RESERVE COMPONENT MANPOWER READINESS AND MOBILIZATION POLICY

VOLUME I

BASED ON THE COLLOQUIUM ON MOBILIZATION WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON GUARD AND RESERVE COMPONENTS 1-4 NOVEMBER 1983

EDITED BY HARDY L. MERRITT BARBARA A. HENSELER AND JAMES L. GOULD

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RESERVE COMPONENT MANPOWER READINESS AND MOBILIZATION POLICY

Based on the
Colloquium on Mobilization
With Special Emphasis on Guard and Reserve Components
1-4 November 1983

Sponsored by the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
with the assistance of the
Mobilization Concepts Development Center
National Defense University
and in cooperation with the
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Edited by
Hardy L. Merritt
Barbara A. Henseler
and
James L. Gould
1984

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
FT. LESLEY J. McNAIR
WASHINGTON, DC 20319
PREFACE

The 1983 Colloquium on Mobilization with Special Emphasis on Guard and Reserve Components, sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs with the assistance of the National Defense University Mobilization Concepts Development Center and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was held on 1-4 November 1983 at Fort McNair.

The Colloquium was the first forum for discussing Reserve Component mobilization issues to include members of the Active, Guard and Reserve communities, scholars from National Defense University and the academic community, and researchers from the defense contractor community. In addition, military officers from France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom participated in the review of a generic framework of a reserve system.

The Proceedings of the Colloquium have been published in two volumes. Volume I contains an overview of the Colloquium, the presentations of the distinguished guests and sponsors, and a consolidation of the issues addressed by the presenters. Volume II contains the papers which were presented by the participants.

The many individuals whose work and dedication made the Colloquium a reality are too numerous to mention here. However, without the support of General Richard G. Stilwell, USA (Ret), the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Dr. Edward J. Philbin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs); Lieutenant General Richard D. Lawrence, USA, President, National Defense University; and Dr. John N. Ellison, Director, Mobilization Concepts Development Center, the Colloquium could never have succeeded.

HARDY L. MERRITT
BARBARA A. HENSELER
and
JAMES L. GOULD
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COLLOQUIUM CONCEPT
AND
CONCLUSIONS

Colonel James L. Gould, USAF
Director, Mobilization Planning and Operations
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
For Reserve Affairs

Guard and Reserve Component mobilization as a process has been generally neglected as a subject of academic study and of applied research. When addressed at all, the topic is frequently subsumed within much broader mobilization concerns. The purpose of this Colloquium was to help alleviate such neglect by merging research interests and perspectives with operational considerations regarding mobilization of the Guard and Reserve.

The effort was undertaken to foster the integration of scholarly research and academic disciplines with the theory and practice of military mobilization; to identify selected military mobilizations issues providing opportunities for both fruitful research and remedial actions; to enhance the visibility of operational factors pertaining to mobilization of Reserve forces; and to broaden the understanding that a combat ready reserve, supported by effective mobilization procedures, is an essential component of national defense, strategic deterrence, and NATO’s capability to defeat an aggressor should deterrence fail.

Reserve Component forces constitute approximately 50 percent of NATO’s authorized wartime strength. The capacity to mobilize those forces in an emergency is therefore fundamental to the defense of the Free World. In recognition of this fact, the Colloquium also served the purpose of highlighting mobilization readiness as an indispensable element of NATO’s military posture.

Specific Objectives

To achieve these purposes, and to reinforce initiatives for enhancing the combat and mobilization readiness of Reserve forces, the Colloquium was designed to meet the following specific objectives:

1. Promote dialogue and the exchange of ideas regarding mobilization among the Active, Guard and Reserve Components; among
the mobilization practitioner and researcher; among the manpower and industrial planning communities; and among defense authorities within NATO and its member countries;

2. Foster an integrating approach to mobilization theory and practice;

3. Identify practical applications for improving mobilization planning and execution which can be derived from systematic study of, and research and publication on, mobilization of Reserve forces;

4. Refine a conceptual, generic framework of an effective Reserve Component System for presentation at a mobilization symposium sponsored by the National Reserve Forces Committee (NRFC) at NATO Headquarters in January 1984.

Colloquium Participants and Guests

Program participants were selected from among Active and Guard/Reserve personnel, DOD officials, and the civilian academic and contractor communities. Selection was made on the basis of expertise in the mobilization arena and in manpower planning, as evidenced by extensive experience or research and publication, and on the basis of a participant's ability to contribute directly to Colloquium deliberations. On a highly selective basis, specific individuals, knowledgeable of mobilization issues generally, were invited as Colloquium guests.

Colloquium Organization and Format

The Colloquium was designed to be a working-level activity. It was organized around five Panel sessions in addition to opening and closing sessions. Each Panel was convened by a Chairperson who was complemented by four to six participants serving as paper presentors or discussants. Papers were commissioned by Panel Chairs with the coordination of OSD and National Defense University staff. Panel formats were structured to facilitate general discussion from Colloquium attendees.

Conclusions

An evaluation of the Colloquium was conducted by participants and Defense Department officials. Three major conclusions emerged:

1. While the Colloquium met its objectives, the deliberations would have been more productive had more time been allowed for discussions. It was recommended that a format be adopted for future colloquia which provides for small group discussions and reports back to the plenary session by the groups' discussion leaders;

2. A strong consensus emerged that the Colloquium initiative should be continued, but with the following modification: OASD/RA should sponsor an annual Colloquium oriented around the applications of scholarly research, and the relevance of academic
disciplines, to the theory and practice of mobilization. Six months after such a Colloquium and rotating among the Services, a senior Service school should sponsor a Symposium addressing an operational issue pertaining to mobilization touched upon in the preceding Colloquium. Such Symposia could examine issues like (a) mobilization planning checklists useful to military planners in all NATO countries; (b) means for retaining current addresses of reserve personnel not assigned to units, such as the Individual Ready Reserve of the United States; (c) effective training of reservists in the execution of mobilization procedures; (d) management information systems for mobilization decision making, execution, and monitoring; and (e) indicators for measuring, reporting, and monitoring the mission readiness and mobilization recall readiness of Reserve forces.

3. U.S. as well as NATO-country Colloquium participants agreed that it would be useful to explore ways for jointly sponsoring mobilization related symposia at the senior military schools of nations who are members of the NATO Alliance.
AGENDA

COLLOQUIUM ON MOBILIZATION
WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON GUARD AND RESERVE COMPONENTS

1-4 November 1983
National Defense University (NDU)
Fort Lesley J. McNair
Washington, D.C.

Tuesday, 1 November 1983
0900-1630 Registration at Hill Conference Center (HCC). Review of Colloquium papers and formulation of additional discussion topics.
1700-1900 Wine and Cheese Social, Rotunda, Bldg. 61.

Wednesday, 2 November 1983
(0730-0830) Late Registration, HCC
0815- Participants Seated.
0830-0900 Keynote Address: General Richard G. Stilwell, USA (Ret), Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Ambassador L. B. Laingen, Vice President, NDU
1000-1020 Coffee
1020-1030 Introduction to the Colloquium: Colonel James L. Gould, USAF, OASD/RA.
1030-1100 "Mobilization Overview," Dr. John Ellison, Mobilization Concepts Development Center (MCDC), NDU.
1100-1200 "Mobilization From A Joint Perspective," Colonel Michael Cluff, USMC, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), J-4.
1215-1330 Lunch
1330-1515 Panel 1: "Total Force Mobilization Issues"
Chairman: Cdr Hardy Merritt, USNR, MCDC-NDU.
1515-1530 Coffee
1530-1700 Panel II: "An Assessment of Guard and Reserve Mobilization Processes and Systems"
   Chairman: LtC Travis Sample, USAF, OJCS, J-4.
1700 Adjourn

Thursday, 3 November 1983
0900-1030 Panel III: "Assessment of Guard and Reserve Component Readiness: Status and Potential"
   Chairman: Colonel Kent Halstead, USAR.
1030-1050 Coffee
1050-1230 Panel IV: "Mobilization Considerations from the Field Commander's Perspective"
   Chairman: Major Luther F. Carter, USMCR
1230-1330 Luncheon, (No Host) Officer's Club, Ft. McNair
1335-1355 Introduction and Welcome of NATO-Country Representatives: Colonel James L. Gould, USAF.
1355-1515 Response by NATO-Country Representatives: LtC Kerr-Smiley, MOD, United Kingdom Representative, Federal Republic of Germany
          Maj Kolsterne, MOD, The Netherlands.
1515-1535 Coffee
1535-1700 "A Conceptual Framework for an Effective Reserve Component System"
   Chairman: Capt Paul Royston, USNR
   Co-Chairman: Col Terry Tucker, ARNG
   Principal Speaker: Dr. Donald Srull
   Chief Management Scientist
   Logistics Management Institute
1700 Concluding Remarks: Dr. Edward J. Philbin, DASD/RA,
   Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs.

Friday, 4 November 1983
0900-1100 Ad hoc discussions among Colloquium Participants of special interest items.
1130-1200 Colloquium Closing: Col Gould and Cdr Merritt.
Colloquium Coordinators

Colonel James L. Gould, USAF, OASD/RA, (202) 695-0092
  (Sponsor and Host responsibilities)
Colonel Rodney Bricker, USAF, OASD/RA, (202) 695-0092
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Colonel Robert Rumph, USA. NDU-MCDC, (202) 693-8198
  (Facilities Management)
I have some affinity with this group for two reasons. The first is that one of the more memorable chapters of my military service was as Commanding General of Sixth Army in San Francisco, where I had the opportunity to rub shoulders with both the National Guard and the Army Reserve. I came away from that tour with an enormous respect for the individuals who provided the leadership for—and composed the core of—our Reserve Components, and an equal appreciation for their capability to mobilize if called upon to do so.

The second reason is that when I returned to Government service after Army retirement, my only aim was to assist this nation’s capability to man battle stations, conscious of the fact that there were two significant vectors moving in almost diametrically opposed directions.

The first vector is continually increasing capabilities of the very formidable Soviet war machine—the most impressive the world has ever seen, not only with respect to its pervasive power on the Eurasian land mass, but also in regards to the Soviet’s increasing capability to project power into other parts of the world where adventurism is increasingly difficult to cope with. The strength of the Soviet Union and its allies relative to the United States and its allies continues to tilt in the wrong direction.

The second vector is the resultant of our penchant, in recent years, to sweep under the rug many of the activities which historically have made the United States the arsenal of democracy. These activities include the mobilization capabilities of the United States—industrial and manpower and other strengths—which turn the tide of the major wars. Unlike the decades of the ’50s and ’60s, our ability to credibly threaten to escalate to the nuclear threshold is no longer a viable concept. This fact—combined with the indisputable requirement to have more formidable conventional capabilities than in the past—points to the imperative of insuring that we repair and remedy the deficiencies in our surge capability that have been neglected for so long.

Until a few years ago, we never looked much beyond deterrence,
beyond D-Day and H-Hour. And when you don't look beyond D-Day and H-Hour, you can forget many things that are so important to the successful prosecution of war in our nation's defense.

As a result of those factors—well documented in three Pentagon mobilization exercises between 1978 and 1982—a number of significant initiatives were taken which bear directly on the purpose of this colloquium. We're starting on the right track; still, we have a long way to go to insure the capability of the United States to marshal, deploy and support our Armed Forces, to harness the wartime and manpower industrial capabilities required to sustain and expand these forces. This includes, of course, forces of both Active and Reserve Components.

We have a revitalized Mobilization and Deployment Steering Group headed by Dr. Fred Ikle, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Its membership is composed of the Vice Chiefs (or equivalent) of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. Membership also includes representation at the Under Secretary-level of the Departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as the major staff sections of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The purpose of this group is to provide the policy guidance, while insuring that related activities are adequately coordinated. This role is important, but it is also limited.

Underneath the Steering Group exists a fairly substantial infrastructure at the OSD level. The Manpower, Installations and Logistic Assistant Secretary, for example, has a major responsibility in several areas, including those found in the Supply Management Policy Directorate. Under the Assistant Secretariat for Reserve Affairs, planning requirements are handled by the Mobilization Planning and Operations Directorate. Substantial responsibility for the entire industrial resource area is found in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. The health affairs aspect is represented in the Medical Planning Directorate under the auspices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs.

Within the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is the Emergency Planning Directorate, responsible for insuring that all mobilization activities elements proceed in a coordinated manner. This directorate also oversees the interface with the Joint Staff and the other Executive Branch, Departments and the agencies on whom the Defense Department depends in time of crisis for the resources needed to support military operations. The director of this office, Mr. Craig Alderman, has been the prime mover in the development of an organization which we call the OSD Crisis Management System (CMS), the battle command post for the Secretary of Defense in time of major crisis. The CMS was established because, although the OSD staff has been very good at establishing policy and reviewing things, it has never really functioned in a mobilization environment. In such an environment, a lot
of things have to be done quicker—with less latitude for mistakes—and based often on information uncertainties characteristics of crises. The strength of our crisis management facility will be a function of the depth of planning, development of action packages, indoctrination and pre-briefing of the key players on requirements likely to be imposed upon them, the identification of whom they must talk to—in short, the evaluation of a standard operating procedure (SOP).

We have, at the OSD level, concentrated more on the substantive functions on the materiel side than we have on the manpower side, despite the fact that people are not only our most precious resource, but they are the *sine qua non* of any armed force capability. Paraphrasing something Creighton Abrams once said: "People don't serve in the Armed Forces, people are the Armed Forces." So equipment aside, the real strength of any organization is the caliber, the character, the motivation, and the spiritual strength of its people.

**The Need for Balance**

I am struck by the importance of the colloquium to insure that we focus adequate attention on the refinement of the mobilization plans and procedures for bringing together the people, the materiel, and the supporting infrastructures that are the Armed Forces.

In the industrial base area, we have focused on four important areas at the beginning of the long, hard work to revitalize a badly atrophied defense industrial base. In the existing Defense Guidance, we treat the four related objectives in some detail. The first is to develop programs to assure the Secretary of Defense and the President that we can rapidly, efficiently and economically produce the equipments that are now programmed in our five-year defense program. A second objective is to determine the capability of industry—with proper support, materiel, money, and priority—to surge selected items of equipment. The third objective is really an expansion of the first: to insure the sustainability of troops on the battlefield with respect to combat-essential equipment. And the fourth is greater investment in the whole field of industrial planning.

A part of this initiative has been the Industrial Simulation Exercise conducted this past summer and fall. Very simple in concept, it sought to bring captains of industry into the Pentagon and engage them in the kind of dialogue that has been absent for many years. These industrialists were asked to consider the following problems:

- If we wanted to double or triple your output of a particular item over the next year, what, from your viewpoint, would it take? Areas to be considered should include: what expansion of your work force skills would be needed and what would you need in the way of assets either of critical materials and/or priorities that you do not now control?
What are the roadblocks you foresee that could be eliminated if remedial action were taken now?

Let us address the aforementioned subject of roadblocks, procedural and otherwise. Although mundane, one of our major actions is to codify the many pieces of legislation extant today which deal with the kind of authorities that are available under various level of national emergency, as well as the extant legislation, such as the Clean Air Act, which operate as an impediment to a military or industrial surge.

I must tell you that codification has been a very difficult job, because of the tremendous number of pieces of legislation—some of them quite ancient—which deal with these matters. So the first step has been to collate, automate, and analyze these laws. The end purpose has been to determine, (1) what authorities do we have now, and (2) what would we need that we do not have under various levels of mobilization, partial, full or total? It has been a big effort, but we have made progress in identifying where we stand.

Considerable work has also been done in the development of econometric modeling. We have one under the very esoteric name of Defense Economic Impact Modeling System—an attempt to analyze one slice of the U.S. economy. It is designed to provide planning information to the private sector on the impact of alternative levels of Defense budgets in terms of industrial manpower, skills and raw material requirements.

In addition, major efforts are ongoing in the field of logistics: transportation, construction and the like. Out of the earlier mobilization exercises came recognition that we really did not have adequate organization and management capability to coordinate the deployment of the forces that we would mobilize, including the Reserve Components. That led to the development of the Joint Deployment Agency, headquartered at McDill Air Force Base and under REDCOM, but with direct links to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Agency’s job is to effect deployment coordination and it has grown steadily in capability to do that. I am pleased to report, as an example, that things looked much better in Proud Saber—the exercise we ran about a year ago, than in any prior exercise.

We have very significant plans and programs to enhance the capability to move and sustain our forces overseas, by air and water.

For many years we have had a program called Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), consisting of 380 aircraft. Today this program represents about 50 percent of our total airlift. However, some real problems lie ahead in maintaining this mobilization asset. For example, requirements of civil aviation are driven primarily by the profit motive, leading to aircraft designs which are increasingly incompatible with military requirements.

We have had a CRAF enhancement program to retrofit and modify a
number of the civil aviation carriers that are part of this program to make them more suitable for military use. However, that program has been foundering, and in the last two years Congress has pushed us hard to move forward on this upgrade.

Similarly, the National Defense Reserve Fleet augments our sealift capability. We now have only 29 ships that could be made available within 5-to-10 days, although we have plans and programs to increase that to about 70 ships within the next several years.

The field of industrial preparedness has been neglected for two decades. We are now putting modest amounts of money into areas such as manufacturing technology. This is the earnest that industry has been looking for: matching our rhetoric with our pocketbook is basic to their collaborative, cooperative efforts.

Let me sum up these unstructured comments. First, there is a new mobilization planning outlook that started in the wake of the 1978 exercise and has slowly begun to blossom. It is on the right track, intended to insure that when and if this nation is ever committed to major combat, we will be able to provide a continuum of support to the operational commanders who must defend American's vital interests.

Second, we add sinews to our deterrent by making it very visible, to both friend and foe, that this nation has a very responsive capability to harness its resources and to sustain them once committed. I consider this component of deterrence no less important than the strategic nuclear forces on which we have depended for so many years. The resilience and the responsiveness of the American base is, in the last analysis, basic to the security of the world we call free.

I applaud the initiative that led to the convening of this group of executives. I know that your deliberations will contribute much—particularly in the manpower area—to the refinement of mobilization theory and mobilization practice.
WELCOMING REMARKS

Dr. Edward J. Philbin
Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Reserve Affairs

You are about to participate in a unique conference designed to focus primarily on mobilization from two perspectives: first, the mobilization event and the necessary plans, processes and procedures required to successfully mobilize; and secondly, as a discipline within military science worthy of dedicated research and study. Furthermore, some portion of your discussions will consider the Guard and Reserve as one element of mobilization.

No effort within the Defense Department is more crucial to national security than developing and maintaining the degree of military capability and readiness required to deter aggression or, if deterrence fails, to prevail over any aggressor. Because of the historic national emphasis on deterrence, the title, “Department of Defense” is indeed appropriate for the organization to which most of us are assigned. But in the same sense that we must be able to successfully wage a military conflict should deterrence fail, we must recognize that the DOD would then function as the nation’s “War” Department—the department of government through which the Commander-in-Chief wields the military might of the nation against an aggressor.

All to often Americans tend to forget the unfortunate fact that the United States must be prepared to wage war if that contagion is once more forced upon us. Our deliberations must be mindful of that terrible fact. Moreover, if this meeting develops its full potential, the results should suggest a wide variety of initiatives which can improve the Nation’s ability to respond to an aggressor through effective mobilization.

This colloquium should consider the mobilization of the National Guard and the other reserve forces because these components of America’s total force are the only source of organized, pre-trained military units and individuals within America’s total force available for immediate augmentation and reinforcement of the active force in the event of a conflict. In any major contingency requiring the use of military force, the Guard and Reserve will be deployed and employed long before the first conscript can be trained, equipped, and integrated into our fighting and support forces. Thus, the Reserve Components
must be viewed as one of the primary objects of military mobilization, and totally dependent upon an effective mobilization to effectuate an infusion of their combat capability to the total force.

Within the United States, the National Guard and the other reserve forces constitute half of the Nation's combat power and two-thirds of its combat support capability. Within NATO, reserve forces constitute half of the Alliance's wartime authorized strength, including 65 percent of its combat support forces. No member of NATO, nor the Alliance itself, can sustain an effective response to any major military challenge without employing at least some portion of the reserve forces. In short, neither we nor our allies can engage in and win anything other than minor conflicts without the combat and combat support power which resides in the Reserve Components.

It is a truism that the military assets in our reserve forces will be of no benefit in any conflict unless they are effectively mobilized; that is, brought from a peacetime status in which they train and conduct daily mission operations to a wartime status in which as an integral part of the total force they engage in a military conflict. The relationship between mobilization and wartime operations is, therefore, intrinsic, immediate and direct. Consequently, this colloquium will be discussing the nation's war fighting capability. It is in the context of that reality and important responsibility that I charge you to approach the work which lies before you with urgency, born of the somber realization that you are addressing nothing less than the ability of the nation to bring its military capability to bear and to put a rapid end to any conflict on terms favorable to our interests, if deterrence fails. No other outcome is compatible with the continued existence of our democratic heritage! Note also, that if potential aggressors are convinced that the alliance can indeed prevail militarily if deterrence fails, deterrence will not fail.

The agenda of this colloquium is very deliberately tied together by the common thread of mobilization. The term mobilization encompasses not only the policies, plans, and procedures whereby the nation's total force transitions from a peacetime posture to wartime operations. It also encompasses the military capability of the active, guard and reserve forces to accomplish the wartime missions assigned to them. Each of these elements of mobilization alone is hollow without the other. The most effective mobilization execution procedures would be of little value unless the forces and units they energize are manned, equipped, and trained for their wartime missions. Similarly, the most combat-capable active and reserve forces are of marginal value to the fighting and successful conclusion of a war unless they can be delivered in the right numbers, to the right wartime commander, at the right time. Consequently, you should consider both of these aspects of mobilization. It is your mission to identify shortcomings and consider remedies in those areas in which we can
do a better job of executing the mobilization which will make it possible to fight successfully, assuming that the combat and support units of all components are mission capable.

Another objective governs the structure of our agenda: that of fostering an integrating approach to the theory and practice of mobilization. Mobilization is first and foremost a practical activity: reduced to its essence it is "making the desired thing happen". It therefore requires execution procedures which energize pre-planned actions as a result of decisions made by our nation's leadership. But mobilization entails more than the detailed procedures by which it is executed. It depends also on general methods of doing things, based upon theories of how people act and why they act. It also encompasses systematic concepts designed to maximize the effectiveness of the means used to determine, integrate, and implement that which must be done. In this view, mobilization is an amalgam of the theoretical and the conceptual, the behavioral and the technological. Unfortunately, and with detrimental consequences to mobilization effectiveness, these facets of mobilization have been generally ignored. The scholarly attention thus far accorded to mobilization is not commensurate with either its theoretical interest or its fundamental political-military significance. Military and other scholarly journals are replete with learned articles on strategy, tactics, logistics, training, personnel management, readiness, and similar topics vital to deterrence and war fighting. Yet, very little has been published on the equally crucial topic of mobilization. National and international interest in mobilization is burgeoning, but this heightened attention has not been reflected in the professional or academic literature. Nor is there evident within the field of military scholarship any significant appreciation of mobilization as a necessary and productive avenue of intellectual pursuit, despite the fact that disciplines which are germane to mobilization include: operations research, systems analysis, comparative studies, information science, sociology, political science and psychology. Mobilization practitioners believe that these—and other—disciplines are applicable to mobilization, but specific applications have not been developed because appropriate rigorous research has simply not been undertaken. Nor has there been systematic documentation of the methodological tools which might be brought to bear on the study, analysis, planning and execution of mobilization.

The nature and capability of the Reserve Components and the process by which they are mobilized, are under-represented in the curricula and research activities of most military schools. Consequently, there is insufficient appreciation of the unique character, contribution and mobilization value of the reserve forces. This limited appreciation can be found even among military personnel who prepare operations plans which are dependent upon the effective mobilization of reserve forces.
Comparative studies of reserve forces and their mobilization are practically non-existent despite the fact that the NATO nations have differing reserve and mobilization systems. Nonetheless, I believe that reserve forces as a component of a nation’s overall defense establishment, and the process of their mobilization, involve essential common elements. For example, all reserve forces must be organized, manned, trained, and equipped to enable them to carry out their wartime missions. Likewise, mobilization as a process encompasses certain common features which lend themselves to productive inter-allied study and analysis regardless of differences. To cite but three examples, these include: mobilization decision making and execution in crisis environments; the processing of reserve units and personnel through a system which transforms them from peacetime to wartime status; and the accession of mobilizing units and individuals by the gaining commands of the active force.

This colloquium should encourage systematic analyses of these and other mobilization-related topics that will foster a continuing productive dialogue between the mobilization practitioner and theoretician. Both have vital contributions to make in improving the effectiveness of mobilization—and the Nation’s capability to fight and to prevail should that ever become necessary.

I believe that scholars, especially those who follow a dual career as academicians and members of the Guard or Reserve, can lend valuable assistance to the mobilization practitioners in the Active Component who, ultimately, are responsible for mobilization planning and execution. It is obvious, for example, that a scholar with the expertise acquired during a lifetime in the information sciences, can offer insights into the development of mobilization management information systems which lie beyond the usual skills of an individual who is assigned the normal three or four year tour in a mobilization-related position. By the same token, experts working for civilian contractors may also be well qualified to advance our knowledge in this and other related fields of specializations. This is the first forum in which active, Guard, Reserve, and civilian mobilization practitioners and theoreticians have joined together to examine issues of profound significance to the combat readiness of this nation and of NATO. It has been far too long in coming and, for the sake of military preparedness, I believe that it must not be the last such meeting.

This colloquium’s final unifying theme is the better integration of the mobilization efforts of the Active, Guard, and Reserve Components, and their civilian colleagues who labor in mobilization-related fields. Mobilization planners develop the plans and procedures for mobilizing the units and members of the Guard and Reserve. It is hardly profound to suggest that the planners should have a sound understanding of the
forces to be mobilized, and that those to be mobilized should be participants in the development of mobilization plans. Such a partnership will assure that all contribute their unique experience and expertise to the development of realistic and effective plans and procedures. The degree of cooperation should be enhanced where it now exists, and initiated where it does not, and I look to this colloquium to examine the possibilities and to make recommendations for remedial action. I believe that mobilization-oriented relationships existing between the Defense Department and the academic community can and should be strengthened. This colloquium can bridge the gap which now exists between the two communities and foster the necessary collaboration. I look forward to meeting with you again at the conclusion of your work here, and to reviewing and using the results of this colloquium.
MOBILIZATION OVERVIEW

Dr. John N. Ellison
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As an economist confronting a group of professionals in the manpower field, I am humbled not only by the challenge of mobilization, but by the divergence in terms of orientations of the disciplines involved. I will attempt to bring some coherence to this diversity by discussing how the mobilization community perceives the manpower dimension of strategic resources in general, and how the NATO community might incorporate some of these concepts.

I. The Mobilization Challenge

The people who brought us success in World War II through the War Production Board (WPB) and in military manpower and acquisition management are no longer here to advise us. The 40 years that have intervened between their efforts and today's reality suggest that, not only have we lost sight of some of the fundamentals of human resources requirements determination, we have actually lost sight of the art of management in a crisis.

Today, analysts are returning to the problem of mobilization as an essential element of the overall deterrent posture. To do this there is need to develop not only the managerial structure, which is fairly well along at this point, but also to develop new ideas concerning the management of national resources. These ideas must include appraisal of the changing structure of U.S. industrial development, the strategy-resource mismatch, and coordinated means for directing the overall resources of the NATO Alliance.

When one thinks systematically about mobilization, one has to begin with a careful review of strategic goals and objectives. Unfortunately, the social science approach that tends to drive our strategy usually articulates these objectives in non-concrete/non-quantitative terms. This community generally thinks in terms of resource-free potentialities, while the mobilization community tends to think more in such terms as quantitative manpower availability, machine tools, minerals, stockpiles, and many other more discrete factors as they relate to goals and objectives and to one another.
It is imperative that strategy and resources be brought together in order to develop a more credible calculus for countering threats to U.S. national security. Any country that generates such a threat, whether it's the Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact, or any other threatening entity, has to be concerned initially about its capabilities to generate forces and to bring them to bear effectively. The intentions of such a country also play a key role in determining the degree of threat it poses. If its intentions are aggressive, it must be able to use military capabilities effectively, and this factor may lever a less capable, into an effectively, belligerent power. Additionally, there is a factor which, we as a nation, have only recently become aware of to a significant degree, and that is the capacity of society to maintain a military commitment. Obviously, our experiences in Korea and Vietnam, represent a test of will. Ultimately, this psychological dimension may test the capacity of the nation to commit itself to either an offensive or defensive position and/or involve itself with the security of another.

In considering an appropriate formulation of response to an external threat, the U.S. and the NATO Alliance system generally, should determine a measured response in keeping with available resources. Thus, the counter-force response of the reacting power is a function of the perception of the threat which has been generated, and its own intentions, internal resource capabilities and social capacity to sustain the response.

The perception of threat relates to intelligence assessments, analysis and interpretation. The problem of misperception is a constant danger because the possibility of bias and filtering in transmission, which may invalidate information, is ever-present. The impact of such problems may cause decisionmakers to develop an inappropriate response to the actual threat.

From the mid-1960's until very recently, the response to the Soviet threat was colored by a perception that the Soviets' conventional capabilities were manageable. That perception is changing, based on the quantitative measurement of their capability as well as reflected in various actions and statements of their leadership.

The resources available to achieve appropriate response to threat largely depend on the forces-in-being, both active and reserve, as exemplified by the Total Force military manpower policy now in effect. The mobilization potential of the society, as a whole, is also important, defined as the capability of generating additions to this total force structure.

The three critical variables which must be marshalled are: manpower, industrial base capacity, and the planning system. All three of these areas were covered by General Stilwell this morning in various parts of his talk.

An area of special concern is the shrinking industrial base in the
United States due to the loss of markets to foreign competition which affects our industrial power. While numbers and location of adequate manpower to support a given level of demand for mobilization are fairly well understood, there are serious questions concerning quality and availability of special skills. Also, similar questions regarding the adequacy of critical materials availability, machine tools and industrial facilities, remain unanswered.

Finally, there is a problem with the national policy and emergency resources management system. We have a very complex interagency web of relationships between DoD and agencies within the Executive Branch, including FEMA and the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board (EMPB). Similar problems exist within DoD relating to the coordination of the roles of the Services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the JCS. This is a very complex bureaucratic problem, and the management of it has to be well-integrated if we are to realize the capability our resources permit for mobilization.

II. Status of the U.S. Resources Base

As we enter the next five years, the increased defense buildup designed to correct inadequacies relating to the massive Soviet investment in their armed forces continues to impact on the industrial base. It is estimated that the Soviets have out-invested the U.S. and the Western powers primarily in hardware investment, over the last 10 to 12 years. To correct this and to modernize forces, the current Administration has underway a program of incremental additions to our normal programs amounting to approximately 1.6 to 1.8 billion dollars. This is a controversial decision, but without such an effort, there are serious questions about our military credibility and the adequacy of our response capability if we are, in fact, threatened in the central front in Europe or elsewhere.

To understand the macroeconomic effect of this increase, an historical perspective is valuable. In the mid-1960’s defense expenditure, as a percent of GNP, was slightly over 10 percent for the Vietnam buildup. This dropped as low as 4.6 percent during the mid-point of the Carter Administration. It’s coming back now and it is estimated that by 1987, DoD will be spending about 6.7 percent of GNP. This is a major increase amounting to roughly 50 percent in proportional terms and it affects the overall economy. Based on econometric studies, we believe that industry can absorb this new demand without major bottlenecks in production or an increase in the rate of inflation.

Another way of thinking about this problem is to consider how much slack there is in the economy to absorb the defense buildup. We are currently operating our economy in macro terms at about 80 percent of estimated capacity. We could increase up to 85-90 percent of capacity
before we would reach a serious inflationary threshold in key industrial sectors. Therefore, the ability of the economy, in the aggregate, to absorb the defense buildup as measured in macro-quantitative terms, at present seems to be readily available within macro-resource constraints.

There are, however, a number of less macro problems associated with a major defense buildup of this magnitude which might be triggered by a serious international event creating demands over and above our current commitments. The planning for the Total Force at the moment represents approximately four to five million people, once all force elements are filled. Fully equipping that force would obviously require many billions of dollars in addition to the current defense buildup. If such a buildup were orderly and supported with appropriate fiscal and monetary policies it could reach the planned force capability within the slack or gap in performance that currently exists in the economic base.

However, certain developments in the industrial base do give us pause, and there are major problems that we see in terms of a declining capacity in basic industries including shipbuilding, steel, and the automotive industry. There are extensive studies underway at the Department of Commerce, at FEMA, in the EMPB working group on defense production, as well as in other elements of the Government, which are designed to assess how much of a degradation these structural changes represent in terms of supporting defense requirements.

Now, to give some macro perspective, in World War II, the U.S. had about 40 percent of GNP and 12.5 million people devoted to the military. During the Korean War the U.S. committed 16 percent of GNP and four million people to the defense effort. Vietnam and lesser engagements have placed far smaller demands on the economy. In the case of Vietnam, the incremental military effort amounted to an increase of approximately three percent of GNP over and above the normal program, and about a half-million people were added to the force structure.

The main point to be made here is that the capability of the U.S. to mobilize in an emergency seems to be adequate in terms of macroeconomic capacity. However, an analysis of specific industrial sectors yields a somewhat different picture.

If one analyzes automobile production, one finds that the weight of a car has been reduced by about 16 percent in the five years between 1977 and 1982. It is expected to decrease further during the present decade, amounting to an overall reduction from 3,700 pounds to 2,500 pounds of materials per unit.

This is significant in that it represents both pluses and minuses from a mobilization capacity standpoint. This fact, coupled with the impact of the increased price of gasoline and the new fuel economy standards mandated for industry, have caused: 100,000 gas stations to close; 23 oil
refineries to shut down (with 14 more scheduled to be shut down this year), and about 90 million tons of tanker capacity to be scrapped, world-wide. This has degraded not only military deployability, but also has seriously reduced the basic industrial capability of this country.

Additionally, electrical energy demand went down in real terms—in 1982 by about 2.8 percent for the first time in 40 years in the United States. This past year 92 nuclear reactors have been canceled with 13 more abandoned. This has serious implications for the steel, aluminum, and nonferrous metals industries and concomitantly, has affected the defense industrial base. This means that the nation has a changing industrial structure upon which to rest the current defense buildup as well as its potential emergency preparedness demands.

Due to repeated recessions, the performance of the economy, overall, has been less than desired in recent years. Similarly, in terms of unemployment, growth, and inflation, the U.S. has not been performing well. In terms of international comparisons, the sluggish performance of the U.S. in the last three years is even more striking when measured against Japan. The Japanese 2.2 percent unemployment rate versus 10.5 percent for the U.S., the Japanese growth rate of 3.5 percent versus 2.0 percent for the U.S., and the roughly 3.0 percent Japanese inflation rate versus roughly 5.5 percent for the U.S. suggest that Japan’s position is competitively superior. By contrast, most of our allies have macro problems similar to our own which means that, from an Alliance standpoint, we must take account of our economic environment if we are to support a larger defense effort and counter the growing Soviet threat in the current period. If we want to evolve a structure that is more responsive and capable in an emergency, we must be concerned about these adverse economic trends because they will disincentivize investment, expansion and efficiency gains for the future.

In analyzing the overall balance, for 1981 one finds that the Soviet Union, the PRC and other Communist countries, represent a significant industrial and economic capability which, when matched against the U.S., reflects rough equivalency in a number of important categories—the U.S. balancing the whole of the Communist Bloc. However, when one includes the NATO and other Western oriented partners, the result is a tremendous and overwhelming advantage in industrial terms for the West.

This is very significant because it means that we can, with a much smaller relative effort, counter the best the Soviets can do in terms of economic potential and performance.

The Soviets currently spend about 16 to 18 percent of GNP for defense, and we in the U.S., are approaching the neighborhood of seven percent. Most of our allies, except for West Germany, are more in the range of three percent of GNP. By contrast, the Japanese, who spend a
little less than one percent of GNP on defense, have a substantially un-
tapped capability to contribute to the defense of the West. This means
that the West has a tremendous potential for supporting incremental or
surge increases in defense efforts, either in an emergency, or for a
defense buildup in peacetime. But there are collateral economic prob-
lems with this strategy in that the technological lead that some of our
partners have evolved, which strengthening the alliance as a whole,
degraded the unilateral economic position of the U.S. in some key indus-
trial sectors.

One reflection of this imbalance is shown in the fact that at the cur-
rent time, the Japanese have about 14,000 major robotic installations in
place, while the U.S. has only about 4,000 such systems. By 1995, it is
expected that the U.S. will approach 15,000 units, while the Japanese
will have somewhere on the order of 45,000 installed units.

This expectation suggests that if, in fact, these patterns eventuate,
the U.S. will have to make new arrangements to make sure that
Japanese production makes some greater contribution to the Western
Alliance in order to avoid an imbalance in defense burdens. Since there
is no formal agreement for this purpose between the U.S. and Japan, or
with our allies in Europe, much needs to be done in terms of redefining
our coalition strategy to square with economic realities. However, it is
quite clear that the industrial lead of the West, in totality, is significant
and could easily counter the Soviet capability in the future, provided
these developmental trends are taken into account.

Now, with the foregoing as background, there are problems in the
manpower area which more directly relate to the focus of this collo-
quium. These problems relate to skills, particularly in areas like key
machinists, tool and die makers, and other important blue collar skill
areas inherent in the industrial scene. Using 1974 as a baseline for full
employment of tool makers and machinists for key industries support-
ing defense, by 1980 employment for this sector was down to 53 percent
and, thus, it is an aging labor force which remains for this sector of
industry.

In response, the U.S. has a major retraining effort ahead if it is to
maintain the efficiencies of our current defense producers and develop
an adequate pool of civil manpower in these same skill areas. Some ef-
forts are underway to develop retraining programs and thereby enhance
the manpower available to our key defense contractors. Several key con-
tractors are cooperating with educational leaders in Southern California
to produce a more adequate supply of critical skills but much more
needs to be done at the national level.

III. The Development of U.S. Mobilization Policy

To fill in the background as to how the U.S. has regenerated an in-
terest in industrial capability and preparedness, it is necessary to begin with the famous NIFTY NUGGET Exercise of 1978, in which many leaders began to be concerned about dimensions of the nation's resource position and the mobilization problem.

As General Silwell has pointed out in this meeting, the key development that flowed from that Exercise was the recognition that the national capabilities for deployment and sustainment of our forces in Western Europe and elsewhere are inadequate. As a result, many initiatives have been taken by DoD to improve the system for acquiring additional assets for lift and sustainment items and commodities.

Relatedly, a growing number of policy officials have become aware of mobilization issues, interagency problems, and key resource constraints on defense mobilization. From that DoD experience, a number of other interagency and interdepartmental developments have emerged. Within DoD, there is now a Mobilization and Deployment Steering Group that was initiated in 1979 and revitalized with the coming into office of the Reagan Administration. Presently this body is very actively engaged in a wide range of policy analysis and planning reform activities. Similarly, the military Services, JCS and OSD are heavily committed to making that coordinating body work.

In the interagency structure, the previous Administration established the Federal Emergency Management Agency, or FEMA, which was designed to pull together civil crisis and preparedness management in an operating and planning interagency context, and FEMA continues to evolve. It's a very complex and difficult organizational task to structure, and changes are constantly underway to improve FEMA's linkage to DoD. FEMA must not only accommodate DoD requirements but reconcile them with critical civilian requirements.

Presidential Directive 57, issued during the latter months of the Carter Administration, set out the course of action to return the Executive Branch and DoD to a major emphasis on mobilization as an element in our deterrent equation. This was a very important step because, until that time, the White House had been virtually silent on such issues for more than 20 years.

Following these developments, improvements were experienced and subsequently tested during the PROUD SPIRIT/REX Exercises conducted in 1980-81. These exercises have begun to bring FEMA into a closer linkage with DoD in fitting total requirements into realistic resource availabilities.

In 1981, the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board (EMPB) was formed as a senior-level policy organization placed in the White House staff, and formerly chaired by the Judge Clark, now by Mr. McFarland, both National Security Advisors to the President. This has resulted in a much more realistic play of the PROUD SABER Exercise...
in 1982, as well as promulgation of the National Security Decision Directive No. 47. This landmark measure represents a major Presidential policy commitment to fully integrated Federal planning for mobilization and emergency preparedness. NSDD No. 47, has driven the development of an Agency-wide Federal Action Plan which is about to be completed, linking all of the departments and agencies in a web of preparedness commitments.

On the international scene similar improvements in mobilization and preparedness relationships are evolving in NATO, linking the U.S. and European allies in a more coherent approach to mobilization and emergency preparedness planning. In the mobilization field there will be follow-on meetings throughout 1984 addressing the NATO WINTEX/CIMEX-85 Exercise in order to bring into its major events opportunities to test new modalities for civil-military cooperation on mobilization and emergency preparedness throughout NATO.

Mobilization may be conceived of as an orderly series of events that have to occur in sequence in order to obtain a predetermined degree of support for national security objectives. Preplanned responses to warning are essential for generating forces, deploying them, sustaining them, and achieving either deterrence or a successful war-fighting outcome. Hopefully, potential conflicts can be resolved short of a nuclear escalation. Such outcomes may well depend on the effectiveness of mobilization doctrine and perceptions of potential adversaries of both capabilities and policies governing their application. If this logic is followed, the U.S. must have, at least, minimal warning in order for mobilization decisions to be effective. Next, a response strategy and mobilization doctrine are required. To be effective, the adversary must believe the U.S. intends to use conventional forces, if possible, rather than let events flow inevitably to a nuclear confrontation.

Recently much has been done to restructure our thinking regarding mobilization doctrine. Attendees of this conference will hear a number of speakers, following this talk, who will concentrate on various dimensions of the manpower aspect of emergency preparedness planning. In addition, and more to your direct interest, the manpower and industrial capabilities of the U.S. must be well-managed if we are to achieve the right effect both in terms of force generation and deterrence of nuclear conflict.

To accomplish this, it is important to recognize the imperative for organizing an effective system that allows adequate warning, specifies doctrinal linkages, and prioritizes the allocation of resources in an efficient and effective pattern. If these things can be planned properly to achieve our national purposes, the U.S. should be able to generate forces sufficient to avoid a nuclear conflict and, perhaps, even deter conventional war if the threat is imposed on the nation.
IV. Issues in Emergency Manpower Planning

In order to maximize the contribution to be derived from the U.S. manpower pool, long-range demographic trends must be understood and a dynamic model constructed which would capture the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of manpower developments, both here and with respect to our allies. Such a data base and modeling capability would go a long way toward clarifying the options national leaders should consider in a crisis.

The second issue which needs to be addressed is that war planning and contingency strategy need not only look at budget and procurement issues, but to address the same requirements in terms of a manpower budget. Such an approach would assess a mobilization and buildup in terms of lost civil activity and gains required in defense production that must be achieved. There is a need to take a good, hard look at whether or not mobilization planning is realistic in manpower terms. I don’t think that we really have a good fix on that anywhere within the DoD or interagency community.

There are various civil agencies that have partial responsibilities here, but there is not enough integration among their efforts to give a macro strategic picture, especially in terms of essential civilian services. The EMPB and the White House Staff may force DoD to compete analytically if it is to achieve the manpower buildup it deems required. Proving the case for granting priority for defense manpower needs may come into sharp conflict with other competing agencies providing essential civil emergency services.

Another issue concerns roles and missions of Reserve Components. There is a need for a more explicit articulation of the advantages of the Total Force concept in a mobilization emergency. Unlike the justification in peacetime, reserve forces may have special advantages in wartime. Not only do they have special advantages over conscription in terms of rapid mobilization and integration into force structures, but they also represent a cost-effective approach to the maintenance of adequate force structure. However activation of Reserve and National Guard units should seek to avoid the undue disruption of local labor patterns.

If, in peacetime, routine plans for filling the planned force are developed, Reserve Components may then have special utility. Once this is recognized, reserve forces may perhaps weigh quite differently in the strategic equation. For instance, there are wholly new populations that we might tap for military purposes which are not traditionally thought of as prime contributors to defense forces.

Examples of such populations are the retired military manpower pool and civilians that are above the normal recruitment ages. These persons could be brought into service as reserves in a crisis and could serve in a
limited military or support role. When options are analyzed objectively in cost-benefit terms, they should prove to be attractive alternatives in managing the nation's manpower resources.

Another issue that needs carefully developed analysis and policy consideration is the balancing of macro civil and military manpower needs. Except for occasional exercises, FEMA and DoD tend to plan without a great deal of communication among manpower planning Agencies. Effective manpower policy formulation and allocation actions require a broader dialogue if effective balancing of civil and military requirements is to be accomplished. For instance, if a telecommunications reserve unit from a small town is activated and takes away all of the telephone installers for the Air Force Reserve or the Air National Guard, there may very well be local communications problems which may impact adversely on Defense production and/or other parts of the crisis management and communication systems.

The point here is that much more needs to be done in terms of preparing to systematically reconcile conflicting claims for scarce manpower, particularly in critical skill areas, in order to optimize on manpower utilization.

V. NATO Manpower Planning Considerations

With respect to NATO-specific manpower issues, there are some unique problems that could be addressed in a preemptive way through better coordination. The goal of such activity should be to maximize the overall manpower utilization and effectiveness and thereby capitalize on the potential of the Alliance as a whole. Better coordination of manpower policies might be achieved if some organizational changes were made both in Washington and in Brussels. Greater attention to coordination of accelerated conscription and time-phasing of Reserve Force activation and deployment might be emphasized as a common Alliance-wide responsibility. Certainly, establishment of training and readiness standards that are uniform for the combined force, as opposed to nationally-generated, would be helpful.

In a similar vein, the joint and combined war planning and operational planning community generally does not address the manpower dimension of planning with the centrality it deserves. The CINC staffs, for example, generally depend on the Services to provide the necessary forces and manpower to the component commands in the region. The question of whether or not some manpower limitation will ultimately prevent full deployment and/or sustainment of those forces due to either demographic or competing claims, while a concern, is seldom uppermost in the minds of staff war planners.

To overcome this deficiency, there is a need for the timely communication of manpower status earmarked for the command availabil-
ity. Most of the major headquarters, and particularly those in Europe, have no single office or dedicated manpower reporting system for this needed statistical assessment. Such an activity might maintain data and models for assessing the manpower balances and for forecasting availability for the component forces assigned to NATO.

Such an agency might also address the need for bringing about and maintaining a public affairs effort to make sure that the populations in each of the contributing countries understand and support inherent NATO manpower commitments. This function might become critical in a broad range of NATO emergencies.

Finally, the operational implications of the planned utilization of military and civil Reserves for logistic support in NATO is another dimension of Alliance manpower realities which is often overlooked. Since the Alliance depends on the host nations in Europe to provide most of the logistics through-put for NATO deployment and reinforcement and since each country has its own individual programs for logistical support, the smooth functioning of the logistical system may ultimately depend on coherent manpower action as much as any other factor.

The bottom line is that, while commitments and pledges of adequate logistical support are there, it is not clear whether or not there is overall harmony in manpower planning for host nation support of NATO logistics operations. Similarly, there is a need for coordinated planning for balancing civil and military demands for manpower in the NATO context. Perhaps the most effective means for assessing the implications of such concerns lies in the exercise arena. The forthcoming WINTEX/CIMEX-85 might be utilized as an assessment vehicle because of the high level of interest and NATO-wide play planned for that particular simulation.

All of the actions described above, when taken in sum, would greatly improve the data system for reporting and assessing NATO-wide manpower balances and capabilities. The efforts suggested would be very helpful in anticipating manpower problems before they actually impact on successful NATO deployments, reinforcements and operations.

In view of the foregoing, perhaps the time has come for the development of a standing committee to work on NATO-wide manpower policy formulation, analysis and allocation systems. In addition, such a broadly gauged group might view the red-blue balance uniquely in manpower terms, establish guidelines that might develop into commitments for the member countries to generate Total Force components according to a more common and systematic pattern, and eventually evolve into a more uniform Reserve Component activation and conscription strategy. Such a group might develop carefully harmonized timetables and synthetically test such manpower plans through exercises and computer analysis.
The complexity of harmonizing civil manpower allocation systems might also be examined. The reality that each NATO country has a different history, a different culture, and a different set of national social objectives that cut across both industrial and military needs for manpower, might be better understood and more appropriately factored into the equation. In the last analysis, NATO's response to the Eastern Bloc threat has to come from an enlightened strategy and resources management system. Ensuring that we effectively and efficiently apply all categories of Alliance resources, both industrial and manpower, to the problem of deterrence is essential to this outcome.

In recent years, the U.S. and its NATO partners have initiated a number of sophisticated programs to deal with industrial aspects of this challenge. We must now turn our attention more explicitly to the manpower base that has to uniquely support both the military and industry. I believe that the meeting today and the representation of all of the groups present suggests that there is a growing sense that NATO's strategic interest is very vitally affected by the success with which we address the manpower dimension of our international security interests.
MOBILIZATION FROM A JOINT PERSPECTIVE

Colonel Michael Cluff, USMC
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My approach today is to give you an understanding of where the Joint Staff fits into the community involved in mobilization. It’s really a healthy area right now, and I’m very enthusiastic because we have a breath of fresh air that’s come into this area. I also think we are beginning to sense this in the mobilization community as highlighted by these sessions sponsored by MCDC and the National Defense University.

My purpose today is to examine how the Joint Staff plays in the national mobilization environment. Then I want to talk a little bit about where mobilization plays in the overall military environment. I will then get into where the joint perspective comes into this environment. Specifically, as far as the planning is concerned, I will discuss some of the options that we might have and how we play in the event of a mobilization.

I’d like to start off with a common definition. The reason is there are some key words here. Webster defines mobilize: “To assemble and make ready for war.” One key aspect here, of course, is “assemble”; the major military effort needed to deploy forces, and one which the Joint Chiefs of Staff are very much involved in.

The other key word is really what mobilization is all about, “making ready” for the business of war. It may be a hard fact to swallow in some circles, but that’s what it’s all about.

I wear this uniform and I have to be prepared to fight, and that’s what we have to think about in mobilization. It’s more than just waging war, it is also a form of deterrence. We can use our ability to mobilize, provided we have the capability, or at least we need to give the perception that we have the capability, to go to war and mobilize our forces to fight.

With this capability, surely our enemy is going to look at us from a little different perspective.

The other thing is that we sometimes have a tendency to scope mobilization with a very narrow focus. I think this is the natural tendency because our focus is based on our background. I look back at my childhood and remember living on a farm and thinking about the one...
great mobilization example we had, which was of course during World War II. I can remember my uncle going off to war, we could not get parts for the tractor and we had to keep driving the horses in the field, we were rationed, we were all energized as school children in our little drills, and the other things we went through. That's a country environment and the perspective which emerged.

Then I moved into the city of Detroit. My father was a State Policeman. He was involved in the protection of the city during the time of air raids, and he was involved in plant protection. I can remember neighbors going off to war and the blackouts at night. Here I gained another perspective. So I know that all of you will have these different perspectives as you think about mobilization.

I think of mobilization as a major evolution, and not just confined to the military. It is a national problem. If we don't think of it on a national basis, I think we're in trouble.

I look at military mobilization as including all of these elements: manpower, industrial preparedness, transportation, materiel/equipment, medical, facilities, host nation support offsets and C3. Of course manpower is really the most critical and vital national resource and it is the one we think about the most. However, I want you to understand right up front that's not all there is to mobilization. It's not just bringing the Reserves onto active duty, it is much more.

Industrial preparedness plays a major role and I think there's been more and more time spent on it. As a matter of fact, the Joint Staff had no one working this area until last year. We brought one officer aboard, and now we are getting involved. We are playing a role with OSD. We've got more people planned to get involved in this area.

Industrial preparedness involves knowing what is in our industrial base and knowing how long we can sustain the war fighting effort through the industrial base that we have.

Another element, of course, is transportation. The JCS plays very heavily in this area, trying to get the resources together for deployment. We have developed a new agency, the Joint Deployment Agency, to work this function so that we can pull all of these national resources together in the event of a mobilization and, in fact, get our troops to the assembly point. It's better to take the troops to the fight than the fight to the troops.

Materiel and equipment, supplies and readiness, are areas which all of us in the Joint Staff are concerned about because we need at some point to say, "Yes, sir, we're ready," and we have to do that with a certain amount of authority. The only way we can is to understand what's going on in other areas of mobilization.

Another mobilization area is medical. A major effort is ongoing in the area of medical resources. Here the Emergency Mobilization
Preparedness Board (EMPB) is doing a masterful job in this area. If we were to mobilize this nation, what would happen in the event that we were to take casualties. It's quite a problem, because when casualties are involved, emotions come into play and we respond differently. A crisis takes on new meaning. Those of you who have been in a combat situation and you've taken casualties know how the tenor of the action changes the minute the first man is hit. It's something that we have to keep in mind because we're very concerned about how we handle our casualties and this will impact on a mobilization effort.

What is the status of our military facilities? How can we house our troops once we've mobilized them? Have we got the maintenance facilities? Do we have the bed-down facilities? All of these things are involved in the mobilization process.

Host nation support is vital to any mobilization scenario. We depend on our allied nations. When we do our planning, we must take into consideration the capabilities our allies have and know how they can support our effort.

The last item is command, control and communications. For most of us this has been an area where it is easy to find fault. Up front, we need to get communications systems energized so that they can help us control all that is involved in the mobilization process. I'm sure if you check off in your mind all of the things that are involved in command and controlling a mobilization effort, it would be a lot more than you would first think.

I'd like to talk a little about the individuals I work for. They are the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the Chairman being the focal point in that he represents them through the Secretary of Defense to the National Command Authority, the President. It is through the Chairman that the President gets advice on military aspects of mobilization and it is the Chairman who says, "Mr. President, we can support that plan. We can mobilize and sustain the force and we can fight and win."

The staff supporting the Chairman, is the Joint Staff, and I may be a little tutorial here to make sure you understand this relationship when we discuss the military services and DoD in the national mobilization environment. I represent and work on this staff that is involved in preparing the Joint Chiefs to make their recommendations to the National Command Authority regarding mobilization and the degree of mobilization needed to support the war planning effort. The OSD staff works mobilization from a broader perspective and not so specifically tied to war planning.

Now let's look at mobilization from a national perspective and see where the Joint Staff fits into the picture. The definition in the JCS Publication Number One, to define the national view of mobilization is: "Preparing for war/emergencies through assembling/organizing national resources."
From a national perspective, we have two sectors including the civil emergency area, where emergency planning focuses on things like floods, earthquakes and civil disturbances. The JCS is involved here by making military support available when necessary, but more focus is given to this area by OSD. The second sector is the defense emergency area, which deals with the war fighting side of mobilization, with planning emphasis in the Defense Department, and with the national security crisis side of mobilization. The two really go together, and a lot of times they're hard to separate, but we will look at them as separate issues. It is in this military sector that we look at the national interest and the enemy threat.

In this national environment, the focus is the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board (EMPB). This Board has the following functions and responsibilities:

- Formulation of Policy Recommendations
- Development of Policy/Fiscal Guidance to Implement National Plan of Action
- Resolution of Mobilization Preparedness Issues

The EMPB is chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Board membership is comprised of senior officials at the Deputy Secretary level from all the major federal agencies. Some of these agencies include: Agriculture, CIA, FEMA, Justice, OMB, NSC, OPM and Treasury. This Board highlights the fact that there's a lot to mobilization than just military aspects. Those who think that that's all there is to mobilization are mistaken.

Once you get all of these Board players together, you've got a group of people who can do something about mobilization. This is the forum that we need to make sure that things move forward. And that's what's happening at the direction of the President right now. He has signed a National Security Decision Directive and a plan of action that lays down various milestones directing how we're going to get from here to there in mobilization. We've got our roadmap, and we're ready to work the problem.

I would also like to point out some of the working groups that are a subset to the EMPB. I'll list some of them so that you can see the issues that are being addressed by the Board. (See Table 1) I also want to point out where the Joint Staff and the OSD play. We have representation on the Board from both the OSD with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the Director of the Joint Staff. Together we work most of the Board's activities. The OSD, the civilian side of the house, plays on all of these working groups. The JCS limits its activity to military mobilization matters which affect war planning. These include the emergency communications area because of the Defense Communications Agency and we also involve ourselves in civil
defense. Actions in these other areas are addressed by subworking
groups where we play an active role and have membership.

**TABLE 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DESIGNATION</th>
<th>DEPARTMENT/AGENCY CHAIR</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Defense</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Earthquakes</td>
<td>Office of Science and Technology Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic Stabilization &amp; Public Finance</td>
<td>Treasury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Communications</td>
<td>Defense/Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food-Agriculture</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government Operations</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
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<td>Health</td>
<td>Health and Human Services</td>
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<td>Human Resources</td>
<td>Labor</td>
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<td>Industrial Mobilization</td>
<td>Commerce</td>
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<td>Law Enforcement and Public Safety</td>
<td>Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Mobilization</td>
<td>Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>Health and Human Services</td>
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</tbody>
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Now I'd like to take us down into the military side of emergency
mobilization. Let's look at another definition out of the same publica-
tion, (JCS Pub. 1), as we consider the military side of mobilization:
"Mobilization is the process by which the Armed Forces or part of them
are brought to a state of readiness for war/national emergency. This in-
cludes assembling/organizing personnel, supplies, and material for ac-
tive military service." Remember, we are still dealing in the national
mobilization environment.

Our view now is from a military perspective. Here is where the distinc-
tion and the dividing line comes between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
what we refer to as the military departments. We have military depart-
ments, and they include the Secretary of Army, Navy and Air Force.
This is the civilian side which provided the direction in resource man-
agement. They are involved in manning the force, they are involved in
equipping the force, and they are involved in training that force to make
it ready to fight.

Now, on the other side of the house, we have the JCS and the CINCs,
and I refer to this as the war fighting operational side. Here is where the
operational direction takes place.

You should remember the Services are not involved in the chain of
command for employing forces. This is done through the JCS, to the
CINCs, from the National Command Authority, with the Secretary of
Defense included in that chain. The authorities within this chain pro-
vides the national direction. I think you have to understand this distinc-
tion so you know where the Joint Staff fits into the mobilization picture.

What is the Joint Staff's most important role? Our most important
role, of course, is operational planning to fight the forces. Therefore, the
JCS role in mobilization is focused on the warfighting requirements for mobilization. The equipping and the training and the manning side of mobilization is done by the Services, through the military departments. What we, the Joint Staff, need to do is ensure that the CINC operational plans are being supported in the Service mobilization plans.

Now mobilization from a joint perspective. The JCS play the role between the Services on one side and the CINCs on the other. On the CINC side we find OPLAN execution. Plans are written for every major geographic area. We then review these plans to see how well the Services have performed in their role of OPLAN support by providing mobilization assets to meet the CINC’s requirements. The Services are also responsible for readiness and sustainability which I’ll mention later.

A major function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff results from having more than one CINC. There are nine Unified and Specified commands. What happens when two or three CINCs are involved in an operation at the same time? When we develop into a crisis situation where we have limited assets, the question is, how do we apply them? It then becomes the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to allocate resources to the most critical areas. This in the mobilization process involves determining who gets what forces and when. But before this decision is made, we must determine what we are mobilizing for and what are we going to do with the forces that we have to employ. It begs the question, mobilize what to do what?

Whatever the mobilization scenario, we are going to have a shortage of resources in many areas, not only manpower. It’s the hard allocation decision as to where and what force we want to employ, and where is the priority. That recommendation comes from the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Secretary of Defense to the National Command Authority. The mobilization process hinges on this decision.

The war fighting drivers are the Unified and Specified commands. They tell the JCS what they need to fight their war plans. The JCS reviews these war plans and matches resources to requirements based on priority.

Now let’s review how the Joint Chiefs of Staff fit into the mobilization planning process. The planning process begins with the threat. This is where the CINCs analyze the threat in their geographic area. Based upon this analysis, CINC mobilization requirements are generated and passed through component commanders to the Services and to the JCS. These mobilization needs in broad terms are passed to the National Command Authority for consideration. The decision is made by the President and the results come back almost through the same chain. In this process the JCS becomes the equalizer between competing demands generated by the threat.
The Chairman of the JCS’ role is to make sure that we on the Joint Staff support the initiatives of the CINCs, the Commanders in Chief of the fighting force. We are, in fact, the CINCs representatives in the mobilization planning environment. This role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is becoming more evident. In the past, the Commander who had to fight had little input into the budget or the mobilization planning process. This is changing now as the Joint Staff looks more carefully at the CINCs mobilization warfighting needs to insure they are included in the various Service budgets.

A key document in the planning process is the Joint Strategic Capability Plan (JSCAP). (See Table 2). This is the overall plan which the Joint Chiefs of Staff would rely on in the event of a mobilization to determine gross requirements. This document is published and updated annually, and under continual review. This plan is passed to the CINCs. The CINCs then do their planning based on what is in the Joint Strategic Capability Plan. The component commands, (Service commands in each CINC), support their respective CINCs by making the forces available and by insuring their forces are trained, equipped and supplied.

This then is in very general terms the planning process we go through. It’s much more involved than described, but it follows this path except when you get in the crisis mode. Even then we still use much of the same general process except that the time is compressed.

Now, I want to show you where mobilization fits into the overall JCS planning process. The mobilization plans, as far as the JSCAP is concerned, is contained in an annex called Annex N “Mobilization.” In this annex we give the CINCs a general feel for what they plan to fight the war from the mobilization base.

The Services, in turn, write their own mobilization plans based on Annex N and other annexes in the JSCAP and provide their input to the component commands that support the CINCs. This is generally the thread and the pattern which is followed in the mobilization planning process. It may appear complex. This appearance is mainly because each Service has a little different approach to their planning because they each have a little different problem, depending on where and how they fight the war.

The biggest problem in the mobilization community from a Service standpoint is the problem the Army faces. They have a lot more involved in mobilization as far as numbers of people and the overall effort is concerned. None of the Services’ mobilization tasks are easy, but the Army has the biggest concerns because of magnitude.

Now a little bit about the mobilization options we have to work with. First of all, you’ve probably heard about the 100 thousand call-up or the 100K call-up. The 100K is a Presidential authority where it is not
necessary to claim a national emergency. We like to think of it as a precursor to mobilization.

We would like to get enough warning time available so that we could bring up these 100,000 reservists to assist in the mobilization planning process. This would include those people who would go to your various home stations, to help in-process Reserves, those who set up aerial ports for the Air Force, or those needed to man the mine sweepers for the Navy, because most of the mine sweeping capability in our force today resides in the Reserves. There are a host of other things that we could allocate under 100K call-up to energize the mobilization system. The JCS allocates this force based on various scenarios as related to specific geographic areas. Now, if the balloon goes up, we'll have to look at that again, but for planning purposes, we have the 100K allocated. It's said that that really isn't mobilization, but I can assure you the
minute they start moving 100,000 reserves, somebody's going to get the signal that you're mobilizing.

The 100K is the first of the mobilization options to consider in the event mobilization is necessary. The next option, partial mobilization is done by the President. Here he can get up to a million Reserves for a period of 24 months. If the President does it, under his authority he must declare a national emergency.

I would suspect in today's environment he's not likely to do this. I think he would probably take it to the next step where he gains a little more duration with the million call-up by getting Congress to declare the national emergency. Partial mobilization is accomplished within the existing structure of the Reserve Component.

When you take everybody that's in the reserve force, and you mobilize them, it is referred to as “full mobilization.” This is everybody to the last person in the Reserve Component. Here we have some more limitations. First, we need to get a Congressional declaration of national emergency. When we bring in all of the Reserve Components, we then need all the supplies and equipment to support them. Here again we need Congress's blessing for funding. This action provides the Reserves for the duration of the emergency plus six months.

The next option we have as far as mobilization is concerned would be the “total mobilization.” The option that we have to plan for is a worse case scenario. In this case we have a mobilization effort which goes beyond our existing force structure. This is where we are heavily committed in all areas of mobilization, particularly industrial mobilization as well as having the manpower available to support this whole effort.

This action represents a whole new mobilization ballgame once we go beyond our existing force structure. Again, it requires a declaration of national emergency from the Congress to get to this level and expend the force in total mobilization.

Now I would like to transition and talk to you about the vital area of industrial preparedness. In the recent past, industrial preparedness was treated as a non problem because of the short war planning that was being done. In this planning environment the first thing you're going to do, once the enemy forces started coming across through our defenses was to realize that you're either going to have to throw up your hands and surrender or press the big button. What's the sense of having any mobilization plans in that war planning environment? Surely sustainment is not an issue in the short war scenario.

Because of this thinking, industrial mobilization was not important. What's the sense of planning beyond a few days? We generally thought in terms of days of supply, and not sustainment for periods of months and years? As a result, the industrial base was sold off. Owners of the industrial base recognized they had to shrink their brick and mortar and
exist with smaller facilities. New manufacturing technologies were introduced into production lines so that they would become very efficient and could be operated on a 24-hour basis. No room was planned for expansion and we were now forced to live in a production environment driven by economics not the enemy threat or national security. This greatly limited our ability to sustain the force.

What is the sense of putting our forces into combat if you can’t sustain it or if they are not ready to be employed. These two areas, readiness and sustainability, are now receiving higher priority today from our military planners. These planners are very much involved in trying to energize the system to make our priorities known. Our planning must key on getting our forces ready to fight and then the natural follow on, sustaining them once deployed.

The first of our two key “Pillars of Defense,” readiness in mobilization terms is generally measured by what’s on hand today; what’s in the supply bins. The argument in the planning community involves how much do we spend on stocking the on hand bin-supplies. One side of the argument says, “Let’s fill up the bins to provide for the fight and forget about the industrial capacity because you can only fight until the bullets run out.” So bullets become the limiting factor. Therefore, let’s not spend our money on industrial preparedness because it detracts from immediate readiness initiatives. The Joint Staff position is to try and force a balance between the two positions. We agree you need the bins stocked, but not at the total expense of industrial preparedness.

The second pillar is sustainability which relates to sustaining the force once employed in terms generally beyond the availability of stocked supplies and material. We know that it’s not practical to develop three-year war bins. That just isn’t going to happen and we recognize that. In reality, to sustain forces we must plan for sustainability. Included must be plans to improve our industrial capabilities so we can supply the force after the bins are empty. Our planning and emphasis on sustainability must be consistent. We can’t put all our emphasis on either readiness or sustainability. They should be treated in balance, with sustainability viewed as an extension of readiness.

Well, I’ve moved pretty fast through the time available, I hope that I have conveyed to you a little about mobilization from the Joint perspective. Our ability to mobilize is vital to this nation’s ability to survive. I hope you now have some idea of the role of the Joint Staff in the mobilization environment. It is a fairly new role, and a role I am very enthusiastic about. I feel confident in the direction mobilization is going now as all levels of government are getting involved. We have the direction, now we all have to pull together to make it work should the day come we are called to mobilize for the security of this great country.
COLLOQUIUM ISSUES

A. ADP Systems
B. Alert Procedures
C. Alignment of Reserve Component Units with Active Component Gaining Commands
D. Presidential 100,000 Call-Up Authority (10 USC 673B)
E. Criteria for Waiver or Delay of Recall Orders
F. Family Support Provisions Following Mobilization
G. Providing More Information on, and Encouraging Research and Publication about, the Guard and Reserve and their Mobilization.
H. Legal Authority to Recall Retired Personnel
I. Mobilization of the Guard and Reserve: Its Impact Upon Scarce Skills in the Labor Force
J. More Effective Use of Retirees as Mobilization Assets
K. Readiness Assessment of Reserve Component Units
L. Remote Site Operations
M. Training Requirements as a Function of Deployment Schedules
N. Use of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)
O. Use of Reservist’s Civilian Skills

ISSUE A: ADP Systems

1. Statement of Issue:
   Computer technology can be a great aid to mobilization planning and execution.

2. Discussion:
   Planning and execution of mobilization of the Total Force is a complicated and difficult process. Computer assistance is mandatory. All Services have ADP systems to assist at various levels of sophistication but all are not equally effective. They clearly have application in mobilization planning, training, execution, and assessment. Use of a unified approach to mobilization planning, a systems development could improve mobilization potential for all reserve components. Compatible data bases and reporting capabilities would provide an ability to communicate more effectively among commands and Services. There truly is a great potential for computer-assisted training—both ad-
ministrative as well as direct training. The gaining command could use the individual computer record in planning assignments, assessing the need for training and conducting the training.

3. Summary/Recommendations:
   a. Emphasize ADP applications for IRR and IMA program management.
   b. Improve ADP system compatibility among the Services.
   c. Improve format and informational content.
   d. Expand data base to include civilian skills.
   e. Study data bases and systems to improve potential for using computers as training aids.

4. References/Bibliography:


ISSUE B: Alert Procedures

1. Statement of Issue:

   Alert procedures hamper quick notification of guard and reserve units and individual members.

2. Discussion:

   Total force policy integrates mobilization of early response Active and Reserve Components. For early deployment of units, immediate notification of unit members must be made. Procedures must be in place which make selection, approval, and notification of units to be mobilized simple and quick. Similarly, procedures must be adopted which makes fast notification of individual unit members possible. Discussion indicates that selection and approval of units to be mobilized is not as simple as would be desired. Reliance on the telephone for notification of individuals is a lengthy process and in a real emergency, an impossibility. It is believed that the telephone system will not be able to handle the load that will be imposed, so alternative means need to be devised. The current prohibition on use of electronic media for a call-up announcement precludes a valuable potential for immediate widespread notification. As in any exercise, improvements can be made by practice.

3. Summary/Recommendations:

   a. Means need to be found to speed selection, approval, and notification of units being mobilized. Delegation of decision to lowest level
possible, within allowed manpower levels, should be considered. Early message and telephonic notification to mobilized unit command should be made to start “call-up” of individuals.

b. Constraints on use of electronic media should be removed to permit effective, immediate notification of early recall units and for their individual members after Commands receive notification to mobilize.

c. Practice alerts should be held during the week without prior warning.

4. References/Bibliography:

Boesch, G. Robert. "'A Day Late—A Dollar Short': A Unit Level Perspective on Mobilization." November 1983. (Paper B-1)

Hartley, James W. "Mobilizing the Naval Air Reserve." November 1983. (Paper B-2)


ISSUE C: Alignment of Reserve Component Units with Active Component Gaining Commands

1. Statement of Issue:

Optimal readiness of Reserve and Guard units can only be obtained when these units are aligned with Active Component gaining commands which provide the total interface necessary for realistic mission preparedness.

2. Discussion:

Without the gaining unit interface, Reserve Components are essentially rudderless, required to base training and preparedness on a general mission void of sufficient detail to spur rigorous and detailed response. This premise transcends service boundaries advocating that all Active Components be assigned gaining unit commands.

Responsibilities of the gaining unit command must be clearly stated and understood, to include provision of the following information to the support Reserve Component unit: mission, Commander’s guidance, war and deployment plans, intelligence, SOPs, training guidance, and administrative and logistical procedures. The interface properly extends far beyond these initial requirements to involve day-to-day interaction to offset distance and time factors to promote readiness.

Because of their dependence on Reserve Component supporting units and their immediate direct knowledge of requirements, the Active Component gaining command should be the primary testing element and readiness evaluator for Reserve Component units. Inherent in this authority is the responsibility to assist in the establishment of a
realistic training program and joint participation in field exercises. Adequate testing requires assessment of the effectiveness of the Reserve Component unit as part of the total force within which it operates.

The Active Component gaining command must recognize conflicts in requirements between the peace-time Reserve Component command structure and war-time gaining command authority. Resolution of such conflicts requires cooperative study between the two commands with special attention to establishment of a reasonable and mutually supporting total mission on the RC units involved.

3. Summary/Recommendations:

Recommend that a position paper be prepared by OASD/RA to detail all aspects of Reserve Component/Active Component alignment programs such as the Army's CAPSTONE for distribution to the Services as an instrument for study of extending these alignments to all Reserve Component units.

4. References/Bibliography:

Isaac, Albert G. “Roundout Brigade Integration Into an Active Army Division.” November 1983. (Paper C-1)


ISSUE D: Presidential 100,000 Call-Up Authority (10 USC 673B)

1. Statement of Issue:

Opportunities may exist for increasing the planning flexibility associated with the Call-Up Authority.

2. Discussion:

Under current planning procedures, the Services have received allocations under the 100,000 Call-Up Authority. It is not clearly understood how the Services would deal with requirements which would be significantly in excess of their allocation. Moreover, many members of the Guard and Reserve, as well as certain Active force personnel, are not sufficiently familiar with planning procedures used in conjunction with the authority.

3. Summary/Recommendations:

It is recommended that OASD/RA and OJCS jointly review the 100,000 Presidential Call-Up authority planning procedures to (1) ensure that they are sufficiently flexible to meet the requirements of the
supported commanders, and (2) to ascertain whether information/orientation materials regarding the Authority should be provided members of the Guard and Reserve.

4. References/Bibliography:


Turkelson, Morris, J. “Mobilization and the Guard and Reserve: The Unit, the Service Headquarters, and the Joint Command.” November 1963. (Paper D-2)


Walker, William H. “Call-Up Under Presidential Authority 100,000/10 USC 673B.” November 1963. (Paper D-4)

ISSUE E: Criteria for Waiver or Delay of Recall Orders

1. Statement of Issue:

No definitive criteria has been promulgated on granting exemptions or delays of recall orders, as required by 10 USC 673.

2. Discussion:

10 USC 673(b) requires that equitable treatment be given to Ready Reservists being considered for recall in a partial mobilization. However, implementing guidance has not been promulgated by DOD as required by the statute. Issues on exemptions and deferral recall orders may account for a substantial share of legal matters requiring resolution after mobilization, and are further complicated for lack of more explicit standards across Services in handling such requests.

Previous recalls indicated that a surprisingly large percentage of reservists will request an exemption or deferral. During the Korean conflict, the Air Force recalled about 100,000 Reservists of which 24,000 requested deferments. During the Berlin call-up, 35 percent of the 3,912 Ready Reservists recalled failed to participate for some reason. Despite a policy of not granting exemptions or waivers for Ready Reservists, some exceptions are likely to be made for humanitarian reasons, and the need for a consistent standard and procedures across all Military Services is self-evident.

3. Summary/Recommendations:

Wider dissemination of DoD “no waiver” policy on mobilization is suggested. The forthcoming revision to DoD Directive 1235.10 should incorporate uniform implementing guidelines and standards for review.
ing individual requests for waiver or deferral of recall orders. Improved screening of reservists to assure availability for mobilization is needed.

4. References/Bibliography:


1. Statement of Issue:
   Provisions for support of Reservists' families following mobilization are inadequate or non-existent.

2. Discussion:
   During the Colloquium, concerns were expressed about the existence of plans to expand family support services to account for the sudden increase in dependents following mobilization. Hospitals, commissaries, and emergency support facilities will be overtaxed unless provisions are made to supplement current capabilities with retirees or civilian personnel. For example, issuance of identification cards, transfer of medical records, school enrollment and pay deposit arrangements must be handled expeditiously to minimize hardships on both Service personnel and their dependents. Some Services may have developed contingency plans for family support requirements but little information was available to Colloquium participants on the scope and level of detail.

3. Summary/Recommendations:
   a. DoD Directive 1235.10 should include a requirement for family support plans as a standard mobilization planning requirement.
   b. Service capabilities to provide family support services following mobilization should be tested in the next appropriate joint exercise.

4. References/Bibliography:
   Knowles, Billy M. "Mobilization—Hypostasis For Or Contingent Upon War Planning." November 1983. (Paper F-1)

ISSUE G: Providing More Information on, and Encouraging Research and Publication about, the Guard and Reserve and their Mobilization.

1. Statement of Issue:
   Facts about the military capabilities of the Guard and Reserve, and the procedures by which they are mobilized, are not as widely known as they should be.
2. **Discussion:**

The Guard and Reserve make a significant and essential contribution to the nation’s deterrence and warfighting capabilities. Yet the extent of that contribution is not widely understood. In addition, the procedures by which they are mobilized are not well understood. At Service schools, including the Military Academies, opportunities can be explored for incorporating more systematic treatment of the Guard and Reserve and of the procedures for mobilizing them.

In the academic world, scholarly research on mobilization related issues is rare. And in both military and academic journals, articles on the capabilities and missions of the Guard and Reserve, as well as on mobilization, appear only infrequently.

In the reserve community itself, many members of the Guard and Reserve lack adequate understanding of the overall national mobilization process of which they could become a part.

3. **Summary/Recommendations:**

   a. In conjunction with the Mobilization Concepts Development Center at the National Defense University, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs, should explore means for providing more comprehensive information on the Guard and Reserve and their mobilization within the Defense Department, including military education institutions. These same organizations should consider options for working with the academic community to promote research and publication on the Guard and Reserve and their mobilization.

   b. The possible advantages of sponsoring short orientation programs on mobilization, and the Total Force contributions of the Guard and Reserve, should be examined. The programs might be provided to senior DoD military and civilian officials and to military officers whose job functions encompass mobilization related issues. With the assistance of reservists, the programs would be presented at military installations around the country.

   c. It should be determined whether a team of Active and Reserve Component personnel could prepared a three or four hour “core curriculum block” on the Guard and Reserve and their mobilization for distribution to Service schools.

   d. An analysis should be made of the means for disseminating more comprehensive information on mobilization within the military community, especially reservists. A “mobilization newsletter,” or short update on mobilization developments suitable for inclusion in existing publications, could be useful.

4. **References/Bibliography:**

Chadbourn, Charles C. “Professional Research and Writing on


Lumianski, Peter J. “A Survey and Analysis of Selected Professional Military Education Service Schools to Determine the Extent to Which Guard and Reserve Component Education is Included in Their Academic Programs.” November 1983. (Paper G-4)


ISSUE H: Legal Authority to Recall Retired Personnel

1. Statement of Issue:
   Current legal authorities for recall of retirees in partial or full mobilization are inconsistent.

2. Discussion:
   Recent revisions to 10 USC 688(a) allow a service Secretary to recall regular retirees; whereas, 10 USC 672(a) and 10 USC 675 require Congressional action before a retiree can be recalled. This apparent inconsistency in legislation could provide a procedural basis for litigation by retirees who refuse to comply with orders for recall.

3. Summary/Recommendations:
   a. The Department of Defense General Counsel should review the statutes cited and recommend corrective action, if appropriate.
   b. A similar analysis of recall authorities pertaining to reserve retirees should be conducted.

4. References/Bibliography:
ISSUE I: Mobilization of the Guard and Reserve: Its Impact Upon Scarce Skills in the Labor Force

1. Statement of Issue:
Mobilization of the more than 1,000,000 Guard/Reservists will deplete the civilian work force of scarce, skilled personnel resources.

2. Discussion:
This issue is based upon the belief that many members of the New York City police department are ready reservists; therefore, mobilization will deplete the New York City police department.

Several participants mentioned situations (isolated) of which they are aware; ... mobilization will deplete the volunteer fire department in the small village of ____________

The mobilization of an estimated 1-2 million reservists from a total U.S. work force of 110-115 million people is the removal of only 1-2 percent of the work force.

3. Summary/Recommendations:
   a. The Federal work force is screened annually; ODASD(RA) prepares an annual report. The annual screening report should be disseminated more widely.
   b. ODASD(RA) conducted a special study of selected (General Dynamics, McDonnell Douglas, Boeing) employers. The study revealed that no more than 3 percent of any single category of skills will be depleted upon mobilization.
   c. Critical skills of the civilian community should be identified.

4. References/Bibliography:
   Lemley, Norman W. “Transfer Value of Civilian Skills to Guard and Reserve Assignments.” November 1983. (Paper I-1)
ISSUE J: More Effective Use of Retirees as Mobilization Assets

1. Statement of Issue:
   Retired military personnel can be categorized into three subgroups:
   • Non-disability regular retirees
   • Disability retirees
   • Non-disability reserve retirees
   Mobilization plans should explicitly utilize these assets.

2. Discussion:
   More than half of all retirees leave active service before completing 25 years of service, and are under 45 years of age. In 1982, non-disability regular and reserve retirees totalled 848,000 people; a substantial asset for mobilization purposes, if required.
   More effective utilization of retirees would be facilitated by standardization across Services on individual status reporting, and more detailed information on civilian job skills, physical condition and need for refresher training.

3. Summary/Recommendations:
   a. Annual reporting requirements for all military retirees should be expanded to provide more comprehensive data for mobilization readiness purposes.
   b. Pre-assignment of military retirees to specific billets required for mobilization should be required for all military services.

4. References/Bibliography:

ISSUE K: Readiness Assessment of Reserve Component Units.

1. Statement of Issue:
   Current systems for reporting unit readiness do not adequately report certain special circumstances of Reserve units which are necessary information in assessment of the ability of these units to effectively perform their assigned missions as part of the Total Force.
2. Discussion:

Existing assessment reports, e.g., Unit Status Report, Forces Command Active Component and Reserve Component Addendum for Combat Units, and Forces Command Annual Training Report for National Guard, represent the evolution of introducing Reserve Component factors into the reporting systems. With our increasing experience in this area and with new demands placed on Reserve Component units as part of the Total Force, it is now time to study and evaluate the adequacy of current systems to comprehensively and rigorously report Reserve unit readiness. The possibility of a Service-wide single report for Reserve units should be considered so that aggregate analysis can be facilitated at the DoD level.

Despite the detail of current reporting systems their initial derivation from Active Component requirements results in substantial deficiencies in the Reserve Component area. Some specific deficiencies are, for example:

a. Real mobilization manning assets are not identified. Unlike Active Component personnel, Reserve Component personnel are primarily civilians with associated orientation and commitments. The true availability of Reserve Component personnel upon mobilization is difficult to ascertain but must be rigorously pursued if an accurate measure of unit readiness is to be reported. Conflicting with realistic reports of true mobilization assets is the requirement of high peace-time strength. The latter must be recognized as a secondary objective not to infringe on the accuracy of reporting true deployable personnel assets.

b. The distinction between "readiness" (according to TO&E authorization) and "capability" (according to relative combat capability) must be introduced in assessment. This is especially true for Reserve Component units which have older equipment which has been replaced in the Active Component by newer models or for Reserve Component units undergoing equipment updates or modifications. In these instances "readiness" reporting may not present a true picture of "capability" because of the inability to report the total actual situation.

c. Many organizational differences exist between Active and Reserve units. These differences create problems at the Active/Reserve interface and are not reported by current assessment systems. Upon mobilization and deployment these problems are surfaced during the integration of the units. Thus many administrative and logistical support activities which are routinely handled within the Active Components require special accommodation to meet the specialized needs of joining Reserve Component units. Plans to respond to these special needs should be evaluated as part of a comprehensive assessment report.

d. Readiness reports of Active Components should include reporting of the status of subordinate Reserve units to be gained upon mobiliza-
tion. Thus gaining commands are held accountable for the readiness of their RC complement.

3. Summary/Recommendations:
Recommend that Services be solicited regarding advisability of establishing an inter-Service study group to examine the need for changes in readiness reporting of Guard and Reserve units.

4. References/Bibliography:

ISSUE L: Remote Site Operations

1. Statement of Issue:
Training and logistics support requirements for remote site operations should receive more emphasis in mobilization planning for Reserve forces.

2. Discussion:
Unlike their active duty counterparts, reserve air wings do not possess their own logistics support infrastructure for operations at remote sites, if required. Nor is training in remote site operations provided to reserve flight crews. The lack of a mobile Antisubmarine Warfare Operations Center (ASWOC) in support of remote site flight operations was also noted as a major problem area.

3. Summary/Recommendation:
Reserve air wings and other hardware reliant units should be offered training in remote site operations, and provided with appropriate equipment and supplies.

4. References/Bibliography:

ISSUE M: Training Requirements as a Function of Deployment Schedules

1. Statement of Issue:
What is the most cost-effective approach to training late deploying individuals and units.
2. Discussion:

Primary training emphasis should be focused on early deploying individuals and units. During the Colloquium, it was noted that a more cost-effective strategy for training reservists would be to further expand the training base capability, and rely more on post-mobilization, intensive-training programs.

3. Summary/Recommendations:

Readiness requirements and associated training for late deploying individuals and units (M+6C days or more) should be reexamined to determine the costs/benefits of deferring more training to be accomplished after mobilization.

4. References/Bibliography:


ISSUE N: Use of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)

1. Statement of Issue:

The IRR represents a valuable talent pool which is difficult to access.

2. Discussion:

Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) manpower assets are vital to mobilization success. The primary need of this initial IRR surge is to fill out Tables of Organization and initially sustain early deploying unit manpower requirements. Accurate and timely personnel data verification and updating of the IRR file during peacetime are critical elements for mobilization. It is imperative that address data be accurate to ensure that IRR can be notified efficiently, ordered to active duty, and joined to early deploying units. Maintaining accurate IRR addresses is an important issue to all Military Services. The inaccurate IRR address issue has been highlighted by many mobilization exercise after action reports. DoD attempts to gain access into non-military Federal agency data files for address verification purposes have been unsuccessful up to this point.

3. Summary/Recommendations:

a. Improved IRR lists are needed together with an address verification mechanism.

b. Dedicating military/civil service personnel to telephonically verify and update inaccurate IRR addresses is ineffective.

c. Contracting civilian agencies to verify and update inaccurate IRR addresses is too costly.
d. Access of existing data bases within the Federal government will provide the most accurate data available with little or no additional cost in manpower or overhead. DoD should explore with IRS for a means to use these lists without violating its privacy.

4. References/Bibliography:

ISSUE O: Use of Reservist’s Civilian Skills

1. Statement of Issue:
   Civilian skills of Guard/Reserve members individually or as a whole represent a large pretrained talent pool that can be put to better use.

2. Discussion:
   The Total Force policy integrates the Active, Guard and Reserve force into a homogenous whole. There is a need in all Services to retain trained personnel because systems continue to become more complex, making the training problem more critical. Mobilization is a complicated undertaking representing an intricate logistics and planning problem. For the Total Force to work to best advantage, full utilization of the talent available is essential. Ways need to be found to use the civilian skills possessed by Guard and Reserve members. Transfer of the vast reservoir of civilian skills to military assignments in a more organized, pre-planned manner can provide an immediate infusion of talent into the military work force. Active force, Reserve/Guard program administrators and the individual reservists will have to rethink their role in the use of Reserve/Guard manpower.

3. Summary/Recommendations:
   a. Increase the use of Guard/Reserve personnel in managerial and planning assignments.
   b. Use Guard/Reserve personnel as direct relief of active duty counterparts when in leave and TAD status.
   c. Increase the use of individual augmentees in the performance of duty based on their civilian skills.
   d. Create additional planning and staff units to augment planning staffs of regular units and senior commands.
   e. Increase Guard/Reserve augmentation of regular commands by individuals or units.
   f. Improve ADP entries on reservists’ civilian skills.
   g. Civilian experience and skills should be considered in approving military specialty codes (NOBC/AFSC/MOS).
4. References/Bibliography:


Lemley, Norman W. “Transfer Value of Civilian Skills to Guard and Reserve Assignments.” November 1983. (Paper I-1)

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