The US Army recently implemented its New Manning System (NMS). A two-pronged approach to improving unit cohesion and affiliating soldiers on a permanent basis to a unit, the New Manning System is progressing deliberately and impacts only a small portion of the Total Force. The problem this paper addresses is how units waiting for full implementation of NMS can build their own cohesion. A review was conducted on the contributions of military scholars and historians to the topic of cohesion as a factor in military units. In addition, the Army's own attempts at building cohesion were investigated to include an (Cont)
analysis of the NMS. Furthermore, in order to discuss appropriately the ways a unit can go about building cohesion, the psychological aspects of group interaction and processes were examined. Based on the research conducted and the author's personal experiences, a formula was devised to build cohesion in military units. It was concluded that units that provide for stability, employ stress, and ensure achievement is rewarded with success, will achieve cohesion.
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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

A FORMULA FOR BUILDING COHESION

INDIVIDUAL ESSAY

by

Lieutenant Colonel Frederick G. Wang, IN

Colonel D. C. Watson, IN
Project Advisor

US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
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The US Army recently implemented its New Manning System (NMS). A two pronged approach to improving unit cohesion and affiliating soldiers on a permanent basis to a unit, the New Manning System is progressing deliberately and impacts only on a small portion of the total force. The problem then, is how can units waiting for full implementation of the New Manning System build their own cohesion now. A review was conducted on the contributions of military scholars and historians to the topic of cohesion as a factor in military units. In addition, the Army’s own attempts at building cohesion were investigated to include an analysis of the New Manning System. Furthermore, in order to discuss appropriately the ways that a unit can go about building cohesion, the psychological aspects of group interaction and processes were examined. Based on the research conducted and the author’s personal experiences, a formula was devised to build cohesion in military units. It was concluded that units that provide for stability, employ stress, and insure that achievement is rewarded with success will achieve cohesion.
A FORMULA FOR BUILDING COHESION

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LIEUTENANT COLONEL FREDERICK G. WONG, IN

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During the past five years, the US Army has taken several cautious initiatives in manning its forces that have successfully resulted in the building of cohesion in a few of its small units. The success of these personnel management initiatives are reflected in the esprit de corps, high morale, higher retention rates and increased combat readiness achieved by these units. In the meantime, units which have not yet been affected by the new manning initiatives can also build their own cohesion by providing for stability in their structure, making for stress in training and insuring that achievement is rewarded.

COHESION: WHAT DOES HISTORY SAY?

The need for cohesion in all our units is absolute as the pages of history are replete with examples of the strength that it provides to military units. History accords high morale, esprit de corps, the fighting spirit, elan and cohesiveness a long and distinguished place in its records of military thought and experience. Nearly every great military thinker and writer of combat and war who studied soldiers in combat, speaks of the advantages that accrue to an army that has cohesion in its ranks. Clearly, an army that fails to heed the lessons of history will suffer for its negligence.

Clausewitz spoke of the requirement for cohesion in Chapter 5 of Book III, On War. Entitled, "Military Virtues of the Army", his comprehensive narrative on the moral qualities required of professional soldiers and their military spirit as opposed to a people under arms, set forth salient points on the benefits that they would have if they had cohesion.
An army that maintains its cohesion under the most murderous fire; that cannot be shaken by imaginary fears and resists well-founded ones with all its might; that, proud of its victories, will not lose the strength to obey orders and its respect and trust for its officers even in defeat; whose physical power, like the muscles of an athlete, has been stealed by training in privation and effort; a force that regards such efforts as a means to victory rather than a curse on its cause; that is mindful of all these duties and qualities by virtue of the single powerful idea of the honor of its arms—such an Army is imbued with the true military spirit.

In other words, Clausewitz felt strongly that an army that has military spirit or esprit must first of all maintain its cohesion in order to wage war successfully and be victorious. In short, to maintain cohesion, an army must first of all have cohesion.

Later on in the second half of the nineteenth century, French Colonel Ardant du Picq, researched the behavior of men in battle. His astute observations yielded several dividends that support the requirement for cohesion in the military.

Du Picq advocated the military profession was unique because of its requirement to transform men into combatants contrary to human nature; that is, to overcome fear and the natural instinct to preserve life and limb. He felt this condition could only be accomplished through cohesion because it is the prerequisite to acquiring the fighting spirit.

He postulated that only cohesive units will fight effectively and advance on the enemy. A soldier's sense of duty to his trusted comrades will overcome his natural inclination to avoid combat and fall back from danger. In other words, cohesion will provide the soldier a desire and commitment to support his fellow soldiers in battle and compensate for his own fears.

In addition, Du Picq felt cohesion increases the value of the individual soldier to the unit in that he will react and fight without observation of his leaders because of the value that he places on the opinions of his comrades.
Cohesion will make the individual soldier fight because he is concerned his peers will otherwise find him unworthy of their respect, resulting in the loss of individual honor and self-esteem. In short, the individual soldier who is cohesed with his unit will possess motivation and individual initiative that will not require the constant supervision of superiors.

Thoughtful reflections on the topic of cohesion can be found in the writings of S. L. A. Marshall in, *Men Against Fire*. Like Ardant du Picq, Marshall studied the behavior of men in battle and contributed greatly to the current body of knowledge on cohesion in military units. Undoubtedly his record of his observations in *Men Against Fire* contains a wealth of supporting evidence which mandates the acquiring of cohesion in the Army.

In his ninth chapter, "Tactical Cohesion," Marshall criticizes those writers of war that use the expression, "battle-seasoned troops," as if to mean that a soldier becomes callous or accustomed to battle. The individual soldier, Marshall contends, who has gained knowledge from his combat experiences will become steadier in battle in that he will be less susceptible to wild imagining or misperceptions, but, over time, these will always be a steady deteriorating of his mental and moral fiber. In short, Marshall felt soldiers will never adjust to the total climate of war because they cannot ever fully conquer the individual and natural human fear of death and wounds.

Marshall further stated that what has been attributed to a "seasoning" in troops is largely a matter of soldiers learning to do a thing well as a group as opposed to doing it badly. Moreover, as the individual soldier increases his own awareness in battle which at first was completely strange and unfamiliar but gradually becomes acceptable and familiar "seasoning" is mainly due to his individual growth in the confidence of his buddies and comrades of his unit. Until that kind of confidence is born, there can be no effective action. Green troops are more likely to flee the field than others only because they have not learned to
think and act together. Individually, they may be as brave and willing . . . but individual bravery and willingness will not stand against organized shock.

With the growth of experience, troops learn to apply the lessons of contact and communicating, and out of these things come the tactical cohesion which enables a group of individuals to make the most of their united strength and stand steady in the face of sudden emergency.¹

In addition, the body of literature that refers to cohesion often neglects to include the studies on psychiatric breakdown or stress casualties in combat. However, these are certainly not unknown. These studies complement the importance of the cohesed primary group and its ties to the individual soldier and his ability to face and hold up under stress in combat.

Ardant du Picq was aware that a relationship between unit cohesion and stress casualties existed. His observations of men in battle led him to say,

In troops without cohesion . . . numbers enter the hospitals without any other complaint than the lack of morale, which very quickly becomes a disease. A Draconian discipline no longer exists; cohesion alone can replace it.⁸

Stress casualties were again recognized in significant numbers in World War I and accounts from World War II indicated that psychiatric battle casualties represented one-fourth of all medical evacuations.⁸

For example, for a brief period during the North African Campaign during World War II, the Americans evacuated more casualties for psychiatric reasons than theater replacements.¹⁰ And, following ten days of fighting on Okinawa, it was revealed that one field hospital devoted its 1,000 bed capacity exclusively to the treatment of soldiers who were psychiatric or stress casualties.¹¹

Other noted military historians and scholars have produced works which proclaim the factors of cohesion as being essential to military units. John Keegan focused on motivation and the psychological aspects of combatants in his book, The Face of Battle.¹² In addition, behavioral scientists Edward
Shils and Morris Janowitz studied cohesion in the German Army during World War II. They concluded that cohesion gave the German Army extra combat power which was obtained by keeping soldiers in the same unit as long as the unit survived. These soldiers became the unit stabilizers who built cohesion because they knew the unit's history, its uniqueness and its unwritten rules.  

Therefore, the annals of the history of warfare and the study of men in battle provide strong evidence that morale, esprit and cohesion provide soldiers an advantage under conditions of extreme privation, fear and uncertainty that soldiers encounter in combat. No thoughtful person could disagree after being exposed to the literature on this topic that soldiers require cohesion to be effective in battle.

**COHESION: WHY BUILD IT NOW?**

The recent initiatives taken by the senior leadership of the US Army to build cohesion in the 1980's must have had other foundations besides the well-documented history of warfare and man in battle. Larry Ingraham and Frederick Manning, both psychologists in the Army, in 1981 advocated three factors they felt helped to move the Army toward launching the new initiatives to build cohesion in its units.

First of all, they advocated the same warning prevalent in the Army service schools during the 1970's, of the next war being a, "come as you war," which will not provide sufficient time for the Army to move these soldiers into effective units and prepare them for battle. Furthermore, because of the rapid and almost immediate employment of combat troops into battle, they felt our nation will be unable to unite public opinion in the civilian sector to support the effort necessary to sustain military operations.
Secondly, they felt the results of the Israeli-Arab Wars which demonstrated conclusively the deadly effects of modern warfare, as compared to combat operations during World War II and Korea, would have a significant impact on units which lacked cohesion. These results showed the rapid generation of psychiatric breakdowns where previously casualties of this sort occurred as a minimum in 25 to 30 days of combat exposure, now occurred in 24 hours. It was felt that individual soldiers in cohesed units would incur fewer stress casualties on the modern battlefield.\(^{15}\)

Ingraham and Manning further advocated that there apparently was a time/intensity exposure factor unique in modern warfare that compounds all the elements leading to battle stress and eventual individual breakdown. They felt the cause for this condition was the extreme lethality of the modern weapons on the battlefield.\(^{16}\) In part, our own service schools in the 1970's predicted the increased lethality of modern weapons will result in situations where if you can be seen, you can be hit and if hit, you can be killed. Consequently, soldiers would only be able to withstand so much terror over time after which they would sunderm to the natural tendency to flee or break down in place. In short, cohesive small units which have esprit and high morale will be in a better position to survive on the modern battlefield and experience fewer psychiatric stress casualties.

The third factor set forth by Ingraham and Manning concerned the social structure of the Army prevalent in the 1970's. It was felt the Army was not healthy as evidenced by incessant reports by the news media of the perceived decline in leadership, the poor quality of recruits, high resignation and first-term attrition rates, lack of job satisfaction, increased incidents of illicit drug use and alcohol abuse, compounded even further by racial and sexual incidents. All of these factors, it was felt, would result in an increase in psychiatric and nonbattle casualties, not to include the
questionable ability of the Army to fight effectively should it be committed to battle.\textsuperscript{17}

In addition to the three factors mentioned previously, Ingraham's and Manning's own research on personnel attrition to drug use revealed additional concerns to the type of cohesion found in artillery units in Germany. They concluded that commonalties fostered by drug and alcohol use may be social necessities in maintaining the small group structure. They also found that soldiers leaving the command prematurely were not significantly different from the general population in terms of demographics. However, both Ingraham and Manning were startled with their lack of attachment to buddies, their lack of identification with their unit and their lack of involvement with their jobs.\textsuperscript{18}

The studies conducted by Ingraham and Manning in Germany certainly added credence for building cohesion in the Army, less alone the improvement of the Army as an institution fully capable of accomplishing its mission.

Another factor which contributed to the growing wave of support to build cohesion was the personnel turbulence resulting from the end of the Vietnam War, to include the end of the draft and the start of the volunteer Army.\textsuperscript{19} The realization that a smaller, nondraft Army with its implicit need for retention favored a highly cohesive force capable of accomplishing its mission. Furthermore, with the advent of peace came a decrease in defense dollars and other resources which added impetus to search for and implement other combat multipliers because clearly, modern equipment alone would not be enough for an Army to survive and win on the highly lethal modern battlefield.\textsuperscript{20}
COHESION: THE ARMY’S EXPERIENCE

The US Army has had experience building cohesion in the past, with programs that were tied primarily to manning and sustaining its forces and moving units. For one reason or another, all of these programs were overcome by lack of resources, changes in structure, inefficiency or because it was just too difficult to do.

Units that were formed and fought in World War II enjoyed cohesion. The majority of soldiers in that war served continuously in the same regiments they joined and fought with until the end of the war. Those veterans who were able to survive the war share immense pride in those experiences with their comrades-in-arms.\textsuperscript{21} One needs only to be a casual observer at a reunion of veterans of a regiment or division that fought in World War II to feel the tremendous outpouring of warmth, friendship, bonding and esprit that exist among its members. They had cohesion.

In the Korean conflict however, soldiers earned points for the number of days they were exposed to enemy fire. Once an individual soldier accumulated the fixed number of necessary points, he was allowed to go home.\textsuperscript{22} This system severely impacted on personnel stability, destroyed whatever bonding had occurred between members of a unit and consequently degraded unit cohesion.

After the Korean War, the Army tried a unit replacement system where company through division-sized units rotated between the continental United States and Europe. "Gyroscope" was implemented to improve morale, increase combat effectiveness of units and reduce the cost of support and facilities.\textsuperscript{23}

Unfortunately, "Gyroscope" did not produce the expected cost savings nor were the expected improvements in readiness achieved. Despite enjoying success in moving units at the battalion and regimental level through this
program, "Gyroscope" was concluded as being too complicated and expensive especially at the division level.\textsuperscript{24}

In the 1960's, the Army expanded rapidly during the Vietnam War because of its large-scale commitment. A one year tour policy was established that resulted in an infusion process to distribute individual soldiers among the units to avoid mass rotations one year after the unit had arrived in combat.\textsuperscript{25}

This system resulted in personnel turbulence and instability which degraded cohesion. In addition, the majority of the commanders from company to brigade level retained their commands for only six months or half of their tour, which further exasperated stability and cohesion in combat units.

Lieutenant General Elton described other programs that have been tried by the Army to man and sustain the force and presumably to provide for cohesive units in his article, "Cohesion and Unit Pride Aims of New Manning System," which appeared in the 1984-85 Green Book of Army.

Other approaches—from the "Depot Battalion" (1899-1912) to the "Platoon Experiment" (1953-1955) to "Long Throat's" rotation of three battle groups to Europe (1962-1963)—all shared common threads with "Gyroscope." They were limited experiments, had no long-range goals or analytic base and, most important, depended on the existing personnel replacement system for sustenance.\textsuperscript{26}

In the 1970's, the Army tried brigade level unit rotations between CONUS and West Germany. "Brigade 75" and "76" were programmed for six month cycles, however they eventually resulted in permanent deployments due to the turbulence and stress experienced by their parent divisions in CONUS.\textsuperscript{27}

In addition to the programs designed to man and sustain the force and at the same time provide for unit movements, other initiatives were tried by the Army which were also clearly designed to build unit cohesion. These initiatives also failed, primarily because of the bureaucracy in our personnel
management system which was geared to individual replacements and because of
the tampering by the higher headquarters that gained the units.

Colonel Dandridge (Mike) Malone's article, "Dear Army: You've Got Yourself a Real Winner", in the September 1984 issue of Army gave three examples of initiatives that attempted to build cohesive units.

Malone pointed out in his article an initiative that took place in the late 1950's to build a cohesive brigade. The "Battle Group" concept started with an officer and NCO cadre and was filled with recruits. The entire unit then trained together in basic training, advanced individual training, basic unit training and advanced unit training. This entire process took a year with no turnover of personnel allowing unit cohesion to flourish. Unfortunately, although achieving a very high degree of cohesion, when the Battle Group was deployed overseas, personnel were inadvertently reassigned to fill personnel shortages in the division to which it was assigned. Eventually, within three months, the fiber of the Battle Group was weakened and as Malone pointed out, "...within a total of about six months after it arrived, it was just another fat, lazy, dead-eyed outfit."

The second example in Malone's article to form a cohesive unit took place in the early 1960's with the formation of "Davy Crockett" platoons. The "Davy Crockett" was a weapons system designed to provide tactical nuclear fire support. Similar to the Battle Group concept, the entire "Davy Crockett" platoon was kept together, trained, tested and shipped overseas together—specially designated and earmarked to man the weapons system. These platoons enjoyed high esprit de corps and cohesion. Unfortunately, like the experience of the Battle Group, the "Davy Crockett" platoons were also split up and shortly dissolved, losing all the cohesion that had been purposely built into it.
The third failure to form cohesive units cited by Malone occurred in the mid-1970's when the Army formed cohesive tank crews. This initiative was undertaken to provide trained cohesive tank crews to man the new M60A2 main battle tank. The concept called for selecting and forming a complete tank crew at Fort Knox, Kentucky, trained on the new M60A2. Upon completion of their training, they would deploy together to Germany where they would pick up their new tank arriving from Detroit. The crew would then serve together with their tank for the entire period of their tour in Germany. Unfortunately, the tank production lines in Detroit bogged down and crews trained and cohesed were soon split up and used as individual replacements.

In summation, the Army has had a wealth of experience in attempting to build cohesion in its units. In nearly every situation, improved morale was evident with the units selected to participate in unit movements. Soldiers stayed together longer and were able to develop a positive self-image and identity with their unit. In addition, it was found that battalion and regimental size rotations were workable which resulted in cohesive units.

On the other hand, the failing of earlier attempts to build and sustain cohesion in the Army provided valuable lessons that must be considered and fixed in any future endeavors. First of all, the personnel management system of the Army must be altered to fully support the movement of units rather than individuals. Second, any system that will result in the stability of personnel in units that will rotate with units overseas had to be fully supportable in the base support structure in both CONUS and the gaining overseas command. Finally, a feasible approach to manning the units had to be established.
COHESION: THE NEW MANNING SYSTEM.

In 1981, the Army decided on a fresh approach to manning and sustaining its forces. Cognizant of its own unit-based manning experiences to include the turbulent events of the 1970's as well as the lesson of history on the benefits of cohesive units, the Army decided to alter its traditional reliance on the individual replacement system and begin careful implementation of a New Manning System.\textsuperscript{32}

The New Manning System (NNS) consists of COHORT and the US Army Regimental System. The Cohesion, Operational Readiness and Training (COHORT) unit movement system on one hand, was designed to tighten cohesion in the Army through unit movements, as opposed to the individual replacement system. On the other hand, the US Army Regimental System would unify our soldiers and their battalions in stable regiments in which they will be affiliated throughout their careers.\textsuperscript{33}

LTG Elton described the benefits of the system as such:

Each of the system's two parts could stand alone; they are not mutually dependent. But when applied together, they are a complementary and reinforcing approach to building, and then sustaining, a more stable fighting force. Together they will cut down on personnel turbulence, foster cohesion in fighting units and achieve a much greater sense of togetherness, esprit and belonging among soldiers.\textsuperscript{34}

COHORT begins when soldiers enlist under the US Army Regimental/COHORT enlistment option. These recruits undergo their initial entry training (IET) together and upon completion are assigned to a COHORT unit where they join their chain of command. They are stabilized and eventually overseas as a company size unit. The COHORT life cycle of three years starts in CONUS where the company trains up to combat effectiveness. Movement as a unit to an overseas station occurs at the 18-month point for long tour locations, like West Germany and Italy, or at the 24-month point for short tour areas like
Korea. Upon completion of the 36 month enlistment option, its soldiers and cadre members either separate from the Army or are reassigned as individual replacements.

The results of the COHORT system have been spectacular based on the fourteen COHORT companies who have completed their life cycles. For example, strong horizontal bonding among recruits existed during IET. This strong bonding is expected to continue throughout the life cycle of three years because these soldiers will be kept together in the same unit. On the other hand, vertical bonding or the relationship between the soldiers and their chain of command has not been as high but is equal to non-COHORT units.35

In addition, the main objective of COHORT, to keep soldiers and their leaders stabilized longer in the same unit, was achieved. COHORT units in CONUS enjoyed a 51 percent increase in stability over their similar non-COHORT counterparts. Furthermore, overseas COHORT units surpassed similar non-COHORT units with a 74 percent increase in the stability rate.36

Moreover, in skill qualification test scores, the armor COHORT units had an 18 and 4 percent higher pass rate in common and armor tasks respectively, over their similar non-COHORT units. In addition, the artillery COHORT units outscored their counterparts by 17 percent in common task and 13 percent in field artillery tasks. Furthermore, reenlistment rates between COHORT and non-COHORT units indicated that on the average, COHORT units had 18 percent more reenlistments than non-COHORT units.37

In short, COHORT soldiers are more competitive, possess strong family feelings in their units, have lower attrition rates and strong horizontal bonding. COHORT units, like elite units, have a positive self-image and their psychological readiness for combat is extremely high. Six of eight battalion
commanders considered the COHORT units the best in their battalions. They had cohesion.38

COHORT establishes one leg of the New Manning System and is producing stable, cohesive units. However, it does not by itself provide for soldiers to align their allegiance to and sense of belonging with their units over the long term. The US Army Regimental System was designed to provide the other leg of the New Manning System and establish the allegiance desired.

Under the present individual replacement system, soldiers switch their allegiance to battalions, regiments and divisions each time they change stations. Associations with units are by chance and short-lived depending on tour length prior to reassignment and another permanent change of station. The regimental system will provide the soldier with an affiliation to one regiment in order to allow him a continuous association or identification throughout his career.39

The regiment will serve as a base for a grouping of battalions of the same kind with compatible missions, organizations and weapons systems. A soldier affiliated with the regiment will serve in one of its battalions whenever he is assigned to a battalion. Requirement for assignments such as ROTC, recruiting, drill sergeant, brigade and division staff duty will result in a temporary break in the soldier's association with the regiment. However, when the soldier is assigned back to a battalion for duty, it will be with one of the battalions of the regiment with which he was originally affiliated.40

The regimental system then, provides a soldier a permanent unit identification throughout his career. He will be able to identify with the rich heritage of his regiment going back to its formation be it the Revolutionary War or Civil War. Furthermore, it is conceivable that he will always serve with other soldiers with whom he has served before because they will always be
assigned to battalions belonging to the same regiment. The soldier will be able to learn the history of his regiment, identify with the glory of its battle streamer, its colors, its motto, insignia and combat honors.

The New Manning System provides for unit stability and a sense of belonging among soldiers. It attempts to capitalize on the powerful combat multiplier of cohesion and well-bonded units, fostering a sense of pride, esprit de corps and professionalism.

However, the New Manning System is proceeding cautiously, and with good reason, given the shaky experiences of previous attempts at unit-based manning initiatives. The process, which is deliberate, is expected to take two to three more years. Evaluations will be continuous.4

Furthermore, competing major initiatives in the Army like "Division 86", the Light Infantry Division and force modernization dictates caution so the benefits already realized from the NMS will not be lost or overcome by equally important initiatives to make our Army better. Consequently, NMS affects a deliberately limited number of units with the majority of Army units yet to be influenced or affected by its cohesion building properties.42 The steady-state of the New Manning System is not yet in sight.

**COHESION: WHAT IS IT?**

Therefore, those units and especially combat arms units, not affected by the NMS, should not wait for NMS but, begin immediately to do all that they can do to build cohesion now. Suffice to say on the surface it sounds easy but on deeper reflection it's one of those taskers that could easily be placed in the "too hard to do box". What is cohesion?

Cohesion is defined in Webster's Dictionary as the act, quality or state of cohering, a sticking together. Whereas cohere is defined: to hold
together firmly, solidly, stickily, with resistance to separation. These formal definitions of the term are basic to our understanding of what cohesion means but to be fully useable, it should be defined or transformed into useable military terms.

Drawing on Ingraham and Manning again, they differentiate between cohesion, morale and esprit as:

The family of concepts—cohesion, morale, esprit—springs from different intellectual traditions and refers to different levels of analysis. Cohesion, as a descriptor of primary groups, derives from social psychology, whereas morale and esprit trace their roots to sociology and military history.

... we prefer 'individual morale' to refer to the individual level of analysis as a psychological state of mind characterized by a sense of well-being based on confidence in the self and in primary groups. 'Cohesion' in contrast, we consider a property of primary groups and, therefore, belongs to the group level of analysis.

In other words, when we use the terms cohesion, morale and esprit, we are really dealing with different levels of reference. Individual morale applies to the individual soldier's self-concept of himself and the confidence that he places in the primary group of which he is a member. Cohesion applies to primary groups or face-to-face relationships or even more appropriately, in military parlance, to the tank crew, fire team, gun crew or squad and maybe the platoon. Cohesion represents the feeling of belonging with a small group that results in "we" as opposed to "them." Therefore, cohesive groups would include mutual affection, interdependence, trust and loyalty to others in the small group, as some of its characteristics. These characteristics should apply ideally, in the formal setting as well as the informal off-duty environment.

Ingraham and Manning clarify esprit:

Esprit is generally reserved for large collectives above the face-to-face interaction, also characterized by pride.
in group membership, but especially by unity of purpose and devotion to the cause.\(^{45}\)

Assuming the validity of Ingraham and Manning's description of esprit, the company, battery or troop is where esprit first surfaces. It is applicable and relevant when referring to the battalion, brigade, regiment and division which provides "purpose" or direction and mission.

A discussion on the semantics of the terms and the intellectual disciplines from which they surface is not appropriate for the problem that is being confronted here. The important distinction that should be made is that when the terms are used it is best to keep these levels of application conceptually distinct even though they tend to overlap.

The task is determining how these terms relate to each level in order to obtain an effective military force. Ingraham and Manning state that two contrasting models exist but that neither is totally adequate or predictive, but that it is the state of our knowledge at present.

The first model assumes a catalytic event (Pearl Harbor) where with minimum levels of bonding and primary group development, the entire Army at all levels are fused collectively by unity of purpose and esprit.\(^{47}\) This model is shunned by the authors because it saves time and there is nothing to do until the event occurs.

The second model on the other hand provides a scenario that is understandable, workable and relevant to our purposes of building military cohesion and understanding the relationship of the terms morale, cohesion and esprit.

The second model assumes a building block analogy whereby individuals bond to buddies which then assemble into primary groups which, in turn, get welded into companies, battalions, brigades and divisions with esprit. Morale, cohesion and esprit can be linked to one another if 'group' is not restricted solely to the work group and if recognition is accorded the fact individuals are members of several different groups simultaneously.\(^{48}\)
In other words, the first step in the process of building cohesive units starts with the face-to-face relationships of two soldiers becoming buddies or pals and friends. The relationship might involve three soldiers or even four but more than likely, two. Their common interest might be in fast cars, fishing, weight lifting or music. This relationship between buddies becomes the primary group.

Progressively, but more importantly, the members of these primary groups should make up a tank crew, fire team or at a minimum, be assigned to the same squad and platoon. Primary groups then form the platoon and progressively the company where esprit first surfaces. The individual soldier is by virtue of his membership in the organization, a member of each progressive level of the larger organization, from tank crew, to platoon, to company, to battalion, brigade and division.

In addition, Ingraham and Manning used the link-pin concept of Rensis Likert, which postulates that supervisors occupy positions in a hierarchy between levels and at the same time are also members of small face-to-face work groups. These primary groups of supervisors share similar purposes and goals for the larger group or collective, where esprit is present to a degree and where interaction takes place that is sometimes negative and sometimes positive.

In other words, it is possible to have cohesive primary work groups such as cohesive squad or platoon leaders, cohesive company or battalion commanders, and cohesive battalion, brigade and division staffs. The members of these primary work groups interact with other primary work groups and their members at their own level in the hierarchy of the organization, but also with other members of the primary work group at several levels above them. Ideally, the individual members of the various primary work groups will share similar
interests outside of the formal military environment, like the PTA, church, gourmet club or Army Youth Activity.

Thus, it is possible for esprit to be transmitted and distributed throughout a sizeable collective made up of many primary groups that are not coextensive in their memberships, but are linked to one another by members who occupy link-pin positions in several groups.

The important point that should be made here is that although the link-pin concept is valid because the Army is built on an ascending hierarchy of units, those individuals that hold link-pin positions are also key to fostering individual morale, cohesion and esprit. The degree of vertical bonding that is established by members of the various primary work groups impacts significantly on the larger unit's esprit. These individuals must believe in the goals and purposes of the larger collective. Ideally, their relationships with other members in their primary work group as well as their counterparts at the next higher level are positive, cooperative and supportive.

As an example, negative relationships between a battalion staff and their brigade staff impacts in a negative manner on the morale of the battalion and has some disabling effects on the brigade collectively. Similarly, a division G4 who is not supportive of the needs of the S4 in the brigades and battalions of the division, creates mistrust, lack of confidence and fosters a relationship which lacks internal coherence and discipline which degrades esprit and cohesion.

On the other hand, a division G3 can independently conduct G-training Meetings with the S3 officers from the brigades and battalions, to equitably distribute the training areas on an installation and to share the Commander's training concerns. He can use this forum to build trust and confidence between individuals who hold "link-pin" positions in the organization's training hierarchy who share similar goals and values; that of good, effective
training. Furthermore, if the G3 steers the discussions at these meetings to create a cooperative, supportive and positive atmosphere, he fosters individual morale, primary group cohesion and esprit within the division's training community.

Therefore, face-to-face relationships which form primary groups are key to establishing cohesion in small units like squads, tank crews and fire teams. Furthermore, individual morale and esprit are enhanced when individual members of primary work groups establish their own cohesion and interact in a positive, supportive and cooperative manner in their relationships with members from other similar primary work groups in the organization's hierarchy.

In the case of stable collectives or large organizations, cohesive primary groups are crucial for maintenance and functioning. They provide the social referent in which individual morale is anchored and the medium through which esprit is transmitted. The final goal is esprit; we cannot get there from here, though, without passing through cohesion! Research suggests that cohesiveness is an emergent property of groups that results from sustained formal and informal interactions, that it rests on common experience, shared symbols and shared values.52

COHESION: HOW TO DO IT

Having discussed what cohesion is provides a frame of reference in attempting to build cohesion. Furthermore, the encouraging results of the New Manning System is already paying dividends in cohesion building, especially COHORT which provides for personnel stability, albeit for a small percentage of the total active force. In addition, our Arm's experience in moving units and manning as well as sustaining the force has provided valuable lessons which should not have to be relearned again. Moreover, military historians, psychologists, sociologists and military scholars have amply recorded the importance of cohesion to the military.
Building a formula for cohesion then, can be very complex if all the components previously cited are included in the equation. The application of the formula will also be challenging if the unit for which it is being built is as dynamic as all active duty units are prone to be in the Army.

Therefore, in simplifying the process three key and very major components are proposed, which in an umbrella-like manner, should cover the subject adequately, and produce unit cohesion. Including more components or factors will clutter the formula and distract from its intended purpose. Active duty units have a full plate that is overflowing without adding more food to what already cannot be consumed. The three components, reduced to their simplest forms, are stability, stress and success.

Stability

The French military writer, Ardent du Picq, gave some perspective to the first component in the formula for building cohesion when he said of stability, "A wise organization (or leader) ensures that the personnel of combat groups changes as little as possible, so that comrades in peacetime maneuvers shall be comrades in war."53 In other words, stability of personnel is paramount to building cohesion. Without stability of personnel, face-to-face relationships will be ineffective and will not result in the bonding that leads to the establishment of primary groups where trust, confidence and loyalty is strongest. Moreover, although very important in the tank crew, fire team and squad, the stability of members in primary work groups such as the battalion and brigade staff is equally important in order to establish vertical bonding which leads to esprit.

The Army's individual replacement system will always cause personnel turbulence in non-COHORT units. However, commanders who continually reassign subordinate leaders and soldiers to different jobs also add to personnel
turbulence. A worthy goal is to assign a soldier to one job that he will have until he leaves the unit or is promoted out of that position.

In addition, a newly assigned sergeant should be assigned to one squad and remain in that squad until he leaves the unit or is promoted. Commanders who move an established NCO to cross-level the unit or to place him in a "softer" job as a reward for good service destroy the bonds of respect, trust and confidence that the NID has built over time with his soldiers.

Moreover, lieutenants should be assigned to one position and stabilized for a minimum of 18 months, if not for their entire tour with the unit. The notion that a lieutenant has to lead a platoon, then serve as a company executive officer and hold a position as an assistant primary battalion staff officer or special platoon leader all in his first tour of duty to gain experience is a worthy goal only for the lieutenant. However, it is not conducive to team building or maintaining over the long term, the glue that bonds the soldier to his leader with confidence, trust and respect.

Similarly, company commanders should serve in their position for a minimum of 18 months and ideally for 24 months. To change company commanders more frequently, will signal a dangerous message that the officer will have only one chance to do everything right the first time. Potentially, this will cause him to light the candle at both ends and burn out himself and his soldiers with him.

Company command cannot be taken lightly and unfortunately, not everyone commands well or will have the opportunity to command. Consequently, those officers who are waiting on the staff for command must sell themselves as good candidates for command and aggressively seek command wherever the opportunity presents itself within his parent battalion, or elsewhere. Moreover, ineffec-
tive commanders should be removed from the position early. Cohesion cannot flourish under poor leadership.

In addition to stability of the personnel in a unit, the component of stability applies across the entire spectrum of what the unit does. There should be a consistency in the way the unit operates which approaches a steady state of being predictable. In other words, the unit should have consistent standards, systems, procedures and a methodicalness in its operations where its members are fully knowlegable of how the unit operates from day-to-day.

Therefore, a standard operating procedure (SOP) that is concise, and workable with understandable standards for everything that the unit does is mandatory. The SOP should be written and available to all the members of the unit, not just the leaders. Moreover, a SOP is mandatory because personnel turbulence will always exist for non-COHORT units, where new members will join the unit on a weekly basis. Every leader and soldier that joins the unit should be taught the SOP as one of the major steps to be accomplished during inprocessing. The goal is to have every soldier in the unit serve his entire tour with the unit using the same SOP and being fully knowledgeable of how the SOP applies to him and the accomplishment of his individual job.

In essence, units that change the way they conduct training or maintenance or operations in the field every other month, create turbulence. The organization is by its very nature already complex with many variables and competing priorities. The unit that resists change for change sake will allow its members to be more knowledgeable, comfortable and confident in the unit and its leaders. As experience and maturity is gained by individual soldiers because of stability in unit operations, the unit will also mature, solidify and the accomplishment of tasks will become routine. Moreover, the unit's
standards, goals, and values will be understood by all its members because of consistency and stability of operations.

The SOP should not be interpreted as an obstacle to individual initiative or implementing a clearly more efficient procedure in performing maintenance or field operations. There is always room for change provided change results in efficiency and improved combat readiness. However, leaders should be cautious in accepting change and carefully analyze the impact that change will have on the units operational stability. Change must be implemented deliberately, and leaders should clearly communicate to their soldiers why it is being done.

Having stabilized leaders and soldiers in their positions and conducting operations in a consistent, routine and regular manner, leaders should look for frequent opportunities to bond soldiers in their primary work groups. The literature available in our Army on leadership and training is replete with examples of how this can be accomplished. The important point here is to employ primary work groups such as crews, fire teams and squads in accomplishing tasks rather than individuals or a detail of "Hey you," soldiers. The goal is to provide as many opportunities or settings as possible for the members of a primary work group to share a common experience that ideally applies to the accomplishment of the primary work group's mission.

In garrison for example, soldiers should be billeted by squad, crew or section. Furthermore, guard duty should be assigned to a squad and not based on the First Sergeant's duty roster. In addition, all details should be assigned to crews or fire teams and not apportioned out to the privates in the company. The leaders of the primary work group should be given the mission for accomplishing the task with his subordinates. He should be placed in charge. Likewise maintenance should be conducted utilizing the entire squad.
Moreover, post support details should be accomplished by unit even though a particular task might not require an entire tank crew of four or a squad of nine soldiers.

In other words, in the conduct of day-to-day military operations, leaders should always avoid breaking up primary work groups to accomplish any task. Throughout the day, the crew, squad or platoon should be together doing whatever needs to be done. Moreover, leaders should discourage appointments or absences by members of the primary work group and instead set aside an afternoon every other week for appointments or time for soldiers to take care of personal business on a case by case basis.

Stability as a factor in the equation for building cohesion not only applies to the formal military side of a unit's activities and functions, it also has application and is equally important to the informal, off-duty activities of soldiers and their families.

Face-to-face relationships that evolve into buddies and increased bonding are enhanced in the informal environment. The settings where soldiers can meet other soldiers and become friends based on common interests take place during the off-duty hours. Innovative leaders who successfully create the environment for these relationships to occur enhance cohesion. Moreover, it is ideal to have settings where soldiers of the unit can interact irrespective of rank or the formal superior/subordinate relationships in the rank structure.

Intramural sports requiring athletic teams provide an example where teams can be organized under unit affiliations and where a private might outperform his sergeant and teach him a thing or two. In the process, they will come to know each other besides their formal military association in the unit. Similarly, the unit can adopt an orphanage, sponsor a dependent youth athletic
team or take advantage of the recreation services fishing trip which again provides settings for increased interpersonal relationships. Furthermore, if the company commander elects to provide compensatory time for the company but cannot allow the entire unit to be gone at the same time, squads and crews or platoons should be given compensatory time together. In short, the goal is to encourage soldiers of primary work groups to stay together and play together during off-duty hours. The more settings by which soldiers can weave the net of interpersonal relationships together more tightly the closer the unit is to cohesion.

Ingraham and Manning suggested that post commanders consider assigning family quarters by unit to enhance the informal face-to-face relationships between soldiers as well as families. Although beyond the capability of small unit leaders to influence where soldiers and their families reside, they can create an environment that bonds the soldier and his family to the unit and other family groups in the unit.

For example, a unit sponsored Easter Egg Hunt, Halloween Party or Christmas Party for the children will automatically involve families of soldiers. In addition, leaders will be wise to involve single soldiers in helping to organize and conduct the party activities. The participation of single soldiers in activities involving families of soldiers in the unit results in the unit being an extension of the family structure for the single soldier.

Furthermore, the unit can sponsor, "A Day with Dad Day," and organize a tour of the unit's facilities by platoons. In this way, family members of the same platoon will visit the motor pool, dining facility and barracks with other family members of the platoon where face-to-face or family-to-family relationships have the opportunity to surface. Single soldiers should be members of this touring group to meet and get acquainted with family members.
The familiar organizational day picnic provides an excellent opportunity for face-to-face relationships to occur between soldiers as well as with family members. All events should be based on the crew, squad or platoon's ability to pull a truck, tug-a-rope, pitch a tent or win a race. Organizing the events for crews, sections, squads and platoons, rather than individuals provides for meaningful experiences to take place between members of the primary work group in an informal setting.

Moreover, a separate category should be established for family members. Instead of the familiar three-legged race with a husband and wife team, the same event can be organized into a two couple, five-legged race that will enhance face-to-face relationships among family members from the same platoon or company. The potatoe and spoon race can be conducted with an all wives team, again providing an opportunity for face-to-face interaction and bonding. The same can occur for the potatoe-sack race.

The goal is to involve family members in the activities of the unit. Family members who are made to feel a part of the unit and its activities result in service members who are more committed to the unit, its leaders and its goals. The opportunities to involve family members in the activities of a military unit are numerous and can include cookie sales, picnics, family day in the field, welcome home from field parades, an awards review, a specialty night at the dining facility and even classes for family members on CPR and First Aid by unit medics.

In summation, the component of stability in the formula for building cohesion applies across the entire spectrum of the unit and all its members. It requires personnel to be stabilized in their jobs. It involves the formal military functions of the unit in performing its mission on a day-to-day basis in a consistent and stable manner. It applies equally to the off-duty and
informal activities that a unit commander can devise to provide settings for interpersonal relationships to flourish. Having provided for face-to-face relationships to occur, which results in buddies and friends eventually leads to bonding and enhanced unit cohesion. From the frequent interaction of its members sharing common experiences, group norms and standards emerge, accompanied by feelings of loyalty, trust and commitment to the unit, other group members and their leaders.

**Stress**

The second component in the formula for building cohesion is alluded to in the writings of Clausewitz as he described the military virtues of an army and what he called military spirit.

> There are only two sources for this spirit.... The first is a series of victorious wars; the second, frequent exertions of the Army to the utmost limits of its strength. Nothing else will show a soldier the full extent of his capacities. The more a general is accustomed to place heavy demands on his soldiers, the more he can depend on their response. A soldier is just as proud of the hardships he has overcome as of the dangers he has faced. In short, the seed will grow only in the soil of constant activity and exertion...

Clausewitz went on to say that the military spirit can be created only in war. However, the challenge confronting our Army is to build cohesion, or Clausewitz' military spirit, in peace in order to have the benefits of unit cohesion and esprit before the first shot is fired in war.

Therefore, the second component in the formula for building cohesion is called stress. Stress applies to the realistic, meaningful and strenuous manner in which we train our soldiers to accomplish their missions in war. It also applies to the significant, emotional experiences leaders can provide for members within primary work groups.
In other words, leaders should devise their training programs to provide their soldiers increasingly tough and challenging experiences that approach as near as possible the conditions they will face under combat together. As soldiers undergo the training and improve their skills and accomplish the training objectives, they gain confidence as a group. Eventually, strong bonds of mutual respect, trust and caring evolve among unit members. In addition, communications among members of the primary group improve which further binds them to each other mentally and emotionally. Moreover, as the primary group gains confidence and improves its proficiency, it also improves its interaction and communications with other primary groups. This in turn, enhances horizontal cohesion as well as its vertical cohesion with leaders and higher levels in the hierarchy of the larger unit.

The point that must be made at this juncture is that the training conducted must be related to the unit’s combat mission. As General George S. Patton, Jr. said, “Practice those things in peacetime that you intend to do in war.” For example, training soldiers in an armor unit in white water rafting may be fun for the soldiers but it is not a function or combat mission for tankers. Likewise, an artillery unit that schedules rappelling for its soldiers is not making good use of the valuable time that is available for training nor does it apply to the unit’s combat mission.

Furthermore, leaders should be innovative and provide for stress in all the elements that make up the unit. For example, an infantry battalion that conducts field training that involves force on force maneuvers, but allows the medics to stand by for an actual casualty to occur is not stressing the medical platoon. Moreover, if the SI section is involved in the training but is not receiving casualty feeder reports or conducting replacement operations, then the replacement and accountability of personnel system is not being
stressed or trained. In other words, training should be integrated and involve every element that is participating or available for training.

In addition, when the element of stress is applied properly, it mandates that every member of the unit clearly understands what is expected. Unit members should be told before the start of training what the standards are for successful completion of the training. Furthermore, an explanation of why the conditions are as rigorous and demanding as leaders have devised the training is necessary. Soldiers who are told what is to take place are not surprised or misled and will perform in a manner to achieve the training objective. Moreover, soldiers who are consistently informed in peacetime of their mission, will gain confidence and trust in their leaders which enhances vertical cohesion and has potential benefits in time of war.

General Bruce C. Clarke’s advice on training for battle in his paper, "The Techniques of Command," said:

> When in battle, units and men will do just what they did on the last training maneuver. A critique is an essential element of tactical training after each unit of instruction.

Our Army has institutionalized the After Action Review (AAR) process in the conduct of training. It is a valuable and powerful training tool that all leaders should implement. However, the component of stress in our formula for building cohesion has special application in that the After Action Review should be exploited by small unit leaders to increase the bonds among primary groups members as well as the vertical and horizontal cohesion between units.

In other words, besides solely conducting an analysis of what happened during a training exercise in order to improve the training, the leader conducting the AAR should provide opportunities for subordinate leaders and soldiers to voice how they would have conducted the same training. Our junior leaders and soldiers should be placed in the stressful position of visualizing
how they would lead a tank section, maneuver a squad or conduct a combat patrol.

The goal is to place our subordinates under stress during the AAR in order that they may gain confidence and become self-reliant and act independently. Providing the opportunity for junior members of the unit to contribute to the improvement of the unit's combat efficiency builds unit confidence when promising subordinates rise to the challenge and provide workable solutions that shows their knowledge in solving tactical problems. A cohesive unit is one where the members recognize that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts and that no one is indispensable, not even the commander.59

Therefore, the appropriate step for leaders to follow after the AAR process is over is to conduct the training event again, but eliminate the actual leader in the process and allow the subordinate to take charge and complete the mission.

In short, leaders should strive to develop a well-trained cadre of subordinate leaders, fully capable of assuming positions of responsibility at the next higher level in the chain of command. In so doing, subordinate unit leaders who hold link-pin positions will have the opportunity to enhance the vertical and horizontal cohesion that lead to esprit. In addition, unit members will develop confidence and trust in that their unit will always have depth in leadership.

In sum, the element of stress applies to conducting mission-related training that is realistic, meaningful and strenuous. As General John A. Wickham, Jr. said:

As all of us know from personal experience, good training bonds units. Training involves shared experiences and mutual challenges that develop and sustain cohesion. Training generates confidence in the organization and its leaders which in turn strengthens the morale of each soldier.60
Success

Having provided for stability and stress in our formula for building cohesion in our units, the third and final component that must be added is success. The component of success in our formula is nothing more than the timely recognition of achievement, but it also means leaders should create situations for success to occur. Furthermore, in rewarding achievement, the emphasis should be directed at the primary work group rather than the individual.

In other words, leaders should plan their training to provide for situations that result automatically in success and achievement for soldiers of primary work groups such as squads, crews, sections and platoons. The conduct of ARTEP training provides an excellent means to achieve this end. Whatever forum is selected, the activities should be all achievable and inasmuch as possible, provide for participation by all of the soldiers in the unit. Furthermore, the events should be stressful, relevant to the combat mission, and ideally provide for competition.

As a special yearly event, the conduct of military stakes is a perfect example of leaders creating situations for soldiers to achieve success. Events that can be included in military stakes are wide-ranging and numerous. The common soldier's tasks provide an excellent menu from which to select events. The goal is to select or devise tactical training events that are measureable, stressful and achievable by the majority of the soldiers in the unit, oriented on the squad, crew or section.

General Bruce C. Clarke, in listing techniques of commanders in World War II who he felt were outstanding said, "They did not fail to recognize outstanding results produced by their subordinates, and to publicize them as appropriate."61
The element of success can be achieved in several ways from a simple pat-
on-the-back to the awarding of a medal for achievement or meritorious service. A short, but warm, personal and sincerely complimentary note is very effec-
tive. Furthermore, letters of achievement, congratulations and commendation that are addressed through the recipient's chain of command with distribution for the soldier's Military Personnel Records Jacket, is another technique that is inexpensive and of value militarily. Certificates of Achievement are yet another way to achieve the same end.

How recognition is accorded fulfills only part of the requirement for effective employment of the component of success in our formula. Recognition should be timely. Instantly where possible, but within a week in any case. The way in which it is done is equally important. Whenever possible, recogni-
tion should be passed on to soldiers in public among family, friends, supe-
riors, peers and subordinates. Leaders who go out of their way to make the occasion meaningful contribute to the element of success significantly. The presence of a General Officer to make the presentation accompanied by a photo-
grapher, the news media to record the event, and even a band makes the occa-
sion a memorable and cherished day in the life of a deserving soldier. It takes special effort, but in the final analysis, the dividends are significant to individual morale, esprit, pride and unit cohesion.

In summation, the element of success involves the premeditated act of creating opportunitites for achievement to take place and recognizing that achievement in a timely manner that is visible to the public. In addition, the component of success is our formula for cohesion building favors the recognition of crews, squads and teams as opposed to individuals to further cement the bonds that create cohesion.
The formula for building cohesion is a combination of three factors that interact with and complement each other. Standing alone, no one factor will achieve the end. Likewise, emphasizing two components over one will not produce the desired results. Each component must be balanced because each has equal weight and bearing on the final product. Stability plus stress plus success can lead to small unit cohesion.

There are other variables that impact on building cohesion. Clearly, the most significant factor is that of leadership. Ineffective leadership employing our formula for building cohesion in a unit will achieve a degree of unit cohesion, but no way near the success that effective leadership can bring to bear on the problem.

Effective leaders must constantly seek to do what is right and what is needed in the application of the formula. They must provide focus and direction. In addition, leaders must devote their energy to executing and working the formula. They cannot have a truly satisfied feeling that they have achieved cohesion over the short term. Effective leaders must plan for the long term and commit themselves for the duration. Furthermore, leaders should have very strong feelings about the attainment of unit cohesion. They must care deeply about achieving the end product.

Cohesion in a unit is characterized by pride, a shared understanding of common purpose, loyalty, mutual trust among members and, most importantly, collective confidence in itself. Cohesion has set into a unit when soldiers are eager to talk about their unit and their achievements. An observer in hearing distance of soldiers will
hear, a lot of "we" and "us" and "our." Without being asked, soldiers will talk about their leaders, in reverent tones often telling tall tales of exploits that may or may not have happened. The appearance of soldiers will be distinctively sharp. Soldiers will walk around the unit area as if they were being marched. Salutes will be crisp and greetings will be "hollered out" despite the distance involved. Nearly every soldier, if asked, will know what is going on and what training events are scheduled for in the months to come. Jody calls for soldiers marching or running in PT formation will be distinctively oriented on the unit, its equipment, present and past unit heroes and even its present leaders. Unit areas will be well maintained, equipment lines will be straight and eyesores will be rare.

Unit members when approached with a novel idea for change, will question what is being proposed and say, "I don't think so, we don't need that," or, "It's not us." Soldiers irrespective of rank are more outgoing among other soldiers from other units to talk about what they have accomplished. Soldiers will be quick to defend their unit's achievements and leaders when challenged. Crew members will talk about their equipment as if they had souls and feelings. Vehicles will be neatly painted with names like "Big Stick" or "Big Gun" or the driver's home state.

A cohesive unit will be visited by staff officers from higher headquarters, not for inspections, but just to visit and see what is going on. Soldiers from other units will ask how they can transfer in and join the unit. Newly assigned officers and NCOs will ask for assignment to the unit by name. The post newspaper will somehow focus on the unit more than others.

In essence, a leader of a unit attempting to measure and evaluate cohesion will be to gauge objectively the tempo of his unit by what he sees and hears. The feedback systems that he employs can be the staff officer or Command Sergeant Major or even the unit chaplain. What the leader obtains in
the feedback must be weighed instinctively against his experience and knowledge of what is actually going on in the unit. Other feedback systems include the families of soldiers, superior commanders and peers.

In addition, the Organizational Effectiveness Staff Officer (OESO) is a valuable asset that can be employed to measure cohesion. The OESO will work for the commander and provide trends that the commander can focus emphasis on to maintain and improve unit cohesion.

The US Army's New Manning System holds promise to man and sustain the force which will result in cohesive combat units, capitalizing on the powerful combat multiplier of the human spirit. Its deliberate course is understandable based on the Army's own experiences in unit base manning. In the meantime, units which are not affected by COHORT and the US Army Regimental System can build cohesion by employing a formula that in an umbrella-like manner, provides for the key and essential factors that result in enhanced spirit and morale in units. Stability added to stress, added to success can lead to cohesive units with concerned and effective leadership. As Clausewitz stated, "An Army that maintains its cohesion under the most murderous fire; . . . such an Army is imbued with the true military spirit."
ENDNOTES

3. Zais, p. 68.
4. Zais, p. 68.
6. Ibid.
10. Ingraham, and Manning, p. 4.
11. Ingraham, and Manning, p. 4.
15. Ingraham, and Manning, p. 4.
17. Ingraham, and Manning, p. 4.
18. Ingraham, and Manning, p. 4.
20. Elton, p. 228.
27. Elton, p. 221.
32. Elton, p. 221.
34. Elton, p. 221.
35. Elton, p. 225.
38. Elton, p. 225.
41. Elton, p. 228.
42. Elton, p. 228.
44. Ingraham, and Manning, p. 6.
45. Ingraham, and Manning, p. 6.
46. Ingraham, and Manning, p. 6.
47. Ingraham, and Manning, p. 6.
49. Ingraham, and Manning, p. 7.
50. Ingraham, and Manning, p. 7.
51. Ingraham, and Manning, p. 7.
52. Ingraham, and Manning, p. 8.
54. Ingraham, and Manning, p. 10.
55. Ingraham, and Manning, p. 8.
56. Clausewitz, p. 189.
58. General Bruce C. Clarke, "The Techniques of Command".
59. House, p. 68.
61. General Bruce C. Clarke, "The Techniques of Command".
62. House, p. 68.
64. Clausewitz, p. 187.