TOWARDS 2000: DIRECTIONS FOR AUSTRALIA’S MILITARY STRATEGY

By WING COMMANDER RICHARD N. KELLOWAY
ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE

AIR UNIVERSITY
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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# Title
Towards 2000: Directions for Australia's Military Strategy

# Authors
Wg Cdr Richard N. Kelloway, Royal Australian Air Force

# Abstract
Since the Australian withdrawal from Vietnam in 1972 Australian military strategy and force development has lacked coherent direction. Although a Government White Paper on defence which was released in 1976— and is still effectively current—proposed that Australia's perceived strategic circumstances necessitated greater self-reliance and operational self-sufficiency, there being no identifiable military threat little motivation has existed for successive governments to translate these strategic objectives into coherent defence policy. The author argues that the ongoing hiatus is avoidable because there are inherent in Australia's strategic environment enduring features which, if utilized, provide the focus that is essential to the development of Australia's military strategy and force structure in peacetime. Being founded upon enduring features the resulting defence posture will meet the longterm national security requirements of the defence-of-Australia doctrine.
AIR WAR COLLEGE
AIR UNIVERSITY
REPORT NO. MS -85

TOWARDS 2000:
DIRECTIONS FOR AUSTRALIA'S MILITARY STRATEGY

by

Richard N. Kelloway, Wing Commander, RAAF

A MILITARY STUDY SUBMITTED TO DR C.O. HUNTLEY

IN

FULFILMENT OF THE RESEARCH

REQUIREMENT

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

March 1985
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Since the Australian withdrawal from Vietnam in 1972 Australian military strategy and force development has lacked coherent direction. Although a Government White Paper on defence which was released in 1976— and is still effectively current—proposed that Australia's perceived strategic circumstances necessitated greater self-reliance and operational self-sufficiency, there being no identifiable military threat little motivation has existed for successive governments to translate these strategic objectives into coherent defence policy. The author argues that the ongoing hiatus is avoidable because there are inherent in Australia's strategic environment enduring features which, if utilized, provide the focus that is essential to the development of Australia's military strategy and force structure in peacetime. Being founded upon enduring features the resulting defence posture will meet the longterm national security requirements of the defence-of-Australia doctrine.
Wing Commander Richard N. Kelloway joined the Royal Australian Air Force as an Air Cadet at the RAAF Academy in 1962. Since graduation from pilot training in 1965 he has flown Sabre, Mirage and F111C aircraft in RAAF operational fighter and strike squadrons, and Macchi MB326 and CT-4 Airtrainer aircraft in RAAF flying training units. His staff experience includes appointments at RAAF Staff College and the Department of Defence (Air Force). He has served with the USAF twice prior to Air War College: in Vietnam in 1968-69 with the 19th TASS as an O1E FAC and at Nellis AFB in 1972-73 with the 442nd TFTS in the F111A.

For gallantry in action in support of the 11th Armoured Cavalry Regiment he was decorated with the Silver Star in 1969, and for his service as the Commanding Officer of No.1 Flying Training School he was appointed as an Officer in the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire in 1983. He is a graduate of the RAAF Staff College and the Air War College, Class of 1985, and holds a BA Degree from Deakin University and an MPS in international relations from Auburn University.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Planning Man's future does not deal with future decisions, but with the future of present decisions.

Daniel S. Papp

Strategic Background

Throughout most of Australia's history her national security policy has been founded overwhelmingly on a strategy of forward defence. So consistent were Australia's commitments under this strategy that some writers were moved to liken them to premiums on an insurance policy. In 1976, however, a White Paper on defence was released which concluded that "a fundamental transformation of the strategic circumstances that governed Australia's security throughout most of its history" had occurred. Underscoring this perceived change of circumstances was the severing--some five years earlier--of strategic guardianship by Great Britain and the United States which had been marked by three events: the withdrawal of British forces from "east of Suez", the promulgation of the Nixon Doctrine, and the withdrawal of US ground forces from South-East Asia.

Flowing from the new strategic situation, Australia's national security policy has been based on a "defence-of-Australia" doctrine and a defence objective of self-sufficiency. Nevertheless, complete recognition of the range of strategic realities that are inherent in this policy reorientation has been very slow. This has caused some defence pundits to become quite critical as successive governments have prevaricated over defence issues. Epitomizing such criticisms were the disparities between the immediate and longer term governmental reactions to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
late 1979. After an initial flush of alarm, the status quo ante was restored—political and public apathy about national security issues resumed and electoral attention turned to more personal social priorities.

The low level of concern about the inconsistencies between declared and de facto security policy notwithstanding, successive Labor and Liberal-National Party Governments have repeatedly affirmed that the primary responsibility of Government is to ensure Australia's security. As evidence of its commitment to this objective, the 1972-75 Whitlam labor Government committed itself to a policy of providing "adequate, good, modern, conventional equipment" for the Australian Defence Force. The 1975-83 Liberal-National Party Government subsequently pledged itself to "the maintenance of a substantial force-in-being". And, more recently, the Hawke Labor Government has declared its determination "to be able to cope with credible contingencies of national defence in the shorter term...and to deter escalation from that level".

Nature of Problem

On the evidence of the public statements of successive governments, the deduction can therefore be made that the 1976 White Paper is still current and reflects an essentially bipartisan view. Certainly, the consensus has been that, although no military threat to Australia is perceived in the foreseeable future, defence preparations can not be delayed until a definite threat finally emerges. Consequently, successive Governments have agreed that defence preparations are "prudent allowances" for "uncertainty" in an otherwise "favourable strategic situation". The nub of Australia's defence policy indecisiveness is, however, to be found in this rhetoric.

Although a bipartisan view of Australia's defence needs should facilitate the formulation of a coherent national security policy, there is no inherent
direction for any such policy in Australia's "no-threat" strategic outlook. Thus, the questions must be posed: If no threat is perceived, what constitutes "prudent allowances", what is "adequate equipment", what defines a "substantial force-in-being", and what are "credible contingencies"? Although the 1976 White Paper notes that "defence planners use contingency studies as a means of systematically exploring future uncertainties and of developing judgements on possible requirements for defence preparedness", it neither details nor analyses any strategic contingencies. Nor has more precise guidance entered the public domain following the reviews of Australia's strategic policy that were announced by the Government in 1979, 1980 and 1983.

Thus, the pundits' criticisms must be agreed. Despite its consistent recognition of the uncertainty of the times and its public reaffirmation of the necessity for adequate defence preparedness, neither the Whitlam, the Fraser, nor the Hawke Government has provided the clear strategic guidance essential to a "national understanding and consensus that will support (the) defence effort".

Some alternative method must therefore be found which will enable the formulation of national strategy and the determination of a pertinent force structure in the absence of a threat and when no credible threat contingencies can be identified. Moreover, a measure of urgency is added to this problem by the very significant disparity between the time that would be required to expand the Australian Defence Force and the warning time that may indeed be available.

Statement of Hypothesis

Fortunately, an appropriate methodology may not be as difficult as Australia's ongoing indecision over her defence policy would indicate. In Military Concepts and Principles, Rear Admiral Eccles, USN (ret), suggests a
postulate when he states that "strategic needs and strategic objectives determine the weapons and forces to be used". By logical extension, if Australia's "strategic needs" and "strategic objectives" can be identified in the absence of a clear strategic threat then the formulation of coherent national security policy may be possible.

The work of other contemporary strategists provides further guidance for the development of this logic. By defining objectives as "the fundamental aims, goals, or purposes of a nation", Collins indicates that a State's enduring objectives will be founded upon influential internal considerations that have long-term consequences. Further to this deduction is Boulding's perception that each State may be considered a sub-system of the total world system. This perception leads to the complementary deduction that pervasive external influences will also have long-term effects on a State's strategic objectives.

Amalgamating the preceding logic steps, an analytical process is suggested that would involve identification of those physical, historical and political features which represent long-term internal and external influences on Australia's strategic needs and strategic objectives. Provided all the relevant elements and their inter-relationships can be determined, these "strategic signposts" could, in turn, be used to provide guidance to a suite of basic strategies that are directed at the enduring characteristics of Australia's strategic environment. From these strategies, the force structure characteristics that reflect Australia's intrinsic strategic requirements may then be deduced.

Although specific threats may in time eventuate, the specific counter-threat strategies that result should supplement, not replace, the basic suite of strategies. Similarly, while concomitant force structure refinements may be required, the characteristics of the core force should remain appropriate.
Outline of Report

The preceding logic has been applied to this report. Accordingly, in Chapter II the works of the classical and some contemporary strategists are surveyed to ascertain whether their views support the hypothesis of this report and to develop a theoretical framework for its subsequent development. With this discussion complete, Australia's physical environment is examined in Chapter III to identify those features which represent enduring strategic influences. In Chapters IV and V, Australia's psycho-social and political environments are discussed so that those factors which will represent significant influences in her defence decision-making may be identified.

In Chapter VI the influences which have been identified in the preceding chapters are amalgamated into a set of strategic signposts. These are then used to formulate a suite of strategies that is based on enduring considerations and influences. From this suite of strategies the associated force structure characteristics are identified. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Chapter VII.

Summary

By way of summary, then, the central argument of this report is that a suite of strategies and associated force structure characteristics may be derived from first principles—the perception of a threat is not a prerequisite to the formulation of coherent defence policy. Concomitantly, defence policy that is based upon enduring strategic features is argued as being much more likely to meet the needs of the defence-of-Australia doctrine towards the year 2000 than would a continuation of the past incoherent processes. Underlying this report, then, is the perception that coherent defence preparations are far too important to be left until a focus is provided as a threat emerges. It is not future decisions that are of concern, but the future of present decisions.
CHAPTER II

CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND

An army and a state succumb quickest to paralysis of the brain.

Liddell Hart

To develop a theoretical framework for the subsequent chapters of this report and to gain an insight into those features in Australia's strategic environment which will be useful in deriving basic strategies and force structures, it is axiomatic that the works of the classical and selected contemporary strategists should be examined. Accordingly, the objective of this chapter is to distill from strategic philosophy those fundamental strategic concepts that are pertinent to the identification of a State's enduring and otherwise-influential strategic features.

Basic Conceptual Subdivisions

His being one of the earliest strategists whose writings survive to this day, it is not surprising that the earliest attempts to classify strategic elements are to be found in Sun Tzu's The Art of War. Thus, we find that Sun Tzu perceives five factors as being fundamental in the specific appraisal of war: the moral influence, weather, terrain, command and doctrine. Of these factors, terrain—in its broadest sense as geography—and weather can be categorized immediately as enduring strategic features. On the other hand, while Sun Tzu's remaining factors are clearly more susceptible to transitory strategic influences, they are recognizable intuitively as having specific relevance to the development in time of peace of a force structure that will meet a State's needs in time of war. At a more
abstract level of analysis, Sun Tzu's five factors may therefore be grouped into two general categories: physical features and psychosocial features. With respect to the latter category, Morgenthau shows that the values, attitudes and perceptions of a nation are largely shaped by its historical experiences.² Sun Tzu's concepts consequently suggest that strategic signposts are to be found in a State's physical and psychosocial-historical environments. These issues will be pursued in Chapters III and IV respectively.

Although Sun Tzu perceived that war is a conscious political act and Machiavelli asserted that a "very strict and intimate relation" must exist between the military and the government,³ it is Clausewitz' often quoted tenet: "War is nothing else than the continuation of state policy by different means"⁴ that has established the prevailing concept of the inter-relationship between political activity and military action. Developing this concept further in his 1827 revision of On War, Clausewitz alluded to the concept of a conflict continuum, the scope of which he perceived would extend from pure military violence to pure political interaction.⁵ Eccles finally placed these concepts into a contemporary context and provides a definitive analysis for this study when he opines that:

"...our basic problem is not necessarily to win a war, but rather to attain and maintain our national objectives in an era of protracted conflict that is both violent and non-violent."⁶

The precepts of these classic and contemporary authorities therefore suggests that strategic signposts should also be looked for in a State's political environment. This issue is discussed in Chapter V. With these three general environmental subdivisions in mind, a search for more specific strategic concepts may now be conducted.

Deterrence, Credibility and Control

Further reflection shows that the notion underlying Eccles' analysis is by no means new. Sun Tzu noted that: "Those skilled in war subdue the
enemy without battle," and more recently Liddell Hart claimed that: "The perfection of strategy would be...to produce a decision without serious fighting." In the nuclear age such concepts have been encapsulated in the strategy of deterrence. Nevertheless, because deterrence is a purely defensive strategy, many contemporary writers have cautioned against reliance upon it as a nation's sole strategy. Indeed, in their recent study Naroll, Bullough and Naroll throw doubt on the feasibility of deterrence by conventional weapons. This pessimistic analysis is given specific contemporary focus for this report by Knorr and Papp's analyses that it is overwhelmingly in the Third World where most military conflicts are now occurring.

The implications of the preceding discussion are, however, somewhat mitigated by Morgenthau's assessment that:

Political power is a psychological relation...In international politics in particular, armed strength as a threat or potentiality is the most important material factor making for the political power of a nation.

This is a most important analysis for it draws attention to the dual character of the concept of deterrence: its psychological and physical dimensions. Liddell Hart further refines the relationship between these dimensions and their effects on a potentially belligerent State when he notes that "the less that a nation has regard for moral obligations, the more it tends to respect physical strength." Provided certain prerequisites are met there is therefore some basis for confidence that reliance upon conventional deterrence is prima facie a reasonable policy.

Collins has usefully abstracted from the preceding elements of deterrence the overarching notion of "credibility" which he contends is predicated upon three considerations: a State's resolve to take action against an aggressor, its ability to "visit unacceptable punishment" on an
aggressor, and a would-be aggressor’s perception of these capabilities. Cline subsequently combined these three features in his concept of “perceived power” which is an important advance for it incorporates Liddell Hart’s earlier concept of national power into the concept of deterrence. It is Clausewitz, however, who outlines the optimum defence posture for a State which seeks to deter aggression:

The best policy is always to be very strong, first generally, then at the decisive point. (Clausewitz’ emphasis)

One way in which deterrence may be made credible in peacetime is suggested by the concept of control. At one level of analysis, if a State can exercise control over the mind of a potential aggressor by the mere possession of tangible military power and preparedness to use that power defensively, then that control will manifest itself as a credible deterrence. At another level, the ability of a State to exercise control over movements within its sovereign territory will contribute to its perceived power and will therefore be a factor in the credibility of its deterrence. Should deterrence fail, then the State’s ability to gain control of its enemy’s activities will substantially determine the outcome of an armed conflict between them. Detailed guidance to the dimensions of control is to be found in the maritime strategies of Thermistocles, Mahan and Corbett, in the continental strategy of Mackinder and in the air doctrines of Douhet and Seversky. More recently, Eccles has eclectically linked the preceding concepts of national power and control with those of Rosinski and Carney in his definition of strategy as:

The art of comprehensive direction of power to control situations and areas in order to attain objectives.

The elements of this definition have clear applicability in both peace and war.
National Power

What then is national power? And, how is it relevant to this analysis? With respect to the latter question, one measure of its relevance is to be found in Collins' definition of national strategy as:

The art and science of employing national power under all circumstances, during peace and war, to attain national objectives.  

This definition is very useful to this study because it refines Eccles' definition and, as a result, links national power, control and national objectives in both peace and war. As for the former question, Schelling makes it quite clear that power confers the ability to influence and is thus an essential adjunct to successful diplomacy. In *Arms and Influence*, Schelling has concentrated on the utility of military force as a component of power; other strategists have, however, presented broader analyses of the components of power. Liddell Hart's early listing of the components of power has been extended very thoroughly by Forbes, Cline and Collins. Although each of these authors started from a different premise there is considerable agreement on the concept of national power between them.

In the following discussion, for convenience, the framework developed by Forbes is used and the views of other authorities are incorporated where appropriate. The elements of power which constitute Forbes' framework are the geographic, demographic, economic, scientific, socio-political, and the military components. Discussion of these follows.

Geography is accepted by all three authors as being the primary component of a nation's power. Thus, Collins mentions the "crushing impact of geography on national security affairs" and notes that "strategic masters manipulate the physical environment, exploit its strengths, evade its weaknesses, (and) acknowledge its restraints". Considering each of the

* See Note 43 of this chapter.
elements that comprise the geographic component, Forbes and Collins state that a country's "natural location" and "relative location" are key elements of "geo-strategy": remoteness conferring defence in depth and a "screening effect" to all but aircraft and missiles; and proximity, access to or control of "choke points", "critical terrain" or "core areas". Although Cline remarks only on the size of a country, Forbes and Collins also cite the importance of shape, for "compactness increases unity, decreases sectionalism and social cleavage, and minimizes the problem of transportation and communications". Topography and climate are mentioned jointly for their consequences for the "timing, conduct and support of military operations", and Collins notes that topography "shapes strategic obstacles or corridors".

The strategic philosophies of Mahan, Mackinder and Seversky also include considerations that contribute valuably to comprehension of the geographic component of the concept of national power. Mahan believed that "a centrally situated strategic position, which combines secure land boundaries with access to one or more bodies of open water...coupled with a coastline that features deep-draft harbours and defensible shores" are fundamental elements of an effective maritime strategy. Furthermore, he contended that these geographic features must be matched by an "affinity of the people for salt water" and government policies that actively promote sea-power. In his geographic concept of the Asiatic "Heartland", Mackinder postulates a nexus between geography, mobility and power, which he expressed in the following way:

Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland.
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island.
Who rules the World-Island commands the World.

Finally, developing an "Area of Decision" concept that is based on the overlapping radii of action of strategic bomber aircraft from the US and USSR, Seversky contended that "common sense demands we channel economic
preparedness only into the zone we can successfully defend".\textsuperscript{38} Despite their having been written about continental Asia and North America, many of the elements of the theories of Mahan, Mackinder and Seversky are believed applicable to Australia's unique geographic and strategic environment.

To place the demographic component into a national security context before discussing its elements, Forbes notes that under full mobilization a balanced industrial state can allocate 8-10 percent of its population to the armed forces while still meeting the industrial work-force requirements for the second-line support of the Services and maintaining essential civilian services.\textsuperscript{39} Thus, he attaches as much importance to the age and sex distribution of the population as to its total number, and cites the importance of the population's "vigour and general outlook",\textsuperscript{40} levels of skill, training, education, productivity, health and morale.\textsuperscript{41} These issues are believed to have particular relevance to Australia's defence policy.

Turning now to the economic component of national power: Eccles places the concept of economic power into the context of this report by noting that "no military theory can stand alone (but) must be related to both political and economic theory".\textsuperscript{42} Developing a similar theme, General Maxwell Taylor very cogently identifies the difficulties created by conflicting social priorities and situates the current national security problems being encountered by most western democracies when he observes that: "The determination of... strategy has become a more or less incidental byproduct of the administrative processes of the defence budget".\textsuperscript{43} The potential relevance to this analysis of these perceptions is enhanced by the continuing economic malaise and the rising cost of social legislation in Australia. Even though these are potentially short-term strategic features their effects on decisions made now are nevertheless long-term.
At the practical level, Forbes, Cline and Collins also comment upon the essentiality of the economic component, and relate directly to the nation's "political and military power" its ability to satisfy the nation's military force requirements, and its ability to "build organized military capabilities, manufacture arms, and provide...logistic and technical support". However, Collins' view is most important because he emphasizes that the nation's economy is a constraint on, as well as a source of, its national power. During his consideration of the energy base, Cline contends that energy is "one of the most valuable economic resources in the world". Forbes emphasizes that the greater the nation's self-reliance for raw materials as well as other commodities, the less disruptive will be any dislocation of overseas trade, and advocates the stockpiling of those strategically important materials that are not available nationally. Finally, of great perceived relevance to this report, Forbes explains that "too great reliance on one form of transport can be a major element of weakness, especially in wartime".

The fundamental importance of science and technology to the nation's power is acknowledged by all three writers. Thus, Collins, having noted that "the current technological explosion is diffuse, cumulative, accelerative, and ...self-sustaining", concludes that to gain the maximum benefit from technology a nation must "harness and direct its energies". Implicit in this observation is the concept that advanced technology considerably enhances a nation's "perceived power", to the benefit of deterrence and hence the nation's security. Australia's large land mass, small but well-educated population

* Cline explains that: "The relationship between production and consumption of energy is a decisive modifier of economic capability since a surplus or shortage of energy materially affects industrial capacity, trade, and balance of payments. In advanced industrial states the amount of energy that must be imported is a crucial constraint on national strategy."
and technological capacity suggest that this component of power has particular relevance in her strategic policies.

Of all the components considered, the political and the social are considered by Forbes, Cline and Collins to be the most difficult to assess. Yet, at the same time, each writer reflects classical strategic philosophy in recognizing their crucial importance to a State's strength. In this regard, his having seen Italy surrender her independence to successive invaders, Machiavelli's works are deeply critical of the social and military policies that had permitted his country's demise.51 Like Sun Tzu, he perceived the vital relationships between the community's will, its cohesiveness, and the country's ability to defend itself.52 Indeed, Machiavelli's most profound misgivings resulted from his society's preoccupation with personal well-being, which he believed to be an inextricable consequence of its domination by financial and commercial interests.53 Reflecting a similar view, Clausewitz stressed the importance of a society's unity and resolve by comparing a State's physical and moral qualities to a sword: "The physical are almost no more than the wooden handle, whilst the moral are the noble metal, the real highly polished blade."54

Eccles has recently placed into contemporary context the importance of a community's support for policies that will preserve the well-being and security of the State.55 Indeed, he devoted much of Military Concepts and Philosophy to analysing the potentially destructive pressures acting upon and within democratic societies.56 Forbes relates these precepts to the thrust of

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* Eccles notes very pertinently (op cit, p227) that: "The long history of totalitarian philosophy shows that the totalitarian prediction is based on the assumption that in the so-called free society short-sightedness, stupidity and selfishness will dominate the conduct of the people. On the other hand, the philosophy of freedom implies that each act of each individual has an influence on the welfare and security of his society...The great challenge of a free society is whether or not these concepts can be understood and the responsibilities voluntarily assumed by enough individuals in society to avoid its collapse."
this report when he concludes that "the form and stability of government, the principles and policies of the regime, relations with other states, the structure of the administration, the quality of leadership, social conditions, the homogeneity of the people, and the extent to which governments command their allegiance" are vital to the nation's "diplomatic and military capabilities, its ability to negotiate, to exert and withstand economic pressure, to carry on and resist subversive propaganda, to plan military defence or aggression, to mobilize its military potential and to maintain its armed forces, and to wage war".

Perhaps, though, it is Kieffer's maxim: "Strategy is a joint undertaking by all the people" that paraphrases most succinctly the thrust of pertinent socio-political strategic concepts. Accordingly, there again appears to be specific relevance for Australia's longterm national security needs in what may be relatively short-term psychosocial features—especially when they are placed in the context of the theories of the oriental Revolutionary School.

Turning now to the military component: Collins drew attention to the bottom-line of a State's national security planning when he warned that "policy-makers who overcommit available combat power can get their countries into deep trouble". In so saying he alluded to the need for governments to continually compare their potential political objectives should war eventuate with the military means that they have provided. Abstracting from a detailed list of characteristics Collins went on to provide direction to the ideal characteristics and capabilities. He thus noted the need for diversified forces that can function effectively in every necessary environment with the requisite logistic support; for the Service arms to complement each other;

* With respect to the military means, Collins assessed (op cit, p177) that the "composition, organization, and balance; roles and missions; personnel strengths; states of training; arms and equipment; logistics systems; locations and dispositions; mobility means; coordination, command, and control" are crucially important.
for complete weapons systems with the greatest possible "persistence" and destructive power; for high quality in, rather than large quantities of, servicemen; and, the need for a responsive, survivable and secure command, control and communications system.

Northedge provided a further bench-mark for the development of the armed forces in peacetime when he noted that "all a state needs is sufficient armed forces to inflict such damage on an aggressor that it would not be worth his while to launch an aggression." The relationship between this proposition and the concept of deterrence is clear even though its implementation reflects Australia's present defence conundrum.

Finally, this analysis would not be complete without a short discussion of the corollary of national power: strategic vulnerability. Collins has provided insight to the concept of vulnerability in his definition:

The susceptibility of a nation to any action by any means that would diminish its capabilities and/or will to ensure national security. By logic, therefore, a vulnerability exists whenever there is a disparity between a State's strategic needs or objectives and the level of national power that is actually available to pursue them. Needless-to-say, vulnerabilities can never be completely eliminated. Therefore, they must be reduced as much as possible within the limitations of available resources. Where a vulnerability is unavoidable it must not be one that is vital to national interests, and strategies must be derived that will enable the flexible utilization of another suitable element of national power to cover the vulnerability should an attempt be made to exploit it.

Summary

Clearly, there is much in the preceding discussion that has specific relevance to Australia's strategic environment and is hence useful to this
report. These specifics will be reflected in ensuing chapters. At a more abstract level of analysis, though, three equally clear thrusts for the further development of this report are apparent.

On the one hand, irrespective of whether a threat is perceived or not, a State's physical environment represents an enduring factor in its strategic calculus. On the other hand, although they are not necessarily enduring features, the variety of socio-economic, psycho-social and socio-political features of a nation's environment also have long-term consequences for national security policy and force structure because they shape the future by influencing present decisions. Thus, the logic is suggested that, in the absence of a definable threat, a State's strategy and force structure will be predominantly influenced by its physical environment. The strategic imperatives that flow from the physical environment will, in turn, be modified by the more long-term influences that are inherent in the State's psycho-social and political environments.

And finally, irrespective of whether a State is at peace or war, its national power and its ability to project unequivocal signals of its resolve and intentions will be substantial influences in the success or otherwise of its international political activity. In this regard, its armed forces have an unquestionable part to play as a backstop to diplomacy and as the final arbiter should diplomacy fail. More specifically, a State's armed forces will be a key element in its ability to control its strategic environment and deter aggression.

By way of summary, then, the preceding review of classical and contemporary strategic philosophy indicates that, in the absence of a threat, a State's strategic signposts—the external and internal influences on its national security policies—should be looked for in its physical, psycho-social, and political environments. These features are examined in the next three chapters of this report.
CHAPTER III

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

Geography and ground can affect military operations in three ways: as an obstacle to the approach, as an impediment to visibility, and as a cover to fire.

Clausewitz

As the analysis in Chapter II has indicated, the preeminent authorities of the last 2500 years have held that the physical characteristics of a State are its primary strategic features—indeed, they are the only truly enduring influence on a State's strategic policies and force structure. Thus, considering Australia's physical environment in the light of Blainey's The Tyranny of Distance, the deduction may be made that three features are as overwhelmingly influential now as they were to the first European settlers in 1788: crushing isolation, vast internal distances and almost uniformly inhospitable climate and terrain.

Comparison of the preceding features with Forbes, Cline and Collins' conceptual discourses on the geographic component of national power shows that Australia's geographic remoteness is analogous to the more abstract geostrategic notion of "relative location" while its vastness and inhospitability are analogous to "natural location". Accordingly, in this chapter these abstractions are used as convenient subdivisions and the more specific features that Forbes, Cline and Collins have discussed are incorporated where appropriate. Throughout the analysis, location is interpreted in the widest possible sense to include pertinent elements of Australia's relative and natural geography, topography, hydrography, climatology and geology. Related demographic,

* Geoffreys Blainey, The Tyranny of Distance: How Distance Shaped Australia's History (Sun Books, Melbourne, 1983). Blainey's views are discussed further in Chapter IV.

** See pages 10-16 above.
trade and defence issues are addressed where appropriate.

**Relative Location**

When Blainey coined the phrase "The Tyranny of Distance" it was Australia's relative position that clearly dominated his thoughts. A map and a set of dividers show why. From Canberra, the Australian Federal Capital, it is about 5000km to Djakarta, the nearest foreign capital; around 6000km to Singapore and Manila; 8200km to Tokyo; and over 16000km to either Washington or London. Only one other European society in the world approaches such distances between itself and another European nation—that State is South Africa, which is only about half Australia's distance from Europe and North America. The sense of isolation that has so profoundly influenced the Australian ethos is placed into context by these geographic and cultural considerations.

A further glance at the map shows that Australia is an island continent and is surrounded on three sides by great oceans. Only the Indonesian archipelago and its extension through New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, the Solomon Islands, New Hebrides and New Caledonia, which arc across the equatorial regions to Australia's north, provide any sort of strategic corridor to Australia. Even then the closest "blue water" approach to the Australian landmass from an island of any consequence (Timor) would involve a passage of some 400km.

Of specific concern to Australia as a trading nation is the fact that the majority of her export traffic must pass through the archipelagic regions to her north. Of equal concern is her dependency on the sea lines of communication from the Persian Gulf for about one-third of her oil supplies. Accordingly, Australia's economic health is very dependent upon freedom of passage through several easily controlled strategic choke points. Foremost
amongst these are the One-and-a-Half Degree Channel through the Maldives; the Lombok and Wetar Straits, and the Molucca Passage in Indonesia; and the many narrow waterways of Melanesia and Micronesia. A further strategic vulnerability that is inherent in Australia's relative location is conferred by the distances over which her international trade is conducted. From Sydney by sea it is about 5000 nautical miles to the PRC, 6000 nautical miles to Japan and Korea, and 9000 nautical miles to the Persian Gulf.

Although Australia's trade with Europe is no longer as significant as it was in the 1950s, 12 percent of her export and 21 percent of her import trade is still conducted with the EEC. Once again this trade is dependent on freedom of passage through several strategic choke points: either the Panama Canal and the Caribbean, or alternatively the Straits of Bab el Mandeb, the Suez Canal, the Straits of Gibraltar and the English Channel. Should the Mediterranean passage be closed then the length of the sea line of communication is increased significantly and the Cape of Good Hope, Cape Verde, Canary and Madeira Islands become choke points. In contradistinction, Australia's trade with the US West Coast is virtually untrammelled, although trade with the US East Coast and ports in the Gulf of Mexico must traverse the Panama Canal and the Caribbean Sea.

Of course, Australia's relative location is simultaneously a source of strategic advantage. Because she is an island continent, all landfalls must result from sea or air passage. Moreover, because considerable distances are involved, tactical warning time and defence in depth are conferred. In this regard, the 2000km range cited for "Jindalee"—Australia's soon to become operational over-the-horizon radar (OHR)—will provide about 1 hour's warning time from detection to entry of Australian airspace on an aircraft cruising at 0.8M, and about 24 hour's warning from detection at maximum range to entry into Australian territorial waters by a ship cruising at 22 knots. Of course, strategic defence in depth is only conferred if the Australian Government
should readopt a "forward-defence" strategy.*

The substantial distances involved in an approach to Australia also confer strategic warning time. Although small lodgements on Australian territory could occur with little preparation time and be conducted by virtually any State in Australia's region, the mounting of a conventional invasion would require a very substantial force projection capability. At the moment only Australia's principal ally, the United States, has such a capability. Even the Soviet Pacific Fleet, which contains the carriers Novorossiisk and Minsk and the Alligator class landing ship the Ivan Rogov, does not yet have a power projection capability that could lead it to directly threaten Australia's vital interests.**

Needless-to-say, the development of a power-projection capability that would enable a conventional invasion would take time and be highly visible. Consequently, Australia's relative location is at once a source of strategic vulnerability as well as strategic and tactical advantage.

One final feature of Australia's physical environment that is germane is the demographic and ethnic disparity between her people and those of her neighbours. In this regard, Australia may be described as an island of European culture in an Asiatic sea of humanity. According to the Global 2000 report, in 1985 there will be to Australia's north about 168 million Indonesians, 766 million Indians, 54 million Filipinos, 122 million Japanese and 1075 million Chinese. Although Australia was able to shut herself off from this "yellow peril" until 1959 through a highly discriminatory immigration policy—the so-called "White Australia policy"—it has recently been forced by world opinion to acknowledge the ethnic and demographic implications of its relative location. The rate of Asian immigration that

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* See Chapter V for the current Australian position, and Chapter VI for further discussion of the issue.
** Australia's security interests are discussed in Chapters V and VI.
should be allowed nevertheless remains a societally divisive issue.

Natural Location

Just as the principal feature of Australia's relative location is her remoteness, so are distance and inhospitability the key features of the continent's natural location. Especially in comparison with the European States—which are the source of Australia's cultural heritage—the distances are vast. From Australia's northern-most to southern-most extremities the distance is almost 3700km, and from her most western to most eastern feature about 4000km. These distances are roughly equivalent to the distances from Helsinki to Cairo and from Lisbon to Tel Aviv. However, Australia's sheer size is perhaps best conveyed by the 36 750km length of her coastline—the longest unbroken coastline of any State. Moreover, with a land area of 7.682x10^6 sq.km, Australia is the sixth largest State on the globe. But, with a population of 15.5 million, her population density of about 2 people per square kilometre is the lowest in the world.7

This latter statistic is, however, quite meaningless because over 50 percent of the Australian landmass is so arid as to be essentially uninhabitable. This fact is nevertheless frequently overlooked by those in Australia who seek to promote xenophobia by citing Australia's low population density as evidence of the attractiveness of the continent to the overpopulated nations to her north.*

* Perhaps, though, there is some circumstantial basis for concern if one accepts that Asiaweek (23 March 1984, pp56-62) reflects a typical Asiatic viewpoint: "Australians have appropriated a hugely disproportionate share of the planet. With something like one-thirtieth of the world's arable land, Australia has one three-hundredths of its inhabitants. An entire continent-full of mineral resources is owned by just 15.5 million people. Australia is grossly underpopulated...its density is just two persons per square kilometre. This compares with 41 in Malaysia, 161 in the Philippines and 314 in Japan. At this point Australians habitually chime in with: Ah yes, but our country is too dry, most of it too desert to support a kangaroo. But they neglect to
In reality, Australia is one of the most highly urbanized of countries in the world with 86 percent of the population living in cities of 100,000 or more persons.

Moreover, the majority of Australia's population live in two crescent-shaped areas in the southeast and the southwest of the continent—these two heavily urbanized and industrialized regions comprising what is known as the Main Support Area. Indeed, it is only in these areas, which comprise the coastal plains and seaward slopes of the coastal ranges, that the climate is truly comfortable to Europeans almost all year round. Accordingly, about 74 percent of the Australian population lives in the south-eastern Main Support Area and about 8 percent in the south-western. Once beyond the immediate inland slopes of the coastal ranges not only does the level of heat discomfort increase markedly but so too does the aridity of the terrain. Consequently, even in the south-east and south-west of the continent, once beyond about 500km from the coast the great inland desert area starts to be encountered.

Although the incidence of drought is moderate on the inland slopes and the immediately contiguous inland plains in the south-east and south-west, it is there that the majority of Australia's agriculture is now conducted. Foremost amongst the reasons for this was the pattern of early settlement and exploration which, although tending to favour the coastal plains, moved quite early to the inland slopes because of the limited area available coastally. Subsequently, the expense of horse or bullock-drawn transportation resulted in the early development of a riverine transportation system and the building of ports at the notice that the 22.1% of the continent that receives more than 60cms of rainfall a year is a very sizeable slice. This fertile, mostly undulating quarter is 4.5 times the total area of mountainous Japan, which has a population of 119 million. Java with its 100 million people would fit comfortably in the coastal plain of the state of New South Wales. The well-watered portion of Australia is 6.7 times the size of West Germany, home to 61 million people, richer, per capita, than Australians."
mouths of rivers to service the coastal and international trade in agricultural products. Similarly, because the cheapest method of transporting industrial products was by coastal sailingship or steamer, early industrialization tended to occur at the sites of natural harbours that were located as close as possible to the sources of the required industrial raw materials. Finally, because commerce and industry was located coastally, the urban development and economic expansion that was necessary to accommodate the post-World War II immigration "boom" also occurred on the coastal plains.  

By the end of the immediate post-World War II period, however, many of the convenient sources of industrial raw materials had been exhausted. Simultaneously, the economic miracles in Germany and, particularly, Japan further increased demand for, and diversity of required, raw materials. The resulting geological and hydrographic surveys in the late 1950s led to the discovery of very substantial mineral deposits in Australia's most remote regions of the northwest. As these regions were settled and minerals extraction began, small ports and associated service towns sprang up along the coast. An indication of the economic importance of these remote regions is gained from the fact that in 1980-81 over 60 percent of Australia's gross export tonnage left from ports in the north of the continent. Moreover, ongoing successful geological and hydrographic surveys indicate that even the most harsh of Australia's remote reaches will eventually have to be inhabited.

As a result of this haphazard pattern of development some authorities have likened Australia to "an archipelago of settlements and resources". This is a very apt description because of the great distances between settlements in the areas away from the more densely populated coastal plains and the virtually impassable terrain between many of these settlements. The latter observation is especially true within the central and north-western regions of
the country where red sand dunes, stoney deserts, dry lakes and the complete absence of surface water defy traverse.

Likening Australia to an archipelago is even more appropriate when the surface-transport infrastructure is considered. Despite the crucial importance of the remote resource areas to the Australian economy, road or rail access to them is very limited. Thus, there is only one sealed road north-south across the continent—from Darwin to Adelaide—and the terrain away from the road is virtually impassable to all but four-wheel drive vehicles. Moreover, although the north-south road is sealed, on those infrequent occasions when Central Australia receives rain, the road tends to be closed by floodwaters. Nor is there an alternative surface link available for, although a north-south railway has been discussed for many years, there is currently a gap between the railheads in the north and the south of about 1500km.15

Unlike the north-south highway, the continental "ring-road" is not fully sealed, and is hence regularly closed by floods across much of the north of Australia during the September to April monsoon season—or "Wet" as it is called colloquially. As with north-south surface communications, there is again no rail system across the north, although there are some rail links from the mining towns in western Queensland to their related coastal ports. In the north-west, moreover, the length of the rail system has actually diminished, for the railway which connected the resource rich Pilbara region with Perth was officially closed in 1981.16 There is, however, an east-west rail link between Sydney and Perth via Adelaide.

Even in the south and east of Australia, where the rail infrastructure is well developed, strategic mobility is severely hampered because many of the states have a different railway gauge. This problem is put into perspective by the following excerpt from the 1956 Report of the (Federal) Rail
Standardization Committee:

...defence planners did not view gauge standardization as a top defence priority in the sense that...it should be pursued at the expense of existing defence projects although they recognized its value 'as considerable'. These gentlemen, with the air of a punter placing an each-way bet, said that if it could be carried through without detracting from the remainder of the defence programme, they would welcome it as providing a considerable increase to the nation's defence potential.17

This issue is no closer to resolution almost 30 years later! As a final indication of the underdevelopment of Australia's land transportation system, there is only 39 500km of railway and 815 000km of public roadway on a continent with a periphery almost 37 000km in length.18

The underdevelopment of Australia's land transport infrastructure would perhaps not be such a source of strategic vulnerability if Australia had a well developed coastal shipping service and associated port facilities. This, however, is not the case. As at 30 June 1982 the Australian Shipping Commission operated a fleet of only thirty-three vessels, fourteen of which were engaged in overseas trade and the remaining nineteen on coastal trade. Of the thirty-three vessels, one was a vehicle deck passenger ferry, thirteen were vehicle deck cargo ships, four were cellular container or container bulk ships and the remaining fifteen were bulk-ore carriers. Moreover, of the nineteen coastal vessels, nine were small bulk-ore carriers of less than 100 000 tonnes deadweight.19 Without a detailed analysis of each ship in the fleet, the deduction can therefore be made that probably not more than fourteen could be used readily for military logistical support.20

The problem of transportation by sea to the remote north and north-west of Australia is further exacerbated by the estuarine location of most of the ports in those regions, as a result of which harbour approaches are generally through narrow channels or across dredged bars. A further problem is presented by the extreme tides in many of these harbours—forty foot tidal

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variations not being uncommon. Finally, because many of the port facilities have been purpose-built to load the particular natural resource that is exported through the harbour, general cargo facilities are frequently not available.21

Nor is the underdevelopment of Australia's land and sea transport system alleviated by the air transport infrastructure. Between Perth and Brisbane—a distance around the coast of about 20 000km—there are only fourteen airfields which can accept commercial jet aircraft. Of these only three—excluding Pearce (outside Perth) and Amberley (outside Brisbane)—are currently capable of accepting unrestricted operations by RAAF combat aircraft. Consequently, very significant gaps exist in air coverage by RAAF combat aircraft over the remote north of Australia.*

* The gaps in air defence/strike coverage are well illustrated by the following map which indicates the approximate extreme high altitude cruise ranges of each aircraft type. No combat allowances are included.
The upshot of the preceding issues is that, whereas Australia’s natural location should provide defence in depth, infrastructural underdevelopment minimizes the military advantages that would otherwise exist. Furthermore, the archipelagic-like disposition of Australia’s settlements and resources represents a significant strategic vulnerability for her economy. While these features, in combination, present significant strategic and tactical difficulties for Australian defence planners they would, of course, also represent an equally significant difficulty for military operations by any would-be aggressor who should land in Australia’s north.

One final implication of the archipelagic distribution of Australia’s settlements and resources is the sectionalism that it has created within her society. Western Australians, in particular, feel their isolation from the bulk of Australian society very keenly. Moreover, their sense of remoteness has been exacerbated since the 1960s by the contribution that Western Australian mining and seabed exploitation royalties from the resource rich Pilbarra and Kimberleys regions and offshore areas in the Timor Sea have made to the national economy. This sensitivity has frequently found expression over the defence of “the West”—a recent newspaper comment is illustrative of this and several other points:

The problem is to balance the enormous cost of providing adequate defence of the vast and barren western coast with the political difficulty of acknowledging it cannot be defended... Compared with the efforts Australia has made to reach an understanding and involvement with its Pacific and Asian neighbours, relations with the Indian Ocean countries have been neglected.22

So noteworthy has this neglect by successive Australian Governments been that one American author felt it important to make mention of the small "Westralia" secessionist movement which is the outgrowth of these feelings.23
Discussion

When the Minister for Defence said recently to a group of defence pundits that: "Geography gives us some natural advantages", he was clearly making a strategic rather than a tactical judgement. In terms of the abstractions used in this chapter, he was thus speaking only of the military advantages that are inherent in Australia's "relative location", not of the economic and defence vulnerabilities that are explicit in her "natural location". He was also ignoring the economic vulnerability that is conferred by Australia's long sea lines of communication and their being routed through many strategic choke points around the globe.

Despite the narrowness of the Minister's interpretation he nonetheless usefully alludes to Collins' advice. Thus, in the absence of a perceived threat, because Australia's physical environment is the only truly enduring influence on her strategy and force structure, this report must seek to identify measures by which its strengths may be exploited and its weaknesses evaded.

As a guide to later discussion, the preceding analysis of Australia's physical environment has shown that the concepts of many of the classical and contemporary strategists can be specifically applied to Australia. Thus, her central oceanic location, absence of land borders, and large land mass provide specific guidance to the thrust of a suite of maritime, continental and aerospace strategies. Moreover, Australia's location adjacent to the node of the Indonesian and Melanesian archipelagoes shape the nature and axes of approach to the continent, and hence provide immutable geographic guidance to her strategic defence.

* See pp10-11 above.

** This process is undertaken in Chapter VI.
Additionally, although many of the features in her physical environment inherently augment her national power, this advantage is offset to some extent by the underdevelopment of her sea, land and air infrastructures. Consequently, Australia's infrastructural underdevelopment represents a potential strategic vulnerability which must be mitigated by the development of appropriate strategies and force structures, or by the compensatory employment of some other component of national power.

More specifically, the need for a maritime strategy within a suite of national and military strategies is strengthened by Australia's status as a trading nation and, concomitantly, her economic health is dependent upon unhindered passage through strategic chokepoints around the whole globe. The conclusion can therefore be made that Australia's standard of living is directly dependent upon a global distribution of power that favours the informal association of free-trade States which comprises the Western democratic alliance and some more-developed non-aligned States.

Relating the physical environment of the continent to the specific issues raised by Forbes, Cline and Collins, the deduction can be made that Australia may be conceptually divided into three "core areas", each of which has fundamental economic and hence strategic relevance to Australia. These core areas are, specifically, the south-east and south-west Main Support Areas, and the north-west resource zone in the Timor Sea, the Pilbarra and the Kimberleys. The destruction or capture of any one of these core areas would profoundly affect the standard of living and way of life of the Australian people. Their defence is therefore essential.

Furthermore, because the transportation infrastructure between and within these three core areas is underdeveloped--and, more specifically, lacks alternative routes--the linkages that are available represent "critical terrain"
for both economic and national security reasons. Thus, a stark contrast is suggested between Mackinder's concepts of continental strategy and the advantages of interior lines and the very real constraints imposed on Australia's national power by many features in her physical environment. A similarly unfavourable relationship can be drawn between Mahan's concepts of maritime strategy and the elements of seapower and the inadequacies of Australia's marine infrastructure.

Just as Australia's oceanic location and extensive landmass can be seen to place specific requirements on her maritime and continental strategies and, concomitantly, on her forces and their support infrastructures, so too do those same features of her physical environment impose prerequisites upon an aerospace strategy and the means for its implementation. Indeed, de Seversky's emphasis of the importance of range is for very few other States more pertinent than as an adjunct to a continental aerospace strategy for Australia. Similarly, perhaps nowhere are the inherent characteristics of air power so relevant as to the strategic defence of Australia. Be that as it may, the underdevelopment of her air infrastructure contrasts just as starkly with the conceptual relationship between strategy and control drawn by Eccles, as do the maritime and continental strategies with their conceptual foundations.

And, finally, an interrelationship between psychosocial issues and geography—which will be further developed in Chapter IV—also bears highlighting. Key elements in this relationship are the sheer isolation of Australia from other European societies, the geography-rooted schisms within her society, and the racial and demographic dissimilarities between Australia and her northern neighbours. Moreover, while Australians have historically regarded themselves as being a strongly individualistic people, this

* See Chapter II, page 9 above.
perception—which is again rooted in Australia's geography—may, like her physical environment, represent both a strength and a weakness in her national power.

The perspicacity of Clausewitz' aphorism on the relationship between geography and ground and operations* is therefore clear. Indeed, it is as penetrating metaphorically as it is literally. Thus, to paraphrase Clausewitz, Australia's physical environment—her "geography and ground"—dictates the nature of her strategy and the requirements of her force structure, profoundly influences her perceptions of the world and hence probable reactions, and provides both strategic warning time and the possibility of defence in depth. But, at the same time, it also presents obstacles to her strategic defence, blinds her because of its vastness and prevents fire being brought to bear because of its intrinsic indefensibility.

* See the epigraph at page 16 above.
CHAPTER IV

PSYCHOSOCIAL-HISTORICAL ENVIRONMENT

Historians must deal with how wars are caused...It is understandable they should have difficulties. The emotions and influences that bore on a people in a past age are not easy to recover...it sometimes happens that a people may not know all the reasons...they have not been fully and frankly informed of the issues by their leaders. A more likely explanation is that people in organized groups, like individuals, sometimes act for reasons of which they are unaware.

T. Harry Williams

The analysis in Chapter II of the strategic philosophies of classical and contemporary authorities has shown that study of a nation's history will reveal the prevalence of values, perceptions or interests. Because these national characteristics will shape the perceptual lens through which a State views the world, they may, in turn, be used to identify propensities for certain courses of action in similar circumstances. Relating this notion back to this study's thesis, the deduction may therefore be made that indications of Australia's future objectives are to be found in her past patterns of behaviour. This chapter will therefore look for evidence of enduring values, perceptions and interests by reviewing the history of Australia's foreign policy and military activity.

Guidance to Analysis

Beaumont has identified a most pertinent continuity in Australia's military history and simultaneously adds an important caveat to this analysis when she explains that:

It would be oversimplifying a complex issue to suggest that the circumstances which led Australians to fight in South Africa in 1899 were the same as those which prevailed in 1939 when Australia declared war on
Germany, and it cannot be assumed that the values and
goals of Australians in 1914 were the same as
those of the politicians who decided in 1965 to send an
infantry battalion to Vietnam. Nonetheless, if one
looks back over the past eighty years of Australian
history, one can discern some almost surprising elements
of continuity in Australia’s commitment of troops
overseas...2

19th Century History

Although Beaumont has reviewed a timeframe of only eighty years in the
preceding excerpt, a more extensive review shows that the practice has been
of much longer duration. The roots of Australia’s overseas commitments can
thus be traced to the early 19th century. Blainey argued that, foremost
amongst the causes of this pattern, have been Australia’s profound sense of
isolation and the fragility of her early links with the British Empire.3 The
emergence of these perceptions was the result of war in Europe and the threats
to the Australian colonies posed by the interests of the other great powers
of the time. Such fears were indeed well founded. In 1793 British ships
sailing to Australia became “fair prey for French men of war and privateers”4
and: “In 1810, Napoleon ordered the Governor of Mauritius to ‘take the
English colony at Port Jackson (Sydney)’.”5

The ongoing nature of this fear of external threat is further evidenced
by the bitter resentment felt in the colonies when France declared a
protectorate in Tahiti in 1844 and annexed New Caledonia in 1853.6 Such
resentment was probably given further piquancy by the nascent regional
responsibilities which flowed from the commissions of the early Governors of
New South Wales: until the mid-1800s their commissions included governorship
of the nearby islands of the South Pacific. As a result, New Zealand was
settled by Australian emigrants in the early 19th century and was, until its
annexation by Britain in 1840, effectively a colony of New South Wales. It
was perhaps inevitable, therefore, that when the Maoris revolted in New Zealand in 1863 the Australian colonies would raise volunteer forces to suppress this threat to Imperial interests in the region.

Australia's tradition of overseas deployment of forces thus began 120 years ago—almost 40 years before the colonies federated and Australia became self-governing. A further twenty years were to pass before the next expeditionary force was despatched by the Australian colonies: this time to the Sudan in 1885. During the intervening period, the increasing wealth and power of the colonies resulted in the withdrawal of the last British garrisons in 1870. Thus, less than 100 years after European settlement and with a total population of only 1.6 million people, each colony assumed responsibility for its own land defence. They were still to rely almost totally on the British Fleet, however, until immediately prior to World War I. Nevertheless, the colony of Victoria had as early as 1853 created its own navy in response to the perceived threat posed by Russia during the Crimean War, not to mention the French naval base in New Caledonia.

The colonies' sense of isolation and vulnerability was greatly exacerbated by the 1879 British Royal Commission which emphasized the weaknesses of the Empire's defences. Concerns about security were given specific focus by the unforewarned arrival off Adelaide in 1882 of a Russian Fleet. Further defence scares were created by the increasing regional challenge to the British Fleet posed by France and Germany, the crises in 1883 in New Guinea and the New Hebrides, and the 1885 war on the Afghanistan frontier—"Australia's furthest line of defence".

Thus, the siege of Khartoum and the death of General Gordon occurred at a time of great public disquiet about security matters. An immediate offer by New South Wales of a contingent of troops was a reflex reaction to such concern.
Although the offer surprised the British government, it was quickly accepted and in three weeks 750 men were raised, equipped and despatched. The event was, however, perceived by some to be of far wider significance: as James Service, the Victorian Premier, said at the time, New South Wales' action had "precipitated Australia, in one short week, from a geographical expression to a nation".

In the decade and a half between the Sudan and the Boer War—Australia’s next expeditionary commitment—the impetus for Federation grew and defence became one of the major propellants of the colonies towards nationhood. The recommendation in 1889 by Major General Edwards, the (then) commander of British forces in China and Hong Kong, that the six colonies amalgamate their forces for the common defence of Australia was thus a significant event in several respects. Similarly influential in the movement towards nationhood had been the earlier discussions about Imperial naval defence at the 1887 Colonial Conference in London. As a result of this Conference the Australian colonies agreed to fund a naval squadron of the British Fleet for the local defence of the Australian station. The Imperial vestiges were still strong!

At the outbreak of the Boer War in 1899 the colonies were thus subject to many crosscutting pressures. The situation is well described by de Garis:

Though some progress had been made towards the evolution of a national identity the loyalties of late nineteenth century Australians were perplexingly tangled. Emotional links with Britain remained strong: the individual colonies commanded the affection and even the patriotism of their inhabitants; and yet most colonists also thought of themselves as Australians. Priorities varied between these three loyalties but few could altogether escape the pull of each and none of the crises of the period were serious enough to make a clear-cut choice necessary.

Reflecting these crosspressures as well as the lack of a legal unity, when the colonies responded to the Imperial call to arms, each despatched an independent contingent to South Africa.
The complexity of the motivations within the colonial communities is clearly evident in the views of the politicians of the day. One Victorian legislator hailed the opportunity for "our men to stand side by side with those who form the British Empire". The Lieutenant-Governor of New South Wales in his farewell address to his Colony's departing contingent claimed that the Dominions' response "...was the expression of the right and duty which these young nations (the various British colonies) have to come forward and help in the defence of the Empire to which they belonged". And in 1902 the first Australian Prime Minister noted that:

...the bond of Empire is not one only of mere patriotism ...but also of self-interest...in the event of Britain at any time losing the control of the passage of the Suez Canal, the route by South Africa would become most important as the trade route from Great Britain to India and Australia.

Of the 16,000 Australians despatched to fight the Boers, 1,400 did not return. At the height of the Boer War, the British Government again requested Australian military assistance—this time in China during the Boxer Rebellion. Although the British Government requested only the release of the Australian Squadron of the Royal Navy, New South Wales and Victoria raised contingents of 260 and 200 men respectively and South Australia despatched its only naval vessel of any size, the gunboat Protector. Millar's assessment that it was Imperial sentiment and interests which led to the Australian colonies' generous support appears to also have been held by General Gaselee, the British contingent commander in China, who claimed that the Australian contingent was "an object lesson not only to foreigners, but also our Indian fellow subjects, of the patriotism which inspires all parts of the British Empire".

Despite the lack of legal unity and some internal dissent within the colonies—especially amongst the Irish emigres—a pattern of behaviour is thus becoming evident. At the close of the 19th century a profound sense of
isolation and vulnerability had become part of the Australian culture. The resulting concern for colonial security had manifested as a perception that all threats to Imperial interests were threats to Australian interests. Millar drew the national sentiments of the time together in his conclusion that:

>This loyalty, this patriotism, this fervour, this sense of being part of a single Empire and responsible for its defence, were to send overseas expeditionary forces to successive wars for a further half century.\(^2\)

Australia's military commitments in the 20th century may therefore be viewed as extensions of a well-nigh established tradition.

**World War I**

Exemplifying the continuity of Australia's historical behaviour, the (then) Prime Minister Joseph Cook asserted on the outbreak of World War I:

>It is no use to blink our obligations. If the old country is at war so are we...We are ready to do our very best with and for the rest of the Empire in defending our interests in any part of the world.\(^2\)

Speaking two days later, though, the Minister for Defence, Senator E.D. Millen, placed a new and most fundamental interpretation upon a century old theme:

>This is a fight for freedom, and no more inspiring battle-cry could be given in this momentous struggle than that of 'Empire', which has been built up on a basis of freedom.\(^2\)
(My emphasis)

The jingoistic tenor of this excerpt aside and its global appeal at the time notwithstanding, Millen's emphasis upon a fight for freedom was to become increasingly a justification for overseas deployments of Australian forces as the 20th century advanced.

The definiteness of these politicians' views were, however, as much an echo of Australia's traditional sense of isolation and vulnerability as an unquestioned acceptance that, because Britain was at war the Empire was also at war.\(^2\) The immediate cause of concern in the first decade of the 20th century was, thus, the "Awakening of the East"—the sudden emergence of Japan as an
expansionist power in the Pacific. This concern found specific focus in the defeat of the Russian army at Mukden and the destruction of the Russian Fleet at Tsushima in 1905.\textsuperscript{25}

At the root of this concern was the fear of racial inundation that had been awakened in the 1850s when Chinese migration to the Australian goldfields began.\textsuperscript{26} The papers and journals thus reeked of xenophobia in the years leading up to World War I—"We have been slumbering beside a volcano, the danger of which was never until now suspected,"\textsuperscript{27} stated one Sydney newspaper in 1905. Further fears were aroused by the renewed Anglo-Japanese Treaty which some Australians feared would be exploited by Japan to modify the White Australia policy.\textsuperscript{28}

As the first decade of the 20th century passed, the probability of war between Britain and Germany became clearer and Australia's sense of vulnerability increased. Consequently, over the five years preceding World War I Australia abandoned its earlier parsimonious defence policy. In the financial year 1913-14, Australians were spending more on defence per capita than any of the other Allied Powers.\textsuperscript{29} Moreover, in 1909 Australia became the first English-speaking country to introduce compulsory military training—or conscription as it was known colloquially—for all males. Conscription was, however, most unpopular and led to rejection at national referenda in 1916 and 1917 of compulsory overseas service for conscriptees.\textsuperscript{30} Only Australian volunteers fought overseas until the Vietnam War.

Despite the bitterness surrounding conscription, at no stage was there a serious challenge to the view that Australian support of Great Britain should continue. Consequently, from a total population of about 4.8 million people, 330 000 Australian volunteers saw service overseas under British command. This represented about half the male population of military age. Almost 60 000 lost their lives.\textsuperscript{31} Out of Australia's sacrifices at Gallipoli,
in the Middle East and on the plains of Flanders grew the emotionally potent legends that have unified the nation. As the official Australian war historian, C.E.W. Bean, has said: on 25 April 1917 "the consciousness of Australian nationhood was born". From this national consciousness and pride Australians came to see their soldiers as more virile, enterprising and egalitarian than those of other nationalities. This perception was bolstered by Australia's experience in subsequent wars and consequently continues in Australian society to this day.

As a result of Australia's role in defence of the Empire, the (then) Prime Minister, W.M. Hughes, demanded a much greater voice for Australia in postwar international events. His stance resulted in Australia and the other Dominions being seated at the Paris Peace Conference independently rather than behind the British representative. It also resulted in the setting up in 1917 of the Imperial War Conference which resolved that "the Dominions must never again be dragged into war without having had the fullest opportunity of expressing their views before the die was cast". Hughes' vigour did not, however, always work as positively in ensuring Australia's interests. His total opposition at Versailles to the Japanese proposal for racial equality in the League of Nations earned Japan's enmity for Australia and an international reputation for racial prejudice.

World War II

With the "war to end all wars" satisfactorily over, Australia's security seemed assured and the size of her defence forces was reduced. Compulsory military service intakes were reduced from 1922, as was the defence budget. Although some increases in defence expenditure occurred in the late 1920s, the onset of the Great Depression led again to severe cuts. When Labor was returned to power in 1929, it finally cancelled conscription. The strength
of the all-volunteer militia fell to 27,000 men.\textsuperscript{36}

By the time Japan and Germany withdrew from the League of Nations, the armed strength of Australia was less than it had been in 1914. Despite some planning by Army Headquarters for the defence of Australia's vital industrial areas, until 1941 her security was overwhelmingly founded upon British naval power.\textsuperscript{37} A pattern of the 20th century thus begins to emerge—Australia's security being reliant more on faith than capability.

When Britain declared war on Germany on 2 September 1939, the (then) Prime Minister Menzies nevertheless declared one and a quarter hours later in a nationwide broadcast that:

\begin{quote}
  in consequence of a persistence by Germany in her invasion of Poland, Great Britain has declared war and that, as a result, Australia is also at war.\textsuperscript{38}
\end{quote}

Two weeks later, and under pressure from the press after a New Zealand announcement that it would raise an expeditionary force, Prime Minister Menzies announced the creation of a force of one division for service at home or abroad. One month later the first of Australia's overseas commitments of World War II began when a naval force sailed for Singapore. A little over three months later, on 20 January 1940, Australia's first ground contingent departed. By the time the "Phoney War" ended on 10 May 1940, an Australian division was established in the Middle East and an Australian naval force in the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{39}

The expediency with which military forces were despatched was, however, as much a reflection of Britain's sanguine assessments of Japanese intentions as a measure of Australia's Imperial loyalty.\textsuperscript{40} There were, of course, ample warnings of the deterioration in the international environment. Routine government-to-government contact throughout the interwar years had ensured that Australia was well briefed on the British perceptions of the situation in Europe and the Far East. Consequently, although lulled by Britain's optimistic assurances, Australia became increasingly alarmed throughout the
1930s by Japan's aggression in Manchuria and China. The Government's concerns, however, did not prevent it from creating ill-will with both Japan and the United States as a result of restrictive trade practices in mid-1936. Frightened by the reaction its policy elicited, the Australian Government studiously ignored Japan's flagrant aggression in China in 1937, and subsequently reversed its provocative trade policy. It also prevented attempts by various private groups to boycott trade with Japan over the next two years.41 Appeasement was not just a European malady!

Events in Europe and Asia were nonetheless reflected in the Government's authorizations for defence. Accordingly, defence expenditure began to increase as the Depression eased; however, it did not pass the pre-1929 level until 1937.42 Throughout this period the Australian Government also pressed its British counterpart with increasing concern about the reinforcement of Singapore.43 Such pressures continued to be met by Churchill with bland assurances that in the event of a simultaneous war in Europe and the Far East a fleet would be despatched.

Indeed, the British Government continued to maintain until Menzies' visit to London in early 1941 that Japan would remain neutral. Nevertheless, as Britain's inability to fulfil its commitments became increasingly clear throughout the late 1930s, Australia turned her security hopes to the United States. Marking this nascent change of reliance, had been the Australian Government's appointment in 1937 of its first (and only, until the war) diplomatic representative to a foreign country—a Counsellor at the British Embassy in Washington.

The foresight of this move was substantiated by a cable from the British Government on 13 June 1940 which read in part:

...in the circumstances envisaged it is most improbable that we would send adequate reinforcements to the Far East. We should therefore have to rely on the United States of America to safeguard our interests there. 44
Despite the serious implications of this advice and subsequent British recommendations that the air and ground defences in Malaya be strengthened, it was not until 22 February 1941 that the first Australian troops sailed for Singapore. By that time, Australia had despatched three Divisions, a fighter squadron and a naval force to the Middle East and a maritime reconnaissance squadron to Europe. A planned expeditionary air force of six RAAF squadrons had previously been declined by the British Government "for the present".

Throughout 1941, Australia and Britain reinforced Malaysia and Singapore. Consequently, when Japan attacked Pearl Harbour, Hong Kong, the Philippines and Malaya simultaneously on the morning of 7/8 December 1941, Australia had one division deployed in defensive positions across Malaya. These land forces were, however, poorly supported. Ammunition shortages were serious, less than two thirds of the assessed aircraft requirements had arrived—those aircraft that had been provided were obsolescent—and the naval reinforcement by the HMS Repulse and Prince of Wales was inadequate.

Moreover, although there had been discussions between the United States, Britain, the Netherland East Indies and Australia throughout 1941, little agreement had been reached over areas of responsibility or strategic objectives in the Far East. Indeed, it was not until 3 January 1942 that General Wavell, the General Officer Commanding ABDACOM (the American, British, Dutch, Australian Command) issued his command direction for the defence of the region. By mid-1942 the Japanese forces were astride the Owen Stanley Range in New Guinea, Darwin and Broome had been bombed on several occasions and Japanese miniature submarines had brought the war to Sydney Harbour.

Throughout the 1930s and early 1940s the profoundness of Australia’s sense of isolation and insecurity was further exacerbated by Roosevelt and Churchill’s grand strategy of Europe first, the Pacific second. Indeed, because that decision had been reached without consultation of Australia, the
decision-making process itself increased Australia's sense of vulnerability. Resulting from these perceptions was an equally profound sense of betrayal, the roots of which can be traced to the national self-delusion that accompanied Hughes' international achievements after World War I. Menzies' visit to London in early 1941 was also strongly contributory—as Horner notes:

For Menzies the trip was a personal triumph, and he came to believe that he might have a role to play in the direction of the imperial war effort. Indeed he might even lead it! And if that happened then perhaps he could bring some balance to Imperial strategy. This fantasy affected Menzies' actions and probably contributed to his subsequent downfall.50

All of these emotions found their focus in the Australian War Cabinet meeting on 24 January 1942 which considered a British Defence Committee proposal that Singapore be abandoned. Although the resulting Australian Government's cable has not been released, its tenor can be gauged from Churchill's reply:

...I really cannot pass without comment such language to me as 'inexcusable betrayal'. I make all allowances for your anxiety and will not allow such discourtesy to cloud my judgement or lessen my efforts on your behalf... You have made it clear in public that you place your confidence in the United States. I have some recent and I believe true knowledge of the view they take, and I doubt very much that they would share your opinion. 51

Perhaps Australia's position was best expressed by General MacArthur when he advised the (then) Prime Minister Curtin that "the agreement between Mr Churchill and President Roosevelt on grand strategy was a high hurdle to get over". This assessment was clearly correct; however, the evidence is that, because of the weakness and inexperience of the Curtin Government, MacArthur's advice resulted in restrictions being imposed by the Australian Government on its resident ministers' proselytising activities in Washington and London. Australia's ability to exert strategic influence in support of her interests suffered as a result.52
A further dimension to this weakness in Australia's strategic decision-making processes was the lack of influence of senior Australian military officers. Key illustrations of this problem were the Lyons Government's appointment of British military officers as the Chief of Staff of each Service during the early war years, the restrictions placed on access by the Chiefs of Staff to the government throughout the Curtin Ministry, the exclusion of Blamey from the Australian Advisory War Council during the crisis period in 1942 and MacArthur's exclusion of Australian staff from his Headquarters. The ramifications of this situation are summarized well by Horner in his study of allied strategy:

> It was now abundantly clear that except for such leverage the Australian government could exert as a result of supplying combat forces to MacArthur, or any influence that its resident ministers might have in Washington or London, the strategy to be employed for the defence of Australia was out of the hands of that country.

Despite the paucity of influence that her government was able to exercise in defence of her perceived interests, Australia's military contribution was significant. In April 1943, before the buildup of US forces began, Australia had 466,000 men in the South West Pacific Area (SWPA) and the US 111,000. At the end of 1944 Australia still supplied almost 50 percent of the Allied armed personnel in the area. Australian servicemen also continued to serve in Europe and the Mediterranean until VE Day. At the end of the War over 500,000 Australians were in uniform out of a total population of about 7.5 million; however, once again only volunteers served overseas. Australian casualties included 33,826 killed and 180,864 wounded. More than 23,000 servicemen and servicewomen had become prisoners-of-war.

These data do not, of course, include the manpower that was mobilized within civilian industry and support services. Some measure of the way in which Australia was overextended by the war effort may be gauged from the manpower assessment for the financial year 1944-45.
155,700 men and 37,700 women (including the approved intakes to the Services) a supply of only 117,650 men and 26,000 women was available. The consequences of the manpower situation—and, indeed, the wider implications for Australia's general wartime production capacity—are evident in the official war historians' summary that:

In short, the lofty notions of self-sufficiency for the RAAF came to very little, and in 1945 American aircraft were supplied in quantity to meet Australian operational requirements.

In summary, World War II represents the first and only occasion when Australian territory has come under attack and when Australian interests have been directly threatened. Even then, the evidence now available is that Japan had not planned to invade Australia—not, at least, as a strategic objective within her initial plan for the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Australia's initial reaction was to mobilize massively and quickly, deploy to the Middle East, and redeploy when her survival appeared in jeopardy. Hasluck provides the key to her actions:

There are three reasons readily distinguishable in parliamentary speeches and public comment on the outbreak of war by representatives of all political parties. Australia entered the war partly because of the view she held of her own membership of the British Commonwealth of Nations, partly because she saw the overthrow of Great Britain in Europe would eventually mean a direct threat of the overthrow of Australia either by Germany or Japan, and partly because of her view of international morality and the foundations of a stable community of nations.

In other words, Australia's motives were essentially a continuance of those that lead to her involvement in earlier wars: Empire, fear and espoused concepts of international responsibility.

Post-World War II

Since World War II Australia has sent forces overseas to fight on three occasions: in Korea (1950-54), Malaya (1950-58), Malaysia (1965-66) and
Vietnam (1964-72). These are, however, merely the highly visible tip of a far less obvious but very extensive range of overseas deployments. The latter include the Army and RAAF elements in the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan (1945-50); a transport flight which flew 7000 sorties during the Berlin Airlift; a RAAF fighter wing to Malta (1953-55); a fighter squadron to Thailand (1962-68) and to Borneo (1965-66); contributions to UN peace-keeping forces in the Middle East (UNEF II and UNIFIL), Cyprus* and Kashmir (UNMOGIP); a peace-keeping force during the elections in Zimbabwe; the ongoing Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai; an almost complete aerial photo-mapping survey of Indonesia and Papua-New Guinea; an ongoing Army and RAAF presence in Malaya; increased maritime surveillance of the North-West Indian Ocean since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; and an Army instructional team to Uganda (1982-84) after the defeat of President Idi Amin by Tanzanian forces.

Under ongoing agreements with the United States, Australia jointly administers US space research and satellite surveillance facilities at Pine Gap and Nurrungar, and a VIF communications facility at North West Cape. She also provides permanent basing rights for B-52 operations at Darwin and host-ports USN vessels as required. Australia is also a signatory to four regional collective security agreements: the ANZUS Treaty with the US and New Zealand dating from 1 September 1951; the ANZAC Pact with New Zealand dating from 21 January 1944; the Manila Pact with France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Great Britain and the US dating from 8 September 1954; and the Five Power Defence Arrangements with Great Britain, New Zealand, Malaya and Singapore dating from 1 November 1971.

* Although the peace-keeping force in Cyprus comprised Australian Federal Police it nevertheless represents a Commonwealth Government commitment overseas.
The preceding catalogue of defence activity must be placed into historical context, however. Again significant correlation with traditional political sentiments is to be found, even though a new threat is perceived—namely, Communism. Indeed, the tenor of Australia's post-war foreign policy perceptions has been held consistently by Liberal-National and Labor Governments since it was first announced by Prime Minister Menzies on 20 September 1950. On that date, in the first of a series of three broadcasts on defence in which he outlined Australia's reaction to the Korean invasion, Menzies stated:

We are, in truth, confronting a new technique of world aggression. The Communists undermine or over-run some European or Asiatic country. They set up a puppet government. They then choosing their time with care, inspire their new puppet or satellite to make an attack under circumstances which impose the greatest military difficulty not only upon their immediate defenders but upon the democratic powers generally.66

The theme is clear: reaction to an "unforeseen" crisis, intense political activity, denigration of the notion that defence preparations could have been left until the fighting started, a national appeal for support of the Government's defence initiatives and an invocation of patriotism based upon the defence of democracy wherever it may be threatened.

Comparison of this theme with the defence policy decisions of the preceding and subsequent years shows a less certain response than the strength of Menzies' rhetoric would indicate. Australia's post-war military policy was first outlined by the Government on 6 November 1946. Emphasis was to be placed upon cooperation with Britain and the US, and a leadership role in regional defence was to be sought; however, the policy was short on detail. Nothing more specific than a "full and adequate provision for post-war defence" was promised. It was to be 1955 before a precise expression of Australia's post-war defence and foreign policy objectives was announced.67
The realities of the preceding lack of specifics became clear on 3 March 1947 when the Treasurer rejected the Chiefs of Staff's request for universal military service (that is, conscription) and informed them that their annual budget for the five years 1947-52 would be £50 million against a programme requirement of £90 million per annum.68

The upshot of the Government's decision was that on 12 October 1949 the Minister for the Army announced to Parliament that there were only 1000 infantrymen in the Army against a goal of 3000.69 Consequently, Australia was unable throughout the Korean War to field the Brigade requested by President Truman, and was only able to provide a second battalion in October 1951 by seriously disrupting its expansion programme.70 A measure of the psychological and political consequences of the disparity between the perceived level of threat and Australia's military capability is evident in Dean Acheson's observations after an early ANZUS Council meeting: "They felt remote, uninformed, and worried by the unknown."71

Those fears of the unknown which were harboured were, however, soon forgotten in the face of more personal social priorities. Thus, despite the ongoing campaign by Commonwealth forces against the Communist-Terrorists in Malaya, a less urgent note was evident in the 1954 Statement on Defence Policy and the Programme by the Minister for Defence:

In a statement on the 10th April, I said the basis of Defence Policy had been transformed from preparedness by a critical date, to the capacity to maintain it at a level that can reasonably be sustained for a 'Long Haul'. In outlining the measures being taken to re-balance the Programme both within and between the Services, I emphasized that it was an interim statement ...The aim of our Defence Policy is to cooperate in repelling Communist aggression...What effect any specific commitments will have upon the present shape of our defence programme or the methods which we now employ is a matter which I will not presume to judge in advance. 72
The Minister went on to describe a series of defence policy reorientations which included maintenance of the Fleet Air Arm on a reduced operational basis and deemphasis of manpower provision for the Army. Reflecting the RAAF’s level of activities in Malaya and Malta a "weighting of the Defence effort in favour of the Air Force" was announced.

In 1955-56 the defence vote was reduced and did not again exceed the Korean War level of expenditure until 1961-62. Between these years it fell from 3.9 to 2.7 percent of the Gross Domestic Product. Over the intervening years the strength of the Royal Australian Navy declined from 14,400 to 11,000 permanent personnel, the Army from 24,230 to 20,637 and the Air Force from 16,907 to 15,665. As Korea receded into history, the level of strategic analysis in the Minister’s annual Statement on Defence Policy and the Programme also dwindled, until in 1961 there was no analysis at all in the 1961-62 Estimates speech.

As the first step in an increase in Australia’s commitment to Vietnam, on 10 November 1964, however, the Prime Minister announced that:

...there has been a deterioration in our strategic position since the review which I presented to Parliament last year. The range of likely military situations we must be prepared to face has increased as a result of recent Indonesian policies and actions and the growth of Communist influence and armed activity in Laos and South Vietnam. If these countries collapsed, there would be a grave threat to Thailand and the whole of South East Asia would be put at risk. The effectiveness of the South East Asia Treaty Organization as a guarantee of mutual security would be seriously jeopardized.

As a result of Australia’s changed perceptions significant expenditure increases, the reintroduction of compulsory military service so that the strength of the Army could be rapidly expanded to 33,000 men and substantial capital equipment programmes were announced. In April 1965 battalion-size forces were despatched to South Vietnam and Borneo. By the end of the Vietnam War, Australia’s commitment comprised at least one RAN ship on
station with USN forces in the Gulf of Tonkin, a Task Force of three battalions with supporting arms and services, and three RAAF squadrons—more than 8000 men in all. To accommodate this level of activity the total strength of the Australian Defence Forces had increased by almost 50 percent between 1962 and 1972. Conscription was essential to the expansion of the Army and for the first time conscriptees served overseas.

By 1970, as societal discord over Vietnam became increasingly strident, the Australian Government began to look to the future. The announcement of the Nixon Doctrine in 1969 and of Britain's intention to no longer permanently base forces in Malaya and Singapore after 1971, clearly rekindled traditional uncertainties. Thus, in March 1970 the Minister for Defence advised Parliament that:

...we are moving from a situation in which we have been supporting commitments of major powers, to a position of partnership with other regional countries which must now accept greater responsibility for their own defence. The familiar forces which have influenced international events for the past 20 years are changing in directions we cannot yet fully foresee...we are faced with formidable uncertainties about the world in which we are living...

Amongst the initiatives announced in the same assessment was "a full examination of the total Service manpower problems including national service". With the election in 1972 of the first Labor Government in 21 years, Australia's withdrawal from Vietnam was finalised and compulsory military service was terminated.

Perhaps because of the social and political divisiveness of Australia's participation in the Vietnam War, her reasons for involvement have been the subject of considerable scrutiny—especially by leftwing elements within the intelligentsia and the Labor Party. The record indicates that throughout the period 1962-64 the US State Department applied pressure on Australia to become involved and that she offered troops during this timeframe. But when the
Minister for Defence announced Australia's initial commitment on 24 May 1962. He related it to a request by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. A suggestion that the contribution was made under the provisions of the SEATO Treaty, to which South Vietnam was a Protocol State, was disproved in a Department of Foreign Affairs report which was tabled in Parliament in 1975. That report stated pertinently that:

The basic concept behind the Australian action was that of forward defence. This rested in turn on a belief in the fundamental importance in Australia's defence of the South East Asia area, and on the necessity to prevent the spread of communism and political instability in the area. Given Australia's military weakness, this policy had to depend for success upon membership of ANZUS and SEATO, and above all upon the presence of the United States in the area. To this end it was Australia's aim to ensure the United States did not waiver in its commitment to South East Asia and to support the American presence politically, diplomatically and if necessary militarily.

The cynicism of Australia's actions aside, elements of the traditional pattern of behaviour are clear in this analysis. These patterns are again evident in Australia's most recent significant defence response: her reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

Between Australia's withdrawal from Vietnam and this most recent response, however, another traditional pattern is evident: the deemphasis of defence as a budgetary priority. Accordingly, as a proportion of the total Budget outlays, defence expenditure fell from a high of 17.1 percent in financial year 1967-68 to a low of 8.5 percent in 1975-76 under the Labor Government. Subsequently, despite the release in the 1976 White Paper, Australian Defence, of an extensive reappraisal of Australia's strategic environment and a commitment to a substantial equipment acquisition programme, the economic consequences of the

* Concomitantly, education, health and social security increased as a proportion of the total Budget outlays over the same period from 2.8, 5.8 and 16.7 percent to 8.4, 13.5 and 23.2 percent respectively.
second oil shock necessitated budgetary restraint.\textsuperscript{86}

When the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan occurred, however, it gave instant focus to defence issues. Thus, the Australian Government perceived the invasion as being:

\ldots probably (the world's) most dangerous international crisis since World War II...The first thing which must be done is to demonstrate in convincing fashion, and beyond any doubt, that the will and resolve to meet the new challenge exists. \textsuperscript{87}

Accordingly, the Government pledged itself immediately to:

\ldots increase operations in the Indian Ocean. This will include extra surveillance flights and naval patrolling, visits to littoral States and exercising with friendly forces in the region...base porting ships...at Cockburn Sound (Western Australia)...upgrading the facilities at this base and... the development of existing and new airfields in Western Australia. \textsuperscript{88}

Immediate increases in defence expenditure were authorized and a longer-term target of 3 percent of the Gross Domestic Product was set for the financial year 1984-85 and beyond.

It is also important to note that the preceding policy decisions were made after a visit by the Prime Minister to the United States and Europe, and were further influenced by discussions with the ASEAN States. Unlike the situation in 1952 when President Truman remarked that both Australia and New Zealand "suffered from a paucity of knowledge of what was going on and faulty appreciation of current situations", \textsuperscript{89} on this occasion the Government was well informed. Not unexpectedly this heightened level of awareness and perceived seriousness of the threat brought Australia's traditional dependency out into the open. Thus, the Minister for Defence stated in March 1980 that:

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan raises serious implications for Australia's interests. Australia cannot secure these objectives by itself. We must rely on our principal ally, the United States...But we can, through our policies, show our concern at Soviet aggression and our resolve to defend our interests and independence, and to raise the cost to the Soviet Union of interference with them. \textsuperscript{90}
On the evidence of the level of rhetoric in the Parliamentary Statements by the Minister for Defence throughout 1982 the perceived crisis had passed. But, in retrospect, the Government's rhetoric can be seen to be an attempt to prepare the electorate for the budgetary realities of the burgeoning recession. Thus, in late April the Minister opined that "the nature and probability of threats to Australia's security are cautiously reassuring". Nonetheless, having been committed contractually to a number of very expensive capital equipment acquisition programmes by the Fraser Government, the incoming Labor Government was not able in its 1983-84 or 1984-85 Budgets to reduce the total authorized defence expenditure. Consequently, to minimize outlays on defence, severe reductions in the authorizations for "running costs" and "restraints on manpower" were made. Effectively, a return to traditional post-crisis patterns of behaviour had occurred.

Undoubtedly also influential in Australia's implicit lowering of defence as a social priority was the rejuvenation under the Reagan Administration of the United States' commitment to defence issues. An indication of the Australian Government's perceptions was the fact that Prime Minister Hawke made an official visit to the United States within four months of his election. Not only was the rapidity with which this visit occurred noteworthy, but so too were the Prime Minister's assurances to President Reagan that Australia had "a shared perception of the global security threats to us all" and that her "close relationship with the United States...will be maintained."

Two reasons make these events especially important. First, dating to the Whitlam Government in 1972-75 there had been significant anti-American sympathy within the leftwing of the Labor Party. Any doubts about the incoming Government's position therefore had to be assuaged quickly. And second, the Government could not overlook the strategic realities that are explicit in Australia's foreign policy and military history, not to mention the growing
Soviet military presence in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

On the basis of the Hawke Government's policy statements over the last eighteen months, the assumption can be made that the Prime Minister received the assurances he sought. Thus, a review of Australia's strategic environment which was completed in late 1983, led to the public announcement that "the prospect of military threat to Australia is presently slight and that we would have several years of warning of unfavourable developments of significant military magnitude".97

Consequently, in addition to reductions in manpower strengths and expenditure on running costs, the aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne was retired and not replaced—the fixed wing element of the Fleet Air Arm was subsequently disbanded and its manpower removed from the Navy establishment tables. In the Defence Minister's own words: "This decision was at once a symbol of the Government's strategic priorities..."100 Nevertheless, patrol activity by RAAF P3C aircraft over the northwest Indian Ocean was continued and Australia's permanent naval presence in the region was strengthened.101

The opportunity was, however, taken because of the forthcoming F/A18A reequipment programme to permanently reduce the RAAF fighter squadron commitment in Malaya to one squadron. As the F/A18A introduction continues, this final squadron is in turn to be progressively reduced in size from 1986 until its final withdrawal in 1988. Thereafter, detachments of 8 or 12 F/A18A are to be based at Butterworth for a total of at least 16 weeks per year. These detachments are to be augmented by deployments of F111C for some exercises.102 Australia's traditional commitment to forward defence may be down, but is not yet out!*

* This issue is examined further in Chapters V and VI.
Discussion

Just as the classical and contemporary strategists have predicted is possible, a review of the history of Australia's foreign and defence policies reveals a high level of consistency. While acknowledging Beaumont's warning* and without abstracting excessively from Australia's history, traditional patterns of behaviour, an essential national character, and prevalent social values, perceptions and interests can be discerned. More specifically, not only have these factors influenced policy and decisions in the past but they also appear to still be doing so today.

Consequently, the conclusion can be reached that the preceding review provides substantive support for the postulate that underpins this report.** That is to say, there are identifiable in Australia's ethos certain enduring characteristics which may be expected to influence future Australian foreign and defence policy decisions. Needless-to-say, to this conclusion must be added the clear caveat that these characteristics represent only a propensity for certain courses of action—they do not allow perfect prediction. Be that as it may, to ignore their potential utility within a strategy and force structure calculus when no other credible guidance has emerged would be crass.

Of course, a fundamental reality must be acknowledged before those pervasive societal influences are summarized.*** This verity was alluded to by the (then) Minister for Defence in 1954 when he announced the post-Korean War redirection of defence policy. In peace Australia's defence preparedness would be shaped by what "can reasonably be sustained for a 'Long Haul'" he said.**** Implicit in this statement is recognition that Australia's small

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* See page 33 above.
** See pages 3-4 above.
*** For discussion of the demographic, economic, social and military elements of power which relate to this paragraph, see Chapter II, pages 12-16 above.
**** See page 49 above.
population and concomitantly limited tax base present a significant restriction on the revenue that can be generated to fund the Government's social programmes.

Since Australia has one of the highest levels of direct personal taxation in the world\(^{103}\) there is little room for more severe imposts unless the community can be convinced of the criticality of the need. It is a fact of life, therefore, that Australian society will not accept either the imposition of higher levels of revenue gathering or the diversion of authorizations from health, education and welfare to defence until the threat to national security can no longer be ignored. This will inevitably represent a substantial constraint on defence planning during periods of peace.

Clearly influential in the development of a uniquely Australian outlook has been a very profound sense of vulnerability. This feeling is rooted in Australia's vast separation from European society, miniscule population, enormous landmass, and perilous closeness to a teeming Asia. It was undoubtedly exacerbated by the resentment and helplessness that the convict felt on being cast out of verdant England and transported to a most inhospitable and unforgiving land at the other end of the earth.

Flowing from this profound sense of vulnerability has been a resolute courting of first Great Britain and more recently the United States for strategic guardianship. Although in time of peace a more independent stance in world affairs has been pursued actively, when a threat has loomed large the measures taken to inveigle protection have been nothing short of extraordinary. Exemplifying this tendency have been Australia's long history of expeditionary commitments to very distant parts of the British Empire on six separate occasions over the period 1863-1942, the charge of "inexcusable betrayal" apparently levelled at Churchill in 1942, Curtin's subsequent strategic abdication to MacArthur and the associated emasculation of the Australian military high command, the final commitments to the dying Empire in the 1950s, and the support of US military operations around the Asian littoral since
The cynicism of Australia's motives in committing her forces to Vietnam is particularly noteworthy.

Especially significant in almost all of these overseas expeditions has also been the level of forces committed. Australia has inevitably given of her resources in full measure, even to the extent of being frequently overcommitted whether in absolute terms or as a result of policy decision. Even more illuminating was her deployment of three divisions to the Middle East in the face of the emerging Japanese threat. Clearly, a generality cannot be deduced from a sample of one; but the decision does usefully illustrate the extent to which Australia has been committed to forward defence.

Throughout the period a clear pattern of justification for the overseas deployment of forces is also apparent. In the days of Empire, a threat to Imperial interests was axiomatically a threat to Australian interests. Increasingly, however, from Millen's speech in 1914 through to the present the justification, while consistent, has been more abstract—the defence of freedom. A cynical and unproven inference may also be drawn from the consistent policy until Vietnam of despatching only volunteers to war; because of the growing dissent to overseas commitments of forces from World War I onwards, Governments sought to avoid the electoral consequences of Australia's strategic need to rely on great power protection by not sending conscriptees. If there is any validity in this inference, then the dissent within Australian society over the issue during the Vietnam War may prejudice the future despatch of conscriptees to fight overseas. Again, a generalization cannot be deduced from a sample of one; but the longstanding opposition to conscription within at least some sectors of Australian society indicates that some cultural predispositions should be assumed.

One final consideration is the legend about the natural soldierly qualities
that are believed possessed by the Australian male. The modern consequence of this perception is a widely held belief that there is no need to have large standing forces during peacetime. This belief is in turn implicitly nurtured by Government assessments about the low level of direct threat to Australia's interests, and manifests as a profound apathy about defence issues. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the budgetary consequences of Australia's small revenue base effectively necessitate restricted expenditure on defence during periods when no clear threat exists.

Consequently, at a higher level of abstraction the conclusions can be reached that future Australian Governments will most probably not have undertaken adequate defence preparations during peace; will rely upon belated, substantial redistributions of revenue to prepare the nation's defences; may commit forces overseas if the perceived threat generates a significant level of uncertainty within Cabinet; and may be expected to decide politically upon national objectives that exceed the social, economic and military means at their disposal.

These, then, are the enduring internal influences which, being rooted in Australian culture, may be reasonably expected to continue to shape "the fundamental aims, goals and purposes of the nation". To paraphrase T. Harry Williams, by their nature they may lead to actions for reasons that Australians are unaware.
... but the less ideal are the conditions for making collective security work, the less formidable will be the combined strength of the nations willing to defend the status quo.

Morgenthau

In Chapter II an examination of classic and contemporary strategic thought led to the conclusion that, in the absence of a threat, a State's strategy and force structure may be guided pertinently by its physical, psychosocial-historical, and political environments. The latter strategic feature is discussed in this chapter. Unlike the thesis in Chapter III, which held that Australia's physical environment imposes enduring requirements and restrictions upon her strategy and force structure, the theses in Chapter IV and this chapter are founded upon the belief that psychosocial and political factors influence the perceptual lens through which governments view the world and, therefore, shape the decisions that they make. In turn, decisions made now will have consequences for many years into the future.

To provide more precise guidance, the excerpt from Politics Among Nations at the head of this chapter is particularly useful because it draws attention to the political prerequisites for collective defence. Morgenthau's abstractions are, in turn, usefully fleshed out both politically and geographically by the Minister for Defence's recent assessment that:

Australia's (security) policies have sought to build on...common interests and cooperative relationships. We provide what help we can for the improvement of the independent capability of our neighbours to provide for their own security.
From this statement, the inference can be drawn that, as in the past*, Australia’s collective security relationships with the US and with her ASEAN and her South West Pacific neighbours remain the most influential features in her political environment.

Although the Minister’s statement usefully defines the present Government’s perceptions of the bounds of Australia’s political environment, because she has historically shown a decided tendency to deploy forces to the far regions of the globe, an analysis of the abstractions ** that have been used by successive Governments to signal their political intentions would be prudently first undertaken. After that analysis, the political implications of Australia’s various collective security agreements may then be examined. This discussion may, in turn, be followed by consideration of the regional interests of Australia and her neighbours, and the political ramifications of those interests. To enable comparison of Australia’s declaratory and de facto security policies to be made, the chapter is concluded with a short discussion of the central issues in extant Australian defence policy. Throughout, this chapter will concentrate on the political environment that is created by the activities, obligations and perceptions of Australia’s neighbours and collective security partners. Domestic political factors will be introduced where pertinent.

What is Australia’s Region?

Australia’s view of what constitutes her region of strategic interest has clearly varied over time. The history of her deployments of expeditionary forces to the African, European and Asian continents infers that Australia’s region of strategic interest has extended to any part of the globe where either

* See the analysis of Australia’s post-World War II foreign and defence policy at pages 48-56 above.

** The abstractions that have been used by successive Australian Governments are discussed at pages 64-68 below.
Imperial interests were in jeopardy or freedom was threatened. Indeed, despite the Whitlam Government's declaration after Australia's withdrawal from Vietnam that some narrowing of strategic focus was essential, there is much evidence in subsequent reactions to world events that the perceptual status quo ante still prevails. This evidence also suggests that there has been an overwhelming consistency in the Fraser and the Hawke Governments' perceptions of the bounds of Australia's strategic region. This disparity between the declaratory and de facto extent of her security regions bears further discussion.

The November 1976 White Paper represents common declaratory policy when it addresses the "Indo-Pacific area" as being Australia's general region of strategic interest and eschews military commitments in "distant areas such as Africa, the Middle East and North East Asia", other than under the auspices of UN peace-keeping operations. More specifically, and reflecting the gap between her ends (security interests) and her means (military capabilities), the White Paper excluded from Australia's strategic region for reasons of practicability those areas in which she could not "contribute military forces that would be significant to the strategic balance" or which would be "beyond the reach of effective defence activity by Australia".

Continuing in a practical vein, the White Paper noted that:

"...the requirements and scope for Australian defence activity are limited essentially to the areas close to home--areas in which deployment of military capabilities by a power potentially unfriendly to Australia could permit that power to attack or harass Australia and its territories, maritime resources zone and near lines of communication." The clarity of these perceptions notwithstanding, the Fraser Government could not avoid the onset of traditional anxieties as a result of her new strategic circumstances. Thus, in recognition of both the instability in the world
order and her own traditional propensities, the caveat was added that:

We do not rule out an Australian contribution to operations elsewhere if the requirement arose and we felt our presence would be effective, and if our forces could be spared from their national tasks.7

The currency of the preceding policy statements was underscored recently by the Labor Minister for Defence, Mr G.G. Scholes, in early March 1984 at an address to the Australian Capital Territory Branch of the Royal United Service Institution. In that presentation the Minister noted that:

The Government sees no primary Australian defence role outside her region. But we recognize that our alliance with the United States and our association with the West could lead to calls for our involvement in peace-keeping exercises in regions distant from Australia.8

The historical and contemporary consistencies in this assessment are clear; however, the situational interpretation of what may constitute a "peace-keeping" exercise is somewhat clouded when the Minister continued—admittedly having prefaced his remark with a reference to the request for an Australian involvement in a peace-keeping force in Grenada:

It is not possible to predict the circumstances in which elements of the Defence Force might one day operate abroad, but it would clearly be for the Government to decide at the time whether to contribute, and what form any contribution should take. A Defence Force developed to provide for our own national security would be able to make a number of different contributions—we should not attempt to structure our forces for...situations... far from our area of primary strategic concern?

This latter excerpt appears to suggest that a fairly liberal interpretation of what constitutes "peace-keeping exercises" may be taken should the need arise.

Most pertinently to this chapter, the preceding discussion also suggests that, although the precise limits of Australia's region of strategic interest are not easily prescribed, a conceptual hierarchy of priorities may nevertheless be identified. Guidance to this notion is to be found in the
1976 White Paper. Accordingly, Chapter 2 of Australian Defence, discusses "Australia's prospects and perspectives" in terms of "key areas", "distant regions" and "areas of primary strategic concern". More specifically, "the theatres of Central Europe and North East Asia" and, by implication, any other areas where US and Soviet strategic objectives conflict are identified as being "key areas". "Distant regions" are listed as being Europe, North East Asia, Africa and the Middle East. And, finally, the Indian Ocean, South East Asia, Papua-New Guinea, the South West Pacific, New Zealand and Antarctica* are clearly described as being Australia's "area of primary strategic concern".10

Further guidance to the areas in which Australia has strategic interests may also be gleaned from consideration of Australia's security treaties and arrangements. In this regard, although they will be discussed more fully later in this chapter, mention must be made at this juncture of the ANZUS, ANZAC and Manila Pacts,11 the Five Power Defence Arrangements and "the pattern of regular high-level consultations on defence matters backed by a pattern of practical cooperation"12 between Australia and Papua-New Guinea. On the evidence of these collective security arrangements, Australia's region of strategic commitment can be seen to extend from as far northwest as Pakistan to the United States in the east, and from the Philippines and Thailand in the north to New Zealand in the south.** Indeed, Australia's defence arrangements create a strategic commitment with all her major neighbours except Indonesia.

With specific respect to the geographic extent of ANZUS, although that Treaty formally obligates its signatories only in "the Pacific Area",13

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* Under the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty, Australia cosigns that: "Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord." Accordingly, it need not be discussed further in this report.

** It is instructive to compare this deduction with the history of Australia's post-World War II commitments of her forces overseas. See pages 46-47 above.
undertakings by the US and recent military exercises in the Indian Ocean and Western Australia have provided clear evidence that the ANZUS provisions have much wider interpretation in practice. Indeed, the (then) Prime Minister Fraser was reported as saying in a speech in New York on 6 July 1981 that:

I do know that we can stretch the ANZUS Treaty, which talks about the Pacific Ocean, up into the Middle East and the Arabian Sea.

Nonetheless, although the frequency of exercises has increased significantly since the Afghanistan invasion, the pattern of exercising has been thusfar limited to the West Australian littoral and to the Indian Ocean areas that would be described in the 1976 White Paper as Australia's "near lines of communication".

This latter fact notwithstanding, Australia's economic life-blood is her international trade. Accordingly, she saw in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan an "increased threat posed to the oil supply route from the Gulf" -- an inherent concomitant is, of course, that a similar threat is posed to her other lines of communication through the Gulf region. As a consequence, Australia has given clear evidence of her recognition that her security region extends to the northern and western Indian Ocean littoral. Moreover, while she had not traditionally maintained a permanent presence in the Indian Ocean, she now maintains continuous aerial surveillance and naval patrols in the region "as a demonstration of (her) continuing interest in the security of the Indian Ocean region".

Another very significant development was the Prime Minister's further extension of Australia's general region of strategic concern to land areas that in November 1976 were termed "distant regions". Thus, in his 19 February

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* The issue of the extended geographic coverage of ANZUS is discussed further at pages 98-101 below.
1980 statement he noted pertinently that:

The danger now is that wars may start in the strategically undefined zones of the Third World and draw in the rest of the world. This danger is most acute in the Middle East. 19

As has happened so often in the past, through her reaction to the emergence of a threat, Australia again demonstrated how readily her perceptions of the boundaries of her security region can be refocused, and how readily she is prepared to accept security responsibilities well beyond the regions that are specifically mentioned in Australian Defence as being her area of primary strategic concern. The importance of such signals / the "dialectic of wills" cannot be overestimated. 20

Consequently, the deduction may be made that, because the White Paper was framed in the global strategic and psychological environment that followed the Vietnam withdrawal, the region of strategic concern that it describes is closely representative of the absolute minimum geographical areas which a Liberal-National Party Government could consider either prudent or acceptable. Subsequently, the Hawke Labor Government has indicated that it also holds similar perceptions. From this perspective, the conclusion is inevitable that the delimitation of Australia's strategic regions in Australian Defence was a reaction to the strategic uncertainties of the post-Vietnam period. Concomitantly, there is a reasonable probability that areas at some distance from Australia may, on the future emergence of a perceived threat, become areas of substantive strategic concern to Australia.

With the preceding discussion in mind, a conceptual subdivision of Australia's security region may now be abstracted. The resulting geographical hierarchy will be observed throughout the remainder of this report as the
definition of Australia's political environment. On the basis of strategic imperatives that flow from her treaty obligations, the delimiting geographical concepts in Australian Defence and her military history, the notional bounds of Australia's security region can be fairly clearly defined. They may, in fact, be likened to a series of concentric regions that are centred on the Australian continent, each of which has varying strategic value to Australia.

At the centre—the strategic focus of her own security policy—lie Australia, her Economic Zone, and her sea and air approaches. Moving outward from Australia lie New Zealand, her inveterate ally and only Caucasian neighbour; Papua-New Guinea, the island State whose territory commands Australia's northern approaches and for whose defence Australia feels strong moral responsibility; Australia's island territories such as the Christmas, Cocos, Heard, Macquarie, Lord Howe and Norfolk Islands; and her near air and sea lines of communication. Because the loss of this region to an aggressor would have such profound psychological impact and would present such an inordinate strategic threat to Australia, this "local region" is, in effect, of equal strategic value to the continent itself. Beyond Australia's local region, and next in order of strategic importance lie the ASEAN and South West Pacific States, and Australia's intermediate distance lines of communication. This region constitutes what the Australian Government frequently terms its "neighbourhood".

In sum, the geographical area which encompasses Australia, her Economic Zone, her "local region" and her "neighbourhood" can therefore be seen to constitute her "area of primary strategic concern".

Adjacent to her neighbourhood lies Australia's "distant security region", the extent, direction and importance of which can be expected to vary with her changing perceptions of the threat that its instability or insecurity would pose to the global, strategic status quo in general, and to Australia's own security.
interests in particular. As is evident by the Australian Government's response following Afghanistan, this region is currently distorted to the west and north-west to include the Gulf region, the Horn of Africa, the Sinai Peninsula, South West Asia, and South Africa-Namibia. Other strategic areas such as North Asia, which also cause concern, also comprise this outer region. 21 As the Australian Government's perceptions of the burgeoning Soviet presence in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam firm, a distortion of Australia's distant security region towards the north may also be anticipated. Clearly, many of Australia's historical military deployments have been made into what she terms her "distant security region".

Before examining the regional security interests within Australia's political environment in more detail, the political implications of her various collective defence arrangements should now be considered.

**United Nations Charter (UNC)**

There is perhaps no stronger evidence of Australia's sense of insecurity, desire to be influential in international affairs and belief in the crucial importance of the moral factor in international affairs than in the alacrity with which she embraced the concept of a United Nations Organization. Thus, Australia became one of the original signatories and was admitted to the UN on 1 November 1945. Since her admission she has been an active Member of the Organization, participated more fully than she was really able* in the only use of coalition warfare which has been conducted under the auspices of the UN, and has actively involved herself in many UN peace-keeping operations.**

Because of the fullness of her support, the deduction is suggested that Australia would be compelled both morally and legally in any future international dispute or situation which affects her interests to support actions under the

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* See page 49 above.
** See page 47 above.
provisions of the UNC. Indeed, the validity of this deduction is supported by the resurfacing of Australia's traditional fears in the 1976 Defence White Paper and the readiness with which she responded to the democratic cause upon the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Most significantly for this report is the fact that, in accepting the obligations of her membership of the United Nations, the Australian Government has evidenced its preparedness to surrender a significant level of its discretion to a supranational authority in the interests of international peace and security. This principle is, of course, consistent with Australia's traditional behaviour when freedom has been threatened. Thus, by logical extrapolation from Australia's history, a probability is suggested that Australia may be prepared to abrogate, at least, some of her sovereign discretion to the composite authority of a politico-military alliance should she feel that her perceived interests are in jeopardy.

The implications of this latter deduction are placed into broad context by certain provisions of the UNC. Thus, under Article 2(4), Australia—along with all other Members—declares her willingness to "refrain in (her) international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state..." The influence of the moral factor could not be more evident in this Article. Its probable effect on a democracy—especially one that cannot afford to spend fully on its defence needs—would be to build in a delay in its response to an emerging threat. The echoes of Liddell Hart's caution ring loud in this respect.*

Should a dispute arise, then Article 33(1) prescribes that the States involved shall attempt to settle their differences by "peaceful means" and, should such attempts fail, Article 37(1) requires that the dispute be referred to the Security Council. Again, for a democracy, these prescriptions would

* See page 8 above.
probably result in military preparations being delayed as a threat emerges despite the fact that Article 51 allows the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs".

Of more specific relevance to the surrendering of sovereign authority, Article 43(1) requires all Members to make available "armed forces, assistance and facilities for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security" when the Security Council so requires. Even more relevant, Article 43(2) states that the agreement(s) by which this assistance is provided "shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location". Clearly, agreements on such issues would be reached through a process of negotiation—as was evident during Korea—but, once reached, a significant level of national control would clearly be lost.

A further indication of the level of decision-making that may be abrogated is to be found in Article 48(1) which provides that:

> The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members...or by some of them as the Security Council shall decide.

Once again it is difficult to envisage how any State could willingly surrender such a high level of sovereign authority unless its national survival were at stake. Accordingly, some prior negotiation may be presumed; however, the underlying philosophy remains as the bottom line—in the interests of the greater good, some individual sacrifices are to be expected. The affinity between this moral principle of international relationships and liberal democratic philosophy makes it most compelling for Australian Governments.

Finally, and leading into the subsequent discussions in this chapter, the UNC states in Article 52(1) that "nothing in the present Charter precludes

* cf Bentham's view that the best society is that which provides the greatest happiness to the greatest number of people.
the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security". Indeed, there is implicit recognition in the UNC that the international system perceived that it was not yet ready for a coherent and pacific world order, and that the best prospects for peace lay in a series of interlocking regional security arrangements within the framework of a global system. Thus, Article 53(1) requires that: "The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority."

Any discussion of the United Nations would, of course, be remiss were it not to include recognition of the difficulties that confront the implementation of the provisions of the UNC. The Organization's record shows vividly that UN action will be possible only when the interests of the Permanent Members of the Security Council allow or require that action be taken. This point was well recognized, as were its implications, in the 1 June 1976 Statement in the House of Representatives on the World Situation by the (then) Prime Minister.* In that statement, he noted appositely that:

...power in a broad sense remains the major factor in international politics...and predominant power is controlled by the United States and the Soviet Union...The international diplomacy of the major powers...has to be understood principally as an effort to create a balance (of power) favourable to their interests.

The philosophy expressed then is equally as relevant today and places into context the following discussion of Australia's regional collective security arrangements.

* The full text of this policy statement was reprinted in the Australian Foreign Affairs Record, Vol 47, No 6, June 1976, pp300-313.
ANZUS Treaty

On 12 January 1950, US Secretary of State Acheson, while addressing the National Press Club in Washington, defined the United States' defensive perimeter as extending from "the Aleutians to Japan...to the Ryukyus...to the Philippines". This "perimeter" thus clearly excluded Australia and New Zealand. Acheson continued:

> So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack...Should such an attack occur--one hesitates to say where such an armed attack could come from--the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations...23

Clearly, the US neither perceived the necessity for, nor was interested in, guaranteeing the security of Australia (and New Zealand) at that time.

Undeterred by US disinterest, the Australian Minister for External Affairs, Percy Spender, spent the next year and a half lobbying very actively for a defence agreement along the lines of Article 5 of the Atlantic Treaty, whereby an attack on any one member would represent an attack upon all. Several issues spurred Spender's efforts. These included concern about the implications of a rearmed Japan and the growing Communist threat in Asia,* the traditional Australian perception about the necessity for the strategic guardianship of a Great Power, and an opportunity to exercise greater influence in the policies and international affairs of the Australian region.** After several false starts, Spender was able to use the lever of the proposed Japanese Peace Treaty to extract US agreement. The Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States was accordingly signed in San Francisco on 1 September 1951.

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* By mid-1950 Australia had deployed forces to both Korea and Malaya to fight against Communist forces. The threat loomed large!

** This wish can be traced to Hughes' efforts after World War I and Evatt's after World War II, and finds its expression in policy in the 6 November 1946 policy statement—see page 48 above.
Within the context of this report, the ANZUS Treaty contains some very important commitments. Before addressing these, however, a notable caveat within the preamble to the Treaty should be discussed. The wording of this caveat is as follows:

Recognizing that Australia and New Zealand as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations have military obligations outside as well as within the Pacific Area...25

Clearly, this proviso must be placed in the context of Australia's foreign policy perceptions and military obligations in the early 1950s. Moreover, this is not the place to explore the implications of the international law on treaties; but it does provide importantly a de jure premise for the de facto observations throughout this report about Australia's deployments overseas of military forces over the past thirty-odd years.

Turning now to the provisions of the Treaty, the echo of Acheson's remarks in 1950 are clear in Article II which enjoins the Parties to "separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack". In other words—and quite appropriately so—mutual assistance will be dependent upon sound self-defence measures. Seventeen years later President Nixon voiced a similar concern when he said at Guam: "we must avoid that kind of policy that will make countries in Asia so dependent upon us that we are dragged into conflicts such as the one that we have in Vietnam."26

As for the precise security provisions within ANZUS, Spender's desire for guarantees similar to Article 5 of the Atlantic Charter were not possible --again the echo of Acheson's perceptions is palpable. Thus, Article III of ANZUS provides only that the Parties will "consult" whenever their "territorial integrity, political independence or security...is threatened in the Pacific".27 Nor is military support necessarily forthcoming, for Article IV provides only
that, because an attack on one Party would be prejudicial to the "peace and safety" of all, each "declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes". Nevertheless, what constitutes an armed attack is carefully defined in Article V to include the Parties' "metropolitan territory...island territories...in the Pacific or...its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific." And Article X provides that the "Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely" but that a Party may withdraw from the ANZUS Council on giving one year of notice to the Government of Australia.

Much has been made by critics—especially those of the socialist Left—about the uselessness of ANZUS because it lays obligations on Australia without necessarily ensuring, and perhaps even jeopardizing, her security. Such perceptions, however, overlook the much wider obligations that Australia has accepted as a signatory of the United Nations Charter, and the concomitant security advantages that are conferred by ratification of that Treaty. Indeed, the mutually supportive nature of ANZUS and the UNC is explicitly recognized in Article IV of the ANZUS Treaty. Thus, ANZUS cannot be interpreted narrowly; its collective security provisions must be read in the context of the more encompassing obligations of the UN Charter.

Be that as it may, during his electioneering in early 1983 the (then) Leader of the Opposition Hawke announced—contrary to grassroots labor Party policy—that he would "maintain our alliances and seek to strengthen ANZUS." Accordingly, ANZUS was reviewed immediately after the election of the Hawke Government and agreement on interpretation of the Treaty was agreed between Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Hayden in mid-July 1983. The likelihood of this agreement had been flagged, however, by Prime Minister Hawke during his visit to Washington in June 1983 when he assured President
Reagan that: "We regard the...security and defence relationship between our
two countries embodied in the ANZUS Treaty as...fundamental to our position."32

Australia's leadership in the campaign to convince the New Zealand Labor Prime
Minister David Lange to reverse his Government's position on access by US
nuclear armed and powered ships is most illuminating of the strength of the
Australian Government's convictions about ANZUS.33

Consequently, despite the vagueness of the Treaty's provisions and the
associated lack of a security guarantee, the extended geographical and strategic
obligations* that have flowed from ANZUS are acceptable to the Australian
Government.

ANZAC Agreement

Although the Australia-New Zealand Agreement predates the ANZUS Treaty
by many years—it was signed on 21 January 1944—like ANZUS, it resulted from
Australian pressure. Despite Australia's use of pressure, the Agreement grew
naturally out of the resentment felt by both countries "over decisions taken
by the major allies, without (consultation), on the direction of the war and
the postwar settlement in the Pacific."34 The predominance of Australia's
role in formulating ANZAC nevertheless manifested itself in the wording and
intent of the Agreement, which Millar claims "reflects the greater claims and
deeper resentments of the Australian Government."35 The probable accuracy of
this assessment is evident in Paragraph 13 of the Agreement:

The two governments agree that, within the framework of a
general system of world security, a regional zone of
defence comprising the South-west and South Pacific areas
shall be established and that this zone should be based
on Australia and New Zealand, stretching through the arc
of islands north and north-east of Australia, to Western
Samoa and the Cook Islands.36

This quote is also useful, for it situates the defence interest that is inherent

* These issues are discussed further at pages 98-101 below.
in the ANZAC Agreement in Oceania.*

The thrust of ANZAC should, however, not be misunderstood as being security orientated. Such is not the case. Essentially, the Agreement unilaterally prescribes claims for post-World War II international administration of the Pacific region by Australia and New Zealand and codifies a range of administrative actions that are clearly intended to regulate the post-war relationship between the signatories.** The real benefit of the Agreement is therefore that adherence to its provisions will present—"so far as is possible"—a uniformity of policy on international issues by both States. Accordingly, Paragraphs 1-4 of ANZAC provide that the two Governments will more fully exchange "information regarding both the views...and the facts in (their) possession", will make sure they are "acquainted with the mind of the other before views are expressed elsewhere", and will ensure that there is "the maximum degree of unity in presentation of the views of the two countries".37

In this respect, the Agreement has been largely successful—despite the frosty relationship throughout the late 1970s between Prime Ministers Fraser and Muldoon, and the independent stance that NZ Prime Minister Lange is now taking over the US nuclear-capable or nuclear-powered warships issue.

Perhaps the utility of ANZAC is best put into perspective in the Australian Government's publication The ANZAC Connection which notes that:

...although there is a strong mutuality of strategic and defence interest between the two countries, New Zealand faces a lesser spectrum of contingencies than that which faces Australia—and faces them generally in the confidence that its military

* The security implications of this geographic imperative are discussed further at pages 88-93 below.

** Some inkling of the bilateral administrative issues that ANZAC seeks to codify is obtained from the subheadings throughout the Agreement. These include: the objectives of cooperation, civil aviation, dependencies and territories, welfare and advancement of Island peoples, migration and the establishment of a permanent Secretariat for collaboration and cooperation.
response would be likely to occur in association with Australia rather than independently. New Zealand's force structure planning and levels of defence expenditure are shaped accordingly.\(^3\)

The mildly condescending tone in this excerpt is also noteworthy.* The utility of the ANZAC Agreement is further underscored by the sequence of bilateral declarations that have been issued—especially over the last fifteen years.\(^3\) It thus represents a framework upon which closer cooperation on a wide range of economic, legal, defence, social and cultural issues is being founded.

**Manila Treaty**

Possibly the most overlooked of Australia's collective security obligations, the Manila Treaty—or South-east Asia Collective Defence Treaty as it is correctly titled—is the still-current legal capstone to the now-defunct South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). This treaty, which grew out of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indo-China, was signed on 8 September 1954 by Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Republic of the Philippines, the Kingdom of Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Even before its ratification, the Manila Treaty was fated to be the subject of half-hearted commitment by the United States and Great Britain. The disagreement which underlay this indifference was rooted in traditional American and British perceptions. Hence, the United States' determination not to support the Imperial interests of the European colonial powers led it repeatedly to refuse to contribute forces to the defence of the colonial possessions of Malaya and Singapore. For its part, Great Britain's traditional antipathy with France led it to not support US defensive efforts in Indo-China. SEATO was therefore destined to provide nothing more than a vehicle for the

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* Millar has commented that: "To Australian political leaders, New Zealand rarely matters very much: it can be taken for granted; it is small and can be pushed around a little. New Zealand political leaders understandably resent such attitudes." (Australia in Peace and War, p320)
exchange of information rather than a framework for collective security action. 40

In the period 1954-71 Australia therefore found herself in the invidious position of having to make military commitments to causes—Malaya and Vietnam—which one or the other of her strategic guardians did not hold dear. The difficulty for Australia was, of course, that her commitments should be undertaken in such a way that the one guardian felt obligated for Australia's support while the other was not given cause for resentment. 41 With the British withdrawal from "east of Suez" this problem was alleviated, and may not be expected to resurface because of the vestigial nature of British power outside Europe.

Consequently, although Australian Governments have inferred that Australia's commitments of forces to Malaya in 1955, to Malaysia in 1963-65 and to Vietnam in 1965 were made under the auspices of the Manila Treaty, these announcements were political sleights of hand because the provisions of the Treaty could never have been successfully invoked without the concurrence of both Britain and the US. 42 Where does this leave Australia today? Millar opines that:

The Manila Treaty was intended to ensure that any threat from China or Indo-China to the security of the region and thus Australia was contained on the Asian mainland. For Australia, (it) 'was primarily a treaty with the United States to that end. 43

While this view may have been true up until late 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan may be assumed to have widened the potential scope of the Treaty's implications for Australia. However, if the invasion was perceived to present a longer term threat to Pakistan then that assessment was not aired by either the US or Australia.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that Article IV of the Treaty provides that:

Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the Treaty Area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement
may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.\textsuperscript{44}

Article IV continues at Paragraph 2 that:

If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence is threatened...the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defence.\textsuperscript{45}

Clearly, collective action under the provisions of the Manila Treaty would be extraordinarily difficult. It does, however, represent for Australia a potential defence obligation to areas that may lie in what she currently terms her "distant security region". Despite the low probability of her being called upon to honour this obligation it does place into political and geographic context the Minister for Defence' comment* that: "It is not possible to predict the circumstances in which elements of the Defence Force might one day operate abroad..."

Five Power Defence Arrangements

by Great Britain

With the withdrawal of all but token forces from "east of Suez" in 1971, the Anglo-Malaya/Malaysia Defence Arrangement was terminated. In its place, the Notes which constitute the Five Power Defence Arrangements were exchanged and the Arrangements came into force on 1 November 1971.\textsuperscript{46} Under the terms of the Arrangements, Australia was to contribute up to two squadrons of fighter aircraft, one battalion group and one destroyer or frigate.\textsuperscript{**} In the event, when the Whitlam Labor Government was elected in 1972 it returned the battalion group to Australia. Despite its election campaign pledges it

* See page 63 above.

** The British contribution was to include one battalion group (in Singapore), up to six frigates, up to four Nimrod maritime reconnaissance aircraft, one helicopter squadron, one submarine (on rotation with Australia), and combat ships and units on visits. New Zealand was to provide an infantry force of one battalion, one frigate and an air defence contribution. Malaysia and Singapore provide facilities for which they are paid a fee.
did not, however, return the RAAF squadrons—these are, finally, being progressively withdrawn as the F/A18A enters service.*

Unlike the other collective security agreements to which Australia is a party, the Five Power Defence Arrangements are not a formal treaty. Nonetheless, the terms of the Communique which was released by the Foreign Ministers of Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore in April 1971 are very similar to the provisions of the ANZUS and Manila Treaties. Thus, the five countries have declared that:

...in the event of any form of attack externally organized or supported or the threat of such attack against Malaysia or Singapore, their Governments would immediately consult together for the purpose of deciding what measures should be taken jointly or separately in relation to such attack or threat.\(^47\)

Although this obligation is less than a prescription for action, the ongoing deployment of RAAF aircraft after 1988 will create an expectation of continuing commitment that will, in turn, make it difficult for an Australian Government to eschew a request for defence assistance should it be needed. Moreover, because the New Zealand Government in its 1984 Defence White Paper reaffirmed its commitment to maintain a battalion in Singapore, an inherent obligation is suggested for Australia to also provide ground forces should they be needed.\(^48\)

Australia's Regional Security Interests

With the implications of the preceding security agreements in mind, consideration of Australia's defence interests in the regions in which she has security obligations is appropriate. Before going any further, though, it would be prudent to first clarify what are a State's interests and to ascertain why they are important. To this end, Collins' following definition

* See page 55 above.
is pertinent; he sees "national interests" as being:

A highly generalized concept of elements that constitute a state's compelling needs, including self-preservation, independence, national integrity, military security and economic well-being.\(^{49}\)

Considering Collins' definition in the light of the postulate of this chapter, the deduction can be made that this section should concentrate upon those factors within Australia's region which, if endangered, could threaten her security, and to which her military power could be applied to deter any potential aggressor.\(^{50}\)

To provide the benchmark against which Australia's regional security interests should be measured, Collins' following contention is most apposite:

The only vital national security interest is survival ...under conditions that preserve our independence... territorial integrity, traditional life styles, fundamental institutions, values and honour...while maintaining a high degree of political, social, economic and military viability.\(^{51}\)

Relating this premise to Australia's collective security treaties and arrangements, conclusions can be reached on their importance as a national security interest. Thus, even under the Nixon Doctrine, ANZUS is a vital interest because it is the ultimate line of defence; similarly, the ANZAC Treaty is a vital interest because Australia and New Zealand's security is so profoundly reliant upon their conjoint action in the event of a threat;\(^{52}\) conversely, the Five Power Defence Arrangements and the Manila Treaty are only an important security interest as they do not directly insure the survival of Australia.\(^*\)

preceding

Collins' viewpoint and the deductions are reflected well by the following extract from Prime Minister Fraser's 1976, *World Situation* policy speech.

Furthermore, the philosophy that Fraser expressed then can be seen to suffuse all subsequent Government statements on foreign affairs and defence, and is

\* The latter treaty and agreement may, however, be vital to their other signatories, of course.
hence elementary to this examination. At that time he said:

...a nation does not have to face a threat of imminent invasion before it has grounds for concern...in the pursuit of a more favourable balance (the policies of the Superpowers) impinge on middle powers, such as Australia, and on areas of immediate importance to Australia, such as South East Asia, the South Pacific area, and the Indian Ocean...it is in the interests of many countries that (these areas) not become a region of increasing great power competition.53

Aside from the security interests that are readily apparent in this statement—namely, that an equitable distribution of power between the Superpowers is essential; that Australia's region should not become an object or scene of Superpower rivalry; and that Australia's security and freedom of action should not be threatened—it also contains an unspoken national interest that is fundamental to Australia's regional perspectives and strategic role. Specifically, Australia must ensure that through her diplomatic and other efforts she maintains a distribution of power within her security region that is favourable to her interests.

The implicit premise in this argument is, of course, that any destabilization or insecurity within her security region will ultimately affect her own security.54 Validation of this logic may be undertaken by considering an underlying tenet of Australia's strategic philosophy in the light of her developing trading patterns. This philosophy could not be expressed more succinctly than it has been in the following statement by the (then) Minister for Foreign Affairs:

The strength of the West depend(s) not only upon its military strength but also its ability to generate world peace and stability through economic growth and social development.55

A more specific expression of this logic is also to be found in an address given in the Philippines by the Australian Ambassador, Mr R.A. Woolcott on 6 January 1979 during which he said:

We see the Philippines as an important future market for Australia. The Philippines, along with the other four ASEAN countries, has shown in recent years an impressive economic growth rate which is considerably higher than the OECD average. This provides an opportunity to develop our exports...56
The geo-strategic factor in Australia's regional security interests was also well illustrated by Woolcott. At a later point in the same address he commented:

Clearly Australia and the Philippines have a common interest in defence cooperation based on a shared concern for the security of the South East Asia region. Moreover, you are strategically important to us because your islands lie astride important shipping routes for Australian trade.57

When considered together, the preceding statements of Australia's interests provide valuable insight into the complex interrelationships between the elements that comprise a State's interests: in this case, because of their shared economic, geographic and strategic interests, Australia has an important political and military interest in the stability and security of the Philippines. The wider applicability of this deduction is clearly evident in the preceding quote when the Ambassador also notes the "common interest" in security that each nation in the region shares with its neighbours. Consequently, while the focus of her interest may change from nation to nation, Australia's security interests in the other States in her neighbourhood are identifiable. Irrespective of the differences in these focuses, however, one general thrust will prevail: the stability, security and prosperity of each State in her neighbourhood will always be an important Australian security interest.

Successive Australian Governments have devoted considerable policy-making effort to determining how they can best insure regional security and stability. One thrust of their interest is evident in the Fraser Government's short-term response to the Afghanistan invasion: although the following statement is founded upon the broad interest of the West in the containment of Communist expansionism and was prompted by a specific crisis, the Prime Minister clearly judges that coordination and constancy are a vital Western security interest.
In his 19 February 1980 statement Fraser thus explained that:

...it is imperative that countries which value their own independence and world peace should respond to this threat (Afghanistan) with firmness and in a sustained way...we must demonstrate...that the will and resolve to meet the new challenge exists.\textsuperscript{58}

The relationship between the broad interests of the West, the more immediate interests of ASEAN and the regional interests of Australia are clear in the Prime Minister's subsequent comment that:

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, on one flank of southern Asia, has happened at a time when, on the other flank, Vietnam is attempting to consolidate its control over Kampuchea, with the active and massive support of the Soviet Union. Certainly the leaders of the ASEAN countries perceive linkages and are deeply concerned.\textsuperscript{59}

He therefore concluded that "the abiding security interests that we share with our regional neighbours call for continuing consultation and cooperation".\textsuperscript{60}

By linking these common interests of demonstrating will and resolve, and coordinated and steadfast effort, with the need for consultation and cooperation, the Prime Minister drew attention to the Australian Government's recurring perception that realization of its security interests will require the adoption of very active regional role.\textsuperscript{61}

The level of importance that Australia attributes regionally to the preceding general interest and the nub of an associated security interest are clearly evident in the (then) Minister for Foreign Affairs' prior assessment that "the confidence and cohesion of ASEAN has become an increasingly important factor in regional stability".\textsuperscript{62} That the Australian Government perceives this interest in the "confidence and cohesion of ASEAN" to also have much wider applicability—along with the policy that it is using to further that interest—can be gauged from the Foreign Minister's subsequent statement that:

In its role as a middle power, Australia needs a foreign policy which encompasses not just bilateral relations but the multi-lateral diplomacy of international organizations and blocs of countries acting together.\textsuperscript{63}
Through such policy statements and the effort that it continues to put into its regional diplomacy, the Government has provided substantial evidence that it regards closer interrelationships within the region to be fundamental to ensuring Australia's security. By its regional security arrangements and Defence Cooperation Programme, the Australian Government has clearly indicated its interest in cooperative defence as the linchpin of regional security. The nub of this interest is explicit in the Minister for Defence' recent explanation that:

Like us, the ASEAN nations have a strong interest in continued strategic stability in the region, and in minimizing scope for the intrusion of powers which might disrupt it. They see the development of cooperative relationships as a means of frustrating efforts to divide them.

Moving a little farther away from Australia, the horns of the dilemma that Australian Governments have historically had to face is evident in a statement made on 22 October 1981 by the (now) Foreign Minister while he was Leader of the Parliamentary Opposition. In discussing Australia's contribution to the Multinational Force and Observers, Hayden noted that the Middle East was "well removed from our area of strategic interest"; but continued:

If there is to be any respectability, credibility and influence on the part of the peace-keeping force, then its perception in the eyes of the world must be that of a force which has international sponsorship, not one which is seen as an extension of United States foreign policy, no matter how well motivated it might be argued that that extension of US foreign policy is.

The suppressed anti-Americanism in this observation aside, Hayden's view is most informative for its inference that it is not the deployment of forces into a "distant region" which is at issue, but the Labor Party's wish that

* This element of anti-Americanism is symptomatic of the left-wing influence from the grass-roots level of the Labor Party on its Parliamentary Wing. The tone of the observation should be compared with the more pragmatic line taken by Prime Minister Hawke at page 54 above.
the Australian Government not to be seen to be too-closely supporting US policy in those areas.

The negative reaction of the Australian Government to US proposals for increased emphasis by Japan on defence spending is also indicative of both a strong interest in a distant region and a traditional bête-noir. Thus, in a visit to Tokyo in late July 1983, Foreign Minister Hayden reportedly told Prime Minister Nakasone that:

"Australia would be concerned if—either as a result of external pressure or internal decision—there was a shift in Japan's basic defence posture or a dramatic acceleration of defence spending...Australia would also be concerned if Japan were to attempt to develop a regional security role. This would have a destabilising effect on the Asia-Pacific regions."67

Once again, a dissociation from US security interests is present in this statement; however, its relationship to the mainstream of Australian perceptions is apparent when it is compared with the Australian Defence, November 1976 observation that: "As a not insubstantial local power, Australia is able to influence developments."68 The deduction is thus suggested that it is Australia's perception of her role in the region which is put at risk by a rearmed Japan, more than regional stability per se. It must, nevertheless, be admitted that despite the rejection by Japan in the 1977 Fukuda Doctrine of a military role in South East Asia and the reaffirmation of that doctrine in 1971 by Prime Minister Suzuki during his visit to Thailand, the ASEAN States also have expressed concerns. Evidence of this concern is to be found in Secretary of Defence Weinberger's assurances during a South East Asian tour in November 1982 that he saw "no disposition whatever on the part of the Japanese...to regain any kind of offensive military strength, or anything remotely resembling a militaristic spirit."69

If Australia's security interests are truly linked with regional stability and cooperation, then this has not prevented the Hawke Government from taking
dysfunctional foreign policy positions. Illustrating this point has been the Government's attempts to develop a closer relationship with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Two policy issues that have particularly raised difficulties between the Australian and ASEAN Governments have been Foreign Minister Hayden's announcement that Australia—again in opposition to US foreign policy—"would strongly support Vietnam's right to multilateral United Nations aid" and her refusal to cosponsor ASEAN's resolution in the United Nations calling for Vietnam to withdraw from Kampuchea. In stating that:

The Vietnamese, as a proud and resilient people, want to be treated with dignity and will only deal on this basis...This we will do without in the process sanctioning their Government's errors or overlooking their excesses

the Australian Government appears to have determined that the future stability of the region is only possible through a greater level of accommodation between all the States in the region.

Concomitantly, it seems to have accepted that some short-term reduction in the level of accord between Australia, the US and ASEAN is necessary in moving towards the longer-term goal. Irrespective of whether this perception is correct or not, it is salutary to place Hayden's action in the context of the (then) Prime Minister Whitlam's expression of Labor philosophy:

We consider that political, economic and social change in Asia will occur and is indeed desirable; we believe that Australia should not intervene militarily even when the contest for power and for control over the change leads to violence.

The philosophy has a familiar ring: to oppose the "forces of progress" is to be "reactionary"! Clearly, the translation of interests into policy is an enormously complex task, and is made even more complex when the perceptions

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* One indication of the ASEAN viewpoint is the comment in late 1981 by the Malaysian representative to the UN, Tan Sri Zainal Abidin bin Sulong that "suggestions made to the effect that the question of peace and security in southeast Asia should be solved on a regional basis through regional consultations with the countries of Indochina on one side and ASEAN on the other were clearly intended to legitimise Vietnam's action in Kampuchea." The New Straits Times, Kuala Lumpur, October 22, 1981.
of one's neighbours conflict with one's own predilections.

As Collins opined, interests are highly generalized and conceptual—this will have already been apparent in the preceding discussion. Similarly, Australia's security interests in her local region are placed into general context in *Australian Defence*. Thus, that paper asserts that the "difficult problems of economic and social development" facing regional States should not be allowed to become a strategic vulnerability. Once again in a general vein, the (then) Minister for Foreign Affairs noted in 1979 with particular relevance to Australia because of her "relative location" that:

...the international debate between North and South (should) not simply be seen in economic terms. The developing countries (are) seeking not only a reallocation of resources but also a greater influence over world affairs.

The suggestion here, of course, is that attempts by small States to gain international influence may be potentially destabilizing. This theme had been reflected earlier in the 1976 White Paper when that document applied it to Australia's specific concerns in Oceania. These concerns received specific focus in late 1982 when the Prime Minister of Vanuatu announced in a press conference that he was going to open Port Vila to port calls by Soviet warships. As *Australian Defence* stated, the "new political situation (that) is developing in the South West Pacific...with the withdrawal of the colonial powers" should not be unconducive to peace and order.

* Peter Hastings, the Foreign Editor of the *Sydney Morning Herald* assessed (21 October, 1982) that the main reasons for Father Lini's announcement were the emergence of a significant domestic political opponent; an attempt to extract a higher level of aid from recalcitrant Western powers; his disaffection with the US over the activities of the Phoenix foundation; and a certain amount of pique with Australia over aboriginal land rights issues. The specific concerns of the Australian Government were further spurred by the report that the Prime Minister of the Solomon Islands, Mr. Solomon Marnaloni was also considering offering the Soviets port-call rights because Australia had refused to provide him with fast patrol boats for his navy.
Recently the Minister for Defence placed this interest into more precise perspective when he noted that:

Like us, the ASEAN powers have a strong interest...in minimizing scope for the intrusion of powers which might disrupt (the stability of the region)...Papua New Guinea and the island nations of the South West Pacific have a special place in Australia's security perceptions. Their geographic position, historic ties and continuing close relationships with us provide a basis for on-going security and defence cooperation which is mutually beneficial.77

Reflecting Clausewitz, however, it was the (then) Minister for Foreign Affairs Street who has drawn indelibly the bottom line for Australia's security interests in his observation that:

...the range of issues on which (Australia), as a middle power, can and should concentrate substantively is necessarily limited, because (her) resources are limited. (She) must be selective and resist both temptation from within and pressure from without to extend (herself) unrealistically.78

Most appropriately, this latter security interest leads to the verity that Australia is a middle power in an international power system. For this reason she cannot frame her security policies in isolation, but must ensure that they reflect the opportunities and constraints that are inextricably part of that system. As has just been intimated, foremost among the many constraints that she must accommodate are her neighbours' security needs and perceptions. It is to these that this chapter now turns.

Papua-New Guinea

Almost ten years after the granting of independence, her confidence bolstered by having successfully weathered several political storms and by her recent smooth changes of government by democratic process, Papua-New Guinea is beginning to realise her potential as a leader in the South West Pacific area. Thus, Dr Julius Chan's Government in 1980 sponsored the
deployment of 456 Papua-New Guinea Defence Force Troops to Vanuatu to help put down a secession attempt on the island of Espiritu Santo and provided transport to its Prime Minister, Father Lini, to enable his signing of the deployment agreement in Port Moresby.

Nevertheless, while this operation was jointly praised by both Prime Ministers as being "an unqualified success" it has aroused fears in other South West Pacific nations about Papua-New Guinea's longer term regional aspirations. Such perceptions by the South West Pacific nations provide clear evidence of their perceptions of the balance of power in the region and of the sense of insecurity that many of those nations feel. Because Australia appeared to associate herself with the Papua-New Guinean actions by permitting the deployment of about 20 Australian Servicemen with the PNGDF—albeit in noncombatant roles and under the ultimate control of the Australian Government—such regional perceptions and insecurities evidence the need for active diplomacy by Australia.

This latter point is further emphasized by the change in foreign policy announced by the (then) Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade Levi in July 1980. Whereas under the prior Somare Government's "Universalism" policy Papua-New Guinea had been "friends of all, enemy of none", she now would concentrate on "those relations which seem likely to affect (her) interests most". The embryonic self-confidence that this statement evidences, was far more clearly evident in Mr Levi's major foreign policy statement four months later. At that time he asserted that:

...it is...time to recognize that the development of our foreign relations has been selective, and to try to ensure that future selectivity...is, as far as possible, the product of selections by us.

Because Australia had framed most of the new nation's early policies this growth is most important; however, one potential risk that is inherent in it lies in Papua-New Guinea's continuing military reliance upon Australia.
As East has noted:

The PNGDF has neither an armoured nor an artillery element. … the Air Element has no offensive capability. The Force is therefore limited to a harassing and delaying action type of role in PNG until joined by allied forces.82

There are thus fairly clear early signs of an emerging gap between Papua New Guinea's confidence and her capabilities. This is significant to Australia on three counts: first, because of her "responsibility-by-association" should Papua New Guinea overstep the mark, Australia's regional efforts could be deleteriously affected; second, because Papua New Guinea "looks perhaps with some confidence to support from Australia and New Zealand if attacked"; 83 and third, because of the growing difficulties between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea over the activities of the Free Papua Movement (OPM).*

With respect to the latter issue, although Papua New Guinea has banned cross-border movement by its people it has not been able to stop the activities of the 500-strong OPM. This group has repeatedly moved from bases in Papua New Guinea to engage Indonesian forces in West Irian. For its part, military operations by Indonesia have involved paratroop deployments in the north that led to some 700 West Irianese refugees entering Papua New Guinea over the period February-April 1984, 84 intrusion by two Indonesian F5E into Papua New Guinean airspace in the same period, 85 and extensive military exercising in the vicinity of Jayapura. 86 A long-term cause for concern for the Papua New Guinean government are the implications of Indonesia's trans-migration policy which will have resulted by 1989 in the resettlement in Irian-Jaya of some 700,000 Javanese. 87

The apparent inaction by Australia may, however, be misleading. As the so-called "Russell Hill Papers"** indicate: "The present Indonesian Government

* Free Papua Movement is the English translation of the Indonesian Organisasi Papua Merdeka or OPM as it is most commonly known.

** In August 1983 the Australian newspaper The National Times printed what it claimed were excerpts from the Australian Strategic Assessments and Defence Policy Objectives. See Chapter 1, Note 18.
relies on the Australian role in PNG to protect Indonesia's interests. Accordingly, the assumption may be made that, recognizing her "responsibility-by-association" and the sensitivity of her relationship with Indonesia, Australia has been busy behind the scene.

New Zealand

Although New Zealand has shared with Australia a similar history of dependence upon a major power, her smaller economy and less developed industrial base have restricted her capacity to adopt an independent security policy as the global strategic environment changed. Thus, the (then) Prime Minister Muldoon, having noted his country's historical tendency to direct her defence activities towards her alliance relationships, recently stated that:

New Zealand has been an active proponent of collective security. We continue to believe that this concept provides a realistic framework for the contribution of a small country to the interests it shares with its major partners.

Nevertheless, New Zealand's continuing commitment to ANZUS—which she reaffirmed in her 1984 Defence White Paper—should not be misunderstood to mean that she takes defence lightly. As her 1973 Defence Review noted: "a country which is not prepared to defend itself can have nothing much to defend". Thus, New Zealand has a clear interest in being seen to be contributing effectively as the junior ANZUS partner. To this end, she announced in her 1984 White Paper the formation of 1000-1200 man "trouble-shooting" force which will be maintained at a high state of readiness for deployment in the South Pacific.

The geostrategic and economic interests which underpin this commitment are clear in the (then) New Zealand Minister for Defence' comment that:

...ultimately the security of our small country, and the protection of our long and exposed sea lines of communication is dependent on collective security effort. This in turn is bound up with the well-being and economic prosperity of our South Pacific neighbours.

He subsequently related these interests to New Zealand's wider geo-strategic interest when he stated that "(We) can best contribute to Western interests by
helping preserve peace and security in our part of the world, the South Pacific". Nonetheless, although she clearly regards herself as being "first and foremost a Pacific Nation", she equally recognizes that her alliance interests confer upon her wider responsibilities and interests. Thus, under the auspices of the Defence Mutual Assistance Programme she not only assists South West Pacific nations such as Fiji and Tonga, but also Papua-New Guinea and the ASEAN states. New Zealand's implicit deemphasis of her "national interests closer to home" further underscores her clear perception that, despite—and indeed because of—her geographic isolation, her security interests are best insured by collective effort in forward defence. The implications for Australia do not need elaboration.

ASEAN

Although it was formed in 1967, ASEAN did not really coalesce until the summit meeting in early 1976 at Bali, under the impetus of the prior collapse of South Vietnam. Despite its purpose being "economic growth, social progress and cultural development", ASEAN nevertheless defined a vague security objective at that meeting, which it stated to be the "continuation of cooperation on a non-ASEAN basis between the members on security matters in accordance with their mutual needs and interests". However, the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in December 1978 rivetted ASEAN's attention on the threat and increased internal pressure for closer military ties.

As noted by Prime Minister Fraser, the ASEAN leadership is deeply concerned by the Soviet-backed military thrust towards their region. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's recent comment that "for at least 10 years there is no combination of military forces in ASEAN that can stop or check the Vietnamese army in open conflict" throws this concern into stark relief.

* For details of New Zealand's contribution to the Five Power Defence Arrangements, see the footnote at page 79 above.

** See page 84 above.
The manifestations of this concern are very pertinent to Australian security policy for they should represent the Association’s needs and perceptions at a time when ASEAN may be expected to seek external support.

The pressure to form a closer military association has continued to receive further impetus from the annual Vietnamese dry-season incursions into Thailand which started in June 1980. The level of interest nevertheless waxes and wanes with the passage of each dry season. The Singapore Foreign Minister perhaps exemplifies ASEAN’s current attitude when he noted that: "Whether ASEAN is forced into some sort of military alliance will depend mostly on what the Soviets and Vietnamese do." Thus, as successive dry seasons have come and gone, the Vietnamese-Soviet threat has precipitated nothing more permanent than an increased level of bilateral military exercises. A potential key to this situation is the pragmatic attitude that was expressed by Thailand—the ASEAN "frontline State"—at the time when the Vietnamese threat was most palpable:

We always maintain that we don't want foreign troops in our country. What we need is political support, material support for our defences and maybe economic assistance for our economy. Otherwise it is our job to protect our country.

A more specific opinion was, however, expressed in 1982 by the Thai Foreign Minister Siddhi Savetsila in response to pressure by Lee Kuan Yew for the expedient militarization of ASEAN. "We don't want to be seen as a military pact", Siddhi is quoted as having said.

The possible reasons for Thailand’s views must, however, be identified. As the Far Eastern Economic Review opined at the time:

...there is little to be gained by declaring a formal ASEAN military alliance and a lot to lose. Such a declaration would necessarily be taken as extremely provocative by Vietnam and lead to a hardening of attitudes on both sides which would reduce the chances for negotiated solutions.

A complementary perspective, which reflects ASEAN’s membership of the Non-Aligned
Movement, was given by a Malaysian official in 1982:

Just five years ago we were talking about a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality...If we now start screaming about an ASEAN defence pact, how would it look to the world?103

The debate over whether or not it should move towards a military alliance notwithstanding, a widely held view within ASEAN is that "the Indo-China conflict, especially Kampuchea...threatens the stability of the South-East/region".104 This perception has led to a seriously held—but less openly expressed—"consensus that the United States should display a more substantial presence in the region as a counterweight to the Communist powers".105 This perception is emphasized by the much more confident line that ASEAN expressed after its annual meeting at Bali in June 1979, which was attended by the US Secretary of State and the Foreign Ministers of Japan, Australia and New Zealand.106 Also encouraged by such support, the Thai Government announced in January 1980 that it was considering seeking activation of the Manila Pact and received pledges from the US, Australia and New Zealand, in return, that each regarded that collective security agreement as still being a valid commitment to Thailand.107 ASEAN's need for a greater Australian and New Zealand presence is particularly evident in the increased military exercising that is now occurring both in the ASEAN countries and in Australia under the aegis of the Five Power Defence Arrangement. Such activities would not be occurring without the full concurrence of the ASEAN country involved.

It is these Five Power Defence Arrangement exercises that also draw attention to another problem that Australia will need to surmount. As was implied earlier, the ASEAN countries have a strong preference for bilateral, rather than multilateral, arrangements.108 The depth of this interest is evident from the plethora of strictly bilateral military exercises within ASEAN that have occurred in the five years since the Soviet invasion of

* See page 84 above and also Notes 108 and 109 for this chapter.
Afghanistan and the first Vietnamese incursions into Thailand. There are some grounds for confidence that this propensity will be outgrown in time, however.\textsuperscript{109} Already there is much standardization in weaponry and operational doctrine between the various air forces, and the success of the Integrated Air Defence System within Malaysia-Singapore is an important first step towards an integrated air defence command. In view of the repeated unauthorized penetrations at very high altitude of ASEAN airspace by Soviet aircraft since 1980 there is also ongoing need for such a development.\textsuperscript{110} A significant implication of these continuing overflights is, of course, that the ASEAN air forces have no means of preventing them and that the Five Powers have no resolve to take measures to stop the practice.

Finally, there remain a few fundamental ASEAN perceptions that Australia cannot overlook in its dealings with the region. As "all the countries, apart from Thailand, still ruefully remember the days when they were colonies of European Powers",\textsuperscript{111} Australia must remember that ASEAN is acutely sensitive to real or imagined grievances. Such sensitivity has not been eased by the stigma of Australia's past restrictive immigration policies, the continuing trade imbalance and her unfavourable trade practices,\textsuperscript{112} and events such as the 1978 civil aviation dispute.\textsuperscript{113}

A measure of the perception of Australians that is held by at least some ASEAN members is clear in the following retort which is attributed to a "senior Malaysian Foreign Ministry official":

\begin{quote}
Australians see themselves as part of South-East Asia? Impossible. Australians are far too conscious of their white skins ever to become part of this region.\textsuperscript{114}
\end{quote}

Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr Mochtar, however, provided a more penetrating analysis when he commented that: "Generally because of Australia's isolation and unfamiliarity with problems you tend to think of things rather too simply."\textsuperscript{115}
One final indication of ASEAN's sensitivity is to be found in its reaction to Australia's defence activities. This sensitivity is, needless-to-say, a fundamental influence on Australia's regional security endeavours. Illustrative in this respect was an official radio commentary reportedly broadcast in English by Indonesia's state radio (RRI) on 10 April 1984, just four days after the Cocos Islanders voted for integration with Australia and less than two weeks after "The Russell Hill Papers" were leaked. * In the broadcast, RRI asserted--without apparent foundation--that Australia was planning to develop military facilities on these islands, thus presenting "a formidable fortress at the entrance of the Sunda Strait and the South Java Sea". The commentary continued that Indonesia had "no ill will against Australia and no territorial ambition" but stated that it wanted to be consulted about any such plans. 116

Because the Five Power Defence Arrangements require Australia to consult with Malaysia--but not Singapore--over "any proposal to alter size or character" of her military commitment at Butterworth, 117 Australia's force reductions may also be assumed to have been a potential source of friction. Apart from some ill-feeling amongst the soon-to-be-redundant locally-employed civilian workforce, this does not, however, appear to have been the case. On the evidence of the official statements from the Malaysian and Singaporean Governments, Australia's undertaking to maintain a presence--albeit by regular deployments after 1988--may be deduced as having been the reason.

The general context in which Malaysia and Singapore view Australia's (and New Zealand's) presence is clear in the report that the ASEAN Governments see it as performing an "indirect tripwire" which creates a modest link between

* The papers asserted that the Cocos and Christmas Islands would be targets for attack should Indonesia turn hostile to Australia. Of these territories, Christmas Island is the closest to Indonesia, being some 2600km north-west of Perth but only 360km south of Djakarta.
the region and US security interests. Accordingly, Prime Minister Lee wrote to the newly elected Hawke Government in early 1983 saying that Australia's presence was a "positive contribution" to the peace and stability of the region and expressing the hope that "there will be some way to maintain this contribution despite the problems that will arise with changing generation of aircraft." The Malaysian Prime Minister Dr Mahathir, on the other hand, reflected a traditional ambivalence when he noted that the decision was one for Australia to make. Subsequently, at a joint press-conference with Prime Minister Hawke in February 1984, Prime Minister Lee said: "One's got to ask whether a quarter of a loaf is better than none...something of a permanent commitment, not an intermittent commitment" was what was required. Australia clearly felt enjoined to acquiesce.

United States

Although the US is located in Australia's distant security region, its perceptions are clearly influential in the Australian Government's strategic decisionmaking. It is therefore appropriate to briefly outline the American view of both the region and Australia's role in the preservation of peace and security in it.

Despite the United States' initial unwillingness to become involved in a security agreement in the South West Pacific Area, by 1962 such reluctance had dissipated. Thus, during a State Dinner at the time of the May 1962 ANZUS Council meeting*, Secretary of State Rusk declared: "You can expect complete solidarity from the United States for Australia's and New Zealand's responsibility in the Pacific." This position has been held consistently by the US ever since.

* As a further indication of the changing US perceptions of the relevance of ANZUS, this was the first ANZUS Council to be held in the Southern Hemisphere.
It is significant in this regard, that, during the 1963-66 Konfrontasi between Indonesia and Malaysia, the extent and resolve of the US was more "tested" than it has been at any other time over the thirty-four year life of the Treaty. At the July 1964 ANZUS Council meeting, the US is reported to have explained that the defence of Malaysia was in the first instance a Commonwealth responsibility. Nevertheless, US diplomats in Djakarta reportedly had already made it quite clear to the Indonesian Government that, should Commonwealth forces suffer a serious reverse, then the US would intervene militarily. This point was underscored during the later visit to Washington by the Prime Minister of Malaysia when President Johnson assured him of assistance and agreed to provide military equipment and training for Malaysian forces.

A more recent indication of the US' commitment to the region is to be found in the events which followed Vice-President Mondale's visit in May 1978. During the tour, Mr Mondale affirmed—in the light of the Soviet activity on the Horn of Africa—the US Government's "interest to maintain America's multilateral and bilateral security commitments and presence and a balanced and flexible military posture in the Pacific". Subsequently, President Carter's planned withdrawal of forces from Korea was rescinded, the US naval presence in the Indian Ocean was increased, the so-called "swing" strategy was abandoned, and a major exercise series "Sandgroper" involving the forces of the ANZUS countries was initiated in the Indian Ocean. When the USSR invaded Afghanistan, the US presence in the Indian Ocean was further bolstered. Under the Reagan Administration, the US' regional presence has again been strengthened notably by the creation of the Rapid Deployment Force.

* By this strategy, under certain emergency conditions Pacific Command forces were to be detached to the European Theatre thereby depleting Asian-Pacific capabilities.

** Australia declined to contribute to the RDF when approached on this issue by the US Government. The ANZUS Alliance (ACPS, Canberra, 1981), p35.
Australia has assisted the US adoption of a more assertive regional role by providing facilities for more frequent USN port calls, and for KC135-supported B52 surveillance operations from Darwin over the Indian Ocean.\(^{126}\)

To place the US perception of Australia's role in the region into context, the 21 May 1982 address by Mr William Clark, President Reagan's National Security Adviser, is highly pertinent. In what was essentially a refinement of the Nixon Doctrine, Clarke stated that: "In contingencies not involving the Soviet Union, we hope to rely on friendly regional states to provide military forces." He added, however, that should the threat exceed the capabilities of the regional states then the US "must be prepared within the framework of our constitutional processes, to commit US forces to assist our allies".\(^{127}\)

The (then) Commander-in-Chief of US forces in the Pacific (CINCPAC), Admiral L.J. Long voiced a similar view in Congressional testimony on 16 March 1982. At that time Admiral Long noted that: "we are dependent on support from our friends and allies... (and are) encouraging these nations to share more of the collective security burden."\(^{128}\) Expanding upon the former point, the US Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy, Dr Fred Ikle, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 10 June 1982 declared that: "The efforts of ANZUS allies with the island nations and South-East Asian nations are important contributions to the common defence." He cited as being particularly important that "Australia and New Zealand enhance Western presence in South-East Asia by conducting combined training with other members of the Five-Power Defence Arrangements" and that both countries "are valued by the South Pacific island nations as friends, sources of aid, and guarantors of security."\(^{129}\)

The bottom line was, however, put to the same Committee by Mr Walter Stoessel, the Deputy Secretary of State who assessed that Australia anchors "the southern end of the western line of defence in East Asia and the Pacific"
and stands guard "over a secure, if lengthy, line of communication between the Pacific and Indian Oceans which was of great value in World War II and would be today in the event of war." Nevertheless, as Albinski notes: "Ideally, the United States would prefer a larger Australian Indian Ocean naval presence."

Clearly, no matter what the philosophical or political leaning of an Australian Government might be, it can expect to come under pressure from the United States to accept the responsibilities that are associated with a key role in the security of the Asia-Pacific region.

**Extant Australian Defence Policy**

One of the earliest expressions of a reorientation in Australia’s defence policy following the withdrawal from Vietnam is to be found in the (then) Minister for Defence, Lance Barnard’s announcement on 23 April 1975 of:

...a new emphasis on securing our own island continent, our Territories and the oceans and air spaces which surround us...(on) self-reliance of our forces so that they have a better capability for independent action...(and on) development of an appropriate infrastructure. The impact of the Nixon Doctrine is clear in this policy statement and Australia’s strategy was headed towards the doctrine of defence-of-Australia. Indeed, this thrust was further developed in the November 1976 White Paper which, reflecting the uncertainties that Australia now perceived she faced, cautioned that: "it is prudent to remind ourselves that the US has many diverse interests and obligations."

This caution can, however, also be interpreted as indicating that the Australian Government realized that Australia’s security interests may be easily forgotten unless she reminded her great and powerful friend of her continuing commitment to the Western democratic coalition. Implicit evidence of this interpretation is to be found in the (then) Prime Minister’s June 1976
statement on the "World Situation". Thus, Australia’s security objectives were announced as being the:

...active and constructive pursuit of a peaceful and favourable international environment...(ensuring) that no one power should dominate the region...that ANZUS does not fall into disrepair and disrepute...(seeking) sound and close relations with Indonesia...(and strengthening) common philosophical commitments and friendships.

The conflict between traditional reliances and the perceived new realities could not be more obvious. Nor could the conflict between the Labor Government’s urgency to chart an independent course for Australia in international affairs and the incoming Liberal-National Party’s clinging conservatively to old attachments.

Be that as it may, when the White Paper *Australian Defence* was released five months after the "World Situation" statement, political dogma had been largely supplanted by the unavoidable strategic realities of the time. Foremost, amongst these was, of course, the United States’ strategic withdrawal while it reassessed its international role in the aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate.

Accordingly, the central thrust of the 1976 White Paper was “to provide the nation with security from armed attack and from the constraints on independent national decisions imposed by the threat of such attack”. In setting out the steps that would be essential to national defence, the White Paper noted that: "A primary requirement emerging from our findings is for increased self-reliance." The Liberal-National Party Government, nevertheless, did not overreact to the Guam Doctrine for it assessed importantly that "even though our security may be ultimately dependent upon US support, we owe it to ourselves to be able to mount a national defence effort that would maximize the risks and costs of any aggression". Although it was too early for the defence planners to settle on deterrence, the essence of that strategy is clearly
evident in the preceding assessment.

Moreover, although defence pundits criticized the Government for its indecisiveness on defence policy, indications are to be found in the White Paper that Australia's path was as clear then as it is now in retrospect. Thus, Australian Defence reasons that:

An alliance does not free a nation from the responsibility to make adequate provision for its own security, or to help support stability and security in its own neighbourhood, should this requirement arise...by accepting our local responsibilities we can contribute to the alliance relationship and to the US global effort. 138

The consistency between this analysis and Australia's traditional defence relationship is unmistakable: if Australia pays her "insurance premiums", they will pay off in Great Power protection. Australia was ready to pay her next installment when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan three years later.

In the meantime, despite a mismatch between its rhetoric and its economic capacity, the Australian Government pledged itself to maintain "a substantial force-in-being, which is also capable of timely expansion to deal with any unfavourable developments". 139 Despite its commitment to a 7 percent real increase in defence expenditure and the announcement of a substantial capital equipment acquisition programme in the White Paper, economic constraints that were unavoidable prevented any significant change in force structure. Moreover, while the Government remained committed to the philosophy expressed in Australian Defence no conceptual refinement was attempted.

That no conceptual refinement was perceived to be needed may, indeed, be assumed by the incoming Labor Government's implicit endorsement of the 1976 White Paper after the 1982 Federal election. Thus, following a "major strategic policy review" immediately after the change of government, the following

* See pages 52-3 above.
As befits a Labor Government the rhetoric is not as stridently supportive of US global perceptions, but the message is unchanged. Also noteworthy is the conceptual subdivision of the globe into regions of security interest and the acceptance that Australia cannot isolate her security concerns from those of "friendly nations".

Nor had perceptions changed markedly two years later. The conclusion is, therefore, inevitable that the defence-of-Australia doctrine of the Whitlam Government, which was assumed by the Australian electorate to mean "fortress Australia", was a short-term reaction to the strategic circumstances of the early 1970s, and especially to the political consequences of Australia's involvement in Vietnam. The failure of successive Governments to disabuse the electorate of its "Fortress Australia" illusion can therefore be deduced to be attributable to a combination of Australia's no-threat circumstances and economic realities. Stated another way, in the domestic political and economic climate that followed Australia's withdrawal from Vietnam her Governments apparently perceived that they could not explain cogently enough to the electorate why a continuation of past defence policies was unavoidable. A traditional pattern of behaviour is therefore suggested.

One final point that must be made is, of course, that although the Australian Government does not currently perceive a threat to Australia's security interests, it does not hold that the emergence of threats is not possible. Indeed, the consistent perception since the early 1970s has been that
there is a great deal of uncertainty in the future and that prudence requires that defence planning allow for that uncertainty. The thrust of Australia's defence planning is that "prudent allowances" necessitate a core-force that can be expanded as a threat emerges. In this regard, the assessment is clearly placed in a defence-of-Australia context, for the warning-time calculus is predicated upon the development by a potential aggressor of a conventional invasion capability. Thus, the Minister noted recently that:"Present planning is based on the premise that external major threats to Australia are not seen as credible in the shorter term."  

Discussion

Within the scope of this report, the roots of Australia's political environment lie in the influence that her national security interests, and those of her neighbours and allies, exert over her defence policy-making. The examination of defence and foreign policy statements which has been undertaken in this chapter has shown that Australia's national security policy is formulated upon the comparative-politics notion of political development. By this concept, political stability is predicated upon national well-being and economic growth. Not surprisingly, because Australia holds to free-market philosophy, she perceives that economic growth is, in turn, dependent on trade.

This should not, however, be misunderstood to mean that Australia eschews other measures that will ensure her security. On the evidence of her international activities, she clearly recognizes that a range of approaches are necessary. With respect to the thrust of this report, the methods she has in the past adopted have included diplomatic measures supported by her engagement in treaty obligations, military deployments during international crises to "key areas" or "distant regions", and military presences in other regions of primary strategic concern.
Hence, on the basis of her past military deployments before she entered into collective security arrangements, the deduction can be made that Australia's political environment may extend in times of international crisis to, at least, those "distant regions" in which she now has treaty obligations. If her military response to Communist aggression in concert with other Western States since World War II is any indication, then she may be expected to perceive that international crises in "key areas" will also be influential events in her political environment.

Consequently, on the evidence of public statements by responsible Ministers since 1944, the preceding deductions may be abstracted to the assessment that Australia's political environment may extend to wherever she perceives that either a challenge to freedom and democracy impinges in some substantive way on her interests, or her general responsibilities as a member of the Western coalition require that she join in acting against the aggressor. In either case her responses may cover the Clausewitzean conflict continuum from pure political to pure violent action.

Needless-to-say, as with the discussion in Chapter IV, a caveat must be added to the preceding analysis: in drawing inferences from history only a level of probability of less than certainty can be attached to the likelihood of an Australian military response. Indeed, her decision to not commit forces to the US Rapid Deployment Force is an indication of the level of discretion her Governments must feel they have—especially when placed in the context of her initial reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Be that as it may, the fact that Australia is now committed de jure to a political environment that extends geographically from Pakistan to the United States and from Thailand to New Zealand allows her less flexibility than she may otherwise have had before the 1950s. Of course, this deduction must also
be placed in the context that the treaties, agreements and arrangements to which she is committed obligate her only to "consult" in the event of a threat emerging to one or another of the Parties.

The level of probability that she may have to act is further increased, however, in those areas where she is already maintaining a military presence. This deduction is illustrated well by the difficulty that Australia has encountered in her attempts to withdraw her forces from the Malaysia-Singapore region. The pragmatism of the Hawke Ministry aside, it clearly intended to implement the Labor Party policy of the Whitlam era.* The political pressure from the US and Singapore, and to a lesser extent Malaysia, clearly elicited more than a token residual presence.

Australia's ongoing maritime patrol activity over the North West Indian Ocean, the US request for her to contribute to the RDF and the pressure for her to increase her commitment of naval forces to the Indian Ocean further illustrate the nature of the political environment in which the Government must reach its defence policy decisions. Further political pressures are created in the context of the ANZAC Agreement by New Zealand's obvious acceptance of her regional security responsibilities in both the South West Pacific Area and South East Asia. New Zealand has maintained a "forward defence" strategy while Australia has struggled with the intellectual and practical consequences of a defence-of-Australia doctrine.143

An illustration that Australia may be having a strategic "buck-each-way" is the paradoxical geographic coverage of the treaties to which she is a

* The pressure to withdraw was not entirely ideological. It was predominantly economic, as Lee Kuan Yew recognized (see page 98 above). The cost of building duplicate maintenance facilities at Butterworth for the F/A18A would have unacceptably increased the already very high project cost for the aircraft. See Millar, Australia in Peace and War, pp 409-10 for discussion of Whitlam's intentions.
Apart from her relationship with New Zealand through the ANZUS Treaty, none of Australia's other defence pacts involves her in an obligatory arrangement with an adjacent State. Thus, she has only a "pattern of regular high-level consultations" that are "backed by a pattern of practical cooperation" with New Guinea, and has no security arrangements at all with Indonesia. Similarly, while Australia has a declared security interest in the stability and security of the emerging States in the South West Pacific, she again has no specific security arrangements with them. Papua-New Guinea, Indonesia and some South West Pacific States are, nonetheless, recipients of Australian aid and development assistance, which from time to time includes military equipment and advisers. Thus, the majority of Australia's security obligations are with States that are well outside her "local region". Clearly, this situation is a product of the West's perceptions of Communist expansionism during the 1950s, as well as being a reflection of the current reluctance of the international system to enter into collective security arrangements. But it does leave an asymmetry in Australia's formal security obligations.

In conclusion, there are clearly many conflicting pressures and limitations with which the Government of a middle power with visions of international influence, but a restricted revenue base, must contend. Accordingly, successive Australian Governments have taken a fairly narrow focus on defence issues in their public statements during times when no direct threat to Australia's interests is perceived. Domestic electoral imperatives have declaredly supplanted her broader international responsibilities. This situation hence places her decision-making on national security policy in a continual state of tension. Thus, not surprisingly, analysis of Australia's declared policies, her historical and ongoing defence activities and her collective security obligations shows that there is a substantive disparity between the "Fortress Australia" expectations of the Australian electorate and the realities of her political environment.
CHAPTER VI

TOWARDS 2000: WHITHER AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE?

The wise general in his deliberations must consider both favourable and unfavourable factors.

Sun Tzu

In the preceding four chapters of this report, the theoretical and empirical influences on Australia's strategic decision-making have been discussed. These analyses have shown that there is support in the works of the classical and contemporary strategists for the hypothesis that—in the absence of a definable threat—strategy and, in turn, force structure characteristics may be determined from enduring internal and external influences.

Indeed, Australia's physical environment has been shown to contain permanent features that will always influence her strategy and force structure characteristics, irrespective of whether she is under strategic threat or not. The imperatives that are inherent in her physical environment are, nonetheless, modified by the future consequences of her past, national patterns of behaviour in conjunction with the political pressures that arise from both internal and external sources.

Accordingly, in this chapter, the strategic issues that flow from Australia's permanent and enduring influences are abstracted to discern the strategic signposts for her defence preparations. These signposts are, in turn, used as a focus for discussion of a strategy framework, from which are identified pertinent force structure characteristics.* Conclusions are drawn from the following discussion in the final chapter of the report.

* Because the determination of specific capabilities and force sizes is beyond the scope of this report, the derivation in this chapter of relevant force structure characteristics is conducted in the abstract.
Strategic Signposts

Collins has indicated that a State's strategic signposts are derived directly from its national security interests and national security objectives, and will find their expression as national strategy. The clarity of strategic logic is unfortunately found to be deceptive when it is placed in the context of reality! Thus, the discussion in Chapters III-V above has revealed the existence of many dilemmas in Australia's strategic environment. Foremost amongst these are the conflicts between expressed policy and implemented policy, between what is desired and what is achievable, between what is certain and what is uncertain, and between the dictates of Australia's strategic environment and the strategic indecisiveness of successive Governments. Nevertheless, because this imbroglio is rooted in Australia's strategic circumstances, its resolution is essential if unequivocal strategic signposts are to be identified. Consequently, some reduction of this mass of apparently conflicting detail must be undertaken.

If the multitude of influences that will shape an Australian national strategy could be abstracted to just two principal issues, they would have to be Australia's national interests as a middle power in the Western democratic coalition and the substantive limitations that are placed upon her national objectives by her socio-economic realities. Effectively, each of the preceding security-related conundrums may be subsumed into those two issues. As such, they and their interrelationships form a vital framework for the following discussion of Australia's national security interests and objectives.

Philosophically, culturally, historically, politically and economically Australia is clearly a member of the loose alliance of democratic States. Despite her geographic location and the strategic imperatives that flow from it, she is also a Western nation and her perceptions of international events
are shaped by European values and traditions. As has been the case in the past, should Western interests be threatened then it would be very difficult for her to hold herself aloof from their collective defence. Consequently, Australia's pursuit of her own interests and objectives will be substantively influenced by the interests and objectives of the Western democratic coalition.²

More specifically, because of the European outlook of the Australian people, future Australian Governments will continue to be influenced by the nation's philosophical adherence to democratic values and Judeo-Christian ethics. Consequently, Australian strategy may be expected to remain fettered—as it has in the past—by her moral and legal obligation "to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any nation". These ideals would prevent Australia from striking preemptively, using methods or weapons proscribed by the Geneva Conventions, and—along with her economic constraints—from maintaining a large force-in-being. Similarly, Australia's belief in the natural right to freedom of all peoples and respect for the rights of the individual creates an interest that she be perceived as an example of the values of freedom and democracy. As a result of this interest, Australia will continue to respond at least morally, if not materially, whenever freedom is threatened. This interest will also continue to constrain the methods that she may employ to attain a domestic or international consensus on any issue. The preceding motivations and constraints thus represent a psychological vulnerability as well as a strength. As a result, any would-be aggressor would have to contend with the strengths that are entailed and would probably seek to capitalize upon the associated vulnerabilities—especially if he adhered to, or was influenced by, Oriental revolutionary principles.

Also associated with Australia's European values is her interest in ensuring that she does not take any action that would undermine the institutional
bases of the international order. In this regard, despite the popular misconception within the Australian electorate about their country’s “fortress” defence posture, the strategic realities represented by Australia’s treaty obligations are unmistakable. Nevertheless, these obligations are by no means immutable: they may be broken either legally by Australia’s giving notice in accordance with the treaty provisions, or de facto by her merely reneging on her obligations should another Party request assistance. The point is also unavoidable that the requirements in Australia’s major treaties that she merely “consult” and “meet the common danger in accordance with constitutional procedures” allow her to renege “with honour”. While such a response is by no means inconceivable—especially if the United States should decide not to respond or be Congressionally prevented from responding—the resulting perceptions of Australia’s level of trustworthiness would be most unfavourable and would undoubtedly be long term. Clearly, treaties cannot be responsibly entered into unless a State is prepared to accept both the benefits and the obligations. As a member of the global community of nations, Australia thus has a broad interest in ensuring that her actions enhance, not diminish, respect for international law. As a founding signatory of the United Nations Organization she is also enjoined to act in a manner that fosters respect for that institution and the precepts that it represents.

To place the preceding analysis of Australia’s value-determined interests and objectives into perspective, her strategic advantages need to be considered. If her people wished, Australia could withdraw into isolationism. In this respect, her geography is a fundamental advantage because it presents a natural defensive barrier to invasion by all but the most capable aggressor. At the moment, only Australia’s principal ally has that capability. Nevertheless, the burgeoning Soviet presence in the Indian-Pacific region and the nascent Soviet
Navy power-projection capability indicate that it could eventually acquire the capability to invade the Australian continent. As current Australian strategic assessments hold, the direct threat to Australian interests is therefore low.

Thus, while Australia's geography presents a certain level of strategic impregnability in the short term, should she decide to adopt a policy of isolationism, then to accommodate possible long-term threats she would need to invest significantly in infrastructural and defence force development. Moreover, substantial industrial development would be essential to ensure that current and projected defence equipment could be supported without recourse to external suppliers since they could not be guaranteed were Australia isolationist. The cost of these parallel developments would probably be prohibitive. A national objective of isolationism becomes even more improbable when the economic concomitants are considered more closely.

Should Australia withdraw into political isolationism, she could survive autarkically. She is self-sufficient in food production and has indigenous supplies of most of her required industrial raw materials. With significant changes in her transportation habits her energy consumption could be reduced to the level of her energy production. But, the standard of living of the Australian community would be significantly reduced under autarky and, without capital inflow, the industrial, infrastructural and defence developments that would be necessary under political isolation could not be undertaken. Unless the international environment were so hostile that political isolation and autarky were the only way Australia could survive as a free and independent State, the associated societal and budgetary consequences would not be acceptable.

Because of her adherence to capitalist economic philosophy and the crucial importance of growth to her national well-being, Australia has a fundamental dependence upon international trade. Autarky, therefore, is not an option for
Australia. Moreover, because international trade without political intercourse would be at best difficult, and more probably impossible, isolationism is not an option either. But membership of the community of nations confers obligations as well as advantages.

The implications of this interest are well illustrated by Australia's relationships with her neighbouring States. Thus, when that unnamed Malaysian official commented that it would be impossible for Australia to ever become part of South East Asia, he was implicitly reflecting as much on the nation's Western outlook as he was on its preponderantly Caucasian racial composition. The veracity of the Malaysian official's viewpoint has indeed been exemplified by the recent emotive response by some sections of Australian society to the Hawke Government's revision of Australia's immigration targets in favour of a higher level of Asian settlement. Clearly, such pragmatic policies are essential if Australia's relationships with her region are to be developed amicably. Yet the adoption of a more enlightened national stance will require the acceptance of her strategic realities by her population. Consequently, Australia's interests in more realistic foreign policy and immigration objectives carries with it the clear liability of an increased level of dissent within society.

Despite her society's traditional perceptions, the inculcation of more regionally orientated values may be facilitated by the already significant investment of Australian blood in the defence of the region. Since the start of the 20th century, Australia has already fought seven times in the Asia-Pacific region and has kept elements of her Defence Force stationed there permanently in peace and war for the past thirty years. Admittedly, Australia's regional involvement finds its original roots in Imperial defence and, more recently, in the fight against Japanese and Communist expansionism; however, the commitment has most importantly not been relinquished despite Britain's
withdrawal to Europe, Australia's experiment with nationalistic independence under Whitlam and the advent of another socialist Government under Prime Minister Hawke.

Thus, when the current Minister for Defence announced recently that the Government cannot predict when Australian forces might one day operate abroad, he was not only stating the obvious but was also reaffirming Australia's traditional realization that she cannot separate her own security interests from those of her neighbouring States in a narrow context, and from those of the West in the broadest context. The price of such pragmatic interests is, however, that with come security obligations which some sections of the Government and the people would prefer to eschew.

Thus, the reality is that Australia's national security decision-making will continue to be influenced by her treaty obligations and the expectations that are raised within other States by her adherence to democratic ideals. At issue here, of course, is the belief by other States that, on the basis of her philosophical predilections, Australia will defend freedom when it is threatened and honour her obligations. Indeed, additional synergisms are suggested by this analysis: If Australia wishes to be influential within the international system and to insure that her major alliance partner respects its treaty obligations, then she must "pay her dues". Moreover, because the health of her economy relies on unhindered trade on a global scale, Australia must rely on the security of her sea and air lines of communication in regions well beyond the range of her own defence capabilities. To gain the security that is provided vicariously by the defence efforts of those distant States, Australia must offer complementary security in her own region. The 1976 White Paper metaphorically cautions Australians that "it is prudent to remind ourselves that the US has many diverse interests and obligations". In other
words, Australia’s security interests may be easily forgotten unless she reminds her powerful and remote friends of her continuing commitment to the broader security interests of the Western democratic coalition.

Consequently, if Australia wishes to retain the security advantages that are inherent in—but not guaranteed by—her alliance with the United States, then she must accept her share of the global security burden. That she seeks to do so is evident in the joint US-Australian defence facilities at Pine Gap, Nurrungar and North-West Cape, and Australia’s ongoing overseas military commitments. In this latter regard, the 1976 White Paper statement that Australia has a responsibility to contribute to the US global effort by helping support regional security and stability remains as the clearest defence statement yet made by any post-World War II Australian Government.

Despite the clarity of the preceding security interests and objectives, and their realization in Australia’s ongoing defence commitments in Malaysia-Singapore and the North-West Indian Ocean, there is a strong element of rhetoric in Australia’s support. Evidencing this criticism is the general asymmetry in Australia’s formal security arrangements—her relative disinterest in the South West Pacific Area, the lack of a formal defence arrangement with Papua New Guinea and her rather "prickly" relationship with Indonesia being particularly noteworthy inadequacies in the translation of her "local" interests into security objectives.

Of course, while resolution of this asymmetry may further her interest in regional security, it would also increase the level of obligation that Australia would have to accept with her neighbouring States. The "percentages" must, accordingly, be weighed. At the moment, Australia clearly has a sound security relationship with the United States and there is, therefore, little impetus for her to voluntarily accept additional security burdens. Should the strategic distribution of power move against Western interests, however,
then some increase in Australia's level of commitment may become necessary or prudent.

In the meantime, of course, New Zealand has accepted in her 1984 Defence White Paper that she must retain a permanent presence in Singapore even though she intends to reorientate her defence responsibilities towards the South West Pacific. Indeed, New Zealand's forward defence objectives represent both a source of comfort and concern to Australia: a comfort because they relieve some of the pressure on Australia to resolve her strategic quandary, but a concern because they place her indecisiveness in a poor light and also create pressures for a declaratory regional defence objective.

The strong anti-nuclear policy that has been adopted by New Zealand's Lange Government compounds Australia's security problems because it has clearly bolstered the stand of the left-wing elements in the Labor Party, thus undermining Prime Minister Hawke's ability to take pragmatic national security decisions. Coming at a time when decisiveness is required because of the burgeoning Soviet presence in the region this domestic political discord is most inopportune. Also pertinent is the Australian community's misperception of Australia's national security objectives. As Williams has opined, from time to time, a government may not "fully and frankly" inform the electorate about an issue. If it fails to do so, however, it incurs a cost in the level of support it gets from the people. But the level of risk that is inherent in this situation is increased significantly if the Government itself is in disarray over the issue. Fortunately, time appears to be on Australia's side.

The latter observation must, however, be placed into context. Since Australia's withdrawal from Vietnam, her defence policy has been based on the premise that strategic warning time will enable expansion of the coreforce as a threat becomes apparent. This premise is, in turn, based upon an
assessment that the threat that will emerge will be a conventional invasion of Australia. Clearly, the logic in this argument is correct on geo-strategic grounds. The length of the sea and air approaches from the archipelagic "bridge" to the northwest and northeast undoubtedly necessitate the possession by an invader of a substantial military capability—although the forces that Japan committed to the Malaya-Philippines-Indonesia-New Guinea campaign were extraordinarily meagre, they still totalled eleven divisions, 1200 fighter and bomber aircraft and a very significant naval force. Moreover, should the aggressor's objective be subjugation rather than resource seizure, then the geographic location of the Main Support Areas, and the size and topography of the continent necessitate an even higher level of capability.

As correct as the preceding logic is, it is nevertheless based on a potentially invalid premise. If Australia has any intentions of fulfilling her collective security obligations, then the warning time that she has in fact, is not the time taken for an aggressor to prepare for an invasion of Australia, but the time that would be required to prepare for military action against any of those States with which Australia has a security obligation. In this regard, Speedy's analysis that the warning times which have occurred historically becomes crucial. On the basis of this logic, the Australian Defence Force is effectively in a "come-as-you-are" posture. Thus, there is possibly a serious disparity between the force structure implications of the Government's declaratory defence policy and those of its de facto defence objectives. Irrespective of whether this situation is the result of either inadequate analysis, wishful thinking or deliberate deception of the electorate, it represents a potentially serious disconnect between Australia's security ends and means. Collins' warning

* See Chapter 1, Note 21.
could not be more apposite.*

Of course, the dilemmas which underlie the preceding interests and objective must also be recognized. On the one hand, adequate defence preparedness is fundamental to Australia's "survival as a free and democratic country", but the maintenance of the self-sufficient defence capability that is the concomitant of her continental geography would be well beyond the bounds of her economy. On the other hand, while the declaration of a strategy of forward defence would enable Australia to stabilize the "dominoes" as far from her shores as possible, it would carry with it the attendant political liability of necessitating justification of that strategy to the electorate. Rather than seeking to resolve these dilemmas, successive Governments have therefore had a strategic "buck-each-way": they have retained an overseas defence presence, but have declared a defence-of-Australia doctrine. The domestic misconception of a "fortress Australia", confused defence policy, and probably the creation of a level of doubt amongst Australia's neighbours about her resolve to honour her collective security obligations can be sheeted home to this decision.

The recent policy announcements by the Hawke Government are, therefore, most important for their probable effects on the level of confidence that regional States place in Australia. However, this refinement of national security objectives must be discussed more widely amongst the Australian people so that "a national understanding and consensus that will support (the) defence effort" is created.19

Also significant to regional stability and security is the loose relationship that is created between ASEAN, the South West Pacific States and the United States through Australia and New Zealand's security interests

* See Chapter 2, page 15.
with each. Although the United States, Japan, Australia and New Zealand all sent Cabinet-level representatives to the 1979 ASEAN meeting in Bali in the wake of the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, the level of support by the United States has been more muted since. On the evidence of the statements made by both the United States and ASEAN over the ensuing six years, the linkage is nevertheless strong and desired by all Parties.

In this regard, Thailand's public vacillation must be placed into its historical and geographical perspectives. That State has survived many invasions over the centuries by accommodating the invader and prevailing after his withdrawal. In the contemporary context, her survival may again be at stake because she is the ASEAN "front-line" State in the face of Vietnamese expansionism. Also underscoring Thailand's apparent concern that she not be seen by Vietnam to be taking an excessively belligerent stance, is the 1980 reassurances by the US, Australia and New Zealand that they would honour a Thai request for collective security assistance under the Manila Pact. Once again the impossibility of a withdrawal to a neo-isolationist foreign and defence policy by Australia is "writ large".

Nevertheless, although Australia's own security is inextricably intertwined with the economic well-being, stability and security of her regional neighbours, she cannot afford to allow them to become over-dependent upon her. First, her own national power has unmistakable limits and she must, therefore, be careful not to overcommit herself. And, second, the implications of the Nixon Doctrine and its more recent refinement by US National Security Adviser Clark necessitate that she not overestimate the possible response that the US may wish or be able to provide.

Also bearing on this discussion is the natural reticence that Australia's Asiatic and Melanesian neighbours feel in their relationships with
her. Although there is currently a desire for contact because of the clear Vietnamese threat and growing Soviet presence, all of her neighbours are former colonies and would resent any hint of condescension by Australia. Consequently, Australia's activities must be undertaken sensitively and in such a way that the self-confidence and self-sufficiency of the States in the region is enhanced. The reality is, of course, that this is a long-term course of action—especially in the South West Pacific. Fortunately, time appears to be on Australia's side.

If Australia is to turn the preceding interests and objectives into reality, she must use the time that she has to implement a national strategy that will insure her own security by contributing to the peace and stability of the world—and, more specifically, the regional—order. That time is on her side should not, however, be misunderstood, as it has so clearly in the past. Time is not an excuse for inaction: decisions made now will shape the future rather than necessitating reaction as unforeseen contingencies arise.

With the foundations of Australia's strategic signposts—her security interests and objectives—in mind, the essence, the extent and the thrust of a relevant national strategy may now be considered. It is to those elements that this chapter now turns.

**National Strategy**

An examination of both theory and empirical data shows that there are few national activities which do not have an implication for Australia's national security. Keiffer's analysis that "strategy is a joint undertaking by all the people" thus emphasizes metaphorically the necessity for the integration of all the components of Australia's power into a national strategy that will both ensure her "survival as a free and democratic country" and preserve "peace, security and regional stability". Thus, the need for a national strategy is suggested that will overlay and give direction to a suite of other strategies.
which are directed at the employment of specific elements of Australia's national power.*

Also providing metaphorical direction to a pertinent national strategy is Clausewitz' caution that, for a State to prevail in a power system, it must be strong—at first generally and then at the decisive point. Consequently, in contemporary parlance, a State must marshal all the components of its national power so that it is perceived by other States as projecting an unmistakable image of its preparedness to take military action in defence of its interests. Thus, perceived power represents the essence of Australia's national strategy and may be described as "manifest capability"**

With the nature of Australia's national strategy resolved the second element—its extent—may now be identified. To do so, those components of Australia's national power must be considered which, on the basis of the earlier discussion in this report, must be manipulated to project an image of manifest capability.

Again the works of the strategic authorities are germane. Clausewitz' most famous aphorism about the relationship between politics and war, and his concomitant allusion to a conflict continuum immediately suggest that a political strategy is going to be fundamental. The specific thrusts of a political strategy are just as readily apparent. Because political action is dependent upon the support of the electorate, a social strategy becomes a logically essential component of a political strategy.21 And also by logic, because it is international politics that are at issue, a diplomatic strategy can be seen to be essential.

* See Collins' definition of national strategy at page 10 above.
** The notion of manifest capability is considered to be very useful to Australia as a middle power because it encompasses a calculus of all the component strengths and weaknesses of national power in a single abstraction.
Placing the military end of Clausewitz' continuum into context is Morgenthau's perception of the importance of armed strength as the bulwark of a State's political power in international relationships. Indeed, it goes without saying that a military strategy will be essential; however, identification of the dimensions of that military strategy has clearly given Australian Governments great difficulty. Nevertheless, those bounds are identifiable by logic and have indeed already been articulated by the Australian Government. Put bluntly, Australia may either deal with a conflict where it occurs, or wait for it to reach her shores. In other words, accepting that, in reality, a strategy continuum exists between those extremes, she may adopt either a forward defence or a continental defence strategy.

In noting the inextricable interrelationship between military, and political and economic theory, Eccles provides guidance to another national strategy dimension that must mandatorily be considered; the economic element. More specifically, as indicated by Forbes, Cline and Collins, Australia's infrastructural weaknesses may be expected to continue to represent a severe constraint on the implementation of a continental defence strategy. Nor can this problem be solved in the short term. The limits of Australia's revenue base and her other social priorities will always limit the preparations that she may undertake in peacetime—be they infrastructural or the development of the Australian Defence Force. Thus, short term and long term economo-industrial strategies are believed to be fundamental components of a national strategy of manifest capability.

Having determined the rudimentary components of a suite of strategies, the thrust of Australia's national strategy may now be considered. Guidance to this element is suggested by her adherence to democratic ideals and Judeo-Christian ethics. Because of these societal values, a strategy of preemption would be morally repugnant to Australian society and, therefore, an

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electorally difficult option for an Australian Government. Consequently, Australia is virtually forced to rely upon a retaliatory strategy. But, should she ever have to retaliate, then her basic national security interest—survival—will already have been placed in jeopardy. Consequently, despite the doubts that Naroll, Bullough and Naroll have raised, the only national strategy which can prevent her national security from being jeopardized, without preemptive military action being taken, is deterrence. The thrust of Australia’s national strategy must, therefore, be to marshal the elements of her national power to deter the emergence of a threat. Should a threat nevertheless emerge then that strategy must be refined to deter an armed attack on, or the threat of attack or strategic pressure against, Australia or her territories.

The credibility of a State’s deterrence has been shown by the strategic theorists to depend on the perception by a potential aggressor that the State has the ability to exact an unacceptable toll on the aggressor’s forces should he attack. Consequently, a State’s strengths can be deduced to enhance, and its vulnerabilities to detract from, a strategy of deterrence. Amongst Australia’s major strategic strengths are her geographic remoteness, the levels of education and technical skill within her population, her research and development efforts, and the level of technology utilized by the Australian Defence Force. Conversely, her major vulnerabilities include the size of her economy, her poor logistical support infrastructure, small population, and the

* This issue is discussed at page 8 above. Although perception of the need for a strategy of deterrence is more difficult when no threat is identifiable because it places the strategy into the notional dimension, this does not invalidate the strategy per se. Thus, a State which has no perceived strategic threat but which wishes to deter all threats to its future security must project an image of being a strong, vigorous and cohesive nation that has the military power, as well as the national resolve to use that power, to defend its territory in all circumstances against all aggressors. See also Australian Defence, November 1976 (AGPS, Canberra, 1976), p13.
numerous schisms in her society. Moreover, because Australia's low "resource-to-area" ratio will make quick rectification of most of her economy-related vulnerabilities impossible, they will continue to represent a severe constraint on the successful implementation of a deterrent strategy well beyond the year 2000. Therefore, as O'Neill suggests, to compensate for these vulnerabilities, increased emphasis must be placed on the strategic employment of the component strengths of her national power.

Clearly, a close relationship exists between manifest capability, deterrence and credibility. As will be recognized from the works of the contemporary strategists, each relies upon the psychological consequences of the images that are projected by a State. A strategy of deterrence through manifest capability, therefore, has particular utility to Australia: first, because it is inherently flexible, it can be finetuned to meet any situation; and, second, it does not necessitate immediate or crippling defence expenditure but can accommodate a "long haul" approach to national development. Moreover, as discussed in the following section, the concepts of manifest capability and deterrence are not situationally limited—they are as applicable to continental defence as they are to a State's contribution to a collective defence strategy.

By way of summary, then, Australia's strategic signposts can be seen to find their expression in the nature, extent and thrust of a national strategy that will accommodate the imperatives in her physical, psychosocial-historical and political environments. These imperatives also provide guidance to the component strategies that employ specific elements of her national power, and compensate for vulnerabilities elsewhere in her power panoply. As with their overarching national strategy, each of these subordinate military and military-support-related strategies will be directed at ensuring Australia's security through the fostering of global—and, more specifically, regional—stability and security. The specific strategy options that meet that objective are discussed in the next sections of this chapter.
Military Strategy

An examination of strategic philosophy shows that national strategy involves the employment of national power to achieve national security objectives and to compensate for strategic vulnerabilities. Consequently, in the following discussion, appropriate elements of Australia's national power must be amalgamated with a national strategy of deterrence through manifest capability in deriving a suite of supporting military strategies. Before doing so, however, the general constituents of that suite of military strategies should be determined.

As has been recognized by successive Governments, Australia's geographic power is going to be a fundamental influence on her military strategy. Indeed, because her ultimate interest is national survival, a military strategy of continental defence must axiomatically represent the bottom line in a suite of strategies. Despite the neo-isolationism which has been fostered societally by this strategic reality, successive Australian Governments have stated—and their international political activities have reaffirmed—that the security of Australia is almost inextricably linked with the stability and economic well-being of her region. This security interest does not, of course, predicate a permanent overseas defence presence; but it does necessitate active measures that will assist regional States to find peace and prosperity. On the evidence of Australia's history, her perception of how regional security may be best ensured will almost axiomatically have to involve some form of defence presence. Her defence policy alternative is withdrawal behind the shield of her geography. Just as political and economic isolation are impossible, so too is military isolation held to be impossible.

Thus, a set of priorities is believed to be implicit in Australia's strategic circumstances. She must first help to preserve the stability of her region and, should her efforts fail, involve herself in the collective defence
of her neighbours' and her own regional interests. In turn, should collective defence fail, then she must be able to defend the sovereignty of her continent and territories. Nevertheless, as has been discussed earlier, should she have to engage in combat—either regionally or in defence of her sovereignty—then her security interests and objectives will already have been placed in jeopardy. Therefore, Australia's regional security efforts must assist regional stability by deterring aggression against and between her neighbours.

A military strategy that may achieve both objectives is suggested by an amalgamation of the strategic concept of control with Australia's national strategy of manifest capability. If Australia is able to not only demonstrate the manifest capability to control her own sovereignty but can also—in conjunction with her neighbours' security efforts—demonstrate the manifest capability to collectively control her region, then she may extend deterrence of threat against her own sovereign interests to her shared regional interests. Before discussing the ways in which a military strategy of control may be extended to the region, its national implications must first be considered.

Clearly, Australia's low resource-to-area ratio makes the simultaneous control of her total sea, land and air spaces impossible. An element of vulnerability is therefore created by this disparity which must be compensated for by another strategy. Accordingly, Australia's geographic remoteness and size must be exploited to provide early warning of any approach towards the continent, thus enabling the positioning of control elements, the undertaking of crisis diplomacy or the despatching of retaliatory strike elements if necessary. In this regard, the warning time that will be provided when Australia's OHR "Jindalee" becomes operational will be invaluable. Nevertheless, because "Jindalee" will provide only one and a half hour's warning time of aircraft
movements and 24 hours for ship movements its use to implement a strategy of control must be accompanied by supporting strategies of forward deployment and infrastructural development.

Even if these latter strategies had already been implemented, it is unlikely that Australia could achieve a strategy of total control. First, "Jindalee" could probably not be kept permanently on the air and, despite its being tunable to account for diurnal changes in the ionosphere, its effectiveness will undoubtedly vary. Second, without a continent-wide, precise sea and air intercept control capability, interception and identification could not be guaranteed. And third, because of the vastness of Australia and its Exclusive Economic Zone, the Australian Defence Force will never have the capacity to be omnipresent. Accordingly, some probability of control less than certainty will have to be accepted.

This fact is, however, the very essence of the strategies of control, deterrence and manifest capability. Because the objective is to project an image, compromises in real capabilities can be accepted provided the psychological impact of the perceived capabilities is compelling. Thus, a strategy of control does not predicate absolute control: rather it necessitates judgements about what minimum level of probability of control is acceptable. Achievement of this level of probability may then be assured by concentrating control capabilities in specific areas when a high level of control is required, or by dispersing it more widely when lower levels of control are acceptable. A military strategy of sovereignty control is therefore inherently flexible--both geographically and temporally.

Because of Australia's geographic imperatives, a military strategy of sovereignty control must have maritime, aerospace and continental dimensions. In conjunction with the works of the strategic theorists, her geography also provides guidance to where strategic priority should be applied. Thus, she
must place emphasis on the level of control she can exercise over the maritime and air "chokepoints" and "core areas" around her continent and territories. Similarly, her land control strategy must emphasize her "critical terrain" and "core areas".* This analysis thus provides guidance to the way in which the flexibility that is inherent in a strategy of sovereignty control may be used to compensate for the small size of the Australian Defence Force. More specifically, Australia's archipelago-like distribution of population and industrial areas and resource zones may be used to advantage to enhance the psychological dimension of her manifest capability.

It is by similar logic that the strategy of deterrence through control may be extended to Australia's region. Accepting that, for the foreseeable future, the military technology which Australia employs is more advanced than that of her neighbours,26 and assuming that higher technology confers higher absolute capability,27 the deployment of Australian forces to the region will enhance the aggregate level of control capability. Consequently, in the absence of Australian forces, a certain level of probability of control may be assured by local forces; however, when deployment forces arrive, that level of probability of control may be increased. Thus, on the basis of judgements about the level of probability that is desired, decisions may be made about the frequency and force levels of, and areas over which control is to be enhanced by, deployments outside Australia. Again a high level of flexibility is suggested which may be utilized to accommodate a wide range of political and strategic variables.

The act of deployment does not, however, evidence manifest capability per se. Once at a deployment location, the Australian Defence Force element must clearly evidence an enhancement of regional control. A closely associated consideration is the ultimate level of integration of forces that

* The meaning of these terms is explained at Chapter II, Note 32.
should occur during collective defence operations in wartime. Should the intention be that Australian and regional forces would integrate, then a high level of commonality in equipment, operational doctrine and command and control would be essential. The development of this level of cooperation would clearly take a long time and, on the evidence of Australia’s experiences in war, would necessitate the subordination of nationalism to the common good.

On the other hand, should the intention be that the forces would be coordinated, but not integrated, then a high level of complementarity in command and control and operational doctrine would be required, while a high level of commonality in munitions and stores would be desirable. In peacetime exercises and deployments pertinent levels of coordination or integration must be developed so that the military system can transition easily to a war-footing, if necessary. Because of the problems that are associated with both integration and coordination, the level of control that can, in fact, be achieved is affected. To project the required image of cohesion and effectiveness, these issues must therefore be considered when decisions are made about the strategies of control and forward defence through deployment.

Relating these abstractions to Australia’s future circumstances, the Hawke Government has made quite clear that, while it realizes it must maintain a regional defence presence, it cannot currently afford for that presence to be permanent. By deciding upon a regular military deployment schedule it has, in fact, already made the policy decision that is the concomitant of a strategy of control. The assumption may also be made that the regional Governments have judged intuitively that the level of military presence and capability which will be provided by the Australian deployments meets their current perceived strategic needs. Accordingly, the advantage of overlaying a strategy of control—or, more specifically, forward defence through deployment—over the Australian Government’s declared local deployment policy is that it provides
a coherent objective for the development of supporting policies and a benchmark against which individual and collective security efforts may be measured. Both of these features are currently missing.

Two further Australian interests impinge on a strategy of forward defence through deployment: first is Australia's interest in taking steps to enhance regional economic and societal well-being, and hence regional stability; and, second, is her interest in ensuring that regional States do not become excessively dependent on her. Clearly, by maintaining only an impermanent presence, Australia will be taking a step that will reduce regional dependence. Nevertheless, at the same time, the removal of her permanent presence may unintentionally create a level of instability. At issue here is the consideration that, by her presence, Australia is either keeping potentially antagonistic neighbours apart or keeping a potential aggressor away.

In this respect, despite the general accord that now exists within ASEAN, the racial and religious disparities between the constituent States represent an inherent casus belli. Furthermore, Australia's relationship with the United States is clearly perceived by her regional neighbours to confer an implicit US interest in the preservation of regional stability. The flexibility of a strategy of forward defence through deployment is an advantage in either case, provided Australia monitors the regional strategic environment after the withdrawal of her permanent presence and sensitively finetunes her deployment schedules.

While such measures are acceptable in the short term, they are not so in the long term. Dependency has both an absolute and temporal dimension. Consequently, the measures that Australia adopts to prevent overdependency must have a long term objective of increasing the self-reliance of her neighbours for their own defence. In other words, just as the Nixon Doctrine seeks to prompt US alliance partners to be more self-reliant, so too must
Australia adopt a similar objective with the States in her region. A strategy that will achieve this objective is "regional cooperation". 30

Two dimensions are perceived for this strategy: first, the general level of defence capacity within the region should be enhanced; and, second, the long-term capability of the regional defence forces to attend to their own security needs should be developed.

With respect to the first dimension, by offering military training and education opportunities in Australian Defence Force institutions to regional forces, Australia would provide access to current military doctrine, technology and practices, while simultaneously creating a greater mutual awareness within her own forces and those of her regional neighbours by the simple process of association. To capitalize on such contact and to assist in the development of specific operational techniques and skills, the existing programme of combined exercises under the Five Power Defence Arrangements should be continued and progressively extended to encompass the other regional States that are not currently included. Foremost amongst the latter States are Indonesia and those of the South West Pacific Area.

Regarding the second dimension, while combined exercising should continue after a basic regional defence capability has been assured, the thrust of the cooperation in education and training should eventually be redirected towards the preparation of instructors and senior non-commissioned personnel and officers. Only through this process will the regional forces be encouraged to develop their own basic training and education programmes. As these programmes are introduced the secondment or loan of instructors would expedite the development of local training courses. Further benefits would accrue if these local programmes were to be undertaken cooperatively between several countries.

Needless-to-say, there is already a considerable difference between the
levels of national development in each of Australia's neighbours. Consequently, her defence cooperation programme must be tuned sensitively to the needs of each State. Most importantly, the approach must be holistic: the defence cooperation programme cannot be misunderstood to be an end unto itself. Its purpose must be to enable the development of national and hence regional self-confidence and an appropriate level of self-sufficiency in defence matters, without imposing an unacceptable economic burden on any of the States—including Australia. Failure to achieve this objective would be to invite the domestic instability through budgetary distortion that the cooperative defence strategy is intended to obviate.

There are, however, some disadvantages in a regional defence role which must be acknowledged. Foremost amongst these are the risks that Australia may be drawn into a conflict that she may have otherwise been able to avoid, and that by her presence in the region her strategic warning time is effectively reduced. Inevitably, these risks have to be accepted. As a small power with limited defence resources and by being crucially dependent on international trade for her economic survival, Australia must rely upon the security efforts of the other States in the Western democratic coalition to provide for the security of her interests in her remote regions.

Concomitantly, those other States rely implicitly on her to protect their interests in her local region and to contribute collectively to their defence in her neighbourhood. Related to this deduction, of course, is the concept that Australia has a role as a regional participant in the global defence responsibilities of the United States. Her membership of ANZUS, the testimony of Deputy Secretary of State Stoessel and the perceptions of the regional powers about the US-Australia relationship are the manifestations of that concept. In short, then, because Australia has interests in far more unstable regions of the globe than is her own locale, the level of risk would be
arguably greater were she not to adopt military strategies of forward defence through deployment and regional defence cooperation.

To complement the preceding framework of military strategies and to compensate for the strategic vulnerabilities that are inherent in her geography and her economy, Australia must utilize one of her strongest suits: her ability to incorporate advanced technology into her Defence Force. Only by this measure can Australia ensure the high levels of capability, flexibility and fire-power that are essential to the successful defence of her vast sovereign spaces. Moreover, only by holding a technological edge can she significantly enhance the regional collective defence effort through a strategy of forward defence by deployment. Thus, high technology confers a "power-multiplier effect" upon the Australian Defence Force. This advantage, of course, is further enhanced by Australia's access to US research information, military philosophy and intelligence. In combination, these advantages accentuate Australia's utility to the Western democratic coalition as a bulwark of regional security.

There is, nevertheless, a premium that must be paid for a defence acquisition strategy of high technology. First, it necessitates an ongoing capital investment within industry so that excessive reliance upon long logistical supply lines is avoided. This can add significantly to the programme costs associated with defence acquisitions. Second, because it is industrially and economically infeasible to manufacture all items of defence equipment, a significant level of defence support dependency will inevitably exist. This can represent an ongoing source of strategic and political vulnerability. And, third, it adds significantly to the manpower costs of the Australian Defence Force—especially to training and education costs. Nevertheless, the Australian Government clearly perceives that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages.
In summary, then, Australia can increase the probability that she will "subdue her enemy without battle" by adopting a military strategy of control to support a national strategy of deterrence through manifest capability. In its national dimension, deterrence will take the form of sovereignty control, and in its regional dimension as forward defence through deployment supported by a strategy of defence cooperation. To enhance the effectiveness of each of these strategies they are, in turn, to be supported by a high-technology acquisition strategy.

To complete this discussion of the strategies that will flesh out a national strategy of manifest capability, the suite of military-support strategies must now be addressed.

Military-Support Strategies

As has been discussed earlier, the credibility of a State's deterrence is dependent not only on the military power it can muster but also on its resolve to take action. On the other hand, a State's vulnerabilities were shown to deduct from its deterrent strategy. These analyses indicate that the principal elements of a deterrent military-support strategy will be a suite of political, social, economic and industrial strategies.

The key to the success of any Government programme is ultimately the support of the people. On the evidence of the disparity over many years between the Australian Government's declaratory and its de facto defence policies, the deduction can be made that Government felt it easier to not attempt to justify its actions. A liability of this decision is that, although it obviates vocal opposition, it does not engender informed support either. When placed in the context of the Australian people's traditional acceptance of its international responsibilities and the inescapable realities of Australia's strategic environment, the Government's decision appears to be
unwarranted. Indeed, in view of the importance of national resolve to a strategy of deterrence the decision appears downright imprudent.

As a result, the Australian people have been allowed to dwell on their own self-interest, and that self-interest has been pandered by the Government's social programmes. Australian society consequently appears to embody most of the qualities that Machiavelli fulminated against. If the Government's defence efforts are to be taken seriously, then it must adopt a socio-political strategy that will lead to a wider understanding of Australia's strategic responsibilities. Only through an active educative programme will the national consensus on defence that is essential to a successful strategy of deterrence be possible. Moreover, because Australia's security will continue to necessitate military deployments throughout her region, the proposed socio-political strategy must have as an associated objective the elimination of the racial prejudice that has marred her relationships with her Asiatic neighbours in the past.

Also essential to the assumption by Australia of her regional strategic responsibilities will be the remedying of the social cleavages that have resulted from the post-World War II immigration "boom" and the sectionalism that has resulted from the remoteness of many centres of population from each other. Alleviation of these problems will undoubtedly require an emphasis by the Federal Government on nationalism and a corresponding deemphasis by the Australian States of their parochial statist ideologies. The inculcation of a greater sense of nationalism would nevertheless have to be undertaken carefully: the myth of the natural soldier and the rapid spread of the "ocker" image indicate that nationalism can very quickly take on quite absurd—and, therefore, debilitating—metamorphoses amongst, at least some sections of, the Australian people.

* "Ocker-ism" was an extraordinary caricature of the beerswilling, uncouth Australian male that was given wide appeal by comedian Paul Hogan in the 1970s.
Because of the considerable sensitivity that clearly exists amongst Australia's neighbours—and which her past insensitive immigration and trade policies have exacerbated—the adoption of a more nationalistic domestic stance would have to be accompanied by a political strategy of active diplomacy. Also relevant as a target for diplomacy would be Australia's seeking to take a more hegemonistic role in regional security affairs. The post-colonial sensibilities of many of the regional States would require particular attention if Australia's role were not to be misunderstood. In this regard, her past performance indicates that this may be a more demanding responsibility than it should be. At the root of this problem appears to be an ingrained arrogance which manifests only too readily in Australia's dealings with other States in her region.

If the preceding socio-political strategies require adeptness, then the economo-industrial strategies that will be essential to compensating for Australia's economic and infrastructural vulnerabilities will require even more skill. Clearly, neither Australia's limited revenue base nor her poor transportation infrastructure can be ameliorated quickly. Moreover, the remedying of both vulnerabilities is closely interrelated: the development of Australia's transportation infrastructure will require the commitment of scarce revenue. Even if private enterprise and investment capital can be attracted to help fund the development, taxation concessions will undoubtedly also be essential. In either case, therefore, the revenue base will be affected which will impact on other social programmes. As Maxwell Taylor opined, strategy has too often become a byproduct of the budgetary process; but, within a democracy, any other situation is improbable unless a clear threat is perceived.

Consequently, an economo-industrial strategy that will enable the long-term development of a transportation infrastructure which will better meet Australia's defence logistics support requirements will necessitate, first, a holistic approach across a number of governmental bureaucracies and, second, the support
of the people. Once again, the crucial importance of a socio-political strategy that will educate the Australian people in their country's strategic realities is clear.

Having developed a strategy framework that is based upon Australia's strategic imperatives, the broad force structure characteristics that flow from them may be addressed. This examination is undertaken in the next section of this chapter.

**Force Structure Characteristics**

With such a low defence resource-to-area ratio, it is not surprising that Australia's physical environment should be overwhelmingly the determinant of the general characteristics of the Australian Defence Force. The general structural characteristics are, in turn, determined largely by the suite of strategies that have been selected. To date, official and informed-lay comment has, however, been directed at specific items or types of equipment. This approach is not appropriate to the abstract approach that has been adopted in this report. Accordingly, this section will look for guidance to the broad force structure characteristics that are predicated upon Australia's physical environment and the preceding framework of strategies.

Because of the vastness of her continent and long over-water transits to all of her island territories and to all of her regional neighbours, range is unquestionably the force characteristic that must predominate all equipment acquisition considerations. Concomitantly, the remoteness of her resource zones, territories and neighbours from the industrial support that is available in Australia's Main Support Areas necessitates that Defence Force elements require the minimum possible level of logistical support—that is to say, that they have a high level of inherent "sustainability". Allied to range and sustainability is the force characteristic of "persistence": the capacity of
a Defence Force element to remain on station as an effective operational unit.

For the equipment that is to be employed by the Australian Defence Force, these requirements translate into either simplicity or high Mean Times Between Failure (MTBF); high levels of portability which generally necessitate compactness and lightweight, ruggedness and insensitivity to climatic extremes; and minimal ancillary support equipment. With respect to manpower, these requirements necessitate high levels of fitness, resourcefulness, training and experience. For units, they necessitate autonomy, minimum administrative support, self-containment and self-sufficiency, light scales and high levels of transportability.

Because of the small size of the Australian Defence Force and the vastness and the remoteness of the regions in which it may have to operate, force elements and their equipment must be highly mobile and flexible, and possess high levels of organic firepower. Consonant with the distances and topography between her Main Support Areas and the regions to which Defence Force units may be deployed, mobility translates axiomatically into transportability by land, sea or air. These requirements once again necessitate compactness, ruggedness and minimal ancillary support items.

Flexibility will, of course, allow deployed units to undertake more than one role. Its achievement, nevertheless, requires high levels of inherent extensive capability within equipment items, and training for Defence Force personnel. High levels of firepower in each unit are also related to some extent to flexibility because there is implicit in that requirement the capacity to bring concentrated firepower to bear on a variety of targets.

In combination, the characteristics of range, mobility, flexibility, sustainability, persistence and firepower almost axiomatically necessitate recourse to high technology. Only high levels of structural and propulsion
technology can simultaneously confer the range, high MTBF, sustainability, persistence, ruggedness, strength and lightness in capital equipment. Only high levels of electronic technology can assure compactness, ruggedness, high tolerance to climatic extremes, lightness, flexibility and high MTBF in operations-support equipment. And only high levels of weapons technology can provide range, flexibility and firepower in the munitions that are used by the Defence Force. Fortunately, Australia's general level of education and technological awareness permit the ready incorporation of high technology into the Services. Moreover, despite the existence of some significant cost liabilities, Australian industry generally has the capability to support high technology acquisitions by the Defence Force.

Finally, to support small, widely dispersed units a flexible, high capability, long range, secure command, control and communications (C^3) system is required. Because of the sensitivity of contemporary democracies to international approbrium, the activities of remote units with high levels of firepower will—of necessity, from the Government's viewpoint—require close control. In time of conflict, this problem would be exacerbated by the very high rates of expenditure of national defence resources that are recognized as being probable. Once an appropriate C^3 system has been developed, however, it introduces the risk that the scene-of-action commander may lose some of his command autonomy. This indicates that some reassessment of command and control doctrine may be necessary.

With respect to the general force structure characteristics that are necessary, the national strategy of deterrence through manifest capability requires that the quantity and quality of the equipment and manpower within, and the cohesiveness of, the Australian Defence Force be such that its capacity to prosecute effective military operations is clear. Because defence resources
will inevitably be quantitatively inadequate, once again the importance of high technology as a force-multiplier is emphasized. By having in service high capability defence equipment manned by skilled and well-educated personnel, qualitative advantages may be used to offset quantitative disadvantages.

In particular, high technology must be employed that will enable long-range operations, provide surveillance of large areas, permit day and night and all-weather identification of intruders, and confer very high kill probabilities on single-shot weapons release. While "Jindalee" will provide a very substantial surveillance capability of Australia's northern approaches, intercepting aircraft, ships or army patrols are necessary to provide for the interception, identification, and apprehension, neutralization or destruction of the intruder. Because of the distances between the current defence facilities in Perth, Darwin and Townsville-Cairns, additional defence facilities must be built and manned between these bases so that reaction times are reduced to less than the warning time provided by "Jindalee".

Moreover, because "Jindalee" does not possess an accurate intercept control capability, it must be supported by an early warning and control system that has the capacity to detect targets in the air and on the surfaces of the sea and the land. In conjunction with Australia's distances, this requirement suggests the need for an airborne radar system which has high volumetric capacity and a moving target detection system, and is supplemented by infrared linescan. The possession of such a capability is, in itself, a combat power multiplier because it enables the timely despatch and precise control of intercepting forces. These advantages, once again, reduce the quantitative requirements that are inherent in Australia's physical environment.

Although the range and area problems that are inherent in air and sea control strategies are demanding, these problems become truly formidable in
the implementation of a land control strategy. The extreme inhospitability of the terrain and climate across the north of Australia further exacerbate this problem. Accordingly, small, autonomous, highly mobile units are essential to an effective land control strategy. Moreover, because of the diversity of terrain in the north, training under desert and tropical-jungle conditions is also essential.

Needless-to-say, familiarity with small-unit operations—especially in jungle terrain, coastal waters and tropical air masses—is particularly relevant to the forces of most of Australia's neighbours. Her development of expertise in this aspect of military doctrine would therefore be a very useful adjunct to her defence cooperation strategy. Moreover, the education and training of Defence Force personnel to operate high technology equipment will concomitantly ensure that high levels of education are provided by Australian Service institutions. Fortunately, there is also considerable excess capacity available in the Defence Force's schools because, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, each of the Services invested heavily in its training institutions to accommodate the expansion programme which the Government of the day appeared to be prepared to authorize. Consequently, Australia is well placed to implement a more extensive defence-cooperation, training programme.

With respect to an air and sea control strategy, while the Royal Australian Navy is used to autonomous operations by single fleet or other units, the Royal Australian Air Force is not. Accordingly, the need for a rather radical reappraisal of RAAF air doctrine is indicated. Foremost amongst the doctrinal development that appears necessary is the RAAF’s concept of fighter operations. The change from a point air defence fighter (Mirage III) to a multirole, continental-capable fighter (F/A18A) epitomizes this need.
While Australian Defence Force elements were to be attached as expeditionary contributions to the forces of a large and powerful ally, separate command and control organizations along single-Service lines were satisfactory. However, with the advent of the Nixon Doctrine, the traditional command and control system became outmoded. The adoption of military strategies of sovereignty and regional control, and the assumption by Australia of a more positive leadership role in her region would make the existing traditional command and control doctrine even more completely inadequate. To ensure that combat elements from the three Australian Services are functionally coordinated, unity of command is essential. Similarly, the coordination of coalition forces necessitates unity of command. Accordingly, the replacement of the existing single-Service command and control organizations by systems that are organized along functional lines is believed necessary. An additional psychological advantage within a strategy of deterrence through manifest capability is also inherent in the image of enhanced cohesiveness and effectiveness that is a concomitant of this reorganization.

Envisaged under the new arrangements are three new operational commands: a Maritime Command, a Continental Command and a Theatre Command. The Maritime Commander would have assigned under operational command all naval and air assets that are essential to the defence of Australia's maritime areas of responsibility. The Continental Commander would similarly command all land and air elements that are required for the defence of the sovereign territories of Australia. While the Theatre Commander would command Defence Force elements deployed from Australia throughout the region, his Headquarters would be staffed by personnel from all countries that contributed forces to the collective defence of the region. As is currently the case, single Service Chiefs of Staff would retain responsibility for the raising and training of
operational forces for the three operational commands. The Chief of the Defence Force would exercise his command through the single-Service Chiefs and the Operational Commanders.

Finally, a great deal of commonality is perceived as existing between the force structure characteristics that are predicated by strategies of sovereignty control and regional control through forward deployment. Small unit operations are again emphasized in peacetime as is a command and control system that has a high level of capability to coordinate the operations of widely dispersed units. Increased emphasis must, however, be placed upon the development of combined strategic and tactical doctrine, upon ensuring the compatibility of communications equipment, and upon the collective gathering and employment of intelligence. Because of Australia's existing intelligence forces arrangements and the evident reluctance of some ASEAN to release information on their own operational activities the latter issue may represent a significant problem.

If Australia is to develop a regional collective defence partnership that can transfer readily from peacetime to wartime—and this an essential element in the projection of a credible deterrence—then each of the preceding issues must be addressed. To do so effectively will necessitate making full use of the time that is currently available.

Summary

In summary, then, the formulation of a suite of coherent strategies and the determination of the associated force structure characteristics does not necessitate the identification of a threat, but may be conducted from first principles. Within the ambit of a national strategy of deterrence through manifest capability a suite of military sub-strategies that include forward defence by deployment, continental and regional control, military training of
and cooperation with regional forces, and the acquisition of high technology are indicated. These military strategies must be complemented by a psychosocial strategy of societal support and cohesion enhancement, by a coherent diplomatic strategy, and by an economo-industrial strategy of infrastructure development.

The implementation of the preceding military strategies, in turn, necessitates force structures that encompass the maximum possible levels of mobility, flexibility, sustainability, persistence and firepower. With forces which possess these characteristics, Australia will be able to meet the imperatives of her geography, history and politics. Because these strategies and force structure characteristics are predicated upon fundamental considerations, they will confer a manifest capability to prosecute combat operations continentally or regionally should the need arise.

If Australia is to exercise the political influence in world affairs that she has traditionally desired, then she must also take the lead in fostering the development of a coherent security posture by her regional neighbours. But, achievement of this objective will require that Australia first get her own strategic "house in order". The suite of military and military-support-related strategies that flow from a national strategy of deterrence through manifest capability offers an appropriate focus for both the coherent development of the Australian Defence Force and Australia's adoption of a more influential role in the world order.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

We must develop a more comprehensive approach to defence strategy, taking into account not only the military requirements, but also the civil, economic political and psychological defence aspects which are vital to a sustained resistance capacity.

O'Neill

The discussion in the preceding chapters of this report has indicated that Australia remains at the strategic crossroad which first balked her progress as early as the late 1960s. Although the Australian Government has from time to time articulated pragmatic national security policies it has failed to develop them into a coherent framework. At the heart of this failure have been the strategic advantages that are explicit in Australia's geographic remoteness and the political uncertainty that followed the severing of strategic guardianship by Britain and the United States. Domestic political and economic factors have also been overwhelmingly influential. In combination, these factors led to the declaration of a defence-of-Australia doctrine and a defence objective of self-sufficiency. These policies proved to be meaningless constructs. Although they provided a useful focus for the Governments' rhetoric and allowed budgetary priority to be placed on more electorally rewarding social programmes, they also antagonized defence pundits because of the failure of successive Governments to develop the Australian Defence Force in accordance with the resulting imperatives and assuaged public concern over defence matters to the point of apathy.

Of course, a reorientation of Australia's social priorities in periods when no threat is apparent is consistent with the historical budgetary patterns
of almost all other Western democracies this century. Clearly, her limited revenue base and the high level of expectation amongst her electorate that health, welfare and education will receive budgetary priority will continue to obviate substantial defence expenditures when no credible defence contingency is apparent. These domestic political and economic realities thus represent a significant limitation on her foreign and defence policies.

Despite this limitation, Australia has nevertheless expressed, and demonstrated repeatedly, a desire to be influential in international affairs. But to be influential requires that she meet the strategic expectations that are held by the United States, her other collective security treaty partners and the neighbours with whom she shares less formalized security interests. Traditionally, Australia has readily accepted her security responsibilities when a direct or indirect threat to her interests was perceived. On the evidence of recent history, this preparedness has not been relinquished.

However, when no threat has been perceived difficulties have emerged. Before strategic guardianship was severed, when no threat was apparent Australia was able to reorient her Budget but maintain a purposeful rhetoric on defence under the shield of her great and powerful friends. From the mid-1970s, however, her Governments have perceived that persevering with this strategic policy would no longer be possible. Either full acceptance of the responsibilities that were associated with their desire for international influence or withdrawal to a neo-isolationist, continental defence strategy were clearly the alternatives that they faced. Although their declaratory policy was to withdraw behind a defence-of-Australia doctrine; they found that, in practice, withdrawal was not possible.

The reality was that military power remained the major arbiter in the international political system. Consequently, a disconnect emerged between
Australia's political ends and strategic means, between her declared national security policy and the policy that she was actually implementing. This situation is still extant today.

More recently, Australia's inability to withdraw to her continent has become even more difficult. Specifically, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan necessitated an increased military commitment in the North West Indian Ocean; and, although it became militarily and financially impossible for her to maintain a permanent presence in Malaysia with the forthcoming entry into service of the F/A-18A, Australia was enjoined by the pressures in her political environment to announce a permanent deployment schedule after her Mirage squadrons had been withdrawn. With this latter announcement and the decision to station a permanent naval presence at Cockburn Sound, the Australian Government has, at last, started to undertake a process of strategic-policy maturation. The public declaration and implementation of a coherent national security policy which reflects Australia's strategic realities will mark the completion of that process.

Most significantly, the formulation of pertinent national strategy and the derivation of force structure characteristics which must accompany the maturation process do not depend on the perception of a threat. Through an analysis of basic strategic principles and an examination of Australia's strategic environment, certain compelling features can be identified that provide the requisite guidance. The defence policy confusion of the past decade could therefore have been avoided.

Indeed, Australia's strategic environment virtually compels its own solutions. Accordingly, the strategic imperatives that are explicit in her geography are, in turn, modified by the influences in her psychosocial and political environments. If reduced to the barest abstraction, Australia's
geography would predicate solely a continental defence strategy and an associated policy of minimal defence expenditure. The strategic realities conferred by Australia's geography are that her remoteness, topography and climate, in combination, imply a high level of natural impregnability to all but the most capable of adversaries. Alternatively, raids could be made with little strategic warning by virtually any regional power—but the question must be asked: for what purpose? Such reservations notwithstanding, the latter level of theoretical threat prudently shapes the minimum strategy and force structure characteristics that are necessary when no credible threat is apparent.

This geographically-derived minimum level of defence effort would, however, be adequate only if Australia were to adopt a foreign policy of isolationism. Although psychosocially attractive to Australians, for political reasons isolationism is not a policy option for Australia. As a declared member of the Western coalition of democratic States and as a middle power which seeks to influence international events, Australia cannot isolate herself from the international system. The relevance of her other elements of national power notwithstanding, Australia's possession of an appropriately higher level of military power is therefore essential. This verity is akin, however, to asking: how long is a piece of string? There is no direct correlation between the possession of military power and the level of influence obtained. Thus, while the absolute minimum level of force can be determined some other measure of the requisite force level must be devised.

A deduction from basic strategic philosophy suggests a resolution: this concept has been termed manifest capability. By demonstrating the capacity to influence events, a State's military and other pertinent capabilities become manifest. But a concomitant of this abstraction is that if Australia's strategic objective is—as she has declared it to be—to ensure her own security
by taking steps to preserve the stability of her neighbours, then the concept of manifest capability requires that she demonstrate her capacity to, *inter alia*, preserve their security. This, in turn, necessitates a defence involvement in the region. By similar logic, the more widely Australia wishes to influence international politics, the more widely she must be able to demonstrate a manifest capability.

Clearly, a corollary of the preceding discussion is that a military strategy of sovereignty defence is not an appropriate adjunct to a strategic objective of regional security. In the context of Australia's strategic environment, the antithesis of continental defence is forward defence. The traditional notion of forward defence has, however, involved the permanent overseas stationing of forces. For a variety of psychosocial, political and economic reasons this is no longer practicable for Australia. A policy of regular deployments of forces has already been announced and is the best available alternative to a permanent presence.

Nevertheless, even a regular deployment programme will not of itself demonstrate manifest capability—although, clearly, the ability of the Defence Force to deploy to any point in Australia's region is an essential ingredient of a manifest capability. Accordingly, a high level of operational competence is also necessary. Here Australia is fortunate that her Defence Force already has a reputation for being a small but highly professional organization with the manifest capability to introduce and operate military equipment that is at the forefront of technology. Through this ability, Australia also reaps the advantages of force multiplication that are inherent in advanced weapons systems technology. Synergistically, a further enhancement of manifest capability is also gained through a materiel procurement strategy that concentrates on high technology.

Needless-to-say, the Australian Government and people would prefer not to
have to put Australia's manifest capability to test in combat. Consequently, because Australia's basic national interest is in survival as a free and democratic country, within the constraints of her national ideals and her wish to preserve the stability of her region, the strategy that will best ensure her security—irrespective of the presence or absence of a threat—is deterrence. Accordingly, Australia must marshal her national power behind a national strategy of manifest capability to deter any potential, yet unidentified, threat to her regional or continental security.

Unfortunately, in Australia's case, many of the elements of her national power are a source of strategic vulnerability, as well as being a constraint on a national strategy of deterrence. Therefore, to ensure the credibility of her deterrence, Australia must correct as many of her weaknesses as possible and capitalize on her national strengths to compensate for the remaining vulnerabilities. The coordination of her military and military-support-related strategies under an overarching national strategy thus provides a coherent focus for the measures adopted in compensation for her strategic vulnerabilities.

One such measure is the utilization of the strategic concept of control in the defence of Australia. This simultaneously takes advantage of the inherent flexibility in and demonstrates manifest capability, whilst embodying a strategy of deterrence. Clearly, the absolute control of Australia's sovereign sea, air and land spaces would require quantitative force levels that would be well beyond her financial capacity. Consequently, something less than total control will, in practice, have to be accepted. The flexibility and psychological thrust of manifest capability become an advantage in this respect.

The objective of a strategy of continental control must perforce be to ensure that the perception is created in the mind of any potential aggressor that there is a significant level of probability that any attempt to flout Australia's control of her territorial spaces would not be successful. The
objective of the strategy of continental control must therefore be to demonstrate to an appropriate level of probability the capability to control entry to, and operations within, Australia's sea, air and land spaces. Concomitants of a strategy of control are the operational strategies of detection, interception, identification and, if necessary, offensive action.

By demonstrating effective control of her sovereignty and by also deploying regularly and effectively throughout the region, Australia's strategies of deterrence and control may be extended to assist the defence efforts of her neighbours. There are, nevertheless, several associated caveats that must be imposed upon this proposition. Foremost amongst these is the necessity that Australia's defence efforts must be contributory to the West's global security objectives. Also crucial are the requirements that Australia must not overextend herself, and that regional States must not become overdependent upon her. The probability that either of these risks may eventuate is considered, in reality, to be low. First, Australia's revenue base will always represent a substantial constraint on what she may attempt to achieve. Indeed, the more likely danger is that because of budget constraints, the appropriations for operating costs may prevent an adequate level of operational activity. And second, by eschewing a permanent defence presence throughout her region, Australia will simultaneously reduce the likelihood of overdependence and gain the psychological benefits that accrue from not always being there, but being there when required. A further advantage of a forward defence by deployment strategy is that, with respect to the ongoing post-colonial sensitivities throughout her region, Australia would implicitly avoid projecting an image of either attempting to force her presence on her neighbours or of overstaying her welcome.

Another way in which Australia can minimize any tendency for the States within her region to become overdependent upon her is for her to take measures
that will increase their own levels of self-sufficiency for defence. In this regard, she is well placed. Her Service schools of technical and professional education and training have significant latent capacity, and the levels of education and training that they offer are very high. Moreover, by educating and training regional military personnel in Australian Defence Force institutions, an understanding of Australia’s military philosophies and societal perceptions may be subtly introduced with potential benefits for her image within her region. Once again, to obviate the emergence of a long-term dependency, the thrust of this education and training strategy must be moved as quickly as possible after initial capabilities have been assured to the education and training of instructors. Not only will the self-reliance of the regional States be bolstered in this way, but so too will their self-confidence in their abilities to take effective measures in their own defence.

The adoption of strategies of deterrence, forward defence through deployment and continental control will not, however, be effective unless they are accompanied by the support of, at least, the majority of Australian society. Because deterrence, control and manifest capability rely for effectiveness as much on psychological as on physical factors, the possession of clear military power must be accompanied by an unequivocal societal resolve to employ that power in the interests of both national and regional security. A decisive statement by the Australian Government of Australia’s responsibility as—along with New Zealand—the regional bulwark within the Western coalition of democratic States, and the clear articulation of supportive Australian military strategies are essential to the acceptance by the Australian people of this responsibility. Supporting this socio-political strategy must also be complementary measures that alleviate the many schisms within Australian society while, at the same time, avoiding the generation of excessive nationalism.
With respect to an economo-industrial strategy, the development of a logistics support infrastructure between the Main Support Areas and Australia's resource zones cannot be accomplished in the short term and will be very expensive even in the long term. Nevertheless, as well as the strategic requirements for a well-developed transport infrastructure, there are also economic and societal reasons for its development. Consequently, the Government must work with industry in planning the progressive extension of Australia's sea, air and land infrastructure—especially across the more remote areas of the continent. In this regard, the encouragement of private enterprise will undoubtedly necessitate financial incentives and will, thus, affect the Australian Government's revenue base. These consequences will therefore predicate an holistic approach across the range of social programmes.

Finally, the preceding sub-strategies must also be accompanied by a strategy of coherent diplomacy. The nub of this issue is that Australia's security efforts must contribute to regional stability, not precipitate instability through misperception of her intentions. Consequently, Australia's regional defence efforts must enhance the region's economic growth and prosperity, increase cooperation and consultation within the region, and create greater confidence in and cohesion between her neighbouring States. The image which Australia must project to her neighbours is of a stable, reliable stalwart on whom they may depend when the need arises and who, at other times, has their development and self-confidence as a primary interest. Furthermore, any tendency within Australian society towards excessive nationalism must be carefully explained so that it does not cause alarm amongst Australia's neighbours. This will require sensitive, active and sustained diplomacy to ensure that unambiguous signals about Australia's objectives are transmitted, received and understood.
To enable implementation of the preceding suite of strategies, appropriate force structure characteristics must also be developed. Australia's geographic imperatives overwhelming influence the requisite characteristics. In this regard, to make optimum use of the strategic and tactical warning time that is conferred by her geographic location, a highly capable intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance system is mandatory. Only by detecting the emergence of a threat at the earliest time or at the maximum distance from her shores, may the vulnerability that is inherent in a quantitatively small Australian Defence Force be offset.

For the foreseeable future, Australia will not, of course, be able to afford her own satellite reconnaissance system. She will, therefore, continue to rely upon access to intelligence gleaned from US satellite reconnaissance to provide for her precise strategic warning requirements. This dependency, in turn, necessitates an ongoing responsiveness by Australia to US strategic expectations. The commitment of Australian forces in defence of broad Western security interests and the ongoing release of Commonwealth land for US strategic facilities exemplify this quid pro quo.

Australia is fortunate to have almost operational a scanning, over-the-horizon, HF radar ("Jindalee") to provide 24-hour, all-weather, long range tactical warning over the north-west to north-east sector to a distance of more than 1500km from the coast. When operational, this system will provide early warning of all surface and air movements within its scan and will also provide a crude intercept control capability. To maximize the probability of detection, interception and identification, an airborne early warning and control capability is, however, also necessary. These capabilities must, in turn, be supported by appropriate sea, air and land interceptors. Because Jindalee's HF transmitter-receiver is tunable, provided its supporting forces are HF radio equipped, command and control of widely dispersed forces
is not the problem it otherwise may be.

The implementation of a strategy of control also necessitates the building of additional defence facilities in the north and north-west of Australia between the existing defence facilities. Not only must these facilities be provided, but appropriate sea, land and air forces must also be based there; however, these forces need not be based there permanently. The level of presence will depend on judgements about the level of probability of control that is required at the time and the duration of the warning and response times available. In general, though, the longer the response time or the higher the desired level of probability of control, the greater must be the level of permanence of the presence.

Further relevant to the preceding calculus are the levels of mobility, sustainability, persistence, flexibility and firepower possessed by each combat element. Because of the distances involved in the strategic defence of Australia, the lower the levels of any of these characteristics, the more unlikely it is that forces of the required potency can be positioned to effect a strategy of control. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that substantive improvements to the extant minimal logistics support infrastructure will not be possible in the short term. Accordingly, force structures, technology, training and operational doctrine should be amalgamated so that each of the preceding characteristics are maximized.

Concomitantly, if all of the preceding characteristics are maximized then the capacity of the Australian Defence Force to deploy and operate effectively throughout her region is axiomatically maximized. Nevertheless, some additional requirements become germane when operations with other forces are contemplated. Foremost amongst these are appropriate levels of complementarity or commonality in equipment, command and control procedures,
operational doctrine and tactics. The most influential determinant in whether complementarity or commonality is required is a decision about whether regional forces are to be coordinated or integrated. More specifically, the higher the desired level of integration, the greater must be the level of commonality.

Because a high degree of commonality requires a high level of trust and the suppression of nationalistic sensitivities, only complementarity will be possible over the early years. However, as experience is gained through Australia's ongoing deployment commitment, through combined exercising, and through a broad military education and training programme, a progressive transition from complementarity to the desired level of commonality may be undertaken. The success of this transition will nevertheless depend very much on a range of military and non-military measures. Active diplomacy will again be necessary and will have to be supported by sensitive military-to-military negotiations to ensure that the intentions of the transition are clearly understood by all parties. A high level of coordination between Australia's own bureaucracies will also be essential.

Comparison of the preceding force structure characteristics with those that would be required in a defence contingency on Australian territory or overseas, shows that they are largely synonymous. The ability to move quickly, to bring firepower to bear, to support combat operations, to exercise command and control over geographically dispersed combat elements, and to participate effectively in coalition warfare are prerequisites for the military forces of a Western democracy that is on a war footing. An Australian Defence Force that has been developed from first principles is, therefore, capable of transition to a war footing should a threat emerge.

To all of the preceding deductions must, however, be added the proviso that some compromises will inevitably be necessary during the conversion of
force characteristic abstractions into actual force elements. Care will, therefore, be required to ensure that the ability to implement a strategy is not prejudiced when a compromise becomes necessary. The link between strategy and force structure is not infinitely elastic!

In conclusion, then, Australia is fortunate that her strategic environment confers time. But her current strategic logic is based on an invalid premise. The time that she has available is most probably not the warning time associated with a conventional invasion of Australia. Because of the strategic traditions that are evident in Australia's history, her interests in the status quo as a member of the Western democratic coalition, and the commitments that continue to be expressed by her Governments, there is a high probability that she would deploy the Australian Defence Force overseas to honour her collective security obligations. She may therefore have less time than she is bargaining on. What time she does have must therefore be used to maximum advantage.

To ensure Australia's own security, her national security policy must be a regional analogy to the Nixon Doctrine: while accepting a leadership role for the regional defence, she must, as actively as she can, encourage her neighbours to develop their own defence capabilities. By taking steps that will advance regional security, she will minimize the probability that armed conflict will arise. By ensuring that regional defence forces are as well prepared as possible to provide for their own defence, she will ensure that, should they request her assistance, the Australian Defence Force would enter the conflict on the most favourable strategic terms.

Nevertheless, the fact must be accepted that these are policies for the "long haul". In the meantime, Australia must embrace the realities that have, until now, been largely the subject of political rhetoric. Her
Government must not only acknowledge that, as the resident regional power, she has unavoidable responsibilities but must also translate them into a regional security objective and ensure public support for its attainment. Only by such measures will she be able to exercise the influence in international affairs that has been her traditional desire. Only by such measures will she ensure the strategic support of her major alliance partner that her traditional sense of insecurity necessitates. Time is on her side, but that fact cannot be used as an excuse for inaction.

It is clearly not future decisions that are of concern, but the future of present decisions!
1. In Australia's Foreign Policy (Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1968, p126), T.B. Millar said of Australia's reliance upon, and commitment of forces to, alliances with the great Powers: "Australia is taking out an insurance premium, putting a deposit in a bank from which it may later wish to borrow...It is also buying, by present payments, a present and future deterrent." In a speech to the Royal United Institution of the Australian Capital Territory on 7 March 1984 the Minister for Defence said metaphorically: "we must plan a measure of insurance to cover the risks of an uncertain future".


3. In Australian Defence it is noted that "Australia must...acknowledge that Britain can no longer be expected to accept significant military involvement in areas of concern to Australia east of Suez." See p1.

4. Since first expressed in August 1969 on Guam, the doctrine was elaborated upon by President Nixon in his US Foreign Policy for the 1970s, 25 February 1971, pp12-14.

5. Reflecting the consequences of the Nixon Doctrine, Australian Defence notes that: "There must be large questions about the circumstances that could move the US Administration and Congress to agree to become militarily involved in (South-East Asia) again, particularly with ground forces"; op cit, p1.

6. The "defence-of-Australia" concept can be traced to the 1968-69 period: see D.E. Kennedy, "The Administration of Defence"; in H.G. Gelber (ed) Problems of Australian Defence (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1970, p284). Kennedy opines that in this period the previously rigorous strategic assessments became less stridently anti-Communist as a mark of realization of the changing strategic environment. Subsequently, in the major policy speech by the (then) Minister for Defence, Mr L.H. Barnard, on 23 April 1975 "a new emphasis on securing our island continent" was announced: see Australian Foreign Affairs Record, April 1975, Vol 46, No 4, p195. The concept was even more clearly articulated as a general strategy in the November 1976 White Paper, Australian Defence--see in particular Chapter 3.

7. The policy of "self-sufficiency" has been espoused by successive Ministers for Defence. See Barnard, op cit, pp189-197, especially p196; Australian Defence, pp10-11; and more recently the text of the presentation by the Minister for Defence, Mr G.J. Scholes, to the Royal United Service Institution in Canberra on 9 March 1984, p11.

8. Desmond J. Ball, The Future of Tactical Air Power in the Defence of Australia (ANU Press, Canberra, 1977), p2. See also D.J. Ball and Ross E. Babbage, "The Australian Aircraft Industry: A Defence Point of View" The Australian Quarterly, June 1975. Notable amongst the few attempts to remedy the ongoing situation have been the 48th Annual Summer Science School on Australia's Defence conducted by the Extension Service of the University
of Western Australia in January 1976; and the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Conferences on the Defence of Australia, The Future of Tactical Air Power in the Defence of Australia, The Spread of Weapons in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and International Security in the Southeast Asian and Southwest Pacific Region, held at the Australian National University on 28-29 October 1976, 25-26 November 1976, July 1977 and July 1982. The declining frequency of such activities may be deduced Alternatively to indicate the increasing frustration of the task or reducing interest, depending on one's view.

9. In his address to Parliament on 19 February 1980 the (then) Prime Minister noted that: "Whatever (the Soviet Union's) original motives, the consequences go far beyond the stabilization of a local situation and have global significance". As a result, he continued, "...the Government has decided that the new strategic circumstances call for a greater allocation of resources to our defences" (Defence Report 1980, AGPS, Canberra, 1980), p1-2. But within six months the perceived urgency of the situation had diminished. Thus, in his Budget Statement on 26 August 1980 the (then) Minister for Defence said: "...I must make it quite clear to the House that what we are doing is limited...We are improving our expansion base...we are not expanding the force in any substantial way..." (Defence Report 1981, AGPS, Canberra, 1981), p1.

10. See Barnard, op cit, p196; and Australian Defence, Introduction, para 1. Note that in accordance with contemporary practice, the term "national security" is used in its widest sense to include not only security from direct and indirect military threat or military pressure, but also strategic threat or pressure through economic, political, moral, diplomatic, psychological, or ethical means. John M. Collins in Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices, (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1973), p273 defines national security as: "The protection of a nation from all types of external aggression, espionage, hostile reconnaissance, sabotage, subversion, annoyance and other inimical influence." This definition is observed throughout this analysis.


14. Australian Defence, p10, para 3; and p12, para 24. Furthermore, during his delivery of the 1976 Roy Milne Lecture, Mr Fraser injected a fundamental note of caution for Australian defence preparations when he observed that "the Government believes that it is a serious distortion to see foreign and defence policy simply as a response to 'threat'." See AFAR, September 1976, Vol 47, No 9, p3.

15. Barnard, op cit, passim.

16. During his delivery of the Roy Milne Lecture in Sydney on 27 September 1976, the (then) Prime Minister Fraser noted that "a statement that there is 'no direct threat' to Australia does not mean that there are no foreseeable problems or dangers in our international environment. It simply means that there is no country foreseeably prepared to launch an assault on Australia.

18. See Defence Report 1980, p1; and Defence Report 1982-83, p2. The National Times, August 12-18, 1983, nevertheless printed what it claimed to be: "A shortened version of the text of the basic Defence Department planning document, 'Australian Strategic Assessment and Defence Policy Objectives'." The authenticity or otherwise of the excerpts was neither confirmed nor denied officially by the Government. If authentic, the document states in effect that there is no perceived major threat to Australia. This has, indeed, been the ongoing public position of successive governments since 1972. An excerpt does, however, acknowledge that: "Indonesia already has... capability for low-level politico-military harassment of Australia, including its maritime resources zone, off-shore territories including Cocos and Christmas Islands and lines of communication. This could present Australia with difficult defence problems." The National Times, August 12-18, 1983, p28.

19. Examples of pertinent criticisms follow: Dr Robert O'Neill contends that "we must develop a more comprehensive approach to defence strategy, taking into account not only the military requirements, but also the civil, economic, political and psychological defence aspects which are vital to a sustained resistance capacity." The Defence of Australia: Fundamental New Aspects (ANU Press, Canberra, 1977), p4. In The Bulletin, July 13, 1982; John Stackhouse ("Our Forces: Now and Future", pp72-74) notes that: "The objective of defending Australia is not disputed now in our community. But the implications of this policy still haven't been grasped." And in The Australian, 14 March 1984, Peter Young ("Investigators Fire Salvo at State of Armed Forces") reports that a group of recently retired senior service officers have likened "Australia's defences to the unpreparedness and mismanagement which nearly brought Britain to disaster in the 1930s."


21. See Desmond Ball and J.O. Langtry (eds), Problems of Mobilization in Defence of Australia (Phoenix Defence Publications, ACT, 1980). LCDR I.M. Speedy concludes in "The Trident of Neptune", Defence Force Journal, January/February 1978, pp7-16 that in conflicts since 1939 the average time from the first indications to the firing of the first shot has been 14·3 months, and that there is a 50 percent probability that the warning time will be less than 16 weeks.


23. "National Objectives: The fundamental aims, goals, or purposes of a nation toward which policies are directed and energies applied. These may be short-, mid-, or long-term in nature." Collins, op cit, p273.

This concept of strategy derivation first occurred to the author during his reading of J.D. Forbes' paper *Evaluating the Strength of a Nation* in 1976, and was further encouraged during readings of Dr. R.S. Cline's *World Power Assessment: A Calculus of Strategic Drift* (Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1975). A similar concept is held by Group Captain M.J. Lancaster, RAAF, who maintains that a nation's geography is the major determinant. In the May/June 1978 *Defence Force Journal*, Lieutenant Colonel J.S. Baker, RAE, articulates a similar concept in his article "The Requirement of National Strategy", when he says: "although national goals will be influenced by external circumstances, the primary determinants of strategy will be found in internal factors, influences and objectives." Baker, op cit, p12. It is also interesting to note that the Minister for Defence in an address to the Royal United Service Institution of the Australian Capital Territory on 7 March 1984 entitled "Defence Policy: Perspectives and Problems", categorized the factors that shape defence policy as being either internal or external to the nation. Amongst the external factors he included Australia's geographic location and treaty obligations, global crises, regional associations and potential vulnerabilities. Amongst the internal factors he discussed Australia's economy, society, demography, politics, environment and technology. Similarities will be recognized between these subdivisions and the logic pursued from first principles in this report.
NOTES ON CHAPTER II (Pages 6 - 17)


3. Machiavelli, *Discorsi*, Book 3, Chapter 31, quoted by Gilbert, *op cit*, p3. This view is antithetical to the then existing Italian philosophy which held that an "army could be raised only when a definite threat emerged, could be ordered out only for the purposes of a specific campaign and could be kept together only as long as the campaign lasted"; Gilbert, p5.

4. Clausewitz; quoted by Rothfels, *op cit*, p105. Clausewitz returned to this view many times, and when he developed it into its final and most elaborate form, he stated that: "War is nothing more than a continuation of political transactions intermingled with other means. We say intermingled with different means in order to state at the same time that these political transactions are not stopped by the war itself, but substantially continue, whatever the means applied may be." *On War*, Book VIII, Chapter VIB.

5. In Clausewitz' words: "The greater and more powerful the motives of war, the more it affects the whole existence of the nations concerned; the more violent the tension that precedes the war...so much the more purely military and less political will war appear to be." *Ibid*, p107. Of course, the corollary to this statement is that the less the preceding tensions and the lower the implications for national survival, the more political will be the conflict. The same will be true, the lower the capabilities of the defence forces involved.


7. Sun Tzu, *op cit*, p79.


9. "It is true that our correlations are not high or significant enough to show...beyond doubt, but they are high enough to discredit the notion that...a State which seeks peace lessens the likelihood of war by strengthening and improving its armed forces." Raoul Naroll, Vern L. Bullough, Freda Naroll. *Military Deterrence in History: A Pilot Cross-Historical Survey* (State University of New York Press, New York, 1974), p330. For details of Australia's reliance upon conventional deterrence see: D.J. Killen, "The Government's View", in Robert O'Neill and D.M. Horner (eds), *Australian Defence Policy for the 1980s*, (University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1982), p31; and the Statement by the Minister for Defence (Mr G. Scholes) to the House of Representatives, 3 November 1983, p3.


13. Collins notes that the credibility of deterrence is based upon psychological rather than physical restraint; _op cit_, p82. Cline likens deterrence to "a chessman which threatens every square on the board to which the opposition may move"; _op cit_, p8.

14. Cline quantifies this term by developing a "Perceived Power" formula, to the components of which he allocates weightings. His formula states:

\[ P_p = (C + E + M)^2 (S + W) \]

where \( P_p \) = perceived power,
\( C \) = critical mass (=population+territory),
\( E \) = economic capability,
\( M \) = military means,
\( S \) = strategic purpose,
\( W \) = will to pursue national strategy.

_op cit_, pp4 and 11.

15. The perspicacity of Liddell Hart's concept can be gauged from the following passage: "Grand strategy should both calculate and develop the economic resources and manpower of nations... Also the moral resources—for to develop the people's willing spirit is often as important as to possess the more concrete forms of power. (It) should regulate the distribution of power between the several services, and between the services and industry. Moreover... grand strategy... should take account of financial pressure, of commercial pressure, and not the least of ethical pressure, to weaken the opponent's will." _op cit_, p336.


17. Thermistocles said 2500 years ago: "he who commands the sea has command of everything."


23. "Strategy is the comprehensive direction of power; tactics is its immediate application." Dr. Herbert Rosinski; quoted by Eccles, *op cit*, p49.

24. "Strategy...is a plan to employ resources to attain objectives." Carney; quoted by Eccles, *ibid*, p49.


29. Despite the similarity between their analyses, each starts from a different premise. Forbes notes that power "depends not only on military forces but on many other factors-size of territory, nature of frontiers, size and quality of population, absence or presence of raw materials, productive plant, transportation facilities, economic and technological development, financial strength, ethnic homogeneity, social integration, political stability, ideology, morals, and national spirit." Forbes, *op cit*, p1. Cline, on the other hand, bases his work on what he terms "politectonics" which he coins to denote the Mackinder-based geographic foundations of his thesis. Cline, *op cit*, pp4 and 11. Collins defines "National Power" as: "The sum total of any nation's capabilities or potential derived from available political, economic, military, geographic, social, scientific and technological resources. Leadership and national will are the unifying factors." Collins, *op cit*, p273.


32. Forbes explains "choke points" as being: "Gateways to continents, islands at the foci of sea-lanes, and bottle-necks between oceans." *op cit*, p2. Collins defines "critical terrain" as: "A single geographic feature, natural or man-made, of great strategic importance, the seizure, retention, destruction, or control of which would afford a marked advantage to one or more countries or coalitions of countries." *op cit*, p266. He defines "core areas" to be: "A continental, regional, or national cluster of geographic features, natural or man-made, of great strategic importance politically, economically, militarily, and/or culturally, the seizure, retention, destruction, or control of which would afford a marked advantage to one or more countries or coalitions of countries." *op cit*, p265.


37. Mackinder, op cit.
38. Seversky, op cit, pp107-111.

40. In Politics Among Nations, Morgenthau draws attention to the "permanent and decisive influence" upon national power of national character. He assesses the national character of some nations as follows: "The elementary force and persistence of the Russians, the individual initiative and inventiveness of the Americans, the undogmatic common sense of the British, the discipline of the Germans." In assessing the effects of these characteristics, Morgenthau notes that "the German and Russian governments...have been able to embark upon foreign policies that the American and British governments would be incapable of pursuing." He therefore sees explicit strategic weaknesses in the national character of the Americans and the British—and by inference Australians—"Antimilitarism, aversion to standing armies and to compulsory military service are permanent traits of the American and British character." Morgenthau, op cit, p122, and 127-8.

41. Forbes, op cit, pp3-5.
42. Eccles, op cit, pvii.

44. Forbes, op cit, pp3-5.
45. Collins, op cit, p194.
46. Cline, op cit, p35.
47. ibid, p42.
49. Collins, op cit, p203.

50. Forbes says: "Differentials in the quality of aircraft, guns, tanks, naval vessels, explosives and electronic devices, and hundreds of other items determine to a large degree relative war potential." op cit, p8. Collins notes that "without superior science and technology, (the) battle could be lost." op cit, p203. Cline devotes two chapters (Chapters 5 and 6) to the relative military strengths of nations, throughout which runs a thread of relative levels of technology and the effect those disparities have on relative power.

51. Within Italy in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries, culture and scholarship had surged ahead of similar development in the other European countries. Concomitantly, while warfare had remained medieval in Switzerland, France and Spain it had become closely regulated by codes of chivalry in Italy. This military disparity was exacerbated further by Italy's limited adoption
of firearms and artillery—their having little place in the ritualistic warfare of the time. A conflict between principalities was frequently determined by battles between individual knights or in ritual combat between leaders. Consequently, lulled into smug indifference by her cultural advancement, and in social decline under the effects of irresistible internal influences, Italy was an easy conquest for successive invasions by her medieval neighbours. As Felix Gilbert remarked: "To their dismay, the Italians were forced to become onlookers as their country became the battlefield of Europe and the centre of attraction for all foreigners in search of military renown." Felix Gilbert, "Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War", Makers of Modern Strategy, Edward Mead Earl (ed), (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1943), p9.


53. See Gilbert, op cit, p15.

54. Clausewitz; quoted by Collins, op cit, p213.

55. Eccles, op cit, passim.


57. ibid, p9.


59. See Mao Tse Tung, Guerrilla Warfare, (translated by Samuel B. Griffith), (Praeger, New York, 1961): "its purpose is to destroy an existing society and its institutions, and to replace them with a completely new state structure"; p7. See also General Vo Nguyen Giap, People's Army, People's War (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Hanoi, 1961): "The conflict will occur not only in the military field but also in the political, economic and cultural fields".

60. Collins, op cit, p177.

61. ibid, passim.

62. By "complete weapons systems" Collins refers to the combination of delivery vehicle, weapons and system of command and control. To these should also be added the support infra-structure for each element. ibid, p181.

63. Collins uses the term 'staying power'. ibid, p182.

64. Eccles notes that: "Smaller but highly versatile armed forces drawn from well-educated and motivated people will have much higher combat efficiency and morale and will be a much smaller economic drain on a nation." Eccles, op cit, p228.


67. ibid, p282.

68. Dr R.J. O'Neill refers to this as the "most vulnerable area" concept. See The Defence of Australia: Fundamental New Aspects, p1.

69. Northedge speaks of "signalling" in these terms: "Failure to make clear to a hostile state the borderline between what you are prepared to tolerate and what you must resist may lead to a situation in which the opponent does not know what your 'point of no return' is, or whether you will allow yourself to be pushed to it or beyond it...a war which perhaps neither side wanted can come about through the failure of the signalling processes on either side." Northedge, op cit, p29.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER III (Pages 18-32)

1. By value, in financial year 1981-82, 28 percent of Australia's export transactions were with Japan, 9 percent with the ASEAN countries, 4 percent with the Republic of Korea, and 2.5 percent with the Peoples' Republic of China. In other words, some 44 percent of Australia's exports pass through the region. Source: Year Book Australia 1983, ABS, Canberra, 1983, Chapter 24.


3. See "Moscow builds for Asian War", Sydney Morning Herald, 10 March 84; "East-West: Moscow's Muscle Flexing", Time, April 16, 1984; "No danger in our backyard, but there are worries", Sydney Morning Herald, 15 May 84; and "The Kremlin's view: only Antarctica of less interest", Sydney Morning Herald, 16 May 84.


7. See Year Book Australia 1983, chapters 2 and 6.

8. ibid, p121.


10. ibid, p122.

11. See "Drought Incidence", ibid, Plate 26, p54.


14. See B.N. Primrose, "Insurance, Deterrence, Faith: The Search for an Integrated Concept of Defence", The Australian Journal of Defence Studies, Vol 1, No 1, March 1977, pp43-44. This archipelagic concept was expressed earlier by Brigadier F.W. Speed in "Australia's Defence Dilemma", Army Quarterly, January 1976, p94, in which he wrote: "The Australian continent is no island fortress impregnable because it is separated from other countries by hundreds of miles of sea. In truth it is an archipelago of settlements and resources, connected by great land distances and by the sea above its continental shelf."

16. loc cit.

17. Quoted in Howes, ibid, p13.

18. Year Book Australia 1983, pp528 and 541.

19. ibid, p515.

20. An indication of the nature of this problem can be gained from the data in Year Book Australia 1983. The table at page 528 shows for example that, of the 30 ports listed only 10 can handle container ships.

21. The deductions in this paragraph are the result of the author's personal observations during several visits and operational sorties over the north of Australia in the period 1965-79.


23. Papr, op cit, pp79 and 467.

24. Presentation by the Minister for Defence, Mr. G.G. Scholes, to the Royal United Service Institution of the Australian Capital Territory, Canberra, on 7 March 1984, p2.


26. AFM 1-1, pp2-2 to 2-4. The characteristics of airpower listed in AFM 1-1 include speed, range and flexibility; the capabilities listed include responsiveness, mobility, survivability, presence, destructive firepower and observation.
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV (Pages 33-59)

1. The application of scientific principles to social science research requires that for valid conclusions to be reached the probability that an event will be repeated should be high. To ensure that the external validity of the deductions which are drawn at the end of this chapter is high, a quite extensive review of the history of Australia's foreign and defence policy is therefore attempted. Refer to Louise H. Kidder, Research Methods in Social Relations (Mct, Rinehart and Winston, New York, Fourth Edition, 1980) for detail on the principles of social science research used in this chapter.


4. loc cit.


6. ibid, p57.

7. "On 4 October 1913 a squadron of one battle cruiser, three light cruisers and three destroyers entered Sydney Harbour, to great public enthusiasm. The young nation had acquired some of the public symbols of nationhood, and some means to protect it, but only within an acknowledged imperial set of processes over which Australia and its fellow Dominions had no control and almost no influence." ibid, p71.


9. loc cit. It is interesting to speculate whether the profoundness of Australia's reaction to the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan may not have in some way been focused by this very early perception.


12. Millar, op cit, p62; Buxton, op cit, p199.


14. Quoted in Millar, op cit, p63.

16. ibid, p22.


20. See Millar, *op cit*, p64.

21. loc cit.


26. According to census, there were 10,000 Chinese in the colonies in 1855 and 42,000 in 1859. This gave a 1:12 ratio of Chinese to Europeans in the colonies; however, local concentrations on the goldfields were much higher. Underpinning the immediate perceptions was the knowledge that there were a further 300 million Chinese in China. David Wetherell, "The Nineteenth Century" in *Australia in the World*, p108.


32. Australia lost 7594 dead and 19500 wounded at Gallipoli. In France during the 1916 offensive in the Armentières sector Australia's Fifth Division suffered 5500 casualties between 1-4 July, the First Division suffered 5300 casualties between 23-27 July, the Second Division 6800 casualties between 28 July and 6 August and the Fifth Division 4600 casualties between 7-15 August. "The thirty acres around Pozières windmill were soaked with more Australian blood than any other piece of land, before or since, in the nation's history." Ian Turner; "1914-19", in Crowley, *History*, p332.

33. 25 April, the day on which Australian and New Zealand Corps soldiers went ashore at Gallipoli, is now celebrated as a national day.
34. Hughes, quoted by Millar, op cit, p75. In The Splendid Adventure. A Review of Empire Relationships Within and Without the Commonwealth of Britannic Nations (London: Ernest Benn, 1929), Hughes states (p76) that the Australian Government was informed that its troops have been despatched to Gallipoli but had not been consulted beforehand.


40. Horner however presents much evidence based upon research of recently released official documents that Churchill deliberately deceived Australia throughout the early war years. He also claims that Menzies' suspicions were aroused sufficiently for him to react harshly to Churchill's manipulations. Thus, on 1 December 1939 Menzies cabled the British Government that:

"We resent being told that shipping is already on its way for the purpose of collecting troops on January 2nd (1940)...It is the general feeling of Cabinet that there has been in this matter a quite perceptible disposition to treat Australia as a Colony..."

Menzies, quoted by Horner, op cit, p31.


42. Hasluck notes that from 1923 to 1929 the annual defence budgets had included $10 million for capital equipment and works, and $5 million for maintenance. Over the period 1933-37 the Government increased the Services' strength so that by 1936-37 the maintenance vote was $6 million. The 1937-38 total authorization for defence was $11.5 million—$3 million in excess of the previous financial year. In 1938 a revision was undertaken and the planned expenditure over the three years 1938-41 was increased to double the 1935-38 expenditure.

43. First decided upon by the British Government in 1921 as a refueling and repair point in the Far East for a battle fleet, the building of an "impregnable fortress" was agreed upon as being "essential" to Imperial defence at the Imperial Conference in 1923. The facility was opened officially on 14 February 1938. Within three years it was in Japanese hands. Millar, op cit, p85; Robertson, op cit, p434.

44. Quoted in Horner, op cit, p35.
45. These recommendations were contained in a British Chiefs of Staff Appreciation of the situation in the Far East, dated 31 July 1940. Ibid, p38.


47. Horner, op cit, p58.


51. Ibid, p152.

52. Ibid, pp204-223, passim.

53. Field Marshal Sir Thomas Blamey was from March 1942 simultaneously the Commander-in-Chief Australian Military Forces and Commander Allied Land Forces under General MacArthur.

54. Horner, op cit, p211.

55. William Manchester, American Caesar (Hutchison, Melbourne, 1978), p286.

56. Horner, op cit, p209.

57. Bolton, op cit, p468.


60. Kirby, op cit, p90. See also Louis Morton, "The Japanese Decision for War", United States Naval Institute Proceedings, No 80, December 1954, p1329.

61. Hasluck, op cit, p156.


63. These facilities have been the subject of much speculation and uninformed debate, especially by left-wing elements of the Labor Party. An excellent and authoritative account of their role and potential as nuclear targets is to be found in Desmond J. Ball, A Suitable Piece of Real Estate: American Installations in Australia (Hale and Iremonger, Sydney, 1980).

64. The basing rights for the B52 deployments was extended by the Australian Government in 1982 to include approval of low altitude navigation sorties over Queensland, the Northern Territory and Western Australia. See Sydney Morning Herald, 18 October 1982; and the West Australian, 23 November 1982.
65. As a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Fraser Ministry attempted to persuade the US Government to baseport USN vessels at HMAS Stirling in Western Australia. See the Prime Minister's speech to Parliament on 20 February 1980. The offer was not accepted but can be viewed as an ongoing attempt by Australian Governments to bind the United States more tightly to Australia's defence.


67. In a Statement in the House of Representatives on Foreign Affairs and Defence on 20 April 1955 the Prime Minister listed the following objectives:

"First, we must constantly seek for peace, provided that peace can be had with justice.

"Second, if we are to become involved in war, we must see to it that in such a war we have powerful and willing friends.

"Third, we must not only defend our rights but also the rights of others. This is the golden rule, and the golden rule operates both ways.

"Fourth, we must seek to raise living standards not only for ourselves but for all those other nations who are struggling towards a life that we have been privileged to enjoy for a long time.

"Fifth, we must live and let live, that is, we are not to interfere with the internal affairs of other people so long as they pursue the same principle."

There is clearly a little something for everybody in these objectives and they are most noteworthy for their caution. The pattern of earlier policy is therefore evident.


69. ibid, p31. (In late 1983, the strength of the Army had risen to about 33000 men but included less than 4000 infantry men. See Dennis Warner, "Australia's defence: the frightening facts" in "Features: The Defence Dilemma", Courier Mail, 7 November 1983).

70. ibid, pp209-10, and 250-2.

71. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (Signet, New York, 1969), p878.


75. Australia's commitment to Vietnam began in May 1962 with the despatch of 30 Army advisers and was increased in June 1964 to include a flight of C7A Caribou aircraft and additional advisers. See Millar, Australia, p215.

76. Speech by Rt Hon Sir Robert Menzies, KT, CH, QC, MP on Defence Review, Parliamentary Debates, 10 November, 1962.

77. loc cit.

78. Millar, Australia, p183.

79. Speech by The Hon Malcolm Fraser, MP on Defence, Parliamentary Debates, 10 March 1970.

80. Millar, ibid, p215.

81. ibid, p262.

82. Australia's Commitment in Vietnam, a paper prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and tabled in Parliament as directed by Prime Minister Whitlam on 13 May 1975; excerpted in Millar, ibid, pp215 and 262.

83. ibid, p215.

84. Figures provided by Department of Defence (Air Force Office), Canberra. See also "Defence 83", The Bulletin, July 12, 1983, pp56-86.

85. See Australian Defence, presented to Parliament by the Minister for Defence, the Hon D.J. Killen, November 1976, AGPS, Canberra, ACT, 1976.


88. loc cit.

89. Acheson, op cit, p878.


91. As Snow observed at the time: "With 1983 shaping as a record year for the Budget deficit, the Fraser Government is perilously close to being hoist on the petard of its own rhetoric." op cit. Indeed, the Budget deficit hit successive records in FY 1982-83 and FY 1983-84. Substantial budgetary cuts and the slowing of the recession enabled some predicted reduction in the deficit in FY 1984-85 to about $8.5% from about $9.6% the preceding year.


94. See the Statement by Mr G.G. Scholes, MP, Minister for Defence to Parliament, 3 November 1983.


96. Despite Prime Minister Hawke's very quick action to assure the US Administration about his Government's position and his subsequent very skillful measures to distance the parliamentary wing of the Labor Party from its extreme left-wing elements at the grassroots level, some problems have burst to the surface in the US-Australian relationship. Foremost, have been the US Administration's reactions to:

a. Foreign Minister Hayden's narrow interpretation of the ANZUS Treaty when he returned to Australia in July 1984 from meetings with Secretary of State Shultz over the Treaty (See the Financial Review, "US puts Hayden right on ANZUS", 2 August 1984);

and

b. the very clumsy way in which Defence Minister Scholes handled the berthing in drydock of the HMS Invincible when the ship's captain refused to allow the ship to be disarmed—thus sparking off speculation that it carried nuclear weapons (See The Canberra Times, "Invincible Fiasco", Wednesday, December 14, 1983, p2.).

97. Scholes, ibid. (See also the Defence Budget 1984-85, Parliamentary Debates, HR, 21 August 1984).

98. ibid.

99. ibid.

100. ibid.

101. The Canberra Times, 20 May 1984, noted that the HMAS Brisbane, a DDG, would leave Singapore for the North West Indian Ocean within the week marking the first RAN deployment to the area since mid-1983. The Destroyer Escort HMAS Stuart was, however, the first ship to be homeported in Western Australia on its arrival in early January 1984. HMAS Stuart was to be followed by a Fremantle-class patrol boat and eventually an Oberon-class submarine.


103. See the 1977 OECD comparative study of the personal taxation schemes in each OECD country.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER V (Pages 60-108)

1. Speech by the Minister for Defence, Mr G.G. Scholes, to the RUSI of the ACT, Canberra on 7 March 1984, p5.

2. germane to this observation are the strategic uncertainty that existed within Australia in the mid-1970s, the alacrity with which Australia seized upon the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as an opportunity for strategic refocusing and the pragmatic thrust of the assessments of the Hawke Ministry. Indeed, so strong was the Fraser Government’s reaction to Afghanistan that it created some alarm amongst defence critics. For example, in his "Editorial" Peter Young stated: "What is causing some concern now is that in the very proper moves to support the US, the Government might be reverting back (sic) to the client state attitudes of ten or more years ago. Giving away the way real gains made in building up an independence of defence effort". Pacific Defence Reporter, May 1980, Vol VI, No 11, p2.


4. ibid, p6.

5. loc cit.

6. ibid, p6.

7. ibid, p10

8. Text of Speech by the Minister for Defence to the RUSI of the ACT on 7 March 1984 entitled "Defence Policy: Perspectives and Problems" (Office of the Minister, WP File No 2275f/0252D), p3.

9. ibid, p4.


11. Details and discussion of each of these Treaties may be found in T.B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War (ANU Press, Canberra, 1978), Annex A.


13. See the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States (1 September 1954), Article IV.

14. In the text of a Ministerial statement tabled by the Honourable Andrew Peacock in the House of Representatives on 22 November 1979, the Minister for Foreign Affairs read a letter from the US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, which stated:

   I can assure you, on behalf of the United States Government, that any arms limitation agreement we reach with the USSR
on the Indian Ocean will not in any way qualify or derogate from the US commitment to Australia or limit our freedom to act in implementing our treaty commitments under the ANZUS Treaty.

The Minister then noted significantly that: "In this regard...a most successful combined ANZUS exercise was held in the Indian Ocean off the coast of Western Australia in late 1978". See "Statements--Indian Ocean Region", Australian Foreign Affairs Record, November 1979, p615. This is not the first time that ANZUS has been extended, moreover, for during the Confrontation with Indonesia the (then) Minister for External Affairs, Sir Garfield Barwick noted its extension to cover Borneo. See Millar, op cit, p244. The extension of ANZUS had, moreover, been recognized as having occurred as early as 1961-3. Thus, in his classic study The ANZUS Treaty Alliance (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1965), Professor J.G. Starke, QC, noted that:

During President Kennedy's Administration, 1961-63, the United States decided to upgrade ANZUS for reasons not merely related to security in the Pacific; for one thing, Australia and New Zealand assumed a new important place in America's global military and technological strategy. The establishment of the North-West Cape Communications Station must inevitably tend to transform ANZUS from an alliance that has been primarily defensive in relation to the Pacific area into one with a strong element of global deterrence, and with direct pertinence to the Indian Ocean, as well as to the Pacific.


17. Australian Foreign Affairs Record, April 1980, pp103-104.


19. Fraser, loc cit.

20. In his An Introduction to Strategy (Faber and Faber, London, 1965, p107), Beaufre defined strategy to be: "The art and science of the dialectic of opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute."

21. For further detail see the "News Release" by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Hon. Andrew Peacock, on 11 February 1979, AFAR, February 1979, pp89-90.


23. loc cit.
24. Notable amongst these false starts was the British response to a question by John Dulles, the new US Secretary of State, in Tokyo in early February 1951. When asked for the British view on Australia's proposed security treaty Sir Alvary Gascoigne, the British political representative in Tokyo, immediately rejected the notion on the grounds that it would diminish the capacity of Australia and New Zealand to contribute militarily elsewhere in the world, eg., the Middle East. He counterproposed that some form of assurance about the protection of the sea approaches to Australia and New Zealand should suffice. See T.B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War (ANU Press, Canberra, 1978), p206.

25. Copy of the text of the ANZUS Treaty, ibid, p452.


27. Millar, op cit, p453.

28. loc cit.

29. ibid, p454.

30. Central to this notion that the ANZUS obligations may jeopardize Australia's security are the joint US-Australian facilities at North West Cape, Nurrungar and Pine Gap. As one defence pundit said recently in a report on a defence seminar in Perth in late February 1984:

Mr Cottrill's (First Assistant Secretary, Strategic and Internal Policy, Department of Defence) exposition...is certain to provide ammunition for the anti-US-bases lobby both in the Government and in the community. (Mr Cottrill said:)...we are able in modest ways to contribute to the avoidance of nuclear conflict by support of US deterrent capabilities...We acknowledge that some of these contributions could increase the risk of nuclear attack on Australia were a global war to occur.


33. Illustrating the linkages between the nuclear ships issue and ANZUS is the following newsspecie from the Radio Australia News, dated 28 September 1984:

The Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr Hayden, has said it would be premature to regard the ANZUS Defence Treaty as a dead agreement. The ANZUS Treaty links Australia, New Zealand...
and the United States. Speaking in New York after talks with New Zealand’s Prime Minister, Mr Lange, Mr Hayden said New Zealand wanted ANZUS to continue. However, he said New Zealand was also committed to its ban on nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed vessels visiting its ports—a ban which the United States has said threatens the future of ANZUS. Mr Hayden said New Zealand and the United States were trying to find some way around this problem, and he was hopeful they would succeed. He reiterated that the issue was up to New Zealand and the United States to resolve alone, and Australia would not act as a mediator. Later today, Mr Hayden is due to hold talks in New York with the American Secretary of State, Mr Shultz.

Nevertheless, all is apparently not well within the Australian Government and indications are that Mr Hawke’s ability to influence foreign policy to a pro-US stance may be waning. Thus, The Times reported on 7 February 1985 ("MX test alarm Hawke's party", from Tony Duboudin in Melbourne) that:

Opposition and disquiet are growing within the Government over Australia's decision to help the United States test the MX missile.

Yesterday the Victorian Labour Unity faction, the support base for Mr Bob Hawke, the Prime Minister, said the government should not involve itself in the testing of one of the most abhorrent technical advances in weaponry.

It is the first time the faction has made any public comment since the Hawke Government came to power, and must sound alarm bells for the Prime Minister.

With the party’s Socialist left faction determined to reverse the decision, and the centre left faction also known to be unhappy, Mr Hawke faces the first real test of his second administration when the party caucus meets on February 19 after his return from Europe and Washington.

The other issue likely to be raised is the secrecy surrounding the decision, which was made in 1983 after earlier approval by the Fraser Government. It was not considered by the full Cabinet.

Evidently, the Left won the day for Hawke announced in Washington that Australia would be withdrawing its agreement to provide basing rights in support of the MX tests. The US subsequently announced that it would conduct the tests without Australia's support and cancelled a scheduled visit to Honolulu by New Zealand’s Parliamentary Defence Committee.

34. Millar, op cit, p318.
35. ibid, p154.
36. ibid, p445.
37. ibid, p444.

39. Particularly relevant milestones in the development of the Australian - New Zealand relationship have been the Holyoake-Gorton Declaration, 1970; the Nareen Declaration, 1978; and the April 1977 Joint Statement by Defence Ministers. As a result of these agreements defence planning, standardization of equipment and procedures, and training are undertaken cooperatively. *ibid*, pp1-3.


41. Millar notes that when Australia committed troops to Borneo in 1965 in support of the British campaign against Indonesia, and to Vietnam in the same year in support of the US, both Powers expressed concern about the undue influence of the other with Canberra. *loc cit*.

42. *ibid*, pp183 and 212-3.

43. *ibid*, p211. Certainly, the US has ratified the Treaty with the Reservation that the Treaty provisions with respect to aggression and armed attack apply only to Communist aggression. It nevertheless agrees to consult in the event of other circumstances.

44. *ibid*, p455.

45. *loc cit*.


50. The methodology that is used in this section is evident if the following definitions by Collins (*op cit*) are compared. "Interests" have already been defined in the text.

a. "National Security Objectives. Those national objectives primarily concerned with shielding national interests from threats, both foreign and domestic."

b. "National Security Policies. Those national policies which provide guidance primarily for attaining national security objectives."

By identifying appropriate security objectives or policies one may therefore work backwards to distil from them the pertinent national security interests. Collins, *op cit*, pp263-282.
51. ibid, pp1 and 74.

52. In this respect Millar (op cit, p50) notes that:

   The ANZAC Pact of 1944 asserted a responsibility for the defence of the region which Australia (with New Zealand) would only be able to maintain, if there were no substantial threat to be defended against.


55. Peacock, AFAR, February 1979, p89.

56. Text of the address to the Baguis City Rotary Club in the Philippines, delivered by the Australian Ambassador, Mr. R.A. Woolcott, on 6 January 1979; AFAR, January 1979, Vol 50, No 1, p34.

57. ibid, p36.

58. Fraser, The Australian, loc cit.

59. ibid.

60. ibid.

61. An indication of the difficulties confronting greater regional coordination can, however, be gauged from the (then) Minister for Foreign Affairs' pledge that: "(He) will be working to make Australia's view of Asia, and Asian views of Australia both more accurate and more understanding". See text of a speech to the National Press Club Canberra on 3 February 1981 by the Hon. Tony Street; reported in AFAR, February 1981 Vol 52, No 2, p86. See also C. Bell (ed), Agenda for the Eighties (ANU Press, Canberra, 1980) p203.


64. For details of Australia's Defence Cooperation Programme see the annual Defence Reports that have been released by the Government since 1973.

65. Scholes, op cit, p5.


68. Australian Defence, p2.


72. ibid.

73. Whitlam quoted in Millar, op cit, p410.

74. Australian Defence; p1.

75. Peacock, AFAR, February 1979, p90.

76. Australian Defence, p2.

77. Scholes, op cit, p5.


80. W. Noel Levi, Statement of Foreign Policy, Port Moresby, 1980; extracted ibid, p280.


83. ibid, p44.

84. See "Fighting drives 260 into PNG", The Age, Melbourne, 7 April 1984.

85. See "PNG scare as unidentified jet drops 'rocket'", Sydney Morning Herald, Sydney, 28 March 1984.

86. See "PNG protest over intrusion", The Canberra Times, Canberra, 29 March 1984.


90. See "New Zealand now takes South Pacific defence seriously", op cit.


92. "New Zealand now...", op cit.


94. ibid, p51.

95. See Muldoon, loc cit, pp6-7 and Gill, ibid, pp51-54.


98. Suppiah Dhanabalan, reported ibid, p33.

99. See Ho and Cheah, op cit, p34.


102. Ho and Cheah, loc cit, p33.

103. See "A New Call...", Asiaweek, op cit.


105. Tasker, loc cit, p12.

106. Following that meeting ASEAN "for the first time named Vietnam as the cause of their troubles and fears" and repeated its "call for the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops...(and) condemned Hanoi over the refugees". Tasker, loc cit, p9.

107. Tasker, loc cit, p12.

108. M.A. Razman, Leader Writer on the New Straits Times, Malaysia, in "The Malaysian View: Leave power plays to the big boys", Sydney Morning Herald, Sydney, 28 November 1983, p9, cites a senior Malaysian Foreign Ministry official as saying that: "The feeling here is that Australia should concentrate on building bilateral ties without trying to jump straight into regional politics like a kangaroo."
The possibility of future moves to multilateralism was, however, acknowledged in 1982 by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. During a press conference at the end of a three-day visit to Djakarta he noted that while Indonesia and Singapore currently held bilateral military exercises, "At a later stage (they) may become trilateral and, later, quadrilateral... The ideal would be multilateral exercises involving all (six) members". Lee quoted in *Asiaweek*, October 22, 1982. For further details of ASEAN cooperative defence issues see "ASEAN—a quietly evolving military alliance", *News Weekly*, 13 October 1982.


Razman cites a Malaysian official as saying that "Australia's trade policies reflect a basic Western approach which is to exploit Asia's markets without giving anything in return." *op cit.*

A measure of the depth of feeling that is felt in ASEAN over such issues can be gained from Hadi Soesastro, "Cooperation in the South West Pacific: An ASEAN Perspective", *PDR*, April 1981, pp6-11.

Dr Mochtar quoted by David Broadbent, "Indonesian rebukes 'ignorant' Australia", *The Age*, Melbourne, 18 July 1983.


See Five Power Defence Arrangements, *op cit*, pp2 and 17.


Rusk cited in *The ANZUS Alliance*, a report by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence (AGPS, Canberra, 1982), p23.


ibid, p223.

ibid, p233.

Mondale quoted in *The ANZUS Alliance*, p35.
126. The granting of basing rights for the KC135-B52 NWIO surveillance flights was granted signed on 11 March 1981. See The ANZUS Alliance, p29.

127. Clark quoted ibid, pp36-7.

128. Long quoted ibid, p37.

129. Ikle quoted ibid, p40.

130. Stoessel quoted ibid, p41.


133. Australian Defence, p2.

134. Fraser, op cit, pp300-313, passim.

135. Australian Defence, p11.

136. ibid, p10.

137. ibid, pp10-11.

138. ibid, p11.

139. ibid, p12.


141. Scholes, op cit, p5.


143. The Defence White Paper states antithetically to this illusion that: "Our stance also takes into account our cooperation with our regional friends and we are mindful of our natural association with the western strategic community, and our obligations in these respects". Australian Defence, op cit; Chapter 3, para 11. There is evidence, however, that the Government considers the forward deployment of ground forces alone to constitute a "forward defence" strategy. See Defence Report 1973 (The Government Printer of Australia, Canberra, 1974), p7, column 2; and Millar's discussion of the Whitlam Government's withdrawal of Australian Army forces from SEA (op cit, pp409-10).

144. Millar notes pertinently that: "Australia continues to show interest in Oceania, but only by occasionally glancing over the shoulder or dipping into the pocket". op cit, p327.
1. The earliest attempts to classify strategic elements and to place them into some sort of framework can be traced to Sun Tzu, for throughout *The Art of War* he distinguished clearly between direct and indirect strategy (op cit, OUP, London, 1963, p102), and presaged the distinction between grand strategy and strategy that was subsequently clarified by Liddell Hart (*Strategy: The Indirect Approach*, Faber, London, 1954, pp335-336) and more recently by Collins (*Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices*, NIP, Annapolis, 1973, p273). Collins depicts a hierarchy of strategies that range from "national strategy", through "grand strategy", to "strategy". He fleshes out this skeletal concept by noting that each level in the hierarchy is subdivided into a number of specific categories of strategy (ibid, p14), and then overlays the whole grouping with a matrix of strategy couplets (ibid, p19). Thus, Collins emphasizes that contemporary strategy is the "art and science of options". Clearly central to these options are the choices about which elements of national power to use and in which way, for Collins defines national strategy as being:

The art and science of employing national power under all circumstances, during peace and war, to attain national objectives. (ibid, p273.)

The applicability of this definition to this report is obvious — assuming, of course that the pertinent elements of national power and national objectives are readily determinable.

To give guidance to the determination of national objectives, Collins describes a complementary hierarchy which he portrays as extending from the nation's "interests" (its compelling needs—ibid, p273) at the highest level, through its "national objectives" (its aims and goals) at the intermediate level, to its "national policies" (its broad courses of action) at the lowest level. The inter-relationship of the two hierarchies is then described by Collins in the following terms: "National interests are the bases for objectives which, within policy guidelines, shape strategy." (ibid, p194.)

2. See *Australian Defence November 1976* (AGPS, Canberra, 1976), Chapters 2 and 3, passim.


5. As D.M. Grieg notes: "...international law cannot exist in isolation from the political factors operating in the sphere of international relations." __________, *International Law* (London: Butterworths, 1979), p1.


8. See Australian Defence, pp50-4; and Denis Warner, "The View...", op cit, p23.


13. Albinski has placed this dilemma into context well when he explains that:

Prudence dictates that any Australian government must in some circumstances mollify popular or party opinion. This must be done so as to demonstrate that it is not humbling itself and Australian interests by being reflexively pro-American. On occasion, it must be prepared to say no to the US. The reasons for this exceed calculations of electoral damage or gain. They also include the calculation that, by tempering or appeasing critical opinion in this way, an Australian government will be better able to follow an array of other, American-related policies. In other words, popular support for the American connection at large would suffer if governmental support for it was, or appeared to be, mindless.

The ANZUS Alliance (AGPS, Canberra, 1982), pp59-60.


17. This was the ultimate national security objective that was posited by the (then) Prime Minister Fraser in his "World Situation" policy statement. (See Australian Foreign Affairs Record, Vol 47, No 6, June 1976, pp300-313).

18. The "domino theory" was first articulated during the Truman Administration but came into common usage after President Eisenhower's 7 April 1954 press conference at which he said:

You have a row of dominoes set up, and you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences.

For further discussion see Walter La Feber, America, Russia, and the Cold War (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1980) and Malcolm Booker, The Last Domino (Collins, Sydney, 1976).

20. See *Australia and the South Pacific*, a Report from the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence (AGPS, Canberra, 1978).


22. *loc cit*.


24. Desmond Ball coined this term in "New Military Technologies for the Defence of Australia", a paper he presented to the California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy at Pan Heuristics on 9 August 1977.

25. Australia's Exclusive Economic Zone, for example, effectively doubles the area that her Defence Force must hold under surveillance.

26. See, for example, Michael Richardson, "Indonesia strengthens its South China Sea defences", *PDR*, February 1983, p40-1; and Kirpa Wong bin Rahim, "Fashioning Singapore's tough armed forces", *PDR*, May 1982, pp30-4.

27. This assumption appears to be widely accepted. See *Australian Defence*, p49; and D.J. Digby, *Precision Guided Munitions* (The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, Report No P-5353, March 1975).

28. This topic is discussed in general terms in *Australia and the Third World*, the Report of the Committee on Australia's Relations with the Third World (AGPS, Canberra, 1979). See also *Australian Defence*, pp6-8; Tony Street, "Why Australia is aligned", *PDR*, February 1983, pp8-12; and Henderson, *op cit*, pp8-9.

29. This observation is based upon the author's personal experience in the region and was especially influenced by an official visit by the (then) Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, Royal Australian Air Force, in September 1979, which the author participated in as the Personal Staff Officer to the DCAS.


32. This term is prompted by Digby's following statement on modern technology: "If a target can be acquired, it can usually be hit. For many targets, hitting is equivalent to destroying." *op cit*, p7. The term is used widely by Ball.


39. This observation is made on the basis of the author’s experience in the Australian Defence Force Command and Control Centre during Exercise Kangaroo 83.

40. Once again, this opinion was formed by the author during the visit by the DCAS, RAAF, to the Malaysia-Singapore region in September 1979.
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