THE ROLE OF AIR POWER
IN
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

RECROD OF PROCEEDINGS

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
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INTRODUCTION

The Airpower Symposium is an annual event sponsored by Air University to foster in-depth examinations of topics relating to airpower and its application. The symposium has two fundamental purposes: first, to provide a forum for open discussion of airpower issues by military and civilian theorists and practitioners; and second, to enhance the Air War College core curriculum thereby providing a learning experience for the resident class.

The theme of the 1985 Airpower Symposium was "The Role of Airpower in Low Intensity Conflict." Its thrust was to examine the role of airpower in lower levels of conflict. Policy, strategy and force structure issues were addressed to determine their impact on military response capability. No "right answers" or "school solutions" were interposed on the attendees--they were left to the individual to determine for himself after being exposed to varied positions, opinions and recommendations.

The symposium was conducted in four interrelated sessions, each lasting approximately four hours over two and one-half days.

Each session was introduced by a plenary address from a distinguished guest. Following the address, the symposium was divided into four separate panel sessions that focused on different aspects of the session's topic. At least three papers written by authors of diverse backgrounds and experiences especially for the symposium were presented during each panel (the papers are reprinted in three appendices to these proceedings).
The topic of Session I was "Policy for Lower Level of Conflict." The session was oriented toward answering the following question: Considering the threat and probability of lesser intensity conflict, what should be the political and military policy of the United States to develop credible force capability for response to conflict?

The topic of Session II was "Military Strategy for Implementing Policy." The session was oriented toward answering the following questions: Considering the political and military policy issues, what military strategy should be developed and how should strategy be implemented? What role should airpower play?

The topic of Session III was "Military Forces for Lower Levels of Conflict." The session was oriented toward answering the following questions: What military capabilities should exist to implement military strategy for combat at lower levels of intensity? How should the United States Air Force be organized, trained and equipped?

The topic of Session IV was "Reflections on Past Operations." The objective of this session was to examine how national security policy, military strategy, and available military forces affected the planning and execution of past operations. Two contemporary military operations were selected, the Son Tay Prisoner of War Raid of November, 1970, and the Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission of April, 1980, as the case studies.

On the evening between Sessions III and IV, Mr. Noel C. Koch, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, addressed the Symposium on the state of the Air
Students of the Air War College Class of 1985 were closely involved with the structure and the organization of the symposium. They served as project officers, host officers for distinguished speakers and guests, panel moderators, and panel recorders. As a result of this involvement in conducting the symposium, and the active interplay between attendees and Air War College students, the purpose of the symposium—increasing the awareness level of future senior Air Force leaders—was accomplished.

The plenary addresses and the symposium papers form the basis of the following proceedings.
ADDRESS

to

THE NINTH AIR UNIVERSITY AIRPOWER SYMPOSIUM

BY

MR. NOEL C. KOCH

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
ADDRESS BY MR. NOEL C. KOCH, PRINCIPAL
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, NINTH
ANNUAL AIR UNIVERSITY AIRPOWER SYMPOSIUM,
AIR WAR COLLEGE, MAXWELL AFB, ALABAMA,
12 MARCH 1985

I want to thank you for this opportunity to be with you
tonight, and to address briefly some of those concerns which
I know you have discussed at length during this symposium.

I regret that I could not be with you for the entire
time, so that I might have a better sense of your own think-
ing in this critical area. I will look forward to reading
the papers on it. In the meantime, if some of my remarks
seem redundant to your discussions, I ask your forbearance.

The subject of this symposium: "The Role of Air Power
in Low Intensity Conflict," is very broad, and appropriately
so. The only way I might have improved on the title would
have been by adding a question mark at the end of it. Because
there may be, somewhere in all this, a Cartesian fallacy which
runs something like "We exist; therefore, we have a role."
The tendency to stand on that premise in explaining what is
the role of air power in low intensity conflict may lead us
to conclusions quite at variance with reality.

So the predicate question ought to be "Is there a role
for air power in low-intensity conflict?" The answer to that
question cannot be taken for granted here in studying this
role unless it is taken for granted universally by the U.S.
Air Force and most particularly its senior leadership.
Nor can the answer be taken for granted if it has not been validated historically. If, in other words, previous experience has not demonstrated that there is a role for air power in low-intensity conflict. And if that role has not been demonstrated satisfactorily, then we need to know if there are external reasons for this which can be corrected, or if the reasons are intrinsic to air power and cannot be corrected.

Obviously, if they are intrinsic, then there is little or no role for air power in this type of conflict.

This is, after all, a university. The university is the cornerstone of all civilization precisely because in these places truth is allowed to run around free, flexing its muscles, challenging orthodoxy and generally doing what truth alone can do, which is survive. No church, no state, no institution, however authoritarian, can smother it. Even in chains, it breathes.

But truth tends to be passive until you make it go by asking the kinds of questions that call it forth. In this environment every question can be asked, and should be asked, without fear of what the answer may be. What we should hope for is that the truth, whatever it may happen to be, will get off campus and insist on being paid attention to.

The whole point here is that we need an acknowledged truth upon which to base a study of the role of air power in
low intensity conflict, and that truth has to be accepted in certain quarters or all the arguments about what that role is and how to implement it are irrelevant.

First, the question of whether the senior leadership agree that such a role exists. This is unclear. The evidence is spotty and inconclusive, but as it stands it is not promising.

Taking a strict constructionist view of it, we can put aside speculation about what the role of air power could be or ought to be and, even for the moment, what it has been. The de minimus approach would look only at what current, agreed upon missions require, at what the Air Force has been asked to do in this area, and at the results of the Air Force having been asked to take its own honest look at the question and to tell us what it thinks it ought to be doing.

Out of this, we get three indicators.

In 1980, a determination was made, and agreed upon, that we needed additional MC-130s even to meet mission requirements that the most hidebound conventionalists could agree upon. Between that time and the present, we have seen an amazing tug of war, the object of which has been to drag the required procurement forward.

Five years later we find ourselves on the eve of a possible procurement. Giving everyone their due, we see this as a good faith forward step. But as our foot gropes for a place to come
down, we hear speculation about a further slippage in the procurement date, and then about putting these aircraft into the reserve force. And it does seem odd that an asset that is to support forces that are to be among the earliest to deploy in a conflict -- a conventional conflict, mind; forget the question of low intensity conflict for now -- that that asset should go into the reserves.

So that is one of the indices we must consider.

The next involves the transfer of the long-range rotary-wing mission from the Air Force to the Army, and here we come to the sub rosa cause celebre of 1984. With apologies to Churchill, I think it is fair to say that nowhere in the history of military conflict have so few made themselves so disagreeable to so many over so little as in the effort by OSD to get a persuasive answer to one very simple, reasonable and responsible question: How are you going to do it?

Our concern was not ever to abrogate Initiative 17. If the Air Force wanted to get rid of the mission and the Army wanted to accept it, all parties agreed it was their decision to make. Pressed by OSD, all parties, including the Chairman of the JCS, agreed there must be no degradation of mission capability as a result of the transfer, either during or after. And so, again, we asked, how are you going to do it?

The question never produced an answer. It produced intense irritation that the question which was being asked, and the
irritation grew as the inability to produce an answer became increasingly evident.

Now, that's the issue as it stands and, as you know, it stands deferred until an answer is forthcoming. We are presently reassured the Air Force will maintain current mission capability. But that is not comforting because current mission capability is far less than we had when the issue arose and we were assured there would be no degradation in mission capability. The capability has already been degraded, and we see no indication of an intention to restore what we had, much less to achieve what we need. Thus, the effect of what we are promised presently is that the Air Force will maintain a degraded capability.

But the real question, germane to this symposium, is whether we can deduce from this whole matter a conclusion that the senior leadership of the Air Force believes that there is a role for air power in low intensity conflict? And in considering this, we cannot be ignorant of the fact that we are talking about a platform that is, and to maintain mission capability must be, air-refuelable. Having sloughed off the long-range rotary-wing mission, does the Air Force intend to retain the refueling mission? Or would that pass to the Army? And if the Army gets back into flying fixed-wing aircraft, do we have the basis for sloughing off the Spectres and the Combat Talons?
Initiative 17 has dimensions.

The third bit of evidence flows from the controversy over Initiative 17.

When OSD raised its concerns over the ramifications of the Initiative, when it asked: "How are you going to do it?" the two Services appointed what was billed as an "independent" study group to answer the question. Now, an independent study group is a smart bureaucratic move when time is on your side -- which means when delay is cost-free.

But the Services wanted to get on with it, and OSD wanted an answer, and the study group had 90 days to provide it. In its independence, it determined that the transfer couldn't work. This was not the answer the senior leadership of either Service wanted. The task of the Study Group was not easy. The Air Force had prepared a Master Plan, in response to OSD directive. The role of the Study Group, in effect, was to determine how the Army could implement key elements of the Air Force Master Plan. With all their experience and expertise, they couldn't devise a way to do that, and they made clear they saw no way to do it.

Then, like a bolt of lightning, the Air Force OPSDEP illuminated the whole issue for both sides with a little note to the OPSDEP of the Army. I won't read you the whole thing, but I have copies here which I will leave for those who are interested. What it says in a nutshell is that the independent
group is acting independently and, thus, "making the transfer too hard." And these problems arose from the fact that the study group apparently thought the Air Force was serious about the Master Plan OSD asked for, when in fact the Plan "would not have been programmatically realized." And the note illustrates how easily the author thinks the mission transfer should be by pointing out just how meagre Air Force SOF rotary-wing assets already are. "The real question," the author says, "is how the Army can best replace the current AF dedicated SOF aircraft." And all that time we thought the real question was how to meet mission requirements. But the mission is nowhere addressed.

Again, the question comes: "Does the senior leadership of the Air Force believe that air power has a role in low-intensity conflict?

So that's the first part of the matter.

The second part is this: "Does air power in fact have a role, and if the answer is yes, how do we substantiate the answer?" Put another way, we should not lightly dismiss the apparent view of some of the senior leadership that air power -- or at least the Air Force -- does not have a role. That
view may not be so easy to dispute.

With a quick backward glance we can see that Chiang Kai-Shek had air superiority in China and lost China; the French had air superiority in Indo-China and lost Indo-China; Batista had air superiority in Cuba and lost Cuba; the United States had air superiority in Viet-Nam and Viet-Nam was lost; Samoza had air superiority in Nicaragua and lost Nicaragua; and, the Soviet Union has air superiority in Afghanistan, where the outcome is very much in doubt and may not, in any case, depend on air superiority.

What then is the role of air power in low intensity conflict?

This is what you are here to discover and discuss. I didn't see historical examples, or lessons-learned, on the agenda; perhaps we would have derived from such an endeavor a conclusion that air power was not used properly, or that ancillary issues rendered the question moot.

That would be fine in all but one case, and that is the case of Viet-Nam. We would not be able to draw conclusions from the Viet-Nam experience, for the simple reason that we haven't studied it. And I think we have to.

There are a number of reasons why.

Because if the taxpayer ever takes a minute to think about any of this, he may feel a little like the fellow who has spent 35 or 40 thousand dollars to send his son to school and finds
out at the end that the boy hasn't bothered to learn anything, and doesn't know any more now than he did when he started.

We should because we lost a lot of lives in the air war in Viet-Nam, and the disposition of a lot of MIA's from the air war remains part of the unfinished Vietnam agenda, and the least we can do is understand why we lost those people, and whether we needed to lose them, so that we can avoid losing more should similar situations arise in the future.

And we should because there may be a role for air power in low-intensity conflict and, if applied correctly, it may be decisive, and, since it is not probable that we can apply it correctly by accident, the argument for evaluating how we applied it in Vietnam is abundantly, corrosively clear.

One of the recurrent arguments about the war in Viet-Nam is that the political leadership wouldn't let the military fight its war. You can play with that argument a lot. Unfortunately, it falters in the face of reality, because it is pretty clear that then, as today, the political leadership relied very heavily on the military leadership to advise it on what should be done. But there is a case, and the Army has the best of it. They couldn't carry the war into the North.

The Air Force very frequently could. There, incrementalism was a disaster; further, certain targets were proscribed. But the real question in any event is not who lost the war, or why. It is what did we do, and did what we tried to do work? There
is a vast range of internal questions that can be and should be answered, before the political leadership hobgoblin is dragged up, and the answers to those questions should go far toward telling us whether air power has a role in low-intensity conflict, and what it is.

The Air Force did not always suffer from being leashed by political leadership anyway. On occasion, political leadership was stymied by the Air Force's reluctance to be unleashed. Linebacker II -- the Twelve Days of Christmas -- was resisted strenuously by the senior leadership of the Air Force.

The strike orders for Linebacker II were not drawn by J-3 or by the Air Force; these were drawn by a Lt. Colonel in the East-Asia/Pacific Region of ISA and handcarried to the Secretary of Defense.

One objection to the use of the B-52's was that we would give away our war-time codes, as though we weren't in a war! Could we have failed in Viet-Nam because the senior leadership didn't consider that we were in a real war?

We lost a number of B-52's over Hanoi and Haiphong. The effort to find out why was carried on outside the Air Force, and those who were studying the question broke into the Air Force computers to get the answer. And the answer was sufficiently appalling that the whole effort was put aside.

If Viet-Nam and its aftermath and the studied refusal to learn from it were a one-time experience, it would be a source
of concern requiring correction. But the pattern is larger than that, and more egregious.

The heyday of SAC began after, not before Korea, as though Korea had nothing to teach.

TAC had been disestablished shortly before Korea broke out, was slapped back together again for Korea, and then reduced again afterward. Today, of course, TAC is enjoying its day in the sun and whether we will see, as a result, the imbalance in force structure similar to that which resulted from "The Age of SAC" remains to be seen. At minimum we can say we see no enthusiastic embracing of the role of air power in low-intensity conflict. And we must weigh that against the Korean experience which seemed to have provided no lessons, no doctrine and no force structure appropriate to the next war -- Viet-Nam.

There may well be a role for air power in low-intensity conflict. But it will be necessary, in order to define that role, to take a look at the role of air power in previous low-intensity conflicts, and I think that process may not be a source of warm comfort for everyone. But the lessons have been bought and paid for, and they are still deliverable.

Beyond Viet-Nam, the record of the Air Force role in special operations is patchy.

It may be instructive that the U.S. Air Force history of the 1st Special Operations Wing draws most heavily on operations carried out in WW II, prior to the existence of the U.S. Air Force.
After that we are told that assistance in parachute training was provided to Mali. And then this paragraph:

"In 1968, the Wing sent UC-123 spray aircraft to Nicaragua and Panama to support the indigenous Air Forces in eliminating the Mediterranean fruit fly. The same year the Wing deployed the same aircraft to the Virgin Islands to spray the 'Bunt Tick' to death. In 1969, the UC-123s of the 1st SOW deployed to Saudi Arabia to combat locusts. Project COMBAT LOCUST was successful, and for the first time in over 2000 years this area was free of locust infestation. Between 1971 and 1973, U-10 aircraft from the Wing largely eliminated the screw worm fly menace from Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands."

I doubt if any of that is going to show up in one of those boob-tube potboilers like "Call to Glory." Mortal combat with the "Bunt Tick" is not such stuff as Public Affairs Officers' dreams are made on. And yet, such missions as these may be as critical to our national defense interests as any we might imagine. Because war is about how people live, not about how they die; therefore, strange as it might sound, an ounce of pesticide may well be worth a five hundred pound bomb in the struggle for freedom in the world today.

Since human beings began to organize themselves for military endeavor, nothing has been so critical to the success of those endeavors as the ability to break out of accepted
wisdom, to stop trying to further perfect the conventional, and to think rather of how to defeat it. Whether the short sword, the phalanx, and the long bow or the submarine, the tank, the airplane, and the atom bomb, the problem has been first to recognize the tar pit of orthodoxy and then to get out of it -- each step requiring creativity, self-confidence and courage.

The people who want to bury us are thinking in front of us. Wars of national liberation, low-intensity conflict -- this is a weapon, pure and simple. So far, it seems to work. So far we don't seem to be prepared to take steps to stop helping it to work.

Our national history opens with British soldiers fitted up in nice red uniforms marching in formation into the fire of men not more clever, but just more capable of seeing reality and adapting to its demands. The British didn't do it once or twice; they did it, obstinately, until they lost.

The analogy is clear. And so is the irony.

I hope nothing I have said here gives the appearance of prejudging the question of the role of air power in low-intensity conflict. You make a valuable contribution by addressing the question, and the size and composition of this audience indicates the breadth of concern for the issue, as well as the calibre of those who share this concern.

I simply say that whatever the answers prove to be, we have to validate them on the basis of what we already know --
what so many of you personally have been through.

And then the case has to be put to the leadership and others having an interest and the authority to put teeth into that interest.

At that point, we can look at who will perform the missions -- whether the Marines, the Navy, the Army or the Air Force. On one hand, I think it would be an egregious loss of the courage, dedication and experience of so many people in Air Force SOF if the Air Force should wish not to have a role in this arena. On the other, it is a thankless and time-consuming business to continually try to press a Service to do something if it doesn't want to. The other Services have long had their own distinguished air capabilities. If there is a role for air power in low-intensity conflict, and if the other services want to perform that role, I see no compelling reason why the possibilities should not be carefully considered.

But I do believe that the future of warfare is in low-intensity conflict, and I cannot imagine anyone not wanting to be there.

Thank you.
PLENARY ADDRESS

to

SESSION I

THE NINTH AIR UNIVERSITY AIRPOWER SYMPOSIUM

AMERICAN MILITARY POSTURE FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICTS: MISCONCEPTIONS, MISDIRECTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONAL AMBIGUITY

BY

SAM C. SARKESIAN, PhD
PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
American Military Posture for Low Intensity Conflicts: 
Reconceptions, Misdirections and Organizational Ambiguity

Sam C. Sarkesian
Indiana University of Chicago

Conventional warfare is as old as the history of 
civilizations. Yet one of the more interesting developments in the 
1960's is the apparent rediscovery of unconventional warfare by 
American military and civilian policy makers. In the 
aftermath of the Vietnam experience, the idea of Special Forces 
or personal combat warfare were virtually placed in the dustbins of 
history. The Soviet Union's interventions in Angola, Mozambique and 
Zaire, and the long period of American policy reassessment regarding 
the Middle East, led to the Soviet Threat. If these events marked 
the end of the Vietnam War and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan symbolizes the end of the reassessment period and the 
beginning of a more realistic view regarding the Soviet threat and 
simulation of the Third World, albeit it is almost too late for an 
attack in the form of direct, armed conflict, among other places.

The role is expected an American capability in what has 
been called, termed low intensity conflict and more specifically, 
whether or not there is a real danger that the mistakes of 
the past in the conventional and role of the present will 
be repeated in the combined military policy. This may, in turn, 
be a result of pressures on resources and manpower into conflict 
as well as the direct political pressure that the 
reassessments are conducted in low intensity conflict.
conflicts.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the intellectual and strategic misconceptions of the current American position on low intensity conflict and the organizational response, and to study what needs to be done. This paper is not intended to be an operational directive nor a specific program designed to correct the major problems. Rather, the purpose is to clarify concepts, study characteristics of low intensity conflicts, and suggest guidelines upon which an effective political-military policy and organizational strategy can be designed.

It is the position of this paper that the current American political-military posture is based on a misunderstanding of low intensity conflict and misjudgements regarding the Vietnam experience: that this posture is little more than a conventional design with forces-in-being, ignoring America's historical experience in unconventional war that dates back to the revolutionary war period; and that this posture reflects a lack of understanding of the character of Third World conflicts. All of these matters affect American strategy and doctrine, weaponry, and organizational strategy. The American response, however, has been fixed by conventional "lenses," creating political--military instruments which, in the main, are incapable of effectively responding to the kinds of conflicts occurring in Third World areas. While there are some exceptions to this charge, the major thrust is valid.

Although, all of the mistakes associated with low intensity
conflict did not begin with Vietnam, the fact is that much can be traced to the Vietnam War and the subsequent analyses of the American experience. The continuing search for meaning in America's Vietnam War experience has created a two fold response. First, there is a continuing re-analysis (some label this revisionism) of political-military policy and strategy. Second, incremental military organizational and doctrinal changes have occurred, in no small measure, in response to "Vietnam-like" contingencies. These promise to continue (e.g., the creation of light divisions and special operations capabilities). Operational patterns and weaponry developments reflect these directions, as does military training and professional career patterns.

Unfortunately, little of the re-analysis has come to grips with the fundamental issues emerging from the Vietnam War experience or for that matter with the range of low intensity conflicts of the contemporary period. Thus, the major focus of American political-military posture remains oriented towards the clearest forms of the conflict spectrum—that is nuclear and major conventional wars and limited conventional wars, on the high intensity end of the spectrum and special military operations on the other end. The middle range of contingencies falling within the broad label of low intensity conflicts, consist mainly of revolution and counterrevolution, and seem to defy effective American response or realistic conceptualization. Such conflicts tend to be viewed as extensions of existing political-military capabilities or subordinated to the main thrust of conventional
political—military mind set. How these misconceptions and misunderstandings came about have their roots in the formative period; the immediate post World War II period to the Vietnam War. It is here one must search for the conceptual and organizational designs that are characteristic of America’s current political—military posture for low intensity conflict.

THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN POSTURE ON LOW INTENSITY CONFLICTS

The Formative Period

Although American experience in low intensity conflict can be traced back to the revolutionary period, it was World War II and more precisely the years immediately following the war that created the environment for the institutionalization of a low intensity capability. The experience of the OSS, the Special Service Force, Ranger Battalions, and behind the lines operations in the Philippines and other parts of Southeast Asia during World War II not only provided a wealth of experience and lessons, but it should have demonstrated the need for permanent special units. However, throughout World War II, many military commanders saw little need for special units or special operations. Most felt that such units added little to the military effort and indeed, detracted from the success of standard line units. Virtually all of these units were disbanded immediately following the war.

Although, the National Security Act of 1947 established the Central Intelligence Agency and a new national security structure, operational capability and doctrines needed to properly carry out
covert intelligence and special operations remained almost non-existent. The military services were opposed to creating on a permanent basis anything that smacked of covert operational units, special units, or other capabilities to undertake special operations. The CIA reluctantly accepted a covert mission only after demands from the highest political echelons could not be ignored.

The first attempts at developing a covert and special operations capability was in response to the continued Soviet military presence in Europe and the increasing Western fear of direct Soviet military intervention in that area. The fall of Czechoslovakia in 1948, the Greek struggle and the subsequent promulgation of the Truman Doctrine, and the increasing activities of the Soviets on the periphery of Europe, seemed to confirm the American fear of imminent Soviet invasion.

The major effort to counter the Soviet threat was a build-up of nuclear weapons and sea and air forces capable of delivering such weaponry to the Soviet heartland. NATO was formed and postured itself for the conventional defense of Europe. This was underpinned by a political-military perspective that saw the Soviet Union as the primary threat and Europe as the major battleground.

The creation of the 10th Special Forces in 1952 was an attempt to strengthen the American counter to the Soviet ground advantage in Europe. It was expected that the Special Forces would organize resistance groups in Eastern Europe and use them against the Soviets in behind the lines operations should the Soviets
invade Western Europe. In the process, unconventional operations came to be viewed as adjuncts to tactical ground operations. Indeed, Special Forces traced their lineage to the First Special Service Force, even though OSS organization and operations during World War II were more appropriate bases for Special Forces.

The Korean War marked a new phase in the evolution of American capability in unconventional warfare. The use of a variety of unconventional tactics by the North Koreans and Chinese convinced American planners that there was a need for some type of American capability in unconventional warfare. This led to the organization of a variety of "patchwork" units ranging from UNPIK (United Nations Partisan Forces Korea) to the 8240th Army Unit designed for agent entry and rescue missions. Even though Special Forces trained officers were later assigned to these patchwork units, little changed, since it was already late in the war and there was no Special Forces operational group to insure effective operations. Additionally, Ranger companies were trained and used with front line units in Korea. But casualties were so heavy that eventually the Ranger units were deactivated. At the same time, the Central Intelligence Agency conducted their own brand of covert operations in Korea.

In an attempt to develop some coordination between military and CIA operational elements, CCRAK was created (Covert, Clandestine, and Related Activities in Korea), controlled by the Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE). However, this organization
had no real authority over CIA personnel nor did it succeed in eliminating duplication of effort or in correcting "amateurish" unconventional war operations in Korea.

The experience in the Korean War added a dimension to American strategy on low intensity conflicts. Special operations, such as those conducted by Ranger/Commando units, became associated with Special Forces. The demise of Ranger battalions after World War II and Ranger companies after Korea shifted special operations into the Special Forces system. The initial focus of Special Forces exclusively on behind-the-lines resistance operations in conjunction with conventional tactical ground operations was broadened to include special operations normally associated with Ranger/Commando units. Increasingly, Special Forces was seen as a special unit capable of all types of special operations. Following the Korean War, little was done in the realm of special operations and unconventional war except to slightly expand Special Forces units, shift the location to the 10th Special Forces to Europe, and establish the 77th Special Forces at Fort Bragg.

Views regarding the utility of special units remained wedded to the World War II period. Elite units were considered contrary to established military organizations and disruptive of military planning and operations. More important, the doctrines associated with special units were, in the main, perceived as contrary to the principles of war and thus, outside the mainstream of military thought.
Throughout its existence Special Forces has been regarded with suspicion by conventional military men, as well as most civilian policy makers. Historically, the conventional military mind in America has been antagonistic towards special units.

Writing about the Special Forces experience, Colonel Kelly noted:

An elite group has always appeared within the Army during every war in which the United States has been engaged... As surely as such groups arose, there arose also the grievances of the normally conservative military men who rejected whatever was distinctive or different or special... In the conduct of conservative military affairs, revisions of current military modes are frequently resisted with missionary zeal and emotional fervor simply because they mean change, they are different... If a new military program or unit is being developed in order to meet new needs, new threats, or new tactics, consideration should be given to the use of elite U.S. Army units despite the customary resistance to change or elitism usually found in conservative elements.

The Counterinsurgency Era

President John F. Kennedy upon taking office in 1961 brought about renewed interest in Special Forces. With his concern about Communist inspired insurgency, President Kennedy placed counterinsurgency and flexible response at the forefront of political-military policy. One result was the increase in the number of personnel assigned to Special Forces and a shift to countering insurgency, subordinating behind the lines guerrilla missions. Moreover, the focus on counterinsurgency opened the floodgates to what seemed like a new development in the American military. Published literature proliferated as the works of Mao and Che became bestsellers. Manuals were published and courses developed to
respond to counterinsurgency. The Vietnam War tested these developments and marked a new phase in American capability in low intensity conflict. Unfortunately, the end result of the Vietnam War led to the decline of the fortunes of Special Forces, and to the discrediting of political-military policy and doctrines established for counterinsurgency.

Much has been written about Vietnam; there is little need to review it all here. A thorough understanding of the issues of revolution, counterrevolution, American military posture during the period and American domestic politics will surely require serious reading of the literature. Suffice it to say that there are now new analyses of the Vietnam War appearing in the literature. Some of which challenge the previous assertions regarding the war strategy. Still others argue that the War could have been won with the proper conventional strategy striking at the heart of North Vietnam, if necessary.

Regardless of the various perspectives, it seems clear that the nature of the war was misunderstood by many and misperceived by others, including military and civilian policy makers, the mass media, and many groups within American society. What emerged from the war was the belief by many that America was unable to defeat the revolutionary forces and as a result, the South Vietnam government was defeated by a combination of revolutionary forces and invasion from the North with regular NVN forces.

Even with all of the self-criticisms and the finger pointing triggered by the American involvement in Vietnam, Special Forces
and the idea of counterinsurgency were viewed by many as major culprits in the loss of South Vietnam. Not only was this a frustration-reaction to the inability to succeed in Vietnam but also because of the presumed immorality of unconventional operations and the fact that Special Forces represented the American effort in such operations. This tended to be the case regardless of one's position on the character of the war and the scope of American involvement.

Equally important, it was clear that the American people and its political leaders perceived the war through conventional lenses. It was difficult for most to understand why 500,000 American military personnel and over 1 million South Vietnamese military could not "win." Further, Americans based their assessment of progress on conventional measures such as body count, prisoners, and real estate taken--factors that had minimum relevance to the kind of war being fought in Vietnam. Most important, the nature of the war, its protractedness and unconventional character, had little relevance to American experience with the "big battles" and democratic notions regarding American purposes. The almost total lack of understanding of the motivations and strategy underpinning revolutionary conflicts, was the philosophical basis for these misconceptions.

Finally, the programs for the "Great Society" were in full swing in the United States. The costs and dynamics created by such programs coincident with the civil rights movement absorbed much of the energy and resources of the Johnson Administration, which found
it difficult to conduct an increasingly costly war while maintaining increasingly expensive domestic programs. The attempt by the mass media to present an understandable picture of the war in Vietnam (a war which most members of the media did not understand themselves) combined with media bias towards the Johnson Administration's conduct of the war added to the confusion and divisiveness within the United States. It was inevitable that such divisiveness and confusion would find its way into the ranks of the military.

The Contemporary Period

The immediate post-Vietnam period saw the reorientation of American political-military policy and doctrine back to Europe and the re-emphasis on the Soviet threat. Training in counterinsurgency was virtually discarded. Standard command and staff career patterns were re-emphasized. Conventional command duty and assignment to combat units whether on the ground, sea, or in the air were the key to career success. Equally important, the "big bucks" were in strategic forces and sophisticated weaponry.

The fallout from Vietnam had a negative impact on virtually all things military in the last half of the 1970's. The volunteer military system could barely attract enough people to maintain adequate force levels. The inadequate attention to the quality of military life and the American public's view of military service did little to engender a high caliber military system. To make matters worse, modernization of forces and replenishment of stocks
used in Vietnam moved at a snail's pace. It was during this period that one high ranking military officer exclaimed that the United States had a "hollow" army.

The 1980s brought another shift in American political-military policy. The new Administration placed a great deal of emphasis on increasing military capability and strengthening America's defense posture. A major effort was begun to modernize strategic forces and produce sophisticated battlefield weapons. At the same time concern increased over the conflicts in Central America and Afghanistan, and rekindled interest in the internal conflicts in Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique.

These new efforts had their impact on the military services. Increased interest developed in special operations and the ability to respond rapidly to areas on the European periphery. The Middle East loomed large in military contingency planning as did Central America.

What gave particular impetus to recognition of these contingencies was the increased fear over terrorist activity and state-supported terrorism. Small wars and rapid deployment forces found their way into military planning. This triggered the development of light divisions in the Army capable of being deployed rapidly in Third World areas, with maximum fighting personnel and minimum logistic and administrative baggage.

The activation of the First Special Operations Command in the Army was aimed at the more unconventional aspects of contemporary conflicts. Additionally, the term special operations was coined to
identify not only units designated for unconventional operations, but to characterize the nature of these operations. Other services also focused more attention on special operations with the creation of the Air Force's 23rd Special Operations Squadron and the expansion of Navy Seal units. Earlier, the Central Command evolved from the Joint Rapid Deployment Force and was given operational responsibility for the Middle East and Southwest Asia. Additionally, the Joint Agency for Special Operations was created at the Department of Defense.

The American military posture in low intensity conflict thus came full circle. From Special Forces and Ranger units at the highpoint of counterinsurgency in Vietnam to almost nothing and back to heightened interest and capability. These organizational directions have not changed the philosophical misconceptions in military thought regarding low intensity conflict, however. While the original mission of Special Forces seemed a move in the right direction, it was soon overshadowed and dissipated by its appendage as a tactical instrument. Later, the real essence of low intensity conflict was lost in the amalgamation of special operations with Special Forces. The idea of special operations remains wedded to conventional views on conflicts and the traditional military ethos which attempts to define military doctrine in pure military terms.

Briefly, special operations as used here are those for which the American military is generally well positioned to undertake. These tend to be small unit operations of a conventional nature and conducted, in the main, as adjuncts to conventional ground
operations. The nature and character of such operations are in marked contrast to those of revolution and counterrevolution, and more easily comprehensible and acceptable by the American public. In this respect, Clausewitz rather than Sun Tzu prevails and the grand battles of major wars are the foundation of American military education.

THE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICTS

Although there is an increased awareness of the scope and challenges of terrorist activities and the kinds of conflicts in progress in Central America and parts of Africa, most military professionals remain fixed in a mind set that views such conflicts through conventional lenses. As important, most civilian officials, the media, and major political actors, still reflect the fears of Vietnam. Combined with a lack of understanding of the nature of low intensity conflict and its two components, special operations and revolutionary/counterrevolutionary warfare, American policy and strategy seeks assurance in conventional military perspectives and traditional policy postures. Further, there is a great deal of confusion and error in definitions which places wars of a "lesser" magnitude in the category of "small wars." This is not only a misreading of the meaning of low intensity conflict, but reflects a fundamental conceptual error in intermixing conventional and unconventional conflicts. Small wars are more properly viewed as limited conventional wars, distinct from revolution and counterrevolution which are the main components of
Low intensity conflicts. The end result is to place the American military at a distinct disadvantage in its capability to respond to low intensity conflicts.

For a greater understanding of low intensity conflicts and the problems these pose for American political-military policy and strategy, we need to study the policy, strategy, and doctrinal differences between various conflicts. Figure 1 shows the conflict spectrum and briefly identifies characteristics of major categories of conflicts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Showing of Force</th>
<th>Non-combat</th>
<th>Low Intensity Conflict</th>
<th>Limited-Major</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special Operations</td>
<td>Surgical</td>
<td>Revolution/Counter-revolution</td>
<td>Conventional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hit-Run</td>
<td>Counter-terror</td>
<td>Spearhead</td>
<td>Rescue</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These categorizations are not intended to show intensity of combat on the ground. Rather, the level of intensity depicted are policy formulations and descriptive of the nature of the conflict. Thus, low intensity conflict (LIC) is a policy posture that presumes involvement with forces-in-being, no national mobilization, and a limited commitment for limited goals, among other things. Low intensity conflicts include two major components: special operations and revolution/counterrevolution. These differ...
in nature and character.

Additionally, the categorizations are not intended to be rigid. That is, it is difficult at times to know when revolution and counterrevolution shift to limited conventional conflicts. The categories of revolution and counterrevolution, for example, are not intended to preclude elements of other kinds of conflicts, i.e., limited conventional. However, conflicts such as Korea or the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) are placed in the limited conventional war category. It is also necessary to note, that in both of these conflicts, special operations aspects were employed primarily as adjuncts to tactical, conventional operations. More of this later.

**Special Operations**

Special operations, as shown in the schematic, are those operations best described in terms of the First Special Service Force and Ranger units in World War II. In the contemporary period, such operations are highly specialized conventional type or semi-military operations. They are intended to be of short duration, highly intense, and specifically focused. These operations are usually in conjunction with conventional forces, i.e. hit-and-run, long range patrol, and spearhead (i.e., British SAS units in the Falkland Islands). Further, units organized and trained for such purposes usually consist of American soldiers commanded by American officers.

Training follows the patterns of small unit tactics as well as those associated with rescue and counter-terror missions.
Additionally, ground forces units can be trained as counter-terror groups to work separately or in conjunction with local forces, both American and foreign. Individuals who are warrior oriented, action prone, aggressive and self reliant, but team spirited, may be the best for such units. In essence, the basis for such operations and units evolve from conventional perspectives of battle. The Grenada operation was the most recent American example of the use of special operations units.

It is also possible that for certain types of special operations, individuals and/or units from existing forces can be designated and specially trained over a relatively short period of time: for example, the Iran hostage rescue attempt— the original basis for organization of Delta Force and units organized for the Son Tay POW rescue attempt. The important point is that all of these are (and were) designed from existing units, mostly from those trained in conventional patterns. The exception, of course, was the use of individual Special Forces personnel in Delta Force. Even here, however, Special Forces members were involved in special operations missions, removed from the main thrust of the original intent of Special Forces. Most of these special operations missions were characterized by quick strike and withdrawal, against a conventionally postured military/civilian force or a para-military/police organization. It follows that strategy and doctrine for special operations flow naturally out of conventional military posture and organizations.
Revolution and Counterrevolution

Revolution and counterrevolution differ considerably from special operations. The nature of revolution and counterrevolution places the focus of battle in the political-social milieu and psychological environment of the political system. These conflicts are usually protracted and unconventional. Political cadre, psychological warfare, intelligence operations, and unconventional operations are usually the most important characteristics of revolution and counterrevolution. The primary ingredient of success is the efficiency of the revolutionary or counterrevolutionary political system. American policy, strategy, and organizational structures designed for revolutionary and counterrevolutionary warfare must rest on at least four basic elements.

First, revolutionary and counterrevolutionary conflicts are asymmetrical. For revolutionaries such conflicts are a struggle for survival. Similarly, albeit usually later, counterrevolutionary systems also recognize that such conflicts are for survival. However, for the United States engaged in such conflicts as a third power, these are limited conflicts. It is not expected that the American people and its resources will be mobilized to fight a war against an enemy that is not clearly perceived to be threatening American security. Americans directly involved in the conflict area are usually caught up in this survival psychology, but the American political system and its military institution are not likely to adapt to the idea that such conflicts are critical for American
security, demanding total effort and energy at the cost of other missions.

Second, such conflicts also tend to be ambiguous. That is, it is oftentimes difficult to distinguish friends from foes. The revolutionaries are not likely to wear distinguishable uniforms, occupy clearly delineated areas, or establish conventional administrative or logistical networks. Moreover, the center of gravity of such conflicts is more likely to be in political-social milieu rather than the "battlefield." This is made more ambiguous by the fact that the revolutionary appeal is likely to be more closely related to the moral and ethical principles of American democracy than those of the existing indigenous system. This can easily lead to psychological and moral ambiguity in American policy and a lack of clearly defined political goals.

Third, revolution and counterrevolution are unconventional in nature. Thus, rarely will there be set piece battles following conventional patterns, but rather a series of hit-and-run raids, assassinations, terror, sabotage, and a variety of other means used to intimidate people and aimed at the psychological fiber of the existing political system. Conventional criteria for measuring success or determining proper responses are in the main, irrelevant and inappropriate. Equally important, the revolutionary armed forces are usually difficult to identify, find, and fix—defying the most basic tenets of conventional warfare, and indeed, special operations.

Four, these conflicts also tend to be protracted, developing
into wars of attrition psychologically and politically, as well as in terms of human resources. History shows that democracies find it exceedingly difficult to maintain the national will and political resolve necessary to persist in such conflicts over a long period of time. Because of the character of low intensity conflicts and the nature of democracy, political consensus and resolve can easily be dissipated. If history is any guide, the frustration with continued conflict and dissension within the body politic can spill over into the military ranks, reducing combat effectiveness and affecting morale. The political and military effectiveness of American policy and military forces involved in such Third World Conflicts is likely to be reduced considerably as the conflict drags on.

Five, American cultural traditions and the bases of American democracy create the kind of military that is ideologically and organizationally far removed from revolutionary philosophy. Historical evidence suggests that revolution and counter-revolution do not adhere to accepted laws of land warfare. Revolutionaries may use any method to achieve their political goals. To be effective, counterrevolutionaries may need some degree of freedom to operate against the unconventional tactics of the revolutionary system. Yet, the very nature of revolution and counterrevolution create combat conditions that may impel counterrevolutionary forces well beyond democratic proprieties. A protracted and unconventional war can lead to My-Lai type incidents, without extremely effective civilian and military
leadership. This may mean considerable restraint imposed on battle tactics and behavior, which in turn may have a demoralizing impact on American forces. The reconciliation of proper behavior and effectiveness of democratic military systems involved in low intensity conflicts remains a difficult and unresolved problem.

Six, American forces engaged in such conflicts, must normally work through the indigenous political-military system. This usually means that Americans must operate in an alien culture whose values and world-view may differ considerably from Americans. Socialized in the values of the Judeo-Christian heritage with its stress on human and civil rights, and individual worth, Americans may find it difficult to operate in an environment in which values differ and are likely to be contradictory.

Finally, American military thought and strategy, as well as political-military policy tends to be conventional in outlook. Lacking an understanding of the nature of revolution and counter-revolution, policy makers tend to design inappropriate criteria for measuring progress as well as doctrines and operational guidelines based on conventional "lenses," resulting in threat perceptions and conflict contingencies that are various versions of conventional conflicts or the "big battle" syndrome. This is reflected in the main thrust of organizational designs, planning, training, and operational doctrine. The exception to most of this is in the thrust of Special Forces organization and training, and some special units in other services.
Americans involved in such conflicts, therefore, require a completely different set of training guidelines, and must be prepared to operate for long periods of time in an alien culture. Patience, persistence, and in most instances, tiring and seemingly inconsequential field work are common ingredients. Periodically, this type of operation is broken by dramatic, high intensity armed conflict in which revolutionary units are engaged in almost conventional type operations. In such an environment, frustration and anger can become commonplace for Americans, not only in dealing with the unconventional nature of such combat, but in trying to operate effectively with indigenous political and military units and agencies.

Thus, revolution and counterrevolution pose a special and highly dangerous challenge to American security policy. Yet, these are the kinds of conflicts that are most likely to occur in Third World areas. Effective response to such conflicts go beyond special operations capability and conventional military posture—and it is in this respect that America is least prepared, particularly the military. To come to grips with the essence of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary conflicts, therefore, we need to study their nature and character in a systematic and analytical fashion, particularly in terms of the involvement of American military units.

*Capability and Effectiveness in Low Intensity Conflicts*

Although there has been improvement in American political-
military policy and strategy in responding to low intensity conflict, this has been uneven and primarily in the area of special operations. Ranger units, SEALS, and airborne units have demonstrated a great deal of capability and effectiveness. Additionally, units such as Delta Force have also demonstrated a high degree of proficiency in the planning and operations of counter-terror and rescue missions. Although the complete story of the Grenada rescue mission may not be known, all indications are that the operation was generally conducted with a high degree of efficiency, some partisan criticism notwithstanding.

In reviewing the nature of special operations and revolutionary/counterrevolutionary conflicts, the main point is that these differ in character, strategy, and doctrinal guidelines. What is most important, they differ in fundamental conceptual formulations.

*Conceptual Coherency*

There is currently a wide range of definitions and concepts of revolution and counterrevolution that spill over into special operations, which not only are intellectually and philosophically confusing, but complicate strategic and doctrinal guidelines. These have a number of implications for organizational strategy and weapons development.

The fundamental philosophical and operational difference between special operations and revolution/counterrevolution is in the fact that the former emerges primarily from conventional
perspectives and professional ethos of a Clausewitzian genre and the latter from the major precepts of Sun Tzu. That is, the center of gravity of revolutionary/countercyclical conflicts is not on military operations and military success or failure in the traditional sense, but on the impact of long range strategy and operations on the political-social milieu of the alien culture and/or the instruments of the existing system.

The focus here is primarily on the concepts of revolution and countercyclical rather than a detailed assessment of special operations. The reasons seem clear. Special operations evolving from a conventional perspective are less difficult to conceptualize and more easily subsumed within the existing military system. Moreover doctrine and operational guidelines for such operations, although highly specialized are rooted in conventional tactical doctrine. The fundamental problem with special operations is a policy and strategic one. That is, when and how should special operations forces be used?

What makes the problem of conceptual coherency more complex is that aside from including special operations and revolutionary/countercyclical conflicts within the umbrella term of low intensity conflict, there exists a deep misunderstanding and misconceptualization regarding revolution and countercyclical. This is clearly reflected in the variety of terms used in describing revolution and countercyclical: war of national liberation, protracted war, unconventional war, guerrilla war, insurgency, counterinsurgency, revolt, revolution, counter-
revolution, internal war, and even civil war.

A close reading of the literature and an analysis of the nature of revolutions reveals three terms of primary reference: guerrilla war, insurgency, and revolution. Many times, all three are used synonymously. Yet, there is a clear difference not only in the terms but in the kinds of conflicts they indicate. Bernard Fall's observations are important starting points in clarifying these matters:

Just about anybody can start a "little war" (which is what the Spanish word guerrilla literally means), even a New York street gang. Almost anybody can raid somebody else's territory, as Pancho Villa did in 1916 or the Nazi saboteurs did in 1942...But all this has rarely produced the kind of revolutionary ground swell which simply swept away the existing government. 11

Fall further argues that,

It is...important to understand that guerrilla warfare is nothing but a tactical appendage of a far vaster political contest and that, no matter how expertly it is fought by competent and dedicated professionals, it cannot possibly make up for the absence of a political rationale. 12

Using Fall's analysis, several observations are in order. Guerrilla war is a description of the armed aspect of revolution which in most cases, is an adjunct to the real war (i.e., a political-psychological contest aimed at the political-social milieu of the target area). Insurgency is normally conducted by a group of armed fighters organized to achieve a limited political goal. It is important to recognize that insurgency is heavily oriented towards limited military action with little thought being given to broader political goals.

Revolution is primarily a political conflict in which a
revolutionary cadre and leadership establish an alternate political system for the prime purpose of overthrowing the existing system. It follows that the ultimate goal for the revolutionaries is to supplant the existing system and govern the state according to revolutionary ideology. This is a total war aimed at the destruction of the existing system. In such conflicts, political cadre, mobilizers, psychological teams, and intelligence collection efforts are usually more important than fighters.

Once a degree of conceptual coherency and clarity is achieved, American political-military policy and global strategy for low intensity conflict can be realistically designed. If the basis for American strategy is to prevent destabilization and strengthen systems that are not inimical to American interests, then a counterrevolutionary strategy must be designed based on multiple options, ranging from low levels of military aid to commitment of American combat troops as the third power element in the conflict. Further, various aspects of American involvement may be more effectively undertaken by civilian agencies. More of this later.

Moreover, consideration must also be given to the support of certain types of revolutions (i.e., Afghanistan) which not only challenge repressive regimes, but are likely to raise the stakes for those systems intent on intervening on behalf of the existing system either directly (as the Soviet Union is doing in Afghanistan) or through proxy forces and surrogates.

This presents a particularly difficult challenge because of
the nature of the American political system and American views on legitimate use of military force. It is very difficult for most American political leaders, as well as for many military professionals, to accept the idea that Americans should become directly involved in fomenting or perpetuating revolution. For many, this is a clear indication of interventionist policies and a clear deviation from democratic norms. Moreover, it is difficult for many to reconcile support of counterrevolution on the one hand, and involvement in support of revolution on the other. It is only through a clear political-military policy and strategy that American involvement in revolution and counterrevolution can be justified. And this must be done in accord with clear goals of American security policy and American national interests.

_Two Phase Counterrevolutionary Strategy_

American strategy in low intensity conflict must particularly concern itself with the complexities and contingencies associated with revolution and counterrevolution. It is conceivable that not only must America assist in defending (defensive phase) the counterrevolutionary system, it must engage in the offensive against the revolutionary system. In brief, there is both a defensive and offensive aspect to counterrevolution. In the former, the American role as a third power is to assist and support the counterrevolutionary system with economic, military, and psychological resources. In the latter case, America may assist in "taking" the revolution to the revolutionaries.
The purpose in the defensive phase is to prevent the revolutionaries from progressing behind phase one revolutionary warfare as envisioned by Mao. This means that not only must the indigenous military and intelligence services become more effective, but a more enlightened governing policy must be implemented and effective government created. Political-psychological appeals to the populace must be designed to undercut the very purpose of the revolutionaries.

In the offensive against the revolutionary system, the counterrevolutionaries must create revolution within the revolution. That is, the revolutionary system must be placed in a position of defending itself against the revolutionary appeal of the indigenous system. The offensive phase is even more difficult than the defensive phase, particularly with respect to the American role as a third power. The offensive phase of counterrevolution requires the conduct of unconventional war against the revolutionary system, demanding a highly effective intelligence system and the implementation of means that may challenge the notion of democratic norms.

Revolutionary Ideology and Systems

All revolutions are not necessarily communist inspired, directed, and controlled. Indeed, in many instances, nationalistic groups instigate revolution only to have Communist groups infiltrate and/or coopt the revolution as it progresses. Similarly, all counterrevolutionary systems are not tyrannical, while few are
true democracies, few are totalitarian. American support of counterrevolutionary systems must be based on the susceptibility of that system to democratic change and the ability of the system to promote more enlightened policies. It may well be the case that the existing system is likely to be less repressive than what might emerge from the revolutionary system. For example, what "might" have emerged from the American Revolution could have been far worse than British rule.

Moreover, the existing system should have, at the least, the components for developing into a reasonably effective and popularly supported government. But to presume that no support should be given to existing systems because none are democratic in terms of American criteria is simply to assume away the problem and not support any counterrevolutionary system. The number of American type democracies in the Third World is miniscule. The number that have the potential to develop into real democracies appears to be on the increase, however. It is this progress (or attempt at progress) towards democracy that places such systems in the most vulnerable position vis-a-vis revolutionary systems.

**America as a Third Power**

American involvement as a third power must be based on policy that does not Americanize the conflict. Unless, the conflict is perceived to be a critical challenge to American national interests, it is unlikely that human and physical resources can be mobilized in a concerted effort to respond to such conflicts. If
the conflict goes beyond the initial phases, serious decisions must be made regarding additional American commitments. This usually means that elements from forces-in-being are deployed (e.g., forces already organized and trained as part of the regular establishment). Thus, there is not only the problem of resource allocation, but also of the domestic political costs and consequences of Americanizing the war.

Moreover, commitment of ground forces, following Clausewitzian logic, aims to place overwhelming manpower at the point of decision. These military axioms create a distinct air and visibility associated with an industrial power, and influence indigenous perceptions of the conflict. As General Weyand has so aptly stated, "The American way of war is particularly violent, deadly and dreadful. We believe in using "things"—artillery, bombs, massive firepower—in order to conserve our soldiers' lives."

The American way of war spills over into the character of its involvement as a third power. This translates into a "let's get on with it" attitude and a problem solving approach: identify the problem, apply the proper technology and skills in the most efficient and economical way. As a result there is a marked tendency to overwhelm the conflict area and indigenous allies, creating an American controlled environment. This, in turn, can easily lead to erosion of the legitimacy and credibility of the indigenous system in the eyes of its own people. Further, because of the contemporary Congressional and public distaste for "Vietnam"
type involvement, policy makers are apt to design political-military responses based on bringing to bear overwhelming American forces for short term, quick strike, and withdrawal operations, a-la-Grenada.

However, historical experience indicates that success in revolutionary and counterrevolutionary conflicts is determined, in no small measure, by the quality and capability of those "on the ground." While sophisticated weapons may be useful and massive firepower effective in some situations, the key in such conflicts is penetration of and influence on the political-social milieu; something that can hardly be achieved by massive firepower. This is not to deny the need for conventional type forces. But their proper use in revolutionary and counterrevolutionary conflicts is protecting the political-social cadres attempting to establish and insure government presence, and implementing effective government policies. This invariably intermixes conventional ground troops with the center of gravity of revolutionary/counterrevolutionary conflicts.

SUMMARY

American political-military posture is currently based on misconceptions and misjudgements of the Vietnam experience leading to concepts and organizational strategies that have not come to grips with the realities of low intensity conflicts. Effective response to such conflicts must be based on conceptual coherency and clarity which provide guidelines for the formulation of policy,
strategy, and doctrines, and in turn, determine organizational strategy and professional perspectives.

The current posture is based on presumptions that special operations and the conduct of revolution and counterrevolution and their various components evolve from similar, if not identical, philosophical and doctrinal roots. The nature and character of revolution and counterrevolution are in sharp contrast to special operations, with all that this suggests with respect to policy, strategy, and organizational posture. The fact is that the American way of war, with its emphasis on the Clausewitzian focus, underpins perspectives on low intensity conflicts, making the concept of special operations more easily adaptable to the nature of the political-military establishment.

While some advances have been made (i.e., rekindling of interest and study of unconventional warfare, and the establishment of special operations structures), these are just a beginning and in some respects, may be steps in wrong directions.

Effective command systems and efficient implementation of low intensity operations require understanding and agreement on the nature of low intensity conflicts. However, the nature of American democracy, the historical view of conflicts and threat perceptions focus attention on strategic nuclear issues and a European centered conflict environment, making it extremely difficult to achieve a conceptual consensus, much less a conceptual synthesis, regarding low intensity conflict. Compounding the problem are disagreements within the scholarly community and practitioner circles on the
meaning of low intensity conflicts and its substantive components. All of these tendencies are reinforced by bureaucratic characteristics towards the status quo and the "known," and the conventional mind sets that dominate the political-military system.

The American public, major political actors and the media, perpetuate these disagreements and misunderstandings. Seeking the most simplistic explanations and solutions to complex problems of low intensity conflicts, and presuming that all states and conflicts conform to democratic notions, the American public in general has neither the patience nor understanding to respond to the demands of low intensity conflict, particularly revolution and counterrevolution. In the words of two scholars, "The American political system is poorly suited to conduct a limited war; and the American people are lacking in two important requisites for a sound foreign policy--patience and understanding of the role that power plays in world affairs."

In this respect, simply to label all revolutions, for example, as Communist or all counterrevolutionary systems as tyrannical, as seems to be the case, is simplistic and erroneous. Even a cursory glance at the problems of modernization shows that many Third World states are in the midst of fundamental changes, which create instability and foster conditions that produce revolutions, and it might be added, revolutions that can be (and have been) manipulated by external powers.

Finally, there is lacking a coherent American strategy and policy on low intensity conflicts, as might be expected given the
complexities and problems most Americans have in understanding such conflicts. This does not mean that the American posture should envision involvement in every Third World conflict. However, there are a number of such conflicts that engulf states that are critical (or potentially so) to American national interests. American strategy and policy must be designed to articulate national interests and at the same time be based on staying power once a decision is made to become involved in Third World areas.

As a former American Under Secretary of State has written,

Reagan's challenge is to pursue a policy of selective engagement, one based on priorities and interests the American people will understand and support. To achieve this difficult task, the United States will have to avoid both the role of world policeman it played in the 1960s and the posture of non-involvement it preferred in the 1970s. And in any selective engagement of U.S. power, whether by choice or by necessity, the United States must achieve its objectives, in fact and in perception.15

Low intensity conflicts, particularly revolution and counterrevolution, are the most difficult and demanding types of conflicts engaged in by democratic systems. Not only does engagement necessitate a military posture free from conventional mind sets, but there must be political resolve and national will within the body politic that is enduring and persistent in support of military commitment, even in the face of adversity. While all of this may not insure successful response to low intensity conflicts, it can minimize the disadvantages faced by the United States when it is necessary to become involved in such conflicts.
CONCLUSIONS

There are a number of political and military implications that emerge from this analysis. Many of these are operational in nature and will not be addressed here. However, it is useful to draw conclusions regarding three major dimensions: conceptual coherency; policy and strategy; and organizational strategy and doctrine.

Conceptual Coherency

There is a compelling need to distinguish between special operations and revolutionary/counterrevolutionary conflicts. The use of the term low intensity conflict and/or special operations as an umbrella for all types of conflicts short of conventional limited war not only obscures the conceptual problem but tends to perpetuate the presumption that all low intensity conflicts are similar.

Without belaboring the point, it should be clear from this study that special operations evolve primarily from conventional military doctrine and tactics, with concentration on small unit operations; hit-and-run raids, rescue operations, counter-terror, and spearhead operations. These type of operations are best illustrated by those undertaken by Rangers and the 1st Special Service Force in World War II, Ranger units in Korea, and Commandos and SAS units in the British Army. In the current period, Rangers, SEALS, Delta Force type units, and special civilian-
military operations in counter-terror and rescue missions are special operations type low intensity conflicts. Conceptual coherency can be achieved by focusing on the small unit doctrines and tactics with missions given to elite units.

The concepts of revolution and counterrevolution, in contrast to special operations, are an intermix of military, political, and psychological factors, that are primarily focused within the political-social system, rather than military system. That is, any conceptual clarity must begin with a recognition that revolutionary causes are rooted deep within the social system and cannot be resolve simply by special operational concepts or doctrine. This requires concepts that aim at the political-social fabric of the existing system, and envision a broad range of political-psychological, as well as social and economic challenges. In turn, this focus should govern American policy, strategy, and criteria for involvement, and be addressed within a civilian-military intermix.

Conceptual coherence regarding revolutions and counterrevolutions must evolve from the following premises: the center of gravity of these conflicts is in the political-social milieu of society; the revolutionaries usually establish an alternative political system; the basic issue is who should rule; the conflicts tend to be protracted, unconventional, and take place in an alien culture in terms of American involvement.

The different conceptual formulations and categorizations distinguishing special operations and revolution/counterrevolution
are shown in Figure 2.

In brief, the Conflict Spectrum-Revised is divided into four categories: non-combat deployment of force; special operations, low intensity conflict, and major wars—both conventional and nuclear. Observations and qualifications with respect to the Contemporary Conflict Spectrum (Figure 1) are relevant. These include the caution that categorizations are not intended to be rigid, nor are they intended to clearly delineate one type of conflict from another, there may be and usually is some overlap and intermix. Additionally, the design of the conflict spectrum is intended for policy considerations and not necessarily to identify the specific characteristics of the intensity of conflict in any given situation. The concepts provide guidelines for formulating policy and strategy, and organizational strategy and doctrines.

Policy and Strategy

Effective American political-military posture for special operations and low intensity conflicts rests on the quality of policy and strategy. In this respect, there is a school of thought that accepts the decreasing utility of military force in international politics. This is based on the premise that military strategic forces are primarily for deterrence and diplomacy by threat, rather than for actual battle. Moreover, this view presumes that actual combat in distant lands is an increasing improbability, hence the decreasing utility of conventional forces.

As Weigley has stated, "At no point on the spectrum of
**Figure 2**

Conflict Spectrum—Revised

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><em>Non-Combat</em></th>
<th><strong>Special Operations</strong></th>
<th>L.W Intensity Conflicts</th>
<th>Convention al Wars</th>
<th>Nuclear Wars</th>
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<td><strong>ICI: I: II: III: IV</strong></td>
<td>Revolution/Counter-</td>
<td>Ltd Major Revolution</td>
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--- Good to. ----/----- Adequate--/ Poor-----/--Good--/--Good---
Adequate /                                                                 /                      / * /

(Relative degree of current American capability)

* Shows of Force; Non-military Assistance

** Hit-Run raids; Counter-terror; Rescue, Spearhead

*** Phase I: Combined economic and other non-military assistance and aid; weapons assistance teams, police training; military training cadres for CR operations

Phase II: Special Forces teams; military training cadres for indigenous units + Phase I

Phase III: Special Forces Headquarters and Teams; US ground troop commitment—defensive role + Phases I and II

Phase IV: "Vietnam" type commitment
violence does the use of combat offer much promise for the United States today...because the record of nonnuclear limited war in obtaining acceptable decisions at tolerable cost is also scarcely heartening, the history of usable combat may at last be reaching its end."

Events however may be causing a revision of these perspectives. Military force can be employed, if done judiciously, as an instrument of policy in conjunction with a variety of non-military instruments. Moreover, the deterrence quality of military force cannot rest on public pronouncements alone, but, to a degree must reflect a national will and political resolve for its use. Indeed, there are some who feel that periodic, demonstrated use is necessary in this regard, e.g., Grenada.

Moreover, the adoption of a "shoring" strategy requires the use of certain elements of the military as a political-military instrument. A shoring strategy is one designed to reinforce and support an indigenous system by committing the necessary resources, both human and material, to give substantive depth to existing systems, allowing them to concentrate on "effective" government.

In the context of these issues, the maintenance of military forces and their use in combat is a probability under certain conditions. Involvement in low intensity conflicts should not be based on "special operations" scenarios, but on a graduated and phased commitment (see Figure 2) incorporating a joint civilian-military structure. This should not be undertaken without serious analysis of the capability of the existing counterrevolutionary
system and the needs of American national security.

The higher the commitment phase, the more difficult it becomes for an American withdrawal. Therefore, before going beyond phase II, it is essential that serious assessments be made of consequences and the importance of the counterrevolutionary system to American national security.

Finally, it is conceivable that under certain conditions a third power or powers acting in concert with American political-military policy and strategy can become the instruments to carry out low intensity operations (as seems to be developing in Central American with the involvement of Honduras, El Salvador, and Israel). Indeed, it seems most appropriate for the United States to pursue alliance politics with third powers involved as political-military instruments. However, this may have its own difficulties and drawbacks because of nationalistic sensitivities and disagreements with certain aspects of American policy.

Organizational Strategy and Doctrine

Effective response to special operations and low intensity conflict is not likely to be achieved by incorporating planning, doctrine, training, and operational implementation into existing structures and policy agencies. Given the experience of the past, to do so is likely to dilute the focus on both special operations and low intensity conflicts, making them just another mission added to the variety of other responsibilities of particular agencies or military commands. This may not be as great a problem for special
operations for reasons discussed earlier.

The prevailing mind sets, conflict assessments, and operational guidelines focusing on well established missions, characterize existing civilian and military agencies. The same groupthink approach will likely prevail in dealing with low intensity conflicts. In such a context, it is difficult to adapt innovative responses and unconventional measures, particularly those seriously challenging conventional wisdom. It is more likely that in the prevailing policy and strategy atmosphere, conventional forces-in-being are perceived as capable of undertaking low intensity conflicts. This may hold a certain amount of truth with respect to special operations, but it is a fundamental error with respect to low intensity conflicts. Moreover, these views and organizational structures allow little flexibility for incorporating civilian agency inputs, cooperation, and coordination, which are essential to successful response in low intensity conflicts.

One method of trying to overcome some of the problems between special operations, low intensity conflicts, and priority attention to these missions, may be in separating missions and organizations accordingly. The First Special Operations Command could be reorganized for those missions and units specifically assigned special operations missions as defined here. A Special Forces Command, with the same standing as the Special operations Command should be created, whose primary mission is low intensity conflicts as defined here. In both cases, the command line for
employment should lead directly to the highest echelons of the National Command Authority, with its focal point in the National Security Council. These organizational structures must not only include realistic "joint" structures and concepts within the military services, but also "joint" structures and concepts as these relate to civilian-military responsibilities and operations (see Figure 3).

Organizational strategy must also account for distinctions between the conduct and countering of low intensity conflicts. In the first instance, this may begin with the use of third country allies through which military assistance is channelled, among other things. It may also include the commitment of teams from the Special Forces Command and an expansion of military supplies to include political-psychological support. In the final phases, it may even mean the involvement of American military forces in support of an indigenous revolution (see Figure 2).

The conduct of revolution is more likely to be undertaken by civilian heavy systems, since the nature of such operations are primarily covert and political-psychological, requiring an effective intelligence network. While it is conceivable that such civilian led operations may be given logistical and administrative support by military commands, they may also be directly supported by Special Forces teams.

Countering low intensity conflicts is primarily an effort to support counterrevolutionary systems. Initially, such an involvement is likely to be directed by civilian agencies, given
Figure 3

NSC Deputy
Joint Planning and Operation Center

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<tr>
<td>Joint Training Command</td>
<td>Joint Operational Command</td>
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Command Systems
----- Tailored for Particular Contingencies-----

First Special + Civilian Opns Command --- Special Forces + Civilian Command Component

Civilian Heavy
| |
|---|---|
| Civilian Executive | Military Executive |
| Military Deputy | Civilian Deputy |

Civilian execution with military assistance and support
| |
|---|---|
| Military execution with civilian assistance and support |
the nature of the conflict. In later phases, assuming the conflict expands with the emergence of an effective revolutionary armed element, the American effort and strategy may shift to a military heavy command system. This may be temporary, in an effort to prevent the revolutionary armed forces from disrupting counterrevolutionary efforts.

In retrospect, successful American response to special operations and low intensity conflict rests with the development of conceptual coherency and clarity regarding the boundaries and substance of these types of conflicts, with particular attention to their relationships within the conflict spectrum. From this a more realistic policy and strategy can be designed which is not based on a world policeman role on the one hand, and semi-isolationism and the Vietnam syndrome on the other. Rather, this must reflect a realistic assessment of American interests in Third World areas, placing priorities on critical areas with a strategy designed to conform to the nature of democratic society.

Equally important organizational strategy and doctrines must be guided by conceptual factors, and the goals, and requirements of policy and strategy. Not only does this involve commitment of necessary resources, but an institutionalization of "joint" organizational strategy that encompasses civilian-military as well as interservice agencies and commands. Doctrinal guidelines that incorporate these also need to provide maximum flexibility for placing or shifting responsibility to civilian heavy and/or military heavy commands as the situation may dictate.
These are not easily accomplished in the military system, nor in civilian institutions, or political policy making circles. It is equally difficult to change philosophical and intellectual directions to recognize the nature and character of low intensity conflicts and the challenges these pose to American security interests. Finally, it is difficult to articulate these matters clearly and understandably to the American people with the view towards a general acceptance of an American political-military posture that is realistic to the challenges of low intensity conflict.

But a serious effort must be made in this respect. The comments by General Weyand, although directed at the American Army, is a charge relevant to all of the military services as well as civilian policy makers.

As military professionals we must speak out, we must counsel our political leaders and alert the American public that there is no such things as a "splendid little war." The Army must make the price of involvement clear before we get involved, so that America can weigh the probable costs of involvement against the dangers of noninvolvement...for there are worse things than war. 18
Endnotes


12. Ibid.


18. As quoted in Summers, p. 25.
PLENARY ADDRESS

to

SESSION I

THE NINTH AIR UNIVERSITY AIRPOWER SYMPOSIUM

TOOLS OF WAR/ SKILLS OF PEACE: THE US RESPONSE TO
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

BY

MR. R. LYNN RYLANDER
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SPECIAL PLANNING
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
TOOLS OF WAR/SKILLS OF PEACE

THE US RESPONSE TO LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

AIRPOWER SYMPOSIUM

11 MARCH 1985

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, I'M PLEASED TO BE ABLE TO JOIN YOU THIS MORNING AS WE COLLECTIVELY ATTEMPT TO COME TO GRIPS WITH ONE OF THE MOST VEXING PROBLEMS CONFRONTING OUR NATION. THE FACT THAT WE'RE GATHERED HERE IN MARCH OF 1985 ILLUSTRATES THE COMPLEXITY OF LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT. MANY OF US HAVE BEEN WORRYING LIC FOR YEARS. MANY OF US WERE HERE IN MARCH OF 1984 WRESTLING WITH THE SAME PROBLEMS. MANY OF US HAVE BEEN KICKING THE ISSUE AROUND EVER SINCE.

SAM SARKESIAN HAS GIVEN US KEY INSIGHTS INTO THE DYNAMICS OF LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT IN THE LAST HOUR. WHAT I'D LIKE TO DO NOW IS TAKE THE NEXT STEP BY ADDRESSING THE IMPLICATIONS OF THAT THREAT FOR US NATIONAL SECURITY, AND SPECIFICALLY, THE CAPABILITIES AND POLICY OUR COUNTRY MUST HAVE TO DEAL WITH THAT THREAT.

THE THREAT

I SHOULD NOT, AND WILL NOT, ATTEMPT TO EMBELLISH ON PROFESSOR SARKESIAN'S DISCUSSION OF LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT. I WOULD SIMPLY LIKE TO NOTE THE RESULTS:

0 SINCE WORLD WAR TWO, THE WORLD HAS SEEN 1,200 CONFLICTS--EIGHTY PERCENT OF THOSE WERE LOW-INTENSITY.
0 SEVENTEEN COUNTRIES HAVE FALLEN TO LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT SINCE CUBA WENT COMMUNIST.
TWENTY-ONE INSURGENCIES ARE ACTIVE TODAY.
AND, COUNTING THE OTHER "SMALL" WARS, ONE OUT OF EVERY
FOUR COUNTRIES IS ENGAGED IN SOME FORM OF CONFLICT.

THE RESULTS, THEMSELVES, ARE SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR CONCERN.
THE PROCESS THAT LED TO THESE RESULTS IS EVEN MORE TROUBLING.
THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER IS THAT THIS APPARENT INSTABILITY IS NO
ACCIDENT OF HISTORY OR GEOGRAPHY. NOR CAN WE ACCEPT THE PREMISE
THAT LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT IS MERELY THE PLAYING OUT OF THE
CHANGES RESULTING FROM THE POST-WAR BREAKUP OF THE OLD COLONIAL
EMPIRES. RATHER, WHAT WE CONFRONT ARE THE FRUITS OF A CONSCIOUS
POLICY PURSUED BY THE SOVIET UNION AND THEIR PROXIES.

SINCE WORLD WAR II, THE FREE WORLD'S NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL
MILITARY STRENGTH HAS PREVENTED OPEN, LARGE-SCALE WAR. THE
SOVIETS, IN ASSESSING THAT FUNDAMENTAL FACT CONCLUDED, HOWEVER,
THAT OUTLETS FOR THE PURSUIT OF THEIR OBJECTIVES STILL EXIST--
THOSE BEING IN THE REALM OF LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT, OR WHAT THEY
CALL "WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION". BY PROMOTING AND SUPPORTING
THIS FORM OF CONFLICT, THEY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ADVANCE THEIR
POSITION WITHOUT DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH THE FREE WORLD.

IN LARGE PART, THE SUCCESS OF THIS POLICY CAN BE TRACED TO
THE SIMPLE FACT THAT LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT RARELY, IF EVER,
RISES ABOVE THE FREE WORLD'S COLLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS HORIZON,
AND WHEN IT DOES OUR TYPICAL HALTING EFFORT TO FIND A RESPONSE,
IN GENERAL, MIRRORS THE DIVERSITY OF OPINION THAT IS THE BASIS
OF A FREE, PLURALISTIC SOCIETY SUCH AS OURS. AS GENERAL NUTTING
NOTED IN 1983, THERE CLEARLY IS A WAR GOING ON--A WAR THAT WE
"INSTITUTIONALLY DO NOT UNDERSTAND...AND ARE NOT ORGANIZED
VERY EFFECTIVELY TO COPE WITH...".

UNLESS WE ARE WILLING TO ACCEPT THE EROSION OF OUR INTERESTS
AROUND THE WORLD, WE MUST RECOGNIZE THIS INSIDEOUS THREAT. AND
WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THE STRATEGY AND FORCES TO DEAL WITH IT
ARE AS IMPORTANT TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY AS THE STRATEGY AND
FORCES WE HAVE DEVELOPED AND MAINTAINED AGAINST THE MORE VIOLENT
BUT FAR LESS LIKELY EVENTUALITY OF CONVENTIONAL OR NUCLEAR WAR.

THE RESPONSE

AMERICANS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN AN OPTIMISTIC PEOPLE. THE MORAL
FABRIC OF OUR OWN SOCIETY LEADS US TO PRESUME THAT RIGHT WILL
ULTIMATELY PREVAIL ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD. BY THE SAME TOKEN,
AMERICA SEEKS NO EMPIRE. WHEN WE HAVE CHOSEN TO USE OUR COUNTRY'S
MIGHT, IT HAS NOT BEEN FOR CONQUEST, BUT RATHER FOR THE RESTORATION
AND PRESERVATION OF LIBERTY. FOR AMERICANS, DIPLOMACY HAS ALWAYS
BEEN THE TOOL TO PEACE--MILITARY FORCE HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE TOOL
OF WAR.

THE DILEMMA FOR AMERICANS IS THAT LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT IS
NEITHER "TRUE" PEACE NOR "TRUE" WAR. AS SECRETARY WEINBERGER
OBSERVED IN NOVEMBER, "THE LINE BETWEEN PEACE AND WAR IS LESS
CLEARLY DRAWN THAN AT ANY TIME IN OUR HISTORY". GIVEN THESE
REALITIES, WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT FOR LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT
THERE CAN BE NO PURELY MILITARY OR DIPLOMATIC OR ECONOMIC
SOLUTION. RATHER THAN VIEW THE TOOLS AT OUR DISPOSAL AS OPTIONS,
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT DEMANDS THAT WE VIEW THEM AS COMPLEMENTS. LACKING SUCH A RECOGNITION, OUR TENDENCY WILL BE TO RELY ON DIPLOMATIC SOLUTIONS--TO THE EXCLUSIONS OF THE MILITARY COMPONENT--ONLY TO CALL ON THE MILITARY WHEN DIPLOMACY FAILS. AND AT THAT POINT A MILITARY "SOLUTION" MAY NO LONGER BE ACHIEVABLE.

IN NOVEMBER, SECRETARY WEINBERGER WARNED OF THE "CONSEQUENCES OF FAILING TO DETER CONFLICT AT THE LOWEST LEVEL POSSIBLE". IF WE ARE TO AVOID THOSE CONSEQUENCES, WE MUST LOOK AT THE CHALLENGE OF LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT AS ONE THAT REQUIRES AN INTEGRATED NATIONAL RESPONSE--ONE THAT DEMANDS THE BEST EFFORTS OF THE MILITARY, DIPLOMATIC, ECONOMIC, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPONENTS OF OUR NATIONAL POWER BOTH FROM THE BEGINNING AND THROUGHOUT OUR INVOLVEMENT. THE ENGAGEMENT OF THESE COMPONENTS MUST BE CAREFULLY BALANCED AND APPROPRIATE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES. IT MUST, AS SECRETARY WEINBERGER POINTED OUT, REFLECT THE FUNDAMENTAL VALUES OF OUR SOCIETY. BUT ABOVE ALL, THE COMPONENTS MUST BE BROUGHT TOGETHER IN A CONCERTED EFFORT. THAT MUST BE THE ESSENCE OF OUR LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT STRATEGY, AND THAT IS WHAT WE HAVE SET OUT TO ACCOMPLISH.

THE MILITARY COMPONENT

WHILE I BELIEVE OUR STRATEGY MUST BE AN INTEGRATIVE ONE, FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS SYMPOSIUM I WANT TO DWELL ON THE MILITARY COMPONENT. NEARLY A QUARTER OF A CENTURY AGO, PRESIDENT KENNEDY HAD THIS TO SAY ABOUT LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT:

"THIS IS ANOTHER TYPE OF WAR, NEW IN ITS INTENSITY, ANCIENT IN ITS ORIGIN--WAR BY
GUERRILLAS, SUBVERSIVES, INSURGENTS, ASSASSINS, WAR BY AMBUSH INSTEAD OF BY COMBAT; BY INFILTRA-
TION, INSTEAD OF AGGRESSION, SEEKING VICTORY
BY ERODING AND EXHAUSTING THE ENEMY INSTEAD
OF ENGAGING HIM. IT IS A FORM OF WARFARE
UNIQUELY ADAPTED TO WHAT HAS BEEN STRANGELY
CALLED "WARS OF LIBERATION", TO UNDERMINE THE
EFFORTS OF NEW AND POOR COUNTRIES TO MAINTAIN
THE FREEDOM THAT THEY HAVE FINALLY ACHIEVED.
IT PREYS ON ECONOMIC UNREST AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS.
ITAL REQUIRES IN THOSE SITUATIONS WHERE WE MUST
COUNTER IT, AND THESE ARE THE KINDS OF CHALLENGES
THAT WILL BE BEFORE US IN THE NEXT DECADE IF
FREEDOM IS TO BE SAVED, A WHOLE NEW KIND OF
STRATEGY, A WHOLLY DIFFERENT KIND OF FORCE, AND
THEREFORE A NEW AND WHOLLY DIFFERENT KIND OF
MILITARY TRAINING."

FOR US IN THE 1980s, THE PERCEPTIONS (AND THE TASKS) ARE
MUCH THE SAME. THE THREAT OF LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT HAS CONTINUED
UNABATED, AND THE NEED TO BUILD A MILITARY COMPONENT CAPABLE OF
DEALING WITH IT PERSISTS. IN THAT CONTEXT, I WOULD LIKE TO FOCUS
SPECIFICALLY ON SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (SOF).

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

WHEN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION TOOK OFFICE IN 1981, SOF WERE
CLOSE TO BEING A MEMORY. DURING THE 1970s--A DECADE OF NEGLECT--
SOF FUNDING WAS CUT BY 95%, UNITS WERE DEACTIVATED, AND MODERNI-
ZATION NEEDS IGNORED. IN THE WAKE OF VIETNAM, THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM WAS THAT SOF WERE A FORCE WITHOUT A MISSION. BUT THOSE WITH GREATER INSIGHT PERCEIVED THAT, IN REALITY, WE HAD A MISSION WITHOUT A FORCE. THAT RECOGNITION WAS THE GENESIS OF OUR SOF REVITALIZATION POLICY.

THE EFFORT IS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT BEING PURSUED BY THIS ADMINISTRATION. IN 1983 DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE THAYER DESCRIBED THE REVITALIZATION OF SOF AS "A MATTER OF NATIONAL URGENCY", AND THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR HAS NOTED THAT SOF REVITALIZATION "IS ESSENTIAL TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY" AND "SHOULD BE A TOP DEFENSE DEPARTMENT PRIORITY". DEPUTY SECRETARY THAYER'S SUCCESSOR, WILLIAM H. TAFT, IV, HAS REVALIDATED THE EMPHASIS, NOTING THAT "THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS ASSIGNED THE HIGHEST PRIORITY TO THE RESTORATION OF OUR SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES."


THE EMPHASIS PLACED ON SOF REVITALIZATION HAS ALREADY BORNE FRUIT. BY THE END OF FY 1985, WE WILL HAVE ADDED A SPECIAL FORCES GROUP, A RANGER REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS PLUS A RANGER BATTALION,
A psychological operations battalion, a SEAL team, and 36 naval special warfare craft, light to the SOF force structure. As the result of DOD emphasis and the identification of deficiencies by the master plans produced by the services, we will add another special forces group, another SEAL team, 18 naval special warfare craft, medium, and 21 MC-130 combat talons between FY 1986 and FY 1990.

Overall, active duty manpower will grow by 80 percent—from 11,600 in FY 1981 to 20,900 in FY 1990. But even with these increases, SOF will account for only about one-tenth of one percent of US military manpower, and a like amount of the Department of Defense budget.

Special Operations Forces in Low-Intensity Conflict

Now what will these increases buy us in terms of our capacity to deal with low-intensity conflict? In the broadest sense, the fact that SOF are specially organized, trained, and equipped to conduct operations during periods of peace and hostilities means that SOF can add a great deal.

More specifically, the extent of that capability can be demonstrated by looking at SOF's six fundamental missions.

Foreign Internal Defense (FID) is the military component of nation-building. While any military component can conduct FID operations, SOF are uncommonly qualified to do so—especially those elements such as special forces and psychological operations
THAT COUNT AREA ORIENTATION AND LANGUAGE TRAINING AMONG THEIR SKILLS. SOF HAVE CONDUCTED MORE THAN 500 TRAINING MISSIONS IN SOME 60 COUNTRIES IN THE LAST DECADE AND, WITH ONE-TENTH OF ONE PERCENT OF THE MILITARY MANPOWER, CURRENTLY ACCOUNT FOR ABOUT ONE-THIRD OF OUR TRAINING OPERATIONS.

**UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE (UW)** IS THE FLIP SIDE OF FID---MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS IN HOSTILE, DENIED, OR POLITICALLY SENSITIVE AREAS, NORMALLY IN SUPPORT OF INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL.

**RECONNAISSANCE**, AS A METHOD OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, IS ESSENTIAL TO LOW-INTENSITY OPERATIONS. SOF ARE CAPABLE OF SUCH OPERATIONS EITHER UNILATERALLY OR IN SUPPORT OF OTHER OPERATIONS.

**DIRECT ACTION** INVOLVES MILITARY ACTION AGAINST TARGETS IN HOSTILE OR DENIED AREAS. SOF PROVIDE US A FLEXIBLE CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT SUCH OPERATIONS, ESPECIALLY AT THE LOWER END OF THE SPECTRUM.

**PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS** ARE DESIGNED TO DESTROY AN ENEMY’S WILL TO RESIST AND/OR BOLSTER FRIENDLY FORCES’ WILL TO PREVAIL, AND CAN BE ESPECIALLY EFFECTIVE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT.

FINALLY, **CIVIL AFFAIRS** ENCOMPASS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN US FORCES AND THE INDIGENOUS CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES AND POPULATION, AND CAN BE CRUCIAL TO THE CIVIL-MILITARY NATION-BUILDING PROCESS.

BECAUSE OF THIS UNIQUE SET OF CAPABILITIES, SOF PROVIDE THE US THE ESSENTIAL BRIDGE BETWEEN PEACEFUL COMPETITION AND MORE VIOLENT FORMS OF CONFLICT. IN SOME INSTANCES, A CARRIER BATTLE
GROUP "SHOWING THE FLAG" WOULD BE BOTH APPROPRIATE AND EFFECTIVE. IN OTHERS, MARINES MAY BE NEEDED FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS OR THE 82ND AIRBORNE DIVISION MAY BE NEEDED FOR CRISIS RESPONSE. IN STILL OTHERS, ROUTINE MILITARY AIRLIFT OPERATIONS MAY BE SUFFICIENT.

IN SOME CASES, HOWEVER, THE EMPLOYMENT OF SIZEABLE, HIGHLY VISIBLE ELEMENTS OF THE US MILITARY STRUCTURE MAY BE INAPPROPRIATE OR POLITICALLY INFEASIBLE. IT IS PRECISELY THAT SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES FOR WHICH SOF, BY VIRTUE OF THEIR SPECIALIZED ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, AND EQUIPMENT, ARE UNIQUELY CAPABLE.

US SOF HAVE NOT YET REGAINED THE CAPABILITY NEEDED TO CARRY OUT THEIR GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITIES. MORE SPECIFICALLY, IF WE ARE TO RESPOND EFFECTIVELY TO LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT, WE NEED TO TAKE A NUMBER OF STEPS.

FIRST, WE HAVE TO FOLLOW THROUGH WITH THE REVITALIZATION PROGRAM ALREADY UNDERWAY. BECAUSE THE PROGRAM IS A MATTER OF INTENSE CONTROVERSY AMONG THE UNIFORMED MILITARY, SUCCESS WILL DEPEND ON SUSTAINED NATIONAL EMPHASIS.

SECOND, WE HAVE TO DEVELOP A COHERENT NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT. BECAUSE OF OUR NATIONAL VIETNAM "HANGOVER", WE HAVE A STRATEGY VOID TO FILL. GATHERING SUCH AS THIS ONE REFLECT THAT NEED.

THIRD, WE NEED TO DEVELOP DOCTRINE THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH THAT STRATEGY. IF YOU READ ARMY DOCTRINE (CONTAINED IN FM 100-20) YOUR CONCLUSION WOULD BE THAT LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT IS NO
DIFFERENT FROM ANY OTHER SITUATION SUSCEPTIBLE TO CONVENTIONAL MILITARY "SOLUTION". THAT SIMPLY IS NOT THE CASE.

WHILE I APPLAUD THE THINKING THAT HAS GONE INTO THE APPLICATION OF ELECTRO-MAGNETIC PULSE, SPACE-BASED WEAPONS, AND THE B-1 BOMBER TO LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT IN PREPARATION FOR THIS SYMPOSIUM, I BELIEVE THE BULK OF OUR ATTENTION SHOULD BE FOCUSED ON THE FORCES DIRECTLY AND SINGULARLY DESIGNED TO DEAL WITH SUCH CONFLICT.

FOURTH, WE NEED TO EXPAND AND IMPROVE DRAMATICALLY THE SKILLS SPECIFICALLY NEEDED FOR LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT. LANGUAGE CAPABILITIES, FOR EXAMPLE, ARE ESSENTIAL, BUT WHILE SPECIAL FORCES' LANGUAGE SKILLS ARE SUFFICIENT FOR SPANISH-SPEAKING REGIONS OF THE THIRD WORLD, WHERE OTHER LANGUAGES PREDOMINATE THE US CAN DEPLOY NO MORE THAN ONE FULLY LANGUAGE-QUALIFIED TWELVE-MAN SPECIAL FORCES A-DETACHMENT. SIMILAR LANGUAGE DEFICIENCIES PERSIST IN PSYOP FORCES.

FIFTH, WE NEED TO RECOGNIZE THAT LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT HAS UNIQUE FORCE STRUCTURE IMPLICATIONS. THE MC-130 COMBAT TALON AND HH-53 PAVE LOW HAVE TREMENDOUS CAPABILITIES THAT ARE UNIQUE IN THE WORLD. HOWEVER, SOME OF THEIR CAPABILITY MAY BE SUPERFLUOUS TO THE DEMANDS OF LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT, AND THEIR COST COULD, ON OCCASION, LIMIT OUR EMPLOYMENT FLEXIBILITY. WE SHOULD BE THINKING OF TAKING A TECHNOLOGICAL STEP BACKWARD--TO SYSTEMS SUCH AS THE AC-47 AND T-28 THAT HAVE LONG SINCE BEEN RELEGATED BY THE US TO THE "BONEYARD".
WE IN DOD SHOULD ALSO BE THINKING INNOVATIVELY, LOOKING AT
WAYS TO EMPLOY THE A-10, FOR EXAMPLE, OR CONSIDERING THE PROCUREMENT OF AIRCRAFT SUCH AS THE DEHAVILLAND BUFFALO.

I HOPE WE'LL HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS SOME OF THESE ISSUES DURING THIS SYMPOSIUM.

THE REQUIREMENT

IN CLOSING, LET ME SUM UP WHAT I BELIEVE ARE THE TWO ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES' RESPONSE TO LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT.

FIRST, WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT IS NEITHER "TRUE" PEACE NOR "TRUE" WAR. OUR RESPONSE REQUIRES THE INTEGRATED USE OF OUR NATION'S POLITICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, DIPLOMATIC, AND UNCONVENTIONAL MILITARY POWER, AND THAT RESPONSE MUST BE CAREFULLY ORCHESTRATED AT THE HIGHEST NATIONAL LEVELS.

SECOND, THE UNCONVENTIONAL MILITARY COMPONENT OF THAT RESPONSE MUST BE REBUILT AS A MATTER OF NATIONAL URGENCY, AND THAT REBUILDING MUST TAKE FORMS THAT WILL BE BOTH UNFAMILIAR AND DISTASTEFUL TO TRADITIONAL THINKERS. GATHERINGS SUCH AS THIS CAN PLAY A KEY ROLE IN DEFINING THAT PROCESS AND BREAKING DOWN THE BARRIERS.

IF WE FAIL TO BUILD A MILITARY CAPABILITY THAT ENCOMPASSES THE TOOLS OF WAR AND THE SKILLS OF PEACE, AND INTEGRATE THAT CAPABILITY INTO A NATIONAL STRATEGY, OUR OPTIONS WILL BE REDUCED TO TWO.

ON THE ONE HAND, WE CAN TREAT LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT SOLELY AS A PEACETIME PROBLEM AND ATTEMPT TO DEAL WITH IT THROUGH
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. THOSE CHANNELS, HOWEVER, OFFER AN IMPERFECT SHIELD FOR OUR VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS AGAINST ARMED AGGRESSION AT WHATEVER LEVEL OF INTENSITY. THE COST, SHOULD WE CHOOSE THIS OPTION, COULD BE DEFAULT ON OUR VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS.

ON THE OTHER HAND, WE CAN TREAT LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT SOLELY AS A WARTIME PROBLEM AND ATTEMPT TO DEAL WITH IT THROUGH CONVENTIONAL MILITARY MEANS—MASS AND FIREPOWER. HOWEVER, AS HISTORY HAS SHOWN, THIS "SOLUTION" IS OF QUESTIONABLE APPROPRIATENESS IN THE LIC CONTEXT. MOREOVER, BECAUSE THE VERY NATURE OF A CONVENTIONAL RESPONSE CARRIES THE SEEDS OF ESCALATION TO WIDER CONFRONTATION, THE COST, SHOULD WE CHOOSE THIS OPTION, COULD BE POLITICAL AND SECURITY PERILS OF FAR BROADER MAGNITUDE.

IN MY VIEW, THESE ARE NOT TRUE OPTIONS AT ALL. THE COSTS IN EITHER CASE ARE TOO HIGH FOR OUR REPUBLIC TO BEAR. WE MUST, IN FACT, AS SECRETARY WEINBERGER PROPOSED, BE PREPARED TO DETER CONFLICT AT THE LOWEST LEVEL POSSIBLE.

THANK YOU.
SUMMARY OF PANEL PROCEEDINGS

SESSION I: "NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY FOR LOWER LEVELS OF CONFLICT."

Papers presented in this session are reprinted in Appendix 1.

PANEL A - "THREAT: TERRORISM AND ETHNONATIONALISM"
(Moderator: Col Hans J. Asmus, USAF; Recorder: Col Ronald D. Gray, USAF)

Paper: "Ethnonationalists or Ideologues: The Case of Terrorism in the Israeli/PLO Conflict," by Dr Omar M. Kadar

Thesis: Terrorism can be characterized as either motivated by ideology or by ethnonationalism.

Conclusion: Ethnonationalistic terrorism can be combatted only with diplomacy and political means while ideological terrorism is a problem for intelligence and law enforcement agencies.


Thesis: A long-term, well-planned, pro-active defense is the best military approach to terrorism rather than a retaliatory, quid pro quo attack on the terrorists.

Conclusion: Security foresight more than retaliation and retribution can significantly reduce the vulnerability of military installations and personnel.

Paper: "Low Intensity Conflict: The Terrorist Dimension," by Dr. James B. Motley

Thesis: United States forces must refocus on the lower end of the conflict spectrum and develop the forces and strategy to operate in that environment.

Conclusion: The United States' military must prepare for anti-terrorist missions by developing the strategy and
forces appropriate to the low intensity nature of this form of conflict.

**Summary of Panel Discussion:** The following were the major points of consensus:

- Ethnonationalistic terrorism can only be addressed by eliminating the grievances of the group, while ideological terrorism is a problem for law enforcement or military forces because it seeks destruction of the existing order rather than creation of something in its place.

- Non-state sponsored terrorism may best be handled by civil law enforcement agencies, but countering state sponsored terrorism requires military involvement.

- The distinction between legitimate covert activities and terrorism is the target, although one man's freedom fighter may be another man's terrorist.

- In the security foresight area senior officer education needs emphasis. The State Department is spending millions on security of overseas facilities and our overseas intelligence networks are improving, but we still do not do very well in identifying potential threats or specifically fixing specific responsibility for terrorist attacks.

- The distinction between ethnonationalistic and ideological terrorists is sometimes fuzzy because both types of terrorists may be in the same group.

- The media may have legitimized terrorist activities by downplaying the criminal nature of their activities and emphasizing political motivations. While some legitimization has occurred, there is no effective means to stop it in a free press environment. Accepting that, governments should use the media to highlight the true character of terrorism.
PANEL D - "POLICY DEVELOPMENT: SEMANTICS AND CHALLENGES"
(Moderator: Col John G. Lorber, USAF; Recorders: Col Stephen C. Mannell, USAF and Cdr William C. Thomas, USN)

Paper: "Airpower, Superpower, and Low Intensity Conflict," by Maj Gregory B. Colvin, USAF

Thesis: The United States has been slow to comprehend classical balance of power realities and the impact of low intensity conflict on the balance of power between East and West. The result has been a failure to develop U.S. national policies and military strategies for dealing with low intensity conflict.

Conclusion: The USAF needs to rebuild Air Force special operations forces to deal with low intensity conflict in accordance with national and defense guidance.

Paper: "Sorting Out the Semantics of Low Intensity Conflict," by Capt Willard L. Elledge, Jr., USAF

Thesis: The words used to define low intensity conflict have created a dictionary of conflicting and ambiguous terminology. The result is military doctrine that is nonstandard, unclear, and ambiguous.

Conclusion: Three basic reasons cause ambiguous terminology: Lack of corporate continuity; reluctance to use terms that were associated with the Vietnam era; and, the joint nature, i.e., multi-service, of the mission area.

Paper: "Low Intensity Conflict: Noncombat Solutions," by Col Calvin R. Johnson, USAF and Capt Peter M. Sanchez, USAF

Thesis: USAF security assistance is essential for combatting insurgencies that are inimical to United States interests. Such assistance could preclude U.S. combat forces from becoming involved in the low intensity conflicts.

Conclusion: USAF security assistance priorities for Latin America should be reevaluated. More emphasis should be placed on civic actions, psychological operations, and drug interdiction. The United States should assist in the acquisition of aircraft that are appropriate for Latin American...
countries and the low intensity environment.

**Summary of Panel Discussion**: The following were the major points of consensus:

- Low intensity conflict will continue to be the most common form of future conflict.
- The emphasis of United States policy must be on helping friendly governments solve their own problems (re-emphasize the Nixon Doctrine).
- Imprecise terminology is a barrier to communicating the nature of low intensity conflict; authors must be more precise in defining their terms when, or if, they depart from the official military terminology of JCS Pub 1 or JCS Pub 20.
- Underlying all the panel's points of agreement was that the United States must demonstrate its readiness to support friendly governments.
- No single aircraft or type of aircraft will solve all of the problems presented by low intensity conflict. The C-130 appears to be the most versatile airframe for use by U.S. forces, but every aircraft in the Air Force inventory could play a role--tactical fighters to bombers to AWACS. It is unfortunate that the United States aerospace industry does not produce a small, easily maintained transport aircraft for use by Third World forces to maintain their lines of communication.
PANEL C - "POLICY DEVELOPMENT: WARNINGS AND INDICATIONS"
(Moderator: Col William Koelt, USAF; Recorders: Lt Col John Zartman, USAF and Lt Col T. Michael Messett, USAF)

Paper: "Early Warning Indicators Relative to US Involvement in Third World Conflict," by Lt Col Lee Dixon, USAF and Dr Leslie Lewis

Thesis: Warning and crisis models are useful in predicting mid to long term contingencies.
Conclusion: There are a dearth of reliable tools to predict threats to United States interests. While actual predictive accuracy is poor, analytic thought process models enforced on decision makers do contribute to a broader understanding of the causes and factors involved in low intensity conflict.

Paper: "Low Intensity Conflict: Not Fulda, Not Kola," by Gen Paul F. Gorman, USA.

Thesis: United States forces are ill-structured to counter threats at the lower end of the conflict spectrum.
Conclusion: Low Intensity Conflict requires different kinds of policy instruments and especially different kinds of armed forces (organization, training and equippage) than those readied for direct engagement of the Soviets.


Thesis: Long range, detailed and integrated security assistance planning is essential for gaining Congressional support for aid programs involving in the Third World.
Conclusion: Security assistance planning should include: bilateral planning adjusted for fiscal and political realities; a detailed program which is fully costed and projected; and, early and continuing engagement of Congress.

Summary of Panel Discussion: The following were the major points of consensus:
-Crisis prediction is hampered by a lack of consistent definition of Low Intensity Conflict (terminology).
Low intensity conflict is best addressed by local forces, therefore, to further United States interests a well planned security assistance program for local forces is essential.

Incorrect structuring (organized, trained and equipped) of military forces constitutes a potential strategic vulnerability.

The USAF should upgrade the mission and organization of United States Air Forces Southern Command (USAFSOC), also known as, the Southern Air Division of Tactical Air Command, so it can take the lead, as a true air component command, in developing Southern Command's theater requirements for weapons systems, training and tactics.

PANEL D - "MILITARY CHALLENGES" Classified SECRET, US Only, (Moderator: Mr. Jerome Klingaman, AU/CADRE)

Requests for papers presented at this panel should be directed to the authors.


PLENARY ADDRESS

to

SESSION II

THE NINTH AIR UNIVERSITY AIRPOWER SYMPOSIUM

MILITARY STRATEGY FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

BY

COLONEL EUGENE G. MYERS, USAF
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF PLANS
UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
Good Morning. On behalf of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command, it's a pleasure to have been invited to the 1985 Airpower Symposium to outline my thoughts on military strategy for low intensity conflict. I am certainly aware of the impressive credentials and collective expertise possessed by this audience. The credentials which I offer this morning are those of an aviator and manager employed in the joint arena. My interests are correspondingly practical. I want to define some of the challenges and threats that low intensity conflict holds for the U.S. Central Command, for the Air Force, and for our nation. With these challenges and interests in mind, we'll focus our concerns for the design of appropriate and effective political-military responses.

The world is experiencing unprecedented revolutions in technology and communications. The post-war demise of colonialism has spawned sweeping changes in political and ideological systems. Forces for modernization are strong -- seemingly irresistible today. Nowhere is this felt more keenly than in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility. Centuries of tradition are being swept away to make room for changing political and social orders. These forces promote unprecedented political instability. Communist and other radical adversaries seek to exploit this changing order at our expense and that of the free world. The Soviet Union supports and promotes terrorism and uses political instability and low intensity conflict to achieve objectives in the third world. Our policy and strategies must develop a capability to counter their thrust. We must be ready to assist friendly states that request our assistance.

Today, conflict most frequently occurs in the low intensity arena. The future will likely conform to this trend. Even with this challenge, our greatest investment of strategic thought and allocation of resources continues to be in preparation for the highest levels of conflict. High level conflict scenarios include strategic nuclear exchange and major conventional war against the Soviet Union in Europe, the Pacific, or Southwest Asia. The US understandably invests heavily against the high intensity threat. And, we need to effectively counter these threats. Because of our vigilance and commitment to deterrence the high intensity threat remains less likely.

But the rough strategic parity of the superpowers has simply encouraged political-military competition at a lower level. More common today are wars by proxy, insurgencies, and wars of
national liberation. The field of battle is most often in the
Third World. And future conflicts are likely to occur in the
low intensity arena and in the Third World. We are better
prepared for what have become the unlikely crises of major
conventional or strategic nuclear war. We are less well
prepared, and we allocate fewer national resources, to coping
with increasingly unavoidable threats at the low intensity level
in the Third World. Perhaps a reexamination of our focus is
necessary.

Several years ago there was much discussion in academic circles
about the declining utility of the use of force. Predictions
made in the 1970s that armed confrontation was becoming obsolete
have not been borne out. At the present time no fewer than a
fourth of the nations around the globe are directly or
indirectly involved in armed conflict. Recent fighting includes
several conventional wars and more than 30 revolutionary and
separatist insurgencies. Some fighting is intense, with
casualties running into the thousands. Other disputes simmer
and occasionally flare into active armed confrontation. In
examining conflict in the world today, the experience of the
USCENTCOM AOR is instructive. Within this region alone, the
following active conflicts and incidents --most in the low
intensity realm -- militate against regional stability.

The Iran-Iraq war is the most intense conventional conflict
being waged today. Hostilities ignited in the fall of 1980 but
regional animosities behind the conflict have simmered for
centuries. While this conflict is well above the low intensity
level, several regional by-products of the conflict fall into
the lower conflict spectrum. The Iranian Islamic Revolution
which preceded the hostilities was, and remains, destabilizing
to the entire region. The religious and ideological extremes of
the revolution have promoted unrest and suspicion of Shi'ite
minorities in neighboring countries. The regime of the
Ayatollah Khomeini, and revolutionary factions within Iran, have
been linked to terrorism in the Gulf and in other areas of the
world. Some examples you are familiar with are the Iran-U.S.
hostage crisis, Iranian-connected Shi'a terror in Lebanon, and
incidents in Kuwait, such as the bombing of the U.S. Embassy,
and hijacking of Kuwaiti airliners. Several of these incidents
resulted in a number of American casualties.

The conservative regional regimes, and those with economic,
political, and diplomatic ties to the West are at risk due to
the continuing instability. Radicals supported by Iran,
attempted a coup in 1981. Though the plot was uncovered and
dismantled, tensions there, and throughout the Gulf, remain
high. Collateral damage from the Iran-Iraq conflict has drawn
other nations into occasional armed confrontation with the
belligerents. Attacks on neutral, non-combatant merchant ships
by the air forces of Iran and Iraq have drawn armed responses and constant vigilance from other regional states. An air strike -- perhaps accidental--on a Kuwaiti installation increased regional fears that the conflict might widen even farther, and endanger the Gulf's major oil fields. The United States has supported threatened, friendly states with security assistance, arms transfers, and deployment of early warning assets, especially AWACS aircraft.

One example of the war's expanding to other regional states, was the downing of an Iranian fighter by Saudi F-15s when the Iranians threatened Saudi territory. Within both Iran and Iraq, a long-standing insurgency smolders as the Kurds continue an armed, uphill struggle for autonomy.

To the east of Iran and Iraq, occupation and insurgency in Afghanistan continues to tie down over a hundred thousand Soviet troops. Since the Soviet invasion in 1979, Mujahedin resistance has continued to grow despite the devastating attacks and retribution from Soviet land and air forces. Rebels still control much of the country, but Soviet obstinance and ruthlessness may yet result in the establishment of an Afghan Soviet Socialist Republic of the USSR. Afghan incursions into Pakistan border airspace threaten to expand the scope of the conflict across international boundaries.

To the west of Iran and Iraq, at the south western tip of the Arabian Peninsula, lie the Yemens. South Yemen is the only avowed marxist state in the Middle East. It is closely tied to the Soviet Union -- economically and politically. Soviet naval combatants enjoy access to port facilities in South Yemen astride the route through the Suez Canal. South Yemen's past support for national front insurgencies, including the Dhofar rebellion in Oman and radical movements throughout the Gulf, has earned the animosity of conservative regional regimes like Saudi Arabia. Border clashes between the Yemens have reached crisis proportions in recent years. Both United States and Saudi military assistance has been sent to North Yemen.

In the fall of 1984, the mining of the Red Sea required a U.S. and allied military response. This act of state-sponsored terror resulted in damage to a number of non-combatant merchant ships. Egypt and others alleged that Libya was responsible for this act. In response, to an Egyptian request, U.S. forces acted in concert with regional states and allied navies to neutralize the threat. Libyan activities in our AOR have extended to attempted political assassination in Egypt and threatened aggression against the Sudan. U.S. Central Command responses included the dispatch of AWACS aircraft. In the Horn of Africa tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia, and the Eritrean insurgency within Ethiopia, are compounded by
devastating drought and famine.

Contrary to a 1984 article in International Security by Eliot Cohen, the U.S. Central Command is not America's "avowed small war force". You can see that within the boundaries of USCENTCOM AOR, however, there is a fair perspective on the range of conflict found in the lower end of the conflict continuum. These conflicts require a full range of political-military responses. That these and other conflicts continue to bubble to open confrontation in the low intensity arena is a function of the complex interrelationships of the superpowers and a recognition of the potential destructiveness of direct superpower confrontation. It is also a function of the restraining influence of world public opinion which motivates indirect, less visible forms of conflict. In the future it appears that military, social, economic and political conflict at the low intensity level will continue. Economic factors certainly support this as the gap between the world's have and have-nots widens. The tools of the terrorist and insurgent will be employed because there are few other outlets for opportunity or for expression of grievance. Among the threats to U.S. interests, low-level conflict often may seem remote, and the potential damage minor in comparison with major conventional war in Europe. The feeling is a deceptive one, however. The long term economic damage may be as devastating to the United States and the West as defeat in a conventional conflict in Europe. The information in these two slides shows just how tied the Western economy is to the resources of the Third World. The loss of access to these resources and markets a "nickel at a time" can be ultimately as devastating as a direct assault upon our interests. The danger is especially acute in the highly volatile, yet critically important region we have just surveyed. Deteriorating conditions in Africa and Central America hold similar perils.

Today, in the U.S. there is increasing concern and awareness of the threat posed by low intensity conflict. But we have barely touched the surface of strategies for low intensity conflict. The challenge for the United States today, given the current world political climate, is to develop our capability to coordinate our strategic, political, and economic actions and apply them with sophistication. Today I'd like to talk with you about strategies for doing just that.

Congressman Newt Gingrich of Georgia, a distinguished scholar in his own right, spoke in 1983 of four layers of conflict-related national decision-making. He identified these as national vision, strategy, operations, and tactics. Vision is the national policy level concept of what a nation hopes to achieve. Strategy is developed to guide implementation of that vision. Vision and strategy, Representative Gingrich suggested, were the
most important of the four and the more difficult to achieve effectively. He illustrated his example with the case of Vietnam. In that conflict we won at the level of operations and tactics. The North Vietnamese won at the level of national vision and strategy. We won the battles, they won the war?

Our national vision emanates from the highest civilian leadership of our government with the best advice of our senior military leaders. At one time our nation did articulate a clear vision related to one aspect of low intensity conflict: that of combatting communist-backed insurgency. Under the Kennedy Administration, we said that we would counter communist-inspired insurrections and wars of national liberation wherever they occurred. We pressed development of military forces capable of meeting that challenge. But the vision became muddled in Vietnam. We could not integrate the elements of national power to achieve even our limited aims in Vietnam. Today, the U.S. faces a similar situation with respect to low intensity conflict. As Prof. Sarkesian pointed out in a recent Air University Review article, "if the experience in the Vietnam war is any guide, the American political system and its instruments for carrying out political-military policy are placed in a highly disadvantageous position with respect to low-intensity conflict."

Today we feel we know, in the broadest terms, what our aims and interests are in many parts of the world. Defense guidance requires the military to prepare to fight at all levels of the conflict spectrum. But we have no coherent, articulated strategy to integrate the elements of national power to accomplish our broad national goals. We have few articulated regional strategies to counter specific threats at the low intensity level. And today, we bear the albatross of our experience in Vietnam. This makes future commitment to countering Soviet adventurism or communist insurgency less supportable to our citizenry. Some Americans are reawakening to the importance of the economic health and political stability of the Third World. But we must recognize there is an aversion to involvement in protracted and ill-defined foreign conflicts. We also must recognize that the nature of democracy and an open press militate against any long term commitment or involvement where U.S. security is not overtly, immediately, and very seriously threatened. Therefore, we look to our national civilian leadership to have what Congressman Gingrich called "vision"; to consider well the implications of the threat; and to articulate that vision into national objectives that are understood by the public and the Congress. Our national objectives are the building blocks for our policy guidance. Upon the national objectives, and associated policy guidance, we will build our strategies.
At present, our national policy for dealing with low intensity conflict is stated only in the most general terms. Developing strategies to support our responsibilities to the broad policy guidance is a process of refining and integrating all the instruments of national power and all the agencies and departments of the Federal Government into a coherent plan. In the low intensity arena, the plan and the coordination of national power must be sophisticated.

Our broad definition of strategy, is contained in the guidance of JCS publications. There are two strategic subsets. The first is national strategy; the second is military strategy. National strategy is that part of the overall strategy that contributes directly to our national security objectives. It is the foundation of our military strategy.

Military strategy is the strategy for use of military force to achieve national strategic objectives. Military strategy contains three distinct elements. These are force development, force deployment, and force employment. This flow from development, to deployment, to employment appears to provide a logical sequence. If we follow this sequence, however, we may find that our strategy is driven by our force structure, instead of force structure being driven by strategy. A discussion of military strategy must start with employment. Concepts for employing forces determine, to a major degree, what forces will be developed and where they will be deployed.

Force employment strategy is a complex subject. Two of the most fundamental aspects to be addressed by force employment strategy are the where and the how. First, where, in broad terms, will a nation employ military power to achieve its particular national objectives. Second, how, again in broad terms, are the military forces to be employed. In the context of low intensity conflict, we must address the employment of specialized tools to meet unique challenges. These tools include intelligence requirements, specialized military forces, and assistance programs of various kinds. Most important is the integration of these tools into a program which coordinates both civilian and military efforts. In the USCENTCOM area, we must plan to employ forces at very long distances, into very austere conditions, in very harsh climatic conditions. The distances over which we must project military forces raise special lift and support requirements. For larger crises, this militates for the development of special air and sea lift capabilities. The importance of access to, and cooperation with, host regional governments is also elevated. The harsh climatic conditions of the AOR and other unique conditions of the area of conflict may raise the requirement for specially adopted weapons systems and individual equipment. This, in turn, creates a requirement for special training in the use of this equipment.
The development of military strategy is thus a four part process. First is the determination of national objectives and national policy. These are derived from that concept of vision we talked about. Second is the development of grand or national strategy to achieve those objectives. In this phase, the instrument or instruments of national power need to be integrated into a plan to achieve the objectives. After selection they are assigned missions, and their use coordinated. In the context of low intensity conflict, the primary instrument may not be military. Third is the development of a military strategy. Within the overarching military strategy considerations of force development, deployment and employment take shape. Finally, battlefield operations and tactics are developed to accompany force employment in the theaters and on the fields of battle. The unique aspect of deployment and employment for low intensity conflict is the degree of coordination with civilian economic and political efforts.

What strategy makes sense for the United States today in the realm of low intensity conflict? Do we presently have a strategy for low intensity conflict? We do only in the very broadest sense. That strategy is more of a mandating statement however, than an actual plan for the integration of elements of national power. Our present strategy is simply to be prepared to meet any challenge within the spectrum of conflict.

The thrust of our military posture statements still leaves no doubt that our defense effort is heavily weighted toward military capability for deterrence and general war. Deterrence has been the major objective of our military strategy since the late 1940s. Deterrence and containment are concepts that can be grasped easily. Military strategy for low intensity conflict has evolved far more slowly precisely because the national objectives are less easily defined and the threats seemingly less urgent to U.S. security. We cannot and should not get involved in every crisis, or war of national liberation which occurs. We look to our national vision for guidance. Once the decision is made on involvement, the military takes a more active part in the struggle, in union with other government agencies, to fully integrate the elements of our power in promoting a favorable resolution. In this, the unified commands with regional responsibilities will play a key role, and in the actual conduct of military operations. It is the unified commander who will actually direct employment of U.S. military forces within the countries assigned to the aor of the unified command.

I spoke earlier of specialized tools, as elements of strategy, which our nation has for dealing with low intensity conflict. From the military perspective the tools available to us to meet this challenge include security assistance programs,
intelligence assets and specialized military forces.

Security assistance represents a strong, present, peacetime link between the United States and our friends and allies throughout the world. Certainly for the U.S. Central Command it permits a direct relationship with the nations of our AOR. U.S. security assistance programs train foreign armed forces to assume the burden of their own defense in counter to regional instability and aggression. In the context of low intensity conflict, revolution, and counterrevolution our security assistance training programs can promote internal stability, and strengthen the internal defensive position from which a friendly regime must fend off an assault upon its legitimacy. As by-products, U.S. security assistance programs promote communication and interoperability, and foster a strong bond between the militaries of the U.S. and recipient nations. U.S. security assistance programs foster the development of common military doctrines, which make combined operations easier to accomplish. The transfer of U.S. systems establishes compatible logistics support bases, within an allied or friendly nation. If U.S. forces must be deployed in support of that nation during a crisis, the deployment is greatly facilitated. Many who are critical of U.S. security assistance and arms transfer programs fail to understand these associated issues. They also fail to understand the importance of the military institution in many third world nations, the military is an avenue for self improvement, social mobility, and nation building. Finally, the experience which our area specialists gain during their security assistance tours is important to building our knowledge and understanding of specific countries and regions.

The second tool which is especially important to successful strategy in low intensity conflict is that of effective intelligence. The British experience with "small wars", which you will hear more about later today, points out repeatedly the absolute necessity of a good intelligence program. Intelligence is needed prior to a crisis to give warning of deteriorating conditions and the potential need for U.S. decisionmakers to commit military forces or take other action. During the evolution of a crisis intelligence is focused on the needs of operational forces. An effective intelligence effort will necessarily involve both military and civilian agencies, though prior to commitment of U.S. forces, the burden will fall most heavily on civilian agencies. As Lt Col John Oseth pointed out in a recent article in the Naval War College Review, a good strategic intelligence program aids U.S. policy and decisionmakers in three areas. First, it aids in obtaining a clearer picture of actual U.S. interests. Second, it assists in more fully assessing the impact upon U.S. interests of international events. Finally, it aids in more carefully defining appropriate tools to deal with a given challenge.
Because an effective intelligence program involves the efforts of several agencies, there is a premium on coordination and integration of effort. In the same article, Colonel Oseth made a good point about the challenge for intelligence related to low intensity conflict.

"The challenge of low intensity conflict is to monitor an enemy not yet conducting continuous or even frequent combat operations, not yet organized into easily identifiable military formations, whose sustenance depends not on battlefield success, but on diverse socio-economic-political factors."

The requirement for better intelligence and more professional regional expertise points again to the need for a strong armed forces area specialist program. Let me say here, that I feel that in the Air Force we very much need a stronger area specialist program. At USCENTCOM we receive many bright young Air Force officers, with excellent operational backgrounds, who have very little initial knowledge of the lands and peoples of our AOR. What we desperately need in our command, and in all unified commands, is a core of experts who have strong operational backgrounds, plus practical experience in, and academic knowledge of, the AOR.

This lack of regional expertise also impacts on the third tool for our strategies for low intensity conflict. That tool is the specialized military forces — organized, trained and equipped to operate in the low intensity arena. The utility of these formations is embodied in the flexibility and option variety which they offer decisionmakers. They can be employed in scenarios where regular conventional forces are inappropriate, and may be used to preempt escalation of crises out of the low intensity arena. It is important that our personnel systems promote their development and encourage good people to be part of the team. Enhancement of the 1st Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, and of USAF Special Operations Forces are steps in the right direction.

I do think we need to face the fact that in an era of constrained budgets we are unlikely to witness the acquisition of fleets of World War II vintage aircraft into the active inventory to meet the low intensity threat. Nor should we. Older aircraft are vulnerable to hand held air defense weapons and are more difficult to fly because of their aerodynamic qualities. They lack the accuracy of modern delivery systems. Recall that high intensity threats are remote precisely because we and our allies invest so much in keeping our deterrent credible. Our conventional forces are spread thin enough. What we can encourage, within present budgetary constraints, is an increased training program for portions of our present conventional forces, in addition to the continuing increase in
special operations forces. This will provide depth to the core of expertise and special capabilities embodied in the 1st Special Operations Command and Air Force Special Operations Forces.

Finally, but very importantly, we have to face the fact that strategies, tactics, forces and expertise for low intensity conflict are not merely small clones of our regular conventional forces. They are unique in their constitution and capabilities, and may be regionally unique in employment.

The Duke of Wellington once suggested that a great nation cannot fight a small war. There is little doubt that the asymmetries inherent in low intensity conflict impact upon our capability to intervene successfully, as do the nature of our society and government process. We look to our national civilian leadership to have the vision to recognize the threat posed to U.S. interests. In turn, the American people must understand the importance of countering threats to U.S. interests at the low intensity level. If we become involved in such a conflict, the solution will not be an easy one nor the involvement of short duration. We must have the national will to see it through, or else determine to avoid involvement entirely.

Our strategy for low intensity conflict must aim at strengthening the host regime and at destruction of the political and social basis of the revolution. We cannot simply attempt conventional destruction of an opposing enemy armed force. This will require very sophisticated integration and coordination of our elements of national power and participation by appropriate elements of all the agencies and departments of our government. We have yet to develop an effective political-military structure for coping with the unique realities of low intensity conflict, though several organizational strategies have been suggested. While we focus on establishing an effective organizational structure, we can continue to develop the tools which we have for meeting low intensity threats: security assistance, enhanced intelligence, specialized military forces, and additional training for our conventional forces. In considering military strategy for low intensity conflict we do well to recall a caution of Clausewitz.

He said, "The first, and most decisive act of judgement which a statesman and commander performs is that of correctly recognizing the kind of war he is undertaking, of not taking it for, or wishing to make it something which by the nature of the circumstances it cannot be." That certainly applies to development of military strategy for low intensity conflict.
SUMMARY OF PANEL PROCEEDINGS

SESSION II: "MILITARY STRATEGY FOR IMPLEMENTING POLICY"

Papers presented in this session are reprinted in Appendix 2

PANEL E - "PREPARATION: STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE"
(Moderator: Col Ray Stratton, USAF, Commandant, USAF Special Operations School; Recorder: Lt Col John H. Patrick, USAF)

**Paper:** "Strategy for Low Intensity Conflict," by Col Thomas A. Cardwell, III, USAF

Thesis: The military needs an operational strategy for Low Intensity Conflict. The question is, "What strategy should the United States have so that we may maintain economic-political access to the Third and Fourth World countries?"

Conclusion: Low Intensity Conflict strategy must begin with clearly stated national and military objectives; it must provide for intergovernmental agency involvement; and, it should be set up to deter conflict or overcome a conflict that has already begun.

**Paper:** "Doctrine for Low Intensity Conflict," by Lt Col Deryk J. Eller, USAF

Thesis: Low Intensity Conflict is a Soviet global strategy representing a threat to US national interests, and that there is no coherent body of doctrine for combating that threat.

Conclusion: National leadership must acknowledge the problem, establish and state unequivocally national objectives and formulate and pursue complementing policies. Then sound, coherent strategies can be devised for prosecuting this "new" warfare, and valid doctrine will evolve from those strategies.
**Paper:** "Of Planes and Brains: An Organic Approach to Basic Aerospace Doctrine and Low Intensity Warfare," by Maj David W. Keith, USAF

**Thesis:** States function as "organic entities." Knowledge of this allows planners to analyze events and project appropriate responses. Failure to recognize the organic, systemic orientation of states decreases the probability of appropriate action, especially in Low Intensity Conflict.

**Conclusion:** States respond to actual or perceived threats much the same as organisms. These responses can be understood, and possibly predicted, by viewing states as organic systems.

**Summary of Panel Discussion:** The following were the major points of consensus:

- The behavior of states is systemic and is probably driven by the hierarchy of needs.
- The United States seems fixed on addressing all conflicts as being Communist inspired, but that perspective is probably not true. There are many reasons other than Communism for a people to challenge its established government and political system. Responses other than military (e.g., economic or social) may be more effective.
- Theater commanders (unified commanders) are charged with developing military strategy to deal with the full spectrum of conflict, including Low Intensity Conflict, in their theaters of operation. The Services should respond within the bounds of the sum of the strategies.
- The Department of Defense might be better served by developing joint operational procedures rather than attempting to come up with a Low Intensity Conflict military strategy.
PANEL P - "PRESCRIPTION: ARTICULATION AND PLANNING"
(Moderator: Col Thomas Dennin, USAF; Recorders: Lt Col D.K. Kealoha, USAF and Lt Col Al Russo, USA)

Paper: "Low Intensity Conflict in Air Force Formal Schools," by Lt Col Michael M. Flynt, USAF

Thesis: Review of curricula of Air Force professional military development schools show less than 5% of the total time is devoted to topics that can be identified with Low Intensity Conflict. Such an allocation is insufficient to develop an understanding of, or even an appreciation for, the threat.

Conclusion: The USAF must expand educational goals for professional development courses to include more time devoted to Low Intensity Conflict.

Paper: "The Use of Military Power and Diplomacy Short of War," by Maj Thomas C. Linn, USMC

Thesis: The United States must have a military capability at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, and military and political leaders' relationships must be complementary.

Conclusion: The political objective determines the intensity of conflict. Strategic military objectives must be formulated to accomplish political objectives. Clear political objectives must be framed before military objectives can be developed.


Thesis: The Air Force is ill-prepared to employ airpower in Low Intensity Conflict.

Conclusion: Low Intensity Conflict should be included as a major topic of research and study at all levels of Air Force Professional Military Education. Further, the United States should put teeth in the Nixon Doctrine and provide allies with the air weapons systems that can be integrated into their military force structure (e.g., no aircraft has been produced
for Low Intensity Conflict since the T-37 was modified to an A-37 configuration). Little or no emphasis has been given to Foreign Internal Defense or psychological operations in the last 20 years.

Summary of Panel Discussion: The following were the major points of consensus:

- There is no common definition of Low Intensity Conflict nor is there a fleshed out strategy which could serve as the basis for force structure, education and employment of military power in low intensity environments.
- There is a pressing need for a government agency to align and integrate the efforts of the military and civilians in responding to low intensity conflict.
- There is a lack of cross-Service doctrinal coherency which could promote proactive programs vice reactive ones.
- Air Force attention on weapons systems like the MC-130 overlooks the needs of the friendly governments like El Salvador. An aircraft to follow the A-37 and OV-10 is needed. Rather than technology as the driving force, it should be the user and its geographical conditions.

Thesis: Long range airpower has characteristics that match the challenges of Low Intensity Conflict better than those of other forces.

Conclusion: The United States should have military response capability on the periphery without dependence on Third World infrastructure for basing rights/support. The long range bomber can contribute by affecting or blocking potentially decisive shifts in the conflict, denial of enemy resupply/massing, maintaining a support image for United States forces, and providing a speed of weapons delivery to match the pace of change in the conflict itself.

Paper: "Air Power in Low Intensity Conflict in the Middle East," by Dr William J. Olson

Thesis: The objective of Low Intensity Conflict is not military conquest, but social control. Military means is but one instrument in the struggle.

Conclusion: Extension of the existing tactical air doctrine (emphasis on bombing and air superiority) to the counter-insurgency effort is inadequate and wrong. The remedy for Low Intensity Conflict may be beyond our capacity or willingness as a nation to make the necessary adjustments.

Paper: "Intelligence Support during Low Intensity Conflict," by Mr Jack E. Starr and Mr Fred B. Phillips

Thesis: There is a growing need for timely, tailored intelligence support for the multi-service combat forces that may be employed in Low Intensity Conflict.

Conclusion: A specific intelligence support system model for the Low Intensity Conflict spectrum and its diverse environments needs to be developed. This new system
(model) should integrate the latest high technology processing and data communication techniques.

**Summary of Panel Discussion:** The following were major points of consensus:

- The importance of a number of Third and Fourth World nations to the United States is so great that military action to protect our interests will almost certainly be required.
- Insurgents are obtaining and employing more sophisticated weapons that invalidates the "just buy them the C-47" mindset of weapons systems procurement and use.
- The intelligence problems of today are: lack of interoperability in collection systems, inadequate HUMINT, delays in receipt of data, poor interperation, and inadequate doctrine to direct the overall program.
- A new organization, under civilian control, might be required to deal with the political nature of Low Intensity Conflict. The military would be a backup counterforce element.
PANEL II - "APPLICATION: INTER-THEATER AND REGIONAL"
(Moderator: Col Hans Hanson, USAF; Recorder: Lt Col Roy Thomas, USAF)

Paper: "Airpower and the Falklands Conflict," by Group Capt Timothy Garden, RAF

Thesis: The Falklands conflict is a case study in the constraints, implications, advantages and penalties of utilizing airpower at extended ranges in Low Intensity Conflict.
Conclusion: Long range airpower is an essential requirement for a global Low Intensity Conflict capability. Flexibility of air force force structure is the key to success.

Paper: "B-52s in an Anti-Terrorist Role," by Maj Clarence O. Herrington, Jr., USAF

Thesis: The United States should counter terrorism through use of all military assets including the long range bomber.
Conclusion: Global range and multipayload aircraft such as the B-52 could be used effectively against terrorists. B-52s can be used as a relatively inexpensive and quick show-of-force, instead of a slow steaming Navy Carrier Battle Group. The B-52 can also provide adaptable fire support.


Thesis: Since 1945, there have been over 5,000 separate incidents of politically motivated violence on the Arabian Peninsula. What began as inter-tribal or economic disputes has now changed to ideological and religious conflict.
Conclusion: Airpower of Great States (United States and Great Britain) can be applied indirectly through effective and enduring security assistance arrangements that provide the means for emerging states to defend themselves.

Summary of Panel Discussion: The following were the major points of consensus:
-The Navy cannot project power to all locations and at
extended ranges. Airpower provides global access.

-Specific conditions pertaining to the Falklands, such as its isolated location, the short conflict duration and the small numbers of forces involved might make the application of lessons learned to Low Intensity Conflict suspect. The lessons of warfare at extended ranges, however, is certainly applicable.

-Except for (an improbable) total dependence on long range airpower, basing rights in regions distant to the United States are important precursors to effective power projection and allow the option of not actually basing of combat forces day-to-day (safety hedge) in those areas.

-If the B-52 were used in a Low Intensity Conflict, target identification would be critical and admittedly hard to obtain. Negative impact on United States and world opinion which might result from civilian losses in target-surrounding communities would have to be carefully weighed by National Command Authorities.
PLENARY ADDRESS

to

THE NINTH AIR UNIVERSITY AIRPOWER SYMPOSIUM

A RESPONSE TO THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE

BY

MAJOR GENERAL W.H. RICE, USMC
DIRECTOR, JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS AGENCY
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
REMARKS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY BY
MAJOR GENERAL W.H. RICE AND COLONEL D.L. COX
JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS AGENCY
TO THE AIR UNIVERSITY SYMPOSIUM ON
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

Tuesday, 12 March 1985

"JOINT MILITARY FORCES FOR THE LOWER LEVELS OF CONFLICT"
(Paper slides begin, in order, after this text)

SLIDE 1 "LOGO"

Being the final speaker allows me to summarize how the Joint Special Operations Agency views the problems that have been so elegantly articulated and outlined by the previous speakers and the numerous papers presented to the work groups.

SLIDE 2 "GEN NUTTING"

Gen Nutting, currently CINCRFED, has stated, when he was CINCSOUTH, that a war is going on, and that we are not well prepared to deal with it. Not only are we not prepared to deal with it but we do not agree upon what to call it. JSOA calls this war, low intensity conflict.

SLIDE 3 "LIC"

In JSOA, this is the definition for low intensity conflict that we use. I must point out that each service has its own definition. The process of defining it is now on-going in the JCS system, and, I hope that you will soon see an agreed upon definition published in JCS Pub 1.

SLIDE 4 "GEN GORMAN"

Regardless of what the final definition of the conflicts we are now seeing in the third world will be, Gen Gorman, former CINCSOUTH, believes low intensity conflict is the problem. Like Gen Gorman, we also feel that different policy guidance and different forces are needed.

SLIDE 5 "CLAUSEWITZ"

To paraphrase Clausewitz, until we recognize the true nature of low intensity conflict, and until we understand it, we will continue to try to make something out of it that by its nature it cannot be.
SLIDE 6 "SEN NUNN"

To solve this LIC problem, we have even received help from the political side, Sen Nunn thinks that three options are available. Under the present realities only the third option is considered achievable.

SLIDE 7 "JSOA MISSION"

The mission of JSOA is to advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on various aspects of special operations. Paramount is the requirement to advise on the national strategy for special operations forces.

The remainder of the briefing this afternoon will be devoted to presenting the conceptual framework which JSOA will use to develop the strategy around which the doctrine for low intensity conflict will be written. I should point out at the very beginning that this is a conceptual briefing and that it has not been approved by the JCS. As stated on our LOGO it is one response to the challenges of change.

SLIDE 8 "OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT"

The first thing we have attempted to do is to analyze the operational environment, which includes these four major points. In doing so, we think that we can begin the process of correctly recognizing the kind of war in which we are now engaged.

SLIDE 9 "CONFLICT"

COL COX

To establish some type of norm for conflict, we covered the conflict spectrum from normal diplomacy to strategic nuclear warfare. The numbering system and levels of conflict we used in between these two outer limits are open to debate. It is an attempt on our part to establish the parameters for conflict.

To measure success in any conflict one must ask the question "How should success look?" Only when we felt that we understood what our objectives were, could we develop a plan to achieve them.

We hold that success is moving the level of conflict from right to left. For example, we think that success is achieved when American objectives can be achieved by the normal diplomatic, political and economic means and not by the use of military force.

SLIDE 10 "CLAUSEWITZ"

If the political and military objective are in tandem, then as the conflict is reduced in scale the military involvement will be reduced.
For conflict to exist, between nations, there has to be disagreement. The first question then that should be put forth is: What is our interest that is being brought into question? Is it a survival problem? Has some territory been violated? or, Are we interested in political and economic access? There are also symbols that must be protected. We had 672 in Grenada. These were the medical students. There were the hostages in Iran, prisoners in Son Tay, and the Mayaguez piracy. One must also consider the question of American justice. We think that our friends must live up to certain standards.

Many of these interests are time sensitive and may even call for direct action. Do not forget, there is a price to pay for each of these interests. The price escalates as the level of conflict moves to the right.

To further help us make the correct decision on the type of forces involved, our plans must recognize that the "intent" of the American people must be taken into account. It is obvious, at least to me, that the US national policy since 1945 has been one of "declared peace." Having stated that, it must be pointed out that it does not mean we are immune from conflictual situations. In fact we have been involved to varying degrees in several conflicts. What it does mean is that we must consider the limitations that have been imposed upon our freedom of action. These limitations include the War Powers Act, the Guam and Carter Doctrines, the Clark Amendment and others that limit our considerations. It further means that all dimensions of a conflict must be considered.

In this "declared peace" there is no clear and present danger. There is usually no galvanizing event to shock these four major elements in our society. Seldom does the entire executive branch agree upon an approach to a problem. The Congress is then reluctant to support the executive branch because of a lack of a comprehensive plan.

The media does not trust either the executive or legislative branch. The people will support national policy for a while, but, without a coordinated, clearly stated objective that is perceived to be worth the price, the people will not support the military involvement in a protracted conflict. A Mr. William Sullivan writing in the FLETCHER FORUM, has summarized well the problem. He states that, "a major reorientation of attitudes among our professional as well as political diplomats (and all elements of government) to institute a practice that considers the public dimension of a foreign policy a major part of its solution rather than another piece of the problem."

As you move to the right, the declaration of war, in the traditional sense eliminate this ambiguity. War is based on a clear and present danger.
The application of force in a political-military environment is different from that used in a military-political environment. Because of the training, doctrine and equipment of Special Operations Forces (SOF), one might conclude that it is the only force capable of operating in a political-military environment. Once the decision is made to move from a political-military to a military-political environment SOF will continue to play a major role; but not the lead role. This will be demonstrated more fully later. SOF value is in the political-military arena.

As you look around the world today, most of the security assistance to the third world is accomplished by the special operations community. We are even involved in such advanced NATO countries such as Turkey, Greece, Spain and Portugal. In the last decade we have been involved in over 60 countries. Yet, in El Salvador where conflict is on-going, we see restrictions like the 55 military advisors.

Once you move to a military-political arena such as was found in Grenada, SOF takes on a supporting role. Grenada is also a good example of seeing the conflict level lowered. The limited SOF forces now in Grenada are working in a political-military environment.

The operational environment for low intensity conflict is in the political-military arena. If we do our job well, we may preclude the need to go to mid or high intensity conflict.

GEN RICE

Col Cox has just discussed the "operational environment" in which we have to plan and execute special operations. To provide a logical and coherent approach to the problem we have to overcome at least four major obstacles.

The objectives of the service SOF master plans are to complete SOF enhancement actions by the end of FY 1990. These plans call for the revitalization of the forces and their equipment. However, without an established doctrine and a community wide coordinated method for determining requirements, we have an uneven development of required capabilities. For example, we have an increase in the number of Army and Navy ground forces, but, we do not have a parallel increase in airlift capabilities.

I feel we do have the nucleus for a special operations organizational framework.
In that you have to start somewhere, we have made five basic assumptions. Many others could have been listed but we feel these cover the major problems.

It is obvious from the first four that the response will not be one that is easy to agree upon. Number five is the only assumption that has close to community agreement.

One of the truisms in war is the need for a totally integrated application of all elements of national power.

As pointed out in our analysis of the operational environment this is a political-military arena. Thus we think our strategy must be a political-military one.

Since a total integrated approach must be taken, we think some type of direction should be established at the NSC level. What it is called is immaterial. Dr. Sarkesian covered this area in his presentation much better than I can.

Such an organization would demonstrate a national awareness and direction to the threat (war) we now face. We would have such direction in a declared war.

On the military side of the house, we must develop a strategy that ties means to objectives. DOD 21 is a national strategy developed by JSOA for the 21st Century, thus DOD 21. We felt that it was necessary to consider the totality of a national strategy that would take into consideration the entire spectrum of conflict. We accepted the fact that the air land battle concept was understood, and probably the concept for operations that would be used in mid to high intensity conflicts.

Our concept is to prepare the battlefield for both low intensity conflict and the air land battle. This is one of my eye charts to keep you awake. This concept calls for a two-tiered battlefield. Every CINC is confronted with the possibility of having to conduct both low intensity and high intensity conflict. In low intensity the special operation forces form the campaign center piece. In mid to high intensity conflicts the air land battle forms the campaign center piece. The CINC must be prepared to wage these campaigns separately or in concert.
One way to depict this concept would be to look at the theater as displayed here. Here you see a political-military campaign situation where some forces are friendly and some forces are hostile.

When the air land battle becomes the campaign centerpiece in the military-political campaign, the SOF elements provide a supporting function in all areas of the theater. Yet, the concept for special operations does not change. We are still operating in both a permissive and a non-permissive environment.

Such a strategy would allow for the comprehensive planning for all levels of conflict in each theater. I will address the LIC operational requirement for this concept later.

Before we determine the forces and resources needed, we must determine the magnitude of the LIC threat so that forces and requirements can be tailored. All too often the forces are tailored to what is available and politically acceptable. One way to look at the threat we face would be to use our conflict spectrum on the top and make an assessment of the levels of conflict within each country. There are at least ten countries in Asia experiencing low intensity conflict. You could rank them in any national priority. We have done this for every region or CINC's area.

After we establish our priorities for each region, because each region does not have the same priority, we must determine the nature and scope of the conflict. This allows us to determine the forces needed. For example, had the Philippines chosen to attack their problems in the propaganda stage, the forces required would have been much different than the forces required at this stage.

The extent of the conflict or level of violence could be displayed as shown here. Once the conflict reaches the final assault phase, low intensity conflict is no longer a consideration. Now conventional formations will be maneuvering against conventional formations. This has to be conceptually considered to be the beginning of mid to high intensity conflict.
SLIDE 28 "INSURGENCY INFRASTRUCTURE"

The high ground or objective in low intensity conflict is the insurgency infrastructure. This is true in El Salvador and in Nicaragua. It is also true for guerrilla warfare in the Soviet Union and it was true in Vietnam. Shown here are the critical nodes. All but the guerrillas are underground. We usually do not recognize the problem until the guerrillas are attacking the government.

SLIDE 29 "WORLD ASSESSMENT"

This slide demonstrates that, with the exception of North America and Europe, low intensity conflict is alive and doing well. War is on-going in most of the third world. In most cases, the indicators are there but they are seldom recognized by the host government, ourselves or the international community.

SLIDE 30 "SOF ORGANIZATION"

The active Special Operations Forces are presently located in these organizations. The forces are, for the most part, located in CONUS. The CINC\s handle their LIC problems through their special operations commands. Not shown on this slide is the reserve force which makes up a large percentage of SOF community. For example, half of SF and most of PSYOP and Civil Affairs units and half of our AC-130 gunships specters are in the reserves.

SLIDE 31 "OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS"

Conceptually, we think that each CINC should have the full capability to conduct LIC. On this slide are the major elements we think that should be in each theater.

Since this is a political-military problem, each CINC should have a capability to bring to bear all the elements of national power. Security assistance is a major part of LIC so there must be a viable capability to use security assistance to achieve our objectives.

The operational requirements must be in place. Each CINC will be different and based on the conflict requirements. Some of the mission requirements are listed here.

In addition to the area support requirement, certain types of specialized support requirements are unique to SOF.
GEN RICE

Since this is the Air Power Symposium it is appropriate that I address the use of air support. The Air Force must be prepared to provide aviation support to special operations in all situations. This means that in some operations the environment will be a friendly one. It also means that in some situations the environment will be a very hostile one. Air power in LIC operations is a weapon of considerable usefulness—it is even vital in some actions—but wherever it is used it must be used with discrimination. The nonlethal uses of air support for reconnaissance, logistical support and the movement of personnel are not an issue; such uses are of great importance and of themselves so not create the perception of escalation. Helicopter gunships and low and slow aircraft equipped with rapid-firing weapons are more controversial, but most problems arise from the tactical use of bombers and fighter attack aircraft. The modern, high performance jet aircraft brings with it its own special problems.

In any case, the lethal use of air power must be subject to strict rules of engagement to insure that the safety of non-combatants and property.

SLIDE 33 "UMBRELLA"

In that the Air Force is authorized umbrellas, this slide is most appropriate for an Air Force symposium. In foreign internal defense the requirement for support in a friendly environment are vastly different than those that you must provide for unconventional warfare in the rear of Warsaw Pact countries. The requirements needed to penetrate such a hostile environment nearly defy the imagination. Yet, we are counting on you to get us to the target area, support us while we are there and finally to bring us home. Additionally, you must also be prepared to provide the aircraft to conduct direct action missions under any circumstances and in any area of the globe.

SLIDE 34 "DEDICATED SOF AC"

The MC-130E, Combat Talon is the main aircraft dedicated to getting the SOF forces to the target. It is an all weather, day and night, infil/exfil platform with a speed of approximately 250 knots and routinely flys its mission at about 250 feet off the deck. This is the only long range penetration aircraft that we have.

The AC-130, Spectre Gunship provides close, surgical air support and interdiction in a low to medium threat environment. The AC is equipped with two visual sensors, one TV and one IR. The teeth of the system is provided by two, 20MM Vulcans, one 40MM Bofors cannon, and one 105MM Howitzer; a standard Army artillery piece. Like the combat Talon, the Spectre prefers the night.
The HH-53, Pave Low is a heavy lift helicopter, which is similar to the Talon in its capabilities, day/night all/weather infil/exfil rotary wing. It can carry approximately 30 fully equipped combat troops, on a 400 nautical mile radius. It also has all weather hover capability. I want to point out again that all of these aircraft are capable of operating in total darkness. The night is their favorite time of day. The EC-130E, Volant Solo. These aircraft are in the Penn Air National Guard. They can conduct PSYOP broadcasting on frequencies that include AM/FM radio, television, short wave and military C3 bands. Electronic jamming is a secondary mission.

Our major concern is the paucity of aircraft dedicated to the SOF mission. The present inventory is not capable of supporting even one CINC's requirements. Especially acute is the lack of exfiltration aircraft.

The Special Operation Low Level (SOLL) training for selected crews in MAC provide the where-with-all for reinforcing the airlift requirements for the Special Operations Forces.

In addition to using C-141 and C-130 aircraft, some C-5 SOLL crews are also available for selected special operations missions.

Once we reach the transitional zone between low intensity and mid to high intensity, most airframes can support special operations. AF Manual 1-I states that most aircraft can support special operations. A good example of support is the airfueling support by SAC.

SLIDE 36 "LOGO SLIDE"

Ladies and gentlemen, for the last 30 minutes you have seen and heard JSOA's view of the LIC problem and our concept for dealing with it. I would like to leave you with three basic thoughts: (1) we are at war now; (2) What you have heard here today is only one concept for approaching this war and that it is not a JCS approved concept. (3) Finally, JSOA has the mission of writing LIC doctrine for JCS by the 4th Quarter FY85. This symposium has added much to our understanding of the problem. It will also serve us well in our attempts to formulate doctrine for SOF. Thank you for the opportunity to be a part of your program.
JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS AGENCY

A RESPONSE TO

"THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE"
GENERAL NUTTING, MAY 1983

"THERE CLEARLY IS A WAR GOING ON...A HIGHLY POLITICIZED FORM OF WARFARE. IT IS POLITICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC AND IT'S MILITARY AND FRANKLY, WE THE UNITED STATES INSTITUTIONALLY DO NOT UNDERSTAND IT AND WE ARE NOT ORGANIZED VERY EFFECTIVELY TO COPE WITH IT....."
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

CONFLICTS RANGING FROM NORMAL DIPLOMACY THROUGH TERRORISM AND LOCAL CRISIS TO INSURGENCIES AND REVOLUTIONS. RESPONSES ARE USUALLY IN CONJUNCTION WITH HOST NATIONS IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES AND REQUIRE TAILORED SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND/OR LIMITED MILITARY ACTIONS.
GENERAL GORMAN

"LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT, THE PROPER NAME FOR THOSE THREATS TO OUR INTERESTS, REQUIRES DIFFERENT KINDS OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS, AND ESPECIALLY DIFFERENT KINDS OF ARMED FORCES THAN THOSE WE HAVE READIED FOR CONTINGENCIES LIKE THE KOLA OR FULDA."

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT: NOT FULDA NOT KOLA
"The first, the greatest and most decisive act of judgement which a
statesman and commander performs is that of correctly recognizing
the kind of war he is undertaking, of not taking it for, or wishing to make
it, something which by the nature of the circumstances it cannot be."

KARL VON CLAUSEWITZ
ON WAR
U.S. OPTIONS FOR PROBLEMS IN THIRD WORLD

- REDUCE GLOBAL COMMITMENTS
- INCREASE DEFENSE SPENDING
- CHANGE STRATEGY

SEN. NUNN
JSOA MISSION

ADVISE THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF IN ALL MATTERS PERTAINING TO SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES RELATED THERETO, INCLUDING NATIONAL STRATEGY, PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, BUDGETING, RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND ALLOCATION, JOINT DOCTRINAL GUIDANCE, EXERCISE AND READINESS EVALUATION, AND EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT:

- CONFLICT
- INTEREST
- INTENT
- CAPABILITIES
CONFLICT, INTEREST, INTENT AND CAPABILITIES

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HOW SHOULD SUCCESS LOOK?

SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS MOVE THE LEVEL OF CONFLICT FROM RIGHT TO LEFT
POLITICAL/MILITARY OBJECTIVE

A MILITARY OBJECTIVE THAT MATCHES THE POLITICAL OBJECTIVE IN SCALE WILL, IF THE LATER IS REDUCED, BE REDUCED IN PROPORTION; THIS WILL BE ALL THE MORE SO AS THE POLITICAL OBJECTIVE INCREASES IN PREDOMINANCE.

CLAUSEWITZ AND THE STATE

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## CONFLICT, INTEREST, INTENT AND CAPABILITIES

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- ECONOMIC POLITICAL WELL BEING ACCESS AMERICAN JUSTICE
- SYMBOLS OF SOVEREIGNTY (TIME SENSITIVE)
- TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY SURVIVAL
### CONFLICT, INTEREST, INTENT AND CAPABILITIES

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<tr>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Diplomacy</th>
<th>Political/Economic Sanction</th>
<th>Subversion Sabotage Terrorism Coups</th>
<th>Insurgency</th>
<th>Low Intensity Conventional Warfare</th>
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<td>&quot;Declared Peace&quot; War Powers, Clark Amend, etc.</td>
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<th>&quot;DECLARED PEACE&quot; WAR POWERS, CLARK AMEND, ETC.</th>
<th>EXECUTIVE</th>
<th>POPULAR</th>
<th>DECLARED WAR</th>
<th>(LEGAL NECESSITY)</th>
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<th>Diplomacy</th>
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<th>Quick Reaction TF</th>
<th>Gen Purpose/Strategic Forces</th>
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<th>Political-Military</th>
<th>Military-Political</th>
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13
THE FOUR OBSTACLES
OBSTACLES

1. ESTABLISH STRATEGIC DOCTRINAL CONCEPTS

2. CREATE METHODOLOGY FOR WORLDWIDE MISSION ASSESSMENT

3. DEFINE RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS

4. CONSTRUCT AN ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK
ASSUMPTIONS

1. THREATS TO U.S. INTEREST VARY GREATLY FROM REGION TO REGION
2. REGIONAL THREATS CAN BE IDENTIFIED AND PRIORITIZED
3. APPROPRIATE AND COORDINATED RESPONSES TO REGIONAL THREATS CAN BE MADE
4. CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES DO NOT RESPOND WELL ACROSS THE ENTIRE CONFLICT SPECTRUM, THUS A NEED EXISTS TO ORGANIZE AND TRAIN TO MEET THREATS AT THE LOWER END OF THE CONFLICT SPECTRUM
5. "LOW-RISK, HIGH LEVERAGE VENTURES SUCH AS TERRORISM AND OTHER ACTIVITIES ON THE LOWER END OF THE CONFLICT SPECTRUM ARE...THE MOST LIKELY CHALLENGES TO OCCUR."
POLITICO—MILITARY CONCEPT FOR:

STRATEGY

AND

OPERATIONS
NATIONAL POLICY MANAGEMENT FOR LIC
RATIONALE FOR ESTABLISHING DIRECTOR, FOR CIVIL-MILITARY AFFAIRS

1. ESTABLISHES IMPORTANCE/DEMONSTRATES UNDERSTANDING OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL. (AT WAR NOW)

2. ESTABLISHES POLICY FOR APPROPRIATE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS (INTEGRATED APPROACH) (CLAUSEWITZ).
STRATEGY:

DOD 21 depends for its success on a sound calculation of objectives and means. It requires that the means employed should be proportioned to the objective being sought.
CONCEPT:

21 IS A CONCEPT DESIGNED FOR A TWO-TIERED BATTLEFIELD. ON THE AIR LAND TIER, THE CORPS IS THE CAMPAIGN CENTERPIECE. ON THE LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT TIER, SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMANDS ARE THE CAMPAIGN CENTERPIECE. THE DOD 21 CONCEPT INTEGRATES BOTH AIR LAND BATTLE AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT STRATEGIES TO FIGHT AND WIN ON A TWO-TIERED BATTLEFIELD WHEN REQUIRED.
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT
POLITICAL—MILITARY CAMPAIGN
DOD 21 PROVIDES:

THE ABILITY TO DISTRIBUTE AND APPLY MILITARY MEANS TO FULFILL THE END OF POLICY AT ALL LEVELS OF CONFLICT
## CONFLICT ASSESSMENT FOR ASIA
### (THE SCOPE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RED – PRIMARY THREAT</th>
<th>BLUE – SECONDARY THREAT</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CONFLICT</strong></td>
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<td>NEW ZEALAND</td>
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<td>PACIFIC ISLANDS</td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>NORMAL DIPLOMACY</strong></th>
<th><strong>1 POLITICAL &amp; ECONOMIC SANCTIONS</strong></th>
<th><strong>2 SUBVERSION SABOTAGE TERRORISM COUPS</strong></th>
<th><strong>3 INSURGENCY</strong></th>
<th><strong>4 LOW INTENSITY CONVENTIONAL WAR</strong></th>
<th><strong>5 MID INTENSITY CONVENTIONAL WAR &amp; U.W</strong></th>
<th><strong>6 HIGH INTENSITY CONVENTIONAL WAR &amp; U.W</strong></th>
<th><strong>7 THEATER NUCLEAR WAR &amp; U.W</strong></th>
<th><strong>8 STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WAR &amp; U.W</strong></th>
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**Note:** The table and chart represent a conflict assessment for Asia, detailing various conflict scenarios and their implications across different regions and scenarios.
INSURGENCY CONTINUUM
(CONFLICT LEVELS 2 THRU 4)

ASIAN SUB-REGIONS

COUNTRY

PHILIPPINES

THAILAND

INSURGENCY CONTINUUM
PROPROPAGANDA
ORGANIZATIONAL GROWTH
GUERRILLA OFFENSIVE
MOBILIZATION OF MASSES
FINAL ASSAULT

CONSOLIDATION

LOW INTENSITY
CONVENTIONAL WAR

SUBVERSION
SABOTAGE
TERROISM
COUPS

INSURGENCY
& U W

CONFLICT INTENSITY

RED - PRIMARY THREAT

BLUE - SECONDARY THREAT
GUERRILLA ACTIONS

ABOVE GROUND

UNDER GROUND

PREPARATION OF REVOLUTIONARY CADRES/MASSES FOR REVOLUTION

SAPPING OF GOVERNMENT MORALE

INCREASED UNDERGROUND ACTIVITY

SABOTAGE/TEROR

OVERT/COVERT PRESSURES ON GOVERNMENT

INTENSIFICATION OF PROPAGANDA

EXPANSION OF FRONT ORGANIZATION

NATIONAL FRONTS/LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS/ALL SECTORS

PENETRATION/LABOR UNIONS/NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

RECRUITMENT OF FELLOW TRAVELERS

INfiltrATION OF FOREIGN COMMUNISTS

INfiltrATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE

AGITATION

PROPAGANDA INCREASE

Dissatisfaction with Pol/Eco/Social

INSURGENCY SUPERSTRUCTURE
# World Assessment of Conflict

## (The Scope)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>COUNTRY SUBREGION</th>
<th>RED - PRIMARY THREAT</th>
<th>BLUE - SECONDARY THREAT</th>
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<td>Strategic Nuclear War &amp; U.W.</td>
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- Europe
- Middle East
- Sub-Saharan Africa
- Asia
- Latin America
- North America
USAF
IN
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT
SPECIAL OPERATIONS

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID)
DIRECT ACTION (DA)
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE (UW)

COUNTERINSURGENCY
MOBILE TRAINING TEAM (MTT)
NATION BUILDING

HUMANITARIAN MISSIONS
DEMONSTRATION OF U.S. INTEREST
CRISIS RESPONSE MISSIONS
COMBATING TERRORISM
STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE
PSYOPS

GUERRILLA WARFARE
EVASION AND ESCAPE
SUBVERSION
SABOTAGE

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT UMBRELLA
SUMMARY OF PANEL PROCEEDINGS

SESSION III: "MILITARY FORCES FOR LOWER LEVELS OF CONFLICT"

Papers presented in this session are reprinted in Appendix 3.

PANEL I - "FORCE STRUCTURE: BASIS AND DEVELOPMENT"
(Moderator: Col Phillip Gardner, USAF; Recorder: Lt Col Edward Mangis, USAF)

**Paper:** "USAF Force Development for Low Intensity Conflict," by Lt Col Thomas J. Doherty, USAF

**Thesis:** USAF's force structure development process for Low Intensity Conflict is in a state of flux. It needs to be stabilized soon lest we find ourselves unprepared for Low Intensity Conflict.

**Conclusion:** The Air Force must develop a coherent and comprehensive strategy and cross-spectrum set of objectives. With the who, what, when, where, and why well defined, force structures for all levels of conflict can be developed. The Air Force has not yet done the former and consequently the latter lags behind.


**Thesis:** Joint special operations forces are a primary national (political-military) element in Low Intensity Conflict. They must be employed early and correctly to achieve their potential for deterrence or conflict limitation.

**Conclusion:** A Joint-Service approach to training and targeting at all conflict levels is the first step down the correct employment path. The National Command Authorities need a timely, candid, and bounded advice on initial and follow-on special operations forces capabilities before they decide on military options. The intelligent application of
special operations forces in the low intensity arena can deter certain types of aggression—and measurably contribute to containment, limitation, or acceptable conclusion of conflict.

**Paper:** “US Army Special Operations Forces in Low Intensity Conflict: Today/Tomorrow,” presented by Col David L. Pemberton, USA

**Thesis:** The adversaries of the United States will continue to foment unrest worldwide, and properly structured, trained and educated special operations forces offer the nation and its allies a valuable asset in the struggle for stability in the Third World.

**Conclusion:** Low Intensity Conflict is an inescapable reality. It results from popular needs unassuaged so therefore is political in nature. The onset of hostilities greatly increases the difficulty of a successful foreign internal defense effort. Due to the political nature of the problem, joint civilian/military efforts are essential for viable foreign defense programs. A security assistance force properly tailored to meet low intensity challenges can confront the revolutionary process and can achieve political-military goals—the ultimate of which is winning without fighting.

**Paper:** “Policy, Strategy, Forces: The Sequential Basis of Military Capability for Low Intensity Conflict.” by Lt Col David C. Schlachter, USAF

**Thesis:** Use of military force in Low Intensity Conflict is a civilian, not military decision. The President expects United States military forces to be able to apply politically complementary force at whatever level required, wherever necessary. Military failure will cause embarrassment to the United States. Yet military strategy, which yields supporting military force structure, will not change without long term national emphasis.

**Conclusion:** National policy must push military strategy to adapt to Low Intensity Conflict. Without such adaptation, military force structure will be fielded to support comfortable, but possibly ineffective military strategy (e.g., Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission). Military senior leadership hold the key to overcoming institutional resistance to building
effective military capability across the spectrum of conflict.

**Summary of Panel Discussion:** The following were the major points of consensus:

- Low Intensity Conflict, as throughout history, is the most prevalent contemporary challenge.

- Joint special operations forces are not currently being area-oriented, task and target trained, equipped, and controlled in a manner that provides a high degree of confidence for efficient employment and success.

- The Air Force needs to give greater institutional attention to special operations forces. The inertia of Air Force strategy is toward conventional, high intensity warfare (strategic interdiction and air superiority—high tech mission areas); it will only change to accept the equality of Low Intensity Conflict if stimulated from without over a long term, i.e., clear and precise national emphasis and direction over two or more presidential administrations. Outside of the senior leadership doing something, little can be done from within.

- It might be advisable to establish a special operations or low intensity division in Headquarters Air Force to coordinate the inevitable and necessary multi-command participation in the mission area. The most appropriate place would be under the Director of Plans.

- The problem of competing with other forces in the Air Force portion of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System is a difficult one in view of the comparatively small size of special operations programs and the absence of high level advocates for special operations needs.

- Low Intensity Conflict is not just special operations forces. All types of aircraft and Major Air Commands can have a mission and a critical impact on the outcomes of Low Intensity Conflict. For example, a fighter or B-52 flyover can have a psychological effect far beyond its physical impact on the military situation.
PANEL J - "FORCE MODERNIZATION: EMERGING TECHNOLOGY"
(Moderator: Col Jeff Cliver, USAF; Recorders: Lt Col Gregory J. Maciolek, USAF and Lt Col Ronald J. Arceneaux, USAF)

**Paper:** "Emerging Technology on Unmanned Vehicle Systems for Use in Limited Wars," by Capt Kenneth S. Bauman, USAF

**Thesis:** The application of emerging technology is available to help the Air Force fight effectively during Low Intensity Conflict.

**Conclusion:** Emerging technology can be applied to increase standoff range, increase accuracy and increase effectiveness. The proper use of combinations of manned and unmanned vehicles could resolve Low Intensity Conflicts more quickly and reduce losses of aircraft and aircrews.

**Paper:** "Light Aircraft Technology for Small Wars," by Lt Col Jerome W. Klingaman, USAF (Ret)

**Thesis:** Use modern design formulas and industrial manufacturing techniques to produce a light armed surveillance aircraft for conflicts below the level of general war, a level of military engagement known as "small wars."

**Conclusion:** If the USAF is to make an effective contribution to meeting United States' security objectives in the Third World, it must do so by acquiring a low order combat response capability. The most promising of these weapons is the light armed surveillance aircraft.

**Paper:** "Implications of Changing Doctrine and Evolving Threats on Future Airlifter Requirements," by Mr Roy C. LeCroy

**Thesis:** The USAF needs a follow-on to the C-130 to meet the needs of future low intensity conflicts.

**Conclusion:** Given the potential for an expanding tactical airlift role in future conflicts, a new tactical transport incorporating features of survivability, significantly improved takeoff and landing performance from unprepared runways, and all-weather day or night precision aerial delivery could enhance its effectiveness across the spectrum of conflict and
especially in Low Intensity Conflict.

**Summary of Panel Discussion:** The following were the major points of consensus:

- There does not seem to be support or sponsorship of Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV) within the USAF or DoD.

- The applicability of aircraft already in the Air Force inventory, such as the OV-10, A-37 and UH-1N, do not meet the needs of the light armed surveillance aircraft. They are too expensive to maintain and operate for many Third World countries.

- The argument, that a light armed surveillance aircraft should be part of the USAF inventory merely for training of allied pilots, is not convincing to the corporate Air Force.

- As Third World Countries acquire better air defense weapons, the survivability of light armed surveillance aircraft becomes questionable.

- The Air Force should consider a follow-on enhancement to the C-130 for Low Intensity Conflict. The Air Force Special Operations Master Plan (Apr 84) delineates the essential need for the JVX (Now the Joint Service MV-22, Osprey) and its place as the prime aircraft for special operations air support. The C-130 will still be needed to provide longer range, and larger payload mission support.
PANEL E - "EMPLOYMENT: JOINT TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES"
(Moderator: Col Robert Casey, USAF; Recorder: Lt Col Pat Dooley, USAF)


Thesis: Before entering into another Vietnam-type conflict, or training others to fight that type of war, the USAF must have a clear understanding of the most effective methods of employing airpower in counter-guerrilla operations.

Conclusion: Airpower supports counter-guerrilla operations by airlift, reconnaissance, close air support, battlefield interdiction, and psychological operations. The Air Force can play a vital role isolating and defeating enemy forces.


Thesis: The ability to effectively employ United States airpower in Low Intensity Conflict would be greatly enhanced by a multi-service agreement on joint tactics, techniques and procedures.

Conclusion: By establishing joint agreements between major tactical commands on joint tactics, techniques and procedures, and by focusing those guidelines on solving problems that have occurred in low intensity conflicts, better joint coordination, cooperation, and integration will result, regardless of the conflict level.


Thesis: Although recent Air Force organizational changes following the failed Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission have enhanced current Air Force special operations capability, force modernization is the key to future capability.

Conclusion: Future improvement of capability can only be
realized by modernizing and expanding the current force structure with systems like the MC-130H (Combat Talon II) and the JVX (Now the Joint Service MV-22, Osprey).

Summary of Panel Discussion: The following were the major points of consensus:

- Unified Commands must identify and prioritize their low intensity and special operations requirements to the Air Force.

- USAF special operations force structure must be developed to counter a wide spectrum of missions from hostage recovery and other special missions up through all stages of Low Intensity Conflict.

- The A-10 would seem to be a very good special operations support aircraft (range, speed and firepower), not unlike the old A-1. Tactical Air Command again needs to become involved in the Air Force response to Low Intensity Conflict.

- Because high visibility failures like Iran tend to receive emphasis, Air Force special operations forces direction and funding will lean toward the long range rescue mission; unfortunately this portends lesser funding for other mission areas of Low Intensity Conflict.

- In pragmatic terms, the highest priority for the Air Force will remain the closing of the gap between the United States and the Soviets in strategic and high intensity conventional systems, and, therefore, systems designed only for Low Intensity Conflict have little chance of large investment funding support.
PANEL L - "MILITARY RESPONSES: FORCE PROJECTION AND THEATER APPROACHES" Classified SECRET, US Only (Moderator: Col Richard T. Swope, USAF)

Requests for papers presented in this panel should be directed to the authors.

Paper: "Weapons System Vulnerability/Survivability in a Chemical Warfare Environment," Unclassified For Official Use Only, by 2Lt Eileen G. Ancman, USAF (Chemical Hardening Division, Deputy for F-16, ASD, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433-5001)


Paper: "Airborne Reconnaissance and Fire Support," Confidential, by Gen Paul F. Gorman, USA (USCINCSO, APO Miami FL 34003)

SESSION IV: "REFLECTIONS ON PAST OPERATIONS" (Plenary Session Only; No Panel Sessions):

PAST OPERATIONS:

SON TAY PRISONER OF WAR RAID (November 1970) - Issues described by BGen Donald Blackburn, USA (Ret), JCS Mission Planner.

SUMMARY OF REMARKS:

General Blackburn addressed the planning for the Son Tay raid in 1970 to rescue the U.S. prisoners held captive in North Vietnam. He traced the events from 25 May 1970 thru execution at 0400 local on 21 Nov. The operation essentially involved a raid into North Vietnam by Army Special Forces using HH-53 helicopters and associated air cover with a carrier-based diversion conducted from the Gulf of Tonkin. The primary task force operated from Thailand. Altogether 116 aircraft from seven bases, some as distant as Japan, were involved.

While he said that the overall planning process took too long, a series of "holds" did permit more detailed assessments in many areas. He stressed three essential elements required for success: taking advantage of lethargy, shock action and surprise; realizing an acceptable weather window for flight operations; and having a perfect intelligence base for making decisions.

After briefings to the JCS and the NCA resulted in approval to proceed with an execute window of 21-24 September (or the same time one month later depending on weather), a Joint Contingency Task Force was established at Eglin AFB. On 8 Aug 1970 authority to proceed with Ivory Coast (also called Polar Circle and later King Pin) was given.

General Blackburn emphasized the separate but important contributions made to the operation by the control planning group in Washington and the execution planners at Eglin AFB. In Washington, the group could readily access federal agency support and central intelligence data for use in detailed planning. The execution planners would have been significantly delayed pursuing normal command channels to obtain needed information and unquestioned support. The task force could effectively concentrate on execution details and training, which
involved over 700 flying hours with "timing" measured in seconds. On 13 Nov the force deployed to Thailand and on 18 Nov the final go-ahead was given. Although the prisoners had been moved, execution was flawless. The only known effect of the raid was the improved treatment of the POWs.

General Blackburn mentioned several points for consideration by future special ops planners. Intelligence must be perfect regarding primary mission objectives. A public relations plan should be prepared prior to operations to address the range of results that might occur. A psychological analysis should be conducted to assess the reaction of the enemy, relative again to the range of possible results. Operations Security must be paramount, but coordination to preclude possible interruptions to execution must be considered. Once the political decision to proceed is reached and the top level military approval has been passed, decentralized control of execution should be maintained. Lastly, this type operation requires a two-body approach: a central planning group to handle the big issues and a detailed planning group formed of those who will conduct the operation.

IRANIAN HOSTAGE RESCUE MISSION (April 1980) - Issues described by Lt Gen LeRoy Manor, USAF (Ret), Holloway Commission Member.

SUMMARY OF REMARKS:

General Manor addressed the planning and execution of the Iranian hostage rescue mission conducted in 1980 to free the U.S. citizens held captive in Tehran by Iranian militants. His remarks were presented in two areas - a philosophical commentary on Special Operations in general and specific comments regarding the rescue mission. The following summary addresses only the general comments on Special Operations. The specific points made by General Manor are contained in the attached copies of his slides as well as the report of the Holloway Commission.

In his general remarks, General Manor stated that Special Operations had been forgotten in the past. He stressed the importance of future leadership recognizing and acknowledging the need for a capability for Special Operations in the future.
Unfortunately he said, our capability to conduct Special Operations had declined during the 1970s. He cited three causes for this decline. There had grown unchecked a general lack of appreciation, knowledge and understanding of Special Operations outside the Community. It was and is a very sensitive area of operations, and lastly there is an element of risk (possible negative notariety) involved.

These factors notwithstanding however, some questions of who's to do what remain unanswered. The general emphatically stated that there is a Special Operations mission for the USAF. It is not necessarily constrained by budgetary influences and there is congressional support available.

General Manor's last point was that Special Operations is important and preparedness is paramount. He said that the NCA must be provided with options on a spectrum of capabilities. We must not allow our citizens and our country to be dishonored by an inability to respond when our people are beleaguered or taken hostage. Readiness to respond is important. We owe this to our leadership, our country and our citizens.

General Manor concluded by saying that we must be ready, we must have a force in being, and we must stop relearning the lessons of the past.
BRIGADIER GENERAL DONALD O. BLACKBURN

Brigadier General Blackburn was born in West Palm Beach FL on 14 September 1916; graduated from high school in Tampa FL in 1934, and from the University of Florida, Gainesville, in 1938; was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Infantry Reserve on 30 May 1938 and entered on active duty with the Army, 22 September 1940, being assigned to the 24th Infantry at Fort Benning GA.

At the outbreak of World War II, he was serving as an advisor to a battalion of the 12th Infantry, Philippine Army. Upon the fall of Bataan in April 1942, he evaded capture and until October 1945 conducted guerrilla warfare on the Island of Luzon. During this latter period he reorganized and commanded the 11th Infantry, Philippine Army, which was integrated in October 1945 as a regular unit in the Philippine military establishment.

Since World War II, he has served in various command and staff assignments. He was assigned to the Department of Military Psychology and Leadership, Tactical Department, US Military Academy in 1950. During 1953, he attended the Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia; and was then assigned to NATO's Allied Forces Northern Europe, Oslo, Norway.

On return to the US in 1956, he was assigned as Commanding Officer 3d Training Regiment, Fort Jackson SC. In 1957, he was assigned to MAAG, Vietnam, and served as the senior advisor to the commanding general, 5th Military Region (Mekong Delta).

In October 1958, he was assigned as Commanding Officer, 77th Special Forces Group (later the 7th SFG) where he was instrumental in initiating Special Forces operations in Southeast Asia; attended the 1961 class of the National War College; served as Deputy Director of developments for Special Warfare, Office of the Chief of Research and Development from 1961-1964, and then was reassigned to the Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations as Director of Special Warfare. He was Commander SOG (Studies and Observations Group) Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, from May 1965 to May 1966. On return to the US was assigned Assistant Deputy Director, Defense Communications Planning Group from August 1965 to August 1967; was the Assistant Division Commander, 82d Airborne Division from September 1967 to October 1968; was the Director of Plans and Programs, Office of the Chief of Research and Development; and in 1969 was assigned as the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, where he proposed the raid on the Son Tay POW camp in North Vietnam and directed planning for same. He retired in July 1971.

From July 1971 to February 1981 he was Vice President, BDM Corporation, McLean VA, and a member of the Secretary of Defense's Special Operations Policy Advisory Group (SOPAG) from December 1983 to the present.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

MR NOEL C. KOCH

Mr Noel C. Koch was appointed Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs March 31, 1981. Prior to that he was President of Koch Associates, Inc., a Washington consulting firm. He served in the Reagan Campaign as an advisor on international policy and public affairs.

Mr Koch was a Special Assistant to Presidents Nixon and Ford, serving in a broad range of assignments including the Apollo Space Program, Drug Law Enforcement, Defense and International Affairs, and Energy Policy Development. Mr Koch came to the White House from the US Post Office where he was Assistant to Postmaster General Winton M. Blount.

Mr Koch's public career includes service as special counsel to the President's Advisory Committee on Refugees, a member of the Washington Regional Selection Panel for White House Fellows, and Energy Consultant to the Senate Finance Committee. Mr Koch was an advisor to Senator Bob Dole in the 1976 Presidential campaign.

Mr Koch holds a Master's Degree in International Relations from Bryn Mawr College and a Bachelor's Degree in English from Widener University.

Mr Koch is a veteran of six years in the US Army, including tours of duty in Europe and Southeast Asia.

Mr Koch heads the Department of Defense Special Planning Directorate, in which role he has responsibility for all policy matters related to terrorism and special operations, including strategic planning, doctrinal development, and force development.

He is the Department's point of contact within the Administration on all terrorism matters. He chairs the Defense Working Group on Terrorism consisting of representatives from DOD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Special Operations Agency, and the Secretary of Defense's Special Assistant for Atomic Energy. He is also the Administration's principal point of contact with allied counter-terrorist authorities.

In addition to these duties, as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA), Mr Koch has responsibility for managerial oversight of all ISA functions, including regional policy development for East Asia, Pacific, Inter-America, Near East-South Asia, and Africa Regions; Policy Analysis, including Contingency Planning & Requirements Policy, and the International Economic & Energy Affairs Directorate; and the Defense Security Assistance Agency.

Mr Koch is also the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Africa Region, with direct responsibility for all Defense policy planning and
implementation related to Africa. In this role he works in close coordination with the Department of State's Bureau of African Affairs and the Office for Political/Military Affairs. He represents Defense Department views before the Congress, and deals closely with Africa heads of state and Ministers of Defense as well as other ministerial-level officials.
LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEROY J. MANOR, USAF, RETIRED

General Manor assumed his position as The Retired Officers' Association Executive Vice President in September 1980. Under the general direction of the President and Board of Directors, he is responsible for the daily management of the association and its Headquarters staff.

LeRoy J. Manor was born in Morrisonville NY, on February 21, 1921. The holder of a Teacher's Certificate from New York State Normal School, he entered aviation cadet training in November 1942 and received his pilot wings and commission in August 1943.

During World War II, he flew 72 combat missions as a P-47 pilot in Europe. Following the war he attended New York University, receiving a BS Degree in education. He served in a variety of assignments, including two tours overseas, in Turkey and Germany; graduated from the Armed Forces Staff College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces; and, from June 1964 to May 1968, served in the Pentagon in the office of the Air Force's Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations.

From May 1968 to June 1969, he commanded a tactical fighter wing in Vietnam where he flew 275 combat missions in F-100s over North and South Vietnam. Upon his return to the US, he commanded an air division until February 1970 when he was assigned as Commander of the Air Force's Special Operations Force. From August 8, 1970, to November 21, 1970, he additionally served as Commander of a joint task force whose mission was to rescue US prisoners of war at Son Tay, North Vietnam.

From 1971 to 1973, he served in the Pentagon as Deputy Director for Operations and Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In 1973 he was transferred to the Philippines, and commanded the 13th Air Force from October of that year until October 1976, when he was assigned as Chief of Staff of the US Pacific Command. He retired from that position on July 1, 1978.

Following retirement, General Manor represented the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander in Chief, Pacific, as senior military negotiator and advisor to the US Ambassador to the Philippines for the successfully negotiated amendments to the Military Bases Agreements with that country. He also served as a member of the group of selected retired senior officers appointed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in May 1980 to make an independent analysis of the unsuccessful April 24, 1980 raid to rescue American hostages held in Iran.

A Command Pilot, his awards include the Distinguished Service Medal with three clusters; the Legion of Merit with one cluster; the Distinguished Flying Cross with one cluster; the Air Medal with 25 clusters; the Purple Heart; and awards from the governments of Korea, the Philippines, and the Republic of Vietnam.

General Manor and his wife, the former Delores H. Brookes, of Schenectady NY have three children. They reside in northern Virginia.
COLONE EUGENE G. MYERS

Colonel Myers is a native of California. He attended public schools in San Diego and graduated from San Diego State University in 1957. He earned his commission through the Air Force ROTC Program. Colonel Myers is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and the National War College. He holds a masters degree from Golden Gate University. Colonel Myers has had a wide range of operational and staff hours including a naval exchange tour and duty in Washington DC. He was a command pilot with more than 4,000 hours of flying experience. He has flown a T-33, T-38, F-100, F-104, F-8, F-9F, F-105, F-4, and A-10 aircraft. His military decorations include the Legion of Merit with one oak leaf cluster; the Distinguished Flying Cross with two oak leaf clusters; the Meritorious Service Medal, Bronze Star, Air Medal with 19 oak leaf clusters, Air Force Commendation Medal, National Defense Service Medal, Vietnam Service Medal with five battle stars; Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross with palm and gold star; Republic Campaign Medal; and Republic of Korea Order of National Security Merit; and the Somil Medal.

Prior to his current assignment, Colonel Myers commanded the 51st Tactical Fighter Wing at Osan Air Base, Korea. He assumed his current duty as Deputy Director; Plans, Policy, and Programs; US CENTCOM; on 9 August 1982. Colonel Myers and his wife, the former Dorothy A. Scully also from San Diego, California, have two children, Deborah and Eugene G., Jr.
MAJOR GENERAL W. H. RICE, USMC

Major General W. H. Rice is the Director, Joint Special Operations Agency, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington DC.

Born on February 7, 1932 in Baltimore MD, General Rice graduated from the Baltimore Polytechnic Institute in 1950 and in January 1951, enlisted in the Marine Corps. After completing recruit training at Parris Island SC, he was assigned to the Weapons Co, 3d Battalion, 8th Marines, 2d Marines Division, Camp Lejeune, NC. While there, he attained the rank of Sergeant and was selected for officer training. Upon completion of the Officer Candidate Screening Course, Quantico VA, he was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in October 1952. His subsequent promotions include: First Lieutenant, April 1954; Captain, July 1956; Major, August 1963; Lieutenant Colonel, July 1968; Colonel, April 1974; Brigadier General, February 1978; and Major General, May 1981.

General Rice served as a Platoon and Company Commander with the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions in Camp Pendleton, Japan and Korea. Returning to Quantico in November 1954, he served in a variety of billets including Platoon Commander with the Training and Test Regiment, the forerunner of the Officer Candidate School. From 1956 to 1958, he was Aide-de-Camp to the Commandant, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico.

In June 1958, he reported to Camp Pendleton CA, where he served as Operations Officer, and later, Pathfinder Platoon Commander with the 1st Force Recon Company. In 1960, he was assigned to the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, 3d Marine Division, on Okinawa, where he served as a commanding officer. From 1961 to 1963, he was Inspector/Instructor, 45th Rifle Company, USMCR, at Ogden UT.

Selected as an Exchange Officer with the British Royal Marines, he reported to Plymouth England, in January 1964 for duty as Commanding Officer, “0” Company 43 Commando.

Returning to Camp Lejeune in June 1965, General Rice was assigned as Commanding Officer, 2d Force Recon Company, until July 1966. Upon completion of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College at Quantico in June 1967, he was ordered to Vietnam in July 1967. He served as Deputy Commander/Chief, Operations and Training, Naval Advisory Detachment until July 1968.

On his return to the US, he served for two years as Plans Officer, Africa Division, J-5, US Strike Command, at MacDill AFB, Tampa FL. In 1970, he was named Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 8th Marines, at Camp Lejeune.

From 1971 to 1973, he was on special assignment at Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington DC. The following year, he completed the Air War College, Maxwell AFB AL. Transferred to Norfolk in 1974, he served as Operations Officer, G-3, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic.
In June 1975, he returned to Washington DC serving as Commanding Officer Marine Barracks, 8th & "I," and Director, Marine Corps Institute. While serving in this capacity, he was selected in February 1978 for promotion to brigadier general. Following his promotion in March 1978, he was assigned duty as Assistant Division Commander, 3d Marine Division, FMF, Pacific Okinawa Japan. In March 1979, he was assigned duty as Deputy Commander, FMF, Pacific, Camp H. M. Smith HI. He served in this capacity until June 1980, when he was assigned as Commanding General, 1st Marine Brigade, FMF, Pacific, Kaneohe Bay HI. Following his advancement to major general on May 1, 1981, he assumed duty as the Commanding General, Marine Corps Recruit Depot/Western Recruiting Region, San Diego CA on May 14. General Rice relinquished command on 10 February 1984 and assumed his current assignment on 1 March 1984.

In addition to completing the Air War College, where he was designated a Distinguished Graduate, and the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, General Rice has completed the US Army's Ranger, Airborne, Pathfinder and Special Forces Officer Schools; the US Navy's Underwater Swimmers school; the Royal Marine Tactical Commanders Course and the Norwegian Army's Snow Warfare and Ski Course. He is a qualified Scuba Diver, and in addition, he is a qualified Navy/Marine Corps Parachutist and Freefall Jumpmaster with over 225 jumps. General Rice graduated Cum Laude with a BS degree in Social Science from Troy State University AL (1975).

General Rice's decorations include: the Legion of Merit with Combat "V"; the Bronze Star Medal with Combat "V"; Meritorious Service Medal with gold star in lieu of a second award; Joint Service Commendation Medal; Combat Action Ribbon; Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with gold star; Vietnamese Honor Medal 1st Class; and the Vietnamese Fourragere (Cross of Gallantry level).

General Rice is married to the former Bebe Faas of California. They have one son, John J.
MR R. LYNN RYLANDER

As Deputy Director for Special Planning, Mr Rylander supports the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) in the formulation of Defense policy for Special Operations Forces (SOF) and counter-terrorism. The Special Planning Directorate also assists the PDASD (ISA) in discharging his oversight responsibility for ensuring that Defense policy objectives are being met, and is the focal point within the Office of the Secretary of Defense for SOF and counterterrorism matters.

Mr Rylander has been associated with the special operations community since 1968, and has served previously with the Central Intelligence Agency and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation). He has earned degrees in economics from the University of Oklahoma and American University, and a Master of Public Administration from Harvard University. He served as a Military Policeman in the Army National Guard.
BIографICAL SKETCH

DR SAM C. SARKESIAN

Dr Sarkesian received his BA from The Citadel; MA, and PhD from Columbia University in the City of New York. He is currently a Professor in the Department of Political Science, Loyola University of Chicago. Dr Sarkesian has published a number of books on national security and military professionalism, including The Professional Army Officer in a Changing Society; Combat Effectiveness: Stress and Cohesion in the Volunteer Military; Non-nuclear Conflicts in the Nuclear Age; Beyond the Battlefield: The New Military Professionalism; US Policy and Low Intensity Conflict; Potentials for Military Struggles in the 1980s; Presidential Leadership and National Security; and America's Forgotten Wars: The Counterrevolutionary Past and Guidelines for the Future. He is also the author of a number of articles on the subjects of the military profession, low intensity conflicts, and national security. Dr Sarkesian is Chairman of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. He is also the Vice Chairman of the Study Group on Armed Forces and Society of the International Political Science Association. Dr Sarkesian served as Chairman of the Department of Political Science, Loyola University, from 1974-1980. He is a retired Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, with over 20 years of service as an officer and enlisted man. He has served in Airborne, Special Forces, and Infantry units in Germany, Korea, and Vietnam.
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