RESEARCH MEMORANDUM

ANALYZING THE SOVIET PRESS – SPOT REPORT NO. 1: THE IRRELEVANCE TODAY OF SOKOLOVSKYIY’S BOOK MILITARY STRATEGY

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with the assistance of
Susan Clark and Mary Fitzgerald

CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES
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1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded as a matter of interest.

2. This Research Memorandum argues that the "bible" of Soviet strategic thinking in the 1960s, the work edited by Marshal V.D. Sokolovskiy, is out of date and should not be resorted to by analysts seeking insights into current Soviet military thinking. Evidence has previously been presented by CNA that, in Soviet eyes, the authoritativeness of the Sokolovskiy work has been declining since the early 1970s. More recently, in a 1985 book, Deputy Chief of the General Staff Gareev directly faults Sokolovskiy for his preoccupation with all-out nuclear warfare alone, ignoring the possibility of protracted conventional war and limited forms of nuclear war.

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James M. McConnell

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Naval Planning, Manpower, and Logistics
The "bible" of Soviet strategic thinking in the 1960s was the work edited by Marshal V. D. Sokolovskiy. Although the question of the work's obsolescence was raised in the 1970s, it was only with the appearance of a recent book by Deputy Chief of the General Staff Gareev that the issue could be definitively settled. According to Gareev, Sokolovskiy is now out of date with respect to the specific features of modern war, and it is necessary to restore all the old strategic principles and categories that had been rejected or revised by Sokolovskiy.
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THE IRRELEVANCE TODAY OF SOKOLOVSKIY'S BOOK  MILITARY STRATEGY

INTRODUCTION

In 1962 the USSR Ministry of Defense published the first inclusive Soviet work on military strategy since the mid-1920s. The team of authors was headed by a former chief of the General Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D. Sokolovskiy. A second edition of the work was put out in 1963 and a third in 1968.

With respect to a possible conflict between the blocs, all three editions were exclusively preoccupied with a single Soviet option—winning an all-out nuclear war. Because of this restricted vision, the book's relevance began to be questioned in the 1970s when some in the West saw signs of a Soviet shift to limited nuclear and then conventional options, reserving all-out war for retaliation in kind rather than war-waging. These doubts were reinforced by a 1980 assertion of General-Lieutenant Mil'shteyn, a section chief at Moscow's Institute for the U.S. and Canada, that the Sokolovskiy work was certainly obsolete on some points and could not be relied on to arrive at a correct understanding of current Soviet doctrine. However, because Mil'shteyn's remarks came in a foreign interview, many found it easy to dismiss them as disinformation.

It is less easy to dismiss a more recent treatment in a book avowedly written for Soviet "military readers" by General-Colonel M.A. Gareev, Deputy Chief of the General Staff. According to Gareev, given the Soviet preoccupation in the 1960s with nuclear warfare, the Sokolovskiy work had provided a "profound and, on the whole, correct analysis." The conditions of warfare had changed in the meantime, however, and Soviet strategy had found it necessary to restore virtually all of the old principles and categories of the military art that had been rejected or modified in a major way by the Sokolovskiy team.

This paper first discusses the changes registered for the military art by the Sokolovskiy team in the 1960s; then the Soviet treatments of certain strategic principles and categories in the 1970s and early 1980s that were implicitly at variance with the Solokovskiy approach; and finally Gareev's explicit confirmation of Sokolovskiy's obsolescence in 1985.

THE SOKOLOVSKIY VERSION OF MILITARY STRATEGY

The Sokolovskiy book was a full-scale effort, involving (in the third edition) 450 pages of text. From the narrow military-strategic standpoint, however, the heart of the message was in a relatively small portion:
• The last two sections of chapter IV, dealing with the impact of new weaponry on the "nature" and "specific features" of modern war (pp. 229-256 of the third edition)

• A small section of chapter I entitled "The Content and Character of Military Strategy in the Conditions of Modern Nuclear-Missile War," which treated the influence of the new "method of warfare" on certain strategic "principles" and "categories" (pp. 20-24)

• The last half of chapter VI, dealing with the changes wrought by the new method of warfare on the "types and forms of military action" (pp. 329-368).

Let us discuss each of these portions in turn—first, Sokolovskiy's treatment of some of the specific features of modern war. With respect to the scale of state participation in war, the Soviets then, as now, recognized only two types of war: world and local. The latter was defined as a conflict between two or a few states in a small area; a world war, on the other hand, was understood to be a conflict between the two social systems—capitalism and socialism—involving most of the states of the globe organized in coalitions.⁴ Such a war, according to the Sokolovskiy team, would have unlimited political objectives and be "inevitably" nuclear, general, (intercontinental) in the scope of combat action, all-out in intensity, and, on that account, probably "short" in duration, though the possibility of a protracted conventional phase after nuclear stockpiles were basically used up in the first mass strike was not ruled out.⁹

The basic "method" of nuclear warfare was said to differ radically from the method of warfare in the past. The old method was said to be the "successive" defeat of enemy troops in the theaters of military action. The new method, however, called for the "simultaneous" destruction of the armed forces and the economy both in the theaters and in the enemy rear.¹⁰

As a result of this change in the method of warfare, radical changes had taken place in such principles of the military art as concentrating forces and means on the decisive axis, economy of force, and partial victory, and in such basic strategic concepts as the theater of military action, the types of military action, strategic deployment, and strategic maneuver. Of the impact on the principle of "economy of force" at the start of a war and on the principle of "partial victory," Sokolovskiy had the following to say:

Even the strategic principle of economy of force looks different in the context of nuclear-missile war. It is obvious that, when the very outcome of the war depends to a great extent on the amount of effort and the effectiveness in applying it at the
very beginning of the war, it is scarcely rational... to reserve most of one's forces for military action in subsequent periods of the war....

In the military strategy of past wars a big role was always allotted to the principle of partial victory. It was deemed an indisputable fact that general victory in war emerges from a great number of partial successes on various fronts and in various spheres of combat action. Modern strategic means of armed combat, which are directly subordinate to the high commands and make it possible to achieve decisive results in gaining victory in war, frequently even without the involvement of forces and means from the tactical and operational level, speak in favor of the proposition that today partial successes might be contingent on successes of a general strategic character.

Thus strategy, which in the past had subsisted on the gains of tactics and the operational art, today acquires a potential for achieving the war's objectives by its own autonomous means, regardless of the outcome of tactical engagements and operations in the various spheres of armed combat. Consequently, even general victory in war is no longer the crown, the sum total of partial successes, but the result of a one-time application of the state's entire strength, accumulated before the war.11

Also, according to the Sokolovskiy team, the two "types" of military action that had previously played the leading role in war—strategic offense and strategic defense in ground theaters of military action—"had lost their old importance." On the one hand, it was argued that defense was only acceptable at the tactical and operational levels, not the strategic; to assume a strategic-defensive posture in the short compass of all-out nuclear war was to guarantee defeat. The strategic offense in a ground theater, on the other hand, while still an acceptable type of military action, could no longer be considered the main type; that honor was now claimed by the mixed counterforce-countervalue action of strategic nuclear forces, whose principal impact was outside the theater framework.12

Just as there had been a change in the "types" of military action and their ranking, so there had also been a change in the "forms" of military action and their ranking. In World War II the basic form of military action by all branches of the armed forces had been the operation (operatsiya). At the strategic level of control, these operations had been organized as "strategic operations" by groups of fronts in ground theaters. Such forms were retained, with some
modifications, in the era of all-out nuclear war—"strategic operations" in continental theaters of military action, "air-defense operations" to protect the national rear, and independent "naval operations" in sea and ocean theaters. These were not, however, main forms of military action; the main form was now the mixed counterforce-countervalue "strike" throughout enemy territory by operational formations of Strategic Missile Troops and the Navy's ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs). It is important to grasp that these ground- and sea-based strategic missile forces had no operational art and that their action did not take the form of either an operation or a strategic operation, but only the form of a strike (удар), a category that previously had not existed at the strategic level.

This, put very briefly, was the Sokolovskiy message. The authors made no attempt to claim that their work as a whole was authoritative. Reviewers at the time characterized it as offering military-scientific "recommendations" rather than promoting (as doctrine does) a "unity of views," and felt free on that account to note the book's individual "shortcomings." Indeed, much of the preface to the second edition dealt with exceptions taken to the first edition by Soviet reviewers. Still, these exceptions did not deal with the matters singled out here. The Sokolovskiy treatment of the "specific features" and "method" of modern warfare did not differ in any way from treatments presented elsewhere that were explicitly labelled as doctrinal. With one exception, the team's discussion of the changes wrought in the "principles" and "categories" of strategy by the new method of warfare also did not differ from that uniformly presented elsewhere, though not labelled as doctrinal. The one exception concerned the types and forms of strategic action, which was a subject of contention in the literature. However, it seems fairly clear that the team's treatment of even this category reflected the prevailing view. This supposition can be confirmed, first, by collating the Sokolovskiy exposition with discussions elsewhere. Second, the views presented in the book did not represent the private views of the most senior members of the team of authors—Marshal Sokolovskiy himself, his usual collaborator General-Major Cherednichenko, and General-Lieutenant Zav'yalov. These men were in fact leaders of the opposition to the characterization of the types and forms of military action depicted in their own book.

Thus, the Sokolovskiy work was in the mainstream for all the salient propositions of Soviet strategic theory in the 1960s—the specific features of modern war and the new method of warfare and its impact on the principles and categories of the military art. The subsequent fate of these propositions would therefore be of uncommon interest.
Discriminating appraisals of the Soviet strategic scene have stressed the correspondence between Soviet capabilities and avowed intentions in the 1960s. Moscow had the capabilities to conduct only all-out nuclear war, not limited war, whether nuclear or conventional, and this limitation was reflected in Soviet declaratory doctrine. The question was whether a similar correspondence between capabilities and doctrine would be found if Soviet forces changed enough to admit limited nuclear and conventional options—as they did, starting in the 1970s.

In the first half of the decade, Moscow made two fundamental hardware innovations. One was the installation of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on a new generation of land-based ICBMs, radically increasing the ratio of warheads to targets. The other was the introduction of the Delta-class SSBN equipped with the SS-N-8 missile, whose intercontinental range permitted launches against the U.S. from Soviet home waters, the only area where SSBN security could be effectively supported by naval general-purpose forces. The two innovations together provided the USSR with a capability for conducting initial strikes primarily against military targets, while withholding a countervalue sea-based reserve for intrawar deterrence of U.S. attacks on the Soviet economy and population centers.

The Soviets' intentions for this limited intercontinental nuclear option were reflected in their treatments of the war's "specific features" from the very beginning of the 5-year plan in which the capabilities were introduced. The Sokolovskiy line of the 1960s had held that a war between the two coalitions would be inevitably nuclear, inevitably general (intercontinental) in the scope of combat action, and inevitably all-out in intensity. The new line of the early 1970s argued that such a conflict would be inevitably nuclear in types of weapons and inevitably general in scope, but not necessarily all-out. Escalation from selective targeting to extensive countervalue action, while remaining a "possibility," was no longer deemed inevitable. As a consequence, the war could lengthen appreciably, even though fought on a nuclear basis throughout.

Subsequent changes in capabilities were also reflected in new treatments of the war's specific features. In 1977 the Soviet intermediate-range SS-20 missile became operational, creating the potential for an independent theater nuclear option. During this same period Soviet conventional capabilities were improved. Coalition war, it was now said, would not necessarily be nuclear and, even if nuclear, not necessarily worldwide in scope. Whether conventional or nuclear, a conflict between the two systems could be confined to a theater of war. Limited methods of waging war, in turn, called for limited objectives. Whereas in general nuclear war, whether primarily counterforce or all-out, the social systems on both sides were at stake,
the threat in theater wars was of a system change in only "one or several" non-superpower countries. More countries might be occupied, but without a change in class orientation.\textsuperscript{21}

The principal innovation of the early 1980s was in the character and status of the Soviet conventional option. In the last half of the 1970s Moscow had acknowledged the relative stability of a "short" conventional conflict that might be fought between the two blocs in the European or Asiatic theater, but not in both at the same time. Now the option postulated a conflict that could be "protracted," even "extending over many years," and "general," covering Europe as the main theater but also the Near, Middle, and Far East, and all sea and ocean theaters. A protracted, general conventional war with the West—evidently the USSR's new basic option—"might" escalate to the nuclear level, but not necessarily.\textsuperscript{22}

Moscow also made adjustments in its theater nuclear option, to compensate for NATO's introduction of the Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic missile and Tomahawk ground-launched cruise missile. By introducing these systems targeted on the USSR, NATO hoped to compel Moscow to abandon an independent Eurostrategic option and recouple the theater to the superpower homelands. Moscow did agree to recouple\textsuperscript{23} but only to the extent of a strategic response against U.S. territory characterized as "analogous" to the Pershing II/Tomahawk threat to the USSR. It was emphasized that this analogous response was "adequate" to the Eurostrategic threat posed by the West; additional strategic nuclear forces would not have to be drawn on to rectify the alleged imbalance.\textsuperscript{24} Since the analogous response would come from sea-based forces located off U.S. coasts, Soviet territory would not be involved in the Soviet strike against America any more than U.S. territory would be involved in a Pershing II/Tomahawk strike against the USSR,\textsuperscript{25} thereby helping to stabilize the option and prevent further escalation. In Kremlin eyes, other features added to the option's stability. Soviet writers stressed that their sea-based analogous response would be equal in every way to the U.S. Euromissile threat, including in numbers of warheads,\textsuperscript{26} and the targeting would apparently be tit-for-tat.\textsuperscript{27} That is, if the U.S. avoided Soviet cities and means of intercontinental nuclear attack but instead hit what the Soviets would call "troop groupings" in the USSR, Moscow would follow the same targeting philosophy against U.S. territory.

In other words, the Kremlin apparently thinks it basically still has an independent theater nuclear option, but one expanded to include the targeting of some general-purpose assets located in the superpower homelands, assets that are useful to a war in the theaters. The "specific features" of this type of war are a far cry from those outlined in the Sokolovskiy work. Westerners ought to familiarize themselves with them, since this expanded theater war now seems to be the principal Soviet nuclear option.
An examination of Soviet treatments of the "method of warfare" and its impact on two principles of strategy—"economy of force" and "partial victory"—also showed amendments to the Sokolovskiy line. That line had emphasized the method of "simultaneous" strikes against military and urban-industrial targets. Soviet writers of the 1970s, however, were reluctant to even discuss the method of warfare. When they did, the central issue of simultaneity was avoided, or a trail of ambiguity was left, or the simultaneity of the strikes was no longer inevitable, but merely possible.

There were also indications of a revival of the principle of economy of force at the start of a war, based on the withholding of many of the Navy's SSBNs from the initial strikes for intrawar deterrence and war-termination bargaining. Soviet writers of the 1960s, including the Sokolovskiy team, had stressed that the war's initial period—and specifically the strikes by the Strategic Missile Troops during this period—would be "decisive" for both the course and the outcome of the war. Now, in the 1970s, it was said that the action of these troops would be decisive only for the course of the war. The Navy's SSBNs, on the other hand, would be decisive for the war's outcome as well as its course. In short, it was not the forces involved in the initial action, but rather a country's "military reserves" that would predetermine the fate of the war. Nor did these reserves have to actually use their weapons to have an impact; intrawar deterrence alone could influence the war's outcome.

The principle of partial victory was also quietly restored by Marshal Grechko in 1974. "Achievement of the war's general strategic objective," he said, "is ensured, as a rule, by the fulfillment of partial strategic tasks...." According to Marshal Ogarkov, too, writing in 1979, the war envisaged by Soviet military strategy would not be dominated by a single blow of general significance but would rather consist of a "series" of strategic operations, each of which would realize one of the war's "partial" objectives. Another writer of the same period stated:

> It is customary to distinguish between the war's general strategic objective, that is, its final result, and partial strategic objectives....The fulfillment of partial strategic objectives leads in the final analysis to achieving the war's general objective....

New options were also reflected in the liberties taken with the Sokolovskiy line on the types and forms of strategic action. The Sokolovskiy team had denied the relevance of defense on a strategic scale, but in the early 1970s strategic defense in the theaters was restored to respectability. By the last half of the 1970s, too, strategic offense in the theaters was acknowledged to be a "basic" type of strategic action, if not the basic type. No longer was the theater
action overshadowed by the intercontinental missile action outside the theaters.

There were also changes in the form of action by strategic nuclear forces. The only form available to these forces in the 1960s had been the mixed counterforce-countervalue "strike." In the 1970s, however, the strike was taken away from the Strategic Missile Troops, and the "operation" substituted. The Navy's SSBNs, on the other hand, retained the strike as their main form at the same time that they also acquired the operation. The evidence suggested that the SSBN strike was countervalue, and the SSBN operation primarily counterforce. A shift to counterforce targeting may also have been behind the shift of the Strategic Missile Troops to the exclusive use of the operation. That some of this counterforce action almost certainly involved counterstrategic action is implied by the appearance of another new form not mentioned by Sokolovskiy or any other writer in the 1960s—the "strategic operation for repelling an opponent's aerospace attack."

Around this same time Moscow began to acknowledge the possibility of a "strategic operation in an ocean theater of military action"; for the Sokolovskiy team, the highest form of action in a sea or ocean theater had been the "naval operation" controlled by a fleet command rather than the strategic operation controlled by the Supreme High Command. Very oblique evidence suggests that this new form of strategic action may have been introduced to manage the Soviet fight to gain command of the sea in support of SSBNs withheld in local bastions.

Limited options were also reflected in successive re-rankings of the forms of strategic action. For the Sokolovskiy team, the main form had unequivocally been the "strike." By the last half of the 1970s, however, the strike, though still the main form for the Navy, was no longer the main form in the overall Soviet calculation, which emphasized instead the strategic operation in a continental theater, the strategic operation in an ocean theater, and the strategic operation for repelling an aerospace attack. Although all three were deemed "basic" forms at the strategic level, Marshal Ogarkov in 1979 implied the primacy of the nuclear strategic operation in a continental theater, presumably a reflection of the emerging Soviet preference for theater nuclear over limited intercontinental warfare.

In 1981 Ogarkov once again re-ranked the forms of military action. The main forms, he said, were now strategic operations in continental and ocean theaters, which apparently could be either conventional or nuclear. Though the strike and the strategic operation for repelling an aerospace attack continued to exist, they were no longer deemed main forms, even in a nuclear war. "Operations by strategic nuclear forces," on the other hand, though no longer a main form in the overall calculation, remained a main form in nuclear war, alongside strategic operations in continental and ocean theaters and operations by Air Defense Troops.
The elevation of the conventional strategic operation in the theater to the status of a basic form accorded well with the current Soviet emphasis on a conventional option. The precedence granted to the nuclear strategic operation in the theater, with a secondary accent placed on operations by strategic nuclear forces outside the theaters, also accorded well with the particular nuclear option currently favored by the USSR as a fallback. This option is centered on the theater (hence the primacy of the nuclear theater strategic operation), but goes beyond it to include the sea-based "analogous response" targeted on assets of theater significance in the continental U.S. (operations by strategic nuclear forces) but not on U.S. cities (the strike) or U.S. strategic facilities (the strategic operation for repelling an opponent's aerospace attack).

GAREEV'S CRITIQUE OF SOKOLOVSKIY

Given the foregoing, it ought to have been long apparent to Western analysts that Sokolovskiy was passe at virtually every point. If this obsolescence was not generally recognized, it was because Soviet writers did not make it easy for analysts. They did not attack Sokolovskiy directly, and they did not state that their treatments of the specific features and methods of warfare and the principles and categories of strategy constituted new points of departure. Since most Western analysts pay little attention to specialized Soviet terminology of this sort, they by and large remained unaware of any changes.

For these analysts, General-Colonel Gareev's 1985 effort will come as something of a shock. He takes direct exception to the Sokolovskiy work and cites chapter and verse where views differ.

With the appearance of nuclear weapons, major changes took place in the methods for conducting the armed struggle, which in the literature were dubbed the revolution in military affairs. But this also occasioned some excesses, when attempts were made to portray the matter in a way that left almost nothing from the old theory of the military art. A profound and, on the whole, correct analysis of the prospects for developing the theory of military strategy, given the appearance of nuclear-missile weapons, was presented in the book *Military Strategy*, edited by Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D. Sokolovskiy. However, over the past 20 some years not all the propositions in this book have held up.48

Gareev then proceeds to criticize Sokolovskiy's propositions one by one, including his preoccupation with only one set of specific features for modern war.
In the '60s and '70s the authors of this and many other books proceeded first and foremost from the fact that, in all cases, the war would be fought with the use of nuclear weapons, while military action with the use of conventional means of destruction alone was viewed as a brief episode at the start of the war. However, the upgrading and piling up of nuclear-missile weapons have reached a point where the mass use of these weapons in war could issue in catastrophic consequences for both sides. At the same time, a frantic process of upgrading conventional types of armament goes on in the armies of the NATO countries. The main emphasis is put on developing highly accurate guided weaponry that approaches low-yield nuclear weaponry in effectiveness. In these conditions, it is assumed in the West, there is an increasing possibility of fighting a relatively long war with conventional weapons, above all new types of highly accurate weapons. The possibility of the imperialists' unleashing a nuclear war is also not ruled out.

Gareev's version of nuclear war differs from that of the Sokolovskiy team. As the passage indicates, he does not object to nuclear weapons as such, but to the destructiveness inherent in their "mass use." He also differs on targeting. According to Sokolovskiy, "with the appearance of nuclear-missile weapons, the target of armed combat comes to be the economy, system of state control, and strategic nuclear means, along with groupings of armed forces in the theaters." In Gareev's discussion of "military doctrine," however, the first three targeting categories are ignored altogether; only the targeting of general-purpose troop "groupings" is mentioned.

Our theory of the military art views a possible world war...as a decisive clash between the two opposing socioeconomic systems--socialist and capitalist. The virtually unlimited range of the means for delivering nuclear weapons, which makes it possible to cripple any groupings of an opponent's armed forces, has changed our notions of the nature of war. Therefore, in the strategic sense, a war can take the form of a global confrontation between two major coalitions of armed forces that has no historical precedent in spatial scope, ferocity, and destructiveness.

This scenario fits very well with the current Soviet conception of a nuclear conflict centered on the theaters but expanded to include the long-range targeting of troop groupings located in the superpower homelands that are also slated for theater warfare (land or sea). It
is, however, utterly at variance with the Sokolovskiy conception of intercontinental nuclear warfare. No such passage could have been penned in the 1960s or, for that matter, in the 1970s.

Gareev does not simply take issue with Sokolovskiy's treatment of the war's specific features, but also with his handling of the principles and categories of the military art.

Thus, it is stated in this book [by the Sokolovskiy team] that a whole series of well-known principles, norms, and rules previously considered authoritative for military strategy are now subject to radical revision or have completely lost their importance. The authors included among these the principles of concentrating forces and means on the decisive axis, economy of force, and partial victory. They postulated that strategic deployment, strategic offense, strategic defense, strategic maneuver, and other basic concepts of strategic theory have to a great extent lost their importance.52

The first of the strategic principles overthrown by Sokolovskiy was the massing of forces and means on the main axis; to do this in the nuclear era, the Soviets argued in the 1960s, was to offer too attractive a target. Accordingly, this principle was replaced with the principle of "massing the strikes of nuclear-missile weapons," rather than the forces and means delivering the strikes.53 According to Gareev, however, the principle of massing forces and means on decisive axes "retains its importance."54 Presumably this reversion stems from the return to a conventional orientation as the basic option.

As for Sokolovskiy's rejection of economy of force and partial victory:

In present-day circumstances, the war's outcome will depend to a considerably greater extent than before on the amount and effectiveness of the effort brought to bear at the very start of the war; however, the strategic principle of economy of force is on the whole retained, inasmuch as in a war between the strongest coalitions with their enormous potential it is hard to count on its being short. Therefore, it is necessary to be ready for a long, stubborn, and fierce armed struggle.

Despite the fact that the main and most powerful means of warfare are in the hands of the supreme military command and that their use can have a decisive influence both on the course of the war as a
whole and on the military action, even the principle of partial victory has still not lost its importance, since exploiting the results of strikes by strategic weapons and completing the defeat of an opponent's [troop] groupings will depend on the success of combat action at the operational and tactical levels.

Thus, Gareev's critique is undertaken from the standpoint not only of a different perspective on conventional warfare but of a different method of nuclear warfare. The Sokolovskiy team, given its method of "simultaneous" destruction of the enemy's economy and armed forces, had postulated the decisive influence of the initial strikes by strategic nuclear forces on both the course and the outcome of war. Gareev, however, is prepared to grant them, at best, a decisive impact on the war's course, not its outcome.

Gareev also asserts that a "different approach" toward strategic deployment is needed than that given in the Sokolovskiy book, though it is difficult to correlate his different approach with any change in Soviet options. As for still another category of the military art--strategic maneuver--Gareev restores its old meaning. Sokolovskiy had replaced the concept of strategic maneuver of forces and means during the war, carried out by moving major operational and tactical formations via road or rail from one front or theater to another, with the concept of shifting efforts mainly through the fire-maneuver of nuclear weapons. Gareev, however, believes that the older definition--"strategic maneuver of forces and means"--retains its importance, just as much as the principle of concentrating forces and means on selected axes. "The appearance of new means of destruction not only does not nullify, but rather increases still more the importance of strategic reserves and the need for them to maneuver during the war...."58

Gareev objects as well to Sokolovskiy's downgrading of the old types of strategic action. In his view, "strategic offense and strategic defense...have also not lost their importance." It is the same with Sokolovskiy's treatment of the forms of strategic action. His team had emphasized the dominance of the "strike," as opposed to the "operation" and the "strategic operation." For Gareev, however, "the strategic content of war is viewed as an integrated system of interconnected simultaneous and successive strategic operations...."59

When he is finished, there is very little left of the Sokolovskiy version of military strategy. Indeed, the only Sokolovskiy amendment still standing is the concept of an expanded theater of military action--and that is presumably because this concept is compatible both with limited forms of nuclear war and, given the character of weapons development, with new forms of conventional war.

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NOTES


2. See the contents note of the catalogue record on the verso of the title page of M.A. Gareev, M.V. Frunze—voennyy teorik. Vzglyady M.V. Frunze i sovremennaya voennaya teoriya (Moscow, 1985).


4. Ibid., pp. 221-228, 253-254.

5. Ibid., p. 226.

6. Ibid., pp. 234-235.

7. Ibid., pp. 236, 248, 255, 335.

8. Ibid., pp. 255, 292, 331.

9. Ibid., pp. 255-256, 335.


11. Ibid., pp. 20-24 (emphasis in original).

12. Ibid., pp. 22-23, 338-344.

13. Ibid., pp. 344-368.


25. L. Bezymenskiy, "Is It Necessary To Bang One's Fist on the Table?" Novoe vremya, no. 17 (20 April), 1984, p. 27.


48. Gareev, p. 239.


50. Sokolovskiy, p. 331.


59. Ibid., p. 237.