Moscow's Post-Brezhnev Reassessment of the Third World

Francis Fukuyama

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The research described in this report was sponsored by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy under Contract No. MDA903-85-C-0030.


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Published by The Rand Corporation
Report Title: Moscow's Post-Brezhnev Reassessment of the Third World

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Performing Organization: The Rand Corporation
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90406

Controlling Office: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Washington, DC 20301

Program Element, Project, Task, or Work Unit Numbers: MDA903-85-C-0030

Report Date: February 1986

Number of Pages: 91

Unclassified

Distribution Statement: Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited

No Restrictions

Supplementary Notes

Key Words: USSR, International Relations, Developing Nations

Abstract: See reverse side
This report analyzes the reassessment of policy toward the Third World that has been taking place in high Soviet leadership circles since the end of the Brezhnev era. It is divided into two main parts: (1) a survey of the theoretical discussion that has been taking place in speeches by Soviet leaders, official statements, articles in journals specializing in Third World issues, and elsewhere; and (2) a comparison of what the Soviets have been saying about the Third World with their actual behavior over the same time period, and a discussion of the potential consequences of the current reassessment for future Soviet policy. The report identifies three primary themes running through recent Soviet discussions of the Third World, all of which imply the need for a retrenchment from the activist policies of the mid- to late 1970s: (1) the pressure of economic constraints and the need to attend to the Soviet Union's own economic development; (2) an awareness of the damaging effect of past Soviet Third World activities on U.S.-Soviet relations, and the fact that increased superpower tension inhibits Moscow's ability to support progressive forces in the Third World; and (3) a critique of the Marxist-Leninist vanguard party as a solution to the problem of securing long-term influence in the Third World.
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Rand

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This study initially grew out of a series of conversations held between the author and Dr. Stephen Sestanovich, currently of the National Security Council Staff. Dr. Sestanovich had noticed new and rather interesting discussions of the Third World appearing repeatedly in statements and speeches by Soviet leaders since around the time of Leonid Brezhnev’s death, which indicated that policy in this area, as in others, appeared to be under review in high Kremlin circles. He eventually published these observations in an article entitled “Do the Soviets Feel Pinched by Third World Adventures?” in the Outlook section of the Washington Post (May 20, 1984).

The current study presents a systematic examination of Soviet writings and statements concerning the Third World that appeared between early 1982 and mid-1985 (as well as some earlier ones going back a decade and a half, which serve as points of reference); it also looks at actual Soviet behavior over the same period to see whether the discussion and statements have been reflected in policy. Throughout the study, the author benefited from earlier Rand studies of Soviet policy in the Third World, and from ongoing discussions on the subject over the past two years.

This project was sponsored by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense. It is part of the International Security and Defense Policy Program at Rand.
SUMMARY

This report analyzes the reassessment of policy toward the Third World which has been taking place in high Soviet leadership circles since the end of the Brezhnev era. It is divided into two main parts:

- A survey of the theoretical discussion that has been taking place in speeches by Soviet leaders, official statements, articles in journals specializing in Third World issues, and elsewhere.
- A comparison of what the Soviets have been saying about the Third World with their actual behavior over this same time period, and a discussion of the potential consequences of the current reassessment for future Soviet policy.

To interpret the voluminous writings on the Third World that are published annually in the Soviet Union, it is necessary to understand the institutional positions of the authors, because those positions determine the authoritativeness of their writings. Apart from major decisions, which are taken by the Politburo as a whole, primary responsibility for the day-to-day running of policy toward the Third World (including nonruling Communist parties, national liberation movements, peace and solidarity fronts, etc.) rests with the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee's International Department (ID), which historically was the successor to the Comintern. The Foreign Ministry, which is responsible for relations with established governments and the central East-West relationship, appears to play a smaller role, and there is some evidence of institutional rivalry with the ID. The most important figures within the ID are its long-time chief, Boris Ponomarev, and his two deputies for the Third World, Karen Brutents and Rostislav Ul'yanovskii. The academic institutes working on Third World issues are effectively subordinated to the ID and act as its eyes and ears, though the influence of any given institute researcher is likely to be small. Hence the most authoritative sources for Soviet Third World policy are, in descending order, (1) statements by senior Politburo-level leaders, (2) writings by high ID officials, and (3) other writings, including those by military writers, Foreign Ministry and other officials, and academics in the various institutes.

Three primary themes run through recent Soviet discussions of the Third World, all of which imply the need for a retrenchment from the activist policies of the mid- to late 1970s:
The pressure of economic constraints and the need to attend to the Soviet Union’s own economic development.

An awareness of the damaging effect of past Soviet Third World activities on U.S.-Soviet relations, and the fact that increased superpower tension (particularly since the Reagan Administration took office) inhibits Moscow’s ability to support progressive forces in the Third World.

A critique of the Marxist-Leninist vanguard party as a solution to the problem of securing long-term influence in the Third World.

The constraints posed by economic stringency seem to impose the most serious limitations on Soviet options. A number of Soviet spokesmen have declared that the USSR’s primary influence on economic development in the Third World lies not in direct bilateral assistance but in the demonstration effect of a successful Soviet economy, and that consequently Moscow can help its friends best by attending to its own economic needs first. This point was raised first in academic circles shortly before Brezhnev’s death, but was picked up in a major way by Yurii Andropov in his June 1983 Communist Party (CPSU) Plenum speech. This theme has also been featured in talks by party secretaries Ivan Kapitonov and Boris Ponomarev, as well as Politburo member Gaidar Aliev.

The second theme on the relationship between activities in the Third World and the central U.S.-Soviet relationship surfaced somewhat earlier and appears to have been recognized, at least implicitly, by Brezhnev himself before his death. Soviet spokesmen consistently assert their right to support the world revolutionary process at the same time that they are seeking arms control and détente with the United States, yet a number of commentators, including Aleksandr Bovin, Fedor Burlatskii, and Georgii Arbatov, have suggested that Third World adventurism played a major role in undermining ties with the United States, and that the resulting atmosphere of strained relations has made further Soviet initiatives in peripheral areas more risky and more costly. This idea seems to have motivated Brezhnev’s 1981 proposal for a superpower “code of conduct” in the Third World.

The third theme on the shortcomings of Marxist-Leninist vanguard parties (MLVPs) has been taken up primarily by officials in the ID, including both Ul’yanovskii and Brutents. The MLVP was initially seen in the mid-1970s as a solution to the reliability problems encountered with so-called “first generation” bourgeois nationalist (i.e., non-Communist) clients such as Egypt, India, Indonesia, Ghana, and Mali. The states of the “second generation,” including Angola, Mozambique,
Afghanistan, South Yemen, Ethiopia, and Vietnam, all espoused scientific socialism as a governing ideology and were encouraged by the Soviets to establish formal Leninist vanguard parties. In the early 1980s, Soviet observers became increasingly aware that the “scientific socialism” of these newer clients has been in many cases no more than rhetorical, and that regimes face problems of economic development and internal instability that are perhaps more severe than those of the first generation.

Running counter to the first three themes is a greater Soviet receptivity to armed struggle as a means of securing revolutionary change, a position that gained increased credibility after the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua. This is a view held primarily by Latin American specialists, and it is one that tends to push Soviet policy in the direction of increased involvement in the Third World.

Actual Soviet behavior during the same period, however, does not indicate that arguments for retrenchment have been reflected in any meaningful way. The study surveys both (1) Soviet military and economic assistance to major clients in the Third World, and (2) Soviet risk-taking propensities in two cases, Syria and Mozambique.

The picture that emerges is mixed and inconclusive with respect to both resource allocation and risk-taking. Soviet military and economic aid shows no consistent pattern in the early 1980s, going up in the cases of Syria, India, and Nicaragua, while remaining flat or declining in others. The case cannot be made that the Soviets have cut back on Third World outlays in any meaningful way. The Soviets have fallen most seriously short of their clients’ needs in the area of economic assistance, but this was also true prior to the early 1980s.

The best case for a lower Soviet propensity to take risks in the early 1980s is probably Mozambique, where Soviet passivity has allowed Maputo to gradually slide into the South African orbit, particularly after the Nkomati accord in March 1984. Nonetheless, the Soviet ability to meet Mozambique’s security requirements is sharply constrained by South African military power, and it is not clear that a leadership with higher risk-taking propensities would have been able to do much more. In contrast to Mozambique, Soviet patronage of Syria after the June 1982 Lebanon War involved serious risks of getting involved in renewed conflict between Syria and Israel. The Soviets faced the possibility of confrontation with the United States, when they supplied Damascus with SA-5 missiles and Soviet combat forces to man them shortly after the war. Hence it is impossible to make a general case that the Soviets have been more risk averse in the post-Brezhnev period.
Since the Soviet reassessment of the Third World has not yet been reflected in behavior, its significance may lie either in its role as a retrospective apology for past Soviet shortcomings in economic assistance, or more likely as a debate over future policy. This debate in some sense concerns the legacy of Brezhnev’s activist policy toward the Third World, one which will not be resolved until the current succession process is consolidated. If Soviet leaders are serious about containing the costs of involvement in the Third World, they will have to tackle the largest recipients of assistance, Cuba and Vietnam, but their political investment in both countries is so great that significant cutbacks seem unlikely. Another shift that may occur is a return to a Khrushchev-era receptivity toward influential non-Communist states in the Third World at the expense of socialist-oriented countries—a shift which may receive institutional backing as Ponomarev and Ul’yanovskii are replaced within the ID by Zagladin and Brutents. Ultimately, any changes in policy will depend on the preferences of Gorbachev and leaders at his level. While Gorbachev’s initial expressions of support for the Third World have been very weak, almost nothing is known about his long-term inclinations at this point.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author would like to pay special thanks to his long-time friend and associate Stephen Sestanovich, who originally provided the inspiration for this study through numerous conversations on the subject of Soviet policy in the Third World and the article he published in the Washington Post.

Jeremy Azrael at Rand and Professor Galia Golan of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem provided thoughtful and informative reviews of the draft manuscript, based on their long study of Soviet affairs. At Rand, Lubov Fajfer and Sally Stoecker were of great help in preparing primary sources. Kathi Watkins did yeoman service in pulling together information on Soviet military and economic aid to the Third World, based on both classified and unclassified sources. Finally, Nancy Giggy helped prepare the final manuscript.

The author would also like to thank the many people in and out of government who have contributed their thoughts and ideas, many of which have been incorporated in one way or another into the present study.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The end of the Brezhnev era in November 1982 provided an occasion for the Soviet leadership to reassess its policies in a number of areas. While the chief issues have centered on management of the economy, there is considerable evidence that a rethinking of the USSR’s relationship with the developing world has taken place as well, or at least that evolving Soviet views on this subject are being aired with increasing openness.

It is not surprising that such a reassessment should occur. In the past, leadership successions have opened up opportunities for major shifts in Soviet policy toward the Third World. For example, the rise of Khrushchev in the 1950s led to a rejection of Stalin’s narrow emphasis on orthodox Communist parties and the consequent broadening of Moscow’s relations with a wide variety of non-Communist states in the Third World, inaugurated by the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal of July 1955. The current succession, which has already produced three new General Secretaries in as many years, differs from previous ones in that it involves a wholesale generational change in the entire top Soviet leadership, including those figures who have set the course of Soviet Third World policy over the past few decades.

Of course, the fact that this generational change is going on and is likely to continue in the near future may inhibit the formulation of coherent policies of any sort. Although Mikhail Gorbachev has claimed the top leadership post, he has not yet fully consolidated his authority and must rule with the consent of others in the leadership; he may feel reluctant to risk staking out bold or new positions. A political succession only provides a permissive environment within which policy shifts can occur; such shifts will obviously not come about in the absence of preexisting pressures for change.

However, there are at least three reasons for thinking that such independent pressure for change does exist. The first concerns economic constraints. The extraordinary burst of Soviet activism in the 1970s, beginning with intervention in Angola and culminating in the invasion of Afghanistan, substantially expanded the Soviet “empire.” While Soviet influence in and access to different areas of the globe have grown considerably, so have the problems and costs associated with maintenance of these positions. One recent study estimates that the total costs of the Soviet empire rose from between $13.6 billion and $21.8 billion in 1971 to between $35.9 billion and $46.5 billion.
billion in 1980 (in constant 1981 dollars). As a proportion of the Soviet GNP, the costs went from 0.9 to 1.4 percent to 2.3 to 3.0 percent over the same period. Older clients such as Cuba and Vietnam received steadily increasing aid and subsidies over the past decade and were joined by a host of new and frequently expensive allies, including Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan. This increased burden of empire comes at a time when the growth rate for the Soviet economy as a whole has started to fall. In the late 1970s, the Soviet leadership decided to cut the rate of capital investment and, according to the assessment of the intelligence community, the rate of defense spending as well. It seems unlikely that in a period of general stringency, when sustained competition with the United States militates against defense spending cuts, Soviet aid to the Third World would not come under scrutiny.

The second factor that could motivate a Soviet reassessment concerns Soviet ability to control the pace and direction of political developments in the Third World. Moscow’s frustration with its non-Communist but progressive bourgeois nationalist clients from the 1950s and 1960s (countries like Egypt under Nasser and Sadat, Algeria, and Indonesia under Sukharno) arguably led to a major innovation in Soviet strategy. Beginning in the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union began to actively promote states governed by self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist vanguard parties (MLVPs), or to encourage the formation of such parties where they did not already exist. Countries such as Angola, South Yemen, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Kampuchea, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan have proven to be more reliable than Third World allies from the previous generation in many respects, cooperating extensively with the Soviet bloc in a variety of political and military areas. But these regimes have at the same time tended to be extremely narrowly based, subject to strong indigenous opposition movements and potentially quite unstable. As a result of the new or expanded commitments undertaken in the mid- to late 1970s, the Soviets have been drawn into a number of unfamiliar counterinsurgency wars and have often found themselves struggling just to maintain their positions in these countries.2

1 These figures are taken from Charles Wolf, Jr., K. C. Yeh, E. Brunner, A. Gurwitz, and Marilee Lawrence, The Costs of the Soviet Empire, The Rand Corporation, R-3073/1-NA, September 1983, p. 19. They include trade credits and subsidies, economic and military aid net of hard-currency sales, and costs of military and covert operations. It should be noted that the CIA has dissented from this report’s conclusions.

In addition, the Third World itself is changing in many ways that affect Soviet interests. With the collapse of the Portuguese empire in 1974–75, the last of the great European colonial empires came to an end. There are few, if any, countries remaining under overt foreign colonial domination; as the Soviets themselves frequently point out, the chief locus of struggle in the Third World has shifted from national to social revolution. But social revolutions are much more difficult to encourage or manage. The days of easy gains from the support of national liberation movements are over, and the influence and good will that used to accrue to the Soviet Union from its opposition to imperialism has grown weaker as the memory of colonialism dims throughout the Third World.

The third factor favoring a reassessment concerns the negative impact of Soviet adventurism in the Third World on U.S.-Soviet relations. It should be fairly clear to the Soviet leadership by now that détente with the United States fell apart largely as a result of Soviet activities in the Third World. While Soviet spokesmen are forever defending their right to support associated national liberation movements and Communist parties at the same time that they seek peaceful regulation of their overt strategic-military competition with the United States, the objective reality is that the American Congress and public opinion will not support so narrow a view of détente, as demonstrated by the Carter Administration's withdrawal of the SALT II Treaty after the invasion of Afghanistan. Another dynamic may be at work here as well: When relations with the United States are going well, the Soviets have more time and energy to devote to activities in peripheral areas like the Third World, and in fact they feel compelled to do so to avoid charges of shirking their socialist responsibilities; but in times of tension and confrontation with the United States, adventurism in the Third World becomes riskier and Soviet attention is more closely focused on the central U.S.-Soviet conflict.

Hence three factors—economic constraints, the inability to control political outcomes, and the impact of relations with the United States—might suggest to the Soviets the need to reconsider the expansionist policies that led to the surge of interventions in the Third World between 1975 and 1980. As this study will demonstrate, there is considerable empirical evidence that a high-level reassessment of the Third World has in fact taken place in the Soviet Union since the late Brezhnev era, in which all three of these issues have been raised by different Soviet spokesmen. What is less clear is the relationship of this theoretical discussion to actual Soviet policy and behavior. It is true that the first half of the 1980s has not witnessed a major Soviet intervention in the Third World on the scale of Angola, Ethiopia, or
Afghanistan, and indeed some observers have interpreted this as a sign of deliberate restraint on the part of the Soviet leadership. On the other hand, the Soviet initiatives of the mid- to late 1970s came as responses to opportunities occurring in the Third World itself; Moscow's relative quiescence since Afghanistan can as easily be explained by the lack of similar opportunities during the 1980s. In terms of other measures, such as military aid, Soviet involvement in the Third World has actually increased between 1980 and 1985.

The present study attempts to analyze the recent Soviet reassessment of the Third World. It begins in Sec. II with an overview of the Soviet Third World policy decisionmaking mechanism, which is useful in interpreting Soviet writings on the subject. Section III documents the current Soviet "debate," identifying the major themes that have emerged, as well as the personalities behind them. Section IV compares this debate to actual Soviet behavior over the same period, both for the Third World as a whole and for specific regions, such as Africa and the Middle East, where one would expect to first see the effects of a reassessment. Finally, Sec. V speculates on the implications of both the recent theoretical discussions and recent Soviet behavior for future Soviet policy.

"Debate" is perhaps too strong a word to use here, since it is not clear that anyone in the Soviet leadership is taking up the opposite side of the argument. Implicitly, however, it is Leonid Brezhnev's foreign policy record in the Third World that has come under attack.
II. THE SOVIET DECISIONMAKING PROCESS FOR THE THIRD WORLD

Since much of the present study relies on Soviet primary sources, some preliminary consideration must be given to the question of how to use, or at least not abuse, these materials. It is unfortunate that many Sovietological analyses quote indiscriminately from different Soviet sources, without regard for the identity of the particular author, as if all Soviet writings were equally authoritative. This assumes a degree of uniformity of Soviet views and control over the editorial process which manifestly does not exist. On the other hand, some observers have gone in the opposite direction in making two assertions: first, that a substantial degree of free interchange and debate has been possible in the Soviet Union in recent years over issues like the Third World, particularly in academic circles; and second, that the views of the academics who work in the various institutes under the USSR Academy of Sciences and publish articles in journals such as *Narody Azii i Afriki* or *Latinskaya Amerika* have an impact on actual Soviet policy, or at least reflect debates and divisions among active decision-makers.

While it may be comforting to believe that there has been something of a liberalization of Soviet thought, or that the academic specialists with whom American scholars have had greater contact in recent years have a strong influence on policy, the truth probably falls short of these claims. Differences of view are indeed aired quite openly in the Soviet literature, but the scope of this debate is constricted not only by the general ideological framework of Marxism-Leninism, but also by existing leadership policies. It is indeed possible at times to detect what appear to be criticisms of current policies, but the critique remains implicit and extremely narrow by the standards of Western political discourse. The types of “debates” that occur in the Soviet literature are generally of a tactical nature, concerning issues such as the role of armed struggle in promoting revolutionary change or the

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opportunities for revolution, or the speed at which a new government can implement socialist transformations given a particular country's level of socioeconomic development. Debates of this sort are hardly new within the Communist movement; they have occurred continually throughout the history of both the Bolshevik movement and the Comintern. Thus, although these discussions are often interesting in themselves and important to U.S. policy, they should not be confused with the type of free intellectual interchange that occurs in the West.

To evaluate the influence of the Soviet institutes on actual Soviet policy, it is necessary to step back somewhat and review what is known about the internal Soviet decisionmaking process for policy toward the Third World. As is the case throughout the Soviet political system, responsibility for foreign affairs is bifurcated between the government and the party, the former being represented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, headed (since July 1985) by Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, and the latter by a number of Central Committee departments, the most important of which is the International Department (ID), whose chief for several decades has been Boris Ponomarev. Former Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who has been a full Politburo member since 1973 and outranked Ponomarev, played an increasingly visible role between the death of Brezhnev and the accession of Gorbachev. But Gromyko's authority and that of the ministry he headed primarily concerned the central East-West relationship and such issues as arms control. The scope of Shevardnadze's authority remains to be seen; in the area of policy toward the Third World and relations with national liberation organizations, it is likely that the ID continues to be the more important body.

The reasons for this are both functional and historical. The foreign ministry was set up to deal with legally established governments and state-to-state relations, whereas the ID was the direct successor to the Comintern, which was disbanded by Stalin in 1943 as a gesture to his wartime allies. The ID, like the Comintern, was responsible for managing the international Communist movement (including relations with ruling Communist parties until this responsibility was broken off into a separate Central Committee department in 1957), as well as the various illegal and extralegal national liberation movements, leftist groups, and opposition parties that have sprung up all over the developing world, and front and peace organizations such as the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization and the World Peace Council. Thus, while the Foreign Ministry sought to normalize and regulate diplomatic relations with Western or pro-Western governments, the ID was responsible for supporting organizations dedicated in many cases to toppling or otherwise subverting these same regimes. The ID in
many cases continues to handle relations with national liberation movements once they have come to power and established themselves as legal governments. The relative influence of the ID and the Foreign Ministry has varied over time, depending on region and historical period. Former Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and the Foreign Ministry were quite active in the management of Soviet policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, for example, throughout the 1970s, and obviously played an important role in relations with important clients such as Vietnam and Cuba.

The ID's roots in the Comintern can be seen in the personal histories of many ID officials. The former and present heads of the ID, Dmitrii Manuil'skii, Georgii Dmitrov, and Boris Ponomarev, all had long careers within the Comintern and simply transferred their duties to the new organization when it was founded in the mid-1940s.

The organizational structure of the ID and its position relative to other organs in the Soviet foreign policy apparatus are shown in Fig. 1. Under Ponomarev come the first deputy chief, Vadim Zagladin, and five other deputy chiefs whose responsibilities are divided for the most part by region. Ponomarev, who turned 80 in 1985, is reputed to have been in poor health for some time; while he writes numerous articles and participates in ceremonial functions, the day-to-day running of the department has been taken over by Zagladin. Zagladin himself focuses largely on major East-West issues like arms control and the West European peace movement. The two deputy chiefs responsible for what we refer to as the Third World are two former academics, Karen Brutents and Rostislav Ul'yanovskii. Within the party apparatus, they are the highest officials exclusively responsible for Third World matters, and it is safe to say that over the years they have played a crucial role in the formulation of Soviet policy toward this part of the world. Of the two, Brutents is the younger (born in 1924) and the more vigorous, having traveled on active diplomatic missions to such places as Mexico, Lebanon, and Syria in the recent past. Ul'yanovskii is a year older than Ponomarev. Fortunately for Western analysts, both Brutents and Ul'yanovskii have written extensively on Third World issues—in Ul'yanovskii’s case, ever since the 1930s.

3Leonard Schapiro notes that Ponomarev in the 1970s was active in a number of areas normally under the purview of the foreign ministry, including Western Europe, the United States, and the Middle East. See Schapiro’s article, “The International Department of the CPSU: key to Soviet policy,” International Journal, Winter 1976–77, pp. 45–46.


Fig. 1—Organization of Soviet decisionmaking for the Third World
It appears that there has been a certain amount of rivalry and tension between the ID and the Foreign Ministry. Anecdotal evidence suggests that former Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko was not very interested in the Third World and that he opposed some of Moscow's more visible Third World interventions because of their potentially negative effect on U.S.-Soviet relations. The broad expansionist thrust of the Soviets in the Third World of the mid- to late 1970s, on the other hand, was due at least in part to the influence of the ID.

Officials in the ID apparat appear to be more sensitive to ideological distinctions among Third World clients than are their counterparts in the Foreign Ministry, as would seem natural for a Party organ. For example, when writing about the Third World, older ID officials such as Ul'yanovskii are careful to make reference to the complicated differences between socialist, socialist-oriented, Marxist, and non-Marxist regimes in the Third World (see the section on Soviet categories in the Appendix). Over the past decade, they have shown a clear preference for supporting states of a socialist orientation, and among those, countries ruled by MLVPs. Former Foreign Minister Gromyko, on the other hand, seldom made use of these distinctions, and when talking about the Third World (which he tends to do in a formulaic way), was as likely as not to single out a non-Marxist-Leninist country like India or Syria ahead of the Angolas and Ethiopias and Mozambique. He almost never engaged in theoretical discussions of the evolution of the class struggle in the Third World or of party-organizational matters, as do some of his ID counterparts. This distinction is not a hard and fast one, however; as will be seen below, Karen Brutents is far less preoccupied with socialist-oriented states than Ul'yanovskii, and has shown an interest in large and important capitalist-oriented states, much as one would expect from a Foreign Ministry official.

The relationship between the ID and the top Politburo leadership on questions of Third World policy has probably varied over time. Obviously, major decisions such as the intervention in Angola or the invasion of Afghanistan were taken only with the concurrence of the highest levels of Soviet leadership, though the final outcome probably had the support of the ID apparat. On the other hand, the initiative for more routine decisions, such as the yearly level of economic aid, is likely to reside within the department. In addition, the influence of the permanent party bureaucracy is likely to be greater in times of transition and uncertainty at the top, as has been characteristic of the Soviet political scene from the late Brezhnev years to the present. One

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area where the authority of the ID may be more limited is that of military matters, such as the type and volume of weapons transferred to Third World clients, or the mechanics of operations in support of countries such as Angola or Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{7}

The staff of the ID is said to number between 150 and 200. Many of the foreign-affairs specialists in the ID apparat are drawn from the various Institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences, or from organizations associated with the ID, such as the Committee for Solidarity with the Countries of Asia and Africa. Three of the six deputy chiefs of the department (Brutents, Ul’yanovskii, and Kovalenko) were former academics. The quality of ID personnel is said to be very high; almost all the staffers have had previous experience in foreign affairs.\textsuperscript{8} There seems to be considerable stability of cadres, and many ID officials have gone on to high posts in the Foreign Ministry.

Thus the writings of Ponomarev, Ul’yanovskii, and Brutents on the Third World are of particular interest. Ponomarev, whose career underwent something of an eclipse under Khrushchev, survived in his present position because of his association with the Soviet Communist party’s (CPSU’s) chief ideologue (until his death in 1981), Mikhail Suslov. Ponomarev and many of his subordinates, including many on the staff of the Institute of the International Worker’s Movement (IMRD), form something of a Suslovite center within the ID and have traditionally been described as hardline Stalinist ideologues. Ul’yanovskii, who, on the internal evidence of his writings, also appears to be an ideological hardliner, began as an academic and Comintern official, writing scholarly articles on India in the 1930s. His association with Karl Radek led to his being purged and sent to the Gulag in 1937, from which he did not reemerge until the 1950s. He has been an ID deputy chief since at least 1966. Brutents was appointed deputy chief in 1976 after a career as an academic. Again on internal evidence, Brutents appears to be a good deal less of a hardliner in his attitude toward the nonsocialist Third World than either Ponomarev or Ul’yanovskii.\textsuperscript{9}

The different institutes, including the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEiMO), the Institute of the USA and Canada, the Institute of Oriental Studies, the Africa Institute, the Far East Institute, the Latin American Institute, and the IMRD, are nominally subordinated to the USSR Academy of Sciences,

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\textsuperscript{7}Gelman (1984), pp. 62-63.
\textsuperscript{8}Kitrinos (1984), p. 50.
\textsuperscript{10}For further biographical information, see Kitrinos (1984), pp. 65-67.
but in fact they do most of their work for one or another Central Committee department, primarily the ID. (Indeed, the IMRD is said to be exclusively under ID purview.) There has been considerable debate in recent years over the extent of the Institutes' influence over actual policymaking. It seems fairly clear that the Institutes work closely with the ID: analyses of specific regional issues by academic specialists are circulated upward, and the ID will at times commission studies. Given the relatively small size of the ID staff in relation to its responsibilities, it seems plausible that the department relies heavily on the Institutes as its "eyes and ears." The heads of the institutes—Georgii Arbatov, Viktor Vol'skii, Yevgenii Primakov, and Anatolii Gromyko—appear to be fairly influential figures in their own right, traveling abroad, meeting with foreigners, and explaining Soviet policies to the media. Ul'yanovskii sits on the editorial board of Narody Azii i Afriki, Brutents sits on the board of Aziya i Afrika Segodnya, and the ID as a whole exerts strong editorial control over Soviet media coverage of international affairs.

But while the writings of the lower-level institutchiki may at times reflect positions taken within the ID, the influence of any individual academic is likely to be virtually nil. The Latin American Institute alone is said to employ approximately 150 researchers; it is not likely that any one of them would have a greater impact than, say, a middle-level CIA analyst on the foreign policy of the United States. Their writings are far less authoritative than those of a serving ID official such as Ul'yanovskii or Brutents, let alone those of a Politburo-level leader.

Thus Soviet writings on the Third World can be divided into three categories of descending importance:

- Statements on Third World policy by Politburo-level leaders (including the Foreign Minister).
- Writings and statements by senior officials of the ID, particularly Ponomarev, Brutents, and Ul'yanovskii.
- Other writings, including those by military writers, Foreign Ministry and related officials, and the academics who work in the specialized institutes.

12For example, the internal Central Committee debate on the lessons of Chile after the fall of Allende seems to have been played out in the IMRD journal Rabochii Klass i Sovremennyi Mir during the mid-1970s. In another case, Ponomarev is said to have requested the publication in Rabochii Klass of several articles on social democracy that differed from his own views, in order to cultivate West European social democrats.
13Harry Gelman quotes a Soviet émigré as saying that Central Committee officials "are inundated with 'tons of papers' which 'just physically can't be read by the International Department because they have too many.'" (Gelman (1984), p. 235.)
In evaluating any published statement, it is important to keep in mind the formal institutional position of the writer, as well as his or her personal background. Commentators like Aleksandr Bovin or Fedor Burlatskii are hardly representative of the mainstream of Soviet elite thinking on foreign affairs, although they have served as mouthpieces for leaders such as Andropov. In other instances, it is useful to have followed the evolution of a particular writer’s views over time, since many of the present-day debates have important historical precedents (for example, the debate over the role of armed struggle that emerged after the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua in 1979 replayed many of the same issues discussed in connection with Chile in the mid-1970s, as noted in Sec. III). In the past, debates and discussions among Soviet academics have been useful for tracking Soviet thinking on Third World topics, but the academic debates have generally tended to follow policy rather than lead it. Ideas broached by the institutichiki take on a special interest only when they are picked up by actual policymakers at higher levels.
III. THEORY

As noted in Sec. I, numerous Soviet writings and pronouncements since the death of Leonid Brezhnev suggest the existence of an internal Soviet discussion over possible retrenchment in the Third World, or at least over whether to exercise greater selectivity in Third World commitments. At least three distinct themes emerge in support of lessened involvement:

1. The pressure of economic constraints and the need to attend to the Soviet Union's own economic development.
2. An awareness of the damaging effect of Third World activities on U.S.-Soviet relations, or the related point that increased tension in the U.S.-Soviet relationship (particularly since the coming to power of the Reagan Administration) inhibits Moscow's ability to support progressive forces in the Third World.
3. A critique of the Marxist-Leninist vanguard party as a solution to the problem of securing long-term influence in the Third World.

Another theme, possibly running counter to the first three, concerns the importance of armed struggle in promoting revolutionary change, which was reinforced by the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua. We shall examine each of these in turn.

None of these themes is completely new; the idea that the USSR should attend to its own economic needs prior to those of the world revolutionary movement was raised in the Khrushchev era, in Stalin's assertion of the need to develop "socialism in one country," and in Lenin's desire for a "breathing spell" at the conclusion of the civil war. The issue is rather the frequency with which these themes are raised, and who is raising them: The significant feature of the present debate is that the themes are being taken up by Politburo-level and Central Committee Secretary-level leaders. Before we can demonstrate that any of these themes represent innovations in recent Soviet thinking, it is necessary to establish a baseline against which to measure them. Because it is not possible to summarize the whole complex of Soviet views on the Third World at the beginning of the 1980s, we shall use Brezhnev's two reports at the 25th and 26th CPSU Congresses as a standard of comparison, referring back to earlier Soviet pronouncements as necessary.
THE 25TH AND 26TH CPSU CONGRESSES

Perhaps the most notable feature of Brezhnev's report to the 25th Party Congress in 1976 was its general optimism toward the prospects for revolutionary change in the Third World. The report was given just after the successful intervention in Angola in support of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, or MPLA, and the collapse of the Portuguese African empire. Brezhnev began his speech with a lengthy celebration of the victory of the Vietnamese revolution and the consolidation of the Cuban regime. He went on to praise positive developments such as the increasing role of the state sector and nationalization of foreign monopoly assets, took note of the new Angolan regime, and concluded that there had been "a great strengthening of the influence of states that not long ago were colonies or semi-colonies."1

A second feature of the 25th Congress report was its very strong expressions of support for the national liberation struggle. Soviet pronouncements on the Third World from the early to mid-1970s tended to be alternatively defensive and belligerent in their assertions that détente would not lead the USSR to sell out the interests of its progressive allies. On the contrary, according to Soviet leaders, détente would increase the Soviet Union's ability to assist worldwide revolutionary struggle because the lowered risks of U.S.-Soviet conflict would allow it to concentrate on the Third World. Brezhnev's report is no exception in this respect. In the section on Strengthening Cooperation with the Developing Countries four complete paragraphs are devoted to reassurances that "our Party supports and will continue to support peoples who are fighting for their freedom," and at a later point he pointedly notes that "Our country has helped—and as the October 1973 war showed, helped effectively—to strengthen the military potential of the countries opposing the aggressor—Egypt, Syria, and Iraq."2 These statements of support were not qualified in any way; for example, no note was taken of economic difficulties faced by the Soviet Union or of the dangers of superpower confrontation.

Finally, Brezhnev took special note of the socialist-oriented states, pointing out that "in many liberated countries, a complicated process of the demarcation of class forces is taking place, and the class struggle is growing."3

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2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., p. 35.
By the time of the 26th Party Congress in 1981, a great deal had happened in the Third World: The Soviets had intervened in the Horn of Africa and in Afghanistan, and the Vietnamese had invaded Kampuchea with Soviet support. Brezhnev's 1981 report laid even heavier stress than his report five years earlier on the "countries that have chosen the path of socialist development," noting that their number had increased and that Friendship and Cooperation Treaties had been concluded with Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), and Syria. He expressed general pleasure with developments among these states, such as the securing of the "commanding heights" of the economy, though he cautioned that "development of these countries along the progressive path does not, naturally, proceed uniformly, but proceeds under complex conditions."

The major difference between the 25th and 26th Congress reports is the notably more somber tone of the latter with regard to the prospects for revolutionary change. While taking note of the numerous advances that had taken place since the last Congress, Brezhnev pointed out that the Soviet Union has had to struggle "in circumstances in which, toward the beginning of the eighties, clouds gathered on the international horizon," largely as a result of the military threat posed by the United States. He went on to say that "as a whole the period after the 25th Congress was not a simple (neprostym) one. There were many difficulties both in the economic development of the country and in the international situation." Brezhnev then went on to detail the internal counterrevolution being exported to Angola and Ethiopia and the "undeclared war" being waged against Afghanistan, as well as providing a somewhat ambivalent evaluation of the Iranian revolution and the Islamic revival. Indeed, much of the report reads like a catalog of troubles (the Iran-Iraq war, machinations against the Arabs), culminating in a prolonged warning about the danger of nuclear war and the possibility of imperialist intervention in the Persian Gulf.

As in the 25th Congress report, Brezhnev laid heavy emphasis on the support provided to Soviet allies in the Third World, beginning with a list of several major economic aid projects in Syria, Algeria, Guinea, and other developing countries. He then stated quite bluntly, "We also help, together with the other fraternal countries, in strengthening the defense capability of the liberated states, when they

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2Ibid., p. 21.
3Ibid., p. 30.
turn to us with such requests. This took place, for example, in Angola and Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{77}

The statements on Soviet assistance are somewhat curious. While they are not qualified in any specific way, Brezhnev’s stress on Soviet economic assistance has a somewhat defensive ring to it, as if he were answering charges on the part of Third World clients as to the insufficiency of Soviet economic assistance. Moreover, he somewhat gingerly criticizes proponents in the developing world of a new international economic order by stating that “one cannot, as is sometimes done, reduce the question simply to a distinction between the ‘rich North’ and the ‘poor South.’”\textsuperscript{8}

The 25th and 26th Congress reports established two important declarative positions concerning Soviet Third World policy, namely, strong and more or less unqualified support for clients in the Third World, and emphasis on allies of a “socialist orientation.” Brezhnev used the following formula to suggest grounds for an activist Soviet policy: “We are against exporting revolution but we cannot agree either with the export of counterrevolution.” This formula disappears from subsequent Soviet statements on the Third World. As U.S.-Soviet relations worsened in the first two years of the Reagan Administration, Soviet statements pointed to the dangers this situation posed to its client regimes and, if anything, increased the belligerence with which it extended promises of support to them.

**“WE HELP OTHERS BY HELPING OURSELVES”**

The first major theme that began appearing in the early 1980s had to do with economic constraints on the Soviet Union’s ability to assist countries in the Third World. Sometime prior to Brezhnev’s death in November 1982, a number of high Politburo- and Party Secretariat-level leaders began to take up a line which had been developed in other, less authoritative theoretical writings on the Third World (particularly since the late 1970s), but which was not present in either the 25th or 26th Congress reports. In essence, it asserted that the Soviet Union can help its friends and allies in the Third World best not so much by direct economic aid as by improving its own economy and making the “real” or “developed” socialism of the USSR the best and the most attractive model for Third World nations to follow.

\textsuperscript{77}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{8}Ibid., p. 32. Brezhnev also asserts that the Soviet Union will provide technical training “to the extent of our ability.”
The clearest and most extended example of the way this theme has been treated at the level of the Institutes was an article by Yurii Novopashin, a section head in the Institute of the Economics of the World Socialist System, entitled "The Influence of Real Socialism on the World Revolutionary Process: Methodological Aspects."9 Novopashin makes the general observation that "real socialism influences the revolutionary process by its very existence and development" and that by "realizing the noble ideas of social justice, of social equality and general well-being . . . [real socialism] widely influences universal development." While Novopashin takes note of the importance of the concrete support offered by the USSR to the world revolutionary process, he clearly regards the Soviet Union's "force of example" and "demonstration effect" as the more important source of influence.

But this "force of example" cannot be effective unless the Soviet Union itself is seen as an attractive model. Novopashin points out the declining economic growth rates of the Council for Economic Mutual Advantage (CEMA) countries in the late 1970s and early 1980s and the growing difficulties of making a transition to intensive types of production. In spite of its recent gains, developed socialism "still cannot rule out shortages of some food products and consumer goods, and their frequently low quality." As a result, the USSR is having increasing difficulties in keeping up with the United States in their competition for influence. He criticizes attempts to paper over these shortcomings and quotes Janos Kadar to the effect that the honor of the party is best defended by not saying or doing anything "that one would later have to be ashamed of."

The central section of Novopashin's article is devoted to economic reform within the USSR. When he finally turns to the developing world, he notes that "it is not always possible for the socialist countries to find the means to assist those states in all those numerous directions where such an assistance would be desirable"; as a consequence, capitalist countries provide 20 to 70 percent of the economic aid to socialist-oriented states. His recommendations are highly unorthodox: For example, noting that forced industrialization in developing countries occasionally leads to lower standards of living and consequently greater demands for economic assistance from Soviet bloc states, he suggests emphasis on traditional agricultural production instead.

Novopashin's article would not by itself be of great significance had its themes not been picked up by other, higher-ranking Soviet officials.

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The most important of these was Yuri Andropov himself during his brief tenure as General Secretary. Andropov's early emphasis after succeeding Brezhnev in late 1982 was on domestic economic reform, and he did not at first devote much emphasis to Third World subjects. His first major statement on the Third World came in his speech to the Central Committee Plenum on June 15, 1983, which deserves to be quoted at length:

Most close to us in the former colonial world are countries which have chosen the socialist orientation. We are brought together not only by common anti-imperialist, peace-loving aims in foreign policy, but also by common ideals of social justice and progress. We see, of course, both the complexity of their position and the difficulties of their revolutionary development. It is one thing to proclaim socialism as one's aim and quite another to build it. For this, a certain level of productive forces, culture, and social consciousness are needed. Socialist countries express solidarity with these progressive states, render assistance to them in the sphere of politics and culture, and promote the strengthening of their defense. We contribute also, to the extent of our ability, to their economic development. But, on the whole, their economic development, just as the entire social progress of those countries, can (of course) be only the result of the work of their peoples and of a correct policy of their leadership.

Like Brezhnev, Andropov paid special attention to the countries of a "socialist orientation" and noted that they are closest to the Soviet Union. But he qualified his expression of solidarity in two important ways: First, he noted the "complexity" and "difficulties" of the situation of the socialist-oriented countries and suggested that while many of these regimes have declared Marxism-Leninism as their official ideology, few have succeeded in implementing meaningful policies based on scientific socialism or have come close to the level of the states of "developed socialism" (i.e., the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe—see pp. 83ff below). Reference to "difficulties" on the part of young states generally implies backsliding and political unreliability, and as we will see, this theme is developed at much greater length by writers like Ul'yanovskii. The second qualification is in the sphere of economic

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10 It is possible to detect a slight foreshadowing of the themes in Andropov's June 1983 Plenum speech in his December 21, 1982, speech to the Supreme Soviet. After detailing the problems experienced by young liberated states, he states that in a "thoroughly considered strategy of economic and socio-political development, mutual respect for each other's interests and rights will enable their peoples to overcome these difficulties, which we might describe as growing pains." Then, rather than making an offer of concrete assistance as would be expected in such a context, he merely closes by saying the "Soviet people wish them great success in consolidating their independence, and in their fight for prosperity and progress." (Quoted in New Times, No. 52, 1982.)

support: While promising political, cultural, and military aid, Andropov pointed out that economic development is the responsibility of the states themselves and not that of their developed socialist allies. Since the main theme of the Plenum speech was the Soviet Union's poor economic performance and the need to raise labor productivity, Andropov was implicitly making the Novopashin-like argument that the USSR must attend to its own developmental needs ahead of those of its allies in the Third World.

Andropov's June Plenum speech then opened the way for similar pronouncements, for example, a Pravda editorial the following July, which quoted him and underlined that "In the end progress can only be achieved through the labor of the people of these countries [i.e., in the developing world] and their leaders' correct policy."12

The theme of economic stringency was taken up that same month in an article by Ivan Kapitonov, entitled "Party of the Working Class, Party of the Whole People: On the 80th Anniversary of the Second RSDRP Congress" in the July 1983 issue of Problemy Mira i Sotsializma. Kapitonov, a veteran party secretary in charge of the Central Committee department for light industry, is primarily interested in economic issues and has no responsibility for foreign affairs.13 In an otherwise unremarkable article devoted to the history of the RSDRP and the CPSU dealing largely with organizational matters, Kapitonov suddenly began discussing the Third World. He quoted Lenin to the effect that Communists have an international duty to support the revolution in all countries. He then went on to state:

In our day this behest of Lenin's is embodied in a twofold international task which the CPSU resolves consistently. Its essence is to achieve new successes in the progress of Soviet society, thereby influencing the correlation of world forces and the course of world development, and to give effective support to today's revolutionary and progressive movements. The party is guided by Lenin's perspicacious tenet that we exert our chief influence on the world revolutionary process through our economic policy. Our every success in perfecting developed socialist society and further strengthening the power of the Soviet state is of international significance and serves the common cause of world socialism, the people's struggle against imperialism and for democracy, national freedom, and social progress.11

12Pravda, July 12, 1983.
13Prior to his replacement by Yegor Ligachev, Kapitonov was the junior party secretary responsible for organizational affairs, i.e., appointment of party cadres.
14Op. cit., p. 9 (italics added). Later in the article, Kapitonov states that "the CPSU regards it as its international duty to give support and assistance to the national liberation movement and develop cooperation with countries which have gained liberation from colonial oppression and are waging a struggle for political and economic independence" (p. 11).
While making an obligatory bow toward the need for direct support of the Third World revolutionary process, Kapitonov repeated the essence of Novopashin's thesis, that is, that the USSR's primary influence over the world socialist movement lies in its own economic success, and that therefore its first duty is toward itself. It is curious that Kapitonov should be speaking on Third World topics at all; one gets the impression that he, as an economic planner with responsibilities for internal party-organizational affairs, was arguing for a redirection of Soviet priorities away from the developing world.\(^\text{15}\)

This theme was further developed by the head of the ID himself, Boris Ponomarev. Beginning in late 1983, Ponomarev published a series of four articles under the general rubric "Real Socialism and Its International Significance" in Slovo Lektora, the last of which (in March 1984) was devoted exclusively to the Third World. In this article, Ponomarev discussed at length the "great importance" of "direct economic and scientific-technical aid provided by the Soviet Union and the other countries of real socialism to the liberated countries." He extensively quoted statistics to show how generous the Soviet Union had been in the past in extending aid to the developing world, noting in particular Moscow's role in subsidizing basic industries like metallurgy, power engineering, and chemistry, and its training of Third World cadres in scientific-technical fields. But he went on to say:

At the same time, the Soviet Union fundamentally rejects the demands that, on a par with the imperialist countries, it allocate for aid to the developing countries a fixed part of its gross national product. Neither in the past, during the era of colonialism, nor under the present-day conditions, has our country taken part in the imperialistic exploitation of the developing countries, the consequence of which is their economic backwardness.\(^\text{15}\)

\(^\text{15}\)Kapitonov has spoken on Third World issues before. In a 1979 speech, he made reference to the economic self-help theme, but stated that "the bonds of mutual respect, good cooperation and sincere friendship link our country with dozens of states which have been freed from the colonial yoke . . . we shall continue to strengthen that friendship and develop that cooperation." (FBIS, April 25, 1979, p. R12.)

\(^\text{16}\)The theme that the Soviet Union does not owe anything to the "poor South" as part of the new international economic order proposed by many Third World states is hardly a new theme with Ponomarev or other Soviet spokesmen. For example, in a November 1980 speech in Berlin, he stated: "The progressive forces of the developing world are becoming ever more fully aware of the fact that the reorganization of international economic relations on a democratic basis depends, above all, on the extent to which they themselves are systematically fighting neocolonialism . . . As we know, motivated by the desire to isolate the developing countries from world socialism, imperialism and its Beijing accomplices are actively exploiting the false concept of the 'poor' nations of the 'South,' allegedly opposing the 'rich' nations of the 'North,' among which they include the USSR and other socialist countries." (JPRS 77341, February 6, 1981.)
Ponomarev continued:

To a greater and greater extent the progressive forces in the developing world are becoming aware that the transformation of international economic relations on a democratic basis depends primarily upon the consistency with which they themselves wage the struggle against neocolonialism and exercise control over the imperialistic monopolies, and the degree of completeness with which they use the positive experience gained by the socialist countries in the building of an independent national economy.

One cannot agree with the point of view that it is only an influx of resources from without that can guarantee the resolution of the burning problems of the developing countries.17

While Ponomarev has stated on previous occasions that economic development is the responsibility of the states of the Third World themselves, the Slovo Lektora article developed this theme at much greater length. Like other Soviet statements on economic aid, it was a combination of highly defensive detailing of the Soviet Union’s record on economic assistance, as if Ponomarev were answering critics of that record in the developing world, and a rather belligerent assertion that in any event the USSR does not bear primary responsibility for the Third World’s economic well-being.

It is interesting that Ponomarev should be calling attention to the responsibility of the countries of the Third World for their own economic development, since one presumes that it was he and his colleagues in the ID who were strong supporters of the expansion in the late 1970s that saddled the Soviet Union with so many expensive new commitments. Ponomarev’s writings continue to reflect the strong ideological perspective that is characteristic of ID officials. For example, he is always careful to distinguish between the Soviet Union’s socialist and nonsocialist clients, laying particular emphasis on the former. He began his Slovo Lektora article by stating, “As everyone knows, the national-liberation movement grew into a number of socialist revolutions. For the remainder, however, that movement reached a new historic boundary when, in addition to the reinforcement of political freedom and national independence, fundamental economic and social reforms began to be included on the agenda.”18 He went on to single out the self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist regimes for special support, including Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Cuba,

17FBIS, June 14, 1984, pp. 2–6 (annex) (italics added).
18Ibid., p. 2.
Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea, and Nicaragua. In addition, he placed strong emphasis on the importance of vanguard parties as a means of institutionalizing revolutionary gains in the Third World.

Gaidar Aliev, a full member of the Politburo, also raised another issue of economic stringency. Speaking in Hanoi at the end of October 1983, he stated:

We are convinced that there are good prospects for economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and Vietnam. Life has shown that it is now necessary to build this cooperation on a long term basis and to proceed to more effective forms of economic ties. This will give our cooperation a more purposeful and stable character and permit us to resolve greater tasks.

Let me say frankly that in helping our Vietnamese friends develop their economy, the Soviet people have to share things they need themselves.

Aliev then went into a long explanation of the economic problems the Soviet Union has been facing, including the slowdown in the Soviet economy's overall rate of growth and declining productivity. This speech is notable both because of the identity of the speaker and because of where it was given, since Vietnam represents one of the more expensive of Moscow's commitments of the past decade.

Finally, it is possible to find the theme of economic stringency discussed at much lower levels. One of the more amusing of these is an article by L. N. Lebedinskaya, a senior staff member at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, entitled “Peoples of the Former Colonial World and Real Socialism,” in Rabochii Klass i Sovremennyi Mir. In the course of a discussion of the developed socialist countries' support for the Third World, Lebedinskaya formulated a series of eleven principles intended to govern their mutual relations, including:

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19 It is interesting to follow Ponomarev's listings of Third World clients. In a March 1983 speech on the centenary of Marx's death, he included Vietnam, Cuba, Korea, and Laos in the world socialist system; Angola, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Mozambique, and “certain other countries” were said to be following “the revolutionary path in the direction of socialism.” Nicaragua, which does not have a vanguard party and has not signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union, was not listed. (See “Marx's Teaching—A Guide to Action,” FBIS, April 1, 1983, p. R2.)

20 In the Slovo Lektora article quoted above, for example, he noted the “necessity of the ideological and political leadership on the part of the party in the revolutionary vanguard, a party that is closely linked with the people” (ibid., p. 6). See also his 1980 Berlin speech, op. cit., p. 44.

21 Pravda, November 1, 1983.
6. Taking into account the real limits of economic possibilities or other resources of the socialist countries in rendering aid to the developing states . . .

8. The impermissibility of parasitical attitudes in connection with obtaining aid from the socialist countries, as well as positions under which the socialist countries are put on the same level with capitalist ones (the rich “North”) in regard to the historical debt to the former colonial countries.22

The author also repeated Novopashin’s argument that “victorious socialism” influences the world revolutionary struggle insofar as “by the force of example it demonstrates the visible advantages of the new structure over the system of capitalist exploitation.”23

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AND THE RISK OF WAR

The second major theme which emerged in Soviet pronouncements during the early 1980s had to do with how worsening relations with the United States and other Western countries increased the risk of war and imposed constraints on Moscow’s ability to help allies in the Third World. This line first began to appear well before Brezhnev’s death, and in fact seems to have been taken up by him in the year before his death.

To better understand the risk-of-war theme, it is necessary to look back at the interconnection between the central East-West relationship and policy in the Third World in Soviet thinking. Historically, it has been under conditions of détente with the United States that the Soviets have been most inclined toward adventurism in the Third World; conversely, when relations with the United States and Western Europe are bad (as they were in the early 1980s), the Soviet tendency is to pull back in peripheral theaters. Thus, in the early days of the Cold War, the Soviets supported primarily orthodox Communists in contiguous theaters (e.g., China, North Korea) and did not make a big effort to cultivate ties with former colonies. The rise of Khrushchev and his promotion of “peaceful coexistence” with the United States corresponded to a major opening toward the developing world, a trend that was reinforced by Chinese charges that the Soviets were abdicating their responsibilities vis-à-vis the world revolutionary process.

22No. 4, 1982. Later in the same article, Lebedinskaya discusses the contradictions and backsliding that exist in progressive Third World countries: “Supported by imperialist propaganda, the spirit of nationalistic prejudices and a deeply rooted distrust toward persons of the white race have exacerbated [their position].”

23Ibid., p. 9.
When the Soviet Union again sought to move into a relationship of détente with the United States in the early 1970s, one of the major tasks of Soviet spokesmen was to assure their friends and allies in the international Communist movement and in the Third World that superpower détente did not mean a Soviet sellout of their interests. As in the case of the Chinese in the 1950s and 1960s, individual allies including Egypt’s Sadat suspected Moscow of having colluded with the United States to freeze the existing status quo in a way that would directly damage their countries’ interests. Soviet spokesmen such as Boris Ponomarev not only had to defend détente in the central relationship, but also had to explain that far from being harmful to the interests of the worldwide revolutionary process, détente would actually increase Moscow’s ability to support that process more vigorously by lowering the risk of confrontation and war with the United States and permitting the Soviets to concentrate their attention on areas outside of Europe and the United States. Karen Brutents, writing in Prawda in August 1973, for example, criticized China’s “noisy campaign regarding the notorious ‘compact between the two superpowers’” and asserted that détente was creating “more favorable conditions” for the “national liberation struggle.” In fact, Soviet behavior in the Third World became more active only after the onset of détente with the West in the early 1970s. Moscow responded to Sadat’s expulsion of Soviet advisors in July 1972 by supplying him with weapons sufficient to allow him to launch the October 1973 war only a year after the May 1972 Nixon-Brezhnev summit and the signature of the “Basic Principles of Détente”; and the Soviets began their Angolan adventure in 1975, the year of the signing of the Helsinki CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) accords.

These trends began to reverse themselves with the final unraveling of détente that had begun late in the Carter Administration and that accelerated with the coming to power of Ronald Reagan in 1981. While Soviet spokesmen continued to emphasize the USSR’s “right” to support the national liberation struggle while pursuing arms control and détente with the United States, there was evidence of a growing recognition on the part of certain Soviet writers that Third World activism had in fact been subverting the more important U.S.-Soviet relationship. In January 1981, Fedor Burlatskii, head of the philosophy department of the Institute of Social Sciences, argued that a “local anesthetic” ought to be applied to regional conflicts to protect the

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24 For a discussion of this issue with regard to West European Communists, see Schapiro (1976-77), pp. 49-51.

“living tissue” of U.S.-Soviet relations, and in March, Georgii Arbatov, director of the Institute for the USA and Canada, urged negotiations on local issues which, he said, could have prevented the introduction of Cuban troops into Angola. Similar proposals for “rules” to govern the U.S.-Soviet competition in the Third World were also put forth by commentator Aleksandr Bovin.26

It appears that Leonid Brezhnev himself was aware of the problematic relationship between détente and the Third World. Evidence for this lies primarily in his proposal of a “code of conduct” governing superpower behavior in the Third World following a visit by Libya’s Colonel Qaddafi to Moscow in April 1981, not long after the 26th CPSU Party Congress.27 Brezhnev renounced spheres of influence or rules of conduct that would favor imperialism, but suggested a series of five principles to govern superpower behavior, including “the recognition of the right of each people to decide its domestic affairs without outside interference,” “unconditional recognition of sovereignty of those [i.e., Third World] states over their natural resources,” and “respect of the status of nonalignment.” Adoption of Brezhnev’s code of conduct would likely have been a meaningless atmospheric gesture, like the 1972 “Basic Principles of Détente,” or else would have proven more restrictive of U.S. than Soviet activities in the Third World, but the fact that Brezhnev felt compelled to propose such a set of rules suggests a recognition on his part that the Third World had become a major problem in U.S.-Soviet relations which needed to be addressed in some way, however tendentiously. Brezhnev’s speech echoed a 1980 Soviet proposal to regulate U.S.-Soviet relations in the Persian Gulf and foreshadowed a proposal made in September 1982, just before his death, that NATO and the Warsaw Pact mutually refrain from extending their operations into various regions of the Third World.

Brezhnev’s apparent recognition at the end of his life of the dangers posed by activities in the Third World was taken up in a much more explicit fashion by Andropov in his June 1983 Plenum speech. The tone of that speech with regard to the overall prospects for U.S.-Soviet relations is very somber and emphasizes the danger of war:

the preservation of peace on earth—is both today and in the foreseeable future the pivotal problem of the foreign policy of our party. And not only of our party. The threat of nuclear war hanging over the world induces one to reevaluate the basic concept of the activities of the entire Communist movement.”

27Ibid.
Juxtaposed with the statements on economic constraints cited earlier, Andropov seems to be suggesting that a “reevaluation” of the goals and activities of the entire Communist movement will lead to the conclusion that the Soviet Union will not be able to support its Third World friends to the same extent as it would under conditions of détente.

Andropov’s remarks came in the midst of a heated Soviet campaign to block the deployment of American intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe, which was scheduled to begin in December 1983. To capitalize on the growing Western anti-nuclear movement, the Soviets attacked the United States with increasing stridency for its aggressive militarist policies and asserted that there was a mounting danger of nuclear war between the superpowers. The “danger of war” theme was present in nearly all Soviet writings and statements on foreign policy in this period, including those on the Third World. While this theme was often quite artificially grafted on, a number of Soviet spokesmen did make a more organic connection between the overall status of U.S.-Soviet relations and Soviet ability to support clients in the Third World. For example, Ivan Koshelev asserted that since the Soviet Union is required to shoulder a heavy burden in maintaining the military balance, “this cannot, of course, fail to limit our possibilities in economic cooperation with the Third World.”

Writing on the nonaligned movement in 1984, Karen Brutents stated that “the liberated states are becoming ever more conscious that the current exacerbation of the international situation hits at their interests in both political and economic respects... the developing countries can hardly count upon a radically improved economic situation while the arms race is progressing on such a gigantic scale and military expenditures are reaching astronomical proportions.”

In the Slovo Lektora article cited earlier, Ponomarev raised a similar point about how American aggressiveness and the arms race act to constrain economic assistance:

The Soviet Union and the other countries in the socialism community have been proposing, for a long time and persistently, the end of the arms race and the reduction of military budgets, and have been allocating some of the funds that have been made available to increase the aid provided to the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The Soviet Union announced its readiness to come to an understanding also with regard to the amounts of money that would

be allocated by each country that reduces its military budget, for the purpose of increasing that economic aid.\textsuperscript{31}

Finally, Aleksandr Bovin has continued to stress the interrelationship between détente and support for the Third World. In a 1984 *Izvestia* commentary, he noted a number of negative trends in the Third World: In spite of the end of overt colonialism, much of the Third World is in serious economic trouble and faces "tragic zigzags"; and economic neocolonialism by transnational corporations is increasing at great cost to its Third World victims. Bovin came to the following somewhat surprising conclusion: "Economic decolonization hardly seems possible in conditions of global confrontation, the exacerbation of conflict situations and the growth of international tension. Therefore, the primary task is overcoming the crisis of détente and establishing a stable climate of international cooperation."\textsuperscript{32} Bovin's article might be interpreted to imply that under current conditions of hostile U.S.-Soviet relations, the USSR cannot do much to help the countries of the Third World that are suffering from neocolonialist domination, whereas a reestablishment of détente would free the Soviet Union to return to the kind of support that was characteristic of the 1970s.

**THE CRITIQUE OF THE MARXIST-LENINIST VANGUARD PARTY**

The third respect in which the Soviets appear to have been rethinking their policy in the Third World concerns the principle of selectivity by which they choose clients. The 1970s, aside from being a period of simple quantitative expansion, saw a number of qualitative changes in Soviet strategy, the most important innovation being Moscow's promotion of Marxist-Leninist vanguard parties (MLVPs). The MLVP, it can be argued, was a response to several specific problems the Soviets had encountered in dealing with the older generation of Third World clients acquired in the 1950s and 1960s. Quite apart from doctrinal pronouncements, this new emphasis on the MLVP was clearly reflected in actual Soviet behavior. Between the mid-1960s and mid-1980s, the number of self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist Soviet clients increased from four (North Korea, North Vietnam, Cuba, and the People's Republic of Congo) to sixteen (those four, plus Laos, Kampuchea, Angola, Mozambique, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, 

\textsuperscript{31}Ibid., p. 3.

Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, and Madagascar\textsuperscript{33}, the bulk having come to power after 1975. This proliferation of Marxist-Leninist regimes did not come about by accident: The Soviet Union and its allies, including Cuba and East Germany, were instrumental in either helping them to seize power or sustaining them thereafter. Many of the tactical innovations of this period, including the use of Cuban and other proxies, heightened involvement in the shaping of domestic Leninist state institutions, etc., were means to the end of consolidating the rule of the MLVP in these different client states\textsuperscript{34}.

But while the MLVPs answered some of the problems posed by Moscow's earlier generation of clients, they raised a host of new difficulties unique to themselves. What is new in Soviet writings on the Third World is an apparently growing Soviet recognition of these difficulties, and increasingly direct criticisms of the shortcomings of the MLVPs themselves. This critique has been developed in Soviet theoretical writings over the past decade, but has become much more open and commonplace since the death of Brezhnev. At present, it does not amount to a repudiation of the emphasis on the MLVP, but it suggests a growing Soviet awareness that the MLVP has been an insufficient answer to their earlier problems in the Third World.

To understand the current discussion of the MLVP, however, it is necessary to go back and trace the evolution of Soviet thinking on the question of selectivity in the choice of friends in the Third World.

\textbf{The Problematic Character of Bourgeois Nationalism}

Soviet policy in the immediate postwar period was characterized by a narrow emphasis on orthodox Communist parties. Stalin regarded the leaders of new nations that were emerging from colonialism as dependencies or stooges of the former European colonial powers and made no significant efforts to cultivate relations with them.

This all changed dramatically following Khrushchev's rise to power. In July 1955, the Soviet Union concluded a major arms deal with Nasser's Egypt (through the intermediation of Czechoslovakia),

\textsuperscript{1}This list does not include Grenada prior to the American intervention in October 1983.

inaugurating a period of rapid expansion of Soviet ties with newly independent countries in the Third World, including Indonesia under Sukharno, India, Mali, Ghana, Syria, and Algeria. This shift was announced in Khrushchev's reference to the "many roads to socialism" in his address to the 20th Party Congress in 1956. Khrushchev argued that these new non-Communist states were natural allies of the Soviet Union insofar as the colonial legacy left them embittered toward the West and ready to share a common anti-imperialist foreign policy with the Soviet bloc.

In internal politics, most of these states proclaimed vaguely socialist ideologies that fell short of scientific socialism, including healthy admixtures of non-Marxist nationalist concepts. The Soviets thus found themselves promoting states that proclaimed a variety of unorthodox syncretist doctrines like pan-Arabism, African Socialism, and later, Islamic Marxism. The Soviets downplayed the importance of this ideological heterodoxy at first, believing that these states would follow a natural evolution toward scientific socialism. The Soviets proved quite willing to sacrifice the interests of orthodox local Communist parties in countries like Egypt and Iraq when the non-Communist rulers of those countries turned against them, for the sake of maintaining good state-to-state relations.

These early Soviet expectations were quickly disappointed. In the first place, many of the regimes with which the Soviets established relations proved to be unstable and short-lived: By the mid-1960s, Moscow had suffered setbacks with the removal of Ben Bella, Keita, Nkhrumah, and Sukharno through military coups. Given the personalistic nature of these leaders' rules, Soviet influence in many cases did not survive their passing. Equally important, none of the new states (with the single exception of Cuba) followed the expected evolution toward scientific socialism. It is easy to forget how exaggerated Soviet hopes for the Third World were in the Khrushchev era. Writing in 1984, Rostislav Ul'yanovskii pointed out that Marxist publications in the late 1950s and early 1960s predicted that the transformation to scientific socialism would "be a lengthy process which would most likely take more than one decade." Misreading the lessons of Russian history, he went on, "Excessively optimistic researchers wanted to see in the personalities of Nasser or Ben Bella a Chernyshevskii who would change into a Plekhanov. Occasionally wishes were presented as reality." Soviet analyses of the Third World became considerably

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more pessimistic by the mid-1960s, and increasingly critical of the bourgeois nationalist regimes so eagerly cultivated by Khrushchev.\textsuperscript{36}

Soviet relations with this first generation of bourgeois nationalist clients were characterized by several important weaknesses. First, the Soviet failure to establish an institutional basis for long-term relations and alternatives to the top leader as sources of influence left their position vulnerable to the sudden political changes that were all too common in the Third World. Second, Soviet influence was based almost entirely on arms transfers, and to a lesser extent on Soviet ability to provide its clients with political and economic support. Arms transfers proved to be a remarkably crude instrument for influencing the day-to-day policies of client states, as the case of Egypt prior to the October War demonstrated. Finally, the nationalism and ideological heterogeneity of this group of clients made them in many cases highly unreliable. While the Soviets continued to regard clients like Egypt, Syria, and Iraq as net assets, they were constantly contravening Soviet wishes and often drew Moscow into unwanted confrontations with the United States. The Egyptian expulsion of Soviet advisors in July 1972 and its launching of the October War the following year, Syria's suppression of the PLO in Lebanon, and Iraq's crushing of the Iraqi Communist party in 1977 were only the most dramatic examples of the problems experienced.

The Rise of the Marxist-Leninist Vanguard Party

Soviet writers themselves are quite explicit about the change that took place in their client base beginning in the mid-1970s; they speak of a "second generation" of states that are very different from those described above. A good description of this shift is given in the 1984 edition of The World Communist Movement, a handbook of official Soviet positions concerning the worldwide revolutionary process (including orthodox Communist parties, national liberation movements, and associated progressive groups), edited by Ponomarev's first deputy in the International Department, Vadim Zagladin. The section on the Third World states:

> It is possible today to speak of two groups of countries of a socialist orientation and of a second generation of revolutionary democrats, who are closer to scientific socialism. The distinctiveness of the new group of countries of a socialist orientation (Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Kampuchea, the PDRY, and others) is that they have to build the economy virtually from scratch, and that a working class

is springing up in them together with industry. The political regimes of this group of countries are distinguished by great clarity of class positions. A process in which new revolutionary parties are coming into being, parties which at their congresses have declared their adoption of Marxist-Leninist ideology, is under way there. It is these parties which are heading the revolutionary development.

This second generation of “socialist-oriented” states has not yet been admitted into the circle of “socialist countries” (see the discussion of Soviet categorizations below), because their Marxism-Leninism is still by Soviet standards more of a “declaratory” variety. In some cases, these states are ruled by the official pro-Soviet Communist party (e.g., Afghanistan); in others the ruling party is distinct from the official Communist party and occasionally competes with it for power (e.g., the PDRY, Nicaragua). On the other hand, the distinctiveness of these states from the first generation of clients is quite clear. According to Ul’yanovskii, unlike many states of the first generation, the new ones rejected “the idea of a ‘third way,’ and the thesis of the special features of the ‘African’ or ‘Arab’ personality.” This led to a much broader basis of cooperation with the Soviet bloc:

The new type of revolutionary democrats are promoting more firmly a rapprochement with scientific socialism, both theoretical and practical. In the practical aspect they enhance cooperation with the socialist countries to a new level and deliberately promote the expansion of such cooperation. They do not mistrust the socialist commonwealth or fear “communist penetration,” which is still experienced by the national democrats and occasionally even by the revolutionary democrats of the senior generation. In the field of theory they adopt the Marxist-Leninist concepts of social structure of society and the class struggle, socialism and the socialist revolution, and the correlation between economics and politics during the period of transition to socialism.

In other words, all things being equal, a state that proclaims Marxism-Leninism as its official ideology is more likely to be a reliable client and will not be prone to pick fights with its Soviet patron simply to demonstrate its “independence from Moscow.” Or, as the Zagladin collection puts it, “Experience has shown that it is impossible to adhere to

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a socialist orientation without pursuing a policy of close friendship and cooperation with the socialist countries.\textsuperscript{39}

For most Soviet writers, formation of a vanguard party is even more important than declaration of Marxism-Leninism as the state's official ideology. The reasons for this are clear and proceed from Moscow's historical experience in the Third World. A vanguard party institutionalizes the regime's rule, and hence Soviet influence, making both less vulnerable to changes at the top. As one recent academic commentator noted, "The problem of the necessity of changing a broad-scale organization into a vanguard organization became particularly critical after revolutionary democrats, first in 1966 in Ghana and then in 1967 in Mali, were removed from power."\textsuperscript{40} None of the countries of the first generation of Soviet clients was ruled by vanguard parties, which in the Soviet view accounts for their frequent weaknesses. Ul'yanovskii notes:

[I]n a number of countries (Egypt, Mali, Sudan, Zaire, Ghana) [the leadership] failed to create a revolutionary-democratic organization which would ensure the reliability of truly revolutionary-democratic accomplishments. Since the truly revolutionary forces had no organization of their own, they were forced to act through the rapidly bureaucratized military and party-state apparatus. Lacking reliable mass support, they relied on a national leader who, in turn, relied on the army, the security organs, his clan or his tribe. The majority of national democrats during that period mistrusted the toiling classes or were unable to mobilize and organize them on the basis of a revolutionary awareness similar to a class awareness.\textsuperscript{41}

Groups such as Nasser's Arab Socialist Union never became serious political organizations. The result was that "during the second half of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s these phenomena led to the defeat of national democracy in some countries." The vanguard party, on the other hand, creates an institutionalized basis for Soviet influence that will survive the whims of individual leaders like a Nasser or a Sadat, and offers multiple points of leverage should the man at the top become intractable.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{39}Zagladin (1984), p. 362 (italics added).
\textsuperscript{40}Yurii N. Gavrilov, "Problems of the Formation of Vanguard Parties in Countries of Socialist Orientation," \textit{Narody Azii i Afriki}, No. 6, 1980, p. 3.
The vanguard party is one issue where Soviet theory and practice have coincided rather nicely. Many of the movements supported by the Soviets in the 1970s transformed themselves into vanguard parties at Soviet urging: the MPLA in Angola and Frelimo in Mozambique in 1977, the South Yemeni National Liberation Front in 1978, and the Committee for Organizing the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia (COPWE) into the Worker's Party of Ethiopia in 1984. Former national liberation fronts such as the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua which have not converted themselves into vanguard parties clearly have lower status in Soviet eyes. Among the most important services provided by the Soviets and their bloc allies (particularly the East Germans) is training in party-organizational work (i.e., training of party cadres locally or in the Soviet Union, writing party statutes and constitutions, etc.), with the ultimate objective of building solid vanguard party organizations.

Second Thoughts: Rostislav Ul'yanovskii

In practice, promotion of MLVPs has been a mixed blessing. On the one hand, they have indeed cooperated closely with the Soviet bloc, signing Friendship and Cooperation treaties with Moscow, permitting relatively free air and naval access to the Soviet military, supporting sympathetic national liberation movements and participating in the socialist “collective security system,” voting with the USSR in the United Nations, etc. On the other hand, these regimes have tended to be weak and narrowly based, lacking the broad nationalist legitimacy of the first generation of nationalist clients, and heavily dependent on Soviet bloc support for their initial rise to power and/or their ability to remain in place. As a result, Angola, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Kampuchea, Ethiopia, and South Yemen have all faced
indigenous opposition guerrilla movements, forcing the Soviets to assist in costly counterinsurgency wars.\textsuperscript{45}

It is therefore not surprising that some Soviet observers have had second thoughts about the MLVP as an answer to the problems posed by the first generation of Third World clients. What is somewhat unexpected is that one important source of these second thoughts is Rostislav Ul’yanovskii himself, who over the preceding fifteen years had been a strong advocate of the MLVP. In the spring of 1984, Ul’yanovskii published two articles, “On Revolutionary Democracy, Its State and Political System” in \textit{Voprosy Filosofi}, and “On National and Revolutionary Democracy” in \textit{Narody Azii i Afriki}, in which he presented an extended critique of the new MLVPs.

The basis for Ul’yanovskii’s critique is that while the new MLVPs have met the criterion of declarative adoption of Marxism-Leninism as a ruling ideology, they have fallen far short in its implementation, particularly in their organization of true vanguard parties. In both articles, he quotes from Andropov’s June Plenum speech that “it is one thing to proclaim socialism as one’s goal and another to build it” (suggesting, incidentally, that it was he or others in the ID who were responsible for putting it in Andropov’s speech in the first place). He then goes on to note that there is no reason to think that the changes going on in countries like Angola, Mozambique, or the PDRY should be similar to the positive example of Vietnam, where the transition to socialism was led by an orthodox Communist party.\textsuperscript{46} Indeed, observation of these cases suggests that “the idea of advancing toward socialism without a firm communist vanguard . . . is today no less topical than it was twenty years ago.” “Declarative radicalism” does not automatically produce a transition to socialism; indeed, it may make the situation worse by triggering sharp internal opposition to the regime. The shortcomings of the new MLVPs lie precisely in their poor party-organizational work: They have not laid the groundwork for socialism by securing mass support, with the result that they have incurred the hostility of the majority in many of these countries. Mongolia and some of the central Asian republics, where the transition to socialism was much more gradual and cautious than in European Russia because of the backwardness of their socioeconomic systems at the time of the revolution, are cited as more appropriate models for the

\textsuperscript{45}For a fuller discussion, see Fukuyama (1984, II).

Third World.\textsuperscript{47} Ul'yanovskii criticizes the Afghan Communists: “Four or five years ago some leftist leaders in Afghanistan had proclaimed the existence of a proletarian dictatorship in a country under feudalism, believing that this assertion was an important contribution to scientific socialism.”\textsuperscript{48}

Criticism of the new MLVPs is not a new phenomenon. Soviet writers have expressed skepticism about the genuineness of their commitment to and understanding of scientific socialism from the beginning, and it is for this reason that none of these countries were admitted into the circle of “socialist” countries.\textsuperscript{49} Nonetheless, Ul'yanovskii’s criticisms of the MLVPs are remarkably candid and extensive and have been echoed at the highest level, in Andropov’s Plenum speech.\textsuperscript{50} A survey of Ul'yanovskii’s own writings over the past decade or so reveals skepticism, but no prolonged criticisms of the “second generation” of states.\textsuperscript{51} It seems especially significant that Ul'yanovskii is expressing these reservations, since he has been a strong proponent of the MLVP. One presumes that if this is true for him, similar views are all the more prevalent elsewhere in the ID and within the broader Soviet foreign-policymaking establishment.\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{47}Ul'yanovskii (1984, II, pp. 28–29) notes that the Bukhara and Khorezm Soviet people’s republics were not admitted into the USSR upon its foundation in 1922 because there is no “automaticity” in the transition from revolutionary-democratic to socialist state power. “One should not strive to artificially turn [revolutionary-democratic power] into socialist power . . . while the objective situation, the level of development of the economy, the development of the class struggle of the workers . . . does not call forth a transition to a higher stage of power—socialist power.” “Resolution of this question each time demands concrete analysis, and only the progressive forces of a given country, its Marxist-Leninist party, can decide whether the transformation of revolutionary-democratic power into socialist power has already taken place.”

\textsuperscript{48}Ul'yanovskii (1984, I, p. 19). Note that this criticism applies equally to the Pecham faction headed by Babrak Karmal and to the Khalq faction of Hafizullah Amin, which since the Soviet invasion has been attacked in the Soviet press quite regularly.

\textsuperscript{49}For example, Gavrilov’s (1980, p. 7) article on vanguard parties notes that “adoption of a program is not everything. According to V. I. Lenin, a party becomes such only when it has its program, works out an effective tactical line based on the evaluation of the existing political situation,” etc.

\textsuperscript{50}The MLVPs are treated much more positively in the Zagladin edition of The World Communist Movement.

\textsuperscript{51}In a 1980 article entitled “The 20th Century and the National Liberation Movement,” Ul’yanovskii states that “noncapitalist development or (the same thing) socialist orientation, as a transitional stage on the path to socialism, nonetheless differs substantially from building socialism.” (\textit{Narody Azii i Afriki}, No. 2, 1980.)

\textsuperscript{52}Other recent criticisms of MLVPs include a 1984 article by Venyamin Chirkin, which provides an extended analysis of the internal “contradictions” of MLVPs. See “Leninskoye ucheniye o revolyutsionno-demokratichekoj vlasti i sovremennost,” \textit{Voprosy Filosofi}, No. 7, 1984. Other, more propagandistic articles note the problems of MLVPs but lay the blame entirely at the door of imperialism and local reaction. See Yuri Irkhin, “Trends in Development of Socialist-Oriented Countries,” \textit{Voprosy Istorii}, No. 6, 1984.
At this point, Ul’yanovskii’s reservations seem to be no more than that. There is no suggestion in his writings that the Soviet Union ought to end its emphasis on MLVPs or otherwise return to a Khrushchevite opening to all comers regardless of ideological orientation. Indeed, the implication of his articles is that the USSR ought to narrow its focus further on orthodox Communist parties, or at least press for closer collaboration between the MLVPs and the orthodox parties where the two are distinct. Nonetheless, he does indicate a clear awareness that the process of building socialism will be a lengthy one, no less for the MLVPs than for the bourgeois nationalists of an earlier generation. He does, moreover, attack quite strongly the “infantile leftism” of MLVPs like the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, and he suggests that they need to work more closely with non-Communist progressive forces as they build their basis of mass support.

Second Thoughts: Karen Brutents

A second ID official who appears to have doubts about the priority accorded to the MLVPs is Karen Brutents, the other Ponomarev deputy responsible for the Third World. Some twenty years younger than Ul’yanovskii, Brutents is likely to inherit overall responsibility for the Third World once Ul’yanovskii passes from the scene, if this has not already occurred in practice. As part of his ID duties, Brutents has been active as a Soviet diplomatic representative, traveling widely throughout the Middle East and Latin America, his two areas of primary responsibility.

Brutents does not criticize the MLVPs explicitly like Ul’yanovskii; rather, he damns them with faint praise and shows a considerably greater interest in the non-Marxist parts of the Third World. While he, like Ul’yanovskii, makes careful distinctions between Third World countries on ideological grounds, it may perhaps be fair to characterize him as a kind of neo-Khrushchevite in his emphasis on the foreign-policy potential of the non-Communist or non-Marxist Third World. A survey of Brutents’ writings indicates that he is considerably less preoccupied with the question of socialist orientation than Ul’yanovskii, writing on such varied topics as the Falklands crisis and the nonaligned movement. For example, in a February 1982 Pravda article Brutents makes a nod toward the socialist-oriented countries, but then quickly notes that under modern conditions “the position and

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53 Indeed, Brutents’ writings from the early 1960s when he was still an academic suggest that he was always something of a Khrushchevite.

role of a country in the world arena are determined not only by the socioeconomic forms which hold sway (i.e., by whether or not the regime is Marxist), but by other factors as well, particularly the country's attitude toward imperialism. Brutents' focus then shifts quickly to "the solid base for the Soviet Union's cooperation with those liberated countries where capitalist relations are developing but which pursue a policy of defending and strengthening national sovereignty in politics and economics." Rather than attacking the shortcomings of these capitalist-oriented countries, he takes note of the many "contradictions" that exist between them and the imperialist states. He points to the Soviet Union's growing cooperation with countries such as India, Brazil, and Mexico, suggesting that it is they and not the socialist-oriented states ruled by MLVPs that will provide more fertile ground for Soviet policy. He then goes on to say that there has been a broadening of Soviet relations with those states closely tied to the West, whose leaderships and/or populations seek national independence and which are treated crudely by imperialism.

These themes are taken even further in a 1984 article in which Brutents defends the anti-imperialist posture and credentials of a number of capitalist-oriented Third World states. Brutents again points out the "contradictions" that exist between these countries and imperialism, and states that "as long as it does not reach the monopolistic stage, even the development of capitalist relations in the liberated countries does not nullify [these contradictions] and does not directly contribute to consolidating the positions of imperialism." While it is true that the tasks of national liberation have by and large given way to those of social liberation, Brutents criticizes as "one-sided" those who in effect write off the capitalist-oriented states and fail to distinguish between different levels of capitalist development within them. Many of these states retain substantial anti-imperialist potential:

It would be wrong to note the remarkable achievements of the liberation struggle and of the socioeconomic changes, including the changes of a capitalist nature, and consequently to underestimate the factor of uncompleted national liberation tasks and, in many young states, also the factor of the uncomplete formation of their nations and national institutions.55

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57 Ibid. (italics added).
Implicitly, Brutents is arguing that the Soviet Union ought to be sensitive to and exploit the contradictions between the capitalist-oriented Third World and the imperialist countries, rather than directing support exclusively to the MLVPs and other socialist-oriented regimes.

A number of Khrushchevite themes are evident as well in Brutents' 1984 article on the nonaligned movement. It is interesting that he should be writing a highly upbeat article on the nonaligned movement (NAM) in the first place, since the NAM consists largely of "first-generation" bourgeois nationalist states. Brutents traces the nonaligned movement back to the 1955 Bandung Conference, which was frequently cited by Khrushchev as an indicator of the Third World's growing independence and anti-imperialist potential. He then praises the early leaders of the NAM, including Nehru, Nasser, Nkrumah, Sukharno, and Tito—the very group whose ideological inconsistency Ul'yanovskii had attacked a few months earlier. While Brutents takes note of the socialist-oriented countries that have entered the NAM, he tends to downplay ideological differences by emphasizing the movement's diversity; when he lists the characteristics that distinguish the liberated countries as a group, ideology or "clarity of class positions" does not figure at all.

**Romanov and Ethiopia**

Soviet skepticism about the genuineness of the "socialist transformations" taking place in MLVP-states was evident in the speech given by Grigory Romanov at the celebration marking the founding of the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE) on September 8, 1984. Romanov, who was at the time both a member of the Politburo and a Central Committee Secretary, was considerably less effusive in touting the achievements of Ethiopia in the spheres of politics and economics than was Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile Miriam, despite the fact that Romanov was in Addis Ababa ostensibly to congratulate the Ethiopians for bowing to Soviet pressure and forming a vanguard party. Romanov made clear that whatever Miriam's claims, Ethiopia was not yet a socialist society. He did not, for example, label the WPE a Marxist-Leninist party, but only a "party guided by the ideals of Marxism-Leninism." He immediately went on to note that Mengistu's report was "a combination of revolutionary aspiration for the future and sober consideration of the real situation": The WPE "talks honestly and openly about the difficulties and unresolved problems,"

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and "rightly stresses that much effort and time are still needed in order to extricate the country from the clutches of a backwardness inherited from the past."\textsuperscript{59}

A number of Western observers have noted that the WPE is not a true vanguard party so much as a front for the military, which still maintains effective control over the government in Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{60} Romanov appears to accept this view, by noting the long period of time required to form a WPE and the rather unorthodox manner in which it was done:

The Soviet people know how long the road to this congress has been . . . . The most important gain of the country’s working people is the creation of the WPE. In resolving this task—a task of truly historical significance—a creative approach has been shown and original, nation-specific forms and methods of party building have been found.\textsuperscript{61}

In addition, the Soviet representative underlines the distinction between Ethiopia and the countries of "real socialism": "The CPSU in its practical activity is guided by the clear understanding of the great importance for the future of all mankind of building, developing, and improving the truly existing socialist society."\textsuperscript{62} The latter phrase also suggests a hint on Romanov’s part that the Soviet Union was going to look to its own economic development needs ahead of those of Ethiopia.

\section*{THE QUESTION OF ARMED STRUGGLE}

The three themes noted above—economic constraints on Soviet Third World activities, the risk those activities pose to U.S.-Soviet relations, and the critique of the MLVP—all suggest pressures for a less activist Soviet policy in the Third World. However, a fourth theme has arisen since the Nicaraguan revolution in 1979 which tends to push policy in the opposite direction. That theme is a shift in emphasis toward armed struggle in the promotion of revolutionary change in the Third World, particularly in Latin America.

The tactical debate over armed struggle vs. traditional political-organizational activities has gone on for as long as there has been a Communist movement. It surfaced between the Soviets and the

\textsuperscript{59}Pravda, September 9, 1984, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{60}Henze (1984).
\textsuperscript{61}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{62}Ibid.
Chinese in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and subsequently between the Soviets and the Cubans. In both cases, the Soviets took the more conservative view that Communist parties ought to come to power primarily through the careful political organization of a mass political base and the use of established legal procedures (such as elections) wherever possible. The Chinese and Cubans, by contrast, had themselves come to power through the armed struggle of guerrilla armies operating in the countryside, and generally took a more activist approach toward the promotion of revolution beyond their borders. Throughout the 1960s, both the Chinese and the Cubans criticized the Soviets for seeking accommodation with the United States and other Western countries, and for their lack of sufficient revolutionary zeal.

The Soviet dispute with Cuba became particularly sharp in the late 1960s. Castro sought to establish a separate Cuban road to Communism in both domestic and foreign policy, claiming he would arrive at Communism sooner than the Soviets through the abolition of material incentives, and by his support of a wide variety of guerrilla armies and other radical revolutionary groups throughout Latin America and other parts of the Third World. The Soviets regarded Castro as a reckless adventurist, and for the most part refused to second his sponsorship of revolutionary movements. The dispute escalated to the point where Castro was jailing members of the orthodox pro-Soviet Communist party (the Partido Socialista Popular, or PSP), while the Soviets retaliated by cutting back oil deliveries to Cuba in 1968.63

Ultimately, the Soviets proved right in their refusal to support armed revolution in Latin America: Che Guevara was killed in Bolivia and almost all of the guerrilla armies supported by the Cubans in the late 1960s were either crushed or dealt severe setbacks in a wave of military takeovers that swept the continent. In many ways Salvador Allende's electoral victory in Chile in 1971 was a model for Moscow's preferred mode of action in the Third World, whereby an orthodox Communist party established a relatively strong internal political base and used it to come to power through legal means.

The debate over armed struggle was reopened in the Soviet Union itself after the overthrow of Allende by the Chilean military in 1973. This setback had a traumatic impact on the Soviets, perhaps more than any single development in the Third World over the past two

decades. Those sympathetic to the Cuban viewpoint used Chile as an occasion to argue that the “peaceful” path to Communism was not viable and was just as subject to counterrevolutionary violence as the path of armed struggle. Ideologues in the ID, including Ponomarev, were in a delicate position in this period, having to steer a course somewhere between the Eurocommunists on the right and the Cubans on the left. In spite of this soul-searching, the official Soviet position on the role of armed struggle did not change after Chile; while Allende’s mistakes were exhaustively analyzed, he and the Chilean Communist party continued to be held up as a model for Communist movements in much of the Third World.

The debate over armed struggle opened up yet again as a result of the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua in 1979. The conservatism of Soviet policy was very much in evidence: Moscow did not see a revolutionary opportunity in Nicaragua even in early 1979 and advised the small, orthodox pro-Soviet Communist party (the Nicaraguan Socialist Party) not to join forces with the FSLN. Instead, it was Castro who took the initiative in supporting the FSLN with weapons and political advice. It appears that the Soviets were surprised when Somoza was actually overthrown, and, naturally, were pleased with the outcome. This led to a series of lengthy postmortems in the Soviet Union, particularly among the specialists who follow Latin America, in which many commentators frankly admitted the error of earlier Soviet policy toward Nicaragua. These admissions were accompanied by expressions of support for armed struggle as an effective means of promoting revolution in this part of the Third World. In a roundtable discussion of the lessons of Nicaragua published in the journal Latinskaya Amerika in the spring of 1980, editor Sergei Mikoyan concluded: “As yet only the armed path has led to the victory of revolutions in Latin America. And the Nicaraguan experience affirms what had been considered refuted by some after the death of Che Guevara and the defeat of a number of other guerrilla movements.” As was the case after the fall of Allende, the Nicaraguan revolution provided Soviet writers (and,

64 Most of these debates were played out in the pages of journals such as Kommunist and Rabochii Klass i Souremenneyi Mir (the journal of the Institute of the International Workers Movement (IMRD), long associated with Suslov). For an account of this debate, see Joan Barth Urban, “Contemporary Soviet Perspectives on Revolution in the West,” Orbis, Winter 1976.

65 The previously cited World Communist Movement collection edited by Zagladin, for example, devotes a long section to an analysis of Chile and concludes that “the formation of a popular government is possible and feasible without a civil war” (p. 332).

presumably, officials) sympathetic to the Cuban line an opportunity to
express their views—indeed, they were often the very same people who
had participated in the Chilean debate.67

The Nicaraguan example led to an upsurge in Soviet optimism about
the prospects for the emergence of revolutionary situations not only in
other parts of Central America, but elsewhere in the Third World as
well. One example of this was a remarkable article in Rabochii Klass
by Sergei L. Agayev, a section head in the IMRD, on the situation in
Iran. After describing the different radical, left-wing groups in post-
revolutionary Iran, Agayev concluded that the party with the greatest
chance for success (and, by implication, the leading candidate for
Soviet support) was not the orthodox Communist Tudeh party, but
rather the radical Marxist Fedayeen. Agayev distinguished what he
terms “left-wing radicalism,” a label he applies to the Fedayeen, from
“left-wing extremism,” which he rejects; both absolutize armed struggle,
but in the case of left-wing radicalism, “the methods of struggle are
consistent with the target.” This is much to be preferred to the tradi-
tional tactics of the Tudeh party: “... concentrating on propaganda
and agitation work over a long period of time (frequently in exile,
where the communists found themselves as a result of repression in
their homeland) has converted some parties into something resembling
educational societies.”68 In spite of the Khomeini regime’s suppression
of the Fedayeen, Agayev believes they represent the best hope for revo-
lutionary change:

The main point here is that many new left-wing revolutionary or-
ganizations show a sincere support of Marxism-Leninism and set them-
selves socialist objectives although maintaining no ties (or maintain-
ing weak ties) with the international communist movement. In fre-
quent cases such organizations are significantly superior to the local
communist parties in terms of size and degree of influence among the
population (it is indicative that in some Latin American countries it
is precisely such organizations which led the working people to vic-
torious anti-imperialist democratic revolutions and which subse-
duently began to turn into Marxist-Leninist parties ...).69

It is interesting to note that Agayev was a strong proponent of the
armed struggle line during the debates in the mid-1970s over the

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67See, for example, N. Yu. Smirnova, “The Shaping of the Party of the Nicaraguan
68S. L. Agayev, “Levii radicalizm, revolyutsionnyi demokratizm i nauchnyi sotsializm
v stranakh vostoka,” Rabochii Klass i Sovremennyi Mir, No. 3, May-June 1984,
pp. 134–135. Agayev makes similar arguments in a later article, “Zigzagi Iranskoy Revo-
yutsii,” Voprosy Istorii, No. 1, Jan. 1985. See also his book, Iranskaya Revolyutsiya,
lessons of Chile and was a supporter of the “uninterrupted revolution” line with regard to Europe.\textsuperscript{70}

While the center of gravity of the Soviet debate over the role of armed struggle undoubtedly shifted to the left in the two or three years immediately following the Sandinista victory, it would be wrong to assume that the Soviets have now officially embraced the Cuban position or are in some way firmly committed to armed struggle as a method. These sorts of debates are a permanent feature of the international Communist movement and can never be conclusively resolved because they concern preeminently tactical issues which are highly dependent on context. Armed struggle will never be the most appropriate instrument for revolutionary change in all cases, any more than political-agitational work will. While the Cubans were vindicated in the case of Nicaragua, the Soviets’ judgment concerning Guevara and the Tupamaros and any number of other guerrilla groups from the 1960s was perfectly sound. Soviet optimism about the prospects for a spreading revolutionary situation in Central America probably peaked in 1980–81, when it appeared that El Salvador and Guatemala might soon follow the Nicaraguan path. The relative stabilization of the situation in El Salvador, the American intervention in Grenada, and Nicaragua’s growing problems with the contras has most likely put a damper on Soviet expectations. The position that best describes actual Soviet policy in the current period is contained in Brezhnev’s 26th Party Congress report: “There has been both armed struggle and peaceful forms of transition to a new social system, both a rapid coming to power by the working classes and processes which have extended over time.”\textsuperscript{71}

**CONCLUSIONS**

It is reasonably clear that a broad Soviet reassessment of policy toward the Third World has intensified since the late Brezhnev years. Many of the reservations and second thoughts being aired amount to an open attack on Leonid Brezhnev and his foreign policy. While no one in the Soviet leadership has openly taken up Brezhnev’s defense since his death, it is seems that the actual Soviet policy record, particularly of the years 1975–80, in some sense represents the other side of the debate.

\textsuperscript{70}For more on Agayev, see Urban (1976), pp. 1367, 1371–1372.

\textsuperscript{71}Dvadtsat’ Shestoi S”ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, 23 Fevrala-3 Marta 1981 goda. Stenograficheskii Otchet.
At the same time, the distinct themes that make up this reassessment, while not mutually incompatible, reflect somewhat different concerns. It is therefore not surprising that they have been taken up by different elements within the Soviet hierarchy.

The most important concern seems to be that of economic constraints on Soviet ability to aid the Third World. The importance of this theme is evident from the level at which it has been raised, by Politburo members Andropov and Aliiev, and party secretaries Kapitonov and Ponomarev. While the theoretical argument was developed during the 1970s, open, high-level airing of this issue does not appear to have begun until after Brezhnev’s death; indeed, the debate was inaugurated by Andropov’s Plenum speech in June 1983.

The theme of how Third World activism endangers U.S.-Soviet relations and increases the risk of war has been raised primarily by commentators such as Arbatov, Bovin, and Burlatskii, who have been concerned, not surprisingly, with the central East-West relationship. In contrast to the economic constraints argument, this theme first began to appear at a high level during the late Brezhnev years and may have received some support from Brezhnev himself. While his “code of conduct” for U.S.-Soviet relations in the Third World was hardly an adequate solution for problems like Angola or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it did nonetheless provide some indication that the Soviet leadership recognized the harmful effects of their adventurism on détente and arms control.

The critique of the Marxist-Leninist vanguard party appears to be of concern primarily to officials within the Central Committee’s International Department, though it has been echoed by Andropov and Romanov. An interesting generational change may occur within the ID itself when Ponomarev and Ul’yanovskii die and are replaced by younger officials. These two protégés of Suslov probably bore a good deal of responsibility for the Soviets’ mid-1970s turn to emphasis on MLVPs in the first place, and for the generally ideological character of present Soviet-Third World relations. Karen Butents’’ published writings, by contrast, indicate a more Khrushchevite view of the Third World and tend to emphasize ties with influential non-Communist states such as Mexico and Argentina at the expense of weak but ideologically sympathetic clients, e.g., Angola, Mozambique, and the PDRY.

Finally, the debate over the role of armed struggle has resurfaced primarily among academic Latin American specialists reflecting on the lessons of Nicaragua. This theme stands potentially at odds with the previous three: greater Soviet support for revolutionary violence and a Cuban-like attitude toward exploiting new opportunities for progressive
change will lead to greater involvement in the Third World, not less. Such a policy, if successful, could engender new military and economic aid commitments, complicate U.S.-Soviet relations with the concomitant risk of superpower confrontation, and require renewed Soviet efforts at Leninist state-building. On the other hand, it is not clear that emphasis on armed struggle has found wide acceptance outside this specialized academic community, or whether half a decade after the Nicaraguan revolution the senior Soviet leadership sees significant new opportunities for further gains.

For obvious reasons, the interpretation of these different strands in Soviet thinking is complicated by the ongoing succession process. While Mikhail Gorbachev's accession to the top party post promises somewhat greater continuity than did the accessions of his immediate predecessors, many observers have pointed out that the succession problem in the Soviet Union is much more than a question of one or two leaders at the top. It involves the replacement of the whole generation of leaders that has been running Soviet policy throughout the post-Stalin period. The inevitable changing of the guard in the ID is just one illustration of the breadth of the succession process.

It is very difficult to predict Gorbachev's views on Third World issues because he has said very little publicly on the subject. If Gorbachev in fact proves to be the heir to the reformist impulse represented by Andropov, then it seems likely that the Soviet reassessment will continue along the lines of the early 1980s and may at some point get translated more obviously into policy. That Gorbachev should take up the Andropov mantle in fact seems likely, at least on the issue of the Third World, since his experience in economic administration would probably tend to make him sympathetic to the notion that the Soviet Union should attend to its own economic construction before turning to that of unreliable allies in the Third World. This conclusion was reinforced by Gorbachev's first speech as General Secretary after the death of Konstantin Chernenko. In the section on the Third World he stated:

The Soviet Union has always supported the struggle of the peoples for liberation from the colonial yoke. And today, our sympathies (simpatii) are on the side of the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin

\[\text{72It was equally hard to discern a Chernenko line on the Third World, a subject that is now of limited importance given his ill health and short tenure. If Chernenko represented a throwback to Brezhnev, one would have expected a policy that sought a return to détente with the United States coupled with greater activism in the Third World. While some effort was made to put the first part of this equation into effect, Chernenko did not live long enough to develop a track record on the second.}\]
America which follow the path of strengthening their independence and social renewal.\textsuperscript{73}

The statement that the Soviet Union's "sympathies" are with the countries of the Third World is a very weak expression of support, one that was not noticeably strengthened in subsequent pronouncements.\textsuperscript{74}

In light of succession uncertainties, one might be tempted to dismiss the recent Soviet reassessment as having no relevance to the future whatsoever were it not for the fact that many of the important themes appear to originate in the permanent party apparatus (i.e., the ID) itself. All three of the themes implying retrenchment in the Third World (economic constraints, risk of war, and the critique of the MLVP) have been raised by Ponomarev, Brutents, Ul'yanovskii, or some other official within the ID. Since this department is the bureaucratic anchor for Soviet Third World policy, the pressures for reassessment and retrenchment may well be expected to survive future changes in the top Soviet leadership. Indeed, it may be that Andropov himself began to address Third World issues in his Plenum speech at the instigation of the ID perhaps along with prodding from economic managers competing for scarce funds.\textsuperscript{75} This suggests that whatever Gorbachev's personal inclinations, the agenda drawn up for him by the party bureaucracy will reflect many of the concerns we have detailed here.


\textsuperscript{74}In a June 1985 speech in Dneiperpetrovsk, Gorbachev stated: "We are doing and will do everything to broaden and deepen our friendly cooperation with the liberated countries." (Pravda, June 27, 1985, p. 2.)

\textsuperscript{75}Ul'yanovskii makes repeated references to a line from the Andropov Plenum speech to the effect that it is one thing to declare socialism as a goal and another thing to build it, which suggests that he may have had something to do with putting the line there in the first place.
IV. BEHAVIOR

The theoretical writings and policy pronouncements described in the previous section concern only the way the Soviets talk and think about the Third World, and do not bear any necessary relationship to actual Soviet behavior. If the Soviets have been reassessing their Third World policy since the death of Brezhnev, with powerful voices in the leadership calling for retrenchment on economic or other grounds, has this reassessment been reflected in a shift in their policies over the corresponding period, or is it likely to be at some point in the future?

The writings of Soviet academics have tended to be rather poor sources for predicting future Soviet policy, since they generally follow and describe trends that are already under way, rather than anticipating them. For example, academic commentators on the Third World mirrored actual disappointments with their regimes during the 1960s and provided a useful window onto subjective Soviet perceptions, but they did not presage any major policy shifts. The higher the level of the speaker or writer, however, the closer he is likely to be to policies either under discussion or in the process of being implemented. Khrushchev's announcement of the opening to bourgeois nationalist regimes at the 20th CPSU congress in February 1956 followed the Czech-Egyptian arms deal by about half a year.

There is perhaps some reason for thinking that the current discussion of the Third World may be of greater predictive value than were discussions in the past. For one thing, themes articulated first by academic writers have only later been picked up by the high-level leadership. Moreover, the Soviets are currently in the midst of a prolonged succession process, where policy is likely to be more fluid than it has been at any time in the past two decades, and less subject to direction from the top. It is entirely possible that recent high-level statements on the Third World are intended not only to influence policy, but to influence the succession process itself. At any rate, it appears that many recent ideas about Third World policy have filtered up from below rather than the reverse, as the themes described in the preceding section generally appeared in the academic literature before surfacing in statements of political leaders, and it may be only a matter of time before they are implemented in actual policy.

The first half of the 1980s has in fact been a relatively quiescent period for the Soviets; there have been no major Third World interventions since the invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979.
Unfortunately, closer examination of the record of these years provides a very mixed and uncertain picture. There is little evidence that a major retrenchment in Soviet commitments to the Third World has already taken place; Soviet military aid to its major clients has in most cases risen steadily in the early 1980s, so the absence of major interventions may simply reflect the lack of opportunities. On the other hand, this same record is not incompatible with the possibility that a decision to retrench has been under discussion and may take place some time in the near future. Commitments of economic aid have never been large and have probably been under steady pressure for cutbacks for some time. In short, the behavioral record of the first half of the 1980s does not provide us with a useful guide as to what Soviet policy is likely to be in the remainder of the decade, nor does it give us particular insight into the status of the ongoing doctrinal reassessment.

Our analysis must begin by defining some measure of Soviet commitment to the Third World which captures in a more precise way the broad trends suggested by terms like “expansionism” or “enlargement.” There are two primary indices of Soviet involvement: The first concerns the quantity, quality, and direction of military and economic assistance that the Soviets are willing to devote to the Third World, while the second has to do with Soviet risk-taking propensities when faced with opportunities or crisis situations. In this section, we shall first look at the question of Soviet resource allocations for a broad range of clients, and then investigate in somewhat greater detail Soviet risk-taking propensities in two specific cases, Syria and Mozambique.

SOVIET MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
Overview

In the following, we survey trends in Soviet military and economic assistance to the USSR’s Third World clients for the first half of the 1980s, based on unclassified sources. Soviet resource commitments are the simplest measure of Soviet intent because they are quantifiable and can be tracked over time. These commitments include arms transfers, economic aid, trade, combat troop or advisor presences, and training of client nationals in the Soviet Union.

Military and economic assistance can take a variety of forms, including outright grants or donations of equipment, price supports (e.g., for Cuban sugar), loans at below-market interest rates or whose repayments are deferred or excused altogether, chronic trade surpluses, repayment for exports through barter arrangements which do not reflect the true cost of Soviet exports, the training of foreign nationals
in the Soviet Union, and the marginal cost of basing troops abroad. On the other hand, the Soviets do have commercial motives when dealing with the Third World, and they often receive substantial benefits from their clients. Ideally, one would like to know the real cost to the Soviet economy of its various assistance programs net of resources that flow backwards from the Third World to the USSR, such as hard-currency sales, barter arrangements, loan repayments, earnings of guestworkers in the Soviet Union, etc.

Unfortunately, time and other constraints do not permit a rigorous economic analysis of the net costs of Soviet aid. Such rigor, in any event, is not necessary for the purposes of the present study, which looks for broad trends in the pattern of Soviet assistance to the Third World which might reflect the internal Soviet reassessment described above. Hence we will not try to arrive at exact figures for net assistance, but will describe gross aid commitments and whatever is known about arrangements for repayment.

In addition, this section takes note of qualitative aspects of Soviet arms deliveries, such as the introduction of weapons systems for the first time into a particular region, or the presence of Soviet combat troops or advisors. Oftentimes, the quantity of arms transfers may reflect a mixture of political and economic motives, so the quality of the weapons delivered is a more meaningful measure of Soviet intentions.

**Latin America**

**Cuba.** Cuba remains the single largest recipient of Soviet military and economic aid in the Third World. Economic assistance currently amounts to approximately $4 billion a year, with military aid amounting to at least $1 billion. Soviet assistance of all forms has increased steadily since the late 1960s, the greatest period of expansion coming between 1975 and 1980, when the Cuban armed forces approximately doubled in size. In the four-year period between 1976 and 1979, Soviet economic assistance rose by 272.8 percent over the total for the five-

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1. Earnings from hard-currency sales in the Third World, mostly of weapons, have made up a significant portion (15 to 20 percent) of total Soviet hard-currency earnings over the past decade and are a fairly clear motive for sales to countries like Libya.

2. The study by Charles Wolf et al. (1983) cited earlier attempts to perform a more rigorous estimate of the real costs of the Soviet empire.

3. The Cuban armed forces increased from 117,000 before the Angola war to 227,000 in 1981. (Blasier (1983), p. 126.)
year period from 1971 to 1975. The reasons for this expansion were obviously related to Cuba's new commitments in Angola, Ethiopia, and a variety of other countries in Africa, Latin America, and other parts of the Third World.

Since 1980, the rate of growth of Soviet military assistance to Cuba has fallen, reflecting the absence of new large-scale interventions. The overall level still remains substantial, however, and there is no evidence that Moscow has sought to cut the Cubans back in the first half of the 1980s. Military deliveries continued to increase after 1980, though at a slower rate than during the late 1970s; between 1981 and 1983, they ranged from 66,000 to 70,000 metric tons per year, compared with an average of 34,000 metric tons from 1962 to 1982. In 1980-83, the Soviets also introduced into Cuba qualitatively different kinds of weapons, including SA-3 and SA-6 air-defense missiles, Mi-24 attack helicopters, MiG-21 and MiG-23 fighter aircraft, a Koni-class frigate, four Foxtrot diesel attack submarines, and four TU-95 Bear long-range bombers. The Soviet advisor presence has remained more or less constant, consisting of a 3,000-man combat brigade (apparently in Cuba since the 1960s) and an additional 3,000 military advisors.

Soviet economic aid continued to grow as well, as indicated by Table 1. As in the case of military assistance, the rate of growth of Soviet economic assistance has fallen somewhat since the late 1970s, but there

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Aid</th>
<th>1979</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1981</th>
<th>1982</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soviet aid commitments</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross concessional disbursements</td>
<td>3491</td>
<td>2988</td>
<td>3218</td>
<td>4048</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


is no evidence that the Soviets have thus far tried to cut the Cubans back. Similarly, Soviet trade with Cuba, which shows a chronic Soviet export surplus, has been increasing steadily in the early 1980s, moving from $22 million to $706 million between 1979 and 1983. The Cubans partially repay the Soviets through export of sugar and other items, but the greater part of the assistance they receive amounts to a subsidy.

**Nicaragua.** Overt Soviet military assistance to Nicaragua did not begin until 1981, two years after the Sandinista victory. Since that time, the Nicaraguan military has grown very rapidly: In 1983, the Sandinista Popular Army (EPS) consisted of 25,000 officers and enlisted personnel, 25,000 reserves, and 30,000 militia, compared with the 9,000-man National Guard under Somoza. Soviet arms deliveries increased from 890 metric tons in 1981 to 6,000 tons in 1982, to between 11,000 and 15,000 tons in 1983; by another account, Soviet arms shipments increased 50 percent between 1983 and 1984.

Since absolute numbers of weapons to Nicaragua are still relatively low when compared with deliveries to other major Soviet clients such as Cuba, Syria, Vietnam, or India, the quality of Soviet weapons is probably a better measure of intent than the quantity. The Sandinista regime has been receiving very sophisticated armaments, given the military capabilities of the other countries of Central America. Shipments have included T-55 tanks, BTR-50 armored personnel carriers, patrol boats, and L-39 Albatross subsonic jets from Czechoslovakia. The Soviets have stopped short of crossing the red line laid down by the United States by providing Mi-24 attack helicopters at the end of 1984 instead of the MiG-21 fighter aircraft requested by Managua. The Mi-24s may in fact be more useful in the counterinsurgency war against the contras, but it should be noted that Moscow has refrained from too overt a challenge to the United States on its own doorstep. This restraint is much more likely to be the result of Soviet fears of provoking a U.S. attack on Nicaragua to which they would not be able to respond than a reflection of economic considerations. Nicaraguan president Daniel Ortega was reported to have received a positive

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7 *Vneshnaya Torgovlya SSSR* (1983).
response to his request for some $200 million in military aid following his visit to Moscow in April 1985.\footnote{The New York Times, April 30, 1985.}

The Soviet Union has also extended fairly generous economic credits to Nicaragua relative to other Third World states, including credits amounting, by various accounts, to as much as $300 million between 1981 and 1983, as well as 29,000 tons of wheat in 1981.\footnote{Rothenberg (1983), p. 9; Pedro Ramet and Fernando Lopez-Alvez, "Moscow and the Revolutionary Left in Latin America," Orbis, Summer 1984, p. 354; Strategic Survey, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 1981–82; Peter Clement, "Moscow and Nicaragua: Two Sides of Soviet Policy," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1985, p. 78 (hereafter, Clement 1985, I); and Rothenberg (1983), p. 9.} Following FSLN leader Ortega’s visit to Moscow, the Soviet Union apparently agreed to guarantee oil deliveries to Managua, and also extended several hundred million dollars more in economic credits.\footnote{Reports from Managua indicated that President Ortega was seeking $200 million in assistance from Moscow during his 1985 visit. (Serge Schmemann, "Nicaraguan, in Moscow, Is Promised Aid," The New York Times, April 30, 1985.)} Soviet bloc allies have played an important role in providing supplementary economic assistance. Cuba was crucial in supporting the Sandinista revolution initially (see Sec. III on the debate over armed struggle) and provided Nicaragua with a $64 million aid package in 1981. Libya, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia have also provided the Sandinistas with credits amounting to several hundred million dollars since 1981.\footnote{Strategic Survey (1981–82), p. 138; Ramet and Lopez-Alves (1984), p. 354.}

**The Middle East**

**Syria.** With the defection of Egypt to the American camp, Syria has become the most important of Moscow’s clients in the Middle East. While the Soviets did relatively little to assist the Syrians during the June 1982 Lebanon war (see the detailed discussion below), Soviet deliveries increased dramatically shortly after the war, following the pattern of previous Middle East conflicts;\footnote{Soviet deliveries to Syria grew rapidly between 1979 and 1982 as well, as a result of the Soviet desire to bolster Syria in the wake of the Camp David Accords and the 1980 Friendship and Cooperation Treaty.} it is impossible to make the case that the Syrians were cut back in any way. The Syrians by and large pay for the arms they receive from the Soviet Union out of subsidies from the other Arab states. Arms supply to Syria is probably profitable to the Soviets; hence the quality of weapons shipped is a more meaningful indicator of Soviet attitudes toward their client than dollar amounts. The advances in quality were indeed quite striking: In a well-publicized move, the Soviets gave the Syrians SA-5 air-defense
and SS-21 surface-to-surface missiles in 1982 and 1983, respectively, the first deployments of these weapons outside the Warsaw Pact area. The SA-5 missiles were at first manned entirely by Soviet crews, bringing the total Soviet combat presence in Syria up to between 6,000 and 8,000 men. In addition, the Syrians have also received T-72 and T-74 tanks, MiG-25 and MiG-27 fighters, Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters, and TU-126 early warning aircraft. The magnitude of the increase is evident from Table 2. The total value of the weapons supplied to Syria since the end of the Lebanon war is said to amount to from $1.5 billion to $2 billion; the magnitude of the increase is also shown in Table 2.

The Syrians do not currently receive significant amounts of economic assistance from the Soviet Union.

Iraq. The Soviet Union briefly cut off arms deliveries to Iraq between September 1980 and May or June 1981, not out of any general policy shift, but to pressure Iraq to settle the war with Iran after Baghdad mounted its initial invasion. Thereafter the Soviets moved into closer alignment with Iraq, despite the fact that Iraq continued its shift toward Western arms suppliers (e.g., France) and began making overtures to the pro-Western states of the Middle East. Indeed, when Iran

<table>
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<th>Item</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1984</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>2920</td>
<td>4200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>2600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-23s</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-21 launchers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA-5 batteries</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCUD-B &amp; FROG-7 launchers</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA-2,3,6,8 batteries</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet advisors</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>6000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


18 Soviet-Iraqi relations were strained in the late 1970s due to a variety of factors, including the Ba’athist regime’s suppression of the Iraqi Communist Party and its gradual opening to the West. See F. Fukuyama, The Soviet Union and Iraq since 1968, The Rand Corporation, N-1524-AF, July 1980, for an account of Soviet arms transfers to Iraq through the beginning of 1980.
turned the tables and invaded Iraq in mid-1982, the Soviets increased their deliveries substantially as a means of pressuring Iran to end the war.19 Beginning in 1983, Iraq negotiated for the delivery of about $3 billion in armaments to be delivered in three installments. Deliveries included T-72 tanks; Scud, SS-12 Scaleboard, and SS-21 surface-to-surface missiles; SA-8 air-defense missiles; Mi-8 helicopters; and MiG-23, MiG-25, and MiG-27 fighter aircraft.20 The total value of arms the Soviets have agreed to ship to Iraq in 1981–84 was approximately $5 billion, compared to $3 billion in 1979–80.

In the past, Iraq has used its oil revenues to pay for weapons with hard currency. As a result of the war, however, its revenues and reserves have been cut substantially, and the Soviets have reportedly financed up to $2 billion worth of weapons at low interest rates.21 Despite this discount, the Soviets have done well by the Iraqis in the past. Thus, while political motives dominate Soviet policy in this sensitive part of the world, economic motives may have supplemented the desire to balance Iranian power and push the two Gulf states toward a negotiated settlement of the war.

Libya. To a much greater degree than the case of either Syria or Iraq, the level of Soviet arms transfers to Libya can be explained by economic motives. Libya purchased some $5 billion worth of weapons between 1975 and 1979, and another $8 billion in 1979–80.22 The Libyans manifestly do not need the quantities of arms they have received from Moscow, since many of their tanks and planes sit unused for lack of trained crews. But the Soviets have been somewhat more restrained in the types of weapons they have sold to Col. Qaddafi’s regime. Shipments have consisted primarily of ground weapons, particularly large numbers of modern tanks, although they have also included MiG-23 aircraft, SS-12 Scaleboard surface-to-surface missiles, and Foxtrot-class diesel attack submarines. Since 1980, Libya’s level of purchases has decreased as a result of declining oil revenues and hard-currency reserves; the initiative for this decline seems to come primarily from the Libyan side. Libya does not receive economic assistance from the USSR. Soviet imports from Libya (presumably of oil) rose dramatically in 1982, from 361.2 million rubles to 1125.8 million hard currency.

rubles, possibly reflecting Libyan efforts to pay back earlier debts to the Soviet Union for arms purchases.  

The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). The Soviets concluded a fairly sizable arms deal with the PDRY in 1979, shortly after Abd al-Fattah Ismail came to power in a bloody coup against President Selim Rubai Ali. The agreement included the provision of T-62 and T-72 tanks, SA-6 and SA-8 air-defense missiles, MiG-23 fighter aircraft, and Mi-24 helicopters. The Soviets do not appear to have negotiated or delivered substantial quantities of arms subsequently. Soviet economic assistance to South Yemen is insignificant.

The Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). One of the more interesting features of Soviet Middle East policy is the amount of money the USSR has been willing to invest in North Yemen. The Soviets have tried to exploit Sanaa's unhappiness with both Saudi Arabia and the United States by retaining its position as North Yemen's primary arms supplier, and in 1984 they formalized their relationship through the signature of a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty. This has come at an extremely high economic cost, however. In 1979, after the brief border skirmish between North and South Yemen, the Soviets concluded a multi-year arms agreement by which they provided Sanaa with some $600 million in military supplies, a much higher level of support than that provided Communist South Yemen. In so doing, the Soviets are competing directly with Saudi Arabia (which provides the YAR with subsidies of about $1 billion annually) in what must seem to some Soviet officials like a losing competition. It does not appear that the Soviets have negotiated further large contracts since the 1979 agreement. North Yemen presumably does not repay the full value of the arms provided by the Soviets.

U.S. Clients. In addition to its traditional clients, the Soviet Union has also cultivated ties with traditional U.S. partners in the Middle East, most notably Jordan and Kuwait. The Soviets concluded a series of arms deals with the former for air-defense equipment between 1981 and 1983, including some $200 million worth of SA-8 missiles and ZSU-23 anti-aircraft guns. Kuwait in 1984 signed a

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23 Vneshnaya Torgovlya SSSR, 1983.
large, $327 million arms deal for the purchase of air-defense missiles, radar, and communications equipment.²⁸

Africa

Ethiopia. Ethiopia has accounted for roughly half of all Soviet military sales to sub-Saharan Africa since 1977. The highest levels of arms transfers occurred in 1977–79, when the Soviets and Cubans supported Ethiopia massively against Somalia in the war over the Ogaden, providing $5 billion worth of arms.²⁹ Thereafter, Soviet military assistance has gone down, but still remains substantial. Some 25,000 metric tons per year were provided in 1980–83, the total value of which amounted to approximately $1 billion.³⁰ Ethiopia’s improving security situation was evident in the drop in Cuban troop strength from approximately 12,000 at the end of the Ogaden War to 8,000 in 1984. The Ethiopians themselves appear to have requested this reduction; in addition, Havana may have wanted to free up forces to transfer to Angola, where they were needed to bolster the sagging fortunes of the MPLA.³¹

Soviet economic assistance to Ethiopia has been small; outright grants are negligible, though the Soviets have been running a trade surplus with Addis Ababa averaging over $100 million between 1980 and 1984. Moscow’s inability to provide Ethiopia with basic foodstuffs to relieve the famine conditions in 1984–85 underlined the inadequacy of its economic assistance. The Ethiopians, moreover, have been made to repay the debts for military equipment run up during the late 1970s through coffee and other exports. Accounts of the amounts still due range from $2.5 billion to $4 billion.³²

Angola. While the fortunes of the MPLA regime in Angola have been steadily declining under pressure from Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA, this decline cannot necessarily be attributed to insufficient Soviet and Soviet bloc support. In 1983 the Soviets committed themselves to a multi-billion-dollar package of economic and military aid to Angola, in

³¹The Cubans, in any event, were unhappy with certain of Mengistu’s policies after the defeat of Somalia, particularly his attempts to suppress Eritrean separatism.
contrast to the approximately $550 million provided in 1975–80. The Soviets agreed to a rescheduling of Angola's debt in October 1983, and to a $600 million hydroelectric dam project. The Soviets also ran a trade surplus with Angola of $50 million to $100 million per year between 1981 and 1984. Equipment deliveries have included T-34, T-54, T-62, and T-72 tanks, SA-8 and SA-9 air-defense missiles, AN-26 transports, and MiG-21 and MiG-23 fighter aircraft, with deliveries accelerating in late August and early September 1983. More importantly, Cuban troop strength in Angola, after falling to approximately 17,000 after the MPLA victory, has been rising steadily in the face of UNITA successes, and by late 1984 stood at 25,000 to 30,000, including some troops transferred from Ethiopia.

As in the case of Ethiopia, the apparent generosity of Soviet aid to Angola is diminished somewhat by the fact that the Angolans are being made to repay old debts and the operating costs of the Cuban troop presence, largely out of their Cabinda oil earnings. By some reports, this has amounted to as much as $1.5 billion per year, in addition to 75 percent of the fishing catch.

**Mozambique.** The Soviets and their allies do not appear to have done nearly as much to support Mozambique against South Africa and the internal South African-supported resistance movement, Renamo, as they did for Angola. Mozambique's relationship with the Soviets was much looser than that of other African clients from the moment of Mozambican independence in 1975, in part because Frelimo was unchallenged and did not, like the MPLA, require massive outside support. The Soviet Union has remained Mozambique's primary arms supplier, and it increased the volume of arms shipments to Maputo substantially in the face of Renamo's growing operations, particularly in 1982. Nonetheless, the regime in Maputo has turned to its former colonial master, Portugal, and to South Africa itself to seek assistance in counterinsurgency warfare. As far as we know, neither the Soviets

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nor the Cubans have offered, and Frelimo has not requested, large numbers of outside combat forces or advisors. Soviet arms transfers have included items such as SA-8 air-defense missiles but are otherwise not qualitatively notable.\(^3\)

Like Angola, Mozambique has agreed that 75 percent of the fish harvested in its waters can be kept by the Soviet Union.

**East and South Asia**

**Vietnam.** Vietnam is second only to Cuba in terms of expense to the Soviets. Soviet aid went up substantially after the North Vietnamese victory in 1975, and again after the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in 1977 and the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1978. For the 1976–80 Five Year Plan, the Soviets promised Vietnam up to $2.5 billion in project aid, commodity supplies, and hard-currency financing.\(^3\) This commitment was increased after the Kampuchean invasion in 1978, when aid was increased to include financing for 1.5 million tons of rice and wheat, 20 to 30 percent of which was to be provided by the Soviet Union.\(^4\)

There is little evidence of a cutback in Moscow's support for Vietnam in the early 1980s. The Soviets agreed to an aid package in the 1981–85 Five Year Plan that was four times as large as the one for the previous five years, as well as a supplemental economic and technical assistance plan in 1983.\(^4\) A great deal of Soviet economic aid, of course, goes to maintaining the 170,000 Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea. The Soviets have provided Vietnam with a range of military equipment needed to support its operations in Kampuchea, including MiG-21 and MiG-23 fighters, in return for which they have received access to facilities in Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang.

While the Vietnamese do not have the means to repay all of their accumulated Soviet debts, one-half of all Vietnamese exports are said to go to the Soviet Union.\(^4\) There are, moreover, perhaps 50,000 Vietnamese guestworkers in the Soviet Union and parts of Eastern Europe whose labor goes to pay off Vietnamese debts; whether they serve as

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\(^{3}\)Defense and Economy, April 23, 1984, p. 5267.


\(^{4}\)Ibid.

guestworkers voluntarily or are compensated adequately is not known.\textsuperscript{43}

**North Korea.** Contrary to the widespread view that North Korea has balanced somewhere between the two Communist superpowers, Pyongyang has in fact been much more a Chinese than a Soviet client.\textsuperscript{44} The Soviets have had a long-standing distrust of Kim Il-Sung's adventurism, while the North Koreans compare Soviet support unfavorably to that provided by the PRC during the Korean War. The poor state of Soviet-North Korean relations has been evident in the relatively low quantity and quality of Soviet arms provided by Moscow for nearly three and a half decades since the end of the Korean conflict, during which the North Koreans did not receive modern weapons like the MiG-21s and MiG-23s or SA-6 missiles that were routinely provided to Cuba, Vietnam, and various Soviet clients in the Middle East. This pattern could be in the process of changing, however, in the wake of warming relations between the United States and China, which may provide the Soviets an opening for greater influence in Pyongyang. Kim Il-Sung's visit to Moscow in 1984 was followed by a visit to Pyongyang by Politburo member Gaidar Aliev and Deputy Defense Minister Vasily Petrov in August 1985; reports were subsequently issued of a Soviet agreement to supply North Korea with 40 MiG-23 jets.\textsuperscript{45}

**India.** In the early 1980s, India became the recipient of one of the largest and qualitatively most remarkable arms deals in the history of Soviet-Third World relations. The Soviets have proven willing to pay heavily for Indian good will. In 1980, in the wake of the Afghanistan invasion, they concluded a $2.5 billion arms pact with India, involving concessional financing and extensive co-production arrangements for Soviet equipment. This was followed in 1983 by another multi-billion-dollar agreement to be financed in rupees or barter at 2 percent interest over 17 years. The deal included the transfer and licensed production of MiG-27, MiG-29, and MiG-31 fighter aircraft (the first instance of the Soviets agreeing to transfer the latter to the Third World), and the transfer and licensed production of T-80 tanks, Il-76 transport aircraft, BMP armored personnel carriers, SA-8 and SA-5 surface-to-air missiles, a wide variety of naval vessels, and other types


of weapons. The package included economic assistance for projects such as steel mill expansion. Partially to finance weapons purchases, trade between the USSR and India has grown rapidly, to the point where the USSR became India’s largest trading partner in 1982.

Afghanistan. Soviet “aid” to Afghanistan consists of the incremental costs of maintaining the occupation force there, above the costs of their normal basing in the USSR itself, as well as money invested in infrastructural and other types of projects. Although the Soviets have provided conventional military assistance to the Afghan armed forces since the invasion in late 1979, the latter have shrunk considerably due to defections and poor reenlistment rates; the Soviets have deliberately kept certain types of equipment, such as advanced aircraft, out of Afghan hands to prevent their being hijacked or stolen. In this period, Soviet troop strength has increased marginally to its present level of approximately 115,000, so we may assume that occupation costs have edged up marginally as well. As the war has affected Afghan agricultural production and led to a mass movement of producers from the countryside either into exile or into cities like Kabul, the Soviets have had to provide some food assistance, delivering 20,000 tons of wheat in 1983 and another 180,000 tons in 1984. Some of the Soviet occupation costs have been offset by imports of Afghan natural gas; the USSR took a reported 2.4 billion cubic meters out of a total of 2.5 billion produced by Afghanistan in 1983. Throughout this period, there has been an improvement in the quality of weapons used by Soviet forces, e.g., the introduction of the SU-25 Frogfoot close-air-support aircraft. Since these weapons are exclusively under the control of Soviet forces, however, their transfer to Afghanistan does not have the same significance as weapon transfers in other countries.

General Trends in Third World Aid

Table 3 summarizes the trends in Soviet military and economic assistance for the countries discussed above. It compares very roughly aid levels in the first half of the 1980s with those of the late 1970s, the


period of rapid Soviet expansionism. While it would be helpful to chart aid levels quantitatively year by year, the unclassified data are insufficient to enable us to do this, so we present them in a more granular form. Moreover, because the Soviets tend to commit themselves to large, multi-year agreements with their major clients, there is a great deal of variance in the actual year-to-year disbursements. In most cases, we have simply compared the magnitude of the publicly stated gross value of these commitments with those from the earlier period. It should be noted that the amount of aid actually disbursed usually falls short of the commitments.

While the results in Table 3 are somewhat impressionistic, the central conclusion is clear. At least with respect to military assistance, the Soviets continued to pour substantial resources into the Third World in the early 1980s, in most cases at levels comparable to or exceeding those of the late 1970s. In addition, there were major qualitative improvements in the types of weapons transferred, particularly to Syria, Cuba, Nicaragua, and India. There does not seem to be any particular regional pattern to the distribution of aid: In almost all cases, specific levels can be explained by local considerations. For example, shipments to Syria and Iraq went up due to the two wars in which the countries were respectively engaged; conversely, aid to Ethiopia decreased because Ethiopia was no longer fighting a major conflict.

Table 3
SOVIET MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID TO MAJOR CLIENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDRY</td>
<td>Slight decrease</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YAR</td>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Flat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Flat</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Increase</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Increase</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
With respect to economic assistance, data from unclassified sources are insufficient to enable us to reach any firm conclusions. On the whole, economic aid levels to Moscow's two most expensive clients, Cuba and Vietnam, did not appear to decline significantly in the early 1980s. On the other hand, it is clear that the Soviets were pressing their clients fairly hard to repay their debts, for example, by requiring the Angolans to repay the costs of the Cuban troop presence with oil revenues, mortgaging the Ethiopian coffee crop, importing Afghan natural gas, using large numbers of Vietnamese guestworkers, or exploiting fishing rights in Mozambican waters. Apart from Cuba and Vietnam, Soviet economic assistance to its Third World clients has never been terribly generous in the first place, and we know from anecdotal evidence that many of these clients have complained about the Soviet inability to finance their development.\textsuperscript{50} Hence, the significant fact may be not that the Soviets have cut back their economic aid from the levels of the late 1970s, but that they have not done anything to raise them from their earlier, insufficient levels.

Thus, while the resources picture is mixed, there is no evidence that the Soviets have cut back on their overall military and economic assistance to the Third World in the period since Brezhnev's death. The economic constraints mentioned in Soviet statements and writings therefore have not as yet affected actual behavior, but rather either refer to future policy or, possibly, in the case of economic assistance, constitute a sort of apologia for past performance.

SOVIET RISK-TAKING PROPENSITIES

Overview

Statistics on Soviet resource transfers are one useful measure of Soviet involvement; were the Soviets to retrench due to economic constraints, the evidence would probably show up here. Resource statistics are in themselves an incomplete indicator of Soviet intentions, however, since they may not reflect other considerations such as fear of war or concern for potential damage to U.S.-Soviet relations. From the standpoint of American foreign policy, the most critical question is where and how the Soviets are prepared to intervene directly in the

\textsuperscript{50}For example, during a 1979 visit to Moscow, Frelimo security chief Sergio Vieira told his Soviet hosts, "Economics is the key to a revolution's viability. We would not like to be a model of 'poor socialism'. This is a particularly sensitive question in Africa." (Seth Singleton, "The Natural Ally: Soviet Policy in Southern Africa," in Michael Clough (ed.), \textit{Political Change in Southern Africa: Implications for United States Policy}, Berkeley: Institute for International Studies, University of California, 1982, p. 214; and Kalter (1984), p. 23.)
Third World. In the past the Soviets have often used arms transfers as a substitute for direct intervention on behalf of a client. The most notable examples of this are the various Middle Eastern wars (including the 1982 conflict in Lebanon), where the Soviets tried to compensate for the lack of stronger action during the crisis itself by providing their clients with ever higher levels of more sophisticated weapons after the fact. In these cases, higher resource levels may actually be misleading indicators of intent; we therefore need a broader measure of Soviet risk-taking propensities.

The Soviets take three types of risks when they intervene in the Third World. The first is the risk of confrontation with the United States, including the possibility of direct military conflict and the ultimate chance of escalation into nuclear war. The second type of risk consists of the danger of souring the overall atmosphere of U.S.-Soviet relations, with potentially negative consequences in such areas as East-West trade or arms control. Finally, there is the risk posed by the local situation itself, e.g., the possibility of getting bogged down in a prolonged guerrilla war, as in Afghanistan; the negative effects on Soviet prestige of intervening in the first place or of not succeeding; or the chance of acquiring new and expensive economic commitments.

When we speak of the Soviets having had a high propensity for risk-taking in the mid- to late 1970s and use this as a baseline for comparison with the early 1980s, we are speaking much more of the second and third types of risk than of the first. The Soviets have never shown a strong propensity to risk war with the United States over the Third World throughout the entire postwar period, while the interventions in Angola, the Horn of Africa, and Afghanistan undermined other aspects of the Soviet relationship with the United States, they did not pose a serious danger of direct military conflict.

Measuring Soviet risk-taking propensities is much harder than charting resource flows because one is trying to gauge intentions in the minds of Soviet leaders under counterfactual conditions, such as what the Soviets would do if faced with the opportunity to invade Iran, or whether they would defend Nicaragua from a U.S. intervention. The question becomes nearly impossible to answer for a period like the first half of the 1980s, when there are few positive examples of Soviet interventions from which to draw general inferences. The lack of positive cases may reflect a lower risk-taking propensity on the part of the Soviet leadership, or it may, as noted earlier, simply reflect the lack of

\[51\] Moscow has undertaken some risky actions in the Third World, including its encouragement of North Korea in 1950, deployment of missiles to Cuba in 1962, and various threats to intervene in the Middle East between 1956 and 1973. But of these, only the Cuban missile crisis involved serious risks of war with the United States.
opportunities to become involved. All of the major Soviet interventions of the mid- to late 1970s were critically dependent on the prior existence of local opportunities or challenges, such as the collapse of the Portuguese empire, the Ethiopian revolution, and Somalia's invasion of the Ogaden, or the imminent collapse of the Afghan Communist regime in Kabul. These developments are not under Soviet control and do not occur every day.

It is fairly clear that the significant crises of the early 1980s—the Iran-Iraq war, the Falklands and Lebanon confrontations, and the ongoing guerrilla struggles in Central America, Southern Africa, and Southeast Asia—have not presented the Soviets with major opportunities for intervention comparable to the developments of the mid- to late 1970s. Under these circumstances, there are only two ways of measuring Soviet intentions: First, we can analyze the few positive cases of Soviet activity in the Third World that have occurred to determine whether they indicate any trends in Soviet risk-taking; and second, we can look at negative cases, i.e., ask whether any opportunities have arisen recently that the Soviets could have exploited had they been inclined toward greater risk-taking. Unfortunately, neither of these measures is very satisfactory, since neither the positive nor the negative examples are strong or particularly revealing.

In the remainder of this section, we will look at two cases of Soviet risk-taking in greater detail, one positive and the other negative: the case of Syria before and after the 1982 Lebanon war, and the case of Mozambique through the signing of the Nkomati Accord in March 1984.

Case I: Syria

Soviet behavior during the 1982 Lebanon war, when the Soviets did virtually nothing to protect their Syrian and Palestinian clients, was in sharp contrast to that in the six months following, when they took substantial risks by providing Syria with SA-5 missiles. The latter risks were on a level with those assumed during the 1967 and 1970 Middle East wars. Indeed, Soviet willingness to take them was probably an effort to compensate for their poor performance during the war and the damaging effects it had on their prestige.

Soviet behavior in the days following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon on June 6, 1982, was not essentially different from what it had been during previous Middle East conflicts; that is, the Soviets provided nothing for their Arab clients beyond verbal support and condemnations of Israeli actions. As Israeli forces trounced the PLO, moved all the way up to Beirut, and destroyed over 90 Syrian aircraft and the
SA-6 missile batteries in the Bekaa Valley, the Soviets did nothing more than warn that the invasion would cost Israel dearly and announce their intention to take the matter to the U.N. Security Council. They stopped short of even the belated hints of direct intervention made in earlier wars; there were no alerts of airborne troops or other indications of actual preparations to provide military support, as there had been in the October 1973 war.

The reasons for Soviet passivity are not hard to discern in light of previous Soviet behavior. On the six previous occasions when Moscow threatened to intervene in a Middle Eastern crisis (1956, 1957, 1958, 1967, 1970, and 1973), Soviet threats were always made relatively late in the crisis when it was clear that they would not have to be carried out. The threats were not made, moreover, until the political survival of the Soviet client regime was actually threatened. The reasons for this historical caution lie ultimately in Moscow's lack of attractive intervention options in the Eastern Mediterranean. Not only do the Soviets have to worry about the possibility of escalation and confrontation with the United States in a theater where U.S. conventional forces are predominant, but they would also face a formidable problem in dealing with Israeli military power. The kinds of projection forces Moscow can bring to bear—naval units and lightly armed airborne forces—would be insufficient to affect developments on the ground in a full-scale war.

The options the Soviets faced during the 1982 Lebanon conflict were not fundamentally different. The Soviets could have tried to bluff Israel and the United States as they had done in the past, by alerting combat forces or threatening to send volunteers, but it is not clear that they could have done anything substantial to support Syria and the PLO militarily against a quick Israeli armored advance. Moreover, their stake in the outcome was considerably smaller than in previous conflicts. While the Syrian air force was attacked and humiliated, Israeli troops never crossed into Syria itself or otherwise directly threatened President Assad's continuation in power. The PLO's infrastructure in Lebanon was destroyed, but Moscow's stake in this organization was always considerably lower than in established regimes such as Ba'athist Syria. After reaching Beirut, the Israeli advance stopped of its own accord in a way that did not permit Moscow to issue one of its late threats. Thus it is hard to imagine a Soviet leadership

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52 For a fuller discussion of earlier Soviet intervention threats, see F. Fukuyama "Nuclear Shadowboxing: Soviet Intervention Threats in the Middle East," *Orbis*, Fall 1981.

with the presumed risk-taking propensities of the late 1970s acting much differently from the way it did in June 1982.  

Not surprisingly, Moscow’s Arab friends, beginning with Syria, were dismayed by this lack of support. Damascus complained about the poor quality of Soviet weapons compared to those provided to Israel, while Palestinian leader Nayif Hawatmeh stated that “the Soviet Union cannot secure its solidarity with us and with the people of Lebanon by confining its support to political and diplomatic pressure,” the effect of which “is limited if not zero.” As they had done when the Israelis shot down four Soviet-piloted MiGs during the 1970 War of Attrition, the Soviets dispatched the chief of the Air Defense Forces, General Ye. S. Yurasov, to Damascus on June 13, and there were rumors of a visit by Marshal Ogarkov, the Soviet Chief of Staff, in July. These visits were intended as post mortems on the poor performance of Soviet air-defense equipment and apparently were the occasion for considerable recrimination on the part of both the Soviets and the Syrians.

It is in this context that the Soviets took two escalatory moves, the deployments of SA-5 missiles in December 1982 and of SS-21s in September 1983. The SA-5s were placed at a number of sites in Syria and were manned at first entirely by Soviet crews, something that Moscow had not done since its dispatch of 20,000 air-defense troops to the interior of Egypt in early 1970. This doubled the total number of Soviet combat troops and advisors in Syria to approximately 6,000 to 8,000. By some reports, Syrian forces were not even allowed on the missile sites.

The SA-5 is a high-altitude surface-to-air missile developed during the 1960s but never deployed outside the Soviet Union; its 185-n mi range was considerably longer than anything previously provided to Syria. It had a military rationale insofar as it could target the airspace over virtually the whole of Israel from bases inside of Syria, posing a

54Karen Dawisha has argued that Soviet passivity was greater in 1982 than in previous conflicts and marked an eclipse of the USSR as a superpower in the Middle East. While this is an accurate characterization of Soviet policy during the war, it does not take account of the deployment of SA-5s which occurred after the Dawisha article was written. See “The USSR in the Middle East: Superpower in Eclipse?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 2, Winter 1982/83.


threat primarily to E-2C Hawkeye and other slow-moving aircraft.\textsuperscript{58} While the Israeli air force could probably devise countermeasures to the SA-5 relatively easily, these countermeasures might include (1) attacks on bases in Syria itself to neutralize the missiles, even if their other operations were confined to Lebanon, and (2) attacks on Soviet combat forces directly.

A number of observers have dismissed the Soviet deployment of SA-5s as a palliative gesture that did not involve significant risks on Moscow's part and was not essentially different from previous resupply efforts such as the one that was undertaken after the June 1967 war.\textsuperscript{59} A closer look at the actual timing of the decision reveals that the Soviets in fact ran serious risks of being drawn into a Syrian-Israeli conflict, which could have had potentially grave consequences for its prestige as well as raising the ever-present possibility of confrontation with the United States.

The Soviets probably began preparing the sites for the SA-5s in the second half of December 1982, although the bases did not become operational until later in the winter of 1982–83.\textsuperscript{60} The decision to deploy the missiles must have been taken perhaps two or three months earlier, however, in September or October. (During the War of Attrition, the original Soviet decision to send air-defense forces to Egypt was probably made in mid-January 1970, after the commencement of Israeli deep-penetration bombing, although the first SA-2s and SA-3s did not show up until March.) Apart from a general desire to atone for lack of support during the war itself, the Soviet deployment was most likely motivated by a desire to counter the perceived momentum of U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East, specifically the September 1 Reagan peace proposal and the Habib mission to seek a Syrian-Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.

The Soviet deployment of SA-5s was highly risky because at the time the decision was made, the Soviets had no assurance that the war between Syria and Israel would not start up again, in which case the Soviet combat forces manning the sites would become involved. By late September, Ariel Sharon, though weakened politically by the Sabra and Shatilla massacres, was still the Israeli defense minister. From the Soviet standpoint, Sharon was a highly unpredictable and dangerous adversary who might be expected to attack Syrian forces in the Bekaa Valley and perhaps even Soviet forces in Syria itself in order to bolster

\textsuperscript{59} Roberta (1983).
Israel's bargaining position in the withdrawal negotiations. Israel's war-weariness and lack of interest in continuing its involvement in Lebanon were phenomena that developed only gradually by the winter of 1982-83; they could not possibly have been evident to the Soviets in September 1982.

The Syrians were no less predictable and might have taken the deployment of the SA-5s as a sign that Moscow was now willing to back them up more strongly in the event of renewed fighting. Such risks would be marginal in any other region but the Middle East, where small gestures have had a tendency to escalate out of control. This had happened to the Soviets before, for example, in the buildup to the June 1967 War. At that time, the Soviets passed on a suggestion to Egypt's Nasser that he mobilize his forces in support of Syria. Nasser interpreted this advice—in itself a much less consequential move than the deployment of SA-5s—as a sign that the Soviets would support a larger Arab war effort, and he went on to expel the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) from the Sinai. The Soviets did not expect him to take this action, which led directly to the outbreak of the war. It appeared that the Soviets learned their lesson after May 1967, since in subsequent years they were extremely cautious in providing their Arab clients with pretexts for going to war with Israel. But in September 1982, they ran a risk that their SA-5 decision would be interpreted by Assad as some kind of green light for renewed confrontation with Israel, much as Nasser had done fifteen years earlier.

The SA-5 decision was riskier than previous arms resupply efforts because of the presence of Soviet combat forces. The Israelis were perfectly capable of launching a successful attack on the SA-5 sites, which might have resulted in the deaths of several hundred Soviet troops. This would not be something that could be swept under the carpet like the loss of the four MiGs to Israel in 1970. The Soviets would have faced the prospect of either suffering this loss of prestige passively or escalating in a situation where there were few good options. As in the War of Attrition, they would have had to count on Israeli prudence in not taking on a superpower for the conflict to be successfully resolved in their favor.

The motive behind deploying SS-21 missiles in September of the following year was probably similar to that for the SA-5 deployment. The risks run by the Soviets were somewhat smaller by this time, since Sharon had been replaced by Moshe Arens as defense minister and Israel was clearly seeking a way out of Lebanon. On the other hand,

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the United States had become more heavily involved in Lebanon at this point, so Moscow did run some risks of a superpower confrontation. The SS-21 was a surface-to-surface missile intended as a replacement for the Frog, capable of carrying a conventional or nuclear warhead some 70 miles.\textsuperscript{62} It was relatively new to the Soviet inventory, and the only place it had previously been deployed outside of the Soviet Union was in East Germany.\textsuperscript{63} Acquisition of the SS-21 clearly had prestige value for the Assad regime, but its military utility was more limited than that of the SA-5.

The Syrian case does not demonstrate \textit{substantially} greater Soviet risk-taking propensities, since neither opportunities nor threats to Soviet interests requiring greater activism (such as direct intervention by Soviet forces in the middle of a conflict) occurred. Nonetheless, the willingness to deploy qualitatively new weapons and Soviet combat forces to man them in the midst of a fragile ceasefire was as risky an action as the Soviets have undertaken in the Middle East, and it indicates that Soviet behavior in this instance was not affected by broader arguments which may have been made for retrenchment.

\textbf{Case II: Mozambique}

While not a recipient of Soviet/Cuban “aid” on the scale of Angola or Ethiopia, Mozambique was one of the most important new Soviet clients to emerge from the 1970s. It was ruled by a self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist national liberation front, Frelimo (the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique), which in February 1977 officially transformed itself into an orthodox Leninist vanguard party, began to receive substantial assistance from the Soviet Union and its allies, and later that year signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Moscow. Mozambique’s backsliding since that time has been truly remarkable. From a situation shortly after independence where Frelimo was giving active support to a number of African nationalist groups, including Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union (ZANU), the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, and the Southwest Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), Mozambique by early 1984 had become a virtual protectorate of South Africa, disavowing support for the ANC and in return receiving assistance from Pretoria to suppress an internal guerrilla resistance organization. This was surely not an outcome desired or expected by the Soviets, and

\textsuperscript{62}There was obviously never any Soviet intention of transferring nuclear warheads to Syria.

the question arises as to whether Moscow could have done more to prevent Mozambique from sliding out of its orbit had Soviet leaders been willing to take greater risks.

Mozambique's slide was caused by Moscow's failure to provide two things generally sought by Third World clients: economic assistance and military security. While it is perhaps not surprising that the Soviets were not able to do more to meet Mozambique's development requirements, its shortcomings in the military security field are somewhat surprising, since this has traditionally been an area of Soviet comparative advantage.

In the economic sphere, Mozambique's problems were created by a combination of the disruptions produced by decolonization, economic mismanagement, the effects of the guerrilla war, and simple bad luck, among other factors. Like the rest of Lusophone Africa, Mozambique's level of infrastructural development at the time of the Portuguese withdrawal in 1975 was low relative to other African ex-colonies, a problem that was immediately compounded by the sudden departure of 200,000 out of 220,000 Portuguese settlers who had run most of the Mozambican economy prior to independence. Some 80 percent of Mozambique's hard-currency earnings were dependent on transit revenues from Rhodesia and South Africa and the wages of Mozambican workers in South Africa, both of which were severely curtailed after independence. Frelimo compounded the country's problems by its efforts to collectivize agriculture into large state farms, such as CAIL (the Limpopo Agro-Industrial Complex), which consumed huge amounts of capital and destroyed the incentives of small farmers to produce. Mozambique, like other parts of Africa, also suffered from the weather, undergoing cyclones, floods, and three consecutive years of drought. Finally, the insurgency by Renamo (the Mozambique National Resistance) has successfully targeted Mozambique's economic infrastructure, including such acts as the sabotaging of the two railroad lines and the oil pipeline connecting Zimbabwe with Maputo and the

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64For example, there were only 40 black students in the university in 1974, blacks were barred from running their own businesses, and the rate of illiteracy was over 90 percent. (Joanmarie Kalter, "Mozambique's Peace with South Africa," Africa Report, No. 29, May-June 1984, p. 21.)

65South African traffic handled by Maputo dropped from 6.8 million tons in 1973 to 1.1 million in 1983, after Pretoria built its own port at Richard's Bay. Mozambique also lost an estimated $2.6 billion in revenues as a result of the drop in the number of miners working in South Africa, and the fact that remittances were no longer paid in gold. (Kalter (1984), p. 20.)

destruction of two-thirds of Beira's oil storage capacity.\(^67\) The combined effect of these disasters was to reduce maize production (the main staple crop) from 364,000 tons to 250,000 tons and sorghum from 202,000 to 152,000 tons between 1970 and 1981, at the same time the country's population was growing from 8 million to 12 million.\(^68\)

It is in the area of economic assistance that Moscow has most clearly failed to meet Mozambique's needs. By one estimate, the Soviets provided Maputo with approximately $175 million in economic assistance between 1978 and 1982. The East Germans have been relatively heavily involved, being Mozambique's fourth-largest trading partner and providing help in coal production and geological exploration; the Bulgarians have provided agronomists; and Romania, oil technicians. Mozambique has received industrial odds and ends from the Soviet bloc, including a truck and tractor assembly plant and a factory to produce agricultural implements, etc.\(^69\) All of this falls far short of Mozambique's requirements, however, and has led to open complaints from Maputo about the level of Soviet support. The Soviet bloc of the late 1970s still did not account for more than 10 or 15 percent of Mozambique's trade. Mozambique asked to be allowed to join CEMA in 1980 in the hopes of receiving development aid from the rest of the bloc to "level up" its economy, as Cuba and Vietnam had done, but it was turned down and granted only observer status.\(^70\) The Soviets also turned down a request to provide a steel mill, on the grounds that it was not appropriate to Mozambique's level of development.\(^71\) The advice of Soviet bloc agricultural technicians proved to be disastrous, compounding the problems created by the state farms.\(^72\) The $175 million in Soviet aid should be compared to aid levels available from the West: Since 1978, Mozambique has received a $100 million line of credit from Brazil for the purchase of General Electric locomotives assembled there, $130 million from Britain, a ten-year agricultural and industrial agreement with Italy worth $450 million.
French loan to help fund a truck factory and a cotton project, a $170 million railway rehabilitation project with Canada, a $55 million agricultural grant from the Nordic countries, and $50 million in humanitarian aid from the United States. In addition, one of Maputo's motives in signing the Nkomati ceasefire accord was the hope of receiving technical and economic assistance from South Africa; it had earlier recognized West Berlin as a Land of the Federal Republic of Germany (much to East Germany's annoyance) in order to qualify for food aid from the FRG. Clearly, a great deal of this Western economic assistance would be forthcoming even if Mozambique remained aligned with the Soviet Union. But considering that aid levels in the billions would be required to rebuild the Mozambican economy, it is not surprising that Frelimo would think to cultivate friendlier political ties with the West as a precaution.

Moscow fell short in the area of military security as well. From the time of independence, the Soviet Union was Mozambique's primary military supplier, also providing other services such as the reorganization of the regime's internal security services. Mozambique's security needs have been consistently high: From 1975 to the Lancaster House settlement in 1979, it was on the forefront of the struggle for Zimbabwean independence, a conflict that cost it a reported $550 million and 1,000 casualties and left it vulnerable to Rhodesian retaliation. No sooner had this conflict been settled than Frelimo came under attack by Renamo, which soon spread its operations throughout all but one province of the country. Renamo was originally a Rhodesian creation, consisting of former Portuguese settlers, disaffected tribal elements, and ex-members of Frelimo itself, which was turned over to South African intelligence after the Zimbabwean settlement. While it is much more clearly an instrument of Pretoria than is Unita in Angola, Renamo appears to have a certain base of support within Mozambique itself which has increased in proportion to the country's economic woes.

Mozambique's deteriorating security situation was underscored in January 1981 by a South African raid on an ANC headquarters in the suburbs of Maputo. In spite of the MiG-17s and air defenses supplied

74. According to Colin Patterson, the South African trade commissioner in Maputo, "Just across the border, not even 50 miles from here, are huge tracts of land producing food, and this must have weighed heavily on President Machel's approach." (Quoted in Lamb (1984).)
by Moscow, Mozambique was clearly defenseless against South African power. The Soviets did respond by issuing a warning to Pretoria and by sending two warships to Mozambican ports in a symbolic gesture of support reminiscent of Soviet behavior toward Egypt during the 1968–70 War of Attrition. While Soviet military assistance was raised substantially following a round of consultations by defense officials from both sides after the ANC bombing, and again in 1982 following a round of consultations between President Machel and Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov, Moscow did not offer to raise its level of support to Mozambique dramatically—it did not offer to ferry in large numbers of Cuban combat forces nor did it provide a sophisticated air-defense network, as it had done in the past for its Arab clients. However, there is no evidence that the Frelimo regime ever asked the Soviets for substantially greater support, as they did in the area of economic assistance. Instead, Maputo took the remarkable step of turning first to Portugal and then to South Africa itself for security assistance. Mozambique foreign minister Joachim Chissano first stopped in Lisbon in March 1981; then Portuguese President Eanes made a trip to Maputo in November, and Prime Minister Balsemão visited Maputo in June 1982. The result of these consultations was a Portuguese agreement to provide Mozambique with assistance in counterinsurgency warfare to help suppress Renamo. As part of an agreement signed in April 1982, the Portuguese moved into the position of the second-largest military supplier to Mozambique, after Moscow, started training 50 Mozambican officers, and dispatched a training mission to their former colony. Portuguese security assistance proved to be insufficient to contain Renamo, however, so in March 1984 Maputo decided to go to the source and sign what came to be known as the Nkomati ceasefire agreement with South Africa, which provided for an end to Pretoria’s military support for Renamo and South African military and economic assistance to Mozambique, in return for Mozambique’s stopping of its assistance to the ANC. U.S.-Mozambican ties improved in tandem; from a low point in 1981, when a number of U.S. diplomats were expelled from Mozambique on charges of spying, the United States in early 1985 offered to provide Maputo with $1 million worth of

78 Clement (1985, II).
“nonlethal” military equipment and $150,000 worth of military training.\(^1\)

The interesting question from the standpoint of our analysis of Soviet policy is why Frelimo chose to go the Portuguese-South African route rather than seeking higher levels of military assistance from the USSR and its allies, as many observers anticipated prior to Nkomati. The Mozambican explanation was that Portugal was particularly familiar with the terrain and with counterinsurgency warfare. This explanation is a bit less than candid, since the Angolans have proven perfectly willing to accept aid from Soviet sources. Did the Soviets refuse to meet Mozambican needs point-blank when asked, or did the Mozambicans decide that such support even if proffered would not be sufficient to resolve their security concerns?

While we have no direct evidence, the answer appears to be a bit of both: The Mozambicans did not request and the Soviets did not offer significantly higher levels of assistance because both parties realized that it would ultimately be insufficient to suppress Renamo in the face of South African military power. Unlike Angola, Mozambique borders directly on South Africa, with its capital of Maputo just a few kilometers away. Pretoria would have regarded a sudden infusion of Cuban troops or Soviet advisors into Mozambique far more seriously than it did in the case of Angola; equally important, it would have been in a good position to prevent this development militarily. When Cuban forces came up directly against the South Africans in Angola in 1975, they did not fare well; as in the case of Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean, it is not at all clear that the Soviets and their allies would prevail in an escalating local war in Southern Africa. The South Africans could, for example, try to attack Soviet planes and ships as they started to ferry in Cuban forces, before they had an opportunity to set up an integrated air-defense network—something that Soviet air-defense forces have never had to do at so great a geographical distance. Were the Soviets to suffer a military setback, they would be faced with the stark choice of tolerating a humiliating defeat at the hands of a regional power, or somehow escalating the conflict in a way that South Africa could not match. The Soviet stake in southern Africa has always been small compared to its stake in other areas closer to its borders, e.g., the Middle East. Its stake in Mozambique’s Frelimo, moreover, has always been smaller than its stake in the MPLA in Angola, due to its long past history of support for the latter and its intimate involvement in the civil war of 1975. It was clear that

Moscow's stake in Maputo was not worth the prices of either defeat or large-scale escalation.

Thus, while the Soviet failure to provide Mozambique with greater economic assistance probably arose from economic constraints, the failure to offer adequate military security appeared to be the result of simple military caution. This does not necessarily represent a lower risk-taking propensity than was evident in the late 1970s. As noted in our previous discussion of Syria, the Soviets have been extremely cautious in undertaking military risks throughout their postwar involvement in the Third World, including regions where their stake has been much higher—primarily the Middle East. While they are most cautious vis-à-vis U.S. military power, they have also demonstrated considerable reserve when facing powerful local American allies such as Israel. South Africa's position in southern Africa is quite similar to that of Israel in the Middle East—both countries dominate their respective regions militarily, and sharply constrict Moscow's ability to project force there. It should not be surprising, then, that the Soviets would hesitate before risking a showdown with a powerful state like South Africa in a theater far removed from the sources of Soviet power. It does not seem likely that Moscow would have behaved differently in the late 1970s, had the Mozambicans come to them then requesting a significantly higher level of military involvement.

Thus Mozambique and Syria point in somewhat contradictory directions as indicators of Soviet risk-taking. In Syria the Soviets proved willing to take substantial, though by no means unprecedented, risks to support their client, whereas in Mozambique they declined the opportunity to do so. This suggests that in the area of risk-taking, as in resource allocations, it is impossible to make generalizations about patterns in Soviet behavior in the early 1980s.
V. CONCLUSIONS

As indicated in the earlier discussion of the Soviet theoretical reassessment, there are several motives behind the arguments currently being made for retrenchment in the Third World, including economic stringency, potential damage to U.S.-Soviet relations, and the poor performance of the second-generation Marxist-Leninist states. If in fact these arguments were to be translated into policy, one would expect to see several distinct shifts in Soviet behavior, i.e., cutbacks in military and economic assistance, a shying away from dangerous or provocative local involvements that have the potential for escalation, and a renewed emphasis on the nonsocialist countries of the Third World.

From the preceding section it is evident that if in fact there are powerful voices within the Soviet leadership calling for a reassessment of policy toward the Third World, this does not seem to have been reflected in actual behavior except at the margins. Indeed, it is difficult to draw general conclusions of any sort from the Soviet policy record of the early 1980s. With regard to military and economic assistance, the picture is mixed: A number of major Soviet clients, including Syria, Angola, Cuba, and India have been the recipients of substantial new aid packages, while aid to others such as the PDRY, Mozambique, and Ethiopia has remained flat or has in fact declined. Clients governed by MLVPs have not done notably better as a group than the non-Marxist-Leninists such as India or Syria; indeed, in terms of aid, they have done relatively poorly compared with the aid they received in 1975-80. On the whole, more Soviet clients seem to have received increased levels of funding than have not; certainly it is impossible to make a general case that the Soviets have sought to cut back on their outlays for economic or other reasons.

One could make the argument that the Soviets would be very reluctant to cut back on assistance to existing clients for reasons of prestige and credibility, but that they have not sought to take on significant new commitments. Clearly, there have been no major new openings in the Third World in the early 1980s, but there are perhaps cases not investigated in detail in the present study where the Soviets would have been able to increase their influence had they been willing to spare more economic resources. Moscow has, for example, cultivated in a desultory way a number of small West African countries, including Benin and Guinea-Bissau, both of which are ruled by self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist regimes. These countries are extremely small, poor,
and lacking in natural or human resources. It probably would not have been difficult for the Soviet navy to have acquired a West African port in return for an outlay of a few hundred million dollars (or less) in economic assistance. Indeed, one could argue that in the heyday of Soviet Third World expansion, Moscow would have done precisely that. The Soviet failure to do so may reflect economic constraints, but it could just as easily result from the fact that there was no real military requirement for such a base.

With regard to risk-taking propensities, it is hard to generalize, since we looked at only two detailed cases, Syria and Mozambique, but here again the picture seems quite mixed. To the extent that one could argue that the Soviets have been more risk-averse in the early 1980s than previously, one could probably make the strongest case for Mozambique. The Soviets certainly could have done a great deal to bolster their political influence in Mozambique and prevent Frelimo from turning to Western sources of financing had they been more generous with economic assistance, though the amount of money required was likely to have been substantial. In the area of military security, they could have offered Maputo a very large military assistance package of the sort given to Angola in 1983, which might have slowed the country's slide into the South African orbit. Ultimately, however, it is not clear that the Soviets had any terribly good options for giving Mozambique effective military support against Renamo, in view of the risks they would have had to run vis-à-vis South Africa. While they may have slowed Mozambique's turn away from them, it may have been impossible to prevent it altogether.

On the other side of the ledger, Syria presents a very different picture: While the Soviets were relatively passive during the initial Israeli invasion of Lebanon, they subsequently took substantial risks to bolster Hafiz Assad's regime. These risks were not unprecedented for Soviet Middle East policy, but they were at the high end of the distribution over the past two decades. Thus, even if one were to say that Soviet actions in Mozambique demonstrated a lower propensity to take risks than previously, this could not be said to represent a broad trend.

Time and resource constraints prevented us from looking at other cases of Soviet risk-taking, e.g., Nicaragua or Vietnam, in the present study, but it is doubtful that a broadening of the survey would yield strikingly systematic patterns. The problem is that the early 1980s have simply not produced opportunities for major Soviet interventions that could serve as benchmarks for evaluating their risk-taking propensities.

Finally, there has been no evident shift away from Moscow's earlier emphasis on Marxist-Leninist vanguard parties in terms of resource
allocations. Whatever theoretical reservations may be raised about them, clients ruled by MLVPs continue to receive significant amounts of Soviet military and economic assistance, and in the cases of Afghanistan and Angola, have received much more direct forms of Soviet bloc support.

If the theoretical reassessment of the Third World has not been reflected noticeably in recent Soviet behavior, the question arises as to what this internal discussion is all about. The fact that concerns over economic costs are being raised at the Politburo-senior party secretary level suggests that the issue is somewhat larger than marginal changes in economic aid to Mozambique or whether to allocate $50 million for a port in Guinea-Bissau. Two possibilities, not necessarily mutually exclusive, come to mind.

The first is that the current discussion of the Third World reflects not a debate over future policy, but an explanation and an apologia for actual economic-assistance policies of the past. The Soviet Union has never been overly generous in providing development assistance; not only has bilateral aid fallen short of what the West collectively has been able to offer, but the Soviets are not able to provide their Third World clients with quality consumer or industrial goods or access to large markets which are the natural concomitant to integration into the international capitalist economic system. These shortcomings are nothing new. Soviet lack of economic competitiveness has become a more acute problem in recent years, however, because the agenda of the Third World has increasingly moved away from political questions of decolonization and national liberation to ones of economic development. As a result, the Soviets have come under increasing criticism from even their most loyal clients for failing to meet needs other than those related to arms and security. The argument that the Soviet Union serves the Third World best by serving itself may have been intended as an answer to the Vietnams and Mozambiques which have been clamoring for greater direct Soviet bilateral assistance.

There are several problems with this interpretation, the first of which is that the current Soviet reassessment covers a considerably broader range of issues than the question of economic aid. There is, moreover, no reason to draw a sharp distinction between economic and security assistance, and in the case of the latter, the Soviets have continued to be fairly generous and do not need to make apologies for their past performance. The sudden upsurge in high-level discussion of the Third World does not seem to be explainable simply in terms of the desire to explain or apologize for past behavior.

A second, more satisfying, explanation is that the current reassessment is actually part of a debate over future policy which has yet to be
implemented. It seems logical that there should be economic managers in the Soviet Union who are unhappy with the amount of money currently being spent on unreliable clients in the Third World, and others with an interest in reestablishing the priority of the central East-West relationship in Soviet foreign policy, who have tried to use Brezhnev's death as an opportunity to influence policy in the directions they favored. But while the prolonged succession process has created the preconditions for innovation, it has also prevented changes from being implemented in the short run. Not only are the attention and energies of policymakers focused elsewhere, the collective decisionmaking process is frozen and no single leader can make significant changes on his own authority. Only after the leadership issue is resolved and Gorbachev or some other figure establishes his authority can we expect to see any major redirection of Soviet policy.

It is also possible that the Third World may itself have been an issue in the succession process. For example, Andropov's June 1983 Plenum speech contains a fairly pointed criticism of Brezhnev's foreign policy; while not stated explicitly, Andropov implies that Brezhnev's priorities of détente with the West and activism in the Third World have led to a situation in which the risk of nuclear war has increased, forcing a reevaluation of the goals of the Communist movement as a whole. Just as Andropov came to symbolize a return to discipline and a crackdown on corruption in the domestic economy, his position on Third World issues may have been a rallying point for those opposed to Moscow's heavy investment in overseas adventures during the late 1970s.

Even if we could establish the existence of a group within the Soviet leadership that intended to try to implement a retrenchment in the Third World at some future time, it would be very difficult to uncover their real underlying intentions, or to predict how such a policy would actually play out. There are several ways in which a retrenchment might occur. If the primary Soviet concern were to reduce the risk of confrontation and war with the United States, then "self-restraint" would be visible primarily in crisis situations—for example, where the Soviets refused to intervene on behalf of or otherwise support a Third World client, or failed to respond forcefully to a challenge to their interests mounted by the United States and its local allies. In non-crisis situations, Soviet restraint would be evident in the failure to take advantage of opportunities to expand their influence at the expense of the United States—for example, by not establishing a close military supply relationship with a future Communist Philippines. The problem with this indicator is that, apart from one or two notable exceptions, the Soviets have never intervened where the cost of doing so
appeared to be high, nor have they otherwise taken significant risks of confrontation with the United States in the Third World. The interventions in Angola and Afghanistan, for example, for all their visibility did not entail serious risks of conflict with the United States. Hence a future Soviet failure to respond to an intervention opportunity may not reflect a greater degree of self-restraint as much as a calculation of the high costs of doing so.

"Self-restraint" in the sphere of economic resources (i.e., declining levels of military and economic assistance) might be easier to recognize, although here again indicators may be difficult to pick up. It is hard to believe that a Soviet leader could argue in favor of a serious effort to economize on Third World expenditures without trying to tackle the largest claimants on Soviet largess, Cuba and Vietnam, which together account for a majority of Soviet expenditures in the developing world. Even if the levels of annual military and economic assistance to these two countries were not actually cut, Moscow could at least attempt to slow the rates of growth from those of the past decade. The savings that would result could well be sufficient to make or break countries like Mozambique or Ethiopia.

The problem with this approach is that the Soviets in the past have invested so much money and prestige in both Cuba and Vietnam that there is a real question of whether any Kremlin leadership could realistically expect to restrict assistance to them more than marginally. Nor is it clear that the Soviets even continue to regard Cuba and Vietnam as part of the Third World. As we have seen, these are the only two clients in the developing world routinely accepted into the circle of "socialist" states, and it may be that aid to them is considered sacrosanct, much like assistance to Israel and Egypt for the United States. As a result, cuts, if they were to be made, would have to affect the tier of states below them. But when one looks at specific cases like Angola, Ethiopia, or Afghanistan, it is hard to imagine the Soviets incurring the political costs of cutbacks for the sake of economic savings. Reducing allocations to states even less important than these may be politically palatable, but will not save the Soviets significant amounts of money. Hence Moscow's options seem to be constrained all the way around. The only clear-cut saving that could be made would be to avoid taking on new and expensive Third World commitments, an inclination that would accord with a desire to minimize friction in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

Another change that may be more likely to occur is a shift in Moscow's choice of clients away from MLVPs and socialist-oriented countries back to Khrushchev-era ties with large and influential states in the Third World, regardless of their internal ideological predis-
positions. Such a shift would be dictated by the poor performance of Moscow's second-generation clients, but would also be given an institutional basis as a result of the upcoming generational change in the International Department. The replacement of the Suslovite old guard, Ponomarev and Ul'yanovskii, by Zagladin and Brutents suggests a policy much less preoccupied with ideological questions and less dependent on a small group of weak and narrowly based client regimes.

Whether these or any other shifts in Soviet policy will actually come to pass will of course depend on the inclinations of Gorbachev and other leaders at his level, since it is they who must make both the personnel decisions in staffing the party and government apparatus and the choices on actual policies. Unfortunately, we know next to nothing about the inclinations of the current General Secretary on Third World policy, or those of the other younger leaders who may rise with him. Our analysis of the current Soviet reassessment can only tell us the way in which these issues are likely to be presented to the new leadership, not about the outcomes of those decisions themselves.
Appendix

THE HIERARCHY OF SOVIET CLIENTS

Based on the evolving Soviet view of the significance of MLVPs, we can reconstruct the Soviet view of the hierarchy of states in the Third World.

The only Third World states consistently admitted into the ranks of the “socialist” states (i.e., on a par with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe) are Cuba and Vietnam, both of which are full members of CEMA. North Korea and Laos are often included (together with Mongolia), though less consistently.¹

Below this level come the socialist-oriented countries, a group of states said to number (depending on the source) between 15 and 24.² “Socialist orientation is synonymous with states following the “non-capitalist path,” and more or less synonymous with the term “revolutionary democrat.”³ The socialist-oriented states are divided into two groups, the upper tier which espouses Marxism-Leninism as a declarative ideology, and a lower tier which does not.⁴ The countries in these respective groups are listed in Table 4. Nicaragua seems to occupy a somewhat lower status in the top tier because it is still ruled by a front which in theory contains non-Marxist-Leninists and has not transformed itself into a vanguard party. According to U'yanovskii, “national democrats” was a generic term invented in the early 1960s to cover all those countries and movements, regardless of class origin or ideological inclination, that were waging a struggle for independence and were therefore “objectively” anti-imperialist. “Revolutionary democracy” constituted the left wing of “national democracy” until the latter term came to refer to the right wing alone, i.e., the non-socialist-oriented countries.

The ranking in Table 4 is generally supported by other types of Soviet lists, for example the May Day slogans for 1981 through 1984

¹North Korea, for example, is included in the list of socialist states in Brezhnev's 25th Party Congress report, but not in the 26th.
³See U'yanovskii (1984, I), as quoted above.
(see Table 5). The order in which the Soviets address different allies and clients gives some idea of Moscow’s relative priorities for that year. One interesting point is that after 1982 specific mention of countries in the Third World drops out and is replaced by generic greetings. Moreover, prior to 1983, fraternal greetings were extended to peoples “who have attained liberation from the colonial yoke and who are waging a courageous struggle for the consolidation of national independence and social progress”; in subsequent years, the slogans distinguished between the socialists and the nationalists in the liberated world.

Table 4
SOVIET RATINGS OF THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

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<tr>
<th>1. Socialist countries</th>
<th>2. Socialist-oriented countries*</th>
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<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>First Generation</td>
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<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<td>Laos</td>
<td>Angola</td>
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<td>North Korea</td>
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<td>Cape Verde</td>
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<td>India</td>
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<td>Grenada (until 1983)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Iraq</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
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<td>Mali</td>
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<td>PDRY</td>
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<th>3. Capitalist-oriented countries</th>
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*First generation = non-Marxist-Leninist countries; second generation = self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist countries.
### Table 5

**SOVIET MAY DAY SLOGANS**

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**SOURCE:** *Pravda,* April 12, 1981; April 11, 1982; April 17, 1983; April 15, 1984; and April 1985.

**NOTE:** * denotes "warm" greetings; ** denotes "ardent" or "fervent" greetings; all others received "fraternal" greetings.
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