DECLARATORY POLICY FOR THE STRATEGIC EMPLOYMENT OF THE
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UNCLASSIFIED
DECLARATORY POLICY FOR THE STRATEGIC
EMPLOYMENT OF THE SOVIET NAVY

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FOREWORD

The content analysis was prepared by the author, a Rand Consultant and active duty Navy Officer, as an integral part of his Ph.D. dissertation at the School of International Service at the University of Southern California. In that larger study "The Strategic Employment of The Soviet Navy in a Nuclear War," the declaratory policy outlined herein is compared to capabilities of hardware and deployment patterns (subjected to sensitivity analysis). The dissertation findings blend all types of analyses used and include policy recommendations for the West.

The decision for Rand to publish the content analysis was due, in part to the author availing himself of the facilities at Rand in order to obtain some of the raw materials used in this content analysis. The author acknowledges the assistance of Marge Behrens, Slavic Librarian, without whose assistance this study could not have been completed.

Thanks is also given to Mike Kurtz and Captain Charles Pease at OSD who arranged for the PASKEY search. Dr. Paul Dav's, Dr. Rose Gottemoeller, and Nancy Nimitz at Rand are thanked for their comments.
on early drafts. Michael McCwire of Brookings and especially Bob Herrick of SAI are likewise thanked for their constructive criticisms and suggestions.

The final product represents the view of the author and should not be construed to be official or represent the opinions of the Department of the Navy.
CHAPTER 1

CONTENT ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY

The first major goal of this research effort is to determine the Soviet Union's declaratory policy for the use of naval forces or other military forces in oceanic theaters in the event of a major (including nuclear) war. What is sought is not what the experts in the West think but what the Soviets themselves say.

Without access to Soviet war plans, one must rely on those unclassified statements by the Soviets that are found in their speeches, articles, books, radio and TV addresses, etc. Using a methodology termed "thematic content analysis," the researcher will attempt to achieve his first major goal, elucidation of the Soviet Union's declaratory policy for the use of naval forces.

Content analysis is a research "technique for making inferences by systematically and objectively identifying specified characteristics of messages." 1/ Simply put, it is a method of observation and measurement of who said what, to whom, and how, in order to infer why it was said and with what effect.
This study will attempt to ascertain the declaratory policy for the strategic employment of the Soviet Navy in a war in which nuclear weapons are used or use of them is threatened. Primary emphasis will be on those naval missions that the researcher discovers the Soviets associate with nuclear warfare or with success in the attainment of war aims. It was the researcher's plan to identify declaratory employment policy herein from such material and then subsequently to test the workability of the declaratory policy in a larger study using other methodologies (hardware, exercise, sensitivity, and contingency analysis). Content analysis is the best technique available to infer declaratory roles and missions.

Content analysis has been used widely in fields such as journalism, literature, and propaganda analysis. The technique is not without controversy, and the researcher hopes to make a contribution to such questions as quantitative versus qualitative measurement and manifest versus latent analysis.

A major reason for using formal content analysis to search for roles and missions is that many analysts of the Soviet Union have often been criticized for selectively searching for citations to support precon-
ceived conclusions. The specific purpose of this introduction to the methodology of this study is to outline the analysis technique that was designed prior to the analysis and was followed during the actual inquiry.

Instead of being selective and arbitrary, the method allowed comprehensive and definitive work without access to official Soviet planning documents.

Themes were selected as the most appropriate unit of analysis. Prior analysis has made extensive use of individual words. Words as a unit of analyses are inadequate to measure major military plans, since context is often overlooked as well as intended audience.

Analysis based upon words such as the "main," "prime," "important," "basic," or other similar types of missions has resulted in much controversy with no real resolution. Word understanding is important in correctly coding themes and will be discussed again later. Other possible units of measurement, such as items or characters, are better suited to studies of other subjects. In addition to being appropriate units for analysis, the themes are designed specifically to sidestep problems associated with previous studies focusing on words.
Previous Investigations

In addition to general reference material describing the application of content analysis, previous work using this technique on military subjects was reviewed. A brief review of four earlier inquiries follows since they involved techniques or methods used in this study.

Lieutenant Michael W. Cramer's master's thesis, March 1975, was a major attempt to apply thematic content analysis to the statements of Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergi G. Gorshkov. Cramer analyzed some 113 documents which included primary and secondary sources, some duplicates, and at least one erroneous entry. His 50 major themes include a broader range of topics than those used in the present study.

C.A.C.I. Inc., completed a study in the fall of 1975 that used, among other techniques, content analysis to identify varying Soviet perceptions of U.S. policies. C.A.C.I. used thematic coding and measured importance by frequency of appearance, and concluded that content analysis was a highly productive methodology for identifying Soviet perceptions.
goals were found to be more the purview of Politburo spokesmen rather than the Foreign Ministry or Military, while hostile perceptions generally emanated from the Foreign Ministry.

C.A.C.I. also found that Politburo spokesmen rarely addressed individual Soviet military services. Military personnel spoke more on specific service roles and missions. In some of the previous analysis of the Soviet Navy, the assumption was often made that Admiral Gorshkov, as commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy, was articulating approved military policies. Cross checks of similar positions by officials senior in the chain of command has generally not been done. A secondary purpose of this study is to ascertain if positions vary by bureaucratic level of the author.

John A. McDonnell completed a content analysis for the Center for Advanced Research at the Naval War College in July 1977. The data base utilized, unfortunately, was only Morskoy Sbornik, the primary Soviet Naval journal. The primary worth of his research for this study is an excellent set of procedures to code Soviet source data including certain themes on naval war fighting roles and missions.
C.A.C.I. obtained their data to be coded from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and associated U.S. government PASKEY computerized files. PASKEY is simply a data bank of FBIS, Foreign Press Digest (FPD) and Joint Publications Research System (JPRS) translations which can be accessed by author or subject and to include or exclude certain dates. PASKEY was tasked to provide C.A.C.I. with English translations of Soviet statements on desired subjects. This method of obtaining and verifying primary data was also used in the present research.

A PASKEY search can quickly scan thousands of documents, provide a list of those which pertain to certain subject areas, and extracts relevant passages. The themes used by PASKEY were too broad for the present study, but PASKEY aided in obtaining documents to be analyzed and identifying portions of large documents which contained Navy related themes.

C.A.C.I. also used bureaucratic analysis to distinguish themes presented by Soviet personnel in the varying levels of the ruling hierarchy. They were able to show that certain classes of speakers appear to have proprietary rights to certain themes. For example, benign perceptions of U.S. arms control
Ketron, Inc. completed an exhaustive study of "Soviet Perceptions of U.S. Antisubmarine Warfare Capabilities," in September 1980. Ketron utilized an experienced Soviet naval analyst and two specialists in quantitative methods and was thus able to combine both qualitative and quantitative analysis. Where findings varied with the method of analysis, both results were presented.

The Ketron Study was useful since one of its themes, tracked since 1960, was the Soviet perception of the ability of their ballistic missile submarine fleet to carry out its wartime missions.

Ketron also included appendices extracting key statements that related to their major themes. Their bibliography demonstrated that Ketron recognized the requirement to consider more than just what Admiral Gorshkov has to say in order to analyze naval matters properly. Ketron's study included political and military authors from a variety of backgrounds.

The present study utilized the Ketron bibliography, which were compiled after a Library of Congress search and a search of the files of analysts of Soviet naval affairs. The researcher planned to compare his conclusions with Ketron's finding on Soviet perceptions.
Gorshkov appeared to follow the Ministry of Defense's lead on themes of military doctrine and strategy, making only tactful, modest, and subsequent comments. Despite the broad discussion of military doctrine and strategy in the other services during this period of 1956 - 1964, Gorshkov generally remained outside the public debate. The Navy primarily appeared to be responsible, however, for questions of naval art and tactics.

Gorshkov's apparent major wartime roles for the Soviet Navy generally followed those previously announced by Khrushchev and Malinovskiy. Interestingly, Khrushchev and Malinovskiy were often very specific about targets for nuclear strikes, while Gorshkov was generally vague. There appeared to be disagreement over which types of forces were to destroy specific enemy naval targets. These differences were noted and tracked in the subsequent analysis.

The Navy appeared to assign a higher status to naval surface and air forces than did the Defense Minister and Khrushchev. Overall descriptions of the Navy by Gorshkov during this period generally used the term "modern" with the capability to perform "operational" tasks. This overall description would be monitored and compared to later descriptions.
If we cannot exactly think like a Russian without being one, following the logical presentation of arguments in their literature is probably the next best thing to actually getting inside their heads. If we are to avoid mirror-imaging concepts, we must use the Russian's concept, phrases, themes, and definitions.

Utilizing an additional 41 documents from all bureaucratic levels in this pre-study, the researcher gained experience in eliminating duplicates and secondary sources, identifying both manifest and latent themes, and coding material as to its source, method of transmission, and anticipated audience.

From this initial rough-cut work, the following lessons were learned and hypotheses identified: There appeared to be a slight difference in the perceived threat as articulated by the Navy commander-in-chief. The Navy appeared to utilize one theme that could be viewed as either describing the threat (actual use of Western navies to support the imperialists' foreign policy goals) or as explaining how the Soviets could use an ocean-going Navy for similar purposes. This theme is singled out since it might be of interest in a follow-on study using formal content analysis for naval diplomacy topics.
Hypothesis Testing

As for the specific mechanics of the content analysis, the cited references guided the researcher with the following additional steps: The researcher experimented with Khrushchev's, Malinovsky's, and Gorshkov's writings from 1956 - 1964 in order to test his hypothesis that specific themes could be created and bureaucratic differences noted and that time series reading was both beneficial and somewhat novel.

In creating themes, the author let the Soviet literature be his guide. He only brought into the research the limiting parameters of Naval involvement and war (including nuclear war). Chapter 3 will expend fully on this logic, but to summarize, the researcher addressed the issue of war first, looking for statements regarding how victory is won. From these concepts of what it takes to win a war, he looked for the Soviet's specification of what types of missions and what types of forces were needed to perform those missions. Thus the researcher did not bring political-military themes into the study with him, but rather created them using the Soviet literature.
the Russian "oborona" or "zashchita." The former implies active military defense, while the latter has been described as a more pacific "shield" or as "protection." 13/ Similar problems occur when trying to translate "mir" into "peace." 14/ Since Russian utilizes no articles, attempts at measuring salience using translations of "the most important" versus "a most important" are also flawed.

A final area of controversy is the value of open source data at all. All bureaucracies and governments need to communicate positions. Communication up the chain of command serves to convince superiors, while communication down the chain serves more to instruct subordinates. External communications may serve to warn. The researcher rejects the claim that all such open source communications are propaganda and/or meaningless, since if 100% of all open source data was a Potemkin village, it would imply that a total covert internal system exists which would be simultaneously performing the same communication function. The current "Aesopian means" of communicating in the open literature originated in Czarist times. 15/
actual author of some documents, but this task is outside the scope of the present research. Tracking actual authors would be of interest to other researchers since one could then read further materials signed by the ghost writer himself and note differences. This was not done in this research since only official approved positions were analyzed, not trial balloons or bureaucratic positions to which the principal would not append his name. No matter who actually wrote an article, etc., once the principal's name is on the document, it is his position.

Another potentially troublesome point was that the research was done using English translations. The author admits that the potential exists for manipulation by translators. Translations were obtained from a wide variety of government and private sources, including official Soviet translations of materials into English. Where key phrases appeared crucial to the understanding of a point, the researcher consulted extensively with Russian linguists familiar with defense terminology.

Examples of key words that cause problems in English are: "deterrence," which has no direct Russian counterpart, and "defense." Defense can be taken from
authored while the individuals were not in power were not used.

It is not possible to ascertain the completeness of the data base since materials in the USSR were not available. The final compilation of documents to be analyzed represents, in the researcher's view, the most comprehensive ever attempted on the questions to be considered.

Some final areas of controversy deserve mention. It is recognized that many or even most of the documents analyzed were not in fact authored by the individual whose name appears as author. For example, Admiral Gorshkov publicly acknowledges those officers who have "assisted" him in the preparation of his book The Sea Power of the State. In fact, they probably wrote the bulk of it. It is the researcher's view that such "ghost-written" documents represent ideas or concepts that had to be approved by the principal individual or for some reason were issued under the leader's name. It is a common bureaucratic procedure for staffs to prepare rough drafts of speeches or position papers for a principal's approval.

Some types of content analysis that investigate writing style would be useful in identifying the
For documents by the Minister of Defense, PASKEY was tasked to provide a printout of all documents that had been coded as containing any Navy-related theme. The Ketron study provided similar citations. The author also did a manual search of Party and government meeting speeches, FBIS Daily Reports of Soviet Armed Forces Day, Navy Day and similar annual materials. A search was made of JPRS indexes and relevant secondary source citations. A total of 66 documents authorized by Marshals of the Soviet Union Rodion Y. Malinovskiy, Andrey A. Grechko, and Dmitry F. Ustinov were identified as having relevant themes and used for this study. 10/ Only documents authorized while these individuals were serving as Minister of Defense and containing Navy-related themes were utilized. Most routine Armed Forces or Navy Day Orders were read but not used since they lacked substantive materials.

Finally, the Politburo leader's statements were obtained using the Ketron bibliography, secondary source citations, and a PASKEY search containing citations coded for any Navy themes. Some 17 documents by Leonid Brezhnev, Aleksey Kosygin, and Yuri Andropov were used in this study. 11/ Documents
and Ketron studies, computer bibliographic searches, sources noted/cited in secondary materials, and from manual searches of FBIS daily reports, bibliographic searches, sources noted/cited in secondary materials, and from manual searches of FBIS daily reports, JPRS indexes, and other government translation indexes.

Document authenticity and reliability appears to be without question. Some materials used were taken from Soviet-provided English language sources such as TASS or Embassy press releases, journals published by the Soviets, or publications authorized in the West. For materials that appear in their original version in Russian, the researcher utilized official U.S. government translations, and, where available, translations commissioned by private sources. Where more than one translation of a document existed, all were read to compare the material. Additionally, 10% of all translations were checked against the Russian originals to verify that they did in fact exist and were attributed to the individual alleged to be the author. Documents so checked were randomly checked but the checking process was limited by the available Russian language originals in local libraries.
analysis of Soviet military writings that mixes materials from lower and senior levels is flawed. Under democratic centralism, there is a need to separate debate, trial balloons, and minority views from approved positions of policy. This has not been done in a number of prior studies.

As to the size of the sample to be analyzed, two different approaches were used. For Admiral Gorshkov, the researcher attempted to obtain every document authorized by Gorshkov that exists in English. The final Gorshkov total for the specified time-period was 189 primary documents, 9/ the largest unclassified collection utilized in any one study that the researcher is aware of. A full list of all documents is included as Appendix A. Rather than footnote all citations, dates will be presented in the text, and the reader can then draw on the appendix to get the full citation. Also of note is that this research generally uses the signed-to-press date for books rather than the publication date itself.

The Gorshkov sample could easily be doubled by including summaries, press releases, and identical materials which appear in more than one place. Documents were identified utilizing PASKEY, the Cramer
the removal of Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, until the end of 1983 and the approximate date of the death of Yuri Andropov. The researcher felt that the Khrushchev era was too historical due to the well-known shifts in military policies that occurred during the Brezhnev era.

The statements of each of the leaders at the three levels of the hierarchy should provide the views of the Politburo, the Ministry of Defense, and the Navy. It is recognized that within each group, especially the military, there is a vast source of primary data written by other personnel. Much of this data was read by the researcher but was not formally tracked via thematic content analysis. Where appropriate, comparisons will be drawn between the data used in this study and some of the more widely known works of other Soviet authors. This is done because much of the previous analysis of Soviet Navy roles and missions has drawn upon this other data.

These other writings represent an interesting source of sometimes even more detailed information. Since the object of this study is to identify approved bureaucratic positions and not items of internal debate within groups, this researcher feels that
This study will attempt to search for articulated roles and missions at the Politburo, Ministry of Defense, and Navy levels. Under the concept of democratic centralism, statements by the head of each organization should be taken as the position of that group both while a subject is under discussion, and to announce final decisions at that level once discussion has ended.

Debate over policies does exist in the Soviet Union. Lower ranking personnel often advance concepts and advocate varying positions. Once the debate within a particular organization is closed, however, a statement of final policy is generally issued. By tracking the policy positions of the heads of the three prime bureaucratic actors in the chain of command, the researcher will be able to cut through the tons of extraneous material and focus on those items that each leader was willing to identify his name with.

The specific data to be analyzed will be the statements, articles, books, speeches, etc. of the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, the serving Ministers of Defense, and the senior member(s) of the Politburo. The time frame will be 1965, subsequent to
One might question using Soviet statements regarding a future war, since invariably the Soviet context is a war unleashed by the forces of imperialism. In other words, if we take the Soviets at face value, there is no contingency plan for a war that they would start. The author rejects this assertion and views all such statements as attempts to ensure ideological conformity.

For the Soviets to engage in a war, according to Marxism-Leninism, a war is just. Just wars always involve defense of socialism against imperialism or struggles by oppressed peoples against imperialism or the bourgeoisie. From a doctrinaire standpoint, the Soviet Union cannot initiate a predatory war, and all warfare will be in response to actions taken by an aggressor.

Soviet statements that they would be involved in a war should imperialism unleash one does not mean that we cannot use their declaratory statements, since they can be expected to justify any future war as being brought on by imperialism. Whether or not the first strike by military forces is carried out by either side is not the question; it will be the political conditions that the Soviets will use to justify the war was forced upon them.
Center for Naval Analyses, indicates that he shared this researcher's opinion that existing methodologies are wanting.

Walt makes some very pointed suggestions to those currently analyzing Soviet military writings. He advocates comparing speakers and tracking themes over time. Perhaps his best suggestion to current analysts is to consider all potential interpretations and examine the evidence for each.

**Data To Be Analyzed**

Perhaps foremost among the established assumptions that this researcher will question is the theory of the ocean bastion and strategic reserve missions for the Soviet Navy. These theories will be fully explained in the following analysis. If, in fact, the ocean bastion/strategic reserve role is the primary wartime mission for the fleet, then severe constraints are imposed on the ability of the Soviet Union to execute other less important missions. A major goal of this portion of the study is to examine the evidence of declaratory policy for these pivotal missions using content analysis. Subsequent hardware and exercise analysis will cross check declaratory policy with capability.
In some cases, differences would be expected since Ketron's quantitative analysis gives equal weight to articles by all authors.

Mention should be made of the vast secondary source material available. In general, the researcher recognizes these previous works but thinks that the application of formal and rigorous content analysis (and other methodologies) as outlined below is needed to test and validate (or challenge) many established Western assumptions that influence these studies. Much, but certainly not all, of this previous work deals primarily with naval diplomacy and deployment policies in peacetime, subjects not covered in this study.

Two recent well-written critical examinations have focused on previous analyses of the Soviet Navy. In the first, Frank J. Stech questions the lack of rigor of current analysts' methodologies. Stech's 1981 technical paper prepared for the Office of Naval Research is required reading for anyone attempting to enter the field and make new contributions.

The second examination was done by Stephen M. Walt and deals directly with the substance of poor content analysis. Walt's analysis, prepared for the
Gorshkov advanced the need for surface ships and aircraft for antisubmarine warfare and to support the striking force and naval forces in defended zones. One of his articles had what appeared to be a "shopping list" for future weapons procurements. Interestingly, Malinovskiy discussed the deployment of submarines under the ice and the need for other forces to provide mutual support for submarine operations, prior to these themes appearing under Gorshkov's name.

Finally, regarding history, the author did not attempt to verify the correctness of Gorshkov's view of Russian/Soviet historical references. What was verified, however, was Gorshkov's use of history as a vehicle to make oblique complaints about policies and governmental behavior. Analysis of latent historical themes is presented in the chapter on Soviet military strategy.

Numerous themes were identified and discarded for presentation herein since they did not pertain to the research in question. It would not be difficult for future analysis to build upon this work, recreating, and tracking themes showing the Navy's support of the Party, or the Warsaw Pact, or the advantages of a fleet in the conduct of peacetime overseas diplomacy.
Thorough analysis of documents in this trial period was not undertaken, but theme creation and initial appearance dates were recorded. From time to time in the findings reference will be made to data which pre-dates 1965. This is done to cite an earlier appearance of a theme or to add context to a discussion.

**Analysis Mechanics**

Thematic reliability was verified by checking the presence of each major theme devised by the author against similar themes used by Ketron, or Paskey. Some 61% of all documents could be so checked. Additionally, a sample of 5% of documents was selected and subjected to an independent coder with a reliability of 86%. All documents gathered by this study were read sequentially regardless of author. The researcher found that this sequential approach, rather than reading each author separately, aided comparison of the differences in positions and in who initiated themes.

To outline the researcher's methodology of identifying a manifestly present theme, and tracking it over time. To provide a sample of direct findings from the use of manifest themes, an example will be detailed. The themes will be those of:
The USSR/Russia is a great Naval/sea/maritime power

vs.

The USSR/Russia is a great land/continental power

vs.

The USSR/Russia is a great naval/sea/maritime and land/continental power.

As can be quickly seen, the essential difference in these three individual themes is whether or not the speaker stated specifically in the text that the USSR/Russia is a great sea, or land, or sea and land power. No latent or hidden meanings need be searched for.

Of the 271 documents used in this research, these three themes appeared 30 times, fairly consistently over the years. A linear presentation would show the following number of appearances for each theme in each of the indicated years. The total is greater than the sample size due to multiple themes within the same document.
Obviously, a shift occurred around 1971 to stress both the maritime and continental aspects of Soviet power. The next step in the process is to ascertain who is the author of each document. In the 30 documents that contain these themes, Gorshkov was the author in all but four cases.

In July 1971, Minister Marshal Grechko stated that the USSR was the largest continental state and at the same time an enormous maritime nation. He also said that recent exercises at sea demonstrated that the USSR was a world naval power. Grechko, in a 1971
book, also claimed world naval power status for the USSR. The only other use by a non-Navy spokesman was by Andropov in his 1983 Der Spiegel arms control interview when he said that the USSR was a land power.

In 1971, Gorshkov paralleled Grechko's use of both land and sea power status. It is impossible to determine who actually used the theme first, in the absence of signed-to-press dates for the two documents. Gorshkov's reference to land power alone in 1973 was generally historical.

Researchers must track both the presence and absence of themes in order to conduct proper analysis. The general absence from Defense Ministry and Politburo spokesmen of the theme that the USSR is a sea power is significant. The Minister of Defense has the opportunity to use this theme in his annual Navy Day Order. Party leaders could have discussed the USSR as a maritime power during their many arms control discussions which deal with submarine launched missiles.

A pattern of advocacy of the maritime might of the Soviet state by Gorshkov appears rather steadily over time, with minor support by the Minister of Defense and a general absence of support by the
Politburo. Despite years of instruction by his Navy Chief, Chairman Andropov in 1983 described the Soviets as a land power.

Further refinement takes place with identification of the object of the communication, or its intended audience. In the use of these themes, around half (13) were primarily aimed at internal general audiences and around half (13) at a more military audience. Four were either directed to foreign locations or received from foreign sources. It would thus appear that Gorshkov's message of Soviet sea power status is directed at an internal audience of both the public (including the Party) and the military. Gorshkov would thus be building a "unity of views" on the need for sea power.

Andropov's remark that the USSR is a land power appeared in a West German magazine, Der Spiegel, and apparently was not republished for popular consumption within the Soviet Union. Gorshkov appears to have followed the Andropov remark with a rebuttal that the Soviet Union was a sea power. Full investigation reveals that Gorshkov's statement that the USSR is a sea power was signed to press six days before the Andropov interview.
Finally, to set the current findings into a more historical perspective, two additional items bear mention. The first is that Gorshkov's claim of Soviet sea power greatness predates 1965. He used the theme at least as early as July 1958. Conflict also predates 1965, since we know that Khrushchev used the theme of the USSR as a continental power in his Central Committee Report of 1961.

To introduce latent themes and the use of surrogate arguments, one finds Gorshkov using both historical and Western references. Rather than criticize any current Soviet spokesmen who argue that the Soviet Union is primarily a land power, we find Gorshkov following a Grechko theme that states there are those in the West who incorrectly claim that the Soviet Union is a land power and does not need a Navy.

Gorshkov uses another oblique technique by referring to Western critics of Russia who falsify history and claim that all Russia's military victories were on the land and not the sea. Western surrogates are used in seven documents primarily directed internally. This technique allows Gorshkov to refute internal current critics of Soviet sea power and to align those critics with the forces of imperialism.
This sample suggests what will follow. Evidence of thematic content and, where appropriate, time series and anticipated audiences will be the subject of the findings chapter.
NOTES

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3. Michael W. Cramer, "Admiral of the Fleet of the
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4. C.A.C.I., Inc., "The Application of New Methodol-
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-30-


9. It should be pointed out that these 189 documents do not include duplicates, summaries, or reprints of essentially the same item. This has been a failing in previous analyses. Of these 189
separate items, 34 were oral, 74 were in a brief written format, 78 appeared as major articles in journals or magazines, and 3 are books. Seventy-three of them were directed to the military, 80 to the general public, 23 were directed to or received from other socialist states, and 13 to or from non-Socialist states.

10. The breakdown for Ministers of Defense is as follows: Malinovskiy - 9 documents (3 oral, 4 brief written, 2 major articles) intended for the military (3), general public (4), and socialist states(2); Grechko - 42 documents (6 oral, 20 brief written, 13 major articles, 3 books) intended for the military (21), general public (20), and from socialist states (1); Ustinov - 15 documents (all brief written) intended for the military (5), general public (9), and the West (1).

11. Politburo breakdown is as follows: Kosygin - 1 document (oral) intended for the military; Brezhnev - 12 documents (7 oral, 2 brief written, 1 major article, 2 reports) intended for the military (2), general public (4), and to or from foreign nations (6); Andropov - 4 documents
(1 oral and 3 brief written) intended for the general public (2) and to or from the West (2).

12. John Erickson makes the point: "I fear that many of our 'Soviet experts' do not read Russian and must perforce wait on official translations, which may or may not materialize. They are not captives of 'Soviet disinformation' but rather of our information process and processing." See "The Soviet View of Deterrence: A General Survey," *Survival*, Vol. 24, No. 6, November/December 1982, p. 250. This researcher thinks that the problems associated with English translations are due to poor editorial direction, indifference, or sloppy work rather than deliberate manipulation.


The content analysis of the documents authored by the Politburo leader, Minister of Defense (MOD), and Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of the Soviet Navy begins with a search for themes that relate to the type of armed conflict that the Soviets associate with both nuclear war and naval forces. This chapter is not concerned with the political use of the Soviet Navy in peacetime nor with deterrence of a nuclear war, but rather with the declared role of the Soviet Navy in the conduct of a major nuclear war involving U.S. and Soviet territory. By investigating use of the fleet in such a war, it will then be possible to investigate the deterrence of such a war.

In order to analyze the role of the Navy in armed conflict, we must consider a number of different factors. First, the literature itself will provide the framework for the analysis. The researcher only enters this phase with the desire to investigate a nuclear war involving superpower territory and naval forces. What the Soviets themselves say is what drives the investigation as to what should be researched.
Gorshkov also says in his February 1974 statement that the Navy is a major strategic weapon of the Supreme Command, and claims that it also can "substantially influence both the course and the outcome of armed conflict in oceanic and continental theaters."

By April of the following year, Gorshkov tones down his boasting to state that the Soviet Naval strategic forces can have a decisive effect on the course of major operations occurring in theaters of war of great breadth and depth, including distant continents.

Again, the watering down of boastful claims is most interesting. In July 1975 and November 1977, Gorshkov repeats his claim that the Soviet Navy can have a crucial effect on the course of armed conflict to mainly military audiences. In his September 1977 booklet *The Navy*, Gorshkov says that the introduction of nuclear missiles and the impact it had on the fleet versus shore capability allows the modern Navy to influence the course and even the outcome of a war. It is not clear if the admiral was referring to the Soviet Navy or to navies in general.

In discussing the ability to influence the course of war, Gorshkov uses a method similar to the one he used in the theoretical discussions of navies' abilities to
force specifically when discussing roles and missions for the fleet.

**Influence on Course of War**

With the arrival of Grechko in the Ministry of Defense in 1967 and the obvious difference between his public position on the Navy and that of Admiral Gorshkov, we note the Navy C-in-C introducing new themes to support his contention of the Navy's importance. The concept of the Soviet Navy's role expanding is one which has appeared from time to time.

In August 1968, Gorshkov published an article in the German Democratic Republic which stated that after the strategic missile troops, the Navy was the most important instrument for exerting a decisive influence on armed conflict in theaters of war involving great distances. Note how watered down this claim is compared to the later 1974 and 1977 claims that the Navy is a strategic weapon of the Supreme High Command. The theme does not claim an equal status for the Navy with the SRF nor the ability to decisively conclude a war, nor is the ability to influence claimed to be universal. Influence on armed conflict is, by its nature, only influence on the course of a war.
strategic nuclear forces. Sokolovsky credits this triad with the capability of having decisive primary significance in the outcome of a modern war. 6/

It appears that according to Soviet military strategy, the chief means of defeating an aggressor will be the strategic nuclear force triad. All forces, however, will have a role in the attainment of victory and the Ground Forces will naturally have to actually occupy territory in order to consolidate the results of victory. The Navy C-in-C appears reluctant to articulate the role of the Soviet Air Force in contributing to the outcome of a war. He also appears to inflate the role of the Navy, often using theoretical discussions instead of direct claims.

The role of the Soviet Navy in the outcome of war is probably the best example of the differences in view depending upon the bureaucratic position of the speaker. The Politburo leaders analyzed here do not appear to single out the Navy as a whole but do give the missile submarines special attention. The MOD appears to have equated the SRF and sub force up until February 1968, at which time the strategic nuclear triad was given special status. Gorshkov generally refers to the entire Navy rather than the submarine
Gorshkov claimed in 14 distinct citations that naval forces/theaters in general will have an influence on the outcome of wars and armed struggle. Gorshkov claimed influence in "armed struggles" in three documents, all of which would have a general Soviet audience. He claims influence in "war" only in Morskoy Sbornik and in his books.

In all but five cases, Gorshkov fails to identify the specific means by which armed struggles and wars will be influenced. In three of these cases, Gorshkov states that operations involving fleets versus shore can influence continental theaters in the outcome of a war. In the other two cases, he is discussing armed struggle and only identifies the means as general strikes from the sea. In all of these theoretical discussions, the anticipated audience is military and primarily naval.

Sokolovskiy's Military Strategy contains an oft-cited passage that military operations in naval theaters can hardly have a decisive effect on the outcome of a future world war. Yet full analysis reveals that this passage is part of a discussion of the four types of strategic operations. Rocket-carrying submarines were included earlier in a discussion of
applies to conflicts in great ocean and continental theaters of military operations. He does not say that the Soviet Navy can achieve victory in war.

In September 1977, Gorshkov states that the modern Navy can influence the course and outcome of a war when operating against coastal objectives. It is not clear if he is referring to navies or the Soviet Navy. A few paragraphs earlier, he said the Soviet Navy and the SRF were capable of influencing the course of warfare (not the outcome), in vast theaters of military operations. In the same document, the Navy C-in-C discusses SSBNs in general and refers to them as strategic nuclear forces.

Gorshkov’s favorite technique appears to be discussing the theoretical importance of navies and naval theaters in the future wars. These passages cannot be directly tied to the Soviet Navy or the USSR. In seven documents, the C-in-C cites both the relative and absolute growth in importance of naval warfare in a future war. The bulk of these citations follow a vague Grechko assertion in July 1971 that combat operations at sea were acquiring a special significance.
the use of the dyad (14 instances) as the main Soviet military force to that of the triad (3 instances) or the SRF alone (3 instances).

Gorshkov made a further claim starting in February 1967, that the dyad of the SRF and the Navy are "a" (or "the") most important weapon of the Supreme Command. The C-in-C only introduced this theme after Malinovskiy claimed the dyad could decisively route the aggressor in war. In 1962 Sokolovsky stated it was the triad that would fulfill tasks of the Supreme High Command which would attain victory. Gorshkov repeats references to the special status of the dyad to the Supreme High Command through May 1970. In February 1974 and November 1977, Gorshkov drops reference to the SRF and states that the Navy (without listing the other services) is a major strategic weapon of the Supreme High Command. Both references appeared in sources that would have a predominantly naval audience. The meaning is not "the Navy alone" but rather "the Navy also."

Gorshkov claims in February 1974 that the Soviet Navy is able to substantially influence the outcome of an armed struggle. Note that he says "influence," not "determine." The claim is diluted by adding that it
Grechko is not the first military officer to have discussed the triad. Reference to it appeared at least as early as 1962 in Marshal V.D. Sokolovsky's Military Strategy. In February 1963 Malinovskiy mentioned joint action by the Navy, SRF, and Air Force against land and submarine rocket bases but did not refer to these as "strategic nuclear forces." References to a triad of strategic nuclear forces continue today and required tracking themes using the term "strategic" as well as references to the influence of other services in oceanic theaters.

Grechko departed from his use of the triad theme at least once. In July 1971, reference was made only to the dyad of the SRF and nuclear missile subs but the context was deterrence and not war fighting. He described both forces as a reliable shield protecting the world socialist system. It is interesting that this anomaly appeared in Grechko's article in the main Soviet Navy journal, Morskoy Sbornik. Analysis to determine who ghost-wrote this article would be interesting.

Admiral Gorshkov's references to the main branches of the Soviet military did not parallel those of his senior in the Defense Ministry. Gorshkov preferred
the "basis of Soviet military might" appears in 45% of all MOD documents since 1960 but only appears during the Malinovskiy-Grechko era. It has not been used since 1976 in any document consulted, but since the SRF was not the object of research, other occurrences in the literature beyond the scope of this research are likely (such as articles, speeches, etc. which appear around the annual day recognizing the SRF).

It would appear that a shift has occurred over time to include other branches from other services as general equals of the SRF without reference to their use in war. In 1965, Brezhnev implied in a discussion of types of ramps for rockets that subsurface forces were worthy of ranking with the SRF. Malinovskiy followed with his previously mentioned references to a dyad of main forces.

Grechko pairs the SRF and nuclear submarines in general in October 1967, soon after he had become MOD. By February 1968, he introduced a new theme, that of a triad of Soviet "strategic nuclear forces:" the SRF, atomic rocket submarines, and long-range aviation. Such forces are not described as decisive, but rather, as warranting special attention.
three times by Malinovskiy in less than one year but is replaced in 1967 by a Grechko theme that the SRF alone is the decisive branch, although the reference to "in war" is dropped, perhaps implying a role for the SRF as the main force for deterrence. Grechko refers to the SRF alone as the decisive branch three times until 1974, when he discusses the capability of all services for decisiveness in modern war.

The C-in-C of the Navy did not drop the Malinovskiy theme of the decisiveness of the dyad composed of the SRF and atomic rocket submarines in war until February 1971, well after Grechko had shifted emphasis to the SRF alone. Gorshkov did not even use the dyad theme until after Malinovsky's death. Gorshkov differs with Grechko in a 1969 French naval journal article and in a 1971 provincial Soviet newspaper article. Perhaps this is an indication of the limits of tolerable debate. Apparently more can be said in Western journals or to provincial readers.

In May 1975, Gorshkov refers to strategic missiles in general (not the Soviet SRF) as being decisive in war. To further investigate this idea of a decisive branch of combat arms, it is necessary to look beyond the concept of "decisive:" The theme that the SRF is
includes diplomatic, economic, ideological and other forms of struggle. Armed struggle involves the use of armed forces conducting combat activities to resolve strategic missions and attaining strategic goals. 1/

Thus, the initial set of findings from the literature review is that, according to Soviet military doctrine, the attainment of victory is never associated with the Navy alone. Instead, all services will have their part to play in attaining final victory. The importance of all services in general is another constant theme used by all speakers and authors.

**Influence on Outcome of War**

If victory requires the participation of all services, the next themes that need to be analyzed are those services, theaters, or operations that have been identified as having an influence on the outcome of war. Generally paralleling questions of victory are statements about which branch(es) of the Soviet armed forces are decisive or can resolutely defeat an enemy.

In April 1966, Malinovskiy introduces the theme that the dyad of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) and atomic rocket submarines can decisively route the aggressor in war. This theme reappears
Of the documents that contain this theme, there are a number of slight variations which should be pointed out. The victory in warfare theme appeared at least as early as February 1960 in a speech by MOD Malinovskiy. In a February 1966 Malinovskiy article appearing in Bulgaria, the MOD adds reference to the special role of underwater branches to the "canned" phrase about all services being necessary for victory. Both editions of Grechko's book *The Armed Forces of the Soviet State* use the phrasing that all services are capable of decisive operations, which is another slight variation.

Gorshkov departs from the Ministry line in an interesting way. He opens his "Navies in War and Peace" series and repeats in his book *The Sea Power of the State* that only ground forces can secure the results of victory. In *The Sea Power of the State*, he adds an additional phrase that victory in a present-day war is only attainable by action of the armed forces. Note, not all armed forces but the armed forces. Perhaps this is the beginning of a view that war is the end of politics.

At this point, it is appropriate to make the distinction between war and armed struggle. War
appears in Navy related documents authored by the Politburo leadership, the MODs or the C-in-C of the Navy.

Victory in warfare is one of the easiest themes to trace in the Soviet literature consulted, since it appears that a "canned" phrase is used. Over the past 24 years, the military doctrine theme that "victory can only be achieved by the participation of all armed forces" has consistently appeared in ten of Gorshkov's documents and ten from the MOD. The latter is probably only a modest sample, since only Navy related MOD documents were investigated. The researcher's additional readings indicate that the theme appears elsewhere. This theme does not necessarily claim that victory can be achieved, but rather that combined arms is the way to attempt to win a war.

What is of interest, however, is that Gorshkov follows the Ministry line essentially to the letter. This is not surprising, since Soviet military doctrine is the state and Party views on the definition and tasks of the armed forces, and Gorshkov appears far too astute to challenge his superiors directly. The preferred way to differ is to use subtle shifts in emphasis or to have a more junior officer author an article.
and will further cross check the ability to influence wars or armed struggle.

After investigating these four areas, it should be possible to determine with what types of forces and by what general means the Soviet Union intends to attain victory, and, in general, what can influence the course or outcome of armed conflict and war. Then from these findings, avenues for further and more detailed analysis of forces and strategy should be created.

**Victory in War**

Military forces engaged in combat are generally attempting to achieve victory. Discussions of victory in the Soviet literature have frequently given rise to the question of a war-winning strategy in a nuclear war. As stated earlier, the question of the possibility of victory in nuclear war is not to be addressed in this content analysis. Rather, the discussion of what the Soviets themselves say about victory is what is of interest.

The findings presented herein will necessarily be limited, since victory was not the subject being researched. Instead, it is the Soviet Navy which is of interest and whether or not the subject of victory
Second, there is the question of victory in a nuclear war itself. This subject has been raised relative to the concept of a war-winning strategy or the idea of being able to fight and win a nuclear war. This research study is only concerned with what the Soviets say about victory in warfare, not whether they, or for that matter, anyone could actually win a nuclear war. Victory in war (all types) is a frequent theme in their literature.

The third concern will be what forces and types of actions have been identified as being able to influence the course or outcome of armed struggle and war. These are "canned" phrases that recur constantly in the literature. A parallel investigation will deal with the relative importance of the naval or oceanic theaters, and serves to cross check the ability to influence war or armed struggle.

The fourth and last area of investigation will be the ability of the fleet to achieve strategic goals which by definition, can achieve the aims of war. Both the navy as a whole and specific combat branches of the fleet will be analyzed to determine how they relate to strategic goals. The use of the term strategic regarding missions will also be investigated.
influence the outcome of war. In 17 different citations found in 7 documents, the Navy Chief expounds upon the ability of fleets and naval theaters in theory as able to influence the course of war. Grechko referred to navies as being able to "have an enormous impact on the entire course of a future war."

As with the subject of the outcome of a war, Gorshkov is generally vague about which theaters of operation he is talking about. Again, influence on the course of a "war" is generally used in Navy documents while influence on the course of a "armed conflict" is the preferred term for other audiences.

The last time Gorshkov spoke of the Soviet Navy being able to influence the outcome of armed conflict was in 1974. The last time he discussed the theoretical ability of navies being able to do this was in 1979. Since then, articles and books from other authors have appeared that support Gorshkov's assertion that the Soviet Navy can influence the course of a war. 7/

The findings of the content analysis regarding assertion of the Navy's ability to influence the course of a war is that Soviet military strategy has allocated a role for the Navy and that certain types of operations can have an influence on the course of
operations in theaters not traditionally associated with naval warfare. Ability to influence the course of a war is not identical with the ability to influence its outcome. Most operations could influence the course of any war.

Means to Influence Outcome and Course of War

Although Gorshkov is distinctly vague about the specific theaters of operations in which naval warfare might be influential, one can infer them. He is less hesitant about the general means associated with the attainment of influence. In his theoretical discussions of the importance of fleets and naval theaters in future conflict, Gorshkov identifies five means to attain influence.

To influence the outcome of a future war, navies can: (1) crush an opponent's military-economic potential, (2) participate in fleet versus shore operations, or (3) destroy major groupings of the enemy. In the first and third cases, one can assume either oceanic or land targets.

Two additional means of influencing the course of armed conflict or war are identified: (1) fleet operations against the enemy's nuclear potential at sea and (2) atomic missile submarines versus shore.
No spokesman used the theme of Soviet atomic submarines (alone) against the shore, hence this idea will be included in the general theme, fleet versus shore. The analysis will specifically look for submarine operations against the shore. Fleet operations against an enemy's nuclear potential at sea will be combined with the destruction of enemy groupings. The analysis will also identify the Soviet's perception of the threat from the sea and the means to counter it.

Taking these themes and measuring their importance by frequency of occurrence, we find the following evidence: A major concept is crushing military-economic potential. It is used 6 times, 3 times as influencing the course of war and 3 times as influencing the outcome. Fleet versus shore in general is used 8 times, 3 times including reference to the ability to influence outcome and 3 times as influencing the course of war. Destruction of major enemy groupings is used three times, split between course (3) and outcome (2). Gorshkov additionally states in the introduction to The Sea Power of The State that direct action from the sea on vital centers of the shore can crush the military-economic potential of an enemy.
In addition to this quantitative assessment, it must be noted that Gorshkov claims in July 1974 that the fleet versus shore role is the primary mission of navies in general and the Soviet fleet in particular. The controversy over whether or not Admiral Gorshkov was referring to navies in general or the Soviet Navy in this Pravda article appears to have been cleared up in his June 1975 Soviet Military Review interview in which he states (in English) that the "main task of the Navy today is to deliver attacks on ground objects." 8/

In September 1977, Gorshkov specifically states that Soviet naval art clearly defines the two main missions of the Navy as fleet versus shore and fleet versus fleet. He says that the Navy's operations against the shore are dominant. Ballistic missile submarines, he adds, are the main component of the world's leading navies, including the Soviet Navy.

Prior to attempting to identify types of forces that have roles that can influence the course or outcome of wars, a cross check will be made of related themes using phrases that refer to the ability to perform these tasks.
Strategic Missions and Goals

"Strategic missions" is a general phrase used by the Soviets to describe missions that can change the situations in vital sectors or theaters and thus attain strategic goals that impact upon the war as a whole or upon a theater of operations. The Soviet use is slightly different from Western use, and mirror-imaging of the U.S. concept must be avoided.

Armed conflict is the means by which armed forces resolve strategic missions, in order to attain strategic goals. In Gorshkov's theoretical treatment of the value of strikes, he specifically explains that strikes can be used to achieve the strategic goals of crushing military-economic potential and shattering enemy nuclear sea power. Strategic goals, by definition, impact on the war as a whole.

We have a number of documents authorized by the Soviet military that specify the strategic missions necessary to attain strategic goals in a future war. The list of strategic missions includes (1) strikes by strategic nuclear forces, (2) strategic operations on the continental theater, (3) strategic operations in naval theaters, and (4) operations to repulse or defend the nation from enemy strikes. It would appear
that by tracking the term "strategic" relative to missions, status, and targets, we may gain further insight on the central questions.

Admiral Gorshkov, but not the MOD, utilizes the theme in 29 of all his documents since 1959 that the Soviet Navy (as a whole) is capable of performing strategic missions. In 17 individual citations, the C-in-C uses "strategic" as a description associated with general Soviet naval operations in oceanic theaters. In 9 citations, "strategic" is associated with the delivery of blows on distant, primarily land, targets. In 7 cases, "strategic" is associated with countering aggression from the sea or protecting Soviet installations. In Gorshkov's booklet, The Navy, the fleet mission against enemy sea based strategic weapons is described as "one of the main" missions and is designed to "weaken their attacks to the maximum extent possible."

In some of the passages, we find specific mention of Soviet missions that resemble those means identified in Gorshkov's theoretical treatment of the ways to influence the outcome or course of armed struggle or the attainment of strategic goals. For example, we find the following specific Soviet Navy strategic missions mentioned (the number of times appears in
parentheses): delivery of blows against ground targets (8), preventing/countering aggression from the sea (4), actions against enemy ballistic missile submarines (4), protecting own installation (2), defense of the border (1), and unspecified operations at sea (12).

"Strategic" is also a descriptor associated with the capability of individual branches of the Soviet fleet. Marshal Malinovskiy mentions rocket submarines twice (in 1966 and 1967) as being associated with strategic tasks. In October 1967, the Navy Chief states that the subsurface, air, and surface branches were all capable of strategic missions.

It is only in 1971 that Gorshkov associates the Soviet submarine force (alone) with the word "strategic." In eight citations, the Navy C-in-C credits submarines with the capability of striking strategic targets or performing strategic missions. In three documents Gorshkov clearly states it was the equipping of submarines with subsurface launch SLBMs with nuclear warheads and ranges of thousands of kilometers which gave these ships a strategic capability. In two cases, the reference involves the strategic task of atomic submarines against an enemy fleet. In two
cases, submarine ballistic missiles are associated with strategic targets ashore.

In seven additional citations, Gorshkov uses the word "strategic" in discussing the theoretical capability of submarines in general. In these cases, he is more specific than when discussing Soviet submarines. In December 1974, he goes so far as to state that a single missile submarine can achieve strategic goals by making strikes against land targets. When this same sentence reappears in *The Sea Power of the State*, the reference to "one combat unit" is deleted.

In other citations concerning the theoretical capability of submarines in general, strategic goals are associated with blows on targets ashore and nuclear submarines are called a "strategic resource" capable of blows against submarines and surface ships of the enemy and important targets ashore.

Gorshkov also associates "strategic" with other branches of the Navy. He attributes a strategic mission once to surface ships, but only in a passage also mentioning aviation and submarines. In four documents, Gorshkov pairs Soviet submarines and
naval aviation and associates both together with strategic missions.

In both editions of *The Sea Power of the State*, Gorshkov specifically associates Soviet submarines with ballistic and cruise missiles and missile-carrying and anti-submarine (ASW) aircraft with strategic missions in oceanic and continental theaters. These forces are then associated with a capability to strike and undermine the military-economic potential of an enemy and shatter his nuclear sea power. Specific targets of strikes are military-industrial and administrative centers and the nuclear missile groupings of the enemy at sea.

These passages from *The Sea Power of the State* represent an excellent source explaining the use of Soviet Naval forces in terms that describe the ability to influence the course and outcome of wars. These passages bridge the gap between Gorshkov's theoretical discussions and his specific roles for Soviet forces.

One of the most important findings relating to the Soviet use of the term "strategic" is that it is not the same as in the West. Certainly the long-range nuclear forces capable of striking the territory of each superpower fall into the category of "strategic."
but there are other classes and types of "strategic" missions and goals that do not involve nuclear weapons. Thus it would appear that with the one exception of conducting nuclear strikes, "strategic" missions of the Soviet military have been identified but the means to perform those missions is not automatically tied to nuclear or conventional ordinance.

**Strikes**

The term "strikes" is frequently used by the Soviets to describe actions taken in combat. Gorshkov describes "strikes" in theoretical terms, including their ability to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic goals in his December 1974 *Morskoy Sbornik* article and in *The Sea Power of the State*. Gorshkov sees the purpose of battle as the mere attainment of tactical goals. Gorshkov also directly links strategic goals with strikes. In eight citations that consider the theoretical role of strikes, Gorshkov directly associates strikes with strategic goals in terms which are identified as means of influencing the course and outcome of wars. Gorshkov says strikes can achieve strategic goals by devastating of military-economic potential and shattering nuclear sea power.
In addition, he says that submarine missile strikes against land targets can achieve strategic goals.

**Findings**

By reviewing the types of targets and means of delivery associated with strikes and strategic missions, and by viewing these together with the ability to influence the course and outcome of wars and to attain strategic goals, it is possible to create a matrix of the declaratory policy for employment of the Soviet Navy in the event of a major war. Table 2 presents this matrix. The means of delivery is in the left column; the top labels refer to the naval means of influencing wars and attaining strategic goals, and the center blocks the number of references to and the specific targets. Gorshkov uses the two distinct phrases "crush military-economic potential" and "crush enemy grouping at sea." For the analysis so far, this distinction is retained. Notice should be made that the means to influence wars and attain strategic goals do not always involve nuclear weapons per se. The subsequent hardware analysis will investigate whether or not these types of forces are dual capable (nuclear or conventional).
Table 2
Strategic Missions/Targeting Associated with Influencing The Course and Outcomes of War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Means of Delivery</th>
<th>Fleet vs. Shore (primary means)</th>
<th>Crush Military-economic Potential</th>
<th>Enemy Groupings (enemy nuclear sea power)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Fleet</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1 military bases 1 acquiring cap-</td>
<td>4 enemy rocket subs 1 enemy fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ability to participate in such</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 prevent/counter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>aggression from sea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet SSBNs/SSGNs/Missile and ASW Aircraft</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 strikes against military</td>
<td>2 nuclear strikes against missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>industrial, and administrative</td>
<td>groupings/shatter nuclear sea power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>centers/undermine military</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>economic potential</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Submarine</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 targets ashore</td>
<td>2 targets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- Spokesman Gorshkov</td>
<td>2 strategic target</td>
<td>possibly implied</td>
<td>at sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- Spokesman MOD (submarines with rockets)</td>
<td>2 targets ashore</td>
<td>possibly implied</td>
<td>2 targets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>at sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines in General</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2 enemy surface ships/submarines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- Submarines by missile strikes</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- Atomic submarines</td>
<td>2 important targets</td>
<td>possibly implied</td>
<td>2 enemy surface ships/submarines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strikes in General</td>
<td>3 (by submarine with missiles)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2 shatter nuclear sea power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 major groupings</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: Compiled by author. Number indicates individual citations mentioning targets.
The obvious finding when analyzing Gorshkov's theoretical means for navies to obtain strategic goals or influence war is that the branches of the Navy capable of such influence cannot be clearly identified. A sharp difference appears between the declaratory policy of the MOD on the one hand, and the C-in-C of the Navy, on the other. Gorshkov appears to give credit to the fleet as a whole, while the Defense Ministry appears to favor discussion of submarines with missiles in roles which Gorshkov describes as being "influential."

Of interest also is the correlation between the naval means of influencing wars, strategic goals, role of strikes, and strategic missions, and Gorshkov's often cited three basic missions of great power navies in nuclear war. In February 1973, Gorshkov listed these missions as the participation in attacks by a nation's strategic nuclear forces, the blunting of nuclear attacks from the sea, and cooperation with ground forces in their operations on the continental theaters. In his booklet The Navy, Gorshkov lists the Navy's two main missions as "operations against an enemy fleet and against a hostile shore."
From the data contained in Table 2, it is clear that further investigation of the role of navies and naval theaters in a major war will have to consider both types of targets identified, and the means of destroying those targets. Primary targets to be investigated will be shore targets from fleet resources, and targets on the oceans which constitute the main striking potential of the West. It is to these questions that the next two chapters turn -- consideration of the fleet versus shore mission and the fleet versus fleet.
Gorshkov also treats the subject of fleet versus land targets in a theoretical sense without specific reference to the USSR. In 15 such citations, vague means of attack are discussed nine times, with submarines as the vehicle in the remaining six. Marshal Grechko discusses theoretical naval blows ashore once but does not identify the means of delivery.

Since no other fleet branch has been given a declaratory role in strikes against distant shore targets, it would appear that the use of non-specific means is not an attempt to describe the missions of forces other than the submarine. To verify this conclusion, the researcher checked the differences between targets specified when submarines are the means and when other means are specified. The possible reasons for Gorshkov's more general means of delivery as opposed to that of his seniors in the chain of command will be addressed in the conclusions.

Targets of Soviet Submarine Strikes Ashore

In the citations that discuss the means of delivery of blows by submarines and the fleet against the shore, we find explicit references to the types of targets. As was shown above, in their discussions of means of delivery, Politburo and Minister of Defense
When the spokesman for fleet versus shore blows on land targets is the Navy Chief, a much different pattern emerges. Gorshkov includes Soviet submarines alone as the means in 17 out of 44 citations. Submarine missiles are specified 11 times.

Gorshkov describes the means for distant blows by using terms such as the fleet (as a whole) (18 citations) or Navy missiles (in general) (3 citations). In most of these passages, targets ashore and afloat are given, which makes analysis difficult.

In four citations, Gorshkov combines submarines with aviation as the means of distant blows but in passages not referring only to operations against the shore. As was mentioned previously, aviation has not been credited with a mission to strike targets ashore, hence one can assume that the aviation targets in these four aviation/submarine passages refer to fleet versus fleet operation.

There are two additional citations in which Gorshkov discusses strikes ashore by both the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) and Navy missiles. To distinguish between the targets for each, it was necessary to search the literature for strikes by the SRF alone. These findings will be presented later.
specifically stated that Soviet Naval Aviation was not intended for use against the American continent. 2/

One might assume that naval aviation strikes against ships in port or bases would be included in fleet versus shore but the Admiral places this role in the fleet versus fleet category. Hence it will not be considered in this chapter. Thus we can conclude Soviet Naval Aviation does not have a declaratory mission in direct strikes ashore, since the theme never appears and strikes against the U.S. are specifically refuted.

**Soviet Submarines Strikes Ashore**

The wartime role of Soviet submarines conducting strikes at land targets is a theme which appears in the statements of Alexey Kosygin, Marshals Malinovskiy and Grechko. In eleven documents that discuss Soviet fleet versus shore blows on land targets from Politburo or Defense Ministry spokesman during the studied period, 100% specified the means as submarines, with all but one specifying submarine missiles. A check of six similar citations prior to 1965 reveals the same patterns, with four references giving submarines as the means for strikes ashore.
 chapter on fleet versus fleet. It could conceivably fit in either section but the author would prefer to deal with the subject later.

**Soviet Naval Aviation Strikes Ashore**

Although the Soviet Navy has only recently acquired air-capable surface ships, naval aviation has existed since the Czarist days. The fleet air arm has had an anti-shore role in past wars including participation by the First Mine-torpedo Regiment of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet in the first Soviet air raid on Berlin on August 8, 1941. 1/

The future combat utilization of Soviet Naval Aviation is discussed in some 41 primarily Gorshkov documents since 1961. One finds reference to an anti-shore mission in only a few. Specifically, there are two references by Gorshkov in July 1968 for Soviet Naval Aviation to strike land targets. In both editions of *The Sea Power of the State*, the C-in-C states in general that aviation attacks by fleets against fixed shore targets are now the exception. In September 1977, Gorshkov explained that the appearance of SSBNs allowed naval aviation to redirect its efforts to strictly warfare at sea. In a widely distributed press release in Fall 1982, the admiral
The primary method of delivery of fleet versus shore strikes is the submarine missile. Gorshkov specifies strikes at strategic and economically important land targets. Therefore, references to the use of submarine missile systems needed in-depth analysis. References to both ballistic and cruise missiles were tracked. Targeting objects were analyzed to determine which ones might achieve the most important category of crushing military-economic potential.

Although one would not expect to find operations at sea in the general category of fleet versus shore, one such operation will be considered in this chapter. This is the disruption of the sea lines of communication (SLOC). Gorshkov states in *The Sea Power of the State* that such operations are aimed at "undermining the military-economic potential of the enemy" and form "part of the general system of operations of a fleet against the shore." This view is a change from its traditional consideration as a fleet versus fleet mission. The SLOC role will be analyzed in connection with all possible means of carrying out the potential disruption.

The question of defense of SSBNs in bastions will not be discussed in this chapter, but rather in the
landings and shore bombardment by guns from ships. These missions may be important, but do not appear in any of the Soviet literature under review as being associated with the ability to influence the course or outcome of a war.

A check was made of anti-shore missions discussed in connection with surface ships, but in all cases, the obvious reference was to amphibious operations, gun fire support, or assistance to the army. Hence, no analysis will be undertaken of Soviet Navy surface ships to directly perform a fleet versus shore strike, although the surface ship role will be analyzed with reference to other missions falling into the category of fleet versus shore.

Carrier aviation is a method of fleet versus shore activity but one in which the Soviet Navy lacked significant capability during the study period. Since Gorshkov did refer to the ability of Soviet Naval missile and ASW aviations as having a potential to perform strategic missions, a search was made through the literature to ascertain if there was any declaratory policy regarding use of land-based Naval aircraft in a direct fleet versus shore mission. These findings will be presented later.
(SSBN) and cruise missiles (SSGN) and missile and anti-submarine (ASW) aircraft, as well as general references to the fleet as a whole. Part of the problem in understanding Gorshkov's generalities about means is that he often includes both operations at shore targets and at sea, requiring the analyst to separate the fleet versus fleet from fleet versus shore missions.

This chapter will analyze the statements of the Navy C-in-C and his seniors to ascertain (1) what is meant by fleet versus shore operations, (2) what means are to be used in fleet versus shore operations that are of sufficient magnitude to be able to influence the outcome of a war or attain a strategic goal and (3) what targets, if any, have been specified. The discussion of when fleet versus shore missions would take place in a war will be included in the chapter on Soviet Military Strategy.

Missions to be Considered

The concept of fleet versus shore operations has been clearly explained by Gorshkov in The Sea Power of the State. It includes a number of traditional missions that neither meet the test of being strategic nor are associated with strikes. These are amphibious
CHAPTER 3

CONTENT ANALYSIS OF SOVIET FLEET VERSUS SHORE

The mission of fleet versus shore has been identified by Admiral Gorshkov in the Soviet literature as the primary mission of fleets in general and the Soviet Navy in particular. As was discussed in the previous chapter, fleet versus shore has also been directly tied to the admiral's theoretical treatment of methods navies in general can use to influence the outcome of wars (all types). Fleet versus shore includes the crushing of military-economic potential of an enemy which is a strategic goal capable of impacting on a war as a whole. There are other methods of attaining this strategic goal which will be considered in the next chapter.

The previous chapter showed that the means, methods, and targets for carrying out the fleet versus shore mission (and crushing military-economic potential) was viewed differently, depending upon the speaker. There is no question that submarines with rockets against shore targets constitute means accepted by all levels of the bureaucracy.

Admiral Gorshkov includes in his description of means Soviet Naval atomic submarines with ballistic
ascertain any role in achieving goals which might have an influence on the outcome or course of a war.

13. This bridging is necessary since in at least one article in Voyennaya Mysl', the General Officer author goes to great lengths to explain that performing strategic missions by themselves might not have a decisive effect on the entire course of armed conflict. See Kruchinin, p. 14.
the theater of military operations as the basic operations in a future war (July 1981).


12. The one reference to a strategic capability for surface ships is an anomaly with no association to means, theater, or operations. Surface ships will not be considered further in this section but will be cross checked in both the fleet versus shore and fleet versus fleet sections to

8. This point was raised by Michael MccGwire in "Naval Power and Soviet Oceans Policy" Soviet Oceans Development, John Hardt and Herman Franssen, Eds., a compendium of papers prepared by the Congressional Research Service for the Committee on Commerce and National Ocean Policy Study, U.S. Senate, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., Committee Print (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1976), p. 178. It is always possible that the Soviet translators made an error in the Soviet Military Review article, but the sentence includes another reference to the role of navies in general. It would appear that the subsequent capitalization was deliberate.

9. Dictionary of Basic Military Terms, Items 1465 and 1472. See also Major-General V. Kruchinin, "Contemporary Strategic Theory on the Goals and Missions of Armed Conflict," Voyennaya Mysl', No. 10 October 1963, pp. 13-14. Marshal Ogarkov had made recent references to strategic operations in
translated texts, both references discuss strategic nuclear forces and, in another sentence, the types of forces whose launching is automated. In 1981, Ogarkov says that intercontinental ballistic missile firings are automated. In 1982, he says that land-and sea-based ballistic missile firings are automated. It is not obvious that he was referring to a dyad here. See Michael J. Deane, Ilana Kass, and Andrew G. Porth, "The Soviet Command Structure in Transformation," *Strategic Review*, Vol. XII, No. 2, Spring 1984, pp. 63 and 69.

4. Sokolovskiy p. 282 states the triad will fulfill their tasks by carrying out rocket strikes according to the plans of the Supreme High Command to attain victory.

5. Sokolovskiy p. 299.


7. Lieutenant-General M. M. Kir'yan, Ed., *Military-Technical Progress and the USSR Armed Forces* (Moscow: signed to press July 8, 1982, credits nuclear power missile carriers with this ability, p. 289. Vice Admiral K. Stalbo wrote recently that navies were capable of exerting an often-

3. Marshal of the Soviet Union N. V. Ogarkov. "Guarding Peaceful Labor," Kommunist No. 10, July 1981, pp. 80-91 (a reprint of a speech to the All-Union Seminar of Ideological Workers in April); Always Ready to Defend the Fatherland (Moscow: Voyenizdat, signed to press January 26, 1982) pp. 34 and 49; "Reliable Defense for Peace," Izvestiya, Morning Edition, September 23, pp. 4-5, and "The Defense of Socialism: Experience of History and the Present Day," Krasnaya Zvezda, May 9, 1984, 1st Ed., pp. 2-3. Ogarkov at the time was Chief of the General Staff and the ranking professional military officer of the USSR. Ogarkov does not claim decisiveness for the triad, but says that strategic nuclear forces allow top-level military leadership to have a capability of significantly influencing the "achievement of strategic and political-military war aims and objectives." A case was made that Ogarkov defined the strategic nuclear forces as a dyad in 1981 and 1982. In the
NOTES


(MOD) spokesmen generally specified submarines, while the Navy Chief used more general terms. We find that in discussions of targets, the reverse is true. The Navy Chief is much more specific.

In 17 Politburo/MOD citations since 1958 referring to fleet strikes against the shore, we find the following targets mentioned: 11 references to general targets ashore, 3 to strategic or vital targets, and 3 citations (all earlier than 1965) specifying military targets. These latter three are statements which associate submarine missiles with naval and land bases as targets, (2 cases) or the joint action by the triad (SRF, Navy, and Air Force) against land and submarine rocket bases.

Admiral Gorshkov's statements contain more explicit targeting information. In order to utilize the information, it must be assumed that he is speaking authoritively on the subject unless the context is an obvious argument. Since Politburo/MOD statements are so vague, there is little opportunity to cross check the Gorshkov information with his seniors. Correlation can be made with other targeting pronouncements found elsewhere. Gorshkov's targeting is presented in Table 3 below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Strategic Vital</th>
<th>Administrative</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Springboards and Overseas Bases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Means of Delivery</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines alone</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarine missiles (SLBMs)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Missiles</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleet in General</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation and Subs*</td>
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<td>Aviation and Sub Missiles*</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRF and Navy Missiles</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* In reality these mean SLBMs (see text)

Compiled by Author
From the data in Table 3, we can quickly sort out that 65% of all pronouncements on shore targeting is of a general nature, giving us no real clue to intended use. By focusing on the remaining 35%, we can observe certain patterns.

Under the category of administrative-political targets, Gorshkov specified administrative targets on the coast and deep in enemy territory. This passage is associated with Soviet atomic-powered submarines with ballistic (SLBM) and guided (SLCM) missiles and Soviet Naval aviation, and includes targets at sea as well as ashore. As was discussed earlier, the aviation portion obviously has to do with sea targets. We can therefore conclude the means of submarine missile strikes ashore is either SLBMs or SLCMs.

The use of ballistic missiles against sea targets has been a lively subject of debate 3/ that will be addressed later. Regarding cruise missiles, Gorshkov declared in a July 1971 speech that winged rockets were primarily for use against sea targets, while submarines (no means specified) could hit enemy strategic targets at distances of 1,000 kilometers.
In the first edition of *The Sea Power of the State*, Gorshkov states that SLCMs were initially developed by navies for use against surface ships and land targets, but he drops land targets in the second edition. From this discussion, we can conclude that the current means for targeting administrative centers and other land targets is the SLBM.

Gorshkov makes reference twice to economic targets. The passage states the targets are the economic (and military) potential and military-industrial centers in coastal areas and deep inland. A third reference is that the Soviet Navy is in the process (February 1973) of acquiring the capability to crush economic (and military) potential.

Military targets are listed twice in the same passages. Thus, military (and economic) targets fall under the category of potential and important military-industrial centers in coastal areas and deep inland. These references are sufficiently vague as to be taken as military, industrial, or military related industrial.

Two other military references come from Polish and Bulgarian articles where the passage specifies "that which comprises the nucleus of military might." One problem with these two citations is that from the
context, it appears that Gorshkov is arguing for such a role, not announcing one. This seems illogical, since the intended audience would not include the Party or Soviet military, but it may have to do with the latitude given publications outside the USSR. Of the remaining nine instances of military targets, three specify bases, and the remainder are vague.

The theme of fleet versus shore strikes against military targets received concentrated repetition between 1968-1972. During that time, it was directed to either general Soviet or foreign audiences and not the Soviet military.

It is, therefore, not clear exactly what type of military targets Gorshkov has in mind for his fleet versus shore strikes. It would appear that his declaratory statements are sufficiently vague to allow speculation by analysts.

The final category of targets of interest include two 1967-1968 references to overseas enemy territory. The Sea Power of the State includes two references to targeting springboards for attacks against the USSR with the means of attack as both SRF and Navy missiles.

Earlier Soviet Navy targeting given by Gorshkov in nine pre-1965 documents reveals mostly general
targets. In one case (May 1963), no specific means were identified but the targets intended were military bases including those in the North, Baltic, and Mediterranean Seas.

Thus Gorshkov's plan for the Soviet fleet to influence the outcome of war and attain strategic goals by SLBM strikes at shore targets appears to include administrative centers, military targets of a vague nature, industrial centers associated with military potential, and bases that constitute a springboard for enemy attack. The widespread inclusion of vague targets ashore may be due to inclusion of a class of targets that the Soviets do not want publicized (for example, cities).

To cross check this list of specific Soviet targeting, we can refer to 15 discussions of the theoretical use of navies (not necessarily the Soviet Navy) against shore installations. Most of these references are also vague. Important economic targets are tied twice to strikes by submarine missiles. There are also three extremely vague references to the need to destroy weapons stores. All but one of these theoretical discussions are found in naval journals or in Gorshkov's books.
Marshal Grechko utilized the device of theoretical strikes by navies in his July 1971 *Morskoy Sbornik* article. The Defense Minister stated that navies in general could deliver powerful strikes against military targets and troop dispositions. The means for such attacks were not given. Of note is the fact that this method of discussing theoretical strikes predates Gorshkov's subsequent use.

Since none of Gorshkov's seniors is explicit in discussions of SLBM targeting, a check was made of translations of other Soviet military literature. In general, non-Navy authors follow the more general and vague SLBM targeting pattern outlined by Politburo/MOD spokesman.

Targeting associated with SLBMs versus that of the SRF was also investigated. Since the SRF was not the primary focus of this research, a check was made of all documents for manifest statements of targeting by Soviet land systems or for non-specific rocket strikes in general. The Politburo/MOD documents consulted represent probably a modest portion of all that contain SRF targeting themes. Findings are based upon the total sample of 2 Khrushchev, 6 Malinovskiy, 4 Grechko, and 6 Gorshkov citations which contain direct reference to Soviet land systems or theoretical rocket strikes.
A January 1960 Khrushchev speech made general reference to the Soviet Armed Forces being able to deliver distant strikes on land targets. In an indirect passage from the same speech, Khushchev threatened destruction of capitals and administrative and industrial centers. On the very next day, the MOD repeated these theoretical themes but added enemy armed forces as a target. The size of the country Malinovskiy used to illustrate destruction of political, administrative, and industrial centers equated to that of a larger European NATO nation.

By 1961, Malinovskiy expanded his discussion of targeting and tied it directly to Soviet ballistic missile systems. Communications centers were added as were bases and rocket sites in host nations close to the socialist community. The MOD also originated the concepts of targeting "everything that feeds war" and "where the attack came from."

In February 1962, Gorshkov writes for the first time that U.S. industrial, administrative, and political centers will be targets, but he does not specify the branch of the Soviet military that would deliver the attack. The Navy Chief also listed U.S. bases overseas as targets.
In February 1963 Malinovskiy associates the SRF with military and industrial targets and general rocket strikes with the U.S. target set given by Gorshkov in 1962. Marshal Grechko specifies SRF targets in 1971 and 1972 as including military administration, bases, means of nuclear attack, large concentrations of troops, industrial and transportation centers, rear services, and state administration and control.

In Grechko's *The Armed Forces of the Soviet State*, the MOD associates general rocket strikes with rear area bases, lines of communications, communications and control centers. Gorshkov follows this with reference to targets of strategic missile strikes. In May 1975, Gorshkov discusses the development of Soviet nuclear missile systems. He concludes an extremely lengthy passage with reference the primary object of military actions in a nuclear war including enemy armed forces, the economy, electrical power system, military industry, and administrative centers.

The MOD appeared to be explicit in SRF targeting (until about 1973), but, as was noted, was distinctly vague about SLBM targets. This may mean a number of
things. On the one hand, Gorshkov may have authority
to announce SLBM targeting. On the other hand,
despite Gorshkov's apparent linking of SLBM targets
with current Soviet strategy, he may be arguing
that SLBMs are capable of striking the same target set
as the SRF.

In Sokolovskiy's 1962 Military Strategy, the
triad of strategic nuclear forces was associated with
the destruction of an enemy means of nuclear attack,
military control centers, military-economic potential,
enemy troop units, communications centers, bases,
economy, system of government. 5/

In a 1982 book, Military-Technical Progress and
the USSR Armed Forces, the authors state that Soviet
strategic nuclear forces will attempt to destroy the
aggressor's strategic nuclear forces, military-economic
targets, troop units, and state and military control
entities. 6/

By recognizing that Soviet SSBNs are a part of
the strategic triad, we may construct a list of
declaratory targets for Soviet SLBM attacks on ground
targets from this list as well as Gorshkov's statements.
SLBM targets include: political-administrative
centers, military-industrial targets, military bases
that constitute a springboard for an attack on the USSR and other non-specific military targets. In order to refine the list further, subsequent hardware analysis should focus on what it is that SLBM strikes specifically can perform that the SRF or Long-Range Aviation cannot.

**SLOC as Fleet Versus Shore**

As was discussed earlier, Gorshkov declared in *The Sea Power of the State* that actions to disrupt SLOCs constitute a part of the general system of fleet versus shore. Fleet versus shore is a term used to describe missions capable of influencing the outcome of war. Gorshkov refers to the fleet versus shore anti-SLOC mission as capable of undermining the military-economic potential of an enemy. In his booklet *The Navy*, the admiral only mentions SLOC disruptions as being able to undermine a nation's economic potential.

The subject of a Soviet SLOC mission, especially against North Atlantic reinforcement and re-supply shipments from North America to Europe, is the subject of much heated and frequent debate in the West. Most previous analyses of the subject have concentrated on the relative importance associated with this task in the Soviet literature.
For example, Marshal Sokolovskiy is often cited for his description of the SLOC mission as being "among the main tasks" (thus inferring it is not the most important) but in need of being developed in the very beginning of a war. In other places, he links the main tasks of SLOC disruption with defeat of an enemy fleet and as such constituting the type of operation which can be termed a strategic mission (although hardly decisive on the outcome). Sokolovskiy includes SLOC disruption in each of the three places where he describes the strategic missions of the Soviet Navy.

Gorshkov says in his booklet *The Navy* that SLOC disruption is "a part of a modern Navy's main mission in a war." The SLOC mission also appears in the writings of other non-Navy Soviet authors. SLOC disruption is still a current topic and one which continues to attract the attention of Soviet naval authors.

We must refer back to Gorshkov again for a tie between disrupting SLOCs and attaining strategic goals. The Admiral makes this claim in general terms in *The Sea Power of the State* when he says that
disruption of the SLOCs are now "the (or a) most important part of the efforts of a fleet, aimed at undermining the military-economic potential of the enemy." In February 1967, the Navy C-in-C stated that SLOCs feed the military and economic potential of aggressors, and their disruption continues to be one of the fleet's most important missions. SLOC operations are capable of the attainment of a strategic goal (undermining the military and economic potential of an enemy) and, therefore, according to Gorshkov, must rank equal in theoretical status with SLBM strikes ashore.

SLOC disruption, however, receives nowhere near the same amount of attention as SLBM strikes at shore targets in terms of frequency of appearance. Gorshkov only refers to it as a current Soviet Navy mission in 12 documents since 1961. The MOD only refers to it twice, and then vaguely.

Gorshkov's specific SLOC disruption citations are quite revealing. When specifically referring to this mission as a current Soviet Navy mission, the means to disrupt the SLOCs are: The general fleet (4 cases), submarines, naval aviation and surface ships (2 cases), naval aviation (3 cases), missile boats in closed and coastal seas (3 cases), and by unspecified strikes across the seas (once in November 1977).
Gorshkov's use of closed and coastal sea SLOC's is of special interest since not all references to SLOCs, convoys and transports as targets necessarily mean the North Atlantic or mid-Pacific. In fact, Gorshkov could be referring to the SLOCs in the Baltic or the Sea of Japan whose disruption might be a strategic goal for that theater.

Strikes across the sea as a means to sever SLOCs could refer to missile strikes against SLOC terminals. This serves to possibly explain the previously discussed use of non-specific targets for SLBMs. The USSR might not want to publicize its plan to target port terminals, since they are generally colocated with cities and therefore with non-combatant civilians.

Further illumination of a SLOC mission is given by analysis of the admiral's general consideration of SLOCs in The Sea Power of the State. In a number of passages, Gorshkov discusses SLOC disruption in current, not historical, terms.

The Navy C-in-C points out the vulnerability of Western economies to SLOC disruption and the military importance of convoys, especially in the North Atlantic. He also discusses the importance of ports in a unified
transport system, although these passages might not be directly linked to military operations.

In one possibly historical passage in this book, Gorshkov states that once an aggressor is deprived of an opportunity to counterattack, the victor exploits his success by severing sea shipments of the enemy. The means he used to sever the SLOCs in this passage include blockade and seizure of islands and distant territories.

In a more contemporary but theoretical reference in The Sea Power of the State to SLOC disruption, Gorshkov states that submarines have been recognized by all fleets as the main threat to merchant vessels. In December 1982, Gorshkov once again points out the life-and-death value of uninterrupted communications to industrial developed coastal and island nations.

To cross check Gorshkov's meger discussions of a current Soviet SLOC disruption mission, it is necessary to consider articles by other authors. In a 1979 Morskoy Sbornik article, a Navy author discusses SLOC disruption in a modern war. The article cites the principal forces involved in the conflict as nuclear submarines, surface ships with aircraft, and shore-based aviation and missile forces.
The article also points out the well known naval principle of the comparative ease in concentrating objectives near terminals rather than along the route. The author states that SLOC combat operations include blockade and attacks. He further cites the potential of various types of armed forces participating in the SLOC campaign and the advantage of nuclear weapons.

Although the SLOC mission was described by Admiral Gorshkov as now being the province of fleet versus shore, full analysis of this mission will require consideration of fleet versus fleet. Although the results of severing the SLOCs are felt on the land and thus account for the fleet versus shore status, the primary means of completing this mission as being strikes against land targets or operations on the high seas cannot be established from the citations analyzed thus far.

Findings of Declaratory Policy

Fleet versus shore and especially strikes which undermine the military-economic potential of an aggressor are described by Gorshkov as influential upon the outcome of war. They rate this status due both to their identification as a strategic goal and also to Gorshkov's direct statements.
The primary means of conducting the strategic fleet versus shore mission is strike by SLBMs. The declaratory targets include political-administrative centers, military-industrial targets, military bases which constitute a springboard for attacks on the USSR, and other military bases. There are other non-specific targets constantly referred to, with strong indication that SLOC terminals are to be included in SLBM strikes since SLOC disruption now falls into the fleet versus shore category.
NOTES

1. This raid has been widely reported by Soviet Naval authors. It is also reported in a book written primarily for the Soviet Air Force. See M. N. Kozhevnikov The Command and Staff of the Soviet Army Air Force in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945, (Moscow: Nauka Publishing House, 1977) English translation published with the approval of the USSR by the U.S. Air Force as Vol. 17 in the Soviet Military Thought Series, p. 50.

2. Interestingly, Gorshkov's claim follows the appearance of this theme in the first two editions of Whence the Threat to Peace, (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1982), 1st Ed. p. 70; 2nd Ed., supplemented, p. 81. This claim, however is deleted in the 3rd Ed. (1984).


4. The 1979 Pergamon edition in English correctly translated the passage which is mis-translated in other sources. See p. 205 where guided missiles are given a role against ships and land objectives. Other translations state that this should read ships and large objectives in the first edition. A check of the Russian reveals Pergamon is correct. The use of SLCMs against shore targets was a possibility in early years similar to U.S. development of Regulus. Both nations appear to have phased out these systems with the advent of SLBMs. In any case, all citations referred to for missile strikes ashore post date older operational land attack SLCMs and pre-date new missile developments. See data on SS-N-3c in Norman Polmer's Guide to the Soviet Navy, 3rd Ed. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1983), p. 363. See also Captain 1st Rank G. A. Ammon, et al., The Soviet Navy in War and Peace. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1981), p. 100, where reference is made to long-range strategic missiles being intended for strikes on land.
targets. It appears that the meanings generally associated with Engineer Rear Admiral N. V. Isachenkov's Krasnaya Zvezda article ("New Ship Weapons" November 18, 1961), that SLBMs are for shore targets and SLCMs for sea targets, has been correct during the study period.


6. Lieutenant-General M. M. Kir'yan, Ed., Military Technical Progress and the USSR Armed Forces (Moscow: signed to press July 8, 1982), p. 314. The continuity between this new publication and Sokolovskiy is reinforced by numerous other references to the object of nuclear attacks in other Soviet military writings.

7. Sokolovskiy, p. 302.

8. Sokolovskiy, pp. 299-300.


10. Major-General V. Kruchinin says it is a strategic mission in "Contemporary Strategic Theory on the Goals and Missions of Armed Conflict," Voyennaya

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CHAPTER 4

CONTENT ANALYSIS OF SOVIET FLEET VERSUS FLEET

The mission of fleet versus fleet is Admiral Gorshkov's term to describe the second of the two major roles of navies. Fleet versus fleet involves the use of naval forces to combat an enemy's naval forces at sea and in his bases. It also has to do with maintaining one's own sea lines of communication (SLOC). In past wars, it also involved disrupting an enemy's SLOC.

Cutting an enemy's SLOCs is now described by Admiral Gorshkov as being part of the overall mission of fleet versus shore. Since the SLOC disruption mission is closely related to operations against naval forces at sea, it will once again be considered here. The related mission of maintaining a Soviet SLOC will not be analyzed in this research since it is not associated with the term strategic nor has it been identified as a mission which has an influence upon the outcome of war. Obviously, SLOC maintenance is crucial for the West, but it is the Soviet strategic situation which is of interest to this study.

Two fleet versus fleet missions have been described in terms associated with the ability to influence the
outcome of war. These are crushing an enemy's military-economic potential (which was also a category for fleet versus shore), and destruction of major enemy groupings. Undermining the military-economic potential at sea involves operations against naval ships and non-combatants on the SLOCs. Under the category of strategic goals, which by definition impact upon the outcome of wars, Gorshkov includes the shattering of an enemy's nuclear sea power.

Since the threat from foreign fleets is implicit in this discussion, consideration must be given to protecting Soviet territory. Gorshkov describes the two chief goals of fleets in The Sea Power of the State as tasks associated with strikes against the shore and protection of the homeland from strikes from an enemy fleet. The latter can be considered as part of shattering an enemy's nuclear sea power. Preventing and countering aggression from the sea was described by the admiral as a strategic mission, as were specific actions against enemy ballistic missile submarines, protecting own installations, and the defense of the sea borders.
Threats From The Sea

One of the most frequent sets of themes encountered in this research has to do with the threat from the sea. The threat from the sea is not always tied to a particular nation but most often cast in terms of the West or NATO. The U.S. is frequently singled out and, upon occasion, other nations such as West Germany, the United Kingdom, and France are listed.

The threat from the sea is contained in 19% of all Politburo, 26% of all MOD, and 31% of Gorshkov's documents analyzed during the study period. The most often discussed threats are enemy nuclear-capable naval forces: submarines with missiles and attack aircraft carriers. Seventy-six percent of all documents that discuss the threat deal with these primary two.

The stated threat to the USSR from submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) has changed over time; from Polaris to Poseidon and then to Trident. Since 1975, the submarine threat missile has expanded to include sea launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). The specific location of Western submarines is rarely given. There are occasional references to the Mediterranean (first use July 1963) and the Atlantic and

Generally there are no substantial differences between the subsurface threat as articulated by individual speakers from the different bureaucracies. All specify the submarine with missiles more often than submarines in general. One slight variation is that Gorshkov refers to submarines as a threat other than in the context of strikes by them against Soviet territory.

The second most-mentioned threat has been the attack aircraft carrier. We find it mentioned twice by Brezhnev, and five times by the MOD, and in 30 documents by the Navy Chief. The most interesting use of this threat theme is revealed by analysis over time.

Attack aircraft carriers were mentioned as a threat to the territory of the USSR in the 1960's with parallel references to their vulnerability to Soviet weapons systems. The high costs and low combat
potential of carriers were also cited. By 1970, Gorshkov wrote in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia that carriers were useful in local and limited wars and as a strategic nuclear reserve. In the event of a nuclear war, carrier-based attack aviation was described as primarily associated with combat actions at sea. No mention was made of major Western air strikes by carrier aviation against the USSR.

Gorshkov repeats the theme that attack carriers form a strategic reserve in The Sea Power of the State and the Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopedia. He does not repeat the theme that attack aviation is only associated with fleet versus fleet in a nuclear war.

Since 1981, the threat from aircraft carriers has most often appeared in the context of articles addressing the U.S.-Soviet naval balance and the need to account for so-called forward-based systems in European theater nuclear arms control talks. Gorshkov did offer his appraisal in January and April 1983, regarding the large versus small aircraft carrier debate in the West, that the Falklands armed conflict demonstrated the supremacy of large carriers. He also published a major article in Krasnaya Zvezda in October 1983 which credited aircraft carriers (according to U.S. strategists)
Soviet spokesmen have specifically noted Western ASW forces as a threat, and Gorshkov has warned the U.S. fleet might pre-empt against Soviet strategic forces. There is evidence in their literature that the Soviets plan to use all naval forces in such a manner that the primary strike force (SSBN) will be allowed to carry out its mission in the face of a Western strategic ASW campaign. Gorshkov states in his booklet *The Navy*, that the fleet versus shore mission created the fleet versus fleet problem.

The primary threat to Soviet SSBNs is from Western submarines. The U.S. has recently emphasized the need for a strategic ASW capability for its SSNs, and stated it will conduct an offensive in Arctic waters in the event of war. 5/ Land-based patrol aviation also constitutes an ASW threat especially to forward-deployed Soviet SSBNs. Western land based air and carrier task groups could mount ASW campaigns in Arctic or other waters close to the USSR, but would be subject to air strikes from Soviet land-based aviation. In Soviet declaratory statements, it would appear that each possible fleet versus fleet interaction has been accounted for.
once more to those offensive missions assigned to the Soviet Navy.

Without question, the primary declaratory role of the Soviet Navy is the fleet versus shore mission consisting primarily of SLBM strikes against distant shores. The second most important mission (but one that appears to be virtually equal in status) is prevention of strikes against the USSR. All other missions are secondary.

Fleet versus fleet must also include protection from Western attacks on lower level Soviet operations such as amphibious missions and convoy resupply of land forces. Considering the perceived threats and the primacy of the fleet versus shore mission, it appears that the primary focus of fleet interactions dealing with threats to the Soviet Navy must be on Western actions contemplated against Soviet SSBNs.

Strategic ASW is rarely discussed in open source Western literature. Soviet SSBNs as targets for Western ASW represents an opportunity to achieve a major military gain during a war, at a potentially low cost. Despite the dearth of official statements in that the West would mount a strategic ASW campaign, there is no question that the Soviets anticipate such actions.
Notably absent from any discussion of how to counter Western SSBNs are a number of other possible methods. There is, for example, no declaratory policy of barrage use of the SRF against Western SSBN patrol areas nor as counter-battery fire once the first Western SLBM breaks the surface. There is no mention of anti-ballistic missile systems or other air defense forces and systems which could counter cruise or ballistic missiles launched from sea or transiting the ocean airspace.

It would thus appear that the Navy's mission in countering the threat from Western navies is primarily directed at the second phase in a layered defense. Soviet submarines will be utilized against Western weapons carriers at sea. SRF and possibly the Navy have a role in distant strikes against the weapon carrier for the missiles while in port. Other forces must be tasked with defense against missiles once they are launched.

Protection of the Soviet Fleet

Having now dealt with the use of the Soviet fleet to engage an enemy fleet in order to protect Soviet territory, we need to account for threats to her fleet. In order to ascertain these, we need to return
I will return to this concept in a separate chapter dealing with Soviet strategy in war. It is only mentioned here because it would appear to be a specific reference to another possible solution to the threat of missile strikes from Western submarines.

In general, the military answer to Polaris and its follow-on replacements appears to be similar to that first outlined by Marshal Sokolovskiy. The SRF appears to have been tasked with destruction of SSBNs in bases. From the literature since 1965, it is possible to conclude that Soviet SLBMs might have either taken over this role or will participate in such strikes on bases.

Aviation appears to have lost the role Sokolovskiy mentioned in countering SSBNs. There are still references to joint Navy-Air Force missions or Air Force missions in maritime theaters but no specific tie to strategic ASW operations. In two cases where Gorshkov appeared to advocate a strategic ASW role for naval aviation, it appears more likely he was advocating this position not announcing it. The main method to combat Western ballistic missile submarines appears to be Soviet submarines.
Soviet submarine activities, however, are stressed twenty-two times since 1965 as having an under-Arctic-ice capability. There is no way to distinguish in the literature if the Arctic is primarily an area of routine deployment for Soviet SSBNs or that Soviet submarines would be conducting a strategic ASW campaign against Western SSBNs which deploy there.

Without entering into the related subject of deterrence of war, as understood in the West, it is necessary to point out one unique citation that appeared to discuss a different solution to the threat of Western nuclear missile strikes from SSBNs. In July 29, 1979, Gorshkov discusses the Western naval strategic nuclear missile threat. He follows the description of the threat by stating that the Party and Government's . . . "way to neutralize that threat . . . consisted of creating qualitatively new strategic facilities in the shape of nuclear submarines carrying ballistic missiles." This appears to be a direct reference to the use of Soviet SSBNs to counter those of the West. But is it a reference to war-fighting damage limitation or a plan to deter use of Western SLBMs by a like Soviet threat implying withholding?
with this passage: It also included land and surface ships as the object of attack and it appears that Gorshkov was advocating this mission, not announcing it.

Marshal Grechko writes in *The Armed Forces of the Soviet State* that naval operations include combat against enemy atomic missile submarines. In a December 1972 *Red Star* article, Grechko stated the SRF would target naval forces in the theater, although not specifically SSBNs. This is the only reference uncovered that discusses the planned of Soviet land-based ballistic missiles to target naval forces apparently at sea although he possibly meant in theater anchorages or bases. Gorshkov does discuss ICBM targeting naval forces at sea once, but clearly from a historical perspective.

As was pointed out in Sokolovskiy's treatment of Polaris patrol locations, the Arctic Ocean was included. None of the Politburo spokesmen, MODs, nor Gorshkov ever refer to this area as a Western SSBN patrol area. Instead, Marshal Malinovskiy boasts in October 1961 that Soviet SSBNs deploy under the Arctic ice. This theme is repeated once by him and once by Gorshkov.
claimed in the 1962 first edition that ASW submarines could use homing missiles and torpedoes against Polaris and Long-Range Aviation could use nuclear depth charges. 4/

Destruction of Western SSBNs is of the highest possible concern to both the West and the Soviet Union. Marshal Malinovskiy stated twice in 1962 and 1963 that Soviet submarine rockets would target Polaris submarines but did not specify where. His reference could mean while Polaris was at sea or in their bases. One can infer from the passages that he meant at-sea targeting. Since that time, Gorshkov has specified Soviet submarines (no mention of missiles) as the means to destroy Western SSBNs. In early 1965, Gorshkov stated that Soviet Navy rockets were capable of dealing with a variety of naval targets including Polaris, but he did not specify at-sea targeting.

There are a number of other citations that use less specific phrases to describe fleet versus fleet combat. In July 1972, Gorshkov said that targets at sea will be the nucleus of the enemies' nuclear might. The means of countering this nuclear threat from the West was Soviet atomic submarines and missile-equipped aviation. There are two problems
enemy's attack does not necessarily have to be a total success. Gorshkov says in his booklet *The Navy* that fleet operations against an enemy's sea-based strategic weapons will "weaken their attacks to the maximum extent possible." During the period of this research, the main threat was the SLBM.

As was discussed in the fleet versus shore section, the destruction of enemy ships in their bases forms part of the fleet versus fleet mission. Land and rocket submarine bases have been on the declaratory list of targets for distant Soviet blows since February 1963. Marshal Malinovskiy specified at that time the means of such blows as the triad of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), the Air Force, and the Navy. Gorshkov followed this declaration with one that the Navy would target Polaris bases in Europe and strike submarines at sea.

Marshal Sokolovskiy was quite explicit in his targeting against Polaris in the 1963 second edition of *Military Strategy*. He discussed defense in depth with the SRF and Long Range Aviation striking the subs in their bases, and Long Range Aviation, ASW submarines, and other ASW forces being tasked with operations against submarines in transit and in patrol areas. He
actions designed to protect Soviet fleet assets and ensure they carry out their missions.

One final consideration of the threat in general concerns the expected audience. Nearly half of all documents were directed at general audiences, with a high percentage being newspaper articles. Only 35% of all documents could be expected to have a predominantly military readership. The remaining either originated in another country or were destined for foreign consumption. Most foreign articles appeared after 1981. In fact, 32% of all documents that contained threat themes appeared after 1981, which constituted only 16% of the study period.

**Prevention of Attacks on USSR**

The primary threat from the sea to Soviet territory is the SLBM and cruise missile. Destruction of the missile carrier itself would appear to qualify as destruction of major enemy groupings and crushing military potential, both of which are included in Gorshkov's means to influence war. Destruction of the enemy's nuclear sea power is a strategic goal itself. There is no question that under the category of strategic missions, combat against enemy missile carriers is included. The mission to frustrate an
is repeated in the *Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya* and *The Sea Power of the State*.

Gorshkov uses the latter book to also introduce the concept that the U.S. fleet is tasked with conducting preemptive operations against enemy strategic forces before they could be used against the U.S. This is not necessarily against Soviet naval assets since the citation refers to counterforce against general strategic forces. Strategic forces according to Soviet use does not necessarily include what the U.S. terms strategic nuclear forces.

The stated threat from enemy fleets to the USSR is presented in the fleet versus fleet section, since actions taken by the USSR against enemy threats from the sea will generally but not always result in fleet interactions. The declared Western threats are submarine-launched missiles, cruise missiles which originate at or transit the sea aboard a variety of platforms, attack aircraft carriers (primarily directed at the Soviet fleet), and ASW forces, including aircraft carrier operations directed at Soviet submarines. For the purposes of this research, these will be consolidated into: (1) interactions designed to prevent nuclear attacks on the USSR, and (2) inter-
subsurface missile threat has clearly emerged as the predominant threat to Soviet territory, with aircraft carriers as more of a threat to Soviet naval forces or in actions not directly related to the USSR. To further develop fleet versus fleet, one must consider those citations that specify which enemy fleet forces are perceived as a threat to Soviet naval forces.

The major category of Western fleet threats to the Soviet Navy is antisubmarine warfare (ASW). Grechko refers to the ASW forces of the enemy twice and Gorshkov does 16 times in 10 documents. The first use of the ASW threat theme is in May 1963 where ASW aircraft carriers and nuclear ASW submarines are noted. Gorshkov later updates his reference to ASW carriers by mentioning the new multi-purpose carriers of the U.S. Navy carry ASW aircraft in addition to attack planes.

In his 1970 Great Soviet Encyclopedia article, Gorshkov lists ASW forces as including ASW carriers, surface ships, diesel and attack nuclear submarines (SSNs). Of Interest is the only role given to the Western SSN in this article is ASW. This SSN ASW threat theme
Other threat themes that appear include the opening of new ocean sectors to the enemy (since May 1975) and the ability of enemy navies to attack from varying directions (since November 1975). The former might have been related to either the increase in U.S. SSBN patrol areas due to the Trident missiles or the reference might be related to the gradual buildup of U.S. forces in the Indian Ocean. The new ocean sector and varying directions themes have only once been tied directly to U.S. submarine missiles.

The perceived threat posed by Western surface ships (other than aircraft carriers), surface-launched SLCMs, and the MLF, has been generally minimal. Most citations credit Western surface ships with the role of protecting carriers, convoys, or amphibious units. One document in May 1975 discussed light missile forces in NATO navies. There are occasional references to amphibious forces and the U.S. Marine Corps, but never in a context of being associated as a threat to the USSR.

In the early 1960's, Gorshkov referred to the attack aircraft carrier and Polaris submarine as the main striking force of the U.S. Navy. Over time, the
Gorshkov has periodically included other nuclear associated threats from the sea. In March 1972 he cited Western plans for ocean floor bases for nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). In the second edition of *The Sea Power of the State*, he claims that older U.S. Polaris submarines will be placed into the reserves, which would imply that they could be reactivated. Marshal Ustinov referred to the U.S. Trident missiles in July 1983 as a first-strike system. The Navy Chief made reference to U.S. neutron warheads from the sea in July 1977. His later discussions of these warheads are more general and do not necessarily involve the oceanic theater.

An interesting Soviet method of discussing the nuclear threat from the West has been to cite the percentage of nuclear potential that the U.S. Navy has relative to other U.S. services. In the 1960's this was described by Gorshkov as one-third. In May 1978, he expanded the comparison by stating that Western Navies had 70% of all NATO potential. Gorshkov uses missiles as the unit of measure twice, in May 1965 and September 1977. He generally uses warheads, which results in a much higher raw number than missiles.
with a decisive role in a future confrontation between navies during a limited nuclear war.

The downgrading of the attack carrier threat was one of the major pieces of evidence that James McConnell and Bradford Dismukes used to support their contention that Soviet fleet actions in the June War of 1967, the Jordanian crisis of 1970, and the October 1973 war were primarily political in nature rather than necessitated by consideration of strategic defense of the USSR. Their logic is that had U.S. carrier deployments posed a real threat to the USSR, then the Soviet response was insufficient to be characteristic of their principles of war. 2/

Another specific nuclear threat from the sea deals with the NATO multilateral force (MLF). The threat of the MLF appeared from February 1963 - February 1966. Since then, the MLF has been mentioned only as a historical note.

As was mentioned earlier, cruise missiles have been discussed as a new threat since at least 1975. SLCMs are sometimes associated with specific launch platform but more often appear in general terms. Cruise missiles as a threat has appeared in about one-third of all documents since 1982.
Protection by Naval Aviation

It was noted earlier that Soviet declaratory policy is for her naval aviation to be used primarily in a fleet versus fleet context. In some 34 documents which discuss Soviet naval air missions, 30 individual citations appear which mention ASW and another 23 associate Soviet naval aviation with an anti-surface ship operation.

Soviet naval aviation includes both fixed-wing airplanes and rotary-wing helicopters. Both are capable of conducting either ASW or anti-surface warfare. The specific surface and submarine targets for Soviet naval air operations are rarely given. There have been four references to convoys and transports as aviation targets. In both editions of The Sea Power of the State, Gorshkov stated that Soviet naval aviation's targets include the ASW forces of the enemy. As a general statement in this book, but one not tied specifically to the Soviet Navy, Gorshkov declares that the main task of naval aviation is ASW. In his 1977 book The Navy, the Navy C-in-C says that the combat capabilities of naval aviation are one of the main indicators of the fleet's striking power.
An interesting theme associated with Soviet naval air is that of cooperation with other naval forces. This theme originated from Marshal Malinovskiy at least as early as October 1961. Since then, Soviet naval aviation has been mentioned five additional times as cooperating with submarines and four times with surface ships.

The Soviet Air Force also has a role in oceanic theaters against naval targets. This theme appears as early as February 1958, and is authored only by the MOD. We found Gorshkov reluctant to address Soviet Long-Range Aviation in his discussion of the strategic triad and now also find him avoiding reference to a Soviet Air Force mission to strike naval forces of the enemy. Gorshkov instead makes occasional references to "other forces" in oceanic theaters without specifying the service.

The status of naval aviation is generally in number two; appearing right after submarines. Gorshkov linked these two main branches first in July 1963 as being more important than other naval branches. This link theme has reappeared 32 times through 1979 and has been used by Marshal Grechko. Use of this theme falls off after 1977. More recent Naval Aviation passages mention their new air capable surface ships.
Protection by Surface Ships

The status and roles for Soviet surface ships are also interesting to trace over time, especially in light of Nikita Khrushchev's oft cited denigrations of surface ships and the reams of papers written in the West about Soviet surface ships used for naval diplomacy. Khrushchev's early 1960's declaration of the declining role of surface ships was followed by similar comments from Gorshkov.

Gorshkov statements in support of surface ships predates Khrushchev's Fall in 1965, showing that he either disagreed with the Party Chairman or that Khrushchev's dismissal of surface ships has been over exaggerated in the West. In July 1963, Gorshkov stated in *Morskoy Sbornik* to a primarily Soviet Navy audience, that surface ships were still needed. In a May 1965 *Literaturnaya Gazeta* article, he refined this claim by making it clear that ships with guns had a lesser role but "war at sea still includes combat tasks which cannot be successfully resolved without surface ships."

By July 1966, Gorshkov attempted to place surface ships on an equal status with submarines and aviation. In February 1968, surface rocket carriers
were termed the "pride of the fleet." In July, he included ASW vessels in this special group. Five years later, he declared in a Pravda article that surface ships are technically equivalent to submarines.

In the first edition of The Sea Power of the State, we find the theme that Soviet surface ships are needed to solve a number of tasks facing the fleet. This theme is dropped in the second edition, although an additional reference is retained concerning the need for surface ships to generally support submarines. In his 1977 booklet, The Navy and in the second edition of The Sea Power of the State, Gorshkov states that missile ships and small combatants are the pride of Soviet shipbuilding. In July 1980, he repeats that surface ships are still important.

In general, it is Gorshkov and not his seniors who praises Soviet surface ships. Grechko did make one favorable reference to surface ships in early 1971, but in a passage which also praised submarines and aviation. Considering the place of publication, Morskoy Sbornik, this was probably a passing reference designed to praise the Navy as a whole. Most of the Gorshkov praise is for surface ships appears in articles and speeches designed for a general audience.
In the 41 documents by all authors that contain references to surface ship missions being considered in this study, the most often mentioned mission for Soviet surface ships is ASW (40 citations), and then anti-surface (14 citations). Surface ship missions against the shore are described as amphibious operations (21 cases) or as assisting the ground forces (14 cases). Notably absent is the use of surface ships to fire cruise missiles against land targets or to specifically engage missiles enroute to targets ashore in the USSR.

In looking at the author of these references to war missions, slight differences appear. In general, Politburo spokesmen or MOD associate ASW with Soviet surface ships. The sole exception is Marshal Grechko, who twice referred to an anti-surface role in 1971 (including one against enemy strike forces) and also mentions amphibious capabilities. Grechko additionally states in the second edition of *The Armed Forces of the Soviet State* that surface ships are being developed for "strike" missions.

Gorshkov specifies individual targets for Soviet surface forces. In 1970, he lists the enemy's strike forces and transports as targets. In *The Sea Power of...*
the State, Soviet missile boats in coastal waters and closed seas are credited with a capability against other surface ships and transports. Convoys are repeated as targets in the Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopedia. Transports and enemy ASW forces appear as targets in September 1977.

Gorshkov also stresses the multi-purpose nature of Soviet surface ships or their capability for a wide variety of tasks 17 times since 1965. In both theoretical discussions of surface ships, and specific discussions of Soviet surface ships, Gorshkov states they are capable of strikes, missions against the SLOCs, and "often the sole combat means of ensuring deployment of the main strike forces of the fleet - submarines."

This latter capability is tied directly to the Soviet Navy in the Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopedia. Gorshkov's booklet The Navy states that Soviet surface ships will "assure the combat stability of submarines." Soviet surface ships cooperating with submarines appears in The Sea Power of the State as well as surface ship interaction with aviation.

The Soviet view of aircraft carriers over time has been written about by others and will not be
repeated here. As for Soviet carriers or air-capable cruisers, Gorshkov has made it clear that these are for ASW purposes, although in September 1969 he did boast that the MOSKVA was capable of combating surface ships. In May 1978, Brezhnev stated that the USSR had no attack aircraft carriers and was not building any.

Recent and repeated Gorshkov comments have stressed that the USSR's two carriers are solely for ASW purposes. Most of these comments were for external consumption. In July 1983, Ustinov went so far as to deny that the Soviets had any carriers obviously meaning attack carriers. Recent Soviet discussions of their carriers appear to be influenced by arms control negotiations and counting rules which might tabulate carrier aircraft as nuclear weapons delivery vehicles.

Protection by Submarines

Soviet submarines are also given a role in fleet versus fleet. There has been a great deal of controversy over the years as to the means of engagement. Submarines are capable of laying mines, firing torpedoes, or using missiles in fleet versus fleet engagements.

Despite a long involvement in mine warfare and much concern about this threat by the West, the Soviet
writings consulted in this study generally lacked mention of any Soviet future use of mines. It also appears that mine warfare is not openly associated with any strategic missions. The subject of U.S./NATO mine warfare capability is a frequent theme in Morskoy Sbornik demonstrating Soviet interest in the subject.

The use of torpedoes is a frequent theme, however. The Soviet Navy Chief and MOD have stated on ten occasions since 1962 that Soviet torpedoes include those with nuclear warheads. Torpedoes are an obvious means for fleet engagements but are not associated with any particular target set.

As was noted in the fleet versus shore chapters, passages referring to the targets of submarine missiles have often included both land and sea targets making analysis extremely complicated. Also noted was the lively debate in the West over the possibility that SLBMs were to be used against targets in the oceanic theater.

In October 1961, Chairman Khrushchev made a specific reference to submarine target-seeking rockets being used against ships. This passage was different from another one in the same report in which Khruschev discussed both submarine ballistic rockets
and target-seeking rockets. Following this Khrushchev report, Engineer-Rear Admiral N. V. Isachenkov stated in a Krasnaya Zvezda interview what appears to be the plan to use SLCMs against ships and SLBMs against the shore. 7/ This article was reanalyzed in the West with the conclusion that he could have meant SLBMs against ships. 8/

Marshal Sokolovskiy states in his 1962 and 1963 editions of Military Strategy that submarines' guided missiles launched from under the surface are a threat to surface vessels. 9/ He states that such a method of operations has replaced the standard method of torpedo attack. One must remember that subsurface-launched cruise missiles had not yet appeared in 1962, and that the only subsurface-launched missile at the time was ballistic. As late as April 1965, when the Dictionary of Basic Military Terms was typeset, cruise missiles were listed as being capable of only being fired from submarines on the surface. 10/

In a February 1966 article by Malinovskiy, which appeared in Bulgaria, a passage discusses the use of submarines in fleet versus fleet engagements. The last part of includes submarine missiles striking "targets" from a submerged position. The type of
missile is not specified, but if the MOD was referring to a SLCM, it had to be a prototype SLCM, since operational cruise missiles capable of submerged launch had not yet appeared.

Marshal Grechko's October 1967 speech to the Supreme Soviet contains a passage that reads:

Submarines armed with ballistic rockets are capable of destroying ships from a distance of hundreds of kilometers and delivering blows from underwater on strategic enemy targets thousands of kilometers away.

The obviously interesting portion is direct reference to the use of SLBMs to target ships at a sufficiently short enough distance as to imply operations at sea. If ships in port were the object, he would have probably said thousands of kilometers.

In a Soviet-prepared English summary of his 1971 Navy Day speech, Admiral Gorshkov reportedly stated that "submarines are capable of hitting enemy strategic targets at a distance of 1,000 kilometers and sending winged rockets and torpedoes to hit enemy ships and submarines." Additional Soviet articles by other authors have appeared that might imply that SLBMs were intended for targets at sea including ships in formation. 11/ From the point of the literature alone,
the use of SLBMs against fleet targets appears to be a declaratory policy at least through 1972.

One must certainly question the possibility of such a major conceptual breakthrough as SLBMs against ships at sea in light of other Soviet pronouncements of their new military and naval capability. The Soviet literature contains direct reference to nuclear warheads on their missiles and torpedoes. A subsurface launch capability for rockets has been referred to by the Navy Chief and MOD since July 1962. Submarine speeds exceeding those in the U.S. have been discussed as early as July 1961. New rocket fuels were mentioned by Malinovskiy in February 1965. In October 1967, Grechko discussed submarine power plant capability being a hundred fold greater than WW II subs and in December of that year, Gorshkov added references to depth increases five times greater than in WW II.

Gorshkov says in his Great Soviet Encyclopedia article that the construction of Soviet nuclear submarines began in 1953. Elsewhere Soviet Naval authors point out their first launch of a SLBM from submarines in 1955. 12/ Statements of this type may be viewed as mere sabre-rattling or propaganda but it is of interest that they are made at all.
It is possible, naturally, that the Soviet military does not want to publicize the use of SLBMs against surface ships or submarines. This may be for internal domestic needs rather than to ensure not "leaking" a surprise military capability. Maintaining support for Soviet naval programs might be undermined if the Party continually had general naval vulnerability discussed in such terms that the vulnerability of Soviet ships was also in question.

Targets of Soviet submarine fleet versus fleet interactions do not clear up the controversy over SLBMs against ships since the means of submarine versus fleet interactions are often vague or include targets ashore in the passage. One finds numerous references to use of submarines against prime threats to the fleet (which are Western aircraft carriers and submarines). The July 1979 reference to a possible mission of Soviet SSBNs against Western SSBNs has previously been pointed out but, this may have been in a reference to deterrence and not counter-battery.

There are references to Soviet submarines against transports and amphibious forces in two encyclopedia articles. In *The Sea Power of the State*, Gorshkov includes enemy merchant ships as the target for
submarines on two occasions, but he does not identify such strikes directly as a Soviet mission.

This book also contains reference to the use of Soviet submarines to engage the enemy fleet in areas of the ocean chosen by the USSR. This passage follows criticism of the centuries-old practice of the Russian fleet being tied to coastal areas and closed theaters. Submarine cooperation with Naval Aviation and surface ships has already been discussed. Notably absent, however, is any mention of Soviet submarines cooperating with submarines. A widely cited passage from a 1975 Morskoy Sbornik article does, in fact, refer to the use of "operational-tactical submarines . . . to support the combat patrolling of strategic submarines." Unfortunately, this entire article is a discussion of Western practices and is based on materials from the foreign press. This does not mean one should dismiss this article out of hand, but it is not a direct citation stating the Soviet's have their ASW submarines patrolling with and protecting their SSBNs. The statement is typical of the problems analysts have in inferring missions of the Soviet fleet using Western surrogates found in the literature.
Soviet submarine cooperation with other submarines in war is a historical fact that has appeared in other open Soviet sources. In discussions of the Soviet Naval campaign against German SLOCs in WW II, submarines were deployed in groups including groups of 2-3 when engaging convoys. At that time, the Soviets were having problems with underwater communications devices which at the time were supposedly capable of transmissions up to 12,000 yards (roughly six nautical miles).

Discussion of this last item included a prognosis (1973) that the problem would eventually be solved. It seems noteworthy that Gorshkov makes no direct mention of the Soviet use of submarines in groups or for the protection of SSBNs. Both concepts have been credited as a Soviet tactic by Western analysts. Another absence is the mention of submarine missiles against aircraft.

The "Blue Belt of Defense"

Problems associated with the translation of the Russian words "zashchita" and "oborona" into English as "defense" have been mentioned previously. The former generally is used as a protective shield between enemy and victim, while the latter is more of
It is to this general conception of an employment plan for the Soviet Navy that the content analysis will now turn. Some of the more recent criticisms of existing analyses of the Soviet Navy is that the evidence in the Soviet literature does not necessarily support these Western conclusions. 3/ The ability of the Soviet fleet to carry out its wartime missions cannot be harshly criticized in internal Soviet publications or speeches for fear of undermining deterrence credibility. The point of this chapter is to weigh the evidence by reviewing the literature for both manifest and latent support.

To do so, themes were tracked that have to do with: the anticipated length of war, the potential for limited nuclear war, the concept of deterrence, strategic nuclear reserves, capabilities of naval forces, command and control, operational art, and tactics.

Global Versus Limited Nuclear War

There is no question from the reading of the literature during the Khruschev era that declaratory doctrine for a response to a strike by the West was for massive nuclear attacks and a specific rejection of limited war. Since that time, military authors and
CHAPTER 5

SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY

Up to this point, we have considered declaratory goals and missions of the Soviet military in the event of a major nuclear war, what enemy forces would be engaged by the various types of Soviet forces, and other basic questions of military doctrine and strategy. To complete the content analysis of Soviet declaratory policy, we now need to assess the nature of a future war, the methods of conducting such a war, and specific plans as they relate to the use of naval forces and operations on the oceanic theater.

The official Washington view of the wartime employment of the Soviet Navy is generally as follows: It is assumed that forward-deployed nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) would be employed against time-urgent targets in the U.S., i.e., bomber/tanker bases, command and control centers, or intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos in a "pin-down" attack. 1/ Certain older submarines in European and Asian waters are assigned theater strike missions. Newer submarines would be deployed in Arctic-defended bastions where they would be withheld from an initial Soviet strike 2/ in order to be used for inter-or post-war negotiations and a peace settlement.

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18. Jonny Marhold Moscow dispatch carried on East Berlin Domestic Service in German at 0756 GMT on May 7, 1970.
with Admiral Sergeyev cited was carried by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1500 GMT and does appear to support Clawson's claim. The report by Val. Goltsev "The Nuclear Submarines Attack," in Izvestiya, April 28, 1970 Morning edition, p. 6, places the reference to ballistic missiles in one paragraph and ships at formation as the targets of missiles (type unspecified) in another, thus undermining Clawson's thesis. By 1970, the missiles capable of striking ships in formation could have been SLCMs.


7. "New Ship Weapons," Krasnaya Zvezda, November 18, 1961. "Ballistic rockets are basically assigned to the destruction of coastal targets... The Soviet Navy is faced with the task of destroying on the sea the ships and vessels of the enemy. The most efficient means of combat on the oceans and seas are self-homing rockets."
NOTES


3. Gorshkov should have known that this was not possible under the provisions of the SALT I Interim Agreement. Consequently, we can surmise either poor research by the staff tasked with updating his book, or deliberate falsification of data.


5. The plan to have U.S. naval forces conduct strategic ASW against the USSR in the event of a war was openly resurfaced by Chief of Naval Operations James Watkins. See, for example, the
coastal areas and closed areas. It appears that the declaratory strategy, to disrupt distant SLOCs is by fleet versus shore missile strikes.

Finally, the matter of the use of ballistic missiles against surface ships appears to be declaratory policy but perhaps historical. MOD Grechko did, in fact, state that Soviet SRF missiles and SLBMS would be used against surface ships in the theater.
Soviet ASW assets, submarines, and supporting land-based air.

There is no doubt that Soviet declaratory policy includes active defense of Soviet SSBNs. This researcher feels active defense of Soviet SSBNs baits Western navies to combat in areas chosen by the USSR. Areas of active defense allow both protection of Soviet assets and the opportunity to destroy major enemy groupings. Soviet military forces assigned to oceanic theaters of operations supporting defended areas include the Soviet Navy and the Soviet Air Force. Soviet policy is for close interaction of a multitude of air, surface, and subsurface units that would ensure control of these areas and deny the West the ability to upset Soviet control of the seas. Concluding this concept of active defense of the fleet as a "bastion," defense appears proper.

There is only modest evidence of a declaratory Soviet SLOC disruption mission associated with traditional at-sea operations rather than by missile strikes against terminals. Occasionally, the Soviets state they intend to use aviation, surface ships (missile boats, especially), and submarines against SLOCs but some of this commentary has specified
battle for its own sake. All major naval engagements are tailored to a formalized system of strategic goals and missions designed ultimately to influence the outcome of a war. To understand these engagements, one must look at the perceived Western threat, visualize distances, and geography.

The long-range threat to the USSR is Western naval forces found in their home bases and waters and specifically SSBNs deployed at sea. The long-range threat can be met by Soviet ballistic missiles from the SRF and possibly also from Soviet Navy submarines. Strikes will be conducted against enemy fleet units in ports and at bases. Ships in their bases (especially Western SSBNs and carriers) are magnets for Soviet strikes, since major military benefits result from the expenditure of only a few missiles. Such attacks constitute part of the overall fleet versus fleet mission. U.S. SSBNs on distant patrol are targets of Soviet submarine ASW action.

A closer-in threat is posed by shorter range SLBMs, SLCM carriers, and surface carrier task forces. These Western units pose a threat against the Soviet homeland itself (SLBM, SLCM) or against the Soviet fleet. They will be countered primarily by
submarines are the main branch, and the main strategic orientation is fleet versus shore, there is a need for "all-round backing of the actions of the forces solving strategic tasks."

Therefore, the struggle to create, in a particular time, favorable conditions for successfully solving by a large grouping of forces of the fleet, the main tasks facing it, and at the same time creating conditions such as would make it more difficult for the enemy to fulfill his tasks and prevent him from frustrating the actions of the opposing side, will apparently be widely adopted. . . . Among these measures are the creation and preparation of the necessary forces and resources for keeping them in readiness to solve combat tasks, form groupings of forces and such deployment of them in a theater as to ensure positional superiority over the enemy . . .

Gorshkov's discussion is an attempt to distance himself from Mahan, whom he frequently criticizes, and to state that in order to accomplish strategic tasks at sea, sea control is only required over particular ocean areas and only during particular times. As we know, strategic tasks have been generally associated with strikes against the shore and with countering aggression from the sea.

Findings of Declaratory Policy

Soviet declaratory policy does not include fleet interactions in which navies engage in a decisive
Minister, General Heinz Hoffman stated in 1966 that Soviet atomic submarines operating in every sea in the world were part of the "blue defense belt." A Hungarian officer wrote the next year in an Army publication in Budapest that the Soviet Union now had a nuclear sword and also a shield. The article makes direct reference to the "blue belt" but it deals mostly with anti-ballistic missile defense. 

Perhaps most interesting is an East German radio broadcast from Moscow in 1970 that report on the Soviet Navy Okean maneuvers. The reporter used the "blue belt defense" term with reference to maritime defense. He also lists only naval forces as those assigned to the "blue belt defense," and associated such units with strategic tasks. The reporter then went on to state that the Okean maneuvers tested the "blue belt defense" and the operability of the fleet "as well as all branches of service in such exercises." 

In *The Sea Power of the State*, Gorshkov expands upon his discussion of dominance at sea mentioned previously in his "Navies in War and Peace" series. With the appearance of the book, the Navy C-in-C states that under conditions of modern war where
of Soviet borders. From the passages, it is not clear whether the targets, objectives, and installations that are to be protected are ashore or at sea. Gorshkov also used the term "defended zone of a naval theater" in a discussion of the need for forces to combat an enemy and to give support to the Navy's main assault forces. This passage appears in the July 1963 Morskoy Sbornik.

One of the most interesting passages concerning naval warfare authored by a MOD was in Marshal Malinovskiy's April 1966 speech to the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In a passage dealing with the defense of borders, Malinovskiy stated that "the construction of our blue belt defense has been completed." The closest any author researched by this study ever comes to repeating this theme is Gorshkov on July 27, 1968. In his radio address that day, the Admiral says that the powerful Soviet Navy is "capable of taking its defense line out into the ocean."

Exactly what the MOD meant by this "blue belt defense" has been the subject of much speculation in the West. 15/ The German Democratic Republic Defense
an active insertion of the shield between oneself and the enemy. The relationship of these differences to the Western concept of deterrence should be obvious.

Defense of Soviet borders is one of the most frequent themes appearing in all documents, appearing some 86 times since 1965. Instead of reopening the "zashchita" versus "oborona" debate, attention will be directed in this section to aspects that are clearly tasks to be actually undertaken in time of hostilities.

Regarding service roles and missions, one finding should be made at the outset. Defense of the sea borders appears to be primarily a Navy task. The participation of other services does appear from time to time but not on a regular basis, nor is there any pattern based upon author. Participation by Warsaw Pact Navies most often appears in articles originating in or targeted on the socialist community. The sea border defense mission (either "zashchita" or "oborona") appears to be an active one. In 28 documents, active terms are used such as "repel" or "repulse" attacks from the sea.

Gorshkov uses the phrase protecting own targets, objectives, and installations, in four of his discussions from October 1967 - October 1969 regarding the defense
leaders have stressed the importance of conventional warfare and the ability to "respond" with other than a spasm nuclear attack.

Minister of Defense (MOD) Grechko introduced the concepts in February 1968 that war can be waged either with or without nuclear weapons. He stated in February 1969 that war could commence with nuclear or conventional weapons, and said in February 1970 that it might be conventional only. Grechko also stated in The Armed Forces of the Soviet State that conventional weapons might be decisive and that nuclear weapons cannot solve all the problems of war.

The Minister of Defense's emphasis on conventional warfare does not necessarily mean that a future Soviet war with the West will take the form of a conventional-only attack on NATO Europe. His references may be directed to the need for certain types of conventional capabilities that complement nuclear warfare or will primarily exploit the use of nuclear weapons. Alternatively, the context might have been for a capability to fight limited wars (such as in Afghanistan) or to provide military assistance at lower levels of conflict.
Admiral Gorshkov has generally remained outside the debate over the character of a future war, making only infrequent statements supporting the MOD. Apparently, the question of the character of future war is beyond the domain of the Navy Chief. The Navy position parallels the MOD: war might be conventional or nuclear. Although it is the latter that this research is focused on, we cannot dismiss complementary conventional operations, such as strategic antisubmarine warfare (ASW), that might be conducted prior to the nuclear phase of a future war and that could prevent strategic nuclear forces from successful mission completion.

The question of escalation is another one that apparently does not translate well from Russian into English. In the West, the general view is that there is conventional war and then there is nuclear war, with some arguing that a limited nuclear war is possible. From certain evidence in the Soviet literature, the firebreaks in escalation appear to be the political goals and not the weapons used. 4/

If political distinction is the essential question in escalation as viewed by the Soviets, we must conclude that a primarily nuclear offensive
is one possible option, that a conventional-only armed struggle is another, and would that a combined nuclear and conventional mix is the third. From the researcher's reading of the available literature concerning land warfare, the Soviet emphasis has included nuclear with conventional as a complement.

This does not preclude conventional-only operations. For example, an insertion of Soviet troops into a Third World crisis area would be for limited political goals and might involve only conventional weapons. If the U.S. then intervened, however, and the political context were decidedly changed, and the Soviets chose to meet the U.S. challenge, then the result might be an alteration of the planned employment of military force to include escalation to nuclear threats or use.

A frequent question in analysis of Soviet military thought has been whether or not the USSR would engage in a limited or tactical nuclear war. A few years ago, one could read from the literature evidence or ascertain from land exercise behavior that limited nuclear war was being contemplated.

In recent years, however, Chairman Brezhnev and Marshal Ustinov specifically rejected limited nuclear
war (November 1981 and February 1982). Marshal Nikolay V. Ogarkov, former Chief of the General Staff and senior professional military officer, also spoke against any Western limited nuclear war again emphasized a frequent theme in the Soviet literature: the decisive nature of the initial period of a future war. 5/

General war is described as early as October 1967 by Admiral Gorshkov in terms including the need to suppress aggression at its inception. Gorshkov repeats this theme at least seven times through 1979. Gorshkov did make one reference to limited nuclear wars in October 1983 but attributed the plan to U.S. strategists. He did say that the U.S. plan to use aircraft carriers in a decisive role in the confrontation between navies.

Ustinov echos the Navy Chief by mentioning the need to prevent military conflicts growing into nuclear ones (July 1982) implying a recognition (of late) of a nuclear firebreak. This supports the Grechko theme that war does not necessarily need to be nuclear. It also implies a need to deter nuclear attack in the event of a conventional-only war.

The Soviet theory of deterrence has been described in the West as "war-fighting." In other words, some
Western analysts claim that the Soviet method of deterrence is not just to threaten a retaliatory blow but to prevent successful attacks in addition to threatening retaliation. Grechko, however, generally spoke of retaliation rather than of attempting to limit damage from an attack. The best Soviet source of late that supports these Western assertions of a "war-fighting" theory of deterrence was Marshal Ogarkov. In discussing Soviet military doctrine in 1982, he states:

The point is to be able not simply to defend oneself, to oppose the aggressor with appropriate passive means and methods of defense but also to deliver devastating response strikes on the aggressor and to defeat the enemy in any situation conditions. 6/

As has been stated earlier, the concept of deterrence as generally understood in the West does not translate well into the Russian. To ensure ideological conformity, all Soviet military actions are cast as responses to the West. Deterrence is used in the abstract, not against any one type of war and not always against the U.S.

In the literature, however, there are two main themes relating to naval warfare that emerge when the
passages are evaluated over time. The first is that the Soviet Navy as a whole is restraining imperialist aggression and adventurism on the high seas in general and also specifically in the Mediterranean. This theme appears as early as June 1969 and appears only in statements by the Navy Chief. In April 1975, Gorshkov says that the Navy is strengthening peace (in general) and stabilizing the international situation. In February 1980, he states that the fleet prevents the imperialists from fulfilling police functions with impunity, and in July 1981 that Soviet sea power has made the Capitalist states recognize the futility of naval demonstrations.

Whereas the Soviet Navy as a whole has a restraining influence on the West's use of naval diplomacy for political purposes, Gorshkov credits fleets in the abstract in the final episode of the "Navies in War and Peace" series with the capability of achieving political objectives in war. In The Sea Power of the State, he adds the ability of fleets (in general) to achieve political goals without actual armed struggle by threatening military action. The context of the latter passage is clearly peacetime naval diplomacy, but the implication extends to other uses of fleets.
The restraint on imperialism in the 30 passages analyzed thus far cannot be tied directly to either nuclear forces as the means of restraint nor to deterrence of nuclear war. In some additional 22 passages, however, the means or restraint is more closely associated with nuclear. These passages contain the second major theme regarding the use of naval power in deterrence. The passages, however, show variation over time and by author.

We find differences between the position of who or what deters between that of the MOD and the Navy Chief. In three citations (1966-1967), Marshal Malinovsky uses the theme of the dyad of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) and Navy atomic rocket submarines as the chief means of restraining/resisting/containing aggression.

Marshal Grechko, on the other hand, in five passages from 1968-1972, cites the SRF alone as the chief means of deterring/restraining/curbing aggression. In his July 1971 Morskoy Sbornik article, Grechko briefly shifts and says it is the dyad which deters, stating that both constitute a shield.
In February 1968, the Navy Chief discusses the nuclear means for deterrence and asserts that the SRF is a powerful means of containing imperialism. At the time of this article, Malinovskiy (who preferred the dyad) had died, and Grechko (who preferred the SRF alone) was in the Ministry.

In July 1969, Gorshkov used the theme that SLBMs were a barrier to aggression. This predates his February 1974 claim, discussed earlier, that the Soviet Navy was a major strategic weapon for the Supreme Command and was capable of influencing the course and outcome of armed conflict. It would appear that the context was that naval forces also, not alone, contributed to deterrence.

In October 1969, Gorshkov uses the old Malinovskiy themes, that the dyad could decisively route the aggressor in war, and that the dyad was a fundamental means of deterring aggression. Gorshkov repeats these themes twice in February 1971 and adds that the dyad was a shield over the socialist system. He ignores numerous Grechko statements that the SRF (alone) was the main service.

Gorshkov also ignores Grechko's three 1971 citations that the SRF (alone) was the main means of
deterrence. The Navy Chief continues using the dyad deterrence theme (including as a shield) in five additional instances. In July 1973, all dyad references by Gorshkov cease.

In July 1979, Gorshkov made his cryptic statement that Soviet SSBNs could neutralize (in the sense of off-setting) the threat of enemy SSBNs. In February 1980, he referred to strategic missile forces as a nuclear shield. In July 1983, Gorshkov stated that Soviet Navy strategic arms deterred aggression.

According to Marshal N. V. Ogarkov, the deterrence of nuclear war is accomplished by strategic nuclear forces. In at least four documents since 1981, Ogarkov specifically mentioned the strategic nuclear forces as the "main factor" for deterring the aggressor. 7/ In his latest pronouncement, the former Chief of the General Staff identified the components of the strategic nuclear forces as the triad of SRF, and components of the Navy and Air Force.

Since 1973, the more frequent theme, relating to deterrence of aggression from the sea against the USSR, has been that the Soviet Navy restrains ocean-originated aggression and can counter such threats. This concept
was first introduced in February 1973, where it was perhaps best explained. In his closing passage to the "Navies in War and Peace" series, Gorshkov discusses the Soviet Navy as a "shield from enemy attacks from the sea and a real warning of the inevitability of retaliation for aggression." In his February 1980 Kommunist article, the Navy Chief again states that the Navy will contain aggression coming from the ocean and if necessary, retaliate.

The question of the inevitability of retaliation is tied to the scope of a future nuclear war. Under Khrushchev, declaratory policy appeared to be that if a war were to occur, nuclear use would be swift, total, and widespread. With the conventional operations articulated by Grechko, the Navy would still have a strategic mission to contain non-nuclear Western naval operations against the Soviet fleet or homeland and to be prepared to initiate or retaliate with its nuclear capability if called upon.

Thus far, the findings appear to fit together. Global nuclear war is not the automatic response to any or all aggression. The question remains, however, how much of the Soviet nuclear forces would be fired
once the political decision were made to go nuclear? Here, the evidence begins to get extremely thin and is inconclusive.

On the one hand, we have Gorshkov's statement in July 1979 that Soviet SSBNs are a counter to Western SSBNs. One can read into this a threat to withhold these as long as the West does, in other words nuclear forces deter opposing nuclear forces. We also have Gorshkov's October 1983 discussion of limited nuclear war involving naval forces. On the other hand, most of the commentary from MOD and Politburo spokesman about the inevitable retaliation include claims that it will be "crushing" and not limited or withheld.

From the content analysis alone, it is impossible to measure exactly what the Soviets mean by a "crushing" blow or response. They appear to emphasize that the response will be a large one, but Soviet comments since January 1981 have discussed both the inevitable danger of unlimited nuclear war (implying that global escalation is not automatic) and that nuclear war cannot be conducted by prearranged rules.

In January 1960, Chairman Khrushchev discussed Soviet hidden reserves of rockets. In February 1968,
Gorshkov stated that an attack on the USSR would be followed by Soviet SLBM retribution from the sea but the retaliation was not described as immediate or swift. In July 1982, the Navy Chief again stated that Soviet SSBNs would provide inevitable retribution to Western strategic submarine missile systems.

Thus the findings on the manifest evidence of the global or limited nature of a future nuclear war are inconclusive. Some of the evidence points to a possible use of Soviet SLBMs as a counter to deter massive use of Western SLBMs or limited nuclear operations. Other evidence points to a swift and massive nuclear retaliation once the decision is made to go nuclear. There is no direct evidence in the literature alone to support a declaratory policy of withholding SSBNs from the initial nuclear strike for inter or post-war bargaining and negotiations. To explore this matter further, the researcher investigated related but more indirect themes.

**Advantages of Naval Forces**

One of the more common themes from all naval leaders is the uniqueness of naval warfare and the advantages of fleets in peacetime or in war. Gorshkov
is no exception. His writings on the use of navies to support foreign policies of states demonstrating that a nation's military might, beyond its borders, support friends, and operate in a no-man's land are well known in the West and have been analyzed by others.

Gorshkov's related comments in December 1972 and The Sea Power of the State that naval forces can demoralize an enemy, intimidate him, and achieve political goals by the mere threat of military action, can be viewed in a number of ways. One can read into them nuclear deterrence, but this researcher thinks that naval diplomacy is the more correct context. Naval diplomacy could be a surrogate for other contexts, however.

The Navy Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) does make frequent reference, starting in 1973, to the concealment of atomic submarines in general and of SSBNs in particular. He also cites their stability from nuclear weapons and great survivability. Grechko adds a discussion of the survivability of missile submarines in the 2d Edition of The Armed Forces of the Soviet State. One cannot take these passages and infer withholding of weapons.
Those of us in the West generally assume that we will not conduct a first strike on the USSR, although NATO land defense may require Western first use of tactical nuclear weapons even if the Soviets initiate warfare with conventional weapons. The Soviets must assume, however, the potential for a Western first strike. Thus submarine' survivability may be explained as an attribute which allows a Soviet inevitable and crushing counter-blow even if the West eliminated all Soviet land systems in a first strike. Grechko in The Armed Forces of the Soviet State, refers to nuclear missiles as being only relatively invulnerable.

Naval forces also have some advantage in a more offensive military context. Gorshkov frequently cites their ability to form into powerful groupings and their great maneuverability (including that of SSBNs). He also discusses the ability of fleets to strike from different directions. One such comment is directly associated with SLBMs (July 1973) and two mentions of a Western capability (in The Sea Power of the State). Striking from different directions can be viewed as a potential threat to the USSR since it would complicate Soviet anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems.
"that not one of the sides achieved its objectives."

McConnell argues that Gorshkov's treatment of the Jutland Battle is a message that less than decisive battles (and even mere fleets-in-being) can have a major influence on the course of the armed struggle.

On a tactical plane, Gorshkov points to German failure to coordinate other forces with its submarine campaign against the SLOC and the high cost to produce the ASW forces which were mounted against the German submarines. All World War I commentary appears in publications designed for military and primarily Navy audiences.

Inter-War Years

Perhaps one of the best examples of the Soviet use of historical surrogates and incomplete Western analysis of Soviet Navy literature is found in the discussion of the Leninist principles governing military operations. Admiral Gorshkov includes these in his "Navies in War and Peace" discussion of the Soviet Navy in the Revolution. Western analysis noted these passages but failed to uncover their prior publication elsewhere.
Historical references to the Czarist days do contain explicit criticisms of short-sighted leaders who failed to understand the value of navies, or misused them, and failed to provide the Russian fleet with the materials necessary in future wars. The value in constantly building and of technological superiority is pointed out. These particular passages appear only in Navy publications.

World War I

Gorshkov states that in certain areas, navies had a profound influence on the course and outcome of World War I. These areas include: (1) the German submarine blockade of Britain, (2) convoying reinforcements to Europe from North America, (3) the allied blockade of Germany, and (4) the influence of Allied Navies on neutrals' decisions to eventually declare war on Germany.

The lack of influence on the Battle of Jutland on the war was rejected by Gorshkov in May 1972 and in The Sea Power of the State. Yet in a another discussion of this battle in The Sea Power of the State, Gorshkov says it did not have "any strategic or operational link with the combat actions on the land." In the Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya Gorshkov writes
themes to send a message that the Soviet Navy will win the peace in a future nuclear war.

Of interest is the place of publication of these references to historical experiences prior to the Revolution. All but one occur in "The Navies in War and Peace" series or in the revision and reprint of these passages found in The Sea Power of the State. One additional place of publication is a March 1972 article in Voyennaya Mysl'. Thus the intended audience is primarily military and not general audiences or foreigners. However, one can assume that the Soviets know the U.S. does read Soviet internal documents and that therefore that the audience includes foreigners.

Some other themes of interest concerning Czarist history not always emphasized by Western analysts include: (1) enemy sea lines of communication (SLOC) should be cut if the enemy depends upon them, (2) the value of bases for inter-theater maneuver, and (3) the ability of navies to geographically escalate. One interesting passage in the 1972 Voyennaya Mysl' article is the appearance of:

The Russian Navy was always confidently guided by the dictate of the first naval regulations: 'Do not adhere to regulations as to a blind wall, for in it orders are written, but not times and instances'.

This theme never appears in any other document consulted.
experiences of the military in a historical context is one of the most frequent methods of articulating concepts in the Soviet literature. It is necessary to analyze this material both due to its volume and to the fact that both Gorshkov and Grechko state that historical military experiences (especially the Great Patriotic War) still have value today. The question at hand will be to analyze latent military strategy themes that use historical surrogates to see if they parallel and supplement current ideas.

Czarist History

James McConnell has done outstanding pioneering analysis of latent themes using historical surrogates. McConnell's summation of hidden messages in historical lessons 9/ is substantiated by this research.

Specifically, analysis of historical passages of the era prior to the Russian revolution does validate that the author does emphasize naval political roles and influence on the outcome of wars and on peace talks. Not stressed by McConnell is a parallel Gorshkov theme that land forces have also been extremely important and are needed to consolidate victory. McConnell uses various examples from events described in Czarist history to argue that Gorshkov uses latent
Latent Lessons of History

Over the years, Gorshkov has changed his emphasis on the value of the lessons of history relative to current military strategy and naval art. In July 1963, he stated to a Navy audience that the role of the Navy today was greater than its role in the Great Patriotic War (the Soviet phrase describing their participation in World War II). In May 1965 Gorshkov said that since the War military art had changed significantly since the War and that many obsolete theories had been abolished.

In May 1975 the Navy Chief changed his emphasis and stated that current questions must include investigation of the experiences of the Great Patriotic War. Gorshkov stated in September 1977 that the gap between capability and tactics had been eliminated. In October 1977 he added the need to study Leninist principles and in July 1983 the experiences of imperialists in local wars.

Centralized command and control has been specifically tied to the success of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. The advantage of naval forces in achieving political objectives has been referred to by Gorshkov in current and historical contexts. The
would be employed on short notice against a variety of land, air, surface, and sub-surface targets.

In May 1966, Gorshkov states that the fleet must be prepared to use nuclear weapons in response to an enemy first use. The advantage of destroying targets with one missile having a powerful warhead appears in July 1972 and March 1973. Since then, the Navy Chief has made three non-specific general comments about tactical nuclear weapons as a powerful means of battle and one direct statement that air launched nuclear missile strikes are especially effective. In his booklet, The Navy, he claims that nuclear missiles are the main weapons.

From the literature evidence alone, it is impossible to conclude that a limited tactical nuclear war would be fought only at sea. The evidence supports a view that if the Soviets go nuclear, all forces will go nuclear. If the land campaign would be better served by a nuclear offensive, their literature supports the conclusion that nuclear use would also occur at sea. Nuclear use at sea alone or first appears to be restricted by a Soviet declaratory policy not to engage in a limited nuclear war.
Gorshkov makes specific reference in that book to problems that the Soviet fleet has in carrying out strategy. The Navy Chief cites the lack of overseas bases, choke points, and bad weather in home areas. As a general comment, he states that battle forces may have to pre-deploy. Battle, as we know, is associated with tactical not strategic objectives.

Gorshkov repeats in April 1983 his direct mention of choke points and Western fleets being able to inhibit Soviet fleet actions. In September 1977 and July 1983, he implies that the proper method of establishing a fleet's balance is to do so in each individual theater.

Boldness and initiative are also frequent Gorshkov tactical themes, usually tied to discussions of increased tempo of operations at a tactical level. Battle, he says, will probably be determined in short order, and success may hinge on seconds.

In discussions of the tactical use of nuclear weapons at sea, Gorshkov has become more vague over the years. In May 1965, he points out the advantages of nuclear weapons in destroying objectives with certainty and rapidly. In July of that year, he boasts to a foreign audience that massive nuclear use
to analyze the hardware and deployment patterns and compare statements to "reality" in order to decide this answer.

**Naval Operational Art and Tactics**

Discussions of naval operational art and tactics are generally found only in writings of Navy authors. Marshal Grechko did discuss these concepts on a few occasions. For example, he mentions in *The Armed Forces of the Soviet State* that sudden attack is a Navy tactic. Since tactics involves concepts that are structurally well below those of doctrine or strategy, one cannot infer a plan for a Soviet nuclear first strike against such a statement. Gorshkov makes similar comments about surprise blows by Soviet naval forces, including one in April 1966 that involves submarines against land and sea targets. The advantages of surprise in conjunction with nuclear weapons is cited in December 1974 by the Navy C-in-C as a general comment, not tied, however to the USSR.

Grechko also introduces the theme in February 1971 that the Soviet Navy has the means for simultaneous and prolonged combat. This is repeated in *The Armed Forces of the Soviet State* and then picked up by Gorshkov in July 1975 and in *The Sea Power of the State*. 

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Stalbo describes naval art as both independent and joint service actions in oceanic theaters. Naval art falls between the theory of the strategic employment of the Navy and naval tactics. Naval or operational art is as it is also known, the standardization of naval operations.

The point is that the Navy does not determine the major questions of how to fight or deter wars but rather is primarily concerned with maximizing the implementation of strategy. The Soviet Navy appears to be interested in gaining command and control over other forces assigned to oceanic theaters for operational-tactical purposes. The Soviet Navy does not and cannot have an independent view of how wars will be fought.

Hence statements by Admiral Gorshkov that are at odds with his seniors must be viewed extremely carefully. Unfortunately, this does not answer questions raised earlier about whether or not Gorshkov is articulating official SLBM targeting or arguing for a particular position. It should be recalled that his statements differ from those of the MOD. It is not clear whether those targeting passages are debates over or announcements of strategy. It will be necessary
forces. The primary strategic effort of the Soviet fleet involves strategic nuclear missile submarines.

In July 1983, Gorshkov ended the debate with a restatement of the theme that there cannot be a separate naval science. There can only be a separate naval theory, a concept allowable for every service. Gorshkov emphasizes that the procurement of new weapons is limited by Navy roles, missions, and economic realities. The strategic employment of the Navy, according to the Admiral, is determined by a unified military strategy. Naval art, however, is considerably more independent. Naval art is primarily determined by the Navy, although it is linked to and based upon land-oriented military art. It appeared from Gorshkov's article that operations by other than naval forces in remote oceanic theaters will in fact be governed by naval art.

Stalbo describes the strategic employment of the navy as being concerned with the objectives of armed conflict at sea and in coastal sectors of continental theaters where strategic missions are accomplished with the Navy's participation. This ties Navy missions previously described as "strategic" to the overall unified military strategy. To re-emphasize, an independent Navy strategy does not exist.
ships in port and possibly those at sea. It has been Gorshkov's view since February 1965 that the Navy, as the prime determinant of naval art, should manage the employment of other than naval forces when they operate in oceanic theaters.

With the 2nd Edition of *The Sea Power of the State*, Gorshkov revises his position slightly by discussing a unified strategy but one with options for the strategic employment of forces. Furthermore, he states that there cannot be one sphere where one branch of the military is sovereign.

Following this revision to the book, a series of nine articles appeared in *Morskoy Sbornik* from April 1981 through April 1983 in which the subject of the "Theory of the Navy" was debated openly. Vice Admiral K. Stalbo, a leading Navy theoretician, opened up the series with his views that: (1) there cannot be an independent naval science, (2) a future war would likely be protracted and global in nature, and (3) that the Soviet Navy could influence the course of such a war. He was critical of those who underestimated the strategic employment of SSBNs, and appeared to argue that naval operations must include actions against the enemies' main and most heavily defended
degree of independence of naval operations, and, (2) the theoretical framework that should govern operations in oceanic theater by other than Naval forces. The debate is deliberately vague but can be directly tied to Soviet military service roles and missions.

Military strategy articulates the planned employment for all Soviet military forces. There is no independent naval strategy. Military art falls under military strategy and in general articulates how land and air forces carry out that strategy. Naval art articulates the role for naval forces in the overall military strategy. There is a running debate in the Soviet literature that: since naval forces are subordinated to military art when operating in a land-oriented military theater, then naval art should determine the employment of other than naval forces when they operate in oceanic theaters. Thus, the open literature debate is theoretical and not specific about command and control. The parallel, however, is obvious.

We know from our review of fleet versus fleet that the Soviet Air Force has a declaratory role in oceanic theaters. We also know that the SRF has a declaratory role in fleet versus fleet actions against
warfare. In July 1982, Ustinov openly discussed the need to ensure tight control to prevent the non-sanctioned launch of nuclear weapons.

Gorshkov and Marshal Orgarkov have endorsed Soviet centralized control on the same basis as it was in the Great Patriotic War. Gorshkov also points out in *The Sea Power of the State* that fleet versus fleet operations are more independent than fleet versus shore. In May 1980, he states that centralized control is necessary for guided missile weapons and other situations in which there can be no delay. Marshal Grechko does acknowledge that naval operational art is somewhat different in *The Armed Forces of the Soviet State*. This researcher feels that the context of the literature emphasizes that initiation of nuclear war would be a political decision and not military.

**Naval Art Versus Military Strategy**

Rather than discussions of specific problems of command and control in the open Soviet literature, we more often encounter detailed debate over the concepts of military strategy and naval art. Debate is permissible as a part of Soviet military science. Some of the most interesting subjects of debate are: (1) the
It can also be viewed as a Soviet advantage since it frustrates U.S. warning systems. The ability of fleets to deploy rapidly is also a Gorshkov theme tied twice to SSBNs twice in *The Sea Power of the State*.

**Command and Control**

Another frequently analyzed area of commentary in the Soviet literature deals with the needs of naval command and control. Gorshkov has gone on record as pointing out the problems posed by independent and distant deployments creating problems for command and control. Most of his passages discussing the need for flexibility are probably of a more tactical nature, since independent military initiative involving the initiating nuclear war would appear to be an anathema to any political group running any country. On the other hand, nuclear war at sea might be viewed as necessary, controllable, and not necessarily escalatory. If the war ashore is nuclear, the war will probably also be nuclear at sea.

In viewing statements involving command and control, one notices that an often-overlooked aspect is that comments are in the context of ensuring control. Malinovskiy referred at least as early as February 1958 to the need to control the new means of
In 1970, the centennial year of V.I. Lenin's birth and the 25th anniversary of the victory over fascist Germany, Marshal Grechko published an article in the third issue of Kommunist which included these Leninist principles. Grechko again discusses these principles in Kommunist No. 3 of 1974 as well as both editions of The Armed Forces of the Soviet State. Gorshkov refers to the principles in his later The Sea Power of the State and says in October 1977 that Leninist principles are still important today. Thus, fuller analyzes reveals that initiation of the Leninist principles is not Gorshkov's.

Leninist principles governing military operations as used by Grechko and Gorshkov are summarized as follows:

1. Determine the primary threat and study all possible means of military employment by the enemy.
2. Concentrate the means and forces at the decisive place and time.
3. Be flexible in the use of forces.
4. Seize the initiative and strike sudden blows.
5. Make blows decisive.

One additional principle appears only in Grechko's statements. In the 1970 article, the MOD discusses
the Great Patriotic War and states "Lenin's concept to the effect that war in our days is a people's war and that 'he who has greater reserves, greater sources of strength and greater endurance within the thick (mass) of the people' emerges as the winner."

In the Kommunist article, Grechko points out how Lenin built up strategic reserves and the Party provided for industrial base reserves prior to World War II. In his book, Grechko adds the need to create reserves in war to the Lennist principles.

The subject of reserves is intimately tied to potential roles of Soviet Navy SSBNs. There have been an excellent attempt to trace the roles of reserves through the Soviet literature and tie the submarine force to such a role. 11/ Perhaps the best evidence from the open literature is from a discussion of strategic reserves in a 1964 Voyennaya Mysl' article, which states that strategic reserves include "reserves of nuclear weapons and rockets," 12/ The value of reserves is tied to Lenin's words that "victory in war goes to the side who people has greater reserves, greater sources of strength, and greater endurance." 13/

The evidence that submarines will be a part of a declaratory policy for a strategic nuclear reserve
simply does not exist in direct manifest or latent passages. Making a conclusion on the basis of only the open literature evidence is speculative and based upon the interpretation of passages which have multiple possible meanings.

Should we accept the latent messages that McConnell sees implying the Navy having the major role in the creation of the peace? If we do so, then why is this message directed primarily at Navy audiences. Is it to explain approved strategy, or does Gorshkov utilize his service journals to advocate? If he were merely advocating, it would appear that the audience who could do him the most good (the Party) is not the primary recipient.

Gorshkov is not reluctant to criticize Soviet policies during the inter-war years. In July 1963, the Navy Chief quotes Army General M. V. Frunze (People's Commissioner for Military Affairs in 1925) at a 1924 conference:

Some comrades, as a result of our inadequate means, have the idea that it would be better to concentrate our entire attention on the land army. This point of view is extremely erroneous. . . The Revolutionary Military Counsel takes the firm and unshakeable point of view that the navy is extremely necessary to us . . .
The quotation reappears in both editions of *The Sea Power of the State*. The Frunze name is associated with a prestigious military academy and an annual award by the Council of Ministers for excellent military or military historical writing. There can be no doubt that Gorshkov is using a historical surrogate to get across the message that the Navy is important to today's audience.

In discussing the Soviet Navy of the 1920's, Gorshkov both points out that the "small war" or "mosquito fleet" was defensive in nature and also that it corresponded to the economic realities of the time. The association of any military form with the defensive is to associate it with the disgraced Trotsky rather than with Lenin and the offensive. All discussions which include criticism of the 1920's era appear in Soviet Navy publications.

In addition to using history to criticize, Gorshkov uses it also to reinforce positive actions. In discussing the economy of the 1930's and the possibilities for building a large Navy, Gorshkov makes repeated reference to the Party decision made before World War II to build such an oceangoing fleet. This theme appears 20 times in a wide variety of domestic publications.
The decision cited by Gorshkov is listed as having been made at the end of the 1930's. Gorshkov implies that the Party, therefore recognized the threat and took corrective action well before the start of hostilities. A related theme is that The Great Patriotic War interrupted the agreed to planned ship-building.

Related to the planned buildup is Soviet commentary on historical military thought. MODs generally refer to pre-war military thought as essentially correct, although Grechko makes reference to some faulty concepts based upon the limited experiences of the Spanish Civil War. Gorshkov frequently points out that a defensive mind set for the employment of the Navy had been created due to the earlier "small war" theories. He says that such a mind-set limited support for naval building.

Gorshkov is specific in his criticism of a pre-war fleet being capable of only local defensive operations. He also says that pre-war military doctrine and strategy was therefore based upon primarily defensive operations and the leadership in the armed forces underestimated or had disdain for the fleet. Gorshkov stresses the pre-war lack of appreciation of
the potential of attack naval aviation. It would appear certain that Gorshkov's use of these concepts constitute examples of history used as surrogates. In all cases, the intended audience is military and not necessarily only Navy.

The Navy Chief also cites the prewar mal-deployment of submarines and problems associated with joint combat operations. The fleet itself, he says, was deficient in amphibious hardware, anti-air protection, ASW equipment and forces, minesweepers, and auxiliaries. Naval aviation was cited as deficient since it lacked aircraft designed specifically for sea warfare. Gorshkov implies in *The Sea Power of the State* that an aircraft carrier would have been useful. Amphibious hardware problems receive the most frequent commentary but are virtually the only criticisms published outside military circles.

In an attempt to ascertain the importance of these latent comments to current needs, a cross check was run to those statements that discuss needs of the current Soviet fleet. Today's surface ships have also been described once as needing anti-air defenses in a passage tied to the lessons of the past war. ASW ships were also cited in 1963 as being needed.
Auxiliary vessels are also needed to balance the fleet today. Gorshkov makes it clear that the pre-war fleet was not balanced. The need for aviation being able to overcome anti-air defenses is associated with the lessons of the war. ASW aircraft problems are discussed and appear also as a prewar criticism.

Subsurface needs are interestingly quite explicit and most interesting. A paragraph was added by Grechko to the 2nd Edition of the Armed Forces of the Soviet State which discusses the need for Soviet SSBN quietness, greater depth and endurance. This passage does not appear in the U.S. translation authorized by the Soviet All-Union Copyright Agency.

Gorshkov discusses in July 1983 the need for greater submarine depth, a new powerplant, the necessity for concealment, and sensors to ensure the submarine gathers necessary intelligence. The Navy Chief makes reference to the possibility of close coordination between subsurface, surface, and air platforms in three passages tied to the lessons of the past war. Thus there appears to be some but not total correlation between openly discussed current fleet needs and those of the Soviet fleet in 1938.
World War II

Both Grechko and Gorshkov have specifically stated that the past war holds lessons of value today. The MOD appears to use the war as a warning to the West that an attack will ultimately result in their defeat.

Gorshkov repeatedly implies that the current Soviet Navy has roles of greater importance than those roles it had in the past war. The increase of importance, he says, is due to the composition of the modern fleet, advances in technology, and the improved economic opportunity. Soviet Navy Wartime roles of interest to this study which Gorshkov refers to are as follows (number of documents containing wartime role theme):

- Support to the Army in general: 52
- Amphibious operations: 45
- Attacking surface ships including disrupting SLOCs: 42
- Maintaining Soviet SLOCs: 41

It has been widely reported that the primary Soviet fleet mission was to support the Army. Gorshkov's discussions of amphibious operations and maintaining supply lines at sea are generally all tied to the support they provided the Army. Other tactical fleet
support operations include gunfire (22) and aviation (16).

Of interest is Gorshkov’s treatment of the Soviet campaign against enemy SLOCs. He often goes to great lengths to explain how the interruption of supplies to the Germans was felt on the land fronts. In July 1982, he states that "all this attests to the great strategic importance of the naval actions on the naval communications lines for victory over the enemy." Soviet Navy roles and missions during the Great Patriotic War are found in a wide variety of internal publications.

Gorshkov cites a number of positive achievements and lessons from the Great Patriotic War. Northern fleet operations in keeping open supply lines to allies have been described as "strategic." The diversion of significant numbers of German Navy units to the flanks contributed to the allies victory in the Battle of the Atlantic. The value and correctness of Stalin’s centralized command and control has already been pointed out as a lesson articulated by both Grechko and Gorshkov. The Navy Chief deviates slightly when he points out the successes of Navy controlled SLOC disruptions (July 1982).
In accordance with the standard party line, Gorshkov acknowledges that the war was won on land. Grechko associates victory with strategic reserves in 1970 but says they were decisive only on the course of the war in *The Armed Forces of the Soviet State*. Grechko cites three times, the importance of the buildup of strategic reserves in the pre-war period.

One of McConnell's main points is that Gorshkov is saying that navies rarely have an impact on the outset of a war but exercise more influence as it progresses. One can infer this from earlier historical discussions. From discussions involving the Great Patriotic War, the war whose lessons Grechko and Gorshkov say are most important, a different pattern emerges.

We find 29 distinct citations by Gorshkov and one by Grechko that refer directly to the Soviet Navy's contribution to the armed struggle in its initial period. In passages that specifically discuss the Soviet Navy doing its duty "right to the end," we find only 14 citations. The initial value of the Navy is cited regularly over the years whereas the "duty to the end" appears less regularly, from 1963-1967 and since 1975.
Not all experiences from the Great Patriotic War were positive, however. Gorshkov admits that during the war the employment of the Navy was too local and merely defensive, and that some commanders had disdain for the fleet and did not understand its potential. He cites examples of poorly coordinated joint operations, including amphibious landings and naval base defense. He specifically cites the lack of surface and air units for support of Baltic fleet submarines due to their diversion for Army support.

The lack of shipbuilding production is described by the admiral as a negative factor. He blames the lack on loss of shipyards to the enemy, assignment to produce items for the Army instead, and naval losses that exceeded all pre-war forecasts. In Gorshkov's September 1977 book and his 1980 Kommunist article, he says the rear supplied the Navy everything it needed. It was not the job of the rear services, however, to provide new ships.

Other less frequent lessons articulated by Gorshkov include that the Soviet Union was hampered in inter-theater maneuver between fleets (meaning that each fleet essentially remained unsupported) and that ships had to perform missions for which they were
never designed. Gorshkov acknowledges the contribution of 1,600 ships mobilized by the Peoples Commissariat of Internal Affairs, the merchant and river fleets, new construction, and allied aid but states that these were of low quality, secondary importance and did not solve the lack of balance in the fleet. All negative comments are found in publications primarily read by military audiences.

Gorshkov draws on the experiences of the USSR's former allies. He points out the massive amounts of support for allied amphibious operations, the tremendous ASW assets tied up with limited results (which in November 1972 he says is of interest today), and the value of the SLOCs, both economically and for the military. In his booklet The Navy, the Admiral emphasizes the role of submarines in the World War II SLOC campaign but not in the historical section. Instead, it appears in the post-war review.

World War II SLOC campaigns are associated with undermining military-economic potential in The Sea Power of the State. In that book, Gorshkov also points out the Pacific War as being instructive for wars between nations separated by oceans. He also
points out that Pearl Harbor had no unified commander responsible for defense.

Gorshkov emphasizes the need for air supremacy/capability for distant-water operations and amphibious landings. He points out in *The Sea Power of the State* that the British attitude that carriers were mere auxiliaries was faulty. Most comments on allied experiences are destined for military readers.

Grechko makes one comment on the Western war experience that is of special interest to this study. In both editions of *The Armed Forces of the Soviet State*, he states that atomic bombs are only decisive if used on a massive scale and that the "American command used the new weapon not on enemy forces, but on cities having little strategic or economic importance."

In assessing the experiences of her former enemies in World War II, Gorshkov points out the value of Norway to Germany, the loan of non-naval aircraft to the German Navy as a bad idea, and the ability of the German command to maneuver fleet units against the USSR and use geography to their advantage. Gorshkov's most frequently cited criticism of the German Navy is its failure to allocate air and surface units to support submarines in the Battle of the Atlantic and
its failure to attack ASW forces. In discussing Japan, Gorshkov cites her wartime navy as being unbalanced and that Japan grossly underestimated its dependency upon SLOCs. The comment is about Japan, but the message applies today also to the U.S. and Europe. All commentary about Axis war experiences appear in Soviet military publications.

Post-War Era

Gorshkov criticizes the postwar Stalin era for its mistaken views that the fleet should revolve around a defensive strategy and assisting the Army. He faults relying on large gun ships that lacked air and submarine defenses. Building gun ships so dominated the shipyards that it precluded building amphibious ships and craft. Gorshkov complains that naval aviation was too defensive in orientation and specifically lacked ASW capability. In February 1967, he said that military theory in this era was deficient. All criticisms generally appear in Soviet military publications.

Criticism of the Khrushchev era begins in February 1967 with commentary about the mid-1950's decision to expand the fleet. Gorshkov criticizes "authorities" who thought that nuclear weapons had made the fleet
obsolete and those who dismissed amphibious operations. He claimed that "defensive tendencies held up forward movement of our theoretical military thought."

Gorshkov mentions in February 1967 that a "frequent assertion of the time was that single missiles, placed on land launchers would be sufficient for destroying . . . surface warships, and even submarines." Yet as was mentioned previously, in December 1972 Grechko made specific reference to the SRF targeting naval forces in the theater. Content analysis is an inadequate tool to ascertain actual declaratory policy, given the timing of these irreconcilable statements.

The Navy Chief repeats in The Sea Power of the State his criticism of those who thought fleets were obsolete, attributing such views to no one in particular or to imperialist circles who genuflected to the "omnipotence" of nuclear weapons.

In one extremely convoluted passage from an article in Voprosy Filosofii, (May 1975), Gorshkov points out that initially Soviet Navy plans for the use of nuclear weapons and missiles were "within the framework of already existing principles and views." Nuclear weapons were simply viewed by the Soviets as intensifications of weapons of the Great Patriotic War.
When Soviet Navy missiles with nuclear warheads were actually built, however, the theoretical employment of these weapons was then based upon the U.S. experience of nuclear weapons in Japan and the experience of other powerful means of armed combat. Following further investigation and testing, Gorshkov states the proper role and targeting objectives of strategic missiles was then later determined. That role and target set were previously discussed in the chapter on fleet versus shore.

Of interest here is the historical reference to early consideration of nuclear weapons for routine tactical use and an apparent disdain for the targeting of cities which parallels Grechko's comments. Targeting objectives might be in cities, which was perhaps unfortunate or irrelevant, but it was specific strategic, military, and economic objectives that were settled upon as the objects of attack.

This Voprosy Filosofii article is simply too vague to allow the analyst to definitely conclude that the Soviets will use nuclear weapons in a limited nuclear war, but it does reinforce military targeting in order to achieve distinct war aims. If the political
decision were made to use nuclear weapons in warfare, their use would not appear to be against civilians or cities.

Value of Historical Analysis

In order to illuminate more fully Soviet declaratory policy involving a future nuclear war, it has been argued in the West that one must include the use of historical latent themes. Such themes are supposed to show that the Soviets intend to withhold a part of their Navy submarine missile fleet to be employed for escalation control, deterrence (or its restoration), and inter/post-war negotiations conducted from a position of strength.

If this view is accepted as declaratory policy, historical surrogates must first be accepted as real. From reviewing the literature, there appears to be no question that historical surrogates are used by Soviet writers to hide messages. There is no doubt that Gorshkov has used latent themes to demonstrate the value of navies and the wisdom of previous Party decisions to support the Navy. Similarly, he uses history to illustrate problems in peace and war when a nation, including the USSR, had an unbalanced navy or when a navy was inadequate for national needs.
If the most significant latent themes of Czarist era history are those involving navies winning the peace, then the intended audience being primarily Navy is a problem. We simply do not know whether this is a case of publishing ideas in Navy journals, since censorship controls are perhaps looser, or, if it is an attempt to explain policies internally to the Navy. There is always the possibility that the use of Czarist era history might simply be to illuminate the general worth of navies and not to convey a special message for nuclear war.

Discussions of Leninist principles governing military operations are associated with today’s political-military situation. The emphasis on reserves is most often cast in terms of land forces and economic stockpiles. Inferring that a message regarding reserves of all forces is logical, even so, withholding as a strategy involving only submarines is not an automatic next step.

Criticism of the defensive tendency of the Soviet Navy in the 1920’s, pre-war period, Great Patriotic War, and postwar eras is constant. Yet the bastions theory would involve a defensive strategy with offensive (active defense) tactics. The weight of the evidence
due to both the quantitative amount and the repeated emphasis to study the Great Patriotic War would suggest that a defensive-only strategy in a future war is not declaratory policy, rather that active defense against western SSBNs and attack carriers should be expected.

Latent historical themes and manifest themes regarding specific fleet building deficiencies were correlated. There was some degree of similarity but no general analogy, hence criticisms of the fleet in 1938-1941 may simply have been used to demonstrate that previous decisions can be erroneous, not to infer specific needs today.

A similar lack of correlation is evidenced by Gorshkov's constant discussions of the need for balanced navies. He frequently points out historical instances of lack of balance and associates this lack with failures. We might, therefore, expect to find him mentioning the need to balance the Soviet Navy today, or, at least no mention of the subject. Gorshkov has stated nine times (from May 1965 to July 1982) to a variety of military, general, and foreign audiences that his fleet is balanced. One does not find a separate external message that the Soviet fleet
is balanced and a different internal message that the Navy needs balance. Yet both editions of *The Sea Power of the State* only refer to having the foundation of a balanced fleet.

If we take Gorshkov's advice and focus on the last war, the latent message is that Soviet naval operations in war will not be purposeless fleet versus fleet operations. Rather the operations would be expected to support the land campaign. Cutting the SLOCs is an important method that undermines the military-economic potential of the enemy and influences the war ashore.

One can attempt to show the Soviet use of history demonstrating navies as valuable in longer wars or after the armed struggle is well underway. Yet the worth of the Soviet Navy in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War is consistently stressed.

It appears, therefore, that there is value in the investigation of historical surrogates but that their utility is diminished by selective extraction and lack of cross check with manifest themes. By taking the extra effort and analyzing a wider data set, analysis of declaratory policy is possible.
Arms Control Impact

In June 1971, Chairman Brezhnev gave an election speech in Moscow where he proposed solving the situation of the navies of great powers cruising for long periods far from their shores. In a February 1982 letter to an Australian disarmament group, the Party Chairman repeated this position. Since 1982, restrictions on Western SSBNs, SLBMs, and SLCMs have been a recurring theme in the context of on going bilateral SALT/START negotiations as well as those involving intermediate range systems in Europe. The Soviets have proposed extensive and various naval arms control regulations. 16/ The latest proposals supplement previous statement by calling for limitations on antisubmarine forces and aircraft carriers. 17/

In general, it would appear that naval arms control is a matter for Politburo spokesman to initiate and the MOD and Navy Chief to simply endorse and more fully explain. Soviet proposals would directly hamper Western deployments and the ability of Western navies to strike the USSR. Few proposals would appear to be related to Soviet home waters. 18/

There appears to be a direct correlation with perceived threats from the sea and willingness to
regulate such threats by arms control. As threats are identified, they appear to be met, in the literature, by a combination of Soviet military programs and arms control. Arms control as a solution appears to be most frequent in areas where the literature indicates the Soviets are weakest militarily.
Notes


A more recent speculation as to the assumed wartime missions of the Soviet Navy has been


8. See issues 4, 5, 11 of 1981; 1, 3, 4, 7 of 1982; and 3 and 4 of 1983.


17. Andrei Gromyko's letter to U.N. Secretary General Javier de Cuellar distributed by TASS April 14,
Gorshkov  "Mounting Guard Over the Soviet State's Naval Borders," Pravda, July 29, 1961 including radio reports of this article carried by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 0400 GMT and Moscow TASS in Russian at 0756 GMT and an East Berlin ADN report in German to East Germany at 0929 GMT on July 30, 1961.

Gorshkov Radio Address, July 29, 1961, carried by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1445 GMT.


1962

Gorshkov  Pravda Interview February 2, 1962 including report by Moscow TASS in English to Europe at 0633 GMT.

Malinovskiy  Soviet Army and Navy Day Speech in Moscow of February 22, 1962, excerpts carried by Moscow in English to Eastern North America at 2320 GMT.

"Standing Guard Over the Peaceful Toil of the Builders of Communism," Pravda, as reported by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 0600 GMT February 23, 1962.


Navy Day Speech reported by Moscow in Polish to Poland at 2100 GMT on July 28, 1962 and by Moscow TASS in Russian to Europe at 1736 GMT on July 29, 1962.

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"The Navy of the Land of Soviets,"
Pravda, July 26, 1959, excerpts reported by Moscow, Soviet Home Service at 0600 GMT.

Khruschev

1960

Khruschev
"Disarmament Is The Path Toward Consolidating Peace and Safeguarding Friendship Among Peoples," Speech to 4th Session of Supreme Soviet, January 14, 1960, carried live by Moscow, Soviet Home Service at 0800 GMT.

Malinovskiy
Speech to 4th Session of Supreme Soviet, January 15, 1960, reported by Moscow, Soviet Home Service, at 1125 GMT.

"On Guard Over Peace," Pravda, February 23, 1960 as reported by Moscow, Soviet Home Service at 0600 GMT.

Gorshkov

Malinovskiy
Order of the Day of the USSR Minister of Defense, No. 177, Moscow, July 31, 1960 as reported by Moscow, Soviet Home Service, 2130 GMT, July 30, 1960.

Gorshkov
"True Sons of Their Motherland," Pravda, July 31, 1960 as reported by Moscow, Soviet Home Service at 1200 GMT.

1961

Malinovskiy
"Mounting Guard Over the Labor of the Builders of Communism," Pravda, February 23, 1961, including report of this article broadcast by Moscow in English to South and Southeast Asia at 1130 GMT.
Material Used for Content Analysis

Appendix A

I. Pre-Study Period (1956 - 1964)

1956

Gorshkov  Navy Day Speech in Leningrad, July 26, 1956, carried by Moscow Soviet Home Service at 1720 GMT.

1957


1958

Malinovskiy  Soviet Army and Navy 40th Anniversary Speech at Sports Palace, Central Stadium on February 22, 1958, carried live by Moscow, Soviet Home Service at 1405 GMT.

Gorshkov  Pravda article of July 27, 1958 excerpts reported by TASS, Radioteletype in Russian to Europe at 0802 GMT.


1959

Gorshkov  "Mounting Guard Over The Achievements of Socialism," Sovetskiy Flot, February 23, 1959 including excerpts reported by Moscow, TASS Radioteletype in Russian to Europe at 0715 GMT.
his deployed forces. Based upon the general tone of the literature, the seriousness with which nuclear war is addressed, and the absence of statements to the contrary, this researcher finds no literature evidence to support the view that release authority for tactical nuclear weapons is a Navy matter nor that a nuclear war at sea alone would be initiated by the Soviets. The decision to initiate tactical nuclear war at sea appears to be neither a Navy decision nor one that will hinge upon naval matters. Rather, it will depend upon the political context, such as participants in a war and desired length of the war.
a war. The evidence of capability in hardware should provide insight into Gorshkov either arguing for this role or announcing it as approved strategy.

Tactical Nuclear War At Sea

Based upon the literature, the possibility for tactical nuclear warfare initiated at sea and limited to that theater cannot be supported or dismissed. It is clear that the Soviets do not want a nuclear world war, but there might be advantages for the Soviets in threatening to go nuclear first in Europe. The Soviets have also been emphasizing conventional capabilities, but this might involve complementary operations ashore or the warfare not involving superpowers or NATO.

Gorshkov has pointed out what all naval officers intuitively understand, that nuclear weapons can guarantee tactical success in battle (one weapon = one ship). Whether or not operations could be confined to the sea is another question. On the other hand, if the Soviets go nuclear ashore, there is no reason to doubt they will go nuclear at sea.

Ustinov made direct reference to the non-sanctioned use of nuclear weapons, and Gorshkov is obviously concerned with getting release authority to
either part of the strategy or is a role that Gorshkov is still advocating. From the content analysis and intended audiences, either case can be made.

The importance of SLOCs in history is cited as being both strategic and capable of undermining an enemy's military-economic potential (a current strategic goal). The difficulty in defending against a submarine campaign in historical passages as well as the diversion of assets it causes is pointed out.

A SLOC campaign at sea is not important in a short nuclear war involving the U.S. or Europe. If Soviet doctrine in fact now recognizes a conventional phase or even a lengthy conventional war (declaratory policy according to the literature), then the disruption of SLOCs without nuclear strikes on the terminal ends would still be a strategic mission that the Soviet military would have to perform. An at-sea SLOC campaign could involve conventional or tactical nuclear weapons.

This could explain Gorshkov's continual criticisms, using historical surrogates, of defensive-only navies. A conventional SLOC capability would involve an offensive strategy that could influence the outcome of
Targeting for fleet versus shore operations appears to involve ballistic missile strikes against political-administrative centers, military-industrial targets, terminals for the sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and military bases. As such all operations would be nuclear. Gorshkov is much more specific in his targeting objectives than are his seniors. This needs to be further analyzed by consideration of deployment patterns and hardware capability.

Of interest is the targeting of military bases that constitute springboards for attack against the USSR. This can certainly be taken as missile or air bases and would thus confirm official Washington's version of Soviet SSBN targeting.

Latent evidence supports the contention that the USSR does not plan to target cities per se, but it does not answer the question if they view civilian casualties as something to avoid, unavoidable and unfortunate, or a bonus.

Sea Lines of Communication

The manifest evidence for a SLOC disruption mission involves nuclear war and strikes against SLOC terminals. There is ample additional latent evidence that a SLOC campaign option against ships at sea is
is that there is a role for navies both in the beginning
and at the end of a future war.

Targeting

Soviet ballistic missile declaratory targeting
includes major Western naval combatants (SSBNs, ASW
forces including carriers and submarines) in ports and
at bases. The Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) and the
navy appear to be assigned this mission. All operations
would be nuclear.

Open ocean fleet versus fleet operations receive
little mention. Modern U.S. SSBNs probably do not have
to enter the local defended bastions in order to fire
their missiles, and therefore they must be the target
of Soviet ASW submarines conducting distant operations.
Such operations could be entirely conventional.

There is also a possible declaratory policy
(not reinforced of late) that SRF and Navy nuclear
ballistic missiles will be used against enemy ships in
the theater which may mean at sea. Admiral Gorshkov
criticized such views in 1967, but Marshal Grechko
did make direct reference to SRF targeting in 1972,
and Gorshkov himself discussed the use of Soviet SSBNs
to counter similar Western systems in 1979. The
matter cannot be resolved by content analysis.
The withholding of submarines as part of a reserve appears likely but not unique. It would appear illogical, based on the literature, that the nuclear reserves would be allocated to only one service. Soviet victory in war is always described as requiring the participation of all services. Naval forces and theaters are described in Navy documents only, as being capable of influencing the outcome of war. In non-Navy documents, the claim is diluted to influence of armed struggles.

The evidence from latent themes does support the use of navies to win the peace, but so do similar historical passages written by Western authors. Rather than conclude that Gorshkov has made a unique contribution in stressing naval forces in winning wars, one need only re-read Mahan on how the American Revolution was really won and how Napoleon was really defeated.

Despite many historical examples of the value of navies over the long run in a war, Gorshkov stresses the lessons of the Great Patriotic War, which emphasize the value of the Soviet Navy in the initial phase. If anything can be gained from these latent messages, it
nuclear weapons will be withheld initially from attacks on the soil of each superpower and would serve as a deterrent to the conduct of such operations. Thus Soviet long-range strategic nuclear forces must be able to survive a Western strike.

Land based systems are not necessarily invulnerable, according to Grechko. The emphasis on sea-based systems survivability, therefore, may have nothing to do with withholding, since it could equally be a part of a general strategy to delay nuclear attacks on superpower territory and fear of a Western first strike or strategic ASW campaign against Soviet SSBNs.

There is no manifest evidence that if the nuclear tripwire is crossed in Europe, the use of nuclear weapons by the Navy will be delayed, rather the fleet's ability to immediately participate is stressed. One can infer that withholding Soviet SSBN strikes from attacks on the U.S. itself could deter similar strikes by American SSBNs. Withholding might be a strategy to deny advantage to the U.S., which has openly discussed maintaining a secure force capable of assured destruction of the USSR. The U.S. might be deterred from using its final military capability due to withheld Soviet reserves.
Withholding SSBNs

The theory that the Soviets will withhold some of their SSBNs for escalation control, deterrence, or to aid inter/post-war negotiating positions is not well substantiated by the manifest evidence. Rather, if there is any latent evidence for withholding, it is of all types of nuclear forces and not specifically those in the Navy.

According to literature evidence, Soviet declaratory policy now includes the potential for an initial conventional phase or a total conventional war. These may not necessarily have anything to do with a possible war with the U.S. The fleet has also been described as having the capability for prolonged combat operations.

Nuclear retaliation from the sea and elsewhere is inevitable, not automatic. Brezhnev and Ustinov have again recently stressed that limited nuclear war is impossible and a future war could not be fought assuming prearranged rules. The context appears to be that if Soviet territory is hit by Western theater systems, U.S. soil will also suffer.

If war is to come about, Soviet declaratory policy is to end it quickly and on terms favorable to the USSR. A case can be made from the literature that long-range
Bastion defense also appears to be associated with the need to protect Soviet territory itself. The defense perimeter that protects the SSBN also protects the homeland against shorter range threats from the sea, such as cruise missiles, older ballistic missiles and carrier aviation.

Latent evidence for bastions appears to be plentiful. The need to provide combat stability to submarines (the main striking arm), is a message from World Wars I and II and Soviet Baltic Fleet operations in the Great Patriotic War. The failure of Germany to attack ASW forces is also emphasized by Gorshkov. Submarines are the navy's total contribution to the Soviet strategic nuclear force triad. There is additional latent evidence of bastion defense in the Soviet claim that Western submarines will support their SSBNs, a concept that is not, in reality, found in Western literature.

Bastion defense may be defensive in strategy, but it would involve aggressive tactics and offensive operations. Defended zones should not be expected to be passive. Defense of bastions can involve a total conventional phase of the armed struggle even though the primary object of attack by the West and subject of defense by the Soviet Union are nuclear forces.
CHAPTER 6

CONTENT ANALYSIS FINDINGS
OF DECLARATORY POLICY

The following represents the researcher's findings of Soviet declaratory policy for the strategic employment of the Soviet Navy in a future major nuclear war. These findings represent a synthesis of the manifest and latent themes as discussed in detail in previous chapters. Alone they do not represent predictions for Soviet behavior. Such predictions must include consideration of hardware, deployments, and exercises.

Bastions

The theory that the Soviets will deploy their fleet in home waters in defended bastions designed to protect their SSBNs appears to be well substantiated by manifest evidence. In the category of fleet versus fleet actions, concepts have been openly described that support a bastion defense, including defended zones, cooperation between branches, and the need to support the main striking arm, their ballistic missile nuclear submarines (SSBNs). The threat to Soviet SSBNs has been described primarily as Western anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces, including submarines and aircraft carriers.

18. A notable exception involves Yuri Andropov's speech of June 7, 1983 where a nuclear free Baltic was discussed, (printed in Krasnaya Zvezda, 2nd Ed. pp. 1,3, and in a June 6 TASS release contained in a Soviet Embassy press release of June 7). According to the New York Times, (p. 14) report of this speech on the same day, Colonel General Nikolai V. Chervov stated some months ago that if the Baltic were made nuclear free, the Soviet Navy would withdraw six missile carrying submarines based there.
"Loyal Sons of the Motherland," Pravda, July 29, 1962 including report by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 0100 GMT.

Krasnaya Zvezda Interview, October 31, 1962 reported by Moscow TASS in English to Europe at 0640 GMT.

1963

Gorshkov

"The Great Tasks of the Soviet Navy" Krasnaya Zvezda, February 5, 1963 including report by Moscow TASS in English to Europe at 0830 GMT.

Malinovskiy

Soviet Army and Navy 45th Anniversary Speech at Kremlin Palace of February 22, 1963, carried by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1415 GMT.

Gorshkov


Pravda article July 28, 1963 reported by Moscow TASS in English to Europe at 1109 GMT.

Navy Day Speech in Vladivostok, July 28, 1963 carried by Vladivostok Domestic Service in Russian at 1130 GMT.


1964

Malinovskiy

Soviet Army and Navy 46th Anniversary Speech at Moscow Central Theater in Moscow of February 22, 1964, reported by Moscow TASS International Service in Russian at 1510 GMT.
"A Faithful Guardian of Peace," *Pravda*, February 23, 1964 including report by Moscow TASS International Service in English at 1021 GMT.

Gorshkov

"Navy on a Distant Cruise," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, March 21, 1964, excerpts reported by Moscow TASS International Service in Russian at 0012 GMT.

Khrushchev

Speech at Kremlin Reception for Graduates of Military Academies, July 8, 1964 reported by Moscow TASS International Service in English at 1543 GMT.

Gorshkov

Navy Day Speech in Moscow at the House of the Unions, July 25, 1964, excerpts carried by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1550 GMT.


II. Research Period (1964 - 1983)

1965

Gorshkov


Malinovskiy

Soviet Army and Navy Day Speech at Central Theater in Moscow of February 22, 1965 carried live by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1430 GMT.

"The Reliable Guard of the Homeland," *Pravda*, February 23, 1965 including
summary report of article broadcast by Moscow in German to Germany at 1600 GMT.

Gorshkov

Interview "To Improve Combat Training of the Navy on Sea and Ocean Expanses," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 4, February 1965, pp. 18-23.

Izvestiya article reported by Moscow TASS International Service in English at 1615 GMT May 5, 1965.


Malinovskiy


Gorshkov

Victory Day Statement of May 20, 1965 carried by Moscow in Serbo-Croatian to Yugoslavia at 1830 GMT.

Malinovskiy


Gorshkov


"The Homeland's Honored Decorations Carry Obligations," Morskoy Sbornik, No. 6, June 1965, pp. 3-4.

Brezhnev

Speech at Kremlin Reception for Graduates of Military Academy, July 3, 1965 reported by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1530 GMT.

Kosygin

Speech at Baltiysk Presentation of the Red Banner Order to the Baltic Fleet, July 24, 1965 carried by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1730 GMT.
Navy Day Talk read by announcer, Moscow in English to South Asia on July 25, 1965 at 1100 GMT.

Malinovskiy  Radio article of July 28, 1965 broadcast in Albanian to Albania at 1700 GMT.


1966


Gorshkov  Krasnaya Zvezda statement of April 3, 1966 including report by Moscow TASS International Service in English at 1000 GMT.


Gorshkov  Navy Day Speech at Central Theater on July 30, 1966 carried by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1730 GMT and excerpts reported by Moscow TASS International Service in English at 1528 GMT.
Pravda interview of July 31, 1966 reported by Moscow TASS International Service in English at 2145 GMT July 30, 1966.

1967

Malinovskiy

"On Guard Over the Gains of the Great October," Pravda, February 23, 1967, reported by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 0840 GMT.

Gorshkov


Brezhnev

Karlovy Vary (Czechoslovakia) speech of April 24, 1967, at Conference of Communist Workers Parties of Europe reported by Moscow TASS International Service in Russian at 2130 GMT.

Gorshkov


Victory Day Statement of May 9, 1967 broadcast by Moscow in Macedonian to Yugoslavia at 1830 GMT.

Izvestiya interview reported by Moscow TASS International Service in English at 1459 GMT May 17, 1967 and Moscow in English to South Asia at 1600 GMT on May 18, 1967.


Agitator article, June 1967, pp. 21-23.

"Our Mighty Ocean Fleet," Pravda, July 30, 1967, p. 2, including reports by
Moscow TASS International Service in Russian at 0402 GMT and Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 0400 GMT.

Navy Day Speech in Leningrad, July 30, 1967, reported by Vladimir Umanskiy on Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1330 GMT.

Grechko Speech before Supreme Soviet regarding bill on Universal Military Service, reported by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1230 GMT October 12, 1967.


Order of the Day of the USSR Minister of Defense, No. 297, Moscow November 19, 1967, as reported by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 2130 GMT November 18, 1967.


1968


Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Guenter Engmann of February 15, 1968 broadcast by East Berlin Domestic Television Service in German at 1202 GMT.

Grechko  Speech "Fifty Years Guarding the Gains of Great October," February 23, 1968 at Kremlin Meeting Devoted to the 50th Jubilee of the Soviet Armed Forces carried live by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1429 GMT.


Trud statement, June 6, 1968, p. 3.

Izvestiya statement reported by Moscow TASS International Service in English at 1006 GMT on July 12, 1968.

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Izvestiya article summarized by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1600 GMT on July 20, 1968.

Krasnaya Zvezda comments reported by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 0600 GMT July 21, 1968.

Navy Day statement of July 27, 1968 broadcast by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1430 and 1600 GMT.


Neues Deutschland (East Berlin) article of August 3, 1968, p. 5.

1969


Gorshkov  Izvestiya interview with V. Goltsev April 5, 1969 including report by Moscow TASS International Service in English at 1418 GMT on April 4, 1969.


Agitator article in issue No. 13, June 1969, pp. 24-27.

Navy Day Speech in Moscow July 25, 1969 reported by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 2000 GMT.
Navy Day Politechnic Museum Speech July 26, 1969 reported by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 0300 GMT.

Grechko

Gorshkov
Interview "The Ocean Watch of the Fatherland," Pravda, July 27, 1969, p. 2, including report by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 0600 GMT.


Novosti interview "The Ocean Guard of the Soviet Union," Rabotnichesko Delo (Sofia), September 19, 1969, p. 4.

Gorshkov
Romanian Army Day Speech, October 23, 1969 reported by Moscow in Romanian to Romania at 1600 GMT on October 24, 1969.


Grechko
1970


Gorshkov  Comments in Ogonek, article by Anatoliy Yelkiv, issue No. 9, February 1970, p. 5.


"Long Voyages Are a School for Naval Training," Krasnaya Zvezda, April 16, 1970, p. 2, including report by Moscow TASS International Service in English at 1017 GMT.


Gorshkov  "Over the Seas and Oceans," Narodna Armiya (Sofia), May 5, 1970, pp. 1,3 (excerpt).

Grechko  Victory Day Speech in Kremlin, May 8, 1970 carried live by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1409 GMT.

Gorshkov  Navy Day Speech at Central Theater in Moscow July 24, 1970 excerpts reported

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by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1900 GMT and Moscow TASS International Service in English at 2008 GMT.

Grechko


Gorshkov


1971

Grechko

"The Unconquerable Shield of the Motherland," Pravda, February 23, 1971, p. 2 including report by Moscow TASS International Service in English at 0115 GMT and radio report by Moscow in English to South Asia at 1000 GMT.

Gorshkov


Grechko


Brezhnev  Election Speech of 11 June 1971 reported in Pravda, June 12, 1971, pp. 1,2.


"Destruction of the Assault Forces of Imperialism (In Honor of the 30th Anniversary of the Beginning of the Great Patriotic War)," Voyennaya Mysl', No. 6, June 1971.

Gorshkov  Navy Day Speech at Central Soviet Army Club in Moscow, July 23, 1971, excerpts reported by Mikhail Levchinskiy on Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1800 GMT and summary by Moscow in English to South Asia at 1000 GMT on July 24, 1971.


1972

"A Trusty Guard for Socialism" Pravda, February 23, 1972, p. 2 including report by Moscow TASS International Service in English at 0613 GMT.


"Russia's Road to the Sea, Peter I to Napoleon," Morskoy Sbornik, No. 3, March 1972.


Interview, "Ruggedness of Naval Life," Ogonek, No. 31, July 29, 1972, pp. 4-5.
Grechko


Gorshkov


"The Commanding Officer of a Ship -- The Leading Figure in the Fleet," Morskoy Sbornik, No. 7, July 1972, pp. 3-8.


Grechko


Gorshkov

"Navies as Instruments of Peacetime Imperialism," Morskoy Sbornik, No. 12, December 1972.
Andropov  Interview with Rudolf Augstein of April 19, 1983 for Der Spiegel reported by Moscow TASS in English at 1515 GMT on April 24, 1983 and press release from The Embassy of the USSR on April 25, 1983.


Gorshkov  Interview with Dimitur Kostov "Parity -- Guarantee for Peace," BTA Round the World, (Sofia) in English at 1325 GMT on May 12, 1983.


Navy Day Address carried by Moscow Domestic Television Service in Russian at 0650 GMT on July 31, 1983.


Gorshkov


1983

Gorshkov


Soviet Army and Navy 65th Anniversary Speech of February 22, 1983 carried by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 0715 GMT.

Ustinov


Andropov

"Yu. V. Andropov Answer to a Pravda Correspondent's Questions," Pravda March 27, 1983, p. 1, also reported by Moscow Radio in English to North America at 2300 GMT on March 26, 1983, and report of TASS release contained in press release from The Embassy of the USSR (undated).

Gorshkov

Comments following visit to Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen reported by Anden Domestic Service in Arabic at 1230 GMT on March 29, 1983.

"Bases of Aggression," Pravda April 15, 1985, pp. 4-5.
Moscow TASS in English at 1110 GMT and a press release from the Embassy of the USSR including another TASS release at 2138 GMT.

Navy Day Speech at Moscow Garrison of July 23, 1982 carried by the Vremya newscast on Moscow Domestic Television Service in Russian at 1700 GMT.

Interview with Aleksandr Abramov "On Guard of the Homeland," broadcast by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1000 GMT on July 24, 1982.

Navy Day Address broadcast by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 0710 GMT on July 25, 1982.


Novosti interview dated September 9, 1982 and distributed by press release from The Embassy of the USSR also appearing as "Whence Comes the Threat; Adm. S. Gorshkov on the true correlation of USSR and U.S. Naval Forces," Rude Pravo (Prague), September 13, 1982, p. 6, and in reworded form as APN interview with Vasily Morozov, Morning Star (London), November 30, 1982, p. 2.


**Brezhnev**


**Gorshkov**

Speech Honoring 40th Anniversary of Yugoslav People's Army in Moscow on December 21, 1981, excerpts broadcast by Moscow in Serbo-Croatian to Yugoslavia at 1700 GMT on December 22, 1981.

**1982**


**Ustinov**


**Brezhnev**

Letter to Australian disarmament organization reported by Moscow TASS in English at 1815 GMT on February 24, 1982.

Speech "Put Concern for the Working People, Concern for Production at the Center of Attention of the Trade Unions," at Congress of Soviet Trade Unions reported by Moscow TASS in English at 1000 GMT on March 16, 1982.

**Gorshkov**


**Ustinov**

"For Averting the Threat of Nuclear War," Pravda, July 12, 1982 as reported by...
Brezhnev

Gorshkov


Ustinov


Gorshkov


Interview with Vasilij Morozov "Myths and Reality About Naval Military Threat,"

"Problems with Respect to Control of Naval Forces," Morskoy Sbornik, No. 5, May 1980, pp. 7-12.

"Problems With Respect to Control of Naval Forces," Morskoy Sbornik, No. 6 June 1980, pp. 3-11.

Comments in Addis Ababa reported by Moscow TASS International Service in Russian at 1106 GMT on July 9, 1980.

Comments in Addis Ababa reported by Moscow TASS in English at 1100 GMT on July 10, 1980.


Brezhnev India Parliament Speech of December 10, 1980 broadcast by Moscow TASS in English at 1458 GMT.

1981


1979


Ustinov  Order of the Day of the USSR Minister of Defense, No. 175, Moscow, July 29, 1979, as reported by Krasnaya Zvezda, July 29, 1979, p. 1 and Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 0000 GMT.


Znamenosets comments contained in article "The Initiators Report" by Captain 2nd Rank V. Nikolayev, No. 7, July 1979, p. 9.


Comments at Fifth Military Region reported by Hanoi VNA in English at 1544 GMT and Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese at 1430 GMT on December 25, 1979.

Comments at Seventh Military Region reported by Hanoi VNA in English at 1543 GMT on December 25, 1979.

1980


Brezhnev
Speech to Personnel of the Pacific Fleet in Vladivostok reported in Kommunist, No. 6, April 1978, pp. 23-26.


Gorshkov

Ustinov

Gorshkov


Navy Day Speech July 29, 1978 carried by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1330 GMT.

Ustinov

Gorshkov


Komsomol Central Committee speech October 20, 1977 reported by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1100 GMT, October 22, 1977.


"Guarding the Accomplishments of the Great October," Morskoy Sbornik, No. 11 November 1977, pp. 6-12.

Speech at Cuban Naval Academy, summarized and reported by Havana Domestic Service in Spanish at 1100 GMT on December 22, 1977.

1978


Soviet Army and Navy 60th Anniversary Speech of February 23, 1978 carried by Moscow Domestic Service at 0545 GMT.


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Excerpts of Navy Day Speech in Moscow reported by "Ceremonial Meeting in Moscow," Krasnaya Zvezda, July 24, 1976, p. 1.

Navy Day Speech July 24, 1976 carried by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 0840 GMT.


1977

Gorshkov

Narodna Armiya (Sofia) interview with Stepan Fedoseyev, Novosti military observer, February 23, 1977, pp. 1,4, including report by Moscow in Serbo-Croatian to Yugoslavia at 1730 GMT on February 22, 1977 containing additional information.

Ustinov


Gorshkov

Krasnaya Zvezda comments contained in article "Friendly Meeting in Tunis," by Novosti correspondent V. Bolshakov and TASS correspondent I. Myakishev, March 31, 1977, p.3.

Interview with Stepan Fedoseyev, Novosti military commentator "We Shall Never Raise the Sword," Bratislava Pravda Slovak Weekend Supplement, April 1, 1977, p. 16 (excerpts).
Grechko

Gorshkov


1976

Gorshkov
"On Ocean Watch," Krasnaya Zvezda, February 11, 1976, p. 2 including report by Moscow TASS in English at 0953 GMT.

Brezhnev

Gorshkov


1975

Grechko


Gorshkov

"The USSR's Decisive Contribution to Victory Over Fascism," *Prace* (Prague), April 5, 1975, pp. 1,2.


"Navy in Great Patriotic War," *Voyenno Istoricheskiy Zhurnal*, No. 4, April 1975, pp. 35-42.


Navy Day Speech at Central Theater in Moscow, excerpts reported in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, July 26, 1975, p. 1 and carried by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1530 GMT on July 27, 1975
"The Reliable Guard of the Fatherland,"
Sovetskiy Patriot, February 20, 1974, p. 1, excerpts.

Grechko
"On Guard of Peace and Socialism."

Gorshkov
Armed Forces Day Speech at Central Theater in Moscow, excerpts reported in

Grechko

The Armed Forces of the Soviet State,

Gorshkov
"The Heroic Exploit of the People."
Trud, May 9, 1974, p. 1.

Grechko
"The Leading Role of the CPSU in Building the Army of a Developed Socialist Society."
Voprosy Istorii KPSS, No. 5, May 1974, pp. 30-47.

Brezhnev
Sejm speech carried live by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1015 GMT July 21, 1974.

Gorshkov
Navy Day Speech at Central Theater in Moscow, July 26, 1974, excerpts reported by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1900 GMT.

Grechko

Gorshkov
Interview "The Maritime Might of the Land of the Soviets," Pravda, July 28, 1974, p. 2 including report by Moscow TASS in English at 2234 GMT.
1973


Gorshkov  Army Navy Day Speech of February 24, 1973 as reported by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1530 GMT.


Bloknot Agitatora article, No. 8, April 1973, pp. 3-6.


Gorshkov  Interview "On Ocean Watch," Pravda, July 29, 1973, p. 2 including report by Moscow TASS in English at 0710 GMT.


1974

Grechko  Speech in Kazan at awarding Tatar ASSR with Order of the Friendship of the Peoples, January 8, 1974, reported by Komsomolets Tatars (Kazan), January 9, 1974, pp. 3-4.
