THE STANDBY RESERVE TRAINING CORPS:  
AN ALTERNATIVE MOBILIZATION MANPOWER POLICY  

BY  

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The Standby Reserve Training Corps: An Alternative Mobilization Manpower Policy

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20. ABSTRACT (continued)

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INDIVIDUAL ESSAY
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INTRODUCTION

Background and Purpose

Our current military manpower policy has been in place since January 1973 when President Richard M. Nixon ordered an end to the draft and established the all voluntary Army. Since that time, there have been vast changes in the pay and conditions of service for the nation's more than 2.1 million service personnel, but the basic policy remains the same. With the establishment of the volunteer Army, there has evolved such a strong reliance on Reserve forces that it would be impossible to engage in a large scale, protracted war without partial or full total mobilization.¹

The major policy change since January 1973 came in June 1980 when Congress, at the recommendation of President Jimmy Carter, and partially in response to the invasion of Afghanistan, approved Public Law 96-282, which authorized funding for draft registration. Thus, as of the end of FY 84 our military manpower structure is composed of the following essential components:²

1) A standing active force consisting of 2.138 million military personnel, ready to deploy on relatively short notice.

2) An active Reserve Component consisting of 434,000 members of the Army National Guard: 275,000 members of the U.S. Army Reserve: 105,000 members of the Air National Guard: 70,000 members of the U.S. Air Force Reserve: 121,000 members of the U.S. Naval Reserve: and 41,000 members of the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve.

3) An Individual Ready Reserve consisting of 277,000 officers and enlisted men in the Army Reserve, with an additional 159,000 in the Reserve of the other Services, plus 9,000 in the Inactive National Guard.

4) A large pool of untrained youth who are registered and subject to conscription, given Congressional approval.
The change in manpower policy suggested here is directed at the pool of untrained youth. Under this proposal a new category of Army Reserve would be established: one that is distinct from either the National Guard or the existing categories of the Army Reserve. This new category would be manned by volunteers in the 18-20 year age group and would incorporate incentives designed to achieve the necessary level of manning.

This new category would be called the Standby Reserve Training Corps (SRTC). Volunteers in the SRTC would incur a six (6) year obligation to be fulfilled as follows:

1) To complete eight (8) weeks of Basic Combat Training (BCT) in two (2) week increments during the summer months for four (4) consecutive years.

2) To be assigned to a pre-trained manpower pool for a period of two (2) years following completion of training and to be subject to immediate call-up in the event of mobilization during that two (2) year period. (NOTE: Those currently in training would also be subject to call-up during mobilization.)

The term, Basic Combat Training, has gone out of usage since 1978 when it was replaced with Basic Training (BT) and Advanced Individual Training (AIT) for non-combat soldiers and One Station Unit Training (OSUT) for combat soldiers. As proposed here, BCT would incorporate the essential components of Basic Training plus other skills that are common to the combat arms. In comparison with the March 1982 Infantry One Station Unit Training (IN-OSUT) Mobilization POI, the SRTC would incorporate most of the subjects except the Infantry specific skills.

The length of each Annual Training period would be from 16 to 18 days, depending on travel time. The recruits would report not later than 1800 hours on Friday preceding the first full week of training, and the first training day would be Saturday of week one. With the exception of the second Sunday and the third
Saturday, which would be half-day training, the training day would be ten (10) hours in length. The resulting thirteen (13) full training days plus the two (2) half days yields a total of 140 hours for each Annual Training period. The total hours available for the four (4) year POI is 560 hours, just 238.5 hours short of the 11B portion of the IN-OSUT Mobilization POI, which covers 13 weeks. If the SRTC were mobilized, those who were graduates of the program could complete their OSUT training in four (4) or five (5) weeks, depending on the amount of refresher training needed.

Since each AT period would require its own administrative start-up, and since the recruits must be ready to train not later than Monday of the first week, it may be difficult to complete administrative processing in the time allotted. One solution is to task the Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) to assume a greater responsibility for initial processing at the time recruits process through their facility. Another alternative would be to add a few days to the first AT period and to have a Reserve Component Reception Station perform these duties prior to the start of training.

The extent to which the SRTC can alleviate mobilization manpower shortages depends on the size of the shortfall and the structure of the program. Various alternatives are presented below, but the primary purpose of the SRTC is to shorten the 113 day delay from the time the draft is implemented until the first inductees reach the battlefield. The SRTC cannot produce MOS qualified soldiers in eight (8) weeks, but it can provide them with basic military skills, and it can significantly reduce the current projected manpower shortfall at M+90.
Historical Perspective

The periods before the great wars in our history -- World War I, World War II, and the Korean War -- saw this country ill prepared: our manpower policies inhibited the rapid and efficient expansion of military forces. Mobilization readiness prior to the war in Vietnam was perhaps superior to anytime in our history, but political leaders refused to utilize that readiness, relying instead on a gradual build up of forces using the draft. We are presently as well prepared as we have ever been, yet there remains a significant shortfall in pre-trained manpower. The alternative manpower policy options that could be used to address this problem can be grouped under these three headings:

1) Volunteer system
2) Selective service system
3) Universal service system.

The first two headings are familiar because of our experience since World War II. The third category is less familiar, although some variation of this proposal has been around since 1786 when President Washington advocated what became known as the Knox Militia Plan. There are actually three sub-categories under this third heading.

1) Universal military training (UMT)
2) Universal military service (UMS)
3) Universal national service (UNS).

UMS goes beyond UMT in that all qualified eligibles not only receive military training, but also are required to serve in a substantive capacity in the active force. Neither UMT nor UMS is particularly suited to today's policy environment because they would generate larger numbers of military personnel than are currently required. Exclusive of any female participation, UMS would lead to an armed force of some 3.5 to 6 million members. Assuming only a one (1) year
obligation in the IRR, UMT would result in an IRR with between one (1) million and two (2) million members at any point in time, exclusive of female participation.\(^{10}\)

UNS has both advantages and disadvantages. Some of the advantages are:

1) A vehicle for encouraging a new "sense of commitment" to the country.

2) A means for encouraging a certain "socialization" process among the nation's youth.

3) Participants would perform tasks and duties that would presumably benefit society as a whole.

4) A National service draft would reduce youth unemployment rates.

5) UNS could serve as a tool for making youth more "employable".

Some of the disadvantages are:

1) There is an equity question concerning the distribution between military and non-military assignments.

2) UNS would be extremely expensive.

3) UNS would displace some currently employed workers.

4) The removal of 1.5 to 3 million young men and women from the work force and/or student rolls for more than a year could cause severe economic dislocations.

5) Finding and managing the 1.3 to 3 million jobs needed to support UNS would be an administrative nightmare. (Many of these jobs would be make-work; government and industry do not presently support them because their value to society is less than their costs.)

6) There is considerable doubt as to how well the program would work, since the need for this type of conscription is unlikely to be seen by many of those subject to it. (While there is a certain credibility for a military draft, drafting for "non-essential purposes" may seriously dilute support for the non-military draft.)

7) Compulsory service would contradict the long held principle of individual freedom, and it may be unconstitutional.\(^{11, 12}\)
Given these arguments and an appreciation of the historical context within which they are made, it seems clear that any discussion of UNS as a military manpower policy is counterproductive. Military planners should be concerned first and foremost with military manpower problems, leaving the solution of social problems to those best equipped to deal with them. Linking military manpower policies to programs with non-military goals attracts opposition that otherwise would not be waged against a strictly military proposal.

Since either UMT or UMS would generate greater manpower than is needed, and since UNS is inappropriate for different reasons, the Selective Service draft is the only alternative to the volunteer force. Since Selective Service carries with it overwhelming opposition that does not seem to die out with the passage of time, the volunteer force is a reasonable alternative. The SRTC is the application of that voluntary alternative to the problem that UMT supporters were attempting to solve through involuntary means. One could argue that SRTC is the voluntary equivalent of UMT. A similar logic was used by Senator Robert Taft, one of the most outspoken critics of UMT. In a counter proposal to UMT, Taft laid out his argument in a speech at Gettysburg National Cemetery in 1945.

"For instance, adequate reserves might be provided by training 200,000 boys in each age group. It would be possible to obtain volunteers in that number for a three months course and basic training during one summer, courses in school and a later three months summer course in the field. The boys could be paid a sum which would assist them in their regular education during the winter."

Taft went on to say that additional courses could be provided to those who want to be officers, and he noted that this was only one idea, there being many others in which the needs of the Reserves could be fulfilled. Taft's proposal is significant because of the linkage of military training to support for education, and because it was based on voluntary recruitment.
Rationale for the SRTC

Given the history of conscription and our manpower policies since the early days of the Republic, a strong case can be made for the use of the voluntary SRTC as a solution to the current mobilization manpower shortfall. Although conscription is inequitable and inefficient, it is not inherently bad, and it may be the only alternative in time of war. However, in today's political and social climate, conscription of any kind is not feasible, and given current manpower requirements, it is probably unnecessary. The SRTC can accomplish what seems to be the major objective of those who are advocating a return to some form of conscription, and it is consistent with the Army's stated policy of relying on a volunteer force.

THE MECHANICS OF THE STANDBY RESERVE TRAINING CORPS

Thus far, the discussion has focused on the "what" and "why" of the SRTC. It is now time to address the "how". Although such a program could be extremely expensive, requiring the development of a vast administrative and training superstructure, it turns out that SRTC can be surprisingly inexpensive. By integrating the training superstructure of the USAR Training Divisions with existing training facilities and with the recruiting capabilities of the Recruiting Command, the SRTC can be implemented with relatively little new capital or new personnel resources.

The USAR Training Division

There are presently twelve (12) Training Divisions in the U.S. Army Reserve. Each Division has its own mobilization station, and each has the mission of establishing or augmenting an Army Training Center. In order to accomplish
this mission, some form of conscription must be approved shortly after
mobilization, otherwise there would be no one to train. Under the best of
circumstances, i.e., Congress approves conscription and the Selective Service
System is able to induct the necessary trainees without delay, there remains a
113 day gap between the time the draft is implemented and the first replacement
reaches the battlefield.\textsuperscript{17} Thus, the Training Division's mission accomplishment
depends totally on these rather uncertain events. The SRTC can eliminate this
uncertainty because it insures that Training Divisions arrive at their
mobilization stations with the first cycle of trainees already assigned, and in
some cases already having completed a portion of their training.

The Manpower Potential of the SRTC

The typical Training Division is capable of training approximately 20,000
trainees in a single cycle. The SRTC will produce a stable manpower pool at the
end of four (4) years if the Training Divisions are employed in increments of four
(4). Using this four (4) Division configuration, one (1) Division is filled each year
for four (4) years, and in year five (5), the first Division begins its second cycle.
The results of this method of employment is illustrated in Table 1 below.

The "Training Pool" is defined as those personnel assigned to a Training
Division at any given point in time. When mobilization is declared, these recruits
will report to the mobilization station with their training unit and commence
training at whatever point they happen to be in the training cycle. The
"Manpower Pool" is defined as those personnel who have completed their training
and are fulfilling the last two (2) years of their six (6) year obligation. This
latter group could be mobilized as individuals, or they could be mobilized as
cohort companies.
Table 1
Four (4) Division Model
Training Pool: Manpower Pool
by year
(in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Training Pool</th>
<th>Manpower Pool</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Division</td>
<td>Total in Pool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 2 3 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>20 20</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>20 20 20</td>
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<td>20 20 20 20</td>
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<td>80 20 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>20 20 20 20</td>
<td>80 20 20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assumptions: 1) 20,000 new recruits added each year
2) No attrition

Conclusions: 1) Size of training pool in year 4 = 80,000
2) Size of manpower pool in year 6 = 40,000

NOTE: The heavy dark lines separate the table into four (4) year cycles.

Table 1 clearly shows that 20,000 recruits each year in the four (4) Division configuration will produce 80,000 in the training pool in year 4 and 40,000 in the manpower pool in year 6. These figures will vary of course, depending on the capacity of each Training Division, and allowing for the fact that some of the volunteers will attrit over the course of the four (4) years. The effect of expanding the training base as shown in Table 2. The expansion is made in four
division increments in order to prevent fluctuations in the training pool and the manpower pool, as well as the recruiting requirement.

Table 2
Expansion of the Four (4) Division Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Recruiting Requirement per Year</th>
<th>Maximum Size of Manpower Pool</th>
<th>Maximum Size of Training Pool</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 Divisions</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Divisions</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>160,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Divisions</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>240,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Divisions</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>320,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Divisions</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>260,000</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Divisions</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>240,000</td>
<td>480,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Divisions</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>260,000</td>
<td>560,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 Divisions</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>320,000</td>
<td>640,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since there are only twelve (12) Training Divisions, it is impossible to expand beyond that point without organizing additional Training Divisions.

Special Considerations

Because the actual training time is extremely limited, and because the trainee's exposure to the military life is relatively brief, the SRTC recruits should be assigned to the same Company throughout the four (4) year training cycle. All records and administrative actions concerning the recruit should be handled within the Training Divisions at the Company level, and the Company should be the recruit's primary contact with the Army.

The SRTC is a far cry from Universal Military Training. Whereas most UMT proposals required one (1) full year of training, SRTC requires only eight (8)
weeks. While this may seem to be a great disparity between the voluntary SRTC and the involuntary UMT, much of the training time under a conscript system is wasted. An Army with an abundance of low paid conscripts tends to be very labor intensive and very inefficient. The key to achieving the maximum training value from eight (8) weeks is to use the available training time to the maximum advantage, and to incorporate design features and incentives that promote learning and enhance skill retention. The following items are offered as examples.

High Entrance Standards: Because of the relatively short training time available, each recruit must be capable of absorbing the training at a somewhat accelerated rate. Since the level of training is geared to the slowest learners, the only way to raise that level is to raise the quality of the recruit. Depending on the size of the pool of potential recruits, the program should be limited to personnel in mental categories I through IIIA.

Encourage Collateral Education: The SRTC is ideally suited for high school graduates who intend to further their education in a college or technical training school. The pursuit of higher education is highly complementary to the SRTC, thus there is justification for subsidizing education. To accomplish this objective, each recruit who successfully completes Annual Training could be given a $1000 stipend to be used for educational expenses the following year, provided he is enrolled full-time in an accredited, post-secondary educational institution. Additional stipends could be paid to students who learn technical skills that are directly applicable to an MOSC.

Incentives for Skill Retention: It is unrealistic to believe that SRTC recruits will retain essential skills from year to year without some incentive or motivation. To overcome this problem, a system of skill testing could be conducted at the
beginning of years 2, 3, and 4, and incentive bonuses could be paid depending on the degree of proficiency. Both a physical fitness and a military skills test would be given, with bonus payments ranging from $200 to $500 for proficiency in each area. To add emphasis to the program, a physical assessment could be made during the first year, and an individualized fitness program developed for each recruit. For the military skills test, soldiers manuals could be specifically tailored to the eight (8) week program so that recruits would have study material to help them prepare for their testing.

The Cohort System: One of the most valuable assets of the military training system is its ability to create esprit de corps among unit members. Since the SRTC soldiers will be assigned to the same Company for their entire training program, it can be expected that this esprit and comradery will develop and will enhance the training environment. If Mobilization plans could be structured so that members of a cohort company are mobilized as a unit rather than as individuals, then this unit cohesion could serve as a training multiplier for post mobilization training.

Maintain Close Contact: Maintaining close contact with members of the unit will be crucial to the success of the program. The USAR Training Company's primary responsibility in this regard will be to keep close track of their soldiers. This can be done through newsletters, personal correspondence, telephone calls, pamphlets and other study material designed to stimulate interest in preserving military skills and maintaining physical conditioning.
COLLATERAL ISSUES

Support for Education

The Federal government spent in excess of $11 billion in 1984 in direct support of individuals in post secondary educational institutions. This support was given as low interest rate loans, loan guarantees, outright grants, and conditional grants. The Department of Defense also has provided support for education over the years. The GI Bill has been in effect at various times since World War II; the Army College Fund has been in place since 1980; and a new GI Bill is to be implemented soon. Thus, DOD support for education is not unprecedented.

Currently, there is sentiment within the administration to reduce spending for non-Defense educational support programs. If dollars spent in these programs are shifted to the SRTC, then educational assistance will still be available, but on a quid pro quo basis. One can argue that a young man or woman who volunteers to be first in line for mobilization is more worthy of public support than someone who makes no service commitment. Whether or not SRTC replaces a loan or grant program is immaterial; the cost of SRTC is less than it appears, simply because the same dollar buys both National Defense and aid to education.

Manpower Source for Active and Reserve Components

Both the Reserve and Active Components will see the SRTC as a source of competition for manpower. This is perhaps true, at least initially, but the competition may be more apparent than real. The SRTC will appeal to those young people who seek to further their education immediately after high school, and therefore have no interest in Active Component service. These individuals may
have an interest in conventional Reserve or National Guard service, but this
collision could be resolved by allowing simultaneous membership in either the
National Guard or Reserve and the SRTC. A simultaneous membership program
now exists for ROTC cadets who are allowed to join the Reserve Components,
thus the idea is not unprecedented. The advantage of simultaneous membership
is that it can be used as an incentive for recruiting in both programs. The long
run impact of SRTC on the recruiting potential for both the Active and Reserve
Components is positive. Those who complete the SRTC program have
demonstrated an interest in military service and are therefore strong prospects
for both Active and Reserve Component recruiters.

Mobilization Mission of USAR Training Divisions

The SRTC mission would require the dedicated support of the USAR Training
Divisions. While this represents a clear shift away from their present focus, it
does not alter or degrade their present mobilization mission; in fact, it actually
enhances it. Preparation and training for the SRTC mission would not differ
significantly from the preparation required for training base expansion. The
SRTC will provide invaluable experience to commanders, training officers, and
Drill Sergeants who would now have year around responsibilities for their own
soldiers. If the Training Divisions were mobilized, the SRTC insures that they
have soldiers to train as soon as they reach the training station. The
vicissitudes of a Congress that must approve conscription, and the Selective
Service System that must produce the necessary inductees would no longer serve
as an immediate constraint on their mission performance, since it is now possible
to produce trained soldiers in less than 113 days.
Territorial Forces

The current force structure does not include Territorial Forces. If this need were ever foreseen, the SRTC would be an excellent source of manpower for "State defense forces". Public Law 364, approved on August 11, 1955, recognized that mobilization of the National Guard would leave the states without a civil defense or internal security force. The law authorizes the states to "organize and maintain State defense forces..." "...in addition to the Army National Guard and Air National Guard". The SRTC could provide manpower for State defense forces, or it could be used as a basis for a Federal Territorial Force for defense of United States borders or for other internal security missions.

Program Costs

The ultimate question concerning the SRTC is "How much does it cost?" Estimates can range across the spectrum, depending on what assumptions are made and how costs are defined. For example, the cost would be astronomical if costing procedures were used in which a significant portion of the fixed cost as well as the direct or variable costs were attributed to the program. Such procedures would charge to the SRTC the entire cost of the Training Division, as well as a large portion of the fixed costs of support activities, such as the Recruiting Command and training base facilities used by the program. This procedure may reflect the budgetary cost according to accepted accounting procedures, but it does not represent the true economic cost of the program. A more appropriate estimate of the economic cost of SRTC can be made by using the incremental cost approach.

Incremental costs are those additional costs resulting from a particular activity. For example, if the SRTC actually enhances the mobilization mission of
the Training Division, then the incremental cost of using these assets is zero. If, however, the SRTC required additional personnel to handle the administrative burden, and additional equipment, POL, ammunition, or other supplies to conduct the training, then these "incremental" costs should be charged to the program.

The true cost of using the Training Divisions for the SRTC mission is the "opportunity cost". An opportunity cost is the foregone activity that would have been performed in the absence of the SRTC. The most obvious of these foregone activities are the satellization missions performed by Training Divisions during Annual "training, and an occasional mission to support the National Guard, Individual Ready Reserves, or ROTC. These foregone missions would impose an economic, if not a budgetary cost, which is directly attributable to SRTC. Without undertaking an elaborate cost study, it is clear that these costs are relatively minor, and certainly do not involve large dollar outlays. The use of facilities during the summer months to train the SRTC would also impose "opportunity costs" on other Reserve units who would have to reschedule their AT period during a less desirable time of the year.

Some examples of incremental costs that rightly should be charged to the SRTC are as follows.

1) Training facility costs: (The guiding principle here is to look for incremental costs, and not simply the fixed costs that are unavoidable, or the maintenance costs that would be expended in any case.)

2) The costs of setting up a recruiting network and the marketing costs:

3) The pay and allowances for the recruits themselves, as well as all costs associated with their care and feeding during the annual training periods:

4) The cost of the incentive programs attributed to the SRTC: (To the extent that these programs reduce existing educational loan and grant programs, the incremental costs may be less substantial than they appear.)
The costs of SRTC are relevant only within the context of its benefits. What is the ultimate benefit of the trained manpower pool? What is the benefit of Training Divisions with a full complement of trainees who have completed some portion of their training? What is the benefit of a partially trained manpower pool already organized into cohort companies? What is the spin-off benefit of having soldiers who are continuing their education in institutions of higher learning? What is the benefit of exposing a wider segment of the civilian population to the military, and of promoting the citizen-soldier image? Certainly these benefits cannot all be valued in monetary terms, but they must be considered when calculating the costs of the program.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

A recent article in the Army Times referring to a four (4) volume DOD report entitled, Manpower Requirements Report FY86, concluded that the Army would be...

"...117,000 people short of requirements, including 97,000 people short in combat skills, 90 days after mobilization...". The FY 86 report shows an increase in the shortfall from the FY 65 version, an increase resulting from estimates that are more accurate, and from changing war-fighting scenarios. What does this mean? The inescapable conclusions are: 1) that there is a significant manpower shortfall; 2) that the problem is increasing; and 3) that the SRTC offers an attractive solution to the problem.

In order for SRTC to work, young people must volunteer. But what will attract them? The incentives suggested above are an attraction, and they can be increased to whatever level is necessary to meet the need. Certainly the program must be marketed, and the Army has the experience to package and sell the program, as evidenced by its highly successful advertising campaigns. But there
is one other important motivation that is not easily measured, yet seems to bear
directly on the SRTC, and that is patriotism. Young people today are more
conservative than in recent years, the military is more popular than it has been—
probably since World War II, and the young people of today are more patriotic.
The SRTC will sell, because patriotism will sell.

The most obvious criticisms of the SRTC are: 1) that eight (8) weeks are
insufficient time to train a soldier; 2) that spreading this training over a four (4)
year period will result in a deterioration of skills; and 3) that skills become
outdated, as technology advances. All of these arguments have merit, but they
are mitigated by the fact that the purpose of SRTC is not to turn out soldiers
ready for combat, but to have enough potential soldiers in the pipeline at the
time of mobilization to eliminate the M+90 shortfall reported in the Army Times
article cited above. But the SRTC does more than just fill up the pipeline. It
exposes civilians to the military way of doing things, and it teaches them the
basics. A strong argument made for UMT in 1945 by Dr. Karl T. Compton, the
Chairman of President's Truman's Advisory Commission on Universal Training, is
relevant for the SRTC. Dr. Compton, in answering the question of the relatively
perishability of skills learned through UMT, made the following statement.

"The same type of argument would say that we should not train an
electrical engineer at MIT today because some of the techniques of
electrical engineering may be different five or ten years hence. Actually, details will be changed and new elements will be
introduced into the picture, but the fundamentals do not change so
much, and anyone with the fundamental training can pick up the
developments of the next five years with relative ease and in a
short period of time." 24

Perhaps the most important conclusion that can be drawn from the SRTC
proposal is that it offers not only a specific solution to the manpower problem,
but a whole new way of thinking about solutions. The idea of subsidizing
education in exchange for an ex-ante commitment to mobilization raises new
possibilities for a broader range of manpower problems, such as physicians and medical personnel. The idea of exposing the military to young people who in all likelihood would never have had such an opportunity creates new possibilities for recruiting. The SRTC is, in a word, flexible. It can be tailored to meet whatever goals are set, ranging from the program described here to a program similar to what Senator Taft suggested in his speech at Gettysburg National Cemetery. (See the quote on p. 6 above.) The following list, although not exhaustive, suggests some of the alternatives.

1) Conduct the training during two (2) summer camp phases of six (6) to eight (8) weeks duration, very similar to the Split-Option Program. USAR Training Divisions could support this program by assigning one (1) Battalion of soldiers to a Brigade, and tasking each of the Battalions to conduct training on a Cadre rotation basis. Further training in years 3 and 4 could include unit level skills.

2) Using the concept described in item 1 above, and focus the recruiting effort on students at the two (2) year junior colleges or technical training schools. This approach would eliminate any potential recruiting conflict with the ROTC.

3) Develop specific programs for MOSC’s in which civilian education would directly complement the military training. (Civilian taught clerical, medical, computer, and engineering skills could substitute for certain military skills taught in AIT or CST.)

4) Make adjustments in the bonus and tuition assistance payments to achieve the desired level of manning. (The SRTC could evolve into a significant educational support program if policy makers are willing to link support for education to military training.)

5) Change the post training obligation so as to require service in the active Reserves or the IRR.

6) Develop a parallel program (POI) for females in the non-combat MOSC’s.

7) Develop options for students who may later desire to enroll in ROTC.

The mobilization manpower problem addressed in this paper is currently receiving attention from planners at DOD as well as interested persons in other
quarters. Current efforts to improve the IRR are meeting with success, but they are insufficient to solve the problem. Solutions offered by Representative Montgomery to institute a draft for the Reserves and by Senator Hart to require Universal National Service are but two (2) of many proposals that have been or will be offered in the near future. The official DOD policy has been to resist any form of a draft or compulsory service in favor of the volunteer system. Since the SRTC is consistent with this DOD view, and since it would not stir the strong objections that either Rep. Montgomery's or Senator Hart's proposals will surely stir, SRTC is an idea that is militarily feasible, relatively inexpensive, and politically palatable.
1. Partial Mobilization can be ordered by the President upon declaration of a national emergency. He may order augmentation of the Active Armed Forces of up to one (1) million men of the Ready Reserve for up to 24 months. Full mobilization requires Congressional action declaring war or national emergency. Full mobilization allows the call-up of all RC units in the approved force structure as well as the IRR.


3. The Standby Reserve Training Corps should not be confused with the Standby Reserve, which is a category of inactive Reserve. The use of the phrase "Standby Reserve" is appropriate in both cases, however, since individuals in each group are not required to undergo annual training, once they have fulfilled their initial training obligation.

4. This pre-trained manpower pool would be a separate and distinct part of the IRR. Further participation beyond the six (6) year obligation could be encouraged through incentive bonuses for re-enlistmen, and additional training.


8. In 1786, Secretary of War Henry Knox presented a plan that came to be known as the Knox Militia Plan. Under this plan, all males between the ages of 18 and 60 were to be formed into advanced corps, main corps, and reserve corps for the purpose of training. The plan was never implemented as such, although the Militia Act of 1792 was a watered down version of the Knox Plan. Rather than provide a national militia as sought by Washington and Knox, the Militia Act of 1792 created a "phantom citizen army" or rather thirteen largely paper armies. The states did not make any serious effort to keep their militias viable, thus the program was never very effective. See John O'Sullivan, and Alan M. Hecker, editors, The Draft and Its Enemies, Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, (1974), p. 37.

9. Cooper, op. cit., p. 158.
10. Ibid., pp. 173-174. An IRR of this type would be most useful if US forces were structured as territorial rather than expeditionary forces. Since this is not the case, UMT provides more manpower than is needed. As long as present policy calls for 2.1 million active duty personnel, approximately 900,000 personnel in the selected reserve, and several hundred thousand in the IRR, then only 400,000 to 500,000 recruits will be needed each year in order to meet the manpower strength objectives. Since the male youth population will vary between 1.2 and 1.7 million each year between now and the mid 1990's, only a portion of the qualified manpower pool would be needed. See Cooper, op. cit., pp. 161-162.

11. Ibid., p. 175-177.

12. The overriding argument against UNS that has not been made against either UMS or UMT is the question of constitutionality. See Philip Bobbitt, "National Service: Unwise or Unconstitutional?", Registration and the Draft, ed. by Martin Anderson, Stanford, California, The Hoover Institution Press. (1982), pp. 299-330.

13. Dr. Cooper makes a persuasive case against any form of conscription, based primarily on his analysis of the success of the All Volunteer Force (AVF). Although he recognizes many problems with the All Volunteer Force, he concludes that the Services have fared very well under the volunteer program. He suggests that the AVF in the 1980's has a good chance of success, so long as manpower requirements stay near their current levels, i.e., up to 2.3 million in the active force, 800,000 to one (1) million in the Selected Reserve, and 400,000 to 500,000 in the IRR. See Cooper, op. cit., p. 171. If the manpower requirements were increased substantially above these levels, i.e., to 2.7 million for the active forces, or 1.5 million for the reserves, then Cooper believes that the AVF would have a difficult time in meeting its force requirements, and conscription may be the only alternative. Assuming the manpower requirements do not change, an additional problem looms in the future as the available manpower pool decreases by some fifteen (15) percent between 1980 and 1985 and by another ten (10) percent between 1985 and 1992. See Cooper, op. cit., p. 172.

14. The strongest and most passionate argument against selective service is the question of equity. No matter how the conscripts are chosen, some few escape service, thus an "unfair" burden rests on those who are selected to serve. Even a system of universal service imposes a hidden tax on those who are forced to serve since the rate of pay for a conscript is always below the prevailing market wage. With selective service, the tax is even more inequitable because the number of "taxpayers" is even smaller. In a voluntary system, those who serve receive a market wage, and the burden of their service is shared more equitably by the population through the tax system.

15. O'Sullivan and Meckler, op. cit., p.189.

16. Seven (7) of these Divisions are predominately IN-OSUT; three (3) are predominately Armor-OSUT; one is Engineer-OSUT; and one is BT/CST. There are also Brigade size units for Military Police, Artillery, and Medical MOSC's.
17. See footnote 5 above.

18. Gerhardt, _op. cit._ The numerous UMT proposals are discussed in great detail throughout the first three (3) chapters of Gerhardt.

19. The size of the stipend suggested here is arbitrary. A larger stipend may be needed if a larger force structure is contemplated. The SRTC could evolve as the primary vehicle for Federal support to education, in which case, its attractiveness would be greatly enhanced.


21. Setting the priority for annual training is a potential problem for simultaneous membership. The SRTC must have priority in this respect, although there is no reason why a recruit could not attend Annual Training in both capacities as long as the dates do not conflict. The SRTC should also be given priority in the case of mobilization, but this problem could be negotiated and is not particularly critical to the success of SRTC. As long as manpower planners are aware that these members are either mobilization assets to the SRTC or the Reserve Components, not both, there should be no real conflict.


23. Rick Maze, "Wartime Soldier Shortage Projections Increase," _Army Times_, 32, March 18, 1985, p. 13. The article goes on to say that there would be a 120 day delay between mobilization and the time significant numbers of new troops join the fighting. This compares with 113 days cited earlier from the _FY85 Force Readiness Report_, which is the only unclassified volume of the four (4) volume _Manpower Requirements Report_.


25. The manpower potential of this option would be about one-fourth of that shown in Tables 1 and 2.