PROSPECTS FOR INCREASED U.S.-JAPAN DEFENSE BURDEN-SHARING

by

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**Abstract:**

This thesis examines current and future trends in U.S.-Japanese defense burden-sharing. To understand the current state of Japanese defense policy, a broad historical survey is provided. This is followed by an examination of key world "players" views on increasing Japan's defense expenditures to meet the challenges of the future. Finally, various views on the likely direction Japan should follow in terms of its security relationship with the United States are provided from a Japanese and American perspective.
Prospects for Increased U.S.-Japan Defense Burden-Sharing

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines current and future trends in U.S.-Japanese defense burden-sharing. To understand the current state of Japanese defense policy, a broad historical survey is provided. This is followed by an examination of key world "players" views on increasing Japan's defense expenditures to meet the challenges of the future. Finally, various views on the likely direction Japan should follow in terms of its security relationship with the United States are provided from a Japanese and American perspective.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The Japanese surrender onboard the battleship U.S.S. Missouri marked the end of World War II and signified the defeat of Imperial Japan. It was a time of national humiliation, a time to (as the emperor said) "bear the unbearable".\(^1\) Japan's military-industrial capability was dismantled by U.S. Occupation Forces and a process of reeducation was underway. The U.S.-inspired 1947 Constitution had specific provisions which would limit Japan's war-making ability. As of 1985 the Japanese rank eighth in world defense expenditures, with a modern army, air force and navy; yet the U.S. is constantly pressuring the Japanese to re-arm, seemingly in contradiction to prior U.S. policy.\(^2\)

This study will explore this unusual situation, in an effort to understand why policy has changed in the United States and Japan over the years.

To do this I will first examine the evolution of Japanese defense policy, divided into two parts. First, the period of 1945 to 1973, then 1973 to the present. The year 1973 is a convenient point in time to separate these two 'phases' in the evolution of Japanese defense policy, but it by no means represents a sudden change; rather it marks a time of gradual changes on the horizon. This evolutionary process will be described and explained in the course of this study.

Next, I will explore an important facet of U.S.-Japan defense relations, that is, the nature of the primary threat to Japan - namely, the Soviet Union. If certain events in

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\(^2\)James H. Buck, Japan's Defense Policy, Armed Forces and Society, 8(Fall 1981): p. 79.
recent years (such as the Soviet attack on KAL 007, the Vietnamese war in Kampuchea, etc.), coupled with a massive Soviet buildup of its forces concurrent with a relative U.S. decline had not occurred, it is doubtful that Japanese public opinion could have changed as it has in recent times. Accordingly, we will demonstrate the extent and nature of the Soviet threat in two parts. First, a nuts-and-bolts examination of the growth of Soviet military power in the region, compared to western forces. Second, an examination of Soviet - Japanese relations, focusing on Soviet views of Japanese rearmament as found in Soviet and Japanese writings.

Having provided the basis for further analysis, the focus will shift to an in-depth presentation on the various schools of thought in Japan today on defense. It will cover the gamut of viewpoints, from the far left to the far right, with explanations by American and Japanese scholars. In a recent conversation with Lt.Col. Yoshihisa Nakamura of the Japanese National Defense Academy, Department of Defense Studies, I was introduced to the ideas of a number of Japanese scholars, politicians, etc. who would be regarded as representing these various schools of thought.¹ Some of these individual's writings will be analyzed.

Before examining the prospects for increased Japanese burden-sharing from the U.S. perspective, we shall examine some key players' views on this topic, for purposes of political comparison with Washington's views and policies, so we might place this issue in a broader perspective. Although very much a U.S. - Japan issue; increased military spending by Japan would have far-reaching implications for the world at large and especially for Asia.

In trying to narrow down this endeavor, the analysis which follows will be limited to the following nations/regions: 1) Western Europe, 2) the People's Republic of China, 3) the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 4) the Korean Peninsula (including both North and South), and ANZUS. These represent the crucial actors or players which will influence, to varying degrees, the extent that Japan will move toward increased burden-sharing (if at all). The specific reasons for examining the above actors will be discussed at length in their applicable sections of this study. Suffice it to say at this point that certain common threads can be identified which run through their respective foreign policies in terms of Japanese rearmament. We shall explore these attitudes, and reservations, if any.

The next and concluding section will be a summary of American security interests in the region with regard to Japan increasing its share of the responsibilities. The Reagan administration has emphasized its desire for Japan to fulfill specific missions as a tactic for increased Japanese involvement in defense burden-sharing. Its viability will be discussed.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF JAPANESE DEFENSE POLICY

A. 1945 TO 1973

As mentioned in the introduction, the year 1945 left an embittered Japanese public. A strong public aversion to the war and to the militarism of the 1930s and early 1940s explains much of Japan's reluctance to pursue any semblance of rearmament in this period.

Unlike Nazi Germany, Japan in the pre-war period was under the domination of a military faction vice a philosophical social force. In other words, the Japanese military, led by Tojo, operated independently of the workings of the Japanese government. Unlike Nazi Germany, the militarism displayed by the generals in the Imperial Japanese Army did not have a close equivalent in the civilian government of Japan. It is understandable in light of the military's control of Japan that many Japanese equated the military with anti-democracy. Any rise in military strength could risk a potential loss in human rights, democracy, etc. of the sort which was experienced prior to World War II. This anti-military sentiment persists today, and remains an obstacle to increasing Japan's defense budget. With this in mind, let us review the historical circumstances since WWII.


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*Satoh, p. 2.

Aspiring sincerely to an International peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

This constitution was generally acceptable to the Japanese, who were weary of war and resigned (for the time being) to the U.S. presence in Japan.

The Korean War was the first of many incidents which began to influence the direction Japan would follow in the years ahead. In response to the U.S. involvement in Korea, Gen. MacArthur pressured Japan into establishing a 75,000 man para-military National Police Reserve (NPR) in July 1950. Prime Minister Ashida interpreted Article 9 of the constitution as not denying the formation of a self-defense force, thereafter known as the "Ashida-Kiyose Interpretation". The Ashida-Kiyose Interpretation allowed for a greater acceptance of the para-military force being instituted in Japan.7

As the Korean War dragged on, U.S. attention to Japanese defense increased. In 1951 in San Francisco, California, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was signed. Then in 1952 (much earlier than many anticipated) Japan was granted independence by the United States. Japan was pressured into improving the NPR; in its place a 110,000-man National Safety Force was established with a sea component. In 1954 this force was modified once again, becoming a tri-service Self-Defense Force (SDF) which remains in Japan today.8

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7Buck, p. 79.
8Satoh, p.2.
9Ibid, p. 3.
During these early years, the role of the SDF was poorly defined, yet a basic defense doctrine was developed; known as the 'Yoshida Strategy'. This strategy, as enunciated by Prime Minister Yoshida following talks with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, hinged upon Japan's willingness to allow U.S. forces to utilize bases in Japan in return for U.S. security protection should an aggressor attack Japan. This strategy continues to be the mainstay of Japanese defense planning. However, recent events have led many to consider new options.

In May 1957 Japan adopted the 'Basic Policy for National Defense' which relied on the Japan-U.S. alliance as the major (if not the sole) shield against the spectre of external attack. This policy provided the basis for a series of four 5-year "Buildup Plans" which were carried out from 1958 to 1976. Each of these "Buildup Plans" doubled in real terms the size of the Japanese defense budget, although considering the growth of the Japanese economy this actually meant a smaller percentage of GNP as time went on.

1960 was an important year, for it was the year which saw a renegotiation of the security treaty. The Japan-U.S. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (MST) was rammed down the throats of the opposition in the Japanese Diet by Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi. Although provoking mass demonstrations from the left, the treaty survived; ironically this caused the socialists to split into two parties.

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9Ibid, p. 3.


11Satoh, p. 4.

12Ibid, p.4.
resulting in a strengthening of the dominant LDP! The major aspect of the MST was Article 5, which stated:

Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accord with its constitutional provisions and processes.  

As the 1960s continued, Japan accelerated its rapid economic expansion, but with no commensurate defense buildup. In 1967 Prime Minister Sato enunciated the "Three Non-Nuclear Principles" which became another continuing aspect of Japanese defense policy. These three principles, simply put, are 1) no possession of nuclear weapons, 2) no production of nuclear weapons, and 3) no entry of nuclear weapons into Japan. Since Sato's pronouncement, these principles have been repeatedly stressed in unanimous Diet resolutions.  

Also in 1967 a resolution was passed to limit arms exports, restraining Japan from sales to socialist nations, nations at war, etc. This resolution was modified in 1976 to preclude the sale of arms anywhere. Finally, in 1972 Okinawa was returned to Japan by the United States. It is the return. of Okinawa which many Japanese use to mark the arbitrary end of the postwar period, and is a useful event to cite as the end of the first phase However, it was the Arab Oil Embargo in 1973 and the resultant shock between the U.S. and Japan which clearly marked an end of one phase and the beginning of another.

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12Buck, p. 81.  
16Satoh, p. 5.  
15Ibid  
16Ibid
When looking back over the period 1945-1973, we can make some generalities. First, through the Yoshida Strategy, Japan was able to relegate defense matters to the lowest possible priority, with very little attention given to strategy. What little discussion existed during this period was of a legal vice a strategic nature. As Japan grew economically, it sought to use diplomacy as the primary tool for regaining lost Japanese prestige resulting from its WWII defeat. Through U.S. auspices, Japan regained acceptance into the international community; signalled by entrance into the IMF in 1952, GATT in 1955 and the United Nations in 1956.

Japan restored diplomatic relations with two important nations in this period. First, the USSR, Japan's enemy for many years, in 1956. Then, South Korea, a nation whose people had been at odds with Japan's for a long time, in 1965. Japanese hatred toward these nations had to be overcome in the process of normalization with these countries. These points will be explored in greater detail later in this study.

By the late 1960s Japan was moving toward a trade surplus with the United States; thus giving rise in the U.S. Congress to the notion of a "free-ride" by Japan at the expense of the United States.¹⁷ Meanwhile, the use of bases in Okinawa by the U.S. in the Korean and Vietnam conflicts caused some in Japan to wonder if the MST threatened Japan more than it protected it.¹⁸ Until 1973, one can generalize about Japanese defense policy as being a reflection of what the United States deemed appropriate for Japan. As the 1970s continued, we can observe an increasing tendency in Tokyo to formulate Japan's policy more independently from

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 35.
the United States. It is in this context that we turn to the next phase of Japanese defense policy formulation.

B. 1973 TO PRESENT

The 1970s and 1980s have witnessed the continued rapid economic growth of Japan amidst a changing global balance of power. The basic tenet of the Yoshida Strategy is that an attack against Japan "would lead to a direct confrontation with the enormous military potential of the U.S., resulting in substantial sacrifice, a consequence which actively deters aggression against Japan." However, events in Asia and the world, to be examined shortly, have forced many Japanese to recognize that 1) U.S. power is declining relative to the Soviet Union's, and 2) the massive Soviet buildup, particularly in the Pacific, is bent upon a course of favorable 'correlation of forces', which places Japan in an increasingly vulnerable position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

The textile controversy of 1971 (Nixon's non-negotiated quota on Japanese textiles), coupled with a more protectionist economic policy of the U.S. in the early 1970s led many Japanese to realize that the United States and Japan were losing the status of "economic partners" to be replaced by "economic rivals". The "Nixon Shocks" caused by U.S. rapprochement with China (as well as the soybean controversy) was viewed by many Japanese as a betrayal by the U.S.; a sign of a certain lack of faith in Japan. The 1973 Oil Crisis demonstrated to Japan that in times of crisis the United States could not necessarily be relied

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18Buck, p. 83.
19Ibid, p. 84.
20Sayle, p. 35.
21Ibid
upon to ensure adequate supplies of oil. Also the extreme dependence of Japan on raw materials in general was made obvious.

In 1975 the fall of Saigon following the U.S. troop withdrawal from Vietnam signalled both a much decreased U.S. presence in Asia, and the perception among Asians of a declining will in the United States to meet its security requirements and commitments. Concurrently, the Soviet Union began to expand its presence in the Asia-Pacific region, especially with regard to naval activities near Japan.

The proposal by U.S. presidential candidate Jimmy Carter to reduce the number of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea tended to further inflame Japanese skepticism over the U.S. commitment to Japan. After becoming president, Carter dispatched Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Philip Habib to meet with President Park and Prime Minister Fukuda to express U.S. views in this matter. The Japanese used this as an opportunity to protest the U.S. troop reduction, contending that the ground forces could not be withdrawn without creating considerable danger to the security of South Korea and Northeast Asia in general.

This proposal, unilateral in design, seemed particularly suspect given the poor state of affairs which had developed between the United States and the ROK as a result of the

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22Satoh, p. 10.
24Ibid, p. 5.
"Koreagate" scandal, human rights violations, etc. Ultimately, Carter backed off on this proposal, but not without once again tarnishing the image of American resolve (or the lack thereof) in the minds of many Japanese.26

The overthrow of the Shah of Iran during the Iranian Revolution and the ensuing hostage crisis saw an embarrassed U.S. send the Seventh Fleet to the Indian Ocean as it became stretched thinner than ever before so as to meet global security needs. Then a series of events transpired, unnerving to the Japanese.

In 1978 the Vietnamese invaded Kampuchea. In January 1979 the U.S. established diplomatic relations with the P.R.C. as it abrogated the U.S.-Taiwan Defense Pact; once again raising doubts over U.S. commitments to its allies. February 1979 saw the Chinese attack Vietnam, heightening tensions in Southeast Asia. In 1979 the world and Japan witnessed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Vietnamese naval and air bases had been occupied by Soviet forces.

The Soviet and Vietnamese activity raised concerns in Japan over the well-being of the ASEAN states. The KAL-007 disaster on 1 September 1983 resulted in the death of 269 lives, including 28 Japanese citizens. Upon first hearing of the possibility of KAL-007 being shot down, the Japanese were slow to react to the incident.27 But by the third of September (with the Japanese on 24-hour maritime patrol for any signs of debris from the ill-fated flight) the nature of the incident had become more clear to the Japanese government; harsh official statements began to be issued in protest. Chief Cabinet Minister Masaharu Gotoda said it was "unpardonable to shoot down civilian

26Ibid, p. 151

aircraft". On the 4th of September grieving Korean and Japanese relatives tossed chrysanthemums into the waters north of Hokkaido, bringing home the brutality of the shooting.

The overall effect of these incidents has been one of switching the brunt of the security debate from whether or not to maintain Japan-U.S. security arrangements and the constitutionality of the SDF to more practical, realistic questions, i.e., the speed of modernization, the desired mode of cooperation with the United states, etc., taking the previously mentioned questions of debate for granted. For example, the Second Mid-Term Program Estimate for the 1983-1987 period was approved in April 1981 by the cabinet-level National Defense Council chaired by Prime Minister Suzuki. This estimate established specific and realistic goals for the SDF to meet in terms of military growth, and will directly determine Japan's ability to maintain its commitment to sea-lane defense.

Two developments have evolved independently of one another during the 1970s: as the Soviet Union has increased in power relative to the United States, Japan has grown immensely in economic power. This has brought a great deal of pressure by the West in general and the U.S. in particular for Japan to increase its defense expenditures. This is not unreasonable, given the recent chain of world events (the Soviet military buildup in the Far East, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Vietnamese invasion of

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25 Ibid
It should be noted that as time goes by, a higher percentage of Japanese will have been born since 1945, resulting in a Japanese Diet being primarily comprised of individuals of the postwar generation. With more Japanese politicians born since WWII, defense discussions are not the taboo subjects they once were; the indirect result may be a more visible and accepted SDF.

In 1976 Japan's fourth 5-year "Buildup Plan" was completed and a new program evolved. It was called the National Defense Program Outline and was adopted with a view of enhancing Japan's air defense and anti-submarine capabilities. It is a new approach to defense planning; it includes a "Mid-Term Program Estimate" covering a 5-year period which is reviewed annually. In 1978 joint Japan-U.S. studies were initiated to seek ways of improving military cooperation.

The late 1970s saw increased Japanese economic assistance to troubled economies such as Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan and Thailand; aimed at enhancing Japanese prestige and increasing stability in the target nations. This was fully in accord with the well known Japanese policy of economic diplomacy (seikei bunri or separating economics from politics). This policy of seikei bunri evolved in the 1960s as an effort by Japan to pursue trade with nations regardless of their political bent. This could enable Japan to simultaneously trade with the nations of Eastern Europe and pay political "lip-service" to official U.S. policy toward those nations. In this way, Japan began to expand its relations with the world independently from the United States.  

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However, as the 1970s continued, the concept of economic diplomacy became an increasingly inappropriate foreign policy for Japan to follow. The realities of a less powerful United States economically vis-a-vis Western Europe and Japan, and militarily vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, led Prime Minister Ohira in April 1979 to order a task force on Comprehensive National Security. This task force was headed by Dr. Masamichi Inoki, former head of the Japan Defense Academy. Dr. Inoki completed the study and made recommendations to Prime Minister Ito in July 1980, following the death of Prime Minister Ohira. Unlike economic diplomacy, comprehensive security combines defense and diplomacy (diplomacy which has an economic aspect to it) in such a manner as to effect maximum political stability in those nations which Japan has targeted for aid. Both economic diplomacy and comprehensive security can trace their roots to the "Yoshida Doctrine", attributed to Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida in the early post-war years. This strategy relied upon the United States to provide for Japan's national security, freeing Japan to pursue a rapid economic recovery and expansion over the years. Active trading with any and all nations (seikei bunri), the U.S. permitting, became the device for Japan to pursue its own unique foreign policy independent from that of the United States.

The notion of comprehensive security, strongly advocated by the late Prime Minister Ohira, is still very much in effect as a Japanese principle of foreign policy. It reflects an increased awareness by many Japanese of the new

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"Ibid"


realities Japan must face in a world which can no longer rely on the balance of power to be maintained by the United States single-handedly. As Nobuhiko Ushiba explains it:

In helping developing countries strengthen their resilience to such corrosive forces as foreign assistance, access to markets, foreign investments, technical cooperation, assistance in strengthening administrative institutions, and a variety of other forms of non-military cooperation may be much more effective than military aid or commitments. The Japanese concept of "comprehensive security" is designed to draw attention to the importance of the non-military as well as the military aspects of free world security.

In an effort to appear cooperative with the West in general and the United States in particular, Japan joined in international sanctions against the Soviet Union in response to the Afghan invasion; Japan also joined in the U.S.-led boycott of the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympic games. It must be noted that these actions were largely symbolic in nature and did not entail great risk nor sacrifice. When the U.S. asked for Japanese cooperation in its sanctions against Iran, Tokyo moved much slower. In 1980 the Japanese Diet established Special Committees on National Security, reflective of a gradual change of perception amongst Japanese politicians. This period also saw the gradual acceptance by opposition parties of all or part of the present Japan-U.S. security arrangements. This should not necessarily be construed to mean a major shift in the party platforms so much as individual strategies by the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), Japan Socialist Party (JSP) to achieve various objectives, such as preventing the changing of the "Peace Constitution", but the fact that some shift has occurred is worthy of

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3 Satoh, p. 37.
mention. The DSP came out in support of the SDF in the late 1970s, with the Komeito Party expressing support in 1981. Even the JSP, long-time advocates of an 'unarmed neutralist' policy, softened their rhetoric. Only the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) remains rigidly opposed to the current security arrangements (however, even they do not oppose the SDF).”

With Prime Minister Suzuki agreeing to some forms of Japanese sea-lane defense out to 1,000 nautical miles followed by the election of the even more pro-U.S. Nakasone; things appear brighter than ever before in terms of the prospects for burden-sharing. “Certain events in Japanese domestic politics in the last few years have also served to contribute toward or indicate an increased acceptance of global realities by the Japanese public.

First, on January 18, 1980 retired SDF Major General Yukihisa Miyanaga was arrested on espionage charges for passing military secrets to a Soviet agent. The small penalty for such a crime in Japan (maximum one year in jail and $150.00 fine) means that Japan cannot help but be perceived as being unreliable by its western "allies" regarding the exchange of state secrets, due to the inadequacy of Japan's espionage laws. The Diet debated the issue but dropped it as it has in the past. "It should be mentioned here that in spite of these shortcomings, the United States does maintain several significant security arrangements with Japan."

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"Weinstein, p. 24.
"Buck, p. 89.
Another incident goes back to October 1979, when the secret enshrinement of fourteen Japanese war criminals (including Prime Minister Tojo) took place at the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo. Although State Shinto was abolished following the end of WWII, Prime Minister Ohira visited the shrine amidst protests from pacifists, Christians, etc., when the news was released six months later.4

A less abstract incident occurred in June 1978, when SDF Chairman of the Joint Staff Council, General Hiroomi Kurisu, was fired for publicly expressing his dismay over what he viewed as an ill-prepared SDF in light of Soviet exercises north of Hokkaido. General Kurisu believed that in the event of a Soviet invasion, the SDF might be forced to act outside of the legal constitutional framework in order to repel an attack. His frankness got him fired, but it also increased the debate over whether or not the Japanese Prime Minister is capable of acting decisively on behalf of his country in times of national emergency. Kurisu put the spotlight on then existing laws that dealt with the SDF and in so doing made defense issues more acceptable as matters deserving of public attention. Kurisu's efforts paid off; one and a half years later the Japanese Diet ruled that the Prime Minister can act temporarily outside of legal constrictions in the event of a national emergency.4

Another important issue still under discussion in 1985 became controversial in June 1980, when Justice Minister Seisuke Okuno addressed the Lower House Judicial Affairs Committee on the subject of constitutional revision. Okuno suggested that there is no broad political consensus regarding the constitution, particularly regarding Article 9. For his remarks he was labeled a conservative

4'Ibid, p. 90.
4'Ibid, p. 90.
reactionary; yet it most certainly caused many Japanese to reassess their opinions on constitutional reform."

By 1982, the Japanese had engaged in several RIMPAC joint exercises with U.S. and allied forces, signalling a break from prior policy. The increased profile of the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) goes back to 1980, when the Japanese government decided that self-defense included defense of Japanese shipping as well as Japanese territory. This modified the prior principle that the MSDF could only conduct defensive operations when Japan was being directly threatened.

Finally, no discussion of contemporary defense-related issues would be complete without mentioning the ever-present Northern Territories problem (this will be examined further in the USSR section). Continued Soviet control over these islands is a knife in the back of Japanese pride and an obstacle to improved Japanese-Soviet relations. With Soviet aggrandizement gaining increased notoriety recently (Poland, Afghanistan, etc.) the Soviet buildup in the Kuriles can prove to be a useful issue which Americans should raise in arguing for increased pragmatism amongst the Japanese people and government, with the goal of more equitable defense burden-sharing.

Having discussed some aspects of the development of Japanese defense policy, and in light of the Northern Territories problem, let us now turn our attention to the primary threat: the Soviet Union.

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"Ibid, p. 91.


III. THE SOVIET THREAT TO JAPAN

A. SOVIET MILITARY POWER IN THE PACIFIC

Benjamin F. Schemmer, in an article written for Armed Forces International summed up the military situation in the Pacific as it has developed over the past few years when he said:

The Pacific theatre has been something of a forgotten stepchild since America withdrew from Vietnam and Pentagon planners turned their attention back on Europe. As in World War II, Europe again enjoyed first priority. Former Defense Secretary Harold Brown appointed a Special Advisor for NATO Affairs, with no counterpart for the Pacific, while President Carter came close to withdrawing most American ground forces from Korea. The western Pacific receded further from American consciousness as the Iranian crisis of 1979 unfurled, as Russia invaded Afghanistan, and as the Pentagon's focus shifted to the Persian Gulf. Not only did America's global strategy hinge on a swing strategy that would withdraw down resources from the Pacific, if necessary, to defend Europe first, but most of the Navy and Marine Corps assets put into the Rapid Deployment Force for Southwest Asia were taken from US forces in the Pacific.

If Schemmer's point is valid, this would seem to be strong reason for Japan to awaken to the dangers which a shift in the global power balance would mean for the future of Japanese security. Accordingly, for a breakdown of current Soviet force levels (approximate) compared to Japan's," refer to Figure 1.

Since the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union has increased its naval strength in the Pacific by 80% with a constant (at


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ground</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>USSR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mech. Infantry Divisions</td>
<td>12 (8,000 men per)</td>
<td>20 (12,000 men per)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery Divisions</td>
<td>1 brigade</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank Divisions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airborne Division</td>
<td>1 brigade</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Air and Anti-Air          |                           |                          |
| Fighters and Interceptors | 240 (38 on order)         | 185                      |
| Tactical Attack           | 60 (7 on order)           | 227                      |
| Bombers                    | none                      | 136                      |
| Helicopters                | 6                         | 313                      |
| Reconnaissance and         | 25 (7 on order)           | 96                       |
| Surveillance               |                           |                          |
| SAM and AAA                | 14 SAM groups with total  | 5,468 short, medium and  |
|                            | of 272 Nike-J and Hawk    | long-range SAMs: SA-2    |
|                            | SAMs                      | through SA-9;            |
|                            |                           | 604 AAA guns: ZSU-23-4   |
|                            |                           | and 55mm.                |

| Naval                       |                           |                          |
| Submarines                  | 14 diesel-electric attack (SS) | 25 SSBN, 6 SSB, 41 SSN. |
|                            | (3 on order)              | 33 SS                    |
| Cruisers                    | none                      | 10 (including 1 large ASW |
| Destroyers                  | 33 (8 on order)           | aircraft cruiser, Minsk) |
| Frigates                    | 16 (2 on order)           | 28                       |
| Corvettes                   | 19 (4 on order)           | 36                       |
| Mine Warfare Ships          | 34                        | 125                      |
| Amphibious Ships            | 6                         | 70                       |
| Logistic Ships              | 2                         | 20 (often used as logistic |
| Naval Aircraft              | 110 combat aircraft;      | ships)                   |
|                            | 61 armed helicopters;     | 77                       |
|                            | (68 reconnaissance aircraft,|                          |
|                            | 54 ASW helicopters)       |                          |

Figure 1  Orders of Battle: Japan-USSR's Far East Forces.
best) U.S. naval presence. The Soviets have increased their number of surface combatants from fifty to about ninety. The Soviet Pacific fleet has grown from the smallest to the largest of their four fleets, with approximately 800 naval and naval support ships total, representing about 40% of the entire Soviet fleet; including 27% of Soviet Naval Aircraft, 31% of all combatants and 30% of naval manpower. Surely this indicates the high priority which the Soviets have attached to the Asia-Pacific region.

According to Adm. Sylvester R. Foley, Jr., U.S.N., the quality, like quantity, of the Soviet Pacific fleet has undergone much change as well: "Russia's Pacific Fleet used to have the leftovers, the cast-offs from the other fleets, whereas today the fleet has the most modern of ships and the latest equipment." He goes on to say "...their exercises integrate the Soviet air arm with naval activities to a much greater degree than they've ever done in the past with much more sophisticated exercises." To compare current levels of U.S. and Soviet naval forces in the Pacific, refer to Figure 2.

In air forces, the Soviets have added 600 fighters and 350 bombers for a total of 1,700 aircraft, a formidable force. Soviet naval aircraft number approximately 400, a 50% increase since 1969. Schemmer calculates that if all the aircraft in Japan plus all naval and marine aircraft in the vicinity were combined, the Soviets would still outnumber U.S.-Japan forces by a ratio of 2:1. Of concern to the Japanese is the increased level of Soviet air

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**Ibid, p. 35.**

**Westwood, p. 31.**

**Ibid, p. 32.**

**Schemmer, p. 34.**

**Ibid, p. 35.**

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Sources: CINCPACFLT for US; Defense Intelligence Agency for USSR.

*Deployment location of three US SSBNs is classified.

Figure 2  Relative Strength of US-USSR Naval Forces: Pacific.
activity near Japan. Flights of long-range aircraft such as Badgers and Backfire bombers near Japan resulted in 929 scrambles by SDF aircraft in 1982 and in 1983 700 scrambles. The Soviet military activity near Japan is very large and real indeed.

Schemmer provides a chart of trends of Soviet Far Eastern forces (Figure 3) which indicates a grave development if these trends are not matched by western military forces.

For Japan, the gravest threat which such a buildup implies is the potential to cut-off Japan's vital oil imports from the Persian Gulf. Having suffered economically from both the 1973 and 1978-79 oil crises, Japan has seen that the U.S. cannot be relied upon to help Japan during times of oil shortages. The lesson should be greater self-reliance in the defense of Japan. This lesson, for many Japanese, helps to explain the current (though modest) increases in the level of Japanese expenditures for defense. An examination of what this Soviet military buildup means to the Japanese will be provided later in this study.

B. SOVIET VIEWS OF JAPANESE REARMAMENT

In a presentation at the Sixth Soviet-America Conference on Contemporary Asia held 27 May-1 June 1984 at Alma Ata, Kazakstan S.S.R., Soviet Japanologist K.O. Sarkisov, whose views are reflective of official Soviet policy, made a persuasive argument that Japan is currently pursuing a two-track policy. First, to develop Japan's political

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"Westwood, p. 36.
"Schemmer, p. 37.
Figure 3  Trends of Soviet Far Eastern Forces.
influence throughout Asia and the world. Secondly, to
develop the military-political alliance with the United
States. The reason these two tracks can be pursued apart
from one another is that so far they have not come into
conflict with one another.

According to Sarkisov, economic growth is the most
important factor in Japan's decision-making process. If in
order to ensure continued economic prosperity Japan must
follow the U.S. lead in the military and political arenas,
then that is the price Japan must pay. He contends the U.S.
has obtained four commitments from Japan, all of which were
forced concessions in exchange for economic prosperity.
These four are: 1) greater involvement in U.S.-Asia
strategy, 2) continued unfriendly behavior by Japan toward
the Soviet Union diplomatically (despite the ever-present
Soviet "good-neighborliness"), 3) Japanese assurances of an
increased Japanese military role, and 4) Japanese commitment
to increase economic aid to Asian "frontier states".
Sarkisov adds that the four conditions are forced upon Japan
by the United States; implying that if no pressure were
applied upon Japan no actions would be taken in this direc-
tion. Although this Soviet assertion may have had validity
during the early post-war period for Japan, it becomes less
valid in the 1980s (a point which will be emphasized
throughout this study).

The Soviets view the U.S. under Reagan as trading
economic concessions (i.e. auto exports to the U.S.) for
increased Japanese political-military involvement. There
are other supposed negative byproducts emanating from
Japan's "sell-out" to the U.S. For example, the Soviets
claim that the August 1984 visit of Japanese Foreign
Minister Abe to the Middle East; ostensibly to offer

"Ibid, p. 8."
assistance as mediator in the Iran-Iraq War; was a failure due to a low level of respect given to Japan in diplomatic circles arising from Japanese concessions to the U.S./Reagan.

The tone of the Soviet paper was alarmist. Sarkisov cites the four billion dollar loan package to the Republic of Korea as proof of a rapidly developing Japan-ROK alliance. In actuality, the ROK and Japan have many hurdles to jump over before that claim becomes a reality, if ever. Similarly, the Soviets claim that Japan's current ties with China coupled with an increase in Japanese defense expenditures poses a grave threat to smaller Asian nations. To the contrary, Southeast Asian nations tend to fear Soviet aggression far more than Sino-Japanese aggression."

Sarkisov concluded by leaving the reader with the thought that there is no guarantee that Japan's growth will not grow uncontrolled as militarism in Japan once again becomes acceptable. In a related article I. Latyshev raises the history textbook controversy as proof that reactionary forces within Japan are slowly preparing the population for a rebirth of the militarism of the nineteen thirties and early fourties."

Hiroshi Kimura, in an article written in March 1982 for the Journal of Northeast Asian Studies claims that what worries the Soviets most is the possibility of active Japanese participation with the PRC and the United States in an anti-Soviet collective front. Kimura details various strategies employed by the Soviets to dissuade Japan from considering entering into such an arrangement.


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The first strategy is called the "divide and conquer" strategy. That is, try to pit one force or group against another, i.e. the Japanese government against the Chinese or American governments, Japanese businessmen against the Japanese government, or (in a clever ploy) pit region against region (Hokkaido fishermen against the rest of Japan, i.e. north vs. south!).

This incident found the Soviets giving very limited fishing privileges to Japanese fishermen in Hokkaido in the vicinity of the Soviet-occupied Northern Territories. By accepting these privileges the Soviets had hoped to defuse this volatile issue which tends to unite the Japanese people against the Soviet Union.

This incident occurred in March 1981 when then Soviet Ambassador to Japan, Dmitri Polyansky, issued "membership cards" at the town of Rausu (facing Kunashiri Island) to a few Japanese fishermen represented by Akagi Munenori, Chairman of the Japanese-Soviet Friendship Association (also an LDP Diet member). Munenori gave unnecessary recognition to the Soviet claim to the Northern Territories by accepting the cards. This was a successful ploy.

A second strategy involves a false display to others for deceptive purposes. Soviet Ambassador Polyansky was well known for using this technique. He would issue false statements to Tokyo indicating a possible breakthrough in the ongoing diplomatic impasse, and then secure meetings with high-level Japanese officials. Upon meeting with Polyansky the officials would find Polyansky had nothing to offer at all; rather he obtained cheap propaganda for the Soviets at the expense of the Japanese.

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62 Ibid, p. 16.
Kimura describes a third strategy which is the use of historical "facts" and arguments to "legally" prove their case as having legitimacy under international law, all others ostensibly operating outside of the law. This was used in 1981 when Prime Minister Suzuki headed a renewed call for the return of the Northern Territories to Japan. These attempts at historical "mind games" are largely unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the Soviets repeatedly use this strategy.

A fourth Soviet strategy is to get the Japanese to admit a fait accompli. In the case of the Northern Territories dispute, this is done by using Russian names for the islands instead of Japanese. If the Soviets get the Japanese to call the islands by their Russian names, then a fait accompli, of a sort, will have been won.

Lastly, the Soviets use the "carrot-and-stick" strategy, whereby a very minor concession is made, such as limited fishing rights on tangle (a fish which the Soviets do not catch), in certain designated areas of Soviet controlled waters. In spite of many qualifications on time, size of catch, etc. this tends to excite overly eager Japanese government officials who are looking for any signs of Soviet flexibility. Take such a development and couple it with the massive Soviet military buildup in the Pacific and a very coercive strategy results.

Interestingly, these strategies have been largely unsuccessful with the Japanese, because they've made certain crucial errors of judgement. First, many Japanese think the Soviets have no real foreign policy aimed solely at Japan; rather the Soviet's Japan policy is a spin-off of their U.S.
Additionally, the Soviets have a tendency to talk down to the Japanese, who logically consider their system far superior to the Soviet system. This Soviet tendency infuriates many Japanese. After all, the Japanese are not asking the Soviets for their technology!

Soviet writings afford ample support for Kimura's analysis. In the paper by I. Latyshev, also written for the Alma Ata Conference, we find examples of Kimura's points. It begins, interestingly enough, with a Soviet historical interpretation of the events in Japan following the end of the Second World War. The Soviet claims that the U.S., against Soviet wishes, influenced Japan to reverse course from its newly found pacifist nature and be revived militarily. He cites the formation of the SDF as the most important link in the overall U.S. anti-Soviet strategy. This Soviet assertion is grossly overstated, but essentially correct.67

Latyshev cited several reasons for Soviet concern over a "remilitarized" Japan. First, it poses a potential threat to the U.S.S.R.'s Far Eastern borders. Second, the Soviets fear the use of Japan as a U.S. "springboard" into the Soviet Union. Third, the Soviets believe that Japan remains essentially a U.S. puppet, dependent economically, culturally, politically and militarily.68 Such assertions were fairly accurate at one time. The flaw in this Soviet view of Japan is that it has not changed with the times. The Soviets (like many Americans) tend to view the Japan of the 1980s like the early post-war Japan of twenty to thirty years ago. Japan has transformed itself into a major power

67Latyshev, p. 3.
68Ibid
in its own right, yet it is not given major power status by the Soviets.

Latyshev admits that Japan grew increasingly independent from the United States as it grew economically; however he claims that whenever the Soviet Union and Japan were on the verge of improving Japanese-Soviet relations (thanks to Soviet "good neighborliness"), the United States would step in to block these "peaceful" initiatives. This was argued through historical examples from independence in 1952 to the present. Under President Reagan, the Soviets claim Japan has been coerced into using anti-Soviet rhetoric for Japanese consumption, thereby creating hostility among Japanese. The somewhat famous mis-quote by Prime Minister Nakasone in January 1983 where Japan was supposedly offered to the U.S. as an "un-sinkable aircraft carrier" is a case in point. Obviously, any statement Nakasone made of an anti-Soviet nature, however misquoted, did not need prompting by the United States. Nakasone's long-standing anti-Communist record speaks for itself; from the American perspective Nakasone is the most conservative prime minister Japan has seen in a long, long time.

Latyshev then switched the tone of his article and issued what I would term standard Soviet propogandistic "scare tactics". To be specific, Latyshev pointed out that since Japan has succumbed to U.S. pressures and designated the U.S.S.R. as its "sole enemy", the Soviets have no choice but to respond with "eternal vigilance". In other words, if the Japanese want the Soviets to ease up militarily in the Pacific, all that is required of the Japanese is to expell the Americans. Next, Latyshev issued the Soviet promise not to ever use nuclear weapons against Japan if Japan would

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70Ibid, p. 15.
eliminate the "it can neither be confirmed nor denied" U.S. nuclear umbrella. In other words, if Japan gives the "boot" to the U.S., it will be free from a nuclear nightmare. Also implied is that poor Japanese-Soviet relations are attributable to the United States alone, and in no way involves the Soviet Union or Japan.\footnote{Ibid, p. 17.}

In summation, the Soviets believe Japan today is undergoing a process of remilitarization, not a legitimate defense buildup. The history textbook controversy is frequently cited as proof of this. The election and subsequent reelection of Yasuhiro Nakasone as prime minister; the four billion dollar loan to the ROK; the recent participation in RIMPAC exercises; the pledge to defend the sealanes of communications out to 1,000 nautical miles, etc. are all indications to the Soviets of a new dangerous force in east Asia. The extreme Soviet reaction to the "unsinkable aircraft carrier" remark indicates the concern the Soviets have over recent Japanese developments. One Soviet commentator stated that "there are no un-sinkable aircraft carriers".\footnote{Menon, p. 340.} and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko warned that the Japanese might be subject to an attack even worse than that on Hiroshima.\footnote{Kimura, p. 20.}

Having examined the nature of the Soviet military threat and efforts by the Soviet Union to influence Japan's decision-making process, we will now examine how other key world players view Japanese rearmament and what direction they would prefer to see this process take. This is essential if we desire a full understanding of the limits by which the United States might reasonably take Japan toward a more equitable defense burden-sharing arrangement.

\footnote{Ibid, p. 17.}
\footnote{Menon, p. 340.}
\footnote{Kimura, p. 20.}
IV. INTERNATIONAL VIEWS OF JAPANESE REARMAMENT

Although U.S. efforts to obtain a more equitable defense arrangement with Japan is essentially a bilateral issue, it has multilateral implications throughout the world. Although increased Japanese defense expenditures would have a world-wide impact, our primary interest should be an examination of those areas which would be of particular interest. Those areas are the PRC, the Korean Peninsula (both the ROK and the DPRK), ASEAN and Western Europe. Also worthy of mention are the role which Australia and New Zealand play in the region. One could argue that other regions should or must be included in this discussion, i.e. the Middle East, Taiwan, India, etc; however these do not impact as directly upon the decision-making processes of either Tokyo or Washington as do the former areas.

A. WESTERN EUROPE

Western Europe and Japan share much in common. Both the European nations and Japan are highly industrialized modern states, dependent upon the U.S. for its military strength to oppose the Soviet bloc. However, some would argue that the "iron curtain" described by Winston Churchill is much more evident in Western Europe, with a divided Germany for all to see, than it is in Japan. The massive Warsaw Pact military buildup in conventional and nuclear force size is very real and obvious. This produces a stronger sense of realpolitik

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in Europe than it does in Japan. If Japan had been divided at war's end: half communist and half free, the Japanese scholars in "free" Japan would no doubt have a greater sense of realpolitik as well.

Japan's self-imposed restrictions on offensive military actions and collective defense rights hinders progress with Western Europe. Western Europe operates in a broad network of multilateral alliances and arrangements, yet Japan will not even commit forces to a U.N. peace-keeping operation.

Some nations, particularly France and the United Kingdom, have expressed doubts as to whether any real cooperative relationship can be worked out between Europe and Japan, especially given the high level of Japan-U.S. interdependence. A recent survey conducted by the Japanese Foreign Ministry in Western Europe indicates that sixty two percent of Britons, sixty percent of French and forty nine percent of West Germans believe Japan is not bearing international responsibilities commensurate with its economic power. They pointed to Japan's low defense expenditures (0.9% GNP) and foreign aid (0.3% GNP) as reasons why they believe this to be so.

One negative aspect from the European perspective is the likelihood of Japan competing with Europe for U.S. military aid in the event of a global war. If Japan finds itself competing with Europe for U.S. resources, it would probably lose out in the event the United States were forced to choose between one or the other, not withstanding the high level of economic interdependence between the U.S. and Japan. It would behoove Japan to adjust its defense

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75Ibid, p. 108.
76Ibid.
77Ibid, p. 111.
policies now, not when WWIII breaks out." If this scenario can be impressed upon the Japanese, it may contribute to a more realistic European-Japanese defense dialogue.

Skepticism amongst Europeans over Japan's reliability in a world emergency is high. Many firmly believe that if war erupted in Europe (but not in Japan) and the U.S. rushed to Europe's rescue, and in the process asked Japan to mine and block its strategic straits to prepare for potential hostilities in the Pacific, that Japan would refuse. Japan must understand that if this ever came about it would risk total alienation from both Europe and the United States; in addition the United States would likely use such inaction as grounds for immediate termination of the Mutual Security Treaty.

Another important point is that the current economic imbalance between Europe and Japan tends to exacerbate the defense debate. The European Economic Community in 1985 is mired in an economic recession, and finding itself seriously hurt by Japanese inroads into the European market. Some, such as France, have resorted to "stall" tactics to protect affected industries, i.e. VCRs, TVs, etc. Up until now, the Europeans have been relying upon Japanese Voluntary Self-Restraints (VSRs) as a shield against a swamping of their market.

This is not to suggest that the Japanese have caused the economic depression in Western Europe. Even if comparable products were evenly priced, it is doubtful that the economies would suddenly experience a drastic improvement. Like the United States, Western Europe is paying increased attention to trade deficits with Japan, and neither can ignore Japan's defense policies while experiencing these deficits.

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Their electorates will not tolerate this, nor will special interest groups hurt by an economically strong Japan.

An article by Shin'ichi Ichimura for Asian Survey raises another aspect of European-Japanese differences. That is, Japan ranks fourteenth in the world in terms of percentage of GNP devoted to Official Development Assistance (ODA).\footnote{Shin'ichi Ichimura, "Japan and Southeast Asia". Asian Survey 20(July 1980): p. 759.} If you look at the nature of Japan's ODA assistance, we find that the percentage ODA of a technical nature is only 10.4 percent, ranking behind the United Kingdom (24.2%), West Germany (37.6%), the Netherlands(22%), among others. In terms of absolute numbers, Japan ranks seventh in technical aid behind France, West Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Belgium.\footnote{Ibid, p. 760.} It is little wonder that a 1980 EC report said the "...Japanese are workaholics living in rabbit hutches".\footnote{Ibid.} Obviously, the Europeans are disturbed over the Japanese tendency to put economic success above all else (a wide spread perception).

In spite of European pessimism toward Japan, there is some evidence that Japan may be slowly awakening to the possibility of the need to broaden its defense relations with Western Europe. First, informal military contacts have been established between the Japanese Director Generals of the SDF and NATO chiefs since 1978 through annual visits.\footnote{Nishihara, p. 114.} During the 1979 visit of Director General Ganri Yamashita to Brussels, he expressed the belief that Japan and Western
Europe must pool its ideas on defense questions. The Europeans responded by expressing a desire to hear Yamashita's views on Soviet developments in the Far East for possible "lessons learned"-type applications in Western Europe.  

Yamashita claimed that Japanese perceptions of Soviet military strategy "overlap" with NATO thinking on several key points. Both NATO and SDF members expressed concern over the expanding Soviet naval threat. The U.S. government privately expressed delight in the visit as another step in the evolution of Japanese defense attitudes from an inward-looking policy to an outward-looking, global interdependent framework for analysis; as part of the "western alliance". The U.S. position is that Japanese contacts with NATO speeds up this process.  

Further evidence of a broadening of defense attitudes toward the west includes the 1979 declaration of Japan's responsibilities to the west as a part of the west. This declaration marked a departure from a regional to a global foreign policy. In 1980 the Japanese Navy participated with the British in a naval exercise for the first time. In March 1982 the Director General of the SDF visited the British Defense Committee of the House of Commons, also a "first". In May 1982, 150 Diet members established a Council on Japan-U.S.-European Comprehensive Security, for the purpose of discussing western security issues as well as to arrange exchange visits with North Atlantic Assembly delegates.  

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"Ibid.
"Ibid, p. 115.
"Ibid, p. 110.
The more conservative Nakasone government supported western objections to Soviet pressures directed toward Poland. Nakasone endorsed the NATO alliance's call for a reduction of Soviet intermediate-range missiles and endorsed the U.S. deployment of Pershing-II missiles if arms talks were to break down. Kiichi Miyazawa (of the Suzuki faction) called for a broad alliance of Europe, Japan and the United States to maintain international peace, promote the world economy and defend freedom and democracy. However, the specific nature of Miyazawa's "alliance" was non-military in nature."

We can see certain parallels between Western Europe and the United States. There are similarities in terms of the trade imbalance with Japan, as well as a disparity in defense spending as a percentage GNP. On ideological grounds Japan differs with the U.S. and Europe on constitutional limitations on defense matters. The North Atlantic community (including the U.S. and Canada) tends to share concern over the inadequacy of Japan's current defense arrangements; in this light the U.S. would be wise to encourage Western Europe to continue to exert pressure upon Japan to "liberalize" its attitudes on defense issues. This could be effected by increased Japan-Europe defense contacts (including participation in joint exercises) coupled with diplomatic pressure. Given Japan's participation in the previously mentioned RIMPAC exercises, the prospects for effecting such change appear good, although not necessarily as rapid as either some in the United States or Western Europe might desire. In this way Japan will move toward a defense role commensurate with its economic prowess and stature.

"Langdon, p. 379.
B. CHINA

Called a "superpower" by some and a "major power" by others, the People's Republic of China with its one billion people remains a cultural, historical, military and political force in East Asia which has turned toward the United States and Japan in recent years as it seeks to modernize. Since the Sino-Soviet split and the Cultural Revolution, China has openly expressed its anti-Soviet foreign policy. To a certain degree, China has befriended the west in the process. As with the case of Western Europe, the implications of Japanese rearmament is of great concern, but in different ways from the U.S. and with varied reactions.

There can be little doubt that since the Vietnam War, China regards the Soviet Union, not the United States, as the primary threat to peace in Asia. China has increasingly turned to the United States, Japan and the West in general for economic and technical assistance as it strives to modernize under Deng Xiaoping's "Four Modernizations" program. Consider the following remark in the Peking Review indicative of official Chinese government foreign policy:

"The massive Soviet military build-up in the Far East, aimed as it is at China, is directed also against the United States and Japan. ... The Soviet Union thus constitutes a growing threat to Japan and is intensifying its infiltration of the country."

Following the Nixon Shocks in 1971, the Japanese quickly normalized relations with the PRC in 1972. The PRC soon called for a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Japan, which would officially terminate hostilities between the two nations. However, the treaty did not get signed and ratified until 1978, six years later. Although to outside observers the treaty seemed little more than nice "window

dressing" upon improved Sino-Japanese relations, it was more than mere symbolism to the PRC and Japan."

There are several reasons for this. First, the Chinese would not consider any long term economic arrangements with the Japanese until the treaty was ratified. The Chinese agreed to an expected 20 billion dollar trade with Japan between 1978 and 1985; this was expanded to 90 billion dollars for 1978 to 1990. The Japanese, like much of the world, were eager to take advantage of the new promising China market. However, the Chinese insisted upon inserting an anti-hegemony clause in the treaty; this made Japanese politicians uneasy. Ultimately a general anti-hegemony clause was inserted, which was in line with China's "Three World's Theory", alluded to in the quote from the Peking Review earlier. Because no specific nation was mentioned in the clause, China and Japan were able to assert their own interpretations without disrupting the treaty, which was acceptable to both nations.

This treaty left the USSR as Japan's only former adversary not to have signed a peace treaty with Japan. Coupled with China's strong support for Japan on the Northern Territories issue, Japan became further polarized away from the USSR and towards the PRC and USA. As in the European example, this treaty represents another step in the evolution of Japan's security policy in Asia and the world. However, China's interests are not in perfect harmony with Western Europe's.

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China would like to see a strong Japan to the extent that Japan has an adequate defense capability, but not a strongly remilitarized state, which is quite different. Although no one wishes to see the rise of a militant Japan in Asia, it would be fair to say that China (and the ROK and ASEAN as well) has more at stake and more to lose if Japan rears with hostile intentions. Many in China still vividly recall Japanese atrocities in Manchuria and elsewhere. This was evident in the condemnation which the PRC displayed toward Japan during the recent history textbook revision controversy.93

China is more ambivalent over Japanese rearmament than the United States or NATO. China prefers Japan closely tied to the U.S. over a neutral Japan, because a neutral Japan would have the potential to become a militant Japan. However, Japanese skills and technology as well as Japan's proximity to China should ensure a dominant Japanese position in China for the next few years. The PRC is careful not to allow Japan too much control in its modernization process, reserving certain domains for the United States, Western Europe, etc.94

The PRC has expressed dismay over the JSP's repeated calls for Japan to dissolve the current U.S.-Japanese security arrangements. The status quo is emphasized; praise was heaped upon Japan (by the PRC) when Japan formed the Japanese National Committee for Japan-United States-China Friendship. Recently, China and Japan have settled down into a somewhat more subdued relationship, having gotten over the euphoria of the newly improved status of China's relations with the west. Both nations appear to be avoiding


the excessive optimism of a few years back to be ensure that a more realistic and stable relationship evolves."

Initially Japan treaded softly with China, eager to please the Chinese in exchange for lucrative economic deals. However, China has involved Japan in some poor investments, i.e. the Baoshan Steel Complex, which was cancelled and never completed. The 1980s finds a stiffening of Japanese attitudes toward the Chinese. Japanese businessmen believe that China has used up its good deals and it is now time to engage in a more mature business relationship.

In 1982 the Twelfth CCP Congress met at Beijing and voiced criticism over excessive Chinese dependence upon the United States and Japan. This raised fears in Japan that the PRC was actively seeking rapprochement with the USSR, a very unwelcome prospect. However, Japanese political leaders generally believe that Japan can dissuade China from such a course. In November 1983 Hu Yaobang met with Prime Minister Nakasone in Tokyo; Nakasone in turn visited the PRC in March 1984. The trips tended to reassure the Japanese of continued healthy Sino-Japanese relations. Similarly, in January 1984 Zhao Ziyang visited the United States, followed by a trip to China by President Reagan later on in the year. This tended to reassure the Japanese of continued stable relations between the PRC and USA.

The Chinese recognize Japan's potential and treat it with a healthy respect; for they seek a capable Japanese SDF but fear a remilitarized Japan out of control. Unlike Europe, China could not be counted upon to exert pressure upon Japan to rearm. However, it remains in the interest of the United States to foster a healthy

""Ibid, p. 10.
Tokyo-Beijing-Washington relationship as a political and diplomatic (if not a military) front of solidarity against Soviet expansionism in East Asia.

C. ASEAN

Like the Chinese, the member nations of ASEAN have bitter memories of Japanese occupation during the Second World War. Like the Chinese, ASEAN roundly condemned the Japanese for attempting to rewrite their history books to present the Japanese militarism of the 1930s and 40s in a more subdued light. The ASEAN member's current policy of non-alignment and advocacy of ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Friendship and Neutrality) make prospects for direct military involvement with either Japan or the United States somewhat remote. However, like the Chinese (generally speaking), the ASEAN members view the Soviet Union as the primary threat to peace in the region, along with Vietnam.

However, in terms of more equitable burden-sharing by the Japanese with the United States, ASEAN remains wary. ASEAN attitudes toward Nakasone's renewed defense pledges in Asia can be characterized as "acceptance" vice "support" for his policies. ASEAN has reason to be less than enthusiastic toward Japanese military involvement in Southeast Asia. The call for defense of the sealanes out to one thousand miles triggers visions of Japanese destroyers steaming through the Straits of Malacca as in years past. Such a presence would be largely unwelcome.

Why is ASEAN so wary of Japan? First, ASEAN is becoming increasingly dependent upon Japan economically, and the nature of trade between ASEAN and Japan tends to be one-way:

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"Simon, p. 308."
raw materials from Southeast Asia shipped to Japan. There is little market for sophisticated Japanese goods in most of Southeast Asia. Some believe ASEAN is being economically recolonized by Japan, a concept anathema to this independent region, which still remembers vividly its anti-colonial struggles. Japan's calls for a Pacific Economic Community raises the spectre of another Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere (regardless of Japan's actual motivations).188

Although ASEAN is highly dependent upon Japan, Japan strivest (rather successfully) to avoid excessive economic interdependence with any nation or region, save the United States or the Middle East. Accordingly, ASEAN would have much more to lose than Japan if trade between the two regions ceased (with its huge oil resources, Indonesia might be an exception). It is important for Japan to assure ASEAN of its importance to Japan to avoid exasperating this delicate situation. Prime Minister Nakasone's 1983 ASEAN trip helped to ease the minds of ASEAN's leaders in this regard, with repeated promises of increased Japanese economic aid as well as reassurances of the peaceful nature of Japan's current modest defense buildup.189

The 1983 Nakasone visit was very important in improving ASEAN-Japan relations, especially in light of certain events. The 1981 Japanese Annual Diplomatic Bluebook (Waga Gaiko no Kinkyo) published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited the Middle East as the area of greatest concern to Japan. It also said that alignment with the United States and the EEC was the "axis" (kijiku) of Japanese diplomacy. However, it said that ASEAN was merely


an area in which Japan has to play a primary role in the maintenance of peace and continued development due to its proximity to Japan and its close historical ties with Japan. The Blue Book emphasized the importance of China and Korea, downplaying Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{182}

In addition, Japan's "equidistant" policy toward ASEAN and Vietnam is viewed by some as a tendency of Japan to place good economic relations with a hostile nation above the wishes of a friendly region embroiled in a controversy with the hostile nation, i.e. the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea. This "equidistant policy", applied to a very sensitive issue, is a source of annoyance in ASEAN diplomatic circles.\textsuperscript{183}

Another source of apprehension in ASEAN toward Japan concerns Japan’s limited supply of raw natural resources; that is, a rearmed Japan might resort to military force to obtain vital resources it is lacking. This overlooks the modern reality of Japan’s economic policies, which have stressed diversification of access to vital raw resources so that no one nation or group of nations could bring Japan's economic machine to a grinding halt. This also overlooks the fact that Japan has resorted to such an action once before which resulted in the humiliating defeat of Imperial Japan, something which most Japanese would likely view as a "lessons learned" experience which should be avoided at all costs. Third, despite the relatively low 0.9% GNP devoted to defense expenditures, it still amounts to a huge defense budget (when one considers Japan’s GNP being the third largest in the world behind the Soviet Union and the United States). If the USA, PRC and the USSR were to dramatically reduce their presence in Southeast Asia, Japan would then

\textsuperscript{182}Yee, p. 37.
\textsuperscript{183}Ibid, p. 38.
have the opportunity to fill the power vacuum. Lastly, ASEAN draws little comfort from Japan's anti-war constitution, for Southeast Asian nations have undergone numerous constitutional changes. Consequently, from their perspective, there is nothing sacred about Japan's constitution. In consideration of ASEAN's apprehensions over a rearmed Japan, Shin'ichi Ichimura offers four gaps between ASEAN and Japan which could give rise to increased anti-Japanese policies by ASEAN. They are the income gap between Southeast Asians and Japanese, the trade gap which tends to be a one-way street, the dependence gap which is also very one-sided, and the perception gap, a byproduct of the first three. With Japan ranked number seven in economic assistance behind France, West Germany, etc. it is in the interest of Japan to increase its economic aid to ASEAN in proportion to its economic size.

In terms of increasing Japan's role in the maintenance of Pacific Basin security, ASEAN remains (like the PRC) ambivalent. A remilitarized Japan, distant from the U.S. and friendlier with the USSR would be a very frightening development to ASEAN. Some in Southeast Asia believe that U.S. efforts to effect increased involvement by Japan in Pacific Basin security is a ploy to get U.S. forces removed from the area. From the ASEAN perspective any Japanese rearmament drive should be in the context of a highly integrated, interdependent relationship with the United States, involving no lessening of U.S. presence in the region. This would serve to obstruct a revival of Japanese militarism."

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164Ichimura, p. 761.
165Ibid, p. 763.
166William T. Tow, "Japan's Rearmament: The ASEAN Factor", p. 16.
The lesson for the United States is to strive to allay any fears ASEAN might have toward Japanese rearmament. The United States must convince ASEAN that both the U.S. and Japan consider ASEAN important to them; this could be accomplished through keeping ASEAN better informed of any defense matters which would involve the ASEAN members, hopefully creating a forum for ASEAN to express its opinions on such defense matters directly to the U.S. and Japan. This would be done through the formation of a regional defense advisory board, which could meet periodically at various locations, in a fashion similar to ASEAN's annual ministerial meetings.

Although neither the U.S. nor Japan would necessarily agree with ASEAN recommendations or objections, the fact that ASEAN was included in such discussions would send a signal to ASEAN that it is to be treated with respect by the two great powers and not taken for granted. The U.S. "swing strategy" as well as Japan's commitment to patrol the sealanes out to 1,000 miles would seem less threatening; and make goodwill trips like Nakasone's 1983 visit to Southeast Asia less necessary; if ASEAN believed it was being treated as an equal in the international community and allowed to have a say in defense matters which would affect ASEAN.¹⁰⁷ The United States must endeavor to bring ASEAN closer to an anti-Soviet security framework. This will involve closer attention to ASEAN affairs, and most importantly, time, to ally ASEAN fears of Japan. ASEAN can prove to be either a barrier or a positive force toward Japanese rearmament, depending upon how the U.S. treats ASEAN in the future. The United States cannot afford to ignore this region as it seeks an increased level of Japanese defense burden-sharing.

¹⁰⁷Ibid, p. 17.
D. THE KOREAN PENINSULA

1. The Republic of Korea

Relations between Korea and Japan have suffered from a heritage of prejudice and colonialism. Many South Koreans can claim two distinct biases: anti-Communist and anti-Japanese. It was for this reason that it took such a long time for these two nations to normalize and establish diplomatic relations, with much prodding by the United States. One of the ironies in the evolution of Republic of Korea-Japan relations is that in spite of continued anti-Japanese resentment in Korea, the ROK has increasingly turned to Japan as the "guiding light" to emulate in pursuit of economic power.

South Koreans resent being treated as a pawn in U.S.-Japan relations and publicly shun the notion of being a defensive buffer for Japan (however, they often try to take advantage of this, i.e. loan demands made to Japan). This creates further resentment when Koreans far outspend the Japanese in national defense as a percentage of GNP. The fact that Japan refuses to unconditionally place its military bases at the disposal of the U.S. armed forces in the event of an armed conflict in Korea is an even greater irritant. Ironically, the notion of a unified Korea is as dangerous a notion to many Japanese as a remilitarized Japan (especially with a nuclear capability) would be to many Koreans.

If one were to look merely at the surface, one might conclude that ROK-Japan relations are destined to be bogged down in prejudice and distrust. This is not so. Ties between Seoul and Tokyo are strong; culturally the Koreans

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109 Yee, pp. 38, 39.
have far more in common with the Japanese than they do with Americans. Both nations are influenced by the continuing importance of maintaining close ties with the United States. Let us examine how ROK-Japan relations have evolved since the Korean War.

The Rhee years were a tense period in the evolution of this relationship. According to W.D. Reeve, a British scholar, the foreign policy goals under Syngman Rhee were four-fold:

Put succinctly, if a trifle brutally, the foreign policy goals of the Republic under President Rhee—and in the main under the successor governments as well—may be summarized as: 1. to regularize, on its own terms, the long-embittered relations with Japan; 2. the reunification of Korea, again on its own terms; 3. implacable hostility to Communism; 4. to continue to extract the maximum possible amount of American aid while at the same time resisting any American encroachment on its sovereign rights as an independent state.  

Syngman Rhee was rabidly anti-Japanese and as long as he remained in power, no possibility of normalization between the ROK and Japan would be possible.

Three series of negotiations were held between the ROK and Japan during the Rhee years: from 1951-1953, 1957-1958 and in 1960. Some basic issues which complicated matters were property claims and counter-claims, the question of Koreans residing in Japan, fishing rights and the "Rhee Line", the Takeshimas Islands issue, but to name a few. As an example of just how bad the feelings were between Koreans and Japanese during this period, in October 1953 the head of the Japanese delegation, Kanichiro Kubota, was said to have proclaimed that the establishment of the Republic of Korea was illegal under international law as

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111 Ibid, pp. 52 - 61.
Japan's ownership of Korea was not subject to disposal by the allied powers and to have also claimed that Japan rightfully owned eighty-five percent of all land and property in Korea and would exact damages for the ruin it suffered during the Korean War. This may have been an exaggeration by the Koreans, yet Kubota was known in fact to have said "Japanese rule had contributed to the Korean railway system, harbor construction, expansion of rice paddies and food production, and changed bald mountains into green ones".\textsuperscript{112}

The Koreans were infuriated over the remark; further talks were held off until an apology was delivered. The Japanese waited until April of 1957 to offer an apology! Obviously, relations were not very good between the ROK and Japan during the Rhee years.

During this period, following the conclusion of an unofficial trade agreement between Japan and the PRC, South Korea broke off trade relations with Japan and banned travel between the ROK and Japan. Many Japanese fishing boats were seized, and by February 1959, 153 Japanese fishermen had been detained by the Rhee government. Then, with the removal of Rhee and the eventual takeover by Park Chung Hee in May 1961, the way was paved for normalization of ROK-Japan relations. President Park knew normalization would aid in rapid economic development for his country.

A basic understanding of the terms for normalization between the ROK and Japan was reached in 1962 by Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira and KCIA Director Kim Chong Pil. However, the Ikeda government was unwilling to bear the political pressures of signing a treaty with the ROK; normalization had to wait for the arrival of the more

\textsuperscript{112}\textit{Ibid,} pp. 56, 57.
conservative Prime Minister Eisaku Sato. The treaty, signed in 1965, paved the way for increased Japanese-South Korean cooperation.

Three essential interests guided Korea's policy toward Japan. The first was that Japanese economic assistance was considered vital to the ROK's development plans. The Japanese contributed from 19.3% to 30% of all support for the ROK's first three five-year plans. Secondly, Korea's policy toward Japan involved the role Japan plays in South Korea's security, especially regarding the use of U.S. bases in Okinawa and Japan proper. The "Korean Clause" of joint U.S.-Japan defense statements would be repeatedly cited by ROK officials as a basis for Japan's obligation to help maintain the ROK's security, especially by contributing to the ROK's industrial base.

The third ROK objective involved concern over Japanese trade with the North Koreans and problems generated by anti-ROK/pro-DPRK Koreans living in Japan. Many Korean organizations in Japan fit that description, which irritated the ROK government. As long as Prime Minister Sato was in power in Japan, Japanese involvement with North Korea was kept to a minimum.114

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the primary instrument of ROK-Japan diplomacy (officially) was the annual ministerial conferences held once a year alternatively in Tokyo or Seoul. Also of use to the ROK government was a broad-based Korean-Japan Cooperation Committee located in Japan, headed by Nobuske Kishi. On the private side, the Korean-Japanese Economic Cooperation Committee led by prominent Korean and Japanese businessmen provided a good forum for discussion. In the mid-1970s the Korean-Japan

114 Ibid, p. 750.
Friendship Association and the Parliamentarian's League were formed in Japan to counter pro-North Korean groups. The Parliamentarian's League was comprised of Korean and Japanese lawyers dedicated to solidifying ROK-Japan ties following the Vietnam debacle. It should be mentioned that the above organizations by no means represent all of the interactions between South Koreans and Japanese, but they are indicative of much of the official interaction which has gone back and forth.

The departure of Sato in 1972 coupled with various events in Korea and the world caused ROK-Japan relations to suffer their worst strain since the Rhee years. The "Nixon Shocks" opened the door to U.S.-PRC normalization and led to the downfall of Sato. The Tanaka government which followed Sato's failed to iterate the necessity of maintaining South Korea's security following Japan's normalization with the PRC in 1972. Then, to add insult upon injury, Japan shut down its offices in Seoul for those firms dealing with the PRC at the PRC's insistence (Zhou Enlai made the demand).

Then the U.S. pulled out the Seventh Division from Korea as the rapprochement between the U.S., Japan and the PRC grew. This convinced President Park that severe internal measures in Korea would be necessary to ensure domestic control by passing the rigid Yushin Constitution into law and imposing renewed martial law. This served to anger anti-ROK forces in Japan who considered Park's measures far too harsh. Finally, ROK dissident Kim Dae Jung was kidnapped from Japan by Korean agents in August 1973 to be brought to trial. This outraged the Japanese government and press; accordingly the Tanaka government postponed its annual ministerial conference scheduled for that same

\[116\] Ibid, p. 748.
month. After an apology (of sorts) was sent to Tanaka by ROK Prime Minister Kim Chong Pil, the conference was held several months later, in December.

The year after the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo, 1974, proved to be even more disastrous for ROK-Japan relations. In the spring of that year the "Democratic Youth and Student League Incident" occurred, whereby two Japanese youths were arrested in Korea for an alleged plot to overthrow the ROK government. Then, in August 1974, President Park's wife was killed by Moon Se Kwang, a pro-DPRK Korean living in Japan. The ROK government demanded an apology from Japan for failing to prevent the incident and a promise to restrict the activities of pro-DPRK Korean communists living in Japan (i.e. the "General Confederation of Korean Residents in Japan"). Japan refused on both counts.

Additionally, by 1974 Japanese trade had increased with the DPRK to $360 million from $58 million in 1971 (according to the International Monetary Fund - IMF). To add more "fuel to the fire", Japanese Foreign Minister Kimura told the Japanese Diet that the ROK "faced no threat from the North" - a direct challenge to Park's primary excuse for tight control, martial law, and other excessive measures. He went on to say that "Seoul was not the only lawful government in the Korean Peninsula".

Two things prevented ROK-Japan relations from deteriorating totally at this point - U.S. intervention and the fall of the Tanaka government resulting from the "Lockheed Scandal". From 1975 to 1977 the Miki government in Japan sought an end to the Kim Dae Jung problem and to improving ROK-Japan relations. Hahn Bae Ho in 1980, gave a good idea

\[116\] Ibid, p. 751.
\[117\] Ibid
\[118\] Ibid
of the evolving trend in Japan which the Japanese government can be expected to pursue, although as of 1985 it had yet to be realized:

The trend set by the Tanaka government and further pursued by the successive governments in Japan is likely to continue and affect the future of Korea-Japan relations in the coming decade. This does not mean that the Seikei Bunri formula as in the case of Japan's relations with the PRC and Taiwan. The volume of Japan-South Korea trade remains large and will probably continue to increase in the next decade, but Japan is likely to steer its diplomatic and security positions away from the relatively firm commitment to South Korea which Japan had once made in the past. Rather Japan would place more emphasis on the preservation of the status quo by leaning toward a diplomacy of equidistance based on a two-Koreas policy.11

Back in 1969 the Nixon-Sato Communiqué defined the ROK as essential for Japan's security. By 1975, with the downfall of Tanaka, Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa clarified his statement by asserting that the U.S. could not use bases in Japan for launching strikes against the DPRK, but he included a caveat that they might be used if the U.S. obtained U.N. approval, indicating there would be some flexibility. Then in August 1975 a joint statement was formally issued by President Ford and Prime Minister Miki emphasizing the importance of South Korean security, with Japan emphasizing the need to preserve the peace on the Korean Peninsula.

This seemingly vacillating position of Japan in its official attitude toward the importance of the ROK in the maintenance of Japan's internal security can be explained in part by the Japanese political system. The LDP as the dominant political force in Japan views the ROK as being

strategically and economically important to Japan (and increasingly, so do the opposition parties), and it encourages friendly U.S.-ROK-Japan relations.

In terms of economic policy, Japan has adopted a neutral stance; it is this policy which the ROK has been emulating to a large extent. This concept of economic diplomacy (examined earlier), which Japan has initiated and which the ROK emulates, is the ROK's key toward the pursuit of an independent foreign policy from the United States. In Japanese style, the ROK is making inroads in the Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia. Seoul, like Tokyo, depends upon imports of raw materials and exports of finished goods for its economic well-being. Under President Chun Doo Hwan, the ROK has softened its anti-Communist rhetoric, is expanding the number of its trading partners, and is acting less according to the wishes of the United States.

In terms of burden-sharing, President Chun requested ten billion dollars from Japan for security assistance so as to more equitably share in the defense of the region, in August 1981. Prime Minister Nakasone responded with $4 billion in "foreign economic assistance" to the ROK in 1983, a positive development in terms of increasing Japan's level of burden-sharing. In September 1984 President Chun Doo Hwan visited Japan and met with Prime Minister Nakasone and Emperor Hirohito. This trip, although largely symbolic, went very smoothly. It may have paved the path for increased ROK-Japan involvement in terms of mutual defense. Considering the relative decline of the U.S. military vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in East Asia, the developments in the past couple of years have been quite positive in terms of improving ROK-Japan relations.

120 Olsen, p. 73.
One might conclude that with the ROK spending about six or seven percent of its GNP toward defense compared with Japan’s one percent, and with the close proximity of the ROK to Japan and their close relationships with the United States, that the ROK would be a strong ally of the U.S. in its efforts to effect an increase in Japanese defense burden-sharing. However, not all Koreans share this view. Personal enmity between Koreans and Japanese remains high in 1985, and there are many Koreans around who remember the atrocities of the Japanese occupation of Korea who would be apprehensive of any revival of militarism which could accompany a commensurate increase in military strength. We can see, as with the PRC and ASEAN, a reluctance to push Japan too hard for fear that Japan will turn into a "Frankenstein’s Monster" which the United States will be unable to control. From the South Korean perspective, any Japanese buildup should not equate to any reduction of U.S. forces in the region, and it should be closely integrated and interdependent with U.S. forces.

2. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

When examining the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), it becomes necessary to determine first what is its status in the global power scheme. Is the DPRK a Soviet proxy? Or is it a Chinese proxy? Does the DPRK pose a direct threat to the ROK as well as an indirect threat to Japan and the United States as well? These are the questions which will be addressed in this portion of this study. North Korea is neither a Soviet nor a Chinese proxy. Rather, it is a self-styled independent nation with its own style of Communism. However, it is highly dependent upon the Soviet Union as well as the People’s Republic of China; therefore as the Sino-Soviet split has festered since the early sixties, the DPRK’s relationship with these two Asian
powers has become increasingly complex. Kim Il Sung, North Korea's leader since its inception as a nation, has played a see-saw back-and-forth game with the Soviets and the Chinese through the changing times, yet never going so far into one camp that it totally and irreversibly alienates the other camp. How has Kim managed to accomplish this? The answer goes back to 1945.

It was the Soviet Union which entered North Korea in 1945 and allowed a communist government to be created in the first place. Without Soviet expansion into the peninsula, Kim would not have had the opportunity to rise to power. Therefore the very existence of the North can be traced to the Soviet Union. In addition, Kim was in the Soviet army and was a strong supporter of Joseph Stalin.

China on the other hand was responsible for the survival of North Korea as a nation. General MacArthur appeared unstoppable as the Allied forces pressed closer and closer to the Yalu River. It was the intervention of 300,000 Chinese troops which saved Kim's regime. Kim owed a huge debt to Mao Zedong's government, and Kim demonstrated a strong affinity for Mao Zedong as he did for Stalin.

Without going into a detailed history of the see-saw relationship between Pyongyang and Beijing and Moscow, suffice it to say that North Korea has not been able to maintain cordial with both powers simultaneously. The "liberalism" of Nikita Kruschev turned Kim away from the Soviets and toward the Chinese. The radicalism of Mao

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124 Ibid, pp. 159-162.
during the Cultural Revolution had the opposite effect. At other times Kim Il Sung's brash, hostile and provocative acts toward the South Korean and U.S. forces along the DMZ have forced either the USSR or the PRC to withdraw aid and support from Kim, fearful of being entangled in a fruitless superpower confrontation.\footnote{Tae-Hwan Kwak, Wayne Patterson and Edward A. Olsen, eds., IFES Research Series No. 20 The Two Koreas in World Politics (Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, 1983) pp. 195-201.}

Helen-Louise Hunter, a U.S. government specialist on the Far East, sums up Kim's policy toward the Soviet Union and China rather neatly:

For a number of reasons, Kim has deliberately sought to conceal the true state of relations with Moscow and Beijing. Among other things, this has made it easier for the Soviets and the Chinese to change directions, in seeking closer or not-so-close relations with Pyongyang. In this way, Kim has managed to keep his options open, always allowing for the possibility of improved relations with one country when relations with the other deteriorate. In this sense, he has probably managed as well as he could have in playing both sides—not at the same time—but at different times. Although he may not have maximized the amount of political, military, or economic support that either the USSR or China might have given him, had he chosen to commit himself to one side or the other, as Castro has, for instance, he has preserved his independence of policy, which Castro has not. He has not become a stooge of either the Soviets or Chinese.\footnote{Ibid, p. 209.}

Turning to Japan, what are Japan's interests in the Korean Peninsula? Put simply, they are to maintain the balance of power in the region through U.S. military assistance to the ROK, and to maintain an equidistant trading policy with all the principle "players" in the region: the USSR, PRC, DPRK and ROK. In other words, they are to assert the Japanese principle of seikei bunri, examined previously. The ROK has emerged as the stronger of the two Koreas in terms of economic power, and is increasingly accepted in the
international community as an independent nation in its own right, no longer a U.S. "puppet" (hence Seoul being awarded the 1988 Summer Olympic Games). Militarily, the ROK appears on the verge of parity with the North, if it has not achieved that status already.\textsuperscript{127}

Japan remains of primary concern to the United States in the region, but with South Korea's enhanced economic status as a U.S. trading partner, the U.S. mission in the ROK has become far more than preventing the Korean Peninsula from becoming a "dagger in the back" of Japan. Both Seoul and Tokyo are cognizant of their relative importance to the United States in this regard.\textsuperscript{128}

In terms of the prospects for increased U.S.-Japan defense burden-sharing, the continued unpredictable nature of Kim Il Sung should ensure the need for a large military presence in the South for years to come. If Kim dies, the nature of his successor's rule could not be relied upon to be any less unpredictable, until events would indicate otherwise. Therefore, from the American perspective, North Korea's hostile presence just a few miles from Seoul, serves to bolster the U.S. argument that Japan must do more in the maintenance of security in Northeast Asia, not just for Japan proper but for Korea as well, where the economic stakes are almost as high as the military stakes.

Other key players views must be addressed as well, notably Australia and New Zealand. The ANZUS Pact formed in 1952 was originally designed to prevent a resurgence of Japanese militarism, not stop Soviet expansionism, since the Soviets were allies during WWII. As one may expect, the Australians and New Zealanders are quite ambivalent toward rapid Japanese rearmament. To many "down under", the


\textsuperscript{128} Ha, p. 165.
memories of Japanese conquests in WWII are very real and very painful. Like ASEAN, the PRC, and the ROK, Australia and New Zealand represent a political force which the United States must deal with openly and delicately, or it could result in negative pressures being applied upon Japan, in direct contradiction with U.S. foreign policy goals.

Another aspect of Australia and New Zealand's relationship with Japan is their common interest in Pacific Basin Security. Unlike the United States, which tends to view conferences on Pacific Basin security as little more than an interesting area for debate and discussion; to the Australians, New Zealanders, and Japanese these are serious calls for the establishment of some sort of framework which would enable the Pacific Basin concept to become a reality. This calls for a combination of diplomatic, political, economic, and potentially military forces among participating nations to promote progress and prosperity and to secure peace in the Pacific Basin. This would fit in closely with the Japanese concept of Comprehensive Security, accordingly, the United States should make an effort to treat discussions on Pacific Basin security in a more serious fashion. This would seem a logical direction to encourage the Japanese in their defense spending, as it would closely integrate their forces with those nations participating in such an arrangement, reducing fears of a remilitarized Japan.

In light of New Zealand's adamant refusal to accept nuclear vessels in New Zealand ports, new fuel may have been added to the anti-nuclear movement world-wide. This could have implications for Japan if opposition parties in Japan are able to seize the issue to effect political change in

12 Buss, p. 204.
13 Ibid
Japan. Recently, Hu Yaobang of the PRC announced that the United States had given China assurances that a scheduled naval visit would consist of non-nuclear forces, which in fact was never promised. Obviously, this development could have an impact on the United State's ability to maintain an active military presence throughout the world, not just in Japan, therefore it is more appropriately addressed in a separate thesis.

E. SUMMARY

We have examined the ROK, the DPRK, the PRC, Western Europe/NATO, and ASEAN; and earlier the Soviet Union; in an effort to understand how the different key players view the prospects for Japanese rearmament as the United States continues to push Japan to increase its share of the defense burden.

In summary, there is no clear consensus between the various world players examined in this chapter. If the U.S. is to maximize Japanese defense burden-sharing with minimal protest/maximum cooperation from other nations in the world (particularly those nations highlighted in this study), then the U.S. must be prepared to take the diplomatic and political steps to effect the same.

We shall now turn our attention to current schools of thought within Japan to gain an appreciation for the positive and negative forces within Japan which will either hinder or promote an increased role by Japan in the defense burden-sharing process.
V. JAPANESE VIEWS ON DEFENSE

Scholars of Japanese strategic thought use different labels to characterize the various schools of thought prevalent in Japan today. Regardless of who you read, they tend to be categorized into four basic categories. Mike Mochizuki, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, analyzed these categories. They are the "unarmed neutralists" (moderate-to-far left), "political realists" (moderate/left), "military realists" (moderate/right), and "Japanese Gaullists" (far right).¹¹

The unarmed neutralists and the Japanese Gaullists represent a small minority and play a minor role in influencing the Japanese decision-making process. The political realists and the military realists are more indicative of mainstream Japanese political thought and are well represented within the LDP. Yasuhiro Nakasone is a well-known military realist.

On the moderate-to-far left, the unarmed neutralists believe that there is little military threat to Japan from the USSR, with Soviet influence on the downside in recent years. Recognizing Japan's dependency on foreign imports of raw materials, they advocate self-sufficiency in grain production and alternative energy supplies, with a big emphasis on stockpiles. They do not back the formation of a large navy to protect Japan's sea-lanes, citing WWII as the ultimate lesson in futility on the question of sea-lane defense.¹²

¹¹Mochizuki, p. 158.
¹²Ibid, pp. 163 - 165.
Politically, the unarmed neutralists seek abrogation of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty coupled with the signing of treaties of friendship with Japan's Asian neighbors as a diplomatic sign of goodwill. They advocate maintaining the Japanese Constitution in its present form in an effort to oppose moves to increase Japanese defense spending. Their influence upon the decision making process is small, yet a March 1981 Asahi Shimbun poll indicated thirty percent approval of unarmed neutrality. With the recent developments in New Zealand and China mentioned earlier, this group has the potential to unravel U.S. foreign policy objectives and cannot be ignored.133

On a more complex level, Martin E. Weinstein, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois (and a former research associate at the Brookings Institute), has identified a "permanent limit thesis", alternatively referred to as "the fundamental spirit thesis" (kihon teki seishin ron) or the "bounds thesis" (waku ron), which tends to represent the views of some advocates of unarmed neutralism; more broadly the views of many of the somewhat left-of-center political realists.134 Not as harsh toward defense issues as those of the extreme left, this theory appeals to those who desire strict adherence to the status quo as being the best course for Japan to follow. There are five limits or bounds to this school of thought:

The spirit of the peace constitution, the principle of civilian control of the military, the exclusively defensive character of the Self-Defense Force (SDF), the three anti-nuclear principles, and the ceiling of 1 percent of the GNP for defense appropriations.135

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133 Ibid, pp. 158 - 163.
134 Chawla, pp. 109 - 111.
Advocates of the left-wing policies implicit in these theories include Yoshikazu Sakamoto of the University of Tokyo, Takeshi Ishida, Hiroharu Seki of the Japan Peace Research Institute, and writer Hisao Maeda. A quote from an article written for Japan Quarterly by Hisao Maeda is illustrative of this group when he said:

the recent noisy farce of the budget-compiling process suggests that it is more correct to regard the threat to Japan as coming from the pressure of the United States, not the military buildup of the Soviet Union. The United States would like to force Japan to build up its military strength and integrate it into U.S. global military strategy. In fact, even if the Soviet Union were building up its military force as insisted by the United States and the Defense Agency, this would not be directly to Japan's disadvantage.

Moving on to mainstream Japanese political thought, the political realists have dominated the decision-making process in Japan for most of the post-war era. They base their thinking upon the Yoshida Strategy, described earlier, which hinges upon Japanese reliance upon the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty as the best means of ensuring Japan's defense needs are being met.

The political realists are aware of domestic pressures to keep defense spending down from pacifist sectors in Japan. In addition, they recognize the dangers of an economic trade off in exchange for military power. Nevertheless, they will acknowledge the need for an expanded role by Japan to help promote world stability through its economic might. Concerning the Soviet threat, the political realists tend to look at the political threat more seriously than the military threat. They fear third world exploitation by the Soviets as the greatest danger to world

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136Mochizuki, p. 163.
stability; Japan can provide economic assistance to strengthen sagging third world economies in an effort to counter this threat.

Weinstein would describe this group as those advocating the "basic defense policy" or "fundamental defense capability plan" (kibanteki boeiryoku koso), which is the present Japanese defense policy. The premise of this theory is that the SDF comprises the basis for Japanese self-defense, with the U.S. military supplementing the SDF. This is the reverse of the permanent limit thesis which has the U.S. military bearing the brunt of Japanese defense, with the SDF supplementing the U.S. forces. Nevertheless, this theory relies upon the basic reliability of the United States and the low possibility of Japan being involved in an armed conflict. Changes in the latter premise are partially responsible for the recent shift in Japanese public opinion away from political realism and toward military realism.\textsuperscript{13}

Advocates of political realism include such scholars as Hiroshi Kimura, Fuji Kamiya, and Masataka Kosaka. The Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) is the primary center for these scholars, headed by Masamichi Inoki.\textsuperscript{14} For example, I offer a quote by political realist Hiroshi Kimura explaining the "logic" of Japanese defense attitudes:

\begin{quote}
It is not hard for Western observers, quite irritated by the logical inconsistencies demonstrated above (Explanatory Note: concerning the perceived Soviet threat versus Japanese defense expenditures - RJT), to criticize the ambiguous and contradictory stand of both Japanese leaders and public toward such important matters. By way of explanation, I would like to remind these rationally minded observers that the coexistence of apparently contradictory positions side by side is a sort of culture-bound feature of the Japanese, with a
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{13}Chawla, pp. 111, 112.

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid, p. 111.

\textsuperscript{15}Mochizuki, p. 158.
long tradition. Hence it may be wrong and unrealistic for Western critics to expect the Japanese to abandon this deeply entrenched cultural characteristic over- night.

Similar to the unarmed neutralists, the political realists recognize the need to diversify Japan's sources of raw materials and the necessity for developing large stockpiles. Beyond this there is not much similarity. The U.S.-Japan alliance is the bulwark of any Japanese security planning and should be strengthened as necessary to ensure Japan's security requirements are being met. In light of current external events, the political realists seek more of a qualitative vice a quantitative change in the SDF, unlike the military realists.142

The military realists today do not dominate the mainstream of Japanese strategic thinking, but they are growing in public acceptance. As proof positive, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone was reelected to a second term in office in 1984. Although his election was far from a mandate, the acceptance of Nakasone as Japan's leader is a solid signal that a slow but gradual change in Japanese strategic thinking is definitely underway.

The military realists go beyond supporting the U.S.-Japan alliance, which to them is an important arrangement but no guarantor of Japanese security. They tend to analyze the military threat and the required response without considering domestic opposition. This implies that if Japan needs to exceed the one percent GNP defense spending level in order to meet its real security needs, then it will do so. Military realists do not place any significance on the arbitrary self-imposed one percent limit on Japanese defense expenditures.

141 Kimura, p. 11.
142 Mochizuki, pp. 158 - 165.

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The military realists follow the "requisite capability thesis" as described by Weinstein, otherwise known as the "as-required defense forces thesis" (shoyo boeiryoku ron) or "activist defense thesis" (sekkyoku boei ron). As Weinstein explains it, this thesis argues that "...the level of Japan's military capability is woefully insufficient and that it should be determined not according to the constitution or to the public opinion but by the magnitude of potential external contingencies and the extent of actual or potential adversaries' capabilities."

The most prolific government official representing this school of strategic thought in Japan is the former Director General of the Research and Planning Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hisahiko Okazaki. Many retired officers from the SDF are included in these ranks, and the Japan Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS) is the main research group for this school of thought, whose president is Shin Kanemaru. Others include Jun Tsunoda, Shigeto Nagano (former Army Chief of Staff), Ken'ichi Kitamura (former Chief of Naval Operations), and Goro Takeda (former Chairman of Joint Staff Council). As a proponent of military realism, Hisahiko Okazaki wrote:

Although leftists in Japan argue that it may be involved in a war because of the existence of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and of the U.S. bases in Japan, in fact it is threatened not because of its military alliance but because of its geostrategic situation. It would be unreasonable not to expect a major power to attempt to seize a geostrategically important area before its opponent utilizes it, particularly if the country at issue were inadequately armed.

1Chawla, pp. 112 - 114.

1**Mochizuki, p. 170.
Of further significance is that military realists put their emphasis on military power vice economic power as the best method of ensuring Japan's security needs are met. Not relying on the accuracy of other nation's stated intentions, they prefer to stick to their capabilities as indicators of what challenges Japan will be facing. Additionally, the "swing strategy", first demonstrated during the Carter years, led many to face the fact that the U.S. may be spread too thin in times of world emergencies to effectively assist Japan.

The Japanese Gaullists represent the small, right-wing component of Japanese strategic thinking. Unlike the military realists, the Japanese Gaullists seek to revise both the Japanese Constitution and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty to allow a massive military buildup which would reflect Japan's economic power. At present, the military realists present a much more palatable alternative to the political realists than do the Japanese Gaullists. According to sociologist Ikutaro Shimizu, a noted Gaullist, in "...this age of global unrest every state is alone...we can rely only on Japan and the Japanese." The Gaullists want to change the current U.S.-Japan relationship to one where the two nations enjoy equal status, unlike the "big brother little brother" relationship which tends to exist today. Other notable Japanese Gaullists include Hideake Kase, who served as Special Advisor to Prime Minister Fukuda for defense matters; Jun Eto, Professor of Comparative Literature at the Tokyo Institute of Technology; and Yatsuhiro Nakagawa, a political scientist from Tsukuba University.

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146Ibid, pp. 168 - 175.
147Ibid, p. 166.
148Mochizuki, p. 166.
Mike M. Mochizuki summed up the Japanese Gaullist's position:

All the gaullists favor eliminating the constraints imposed by the government on defense policy including the ban on arms exports, the three non-nuclear principles, and the 1 percent of GNP defense spending limit. For them, Japan is now a grotesque state—an economic giant and a military dwarf. Only by redefining itself as a nation can Japan emerge from this abnormal condition.

Barring any severe changes in the international arena like those described by Tetsuya Kataoka in Waiting for a "Pearl Harbor": Japan Debates Defense the Gaullists have little chance to emerge as a potent political force. However, like the unarmed neutralists, the Gaullists cannot be ignored.

The theory behind the Japanese Gaullists as described by Weinstein is called the "autonomous defense thesis" or jishu boei ron alternative. Three forces drive proponents of this theory, with one or all being in effect—nationalism, responsibility commensurate with capability, and mistrust of the United States. The basic thrust is that an independent nation's defenses are a requirement for its distinction as a sovereign state.

Japan's contemporary external environment has caused the primary focus of debate to switch from idealism versus realism to political realism versus military realism. This bodes well for U.S. defense planners; yet in spite of Nakasone's reelection the political realists within the LDP continue to dictate defense policy. It remains to be seen how quickly, or if at all, Nakasone (or his successor) will implement changes in the current U.S.-Japan security arrangements.

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145 Chawla, p. 114.
1. Beyond the Nakasone Administration

Much of the discussion in this section has centered on the present or near-term future of Japanese politics. A question logically raised is "what will be the nature of U.S.-Japan relations following the end of Prime Minister Nakasone's second term in office?" I would contend that Nakasone's successor would not appreciably alter the current course Japan is following.

This assumes that the LDP remains the party in control. Most experts would probably call that a certainty. If one sets aside the remote possibility of an alternate party take-over, the issue becomes a focus on the factions within the LDP. These factions are dominated by the Tanaka faction with 120 seats, the Suzuki faction with 80 seats, and the Fukuda faction with 72 seats in the Japanese Diet.

Following the 27 February 1985 stroke suffered by Kakuei Tanaka, the huge Tanaka faction has been in disarray. A power struggle has ensued, with a battle for factional control between LDP Vice President Susumu Nikaido and Finance Minister Noboru Takeshita shaping up. Nikaido is the "official" faction leader of the Tanaka faction, but Takeshita is the favorite amongst rank-and-file Tanaka faction members. Although some analysts point to this struggle for power as a signal of the "death" of the Tanaka

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112 Teruo Tsutsumi "Tanaka may Recover from Stroke, but return to Power is less likely", Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly (April 1, 1985), p. 10.

faction, it would more likely signal the emergence of yet another political compromise. Ultimately, given Takeshita's popularity, he stands to emerge as the new "official" leader of the Tanaka faction, with Nikaido continuing to serve for an agreed upon period of time. At worst, the struggle for power may result in a reduction in the size of the Tanaka faction, with a splinter group splitting off and forming yet another faction within the LDP.

Three clear successors to Nakasone emerge: Takeshita, previously mentioned, Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe ("acting" faction chairman of the Fukuda faction), and Executive Board Chairman and former Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa ("acting" faction chairman of the Suzuki faction). Known in Japanese political circles as the "New Leaders", all three are described as traditional Japanese politicians: consensus-oriented, and not given to the outgoing style of Nakasone. Representative Hiroshi Matsuzuka describes Abe as the most direct and least patient of the three. Abe has a political science background with numerous contacts throughout the world resulting from his extensive diplomatic travels.

Miyazawa has experience in economics and foreign affairs, and is known as a proponent of expansionist economic policies vice the inclination toward "fiscal responsibility" favored by Nakasone. Takeshita, by contrast, has had to pay allegiance to Nakasone's fiscal policies, a negative point in light of the growing discontent within the LDP toward Nakasone's handling of the current trade controversy.

15* Martin, p. 15.
155 Ibid
154 Ibid
157 Smith
Bradley K. Martin offers the following comment regarding Nakasone's likely successor: "If precedent is followed, each eventually will have his turn as prime minister. The main dispute among them boils down to who should go first."

"If one accepts the premise that Miyazawa, Abe, and Takeshita are all likely successors to Nakasone, what is the implication for future Japanese attitudes toward defense burden-sharing? In all likelihood, it means business as usual. Japanese political affiliations determine policy, not the other way around, whether it is economic, foreign or defense policy. The LDP is not an ideological party per se, rather it is the machine that runs Japan. Up until now, continuity has been the trademark of the office of the prime minister regardless of who is in power at any given time. The Japanese decision-making process is one of consensus-opinion: very slow, often inefficient, yet effective in implementation.

Even the conservative Nakasone, considered a strong supporter of the United States, has been reticent to place unpopular issues to the test in the Japanese Diet: constitutional reform, anti-espionage laws, recognition of the Yasukuni Shrine, educational reform—all of these issues have been effectively side-stepped. Nakasone is fully cognizant of the very real limitation to his power, as well as the tenuous nature of his support (more so in light of Tanaka's slow recovery from his stroke).

It would be foolhardy to suggest that Nakasone's successor's would be no different in their attitudes toward U.S.-Japan burden-sharing. If nothing else, Nakasone is the most conservative (from the U.S. perspective) and pro-U.S.

15 Martin, p. 15.
15 Smith
prime minister the United States has had to deal with in many years. The lesson here might be that the U.S. must capitalize on the present and pressure Japan to the greatest extent possible to accelerate the burden-sharing process while Nakasone is still in office, rather than wait for a less enthusiastic successor to arrive, possibly causing the defense spending gap between our two nations to widen, vice narrow.

If we look beyond the "New Leaders", we increase the likelihood of change in Japanese attitudes toward defense burden-sharing. As Matsuzuka describes it: "There will be new New Leaders. These will be people who grew up after the war. Then we'll have more dynamism in politics. The implications of such new leadership would be difficult to estimate. In any case, their pressure would not be felt until at least the mid-1990s at which time a very favorable (or unfavorable) defense relationship may have involved between the United States and Japan, depending upon the course we pursue today. However, for the duration of the Reagan years and through the following four years we can expect a very predictable Japanese government, not unlike the one in power today.

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161 Martin, p. 15.
VI. AMERICAN DEFENSE OF JAPAN: WHAT DIRECTION FOR THE FUTURE?

From the American perspective, it is difficult to understand the reluctance which Japanese have toward doing their fair share of defending their homeland. When Prime Minister Suzuki met with President Reagan on May 1981, a joint communiqué was issued (with predictably vague sounding language) committing Japan to improving its defense capabilities. However, upon leaving the United States, Suzuki stumbled when greeted by Japanese reporters and more or less denied having agreed to anything at all with President Reagan. Such actions lead Americans to conclude that the Japanese are to be measured by what they do, not what they say. Indeed, even Prime Minister Nakasone; by most measures a close friend of the United States; has been much bigger on words than deeds (largely due to constraints imposed upon the prime minister by the Japanese political system).

Martin E. Weinstein, in an article written for the Journal of Northeast Asian Studies explains these contradictions:

Imperial ambition, power politics and large military forces are popularly believed to have led Japan down the road to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Therefore, renounce imperialist ambition, power politics and offensive military forces, concentrate instead on peaceful, economic pursuits, and the result should be peace. It is precisely this fundamentally isolationist mentality that helps to explain how the Japanese can simultaneously favor the U.S. - Japan Security Treaty, disbelieve the American guarantee of Japan's defense, and yet reject an active military role in the alliance. Neither the diminishing of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, nor its partial redeployment to the Indian Ocean, nor the growth of Soviet forces around Japan, nor Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has yet had a significant effect on this deep-seated isolationism - this irrational belief that

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14 WIFIstein, pp. 23-34.
most Japanese have that Japan is immune to international military balances, conflict, and war.

However, Weinstein goes on to say:

as unsatisfactory as Japan's defense and alliance policy may be to those who see a pressing need to build a powerful coalition to deter Soviet adventures or miscalculations, it should be kept in mind that even an isolationist Japan that is not bearing its fair share of the defense burden is clearly preferable for American interests to a neutral or hostile Japan. It is of crucial importance not to let our differences on defense and alliance policy become divisive and destructive.  

Are we to conclude from Weinstein's analysis that the U.S. should be resigned to a "third-rate" defense effort from a "first-rate" ally (not to mention an economic superpower)? I would contend not, and we must then explore possible avenues through which the United States might persuade Japan to hasten its rearmament drive.

It cannot be overemphasized that the present consensus in Japan for the support of a broader defense role is a very tenuous one. The 1983 Japanese fiscal budget was the most austere since 1955, with no increase (overall) from the 1982 budget. However, the defense budget was increased, partly due to U.S. pressures, and partly due to Japan's new awareness of the global realities in the Pacific Basin and the world. Realizing the fact that any near-term increases of a significant amount for defense are unlikely, how might the U.S. exert pressure upon Japan to "change its tune"?

First, let us examine the SDF in Japan today. Due to an almost irrational need for civilian control over the military, the SDF has its hands tied in many respects

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164 Ibid, p. 31.
operationally. The Japanese Diet has enacted legislation which in effect prevents the Ground Self Defense Forces from shooting until they see the "whites of their enemies eyes" in a literal sense, an absurd concept when one is discussing the defense of your homeland. In other words, the SDF will not respond to the enemy until attacked, and in the event of an attack will only respond at the same level of violence and no more. Additionally, SDF numbers do not "speak" for themselves.

The SDF is dangerously low on ammunition, the air forces have little fuel to practice with, administrative procedures are cumbersome and combat training is poor. Japan could only muster approximately 40,000 reservists on short notice (as compared to Switzerland, a model neutralist country, which could mobilize close to 700,000 troops in the same time frame!). In short, the SDF is not an in-depth fighting force and it would only be able to withstand an enemy attack for a very short time without massive U.S. intervention.

If this is the case, then before the U.S. can convince Japan that it is in its interest to purchase a fleet of 125 P3C - Orion ASW aircraft, it should first ensure that the current 50 or so ASW aircraft are being maintained and utilized to the correct limits of their capabilities. Before the GSDF increases its number of divisions from 12 to 15, it should first ensure that these 12 divisions are fully capable, well-trained and well-supplied units capable of fighting a sustained effort.

Both the Carter and Reagan administrations have outlined specific proposals to the Japanese which would commit the SDF to certain mission, enabling U.S. forces to be released

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167 Ibid
for operations elsewhere if the need arose. The Reagan administration has called for three basic missions to be filled by Japan. First, the sea-lane defense of Japan out to 1,000 miles. Second, the mining and blockading of the strategic Tsushima, Tsugaru and Soya Straits which connects the Sea of Japan with the Pacific Ocean, thereby intercepting Soviet naval and merchant vessels prior to reaching open ocean. Third, the development of an air defense network which could effectively stop and destroy Soviet fighter and long-range aircraft.¹⁶¹

All of the Reagan proposals are credible, yet they are easier to agree to than to implement. Even under the Nakasone government, defense improvements have been moderate in nature. Japan cannot be solely blamed for this. The United States has made it clear through its actions that it is as committed to Japanese defense as ever. Why should the Japanese, given the past success of the Yoshida strategy, pump billions of yen into defense when they know that the U.S. will come running to fill the defense gap whenever Japan fails to meet its end of the security agreement?

In retrospect, the Carter administration's "swing strategy" was alarming to the Japanese, and it may have stimulated a positive response from the U.S. perspective. Reagan, although not abandoning the swing strategy concept, has been emphasizing missions for the SDF to fulfill. This "mission strategy" sounds reasonable, but is very slow in achieving the desired affect: increased Japanese burden-sharing. Let us examine possible U.S. tactics further.

Up until now, every U.S.-Japan defense summit has resulted in a vague, bland document; endorsed by both parties, committing Japan to greater defense responsibili-

ties, no strings attached. While accomplishing little, it enables the U.S. president to declare that he "successfully persuaded the Japanese to do more", thereby satisfying the American electorate. The Japanese on the other hand go home knowing that no real commitment has been agreed upon, saving the leadership from domestic pressures. In this light, the comprehensive security concept is little more than a rationale for doing nothing. The growing Soviet threat can no longer be ignored; even by Japan. If they ignore it anyway, a time may be reached where the Japanese will have to accept the "Finlandization" of their country.

The U.S. proposals for increased Japanese burden-sharing are realistic, necessary, but lack the proper incentives for implementation. The Reagan administration must fall back and regroup in its thinking on how to handle this Japanese defense dilemma. Avoiding nebulous commitments with no framework for implementation, the administration must enter serious negotiations with the aim of committing Japan to very specific goals, including a commitment to expand on the hardware and personnel required to meet these goals, with an eye on target figures.

Concerning the one percent GNP defense limit, the Japanese will have to abandon this figure or the U.S. may as well forget getting the Japanese to meet the specific agreed-upon goals. In light of the current administration's proposals, Larry Niksch calculates that it would require "A sustained growth in the defense budget of 10 or 11 percent annually would appear necessary. Otherwise, logistics likely will suffer, even if the planned targets are attained".149 Barring unrealistic economic growth, even for the Japanese, this spending will be impossible unless the one percent ceiling is broken. Considering the recommended

149Ibid, p. 35.
levels of weapons which Washington calculates Japan will need to realistically fulfill the agreed-upon missions, Japan will likely have to boost its defense spending to about two percent of GNP (if one also calculates the commensurate increase in logistical support which will be required to maintain such a defense effort.)

It should be emphasized, however that this author in no way would recommend committing Japan to a new two percent GNP defense spending level, for this could backfire in the future when a huge sacrifice may be needed from Japan in response to a developing emergency; that would not be the time to be engaged in a debate over how to get Japan to bust its two percent GNP spending limit! On the contrary, what is needed is a commitment to spend whatever is necessary in order to fulfill an agreed upon strategic objective, GNP percentages aside. At present, however, this will require Japan to exceed its one percent spending limit. This should be treated as an internal question for Japan to resolve; not something which the U.S. should get caught up in which detracts from the real goal: equitable Japan-U.S. burden-sharing.

The Japanese have a great industrial sector aimed at high technology. Therefore they would be well-suited in areas requiring a high-tech capability; i.e. air defense, anti-submarine warfare, etc. Japan should be encouraged to "specialize" in these areas to exploit an inherent strength. Likewise, the private defense sector in Japan would rise in political influence as it expanded, enabling the U.S. to "pull" a more influential lever in the LDP. Interest groups are the bulwark of the Japanese political system and the U.S. would find its efforts to effect change in Japan made much easier if contacts were established with these key

17*Ibid.
interest groups. Having concentrated primarily on the current administration's policies, let us briefly explore alternative U.S. views with the purpose of looking beyond 1988.

1. Beyond the Reagan Administration

Much of this discussion has focused on the prospects for increased Japanese defense burden-sharing on the basis of how the current administration has dealt with this issue. Recommendations and responses to the U.S. position have been mainly in consideration of the Reagan administration's relations with Japan, not with what will follow Ronald Reagan's presidency.

If one looks beyond 1988, we can see several possible alternatives. On the Republican side, Vice President George Bush would likely gain the nomination, given historical precedent. If one accepts this premise, Bush would likely defeat any opponent if the economy is running along smoothly. If the country is in a recession, Bush would likely lose, as Americans would not find Candidate Bush to have the same charisma of Ronald Reagan (although Bush would undoubtedly have Reagan's unqualified support).

Vice President Bush is certainly not the conservative ideologue that Reagan is (recall Bush accusing Reagan of preaching "voodoo economics" during the 1980 presidential campaign), but he has demonstrated his loyalty as a strong team player. Bush has had extensive governmental service in Washington, with a considerable educational background. This could lead to a greater sophistication in handling Japan; however, a Bush presidency would likely be marked more by continuity with his predecessor than change. The emphasis on a mission-oriented approach to Japan would likely continue as a matter of policy. If a Republican
"ideologue", i.e. Congressman Jack Kemp, were to become president instead of Bush, this could result in a new Japan policy, however the political chances would seem slim, given historical precedent.

On the Democratic side, it is difficult to speculate with any accuracy on the likely 1988 candidate, but current names in the news include veteran Senators Gary Hart, John Glenn and Edward M. Kennedy. Just as the Republicans tend to draw from conservative "think tanks" for advice and expertise in formulating policy (such as the Hoover Institution, the American Enterprise Institute, or the Heritage Foundation), the same can be said for the Democrats, who would draw upon moderate and liberal "think tanks" for advice (i.e., the Center for Defense Information or the Brookings Institution). Accordingly, let us explore several different U.S. views on Japan as counter-points to the Reagan administration's views.

On the left, an article by David C. Morrison is illustrative of U.S. liberal thinking on the issue of U.S.-Japan defense burden-sharing. Clearly, Morrison believes that Japan has already gone too far in the area of military spending. He cites Nakasone's election as prime minister as an indicator of a dangerous shift in Japan to the right. Morrison contends such a shift will lead Japan to pursue the same dangerous anti-Soviet tendency already found in the United States, leading to an unacceptable heightening of tensions between East and West. Japan has been a model pacifist nation for over thirty years; a preoccupation with rearmament could disrupt this pacifist tendency, even leading to a rise in militarism.

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In general, Morrison views current trends in Japan as being unwelcome throughout the world, unnecessary for the security of the United States, and unpopular in Japan. If a left-wing candidate within the Democratic party adhering to these views were elected in 1988, it would signify a radical change in the course of U.S. policy in the Pacific, especially with regard to the issue of burden-sharing.

What sort of policy recommendations would liberals tend to offer? Basically, a retreat from the current established forward basing policy to a more isolationist defense posture. U.S. diplomatic efforts would be initiated to:

encourage greater regional military cooperation and self-reliance, without the current overwhelming U.S. military presence. The United States could then refocus its attention on the long-neglected political and economic components of regional security.

An article by the senior ranking Democrat in the Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, John Glenn, illustrates a moderate alternative to the Reagan administration. Senator Glenn contends that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is the "linchpin, not only of Japanese defense, but of U.S. military activities throughout Asia." In this respect Glenn would be in agreement with the Reagan administration's views on the importance of current defense arrangements with Japan. However, in terms of urging Japan to increase its share of defense spending, he believes Japan has already made "substantial defense contributions at a time when NATO and U.S. defense spending remained essentially static."

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177Ibid
179Ibid, In this area more than any other statistics are
It should be mentioned that Senator Glenn welcomes increased involvement by Japan in regional security matters, however the sense of urgency found in the Reagan administration is not present with this moderate viewpoint. Glenn criticizes the current administration's efforts as being excessively bilateral in orientation. Glenn would prefer to see a multilateral arrangement in the Pacific, along the line of a Pacific community of nations. This would serve as a forum for the exchange of ideas, hopefully integrating economic and military cooperation in the Pacific to effect "consensus-building" as a means of enhancing Pacific Basin security.

This moderate approach would be welcome within Japan, especially after the rather conservative Nakasone leaves office. I would anticipate less radical change of policy toward Japan if a moderate were to replace Reagan, Democrat or Republican. The likely difference between a moderate administration and the more conservative Reagan administration would be more in terms of pursuing the proper avenue to effect military cooperation with Japan, as opposed to the question of whether continued military cooperation would be advisable in the case of the liberals. President Carter's Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (1979-81) Robert W. Komer essentially echoes this when he said:

Amen that the US can no longer (given the relative decline in our economic strength vis-a-vis that of our allies) provide most of the Free World's strategic and theatre nuclear umbrella, command the seas, be the chief arsenal of democracy (and of several friendly dictatorships too), and still provide more well-equipped conventional forces to almost any theatre than any other

used to prove either side of this debate: conservatives point to the consistent less-than-one-percent GNP spent by Japan, liberals point to the total defense outlays by Japan purely in terms of dollars spent or in percent growth over a certain period of time. Which is more or less impressive? Both groups use the same figures to come up with the opposite conclusions: either the miserliness of Japanese defense expenditures or the abundance of it!
Thus far, the author has presented liberal and moderate viewpoints to demonstrate the differences one might find with a new administration in 1988. Of the two viewpoints, the moderate position would be far more palatable to planners in the current administration. If we turn to U.S. conservatives, we can still find alternatives to the policies of the Reagan administration, despite its conservative leanings. In an article for Comparative Strategy William M. Carpenter and Stephen P. Gilbert offer such an alternative:

the United States might consider other actions designed to persuade Japan to improve its defensive capability. Such possibilities include trade sanctions, removing American troops from Okinawa and Japan, and insisting upon revision of the Mutual Security Treaty... if necessary, such actions should be undertaken. The United States should be interested in a fair and truly mutual defensive alliance; non-reciprocal troop stationing accords no longer advance American purposes.

It must be mentioned that there are an abundance of views within my three categories of liberal, moderate and conservative; no discussion here is meant to be all-encompassing in nature.

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179 For an excellent compilation of a wide variety of views on the U.S.-Japan alliance from both U.S. and Japanese scholars, politicians, businessmen, military officers, etc., see Robert W. Barnett Beyond War: Japan's Concept of Comprehensive National Security (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984)
2. Conclusions

To conclude, my proposals are supportive of the present administration's Japan policies to a large extent. However, if the current pace of Japanese rearmament is too slow for U.S. planners (and I would contend that it is), then administration efforts in this area should be redoubled. Professor Edward A. Olsen, Associate Professor of National Security Affairs and Coordinator of Asian Studies at the Naval PostGraduate School, reminds us of the consequences of not pursuing plans for increased Japanese defense burden-sharing with the utmost zeal:

Tokyo is masterful at using tactics designed to postpone distasteful and costly defense decisions long enough that the United States becomes frustrated, or distracted by other concerns, and lets Japan slip away with a minimal response. 1

Olsen suggests that a renegotiation of the 1960 Mutual Security Treaty on more equitable terms would be the most effective method for meeting the administration's goals for Japan. 2 Considering the slow but steady growth in the Japanese defense forces in the past few years, Olsen's strategy may be far too risky as a tactic for the present. If such a proposal caused Japan to adopt a neutral or pro-Soviet stance (however unlikely), the risks would outweigh the potential advantages. Olsen's strategy may be most useful as a warning to the Japanese that the United States is quickly tiring of the status quo, and unless they begin to seriously address the administration's proposals, a very undesirable arrangement, from the Japanese perspective, may result.

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Considering the growing domestic unrest stemming from the huge trade imbalance which the United States is experiencing vis-a-vis Japan, the Japanese would be well advised to negotiate in faith or a trade war could arise which would drive a wedge between our two nations and make burden-sharing a moot question. Japanese exports rely on the U.S. market for success, and it is in this area which the administration would have the greatest opportunity to obtain realistic defense commitments from Japan, and this would be my recommendation. Otherwise, the Olsen strategy may have to be employed, and that would be risky indeed.
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