THE ROLE OF FORSCOM
IN THE RECEPTION AND CARE OF REFUGEES
FROM CUBA IN THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. ARMY FORCES COMMAND
FORT McPHERSON, GEORGIA
THE ROLE OF FORSCOM IN THE RECEPTION AND CARE
OF REFUGEES FROM CUBA IN THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

By
FRANK W. PEW
FOREWORD

This monograph presents the background of previous attempts by the U.S. Government and the U.S. Army in particular to receive and care for large numbers of refugees involved in a mass exodus from a Communist-dominated country. It covers the initial planning by FORSCOM to receive, house, and care for the Cuban refugees until their removal from military jurisdiction as well as the FORSCOM commander's decision to use his mobilization chain of command for command and control purposes. It includes in some detail the important jurisdictional and public relations problems which arose involving the law enforcement rights and responsibilities of both the military and civilian agencies involved because of the pronounced anti-social behavior of a large number of the refugees in the processing centers. It discusses some of the political implications of the program and the selection of appropriate military installations for its implementation. It reviews the FORSCOM support operations at Fort Chaffee, Ark., and Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa., both of which had processed Vietnamese refugees in 1975, and then reviews in greater detail the support operations at Fort McCoy, Wisc., which had last been engaged in a mobilization type mission during the Korean War. It points out the impact of this extended support mission on the overall readiness of FORSCOM's participating Active and Reserve Component units and individuals and reflects their valuable contributions to its overall success.

The author wishes to express his appreciation to Col. W. J. Moran, former commanding officer of Fort McCoy, Wisc., and members of his staff; Col. G. N. Zelez, formerly assigned to the FORSCOM Provost Marshal's Office; and Mr. R. W. Wagner and SGM(Ret) S. J. Maxwell, FORSCOM Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, for their valuable assistance in the development of this monograph. The author also wishes to thank Mrs. Judy Marquith of the FORSCOM Military History Office staff for her outstanding administrative support. Finally, the author wishes to thank Mr. Jean R. Moenk, Chief Historian, U.S. Army Forces Command, for his professional assistance, wise counsel, and unwavering support during the entire process.

FRANK W. PEW
Historian
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Fort McPherson, Georgia
12 July 1984
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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

Initial Cuban Refugee Processing Operations

Background

In April 1980, the Cuban Government of Fidel Castro, in the face of growing political and economic unrest, suddenly decided to permit mass emigration and announced that anyone desiring to leave Cuba could do so.1 As soon as this announcement was made public, Cuban Nationals residing in the United States, especially those living in the Miami area, began chartering boats in Florida to bring their relatives still living under the Castro regime to the United States. In turn, Castro seized this opportunity to rid his country of what he termed undesirable social elements -- political common criminals, mental defectives, and other antisocial elements whom the revolution had been unable to assimilate. Castro's representatives forced the boats arriving in Cuba at the port of Mariel (the designated embarkation port) to accept these undesirable social elements in addition to those Cuban elements they had been hired to transport. This mass movement became known as the "Freedom Flotilla" and it resulted in the arrival of some 125,000 Cubans in the United States. President Jimmy Carter, who had originally announced his intention to accept some 3,500 of these Cuban refugees, decided to accept all arriving Cubans (popularly known as "Marielitos") for humanitarian reasons.

Early FORSCOM Involvement

The U.S. Army Forces Command first became involved in this humanitarian operation on 27 April 1980 when it directed Fort Eustis, Va., to provide one utility landing craft (LCU) with crew to assist the U.S. Coast Guard in rescuing Cuban refugees whose boats were in danger due to high seas between Florida and Cuba. On the following day, Department of the Army instructed FORSCOM to provide a field grade officer to act as military liaison with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in Miami. On 30 April, the President directed the Federal Emergency Management Agency to assume control of an initial Cuban refugee processing center at Key West, Fla., in addition to the ongoing refugee processing operations in Miami and at Eglin Air Force Base in northern Florida. At this point in time, the U.S. Government still had no clear conception of the ultimate scope of the Cuban refugee mass movement which continued to grow on a day-to-day basis. By 6 May, however, the uninterrupted and large flow of incoming refugees had completely overwhelmed the refugee processing facilities noted above as well as those state and local resources centered in the Miami area which were assisting in the rapidly growing operation.

1.

The entire section is based on HQ FORSCOM, FORSCOM/ARRED Annual Historical Review, FY 81, pp. 342 - 43.
Expansion of the FORSCOM Role

In response to this now full-scale emergency, President Carter directed the Federal Emergency Management Agency to assume control of the Federal effort to receive and process the incoming Cuban refugees. Since that newly formed agency was still undergoing organizational pains, and since it lacked the immediately required manpower, facilities, and other organizational and structural resources required to successfully manage an already large and growing operation, the agency requested the Department of Defense to provide support as required. In recognition of the Army's successful and major roles in the efficient handling of the earlier Hungarian and Vietnamese refugee processing operations in 1956 and 1975, respectively, the Department of Defense designated the Secretary of the Army as the Defense Executive Agent. At the same time, the Department of the Army, in its newly assigned role as the Defense Executive Agency in this matter, immediately directed Eglin Air Force Base to expand its capacity for housing Cuban refugees to 10,000 persons. The Department of the Army also directed FORSCOM to provide command and control elements at both Miami and Key West and to activate Fort Chaffee, Ark., a sub-installation of Fort Sill, Okla., a major installation of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). This installation was selected since it was available; it enjoyed mild winters (a valuable consideration in the event of long-term operations); it had the ability to handle the refugees while continuing its Reserve Component support mission; and it had previously housed and processed thousands of Vietnamese refugees and thus its permanent garrison staff was familiar with such operations. FORSCOM instructed both the Fort Sill and Fort Chaffee commanders to be prepared to accept up to 15,000 Cuban refugees on short notice. FORSCOM then directed First U.S. Army to coordinate with the recently established Federal Disaster Control Office in Miami for the onward transportation of incoming Cuban refugees selected for assignment to the Fort Chaffee Cuban Refugee Processing Center. In order to support this vital element of the overall refugee processing mission, FORSCOM dispatched a small task force furnished by XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, N.C., to Miami on 10 May. Shortly thereafter, the Department of the Army instructed FORSCOM to activate two additional installations to serve as Cuban refugee processing centers for the still growing numbers of incoming refugees. In response to this Departmental directive, FORSCOM activated Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa., on 11 May. This installation had previously processed Vietnamese refugees and possessed similar managerial skills in this area as Fort Chaffee. On 19 May, FORSCOM selected the third installation, Fort McCoy, Wis., which had had no previous experience in this type of operation. The FORSCOM commander, General Robert M. Shoemaker, viewed this latest refugee processing operation as a much needed and vitally important "mobilization exercise" for his command and directed that the chain of command reflect that fact. Because of this decision, all subsequent directives flowed from FORSCOM through the appropriate CONUS commanders to the operational on-site military Task Force commanders rather than through the normal peacetime day-to-day FORSCOM channels -- i.e., from FORSCOM to the installation commanders.
Operational Overview of Fort Chaffee

Establishment of Refugee Processing Center

As noted above, the Department of the Army had directed FORSCOM to establish a Refugee Processing Center at Fort Chaffee, Ark. Although Fort Chaffee was a sub-installation of Fort Sill, Okla., a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command installation, the commander of the Fort Chaffee Refugee Processing Center (military Task Force commander) was to be a FORSCOM general officer. In view of this requirement, the Commander, Fort Sill, selected Brig. Gen. James E. Drummond, Commanding General, III Corps Artillery, Fort Sill, Okla., a major FORSCOM organization tenanted on that installation, to command the provisional refugee processing center. His principal mission was to provide requested and authorized support to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (and later the State Department) civilian operating directors of the center itself on a reimbursable basis. Fort Chaffee was normally manned by a U.S. Army garrison (semi-active) consisting of 14 permanent party military personnel, 127 Government civilian employees, and a U.S. Army Communications Command (USACC) element staffed by 13 Government civilian employees. The primary mission of this garrison was to operate the post and to furnish Annual Training (AT) support for the Reserve Components (RC). In order to provide adequate military support for the operation of the Fort Chaffee Refugee Processing Center, Fort Sill organized a task force consisting of personnel from four major sources — units and the garrison at Fort Sill, the garrison at Fort Chaffee, FORSCOM units from installations other than Fort Sill, and both individual volunteers and units from the Reserve Components.

Early Policy Decisions

In recognition of the fact that the Federal Emergency Management Agency had become the Federal government’s principal emergency manager, General Drummond immediately established two major operating policies in support of the Fort Chaffee Refugee Processing Center and its civilian directors. These policy decisions were based upon the experience gained in operating the Vietnamese refugee processing center at Fort Chaffee and were designed to facilitate the smooth operation of the military supporting task force itself and to effect timely reductions in the number of military personnel required by the task force to furnish support to the center. Specifically, military personnel normally assigned to the U.S. Army Garrison at Fort Chaffee were to be released to perform their Reserve Component annual training support duties as soon as possible. In addition, task force military and civilian personnel were to be replaced by personnel provided by the Federal civilian operating agencies as soon as possible. General Drummond insisted upon strict adherence to these policies by both his own personnel and by the management personnel of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. This would keep the number of military personnel required for the task force

2. Entire section is based on ibid., pp. 343 - 47.
to the absolute minimum. The overall objective of these policies was, of course, to avoid an adverse effect upon the readiness condition of involved FORSCOM Strategic Army Forces (STAF) personnel and their units through prolonged involvement.

Experience Factors

Fortunately, a number of Fort Chaffee's Government civilian employees and a few of the military personnel from Fort Chaffee and Fort Sill had been involved in processing Vietnamese refugees at Fort Chaffee in 1975. This same helpful situation obtained among certain senior grade Reserve Component personnel and throughout the FORSCOM chain of command. Illustrative of this situation was the efficient manner in which Fort Chaffee's experienced Directorate of Facilities and Engineering (DFAE) prepared the installation facilities to receive, house, and process the expected refugees. It activated a total of 600 buildings, including 50 hospital buildings, and partitioned 149 barracks buildings for use as family quarters. It also activated the hospital boiler plant and steam distribution system, several sewage lagoons, which had been improved on and expanded during the Vietnamese refugee period, as well as a supporting aeration system. The directorate also constructed 19 temporary shower units and installed 12 hot water systems for mess halls in the receiving tent city area and installed kitchen equipment in an additional 12 mess halls in the barracks area. In order to meet anticipated security requirements, it installed 1,200 linear feet of chain link fence with 8 gates and constructed and set up 12,000 linear feet of barricades which were connected with rope to stretch over an area of 6 miles. Finally, the directorate installed security lights in the cantonment and inprocessing areas and constructed and set out a total of sixty guard shacks. This work was accomplished primarily by the 46th and 244th Engineer Battalions, with the assistance of the 348th Utilities Detachment (USAR), Waco, Tex.

Overview of Task Force Support Operations

During the short period, 9 through 18 May, planeloads of Cuban refugees arrived daily, bringing an average of 1,875 per day to the Fort Chaffee Refugee Processing Center. All of the refugees required immediate food, clothing, and shelter, and many required medical attention. To meet this latter need, the 47th Field Hospital operated a hospital proper, as well as three dispensaries to handle outpatient cases. The 96th Civil Affairs Battalion handled all administrative affairs within the refugee compound and organized the inhabitants politically so that they elected candidates from among the refugees to represent them at various levels. The Civil Affairs battalion also managed barracks assignments, issued bedding, and generally controlled the refugees within the cantonment area. The 1st Psychological Operations Battalion established a Cuban language newspaper and public address broadcasts which provided a free flow of information into and within the cantonment area. Fort Sill provided 200 Spanish speaking soldiers who served as interpreters throughout the entire administrative area. By 18 May, the last scheduled flight of incoming Cuban refugees had arrived, bringing the total refugee population at the Fort Chaffee Refugee Processing
An additional and unscheduled 46 Cuban refugees arrived by plane and bus on 23 May, bringing the final total of Cuban refugees housed at Fort Chaffee to 19,246.

By that time, the center was fully established and the military Task Force commander's primary concern was to assist in making the stay of the refugees as comfortable as possible until the civilian Voluntary Agencies, which worked under State Department supervision, could place them into American society. The arrival of the last scheduled flight of Cuban refugees on 18 May completed the inprocessing phase. The processing center operated by the 545th Adjutant General Company (Personnel Services), Fort Campbell, Ky., ceased operations and the unit returned to its home station three days later. Fort Chaffee turned the processing facility over to the Federal Emergency Management Agency for further use in outprocessing the refugees. By 6 July, the 47th Field Hospital, Fort Sill, Okla., and its supporting medical detachments had closed out their operations and had returned to their home stations. By 5 August, when the Fort Chaffee Refugee Processing Center became the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Refugee Processing Center, the only original operational units still remaining at Fort Chaffee were elements of civil affairs and psychological operation units. During the remainder of the time, until 19 February 1982 when the military Task Force was finally discontinued, FORSCOM continued to provide essential military command and control, security, medical, and other support as required. The Reserve Components made a major contribution in the form of units and individual personnel in FY 1980 and to a lesser extent in FY 1981. By the end of July 1980, the civilian Voluntary Agencies working under State Department supervision had managed to outprocess 13,849, or 72 percent, of the refugees then on hand. The Federal Emergency Management Agency, the State Department, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Department of Justice played key roles in the operation of the center during this period, which was punctuated by Cuban refugee demonstrations, riots, and other outbursts requiring the use of military police and backup combat units.

Overview of Long-Term Task Force Operations

By 5 August 1980, outplacement programs had improved to the point where the Department of Defense selected Fort Chaffee as its long-term consolidated refugee processing center for the remaining, hard-to-place young single male Cuban refugees still remaining at the Eglin Air Force Base, Fort Chaffee, Fort Indiantown Gap, and Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Centers. Other factors involved in this decision were economic in nature and included the savings to be realized through the consolidation of overhead costs as well as the avoidance of winterization costs at Fort Indiantown Gap and Fort McCoy. The actual consolidation began on 25 September 1980 and involved 5,771 Cuban refugees, bringing the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Refugee Processing Center population to 8,349 at the conclusion of the consolidation operation in early October. By 21 January 1982, the Voluntary Agencies and the Federal government had succeeded in placing all but 395 Cuban refugees either into American society or in other Federal institutions. The final placement action started on 22 January 1982 when the Department of Justice, which had
been given custody of the remaining Cubans at the direction of the President on 21 January, announced that they would be transferred to Federal prison facilities in Atlanta, Ga., for further safekeeping or to Springfield, Mo., for safekeeping and psychiatric evaluation. This final transfer was completed on 4 February. Task Force Fort Chaffee was officially terminated and disestablished on 19 February 1982.

Operational Overview of Fort Indiantown Gap

Establishment of the Second Refugee Processing Center

On the day following the establishment of the first FORSCOM refugee processing center at Fort Chaffee, the U.S. Army Forces Command informed the Commander, Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa., that his installation was also under consideration for use as a Cuban refugee processing center. The Fort Indiantown Gap garrison staff, which had had extensive experience handling Vietnamese refugees at that installation in 1975, immediately started preliminary planning. This second center was formally established on 11 May 1980 with Brig. Gen. Grail L. Brookshire, Assistant Division Commander, 4th Infantry Division (Mech), Fort Carson, Colo., as the center commander. Early troop unit support furnished by FORSCOM from a variety of sources included medical, engineer, military police, adjutant general personnel services, as well as civil affairs and psychological affairs personnel. Based upon information gleaned from the ongoing Fort Chaffee Refugee Processing Center operation, First U.S. Army requested additional military police, civil affairs, psychological operations, airfield control group, linguistic, and detail soldier support. FORSCOM filled the request for additional military police support from the Puerto Rico Army National Guard -- the 440th and 77th Military Police Companies. The linguistic support problem was solved to some extent when the Civilian Personnel Office at Fort Indiantown Gap was able to hire 202 temporary civilian employees to serve as interpreters. Once in command, General Brookshire designated the installation staff as the principal task force staff and the installation commander as the Deputy Task Force Commander. Task force units were placed under the operational control of the directorate or activity having responsibility for a respective function. Exceptions to this rule included the 42d Field Hospital, the provisional civil affairs battalions, and the 519th Military Police Battalion.

Reception and Processing of Cuban Refugees

The first flight of 325 Cuban refugees arrived at Fort Indiantown Gap on 18 May 1980. During the next twelve days a total of 19,094 refugees arrived, including the initial shipment. Families and unaccompanied males were billeted in areas geographically separate from unaccompanied females. The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service established and operated a detention center with a total of 106 Cuban refugees transferred to Federal prisons during the period 18 May through

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The entire section is based on ibid., pp. 347 - 49.
5 June 1980. The Fort Indiantown Gap Director of Personnel and Community Activities (DPCA) conducted all inprocessing of the refugees with the assistance of the 382d Adjutant General Company (Personnel Services), Fort Devens, Mass. This operation included the completion of forms required by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, the issuance of photo-identification cards and meal cards, the assignment of billets, and an initial medical screening. The inprocessing phase was completed by 31 May, at which time FORSCOM turned the center over to the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service for further outprocessing activities involving the actual resettlement of the refugees in the United States. The overall processing of the refugees for resettlement was the responsibility of the State Department, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, and various Voluntary Agencies.

The Provisional Civil Affairs Battalion conducted the internal management of the actual cantonment area housing the Cuban refugees. The battalion's responsibilities included such functions as maintaining accountability of the refugees, providing command and control, issuing bedding, clothing, and the like, coordinating and providing the refugees for processing by responsible agencies, establishing recreation programs, and managing the outprocessing area. The Task Force Provost Marshal (Commander, 159th Military Police Battalion) was responsible for both perimeter and installation security, while Federal law enforcement agencies were primarily responsible for internal security with backup assistance from the military police and both Active and Reserve Component combat units furnished by FORSCOM as needed. Specific examples of reinforcement by Active and Reserve Component combat units will be discussed in the following chapters for all three refugee processing centers. At the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Processing Center, however, law enforcement activities were seriously hampered by the unique split-jurisdictional environment involving both the Federal government and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Termination of the Operation

As noted above, Fort Chaffee was selected by the Defense Department to become the long-term consolidated refugee processing center for residual Cuban refugees on 5 August 1980. During the period 6 through 9 October, 1,980 Cuban refugees were airlifted from the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Processing Center to the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Refugee Processing Center. As of 15 October 1980, when the center was discontinued, other refugee disposition included 389 transferred to various Federal correctional institutions, 7 unaccounted for whose names had been turned over to the appropriate Federal agencies, and 16,718 (87.6 percent) placed in American society.

Operational Overview at Fort McCoy

Establishment of the Third Refugee Processing Center

On 16 May 1980, the Department of the Army learned that a joint team from the Department of Defense, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the General Services Administration had selected Fort McCoy, Wisc.,
as a third FORSCOM Cuban refugee processing center. The Department of the Army directed FORSCOM to select a Task Force Commander and to prepare Fort McCoy as a refugee processing center to receive up to 15,000 Cuban refugees beginning on 29 May 1980. This was the date on which higher headquarters anticipated that the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Processing Center would have reached its capacity of 20,000. On 20 May, FORSCOM designated Col. (P) Bernard M. Herring, Division Artillery Commander, 9th Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Wash., as the Fort McCoy Task Force Commander. FORSCOM assigned operational control of the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center to Fifth U.S. Army and directed that command to determine the feasibility of employing Reserve Component units capable of civil affairs and psychological operations. In the interim, Colonel Herring was promoted to the grade of brigadier general. Active Army adjutant general (personnel, services), airfield control group, civil affairs, engineer, military police, psychological operations, public affairs, and transportation units began arriving at Fort McCoy. The Active Army civil affairs and psychological operations unit elements were assisted by counterpart Reserve Component units during their two-week tours of annual training. The first planeload containing 172 Cuban refugees arrived at Fort McCoy on 29 May 1980. During the first week of operation, the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center received a total of 11,655 Cuban refugees. Of that number, 3,637 had completed all processing requirements, 30 had been released to sponsors, 13 had been transferred to the detention area operated by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, while 2 of the refugees had died since their arrival in the camp. On 7 June, 1,061 military personnel and 42 Government civilian employees supported Task Force McCoy. At that time, General Herring pointed out that the general lack of personnel in all functional areas was a matter of grave concern. This situation soon disappeared with the recruitment of an adequate workforce during the next few weeks.

Termination of the Operation

As indicated above, the involved Federal agencies determined on 5 August that Fort Chaffee would be retained as the single long-term Cuban consolidated refugee processing center during the oncoming winter months and that the actual consolidation process would begin on or about 25 September. By that date, the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center had received a total of 14,360 Cuban refugees. Since these late arrivals contained a larger percentage of criminal and mentally disturbed personnel than the earlier arrivals billeted at the other refugee processing centers, the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center experienced an unusually large number of incidents both inside and outside the refugee compound. The general situation was such that, on 27 August 1980, FORSCOM had to replace the last of the Reserve Component military police units with mechanized infantry personnel from Fort Carson, Colo. Following a major disturbance on 7 September, this reaction force was further augmented with airborne air assault personnel from Fort Campbell, Ky. During the period 26 September through 3 October, Fort

4. The entire section is based on ibid., pp. 349 - 51.
McCoy transferred 3,174 adult male Cuban refugees to Fort Chaffee. All of the flights were accomplished without incident. Earlier predictions that the transferring refugees would offer resistance to the move failed to materialize. On 3 November, Fort McCoy transferred the last ninety-three Cuban juveniles still in residence at the center to the physical jurisdiction of the the State of Wisconsin at Wyalusing State Park. This movement of Cuban refugee juveniles marked the termination of refugee processing operations at Fort McCoy.

**Jurisdictional Problems**

The primary areas of special concern for FORSCOM's Task Force commanders were the security of and their legal jurisdiction over the Cuban refugees during the incident-ridden summer of 1980. The most critical legal issue from FORSCOM's viewpoint was the determination of restrictions of Army authority over the Cubans — i.e., the proper application of the Posse Comitatus Act. On August 8 and 9, 1980, the Department of the Army attempted to clarify the situation in general terms. Because of the generalities of these directives, the Fort Chaffee Task Force commander, General Drummond, directed his staff judge advocate to prepare a detailed memorandum of understanding concerning responsibilities for law enforcement and security in coordination with other civilian Federal law enforcement agencies located at the Fort Chaffee Refugee Processing Center. The Department of the Army subsequently disapproved this local law enforcement initiative. On May 12, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the lead Federal agency in the operation, issued the following law enforcement guidance. The support military Task Force commander would provide perimeter security and would quell any observed disorders, turning offenders over to the U.S. Marshals, as appropriate. General Drummond, in response to this guidance, directed his task force security forces to use no force in the event any Cuban refugee tried to leave the area — U.S. Marshals would handle such situations. After many differences of opinion were expressed concerning this matter by Department of Justice, Department of Defense, and Department of the Army officials, the latter elected to stand fast on the matter of jurisdictional policy. By May 15, therefore, as the Fort Chaffee Refugee Processing Center's refugee population mounted rapidly, and as preparations were underway to receive additional Cuban refugees at the Fort Indiantown Gap and Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Centers, it became quite clear that FORSCOM military Task Force personnel at those installations would not use force if a Cuban refugee attempted to leave the area, nor would they perform police or law enforcement activities within the cantonment areas. This policy remained in effect until the major Cuban refugee riot at Fort Chaffee on June 1.

Following this riot, which attracted widespread media coverage and is discussed in Chapter II, the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency reached an agreement concerning law enforcement and peacekeeping responsibilities

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5. The entire section is based on ibid., pp. 352 - 53.
for detainees at military installations. The agreement reiterated that the primary responsibility for peacekeeping, law enforcement, and related activities concerning the Cuban refugees rested with the civilian law enforcement authorities. However, when the civilian law enforcement authorities were not available in sufficient numbers to carry out this responsibility at military installations, the military commander would exercise his authority to maintain order on the military installation and take reasonable steps to provide for the safety of both persons and facilities thereon. These temporary military measures would not usurp the primary responsibility of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service or other Federal agencies which had been assigned jurisdiction by statute or otherwise. This agreement further stipulated that, because of the nonavailability of Federal civilian law enforcement officials, at certain locations, the Department of the Army and the military Task Force commander at such locations were responsible for certain law enforcement functions. These functions included the maintenance of preventive controls, the provision of security for the control zone, and the maintenance of adequate response forces to control any large scale disturbances which might occur. When sufficient civilian law enforcement capabilities did become available, however, they would assume the above responsibilities in the order named. From the FORSCOM viewpoint, the most important provision of this agreement stated that nothing contained therein would be permitted to affect the authority and the ultimate responsibility of the FORSCOM military Task Force commander to assure the orderly functioning of the military base under his control. Of necessity, this guidance, too, was general in nature and did not come to grips for instance, with the unique split jurisdictional situation arising from the lease agreement entered into by the Federal government for the use of Fort Indiantown Gap, which was owned by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Complications in this instance not only involved installation security but the prosecution (or lack of prosecution) of Cuban refugee lawbreakers apprehended in the local communities. All aspects of these matters are discussed in the following chapters pertaining to each of the Cuban refugee processing centers operated by FORSCOM.

Military Police Support

It became very apparent early in the Cuban refugee operations that the volatile nature of many of the incoming Cuban refugees, particularly when compared with the relatively high degree of law and order demonstrated by the earlier Hungarian and Vietnamese refugees, would require an intensive and sustained degree of FORSCOM military police support to ensure the security of the supporting installations. The continued scope of this program would, in time, adversely affect the readiness of assigned military police units and individuals. It was due to the previously mentioned aggressiveness of many of the individual Cuban refugees, some 10 to 12 percent of whom had criminal records of one sort or another. Other contributing factors included the early slowness of outprocessing due to burdensome administrative security.

6. The entire section is based on ibid., pp. 353 - 54.
requirements; the high percentage of young hard to place single males; communications difficulties; different life styles and mores; and other negative environmental conditions at the centers.

Beginning in mid-May 1980, FORSCOM began supporting the rapidly burgeoning Cuban refugee processing operations with both Active and Reserve Component military police units and individuals. Through September of that year, when the three FORSCOM Cuban refugee processing centers -- Fort Chaffee, Ark., Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa., and Fort McCoy, Wis. -- were in operation, the requirements for Active Component military police units alone constituted a minimum of three military police battalion headquarters and headquarters detachments and nine military police companies. In mid-October, when the consolidation of all remaining adult Cuban refugees at the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Refugee Processing Center was completed, Active Component military police support requirements were reduced to elements of one military police battalion headquarters and headquarters detachment and two military police companies. During the sustainment and termination phases of the consolidated refugee processing operation (9 October 1980 through 30 January 1982), when the last supporting FORSCOM military police unit departed Fort Chaffee, a total of 1 military police brigade headquarters and headquarters detachment, 3 military police battalion headquarters and headquarters detachments, and 20 military police companies were involved in security support operations. FORSCOM also employed the services of forty-five Reserve Component military police units assigned to the First and Fifth U.S. Armies at the three refugee centers during the peak period of Cuban refugee population in the summer of 1980. These units were staggered on their two-week annual training periods to support this requirement. Participating Army National Guard military police units were placed under Title 10 of the U.S. Code (Federalized) for the Cuban refugee support mission. Reserve Component military police units were not employed in 1981 and 1982.

By 31 March 1981, FORSCOM observed that the continued support provided by its Active Component military police units up to that point had had an adverse effect on their readiness status. Training had suffered in skill qualification testing (SQT) of individuals, the implementation of military police unit Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) testing of units, and required participation in exercises. In many instances, individual military police personnel had been employed for lengthy periods of 12-hour days, seven days a week. During the remainder of FY 1981 and until 30 January 1982, the Cuban refugee resettlement operation remained consolidated at Fort Chaffee and continued to require military police support by Active Component units of FORSCOM's Strategic Army Forces (STRAF). As noted earlier, this consolidated support phase was accomplished by elements of a military police battalion and two military police companies on a continuous basis. Most of the military police units involved during this lengthy operation (9 October 1980 through 30 January 1982), and indeed over the entire operational period (May 1980 through January 1982) were required to perform this vitally needed support service for the second or third time. Finally, during the entire period, it was necessary to reinforce these military police units at all three Cuban refugee processing centers from time to time with a varying number of Active or Reserve
Component on-scene or on-call combat arms battalions depending upon the actual or probable degree of refugee violence experienced or expected. This particular facet of FORSCOM's support operations was widely appreciated by the apprehensive residents of nearby civilian communities. It might or might not achieve similar prominence in a future refugee processing operation since the type and nationality of the refugees involved might effectively preclude similar type antisocial conduct.

Financial Support

According to the latest financial management data available to Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Command, reimbursable costs incurred by the command in the operations of the Fort Chaffee, Fort Indiantown Gap, and Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Centers amounted to $108.8 million. Of this amount Fort Chaffee incurred $55.9 million, Fort Indiantown Gap incurred $24.9 million, and Fort McCoy incurred $28.0 million. All but $4.0 million of this amount was reimbursed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Department of Health and Human Services, the principal Federal civilian agencies charged with reimbursement responsibilities. The $4.0 million in arrears, was owed by the Department of Health and Human Services in connection with restoration costs at the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Refugee Processing Center. The department found itself in this position because its appropriations for this purpose had been limited to $2.0 million. Pending the receipt of the balance owed in this matter, the Department of the Army instructed the parent major command concerned, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, to proceed with needed restoration at Fort Chaffee using funds made available by the department for this specific purpose. The overall incurred costs processed by FORSCOM amounted to $150.9 million. This included the costs previously noted as well as $42.1 million in the "Florida" account, an account which included both operational costs incurred by the U.S. Air Force operated Eglin Air Force Base Refugee Processing Center in Florida as well as ancillary costs incurred at Key West and Miami by FORSCOM in support of the overall refugee reception and processing operations. The remaining costs incurred involved $65,800 spent in support of early planning efforts to establish the Fort Allen Refugee Processing Center in Puerto Rico, a project which did not achieve fruition. The average cost per refugee incurred by FORSCOM amounted to $2,100. The final bill to be incurred by the American public until the last Cuban refugee processed through the FORSCOM operated Cuban refugee processing centers from May 1980 until February 1982 is settled and is self-supporting will undoubtedly come to millions more.\(^7\)

\(^7\) Info furn by Mr. Terry Cook, FORSCOM DCSCOMPT F&A Div, 19 Sep 83.
Chapter II
FORT CHAFFEE SUPPORT OPERATIONS
Preparation and Establishment, 7 May – 18 May 1980

Background

As noted earlier, the mass flight of Cuban refugees to the United States in the spring and early summer of 1980 represented the culmination of a pattern of individual escapes dating from the early days of the regime of Fidel Castro. In the spring of 1980 a number of Cubans began seeking asylum in several Latin American embassies in Havana. In support of their actions, they cited such reasons as strict rationing of the necessities of life, other economic sanctions of one kind or another, and the lack of personal and religious freedom. It was subsequently believed by interested observers of this phenomenon that the widespread media coverage given these events throughout much of the world was the likely cause for the Castro Government relaxing its hitherto restrictive emigration policies. In a very short period of time following this relaxation of emigration policies, some 10,000 Cubans who wished to get out of Cuba besieged the Peruvian Embassy. As an act of humanitarian relief, President Jimmy Carter authorized up to 3,500 Cubans to enter the United States and promised that additional resettlement arrangements would be made by the United States with the governments of other countries. Reacting to this American policy pronouncement, the Cuban Government then announced that any Cuban wishing to emigrate could do so through the port of Mariel, some twenty miles from Havana.¹

While the United States Government was attempting to establish an orderly exodus of refugees from Cuba to Florida, Cuban residents of the United States, who were friends and relatives of the emigres, hired, bought, or commandeered a flotilla of evacuation vessels of all shapes and sizes, thus beginning an uncoordinated exodus of Cuban refugees to southern Florida. This flotilla was soon augmented by the owners of a number of shrimp boats from as far north as South Carolina who also entered the refugee carrying trade on a commercial basis. The Castro Government, in turn, saw this developing situation as an opportunity to rid itself of a number of undesirables such as criminals, mentally ill, and other disruptive elements of its "classless" society. At Mariel Harbor, Cuban troops began forcing the boats arriving from Florida to take on these undesirables as a precondition to taking on those genuine refugees desiring to leave Cuba for the United States. In a short period of time, the processing facilities hastily established in Florida by both Federal and state agencies became overwhelmed by the tremendous influx of Cuban refugees. President Carter then issued an executive

¹.

order establishing additional refugee processing centers at Eglin Air
Force Base, Fla., Fort Chaffee, Ark., Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa. and Fort
McCoy, Wis. On 7 May 1980, the Secretary of Defense directed FORSCOM
to establish a Cuban refugee processing center at Fort Chaffee, Ark.
Brig. Gen. James E. Drummond, Commander, III Corps Artillery, Fort Sill,
Okla., a FORSCOM organization, commanded the Task Force at Fort
Chaffee. He arrived on the scene on 8 May and activated his Emergency
Operations Center. The Federal Management Agency (FEMA), a newly
created federal agency designed to handle domestic emergencies, was
responsible for the overall coordination of the Federal agencies
involved in the refugee processing center. FEMA appointed Mr. William C.
Tidball as the Center Coordinator. Within the short space of three
days, Active Army troop strength reached 1,470 and the Cuban refugee
population reached 3,988. Fortunately, Fort Chaffee garrison personnel
had garnered extensive experience in supporting refugee operations
during 1975 when the installation had hosted thousands of Vietnamese
refugees. It was thus able to react swiftly and competently to meet
the requirements of the current crisis, as was its immediate higher
headquarters, Fort Sill, Okla., a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command installation. 2

The Task Force Refugee Processing Center Operation was a joint ven-
ture combining the efforts of both military and civilian agencies. It
included the Department of Defense, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, the Department of State, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, the Department of Health and Human Services, the General
Services Administration, and the U.S. Marshals Service. In addition to
these Federal Government agencies, a number of Voluntary Agencies
(VOLAG) constituted perhaps the most important element of the operation
since they arranged for the outplacement of the Cuban refugee aliens
once they had been processed and were ready for sponsorship. Fort
Chaffee, a sub-installation of Fort Sill, was normally manned by a U.S.
Army Garrison (Semi-active) consisting of 14 permanent party military
personnel and 127 Government civilian employees. The garrison's primary
mission was to maintain the post to meet mobilization requirements and
to support the Reserve Components (Army Reserve and Army National
Guard). On 7 May, when the order was received to establish a Refugee
Processing Center, the mission of the Fort Chaffee garrison thus became
two-fold in nature: to establish the Refugee Processing Center; and to
support Reserve Component Annual Training requirements for 1980. In
order to accomplish this mission, the Fort Sill Commander, Maj. Gen.
Jack N. Merritt, thus appointed General Drummond to be the Task
Force/Fort Chaffee Commander and provided him with a staff formed from
Fort Sill and Fort Chaffee staff sections with the result that for all
practical purposes the Fort Chaffee U.S. Army Garrison and its Annual
Training support operations became absorbed into the Task Force. As it
was organized, the Task Force consisted of personnel from four individ-
dual sources: Fort Sill personnel and units; Fort Chaffee Garrison;
FORSCOM units from installations other than Fort Sill; and Annual

2.

FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE
7 May 1980 - 1 January 1981

-FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

STATE DEPARTMENT

IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE

HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

U.S. MARSHALS

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

RED CROSS

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST

SOUTHERN BAPTIST CONVENTION
CHURCH WORLD SERVICES
U.S. CATHOLIC CONFERENCE
WORLD RELIEF COMMITTEE
INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arrival Date</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Departure Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 May 80</td>
<td>46th Engineer Battalion</td>
<td>14 May 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fort Rucker, Ala.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 May 80</td>
<td>546th Military Police Company</td>
<td>15 May 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fort Sill, Okla.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 May 80</td>
<td>30th Finance Detachment</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fort Sill, Okla.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 May 80</td>
<td>545th Adjutant General Company</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fort Campbell, Ky.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 May 80</td>
<td>13th Public Affairs Detachment</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fort Hood, Tex.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 May 80</td>
<td>471st Transportation Company</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fort Sill, Okla.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 May 80</td>
<td>675th Medical Detachment</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fort Benning, Ga.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 May 80</td>
<td>676th Medical Detachment</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Fort Benning, Ga.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 May 80</td>
<td>507th Medical Detachment (-)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Fort Sam Houston, Tex.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 May 80</td>
<td>258th Military Police Company</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Fort Polk, La.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 May 80</td>
<td>47th Field Hospital</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fort Sill, Okla.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 May 80</td>
<td>716th Military Police Battalion</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Fort Riley, Kans.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 May 80</td>
<td>977th Military Police Company</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fort Riley, Kans.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 May 80</td>
<td>1st Psychological Operations Battalion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Fort Bragg, N.C.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 May 80</td>
<td>96th Civil Affairs Battalion</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Fort Bragg, N.C.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 May 80</td>
<td>299th Engineer Battalion</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Fort Sill, Okla.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 May 80</td>
<td>11th Signal Brigade</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Fort Huachuca, Ariz.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 May 80</td>
<td>225th Medical Detachment</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fort Sill, Okla.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 May 80</td>
<td>3d Battalion, 9th Field Artillery</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fort Sill, Okla.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 May 80</td>
<td>2d Battalion, 18th Field Artillery</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fort Sill, Okla.</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 May 80</td>
<td>439th Medical Detachment</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Fort Leonard Wood, Mo.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Based upon lessons learned from the Fort Chaffee Vietnamese refugee operations in 1975, General Drummond instituted two policies calculated to ensure the smooth operation of the Task Force and to reduce the number of military and civilian personnel required to support the refugee processing operation as soon as possible. First, military and civilian personnel normally assigned to the Fort Chaffee garrison staff would be released to perform their Annual Training support duties and be eliminated from involvement in the refugee processing operations as much as possible and as soon as possible. Second, military and Department of the Army civilian personnel would be replaced by personnel from the Federal Civilian Agencies involved in the refugee processing operation as rapidly as possible. Effective 13 June 1980, General Drummond altered the Task Force organization to separate the Task Force and Fort Chaffee. He also established provisional headquarters company and attached Task Force personnel to Fort Chaffee for administration and the exercise of jurisdiction under the Unified Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The functional organization of the overall Task Force (including the military support elements) during the period 7 May through 1 January 1981, when control of the resettlement operation passed from the Federal Emergency Management Agency to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the successor to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), was as shown on Chart 1.4

Active Component Unit Support

Active Component units which supported Fort Chaffee Refugee Processing Center operations during the Preparation and Establishment Phase, 7 May through 18 May 1980, were as shown on Table 1.

3. Ibid., pp. I-III-1 and I-IV-1.

Reserve Component Unit Support

The following Reserve Component units supported the Fort Chaffee Refugee Processing Center operations during the Preparation and Establishment Phase, 7 May through 18 May 1980:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arrival Date</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Departure Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 May 80</td>
<td>222d Hospital Section Indiana - USAR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 May 80</td>
<td>496th Hospital Section Indiana - USAR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 May 80</td>
<td>369th Station Hospital Puerto Rico - USAR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 May 80</td>
<td>225th Military Police Company Puerto Rico - ARNG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 May 80</td>
<td>188th Tactical Fighter Group Arizona - ANG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Operational Summary

On 7 May 1980, Maj. Gen. Jack Merritt, the Fort Sill Commander, received a warning order from the FORSCOM Commander in connection with the establishment of a Cuban Refugee Processing Center at Fort Chaffee, Ark., a sub-installation of Fort Sill. In his situation analysis, the FORSCOM Commander declared that large numbers of Cuban refugees were continuing to arrive in Key West, Fla., and that a major influx of up to 20,000 refugees was expected in the next few days. He stressed that, as of 7 May, local, state, and Federal resources in Florida were severely strained as the large number of refugees already on hand were overwhelming available refugee control resources. In view of the potential immensity of the operation, the President had directed the Federal Emergency Management Agency to coordinate the rapidly developing Federal effort to receive and process the incoming Cuban refugees. In turn, the Federal Emergency Management Agency had already requested that the Department of Defense provide support as needed. The Secretary of Defense designated the Secretary of the Army as the Department of Defense Executive Agent. The Secretary of the Army chose the Director of Military Support, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS) as his representative in directing the Department of Defense response. The FORSCOM Commander also alerted appropriate subordinate commanders who would be required to deploy specifically designated Active Component units as required to Fort Chaffee upon receipt of an actual execute order. This warning order was dispatched

5. Ibid., p. I-IV-C-1.
FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION
TASK FORCE FORT CHAFFEE
15 May 1980

HEADQUARTERS
CG-III CA (Ft Sill)

CMD & CONTROL STAFF (Ft Sill)

TRAN SVC
471st Trans Co (-) (Ft Sill)

SPLY SVC
TMP Ft Sill (Bus Section)

GENERAL SPT
III CA (Ft Sill)
3/8 FA (Ft Sill) 299th Eng Bn
2/18 FA (Ft Sill) 46th Eng Bn (-)

HOUSING SVC
Linguists (Ft Rucker)

FOCO SVC
None

REFUGEE INPROCESSING CENTERS
AG Det (Ft Sill)
545th PS Co (Ft Campbell)

CIVIL AFFAIRS
1st PSYOPS Det (Ft Bragg)
95th CA Bn (Ft Bragg)

PUBLIC INFO
13th PA Det (Ft Hood)

MEDICAL SVC
47th Fld Hsp (Ft Sill)
369th Sta Hsp (USAR) Puerto Rico

COMMUNITY SVC
977th MP Co (Ft Riley)
11th Sig Bde (Ft Huachuca)

at 1500 hours on 7 May; the execute order was dispatched at 1716 hours; N-Hour was 071530Z May 1980.

In compliance with this warning order, General Merritt appointed General Drummond as the Task Force Commander. Within a period of twenty-four hours, Emergency Operations Centers were established at Fort Sill and Fort Chaffee, and military personnel to support the operation began to arrive at Fort Chaffee from Fort Sill and other US. Army installations. General Drummond quickly organized his Task Force, using personnel from staff sections of the Field Artillery Center at Fort Sill as well as garrison personnel stationed at Fort Chaffee. The 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (-) and elements of the 1st Psychological Operations Battalion arrived from Fort Bragg to provide managerial support to the Fort Chaffee Refugee Processing Center. Units from Fort Riley and Fort Sill provided military police support; the 46th Engineer Battalion (-) from Fort Rucker provided engineer support; and Fort Campbell furnished administrative support. General Drummond also established a Headquarters Company (Provisional) to provide management and support for the hundreds of soldiers arriving at Fort Chaffee to support the Cuban refugee resettlement operations (Chart 2).

Within forty-eight hours of the receipt of the execute order from FORSCOM, the 47th Field Hospital from Fort Sill had established a 100-bed hospital, engineers had prepared barracks space for 6,000 Cuban refugees; military police had established security around the cantonment area; and administrative personnel had established an inprocessing center. The Task Force established a Public Affairs Office using Fort Sill and Fort Chaffee personnel to handle the large number of media personnel who were arriving daily. The early establishment and responsible operation of the Public Affairs Office did a great deal to improve the center's public relations by serving to modify somewhat the adverse attitudes of many residents of the surrounding civilian communities concerning the reportedly large criminal element in the incoming Cuban refugee population. Beginning on 9 May and continuing through 18 May, 19,246 Cuban refugees arrived by chartered air at Fort Smith, Ark., where they were transported by bus to Fort Chaffee. Fort Chaffee Refugee Processing Center officials had to process an average of 1,925 Cuban refugees per day during this frantic period. All required food, clothing, and shelter and many required medical attention. By 14 May, Fort Chaffee's post engineers and personnel of the supporting 46th Engineer Battalion had prepared barracks housing to accommodate some 20,000 refugees. The 47th Field Hospital operated three dispensaries to handle the heavy load of outpatients in addition to the refugee hospital. The administrative personnel managed to keep up with the rapid


7. HQ USAFAC & Ft. Sill, Perm 0 82-22, 15 May 80, eff 7 May 80.
inflow of refugees, and the Military Police handled security of the compound and quickly established control of the area. (Map 1).

The 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (-) assumed the primary mission of organizing and handling all refugee affairs within the compound. The unit swiftly organized the refugee camp by establishing a political infrastructure whereby the Cubans elected other Cubans to represent them at various levels. In addition, Civil Affairs personnel managed barracks assignments, issued bedding, and generally controlled the refugees within the cantonment area. The 1st Psychological Operations Battalion worked hand-in-hand with the Civil Affairs personnel. The latter unit established a Cuban refugee newspaper, made public address broadcasts, and published other informational materials. All of these efforts were presented in Spanish and English and did a great deal to allay the many fears and apprehensions of the newly arrived Cuban refugees. These psychological operations operational techniques helped to provide a free flow of reliable information into and within the cantonment area. In this connection, it should be pointed out that probably nothing would have gone as smoothly as it did during the Preparation and Establishment Phase without the valuable services of some two hundred Spanish speaking soldiers provided by Fort Sill who served as interpreters. They were employed in nearly every inprocessing location, and their ability to overcome what could have been a severe communications problem was instrumental in ensuring the rapid inprocessing and initial settlement of the refugees at the center. By 18 May, when the last scheduled flight of refugees arrived, the Fort Chaffee Refugee Processing Center was fully established and the primary concern for the Task Force in its support role and the Federal Emergency Management Agency in its overall coordinating role became one of making the stay of the Cuban refugees as pleasant as possible until they were assimilated into American society.

Special Area of Concern: Posse Comitatus Act

Throughout the Preparation and Establishment Phase, and for that matter throughout the Throughput and Consolidation Phases, the proper application of the Posse Comitatus Act persisted as a special area of concern. Specifically at issue was a precise determination of the legal restrictions of U.S. Army (Task Force) authority over the Cuban refugees. On 8 and 9 May, the Task Force Commander received messages from higher headquarters which provided initial guidance concerning his law enforcement responsibilities. These messages stated basically that the commanders of military installations were responsible for the security of their installations and were permitted to take such actions as were reasonably necessary to protect government property and personnel or maintain order therein. However, there was no authority as such vested in the armed forces to restrain or confine Cuban refugees for law enforcement purposes. Because of the generalities contained in these

messages and in view of the nature of the incoming refugee population, General Drummond directed his Task Force Staff Judge Advocate to prepare a detailed memorandum of understanding (MOU) on law enforcement and security responsibilities. Following tentative approval of this memorandum by on-site representatives of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the U.S. Marshals Service, General Drummond requested that the proposed memorandum be reviewed by higher headquarters. It was ultimately forwarded by FORSCOM to the Director of Military Support (DOMS) at Headquarters, Department of the Army. After some discussion, the Director of Military Support disapproved the memorandum. On the other hand, he did not require that any changes be made in the on-going security enforcement program at the Fort Chaffee Refugee Processing Center.10

In his memorandum of understanding, General Drummond described in detail the security situation that his Task Force military personnel faced with the incoming Cuban refugee population. He pointed out that because many of the refugees arriving at Fort Chaffee apparently had not been previously screened or processed in any way, there was a clear necessity to search their persons and belongings and to seize weapons and contraband for the protection and welfare of the military personnel involved in the refugee processing operation. The on-site U.S. Marshal's Office disclaimed authority and responsibility in the matter. The Immigration and Naturalization Service currently did not have sufficient regular personnel to accomplish the requirement. It did, however, desire to appoint certain military members as "designated immigration inspectors" to perform this necessary task. Because of the clear military necessity for this action, General Drummond agreed in the proposed Memorandum of Understanding to the selection of certain military members as "designated immigration inspectors" and for them to perform such searches and seizures upon the initial entry of the Cuban refugees into the reception area. He stressed that there was no intent to use any item seized as evidence in any prosecution of the Cuban refugees from whom it was seized. He concluded by stating that the Immigration and Naturalization Service agreed to take over this search and seizure function as soon as possible.11


Thus, effective 12 May 1980, following the decision by the Director of Military Support, the status of security and law enforcement at the Fort Chaffee Refugee Processing Center for the area in which the Cuban refugees were housed was as follows. Task Force military personnel (including Military Police) could not perform police or law enforcement activities within the perimeter of the center, but could provide perimeter security and could quell any emergency disorder, turning over apprehended offenders to U.S. Marshals. In addition, General Drummond directed that no force was to be used by Task Force military personnel if a refugee attempted to leave the area. In such cases, the civilian law enforcement agencies were to be called in. This policy of General Drummond represented a conscious decision made on his part pursuant to verbal amplifying instructions originating with the Director of Military Support concerning the "reasonable measures" authority to contain the refugees within designated areas. This guidance was not changed by the Department of the Army until after the 1 June 1980 major Cuban disturbance at the Fort Chaffee Center.12

Following this major disturbance, which produced anti-Cuban refugee shock waves throughout the country and particularly in those areas surrounding other Refugee Processing Centers such as Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa., and Fort McCoy, Wis., the Department of the Army issued major modifications to its original guidance regarding military jurisdictional control at facilities containing "Cuban aliens." These Departmental messages modifying jurisdictional policy stated that the primary responsibility for peacekeeping, law enforcement, and related activities concerning the "Cuban detainees" rested with the civilian law enforcement authorities. When civilian law enforcement officers were not available in adequate numbers to carry out this responsibility at a military installation, the military commander would exercise his authority to maintain order on his installation and would take reasonable steps to provide for the safety of persons and facilities thereon. He was also directed to take reasonable measures to prevent the unauthorized passage outside the security perimeter, using the minimum force necessary to deter the Cuban detainees. This guidance, which also contained detailed instructions on the duties to be performed by his military personnel, was further amplified by a Memorandum of Understanding, dated 4 June 1980, executed between the Department of Defense, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Department of Justice (DOJ). The final step in the delineation of responsibilities for law enforcement and security of the Fort Chaffee Refugee Processing Center was taken on 24 September

96th CIVIL AFFAIRS BATTALION
INITIAL ORGANIZATION
9 May 1980

when the Governor of Arkansas, on behalf of his thoroughly aroused constituents, approved the center's Joint Security Plan.\(^{13}\)

**Resettlement Operations**

The 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (--) was responsible for the administration of the resettlement community. This community was originally divided into four "neighborhoods", each with an area leader, a block leader per row of barracks, and a barracks leader per barracks. It was also originally planned that military personnel would be assigned at the neighborhood level and would report to a military community leader. The Cuban refugees would not be allowed to hold a position higher than the neighborhood level in order to prevent influence peddling and to prevent the impression that a Cuban refugee had more authority than the military neighborhood leader. In addition, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (--) planned to have representatives at the inprocessing station to issue refugee meal cards and to assign billets. The initial refugee density per barracks would be seventy. Due to a lack of any reliable demographic data, but based on admittedly sketchy information that the majority of the incoming refugees would be family groups and that the remainder would be young and unattached males -- and that over half of the barracks were not fully prepared for occupancy at that time --, the decision was made to billet the unattached males on the upper floors of the barracks and the family groups on the lower floors. Upon the arrival of the first plane load of refugees on 9 May, the Battalion was forced to alter its proposed organization. This organizational change was necessitated by the lack of Spanish speaking interpreters to man the leadership positions, and the need to assign the majority of available Civil Affairs personnel to billeting the refugees. The organizational structure as of 9 May was as shown in Chart 3.\(^{14}\)

As the arrival of Cuban refugees increased to an average of 1,925 per day, General Drummond decided that a formal holding area was needed. This situation arose from the fact that the Adjutant General Inprocessing Section could only process 90 to 150 refugees per hour. Also, military personnel were needed to supervise the moving of refugees through the inprocessing system; to oversee the double bunking of neighborhoods III and IV; to act as dining facility coordinators; and be


96th CIVIL AFFAIRS BATTALION
MAJOR REORGANIZATION
12 May 1980

BN CDR

DEP CDR

INITIAL
INPROCESSING
TEAM

INTERMEDIATE
INPROCESSING
TEAM

S4

BUNKING
DETAIL

S3

CAMP
OPMS

DAY
SHIFT

NIGHT
SHIFT

NEIGHBORHOOD

HOLDING
AREA

responsible for assisting with operations, preparing meal cards, and staffing the contractor operated dining facilities with refugee kitchen police. This major organizational change was as reflected in Chart 4.

When the refugees landed at the Fort Smith, Ark., airport, they were transported by chartered bus from the airport to the inprocessing station in the 2500 area of Fort Chaffee. There, the Immigration and Naturalization Service issued each Cuban refugee an I-94 Alien Status Card as well as an alien number. Adjutant General military personnel then issued identification cards, recorded basic essential information, and made arrangements to have the refugees fed (if needed). Civil Affairs personnel made a clothing issue which included personal toilet articles and shower clogs. Public Health Service (PHS) personnel then screened the refugees for disease. This screening process included blood tests and x-rays. Finally, Civil Affairs personnel made barracks assignments, issued meal cards, and briefed the new arrivals on camp operations.13

Once the Cuban refugees had been escorted through the inprocessing station, they were bussed to the camp inprocessing supply room where they were issued bedding and were then transported to a holding area. From the holding area, they were taken to their preassigned barracks, escorted to their assigned bunks, and there given an additional briefing on the location of the dining facilities, medical facilities, housekeeping, supply procedures, and the importance of cooperating with the military area leaders. Additionally, the billeting team selected the barracks leaders from among the incoming Cuban refugees (later, the refugees were permitted to select their own barracks leaders). This system continued for the first three or four days of the operation. At this point, the Cuban refugees took matters more or less into their own hands and began to relocate within the housing areas on their own initiative. During the course of this spontaneous relocation effort, Civil Affairs personnel soon found it impossible to depend upon the barracks assignment locations made at the inprocessing center to locate individual refugees for further processing actions. Billeting procedures had to be completely changed. A one time census was made, records were adjusted accordingly, and in the case of subsequent arrivals, the billeting team was given a blank registration card with only the individual refugee's name and alien number on it. When billeting personnel located a barracks space for the refugee, the barracks assignment was recorded on the billeting card, which was then returned to the inprocessing center.16

The basic procedure used in outprocessing Cuban refugees from the Fort Chaffee Refugee Processing Center into American society was a relatively simple but time-consuming process. The Immigration and Naturalization Service screened the refugees and requested clearances for

15. Ibid., p. II-11-0-1.
16. Ibid.
individual alien status from Washington. This process took from five
to seven days. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central
Intelligence Agency further screened selected Cuban refugee aliens who,
as a result of the initial screening, were believed to constitute poten-
tial security problems. The refugees were then checked by the U.S.
Public Health Service. If further medical treatment was indicated, the
refugee concerned was called back and treated. The Voluntary Agencies
interviewed the refugee, arranged for his sponsorship, and coordinated
his travel arrangements to his new home. As their scheduled departure
date approached the refugees involved were instructed to gather their
personal possessions and bedding, and report to their neighborhood supply
room. There they turned in their bedding, had their departure status
verified, and were then transferred to the holding area. When they
arrived at the holding area, their status was once again verified and
they were issued one blanket and a meal card good for the holding area
dining facility. In general, the refugees remained in the outprocess-
ing holding area no more than seventy-two hours before departing Fort
Chaffee. In addition to the basic procedures described above, many
refugees, such as those with sponsoring family members living in the
United States, were specially processed. These refugees were hand-
carried through the processing network by Federal Emergency Management
Agency personnel. In some cases Civil Affairs military personnel were
also used to expedite the processing of designated refugees.17

Throughput Operations, 19 May - 5 August 1980

Background

The Throughput Operations Phase at Fort Chaffee covered the period
19 May through 5 August 1980. During this period the center operated in
the same fashion as the Fort Indiantown Gap and Fort McCoy Refugee
Processing Centers. It received, processed, housed, fed, treated, and
outplaced its Cuban refugee population. On 15 July 1980, the Department
of State assumed operational control of the resettlement operation at
Fort Chaffee from the Federal Emergency Management Agency. On 5 August,
State Department officials received information that Fort Chaffee had
been selected as the consolidation site for all subsequent Cuban refugee
resettlement operations. In practical terms this meant that, as of
5 August, the Fort Chaffee Refugee Processing Center would become the
Fort Chaffee Consolidated Refugee Processing Center and would begin
receiving the hard core residual Cuban refugee elements from all other
Department of Defense Processing Centers. In the meantime, the Fort
Chaffee Refugee Processing Center achieved its peak Cuban resident popu-
lation of 19,246 on 23 May 1980. During the remainder of May only 439
Cuban refugee aliens were outprocessed from the center, leading to a
mounting sense of frustration on the part of the refugees on the whole
and particularly on the part of those refugees with family members
waiting outside the front gate of Fort Chaffee for their release. By
the end of June, the resident refugee population decreased to 11,681

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17. Ibid., p. II-II-D-1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arrival Date</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Departure Date</th>
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<tr>
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<td>30th Finance Detachment, Fort Sill, Okla.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>545th Adjutant General Company, Fort Campbell, Ky.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 May 80</td>
<td>15th Public Affairs Detachment, Fort Hood, Tex.</td>
<td>24 May 80</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 May 80</td>
<td>471st Transportation Company, Fort Sill, Okla.</td>
<td>25 May 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 May 80</td>
<td>675th Medical Detachment, Fort Hood, Tex.</td>
<td>24 Jun 80</td>
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<td>676th Medical Detachment, Fort Sill, Okla.</td>
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<td>507th Medical Detachment (-), Fort Sam Houston, Tex.</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 May 80</td>
<td>47th Field Hospital, Fort Sill, Okla.</td>
<td>6 Jul 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 May 80</td>
<td>716th Military Police Battalion, Fort Riley, Kan.</td>
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<td>1st Psychological Operations Battalion, Fort Bragg, N.C.</td>
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<td>96th Civil Affairs Battalion, Fort Bragg, N.C.</td>
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<td>8 May 80</td>
<td>299th Engineer Battalion, Fort Sill, Okla.</td>
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<td>8 May 80</td>
<td>11th Signal Brigade, Fort Huachuca, Ariz.</td>
<td>30 Jun 80</td>
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<td>225th Medical Detachment, Fort Sill, Okla.</td>
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<td>3d Battalion, 9th Field Artillery, Fort Sill, Okla.</td>
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<td>23 May 80</td>
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<td>13 May 80</td>
<td>439th Medical Detachment, Fort Leonard Wood, Mo.</td>
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<td>2 Jun 80</td>
<td>3d Battalion, 18th Field Artillery, Fort Sill, Okla.</td>
<td>17 Jun 80</td>
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### TABLE 3

#### RESERVE COMPONENT UNIT SUPPORT

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<th>DEPARTURE DATE</th>
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<td>369th Station Hospital Puerto Rico - USAR</td>
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<td>14 May 80</td>
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<td>31 May 80</td>
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<td>15 May 80</td>
<td>185th Tactical Fighter Group Arizona - ANG</td>
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<td>607th Military Police Battalion Texas - USAR</td>
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<td>362d Psychological Operations Company Oklahoma - ARNG</td>
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<td>205th Military Police Company Missouri - ARNG</td>
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<td>547th Military Police Platoon Michigan - ARNG</td>
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<td>22 Jun 80</td>
<td>5064th U.S. Army Garrison Michigan - USAR</td>
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<td>2 Aug 80</td>
<td>144th Military Police Battalion Michigan - ARNG</td>
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Source: TP Ft. Chaffee AAR, p. I-IV-C-1.
with the outplacement of an additional 7,126 refugees. By the end of July, the refugee resident population decreased still further to 5,397 as an additional 6,284 refugees were outplaced.\(^{18}\)

**Active Component Unit Support**

Active Component units which supported the Fort Chaffee Refugee Processing Center Throughput Operations during the period 19 May through 5 August 1980 were as shown on Table 2.

**Reserve Component Unit Support**

Reserve Component units which supported the Fort Chaffee Refugee Processing Center Throughput Operations during the period 19 May through 5 August 1980 were as shown on Table 3.

**Operational Overview**

By 18 May 1980, the refugee population at Fort Chaffee had reached 19,246 and the Throughput Phase began. The Task Force Commander closed out the Inprocessing Center, which had been operated by the 545th Personnel Services Company, Fort Campbell, Ky., as well as elements from the Adjutant General Division at Fort Sill, Okla., and transferred the physical facilities to the Federal Emergency Management Agency for use as an Outprocessing Center. The Task Force Commander made every effort to reduce the number of Active Army personnel stationed on temporary duty at Fort Chaffee and to increase the duties and responsibilities of the various Federal civilian agencies on site in support of the outprocessing operations. At the same time, the Task Force Commander expanded the Civil Affairs program to permit the Cubans to manage themselves. Each barracks, block, and area chose its own leadership, who managed the affairs of their constituents and voiced their problems through regular meetings with key military and Federal civilian agency officials.\(^{19}\)

Many of the Cuban refugees were eager for employment and were used in every area of work which could be made available under current employment regulations. They assisted in the operation of area supply rooms, clothing issue, publication of the center newspaper and recreational services. This voluntary involvement of the Cuban refugees proved to be very positive in at least two significant ways. It permitted the Cuban refugees to manage their own affairs as much as possible, and it relieved the growing boredom of many who were much happier and content with something to do pending their placement in American society. Fort Chaffee recreational services provided boxing and softball gear, furnished musical instruments for a refugee organized band, showed movies every night, and arranged for classes in English. The Task Force Chaplain established regular worship services for both


CHART 5

TASK FORCE COLLINS
1 June 1980

Catholics and Protestants and organized a wide variety of other religious activities which were well received by a large number of the refugees. Not surprisingly, the virtual lack of cigarettes for distribution to the Cuban refugees during the first days of the center's operation soon constituted a major negative morale factor since virtually all of the Cubans enjoyed smoking. Several of the refugees were soon apprehended while off post (illegally) apparently attempting to procure cigarettes -- which in addition to their own intrinsic value had become a medium of exchange throughout the processing center. Once this growing situation had become identified, center operating officials took immediate steps to coordinate cigarette sales through the Fort Chaffee Post Exhange and its branches to alleviate what could have become a serious problem.20

One growing problem area defied immediate solution, however, and soon became the single greatest source of frustration for the refugees. It involved the initial slowness of the refugee outprocessing system. After two weeks of outprocessing efforts by the Voluntary Agencies, only about 100 refugees had been released. Families continued to arrive at Fort Chaffee to pick up refugee relatives but were told in many instances that the refugees in question could not be released because they (the refugees) had not finished their outprocessing requirements -- including the granting of final security clearances from Washington. This led to a growing sense of impatience on the part of all concerned which culminated in a major riot on 1 June. This riot attracted both local and national adverse attention and publicity and produced an immediate and dramatic change in security procedures at the center. Fort Chaffee requested and received nearly 2,000 soldiers from Fort Sill, Okla., who were organized as Task Force Collins (Chart 5) with the mission of providing perimeter security. Fort Chaffee also established two battery-size (company-size) reaction forces. The Task Force Commander developed a barrier plan and the 489th Engineer Battalion, an Arkansas Army Reserve unit, installed a double strand concertina barrier around the entire Cuban refugee housing area. Military Police patrols, both mounted and walking, were employed within the cantonment area. On 6 June, the Federal Emergency Management Agency made the decision to begin conducting "search and seizure" operations throughout the Cuban refugee compound to seize contraband. The agency conducted the first of such operations that same day with the result that two 1-ton trailer loads of homemade weapons, liquor, and other items were uncovered. Another operation conducted on 10 June yielded an operating still. There were no serious incidents involving Cuban refugees during this period. This was not surprising in view of the suddenly increased security precautions.21

Effective at noon on 4 June, the Federal Emergency Management Agency operating officials announced that Cuban-American families looking for relatives at the Fort Chaffee Refugee Processing Center would no longer

20. Ibid.
be permitted on post. This rather stern measure was invoked largely due to the unrest and agitation which these families had caused during late May and early June. Cuban-American families on the post as of noon on 4 June were permitted to take their relatives with them and, by noon on 7 June, no Cuban-American families remained on post. By mid-June, the appropriate Federal civilian agencies began assuming full responsibility for the refugee processing operation, and a formal Phase Down Plan for military strength reduction was approved. The first major step in this program involved the assumption of the refugee medical support mission by the U.S. Public Health Service from the 47th Field Hospital, Fort Sill, Okla., on 6 July. On 26 June, FEMA announced an important change in the outprocessing policy which was designed to speed up the overall resettlement process. This new policy permitted those refugees having close relatives (first cousin or closer) in the United States to be released without a final clearance. At the same time, the Department of Health and Human Services began separating unaccompanied minors from the rest of the refugee population. Any unaccompanied minor who was subsequently identified as having close relatives in the United States was given priority for processing and release. Finally, on a positive note, the Throughput Phase of operations was highlighted by the celebration of Independence Day. Members of III Corps Artillery units fired a 50-gun salute and this, along with outdoor cookouts, an arts and crafts fair, and various athletic contests and games, made it a memorable occasion for both the refugees and Task Force personnel. 22

**Major Riot on 1 June**

As noted above, the series of demonstrations which occurred during the last week of May and through 1 June were generated by a mounting sense of impatience with the perceived slowness of the outprocessing system. On 26 May, the growing frustration with the system on the part of many of the refugees and their potential Cuban-American family sponsors came to a head when a demonstration group of several hundred refugees, apparently agitated by their visiting relatives, began to run down the road parallel to the cantonment area and headed out a range road to the back gate of Fort Chaffee. An estimated 300 to 400 Cuban refugees actually left the post and had to be collected by state and county police officers. While no one was seriously injured and no property damage was reported, the potential for trouble was immediately recognized by military and civilian officials at the Federal and state levels. Not surprisingly, this incident led to a strong reaction from the local community which still remembered some of the negative aspects of the Vietnamese refugee operations at Fort Chaffee in 1975. Consequently, many citizens residing in the civilian communities surrounding Fort Chaffee listened to and generated a number of unfounded adverse rumors concerning the magnitude and seriousness of the incident and a great deal of fear developed practically overnight. In response to this highly charged atmosphere, Governor Bill Clinton (D) of Arkansas came to Fort Chaffee on 27 May to express his concern over what he viewed as a

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22. Ibid., p. III-1-2.
The period 26 May through 31 May constituted a grand rehearsal for the major riot which occurred on 1 June. During that tense week, demonstrations occurred on a daily basis and all featured the same theme — "Why aren't we being released?" Each one of these demonstrations dissipated after several hours of activity without serious incident. On 1 June, however, the lid blew off. Beginning at about noon, a large group of refugees began throwing rocks and other missiles at cars near the main gate. An hour or so later, a mob of some 300 Cuban refugee aliens moved out into the street and headed out the main gate. They then turned west on State Highway 22 where they encountered a large group of state troopers. When the mob encountered the state police, approximately 200 of the Cubans turned back and returned to their compound. The remaining 100 or so hard core demonstrators engaged in a rock throwing contest with the state police, who managed to break up the mob and force them back to the compound. Injuries were sustained by both groups. Media coverage was intensive, both locally and nationally. The local citizenry was incensed. At about the same time, another group of about 100 Cuban refugee aliens left the compound and headed toward Gate 5. The Task Force military reaction force broke up this group and herded them back to the compound. By late afternoon, Task Force and Federal Emergency Management Agency officials estimated that the Cubans who had left the compound had been returned and that the worst was probably over.24

At 1800 hours on 1 June, another group of 300 to 400 Cuban refugees apparently angered by the earlier encounter with the Arkansas State Police, rushed to the Fort Chaffee main gate where the troopers had been stationed by the Governor to prevent further incidents in the surrounding local communities. The Cubans stoned State Police cars and the police fired a combination of warning shots and shots into the crowd. The mob returned to the compound where they resumed throwing rocks and set fire to two of the guard shacks. By this time there were about 1,000 refugees involved in the demonstration and groups soon started running through the compound and in the streets. Buildings were set on fire and Task Force military reaction forces and available U.S. Marshals were employed at all locations to bring the situation under control. This latest demonstration, which had rapidly assumed riot dimensions, was finally broken up by about 2030 hours when order was restored and fires were then brought under control. The Task Force Commander imposed a curfew beginning at 2200. At approximately the same time, Governor
Clinton arrived on the scene to reanalyze the overall security situation. His arrival was followed in short order by Mr. Eugene Eidenburg, Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet and Deputy Assistant to the President for Intergovernmental Affairs, and Mr. Thomas Casey, Federal Emergency Management Agency, who came to get a first hand look at the situation. The Fort Sill Commander, General Merritt, also arrived on the scene. During the night of 1 - 2 June, some 300 additional soldiers arrived from Fort Sill to further augment the Task Force’s security forces. In addition, the Fort Sill Commander, acting on FORSCOM orders, employed an Arkansas Army National Guard Field Artillery Brigade of some 1,000 soldiers which were engaged in Annual Training at Fort Chaffee. This unit was federalized to be used in support of the refugee processing operation. The brigade remained federalized for two days until additional Active Army personnel could be brought in from Fort Sill and other FORSCOM sources.

In all fairness, it should be pointed out that during the course of this destructive riot, groups of Cuban refugees assisted the Task Force and Federal Civilian operating agency personnel in putting out building fires and attempted to assist in the restoration of order. At least one Cuban vigilante group searched for the instigators in an attempt to turn them over to the authorities. In summary, a total of thirty-seven Cuban refugees were injured, nine of whom were admitted to nearby hospitals for the treatment of gunshot and stab wounds. The stab wounds presumably were inflicted by fellow Cuban refugees. Two Task Force military personnel and one installation fireman received minor injuries which were locally treated and the personnel released. Five buildings were burned in the course of the riot; two were completely destroyed.

During the remainder of the month of June the Fort Chaffee Refugee Processing Center received a great deal of attention from both military and civilian leaders. The center initiated a number of improvements in the processing system; and made an effort to soothe the sensibilities of the surrounding communities; and attempted to improve information gathering efforts involving criminals among the resident Cuban refugees. Selected prominent personnel visiting Fort Chaffee during this critical period included Senators Dale Bumpers (D-Ark) and David Pryor (D-Ark) and Congressman John Paul Hammerschmidt (R-Ark) on the day following the riot. On 23 June, Congressman Edward R. Roybal (D-Calif), a member of the House Appropriations Committee, arrived. On 27 June, Mr. Nick Thorns, Director of the Department of State Task Force for the overall Cuban resettlement operation arrived, and on the following day Dr. Bob Maddox, White House Special Assistant for Religious Affairs arrived. Prominent Army leaders arriving during June included the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Logistics, the Hon. Alan J. Gibbs, on 3 June; General Robert M. Shoemaker, the FORSCOM Commander, on 16 June; and Representatives from the Department of the

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96th CIVIL AFFAIRS BATTALION
MAJOR REORGANIZATION
19 May 1980

EN CDR

US MARSHAL LIAISON

EOC LIAISON

INTERMEDIATE INPROCESSING TEAM

S-3

S-4

CAMP CEN

MESS LIAISON

NEIGHBORHOOD

RED CROSS/FEMA LIAISON

ID CARD SECTION

HOLDING AREA

REC SERVICES LIAISON

PREVENTIVE MEDICINE

Army Inspector General's Office on 30 June. In the community relations area, General Drummond gave a briefing to the Fort Smith, Ark., Chamber of Commerce concerning the Cuban refugee operations on 13 June, and Dr. Maddox, accompanied by General Drummond and a number of the Cuban refugees, attended a God and Country Service at the First Baptist Church in Fort Smith. Morale and processing improvements during the month included a visit by scouts from the Cincinnati Reds to look at potential major league talent; the activation of the Fort Chaffee bilingual radio station KNGB-FM (92.7); the establishment of a Criminal Information Center (CIC); the segregation of unaccompanied minors from the rest of the center's refugee population; and the institution of a new and relaxed policy permitting refugees with close relatives (first cousin or closer) to be released without final clearance. As a result of the positive effects of the improved administration within the center, the increasing proficiency of the Voluntary Agencies in their refugee outplacement efforts, and the general lessening of tensions among the Cuban refugee population, the Task Force Commander announced the adoption of a Phase Down Plan for military personnel, effective 21 June. By 30 June, 7,126 of the 19,246 (37 percent) of the refugee population had been placed in American society.27

Civil Affairs Operational Summary

Following the arrival of the last scheduled flight of incoming Cuban refugees on 18 May, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, which was primarily responsible for center support operations, reorganized its operations as reflected in Chart 6. This basic organization remained in effect until the end of June, when the Emergency Operations Center, the U.S. Marshals Service, and mess liaison officers, holding area, and intermediate processing teams were no longer needed. At that point in time, full effort was being devoted to outplacing as many Cuban refugees as fast as possible. By mid-July, sufficient progress had been made in the outplacement process so as to permit the closing down of Neighborhoods #3 and #4. Within the refugee housing enclave, the processing procedure and the day-to-day activities began to achieve a consistent degree of regularity. Each of the Neighborhood's leadership chains were well established and functioned efficiently. In the beginning, the civil affairs battalion selected the refugee leaders, but as these refugee leaders departed Fort Chaffee to enter American society, their replacements, for better or for worse, were elected by their peers. Military and refugee leadership conducted daily meetings and, between them, they were responsible for ensuring that the Cuban refugees were properly fed, clothed, and processed. In addition, they established and operated Neighborhood supply centers, supervised mess line order and the distribution of mail, ensured that the refugees received proper medical attention, conducted police calls, regular census counts, distributed newspapers, and inspected the barracks for cleanliness. In effect, each

Neighborhood leader acted as the mayor of a town of some 5,000 inhabitants. 28

Another important facet of center operation from the perception of the Cuban refugees was the establishment and implementation of a recreation program. Military personnel from Fort Sill initially operated this program, but by mid-June the Federal Emergency Management Agency assumed responsibility. This program encompassed sewing centers, athletic issue centers, art centers, television viewing rooms, a library, a music center, boxing clinics, movies, and sports contests. English language classes began in mid-June. To meet the demands of the Cuban refugee families, the program provided day care centers, nurseries, and baby care centers. This program combatted boredom and assisted many of the refugees through their transitional passage to American lifestyles. An additional and productive outlet for idle hands came about through the establishment of a refugee self-help program which was coordinated by the Fort Chaffee Directorate of Facilities and Engineering. Through this program, interested refugees carried out such small projects as constructing bleachers, building picnic tables, and scraping old paint from barracks buildings. Contractor-operated dining facilities employed some 350 refugees; over 180 worked in the neighborhood supply rooms; 20 were used in publishing the center's Spanish language newspaper; and 15 were employed in center operations as receptionists, clerks, and draftsmen. 29

**Consolidation Operations**

During the month of June, the Task Force Commander directed his staff to prepare a plan to consolidate the cantonment area once the Cuban refugee population dropped below the 10,000 level. By 3 July, the number of refugees had decreased to 10,500 out of an original population of 19,246. Projections based on Voluntary Agency outplacement trends indicated that, by 5 July (the desired implementation date), the Cuban refugee alien population would fall below the 10,000 mark. The purpose of this consolidation was two-fold. First, a consolidated cantonment area would reduce the total cost of Task Force operations by decreasing the size of the security force required for guard duty as well as the number of dining facilities, child care centers, and the other support facilities which were originally established for the much larger original population. Second, the consolidation, if carried out according to plan, would provide an atmosphere more conducive to family living by separating families from single adults. It was also planned that refugee families would be further subdivided into those with and without children. The friction that existed between single adults and families, particularly during meal hours, posed a constant source of turbulence within the refugee community. 30

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29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., p. III-III-B-1.
The Task Force Commander requested that the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion prepare an appropriate Letter of Instruction (LOI) for the consolidation operation. After securing approval from the Task Force Commander, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion issued the initial Letter of Instruction on 3 July with an implementation date of 5 July. This consolidation plan met with a cool reception from refugee representatives as well as block leaders who were briefed prior to the planned start of the operations. Due to some scheduling conflicts within the area to be cleared and a request from the refugee leaders for more time to inform the population, the Task Force Commander delayed the starting date to 7 July and published a new Letter of Instruction. Both military and refugee leaders used this additional time to inform the restless refugee population of the details of the relocation program. This was accomplished in part by the publication of an informative article in the camp newspaper "La Vida Neve" on 8 July and through the airing of special Spanish-language broadcasts explaining the program over the center's radio station.31

The consolidation and reduction of the cantonment area began in earnest on the morning of 8 July. From each building where the refugees were being required to move, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (which had been assigned the primary responsibility for the actual relocation of the refugees) encountered peaceful resistance to the move. As groups of single adults or families were separated from one another, the Civil Affairs personnel succeeded in persuading the occupants to vacate the buildings. However, they did encounter several minor problems. These included family status, marriage status, location status, and lack of satisfaction with the new consolidated living arrangements. As each legitimate family was approached to move, as many as fifteen to twenty people claiming to be members of that family attempted to move with them. Civil Affairs personnel finally ruled that only maternal or immediate members of a family would be relocated into the family's new cantonment area. As single adults were approached for relocation (both male and female), many of them claimed to be married to another refugee living in the same barracks. Many of these claims were difficult to verify, but using the census information that was furnished during the initial phase of the resettlement operation, each claim was investigated. In an attempt to avoid relocation, some refugees left their area in hopes that if they could not be found, they would not be relocated. This brought up the question of what to do with their personal belongings. As each instance occurred, missing individual's belongings were packed up, tagged with the correct name (if known), and both old and new residence building numbers. Finally, several of the Cuban refugee families were not satisfied with the condition of their new barracks. In an effort to appease these refugee families who appeared to be genuinely concerned with this issue, arrangements were made for the family leaders to inspect their designated barracks prior to relocation. Attempts made to satisfy each concerned family in this respect were generally

31. Ibid.
successful. Those few family leaders who could not be satisfied were moved nevertheless and without incident. \(^{32}\)

On 9 July, the situation changed for the worse even though most of the resistance to relocation was peaceful and quickly settled. There were a few instances where refugees had to be forced to leave their old and familiar accommodations and five refugees were arrested during the operations. Resistance to being moved was strong enough on the part of the refugees that the first element of the Military Police Reaction Force (20 personnel) had to be called out. Reaction Force responsibilities included preventing refugee crowds from gathering around the buildings being cleared and keeping other refugees from entering the building where the occupants were being moved. As each refugee was identified for refusing to cooperate, he was brought to the attention of the U.S. Park Police force which had the responsibility for the actual arrest and the filing of charges. The deployment of the initial contingent of the Military Police Reaction Force also served to demonstrate to the Cuban refugees that the Task Force Commander was determined to effect the consolidation, as ordered, in the most expeditious manner possible. Approximately 25 percent of the consolidation was completed by the end of the day. \(^{33}\)

The early phases of the consolidation operation conducted on 10 July were closely patterned after the sequence of events encountered during the previous day. The Reaction Force was called out once again and the U.S. Park Police made seven refugee arrests for unlawful trespassing. The remaining refugees quickly recognized during this third day of consolidation operations that the buildings earmarked for clearing would be emptied no matter what type of resistance was applied. Consequently, by the end of the day many refugees were observed moving not only themselves, but were helping other refugees to move as well. Approximately 65 percent of the 3,000 refugees requiring consolidation were moved out by the end of the day. The final consolidation operations conducted on 11 and 12 July were completed with no enforcement problems. By noon on 12 July, the 3,000 refugees had been relocated. \(^{34}\)

Due to the sensitive nature of this consolidation program, special security precautions had to be devised and put into effect prior to the start of the program. Because of the negative reaction to the program on the part of the Cubans, the Task Force Commander was well aware that there was a distinct possibility of individual conflicts blossoming into widespread turmoil. He directed his Staff Provost Marshal to plan for and to execute all security aspects of the program. In compliance, the Provost Marshal stationed a contingent of twelve Military Police in the area of each building as it was cleared. The Military Police assumed

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\(^{32}\) Ibid., p. III-III-B-2.

\(^{33}\) Ibid., p. III-III-B-2.

\(^{34}\) Ibid., pp. III-III-B-2 and III-III-B-3.
TASK FORCE ENCLAVE PATROL PLAN
1 JUNE 1980

CHART 7

TASK FORCE III
21 June 1980

TF CDR
Dep CDR
XO

S-1
S-3
Opnrs Ctr

Shift Ldrs
S-4

60-MAN UNIT
60-MAN UNIT

responsibility for refugee crowd control, the eviction of uncooperative refugee residents, and for the certainty that once refugee residents were cleared from their old domiciles, they were not permitted to sneak back inside. As each departure bus filled with transferring Cubans, it was escorted by Military Police to its destination. Upon arrival at the designated destination, the accompanying Military Police escort stayed with the busload of refugees until they and their belongings were inside the new residence.35

The U.S. Park Police provided an on-site liaison officer to assist Military Police personnel engaged in the consolidation operation. As the Military Police identified disorderly Cuban refugees, the liaison officer summoned other U.S. Park Police officers who were responsible for the actual arrest and booking procedures. Military Police Reaction Forces were prepositioned at strategic locations near the area of operations in the event isolated conflicts spread. These reaction forces consisted of a 20-man Reaction Force and a 40-man Backup Reaction Force. In addition, the Task Force III Reaction Force (discussed below) was placed in a state of increased readiness. In summary, the 20-personnel Military Police Reaction Force was deployed on two occasions during the refugee consolidation operation to support clearing the barracks where more than a few Cuban residents refused to move. Special Military Police teams also patrolled the consolidation areas during the hours of darkness.36

Security Operations

The Fort Chaffee Task Force security program was a multi-faceted operation during this difficult phase of the overall operation. It depended upon trained security personnel from military and civilian law enforcement agencies and after the riot of 1 June, military combat soldiers. The division of duties among the military and civilian law enforcement personnel followed the boundaries of the Cuban refugee enclave. The civilian law enforcement agencies exercised jurisdiction inside the enclave. The military security forces, while still being responsible for the overall protection of the installation and government property, exercised jurisdiction outside the enclave. Before the riot of 1 June, the primary mission of Task Force Military Police was to man the enclave perimeter and the gates to Fort Chaffee. Stationary guard posts were situated approximately 100 meters apart. The Military Police also maintained an immediate reaction platoon which was on call twenty-four hours a day. After the arrival of Task Force Collins following the riot, the Task Force Military Police began patrols inside the Cuban refugee alien enclave — four motorized and two walking patrols. (Map 2). Army combat units from Fort Sill comprised Task Force Collins (see Chart 5), which later was functionally organized as Task Force III (Chart 7). Task Force Collins was responsible for perimeter security and relieved the Task Force Chaffee Military Police of

35. Ibid., p. III-III-B-3.
36. Ibid.
TASK FORCE BADGE SYSTEM
21 MAY 1980

TASK FORCE
RESETTLEMENT OPERATION
FORT CHAFFEE

Bearer is authorized unlimited access to
refugee facilities.
Mishandling of this pass will result in
confiscation.
(See reverse side)

NO.__________
(brown)

TASK FORCE
RESETTLEMENT OPERATION
FORT CHAFFEE

The below named individual
is authorized access to the
Refugee cantonment area
From _______________________
To _______________________

By order of the
Task Force Commander:

HENRY J. SALICE
CPT, INF
Chief TF Security

NO.__________
(blue)

the requirement for an immediate reaction force. As Federal civilian agency law enforcement manpower increased, and they were able to assume more of the internal enclave security responsibilities, the Army forces were gradually phased down. As noted earlier, the Department of Defense changed its guidance on the limits of safety and security activities by Task Force military personnel due to the riot. The Task Force military personnel were then authorized to hold and detain any Cuban refugees attempting to depart their enclave, and to use the minimum physical force necessary. The term "minimum physical force necessary" excluded hitting a refugee about the head or shoulders. These holding and detention authorizations also applied to the maintenance of camp discipline and the protection of government property.37

Personnel badges permitting access to the Cuban refugee enclave were divided into three major categories. A Brown Pass provided for permanent and unlimited access to the enclave. Specifically, it permitted permanent access into the refugee cantonment restricted area on a continuous basis for personnel (both military and civilian) whose duties required routine entry and exit. The recipient's name was printed on the reverse and misuse of the badge could result in its confiscation (Chart 8). A Dark Green Pass (not shown) was similar in nature to the Brown Pass but provided for permanent limited access. This badge permitted permanent access into the refugee cantonment restricted area support facilities such as the dining halls, medical clinics, and other processing centers on a continuous basis for military and civilian personnel whose duties required routine daily presence in these areas. The recipient's name, work area, and building number were printed on the reverse. A Blue Pass provided for temporary, unlimited access. This badge permitted temporary 24-hour or less entry into the refugee cantonment area on a one-time basis for military and civilian personnel whose duties required unlimited access. These passes were issued to individuals as needed. Used passes had to be returned to the Provost Marshal's Office after use.38

Termination of Operations

In hindsight, the period 15 July to 5 August actually represented a termination of the operations segment of the Throughput Phase. It began with the assumption of operational control of the Fort Chaffee Refugee Processing Center resettlement operation by the Department of State on 15 July and terminated with the announcement by the White House on 5 August that the Fort Chaffee Refugee Processing Center had been selected to be the nation's one and only Consolidated Refugee Processing Center. Following the Department of State assumption of operational control on 15 July, the Task Force Commander continued his program of security improvements brought about by the 1 June riot and the steadily diminishing Cuban refugee population. On 20 July, for instance, he converted

37. Ibid., p. III-IV-1.
38. Ibid., p. III-IV-C-1.
the Holding Area to a Detention Area for trouble makers and escapes and
also established a Protective Custody Compound. This latter area was
located apart from the Detention Area. During the period 30 July to
2 August, the Task Force Commander reduced the refugee camp area
still further. In the meantime, on 25 July, White House officials re-
quested Governor Clinton's approval to use Fort Chaffee as the consoli-
dation center for all Cuban refugees in the United States. Three days
later, Governor Clinton told Federal officials that he disapproved of
using Fort Chaffee as a consolidated center. Needless to say, Governor
Clinton enjoyed strong public support in this matter. On the following
day (29 July), however, the Hon. Dr. Robert H. Spiro, Jr., Under Secre-
tary of the Army, accompanied by other key Department of the Army and
Department of State officials, visited Fort Chaffee to analyze its
possible use as a consolidated Cuban refugee processing center. Major
considerations included the overall savings which consolidation would
bring; the avoidance of heavy winterization costs if the Fort Indiantown
Gap and Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Centers could be closed before
winter; and, hopefully, an increase in outplacement efficiency with a
consolidated operational center for the Voluntary Agencies. It was also
true that Cuban refugees still on hand at Fort Indiantown Gap and Fort
McCoy would be more comfortable at Fort Chaffee because of its more tem-
perate climate during the winter months. On 5 August, Mr. Eugene
Eidenberg, President Carter's Deputy Assistant for Intergovernmental
Affairs, announced that Fort Chaffee would be used as a consolidation
center.39

Summary

During the 90-day period of 7 May to 5 August 1980, the Fort Chaffee
Refugee Processing Center received and processed a total of 19,246 Cuban
refugee aliens. Until 15 July, the processing center came under the
operational control of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Effective 15 July, the Department of State assumed this responsibility
although the Federal Emergency Management Agency retained important
financial control responsibilities. Responding to orders received from
Headquarters, Department of the Army, which had been appointed as the
Executive Agent for the Defense Department to provide support to the
Refugee Processing Centers in the United States, FORSCOM established the
Fort Chaffee Task Force from personnel assets available at Fort Sill,
Okla., and other sources. The Task Force operated in support of the
center and its authorized expenditures were reimbursed by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency. By the end of July, the Voluntary Agencies
working in the center had managed to place 13,849, or 72 percent, of the
Cuban refugee aliens into American life. Task Force Active Army and
Reserve Component personnel played a key role in support of the overall
operation, a role which was, from time to time, made more difficult by
jurisdictional disputes and a series of refugee demonstrations during
the latter part of May which culminated in a riot on 1 June. As noted
above, by the end of July the refugee population had been substantially

reduced, the cantonment area had been consolidated, and day-to-day operations by FORSCOM Task Force personnel had become more efficient and routine in nature. It was at this point that the decision was made and announced at the White House level on 5 August that the Fort Chaffee Refugee Processing Center would become the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Refugee Processing Center and would receive residual and hard to place Cuban refugees from the other Refugee Processing Centers (Eglin Air Force Base, Fort Indiantown Gap, and Fort McCoy). FORSCOM's Task Force Chaffee had already spent $21.7 million in support of the Cuban refugee alien processing center operation by this time and was engaged in the reimbursement process with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, using the special staff agency established for this purpose by FORSCOM and the Army at Fort George G. Meade, Md., the site of First U.S. Army headquarters. 40

TASK FORCE - FORT INDIANTOWN GAP
AS OF 24 MAY 1980

Chapter III

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Planning and Preparation 8 May - 8 June 1980

Background

As indicated earlier, the Fort Chaffee Refugee Processing Center, the first of the FORSCOM-operated Cuban refugee support centers, became operational on 7 May 1980. On the following day, FORSCOM informed First U.S. Army that it was considering Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa., as an additional location for the processing of Cuban refugees. Responding to guidance from First U.S. Army, the Fort Indiantown Gap commander immediately set his staff to work on preliminary planning based on operations conducted at the installation in support of the Vietnamese refugees in 1975. On 11 May 1980, FORSCOM issued the formal execution order and designated Brig. Gen. Orail L. Brookeh, Assistant Division Commander, 4th Infantry Division (Mech), Fort Carson, Colo., as the Task Force Commander. FORSCOM then directed First U.S. Army to provide staff augmentation to the Task Force and supporting units to include the 92d Engineer Battalion (-), Fort Stewart, Ga.; the 42d Field Hospital, Fort Knox, Ky.; the 519th MP Battalion, Fort George G. Meade, Md.; the 382d Adjutant General Personnel Services Company, Fort Devens, Mass.; the 548th Supply and Service Battalion, Fort McClellan, Ala.; and the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion, Fort Bragg, N.C. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) designated Mr. Robert Adamek as its coordinator with overall responsibility for the Cuban refugee operation. On 13 May, General Brookeh and Mr. Adamek provided initial guidance and policies for organizing and establishing the Task Force. Cuban refugee transportation (buses) and subsistence contracts were settled on the following day. Preparations were well underway when the first Cuban refugee flight (325 persons) arrived at the Harrisburg, Pa., International Airport on 18 May. Due to the press of events, planning and preparation continued during the arrival phase until 24 May when the maximum potential capacity of 19,000 refugees was reached. The actual refugee population on that date was 10,209. At no time during the arrival phase was the incoming Cuban refugee population adversely affected by the ongoing planning and preparations. (Chart 9).

Initial Processing

As the Cuban refugees arrived at the Harrisburg International Airport, they proceeded by bus to the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Processing Center for initial screening and processing and assignment to billeting areas. The Task Force billeted families, unaccompanied females, and juveniles, approximately 38 percent of the total arrivals, in

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areas geographically separated from unaccompanied males. The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service established and operated a Detention Center. The Cuban refugee compounds at the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Processing Center consisted of six separate enclaves, centrally located within the installation, and one detention enclave located near the outer perimeter. Fort Indiantown Gap did not enjoy perimeter fencing and was an open post. Cuban refugee facilities were World War II billets, two story, frame buildings. Barriers surrounding each enclave consisted of wooden barricades (saw horses) with rope and engineer tape strung to form a perimeter. However, the Detention Center, "Delta House," was surrounded by a ten foot high chain link fence with barbed and concertina wire on top. The Military Police controlled access to the enclaves. Immigration and Naturalization Service personnel, U.S. Marshals, Park Police (deputized U.S. Marshals) and military Civil Affairs personnel from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, Fort Bragg, N.C., provided security within each of the enclaves. Military Police, Immigration and Naturalization Service personnel, Park Police, U.S. Marshals, and Pennsylvania State Police, provided security outside of the enclaves. Emergency services were provided by the Fort Indiantown Gap Fire Department augmented by the 369th Engineer Detachment (USAR), the 42d Field Hospital, medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) capabilities, the Fort Indiantown Gap Dispensary, and surrounding civilian hospitals.

Task Force Organization

Upon assumption of command on 12 May, General Brookshire designated the Fort Indiantown Gap staff as the principal staff, with the garrison staff commander, Col. Joseph J. Scott, as the Deputy Task Force Commander, and Col. Cleveland Corbett (Headquarters, First U.S. Army) as the Task Force Chief of Staff, the garrison deputy commander, Lt. Col. Vernon L. Clark, Task Force Headquarters Commandant, and Sergeant Major Enrique Perez (Headquarters, First U.S. Army), as the Command Sergeant Major. The garrison Director of Plans, Training, and Security moved into and continued to operate the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in the Task Force Headquarters building. Garrison staff agencies with full-time EOC representation during the Planning and Preparation Phase included the Director of Personnel and Community Affairs (military personnel and Cuban refugee inprocessing), Director of Facilities and Engineering (engineers), Director of Industrial Operations (logistics and maintenance), Civil Affairs (camp management), and the Director of Plans, Training, and Security (operations and security). The supporting units were under the operational control of the directorate or activity with staff responsibility for their respective functions, with the exception of the 42d Field Hospital, the Civil Affairs Battalion (Provisional), and the 519th Military Police Battalion.

Specifically, the Director of Industrial Operations was responsible for the reception of the Cuban refugees at the Harrisburg International Airport (25 miles southwest of the installation). The "Reception Group" included security and control elements furnished by the Military Police and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, medical personnel from the 42d Field Hospital, interpreters, U.S. Air Force liaison personnel, and support facility personnel (Pennsylvania Air National Guard). The
incoming Cuban refugees were moved directly from the chartered aircraft to chartered busses and moved to the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Processing Center escorted by Military Police and Immigration and Naturalization Service personnel. Headcounts were taken as the Cuban refugees exited the aircraft, boarded the busses, and once again before the busses departed for the Refugee Processing Center.

As noted earlier, the Director of Personnel and Community Affairs was responsible for the Cuban refugee inprocessing center and holding area. The 22d U.S. Prisoner of War/Civil Internee Information Center (Branch) was placed under the operational control of the director to assist in the inprocessing function. Inprocessing included completion of required Immigration and Naturalization forms, issuance of photo-identification and meal cards, assignments of billets, and initial medical screening. Cuban refugees processed per hour averaged 122. All inprocessing was completed by 31 May. The Cuban refugee outprocessing function was the responsibility of the State Department, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Voluntary Agencies (VOLAGS) under the overall supervision of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

The Provisional Support Units of the Civil Affairs Battalion was responsible for the internal management of the Cuban refugee enclaves. Management responsibilities included maintaining accountability for the Cuban refugees; providing a command and control element for the enclave; issuing bedding, clothing, and the like; coordinating refugee processing with the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS); establishing recreation programs and information programs; and managing all refugee daily functions with other agencies. The Task Force Provost Marshal (Commander, 519th MP Battalion) was responsible for perimeter and installation security. He also provided backup assistance to other Federal law enforcement agencies when required. Finally, the appropriate installation directorate provided installation support functions. For example, the Management Information Systems Office (MISO) provided an automated data processing system for Cuban refugee data; the Civilian Personnel Office hired temporary civilian employees for Task Force support; and the Director of Industrial Operations was the representative for chartered bus transportation and the contractor-operated mess operations.

In summary, during the period 18 through 31 May, the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Processing Center received and processed 19,093 Cuban refugees (increased on 7 June to 19,094 with the arrival of the son of a critically ill refugee), more than filling the center to its planned capacity of 19,000. A total of sixty-nine scheduled Cuban refugee flights arrived at the Harrisburg International Airport during the period. Of the total Cuban refugee population of 19,094, 2 percent were unaccompanied juveniles, 4 percent were unaccompanied females, 32 percent were families, while the remaining 62 percent were unaccompanied males. (Map 3). A total of 25 Cuban refugees had been resettled with their sponsors and 78 had been transferred as criminals to various Federal correctional institutions. As of 31 May, FORSCOM obligations in support of the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Processing Center amounted to $3,603,400, while the dollar value of the 181 contracts awarded amounted
TABLE 4

HARRISBURG INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL STATISTICS

Total number of refugee flights - 69
Total number of refugees - 19,094 a
Average number of flights per day - 5
Average number of refugees per flight - 277

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>NUMBER OF FLIGHTS</th>
<th>NUMBER OF PASSENGERS</th>
<th>TOTAL ARRIVALS AT FTIG</th>
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<tr>
<td>18 May 80</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>325</td>
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<td>19 May 80</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>7 Jun 80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19094</td>
</tr>
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</table>

a. Includes one (1) refugee transferred from Ft Chaffee, 7 Jun 80.

to $5,993,000. All expenditures were to be reimbursed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency. By 8 June, the date on which the Planning and Preparation Phase officially ended, obligations amounted to $4,870,000, while the dollar value of the 208 contracts awarded amounted to $6,334,500. On the same date, 408 Cuban refugees had been released to their sponsors and a total of 108 had been transferred to various Federal correctional institutions. (Table 4).

Joint Venture Environment

The Task Force operated within a joint venture environment which combined the efforts of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, as well as the Army National Guard, the Army Reserve, and the Air National Guard with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Department of State, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the Federal Protective Service (FPS), the American Red Cross (ARC), and the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM). Voluntary agencies included the Church World Service (CWS), the International Rescue Commission (IRC), the U.S. Catholic Conference (USCC), the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service (LIERS), the World Relief (WR) organization, and the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society. The Task Force commander reported through the FORSCOM mobilization chain of command consisting of Headquarters, First U.S. Army, Fort George G. Meade, Md., Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Command, and Headquarters, Department of the Army. The Deputy Task Force commander, the Commanding Officer of Fort Indiantown Gap, continued to report directly to Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Command, on installation matters. On 16 May, FORSCOM further clarified these command relationships. FORSCOM placed the Task Force and Fort Indiantown Gap installation under the operational control (OPCON) of First U.S. Army for refugee operations only, the Task Force responsible for coordinating with the local Federal Emergency Management Agency representative to determine necessary support -- to be reimbursed at a later date -- and to pass the requirements thus arrived at through First U.S. Army to U.S. Army Forces Command. The Arrival Airfield Control Group (AACG) provided reception, control, and medical aid at the Harrisburg International Airport. The U.S. Military Airlift Command (MAC) element at Key West, Fla., reported flights and passenger information to the Arrival Airlift Control Group. The Arrival Airlift Control Group verified the passenger count and passed the information on to the Task Force Emergency Operations Center (EOC). Charter buses (Capitol Trailways) were then used to transport the Cuban refugees to the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Processing Center.

Department of Defense Military Unit Support

During the planning and preparation phase (8 May to 8 June 1980) Department of Defense military units in support of the Task Force included Army Active and Reserve Component units and U.S. Marine Corps units. These were categorized by the Task Force commander as Task Force Asset Units, Task Force Civil Affairs and Personnel Services Units, and Task Force Military Police Units.

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Task Force Asset Units. Task Force Asset Units during the planning and preparation phase consisted of the following organizations with their arrival, strength, and departure dates. Their mission was to activate and operate a Refugee Center at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, capable of receiving and processing 18,000 to 20,000 Cuban refugees.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arrival Date</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Departure Date</th>
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<td>92d Engineer Battalion</td>
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<td>24 May 80</td>
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<tr>
<td>14 May 80</td>
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<td>514th Maintenance Company (-)</td>
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<td>2 Jun 80</td>
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<tr>
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</table>

Task Force Civil Affairs Provisional Support Units. Task Force Civil Affairs Provisional Support Units during the planning and preparation phase consisted of the following organizations and their arrival, strength, and departure dates. Their mission was to receive, inprocess, house, and provide for the welfare of Cuban refugees arriving at Fort Indiantown Gap; to support Federal and civilian agencies in the processing of the refugees for resettlement; and to be prepared to order to ship to a consolidation facility on order those refugees without sponsors.

2. Ibid., p. 195.
3. Ibid., p. 197.
### Task Force Military Police Units

Task Force Military Police Units during the planning and preparation phase consisted of the following organizations and their arrival, strength, and departure dates. Their mission was to provide the external security for the portions of the installation dedicated to the Cuban refugees; to deny entry into the refugee compounds of those individuals whose presence was neither necessary nor desirable; to exclude the Cuban refugees from those areas of the installation where their presence was unwarranted or could constitute a hazard; to be prepared to enter the compounds in the event of a major disturbance and restore peace; to provide traffic control and crowd control in areas where personnel were channeled because of the relocation program; and to serve as a focal point for the coordination of activities of all security and control personnel supporting the operations.

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**Arrival Date | Unit | Strength | Departure Date**
---|---|---|---
12 May 80 | 96th Civil Affairs Battalion | 6 | |
17 May 80 | 416th Civil Affairs Company | 39 | 1 Jun 80 |
18 May 80 | 450th Civil Affairs Company | 11 | 1 Jun 80 |
18 May 80 | 354th Civil Affairs Brigade | 13 | 2 Jun 80 |
18 May 80 | 304th Civil Affairs Group | 10 | 31 May 80 |
26 May 80 | 402d Civil Affairs Company | 21 | |
27 May 80 | 478th Civil Affairs Company | 23 | |
28 May 80 | 4th Civil Affairs Group (USMC) | 13 | |
30 May 80 | 358th Civil Affairs Brigade | 43 | |
1 Jun 80 | 354th Civil Affairs Brigade | 17 | |
1 Jun 80 | 360th Adjutant General (Per Svcs) | 26 | |
2 Jun 80 | 353d Civil Affairs Command | 21 | |
6 Jun 80 | 358th Civil Affairs Brigade | 45 | |
7 Jun 80 | 4th Civil Affairs Group (USMC) | 11 | |

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1. Ibid., p. 200.
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<td>157th Military Police Company</td>
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<td>6 Jun 80</td>
<td>770th Military Police Company</td>
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<td>7 Jun 80</td>
<td>65th Military Police Company</td>
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**Special Areas of Concern**

During the period 18 May through 15 October 1980, the Fort Indian- town Gap Refugee Processing Center played host to 19,094 Cuban refugees. The overall success of the operation clearly illustrated the ability of the Active and Reserve Components of the Army to care for large groups of people on short notice. It also illustrated, on the other hand, major problem areas in the decision making process at the higher levels of the Federal Government -- despite the fact that similar refugee processing operations had occurred before in the not too distant past and would most likely occur once again in this troubled world. The weaknesses revealed by this operation from its very beginning, should be addressed and corrected before the next major wave of illegal immigrants reached the point where Department of Defense resources were required to control it. While many problem areas were identified and resolved, four areas in particular plagued the Task Force throughout the operation. These included the legal authority of the Federal agencies over refugee aliens; the disposition of criminals; the disposition of mental patients; and the care and control of unaccompanied juveniles (under 18 and not accompanied by an adult family member).

**Legal Authority of Federal Agencies Over Aliens.** Fort Indiantown Gap, a semi-active installation assigned to the U.S. Army Forces Command, presented special problems as a refugee processing center because it was located on land leased by the Federal Government, and the primary law enforcement responsibility for civilians on the installation continued...
to remain with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. When local law en-
forcement agencies and the local prosecutor's office were faced with the
possibility of prosecuting in their courts numerous Cuban refugees for
crimes against each other and confining those found guilty and sentenced
accordingly in their jails at local taxpayer expense, they stated that
they were not interested in prosecuting such crimes. Despite the fact
that the Federal Government had contracted for dedicated Pennsylvania
State Police support and notwithstanding the complete cooperation of the
local State Police Troop Commander, no satisfactory system evolved to
punish the Cuban refugees for crimes against each other. Legal restric-
tions and departmental interpretation of legal restrictions caused a
complicated situation as to who had authority and responsibility in a
wide range of cases. The system worked as well as it did only because
of the cooperation and determination on the part of the heads of the
local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies. The problem remain-
ed unresolved at the departmental level when the Task Force terminated
on 15 October 1980.

Disposition of Criminals. Relative to the jurisdictional problem
discussed above, but separate and distinct, was the problem of the
disposition of criminals. When it had become obvious that criminals and
other social undesirables had been included in the Cuban exodus from
Mariel, the Task Force immediately initiated strong efforts to protect
the remainder of the Cuban refugee population from the crimes of these
people. Additionally, the Task Force expended considerable effort to
prevent the unauthorized departure from Fort Indiantown Gap of all of
the Cuban refugees, but especially to prevent the commission of criminal
acts by the Cuban refugees in the already apprehensive civilian com-
munities surrounding the installation. While many Cuban refugee criminal
types were identified at the center during the initial Immigration and
Naturalization Service screening process, and those not identified in
this fashion began to surface through crimes committed in the center
itself, no commensurate or responsive mechanism existed for confining
them away from the general Cuban refugee population. The normal course
of action taken was to confine them for a few days in the small Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service detention facility (Della House) and
then to release them back into the general refugee population where they
were free to commit more crimes and to avenge themselves on those fellow
Cuban refugees who had identified them as law breakers. During the
overall processing period 389 Cuban refugees were transferred to Federal
Correctional Institutions for various infractions committed in the
United States or because of their criminal records in Cuba. It was the
view of the Task Force Commander that hundreds more should have been
similarly transferred at the first indication of their true character.
Further, over 100 of those transferred were as a direct result of disor-
ders that broke out in the center which were caused in part by the fact
that criminal and other unruly elements could not be removed from the
general Cuban refugee population. As of the end of the operation on
15 October 1980, no procedures had been developed to correct this seri-
ous problem.

Disposition of Mental Patients. It also became obvious that the
Cuban refugee population contained some individuals with severe mental
health problems. The Department of Health and Human Services was primarily responsible for the treatment and care of these mental cases. The very presence of these mentally disturbed Cuban refugees in the general population caused serious problems for all who dealt directly with the overall refugee population. The mental cases, not surprisingly, were particularly prominent in disturbances, crimes, and other disruptions to orderly center routine. Stressful conditions within the center contributed to the further deterioration of the mental and emotional condition of both the severe cases as well as those with lesser mental problems. Removal of this disruptive element from the Cuban refugee population proved to be a most formidable task. While acknowledging that the mental cases were indeed disruptive and an ongoing danger to both themselves and the general refugee population, the Department of Health and Human Services developed no satisfactory solution to this pressing problem. It continued to conduct treatment on an outpatient basis with the primary objective of keeping the mental cases quiet to prevent them from causing trouble. Indeed, to the very end of the operation, certified mental cases that should have been hospitalized were retained at the center under inadequate conditions.

Care and Control of Unaccompanied Juveniles. Although unaccompanied juveniles represented about 2 percent of the center's refugee population they caused problems all out of proportion to their small numbers. For example, at one stage in the processing operation, 40 percent of the off-post crimes known to have been committed by Cuban refugees were committed by unaccompanied juveniles. Legal restrictions prevented the release of the Cuban refugee juveniles to family members other than parents. While this ruling was supposedly in the best interest of these juveniles, other actions taken to solve their many problems were not immediately forthcoming. In the latter stages of the operations, all juveniles were segregated from the general refugee population and a last minute attempt was made to provide them with better educational and recreational facilities, but the basic problem, the inability to obtain their release to sponsors, was not solved at the departmental level until the Cuban refugee consolidation began at Fort Chaffee in late September. Agreements between state government officials and the local Federal camp administrator did succeed in freeing some of the juveniles earlier, but the Cuban juveniles who left the center prior to late September left for confinement in a juvenile correctional institution.5

General Observations

In addition to the special areas of concern discussed above, the Task Force commander commented upon an additional number of topics which he deemed worthy of attention. They included such items as non-sponsorable refugees; the responsiveness of Fort Indiantown Gap to a mobilization situation; the quality of response by Reserve Component units and individuals; and the counterproductive role of the media.

5. Ibid., pp. 203 - 04.
Non-sponsorable Cuban Refugees. As the content of the Cuban refugee population became better known, it was obvious that a "residual" composed of individuals who could not or should not be sponsored would remain and would have to be cared for. The potential for this residual was not immediately acknowledged by the Federal civilian agencies. Consequently, decisions for the long-term institutional care (or deportation) of these individuals were not initiated until the consolidation of the remaining refugees at Fort Chaffee forced the issue. While a small number of the residual Cuban refugees had been placed in a number of institutions by the closing of Fort Indiantown Gap, the greater majority was transferred to Fort Chaffee. Estimates of the size of this group of non-sponsorables thus transferred ranged from 183 to approximately 1,500.

Responsiveness of Fort Indiantown Gap to a Mobilization Situation. The Cuban refugee processing operation provided a realistic opportunity to test the responsiveness of Fort Indiantown Gap to a mobilization situation. The Task Force commander concluded that the responsiveness of the installation was outstanding. Within six days after notification, the post was fully prepared to receive, process, house, and support 19,000 refugees. General Brookshire noted especially the experience, skill, and dedication of the Government civilian staff at the installation. He observed that military units from other posts were unanimous in their appraisal of Fort Indiantown Gap's staff as the most responsive they had ever encountered.

Quality of Responsiveness of Reserve Component Units and Individuals. The Cuban refugee processing operation also provided the opportunity for an evaluation of the quality of participating Reserve Component units and individuals. The thirteen Army National Guard and three Army Reserve Military Police units which supplemented the security force during the operation demonstrated a high state of discipline and all of the skills necessary to perform a security-type mission. However, the Task Force commander noted that the units' support of his mission was in lieu of their two weeks annual training. Because of their high state of readiness and their language ability, the three Puerto Rican Army National Guard Military Police units, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 124th Military Police Battalion, 480th Military Police Company, and the 770th Military Police Company were especially effective. On 5 August, when disturbances occurred in two different enclaves within the center, the Task Force commander felt compelled to request assistance from the 2d Brigade of the 28th Infantry Division, Pennsylvania Army National Guard, then conducting annual training at Fort Indiantown Gap. Four battalions of this brigade were quickly assembled from a deployed field training location, returned to the cantonment area, and deployed around Enclaves 3 and 4 in two-battalion strength by nightfall. The responsiveness of the brigade's command structure and the discipline of its soldiers were particularly noteworthy. The performance of individual reservists ranged from outstanding to unsatisfactory. For the first two months of the operation, Reserve civil affairs personnel, augmented by reservists from other branches, operated the seven Cuban refugee enclaves of the Refugee Processing Center. According to the Task Force commander, their overall performance was more than
satisfactory. Individual reservists whose performance was less than satisfactory were replaced. The most serious drawback to the use of reservists was the necessity for changing area commanders every two weeks. Knowledge of the Cuban refugee population was lost and old lessons had to be relearned. This problem was finally solved by using a cadre of Active Army officers and soldiers augmented by reservists.

Operation of Support Installation
9 June - 28 September 1980

Background

In his after action report covering the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Processing Center, General Brookshire designated the period 9 June through 28 September 1980 as the "Operation of Support Installation" phase. From the beginning of this period through 14 July, the Federal Emergency Management Agency continued to exercise full operational control over the other Federal Civilian Agencies, the Voluntary Agencies, and those contractors such as food service who were engaged in the processing, outplacing, and, where necessary, the transfer of the Cuban refugees to other Federal Correctional or Medical Institutions. On 15 July, the Department of State assumed this mission for the remainder of the period. The Federal Emergency Management Agency, however, continued to control the purse strings for the operation. This control extended to the Task Force and Fort Indiantown Gap installation support activities in the form of reimbursement for allowable costs incurred in the performance of their support mission. The period in question was essentially devoted to outplacing the refugees, a task which became increasingly difficult due to media exploitation and a major refugee disturbance on 5 August. The outplacement of the refugees into American society was accomplished by the Voluntary Agencies but in some individual cases, outplacement could not be accomplished. This residual Cuban refugee population had to be transferred to a warmer location before the advent of winter. On 5 August, the Joint Cuban-Haitian Task Force chose Fort Chaffee, Ark., as the consolidation center.

Resettlement Operations, June 1980

From the beginning and through 8 June 1980, resettlement operations were generally unsatisfactory due to internal procedural problems with the Department of State and the responsible Voluntary Agencies. Despite continued pressure from the Federal Coordinating Officer (Federal Emergency Management Agency until 14 July; Department of State thereafter), and the Task Force Commander and staffs, only 561 Cuban refugees had been resettled and 118 transferred to various Federal Correctional Institutions. During the remainder of the month, however, progress was made and by the end of the month a cumulative number of 6,293 Cuban refugees had been resettled and a cumulative number of 163 Cuban refugees had been transferred to various Federal Correctional institutions.

6.
Ibid., pp. 204 - 06.
This improvement was due to a steady refinement in internal outprocessing procedures and the increasing success of the Voluntary Agencies in finding sponsors. The daily resettlement figure rose from 177 during the first week of June to 371 by the last week of June. Unseasonably cool temperatures during most of the month continued to favor a low refugee incident rate.7

Resettlement Operations, July 1980

Resettlement operations fluctuated markedly during the month of July. On 6 July, for example, the largest number of Cuban refugees was resettled when 604 departed to join their sponsors. The average number of resettlements during the first week of July rose to 415 per day but by the end of the month it had declined sharply to 81 per day. As a matter of fact, even as the average number of daily resettlements rose to 415 during the first week of July, officials of the Refugee Processing Center were already aware of the fact that a substantial residual population of hard to place refugees was building up. For example, on 30 June the total number of Cuban refugees processed (cleared and sponsor identified) stood at 3,323 ready for departure. By 6 July, this figure had declined to 2,554 and, at that time, operating officials already anticipated a further decline as the population reached that number of Cuban refugees who would be more difficult to resettle since they had no family (sponsor) in the United States. Also, by this time, the daily average of those being processed had been steadily declining. This was a definite indicator of the total number of Cuban refugees who would require extra efforts for resettlement. The whole resettlement phase continued to be characterized during the remainder of the month of July by continued fluctuation in Cuban resettlements both daily and weekly. Daily placements ranged from 455 to 192 during the period 7 through 13 July. As of the latter date, 11,318 aliens had been resettled and 172 transferred to various Federal Correctional Institutions. The average daily resettlement rate at that time was 303 with a total of 2,122 having been resettled during that week. Operating officials still anticipated a period of sharp decline in the near future as the hard to place Cuban refugees became the majority at Fort Indiantown Gap. Although temperatures were at or above normal, the effect of seasonal temperatures had no significant impact on Cuban refugee alien incidents up to this point.8

During the latter half of July, the average daily resettlement rate dropped from 303 to 81. By the end of the month, approximately 13,752 Cuban refugees had been resettled and 182 had been transferred to various Federal Correctional Institutions. The processed category continued to decline, almost paralleling the decline in resettlement figures. On 31 July, the three FORSCOM Refugee Processing Center Commanders (Forts Chaffee, Indiantown Gap, and McCoy) attended a meeting at Headquarters,

7. Ibid., p. 75.
8. Ibid., pp. 75-76.
Department of the Army, to discuss plans for a consolidation facility for all residual Cuban refugees. Through the first week of July, the Cuban refugees at Fort Indiantown Gap had conducted themselves in a reasonably good fashion. They had engaged only in a few minor incidents involving small numbers of refugees apprehended outside of their designated areas. As the result of an interagency agreement reached on 11 June, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) assumed internal security responsibilities in the refugee enclaves, to include all law enforcement activities and patrolling. At the same time, representatives of the 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, Ky., reached an agreement with the Task Force staff making the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 503d Infantry available as a "GARDEN PLOT" Reaction Force in an on call status beginning on 20 June. This requirement was subsequently rescinded on 9 July.

By 5 July, however, the nature of refugee incidents began to change as the criminal element continued to emerge and naturally constituted a growing percentage of the rapidly shrinking overall refugee population. Their ascendency was facilitated by the jurisdictional situation which precluded effective punishment for violations of rules and regulations; the growing apprehension of those refugees in the center without relatives in the United States as to their ultimate fate; and, perhaps, the growing monotony of their daily existence and the negative aspects of fraternization. On 5 July, a small group of Cuban refugees were reported off the installation where they were charged with larceny and possession of a firearm. On 16 July, the Pennsylvania State Police apprehended a group of Cuban refugee aliens in nearby Ono, Pa. On 22 July, an incident of rape was reported in the Cuban refugee community as the single male population continued their efforts to get to the female population. Two days later, a group of Cuban refugees in detention status staged a successful breakout. The local civilian populace was becoming increasingly hostile to the Cuban refugees because of these widely reported incidents as well as other nationally publicized incidents concerning refugees at other Centers. Due to the sensitivity of the security issue, the Task Force Commander recommended to higher headquarters that increased Military Police support be furnished. On 25 July, the Task Force Provost Marshal received an anonymous threat of harm to the Cuban refugee population if action was not taken to control them. On 27 July, General Brookshire received a petition from the refugees stating that not all Cubans were troublemakers and that they realized that the unfavorable publicity some were causing would hurt future outplacement operations. It was during this period of gradually heightening tensions that the Department of State assumed responsibility for the operation and maintenance of the Refugee Processing Center from the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Mr. Harry T. Johnson assumed the position of Director on 15 July 1980.

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9. Ibid., pp. 5 - 7.
10. Ibid., pp. 7 - 8.
Outplacements during August were marred by a major internal disturbance on 5 August in the general Cuban refugee population as well as a major disturbance on 28 August by the Cuban criminal element which was being held in the Immigration and Naturalization Service Detention Facility in Area 1. These disturbances probably inhibited the steadily decreasing flow of outplacements but to an unknown degree. Possibly even more inhibiting from the viewpoint of the Voluntary Agencies was the announcement made by the Joint Cuban-Haitian Task Force in Washington on 5 August that Fort Chaffee, Ark., had been selected as the site of the Consolidated Refugee Processing Center for all residual Cuban refugees still resident in other Processing Centers. Once this announcement was made, Voluntary Agency outplacement personnel naturally began concentrating on those cases which could reasonably be outprocessed during the next few weeks and began preparing transfer files on those who represented residual hard to place cases (refugees without family or relatives in the United States). During the month of August, the daily resettlement figure declined from 81 to 35. By the end of August, 15,088 of the 19,094 Cuban refugees (79 percent) had been resettled. The cumulative number of criminals transferred to various Federal Correctional Institutions increased to 355.11

A number of increasingly serious security incidents occurred during the month of August. On 4 August a number of Cuban refugees were apprehended by local authorities for a break in at a local tavern. On 5 August, at about 0500 hours, Federal Protective Service officers were in the process of conducting a surprise barracks search for concealed weapons. During the search a confrontation occurred between the officers and the Cuban refugees in one of the barracks. The Cuban refugees accused the officer of manhandling a pregnant female refugee. Some 500 Cuban refugees then protested this action by proceeding to break into a dispensary, a supply room, and three dining facilities. A Military Police Reaction Force, provided by the 519th MP Battalion, assisted by an element of the 82d Airborne Division (B Co, 1st Battalion (Airborne), 325th Infantry), assigned at that time to Fort Indiantown Gap to provide Annual Training Support for the Reserve Components, and the 2d Brigade, 28th Infantry Division, Pennsylvania Army National Guard, then conducting Annual Training at the post, quelled the riot. As a result of the 5 August disturbance, FORSCOM directed the XVIII Airborne Corps Commander on 6 August to provide a direct reaction force (DRF) to the Task Force Commander for the duration of the Cuban resettlement operation. The XVIII Airborne Corps Commander directed the 82d Airborne Division to deploy a battalion to Fort Indiantown Gap that same day. The 82d Airborne Division selected the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 504th Infantry, which arrived on site on 6 August. On 8 August, the Pennsylvania Army National Guard units federalized during the 5 August disturbance were released from active duty. And, on the same date, the 503d Military Police Battalion, originally scheduled to arrive in mid-August, arrived

11. Ibid., pp. 9 - 10; 76 - 77.
CUBAN REFUGEE ALIEN COMPOUNDS -- 5 AUGUST 1980
RIOR SITUATION POPULATION, 5,006
on the scene, thus permitting the 519th Military Police Battalion to return to its home station on 10 August. Injuries incurred during this disturbance were, for the most part, minimal in nature. However, there was one fatality — one of the Cuban refugees received massive head wounds during the disturbance and was promptly evacuated to Hershey Medical Center, Hershey, Pa., for treatment. He died there on 19 August. 12

During the following week, U.S. Marshals, Federal Protective Service, and Immigration and Naturalization Service personnel made several searches through Cuban refugee barracks which resulted in the confiscation of homemade weapons and government property stolen during the 5 August disturbance. On 18 August, the Task Force Commander and the FORSCOM Commander requested assistance from Headquarters, Department of the Army, concerning the apparent inability of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to transfer 80 criminals from its overcrowded Detention Facility to various Federal Correctional Institutions before another serious disturbance occurred. A disturbance did occur on 28 August in the facility, causing damage to buildings but no injuries to personnel. As a result of this disturbance and the obvious overcrowded conditions (the criminal population in detention now up to 84), the Immigration and Naturalization Service secured permission to transfer its detainees to various Federal Correctional Institutions. During the last week of August, Federal Civilian Agency security personnel conducted additional searches which resulted in the further confiscation of homemade weapons and stolen government property, as well as the detention of a number of Cuban refugees charged with inciting disturbances. In a supporting action, security personnel conducted an unannounced search of the juvenile area at the request of the Department of State, occasioned by two earlier superficial stabings. Based upon this search, eleven juveniles were held for further questioning. These developments all received publicity in local, regional, and even national media on occasion. Combined with similar occurrences at the other Refugee Processing Centers, this gave this latest wave of Cuban refugees a far less flattering overall reputation than the earlier Cuban refugees who fled Cuba shortly after Castro took over in 1959. 13

Resettlement Operations, September 1980

Outplacements fluctuated somewhat during September as officials of the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Processing Center completed their preparations for the transfer of the residual, hard core Cuban refugees to the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Refugee Processing Center during the period 6 through 9 October. During the first week of September, daily resettlement figures decreased from the 35 per day recorded during the last week of August to 21 per day. By the end of the second week,

12. (1) Ibid., pp. 9 - 10; 77; 195 - 96; and 201; (2) Msg 05174Z Aug 80, DA to Distr, subj: DOD Support to Cuban Refugees as of 051600 Aug EDT.
resettlement daily averages were up to 31 per day as the Voluntary Agencies mounted a last minute drive to clear up all pending cases prior to the actual transfer. At that point in time, the total cumulative resettlement figure reached 15,450 (81 percent) and the number of Cuban refugees transferred to various Federal Correctional Institutions reached 363. Cooler temperatures at night (lows in the 50's) kept refugee activity at a minimum and assisted from a psychological viewpoint in preparing the refugees for the forthcoming move to a warmer winter climate at Fort Chaffee. By 28 September the cumulative total resettlement figure had risen to 15,783 (83 percent) and the number of Cuban refugees transferred to various Federal Correctional Institutions rose to 371. Cool weather and rain plus a comparatively small Cuban refugee population all played a role in keeping refugee activity at a minimum.14

Department of Defense Military Unit Support

During the support installation phase of operations (9 June to 28 September) Department of Defense military units supporting the Task Force included Army Active and Reserve Component units and U.S. Marine Corps units. These were categorized by the Task Force commander as Task Force Asset Units, Task Force Civil Affairs and Provisional Support Units, and Task Force Military Police Units.

Task Force Asset Units. The mission of the Task Force Asset Units was to operate a Refugee Center at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, capable of processing 18,000 to 20,000 Cuban refugees. The important augmentation of these forces which occurred on and about 3 August resulted from the major disturbance which took place on that date involving the Cuban refugees. Task Force Asset Units during the operation of installation phase consisted of the following organizations and their arrival, strength, and departure dates:15

14. Ibid., pp. 77 - 78.
15. Ibid., pp. 195 - 196.
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**Task Force Civil Affairs Provisional Support Units.** The mission of the Task Force Civil Affairs Provisional Support Units was to receive, inprocess, house, and provide for the welfare of Cuban refugees arriving and living at Fort Indiantown Gap; to support Federal and civilian agencies in the processing of the Cuban refugees for resettlement; and to be prepared to ship refugees without sponsors to a consolidated facility when so directed. Task Force Civil Affairs Provisional Support Units during the operation of installation phase were as shown on Table 5.16

**Task Force Military Police Units.** The mission of the Task Force Military Police Units was to provide external security for portions of the installation dedicated for the Cuban refugees; to deny entry into the refugee compound of those individuals whose presence was neither

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necessary nor desirable; to exclude Cuban refugees from those areas of the installation where their presence was unwarranted or could constitute a hazard; to be prepared to enter the compounds in the event of a major disturbance and restore peace; to provide traffic control and crowd control in areas where personnel have been channeled because of the relocation program; and to serve as a focal point for the coordination of activities of all security and control personnel supporting the operation. Task Force Military Police Units during the operation of installation phase consisted of the following organizations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARRIVAL DATE</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>DEPARTURE DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Headquarters &amp; Headquarters Company, 160th Military Police Battalion</td>
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</table>

Termination of Operations
29 September - 15 October 1980

Background

The Refugee Processing Center officials at Fort Indiantown Gap announced on 2 October that a proposed flight schedule, beginning on

Ibid., pp. 201 - 202.
6 October, had been received from higher headquarters. This provided for the transfer of the residual Cuban refugee population from the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Processing Center to the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Refugee Processing Center. Upon the receipt of this final planning information, center officials were able to complete their transfer planning. Minor offenders being held in detention were immediately returned to the general Cuban refugee population for the move. Confirmed (or under investigation) hard core criminals were identified for transfer to various Federal Correctional Institutions. The authorities mounted an all out effort to institutionalize the criminals, the mentally ill, and the still unsponsored juveniles.

Transfer Operations

Those Cuban refugees scheduled to move on the first flights were notified to pack their belongings two days in advance. The day before actual departure, the Cuban refugees who had been manifested for departure boarded buses enroute to the staging area. Each Cuban refugee received a fact sheet (in Spanish) explaining movement procedures and Spanish speaking interpreters answered questions on the buses enroute to the staging area. In the meantime, Military Police and Federal Protective Service personnel cleared the newly vacated Cuban refugee housing for weapons, contraband, and possible holdouts and the barracks were then secured. As a line of barracks was emptied, the barrier perimeter and guard posts were moved forward to mark a smaller perimeter. At the staging area itself (part of Area 5), all possessions were inspected and packed and baggage claims were issued. Boxes holding all possessions were loaded on trucks which accompanied the bus convoy to the Harrisburg International Airport. On the day of departure, each Cuban refugee was positively identified by Immigration and Naturalization personnel. Department of Health and Human Services personnel made a final medical check and, finally, the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration manifested each Cuban refugee. All Cuban refugee files were packed and shipped to Fort Chaffee along with the transfer manifest. The Cuban refugees then boarded buses enroute to the same airport where they had arrived in Pennsylvania earlier in the year. Each bus unloaded its passengers at the aircraft ramp. The above strictly enforced procedures continued for four days (6 through 9 October 1980, inclusive). The Military Police, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Federal Protective Service, U.S. Marshals Service, the Federal Aviation Agency, and the Pennsylvania State Police provided security for the operation.18 (Map 5).

With the announcement of the flight scheduled on 2 October, and the determination that there would be no delay in transporting the residual Cuban refugee population to the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Refugee Processing Center, the Department of State and the Voluntary Agencies, as noted above, mounted a last minute aggressive resettlement effort. Daily resettlements showed an immediate, marked increase with 82 and 52

18. Ibid., pp. 12 and 169.
TABLE 6

HARRISBURG INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
AIRCRAFT DEPARTURE STATISTICS (FT CHAFFEE)

Total number of refugee flights - 10
Total number of refugees - 1,980
Average number of flights per day - 3
Average number of refugees per flight - 198

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>NUMBER OF FLIGHTS</th>
<th>NUMBER OF PASSENGERS</th>
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<td>626</td>
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### TABLE 7

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a. Includes 1,980 refugees transferred to Fort Chaffee.
b. Seven refugees unaccounted for at end of mission.

## TABLE 8

### WEEKLY MILITARY STRENGTH AVERAGES

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**SOURCE:** TF FIG ARR, App. 2 (Military Strength), pp. 2 - 5.
Cuban refugees resettled on 4 and 5 October, respectively. At that point, the cumulative total resettled was 16,056 (84 percent) and the number transferred to various Federal Correctional Institutions was 386. The continued cooler temperatures, especially at night, added favorably to psychological operations efforts as the Cuban refugees were told they would be soon heading south. Resettlement efforts continued at an increased rate while the chartered flights took the residual Cuban refugee population to the the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Refugee Processing Center. A total of 10 flights with 1,980 Cuban refugees departed Harrisburg International Airport for Fort Chaffee leaving a final residual population of 405 Cubans (32 mental patients, 12 criminals, 150 juveniles, 8 hospitalized, and 203 awaiting sponsorship). During the period 6 through 15 October, daily resettlements averaged 66, with a total of 662 resettled. The cumulative total resettled was 16,718. The cumulative number of prisoners transferred to various Federal Correctional Institutions was 389. One of the refugees transferred to a Federal Correctional Institution was a mental patient charged with the death of another Cuban refugee, who had died on 19 August from massive head injuries inflicted by the above mentioned mental patient during the 5 August disturbance. Seven Cuban refugee aliens remained unaccounted for at the end of the operation and their names were reported the proper authorities. (Tables 6 & 7).19

Department of Defense Military Unit Support

During the termination of operations phase (29 September to 15 October) Department of Defense military units provided in support of the Task Force included only Active Army units. They were categorized by the Task Force commander as Task Force Asset Units and Task Force Military Police Units. The last Civil Affairs Provisional Support Units departed Fort Indiantown Gap on 27 September 1980, two days before the commencement of the terminations of operations phase. (Table 8).

Task Force Asset Units. The principal mission of the Task Force Asset Units retained at Fort Indiantown Gap during the termination of operations phase was to provide support and security for the transfer of residual Cuban refugee aliens from the Fort Indiantown Refugee Processing Center to the newly established Fort Chaffee Consolidated Refugee Processing Center during the period 6 through 9 October and the final disposition of any remaining Cubans to various Federal Correctional Institutions, mental hospitals, juvenile homes, and other destinations. Active Army units which comprised the Task Force Asset Units were as follows:20

19. Ibid., pp. 169, 170, and 176.
20. Ibid., p. 196.

78
Task Force Military Police Units. The mission of the Task Force Military Police Units during the termination of operations phase was to continue (on a diminishing scale) to provide the external security for those portions of the installation dedicated to the Cuban refugees; to deny entry into the alien compounds of those individuals whose presence was neither necessary nor desirable; to exclude Cuban refugees from those areas of the installation where their presence was unwarranted or could constitute a hazard; to be prepared to enter the compounds in the event of a major disturbance and restore peace; to provide traffic control and crowd control in areas where personnel were channeled because of the relocation program; and to serve as a focal point for the coordination of activities of all security and control personnel supporting the termination operations. Task Force Military Police Units during the termination of operations phase consisted of the following:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>ARRIVAL DATE</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>DEPARTURE DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 Sep 80</td>
<td>1st Battalion, 325th Infantry 82d Airborne Division</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>9 Oct 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 May 80</td>
<td>4th Group, 6th Psychological Operations Battalion</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>15 Oct 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 May 80</td>
<td>50th Public Affairs Detachment</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20 Oct 80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Public Affairs Summary

According to General Brookshire, the Cuban Alien Resettlement Operation should have been a propaganda defeat for the Cuban Government. In his opinion, it had not been and this was primarily attributable to the focus of the U.S. news media on the undesirable and disruptive elements placed among the departees by the Cuban Government and the Federal Agencies' inability to deal successfully with these disruptive elements. General Brookshire, for one, recommended that the responsible authorities should examine closely the laws affecting the Immigration and Naturalization Service and other Federal agencies that participated in the operation, and that remedial legislation should be introduced which would permit them to deal swiftly and successfully with disruptive elements in future operations of this type. Presumably, if these recommendations came to pass, the media would concentrate more on the positive aspects of the operation.22


22. Ibid., pp. 205 - 06.
Press Center operations began on 14 May 1980 with the arrival of an advance contingent of personnel from Headquarters, First U.S. Army, Fort George G. Meade, Md., and from the 50th Public Affairs Detachment (PAD), Fort Devens, Mass. By 16 May, the Press Center had reached its full strength of nineteen military and one government civilian personnel. Beginning with the arrival of the first planeload of Cuban refugees on 18 May and continuing throughout the operation, one of the objectives of the Press Center was to allow information media representatives to cover events of the resettlement without interrupting operations. On two occasions, press representatives were found in unauthorized areas without escorts and the Military Police personnel confiscated their cameras and other equipment. In both cases the cameras were returned, but one of the incidents resulted in Congressional interest to which General Brookshire responded. In another incident, the editor of a local newspaper and a reporter obtained volunteer positions within the Task Force. Although their motives were uncertain at best, both were released from their positions and had to be forcibly removed from the Task Force Headquarters. General Brookshire issued letters to them barring them from the installation. This incident attracted the attention of the national media professional publications, but little notice otherwise.

Press coverage was accurate if not always fair from the Task Force’s standpoint. However, the major disturbances of 5 and 28 August attracted a good deal of national attention, and were handled fairly. Similarly, of the thousands of news and feature articles written (many of which were never seen by the Press Center staff) more than half of those actually read were favorable or reflected the good aspects of the Cubans. During the life of the Press Center (14 May through 20 October) there were more than 2,200 media visitors including foreign media personnel from Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Mexico, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Press Center personnel answered more than 10,000 telephone queries and published more than 200 news releases. Beginning on 15 July, the FORSCOM military and civilian personnel staffing the Press Center were replaced by eleven Department of the State public affairs personnel. General Brookshire subsequently observed that in future operations of this nature, the determination needs to be made early whether or not there will be a Joint Press Center and whether or not there will be one spokesman for the operation. This observation may have been based, at least in part, on what occurred after a 10 October broadcast by Radio Station WAHT, Lebanon, Pa., which featured horror stories concerning the destruction of Areas 3 and 4 at the center by their former Cuban refugee residents. This broadcast, which was apparently based upon tips received from Fort Indiantown Gap employees, was followed by a visit from a Harrisburg, Pa., reporter who wanted to view the extent of the destruction. The Department of State operated Press Center recommended to General Brookshire that they be allowed to see the areas in question because if they were not let in, the rumors would grow to be worse than the actual truth. They failed to convince

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General Brookshire of the necessity of adopting this course of action, however, and no reporters were allowed into these areas. 24

Civil Affairs Provisional Support Units Summary

Civil Affairs Provisional Support Units personnel on the scene in mid-May 1980 immediately prepared to support the various Federal and voluntary agencies in the Cuban refugee resettlement effort. These activities included, but were not limited to, gathering and transporting the Cubans to Immigration and Naturalization Service in-depth interviews, Public Health Service physical examinations, Voluntary Agency sponsorship processing, and for the issue of old and new clothing. They also provided the transportation required to move visitors and Cuban refugees to three separate Reunion Halls which were opened to accommodate a large number of visiting family members and their refugee relatives. As the population diminished through sponsorship, and other transfers, the relocation of unaccompanied males (by 5 August 78 percent of the residual population) from Areas 12 and 13 to Areas 3 and 4 was necessary in order to consolidate the operation and to make room for the arrival of Reserve Component military personnel on Annual Training status. During the evacuation stages, Cuban volunteers under the direction of the Civil Affairs Area Commander, began to clean and sanitize vacated barracks and to reconfigure bunks and wall lockers for military occupancy. These workers formed the nucleus of what grew to be a workforce of over 500 Cuban refugees who engaged in self-help projects throughout the installation as well as community relations labor projects. They became involved in the construction of picnic tables, benches for the theatre areas within each of the Cuban refugee compounds, and outdoor concrete grills. Other projects included building sidewalks, repairing bleachers at training areas and field tables, and painting and repairing wall lockers and screens. 25

In a separate action from the above program, Civil Affairs personnel had to relocate early arriving Cuban refugee families from Area 1 to Area 5 in order to clear Area 1 for the establishment of a detention facility for anti-social and otherwise troublesome Cuban refugees who needed to be temporarily separated from the general population pending further disposition. By 15 June, Area 1 was ringed with triple strand, concertina wire, the only distinguishing feature from other housing areas since movies, American Red Cross activities, and the like, and other privileges remained the same as in other areas. 26

A number of situations occurred at various times during the Civil Affairs segment of the overall Cuban refugee processing operation which could have (but did not to a major extent) seriously and adversely impacted on its overall successful achievement. They included such items as insufficient communications, the unavoidable rotation of Army

25. Ibid., p. 190.
26. Ibid., pp. 190 - 91.
Reservists, the forfeiture of accrued leave time by Active Army Civil Affairs personnel, and the inability of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to mete out appropriate punishment to Cuban offenders. The meager number of land lines to Area Headquarters and the Inprocessing Section and the accompanying lack of sufficient radio communications contributed significantly to near chaotic conditions which existed during the inprocessing phases of the operation. Had it not been for four jeep-mounted radios, the inprocessing situation would have become totally uncontrollable. The necessary rotation of Army Civil Affairs Reservists on their two-week Annual Training tours of duty at Fort Indiantown Gap disrupted all continuity efforts despite the use of overlapping tours. The quality of Army Reserve Civil Affairs personnel varied from good to unsatisfactory. As a result, the requirement for Active Army Civil Affairs permanent party personnel to personally become involved in the actual management of the refugee housing areas varied accordingly, much to the detriment of normal headquarters operating efficiency. In addition, several Active Army Civil Affairs personnel faced the possibility of forfeiting accrued leave. Some actually had in their possession individual temporary duty orders which specifically prohibited leave in conjunction with their travel. Others had so much accrued leave that it was impossible to grant them sufficiently long absences from the operation to use up excess accrued leave (more than 60 days as of 30 September each year). Some home stations were so distant from Fort Indiantown Gap that travel costs and leave time available made it impossible for them to leave the immediate vicinity of the installation. Finally, the inability of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to deal definitively with criminals in the general refugee population caused much consternation among both the law-abiding Cuban refugees and the military on duty at the scene. Naturally enough, dangerous Cuban criminals who were released back into the general refugee population following a few days in detention because of insufficient evidence had a tendency to disrupt the orderliness and tranquility in the compounds.27

Psychological Operations Summary

Psychological operations were conducted largely by Reserve Component personnel assigned to provisional support units under the overall direction of Active Army members assigned to the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion (-), Fort Bragg, N.C. From the opening of the center in mid-May until 1 August, the battalion provided printing support for the Cuban/Haitian Task Force in excess of 4.5 million impressions. It also provided loudspeaker support for the entire operation. In addition, it published the bilingual Refugee Processing Center newspaper La Libertad Monday through Friday of each week. This publication constituted a key link of official information between the Refugee Processing Center Administration (first the Federal Emergency Management Agency and then, effective 15 July, the Department of State) and the Cuban refugees, many of whom became depressed, apprehensive, and unhappy as the time necessary for resettlement of those eligible for sponsorship passed from

27. Ibid., p. 191.
Durante los pasados meses que los refugiados cubanos estaban en el Fuerte Indiantown Gap y en sus nuevos hogares a través de los Estados Unidos, todos ellos han llegado a una conclusión acerca de la América, su gente y sus oportunidades. Aunque algunos de nuestros amigos cubanos están algo descontentos, por lo general sus sentimientos son positivos. La mayoría de ellos que vinieron a esta país, en busca de libertad, hoy en día sienten la misma gratitud que la que sintieron al arribar a los Estados Unidos.

Un hombre puso su sentimiento en palabras cuando llegó al Fuerte Indiantown Gap en mayo. Escoy asegura que su sentir aún prevalece, tanto como el deseo de felicidad y éxito extendido a todos los refugiados cubanos de sus hermanos norteamericanos.

Sharon Markel
Editora de "La Libertad"

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Fuerte Indiantown Gap, PA
22 de mayo

A J. GENEROSO PUEBLO DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMERICA:

En nombre de todos los refugiados cubanos que nos encontramos en este campo militar, y en general de todos los que de una forma u otra hemos llegado al país de la democracia y de la libertad, hago llegar este mensaje a la prensa de esta gran nación para que este pueblo conozca nuestro agradecimiento.

Sharon Markel
Editor de "La Libertad"

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During the past months that the Cuban refugees have spent at Fort Indiantown Gap and in their new homes all across the United States, all of them have developed an opinion about America, her people and her opportunities. Even though a few of our Cuban friends have been somewhat dissatisfied, a very positive feeling is the widespread, general consensus. The majority of those who fled to this country, in search of freedom, continue to feel the same gratitude today which they felt upon arrival in the United States.

One man put these feelings into words, when he arrived at Fort Indiantown Gap, in May. I'm sure this feeling still prevails, as does the wish for happiness and success extended to all the Cuban refugees from their American brothers and sisters.

Sharon Markel
Editor of "La Libertad"

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Fort Indiantown Gap, PA
May 22

TO THE GENEROUS PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

In the name of all the Cuban refugees who find themselves in this military camp, and everyone in general who, in one way or another has arrived in this country of democracy and freedom, we send this message to the press of this great nation in order that her people are made aware of our gratitude.
days, to weeks, to months. Finally, the unit showed a feature length film in each housing area each night. These showings were in addition to the various morale and welfare activities conducted concurrently by the American Red Cross and the installation's Director of Personnel and Community Activities. Perhaps the most valuable contribution made by this battalion to the overall resettlement operation was the development and implementation of an effective psychological operations program to support the transfer of residual Cuban refugees from Fort Indiantown Gap to Fort Chaffee. From the viewpoint of the Task Force Commander, this campaign contributed significantly to the smooth transfer operation which resulted.28

During the first week of October, the battalion initiated a high intensity psychological operations program concerning the move. It put posters all over the housing areas publicizing the harsh features of typical Pennsylvania winters and the attractions of much warmer winters in Arkansas. In addition to the posters, the battalion also distributed a large number of leaflets to individual refugees elaborating on the same theme. It also produced and delivered numerous loudspeaker broadcasts in the housing areas stressing the point that cooperation on the part of the Cuban refugees indentified for transfer to Fort Chaffee was the best way to help make a smoother transition. Topics presented included information about Fort Chaffee and its activities, available housing, Voluntary Agency outplacement operations, and the prospect of a milder winter. Following the departure of the Fort Chaffee transferees, the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion (-) continued its publication of La Libertad and other resettlement support activities until the last remaining Cuban refugee was resettled on 15 October. (Illustration 1).29

Religious Activities Summary

On Sunday, 18 May 1980, the first public worship service was held for the incoming Cuban refugees. At that time, some 168 Cubans and 80 other military, civilian employee, and volunteer workers attended a Roman Catholic Mass celebrated by Msgr. Mercurio Fregepano, Hispanic Vicar of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Harrisburg, Pa. The Mass and addresses were delivered in Spanish, followed by the singing of religious and patriotic hymns. Coming as they did from a land where free and open religious practice was repressed, it was a great religious and emotional experience for the then on site Cuban refugees. At that time, the professed religious composition of the Cuban refugees was 80 percent Roman Catholic, 1 percent Protestant, and 19 percent no preferred faith. A few (20) claimed to be members of the Jewish faith. Religious services conducted during the resettlement operation included 319 Roman Catholic Masses for the Cuban refugees; 170 Roman Catholic Masses for the Task Force and the Fort Indiantown Gap Garrison; 105 Protestant Services for

28. Ibid., p. 194.
29. Ibid., pp. 193 - 94.
the Cuban refugees; 71 Protestant Services for the Task Force and the Garrison; 14 Jewish Services for the Cuban refugees; and 21 Jewish Services for the Task Force and the Garrison. Roman Catholic Sisters (approximately 75) conducted an intensive English program for the refugees as well as basic catechism classes. Some thirty Roman Catholic Priests were involved in religious programs for the Cuban refugees on a continuing basis. Roman Catholic church groups donated 10,000 copies of the New Testament in Spanish and religious articles such as medals, rosaries, crosses, and holy pictures. The high point of the overall religious activities program occurred on 25 May when the Roman Catholic Cardinal of Philadelphia, John Krol, conducted Mass for the Cuban refugees.

Facilities Engineering Summary

Initial Operation. Fort Indiantown Gap preparations for the receipt and processing of the Cuban refugees was hampered by an initial lack of knowledge concerning the demographics involved. Significant problems were also encountered due to the short notification period. Although a local labor force was available, problems arose in the hiring of skilled personnel such as carpenters, plumbers, and electricians. Fortunately the availability and use of troop labor permitted the timely opening of reception facilities. One complicating issue was the lack of established procedures between the Federal agencies directing the resettlement (Federal Emergency Management Agency and later the Department of State) and the supporting FORSCOM military and civilian personnel. In the final analysis, the Fort Indiantown Gap Director of Facilities and Engineering was responsible for determining what would or would not be accomplished regardless of cost during the first three weeks of the operation. It was not until that time that a clear Letter of Authority in this matter was drafted. After that, all work requests had to be signed and initiated by a responsible individual in each agency.

Utilities. Complex problems were experienced with the utilities during the operation. Due to a lack of knowledge on the part of many Cubans concerning the use and maintenance of the installation's plumbing system, a great deal of damage was done to latrine fixtures and the sewer system. This damage occurred when the Cubans first would not flush anything and later on washed their clothing in the same fixtures. This practice resulted in a large amount of clothing and other personal items entering the sewer system, causing damage to the plumbing lines. This unacceptable practice was largely neutralized through education and the provision of tubs and hoses at various wash points. The installation of wash points caused another problem, however. The Cubans followed their traditional habits of using unusually large quantities of water (200 gallons per individual per day), a situation made more serious by the fact that Pennsylvania was experiencing a drought at the time.

30. Ibid., pp. 3 and 172.
31. Ibid., pp. 180 - 81.
time. This unnecessary level of use of relatively scarce water was brought under control through the institution of a strict conservation program. Finally, despite two power outages, the installation was able to meet all electrical demands.32

Security. During the course of the operation, the Director of Facilities and Engineering was required to effect many changes in security fencing. These changes were needed to provide security for the Cuban refugee population and to bring about desired demographic groupings. Due to the nature of the operation (reception, inprocessing, maintenance, outplacement, and transfers) no clear cut security fencing plan could be developed and followed on a scheduled program. In actual practice, the security fencing requirements changed daily due to the constantly changing population and in the outprocessing and living procedures. In addition, any of the security demands were met only through the construction of extensive barricades as well as expedient fencing. Security fencing requirements met during the several days just prior to the transfer of residual Cuban refugees to Fort Chaffee, for example, were as follows. On 29 September, a number of culverts were secured with concertina wire in Area 3. On 30 September, a concertina wire barricade was installed in Area 5. On 3 October, other concertina wire barricades were installed in Areas 5 and 14. On 5 October, a concertina wire barricade was relocated in Area 3, and so forth.33

Damage. As of 15 October, installation estimates of damages incident to the operation of the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Processing Center remained undetermined. However, the Task Force staff felt that the cost necessary to clean up and repair those areas of the installation directly associated with the relocation process would amount to $2 million. Most of the damage appeared to be superficial such as electrical switches, lighting fixtures, plumbing lines, holes in walls, broken and missing screens, doors, fire escapes, porches, and other miscellaneous damage to the outside of the buildings. The general condition of the sewer system and electrical system and possible damage to the structure of the buildings might not surface for years to come.34

Comptroller Summary

The role of the Fort Indiantown Gap Installation Comptroller during the refugee processing operations at that site was critical in nature. In its capacity as a supporting installation for Federal Emergency Management Agency and later Department of State directed operations, it had to make multi-million dollar disbursements which, if properly documented and in accordance with strict Federal Emergency Management Agency and Department of State criteria, could be reclaimed through reimbursement agreements. Item costs not reimbursed for one reason or another

32. Ibid., p. 181.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
had to be assumed by FORSCOM. Once the Installation Comptroller finished his billing procedures (virtually on a day-by-day basis), he would forward them at intervals to a specially constituted billing agency established at Headquarters, First U.S. Army, Fort George G. Meade, Md., where they were reviewed, processed further if necessary, and then forwarded to the Federal Emergency Management Agency and Department of State for reimbursement. This First U.S. Army billeting agency was in fact a central agency for FORSCOM and also handled similar reimbursement accounts for Forts Chaffee and McCoy.

Comptroller activities officially began by 9 May 1980 when the installation prepared and submitted an estimate of costs anticipated for the support of 20,000 Cuban refugees over a 6-month period. This estimate amounted to $30 million. This was later (September) reduced by some $7 million based on actual experience. At the same time, the Fort Indiantown Gap Comptroller established appropriate Account Processing Code (APC) files designed to identify opening and operating reimbursable costs for the Cuban refugees and the supporting troops. The Comptroller concluded the first phase of operations by establishing a requirement with the installation's Management Information Systems Office for a daily obligation report. In its next major action, the Comptroller's office established a Force Development Branch on 17 May which produced an approved Task Force organization by 22 May. During the same period, the Comptroller arranged for necessary augmentation computer rentals, prepared a matrix for all Reserve Component units scheduled to perform Annual Training at the installation, and accomplished the first temporary employee pay cycle. By that point (1 June), 390 temporary employees were on the payroll and, of this number, 377 were paid. Of the 13 not paid, 8 had no pay due and 5 working from 3 to 16 hours had no Time and Attendance Cards on file, a situation which continued to cause problems for some time until the Federal Civilian Agencies mastered the administrative requirements involved and knew who and where their employees were at all times. FORSCOM rendered technical assistance in this area on an as needed basis during the entire operation.

During the first week of the Operation of Support Installation phase, Fort Indiantown Gap submitted its initial billings (SF 1080) to Headquarters, First U.S. Army, in the amount of $3,635,000 for reimbursement by the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Department of State. Representatives from FORSCOM visiting at the time of the initial submission were very favorably impressed as compared to Forts Chaffee and McCoy. The Time and Attendance Card problems were resolved and FORSCOM authorized Fort Indiantown Gap to disburse per diem funds from current Army mission funds to employees of the Department of Health and Human Services who were supporting the Cuban refugee mission at that site. Billings for reimbursement were to be sent to the Department of Health and Human Services for amounts disbursed. This realistic decision solved a serious problem area among these employees. The projected

35. Ibid., p. 128.
36. Ibid.
COST PER REFUGEE PER DAY
BASED ON POPULATION

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<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>$5</th>
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<th>$20</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

CONTROLLABLE COSTS
-$556 per bus
-$35 Per Temp Hire
-$796 Per Mess Hall
-$64.50 Per Oil Fired Bks
-$11.60 Per Coal Fired Bks
Other Contract Svcs

FIXED COSTS
Supplies
Utilities
Daily Food Cost

The approximate cost per individual incurred as of 15 October based upon cumulative obligations to that point of $19.9 million plus a projected $2.0 million for the restoration of facilities amounted to an average daily cost of $7.16 per Cuban refugee over the 160-day period of the operation. (Chart 10).

During the Termination of Operation phase, cumulative obligations and contract status figures were confirmed and published based upon daily obligations and contract status submissions. As of 15 October, they were as follows: obligations, $19,858,900; number of contracts, 522; dollar value of contracts, $9,431,200, and contractual obligations, $9,278,300. As noted above, the projected $2,000,000 for restoration work was not included in these figures. Other selected periodic figures of the categories enumerated above were as follows during the overall course of the operation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Obligations to Date ($ in Thousands)</th>
<th>Number of Contracts</th>
<th>Dollar Value of Contracts ($ in Thousands)</th>
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<td>$19,858.9</td>
<td>522</td>
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<td>9,278.3</td>
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37. Ibid., pp. 128 - 35 and 182 - 83.
38. Ibid., pp. 56; 128 - 31; and 182 - 83.
The final overall reimbursable supports costs incurred by the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Processing Center amounted to $24.9 million, approximately $2.0 million of which was generated by the restoration of facilities. As noted above, it was possible that future utilities restoration costs resulting from Cuban refugee misuse and abuse could surface in years to come.39

**Disturbance Control**

**Principal Mission**

The principal mission of the military forces deployed at Fort Indiantown Gap was to maintain peace and order on the installation and assist in maintaining the perimeter of the Cuban refugee compounds. For example, in taking containment action against the 5 August disturbance involving several hundred Cuban refugees, participating Active Army and Army National Guard troop unit commanders were bound by very specific rules of engagement. They were authorized to take all reasonable measures to prevent unauthorized passage of Cuban refugees outside the perimeter. Only the use of reasonable, but non-lethal, force was authorized. Commanders were required to ensure that only the minimum force necessary to accomplish the mission (or other missions of a similar nature) was employed. Each deployed unit was issued riot control equipment to include batons. Individual soldiers used the batons to maintain the perimeter when verbal warnings were not heeded. The use of batons was discontinued once the perimeter was reestablished. The batons were used as a barrier and as weapons only in cases of self-defense. Blows to the head were not authorized.40

**Military Police**

Military Police personnel performing preventive patrol missions on the perimeter of the Cuban refugee compounds were equipped with standard Military Police equipment including sidearms and ammunition. No other military personnel could be issued firearms or ammunition without authorization from the Task Force Commander. Further, firearms or ammunition, to include bayonets, could not be used without the Task Force Commander’s authorization. Ammunition stocks had to be maintained at battalion level.41

**Riot Control Formations**

In addition to the primary mission discussed above, the Task Force Commander provided for the use of military units in Riot Control Formations. The purpose of such formations was to engage Cuban refugees who

39. Info furnished by Mr. Terry Cook, FORSCOM DCSOMPT F&A Div, 19 Sep 83.
40. Ltr AFZQ-TF-JA, FIG TF Cdr to AA and ARNG Cdrs, 7 Aug 80, subj: Rules of Engagement, in which verbal instructions of 5 Aug were confirmed.
41. Ibid.
refused to leave or return to a specified area. Batons were authorized to be used in the port or guard positions. Thrust and butt strokes were authorized on an as required basis to meet resistance from the refugees. Blows to the head were not authorized. If a serious breach of the compound perimeter took place, increased degrees of force could be taken as the situation warranted. These degrees (in ascending order) included oral warnings, show of force (massing of troops), use of water, use of riot control formationa, use of riot control agents (authorized by the Task Force Commander only), and use of deadly force (authorized by the Task Force Commander only).42

Use of Deadly Force

As noted above, the use of deadly force could only be authorized by the Task Force Commander, a situation which was never required during the overall refugee operation. Once authorized, deadly force could be used only where all of the following circumstances were present. Lesser means had been exhausted or were unavailable and the risk of death or serious bodily harm to innocent persons was not significantly increased by its use. Furthermore, the purpose of its use was one or more of the following: self-defense to avoid death or serious bodily harm; prevention of a crime which involved a substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm (for example, sniping); prevention of the destruction of public utilities or similar property vital to public health or safety; and the detention or prevention of escape of persons who had committed or had attempted to commit any of the above listed offenses. Once the use of firearms as a deadly force was authorized by the Task Force Commander, the marksman was enjoined to wound rather than to kill. The use of such deadly force was to be preceded by a clear warning (in Spanish) to the individual Cuban refugee or groups of refugees that the use of such force was being contemplated or was imminent. Finally, warning shots were not to be employed on the grounds that such firing constituted a hazard to innocent persons.43

Individual Soldier

The individual soldier had the right to use the minimum essential force necessary to defend himself against violent and dangerous personal attack. When under the direct supervision of an officer or noncommissioned officer, the individual soldier was not authorized to use deadly force without first being directed to do so. In circumstances when an individual soldier was isolated, he was authorized to use deadly force in self-defense to prevent death or serious bodily harm to himself. When possible, his use of deadly force was to be preceded by a clear warning to the individual or group that use of such force was contemplated or imminent.44

42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
Chapter IV
FORT INDIANTOWN GAP LESSONS LEARNED
Problems, Lessons Learned, and Recommendations

Introduction

Throughout the existence of the Task Force at the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Processing Center, certain areas of concern surfaced which were either resolved at the Task Force level or remained troublesome throughout the operation (11 May 1980 - 15 October 1980). Because of the complexity of the operation and the lack of decision making authority in the Federal civilian agencies at the operating level, the special problem areas discussed above (Legal Authority of Federal Agencies Over Aliens; Disposition of Criminals; Disposition of Mental Patients; and the Care and Control of Unaccompanied Juveniles) caused continuing concern to the Task Force commander, his staff, and the Task Force as a whole. Although the duration of the operation (five months) was not sufficient to permit the development of solutions to these problems, the Task Force commander believed that discussions should begin now within the appropriate Federal agencies so that current problem areas could be resolved in anticipation of future operations of this nature.

General Problems

General problem areas ranged from the designation of installations as refugee processing centers to the return of aliens.

Designation of Installations. The Task Force commander, the Fort Indiantown Gap Garrison, and the Federal civilian agencies involved had insufficient time to adequately prepare and plan the conduct of this operation. The Task Force commander recommended that decisions be made as early as possible concerning the selection of installations as refugee processing centers as well as those units required to support contingency operations.

Command and Control. The Task Force commander found that using the currently available Fort Indiantown Gap installation staff as his primary staff provided him with the immediate capability to assess the local situation, effect necessary policy and operational changes in a timely manner, and eliminate the requirement to bring in a principal Task Force staff. He recommended that Task Force organizations in similar operations in the future integrate Task Force and Installation Staffs at the very outset.

Lost Leave for Individuals Assigned to the Task Force. Task Force efforts to obtain relief for individuals who lost leave as a direct

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result of being assigned temporary duty with the Task Force proved unsuccessful. The Department of the Army had no recourse until legislative relief could be passed. Currently, any operation that ran through the end of a fiscal year (30 September) would result in soldiers losing leave. As matters currently stood, only the Congress could make provisions to preclude this adverse personnel action. The Task Force commander recommended that the Department of Defense present this Department of the Army initiative for future relief in similar circumstances and, if possible, for retroactive relief for individuals who lost leave while performing humanitarian or emergency duties with the Cuban refugee relief operation.

Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction. The State of Pennsylvania owned the land on which Fort Indiantown Gap was located and leased it to the United States as a training area for Reserve Component military units. Although the State of Pennsylvania had in the past offered to relinquish concurrent jurisdiction to the United States, the United States had consistently refused such jurisdiction, thereby retaining only proprietary jurisdiction. As long as the United States maintained only proprietary jurisdiction over the Fort Indiantown Gap military reservation, it had no way of prosecuting most crimes committed by civilians (including aliens) on the installation. In view of the jurisdictional difficulties involving prosecution experienced during the Cuban refugee processing operation, the Task Force commander recommended that Fort Indiantown Gap not be used in the future as a processing center for aliens. If the decision should be made to use it once again for that purpose in the future, the Task Force commander recommended that the United States Government should establish concurrent jurisdiction as prescribed by 40 United States Code 255.

Law Enforcement. Delegated rules and regulations concerning installation law enforcement policies during a refugee processing center operation were non-existent or unclear at the outset of the mission. The Task Force commander recommended that, prior to the commencement of refugee processing center operations, simple rules be established for the enforcement of law and order. The rules would have to encompass all on-site law enforcement agencies and their functions. The Task Force commander also recommended that, prior to the law enforcement agencies being committed to the refugee processing center operation, the highest levels of each agency should jointly establish and concur in rules for the enforcement of law and order.

Priorities for Support Units and Temporary Hire Personnel. Experience at the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Processing Center showed that certain support units should have been among the first to arrive rather than among the last. The early arrival of the Civil Affairs unit and the Federal Agencies placed immediate and heavy demands on logistics support. Support service staffing was not adequate to satisfy these increased demands. In a similar fashion, priority was given to the hiring of Spanish speaking interpreters rather than more critically needed warehouse personnel. The Task Force commander recommended that a priority listing be developed for future operations of this nature containing a proper mix of units and personnel to handle all identified functions.
Wanton Destruction of Government Property. Due to an overall shortage of supervisory personnel within each enclave of Cuban refugees, as well as the rapid turnover of those who were available, the refugees were able to cause major damages, particularly in those areas assigned to unaccompanied males. The Task Force commander recommended that future refugee processing center staffing requirements include personnel and billet supervisors within each area command. Such positions should be filled with Active Component military or Government civilian personnel so that an overall, standard policy could be maintained on living conditions within the refugee population. Control and discipline should be established early and maintained throughout.

Civil Affairs Provisional Support Unit Augmentation Personnel. The Task Force commander soon ascertained that Active Army Civil Affairs Provisional Support Unit augmentation personnel brought on to occupy key positions in the organization for periods of less than thirty days were not especially productive. Specifically, key personnel, to include both area staffs (down to billet supervisors) and headquarters staff, gained a working knowledge of the operation and then, in many cases, departed. In view of this constant turbulence and necessarily decreased efficiency, the Task Force commander recommended that key personnel staff positions should be assigned to Active Army personnel who could remain for the duration of the operation or for a major portion thereof (at least sixty days).

Reserve Component Augmentation in the Civil Affairs Provisional Support Units. Reserve Component augmentation personnel for the Civil Affairs Provisional Support Units who engaged in multiple unit training assembly (MUTA) periods -- 2 consecutive days of duty each month -- in support of the Cuban refugee processing operation, although gaining "hands on" experience and knowledge of operations, did not have sufficient time on board to be able to perform productively in camp management. They only added to the turbulence of the two week turnover of personnel on annual training. The Task Force commander recommended that Reserve Component personnel engaging in multiple unit training assemblies should not be permitted to participate in future operations of this nature.

Fort Chaffee Movement Planning. The lack of timely logistical support and operational decisions by the Federal Agencies hampered planning for the residual Cuban refugee movement to Fort Chaffee. During the supporting planning stages, many questions surfaced having a direct impact on the plans required for an orderly and efficient outprocessing operation. In the absence of necessary and timely Federal Agency decisions, the Task Force commander and his staff were forced to develop several courses of action in order to be prepared for any possible contingency. Answers required to prepare definitive plans included, but were not limited to, the types of aircraft (for seating capacity); definite departure dates; how much personal baggage per person would be permitted; and shipping instructions for other possessions (record players, stereos, and the like). The Task Force commander recommended that the Federal Agencies should establish and publish policies on moving matters as early as possible to eliminate unnecessary planning.
Return of Cuban Refugees. Cuban refugees continued to return to the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Processing Center after their final outprocessing by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Some returned on their own and others were brought back by their sponsors for various reasons. The returned Cuban refugees were placed in the outprocessing or holding areas since the Federal and Voluntary Agencies had no facilities to handle such cases. In other words, the fact that a Cuban refugee was resettled did not guarantee that the individual would not return due to a real or perceived problem. Some were returned by their sponsors due to behavioral problems, while others were returned because they did not want to work for a living, or some sponsors changed their minds at the last minute. The Task Force commander recommended that the Federal or Voluntary Agencies establish a location for returned refugees. This place should provide the means for them to be self-sufficient until some time when other sponsors could be found or independent voluntary relocation became feasible.

Civil Affairs Provisional Support Unit
Selected Problems, Lessons Learned, and Recommendations

Introduction

Selected problems encountered, lessons learned, and recommendations made by the Civil Affairs Provisional Support Units covered a wide gamut of areas which have been encountered over and over again in refugee processing operations. Most of these could be prevented or diminished in scope if the personnel conducting the operation had been furnished with a simple guidebook covering the most obvious problem areas. While the faces change in each operation (both refugee and operating personnel), the human problems involved tend to be the same although admittedly they may vary in degree of intensity. As noted earlier, the Civil Affairs Provisional Support Unit problem areas discussed below are selective in nature.

Inaccuracy of Incoming Cuban Refugee Mix Count

Inaccuracy of the incoming Cuban refugee mix count aboard aircraft departing from the initial reception facilities in Florida as reported to the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Processing Center Task Force Emergency Operations Center resulted in an improper distribution of military and Government civilian personnel at the inprocessing center. In order to better organize and determine accurate personnel requirements for the inprocessing operation, it was imperative that the Emergency Operations Center be informed as accurately as possible of the Cuban refugee population mix with sufficient advance notice so as to permit necessary personnel adjustments. A lead time requirement of four to six hours prior to the estimated time of arrival of the refugee aircraft at the unloading site (Harrisburg International Airport) was essential. The Task Force commander recommended that the initial reception centers hold the refugees and load the aircraft according to population mix (families, unaccompanied males, and the like) -- when practical -- and that accurate headcounts be conducted as the refugees deplaned. Mixed population arrivals at the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee
Processing Center delayed inprocessing operations. It took three times as long to inprocess families, particularly in the assignment of billets. The Task Force commander recommended that, where possible, the initial reception centers should isolate the population groupings and time their departures to preclude the need for a refugee holding area at the inprocessing site. The recommendation qualifiers "when practical" and "where possible" recognized the simple reality of the Cuban refugee situation where the initial reception centers in Florida were simply overwhelmed with refugees in a very short period of time. On the other hand, similar problems had been experienced in the processing of the Vietnamese Refugees at Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap in 1975. This occurred despite the fact that most of those refugees were held for varying periods of time in Guam and other locations in the Pacific before they were transported to the continental United States for further processing. The real problem area was the lack of a standing operating procedure binding upon all participating military and Federal civilian agencies.

Medical Inprocessing

During the initial inprocessing at the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Processing Center -- which was, after all, subsequent to the initial reception center processing in Florida -- only obvious medical emergencies were isolated for immediate treatment and hospitalization. Other illnesses and injuries such as chronic asthma, diabetes, unseen and unreported lacerations (one shotgun wound detected later), burns, and the like, became apparent only after the refugees had been settled in their assigned housing areas. Since no medical facilities were located in those areas, the afflicted refugees had to be transported elsewhere. This situation caused an unavoidable backlog of refugees in the housing areas and caused considerable discontent. Once the basic needs of the refugees (food, shelter, clothing, and the like) were met, medical problems and other ailments immediately surfaced. The Task Force commander recommended that medical clinics for sick call should be ready for operation in each housing area prior to the arrival of the first incoming shipment of refugees. Paramedics (military or civilian) should be made available as part of the area staff to sort those cases which should be taken to sick call and others which could be treated locally, thus preventing overcrowding of the clinics. Another facet of this overall problem involved a refugee who was returned from the Hershey (Pennsylvania) Medical Center after being treated for hepatitis, but still was contagious. The fact was that contagious diseases were likely to appear (and did) in a population the size of that at the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Processing Center. Many times these diseases were not serious enough for hospitalization and the affected individual refugees had to be quarantined within the overall refugee population. The Task Force commander recommended that the health authorities provide for patient care in an isolated facility until the individual could be returned to the population.

Fraternization

In spite of the orientation and directions given to military personnel regarding fraternization with military and Cuban refugee females,
some incidents occurred. Verbal instructions and orientations proved to be insufficient to guarantee that established policies would be followed implicitly. It was easy for an individual so involved to claim that he or she had never received the information. The Task Force commander recommended that sensitive policy issues be acknowledged in writing by all military and Government civilian personnel assigned to the Task Force. Signed statements should be maintained by the local Military Personnel Office and the Civilian Personnel Office as evidence of understanding should a violation occur. Reported fraternization between military personnel, Voluntary Agency workers, Federal Protective Services personnel, and Cuban refugees, although sporadic, disrupted center life. Although fraternization could not be controlled totally, it could be discouraged through prompt investigation of alleged offenses. The commander further recommended that an inspector general team or equivalent agency under the operational control of civil affairs supervisory personnel be made available to investigate internal disciplinary problems arising from fraternization. In this connection, a number of cases of fraternization between Federal Protective Services and Military Police personnel involving female refugees were reported by refugees themselves. Prolonged duty at static Military Police posts and Federal Protective Services roving foot patrols caused these personnel to become familiar with the Cuban refugee population due to long duty hours and repeated exposure to the same area of assignment. Military Police and Federal Protective Services personnel should be rotated periodically to limit the potential for fraternization and to assist in the maintenance of their professional status in the eyes of the refugee population.

Internal Security

Both the military and Federal agency law enforcement personnel encountered a wide variety of persistent internal security problems, ranging from forgery to criminal assault. As in any large population, a few agitators, malcontents, and antisocials continuously disrupted center activities. These disruptive individuals upset the general refugee population by creating problems of every imaginable type. Such individuals should have been permanently separated from the rest of the refugee population until they were outprocessed or demonstrated their willingness to behave. A secure area should have been made available for their housing. It should have been surrounded by a ten-foot high wire mesh fence to make escape more difficult. In order to gain access to other areas, some of the Cuban refugees forged notes from clinics and Area Commanders and even manufactured semi-official passes. Military Police at area entry points in many cases did not challenge the validity of these documents. The Cuban refugees, as a whole, demonstrated that they were very ingenious and would find any means to falsify notes and passes in order to move freely between areas. The availability of laminating machinery at administrative locations facilitated the manufacture of official looking passes. Military Police supervisors should repeatedly brief guards on center policies in order to preclude lapses of memory, and make sure that replacements are well indoctrinated on rules. Any equipment which could be utilized to falsify passes should be kept at the Area Headquarters level and secured every evening. Post Engineer
personnel refused to enter areas to make repairs during the hours of darkness. They were fearful for their safety and some claimed their tools were stolen by refugees while they worked. It was true that some refugees were particularly active in the production of homemade knives. Screwdrivers and other tools which could easily be reshaped made excellent weapons and they would seek every opportunity to steal those items. All repairs, not of an emergency nature, should be made during daylight hours and a trusted consejero (counselor) should escort the repairman. If repairs should be required during the evening hours, a military escort, where feasible, should be provided. Lamination cards continued to run out due to the excessive number of meal cards issued in the area. In retrospect, Cuban refugee self-governmental elements should not have been allowed to issue meal cards or to have had laminating machines placed at their disposal for any reason. During idle hours, they used this equipment for other purposes.

In another manifestation of disruptiveness, Cuban refugee troublemakers loved to show their discontent by climbing onto roofs and chimneys. Without prior planning, it was impossible for the authorities to physically prevent these refugees from gaining access to other parts of the exterior of buildings. It was necessary to carefully evaluate potential sites for both individual and group demonstrations. The problem was eventually resolved by placing concertina wire on the second floor overhang of all barracks and around chimneys and poles. It also proved to be imperative that the inprocessing procedure not permit so-called common law marriages into the family areas. Secondly, when the males were separated from the females, they would find a way to get to them. It was necessary to tighten security around the family and female areas and to conduct night checks daily to preclude "homesteading". In a number of cases, Cuban refugee security personnel were threatened and one was seriously injured. They complained to the American authorities that there were no measures to discourage other refugees from committing aggressive acts against them. It was obvious that, if refugees were to be used to assist in security, they should have been protected by the same rules governing attacks on military and Federal Agency law enforcement personnel. When the Cuban refugee security forces were expanded to make up for shortfalls in the Federal Protective Services, some undesirable refugees infiltrated their ranks. In this particular instance, the original Cuban refugee security force personnel demonstrated that they were likely to include their friends in any activity they participated in regardless of their background or reliability. This situation indicated that refugees occupying sensitive positions within the refugee government security forces must be thoroughly screened by the American authorities prior to their appointment and assignment to actual security force duties. American authorities encountered resistance while they were in the process of erecting barricades between Areas 3 and 4. Objections to this construction were voiced by the very same Cuban refugees who had originally requested that the two areas be separated. This incident illustrated that the mood of the refugee community changed rapidly and that the refugee government was not always in a position to convey changing moods in a timely fashion. The American authorities soon learned that before acting on a request of any magnitude stemming from the refugees, it had to be thoroughly examined and coordinated with
those affected. Once a determination was made to go through with its implementation, the American authorities should launch a concerted effort to "sell" the idea to the refugees prior to actually taking action. Finally, a number of acts of refugee violence occurred involving assaults, fights, robberies, rapes, and knifings in the refugee areas. Criminal refugee elements banded together taking advantage of every opportunity to terrorize the remainder of the population. The frequency of their activities appeared to be proportional to the amount of internal security provided by and the credibility of the security forces with the general population and the fairness of the security forces. It became evident that the security effort must be such that it can adjust in size and effort as required by the situation. As military and Federal law enforcement forces became or proved to be too limited to accomplish the mission completely, an increase of refugee security personnel was usually much easier and quicker to accomplish. The refugees chosen for this mission should be screened for reliability and ability. They should be trained, equipped, and given the authority necessary to conduct limited police actions. They should be guaranteed sponsorship but remain in position until the closure of the processing center. The only alternative proposed to this relatively unattractive proposal would be to have adequate military or Federal police resources assigned to the center as needed.

Refugee Processing

A number of problems arose in the refugee processing system. For example, the reunification of refugee families while individual members, who may have arrived at separate times, continued to be inprocessed disrupted the system since males from Area 3 had to be reprocessed between arriving planes in order to be reunited with their families in Area 6. The Task Force commander recommended that no attempt be made to effect any reunifications until the last plane of refugees had been inprocessed and settled. Due to the complexity of the processing operation (physical examinations, interviews by the Immigration and Naturalization Service and Voluntary Agencies, and the like), the refugees became confused over their status. They were anxious to leave the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Processing Center as soon as they had completed their processing and had sponsors waiting. They did not understand that having all of the processing steps completed at the center level did not necessarily mean immediate release. The commander further recommended that the refugees be kept apprised of the details of processing in order to appease them and to keep them away from the Area Headquarters. This was and could be accomplished through special articles in the center newspaper and by establishing information booths manned by properly trained individuals either from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, or the Department of State. Due to an understandable effort to improve the rate of outprocessing, approximately 144 refugees had been held in the outprocessing area in excess of ten days and some of them as much as three weeks or more. Morale problems were created when refugees who arrived in later planeloads were released promptly. The commander recommended that the center authorities not jump the gun in an attempt to achieve maximum outprocessing in this fashion. The Federal Civilian
Agency in charge -- in this case, the Department of State -- should ascertain the exact status of individual refugees before bringing them into the outprocessing holding area and also to have transportation available or booked to move them out promptly.

Unilateral complaints regarding the separation of refugee factions continued to surface throughout the entire operational period. These complaints arose from the fact that social and economic differences existed and these various factions resented the fact that they had been thrown together into one common area. The Task Force commander recommended that detailed interviews during inprocessing, when feasible, could assist in the subsequent segregation of the refugee population in a more sophisticated fashion beyond the obvious mix of family, unaccompanied males and females, and juveniles. The Voluntary Agencies caused confusion regarding outprocessing procedures and gave estimates of days (frequently faulty) which the refugee could expect to remain in the center until sponsored. The untrained and uncoordinated Volunteer Agency personnel caused a loss of credibility in the processing center operation on the part of many of the refugees. Voluntary Agency personnel should be required to undergo an orientation process conducted by the Task Force or coordinating Federal civilian agency (Federal Emergency Management Agency) which would include Task Force organization, the responsibility of each supporting unit and agency, and a thorough briefing on policy matters. Finally, the low class Cuban refugees lived in a constant state of uncleanliness and refused to cooperate with the authorities. The lack of authority of the military to mete out strong disciplinary action led to an uncontrollable situation. In the future, segregated areas should be made available where uncontrollable or uncooperative refugees could be placed for more effective control and disciplinary action.

Public Affairs

The propensity of the media to focus on the sensational or the bizarre was amply demonstrated when Paris Match (French magazine) representatives continued to visit the homosexual barracks at the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Processing Center. Their intent, apparently, was to exploit the situation. The rest of the Cuban refugee population became extremely upset over this practice as they viewed homosexuals as an insult to their moral fiber and they were apprehensive that the American public would perceive them in the same fashion. They wanted good publicity instead to increase the possibility of prompt sponsorship. Americans on the scene came to the conclusion that the sensitivity of refugee populations to press coverage should be measured prior to permitting the news media to visit them. In future operations, controversial print and audio-visual media visits should be coordinated with the refugee population. Another public affairs credibility problem area arose when the Department of State announced that cantinas (coffee houses) would open in the housing areas to dispense late evening coffee and snacks. This plan was not implemented and was viewed by the refugees as yet another broken promise. Long-term refugee residents became accustomed as a result of this and other broken promises (as they perceived them to be) to not believing what they heard until they saw the
results of the promise. As a result of similar cumulative experiences, information published by the authorities concerning the relocation of the residual refugee population to Fort Chaffee was not given much credence. As a result, refugee "manipulation" by Civil Affairs and Provisional Support Unit personnel became more difficult. In future operations, all Federal civilian agencies should carefully weigh the chances of fulfilling their promises before any announcements were made to the refugee population involved.

Clothing and Feeding

It seemed at first that Cuban refugees apparently were not satisfied with the quantity of old and new clothing issued to them in spite of several such general distributions. They broke into clothing issue points, stole identification cards good for third or fourth clothing issues, and repeatedly mobbed delivery trucks. However, the principal motivating factor was the chronic scarcity of clothing in Cuba. The American authorities learned that in Cuba clothing could be purchased only once a year and then only with coupons issued by the government. Hoarding, therefore, had become instinctive. In future refugee operations, the initial interviewing of the refugees should include questions involving the economic climate of the country of origin. Their responses would assist in the development of a more responsive distribution system of necessities as well as provide a base for an educational campaign to prevent or limit the hoarding of clothing (in this case) and breaking and entering to steal clothing. In the case of the Cuban refugees, the clothing issue points or warehouses continued to be of interest. Although adequately clothed, the hoarding instinct continued to be strong and break-in attempts were frequent. Whenever possible, clothing issue points or warehouses, whether containing new or old clothing, should not be located within the refugee housing areas.

The issue of monthly meal cards without refugee identification numbers or mess hall to be used created an uncontrollable situation in that refugees were returning for second and third feedings for the same meals. Symbol and color coding of meal cards with assigned mess halls was also less than successful since both refugee and contractor mess hall personnel tended to ignore the system. In future operations of this nature, meal cards should be laminated and affixed to neck chains along with refugee identification cards. Mess cards should bear the individual's refugee's identification number, the mess hall number to which he or she was assigned and an individual sequence number which would be checked off prior to entering the mess hall. This procedure would prevent double feedings as well as the use of several mess halls. Because of these problems, many mess halls remained open beyond the 2-hour scheduled feeding time in order to accommodate those refugees still waiting in line to eat. Some mess halls closed promptly, however, and left some refugees without food. To feed a regular meal to 500 Cuban refugees, particularly in the family area, took longer than two hours. Before establishing meal hours, a concerted effort should be made to determine the number of refugees who could be fed per meal and the proper length of time the mess halls would have to remain open in order to accommodate that number of people. For example, during the
Vietnamese refugee operation, their diet (rice, fish, and the like) lent itself to fast feeding practices. The Cuban refugees, on the other hand, desired and were fed regular Army rations which they consumed less neatly and at a slower rate than disciplined American troops. It was necessary to extend the meal hours by thirty minutes.

Even with the abundance of food on hand, many of the refugees were constantly fearful that they might not be fed again and removed quantities of food for themselves and for friends who were unwilling or unable to stand in mess hall lines. This practice led to the creation of unsanitary conditions in the housing areas and impacted adversely on mess hall operating costs. Two military personnel should be placed on duty at each mess hall during eating hours, one at the entrance and the other at the exit. Posting of these individuals — if they were available — should begin from the very start of the operation and continue until such time as the refugees would stop their attempts to remove food. This problem was compounded by the fact that many of the Cuban refugees did not eat breakfast on a regular basis. Consequently, they made up for this deficit (by American standards) by doubling up their evening meal intake and attempting to remove food since their next meal would not take place until lunch the following day.

Military Police
Problems, Lessons Learned, and Recommendations

Introduction

There were continued widespread attempts on the part of a rather large percentage of the Cuban refugees to circumvent the physical and other administrative measures which were used to confine them to their assigned areas. In those cases where they succeeded in circumventing the control system, it was due to their own ingenuity (legal or illegal), assistance from non-refugee personnel, and discrepancies inherent in the control system itself. In all, seven major problem areas surfaced during the operation. These included passes and badges, weapons, assaults, communications, runners, unaccounted for refugees, and civilian escorts.

Pass and Badge System

The unauthorized movement of the Cuban refugee population was a difficult problem, and a new pass system soon became necessary. More stringent controls had to be introduced and placed on pass holders to include those specific areas to which they were permitted access and the times they were permitted to be there. Consequently, the Task Force staff recommended that a pass system be implemented from the beginning of such an operation which would clearly state where an individual would be authorized to enter and for what period of time. Even so, a substantial number of passes and badges were not accounted for. A list of infrequently used badges should be compiled by name and number and the main access to each area should be provided this list for use in confirming access for all personnel. To complicate a difficult problem even more, Military Police observed a number of counterfeit badges being worn
by Cuban refugees inside refugee areas. All Federal civilian agencies (particularly their law enforcement personnel) should increase their pass and badge checks. Careful scrutinization was necessary since many of the counterfeits were well done.

**Weapons**

The Cuban refugees demonstrated a high degree of skill in the manufacture of weapons, and there were many flagrant displays of weapons inside the refugee areas. These weapons were manufactured from such readily available materials as door knobs, bunk adapters, broom sticks, and the like. Federal civilian agency security personnel and the Military Police should coordinate and perform organized, systematic searches for basic materials as well as homemade weapons.

**Assaults**

A number of isolated attacks on Cuban refugees by other refugees occurred within the billeting areas. The Military Police assisted the Federal civilian agencies' law enforcement personnel inside the refugee areas by visually monitoring enclave activities and reporting suspicious activities to the proper civilian authorities. The Military Police also monitored the formations and actions of Cuban refugee gangs. Based upon considerable active experience in this area, the Military Police recommended that their guardshacks should be positioned so as to provide maximum visibility and should be numbered for rapid identification purposes. They also recommended that each of the Federal civilian agencies be provided with strip maps showing each observation post for quick response purposes. They concluded by recommending that intelligence sources should gather all possible information on refugee gang activities and pass it on to security and control personnel along with a list of possible courses of action by the gangs.

**Communications**

Voice communications between static Military Police observation posts were ineffective at best. Contact between the Military Police perimeter forces and the internal Federal civilian agency law enforcement authorities relied on the perimeter observation posts relaying their information to a base station which had the responsibility to pass it on to the appropriate Civil Affairs and Provisional Support Unit elements inside the areas. The Military Police recommended that each refugee area should have internal wire communications installed between the static perimeter observation posts and the Area Headquarters.

**Runners**

The Military Police continually encountered problems with runners, strollers, and walkers (usually male Cuban refugees) who constantly attempted to enter female Cuban refugee areas. They recommended that a policy of placing offenders into detention for repeated offenses be enforced. The erection of barriers around selected areas of the perimeter proved to be effective in reducing these incidents. Barriers
should be constructed to surround an entire perimeter and divide the
refugee areas to permit better control of the refugee population.

Unaccounted for Refugees

At any given time during the processing operation, a varying number
of refugees were temporarily unaccounted for. This problem was gra-
dually reduced through the introduction of a change to the overall
security program which required that, when a refugee checked out of his
assigned area, he had to leave his meal card with the Military Police
at one of the static guard posts. When the refugee returned, he would
get his meal card back from the post. All meal cards not claimed each
day were returned to the appropriate Area Headquarters. This system,
which represented a definite improvement over earlier systems should be
expanded and the Federal civilian agencies should make a more aggressive
follow-up concerning those refugees who had not returned to their
designated areas.

Unauthorized Civilian Escorts

The Military Police often discovered Cuban refugees off post or in
unauthorized areas. In some cases, they had been escorted there by
Federal and Voluntary Agency civilian employees who did not have the
authority to take them away from their assigned areas. The Military
Police recommended that civilian personnel involved in unauthorized
escorting should be subjected to disciplinary action or should be ter-
minated.

Psychological Operations

Selected Problems, Lessons Learned, and Recommendations

Introduction

Despite the fact that Spanish was the most popular foreign language
studied in American schools, colleges, and universities, and that there
was an ever increasing percentage of Spanish speaking persons in the
general population as well as in the Armed Forces, a number of problems
were encountered in the overall processing of the Cuban refugees (in-
cluding psychological operations) because of problems of misinterpreta-
tion and a lack of detailed knowledge concerning conditions in Castro
Cuba. This area of operations would always constitute one of the major
variables in any future refugee operation, particularly in those future
operations involving other than Cuban refugees. The general problem
areas should remain essentially the same, however, although they might
vary in intensity in specific areas.

Misinterpretation

To those who had knowledge of the wide diversity of cultural pat-
terns in the Caribbean area and what was commonly referred to as Central
and Latin America, the translation of California Spanish, Chicago
Spanish, and New York Spanish differed from Cuban Spanish. It differed
so much in fact that many cases of misinterpretation occurred, causing
problems for the processing center administration. As soon as possible, the authorities should hire people from the country of refugee origin to act as interpreters. In this particular situation, a well educated Cuban could have helped in avoiding the many mistakes experienced by FORSOM Psychological Operations personnel.

The Availability of Spanish Language Films

Psychological operations personnel even encountered problems in locating a film agency dealing in Spanish language films. This problem was further complicated by the fact that all military Spanish language films were with the 193d Infantry Brigade in the Republic of Panama. Contacts should be established as soon as possible with non-military sources. In point of fact, it might be better if psychological operations personnel were furnished with appropriate film distribution data which might be maintained on a routine basis by other Government agencies and thus preclude wasted time and motion at the actual operations site. The showing of appropriate English language films as well would assist the refugees in beginning their adaptation to American life.

Publication of La Libertad

The publication of La Libertad, the daily refugee newspaper, was reduced from seven times a week to five times a week because Fort Indiantown Gap had to pay two Government civilian employees in the Reproduction Section the minimum four hours overtime in order to do what amounted to thirty minutes of work. This problem area was substantially reduced through better coordination and establishment of deadlines as well as close coordination with post facilities to alleviate overtime. In view of the critical importance of this publication to the Cuban refugees who, after all, lived in the enclaves seven days per week, and the fact that these printing costs were an allowable reimbursement expense by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, it would seem that the daily publication of La Libertad should have been maintained.

Transfer to Fort Chaffee

A media campaign was needed to reduce the anxieties of the residual Cuban refugee population which was scheduled for transfer to the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Refugee Processing Center in the fall of 1980. A second objective of this campaign was to eliminate the chance of violence. Based upon the results of this campaign, which were generally favorable, similar campaigns should be initiated sooner in order to derive maximum potential effects. A multi-media, high intensity campaign should be initiated as soon as possible in future situations of this nature to eliminate transfer problem areas.

Director of Personnel and Community Activities
Selected Problems, Lessons Learned, and Recommendations

Introduction

The Fort Indiantown Gap Director of Personnel and Community Activities, who was also a member of the Task Force staff, experienced a
number of problems which impacted adversely upon the morale and welfare of the military, Government civilian, and both Government and non-governmental agency personnel engaged in the refugee processing operation. Although many of these matters were administrative and supportive in nature, they did affect the quality of life of those engaged in this arduous and demanding type of duty, frequently over long periods of time and under minimal living and working conditions.

Accountability of Personnel

There was no accurate accounting for Task Force personnel until the Task Force Military Personnel Office (MILPO) was established. In other words, there was no established method to accurately account for personnel arriving with Task Force units or as individual military members placed on temporary duty. This situation had important personnel accountability, pay, personnel locator, and other ramifications. Procedures must be established in advance to expedite the immediate accountability of personnel.

Lack of Proper Notification

In many cases, augmentee personnel assigned to the Task Force were not properly notified. Most were informed of their upcoming temporary duty assignments only twenty-four to forty-eight hours in advance, with little or no information provided as to the functions to be performed or the positions to be held. Orders issued were not specific as to what requirement each service member was being assigned against. In future operations of this nature, a simple numbering system should be used by requisitioning authorities. This number, along with the duty position and military occupational specialty, should be indicated on the temporary duty orders issued to the individual Task Force augmentee. As an absolute minimum, the orders should identify the staff section to which a service member would be assigned for duty.

Morale Support Activity Problems

Morale Support Activity problem areas included both a chronic understrength and the lack of coordination with the volunteer agencies. The inability of this supportive activity to receive necessary authorized temporary hire employees to compensate for the 40 percent understrength of permanently hired personnel and the late arrival of augmentee military personnel resulted in an unavoidable increase in overall working hours to meet the upward adjusted facility operation to accommodate increased patronage by Active Army support organizations. The lack of definitive guidelines for the coordination of requisitions precluded the expeditious establishment of proper liaison with procurement officials for either General Services Administration or local purchase requirements. At least two Morale Support Activity staff personnel should be authorized appropriate identification to have access to future Task Force Headquarters engaged in similar operations for coordination with their counterparts. All Outdoor Recreation personnel assigned to facilities and programs should also be furnished appropriate identification which would afford them freer access to assigned facilities and programs. Definitive policies or guidelines should be made
available to the Morale Support Activity staff regarding future supply coordination which would afford less cumbersome and more expeditious procurement in support of refugee processing operations.

Preparation of Efficiency Reports

Officer Efficiency Report Support Forms (DA Form 67-8-1) and the required rating chains were not prepared in a timely manner when it seemed that personnel would be terminated in less than ninety days. A strict interpretation of AR 623-105 was needed in that the Task Force Military Personnel Office should have requested a close-out Officer Efficiency Report or Senior Enlisted Evaluation Report from the home stations of all personnel with temporary duty orders reflecting ninety or more days (seventy-six days for enlisted personnel). The existing regulations should be modified to require the home station Military Personnel Office to send a copy of close-out reports to temporary duty stations (or listing of non-rated days) not later than ten days after a member's departure on temporary duty. In a similar fashion, Officer Efficiency Reports were required for Army Reserve officers placed on annual training or active duty for training status for eleven days or more. With the large influx of Army Reserve personnel in these categories at various periods during the refugee processing operation, the control of and signing prepared Officer Efficiency Reports required so many man-hours as to tend to detract from Task Force operations. In this instance, the existing regulations should be modified concerning the preparation of a mandatory letter report for periods of eleven to twenty-nine days of annual training or active duty for training. Officer Efficiency Reports should not be prepared unless the officer served thirty or more consecutive days of active duty for training. The letter report should be attached to the individual officer's next regular annual report.

Staffing Guide Requirement

The original manning requirements for the Task Force were based on recommendations furnished by the Fort Indiantown Gap Garrison (handwritten) due to the urgency of the situation. Personnel subsequently reporting for duty with the Task Force had to be matched against positions in accordance with grade, secondary skill indicator, and military occupational specialty. Under these overall conditions, it was very difficult to ensure the best use of temporary duty personnel. Higher headquarters should develop a staffing guide for a Task Force type operation which would permit authorizations based on personnel and/or refugee population and area (disaster relief, relocation operations, and the like). The recommended staffing guide should address both a Task Force and a Joint Task Force.

Postal Service

Postal services for the Task Force supporting units and for the Cuban refugees were provided by Army Reserve postal units and the American Red Cross, respectively. The U.S. Postal Service refused to provide any on site postal services. While the American Red Cross did a
satisfactory job in processing and delivering refugee mail, there was very little control or security measures established for processing and securing accountable mail. On-site postal service should be provided by the U.S. Postal Service for both the support troops and for the refugee population.

Director of Plans, Training, and Security
Selected Problems, Lessons Learned, and Recommendations

Introduction

Director of Plans, Training, and Security problem areas ranged from proper manning of the emergency operations center to the control of medical evacuation DUST-OFF missions. Other problem areas included the lack of standardised procedures, unit movement control on redeployment, and ground support cross training.

Emergency Operations Center - Mission and Manning

The Fort Indiantown Gap Task Force Emergency Operations Center was not kept informed of all activities, visits, and other pertinent scheduled events. Needless to say, under such circumstances, it received a number of questions concerning various activities which it was eventually able to answer only after appropriate investigation. In future refugee processing operations, one focal point for all operations, the Emergency Operations Center, should be established and enforced. All Task Force staff sections and Federal and voluntary agencies should be informed of this action so that effective coordination could be made. Such a development would permit the proper dissemination of information and result in a smoother overall operation. Moreover, on 5 August 1980, when the Refugee Processing Center's major disturbance occurred, the Emergency Operations Center was not sufficiently manned to handle that disturbance. This condition had developed due to the ongoing reduction of the Cuban refugee population and the accompanying reductions in supporting Task Force personnel. It became necessary to employ additional liaison personnel and radios in order to monitor the increased level of operational activity. During any type of refugee disturbance or increased activity, the supporting Task Force Military Police should be directed to furnish one liaison person with radio to keep the Emergency Operations Center informed of Military Police operations and to handle related inquiries. In addition, Civil Affairs Provisional Support Units should provide a radio capable of monitoring their net. Finally, if there was an increase in Task Force security personnel from the Active Army or, in this case, the Army National Guard, due to a disturbance, they should also place liaison personnel in the Emergency Operations Center.

Director of Industrial Operations
Selected Problems, Lessons Learned, and Recommendations

Introduction

Director of Industrial Operations problem areas included mess operations and menu modification, the proper phasing in of Task Force
logistical support units, the continuity of units and personnel, the care of areas and buildings, and the processing of requisitions. This operational area was, in fact, the key element in FORSCOM's support role of the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Processing Center which was operated, in turn, by the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Department of State. The success of the entire operation was dependent to a large measure upon the quality and responsiveness of the logistical support rendered by this garrison directorate on a day-to-day basis and constituted a major test of its mobilization support capabilities.

Mass Operations and Menu Modification

Despite the fact that the installation and the food service contractor had both experienced the same situation during the processing of the Vietnamese refugees in 1975, numerous problems were once again encountered with mass operations in support of the Cuban refugees as no workable system was established at the outset to ensure that they were assigned to a specific mess hall to eat and that they only consumed three meals per day. Once again, it was obvious that confusion would reign unless a system was established at the outset of such an operation. A clear cut pass system (meal card) would have to be established, limiting the number of personnel to be fed at any given mess hall and controlling the number of meals that could be consumed by an individual each day. At the outset of the refugee processing operation, the decision had been made by operating officials that the Cuban refugees would be fed the Standard Army Fourteen Day Reserve Menu which Fort Indiantown Gap had prestocked in preparation for the 1980 Annual Training season. However, this menu was not entirely satisfactory as it did not conform to the individual Cuban refugee's culture, dietary desires, or restrictions. Additional sugar had to be added and other items had to be deleted or prepared differently to meet their requirements. Prior planning for a refugee menu should take into consideration an evaluation of the refugee's culture, dietary desires, and restrictions. The central importance of the mess hall and the quality of preparation of the food it offered to the individual refugee -- particularly the long term refugee residents -- cannot be overemphasized.

Phasing In of Logistical Support Units

The Task Force staff determined early in the operation that logistical support units should be among the first to arrive in any support operation rather than among the last. The Director of Industrial Operations was not staffed to support the early arriving Civil Affairs Provisional Support Units and Federal agencies. In addition, the Civilian Personnel Officer gave priority to the hiring of interpreters rather than to more immediately needed warehouse personnel. In future operations, the logistical support units should be the first units scheduled to arrive at the center. Other support problem areas required attention as well. The fact that support requirements were largely unknown to the supported agencies, both military and civilian, caused much confusion. In the absence of adequate publication of Fort Indiantown Gap support procedures, the supported agencies had no idea what was available and what process to follow to obtain the needed support.
Based on this experience, which would have far reaching consequences in the event of a sudden major mobilization effort, the Task Force Staff garrison provide a briefing or the supported agencies as to the support procedures by the Director of Facilities and Engineering, the Director of Industrial Operations, and the Training and Audio-Visual Support Office. A support standing operating procedure should be published and distributed, and all agencies should be provided an understandable organizational chart showing civilian and military Task Force elements with building numbers, phone numbers, and a brief explanation of responsibilities. In actual practice, many materials and items of equipment which were ordered by various agencies and units were not accepted when delivery was made. Leased typewriters, for example, and other items had to be returned. This situation could have been avoided if support requirements had been given proper constraint measures at the outset of the operation and that the specific identification of items required had been insisted upon prior to supply orders being accepted for procurement action.

**Continuity of Units and Personnel**

There was very little continuity of units and personnel assigned to support the refugee processing operation. Army Reserve units and personnel were assigned on a 2-week, rotating basis which made it difficult to determine requirements or even to safeguard Government property as the units and personnel signing for it were constantly changing. Not surprisingly, operational logistics support knowledge was lost with each rotation and incoming units and personnel had to go through a learning curve to become familiar with the installation's logistics support procedures. This major problem and the fact that, as each unit rotated, it took with it a good portion of the expendable supplies which were purchased to support the entire refugee processing operation not only caused additional work for the Director of Industrial Operations, but also additional avoidable cost to the overall operation. Units and personnel should be assigned for the duration of the operation or for not less than 30 to 60 days.

**Care of Areas and Buildings**

As areas used for the billeting of refugees were returned to installation control and use, it became very apparent -- just as in the case of the Vietnamese refugees -- that a major clean up and renovation would be required to put these areas back into an acceptable state of occupancy for military personnel. Disregarding the damage that was done during the major disturbance of 5 August, the general condition of the former Cuban refugee housing was deplorable. Windows were broken, latrines were damaged, and the walls and floors were filthy. The operating Federal agencies (Federal Emergency Management Agency and later the Department of State) had done little to ensure that the refugee housing was kept clean and sanitary. Some sort of inspections of the housing areas to stress sanitation and respect of property, might have precluded a great deal of the damage. Once again, the Task Force staff recommended that, in future operations of this nature, daily inspections be conducted by the operating Federal agencies to ensure that the installation's buildings were maintained in a suitable condition.
Introduction

Selected Director of Facilities and Engineering problem areas included water distribution, electrical wiring, heating, self-help, verbal requests, and procurement. These problems, and others, were made even more difficult from the very beginning when Federal Emergency Management Agency representatives did not become available to approve actions taken by the Task Force and the Garrison staff until five days after the execution order. As a result, specific funding guidance and the establishment of overall priorities for work were slow in developing. The lack of general data pertaining to the Cuban refugee population to be received (such as the percentage of family units, single males, or single females) compounded early planning problems. For example, early planning to fully partition off all proposed Cuban refugee barracks housing could have been avoided had the above data been made available.

Water Distribution

Due to a combination of conditions -- not the least of which was the sporadic use of the water distribution system since World War II -- the pressure on the system tended to increase significantly during the early morning hours, resulting in numerous breaks in the water mains. Through coordination with the Jonestown, Pa., water pumping station, the supplier of water to the installation, and an on-post adjustment of water level controls in its water storage tanks, installation facilities and engineering personnel were able to properly regulate the water pressure for the duration of the refugee operation. This was a short-term solution at best. For the long term, it was clear that periodic utility capacity surveys should be made of all potential refugee center sites in FORSCOM, as well as programmed and potential mobilization sites, to ensure that corrective actions indicated could be accomplished prior to actual need. Although the installation's water supplier was able to provide both the quality and quantity of potable water required, chlorine residual content was low in a few areas within Fort Indiantown Gap. From observation, facilities engineer personnel concluded that manual injection of chlorine into the three installation water storage tanks was required periodically to maintain the proper chlorine residual. They also determined that the high usage rates experienced during the refugee operation created, in effect, a scouring of the water lines which produced a higher organic substance in the water distribution system. This organic matter had been generated over a number of years when water consumption had been relatively low.

Heating

With the approach of cooler fall weather, long-term Cuban refugee residents attempted to start and maintain heat in many of the barracks. They broke into the boiler rooms and removed wood skirting from some buildings for use as fire wood. They removed or modified electrical...
fixtures and receptacles in barracks and thus created significant fire and safety hazards. Although the Fort Indiantown Gap Fire Department used interpreters to assist in fire prevention procedures and inspections, the designated Cuban barracks chiefs failed to exercise sufficient control over the barracks occupants. On the other hand, the legal turning on and off of heat in the barracks occupied by Cuban refugees as weather conditions changed created difficult scheduling problems for boiler firemen. During non-heat days, boiler firemen worked on the day shift. When heat was required, their tour of duty had to be changed to provide twenty-four hour a day service. There seemed to be no real lasting solution to this problem so long as the weather remained variable. In addition, many heating elements in existing hot water heaters in the occupied barracks failed due to the continuous operation of the elements because of the abnormally high consumption of hot water. Facilities and engineering personnel were forced to change the hot water temperature setting from the recommended energy conservation setting of 105°F to a setting between 160°F and 180°F. This was done in an attempt to create a higher hot water turnover rate. For the most part, it proved to be successful in prolonging the life of the individual heating elements.

Electrical Wiring

The heating problem was further compounded by the fact that the refugees energetically removed batteries from smoke detectors in their quarters and modified electrical wiring and receptacles to the extent that they constituted serious fire and safety hazards. This was a recurring problem throughout the entire operation and no amount of special instructions in Spanish succeeded in eliminating the problem. The only practical solution for facilities and engineering personnel — in the absence of any meaningful disciplinary action on the part of the operational Federal civilian agencies — was to continue with their fire inspections and maintenance and repair work so as to minimize the potential fire and safety hazards created by this condition.

Procurement

The pressing requirement to purchase large amounts of material and supplies, such as lumber and hardware, in a very short period of time created problems with the General Services Administration and local vendors or suppliers. From time to time, the delivery or pickup of items was delayed due to the lack of sufficient manpower and/or transportation. The large purchases of material and supplies (at least in the Fort Indiantown Gap area) could be difficult under normal conditions. The Task Force commander recommended that Federal civilian agencies in a position to direct military installations with special assignments should provide sufficient advance notification for planning and preparation.

Miscellaneous

Miscellaneous topics included Cuban refugee self-help, verbal work order requests, window shade, and window screen problems. The Cuban
refugee self-help program, although well intentioned, encountered counter productive delays and coordination problems from its beginnings. At one time, all of the Reserve Component noncommissioned officers during their Annual Training with the Director of Facilities and Engineering had to be used to support the program. In the future, Civil Affairs Provisional Support Units should be required to assume the responsibility for signing for all of the self-help tools so as to reduce the directorate’s role in supervising participants in the self-help program. The directorate’s personnel should be primarily responsible only for the materials issued. Another operational bottleneck developed in the directorate when supervisors and employees were flooded with verbal requests from Task Force, Garrison, and other Cuban refugee support activities during the first week of the refugee processing operation. Under normal conditions, work order request forms were submitted by the requestor. Due to the urgency of the situation, the directorate agreed to prepare the necessary work order requests. This decision soon backfired and created a massive backlog of these documents. The subsequent assignment of an engineering representative to the Task Force Emergency Operations Center finally assisted the directorate in gaining control of the situation to the point where it could demand that future work orders follow the normal procedure and be initiated in writing by the requestor. Actual experience proved that it was a waste of time and money to install window shades or screens since the refugees destroyed or disposed of the vast majority of them.

**Comptroller**

**Problems, Lessons Learned, and Recommendations**

**Introduction**

Considering the urgency and the complexity of the operations of the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Processing Center, it was surprising that the supporting Installation Comptroller reported only two major areas of concern. These included routine delays in the receipt of obligation documents needed to support Standard Finance System (STANFINS) processing operations and a number of problems in civilian pay administration due to inexperienced supervision and the rapid influx of a large number of temporary civilian employees.

**STANFINS Processing Operations**

The routine delays experienced in the receipt by Installation Finance and Accounting personnel of obligation documents for input to the Standard Finance System (STANFINS) caused the daily listings to reflect lower than actual obligations recorded in the mission accomplishment area. This produced management supervisory problems throughout the chain of command. This embarrassing problem was solved through the institution of a requirement for daily reporting of Miscellaneous Obligation Documents (MOD) from the actual number of contractor-operated dining facilities in use each day as well as the number of contractor-operated buses in use each day.
Civilian Pay Administration

A combination of the following circumstances caused a problem in the civilian pay administration area. It involved 211 temporary civilian employees with little or no Government employment experience, as well as a military supervisor with only minimal experience or training in civilian pay administration. It was compounded by the general disorder and confusion concerning the initial reception and processing of the Cuban refugees. These unavoidable circumstances resulted in inadequate control and improper reporting of Time and Attendance Cards (T&AC) for temporary civilian employees as well as bottlenecks and additional workload within the Civilian Payroll Section due to a number of specific causes. These included the improper coding of Time and Attendance Cards, the tardy submission of the cards, and their improper certification or certification by unauthorized individuals. Other specific causes included the non-submission or untimely submission of overtime authorizations or other supporting documentation; unnecessary telephone or walk-in inquiries which should have been directed to the proper timekeeper or operating official; and numerous unnecessary adjustments and corrections. In hindsight, experienced personnel familiar with civilian pay administrative procedures should have been used to control the new temporary employees. In future operations of this nature (and mobilization), the span of control should be kept to a manageable level. One supervisor, as at Fort Indiantown Gap, should not have been required to keep track of all employees. The time and attendance reporting responsibilities should be delegated to the lowest level possible. Changes in work assignments and work centers should be minimized as much as possible. Initial coordination and mutual assistance between the installation Civilian Personnel Office, Finance, and Task Force personnel must be emphasized. Needless to say, the late and occasionally inaccurate payments resulting from the above noted circumstances caused immediate morale and financial problems for the temporary civilian employees involved.

Staff Judge Advocate
Problems, Lessons Learned, and Recommendations

Introduction

Staff Judge Advocate problems included civil and criminal jurisdiction and the termination of temporary civilian employees. The civil and criminal jurisdiction problem was never satisfactorily resolved during the entire life of Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Processing Center. It produced many instances of criminal misconduct on the part of Cuban refugees which should have been punished but were not due to this technical jurisdictional dispute. The continued (and unpunished) presence of these law violators within the Cuban housing enclaves contributed to even more violence and inhibited the maintenance of security and safety by the operating Federal civilian operating agencies.

Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction

The State of Pennsylvania owned the land on which Fort Indiantown Gap was located which was leased to the United States as a training area.
for Reserve Component units. As previously discussed in this chapter, the State had, in the past, offered to cede concurrent jurisdiction to the Federal Government on a number of occasions. The United States, however, consistently refused to accept such jurisdiction, thereby retaining only proprietary jurisdiction. The fact was (and will be) that, so long as the United States maintains only proprietary jurisdiction over Fort Indiantown Gap, the Federal authorities will have no way of prosecuting most crimes committed by civilians (including aliens) on post. Prosecution will remain at the discretion of the local State and County authorities. When and if Fort Indiantown Gap is used in the future as a detention area for aliens, the United States should establish concurrent jurisdiction as prescribed by 40 United States Code 255.

Termination of Temporary Civilian Employees

Due to various violations of regulations concerning entry into the Cuban refugee compounds and fraternization with the refugees, a number of temporary civilian employees were terminated. Supervisory personnel had not been sufficiently briefed on the procedures to be used in the termination of temporary civilian employees, a condition which led to a number of corollary problem areas. In future operations at any FORSCOM installation which required the hiring of temporary civilian personnel, provisions should be made for a thorough briefing between the Civilian Personnel Office, the Staff Judge Advocate, and the pertinent supervisors.

Management Information Systems Office
Problems, Lessons Learned, and Recommendations

Introduction

Problem areas in the Management Information Systems Office included the usual interface difficulties as well as initial lack of coordination for automatic data processing support. Until these difficulties were corrected or minimized, efficient automatic data processing support was not possible.

Computer Interface

The on-line computer system installed in the Task Force Headquarters did not easily interface with the installation computer. A third party was required to make the necessary file conversion. In addition, the vendor was too optimistic in promising early operational status of the on-line computer system. Converting the files during the holiday period was not considered. It proved to be most difficult to order, install and convert files, and to become operational in a short period of time. In the future, the senior agency (Federal Emergency Management Agency) should conduct a study to determine the hardware and software requirements for an on-line computer system to process personnel. In addition to the hardware and software problem areas encountered, there was a distinct lack of clear cut guidelines and line of authority in the early stages of the Task Force organization which resulted in poorly coordinated automatic data processing support. For instance, the initial form designed to capture Cuban refugee (alien) data was not coordinated with
all of the interested staff agencies; subsequently, the form was changed
several times. The "final" forms used were still incomplete and poorly
designed. Requirements for reports and listings in general were not
well defined and much actually needed information was not readily
available while "catch up" programming of the computer was being
accomplished. Controls over the flow of Cuban refugee information docu-
ments were not rigid enough. No one person or office could be held
accountable for this vital information.

Senior Agency Staff Support

The senior agency staff (Federal Emergency Management Agency) should
have included at least one member who was well informed in automatic
data processing concepts. This person should have been among the first
to contact the supporting installation. The Cuban refugee data sheet
should have been complete, easily understood, and simple to fill out by
non-technical personnel. One person or staff office should have
organized a control office to log, control, and route both input and
output data. Report requirements should have been well defined and
fully approved prior to writing the computer programs. The data files
should have been designed to accommodate all data. In future operations
of this nature, an automatic data processing staff member should be
included in the senior agency and should make contact early on with the
supporting installation in order to lay on all automatic data processing
requirements. Consideration should be given to use of the Prisoner of
War segment of the Army Standard Information System. This Military
Police Management Information System (MPMIS) segment reportedly included
a prepared set of data elements, procedures, and reports for recording
and maintaining a file on an alien type population.

Civilian Personnel Office

Problems, Lessons Learned, and Recommendations

Introduction

The Fort Indiantown Gap Civilian Personnel Office experienced a
number of problems regarding dual pay, employment and strength data
inaccuracies, and employee complaints for not receiving pay. In addi-
tion, the Civilian Personnel office encountered serious difficulties
when it attempted to transfer civilian employees to other controlling
agencies brought into Fort Indiantown Gap to assist in the operation of
the Refugee Processing Center. It should be noted that the majority of
these problems probably would have not occurred -- or at least to a
more diminished degree -- in a less turbulent crisis ridden atmosphere.

Data and Pay Complaints

Many Army temporary civilian employees hired as interpreters were
used by other civilian agencies such as the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, the Department of Health and Human Services, the American Red
Cross, and the like. Because of this mixed up situation, some Army tem-
porary civilian employees received only partial pay or no pay if they
were not located. This situation was aggravated by the fact that some
of the civilian agencies failed to furnish any information concerning
the locations and hours of work of this category of employee to the Army
administrators. In order to correct this unacceptable pay situation,
and to effect the necessary transfer of many employees to other agencies
and to preclude dual payment and inflation of Army temporary civilian
employees strength data, the Civilian Personnel Office had to expend many
additional hours of effort to effect a workable resolution to the
problem. Based on this experience, the Task Force commander recommended
that, in future operations requiring a sudden expansion of temporary
civilian employees, the Civilian Personnel Office hire only for those
positions for which the Army would have requirements.

Transfer of Temporary Civilian Employees

The Fort Indiantown Gap Civilian Personnel Office experienced
extreme difficulties in transferring some of the temporary civilian
employees to controlling agencies on post. The Federal Emergency
Management Agency and the American Red Cross cooperated, but the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services did not despite numerous attempts at
coordination by civilian personnel specialists. In some cases, the tem-
porary civilian employees were concurrently on the rolls of the Army and
other civilian agencies. Some temporary civilian employees, not imme-
diately located, were subsequently found to be working under Department
of Health and Human Services control and no attempts had been made by
any of the agencies involved to coordinate any of the transfers. The
Department of Health and Human Services refused to pick up some of these
temporary civilian employees despite the fact that they were using their
services. Closer supervision was needed from the very beginning to
preclude such vexatious problems. In all future operations of this
general nature, all temporary civilian employees hired by the Army
should have their military employment terminated prior to their starting
work for any of the civilian organizations.

U.S. Army Communications Command
Problems, Lessons Learned, and Recommendations

Introduction

The U.S. Army Communications Command element at Fort Indiantown Gap
experienced serious problems involving the installation, relocation,
removal, and reconfiguration of telephones during the course of the
Cuban refugee processing operation due primarily to the urgency of the
overall situation and the unfamiliarity of many of the users with the
communications system and their administrative responsibilities. Other
problems involved the procurement of both tactical and non-tactical
radios.

Servicing and Use of the Telephone System

Due to the uniqueness of the telephone system servicing Fort Indian-
town Gap and the unfamiliarity of the various persons assigned to the
non-Department of Defense agencies such as the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, the Department of State, the Department of Health and
Human Services, the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Federal Protective Service, actions and procedures were never documented to ensure that internal telephone service was installed, understood, and managed in a cost effective manner. Civilian agency personnel were not concerned nor did they understand the installations's telephone service. They tended to count on the telephone to achieve their missions without really caring except to get somebody on the other end for various purposes. Unnecessary costs, confusion, mistakes, and countless hours of work could have been avoided through better management. In future operations, it should be immediately determined which office would pay the cost for particular categories of telephone calls. In the case of non-Department of Defense users, telephone service requests should be sent to the non-Department of Defense representative for approval and further transmittal. In the case of a Department of Defense agency, the request should then follow the rules and regulations laid down by the Department of the Army.

**Procurement of Tactical and Non-Tactical Radios**

The procurement of both tactical and non-tactical radios by the U.S. Army Communications Command element at Fort Indiantown Gap was hindered by the fact that the requests for the latter type of radio were not forwarded by the potential users directly to that agency. Instead, they were forwarded to the installation's Director of Industrial Operations for procurement action along with the requests for tactical radios. Inasmuch as the U.S. Army Communications Command element handled the procurement of non-tactical radios, the practice noted above led to unnecessary confusion and longer procurement time. Other technical considerations which had to be resolved by communications command personnel before any procurement action could be initiated included the fact that the Civil Affairs Provisional Support Units, the Military Police, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of State, and other organizational elements needed small handy-talkie radios which could be worn on a belt. In addition, each agency had its own radio frequency. Some nets consisted of two channels while others needed only one. The proper channels for procurement of non-tactical radios required that each individual office requiring such equipment request and justify its needs. Upon approval by the Task Force Commander or non-Department of Defense coordinator, the requests, along with fund citations, were then forwarded to the U.S. Army Communications Command element for procurement.

**Public Affairs**

**Problems, Lessons Learned, and Recommendations**

**Introduction**

The reader will recall that, earlier in this chapter, General Brookshire, the Task Force Commander, remarked that the Cuban refugee processing operation should have been a propaganda defeat for the Cuban Government. The fact that it was not was primarily attributable to the focus of the U.S. (and foreign) news media on the undesirable and disruptive elements placed among the departees by the Castro government. It
was also due to the Federal Civilian Agencies' inability to deal successfully with these disruptive elements because of the jurisdictional problems peculiar to Fort Indiantown Gap and their own charters.

**Public Affairs Operational Deficiencies**

Public affairs personnel on the scene during the operational phase of the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Processing Center felt, in retrospect, that there had been a general lack of direction in the overall public affairs program from the very beginning. This lack of direction included "reacting" to media queries and many times being on the defensive when they (public affairs personnel) should have been on the offensive with facts, news releases, and other information for the press. Within Fort Indiantown Gap itself, the community relations aspect of the overall public affairs program was considered to have been successful due to the aggressive program devised by the Fort Indiantown Gap Public Affairs Office. The command information element of the overall program was completely neglected, however. This resulted in uninformed soldiers and civilian employees and the needless proliferation of both false and partially true rumors. Public affairs personnel at the installation level felt that "some sort of game plan" should have been developed by higher headquarters to ensure that the public affairs program as presented would be orderly and aggressive and that it would include public information, community relations, and command information (the three facets of any good public affairs program). At the outset of any future similar operation, the operating public affairs officer and his staff should have a workable public affairs plan already in hand.

**Visitors Bureau Observations**

Visitors Bureau personnel tended to support the observations and recommendations of the installation public affairs personnel as presented above. They reported in their after action comments that military and civilian personnel working with the Cuban refugees had a tendency to focus on the negative aspect of the operation when briefing very important persons (VIP). Based upon their observational experience in this matter, visitors bureau personnel noted that it was important to stress the overall positive picture when briefing visitors. Problem areas should not have been ignored or covered up, but they should not have overshadowed successes. In future operations of this nature, briefing personnel should be prebriefed by the Visitors Bureau on the proper techniques to use.
Chapter V

FORT McCoy EARLY SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Background

By the first week of May, it had become obvious to the Department of the Army and FORSCOM that a third Army installation, and possibly more, would have to be prepared to properly accommodate the ever increasing flow of Cuban refugees into the United States. On 9 May, FORSCOM, in response to a Departmental directive, instructed the Commander, Fort McCoy, Wisc., Colonel William J. Moran, to determine the number of refugees his post could support in terms of housing and processing facilities, based upon a housing requirement of fifty-five square feet per person. FORSCOM also needed information concerning the number of heated and unheated barracks available, the number of messing facilities by type and capacity, the amount of bedding on hand, the capacity of current water and sewage systems, the ability of the nearest airfield to receive C-141, 727, and 737 aircraft, and the impact on Reserve Component Annual Training for 1980 -- Fort McCoy's principal mission -- once the refugees moved in. Additional action addresses and potential sources for supporting troop units included the Commanders, 24th Infantry Division (Mech) (-), Fort Stewart, Ga.; the 5th Infantry Division (Mech) (-), Fort Polk, La.; Fort Devens, Mass.; and Fort Drum, N.Y.

FORSCOM also furnished an informational copy of this message to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command at Fort Monroe, Va., due to the fact that some troop units being considered for possible deployment to Fort McCoy were FORSCOM units located on TRADOC installations.

Fort McCoy's Capability Assessment

In his capability assessment statement, Colonel Moran indicated that Fort McCoy was capable of providing billeting and supporting messing facilities for 12,000 persons on an immediate basis. He predicted that, in two more weeks the post could support 15,000 persons, and by early September, if necessary, it could support 18,000. At any one time, approximately one-third of the billeting area would be unheated. Beds and mattresses were available but there would be a deficit of 10,000 individual issues of linen and blankets. Open bay barracks would have to be used by women and children. At the time of the assessment, they were without shades. In general, the messing facilities were equipped but not activated. Upon activation they would require milk dispensers and large supplies of paper and plastic items, as well as specialized food items to achieve a partial normal diet for the refugees. Essential personnel augmentation required prior to the arrival of the refugees included medical personnel, food service personnel, military police, qualified interpreters, drivers, and maintenance personnel. The nearest

1. (1) Msg 071805Z May 80, DA to FORSCOM, subj: Refugee Processing Center; (2) Msg 091940Z May 80, FORSCOM to Distr, subj: Refugee Processing Center.
major airfield, Volk Field, a Wisconsin Air National Guard installation, was located fifteen miles away and was capable of handling commercial jet aircraft larger than the Air Force's C-141 aircraft. Since organic military transportation was not locally available to transport refugee passengers from Volk Field to Fort McCoy, commercial contract transportation would have to be used. The Fort McCoy Airfield was capable of handling aircraft up to the C-130 size. If selected for refugee use, however, it would be necessary to augment Fort McCoy's operational staff after 1 September, when the Reserve Component Annual Training period was largely over, until all the refugees were out processed and placed. The installation's utility capability was adequate as was its capability to support scheduled 1980 Reserve Component training.2

In an expanded capability assessment statement, occasioned by subsequent communication with FORSCOM and the Department of the Army, Colonel Moran reported that the initial opening cost for the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center would be $1.0 million. He indicated that there would be no significant environmental impact and no significant political impact. He did, however, qualify this latter prediction by pointing out that the general public had not been advised of the possibility that the installation might be directed to undertake the refugee mission. On the other hand, he viewed the economic impact as being very favorable, particularly in view of the fact that the surrounding rural area of Wisconsin was suffering an unemployment rate of 9 percent and an inflation rate of 10 to 12 percent. The increased local spending in the area as well as increased employment opportunities provided by the establishment and operation of a refugee processing center would have a positive economic effect. The lead time required to open the processing center would be a minimum of ten days. The center's maximum refugee support capability would be 15,000 persons based upon an influx of no more than 1,200 per day. The lead time for mission execution purposes should be at least three days and, ideally, seven days. Augmentation support required included an engineer element (to be determined); a medical field hospital with 10 doctors, 5 dentists, and 15 nurses; a battalion headquarters and 1 company of psychological operations personnel; a minimum of 1 civil affairs company; sufficient Active Army mess personnel to operate 41 dining facilities; and a minimum of 1 light transportation truck company. Colonel Moran based these estimates upon the operational experience of Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Processing Centers and upon personal consultation with General Robert M. Shoemaker, the FORSCOM commander, who visited Fort McCoy on 13 May 1980 to inspect Reserve Component 1980 Annual Training and to discuss the Cuban refugee situation.3

Fort McCoy’s Preliminary Planning Guidance

In the meantime, pending the receipt of detailed instructions from higher headquarters and the appointment and arrival of the Task Force commander, Colonel Moran issued the following preliminary planning guidance to his staff, which was already heavily engaged in supporting 1980 Reserve Component Annual Training. Fort McCoy would provide support to the Cuban refugee operation without any degradation to its Reserve Component Annual Training mission. Fort McCoy’s support of the Cuban refugee and the annual training requirements would constitute two separate and distinct operations and would be managed accordingly. Fort McCoy would maintain a host-tenant relationship with the Cuban refugee operation. The Cuban refugee support operation would be treated as a mobilization exercise (MOBEK). The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) would fund the incremental costs connected with the Cuban refugee support operation. The local FERA representatives would validate all support costs. However, all existing statutory limitations and ceilings would remain in effect. Automatic reimbursement procedures would be used, the Form 1080 billing would be sent to Headquarters, Fifth U.S. Army, for consolidation and further submission to FORSCOM. On 13 May, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the General Services Administration, and the Department of Defense conducted a joint analysis of Fort McCoy’s capability to accept refugees. Their findings were highly favorable. FORSCOM advised Fort McCoy to permit these three agencies to function in their respective roles and to make maximum use of contracting, if the installation was selected as a Cuban refugee processing center.4

Selection of Fort McCoy as a Cuban Refugee Processing Center

On 15 May, Colonel Moran received an information copy of a Departmental message outlining Department of Defense support to the housing and processing of Cuban refugees at military and non-military facilities in the continental United States. This message indicated that the Department of Defense, General Services Administration, and Federal Emergency Management Agency joint site survey had resulted in a recommendation that Fort McCoy should be opened as a refugee facility after Fort Indiantown Gap reached capacity. At that point in time, Fort Indiantown Gap had a capacity of 8,000 and a refugee population of 0, but the current refugee flow would fill it up in just a few days. Earlier that same day, Colonel Moran dispatched a reconnaissance party to the Fort Chaffee, Ark., Refugee Processing Center to gather data on the operation, since Fort Chaffee had amassed a great deal of experience during its earlier Vietnamese Refugee operations and from its ongoing Cuban Refugee operations.5

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4. Daily Journals, 9, 12, and 13 May 80.
5. (1) Daily Journal, 15 May 80; (2) Msg 151700Z May 80, DA to Distr, subj: DOD Support to Cuban Refugees as of 150800 May EDT.
CHART 11

COXK, Ft McCoy

CDR, TF Refugee

FEMA Washington

FEMA Regional

COORD Support

1. TF is Ft. McCoy tenant unit.
2. TF Staff augmented by ARR V
3. CDR, TF, is clearing house for support from post.
4. CDR, TF, is C&C for TF augmentation.

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from Fifth U.S. Army that the Department of the Army had selected Fort McCoy as its third FORSCOM-operated Cuban refugee processing center. This selection was based on the previously noted findings and recommendations of the joint Department of Defense, General Services Administration, and Federal Emergency Management Agency site selection survey team. The team had submitted its recommendations to the White House which, in turn, had directed the Department of Defense to establish a refugee support facility at Fort McCoy. In the same message, Department of the Army directed FORSCOM to appoint a Task Force Commander and establish such a facility at Fort McCoy, prepared to receive up to 15,000 refugees beginning on 29 May 1980. The Department cautioned all addressees that no release of the information or movement of personnel or units would be accomplished prior to 1300Z 19 May 1980. Based upon informal information received from higher headquarters, Colonel Moran immediately published the command relationship schematic shown on Chart II.6

Receipt of Execute Order

On 19 May 1980, FORSCOM issued an execute order which directed the Commander, Fifth U.S. Army, Fort Sam Houston, Tex., to activate and operate a refugee processing center at Fort McCoy, Wis., to receive and process 15,000 Cuban refugees. FORSCOM issued this execute order under the authority and by the direction of the Secretary of Defense.

Situation. As of 19 May 1980, large numbers of Cuban refugees continued to arrive in Key West, Fla., primarily from the port of Mariel in Cuba and the influx was expected to continue for the immediate future.

Execution. FORSCOM selected certain organizations who were to provide supporting troop units to the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center and to deploy task organized elements as soon as possible so as to be able to initially organize and operate a refugee center capable of receiving and processing 15,000 Cuban refugees. However, they were to be prepared to accommodate up to 30,000 refugees. Refugee assistance would include, but not be limited to, transportation, medical support, security, engineer support, personnel processing, and public affairs support. FORSCOM directed the Commander, Fifth U.S. Army, who was already charged with establishing and operating the Refugee Processing Center at Fort McCoy, to determine the feasibility of employing Reserve Component Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs units as part of, or in addition to, their Annual Training, to support refugee operations since all Active Army Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs units were already totally committed. FORSCOM directed Colonel Moran to assist and support Fifth U.S. Army in the activation and operation of the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center. FORSCOM also designated Colonel Moran as the Base Support Installation (BSI) commander and

Colonel William J. Moran and staff at Fort McCoy, Wis., in May 1982.
further instructed him to coordinate with and support the Task Force commander in the operation of the refugee center. Other commanders designated to furnish initial troop unit elements were as follows:

| 1st Infantry Division (Mech) & Fort Riley, Kans. | 48th Medical Detachment |
| 4th Infantry Division (Mech) & Fort Carson, Colo. | 28th Public Affairs Detachment |
| 101st Airborne Division (AASLT) & Fort Campbell, Ky. | 52d Engineer Battalion (-) |
| U.S. Army Training Center & Fort Dix, N.J. | 86th Combat Support Hospital |
| U.S. Army Armored Center & Fort Knox, Ky. | C&C Element, 759th Military Police Battalion |
| U.S. Army Engineer Training Center & Fort Leonard Wood, Mo. | 401st Adjutant General Company (Per Svcs) |

**Detailed Staff Planning Initiated**

On 15 May, Colonel Moran had dispatched a Fort McCoy Reconnaissance Party to Fort Chaffee to observe the ongoing operations of that installation's Refugee Processing Center. On the following day, he received information that Fort McCoy had been selected as the next site for a refugee processing center. He immediately initiated those local actions which would support the implementation of the execute order when it was received. On 17 May, he conducted a staff meeting at which he debriefed the Fort Chaffee Reconnaissance Party and began detailed planning to support the Cuban refugee operation. He again emphasized to his staff that the Cuban refugee operation would be treated as a tenant activity and that he did not want Reserve Component Annual Training to be adversely affected. He also authorized the employment of the 416th Engineer Command, a U.S. Army Reserve unit then undergoing its 1980 Annual Training at Fort McCoy, to construct a Cuban refugee compound fence and to accomplish other supporting engineer projects. This employment marked the first use of a Reserve Component unit to support what became the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center. During that same period, the Post Chaplain canvassed the surrounding area for Spanish-speaking Roman Catholic priests, coordinated with local religious organizations with respect to offering assistance for the incoming Cuban refugees, and contacted the Milwaukee Catholic Diocese concerning the contracting of one full-time bilingual priest beginning 1 June. In other actions, the Post

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Provost Marshal activated a "Closed Post Policy," the Civilian Personnel Office suspended routine operations in preparation for its anticipated and expanded support mission, and planning and logistics personnel hurried to establish an Emergency Operations Center and to locate and prepare for issue supporting medical, housekeeping, and other required items of material. By 19 May, the day on which the Execute Order arrived, Fort McCoy had already assumed a mobilization posture.8

Initial Funding and Subsequent Reimbursement

On 19 May, the Department of the Army, in its role as the Department of Defense Executive Agent for the implementation of the Cuban Refugee Support Program, issued initial funding and subsequent reimbursement instructions relative to incremental costs incurred by Department of Defense participants in the program. In this message, the Executive Agent instructed Department of Defense activities, commands, and agencies involved in refugee support activities to establish automatic reimbursable orders for estimated additional costs to be incurred. Additional costs were defined as those incremental costs incurred in addition to normal operating expenses which were directly relatable to the support mission. Billings would be prepared on Standard Form 1080, supported by copies of all applicable documentation. Reimbursement would be made by the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Billings for reimbursement were to be prepared at the conclusion of the support mission and forwarded to Headquarters, First U.S. Army, Fort George G. Meade, Md., for consolidation and submission to the Federal Emergency Management Agency for direct reimbursement to the agencies concerned. Fort McCoy's initial cost estimates were in excess of $10 million.9

Selection of Task Force Commander

On 20 May, the Department of the Army announced the selection of Colonel (P) Bernard M. Herring, Division Artillery Commander, 9th Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Wash., as the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center Task Force Commander. The Department defined his mission on 22 May as the processing and provision of logistical and administrative support of Cuban refugees at Fort McCoy. Upon the appointment of Colonel Herring as the Task Force Commander, Maj. Gen. Michael D. Healy, Commander, U.S. Army Readiness Region V and the Task Force Commander's immediate superior, recommended to Fifth U.S. Army that Colonel Herring be immediately promoted in order that he might have optimum impact on the situation. General Healy also informed the Fifth U.S. Army commander, Lt.Gen. William B. Caldwell, III, that he had assigned his deputy commander, Colonel Enrique Irizarry, as the Task Force Deputy Commander. In addition to Colonel Irizarry, who spoke fluent Spanish,

8. (1) Daily Journals, 16, 17, and 18 May 80; (2) Staff Mtg w/ COL Moran, 17 May 80.
General Healy assigned two more Spanish-speaking officers to the Task Force staff who were highly experienced in refugee processing center operations. 10

Unpredictability of the Cuban Refugee Flow

General Healy also retransmitted a message from the Department of the Army addressed to Colonel Herring which stated that, because of the unpredictability of the Cuban refugee flow, the capacity of the existing refugee processing centers might be exceeded before 29 May, the date on which the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center was scheduled to receive its first incoming increment of Cuban refugees. The Department wished to be advised as to the earliest possible date on which the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center could be prepared to receive refugees in daily increments of up to 3,000. Colonel Herring informed his point of contact in the Department, Brig.Gen. Roderick D. Renick, Acting Director of Military Support, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, that the Fort McCoy commander, Colonel Moran, had already informed FORSCOM on 12 and 14 May that Cuban refugees could not be accepted at Fort McCoy earlier than 25 May, and even this date could not really be confirmed unless dining facilities personnel were contracted for prior to that date. Further, Colonel Moran had advised FORSCOM that he recommended an acceptance rate of 1,200 refugees a day because of Volk Field's capacity to take commercial aircraft and the turnaround time from Volk Field to Fort McCoy which was more than two hours. However, this capacity could be expanded on a limited surge basis to 2,500 refugees per day. The Federal Emergency Management Agency Regional Agent on the scene, Mr. Ronald Buddecke, who had discussed this matter with the FEMA Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), Mr. Robert Connor, on the latter's visit to Fort McCoy on 16 May, concurred in Colonel Herring's message. Potential problems in using Volk Field were subsequently solved on 23 May when the Federal Emergency Management Agency selected the LaCrosse Municipal Airport, LaCrosse, Wisconsin, as the arrival airfield for Cuban refugees. FEMA based this decision on concern for the safety of the passengers and the aircraft, the high level of support available at the LaCrosse Airfield as compared with the lack of adequate support facilities for this type of an operation at Volk Field, the lack of adequate safety features at Volk Field, and recommendations of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The FEMA Disaster Control Office in Miami, Fla., notified FORSCOM that the first shake-down flight would take place the morning of 27 May with a normal flow commencing 28 May. FEMA obtained the needed ground support equipment by contract from Wisconsin Air National Guard sources. 11

10. (1) Daily Journal, 20 May 80; (2) Msg 201610Z May 80, DA to Distr, subj: DOD Support to Cuban Refugees as of 200/800 May EDT; (3) Msg 201520Z May 80, DCG ARR V to CG USA FIVE, subj: Cuban Refugee Support; (4) Fort McCoy Perm Order 8-1, 22 May 80.

Army Reserve engineer troops assigned to the 416th Engineer Command (USAR), Chicago, Ill., erect initial Cuban refugee fencing at Fort McCoy, Wisc., just prior to the arrival of the first refugees.

Concertina wire used to prevent fence-jumping surrounds the Cuban Juvenile Compound.
Establishment of the Task Force

On 22 May, the Commander, Fort McCoy, acting in accordance with authority received from FORSCOM on 18 May, published orders establishing the Fort McCoy Cuban Refugee Processing Center Task Force, with the newly promoted Brig. Gen. Bernard M. Herring in command. Variations in the operational strength of this provisional unit were to be determined by the Task Force Commander. General Herring's first official action was to request a two day extension of Annual Training for 240 volunteers (55 officers and 185 enlisted personnel) of the 416th Engineer Command (USAR) to accomplish priority construction tasks (compound fencing) in support of the Task Force's mission. Headquarters, Fifth U.S. Army, approved this extension and the unit completed the compound fencing on 25 May. On the day before the activation of the Task Force, Department of Defense Cuban refugee support figures reflected that the present population had reached 35,200, thus the current capacity was 50,500, and that the planned capacity was 70,000. Fort McCoy figures, which were included in these overall figures, reflected a present population of 0, a current capacity of 0, and a planned capacity of 15,000. Fort Chaffee, the first Cuban Refugee Processing Center to be activated by the Army and FORSCOM, reported a current population of 19,000, a current capacity of 20,000 and a planned capacity of 20,000. Fort Indiantown Gap, the second and only other Army Refugee Processing Center in operation at that time, reported a present population of 6,200, a current capacity of 15,500, and a planned capacity of 20,000. However, Fort Indiantown Gap's refugee population had grown to 6,200 in less than five days. Less than a week later, on 29 May, the day on which Fort McCoy received its first refugees, both Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap were operating close to capacity. As of 0600 Eastern Daylight Time on that day, Fort Chaffee reported a present population of 18,843, a current capacity of 19,000, and a planned capacity of 20,000. Fort McCoy, the last of the three Army Cuban Refugee Processing Centers to be placed in active operation, reported a current population of 0, a current capacity of 12,000, and a planned capacity of 25,000, which had been expanded from 15,000 during the past week. At this time, Cuban refugees were still arriving in Miami from Mariel at the rate of several thousand per day with no end in sight. 12

Final Preparations

As noted above, most staff sections and units assigned to Fort McCoy began planning under Colonel Moran's direction and guidance prior to the

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(1) Daily Journal, 22 May 80; (2) Msg 182045Z May 80, FORSCOM to Distr, subj: Provisional Units; (3) Ft. McCoy Form Order 8-1, 22 May 80; (4) Msg 221640Z May 80, TF Cdr to Fifth U.S. Army, subj: Personnel Extension Annual Training; (5) Msg 212115Z May 80, DA to Distr, subj: DOD Support to Cuban Refugees as of 211100Z May EDT; (6) Msg 292014Z May 80, DA to Distr, subj: DOD Support to Cuban Refugees as of 290600 EDT; (7) Msg 271700Z May 80, DA to Distr, subj: Expansion of Refugee Capacity at Ft. McCoy, WI.
In a test run of the In-processing System for the Cuban refugees, a U.S. Public Health Service officer assists a soldier who poses as a refugee.

In a similar test run, a civilian interpreter assists military clerks in gathering the necessary personnel data from the Cuban refugees.
52d Engineer Battalion soldier fabricates wooden partitions to be used in the preparation of barracks in the Refugee Center.

Seventh Day Adventist Church volunteers from LaCrosse, Wisc., stack "comfort kits" for issue to incoming Cuban refugees.

**Personnel Planning and Preparation.** Personnel planning and preparations began when personnel in the Post Director of Plans, Training, and Security (DPTS) coordinated with Army Readiness Region V and Fifth U.S. Army staff counterparts to identify personnel to form the Task Force staff. The staff G-1 (Personnel) was established on 23 May and became the proponent for the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center. Its overall area of interest included such diverse functions and activities as Security Screening, Alien Designation, Preparation of Identification Cards, the obtaining of refugee personal profile data, the operational activities of the 401st Adjutant General Company (Par Svcs), and effective liaison with and support of the U.S. Marshals Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Between 25 and 28 May, the Task Force conducted numerous processing run-throughs using Task Force interpreters to simulate actual refugees. The inprocessing center flow was repeatedly adjusted to correct the problem areas encountered. Civilian temporary hire interpreters were used primarily to operate the twenty-four bilingual personal profile data collection desks. Some of these civilian temporary hire interpreters were hired from as far away as Chicago. The military interpreters were used as monitors and guides. Military personnel assigned to the 401st Adjutant General Company operated the identification card/photo section, which consisted of four cameras and four lamentation stations.

**Engineer Planning and Preparation.** Fort McCoy Facility Engineer personnel accomplished extensive planning and preparation for the support of the refugee processing center operation prior to the arrival of Task Force staff personnel. They had already planned, directed, and implemented both internal and external construction and utility projects, including containment area fencing, activation of buildings (utilities, water, sewage, electrical), and partitioning of barracks. They had also processed and coordinated extensive support requirements by civilian governmental agencies assigned to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), attached military support units, and Fort McCoy installation activities. During the period 23 through 25 May, the 416th Engineer Command (USAR) constructed over 20,000 linear feet of fencing and gates surrounding the 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, and 700 blocks. Fifth U.S. Army extended the command's Annual Training period for two additional days for selected subordinate units to accomplish this mission. During the period 24 through 27 May, a Task Force (two

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The entire paragraph is based on: (1) Ltr AFZR-TF, Cdr Ft. McCoy TF to Cdr Fifth USA, 7 Jun 80, subj: After Action Report, DOD Support to Cuban Refugees, hereafter referred to as Ft. McCoy TF AAR, 7 Jun 80; (2) Ft. McCoy Daily SITREP 006, 29 May 80, hereafter referred to as Daily SITREP; (3) Daily Journal, 23 May 80.
construction companies (-) of 180 personnel from the 52d Engineer Battalion (CBT)(HWY), Fort Carson, Colo., constructed required billet and latrine partitions for 35 buildings which had been assigned as refugee family quarters. In addition, the Task Force prefabricated an additional fifteen partition sets to be installed when actually required.

Security Planning and Preparation. While the main body of the 759th Military Police Battalion, Fort Dix, N.J., was busy making arrangements at that post, the advance party arrived on site at Fort McCoy to make arrangements for facilitating the rapid establishment of control once the main body arrived. Major areas of concern included the establishment of points of contact within the Task Force, making housekeeping arrangements, relaying essential information to the main body, and in general, identifying operational considerations for the security of the refugee area in coordination with the Task Force Provost Marshal. Both parties attempted to resolve the confusion as to the extent of authority and jurisdiction the Military Police would have over the Cuban refugees once they arrived at Fort McCoy.

Medical Planning and Preparation. The advance party of the 86th Combat Support Hospital, Fort Campbell, Ky., coordinated a plan with local medical representatives and Task Force headquarters which integrated its medical unit, self-contained, transportable (MUST) equipment with elements of the fixed hospital at Fort McCoy. On 24 May, it began establishing a 100-bed hospital. The unit fixed hospital beds and supporting equipment from the Fort McCoy prepositioned war reserve stocks (PWRS), and established three wards in the fixed facility area. The unit also erected emergency medical treatment (EMT) and dispensary inflatable sections and established expandable pharmacy, laboratory, and x-ray (PLX) facilities. They also established two operating rooms (OR) and a central material supply (CMS) office in expandable units adjacent to the emergency medical treatment site and in close proximity to the wards. By 1800 hours on 24 May, the 86th Combat Support Hospital was fully operational. Later refinements included the establishment of a psychiatric interview area, orthopedic and oral surgery facilities, a morgue, and a hospital chapel.

Base Support Installation Planning and Preparation. As of 29 May 1980, the Fort McCoy Base Support Installation supported an overall Refugee Processing Center Task Force consisting of 747 U.S. Army personnel, 27 U.S. Army Reserve personnel, and 953 temporary hire civilian personnel. In addition, Fort McCoy administered some 20 contracts and 111 purchase orders. Major contracts included $5,553,900 for the operation of dining facilities, $442,738 for rental cars, and $3,998 for portable toilets, and were for varying periods of time up to six months. The overall contract total as of 29 May amounted to $7,246,000. The post did not report any major problem areas in contract administration as of that date.

Task Force Participation and Related Mission Statements

As of 29 May 1980, Fort McCoy Task Force participation and related mission statements were as follows. The Task Force headquarters
consisted of 46 personnel. Its mission was to activate and operate a refugee center at Fort McCoy, Wisc., to receive and process 15,000 Cuban refugees and to be prepared to expand operations to accommodate up to 30,000 refugees. The 759th Military Police Battalion, Fort Dix, N.J., consisted of 295 personnel, with augmentation from the 32d Military Police Company, Wisconsin Army National Guard (58 personnel). The battalion's mission was to provide security for the Task Force Refugee Operation. This included the secure and efficient movement of the refugees during convoy operations from the LaCrosse Municipal Airport to Fort McCoy and the security and maintenance of order around the Cuban refugee processing and billeting area. The 86th Combat Support Hospital, Fort Campbell, Ky., consisted of 185 personnel. Its mission was to operate an 80 (expanded to 100) bed hospital, Emergency Medical Treatment facility, hospital dispensary, two operating rooms, a Central Material Supply facility, and related ancillary services in support of the refugee program as well as Task Force military and civilian personnel. It was also responsible for augmenting and/or assuming operational control of those medical missions which the U.S. Public Health Service could not immediately assume; providing arrival airport medical triage; conducting medical inprocessing; performing x-ray screening, and accomplishing laboratory procedures in support of medical inprocessing. Additional mission responsibilities included the operation of two general health clinics; the furnishing of public health nurse support in designing and planning the operation of infant health care centers; the provision of preventative medicine support; the performance of Class I food inspections; and the operation of Task Force and hospital dining facilities.

The 401st Adjutant General Company (Personnel Services), Fort Knox, Ky., consisted of 105 personnel. Its mission was to assist in the processing of Cuban refugees and to provide personnel service support for the Task Force headquarters. The 12th Transportation Company (Light Truck) (-), Fort Leonard Wood, Mo., consisted of 78 personnel. It provided motor transportation support to include ambulance drivers for the 86th Combat Support Hospital. It also provided vehicles, drivers, and details in support of the American Red Cross and supported the Fort McCoy Director of Industrial Operations in picking up supplies and sports equipment in the nearby towns of Sparta and LaCrosse. It provided a 30-man detail to move 1,200 bunks and mattresses from buildings on post into the refugee compound. Finally, it provided back up support to the Fort McCoy Transportation Motor Pool (TMP). Headquarters, III Corps and Fort Hood, Tex., provided 99 military interpreters. Their mission was to provide interpreter support as required. The 28th Public Affairs Detachment, Fort Carson, Colo., consisted of 4 personnel with augmentation from the 363d Public Affairs Detachment (USAR), consisting of 6 personnel. Its mission was to augment public affairs activities. Specifically, it was placed in charge of the Command Information/Production Program to include the Refugee Handbook, the Chronicle newspaper, and a news scanning/clip service. The 96th Civil Affairs Group (-)

Fort Bragg, N.C., consisted of 9 personnel, with augmentation from the 432d Civil Affairs Group (USAR) consisting of 64 personnel. It provided command and control personnel to plan and coordinate the complete processing cycle of operations. After initial processing was completed, it would assume the duties incident to administration and logistical support of the refugee camp. The 8th Battalion, 4th Psychological Operations Group, Fort Bragg, N.C., consisted of 5 personnel with augmentation from the 13th Psychological Operations Battalion (USAR) consisting of 64 personnel. It facilitated and desensitized the screening process and billeting of refugees and promoted a gradual program of acculturation and awareness. The Departure and Arrival Airfield Control Group (DAACG), Fort Riley, Kans., consisted of 25 personnel. It coordinated refugee flights and transportation between the LaCrosse Municipal Airport and Fort McCoy. The U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) element consisted of 6 personnel who supported Justice Department processing. Finally, the 52d Engineer Battalion (-), Fort Carson, Colo., consisted of 177 personnel who provided essential support in establishing facilities to house the refugees. This latter unit departed Fort McCoy for its home station on 27 May after completing its mission.15

Initial Safety and Security Guidance

On 8 May 1980, Department of the Army issued instructions to the Fort McCoy Task Force Commander concerning safety and security activities by military personnel at facilities such as the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center operating in support of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The Department pointed out that commanders of military installations were responsible for the security of their installations and might take such action as was reasonably necessary to protect government property and personnel or to maintain order thereon. There was, however, no authority vested in the armed forces to restrain or confine "Cuban Aliens" for law enforcement purposes. This lack of specific authority did not limit the overall authority of any commander to detain persons when necessary to maintain peace and order, including the suppression of riots or other major disturbances. In such instances, however, the commander should seek immediate assistance from civilian law enforcement officials and any civilian detained in such a situation should be immediately turned over to those authorities. The internal security of those portions of the installation dedicated to the performance of the "Cuban Aliens" mission should be provided by civilian law enforcement officials under the direction of the Federal Emergency Management Agency representative at the installation. The commander could take reasonable measures to limit the entry of "Cuban Aliens" onto those portions of the installation where their presence was neither necessary nor desirable, or could constitute a threat to peace and order. The commander was also authorized to exclude other individuals from those portions of the installation dedicated to the performance of the "Cuban Aliens" mission. In short, the military

15. Ibid.
commander was not responsible for the internal security of those portions of the installation dedicated to the performance of the "Cuban Aliens" mission. That was clearly the responsibility of the local Federal Emergency Management Agency representative. 16

Community Relations

The state and quality of community relations between Fort McCoy, its surrounding communities, and the state of Wisconsin became increasingly important during the latter half of May 1980 as the post prepared to receive its first shipment of Cuban refugees. However, the small nearby rural communities of Tomah, Sparta, and the small city of LaCrosse were of sharply divided emotions concerning the establishment of the proposed refugee processing center. Although they were suffering from high inflation, rising unemployment, and welcomed the large number of temporary job opportunities and other major economic stimulation which the center would provide, many area residents voiced strong objections to its establishment. They were soon joined by local, state, and congressional political leaders. The local news media took an intense interest in the whole matter from the very beginning. FORSCOM public affairs trouble shooters as well as the Fort McCoy and Task Force commanders launched an aggressive public affairs effort to ensure the preservation and strengthening of good relations between the post and its neighbors. They stressed the fact that the military were involved in supporting the whole refugee processing center operation under the overall direction of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Federal agency in charge. In other words, the Army was simply providing those housekeeping and other supporting services to those other Federal civilian agencies which had been directed by the White House to handle the Cuban refugees. 17

Background. Fort McCoy was originally established in 1909 as Camp Robinson, which was used to provide artillery practice ranges for Regular Army and Army National Guard units. During World War I, the post trained infantry and field artillery units. In 1926, the site was officially named Camp McCoy, and from 1933 to 1935, it served as a Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) supply base, as well as a summer training location for various military units. During World War II, the Civilian Conservation Corps Reception Center at South Camp McCoy was converted into a prisoner of war and enemy alien prison camp for German and Japanese prisoners. The last of the prisoners departed in June 1945.


1946, and the prison camp was closed. Japanese-American soldiers trained there in 1941, and between 35,000 and 40,000 troops were stationed there during the war years. After the war, Camp McCoy processed 247,779 soldiers for discharge. It was then placed on inactive status on 30 June 1947. The post was subsequently reactivated in 1950 during the Korean War and became one of the major training centers for the Fifth U.S. Army, but it closed again in 1953 due to economic reasons when the war ended. Since that time, it had been used as a summer training camp, although 100 military personnel had been stationed there full time (300 during the summer) and 700 employees (1,000 during the summer) were employed from September through April. Camp McCoy was redesignated as Fort McCoy in 1974. In recent years, it had also served as the site of the Wisconsin State Police Academy.

The surrounding communities had been most supportive of Fort McCoy and its various missions from its inception. Many soldiers stationed at the huge installation (14 miles from north to south and 7 miles from east to west) during the years reciprocated this hospitality. A prime example involved the men of the 100th Infantry Battalion, a unit made up of Hawaiian Americans and repatriated Japanese, who trained at then Camp McCoy during World War II and later distinguished themselves in the bloody campaign in Italy. After the war, they contributed a sizable amount of money toward the development of Sparta's Memorial Park, because they were grateful for the treatment they had received from the community.

**Political Leadership Reaction.** In general, initial local and state political leadership reaction to the news that Fort McCoy might be selected as a refugee processing center was supportive but with reservations. Mayor James Ebert of Tomah observed that the community had been able to live with the prisoners of war at Camp McCoy during World War II and he thought they could do it again with the Cubans. Mayor Thomas Gomes of Sparta said he wasn't really sure what would happen if Cubans were taken into Fort McCoy. He felt that the change in climate and the lack of job opportunities might prove to be a difficulty. Republican Governor Lee B. Dreyfus thought that Wisconsin was ready to do its part. He called it "... a great opportunity for the State Department to show the world what Castro really is." Although there were stories circulating concerning an influx of Cuban criminals among the refugees, area residents were assured by a spokesman for U.S. Senator Gaylord Nelson (D-Wisc) that all incoming Cuban refugees were being screened to eliminate criminal and other undesirable elements. Thus, area residents remained generally positive to the plan to use Fort McCoy as a refugee processing center. As late as 18 May, Governor Dreyfus said he hoped that Wisconsin residents would welcome Cuban refugees to the state. He was quoted as saying, "I think once people understand the plight of the human beings, then the concern of that

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human comes out. Every living American of any race or ethnic back-
ground is the descendant of a refugee."

On 19 May, the day on which the public announcement was made that Fort McCoy had been selected as a refugee processing center, Congressman Alvin J. Baldus (D-Wisc), in whose district Fort McCoy was located, noted that about 95 percent of his constituents who had contacted his office on the matter were opposed to such a use of Fort McCoy. On the following day, Colonel Moran and then Colonel Herring conducted a briefing for local city and county elected officials concerning Fort McCoy's new mission. At this briefing, Mr. Ronald Buddecke, a deputy coordinator for the Federal Emergency Management Agency on site at Fort McCoy, stressed four major points. National Guard summer training would not be affected by the influx of refugees. The refugees would be confined to the base. Every effort would be made to minimize the impact on nearby communities. And the refugees would be flown into Volk Field (later changed to the LaCrosse Municipal Airport). He concluded by stating that the impact on the state would be minimal and that he believed a Federal-state agreement would be reached before the state would be asked to take on any financial burdens arising from the program. This statement may have been made in response to an earlier observation expressed by Governor Dreyfus at a press conference held in Madison when he said that the state might be responsible for various costs of the refugees and that he was suspicious of the Federal Government because it tended to punish states which were the most generous. Mr. Robert Connor, Federal Coordinator for the Federal Emergency Management Agency, stressed the positive economic impact of the upcoming refugee processing center operation and declared that reports of Cuban leader Fidel Castro emptying his prisons and mental institutions during the refugee boatlift -- the "Freedom Flotilla" -- had been exaggerated. Mr. Buddecke added that, if current percentages held true, about 70 percent of the refugees would be single males. The remaining 30 percent would be a combination of families, the elderly, and children. All were classified by the Federal Government as "undocumented aliens." The overall reaction on the part of those officials who received the briefing was mixed at best. Mayor Patrick Zelisko of LaCrosse, the soon to be announced arrival location for the Cuban refugees, thought that there were a lot of evasive answers to questions. Most of the participants agreed that there might be some short-term economic benefits for their communities, but they were still concerned that, from an economic standpoint at the national level, with unemployment running so high, the program did not make sense.

On 22 May, Governor Dreyfus let it be known that he was considering a federal suit to block the entry of Cuban refugees into Wisconsin unless

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20. (1) LaCrosse Tribune, 13 May 80; (2) LaCrosse Tribune, 15 May 80; (3) Wisconsin State Journal, 18 May 80.

21. (1) Sparta Herald, 19 May 80; (2) LaCrosse Tribune, 20 May 80; (3) Monroe County Democrat, 22 May 80.
the Federal Government paid all resettlement costs. The governor was concerned over how the incoming refugees would be classified. As refugees, they would remain under the care and protection of the Federal Government, but as "aliens" released from Fort McCoy, the State of Wisconsin might be forced to pay their food costs, housing, and medical expenses. Aides to the governor stated that he was seriously considering not cooperating with the transportation of the refugees and might decide to block the refugee airlift by ordering that Volk Field be closed. As Col. Killian Morin, the Volk Field commander pointed out, the installation was owned by the State of Wisconsin and leased to the Air Force for training. If the governor ordered the state adjutant general to close the air field, he would have to comply with the order. The following day, FEMA selected the LaCrosse Municipal Airport as the Cuban refugee arrival because of ground servicing equipment shortages at Volk Field.22

Citizen Response. On the same date, the Roman Catholic Bishop of the LaCrosse Diocese, Frederick W. Freking, published a letter to area Catholics to help the incoming Cuban refugees by offering their help in processing refugees and even to consider sponsoring an individual or family for resettlement in Wisconsin. Meanwhile, thousands of applicants were showing up at Fort McCoy to apply for several hundred jobs as plumbers, electricians, maids, and maintenance workers at the refugee processing center. Local apprehensions, however, were further strengthened on 25 May when a widely publicized account of a "large scale" disturbance involving some 2,000 Cuban refugees erupted at a refugee processing tent city at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida. They were angry about delays in the resettlement process according to Air Force spokesmen. Between 25 to 100 of the refugees jumped a fence and fled the compound. The Air Force said that nearly all of them had been persuaded to return to the processing center. Florida Highway Patrol troopers and local Sheriff's deputies were searching for those still outside the camp. Monroe County Sheriff Ray Harris announced later that day that his office was prepared to take law enforcement responsibilities if any Cuban refugees left the Fort McCoy compound and committed a crime in the county. He said that the perpetrator would be "charged by our people, held in our jail, and tried in our courts." He did inform county residents that the military police and U.S. Marshals would be responsible for law enforcement on the base. Two day later, ITG Corporation, contracted by Fort McCoy officials to operate forty-one mess halls in the refugee processing center, issued a call for 900 workers to staff this operation. By 27 May, the Federal Government had spent $6 million in the immediate area in support of the pending refugee processing center operation. Contracts and purchase orders included transportation, food services, recreation equipment, lumber, radio equipment, and portable toilets. Selected individual purchases involved 4,500 window shades, needed within 12 hours; 300 wash tubs and scrub boards; seven miles of cyclone fencing; 50 picnic tables; $7,000 worth of wall paneling; and 100,000 small packets of catsup and mustard filled by a local supermarket. As one Sparta businessman remarked, "Even if the

22. (1) Tomah Journal, 22 May 80; (2) Daily Journal, 23 May 80.
Cubans don't show, our economy has sure had a needed boost." On that same date, Dr. Robert H. Spiro, Jr., Under Secretary of the Army, visited the refugee processing center with Colonel Moran and General Herring and said that he was happy with the situation. He stated that Fort McCoy could expect to receive one or two planeloads of refugees at the LaCrosse Municipal Airport beginning either on the 29th or 30th of May. The public climate in the surrounding area was perhaps summed up best by Gaizka Usabel, a bi-lingual columnist for the Capital Times, who, although critical of many aspects of Fort McCoy preparations, wrote that, "... the visit to Fort McCoy on Sunday (27 May) revealed that people in LaCrosse, Sparta, and Tomah and in other areas of the state, care; the number of volunteers continually increase and people in charge are sincerely dedicated to smooth the transitional process of Wisconsin's first group of Cuban refugees."23

Summary

During the period 9 through 29 May 1980, the Fort McCoy commander, Colonel William J. Moran, acted as the Base Support Installation commander of the Task Force McCoy Refugee Processing Center. He initiated the necessary staff reorganization and facility conversion required to receive and process some 12,000 Cuban refugees, a figure which was subsequently increased by higher headquarters to 15,000 and then to 25,000. In addition, he supported 747 Active Army and 27 U.S. Army Reserve personnel specifically assigned to support the refugee processing mission; recruited, selected, and hired on a temporary basis, 953 civilians in such skill areas as carpenters, plumbers, electricians, medical technicians, and Spanish-speaking interpreters; and let contracts and purchase orders in the amount of $7.3 million for the operations of refugee dining facilities, the provision of necessary bus and auto rental services for the staff and the refugees, and the acquisition of miscellaneous administrative and maintenance supplies and services required to support the refugee processing operation. Based upon instructions received from the FORSCOM commander, General Robert M. Shoemaker, on 9 May 1980, Colonel Moran and his staff treated the entire operation as a mobilization exercise. On 23 May, Colonel Moran became the Base Support Installation commander in fact when Task Force Refugee Fort McCoy was established and Colonel (P) Bernard M. Herring, was appointed as the Task Force commander in charge of the overall Army Cuban refugee support mission at Fort McCoy. The actual management responsibility for the Cuban Refugee Processing Center itself at Fort McCoy was the responsibility of the recently created Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which had agreed to reimburse the Army for all incremental costs pertaining to the establishment and support of the refugee processing center. This agency, which received its instructions in large measure directly from the White House, as represented at Fort McCoy by Mr. Robert E. Connor, a Federal Coordinator for the agency, and Mr. Ronald Buddecke, who acted as a deputy coordinator for Mr. Connor at

23. (1) LaCrosse Tribune, 22, 25, and 27 May 80; (2) Sparta Herald, 27 May 80; (3) Capital Times, 27 May 80.
Fort McCoy on a day-to-day basis, General Herring was responsible for the overall security of the installation. The FEMA officials were responsible for security inside the Cuban Refugee Processing Center Compound. They were assisted in this mission of internal security and refugee processing by other governmental agencies including the Justice Department, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and, once the refugees actually began arriving, the Voluntary Agencies (VOLAG) which effected the outplacement of the refugees into American society. The Task Force commander worked very closely with the FEMA officials on a daily basis to ensure that they were being properly supported in the performance of their sensitive and difficult mission. Since FORSCOM regarded the entire operation as a realistic mobilization exercise -- Fort McCoy's immediate mission in the event of war -- General Herring reported through FORSCOM's Reserve Component management mobilization chain of command of Headquarters, Army Readiness Region V (ARR V), Fort Sheridan, Ill., Headquarters, Fifth U.S. Army, Fort Sam Houston, Tex., and Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Ga. By 29 May, the Army's two other posts engaged in Cuban refugee processing support activities, Fort Chaffee, Ark., and Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa., were nearly filled to capacity and the arrival of the first shipment of refugees at Fort McCoy was planned.24

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24. See Fort McCoy Daily Journals, 9 - 29 May 80, and TF McCoy Daily SITREP's, 23 - 29 May 80.
Chapter VI

THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY AT FORT MCCOY

Background

The operational phase of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) at Fort McCoy lasted from 29 May 1980, the date of the arrival of the first refugees, until 15 July 1980, when the State Department assumed responsibility for the continued management of the center. During this initial and demanding operational phase, FEMA, supported by both the Fort McCoy Task Force and Fort McCoy in its critical role as a base support installation, received 14,241 Cuban refugees. Some 12,902 of these refugees arrived during the first 10 days of the operation, straining available facilities and support personnel resources to the utmost. The refugees arrived from the Miami area at the LaCrosse Municipal Airport via chartered aircraft. They were then transported by chartered buses under tight security by both military police and, during the first few days, by local county police officers, from the airport to Fort McCoy which was some 30 miles away. During this Operational Phase, the Voluntary Agencies working with FEMA succeeded in placing 5,940, or 42.1 percent, of the refugees with American sponsors. These positive accomplishments were tarnished by the fact it had become apparent by this time that the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center had received a number of criminals and mentally ill in its allotment of Cuban refugees. Fidel Castro had obviously seized upon the Mariel exodus as an opportunity to rid his society of a number of undesirable elements. As of 15 July 1980, the number of refugees in confinement at the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center was 297, down from a high of 726 on 7 July. Not surprisingly, a number of the criminal element engaged in unlawful activities within the refugee processing center and in the surrounding communities following their various escapes from the center. The refugee population at the center peaked at 13,334 on 15 June 1980. By 15 July, it had diminished to 8,301. The number of refugee deaths was 3. The number of civilian workers hired on a temporary basis by the Fort McCoy Civilian Personnel Officer (CPO) reached a high point of 1,688 on 11 June. This figure included 1,069 FEMA employees, 74 Task Force employees, and 545 Fort McCoy base support installation employees. Task Force military support personnel strengths reached a high on the same date. The total figure of 1,352 military personnel included 1,158 Active Army, 58 Army National Guard, 127 Army Reserve, 4 Air Force, and 5 Marine Corps. By the end of the FEMA Operational Phase, military strengths were down to 912. This figure included 588 Active Army, 211 Army National Guard, and 113 Army Reserve. Cumulative obligations during the FEMA Operational Phase increased from $7.3 to $13.8 million while cumulative commitments amounted to $20.0 million. The number of cumulative contracts increased from 151 to 441.¹

¹ Fort McCoy Daily Journals, 29 May - 15 Jul 80, and TF Fort McCoy SITREP's, 29 May - 15 Jul 80.
Task Force Commander's Observations

On 27 June 1980, in response to a request from Maj. Gen. Michael D. Healy, the Army Readiness Region V commander and his immediate superior in the Task Force Fort McCoy chain of command, General Herring furnished his observations concerning the first thirty days of operation of the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center. He noted that his task force had encountered several problem areas, early recognition and resolution of which would have significantly facilitated operations. These included such areas as the chain of command, the role of the State Department and the Voluntary Agencies, inadequate intelligence, initial shortages of military police, lack of interpreter support, initial holding area deficiencies, the lack of authority for long term contracts, the ambiguous status of jurisdiction and law enforcement, and tardy release guidance from the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Chain of Command. As previously indicated, FORSCOM took the position that the Fort McCoy commander and the Task Force commander should operate under mobilization exercise conditions and thus it established a chain of command which would be used in the event of a mobilization (See Chart 11). Based upon some thirty days of experience in a very dynamic mobilization type situation, General Herring noted that FORSCOM was the headquarters at which the command lines for the task force and the installation should have converged. FORSCOM was also the approving and tasking headquarters for most task force requirements. The interposition of Army Readiness Region V and Fifth U.S. Army tended to impede rather than facilitate responsiveness to task force requirements.

State Department and the Voluntary Agencies. Although the Federal Emergency Management Agency's refugee processing phase extended from the arrival of the first refugees on 29 May until it turned over its responsibilities to the State Department on 15 July, the Voluntary Agencies operated under State Department auspices from the very beginning. General Herring pointed out, as had his predecessors in the Hungarian and Vietnamese refugee operations, that the Voluntary Agencies were the key to the rapid settlement of the Cuban refugees. Although the Task Force was essentially manned and operational by 23 May, the State Department and the Voluntary Agency representatives were not in place and operational until after the refugees had begun to arrive. General Herring believed that their representatives should have been on site before the first refugees arrived to ensure that that critical function was ready to respond immediately.

Intelligence. The inability of the Task Force commander to obtain timely and accurate information concerning incoming refugees contributed to several problems. Reports received by the task force from the Miami refugee receiving area concerning the number of anticipated arrivals were usually erroneous and could not be relied upon for purposes of

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2. The entire paragraph is based on Msg 271531Z Jun 80, Ft. McCoy TF Cdr to Cdr ARR V, subj: Task Force Refugee Lessons Learned.
The first load of Cuban refugees disembarks from a chartered airliner at the LaCrosse, Wisc., Municipal Airport on 29 May 1980.

Planeloads of Cuban refugees continue to land throughout the night. Chartered schoolbuses await the refugees to carry them on the 45-minute trip to the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center.
Arriving Cuban refugees pass through a feeding line at two o'clock in the morning at the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center.

Cuban refugees move from the tent city holding area to the inprocessing Center.
A Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center Task Force soldier helps an exhausted Cuban female refugee to leave her plane.

Members of the 401st Personnel Services Company, Fort Knox, Ky., take personal data on Cuban refugees at the Inprocessing Center.
Once the Cuban refugees had arrived at the center and had been fed, they were directed to the inprocessing building where they began the registration and outprocessing procedures.

Military Police search a refugee with a metal detector in search of concealed weapons.
During inprocessing, Cuban refugees were individually photographed for identification cards which were prepared later.

American families of the refugees wait at the Visitor's Center for a meeting with their relatives.
A Cuban refugee fills out the papers for sponsorship by the Lutheran Church sponsoring agency. An agency interpreter aids him in his efforts.

A criminal investigator for the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service aids a family of Cuban refugees in the final check at the outprocessing center before departing the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center to be with sponsors.
Army surgeon takes a break after removing a benign tumor from the hip of a Cuban refugee. The operation was performed in the inflated MUST hospital.

Army Reservist dental surgeon extracts one of twelve bad teeth from a Cuban refugee. A Cuban refugee assistant and interpreter applies suction.
Army surgeons examine a Cuban refugee injured in an altercation at the center.

Army medical technician stitches up a head injury suffered by a Cuban refugee at the center.
The first "Jeffes" of the Cuban refugee self-government hold a press conference at the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center. The person in the center is a civilian interpreter from Madison, Wisc.

Cuban refugees from the single-male compound proudly pose in their "Warhawk" jackets. The "Warhawks," a Cuban refugee internal police group, was later disbanded because of power abuse.
On 7 June 1980, a General Services Administration warehouse with bedding and linens burns to the ground at Fort McCoy, Wisc., after catching fire around 10:30 P.M.

On the following day, Fort McCoy Fire Department personnel continue to soak down the still smouldering ruins of the warehouse.
Fourth of July festivities are celebrated in the refugee compound. Secretaries from the Psychological Operations Office dress as clowns and give out flags and balloons to the refugee children in the family area.

Fort McCoy Task Force employee distributes cigarettes to appreciative refugees.
Javier Julian Martinez Hernandez, the first child born to a Cuban refugee, was born on 4 July 1980 at the Tomah Memorial Hospital, Tomah, Wisc.

A young Cuban girl awaits inprocessing in the tent city holding area.
On 4 July 1980, Cuban refugees from the single-male compound, Building 712, proudly display a hand-painted sign thanking everyone for all the hospitality bestowed on them.

A smiling Cuban refugee leaves through "Salida al Futuro" or "Gateway to the Future" to meet his sponsors and to begin his new life in the United States.

Cuban refugees say a final farewell to Wisconsin after finishing processing on their way to a new life in the United States.
reception and inprocessing. It was impossible to determine the female and male mix on individual flights until after their arrival at the LaCrosse Municipal Airport. There was no information to indicate the large number of prior felons with which the task force would have to cope. Consequently, plans for detention facilities had to be altered several times.

**Physical Security.** For several reasons, including the inability on the part of all concerned at all levels to resolve law enforcement and security responsibilities among the various agencies represented at the refugee processing center, initial military police assets were grossly inadequate. All available military police personnel were forced to work a minimum of twelve hours a day, seven days a week without relief during the first half of June when the Cuban refugee population mushroomed from 0 to 13,334. Ideally, military police requirements should have been determined early for all required units to be on station at least seventy-two hours prior to the arrival of the first refugees.

**Interpreter Support.** While initial planning identified the need for both military and civilian interpreters, the identification and recruitment of sufficient bilingual personnel lagged behind the need. The lack of sufficient interpreters inhibited both the ability of the civil affairs personnel to organize the Cuban refugees into a viable government and their ability to respond to the needs of the refugee personnel for whom they were responsible. General Herring recommended that future operations of this nature should provide initial priority for the assignment of bilingual personnel to the civil affairs area of responsibility. This approach would provide the organization necessary to establish an organized and responsive internal government.

**Initial Holding Area.** During peak periods, the Task Force had to establish holding areas for upwards of 4,000 refugees while they awaited processing. This level of refugee population exceeded the area initially established for this purpose by 3,400 spaces. In retrospect, it would have been wiser to have used the hospital area for this purpose since it had the capacity to provide adequate holding facilities, two dining facilities, and was within walking distance of the inprocessing center.

**Long Term Contracts.** The Federal Emergency Management Agency's lack of authority to award long term contracts deterred efforts to civilianize refugee processing operations. For example, contracts for both detention security and for civil affairs operations could have been awarded had proper authority been granted.

**Jurisdiction and Law Enforcement.** The ambiguous legal status of the "refugees" and the initial lack of guidance to military commanders regarding their authority and jurisdiction over the detainees prevented the quick establishment and rigorous enforcement of rules, regulations, or laws applicable to them. By 27 June, the status of the detainees still had not been clarified, but, as noted above, Department of Defense guidance on security matters was finally specified. The fact remained,
however, that law enforcement and disciplinary control at the installation and the refugee processing center remained inadequate because of insufficient staffing of the civilian agencies which were primarily responsible for peacekeeping, law enforcement, and related activities within the processing center.

Clearance by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Finally, on 25 June 1980, exactly thirty days following the activation of the Task Force Emergency Operations Center (EOC), Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) field representatives at Fort McCoy received firm guidance permitting the release of Cuban refugees with bona fide relatives in the United States prior to the receipt of final security clearance. According to General Herring, had this guidance been provided at an earlier date, the center’s average release rate of fifty-four per day would unquestionably have been greatly increased.

Operational Overview

As previously indicated, the two week period at Fort McCoy preceding the establishment of the Task Force headquarters on 23 May was one of intense activity on the part of the Fort McCoy Command Group, directorates, and activities. It was characterized by the gathering of information; the assessment of facilities; intense coordination between installation staff sections, other headquarters, and other civilian agencies; the development of forces; the preparation of facilities; the awarding of contracts; the reception of augmentation military forces; and the hiring of temporary civilian forces. The period 25 May to 7 June 1980 consisted of three distinct sub-periods. From 25 May to 29 May, the date on which the first Cuban refugees arrived, the Fort McCoy commander and the Task Force commander continued their preparations for the receipt of up to 15,000 refugees. From 29 May to 2 June, as the refugee population began to increase rapidly, the two commanders initiated plans to accommodate up to 25,000 refugees. From 2 June to 7 June, the post began experiencing and adjusting to the impact of rapidly rising refugee and support staff populations. As of this latter date, the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center had already received 12,614 Cuban refugees at an average rate of over 1,250 per day. It had also employed 1,604 temporary hire civilian workers at this point in time to assist in the refugee processing center support and operational activities.3

The period 8 June to 21 June 1980 was one of major significance because of its pivotal nature. It was during this period that the Cuban refugee population, the task force military strength, and the Fort McCoy temporary hire civilian strength peaked. At the same time, a reduction in the Cuban refugee population ceiling was imminent; Fort McCoy began to conduct its operations in a more normal fashion; the Task Force began to transfer support requirements to the Federal Agencies on site and to

3. (1) Daily Journal Overviews, 9 - 24 May 80, and 25 May - 7 Jun 80; (2) Daily SITREP, 7 Jun 80.
civilians; and plans were initiated for the long-term housing of the refugees. The period 22 June to 5 July 1980 was one which was characterized by an increase in the Fort McCoy crime rate, as the Cuban refugee convicted felon population increased and the general population decreased. It was also characterized by the progressive demilitarization of the overall refugee processing operation, as Cuban refugee contingency planning and Reserve Component Annual Training support continued. The period 6 July to 15 July 1980 was one in which security and law enforcement continued to be problem areas as the Cuban refugee population continued to decline and a hard core residual felon and hard to place grouping of refugees emerged. By the end of this period, discussions were initiated concerning the rehabilitation of Fort McCoy; the Federal Emergency Management Agency transferred its operational responsibilities to the State Department; and the Task Force was directed to remain operational.

Active Component Support

Temporary Nature. Active Component support continued during the Federal Emergency Management Agency phase at the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center, but at steadily declining levels as the Cuban refugee population also declined after reaching a high point of 13,334 on 15 June 1980. By 15 July, the date on which the Federal Emergency Management Agency transferred its operational responsibilities for the refugee processing center to the State Department, the refugee population had decreased to 8,080. As early as 24 June, when it had become apparent that the Mariel exodus to the Miami area was coming to a close, the Task Force commander, General Herring, acting at the direction of, and in coordination with, Army Readiness Region V and Fifth U.S. Army operations plans, began a systematic phase-out of task force Active Component troop units and personnel. He did this as soon as he was able to pass on specific support responsibilities to the Federal Emergency Management Agency or its contracted civilian supporters. In short, General Herring planned to furnish a steadily diminishing level of military support to the Federal Emergency Management Agency or its successor agency until he could establish a true host/tenant relationship between Fort McCoy and the refugee processing operating agency. At this point in time, it was anticipated that the task force would be dissolved and the Fort McCoy installation commander would assume all support responsibilities for the operating civilian agency.

Conversion Progress. In his message of 10 July, General Herring informed higher headquarters that Mr. Nick Thorne, a representative of the State Department, had visited the task force headquarters on 9 July.

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### TABLE 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional Area</th>
<th>Disposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feeding</td>
<td>Contracted by the installation from the beginning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>Task Force passed to the installation with the departure of the 410th Engineer Command (UMAE) and the 32d Engineer Battalion on 27 May 1980.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outprocessing</td>
<td>FEMA proponenty since 17 June 1980. Joint Task Force/FEMA operation up to that time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Processing</td>
<td>FEMA and installation since 23 June 1980 departure of the 401st Adjutant General Company (Personnel Services).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>Initially provided by the 86th Combat Support Hospital. FEMA (U.S. Public Health Service and the Department of Health and Human Services) assumed this responsibility on 1 July 1980.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departure and Arrival</td>
<td>Initially a Task Force Operation. Passed to FEMA on 1 July 1980 with the departure of the DAKOS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airfield Control Group (DAMOS)</td>
<td>Task Force 04 coordinated issue of supplies and equipment until the installation assumed this responsibility on 1 July 1980.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>FEMA assumed this responsibility as of 8 July 1980 when Civil Affairs assistance in these areas was terminated. Areas included education, recreation, religion, and the like.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee Activities</td>
<td>FEMA to assume responsibility on 14 July 1980 from Fifth U.S. Army Public Affairs Office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Affairs</td>
<td>FEMA to assume responsibility on 14 July 1980 with the departure of the last of the military interpreters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpreters</td>
<td>Always a FEMA responsibility through the use of Immigration and Naturalization Service and U.S. Marshals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detention</td>
<td>Military involvement will be reduced to 12 civil affairs and 3 psychological operations Active Component personnel by 25 July 1980. FEMA civilian hire in this area rapidly proceeding with the eventual phaseout of Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Active Component personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs/Military Operations</td>
<td>Military function. The closing of the west wing on or about 13 July 1980 would permit a reduction of shift hours from 12 to 8 for military police and would also permit a minimum of compensatory time. As of 10 July, the projected Cuban refugee population would be approximately 2,500 by 13 July.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Msg 102355E Jul 80, Cdr TF Refugee, Ft. McCoy, to Cdr UARMA V, subj: Phase-out of Task Force Refugee, Ft. McCoy.
At that time, he had indicated that the State Department would replace the Federal Emergency Management Agency as the operating civilian agency of the refugee processing center on 15 July. Two State Department representatives had already arrived at Fort McCoy, and the State Department director was scheduled to arrive on the following day. However, the current Federal Emergency Management Agency director had not as yet received confirmation of when the actual turnover would occur between FEMA and the State Department. General Herring also took this occasion to present his superiors with an updated schedule of past and projected functional phaseout dates as indicated on Table 9.6

**Recommended Inactivation of Task Force Headquarters.** General Herring concluded this critical message by stating that the civilianization of the above stated functions would result in one military police battalion (759th Military Police Battalion) and 15 Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations personnel remaining as the only active military units and personnel still subordinate to the task force headquarters. They would continue to operate on a 24-hour basis. The task force headquarters element consisted of thirty-four senior officers and enlisted personnel -- for the command and control of one military police battalion and 15 Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations personnel. He, therefore, stated that his headquarters had "... worked itself out of a job. Accordingly, it should be inactivated regardless of which federal agency assumed the responsibility for the refugee mission. The remaining active force should then come under the operational control (OPCON) of the Commander, Fort McCoy, and continue to support refugee missions in a Host/Tenant relationship." He recommended, therefore, that the Task Force staff should begin its phaseout on 21 July with completion by 25 July. The Federal Emergency Management Agency Federal Coordinating Officer on site, Mr. Robert Connor, and the Commander, Fort McCoy, Colonel William J. Moran, concurred in General Herring's concept.7

Based upon a general approval of General Herring's proposed inactivation of the Fort McCoy Task Force by the Army Readiness and Mobilization Region V commander, the Commander, Fifth U.S. Army noted that, as the remaining responsibilities of Task Force Refugee Fort McCoy were assumed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (or successor agency), the continuation of the Task Force would serve no further purpose. The single responsibility which could not be transferred was the external security for the refugee center. That function would have to be met by military police, but it could be fully satisfied under the direction of the Commander, Fort McCoy. The proposed transfer of the residual responsibilities by the Task Force commander would reduce military support to the minimum. The conditions required to achieve the desired Host/Tenant relationship would have been achieved. The Army commander then recommended that General Herring's proposals as presented by the

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7. Ibid.
Commander, Army Readiness and Mobilization Region V, be approved; that the release of the Commander, Task Force Refugee Fort McCoy be at the discretion of the Fifth U.S. Army Commander; and that, unless otherwise directed, the transfer of responsibilities and the reduction in Task Force Refugee Fort McCoy would proceed as proposed.8

FORSOM's Disapproval. As noted above, General Herring's phaseout recommendations were approved in general at both Headquarters, U.S. Army Readiness and Mobilization Region V, and Headquarters, Fifth U.S. Army. At FORSCOM, however, other strategic planning factors precluded immediate approval. FORSCOM informed the field that other government agencies were currently discussing the feasibility of consolidating the Cuban refugees into one or two refugee centers. FORSCOM expressed the hope that an early decision would be made in this matter. Since the decision for consolidation would effect phaseout operations at the current refugee centers operated by the Army, no close-out of operational task force headquarters would be accomplished until the decision was announced. In the meantime, FORSCOM directed that planning for an eventual phase-down of task force operations should continue with the task force headquarters remaining operational until a long-term decision was reached. Finally, the release of the Commander, Task Force Refugee Fort McCoy would be only upon the approval of the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Command.9

Phaseout of Units. By 15 July 1980, the bulk of the Active Component units supporting the Fort McCoy Refugee Center had departed for their respective home stations. These included the 52d Engineer Battalion (-), 178 personnel, Fort Carson, Colo., on 27 May; the 401st Adjutant General Company (Personnel Services), 96 personnel, Fort Knox, Ky., on 20 June; the 12th Transportation Company (Light Truck) (-), 81 personnel, Fort Leonard Wood, Mo., on 23 June; the 86th Combat Support Hospital, 186 personnel, Fort Campbell, Ky., on 27 June; the Departure/Arrival Airfield Control Group (DAACG), 25 Army and 1 Air Force personnel, Fort Riley, Kans., on 30 June; Headquarters, III Corps military interpreters, 55 personnel, Fort Hood, Tex., on 14 July; and the 28th Public Affairs Detachment, 4 personnel, Fort Carson, Colo., on 14 July 1980. As of that date, civil affairs, psychological operations, and security functions were still being performed by military personnel. Civil affairs functions were performed by 16 Active Component personnel assigned to the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, Fort Bragg, N.C., assisted by the personnel of Army Reserve civil affairs units on Annual Training. The last Army Reserve civil affairs unit was scheduled to complete its Annual Training period on 17 July. Psychological operations functions were performed by 4 Active Component personnel assigned to the 4th Psychological Operations Group, Fort Bragg, N.C., assisted by U.S. Army...
Reserve Psychological Operations units on Annual Training. The last U.S. Army Reserve Psychological Operations unit was scheduled to complete its Annual Training period on 24 August. In the meantime, the Federal Emergency Management Agency attempted to hire personnel who would be trained to perform these functions prior to the departure of the last Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units. The Federal Emergency Management Agency concentrated its recruiting efforts on reservists assigned to these units. By the middle of July, 8 reservists had responded in the affirmative and it was believed that an additional 20 to 40 reservists would do the same. The security functions were performed by the the 759th Military Police Battalion, Fort Dix, N.J., and four assigned military police companies with an overall strength of 567 personnel. These units could not be phased out until a decision was made at a higher level with respect to a civilian contract.10

Reserve Component Support

Early Planning. On 15 May 1980, FORSCOM advised its three continental U.S. Armies, its Task Force commanders at Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap, and the Fort McCoy installation commander that specific type Reserve Component units such as civil affairs, psychological operations, public affairs, medical, and military police possessed unique skills which were needed to operate refugee camps. The use of such units during their Annual Training periods in their respective capacities permitted them to accomplish a required mission while lessening the requirement for Active Component units. FORSCOM then advised that current guidelines for the use of Reserve Component units to support refugee camp operations required that such support be rendered on a case-by-case basis only after the Federal Emergency Management Agency representative at each camp had identified a requirement for the support and had agreed to pay for incremental costs incurred for the Reserve Component unit used. As of 15 May, only military police units from the Puerto Rican Army National Guard and a Puerto Rican U.S. Army Reserve medical detachment had been assigned to refugee camp support at Fort Chaffee, Ark. FORSCOM further advised that it had gone to Headquarters, Department of the Army, and had requested assistance in facilitating the use of Reserve Component units for refugee camp operations. In the meantime, FORSCOM directed its Army commanders to examine their Reserve Component troop lists and Annual Training dates and provide unit nominations, dates, and preferred refugee camp sites by the close of business on 19 May. FORSCOM based these planning measures on its experience with the Vietnamese refugees in 1975 and on the Army's historical experience with the Hungarian refugees in 1956.11

11. Msg 151245Z May 80, FORSCOM to Distr, subj: Reserve Component Support of Cuban Relief Operations.
Execute Order. As noted earlier, on 19 May 1980, the FORSCOM commander, by authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense, had issued the execute order required to activate the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center. In the course of this message, he directed the Fifth U.S. Army commander not only to establish and operate the refugee processing center at Fort McCoy, but to determine the feasibility of employing Reserve Component Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units at Fort McCoy as part of, or in addition to, their Annual Training to support refugee operations. The FORSCOM commander also pointed out that all Active Component Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units were presently totally committed. In response to this message, the Commander, Army Readiness and Mobilization Region (ARMR) V, immediately responded that the newly established Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center Task Force Headquarters urgently required the supporting services of one civil affairs company or its equivalent and nine psychological operations teams organized for command and control, loudspeaker, audio visual, light printing, and radio broadcasting activities. In addition, he requested that a public affairs detachment or its equivalent and a field grade signal officer be provided. All elements should come fully equipped. It was his position that the requested support was essential to the success of the refugee processing operations at Fort McCoy. Currently, there were no provisions within the Federal Emergency Management Agency organization to provide the requested assistance. He concluded by stating that his assessment of the situation was based on the experience gained in other installations supporting a similar mission and a careful analysis of lessons learned.12

Army Commander's Recommendations. After analyzing these recommendations, the Fifth U.S. Army commander observed that it would be feasible to employ Reserve Component units in the support roles requested provided that an Active Component Psychological Operations command element was assigned to ensure continuity in psychological operations and civil affairs actions for the duration of the operation. He believed that, without that continuity in direction, the Reserve Component performance of the subject functions would be of limited value at best and might become detrimental. Moreover, Reserve Component units employed separately for two week periods could not produce the desired results. He then furnished FORSCOM with a list of four U.S. Army Reserve civil affairs companies and five assorted headquarters and company size psychological operations units which had been scheduled for Annual Training during the summer of 1980 at various sites. He recommended that additional Active Component or Reserve Component units assigned to the First and Sixth U.S. Armies be directed to fill those two week periods not covered by Fifth U.S. Army units. He also recommended that

an Active Component battalion level command and control element be designated to provide continuity at the Fort McCoy refugee processing center. 13

Specific recommendations for U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs unit included the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit and AT Dates</th>
<th>Home Station</th>
<th>Scheduled AT Site</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>362d Civil Affairs Company</td>
<td>Arkansas USAR</td>
<td>Fort Chaffee, Ark.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 May - 14 Jun 80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Jun - 28 Jun 80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>486th Civil Affairs Company</td>
<td>Oklahoma USAR</td>
<td>Fort Chaffee, Ark.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Jul - 19 Jul 80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>432d Civil Affairs Company</td>
<td>Wisconsin USAR</td>
<td>Home Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Aug - 16 Aug 80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Headquarters, Fifth U.S. Army, was prepared to redirect these units to Fort McCoy during their annual training periods. This approach was facilitated on 27 May, when the Federal Emergency Management Agency representative on site at the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center agreed to fund the excess costs incurred through the diversion of U.S. Army Reserve units from their originally scheduled 1980 annual training sites to Fort McCoy in support of the Cuban refugee processing program. However, the Federal Emergency Management Agency limited its reimbursement scope to the difference in the cost of travel between each participating U.S. Army Reserve unit's home station and Fort McCoy and its originally scheduled annual training site. 14

Specific recommendations concerning U.S. Army Reserve Psychological Operations units included the following: 15

13. Msg 240110Z May 80, Cdr USAFIVE to FORSCOM, subj: RC PSYOPS and Civil Affairs Units for Refugee Support.
15. Ibid.
### FORSCOH Selections

On 6 June 1980, FORSCOM confirmed its selections of U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units for the support of the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center as follows:

#### Psychological Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Home Station</th>
<th>Scheduled AT Site</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>246th Psychological Operations Company</td>
<td>Ohio USAR</td>
<td>Fort Bragg, N.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>350th Psychological Operations Company</td>
<td>Ohio USAR</td>
<td>Fort Bragg, N.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Psychological Operations Group Headquarters</td>
<td>Ohio USAR</td>
<td>Fort Bragg, N.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Psychological Operations Battalion Headquarters</td>
<td>Kentucky USAR</td>
<td>Fort Bragg, N.C.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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FORSCOM Selections. On 6 June 1980, FORSCOM confirmed its selections of U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units for the support of the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center as follows:

#### Civil Affairs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Home Station</th>
<th>AT Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>432d Civil Affairs Company</td>
<td>Wisconsin USAR</td>
<td>31 May - 14 Jun 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40th Civil Affairs Company</td>
<td>Minnesota USAR</td>
<td>14 Jun - 28 Jun 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>431st Civil Affairs Company</td>
<td>Arkansas USAR</td>
<td>21 Jun - 6 Jul 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>415th Civil Affairs Company</td>
<td>Michigan USAR</td>
<td>6 Jul - 19 Jul 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>360th Psychological Operations Battalion, HHD</td>
<td>Minnesota USAR</td>
<td>14 May - 28 May 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th Psychological Operations Battalion, HHD (PW SPT)</td>
<td>Minnesota USAR</td>
<td>31 May - 14 Jun 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>246th Psychological Operations Company</td>
<td>Ohio USAR</td>
<td>28 Jun - 12 Jul 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th Psychological Operations Company</td>
<td>Minnesota USAR</td>
<td>12 Jul - 26 Jul 80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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FORSCOM Selection of Military Police Units. FORSCOM selection of Military Police units during the FEMA phase of the Fort McCoy refugee operations was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Home Station</th>
<th>AT Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>32d Military Police Company</td>
<td>Wisconsin ARNG</td>
<td>31 May - 14 Jun 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>381st Military Police Company</td>
<td>Michigan USAR</td>
<td>15 Jun - 29 Jun 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>814th Military Police Company</td>
<td>Michigan USAR</td>
<td>15 Jun - 29 Jun 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>822d Military Police Company</td>
<td>Michigan USAR</td>
<td>15 Jun - 29 Jun 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>283d Military Police Company</td>
<td>Michigan USAR</td>
<td>15 Jun - 29 Jun 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>358th Military Police Company</td>
<td>Michigan USAR</td>
<td>15 Jun - 29 Jun 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34th Military Police Battalion, HHD</td>
<td>Iowa ARNG</td>
<td>28 Jun - 12 Jul 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>186th Military Police Company</td>
<td>Iowa ARNG</td>
<td>28 Jun - 12 Jul 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33d Military Police Battalion, HHD</td>
<td>Illinois ARNG</td>
<td>12 Jul - 26 Jul 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>318th Military Police Platoon</td>
<td>Texas USAR</td>
<td>12 Jul - 26 Jul 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>733d Military Police Company</td>
<td>Illinois ARNG</td>
<td>12 Jul - 26 Jul 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>838th Military Police Company</td>
<td>Ohio ARNG</td>
<td>12 Jul - 26 Jul 80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FORSCOM Selection of Engineer Units. FORSCOM selection of Army National Guard Engineer units during the FEMA phase of Fort McCoy refugee operations was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Home Station</th>
<th>AT Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>426th Engineer Battalion(CBT)(HV)</td>
<td>Wisconsin ARNG</td>
<td>31 May - 14 Jun 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724th Engineer Battalion(CBT)(HV)</td>
<td>Wisconsin ARNG</td>
<td>31 May - 14 Jun 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203d Engineer Battalion(CBT)(HV)</td>
<td>Missouri ARNG</td>
<td>14 Jun - 28 Jun 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>527th Engineer Battalion(CBT)(HV)</td>
<td>Louisiana ARNG</td>
<td>12 Jul - 26 Jul 80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Suspension of Formal Evaluations for 1980 Annual Training. Headquarters, Fifth U.S. Army, both advised the Fort McCoy installation commander and the Fort McCoy Task Force commander that Reserve Component units performing annual training which solely supported the processing of Cuban refugees would not be formally evaluated. Under the normal evaluation procedures, FORSCOM evaluators periodically evaluated the Reserve Component units during their annual training. This evaluation played an important part in the overall determination of the units' respective levels of readiness. The commander, Army Readiness and Mobilization Region V, was responsible for ensuring that the unit commanders exempted from formal evaluation under the provisions of this policy completed Parts 1 and 2 of the FORSCOM annual training form (Form 1-R) along with other specific supplemental items of interest which would be designated by the Army commander.19

Security.

Security operations during the FEMA phase of operations were marred by an overall confusion as the installation, Task Force, State of Wisconsin, and Federal agencies sought to clarify their respective responsibilities concerning the security of the Cuban refugees during the period.

Fort McCoy/Task Force. On 8 May 1980, the Department of the Army issued initial safety and security guidance to the Fort McCoy commander concerning the conduct of such activities by military personnel at facilities designated to receive "Cuban Aliens" in support of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. This guidance specified that the commander of a military installation was responsible for the security of his installation and might take such action that was reasonably necessary to protect government property and personnel or to maintain order thereon. There was, however, no authority vested in the armed forces to restrain or confine "Cuban Aliens" for law enforcement purposes. This authority was vested in appropriate civilian law enforcement agencies operating under the direction of the Federal Emergency Management Agency representative at the installation. The Fort McCoy installation commander passed this guidance to the newly activated Fort McCoy Task Force commander on 23 May 1980.20

On 2 June 1980, the FORSCOM commander informed officials at Fort McCoy that the above guidance would remain in effect but would be modified as follows. He directed that a perimeter be established around the area in which the detainees were located (Detainee Enclave).

This perimeter was to be clearly marked and posted with signs in English and Spanish prohibiting the Cuban detainees from unauthorized departure from the Detainee Enclave. Military personnel would be used to assist in maintaining the perimeter and would be stationed along the perimeter and at any gates or openings to deter, detect, and make reasonable efforts to prevent unauthorized departures. The use of physical barriers was also permitted at the option of the military commander. Military personnel could use reasonable measures to prevent unauthorized passage outside of the perimeter, first with oral warnings and, if those failed, reasonable, but wholly non-lethal, measures to deter the detainees from attempting to cross the perimeter. Only the minimum measures required to deter the detainees were authorized. The measures taken would not impose a threat of death or serious bodily harm. Military personnel could be authorized to use nightsticks and riot control equipment. The use of night sticks or batons as a barrier might prove to be sufficient to deter individuals from leaving the enclave. Individuals would not be struck in the head or otherwise subjected to excessive measures. Firearms without ammunition might be used. An outer perimeter would be established around the Federal installation, and appropriate reaction forces would be maintained. If the Detainee Enclave was breached, the same measures discussed above would be applied to prevent them from leaving the Federal installation. Finally, military personnel would not leave the installation to pursue and apprehend detainees.

On 3 June, General Herring, the Task Force commander, received a memorandum from Mr. Connor, the Federal Coordinating Officer at Fort McCoy, tasking him to immediately begin providing internal security within the compound or Detainee Enclave. Since this directive was in direct contradiction to the FORSCOM commander’s instructions of 2 June concerning the use of detention force by military personnel outside the perimeter only, General Herring requested clarification from his superiors as to what steps he was now authorized to take based on the contradictory instructions received from Mr. Connor. In commenting upon General Herring’s request for clarification and additional instructions, the Fifth U.S. Army commander pointed out to FORSCOM that recent Cuban refugee outbreaks at Fort Chaffee stressed the need for clear guidance on the exercise of police power at the host installations, including internal security within the refugee compound. He further stated that this issue must be resolved immediately to give military commanders and Federal Emergency Management coordinators on the scene unequivocal and consistent direction and responsibility and authority for law enforcement. He requested immediate action to resolve the issue.

21.


22.

Mag 030155Z Jun 80, Cdr USAFIVE to Distr, subj: Law Enforcement in Cuban Refugee Camps.
Department of the Army was well aware of the contradictions and ambiguities among the participating agencies concerning law enforcement at the refugee processing centers and had been working with them on an acceptable resolution of the matter for some time. Late on the evening of 3 June 1980, the Department finally published a revision of its previous instructions of 8 May and 2 June concerning law enforcement at the refugee processing centers. The Department announced that the Department of Defense, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Department of Justice had reached an agreement concerning law enforcement and peacekeeping responsibilities for detainees at military installations. Consistent with the agreement, the responsible military commander and the Federal Emergency Management Agency Officer-in-Charge, or other proper on-scene authorities, could establish and implement additional security procedures as necessary. The primary responsibility for peacekeeping, law enforcement, and related activities concerning the Cuban Detainees rested with the civilian law enforcement authorities. When civilian law enforcement officers were not available in adequate numbers to carry out this responsibility at a military installation, the military commander would exercise his authority to maintain order on the military installation and take reasonable steps to provide for the safety of persons and facilities thereon. Such temporary emergency measures by the military, however, did not constitute an exercise of the law enforcement authority of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) or any other Federal agencies regarding laws for which they had been assigned jurisdiction by statute or otherwise.\textsuperscript{23}

The Department went on to state that, because of the present unavailability of sufficient law enforcement officers of the Federal Government at certain locations, the following duties would be performed at those locations by personnel responsible to the Department of Defense, through its Executive Agent, the Department of the Army, and the responsible military commanders. Current efforts to provide civilian law enforcement officers at the earliest possible time would be continued. As these officers became available to replace the military, they would assume the following functions in the order listed. In all cases, however, nothing contained in this message would affect the authority and responsibility of the military commander to ensure the orderly functioning of the military base under his control. The functions listed included preventive patrols, securing the control zone, and the use of responsive force.\textsuperscript{24}

Through the use of preventive patrols and any stationary posts as might be needed, host installation and task force commanders would maintain adequate police presence and visual surveillance at all times in


\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
the area in which the detainees were located (Detainee Enclave). The purpose of such patrols would be to deter, detect, and prevent disorder, criminal offenses, and any serious harm from any cause to the Cuban Detainees, as well as to protect other personnel, buildings, and equipment. In addition, Department of the Army directed host installation and task force commanders to establish a control zone around the Detainee Enclaves on their installations. These control zones were to be clearly marked and posted in English and in Spanish prohibiting the Cuban detainees from unauthorized departure from the Detainee Enclaves. Military personnel were to be used to maintain these perimeters and were to be stationed along the control zones and at any gates or openings to deter, detect, and make reasonable efforts to prevent unauthorized passage outside the control zones. They would first use oral warnings and, if these failed, they would then use reasonable, but wholly non-lethal measures to deter detainees from attempting to cross the perimeters. The use of physical barriers was also permissible at the option of the military commanders on the scene. Military personnel were not to leave the installation to pursue or apprehend escaped detainees. Detainees found on the installation outside of the Detainee Enclaves should be returned under escort to the enclaves and their unauthorized departure should be reported to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the U.S. Marshals, and to the representatives of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. Similarly, any detainee returned to the installation by civilian authorities or otherwise should be escorted back to their enclaves and similarly reported. Finally, host installation and task force commanders were to maintain a reserve force of military police at all times with sufficient capacity to respond promptly should large scale disturbances occur on the installation which proved to be beyond the capabilities of the responsible law enforcement agencies; or in the event that Federal officers become unable to perform their law enforcement functions on the installation; or in the event the safety of Federal officers on the installation was threatened by the detainees.  

In every case, and without regard to whether law enforcement functions of any particular host installation were being discharged primarily by military or civilian officials, the responsibilities of the Federal Emergency Management Agency and civilian law enforcement agencies included an immediate response for arrest. In support of this policy, the Federal Emergency Management Agency was required to designate a lead civilian law enforcement agency at each host installation. The civilian law enforcement agency selected by the Federal Emergency Management Agency would respond immediately to calls from military personnel or civilian law enforcement personnel in connection with circumstances requiring detainee(s) to be arrested, searches to be conducted, investigations to be undertaken, or other similar law enforcement activities to be conducted. Under Department of Defense policy in this area, as prescribed by its executive agent, the Department of the Army, the lead agency designated at each host installation by the

25. Ibid.
Federal Emergency Management Agency could be assisted in any or all of the above activities by other agencies, although this authority could not be used to alter the normal division of jurisdiction for the enforcement of specific statutes by various agencies. In such case, the designated lead agency would transfer responsibility for further response to the particular Federal agency with jurisdiction for the statutory violation or circumstances.26

State of Wisconsin. On 2 July 1980, the Attorney General of the State of Wisconsin, Bronson C. LaFollette, issued guidelines regarding the authority of local Wisconsin law enforcement agencies such as those in the nearby civilian communities in the Fort McCoy area -- Tomah, Sparta, and LaCrosse. These guidelines, which stemmed from a meeting of interested state agencies on 4 June 1980, specifically referred to the Cuban refugee situation at Fort McCoy. In his guidance, the Attorney General noted that the influx of thousands of Cuban refugees to Fort McCoy had prompted a number of inquiries by law enforcement agencies concerning their authority to deal with any emergency situations that might arise involving those refugees. Based upon his understanding that contingency plans had been developed for the potential use of local law enforcement agencies in the event of mass disturbances created by the refugees, he had researched the subject matter and had come to the conclusion that the authority of state and local law enforcement agencies to act in these situations was extremely limited. He then suggested that the following guidelines be followed in the event they were called upon to act in regard to the Cuban refugee situation. Under these guidelines, state and local law enforcement agencies had no authority to enter Fort McCoy to arrest individuals or to quell disturbances since the installation had not been designated as an immigration station. State and local law enforcement agencies had no responsibility to transport refugees to institutions off the confines of Fort McCoy or to provide protection to federal authorities who wished to make such moves. State and local law enforcement agencies had no authority to arrest, apprehend, or detain refugees who may have absconded from Fort McCoy or hospitals to which refugees might have been conveyed for treatment. This situation applied even if specific requests for detention had been made by the federal authorities. At the present time (3 July 1980), only members of the United States Marshal’s Office or agents of the Immigration and Naturalization Service had the authority to take absconding refugees into custody. If, on the other hand, refugees violated state law while away from a federal installation, they could be arrested and charged with said violations. In the event of mass civil disturbances at Fort McCoy, local law enforcement agencies might still choose in their discretion to patrol non-military areas and monitor situations arising off the base just as they would in any other large scale civil disturbance. If situations arose which were not covered in the guidelines, the Attorney General suggested that the civilian law enforcement agencies involved contact their respective district attorney or corporation counsel for advice. The announced guidelines were much

26. Ibid.
more restrictive with regard to the activities of state and local law enforcement agencies than those previously agreed upon at the 4 June meeting which had been attended by both military and civilian law enforcement agencies. In effect, they superseded that earlier agreement. The State of Wisconsin's Administrator of the Division of Emergency Government, Michael P. Early, advised state and local law enforcement agencies that, in the event of a major incident, at or near Fort McCoy, that they follow the guidelines set forth in the Attorney General's letter. In addition, they should continue to follow normal channels of information and communication with regard to law enforcement mutual aid procedures. This information was furnished to the Task Force by Fort McCoy Federal Emergency Management Agency representatives on site at Fort McCoy. The Federal Emergency Management Agency representatives continued their attempts to resolve any anticipated problems resulting from the guidelines.27

Federal Agencies. On 13 June 1980, two days prior to the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center achieving its high point of 13,334 Cuban refugees in residence at the installation, a distinguished committee of representatives of the Department of Justice, Department of Defense, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the White House met in the Task Force's Emergency Operations Center (EOC) with the Task Force and local Federal Emergency Management Agency staffs to review the operation of the Fort McCoy refugee program to date. Among those in attendance were Mr. Paul R. Michel, Associate Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice; Mr. David O. Cooke, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Administration, Office of the Secretary of Defense; Mr. John Toomey, Deputy Director, U.S. Marshals Service; Mr. Michael Cordoza, Deputy Counsel to the President; and Brig. Gen. R.D. Renick, Acting Director of Military Support, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army. The meeting began with a general welcoming orientation conducted by Mr. Robert E. Connor, the Federal Coordinating Officer, representing the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the lead agency at Fort McCoy, who explained the initial processing operation, and described his agency's organizational structure.28


General Herring, the Task Force commander, followed by describing the Army Task Force organization and structure. He further briefed the group on the physical point, the makeup of the refugee population, and provided statistics on the medical caseload. His Provost Marshal, Lt. Col. Gordon Zelez, discussed the task force security complement, plan of operations, and staffing levels, and the fact that a contingency plan had been developed in concert with state and local law enforcement officials and was in standby condition. This was the plan which was later superseded by the Wisconsin Attorney General's guidelines discussed above. Lt. U.S. Curry, Federal Protective Service Officer in Charge then explained that the Federal Protective Service role at Fort McCoy was limited to the protection of Federal employees and Federal property. He indicated that his officers were presently on duty at the center's initial processing, visitors center, and dispensary areas. Marshal Robert Thompson, Chief Marshal, Western District of Wisconsin, explained the role of the U.S. Marshal force currently on site at Fort McCoy. He emphasized that there were only four deputy U.S. Marshals available on the staff and he needed and requested additional numbers. Mr. Joel Rogers, Officer in Charge, Immigration and Naturalization Service, described immigration and naturalization processing functions at the center. He disclosed that recently a "high percentage" of arriving refugees had been identified as those with criminal records who had been imprisoned in Cuba. This influx of criminal population had created substantial increases in operations, confinement at Fort McCoy, and later transportation to Federal Correctional Institutions (FCI). He then related the details of an incident which had occurred the night before involving a disturbance among a group of seventy-five Cuban Detainees being returned to the LaCrosse Municipal Airport for further shipment to the Leavenworth Federal Prison in Kansas. The disturbance occurred spontaneously at a time when the immigration detention officers were attempting to handcuff the detainees and place them on buses for the trip to the airport. No serious injuries were experienced and the disturbance was suppressed with the assistance of the military police force which arrived within ten minutes of the outbreak. Mr. Rogers indicated, however, that this disturbance demonstrated the need for better confinement facilities as well as increased staff to manage the detention area and to provide a security force for air transportation. Of the 13 immigration detention officers on duty at the time, 10 were required to accompany the prisoners, leaving only 3 to maintain the security of the detention facility.29

Following General Herring's presentation, Mr. W. L. Takacs of the Federal Emergency Management Agency indicated that preliminary contracting negotiations were underway with Honor Guard, Inc., a Washington, D.C. based private security firm. Plans called for this firm to provide contract services to secure both the facility and the newly established detainee compound in the old Fort McCoy prisoner of war area. Messrs. Michel, Toomey, and Cardoza violently objected to this proposed contract for additional guard services. They indicated that additional

29. Ibid.
Immigration and Naturalization Service Detention Officers and U.S. Marshals were immediately required. The party then adjourned to inspect both the detention facilities and the newly established compound. They agreed that the current detention facilities lacked adequate ventilation, adequate supervision, and sufficient barriers to deter attempted escapes. The group then traveled to the compound area where a disagreement arose concerning its suitability. Messrs. Michel and Cardoza felt that it was a proper confinement facility for those Cuban Detainees who had been identified as hardened criminals. Other members of the group felt that it too closely resembled a concentration camp. Failing to reach any agreement about its proposed use, the group returned to the Emergency Operations Center.

A presentation was then given by the Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer, Mr. Ron Buddecke, and the Department of State Representative, Mr. Art Schoeper, regarding the outprocessing of the Cuban refugees. The review found the procedures being used were comprehensive and provided a sufficient degree of control for the expeditious outprocessing of the refugees. These procedures were based on the successful experiences of other refugee processing centers. One problem noted was the lack of sufficient experienced staff members within the voluntary resettlement agencies. These shortages prevented the agencies from locating sponsorships fast enough to match the medical clearances and clearances by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which were then beginning to develop at a rapid rate. Alternatives considered involved augmentation of volunteer interpreters for the Voluntary Agencies (VOLAC), as well as further augmentation with professional resettlement personnel. Current planning by the Federal Emergency Management Agency was designed to resettle a maximum of 350 Cuban refugees per day by the end of June. The attendees at the meeting agreed that the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center, having benefitted by the experiences in the earlier Cuban refugee operations, was well ahead of expectations and only minor changes were necessary to further improve the system. The Task Force commander was vitally interested in this overall assessment since the sooner the Cuban refugees were processed and transferred out of Fort McCoy to their new destinations, the sooner the Task Force could dissolve, the supporting units and personnel on temporary duty could be relieved and returned to their home stations, and Fort McCoy could get back to normal and resume its usual support and training activities.

Concern Over the Increasing Number of Convicted Felons

By 27 June, however, the overall security situation took a sudden turn for the worse. This condition was due to the indiscriminate shipping of convicted felons from the Opa Locka, Fla., initial reception center to the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center. In a message to his superiors, General Herring expressed concern that the large numbers of

30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
Cuban criminals being shipped to Fort McCoy would disrupt refugee processing at the center. He recommended that the incoming Cuban refugees be identified and that the criminals among them should be shipped directly from the initial reception centers in Florida to appropriate detention facilities. General Herring also pointed out that the Federal Emergency Management Agency's representative's efforts to correct this situation through his chain of command had been fruitless. The Fifth U.S. Army commander further noted a recent Department of the Army message which described the problems arising from the failure to identify a long-term Cuban refugee facility and its adverse effects upon the Eglin Air Force Base Refugee Processing Center. He urged that efforts should be taken now to prevent a quick-fix solution for Eglin Air Force Base by distributing the remaining "Hard-to-Place" Cuban refugees among the current "Short-Term" refugee processing centers such as Fort McCoy. To do so would make the potential situation at Fort McCoy only worse. If efforts to identify a long-term Cuban refugee facility were not concluded soon, the prospect of serious problems at Fort McCoy and other centers would increase. Pending a decision at the national level, consideration should be given to designating a long-term camp from among those now operating and plans should be made accordingly to consolidate the residual Cuban refugees at other center. In closing, the Army commander recommended to FORSCOM that the proper authorities should identify the site for the long-term camp; develop alternative plans for a long-term camp at a current refugee processing center; and increase their efforts to identify and ship known Cuban refugee criminals directly from the Opa Locka Initial Reception Center to appropriate detention facilities.  

General Herring's concern over the rapidly increasing Cuban criminal population at Fort McCoy was amply supported by available statistics. On 1 June, for example, there were 3 Cuban detainees in local confinement facilities. A week later, 27 Cuban criminals had been identified and transferred to Federal Correctional Institutions (FCI). At the time of the meeting with the visiting group from Washington (12 June 1980) a total of 97 identified Cuban criminals had been transferred to Federal Correctional Institutions. By 27 June, the date on which he expressed concern to his superiors over the rapidly rising rate of incoming Cuban criminals, 551 had been identified and transferred to Federal Correctional Institutions and 27 were being held in local confinement at Fort McCoy. This trend continued throughout the remainder of the Federal Emergency Management Agency phase of the Cuban refugee operation at Fort McCoy which terminated on 15 July when the State Department assumed responsibility for the operation of the refugee processing center. On 7 July 1980, the last date on which the daily situation reports reflected the number of Cuban refugees transferred to

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32. Msg 281645Z Jun 80, Cdr USAFIVE to Cdr FORSCOM, subj: Concern Over Rising Convicted Felon Population.
Federal Correctional facilities, a cumulative total of 621 had been transferred. On the same date, 104 were still in local confinement.33

Although not specifically stated in this message, there was growing concern on the part of Fort McCoy Task Force and installation law enforcement agencies over the ever increasing rate of thefts, incidents, assaults, and attempted escapes from the refugee center. Typical instances included theft, the stealing and fashioning of deadly weapons, attempted suicides, assaults, the buying and selling of drugs, fence jumping within the compound, tunneling and other escapes, misconduct on the part of both military and Government civilian personnel involving the refugees, and the like. The introduction of convicted Cuban criminals into this environment simply aggravated the situation. On 8 July, for instance, Immigration and Naturalization Service authorities discovered an escape tunnel approximately thirty feet long in the detention center. The tunnel had not penetrated the plane of the restraining barriers, and it was subsequently destroyed. This detention area was used by the Immigration and Naturalization Service authorities to detain Cuban refugees suspected of being convicted felons and was guarded entirely by that service. In view of the above, and because of the nature and number (104) of the detainees, at least one of whom was suspected of being a convicted murderer, the senior Immigration and Naturalization Service official at Fort McCoy authorized the issue of eight 12-gauge shotguns with Double - 0 buckshot ammunition. The 759th Military Police Battalion provided the weapons at the request of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and with the approval of the Task Force commander. The Department of the Army, however, took exception to this course of action and directed the immediate withdrawal of the weapons and ammunition from the Immigration and Naturalization Service.34

Relocation of Unaccompanied Juveniles

On 19 June 1980, shortly after the peak refugee figure had been reached and when it had become apparent that a large and growing criminal refugee element was arriving at Fort McCoy on a daily basis, the Federal Emergency Management Agency decided to relocate some 214 unaccompanied juveniles (205 males and 9 females) to a separate enclave in an attempt to provide more positive control and to reduce disciplinary problems. Federal Protective Service guards were to provide security; local nuns would serve as daytime housemothers; and selected infrastructure personnel would provide this function at night. The area was to be segregated with a fence twelve feet high topped with barbed wire.35

33. See Daily SITREP’s, 2 Jun, 8 Jun, 13 Jun, 28 Jun, 8 Jul, and 15 Jul 80.


Internal Harassment of Juvenile Refugees

On 14 July 1980, the LaCrosse Tribune published a story by one of its staff writers which alleged that juveniles among the Cuban refugees at the Fort McCoy Refugee Center claimed they were being harassed by the camp's internal security force, the members of which had been selected by Cuban self-government officials. This internal security force, popularly known as the "Warhawks" because of the sports team jackets they wore which had been donated by the University of Wisconsin at Whitewater, allegedly robbed and injured juvenile refugees in scattered incidents over the past month. Although the Cuban self-government structure was established with the advice and assistance of Civil Affairs personnel assigned to the Task Force, it came under the supervision of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. This incident was just one of many which had been featured in the local press since the first Cuban refugees had actually arrived. It contributed to a growing negative feeling on the part of the general public towards the refugees at Fort McCoy, 90 percent of whom were young unaccompanied males, and had an inhibiting effect upon the outplacement process.36

Community Relations

Background. In general, it may be said of the preparatory phase at the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center (8 through 29 May 1980), that public opinion regarding the arrival of the first Cuban refugees at Fort McCoy was mixed at best. Prominent political leaders raised numerous questions concerning reimbursement for state-incurred settlement costs, while a large segment of the citizenry in the small communities surrounding the installation expressed fears over their security and economic opportunities. Religious leaders and organizations did their best to neutralize these negative feelings and it could be fairly said that most of the citizens in Sparta, Tomah, Tunnel City, and LaCrosse were willing to give the Cuban refugees the benefit of the doubt and to be as helpful as possible. Local printed media accounts of the Federal Emergency Management Agency phase through the end of June when the resident Cuban refugee population had peaked out were positive in nature. Many stories were printed about the courage of, and the hardships endured by, individual Cubans as well as other aspects of their lives in Cuba and at the Refugee Processing Center which were most sympathetic in nature. Those few stories which were published concerning incidents within the Refugee Processing Center compound or escapes within or outside the confines of the installation were treated in perspective and in a non-sensational way. This treatment was also extended to include the subject of hardened criminals among the refugee population. Media treatment which produced apprehension among the local civilian population originated principally at Fort Chaffee, Ark., where a number of serious Cuban refugee protests had taken place. On 30 June 1980, for instance, the Wisconsin State Journal published a story by one of its staff journalists regarding the impressions he had gained of the

36. LaCrosse Tribune, 14 Jul 80.
Cuban refugee operation while he performed his National Guard Annual Training at Fort McCoy. He pointed out that, while much of the publicity had been centered on refugee families and children, 91.5 percent of the refugees were young single men. Fort Chaffee type riots were less likely to occur so long as the refugees were being processed and released. As long as the refugees were leaving, there would be hope for those remaining that their time would come. Only one refugee had been settled in Wisconsin and local churches and civic organizations had not done enough in this area. Some of the refugees had prison records stemming from their religious affiliations, their political beliefs or for their "loose mouths." Finally, the Cuban refugees were not really prisoners at Fort McCoy. They were being detained for their own and the nearby communities' security. It was more like house arrest than jail. In another feature article on the same date in the same newspaper, U.S. Marshal Robert Thompson, a former Wisconsin legislator, state senate sergeant-at-arms, and U.S. Marshal for the western district of Wisconsin stated, "Our job is twofold - to protect the Cubans inside the center and the people on the outside and to work toward the peaceful resettlement of new Americans." 

Political Leadership Reaction. Republican Governor Lee S. Dreyfus of Wisconsin continued to raise questions concerning the reimbursement of state-incurred expenses and the adequacy of security measures taken at Fort McCoy. On 11 June, Governor Dreyfus reviewed Wisconsin Army National Guard troops and visited the Cuban refugee compound. During his visit to the compound, he stressed that he wanted chain link fences around the refugee areas and barbed wire for detention areas. He expressed concern over recent reports of incidents of violence, the creation of weaponry, and the need to make education mandatory for the refugees. Once again he expressed his concern over the State of Wisconsin's financial obligations in the resettlement of the Cuban refugees. Referring to the Federal government's reimbursement role in the matter, he stated, "It turns out they don't have the legal authority to guarantee a dime. But I wanted that on the table where everybody could take a look at it."

On 20 June 1980, Governor Dreyfus told the White House that it was "consummately unfair" for President Carter to expect the states and local communities to pick up a major part of the cost of resettling the Cuban refugees. The governor's communication followed a recent State Department announcement to the effect that the Cubans would be allowed to stay in the country at least another six months, and that during that time, they would be eligible for welfare, fuel assistance, and other aid with the federal government paying its normal share and the states paying their normal share. The governor indicated that the public would react with negative statements and public opinion. Democratic Congressman David R. Obey of Wisconsin responded that the governor's widely

38. (1) Tomah Journal, 12 Jun 80; (2) LaCrosse Tribune, 12 Jun 80; (3) Wisconsin State Journal, 12 Jun 80.
publicized comments served only to confuse the situation and that his statements about the state's possible financial liability under the Cuban refugee resettlement program were based on a misunderstanding of what was going on at Fort McCoy. Congressman Obey noted that only three Cuban refugees had resettled within the state. Democratic Congressman Alvin J. Baldus of Wisconsin, whose district included the Fort McCoy area, said in a separate statement that Wisconsin so far had not paid one dollar toward the cost of processing refugees at the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center. He added, however, "Their presence in this country is a result of a national policy decision and, therefore, the burden of assistance should rest solely with the federal government."39

Fort McCoy Task Force and Federal Emergency Management Agency spokesmen conducted an extensive public information program during this period in an attempt to ensure that the public was kept fully aware of just what was going on at Fort McCoy. On 4 June 1980, for instance, the Monroe County Board heard from three different government officials about the center. Speaking on a telephone link up from Alexandria, Va., the Under Secretary of the Army, Robert H. Spiro, Jr., said that the Army was not running the refugee camp, but was supporting it. He added he did not know if the Cubans would be classified as immigrants or refugees. He said that was a legal definition to be set by the White House. He described the Cubans as intelligent and industrious and that less than 1 percent of them were trouble makers. Under Secretary Spiro was followed by the Federal Coordinating Officer of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Mr. Robert E. Connor, who presented a detailed briefing concerning the reception, processing, and outplacement system. The third speaker was Monroe County Sheriff Ray Harris who told the board members that he was impressed by the refugee camp operation at Fort McCoy and that the authorities there were "bending over backward" to be cooperative with county and other local law enforcement personnel. On 10 June 1980, Lt. Col. Fred Ussery, a spokesman for the Task Force, briefed Sparta alderman concerning the refugee operations. Among other points, he stressed that the refugee influx as of that date had had a beneficial economic impact on the area with $9 million in contracts having been awarded, mostly to area people. He also predicted that very few, if any, refugees would remain in the Sparta area when the refugee resettlement was finally completed. He expected the process to be finished before winter. He felt that the Cuban refugees posed no danger to persons residing in the Fort McCoy area. Speaking at the Monroe County Democratic picnic at nearby Winnebago Park on 14 June, Mr. Connor and Ms. Joan Montfort, Activities Director at the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center, spoke to the gathering about the center. Mr. Connor stressed the economic benefits to the local community of operation and discussed the internal security precautions which had been instituted as well as the establishment of an internal Cuban self-governmental structure. Ms. Montfort discussed in some detail the religious, recreational, educational, internal communications, and entertainment

programs which her department provided to the refugees. Congressman Baldus, who was also present, stated that the Cubans were seeking political asylum and, therefore, did not fit into existing refugee laws in effect in the United States. He said that the existing refugee law needed to be carefully rewritten.\footnote{40}

Finally, on 5 July 1980, the LaCrosse newspaper published an interview with Attorney General Steve Clark of Arkansas, who had been elected in 1978 as the youngest state attorney general in the nation's history. He had just performed two weeks of annual training at Fort McCoy as a captain assigned to the 431st Civil Affairs Company, U.S. Army Reserve. Capt. Clark had been responsible for liaison between the military and the seventeen agencies involved in the refugee operations. Due to the nature of his assignment, he had experienced close personal contact with the refugees and developed a number of friendships. He stated that he had not visited the volatile refugee processing center at Fort Chaffee, Ark., where disorders -- many reportedly caused by relatives waiting for refugees to be released -- created problems for federal and local law enforcement officials trying to protect the nearby community of Fort Smith and the surrounding area. After conferring with Wisconsin Attorney General Bronson C. LaFollette at Fort McCoy concerning jurisdictional problems, he stated that he agreed with the decision which the latter had made that week, and that he had an investigation going on into the law enforcement situation at Fort Chaffee. He also remarked, "The question we are still trying to get answered is: What is the status of these people -- refugees, aliens, or what?\footnote{41}

**Citizen Response.** During the Federal Emergency Management Agency phase of operations, the Cuban refugees at Fort McCoy received the uninterrupted strong support of the religious community in Wisconsin. On 1 June, as the first Cuban refugee arrivals were still finding their way about the processing center, the Reverend Jerome Thompson of Milwaukee conducted a Catholic Mass in Spanish for some 300 Cuban refugees in front of one of the barracks. The refugees, dressed in their Red Cross T-shirts, or sweatshirts, or blue denim workshirts and blue jeans sang praise to God -- with some of them praying while standing on top of huge trash containers. "We thank God for the chance to breathe free in open air," said Rev. Thompson. "May we have the spirit to go ahead with our lives." Protestant services were conducted later the same day. In the hastily established day care center, refugee childrens' drawings were hung on one of the walls. The drawings depicted their voyage from Cuba and showed ships, high waves, and sharks. At the same time, a large group of Catholic priests in the LaCrosse Diocese, concerned by what they termed as un-Christian comments concerning the Cuban refugees temporarily housed at Fort McCoy, joined together to issue a statement in

\footnote{40}{(1) Tomah Journal, 5 Jun 80; (2) Monroe County Democrat, 5 Jun 80; (3) LaCrosse Tribune, 11 Jun 80; (4) Tomah Herald, 16 Jun 80.}

\footnote{41}{LaCrosse Tribune, 5 Jul 80.}
The priests of the Diocese of LaCrosse wish to welcome and offer help and love to our sisters and brothers from Cuba who are at Fort McCoy." On 15 June, Bishop Frederick Freking of the LaCrosse Diocese conducted a good will visit to the Cuban refugees on behalf of the U.S. Catholic Conference. He warned the refugees not to misuse their freedom and to be patient and optimistic during the weeks of processing ahead. He told them, "The United States is a country of many freedoms. But it is one of responsible freedoms, for which we must all work together to safeguard the good of all." He then thanked the military chaplains present for the religious program that had been established at the Refugee Processing Center. This program consisted of three sets of services daily after each meal for Catholics, Protestants, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Mormons. One of the female Cuban refugees observed that since the 1960 revolution in Cuba, the churches were open only during Mass times, and that many of them had been allowed to deteriorate, since many of the nuns and priests were forced to leave the country. She noted that many of the young Cuban refugees who attended services at Fort McCoy were delinquents who had had no real religious training and did not believe in anything.

The Revs. America and Carlos Tapia-Ruano preached, taught, and reached many Cuban refugees during most of the period. The Cuban-born, Methodist-ordained ministry couple, who were Castro revolutionaires before they fled Cuba in 1961, delivered sermons which were not limited to religion. They also talked about representative democracy, hope, patience, and life in the United States. In addition, they tried to lay the groundwork for a counter-revolution some day in Cuba. Carlos told the refugees, "Give thanks to God for being in this country. Now, I must learn and grow and someday return and liberate my family and my country." Both were pastors of Hispanic-community Methodist parishes in the Chicago area, and worked at the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center Monday through Friday of each week. Carlos was one of twenty ministers in the United States who had attended a prayer meeting with President Carter two months before in the White House.

And on 25 June 1980, Mr. Joseph Battaglia, a U.S. Catholic Conference Regional Director at the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center, said that the task of resettling the Cuban refugees who were now living at Fort McCoy would take all summer and probably all winter. He stated that the difficulty experienced in finding non-related sponsors for single, male refugees was going to slow down the resettlement process and force government officials to house the refugees somewhere during the winter months. He explained that the resettlement of this particular category of refugees was going to be a time-consuming process because public sentiment was running against them. Many Americans, he said, had turned against the refugees after the riots at Fort Chaffee, Ark. "The trouble in Chaffee disturbs many Americans,"

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42. LaCrosse Tribune, 2, 4, and 16 Jun 80.
43. Ibid.
Battaglia said. "But we're talking about a minority of the refugees there. We're talking about the criminal element and troublemakers. These people at McCoy are very nice people." In the course of additional comments on the same subject, he pointed out that what really was behind the American attitude was the shaky economy. "Everyone was looking at it selfishly. They think that this is what is ruining our economy."44

Summary

During the period 29 May to 15 July 1980, the Federal Emergency Management Agency was actively engaged in receiving, housing, processing, and outplacing a cumulative total of 14,241 Cuban refugees. The Fort McCoy Task Force commander supported the Federal Emergency Management Agency with both Active Component and Reserve Component units and individual personnel, equipment, and materiel. The Task Force commander was supported in turn by the Fort McCoy installation commander who acted as a base support installation commander for that purpose. The chain of command used by U.S. Army Forces Command for this mobilization type exercise ran from the Fort McCoy commander to the Task Force commander on up through the normal FORSCOM Reserve Component management (and mobilization) organizational structure of the Army Readiness and Mobilization Region V commander to the Fifth U.S. Army commander and then to the FORSCOM commander. The Fort McCoy installation commander also had direct access to the FORSCOM commander for the normal day-to-day operation of the installation in keeping with the normal FORSCOM chain of Active Component unit and installation command lines established by the STEADFAST reorganization of 1973 when FORSCOM was founded. Late in June, the Task Force commander was able to release the majority of his Active Component units which had been supporting the Federal Emergency Management Agency on a temporary duty basis in such areas as engineer, transportation, personnel services, interpreter, and medical until that agency could make other appropriate contractual arrangements. He then recommended in early July that his Task Force headquarters be inactivated. The FORSCOM commander disapproved this recommendation because no decision had been made by higher headquarters by 15 July as to where the residual Cuban refugee populations of Eglin Air Force Base, Fort Indiantown Gap, Fort McCoy, and Fort Chaffee would be consolidated for the winter months. The outplacement of the residual Cuban refugees at Fort McCoy had been hindered because over 90 percent of them were young, single males, many of whom had no family connections in the United States. Widespread media account of refugee violence, particularly at Fort Chaffee, coupled with widespread economic problems in the country also impeded the outplacement process.

At the time the State Department assumed the operation of the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, local media and community relations were still very good although a number of prominent state political leaders continued to

raise disturbing questions concerning the precise legal status of the refugees and the nature and extent of the state's financial obligations depending upon determinations to be handed down from Washington. Despite these actions, which were pointedly counteracted in word and deed by state religious leaders, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, through its cooperating Voluntary Agencies, had managed to place 5,763 of its charges throughout the country, with only 3 being placed with relatives in Wisconsin. The agency had also succeeded in reducing the center's resident refugee population from a high point of 13,334 on 15 June to 8,478 by 15 July. Nevertheless, there was growing evidence that the remaining relatively hard to place refugee population was becoming increasingly restless and apprehensive. This was illustrated by the increasing number of attempted escapes, assaults, and other acts of violence which came to the attention of the center's authorities. Up to the transfer point, Fort McCoy had supported the Cuban Refugee Processing Center operations in the amount of $12.8 million in reimbursable expenditures with an additional $5.4 million committed. Cumulative contracts to date amounted to 441. This figure included 17 for transportation, 20 for various rentals and contractual services, 367 for supplies and materials, and 37 for equipment. It appeared that, as of 15 July 1980, the Task Force commander had largely succeeded in establishing the desired host-tenant relationship between the Army and the Refugee Processing Center.
Chapter VII

FORT McCOY STATE DEPARTMENT SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Background

The State Department operational phase of the Cuban Refugee Processing Center at Fort McCoy lasted from 15 July 1980, the date on which the State Department assumed operational responsibility for the Center from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, to 3 November 1980, when the last of the refugees had either been transferred to the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Refugee Processing Center and other federal institutions or had been turned over to the appropriate State of Wisconsin authorities for further processing. During this concluding, turmoil-ridden operational phase, the Fort McCoy Task Force augmented at times by two reaction force infantry battalions to contain the growing violence within the refugee compound, continued to support the State Department. During this nearly two-month closeout period, the State Department transferred 3,174 refugees to Fort Chaffee; 60 refugees to various hospitals in New Orleans, La., and Washington, D.C.; and 93 juveniles to the State of Wisconsin, thus reducing the Cuban refugee population from 8,478 to practically zero. In a final accounting on 4 November 1980, the Task Force commander reported that the 93 juveniles noted above had been transferred, 1 refugee had been sponsored, 8 were unaccounted for, 3 were on a Federal Bureau of Investigation hold, and 6 had died during the overall operational period from 29 May to 4 November. The Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center had received a cumulative total of 14,362 refugees.

Operational Overview

During the first full week of State Department operations at Fort McCoy, security and law enforcement continued to be a problem as tension among the refugees concerning their eventual outplacement continued to grow, despite the fact that the overall Cuban refugee population continued to decline. The Fort McCoy Task Force continued to perform its functions but rehabilitation of the installation became an issue as the refugee operations moved toward its inevitable ending. The period 20 July to 2 August, was one in which the Federal Emergency Management Agency continued to transfer its functions to the State Department; Cuban refugee and Task Force support personnel strengths continued to decline; the Cuban refugee crime rate continued to increase; and a slowdown in outplacement at all refugee centers, coupled with the possibility of winter operations, caused the White House to decide on a consolidated facility at Fort Chaffee, Ark. The period 3 August to 16 August, was one which saw the final development of the consolidated facility plan, the receipt of the plan at Fort McCoy, and public announcement concerning the plan. It was also a period in which the Task

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Force continued to operate, Cuban refugee and support personnel strengths continued to decline, and unrest increased among the sponsored and unsponsored Cuban refugees. The period 17 August to 30 August, was one during which planning for the consolidated facility was completed; Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve support was completed; and FORSCOM dispatched an Active Component infantry battalion to Fort McCoy to provide a ready reaction force in the face of growing Cuban unrest. The period 31 August to 13 September, was one of turbulence which included the submission of a critical report by the Governor's Commission to the Department of the Army concerning conditions inside of the refugee compound, two major outbreaks of violence, and the dispatch of a second infantry battalion to Fort McCoy as a ready reaction force. During the period 14 September to 27 September, the degree of turmoil at the refugee processing center increased still more with the announcement that a 20-year old former Cuban refugee had been charged with killing his middle-aged female sponsor at her residence in nearby Tomah, Wis. In addition, it appeared for a time that there would be a "sick call-in" strike by civilian workers at the center, but this never materialized. The date for moving Cuban refugees to the Fort Chaffee Refugee Consolidated Processing Center had been postponed to 15 October, but transfers actually began on 26 September. On that date, an initial increment of 112 refugees was bussed to Volk Field under heavy security provided by federal marshals, military police, and combat infantrymen; and subsequently flown to Fort Smith, Ark., and Fort Chaffee without incident. In the meantime, Col. Alan R. Carlisle had replaced General Herring as the Task Force commander on 23 September. On 8 October, FORSCOM inactivated the Task Force and Colonel Moran assumed all residual Task Force responsibilities. Although the transfer of the adult Cuban refugees from Fort McCoy to Fort Chaffee was completed on 3 October, the question of what to do about the remaining juveniles at Fort McCoy had yet to be answered. During the period 12 October to 25 October, the winding down operation continued. Fort McCoy personnel removed fences and launched a monumental clean-up effort. Finally, the period 26 October to 7 November, marked the concluding phase of the Cuban refugee operation. The State of Wisconsin, in its capacity as the agent for the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service for those Cuban juvenile refugees still in residence at Fort McCoy chose Wyalusing State Park, Wis., as the new housing site for these young people. On 3 November, Colonel Moran moved the juvenile refugees to that location in response to a request from the State Department officials in charge of the refugee processing center. The last military support unit, the 194th Military Police Platoon, departed from Fort McCoy on 7 November for its home station at Fort Knox, Ky., thus bringing to a close almost six months of direct U.S. Army military and civilian support of the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center.

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A bilingual teacher from Madison, Wisc., teaches an English class to adult Cuban refugees in August 1980. These classes occurred twice daily and emphasized practical English -- both written and spoken.

The Cuban Refugee Salsa Band performs at Duffy's Tavern, Minneapolis, Minn., in connection with a Cuban refugee sponsorship drive.
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service detention officers conduct interviews with Cuban refugees in the course of gathering biographical data for a security check.

A view of the maximum security detention area for Cuban refugees. Surrounded by concertina wire with four guard towers, this detention area was used in WW II for prisoners of war.
On 10 September 1980, Cuban refugee volunteers put back the fence which other Cuban refugees had torn down three days earlier.

On 13 September 1980, the first official wedding between two Cuban refugees was celebrated at Fort McCoy. Judge James Rice performed the ceremony.
A sampling of weapons confiscated from the Cuban refugees by the U.S. Marshal's office during July 1980.

State Department official, Sylvia Gonzales, dances with some of the Cuban refugees as part of a celebration and spirit-booster for those refugees who were transported to the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Refugee Processing Center later that day, 27 September 1980.
Military Police in riot gear usher hard-core, hard-to-place Cuban refugees to buses to begin their journey from Fort McCoy to the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Refugee Processing Center.

At Volk Field, Camp Douglas, Wisc., these same refugees are loaded aboard chartered commercial aircraft for the continuation of their journey to Fort Chaffee. Note the heavy security precautions.
A view of one of the Cuban refugee barracks in the single-male compound following the transfer of its occupants to the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Refugee Processing Center in late September 1980.

Another typical view of the destruction experienced at Fort McCoy at the hands of some of the Cuban refugees.
Active Component Support

Active Component support of the Fort McCoy Refugee Center reached a new high of 1,716 military personnel on 26 September 1980, the date on which the State Department began transferring 3,174 Cuban refugees from the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center to the winter consolidation center at Fort Chaffee, Ark. Since the residual elements of the 8th Battalion, 4th Psychological Operations Group, Fort Bragg, N.C., had departed on 23 August, the Active Component force in being at Fort McCoy on 26 September was made up of the 759th Military Police Battalion, Fort Dix, N.J., the 1st Battalion (Mech), 12th Infantry, Fort Carson, Colo., and the 2d Battalion (Abn), 502d Infantry, Fort Campbell, Ky. The latter two units closed on Fort McCoy on 27 August and 9 September, respectively. Their announced mission was to conduct normal training and to provide backup support to the Task Force in meeting increased security requirements stemming from the Cuban refugee transfer to Fort Chaffee and the termination of Reserve Component military police unit support on 23 August. The 1st Battalion (Mech), 12th Infantry, departed for its home station on 5 October and the 2d Battalion (Abn), 502d Infantry, departed for its home station on 7 October. The 759th Military Police Battalion (Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment) departed for its home station on 5 October. Two of its assigned units during the support operation at Fort McCoy, the 463d and 978th Military Police Companies, departed for their respective home stations on the same date. The remaining two assigned units, the 984th and the 1st Military Police Companies departed for their home stations on 7 October and 23 October, respectively. This Active Component high strength figure of 1,716 on 26 September was considerably higher than the previous high of 1,158 recorded on 16 June, when the Cuban refugee population had peaked at 13,334.

Reserve Component Support

During the Federal Emergency Management Agency phase of the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center operations, Reserve Component support strength assigned to the Task Force had reached a high of 321 on 14 July 1980 as unrest and incidents among the Cuban refugee population began to markedly increase. This total included 113 Army Reservists and 208 Army National Guardsmen who were assigned to civil affairs, military police, and psychological operations units. During the State Department phase at Fort McCoy, Reserve Component support strength assigned to the Task Force reached a high of 539 on 8 August 1980. On the day previous, Ms. Sylvia Gonzales, Special Assistant to the Director of the State Department's Cuban-Haitian Task Force, announced, while visiting the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center, that Fort Chaffee, Ark., had been designated as a consolidation center and that the refugees remaining at Fort McCoy would be relocated there during the period 15 through 30 September. This announcement generated an immediate apprehension among the

3. Daily SITREP's, 16 Jun 80, 24 Aug 80, 28 Aug 80, 10 Sep 80, 5 Oct 80, 8 Oct 80, and 23 Oct 80.
refugees as to their future. This feeling continued to grow beyond 24 August 1980, when the last Reserve Component units departed Fort McCoy for their home stations. This situation created a security maintenance vacuum which the Task Force commander immediately called to the attention of higher headquarters and recommended the introduction of Active Component troops to fill the gap.4

Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations Units. U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations units during the the State Department phase of Fort McCoy refugee processing center operations were as follows:5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Home Station</th>
<th>AT Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>350th Psychological Operations Company</td>
<td>Ohio USAR</td>
<td>26 Jul - 9 Aug 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Psychological Operations Company</td>
<td>Pennsylvania USAR</td>
<td>9 Aug - 23 Aug 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>245th Psychological Operations Company</td>
<td>Texas USAR</td>
<td>10 Aug - 24 Aug 80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Military Police Units. Reserve Component Military Police units during the State Department phase of Fort McCoy refugee processing center operations were as follows:6

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Home Station</th>
<th>AT Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>535th Military Police Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment</td>
<td>Ohio USAR</td>
<td>26 Jul - 9 Aug 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135th Military Police Company</td>
<td>Ohio ARNG</td>
<td>26 Jul - 9 Aug 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>342d Military Police Company</td>
<td>Ohio USAR</td>
<td>26 Jul - 9 Aug 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>361st Military Police Company</td>
<td>Ohio USAR</td>
<td>26 Jul - 9 Aug 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>377th Military Police Company</td>
<td>Ohio USAR</td>
<td>26 Jul - 9 Aug 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210th Military Police Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment</td>
<td>Michigan ARNG</td>
<td>2 Aug - 16 Aug 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>233d Military Police Company</td>
<td>Illinois ARNG</td>
<td>2 Aug - 17 Aug 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1775th Military Police Company</td>
<td>Michigan ARNG</td>
<td>2 Aug - 16 Aug 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>257th Military Police Company</td>
<td>Minnesota ARNG</td>
<td>9 Aug - 23 Aug 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>447th Military Police Company</td>
<td>Ohio USAR</td>
<td>9 Aug - 23 Aug 80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Security Operations

Security operations during the State Department phase of operations were conducted in the knowledge that those Cuban refugees not placed by the end of September were to be consolidated at Fort Chaffee, Ark., along with similar categories of Cuban refugees from Eglin Air Force Base and Fort Indiantown Gap. This period also included the end of Reserve Component support to the Task Force and the introduction of two of FORSCOM's Active Component combat arms battalions to Fort McCoy to provide backup security support as required in the face of increased Cuban refugee misconduct both inside and outside of the processing center which reflected on the Army, but which the Army had no authority to control.

New Reaction Force. On 14 August 1980, the Fifth U.S. Army commander surveyed the general security situation at Fort McCoy and reminded FORSCOM that, on 24 August, the four Army National Guard and one U.S. Army Reserve military police companies then on duty at Fort McCoy would complete their annual training for the year and that no additional Reserve Component units were available for this mission. He noted that, for several reasons, security problems in the refugee processing center would increase rather than decrease as the Cuban refugee population diminished. The remaining refugees would consist largely of single males without marketable skills, relatives, or prospects of immediate sponsors. As other refugees were placed, the remaining refugees would become increasingly discontented. An appreciable number were known to be or were potentially bad characters. In short, the requirement for a
large available security force would remain. In closing, he observed that, to date, the security forces at Fort McCoy had been able to stop incidents of possible violence with a prompt show of force through the use of readily available security forces. A good example of this had occurred that very morning when a group of fifty to sixty Cuban refugees, many of whom were armed with homemade weapons, engaged in a series of confrontations and clashes among themselves. U.S. Marshals in charge of refugee security alerted Military Police reaction forces, who, in three instances, mounted show of force/protective role demonstrations. Although there was no contact between these reactive forces and the refugees, the disturbances soon ceased in the face of this display of reactive strength. Approximately twenty refugees were treated for injuries inflicted by other refugees during the conflict. At that time, 324 military security personnel were on duty at Fort McCoy. This total included 28 Active Army personnel inside the enclave; 114 personnel on the enclave perimeter (67 Active Army, 51 Army National Guard, and 18 U.S. Army Reserve); 8 on the external perimeter (4 Active Army and 4 Army National Guard). In addition to this overall total, five Active Army personnel were engaged in installation security functions. In view of this security situation, the Fifth U.S. Army commander requested that the FORSCOM commander assign an additional Active Army military police battalion or combat arms battalion of sufficient strength to replace the departing Reserve Component military police units on 24 August 1980.

On 25 August 1980, FORSCOM disapproved this request and restated its position to reduce the number of active military personnel (then 556 in the Fort McCoy Task Force) involved in refugee operations. FORSCOM felt that to deploy additional security personnel to the refugee centers at a time of reduced Cuban population (down from a high of 13,334 on 15 June to 5,170 on 25 August) and impending consolidation at Fort Chaffee would be inconsistent with FORSCOM's stated position. At this point in time, however, increasing Cuban refugee unrest and apprehension as the transfer of residual elements to Fort Chaffee drew ever nearer forced the Task Force to commit 402 of its military personnel to security duties, a number which stretched its capabilities in this area to the extreme.

On the following day, FORSCOM directed the Commander, 4th Infantry Division (Mech), Fort Carson, Colo., to deploy a mechanized infantry battalion to Fort McCoy to provide a reaction force for the refugee processing center and to conduct training activities consistent with the reaction force requirement. The unit would function as a reaction force and would not be absorbed into day-to-day routine security requirements. It would be under the operational control (OPCON) of the Fort McCoy installation commander. The 4th Division selected the 1st Battalion (Mech), 12th Infantry, which closed on Fort McCoy on 27 August with 471

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personnel and immediately assumed its duties as a reaction force. By 29 August 1980, the Task Force was able to reduce its military security requirements from 402 military personnel to 217 military personnel, 56 of whom performed inside enclave duties and 161 of whom performed enclave perimeter duties.9

Additional Law Enforcement Guidance. The Department of the Army had become increasingly sensitive to public charges that official law enforcement was lacking within the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center. Consequently, on 4 September 1980, the Department issued additional law enforcement guidance to the Task Force commander who, it must be once again pointed out, was not responsible for this function inside the refugee processing center where the alleged excesses were taking place. This was the responsibility of the State Department and the law enforcement elements operating under that department's overall supervision such as U.S. Marshals, Immigration and Naturalization Service officers, Border Patrol officers, Federal Protective Service officers, and the like. Department of the Army made clear that the purpose of its latest law enforcement guidance was not to modify guidance previously discussed and that it did not decrease the responsibilities of the primary civilian law enforcement agency (U.S. Marshals working under State Department control) at Fort McCoy. This message directed the Task Force commander to immediately increase the scope of preventive patrols within the Cuban enclave at Fort McCoy, to include patrolling inside the barracks housing Cubans. The purpose of these patrols was to promote a sure and visible law enforcement presence and thus serve as both a security check and a deterrent. The patrols were to be conducted in such a manner that the location, time, and frequency was to be determined solely by the military authorities at Fort McCoy, although they should consult the civilian law enforcement authorities in the programming of barracks patrols. If requested by the civilian law enforcement authorities, the Task Force commander could authorize military personnel to conduct searches of barracks and individuals to discover and confiscate contraband such as weapons and drugs. Such searches would require the presence and active participation of civilian law enforcement officials who would provide advice and have arrest authority. Further, he would assist civilian law enforcement officials in the identification and detections of Cubans in the compound who posed a threat to others. He would also assist in efforts to detect and prevent any unauthorized Cuban departures or escapes from the compound or the installation.10

New Reaction Force Augmentation. Following the arrival of the 1st Battalion (Mech), 12th Infantry, at Fort McCoy as a reaction force, the Cuban refugees continued to maintain a high level of incidents involving

9. (1) MAG 262040Z Aug 80, FORSCOM to Distr, subj: Execute Order - Deployment of Inf (MECH) Bn to Ft McCoy WI; (2) Daily SITREP's, 25 and 29 Aug 80.

10. MAG 041510Z Sep 80, DA to FORSCOM, subj: Safety and Security Activities by Military Personnel at Ft McCoy, WI.
acts of misconduct of all varieties both inside and outside the refugee processing center and outside the installation. On 7 September 1980, for example, some 300 of the refugees knocked down an estimated two thirds of the chain link fence surrounding the all male refugee compound. All available personnel assigned to the 759th MP Battalion and the 1st Battalion (Mech), 12th Infantry, were committed to cordon off the disturbance area. The reaction force was forced to use CS (tear gas) on a limited basis in one area to turn back a group of the refugees who were attempting to get to the Westleg of Fort McCoy which contained the unaccompanied minor area, the family area, detention areas, and the single male compound. It took the reaction force five and one-half hours to stabilize the situation. At that point in time, a reserve force of 122 military policemen was reconstituted and 150 infantrymen were positioned in nearby woods. On 8 September, FORSCOM directed the Commander, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, N.C., to provide an additional battalion of infantry equipped with riot control equipment. However, the unit would be under the operational control of the Fort McCoy Task Force commander. The main body was to close at Fort McCoy no later than 2400 that day and would be prepared to support security operations at the refugee processing center and to conduct training activities consistent with security force requirements. XVIII Airborne Corps directed the 101st Airborne Division (AASLT), Fort Campbell, Ky., to provide the required unit. The 2d Battalion, 502d Infantry Battalion (Abn), deployed to Fort McCoy that evening with a strength of 425 personnel. The battalion closed on 9 September, a day which witnessed incidents of suspected arson, major escape attempts, and general unrest. Military police supported the Immigration and Naturalization officials and U.S. Marshals in restoring order. Once again, reaction force elements used tear gas to disperse Cuban refugees attempting to break out of the detention center. The intensity and scope of the disturbance was considerably less than that of the previous day. According to the Task Force commander, the quick reaction by the military police and mechanized infantry personnel in sealing off and apprehending the agitators had quickly defused the situation.11

**Governor's Fact-Finding Commission**

**Background.** In the meantime, news media nation-wide reported allegations concerning the mistreatment of Cuban juveniles within the center by adult Cubans including members of the internal Cuban self government security force; the abnormally high rate of mental illness; and an 80 percent conviction rate among the refugees. On 15 August 1980, for example, the Cuban American Legal Defense and Education Fund of Fort Wayne, Ind., filed papers in the U.S. District Court at Madison, Wisc., asking for a writ of habeas corpus to free the juvenile refugees at Fort McCoy. The request for the writ alleged that the Cuban juveniles had been subjected to physical assaults, homosexual rapes, and physical

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11. (1) Daily SITREP's, 7 Sep 80, 8 Sep 80, 9 Sep 80; (2) Msg 081600Z Sep 80, FORSCOM to Distr, subj: Execute Order - Deployment of Infantry Battalion to Support Cuban Resettlement Center - Ft McCoy, WI.
restraints. Among other things, the writ asked that the Cuban juveniles be transferred to safer quarters and that they be released to their American relatives or to responsible parties within the next fifteen days. In a related incident in July, two Cuban juveniles fled the center and said they needed protection from physical abuse at the camp. A local circuit judge placed them in a sheltered home to protect them from the alleged violence. On 17 August, Governor Dreyfus announced that he was sending a fact finding commission to Fort McCoy to investigate the previously noted allegations. A week later, National Public Radio added to the public's concern in the matter by broadcasting a report concerning a study performed by a psychiatrist and a researcher for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services which stated that 4,000 of the approximately 5,000 Cubans at the refugee processing center admitted to having served prison terms of at least fifteen days in Cuba and that they had an abnormally high rate of mental illness. A State Department spokesman said that only 940 of the 14,300 refugees then processed at Fort McCoy had serious criminal records and that all of them had been sent to federal correctional institutions for further evaluation. Refugees found to be suffering from mental illness received complete medical attention. He also pointed out that a Cuban could serve a prison term and have a prison record for an offense that would not be considered a criminal offense in the United States.12

On 18 August 1980, a national spokesman for the State Department's Cuban-Haitian Task Force said the Federal Government had concluded an agreement with the states of Florida, New Jersey, and Wisconsin by which it would pick up 100 percent of the costs of foster care which the states would provide for Cuban juveniles transferred to their authority. He also announced that Cuban juveniles could now be released to relatives other than parents or be placed in foster homes and that the actual placement would start in about one week. Mr. Tom Irwin, Director of the Cuban-Haitian Task Force for the State Department at Fort McCoy agreed to permit a 5- or 6-man fact-finding commission appointed by the governor to visit the camp and probe the situation, especially among the juveniles. Mr. Irwin admitted that several juveniles had been sexually abused but that measures had been taken to prevent further attacks. They included increased security, the formation of a 12-member juvenile council to communicate with camp officials, and counseling by child sociologists and psychologists.13

Commission Findings. The Governor's Fact-Finding Commission conducted its mission at the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center during the period 28 to 29 August 1980. In a lengthy report to the governor on 2 September, it found that there was substantial evidence of sexual and psychological abuse of both male and female Cuban juveniles housed at the refugee processing center. According to the commission, one juvenile

female had been recently raped by fifty-four men. Another juvenile female either voluntarily or inadvertently had gone into the single men's section and was raped by nine men. There were other reports that some female juveniles had been intoxicated by military personnel and then had been sexually molested and that other camp personnel tried to extract sexual favors from young females, but the commission was unable to confirm these reports. Currently, unaccompanied juveniles were located in all areas of the compound based solely on their preference. Male homosexuals were assigned to the same barracks as female juveniles and all juveniles had complete and free access to all barracks, even in Section 700-A which had been designed as a maximum security area for those Cuban juveniles who volunteered to reside there. Classes, mostly English, were offered on a voluntary basis to the children in Section 700-A only, but they made up only a small percentage of the 400 juveniles then in residence in the refugee processing center. There was little evidence of extensive organized recreational activities for juveniles. In fact, some juveniles outside of Section 700-A had been forced to stay in their barracks for fear of being physically or sexually assaulted. Some children were being aided or coerced by adults and older juveniles into stealing among themselves and even outside of the compound to supply a small black market operation. The currency in this market consisted of cigarettes, clothing, small radios, and a small amount of money.14

As far as additional resettlement and consolidation was concerned, the commission reported that there seemed very little likelihood that many of the 5,000 Cuban refugees still in residence at Fort McCoy would be outplaced prior to their consolidation at Fort Chaffee, Ark., later in September. The hard to place element of the overall Cuban population continued to grow, leading to increased tension to the point of desperation. The growing tension and desperation was manifested in conflicts, depression, suicide attempts, hunger strikes, and other aberrant behavior. Among the Cuban refugees, Fort Chaffee had a bad reputation and the commission was of the opinion that force of some kind might be necessary to move some of the Cubans from Fort McCoy. 15

As far as security was concerned, the commission was of the opinion that internal security for the protection of the Cubans in the compound was, for all practical purposes, nonexistent. The only internal protection in being was offered by the Cuban self-government, whose efficacy was difficult to assess. The military police and U.S. Marshals were outside the compound. Inside the compound, it was a free-for-all with every person looking out for himself. This state of affairs had directly contributed to the abuses mentioned above and was one reason why the proposed consolidation at Fort Chaffee was viewed with such trepidation by the remaining Cuban refugees. Section 700-A was the exception and

15. Ibid.
did have guards inside the compound. They were there basically to pro-
tect teachers and other personnel from the Cubans. External security
was also a problem. According to the local sheriff, some 45 break-ins
at local residences or business establishments had been attributed to
Cubans who had walked off Fort McCoy. In addition, the Sheriff's
Department had picked up some 100 Cuban refugees outside of the instal-
lation.16

Information was disseminated to the Cuban refugees from a number of
sources including the voluntary agencies, government authorities, radio,
television, and visitors. Periodic announcements were made via public
address systems and Spanish radio programs. Nevertheless, the commis-
sion felt that it was questionable whether most Cubans in the compound
knew or understood what was happening to them beyond the superficial
level. All of the juveniles, for example, knew that no unaccompanied
juveniles had been allowed to resettle even if they had relatives in the
United States. They knew this basic fact, but they did not know the
basic rationale behind the decision. They believed that there was a
prohibition against unaccompanied juveniles being resettled and that
they would have to wait until they were eighteen to be let out. This
lack of information beyond the surface level created an environment of
mistrust, anxiety, and rumor-mongering.17

As far as violence was concerned, the commission found that there
had been sporadic violent attacks among the Cuban population, but they
appeared to be on the decline and involved a very small percentage of
perpetrators. Sexual attacks upon females also appeared to be on the
decline although there was evidence that they still occurred. The com-
mission also noted that early in the internment period, when a U.S.
military-imposed system of internal security consisting of Cuban vigi-
lantes known as the "Warhawks" was in existence, there were incidents of
physical abuse and unauthorized detainment and punishment by this secu-
rity force which was a component of the Cuban self-government council or
"Jefes" within the compound. At the time the commission visited the
refugee processing center, the "Warhawks" had been disbanded and vigi-
lante violence appeared to be minimal. There was evidence of some self-
inflicted violence which was partly due to the frustration and sense of
hopelessness experienced by some of the Cuban internees. Some apparent-
ly superficial self-inflicted wounds were attempts by Cuban refugees to
attract official attention in the hope of an early release. The com-
mission believed that the cause of violence was partly due to the
assignment of such a large population in such stark and ugly surround-
ings and the attendant despair. On the other hand, some of the blame
could be laid to the fact that the bad elements in the Cuban refugee
population, both adult and juvenile, had not been completely weeded out
of the general population. The argument could be made that due to the
lack of records, the weeding out of Cuban refugees with a propensity for

16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
violence was difficult. The commission recognized the validity of such an argument, but insisted that there was evidence which indicated that at least some of the Cuban refugees who had exhibited violent or potentially violent behavior were segregated from the general population for only a few days and were then released again into the compound. It then stated that this approach had taken place on a number of occasions and that it had a tendency to discourage the victims from complaining for fear of having to face their attackers in the near future within the confines of the compound where they had little or no protection from the authorities.18

Commission Recommendations. In view of the above findings, the commission recommended that the State of Wisconsin immediately sign a contractual agreement with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to reimburse the state for 100 percent of its costs for the placement of unaccompanied Cuban refugee minors in return for the state's agreement to accept legal responsibility for their placement and supervision. It recommended that in the unlikely event that no agreement could be reached between the State of Wisconsin and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the state nevertheless agree to accept legal responsibility for a number of Cuban refugee minors who had no relatives in the United States. It recommended that the state do all in its power to encourage the U.S. Congress to act favorably on the pending Fascell-Stone legislation, which would authorize the use of $100 million for the welfare of minor Cuban refugees. It also recommended that the state do all in its power to prevent all minor Cuban refugees at Fort McCoy from being moved to Fort Chaffee. All unaccompanied minor Cuban refugees should be segregated from the general population at Fort McCoy to better ensure their safety and welfare. All efforts possible should be made to resettle as many Cuban refugees as possible prior to the consolidation date as there were apparently ample numbers of sponsors waiting to help resettle Cubans. In this connection, the state should use its full array of resources and power to assist the Voluntary Agencies and the Federal Government in expediting the resettlement of Cuban refugees at Fort McCoy prior to 15 September 1980, the projected date of consolidation. The commission recommended that an extensive informational program be undertaken to keep all Cuban refugees at the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center completely informed of all relevant matters pertaining to their placement with sponsors and/or their movement from Fort McCoy so as to assuage their fears and avert any possible future problems. It further recommended that all Cuban refugees with a history of violence or who engaged in violent behavior in the compound be segregated from the general population. Cuban refugees caught with concealed weapons should also be segregated. Wherever necessary, due process hearings should be afforded the segregated Cubans. Finally, the commission recommended that the military police be placed inside the compound in sufficient numbers to keep the peace and to protect all individuals from violence or other abuses.19

18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
Commission Memorandum. In a separate memorandum to the Governor, the commission reviewed some of their findings and recommendations and provided additional background material and comments. In terms of findings, it confirmed the allegations of assaults, stabbings, beatings, and robbery at Fort McCoy, but noted that the number of incidents had declined since mid-August. It found security inside and outside of the center to be "extremely relaxed", creating situations where Cuban refugee families and juveniles existed in a siege status. Federal marshals were helpless at the hands of internal Cuban elements. It found the behavior of the refugee processing center staff, security, and the Cuban refugees themselves to be in various stages of fear and frustration. Most Cubans interviewed expressed the situation in terms of a prison-like atmosphere and camp morale was low. The commission found that in almost every section of the refugee processing center, there was evidence of staff changes every month since the Cuban refugees arrived, providing a lack of continuity and a reluctance to accept responsibility for the allegations reported in the media. It found that there was evidence of the integration of Cuban juveniles, families, homosexuals, and hardcore criminals in the same living quarters, thus providing a situation for the strong to prey on the weak. It noted that, even though the Voluntary Agencies appeared to have done an admirable job in the resettlement effort and placement of the Cuban refugees, it was also true that the greatest number of placements had been made to relatives with only a minimal effort being made to place those without relatives in the United States. Commission interviews with Voluntary Agency personnel indicated an almost winding down of effort, a clean-up of existing files, and a certain lack of responsiveness to citizens in the state of Wisconsin who wished to sponsor Cuban refugees. The commission observed that the American National Red Cross, charged with clothing the refugees, did not issue more than two outfits per refugee even though there was evidence of rampant stealing of clothing within the compound. Commission members saw medical staff personnel assisting Cuban refugee patients wrapped in sheets and other makeshift garments. Finally, the commission noted that, as planning continued to consolidate the Cuban refugees at Fort Chaffee, there was much concern among the refugees. They saw it as a lateral move rather than one of upward mobility in status. Many Cubans expressed the belief that another internal Cuban refugee struggle for control would surface at Fort Chaffee resulting in the creation of even more violent acts than those presently existing at Fort McCoy.20

In additional comments to the governor in its separate memorandum, the commission reported that the majority of the refugee center staff personnel expressed concern regarding the negative press resulting from the center's problems. The commission also reported that particularly unique to the State Department personnel in charge of the refugee center was the admission of the allegations and the expression of hope for some resolution, since the members of the commission were representatives of

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Memo, Governor's Cuban Resettlement Fact-Finding Commission to Governor Lee Sherman Dreyfus, 2 Sep 80.
the Governor's Office. The commission remarked that, although it had not been charged with making management recommendations in the matter, it saw a need for swift action to assist these prospective American citizens. The commission then presented several recommendations for the governor's consideration which it urged him to use in discussions with federal officials. It urgently recommended that the refugee center officials segregate the Cuban refugees more than they currently were. Juveniles, homosexuals, families, single females, and hardened criminal males should be segregated from one another. Hardened criminal males should be segregated from well behaved males who reflected educational and vocational skills and goals. Provisions should be made for a staff to accomplish this and to follow through with mental and physical rehabilitation for those already affected. The commission urgently recommended that provisions should be made for increased security with a prosecuting process in and outside of the compound. Refugee processing center officials should dismantle the Cuban internal self-government organization, take over internal control of the compound, and provide the security, counseling, and administrative staff adequate to accomplish this objective. The commission also recommended that the Federal agencies involved move immediately to obtain from the U.S. Congress and to stress to the Congress the importance of long term funding for the Cuban juvenile refugees. Once this funding was accomplished, the state should then immediately sign the juvenile placement contract. Such action would provide for the release of some non-criminal Cuban refugee juveniles immediately, for the beginning of rehabilitation work with others, and for assistance in getting some of the juveniles out of the compound and out from under the siege by older Cuban males.21

The commission also recommended in its separate memorandum that the Governor urge the supporting voluntary resettlement organizations to move expeditiously to resettle more Cuban refugees and, as a minimum, deal with the Cuban refugee placement situation in the same priority status as other resettlement efforts (Cambodian and Vietnamese). The commission went on to state that the Cuban refugee resettlement effort should not have been treated as a disaster, but rather as a human services effort. It noted that, in order for the Federal Government to accomplish the above tasks (which many observers at this time found rather late in view of the imminent residual refugee movement to Fort Chaffee), institute some responsibility, and avoid further criminal acts, it would have to move expeditiously, authoritatively, and comprehensively. The commission also noted that, in order for the state to meet its moral and possibly legal responsibility at this time, it should request that all Cuban juvenile refugees, as well as potential sponsorable Cubans who wished to work, get an education, and become responsible citizens be kept in Wisconsin. Finally, the commission recommended to the Governor that the information contained in its communications be shared with Mr. Tom Irwin, Cuban-Haitian Task Force Director at Fort McCoy, for the purpose of allowing him any option in alleviating the problem areas noted.22

21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
State Department Response

State Department representatives at the Fort McCoy Refugee Center immediately voiced a strong rebuttal to the commission's principal and sensational charges. They termed as "incorrect" portions of the report which claimed verification of two multiple rapes, a lack of law enforcement within the compound, and a failure to segregate proven criminals from the general population. On the other hand, they also stated that "... some of the report can be embraced by us." For example, they endorsed the necessity for reaching an agreement between the U.S. State Department and the State of Wisconsin concerning legal and financial responsibility for the resettlement of unaccompanied juveniles. Specifically, they stated that there was no indication of rape in the two most highly publicized cases and that while in no way did they deny that there may have been sexual assaults within the compound, they were unaware of any case where there had been enough evidence to prosecute. They stressed that U.S. Marshals, Military Police, and U.S. Immigration and Naturalisation Service personnel had been inside the refugee compound at all times since the beginning of the refugee operation at Fort McCoy. Regarding the segregation of criminals, they stated that more than 1,000 refugees had been sent from Fort McCoy to federal correctional institutions or placed in one of five separated detention areas at the center. These detainees consisted of refugees who might have posed a threat to society because of their past records in Cuba, or who had exhibited violent behavior at the center. Finally, the departmental spokesmen denied commission accusations that military personnel had provided liquor to female refugees and sexually molested them. They admitted, however, that there had been isolated incidents of military indiscretions. On 5 September, the Wisconsin State Journal editorialized that the selection of Fort McCoy and the early handling of the refugees by the Army and federal agencies (Federal Emergency Management Agency) was proper and well handled, but that later on (under the State Department) that performance had deteriorated.23

Voluntary Agencies

The Voluntary Agencies were responsible for placing Cuban refugees from the Fort McCoy Refugee Center into American society. In general, the success of these agencies in their placement efforts had a direct bearing on the smooth and efficient operation of the center. Any diminution of their success in effecting voluntary placement with individual and group sponsors was reflected in an increased length of stay in the center for individual refugees as well as an inevitable buildup of the overall center's refugee population. Naturally, the Voluntary Agencies concentrated first on placing those individual refugees and family groups who had relatives living in the United States. This meant, of course, that the hard to place population continued to remain in the center and to increase in strength, a condition which was reflected in

23. (1) LaCrosse Tribune, 5 Sep 80; (2) Wisconsin State Journal, 5 Sep 80; (3) Sparta Herald, 8 Sep 80.
antisocial behavior of all types. This situation was further complicated by the machinations of the pro and anti Castro groups within the refugee population and the excesses perpetrated by the Cuban self-government structure within the compound. The wide coverage given these matters in the media guaranteed that Voluntary Agencies would be unable to place all of the refugees who were suitable for sponsorship prior to the consolidation of the remaining Cuban adult and family group refugees at Fort Chaffee beginning on 26 September 1980. All in all, five Voluntary Agencies operated at the Fort McCoy Refugee Center. These included the Catholic Charities, the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service, the Church World Services, the Hebrew Immigration Aid Society, and the International Rescue Committee.2

The Use of Reaction Forces

The Task Force commander employed the reaction forces, the 1st Battalion (Mech), 12th Infantry, Fort Carson, Colo., and the 2d Battalion (Abn), 502d Infantry, Fort Campbell, Ky., during two distinct phases. These consisted of the pre-consolidation phase, which occurred between the arrival of the reaction forces at Fort McCoy and 25 September, and the consolidation phase which occurred during the period 26 September through 3 October 1980.

Pre-Consolidation Phase. As noted earlier, the 1st Battalion (Mech), 12th Infantry, had closed at Fort McCoy on 27 August with 471 personnel. In effect, it replaced the last of the Reserve Component military police units which had performed reaction force duties prior to their departure on 23 August 1980. From its arrival until the arrival of the 2d Battalion (Abn), 502d Infantry, which closed at Fort McCoy on 9 September with 425 personnel, the 1st Battalion (Mech), 12th Infantry, constituted the sole reaction force at the installation. Its first action came on 1 September 1980 when, due to internal unrest within the Cuban security force, the 759th MP Battalion deployed a battalion reaction force in a show of force by conducting continuous patrols along the enclave perimeter. The Task Force commander also alerted and assembled a company size element of the mechanized infantry battalion for possible use. On the following day, another company size force of this Battalion Reaction Force conducted a sweep of the wood lines in the vicinity of the enclave from 0600 to 0715 in a search for refugee escapees. This force sighted no Cuban refugee escapees, but it did recover one homemade spear which it turned over to the authorities. On 4 September, a similar size force conducted a sweep in the same area for the same purpose from 0600 to 0800. It found no refugees, but did find a suitcase filled with female clothing and four homemade weapons (knives) approximately twelve to eighteen inches long. On 5 September, the Battalion Reaction Force conducted operations from 0230 to 0800 by placing observation posts and listening posts within the woodline north and south of the enclave and conducting a sweep of the same area. The results were mixed, but better than previous sweeps. Four refugees were taken into

custody and subsequently turned over to the military police, a fifth refugee evaded capture and fled back into the enclave, and a partially buried can containing thirty-four blasting caps was found in a heavily used training area. The Battalion Reaction Force turned this can over to the Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) representatives for further investigation. Since the Fort McCoy Provost Marshal reported that the post's ammunition supply point (ASP) had no inventory shortages of blasting caps, the matter was further referred to the appropriate Federal agencies. The following day, 7 September, proved to be significant from the viewpoint of maintaining security. The Battalion Reaction Force conducted a night training exercise which ended at 0145 on 7 September. During the course of this night training exercise, the Force employed observation and listening posts and conducted a sweep. It intercepted five refugees which it turned over to the military police for transfer to the detention area. This proved to be but the first action of the day for the reaction force.

At approximately 1600 that day, a demonstration resulted when some 300 Cuban refugees knocked down approximately 7,000 feet of the 6-foot high chain link fence surrounding the single male compound. There were no major injuries, no incident of mass escape, and no acts of violence by the Cuban refugees. The Task Force commander committed all available personnel assigned to the 759th MP Battalion and to the 1st Battalion (Mech), 12th Infantry, to cordon off the disturbance area. Troops used CS gas (tear gas) on a limited basis in one area to turn back a group of Cuban refugees who were attempting to get to the Westleg of Fort McCoy. By 2030, the Cuban refugee demonstrators had quieted down and the troops restored order throughout the refugee center. The unaccompanied minor area, the family area, the detention areas, and the single male compound on the west side of the camp were unaffected by the disturbance. Military police and Battalion Reaction Force personnel detained a total of twenty-one Cubans and turned them over to the U.S. Marshals for further action. By 2330, the overall situation had stabilized to the point where the Task Force commander was able to reconstitute a military police reserve of 122 personnel and to reduce the number of perimeter guards. In addition, he positioned 150 infantrymen of the Battalion Reaction Force in the woods adjacent to their portion of the perimeter. On the following day, the 2d Battalion (Abn), 502d Infantry, began arriving at Fort McCoy to conduct training and to provide additional troops for use by the Task Force commander. On 9 September, some 150 Cuban refugee volunteers reconstructed the fence.

On 8 September 1980, the Cuban refugees precipitated further incidents which required intervention by both military police and the reaction force. Although the intensity and scope of these disturbances was considerably less than those experienced the previous day, they caused

25. Daily SITREP's, 1 Sep 80, 2 Sep 80, 4 Sep 80, 5 Sep 80, 6 Sep 80, 7 Sep 80.
26. Daily SITREP's, 8 Sep 80, 9 Sep 80, 10 Sep 80.
considerable concern among both Task Force and refugee center personnel. At approximately 1400, an estimated group of 100 Cuban refugees began random movement throughout the single male compound, the site of the fence destruction on the previous day. The Task Force commander ordered military police and reaction force personnel to strengthen their cordon activities and to restore order. During the course of this process, the military personnel involved apprehended and caused to be placed in detention, twenty-three Cuban instigators. Four military police soldiers received minor injuries with three returning to duty immediately. One military policeman received two broken fingers when struck by a lump of coal. According to the Task Force commander, the quick reaction by the military police and the reaction force in sealing off the area and apprehending the agitators quickly defused the situation. All activity ceased at approximately 1600.27

At approximately 1900 on the same date, a disturbance occurred at the Immigration and Naturalization Service detention facility in Area 800. Cuban detainees attempted to break through the double entrance gates (sally port). They succeeded in battering their way through the first gate using a water trailer. Military police reaction forces responded to an Immigration and Naturalization Service request for support and used CS gas to disperse the detainees. Officers of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and U.S. Marshals entered the detention area supported by military police and apprehended sixteen agitators. These were then transferred to the U.S. Marshals' detention facility in Area 1000. The Task Force commander placed elements of the reaction force on standby alert. Participating military personnel suffered no injuries in this incident. However, one U.S. Marshal did sustain a thigh injury for which he was treated and released to quarters. The disturbance was quelled at 2000. Less than one hour later (2047), Building 611 (Recreation Building) was reported on fire. The Fort McCoy fire department reacted swiftly and brought the fire under control by 2115, but the building suffered severe internal damage. Military police reaction force elements were placed on standby, but were not required. By 2400 that night, 365 troopers of the 2d Battalion (Abn), 502d Infantry, who had been deployed on short notice earlier that evening from their home station at Fort Campbell, Ky., and had arrived on the scene, were constituted as a second Battalion Reaction Force. The remainder of the latter battalion closed at Fort McCoy on 9 September.28

Consolidation Phase. As noted earlier, the consolidation phase, which involved the movement of 3,174 Cuban refugees from Fort McCoy to Fort Chaffee occurred during the period 26 September through 3 October. Twenty-four chartered flights were used to move the refugees. Each flight carried an average of 132 adult Cuban refugees as well as security personnel from the Federal civilian agencies. All of the flights were completed without incident. Earlier predictions that a great deal

27. Daily SITREP, 9 Sep 80.
28. (1) Ibid.; (2) Daily SITREP, 10 Sep 80.
of unrest would be encountered among the refugees and that they would offer resistance to the consolidation move failed to materialize. State Department and supporting Task Force security personnel took no chances, however, and the adult Cuban refugees were bussed from Fort McCoy to nearby Volk Field, a Wisconsin Air National Guard installation, under heavy guard provided by military police, combat infantrymen, and Federal civilian agency security personnel. This guard was maintained at Volk Field until each chartered flight departed the field for Fort Smith, Ark., where the refugees were bussed under similar security conditions to their destination at Fort Chaffee. Other factors which may have played a role in this smooth transfer of refugees from Fort McCoy to Fort Chaffee included the rapidly falling night temperatures approaching the freezing point in non-winterized buildings; the deluge of adverse publicity surrounding the current murder investigation and early judicial proceedings connected with the alleged murder of a middle-aged female sponsor by a 20-year old male refugee recent resident of the refugee processing center; and the hope that, at Fort Chaffee, the State Department and the Voluntary Agencies would be better able to concentrate on placing the remaining hard core refugees into American society.  

On 3 November 1980, Colonel Moran transferred ninety-three juvenile Cuban refugees still in residence at Fort McCoy to the physical jurisdiction of the State of Wisconsin. The juveniles were transported to Wyalusing State Park in four chartered busses and were accompanied by some fifty Fort McCoy Refugee Center staff members and several U.S. Marshals. The 194th Military Police Platoon, the only remaining military augmentation unit at Fort McCoy, did not participate in this movement. Until its departure on 7 November, that unit conducted a final series of sweeps in and around the former refugee compound to ensure that all refugees had departed the area. In a final accounting of Cuban refugees published on 4 November 1980, Colonel Moran reported that, by the final day of operations (3 November 1980), 14,362 Cuban refugees had been received and processed at the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center. Of that number, 3 were on Federal Bureau of Investigation hold, 6 had died, 8 were unaccounted for, and the remainder had been placed, transferred to Federal Correctional Institutions or health facilities, or transferred to the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Center. On that same date, there were still 377 temporary hire civilians on the Fort McCoy payroll, 59 of whom were working in installation support activities. Cumulative obligations as of 3 November amounted to $25.2 million.  

Special Treatment for Cuban Juvenile Refugees  

On 15 August, the Cuban-American Legal Defense and Education Fund had filed a writ in the U.S. District Court in Madison, Wis., before Federal Judge Barbara Crabb, seeking to force the Federal Government to free all unaccompanied Cuban juvenile refugees at Fort McCoy. The

29. Daily SITREP's, 26 Sep - 3 Oct 80.  
30. Daily SITREP's, 8 Oct and 4 Nov 80.
petition requested, among other things, that all Cuban juveniles then at
the center be transferred to safer quarters while the overall release
process took place. The suit alleged that the Cuban juveniles at the
center had been subjected to physical abuse, sexual attack, and physical
restraint. In the meantime, both sides in the controversy had requested
and had been granted postponements to provide more time to prepare
briefs in the case. On 12 September, Judge Crabb concurred in a request
by the Cuban-American Legal Defense and Education Fund, to which the
Federal officials agreed, and signed a restraining order which would
keep the unaccompanied Cuban juveniles at Fort McCoy after the Center's
remaining refugees were moved to Fort Chaffee. Judge Crabb's order forbade
the movement of any unaccompanied juveniles from the Western
Wisconsin Court District, except by court order or for juveniles receiv-
ing health care or those resettled with a group home, a relative, or a
sponsor. On 13 September, the University of Wisconsin sponsored a sym-
posium at which the audience was told that the recession, election year
politicizing, and exaggerated news coverage of events at Fort McCoy, as
well as the other refugee centers, made it difficult for all concerned to
find sponsors for the refugees. The gathering also heard a Cuban refu-
gee tell of being beaten by Military Police, and a State Department
official's response that the handling of the sometimes tense situations
by security personnel had, for the most part, been exemplary. The par-
ticipants also discussed Judge Crabb's order concerning the juveniles at
Fort McCoy. On 23 September, Mr. Joseph LaFleur, an aide to the
Wisconsin governor, announced the signing of an agreement between the
State of Wisconsin and the Federal Government on caring for the unac-
companied Cuban juveniles. The State of Wisconsin would, in effect, act
as an agent for the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, which
had been granted custody of the juveniles, and would help place them in
group homes. The Federal Government had agreed to pay the State of
Wisconsin $2 million to care for the juveniles in state-licensed group
homes in a program which would last until March 1981.31

Further Legal Action. Once the transfer of the adult and family
group refugees to the Fort Chaffee Consolidation Center was well under-
way, the news media focussed on the condition of the unaccompanied juve-
niles still at Fort McCoy. The most notable accounts dealt with the
manner in which they were being treated by the authorities, the con-
tinued judicial actions affecting their legal status, and their eventual
placement in American Society. On 2 October 1980, for example, an attor-
ney armed with a Federal Court Order found six naked Cuban juveniles
locked in a barracks room at the center and was blocked by guards who
had been told to ignore the court order. This incident coincided with
another where it was reported that a girl had been struck on the head
and a sixteen-year old boy and girl had been manacled to a fence for six
hours during the night by guards assigned to the Federal Protective
Service. In the meantime, Monroe County Judge James W. Rice continued
to hold protective custody hearings at the center for the remaining

31. (1) LaCrosse Tribune, 12, 13, and 24 Sep 80; (2) Wisconsin
State Journal, 13 and 24 Sep 80; (3) Sparta Herald, 15 Sep 80.
Cuban refugees enrolled in the "Self-help" program work in the carpentry shop sawing boards for picnic tables for use in the compound by the refugees.

On 23 October 1980, a bilingual academic evaluator for Western Wisconsin Technical Institute instructs Cuban refugee juveniles on how to take the General Educational Development standardized tests.
A Cuban refugee youth completes his outprocessing identification card at a table staffed by U.S. Department of Health and Human Services personnel.

Meanwhile, other Cuban youth refugees still waiting outprocessing and seeing snow for the first time, waste no time in making snowballs for their first snowball fight.
On 3 November 1980, a Cuban refugee youth looks on as his possessions are inspected prior to shipment to Wyalusing State Park.

On the same day, U.S. Border Patrol agents search a Cuban refugee youth in a body pat-down security check prior to shipment to Wyalusing State Park.
On 16 October 1980, Cuban refugee juveniles assigned to the "Honors Barracks" enjoy a swim in the base field house pool.

On 3 November 1980, Cuban refugee juveniles wave farewell to the staff as they depart for Wyalusing State Park.
juveniles under an impossible situation. He stated that the situation was impossible because there was no law to cover it. The hearings he referred to were for Cuban minors who had allegedly committed delinquent acts in Cuba and had been placed in detention areas within the center. Many were brought to their hearings in handcuffs, touching off a wildly chaotic situation. On 17 October, the attorney for the Cuban-American Legal Defense and Education Fund dropped that organization's perception that the situation at Fort McCoy had improved since the writ was originally filed on 15 August. On 31 October, the State of Wisconsin, acting as the duly appointed agent for the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service in the matter, announced that it would assume responsibility for the remaining unaccompanied Cuban juvenile refugees at the center and would move them to Wyalusing State Park for further processing and placement within Wisconsin.  

New Direction for the Treatment of the Juveniles. At the same time that the Attorney for the Cuban-American Legal Defense and Education Fund announced the dropping of its suit to secure the release of the Cuban juveniles from the Fort McCoy Refugee Center, Mr. Bill Jarmack, the newly appointed State Department Director for the center, informed the news media of the progress made at the center in recent weeks for the treatment of the juvenile population. Mr. Jarmack had spent most of the past two years on a special team investigating 61 child-care facilities in Arizona and had been instrumental in closing 9 and placing another 15 on probation. He had replaced Mr. Tom Irwin as the Director of the State Department's Cuban-Haitian Task Force at Fort McCoy on 24 September. Mr. Jarmack reported that his first impressions of the center indicated that there were "physical and programmatic deficiencies" which he and his staff set out to correct. After most of the adult and family group refugees had been transferred to Fort Chaffee, the new director and his staff were able to concentrate on the juvenile program and to bring about "significant advances." Specifically, he pointed to improvement in the facilities, including plumbing and the other systems within the barracks; the removal of barbed wire from around the compound; the establishment of an honor facility for thirty-one juveniles who showed above average interest and attitude and another facility for twenty-five juveniles who were candidates for the honor housing area; and the naming of Ms. Louisa Stark as director of the Juvenile Section which, at that time, consisted of some 170 juveniles. One of Ms. Stark's major innovations was to grade the juveniles daily on a scale of zero to four for attitude and participation. Honors were maintained or gained by amassing at least thirty points daily. According to Ms. Stark, this grading system helped to identify those juveniles requiring more counseling and more care after being resettled. The higher groups would be more likely to be placed in foster homes with minimum restrictions.  

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32. (1) LaCrosse Tribune, 1, 3, 18, 19, 20, and 30 Oct 80; (2) Monroe County Democrat, 2 Oct 80; (3) Sparta Herald, 3 Nov 80; (4) Tomah Journal, 2 Oct 80; (5) Wisconsin State Journal, 31 Oct and 4 Nov 80.  

33. LaCrosse Tribune, 21 Sep and 19 Oct 80.
During its period of active operational responsibility at the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center (15 July to 3 November 1980), the U.S. State Department succeeded in outplacing or otherwise accounting for 8,478 Cuban refugees. The entire period was characterized by growing turmoil among and between the refugees and, in some instances, among and between civilian employees of the center and its administration. In response to the growing tension, FORSCOM moved two battalions of combat ready troops to Fort McCoy to assist the on-site military police and the State Department in maintaining law and order. The overall reputation of the refugee processing center diminished somewhat as the result of the publication of a number of reports which were very critical of the administration of the center. The most notable of these reports emanated from a fact-finding commission appointed by the Governor of Wisconsin which conducted an unprecedented on-site investigation with the concurrence of the State Department. Fortunately for the Army's good name, the local media and the citizenry recognized the fact that its role was confined to logistical, administrative, and security support of the operation and that the refugee processing center itself was operated by civilian governmental agencies. The Fort McCoy base installation support and task force commanders and their military and civilian personnel performed their very difficult support missions in a competent and professional manner. The situation and its perception by the media and the local citizenry could have been more negative, however, and to preclude such a probability, the Army should develop agreements with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the State Department, or other governmental agency placed in charge, which would ensure that future refugee processing center operations on Army property were conducted in accordance with model management procedures. According to the latest financial management data available at FORSCOM headquarters, the final overall reimbursable costs incurred by the command in the operation of the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center amounted to $28.0 million, including $3.0 million in facilities restoration costs.
Chapter VIII
FORT McCOY AFTER ACTION REPORT

Task Force Commander's Comments

Background

In his after action report concerning FORSCOM's role in supporting the Cuban refugees, the Task Force McCoy Commander made a number of incisive observations concerning significant issues which arose during the course of the operation. Preparation and planning issues included command and control, personnel tasking policies, lack of information and intelligence on incoming refugees, security fencing, idiosyncracies of Latin culture, and visitor center operations. Execution issues involved Voluntary Agencies, Immigration and Naturalization Service clearance procedures, use of indigenous infrastructure, processing surge, resettlement actions, and the adequacy of orientation. Legal issues included the treatment of minor offenders, security jurisdiction, lack of detention guard policy and forces, and problems in handling juveniles. Other items of interest included the use and training of augmentation security back-up forces and the Army's role in the consolidation of the refugees at the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Refugee Processing Center. The Task Force McCoy Commander pointed out in his appended comments that the uniqueness of this operation might possibly preclude the application of the data contained therein to future refugee processing operations involving other third country nationals.

Preparation and Planning Issues

Preparation and planning issues included command and control, personnel tasking, lack of information and intelligence, security fencing, idiosyncracies of Latin culture, and visitor center operations.

Command and Control. During the initial stages of the operation and, on subsequent occasions, the lines of control, approval, and tasking were overly complicated. The execute order by authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense which FORSCOM published on 19 May 1980, directed the Fifth U.S. Army to establish and operate a Refugee Processing Center at Fort McCoy. In keeping with the FORSCOM commander's desires to treat the operation as a mobilization exercise through mobilization channels, Fifth U.S. Army further delegated command responsibility in the matter to U.S. Army Readiness and Mobilization Region V on 20 May. The Fort McCoy Task Force Commander took the position, based on operational experience, that this interposition of intermediate headquarters tended to impede responsiveness to his requirements.

1. Unless otherwise indicated, the entire section is based on TF McCoy AAR, subj: After Action Report, DOD Support to Cuban Refugees, 8 Oct 80, Executive Summary.
Personnel Tasking. In retrospect, Task Force McCoy personnel should have been placed on temporary duty for a 60-day (not a 90-day) period with a firm replacement and rotation policy from the outset. The initial normal work week schedule was 7 days per week, 16 - 20 hours per day, with only scant chances to rest. These demands caused personnel to lose their "edge" and resulted in lowered efficiency and morale. The tenuous and uncertain status of the Task Force with "no light at the end of the tunnel" precluded anyone from making plans for termination and return to normal duties. On the other hand, Colonel William J. Moran, the Fort McCoy Commander, who acted in the capacity of a base support installation commander during most of the operation, felt that he could have conducted the entire operation with an augmented staff.2

Lack of Information and Intelligence. Inaccurate and incomplete information and intelligence hindered effective planning and preparations in a number of instances. For example, initial and continuing plans higher headquarters should have developed to sustain a reliable and responsive intelligence source regarding incoming refugees. Informal communication between Task Force operational personnel and the Department of Defense Coordinator in Miami constituted the primary source of information. After the curtailment of Army participation at Miami, subsequent reports from that source were usually erroneous and could not be relied upon. It became even impossible to determine the male and female composition on individual flights until after the flights had arrived in Wisconsin. No information was provided which indicated the large number of prior felons being shipped. Consequently, plans for detention facilities were repeatedly altered. Another notable example involved the receipt on 13 August of 112 Cuban refugees who had been previously incarcerated in Talladega Prison, Talladega, Ala., for several months. During the month prior to their arrival at Fort McCoy, the Task Force had received several reports announcing their imminent arrival. However, these reports were subsequently retracted. Estimates of the number of prisoners varied from less than 30 to more than 200. Fort McCoy finally received confirmation that this group was indeed coming less than forty-eight hours prior to their arrival. Information which the Task Force had requested concerning the prisoner's personal histories, problem areas, and the like, arrived less than twenty-four hours prior to their arrival. This information proved to be incomplete in many respects. Finally, soon after the Refugee Processing Center had become operational, various reports and requests for information indicated that plans were underway at higher headquarters to select a consolidation site (ultimately Fort Chaffee) to handle the residual Cuban refugee population from all of the centers currently in operation. On several occasions, Task Force McCoy specifically requested advance information notification of the consolidation announcement in order to psychologically prepare the refugee population for this eventuality. As things turned out, the requested information was released to the public before official notice was sent to the centers involved. On 7 August,

2. Interv, Mr. F.W. Pew, FORSCOM Hist Ofc, w/COL W.J. Moran, Ft. McCoy Commander, 19 Nov 81.
a visitor from the Office of the Special Assistant to the Director of the Cuban-Haitian Task Force (CHTF), -- Ms. Sylvia Gonzales -- informed Task Force McCoy that Fort Chaffee, Ark., had been selected for the consolidation of the Cuban refugees during the period 15 through 30 September 1980.

**Security Fencing.** During the planning for refugee operations, officials at Fort McCoy decided to surround the refugee enclave with a six foot security fence. Although they deliberately left off the barbed wire top guard in order to reduce the concentration camp image, visiting officials expressed some consternation prior to the arrival of the first refugees. After the Fort Chaffee disturbance on 1 June, however, they raised no further objections. In general, the refugees accepted the wire and, although frequently breached by fence jumpers, it greatly assisted security personnel in controlling the refugee population and precluding unauthorized entry by others.

**Idiosyncrasies of Latin Culture.** On several occasions, misunderstandings resulted due to a lack of knowledge regarding Cuban culture on the part of many of the American personnel assigned to the Task Force. To the uninformed, a group of Cuban refugees speaking loudly and waving their arms meant the beginning of a riot. In reality, it represented merely a commonplace event in Cuban circles. In a similar fashion, crowds of Cuban refugees became somewhat unruly when problems developed with movie film or projection equipment. Subsequent discussion with the Cuban leaders revealed that this sort of behavior was quite common in Cuban theaters, but that there was no danger of physical violence. And some of the Cubans, understandably, became very impatient with waiting to be resettled. When the desired resettlement action was not immediately forthcoming, they felt neglected and tended to lose sight of the magnitude of the overall resettlement program. The Task Force McCoy Commander felt that a short orientation program on Latin characteristics would have been beneficial to the U.S. Military and civilians serving on the mission.

**Visitor Center Operations.** In order to expedite the Federal Emergency Management Agency's opening of a visitor center and reunion facility, the Task Force G-5 assigned an officer to organize and assist in the matter. This officer served as the single point of contact between the Agency and all other Department of Defense Agencies. This effort proved to be invaluable, especially during the early stages of the refugee processing operation when large numbers of relatives arrived searching for members of their families in the refugee compound. The center established a separate post gate and receiving facility where visitors remained under control at all times. Once checked into their own reception area, the visitors were bussed to the reunion center and assigned interpreters who assisted them in locating their family members. At that time, the visitors received the best information available regarding subsequent release dates. Many visitors praised the efficient organization and smooth operation of this element and it ultimately made a significant contribution to the overall functioning of the Refugee Processing Center.
Execution Issues

Execution issues included voluntary agencies, Immigration and Naturalization Service clearance procedures, use of an indigenous infrastructure, processing surge, resettlement actions, and adequacy of the orientation.

Voluntary Agencies. Not surprisingly, the key to rapid resettlement depended on the efficiency and success of the Voluntary Agencies. Even though Task Force McCoy was essentially staffed and operational by 23 May, the Voluntary Agency personnel were not in place until after the Cuban refugees had begun arriving on 29 May. The Task Force McCoy Commander concluded that the Voluntary Agencies should have been on site prior to the arrival of the first refugees in order to ensure that this critical function was operational in a timely manner.

Immigration and Naturalization Service Clearance. The average daily Cuban release rate was very low due to late receipt of official guidance. Task Force McCoy was operational for thirty days before the Immigration and Naturalization Service received directions permitting the release of refugees with bona fide relatives in the United States prior to the receipt of final security clearance from Washington.

Use of an Indigenous Infrastructure. Center officials selected the initial Cuban leaders based on demonstrated leadership and reliance on known Castro political prisoners with leadership ability. As the original leaders departed, they selected their own replacements and trained them to assume their new duties. This situation arose because of the initial turbulence in the build-up of the Refugee Processing Center and the subsequent constant turnover of leaders. Officials did not think that elections were either possible or practical. In actual practice, the establishment of a functioning "Cuban Government" in the center was rendered difficult by the emergence of several problem areas. For instance, the former Castro political prisoners, although originally considered to be the most likely to provide their fellow Cuban refugees with responsive leadership, tended to become involved exclusively in political activities and neglected their main function of meeting the immediate needs of their constituents. Many of the office holders used their positions for purposes of privilege and personal gain. They also used their positions to obtain personal favors from both seniors and subordinates. The three main parts of the compound -- juveniles, unaccompanied females and families, and unaccompanied males -- had distinct populations with problems requiring different forms and levels of attention. The fact was that the establishment of a central Cuban refugee government could not begin to fully meet the variety of needs. The Task Force McCoy Commander concluded that the refugee community should have been provided with detailed information on the intent of using indigenous refugee leadership. Newly appointed political leaders should receive detailed instructions concerning their responsibilities, especially in the areas of leadership and management. This facet of the operations at Fort McCoy was under the overall supervision of the Federal Emergency Management Agency and, later, the State Department. The Army had no responsibility in this area. Upon the request of the
civilian agencies, the Army provided civil affairs personnel until civilian employee replacements could be secured.

**Processing Surge.** Due to the rapid influx of Cuban refugees, it was necessary to designate hastily prepared refugee holding areas. During peak periods, over 4,000 Cuban refugees at Fort McCoy were in a temporary holding status awaiting processing. This surge exceeded the capacity of the originally established holding area by 3,400 spaces. Significant problems resulted in housing, feeding, transporting, and general control. The Task Force McCoy Commander concluded that these particular problems could have been precluded if reliable advance information had been provided from the port of entry.

**Resettlement Action.** The amalgamation of required personnel clearance actions and the multiplicity of agencies involved effectively precluded the rapid resettlement of the refugees. On the other hand, even after all the "checks" had been completed, to include securing a sponsor, resettlement under the direction of the Federal Emergency Management Agency and later the State Department progressed at a very slow pace. There was, in fact, a continuous back-log of refugees on the "ready line."

**Adequacy of Orientation.** There was also a need for a more extensive notification program designed to acquaint the incoming refugees with the approximate length of the processing time. Even though the Center authorities told the refugees that completed processing could take weeks, most of them thought that once their medical, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and Voluntary Agency appointments had been completed and a sponsor was in hand that they would be allowed to leave immediately. Such was not the case, however, since they were still required to wait for final security clearance from Washington. This situation created anxiety, queries, and complaints on both the part of the affected refugees and their sponsors until the decision was made at the Washington level to permit them to leave the center with their sponsors pending receipt of the final clearance.

**Legal Issues**

Legal issues included treatment of minor offenders, security jurisdiction, lack of detention guard policy and forces, and problems in handling juveniles.

**Treatment of Minor Offenders.** Military Police expended the vast majority of time and manpower in efforts to deter such minor offenses as fence jumping, to the apprehension of successful fence jumpers, and the detecting and apprehension of others involved in unauthorized departures. The steady rise in incidents of this general nature could be attributed, at least in part, to the frustrations of confinement to a small area. It was also attributable to the absence of meaningful disciplinary actions taken against those refugees who had committed minor offenses. Other illegal acts included stabings, prostitution, and indecent exposure, particularly in the presence of female military police and female civilian employees. As these offenses increased, the
punishment meted out by the civilian agencies under the general supervision of either the Federal Emergency Management Agency or the State Department remained either meaningless or nonexistent. Consequently, the offenses became more serious both in their nature and in their implication for future law enforcement personnel in the civilian communities where the offenders were finally resettled.

Security Jurisdiction. On 3 June 1980, the Department of the Army provided its only applicable guidance to the Task Force McCoy Commander concerning the authority and jurisdiction available to his assigned military police. In essence, this guidance stated that the civilian law enforcement authorities had the primary responsibility for peacekeeping, law enforcement, and related activities. It also stated that the military commander was responsible for providing additional manpower when the situation exceeded the capabilities of the civilian agencies in this sensitive area. Since the civilian agencies at Fort McCoy remained understaffed throughout the entire operation, the military police consistently performed augmentation missions which required them "to balance on a very fine line of legality." In actual practice, the military police attempted to "deter, detect, and prevent" by their mere presence, to the extent possible, and to notify the U.S. Marshals when incidents occurred. The Task Force McCoy Commander concluded that it was noteworthy that this key mission was designated in this guidance as first priority for assumption by civilian law enforcement officers as they became available. In reality, no civilian officers were ever assigned to this mission.

Lack of Detention Guard Policy and Forces. From the very beginning of the operations, a great deal of disagreement and reluctance existed concerning the staffing of refugee detention facilities by the civilian agencies involved. The guidance, mentioned above, specifically precluded military police involvement by stating that in "every case" one of the civilian law enforcement agencies would be responsible for guarding detainees at the detention facilities. As noted earlier, the civilian law enforcement agencies at Fort McCoy were consistently understaffed. In addition, most of the personnel on site had little or no experience in the basic principles of confinement operations. The detention of minor offenders, for instance, was at first a matter of uncertainty since the staffing of Federal civilian agencies could not accommodate an additional category of offenders. A decision to employ additional and questionably qualified guard personnel under the auspices of the Federal Emergency Management Agency simply led to the creation of yet another ineffective law enforcement force. Combined, all of these factors led to considerable inefficiency at the two major detention facilities and the special refugee housing areas. The military police were called upon numerous occasions to respond to refugee escapes or major disturbances. In most cases, this problem could have been prevented by additional staffing, the provision of experienced personnel, better management, or some combination of the three.

Problems in Handling Juveniles. The problems experienced in the handling of juveniles at Fort McCoy stemmed from the nature of the refugees involved, the lack of activities provided for them, and the
uncertainty of their status. A number of the unaccompanied juveniles came from Cuban prisons or had been basically street gang members and thus experienced in an environment of distrust and violence in influencing and compelling others. FORSCOM civil affairs personnel working in support of the Federal Emergency Management Agency established initial control over this volatile element of the center's refugee population as a matter of sheer desperation in order to stabilize the situation. As time passed, a general feeling of distrust of all authority developed among the juvenile refugees since the power groups among them continued to successfully cause problems and hinder progress and activities. The lack of a definite high level position on youth sponsorship status resulted in an increased feeling of hopelessness, particularly for those who had no relatives or even acquaintances in the United States.

The Use and Training of Security Back-up Forces

FORSCOM deployed two infantry battalions to Fort McCoy in late summer in a training and back-up security support role for Task Force McCoy. When not actually employed in the security role, these units received needed TOW and DRAGON weapon training which culminated in live firing. Individual infantrymen also received required qualification firing training with the M203 grenade launcher or the M16 rifle. During their deployment in the security role, they received intensive training in the deployment and use of night vision and detection devices as well as in riot control and crowd disturbances. They also received training for individual skill qualification tests (SQT) and made both five and twelve mile road marches. In hindsight, one of the better training benefits realized was the overall training in troop leading techniques for the battalions' junior leaders, both officers and noncommissioned officers. They had the opportunity to work very closely with their subordinates and to develop a much closer camaraderie and higher state of unit cohesiveness. The units maintained readiness at acceptable levels throughout the duration of their deployment.

The Army's Role in the Consolidation of the Refugees

On 7 August 1980, a White House spokesman announced that Fort Chaffee had been selected as the consolidation location for all Cuban refugees. The Department of the Army developed a concept plan for the upcoming consolidation which it staffed with the Task Force Commanders, the affected continental U.S. Armies, FORSCOM, and the Military Traffic Management Command. Since the original plan anticipated that all of the remaining refugees would be moved to Fort Chaffee by 15 September, FORSCOM suspended the rotation of the military police units then located at Fort McCoy pending the actual consolidation. In this plan, the Immigration and Naturalization Service assumed the lead role in coordinating the movement of the refugees from Fort McCoy to Fort Chaffee. The U.S. Marshals Service, the Federal Protective Service, the Inter-governmental Committee on European Migration, the Department of Health and Human Services, the U.S. Public Health Service, and the Department of Defense assisted in the consolidation movement as necessary. State Department operating officials at Fort McCoy prepared the local consolidation plan which spelled out organizational responsibilities.
Responsibilities assigned to Task Force McCoy included perimeter defense of the outprocessing area and the bus staging area, traffic control in the outprocessing area, and the security of the baggage truck while in the outprocessing area. Additional responsibilities included the provision of a mobile reaction force at Fort McCoy, if required; installation of security at Volk Field (departure airfield) as requested by the Commander, Volk Field; and the provision of security for the extraction of refugees from the general compound and their movement to outprocessing, followed by a sweep and locking of barracks.

The local State Department refugee consolidation plan also directed the Federal Protective Service to conduct outprocessing activities involving a security search of refugees and their personal belongings; the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration to accomplish all manifesting; the Immigration and Naturalization Service to accomplish all processing of records and security on the busses during the movements to Volk Field; the U.S. Marshal Service to accomplish law enforcement in the camp; the Federal Aviation Administration to accomplish the security of the refugees aboard the aircraft; and the Department of Health and Human Services and the U.S. Public Health Service to accomplish the delousing of the refugees and their belongings and the transfer of their medical records. The first shipment of refugees from Fort McCoy to Fort Chaffee occurred on 26 September, with the last shipment on 2 October. In all, 3,174 Cuban refugees were relocated to Fort Chaffee. Some 368 refugees, many of whom were juveniles, remained at Fort McCoy after completion of the transfer. Aside from malfunctions of the chartered aircraft which resulted in cancelled or delayed flights, the consolidation movement during the eight day period went well. The major lesson learned by the Task Force as the movement progressed was the necessity for the refugees to pack their belongings on the day before they were shipped in order to meet the movement schedule of 500 refugees per day arriving at Fort Chaffee between the hours of 0900 and 1500.

Special Areas of Concern

Background

In addition to those items of interest noted in the Task Force Commander's Executive Summary, a number of other areas of special interest deserved separate treatment while others needed some elaboration. These included such disparate areas as deficiencies in medical support planning, turbulence in the data processing support operations, and complications in the detention and security support operations.

Medical Support Planning Deficiencies

It was obvious, some thirty days after the onset of the Cuban refugee processing center operations at Fort McCoy, that the special mission

3. The entire section is based on TF McCoy AAR, subj: After Action Report, DOD Support to Cuban Refugees, 8 Oct 80, Part III.
Army Medical Department (AMEDD) units (one Combat Support Hospital and two Medical Detachments (Preventive Medicine)) deployed for support purposes were simply not sufficient for the initially assigned medical support missions. These initial medical missions included medical support at the arrival airfield at LaCrosse, Wis.; medical in-processing of the refugees at Fort McCoy; ambulance support; support of two small outpatient clinics in the refugee area; emergency medical treatment; hospitalization; preventive medicine; emergency dental care (extractions and immediate oral surgery); and a significant amount of psychiatric care which included special psychiatric evaluations requested by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Evidently, Communist Cuba's highly vaunted and even more highly publicized socialized medical care delivery system did not, in fact, extend to every member of the population.

According to the Task Force McCoy Commander, the Army's medical planners had only planned for emergency medical care, hospitalization, and preventive medicine tasks and not the complete health services support system which was actually needed. The Task Force McCoy Commander concluded that, the U.S. Health Services Command should have either deployed special units capable of providing ground evacuation and outpatient medical care or should have reinforced the selected Combat Support Hospital with this capability.

With the departure of the 86th Combat Support Hospital to its home station of Fort Campbell, Ky., on 27 June 1980, the U.S. Public Health Service assumed primary responsibility for the furnishing of health support services for the Cuban refugee population, which continued to diminish in strength throughout the summer months. The Task Force McCoy Commander observed subsequently that the U.S. Public Health Service's policy of rotating its uniformed personnel every fourteen days; as well as its minimal staffing of key administrative positions, severely impeded the operation of the health services support system. In practical terms, it meant that rotating individuals spent too much time in learning the operations of the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center. Further, even when they had wasted entirely too much time in this endeavor, they still did not possess any relevant historical knowledge on which to base required management decisions. As a result, long range planning and the subsequent development and implementation of operating policies critical to the operation of an effective health service support system were either delayed or lacking. All aspects of an effective health service support program could probably work effectively at some point in the future, but current rotation and staffing policies precluded early achievement of this goal at the time when the need was the greatest.

Turbulence in the Data Processing Support Operations

The lack of a stable interpreter group coupled with an inordinate number of changes to the data collection forms used in the refugee processing operation led to a great deal of avoidable turbulence in data processing support operations which proved to be expensive in terms of time and effort. The lack of a stable interpreter group for the
in-processing center was detrimental to the initial data collection effort and to the information provided to the computer for subsequent use by the Federal Emergency Management Agency and other involved agencies. Until the interpreter staff finally stabilized in the middle of June, problems with training, control, quality of data collection and responsiveness were evident throughout the in-processing phase. In addition, the Fort McCoy Refugee Data Processing Center also had to cope with an inordinate number of changes to the data collection form, the data storage fields required, and the number and types of reports requested. Federal Emergency Management Agency personnel assisted in sorting out these problems. Reports in use by the end of June, for example, included the Standard Alien Number Report, the Standard Refugee Alpha Report, the Standard Occupation Report, the Standard Barracks Report, the Cuban Audit Trail, the Medical Clearance Roster, and the Cuban Clearance Check List, all of which were generated on a daily schedule. Much time and effort involving limited computer assets could have been avoided through the early identification of specific data needs, with data collection forms and report formats tailored to the needs of the using agencies. Data processing equipment on hand at that time included 5 IBM 5257 CRT Display Station, 1 IBM 5211 High Speed Printer, and 1 IBM 3340 System/34 Central Processing Unit. Eleven other remote and local display stations and one remote printer were still on order, but had either not arrived or had not been installed.

Complications in Detention and Security Support Operations

There were a number of operative factors which resulted in notable complications in detention and security support operations. For example, a continued area of special concern was the necessity to provide military police inside the Refugee Housing Enclave where they served as a visible crime suppression and crime prevention force, but lacked any real authority in law to apprehend refugees or to initiate proceedings against refugees breaking the law. This requirement meant that a majority of the military police present for duty at Fort McCoy had to work at least twelve hours a day, seven days a week, for the duration of their stay. This demanding regimen took its toll physically, mentally, and emotionally among the personnel involved. Also, the hospital psychiatric wards were modified to serve as a Cuban refugee detention facility for those persons who broke the law at Fort McCoy. Unfortunately, these converted wards had certain inherent structural deficiencies which made effective security all but impossible. These difficulties were further compounded by an apparently insoluble shortage of Federal law enforcement personnel. This combination of problems continued to produce an unusually high number of incidents at this detention facility. Finally, the availability of material within the Refugee Housing Area which could be converted into deadly weapons by the criminal element or those non-criminals who were simply providing for their own self-defense, made the control of such weapons impractical, if not impossible. This situation led to a significant number of assaults by Cubans on Cubans, and posed a threat to military and civilian employees who were required to work within the refugee areas. The Task Force Commander accurately predicted that incidents of violence involving these homemade weapons would increase proportionately as the "more
desirable" Cuban refugees were settled first, leaving behind those who were "less desirable" to become increasingly frustrated and more hostile the longer they remained in the processing center.

Lessons Learned and Recommendations

Introduction

The reader should bear in mind that the following lessons and recommendations stemmed from two distinct sources. Some came from the Task Force's actual involvement in operations in support of the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center. Others were the product of the Task Force's observations and evaluations of the performance of the civilian agencies charged with the operation of the center. Together, they tend to support Colonel William J. Moran, the Fort McCoy Commander, in his post-operation evaluation that all future refugee center operations conducted on Army installations should be under the direct control of the Army. The lessons learned and recommendations discussed below represented just a sampling of those actually included in the Task Force McCoy After Action Report.

Task Force G-4 (Logistics)

Accounting for Property. The Task Force McCoy supported many civilian Voluntary Agencies, Federal agencies, and other civilian activities connected with the actual operation of the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center. These organizations were unfamiliar with the military system of receipting and accounting for property and, initially, were hesitant to accept the responsibility for property, sign for items, and establish signature cards at the various supply activities. The Task Force was not staffed to do all these things for them. Problems developed in getting issued property properly hand-receipted to the user level and turned in when it was no longer required. The Task Force G-4 recommended that the operating Federal agencies and other civilian organizations receive a briefing upon their arrival regarding the military property accountability system and their responsibilities within that system.

Removal of Food from Refugee Dining Facilities. The refugees managed to draw food and remove it from the contractor-operated dining facilities. Consequently, this resulted in extremely unsanitary conditions throughout the compound. This practice also produced excess head counts and much wasted food. The internal Cuban refugee government was ineffective in controlling these take-out issues. The meal card system was also ineffective. The only effective means was to place guards in the dining facilities. The Task Force G-4 recommended that, in future operations, food be consumed only in dining facilities and that guards or interpreters be used to enforce that policy.

4. The entire section is based on TF McCoy AAR, subj: After Action Report, DOD Support to Cuban Refugees, 8 Oct 80, Part IV.
Internal Security Force. A requirement existed to provide an internal Cuban security force which would be capable of instantaneous reaction to prevent a crime of violence or to provide normal police functions within the refugee population. The civilian operating agencies (with Task Force civil affairs advice) formed such a force which was identified through the use of purple windbreakers bearing the name "Warhawks." These windbreakers rapidly became both a status symbol and a point of dissonance within the Cuban community. The visibility of the jackets at every incident caused rapid negative feelings against and notoriety for this force. The Task Force G-5 recommended that particular care be used to select mature, responsible personnel for any internal refugee security force in future camps of this nature. Jackets or other items of identification should not be issued.

Transition from Military to Civilian Control. Although the staffing tables for the civilianization of the civil affairs and psychological operations activities had been established well in advance of the mid-July transfer date, the transition itself was not smoothly effected. The timing, fairly late in the Cuban refugee processing operations, gave the appearance of a general winding down, although the remaining population by this time proved to be the most difficult to deal with and problems accordingly increased. At the same time, many of the best civilian employees recruited for the transition left Fort McCoy on or about 1 September to return to school. In retrospect, the planning for the transition should have been started early in the operation, and should have been executed as soon as possible in order to reinforce the concept of a long-term operation. The Task Force G-5 recommended that the G-5 section in future task forces of this nature include full-time Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations (CA/PSYOPS) planners to establish the necessary transition staffing requirements and to execute the transition. The transition from military to civilian control of these functions should be initiated as early as possible.

Family and Single Female Housing. Each of the three Refugee Processing Centers which were supported by FORSCOM (Forts Chaffee, Indian-town Gap, and McCoy) experienced continuing problems with single males infiltrating the family and single female housing area, resulting in prostitution, acts of violence, and constant tension and frustration. The Task Force G-5 recommended that future operations include a Refugee Processing Center specifically designated for the processing of families and single females which would be completely separate from the other Refugee Processing Centers.

Task Force Chaplain

Religious Services. The Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Task Force Chaplain's office contracted for civilian clergy to provide religious services. In the beginning, the Cuban refugees responded well to all clergy and their services, because they had just come from a country where religion was repressed. Attendance, however, tended to diminish as time passed. It became necessary to modify the purely
religious ministry into one embracing religious services, counseling, and education. The Task Force Chaplain recommended that, at the outset, religious program planning should investigate all resources of counseling areas and access to chapels and other buildings in the compound, and educational materials, as well as resources for religious worship services.

Voluntary Agencies/Religious Groups. As noted above, contract clergy (Roman Catholic and Protestant) served the religious needs of the Cuban refugees. Other groups came in on a volunteer basis in an effort to help in the same area and integrated with the established program of religious services. Still others circumvented the program taking over buildings, venturing into areas where it would be difficult to ensure security, holding meetings in barracks, and, in general, invading the privacy of others. Members of these latter groups obtained identification from Voluntary Agencies situated at the Refugee Processing Center and then proceeded to operate for strictly religious purposes. Such actions caused potential problems in personnel and physical security and helped to create an environment which fostered black market operations. The Task Force Chaplain recommended in this instance that a clear policy with firm guidelines should be initially established by joint coordination between the Chaplain and G-5 (Civil Affairs) concerning this matter. Access to the refugee compound should be strictly enforced with only one central agency allowed to issue identification cards. Persons identified as potential risks to good order, within the compound, should be immediately removed.

Task Force Comptroller

Revision of AR 500-60. According to the Task Force Comptroller, the applicable provisions of AR 500-60, Disaster Relief, as currently written for funding guidance in specific disaster cases was inadequate or inapplicable in the case of the Cuban refugee support operation. The Task Force Comptroller was of the opinion that AR 500-60 applied in particular to Army support of civil disasters and not to a "mini-mobilization" on an Army installation providing full support. He recommended that the Department of the Army modify AR 500-60 to cover such protracted military support of Federal relief agencies and that support agreements between the Department of Defense and such coordinating Federal agencies be provided down to the operating level as soon as possible.

Temporary Duty Status. A lack of uniformity existed among installations which provided the supporting military personnel with regard to their status (per diem or non-per diem) while on temporary duty. Individual military personnel and, in some cases, military units performed their support duties under authority of orders prepared on DD Form 1610 (Request and Authorization for TDY Travel of DOD Personnel) with no question regarding per diem entitlement. On the other hand, some units deployed under the authority of temporary change of station orders (Order Format 745, AR 310-10). In the latter case, some installations refused per diem payment while others honored the order. A timely decision could not be obtained through channels from the U.S. Army
Finance and Accounting Center (USFAC) with the result that some units could not be paid accrued per diem while at Fort McCoy. Although the Task Force Commander had no specific recommendations to make in this matter, which was so important to the individual soldier, he did comment that a written decision should be made available for future emergency situations.

**Task Force Engineer**

**Safeguarding Property.** During the course of the consolidation phase, when the majority of the residual Cuban refugee population at Fort McCoy was transferred to Fort Chaffee, the safeguarding of Government property, including buildings, equipment, and utilities, was given little consideration with respect to damage, theft, or even destruction. The fact was that most of the civilian operating agencies abandoned their assigned buildings without even locking them or removing pilferable items. High dollar theft items such as radios, generators, electric typewriters, and the like, had to be seized at abandoned sites and buildings. This was done by Task Force military personnel to prevent theft. Even though the State Department and Fort McCoy had established procedures to control Government property, the rate of personnel turnover in the civilian operating agencies during the winding down of operations was such that the information and urgency was never translated into action. In fact, many of the civilian operating agencies were simply too undermanned to perform their basic missions much less control or turn in their assigned property. The Task Force Engineer recommended that the civilian operating agencies should not be permitted to reduce the number of personnel or depart until their assigned property had been safeguarded or accounted for. Federal audit agencies should review the procedures and policies for property accountability to ensure that training and indoctrination was penetrating through the civilian employee level.

**Heat in the Refugee Housing Area.** Heat was not supplied on a timely basis to the barracks housing the Cuban refugees and to the facilities occupied by the civilian operating agencies. In addition, some of the buildings which were occupied were not heatable. These unheatable buildings had been identified to the State Department on 20 July 1980. Although building heat was frequently discussed through the months of August and September, the State Department had neither accepted nor approved the contingency plan. When a crisis need for heat developed, the refugees and the civilian operating agencies simply remained in the unheatable buildings, and the State Department did not require them to move. One effort was made to shut off the water to unheatable refugee buildings, which only resulted in poor sanitation along with the fact that the people did not move. The Task Force Engineer recommended that future refugee operations should develop and execute plans to provide heat to buildings or to move the refugees and civilian operating agencies to buildings which could be serviced.

**Civil Engineer Expertise.** The State Department and the Federal Emergency Management Agency established a need for a civil engineer to resolve problems in the future in the following areas: the definition
of staff operations and responsibilities; coordination with post engineer support; project approval or disapproval; and identification and negotiation of salvage and restoration projects. Other problem areas included planning work for refugee labor, planning and estimating for projects, funding and continuity of utilities related projects, and cost estimating. During the Fort McCoy support operation, installation and Task Force engineers performed these functions. However, according to the Task Force Engineer, engineer planning should be part of the operational planning and should be included within the staff information flow of the State Department and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. He, therefore, recommended that the State Department or the Federal Emergency Management Agency include a civil engineer as part of their organizational structure on future refugee operations.

Task Force Staff Medical Advisor

Acquisition of Medical Supplies. In general, the Fort McCoy Medical Supply Office proved to be responsive in meeting medical supply requirements. However, the Task Force Staff Medical Advisor pointed out that the initial demand for supplies exceeded the capabilities of the standard Army Medical Supply System. This situation resulted in the establishment of a separate $100,000 blanket purchase order (BPO) for implementation by the General Services Administration (GSA). This basic purchase order approach relieved the immediate pressure placed upon the medical supply system and was largely responsible for the 86th Combat Support Hospital (CSH) and the U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS) being able to meet their medical supply requirements in a timely fashion. The Task Force Staff Medical Advisor recommended that future operations of this nature should include the automatic establishment of this type of account.

Emergency and Non-Emergency Vehicle Control. By the end of June, the Refugee Center had established a central ambulance dispatch system for the emergency and non-emergency movement of patients. Four contract ambulances and two carry-alls provided the coordinated service. In addition, the U.S. Public Health Service hired full-time dispatchers to provide a professional evacuation system. A dedicated military phone system for the Military Police Operations desk provided a primary back up to the post phone which was used only for incoming ambulance requests. After a slow start, the operations was well staffed and operated satisfactorily. The Task Force Staff Medical Advisor recommended that future combined operations should rely on Army ambulance companies for the first thirty to forty-five days to permit the Department of Health and Human Services and the U.S. Public Health Service to become organized and fully operational before assuming this mission.

Continuity of Medical Support Operations. The Task Force Medical Operations Coordinator provided continuity for medical support operations for the Fort McCoy Refugee Center. This resulted from the lack of an adequate medical staff at the Task Force level and the frequent rotation of all key Department of Health and Human Services and U.S. Public Health Service medical personnel. Higher headquarters either delayed or denied requests for augmentation of the Task Force medical staff. In
actual practice, three to four days of each two-week rotational tours of duty for Department of Health and Human Services and U.S. Public Health Service key personnel were spent getting organized before the individual key person became productive. The same individual spent the last one to two days in preparing to orient his replacement. The continuity of patient care was also broken due to the frequent rotation of U.S. Public Health Service doctors and nurses. Still, no patient was denied proper medical care. The Task Force Staff Medical Advisor recommended, however, that the Department of Health and Human Services and the U.S. Public Health Service establish longer duty tours to provide continuity throughout the program.

Control and Coordination of Health Services Support. Prior to the departure of the 86th Combat Support Hospital from Fort McCoy to its home station at Fort Campbell, Ky., the commander of that unit, the Senior Public Health Service Officer, and the Task Force Staff Medical Advisor shared the responsibility for health services support planning and execution. Despite this division of authority and responsibility, health services support was not adversely affected. Nevertheless, the Task Force Staff Medical Advisor recommended that he should constitute the sole source of medical planning, direction, and coordination until such time as the U.S. Public Health Service assumed the majority of the health services support mission. Specifically, in this case, the Commander of the 86th Combat Support Hospital should have functioned as the Task Force Surgeon only to make those decisions relevant to direct patient treatment.

Inadequate Staffing of the Task Force Staff Medical Advisor’s Office. The mission of support for the refugee processing operations required the establishment of a total health services support system. One health services plans and operations officer at Task Force headquarters was not sufficient to direct the implementation and operation of a complete health services support system nor could the staffs of the operating units function in two roles because of the demands of their unit operations. The Task Force Staff Medical Advisor recommended that future offices of this type should include as a minimum: one lieutenant colonel, health services plans and operations officer; one major, nurse administrator; and one captain, medical supply officer. He envisioned this staff as developing the plans, policies, and procedures to be followed by the operating units as required.

Fragmented Transfer of Health Services Support from AMEDD to USPHS. The transfer of medical support functions from the special mission Army Medical Department units to the U.S. Public Health Service at the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center was not always accomplished in a timely and complete manner. The Public Health Service was not always prepared to assume a given mission from the Army Medical Department even though they had agreed to assume the mission prior to the effective transfer date. After the 86th Combat Support Hospital ceased operations and its medical officers had departed, the Public Health Service could only provide limited psychiatric and dental service. Personnel of the 86th Combat Support Hospital had to organize, equip, and clean the facility that the Public Health Service used for emergency medical treatment.
When the two Army preventive medicine detachments departed Fort McCoy for their home stations, the Public Health Service had but one sanitary present with no staff to conduct sanitation inspections. Based upon this experience, the Task Force Staff Medical Advisor recommended that, in future operations of this nature, the special mission Army Medical Department units should be fully capable of providing all necessary health service support and should be scheduled to operate for a designated period of thirty to forty days. Such an approach would permit the establishment of an effective health service support system and give the Public Health Service ample time to observe the system, identify changes they would make in the system, acquire the necessary personnel and equipment resources, and gradually assume control of the operation in accordance with jointly developed time-phased plans.

**Insufficient Mission Guidance.** Despite the fact that Fort McCoy was the last of the FORSCOM operated Refugee Processing Center support operations, initial health service guidance was sketchy at best. This situation became evident with the arrival of the 86th Combat Support Hospital (reinforced) on 23 May 1980. That unit arrived with the expectation of operating in a hospital role for only a limited period. However, it inherited a multitude of medical tasks for which it was unprepared, thus highlighting the lack of planning and shortages in both personnel and equipment. The Task Force Staff Medical Advisor recommended that representatives of the Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army, the U.S. Public Health Service, and the Office of the Surgeon, U.S. Army Forces Command, jointly develop guidance regarding the level of health service support to be provided for future refugees; fix time frames for the transfer of health service support functions; and ensure that adequate resources be provided on a timely basis. He predicted that failure to accomplish the above functions and a lack of responsiveness to requests from the field would negate an effective and timely transfer of future health service support missions regardless of efforts at on site coordination.

**Cleanliness of Living Areas.** After the transfer of most of the refugees to Fort Chaffee in late September and early October 1980, it was readily apparent that the departing Cubans had been living in an environment best characterized as an immense health hazard. The Cuban refugees themselves had created this unacceptable environment with the passive tolerance of the responsible U.S. civilian agencies which had partial to full knowledge concerning what was being created. Inspection of the vacated barracks revealed long-standing unwashed floors and unflushed commodes in the latrines; long-standing unwashed floors in the bay areas; uneaten food sitting in corners, on make shift tables, and on beds; rotten fruits and food stuffs, as well as spoiled milk sitting on the shelves and inside foot lockers; and human waste on the floors, in trash cans, and smeared on mattresses. In addition, mattresses, blankets, and sheets were laying in filth on the floors; shaving cream and tooth paste was smeared on walls and floors; and there were many missing and torn window screens as well as missing and broken mirrors and windows. There was also evidence of voluntary overcrowding subsequent to barracks assignment. This listing of deficiencies was not complete, but it served to illustrate the deplorable health conditions.
and confirmed the potential for epidemic which was probably present throughout the entire period of camp operation. These conditions provided an ideal environment for a sizable population of rats, mice, roaches, flies, lice, and so forth to become established and then flourish. Communicable diseases such as tuberculosis, venereal disease, and the like could also have run wild in such an environment. To establish and operate an active disease prevention program under such circumstances would have required a rather large number of knowledgeable workers. However, such action would have been wise.

The Task Force Staff Medical Advisor recommended a number of actions to preclude, or at least minimise, the occurrence of such intolerable conditions in future operations of this nature. They included assigning a fixed number of persons per building, based on square footage per person, assuming long-term residency; enforcing residential building assignments; prohibiting refugees from taking food stuffs and beverages from the dining facilities; and establishing a smoking lounge on each floor as well as encouraging those who must smoke to smoke out-of-doors. He concluded by recommending that the civilian operating agencies insist on self-help daily trash removal from barracks; self-help daily sweeping of floors; self-help daily soap-mopping of barracks; self-help daily disinfectant mopping of all floors, bay areas, and latrines; and regular inspections of the barracks. The regularity of these inspections could be established initially, and then tightened or relaxed depending on the response to and the results received from the program.

Task Force G-3 (Plans and Operations)

Lack of a Coordinated Interagency Staff. Perhaps the most important item of all was that, during the entire operation, numerous occasions arose when one agency was not aware of another agency's operation, even though it should have been. There was very little structured coordination between agencies. The only coordination which occurred was due to individual efforts. Consequently, several operations could have been executed more smoothly and might have obtained better results if they had been jointly planned and coordinated. The Task Force G-3 recommended that, in future operations, all like staff sections of different agencies be located together so as to facilitate coordination and dissemination of information.

Lack of Intelligence Gathering, Correlation, and Dissemination. Several law enforcement agencies gathered information throughout the entire operation. Each agency gathered essential elements of information (EEI) from its own sources, with only limited coordination in their dissemination. However, no centralized correlation and dissemination point existed. The Task Force G-3 recommended that one agency be assigned the responsibility for correlation and dissemination of essential elements of information and that that agency establish full time liaison with other agencies.
Military Police Commander's Comments

Introduction

The most valuable support contribution FORSCOM rendered to the civilian operating agencies in charge of the Fort Chaffee, Fort Indiantown Gap, and Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Centers was its provision of trained Active Component and Reserve Component Military Police Units. The 759th Military Police Battalion, with home station at Fort Dix, N.J., was the only military police command and control element involved in a Cuban refugee processing operation from start to finish. The unit served at Fort McCoy and its commander, Lt. Col. Gordon N. Zelez, observed in his After Action Report that some of the most significant and large scale operations in support of the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center occurred during the final six weeks before redeployment. These experiences were immensely invaluable to the battalion. They added a perspective that an earlier redeployment would have precluded. FORSCOM considered Colonel Zelez's report to be extremely useful since no military police doctrine existed in 1980 which specifically addressed refugee-type operations. Further, refugee operations, once rather uncommon in the post World War II era involving the U.S. Army, have now occurred twice (Vietnamese in 1975 and the Cuban in 1980) in the past five years. The only other refugee operation of note, of course, was the Hungarian operation at Camp Kilmer, N.J., in 1956.

Operational Experience of the 759th Military Police Battalion

Mission. The battalion's mission was to provide security for the Cuban refugee processing operation, including secure movements during the refugees' arrival at the center and, subsequently, during the consolidation operation when the remaining refugees were transferred to Fort Chaffee. The unit also provided security and maintenance of order, to include traffic control, in and around the refugee processing and billeting areas. FORSCOM officially alerted the battalion for this mission on 19 May 1980; the unit deployed from Fort Dix and arrived at Fort McCoy on 23 May. It performed its assigned mission from 23 May until relieved at 1700 on 2 October 1980. It then redeployed and arrived at Fort Dix on 4 October, having spent a total of 135 days on site. The total number of Cuban refugees (illegal aliens) received at Fort McCoy was 14,360. The total transferred from Fort McCoy to the U.S. Federal Prison System was 1,000. The type of jurisdiction at Fort McCoy was exclusive Federal jurisdiction on the installation. No state or local law enforcement agencies possessed any authority on the installation.

5. The entire section is based on the HQ 759th MP Bn AAR, 8 Feb 81, subj: 759th Military Police Battalion After Action Report, Task Force Refugee, Fort McCoy, Wisconsin.
Military Police Task Organization. The Active Component units, home stations, and operational dates under the command of, or operational control of, the 759th Military Police Battalion were as follows:

759th Military Police Battalion
Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 759th Military Police Battalion (Ft. Dix, N.J.; Organic)
511th Military Police Company (Ft. Dix, N.J.; Organic)
978th Military Police Company (Ft. Bliss, Tex.; 28 May - 4 Oct)
401st Military Police Company (Ft. Hood, Tex.; 7 Jun - 8 Jul)
463d Military Police Company (Ft. Leonard Wood, Mo.; 7 Jun - 4 Oct)
984th Military Police Company (Ft. Carson, Colo.; 7 Jul - 2 Oct)
1st Military Police Company (Ft. Riley, Kans.; 26 Sep - 2 Oct)
194th Military Police Platoon (Ft. Knox, Ky.; 27 Sep - 2 Oct)

Reserve Component Military Police support, as noted in an earlier section of this chapter, consisted of portions of twenty-two units in 2-week increments. The battalion's chain of command went through Task Force Refugee, U.S. Army Readiness and Mobilization Region V, Fifth U.S. Army, and U.S. Army Forces Command, to the Department of the Army. The civilian operating agencies in overall charge of the Fort McCoy Refugee Center consisted of the Federal Emergency Management Agency until 15 July 1980, and the U.S. Department of State after that date. Other law enforcement agencies present at the Refugee Center included the U.S. Marshals Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the U.S. Border Patrol, the Federal Protective Service, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The principal civilian and Federal support agencies involved included the Department of Health and Human Services, the U.S. Public Health Service, the General Services Administration, the American Red Cross, the Federal Emergency Communications Center, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Inter-Governmental Committee for European Migration, and the I.T.C. Corporation for food services. The principal Voluntary Agencies performing the resettlement portion of the refugee operation included the U.S. Catholic Conference, the Church World Service, the International Rescue Committee, the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Services, and the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society.

Operational Statistics. During the course of its support operations, the 759th Military Police Battalion issued 17,826 passes and badges, while its line military police personnel worked 12-hour shifts, 7 days a week, averaging 11 days on and 1 day off, plus making themselves available during their "off-duty" time in the case of reaction force requirements. Staff and supervisory personnel averaged 12-hour shifts, 7 days per week. The battalion reached its peak strength on 7 August with 1,006 personnel, a total which included 503 Active Component personnel and 503 Reserve Component personnel. Refugee offense statistics recorded in the 759th Military Police Battalion blotters covered forty-three categories of offenses. Some 4,579 cases were involved, including 2,974 recorded apprehensions, 2,316 of which were fence jumpers. The 1,605 other cases included 2 homicides. According to Colonel Zelez, his battalion's "worst day" took place on 8 September, the second day of the Fort McCoy Refugee Center's major riot, when the unit had to employ CS gas against the demonstrators. On the same date,
TASK FORCE REFUGEE HEADQUARTERS

TF CDR

DEP CDR

CHIEF of STAFF

G-1

G-3

G-4

G-5

JAG

CHAP

EMCR

SIG

MED

COMPT

PAO

PHO
another major violent demonstration broke out at one of the detention facilities. The unit again used CS gas. Finally, later that evening, a serious case of arson occurred in the general refugee housing area with one building completely gutted.

Major Problems and Lessons Learned

A number of major problems and lessons learned arose from this extended support operation, including command and control, intensity of the operation, sensitivity of the operation, the value of extensive mobility, communications techniques and capabilities, and the pass and badge system. Other major problems and lessons learned included ability and willingness to task organize, the value of a show of force, the dual role as Battalion Commander/Task Force Provost Marshal, deployment, and stand-down time after return to home station.

Command and Control. As noted earlier, Federal civilian operating agencies were in overall charge of the operation, supported by Active and Reserve Component Army units and individual personnel. The chain of control was from the battalion to Task Force Refugee (Provisional) to the Federal Emergency Management Agency and later to the U.S. Department of State. The Fort McCoy Task Force structure was similar to a G-staff (Chart 12). Fort McCoy installation agencies supported the Task Force in the same way that a division support command operated to support a division. Staffs of the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the U.S. Department of State were organized along functional lines similar in some degree to standard Army staff organization, but not to a degree which tended to facilitate the extensive amount of coordination necessary. By Army definition, a considerable crossing over between line of responsibility occurred which resulted in making it quite difficult to go to the right place with the right question. For instance, both operations and security personnel of the Federal Emergency Management Agency had significant equipment-related responsibilities which seemed more likely to be placed with the logistics section. While this situation presented no problems which could not be overcome, it did increase the complexity of an already major coordination requirement and added significantly to the amount of time necessarily devoted to it. An additional factor in the equation was the absence of a central staff coordinator (Chief of Staff) in the civilian agency structures. This made it very difficult to efficiently coordinate multi-staff and multi-agency actions.

Intensity of the Operation. From Day 1 to Day 135, seven days a week, the operation was relentlessly intense. The national limelight nature of it, the caliber of the Cuban refugee population (nearly one of every fourteen was transferred from Fort McCoy to the U.S. Federal Prison System), news of violent rioting at Fort Chaffee and Fort Indian-town Gap, the violence at Fort McCoy becoming more frequent and large scale produced an environment of extraordinary and unremitting stress for every service member in the Task Force. With the passing of time, the situation grew worse. Of necessity, military police missions enlarged in scope as time went by in an attempt to compensate for the chronic shortage of Federal civilian law enforcement personnel; the
increasingly hostile state and local populations as well as governments; the recognition that many of the conditions provoking riots at Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap clearly existed at Fort McCoy; and the knowledge that, at any given time until late September, the 759th Military Police Battalion might or might not have the Active Component or Reserve Component back-up reaction force necessary to help control a major outbreak of violence. All of these added to the overall negative environment.

Colonel Zelez reported that, within his battalion, stress and fatigue were multiplied in direct proportion to unit vacancies in key positions. The absence of a battalion executive officer to supervise staff actions and to conduct interagency coordination was particularly detrimental. The S-3 officer could not successfully control an operation of such magnitude and, at the same time, effectively coordinate the staff. Fifth U.S. Army's assignment of a senior Military Police major for part of the month of June and a promotable Military Police captain from early July on proved to be a significant factor in the battalion's successful accomplishment of its difficult mission. Beyond any question, a Military Police battalion headquarters deployed as the command and control element for the equivalent of five Military Police companies required full staffing for optimal efficiency. Stress and fatigue symptoms included physical exhaustion, loss of motivation, uncertainty, and temper flare-ups. The more significant effect included increased error rates, difficulty in following instructions, acceptance of unnecessary risks, confusion, deterioration in judgment, and inability to concentrate. Each of these symptoms and effects had its individual impact on the overall operation. Multiplied by stress and understaffing, the total impact was significantly detrimental.

Sensitivity of the Operation. The extraordinary nature of the Cuban refugee issue, with its impact on local, state, national, and even international politics, elevated the operation to high degree of sensitivity which had a major role in virtually every policy, decision, and action. Many decisions concerning day-to-day operations emanated from the White House level. A situation report (SITREP) prepared daily at each of the supporting installations was consolidated and delivered to the White House. The Wisconsin State Government and, consequently, Wisconsin's news media, were heavily involved with the operation at Fort McCoy. Widely published national media descriptions of the Cuban refugee population as criminals, mental retards, prostitutes, homosexuals, mentally unbalanced, criminally insane, and carriers of venereal and other diseases generated an intense interest in the law enforcement aspect of the operations. Therefore, much attention focused on the military police as the recognizable (uniformed) Army presence. There was little understanding of the fact that this was not an Army project, although the operation was located on an Army installation. It was, in fact, an operation of the United States Government coordinated with state governments, and supported through the use of military personnel, equipment, and facilities in their capacity as Federal assets available for service in non-military emergencies of nation-wide impact. As a result, military police activities were under constant and close scrutiny and were generally regarded as those activities in which the
observers perceived they would be most likely to detect the "true nature" of how the Federal Government intended to treat Cuban refugees, as well as the "true nature" of the refugee population. Consequently, some basic and important rules were strictly applied to military police activities. These included avoidance of actions which might provoke or increase a disturbance or generate additional media interest; avoidance of direct confrontation if there was any acceptable alternative, no matter how undesirable that alternative might be in comparison to the preferred course of action; and careful selection of terminology.

An example of avoidance of actions which might provoke a disturbance or generate additional media interest concerned the show of force which the unit conducted on 14 August 1980 in response to a number of incidents stemming from altercations between the Warhawks, the internal Cuban security force, and other Cuban refugees in the compound. This show of force by the military police represented a calculated risk taken only after careful evaluation and determination that, under the circumstance, it was probably somewhat more likely to deter than to provoke additional violence. Other examples of how this rule was followed included the selection of staging areas for the military police reaction force in locations concealed from the refugee population, and movement to these staging areas by routes also concealed from view if there was a chance that an emerging disturbance would die of its own accord or with minimal military police response. The purpose was to avoid inciting the refugees by reaction force response that might be viewed as out of proportion to the size or nature of the disturbance, while still maximizing the advantage of prepositioned response.

An example of avoidance of direct confrontation if there was any acceptable alternative, no matter how undesirable that alternative might be in comparison to the preferred course of action, involved the movement of refugees in mid-July from the West Leg to the East Leg within Fort McCoy. The number of refugee resettlements made up to this time permitted such a consolidation of facilities and support personnel. When informed of the move, however, the West Leg occupants strongly protested. They observed that there were only a few hundred of them; so they were a relatively close knit group with firmly established leaders who might lose power in a larger population. They claimed that political enemies in the East Leg would murder many of them. They stated that they would burn the compound and kill military police or anyone else who tried to make them move. For all the reasons that make a one-front operation desirable, it would have been advantageous to empty the West Leg and close it. However, the potential risks to property, to Cuban as well as American lives, and of generating unfavorable publicity with its resulting adverse impact of refugee resettlement operations nationwide outweighed the consolidation advantages. Hence, the West Leg population was permitted to stay where it was until the consolidation at Fort Chaffee occurred in late September and early October. Surprisingly, the West Leg population still remaining at Fort McCoy at that time was very willing to move to Fort Chaffee.

An example of careful selection of terminology involved Federal Agency spokesmen when discussing law enforcement activities with the
press. Vitally aware of the impact of unfavorable publicity on the Federal government's goal of rapid resettlement of the Cuban refugees, Federal Agency spokesmen were extremely cautious when discussing law enforcement operations at the center. To have designated the 7 and 8 September riots as "riots" rather than "disturbances" probably would have had an equally disastrous effect on resettlement and on the carefully negotiated agreements between the State of Arkansas and the Federal Government for the pending consolidation of all refugees at Fort Chaffee. In support of these goals of the United States Government, State Department officials at Fort McCoy announced that there had been disturbances on 7 - 8 September and provided sufficient facts to generally describe the more significant aspects of what had happened. The same principle was applied to announcements throughout the entire operation. The effort was not to distort the facts, but rather to provide minimal grounds for distortion by the press. Even so, the press promptly identified the "disturbances" and riots. Had the official announcement used the word "riot," press coverage possibly would have escalated the facts out of all proportion to reality, damaging the consolidation and resettlement goals even more than warranted by what had occurred on those two days. However, the local news media were well aware of these practices and had taken measures to develop other sources of news concerning the operation.

Value of Extensive Mobility. Military Police companies organized under modification table of organization and equipment (MTOE) 19-77 were probably the most mobile light units in the Army in 1980. In fact, the flexibility inherent in the mobile patrol and rapid reaction force configurations was one of the most fundamental factors in the successful accomplishment of the military police mission at Fort McCoy. Between organic, attached, and borrowed assets, the battalion had more than 160 4-ton vehicles in its inventory by mid-September, with one-third of these assets assigned to the rapid reaction forces. According to Colonel Zelez, it was not imprudent to state that, without this kind of mobility, the security mission at Fort McCoy would not have been performed to the satisfaction of the Task Force, U.S. Army Forces Command, or the United States Government.

Communications Techniques and Capabilities. Current doctrine (1980) for garrison Military Police radio communications and Communications-Electronics Operation Instructions (CEOI) procedures for tactical operations were not suitable or adaptable to a refugee support mission. The reason was that the military police had to maintain constant and readily understandable communications with many civilian and non-military police agencies. Accordingly, the 759th Military Police Battalion designed and implemented a relatively simple call-sign system which, combined with open rather than coded transmissions, proved to be well suited for this type of operation. Colonel Zelez noted that it was impossible to over-emphasize the need for a massive communications capability in a refugee support operation. Tactical radios (VRC-46, VRC-47, and PRC-77) were an invaluable secondary communications system, but even the relatively large numbers authorized by for Military Police units could not approach the capability which was actually needed. Consequently, the battalion obtained fifty commercial hand held
radios which were used as the primary command net. Their versatility was an essential element in maintaining the extensive communications needed throughout all levels of the battalion and with other agencies.

Pass and Badge System. Fort McCoy personnel developed the pass and badge system without the benefit of after action reports from the Vietnamese refugee operations at Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap in 1975. Color coding had been used in those operations to restrict certain categories of personnel to specific areas. Since the system developed at Fort McCoy was deficient in this vital respect, area access control was a major element of the overall Military Police operation at that installation. The key to the problem was the lack of an opportunity to benefit from lessons learned at other times and places.

Ability and Willingness to Task Organize. The operational effectiveness of the Military Police support forces depended in a very large part on their ability and willingness to task organize at the expense of doctrinal command and control structures, and to do so to whatever degree was necessary to get the job done. Standard Military Police training, garrison employment, tactical mission execution, and current doctrinal guidance facilitated a fairly painless and rapid transition from one configuration to another with a minimal degrading of command, control, and communications. On the other hand, the two infantry battalions deployed to Fort McCoy in the latter crisis-racked stage of the operation as additional emergency reaction forces refused to task organize into configurations which had already been found, through trial and error, to be best suited for success. Indeed, their refusal to do so placed significant limitations on their value as reaction forces.

Value of a Show of Force. Executing shows of force in actual civil disturbance situations led to one of the most valuable lessons learned from the entire operation. A 12-vehicle show of force convoy fielded in response to the incidents involving the Warhawks and other Cuban refugees noted above, produced a devastating and thoroughly demoralizing effect on large groups of armed Cuban refugees in a situation on the brink of erupting into large scale violence that probably would have resulted in the loss of life. This show of force was successful in dispersing the groups with no physical confrontation between the Military Police and the refugees. It was the largest of several such maneuvers conducted for similar reasons. Each of these demonstrations proved to be successful. They were immensely more effective than many commanders might imagine them to be.

Dual Role as Battalion Commander/Task Force Provost Marshal. There were significant advantages to the dual role of Battalion Commander and Task Force Provost Marshal, the most important of which was the total familiarity gained by the incumbent concerning Military Police assets and capabilities. The disadvantages, however, were also significant. The demands of each role tended to detract from the capability of the officer concerned to perform either one at peak efficiency. This situation was particularly detrimental during the first and the last weeks of the mission when the need for a full-time Military Police staff planner was the greatest. For instance, at the beginning of the
operation, an overall security plan had to be designed, including two
detention facilities. During the concluding phase of the operation,
there was a need for highly detailed planning concerning the physical
transfer of the remaining hard core Cuban refugees from Fort McCoy to
Fort Chaffee. This dual role affected the efficiency with which both
Military Police command and staff functions could be accomplished.

Deployment. The deployment effort connected with the movement of
the 759th Military Police Battalion from Fort Dix to Fort McCoy in May
1980 was more exhausting than anticipated. Few of the battalion person-
nel had any experience in deployment operations. In addition, a critical
shortage of senior noncommissioned officers existed in the S-3 (Plans
and Operations) section to plan and coordinate the movement. As a
result, most of the battalion's key personnel were seriously fatigued
prior to their arrival at Fort McCoy. This situation had a tremendous
adverse impact on their ability to function properly in the fast-paced
18 to 20 hour workdays, 7 days a week, which characterized the first
month and one-half of on site operations.

Administrative Support Problems and Lessons Learned

Three of the more important administrative support problems and
lessons learned experienced by the 759th Military Police Battalion at
Fort McCoy included the temporary duty status of and payments to individ-
ual members, the provision of adequate health and welfare services,
and restraints on reassignment and rotation of assigned and attached
personnel.

TDY Status and Payments. One of the most difficult problems
for the battalion to resolve concerned the temporary duty status of its
Active Component Military Police units. The battalion experienced con-
siderable difficulty in obtaining proper movement orders authorizing
temporary duty payments for its assigned and attached Active Component
units, coming as they did from a variety of home stations. Resulting
problems included determining which individual members qualified for
temporary duty payment, how it was to be accomplished once the temporary
duty status was accomplished, how individual service member's other
allotments were effected (e.g., separate rations and family separation
allowances), amount of surcharge for meals, and similar financial
questions -- all of which impacted on morale. In short, the battalion
needed about one month of concerted effort and coordination to resolve
these questions to the satisfaction of the Task Force headquarters, Fort
McCoy, and the home stations involved. Once resolved, the battalion
arranged for the payment of accrued temporary duty cash on a monthly
basis by individual unit Class "A" Agents. Based on its experience in
this matter, the battalion recommended that home stations should resolve
temporary duty problems through coordination with the receiving insta-
lation prior to the deployments of their units. If, on the other hand,
the rapid deployment of a specific unit or units precluded this from
being accomplished, affected unit commanders should be aware of this
potentially damaging situation to morale and be prepared to devote con-
siderable efforts to its solution.

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Provision of Adequate Health and Welfare Services. The battalion recognized the fact that Fort McCoy's primary mission was to support Reserve Component annual training. Thus, the installation was not prepared to cope with the increased demands for health and welfare services placed on it by a significantly larger than normal number of both Active Component and Reserve Component units during the summer of 1980. In addition, the installation was not prepared to provide these services well beyond the standard summer annual training period. Specific health and welfare service areas included post office, post exchange, barber shop, bank, food stands, laundry facilities, television sets for the barracks, athletic equipment, and theaters. The problem impacted most during the first and last months of the operation — before Fort McCoy could fully gear up for the unexpectedly increased population, and after the contractors and summer hire personnel began to terminate their employment. The battalion, the Task Force headquarters, and Fort McCoy staff agencies expended a great deal of effort to maintain the previously noted services at even a minimally satisfactory level to accommodate the 24-hour a day nature of the operation. The battalion's position was that cost effectiveness (budget restraints and civilian contracts) should not be permitted to curtail such vital services as barber, postal, and check cashing, particularly in an operation as intense and demanding as the Fort McCoy Refugee operation. As Colonel Zelez pointed out, the troops needed every support service available in such an environment. Each curtailed service became another source of frustration, lowered morale, and degraded efficiency.

Restraints on Reassignment and Rotation. Restraints on reassignment and rotation of battalion personnel from Fort McCoy arose from the fact that the Federal Emergency Management Agency would not reimburse the Army for reassignment and rotation of individuals unless for emergency reasons, permanent change of station, or retirement. In order to maintain maximum strength levels and minimize expense to the Government, higher headquarters imposed strict control measures to limit reassignments and rotations. The battalion had to fully justify each case in writing to the Task Force. During the course of the 759th Military Police Battalion's support mission at Fort McCoy, some 100 cases were processed and approved for both assigned and attached members of the battalion. The various home stations replaced the vast majority of these individuals on a one for one basis. The battalion recommended that units involved in such operations in the future should be prepared for similar constraints.

Detention Facility Problems

Detention facilities — Block 8 and Buildings 1065 - 1067 — at Fort McCoy merited some discussion since they proved to be the major sources of military police concern throughout the Cuban refugee operation. The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service operated Building 8 and the U.S. Marshals Service operated Buildings 1065 - 1067.

Feisol Detention Facility Problems. Block 8 was a prisoner of war training camp used by Reserve Component units charged with the safeguarding of prisoners of war in future American military operations.
This was totally inadequate for the safeguarding of convicted Cuban felons during the early days of Cuban refugee operations. Overall security of the area improved substantially in the latter half of June with the construction of an additional 12-foot high fence. For most of the hectic summer of 1980, the military police in the area were positioned in mobile listening posts located not far from the facility. They were positioned in such a way that they could be seen by the detainees and served as a deterrent against disturbances and escapes, as well as a rapid reaction force for either event. Unfortunately, the area was not lighted as well as it should have been and, as a general rule, not more than 2 of the 4 corner guard towers were manned -- frequently, only 1. Block 8, as noted above, was primarily a facility for felons, which was constantly undermanned by Immigration and Naturalization Service guards who were neither trained nor experienced in detention operations. Consequently, it constituted a source of great concern to the Military Police throughout the entire operation. The 759th Military Police Battalion's concern was rooted in the fact that it was responsible for supporting the Immigration and Naturalization Service in controlling disturbances and riots, and for making "all costs" efforts at apprehending Cuban refugee escapees. It seemed that everyone at Fort McCoy but the Military Police was surprised that the additional 12-foot high fence and concertina did not make Block 8 escape-proof. It might have been escape-proof if the Immigration and Naturalization Service had done a better job of guarding.

Misdemeanor Detention Facility Problems. Buildings 1065 - 1067 were three old-style psychiatric wards in the huge Fort McCoy hospital complex. Operated, as noted above, by the U.S. Marshals Service, this facility was used for Cuban refugees who had committed offenses generally characterized as misdemeanors. Just as in the case of Block 8, the U.S. Marshals Service guard force was undermanned and had neither training nor experience in operating detention facilities. Major problems involved basic security (leaving doors open and not guarding the sides or back of the facility); overcrowding; the absence of sentencing or identification procedures which were systematically followed; and the condition of the structure itself. The entire hospital complex was a maze of wards (buildings) all interconnected by corridors, roof cavities, and crawl space under the floors. Cuban refugee escapees could, and did, disappear very quickly by getting into the ceiling space or under a floor. The Military Police battalion commander recommended that a 10-foot section between Ward 1067 and the rest of the complex be removed. This would have isolated the detention facility and would probably have solved most of the escapee problems. However, higher authority disapproved this recommendation as too damaging to the structure. The military police were thus required to devote a continued and costly number of manhours in containing disturbances and escapes throughout the entire operation.

Summary

The Fort McCoy After Action Report consisted of comments furnished by both the Task Force Commander and the Commander, 759th Military Police Battalion. In his comments, the Task Force Commander stressed...
that the uniqueness of the data presented might possibly preclude its application to future refugee processing operations involving other third country nationals. He was referring, of course, to the actions of the criminal element and other antisocial elements among the Cuban refugees. On the whole, this group of refugees was far more prone to violence that the Hungarian refugees processed under Operation MERCY in 1956 at Camp Kilmer, N.J., and the Vietnamese refugees processed under Project NEW ARRIVALS in 1975. However, in view of this situation, and the fact that the same kind of an influx could be artificially contrived by or naturally result from the repressive actions of any number of authoritarian heads of state throughout the world, it was probable that such a phenomenon would occur again. Thus, the Task Force Commander’s comments remain relevant and merit further review. Comments of the Commander, 759th Military Police Battalion, fell into the same useful category, particularly if the next wave of refugees contained some of the same disruptive social elements which characterized the 1980 Cuban refugees. His comments were also valuable for the insight they gave concerning the stress and strain under which his soldiers had to operate from the beginning to the very end of the refugee operation at Fort McCoy.

Fort McCoy Commander’s Comments

In reviewing the Fort McCoy operations in support of the Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center a year after the event, Colonel Moran, the post commander, stressed several major points. He noted first of all that his successful execution of the preparatory phase for the reception of the Cuban refugees was due to a number of critical factors. These included the unstinting and responsive support rendered by General Healy and his U.S. Army Readiness and Mobilization Region V, headquartered at Fort Sheridan, Ill., the valuable contributions made by Colonel Irizarry of that headquarters, and, in particular, the brilliant performance of duty by his director of industrial operations, Lt. Col. J. Michael Hagman. Indeed, according to Colonel Moran, it was General Healy’s energetic intervention on his behalf which enabled the U.S. Army Reserve’s 416th Engineer Command from Chicago, Ill., to drop its scheduled Annual Training program and to construct over 20,000 linear feet of security fencing at the refugee processing center in three days before the arrival of the first refugees. Colonel Moran also noted that General Healy and other agencies had staffed General Herring’s Task Force headquarters with only top notch officer personnel, often at significant cost in terms of operational efficiency of the supplying Army Readiness and Mobilization Region V and other Fifth U.S. Army activities.

Based upon his experience as the base support installation commander during the actual refugee operation which was conducted initially by the Federal Emergency Management Agency and later by the U.S. State

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6. The entire paragraph is based on interv, Mr. F.W. Pew, FORSCOM Hist Ofc, w/COL W.J. Moran, 19 Nov 81.
Department, Colonel Moran was firmly convinced that, in future operations of this nature -- particularly those conducted at Army installations -- the Army should have complete control over and conduct the operations. In order to do so, the Army would have to strengthen its Active Component Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations forces to meet both potential future operational and deployment requirements for the processing of refugees. Colonel Moran felt that the Federal Emergency Management Agency was not designed to conduct refugee processing activities and that it suffered from severe organizational and structural weaknesses. The State Department was even less well equipped to perform such a function and at Fort McCoy it was forced to operate in an unfavorable environment. Although the State Department was fully responsible for the operation of the refugee center on 15 July 1980, the Federal Emergency Management Agency continued to retain full control over all funding matters. This condition led to much dissension between and within the two agencies. This was fueled further by the constant turnover of personnel in both agencies, some of whom arrived at the refugee processing center with other future job commitments in their pockets. Colonel Moran contended that the Army, with its vast managerial, technical, and superior organizational abilities, could have operated the center in a much more professional and productive fashion.

Colonel Moran also pointed out that the Active Component and Reserve Component engineer, civil affairs, psychological operations, public affairs, and military police personnel who participated in supporting the refugee center received invaluable training in their specialties. In particular, he praised the "herculean efforts" of the military police. He also pointed out that there was no diminution in the effectiveness of the training conducted by the more than 28,000 Army National Guard and Army Reserve personnel at Fort McCoy during 1980. In fact, those who conducted all of their training under field conditions due to the assignment of normal housing space to the Cuban refugees were uniformly positive concerning their experience. This positive attitude towards the Army's supporting role during the refugee processing period was also reflected in the local and state media. Colonel Moran attributed this happy turn of events to the fact that he and his recent predecessors at Fort McCoy had cultivated honest and candid relationships with the local press and other news media. He continued to follow this policy while the center was in operation and relied heavily upon the professional assistance rendered by representatives from the FORSCOM public affairs staff. Despite all of the negative publicity experienced by the center itself, Fort McCoy sustained and improved its public image.
Chapter IX
FORT CHAFFEE CONSOLIDATED SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Consolidation Phase
5 August - 8 October 1980

Background

On 5 August 1980, Mr. Eugene Eidenberg, Deputy Assistant for Inter-governmental Affairs, announced from the White House that Fort Chaffee would be the consolidation center for all Cuban refugees then in residence at other camps (Eglin Air Force Base, Fort Indiantown Gap, and Fort McCoy) in the United States. The first Cuban refugees would arrive at the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Center from the Eglin Air Force Base Center on or about 1 September. This announcement evoked a protest from Governor Bill Clinton of Arkansas and other elected officials and laid the groundwork for a political battle involving both the State and Federal Government for another month. Meanwhile, the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Center Task Force Commander and the heads of the Federal Agencies at the Center began planning in earnest for the arrival of the new refugees. 1

In his early planning efforts for consolidation, Brig. Gen. James E. Drummond, the Task Force Commander, assumed that the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Center would house approximately 10,000 Cuban refugees as a maximum. Two immediate problems which he had to address involved the early construction of perimeter fencing, and the further delineation of law enforcement responsibilities on the part of state and local police agencies. In addition, the current Cuban refugee population of 5,000 at the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Center had to be reduced to a level which would permit the influx of approximately 6,000 Cuban refugees from the other centers without exceeding the Fort Chaffee capacity of 10,000. Representatives of the Federal Government and the State of Arkansas had negotiated this capacity ceiling. Another primary concern of FORSCOM was the further "civilianization" of center functions before the consolidation began. This was necessary because of the temporary duty strain placed on the Military Police units in particular and the fact that very little Reserve Component support would be available during the coming winter and early spring months. General Drummond, therefore, was extremely anxious to completely remove his military Task Force members from non-military functional areas prior to the actual consolidation of the center. He implemented this policy on 5 and 6 August with the departure of the majority of personnel from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion and the 1st PSYOPS Battalion. He transferred their operational responsibilities to the Department of State representatives at the center. This departure was an important step in General Drummond's transfer of non-military functional responsibilities from Task Force military personnel to Federal agency civilian personnel. 2

2. Ibid.
On 17 August, the 299th Engineer Battalion, from Fort Sill, Okla., which had been on temporary duty at Fort Chaffee since 8 May, began the construction of a chain link fence required by the Department of Defense to enclose the perimeter of the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Center. The engineers estimated that it would take three weeks to complete this fence project, which required 15,500 feet of chain link fence, ten feet high, topped with six-strand barbed wire. Working around the clock, the battalion completed this important project by 25 August. The battalion then began Phase II of the project which included the establishment of various segregation areas for the incarceration of various levels of Cuban refugee offenders. In the meantime, General Drummond continued his efforts to civilianize the non-military aspects of the Task Force functions. On 31 August, the U.S. Park Police relieved the Task Force Military Police of all security duties and patrols inside the enclave. On the following day, they relieved the Military Police of the responsibility for manning the gates to the enclave. On 12 September, the 299th Engineer Battalion completed the remainder of the fencing project and, as of that date, all fencing had been erected as outlined in the Joint Security Plan, which had been prepared jointly by the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice, and dated 5 September 1980. A specific provision of the fencing plan included in this document called for a segregated area to be designated as Level II. This area, controlled by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, was built to hold habitual troublemakers and persons attempting to leave the center without proper authority. On 14 September, selected Task Force Military Police and Federal Agency Law Enforcement personnel conducted a "sweep" operation inside the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Center to locate and transfer appropriate "Level II" individuals to that segregated area. This operation was successful, and Level II began functioning in accordance with the Department of Defense – Department of Justice Joint Security Plan (DOD-DOJ JSP).3

One concession which Governor Clinton gained in his dispute with the Federal Government was that no additional Cuban refugees would be sent to Fort Chaffee until he approved of the center's security measures. Following the resolution of several conflicts over several specific provisions of the plan, Governor Clinton approved it on 24 September 1980. On the following day, the first group of "consolidated" Cuban refugees arrived at Fort Chaffee from Eglin Air Force Base. A total of 617 transferees arrived on 25 and 26 September, completing that operation. During the period 26 September to 3 October, Fort McCoy transferred 3,174 Cuban refugees and, during the period 6 to 9 October, Fort Indiantown Gap transferred 1,980 Cuban refugees. With the arrival of this last plane load of Cuban refugees from Fort Indiantown Gap on 9 October, the overall Fort Chaffee Consolidated Center contained 8,349 Cuban refugees (2,578 original remaining refugees and 5,771 newly arrived

3. (1) Ibid.; (2) Department of Defense and Department of Justice Security Plan Refugee Processing Center Resettlement Operation, Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, 5 Sep 80, hereafter referred to as DOD-DOJ JSP, 5 Sep 80.
"consolidated" refugees), a figure which was well below the maximum figure promised to the Governor of Arkansas by the Federal Government.  

Governor Clinton's Concerns

As noted above, the White House and the Governor of Arkansas had reached an agreement giving the latter the right to approve or disapprove the proposed Department of Defense - Department of Justice Joint Security Plan. On 11 September, Governor Clinton released a media announcement in which he commended Federal officials for the cooperation they had displayed in working with state and local law enforcement officials in Arkansas in the development of the DOD-DOJ Joint Security Plan. As far as the Governor was concerned, the proposed Joint Security Plan reflected a genuine concern and effort on the part of the Federal Government to provide adequate security for both the consolidated Cuban refugee population and the citizens of the surrounding communities at Fort Chaffee. The plan included many fine features such as the installation of an additional security fence around the perimeter of the Refugee Center; the continued presence of the Federal military (Task Force) at a reasonable level; the funding of additional civilian law enforcement officers; and improved communications with state and local law enforcement officials. However, after discussing the matter with the State's two U.S. Senators, Congressional Representatives, and local officials, the Governor still had some concerns concerning the plan.

Selected Concerns. Governor Clinton insisted that no minors be sent to Fort Chaffee since they would present additional security problems. Also, no mentally disturbed Cuban refugees should be sent for the same reason. Before beginning the consolidation at Fort Chaffee, the current population at Fort McCoy should be screened to remove any hardcore troublemakers. When the transfer from Fort McCoy did take place, it might be necessary to exercise extra security precautions not outlined in the proposed Joint Security Plan. Federal military personnel should be physically present during the unloading of the incoming Cuban refugees at the nearby Fort Smith Airport. The authority of the Federal military forces should be clarified so that it would be clear that they would have access to areas of concurrent jurisdiction. Any reduction in Federal enforcement strength should be approved by the Security Advisory Group, a security and law enforcement coordinating body established at Fort Chaffee. This group consisted of members of civilian and Federal military security forces and was chaired by the Senior Civilian Coordinator. After the arrival of Cuban refugees from one of the other Refugee Centers, no other refugees should arrive until after the Security Advisory Group had given its approval. A head count of the refugees should be taken regularly to ensure accurate accountability.

5. Governor of Arkansas Media Release, 11 Sep 80, concerning Joint Security Plan.
and the overall Cuban refugee population at Fort Chaffee after consoli-
dation was completed should not exceed 10,000.6

Non-Security Concerns. Governor Clinton also expressed some addi-
tional concerns which were not related to security. State and local
entities should be reimbursed for expenses incurred subsequent to
1 June 1980. The reimbursement requests now pending should be processed
as soon as received from state authorities. Cuban refugees who returned
to Fort Chaffee after being sponsored should be permitted to reenter the
center and be housed until a new sponsorship was arranged. Moreover,
the Administration should vigorously support and attempt to enact pend-
ing legislation before the Congress recessed which would ensure that
the Voluntary Agencies operating at Fort Chaffee received the funds
necessary to continue their efforts to promptly resettle the refugees.7

Department of State Response

In his response to Governor Clinton's concerns concerning the provi-
sions of the proposed Joint Security Plan, Mr. Christian R. Holmes,
Director, Cuban-Haitian Task Force, Department of State, stated that,
although the proposed Joint Security Plan was reflective of the
Department of State's (and the U.S. Government's) concern for the
health, welfare, and dignity of the Cuban refugees, its genuine concern
for the rights and security of the citizens and members of the local
communities of the State of Arkansas was of equal importance. The
Director did not expect unaccompanied minors to be billeted at Fort
Chaffee, except for a few individual hardship cases. Each such case
would be brought to the attention of the Security Advisory Group for
their concurrence. Mentally disturbed Cuban refugee aliens would be
relocated to Federal hospital facilities yet to be designated. Known
hardcore troublemakers would not be moved to Fort Chaffee. The current
Cuban refugee population at Fort McCoy, as well as the Cuban refugee
population at the other centers, was continuously monitored to better
identify those individuals who were hardcore troublemakers. Every
effort was being made to identify and isolate those Cuban refugees who
were responsible for the recent disorder at Fort McCoy. The present
Joint Security Plan represented what the U.S. Government believed to be
adequate and reasonable measures to secure and control the Cuban entrant
population based on current assessments of the situation. Security pre-
cautions could and would be increased when justified by a continuing
assessment of the situation at Fort Chaffee. In addition, current plans
called for some 36 - 40 civilian Federal law enforcement personnel to be
present during the debarking of Cuban refugees at the Fort Smith Air-
port. Twenty of these personnel would be uniformed, riot-equipped
Border Patrol officers. An additional twelve uniformed Immigration and
Naturalization Service detention officers would also be present. The
remaining law enforcement personnel would be in civilian attire. The

6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
Border Patrol officers would be used to provide a cordon between the aircraft and the busses. Cuban refugees would debark in increments of five or ten at a time to eliminate the possibility of any sort of mass escape. The timetable for the arrivals of the Cuban refugees was dependent upon many factors including proper security arrangements and security schedules. All movements of these personnel into Fort Chaffee would be coordinated through the Security Advisory Group. Body counts of the Cuban refugees at Fort Chaffee would be conducted on a periodic basis. And, the Director fully intended to keep the Cuban refugee population at Fort Chaffee at or below 10,000, as announced in his 5 August briefing on the matter.8

In response to Governor Clinton's concerns which were not related to security, the Director responded that the State of Arkansas was in the process of currently preparing a submission for expenses incurred in accordance with Federal Emergency Management Agency guidelines. That agency had already been in contact with state administrative and financial personnel and had provided them with appropriate documents and guidelines for submitting their bills for processing. The reimbursements (for bills submitted prior to and subsequent to 1 June) would be processed as soon as the bills were received in accordance with the governing provisions of the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (PL-93-288). Federal Emergency Management Agency personnel stood ready to provide whatever advice was necessary to overcome the technical problems of the guidelines which originally related to natural disasters. As far as the reentry of Cuban refugees was concerned, the general policy was to disallow reentrance. However, Cuban refugees who returned to Fort Chaffee after having been placed with sponsors would be housed until the Voluntary Agencies could arrange new sponsorships. The Administration continued to support the enactment of both the pending Fascell/Stone Amendment and a $65 million appropriation to finance the resettlement of Cuban and Haitian refugees and the operation of Federal processing facilities in the post-1 October 1980 period. The Director estimated that the $65 million would be available by 1 October to fund the private Voluntary Agencies for their incurred costs in resettling the Cuban and Haitian refugees. The Director stated that the Federal Government was firmly committed to making the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Center a safe, efficient, and effective resettlement operation. He also noted that both the officials and citizens of the State of Arkansas had been most cooperative in assisting the Federal Government to carry out this commitment. On 19 September, Governor Clinton raised a few minor reservations concerning procedures and definitions which were subsequently resolved. As noted earlier, he approved the Joint Security Plan on 24 September.9


The final Joint Security Plan for the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Center had been developed jointly by the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice, approved by their representatives, on 5 September, and then, because of White House interest, was referred to the Governor of Arkansas for his approval, which was finally secured on 24 September.

Mission and Purpose. The mission of the Joint Security Plan was to provide security and law enforcement during the movement, consolidation, and sustainment of the Cuban refugees at Fort Chaffee, Ark.; to ensure coordination with local, state, and Federal Government agencies for the security of the local population; to prepare for civil disturbance operations; and to maintain full control of all refugees at Fort Chaffee. The purpose of the Joint Security Plan was to establish requirements for the refugee movement, consolidation, and transition to "normalization" at Fort Chaffee and the surrounding area.10

Situation. The terms of the Joint Security Plan designated Fort Chaffee as the consolidation center for Cuban refugees who remained at the centers at Eglin Air Force Base, Fort Indiantown Gap, and Fort McCoy. The movement which would begin only when the security measures in the plan had been implemented, would be a coordinated movement, occurring sequentially from center locations. The total consolidated refugee population to be located at Fort Chaffee would not exceed 10,000 persons at any one time. The Joint Security Plan was written on a joint basis and it detailed those requirements which were or had been assigned to military and civil agencies. The Joint Security Plan was to be binding on those agencies which were responsible for performing certain tasks. A Security Advisory Group (previously mentioned above) would be established to review and advise on the plan's implementation and to recommend any changes which might be required. Members of the Security Advisory Group would be drawn from the Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and the military security forces. The Security Advisory Group would be chaired by the Senior Civil Coordinator.11

Assumptions. The following assumptions were made with the understanding that they were to be considered as requirements prior to movement. They included the fact that security measures detailed in the plan had been implemented at Fort Chaffee and the surrounding location; that a lighted security fence made up of a 10-foot chain link material topped with concertina wire would be in place; that approximately 500 refugees daily would be scheduled to arrive sequentially from other locations during the hours of daylight; and that all personnel sent to Fort Chaffee would have been fully briefed and their records checked and confirmed. They also included the fact that a segregated living area to

10. DOD - DOJ JSP, 5 Sep 80.
11. Ibid.
be manned by a Federal civilian law enforcement agency (Immigration and Naturalization Service) had been established at Fort Chaffee for habitual troublemakers and for persons who attempted to leave without authority; that a thorough search would be made of all refugees and their possessions prior to boarding aircraft at the departure location and also after arrival at Fort Chaffee; and that demographic data would be provided one week prior to shipment to Fort Chaffee detailing the number of single males, females, families (and make-up of families), unaccompanied minors, and the like.\textsuperscript{12}

Operational Phasing. Physical security for the Resettlement Operation at Fort Chaffee was organized into three phases. Phase I involved the movement of incoming refugees from other refugee centers through the Arkansas Air National Guard facility at the Fort Smith Airport to the refugee enclave at Fort Chaffee. Phase II was the transition phase. It involved the physical security arrangements in effect during the consolidation and transition phases. Phase III was the sustainment phase. It involved the physical security arrangements in effect during the sustainment period of the refugee center.

Movement Security. The following requirements governed the movement of the refugees from each refugee center to Fort Chaffee. The U.S. Army Task Forces would provide Military Police and security force personnel at departure and arrival airports when located on Department of Defense property. Troops would also be provided at the processing site to assist in crowd control. The Immigration and Naturalization Service would provide guard personnel on board aircraft and at the departure and arrival points to conduct physical searches, and as bus guards enroute to Fort Chaffee. Federal Aviation Administration (Sky Marshals) would support Immigration and Naturalization Service movement security operations as necessary. The Arkansas State Police would provide personnel to escort busses from the Fort Smith Airport to nearby Fort Chaffee. Air police of the Arkansas Air National Guard would assist the Immigration and Naturalization Service security force at the Fort Smith Airport as required.\textsuperscript{13}

Post and Enclave Security. Post and enclave security measures to be implemented prior to the arrival of Cuban refugees at Fort Chaffee included physical security, security forces, and Federal civilian forces. Physical security requirements and their pre-arrival implementation included a lighted security fence to be constructed at least 10-feet in height topped by a concertina wire. Gates would be placed at critical intersections and would be manned twenty-four hours a day. Three gates would remain open under guard for the control of traffic and contraband. The pass and entry system would be administered by the Department of State and would be executed by the U.S. Park Police, the senior law enforcement agency at the consolidated center. U.S. Army

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
Task Force security forces would consist of approximately 540 Task Force III combat personnel and 267 Military Police during the Movement Phase. U.S. Army Task Force security forces would consist of approximately 540 Task Force III combat personnel and 174 Military Police during the Transition Phase. Requirements for a military personnel security force during the sustainment phase would depend upon the demands generated through a continuing reassessment based on the security situation and the size and nature of the Cuban refugee population. The Department of Justice designated the U.S. Park Police, Department of the Interior, as the lead civilian law enforcement agency. In this role, the U.S. Park Police were responsible for coordinating the total security and law enforcement effort at the consolidated center at Fort Chaffee. Other Federal law enforcement agencies were responsible for major supporting missions during all phases of the consolidated resettlement operation. These included the U.S. Park Police, Department of the Interior, 73 personnel; the U.S. Marshals Service, Department of Justice, 10 personnel; the Federal Protective Service, General Services Administration, 62 personnel; the Immigration and Naturalization Service Border Patrol, Department of Justice, 10 personnel; the Immigration and Naturalization Service Detention and Deportation Division, Department of Justice, 65 personnel; and the Bureau of Prisons, Department of Justice, 15 personnel; for a grand total of 225 Federal civilian law enforcement personnel. In addition, the Federal Aviation Administration provided 15 personnel (Sky Marshals) during the Movement Phase of the operation.

Local Community Security. Local community security would be provided by state and local law enforcement agencies and, if required, by the Arkansas Army National Guard. These agencies, including the Arkansas Army National Guard, were authorized to post their own liaison personnel in the Task Force Emergency Operations Center during critical periods. Law enforcement and security relationships were as shown on Chart 13 and physical protection measures taken were as shown on Map 6.

Command and Control. The Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Arkansas State Police were responsible for command and control for law enforcement and security matters at the Fort Smith Airport, the debarkation point. The U.S. Army Task Force Commander was responsible for command and control of law enforcement and security matters at Fort Chaffee. The U.S. Park Police were responsible for command and control of law enforcement and security matters in the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Refugee Center Enclave. In the event that unrest among the Cuban refugees in the enclave escalated to civil disorder status requiring the intervention of Military Police or other U.S. Army personnel, command and control responsibilities would be transferred from the U.S. Park Police Commander to the U.S. Army Task Force Commander. The Chief of the local law enforcement agency force involved was responsible for command and control of the local civil police. As far as civil disorder

14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
control was concerned, the U.S. Army Task Force Commander was responsible for maintaining law and order on post, and the Arkansas State Police was responsible for maintaining law and order off post. As noted earlier, the Task Force Commander maintained a Joint Emergency Operations Center at Fort Chaffee. 16

Estimated Personnel Requirements. Estimated personnel requirements as of 5 September for both military and Federal civilian agency personnel by phase were as follows: 17

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Phase I</th>
<th>Phase II</th>
<th>Phase III</th>
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<tr>
<td>Task Force III</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Perimeter</td>
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<td>180</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Immediate Reaction Force</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol/Reaction Force</td>
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<td>180</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (All Shifts)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Police</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Patrols</td>
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<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Security Force</td>
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<td>137</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cordon Security Force</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate Reaction &amp; Security Force</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (All Shifts)</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Phase I</th>
<th>Phase II</th>
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<td>U.S. Park Police</td>
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<td>U.S. Marshals Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>Federal Protective Service</td>
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<td>62</td>
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<tr>
<td>Immigration &amp; Naturalization Service</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detention</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Patrol</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau of Prisons</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Aviation Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total (All Shifts)</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the above personnel requirements, the U.S. Marshals Service and Bureau of Prisons estimated on 5 September that they would require seventy contract guards.

16. Ibid.
17. DOD - DOJ JSP, 5 Sep 80.
Responsibilities

Department of Defense. The U.S. Army Task Force was primarily responsible for perimeter security of the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Refugee Enclave. This responsibility included the apprehension and return of escapees found outside of the designated enclave, but still within the boundaries of the military installation, and for the provision of a reaction force of sufficient size to handle situations beyond the capability of the Federal civilian law enforcement agencies on site.

Department of Justice. Under the overall coordination of the Department of Justice, designated Federal civilian law enforcement components were responsible for patrolling, policing, and performing peacekeeping duties within all interior areas of the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Refugee Enclave and such other refugee processing areas as might be designated. The Federal civilian law enforcement agencies were also responsible for security during the movement of the refugees to Fort Chaffee and for the implementation of appropriate administrative and criminal justice procedures. The Department of Justice assigned the following specific responsibilities to its law enforcement component agencies. The U.S. Park Police were responsible for peacekeeping, law enforcement, and security operations within the refugee enclave. They also provided immediate reaction to requests from the military and civilian personnel in situations requiring the arrest of refugees, the conducting of searches, the initiation of investigations, or the carrying out of similar law enforcement activities. They were responsible for the submission of timely and accurate consolidated law enforcement reports to the Department of Justice. The U.S. Marshals Service was responsible for the operation of segregation areas for refugees in protective custody and for unattached personnel under the age of eighteen. They were also responsible for the operation of the refugee stockade through 15 September 1980; for the transportation of prisoners and the support of court functions; for effecting general liaison with state and local law enforcement agencies on behalf of the Senior Law Enforcement Coordinator (the senior U.S. Park Police Commander on site at Fort Chaffee); and for such additional short-term or immediate law enforcement or security missions as might be assigned on an emergency basis. The Federal Protective Service was responsible for the protection of all civilian personnel associated with the refugee operation; and for the areas in which others worked, except in those areas within the jurisdiction of other agencies. The Federal Protective Service was also responsible for providing access control of personnel and vehicles at interior and exterior Fort Chaffee Consolidated Refugee Enclave gates.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service Border Patrol was responsible for the pursuit and apprehension of refugees who fled or otherwise

18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
left the boundaries of Fort Chaffee without authorization. The Border Patrol was also responsible for sending escape notifications to all necessary state and local jurisdictions, to include police agencies and airport authorities. The Border Patrol also established liaison with state and local authorities on matters relating to unauthorized refugee departures and returns. The Immigration and Naturalization Service Detention and Deportation Division was responsible for the security and operation of the Level II (Detention Area) housing area. The Immigration and Naturalization Service itself designed and implemented a system of uniform and strict rules of conduct for refugee behavior and the application of disciplinary procedures where warranted. The Bureau of Prisons was responsible for the security and operation of the refugee stockade facility at Fort Chaffee after 15 September 1980. And, the Federal Aviation Administration was responsible for ensuring preboard security screening through the use of walk-through and hand wand devices on all Cuban refugees transported by commercial aircraft. They were also ensured x-ray examination of all Cuban carry-on and checked baggage, and assigned a sufficient number of Federal Air Marshals to refugee flights to ensure control of the Cubans and the protection of crew and aircraft. 20

Movement of Cuban Refugees - Fort Smith Airport to Fort Chaffee

The actual movement of the incoming Cuban refugee alien entrants from the Fort Smith Airport, some five miles from Fort Chaffee, to that installation occurred without incident. The first group came from Eglin Air Force Base in Florida. The distance was 565 air miles and required 1.5 hours of flying time. All flights started and terminated during daylight hours during the period 25 and 26 September. A total of 617 Cuban refugees were transferred. The second and largest group were from Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. The distance involved was 612 air miles and required 1.75 hours of flying time. All flights started and terminated during daylight hours during the period 26 September to 3 October. While there was a slight initial delay due to maintenance problems involving an Air Florida chartered aircraft, no serious problems were encountered. A total of 3,714 Cuban refugees were transported during this segment of the consolidation operation. The third and final group came from Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania. The distance covered was 1,018 air miles and required 2.5 hours of flying time. All flights started and terminated during daylight hours during the period 6 through 9 October. A total of 1,980 Cuban refugees were transported during this final phase. Upon arrival at the Arkansas Air National Guard section of the Fort Smith Airport, the Cuban refugees found themselves under tight security control. 21

Incoming refugee aircraft at the Fort Smith Airport moved to the Arkansas Air National Guard facility for debarkation. At this point,

20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
FORT CHAFFEE CONSOLIDATED REFUGEE PROCESSING CENTER
FORT SMITH AIRPORT STAGING AREA
25 SEPTEMBER 1980

Fort Smith Airport
Flight Deck Area
South Gate
Main Gate

Source: DOD-DOJ Joint Security Plan, p. unnumbered. (UNCLASSIFIED)

FORT CHAFFEE CONSOLIDATED REFUGEE PROCESSING CENTER
ROUTE FROM AIRPORT TO FORT CHAFFEE
25 SEPTEMBER 1980
two Border Patrol agents provided on scene direction for the Cubans from the aircraft to a prepositioned bus from a bus pool maintained in the immediate vicinity. The Supervisory Border Patrol Agent in charge was responsible for this initial and critical transfer. Two Arkansas State Troopers were also present to provide an escort for the Cubans to Fort Chaffee and to provide additional security at the airport or on the road to Fort Chaffee as required. Additional Arkansas State Troopers were available if needed. Four Departure/Arrival Airfield Control Group military personnel were also present to act as liaison between the U.S. Army Task Force at Fort Chaffee, the Arkansas Air National Guard facility at the Fort Smith Airport, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Two U.S. Public Health Service medical technicians with ambulance were present in the event of a medical emergency. Two to six Immigration Detention Officers assigned to incoming flights as escort personnel were available at the scene to provide additional security if needed. Some thirty Border Patrol Agents provided ramp security for the buses, each of which transported fifty Cuban refugees per trip. Arkansas Air National Guard Air Police and other security personnel provided the necessary security for their facility, parked refugee aircraft, and other servicing equipment. In the event of a disturbance or other emergency, they had three security personnel on standby for communication purposes only. (Map 7)22

Arkansas Air National Guard personnel parked and secured the arriving refugee aircraft. The aircraft were not refueled until the Cuban refugees had been removed from the aircraft. Border Patrol Agents stood at the bottom of the ramp in two lines of fifteen men each from the bottom of the ramp to the bus to be loaded. Immigration and Naturalization Service security escort personnel assisted in removing Cuban refugees from the aircraft as required. Security personnel, as well as chartered bus drivers, were forbidden to communicate with the refugees. When the first bus was fully loaded, it proceeded to the rear of the prepositioned Arkansas State Police lead escort vehicle and awaited the remaining personnel. Buses two and three proceeded in the same manner after loading. A minimum of three Immigration Detention Officers boarded each bus for its five-mile trip to Fort Chaffee. When required, they were reinforced with arrival aircraft Immigration Detention escort security officers. Security officials unloaded Cuban refugees identified for the stockade and Level II (Detention Area) in groups of five which could be quickly subdued in the event of demonstrations. General Cuban refugee population, family groups, and the like, were unloaded from the arriving aircraft in groups of ten. Once the busses were loaded and all was in order, the Arkansas State Police escorted them over a prescribed route from the Fort Smith Airport to Fort Chaffee (Map 8) to Gate 5, where Task Force Military Police assumed responsibility for convoy escort. A number of civilian and military Traffic Control Points were established and manned along the route for security and communication purposes. Again, it should be noted that these very strict control measures produced an incident-free transfer of Cuban

22. Ibid.
refugees from the Fort Smith Airport to the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Refugee Center. The success of this mass movement of 5,771 refugees did much to temporarily alleviate the high degree of tension in the surrounding civilian communities.23

**Troop Strength for Physical Security**

On 4 September 1980, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the Secretary of the Army to maintain the physical security troop strength at Fort Chaffee at the number present that day. The troop strength as of 4 September was to remain at that level until all the Cuban refugees had been relocated to Fort Chaffee, at which time any strength reductions would be determined by the Department of the Army following consultation with the Department of Justice. On 4 September 1980, the Department of the Army reported a physical security troop strength of 963 military personnel assigned to TF III and Active and Reserve Component Military Police. On 14 September, the Department of Justice prepared a response to the questions and comments from Governor Clinton (discussed above) which was intended to clarify all outstanding issues so as to gain the Governor's approval of the Joint Security Plan, thereby initiating the relocation of the residual Cuban refugee aliens to the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Center. As part of the Department of Justice response, the Army's troop strength at Fort Chaffee was specified to be "approximately 1,000." After securing confirmation of this figure from the Task Force, the Department of the Army requested that the troop strength figure cited by the Department of Justice to Governor Clinton be changed to read "approximately 950." The Department of Justice refused to accept this change. Their rationale for keeping the Fort Chaffee TF III and Active and Reserve Component Military Police combined strength at "approximately 1,000" was that they believed that it was the figure Governor Clinton wanted to see. As far as the Task Force Commander was concerned, 950 was a more accurate figure and represented the level of troop strength which the Task Force would maintain until and unless the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice decided to reduce Fort Chaffee's troop strength.24

**Task Force Security Plan**

On 20 September, the Task Force published its Fort Chaffee Consolidated Refugee Center security plan. Priorities for protection were as follows: Task Force Fort Chaffee Headquarters (Bldg 1370), Communications Center/Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) (Bldg 1375), Dial Communications Center (Bldg 1321), MP Station (Bldg 1390), Weapon Storage Area (Bldg 460), Officer and Noncommissioned Officer Clubs (Bldg 1683 and Bldg 1178), and Defense Investigative Service/Criminal Investigation Division (DIS/CID) (Bldg 1180). Military

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23. Ibid.
MAP 9

MOBILE BARRIER

GATE

VEHICLE ENTRY/EXIT
THROUGH 38 & 42
PERSONNEL GATES 39 & 41

(25 SEP 80)

FORT CHAFFEE CONSOLIDATED REFUGEE PROCESSING CENTER
TASK FORCE SECURITY PLAN -- 25 SEPTEMBER 1980

personnel were again reminded that security and law enforcement within the Cuban Refugee Enclave at Fort Chaffee was the responsibility of the U.S. Park Police, the lead Federal civilian agency law enforcement agency in this instance. They were assisted in this mission by law enforcement representatives of the Federal Protective Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Border Patrol. Task Force Military Police provided perimeter security for the Cuban Refugee Enclave. Positions were as indicated on Map 9. Each position was normally manned by one Military Policeman with radio communication to the Military Police Desk. Gates to the Cuban Refugee Enclave would be closed in the event of emergency by Federal Protective Service personnel on order of the Senior Security Force Commander (Senior U.S. Park Police Officer or the Task Force Commander if military forces had been committed.). The eighteen mobile barriers were to be closed, or opened as the case might be, on order of the Task Force Emergency Operations Center.25

The Task Force military mobile reaction forces were equipped as follows. The Provost Marshal’s 25-man Reaction Force was mounted in six ½-ton vehicles. TF III (not to be confused with the supervisory Task Force Headquarters) consisted of two Immediate Reaction Force Batteries and one Reaction Force Battery. The two Immediate Reaction Force Batteries consisted of fifty-eight combat trained soldiers each. Immediate Reaction Force 1 was located in Bldg 2210 with the call sign "Red Barn." Immediate Reaction Force 2 was located in Bldg 1495 with the call sign "White Barn." Reaction Force 1 was organized on a 30-minute standby basis and was located in the 800 area. The Task Force Emergency Operations Center maintained a ½-ton reaction vehicle equipped with sound equipment and a television camera. The Task Force Aviation Section maintained an OH-58 helicopter equipped with a night sun searchlight on standby at the Fort Chaffee Airfield. Coordinating instructions provided that the Task Force Emergency Operations Center would order the closing of the barriers. It would also designate selected barriers to remain open to allow the deployment of the reaction forces. In addition, selected barriers would be closed on order of the Task Force Emergency Operations Center to assist in the capture of Cuban refugees who crossed the enclave perimeter. Finally, selected elements of TF III would be deployed on order of the Task Force Emergency Operations Center to assist in the apprehension of Cuban refugees who crossed the enclave perimeter.26

Task Force III Reaction Force Operations

As noted above, the Task Force III Reaction Force, so called because it consisted of organizational elements of units assigned to III Corps Artillery at Fort Sill, Okla., consisted of two Immediate Reaction Force


26. Ibid.
Batteries and one Reaction Force Battery. The Immediate Reaction Force (IRF) Battery on duty was responsible for assembling, moving to a selected area, tactically deploying anywhere on Fort Chaffee within five minutes. TF III Operations or the Task Force Emergency Operations Center normally directed the call out of this force. The battery responsible for immediate reaction force duties at any given time was billeted in Building 2210 (The Barn) during its shift. All required personnel and equipment remained at that location except when alerted. The Immediate Reaction Force Battery Commander normally acted as the leader of combined forces when additional forces such as the REDLEG Roving Patrol/30-Minute Reaction Force were required. Each participating battery consisted of 58 personnel -- 3 officers and 55 enlisted men -- organized into two platoons containing two squads each. Each member of the Immediate Reaction Force was equipped with fatigues, M16A1 rifle, helmet with liner with face shield down, web belt with canteen and first aid packet, flak vest, M17A1 gas mask, flashlight or lantern at night, and a riot baton. Battery transportation consisted of two radio equipped ¼-ton trucks and two school busses. Each battery conducted continuous training in the area of riot control formations to include forming the wedge; the skirmish line; the provision of general and lateral support; and the execution of the diamond and circle formations. They also conducted training with the riot baton in preparation for perimeter guard duties. Battery personnel could expect to be deployed in a skirmish line to sweep through and search buildings on Fort Chaffee; to search and sweep wooded areas on the installation; to surround, cordon off, and secure post buildings that were burning, were being used by Cuban refugee rioters as headquarters, or were important structures such as post headquarters, communications centers, weapons storage areas, and the like. Each shift conducted a minimum of one hour of riot control, bus loading, and baton training at the beginning of the shift.  

The REDLEG Roving Patrol/30-Minute Reaction Force was organized to conduct dismounted patrol operations both inside and outside the Cuban Refugee Enclave fence, as directed by TF III Operations or the Task Force Emergency Operations Center. It was also organized to detect and apprehend Cuban escapees found outside of the Refugee Enclave, but still on the installation. An additional mission assigned to the Roving Patrol was to be able to respond as a 30-Minute Reaction Force to Cuban civil disturbances. This additional mission remained in effect even as the Roving Patrol was engaged in its normal duties of patrolling the Refugee Enclave perimeter, following these patrols, and during daylight shifts. The REDLEG Roving Patrol was required to be on station by 2000 hours each night and to patrol until 0200 hours the following morning. Normally, TF III Operations assigned the lettered checkpoints and the numbered patrol areas to be patrolled. A minimum of two walking guards patrolled each area. Normally, the guards patrolled in opposite directions unless otherwise directed by TF III Operations during the operations briefing. Patrol personnel detecting Cuban refugee escapees, surrounded and detained them and then summoned adjacent patrol personnel.

27. Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arrival Date</th>
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<td>Fort Riley, Kans.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 May 80</td>
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<td>Fort Bragg, N.C.</td>
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<td>22 Aug 80</td>
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<td>Fort Bragg, N.C.</td>
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</table>

for assistance. Use of reasonable force was authorized. Once they had captured or detained a Cuban escapee, he was immobilized and searched for weapons. Extreme caution was used in searching escapees. Further, the approach to and the actual searching of the Cuban escapees was conducted only after sufficient backup personnel had been summoned. Captured escapees were turned over to the U.S. Park Police. Patrolling personnel employed maximum stealth and noise discipline during the performance of their night patrolling duties. The use of flashlights and lanterns was held to a minimum so as to avoid the disclosure of patrol locations. No incidents of any note involving Cuban refugees and Task Force Military Police and TF III combat trained Immediate Reaction Forces were reported during the actual consolidation phase, 25 September through 9 October.28

Active Component Unit Support

The Active Component units which supported the Fort Chaffee Refugee Processing Center Consolidation Operations during the period 5 August to 9 October 1980 were as shown on Table 10.

Reserve Component Unit Support

The Reserve Component units which supported the Fort Chaffee Consolidation Operations during the period 5 August to 9 October 1980 were as follows:29

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<th>Unit</th>
<th>Departure Date</th>
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<td>146th Military Police Battalion Michigan - ARNG</td>
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<td>8 Aug 80</td>
<td>198th Military Police Battalion Kentucky - ARNG</td>
<td>23 Aug 80</td>
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<td>223d Military Police Company Kentucky - ARNG</td>
<td>23 Aug 80</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 Aug 80</td>
<td>386th Military Police Company Alabama - USAR</td>
<td>23 Aug 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Aug 80</td>
<td>310th Military Police Company Alabama - ARNG</td>
<td>30 Aug 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Aug 80</td>
<td>423d Military Police Company Alabama - ARNG</td>
<td>30 Aug 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Aug 80</td>
<td>351st Military Police Company Florida - USAR</td>
<td>6 Sep 80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

29. Ibid., p. I-IV-C-1.
Summary

In summary it may be said that the Consolidation Phase (5 August to 9 October) had much fewer disturbances than the most optimistic observer might have considered possible based on the serious incidents which occurred during the earlier Establishment of a Throughput Phase (19 May to 5 August). That earlier phase as characterized by a number of demonstrations and incidents which finally culminated in the major riot of 1 June 1980. These disturbances caused growing apprehension in the surrounding civilian communities and more or less forced the Administration to gain the Governor's personal approval of its Department of Defense - Department of Justice Joint Security Plan before the actual consolidation of the Cuban refugees at Fort Chaffee could be undertaken. Once the Governor approved the DOD-DOJ Joint Security Plan on 24 September, the consolidation itself began on the following day with the arrival of 5,771 Cuban refugees during the period 25 September through 9 October. The movement of the Cuban refugees, their reception at the Fort Smith Airport, and their onward transfer and reception at the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Center was accomplished with an absolute minimum of controversy or disruption. This particular phase, prior to its actual execution, had been viewed as potentially dangerous due to the hard-core, hard-to-place troublesome Cuban residual population involved. The overall success of the actual consolidation phase was probably due to the closely integrated security planning and implementation involved which included the Department of Defense, the U.S. Army Task Force at Fort Chaffee, the numerous Federal Agencies, as well as the Arkansas Air National Guard, State Police, and a host of other local law enforcement agencies. By 9 October, therefore, the Cuban refugee population at the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Center was 8,349, and the Voluntary Agencies on site were prepared to finish the outplacement of every eligible Cuban refugee as soon as possible. FORSCOM expenditures in support of the Fort Chaffee refugee operation up to this point amounted to $25.0 million. These expenditures had been made with the understanding that they would be reimbursed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency upon submission, review, and approval.

Sustainment Phase
9 October 1980 - 20 January 1982

Background

The Sustainment Phase of the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Center lasted from 9 October 1980 to 20 January 1982. This lengthy period proved to be arduous and trying for the FORSCOM military stationed at Fort Chaffee in their supporting role and for the Federal Civilian Agency and Voluntary Agency personnel in their operational and outplacement roles. It was also a trying period for many of the residual young single male refugees who encountered great difficulties in being outplaced into American society. Much of the slowness of the outplacement problem was due to the real and perceived problem areas encountered in placing this hard-core refugee population which had been associated in the public mind with antisocial and even criminal conduct. With the arrival and inprocessing of the last Cuban refugee arrivals from Fort Indiantown Gap
on 9 October 1980, the Department of the State and other Federal Civilian Agencies on site had complete control of the Refugee Processing Enclave at Fort Chaffee and the Cuban refugees in residence there. Due to the concurrent reduced military commitment at Fort Chaffee, the assumption of its new and reduced role as strictly a caretaker of installation facilities, higher headquarters determined that a general officer was no longer required. On 23 October, therefore, General Drummond turned over command of the Task Force to Col. Don E. Karr. At the same time, other units and personnel still assigned to the Task Force from Fort Sill, Okla., the parent installation of Fort Chaffee, prepared for the transfer of their duties to other FORSCOM units. On 29 October, the Task Force Public Affairs Office closed down, and on 1 November, FORSCOM assumed responsibility for the Task Force and its continued operation from the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS). 30

Following the assumption of Task Force responsibilities by FORSCOM on 1 November, the remaining units furnished by Fort Sill deployed in sequence back to their home station until 14 November when Task Force III (III Corps Artillery) departed from Fort Chaffee and the 3d Battalion, 11th Infantry, Fort Polk, La., assumed security duties at Fort Chaffee. This security arrangement (two military police companies and one infantry battalion) lasted until 7 December. Due to the steadily decreasing Cuban resident population at the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Center (down from 8,349 to 6,596 on 30 November – including 152 refugee returnees), FORSCOM made the decision to reduce the military security requirements to two military police companies and one rifle company -- Company A, 2d Battalion, 58th Infantry, Fort Hood, Tex. The other two rifle companies of this battalion remained on a standby basis at their home station. The 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, Fort Riley, Kans., replaced this battalion on 7 January 1981 on the same basis (one rifle company at Fort Chaffee, two rifle companies on standby at the home station). This battalion served until 5 February, when it was replaced by the 3d Battalion, 10th Infantry, Fort Polk, La., on the same basis. This latter battalion served until 17 March 1981. From that point on, FORSCOM Active and Reserve Component military police units furnished all of the security forces at Fort Chaffee during the remainder of the Sustainment Phase. On 17 March 1981, FORSCOM alerted its Garden Plot battalion to leave all three rifle companies on standby at their home station. By the end of the Sustainment Phase, the military police strength was also reduced, leaving one MP company responsible for security at Fort Chaffee. 31

The Federal Civilian Agencies constituting the Cuban/Haitian Task Force at Fort Chaffee underwent several changes in assigned responsibilities and relationships to one another during the same period. The Federal Protective Service replaced the U.S. Park Service as the lead

31. Ibid.
law enforcement agency within the Refugee Enclave on 21 December 1980.
On 1 January 1981, control of the resettlement operation passed from
the Federal Emergency Management Agency to the Department of Health and
Human Services. On 1 February, the Cuban/Haitian Task Force became a
normal tenant unit with support provided directly by Fort Chaffee.
Support activities included that provided by the Task Force which had
become solely a security force functioning under the Fort Chaffee
Provost Marshal's Office. On 7 March, Colonel Karr turned over his com-
mand to Lt. Col. Charles Donovan. Almost immediately, a series of
demonstrations having nothing to do with his appointment began to occur
as the remaining Cuban refugees became increasingly restless concerning
their disposition.32

Major Demonstrations

During the period 9 October 1980 to 17 April 1981, the Cuban refu-
gees engaged in only a few and relatively minor demonstrations or other
antisocial activities. On 27 October, for instance, a refugee escaped
from the maximum security area of the psychiatric ward of the Fort
Chaffee hospital. He was subsequently shot by a Military Policeman,
after assaulting that individual with a rake. On the following day, a
suspected arsonist set fire to one of the buildings in the Refugee
Enclave. The same type of incident occurred once again on 20 November
in the general population area of the Refugee Enclave. Four Cuban refu-
gees and two U.S. Park Policemen received minor injuries in this fire of
unknown cause. Finally, on 13 March 1981, some thirty to fifty Cuban
refugees mounted a peaceful demonstration outside the U.S. Catholic
Conference (Voluntary Agency) building to show their impatience with the
pace of sponsorship. In general, overall conditions were considered to
be so good within the Refugee Enclave at this point that, on 17 March,
FORSOM and the Task Force deployed the 3d Battalion, 10 Infantry, to
its home station and thus reduced its full-time security force to two
Military Police companies at Fort Chaffee, and an infantry battalion on-
call at its home station.33

Pre-Disturbance Conditions. The relatively quiet period following
the establishment of the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Center through
17 April proved to be the lull before the storm. In general, for several
weeks prior to the first major disturbance on 18 April, a peaceful
atmosphere prevailed in the Refugee Enclave. The Federal Protective
Service recorded fewer reports of criminal activity than normally, and
police-refugee relations were considered to be at a high level. Both of
these positive conditions may have stemmed from the higher rate of
sponsorship experienced during the past month, when 938 Cuban refugees
were sponsored as compared with 882 in February and 792 in January. The
refugee population had decreased to approximately 2,700 at the time of
the disturbance on 18 April. Although sponsorship activities had been

33. Ibid.
temporarily discontinued on 17 April, mainly because of extensive Easter weekend traffic, this was not considered to have been a factor in the violence that did occur. In the week or so prior to the disturbance, there had been a number of Cuban "Conga Lines" dancing through the Refugee Enclave to Cuban drum music. These groups generally were peaceful although noisy. There were also several peaceful marches or processions during the week of 18 April which were related to, and had a religious significance for, the Easter season. The weather was seasonably warm (highs of 81 degrees) with intermittent showers.34

In retrospect, there was one incident worthy of note preceding the outbreak of violence on 18 April. During the evening hours of 11 April, information reached the Federal Protective Service that a burglary was in progress within the Refugee Enclave involving three Cuban refugees. Federal Protective Service officers arrested one of the Cubans, but the other two who were later arrested, ran away and joined a "Conga Line." The officers decided not to pursue the two Cubans into the "Conga Line" for fear that they might provoke a confrontation with the entire group of refugees. Several rocks were thrown at the officers from this "Conga Line" group. This was the first known case of this type of violence since the disturbances which had occurred around the latter part of May 1980 and had culminated in the 1 June 1980 riots.

Precipitating Incident. During the refugees' supper hour on the evening of 18 April, a Federal Protective Service officer responded to a report of a stabbing incident in progress. The officer found two Cubans attempting to restrain a third Cuban, knife in hand, who was struggling to break free and attack a fourth refugee. As the officer arrived, the assailant broke free and lunged toward his intended victim who tripped and fell while trying to escape. The assailant then raised both of his hands above his head, knife still in hand, and took a standing position over his intended victim. The officer and an accompanying interpreter told the assailant in English and in Spanish (three times) to drop the knife. The assailant hesitated for a moment, looked directly at the officer, then turned again to his intended victim and began a downward thrust with the knife. The officer then used his service revolver to fire one shot, striking the assailant in the chest area. The assailant fell to the ground and his intended victim ran from the scene. Many refugees then began to run into the area from a nearby mess hall and nearby housing barracks. Additional Federal Protective Service police were requested from the scene and were dispatched, as was an ambulance at 1746.

Disturbance/Riot, 18 April 1981. A large crowd of confused and hostile refugees soon gathered at the scene and attempted to get at the officer who had "killed" the would-be assailant. Fellow officers who arrived at the scene in just a few minutes administered first aid to the

34

The remainder of the entire paragraph is based on TF Ft. Chaffee PHO AAR, Participation in Disturbance at Ft. Chaffee, AR, on 18 and 19 April 1981, p. 2.
assailant and finally succeeded in safely escorting the officer involved in the shooting to a nearby booking van and used this vehicle to transport him out of the area through a hail of rocks. The refugees made no attempt to interfere with the ambulance. The refugees then began to heavily stone both Federal Protective Service officers and their vehicles at the scene. The officers attempted numerous times to push the refugees back, but they were severely outnumbered. By 1730 hours, the refugees on the scene were completely out of control and had grown to between 300 and 350 in numbers. The officers were ordered by their Operations Officer to withdraw from the area as quickly as possible. The refugees continued to taunt them, inflicted a number of injuries, and then set fire to several vehicles. The Federal Protective Service called upon the Military Police for assistance at 1756.

Military Police Support. On 18 April 1981, only two Military Police companies were assigned to the Task Force -- the 502d Military Police Company, Fort Hood, Tex., and the 977th Military Police Company, Fort Riley, Kans. Military Police alert forces provided by these two companies included a Special Reaction Team of twenty-five personnel which was maintained on a five minute standby status. An additional Military Police platoon, called "White Barn," was also on a five minute standby status, while two other backup Military Police platoons, called "White Barn Standby" and "Discipline, Law, and Order (DLO) Standby," respectively, were maintained on a fifteen minute standby basis. The Military Police had access through most of the enclave's gates by using the master key lock system. They did not have access to Gates 38 - 42. These critical gates remained under the exclusive control of the Federal Protective Service.

Upon receiving notification from the Military Police Emergency Operations Center, the Task Force Commander immediately placed all static security points, "Discipline, Law, and Order" Patrols, "White Barn," and the Special Reaction Team on alert. By 1800, the three Fort Chaffee entrance gates had been closed to incoming traffic. A few minutes later, the mobile patrols and teams noted above had arrived at the assembly area adjacent to Gate 42. Both Military Police companies had been notified to place all of their personnel in a full-scale alert status and to assemble near Gate 39. In the meantime, the Task Force Commander was notified that mess hall workers were trapped inside Building 1549 and that the Federal Protective Service requested Military Police assistance in evacuating them from the building. The "White Barn" patrol and the Special Reaction Team entered the Refugee Processing Enclave through Gate 42 and advanced to Building 1549. At the sight of the Military Police, the large crowd of Cubans at the site fell back in a disorganized manner. Camp Operations personnel on the scene stated that the workers had already been evacuated. They felt that they could control the Cubans and requested that the Military Police leave the scene. They expressed concern that the continued presence of the Military Police would further aggravate the situation. Since there were no workers left to evacuate, the Task Force Commander withdrew his Military Police forces without incident.

The "White Barn" Military Police Platoon and the Special Reaction Team had barely made their peaceful exit through Gate 42 when they were
required to move to the vicinity of Gate 40 where a large group of Cubans had formed, overturned a U.S. Catholic Conference leased vehicle, and were busily engaged in damaging Building 1685. They soon set the vehicle noted above on fire and threw rocks at other vehicles parked outside of the perimeter fence. The "White Barn" Platoon was forced to back away from Gate 40 due to the increasing barrage of rocks being thrown at them by the Cubans. At this point, the Task Force Commander ordered the Special Reaction Team, which was equipped with shields, gas masks, and CS gas canisters to move forward and disperse the refugees. When the Cubans attempted to force open Gate 40, the Special Reaction Team used CS and the Cubans fell back from the gate and made no further attempts to leave the Refugee Enclave by that gate or at any other position on the perimeter. The Fort Chaffee Fire Department, responding to a call, was stopped some distance from Gate 40 by the Military Police since the burning vehicle was obviously lost and injuries to firefighting personnel and their fire vehicle would most likely be sustained if they entered the enclave. Up to this point, Task Force Military Police personnel had sustained no injuries.

At approximately the same time (1815 hours), the Federal Protective Service Communications Center received word that Federal Protective Service officers on duty at the Federal Protective Service Operations Center (building 1780) were trapped in that building by a crowd of refugees. The Task Force Commander ordered two platoons of Military Police that had been in an off-duty status prior to 1800 to report to Gate 38, which was located in the vicinity of the Federal Protective Service Operations Center. The two platoons of Military Police entered the Refugee Enclave through Gate 38 and advanced toward Building 1780. The lead platoon employed a wedge formation and the second platoon employed a lateral formation. As they approached the Federal Protective Service Operations Center, they began to receive a large and steady barrage of rocks, pipes, trash cans, and the like thrown by refugees in that area. The lead platoon came into physical contact with the Cubans on the scene. The second platoon in lateral support broke into a wedge formation to push Cubans down one of the side streets. They managed to push the refugee crowds back near Building 1780, but finally had to resort to the use of CS gas for protection against the overwhelmingly large crowd of refugees who were armed with rocks, sticks, trash cans and covers, bunk adapters, bottles, and various other items which they continued to throw at them. The two Military Police Platoons were forced to fall back and began to move toward Gate 39. One platoon managed to exit the gate at this time. The other platoon was trapped by the Cubans. The platoon leader called for assistance, but his radio call was not readable and his position in the darkness and confusion could not be ascertained at the Task Force Military Police Emergency Operations Center. Fortunately, after approximately five minutes, his position was relayed by radio and the Task Force Commander directed Special Reaction Team personnel to go to the rescue. This reaction force also brought a vehicle with them because it had been reported that one Military Policeman was unconscious and had been badly hurt. This ½-ton Military Police patrol vehicle was used to evacuate two seriously injured Military Police enlisted personnel. The Special Reaction Team joined forces with the Military Police Platoon under attack and the combined
force was able to make its exit through Gate 39. This action was completed by 1930. A third serious injury was sustained by a Military Police officer who was struck by a rock while directing Military Police forces outside of Gate 39 at approximately the same time as the rescue attempt got underway.

While the two Task Force Military Police Platoons were attempting to reach the Federal Protective Service Operation Center in Building 1780, other Federal Protective Service rescue personnel were also attempting to reach the same site. They ran into such heavy resistance from a crowd of Cuban refugees whom they estimated to number about 300 persons armed with rocks, sticks, and various other weapons, that they were in imminent danger of being overrun. Their officer-in-charge subsequently directed them to leave the enclave by Gate 40. Because of the damage caused to the gate previously, they had to crawl under the gate to exit the enclave and were struck by numerous hurled objects while doing so. The "White Barn" Standby Military Police Platoon assisted the Federal Protective Service officers at this location.

At approximately 2115, most Military Police forces returned to their alert positions or barracks and remained on alert standby for the rest of the evening. The "White Barn" Standby Platoon remained at Gate 40 for security purposes and assisted Fort Chaffee Engineer personnel in replacing the heavily damaged gates at that location. This platoon also provided security to the two military wreckers used to remove 8 heavily damaged Federal Protective Service patrol cars, 1 burned sedan leased by the U.S. Catholic Conference, and 2 slightly damaged privately owned vehicles. At approximately 2300 hours, all of the damaged vehicles had been removed by the two wreckers, one of which had been obtained from the Fort Chaffee Transportation Motor Pool, and the other from the 977th Military Police Company.

Disturbance/Riot, 19 April 1981. The Cuban refugee disturbance/riot which occurred on Easter Sunday morning, 19 April 1981, differed from that of the previous evening in that the Easter Sunday rioters had identifiable leadership, the number of refugees taking part was smaller, and the disturbance was terminated with the assistance of a separate friendly refugee group which had been visibly upset by the previous evening's violence. Federal Protective Service and Military Police units did form up outside the Refugee Enclave in the vicinity of Gate 41 and were fully prepared to enter the compound if required. This disturbance/riot began at approximately 1012 when a group of about fifteen Cuban refugees approached Gate 42. They were led by an individual who, it was later learned, was attempting to use the group to obtain the release of his brother from the Level II Detention Area. The Federal Protective Service had placed his brother in detention for a curfew violation which had occurred on the previous evening. Refugees in the general area reported to the Federal Protective Service that the demonstrating group of individuals were armed with machetes as well as the more conventional clubs, sticks, and the like. Upon their arrival at Gate 42, the leader of the group, who spoke English fairly well, demanded of the Federal Protective Service representatives that his brother be freed from Level II Detention Area and threatened violence if his demand was not met.
More refugees began to gather around the gate and violence commenced although the group as still small in number. The group's leader, upon learning from Federal Protective Services officers inside the gate that his brother was not scheduled for release from the Level II Detention Area until the following day, became highly excited and began to agitate his followers. The group quickly responded by attacking the Federal Protective Service officers inside the gate with rocks, sticks, and clubs (no machetes were observed), forcing the officers out through Gate 42. One officer was assaulted with a mop handle that had a sharp metal edge on one end. His resultant wound required several stitches. The Federal Protective Service Operations Center notified the Task Force Military Police Emergency Operations Center at 1030 that assistance was required. The group of rioters had grown significantly in just a few minutes and were pelting Federal Protective Service officers outside of Gate 42 with numerous rocks and other objects. By approximately 1032, the Military Police standby units had been notified and had begun to arrive. By 1037, the Special Reaction Team, the "White Barn" Military Police Platoon, the "White Barn" Standby Military Police Platoon, and the "Discipline, Law, and Order" Standby Platoon were all in position either in the roadway facing Gate 42 or in the nearby parking area of the Fort Chaffee Post Exchange. Two other Military Police Platoons responded shortly thereafter. One of these platoons was kept a short distance away from Gate 42 behind the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Club where it assumed the duties of a Quick Reaction Force. All gates were secured by 1050 hours and all civilian workers in the immediate general area had been evacuated by Camp Operations personnel with the assistance of friendly refugees. At 1040 hours, the Federal Protective Service officers, the Special Reaction Team, and the "Disturbance, Law and Order" Standby Platoon had been briefed, masked, and prepared to enter the Refugee Enclave at Gate 42. The Task Force Commander made the decision at that time to delay this move until it was absolutely necessary. At the same time, Center for Disease Control (CDC) officials requested assistance from the Federal Protective Service in evacuating their personnel because a large number of Cubans had gathered in front of their building (Building 1592). While the Federal Protective Service opened Gate 41 to enter the enclave and effect the requested evacuation, they were met by Camp Operations personnel who assured them that they could, with assistance of friendly Cuban refugees, easily escort the CDC personnel to Gate 41. The Task Force Commander, on the scene, determined that this course of action was feasible and its implementation could prevent a serious confrontation between the security forces and the refugees. The evacuation was completed swiftly and without incident. The Federal Protective Service concurred in this approach. Following additional negotiations between the dissident refugee group's leader and enclave officials, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Federal Protective Service, and other enclave officials agreed to release the group leader's brother from the Level II Detention Area. The two brothers then met in Building 1781 while a group of thirty refugees remained outside the building. This meeting took place at 1230. Approximately twenty minutes later, a group of about forty Cuban refugees headed toward Building 1781. This second group of Cubans were
carrying clubs and sticks and engaged the first group. They then chased
the first group from the vicinity of Building 1781. Shortly thereafter,
the band of "vigilante" Cubans arrived at Gate 40 and released to the
Federal Protective Service three injured refugees who had been leaders
or active participants in the previous disturbances. These men were
transported by ambulance to the emergency room under Federal Protective
Service escort. After being treated and released, they were brought to
Federal Protective Service headquarters where they were interrogated and
booked. The Federal Protective Service began to slowly phase its
patrols back into the enclave at approximately 1310. Civilian contract
workers for the mess halls and civilian employees at the minimum
psychiatric area were escorted into the enclave beginning at about 1400.
The Federal Protective Service also reinstated foot patrols within the
enclave at this time using four officers per patrol. At one point, the
vigilante group grew to approximately 150 persons. A parade-like pro-
cession formed and moved through the enclave complete with Cuban drum
music, shouting, loud singing, and dancing. The procession dispersed in
an orderly fashion of its own accord at about 1500 hours. Small bands
of refugees continued to move around in various areas of the enclave in
a peaceful fashion. After the earlier confrontation near Gate 41, Task
Force Military Police units remained on standby for approximately one
hour. When the crowd of Cuban refugees decreased to about thirty, they
began to move peacefully toward Building 1781. At that time, the
Military Police forces returned to their alert positions. CS gas,
which was issued but not used, was maintained in possession until
approximately 1600 when the Task Force Commander determined that the
enclave would most probably remain quiet and that further confrontation
was not necessary.

Procedural Review

Following the two major disturbance/riots discussed above, the Task
Force Commander conducted a procedural review of the problems
experienced and the lessons learned and implemented. Major problem
areas included such areas as communications, lock and key control,
access to riot control agents, and equipment shortcomings.

Communications. Based upon his own personal experience, the Task
Force Commander observed that a requirement existed for direct com-
munication between Camp Administration personnel and the Federal
Protective Service during a disturbance. It would have been helpful in
the execution of total command, control, and coordination efforts if the
Task Force Commander, the Camp Administrator, the Federal Protective
Service Commander, and, in this case, the Cuban-Haitian Task Force
Director had been in constant communication. Such a desirable situation
would have required that both the Federal Protective Service Commander
and the Cuban-Haitian Task Force Director carry two radios. The FORSCOM

35. Unless otherwise indicated, the entire paragraph is based on TF
Ft. Chaffee PMO AAR, Participation in Disturbance at Ft. Chaffee, AR, on
Task Force Commander and the Federal Protective Service Commander were able to maintain communications.

**Lock and Key Controls.** A delay in reaction time resulted from the lack of immediate access to Gates 39 and 41 which were unmanned at the time that the Military Police support units required entrance. Keys for all of the perimeter gates including those gates which were used at various times for pedestrian traffic were turned over to the closest Military Police Station Security Post following the two demonstrations. Additional gate keys were subsequently furnished the Military Police Duty Officer, the Military Police Patrol Supervisor, the Operations Officer, and the Provost Marshal. The Federal Protective Service initiated and completed modifications to its gate key procedures to ensure ready access to, and emergency egress from, all available perimeter gates.

**Riot Control Agent Access.** At the time the Special Reaction Team was called out during the demonstration/riot of 18 April, there was only one case (16 canisters) of CS riot control agent immediately available and constantly in the possession of this team. The rest of the riot control agent was stored in the Fort Chaffee Ammunition Supply Point. Because of the time and distance involved in traveling to and from this ammunition supply point, access to the agent was unduly delayed. Following the disturbances discussed above, the Task Force Commander succeeded in making a sufficient amount of the CS riot control agent immediately available at the Military Police Emergency Operations Center.

**Equipment Shortcomings.** Although Task Force Military Police were fully equipped with steel helmets, face shields, flak vests, and riot clubs, considerable injuries were sustained, especially on arms and legs. It was obvious that all Military Police personnel required body shields. Shortly after the disturbance/riots, all five-minute alert personnel received these devices. During the disturbance/riots, only the Special Reaction Team was in possession of body shields. A later examination of these shields revealed a large number of marks and dents, each of which would have represented an injury to an unprotected soldier. A replacement Military Police Company brought other plywood body shields to Fort Chaffee on 21 April 1981. Although these body shields would probably not be practical in all instances, the Task Force Commander strongly believed that their use during the demonstration/riots would have greatly decreased the number of injuries suffered on 18 April. He, therefore, initiated a search for additional body shields and requested that local fabrication be employed when and if necessary to make up any shortfalls.

**Summary.** In general, the five-month period preceding the demonstration/riots experienced on 18 and 19 April 1981 was notable for its relative calm. The only demonstration of any note during that period occurred when some thirty to fifty Cubans demonstrated peacefully outside the U.S. Catholic Conference building to show their impatience with the pace of sponsorships. This was ironical since it was precisely at this point in time that the number of Cuban refugees being placed each month by the Voluntary Agencies had just started to show a dramatic
The refugee disturbance which occurred on 18 April resulted from the shooting of a Cuban refugee by a Federal Protective Service officer in the line of duty. Several crowds of approximately 350 persons each gathered at various times and places within the Enclave and threw rocks and other missiles at civilian employees, Military Police personnel, and Federal law enforcement officials. They also burned or destroyed ten vehicles. On 19 April, a demonstration by approximately 150 Cuban refugees occurred, led by an individual who demanded the release of his brother from the Level II Detention Area where he had been placed by Federal authorities for a period of three days for curfew violation stemming from the 18 April demonstration. This new demonstration produced an immediate release for the curfew violator. This was followed shortly thereafter by a confrontation between the first crowd of now successful demonstrators and a vigilante Cuban group which took exception to the turmoil of the past two days. The total casualties for the 18 and 19 April demonstrations were 109 injuries (84 American and 25 Cuban), three of whom -- all Americans -- were seriously injured.

FORSCOM Task Force Military Police, answering calls for assistance from the Federal Protective Service Commander on both days, played a key role in the restoration of order in the Refugee Enclave.36

Command and Control Arrangements

Task Force Mission Responsibilities. Following the successful completion of the Consolidation Phase on 9 October, and the assumption of responsibility for Task Force Chaffee on 1 November, FORSCOM prepared and dispatched a statement on 4 November concerning the mission responsibilities of the Task Force Commander. In this message, FORSCOM first noted that responsibility for the operation of the Cuban Resettlement Center had been transferred from the Federal Emergency Management Agency to the Department of State on 15 July 1980; that the Department of the Army remained the Department of Defense Executive Agent for military support of Cuban Resettlement Camp operations; that the residual Cuban refugee population had been consolidated at Fort Chaffee on 9 October 1980; and that the Fort Chaffee Commander would make real estate available to the Department of State. FORSCOM's mission was to establish a liaison and security element to coordinate the military support requested by the Department of State for the operation of the Consolidated Cuban Resettlement Center at Fort Chaffee.37

Concept of Operations. Military support for the operations of the Cuban Resettlement Center at Fort Chaffee would be limited to a landlord/tenant relationship between the Army and the Department of State. The Commander, Fort Chaffee, would provide the use of building and real estate under permit to the Department of State and would

37. Msg 041435Z Nov 80, FORSCOM to Dist, subj: Command and Control Arrangements - Sustained Support of Cuban Resettlement Camp, Ft. Chaffee, AR.
maintain Army property. The Task Force Commander would provide an external reaction force and would act as a single point interface between the Federal Civilian Agencies and the U.S. Army. All other functions and services for the operation of the Cuban Resettlement Center were the responsibility of the State Department. Specifically, the Task Force Commander had to maintain liaison with the State Department and the Fort Chaffee Commander for the military support of the center. He would pass unresolved requests for additional military support to Headquarters, FORSCOM. He was also responsible for providing external security for the center, to include a reinforcing reaction force in the event of incidents of serious indiscipline. 38

Coordinating Instructions. Coordinating instructions required that the Troop Medical Clinic provide limited medical support to military personnel at the center; that Military Police units provide external security forces for the center, to include the provision of an immediate reaction force in the event of refugee disturbances. An infantry battalion trained in the control of civil disturbances would provide a reinforcing reaction force in the event of serious disturbances. If the infantry battalion in question was on-call at its home station, requests for commitment would be submitted by telephone to the FORSCOM Operations Center. Personnel and units on temporary duty to, or under the operational control of, the Task Force would be committed for a period of up to ninety days. Extensions beyond the normal commitment period would be granted on a "case-by-case" basis. Units committed to support the Resettlement Center would arrive self-contained in maintenance, supply, and mess support. Unless otherwise directed, basic loads of ammunition would not be deployed from home station. When committed, on-call infantry battalion would deploy with a five-day basic load of individual combat meals. The Base Support Installation would be Fort Sill, through Fort Chaffee. Units and personnel assigned to support the Resettlement Center would be under the operational control of the Task Force Commander. The chain of command would be Headquarters, Department of the Army, the FORSCOM Commander, and the Task Force Commander. The Task Force would be a tenant unit on Fort Chaffee under the command of Headquarters, FORSCOM. 39

Infantry Battalions Trained in the Control of Civil Disturbances. In a message to participating major subordinate unit commanders on 27 October 1980, FORSCOM warned them to be prepared to deploy an infantry battalion trained in the control of civil disturbances to Fort Chaffee on order. It explained that III Corps Artillery (Task Force III) had been providing a reinforcing reaction force at Fort Chaffee since 1 June 1980, when the first major riot occurred at the Fort Chaffee Center. On 1 November, the command of Task Force Chaffee would be transferred from the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center & School, Fort Sill, Okla., to Headquarters, FORSCOM. On 13 November, the 5th Infantry

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38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION
TASK FORCE FORT CHAFFEE
1 June 1981

TF CDR/PMO

DEP PMO → Supply Off

Traffic & Security Section

MP Company

Operations Section

MP Company

ENFORCE & INVESTG
CRIME PREV BR
PHY SECY BR

MPI BR
MP Station
EDC & PLANS

MP PLAT
MP PLAT
MP PLAT

NOTE: MP Company to include CO HQ, CO Supply, CO Maintenance, Unit Clerk MP Platoons to include 1 officer and 40 EM (956)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Arrival Date</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Departure Date</th>
<th>Arrival Date</th>
<th>Unit</th>
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Division (Mech), Fort Polk, La., would replace III Corps Artillery in providing the reinforcing reaction force at Fort Chaffee. The anticipated length of operations for each battalion, in turn, was scheduled at forty-five days. The unit would conduct individual and small unit training at Fort Chaffee while providing an "On-Call" reinforcing reaction force to the Task Force Commander. As noted earlier in this chapter, the scheduling and deployment aspects of this message were modified in the face of dwindling refugee strengths and the perception that there was a decreasing possibility of violence based upon the generally good behavior of the refugees from November through the middle of March 1981.40

Security Force Composition. During the Sustainment Phase, the military task force providing security to Fort Chaffee was altered several times. After FORSCOM assumed responsibility for the Task Force, Task Force III was able to return to Fort Sill by 14 November. An infantry battalion trained in the control of civil disturbances replaced Task Force III on that date. On 7 December, this requirement was reduced to a rifle company on station, with the remainder of the battalion on-call at home station. On 17 March 1981, due to the steady decrease in the Cuban resident population (down from 8,349 in October to 3,308 by the end of March), as well as the apparent presence of a relatively tranquil atmosphere at the Center, FORSCOM placed the entire battalion on standby at home station. Following the major demonstrations of 18 and 19 April, FORSCOM continued to follow this course because of the steady continued diminution of the Cuban resident population (down to 1,016 by the end of June); the successful combined operations of the Federal Protective Service and the Military Police (when requested for assistance) during those demonstrations; the evidence of support from friendly Cuban refugee vigilant groups; and the ready availability, if needed, of a force trained in the control of civil disturbances from any number of FORSCOM sources. On 30 December, when the Cuban refugee population was down to 395, the Military Police support was scaled down to one overstrength Military Police Company. Chart 14 reflects the organizational structure in being as of June 1981.41

Active Component Unit Support

The Active Component units which supported the Fort Chaffee Refugee Processing Center Sustainment Phase Operations during the period 9 October 1980 to 30 January 1982 were as shown on Table 11.

40. Msg 271806Z Oct 80, FORSCOM to Distr, subj: Warning Order - TOE BN, Ft. Chaffee, AR.
Reserve Component Unit Support

Reserve Component units which supported the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Refugee Processing Center Sustainment Phase Operations during the period 9 October 1980 to 20 January 1982 were as follows:42

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Summary

In summary, it may be said that the Sustainment Phase (9 October 1980 to 20 January 1982) proved to be long and tedious and punctuated with outbreaks of violence. During this period, the length of which was merely a reflection of the difficulties the Voluntary Agencies encountered in attempting to place the hard-core residual Cuban refugee (primarily unattached and single males), refugee strengths gradually dropped from 8,349 to 395. As the refugee strengths decreased, there was a corresponding decrease in the number of on-site military personnel used to support the operation principally through the provision of security personnel in the form of temporary duty Military Police units. Military strength dropped from 1,027 to 162 with the departure of Task Force III early in the period and the subsequent departure of the infantry battalion. By the end of the reporting period, only one Military Police Company remained on hand, plus a very small nucleus in the Task Force Headquarters. Civilian employee strengths reflected a similar decrease. By the end of the period, as arrangements were being made to transfer the remaining Cuban refugees to Federal prisons in Atlanta, Ga., and Springfield, Mo., the focus of operations shifted to the garrison side of Fort Chaffee. The installation commander continued to press his needs for adequate reimbursement funding from the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Department of Health and Human Services in order to restore Fort Chaffee to its pre-Refugee Processing Center physical status. This would enable him to meet his Reserve Component support mission responsibilities during Annual Training 1982.

42. Ibid.
Termination and Restoration Phase
21 January - 19 February 1982

Background

On 21 January 1982, the President signed an executive order transferring custody of the remaining Cuban refugees from the Department of Health and Human Services to the Department of Justice. On 22 January, the Department of Justice announced that all Cuban refugees remaining at Fort Chaffee, many of whom had criminal records of one sort or another, would be transferred to Federal prison facilities in Atlanta, Ga., for further safekeeping or to Springfield, Mo., for further safekeeping and psychiatric evaluation. The Task Force Commander learned that this move to prison facilities was selected over other options because it was less expensive. By 4 February, the last of the 395 Cuban refugees originally involved in this final transfer had departed Fort Chaffee. The 4th Combat Support Hospital departed for home station on the same day. On 30 January, when the Cuban refugee population was down to twenty-four, the 293d Military Police Company, the last Task Force security support unit, returned to its home station. This left a 20-man cell to perform Provost Marshal functions at a largely deserted Fort Chaffee. On 12 February, a contingent of Fort Sill Military Police replaced this cell. They were to remain during the restoration phase. Effective 19 February, FORSCOM officially terminated and disestablished Task Force Fort Chaffee.43

Restoration Funding

As early as 1 May 1981, Col. Ray L. Spence, the Commander of Fort Chaffee, felt pressured to communicate his increasing concern to the Commanding General, Fort Sill, Okla., -- Fort Chaffee's parent and supporting installation -- concerning the rate of restoration cost payments by the Federal Emergency Management Agency. He stated that he was somewhat apprehensive that the allocation and formal commitment of the funds necessary to provide for the rapid and total restoration of Fort Chaffee following the termination of the Cuban refugee processing mission was not receiving the necessary attention from all concerned. He pointed out that, on 30 January, using in-house capabilities of logistics, facilities engineering, and communications expertise, he had formulated and forwarded a base line cost estimate of $5.8 million for complete restoration to Fort Sill. This estimate included hospital buildings, but did not include restoration costs for medical supplies which constituted a separate package to be prepared through U.S. Army Health Services Command channels. Colonel Spence's concern stemmed from the fact that, as of 1 May 1981, Fort Chaffee had received approval and fund citations from the Federal Emergency Management Agency in the

43. (1) Msg 271511Z Jan 82, FORSCOM to Distr, subj: Fort Chaffee Security Operations; (2) Msg 241537Z Feb 82, FORSCOM to Distr, subj: Fort Chaffee Detention Center; (3) TF Ft. Chaffee AAR, Vol. VI, p. VI-1-1.
amount of only $1.1 million, a sum which only marginally addressed those installation facilities requiring restoration which had been vacated by the Cubans prior to 1 January 1981. This shortfall of approximately $4.5 million from the base line estimate worried him greatly since his current projection indicated that, if the Cuban refugee operation terminated in July or August as currently programmed, restoration funds and resources had to be readily available if total restoration was to be completed in time to support Reserve Component Annual Training in May of 1982.44

On 28 May, Colonel Spence informed his superiors that his original 30 January 1981 restoration cost estimate of $5.8 million was based on two assumptions, both of which had proved to be false. The first assumption was that the Cuban resettlement operation would be concluded by 1 April 1981; the second assumption held that damage and loss would decrease as the Cubans became settled and the Department of Health and Human Services gained control. As noted above, both of these assumptions were false. The Cuban refugees were still at Fort Chaffee, and the extent of damages and losses to Fort Chaffee property were directly proportional to the length of their occupancy of any given area or facility. As of 28 May, Fort Chaffee had received the previously noted $1.1 million in reimbursement from the Federal Emergency Management Agency and $1.0 million in reimbursement from the Department of Health and Human Services, a combined sum which still left an estimated shortfall of $3.5 million on the original projections. In a revised estimate prepared as of 28 May, which included data applicable only to costs incurred for the Department of Health and Human Services after 1 January, the initial costs, calculated to be $4.7 million, were increased by $1.7 million, for a total of $6.4 million. The on-site Department of Health and Human Services Comptroller monitored this revised estimate in its preparation and gave his formal concurrence. The revised estimate included funding requirements for damages and losses to facilities, installed equipment, communications equipment, furniture, dining facilities, and replacement items. The increase was primarily attributed to estimates based on current costs and additional identified losses in the logistics area. The $1.1 million previously funded against the Federal Emergency Management Agency for restoration was not included in these calculations, but the $1.0 million previously provided by the Department of Health and Human Services was included. Of the previously noted Department of Health and Human Services $1.0 million in reimbursement costs, a total of $570,060 was committed, thus leaving a balance of $5.8 million. The uncommitted balance of the Department of Health and Human Services $1.0 million in reimbursement monies - $429,597 - would be applied to those areas which had been determined to be of highest priority. Major categories within the balance figure of $5.8 million included $4.4 million for the restoration of facilities and buildings, $1.1 million for logistics, $301,700 for logistics labor, $115,300 for

44. Ltr ATZR-B-CDR, Col. Spence to CG, USAFACFS, subj: Restoration Funding for Fort Chaffee (cys telecopied to FORSCOM and DA on 7 May 81), 1 May 81.
miscellaneous labor costs and administrative support, and the remainder for supplies and equipment for the restoration of communications and the hospital building.\(^45\)

Colonel Spence requested that this revision of estimated costs be considered in obtaining funding authority to permit the completion of restoration at Fort Chaffee for those installation facilities vacated after 31 December 1980. He stated that he planned to complete the restoration on an in-house basis as that approach appeared to be more economically feasible in view of the fact that, at the present time, Fort Chaffee had the necessary trained personnel in an in-hire status. Conversely, if the requested funds were not made available in a timely fashion, a personnel lay off would become necessary and, in the long run, would prove to be more costly than using the present workforce. Based on the current commitment rate, he predicted that the uncommitted balance in the Department of Health and Human Services reimbursement total of $1.0 million would be fully committed by 16 July 1981. Colonel Spence felt that it was imperative that funding approval for the previously mentioned $5.4 million, or a major portion thereof, must be made available prior to 16 July to ensure continuance of the effort for restoration of Fort Chaffee facilities by 1 May 1982 in order for the installation to meet its required support missions.\(^46\)

**Public Affairs Operational Summary**

Operating officials detailed a number of problem areas, lessons learned, and recommendations concerning future public affairs operations at an Army supported Refugee Processing Center after the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Refugee Processing Center terminated operations on 19 February 1982. They included such specific public affairs areas of concern as the initial selection of a Public Affairs Officer, media accreditation, media escort, media queries, press briefings, staff press clipping services, initial personnel requirements, and external communications. The selection of the initial on-site Public Affairs Officer proved to be critical due to the immediate need to establish a firm working relationship with the Task Force Commander. During the initial implementation phase, the need for accurate and timely media responses was essential to establish a positive media atmosphere. The staff recommended that the Task Force Commander initially employ his own Public Affairs Office personnel until the Task Force Public Affairs Office was fully staffed and operational. The need to recognize, organize, and register media elements was essential from the very first day of the operation. The immediate establishment of a media accreditation point of contact produced a daily log of media representatives by name, agency, location, and phone number, and served the media in turn through the provision of points of contact for media inquiries. The control and escort of media elements

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\(^{45}\) Ltr ATZ-4-CO, Col. Spence to CG, USAFACFS, subj: Revision of Restoration Estimate, Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, 28 May 81.

\(^{46}\) Ibid.
by qualified personnel of the Public Affairs Office was an early recognized requirement. An escort Officer-in-Charge to manage and direct the Escort Officers proved to be necessary to control the use of escorts and to prevent duplication of effort. The Public Affairs Office had developed a daily schedule providing for a specific time period for escorting individuals and small media groups, as well as specific time period for escorting established group tours. Media queries continually interrupted the operation of the Public Affairs Office. Press queries should be taken by the Escort Officer-in-Charge or the Public Affairs Office secretary and directed to the appropriate Task Force agency for response which should be kept on file for future use.\textsuperscript{47}

An internal staff problem arose over the content of daily press briefings. In the process of developing answers to anticipated questions from the media which involved a number of different operational agency elements at the Refugee Processing Center, the various agency Public Affairs Officers developed very thorough and accurate daily press briefings. Problems arose when they provided information unknown to other staff members, catching them by surprise when the next issue of the local papers, for example, hit the street. In order to cope with this problem, it was necessary – immediately following the morning press briefing – to consolidate, type, and distribute press briefing notes to each press officer, the Task Force Commander, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency Director. There was an immediate need to collect, clip, and distribute all area news articles pertaining to the refugee processing operation in order for the Task Force Commander and the staff to keep abreast of the press atmosphere and accuracy of reporting. Media requirements completely dominated operations of the Public Affairs Office for months and, during that time, other normal Public Affairs areas such as command information and community relations were necessarily curtailed until media interest began to slacken. Finally, the need for effective and immediate external communications was absolutely necessary to return long distance press calls, to seek assistance from distant locations, and to make telephonic press releases. This potential problem was solved early in the operation when the Public Affairs Officer of the Federal Emergency Management Agency secured a priority for the installation of a commercial telephone system within the Public Affairs Office and Press Center at Fort Chaffee. Based upon his extensive previous service in working various disasters for the agency and its predecessor organizations, he requested (and secured) one nationwide WATTS line, one statewide WATTS line, two FTS lines, four regular lines, and one intercom for each.\textsuperscript{48}

\textbf{Psychological Operations Summary}

Psychological Operations personnel encountered a number of serious problem areas, one of which involved the maintenance of credibility in


audio and visual operations due to the many sudden changes in plans by the supported units. Psychological operations personnel soon learned that words without action to back them up were worthless. As soon as the refugees realized that bluffing was a common practice to control them, they became increasingly reluctant to obey public announcements. For example, many times the refugees were told to form a straight line to the mess hall or it would be closed. Naturally, it was never closed. In another instance, they were told to go back from the clothing issue point to their barracks where busses would pick them up and transport them to the clothing issue point where they would receive their winter clothing in an orderly manner. The busses did not pick them up as promised, clothing issues were resumed at the point, and a disorderly scene soon developed as refugees poured out of the barracks and nearly overwhelmed the clothing issue point. There were many other instances of this nature, all of which undermined the credibility of the psychological operations broadcasting teams.49

Another problem involved the lack of essential elements of information to be gathered by personnel of the Psychological Operations Intelligence Section during their interviews with the refugees. Without prior guidance and planning, the potential intelligence generating field to be explored soon became very extensive and disorganized. They gathered much worthless information at a great expenditure of time and effort. Further, the lack of security inhibited intelligence gathering operations. Intelligence Section personnel could not perform at 100 percent efficiency without facilities for debriefing since this was not an overt operation. Civilian attire should have been worn and the Intelligence Section personnel should not have been identified or mixed up with the communications aspect of psychological operations. The staff recommended that, in future operations of this type, an intelligence gathering team should be maintained for that purpose only. This approach would enable the team to work closely with other agencies on the post. The team should not be identified with psychological operations, it should wear civilian attire, and it should be provided with its own place for debriefing and work. Surprisingly, considering the large number of Spanish speaking soldiers in the U.S. Army, there was a serious lack of native linguists. Defense Language Institute (DLI) trained Spanish speaking linguists did not demonstrate the level of knowledge necessary to translate for a camp newspaper. The target audience (the refugees) could not understand the Spanish taught at the Defense Language Institute. This problem was solved to some degree by recruiting a Cuban refugee staff. The staff recommended that native linguists be assigned to Psychological Operations units. Linguists trained at the Defense Language Institute needed slang and street language training -- at least in the Spanish language as used in Cuba and probably in other Spanish speaking countries.

The Intelligence Section's language capabilities were very limited, even though the personnel involved represented the only Latin American

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Operations Detachment in the Active Army. Linguists trained by the Defense Language Institute proved to be unable to maintain the level of Spanish speaking proficiency required at Fort Chaffee. The staff recommended that this group of linguists maintain an acceptable level of proficiency through continuous language training (language laboratory, library, games, music and the like). Spanish speaking linguists also had to learn Latin customs, eat Latin foods, drink Latin drinks, and basically learn the Latin way of life. The staff specifically recommended that the 4th Psychological Operations Group, the parent group of the Fort Chaffee Psychological Operations personnel, look into the possibility of maintaining the Latin American Operations Detachment II at Key West, Fla., in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or in the Republic of Panama. In addition to exhibiting linguistic deficiencies, interrogators had obviously not received the advanced training required to execute debriefings in an organized and professional manner. The staff recommended that interrogators be made aware of debriefing methods and terminology in the particular target language. They should receive the advanced training made available through the FORSCOM REALTRAIN program.

Civil Affairs Operational Summary

Civil Affairs operational personnel encountered four major problems. These included the lack of demographic data, the lack of Civil Affairs personnel, the initial lack of refugee information means, and the location of refugee services "outside the wire." Due to a lack of refugee demographic data prior to the start of the sustained Cuban refugee flow, it was extremely difficult for Civil Affairs personnel on site at Fort Chaffee, Fort Indiantown Gap, and Fort McCoy to plan and prepare for the segregation of family groups, unattached males and unattached females into separate "neighborhoods." At Fort Chaffee (and at others), the Cuban refugee population segregated itself after being assigned to barracks. The majority of the refugees made at least one "unnecessary" move. This constantly fluctuating situation made it extremely difficult to locate individual refugees and impossible to outprocess them by barracks on a first in - first out basis. This contributed to refugee uncertainty and frustration. The staff recommended that, in future operations, separate "neighborhoods" be provided for family groups, single and unattached males, and single and unattached females based upon the best available demographic projections. To further complicate matters, Civil Affairs personnel strengths were inadequate to support a mission of the magnitude of the Cuban refugee processing operation. In addition, the Civil Affairs organizational elements did not have the means to procure or maintain required Spanish speaking interpreters. As the only Civil Affairs Battalion in the Active Army, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, Fort Bragg, N.C., had to assign elements to Key West, Fla., Fort Chaffee, Fort Indiantown Gap, and Fort McCoy to support the

Cuban refugee operation. Also, it still had to be prepared to support XVIII Airborne Corps in its worldwide contingency responsibilities. At the time of this commitment, the battalion had only 85 of its 115 authorized personnel spaces filled. The lack of an internal language/interpreter capability considerably hampered the unit's ability to effectively communicate in any foreign language and the unit had to rely on hastily procured, inexperienced personnel. The staff recommended that the battalion be constantly maintained at its full authorized strength, and that it be provided with an internal interpreter capability.52

The initial lack of adequate refugee information means contributed to refugee frustration and confusion over Refugee Processing Center policies, outprocessing procedures, and daily "community" activities. This problem stemmed from the fact that elements of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion and the 1st Psychological Operations Detachment were initially unable to obtain funding and authority for the production of a multi-page newspaper and the operation of a radio station for the information and the benefit of the refugees. Had this funding been approved when first requested, a great deal of refugee frustration might have been alleviated. The staff recommended that, in future operations, a multi-page newspaper and radio station receive a higher priority. Finally, the location of refugee services "outside the wire" resulted in a high degree of refugee frustration and confusion. It resulted in a tremendous lack of knowledge and understanding about the entire outprocessing system on the part of the refugees as well as an inordinate amount of coordination on the part of Civil Affairs personnel to assemble and move them as required. The staff recommended that the entire outprocessing complex be located "inside the wire" in future refugee operations. Such a relocation would reduce refugee confusion, permit Federal civilian and Voluntary Agencies to become more directly involved in refugee outprocessing, and allow them to communicate outprocessing procedures directly to the refugees.53

End of Tour Report
Task Force Commander

Background

In his End of Tour Report, the last Task Force Commander, Lt.Col. Alfred W. Kinkead (30 April 1981 - 21 March 1982), provided a general overview of Task Force actions to support the Cuban Resettlement Operation.54 He also provided a summary of lessons learned in those

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54. The entire section is based on Ltr ATZR-B-TCDR, TF Cdr, LTC Kinkead to Cdr, FORSCOM, subj: End of Tour Report/Lessons Learned, Task Force Chaffee.
areas where Army forces might be required to participate in the future. The FORSCOM Task Force operated as a Field Command of Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Command, under the operational control (OPCON) of the FORSCOM Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. FORSCOM assigned one officer and one Government civilian secretary on a permanent basis to the Task Force Headquarters. FORSCOM assigned command and control elements in a temporary duty status for sixty days. These were battalion headquarters or "cells" drawn from units of the Strategic Army Forces (STRAF). All provided elements were under the operational control of the Task Force.

Lessons Learned

Colonel Kinkead noted, that the Task Force Headquarters must have a small nucleus of personnel which would be assigned permanently or placed on extended temporary duty (more than sixty days). If troop units continued to rotate periodically, the need for continuity would continue to be important and having a commander, S-3, S-4, and one clerk would significantly reduce the time expended in planning, training, rehearsal of contingency plans, and repetitive supply inventories and reissues. The 60-day rotation cycle of the supporting troop units proved to be workable and could fall as low as forty-five days, if necessary. Periods in excess of sixty days would cause increased morale and family hardship problems. The need for a battalion headquarters to manage company-size elements was questionable except when a multibattalion force was involved. If properly staffed, the Task Force Headquarters could control a sizeable number of companies by itself. Finally, Colonel Kinkead observed that every effort should be made by FORSCOM to deploy units as companies. Composite units made up of platoons from various installations required significantly increased training and were the sources of continuing personnel, administrative, and logistics problems. Experience clearly indicated that those units which deployed to Fort Chaffee for duty with the Task Force as complete companies not only performed their assigned missions better, but returned to their home stations in a higher state of overall readiness. Specifically, the unit noncommissioned officer chains of command were significantly strengthened.

Personnel Administration

All personnel actions were performed by support agencies at the units' home station. The Task Force Headquarters entered into the personnel area only when an emergency arose or extensive coordination was required which would burden the company commander on site at Fort Chaffee. This approach worked well and the Task Force Commander recommended that it be used in future operations where possible.

Intelligence Operations

Upon the arrival of Colonel Kinkead at Fort Chaffee as Task Force Commander on 30 April 1981, shortly after the two riots which took place earlier that month, he found no intelligence gathering operation designed to keep the security forces informed concerning current or
projected attitudes and activities of the Cuban refugee population. Consequently, all Task Force elements were habitually surprised by Cuban refugee actions and crises and, consequently, overreacted. After reviewing this unsatisfactory situation, Colonel Kinkead formed a joint Task Force-Federal Civilian Agency informal intelligence committee with representation drawn from each agency involved with security or law enforcement. This committee subsequently met on a weekly basis to review past events, to identify specific troublemakers and potential threats, and to attempt to forecast Cuban reactions to anticipated future events. In addition, the Task Force Commander developed a very informal net of informants consisting of cooks, kitchen police, secretaries, Voluntary Agency personnel, interpreters, selected Cubans, and other employees in the Refugee Enclave. The Task Force Commander also visited inside the Cuban Refugee Enclave daily at varying hours to sense the attitude of the refugees and to reinforce the image of a concerned Army presence. Based upon past major incidents at Fort Chaffee, it was obvious that some sort of an intelligence gathering system was an absolute necessity. The informal system described above worked well and did not create an administrative or personnel burden or an atmosphere of mistrust among the Cubans. Colonel Kinkead noted that an intelligence system of this nature in a refugee operation should not be overly secretive or covert so as not to unduly alarm or disturb the refugee population and create an air of mistrust.

**Task Force Operations**

Task Force operations comprised three distinct categories: Civil Disturbance; Enclave Perimeter Security; and Discipline, Law, and Order. The Civil Disturbance Reaction Force mission was a separate entity. This mission required that a standing force be immediately available (five minutes to the disturbance site). Secondary reaction forces supported this immediately available standing force in order to reinforce the initial deployment if required. The standing force was available twenty-four hours a day in their billets or at a training site. The secondary forces were personnel in a break or off-duty status who could be recalled for duty within varying time limits ranging from fifteen minutes to two hours. In normal operations, the entire Task Force could be made available within two hours. The Task Force had developed various alert categories to increase the alert status from normal operations to an intensified state which required all Task Force personnel to be present, equipped, and loaded on vehicles at preplanned staging areas near the Cuban Refugee Enclave. The alert status at any given time was based on the nature of conditions within the enclave as well as available intelligence information. This system permitted the use of economy of force, but required intensive planning, training and rehearsal, frequent practice alerts, and up to the minute coordination at all times. The Enclave Perimeter Security mission required the provision of roving foot and vehicle patrols and the maintenance of static guard posts around the fence line.

The Discipline, Law, and Order mission constituted the traditional Installation Provost Marshal function to include traffic controls, patrols, physical security, Military Police Desk, and Military Police
Investigation. For practical control reasons, the Military Police Desk operated as the control element for the perimeter security force. Such integration allowed individuals to be rotated between positions thus reducing boredom and increasing alertness of the perimeter security force. The Military Police Desk also functioned as the emergency operations center for day-to-day operations. During periods of civil disturbance or when Cubans attempted to escape, the Task Force Headquarters activated its Emergency Operations Center to separate the Discipline, Law, and Order function from the crisis at hand. In general, the approach to the mission which the Task Force used resembled a tactical combat operation. Due to the past history of violence by the Cuban population at Fort Chaffee, such an approach was appropriate. Intensive planning, training and rehearsal, and the holding of practice alerts were essential, especially as the units involved rotated every sixty days. As a matter of fact, the Task Force was required to be ready to cope with a worst case scenario at all times. The Task Force used all classical riot control formations and procedures and such training was intense. In addition, the Task Force procured special equipment to improve on normal tactical operations. Through imaginative planning and the development of appropriate tactical doctrine, the employment of this special equipment resulted in significant force reductions while still retaining the capability necessary to control a major civil disturbance.

Special Operations Equipment

Colonel Kinkead's review of after action reports of previous riots at Fort Chaffee revealed a need for centralized control of certain activities and some equipment. Since the use of CS gas and other equipment was both media and politically sensitive, the Task Force Commander alone controlled such activities.

Use of CS Gas. In previous riots at Fort Chaffee, the authority to use CS gas in grenade or dispenser form had been decentralized. This procedure had resulted in the gassing of friendly personnel or in ineffective deployment based on wind conditions. The use of CS gas by Task Force personnel was interpreted by the media to mean that the Army had lost control of the situation. For these reasons, a special team consisting of headquarters personnel responded to the Task Force Commander for the use of gas, forced entry into buildings, and for loudspeaker operations. Through the use of this "Force Team," the Commander controlled what was said to the Cuban refugee alien crowd, how and where CS gas would be used, and what damage would be inflicted on Federal property by friendly forces.

Water Cannon. In previous riots at Fort Chaffee, the only solution to the issue at hand was for the military force to confront the rioters face to face and reduce the situation through the use of CS gas or resort to hand to hand combat. Such an approach led to increased casualties on both sides as well as the danger of fatalities. In order to alleviate this problem, Colonel Kinkead determined that a water cannon (used extensively on the Continent in riot situations) was needed. While a water cannon proper was not available, investigation revealed that a fire truck could be used for essentially the same purpose if
military and other law enforcement personnel manned the equipment. Based on these determinations, and using the rules of engagement approved by the Fort Sill Staff Judge Advocate, Colonel Kinkead obtained the use of an installation fire truck and instituted the necessary training. This piece of equipment greatly increased the Task Force's capability to react to civil disorder with a broader spectrum of options. The very availability of the "at-e cannon" had a very positive effect on the individual soldier.

Armed Personnel Carrier. In riotous situations at Fort Chaffee, there was an ever-present danger of civilian employees becoming isolated in the Cuban Refugee Enclave and being forced to barricade themselves in buildings for their own protection. A review of past riots showed that no provision had been made to rescue such personnel other than to fight through to them in a riot control formation and come out the same way with the rescued personnel in the same formation. To meet this need and, at the same time, provide cover in using an economy of force, the Task Force Commander borrowed an armored personnel carrier from the Fort Chaffee Equipment Concentration Site. This vehicle also provided a capability of a "crowd breaker" and sent a strong and viable psychological message to riotous Cubans.

Cracker Box Ambulance. This review also determined that a need existed for a safer method to evacuate wounded personnel from the Refugee Enclave while under a barrage of rocks, bottles, and paving stones. In previous riot situations at Fort Chaffee, open 5-ton vehicles had been used and the wounded continued to receive "hostile fire" from the crowds. A covered ambulance would provide the necessary protection for the wounded and the Task Force Commander borrowed one from the Fort Chaffee Equipment Concentration Site. The vehicle was also available to back up or substitute for the armored personnel carrier if necessary.

Wire Wagon. Finally, the Task Force Commander directed the modification of a 24-ton truck through local fabrication and installation of a device capable of dispensing and laying 1,500 feet of double concertina wire in approximately two minutes, using only two men. The device could be reloaded in fifteen minutes. This piece of equipment was critically needed as the Refugee Enclave at Fort Chaffee had no cross-fencing and the rioters could roam throughout the compound at will causing all kinds of mischief. This device permitted the Task Force Commander to establish barriers rapidly and to man them with a bare minimum of force.

Task Force Training

The overall training objective of the Task Force was to ensure the maximum capability of the units to meet the requirements of the Cuban operation while continuing to improve proficiency in Skill Qualification Tests (SQT) and in Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) skills. In addition, the Task Force placed specific emphasis on both junior leader training and the use of unit chain of command. In particular, the Fort Chaffee mission afforded Military Police unit commanders with the rare opportunity of having all of their assigned personnel under their
own control with ample training time and resources. Through the maintenance of unit integrity, that time spent as "Alert Force/Standby" was converted into training time managed and conducted by first line supervisors. The Battalion Training Management System (BTMS) was the modus operandi which worked very well. In every case, unit commanders left Fort Chaffee reporting that the Cuban mission was the best thing that had ever happened to their units in terms of leader development, training, chain of command, and unit cohesiveness. In summary, it was obvious that, with the use of a little imagination and willingness to make unit chains of command work, a mission such as the Cuban operation could be a major training vehicle for units, presenting them with opportunities seldom found in the press of home station activities. The areas most favorably received were SQT skills; junior officer and non-commissioned officer development; platoon and squad missions and team-work; noncommissioned officer development, leadership, experience; company teamwork, esprit, morale, and cohesiveness; ARTEP tasks such as range firing, gas chamber, decontamination, and unit NBC procedures; communications; and maintenance.

**Interagency Operations**

According to the Task Force Commander, the Cuban operation was conducted in a command and control atmosphere which was devoid of unity of command. Each agency and department of this joint undertaking remained responsive to its own chain of command with local operations at Fort Chaffee conducted as a cooperative/coordinated venture. Although such an arrangement led to a very suspicious, tedious, and parochial atmosphere, the system worked even if it was painful and somewhat cumbersome. The civilian task force (Cuban-Haitian Task Force) leadership consisted of temporary employees, most of whom were occupying their first positions as senior leaders and managers. This element of the joint venture was overwhelmingly oriented toward social welfare and, at the highest levels, was openly and vocally hostile to the military. Such attitudes required the Task Force Commander and his staff to be extraordinarily diplomatic yet, at the same time, stand rock firm on issues which were security oriented, involved Army procedures, or Army requirements. The Task Force Headquarters made a concerted and generally successful effort to keep such negative pressures removed from the line units. Many of the Cuban refugee incidents which did occur had their genesis in the highly permissive atmosphere nurtured by the Cuban-Haitian Task Force leadership.

**Task Force Media Relations**

The operation of the Fort Chaffee Refugee Processing Center proved to be the biggest local media event in Arkansas since the Vietnamese Refugee Operation in 1975. Local media sources were generally hostile to the Cuban operation in response to vocal and negative public sentiment. The Task Force Commander's policy concerning press relations was to deal only with questions which were purely security or Task Force oriented. All other questions were referred to the Department of State's Cuban-Haitian Task Force Director or to the Fort Chaffee U.S. Army Garrison Commander, as appropriate. However, a conscious effort
was made to minimize contact with the media. If comment was appropriate, it was presented in a precisely factual, open, honest, and whole fashion. The institution of this policy by Colonel Kinkead brought about a steady improvement in media relations, which was reflected in consistently favorable coverage.

Task Force Community Relations

The Task Force was the most visible Army activity in Arkansas and in Eastern Oklahoma during Colonel Kinkead's tenure. As Task Force Commander, he directed an effort to create the image of a professional and tough unit interested in the local community. Task Force units and individual members marched in local and area parades, provided traffic control and parking assistance at local events, donated over 800 pints of blood, participated in local charity drives, and took part in Armed Forces, Memorial, and Labor Day activities. The local community responded with warmth, sincerity, and respect for the individual soldier. All members of the Task Force worked hard at this job and it paid great dividends in mutual respect, understanding, and cooperation.

Task Force Relations with Elected Officials

The Cuban operation was an unusually sensitive issue with area elected officials and a very emotionally charged issue with the general population. The offices of Governor Frank White, Congressman John Paul Hammerschmidt, Sheriff Bill J. Cauthron, and the Fort Smith, Ark., Police Chief were especially interested in the operation. The Task Force made a special effort to build mutual confidence and trust with these officials. Due to the close relationships, which were actually established, the Army was able to effect recurring troop strength reductions while other agencies involved in the operation at Fort Chaffee found their attempts at reductions delayed or refused at the Washington level. Based on the credibility established by the Task Force Headquarters, the local reaction to Army strength reduction actions was "...if the Task Force Commander approves it, we support it." These same officials were also instrumental in reassuring the media, local citizens, and business leaders that the Army was up to the task and could be depended upon. In summary, winning and keeping the confidence of elected local officials was essential to the success of the Task Force's mission in such a politically and emotionally charged atmosphere. The time and effort spent by the Task Force Commander in this matter paid significant dividends. A totally honest, open, and frank approach combined with genuine concern for the needs of the local communities proved to be the proper and most productive course of action.

Summary

In summary, it may be said that the Termination and Restoration Phase (21 January 1982 - 19 February 1982) marked a transition phase during which the last of the Cuban refugees were finally transferred to other Federal institutions, the Task Force was disbanded, and the U.S. Army Garrison at Fort Chaffee was completely free to concentrate all of its energies in preparing for its support of Reserve component annual
training during TY 1982. It was also during this period that the Task Force commander was able to review military support operations during the entire sustainment period and to formulate a number of keen observations and recommendations which could very well be applicable to future operations of this kind. This phase began on 21 January 1981 when the President signed an executive order transferring custody of the remaining Cuban refugees from the Department of Health and Human Services to the Department of Justice. The Department of Justice announced the next day that the remaining Cuban refugees, many of whom had criminal records of one sort or another, would be transferred to Federal prison facilities in Atlanta, Ga., for further safekeeping and to Springfield, Mo., for further safekeeping and psychiatric evaluation. By 4 February, the last of the Cuban refugees had departed and FORSCOM officially terminated and disestablished Task Force Fort Chaffee on 19 February 1982. The Task Force commander, as noted above, then prepared a review of the entire military support portion of the operation and made useful observations and recommendations in such areas as the span of command and control, and the length of tours of temporary duty, personnel administration, intelligence operations, Task Force operations, special operations equipment, Task Force training, interagency operations, Task Force media relations, Task Force community relations, and Task Force relations with elected officials. Operating officials augmented these comments by further remarks in such areas as public affairs, psychological operations, and civil affairs. The restoration of Fort Chaffee facilities, which was dependent for its solution on the timely receipt of several million dollars in reimbursement funds from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, was still unresolved as of the termination date of the Task Force. According to the latest financial management data available at FORSCOM headquarters, the final overall reimbursable operating costs incurred by the command in the operation of the Fort Chaffee Refugee Processing Center and the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Refugee Processing Center amounted to $55.9 million, including the previously mentioned restoration costs. In the case of Fort Chaffee, the responsible Federal civilian agency, the Department of Health and Human Services, stated that it was able to reimburse only $2.0 million of the costs incurred pending further supplementary appropriations from the Congress. In the meantime, the Department of the Army informed FORSCOM and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, the major command to which Fort Sill, Okla., and its sub-installation, Fort Chaffee, were assigned, to proceed with necessary restoration work using funds made available by the department. 55

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Info furn by Mr. Terry Cook, DCSOMPT R&A Div, FORSCOM, 19 Sep 83.
Chapter X

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Previous Humanitarian Operations and Conclusions

Background

FORSCOM support rendered to the Cuban refugee reception and processing program during the period May 1980 through January 1982 constituted the Army's second largest peacetime humanitarian effort since the end of World War II. The Cuban operation occurred during a period of major organizational and force modernization efforts and lasted through an unprecedented period of time. This prolonged support period adversely affected the overall readiness of FORSCOM's participating military police units and their personnel. FORSCOM conducted the operation within the context of the All Volunteer Force as well as the Total Army concept. All units, both Active and Reserve Component, responded to the challenges and requirements involved in a professional manner, despite the fact that the Cuban refugees proved to be much more difficult to deal with in many ways than the Hungarian and Vietnamese refugees who preceeded them in 1956 and 1975, respectively. By tradition, the Army had sought to avoid lengthy and involved participation in American domestic situations and it was not until after the Civil War that the Army played an important role in such matters as disaster relief. Even then, the Army limited its activities largely to exploration, medical research, construction, and the suppression of domestic disturbances. Until the Cuban refugee program of 1980, the Army's major domestic efforts had been devoted to supporting the Civilian Conservation Corps in the 1930s, Operation MERCY in 1956 and the Operation NEW ARRIVALS in 1975.

Civilian Conservation Corps

In 1933, during the worst part of the Great Depression, Congress established the Civilian Conservation Corps as a means of providing employment for thousands of young men in reforestation and other reclamation projects. President Franklin D. Roosevelt directed the Army to mobilize these men and to operate their camps without making the Civilian Conservation Corps a military project in disguise. Within seven weeks time, 3,000 Army officers and noncommissioned officers mobilized 310,000 men into 1,315 camps, a mobilization more rapid and orderly than any in the Army's long history. For more than a year, the War Department kept a large number of Regular Army soldiers assigned to this task, which resulted in the stripping of key leadership from many tactical units. Regular Army training came to a standstill and unit readiness for immediate military employment was virtually destroyed. Fortunately, in the second half of 1934, the War Department received authorization to call to extended active duty some 9,300 reserve officers who were used to replace the Regulars in operating the Civilian Conservation Corps program. Many of these reserve officers continued in this service until 1940 and the general mobilization for training prior to World War II. Although the Civilian Conservation Corps was
disruptive to Army training and readiness at the start, it did furnish thousands of trained officers and disciplined young men to the American military forces in World War II.¹

Some of the adverse effects on readiness which the Army endured with the Civilian Conservation Corps emerged once again, although on a much smaller scale, during its support of the Cuban refugee processing operations. The Army’s involvement in the support of three of the Cuban refugee processing centers (Fort Chaffee, Ark.; Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa.; and Fort McCoy, Wisc.) became a military duty which used the peak strength talents of 6,000 officers and enlisted personnel of both the Active and Reserve Components. Since many of these personnel were employed in operations quite similar to those for which they had trained, and strong emphasis was placed on alternative training for reaction forces deployed to all three processing centers from time to time in response to riots, demonstrations, and periods of heightened tension, there was some practical value to their employment. The necessarily repeated use of FORSCOM’s military police units due to the duration and the nature of the refugee operation, as noted earlier, adversely affected readiness of these units and their personnel. Much of this adverse effect resulted from the inability of the Federal law enforcement agencies involved at the processing centers to adequately staff their personnel requirements.

Operation MERCY

Background. Until its assignment to conduct Operation MERCY in 1956, the Army’s involvement with refugees had historically been confined to wartime operations.² During the course of World War II, U.S. Army military government units followed the combat units in Europe and helped to reestablish normal living conditions in war-shattered cities and cared for large numbers of displaced persons until they could return home, or other arrangements could be made. Consequently, outside of wartime conditions, the Army had little to do with refugee problems, all of which had occurred outside the United States. In all of these cases, either the Intergovernmental Committee on European Migration (ICEM) or the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) took care of the refugees. While some of these refugees eventually came to the United States, they did not come in such numbers as would require special processing. As a matter of fact, the first large-scale influx of refugees to the United States took place during the ill-fated Hungarian


Revolution of 1956. This event also marked the first time the United States used U.S. Army military government units in peacetime and the first time such units were employed within the continental United States.

Soviet Intervention. In late October 1956, student demonstrations and street riots in Hungary escalated into outright rebellion and the communist government of that country requested Soviet aid. On 24 October, Soviet forces seized Budapest. The governing communists then replaced the Premier with Imre Nagy, who promised to oust the Russians. Soviet forces withdrew on 1 November, but returned three days later in force shooting freely and killing many civilians. After seizing the city once more, they erected a puppet government. Meanwhile, masses of Hungarians fled the country and by the end of April 1975, approximately 175,000 of them had sought asylum in Austria. In the past, the relocation of such refugees had been accomplished by the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. The current situation, however, proved to be rather unprecedented for peacetime and the committee was unable to provide proper care for the refugees. The sheer number involved made it impractical for the Federal Republic of Austria to shelter them for any length of time since it was still in the process of recovering from the years of post-World War II occupation by the Soviets and the three major Allied Powers. On 5 November, the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration appealed to the Free World for offers of asylum for these people. Twenty-five nations responded with offers varying from the acceptance of a few hundred to an unlimited number.

Executive Order Number 9. On 9 November, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, issued Executive Order Number 9, which permitted the immediate entry of 6,500 Hungarian refugees who were fleeing Soviet military occupation. The President then invoked a little used section of the McCarran-Walter Act to permit an additional 15,000 Hungarian refugees to be admitted to the United States in a "parole" status. Since this action did not in itself guarantee permanent residence, Congress later passed special legislation which permitted most of them to apply for that status. Subsequently, the President stipulated that the United States continue to grant entry to those refugees until the Congress passed legislation which would either limit the number authorized for entry or simply open doors to all who were fleeing communist rule.

U.S. Army Responsibilities. In order to evacuate the Hungarian refugees from Austria, the United States arranged for transportation on a large scale, using both ships and aircraft. In view of the fact that existing relief agencies in the continental United States did not readily possess the required organizational and material resources to deal with the number of refugees expected, President Eisenhower directed the Army to provide the necessary facilities and logistical support for both the refugees and some twenty-five governmental and Voluntary Agencies charged with processing and resettling the refugees under the provisions of the Hungarian Relief Act (Operation MERCY). In order to coordinate the activities of all of these agencies, the President formed the President's Committee for Hungarian Refugee Relief which, like the Interagency Task Force formed to conduct Operation NEW ARRIVALS,
coordinated the entire refugee relief operation. Unlike the latter Interagency Task Force, the President's Committee did not have a senior civil official commanding at Camp Kilmer, N.J., the site of the Hungarian Refugee Reception Center.

Mission of First U.S. Army. The Department of the Army assigned the task of housing, feeding, and providing medical care for the Hungarian refugees to First U.S. Army, Governors Island, N.Y., with Lt.Gen. Thomas W. Herren in command. First U.S. Army selected Camp Kilmer, N.J., a major embarkation center in World War II, as its Hungarian refugee reception center, since it was equipped with excellent facilities for such an operation and was situated in close proximity to two major ports of entry -- McGuire Air Force Base, N.J., and the Brooklyn Army Terminal. The camp was also located conveniently close to New York City where the majority of the Voluntary Agencies were located. Brig.Gen. Sidney C. Wooten commanded the Camp Kilmer Refugee Reception Center during the operation.

Use of Civil Affairs Military Government Units. Among the military units deployed by the Department of the Army to Camp Kilmer was a Civil Affairs Military Government (CAMG) Provisional Detachment, formed from elements of the 41st Military Government Company, Fort Gordon, Ga. This unit arrived at Camp Kilmer on 16 November and was given the mission of supporting U.S. Government agencies there by receiving, housing, feeding, caring, and providing statistical coverage of the incoming Hungarian refugees during their processing and making them available to the Voluntary Agencies at the earliest possible moment for the purpose of resettlement. The influx of refugees was such by 8 December that the Provisional Detachment was discontinued and replaced by the 41st Military Government Company which, in turn, was later augmented with additional personnel from other military government units. Among the governmental agencies supported at Camp Kilmer was the U.S. Border Patrol, an element of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. While the Army Military Police secured the camp as a whole, the Border Patrol secured the refugee areas and the refugees themselves. Border Patrolmen handled the arrest or detention of the refugees since the government maintained that the military police had no jurisdiction. Since many refugees had relatives and/or friends living in the United States, they were disposed to leave the Refugee Reception Center before they had completed their outprocessing. The Border Patrol was charged with finding them and returning them to Camp Kilmer.

Procurement of Interpreters. Many of the refugees did not speak the English language, so the Army had to employ interpreters throughout the operation (as with Operation NEW ARRIVALS, and the Cuban Refugee Processing Operation). At the peak of Operation MERCY, 51 military and 31 civilian interpreters were employed. The civilian interpreters, primarily local housewives who had emigrated to the United States following World War II, were recruited by both the Army and the Voluntary Agencies. A large percentage of the military interpreters were Lodge Act enlistees who were themselves only a few months removed from refugee status. Unlike Operation NEW ARRIVALS and, more surprisingly, the Cuban Refugee Processing Operation, no problem arose with regard to incompetency among the interpreters.
Inprocessing Procedures. Initially, Hungarian refugees arrived from Austria via West Germany on aircraft provided by the Military Air Transport Service. Later, as the refugees continued to grow in numbers, the Military Sea Transport Service used five of its vessels to augment the airlift. When the refugees arrived by air, Hungarian speaking military government personnel met them at McGuire Air Force Base and gave them a brief orientation during the bus trip to Camp Kilmer. Upon their arrival at the Refugee Reception Center, they were received by the U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS). That agency was concerned with ensuring that none of the refugees had a communicable disease or one which would exclude them from entry under normal conditions. In either case, those requiring medical attention were placed in quarantine until the condition was cured or they could be cared for on a long-term basis. The necessity for these measures was supported by the fact that 8 percent of the refugees screened had either tuberculosis or venereal disease. An Army medical team attached to the 41st Military Government Company administered routine smallpox vaccinations, which were required for all persons entering the United States. This team also rendered emergency medical and dental care and sent refugees requiring further care to the Camp Kilmer hospital which was operated by the 17th Field Hospital. Those Hungarian refugees arriving by ship at the Brooklyn Army Terminal received their preliminary physical checks and vaccinations from U.S. Public Health Service teams on board during the voyage. The U.S. Customs Service and the U.S. Department of Agriculture conducted additional screening procedures. The Camp Kilmer Hospital opened a living area for long-term patients and their families to keep them together. Other refugees were assigned to overnight, temporary, or long-term billets, segregated by family -- or by sex in the case of single men and women -- depending upon their time of arrival during the day and their processing status. Each refugee over ten years of age was furnished a Post Exchange coupon book worth $2.50 on a weekly basis to enable them to purchase necessities. The Red Cross distributed comfort items and clothing items which had been donated by individuals and service organizations.

Refugee processing at Camp Kilmer was relatively simple compared to that for Operation NEW ARRIVALS, since it involved only four stations. At the first station, a representative of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service interviewed each refugee and entered the gathered information on the refugee's Alien Registration Form. At the second station, all refugees over fourteen years of age were fingerprinted for identification as required by law. At the third station, the refugee's identification picture was taken. In the beginning, this requirement delayed the timely completion of the required processing due to the 3-to-4-day photo processing time required. This problem was solved with the introduction of a then new Polaroid camera which produced four prints in less than a minute. The Department of Labor manned the last station and interviewed each refugee of employable age for information concerning job skills. This was necessary since there was a marked difference between the terminology used regarding professional status in the United States and that currently in use in Hungary. Also, at this station, the Social Security Administration issued social security numbers to facilitate the refugee's employment and to prevent the crowding
of regional offices. In view of the fact that a large number of the Hungarian refugees already had relatives or friends residing in the United States, the finding of sponsors posed no particular problem. In fact, when the refugees first arrived at Camp Kilmer, the Red Cross gave each a free phone call anywhere within the country. These calls frequently produced immediate offers of sponsorship. During the period 16 November 1956 through 31 March 1957, the Camp Kilmer Refugee Reception Center processed a total of 30,673 refugees, 6,238 of whom entered the country on visas, while the remaining 24,435 entered under the parole program.

Conclusions. Taken as a whole, Operation MERCY, like Operation NEW ARRIVALS, and the Cuban Refugee Operation, reflected well on the Army's ability to meet an emergency situation of large proportions. As with the Indochina and the Cuban refugee problems, situations arose quickly which could not be handled by other than the military services, particularly the Army with its manpower, available facilities, and general expertise in handling large numbers of people. Despite some initial confusion over how many refugees were coming and exactly what was to be done for them, Operation MERCY ran smoothly. Once the operation terminated, the Military Government personnel involved reviewed their experience and drafted several recommendations for similar future operations. They emphasized that Military Government experts should be included in the early planning phases for any similar operation. They recommended that the Military Government unit commander be made responsible for all phases of refugee control and administration. In addition, civil affairs personnel should be in charge of all supervision of, and accounting for, the refugees. And, finally, they recommended that their supply personnel be considered for training in basic supply procedures at appropriate service schools.

Operation NEW ARRIVALS

Background. Operation NEW ARRIVALS was the largest peacetime humanitarian operation in which the U.S. Army had ever been involved. U.S. Army Forces Command and its subordinate units bore the brunt of supervising the Army's portion of this massive Defense Department effort, providing needed support and dispensing guidance. FORSCOM's involvement in this truly historic effort actually began with Operation BABYLIFT, the evacuation of some 2,715 Vietnamese orphans from the war torn nation. During the period 3 April through 25 June 1975, FORSCOM units supported this effort at the Presidio of San Francisco, Calif., and Fort Lewis, Wash., where 2,077 (77 percent of the total) were cared for and processed for entry into American society. Shortly after the inception of Operation BABYLIFT, when the final Vietnamese collapse of 30 April 1975 was but a few days away, the number of Vietnamese refugees fleeing the country soon swelled far beyond all early forecasts, thus forcing

the U.S. Government to find immediate suitable safe havens. The first safe haven constructed on American soil was at Orote Point Camp on Guam. The U.S. Navy hastily constructed this camp, but subsequently turned it over to the U.S. Army to operate. FORSCOM units from the 25th Infantry Division (-), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, along with other combat service support units furnished by the U.S. Army Support Command, Hawaii (USASCH), as well as from installations in the continental United States, operated the Orote Point Refugee Processing Center under the overall control of the U.S. Navy. These units received, processed, and otherwise supported 112,000 Vietnamese refugees -- 81 percent of the total of 138,000 refugees who passed through Guam in what was called Operation NEW LIFE.

As the number of refugees continued to grow, the U.S. Government initially established three Refugee Processing Centers within the continental United States, with a fourth added later on. FORSCOM, acting as the Army's Executive Agent, operated two of these four centers -- Fort Chaffee, Ark., and Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa. Of the 138,869 Indochinese refugees processed through the refugee centers in the continental United States, 73,021, or 53 percent, passed through the FORSCOM operated centers -- 50,809 at Fort Chaffee and 22,103 at Fort Indiantown Gap. At its peak, this processing effort required the services of some 1,800 military personnel and over 1,000 civilians including those from other Federal agencies and Voluntary Agencies. The total cost of FORSCOM's participation in Operation BABYLIFT, Operation NEW LIFE, and Operation NEW ARRIVALS, amounted to more than $48 million by 30 November 1977, including $5 million for opening costs, $37 million for operating costs, and $6 million for closing costs. The entire operation had very little adverse effect upon the readiness of the U.S. Army Forces Command. FORSCOM was indeed fortunate that the vast majority of the Indochinese refugees were processed in an unusually orderly fashion. Except for some relatively minor acts of vandalism and petty theft, the refugees were law abiding and cooperative.

Once the processing operation reached and passed its original 90-day limit, the Army let it be known that it could not continue to support the Indochinese Refugee Processing Centers on an indefinite basis through the use of both Active Army personnel and Reserve Component volunteers. The Federal civil agency in control -- the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) -- responded that it had no intention of operating the centers on its own. The result of this impasse was that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, announced the closing of three of the centers in the fall of 1975, with the fourth refugee processing center at Fort Chaffee to be kept open indefinitely under Army auspices. At the same time, a sudden acceleration of refugee out-processing occurred, accompanied by the mass adoption of many refugees by several of the state governments. The rush to clear the refugee centers became more frantic as the end drew near. Vietnamese families of more than eight persons were broken up and parcelled out among separate sponsors while single men were grouped together in groups of four or six with an employable English speaking leader. Some refugees ended up in halfway houses operated by various charitable organizations. Fort Chaffee, the last of the operating refugee processing centers, closed in December 1975.
Emergency Nature of Operation NEW ARRIVALS. Operation NEW ARRIVALS was carried out on an emergency basis from the very beginning. Matters developed so quickly that the civilian agencies involved, especially the State Department, which was supposedly in charge, could not react fast enough. This put the military departments in the position of having to provide all of the required support while the civilian agencies generally supervised and directed the refugee reception and processing operations and paid for the services. The direction provided, however, was frequently fragmentary and inaccurate due to the chaotic circumstances surrounding the downfall of Saigon. For example, the State Department originally announced that 20,000 Vietnamese were to be evacuated. This number suddenly increased to 200,000 without any explanation. The State Department had no clear idea as to how many were actually being evacuated or fleeing the country on their own initiative. In addition, the U.S. Ambassador in Vietnam liberally interpreted the authorized evacuation figures provided to him by the Department of State to mean heads of households, thereby increasing the potential number of evacuees by a factor of eight. When South Vietnam suddenly collapsed, the U.S. Embassy in Saigon was unable to control the mass flight of panicked Vietnamese and over 130,000 fled to American safe havens. Although the State Department set up a civil-military operation under civil control to administer the refugee reception and processing mission, it soon proved to be unable to keep up with the fluid, fast moving situation. Thus, the military departments had to transport and support the refugees until they could be assimilated into American society. This meant that the feeding, shelter, medical care, and recreation of the displaced peoples all came from military sources.

Interpreter Problems. From the very beginning, urgent requirements existed for Vietnamese and Cambodian linguists to support the refugee reception and processing operation. Since many of the refugees could neither speak nor understand English, FORSCOM treated this requirement in a top priority fashion. It soon identified large numbers of military personnel proficient in these languages based upon records maintained by the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center. Thus, FORSCOM had no problem in meeting the initial requirement from Fort Chaffee for thirty linguists. In addition, eight Vietnamese Army officers, who had been in training at the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and School at Fort Sill, Okla., at the time of the collapse of the Saigon government, were immediately sent to the Fort Chaffee Refugee Processing Center to act as interpreters while other Vietnamese military personnel were identified and readied for deployment to that same installation. Once the American military interpreters were in place at Fort Chaffee, the Task Force commander discovered that fully 75 percent of those identified by the U.S. Military Personnel Center as being proficient in the Cambodian or Vietnamese languages neither spoke nor understood them.

Consequently, FORSCOM was forced to make an extensive search for truly qualified interpreters and then move them, at considerable expense, from many sources to Fort Chaffee. Ironically, the majority of successful linguists at both Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap were not even carried on official Army linguist rosters. They were discovered at Army installations through advertisements in the Daily Bulletin.
and word-of-mouth requests through unit command channels to locate military personnel with Vietnamese wives. This method was comparatively inefficient at best, since it placed the accomplishment of mission requirements at the mercy of individual volunteers and did not provide a method of proficiency testing. Since this method, too, failed to produce sufficient interpreters, other means had to be found. Inasmuch as Federal law precluded the Army from hiring foreign nationals in any capacity, the Interagency Task Force arranged for sixty volunteer Vietnamese refugees located on Guam to act as interpreters for the refugees in the continental United States. Each of the three operating centers at that time, Fort Chaffee, Fort Indiantown Gap, and Camp Pendleton, Calif., received twenty volunteers. The remaining interpreter shortages at both Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap were met through personnel assets under the control of the Army Security Agency (ASA) as well as through an administrative action which simply reduced the number of linguist spaces to be filled. FORSCOM was never able to find a satisfactory solution to this problem during the operation. FORSCOM's unhappy experience in this area raised serious questions concerning the teaching, testing, maintenance, and record keeping involving Army linguists and their skill levels. This problem surfaced again during the Cuban Refugee Operation.

All Volunteer Force Problems. Soon after deployment, the FORSCOM Task Force commanders at Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap discovered that a significant number of their newly assigned female enlisted personnel were pregnant. This caused great concern among Army medical personnel since the women were assigned to duties in which they dealt directly with the refugees and were thus exposed to a broad range of refugee diseases not normally encountered in the United States. As a result, these female soldiers, who constituted a growing percentage of the Volunteer Army, had to be replaced at additional cost to the Army. FORSCOM then informed its participating units that they should not deploy pregnant personnel to support humanitarian operations which would bring them in contact with contagious diseases. It should be noted, however, that these female soldiers deployed with their male counterparts and units and that there was hardly time, given the circumstances under which the deployments were carried out, to determine who was and who was not pregnant at the time of deployment. Another problem engendered by these rapid deployments was the fact that a large number of Station of Choice (SOC) and Unit of Choice (UOC) enlisted personnel had been included in the Task Forces. Under the contractual obligations in effect in those two areas, the Army guaranteed Station of Choice enlistees a stabilized tour of duty at the post of their choice for twelve months and guaranteed Unit of Choice enlistees a stabilized tour of duty with their unit of choice for sixteen months. It was also true that both types of enlistment contracts contained provisions for the waiver of these guarantees in a time of national emergency, but current stringent definitions of what constituted a genuine emergency rendered the deployment of these personnel in a non-voluntary status most difficult in any situation short of war. The Station of Choice problem was particularly evident in the support specialties such as cooks and medical personnel. The Unit of Choice was most noticeable with filler personnel used to round out deploying units. Under these circumstances,
FORSOM requested that the Department of the Army declare an emergency for a 30-day period so as to avoid contract violations while replacements could be located or the individual soldiers involved could be prevailed upon to sign waivers permitting them to continue with the operation. This request was not granted.

The Changing Role of the Task Forces. At the time when Operation NEW ARRIVALS was first implemented, the Department of Defense directed the Department of the Army to provide logistical support for the Interagency Task Force and to provide housekeeping support services such as billets, perimeter security, messing, and health and comfort services for the Vietnamese refugees. As the refugee reception and processing operation developed at the two FORSCOM operated centers, the Task Force commanders found themselves increasingly involved in the general processing and administration of the refugees. This situation arose because the Federal civil agencies on site, who were primarily charged with these responsibilities, lacked the capability for implementation. A case in point involved the Adjutant General (Personnel Services) Company supplied to each of the two centers. Initially, FORSCOM deployed these two units to Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap to provide required military administrative services for the FORSCOM military personnel assigned to these centers. Upon their arrival, however, FORSCOM had to divert the units to conduct refugee in-processing duties in order to maintain the flow of processing. In the absence of any guidelines from the concerned Federal civil agencies as to how to conduct the in-processing system, each unit established its own processing procedures using its own forms. This approach subsequently caused difficulties in the intercamp transfer operations. In addition, the Federal civil agencies were not reluctant in presenting additional requirements to the Task Force commanders such as census taking and the compilation of various statistical data.

Lack of Federal Civil Agency Guidelines. Other examples of the lack of guidance from the Federal civil agencies as well as clear-cut areas of responsibility came to light when the Task Force commanders had to negotiate directly with other Federal agencies such as the U.S. Public Health Service, the U.S. Postal Service, and the Department of Labor on matters of support for, or for the use of, the refugees even though the Interagency Task Force supposedly had overall responsibility for the operation. Once again, FORSCOM's Task Force commanders had to fill a vacuum created by the Federal civilian agencies in order to keep the refugee reception and processing operation moving. The general lack of guidance was aggravated by the routine practice of the Federal civil agencies which rotated their key personnel every thirty days, thus causing a lack of continuity in direction. The FORSCOM Task Force commanders often had to sustain activities of a civilian agency during the transition period between civilian directors rather than permitting the activity to falter. The fact that neither the State Department nor the Interagency Task Force had described in detail the scope of authority of the Senior Civil Coordinator complicated matters still further, thus causing confusion as to the approval level for projects. In short, FORSCOM soon learned that the Army, by its very nature, was the only agent present in the refugee processing centers which possessed the
personnel and materiel resources, as well as the inherent organizational flexibility, to respond adequately to the ever-changing operational needs of a refugee center. Based on experience in Operation NEW ARRIVALS, refugee processing center task force commanders should expect and should be prepared to assume immediate responsibility for diverse nonmilitary actions which could not, for one reason or another, be accomplished by other Federal agencies. FORSCOM concluded that, in future humanitarian operations such as Operation NEW ARRIVALS, its Task Force commanders would have to be prepared to assume responsibility for such operations as the in-processing and the general support and administration of the refugees from the very outset. Even if memorandums of understanding (MOU) were concluded by all of the Federal departments and agencies concerned defining precise lines of authority and responsibility prior to the establishment of future refugee processing centers on Army property, past history and experience demonstrated that, in the final analysis, the Army would have to be ready to step in as required to keep the operation going. The fact that the center was located on a military installation would make the military, as far as the general public was concerned, responsible for the overall smooth functioning of the center.

Employment of the Refugees. A number of vexing administrative problems could have been solved almost immediately if FORSCOM had been given authority to employ the refugees themselves for such tasks as interpreters, food handlers, mail sorters, recreational aids, and, particularly in the case of Operation NEW ARRIVALS, Buddhist clergy. Upon requesting authority to hire refugee personnel for these purposes, Department of the Army informed FORSCOM that both Federal and Civil Service Regulations forbade the hiring of refugees who had not as yet achieved resident alien status. Since the refugees had not even achieved parole status when they arrived at the reception and processing centers, their direct hire was out of the question. FORSCOM then proposed using volunteers to perform these functions. The Department of the Army indicated that volunteers who possessed unique skills clearly unavailable in the local area could be used at the discretion of the local Task Force commander. While FORSCOM understood the need to protect American labor as far as Federal government employment procedures were concerned, it was in need of skills which the local labor pools could not supply — unlike the Operation MERCY experience at Camp Kilmer, N.J., in 1956 and 1957 when an ample supply of Hungarian-speaking Americans was easily obtainable — and, thus, it perceived these regulations to be overly restrictive. FORSCOM observers felt that unfair labor competition could not exist per se when the skills required were not available in the labor market on a responsive basis. Moreover, there was not enough time to train American workers for these jobs. Task Force personnel concluded that some relaxation of the applicable laws and regulations in this matter would have to be considered in future operations when labor supply difficulties hindered the accomplishment of the mission.

Food Service Problems. A major problem area which affected both FORSCOM and the Army as a whole was the provision of adequate food service at the refugee centers. As soon as operations at Fort Chaffee had
begun and while those at Fort Indiantown Gap were being established, FORSCOM realized that there were not enough military food service personnel to go around and still properly feed the Active Army. Food service personnel were in short supply on an Army-wide basis in early 1975 and the additional demands for such personnel generated by the Orote Point Camp on Guam, Fort Chaffee, and Fort Indiantown Gap had depleted the supply of available food service personnel throughout the Army. The situation was so bad by the time the Fort Indiantown Gap Center began operations, that many FORSCOM installations were forced to feed their military personnel in shifts since so many cooks had already been deployed. FORSCOM recognized that the refugees at Fort Indiantown Gap could not be fed exclusively using Army food service personnel except at the very beginning of the operation. FORSCOM's realistic solution was to contract with civilian catering firms at both refugee processing centers, but to leave the troop messes at the two installations in Army hands. Unfortunately, for the worldwide units which had already supplied mess personnel to the Orote Point Camp on Guam, these personnel had to stay there until the Army closed out that operation since there was no feasible way to replace them with civilian contract cooks. Through this predictable experience, FORSCOM learned that, while the initial urgency of such an operation might dictate the use of military food service personnel, planning for refugee center operations should include the conversion of the food service to contract status as soon as possible. This same approach should be applied to other functional areas which lent themselves to contracting arrangements, especially in view of the current emphasis on the Army's readiness as well as the contractual restrictions of the All Volunteer Force's enlistment programs.

Acquisition of Specialized Personnel. Among major difficulties encountered during the operation was the acquisition of specialized military personnel from the high priority Airborne "D" Force Package to support Operation NEW ARRIVALS. All but one of these units was temporarily replaced within the package by a similar unit. The one exception -- the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion -- was the only such unit in the Active Army and its expertise was needed to administer the refugees on a day-to-day basis when they were not actively engaged in processing activities. Since all the refugee reception and processing centers operated by the Army required their services, FORSCOM had to break the battalion up into several tailored packages. Because this civil affairs battalion represented one of a kind, as well as for other reasons noted above, these packets could not continue operations at the three FORSCOM operated refugee reception and processing centers indefinitely without seriously degrading unit readiness. FORSCOM's solution to this pressing problem was to use individual volunteer reservists who possessed the required civil affairs military occupational specialties. As the volunteers arrived at the refugee centers, they replaced comparable personnel from the Active Army packets. The full and immediate use of U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs units would have greatly facilitated the overall operation, but this course of action was simply out of the question. Current federal legislation did not permit a call-up for a contingency of this sort. Subsequently, the President gained the authorization in Public Law 94-286, 14 May 1976, to call up a total of 50,000 reservists.
for ninety days if he determined that it was necessary to augment the active forces for an operational mission. While this legislation might facilitate the staffing of future refugee reception and processing centers with needed specialized personnel, it remained to be seen if any future President would invoke the law for that purpose. The solicitation of individual volunteers was the most probable and viable course of action for the immediate future.

**Scheduling and Statistical Problems.** Other major problems encountered included both the scheduling of incoming refugee flights and the accurate accounting for those refugees on hand in the refugee reception and processing centers. As far as the scheduling of incoming refugee flights was concerned, FORSCOM was unable to locate any central scheduling authority. Requests to both the Twenty-first Air Force and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to regulate the flights had the effect of temporarily alleviating the situation, but no long-term changes occurred. As far as FORSCOM was concerned, someone should be given authority in future operations to schedule the flow of refugees into the refugee reception and processing centers in the most efficient, economical, and optimum fashion. The second major difficulty involved the keeping of an accurate refugee census. Since both the Interagency Task Force and the military Task Force at each refugee reception and processing center submitted daily situation reports, which included refugee population figures which never agreed, there were constant and futile efforts to reconcile the figures. FORSCOM determined that, in future operations requiring such counts, the agency charged with overall responsibility should determine the daily population count.

**Closing Problems.** Because the Federal civil agencies delayed the decision to close the refugee centers, FORSCOM was unable to develop realistic plans until late in the operation. Both Task Force commanders initiated planning as soon as they had some idea of a closure date. Even this relatively simple matter became more complicated, since the constant rotation of personnel by the other Federal agencies naturally produced conflicting opinions from a succession of their executive representatives concerning the requirements, responsibilities, and reimbursement for termination projects. In addition, the lack of knowledge on the part of the successive Senior Civil Coordinators concerning their actual scope of authority led to further problems. At the Fort Chaffee Refugee Processing Center, for example, the Senior Civil Coordinator approved some installation restoration work on a reimbursable basis as part of the overall termination project. Only after the work was partially accomplished using Army funds -- some time after the center had closed -- FORSCOM learned that the decision of the Senior Civil Coordinator had been overturned by the Comptroller of the Interagency Task Force. These two organizational and functional problems led to several additional months of negotiation between FORSCOM, the Department of the Army, and the Interagency Task Force to determine what could and what could not be done on a reimbursable basis in order to restore the refugee processing centers to their original configuration and condition as part of the termination process.

**Planning and Implementation.** At the beginning of the operation, the Department of the Army directed the U.S. Army Forces Command to provide
and coordinate all support from the continental United States (CONUS support) for the Army's refugee processing centers, including the effort at Orote Point Camp on Guam. As part of this mission, the Department of the Army authorized FORSCOM to task other Major Army Commands for personnel. The major commands provided other forms of support either through mutual coordination or through direction by Department of the Army on request from FORSCOM. This rather unwieldy arrangement often caused confusion or delay in response, particularly in the early stages of Operation NEW ARRIVALS, when speed was of the essence. FORSCOM quickly adopted the position that, in future operations of this nature, the authority to direct support from other Major Army Commands should be more clearly defined and announced to all concerned. If such authority were granted in the future, it should cover all areas of support, and the Department of the Army should only intervene to solve major problems. The fact that, in the space of three days, FORSCOM had to prepare contingency plans for refugee reception and processing operations at three different installations, nominate the installations to be used as refugee processing centers, and obtain and deploy troop units to Guam complicated the coordination problem. Under such circumstances, major problems were bound to arise during the site selection process.

The original concept of the refugee processing operation, as presented by the State Department, called for a short-term requirement to house and, otherwise, support some 20,000 Vietnamese refugees for no more than 90 days. Consequently, FORSCOM planners did not evaluate any cold weather capabilities or requirements. FORSCOM did, however, heed the State Department's request to keep the refugee processing centers in relatively mild climates. On the basis of subsequent and largely unforeseen events, FORSCOM soon discovered that the real possibility of extended operations should be included as a factor in selecting an installation. Furthermore, FORSCOM learned that, if the installation or installations selected as refugee processing centers were semiactive, then existing utilities contracts had to be immediately reevaluated to determine their current validity. FORSCOM encountered further anticipated problems in May when the original concept of a short-term refugee processing operation became obsolete in the face of a huge and sudden increase in the actual number of refugees. At that time, FORSCOM requested further guidance from the Department of the Army concerning possible preparations for cold weather operations. The Department of the Army responded in the negative; as far as the Department was concerned, the 90-day operational limit was still in effect. Consequently, FORSCOM did not begin planning for cold weather operations until July 1975. By that time, action was already overdue in order to prepare the refugee processing centers and their estimated populations for winter. For instance, normally available procurement procedures such as requests for bids to supply needed winter clothing could not be employed, thus causing greater expenditures than might otherwise have been encountered. In this area, FORSCOM learned that timeliness was essential in planning the continuation of an on-going action. Plans had to be developed, reviewed, and approved as soon as a change in the situation was apparent. Delays in this process resulted in hasty measures, increased costs, and slow deliveries.
Conclusions. Despite the manifold problems encountered, FORSCOM successfully concluded its assigned duties in support of Operation NEW ARRIVALS. Working under less than ideal conditions, FORSCOM conducted its part of the overall refugee processing operation with relatively minimum effort and maximum efficiency. Headquarters, FORSCOM, managed to continue its daily routine with only a small portion of its staff actually engaged on a day-to-day basis in the operation. FORSCOM managed the whole operation in a way which required only a minimum effort once the assigned Task Forces arrived on the scene and began to execute their various support missions. None of the participating FORSCOM units suffered any major degrading of readiness and none of the Reserve Component units, originally scheduled to perform their Annual Training at either Fort Chaffee or Fort Indiantown Gap, lost any training time. Many units actually spent more time in field training than would normally have been the case. This additional field training was particularly useful for the combat units involved.

FORSCOM processed most of the Indochinese refugees passing through Guam, more than one half of the orphans evacuated to the United States for adoption, and over one-half of the refugees seeking assimilation into U.S. society from the refugee processing centers operated by the Armed Forces in the continental United States. Despite this formidable accomplishment, FORSCOM, the Department of the Army, and any other Federal agencies likely to be involved in future large-scale refugee reception and processing operations should get together as early as possible to develop clear-cut memorandums of understanding (MOU) concerning their respective responsibilities, measures of authority, and standing operating procedures. FORSCOM and the Army should have the greatest interest in reaching such a commonality of agreement since its installations would most probably be used as refugee processing centers and the success or failure of each important aspect of the refugee processing operation at these sites would be indissolubly linked in the public mind with the Army — even if it were operating in a purely support role to the Federal civil agencies charged with the actual refugee processing responsibilities.

Upon the conclusion of Operation NEW ARRIVALS, the U.S. Army as well as FORSCOM received numerous congratulatory messages on the handling of the project. In addition, Senator Edward F. Kennedy's critical investigation of the entire operation contained nothing but praise for the Army's role. All recognized that the success of the operation hinged primarily on the military departments which were responsible for the transportation and the continued basic support of the refugees in both the Pacific Area and the continental United States. The military inherited their support responsibilities in this particular instance because the participating Federal civilian agencies lacked the expertise, flexibility, and human and materiel resource capabilities for the immediate management of large numbers of refugees. This, of course, was the reason why the U.S. military, especially the Army, had been called upon in the past to provide large-scale disaster relief, refugee support operations, and other similar types of operations. Operating the Civilian Conservation Corps camps during the Great Depression, supporting the Hungarian refugees in the latter fifties, and providing
disaster relief at home and abroad had all required varying degrees of Army support. This sort of activity, valuable as it was, was not one of the Army's major missions and, under certain conditions, could adversely affect the Army's overall readiness for immediate deployment and combat. Fortunately, Operations BABYLIFT, NEW LIFE, and NEW ARRIVALS had very little adverse effect upon the readiness of FORSCOM's Active and Reserve Component units.

Cuban Refugee Processing Operation

Background

The Cuban Refugee Operation constituted the third major refugee processing support operation in which the U.S. Army participated during the past quarter of a century. Of these three refugee processing support operations -- Hungarian refugees in 1956, Indochinese refugees in 1975, and the Cuban refugees in 1980 -- the support of the Cuban refugee processing operation proved to be only the second largest of the three. During the course of this support operation, the U.S. Army Forces Command provided required support services for the Federal Civilian Agency which processed 52,702 Cuban refugees at a reimbursable cost of $2,100 per person. The Cuban refugees which FORSCOM supported were only 42 percent of the total estimated number who fled, were permitted to leave, or were sent from Castro's Cuba to the United States in the spring and early summer of 1980. Based upon its study of the history of the Hungarian refugee operation, as well as its actual experience in the Indochinese refugee operation, the U.S. Army Forces Command was able to support the Cuban refugee operation in a largely routine fashion. The command also took the opportunity to exploit this latest refugee processing support operation to its own training and operational advantage by treating it essentially as a mobilization exercise and using its participating continental U.S. Armies in their wartime command and control roles in the chain of command. This approach contrasted sharply with the one used in the pre-STEADFAST era when the processing support of the Hungarian refugees was accomplished by First U.S. Army at a time when the continental armies exercised command and control over all Class I installations in their geographical areas. It also stood in marked contrast to the normal FORSCOM day-to-day STEADFAST command and control approach employed during the Indochinese refugee operation where the supporting installation and Task Force commanders reported directly to FORSCOM headquarters while its continental armies continued their peacetime mission of commanding the Army Reserve and supervising and monitoring the training and readiness of the Army National Guard. FORSCOM's use of its mobilization chain of command during the major portion of the Cuban refugee mission underscored the increasing emphasis placed on mobilization planning and exercising throughout the Department of Defense and other important elements of the U.S. Government in recent years.

General Observations

In summary, FORSCOM encountered no major surprises in the type of support requirements it was called upon to provide in support of the
Cuban refugee processing operation as compared and contrasted with its experience with the Indochinese refugee processing operation some five years earlier. Many installation support personnel at both Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap were still familiar with refugee support requirements from the 1975 experience with the Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees. Fort McCoy installation support personnel, who had had no experience in this type of operation, were able to profit from the lessons learned by their counterparts at Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap before they became the third and last FORSCOM controlled refugee support installation. All of the supporting installation commanders and later the respective Task Force commanders received much valuable assistance from the CONUS army commanders in their mobilization chain of command.

Principal differences encountered in the administration of this refugee support operation included the unprecedented length of the operation — although the extended portion was concentrated at Fort Chaffee — as well as the unprecedentedly high degree of violence encountered from various elements of the Cuban refugee population. This required extensive and sustained military police support and the use of both Active and Reserve Component combat unit security forces. Despite the growing use and study of Spanish in the United States, Spanish speaking interpreters encountered many difficulties in dealing with the Cuban refugees. These difficulties in communication resulted from varying levels of skills in the Spanish language, unfamiliarity in many cases with Cuban Spanish, and a lack of knowledge concerning Cuban cultural and demographic specifics. Military personnel trained as Spanish-speaking foreign area specialists were not immune to these difficulties.

Other problems experienced in both this and the Indochinese refugee operations included staffing problems in the Federal Civilian Agencies (understaffing and high turnover), lack of supervision in the areas of housekeeping and sanitation, poor supply discipline, and the general lack of efficient and uniform internal administration of the refugees. The fact remained that the Army and the FORSCOM Task Forces and their supporting installation staffs were once again placed in the difficult position of having to anticipate and then compensate for the deficiencies of the refugee center management as they arose despite the fact that the Federal Emergency Management Agency and, later, the Departments of State and Health and Human Services actually controlled the centers. This situation and particularly the security aspect of it was further complicated by the jurisdictional problems encountered at the three FORSCOM supported refugee centers. The actions and responses of various state officials, including governors, to specific jurisdictional problems involving security, internal processing center administrative and placement problems involving juvenile refugees, as well as reimbursement for state incurred expenses further complicated planning and implementation by the Task Force.

Considering the frequently chaotic and frustrating conditions under which they operated for extended periods of time, FORSCOM's forces, particularly the military police and combat unit security forces, exhibited
a high degree of discipline and training and accomplished their difficult and sensitive missions with maximum efficiency and a minimum use of force. Other task force personnel and supporting installation personnel, both military and civilian, both Active and Reserve Component, performed their duties with general skill and dedication. A higher degree of professionalism and competency on the part of the Federal Civilian Agencies and their personnel and the Voluntary Agencies and their personnel would have made the accomplishment of the respective Task Force and installation support commander's missions much easier. As it was, the extended use of Active Component military police units led to adverse unit and individual readiness problems; the relatively rapid turnover of the participating Reserve Component civil affairs and military police units proved to be counterproductive in some cases; and the relative lack of supervision in the areas of proper housekeeping and sanitation by Federal Civilian Agency supervisory personnel produced millions of dollars in damages to the facilities in use. In addition, at least some Federal Civilian Agency officials expressed hostility toward military personnel engaged in the operation and, thus detracted from the harmonious relationships required to accomplish the common mission.

Conclusions

In general, the same problem areas experienced in earlier refugee operations since World War II in which the Army played an important role continued to manifest themselves once again in varying degrees in the Cuban refugee operation. In the case of this latest refugee operation, it was perhaps unfortunate that the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which was not activated until 1979, had not had sufficient time to prepare itself to cope adequately with the sudden influx of Cuban refugees in the spring of 1980. Hopefully, as this vital agency matures in terms of longevity and actual experience, it should be able to develop uniform processing staffing, administrative, logistical, and jurisdictional policies for the processing of refugees in close coordination with the Departments of State, Justice, Health and Human Services, and Defense as well as other interested Government agencies and Voluntary Agencies. Thus, all participants would know precisely what their specific responsibilities were before the next major refugee requirement appeared. The Federal Emergency Management Agency and other concerned Governmental entities and the Voluntary Agencies should also look into the possibility that a future major refugee processing requirement might arise during an actual military mobilization period and thus alternative means in terms of both personnel and facilities should be explored in advance to administer and support such an eventuality. At that point, Defense Department resources might not be as readily available as in peacetime.

In view of the generally acknowledged widespread illegal emigration into this country at the present time from Spanish-speaking countries in particular, due to economic, social, and revolutionary conditions, it is most probable that the next refugee processing operation will involve this type of refugee. In any event, based upon experience in the Cuban refugee processing operation, it would be prudent for the Army to strengthen its civil affairs and psychological operations capabilities

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in general and those elements specializing in Spanish-speaking areas in particular. It should also explore the feasibility of employing qualified and available retired military personnel and volunteer individual reservists in mobilization tables of distribution and allowances units to support refugee processing centers. These units would be specifically designed for future use in this type of operation. Such personnel should be designated in advance for these positions and should be required to participate in appropriate exercises to be held on site at periodic intervals. These exercises should include sufficient realistic scenario details concerning likely geographical source areas for refugees so as to require the participants to make informed decisions concerning refugee processing support matters. The Federal Emergency Management Agency and other interested Government agencies should also be invited to participate so that interal camp administration policies could also be resolved in advance depending upon the most probable types of refugees to be processed. Finally, if at all possible, interpreters should be identified in both the military and civilian communities who could function at a high level of efficiency in the languages (or dialects) involved and who were familiar with the cultural peculiarities involved. The implementation of such a program, in whole or in part, would do much to ensure that any future FokSCOM participation in a major refugee processing situation would be more efficient, less detracting on individual and unit readiness, and would be more cost efficient in terms of personnel employed and facility restoration costs. Appendix A lists the commanders of the Task Forces; Appendix B lists selected incidents at Fort Chaffee; Appendix C lists selected incidents at Fort Indiantown Gap; and Appendix D lists selected incidents at Fort McCoy.
APPENDIX A

TASK FORCE COMMANDERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMANDER</th>
<th>DATE OF TENURE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fort Chaffee</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Fort Indiantown Gap</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Fort McCoy</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. William J. Moran*</td>
<td>8 October 1980 - 3 November 1980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Colonel Moran was the Commander, Fort McCoy.
APPENDIX B

FORT CHAFFEE SELECTED INCIDENTS

26 May 1980

Some 200 to 300 young Cuban male refugees mounted a demonstration. They overturned a number of barriers. In the process, four of them were injured by security personnel.

28 May 1980

Some 1,200 Cuban refugees demonstrated against slow outprocessing.

30 May 1980

Some 200 Cuban refugees demonstrated against slow outprocessing.

31 May 1980

Some fifty to seventy Cuban refugees stoned a U.S. Marshal’s vehicle and set a fire near a barracks building.

1 June 1980

A group of some 1,000 Cuban refugees marched to the main gate and caused a major disturbance. Arkansas state troopers opened fire to restore order and wounded five of the refugees.

5 June 1980

Some 200 would be Cuban relatives of the refugees demonstrated peacefully outside the main gate. Later that day, one Cuban refugee was arrested for armed robbery.

6 June 1980

Federal Civilian Agency law enforcement personnel confiscated over 1,400 homemade weapons in the refugee housing areas.

9 June 1980

Federal Civilian Agency law enforcement personnel arrested four Cuban refugees for weapons possession, one for attempted sodomy, one for robbery, and one for attempting to incite a riot.

These comprise only a sampling of the incidents which occurred. Detailed discussions of the major incidents can be found in the chapters devoted to the Fort Chaffee Refugee Processing Center and the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Refugee Processing Center support operations.
27 October 1980

A Cuban mental patient escaped from the maximum security area of the psychiatric ward at the Fort Chaffee Consolidated Refugee Processing Center hospital. He was subsequently shot by a military policeman, after assaulting him with a rake.

28 October 1980

A suspected Cuban arsonist set fire to one of the buildings in the refugee enclave area.

20 November 1980

A suspected Cuban arsonist set fire to one of the buildings in the general housing area of the refugee enclave. Four of the refugees and two U.S. Park Service policemen received minor injuries in this fire of unknown cause.

13 March 1981

Some thirty to fifty Cuban refugees mounted an essentially peaceful demonstration outside the U.S. Catholic Conference (Voluntary Agency) building to show their impatience with the pace of sponsorship.

18 April 1981

After repeated warnings, a Federal Protective Service officer shot a Cuban refugee who was attempting to assault another refugee with a knife. Some 300 to 350 Cuban refugees then set off a major riot. Some hours later, military police reaction forces quelled the riot after Federal Civilian Agency law enforcement personnel requested such assistance. Three military policemen were seriously injured and a number of others received minor injuries. Rioters damaged and burned eleven vehicles in the riot area. The military police reaction element used CS gas for protection against the overwhelmingly large crowd of refugees who were armed with rocks, sticks, trash cans and covers, bunk adapters, bottles, and various other potentially dangerous objects.

19 April 1981

A group of about forty Cuban refugees attacked Federal Protective Service officers in an attempt to secure the release of their leader's brother from the detention area for a curfew violation he had committed the day before. Federal Protective Service officers were finally assisted in the quelling of this demonstration by a group of "vigilante" refugees. Military police reaction forces arrived on the scene, but were not actually used. The Task Force commander played a very active personal role in the resolution of this potentially explosive matter.
APPENDIX C

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP SELECTED INCIDENTS

4 June 1980

Local law enforcement officials reported several incidents involving Cuban refugees outside designated areas.

5 June 1980

Police arrested two Cuban refugees for breaking and entering the residence of the Lieutenant Governor of Pennsylvania.

9 June 1980

Officials reported twenty-five attempted fence jumpings and five incidents involving the destruction of Government property.

16 June 1980

One Cuban refugee admitted to the hospital with stab wounds.

17 June 1980

Local law enforcement authorities apprehended three Cuban refugees off post.

23 June 1980

Cuban refugees billeted in the Family Section voluntarily turned in numerous weapons.

5 July 1980

Local law enforcement authorities charged Cuban refugees with larceny and possession of a firearm off post.

16 July 1980

State Police apprehended Cuban refugee escapees in Ono, Pennsylvania.

These comprise only a sampling of the incidents which occurred. Detailed discussions of the major incidents can be found in the chapters devoted to Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Processing Center support operations.
18 July 1980

U.S. Congressman Allen S. Ertel (D-Penn.) made an unannounced security visit during the early morning hours.

25 July 1980

The Task Force Provost Marshal received an anonymous threat of harm to the Cuban refugees unless he took action to control the refugee population.

27 July 1980

A group of Cuban refugees sent a petition to the Task Force commander in which they deplored the troublemakers in their midst and the unfavorable publicity which their actions had caused.

5 August 1980

A major Cuban refugee riot/disturbance occurred which required the combined efforts of both Active and Reserve Component military police and combat unit security forces to contain. One Cuban refugee was severely injured during the incident by another refugee and later died from his wounds.

21 September 1980

Two Cuban juvenile refugees broke into the Pennsylvania State Adjutant General's quarters in the vicinity of Fort Indiantown Gap, causing minor damages. Police recovered all stolen property.
APPENDIX D

FORT MCCOY SELECTED INCIDENTS

6 June 1980

Fence jumpers unusually active. Two military policemen injured.

8 June 1980

Warehouse destroyed by fire.

11 June 1980

Seven Cuban refugees found off post.

12 June 1980

Three Cuban refugees evacuated to nearby civilian hospital in critical condition due to drinking antifreeze. Two small disturbances quelled.

13 June 1980

Nine Cuban refugees escaped from medium security detention facility.

15 June 1980

Thirteen Cuban refugees escaped from detention facility. A number of refugees had inflicted cuts upon themselves to sham suicide attempts.

17 June 1980

Officials apprehended two Federal Civilian Agency interpreters while attempting to smuggle a Cuban refugee out of the refugee processing center.

18 June 1980

Two Cuban refugees apprehended for fighting with homemade knives.

19 June 1980

Unaccompanied juvenile Cuban refugees relocated for better control and protection from predatory adult refugees.

These comprise only a sampling of the incidents which occurred. Detailed discussions of the major incidents can be found in the chapters devoted to Fort McCoy Refugee Processing Center support operations.
22 June 1980
Numerous incidents of fence jumping occurred.

23 June 1980
Two Cuban refugees involved in knife fight. A group of Cuban juveniles attacked their barracks chief with homemade weapons. Another Cuban refugee accused of being a "Castro Agent" was taken into protective custody.

25 June 1980
Officials transferred eighty-nine Cuban refugees determined to have past criminal histories to appropriate Federal criminal institutions. Another Cuban refugee attempted suicide and security personnel confiscated fifty-three homemade weapons in the adult refugee housing areas.

26 June 1980
Security personnel confiscated twenty-two homemade weapons in the Cuban juvenile refugee housing area.

13 August 1980
A series of clashes involving opposing Cuban refugee groups occurred. These involved fifty to sixty refugees, twenty of whom were subsequently treated for injuries received.

14 August 1980
Two buildings damaged by fire. Cuban refugee arsonists suspected.

1 September 1980
A disturbance occurred in the refugee processing center as a number of the refugees attempted to rid themselves of an unpopular internal security force consisting of fellow refugees which had been originally appointed by Federal Civilian Agency personnel.

2 September 1980
Disturbances from previous day continued.

7 September 1980
Three hundred Cuban refugees, upset over slow outprocessing procedures and the proposed consolidation of refugees at Fort Chaffee, participated in a major demonstration. The refugees tore down two-thirds of the fencing around the male section. Military police aided by combat unit security forces had to form a human wall around the area to maintain security while the fencing was restored. Suspected arsonists torched two recreation buildings.
8 September 1980

Arsonists believed responsible for damaging yet another building. An additional refugee demonstration occurred involving about one hundred persons. Security personnel apprehended twenty-three of the instigators.

9 September 1980

A large number of Cuban refugees assisted in the restoration of the downed fence.

9 September 1980

Seven Cuban refugees escaped from the detention area.

22 September 1980

Suspected Cuban refugee arsonists damaged a building in the Cuban juvenile refugee housing area.

29 September 1980

Six Cuban refugees escaped from the detention facility.
APPENDIX E

GLOSSARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AACG</td>
<td>Arrival Airfield Control Group</td>
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<td>AAR</td>
<td>After Action Report</td>
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<td>AMEDD</td>
<td>Army Medical Department</td>
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<td>ARC</td>
<td>American Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARMR</td>
<td>Army Readiness and Mobilization Region</td>
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<td>ARNG</td>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARTEP</td>
<td>Army Training and Evaluation Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>Annual Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>BOP</td>
<td>Bureau of Prisons</td>
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<td>BPO</td>
<td>Blanket Purchase Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>BSI</td>
<td>Base Support Installation</td>
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<tr>
<td>BTMS</td>
<td>Battalion Training Management System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA/PSYOPS</td>
<td>Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations</td>
</tr>
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<td>CAMG</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Military Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>Civilian Conservation Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCOI</td>
<td>Communications-Electronics Operating Instructions</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHTF</td>
<td>Cuban-Haitian Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CID</td>
<td>Criminal Investigation Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMS</td>
<td>Central Material Supply</td>
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<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
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<td>CPO</td>
<td>Civilian Personnel Office</td>
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<td>CSH</td>
<td>Combat Support Hospital</td>
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<td>CWS</td>
<td>Church World Service</td>
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<td>DAACG</td>
<td>Departure and Arrival Airfield Control Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFAS</td>
<td>Directorate of Facilities and Engineering</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHHS</td>
<td>Department of Health and Human Services</td>
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<td>DIS</td>
<td>Defense Investigative Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>DLO</td>
<td>Discipline Law and Order</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DOI</td>
<td>Department of the Interior</td>
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<td>DOJ</td>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
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<td>DOMS</td>
<td>Director of Military Support (Department of the Army)</td>
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<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<td>DPCA</td>
<td>Director of Personnel and Community Activities</td>
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<td>DRF</td>
<td>Direct Reaction Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEI</td>
<td>Essential Elements of Information</td>
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<td>EMT</td>
<td>Emergency Medical Treatment</td>
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<td>EOC</td>
<td>Emergency Operations Center</td>
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<td>FAA</td>
<td>Federal Aviation Administration</td>
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<td>FPS</td>
<td>Federal Protective Service</td>
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<td>FTS</td>
<td>Federal Telecommunications System</td>
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<td>HHS</td>
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<td>ICGM</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration</td>
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<td>Immigration and Naturalization Service</td>
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<td>INSCOM</td>
<td>Intelligence and Security Command (Department of the Army)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSP</td>
<td>Joint Security Plan</td>
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LCU  Landing Craft Utility
LE  Law Enforcement
LOI  Letter of Instruction
MAC  U.S. Military Airlift Command
MEDEVAC  Medical Evacuation
MILPO  Military Personnel Office
MISO  Management Information Systems Office
MOBEX  Mobilization Exercise
MOD  Miscellaneous Obligation Documents
MOU  Memorandum of Understanding
MTOE  Modification Table of Organization and Equipment
MUST  Medical Unit, Self-contained, Transportable
MUTA  Multiple Unit Training Assembly
ODCSOPS  Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of Operations and Plans
OPCON  Operational Control
OR  Operating Room
PHS  Public Health Service
PL  Public Law
PLX  Pharmacy, Laboratory, and X-ray
PSYOPS  Psychological Operations
PWS  Prepositioned War Reserve Stocks
RC  Reserve Components
SITREP  Situation Report
SOC  Station of Choice
SQT  Skill Qualification Test
STANFINS  Standard Finance System
STRAF  Strategic Army Forces
T&A  Time and Attendance Cards
TCP  Traffic Control Point
TF  Task Force
TMP  Transportation Motor Pool
TRADOC  U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
UCMJ  Uniform Code of Military Justice
UOC  Unit of Choice
USACC  U.S. Army Communications Command
USAR  U.S. Army Reserve
USCC  U.S. Catholic Conference
USFAC  U.S. Army Finance and Accounting Center
USMS  U.S. Marshal Service
USPHS  U.S. Public Health Service
USPP  U.S. Park Police
VOLAG  Voluntary Agency
WR  World Relief
WWMCCS  World-wide Military Command and Control System
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