of defense in a European conflict.
Threats to national security can also materialize on the high seas, in the air and against Spanish shores and sealines of communication. The PEC apparently makes a point of Spanish dependency on overseas sources of raw and vital materials, as more than 90 percent of Spanish trade utilizes vulnerable sea routes. The Spanish geographical position involves other inherent threats, especially since Spain is separated from Africa only by a few miles of Mediterranean waters. A threat to Spanish territory, therefore, could come from a potential Soviet presence of bases in one of the Maghreb countries, while potential conflicts in the Western Mediterranean also could pressure Madrid.

The prominent geographical position of Spain along the Strait of Gibraltar and its approaches also subjects the country to the risks of conflict involving control of that critical "choke point". Non-innocent transit is a particular problem, especially concerning passage by strategic submarines. The Strait's waters, especially those of its western mouth, might be sown with mines, thereby jeopardizing both commercial and naval maritime transit. From the Spanish perspective, both these risks are compounded by the fact that the British keep an "unwanted" military base in a point so crucial to Spanish security.

One distinct conception of the PEC is that of the "Eje Baleares-Estrehco-Canaris" (Balearic-Strait of Gibraltar-Canary Islands axis), which is the geostrategic hinge around which the Spanish defense effort swings, facing
threats that may come from three main areas: the western Mediterranean, the southern Mid-Atlantic and North Africa. It is along this axis that Spain focuses its military effort. The PEC also calls for Spanish cooperation with the Western and allied countries in an emergency or war. In this context, Spain is perceived as the rearguard of Europe, as a redoubt from which to project force and to transport help to beleaguered Central Europe and the Mediterranean allied countries. Military resupply and logistical support missions could emerge as important NATO roles for Spain, although such efforts probably would be made only in support of NATO conventional forces, given Spanish opposition to the basing of nuclear related facilities in Spain.

One clear military mission for Spanish armed forces, mainly the Navy and Air Force, would be the protection of trans-Atlantic convoys. Due account is taken by the PEC of NATO plans for defense of critical areas, two of them being the Atlantic approaches to southwestern Europe and the Mediterranean. The PEC also takes into consideration NATO mobilization plans: transport by NATO of up to 1.25 million men and 10 million tons of supplies is a task that unquestionably could benefit from all the escort capacity the Spanish Navy could provide for the protection of convoys from the mid-Atlantic to Sicily in cooperation with allied forces. Antisubmarine warfare also would be a primary responsibility of the Spanish Navy in this area. Intrusion by Soviet surface combatants in the approaches to Spanish
shores is unlikely although air power projected from the Iberian Peninsula and the Canaries must take this risk into consideration.

Nevertheless, strategic thought within the ruling Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) is a variance with a number of these precepts. Although very little is known of Defense Minister Serra's military preferences, some inklings can be discerned from his public statements. He believes, for example, that "a deterrent capacity is a component of national sovereignty" and that "Spain should pursue a defense policy of integration in Europe." He has demonstrated great dedication to the implementation of military policies outlined by former governments and consistently proposed by the armed forces' reformists, who have been operating from within the military since the early 1970s. He is not known, however, for having defended the doctrinal assumptions on which defense and military reforms have been propounded and executed during the last few years, and he even rejects the term "military reforms". One of those assumptions, it is important to note, was that the natural course of Spanish progress in matters of security and defense was to join the Alliance at a certain stage decided by political forces.

Equally telling, it is hard to find one single text produced by the Socialist press, or a declaration by PSOE leaders, in which the Soviet Union is portrayed as a military power which threatens to control by force or subversive
pressure Western Europe. Those expressions are simply not in the Socialist literature and much less so in the Party's doctrine. In this light, Spain's Foreign Minister Fernando Moran sees the Soviet Union as a country that overreacts to its perception of military and technological inferiority vis-a-vis the United States. Yet, Socialist leaders like to be considered sufficiently wise to realize that the Soviet Union and world communism represent a threat to European values, and they apparently have faced up to Soviet realities from the days when Sr. Felipe Gonzales, in the name of PSOE, signed in Moscow (in December 1977) a declaration with the CPSU, committing the PSOE to resisting the aggrandizement of military blocs. The PSOE earnestly maintained this anti-bloc attitude (although the Soviet Union is, of course, head of one of the blocs) up to and through the 1982 election, in which it announced that a Socialist Government would suspend the process of military integration in NATO, pending a referendum on the issue.

Blocs, according to Sr. Moran, tend to draw benefits from globalizing local or regional conflicts, that is, from placing them, and forcing regional actors to be placed, in the context of the broader East-West conflict. The Socialist Government, moreover, has been very cautious about introducing value judgements into its assessment of the international situation when the Soviet Union is involved. Strong words were used by Sr. Moran when the Korean airliner was shot down, but Spain refused to join other European nations in applying sanctions.
Still, rather than trying to interpret Government intentions from pronouncements on the Soviet Union, it is more useful to examine the positive pronouncements that seem to bind Spain to the defense of the West. As stated by Sr. Moran in a recent article (1983):

Spain will...fulfill all the obligations which derive from her position as a NATO member and, as long as she continues to be a member of the Alliance, the rest of the signatories of the Treaty of Washington can be assured that my country will be a loyal ally and exact in the fulfillment of its obligations. Spain does not want to conduct an ambiguous foreign policy.

Sr. Moran announced in the December 1982 NATO Council meeting in Brussels that the Spanish Government planned to conduct a detailed study of Spain's defense interests and alternative means to guarantee Spanish national security.

It is not rare to hear Spanish ministers and secretaries of state saying that NATO is not after all the bogey some of them portray it to be in public. But none of them has dared to take up the challenge thrown them by the Vice President when he said last July:

I believe Spain should not be in NATO, that it should withdraw. There are many people who do not think it should, but they only say so in restricted circles. If there is anybody inside or outside government, or critics, that think otherwise, they should speak out.

His statement seemed to refer to several ministers, including those for Defense and Economy, for example, as well as the Secretary of State for Relations with the EEC. However, the statement of the Vice President only elicited speeches by four ministers in favor of withdrawing, and none by those in favor of remaining.
Those who spoke out based their remarks on the bible of party wisdom the 29th Congress Program (of October 1981) which set forth four fundamental reasons why Spain should not join NATO:

- NATO does not guarantee Spanish territorial integrity, because the North Atlantic Treaty excludes part of Spanish territory from the Atlantic defensive system (i.e., the North African enclaves).
- NATO does not cover Spanish security and defense needs, given the risk and threat in theaters beyond the area contemplated in the Treaty.
- Participation in NATO means an increase in the risks of nuclear destruction of the Spanish people.
- Spanish adherence to NATO would provoke the other bloc's reaction, involving the strengthening or enlargement of the Warsaw Pact, increasing overall tension and risks of war.

With the first argument, the Socialists point out that NATO does not protect the Spanish/North African enclaves from Moroccan encroachment; the implications of the second point is that Morocco is the only likely threat to Spain; the third point is self-explanatory; and the fourth is the official expression of the old Socialist tenet, maintained by the party experts even before Spain joined the Alliance, that, by becoming a member, Spain would destabilize the European balance and encourage the other bloc to enlarge.

The Spanish attitude towards NATO, then, is noncommittal and selective. Spanish representatives participate in a few dozen committees of the scientific,
political and military branches, among them the High Level Group, the Special Consultative Group on Euromissiles, Eurogroup, etc. Spain does not participate in the force structure and its commands, nor in matters of infrastructure. Spain has not yet signed certain important NATO conventions, such as the statutes for forces and personnel.

Spain has disassociated itself from the issue of INF deployment. Foreign Minister Moran did not adhere to the final communiqué of the North Atlantic Council on December 1982, which reaffirmed the dual track decision. The reason given by a Government spokesman was that Spain considered it more honest "not to underwrite the spirit of a document which, inter alia would involve the sanctioning of the installation of new missiles in Europe".

The official Spanish attitude towards NATO was defined by Sr. Moran in his presentation before the Atlantic Council in December 1982. He made the following points:

- Spain has signed the Washington Treaty and will remain a loyal ally while in NATO.
- The military integration process is to be frozen.
- The Government's position on the issue will be declared after conducting a thorough examination of the defense and security needs of the country.
- A referendum will be conducted to allow the people to express opinions on NATO membership.
- Allies will be consulted before the Government adopts a decision.
In any case, the Government will set in place the modalities of a Spanish contribution to Western defense, which is assured whether or not Spain remains in the Alliance.

2.4 PORTUGUESE PERSPECTIVES

In marked contrast to Spain, Portugal was a founding member of the Atlantic Alliance and remains an integral member of NATO. A European state with an Atlantic coastline and orientation, Portugal's island outposts guard the approaches to the European continent. As such, Portugal forms an important asset in NATO's Iberland Command, and maintains an interest in ensuring the safety of the critical sea lines of communication (SLOC's) running from the North and South Atlantic.

Despite its Atlantic orientation, Portugal is committed to the defense of West Europe through NATO. Portugal has earmarked one airmobile army brigade for NATO, although this unit is poorly equipped and would require extensive modernization and additional "lift" capabilities to prove effective. As there is an existing Portuguese commitment to deploy the NATO-tasked brigade to Italy in a European conflict, Portugal seeks to implement sufficient military modernization to transform what has traditionally been a colonial army into a modern force structure. However, the perception exists in Portugal that there is a lack of support by NATO allies for the requisite modernization of Portuguese defense capabilities. Thus, as
the financial obligations associated with Portuguese participation in NATO are increasing, the willingness of the allies to underwrite significant support for Portugal is perceived as being undercut by competing requests for economic aid from more fractious NATO members, including Spain and Greece. Thus, the perception exists that Portugal is being punished for its loyalty.

Another critical element of the Portuguese contribution to NATO is the provision of key air bases to the United States and to the Federal Republic of Germany. These are Lajes, in the Azores, and Beja, in the Southern Alentejo region, respectively. Lajes plays an important role in U.S. Atlantic ASW and reconnaissance operations. The site of a U.S. Military Airlift Command, Lajes has also emerged as a vital refueling and transshipment point for U.S. forces en route to the Middle East, as well as to Central and Southern Europe. However, this latter contribution has become controversial, particularly with regard to U.S. access for out-of-area contingencies. The current Socialist and Social Democratic coalition government of Mario Soares reserves the right to provide or deny the United States access on a case-by-case basis. Thus while Portugal might support anti-Libyan contingencies, the Portuguese would be reluctant to grant the United States the use of their facilities in the case of a Middle East confrontation involving the threat of another Arab oil boycott similar to the one imposed in the Yom Kippur War of
October 1973. However, Portugal would probably be more willing than Spain to provide support for U.S. intervention in most out-of-area contingencies.

U.S.-Portuguese relations have become more complicated ten years after the "Revolution of Flowers" of 1974. Portugal's defense modernization program has been slowed by the task of constitutional reform as well as by the repercussions of the rapid Portuguese withdrawal from overseas possessions in the mid-1970s. The Council of the Revolution, through which the Portuguese military had exercised a major political role since 1974, was dissolved only in August 1982 after the new Constitution was adopted by two-thirds of the Portuguese Parliament. The fragile Portuguese democratic political system has thus confronted formidable constraints which have limited its defense spending.

In April 1983, Portuguese voters turned out the governing Social Democratic/Christian Democratic coalition. The Socialist Party under Mario Soares gained a plurality, and formed a new governing coalition with the Social Democratic Party. With the ouster of the more Atlanticist Christian Democrats and the dominance of the more Europeanist Socialists in the ruling coalition has come a different emphasis for Portuguese defense policy. The Soares Government places a greater emphasis on European defense cooperation. This is in keeping with a conceptualization of Western Europe as an intermediary or
"broker" between the two superpowers. Moreover, the Atlanticist junior partners of the coalition, the Social Democrats, do retain significant influence, chiefly through the person of Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Carlos Mota Pinta. Thus, Portugal is likely to continue to emphasize its SLOC control and ASW roles and to seek assistance from the United States for the requisite modernization of Portuguese naval and air forces.

Moreover, Portugal will undoubtedly remain opposed to the establishment of a fourth NATO (Iberian) command which, it is feared, would provide Spain a dominant voice in military affairs on the Peninsula and overshadow Portuguese concerns. Hence, further Spanish integration into the military command structure of NATO may prove contentious with regard to Portugal. Meanwhile, as in the new 1983 bilateral agreement providing for U.S. access to Lajes, the Portuguese are likely to be cautious in making available facilities in support of out-of-area contingencies. Left-wing socialists of a National-Bilateral bent, and pressure on the left flank from the potent Portuguese Communist Party (which favors unilateral disarmament) will serve only to reinforce this trend.

2.5 CONCLUSION

Thus it is apparent that parallel schools of thought with regard to national defense and foreign policy exist in Spain and Portugal: Atlanticists, Europeanists,
National-Bilaterals, and Unilateralists. However, the influence of the respective schools varies between the two countries. In Spain, the Socialist Government has a Europeanist/National-Bilateralist orientation, while in Portugal, a Europeanist/Atlanticist alignment is evident in the Socialist-Social Democratic coalition government.

Therefore, Spain tentatively continues its commitment to NATO, while linking further integration to progress in other areas, such as Spanish membership in the EEC and the status of Gibraltar. Portugal, on the other hand, remains a staunch member of the Atlantic Alliance, preferring a strong alignment with the dominant naval power—the United States—while pursuing further integration with Europe. This means in concrete terms that Portugal maintains a more active interest in military modernization and integration within NATO than does Spain, which will resist such options as modernization and redeployment of Spanish forces to the Central Front.

Portugal will continue to provide the critical Lajes base to the United States, and might not be adverse to expanding U.S. access to Portuguese facilities in return for aid in military modernization (while continuing to insist on case-by-case approval of the use of such facilities for out-of-area contingencies). As Spanish contributions of an active nature seem problematic, contributions of a passive nature -- regarding access to Spanish facilities -- which capitalize upon Spanish geography rather than its forces,
must be pursued. However, the present governments of Spain and Portugal will oppose basing U.S. nuclear forces, just as they will remain noncommittal with regard to the INF deployment set forth in the NATO decision of December 1979. Thus, while national sensitivities must be considered, under current circumstances, the United States will be best served by an Iberian contribution of facilities as a redoubt for resupply of the Central Front.
SECTION 3

CHINESE PERSPECTIVES

The People's Republic of China (PRC) assesses questions of defense and national security very broadly and in a long-term strategic context. Perceived threats to Chinese security are both internal and external, and are not confined to the military realm. It is important to evaluate Chinese perspectives on security and strategy at three levels: what the PRC says publicly for the record, what it says privately to privileged foreign visitors or to elite domestic audiences, and what it actually does.

At all three levels, the process is closely controlled and directed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In the past five years the Party organization has undergone extensive reform and restructuring. In 1982 the Party established an Advisory Commission from which elderly Party veterans can continue to exert influence while younger individuals direct the daily operations of the Party, government and military apparatus. The Party Congress in September 1982 made some progress in this direction, lowering the average age of the Party Secretariat and the Central Committee membership. However, senior policy-making bodies -- the Politburo and its Standing Committee, the Military
Commission, and the Discipline Inspection Commission -- remain under the direction of the Party's aging old guard. The state administrative machinery under Premier Zhao Ziyang is streamlining operations and promoting younger, more qualified personnel. But change has been much less perceptible among the military/strategic elite. Under a new state constitution, the Sixth National People's Congress (NPC) in June 1983 elected chairmen and vice-chairmen of the PRC, the NPC, and the Central Military Commission. Those chosen were all members of the old guard.

Most major security issues tend to have both a domestic and foreign policy component with Chinese leaders perceiving a close interrelationship between the two. In Party power struggles, external issues are normally of secondary importance but can be used to discredit opponents or, as apparently occurred with Deng Xiaoping, to bolster a leader's prestige and Party standing. During the last ten years of Mao's life, there were marked differences in global outlook within the Party elite and sharp fluctuations in Chinese foreign and security policy. Since Mao's death in 1976 and the ouster of the Gang of Four, Chinese foreign policy has followed a far steadier course. While leadership differences in strategic outlook and foreign policy appear to persist, they are not as striking or disruptive as before and are held in check by Party
elders, who may disagree on policy but agree on the need for unity and stability.

The economy has placed sharp restraints on plans to update China's obsolescent military forces as part of the "four modernizations" (agriculture, industry, science and technology, and defense). Defense spending was reduced in 1980 and again in 1981, despite misgivings of some military professionals. Beginning in late 1982, renewed emphasis has been given to defense modernization, with indications that Beijing will look to foreign sources for prototypes, technology and perhaps joint investment, but insofar as possible will try to develop an indigenous production capability of military weapons and material.

While political stability and national unity have been prominent security concerns of the Party leadership, this theme has also been used to serve partisan political interests: by Mao loyalists and many in the military elite to defend Mao and Cultural Revolution policies and at the same time to attempt to retain their political power; and by Deng and his supporters to call for the reconstruction and revitalization of the Party apparatus and, in the process, to enhance and consolidate their political power. Military policy has clearly been an issue in the contest for power. Even though Deng and his group are increasingly in control and Deng personally heads the Party's Military Commission, there apparently has been some resistance to Deng's reform program from elements within the military elite. To ensure
military support at critical junctures, Deng appears to have deferred to military interests on several key issues, such as the forced retirement of overage PLA commanders and cadres.

China's military capability, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), is large, unwieldy and outdated. It is deployed to guard against both external attack (primarily along its northern border with the U.S.S.R. and Mongolia and its southern border with Vietnam) and internal uprisings or other domestic security threats. The attack on Vietnam in 1979 revealed deficiencies in PLA capabilities. The Party continues to endorse the validity of Mao's strategy of people's war, albeit updated to reflect conditions of modern war, while quietly embarking on a program to upgrade the professional and technical levels of PLA personnel. At this juncture, China may well be relying both upon its considerable conventional defensive capability and limited nuclear capability, together with the maintenance of amicable relations with the United States, to deter a possible Soviet attack.

However, there are clearly divisions within the military-strategic elite, and China's military doctrine and strategy may be at issue. Other probable issues under debate include the declining prestige and career attractiveness of the PLA, persisting civilian-military tensions, differences on the role of ideology and on the impact of pragmatic policies both within the PLA and
throughout society. These differences seemed to be resolved, or papered over, at the Sixth Plenum of the CCP Central Committee in June 1981. The compromise, or consensus, forged at that gathering seemed to remain in effect during both the Twelfth Party Congress in September 1982 and subsequent NPC sessions in 1982 and 1983, and a CCP Central Committee plenum in October 1983.

China's global outlook and strategy are based on theoretical formulations propounded by Mao Zedong and subsequently expanded or refined by Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and others. These formulations are rooted both in Marxism-Leninism and in Chinese historical and philosophical traditions. The Chinese world view has evolved markedly over the years and has provided a rationalization and justification for sharp changes in Chinese policies. Mao initially posited a two-camp theory, declaring in 1949 that China would lean to one side, that of the Soviet Union, and that there was no alternative to joining either the Soviet or U.S. bloc.

By the mid-1950s China's world perspective showed signs of change, with Mao elevating the role of Third World countries by establishing an "intermediate zone" with which China's interest became increasingly identified. In the 1960s as the Sino-Soviet split deepened, Mao spoke of two "intermediate zones" between the U.S. and Soviet camps. Then in the 1970s the Chinese global outlook was reordered and synthesized in Mao's "three world" view in which the
U.S. and USSR were lumped together as the two superpowers to comprise the "first world"; the developed industrial countries of Western Europe and Japan were the "second world"; and the rest of the world, essentially poorer, less developed countries comprised the "third world", a category in which China placed itself. Zhou elaborated on Soviet strategy while Deng postulated a united front strategy which could serve to postpone or even avert a global conflict.

China's world view is strongly influenced by external determinants, especially the actions of the superpowers; is increasingly based more on national security interests than on ideological considerations; and, not suprisingly, is highly Sino-centric, i.e., according a larger role to China than an objective evaluation of its present strength, wealth, and international influence and involvement would warrant. Thus, global assessments of China's leaders have served to reinforce and rationalize policies and actions that are deemed best to serve China's interests.

Although these are seldom if ever publicly stated, the following appear to be the core elements of China's national strategy: maintain China's independence and sovereignty, relying primarily on indigenous resources; combine with others with parallel interests to combat a common threat, that is Soviet expansionism; augment China's conventional and strategic capabilities with a latent "strategic relationship" with the United States to deter Soviet attack; avoid at all costs a multi-front, multi-enemy
war; do not initiate military action unless China can control the scope of the conflict; recover territorial claims and unify China as circumstances permit; and gain stable foreign trade partners and access to modern technology.

In the context of the strategic triangle (U.S., USSR, and PRC), China has altered both its strategic views and tactics over the years and has maneuvered skillfully to advance its own interests. US-China rapprochement was based on the perception of a common Soviet threat to security. Normalization of relations in late 1978 permitted China to use this "American card" several months later and attack Vietnam without incurring a retaliatory response from Hanoi's Soviet ally. But concerned that the price of detente with the United States could be the permanent loss of Taiwan, Beijing has stiffened its position with respect to U.S. policies toward Taiwan. It has proclaimed an independent foreign policy, oriented toward the Third World, and pursued a strategy of equidistance between Moscow and Washington. Chinese actions have included a dampening of anti-Soviet polemics, increasing criticism of U.S. "hegemonism," and the holding of bilateral discussions with the Soviets at the vice-foreign minister level. This may also represent a reaction both to Soviet overtures to China and to perceived U.S. shortcomings in its relations with China, especially with respect to Taiwan. It seems unlikely that Beijing anticipates or would welcome a full
normalization of relations with the USSR, but it apparently
does favor a measured reduction in tensions. It also may be
trying to position itself within the triangle in the hopes
of gaining concessions from either the United States or the
Soviet Union or both.

Even though China now refuses to join with the United
States in warnings about Soviet expansionism, its concern
over the Soviet threat to its security remains a significant
element in Beijing's view of the US-PRC relationship. There
has been a significant upturn in that relationship since the
fall of 1983. An exchange of visits in 1984 between Premier
Zhao and President Reagan underscored the mutual benefits of
this relationship and led to agreements concerning nuclear
energy cooperation, Chinese access to advanced technology
and some weapons systems, and various trade and investment
issues.

Militarily and strategically, there is much less
ambivalence in the Chinese position, in the face of what the
PRC views as almost a complete reversal and worsening in the
military balance in the Asia-Pacific region since the late
1960s. China must now contend with a strong Soviet
land-based threat bolstered by an overwhelming strategic
superiority and a growing naval presence in the region,
which now has access to major Vietnamese ports. The total
deterioration in Sino-Vietnamese relations -- from ally to
foe within four years -- has particularly worsened the
military balance in Southeast Asia from the Chinese vantage
point. The Chinese see the Soviet geopolitical and strategic gains in Asia and the Pacific as serving Moscow's global strategy, although they also calculate that the Soviets are overextended and facing economic difficulties, so that the immediate Soviet threat to Chinese security has diminished.

Perhaps for this reason, China purports to view the nuclear equation primarily in global rather than regional terms, and as an element in the rivalry of the two superpowers. In discussions with Western strategists, Chinese leaders have referred to the edge gained by the Soviet Union in the Eurasian theater nuclear balance by the deployment of the SS-20 and the Backfire bomber. Consistent with their strategic projection of a superpower confrontation in Europe, not Asia, Chinese leaders initially viewed with approval both the 1979 NATO decision to deploy Pershing and cruise missiles in Western Europe, and the development of British and French national nuclear forces. For the public record, however, Beijing expresses extreme skepticism that U.S.-Soviet arms reduction talks actually will slow the nuclear arms race and now opposes both the US missile deployments in Europe and the Soviet missile deployments in both Europe and Soviet Asia. Indeed, Chinese authorities have gone so far as to suggest that both sides sought to make disarmament serve the purpose of achieving military superiority and carried out bilateral talks merely to work out "rules of the game" and reduce costs.
This "evenhanded" Chinese treatment accords with Beijing's "independent" foreign policy line and tactical equidistancing of itself from the Soviet Union and the United States, but it does not accord with Beijing's actual assessment of the strategic situation or the implications for its security. On several occasions, China has expressed "grave concern" over the buildup of Soviet strategic forces in Asia and indications that the Soviets might redeploy to Asia those SS-20s removed from the European theater under an INF agreement. And in early February 1983, for the first time and without further elaboration, it listed arms control among the areas in which China and the United States shared similar views. These statements stand in sharp contrast to the aforementioned Chinese critique of both U.S. and Soviet disarmament proposals and strategic policies.

China's actual military deployments and strategy are clearly geared to possible Soviet attack. Its deterrence strategy consists of a small, developing nuclear weapons capability buttressed by a massive, albeit obsolescent, conventional military force, and an implied "strategic relationship" with the United States. Both its conventional and strategic forces are deployed preponderantly against the Soviet threat. Despite Cultural Revolution disruptions and the resource constraints imposed by the "economic readjustment" policy inaugurated in 1979, China successfully tested two liquid-fueled ICBMs in 1980, is reportedly developing a solid-fueled ICBM, and successfully launched an
SLBM in October 1982. Since early 1983 there have been indications of a Chinese decision to give higher priority to defense modernization ("to cope with international developments" according to Premier Zhao); and in a lengthy article on the subject, the Defense Minister implied that strategic weapons programs would get special attention.

China apparently values its nuclear capability both for the international status it conveys and for its limited deterrent effect, even though Beijing recognizes the vast and growing imbalance in Chinese and Soviet nuclear forces. As additional insurance, however, the Chinese, in normalizing relations with the United States, sought a relationship which would give the Soviets pause before attacking China. Recently, at Chinese insistence, the "strategic relationship" has gone underground; and the Soviet threat was not mentioned in the joint U.S.-Chinese communique in August 1982. However, the Chinese clearly continue to regard the Sino-American relationship as mutually beneficial in deterrence terms. As a Chinese analyst of Soviet strategy noted in March 1983, the Soviet Union now has to "worry about fighting on two fronts," thus serving as a deterrent to Soviet attack in either Europe or Asia.

As for nuclear weapons limitation, China generally has opposed most arms control treaties, agreements and organizations, contending that they represent an effort by the two superpowers to maintain a nuclear monopoly and
constitute an infringement upon national sovereignty and the right of nations to assure their self-defense. Chinese pronouncements on the subject have been of two types: assertions of the defensive nature of the Chinese nuclear weapons program coupled with declarations of no-first-use and of non-use against nonnuclear states; and broad, sweeping disarmament proposals which call for a total ban on nuclear weapons and link disarmament of conventional forces with that of strategic weapons. China has consistently opposed the Limited Nuclear Test Ban of 1963 and subsequent proposals for a comprehensive test ban; and it has similarly refused to endorse the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968. Before 1983 the one nuclear arms control convention it had signed was the protocol of a treaty establishing a nuclear free zone in Latin America, a concept which the PRC has long advocated for other parts of the world, including Asia.

Since joining the United Nations in 1971, the PRC has gradually played a more active role in U.S.-sponsored disarmament deliberations, including the Commission on Disarmament talks in Geneva and the two Special Sessions on Disarmament (SSOD) in May-June 1978 and June-July 1982. Thus, while China contended in 1971 that it would never "betray" the nonnuclear nations by joining in nuclear disarmament negotiations sponsored by the two superpowers, its current position represents a tactical evolution from this extreme position. China now asserts that, as a
Security Council member and the only Third World nation possessing nuclear weapons, it will play a responsible role in disarmament parleys which are held under U.N. auspices in order to assure proper reflection of Third World views. Moreover, in October 1983 China joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a special agency of the UN.

At SSOD II, PRC Foreign Minister Huang Hua presented an arms control proposal which constitutes the official Chinese position in the subject. The three principal elements of the plan are: 1) all nuclear states should reach an agreement not to use nuclear weapons and, pending such an agreement, should unilaterally make pledges of no-first-use and non-use; 2) conventional disarmament should be effected simultaneously with nuclear disarmament and states should undertake not to commit aggression against or militarily occupy any country; and 3) the United States and the Soviet Union should first cease testing, by 50 percent, at which point the PRC "is ready" to join with others in working out similar arms control and reduction measures, eventually providing for the destruction of all nuclear weapons.

Up to 1983, China had not been a party to the various conventions, organizations or arrangements which impose controls and safeguards on nuclear transactions, declaring that these represented infringements upon national sovereignty. China has now modified its position. In joining IAEA, the last of the nuclear weapons powers to do
so, China pledged to accept the rules and statute of that agency and to fulfill the obligations of membership. This will entail a significant degree of scrutiny and safeguards.

China has announced plans for nuclear energy plants to be constructed in cooperation with foreign contractors and suppliers. This will require nuclear energy cooperation agreements with the supplying countries, in accordance with IAEA requirements. During President Reagan's April 1984 visit the US and PRC initialled such an agreement which, when formally approved, will permit private U.S. firms to sell nuclear equipment, materials and technology to China. China remains opposed to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which it regards as discriminatory, but on joining the IAEA and on numerous occasions since then, China has declared that it "neither stands for nor encourages the proliferation of nuclear weapons."

Within its overall security perspectives and strategy, China also must take into account special considerations affecting relations with various nations on its East Asian periphery. On the Korean Peninsula, Beijing competes strenously with Moscow for Pyongyang's affection and at present enjoys a slight edge. Strategically, it is considered essential to the PRC to have a close relationship with North Korea (DPRK) in order to stave off Soviet inroads into the area, a development that would nearly complete Soviet encirclement of China. However, despite rhetorical support for North Korea's position, China wishes to avoid
renewed hostilities in Korea, which *inter alia* would put it on the opposite side from the United States and Japan. In consequence, the PRC was probably privately relieved when a few years ago the United States cancelled plans for a partial troop withdrawal from Korea, thus permitting PRC media to wax eloquent in support of Pyongyang, while at the same time alleviating Chinese fears that a power vacuum would be created on the Peninsula which the Soviet Union would seek to exploit. More recently, Chinese leaders hinted at a willingness to work with the United States and Japan toward reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, only to back-off subsequently -- perhaps at Pyongyang's insistence -- and remove itself as a party to any Korean negotiations.

There is a close correlation between the evolution of Sino-Japanese bilateral relations and China's altered strategic view of Northeast Asia. In both cases China's position has been largely shaped by the perceived Soviet threat. Indeed, China's *volte face* in its relations with Japan was based on the premise of perceived parallel interests in resisting Soviet expansionist pressures, a premise which has found greater favor in Japan in the wake of Soviet military construction and deployments in Japan's former Northern Territories. Chinese leaders, however, have privately communicated to Tokyo their acceptance of the special U.S.-Japan security relationship.
For several years after the 1978 Sino-Japanese peace treaty, China perceived a greater parallelism of Sino-Japanese interests and a larger regional security role for Japan than Japan seemed willing to accept. China urged Japan to strengthen its self-defense forces, especially its maritime capabilities, make a greater contribution to regional security, and enter into various limited forms of military cooperation with the PRC. Yet, in reality, Beijing is far more interested in the economic and technological benefits of its relations with Tokyo and, in fact, may be having second thoughts about a larger security role for Japan. While publicly proclaiming that close Sino-Japanese ties and cooperation are conducive to peace and stability in the Asian-Pacific region, Chinese leaders have begun to issue periodic reminders that Japan should not revert to a militarist role. The current cordiality in relations was marked by an exchange of visits between Hu Yaobang and Nakasone in late 1983 and early 1984.

With respect to Taiwan, both long-term security interests and the issues of sovereignty and national unity figure importantly in PRC policies and strategy. Beijing does not consider that the armed forces in Taiwan constitute a military threat to PRC security, but will not tolerate the possible future use of Taiwan -- the quintessential unsinkable aircraft carrier -- by a foreign power for military purposes. Taiwan reunification has been made a priority issue by the Chinese leadership, whose concern
seems to lie more in insuring acceptance in principle of PRC sovereignty by other nations and on Taiwan than in the actual return of Taiwan to PRC control in the near future. However, China now strongly criticizes the United States, citing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and the Taiwan Relations Act as violations both of Chinese sovereignty and of joint U.S.-PRC agreements. China has also demanded the return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty by 1997 at the latest, while indicating some flexibility in working out administrative arrangements. The two issues are closely related, and an increasingly nationalistic Chinese leadership will presumably hold the United States responsible for any failure in realizing their irredentist aspirations.

A particularly complex situation exists for China in Southeast Asia. China must now contend simultaneously with the hostility of a Soviet-backed militarily strong neighbor in Vietnam, and the reservations of the noncommunist countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), who are apprehensive about China's future aspirations and policies in the region. Since 1979, Beijing has sought to punish Vietnam for its invasion of Kampuchea and for its alliance with the USSR and defiance of China. Chinese efforts to parlay the Vietnamese/Soviet threat to Southeast Asian security into closer relations with the ASEAN nations have had limited differentiated results. While ASEAN as a whole, and Thailand in particular, has
valued the overall restraining effect which Chinese policies have had on Vietnam, the ASEAN nations fear as well that the Chinese attack on Vietnam might lead to Soviet involvement and a wider regional war. In the long run, moreover, the ASEAN nations will be more interested in containing and co-existing with Vietnam than in punishing it, and do not fully share Beijing's concern with a global, strategic Soviet threat.

For its part, China has cooperated with ASEAN on its Kampuchean initiatives and has tried to allay the fears of ASEAN nations concerning Chinese support of the overseas Chinese communities or of communist insurgencies. Nevertheless, China continues to follow an aggressive attrition strategy toward Vietnam, which raises questions as to whether China's future actions and strategy in Southeast Asia actually will contribute to peace and stability in that region.

We conclude from this broad survey that overall the PRC elite consider domestic threats to national security to be primary, closely followed by the external threats posed by the USSR, while a third threat is that posed by U.S. policies toward Taiwan. There are differences within the Party leadership on the priority to be accorded foreign and domestic threats and the appropriate policies that follow therefrom. While these differences in perception are liable to continue under the present leadership, so is their current tendency to compromise their differences and strive
for a consensus. There is no argument in Chinese leadership
circles, for example, over China's need for a peaceful
environment in order to achieve the necessary conditions for
modernization. However, after generational succession
occurs within the next decade or so, the possible
alternative strategies of the new Chinese elite are wide
ranging and include even the development of a policy of
genuine detente with the Soviet Union.
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