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REVISION OF AR 220-1

BY

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In the spring of 1984, the Army responded with great effort to a query from the Senate Armed Services Committee concerning readiness. The committee was concerned that with the large sums of money being spent on new equipment for modernization, a corresponding improvement was not being shown by the Army in its monthly "readiness reports." It seemed logical that a tank battalion, for example, with the new M1 tank should be much more "ready" for combat than a battalion with the M60A3 tank, yet the first battalions equipped with the M1 were reporting C-4, not combat ready, after the tank had been fielded for 90 days or more. The Army and JCS response...
to the Congressional committee convinced its chairman that the Army was more capable with the new equipment, but that these improvements in capability were not reflected in the USR (AR 220-1). Army Regulation 220-1 reports on operational status of units as compared to documented requirements. Unit status reports are adversely affected by the major modernization program in equipment and by the documentation procedures for new equipment and force structure. The Army decided that this would be a good time to revise AR 220-1 and insure that the Army is doing the best possible job of measuring status as an indicator of readiness.
SUBJECT: Report of Group Study Project: Revision of AR 220-1

Commandant
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1. GENERAL: When the VCSA visited the USAWC and addressed the Class of 1985 in August 1984, he discussed the Army Unit Status Reporting System and suggested that the Commandant consider including the USR as a subject in the student study project program. The Commandant added this subject to the student group study project list.

2. PURPOSE: To report the results of the group study effort to examine the Army's system for Unit Status Reporting and AR 220-1.

3. BACKGROUND. In the spring of 1984, the Army responded with great effort to a query from the Senate Armed Services Committee concerning readiness. The committee was concerned that with the large sums of money being spent on new equipment for modernization, a corresponding improvement was not being shown by the Army in its monthly "readiness reports." It seemed logical that a tank battalion, for example, with the new M1 tank should be much more "ready" for combat than a battalion with the M60A3 tank, yet the first battalions equipped with the M1 were reporting C-4, not combat ready, after the tank had been fielded for 90 days or more. The Army and JCS response to the Congressional committee convinced its chairman that the Army was more capable with the new equipment, but that these improvements in capability were not reflected in the USR (AR 220-1). Army Regulation 220-1 reports on operational status of units as compared to documented requirements. Unit status reports are adversely affected by the major modernization program in equipment and by the documentation procedures for new equipment and force structure. The Army decided that this would be a good time to revise AR 220-1 and insure that the Army is doing the best possible job of measuring status as an indicator of readiness.

4. STUDY GROUP COMPOSITION: The officers who volunteered for this project include the following members of the Class of 1985:

   a. LTC Cary D. Allen, QMC: Cdr, 501st Supply and Transportation Battalion, 1st AR Div, Nurnberg, Germany (Feb 82-Jun 84); Dep Instl Cdr, HQ, USMCA, Nurnberg, Germany (Oct 81-Feb 82); and XO, 240th Quartermaster Battalion (Petrol Ops), Fort Lee, VA (Oct 78-Dec 81).
SUBJECT: Report of Group Study Project: Revision of AR 220-1

b. LTC Frank C. Foster, Jr., AGC: Deputy AG, HQ, FORSCOM, Fort McPherson, GA (Jan 82-Jul 84); AG, 4th Inf Div, Fort Carson, CO (Jul 80-Jan 82); and Chief, Personnel Services Division, 4th Inf Div, Fort Carson, CO (Jul 79-Jul 80).

c. COL Jack D. Rives, AR: Chief, Force Modernization Division, ODCSOPS, HQ, USAREUR and 7A, Heidelberg, Germany (Jun 82-Jul 84); Cdr, 3d Bn, 77th Armor, 5th Inf Div, Fort Polk, LA (Nov 79-May 82); and ACoS, SPO, 3d SUPCOM (Corps), Frankfurt, Germany (Jul 76-Jul 79).

d. LTC Jack B. Wood, IN: Cdr, 1st Bn, 52d Inf (Mech), 1st AR Div, Bamberg, Germany (Jun 81-Jun 84); XO, 3d Bde, 1st AR Div, Bamberg, Germany (Jul 80-Jan 81); and XO, 1st Bn, 54th Inf (Mech), 1st AR Div, Bamberg, Germany (Jul 79-Jul 80).

5. METHODOLOGY: The Study Group Methodology in approaching this project started with a detailed review of AR 220-1 and JCS PUB 6 from four functional areas of expertise: training, maintenance (ES/ER), supply (EOH) and personnel. The group began by asking the basic question: should the Army continue to measure status as it does now using AR 220-1 or should it develop other measurements of readiness? Recognizing the number and extent of on-going efforts by the Army and other DOD agencies to develop methods to measure capability and readiness, the group determined that the project would be of most benefit to the Army if directed at a revision of AR 220-1 rather than devising a radically new system.

a. As a point of departure the group was briefed by the DCSOPS action officer responsible for rewriting AR 220-1. The action officer highlighted on-going efforts and raised several issues for the group's consideration. During numerous working sessions, other issues were formulated and prepared for comment by the field. Later each group member visited one or more MACOMs, corps or field activities to obtain specific recommendations or clarifications on previously stated positions.

b. Group members made trips to FORSCOM, USAREUR, 1st PERSCOM, III and VII Corps, the 1st and 2d Armored Divisions, the 1st Cavalry Division, the Theater Army Materiel Management Center (TAMMC), Europe, and the Logistics Evaluation Agency (LEA) at New Cumberland Army Depot. In addition to the comments and suggestions offered by the aforementioned agencies, the group surveyed some 23 former battalion commanders, G-3's and G-4's in the Army War College Class of 1985.

c. After completion of travel, a thorough analysis of field comments and previous DA positions was conducted. In December, the group conducted an IPR for the Commandant, USAWC. The group then finalized its position on the issues developed during the study.

6. SUMMARY. The USR is doing its job well. As long as status is not confused with readiness, the USR gives a clear picture of unit assets
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compared to requirements. The changes proposed in Inclosure 4 will result in better USR and one that is more aligned with the needs of the Army.

5 Incl
1. Executive Summary
2. Summary of Research
3. Figure 1 Unit Status in Perspective
4. Issues and Recommendations
5. DA DCSOPS Issues

JACK D. RIVES
Colonel, Armor
Group Chairman
INCLOSURE 1: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Maintain USR in basically its current form. Reduce reliance on USR as a management tool and emphasize the operational nature of the report. (Issue 1)

2. Change the interval of the formal report from monthly to quarterly. (Issue 3 and 10)

3. Require only composite, rolled-up reports be forwarded to MACOM and on to DA through JCS. (Issue 3 and 5)

4. Change the format of subordinate unit reports so that they provide all necessary input to a composite report, but do not require data on K-type cards. (Issue 5)

5. RC units submit a USR quarterly. (Issue 7)

6. Require that the next higher commander in the battalion or separate company's chain of command will make the decision on a subjective upgrade or downgrade of a subordinate unit's overall rating. (Issue 8)

7. Base composite rating in each area (PER, EOH, ES, and TNG) on the average rating of units using Tables 3-6 and 3-7, AR 220-1. Do not divide into categories of maneuver, fire support and support. (Issue 11)

8. Apply a fixed nonavailable personnel percentage to assigned strength to calculate personnel availability status. (Issue 17)

9. Eliminate the grade E5 from senior grade status computations. (Issue 20)

10. Eliminate personnel turnover data from the USR. (Issue 21)

11. Revise procedures for calculating EOH. (Issue 24)

12. Eliminate the USACEGE report. (Issue 27)

13. Require that the next higher commander in the battalion and separate company's chain of command will make the decision on the training rating of the unit. (Issue 28)

14. Retitle the Equipment Readiness title as Equipment Availability (EA). (Issue 30)

OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. AC unit commanders should make mandatory comments on their roundout unit's ability to perform and effect on his mission accomplishment. (Issue 9)
2. Drop inactivating units from composite rating 90 days prior to E-date. Update Table 3-6 to include light division and forward support battalions. (Issue 11)

3. Allow MACOMs to designate qualified units as C-5 until a unit is C-3 or better in personnel and equipment, as long as rating limitations are caused by a DA action/program. (Issue 12)

4. Delete comment that prohibits subjective upgrading of C-5 rating. (Issue 12)

5. POMCUS units develop a list of equipment that is authorized for prepositioning but is short and must deploy with the unit, due to being mission essential, but will not appreciably increase strategic lift requirements. Include this shortfall computation in EOH category. (Issue 13)

6. Eliminate USR for a unit once deployed/employed under responsibility of theater commander. (Issue 14)

7. Change AR 220-1 to give lowest level preparing commands three working days after the 15th of the month for preparation. (Issue 16)

8. Revise Appendix F, Equipment Readiness Codes to expand ERC selection criteria, clarify definitions, and reduce interpretation problems for TRADOC. Designate items reported IAW DA PAM 738-750 (2406) as ERC A. Designate move, shoot, and communicate items in all units as ERC A. (Issue 22).

9. Update pacing item list giving special attention to combat support and combat service support systems. (Issue 23)
INCLOSURE 2: STATUS VERSUS READINESS

1. An early problem which had to be addressed by the study group was the general misunderstanding of the terms status and readiness. During the past year the Chief of Staff of the Army has made a concerted effort to inform the Army leadership that there is a major difference between status and readiness.

   a. Unit status is a measure of unit resourcing in the areas of personnel, equipment, and training. All are measured against clearly stated requirements in organizational documents. Unit status does not measure a unit's capability, nor is it intended to measure the ability of a unit to execute a particular operational war plan or concept plan. The primary purpose of measuring unit status is to inform each echelon of command of the current status of resourcing in all subordinate units. Commanders and the JCS need this information in order to insure units are resourced adequately to meet the requirements of employment options, and, if not resourced adequately, to consider the impact of under resourcing when making employment decisions. A secondary purpose of measuring unit status is to assist in the management of resource allocation.

   b. Readiness has a much broader meaning which encompasses unit status and every other factor which impacts on the ability of a force to carry out its mission. The term readiness connotes 'ready to execute' whatever mission the force is called upon to perform. This generally means ready to execute a war plan. Any measure of a force's readiness to execute a war plan would have to include strategic mobility, air power, sea power, allied forces, sustainment, thoroughness of planning, command and control, perhaps mobilization, and, of course, unit status. A measure of readiness would have to include how well the units fit together and support one another. It is misleading to speak of the readiness of one unit because one unit alone cannot execute a war plan. Success in the execution of a war plan also depends on the capability of equipment, weapons systems, doctrine, and force structure. Modernized units are more capable and have greater output, therefore the chances for success are improved.

2. Unit status is relatively easy to measure compared to a total measurement of readiness. It is, however, important to measure the right elements of status and in such a manner as to be the most indicative of the readiness of the force. Personnel status must include a measurement of the number of soldiers assigned, MOS distribution, and grade distribution. Equipment status measurement must include number of important items of equipment on hand and operational. Training status measurement must capture training level achieved within allocated resources and also include identified training resource shortfalls. AR 220-1 specifies the manner in which the Army reports status.

3. The Army currently does not have a readiness report that wraps together all the elements of readiness mentioned above. The commanders situation report submitted semi-annually by each unified command is most indicative of a force's readiness to execute each major operational or concept plan. The intent of this report is to evaluate the ability and capability of the CINC to accomplish the mission with the forces assigned. Shortfalls identified by each CINC comprise input to the force planners and the budget...
There are many efforts underway to devise systems to measure various aspects of readiness and force capability within the Army, but all of these are in addition to, and not in lieu of measuring unit status.

4. The study group was chartered to analyze the Army's system for measuring unit status and to recommend changes to improve unit status reporting. AR 220-1, therefore, was the start point of the study. It was determined early in the study that it is beneficial to the Army to measure and report unit status. Status reports cause managers to react to unprogrammed deficiencies and insure operational decisionmakers are made aware of the level of resourcing in each unit. The study group did not address the measurement of readiness or attempt to change the unit status report into a readiness report. There is a need to quantify force readiness and the Army is working towards this goal, but there is also a need to continue to measure and report unit status.
INCLOSURE 4: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

ISSUE NUMBER

1. Should the USR be drastically changed so that it becomes a purely operational report meeting only minimum JCS PUB 6 requirements?

2. Should the USR be expanded to include significantly more management data?

3. Does the use of the data currently in the USR warrant the workload involved in its preparation, processing, and transmission?

4. Should divisional brigades or corps do a rollup USR?

5. Should the battalion/separate company report go all the way to JCS and DA or should only the next higher level rollup report be forwarded?

6. Should the USR report against personnel authorizations or requirements?

7. Should RC units report quarterly?

8. Should the next higher commander make the final decision on the subjective upgrade or downgrade of a subordinate battalion or separate company's overall C-rating?

9. Should roundout unit's USR be considered in determining major combat unit composite rating?

10. Should the USR be submitted monthly or quarterly by AC units?

11. Is the current composite rating system too stringent?

12. Can the C-5 rating procedures be changed to be more unified?

13. How can the accuracy and utility of NATO contingency reports be improved?

14. Should the USR be used during mobilization and in wartime?

15. Should the MICAF product for measuring improved capability of Army forces be added to AR 220-1?

16. Should the timing of the USR be changed to active components to add more processing time?

17. Is personnel availability criteria too stringent?

18. Do current procedures for determining enlisted personnel MOS qualifications accurately determine status?
ISSUE 12: Can the C-5 rating procedures be changed to be more useful?

DISCUSSION:
1. The C-5 rating, not combat ready programmed, compared to C-4, not combat ready, applies to units not ready by DA actions or programs, e.g., undergoing major modernization in equipment and/or force structure or inactivation.
2. Current procedures allow reporting units which are activating or in transition to report C-5 until a rating of C-3 or higher is obtained in personnel and equipment, but not more than three months after E-date.
3. In many cases after three months, a unit goes from C-5 to C-4, even though it is still adversely affected by a DA action/program.
4. AR 220-1 does not allow the C-5 rating to be subjectively upgraded.
5. JCS PUB 6 does not limit the period a unit can report C-5.
6. An associated concern for units reporting C-5 is the "instant unreadiness" problems. Under the existing documentation (TOE, MOTE) system, numerous unit status ratings have been degraded because additional or new equipment has been documented with an E-date earlier than could be resourced. The policy of equipment exemption and equipment issue in lieu of procedures is currently providing some relief for the problems of status reporting.
7. With the development and implementation of the living TOE, the instant unreadyness problems of today will be eliminated by insuring that equipment additions will not be documented until they can be fully resourced.
8. HQ USAREUR supports the commander's subjective upgrade of the C-5 overall rating for a limited period when appropriate.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Allow MACOMS to designate qualified units as C-5 until a unit is C-3 or better in personnel and equipment, as long as rating limitations are caused by a DA action/program.
2. HQDA and MACOMS consider activation/transition requirements during planning/programming and direct qualified units to report C-5 for specific periods of time, unless a C-3 rating on personnel and equipment can be attained sooner.
3. Provide further guidance in AR 220-1 as to what constitutes organization, major equipment conversion, and transition for C-5 reporting purposes.
4. Delete comment that prohibits subjective upgrading of C-5 rating.

ASSOCIATED ACTIONS: See Issue 11, Is the Current Composite Rating System Too Stringent?

NOTE: DA, DCSOPS ISSUE #5.
ISSUE 11: Is the current composite rating system too stringent?

DISCUSSION:
1. The present composite rating system for division, separate brigade and armored cavalry regiment is based on the lowest average rating for subordinate units in the categories of maneuver, fire support, and support units.
2. The worse case is always assumed since low ratings in one category (often a small number of support units) can result in low ratings for the parent unit.
3. Major unit commanders are in the best position to judge the impact of the status of organic units on the ability of their units to accomplish assigned missions.
4. Discussions with the USAWC Class of 1985 students that are former division G3's and/or battalion commanders and discussions with current division staff officers found agreement that the current composite rating system is too stringent and that major unit commanders are in the best position to judge how the status of subordinate units impacts on their overall unit rating.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Base composite rating in each area (PER, EOH, ES, and TNG) on the average rating of units using Tables 3-6 and 3-7, AR 220-1. Do not divide into categories of maneuver, fire support and support.
2. Add instructions that if composite ratings in each area are not truly reflective of the parent unit's readiness, then the commander should subjectively upgrade or downgrade his overall unit rating and discuss in remarks.
3. Drop inactivating units from composite rating 90 days prior to E-date.
4. Convert C-5 ratings to C-4 for calculating composite ratings; however, if more than 20 percent of organic units are C-5, then the commander should consider making his overall rating C-5 unless a rating of C-3 or better can be attained.
5. Number of organic units rated C-5 will be reported.
6. Update Table 3-6 to include light division and forward support battalion.

ASSOCIATED ACTION: Revise AR 310-49, the Army Authorization Documentation System (TAADS) to include information regarding how composite ALO are determined.

NOTE: DA, DCSOPS ISSUE 04
**ISSUE 10:** Should the USR be submitted monthly or quarterly by AC units?

**DISCUSSION:**

1. Currently AC units submit a monthly report.
2. JCS requires current USR data and does not specify the frequency of reporting, only that changes in overall or resource area ratings for major units be reported within 24 hours.
3. The Army, unlike some other services, does not submit change reports. A USR is completed monthly and any changes reported at that time. The assumption is that little change occurs within a monthly period.
4. It has been reported that approximately 55% of AC major combat units change the rating in one or more rated areas each month.
5. FORSCOM recommends going to a quarterly report. USAREUR, WESTCOM, EUSA, and AMC nonconcurs with the proposal to go to a quarterly report. DA DCSOPS also nonconcurs.
6. Submission of a complete quarterly report with updates during the intervening months would insure that data is as current as the present system, yet would save considerable administrative time.
7. Currently MACOM and DA brief USR data on a quarterly basis.
8. A separate issue recommends that RC units go to a quarterly report.
9. Completing a formal USR takes considerable time because the report is used for managing resources in addition to providing operational status. Submitting a change report requires less time and focuses on an operational status update only.
10. The lead time in solving problems cited in a USR is at least 90 days. A monthly report cites problems again and again that are in the process of resolution.
11. Corps, MACOM, and DA are overwhelmed with USR data. It is increasingly difficult for staffs to process and digest the volume of USR data that flows into the headquarters on a monthly basis.
12. DA DCSOPS Issue 1 does not propose the alternative of a quarterly report with monthly abbreviated updates.
13. A formal quarterly report would require and allow concentration on the really important issues. Because commanders grow tired of saying the same things each month, the monthly report indirectly causes commanders to stray from the important issues.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:**

1. Change AR 220-1 to require a formal report quarterly.
2. Require major units to review USR data monthly and submit change reports as necessary.
3. Require subordinate units to review USR data monthly and submit change reports as necessary.
4. Use interim monthly change reports for operational requirements only; use the quarterly report for resource management as well as operational purposes.

**NOTE:** DA, DCSOPS Issue #1.
ISSUE 9: Should roundout units' USR be considered in determining major combat unit composite rating?

DISCUSSION:
1. Currently major combat unit USR rating do not consider the status of RC roundout units.
2. Many roundout units provide an important share of a major combat units' fighting power and their readiness is important to the AC unit overall status.
3. Tying unit status of AC and RC roundout units together would strengthen affiliation and highlight problems.
4. RC units report semi-annually, AC units report monthly.
5. RC roundout units may not deploy or fight with current alignment.
6. Combining RC and AC ratings could muddy status of both and would be difficult to analyze.
7. Would increase both RC and AC workload without increasing assets.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. AC units should not use RC USR in determining their overall rating.
2. RC affiliated program units continue to provide information copies of USR to the AC unit which affiliated.
3. AC unit commanders should make mandatory comments on their roundout unit's ability to perform and effect on his mission accomplishment.

NOTE: DA, DCSOPS ISSUE: #3
ISSUE 8: Should the next higher commander make the final decision on the subjective upgrade or downgrade of a subordinate battalion or separate company's overall C-rating?

DISCUSSION:
1. Currently a commander has the latitude to subjectively upgrade or downgrade his overall rating should his analysis indicate that there is a unique circumstance that causes the unit's overall status to be higher or lower than the lowest rating among the three resource areas and the training area ratings.
2. AR 220-1 does not allow the next higher commander, generally 06 brigade or regimental commander, to be involved in an upgrade or downgrade. The intent is for the rating to be done solely by the commander of the unit completing the report.
3. There is mixed adherence to this policy across the Army. Some brigade commanders do not get involved, some direct the upgrade or downgrade, and some subtly indicate agreement, disagreement, or suggest a particular action.
4. Many battalion and separate company commanders lack the breadth of knowledge, experience, or perspective to make the call on an upgrade or downgrade. The 06 commander theoretically has the experience and judgment to decide if a subjective change is warranted. The brigade commander by virtue of his position can see his units move objectively and apply consistent judgment to such decisions within the brigade.
5. A division commander should hold a brigade commander responsible for justifying, if necessary, a subjective upgrade or downgrade of a battalion or separate company overall rating.

RECOMMENDATION:
1. Change AR 220-1 to require that the next higher commander in the battalion or separate company's chain of command will make the decision on a subjective upgrade or downgrade of a subordinate unit's overall rating.
2. The decision will be made on the recommendation of the commander of the reporting unit.
**ISSUE 7:** Should RC units report quarterly?

**DISCUSSION:**

1. Currently AR 220-1 requires RC units to report semi-annually and submit change reports within 24 hours of when they occur. RC units must report within 5 days of arrival at mobilization stations and monthly thereafter.
2. National Guard units complete a quarterly report for the NGB.
3. HQDA requires active Army units to report monthly.
4. FORSCOM needs RC status during mobilization to assist in personnel and equipment redistribution.
5. Semi-annual reporting is not satisfactory from an operational or a management view. The data is not sufficiently timely to be reliable and to be used as a basis for decisions.
6. Most RC units meet only monthly and a monthly status report is not practical.
7. Other systems such as SIDPERS-USAR provide key RC management data monthly.
8. Quarterly reporting by RC units would improve validity of USR database.
9. RC USR quarterly reporting is supported by HQDA and FORSCOM staffs.

**RECOMMENDATION:** RC units submit a USR quarterly.

**NOTE:** DA, DCSOPS ISSUE #2
ISSUE 6: Should the USR report against personnel authorizations or requirements?

DISCUSSION:
1. Currently AR 220-1 requires assigned strength to be reported against the required MTOE strength. The assigned strength is divided by the required MTOE strength and converted to a percentage to report the assigned strength percentage.
2. With Army end strength at 781K most units have an authorization lower than TOE/MTOE required level.
3. Even in Europe with high authorizations levels, the number of assigned is lower than authorized.
4. Some units are automatically C-2 or lower since the authorization level does not meet the C-1 rating requirement based on required strength.
5. Some commanders would like to report against authorizations rather than requirements so that status ratings are higher.
6. Many infantry squads designed by doctrine to have 11 men have only 6 or 7 assigned or present for duty. Doctrine and requirements call for 11 men but resource limitations and availability result in fewer. Many think this is like training 7 men for an 11 man football game.
7. Current requirements are an artificially high standard given current resources. The Army cannot achieve C-1 within 781K. To measure assigned strength against required generally generates a C-2 Army status.
8. Doctrine is developed to counter the threat and TOEs are designed to carryout doctrine by providing the required soldiers and equipment.
9. The required column of MTOE is what is needed to execute the wartime mission for which the unit was designed.
10. To obtain unit status we must measure quantities assigned against quantities required. The USR measures against a constant: wartime requirements.
11. Army has identified wartime requirements. In many cases the Army has made a conscientious decision to authorize less than required in order to stretch available resources within the approved force.
12. Authorizations change frequently.
14. USR accurately reflects status of force and degree of risk.

RECOMMENDATION: The USR should continue to report against requirements.
2. Change the format of subordinate unit reports so that they provide all necessary input to a composite report, but do not require data arrays on K-type cards. Only a DA Form 2715 and comments need to be provided by subordinate units.
ISSUE 5: Should the battalion/separate company report go all the way to JCS and DA or should only the next higher level rollup report be forwarded?

DISCUSSION:
1. Currently each battalion and separate company report is forwarded monthly through brigade, division, MACOM, and JCS to DA.
2. The reports are rolled up into a composite report at division, separate brigade, or regiment and the rolled-up report is forwarded along with all subordinate unit reports.
3. JCS requires reports only from the major units, i.e., division, separate brigade, regiment, and separate units.
4. Subordinate unit reports are forwarded in order to provide additional management data to corps, MACOM and DA.
5. At this time USR data must be manipulated by hand in order to present comparisons and to show trends.
6. Processing, sorting, analyzing, and presenting data is a major task at each headquarters level.
7. Visits to the field indicate that at corps, MACOM, and DA, only the rolled-up composite reports and those from separate units receive close scrutiny. Data overload prevents the close review of battalion and company reports at all but the next higher level headquarters.
8. Corps commanders receive a monthly briefing which includes only rolled-up and separate unit reports. Subordinate unit report data is used as backup only.
9. MACOM commanders and the Army Chief of Staff receive briefings quarterly. Again only rolled-up reports are briefed. Subordinate unit reports are kept on hand for backup but rarely used.
10. It is generally accepted that any major problem requiring action by MACOM or DA headquarters will be highlighted in the division, separate brigade, or regiment rolled-up report. The volume of subordinate units' reports is too great to expect corps, MACOM, or DA staffs to analyze every report and address problem areas.
11. Many commanders question the need for MACOM and DA to collect USR data on every unit down to battalion and separate company. This requirement indicates that these headquarters intend to manage resources at the battalion and separate company level when it is impossible to do so.
12. USAREUR puts together a monthly USR book that contains USR data from every unit in theater. The book is distributed to commanders and staff approximately 45 days after the data cut-off date. Trips to the field indicate that the book is occasionally looked at, but mostly a historical record. There is little indication of substantive action resulting from this presentation of data.
13. Subordinate unit USR data can be maintained at the headquarters which submits a composite report. Other headquarters can have access to this data should the need arise.
14. There is support at division, MACOM and DA, especially at the worker level, to eliminate the forwarding of subordinate unit reports.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Change AR 220-1 to require that only composite, rolled-up reports be forwarded to MACOM and on to DA through JCS. Subordinate unit reports to be retained by the division, separate brigade, or regiment completing the composite report.
ISSUE 4: Should divisional brigades or corps do a rollup USR?

DISCUSSION:
1. Divisions, separate brigades and regiments prepare a consolidated USR. This is a JCS PUB 6 requirement.
2. Neither corps or divisional brigades are required to submit rollups.
3. III Corps desired a consolidation at corps level. This would allow presentation of status of operational corps including combat, combat support and combat service support elements.
4. Corps and divisional brigades are "war fighting" headquarters. Although peacetime troop list remains relatively stable, the combat organizations of both will be very fluid.
5. Divisional brigade and corps commanders submit cover letters of transmittal with subordinate USR's highlighting areas of concern.
6. Corps commanders could administratively rollup USR's from subordinate commands to look "inhouse" at status. USR, plus other logistical and operational data, i.e., 2406, CBS X report, etc., could present a status of the command, however, USR alone would have minimum value.
7. No support found for brigade rollup.
8. Neither VII Corps or USAREUR support corps rollup.

RECOMMENDATION: Do not recommend rollup of USR at either brigade or corps.
ISSUE 3: Does the use of the data currently in the USR warrant the workload involved in its preparation, processing, and transmission?

DISCUSSION:
1. At each level handling USRs, there is a major commitment of man hours. Battalions, brigades, divisions, and MACOMs consider the USR to be the largest and most time consuming report generated by their headquarters.
2. At higher levels, corps, MACOM and DA, only rollup USRs are closely analyzed. Battalion and separate company USRs which are rolled into a division or separate brigade USR received very little attention.
3. Higher commands with dedicated USR staff sections consider the USR to be worth the effort. Data is presented in countless graphs and tables. Issues that result in action, however, are primarily those cited in commanders' comments by division or separate brigade commanders or written into accompanying letters. The volume of data is too great to handle otherwise.
4. All levels of command consider the USR process to be healthy for an organization. Continual awareness of unit status is considered important, and the USR process fills this need.
5. Many commands add various data requirements to be reported with the USR in addition to those required by AR 220-1.
6. Commanders generally agree that if all supporting systems are working properly, there should never be any surprises in a subordinate unit's USR.
7. Projections of USR data are considered more useful as management tools than the report itself.
8. Time, effort, and command involvement directed to the USR process is directly related to the attention given to the USR by the division or separate brigade commander and his involvement in the details of the report.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Reduce time dedicated to the USR by reducing the interval for a formal report from monthly to quarterly. (See Issue 10.)
2. Require only rollup reports to be forwarded. Rolled up subordinate unit reports are retained at the headquarters completing the rollup. (See Issue 5.)
3. Discourage USR add-on data requirements.
ISSUE 2: Should the USR be expanded to include significantly more management data?

DISCUSSION:
1. Currently the USR is designed as both a status report and a management tool to assist in allocating resources.
2. The Army requires submission of additional data beyond that required by JCS PUB-6. The extra information includes personnel percentages, equipment on-hand data, equipment readiness data and training data all of which increase the value of the USR as a management and operational report to the Army.
3. The USR is an established system which could be expanded to report more management data.
4. Uniform MACOM response was that the current USR contains sufficient management data for use as a management and operations report.
5. Concern was expressed that much statistical information was being produced in a format that could only be analyzed manually.
6. General response was that an expanded USR would result in greater workload without significant increased value for MACOMs.
7. MACOMs view the USR as a selected indicator or flag waver.
8. Personnel and logistics channels (SIDPERS, SIDPERS-USAR, DS4, CBX) are designed to provide all necessary management information.
9. Former battalion commanders and MACOM staff operators would like the report to remain constant and simple.
10. MACOM staffs would like to have an improved capability to perform automated sorting of current USR data rather than a capability to add data.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Do not expand USR management data.
2. Improve current ADP support systems ability to sort, analyze and display the data already in the USR.
ISSUE 1: Should the USR be drastically changed so that it becomes a purely operational report meeting only minimum JCS PUB 6 requirements?

DISCUSSION:
1. Currently AR 220-1 requires a thorough bottom-up development of a monthly USR. All data from every separate company and every battalion in the Army is transmitted through channels to HQDA. The data contained in the reports is far in excess of that required by JCS PUB 6. The additional data is used at various levels of command as management tools to assist in the allocation of resources and to point out significant problems.
2. The USR is a portion of the UNITREP. The purpose of the JCS UNITREP is to provide the National Military Command Center with a capability status of the major forces assigned to support approved JCS OPLANS. In conjunction with the CINC SITREP, the UNITREP provides the basis for operational decisions.
3. The JCS requires only minimal "bottom line" ratings from major forces.
4. Of all the services the Army has by far the most extensive system for implementing JCS USR requirements. The Army has enhanced the usefulness of the USR as a management tool by adding requirements for data that explain and expand each C rating.
5. Battalion commanders generally agree that combining a status report with a management report tends to cause a dichotomy. On the one hand, emphasizing shortcomings is essential to compete for resources, while on the other hand emphasizing strengths gives a better picture of preparedness for war.
6. Battalion commanders would like to see the administrative requirements of the USR reduced. The man hours required for its monthly preparation detract significantly from other programs.
7. Divisions use the report as a management tool. Should the requirement for the USR in its current form be discontinued, divisions would adopt other management tools to highlight problems.
8. Corps are involved in USR data to varying degrees and always on an exception basis. Generally, only rollup reports are reviewed.
9. USAREUR and FORSCOM have extensive programs for analyzing and presenting USR data. Major problems presented by divisions and other major units are addressed. Processing of USR data is a major task.
10. Most commanders agree that reliance on the USR as a primary management tool breeds a reactive mode that emphasizes solving current problems rather than anticipating and heading them off.
11. The USR data is used as a check on other management systems. Virtually all of the data can be captured through automated systems. The bottom-up submission highlights failures in the primary system.
12. The USR system is in place, understood by all, and there is at least the perception that USR data is essential to managing the Army.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Maintain the USR in basically its current form. Fix the problems with AR 220-1 that have been identified, but at this point do not design a radically new report that meets only minimum JCS requirements.
2. Reduce reliance on the USR as a management tool. (See related issues 6 and 11.) Deemphasize its use as a problem-solving mechanism.
3. Emphasize the operational nature of the report by requiring each level of command to analyze the USR against approved OPLAN requirements. Report discrepancies to higher commander via separate communication.
19 Should senior grade status be used in computing personnel ratings?

20 Should the grade of E-5 be eliminated from senior grade status in computing personnel ratings?

21 Is unit turnover data necessary?

22 Should the Army continue to designate reportable equipment using readiness codes (ERC) or develop an alternate system?

23 Is the pacing item list in Appendix C, AR 220-1 adequate and should pacing item shortage continue to outweight EOH computations?

24 Are the current procedures for calculating equipment on-hand overly restrictive?

25 Should the status of operational supplies be reported?

26 Should equipment available for cross-leveling, to include POMCUS uncovered residual equipment, be used in computing overall C-ratings for applicable units?

27 Should the USACEGE POMCUS report be eliminated?

28 Should the decision on the training rating of a battalion or separate company be made by the next higher commander in the unit's chain of command?

29 Is there a way of providing a more objective procedure for determining training ratings?

30 Should the equipment readiness rating be eliminated retaining only the equipment status rating?

31 Should the equipment status rating go from a monthly average to a point-in-time rating?
ISSUE 13: How can the accuracy and utility of NATO contingency reports be improved?

DISCUSSION:
1. All units with assigned POMCUS equipment (including major combat units) will submit additional reports showing their NATO contingency status. NATO contingency ratings show the status of units based on the set of equipment with which they will fight in the rapid reinforcement and defense of NATO. These ratings show unit status only. The basic procedure is to delete the CONUS equipment ratings from the normal unit status equation, substitute ratings for NATO contingency equipment, and reevaluate the overall ratings.
2. Present report uses preposition (POMCUS equipment set originated by USACEGE, USAMMCE) plus internal data from POMCUS units on equipment to accompany troops (TAT), and not authorized for prepositioning (NAP) in computing data for USR.
3. Units do not count equipment that must be shipped from CONUS to fill shortfalls in the POMCUS equipment sets.
4. Units use normal monthly unit status ratings for personnel and training.
5. Report is submitted quarterly.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. POMCUS units develop a list of equipment that is authorized for prepositioning but is short and must deploy with the unit, due to being mission essential, but will not appreciably increase strategic lift requirements, e.g., radio installation lists, NBC equipment, special tools, and test equipment.
2. Include in EOH computation the following equipment categories:
   a. Prepositioned
   b. TAT
   c. NAP
   d. POMCUS shortfall authorized for deployment with unit.
3. Apply procedures designed to correct "instant unreadiness" in POMCUS equipment.
4. Increase emphasis on commander's comments pertaining to resource areas affecting the unit's ability to accomplish mission if deployed to Europe.

NOTE: DA, DCSOPS ISSUE #14.
ISSUE 14: Should the USR be used during mobilization and in wartime?

DISCUSSION:
1. In peacetime AC units are required to report each month and to submit change reports as they occur, or when alerted for deployment or employment in carrying out contingency plans.
2. RC units report semi-annually, upon change, and within five days after arrival at their mobilization station and monthly thereafter.
3. AR 220-1 does not address any change in reporting requirements during wartime.
4. JCS and HQDA need to know status of unit prior to deployment or employment.
5. The theater commander assumes responsibility for units deployed or employed under his control.
6. USR data is of great value to FORSCOM during mobilization.
7. During peacetime the USR is important in allowing HQDA and MACOMs to allocate resources, determine Army-wide conditions and trends.
8. SITREPS and other tactical systems track unit status once units are deployed/employed in conflict.
9. Most MACOMs indicate units should not be required to submit USR following deployment/employment.
10. FORSCOM suggested an appendix to USR during mobilization to allow for an abbreviated format addressing only critical areas.
11. Continuation of USR by deployed/employed units would create administrative burden, tax communication and ADP systems and be of no operational value to the JCS.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Eliminate USR for a unit once deployed/employed under responsibility of theater commander.
2. Add an appendix to AR 220-1 for adjustable format during mobilization.

NOTE: DA, DCSOPS ISSUE #17.
ISSUE 15: Should the MICAF product for measuring improved capability of Army forces be added to AR 220-1?

DISCUSSION:
1. Unit status as reported under AR 220-1 measures unit monthly status in personnel, equipment on hand, operational equipment, and training compared to wartime requirements.
2. The measurement of unit status and unit capability are two different measurements. Status reports the monthly posture of a unit to accomplish its mission compared to its wartime MTOE requirements. This report meets the JCS operational requirements of Pub 6. Capability reports on a unit's quantitative ability to accomplish wartime tasks against a given baseline (a measure of combat capability). This measurement would have more meaning to Congress than unit status information. In unit status, a tank battalion with M60A1 tanks and a tank battalion with M1 tanks can both be rated C2, for example, showing equal unit status. However, the battalion with the M1 tanks has a greater capability because of the more modern tank.
3. MICAF will primarily address increased combat capability or potential resulting from modernized systems fieldings. Only major combat units will be measured. MICAF does not measure all aspects of capability, e.g., sustainability. It focuses primarily on measuring EOH with little regard to actual personnel, operational equipment, training, or mobilization/deployment status.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. MICAF not be included in AR 220-1.
2. Develop a new AR to prescribe MICAF reporting requirements.
3. Expand MICAF process to include increased combat potential from changes in force structure and doctrine as well as from modernized equipment fieldings.

NOTE: DA, DCSOPS ISSUE #18
ISSUE 16: Should the timing of the USR be changed for active component units to add more processing time?

DISCUSSION:
1. The "as of date" for the USR is the 15th of each month to arrive at JCS within 9 working days after the as of date.
2. A survey of battalion commanders (past and present) determined that time requirements cause units to project maintenance, personnel, and equipment-on-hand data for 3-5 days within the reporting period.
3. The experience levels of battalion staffs/separate company personnel necessitate adequate time to properly complete the USR. Further, the USR competes with other battalion/company priorities.
4. The short-fuse requirement (due to brigade on or before the as of date) results from "admin time" required by brigade and division.
5. III Corps desires cutoff to be end of month with 15-30 days to process. This would allow commanders to "fix after" before forwarding.
6. Moving the USR to end of month "cutoff" would add to normal end of month admin workload. No other commands support this change.
7. A delay in reporting will decrease operational value of the report.
8. Numerous long-term logistical problems negate value of delaying the report. . . . Problems can't be fixed with additional time.
9. Most logistical/personnel problems are identified before USR is submitted.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Make no changes to the current reporting schedule.
2. Change 220-1 to give lowest level preparing commands three working days after the 15th of the month for preparation.
ISSUE 17: Is personnel availability criteria too stringent?

DISCUSSION:
1. Current personnel rating is based on available versus required for both total strength and senior grade.
2. Personnel are considered unavailable if they fall into one of eight categories for an overseas unit or one of fourteen categories in CONUS.
3. FORSCOM's FORMSDEP availability guidance differs from AR 220-1.
4. Many field commanders believe certain availability criteria are too restrictive.
5. Assumes personnel within 14 days of ETS are not available and does not consider programmed replacements. For example, during a three-year period at Fort Carson an average of 50 replacements arrived each working day, or 500 were not considered available when all personnel within 14 days of ETS are counted as unavailable.
6. Not counting personnel within 14 days of ETS does not consider "stop loss" action during mobilization.
7. Former battalion commanders also criticize availability criteria based on legal processing (chapter cases or courts martial). Those pending will go to war.
8. In Europe, leave criteria in some instances may result in soldiers being denied leave to maintain unit availability statistics.
9. USAREUR and FORSCOM have long-term statistical studies which show units average 4 percent nonavailable (RC units about 10 percent).
10. Once personnel availability criteria is standardized, the Army could establish an average nonavailable percentage figure in each theater.
11. Establishment of a fixed nonavailable percent would eliminate a laborious unit administrative task and allow the unit to subtract the fixed (3 or 4) percentage from assigned strength to calculate available strength. The procedure would also apply to senior grade.
12. Such a change would more accurately reflect the number of people who will go to war versus those who are administratively nonavailable due to having not yet arrived, being within 14 days of ETS, pending chapter action or pending court martial.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Review and reduce nonavailability criteria for personnel within 14 days of ETS, pending chapter cases or court martial.
2. Standardize all Army availability criteria between DA, FORSCOM and RC units.
3. Review historical nonavailable percentages for AC and RC after changes in 1 and 2 are made and establish a fixed nonavailable percentage for AC and RC units in each theater.
4. Apply this percentage to assigned strength to calculate personnel availability status.

NOTE: DA, DCSOPS ISSUE #6.
ISSUE 18: Do current procedures for determining enlisted personnel MOS qualifications accurately determine status?

DISCUSSION:
1. Currently enlisted personnel are determined qualified when their primary, secondary, additional or substitutable MOS match against a MTOE vacancy.
2. DA DCSPER proposed that commanders have authority to consider personnel MOS qualified, regardless of schooling or OJT, if the commander believes the soldier is qualified to deploy with the unit.
3. Current procedures for awarding an MOS require completion of courses and in some instances, OJT.
4. Many commanders believe this policy is overly restrictive since many soldiers who are counted as nonqualified can perform job requirements but have not been awarded the MOS.
5. RC units especially have many soldiers who are counted as nonqualified but who commanders feel can perform job requirements. In RC units opportunities to be awarded an MOS are much more limited than in AC units.
6. It is not in the commanders best interest to declare personnel qualified who are not qualified although subjectivity usually favors optimism.
7. Changing the system could mask problems associated with individual job training qualification. The MOS remains the best overall criteria to determine if a soldier is or is not trained to perform a given job.
8. MOS qualification data can be gathered from a unit's SIDPERS data base. Any other system would require a bottom up by name monthly report that would be administratively cumbersome and unreliable.
9. The current MOS qualification rating procedure masks key low density MOS shortfalls. Critical MOS shortages must be addressed in commanders' comments and the overall readiness rating of the unit downgraded if necessary.
10. Key shortages cause commanders to malutilize soldiers. Few infantry battalions do not have infantry soldiers working in other critical non-infantry positions. A commander will use his soldiers where needed the most.
11. Allowing commanders to determine if a non-MOS qualified soldier is qualified in a position would decrease the emphasis on completing the action required to have the soldier awarded the MOS.
12. A subject rating of MOS qualification would reduce the value of this portion of the report for management purposes.
13. The field generally supports keeping the rating system as it is currently structured.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Continue with current procedures for determining MOS qualification.
2. Review criteria for award of primary, secondary, and additional MOS. If criteria for USR reporting is considered too stringent, then criteria for award of the MOS must also be considered too stringent.

NOTE: DA, DCSOPS ISSUE #7.
ISSUE 19: Should senior grade status be used in computing personnel ratings?

DISCUSSION:
1. Currently the status of available senior grade personnel (officer, WO, and E5-E9) compared to required is one of three criteria used to determine an overall personnel rating.
2. DA DCSPER recommends senior grade status be dropped from calculations of personnel rating, but continue to be reported on DA Form 2715. DA DCSPER states current shortages are due to distribution problems, not manning problems.
3. JCS does not require senior grade status to be used in calculating C-ratings and the Army is the only service to use it.
4. Status of senior grade personnel indicates the leadership and experience present in a unit and is critical to unit readiness.
5. MACOMs, corps, divisions and ex-battalion commanders contacted believe units should continue to use senior grade status in determining a personnel C-rating.

RECOMMENDATION: Continue to use senior grade status in computing personnel ratings.

NOTE: DA, DCSOPS ISSUE #8.
ISSUE 20: Should the grade of E-5 be eliminated from senior grade status in computing personnel ratings?

DISCUSSION:
1. Currently senior grade personnel are composed of officers, WO and E5-E9.
2. Status of senior grade personnel compared to required is one of three criteria used to determine an overall personnel rating.
3. Commanders express concern over the use of grade E-5 in computing senior grades.
4. Number of E-5's is generally much larger than cumulative numbers of other NCO's. The E-5 count tends to skew the senior grade status.
5. Battalion commanders feel that E-5's are not yet senior grade; many are first-term soldiers still developing their leadership skills. It is the absence of E-6 and above that negatively impacts on readiness.
6. JCS PUB 6 does not require senior grade status to be used in C-rating calculations.
7. Battalion commanders confirm the need to measure senior grade status, however, a better indicator of senior grade readiness would be to measure the status of E-6 and above.

RECOMMENDATION: Continue current procedures for computing senior grade status, but eliminate the grade of E-5 from this calculation.

NOTE: DA, DCSOPS ISSUE #8
ISSUE 21: Is unit turnover data necessary?

DISCUSSION:
1. Currently all USR reporting units are required to keep count of the number of personnel assigned to the reporting unit or reassigned from the reporting unit during the past three months.
2. Units compute this statistic by dividing losses during the prior three months by current operating strength and converting to percentage.
3. RC units base turnover percentage on a 6-month period.
4. Personnel turnover percentages do not have any impact on C-ratings.
5. Real effect of personnel turnover as far as status reporting would be reflected in training readiness.
6. No one in DA DCSPER readiness branch indicated a management use for personnel turnover percentages from the USR.
7. MILPERCEN currently submits a personnel turbulence report (RCS-DD-M(Q)-1402) quarterly to DA DCSPER who reports it semi-annually to DOD.
8. Turnover data is available on the MILPERCEN data base.
9. Removal of reporting requirement would reduce unit administration.

RECOMMENDATIONS: Eliminate personnel turnover data from the USR.
ISSUE 22: Should the Army continue to designate reportable equipment using readiness codes (ERC) or develop an alternate system?

DISCUSSION:
1. Primary weapons and equipment are coded ERC A in authorization documents IAW TRADOC equipment readiness coding rules.
2. The assignment of a readiness code (A, B or C) to an item in any TOE is based on to what degree that item is considered to be essential to the primary mission of that unit.
3. MACOM responses concur with retaining the current system, however, note that certain changes are required.
4. Policy guidelines in applying/policing application of ERC codes requires redefinition. For example, FM command and control radios are only coded ERC A in combat arms units, yet they are absolutely mission essential to many combat support and combat service support units.
5. TOE "scrubs" in conjunction with redefinition of ERC designation criteria should emphasize "move, shoot and communicate" items and other essential mission required equipment. This effort will require extensive TRADOC proponent school involvement.
6. With the dynamics of the modern battlefield, the "move, shoot and communicate" criteria should apply to all units. The individual weapon is as important to the DISCOM soldier as his counterpart in DIVARTY.
7. A review of other reporting systems, specifically DA PAM 738-750 (DA 2406), reveals dissimilarity of reported items.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Continue with current ERC system.
2. Revise Appendix F, Equipment Readiness Codes to expand ERC selection criteria, clarify definitions, and reduce interpretation problems for TRADOC.
3. Designate items reported IAW DA PAM 738-750 (2406) as ERC A.
4. Designate move, shoot and communicate items in all units as ERC A.
5. Clarify the definitions and applications of the terms "in lieu of" and "substitute" items.

NOTE: DA, DCSOPS ISSUE #9.
ISSUE 23: Is the pacing item list in Appendix C, AR 220-1 adequate and should pacing item shortage continue to outweigh EOH computations?

DISCUSSION:
1. Pacers are the most critical combat essential equipment items within a unit. They are identified in Appendix C, AR 220-1.
2. Comments from and discussions with field activities indicate immediate need to update pacing item list. This is caused by the Army's modernization efforts and errors in the current regulation.
3. Many units, particularly combat service support, have no pacing items although specific equipment is vital to mission accomplishment.
4. According to AR 220-1, the rationale for not designating pacers in certain units (ENG, CEWI) is the large number of critical items and the "low density" of each line.
5. The "low density" logic precludes certain war stoppers from getting the appropriate degree of visibility; i.e., 5,000 POL tankers and forklifts in divisional main and forward support battalions.
6. If a commander determines that a nonpacing item is impacting adversely on the unit's readiness, the overall rating may be subjectively downgraded. However, our research has shown that commanders tend not to subjectively down grade ratings based on nonavailability of critical nonpacing items.
7. The designation of pacing items in Appendix C, AR 220-1, by MTOE number is overly restrictive and causes confusion to users.
8. Unit equipment ratings (EOH) for battalion size and smaller units may be no higher than the lowest pacing item rating. This "override" system causes equipment on hand rating to be tied to the most vital of war fighting equipment. Consequently, the logistics support systems react accordingly.
9. Field activities generally concur with keeping pacer override computation method, but feel system will have more validity with updated listing.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Update pacing item list giving special attention to combat support and combat service support systems.
2. Eliminate specific TOE numbers from Appendix C, AR 220-1.
3. Continue "weighted" pacer rating contingent on updated list.
ISSUE 24: Are current procedures for calculating equipment on-hand overly restrictive?

DISCUSSION:
1. Equipment on hand (EOH) is computed in the following manner:
   a. Determine number of lines coded ERC A.
   b. Compute the percentage of fill by dividing the total number of on-hand items and in lieu of (ILO) by the MTOE required column.
   c. For lines of 21 or more, the line fill percent must equal:
      - At least 90% . . . . C-1
      - At least 80% but less than 90% C-2
      - At least 65% but less than 80% C-3
      - Less than 65% C-4
   d. The numbers in each computed line are summed and compared to 90% of total lines required. A rating is attained by using percentages above.
2. Lines at 20 or less use Table 3-1, AR 220-1.
3. The current procedures for calculating EOH is overly restrictive when applied to units with low density reportable lines. Under present criteria some units in this category can attain only C-1 or C-4 rating.
4. The current calculation method rates units C-4 when their combat capability far exceeds rated score.
5. DCSOPS proposes an alternate method using an averaging system which can be compared to the current computation method to select the best rating. The DCSOPS proposed criteria:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C-1</th>
<th>C-2</th>
<th>C-3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>90% at 90%</td>
<td>Best C-rating calculated using: 90% at 80% fill or average 1.31</td>
<td>Best C-rating calculated using: 90% at 65% fill to 1.50 or average 1.51 to 1.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Survey of former battalion commanders indicates support for the DCSOPS proposal provided a detailed explanation of the averaging rationale and methodology is presented.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Revise procedures for calculating EOH.
2. Adopt the DCSOPS averaging method.
3. Provide a detailed explanation of the averaging rationale and methodology in the revised regulation.
4. Continue the pacing item override methodology in conjunction with revised EOH computations.

NOTE: DA, DCSOPS ISSUE #10.
ISSUE 25: Should the status of operational supplies be reported?

DISCUSSION:
1. Operational supplies in Army units (Class III, PLL, basic load of ammo, etc.) varies significantly depending on location (OCONUS, CONUS) mission and component (AC or RC).
2. DCSOPS Indicates JCS PUB 6 may be changed to require services to measure status of selected supplies.
3. The status of operational supplies may have an adverse impact on readiness, however, effect is usually short-term and can be fixed within the logistical system.
4. This issue is already indirectly reflected in equipment ratings. Example: Class IX shortages would affect equipment readiness.
5. There are enough systems currently in use and independent of USR which track these items. Examples: DA 2406, MAD Report, CBS-X, etc.
6. The current AR 220-1 allows commanders to comment on the status of operational supplies and downgrade unit rating if any shortages significantly impact status.
7. DCSOPS proposes additional USR reporting of PLL, ASL, CTA NBC and basic loads (Classes I, III, and V). This recommendation appears to be based on probability of JCS PUB 6 directive.
8. MACOMS, except FORSCOM, nonconcur:
   a. FORSCOM recommends addition of a field to USR, Section A, for percentage of zero balance combat PLL.
   b. ODCSLOG position:
      (1) MPL/PLL/ASL fill in remarks.
      (2) Consider with overall C-rating.
      (3) Do not establish EOH C-rating for PLL/ASL at this time.
9. A survey of former battalion commanders at the USAWC indicates no support for separate reporting of operational supplies.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Nonconcur with DCSOPS proposal. Do not add status of operational supplies to body of USR.
2. Continue to allow optional commander's comment on the status of operational supplies if a serious shortcoming exists.

ASSOCIATED ACTIONS:
1. If JCS PUB 6 is changed to require measurement of selected supplies, then modify USR in the following manner:
   a. Designate separate-rated area for operational supplies.
   b. Establish three categories:
      (1) PLL/ASL
      (2) CTA NBC
      (3) Sustaining supplies (Classes I, III and V)
   c. Authorized subjective rating, C-1, C-2, C-3 and C-4 by commanders. Do not require statistical data since it has little value and is reported by other methods.
2. ODCSOPS encourage decision by JCS before revised AR 220-1 is published.

NOTE: DA, DCSOPS ISSUE #13.
ISSUE 26: Should equipment available for cross-leveling, to include POMCUS uncovered residual equipment, be used in computing overall C-ratings for applicable units?

DISCUSSION:
1. The Army does not get readiness credit for equipment that will become available for cross-leveling during mobilization.
2. No systems currently exist which identify all equipment that will become available for cross-leveling during mobilization and earmark it for redistribution.
3. POMCUS is filled by setting aside that portion of the war reserve required when CONUS units fall in on prepositioned equipment. Assets left behind as "PURE" become available for use as war reserves and to meet other requirements.
4. The mobilization equipment redistribution system (MOBERS) being designed to facilitate the redistribution of equipment during mobilization will be tested during MOBEX-85 (fall 1985).
5. A MOBER-like capability is required to determine both feasibility and desirability of earmarking equipment for the purpose of readiness reporting and subsequently the development of redistribution implementation plans.

RECOMMENDATION: Do not attempt to use equipment available for cross-leveling to determine C-ratings at this time; reconsider after MOBERS is evaluated.

NOTE: DA, DCSOPS ISSUE #15.
DISCUSSION:

ODCSPER has proposed that commanders be allowed to consider personnel MOS qualified who in the opinion of the commander have attained an acceptable level of proficiency in a needed MOS and would deploy with that unit even though a formal school or OJT program has not been completed, and required paperwork has not been processed.

Current procedures place heavy emphasis on the completion of courses and paperwork awarding an MOS.

Many personnel that would deploy with and can perform job requirements are counted as non MOS qualified, particularly in RC units.

Changing the current system could mask personnel and training problems associated with MOS qualification, and operators would loose visibility of "actual" MOS qualification versus "subjective" qualification.

In some instances changing current procedures may lead to malutilization of personnel.

PROPOSED ACTION: Continue with current procedures.

ASSOCIATED ACTION: ODCSPER review and improve procedures for designating personnel as MOS qualified.
ISSUE #6: PERSONNEL AVAILABILITY CRITERIA TOO STRINGENT.

DISCUSSION:

- CURRENT PERSONNEL RATING IS BASED ON AVAILABLE VERSUS ASSIGNED STRENGTH.
- JCS PUB 6 AND, THEREFORE, AR 220-1, DEFINES AVAILABLE PERSONNEL IN AN OVERLY
RESTRICTIVE MANNER.
- ASSUMES PERSONNEL PENDING ETS WILL NOT BE REPLACED WITHIN 14 DAYS AND DOES
NOT GIVE CREDIT FOR PROGRAMMED REPLACEMENTS.
- DOES NOT CONSIDER THE INITIATION OF "STOP LOSS" ACTION DURING MOBILIZATION.

PROPOSED ACTION: DELETE RESTRICTION THAT INDICATES THAT SERVICE MEMBERS WITH LESS
THAN 14 DAYS TO ESTIMATED TIME OF SEPARATION ON THE ACTUAL OR PROGRAMMED DEPLOYMENT
DATE AND WHO HAS NOT REQUESTED EXTENSION OF SERVICE WILL BE CONSIDERED NOT AVAILABLE.

ASSOCIATED ACTIONS:

- WILL REQUIRE A CHANGE TO APPENDIX D, JCS PUB 6.
- INSURE SAME AVAILABILITY CRITERIA IS USED ARMY WIDE, E.G., CONFLICT CURRENTLY
EXISTS BETWEEN AR 220-1 AND FORSCOM FORMDEPS.
CURRENT PROCEDURES ALLOW REPORTING UNITS WHICH ARE ACTIVATING OR IN TRANSITION TO REPORT C5 UNTIL A RATING OF C3 OR HIGHER IS OBTAINED IN PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT, BUT NOT MORE THAN 3 MONTHS AFTER E-DATE.

IN MANY CASES AFTER 3 MONTHS A UNIT GOES FROM C5 TO C4, EVEN THOUGH IT IS STILL ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY A DA ACTION/PROGRAM.

C5 RATINGS INDICATE PROBLEMS EXIST WHICH ARE BEYOND THE CONTROL OF A UNIT COMMANDER TO FIX.

JCS PUB 6 DOES NOT LIMIT THE PERIOD A UNIT CAN REPORT C5.

PROPOSED ACTION:

ALLOW MACOMS TO DESIGNATE QUALIFIED UNITS AS C5 UNTIL A UNIT IS C3 OR BETTER IN PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT, AS LONG AS RATING LIMITATIONS ARE CAUSED BY A DA ACTION/PROGRAM.

HQDA AND MACOMS CONSIDER ACTIVATION/TRANSITION REQUIREMENTS DURING PLANNING PROGRAMING AND DIRECT QUALIFIED UNITS TO REPORT C5 FOR SPECIFIC PERIODS OF TIME, UNLESS A C3 RATING ON PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT CAN BE ATTAINED SOONER.

PROVIDE FURTHER GUIDANCE IN AR 220-1 AS TO WHAT CONSTITUTES REORGANIZATION, MAJOR EQUIPMENT CONVERSION, AND TRANSITION FOR C5 REPORTING PURPOSES.

ASSOCIATED ACTIONS:

SEE ISSUE #4, COMPOSITE RATING SYSTEM TOO STRINGENT.

CHANGE AR 310-49 TO REQUIRE CONSOLIDATION OF SUPPORTABILITY ANALYSIS BY FD
DISCUSSION:
- Present Composite Rating System (for Div, SEP BDE, and ACR) is based on the lowest average rating for subordinate units in the categories of Maneuver, Fire Support, and Support Units.
- Worst case is always assumed since low ratings in one category (often a small number of support units) can result in low ratings for the parent unit.
- Major unit commanders are in the best position to judge the impact of the status of organic units on the ability of their unit to accomplish assigned missions.

PROPOSED ACTION:
- Base composite rating in each area (PER, EOH, ER, and TNG) on the average rating of units using Tables 3-6 and 3-7, AR 220-1 -- do not divide into categories. (Assuming training rating is made more objective).
- Add instructions that if composite ratings in each area are not truly reflective of the parent unit's readiness then the commander should subjectively upgrade or downgrade his overall unit rating and discuss in remarks.
- Drop inactivating units from composite rating 90 days prior to E-date.
- Convert C5 ratings to C4 for calculating composite rating, however, if more than 20% of organic units are C5 then the the commander should consider making his overall rating C5 unless a rating of C3 or better can be attained.
- Number of organic units rated C5 will be reported.
- Update Table 3-6 to include Light Division, Forward Support Battalions.
- Brigade commanders provide intermediate assessment letters to Division Commanders.

ASSOCIATED ACTION: Revise AR 310-49, The Army Authorized Documentation System (TAADS) to include information regarding how composite ALO are determined.
ISSUE #3: CONSIDERATION OF ROUNDOUT UNITS IN DETERMINING MAJOR COMBAT UNIT COMPOSITE RATING.

DISCUSSION:

- Present composite rating system does not address the impact of the status of assigned roundout units on major combat units.
- Tying the status of these elements together would strengthen roundout affiliations and increase the emphasis on the status of key RC units.
- Roundout units may not always deploy or fight under current alignments.
- Combining AC and RC ratings would lead to analysis problems.
- Roundout units only update their USR semi-annually.

PROPOSED ACTION:

- Roundout units provide a copy of their USR to parent major combat unit.
- Major combat units identify roundout units on DA Form 2715 and their latest overall rating.
- Status of roundout units not considered when determining a major combat unit's overall rating.
- Mandatory remarks required concerning the status of assigned roundout units and impact on mission accomplishment — also include computed overall rating if include roundout unit in composite calculations.

ASSOCIATED ACTION: ISSUE #2, FREQUENCY OF REPORTING: Change RC frequency of reporting to quarterly.
ISSUE #2: FREQUENCY OF REPORTING FOR RC UNITS.

DISCUSSION:

- RC UNITS CURRENTLY SUBMIT A SEMIANNUAL USR TO JCS AND HQDA; HOWEVER, NGB UNITS COMPLETE AN IN-HOUSE USR QUARTERLY.
- INCREASED RELIANCE IS BEING PLACED ON RC FORCES.
- MANY RC UNITS ARE SCHEDULED TO DEPLOY BEFORE AND/OR CONCURRENT WITH AC UNITS.
- SEMIANNUAL UPDATE IS NOT SATISFACTORY FROM AN OPERATIONAL OR MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE.

PROPOSED ACTION: CHANGE CURRENT POLICY TO REQUIRE RC UNITS TO REPORT QUARTERLY.

ASSOCIATED ACTION: ISSUE 3, CONSIDERATION OF ROUNDOUT UNITS IN DETERMINING DIVISION COMPOSITE RATINGS.
ISSUE #1: FREQUENCY OF UNIT STATUS REPORTING FOR AC UNITS.

DISCUSSION:

- FORSCOM RECOMMENDS THAT AC UNITS BE REQUIRED TO SUBMIT QUARTERLY VERSUS MONTHLY USR.

- JCS (MOP 172 AND PUB6 VOL II) REQUIRES CURRENT USR DATA. CHANGES TO OVERALL AND RESOURCE AREA RATINGS ARE TO BE REPORTED WITHIN 24 HOURS. ARMY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JCS REQUIREMENT IS MONTHLY REPORTING. RATIONALE IS THAT MOST CHANGES DURING ANY MONTH ARE MINOR AND IT IS NOT PRACTICAL OR DESIRABLE TO CALCULATE USR DATA ON A DAILY BASIS. QUARTERLY REPORTING WOULD REQUIRE PERIODIC CHANGE REPORTS TO KEEP THE DATA BASE REASONABLY CURRENT.

- LITTLE ADMINISTRATIVE TIME IS SAVED BY MEETING JCS REQUIREMENTS WITH A "CHANGE ONLY" POLICY -- HISTORICAL RECORDS SHOW THAT APPROXIMATELY 55% OF AC MAJOR COMBAT UNITS CHANGE THE RATING IN ONE OR MORE RATED AREA EACH MONTH.

- USR DATA ARE USED AT ALL LEVELS OF COMMAND FOR MAKING RESOURCE AND OPERATIONAL DECISIONS -- THE TIMELINESS OF THE USR IS ONE OF ITS STRONG POINTS.

- EACH CHANGE AT BATTALION LEVEL WOULD REQUIRE MAJOR COMBAT UNITS TO CHECK ON A CHANGE TO THEIR COMPOSITE RATING.

- REPORTING AS CHANGES OCCUR WOULD NECESSITATE THE USE OF A "POINT IN TIME" VERSUS "MONTHLY AVERAGE" EQUIPMENT READINESS RATING.

- MONTHLY REPORTING INSURES THE VITALITY OF THE REPORTING SYSTEM.

- CURRENT PROCEDURES CAUSE UNIT COMMANDERS TO THINK THROUGH THEIR READINESS POSTURE ON A MONTHLY BASIS.

- USAREUR, WESTCOM, EUSA AND AMC NONCONCUR WITH THE PROPOSAL TO GO TO A QUARTERLY REPORT.

PROPOSED ACTION:

- RETAIN CURRENT POLICY OF AC REPORTING MONTHLY.
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<tr>
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<td>26 NOV 84</td>
<td>COMPLETE STAFFING OF SUMMARY WITHIN HQDA</td>
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<td>28 NOV 84</td>
<td>IPR DCSOPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 DEC 84</td>
<td>REVISE AND STAFF (ARMY WIDE) DIRECTION SUMMARY</td>
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<td>8 FEB 85</td>
<td>DECISION BRIEF DCSOPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 MAR 85</td>
<td>DETERMINE AND INITIATE CHANGES TO OTHER PROCEDURES/SYSTEMS AFFECTED BY AR 220-1 CHANGES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 APR 85</td>
<td>COMPLETE DRAFT AR 220-1 AND DISTRIBUTE DRAFT (ARMY WIDE) FOR REVIEW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 JUN 85</td>
<td>CONDUCT SEMINAR ON DRAFT AR 220-1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>30 AUG 85</td>
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ODCSOP INITIATIVE
REVISION OF AR 220-1 (UNIT STATUS REPORTING)
GOALS

MAKE THE USR MORE REFLECTIVE OF A UNIT'S STATUS

INCREASE THE USEFULNESS OF THE USR TO THE ARMY

MAKE AR 220-1 EASIER TO USE

INCREASE ABILITY TO USE AUTOMATION FOR ANALYSIS

UPDATE REGULATION, TO INCLUDE PROPOSED ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES AS APPROPRIATE

FIX ASSOCIATED REGULATIONS AND SYSTEMS
ISSUE 31: Should the equipment status rating go from a monthly average to a point-in-time rating?

DISCUSSION:
1. The current system measures equipment status by an average rating for the period (a month). Other USR ratings are made at a point in time. 
2. The average rating for ES was selected to avoid "peaking" and because it was considered a better indicator of a unit's normal peacetime equipment status. The unit commander generally has complete control over the ability to maintain his unit's equipment. Therefore, this measurement reflects his unit's true ability to maintain, not an ability that is totally dependent on the Army system for control, resources, or support. 
3. During mobilization, a monthly average would not be responsive to the needs of the Army or the JCS. 
4. All MACOMS except USAISC indicated that the average rating system should be retained.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Retain the monthly average in peacetime. 
2. Go to a point-in-time system during mobilization. 

NOTE: DA, DCSOPS ISSUE #12.
ISSUE 30: Should the equipment readiness rating be eliminated retaining only the equipment status rating?

DISCUSSION:
1. Equipment status (ES) is the mission capable rating of ERC A reportable equipment which is actually on hand given in percentage. Equipment Readiness (ER) is the amount of mission capable ERC A equipment on hand in a unit compared to that amount specified by the MTOE as the full wartime requirement.
2. The EOH status is the rate of ERC A reportable equipment which is actually on hand in a unit compared to that amount specified by the MTOE as the full wartime requirement. The rating does not reflect operational status of that equipment.
3. The ER rating provides the true operational and available status of equipment in the unit to meet the full MOTE wartime requirement. Without this rating, a subjective comparison of the EOH and ES ratings would be required by the user. This subjective comparison would be less accurate in showing the true equipment available status.
4. Proponents for the elimination of the ER rating say that the unit's rating is punished twice for equipment missing, both in the EOH rating and in the ER rating. Paragraph three disestablishes that argument by showing that neither the EOH nor ES rating serves as a substitute for a true equipment readiness rating.
5. By titling the unit's equipment availability to meet full wartime requirements as ER, this rating is often incorrectly considered a measurement of the unit's wartime fighting capability (in terms of fighting power against a known baseline as measured by the MICAF study) when it is actually a measurement in percentage of equipment operationally available compared to MTOE requirements. The title equipment availability (EA) would best reflect the true meaning of this measurement and preclude confusion with unit capability. The requirement for the JCS and the Army to testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee in the spring of 1984 concerning improvement in unit capability as a result of modernization in equipment is a good example of the incorrect interpretation of ER as discussed above.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Retain the equipment readiness rating as required in AR 220-1.
2. Retitle the rating as equipment availability (EA).
ISSUE 29: Is there a way of providing a more objective procedure for determining training ratings?

DISCUSSION:
1. Currently a commander evaluates his unit's training status by comparing current training to that required for his unit to accomplish the wartime missions for which it was organized. The commander then estimates the time required with no constraints on resources to train the unit to a full wartime capable status. The time requirement then translates to a C-rating. The procedure is purely subjective although AR 220-1 does specify the indicators which a commander should use in making his evaluation.
2. Although the training rating gives a general status of training, the procedure is too subjective to allow comparison of units or to assist in the allocation of training related resources.
3. Divisions, corps, and MACOM's have devised various systems in attempts to objectively measure training status. Some are used in conjunction with making USR ratings and others are done separately and are used by the command to manage training. No system has yet been devised that would lend itself to broad application to all type units to arrive at a training rating and relate the rating to resource areas.
4. There is general dissatisfaction among battalion, brigade, and division commanders with the subjective nature of the training rating. It is the least meaningful portion of the USR. Actual ratings vary with the philosophy of division and brigade commanders on standards of training and their individual evaluation of training readiness.
5. Battalion commanders agree that there is need for change, but the study group was unable to devise a system better than the current system that was not overly complex and unit and theater dependent.
6. DA DCSOPS is working on a system to measure training status and to relate that measurement to resources. The system will have application to the USR when it is refined.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Continue at this time with current system.
2. Continue to develop a more objective system. After thorough testing, incorporate into later version of AR 220-1.

ISSUE 28: Should the decision on the training rating of a battalion or separate company be made by the next higher commander in the unit's chain of command?

DISCUSSION:
1. Currently the commander of the unit completing a USR has sole responsibility for evaluating training and determining a training rating. The theory is that the commander knows the unit's training status better than anyone. Higher commanders cannot change ratings.
2. Brigade commanders get involved in training ratings to various degrees. Some direct training ratings, some stay out of it completely, and others hint at agreement or disagreement with a subordinate unit's rating.
3. The brigade commander has more depth of experience. One of his primary responsibilities is the evaluation of training. Because he sees more units, he has a greater foundation for training evaluation.
4. Battalion commanders agree that having the brigade commander make the decision would involve him more in training evaluation and generally result in a better exchange of perceptions.
5. Two commanders should generally be able to make a more accurate subjective rating than only one.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Change AR 220-1 to require that the next higher commander in the battalion and separate company's chain of command will make the decision on the training rating of the unit.
2. The decision will be made on the recommendation of the commander of the reporting unit and his justification of the proposed rating.
ISSUE 27: Should the USACEGE POMCUS report be eliminated?

DISCUSSION:
1. USACEGE, with the help of USAMMCE for medical material, submits logistical data for each unit set of equipment assigned a UIC.
2. DCSOPS recommends elimination of the report for the following reasons:
   a. The USACEGE report only addresses POMCUS fill; it is basically a logistics report and does not need to be handled in USR channels.
   b. The NATO contingency report (PERL) provides sufficient POMCUS data for basic operational and management purposes.
   c. The USACEGE report is not used enough to justify its preparation.
3. MACOMS concur.
4. The USAWC Group Study Team concurs.

RECOMMENDATION: Eliminate the USACEGE report.

NOTE: DA, DCSOPS ISSUE #16.
ISSUE #8: USE OF SENIOR GRADE STATUS IN COMPUTING PERSONNEL RATINGS.

DISCUSSION:

- STATUS OF AVAILABLE SENIOR GRADE PERSONNEL (OFFICER, WO, AND E5 - E9) COMPARED TO REQUIRED IS ONE OF THREE CRITERIA USED TO DETERMINE AN OVERALL PERSONNEL RATING.
- THE STATUS OF THESE SENIOR PERSONNEL AND THE LEADERSHIP/EXPERIENCE THEY REPRESENT IS CRITICAL TO UNIT PERFORMANCE.
- ALL RESPONSES FROM THE FIELD INDICATED WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO USE SENIOR GRADE AS PART OF THE PERSONNEL RATING DETERMINATION.
- ODCSPER RECOMMENDS SENIOR GRADE BE DROPPED FROM PROCEDURES USED TO CALCULATE PERSONNEL RATINGS BUT CONTINUE TO BE REPORTED ON DA FORM 2715. RATIONALE: CURRENT SHORTAGES ARE DUE TO DISTRIBUTION PROBLEMS, NOT MANNING PROBLEMS.
- JCS DOES NOT REQUIRE SENIOR GRADE CRITERIA TO BE USED IN CALCULATING C-RATINGS. THE ARMY IS THE ONLY SERVICE ELECTING TO DO SO.

PROPOSED ACTION: CONTINUE WITH CURRENT PROCEDURES.
ISSUE #9: WHETHER THE ARMY SHOULD CONTINUE TO DESIGNATE REPORTABLE EQUIPMENT USING EQUIPMENT READINESS CODES (ERC) OR DEVELOP AN ALTENATE SYSTEM.

DISCUSSION:

- ALL RESPONSES INDICATED THE CURRENT ERC SYSTEM SHOULD BE RETAINED, HOWEVER, CURRENT GUIDANCE NEEDS SOME IMPROVEMENT.

PROPOSED ACTIONS:

- CONTINUE WITH CURRENT ERC SYSTEM.
- REVISE APPENDIX F, EQUIPMENT READINESS CODES TO EXPAND ERC SELECTION CRITERIA, CLARIFY DEFINITIONS, AND REDUCE INTERPRETATION PROBLEMS FOR TRADOC.

ASSOCIATED ACTIONS:

- UPDATE PACING ITEM LIST.
- CONTINUE TO EDUCATE ERC-A DESIGNATORS AND SCRUB TOE FOR PROPER DESIGNATION.
- CLARIFY EQUIPMENT SUBSTITUTION CRITERIA AND ELIMINATE CONFLICT WITH DA PAM 700-25, CLASS VII SUBSTITUTION LIST.
- INDICATE CORRELATION BETWEEN ERC-A IN AR 220-1 AND URGENCY OF NEED DESIGNATOR (UND) AS DESIGNATED IN DA PAM 710-2-1, USING UNIT SUPPLY SYSTEM, MANUAL PROCEDURES.
- CORRECT ADP PROBLEMS THAT ARE CURRENTLY DEGRADING THE USE OF ERC DISCRIMINATION IN AUTHORIZATION DOCUMENTS.
ISSUE #10: CURRENT PROCEDURES FOR CALCULATING EQUIPMENT ON-HAND RATINGS ARE OVERLY RESTRICTIVE.

DISCUSSION:
- CURRENT SYSTEM VERY SENSITIVE TO SHORTAGES OF LOW DENSITY LIMS AND THE NUMBER OF REPORTABLE LIMS.
- CURRENT SYSTEM TENDS TO RESULT IN MANY C4 UNITS THAT ARE MORE READY THAN RATING IMPLIES.
- CURRENT SYSTEM PROVIDES WORSE CASE RATINGS.

PROPOSED ACTION:
- REVISE PROCEDURE FOR CALCULATING EOH.
- PROPOSED CRITERIA:

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<th>C-1</th>
<th>C-2</th>
<th>C-3</th>
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<td>BEST C-RATING CALCULATED USING:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90% a 80% FILL OR AVG 1.31 TO 1.50</td>
<td>90% a 65% FILL OR AVG 1.51 TO 1.60</td>
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</table>

ASSOCIATED ACTION: CONTINUE EFFORTS TO FIX DOCUMENTATION PROCEDURES THAT ARE CURRENTLY BIASING UNIT STATUS RATINGS.
**CURRENT**

- 90% @ 90% Fill or Better
- 80% Fill / 72% Fill
- 78.5% Fill / 58.5% Fill

**PROPOSED**

- 90% @ 90% Fill or Better
- 80% Fill / 72% Fill
- 78.5% Fill / 58.5% Fill

* Pacing item over-ride continue as is

\[\text{WPP} = \text{Worst Possible Profile}\]
\[\text{PP} = \text{Possible Profile}\]
\[\text{WPP/A} = \text{Worst Possible Profile Using Average Gates}\]
ISSUE #11: PROVIDE A MORE OBJECTIVE PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING TRAINING RATINGS.

DISCUSSION:

- CURRENT TRAINING RATING IS VERY SUBJECTIVE.
- A MORE OBJECTIVE SYSTEM IS REQUIRED TO BETTER IDENTIFY TRAINING SHORTFALLS AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS, AND TO PROVIDE A MORE UNIFORM SYSTEM FOR ASSESSING UNIT TRAINING STATUS.
- DAMO-TR IS CONDUCTING A WORKING CONFERENCE (ALL MACOMS) ON 19 AND 20 NOV 84 TO REVIEW PROPOSED RATING PROCEDURE AND A CONFERENCE 4 AND 5 DEC 84 (MACOM DCSOPS) TO FINALIZE PROCEDURE.

PROPOSED ACTION:

- CONTINUE TO DEVELOP MORE OBJECTIVE TRAINING RATING SYSTEM.
- RUN TEST CASE (AC & RC) ON PROPOSED TRAINING SYSTEM BEFORE IMPLEMENT ARMY WIDE IN AR 220-1 -- TRAINING SECTION REMAIN BASICALLY AS IS IN SEP 85 VERSION OF AR 220-1.

ASSOCIATED ACTION: REVISE TRAINING REGULATIONS TO SUPPORT NEW TRAINING MEASUREMENT CONCEPT.
ISSUE #12: CONSIDER GOING FROM A MONTHLY AVERAGE TO A POINT-IN-TIME EQUIPMENT READINESS RATING.

DISCUSSION:

- THE AVERAGE RATING SYSTEM WAS SELECTED TO AVOID "PEAKING" AND BECAUSE IT WAS CONSIDERED A BETTER INDICATOR OF A UNIT'S NORMAL PEACETIME READINESS.
- ALL MACOMS EXCEPT USAIAC INDICATED THAT THE AVERAGE RATING SYSTEM SHOULD BE RETAINED.
- DURING MOBILIZATION A MONTHLY AVERAGE WOULD NOT BE RESPONSIVE TO THE NEEDS OF JCS OR THE ARMY.

PROPOSED ACTION:

- RETAIN MONTHLY AVERAGE IN PEACETIME.
- GO TO POINT-IN-TIME SYSTEM DURING MOBILIZATION.
ISSUE #13: PROVIDE GREATER VISIBILITY OF THE STATUS OF OPERATIONAL SUPPLIES.

DISCUSSION:

- MOST LIKELY JCS PUB 6 WILL BE CHANGED TO REQUIRE EACH SERVICE TO MEASURE THE STATUS OF SELECTED OPERATIONAL SUPPLIES.
- OPERATIONAL SUPPLIES IN ARMY UNITS (CLASS III, PLL, BASIC LOAD OF AMMUNITION, ETC) VARIES SIGNIFICANTLY DEPENDING ON LOCATION (OCONUS/CONUS), MISSION, AND COMPONENT (AC OR RC).
- THE STATUS OF OPERATIONAL SUPPLIES HAS A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON UNIT READINESS.

PROPOSED ACTION:

- ADD A MEASURED RESOURCE AREA FOR OPERATIONAL SUPPLIES.
- MEASURE THE FOLLOWING
  - PLL (ON-HAND VERSUS REQUIREMENTS AT REPORTING UNIT)
  - ASL (ON-HAND VERSUS REQUIREMENTS AT SUPPORT UNIT)
  - BASIC LOADS (CLASS I, III, AND V)
  - CTA NBC ITEMS
ISSUE #14: IMPROVE THE ACCURACY AND UTILITY OF NATO CONTINGENCY REPORTS

DISCUSSION:

- Present report uses prepositioned, to accompany troops (TAT), and not authorized for prepositioning (NAP) equipment in computing EOH and ER data for USR.
- Units do not count equipment that must be shipped from CONUS to fill shortfalls in the POMCUS equipment sets.
- Units use normal monthly unit status ratings for personnel and training.
- Report is submitted quarterly.

PROPOSED ACTION:

- Develop list of equipment that is authorized for prepositioning, but is short, and must deploy with the unit, due to being mission essential, but will not appreciably increase strategic lift requirements, e.g., radio installation kits, NBC equipment, special tools, and test equipment.
- Include in EOH computation the following equipment categories:
  - Prepositioned
  - TAT
  - NAP
  - POMCUS shortfall authorized for deployment with unit.
- Apply instant unreadiness policy to POMCUS equipment.
- Increase emphasis on commanders comments pertaining to resource areas affecting the unit’s ability to accomplish mission if deployed to Europe.
- Place in remarks the unit’s computed EOH rating if all CONUS and POMCUS equipment were considered.
Consider equipment available for cross-leveling, to include POMCUS uncovered residual equipment, in computing overall C-ratings for applicable units.

Discussion:

- The Army does not get readiness credit for equipment that will become available for cross-leveling during mobilization.
- No systems currently exist which identifies all equipment that will become available for cross-leveling during mobilization and earmarks it for redistribution.
- POMCUS is filled by offsetting the war reserve required when CONUS units fall in on POMCUS, assets left behind as pure become available for use as war reserves and to meet other requirements.
- The mobilization equipment redistribution system (MOBERS), being designed to facilitate the redistribution of equipment during mobilization, will be tested during Mobex-85 (Fall 85).
- A MOBERS-like capability is required to determine both feasibility and desirability of earmarking equipment for the purpose of readiness reporting and subsequently, the development of implementation plans.
- Cross-leveling will be scenario dependent -- it may not be possible to follow plans that are developed.

Proposed Action: Do not attempt to use equipment available for cross-leveling to determine C-ratings at this time; reconsider after MOBERS is evaluated.
ISSUE #16: ELIMINATE THE USACEGE POMCUS REPORT.

DISCUSSION:
- THE USACEGE REPORT ONLY ADDRESSES POMCUS FILL; IT IS BASICALLY A LOGISTICS REPORT AND DOES NOT NEED TO BE HANDLED IN USR CHANNELS.
- THE NATO CONTINGENCY REPORT PROVIDES SUFFICIENT POMCUS DATA FOR BASIC OPERATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT PURPOSES.
- THE USACEGE REPORT IS NOT USED ENOUGH TO JUSTIFY ITS PREPARATION.

PROPOSED ACTION: ELIMINATE THE USACEGE POMCUS REPORT.

ASSOCIATED ACTIONS:
- ODCSLOG SHOULD DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT A NEW LOGISTICAL REPORT IS NEEDED TO REPLACE THE USACEGE POMCUS REPORT.
- ISSUE #13, IMPROVE THE ACCURACY AND UTILITY OF NATO CONTINGENCY REPORTS.
JCS FLOODS UNITS TO SUBMIT USR IN PEACETIME AND WARTIME.

JCS NEEDS TO KNOW STATUS OF UNITS PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT OR EMPLOYMENT, IF FORWARD DEPLOYED, BUT ONCE DEPLOYED OR EMPLOYED UNITS ARE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE THEATER COMMANDER.

SITREPS AND OTHER TACTICAL SYSTEMS TRACK UNIT STATUS ONCE UNITS ARE DEPLOYED/EMPLOYED IN TIME OF CONFLICT.

MOST MACOMS INDICATED UNITS SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO SUBMIT USR FOLLOWING DEPLOYMENT/EMPLOYMENT.

COMPLETION OF USR BY DEPLOYED/EMPLOYED UNITS WOULD BE AN UNNECESSARY ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN AND WOULD OVERTAX EXISTING ADP SYSTEMS WHEN COMBINED WITH OTHER OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS.

PROPOSED ACTION:

ADD SECTION TO THE USR PROVIDING MORE DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING USR DURING MOBILIZATION/WARTIME.

RC UNITS RENDER A USR WHEN MOBILIZED.

ESTABLISH AN ABBREVIATED USR TO BE USED FOLLOWING MOBILIZATION; AC AND RC UNITS SUBMIT CHANGE REPORTS AS SIGNIFICANT CHANGES OCCUR.

DELETE REQUIREMENT FOR UNITS TO SUBMIT USR FOLLOWING DEPLOYMENT OR EMPLOYMENT, IF A FORWARD DEPLOYED UNIT.

CONSIDER ALSO ADDING A SECTION ADDRESSING USR DURING EXERCISES, REFORGER, ETC.

ASSOCIATED ACTION: REQUIRES CHANGE TO JCS PUB 6.

KRAUS 8 19/15

28 NOV 1984
ISSUE #18: ADDING MEASURING IMPROVED CAPABILITY OF ARMY FORCES ADDING (MICAF) TO AR 220-1.

DISCUSSION:
- THE USR PRIMARILY ADDRESSES THE STATUS OF A UNIT COMPARED TO WARTIME REQUIREMENTS.
- MICAF WILL PRIMARILY ADDRESS INCREASED COMBAT POTENTIAL AS A RESULT OF THE FIELDING OF MODERNIZED SYSTEMS -- ONLY MAJOR COMBAT UNITS WILL BE MEASURED.
- MICAF MEASURES PRIMARILY EOH WITH LITTLE REGARD TO ACTUAL PERSONNEL, ER, TRAINING OR MOBILIZATION/DEPLOYMENT STATUS.
- MICAF DOES NOT MEASURE ALL ASPECTS OF CAPABILITY, E.G., SUSTAINABILITY.
- PRIMARY USE OF MICAF WILL BE TO EVALUATE PROPOSED MODERNIZATION ACTIONS AND MODERNIZATION PROGRESS.

PROPOSED ACTION:
- MICAF NOT BE INCLUDED IN AR 220-1.
- DEVELOP AR 220-2 TO PRESCRIBE MICAF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
ASSOCIATED ISSUES

- IMPROVE THE ADP SYSTEM SUPPORTING UNIT STATUS REPORTING.
- STRENGTHEN THE LINK BETWEEN MEASUREMENT OF UNIT STATUS AND FIXING UNIT PROBLEMS.
MORANDUM FOR COLONEL BILL CARMICHAEL

OBJECT: AR 220-1, Military Study Project, Group Visit to the 1st Infantry Division, 19-20 February 1985

As requested by MG Healy, COL Jack D. Rives and LTC Jack B. Wood, AR 22C-1, military Study Project Group Members, visited Fort Riley, Kansas and the 1st Infantry Division on 19-20 February 1985. The purpose of the visit was to brief MG Watts and his staff on the Study Group's effort and obtain their reactions and comments.

Group members spent one hour with the G3, LTC Jim Dickey; one hour plus an hour with a group of fifteen readiness reporting action officers from various units and staffs at Ft. Riley; and one and a half hours with MG Watts and his command Group. The visit was well received and everyone was genuinely interested in readiness reporting and AR 220-1. The Ft. Riley hospitality was flawless.

Since the time allotted for the briefing was one hour, LTC Wood briefed only fourteen of the thirty-one issues in the Study Group Project. The fourteen issues briefed were considered the most significant.

The following are comments made by MG Watts or his staff. (There was agreement on many of the issues covered, however, for the sake of brevity, only those points of disagreement follow.)

a. MG Watts stated that the Army needs a system that measures a unit's capability to execute assigned war plans. This system would consider not only the unit's posture but also the availability and status of external support located. He felt that since the Study Group Project had focused primarily on AR 220-1, the effort was not oriented toward what the Army really needs, e.g., a new system.

b. Concerning NATO contingency reporting, MG Watts said that this portion of the current regulation does not report his true status for supporting NATO. For example, he now has his ADA Battalion at Ft. Riley (2-67 ADA returned from Germany in mid-1984 where it had been stationed since the early '70's), but it has no equipment in POMCUS. The current reporting system does not show this deficiency. He went on to say that he cannot report accurately without knowing the guaranteed number of air frames available to him for deployment to Europe. This discussion ties into the points made in the preceding paragraph.
c. MG Watts did not agree with the Study Group recommendation to have AR 220-1 provide to each reporting unit three working days following the end of the reporting period for report preparation. He stated that more time should be given to each echelon. There is no reason why the report cannot arrive later at JCS.

d. MG Watts did not agree with the Study Group recommendation that applies a fixed nonavailable personnel percentage to personnel availability criteria computations. He said that to insure accuracy, computations must continue as currently required.

e. MG Watts did not agree with the Study Group recommendation that eliminates the grade E5 from Senior Grade computations. His point is that E5's are leaders and should be included. He further suggested that the word "leader" may be more appropriate than the title "senior grade."

f. MG Watts recognized that when developed, the Living TOE will correct a number or most of the on-going problems, but he could not see much progress on that effort now.

g. MG Watts also mentioned the need to purge subjectiveness from training status reporting. He suggested the development of methods to measure SQT qualifications, Officer Basic Course and NCOES attendance, and PT qualifications to mention a few.

h. MG Watts further indicated that readiness measurement should include such areas in the logistics field as availability of classes of supply to support war missions.

i. MG Watts felt that a time limit should be retained on reporting C5. He said that RC units might take advantage of an unlimited C5 reporting period and rely on it for long periods of time.

j. MG Watts also recommended that additional spaces be provided for commander's comments. The current space provided is too restrictive.

5. During the briefing MG Watts did not specifically indicate disagreement with the recommendation of reporting quarterly rather than monthly. However, he made his disagreement known to MG Healy later that day by telephone.

6. Because of time constraints study group members felt that there was not sufficient time to adequately address all aspects of each study group recommendation, particularly those with which MG Watts disagreed. With more time a better case for each recommendation could have been presented.

7. MG Watts indicated that a lot of hard work had been applied to this Study Group effort and he thanked the War College for giving Ft. Riley a chance to comment on it.
AWCSS

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8. The study group members thanked MG Watts for his time and assured him that his and his staff's comments would be considered along with all other input in the final study group report.

JACK D. RIVES
Colonel, Armor
Study Group Chairman
END

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