ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES OF MILITARY COUPS D'ETAT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 1960-1982 (U)
ORKAND CORP SILVER SPRING MD T H JOHNSON ET AL. APR 83 TR-83W-025 UNCLASSIFIED SBI-AD-E750 936 MDA908-82-C-0303
ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES OF MILITARY COUPS D'ETAT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, 1960-1982

FINAL REPORT

April 1983

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Defense Intelligence Agency
U.S. Department of Defense

A collaborative research project by The Orkand Corporation and Arizona State University.

The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the Defense Intelligence Agency or the United States Government.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This research project, which was conducted for the Language and Area Studies Program of the Defense Intelligence Agency, represents a joint effort of the National Security Program at The Orkand Corporation and of Arizona State University. Numerous people made significant contributions to this project and deserve acknowledgment. Mr. R. Peter Spicer, Defense Intelligence Officer for Africa, Mr. William Thom, LTC Robert Winstead, and Dr. William Stoakley, all of DIA, provided helpful suggestions and criticisms concerning the research throughout the study. Their cogent comments have helped us to formulate, clarify, and rethink our research in ways relevant to the intelligence community.

Thomas H. Johnson, Senior Staff Consultant of The Orkand Corporation, and Professor Patrick J. McGowan, Chair of ASU's Political Science Department, served as Co-Principal Investigators and did the bulk of the analysis and writing presented here.

At The Orkand Corporation, Dr. Robert O. Slater, Senior Staff Consultant, served as Project Director and performed numerous critical tasks. His assistance relative to conceptual and theoretical issues proved invaluable. Dr. Donald S. Orkand, President of The Orkand Corporation, and Dr. Anton S. Morton, Director of its National Security Program, both reviewed the entire report and made extremely useful suggestions. The research assistance of Ms. Nancy Rambo and Ms. Carol Sarnat went far beyond the call of duty. Ms. Rambo was responsible for compiling much of the quantitative data critical for the project and Ms. Sarnat wrote the case studies of Tanzania and Sierra Leone. Finally at Orkand, Ms. Yvette C. Shelton expertly and efficiently typed the entire report under heavy time constraints.
At Arizona State University, Professor McGowan was ably assisted by Mr. John Anene and Ms. Kate Manzo, political science graduate students, in data gathering and the writing of the case studies of Ghana and the Central African Republic.

The basic report and Appendix D should be processed as one document per Dr. Slater, Defense Intelligence College.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

The *Washington Post* reported the following news item on March 3, 1983:

ABIDJAN, Ivory Coast - The Ghanaian government foiled a coup attempt in which civilian and army plotters planned to assassinate head of state Gerry Rawlings, Accra radio reported. It was the third reported attempt to overthrow him since last October.

The radio, monitored here, quoted a government statement saying security forces shot two soldiers and arrested nine in Accra last Sunday as they were preparing to launch the coup. The statement said the leaders of the coup were being hunted by police.

Reports such as these are not rare. Plots, attempted coups and successful ones are frequent events in African politics. But can they be anticipated? Do the events often catch intelligence analysts by surprise?

The purpose of the research effort reported here is to provide the Language and Area Studies Program at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) with a comprehensive and analytical approach to delineating the causes of military intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa and to identify ways to estimate the probability of coups in the future. The study also demonstrates the utility of analytic methods to intelligence analysts. Particularly in subject areas as difficult as the prediction of military intervention and coups, analysts are confronted with large amounts of information and faced with the task of synthesizing this information into concise analyses written in a short time frame and comprehensive to a wide audience. The use of analytic methods provides the analyst with a systematic means for evaluating information, exploring assumptions, testing hypotheses, and preparing accurate forecasts.
SCOPE OF STUDY

This effort examines the causes of military coups in forty-five Sub-Saharan African countries between 1960 and 1982. In order to develop, formulate and apply a number of models of military coups, this research was guided by an overall strategy which included the following key steps:

- Define the concept of military intervention and three levels thereof;
- Review and synthesize explanations of military intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa;
- Delineate alternative or competing models of military coups;
- Test alternative models;
- Develop an integrated model;
- Apply forecasting methodologies for predicting military coups; and
- Undertake case studies of countries which do not fit the model.

SUMMARY OF KEY RESULTS

This research effort provides the following key results concerning the causes of military coups in Sub-Saharan Africa:

- An Integrated Model of the causes of military coups in Sub-Saharan Africa is developed which is remarkable in its ability to delineate the major causes of coups across thirty-five countries, 1960-1982. (The Integrated Model accounts for 91 percent of the variance of military intervention.)

- The Integrated Model suggests those factors which are most important in characterizing the potential of countries to experience military coups. These factors include domestic and international economic, political, social and military measures.
Based on this Integrated Model, forecasts are made of the propensity of Sub-Saharan countries to experience coups. These forecasts accurately classify all but three of thirty-five countries as likely or unlikely to experience coups between 1960-1982. This forecasting methodology is used to estimate probabilities of coups in the next three years.

In addition to those highly significant findings, this effort provides the Defense Intelligence Agency with a powerful and relevant example of the application of systematic analytical techniques to practical intelligence problems. Below, we address each phase of the project.

THE CONCEPT OF MILITARY Intervention

Three Levels of Military Intervention

Three levels of military involvement in politics were conceptualized. Table 1 lists the forty-five independent states of Sub-Saharan Africa and gives their dates of independence. Also listed for each state are the dates of each successful military coup d'état it has experienced since independence through the end of 1982. In this study, successful military coups d'état represent events in which the existing civilian or military regime is suddenly and illegally displaced for one week or longer by the action of a relatively small elite group in which the military, security, and/or police forces of the state played a role. Table 1 indicates that twenty-five African states (55.5%) have experienced one or more successful military coups. Between January 1960 and December 1982 fifty-two successful military coups have occurred.

The study defines attempted coups as involving some action by the military and/or police (such as arresting government personnel or taking over the government by force) which is successful for no longer than one week. Table 2 shows 56 of these. The third level of military intervention consists of plots to
TABLE 1: Sub-Saharan African States, Date of Independence, and Dates of Successful Military Coups Through 1982.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Date of Independence</th>
<th>Dates of Successful Military Coups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. People's Republic of Benin</td>
<td>August 1, 1960</td>
<td>July 8, 1966; Nov. 28, 1966; Nov. 1, 1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Republic of Botswana</td>
<td>September 30, 1966</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Republic of Burundi</td>
<td>July 1, 1962</td>
<td></td>
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<td>5. United Republic of Cameroon</td>
<td>January 1, 1960</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Republic of Cape Verde</td>
<td>July 5, 1975</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Republic of Chad</td>
<td>August 11, 1960</td>
<td>April 13, 1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Ethiopia</td>
<td>Antiquity</td>
<td>Sept. 12, 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Gabon Republic</td>
<td>August 17, 1960</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. The Gambia</td>
<td>February 18, 1965</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Date of Independence</td>
<td>Dates of Successful Military Coups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. People's Revolutionary Republic of Guinea</td>
<td>October 2, 1958</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Republic of Ivory Coast</td>
<td>August 7, 1960</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Republic of Liberia</td>
<td>1847</td>
<td>Apr. 12, 1980</td>
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<tr>
<td>24. Republic of Malawi</td>
<td>July 6, 1964</td>
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<tr>
<td>27. Maurituis</td>
<td>March 12, 1968</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe</td>
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<td>33. Republic of Senegal</td>
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<td>34. Republic of Seychelles</td>
<td>June 29, 1976</td>
<td>June 5, 1977</td>
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<td>35. Republic of Sierra Leone</td>
<td>April 27, 1961</td>
<td>Mar. 21, 1967; April 18, 1968</td>
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Table 1: (cont'd.)

<table>
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<th>State</th>
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<td>36. Somali Democratic Republic</td>
<td>July 1, 1960</td>
<td>Oct. 21, 1969</td>
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<td>38. Kingdom of Swaziland</td>
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<td>39. United Republic of Tanzania</td>
<td>December 9, 1961</td>
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<td>44. Republic of Zambia</td>
<td>October 24, 1964</td>
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<td>45. Republic of Zimbabwe</td>
<td>April 18, 1980</td>
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N.B. The November 17, 1958 coup in the Sudan is not included in this study other than in this Table, as our starting date is January 1, 1960.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Total Military Involvement Score</th>
<th># Coups</th>
<th># Attempted Coups</th>
<th># Plots</th>
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<td># Coups</td>
<td># Attempted Coups</td>
<td># Plots</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Where states have the same TMIS, they have been ranked on the basis of the number of successful coups they have experienced.*
throw the government. Such plots are validated through cross-checking of
reports about them from multiple sources. We identified 102 such plots.

Total Military Involvement Score

Narrative descriptions of these two hundred and ten successful, unsuccess-
ful, and plotted coups were assembled. Following the procedures of previous
archeological studies, each event was assigned five points if it was a successful coup,
and one point in the case of an attempted (unsuccessful) coup, and one point if
it was a plot. Adding the resulting scores for each country provides our
measure of coup behavior in Sub-Saharan Africa: the Total Military
Involvement Score (TMIS). Table 2 provides a rank ordering of the forty-five
Sub-Saharan African states by their Total Military Involvement Score. The
le shows that twenty-five states have experienced coups and that another
have witnessed at least one attempted coup. Plots were reported for three
tries that have experienced no coup events. The average TMIS score is
32 for the forty-five states. Thus, the first nineteen countries, Ghana
ough Liberia, manifest above-average levels of military involvement, with
highest scoring state, Ghana, recording four times as much military involve-
ent as the average. Detailed descriptions of each of the military involvement
ents are provided in Appendix B.

NATIONS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION

While much of the literature on military intervention in politics is rich
theoretical insight, few systematic empirical evaluations have been under-
en. Although explanations are frequently implicitly or explicitly suggested,
there is no firm consensus as to the precise mix and impact of key factors on
military’s disposition to intervene. Our initial activity in this phase
the effort was to draw from the literature guidance as to variables and

xii
The results of this effort are directly relevant to the conduct of intelligence analysis. Most important is the ability to estimate the probability that a country will experience a military coup, based on the highly significant results of our Integrated Model. For example, this model provides a basis for identifying those countries susceptible to military coups in the near term (i.e., 1983-1985). These countries include:

- Benin;
- Burundi;
- Congo;
- Ghana;
- Nigeria;
- Uganda; and
- Upper Volta

The impressive forecasts demonstrate that the results of this analytical exercise have provided the DIA with a set of indicators of the likelihood of future coups.

Significant also is the demonstration of the utility of applying systematic analytical techniques to practical intelligence analysis problems. Moreover, the methodology demonstrates that practical applications may spread beyond the boundaries of Sub-Saharan Africa to other geographical regions experiencing similar forms of instability.
ee instances. In sum, we can conclude from this postdictive analysis that forecasting techniques are valid and merit attention.

Our report presents formulas which will enable analysts to forecast the probability of a successful coup for a Sub-Saharan country, within a near-term frame. In order to do so, the analysts will need to have data for that country about the economic, political, social and military variables that together comprise the elements of the model. Hence, it is important to update these data annually.

SE STUDIES

It is unlikely that any model will succeed in accurately characterizing states in Sub-Saharan Africa. The cases which are classified as deviant provide important data which will shed light on the model itself. Most importantly, are these cases anomalies? Are there logical explanations for why these countries do not fit the model?

The systematic in-depth case study can be used to answer such questions. Our cases were selected which did not fit the replication of the Jackman model. In order to develop the case studies, given the constraints of time, it was necessary to identify these cases at as early a stage as possible. The Jackman model was chosen to reveal deviant cases, since it was identified as the most powerful explanation, published before our study was completed, of the causes of military coups. Ghana and Central African Republic are two countries which have experienced more military involvement than predicted; Sierra Leone and Tanzania exhibit less military involvement than predicted. Case studies are included in Appendix D.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Misforecast</th>
<th>Experience Coup?</th>
<th>Serious Intervention Probabilities, 1970-82(a)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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</table>

The first probability was generated from a linear probability model (a single equation multiple regression with a binary dependent variable valued 0 if the country did not experience a successful military coup between 1970 and 1982 and valued 1 if it did). The second probability was generated by a discriminant function analysis.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Misforecast</th>
<th>Experience Coup?</th>
<th>Experience Coup?</th>
<th>Serious Intervention Probabilities, 1970-82(a)</th>
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### TABLE 3: FORECASTS BASED UPON THE INTEGRATED MODEL OF MILITARY INTERVENTION (Cont'd.)

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a. The first probability was generated from a linear probability model (a single equation multiple regression with a binary dependent variable valued 0 if the country did not experience a successful military coup between 1960 and 1982 and valued 1 if it did). The second probability was generated by a discriminant function analysis.

* Probabilities in the range of .25 to .75 are not much help in forecasting.
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The statistical results for this integrated model show that it provides a valid basis for developing forecasts of military intervention.

FORECASTING MILITARY INTERVENTION

A primary objective of this effort is to develop and apply a methodology which enables intelligence analysts to make reasonably accurate forecasts of the likelihood of coups d'etat and other serious military intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Table 3 presents forecasts based on our Integrated Model of Military Intervention. The forecasts represent the probabilities that countries will experience at least one successful coup in the near term (i.e., 1983-1985). The forecasts are, for the most part, sufficiently clearcut to demand attention. Only nine of the states have predicted probabilities in the "too close to call" range (probabilities between .25 and .75). In addition, only three countries are not properly classified. A country was considered properly classified if its forecast for coup-proneness in 1983-85 was consistent with the coup-proneness it has shown in the past. That is, both Guinea and Zambia are forecast as being coup-prone (but they were not) and Liberia is classified as not coup-prone, although it has been. However, misclassification of only three of thirty-five states is a remarkably small error in predictions as difficult as these.

An alternative strategy for validating the forecasts from our Integrated Model make use of a technique known as postdictive analysis. Here one uses the forecasting technique to make predictions where results are already known. Table 4 presents postdictive forecasts of military coups, 1970-1982. The table indicates that in cases where forecasts for states suggested that they would have coups between 1970-1982, coups indeed occurred in all except one instance. States that were forecast not to have coups did not experience any, except in
FIGURE 2. OBSERVED VERSUS PREDICTED SCORES OF MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AS PRODUCED BY THE INTEGRATED MODEL
A positive Trade Balance/GNP is an indicator of international economic performance and reflects a positive current trade balance and current account and the fact that total trade is a large percentage of the economy's GNP. Hence, it measures how well the country's economy is performing in the international economy. Previous findings suggest that this variable should be negatively associated with Military Intervention, or, in other words, inhibit the likelihood of intervention by the military.

Urbanization (U) and Social Mobilization (M) are two central variables of the Social Change Model. Consistent with earlier findings, it is hypothesized that Urbanization increases the probability of Military Intervention while Social Mobilization decreases it.

Finally, both independent variables from the Military Motivations Model—Military Cohesion (MC) and Military Importance (MI) are specified to be positively associated with the likelihood of Military Intervention.

Results

The results of the test of this integrated model are extremely powerful. The model accounts for 91 percent of the variance in military intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1960 and 1982. Explaining such a high percentage of the variance indicated that we can confidently conclude that there will only be minimal errors involved in estimating the level of military intervention for a country, by using the factors delineated by the model. Figure 2 provides a visual display of the overall power of the model. This figure is a scatter plot of the observed Military Involvement Score for each country versus its score of Military Involvement predicted by the model. Most important is the closeness of the data to the line. Clearly, there are few countries which deviate significantly from the line; the observed data are very close to the predictions of the model.

Political Party Dominance (D)  \[\rightarrow\]  Military Cohesion (MC)  \[\rightarrow\]  Military Importance (MI)  \[\rightarrow\]  Commodity Concentration (CC)

Trade Balance/GNP (TB)  \[\rightarrow\]  MILITARY INTERVENTION 1960-1982

Economic Growth (EG)  \[\rightarrow\]  Industrial Employment (IE)  \[\rightarrow\]  Urbanization (U)  \[\rightarrow\]  Social Mobilization (M)

Political Participation (P)  \[\rightarrow\]
DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTEGRATED MODEL

Variables

The integrated model of military intervention is based on the most promising individual factors from each of the alternative models. Figure 1 pictorially represents the key factors included in this model.

The model contains two variables from the Political Development Model--Political Party Dominance (D) and Political Participation (P). Both of these variables are hypothesized to have a negative relationship with military intervention. That is, the extent of Political Party Dominance and Political Participation should both act to hinder the extent of military intervention. This hypothesis is consistent with the findings for the Political Development Model.

Industrial Employment (IE) and Economic Growth (EG) are two variables originally delineated in the Domestic Economic Performance Model. Both of these variables are hypothesized to be inversely related to Military Intervention. The notion here is that poor economic performance, as indicated by variables such as these, can undermine the legitimacy of the government. Hence, we would expect that as these measures of domestic economic performance increase (or improve) we should also see a decrease in the likelihood of Military Intervention. While not explicitly delineated in the Domestic Economic Performance Model, Commodity Concentration (CC) is an additional indicator of economic performance and a measure of economic dependency. High commodity concentration is an indicator of uni-dimensional, often single cash-crop, economies. Thus, the greater the Commodity Concentration of the economy the less sophisticated and developed the economy is. Because of this dynamic, we expect CC to be positively associated with Military Intervention.
institutions. Five key factors are hypothesized in this model: degree of political participation, social mobilization, urbanization, quality of life, and industrialization.

- Military Motivation Model. This model focuses on the impact of two variables internal to the military: the degree of military cohesion and the military's importance in politics.

- Jackman Model. This model, as we indicated earlier, is an outgrowth of quantitative research on instability in Sub-Saharan Africa. The model delineates four key factors relating to the occurrence of coups: Social mobilization, ethnic dominance, party dominance, and political participation. The Jackman model was replicated in our effort.

TESTING ALTERNATIVE MODELS

The alternative models of the causes of Sub-Saharan Africa military intervention were systematically tested in order to determine the empirical validity and explanatory power of each model. This effort was critical to the development of forecasts of military intervention useful to the intelligence analyst, because if the forecasts are not accurate, they will be useless.

Each model was tested independently using the Total Military Involvement Score as our measure of military intervention. In order to test the models, an extensive data set was assembled on economic, political, social, cultural and military factors. Details of this data set are provided in Appendix A.

In general, the results of the alternative models are encouraging. All of the models were found to provide statistically significant explanations of military intervention. However, none of the models is powerful enough to support valid forecasts. In an effort to develop such a powerful model, an effort was undertaken to combine the most salient aspects of the competing models into an integrated model of military intervention.
of explanatory power of each of the alternative or competing viewpoints must be subjected to explicit empirical validation. In other words, we must be able to assess the relative ability of each viewpoint to explain the occurrence of military intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Six alternative models of military intervention were developed for empirical validation:

- **Political Development Model.** This model examines the impact of political factors on military intervention behavior. Four factors are hypothesized to be related to military intervention: political democracy, multipartyism, political party dominance, and political violence.

- **Domestic Economic Performance Model.** This model centers around the proposition that the better the local economy performs in growth and distribution, the more legitimate a government becomes, and, hence, the less likely is military intervention. The model specifically hypothesizes four factors as central in explaining military intervention: inflation, economic development, growth in domestic investment, and general economic growth.

- **International Economic Performance Model.** This model, similar to the previous one, posits that the better a state's international economic performance, the greater the legitimacy of the government and the less likely that it will be prone to military coups. The model focuses on three key factors: growth in exports, growth in imports, and trade balance relative to Gross National Product.

- **Social Change Model.** The general thesis of the social change model is that rapidity and scope of social change and social mobilization bring new groups into politics and strain the capacity of existing
hypotheses that demand attention for determining the probabilities of military intervention in Sub-Saharan African countries. This information then constituted the core of our alternative models explaining military intervention.

Three general schools of thought exist concerning the causes of military intervention. These schools are described in detail in Chapter V of the report. The first school stresses societal and structural weaknesses which can create power vacuums, lack of legitimacy, and domestic conflicts—all of which can lead to military intervention. The second school's interpretation of military intervention focuses on the organizational characteristics of the military. The third school asserts that military intervention arises from factors idiosyncratic to each situation: intervention cannot be generally explained, nor can it be predicted. From the first two schools, a number of factors were delineated which are purported to influence military intervention.

In addition to the predominantly theoretical literature on military intervention, one major quantitative effort has a direct bearing on this effort. Robert W. Jackman's 1978 article in the *American Political Science Review* on "The Predictability of Coups d'Etat: A Model with African Data" represents what we believe to be the best published quantitative study to date on coups in Africa. Our study builds on Jackman's research.

**DELINEATION OF ALTERNATIVE MODELS**

After review and synthesis of the literature on military intervention most relevant to our research, explicit models of military intervention were systematically delineated. Underlying this phase of the effort was the assumption that all of the various factors of military intervention drawn from the literature review may have merit in explaining this complex phenomenon. The actual degree
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

"Who is to guard the guards themselves?"
- Juvenal, Roman poet, circa 60 AD

"The class that bears the lance or holds the musket regularly forces its rule upon the class that handles the spade or pushes the shuttle."
- Gaetano Mosca, nineteenth century Italian political scientist*

MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Harold Lasswell (1965:3), in one of his seminal treatises on politics describes politics as "the study of changes in the shape and composition of the value patterns of society." To study politics, he suggests, one must focus on influence and the influentials that exist within societies because politics at its most basic level can be defined as who gets what, when, and how (Lasswell, 1936).

In the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, recent history vividly reveals that the military has become a dominant wielder of political influence. The capacity of the military to affect the behavior of African societies relative to who gets what, when and how is apparent when one considers the rash of military interventions that have occurred in these states since the gaining of their independence. Of the 45 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (Black Africa), 25 (or 55%) have experienced at least one successful military coup d'état and 38 (or 84%) have witnessed at least one coup attempt or plot by the military aimed at unseating a government in power. From 1960 to 1982, these 45 states have seen

* Both of these quotes can be found in: Claude E. Welch, Jr. and Arthur K Smith, Military Role and Rule: Perspective on Civil-Military Relations (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1974) pp. 1, 8.
governments replaced by ruling councils drawn largely from the army via military coups in 52 instances. The occurrence of coups has clearly become a, if not the, dominant form of the transfer of power and influences in Black African societies.

STUDY PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES

The purpose of the study reported here is to provide the Language and Area Studies Program at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) with a comprehensive and analytical approach to delineating the causes of military intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa. Our specific research objectives are two-fold:

1 These countries are:

- People's Republic of Angola
- People's Republic of Benin
- Republic of Botswana
- Republic of Burundi
- United Republic of Cameroon
- Republic of Cape Verde
- Central African Republic
- Republic of Chad
- Federal and Islamic Republic of Comoros
- People's Republic of Congo
- Republic of Djibouti
- Republic of Equatorial Guinea
- Ethiopia
- Gabon Republic
- The Gambia
- Republic of Ghana
- People's Revolutionary Republic of Guinea
- Republic of Guinea-Bissau
- Republic of Ivory Coast
- Republic of Kenya
- Kingdom of Lesotho
- Republic of Liberia
- Democratic Republic of Madagascar
- Republic of Malawi
- Republic of Mali
- Islamic Republic of Mauritania
- Mauritius
- People's Republic of Mozambique
- Republic of Niger
- Federal Republic of Nigeria
- Republic of Rwanda
- Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe
- Republic of Senegal
- Republic of the Seychelles
- Republic of Sierre Leone
- Somali Democratic Republic
- Democratic Republic of the Sudan
- Kingdom of Swaziland
- United Republic of Tanzania
- Republic of Togo
- The Second Republic of Uganda
- Republic of Upper Volta
- Republic of Zaire
- Republic of Zambia
- The Republic of Zimbabwe
1. To develop, formulate (specify) and apply a number of multivariate causal models of military interventions in Sub-Saharan Africa. These models are aimed at aiding in the explanation of those political, economic, military, social and cultural factors which "cause" African military intervention and can be used to "predict" the likelihood of future military coups; and

2. To present intensive case studies of several African countries which do not fit the overall patterns as developed in the models. The case studies presented in this report are aimed at providing in-depth and comparative analyses of successful (and unsuccessful) coups and isolating those factors which seem to be responsible for their occurrence (and nonoccurrence) and at complementing the statistical analyses of military intervention.

Guiding our efforts, in part, is the belief that research such as that presented in this report represents a significant effort and opportunity to introduce more advanced analytic methods to intelligence analysts. Particularly in subject areas as difficult as the prediction of military intervention and coups, analysts are confronted with large amounts of information and faced with the task of synthesizing this information into concise analyses written in a short time frame, comprehensible to a wide audience. The use of quantitative analytic methods provides the analyst with a systematic means for evaluating information, exploring assumptions and testing hypotheses. Ultimately, such methods can have a positive impact on the formulation of coherent policy alternatives.

EXPLAINING AND PREDICTING MILITARY INTERVENTIONS AND COUPS D'ETAT: SOME GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS

The phenomenon of coups has long been the subject of intense interest on the part of policymakers and academics alike. Certainly, there is agreement
that the ability to explain the processes which bring about coups and possibly predict their occurrence would contribute substantially to our understanding of a dominant mode of government change in Sub-Saharan Africa. Coups are the result of a complex mix of political, economic, military, social and ethnic/cultural as well as historical factors. There is no single or easily identified variable that can explain or predict the chances of militaries usurping civilian control of states. This is especially true in Sub-Saharan Africa where one finds countries with divergent historical experiences, peoples, societal structures, governmental forms, and economic institutions. The countries of Black Africa are far from being homogenous. Analytically this fact suggests the need to examine alternative or "competing" explanations (models) of the dynamics of military intervention in Africa. That is, it is reasonable to expect that some models may fit for some countries and not fit for others.

The recent coup attempt in Kenya (August 1982) provides an excellent example of the importance of anticipating coups but the inherent weaknesses in pinpointing their causes. Since gaining independence in December 1963, Kenya has been considered one of the more stable governments in Black Africa and even witnessed a peaceful transition in the Presidency when Jomo Kenyatta died and Vice President Daniel Arap Moi became President. This attempted military coup and numerous other events suggest a number of assumptions which must be made concerning research on the causes of coups:

- Coups are generally probabilistic in nature—they can occur anywhere at anytime. The best that can be achieved by the application of analytic methods is to assign probabilities or likelihoods to the occurrence of coups. Point predictions that a coup will occur in country X in a particular month are not defensible and highly suspect.
Some African military interventions, such as the recent coup attempt in Kenya, or the April 1980 coup in Liberia that put Sgt. Samuel K. Doe in power, seem to be the result of actions by a few disgruntled military men who may be motivated by personal ambition or a sense of personal grievance. The prediction of such coups is a significant issue, one which is addressed by this report. If, in fact, empirical methods, show that a large number of coups fall into this category, other modes of intelligence gathering and analysis should be explored by DIA.

This last point, in part, has led some scholars to the epistemological position that coups cannot be predicted (for example, Zolberg, 1968) and/or that structural characteristics of a country (such as modernization, cultural pluralism, the nature/extent of political participation, economic performance, strength of the military, etc.) play a minor role in the explanation and prediction of coups when compared to specific idiosyncratic characteristics of each particular situation (for example, Decalo, 1976). In other words, the incidence of coups d'état is random and defies forecasts. The research reported in this report is based on the assumption that structural characteristics of African societies, if properly defined and measured can result in probabilistic statements concerning the occurrence/non-occurrence of coups in the states under study.

Indeed, two previously published empirical studies—Jackman (1978) and McGowan (1974), which our research builds upon and expands, were quite successful in the prediction of Africa coups. Focusing on coups in 30 Black African countries (1960-1975), Jackman (1978) used econometric techniques to predict the incidence of coups as a function of four key structural variables:
"societal mobilization" of a society defined as the simple sum of the percentage of labor force in nonagricultural occupations and percentage of population literate;

- ethnic dominance operationally defined as the percentage of the population in the largest ethnic groups;

- party structure/party dominance operationally defined as the percentage vote cast for the winning party in the election closest but prior to the date of a state's independence; and

- mass political participation operationally defined as the percentage of electoral turnout.²

Jackman's (1978) estimation of this model, using multiple regression techniques, revealed that an amazing four-fifths of the variance ($R^2 = .84$) in military coups in Black Africa could be explained.³ From his analysis, he concluded:

For students of African affairs, one clear inference to be drawn ... is that instability of this kind (coups) is not random with respect to political and social structure ... This study shows that idiosyncratic factors ... cannot account for more than one-fifth of the variance in coups d'etat ... Far from pointing to a random process, these estimates suggest a rather deterministic pattern (Jackman, 1978: 1273).

Part of the analysis presented in Chapter VI represents a replication and extension of Jackman's interesting and empirically robust model.

A study conducted by McGowan (1974) is a second example of the utilization of systematic techniques for the successful prediction of coups in Black

---

Jackman's (1978) findings suggest that coups are positively related to societal mobilization and ethnic dominance and negatively associated with party dominance and mass political participation.

Multiple regression is a widely used statistical technique that measures how much variation in a dependent variable can be explained by two or more independent variables acting together.
rica. This study utilized discriminant function analysis to examine the relationships between the incidence of coups in 32 African countries (from the time of their independence to 1969) and five factors:

- social mobilization as measured by percentage of labor force in agriculture;
- interest groups size as measured by the percentage of workers in the public sector;
- government economic performance as measured by a country's cumulative balance of trade;
- political party fractionalization as measured by the number of "illegal" political parties; and
- external support as measured by the amount of foreign aid received per capita from an ex-colonial metropole.

Gowan's analysis established that eleven states should be classified as coup-prone and had high probabilities of experiencing a coup between January 1970 and March 1974. Of the eleven countries during this period, seven indeed had a successful coup or a serious coup attempt with military intervention. McGowan's analysis also suggested that twenty of the countries could be classified as non-coup prone with small probabilities of experiencing a coup. In only two cases of the twenty, did an actual coup occur during the relevant time period.

The aforementioned studies clearly support the contention that systematic techniques can be used to probabilistically predict the relationships between the structural characteristics of a country and the incidence or likelihood of military intervention. Building on these studies and others is the goal of the research reported here.
TENTS OF THIS REPORT

The next chapter of this report presents our research design or overall strategy for explaining and predicting military coups in Sub-Saharan Africa. Specific attention will focus on the variables, types and sources of data used in this research, and methods of data analysis—experimental econometrics, discriminant function analysis, content analysis and systematic case studies.

Chapters Three and Four focus on the description and initial analysis of key dependent variable or phenomenon our research wishes to explain and predict—military intervention in African politics. Specifically, Chapter Three presents a descriptive analysis and summary statistics concerning the 52 successful military coups, 56 attempted but unsuccessful military coups and 102 military plots identified by our research for 45 Sub-Saharan African countries (1960-1982). Chapter Four expands the discussion of military intervention in African politics presented in Chapter Three by focusing on the motives of African policymakers. Using data generated from a quantitative content analysis of the narratives of 164 military intervention events, this chapter suggests the relative frequency of seventeen motives for the intervention of the military in African politics.

Chapter Five presents a detailed literature review of various explanations of military intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa. Using variables and hypotheses suggested in this literature, this chapter concludes with the specification of alternative or "competing" models of military intervention.

Chapter Six presents the results of the estimation of the alternative models specified in the previous chapter. Using econometric techniques this chapter examines the relative validity of these models in explaining and predicting military intervention behavior. The chapter concludes with the specification and estimation of an Integrated Model of Military Intervention which
**LE III-1: Sub-Saharan African States, Date of Independence, and Dates of Successful Military Coups Through 1982.**

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<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Date of Independence</th>
<th>Dates of Successful Military Coups</th>
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<td>People's Republic of Angola</td>
<td>November 10, 1975</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Botswana</td>
<td>September 30, 1966</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Burundi</td>
<td>July 1, 1962</td>
<td>July 8, 1966; Nov. 28, 1966; Nov. 1, 1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Republic of Cameroon</td>
<td>January 1, 1960</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Cape Verde</td>
<td>July 5, 1975</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Chad</td>
<td>August 11, 1960</td>
<td>April 13, 1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal and Islamic Republic of Comoros</td>
<td>July 6, 1975</td>
<td>May 12, 1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Djibouti</td>
<td>June 27, 1977</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>October 12, 1968</td>
<td>Aug. 3, 1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Antiquity</td>
<td>Sept. 12, 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon Republic</td>
<td>August 17, 1960</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Gambia</td>
<td>February 18, 1965</td>
<td></td>
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ITARY INVOLVEMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

The phenomenon of military involvement in African politics is indeed a pervasive one. Table III-1 lists the forty-five independent states of Sub-Saharan Africa and gives their dates of independence. Also listed for each state are the dates of each successful military coup d'etat it has experienced since independence through the end of 1982. As noted earlier, in this study, successful military coups d'etat represent events in which the existing civilian military regime is suddenly and illegally displaced for one week or longer by the action of relatively small elite groups in which the military, security, and/or police forces of the state played a role. The scope of change in the time resulting from military coups d'etat may vary from wholesale replacement of political decision-makers by the instigators of the coup and their followers, a dissolution of the constitutional relationships between different groups of decision-makers (e.g., the dissolution of legislative relationships) without substantial change in personnel. The stated aims of the insurgents can vary from reaction to revolution and the degree of violence and physical injury resulting from a coup may be negligible or pronounced. What distinguishes a coup d'etat from mass and communal violence, revolutions, and civil wars (all of which can also displace regimes) is that its instigators are elites and that it is sudden and abrupt, lasting a matter of hours or days only.

Table III-1 indicates that twenty-five African states (55.5%) have experienced one or more successful military coups. Benin leads the list with six such coups beginning in October 1963. The earliest coup was in November 1958 in the Ian and the most recent was in Upper Volta in November 1982. Since January 1950 a total of fifty-two successful military coups have occurred, making this extra-legal form of military action the most frequent means of regime change in
was given to traditional political elites and almost everyone ignored in research and writing the two principal institutional legacies of the colonial state, the civil bureaucracy and the armed forces and police. Yet, it be easily shown that to the extent that the European colonial regimes engaged in sustained political development efforts during their roughly sixty years of African rule, it was to build institutions of administration and security. There were differences among the colonial powers, in the style in which they led out their administration. For example, British colonial administration tended to involve centralized planning and decentralized execution. It has been that the converse characterized French colonial administration.

It is clear that analysis tends to follow events rather than to anticipate them. Because the 1950s and early 1960s were years in which western-educated illian elites organized and led successful nationalist and anti-colonial independence movements, political scientists and sociologists focused on leaders, political parties, elections, parliaments, mass-elite linkages, and the Pan-African expression of African unity. Since the mid-1960s African politics have been dominated by military and police interventions and scholars have subsequently begun to focus on the role of the military and other security forces in African politics. The year 1966 was the turning point when the military led six coups d'état in Nigeria (twice), Ghana, Burundi, Upper Volta and the Central African Republic and were involved in a supporting role in two other coups in Tuni and Uganda. Useful articles were almost immediately produced by In (1966), Nelkin (1967), Murray (1966), and Welch (1967) but it was not until 1969 with the publication of J. M. Lee's *African Armies and Civil Order* (New York: Praeger, 1969) that a substantial book appeared on this central feature of contemporary African politics.
CHAPTER III. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICAN POLITICS, 1960-1982

A DESCRIPTIVE OVERVIEW

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this Chapter is to descriptively analyze the "dependent" variable or variable to be explained by this research--military involvement in African politics. By focusing on systematic data gathered concerning each reported instance of military intervention, this chapter will focus on time and cross-sectional trends concerning military involvement during the period 1960-1982.

As the year 1958 began, there were only four independent states in Sub-Saharan Africa--Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, and the Sudan. Sekou Toure's Guinea became independent in October of 1958, but it was in 1960, when seventeen new states emerged, that the era of independent African politics really began. By the end of 1982 another twenty-three states had achieved political independence, bringing the total to forty-five. Except for Namibia and the Republic of South Africa (Anzania), all territories of Sub-Saharan Africa and its adjacent islands are now independent states ruled by members of their majority populations.

The decolonization of Sub-Saharan Africa beginning with Sudanese independence on January 1, 1956 is one of the major events in twentieth century world politics. How this change was brought about by charismatic nationalist leaders, by mass political parties, and in a few instances by wars of national liberation, has been described and analyzed in a vast array of books, monographs, and scholarly articles. Liberal opinion in the West--and this includes the vast majority of Africanists--favored African decolonization and independence and focused attention on the new African political elites and their parties and movements. Except for anthropologists, comparatively little attention after the early
Our strategy for selection of case studies must be systematic yet undertaken considering the time constraints of a research effort such as this. In-depth case studies can be time consuming and involve extensive documentation. Consequently, our approach was to identify deviant cases from our replication of a well-known model of African coups—Jackman (1978). Four case studies were chosen, representing two countries which exhibit substantially less coup behavior than this model would predict and two which exhibit substantially more coup behavior. The objective of the case studies (which can be found in a separately bound Appendix) was to explore reasons for those anomalies.
forecasts of military coups were generated. Two methodologies—a linear probability model and discriminant function analysis—were utilized here. These methodologies both represent powerful statistical techniques which allow us to explore the probability that a country will experience military intervention in the near future (1983-1985). The results of such an exercise will allow the DIA analyst to focus on those countries which appear to be most prone to military intervention. Chapters VI and VII provide explanations of the utility of such forecasting methodologies.

SYSTEMATIC CASE STUDIES

It is highly unlikely that any model will be capable of accurately explaining the causes of military intervention across all Sub-Saharan African countries. The goal of the model-building effort is to succeed in identifying those variables which account for as much variance in military intervention behavior in as many cases (countries) as possible. As important as the model-building results themselves is the delineation of those factors which may explain why a model or group of models does not adequately explain military intervention in specific countries—known as outliers, or deviant cases.

Four systematic case studies examined such outliers. Our objective was to demonstrate not only the applicability of more powerful analytic techniques used for model-building and estimation, but also to illustrate the importance of systematically exploring cases where particular circumstances might explain deviations from a model’s predictions. The existence of deviant cases often suggests one of two possible problems. First, the model is inadequate; it is not capable of explaining a phenomenon across a sufficient number of cases. Second, the model, while adequate, can be further buttressed by demonstrating that the deviant cases are truly exceptions and reasons why the model cannot encompass these cases can be offered.
This approach insures the DIA that the most valid model possible of the causes of military coups will be developed. The importance of developing such a model cannot be overstated. An intelligence analyst cannot be expected to place confidence in a model which is demonstrably inaccurate. Such a model would only serve to confirm the skeptical analyst's suspicion that analytic methods cannot provide useful approaches to intelligence analysis problems. The bottom line, then, is to develop the best model possible and to accurately assess and explain its strength and weaknesses. Moreover, the development of such a model is critical for forecasting accuracy.

MODEL ESTIMATION

Our approach to model assessment relies on experimental econometric techniques (Koutsoyiannis, 1973). The essential purpose of the analysis is to test the alternative models developed through our review of the literature on military intervention. Multiple regression, a statistical technique designed to assess the relative importance of independent variables and their combined ability to predict changes in a dependent variable (military intervention), was used to estimate each model and, more importantly to determine how powerful the model was in explaining differences between countries in military intervention.

Based on the results of the independent tests of the alternative models, an integrated model was formulated and estimated. The same technique, multiple regression, was used to estimate this integrated model and to determine its merit.

FORECASTING COUPS

The essential purpose of the model building approach was to suggest those factors which are most useful in explaining the causes of military coups. Based on the results of the most powerful model developed in our model estimations,
of at least twelve years for each country to experience military interventions. These data provided a basis for addressing a wide range of questions concerning the causes of military coups in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Developing Alternative Models and An Integrated Model

The literature on instability and coups, both theoretical and empirical, is rich in suggesting hypotheses concerning causes of military coups. However, few attempts have been undertaken to synthesize this literature and develop an inventory of propositions (e.g. Welch and Smith, 1974). Thus, an extensive literature review was undertaken to develop an inventory of variables, measures, and hypotheses to guide the specification and testing of alternative models of the causes of military intervention.

Why test alternative models? Our approach rests on the assumption that no single, existing model would be sufficient to explain and predict the causes of military coups. In order to develop an acceptable model, it was essential that each explanation be evaluated so that its value could be determined. A model may provide poor overall explanations; however, one variable of the model may be particularly valuable. Another model may provide a better explanation and several variables may be yielded by that model. It is possible that one model (e.g., Jackman, 1978), or a set of models, will succeed in explaining the causes of military coups in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, should no existing model provide sufficient explanatory power, the results from the independent models can be employed to construct a general or integrated model. This model will be designed to draw on the most critical variables yielded by our initial theoretical and statistical analyses.
plot" may in any case be viewed as a political datum, indicative of military involvement in politics.

Using these definitions, military intervention data were assembled for all Sub-Saharan African countries for the period 1960 to 1982. The following sources were systematically, analyzed (see Appendix A for the research's codebook) and every instance of military intervention was recorded.

Index to the New York Times, 1960-
Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1960-
Africa Research Bulletin, 1964-
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1960-

Appendix B presents the extensive data set on military intervention events which results from our research efforts.

A wide range of independent factors have been posited by researchers and scholars to be related to the existence of instability or the occurrence of coups. As we have already suggested, many of these factors have not been successfully drawn together into a model(s) which accurately explains and/or predicts coups. Even less has been achieved in the explanation or prediction of military coups. Consequently, an extensive effort was undertaken to assemble a comprehensive data set on political, economic, social, cultural, and military factors, between 1960 and 1980 (see Appendix B). Specifically, cross-sectional data (across countries) was assembled for variables at five-year intervals: 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980. Data on independent variables were gathered for thirty-five countries (see Appendix C for a list of three countries) which represent all African states south of the Sahara which were independent by the end of 1970 except for Equatoria Guinea which had to be excluded due to a lack of data. The end of 1970 was chosen as a cutoff point since it provides a period
of the insurgent military, security and/or police may vary from reaction to re-
form, and the degree of physical injury resulting from a coup may be negligible
or pronounced.

To be coded a successful military coup d'état, the military, security
and/or police must be instigators, that is, conspirators or co-consipirators,
acting alone or with other elites and the displacements of persons or constitu-
tional forms must last at least one week.

2. **An Unsuccessful (Attempted) Military Coup D'Etat** is an event in which the
insurgents acted without success to effect any lasting displacement of the poli-
tical regime but are known to have succeeded in one or more of the following
actions: (a) the assassination, attempted assassination, or arrest of some
members of the political elite; (b) the temporary (for less than one week) dis-
ruption, interruption, or take-over of government facilities; and (c) the sudden
meeting, mobilization of, or action by military, security and/or police forces
explicitly aimed at the take-over of government.

3. **Plotted Military Coups D'Etat** are events in which an announcement or ad-
mission is made by the elite group in power that a plot to overthrow the govern-
ment by violence involving elements of the military, security and/or police
has been discovered prior to any action other than "plotting" being undertaken.
Reports of plots may take various forms, ranging from a simple statement that
a plot has been thwarted, without further elaboration, to the arrest, identifi-
cation, and trial of alleged plotters. Plots may in fact be manufactured by
the government as a pretext for the elimination of military, security and/or
police elites or for the imposition of extreme or coercive policies. Although
there is no reliable means by which the researcher or analyst can definitively
distinguish between plots and manufactured allegations thereof, the "reported
Defining and Measuring Key Concepts

The concept of military intervention is clearly central to the research effort. Our approach to military coups was to develop a definition which will accurately measure the critical dimensions of the concept. Consistent with the study requirements outlined by DIA, military intervention events are defined to include those that are successful and unsuccessful. In addition, coups that were plotted, but not attempted, were also included.

In order to maximize comparability with the few earlier systematic studies of African coups and instability (e.g., Morrison and Stevenson, 1971; McGowan, 1975; Jackman, 1978), the following definitions suggested by Morrison, et al. (1972: 128) and used by these studies, as appropriately modified, were used:

1. A Successful Military Coup D'Etat is an event in which the existing political regime is suddenly and illegally displaced by the action of relatively small elite groups in which the military, security and/or police forces of the state play a role. Thus, these forces may act alone or in conjunction with elite civilian groups such as civil servants or the leaders of a political party. However, if there is no military, security or police participation as in an entirely civilian palace revolution or if overt mass participation is the principal cause of the event, the event is not a successful military coup d'etat. This is so because in the first case the military, security and/or police are not involved and in the second case because mass leadership is not part of military elite instability behavior.

The scope of change in the regime resulting from military coups d'etat may vary from wholesale replacement of political decision-makers by instigators of the coup and their followers, to a dissolution of the constitutional relationship between different groups of decision-makers (e.g., the dissolution of legislatures) without any substantial replacement of decision-makers. The stated aims
FIGURE II-1
OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH DESIGN

DEFINE RESEARCH PROBLEM

DEFINE ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF COUPS

ESTIMATE ALTERNATIVE MODELS

INTERPRET RESULTS

CONSTRUCT AND ESTIMATE INTEGRATED MODEL

IDENTIFY DEVIANT CASES

INTERPRET RESULTS

UNDEARTAKE SYSTEMATIC CASE STUDIES

DEVELOP AND VALIDATE FORECASTS
CHAPTER II. RESEARCH DESIGN

INTRODUCTION

The conduct of this effort follows a carefully planned research process designed to approach the problem using rigorous and systematic analytical techniques. The basic steps in the research process are represented in Figure II-1. The ultimate goal of our approach is to provide the DIA analyst with a set of meaningful methods which can be reliably applied. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the steps designed to achieve these objectives.

THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

As we have indicated in our introductory chapter, the objective of this effort is to model the causes of military intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa. A wealth of literature exists on coups, as well as the more general topic of political instability. However, analytical approaches are less than abundant and few robust models of either instability or coups have been developed. Even more troublesome, the results of past analytic work have had little bearing on the conduct of intelligence analysis.

In approaching this effort, our strategy was to develop a meaningful and useful approach to fulfill the following critical objectives

- provide an indication of which factors seem most important in the occurrence of military coups d'état in Sub-Saharan Africa;
- develop a model which forecasts the probability of coups; and
- identify and describe the countries which may be exceptions to the model.

---

1 See footnote 1 in Chapter I for a complete list of countries.
combines relevant factors from the competing models. This model proves to be extremely powerful in explaining and predicting military intervention.

Using the Integrated Model and a forecasting methodology, Chapter Seven presents the probabilities of military intervention in thirty-five Black African countries for the years 1983-1985. This chapter also presents a postdictive analysis (an examination of actual versus predicted coups) which suggests the validity of the forecasting methodology adopted.

Chapter Eight draws conclusions from our research for the intelligence community and offers suggestions for future examinations.

A separately bound Appendix focuses on detailed case studies of military intervention in Africa of four countries that do not seem to "fit" the quantitative patterns established in one of our model's analysis. The point here is to complement quantitative studies of military intervention with in-depth and systematic case studies.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Date of Independence</th>
<th>Dates of Successful Military Coups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17. People's Revolutionary Republic of Guinea</td>
<td>October 2, 1958</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Republic of Ivory Coast</td>
<td>August 7, 1960</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Republic of Liberia</td>
<td>1847</td>
<td>Apr. 12, 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Republic of Malawi</td>
<td>July 6, 1964</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Mauritius</td>
<td>March 12, 1968</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe</td>
<td>July 12, 1975</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. Republic of Senegal</td>
<td>June 20, 1960</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Republic of Seychelles</td>
<td>June 29, 1976</td>
<td>June 5, 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Republic of Sierra Leone</td>
<td>April 27, 1961</td>
<td>Mar. 21, 1967; April 18, 1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Date of Independence</td>
<td>Dates of Successful Military Coups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali Democratic Republic</td>
<td>July 1, 1960</td>
<td>Oct. 21, 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Sudan</td>
<td>January 1, 1956</td>
<td>Nov. 17, 1958; May 25, 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Swaziland</td>
<td>September 6, 1968</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Republic of Tanzania</td>
<td>December 9, 1961</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Zambia</td>
<td>October 24, 1964</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Zimbabwe</td>
<td>April 18, 1980</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.B. The November 17, 1958 coup in the Sudan is not included in this study other than in this Table as our starting date is January 1, 1960.
the continent. Military coups and attempted coups have affected over three-quaters of African states (78%) and their frequent success has meant that at any given time since the early 1970s most Sub-Saharan African states are ruled by military juntas of one form or another. Table III-1 also makes clear that military coups have happened in all regions of the continent except Southern Africa and that colonial heritage does not offer special benefits—former French, British, Italian, Belgian, Portuguese, and Spanish colonies—all have had coups. The absence of a colonial background is no help either, in that both Ethiopia (1974) and Liberia (1980) have witnessed successful coups.

In Table III-2 the fifty-two coups d'état since January 1960 are listed chronologically from the first in Zaire on September 14, 1960 to the most recent in Upper Volta on November 7, 1982. Coups happened in nineteen out of the twenty-three years in our study (83%) and every year since 1971 has seen one or more successful military coups. The years 1966 and 1980 were years of particularly frequent coup activity, with eight and five respectively. The 1960s saw twenty-five coups whereas the 1970s saw nineteen, but this does not suggest a trend downwards in coup activity because the 1980s have already seen eight coups in but three years, a rate comparable to the 1960s.

If one combines the information contained in Table III-1 and Table III-2, it would appear that military coups d'état have been very widespread in terms of both time and space. Many researchers such as Zolberg (1968) explicitly argue that there are no factors systematically related to military coups and, therefore, their location and timing are random and not open to prediction by standard econometric techniques. Other researchers examining identical data conclude that while structural factors such as poverty and underdevelopment are not related to the incidence of coups, intra-elite rivalry and personal ambition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country(s)</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>ZAIRE (9-14)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>TOGO (1-13) CONGO (8-15) BENIN (10-28)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>ZAIRE (11-25) BENIN (11-29) BENIN (12-22)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (1-1) UPPER VOLTA (1-3) NIGERIA (1-15) GHANA (2-24) UGANDA (2-26) NIGERIA (7-29) BURUNDI (7-8) BURUNDI (11-28)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>TOGO (1-13) SIERRA LEONE (3-21) BENIN (12-17)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>SIERRA LEONE (4-18) CONGO (8-3) CONGO (9-2) MALI (11-19)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>SUDAN (5-25) SOMALIA (10-21) BENIN (12-10)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>UGANDA (1-25)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>GHANA (1-13) MADAGASCAR (5-18) BENIN (10-26)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>RWANDA (7-5)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>UPPER VOLTA (2-8) NIGER (4-15) ETHIOPIA (9-12)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>MADAGASCAR (1-25) CHAD (4-13) NIGERIA (7-29)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>BURUNDI (11-1)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>SEYCHELLES (6-5)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>COMOROS (5-12) GHANA (7-5) MAURITANIA (7-10)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>GHANA (6-4) EQUATORIAL GUINEA (8-3) CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (9-1)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>MAURITANIA (1-4) LIBERIA (4-12) UGANDA (5-11) GUINEA-BISSAU (9-10) UPPER VOLTA (11-25)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (9-1) GHANA (12-31)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>UPPER VOLTA (11-7)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
are and therefore, while coups cannot be predicted, they can be explained post hoc. (Decalo, 1976: 5-37). A third group of researchers, with which this study shares much, rejects such arguments and suggests that by using structural variables it is possible to statistically explain past coup behavior and to forecast the location of future coups in a fashion not much different from weather forecasting with its probabilities of tomorrow's rainfall (Morrison and Stevenson, 1972; Wells, 1974; McGowan, 1975; Jackman, 1978). But in order to do this we must develop a more refined measure of military involvement in African politics than the simple frequency of successful coups presented in Table III-1.

Three levels of military involvement in domestic politics may be distinguished. The first is regarded as legitimate behavior in most political systems and involves lobbying for military appropriations and equipment, public works construction, education and manpower training, and providing for internal and external security. The second level is generally regarded as illegitimate behavior and involves the coup d'etat where the military or police seize political power or engage in plots and attempts to seize power. The most advanced level of involvement is when the military actually rule, as they do in nearly half of all Sub-Saharan African states today. In this study we are concerned with the second level of military involvement in politics—plots, attempted coups, and successful coups. We seek to describe, explain and predict military involvement in seizing political power from the forty-five independent states of Sub-Saharan Africa from 1960 through the end of 1982 (See Appendix A for this study's explicit definitions of what events constitute military interventions).

Table III-1 has identified a universe of fifty-two successful coups d'etat during the past twenty-three years. Using a variety of sources,1 we have also

---

identified fifty-six attempted coups and one hundred and two instances where plots of coups have been discovered or alleged. Attempted coups involve some action by the military and/or police such as arresting government personnel or even taking over the government by force, but they are unsuccessful in maintaining control for longer than one week. The existence of plots is difficult to validate, but through cross-checking of reports of plots across sources, we are confident that in each case we report, an alleged plot to overthrow the government actually existed.

Our narrative descriptions of these two hundred and ten successful, unsuccessful and plotted coups are provided in Appendix B. Following the procedures of previous research in this area, (Morrison and Stevenson, 1972; Jackman, 1978) each event was assigned five points if it was a successful coup, three points in the case of an attempted coup, and one point if it was a plot. Table III-3 presents the results of this exercise and gives our basic measure of coup behavior in Sub-Saharan Africa, our Total Military Involvement Score (TMIS).

Table III-3 contains much useful information. We see that only seven states have not yet experienced military and/or police involvement in politics. Three of these states—Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland—have extremely small armies and survive in the long shadow of South Africa. Cape Verde and Mauritius also have minor militaries and Djibouti exists largely because France, Ethiopia, and Somalia find it convenient that it should. The only substantial state, independent since 1960, that has no record of military involvement is the United Republic of Cameroon. But this is not to say that Cameroon has been

---

2 According to ACDA's World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1969-1977 (Washington: ACDA, 1982), Botswana had 3 thousand men under arms in 1977 and Lesotho and Swaziland had 1 and 2 thousand men under arms respectively in 1978. None of these countries had any army at all until 1974.
TABLE III-3  Rank Order of Forty-Five Sub-Saharan African States by Their Total Military Involvement Score (TMIS), 1960-1982.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Total Military Involvement Score</th>
<th># Coups</th>
<th># Attempted Coups</th>
<th># Plots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>C.A.R.</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>Nigeria</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>Niger</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Togo</td>
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<td>Liberia</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Chad</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Total Military Involvement Score</td>
<td># Coups</td>
<td># Attempted Coups</td>
<td># Plots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Mali</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Zambia</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>Comoros</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>Seychelles</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<td>37.5</td>
<td>Sao Tome &amp; Principe</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>42</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
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<td>Cape Verde</td>
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<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.B. Where states have the same TMIS, they have been ranked on the basis of the number of successful coups they have experienced.
politically stable throughout its history. In the late 1950s and early 1960s it suffered a long and bloody civil war in which as many as 100,000 persons may have died.

Table III-3 also shows that twenty-five states have experienced successful coups d'etat and that another ten have witnessed at least one attempted coup. Perhaps the most important fact contained in this table is not the high scores of Ghana, Benin, and Uganda or the low scores of Senegal, Malawi, and Cameroon, but that African military and police involvement in politics is a syndrome in which coups, attempted coups, and coup plots occur together. Note that only in Upper Volta have coups occurred without being associated with plots and coup attempts. This fact validates our TMIS index which is the simple weighted sum of each instance of a coup (5), attempted coup (3), and plot (1). Further evidence of the validity of our index is provided in Table III-4 which compares our TMIS index to Jackman's index of elite instability. (Jackman, 1978: 1264-6).

While Jackman used the same procedures in constructing his elite instability index for 1960-1975, two important differences between TMIS and his measure exist. First, as a source of events he did not use Africa Research Bulletin, which, since its appearance in 1964, has established itself as the most comprehensive source of political event information on Africa. Since we did use this excellent source as well as others used by Jackman, Keesing's Contemporary Archive, Index to the New York Times, our TMIS index should pick up more events than Jackman's and therefore, record higher scores for some cases as it did for Uganda, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Niger and Tanzania. Counter-balancing this difference is the fact that Jackman included all elite instability events between 1960 and 1975 (coup attempts, plots) whether or not the military was involved. Since in some cases only civilians have been involved
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>TMIS 1960-82</th>
<th>TMIS 1960-75</th>
<th>Jackman's Index 1960-75</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>hana</td>
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TABLE III-4 (cont'd.)

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<td>Zory Coast</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zmeroon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Thanks are due to Professor Jackman for making his data available to us.
such behavior, in general Jackman's sources should be higher than ours. In,
they are in twenty out of thirty instances. Only in five cases do our
xes record the same score for a given state.

But, what is important is not that index scores are identical, but that
sures of roughly similar phenomena produce roughly similar results. An index
similarity of results is the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient
ch, when it equals 1.000, demonstrates exact correspondence of results. The
relation between TMIS (1960-1975) and Jackman's index is .911, more than ade-
te given the two above-mentioned differences in our measurement procedures.

kman's index has a mean value of 13.97 and a standard deviation of 12.29
reas TMIS records a mean of 10.6 and a standard deviation of 10.11 for the
forty cases of Table III-4. Thus, Jackman's index tends to record higher values
average because it includes entirely civilian elite instability events, which
not part of our study of specifically military behavior.

Given that TMIS appears to be a reliable and valid index of military inter-
tions in African politics, what else can be learned from an examination of
le III-3? The average TMIS score is 11.82 for our forty-five states. Thus,
first nineteen countries, Ghana through Liberia, manifest above-average
els of military involvement, with the highest scoring state, Ghana, recording
r times as much military involvement as the Sub-Saharan average. Ghana,
in, Uganda, the Congo, and the Central African Republic, by their total TMIS
res and the frequency of successful coups they have undergone, may be viewed
praetorian states in which military involvement in politics has become the
rather than the exception.

A final interesting fact contained in Table III-3 is that the number of
empted coups is about equal to the number of successful coups, 56:52. This
ests that there is almost a 50% chance of success when elements of the

III-16
can military and/or police initiate a coup attempt, a sobering fact evidencing the fragility of African political institutions.

In Figure III-1 we have constructed a histogram which displays the distribution of our TMIS index. With a mean value of 11.82 and a standard deviation of 1.76, TMIS is somewhat positively skewed with six states forming a tail to the right of the distribution. Six states--Ghana, Benin, Uganda, Congo, the Central African Republic and the Sudan--have experienced by far the most coup behavior since 1960. Indeed, they have witnessed fully 40% of all the military involvement recorded in the TMIS index and their average value of 35.3 is some six times greater than the mean of TMIS for all states. Finally, it should be noted that our observed distribution, which is hardly the familiar bell-shaped normal distribution, is quite common in comparative quantitative research. Variables in such research, and particularly measures of violence and stability, evidence the positive skewness of Figure III-1. In brief, while African states have experienced some military involvement in national politics, in only a handful has this become highly frequent and pervasive.

Section of the figure casts doubt on the hypothesis that there is a clear relationship between the colonial heritage and TMIS. For example, former British colonies are scattered throughout, from Botswana (with the lowest possible TMIS) to Ghana, with the highest TMIS found.

What trends are evident over time in the frequency of military involvement in African politics since 1960? Figure III-2 provides this information in the form of a histogram or bar chart. The years 1966 and 1980 saw the most military action while the average year contributed 23 points to the TMIS index. No year was without some military involvement. Unfortunately for the prospects of
by Their Total Military Involvement Score (TMIS), 1960-1982.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KEN</th>
<th>GAM</th>
<th>TAZ</th>
<th>ZIM</th>
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<td>31-35</td>
<td>36-40</td>
<td>41-45</td>
<td>46-50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Consult Appendix A for the country names of the acronyms used in this figure.
One would not expect any government to admit the existence of valid
cases for attacks on its rule, and no African government did during the
examinations. Overwhelmingly, it was the coup-makers themselves who alleged
in the existing regime as the reason for their actions. Journalists
with coup-makers, but only in about half the cases.

All using the sum of mentions, by all three sources, as our measure of
importance of motives, it appears in Table IV-1 that socio-economic factors,
and closely by intra-elite differences, are both considerably less frequent
than the aforementioned desire to replace a poorly performing govern-
Next in frequency come idiosyncratic factors, the dominant subset of
is the personal ambition of the coup-makers and their rivalry with the
s of the government in power. Next is a group of military issues, pri-
the desire to rectify poor treatment of the military by the government.
all factors as a motive takes last place. Now, we turn to a comparison
three sources and the frequency with which they attributed motives to
akers.

Both coup-makers and journalists point to corruption, repression,
inistration, the breakdown of public order, losses of legitimacy, and
es to keep promises as the causes of military interventions in African
cs. In Western democracies, when governments perform so poorly, the
rate tends to vote them out of office. There are few functioning multi-
(two or more parties) democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa--Botswana, Gambia,
ibus, Nigeria, Senegal and Zimbabwe--where this is perhaps possible. (All
Senegal are former British colonies.) With the exception of Nigeria,
these countries has experienced a successful military coup d'etat
independence. This suggests that in today's Africa the military coup

IV-6
<table>
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<th>Motives</th>
<th>Coup-Makers</th>
<th>(Former) Government</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<td>16. Generational differences within military</td>
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<th>Media</th>
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<td>3. Inefficiency, incapacity to govern</td>
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<td>4. Public disorder and violence</td>
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<td>8. Economic decline and stagnation</td>
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<td>10. Over ideology &amp; doctrine</td>
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<td>12. Restore former leader(s)</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>13. Free prisoners</td>
<td>2</td>
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IV-4
African military and police leaders of coups and plots cannot be discounted of hand. Indeed, when treated with caution and considered in relation to source and context, such statements are the closest possible equivalent to interview (where untruths and rationalizations also happen) and at least as ful as journalistic reports and government press releases.

Perhaps the least credible source of information on the motives of coup- ers is the government that has thwarted a coup attempt or has uncovered a ip plot. Again, self-justification must always be considered as primary. t, even in this circumstance, charges of personal ambition on the part of the ip-planners or foreign subversion are not the only allegations that are made. in, members of former governments who are safely in exile may speak quite ithfully and surviving governments to some extent must level charges that are edible locally.

Given that no one source of information on the motives of coup-makers is completely credible, how can we use the information from the content analysis? our analysis, we typically combined the results from all three. We considered at the best approximation to reality was the consensus of all observers.

us, we allowed the biases of each source group to cancel out the biases of the hers.

SCUSSION OF THE ANALYSIS BY SOURCE

e Six Major Categories of Motives

In an effort to ascertain the validity of the content analysis data, we ve cross-tabulated the seventeen sub-motives and the six major categories th the three sources of information in Table IV-1. The most frequent reason ven for military intervention in African politics since 1960 has been to put end to the abuses of the regime in power. Former or surviving governments t once alleged this as a motive but coup-makers and the media frequently
The descriptions are derived from three original sources: (1) accounts
local and foreign journalists, (2) statements made by successful coup-makers
d sometimes unsuccessful ones when they flee the country or are brought to
ial, and (3) government statements in instances where coups fail or plots are
covered or when former government officials are in exile or are brought to
ial. Each source has its problems, as is obvious.

Journalists, such as those chronologized in Africa Research Bulletin, are
ore or less knowledgeable, more or less ethnocentric. Nevertheless, we are
forced to rely upon the media unless more reliable information on the events
question can be obtained. It should also be added that much of intelligence
porting is similar to that of the media in providing narrative accounts.
fortunately, journalistic reporting is subject to substantial bias. The
ly way to control for such bias is to use multiple sources. The Africa
search Bulletin, the major source of African events, has existed since 1964
uses over fifty different local African and international sources, including
he BBC Monitoring Service. ARB is now well recognized as a comprehensive and
dible source of political event information on Africa.

When successful coup-makers justify, after the fact, the reasons for their
ctions, their rationalizations must be seen for what they are. Similarly,
en coup-plotters fail and live to relate the reasons for their actions, self-
stification and rationalization are equally obvious. Further, such statements
re, at least in part, designed for local public consumption. It is easy, for
ample, to charge that the existing or previous regime is or was corrupt,
cause most regimes in tropical Africa are corrupt to some degree. But,
eless coup instigators are completely out of touch with the local population,
ey will not charge or allege corruption unless such charges and allegations
re locally credible. It seems, then, that motives and reasons provided by
CHAPTER IV. THE MOTIVES OF AFRICAN COUP-MAKERS

INTRODUCTION

Intelligence analysts devote considerable time to the interpretation of narrative or descriptive accounts of events. While they may not refer to it as content analysis, most analysts are involved in a search for patterns which can explain the occurrence of specific phenomena. This search for regularity in narrative material is the essential objective of content analysis.

Our extensive and systematic narrative accounts of two hundred and ten military intervention events provide an opportunity to explore patterns which may exist in these data. In particular, they provide an opportunity to investigate the possible motives of African coup-makers. Motives are often difficult, if not impossible, to assess. In-depth case studies, such as those undertaken by Decalo (1976), can be used to assess motives. However the choice of such case studies is often arbitrary and it is frequently difficult to generalize from the conclusions. The alternative to these approaches is a systematic content analysis of military intervention events. The remainder of this chapter will describe the method for inferring motives and the results of the content analysis.

ASSESSING MOTIVES

Each narrative description of a military intervention event is a composite based on one or more of five documentary sources (e.g., Africa Research Bulletin). Each event's write-up contains three basic elements: (1) a description of what happened before, during, and after the coup, attempted coup, or plot, (2) a list of the known participants, and (3) a narration of the apparent or alleged causes of the event.
the period 1960-1982, although 1966 still remains the year of most involvement and the key turning point in the political history of independent Sub-Saharan Africa.

Having described the central phenomenon of this report, we must now turn our efforts towards an explanation of it. In the next chapter we report a content analysis of the motivations of African coup-makers and coup-plotters.

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</table>

III-24
Guinea, and Mozambique. Except for the Seychelles and Guinea-Bissau, their ranks are not sharply divergent from Table III-3. In general then, except for the substantial increase in Zimbabwe's rank, Table III-5 does not change our image of which states manifest the most and least military involvement in African politics, and therefore we shall use the TMIS index of Table III-3 in the remainder of this study.

One final way to describe military involvement in African politics is to examine the distribution of types of events since 1960 as presented in Table III-6. In relative terms it is clear that the first five years of African independence saw the least military involvement in politics and that the period 1965-1969 was a turning point. During this second five-year period civilian governments across the continent fell to military elites. This was also the only period during which successful coups far out numbered coup attempts. During the 1970s and the 1980s military involvement has become endemic with four to six plots per year, with two to four attempted coups each year and with successful coups averaging nearly two per year.

SUMMARY

In this chapter we have measured and described the degrees of military involvement in African politics. By systematically collecting each reported instance of military coups, attempted coups, and plots to overthrow the government we have been able to determine which African states have experienced the most and least military interventions. We have shown that Ghana is the state most subject to praetorianism and that Cameroon is the only significant African state without a history of military involvement in national politics. We have provided evidence of the reliability and validity of our TMIS index and examined its values over time. There is a trend for increased military involvement during
<table>
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<th>Weighted Score</th>
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<td>Cameroon</td>
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N.B. Where states have identical Weighted Scores they are ranked by length of independence, with states independent for less time ranking higher than states that have been independent longer.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
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<th>TMIS</th>
<th>Years Independent</th>
<th>Weighted Score</th>
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<td>Liberia</td>
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</table>
African political stability, there is a positive trend over-time.\(^3\) As each year passes military involvement in African politics is becoming more frequent throughout the continent. The principal reason for this trend is that in 1982 there were more than twice as many independent African states (45) as there were in 1960 (22), providing just that many more opportunities for the African military to become coup-makers.

This suggests the need to modify TMIS somewhat by considering how long an African state has been independent. This is done in Table III-5 where each state's TMIS value has been divided by the length of time the state has been independent since January 1960. The resulting weighted score can be viewed as the annual amount of military involvement in politics experienced by each state since 1960 or the date of its independence, if later.

Overall, the rankings of the forty-five African states are quite unaffected by standardizing for years of independence, with but a few substantial changes in rank.\(^4\) The country whose rank changed most was Zimbabwe, which ranks fourth in Table III-5, but only thirtieth in Table III-3. Military involvement in Zimbabwean politics by disaffected elements of Joshua Nkomo's former ZIPRA forces has made Zimbabwe one of the more unstable African states since its independence in April 1980.

Five other states rank noticeably higher in Table III-5 than they do in Table III-3, because in each instance they have been independent for fewer years than most other African states: Seychelles, Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Equatorial

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\(^3\) When the annual amount of TMIS is regressed on time, the resulting regression is \(\text{TMIS} = 13.37 + .802 \times \text{Year}\) with a serial correlation \((r)\) of .489, which is highly significant statistically.

\(^4\) This is reflected in the Spearman's rank order correlation coefficient \((r)\) value of 0.892 obtained between the ranks in Table III-3 and Table III-5.

1960 -------- 8
1961 ------ 6
1962 ---- 4
1963 ----------------- 24
1964 --------- 10
1965 -------------- 19
1966 --------------------------------------------------------------- 47
1967 ----------------- 21
1968 ------------------- 27
1969 --------------------------------------------------------------- 32
1970 --------- 11
1971 ----------------- 21
1972 ----------------- 26
1973 --------- 12
1974 --------------------------------------------------------------- 35
1975 --------------------------------------------------------------- 37
1976 ------------------- 25
1977 ------------------- 24
1978 ------------------- 22
1979 ------------------- 23
1980 --------------------------------------------------------------- 41
1981 ----------------- 26
1982 ----------------- 28
has become an institutionalized mechanism for changing governments whose performance has alienated the military and quite often large segments of the civilian population as well.

Thus, in attempting to forecast the probability of a military coup d'etat in an African state, the following questions are suggested by the first part of Table IV-1. First, how effectively is the present regime governing the country? If it is reasonably effective and efficient, able to maintain public order with minimal repression and corruption, then the likelihood of a coup is lessened. Second, what is the character of the regime? If the regime is a multi-party democracy with some degree of press freedom and institutionalized channels of dissent, then it is unlikely to have a coup as long as public order is maintained and repression is kept to a minimum.

A major political problem in tropical Africa today is the paucity of well institutionalized, effective and efficient democratic governments. While the people of Sub-Saharan Africa have strong traditions of political participation and democratic decision-making at the local and village level, their historic experiences as colonies and new states as well as their often marginal economic situations have made democratic political development at the national level the exception rather than the rule. For better or worse, the military coup d'etat has now become the principal means of removing ineffective African governments from power. And, while more research needs to be done on what differences, if any, in government performance military rule makes, the record of the past twenty years is not encouraging. The military, with some exceptions as in Togo, do not seem to provide more effective and efficient governance than the regimes they have replaced. (See Welch and Smith, 1974).

Journalists and coup-makers indicate that the third and second (respectively) most important motive for military interventions in Africa is comprised of the
socio-economic factors of ethnicity and economic decline. Most African states are plural societies containing dozens of different ethno-linguistic groups (often misnamed as "tribes"). These nations within nations are all too often the focus of political identity and action. Sub-national differences and rivalries are found throughout society, including the civil administration and military and police forces. As a primary basis for political mobilization and action, each ethno-linguistic group should be viewed as a type of multi-purpose interest group involved with other such groups in a continuing struggle for the goods and services provided by government and the economy, including the most important good of all, political power.

Viewed in this fashion, when ethnic pluralism is combined with rapid population growth (everywhere in Africa) and economic decline or stagnation (widespread in Africa), ethnic-based competition over scarce resources can become intense and even violent. The forecasting problem here is to be aware of demographic and economic trends and to combine knowledge of these trends with country-specific knowledge of the history of inter-ethnic relations. If the trends are unfavorable and the historical record is one of communal instability and ethnic-based violence, then the likelihood of military interventions in national politics is greatly augmented.

For the media, the most important motive was intra-elite differences, closely followed by government performance, socio-economic factors, and idiosyncratic factors; the last is primarily made up of mentions of personal ambitions and motives. Coup-makers agreed as to the importance of the first two, but as one would expect, they did not often mention the last. Governments stated that idiosyncratic reasons and foreign interference were most important. Interestingly, problems within or related to the military were mentioned by journalists and coup-makers.
Often cited by governments that have thwarted coups and by journalists covering African politics are what we have called in Table IV-1 idiosyncratic factors. Except for two instances in which it was asserted by coup-makers that they acted in part to free prisoners, personal motives have not been claimed by the military and police, as one would expect. That military coups d'état are primarily a consequence of personal motives is to be doubted because of the information contained in Table IV-1 and because of common sense. It is axiomatic that every military and police establishment in the world contains its cadre of personally ambitious individuals who dislike some of their colleagues or the current government of their country. This fact cannot explain why military interventions occur at certain times and places and not elsewhere. Idiosyncratic factors must be seen as necessary but not sufficient conditions for military involvement in African politics. The sufficient conditions are those listed elsewhere in Table IV-1.

Idiosyncratic factors represent a dilemma to forecasters, not only because they may be present everywhere but also because they can be triggered at any time. Ideally, to forecast when personal ambition or rivalry will prompt a coup attempt requires rather in-depth knowledge of the local military and police personalities, their fears and hopes, their ambitions and plans. Such information is difficult and expensive to obtain and efforts to collect such data can be counterproductive if they negatively impact on other U.S. programs in the host country. In our view, because of both practical and theoretical reasons, efforts to collect and evaluate idiosyncratic data on African military and police leaders for purposes of forecasting coups are not worth the cost, except perhaps in a few countries of vital national interest to the United States.
The final motive or reason for military involvement in African politics listed in Table IV-1 is foreign intervention and subversion. Surviving governments alleged this nineteen out of the twenty-five times it was mentioned in our textual materials. The other six attributions were made by the media. Never did coup-makers admit or allege that they acted in part at the behest of a foreign power.

The reasons and motives given by journalists may be used as a validator of the explanations presented by governments and coup-makers. Viewed in this fashion, all six basic reasons, from government performance to external interference must be given some credence. Coup-makers and governments tend to disagree over the importance of particular reasons, as one might expect. Coup-makers perhaps over-emphasize poor government performance and de-emphasize or ignore intra-elite differences, idiosyncratic motives, and foreign interference. Governments, on the other hand, stress foreign involvement and the personal motives of the coup-makers and ignore or give little emphasis to their own performance in office, to socio-economic problems, and to the possibly legitimate grievances by the military. This all makes sense to us and suggests that our content analysis data provide a useful source of information on the motives of the African military for intervening in politics.

The 17 Sub-Motives

The single sub-motive most often referenced by journalists is intra-elite differences over policies and programs. When combined with elite differences over ideology and doctrine into the factor named "Intra-Elite Difference," this type of sub-motive exceeds Socio-Economic Factors in frequency of mention by journalists. They particularly favor it as an explanation of military interventions and apply it in about equal proportions to plots, attempted coups, and successful coups.
What are some policy differences that have contributed to successful coups d'état in Sub-Saharan Africa? The coup of December 10, 1969 which overthrew the Zinsou government in Benin (Dahomey) was in part caused by Zinsou's policy of permitting Red Cross airlifts to Biafra from Benin. The Federal Nigerian government responded by closing its border and thereby disrupting trade in Eastern Benin. This highly unpopular policy lost support for Zinsou and was reversed by the new Kouandete military government. Prime Minister Kofi Busia was overthrown by the Ghanian military in January 1973 because of his austerity policies which involved a 44% devaluation of the Cedi and cuts in the military budget. The new military government of Colonel Acheampong rescinded the devaluation and restored the military budget to levels it wanted. In November 1980 the military ousted President Lamizana of Upper Volta, in part because of his government's failure to devise a policy to solve the famine in the country. This list could be greatly augmented, but that is not needed to draw the conclusion that one way to reverse unpopular public policies in Africa is to overthrow the government that has implemented them.

An important forecasting problem here is to focus on governmental policies that directly affect the military and police in an unfavorable fashion. One obvious way to reverse such policies is to plan and execute a coup d'état; this avenue is increasingly used particularly when the local military have a history of intervening in national politics. Remembering that most African states are pluralistic societies, the indirect impact of public policies on the military cannot be ignored either. When policies have an unfavorable influence upon a particular ethnic group or region of the country from which many of the military are recruited, they may act to reverse these policies. Also, when policies impact on categories of individuals with whom the military may perceive
common interests, such as teachers and other governmental employees this too may motivate the military to action.

Considering sub-motive 9, intra-elite differences over ideology and doctrine, it is often fashionable in U.S. governmental circles to refer to "conservative" and "radical" African regimes, with such regimes as those in Kenya and the Ivory Coast being characterized as conservative and pro-Western and regimes such as those in Guinea and Angola being seen as radical and anti-Western. Most specialists in African studies reject such categories and de-emphasize the role of ideology and doctrine in African politics and foreign policy. While this is basically correct, ideological differences also have a role to play in the planning and execution of African coups. In the Sudan in January 1973, a plot was uncovered, involving militant Pan-Arabists who were unhappy with President Nimeiry's failure to join the Federation of Arab Republics even though he had signed the Charter on Sudan's behalf. During late 1968 the Massamba-Debat government in the Congo was overthrown by left-wing officers led by Captain Marien Ngouabi because of Massamba-Debat's purge of left-wing politicians from his government. In the 1976 attempted coup in Nigeria in which the Head-of-State, General Murtala Mohammed, lost his life, it was claimed that the instigators feared that Nigeria was going "communist" because of the government's support of the "radical" MPLA movement in Angola.

In a few countries of tropical Africa—Angola, the Congo, Ethiopia, Gambia, Madagascar, and the Sudan—ideological differences have from time to time served as a point of polarization within the military or between the military and civilian politicians. Instances of conflict based on religion in countries like Nigeria, Ethiopia and Uganda have been more visible than conflicts over secular ideologies. However, as economic inequalities within and between
African states accumulate and as local class structures solidify, it appears that the economic and social bases of ideological conflict will grow in Africa, and ideology will have a greater impact on African politics than it has had in the past.

Relevant also are the grievances (sub-motive 14) that the military qua military may have against the current government. Both journalists and coup-makers have claimed such grievances to have been motivating, particularly with reference to successful coups. When the government cuts military spending or establishes para-military units such as Presidential Guards that the regular military see as threatening its rights and privileges, then counter-action becomes a possibility. Also relevant, at least in the case of successful coups, are generational differences within the military. Most officers and NCOs aspire to promotion and career advancement. When the age structure of the military or police limits such advancement because of a youthful officer corps, self-interested action by junior grades is possible, as has been the case in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

To solve the forecasting problem for this category of motives requires rather detailed knowledge of the local military establishment, its budgets, promotion schedules, and autonomy. If desired, such information should be gathered in host countries in the normal course of diplomatic reporting, since library research in the United States will not provide the necessary information.

For those concerned with forecasting military involvements in African politics, the actions of other states seem a low priority item because of the evidence of Table IV-1 and again, because of common sense. Subversion interference, and destabilization only work if the political, economic, and social conditions in the target country provide a favorable ground upon which to sow such seeds of revolt. These conditions have already been discussed in this
section of our report. They would appear to be directly related to coups d'état and not indirectly related via assisting foreign powers in their efforts to overthrow target regimes. Thus, the hostility of a foreign power may be the straw that breaks the back of a given regime, but that has not yet happened in independent Africa. As we shall see in the next section, no source mentioned external subversion in association with a successful coup.

DISCUSSION OF THE ANALYSIS BY LEVEL OF MILITARY INTERVENTION

In Table IV-2 we present the content analysis data arrayed by type of event: successful coups, attempted coups, and plots. In terms of successful coups, by far the most frequently reported reason is governmental performance. Socio-economic factors are mentioned second most frequently as motives for successful coups; intra-elite differences come next, military grievances fourth, and idiosyncratic factors fifth. Not a single mention of external factors as motives for successful coups was found.

With regard to motives for unsuccessful coups, intra-elite differences was the one most frequently mentioned; it seems to be a far more common motive for unsuccessful coups than for successful ones. It is followed by government performance and socio-economic factors (tied); idiosyncratic factors, military grievances, and external factors show up somewhat less frequently.

Idiosyncratic factors are mentioned most commonly as motives for plots; second comes intra-elite differences, then external factors, with socio-economic factors fourth in number of mentions, government performance next, and military grievances least often mentioned.

As Table IV-2 shows, foreign intervention was never cited as a cause of a successful coup, being overwhelmingly associated with plotted coups. To our knowledge, the principal instances of this phenomenon were the 1970 Portuguese-backed attempt to overthrow President Sekou Toure of Guinea and various Libyan
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Motives</th>
<th>Coups</th>
<th>Attempted Coups</th>
<th>Plots</th>
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<td>31</td>
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<td>2. Repression</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>1</td>
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</tr>
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<td>4. Public disorder and violence</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<td>5. Lack of popular support</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>7. Ethnic, tribal rivalry</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>38</td>
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<td>8. Economic decline and stagnation</td>
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<td>Motives</td>
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<td>31</td>
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<td>12. Restore former leader(s)</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>13. Free prisoners</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>15. Intra-military conflict and rivalry</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<tr>
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<td><strong>I. EXTERNAL FACTORS:</strong></td>
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<td>34</td>
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</table>

Since events may involve more than one motive, the total number of motives, 171, is much greater than our 210 events. We only have information on 164 out of 210 events. Thus, each event averages more than two motives.
tiatives in Chad and the Sudan. Thus, while allegations abound, there is no
evidence that even one successful coup d'etat in Black Africa was at
least in part organized and motivated by a foreign power, African or non-African.

The attempts at subversion and destabilization have been numerous throughout
the continent since 1960, none has had more than nuisance value.

Over half of the instances in which it has been claimed that personal ambi-

n and rivalry or other personal motives were operative involved coup plots
not successful coups.

CONCLUSION

This exercise in content analysis has produced useful results. Our

venteen sub-motives and reasons include all of the major causes of military

ventions in African politics that have been put forward in the scholarly

ature. Focusing just on successful coups d'etat, two structural features

African political and social life have by far the greatest weight—poor

formance by the existing government and the socio-economic factors of ethnic

alry and economic stagnation and decline.

Possibly more important than the actual results is the demonstration that

ematic analysis of the content of narrative reports can reveal patterns in

occurrence of events, which might otherwise remain undetected.
CHAPTER V. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF
MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Having descriptively analyzed Sub-Saharan African military intervention in
III and tentatively posited motives for this phenomenon in Chapter IV, we
now turn our attention to the explicit causal explanations as to why the
military intervenes so frequently in African politics. Special emphasis will
be devoted to the examination of theoretical literature concerning coups d'état
as evolved during the past two decades. These explanations, while often
providing theoretical insight, have seldom been subjected to systematic, empirical
test. Hence, while much of this literature either implicitly or explicitly
suggests how models aimed at the probabilistic prediction of coups might be
formed (i.e., formulated), there is no firm consensus as to the precise mix
ee that these "key" factors have on the military's "disposition to
intervene".1 The initial objective of this Chapter, therefore, is to draw from
the existing literature guidance as to the kinds of variables that affect the probability
of military intervention, as well as hypotheses about those probabilities.

Information will then constitute the central components of our models on
alternative explanations of military intervention. These models, which will be
formulated and explicitly formulated in the latter section of this chapter, will
serve as focal points for analyses presented in subsequent chapters of this report.

1 This concept was first introduced in Finer's (1962) influential examina-
tion of military intervention, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military
in Politics.
political violence, it can be argued, represents the transgression of a
threshold when individuals or groups have grown sufficiently dissatis-
fracted with existing conditions/order that the promotion of the
preservation of law and order is preferred to their preservation (Nieburg, 1962).
question of course is: when and why is such a threshold crossed? In
military intervention, which is the type of political violence we
interested in here, the answers to this question are widely varied.
entially three general "schools" of thought exist concerning the causes
itary intervention (Decalo, 1976: 7-12). The first school can be cate-
d as stressing societal and structural weaknesses which can create "power
lack of legitimacy, and domestic conflicts—all of which can lead to
ervention. The kinds of dynamics examined by this school as rele-
xplanatory variables of military coups include:
failure of political institutions and lack of "political culture"; 2
the breakdown in economic development and economic stagnation; 3
class conflicts; and 4
cultural and social variables. 5

amuel Huntington (1968) is probably the leading proponent of this
on. Also see, Feit (1973, 1968), Pauker (1959), Finer (1962), Pye (1962),
atic analysis of the role of political and related variables in coups,
ckman (1978).
ee Bratton (1982), Nelkin (1967), Putnam (1967), Needler (1966),
(1963).
see Lofchie (1972), Nun (1965).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Coups</th>
<th>Analysis of Causes</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960-1962</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Economic instability and political discontent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-1965</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Military dissatisfaction and political polarization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-1968</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>International pressure and regional conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-1971</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Economic reforms and political repression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-1974</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Military discontent and political ambition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-1977</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Economic downturn and political instability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-1980</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>International intervention and regional conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-1983</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Economic reforms and political repression</td>
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<td>1984-1986</td>
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<td>Military discontent and political ambition</td>
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<td>1987-1989</td>
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<td>Economic downturn and political instability</td>
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<td>1990-1992</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>International intervention and regional conflicts</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS 1978
A case can be made, considering recent African history, that all of these dynamics have been and continue to play an important role in African politics. There can be little argument that African countries are among the most under-developed both politically and economically (from a Western point of view). Also, class conflicts and cultural cleavages have contributed to political instability in these countries.

The second "school's" interpretation of military intervention focuses on the organizational characteristics of the military. Central here is the military's "characteristics of professionalism, nationalism, cohesion, and austerity that impel them to move into the political arena and to rescue the state from the grip of corrupt and self-seeking political elites" (Decalo, 1975: 12). Numerous scholars have focused on the impact of the degree (or lack) of military "professionalism" and its organization and how its professional identity affects its political behavior.6 Interestingly, Huntington (1957), a leading advocate of the structural school, in an early, influential analysis adhered to this organizational position by theorizing that a key factor in military intervention was whether the military was a "professional" organization because the lack of professionalization leads to political (vs apolitical) roles for the military. Other important factors, suggested by the proponents of this school include:

- military cohesion;
- the military's view of civil supremacy in politics;
- the military's sectional interests (i.e., class, regional); and
- the corporate self-interest of the armed forces.

---

As with the case of the structural school, the organizational interpretations of military invention has apparent face validity relative to Africa. The military most certainly has political advantages over civilian organizations vis-a-vis African states when we consider their centralized command, hierarchy, discipline, inter-communications, highly emotionalized symbolic status, and their monopoly on arms. Yet, they also have major political weaknesses—two of which are the military's historical technical inability to administer politically and its lack of the legitimate title to rule (Finer, 1962).

A third school of thought holds that idiosyncratic factors determine military coups d'état. This school gives prominence to the personalities of leaders and to adventitious circumstances. It maintains that coups cannot be predicted.

Having introduced the three general schools of thought concerning the courses of military intervention, let us now ascertain the specific factors of intervention asserted by each.

**Structural Factors Affecting Military Intervention**

As suggested above, the notion of "legitimacy" is central to the structural analysis of military intervention. Legitimacy reflects an underlying consensus that endows the leadership and the state with authority, and that offers respect and acceptance for individual leaders, institutions, and behavior norms. Hence, legitimacy is fundamental to the maintenance of political order in society. But what are the factors that determine legitimacy? What factors increase or decrease a regime's legitimacy?

Both questions posed above would seem critical to explanations concerning military intervention into politics. This seems to be especially true in the case of Sub-Saharan African countries where many of these states can be categorized as "praetorian". Characteristically, praetorian societies have weak
political institutions and politics assume a Hobbesian pattern with little consensus existing on the means to resolve political disputes because the basis for legitimizing political authority is uncertain. Below we will consider a number of structural factors that are proposed to impact on the legitimacy of a state's institutions and thus deem attention in the analysis of military intervention in politics.

**Political Factors.** Politics, in part, is concerned with the exercise of influence and decisions vested with the authority of the society for which the decisions are being made. Hence, by definition, political factors have a crucial impact on legitimacy. And because the probability of military intervention is low in countries marked with a high degree of legitimacy (Welch and Smith, 1974: 27), it is critical to analyze those political factors that impact on legitimacy and therefore influence military intervention or lack thereof.

One influential scholar whose work has followed this theoretical line of reasoning is Samuel Huntington.

Huntington (1968) suggests that the gravest problem facing the countries of the Third World is their shortage of political community and effective, authoritative, legitimate governments. Rapid social changes and rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions--dynamics well known by the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa--create an environment that can be exploited by the military (Huntington, 1968). Hence, to understand the causes of military coups one needs not focus primarily on the military per se.

The most important causes of military intervention in politics are not military but political and reflect not the social and organization characteristics of the military establishment but the political and institutional structure of the society ... military explanations do not explain military interventions. The reason for this is simply that military interventions are only one specific manifestation of a broader phenomenon in underdeveloped societies: the general politicization of social forces and institutions. In such societies, politics
lack autonomy, complexity, coherence, and adaptability. All sorts of social forces and groups become directly engaged in general politics (Huntington, 1969: 194).

As suggested above, the concept of "political community" is central to Huntington's thesis. The degree of political community in a society is a function of the strength of the political organizations and procedures found in the society. This strength, in turn, is determined by the scope of legitimacy held by the political organizations and procedures. Considering that the military is less likely to intervene in a society with well-established, legitimate institutions, we can conclude that the less the degree of political community, the less legitimacy will be held by the society's political institutions and thus the greater the chance of military intervention. Recognizing the dangers for instability in countries with low levels of political community and development, Huntington (1968) goes as far as to suggest that less developed countries may require Leninist-type political parties to guarantee stability and order and to avoid "political decay".

A second leading theorist who has focused on the relationships between political factors, legitimacy, and military interventions is S. E. Finer. Finer (1962) bases his thesis on the concept of "political culture" which is analogous to legitimacy. Political culture is simply the attachment and legitimacy given to civilian institutions by a country's populace. In other words, political culture is the pattern of orientations toward government and politics within society. A society's political culture is the product of historical experience as well as the socialization of the population. The specific attributes which can be used to measure this concept are:

- the degree of acceptance by a population that the political leaders have a moral right to govern and should be obeyed;
- the degree of consensus held by a population that the civil procedures and institutions that jointly constitute the society's political system are recognized as authoritative, and
the degree of public involvement in political institutions (Finer 1962: 87).

Finer's (1962) key hypothesis (which is graphically portrayed in Figure V-i) is: the lower the level of a country's political culture, the less legitimacy will be attached to civilian institutions, resulting in a greater chance for the military to intervene against a civilian regime.

As suggested in Figure V-1, countries with minimal political culture confer little or, more probably, no legitimacy on their governments. In such situations the disposition to intervene by the military is often based on the motive of serving the national interest (Finer, 1962). That is, because of the very low level of political culture and resulting lack of legitimacy, the civilian political institutions are unable to govern effectively. In essence, the legitimacy of the government is so slight as to present no check on the ambitions of contending groups (Welch and Smith, 1974: 28). Hence, the national interest of the society leads the defenders of the state—the military—to intervene in an attempt to alleviate the decaying situation (Finer, 1962: 45-47). This intervention will result in either the displacement or supplanting of the civilian government.

In countries with a low level of political culture, legitimacy assumes greater importance but it is fluid between governments. In such situations, a civilian government might be totally supplanted but is more likely to be displaced by a temporary military regime or military-civilian coalition.

Countries with either a developed or mature political culture will only on the rarest occasions have a government displaced by the military, according to Finer (1962). In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, the existence of such countries is rare because in few instances is legitimacy paramount and unobtainable by the military.
FIGURE V-1: Relationships Between Political Culture and Military Intervention*

ORDER OF POLITICAL CULTURE | CHARACTERISTIC OF THE ORDER OF POLITICAL CULTURE | CHARACTERISTIC LEVEL TO WHICH MILITARY INTERVENTION IS PUSHED

1st Order: Mature Political Culture | Legitimacy paramount, and unobtainable by military | Influence

2nd Order: Developed Political Culture | Legitimacy important and resistive to military | Blackmail

3rd Order: Low Political Culture | Legitimacy of some importance, but fluid | Displacement of Civilian Government

4th Order: Minimal Political Culture | Legitimacy unimportant | Supplanting of Civilian Regime

* Source: Finer (1962: 139).
Economic Factors. A society's economic characteristics and performance are further structural characteristics posited to influence military intervention. Nelkin (1967: 231), for example, in her analysis of the mid-1960 African coups concludes that "the issues which best account for the ease of military access to power, relate to economic circumstances and their social consequences."

Welch and Smith (1974: 26) in their excellent treatment of civil-military relationships in Africa propose that:

The likelihood of military intervention rises with a perceived deterioration of economic conditions, especially if accompanied by a belief that the government cannot resolve, or is responsible for, this deterioration.

"Revolutions of rising expectations" followed the decolonization of Africa. Yet in few instances were the expectations realized. The countries of Sub-Saharan Africa are among the poorest and least economically developed in the world. This reality coupled with initial high expectations has lead to built-in frustrations that threaten government stability in a number of ways.  

First, the military itself can have its position threatened by deteriorating economic conditions. Cuts in the military budgets necessitated by economic stagnation can threaten the livelihood of individual soldiers and the overall position of the military, thus enhancing the chances of military intervention. Also, like political "decay", economic downturns resulting in high rates of inflation, or unemployment, and general social dislocation can result in labor unrest, class conflicts, etc. which can threaten the "national interest" and thus prompt the military to try to alleviate the situation. Central here is the notion that in a climate of dissatisfaction over economic circumstances and of

7 See Feierabends (1966), Gurr (1970), and Deutsch (1961) for examinations on the effects of rising expectations on the range and intensity of collective discontent in developing countries.
isaffection with the increasing disparity between expectations and reality, the military might be "forced" to stem discontent and the discontinuities often associated with it. This phenomenon of the military, especially in praetorian societies, to view themselves as unique custodians of the national interest cannot be taken lightly. Again quoting Welch and Smith (1974: 67):

These armies consider themselves to be repositories of national honor and prestige. Relying on the broadest possible interpretation of their role as defenders of the nation, they assume the responsibility to protect their societies against threats from any quarter, including those resulting from the perceived malfeasance, corruption, and incompetence of civilian politicians.

In a similar vain, Austin (1966: 66) in his article on "The Underlying Problem of the Army Coup d'Etat in Africa" argues that:

Soldiers are natural patriots: to "defend the state" is their prime duty, and any major weakening of the economy or supposed subservience to an external power is likely to offend."

Evidence supporting the impact of economic decline and stagnation relative to military intervention in Sub-Saharan African, the reader will recall, was vividly revealed in Chapter IV of this Report. Our content analysis of the motives of African coup-makers suggested this dynamic to be the single most prominent motive. In fact, it was as mentioned as a motive in 26 successful coups. Clearly, economic factors must be considered in any serious examination of military intervention.

Class Conflicts. While not as prominent as political factors or economic deterioration/stagnation in the literature aimed at explaining the causes of military intervention, class conflict is a third structural characteristic that has been considered in the literature. Lofchie (1972) argues that the Amin coup in Uganda (January, 1971) for example, was a result of "class action" by

8 Class interests as an explanation of military coups, while not overly prominent in examinations of Sub-Saharan Africa, are found frequently in analyses of Latin-American military interventions. For example see: Nun (1965).
the military. Viewing the army as a type of economic class interested in protecting its institutional and personal interests, Lofchie (1972: 19) suggests that the officer corps were drawn almost entirely from one economic class (i.e., the inhabitants of the economically less-developed northern region). President Obote was deposed, the logic goes, because his policies threatened the military's economic and social class privileges.

It is reasonable to suspect that certain government policies can have differential impacts on economic classes and ethnic groups. Moreover, in societies lacking political community, "loyalties to the more primordial social and economic groupings--family, clan, village, tribe, religion, social class--can compete with and often supersede loyalty to the broader institutions of public authority" (Huntington, 1968: 30). Therefore, when economic austerity programs, for example, are viewed as particularly detrimental to a class of people that the military identifies with, it is not farfetched to expect the military to parochially enter the political arena.

Cultural/Social Factors. Cultural factors, like class factors, are concerned with the dominance of one group by another and can have a negative impact on the legitimacy of a government (de Jouvenal, 1963: 123). This seems to be especially relevant to the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, considering the great diversity and numbers of ethno-linguistic groups found in these countries. With high degrees of ethnic pluralism and low degrees of government legitimacy, it is difficult for these governments to satisfy the demands of ethno-linguistic groups with varying goals and/or values. To quote O'Connell (1967: 187):

Tribalist feelings are given an extra edge of bitterness in the modernizing process where an existing rank order of ethnic groups appears to be reversed particularly where a group advances from an original state of educational backwardness to take over posts in areas that another group or set of groups had considered to be their monopoly. The political significance of these ethnic conflicts is that they slow down the creation of nationalism that attaches sentiments to the state ... They heighten social distrust between the elite groups and damage communications between them. And so they deepen the antagonisms between political leaders, who require the support of the opinion leaders of their own communities and who are themselves in no way insulated from the competitive strain, distrust, and bitterness which makes up the essence of tribalism.

Because of phenomena such as those suggested above, it has been suggested at there is a direct relationship between cultural or ethnic cleavages and the likelihood of military intervention (Germani and Silvert, 1961). In highly plural societies political issues are often resolved more by force than institutionalized and reasoned compromise (Welch and Smith, 1974: 25). For example consider the role of ethno-linguistic fractionalism in Nigeria or the domestic antagonisms found in Zanzibar or Burundi where minority groups (the Arabs and Watusi, respectively) have exercised control. Indeed, our content analysis of the motives of African coup-makers (Chapter V) found ethnic, "tribal", valory to be quite relevant.

Obviously, the dynamics of ethno-linguistic pluralism are closely tied to other factors (political/economic, class) in military intervention discussed above. Cultural pluralism can be seen as a competitive struggle for the benefits of modernization or development, be these political or economic, between elites and members of different ethno-linguistic groups. Such competition may be manifested in the military when, for instance, the ethnic affiliation of rivals may be believed to be a more decisive factor than merit in promotions. Members of the armed forces perceive the government to be dominated by
omic elites hostile to the interests of another ethnic group which is heavily
presented in the military, conflicts based on tribe or region may quickly
develop (Welch, 1970: 28).

Having discussed theoretical propositions relative to cultural pluralism
in military intervention, let us now turn our attention to a second prominent
social variable suggested to impact on military intervention behavior—the rate
of social change in a society. Social change or what Huntington (1968) refers
as "social mobilization" involves processes that accompany and are generated
dynamics such as:

- urbanization or migration from rural areas to the cities;
- education/increases in literacy;
- media exposure; and
- industrialization.

One of these indicators of social change/mobilization impact on a population is
at they give rise to new or enhanced aspirations and expectations. If these
sires are not accommodated, widespread frustration may result and ultimately
lead to a deterioration of public order (Welch and Smith, 1974: 252; Huntington,
68: 47). This is especially true in a country that lacks strong and adaptable
political institutions because social mobilization leads to increased mass
political participation:

Political stability ... depends upon the ratio of institutionalization
to participation. As political participation increases, the
complexity, autonomy, adaptability, and coherence of the society's
political institutions must also increase if political stability
is to be maintained (Huntington, 1968: 79).

hence, a primary problem facing less developed countries such as those found in
ub-Saharan Africa is the lag in the development of political institutions
hind social change. The impact of this phenomenon on military intervention
is cogently suggested by Welch and Smith (1974: 36-37):
Political stability reflects, in large measure, an imbalance between socioeconomic change (which generates new policy issues) and political institutionalism, the development of effective political institutions (by means of which these issues may be resolved). The disjuncture between these two processes may be especially marked in the less developed states of Africa ... [where] social and economic changes have generated ... a situation of widespread social frustration and unrest caused by the inability of the society to meet its citizen's rising expectations ... This social frustration, if unmoderated by the creation of new opportunities for social and economic mobility or by political institutions capable of absorbing and channeling its energy, may lead to a rapid expansion of demands on government and a concomitant rapid mobilization of new social forces seeking to press those demands ... The result is political decay ... Political decay inevitably involves a general increase in the use of coercive political resources, with the result that the military is drawn into the political process.

To summarize, the preceding discussion has presented both the central labels and hypotheses concerning the causes of military interventions as tested by proponents of the structural school. It should be apparent that major categories of explanatory factors—political, economic, class, cultural/social are not mutually exclusive. In fact, the individual factors interact in both explicit and subtle ways to threaten civilian authority. This authority is most likely threatened when structural characteristics ermine the legitimacy of the civilian institutions and their effectiveness resolving societal frustrations and conflicts.

Military Organizational Factors Affecting Military Intervention

The proponents of the organizational school of the causes of military intervention argue that while structural factors may be important, they cannot be emphasized at the expense or exclusion of variables "internal" to the armed forces (for example, Luckham, 1971). These theorists suggest, as do the proponents of structural theories, that their hypotheses and variables are especially relevant to praetorian societies where the military does not view its political role as subordinate to civilian institutions.
"modernity", in the sense of technology, non-subsistence economic values, education, and susceptibility to mass communications.

A third variable associated with social change is urbanization. Like the previous two variables, urbanization also marks an increase in political partition and signifies a break from traditional rural lifestyles. Hence it can disrupt the political calm. Relative to military intervention it is hypothesized that:

an increase (or decrease) in urbanization is associated with an increase (or decrease) in military intervention, all other things held constant.

Urbanization was measured as the percentage increase in the population of country's capital city, 1950-1960 (various sources).

As we have seen, social change can result in demands for a higher quality life, as the populace is subjected to the dynamics of modernity. It seems reasonable to assume, therefore, that how well new demands and aspirations are reflected in the country's quality of life. A low quality of life indicates that rising expectations are not being satisfied and the resulting content can lead to military intervention:

a given percentage fall (or rise) in a country's quality of life is associated with a given percentage increase (or decrease) in military intervention, ceteris paribus.

Our physical quality of life measure is based on an index developed by the Overseas Development Council (1980) which incorporates various factors associated with the standard of living.

The last variable of the social change model is industrialization. Industrialization, like the other variables mentioned, is a reflection of social change and a society's drive for modernity. It results in people assuming new roles, which are often in conflict with traditional roles, and can lead to
Political participation is one phenomenon that accompanies rapid social change. It has been argued that mass influx into the political process can be stabilizing for developing states (Huntington, 1968). The lack of the maturity of Sub-Saharan political institutions prevents them from absorbing the strains that result from mass political participation. Hence we can hypothesize that increases in political participation are associated with a country's level of military intervention:

a given percentage increase (or decrease) in political participation is associated with a given increase (or decrease) in military intervention, all other things equal.

Political participation was measured as the number of votes (as a percentage of the total population) in the last national election before the date of independence (Morrison, et al., 1972: 102).

Social mobilization, which also occurs during periods of rapid social change, is a second relevant variable in this model. Increases in social mobilization put an additional strain on political institutions especially when these institutions are unable to respond to and satisfy the new aspirations and expectations generated by this dynamic (Jackman, 1978: 1263). Hence, if the established political channels are not resilient enough to absorb and respond these demands, conflict can result which can draw the military into the political arena:

an increase (or decrease) in social mobilization is related to an increase (or decrease) in military intervention, ceteris paribus.

Social mobilization was measured as the percentage of the adult labor force employed in the agricultural sector. This measure, Jackman (1978: 65) suggests:

First, and most important, ... reflects variations in the importance of the market economy, since in the African case, "agriculture" includes a substantial subsistence component. Second, it partly reflects the size of the nonrural population, for obvious reasons. Finally, it also taps exposure to
Import growth was measured for both the 1960s and 1970s. Specifically it is measured and specified for the years 1965-1970 and 1970-1975 as the growth of imports and nonfactor services (as a percentage of GDP) (Bornschier and Heintz, 1979: 103-105).

The last variable in this model is a country's trade balance relative to its GNP. This variable is linked positively to a country's economic performance because it can reflect a positive current trade balance and current account and that total trade is a large percentage of the economy's GNP. Hence, it is proposed that this variable should be inversely related to military intervention:

a given percentage increase (or decrease) in trade balance/GNP is associated with a given percentage decrease (or increase) in military intervention, other factors kept constant.

This variable was measured as exports minus imports divided by GNP, 1965 (various sources).

Social Change Model

The general thesis of the social change model is that the rapidity and scope of social change and mobilization can bring new groups into politics and train the capacity of existing institutions. This can result in the breakdown of institutional legitimacy producing conditions of public disorder and instability that often herald military intervention (Welch and Smith, 1974: 36). The key independent variables of this model are:

- political participation;
- social mobilization;
- urbanization;
- quality of life; and
- industrialization.
International Economic Performance Model

The international economic performance of Sub-Saharan African countries would seem to be an additional economic dynamic that could impact on military intervention. As in domestic performance, the better a state's international economic performance, the greater the legitimacy of the government and the less it will be prone to military coups. There is little question that the incorporation of Sub-Saharan countries in the world economy imposes opportunities and constraints. The measures of international economic performance included in this model are:

- growth in exports;
- growth in imports;
- trade balance relative to GNP;

Growth in exports can be viewed as a positive indicator of a state's performance in the international economy. Hence, it can act as a government legitimizer and deter military intervention:

\[
\text{a given percentage increase (or decrease) in growth of exports is associated with a given percentage decrease (or increase) in military intervention, all other things held constant.}
\]

Export growth was measured as the growth in the exports of goods and non-factor services (as a percentage of GDP) 1965-1970 (Bornschier and Heintz, 1979: 87-89).

Unlike export growth, the relative increase in the growth of imports is an indicator of poor international economic performances because it can drain capital that could be used for development plans out of the country. Hence we hypothesize:

\[
\text{a given increase (decrease) in the growth of imports is associated with a given percentage increase (or decrease) in military intervention, ceteris paribus.}
\]
economic performance of a country and hence should decrease the likelihood of military intervention. Therefore, 

an increase (or decrease) in the percent of labor force in industry is associated with a decrease (or increase) in military intervention, other factors kept constant.

Industrial employment was measured as the increase of the percent of the labor force employed in industry (World Bank, 1980: 138) over the years 1960 to 1978.

The growth in gross domestic investment (GDI) is an additional indicator of positive domestic economic performance and a sine qua non of programs of economic development. It should therefore be negatively or inversely related to military intervention:

a given percentage rise (or fall) in GDI growth is associated with a given percentage decrease (or increase) in military intervention, ceteris paribus.

Our measure of GDI (as a percentage of GDP) growth represents its growth over the years 1960 to 1970. Our data source was Bornschier and Heintz, (1979: 43-45).

The last variable in this model economic growth, is yet an additional indicator of an economy's performance. It should therefore also be negatively related to military intervention:

an increase (or decrease) in economic growth is associated with a decrease (or increase) in military intervention, all other things being equal.

Economic growth was measured as the percentage increase in gross national product, 1965 to 1970 (Bornschier and Heintz, 1979: 12-14).

These four economic performance indicators then become the basis of the overall model which suggests that military intervention is a function of a country's inflation rates, increase/decrease is industrial employment (economic development), growth in GDI, and general economic growth.
and distribution the more legitimate a government becomes and, hence, the less likely is military intervention.

The likelihood of intervention rises as prevailing economic conditions worsen, especially when the government is perceived to be responsible for or unable to control the situation. Economic deterioration leads to government belt tightening. Regimes with shallow public support are poorly equipped to withstand the protests of social groups from whom sacrifices are demanded. Austerity measures tend to affect the lower strata most severely, giving rise to strikes, demonstrations, and even riots. Actual outbreaks of violence or serious doubts about the government's ability to maintain order may prompt the military to intervene (Welch and Smith, 1974: 246).

The domestic economic performance model specifically hypothesizes four variables as central in explaining military intervention:

- inflation rates;
- the increase in industrial employment;
- the growth in gross domestic investment (GDI); and
- economic growth.

Inflation can be a very powerful dislocating economic force. Moreover, high rates of inflation can lead to austerity policies that can alienate sectors of society, including the military if it is forced to sacrifice because of the austerity policies. Hence, inflation is proposed to be positively correlated with military intervention:

a given percentage increase (decrease) in inflation is associated with a given percentage increase (or decrease) in military intervention, other factors kept constant.

Our measure of inflation represents the average annual rate of inflation (%) over the years 1970 to 1978 (World Bank, 1980: 101).

Increases in industrial employment reflect not only employment opportunities for a country's populace but also can be viewed as an indicator of economic development. This variable is hypothesized to be a positive sign of the domestic
source of legitimacy and authority ... legitimacy must be embodied in a party ... Where traditional political institutions are weak or nonexistent, the prerequisite of stability is at least one highly institutionalized political party. States with one such party are markedly more stable than states which lack such a party.

Therefore, we hypothesize that

a given percentage rise (or fall) in party dominance is associated with a given percentage decrease (or increase) in military intervention, all other things equal.

Our measure of party dominance is the degree of factionalization (party cleavages) in a country's lower house of the legislature, 1975 (Bornschier and Heintz, 1979: 267-270).

The last variable of the political development model is political violence. The degree of political violence in a country is an additional indicator of the lack of political legitimacy, public support and institutional procedures for resolving political conflict. Where political violence is high, we can expect the breakdown of political institutions and the greater chance of the military intervening to meet the demands for change or to alleviate political decay. Hence,

an increase (decrease) in political violence is associated with an increase (decrease) in the likelihood of military intervention, other things constant.

Our measure of political violence is the number of a country's deaths from domestic violence, 1960-1967, was found in Taylor and Hudson (1972: 110-115).

Therefore to summarize, the political development hypothesizes that military intervention is a function of a country's political democracy, multipartyism, party dominance and political violence.

**Domestic Economic Performance Model**

As the reader saw above, it has been theorized that economic performance is also a factor that influences the likelihood of military intervention. The basic position here is that the better the local economy performs in growth.
Military intervention, it has been argued, rarely occurs in countries marked with strong political institutions, procedures, and legitimacy. Democracy requires such dynamics. Moreover, democratic societies can be viewed as mature political cultures. Such societies usually have well established "rules of the game" for resolving political disputes and conflicts. Hence, it is reasonable to hypothesize that a society's relative degree of democracy should be inversely related to the amount of military intervention it experiences:

In terms of partial elasticities, we can simply state that a given percentage rise (or fall) in the level of a society's political democracy is associated with a given percentage decrease (or increase) in domestic military intervention, other factors kept constant.

Our measure of political democracy comes from Bollen's (1980) political democratic index, 1965.

The second independent variable of this model--number of political parties--is a measure of mass political participation and multipartyism. Huntington (1968) suggests that multipartyism can exacerbate social/political conflict and where political rivalry cannot be contained, the probability of military intervention increases. Hence,

a given percentage rise (or fall) in the number of political parties in a society is associated with a given percentage increase (or decrease) in the amount of military intervention, other things kept constant.

Our measure of multipartyism is the number of political parties formed in a country from date of independence through 1969 (Morrison and et al., 1972: 99).

A third political factor that has been theorized to impact on military intervention is the lack of dominance of a single political party. Huntington (1969: 91) cogently suggests:

Where traditional political institutions collapse or are weak or nonexistent, the role of the party is entirely different from what it is in those politics with institutional continuity. In such situations, strong party organization is the only long-run alternative to the instability of a corrupt or praetorian or mass society. The party is not just a supplementary organization; it is instead the
model construction for forecasting purposes (something he did not do despite the title of his article). If his model does not fit our data, then we must discover why because without a strong statistical model in terms of the percentage of variance explained, quantitative forecasts are useless.

ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION

Having reviewed and synthesized the literature of military intervention most relevant to our research, we will now present our explicit specifications of alternative models of military intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa. Each alternative model constitutes a partial explanation of military intervention. Underlying this exercise is the assumption that all of the various factors of military intervention discussed in our literature review have relative merit in explaining this complex phenomenon. The actual degree of explanatory power of each of the "competing" theoretical viewpoints, however, must be subjected to explicit, empirical validation. But before the empirical validity of each can be assessed, the alternative theoretical positions need to be specified in a form that allows for statistical analysis. That is the purpose of the remainder of this chapter. For each model we will present its key propositions.

Political Development Model

The first model to be specified incorporates the theoretical positions of Huntington (1968), Finer (1962) and others and focuses on the impact of political factors on military intervention behavior. Specifically, our political development model examines the impact of the following variables:

- political democracy;
- number of political parties;
- political party dominance; and
- political violence.
Coups d'etat across twenty-nine countries and sixteen years is explained statistically by the model indicates a strong degree of predictability. Coups d'etat in Africa are clearly related to structural elements of African states and societies.

From a theoretical point of view the results are equally satisfying. The positive coefficients associated with Social Mobilization (M) and Ethnic Domination (C) indicate that when social change has advanced to relatively high levels within African states and when these same states are dominated by a single ethnic group, the additive effect of these two aspects of social structure is strongly destabilizing. The negative parameter (-.202) associated with Party Dominance in Africa indicates that when a single political party enjoys widespread electoral support this stabilizes such states. In other words, multipartyism in Black Africa is destabilizing. Political Participation (P) as represented by a high voter turnout is also stabilizing as is the interaction of Party Dominance and Political Participation (D*P). Finally, a strong political party in combination with a dominant ethnic group (C*D) is stabilizing, whereas a dominant ethnic group in the presence of high levels of Political Participation (C*P) is particularly destabilizing. Much of this sounds intuitively correct; further, Jackman's concepts and theoretical propositions are strongly grounded in the well known theoretical writings of distinguished theorists such as Karl W. Deutsch, Samuel E. Finer, and Samuel P. Huntington that we discussed in early sections of this chapter.

Given the very successful results of Jackman's pioneering study, part of our quantitative analysis, presented in Chapter VI, represents a replication of his research with our measure of total military involvement in Sub-Saharan African countries for the years 1960-1982. If Jackman's (1978) model fits our data well, this would tend to add credence to his results and save us time in
studies of instability in Africa. The reason for this is simple. Few quantitative studies have been published for this area of research. The most effective published work along these lines is Robert W. Jackman's 1978 article in the American Political Science Review, on "The Predictability of Coups d'Etat: A Model with African Data" (Volume 72 1262-1275). Jackman's research is important to our research for a number of reasons. First, his analytical approach is similar to the strategy suggested by our research design (see Chapter II). Second, as mentioned above, Jackman's research represents what we believe to be the best published quantitative study on coups in Africa. Third, his findings are very powerful in explaining the causes of coups in Sub-Saharan Africa.

In this article Jackman specifies and estimates a statistical model of the structural determinants of coups d'etat for twenty-nine new states of Black Africa in the years 1960 through 1975. His best result, from both a statistical and theoretical perspective, was the following single equation model (whose results are explained below):

\[
\text{Coups d'etat 1960-75} = 19.129 + 0.277(M) + 27.666(C) \\
- 0.202(D) - 23.047(P) - 0.186(D\times P) - 0.317(C\times D) \\
+ 11.380(C\times P) + \text{error}
\]

\[
R^2 = 0.843 \quad \text{Corrected R Square} = 0.791 \quad \text{Number of cases} = 29
\]

Where \( M \) = Social Mobilization \( C \) = Ethnic Dominance \( D \) = Party Dominance and \( P \) = Political Participation.

From a statistical point of view this is a most satisfactory result. Each estimated parameter, with the exception of the \( D\times P \) interaction term, is highly significant in that it is well more than twice its standard error (given in parentheses below each parameter). That eighty percent of the variance in
The cohesion of the military is crucial if it is to be a coordinated, directed organization. High internal cohesion is a fundamental military value and crucial for it to carry out its functions. The importance of cohesion is amplified by the fact that all militaries stress organizational loyalty at the expense of the individuality of their members or their heritage.

Military cohesion is problematic, however, in Africa because of the ethno-linguistic cleavages discussed earlier. This pluralism has a number of theoretical implications. First, as suggested in the first hypothesis presented above, the lack of cohesion caused by cultural pluralism can inhibit this military from attempting to carry out a coordinated military intervention. If this cohesion does not exist, actions as drastic as political intervention could cause the military's own disintegration by alienating its members against one another. This seems especially likely if the military, or a group within, moves against a government highly tied to a particular ethno-linguistic group which is represented in the armed forces. In such a case, the military group may be successful in supplanting the government but leaves itself prone to a countercoup by opposing factors within the military.

The second hypothesis presented above addresses the impact of recruitment patterns, their impact on military cohesion, and ultimately military intervention. The assumptions here are similar to those posited concerning ethno-linguistic groups, but instead of focusing on cultural pluralism, it is interested with the diversity of class on social strata found within the military.

Jackman's 1978 Study of African Coups d'Etat

So far in this chapter we have discussed a number of factors purported in the literature to impact on military intervention. While we have examined a large variety of literature, we have given little attention to quantitative
The strength of the armed forces vis-a-vis other societal institutions will also affect the military's role. If the military absorbs a large percentage of total government expenditures it can apply its resources and influence in a manner which is beyond the means of other societal institutions. Moreover, it is reasonable to suspect that if a civilian government institutes policies that threaten the piece of the pie the military is accustomed to then it can impact on the military's inclination to politically intervene.

The impact of nationalist feelings in the military, as we have seen earlier, can also influence military intervention. Relative to the role of the military in society, overly zealous nationalism can lead the military to justifying their political actions in broad terms aimed at safeguarding the strength and the viability of the country as a whole. Such a role for the military can lead it to the belief that the adoption of any policy harmful to the military is harmful to the state (Austin, 1966).

**Military Cohesion.** The cohesion of the armed forces is a second general organizational variable that may impact on the dynamics of military intervention. Welch and Smith (1974: 14-15) suggest two hypotheses concerning aspects of military cohesion and military intervention:

- Armed forces with high internal cohesion have a greater capacity to intervene in domestic politics than armed forces with lesser cohesion; counter-coups after the seizure of power are more likely to occur if the new military regime is one of low internal cohesion; and
- The likelihood of military intervention diminishes if officers are drawn from or incorporated into the same social strata as the governing elite, and rises if the two groups are drawn from different strata.
While there are numerous, specific organizational or internal factors that have been posited as affecting the chances of military intervention, they, for the most part, can be subsumed under two general categories—the military's role and/or scope of mission and cohesion patterns within the military.

Military's Role. How a military perceives its role in society is a complex phenomenon and seemingly critical in its entry into the political arena. While the actual degree of military political involvement will vary from country to country, there are a number of suggested key variables that appear to affect the military's role and political interests. Such variables are the military's political awareness, professionalism, strength and societal importance, nationalism, and traditional political roles. These variables should not be viewed as mutually exclusive dynamics. Indeed, these variables interact and the role of the military is influenced by their interaction. For example, a military's political awareness, according to Huntington (1957), will be influenced by its professionalism. Western political thought maintains that a professional army is a relatively nonpolitical entity. Important here is the notion that the boundaries between and responsibilities of civilian and military institutions must be clearly demarcated.

Military establishments with fragmented boundaries are generally less professional overall, but are especially so in terms of their coherence and corporateness or in terms of function, the armed forces may have no clear-cut external competitive focus for their activity, no foreign adversary power against which their mission can be defined. Instead, they may be directed primarily into domestic police or counter-insurgency functions, or perhaps into civic action programs, all of which tend to exacerbate boundary fragmentation by thrusting the armed forces into the domestic political arena. Fragmented boundaries imply that the institutional roles and values of the military are relatively undifferentiated from those found in the environment (Welch and Smith, 1974: 41).

The above quotation surely is applicable to African militaries.
politicalization via unionism and heightened aspirations. The increased political and social awareness associated with industrialization can result in societal conflict and therefore increase the likelihood of military intervention:

an increase (or decrease) in industrialization is associated with an increase (or decrease) in military intervention, all other things equal.

Industrialization was measured as the increase in the percentage of GDP produced by manufacturing between 1960 and 1978 (World Bank, 1980: 114).

Military Motivations Model

The four models thus far specified all examine the impact of structural characteristics of a society on military intervention. The last model to be specified—the Military Motivations Model—focuses on the impact of variables internal to the military. The two independent variables of this model are:

- military cohesion; and
- the military's importance.

The impact of military cohesion on military intervention seems to be especially important in Sub-Saharan African societies. Yet its actual theoretical impact seems confusing. One could argue that when cleavages exist in the military (i.e., lack of cohesion) they could become so decisive, especially if the military pluralism is also reflected in the society as a whole, that they could result in military intervention. Hence, a negative relationship should exist between military cohesion and military intervention. That is, the less military cohesion the greater the likelihood of military intervention. We do not agree with this theoretical position. As suggested in the literature review section of this chapter, military intervention requires a coordinated, agreed-upon effort. If cleavages exist, the chances of coordination are hindered and the military chances internal strife and possibly civil war. Hence, we
hypothesize that military cohesion is needed for a coordinated military entry into the political arena:

an increase (or decrease) in military cohesion is associated with an increase (or decrease) in military intervention, ceteris paribus.

Our measure of military cohesion is a multiplicative of the percentage of the largest ethno-linguistic group (as a percent of the total population) (Morrison, et al., 1972: 182-378) and the size of the military, 1970 (ACDA, various years).

Military importance--the second variable of this model--has two central characteristics. The first is the military's accepted role in domestic politics. In those countries that have governments that employ coercion against their opponents, we can expect the military to play a greater role in politics. For example:

Involvement of the armed forces in internal pacification ... inherently and inevitably brings the military into political disputes ... The likelihood of military intervention rises should the armed forces become heavily involved in primarily domestic, police-type or counterinsurgency activities (Welch and Smith, 1974: 10).

The second characteristic of military importance relates to the societal resources it receives and which it wants to preserve for its own institutional well-being. That is, the military does not want to have to sacrifice its part of the budget, for example, or want civilian meddling in their internal affairs. If this occurs it may prompt the military to intervene. Hence:

a given percentage increase (or decrease) in military importance is associated with a given percentage increase (or decrease) in military intervention, all other things equal.

Military importance was measured as a multiplicative of government sanctions against opponents, 1960-1967 (Taylor and Hudson, 1972: 116-123) and the country's defense expenditure as a percentage of total current revenue, 1965 (Bornschier and Heintz, 1972: 283-285).
CONCLUSION

In this chapter we have reviewed the literature concerning the causes of military intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa. Although the vast majority of this literature (Jackman (1978) being the exception) does not present systematic tests of theoretical positions, it does present the kinds of factors that merit empirical examination. Using these factors and their associated hypotheses, this chapter specified a number of competing or alternative models and the causes of military intervention. The next chapter will test the relative validity of these models via the application of econometric and multivariate statistical modeling techniques.
CHAPTER VI. ASSESSMENT OF ALTERNATIVE MODELS
OF THE CAUSES OF MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

INTRODUCTION

In Chapter V a number of alternative models of the causes of Sub-Saharan African military intervention were described and specified. The objective of this Chapter is to systematically test the empirical "validity" and explanatory power of each of these models. This exercise is critical to the development of forecasts of military intervention, meaningful to the intelligence analyst, because if the forecasts are based on models with little empirical validity, the resulting forecasts are useless.

REPLICATION OF JACKMAN'S (1978) MODEL

As suggested in Chapter V, Jackman's (1978) model is extremely powerful in explaining the causes of coups in Black Africa for the nations and years which it addresses. Because of the success of this model, our initial analysis will focus on our replication of it.

Our intention was to replicate Jackman's work as closely as possible. The first aspect of this exercise was to recompute his results for his measures, time period, and countries. Data on Jackman's independent variables are available from published sources, particularly Donald G. Morrison, et al., Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook. (New York: The Free Press, 1971). Scores for coups between 1965 and 1975 were obtained from Jackman. The replication indicates that results are virtually identical to his.

The next step in replicating Jackman was to regress the measure of military intervention developed in this study for 1960 through 1982 on the Jackman

---

1 The reader will recall from Chapter III that Total Military Intervention Score (TMIS) is an index which is the simple weighted sum of each instance of a coup (5), attempted but unsuccessful coup (3), and military plot (1).
independent variables. While a clear replication, this is not identical to his work. Several important differences must be noted at the outset. First, thirty-five countries are examined (see Appendix C), while Jackman only studied twenty-nine Black African states. Our sample of thirty-five countries is as inclusive as possible, representing all African states south of the Sahara which were independent by the end of 1970 except for Equatorial Guinea (independent in 1968) which had to be excluded because of a lack of data on many key variables. The end of 1970 was chosen as a cutoff point since it gives each country at least twelve years, 1971 through 1982, to experience serious military interventions, including military coups d'état. Thus, the second replication differs from Jackman in that it included all his states and six others—Botswana, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, and Swaziland. A second obvious difference is that seven additional years of African coup behavior, 1976-1982, are included. Of course, since our data were collected on a yearly basis, we can examine the 1960-1975 period if necessary.

The third and most important difference is the focus on elite instability events involving the military, police, and security forces exclusively. Jackman included entirely civilian plots, attempted coups, and coups in his index, as well as events involving the military and police. Since by far most of these events have involved armed forces of one type or another, our indexes are quite similar ($r = .911$) although not identical. This lack of identity comes from our different conceptual definitions and the fact that we did not use identical sources for our event collections. Unlike Jackman, Africa Research Bulletin, which since its start in 1964 has established itself as the standard news chronology for the continent, formed the basis for this effort. Consequently, events were included which Jackman missed. Nevertheless, the indexes are
sufficiently similar to permit us to ask whether or not Jackman's theoretical model will do as well against our measure of military coups d'état as it did against his.

To answer this question we did the necessary regression analysis which produced the following results:

Total Military Involvement Score 1960-82 = \(28.087 - 2.010(M)\)
\(\quad + 19.388(C) - 15.409(D) - 29.366(P) + 26.625(D*P)\)
\(\quad \frac{(11.445)}{(13.227)} \quad \frac{(12.316)}{(17.540)} \quad \frac{17.166}{(7.808)}\)

R Square = .426  Corrected R Square = .302  N of cases = 35

Where \(M\) = Social Mobilization  \(C\) = Ethnic Dominance  \(D\) = Party Dominance  
and \(P\) = Political Participation.

We see clearly that Jackman's model does not fit our data very well at all. Only the constant and Political Participation (\(P\)) are significant and of the same sign as his regression. Moreover, we explain a rather modest amount of variance in TMIS, in comparison to Jackman's result. We are certain that this lack of success is not caused by problems in the independent variables because: we used the same sources as did Jackman; we were able to replicate exactly his original results; and we have used his exact operational definitions—Social Mobilization is the sum of the percent of the population not in agriculture around 1966 plus the percent of the population that was literate around 1965; Ethnic Dominance is a binary variable, coded 1 when the largest ethnic group comprises 44 percent of the population or more and coded 0 when it is 43 percent or less. Party Dominance represents the percent of the total vote received by the winning party at the election closest to but before independence. Political Participation is also a binary variable, coded 1 when the percent
of the population voting in the election closest to but before independence was greater than 20 percent and 0 otherwise.

Three possibilities remain as to why Jackman's model is inadequate with respect to our data. First, by adding seven years we may have included in our study new phenomena which represent a "structural change." This means that the structural factors identified by Jackman for the 1960-1975 period may no longer be operative or at least very much less important than they once were and that new factors must be specified in the model if it is to produce strong results. This can be tested quite easily by removing the period 1976-1982 from our index and by regressing TMIS 1960-1975 on Jackman's independent variables. If time is the source of the problem, this would tend to support Jackman's original model in that it works for 1960-1975 for his coup index and for ours. That things have changed since he did his research cannot be used to criticize his work.

Unfortunately, when TMIS 1960-1975 is regressed on Jackman's independent variables for our thirty-five cases, the R Square is only 59 percent and the only significant variables are Ethnic Dominance (C), Political Participation (P) and the interaction of Ethnic Dominance and Party Dominance (C*D). However, when we regress TMIS 1960-1975 on Jackman's twenty-nine countries, thereby providing an exact replication except for the small differences in the dependent variable discussed above, R Square is .793 and most variables are significant and have the same sign as in Jackman's original results (not significant are Social Mobilization [M], Party Dominance [D] and [D*P]). This strongly suggests that our failure to achieve results as satisfactory as Jackman's with our thirty-five cases and 1960-1982 time period was caused to a great degree by our inclusion of six countries not studied by Jackman. This seriously questions the general validity of his results, that is, his results may be limited just to the cases he studied and may not be general for all of the states of Sub-Saharan Africa.
A second possible reason for the failure of our results to produce statistical evidence as strong as Jackman's is that our set of countries were different from Jackman's set. If this is the case, as we have just pointed out, one would tend to question the general usefulness of Jackman's model for forecasting beyond his time period and cases. We can test this possibility by regressing TMIS 1960-1982 on the twenty-nine countries studied by Jackman. When this is done, R Square is .671 and all variables are significant except for Party Dominance (D) and (D*P). While not as powerful as Jackman's original results, this result is better than when TMIS 1960-1975 is regressed upon our thirty-five countries, indeed, considerably so.

The third possible reason for our different results is that the differences in our samples of countries and time periods studied have interacted to confound our analysis. It would appear that this is indeed the case, but that the primary difference in our results is caused by our working with thirty-five countries and not Jackman's twenty-nine or thirty (in some of his analyses he includes Ethiopia, in others he does not). Since the objective of this effort is to be as inclusive as possible, all of our model estimations will include thirty-five cases (see Appendix C for a list of these countries).

Forecasts Based on the Jackman Replication Model

A primary objective of this effort is to develop a methodology to enable intelligence analysts to render reasonable forecasts of the likelihood of coups d'état and other serious military interventions in African politics. It is often the case that a bad example is at least as instructive as a good example. We have already stated that for quantitative forecasts to be at all credible, they must be based upon statistical models that have strong explanatory power in terms of the amount of variance explained in the dependent or
criterion variable. Because the replication of Jackman's model accounted for only 42.6 percent of the variance in its criterion, TMIS 1960-1982, we would expect that forecasts generated by such a weak regression would be at best problematic. Table VI-1 demonstrates that this is indeed the case.

In this table we present two forecasting methods which we shall use throughout our analysis—a linear probability model forecast and a forecast based upon a discriminant function analysis.\footnote{A linear probability model takes the form (this discussion draws heavily from Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981: 275-276):
\[
Y_i = \alpha + \beta X_i + \epsilon_i
\]
where \(X_i\) = value of attribute (for example, social mobilization) for the \(i\)th country;
\[
\begin{align*}
Y_i &= 1 \text{ if the country is coup prone (i.e. has experienced a successful coup, 1960-1982)} \\
Y_i &= 0 \text{ if the country is not coup prone (i.e. has not experienced a successful coup, 1960-1982)} 
\end{align*}
\]
Since \(Y_i\) is a binary variable, the probability distribution of \(Y\) can be described as
\[
E (Y_i) = 1(P_i) + 0(1-P_i) = P_i.
\]
Therefore, the regression equation can be interpreted as describing the probability that a country will have a coup, given its level of social mobilization. The difficulty with a linear probability model is that there is no guarantee that the predicted value of \(Y_i\) will lie in the \((0,1)\) interval. If such predictions do exist they can arbitrarily be set to equal .01 and .99.}
Discriminant Function Analysis examines data with one binary classification variable (e.g., coup prone and not coup prone) and several continuous, independent variables. Hence discriminant analysis is used to classify observations into a known group on the basis of independent variables.

The discriminant model, also known as a classification criterion, is determined by a measure of generalized squared distance (Rao, 1973). The classification criterion can be based on either the individual within-group covariance matrices or the pooled covariance matrix; it also takes into account the prior probabilities of the group.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Misclassified (1960-1982)</th>
<th>Serious Intervention Probabilities, 1983-85(a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Benin</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Botswana</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>.56*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Burundi</td>
<td>.72*</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Cameroon</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Central African Rep.</td>
<td>.63*</td>
<td>.72*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Chad</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Congo, Brazzaville</td>
<td>.53*</td>
<td>.56*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Ethiopia</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Gabon</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Gambia</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Ghana</td>
<td>.68*</td>
<td>.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Guinea</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>.67*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Ivory Coast</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Lesotho</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>.51*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Liberia</td>
<td>.58*</td>
<td>.65*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Madagascar</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Malawi</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>.55*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Mali</td>
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<td>.89</td>
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<td>20. Mauritania</td>
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<td>.76</td>
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<td>21. Mauritius</td>
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<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Niger</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.94</td>
</tr>
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<td>23. Nigeria</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Rwanda</td>
<td>.72*</td>
<td>.84</td>
</tr>
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</table>
### TABLE VI-1: Forecasts Based Upon Jackman’s Model (Cont’d.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5. Senegal</td>
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<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>.97</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Somalia</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Sudan</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Swaziland</td>
<td>.52*</td>
<td>.54*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Tanzania</td>
<td>.69*</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
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<td>1. Togo</td>
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<td>2. Uganda</td>
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<td>3. Upper Volta</td>
<td>.74*</td>
<td>.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Zaire</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Zambia</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. The first probability was generated from a linear probability model, a single equation multiple regression with a binary dependent variable valued 1 if the country did not experience a successful military coup between 1960 and 1982 and valued 0 if it did). The second probability was generated by a discriminant function analysis.

2. Probabilities in the range of .25 to .75 are not much help in forecasting.
"forecast" based upon a poorly fitting model is that seven of thirty-five cases (20 percent) are not properly classified. That is, the discriminant function analysis suggests, for example, that a country should be "coup prone" when actual empirical data suggest that it is not. Botswana, Guinea, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland and Zambia are all forecast as being coup prone, with probabilities ranging from .04 to .08, when the empirical data show it is. Except for Guinea, first five named states have been among the most stable in Sub-Saharan Africa since their independence, whereas Madagascar has a TMIS score of 18, well above the thirty-five state average of 13.8. Again, four of the seven poorly predicted states--Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, and Swaziland--were not among Jackman's final twenty-nine cases.

It is also interesting to note the frequency with which either the linear probability model or the discriminant function analysis produces probabilities in the "maybe it will, maybe it won't" range of .25 to .75. Fifteen out of thirty-five states (43 percent) have one or both predicted probabilities in this range (similar to a weather forecast with a 50 percent probability of rain). In forecasting important phenomena such as military coups d'etat in Africa, it is vital that the analyst be able to say that for any given country it is either highly likely, highly unlikely, or too close to call. The result of using a poorly fitting statistical model to "forecast" the probability of serious military interventions in the period 1982-1985 is that 43 percent of the African states are too close to call.

ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT MODEL

Our findings relative to the replication of the Jackman (1978) model strongly suggest that alternative specifications are called for in explaining military intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa. The first alternative model we
examine is the political development model which the reader will recall is that military intervention is a function of:

- political democracy;
- multipartyism;
- party dominance; and
- political violence.

Using multiple regression this model was estimated for the thirty-five tries of this study and the following results were realized:

Military Involvement Score 1960-1982 = 17.726 - .248(PD) + 1.612(MP) - 36.566(D) - .001(PV) + error

\[ \begin{align*}
&= 17.726 - 5.185(PD) + 1.612(MP) - 36.566(D) - 0.001(PV) + \text{error} \\
&= 17.726 - 5.185(0.010) + 1.612(10.710) - 36.566(0.003) + \text{error} \\
\end{align*} \]

\[ \begin{align*}
\text{R}^2 &= 0.447 \\
\text{Corrected R Square} &= 0.393 \\
\text{F} &= 6.07(p < .001)
\end{align*} \]

where PD = Political Democracy, MP = Multipartyism, D = Party Dominance, and PV = Political Violence.

The overall regression equation from a statistical standpoint is highly significant (p < .001). Each of the independent variables' parameter estimates are significant with each estimated parameter well over twice as large as standard error (standard errors are presented in parentheses under the parameter estimates). As far as the variance in military intervention explained is concerned, this model is a little more powerful (R² = .45) than our Jackman Application Model (R² = .43). The signs of the parameters are as theorized, except the Political Violence, as measured by deaths from domestic violence 1960-7, is negatively associated with Total Military Involvement. The reader will recall that we proposed that Political Violence should be positively related to because such phenomena can be viewed as a breakdown of political institutions and groups resorting to conflictual means for problem/dispute resolution. The
in military elites (Decalo, 1976), our results do suggest strongly that
pecific to African military establishments must be considered in
ach for the structural determinants of military interventions in African
es.

Two features of national politics are strongly stabilizing for our thirty-
frican states; these are pre-independence electoral turnout and the degree
itical pluralism around 1975. Our measure of political pluralism is the
ge of party cleavage in the national legislature (lower house where appli-
 of the African state. It ranges from states which had no elected legis-
 body in 1975 (e.g., the Congo, Ethiopia, and Somalia), states where a
 political party held all seats (e.g., Ivory Coast, Kenya, and Tanzania),
o states where several political parties held legislative seats (e.g.,
a, Mauritius, and Zambia).

The highly significant negative coefficient of our political pluralism
ble indicates that African states which have either maintained or restored
degree of party competition have considerably less military involvement
more authoritarian states. It should be noted that this finding, based on
-1970s variable, contradicts Jackman’s (1978: 1271) finding that a pre-
endence measure of multipartyism was destabilizing. The “ideal” situation
ing political parties and pluralism in today’s Africa would appear to be
ong mass party (in terms of electoral support and legislative seats) that
tolates or permits minority parties to exist, to compete in elections,
o hold seats in the legislature, at least as long as they are no threat to
ule (e.g., Botswana).

As Jackman did, we find that early social mobilization of African socie-
is highly destabilizing. States whose populations were still primarily
ulture around 1960 have experienced significantly fewer military
where $D$ = Political Party Dominance, $MC$ = Military Cohesion, $MI$ = Military Importance, $CC$ = Commodity Concentration, $P$ = Political Participation, $M$ = Social Mobilization, $U$ = Urbanization, $IE$ = Industrial Employment, $EG$ = Economic Growth, and $TB$ = Trade Balance/GNP.

The results of this estimation are extremely powerful. This Integrated Model accounts for 91% of the variance in military intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1960-1982, and is statistically significant at the .0001 level. More importantly, every single parameter estimation is significant and in the proper direction. Findings as powerful as these in the political and social areas are quite rare.

We find that two features of the military are destabilizing, its cohesiveness and political centrality. Our measure of the cohesiveness of the African military is the product of Jackman's measure of ethnic dominance and the size of the military establishment in 1970. Thus, when other things are equal, African states whose militaries are large and ethnically homogeneous experience more military involvement in politics than states with smaller, culturally pluralistic militaries. Following Zolberg (1968a and 1968b), our measure of the political centrality of the military is the product of total government sanctions between 1950 and 1967 (repression) and defense expenditure as a percentage of total government revenue in 1965. We find that as Zolberg argued, in African states where the military was relatively central because of its role in repression because of its claim on state revenue, the military subsequently has become involved in politics (very little of TMS 1960-82 occurs before 1966). While strength of our regression analysis lends no support to arguments that coups d'état are the result of personal and idiosyncratic features of
Finally, both independent variables from the Military Motivations Model—Military Cohesion (MC) and Military Importance (MI) are specified to be positively associated with the likelihood of Military Intervention. The reader recall that Jackman (1978) did not consider the theoretical implications the rather large literature that now exists on the role of the African military in politics, particularly the works of Bienen (1968, 1971), Decalo (1976), teridge (1969), Welch (1970), Welch and Smith (1974), and Zolberg (1968a and 8b). These works argue that there are factors specific to African military organizations that encourage or inhibit interventions in politics. Nordlinger's synthesis of this literature emphasizes defense of the military's collective corporate interests—particularly military budgets, organizational economy, and survival in competition with other governmental entities such as parties—and the failures of poorly institutionalized civilian governments rule and promote economic growth (1977: 85-91). Zolberg (1968a and 1968b) persuasively argued that when civilian governments shift away from political pluralism and democracy toward authoritarianism and repression, the political centrality of the military as the principal agents of repression rises its motivation to openly intervene on its own grows.

TESTING THE INTEGRATED MODEL

As in other model analyses, multiple regression was used to evaluate andimate this Integrated Model of Military Intervention. The results of this alysis are presented below:

\[
\text{Total Military Involvement Score 1960-1982} = 79.706 - 76.312(D) + .319(MC) \\
\quad (10.115) \quad (8.863) \quad (.113) \\
\quad + .004(MI) + .150(CC) - 17.986(P) - .635(M) \\
\quad (.002) \quad (.034) \quad (6.521) \quad (.095) \\
\quad + .043(U) - 180.338(IE) - 16.633(EG) - .763(TB) + \text{error} \\
\quad (.008) \quad (68.882) \quad (4.228) \quad (.137)
\]
government and its economic policies. Hence, we would expect that as these measures of domestic economic performance increase (or improve) we should also see a decrease (or increase) in the likelihood of Military Intervention. All non-Saharan African states are economically underdeveloped and therefore all African governments claim that economic development is one of the major objectives against which their performance in office can be assessed. A stagnating economy in conjunction with rising unemployment, recurrent balance of payments crises, and flagrant corruption create an environment in which military coups are likely events. While not explicitly specified in the Domestic Economic Performance Model, Commodity Concentration (CC) is an additional indicator of economic performance and also a measure of economic dependency. High Commodity Concentration is an indicator of uni-dimensional, often single cash-crop, economies. Thus, the greater the Commodity Concentration of the economy, the less sophisticated and developed the economy is. Because of this dynamic, we expect CC to be positively associated with Military Intervention.

A positive Trade Balance/GNP is an indicator of international economic performance and reflects a positive current trade balance and current account and at total trade is a large percentage of the economy's GNP. Hence, it measures how well the country's economy is performing in the international economy. Previous findings suggest that this variable should be negatively associated with Military Intervention, or in other words, inhibit the likelihood of intervention by the military.

Urbanization (U) and Social Mobilization (M) are two central variables of the Social Change Model. Consistent with earlier findings, it is hypothesized that Urbanization increases the probability of Military Intervention while Social Mobilization decreases it.

- Political Party Dominance (D) → Military Cohesion (MC) (+) → Military Importance (MI) (+)
- Trade Balance/GNP (TB) (-) → Military Intervention 1960-1982 (+)
- Economic Growth (EG) (-) → (-) Industrial Employment (IE) (-) Urbanization (U) (+) Social Mobilization (M) (-)
- Commodity Concentration (CC) (+) Political Participation (P) (-)
Hence, in the next section of this chapter, we will combine various variables of the models thus far estimated in search of an Integrated Model of Military Intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa.

AN INTEGRATED MODEL OF MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

The general model of military intervention is based on the most promising individual factors of each of the alternative models specified above. Figure VI-1 pictorially represents our specification of this model.

The model contains two variables from the Political Development Model—Political Party Dominance (D) and Political Participation (P). Both of these variables are hypothesized to have a negative relationship with military intervention. That is, the extent of Political Party Dominance and Political Participation should both act to hinder the extent of military intervention. This hypothesis is consistent with the findings of the estimation of the Political Development Model.

Industrial Employment (IE) and Economic Growth (EG) are two variables originally specified in the Domestic Economic Performance Model. Both of these performance variables are hypothesized to be inversely related to Military Intervention. As we saw earlier, the notion here is that poor economic performance as indicated by variables such as these can hinder the legitimacy of the

---

5 We also specified and estimated a Dependency Model whose results are not represented in this Report for two reasons. First, the impact of economic and political dependency was not explicitly suggested in the vast majority of literature on military intervention. It is more a product of radical political economies and neo-Marxist thought. Second, the results of the model were weak at best. Nevertheless, one variable—Commodity Concentration—did present interesting results and will in fact be included in the integrated Model. Commodity Concentration (CC) is measured as the increase in commodity concentration 1960-1965. The source of these data was Bornschier and Heintz (1979: 97-99).

6 The indicators of the variable included in this model are the same in all instances as suggested in Chapter V.
Total Military Involvement Score 1960-1982 = 8.704 + .709(MC) + .006(MI) + error 
(2.278) (2.41) (0.003)

R Square = .316  Corrected R Square = .295
F Ratio = 7.38(p < .002)  N of Cases = 35

where MC = Military Cohesion, and MI = Military's Importance.

While not overly powerful in its ability to explain military intervention, this two-variable model is significant (p < .002) with each of its estimated parameters likewise significant and in the direction theorized. Actually a two-variable model accounting for 32% of the variance in Military Intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa suggests that analyses of this phenomenon should consider the internal and organizational characteristics of the military. These results suggest that both the cohesion of the military and its relative societal importance and role promote military intervention.

SUMMARY OF THE ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE MODELS

All things considered, the estimation results of our alternative models of the causes of military intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa are most encouraging. All of the models were found to be statistically significant and the R²'s range from .32 to .53. While the Social Change Model was found to be the most powerful model in explaining military intervention, it is still not powerful enough to use for forecasting purposes. Too much variance in the dependent variables goes unexplained.

In an effort to find a powerful model, it seems fruitful to combine aspects of the various competing models into an integrated model of military intervention. Theoretically this is defensible because the individual models should not be viewed as mutually exclusive. That is, it is reasonable to suspect that the various competing factors can and do affect TMIS. Moreover, our statistical results suggest that none of the models can be completely ignored.
The finding of an inverse relationship between Social Mobilization and Military Intervention is more problematic and requires further research. While we would have expected positive relationships, it has been argued "that increased mobilization is likely to decrease the probability of coups, since these are covert events instigated by small numbers of people. If the number of participants in a mobilizing polity is rising, it should become increasingly difficult for such small factions to count coups" (Finer, 1962: 87-88; Fossum, 1967: 235). ⁴

Other key findings of our estimation of this model are:

- Urbanization increases the probability of Military Interventions; and
- Increases in the Quality of Life decrease the chance of Military Intervention. This finding supports the notion that if rising expectations that accompany social change are not satisfied, discontent can result and open the way for military coups.

ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY MOTIVATIONS MODEL

The Military Motivations Model focuses on the impact of two "internal" military variables, each of which is theorized to increase the probability of military intervention:

- Military Cohesion; and
- The Military's Importance.

Regressing these independent variables on military intervention produced the following results:

⁴ Source of this quote is Jackman (1978: 1262-1263).
Total Military Involvement Score 1960-1982 = 78.710 - 29.038(P) – .575(M) – 13.936(U) – 71.61(I) + error

R Square = .535  Corrected R Square = .473
F Ratio = 6.68 (p < .0003)  N of Cases = 35

where P = Political Participation, M = Social Mobilization,
U = Urbanization, QOL = Quality of Life, and I = Industrialization

These estimation results are indeed encouraging. The model is highly statistically significant (p < .0003) and moderately powerful. Every parameter estimation, with the exception of Industrialization (I) is statistically significant. It is worth paying attention to a model that can explain 53% of the variance in a phenomenon as elusive as Military Intervention.

It must be pointed out, however, that two of these estimated parameters' signs are in conflict with the model's theoretical specification presented in Chapter V—Political Participation (P) and Social Mobilization (M). While we theorized that Mass Political Participation would increase the likelihood of Military Intervention, it actually decreases its likelihood. Jackman (1978: 1269) also found that participation had a stabilizing impact. These findings may be a function of how political participation was measured. That is, because this concept was measured as the percentage of the population voting in the election just before independence, it might be a biased measurement. Most countries of Africa during this period had one strong political party which was taking the lead in the independence movement. Hence, the number of voters (and therefore political participation) might be indicative of solidarity and support for the one party, rather than indicative of political cleavages that often accompany increases in political participation in the Third World.

3 The signs of these parameters are consistent, however, with the results of our Jackman Replication Model.
relative lack of indigenous goods and services, need an influx of imports to keep up with the aspirations of their populations.

While the actual empirical validity of these propositions goes beyond the scope of our present research, we can conclude that our International Economic Performance Model is either poorly specified, fraught with measurement error, or just not a powerful explanatory model of military intervention.

ANALYSIS OF THE SOCIAL CHANGE MODEL

As suggested in Chapter V, the specification of the Social Change Model is based on the theoretical position that the rapidity and scope of societal change and social mobilization is destabilizing and can lead to military intervention:

If mobilization is not accompanied by an increase in government capacity, governments are unlikely to respond to and satisfy the new aspirations and expectations that are generated by social mobilization. Under such circumstances, the effect of mobilization on instability is reversed and becomes positive (Jackman, 1978: 1263).

Our model of Social Change, building on the theoretical suggestions of Huntington (1968), Welch and Smith (1974), and Jackman (1978) consists of the following independent variables:

- Political Participation;
- Social Mobilization;
- Urbanization;
- Quality of Life; and
- Industrialization.

A multiple regression analysis of the Social Change Model produced the following results:
should have a positive impact on the likelihood of military intervention. Our multiple regression analysis of this model yielded the following results:

Total Military Involvement Score 1960-1982 = 15.948 + 30.109(EXG) - 34.786(IMGI)
- 10.516(IMG2) - .447(TB) + error

\[
\begin{align*}
&= 15.948 + 30.109(2.487) - 34.786(8.935) - 10.516(10.378) - .447(0.243) + error \\
&= 42.776 - 316.359 - 106.674 - .108 + error \\
&= -475.361 + error
\end{align*}
\]

R Square = .352  Corrected R Square = .289
F Ratio = 4.08(p < .009)  N of Cases = 35

where EXG = Growth in Exports; IMGI = Growth in Imports, 1965-1970;
IMG2 = Growth in Imports, 1970-1975; and TB = Trade Balance/GNP.

This model's overall equation, like the others previously presented, is statistically significant (p < .009). Yet, like the Domestic Economic Performance Model, it is not very powerful in explaining military intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa. That is, this model only explains 35% of the variance in military intervention for the thirty-five countries for the years 1960-1982. Moreover, none of the significant parameter estimation's signs is in the direction hypothesized by the specification presented in Chapter V. It was hypothesized that the Growth in Exports (EXG) should be an indicator of good international economic performance and, hence, inversely related to Military Intervention, but the opposite was found to be true. This finding may be a reflection that the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa—many of which are single-crop economies—deny indigenous goods to its populace through exports. This may result in societal frustration and the breakdown of government legitimacy. A similar logic might also pertain to the finding of an inverse relationship between Growth of Imports and Military Intervention. Liberal Western economic thought would suggest that Growth in Imports, especially when not accompanied by greater Growth in Exports, is an indicator of poor international economic performance. The countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, however, because of their
positive economic performance measure and should legitimize the government and inhibit the military from intervening. The statistical findings presented above suggest that increases in industrial labor increases the likelihood of military intervention. Hence, we conclude that this indicator is not in fact measuring the degree of a society's economic development or our original hypothesis was incorrect. Increases in this indicator may, however, point to increasing social mobilization occurring in the society with shifts from an agricultural to urban society, which can facilitate political discontent. If this is indeed true then its positive impact on military intervention would support theoretical notions presented by Huntington (1968) and others.

Finally it seems clear that one must be careful in differentiating economic performance as a "cause" versus a "motive" of military intervention. Our analysis of military motives presented in Chapter IV of this report clearly suggested the relevance of economic variables as a motive for military intervention. This statistical analysis, however, has not found domestic economic performance variables to be powerful in explaining the causes of military intervention.

**ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE MODEL**

Similar to the Domestic Economic Performance Model, the International Economic Performance Model suggests that the better a state performs relative to the international economic system, the greater its legitimacy and less likely prone to military intervention. Specifically, this model posits that growth rates in total exports and the balance of trade relative to GNP should have a deterrent effect on military intervention. The growth rate of imports, however, can be a negative indicator of international economic performance and therefore
- inflation;
- industrial employment (economic development);
- growth of gross domestic investment; and
- economic growth.

Our multiple regression analysis produced the following results:

Total Military Involvement Score 1960-1982 = 1.607 + .745 (I) + 228.345(IE) - 2.806(GDI) - 5.98(EG) + error

\[ (6.433) \quad (94.308) \quad (1.679) \quad (8.292) \]

R Square = .393 \quad Corrected R Square = .334

F Ratio = 4.85(p < .004) \quad N of cases = 35

where I = Inflation, IE = Industrial Employment, GDI = Growth in Gross Domestic Investment, and EG = Economic Growth.

While the overall regression equation is statistically significant (p < .004), only two of the individual parameter estimations—Inflation and Industrial Employment (Economic Development)—are significant. These findings, in conjunction with the fact that this model only explains 39% of the variance in military intervention, suggests that the model is either misspecified or theoretically inadequate in explaining military intervention behavior. Our results of this model's estimation suggest the following conclusions:

- Inflation does appear to be a destabilizing economic dynamic that can act as a magnet pulling the military into the domestic political arena. Its parameter estimation is statistically significant and in the direction hypothesized.

- The concept of Economic Development as measured by increases in the percent of the labor force employed in the industrial sector does impact on military intervention but not as we theoretically speculated. In Chapter V we posited that this concept should be viewed as a
reasons for this counter-intuitive finding are unclear. One possible explanation for this result might be that regimes subjected to political violence recognize the explicit threat to their longevity and hence move to alleviate policies viewed as problematic by the various groups resorting to the violence. Hence, violence, as an explicit manifestation of societal or group discontent, has a cybernetic impact on regimes who try hard to calm the storm before the military acts. Another possible explanation for this inverse relationship is measurement error concerning domestic violence.

In summary, the findings of this model:

- confirm Finer's (1962) theoretical notions concerning the stabilizing effect of mature political cultures. Democracy as a representation of this concept is clearly inversely related to military intervention. Therefore, it can be argued that political institutions that have established procedures or "rules of the game" deter the military from explicitly entering the political arena;

- confirm that multipartyism is destabilizing and invites military intervention, while a single, strong dominant party is crucial for political stability. Huntington (1968) may indeed be correct when he suggests that less developed countries may require Leninist-type political parties to guarantee stability and order and to avoid political decay.

ANALYSIS OF THE DOMESTIC ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE MODEL

The Domestic Economic Performance Model specifies that military intervention is caused (or hindered) by how well the local economy performs in growth and distribution. Specifically, military intervention is hypothesized to be a function of:
interventions than more mobilized societies. Also, early and rapid growth in the population of the capital city of an African state (where most coups occur) is equally destabilizing. This finding represents a troubling paradox for Africa, in that it suggests that those states where social change is happening, something both African leaders and masses want, are states most likely to experience generally unwanted praetorianism.

We find that three measures of economic performance represent all highly stabilizing factors and, conversely, that African states whose economies have not performed well in the 1960s and 1970s are prone to coups d'etat. States where the percentage of industrial jobs to all employment increased the most between 1960 and 1978 have been relatively stable, as have states whose economies grew in the late 1960s and whose mid-60s export performance was superior. Finally, states whose international economic commodity concentration increased in the early 1960s have experienced more military interventions than those whose commodity exports have diversified.

To summarize, we find that African states with relatively dynamic economies whose societies were not much mobilized before independence and that have maintained some degree of political participation and pluralism while keeping their military forces small and non-politicized have been the most stable; whereas countries with the opposite set of characteristics have experienced considerable political instability in the form of military praetorianism.

Figure VI-2 represents additional evidence, as well as a visual display, of the explanatory strength of the Integrated Model. This figure is a scatter plot of the observed scores of Military Intervention (TMIS) for each country versus the scores predicted by the model. The diagonal line represents the regression line (a least squares line between the observed and predicted) which
Figure VI-2: OBSERVED VERSUS PREDICTED SCORES OF MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AS PRODUCED BY THE INTEGRATED MODEL
is the best fit of the data relative to the model. Hence, the closer the data are to the line the "better" the model in its explanatory power. The distance or deviation of each data point from the regression in known as the data's residual. Clearly, the greater the residuals, the less powerful the model.

As suggested by Figure VI-2, the residuals of this model are very small. That is, for most countries, predicted TMIS corresponds closely to actual TMIS for the years 1960-1982. The exceptions are the predictions for Benin, Gambia, CAR, and Madagascar which have relatively large positive residuals (i.e., a greater TMIS was observed than predicted by the model) and Chad, Burundi, Cameroon and the Congo which have relatively large negative residuals (i.e., a smaller TMIS was observed than predicted by the model). Table VI-2 presents the residuals or deviations of the observed from the predicted TMISs for all the countries analyzed by the model.

In order to examine the stability of the Integrated Model, we need to evaluate its explanatory power vis-a-vis a time period different than was originally estimated. The point here is that powerful models should not have their predictive capability tied to the conditions (or structure) of one time period. Estimated relationships should be independent of time. The initial estimation of

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7 The regression line represents the best straight line that can be drawn between the data which minimize the deviations between the observed and predicted values. Hence, this line provides a reasonable measure of how well the data points fit the regression line based on the method of least squares. The line of best fit therefore represents that which minimizes the sum of the squared deviations between the observed and predicted data points with the distances measured vertically.

8 An examination of a plot of the residuals in Table VI-1 indicated a homoscedastic error variance. Stepwise regression analysis of the same regression indicated great stability in the estimated values of the parameters and their standard errors, thereby suggesting that multicollinearity is not a problem in this model (the estimated standard errors are also all much less than one-half their parameters).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Deviations of Predicted TMIS vs Observed TMIS (Observed-Predicted)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>6.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>-1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>-5.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>-8.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Rep.</td>
<td>5.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>-7.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo, Brazzaville</td>
<td>-.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>6.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>-.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>2.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>2.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>-5.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>-.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>4.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>7.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>3.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>-.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>-1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>-2.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>-3.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>-.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE VI-2: Deviations (Residuals) of Predicted TMIS Versus Observed TMIS* from an Integrated Model
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Deviations of Predicted TMIS vs Observed TMIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25. Senegal</td>
<td>-4.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Sierra Leone</td>
<td>-.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Somalia</td>
<td>-1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Sudan</td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Swaziland</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Tanzania</td>
<td>-3.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Togo</td>
<td>2.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Uganda</td>
<td>2.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. Upper Volta</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Zaire</td>
<td>3.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Zambia</td>
<td>-3.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See Table III-3 for Observed TMIS, 1960-1982 Scores.
this model was based on a multiple regression where the dependent variable--TMIS--represented pooled data of Military Involvement over the entire period (1960-1982). It could be argued, therefore, that different results could be realized if the independent variables were regressed on data representing a pool of different years. If this is indeed the case, the model could be attacked as not being stable. Truly powerful models should not be tied to exclusive time periods.

To test the stability of the model, we decided to regress its independent variables against pooled TMIS data over the years 1970-1982. We specified this regression exactly as that presented in Figure VI-1. The results of this multiple regression analysis are presented below:

Total Military Involvement Score 1970-1982 = 42.082  
\( \text{(10.860)} \)
\[-41.893(D) + .325(MC) + .006(MI) + .134(CC) - 12.809(P) \]
\( \text{(9.516) (}.122\) (}.002\) (}.037\) (7.001) \)
\[-.287(M) + .038(U) - 163.616(IE) - 14.114(EG) - .306(TB) + \text{error} \]
\( \text{(.102) (}.009\) (73.954) (4.540) (}.147\) \)

R Square = .765   Corrected R Square = .680

F Ratio = 7.80(p < .0001)   N of Cases = 35

where D = Political Party Dominance, MC = Military Cohesion, MI = Military Importance, CC = Commodity Concentration, P = Political Participation, M = Social Mobilization, U = Urbanization, IE = Industrial Employment, EG = Economic Growth, and TB = Trade Balance/GNP.

These results indicate that the Integrated Model is very stable. While the R Square is somewhat smaller than the model's estimation when TMIS6082 was the dependent variable, it is still very high (.765). More importantly, however, nearly every parameter estimation is of the same magnitude and direction as the
model's "original" estimation. Hence, we can conclude that the Integrated Model is not tied to the dynamics of a specific period of time. This represents further evidence that this model is valid and powerful in explaining the causes of military intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa.

SUMMARY

In this chapter we initially examined various alternative models aimed at explaining military intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa. While the results of this exercise were useful, it was concluded that none of the models were individually powerful enough to be the basis of forecasts of military intervention.

The search for such a model lead us to the specification of a model of military intervention which combined the theoretical propositions of the alternative models. Theoretically this is defensible because the alternative models could not be viewed as truly independent or mutually exclusive.

The statistical estimation of the Integrated Model produced results that were extremely encouraging. So encouraging and powerful was this model that it will serve as a forecasting heuristic, the results of which will be the topic of the next chapter of this report. Moreover, we conclude that this chapter has provided another demonstration of the value of quantitative analysis in the realm of the intelligence community.

9 Both the political centrality of the Army around 1965 and pre-independence electoral turnout cease to be significant, thereby indicating that they are mainly related to 1960's military interventions. The remaining eight explanatory variables retain their signs and statistical significance, thereby indicating the stability of the model.
CHAPTER VII. THE PROBABILITIES OF MILITARY INTERVENTION
IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, 1983-1985

INTRODUCTION

The Washington Post of March 3, 1983 reported the following news item:

ABIDJAN, Ivory Coast - The Ch'anaian government foiled a coup attempt in which civilian and army plotters planned to assassinate head of state Gerry Rawlings, Accra radio reported. It was the third reported attempt to overthrow him since last October.

The radio, monitored here, quoted a government statement saying security forces shot two soldiers and arrested nine in Accra last Sunday as they were preparing to launch the coup. The statement said the leaders of the coup were being hunted by police.

Reports such as these are surely not rare. Coups and attempted coups, as we know, are frequent events in African politics. But are they anticipated? Did the attempted coups in Ghana catch intelligence analysts by surprise?

The purpose of this Chapter is to present a methodology aimed at anticipating and forecasting military intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa. Also presented will be initial findings based on this methodology concerning the probability of military intervention in thirty-five Sub-Saharan countries for the time period 1983-1985.

FORECASTING MILITARY INTERVENTION

A primary objective of this report is to develop a methodology which enables intelligence analysts to make reasonable forecasts concerning the likelihood of coups d'etat and other serious military intervention in Black African politics. Before a model can be used for forecasting purposes, however, the explanatory power of the model must be assessed.

In Chapter VI we introduced our forecasting methodology vis-a-vis the Jackman Replication Model. The reader will recall that these forecasts were
problematic because they were generated from a model that accounted for (or explained) only 42.6 percent of the variance in its criterion (dependent) variable—TMIS 1960-1982. If a model does not explain at a high degree of confidence the phenomenon it is geared towards, one can have little faith in forecasts produced by it. This is not the case, however, with the Integrated Model of Military Intervention specified and estimated in Chapter VI. This model was found to be extremely powerful and stable in explaining and predicting military intervention in the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, 1960-1982. Hence, it is reasonable to suspect that the forecasts it generates should be accurate.

Table VII-1 presents forecasts of the Integrated Model of serious intervention probabilities (i.e., at least one successful coup) for each country in this study for the time period—January 1, 1983 to December 31, 1985 via the forecasting methods of a linear probability analysis and a discriminant function analysis.¹ What do these forecasts represent? First, they represent a time-interval forecast—the probability that a coup will occur 1983-1985. Our methodology does not claim to be able to make "point predictions." It is virtually impossible, for example, to be able to predict that a coup will take place in country X on the 5th of May, 1983. Methods and data are not refined enough to be able to do this. Moreover, every model contains aspects of error—

¹ See footnote 2 in Chapter VI for a discussion of the forecasting methodologies. The linear probability equation for these forecasts is:

\[
\text{TMIS} = 1.615 - 2.462(D) + .006(MC) + .001(MI) + .005(CC) - .649(P) \\
- .009(M) + .002(U) - 1.451(IE) - .617(EG) - .019(TB) + \text{error}
\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Misclassified (1960-1982)</th>
<th>Serious Intervention Probabilities, 1983-85(a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>.29*</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Rep.</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo, Brazzaville</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>.30*</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>.51*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>.49*</td>
<td>.49*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>.37*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>.58*</td>
<td>.68*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>.60*</td>
<td>.73*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>.71*</td>
<td>.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>.52*</td>
<td>.54*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE VII-1: FORECASTS BASED UPON THE
INTEGRATED MODEL OF MILITARY INTERVENTION (Cont'd.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Misclassified (1960-1982)</th>
<th>Serious Intervention Probabilities, 1983-85(a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>.44*</td>
<td>.37*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>.75*</td>
<td>.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>.65*</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>.44*</td>
<td>.37*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>.61*</td>
<td>.75*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>.71*</td>
<td>.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>.55*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first probability was generated from a linear probability model (a single equation multiple regression with a binary dependent variable valued 0 if the country did not experience a successful military coup between 1960 and 1982 and valued 1 if it did). The second probability was generated by a discriminant function analysis.

Probabilities in the range of .25 to .75 are not much help in forecasting.
t measurement error, or the absence of some variables or the random fluctuations of others that contribute to the variance in the dependent variable. It is conceivable that variables not included in the model might be important in prediction of a particular military intervention in a particular country at a particular time. Second, these forecasts represent conditional forecasts, as assumed that if the structural parameters of the independent variables the "ceteris paribus" clause made in the model's specifications remain constant or stable, then the probability of a coup will take on the values assumed for the forecast period. In other words, the forecasts assume that major structural changes will not occur during the forecast period which would require the model to be modified (or respecified).

The first thing to note about the forecast based on the Integrated Model Table VII-1 is that only three of the thirty-five countries (6 percent) are not properly classified. That is, both Guinea and Zambia are forecast as being coup prone (although only slightly, p's range from .51 to .63) and Liberia is classified as not coup prone (p = .23 to .37). Yet we know that neither Guinea noribia have experienced a successful military coup (1960-1982) and that Liberia experienced a coup (April 1980 coup which brought Master-Sergeant Samuel Doe to the People's Redemption Council to power). There are a number of possible explanations as to why these countries are misclassified.

First, each of these countries is lead by charismatic and at times unpredictable leaders—Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia, Sekou Toure in Guinea, and Samuel Doe in Liberia. The Integrated Model does not incorporate idiosyncratic variables; consequently, certain characteristics which might be important in explaining military intervention behavior (or lack thereof) of these countries are not considered. Thus, however, cannot be viewed as a major criticism of the model because such
les are nearly impossible to measure and must be assumed to be random.

Each of these countries have had their share of attempted, but unsuccessful, and military plots (see Table III-2). Thus, because Table VII-1 lists only the most "serious" type of military intervention—military coups—non-coup prone states would have possibly been classified as coup prone had not be successful in deterring military intervention.

Also note from Table VII-1 that only nine of the states (26 percent) have of the predicted probabilities in the "too close to call" range \( p \leq .75 \). The vast majority of the states have probabilities in the that demand attention by intelligence analysts interested in military.

Those states that are forecast to be especially susceptible to military during 1983-1985 are:

- Benin;
- Burundi;
- Congo, Brazzaville;
- Ghana;
- Nigeria;
- Uganda; and
- Upper Volta.

States forecasted to be especially stable for the time period 1983-1985 are:

- Botswana;
- Ivory Coast;
- Lesotho;
- Malawi;
- Mauritius; and
- Swaziland.
Here is strong evidence that the models presented here can be used in the
next years to forecast the probabilities of military coups in Sub-Saharan
African. We strongly recommend, however, that DIA reexamine and update the
models periodically, e.g., every two years. First and obviously, the data base
to be brought up to date. For example, the Gross Domestic Product of a
country changes over time. Second, the structure of the model may change:
variables may need to be added and others deleted; certainly the weights
attached to each independent variable may change over time. For example, if the
economy emerges from its current slump, the parameters of economic vari-
ables in the model will most likely change.

ST VALIDITY

The "ultimate" validity of a forecast is established if the event being
predicted occurs or not. Waiting for "ultimate" validators, however, is not
practical, and in fact can be self-defeating, especially in the area of intelli-
genous analysis. An alternative strategy for validating a forecasting technique
is postdictive analysis. Here one uses the forecasting technique to make "pre-
dictions" where results are already known. Table VII-2 presents postdictive
predictions of military coups, 1970-1982.3

It should be noted that the recent coup plot in Ghana, as reported in
the Washington Post article introducing this Chapter, was anticipated by our
predictions presented in Table VII-1 where Ghana was forecasted to have a .99
probability of serious military intervention.

These postdictive forecasts are based on a "modified" Integrated Model. Our
modified Model is modified in that some of our indicators for the independent
variables were changed so that their data in all instances would precede 1970-
art of the TMIS pooled data. This was important because the independent
variables must precede TMIS so there is no ambiguity about causal ordering.
Estimation of this model resulted in findings consistent with those of the
modified Model and a R Square = .884.
P.M.'s home. Other senior army officers arrested the commander and restored Stevens to power.

b. **Participants:** Brig. John Bangurah, the army commander, and his supporters.

c. **Apparent Causes:** Coup attempt followed several months of political unrest. The coup participants opposed the proposed change in the constitution. It is reported that they were also opposed to Steven's use of Guinean troops in Sierra Leone.

**Source:** Morrison, et al. (1972:335)

c. **Plotted Military Coup d'Etat:**

---

**KENYA**

501 10/15/77

a. **Description:** A government spokesman announced that military and police units had arrested several officers and ranks of the Kenyan Air Force who informants reported were plotting to overthrow the gov't.

b. **Participants:** "Several" officers and ranks of the Kenyan Air Force based in Nanyuki.

c. **Apparent Causes:** None given.

**Source:** Hypothetical example.

---

Each event identified in **two or more** sources occurring since 31-60 or the date of independence will be given a score as ows:

5 = successful coup  
3 = attempted coup  
1 = plot

**A-5**

These scores will be aggregated in a variety of ways as described subsequently in this codebook. The above weighting scheme has been used by previous researchers and therefore will enhance comparability of results.
day, the reported beginning and ending dates).

d. Narrative description of events as reported in the sources.

e. Source, date, and page number.

The narrative description must include information on:

a. description of what happened;
b. description of participants
c. apparent causes.

following are examples --

a. Successful Military Coup d'Etat:

GHANA  452  01/17/72

a. Description: A group of army officers led by Col. I.K. Acheampong seized power in a bloodless coup while P. M. Busia was in London for medical treatment. Cabinet ministers and two top ranking officers were jailed. A national Redemption Council was set up headed by Col. Acheampong, parliament was disbanded, and all political parties were banned.

b. Participants: Army officers led by Col. Acheampong.

c. Apparent Causes: Discontent with the country's economic situation, especially the 44% devaluation of the cedi in December 1971, seems to have been the major cause. Busia's austerity budget involved cuts in military expenditures as well. Col. Acheampong accused Busia's government of extravagance and permitting wide spread official corruption.

Source: Morrison, et al. (1972:256)

b. Attempted Military Coup d'Etat:

SIERRA LEONE  451  03/23/71

a. Description: P. M. Stevens was briefly held captive by the army commander after a gun battle outside the
the political elite; (b) the temporary (for less than one
year) disruption, interruption, or take-over of government
ilities; and (c) the sudden meeting, mobilization of, or
ion by military, security and/or police forces explicitly
ated at the take-over of government.

**PLOTTED MILITARY COUPS D'ETAT** are events in which an
ouncement or admission is made by the elite group in power
at a plot to overthrow the government by violence involving
ements of the military, security and/or police has been
covered prior to any action other than "plotting" being
taken. Reported plots may take various forms ranging from a
ple statement that a plot has been thwarted, without further
aboration, to the arrest, identification, and trial of alleged
otors. Plots may in fact be manufactured by the government as
 pretext for the elimination of military, security and/or police
ites or for the imposition of extreme or coercive policies.
though there is no reliable means by which the researcher or
alyist can clearly distinguish between bona fide plots and
ufactured allegations, the "reported plot" may in any case be
ewed as a political datum, indicative of military involvement
politics.

In order to measure military coup behavior in Sub-Saharan
rica between 01/01/60 and 12/31/82, every instance of military
ite instability events will be recorded as follows:

1. The sources to be used will include:
   a. *Index to the New York Times*, 1960-
   b. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1960-
   c. *Africa Research Bulletin*, 1964-
   d. *Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook*, 1960-
      1972
   e. *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, 1960-

2. Each event meeting the above definitions as
sported in each source will be recorded on a 4" x 6" index card
cluding the following information:
   a. Name of country
   b. Country I.D. number
   c. Date of event (if the event lasted more one
In order to maximize comparability with earlier studies (e.g., Morrison and Stevenson, 1971; McGowan, 1975, Jackman, 78), the definitions given by Morrison, et al. (1972:128), as appropriately modified, are used in this study.

**LITARY COUP EVENTS:**

A **SUCCESSFUL MILITARY COUP D'ETAT** is an event in which the existing political regime is suddenly and illegally displaced by the action of relatively small elite groups in which the military, security and/or police forces of the state play a role. Thus, the military, security and/or police may act alone or in conjunction with elite civilian groups such as civil servants or leaders of a political party. However, if there is no military, security or police participation as in an entirely civilian "palace revolution" or if overt mass participation is the principle cause of the event, the event is not a successful military coup d'etat. This is so because in the first case the military, security and/or police are not involved and in the second case because mass leadership is not part of military elite stability behavior.

The scope of change in the regime resulting from military coups d'etat may vary from wholesale replacement of political decision-makers by instigators of the coup and their followers, to a dissolution of the constitutional relationships between different groups of decision-makers (e.g., the dissolution of legislatures) without any substantial replacement of decision-makers. The stated aims of the insurgent military, security and/or police may vary from reaction to reform, and the degree of physical injury resulting from a coup may be negligible or pronounced.

**TO BE CODED A SUCCESSFUL MILITARY COUP D'ETAT THE MILITARY, SECURITY AND/OR POLICE MUST BE INSTIGATORS, THAT IS, CONSPIRATORS OR CO-CONSPIRATORS, ACTING ALONE OR WITH OTHER ELITES AND THE REPLACEMENTS OF PERSONS OR CONSTITUTIONAL FORMS MUST LAST AT LAST ONE WEEK.**

**AN UNSUCCESSFUL MILITARY COUP D'ETAT** is an event in which the insurgents acted but failed to effect any lasting displacement of the political regime but are known to have succeeded in some combination of the following actions: (a) the assassination, attempted assassination, or arrest of some members...
APPENDIX A: CODEBOOK
ay spread beyond the boundaries of Sub-Saharan Africa to other geographical regions experiencing similar forms of instability.

Two additional implications can also be delineated. First, the compilation of narrative descriptions of military interventions in Sub-Saharan Africa (see Appendix B), provides the intelligence analyst with the most comprehensive historical collection of such information to date. This information can be used imply as an historical collection or it can be structured to provide the analyst with the capability to systematically search for patterns and similarities across coups and across countries. Analysis, such as the content analysis of motivations of coup-makers presented in Chapter IV, can be supported through the establishment of a textual data file on military interventions. This file can be supplemented with intelligence reports available to the analyst.

Second, the compilation of data on political, economic, social, cultural, and military factors, over a twenty-two year time span, provides the basis for further exploration of military intervention behavior as well as other phenomena of interest to the intelligence analyst.
IMPLICATIONS

The results of this effort are directly relevant to the conduct of intelligence analysis. Most important is the ability to estimate the probability that a country will experience a military coup, based on the highly significant results of our General Model estimated in Chapter VII. This model provides a basis for identifying those countries most susceptible to military coups in the near future (i.e., 1983-1985): Benin, Burundi, Congo, Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, and Upper Volta. The forecasts, presented in Chapter VII, indicate that we are able to correctly classify all but three of thirty-five Sub-Saharan countries as coup-prone or non-coup-prone for the 1960-1982 period. These impressive forecasts demonstrate that the results of this analytical exercise have provided the DIA with a set of indicators of the likelihood of future coups.

The overall utility of the methodologies presented here is in this identification of potential indicators of military coups. By providing the analyst with a set of factors which accurately characterize the occurrence of military intervention behavior, it is possible for the analyst to focus greater attention on those factors. While most of the measures used in this effort draw on annual data, it is clearly within the realm of subsequent efforts to develop more timely (monthly) measures of the same or similar factors and to construct a more dynamic model of military intervention behavior.

Even more significant is the overall demonstration of the utility of applying systematic analytical techniques to practical problems of intelligence analysis. The ability to explain the causes of military coups in Sub-Saharan Africa clearly provides an important tool to the intelligence analyst working in that region. Moreover, the methodology demonstrates that practical application
states which have either maintained or restored some degree of party competition have considerably less military intervention than more authoritarian states. The "ideal" situation regarding political parties and pluralism in today's Africa would appear to be a strong mass party that also tolerates or permits minority parties to exist, to compete in elections, and to hold seats in the legislature.

- Early social mobilization of African societies is highly destabilizing. States whose populations were still primarily in agriculture around 1960 have experienced significantly less military interventions than more mobilized societies. Also, early and rapid growth in the population of the capital city of African states (where most coups occur) is equally destabilizing. This finding represents a troubling paradox for Africa in that it suggests that those states where social change is happening, something both African leaders and masses want, are states most likely to experience military interventions.

- Good economic performance is highly stabilizing and, conversely, African states whose economies have not performed well in the 1960s and 1970s are prone to coups d'etat.

To summarize, we find that African states with relatively dynamic economies whose societies were not much mobilized before independence and that have maintained some degree of political participation and pluralism while keeping politicized have been the most stable, whereas countries with the opposite set of characteristics have experienced considerable political instability in the form of military intervention.
Africa was at least in part organized and motivated by a foreign power, African or non-Africa.

The major finding resulting from our quantitative assessment of alternative models of the cause of military intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa is that "instability of this kind is not random with respect to political and social structure" (Jackman, 1978: 1273). While it is true in a phenomenological sense that every plot, coup, and attempted coup is the consequence of motivations and decisions of small groups of men acting in secret, our findings contradict those who see military intervention as an unpredictable, random phenomenon (Zolberg, 1968: 71; Decalo, 1976: 22). Rather, it would appear that an identifiable structure of forces encourages or discourages coup-makers. We see social mobilization and ethnic dominance as favoring coup-decisions, while mass political participation discourages them. Also important explanatory variables of military intervention are political pluralism, past military interventions, and domestic and international economic performance. Other specific findings of our quantitative analysis are:

- Two features of the military itself, were found destabilizing—its cohesion and political centrality (or importance). Thus, African states whose militaries are large and ethnically homogenous experience more military involvement in politics than states with smaller, culturally plural militaries. Variables specific to each African military establishment must be considered in any search for the structural determinants of military intervention in African politics.

- Two features of national politics are strongly stabilizing for our thirty-five African states: they are pre-independence electoral turn-out and the degree of political pluralism. The highly negative coefficient of our political pluralism variable indicates that African
The number of attempted coups is about equal to the number of successful coups, 56:52. This suggests that there is almost a 50% chance of success when elements of the African military and/or police initiate a coup attempt, a sobering fact evidencing the fragility of African political institutions.

Our extensive compilation of the narrative accounts of two hundred and ten military events (see Appendix B) provided an opportunity to investigate the possible motives of African coup-makers. Upon analyzing these data, the following findings were realized concerning the motives of African coup-makers:

- In terms of successful coups, by far the most common reason reported by our sources is governmental performance. Both coup-makers and journalists point to corruption, repression, maladministration, the breakdown of public order, losses of legitimacy, and failures to keep promises as the motives behind military intervention in African politics.

- The second most important motive for military intervention is comprised of the socio-economic factors of ethnicity and economic decline.

- Except for two instances in which it was admitted by coup-makers that they acted in part to free prisoners, personal motives have not been claimed by the military and police, as one would expect.

- Coup-makers have claimed motives concerning military conditions. When the government cuts military spending or establishes paramilitary units such as Presidential Guards, that the regular military see as threatening its rights and privileges, then military action becomes a possibility.

- Never did coup-makers admit or allege that they acted in part at the behest of a foreign power. Thus, while allegations abound, there is no strong evidence that even one successful coup d'état in Black VIII-2
CHAPTER VIII. CONCLUSIONS

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this concluding chapter is to present a summary of our key findings concerning the causes of military intervention in Sub-Saharan African politics and their implications for DIA.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Our descriptive analysis concerning Sub-Saharan military intervention found that:

- Since January 1960 a total of fifty-two successful military coups have occurred, making this extra-legal form of military action a very frequent means of regime change in the continent.

- Military coups have been witnessed in all regions of the continent except Southern Africa. Colonial heritage does not offer special benefits—for example, former French, British, Italian, Belgian, Portuguese, and Spanish colonies—all have had coups. The absence of a colonial background is no help either, in that both Ethiopia (1974) and Liberia (1980) have witnessed successful coups.

- Coups happened in nineteen out of the twenty-three years in our study (83%) and every year since 1971 has seen one or more successful military coups. Hence, coups have been very widespread in terms of both time and space.

- Military intervention has been especially prevalent in Ghana, Benin, Uganda, the Congo, the Sudan, and the Central African Republic. The frequency of successful coups in these states suggests that they can be viewed as praetorian states in which military involvement in politics has become the norm rather than the exception.
This Table suggests that the postdictive forecasts are very valid. Thirty-one out of the thirty-five forecasts (89 percent) were correct. That is, states with forecasts that suggested they should have coups between 1970-1982 in fact experienced them, and those that were forecast not to have coups did not. We can conclude from this postdictive analysis, therefore, that our forecasting techniques are valid and useful.

SUMMARY

In this chapter we presented a forecasting technique and actual forecasts of the probabilities of military coups d'état in Sub-Saharan Africa for the years 1983-1985. The results realized seem to have validity and postdictive analysis suggests the technique to be valid. Given that it is possible to assign a number to the likelihood of a given country experiencing a serious military intervention over the next three years, how meaningful is the number? The answer is that the number can be quite meaningful if it is based upon a theoretically plausible model that, when estimated against data, has been shown to be powerful in accounting for past behavior. Such a model is our Integrated Model of Military Intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is our conclusion that DIA analysts should carefully review these forecasts and possibly conduct further analyses concerning those countries that seem especially prone to coups in order to refine or refute our findings.
### TABLE VII-2: POSTDICTIVE FORECASTS OF MILITARY COUPS, 1970-1982 (cont’d.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Misforecast</th>
<th>Experience Coup?</th>
<th>Serious Intervention Probabilities, 1970-82(a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25. Senegal</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Sierra Leone</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Somalia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.02</td>
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<td>28. Sudan</td>
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<td>29. Swaziland</td>
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<td>30. Tanzania</td>
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<td>31. Togo</td>
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<td>32. Uganda</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>33. Upper Volta</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>.83</td>
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<tr>
<td>34. Zaire</td>
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<tr>
<td>35. Zambia</td>
<td>No</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*a. The first probability was generated from a linear probability model (a single equation multiple regression with a binary dependent variable valued 0 if the country did not experience a successful military coup between 1970 and 1982 and valued 1 if it did). The second probability was generated by a discriminant function analysis.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Misforecast</th>
<th>Experience Coup?</th>
<th>Serious Intervention Probabilities, 1970-82(a)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
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<td>Burundi</td>
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<td>Central African Rep.</td>
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<td>Chad</td>
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<td>Gabon</td>
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<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>.55</td>
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<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
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<td>No</td>
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<td>Niger</td>
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<td>Rwanda</td>
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II. The Sub-Saharan African Countries included in this study are:

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<th>SHORT NAME</th>
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<th>DATE INDEPENDENT</th>
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<td>ANG</td>
<td>540</td>
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<td>09-30-66</td>
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<td>07-01-62</td>
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<td>402</td>
<td>07-05-75</td>
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<td>Republic of Chad</td>
<td>CHA</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>08-11-60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Federal and Islamic Republic</td>
<td>COM</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>07-06-75</td>
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<tr>
<td>of Comoros</td>
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<td>People's Rep. of Congo</td>
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<td>Republic of Equatorial</td>
<td>EQU</td>
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<td>The Gambia</td>
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<td>Republic of Ghana</td>
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<td>03-06-57</td>
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<td>People's Revolutionary Republic of Guinea</td>
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<td>10-02-58</td>
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<td>Kingdom of Lesotho</td>
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<td>09-30-66</td>
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<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Country Name</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Population</td>
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<td>-----</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Madagascar</td>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>Republic of Malawi</td>
<td>MAW</td>
<td>553</td>
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<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Republic of Mali</td>
<td>MLI</td>
<td>432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>MAT</td>
<td>590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>People's Republic of Mozambique</td>
<td>MOZ</td>
<td>541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>Republic of Niger</td>
<td>NIR</td>
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</tr>
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<td>30.</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Nigeria</td>
<td>NIG</td>
<td>475</td>
</tr>
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<td>31.</td>
<td>Republic of Rwanda</td>
<td>RWA</td>
<td>517</td>
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<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe</td>
<td>TOM</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.</td>
<td>Republic of Senegal</td>
<td>SEN</td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.</td>
<td>Republic of the Seychelles</td>
<td>SEY</td>
<td>591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35.</td>
<td>Republic of Sierra Leone</td>
<td>SIE</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36.</td>
<td>Somali Democratic Republic</td>
<td>SOM</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.</td>
<td>Democratic Rep. of the Sudan</td>
<td>SUD</td>
<td>625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38.</td>
<td>Kingdom of Swaziland</td>
<td>SWA</td>
<td>572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39.</td>
<td>United Rep. of Tanzania</td>
<td>TAZ</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40.</td>
<td>Republic of Togo</td>
<td>TOG</td>
<td>461</td>
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<tr>
<td>41.</td>
<td>The Second Rep. of Uganda</td>
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<td>42.</td>
<td>Republic of Upper Volta</td>
<td>UPP</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>43.</td>
<td>Republic of Zaire</td>
<td>COP</td>
<td>490</td>
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<td>44.</td>
<td>Republic of Zambia</td>
<td>ZAM</td>
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<tr>
<td>45.</td>
<td>The Rep. of Zimbabwe</td>
<td>ZIM</td>
<td>552</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Ethiopia's origins are ancient, and no certain date of independence is known. Liberia was founded as an independent republic in 1847. In both cases we have assigned 01-01-60 as their dates of independence.
III. DATA FILE DESCRIPTION

Data in this project are organized into two separate files, a "cross-sectional-panel file" in which the cases or rows are the forty-five countries listed in section II and the columns are military coup d'etat and structural variables pertaining to each country. The second file is a "time-series file" in which the cases or rows are the twenty-three years, 1960-1982, and the columns are country-variables, giving, for example, the annual coup activity in Ghana or the annual value of Togo's exports. Only included are the twenty-two states independent since 1960 or before.

THE MISSING DATA CODE IN BOTH FILES IS A BLANK IN EACH COLUMN OF EVERY VARIABLE'S FIELD.

A. CROSS-SECTIONAL-PANEL FILE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Short Name</th>
<th>Columns</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Card</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>01 = first data card for the given case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>3-5</td>
<td>Three letter name of African state, e.g., TAZ = Tanzania.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>8-10</td>
<td>Three digit identification number of each African state, e.g., 490 = Zaire.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) MC6064 11-12

Total military instability score of each African state, 1/1/60-12/31/64.
-- = state not independent during the period.

(2) MC6569 13-14

As above for 1/1/65 - 12/31/69.

(3) MC7074 15-16

As above for 1/1/70 - 12/31/74.

(4) MC7579 17-18

As above for 1/1/75 - 12/31/79.

(5) MC8082 19-20

As above for 1/1/80 - 12/31/82.

(6) MC6069 21-22

As above for the 10 year period, 1/1/60 - 12/31/69. -- = state not independent during this period.

(7) MC7079 23-24

As above for 1/1/70 - 12/31/79.

(8) MSC6064 25-26

Total number of successful mili-
<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(9) MSC6569</td>
<td>27-28</td>
<td>tary coups d'etat only, 1/1/60 - 12/31/64.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10) MSC7074</td>
<td>29-30</td>
<td>As above for 1/1/65 - 12/31/69.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(11) MSC7579</td>
<td>31-32</td>
<td>As above for 1/1/70 - 12/31/74.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(12) MSC8082</td>
<td>33-34</td>
<td>As above for 1/1/75 - 12/31/79.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(13) MSC6069</td>
<td>35-36</td>
<td>As above for 10 year period, 1/1/60 - 12/31/69. -- = state not independent during this period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(14) MSC7079</td>
<td>37-38</td>
<td>As above for 1/1/70 - 12/31/79.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(15) MCD6069</td>
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<td>Dummy variable, 1 = the African state experienced a successful military coup between 1/1/60 and 12/31/69, 0 = it did not. - = state not independent.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(16) MCD7079</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(19) MSC6082</td>
<td>43-44</td>
<td>Total number of successful military coups d'etat, 1/1/60 - 12/31/82.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(20) MC6082</td>
<td>45-46</td>
<td>Total military instability score, 1/1/60 - 12/31/82.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(21) CMC6069</td>
<td>47-48</td>
<td>Total military instability scores of all Sub-Saharan African state contiguous to the African state, 1/1/60-12/31/69.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(22) CMC7079</td>
<td>49-50</td>
<td>Total military instability scores of all Sub-Saharan African states contiguous to the African state, 1/1/70 - 12/31/79.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(23) AMC6064</td>
<td>51-53</td>
<td>Total military instability scores of all other Sub-Saharan African states, 1/1/60 - 12/31/64.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(24) AMC6569</td>
<td>54-56</td>
<td>As above for 1/1/65 - 12/31/69.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(25) AMC7074</td>
<td>57-59</td>
<td>As above for 1/1/70 - 12/31/74.</td>
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</table>
(26) AMC7579  60-62  As above for 1/1/75 - 12/31/79.
(27) AMC6069  63-65  As above for 1/1/60 - 12/31/69.
(28) AMC7079  66-68  As above for 1/1/70 - 12/31/79.
(30) GNP60  71-76  Gross National Product, at Current Market Prices in millions of U.S. $ in 1960 (F6.1) Sources: Zurich (1979: 12-14.)
Card  1-2  02 = second data card for the given case.
Name  3-5  Three letter name of African state, e.g., TAZ = Tanzania.
ID  8-10  Three digit identification number of each African state, e.g., 490 = Zaire.
(31) GNP65  11-16  As in 30 for 1965.
(32) GNP70  17-22  As in 30 for 1970.
(33) GNP75  23-28  As in 30 for 1975.
(35) PC60  35-39  GNP per capita, at Constant Market Prices in U.S. $ in 1960 (F5.1) Sources: Zurich (1979: 15-17).
(36) PC65  40-44  As in 35 for 1965.
(37) PC70  45-49  As in 35 for 1970.
(38) PC75  50-54  As in 35 for 1975.
(40) DEV60  60-62  Energy Consumption per capita, in kilograms of coal equivalent, in 1960 (F3.0). Sources: Zurich (1979: 184-
186).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>As in 40 for 1975.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEV80</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>As in 40 for 1980.</td>
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Gross Domestic Investment as % GDP in current market prices, 1960. (F3.1) Sources: Zurich (1979: 43-45).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>Source</th>
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<tr>
<td>GDI75</td>
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<td>As in 45 for 1975.</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAB70</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAB75</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>As in 50 for 1975.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAB80</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>As in 50 for 1980.</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Percentage share of national income of top 5% of the population (F3.1). Sources: Zurich (1979: 212-218).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
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</thead>
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<td>TOP5P</td>
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<td>As in 50 for 1980.</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOP20P</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Percentage share of national income of top 20% of the popu-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A-11
(57) GINI  56-58  Gini coefficient of income inequality. (F3.1) Sources: Zurich (1979: 212-218).

(58) EXP60  59-61  Exports of goods and nonfactor services, as % of gross domestic product, 1960. (F3.1) Sources: Zurich (1979: 212-218).

(59) EXP65  62-64  As in 58 for 1965.

(60) EXP70  65-67  As in 58 for 1970.

(61) EXP75  68-70  As in 58 for 1975.


(63) IMP60  74-76  Imports of goods and nonfactor services as % of gross domestic product, 1960. (F3.1) Sources: Zurich (1979: 103-105).

(64) IMP65  77-79  As in 63 for 1965.

Card  1-2  04 = fourth data card for the given case.

Name  3-5  Three letter name of African state, e.g., TAZ = Tanzania.

ID  8-10  Three digit identification numbers of each African state, e.g., 490 = Zaire.

(65) IMP70  11-13  As in 63 for 1970.

(66) IMP75  14-16  As in 63 for 1975.


(69) BAL65  24-27  As in 68 for 1965.
(70) BAL70 28-31 As in 68 for 1970.
(71) BAL75 32-35 As in 68 for 1975.
(73) BALPAY60 40-43 Current account balance in current U.S. $, converted by means of annual exchange rates, as % of exports and nonfactor services, 1960. (F4.1). Sources: Zurich (1979: 76-78).
(74) BALPAY65 44-47 As in 73 for 1965.
(75) BALPAY70 48-51 As in 73 for 1970.
(76) BALPAY75 52-55 As in 73 for 1975.
(77) BALPAY80 56-59 As in 73 for 1980.
(79) TERM65 64-67 As in 78 for 1965.
(80) TERM70 68-71 As in 78 for 1970.
(81) TERM75 72-75 As in 78 for 1975.
Card 1-2 05 = fifth data card for the given case.
Name 3-5 Three letter name of African state, e.g., TAZ = Tanzania.
In 8-10 Three digit identification number of each African state, e.g., 490 = Zaire.
(83) BALGNP60 11-14 Exports - Imports divided by GNP in current U.S. $, 1960. (F4.1) Sources:
<p>| | | |</p>
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<tr>
<td>84) BALGNP65</td>
<td>15-18</td>
<td>As in 83 for 1965.</td>
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<tr>
<td>85) BALGNP70</td>
<td>19-22</td>
<td>As in 83 for 1970.</td>
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<td>86) BALGNP75</td>
<td>23-26</td>
<td>As in 83 for 1975.</td>
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<tr>
<td>89) POP65</td>
<td>36-40</td>
<td>As in 88 for 1965.</td>
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<tr>
<td>90) POP70</td>
<td>41-45</td>
<td>As in 88 for 1970.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91) POP75</td>
<td>46-50</td>
<td>As in 88 for 1975.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92) URBAN60</td>
<td>51-53</td>
<td>Urban population, as percentage of total population, 1960 (F3.1) Sources: Zurich (1979: 193-194).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93) URBAN70</td>
<td>54-56</td>
<td>As in 92 for 1970.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95) LIT60</td>
<td>60-62</td>
<td>Literate adults as a percentage of the total adult population (15 years of age and over, 1960 (F3.1) Sources: Zurich (1979: 218-220).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96) LIT70</td>
<td>63-65</td>
<td>As in 95 for 1970.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98) AGRI60</td>
<td>69-71</td>
<td>Percentage of the adult labor force in agriculture, 1960 (F3.1). Sources:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99) AGRI70</td>
<td>72-74</td>
<td>As in 98 for 1970.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Card</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>06 = sixth data card for the given case.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>3-5</td>
<td>Three letter name of African state, e.g., TAZ = Tanzania.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>8-10</td>
<td>Three digit identification number of each African state, e.g., 490 = Zaire.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(101)CAP60</td>
<td>11-13</td>
<td>Percentage increase in population of capital city 1950-1960 (F3.0) Sources: various.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(102)CAP70</td>
<td>14-16</td>
<td>As in 101 for 1960-1970.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(104)ECOLE60</td>
<td>20-22</td>
<td>School enrollment of the age group 15 and older, in thousands, 1960 (F3.0) Sources: Zurich (1979: 230-232).</td>
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<tr>
<td>(105)ECOLE65</td>
<td>23-25</td>
<td>As in 104 for 1965.</td>
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<td>(106)ECOLE70</td>
<td>26-28</td>
<td>As in 104 for 1970.</td>
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<td>(107)ECOLE75</td>
<td>29-31</td>
<td>As in 104 for 1975.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(108)ETHNIC</td>
<td>32-33</td>
<td>Index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization, 1960-65 (F2.2) Sources: Zurich (1979: 259-261).</td>
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<tr>
<td>(109)DOMLANG</td>
<td>34-36</td>
<td>Percentage of population speaking the dominant national language 1967, (F3.1) Sources: Black Africa (1972: 27).</td>
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<tr>
<td>(110)TOTLANG</td>
<td>37-39</td>
<td>Total number of languages spoken in the country, 1960- (F3.0) Sources: Black Africa (1972: 28).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(111)PARTY60S</td>
<td>40-41</td>
<td>Number of political parties formed from date of independence through 1969. (F2.0) Sources: Black Africa (1972: 99).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(112)PARTY70S</td>
<td>42-43</td>
<td>Number of political parties formed from 1970 through 1979. (F2:0) Sources: Africa South</td>
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</table>
of the Sahara, various years.

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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>COMP60</td>
<td>The degree of competitiveness and effectiveness of the political party system in 1960. (F2.0) Sources: Zurich (1979: 264-266).</td>
<td>44-45</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMP65</td>
<td>As in 113 for 1965.</td>
<td>46-47</td>
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<td>COMP70</td>
<td>As in 113 for 1970.</td>
<td>48-49</td>
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<td>COMP75</td>
<td>As in 113 for 1975.</td>
<td>50-51</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMP80</td>
<td>As in 113 for 1980.</td>
<td>52-53</td>
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<tr>
<td>LEGFAC65</td>
<td>As in 118 for 1965</td>
<td>56-57</td>
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<tr>
<td>LEGFAC70</td>
<td>As in 118 for 1970</td>
<td>58-59</td>
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<td>LEGFAC75</td>
<td>As in 118 for 1975</td>
<td>60-61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEGFAC80</td>
<td>As in 118 for 1980</td>
<td>62-63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOTES60S</td>
<td>Voters as % of electorate in election closest to 1965. (F4.1). Sources: World Handbook (1972: 54-56).</td>
<td>64-67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOTES70S</td>
<td>As in 123 for around 1975</td>
<td>68-71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRESS75</td>
<td>As in 125 for around 1980. Source: Freedom in the World, 1982.</td>
<td>76-79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Card 1-2 07 = seventh data card for the given case.

Name 3-5 Three letter name of African state, e.g., TAZ = Tanzania.

ID 8-10 Three digit identification
number of each African state, e.g., 490 = Zaire.

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<th>Source(s)</th>
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<tr>
<td>7)</td>
<td>ELECT65</td>
<td>Ordinal scale of electoral irregularity 1965, 1 = good, 5 = bad. (F1.0). Sources: Zurich: (1979: 271-272).</td>
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<tr>
<td>8)</td>
<td>ELECT75</td>
<td>As in 127 for around 1975.</td>
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<tr>
<td>9)</td>
<td>INSTAB60</td>
<td>Communal instability from date of independence to 1969. Sources: (F2.0). Black Africa (1972: 129).</td>
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<td>0)</td>
<td>INSTAB70</td>
<td>As in 129 for 1970s.</td>
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<td>2)</td>
<td>VIOL6567</td>
<td>As in 131 for 1965-1967.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3)</td>
<td>VIOL6067</td>
<td>As in 131 for 1960-1967.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5)</td>
<td>SANC6567</td>
<td>As in 134 for 1965-1967.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6)</td>
<td>SANC6067</td>
<td>As in 134 for 1960-1967.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7)</td>
<td>ARMS60</td>
<td>Defense expenditure as % of general government total current revenue, 1960. (F4.1). Sources: Zurich (1972: 283-285).</td>
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<tr>
<td>8)</td>
<td>ARMS65</td>
<td>As in 137 for 1965.</td>
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<td>9)</td>
<td>ARMS70</td>
<td>As in 138 for 1970.</td>
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<td>10)</td>
<td>ARMS75</td>
<td>As in 138 for 1975.</td>
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<td>11)</td>
<td>ARMS80</td>
<td>As in 138 for 1980.</td>
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<tr>
<td>12)</td>
<td>FORCE60</td>
<td>Total military manpower in thousands, 1960. (F3.0). Sources: ACDA, World Military Expenditures, various years.</td>
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<td>13)</td>
<td>FORCE65</td>
<td>As in 142 for 1965.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Range</td>
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<td>FORCE70</td>
<td>76-78</td>
<td>As in 142 for 1970.</td>
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<td>Card</td>
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<td>As in 142 for 1975.</td>
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<td>FORCE80</td>
<td>14-16</td>
<td>As in 142 for 1979.</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTN75</td>
<td>21-24</td>
<td>As in 147 for 1975.</td>
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<td>DEBT70</td>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>As in 149 for 1970.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEBT76</td>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>As in 149 for 1976.</td>
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<tr>
<td>MORT70</td>
<td>54-57</td>
<td>As in 154 for 1970.</td>
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<tr>
<td>MORT76</td>
<td>62-65</td>
<td>As in 154 for 1976.</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMCON65</td>
<td>70-72</td>
<td>Commodity Concentration of</td>
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A-18
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<th>Code</th>
<th>Prefix</th>
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<td>COMCON75</td>
<td>76-78</td>
<td>As in 159 for 1975.</td>
<td>Sources: Zurich (1979: 97-99).</td>
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<td>ime</td>
<td>3-5</td>
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<td>Sources: Zurich (1979: 97-99).</td>
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<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>8-10</td>
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<td>Sources: Zurich (1979: 97-99).</td>
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<tr>
<td>FORINV67</td>
<td>52-56</td>
<td>Stock of foreign private direct investment in millions of</td>
<td>Sources: Zurich (1979: 116-118).</td>
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS 1967 A
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<td>(174) FORINV73</td>
<td>57-61</td>
<td>As in 173 for 1973.</td>
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<td>(175) FORINV80</td>
<td>62-66</td>
<td>As in 173 for 1980.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(177) RUSAID80</td>
<td>71-74</td>
<td>As in 176 for period 1966-1980.</td>
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<td>Card</td>
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<td>10 = tenth data card for the given case.</td>
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<td>Three digit identification number of each African state, e.g., 490 = Zaire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(179) USAID80</td>
<td>11-14</td>
<td>As in 178 for period 1966-1980.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(181) REVNU65</td>
<td>18-20</td>
<td>As in 180 for 1965.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(182) REVNU70</td>
<td>21-23</td>
<td>As in 181 for 1970.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(183) REVNU75</td>
<td>24-26</td>
<td>As in 181 for 1975.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(185) SPEND60</td>
<td>30-32</td>
<td>General government total current expenditure in 1960 as % of GDP. (F3.1). Sources: Zurich (1979: 37-39).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>SPEND65</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>As in 184 for 1965.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPEND70</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>As in 184 for 1970.</td>
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<td>SPEND75</td>
<td>1975</td>
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<td>PUBLIC75</td>
<td>1975</td>
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<tr>
<td>(203)YEARS</td>
<td>71-73</td>
<td>Years independent, 1/1/60 to 12/31/82. Maximum value = 23.0. (F3.1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(204)DEM60</td>
<td>74-76</td>
<td>Political Democracy Index, 1960, (F3.1) Source: Bollen (1980:388).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(205)DEM65</td>
<td>77-79</td>
<td>As in 204 for 1965.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Card</td>
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<td>11 = eleventh data card for the given case.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Three digit identification number of each African state, e.g., 490 = Zaire.</td>
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<td>(207)INFL7078</td>
<td>14-16</td>
<td>As in 206 for 1970-78.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Year</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
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<td>(210)AGRIP78</td>
<td>22-23</td>
<td>As in 209 for 1978.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(211)MANUP60</td>
<td>24-25</td>
<td>Percent of GDP produced by manufacturing in 1960 (F2.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(212)MANUP78</td>
<td>26-27</td>
<td>As in 211 for 1978.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(213)RESV70</td>
<td>28-30</td>
<td>Gross international reserves in millions of $, 1970 (F3.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(214)RESV78</td>
<td>31-33</td>
<td>As in 213 for 1978.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(215)RESVIMP</td>
<td>34-36</td>
<td>Gross international reserves in 1978 as months of import coverage (F3.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(216)INDUST60</td>
<td>37-38</td>
<td>Percent of labor force in industry 1960 (F2.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(217)INDUST78</td>
<td>39-40</td>
<td>As in 216 for 1978.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(218)WINVOTE</td>
<td>41-43</td>
<td>Percentage of the vote cast for the winning party in the election closest to,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>but before, the date of independence (F2.2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(219)VOTEPAR</td>
<td>44-45</td>
<td>Number of voters in the national election closest to, but before, the date of</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>independence, as a percentage of the population in that year (F2.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(220)GROUP</td>
<td>46-47</td>
<td>Largest ethnic group as a percent of total population (F2.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(221)NONAGRI</td>
<td>48-49</td>
<td>Percent of the labor force in nonagricultural occupations, ca. 1966 (F2.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Source: Black Africa (1972: 40).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(222)LIT65</td>
<td>50-51</td>
<td>Estimated percent of the</td>
</tr>
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</table>

A-23
population that is literate, 1965 (F2.2) Source: Black Africa (1972: 70).

(223) SOCmob66 52-54 Sum of 221 and 223 (F3.2).

(224) MC6075 55-56 Sum of all military conflict events, 1960-1975. Compare to variable #20. (F2.0).
APPENDIX B: DESCRIPTION OF SUB-SAHARAN MILITARY INTERVENTION EVENTS, 1960-1982
Description: President Agostino Neto announced that forces had crushed a revolt by army extremists. Seven senior party members were killed, as well as 200 civilians during street fighting. A Cuban unit reportedly played a key role in suppressing the challenge to Pres. Neto. The rebels seized the radio station, tried to storm the Presidential Palace, and freed some dissidents from prison (including Commander Alves himself).

Participants: The attempted coup was led by former Interior Minister Commander Nito Alves, and Jose Van Dunen (both expelled from the MPLA Central Committee on May 21).

Apparent Causes: "Factionalism" in the MPLA Central Committee, i.e., differences between those who resent the friendly posture toward whites and the influence of Mesticos in government. There were also reported differences over the continuation of Cuban troops in Angola.

Sources: Index to the N.Y. Times (1977:54), Keesings (1977:28489).

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BENIN (Dahomey) (c) 434 10-28-63

Description: Union and worker dissatisfaction with the government led to a general strike and to violent demonstrations in Cotonou and Porto-Novo, which continued unabated for several days and culminated in the resignation of President Hubert Maga and the intervention of Col. Christophe Soglo, Army Commander, on October 28. He dissolved the Government and the National Assembly and suspended the Constitution. The following day a provisional government was formed with Soglo as President, and the three major civilian leaders (Apithy, Ahomadegbe and Maga) as the only members of the cabinet.

Participants: Members of the military and their commander, Col. Soglo.

Apparent Causes: The demonstrations, which began on October 21, were in protest against the release of a deputy, M. Bohiki, who had been accused of murder. However, southern antipathy for the government due to President Maga's (a northerner) alleged discrimination, as well as the unions' dissatisfaction over the 10 percent cut in service wages, seem to have been the major causes. Soglo stated that the coup "preserved national unity and cohesion." Military spokesmen also cited the extravagant lifestyle of a number of ministers as another reason for the takeover.

Description: Following growing dissension between President Apithy and Vice-President Ahomadegbe, both men resigned on November 29, under pressure from the Army. Gen. Soglo, the Army Commander, announced that the President of the National Assembly, M. Tairou Congacou, would rule the country, as provided for in the Constitution, until new elections were held. He added that, "the Army...does not intend to assume power except if the people express the wish that it should do so, or in the event of a power vacuum". M. Congacou's Cabinet comprised only four other Ministers, all of whom were described as non-political, technical experts.

Participants: General Soglo, Army Commander.

Apparent Causes: The continued, unresolved rivalry between Apithy and Ahomadegbe appears to have been the main reason for the move by Soglo. Also involved were mass demonstrations against the President and Vice-President and a dispute between the President and the National Assembly over the appointment of members of the Supreme Court.

Sources: Keesings Contemporary Archives (1965/66:21190), FBIS (November 28, 1965), Index to the N.Y. Times (1965250).

Description: Following the events in November when Gen. Soglo intervened and formed a new civilian government, a political impasse developed, and Soglo dismissed the government he had formed a month before. He then suspended the Constitution, dissolved the National Assembly, banned all political parties, and named himself Head of State on December 22. He announced that free elections would be held on January 16, 1966, but that he would not hand over power to the elected leaders until order was completely restored and dissension ended. Soglo said on December 27th that the Army had no desire to confiscate power and had formed a government of professionals which included only two Army officers.

Participants: Gen. Soglo, Army Chief of Staff, and military elements.

Apparent Causes The unresolved conflicts between the head of state and head of government appear to have been the major factor. Gen. Soglo stated that he had assumed control because the politicians had proved unable to lead the country towards a better future and had "indulged in a struggle for power to the detriment of the country's interests", and that Congacou's appointment (on November 29th), far from calming passions, had merely revived them.

BENIN (Dahomey) (c) 434 12-17-67

Description: The military regime of Gen. Christophe Soglo was overthrown by a group of junior officers on December 17. Strikes by workers in both the public and private sectors had culminated in a general strike in Porto Novo and Cotonou by December 13. The paratroops involved in the coup had been brought into the capital during the industrial disturbances to help police maintain public order. Two commando units, led by Maj. Kerakou and Col. Kuandete, surrounded the residences of Gen. Soglo, Col. Alley, Lt. Col. Aho, and Maj. Sinzogan, and took over strategic points in the city. A "Revolutionary Military Committee", comprising 15 officers, was formed. Four days later Col. Alley was asked to become Head of State, apparently because he was satisfactory to both labour unions and France, and was not identified with any particular region. Maj. Kuandete became Defense Minister.

Participants: Maj. Kerakou and Col. Kouandete were northerners, but they received support from many junior officers of southern origins. All the men involved were younger than their predecessors. Maj. Kouandete was the apparent coup leader.

Apparent Causes: Maj. Kouandete stated that the group had acted in order to avoid "fratricidal conflict". The industrial unrest appears to have been due to Gen. Soglo's austerity measures, which included a 25% wage reduction for all workers. However, the Government had negotiated a return to work just two days before the coup took place. Also, according to official sources, Soglo was perceived to be a weak leader, who gave in too often to trade-union demands, and decisions were made by a "family circle". The coup was apparently also linked to the growing split between northern and southern elements in the army, as all the "rebel" officers came from the north as opposed to Soglo, who is a southerner.


BENIN (Dahomey) (p) 434 05-05-69

Description: The government announced that a plot to overthrow it had been discovered and foiled. The plotters were to have carried out their action on April 15, 1969. Many arrests were made, including that of an Army Lieutenant.
Participants: Twenty people including an Army Lieutenant (Justin Adjanohoum).

Apparent Causes: According to the government, the aim of the plot was to return Soglo to power.


BENIN (Dahomey) (ac) 434
07-18/19-69

Description: The government announced that an attempted coup had been foiled. It was to have taken place in three stages, and involved beheading the Army Chief, then the Gendarmerie Chief, and finally the Head of State. However, the attempt failed when the initiators tried to kidnap the Army Chief, as they were prevented by a guard who then sought reinforcements. Many arrests were made.


Apparent Causes: Not given, but as Alley was a former Head of State, the attempt could be connected to personal power ambitions.


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BENIN (Dahomey) (c) 434
12-10-69

Description: Following an attempt to assassinate him, Pres. Emile-Derim Zinsou was seized by a group of army officers, whose troops occupied the wireless station and Presidential Palace. Elements of the army and the military assumed control of the government. A three-man "Directory" consisting of Lt. Col. Paul Emile de Souza (as President), Lt. Col. Benoit Sinzogan, and Col. Maurice Kouandete, was chosen to hold power. The junta ordered censorship of all publications and radio broadcasts, and the release of all political prisoners. The Ministers of the deposed President were allowed to continue functioning, but they resigned on December 16 following disagreement with the Directory.

Participants: The coup was organized by Lt.Col. Maurice Kouandete, a senior officer and army Chief of Staff, and by younger officers of the "third generation."

Apparent Causes: Col.Kouandete stated that the Army had asked the Zinsou Government in July 1968 to provide for unity among all inhabitants and groups in Dahomey but that in fact a situation of utter insecurity had developed, as the Government had moved away from the general directions proclaimed in 1968. Dr.Zinsou had been particularly unpopular in the eastern border areas, due to his policy of allowing Red Cross airlifts to Biafra and the
nsuing restriction of trade with Nigeria. There was also internal conflict in the army between followers of Lt. Col. Philphonse Alley and Kouandete, following supposed attacks on the latter. Alley was sentenced to jail for one of these attacks. These apparently led Kouandete to suspect President Zinsou of being involved in a plot to limit his power. A remote cause of the coup was that all the major interests in the country distrusted Zinsou: the intellectuals because of his "pragmatism", the students because he was a former French MP, the Trade Unions because he was on good terms with the military. The Unions had organized many strikes, which the Army was used to break.


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**BENIN (Dahomey) (ac) 434 02-23-72**

**Description:** The President (Mr. Maga) announced that a group of mutineers had attempted to overthrow the government, but that they were quickly suppressed by loyal troops. An attack was made on Col. de Sousa (Army Chief) by soldiers who are reported to have tried to take over "strategic national points". Four Dahomean junior officers and four sergeants were arrested after the raid on de Souza's residence and the attempt to take over the government. Col. de Souza was only slightly wounded. Many arrests were made, including Col. Kouandete, who was sentenced to death in the subsequent trial.

**Participants:** Junior officers and sergeants, led by Col. Kouandete, who had been involved in two previous military coups.

**Apparent Causes:** Not given, but the attempt was on the eve of the President's trip to France, which was cancelled. Kouandete also had a record of coup activity.


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**BENIN (Dahomey) (c) 434 10-26-72**

**Description:** There was a national announcement that the army had seized power, following a military coup led by Maj. Kerekou (a paratroop Commander), and the army's deputy Chief-of-Staff. The troops occupied strategic points in the capital and also around the Presidential Palace, where a Cabinet meeting was in session. The Presidential Council and National Consultative Assembly were dissolved, the Constitution suspended, and an eleven man military government named, with Kerekou as President and Defense Minister.

**Participants:** Army officers, mostly Captains, led by Maj. Kerekou.
Apparent Causes: The reason given by Maj. Kerekou was that the authority of the state had disappeared everywhere because of lack of economic or social progress and damaging political rivalry among members of the three-man Presidential Council. He also stated that his group acted because the former rulers were running the country by "political intrigue."


BENIN (Dahomey) (p) 434 02-28-73

Description: The President, Mathieu Kerekou, announced that several arrests had been made in connection with a plot to overthrow his government and eliminate the persons responsible for the Oct. 26th. revolution. The arrested Army officers were tried in May and sent to prison.

Participants: High ranking army officers, especially those discharged after Oct 26th (Col. Alphonse Alley, Maj. Jean Baptiste) and a foreign power, France.

Apparent Causes: Not given, but it seemed to be a manifestation of a culture of military involvement in politics in Benin in that some of those arrested had once been in power as the result of their own coups.


BENIN (Dahomey) (ac) 434 01-21-75

Description: Radio Cotonou reported that an attempted armed rebellion had been crushed by government forces before it could get underway. The leader of the rebellion, Capt. Assogba, was accused of having defamed the Head of State, Lt. Col. Kerekou, incited troops to armed rebellion against the state, and led a move towards Cotonou by troops of the Armoured Car Unit he commanded at Ouidan. He had, as a result, been relieved of all offices and placed under arrest.

Participants: Capt. Janvier Assogba, Minister of Civil Service and Labour, former Minister Bertin Boma, and a section of the armed forces.

Apparent Causes: The alleged involvement of the Head of State in a major corruption case arising out of a bribery attempt. Also perhaps related was the fact that the attempt followed the announcement of wide-ranging political and economic changes, which included the complete nationalization of over 90% of all
Participants: A small group (50) of army commandos, led by Maj. Iyom-ni. Lt. Kikanga and Zaire were accused of instigating the overthrow. Kikanga had apparently taken part in an earlier coup attempt (Nov. 1969).

Apparent Causes: Not known. According to Africa Digest the earlier coup attempt was supported by ex-President Fulbert Youlou from exile in Spain. The government claimed the attempt to be the handiwork of international imperialism, yet the bulk of the attackers had entered the country from Zaire.


CONGO (ac) 484 02-22-72
Description: It was announced that an attempt by left-wing officers to overthrow the government while President Ngouabi was visiting Pointe Noire was foiled by loyal troops. The rebels had temporarily occupied the radio station where they broadcast to the nation. They arrested certain political leaders as well. Although 169 arrests were made, the coup organisers escaped. Three persons died during the attempt. Twenty army officers were subsequently demoted to the ranks by Ngouabi for their part in the affair.

Participants: The insurgents, perhaps as few as 26, were led by Lieutenant Ange Diawara (an infantry commander), as well as many prominent persons and officers, including the former Head of State Major Alfred Raoul.

Apparent Causes: "Ambitious and power-hungry elements" were alleged by the government to have been behind the attack. It was further stated that the rebels were opposed to the President's rapprochement with President Mobutu of Zaire.


CONGO (p) 484 02-12-73
Description: President Ngouabi claimed on February 12th that a plot against his government was being hatched and warned of the consequences of such activities. He claimed that some of the dangerous elements were in the Army and that some arrests had been made (perhaps 100). The Police Force was dissolved on February 20th for incompetence. In April it was announced that the apparent leader of the plot, ex-Lt. Ange Diawara, his deputy, Jean-Baptiste Ikoko, and fifteen of their followers had been killed by Army units near the boarder of Zaire.
gouabi "for failure to ensure respect for the country's institutions and national unity" and placed under house arrest in the Presidential Palace. The Army assumed full power and the national Council of the Revolution named Premier Raoul as interim resident (Sept 5).

Participants: Capt. Ngouabi, Chairman of the Council and the Army.

Apparent Causes: In a nationwide broadcast, Ngouabi announced that Massamba-Debat had resigned because of his failure to assure peace and national unity." This may have been a reference to the fact that clashes between different tribes in the provinces had been reported a few days earlier. However, a general staff order to incorporate the militia into the army on September 2 appears to have been a more direct cause. Ngouabi charged the Massamba-Debat regime with general incompetence and "fratricidal struggles."


ONGO (p) 484 02-25-69

Description: Major Mouzabakani was arrested for being the leader of a group of civilians and military "counter-revolutionaries." The National Council for the Revolution (CNR) decided on a purge of the Army, Police, and Gendarmerie following the discovery of two counter-revolutionary networks.

Participants: Major Mouzabakani and a group of civilian and military counter-revolutionaries.

Apparent Causes: Ideological differences and perhaps personal ambition in that Mouzabakani had been sentenced to death by the previous Massamba-Debat government for engaging in anti-state activities, but was released from prison by the CNR.


ONGO (ac) 484 03-22-70

Description: Pres. Ngouabi announced that an attempted coup had been crushed. Lt. Pierre Kikanga (sentenced to death in absentia on August 9, 1969) crossed over from Zaire, and with the aid of a rebel commando unit, took over the radio station in Brazzaville and broadcast that Ngouabi had been overthrown and arrested. Within a few hours President Ngouabi's troops, led by the resident himself, defeated the rebels and killed their leader. Thirty insurgents and two loyal troops died in the fighting. On March 29th, 1970, Capt. Albert Miaouma, Andre Nkoutou and Sgt. Jean-Marie Mengo were executed for their part in the coup attempt.
CONGO (ac) 484 07-31-68

Description: According to Agence France Presse, there was an attempted coup by the paramilitary, Cuban-trained, Civic Guard. The guards tried to cut off Brazzaville by setting up road blocks across the main routes to the city. There was, however, a massive walk-out and demonstrations by civilians in support of the President, who subsequently dissolved the National Assembly and suspended the activities of the Political Bureau of the ruling National Movement of the Revolution (MNR). The Army also stated its support for the President.

Participants: Paramilitary Civic Guards.

Apparent Causes: It was the aftermath of a struggle for control of the MNR between the extreme-left wing and the rest of the MNR's members. The paramilitary Civic Guards supported the extreme-left wing.


CONGO (c) 484 08-03-68

Description: Following the arrest of Capt. Marien Ngouabi by Massamba-Debat, elements of the army overthrew the government and rescued Ngouabi from prison. Massamba-Debat fled during the fighting but was recalled to limited power by the new National Council of the Revolution. Defense Secretary Lt. A. Poignet was named President, and Capt. M. Ngouabi, the coup leader, was named Army Chief. Further conflict within a couple weeks led to Massamba-Debat's resignation and Ngouabi's assumption of full power in Dec. 1968.

Participants: Ngouabi and paratroops were reinforced by left-wing factions in the party and labor organizations, and by disadvantaged northerners in these institutions.

Apparent Causes: The conflicts appeared to be related to both ideology and ethnicity. Massamba-Debat's appointment of moderate ministers, his dismissal or demotion of leading left-wing politicians, and his imprisonment of Ngouabi (a left-wing northerner) intensified these conflicts and precipitated the coup.

Sources: Morrison et al (1972:214), Index to the N.Y. Times (1968:257)

CONGO (c) 484 09-02-68

Description: President Massamba-Debat was again deposed by Capt.
Description: Following a three-day general strike and sporadic violence, in which some three thousand demonstrators stormed the prison and released all the prisoners, stormed the radio station, and surrounded the palace, the army forced civilian President Abbé Fulbert Youlou to resign. It then supported Christian/Communist labor leaders in their choice of an eight-man provisional government, headed by Massamba-Debat and composed of radical young technician-ministers. The Constitution was suspended, National Assembly dissolved, and amnesty ordered for all political prisoners.

Participants: A crowd of demonstrators, supported by Trade Union leaders and the Army.

Apparent Causes: Worker dissatisfaction with the government was the reason for the demonstrations. In 1962 the pay of government officials and civil service employees had been cut by 20-50% in an austerity drive. The Unions cited unemployment and regime incompetence in the face of the growing economic crisis as reasons for the move. The coup was also intended to put an end to fiscal mismanagement, extravagance in high places, despotism, tribalism and moral corruption. Finally, there had been an announcement that a single party system was to go into operation. In a radio speech following the coup, Massamba-Debat pledged major reforms.


Description: An army uprising was reported. Government leaders, under the protection of the Presidential Guard, took refuge in the stadium, while insurgent troops patrolled the city. While reportedly in control, the rebels appeared reluctant to force the government leaders from the stadium, as they were still there on June 30.

Participants: Capt. M. Ngouabi was identified as the leader of the army group.

Apparent Causes: The move was linked to army officers' resentment over Pres. Massamba-Debat's decision to form a private presidential army consisting of Cuban negroes, as well as the recent establishment of a "collective" army command and a special political department for the Marxist indoctrination of the troops.

Source: Index to the N.Y. Times (1966:247)
Description: The Army arrested more than 40 people for allegedly planning to overthrow the government.

Participants: 40 youths, an officer of the Presidential Guard, an inspector of posts and telecommunications and a teacher.

Apparent Causes: To put an end to economic collapse and corruption

CHAD  (ac)  483  04-01-77

Description: It was announced that an attempt to take over the headquarters of the Supreme Military Council (the Presidential Palace) was overpowered by the police (palace guards). Eight persons were killed in the fighting, including Army Chief of Staff Lt. Col. Dabio, and twelve injured.

Participants: Some 60 soldiers ("Nomad Guards") supported by armoured cars and led by sub-Lieutenant Brahim Abakar Koumba.

Apparent Causes: Alleged injustices suffered by Moslems in the Army, who constitute only 20% of the forces and are found mostly in the lower ranks.


COMOROS  (c)  581  05-12-78

Description: In a bloodless coup, an alliance of military officers and politicians seized power and arrested President Ali Soilih. He was replaced by a Political-Military Directory under M. Said Attoumani, described as a deeply religious, Moslem administrator. Former President M. Abdallah and former Vice-President Mohamed Ahmed were named as co-Presidents. Five persons were killed during the operation. Political detainees were released and freedom of religion restored. The country's name was changed to include Islamic Republic. On May 30 it was announced that the deposed President had been shot and killed while attempting to escape from house arrest.

Participants: Said Attoumani and the Armed Forces, under the command of Belgian mercenary Robert Denard, who became the Armed Forces' Chief-of-Staff after the coup.

Apparent Causes: The coup was supposedly in response to President Soilih's destruction of the country's "colonial structure" and the establishment of a Marxist regime. He had also apparently suppressed traditional Islamic practices and handed over the administration to gangs of teenagers, "a government of children". Political opponents had been dispatched to re-education camps and chaotic "reforms" had destroyed the tropical farming economy and led to economic collapse. Apparently, the government was completely isolated by the time of the coup.

CHAD (p) 483 06-24-73

Description: Brig Gen. Felix Malloum was arrested by President Tombalbaye for plotting to overthrow the government and to assassinate the President and his family. Also arrested was a Mme. Kaltouma Guembong, who was sentenced to jail in February 1975.


Apparent Causes: It was claimed that Malloum was power hungry and wanted to replace Tombalbaye as President.


CHAD (c) 483 04-13-75

Description: The Government of President Tombalbaye was overthrown by units of the army and gendarmerie. Chadian soldiers, led by Army Chief of Staff Gen. Noel Odingar, stormed the Presidential Palace and killed President N'garta Tombalbaye. There were apparently heavy casualties during the fighting. The Constitution was suspended, the Government and National Assembly dismissed, and political parties were banned. Brig. Gen Felix Malloum was named Head of State (President) and leader of a 9-member Supreme Military Council. Col. Namari Djimet was named Vice-President.

Participants: Units of the Army and Gendarmerie, led by Gen. Noel Odingar, Armed Forces Chief of Staff.

Apparent Causes: The new leaders said that the former ruler was "autocratic and unpredictable". There were also complaints that the former President had persecuted Moslem northerners and, according to Le Monde, Christian southerners. He had certainly alienated many educated Chadians, hundreds of whom were living in exile, and more recently had apparently alienated the leaders of the armed forces who, it was reported, felt they had not been sufficiently compensated for putting down Libyan-backed northern rebels. The country itself had widespread poverty and unemployment, and the unpopularity of the regime was exacerbated by food shortages, rising prices, and corruption in the handling of international famine relief.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (c) 482 09-01-81

Description: In a bloodless coup, President Dacko was overthrown by the army and placed under house arrest. The Constitution and political parties were suspended, and a Military Committee For National Recovery (CMRN) established, with Gen. Andre Kolingba, the coup leader, as Head of State.

Participants: The army, led by General Andre Kolingba.

Apparent Causes: It was claimed as a move to introduce "real democracy" (there had been General Elections in March, 1981, the results of which were contested by the opposition parties), and to revitalize the economy. Dacko was also said to be in poor health.


CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (ac) 482 03-03-82

Description: The Information Minister, Francois Bozize, made a broadcast calling on President Kolingba to step down. But the President made a later broadcast, appealing for calm. It was alleged that around 200 anti-government troops deserted while loyalists rounded up dissident supporters. There were riots in the street in support of the dissidents. General Bozize was known for his sympathies with M. Ange Patasse, the leader of the Movement for the Liberation of the Centrafrican People (MLPC). The day after the coup attempt, loyal soldiers moved against the MLPC; at least five Gendarmerie and two Army officers were arrested and the MLPC was dissolved.

Participants: General Francois Bozize, General Mbaikona and M. Patasse. Patasse was given political asylum by Togo on April 14. The whereabouts of the two Generals, who had fled, was unknown.

Apparent Causes: Not given, but it was stated that the government was based on southern tribes, while the dissidents were mainly northerners. There had also been a personal rivalry between Patasse and General Kolingba (President) for some time.

was sentenced to ten years in prison.

Participants: The Inspector General of the Gendarmerie, General Lingoupou, and two Colonels in the Gendarmerie.

Apparent Causes: Not Given


CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (ac) 482 02-01-76

Description: Government radio announced, and reports from Paris and N'djamena confirmed, that a coup attempt, involving a grenade attack at Bangui airport on President Jean-Bedel Bokassa, had been thwarted. The President was unharmed, although two of the attackers and a presidential aide lost their lives in the attack.

Participants: Three army officers, Commander Fidel Odrou, Lt. Satao, and Martin Meya were named as the ringleaders, and were sentenced to death. Also sentenced were a U.S. Embassy employee who was an Iraqi national, and a number of unnamed Senegalese.

Apparent Causes: The coup attempt was said to have been at the instigation of Colonialists and Imperialists. It was further stated, on March 23,1976, that the conspirators (eight in number) had made nine previous attempts on the life of the President.


CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (c) 482 09-20-79

Description: Emperor Bokassa was overthrown during the night of September 20-21 while he was visiting Libya. The country reverted back to a Republic from an Empire. The rebel CAR troops seized the airport and radio station. The leader of the coup, former President David Dacko, called in 350 French troops to keep law and order after the coup.

Participants: Mr. David Dacko, with the aid of CAR troops.

Apparent Causes: The aim was to restore political and human rights and to reconstruct the economy. The immediate cause of the coup was the adverse publicity generated by the alleged massacres of hundreds of children and cannibalism by high government officials. It was also alleged that there was maladministration, a poor economy, that the CAR's international prestige had been lowered, and that general insecurity prevailed.
Bokassa (Army Chief of Staff).

**Apparent Causes:** The military claimed that Dacko's aides were wasting public funds and losing touch with the masses. There may also have been discontent with military appropriations, rumors that Bokassa was to be dismissed, and unrest over a 20% cut in government salaries. Bokassa also stated on January 5th that the coup forestalled a plot by pro-Chinese extremists, who planned to disband the existing army and execute its leaders.


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**CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (p) 482 01-08-66**

**Description:** At a Cabinet meeting on January 8, 1966, within a week of Col. Bokassa's successful coup, several officers and NCOs from the army were dismissed, on the grounds that they were party to a plot to assassinate the President.

**Participants:** Unnamed army officers and NCOs.

**Apparent Causes:** Not given.


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**CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (p) 482 04-10-69**

**Description:** Pres. Bokassa announced that a plot to overthrow him had been foiled, at the military camp at Kasai, on April 10. The officers there overpowered Lt. Col. Banza, who demanded that the officers should order the arrest of members of the government and the occupation of important buildings. Banza was tried on April 11th and shot on April 12th.

**Participants:** Lt. Col. Banza, Minister for Public Health.

**Apparent Causes:** Lt. Col. Banza, who was the chief organizer of the coup that brought Bokassa to power, had progressively been stripped of influence and Ministerial responsibility.


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**CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (ac) 482 12-7-74**

**Description:** It was reported on December 16, 1974 from the capital of Chad that a coup attempt "two weeks ago" against President Bokassa had failed and that three officers of the CAR gendarmerie had been arrested. The organizer, General Lingoupou,
southerners and granting special privileges to the Tutsi tribe.


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BURUNDI (c) 516 11-01-76

Description: Burundi radio announced that in a bloodless coup, armed forces led by Lt. Col. Jean-Baptiste Bagaza had deposed Lt. Gen. Michel Micombero. Burundi's only political party was dissolved, telephone and telegraph communication with the outside world suspended, and a dawn-to-dusk curfew imposed. Bagaza announced that he had taken over as head of state on Nov. 4 and named himself President and head of a 30-man "Supreme Council of the Revolution".

Participants: Burundi armed forces, under the leadership of Col. Bagaza.

Apparent Causes: The coup was apparently due to a deteriorating economic and political situation and "therefore" the need to reform the apparatus of the State and re-educate those morally incapable of the effective performance of public tasks. In a communique immediately following the coup, the Armed Forces announced that they "were forced to take power because clans of self-interested politicians hungered for personal power and material wealth."


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CAMEROON 471 Nothing to report

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CAPE VERDE ISLANDS 402 Nothing to report

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (c) 482 01-01-66

Description: In a bloodless coup, military officers, under the command of Col. Jean Bedel Bokassa, overthrew the elected civilian regime of David Dacko. Parachutists stormed the Radio station and the Presidential Palace and overcame the defending gendarmes. President Dacko and his Cabinet were subsequently placed under house arrest. All political prisoners were released and the National Assembly was dissolved. Col. Bokassa proclaimed that "the bourgeoisie is abolished, and a new era of equality between all citizens is inaugurated." Following the coup all Communist Chinese nationals were ordered to leave the country within 48 hours, and relations with China were broken.

Participants: High level army officers, led by Col. Jean-Bedel
and had allowed himself to be influenced by his father, the former King. He also accused him of being influenced by criminals, practising nepotism, and plotting to destroy the army. However it had become obvious that Ntare V and his supporters had been vying for power with the military and government bureaucrats. In October the Mwami had more or less openly accused the P.M. of "incompetence" and "abuse of his authority". The King also opposed the proposed resumption of relations with Communist China (severed in January 1965) and later claimed to have proof that China had played a key role in the coup which overthrew him.


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BURUNDI (p) 516 09-16/17-69

Description: President Micombero announced on October 8 that an attempt to overthrow his government had been foiled in September and that the persons involved had been arrested and would be tried. Twenty three persons (nineteen military men and four civilians) were tried on November 21 and subsequently executed on December 22.

Participants: Those executed included three former Cabinet ministers, a former vice-President of the Bank of Burundi, M. Ferdinand Bitariho, and a number of officers (Capt. N. Katariho and Maj. Charles Karolero) and N.C.O.s.

Apparent Causes: Not specified, although tribal rivalry seems to have been a factor, as those accused of the attempted coup had apparently also planned a massacre among the Tutsi tribe. Army involvement may have been due to the fact that in March 1967 the President had incorporated the Gendarmerie into the Army, and in May the same year had taken over as Chief of Staff, the official reason given being that "a small group of irresponsible men" with "accomplices in the judiciary and the Army" wished "to make use of the Republic for their own advantage."


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BURUNDI (p) 516 07-06-71

Description: The government radio announced that a plot to overthrow the government had been uncovered. Many arrests were made, including military officers as well as some political notables.

Participants: Two Ministers and five army officers.

Apparent Causes: The plotters were alleged to be "Maoists". They supposedly accused the government of giving preference to
26.


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BURUNDI (c) 516 07-08-66

Description: Prince Charles Ndizeye, son of Mwami Mwambutsa IV, announced in a broadcast July 8 that he had assumed the position of Head of State in place of his father. He demanded the resignation of the Cabinet led by M. Leopold Bina, and suspended the Constitution. The former Secretary of State for Defense, Capt. Michel Micombero, was named Prime Minister. On July 13 he announced a Cabinet of fourteen Ministers, of whom six were Hutu and the rest Tutsi. Five were officers. Ndizeye was proclaimed King (Mwami Ntare V) on September 1.

Participants: Prince Charles Ndizeye, Crown Prince, with the support of a number of young Tutsi politicians and army officers.

Apparent Causes: The Prince said he took power in order to "safeguard the country's institutions and make the development of a national economy possible." He blamed the politicians for "dereliction of duty, stagnation and hesitation, powerlessness and nepotism." The previous king's permanent residence in Geneva, and the need for stable government, were also cited as reasons for the coup. The cabinet was staffed with young intellectuals.


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BURUNDI (c) 516 11-28-66

Description: King Ntare V was deposed in a bloodless coup, while on a visit to Kinshasa, by Capt Michel Micombero, P.M. and Minister of Defense, who declared the country a Republic and named himself President. He dissolved the existing government, replaced the country's provisional governors by officers, and appointed a "Provisional Revolutionary Committee" of thirteen officers and the former Minister of Justice, M. Simbananiye, as Attorney General. The Revolutionary Committee raised the President's rank to Colonel and fixed his term of office at seven years.

Participants: Young Tutsi army officers, led by Captain Micombero.

Apparent Causes: The new President alleged that the move was due to the fact that the young King had failed to keep his promises
foreign-owned business and properties.


BENIN (Dahomey) (p) 434 07-28-75

Description: Further details of events surrounding the murder of Capt. Aikpe, the former Interior Minister, were revealed by the magazine, Jeune Afrique. It was claimed that Capt. Aikpe was planning to oust President Kerekou when the latter pre-empted this plot.

Participants: The plot was revealed by trade unionist Mito Baba. Only Baba and Aikpe were named.

Apparent Causes: None given.


BOTSWANA 571 Nothing to report

BURUNDI (ac) 516 10-18-65

Description: On the night of October 18-19, an abortive coup was carried out by a group of Army and Gendarmerie officers, in collusion with some political leaders. Dissident Hutu members of the army and gendarmerie attacked the royal palace, but were eventually driven off by loyal troops under the command of Colonel Michel Micombero, Secretary of State for Defense. Hutu troops also attacked the home of Prime Minister Biha, who was critically wounded, while King Mwambutsa IV escaped to the borders of the Republic of the Congo. Forty rebels and ten loyalists were killed in the fighting, and fifty leaders of the revolt subsequently executed in October.

Participants: Members of the army and gendarmerie, mostly Hutu, led by Secretary of State for the Gendarmerie, Antoine Serukwavu.

Apparent Causes: The coup followed a period of political unrest, due to rivalry within the Government between the minority Watutsi and majority Bahutu tribes. There had been continued attempts by Mwami Mwamkutsa IV to transfer power from parliament to himself after Hutu members had gained a parliamentary majority for the first time since independence. Unrest had also followed the murder of the late Prime Minister, M. Pierre Ngendandumwe, in January 1965, and the general election in May 1965. The execution of the fifty Bahutu mutineers led to reprisals by Bahutu bands, who attacked Watutsi villages, killing and destroying property. Order was eventually restored on October
Participants: Ex-Lt. Ange Diawara, J.B. Ikoko, and sixteen members of the Army and PCT.

Apparent Causes: Not given, but there seemed to be a general feeling of insecurity since Diawara, who had led a coup attempt in February 1972, had not been arrested and was attempting to challenge the Ngouabi regime by organizing a resistance movement.


CONGO (ac)  484  03-18-77

Description: Congo radio reported that President Ngouabi was killed by a four-man "suicide squad" at his official residence, in an attempted coup. Power passed to an 11-man military committee, and on April 5 Col. Joachim Yombi-Opango was named the new President. The plotters were tried and executed.

Participants: Former Army Captain Berthelemy Rikadidi supposedly masterminded the assassination. He was arrested on April 12. On March 26, former President Massamba-Debat was executed for his alleged role, and on March 27, four soldiers and two civilians were executed by firing squad.

Apparent Causes: According to Keesings, those involved were opposed to the socialist revolution taking place within the country. Africa Research Bulletin said that President Ngouabi was very unpopular with the political left, having crushed a general strike and arrested union leaders the previous March. Poor industrial relations were compounded by tribal divisions within the country. But the specific reasons for the assassination were unknown.


CONGO (p)  484  08-14-78

Description: The President, Yhombi-Opanga, announced the discovery of a "vast plot against the internal security of the country and its revolutionary institutions." It was alleged that mercenary troops and military aircraft were to be used with the backing of several Western and African states.

Participants: Four people were named as the domestic "lackeys" of the plot (all had held office in the Youldou regime overthrown in 1963). Among them was an ex-mayor and Adjutant Chief of General Staff, Felix Mouzabakani.
Apparent Causes: Not given, but it may have been due to personal ambition in that the four men had been associated with attempted or plotted coups in the past and had also participated in previous governments.


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DJIBOUTI 522 Nothing Available

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA (ac) 411 04-05-69

Description: It was reported that a number of high-ranking political leaders had been arrested after an unsuccessful coup d'etat. Units of the National Guard blew up the Bata radio transmitter and occupied buildings housing the civilian government before they were overpowered by troops loyal to the President.

Participants: Senor Ndongo was the leader of the abortive coup. The other participants were not named.

Apparent Causes: The coup attempt was the result of Ndongo's unsuccessful efforts to stop the President from continuing the broadcasts that were inciting the people to attack whites. (There had been a dispute with Spain because Spanish troops occupied the airport and patrolled the streets).


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EQUATORIAL GUINEA (ac) 411 12-27-74

Description: Sir Nvono Nia (Charge d'Affaires in Madrid) admitted that "subversion" was being suppressed and that a number of persons had died after two unsuccessful coups.

Participants: Antonio Edhjo Eden (a member of the provincial council) and Sr. Marcos Mba Obiang (a police inspector) were both involved in the two coups.

Apparent Causes: Not Given

Source: Keesings (1975:26913)

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA (c) 411 08-03-79

Description: A national radio broadcast announced that the government of President Macias Nguema Masie had been overthrown in a bloodless military coup, and replaced by a "Revolutionary Military Council" led by Deputy Defence Minister Lt. Col. Teodoro
Nguema Mbasogo. The deposed President was captured after his body guards were overpowered. He and six former aides were tried by a "military and people's court" and were executed on Sept. 29. Five thousand political prisoners were released.

Participants: The Army led by Vice-Minister of Defense, Lt. Col. Teodoro Nguema Mbasogo (the President's nephew).

Apparent Causes: At his trial Masie was convicted of genocide, treason, and embezzlement of public funds. There were charges of the alleged impoverization of villages and the misery resulting from his "reign", as well as the charges of arbitrary arrests and murders for imaginary plots. His 11-year rule had been described as one of the most brutal in Africa.


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EQUATORIAL GUINEA (ac) 411 04-10-81

Description: It was announced by the government that an attempt to overthrow the President, Teodoro Obiang Nguema, was foiled by security forces. Many people were killed in the fighting. Many arrests (60-80) were made and a soldier was executed in June for his part in the coup attempt.

Participants: Many Army officers, some government Ministers, and many civilians.

Apparent Causes: Not given.


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EQUATORIAL GUINEA (p) 411 05-08-81

Description: Authorities arrested a large number of soldiers and civilians for allegedly plotting against President Teodoro Obiang Nguema.

Participants: No names given.

Apparent Causes: None given.


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ETHIOPIA (ac) 530 12-14-60

Description: While Emperor Haile Selassie was on a state visit to Brazil, his son, Crown Prince Asfa-Wossen, seized power, with the help of the Imperial Household Guard, after having occupied the radio station, air field, ministries etc. The new regime
dissolved Parliament and formed a new Government, with R. Imru as Premier. But the Army, Navy and Airforce did not support the rebels and fought to put down the revolt. On December 17 they captured Addis Ababa and seized the Imperial Guard. During the three-day battle 331 people were killed and 785 were wounded.

Participants: The Imperial Body Guard, led by Brig.Gen Mengistu Neway, (hanged December 26) and his brother Germame; the Crown Prince; Chief of Police Brig. Sige Dibu; Lt.Col. Gebenhayo, (hanged December 20); plus various younger elements in the army, government and police.

Apparent Causes: According to the Revolutionary Proclamation on national radio, "There has been no progress...A few self-centered persons...have chosen to indulge in selfishness and nepotism. The Ethiopian people hope to be freed from... ignorance, illiteracy and poverty." The proclamation promised land redistribution and freedom from oppression, poverty and ignorance, as well as the intention not to be left behind in development by the newly independent states of Africa.


ETHIOPIA (p) 530 11-28-66

Description: Police accused certain elements of conspiracy against the government, following an explosion in a cinema on Nov. 19th, 1966, in which 36 persons were injured.

Participants: Lieutenant Mammo Mezemir (who threw the grenade), General Taddesse Biru, General Darvit Abdi and some five others.

Apparent Causes: Not given.


ETHIOPIA (p) 530 11-27-69

Description: It was announced by the police that a plot against the government, led by General Takele Woldehawrial (70), an Italian - Abyssinian veteran, had been uncovered.

Participants: An army captain, two soldiers and six other people, all led by General Woldehawrial.

Apparent Causes: Not given.

**Description:** Lt.Gen. Abebe (Minister of Defence) said in a broadcast that "irresponsible elements" had sought to take over the government, but that the armed forces had foiled the plot.

**Participants:** Some extremist units of the police, army and air force.

**Apparent Causes:** Not given.

**Source:** Keesings (1974:26637).

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**Description:** Emperor Haile Selassie was deposed by the Armed Forces Coordinating Committee, (which had been in effective control of the country since June), and a Provisional Military Government established, under the leadership of Lt.Gen. Aman Michael Andom. Parliament was dissolved, the Constitution suspended, strikes and unauthorized demonstrations were banned, and plans to remove all effective power from the Monarchy announced. A dusk to dawn curfew was imposed and Army tanks took up strategic positions in the capital.

**Participants:** The Armed Forces, under Gen. Andom.

**Apparent Causes:** The move followed months of unrest, which had begun with an army mutiny over pay in Feb. and was followed by peasant revolts, student demonstrations, and the country's first general strike in March. The apparent callousness of the Government and Emperor over the death of 100,000 Ethiopians from drought-induced famine appears to have sparked the unrest. Also cited were the abuse of authority by the Emperor for the benefit of himself and his family; his inability to carry out the responsibilities of high office due to his age (82); the 1955 revised Constitution which gave absolute power to the Emperor; the feudal system which created economic difficulties; and the presence of an undemocratic parliament. The new regime promised land distribution, separation of church and state, free speech, and elections.


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**Description:** Arrests were made of those plotting against the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie.

**Participants:** Lt. Gen. Maru Ganed, General Teklu, and nineteen
civilians.

**Apparent Causes:** It was alleged that they wanted to free the ex-Emperor from arrest, that they were opposed to the Revolution, and that they were acting as agents of a foreign power.


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**ETHIOPIA (p) 530 11-24-74**

**Description:** The Provincial Military Government announced the execution of 60 men (31 civilians and 29 Military officers). It was reported that they were guilty of numerous crimes including plotting against the "popular movement of the people" and the armed forces.

**Participants:** Some 60 people, including Lt.Gen. Aman Andom (until then the leader of the Provisional Military Government).

**Apparent Causes:** Not given

Source: Keesings (1975:26883).

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**ETHIOPIA (p) 530 03-13-75**

**Description:** Some 100 rebels were arrested by troops for attempting to "disrupt the Ethiopian popular movement" and acts of terrorism. The ringleaders were tried, and executed on March 19.


**Apparent Causes:** Opposition to land reform among the Gallas (an ethnic group).

Sources: Keesings (1975:27255), Index to the N.Y. Times (1975:763).

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**ETHIOPIA (p) 530 04-27-75**

**Description:** The Provisional Military Council arrested twenty-two military officers and civilians for an alleged attempt the previous week to free the ex-Emperor and overthrow the military rulers.

**Participants:** Lt.Col. Negussie Haile (head of the security force), Capt. Debessu Beyene and 20 others.

**Apparent Causes:** Not given, except to free the ex-Emporer

Source: Keesings (1975:27255).
ETHIOPIA (p) 530 07-13-76

Description: Ethiopia radio announced that 18 military leaders and merchants had been executed for crimes ranging from plotting a coup against the government to economic sabotage, i.e., food hoarding.

Participants: Major Sisay Habte, the third highest ranking member of government, and Brig.Gen. Getachew Nadew, as well as some 16 others.

Apparent Causes: The executions came after months of reported dissension and division within the ruling Provisional Military Administrative Council. The plotters supposedly supported the former regime and were opposed to land reform. Gen. Nadew is also supposed to have resented government interference in measures to stamp out the Eritrean rebellion (he was Martial Law Administrator of the Province).


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ETHIOPIA (ac) 530 02-03-77

Description: It was announced that the Head of State, Brig.Gen. Teferi Benti, and some of his colleagues, had been killed in battle following their attempt to overthrow the revolution by means of a "fascist coup d'etat". Lt.Col. Mengistu Haile became the new Head of State and the "Derg" was formed.

Participants: Brig. Gen. Benti and his colleagues

Apparent Causes: Not given, but it would seem to be connected to the power struggle within the military junta.


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ETHIOPIA (p) 530 07-13-80

Description: Four military men were sentenced to death by a military court for allegedly conspiring with the CIA to overthrow the Marxist military government of Lt.Col. Menzistu Haile Mariam.

Participants: Lt.Col. Desta Tadesa, Lt.Col. Mokone Fikre, Dr. Desham Maketeh and Tesfae Tafara

Apparent Causes: None given, but ideological differences among the military may have been a cause.

GABON (ac) 481 02-18-64

Description: In a bloodless coup, the army seized the Presidential Palace and other public buildings and forced President Leon M'Ba to resign in favour of Jean-Hilaire Aubame, the opposition leader. A "Revolutionary Committee" comprising four junior officers was formed. However, less than twenty four hours after a request for help was sent to President de Gaulle, French troops arrived from Senegal and Congo (Brazzaville) and restored M'Ba to power. Nineteen Gabonese and two French soldiers were killed in the fighting.

Participants: The group of 150 troops of the 400 strong Gabonese Army was led by four junior officers with J.H. Aubame in charge. The coup attempt apparently had the backing, not only of much of the army, but also of the police, as well as the tacit approval of the Democratic and Social Union opposition party.

Apparent Causes: The reason for the coup was said to be the violation by M'Ba of an agreement with the French to let opposition candidates run in the Assembly elections. Since 1963 a virtual one party system had developed. Aubame had criticized M'Ba for being authoritarian, and had objected to the slow pace of Africanisation of the army and administration. Army discontent stemmed from low pay and the retention of French officers in command positions.


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GAMBIA (p) 420 10-27/31-80

Description: Cmdr. Mahoney was shot to death on Oct. 27th in an incident the government described as being the result of a personal dispute, but it was officially reported to be connected with an anti-government plot. Before the burial, the government called in Senegalese troops to forestall the revolt of the alleged plotters. Diplomatic relations were severed with Libya and two radical opposition movements banned, all within the one week stay of the Senegalese soldiers. It was therefore seen as an attempt to forestall a specific coup attempt.

Participants: Cmdr. Mahoney (from the description), Libya, and some members of Gambia's 300 - strong field force (Gambia has no army).

Apparent Causes: Not given.


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Description: A combination of some elements of the nation's only military group (the Field Forces) and an "obscure socialist group" seized power while President Jawara was in London for the Royal Wedding. They seized the radio station, suspended the Constitution, and formed a 12-member National Revolutionary Council. However, within twenty four hours airborne troops from Senegal entered Gambia and crushed the rebellion. 815 persons, including military personnel, were arrested for participation in the coup attempt.

Participants: Some 358 members of the Field Force, led by Mr. Sanyang. Some opposition party members and the USSR were implicated.

Apparent Causes: Economic difficulties were prominent. The Balance of Trade was bad, and groundnuts production (a main export earner) was low because of drought. There was also corruption, smuggling, profiteering and tribalism. The rebels claimed they wanted to promote "revolutionary socialism" and install a "dictatorship of the proletariat" and were acting against imperialism and neocolonialism.


GHANA (ac) 452 01-02-64

Description: A police constable tried unsuccessfully to assassinate Pres. Nkrumah. The President's security guard was injured. There were public demonstrations demanding the death of the assailants and allegations that the conspiracy dated back to pre-independence days and was the work of the capitalist class.

Participants: Supposedly Dr. Danquah and a host of opposition leaders, some of whom were in exile. On January 8th the Commissioner of Police, two deputy commissioners and a superintendent were dismissed. Two of these officers were detained, Commissioner S. Amaning and Superintendent M. Awuku.

Apparent Causes: Not given, but there seemed to be growing dissatisfaction among some groups with Nkrumah's policies. There had been bomb explosions, assassination attempts, the arrest of opposition leaders and many exiles. The coup attempt appears to have been a reaction to Nkrumah's increasingly socialist policies.

GHANA (c) 452 02-24-66

Description: President Nkrumah was replaced by an army and police coup while on a state visit to the Chinese Peoples' Republic and Hanoi, where he hoped to bring about an end to the Vietnam War. The army occupied key installations in Accra and other important towns and attacked the Presidential Guard. In all, 27 Ghanaians were killed in the operation. Ministers were dismissed, the Convection People's Party (CPP) declared illegal, Parliament dissolved, the Constitution suspended, and the release of all political prisoners promised. All faculty of the Nkrumah Ideological Institute were arrested. A 7-man National Liberation Council, composed of police and army officers, was established, with Maj.Gen. Ankrah (retired) as chairman. Dr. Nkrumah took up residence in Guinea.

Participants: Two brigades of the army (about three thousand men), led by Col. Emmanuel Kwashie, Col.F.K Kotoka and T.W.K Harley (commander of the police).

Apparent Causes: The army alleged that Nkrumah's dictatorial and "capricious" handling of the country's economic affairs, coupled with government waste and extravagance, had resulted in the economic deterioration of the country. It was claimed that the National Income had increased by 3% a year while the cost of living had increased by 56% On Feb. 24th the new regime announced, "...this act has been necessitated by the political and economic situation within the country. The concentration of power in the hands of one man has led to the abuse of individual rights and duties. He... runs the country as his own personal property."


GHANA (p) 452 01-08-67

Description: A Sergeant with military intelligence was sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment by a military court for failing to report knowledge of plots to overthrow the government and to assassinate members of the National Liberation Council.

Participants: Certain unnamed plotters and Sergent Berkoh.

Apparent Causes: Not given.


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GHANA (p) 452 01-23-67

Description: The NLC announced that it had uncovered a plot to overthrow it and assassinate its members. On May 29th four plotters were given long prison terms for their crimes.

Participants: Former graduates of Nkrumah's Ideological Institute (a Nigerian and a Ghanaian); an administrative officer and two Army lieutenants, A. Owusu-Gyimah and A. Sulemana. The officers were arrested.

Apparent Causes: To return Nkrumah to power.


GHANA (ac) 452 04-17-67

Description: Gen. Ankrah reported that a plan to assassinate all senior officers on April 17th had been crushed. About 120 members of the Army Reconnaissance Regiment on training manoeuvres attacked the Presidential Castle, government offices, and succeeded in occupying the radio station, but were later overwhelmed by loyal troops. Many lives were lost in the fighting, including those of Gen. Kotoka and two other government officers, but Head of State Gen. Ankra was unhurt. The coup leaders were jailed and 20 mutineers disarmed. After trial the ring leaders were executed on May 9th. The Reconnaissance Regiment was disbanded also.

Participants: 120 members of the Reconnaissance Regiment commanded by Lt. Sam Arthur. An additional squadron was also said to be involved. Lts. Arthur and Yeboah were tried, found guilty, and hanged. A third junior officer was sentenced to 20 years in prison.

Apparent Causes: There were rumours that the rebels were linked to ex-President Nkrumah, but this was denied by Lt.Gen. Ankrah, the National Liberation Committee chairman. There may possibly have been divisions within the army between junior and senior officers, as this had been described as a junior officers' coup attempt. The junior officers were said to be dissatisfied with lack of promotion.


GHANA (p) 452 11-19-68

Description: It was announced that Air-Marshall M. A. Otu (General Officer Commanding the Armed Forces) had been relieved of his command on November 19th for alleged complicity in plots to
overthrow the government. Lt. Kwapong was placed under arrest for the same reasons. It was alleged that they were working with Nkrumah supporters in London.

Participants: Otu and Kwapong.

Apparent Causes: Not given, but thought to be the restoration of Kwame Nkrumah to power.


GHANA (c) 452 01-13-72

Description: While P.M. Kofi Busia was in London for medical treatment, Ghana radio announced that a group of army officers had seized power in a bloodless coup. The Army seized Broadcasting House, the International Airport, Commercial Banks and the External Communications Department. The Government was placed in the hands of a National Redemption Council, headed by Col. I. K. Acheampong and comprising five other army officers, heads of the navy and air force, and a police inspector general. The Constitution was suspended, Parliament dissolved, and a ban placed on all political parties. However, the Trades Union Congress (TUC) was restored. Leading members of the deposed government were placed in "protective custody".

Participants: Army officers led by Col. Acheampong, commander of the 1st Infantry Brigade.

Apparent Causes: Deposed P.M. Busia said that the coup stemmed from unhappiness among army officers over the loss of some privileges. It was alleged that Busia dismissed many Army and Police officers and reduced the fringe benefits the Army had been receiving. He also banned the TUC and dismissed about 1,000 civil servants. The army alleged economic mismanagement, arbitrary dismissals, victimisation of military and police personnel, currency devaluation and a 5% development levy on all salaries for civilian administrators. The country's economic situation was almost certainly the main reason for the coup. In an effort to reduce the huge national debt, inherited from the Nkrumah regime, Busia had introduced austerity measures in December 1971 which included a 44% devaluation of the Cedi and cuts in military expenditures. The devaluation was cancelled by Acheampong in March.

description: The leaders of the new military government crushed an alleged plot to reinstate deposed P.M. Busia by jailing 3 alleged plotters.

Participants: Lt. Gen. Afrifa, who headed Ghana's last military government, was the only one named.

Parent Causes: None given

Source: Index to the N.Y. Times (1972:814).

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description: The government announced (July 16th) that disgruntled businessmen and leaders of the dissolved Progress Party, with the cooperation of Dr. Busia, had "attempted" to overthrow the government on July 14th. The intention was to detain and assassinate all the NRC members, all Commissioners and 11 officers above the rank of Captain and effect a wholesale promotion of other ranks.

Participants: Five soldiers and three civilians were tried by a military tribunal and sentenced to death.

Parent Causes: To reinstate Dr. Busia, who was overthrown by the military regime. The plotters intended to hold power for two weeks and then to turn the government over to Dr. Busia.


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description: Eight Ghanaians were condemned to death by a military tribunal, convicted on charges of subversion.

Participants: Five of the eight were soldiers in the Ghanaian army, but no names were given.

Parent Causes: The plotters were alleged to have planned to overthrow the NRC and to restore Dr. Busia to power.


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description: Eight people, including two retired and four serving soldiers, went on trial in Accra on May 19, 1976. They
were accused of plotting a coup against Gen. Acheampong in December 1975 by subverting junior ranks in the Army. The plotters had apparently amassed an arsenal of 3,000 rounds of ammunition and 39 grenades, which had not yet been found. They were convicted and sentenced to death on July 29, 1976.

Participants: The plot leader was named as retired Brig. Lphonse Kattah. Also named were Cpl. Kwaslinga, Staff Sgt. mereka, Capt. Banini, Capt. Tsikata, former Lt. Latzoo, Warrant officer Nyantepeh and Francis Agboada, a businessman.

Possible Causes: None given.


HANA (p) 452 02-25-76

Description: Three people were arrested in connection with a suspected coup against the government of Gen. Acheampong.

Participants: Professor Awoonor (later released), Col. Anthony elormey and Col. Kodwo Agbo. By August, five people had been sentenced to death.

Possible Causes: None given.

Source: Index to the N.Y. Times (1976:602).

HANA (p) 452 05-19-76

Description: It was reported by The Times of London on June 16, 1976 that Lt. Col. Minyila (Director of Logistics) together with a politician and a businessman had been arrested following an attempt in May 1976 to take over Broadcasting House in Accra as part of a plot to overthrow the government of Gen. Acheampong.

Participants: Lt. Col. Minyila and Mr. Quarshie.

Possible Causes: None given.

Sources: Keesings Contemporary Archives (1977:28468), FBIS May 0, 1976.

HANA (c) 452 07-05-78

Description: General Acheampong was forced to sign a letter of resignation after his bodyguard was lured away and disarmed by members of the Supreme Military Council. The action was sequel to the pressure of junior officers and it was said to be aimed at
KRIA (p)  450  05-24-81

caption: The government announced the arrest of 15 N.C.O.s
private soldiers on charges of threatening to overthrow the
ernment (People's Redemption Council) while President Doe was
y in Freetown, Sierra Leone at an ECOWAS meeting. Thirteen
ple were executed on June 19th after a military trial on June

ticipants: Fifteen N.C.O.s and private soldiers.
arent Causes: None given.
31:6082), FBIS May 25, 1981, Time Magazine September 14, 1981,
ex to the N. Y. Times (1981:609).

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KRIA (p)  450  08-09-81

caption: Five members of the PRC were arrested and executed
Aug. 14, 1981 for allegedly attempting to overthrow the
ernment. Pres. Doe charged that there had been an attempt to
assinate him and three other leading PRC members.

ticipants: Maj.Gen Thomas Syen (ousted deputy head of the
ernment), and former Council members Cols. Harris Johnson,
on Toe, Robert Sumo and Maj. Henry Zuo.
arent Causes: Government authorities blamed it on the
filtration of foreign ideologies into Liberian society."ever, there were signs of a power struggle within the PRC.
e of the officers had warned against deviating from a policy
"non-alignment" and playing a surrogate role to the United
tes. Some officers in the PRC also reacted unfavorably to the
ure of the Libyan "Peoples Bureau" and the expulsion of some
iet diplomats in May. It was alleged that General Syen was a
g-time personal rival of Sergeant Doe as the second most
erful man in the ruling junta. Syen favored the Libyans.
rces: Keesings (1982:31281), Index to the N.Y. Times

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AGASCAR (p)  580  06-01-71

caption: Arrests of the Second Vice-President, two members
the ruling Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the Chief of the
urity Forces were made following accusations of collaborating
h a foreign power to overthrow the government.

ticipants: Major Hasse, Mr. Andre Resampe.
Participants: NCOs led by Master Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe.

Recent Causes: The former regime was charged with "rampant corruption," treason and violation of human and constitutional rights. Doe also stated that the coup was necessary because the b Bert Government had failed to respond to the needs of the N Nes. This was presumably a reference to economic conditions; lowering the coup the minimum wage was increased from $200 to 0 a month for both soldiers and civilians. The new Doe government promised a society based on justice and human dignity.


BRIA (p) 450 05-14-80

Description: Brig. Gen. Quiwonkpa announced on May 18 that six government ministers and newly-promoted high-ranking army officers had been arrested on May 14 for planning a countercoup against the Doe government. The plotters were subsequently given one year jail terms.

Participants: Major Douglas, the new Minister of Commerce, General Kolako, the Airforce Commander, Colonel Arthur Bedell and several other officers.

Recent Causes: The extravagant behaviour of some members of P.R.C, "over-enthusiastic" demonstrations by members of the ethnic group, and cases of corruption by the new military government.


BRIA (p) 450 07-11-80

Description: It was announced on July 11th that the trial had begun of nine army officers accused of treason for plotting to overthrow the new military government.

Participants: General Rudolph and eight others.

Recent Causes: None given.

Sources: Africa Research Bulletin (1980:5745), FBIS July 12, 0.
parent Causes: A contagion effect could be imputed. The
lonel had apparently approached other officers with the plan,
ying that if the 250-strong Togolese army could kill Olymio
d overthrow his government, the 5,000-strong Liberian army
uld certainly overthrow Tubman.

urces: Index to the N.Y. Times (1963:469), Keesings
ntemporary Archives (1963:19265), Africa Research Bulletin
64:41).

BERIA (p) 450 10-11-66

gcription: The President announced the discovery of a plot
thin the army to overthrow his government while he was on a
it to Switzerland in September. It was alleged that the
tempt was instigated by a neighboring country for 30,000 pounds
ling.

ticipants: Allegedly Guinea, and some Liberian Army units.

parent Causes: Not given


BERIA (p) 450 01-22-73

gcription: There was an alleged plot to kill President Tolbert
id his brothers and to overthrow his government. The plan would
ve been carried out during his inspection of the Anglo-French
liner Concorde. Three "conspirators" (two military officers
id one civilian) were arrested and sentenced to death by

rticipants: Mr. Prince N. A. Brown (a former Government
ister) and Lt.Cols. Moses Kpadeh and William Saydeee.

parent Causes: Not known.

letin (1973:2860,2887,2920).

BERIA (c) 450 04-12-80

gcription: In a pre-dawn coup staged by junior army officers,
es. Tolbert was killed and replaced as head of state by Sgt.
uel K. Doe. The "People's Redemption Council" named by Doe
following day contained 15 ministers, five of whom were army
icers. A dusk-to-dawn curfew was imposed, the airports
osed, all political prisoners released and the Constitution
pended. On April 22, 13 ministers and other top officials
m the deposed government were executed by firing squad.
**ENYA (ac) 501 08-01-82**

**Description:** Junior officers and ranks from the Kenya Airforce seized the radio station in Nairobi but were later overpowered by royal army and police units, who regained control. There was fighting in Nairobi and also at the airforce base at Embakasi outside Nairobi. While in control of the radio station the rebels, calling themselves the "National Redemption Council", announced the overthrow of the government, the suspension of the constitution and a 24-hour curfew and told the police to stay at home. Between 129 and 300 persons were reported killed in the fighting. More than 3,000 persons, including the entire airforce, were arrested, although the coup leaders were still at large. President Moi described the coup attempt as "a serious form of hooliganism by misguided youth."

**Participants:** About 200 members of the Kenya Airforce led by senior Private Hezekiah Ochuka and Senior Sergeant Pancras Oteyo, both of whom fled to Tanzania. The former head of the Kenya police, Mr. Ben Gethi, and several senior officers were arrested.

**Apparent Causes:** It was alleged that President Moi's administration was corrupt and dictatorial. Months of dissent allowed the coup attempt, with some universities being closed. According to the New York Times rapid population growth, inadequate food supplies, and the need for land reform were factors behind the uprising. There appeared to be much popular support for the coup attempt; widespread damage caused by looting was said to have cost millions of pounds.


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**LESOTHO 570 Nothing to Report**

**LIBERIA (p) 450 02-05-63**

**Description:** It was announced officially that a plot to assassinate Pres. Tubman and overthrow his government had been discovered. Five people were arrested, including an army colonel.

**Participants:** Attorney Gen. Kessou, internal security chief, was busted after the plot discovery. The army colonel was named as David Y. Thompson (commander of the Liberian army). At most, five persons seem to have been involved. In March 1964 Thompson was sentenced to ten years' hard labor.
IVORY COAST (p) 437 04-28-80

Description: A police Lieutenant, Oulai Zoumana, was arrested for plotting to carry out a coup scheduled for May 10th. The arrest was made while the President was out of the country at an OAU meeting in Nigeria. About 100 other persons were arrested.

Participants: Only Zoumana was named.

Apparent Causes: None given.


KENYA (p) 501 06-08-71

Description: Some conspirators were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment on June 8 for plotting to overthrow the government. The plot was discovered when one of the conspirators went to Tanzania in search of funds and was turned over to the Kenya police. Gen. Ndolo (Chief of Defense Staff) was dismissed on June 24, 1971 for his alleged connection to the plot.

Participants: Some twelve people, including Gen. Ndolo.

Apparent Causes: Not given, but it was stated that during the trial one M. Mutiso alleged that Gen. Ndolo claimed to admire Pres. Kenyatta, but that he found his government "intolerable."


KENYA (p) 501 11-?-78

Description: An alleged conspiracy aimed at the assassination of Arap Moi after the death of President Kenyatta was reported. The aim was to stop his accession to the Presidency and was to be carried out by a detachment of the paramilitary Stock Control Unit of the police force based at Nakuru. It failed partly because President Kenyatta died in Mombassa instead of in Nakuru. The leader of the plot, a police officer, escaped from the country before he could be arrested.

Participants: A unit of the police force led by Mr. James Mungai (a senior assistant police commissioner).

Apparent Causes: To stop the accession to power of Mr. Arap Moi.

Description: General Joao Vieira announced the discovery of a plot to overthrow him, the Dakar daily Le Soleil reported. A former Health Minister, a Deputy Police Chief, and an ex-Ambassador were arrested for "counter-revolutionary" activities. No details of the precise nature of the plot were given.

Participants: The three were named as Joao da Costa, Major Leopoldo Alfama and Honorio Fonseca.

Apparent Causes: da Costa was described as "an extreme left-winger". In May a government shuffle had purged left-wing elements and increased the concentration of power in Vieira's hands. This may have been the motivation for the plot.


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<th>IVORY COAST (p)</th>
<th>437</th>
<th>01-09-63</th>
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Description: The Government announced the discovery of "an extreme left-wing plot" to overthrow the President. One hundred people were arrested including an army captain, a gendarmerie officer and two French citizens. A bill was introduced and passed in the National Assembly establishing a Special State Security Court which legitimized extensive search, preventive detention and the holding of suspects in police custody for up to two months.

Participants: 100 people led by Capt. Anaky, three ministers and seven deputies.

Apparent Causes: The plotters wanted to establish a Communist party which the state had declared to be illegal.

Source: Keesings (1963:19267).


table:

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<th>IVORY COAST (p)</th>
<th>437</th>
<th>06-28-73</th>
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Description: The President announced on June 28th that five army captains and seven lieutenants had been plotting for three years to overthrow him on August 7th. The plot was discovered because the leader had killed five foreign fishermen as human sacrifice to ensure the success of the plot. Evidence and documents had therefore been revealed during investigation into the fishermen's deaths. Many arrests were made and seven officers were sentenced to death in the trial of July 26, 1973.

Participation: Twelve army officers, led by Capt. Koulahou.

Apparent Causes: Not given.

Sources: Keesings (1973:26005), Africa Research Bulletin
Description: Pres. Luis Cabral was overthrown, and placed under house arrest, in a coup organized by P.M. Joao Vieira. Troops loyal to Vieira took up positions, occupied the Radio Station and imposed a curfew. Two senior officers were killed in the fighting. The overthrow took place while many senior officers were in the capital of Cape Verde for a meeting and while the Interior Minister and Chief of Police were out of the country. A Council of the Revolution was formed, composed of 6 army officers and 3 civilians, with Maj. Vieira as President, and Foreign Minister Victor Maria as Vice-President.

Participants: Some Black Military officers led by Maj. Vieira.

Apparent Causes: A new Constitution which extended the power of the President was the immediate catalyst. However, there had also been shortages of food staples, as well as the continued domination of blacks in the government and party echelons by the mesticos (half-castes) such as Cabral and the two slain officers. Related to this was the proposed union with Cape Verde. The distant Cape Verdians being of Mestico stock, Guinea Bissau's blacks preferred closer ties with their identical ethnic groups in Guinea or Senegal. The new government was composed entirely of Guineans opposed to the plans for union with Cape Verde. Vieira stated that the reason for the coup was Cabral's execution of 500 political prisoners during his six-year rule.


Description: A tank commander was killed while the President was out of the country on an official visit to Cuba. Some sources said that the President's opponents tried to stage a coup while other sources called it "a minor problem between the military." Nevertheless, the President returned home immediately and a number of military officers were subsequently arrested.

Participants: Some military men.

Apparent Causes: Continued food shortages and economic stagnation as evidenced by frequent electric service outages.

Description: The President announced the "forcible retirement" of Gen. Keita Koumandian (Chief of Defence Staff) and his later arrest, along with two other army officers, on charges of high treason. There had been a general air and announcements of plots and threats of invasion, as well as the breaking off of diplomatic relations with some countries, since March. Four days later eight army officers, Gen. Koumandian included, were sentenced to death for treason.

Participants: Gen. Keita and seven other army officers.

Apparent Causes: Not given.


Description: It was announced in Guinea that some "foreign infiltrators" had been arrested and that a "Fifth Column" existed within the army and among civilians and students. The announcement came in the wake of continuous allegations of plots, threats of invasion and threats of assassination of the President. Many arrests were made.

Participants: Some units of the army, civilians, students and some foreigners.

Apparent Causes: Not given, but there had been a constant air of insecurity.


Description: The discovery of an attempt to assassinate the President on May 13 by six members of the Militia of the ruling party (PDG) was announced. It was to be part of a scheme involving the invasion of Guinea by Guinean exiles from Senegal and the Ivory Coast. Many arrests were made and many foreign countries said to be implicated in the plot.

Participants: Four members of the Militia (including the commander in Conakry), Mr. Diallo Telli (Minister of Justice), Sekou Toulo (former ambassador to Algeria), Capt. Lamine Kouvate, Lt. Assane Diallo and Mr. David Camara.

Apparent Causes: Not Given
Diaby. Thirteen persons were sentenced to death and the Army was purged and reorganized.

**Participants:** Col. Kaman Diaby, Mr. Fodeba Keita (a minister), other officers and a unit of the Parachute Company of the Army.

**Apparent Causes:** Not specifically stated, but foreign intervention was implied because it was stated that Col. Keita had been in contact with imperialists (France) and had been told since October 31, 1958, to infiltrate the Guinean army in order to "fulfil a task compatible with French interests."


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**GUINEA (ac) 438 11-22-70**

**Description:** It was announced that mercenaries from neighboring states, particularly Portuguese Guinea, had invaded Guinea. The invasion lasted for six days. The invaders failed, but were able to capture Camayeme prison and release the political prisoners, including Col. Kaman Diaby (leader of the March, 1969 plot). However, another source (Jeune Afrique Dec. 1st) claimed that the raid was planned and carried out by exiled Guinean army officers and not by the Portuguese.

**Participants:** Some 150-200 mercenaries or exiled Guinean army officers. Reports of the trial two years later however, indicated that some high-ranking army officers had also been arrested.

**Apparent Causes:** "To Liberate Guinea from Sekou Toure's dictatorship"


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**GUINEA (p) 438 06-24-71**

**Description:** Many arrests were made of Army officers and certain civilians for being fifth-column agents and for plotting against the state.

**Participants:** Unnamed civilians and Army officers. France, West Germany and the United States were accused of being behind the plot.

**Apparent Causes:** Not given, except for the workings of international imperialism.


GUINEA (p) 438 10-02-65

Description: The government announced the discovery of a "counter-revolutionary" plot to overthrow it. Beginning on October 2nd, a soldier was to arrest the President and threaten to shoot him if he tried to escape, while an incited crowd would demand his resignation during a public meeting. Failing this, a grenade attack on the Presidential car would take place on October 9. If this too failed, a mass demonstration would take place on October 17, giving the army a pretext for seizing power.

Participants: France (diplomatic relations were broken because of it), Ivory Coast, Niger and Upper Volta (the Council of the Entente countries) and deposed Congolese Prime Minister Moise Tshombe were charged with involvement. The local leader of the plot was said to be Mamadou Toure (no relation to the President). Many arrests were made, including that of an Army major, Keita Mamadou.

Apparent Causes: Not given, but it was said to be the latest in a series of French plots since 1958.


GUINEA (p) 438 02-26-69

Description: A Special Military Court stated in March that a conspiracy existed to overthrow the government of President Sekou Toure. Three military men were arrested on February 26, 1969 after trying to seize an aircraft carrying them to Conakry for trial.

Participants: At least three Guinean military men and allegedly France and certain African states.

Apparent Causes: Not given, but possible subversion by conservative OCAM African states.


GUINEA (p) 438 03-10-69

Description: It was claimed that a parachute company of the Army at Labe (180 miles from Conakry) had planned to assassinate President Toure on March 10th and overthrow his government. The President revealed on March 18th that many arrests had been made, including that of Army Deputy Chief of Staff, Colonel Kaman.
support from the Air force and 5th Battalion they fought and defeated the loyal 1st and 2nd Infantry Brigades. They then stormed Broadcasting House, overwhelmed the police guard, and overthrew the civilian administration. The Constitution was suspended, all political parties banned, and Pres. Limann placed under house arrest. A Provisional National Defense Council was formed with Flt. Lt. Rawlings as Chairman. Although he named a cabinet containing ten civilians, Flt. Lt. Rawlings announced that he had no intention of handing over power. Rawlings also said "I am not here to impose myself on this country." On January 6, 1982 it was announced that members of the ousted government would be tried by "People's Tribunals" for crimes against the people.

Participants: Lt. Rawlings, a group of ex-soldiers and some divisions of the army.

Apparent Causes: Rawlings accused Pres. Limann of taking the country "down to total economic ruin," and called his regime "repressive." A revolution was necessary, he felt, in order to effect the social and economic transformation of Ghana. In a radio broadcast, Rawlings said that the main reason for taking control again was to eradicate corruption and establish a democracy. He said that democracy is not just "abstract liberties; it involves, above all, food, clothing, shelter...the basic necessities of life." The failure of the Limann administration to combat corruption and the marked deterioration of the country's economy provoked the action.


GHANA (ac) 452 11-24-82

Description: The head of Ghana's military Government announced that an attempted coup had been crushed. Flight Lt. Jerry Rawlings announced on Accra radio that "loyal troops" had put down a rebellion led by "misguided individuals". A dusk-to-dawn curfew was imposed, the nation's borders closed and Accra Airport shut down. Shooting had apparently broken out at the Burma Army Barracks the previous day, but the uprising was apparently suppressed before it could spread to the city. There was no information on casualties.

Participants: The coup attempt was apparently mounted by soldiers loyal to Sgt. Alolga Akate-Pore, a member of the Provisional National Defense Council. Akate-Pore's bodyguard was seized, but he himself was not arrested. Some civilians were also said to be involved.

Apparent Causes: Not given, although the move followed the abrupt resignation the previous day of the Deputy Head of State and Army Chief of Staff, Brig. Gen. Joseph Nunoo-Mensah.
officers, including Gen. Acheampong, were subsequently executed by firing squad on July 16th for their alleged corruption while in office.

Participants: Maj. Mensah, Lt. Rawlings, and junior air force officers and ranks.

Apparent Causes: The insurgents charged that their aim was to redeem the "sunken reputation" of the Army and to "secure justice for those...who have suffered far too long" and to conduct a "house-cleaning" or "purging" exercise against maladministration and corruption. Some Lebanese and Syrians were arrested because it was claimed that they were spoiling the economy. The country's economic situation was probably the major reason for the coup. A drastic devaluation of the currency had produced rampant inflation.


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GHANA (p) 452 03-?-80

Description: Eight junior officers and soldiers and a civilian suspected of planning a coup were arrested at the end of March, 1980.

Participants: Eight junior officers and ranks.

Apparent Causes: Not given.


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GHANA (p) 452 05-12-80

Description: About twenty military men alleged to have been involved in a rebellion were arrested on May 12th.

Participants: Twenty unnamed military.

Apparent Causes: Not given.


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GHANA (c) 452 12-31-81

Description: Flt. Lt. Jerry Rawlings again assumed control of the Government. A group of ex-soldiers, trained in Libya and the USSR, seized three armoured cars, overpowered the guards at the Reconnaissance Regiment and took the armoury. After receiving
preventing a violent coup. New economic and political initiatives were announced. General Akuffo took over the reigns of government.

Participants: Senior officers in the Supreme Military Council.

Apparent Causes: Economic difficulties and the controversy surrounding the "Union Government" proposal of General Acheampong.


GHANA (ac) 452 05-15-79

Description: A "handful" of junior officers using armoured personnel carriers and led by Flt. Lt. Jerry Rawlings of the Airforce held a number of hostages at three locations in Accra but were defeated with a minimum of force after an exchange of fire with loyal troops. Apparently it was intended to provoke a mutiny in the Army and thereby overthrow the regime. The government called the incident a mutiny, but the officers were charged with attempting the violent overthrow of lawful authority. One airman was killed.

Participants: About sixty Airforce men led by Flt. Lt. Rawlings.

Apparent Causes: To protest the country's poor economic situation, which was blamed on Syrians and Lebanese in Ghana, and the widespread personal corruption in high places. The rebels also charged that Gen. Acheampong and other corrupt officers had not been prosecuted. They further claimed that the military should not hand over power to civilians on unaccountable terms (i.e. they wanted to maintain the reputation of the army) and that the military should continue to rule for two more years, thereby demonstrating its ability to govern.


GHANA (c) 452 06-04-79

Description: The military regime of Lt. Gen. Akuffo was ousted by rebel air force officers, under the command of Maj. Opoku Mensah. They overcame resistance from senior officers and freed Lt. Jerry Rawlings from prison. During fighting between rebels and loyal troops the rebels took the Broadcasting House and Army Headquarters and "government" resistance gave up. Thirteen people were killed in the fighting. An Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) was formed with Flt. Lt. Rawlings as chairman, and elections set for two weeks hence, once a thorough "house-cleaning" had been accomplished. Eight high-ranking army
Description: President Tsiranana announced the dissolution of his government and turned full power over to General Ramanantsoa, Army Chief of Staff. Ramanantsoa pledged action on economic and social matters. On May 27th he appointed a Government of four military officers and six civilians.

Participants: General Ramanantsoa.

Apparent Causes: The move followed six days of anti-government riots, strikes and demonstrations, which began when students demanded an end to the French-oriented curriculum at Tananarive University in favor of more emphasis on Madagascan culture. The students were joined by labor groups, demanding satisfaction of economic grievances.

Sources: Index to the N. Y. Times (1972:1205), FBIS May 18, 1972.

Description: A mutiny led by Col. Rajaonarison and described as a "rightist" plot was supported by the Malagasy Socialist Party (PSM). The PSM proposed that the Head of State should surrender power on 25th Jan. 1975. He did so on Feb. 5, 1975 and handed over power to Gen. Ramanantsoa.

Participants: Colonel Brechard Rajaonarison and some mutineers, as well as the Malagasy Socialist Party.

Apparent Causes: None given.

Sources: Keesings (1975:26987), Index to the N.Y. Times (1975:1309).

Description: Maj. Gen. Ramanantsoa dissolved the government and handed over full executive powers to Lt. Col. Ratsimandrava. A new military council was formed under Gen. Andriamahazo, and on June 15, Didier Ratsiraka was named Revolutionary Council head and President.

Apparent Causes: The move was apparently due to new unrest caused by long-standing ethnic differences between the coastal people and those living on the plains.

Source: Index to the N.Y. Times (1975:1309).

MADAGASCAR (ac) 580 02-11-75

Description: The newly appointed Head of State, Col. Ratsimandrava (in power since February 5) was shot and killed in an ambush of his car by a police mobile group which then took refuge with the mutinous camp of Colonel Rajaonarison. General Andriamahazo took over the government and used loyal troops to attack the rebel camp on February 13, 1975. The headquarters of the PSM was attacked and its officers arrested. Many other arrests were also made. Martial Law was proclaimed, and a National Military Directing Committee of nineteen officers was formed.

Participants: Mobile police units and members of the PSM under the leadership of Col. Rajaonarison.

Apparent Causes: Ethnic factors may have played a part, as the assassins were of "coastal" origin, while Col. Ratsimandrava was of the Merina ethnic group. Also, a number of officers from the group had been purged by the Ramanantsoa government at the end of January after an attempted coup.


MADAGASCAR (p) 580 01-24-82

Description: It was announced that some officers and priests had been arrested, following the discovery of a plot to overthrow the government. The Reverend Richard Andriananjato of the Supreme Revolutionary Council (CSR) announced that "According to the plot discovered within the last few days, the current regime was to be overthrown, and President Didier Ratsiraka and some of his colleagues...were to be killed." Four warships were sighted off the north-west coast and MIG fighters of the Malagasy Armed Forces had to be used to chase them away. Andriananjato also said that the plot entailed "the scattering of mercenaries in the country to contact Malagasy nationals."

Participants: Unnamed officers and priests.

Apparent Causes: None given.

Description: A former Cabinet Minister and a former Police Officer went on trial in Blantyre, accused of having prepared, endeavoured or conspired to overthrow the Government by force or other unlawful means. Both pleaded not guilty.

Participants: Mr. Albert Ngumayo and Mr. Focus Gwede.

Apparent Causes: Not given.


Description: Radio Mali announced that Pres. Keita had been overthrown in a bloodless coup by young army officers. A National Liberation Committee (NLC), led by Lt. Moussa Traore, took over the country and jailed Pres. Keita. Also arrested were Seydou Koyate (a former minister), other ministers including the Prime Minister, several labour leaders, and officers opposed to the takeover. The "People's Militia" was supposedly "knocked out". The NLC claimed to have put an end to "Mobido Keita's dictatorial regime", and to have taken over all political and administrative functions. A curfew and ban on all meetings larger that three persons were imposed. The leader of the new regime, Capt. Diakite, announced that a referendum on a new constitution would be held early in 1969, to be followed by National Assembly and Presidential elections.

Participants: Lt. Moussa Traore and Capts. Malik Diallo, Charles Sissoko and Mamadou Sissoko, and sections of the Army.

Apparent Causes: The economic situation appeared to be the main reason. According to Moussa Traore "the state has been living far beyond its means" and the "demagogic and sterile radicalism" of the Keita regime had frightened away foreign investors. Unrest had been festering since January, when Pres. Keita dissolved the National Assembly and took full powers because of the deputies' hostility towards his austerity measures. By such actions Keita was said to have violated "basic democratic principles and individual freedom." More remote causes included corruption, an unstable currency, a bad harvest in 1968, and also some political conflicts in the single party. These conflicts were generational and ideological, between dogmatic young and pragmatic oldsters.

MALI (p) 432 08-12/13-69

Description: Forces loyal to the National Liberation Council foiled a plot allegedly aimed at restoring ex-President Mobido Keita to power. On Dec. 14, 1969, 25 military men accused of being involved in the attempt were sentenced to various prison terms.

Participants: Twenty-five to thirty-three military men, among whom were six officers led by Capts. Dibi Sillas Diarra, Alassare Diarra and Sergeant Traore.

Apparent Causes: The NLC had not kept its promise to return the country to constitutional government in 1969. Sources speculated that it was a plot to return former President Mobido Keita to power and that the plotters were "inspired by personal and inordinate ambitions."


MALI (p) 432 04-08-71

Description: Captain Yovo Diakite (Vice-President and Minister of the Interior, Security and Defense until Nov. 1970) was accused of organizing a plot discovered a month earlier. He was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labour on July 31, 1972.

Participants: Also charged with Captain Diakite were former captain Malik Diallo (Commissioner of Information) and a Sergeant Major. A fourth soldier and a civilian received 5-year prison terms.

Apparent Causes: Not given, but all the accused denied the charges. Frustration could be implied, because it was stated that they failed to have their "anti-national, anti-African, and retrogressive position" accepted by the Government (CMLN) and the Army. Personal vendetta could be imputed because a number of the officers had been relieved of their Cabinet posts.


MALI (p) 432 02-28-78

Description: The government announced the arrest of three ministers (former Lt. Cols) for "high treason, the spreading of state secrets, lies and speculation." On March 13, it was also announced that additional arrests had been made in connection with the ministers' conspiracy. The plotters were said to have planned to kill President Traore and to replace him with Foreign Minister Col. Cissoko. Thirty officers were arrested.
Participants: Leaders of the plot were Defense Minister, Col. Doukara, Security Services Minister, Col. Bagayoko, and Foreign Minister, Col. Cissoko. Also arrested after the three ministers were the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Gendarmerie, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Airforce, as well as other officers in the Army, Police and Airforce.

Apparent Causes: To eradicate factionalism. It was alleged that the arrested ministers constituted a pro-Soviet faction within the government.


MALI (p) 432 01-01-81
Description: About fifteen Police Officers were arrested after the discovery of a plot to overthrow the government. It was alleged that the plotters were about to go into action when they were discovered. Arrests were made and the leader of the group, Salif Mangara (a Gendarme), was sentenced to three years in jail on March 18th.

Participants: Fifteen Police Officers led by Salif Mangara. However, at least sixty persons were interrogated by the authorities.

Apparent Causes: Not given.


MAURITANIA (p) 435 05-02-62
Description: Three soldiers were executed and twenty-one other persons jailed for their role in a plot allegedly directed from Morocco. The plotters were based in Mali.

Participants: No names were given but Radio Mauritania said that "three persons sentenced to death by the Special Criminal Court for their part in the Nema outrage and for acts against the external security of the state were shot near Nouakchott."

Apparent Causes: None given, but foreign subversion is a possibility.

MAURITANIA (c) 435 07-10-78

Description: The government of President Ould Daddah was overthrown in a bloodless military coup led by Lt. Col. Mustapha Salek, army Chief of Staff. A military communique said that the President had been arrested before dawn "in the utmost calm and without bloodshed." A Military Committee for National Recovery was formed, which suspended the Constitution and dissolved the Government, National Assembly and Mauritanian People's Party (PPM). Pres. Daddah and his ministers were placed under house arrest. A curfew was imposed in the capital and the airport closed. The Military Committee later formed a new sixteen-man government of eight soldiers and eight civilians.

Participants: The Army, led by Lt. Col. Mustapha Ould Salek.

Apparent Causes: The army stated that the seizure of power was necessitated by the country being on the verge of bankruptcy due to economic stagnation, financial mismanagement, corruption and the daily danger of a revolt by the people. At this time Mauritania was engaged in an international conflict over the Spanish Sahara and was devoting 60% of its budget to defense. It was believed that the military was unhappy with the conduct of the protracted war against POLISARIO in the former Spanish Sahara, annexed by Morocco and Mauritania after Spain withdrew in February 1978.


MAURITANIA (p) 435 03-20-79

Description: President Ould Daddah assumed broad powers following reports of a coup being planned by pro-Algerian elements within the government. On March 21 he dismissed from office some ministers apparently associated with the plot, of whom some were military officers.


Apparent Causes: The intention was to change the power axis in the Spanish Sahara conflict, by forcing an alliance with Algeria, a supporter of "Polisario." Mauritania had traditionally allied with Morocco in the crisis and there were in fact some 9,000 Moroccan troops stationed in Mauritania.


MAURITANIA (c) 435 01-04-80

Description: The Head of State was ousted by the Premier, Lt.
Col. Haidalla in a "palace coup".

**Participants:** Haidalla, with the tacit support of the Army.

**Apparent Causes:** Haidalla claimed that the coup was carried out in order to "get rid of all those who are not working wholeheartedly and with determination to restore the nation."

**Source:** Africa Research Bulletin (1980:5535).

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**MAURITANIA (ac) 435 03-16-81**

**Description:** An attempted military coup took place in the wake of plans to return the country to an electoral political system. A group of military rebels attacked the Presidential Palace, the Army Headquarters and the radio station in the capital, with the aim of overthrowing the government and killing its leaders, but after heavy fighting in the streets of the capital they were overpowered by government forces who imposed a curfew, closed the airport and barred all traffic from the capital. Mauritanian government sources claimed that the attempt was led by two exiled colonels who crossed from Senegal and were armed by Morocco. Diplomatic relations with Morocco were subsequently broken. However, another source from Paris claimed that the coup was undertaken by Mauritanian nationals, with the active support of many senior officers but without any external help. The ruling Junta responded to the coup attempt by postponing indefinitely the handing-over of power to civilians.

**Participants:** Soldiers led by four officers (Lt.Cols. Abdel Kader and Ould Sidi, and Lts. Niang and Doudou Seck) who were sentenced to death and shot on March 26, 1981.

**Apparent Causes:** The government claimed that Morocco sponsored the coup in order to install a government which would cease support of Polisaro fighters in the war over the liberation of the Spanish Sahara.


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**MAURITANIA (p) 435 02-06-82**

**Description:** It was reported from Dakar (Senegal) that an attempt to overthrow the Government had been foiled. The ringleaders were sentenced, March 6, to ten years in jail, and had their property confiscated.

**Participants:** Former President, Lt. Col. Mustapha Ould Salek; former P. M. Sid' Ahmed Ould Bneijara; former Interior Minister Baham Mohammed Lagdaf; and Capt. Ould Dneijara. Also sentenced to five years was Lt. Ould El Khan.

B-56
Apparent Causes: The aim of the plot was to arrest or assassinate the President, Col. Haidalla, as he left for Nairobi from Nouakchott Airport, in order to return Ould Salek to power. Prior to the discovery of the plot, serious charges of government corruption were reported.


MAURITIUS 590 Nothing to report

MOZAMBIQUE (ac) 541 12-17/18-75

Description: An attempt by about 400 African troops and police to occupy key points in the capital and overthrow the government during President Machel's absence was foiled by troops loyal to Frelimo. During the fighting, which lasted two days, communication links were severed and the airport closed to international traffic. About 6 people died and 44 were wounded in the fighting.

Participants: About 400 African troops of the Machava Battalion and police who were called "uniformed armed reactionary elements" by the government.

Apparent Causes: The government charged that it was an imperialist attempt to create an "atmosphere of unrest and instability to prevent the installation of popular power."

However, the immediate cause of the trouble seemed to be the announcement by President Machel on Dec. 13, 1975 of his intention to purge the armed forces and Frelimo of those guilty of violating discipline and being agents of imperialism. He charged that these elements confused popular victory with permission for personal satisfaction and depravity.


NIGER (ac) 436 04-13-63

Description: There was an attempt to assassinate President Diori Hamani on this date.

Participants: Not given, but see following event of 12-03-63.

Apparent Causes: Not given.

Out of a total of 65 persons who appeared before the Niger State Security Court on May 25, 1965, all accused of an attempt against the security of the State on December 3, 1963, were sentenced to death, 14 to life imprisonment, 28 to sentences ranging from four to fifteen years, and the rest were acquitted. The charges arose following a mutiny in December 1963 by a Company of the Army and as a result of the attempted assassination of President Diori Hamani on April 13, 1968.

Participants: Among those sentenced to death were Mr. Zodi chia, former Minister of African Affairs, and former Capt. Lallo.

Apparent Causes: None given.


The government was overthrown by the armed forces and a 12-member Supreme Military Council, under the leadership of Lt. Col. Seyni Kountche (Army Chief of Staff), was formed. Twenty persons were killed in the exchange of fire between the insurgents and Presidential guards. President Diori was placed under house arrest, the Constitution suspended, National Assembly dissolved, political parties suppressed and a curfew imposed. Lt. Col. Kountche became the new Head of State. All political detainees were released by the new regime.

Participants: Armed forces, led by Lt. Col. Seyni Kountche.

Apparent Causes: It was announced in a radio broadcast that the act was committed because of the country's "catastrophic situation," a reference to the severe drought-induced famine laguing the country. It was also claimed that the deposed government had wreaked 15 years of injustice, corruption, selfishness and indifference on the people. A further complaint as that the youth were not given access to important positions. Nigerian diplomats speculated that the coup was also prompted by the Army's opposition to Diori's increasingly close ties with Libya.

Description: Colonel Seyni Kountche, the Head of State, announced on his return from an OAU meeting in Kampala that the vice-President (Major Sani Sido) and other high-ranking civilians had been arrested for "attempting to divide the people and to set up an ideological change....with the objective of seizing power." The President claimed that the plotters aimed to divide the people, revive the banned political party, and that they were guilty of corruption and intimidation of officials.

Participants: Major Sani Souna Sido and two civilians, Djibo Akari and Maitourare Gadjio, former party leader and civil servant, respectively.

Apparent Causes: Observers noted the personality differences between Kountche and Sido. Mr. Bakari had only been allowed to return from exile in Guinea on condition that he refrain from political activities.


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GER (ac) 436 03-14-76

Description: In a radio broadcast on March 15th, Pres. Kountche announced that troops loyal to the government had crushed a coup attempt led by three army officers the previous night. He said that the Supreme Military Council had the situation "well in hand thanks to the loyalty of the National Armed Forces." Eight loyal officers and soldiers were killed in the fighting, as well as any rebels. Nine people were condemned to death, seven of whom were executed on April 22.

Participants: Maj. Bayere Moussa was said to be the coup leader. Also named were Capt. Sidi Mohammed and Mr. Ahmed Mouddour. Some twenty civilians and soldiers also took part.

Apparent Causes: None given, although there may have been an element of personal vendetta as both Maj. Bayere and Capt. Mohammed had been dropped from the Cabinet in the re-organisation of Feb. 21, 1976. Major Bayere was reported to want to see the end of a "regime of unbalanced and timorous men, slaves of a dictator inspired by Satan."


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IGERIA (c) 475 01-15-66

Description: Junior army officers in Kaduna, Ibadan and Lagos carried out a coup and killed the premier of the Northern Region,
premier of the Western Region and two major federal ministers: the P.M. Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, and the finance minister, Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh. These deaths induced the remaining ministers to hand over power two days later to the Iief-of-Staff of the Army, General Aguiyi-Ironsi, an Ibo. He spended the Parliament and offices of President and Prime minister, as well as regional government, premiers and legislatures, and named military governors for each region, with governors as advisers. A Supreme Military Council and Federal Executive Council were formed, with Aguiyi-Ironsi naming himself ad of both. The original coup leaders, mainly junior Ibo officers, were subsequently arrested, but the Army top hierarchy took over the government of the country anyway.

Participants: Five Army Majors led by Maj. Nzeogwu and Army its under their command. Most of the junior officers involved were Ibo, and most of those killed were not. However, a generation gap and ideological differences were also reflected in the coup.

Parent Causes: The officers stated that they were trying to place a corrupt regime and prevent the army being used for political purposes. There had been a gradual breakdown in law and order in the Western Region where many lives were lost. It was worsened by allegations of irregularities in the elections to the regional Legislative Assembly in October 1965. The federal M. was apparently unable to bring order to the region because of the problems between the two parties in the National Alliance. The coup-makers stated that they acted to "bring an end to_pantherism and disorder, corruption and despotism. To stamp out potism, tribalism and regionalism."


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GERIA (c) 475 07-29-66

Scripture: Northern army officers killed General Aguiyi-Ironsi and Lt.Col. Fajuyi (military governor of the Western Region) and took control of the airport after overpowering loyal troops. About thirty people were killed in the fighting, mostly Ibos. On August 1, Lt.Col. Gowon, Army Chief of Staff, announced that he had taken control of the country, but that he intended to hand over to civilians as soon as possible. Gowon was not involved in the coup, but he was acceptable to the coup-makers.

Participants: Troops from both the Middle Belt and Far North took control.

Parent Causes: The coup was partly a reaction by Northerners to the introduction of a unitary form of government by the Ironsi regime and the alleged exclusion of Northerners from the government. It was also a reaction to the January 15, 1966 coup.
was charged that the coup was regional as the public officers involved were from a particular area of the country and the coup leaders all came from the same ethnic group.


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GERIA (c) 475 07-29-75

Description: Pres. Gowon was overthrown in a bloodless coup by a group of young army officers, and some police, while attending an organization for African Unity conference in Uganda. A 22-member Supreme Military Council was established, with Brigadier Murtala Mohammed as Head of State. A curfew was imposed, all borders and the airport closed, external communications suspended, and a work-free day proclaimed for all workers. All state governors and civilian administrators were retired and all federal commissioners relieved of their posts.

Participants: The Brigade of Guards (an army unit), led by Col. Irba. The real author of the coup was thought to be Gen. Hassan Usman.

Apparent Causes: Mohammed claimed that the country had been left to drift and that intervention was necessary in order to avoid bloodshed. It was further claimed that the former regime lacked collective responsibility and that it was characterized by lack of consultation, indecision, indiscipline and neglect. Gowon's announcement in 1974 that he would not return the country to civilian rule in 1976 as promised and that the military would rule indefinitely had been followed by student and labour unrest. Widespread corruption was also suspected.


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GERIA (ac) 475 02-13-76

Description: Nigerian radio reported that a group of self-described "young revolutionaries" had tried to seize control. They had temporarily occupied the radio station and announced the overthrow of the government, but were crushed by loyal troops the same day. However, Brig. Muhammed was killed when hisimosine was caught in a blaze of gunfire. The government ordered a curfew and closed all borders and the airport. Lt. Gen. Obasanjo was appointed head of state. Ex-Defense Minister Adj. Gen. Bisalla and 30 others were subsequently put to death or their part in the coup attempt.

Participants: Muhammed was supposedly killed by Lt. Col. Dimka and a "few dissident troops" from the Army Physical Training
Many other people were implicated however, including Gen. la (executed), Gen. Gowon (former Head of State), and a r of civilians.

ent Causes: The rebels apparently disapproved of government rt of the MPLA in Angola and feared that the government was ng communist. They also apparently disapproved of the t promotion of 14 brigadiers to General, wished to restore to power, to restore other retired officers and personnel eir jobs, and to stop the demobilisation of 100,000 out of 00 soldiers. It was stated that some of the majors involved also opposed to the tough conversion exercise formula of the ary.


IA (p) 475 02-19-82

iptation: Nigerian newspapers reported and a government incement confirmed that a coup plot had been foiled. A lian and som soldiers had been arrested and charged with piring to commit a felony by the incitement of soldiers to it a mutinous act." The businessman had apparently handed large sums of money to a Major and several soldiers to nhrow the civilian government.

icipants: An officer and several NCOs were arrested. No were given.

ent Causes: The businessman had apparently received big acts under the previous military regime, but was not ning any from the present government.


A (c) 517 07-05-73

iptation: The Government was overthrown in a bloodless coup two months before scheduled Parliamentary and Presidential ions. The Army (National Guard) announced that a National ittee for Peace and Unity had been formed to run the nment and that Pres. Gregorie Kayibanda was under the ction of the National Guard. All political activities were ended, the National Assembly dissolved, the Government ssed and all organs of the Party (Parmehutu) suspended.


ent Causes: The President was planning to change the itution so that he would be eligible to stand for re-
tion to the Presidency in September. According to the
Constitution he had already served the maximum three
year terms. However, the coup followed months of tribal
conflict between the governing Hutu majority and Tutsi minority.
There was also conflict between southern Hutus, who dominated the
north, and northern Hutus, who dominated the Army, but wanted
more participation in the country's affairs. Rwanda's
economic and social stagnation may also have been a factor.

References: Index to the N.Y. Times (1973:2086), Keesings
Temporary Archives (1973:26003), Africa Research Bulletin
3:2922).

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DA (ac) 517 04-7-80

Description: Following reports of an attempted coup, many
important officials were arrested or dismissed in May 1980.

Participants: Among those arrested was Maj. Theonaste Lizinde
mer, chief of security and Presidential adviser for foreign
affairs).

Rent Causes: Not given.


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TOME and PRINCIPE (p) 403 07-09-77

Description: President Pinto da Costa discovered a plot to
throw him as part of the "COBRA 77" plan to undermine the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of independent African
states. In connection with the plan, an exiled former minister
Carlos de Graca) was sentenced (in absentia) to 24 years
imprisonment and Cmdr. Albertino Neto to 15 years.

Participants: Dr. Carlos de Graca and Cmdr. Albertino Neto.

Rent Causes: Not stated, but believed to be part of an
internationalist attempt to subvert independent African states.


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GAL (ac) 433 12-17-62

Description: P.M. Mamadou Dia mobilised some members of the
military guard and gendarmerie, and took control of the
Ever, with the help of loyal officers, President Senghor
reached full control the following night. The turning point
was the loyalty of the parachutists, who captured
and his ministers and put a radio transmitter at Senghor's
palace. No injuries were reported. P.M. Dia was arrested,

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s led by a retired army officer, but many serving officers also involved. Many arrests were made. This was said to be 5th plot since Nimeiry came to power in 1969.

**Participants:** Retired Brig. Saad Bahar, three Majors, three NCOs, former member of the National People's Assembly, Mr. Sadiq h.

**Ent Causes:** The government attributed the plot to foreign influence, especially from Syria and the Soviet Union. In addition to the fact that there was much domestic situation to the President, the country's economic situation remained to worsen and tensions remained between the central government in Khartoum and the autonomous Southern Region. The was uncovered during a period in which President Nimeiry was coping a pro-Western foreign policy, particularly favorable to the USA.


**LAND**

**572** Nothing to report

**NIA (ac)**

**510** 01-19-64

**Description:** In a revolt by some army units, Dar es Salaam was taken, cabinet members arrested, and 30 Britons held hostage. Eleven people were reported dead and 120 hurt. However, by the day President Nyerere was reported to be firmly in control, denied there had been an attempt to overthrow the government. SH troops put down the mutiny on January 25.

**Participants:** Army units. Some policemen were also arrested.

**Ent Causes:** Some army units appeared to be trying to force SH officers to leave, but no real reasons for the uprising given.

**Note:** Index to the N.Y. Times (1964:984)

**NIA (p)**

**510** 10-11-69

**Description:** The detention of a former minister, a prominent member and four army officers was announced. They were led to be involved in subversive activities while President Nyerere was visiting various countries, including the Soviet Union. In May 1970 eight persons were charged with treason out of this plot. The accused intended to overthrow the government by using the Army and Freedom Fighters based in Nia.
riotion: A rebellion aimed at the overthrow of the government was carried out. Rebel Sudanese army officers led by Troop Colonel seized the state radio station at Omdurman and proclaimed the overthrow of the government and the release of political prisoners. Some cabinet ministers were arrested. Attack on the Presidential Palace was also planned. However, fierce fighting loyal troops overpowered the rebels within hours. Many casualties were recorded on both sides.

icipants: Lt. Col. Hassan Osman was identified as the coup er. Other plotters were junior army officers, communists and ers of the Moslem Brotherhood. The group called itself the Front, which is an amalgam of both Communist and right-religious opposition groups.

t Causes: The rebels declared that corruption, high es and poverty prevailed, instead of freedom and pendence. They also claimed that Nimeiry's revolution had ressed freedom of thought, education, nationalised the press closed the Islamic University.


riotion: The Middle East News Agency reported that Pres. ery had succeeded in suppressing an attempted military coup. 300 people were killed, and another 300 wounded, in the ting. Nimeiry charged that the attack was made by enaries recruited and armed by Col. Qaddafi of Libya, but charge was dropped on July 15. Former P.M. Sadik al-Mahdi pted responsibility for organizing the coup but denied that as carried out by mercenaries. He was sentenced to death on ember 30.

icipants: al-Mahdi and unidentified soldiers.

nt Causes: None given.

ce: Index to the N.Y. Times (1976:1577).
cription: President Nimeiry announced on July 23rd that a plot to overthrow his regime had been uncovered on July 20th. The plotters planned to occupy strategic locations with armoured vehicles and to assassinate or arrest the President.

Participants: Members of the banned Umma and Iftihad parties and "deceived" Army officers.

arent Causes: Not given.


cription: The Sudanese government announced that it had led a plot to assassinate Pres. Nimeiry and other leading members of the government. Sudanese officials said that the up acted alone, without the support of political groups inside Sudan or abroad. The plotters went to trial on March 21st.

Participants: Retired Brig. Gen. R.M.K. Shanan and 11 non-missioned officers were arrested. Soldiers of lesser rank also allegedly involved, as well as Communists, the Moslem Brotherhood and Arab Nationalists.

arent Causes: There was some speculation that it may have been due to Nimeiry's decision not to join the Federation of Arab publics, even though he had signed the Charter. However, this was denied by Sudanese officials.


cription: The President announced that a plot had been anized by "rank and file" Army officers led by Brigadier Abkadoak. The President alleged that the conspiracy had begun in January 1973. Arrests were made and trials held.

Participants: At least eight NCOs led by Brig. Abkadoak.

arent Causes: It was alleged to be racially motivated. All accused were from the Western Sudan. Religion was also involved in that Abkadoak was a Christian known for his anti-Arab, anti-Moslem sentiments.
arent Causes: None given.

Sources: Index to the N. Y. Times (1970:1813), FBIS August 27, 0.

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AN (ac) 625 07-20-71

Description: Premier Nimeiry was reportedly deposed in a coup conducted by a group of army officers headed by Maj. H. al-Ata. Forces of the armoured division, supported by the Presidential Guard, seized power and placed Gen. Nimeiry and other members of the Revolutionary Command Council under arrest. A seven-member military council was formed, which declared all decisions made by previous rulers to be invalid. All newspapers were banned except the organ of the armed forces. The name of the country was changed to "democratic and independent republic", and many countries, including Iraq, extended recognition to the regime. The Revolutionary Command Council reactivated banned Communist organizations and set up a National Democratic Front grouping together workers, peasants, intellectuals and soldiers. However, on July 22 troops loyal to Nimeiry and led by Kerbassi seized the radio station at Khartoum, occupied the presidential Palace, freed Gen. Nimeiry and arrested the coup leaders. A State of Emergency was declared. Over 1000 persons were reportedly arrested, and all coup leaders were executed. Communist party chief Mahgoub was executed for his alleged role in the coup attempt on July 27. Thirty loyalist officers and soldiers were killed in the fighting.

Participants: The leaders were Major Hashem al-Ata, Col. Abdel neim Ahmed, Lt. Col. Osman Hussein, and Capt. Muaweya Abdel i. Col. al-Nur Osman and Major Hamadallah, although part of the plot, were in London at the time. They called themselves the Officers Organization.

arent Causes: In November 1970, al-Nur Osman, Hamadallah and -Ata had been ousted by P.M. al Nimeiry for opposing plans to nk the Sudan in a federation with Egypt and Libya. Al-Nur man denied any communist sympathies and said the action was prompted by the belief that Nimeiry had deviated from the licies of the May 1969 revolution. They criticised his tionalisation without preparation and neglect of the problems southern Sudan. They also said that al Nimeiry was ctatorial in that he did not consult sufficiently with the volutionary Council.


DAN (p) 625 08-17-69

Description: The Radio announced that "security forces have come aware of contacts being made by persons well known for their political affiliations with a small number of Armed Forces officers. These persons aim at overthrowing the current regime in favor of reactionary forces. A number of military personnel and civilians have been arrested pending investigation." Those involved were brought to trial in October.

Participants: Members of the military and certain civilians.

Apparent Causes: Not given, but the political situation in the Sudan in 1969 was very unstable.


JDAN (p) 625 01-13-70

Description: Army Chief of Staff Abbas was quoted by a newspaper as saying that a new attempt to overthrow the government had been foiled. Members of the counter-revolutionary organization, consisting of a handful of NCOs with allegedly sectarian and tribal aims, had been arrested. They were caught trying to enlist other officers to their cause.

Participants: A handful of NCOs. Also reportedly involved was a Maj. A. M. Adam.

Apparent Causes: The political climate in the Sudan continued to be generally unsettled. Religious and ethnic differences may also have been involved.


UDAN (p) 625 08-26-70

Description: One officer and a number of NCOs and soldiers were arrested for being members of a secret organization in the Armed Forces which aimed to overthrow the regime sometime in the future.

Participants: One officer and several other ranks.
A group of soldiers, led by middle-ranking army officers, deposed Premier Mahgoub in a bloodless coup. They cut off communications in the capital, arrested senior army officers, and placed President El-Azhari and the cabinet under house arrest. The provisional constitution, Presidential Council and constituent Assembly were dissolved, public meetings banned, newspapers suspended, airports closed, political opponents threatened with execution and a Military Revolutionary Council and civilian cabinet appointed. Ex-Chief Justice Awadallah was named Premier and Foreign Minister, and Col. Gaafar al-Nimeiry President. Awadallah announced that the regime would follow a socialist democratic course. The country was proclaimed to be the Democratic Republic of the Sudan.

Participants: The organizers were a group of army majors and colonels, led by Col. Nimeiry, with socialist and pan-Arab sympathies. The civilian council, led by Abubakr Awadallah, included at least three other Marxists.

Apparent Causes: The immediate cause was the instability and conflict in the coalition government which led to the resignation of the P.M. Two wings of one of the coalition parties (Umma Party) were re-united and demanded a greater number of cabinet seats. This demand was rejected by the Democratic Union Party. Other direct causes were the country's economic problems, the civil war in the south, corruption, and the failure of the Sudan to take a stand against Zionism in Palestine. Ideology may have played a part in that leftist politicians had been barred from serving in Parliament under the previous regime.


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The government announced the discovery of a conspiracy within and without the armed forces. It was aimed at overthrowing the government on July 18th. The conspiracy had been in existence before the coup of May 25th.

Participants: Not given, but involving part of the Armed Forces. Ninety persons were arrested, and brought to trial in October of 1969.

Apparent Causes: To liberate the negro South, to end the country's economic crisis, and to settle the dispute between Muslims and Christians. Involved was an organization known as the Front for the Liberation of African Sudan which sought its aims by force.
Apparent Causes: None given.


SUDAN (p) 625 11-09-64

Description: Seven Army officers of the rank of Major General and former members of the previous government were arrested for conspiracies against the security and safety of the State, according to Radio Omdurman.

Participants: Not given.

Apparent Causes: Apparently related to the promulgation of the new Constitution.


SUDAN (ac) 625 12-28-66

Description: In the wake of riots between pro- and anti-communist forces, Premier al-Mahdi announced that loyal troops had averted a coup attempt by cadets at the army training centre in Khartoum. The rebels had reportedly tried to seize the Central Post and Telegraphs Office, the Presidential Palace and radio station, but were crushed by the security forces, who occupied all strategic positions in the city. Four hundred people were arrested.

Participants: Approximately 300 trainees from the Gordon Training School, led by 2nd Lt. Khalid Hussein. Six other officers, including Col. Gaafar Nimeiry, were eventually arrested. The rebels apparently had the support of other military officials, and leftist-communist politicians who had been barred from parliamentary seats. After the coup leading members of the Communist Party were arrested, but the connection was never made clear.

Apparent Causes: "To end the state of constitutional anarchy" in the country due to rivalry between pro- and anti-communist parties and political factions. A High Court verdict on December 22nd in favor of the Communist Party may have sparked the coup attempt. The arrests of leading communists appeared to some sources to be due to the influence of traditional religious elements.

and soldiers were killed during the revolt, which was quickly crushed. Fifty-three officers and men were sentenced to death or various terms of imprisonment for the coup attempt.

Participants: Fifty-three officers and men, including some police officers led by Col. Abdullaahi Yusuf and Col. Mohammed Osman.

Apparent Causes: Nepotism and tribalism were cited by the government as reasons for the move. The plotters were from the north-eastern Mijarten tribe while the President was from the Marehan tribe. The government also charged that the coup attempt was the work of imperialism and colonialism. President Barre had been criticized for withdrawing from the Ogaden war in March and for conceding victory to Ethiopia. Army morale was said to be extremely low, although the majority of troops apparently remained loyal to the Barre regime.


SOMALIA (p) 520 04-28-82

Description: The dissident radio station, Radio Kulmis, reported that an attempted coup had been aborted. Seventy army officers were arrested, most of whom were thought to be close relatives of the President, Said Barre. The coup was disclosed when the President quickly returned to Mogadishu after cutting short his visit to Cairo and the Gulf States in early April.

Participants: The leader of the plot was said to be General Umar Masaleh, the Minister of Health.

Apparent Causes: General Masaleh was said to be angry at his Defense portfolio being taken from him in March, his removal from the Army and his appointment as Health Minister.


SOMALIA (p) 520 06-09-82

Description: It was announced on June 12 that seven senior Somali politicians and other government and party officials had been arrested for collaborating with an unnamed foreign power to "undermine the very existence of the nation." They were stripped of all responsibilities and kept in custody until they could be brought to trial.

SOMALIA (p) 520 04-27-70

Description: The Supreme Revolutionary Council announced that it had foiled a "counter-revolutionary" plot and made many arrests.

Participants: Among those arrested was Maj.Gen. Khorshel, the first Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Council.

Apparent Causes: It was alleged that they wanted to provoke Ethiopia in order to engage the army and have an opportunity to arrest some members of the Revolutionary Council. They would then call in foreign forces, set up a "puppet" regime to serve imperialism and seek a cease-fire and detente with Ethiopia.


SOMALIA (p) 520 05-05-71

Description: It was announced that a plan to overthrow the government and destroy the revolution had been foiled. It was alleged that the plan, originally scheduled for May 7, was carried out on the 5th because of fear of leaks. Arrests were made, and the rebels were accused of planning to attack the capital, to incite civilians against the government, and to murder some members of the SRC (Supreme Revolutionary Council).

Participants: Brig. Gens. Ainanshe and Gabeyreh and other soldiers and civilians. Also mentioned were Gen. Guled (Vice-Chairman of the SRC) and Gen. Kedie (member of the SRC).

Apparent Causes: It was alleged to be an "international colonialist" plot against the revolution and that the plot leader, Gen. Ainanshe, had never been in support of the October 1969 Revolution and wanted a return to civilian government. A radio broadcast claimed that the plotters "aimed at causing bloodshed by setting up an army against army...and ignite a civil war."


SOMALIA (ac) 520 04-09-78

Description: Somali radio reported that a few soldiers and army officers, influenced by "foreign powers", had tried to overthrow the Said Barre government, but that they had failed due to lack of support from the rest of the army. The action was apparently restricted to the outskirts of Mogadishu. Twenty loyal officers
SOMALIA (ac) 520 12-10-61

Description: Twenty-three military officers failed in an attempt to seize command of an army unit in the north. The plan included the seizure of local administration. All were brought to trial in Mogadiscio on December 13, and were imprisoned until January 1965.

Participants: Young northern military officers.

Apparent Causes: The removal of Suk Ali Guimale as Minister of Health on December 6 supposedly contributed to army discontent, but this was only conjecture. I.M. Lewis suggested that the British-trained junior officers were angered when they were placed under the command of Italian-trained officers from the south. The officers urged a separation of north and south.

Source: Morrison et al (1972:341)

SOKALIA (c) 520 10-21-69

Description: Following the assassination of President Abdirashid Ali Shermake by a policeman on October 15th, army commanders, with the support of the police, seized power in a bloodless coup. The Constitution was suspended, National Assembly dissolved, a state of emergency declared, and a curfew imposed. A 14-man National Revolutionary Council was formed, with Major General Mohammed Said Barre as Chairman. On October 22 the Council arrested all members of the deposed government, abolished the Supreme Court, prohibited political parties, closed down the three government newspapers, and changed the name of the country to the Somali Democratic Republic.

Participants: Four army colonels who organized the coup gained the support of the army commander and police commissioner.

Apparent Causes: Apart from the leadership crisis, the military government stressed its opposition to tribalism and the "corruption of the ruling classes." Major conflicts between Somali elites were apparently intensified during the March 1969 elections, in which there were allegations of government rigging, and in which the ruling party received only 40% of the vote. The new regime also announced its intention to stop the open-door policies being pursued by P.M. Egal and to work for the country's future development and the unification of Somali people everywhere. In brief, the power vacuum caused by the assassination, maladministration, corruption, and tribalism.

under the emergency regulations currently in force.


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SIERRA LEONE (ac) 451 03-23-71

Description: A group of officers attacked the residence of P.M. Stevens, killing two of his bodyguards, and placed the Governor-General under house arrest following an attack on his residence. Three cabinet ministers were held hostage in order to enforce the release of persons detained under emergency regulations. Brig. John Bangura announced that the army had taken over. But later Lt.Col. Sam King announced that a large percentage of the army did not support Brig. Bangura and still regarded the Stevens Government as legal. Brig Bangura was reported to be under arrest and the abducted ministers freed by loyal forces. The P.M. made a broadcast announcing the situation to be back to normal.

Participants: A section of the army led by Brigadier Bangurah, the army's commander-in-chief.

Apparent Causes: The coup participants opposed the continued existence of the State of Emergency from Sept. 14, 1970, and the proposed change in the constitution. They were also against the government's signing of a defense agreement with Guinea and the actual existence of Guinean troops in Sierra Leone.


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SIERRA LEONE (p) 451 07-?-74

Description: Two former Ministers were sentenced to death in November 1974 for planning to overthrow the government while the President (Siaka Stevens) was visiting Europe. Some military men were also sentenced to death on the same charges on January 29, 1975.

Participants: Two former Ministers and seven NCOs.

Apparent Causes: Not given, but the two former Ministers had been detained in 1970, so personal ambition could not be ruled out.

Source: Keesings (1975:27082).
the country. Margai had already tried unsuccessfully to impose a one-party state system and institute a constitutional amendment, declaring the country a republic. Mr Stevens refused appeals for a coalition government on the grounds that it would result effectively in a one-party state. Social class may also have been a factor in that the senior officers were linked to the traditional ruling families opposed to Stevens, who had a trade union background.


Sierra Leone (c) 451

Description: The military and police took control of the government, and seized Col. Juxon-Smith and Maj. Leigh. A National Interim Council (NIC), composed of officers loyal to Siaka Stevens, was formed in order to return the country to civilian rule. The ousted officers were demoted, and Stevens sworn in as P.M on April 29, 1968.

Participants: Army and police elements led by two warrant officers - Sergeants Major Patrick Conteh and Amadu Rogers.

Apparent Causes: Sgt. Rogers charged that the National Redemption Council (formed after the March 1967 coup) had become "more corrupt and selfish than the civilian regime," that it had ignored the rank-and-file of the army and police (by not granting a pay rise demanded by the ranks in the face of sharp inflation), and had reneged on a promise to return the country to civilian rule as soon as possible.


Sierra Leone (p) 451

Description: Six army officers were arrested for planning a coup against the government. It was alleged to be the second in a week. The plotters were said to be in possession of 650 rounds of ammunition when arrested.

Participants: Eleven soldiers led by Warrant Officer Conteh and Mr. Mark T. Colby of the U.S. Embassy, who was declared persona non grata.

Apparent Causes: Not given, but there was dissatisfaction with Dr. Stevens' preparations to declare a republic. That, it was alleged, would make it possible for him to be President for a new five-year term, thereby circumventing the 1972 election, due under the existing constitution. Some cabinet ministers resigned in protest. It was also said to aim to release those arrested...
stated that he would accept military cooperation from Third World states only.


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SIERRA LEONE (p) 451 02-08-67

Description: The P.M, Sir Albert Margai, announced that - "an attempted military coup, aimed at murdering him and seizing power, had been foiled." He stated that the plotters had intended it for Feb. 1 or 2 and would have obtained help from another African country. He said that Guinea had helped by moving troops to the border and thanked Guinea for its help.

Participants: Seven senior Army officers were detained.

Apparent Causes: It was alleged to have been an imperialist plot begun in January as a consequence of the move to make Sierra Leone a Republic via a Bill in Parliament.


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SIERRA LEONE (c) 451 03-21-67

Description: Minutes after being sworn in as P.M., Siaka Stevens was arrested, along with Governor-General Sir Henry Lightfoot Boston, by an army group headed by Brigadier David Lansana. The army and police formed a National Reformation Council, which suspended the Constitution, dissolved all political parties, closed down all newspapers and banned political activity. It was announced that the move was temporary and that constitutional government would be restored as soon as the politicians came together. Following the move riots in Freetown resulted in four deaths, and a curfew was imposed on March 22. Control of the government was offered first to Lt. Col. Genda, but he was soon replaced by Lt.Col. Andrew Juxton-Smith. Brig. Lansana was subsequently arrested by the new military regime.

Participants: Brig. Lansana (Army Chief), Majors Jumu Blake and Kaisamba, plus Mr. William Leigh, Commissioner of Police (later named deputy-chairman of the junta) as well as units of the army and gendarmerie.

Apparent Causes: The move came in the wake of general political uncertainty, following the elections. Brig. Lansana claimed that the Governor General had no right to appoint Mr. Stevens as P.M because the election results were inconclusive. There were evidently some ethnic factors involved, as the defeated candidate, Sir Albert Margai, was from the same tribe as Brig. Lansana. (The powerful Mende tribe). However, the junior officers involved stated that they acted in order to avert a civil war and to stop Brig. Lansana from imposing Sir Margai on
along with Gen. Fall, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

**Participants:** P.M. Dia and Gen. Fall, as well as some members of the territorial guard and gendarmerie.

**Apparent Causes:** Personal and ideological rivalry between Dia and Senghor. Dia favoured a Socialist-style planned economy, while the President did not. The National Assembly supported the President so Dia moved in order to forestall a censure motion. When the Assembly later met he was legally ousted.

**Sources:** Morrison et al (1972:328), Keesings Contemporary Archives (1963:19201).

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**SEYCHELLES (c) 591 06-4/5-1977**

**Description:** Mr. Mancham was deposed in a coup d'état while attending a Commonwealth meeting in London. The Prime Minister, Mr. Rene, took over as President after being approached by the rebels. The Army task force, which included policemen and militant workers, took control of the police armoury and "all strategic positions" in the capital. The Constitution and General Assembly were suspended and a curfew imposed. Six people were killed in the action.

**Participants:** The 60-man armed task force, a number of policemen and 200 militant workers.

**Apparent Causes:** The rebels charged that the President was a "dictator" who spent lavishly on himself and globe trotted. (He had not spent 3 consecutive weeks in the country since independence). He was accused of planning to postpone until 1984 the Presidential and Parliamentary elections due in 1979.

**Source:** Keesings (1977:28485).

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**SEYCHELLES (p) 591 11-16-79**

**Description:** The President announced the discovery of a plot to overthrow him, apparently sponsored from abroad and using S.African mercenaries. Curfew was imposed, 81 persons were arrested and Tanzanian troops in the country subsequently increased from 250 to 550 men.

**Participants:** 81 persons, including M. Jacques Chevalereau (a Frenchman) entrusted with the training of the Seychelles harbour police.

**Apparent Causes:** There may have been a connection to strategic international naval interests. The President declared that he would not allow the Seychelles to become involved in great power rivalry and that he would restrict naval visits to his islands, U.S. and Soviet war ships having visited it in turn. He further
Participants: M. Michael Kamaliza (former Labour Minister), Mrs. Bibi Titi (a senior party-member), four military officers, and Mr. Oscar Kambona (former Foreign Minister), who was in exile in London at the time the plot was discovered.

Apparent Causes: Not given.


TOGO (p) 461 05-11-61

Description: It was announced that a plot aimed at rebellion and the assassination of members of the government had been uncovered.

Participants: Members of the opposition, Ghana, and a Police Commissioner, who allegedly supplied arms to the plotters.

Apparent Causes: Not given, but since independence in 1960 the governing party had presented a candidate list for General Assembly elections only, while lists from opposition parties were discarded on the grounds of being late.


TOGO (p) 461 12-04-61

Description: A plot to assassinate the President (Olympio) and members of the cabinet was discovered. Sixty-four people were arrested and a quantity of arms (revolvers) seized. It was claimed that the men were trained in Ghana.

Participants: Some 64 men were involved. A police commissioner had allegedly been supplying the plotters with arms.

Apparent Causes: None given, although it may have been connected to the May 5 plot.

Sources: Index to N. Y. Times (1961:972), Keesings Contemporary Archives (1962:18605)

TOGO (c) 461 01-13-63

Description: President Olympio was assassinated in front of the U.S. Embassy, Lome, (where he sought safety) by non-commissioned army officers. The rebels arrested five ministers and announced that a coup had taken place. An eight-member "insurrectionary committee" (comprising the infantry, territorial guards and gendarmerie) was formed, led by Sergeant Major Brodjolle (an ex-
serviceman). Political prisoners were released and opposition leaders in exile invited to return. The new junta asked Antoine Meatchi, ex-Premier Nicholas Grunitsky and ex-Minister Santos to head the government. Grunitsky was named President and Meatchi Vice-President.

Participants: Two hundred members of an infantry company of the army, including former sergeants in the French army, as well as about two hundred members of the Territorial Guard. Sergeants Bodjillo and Eyadema led the revolt.

Apparent Causes: A remote cause was political disenchantment due to the government's invalidation of the opposition by not allowing it to field candidates. Some opposition leaders had been detained and others had gone into exile in Benin and Ghana. However, a more immediate cause was army discontent. When the 700 Togolese who had fought in the French army returned home in 1962, Olympio refused to reintegrate them into the Togolese army because of the financial burden. After the coup the size of the army increased from 250 to 1200 men. There were also regional causes, as the soldiers involved were apparently mainly from the north of the country and were incited by "Colonel" Eyadema.


Togo (c) 461 01-13-67

Description: Pres. Grunitsky was ousted in a bloodless military coup led by Lt. Col. Eyadema, although he announced that his withdrawal from office was voluntary. The Constitution was suspended, the National Assembly dissolved, all political parties prohibited and a state of emergency declared, involving a break in all communications with the outside world. Eyadema took over as President and Defence Minister, and dissolved the National Revolutionary Committee which had been formed after the 1963 coup. Eyadema formed a National Reconciliation Council to advise on democratic and free elections scheduled three months hence.

Participants: Lt. Col. Etienne Eyadema, Chief of Staff, and the Togolese army.

Apparent Causes: The army said that it had acted in order to "end the confused political situation" which was creating "a psychosis of imminent civil war". This was a reference to the power struggle between President Grunitsky and Vice-President Meatchi which had preceded the coup. A recent reduction in army appropriations may also have been a factor.

TOGO (p) 461 08-08-70

Description: It was announced that the Army had foiled an attempt to overthrow the government and assassinate the President. The plot was alleged to be organized by former military men in exile in Ghana and Benin, but seventeen persons were arrested at the house of a Police officer, who was killed trying to escape. Arms were discovered at the house and siezed by the authorities. Other arrests followed.

Participants: Some retired Army officers and a serving Police officer, M. Osseyi. The majority of the plotters were not Togolese, but from Ghana and Benin.

Apparent Causes: Apparently Osseyi sought promotion as the result of a successful coup. The plot may have also been related to President Eyadema's 1969 declaration making Togo a one-party state, with himself as President.


TOGO (p) 461 10-26-77

Description: It was announced that a plan to assassinate President Eyadema and overthrow the government had been foiled thanks to information supplied by the British government. The attack was to be carried out by mercenaries organized by two prominent Togolese families (Olympio and de Souza) with the aid of local members of the Togolese military.

Participants: Lt. Col. Francis Lawson, Major Sanvi and members of the Olympio family (the late President's son, Jules Olympio) and that of de Souza.

Apparent Causes: It was meant as a vendetta because President Eyadema claimed personal responsibility for the 1963 assassination of President Olympio. Ethnic factors were also involved as it was charged that the President kept himself in power through the help of his Northern kinsmen whereas the plotters were from the Southern Ewe people.


UGANDA (c) 500 02-22-66

Description: P.M. Obote suspended the Constitution in order to
thwart an alleged attempt to overthrow the government with the aid of foreign troops. Five ministers were arrested and action taken against some members of the armed forces. Capts. Ongodia and Erimaa received jail terms of four and three years for conspiring to arrest Dr. Obote in February '66 and for causing false alarm. Two lieutenants were also sentenced on Sept. 22 and Oct. 13 respectively for having attempted to cause a mutiny among their men in Feb. 1966. Brigadier Opolot (Chief of Staff) was dismissed on Oct. 7, 1966 for "activities and behaviour prejudicial to the stability of the armed forces". On March 2 Obote assumed the powers of Pres. Mutesa and Vice.Pres. Nadiope, and on April 2 declared himself Executive President.

Participants: P.M. Obote, with the support of various police and military elements.

Apparent Causes: Obote was challenged by the Kabaka Yekka Party and elements in his own party. Parliament voted to establish a commission to investigate allegations that he was involved in illegal activities in connection with the transfer of gold from the Congo (Kinshasa). He preempted his opponents by moving first.


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UGANDA (c) 500 01-25-71

Description: Pres. Obote was deposed by the army while attending a Commonwealth meeting in Singapore. Gen. Amin and a section of the army seized key installations in Kampala and the airport at Entebbe after overpowering some resistance. After fierce fighting the garrison at Jinja (50 miles from Kampala) was overpowered by troops led by Brig. Hussein. Amin proclaimed himself head of state, closed the airport, imposed a curfew, freed all political prisoners and arrested Obote's cabinet ministers. "Free and fair general elections" were promised as soon as the country was stabilised. On February 21 he accepted the title of President offered to him by the army.

Participants: Sections of the army and police led by Major Gen. Idi Amin, who had risen from the ranks to become army commander in 1966.

Apparent Causes: The immediate cause was the fear that Lango and Acholi officers in the army (75% of the officer corps) were on the brink of disarming all other officers and men. However, there was also dissatisfaction with Obote's economic policies. Amin stated that Obote had indulged in excesses, maintained "an idle life at public expense", and that his economic policies were benefiting the "big, rich men". Obote was also accused of developing his own home region in the north at the expense of other parts of the country, and blamed for the deterioration in
relations with Tanzania and Kenya. Obote later stated that the takeover was staged to prevent a murder trial that might have implicated Amin. It seems that Obote was planning to dismiss Amin from his army command on his return from the conference.


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UGANDA (ac) 500 07-7-71

Description: It was announced on October 18th that soldiers at Moroto Barracks had attempted to overthrow the government while the President, General Amin, was visiting Israel (he departed on July 11th).

Participants: A section of the Army at Moroto Barracks.

Apparent Causes: It was claimed that the aim was to return to power the recently overthrown President, Milton Obote. The evidence supplied involved contacts between the soldiers and dissident Ugandans in Tanzania.


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UGANDA (p) 500 05-27-72

Description: It was announced that President Amin had uncovered evidence of a conspiracy to overthrow his government linking Israeli intelligence and some members of the Ugandan Army and Air Force. Amin produced a letter allegedly demonstrating the existence of a plot.

Participants: Some unnamed members of the Army and Air Force.

Apparent Causes: Not given, but there was at this time a general air of insecurity in Uganda.


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UGANDA (ac) 500 03-23-74

Description: Units of the Ugandan army clashed for several hours. It was not entirely clear whether the rebellious soldiers were attempting a coup or whether Amin loyalists had begun a tribal massacre within the army. Most sources thought it was an attempted coup by Lugbara elements in the Army.

Participants: Amin attributed the "confusion" to Brig. Charles
Arrube, who reportedly killed himself, and other men rumored to be planning to murder Amin and seize the capital. Amin arrested Lt. Col. Wilson Toko and Michael Ondoga on suspicion of being involved in the attempt. Most of the anti-government participants were Lugbara ethnic group members.

**Apparent Causes:** The rebellious soldiers were Christian Lugbaras. However, the uprising could not have been due simply to tribal rivalry as this group had once been among Amin's strongest supporters. There was growing dissent over chronic food shortages in the country.


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**UGANDA**

**Description:** East African diplomatic sources reported that Ugandan commandos attempted to overthrow President Amin but that the revolt was crushed by loyal troops. At least fifteen soldiers were killed and many wounded.

**Participants:** Members of Amin's Special Commando Division.

**Apparent Causes:** The Commandos complained that they had not been paid for three months.

**Sources:** Index to the New York Times (1974:2426), FBIS November 11, 1974.

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**UGANDA**

**Description:** The UK Sunday Telegraph reported on February 16th that President Amin had escaped an assassination attempt a few weeks before. Sub-machine gun fire struck the President's car when an official motorcade was ambushed between Kampala and Gulu, in Northern Uganda, but Amin was actually travelling in an ordinary car some distance behind.

**Participants:** Several members of both the Air Force and Army were arrested.

**Apparent Causes:** None given.

**Source:** Africa Research Bulletin (1975:3534).
**GANDA** (p) 500 08-7-75

**Description:** The Kenya Daily Nation and diplomatic sources in Nairobi reported that a group of Army officers planned to overthrow President Amin while he was visiting Ethiopia in August. Apparently tank units were ready to role into Kampala but a Lieutenant betrayed the plot and the leaders were arrested.

**Participants:** Some troops led by Lt. Col. Gori and an unnamed Major.

**Apparent Causes:** Not given, but the Lt. Col. was a cousin of the late Lt. Col. Michael Ondoga, a former foreign minister who fell victim to Idi Amin's executions. A personal vendetta could be computed.


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**GANDA** (ac) 500 06-10-76

**Description:** President Amin narrowly escaped assassination in Kampala when three hand grenades were thrown as he was leaving a passing-out parade at the Police barracks. Amin's driver was killed, and the President owed his life to the fact that the two had changed places and he was driving the jeep himself.

**Participants:** Mass arrests followed among civilians. Amin denied that the Police were involved but sources in London were convinced that the military was behind the attempt and that Amin was blaming civilians in order to avoid provoking the Army.

**Apparent Causes:** Not known.

**Source:** Africa Research Bulletin (1976:4064).

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**UGANDA** (p) 500 08-01-76

**Description:** Kenya's Sunday Nation newspaper reported that Amin had arrested several army commanders to head off a possible attempt to topple him from power.

**Participants:** Defense Min. and Army Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Mustafa Adrisi was among those arrested.

**Apparent Causes:** The arrests followed reports that 30 senior Army officers had told Amin to resign because of Uganda's critical economic situation.

**Source:** Index to the N.Y. Times (1976:1683)
Description: President Amin ordered a "purge" after uncovering an attempt to overthrow him planned for January 25th. Reports from Kenya (Feb.13) claimed mass killing, while those from Uganda (Feb.14) claimed that quantities of arms meant for liberation movements in S.Africa were diverted to Uganda by the plotters and that religious "ministers" were involved. Anglican Archbishop Janani Luwum, Internal Affairs Minister Charles Oboth-Ofumbi and Water Resources Minister Lt. Col. Erinayo Oryema were arrested for plotting to overthrow Pres. Amin. Amin accused President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania of being involved in the plot. All three supposedly died in an auto accident later the same day. In August, Pres. Amin accused some army officials of collaborating with the civilians to topple his regime. Sixteen Ugandans charged pleaded guilty. Fifteen of them were executed September 9.

Participants: Other than Luwum, Oboth-Ofumbi and Oryema, only Mr. Abdallah Amyura, Mr. John Olobo and Lt. Ben Ogwang were named. Senior civil servants were among those who pleaded guilty to the plot on August 29th.

Apparent Causes: Opposition to Amin came from many fronts. To curry favor from Arab states he had replaced Christians in the Army, civil service and industry with Moslems, who represent only 5% of the population. Few Ugandan Moslems being well educated, they were supplemented by foreign Moslems from such countries as the Sudan. The number of Kakwa (Amin's tribe) in the Army had risen from a few hundred in 1971 to over 3,000. These factors led to growing frustration with the regime.


UGANDA (ac) 500 06-18-77

Description: Reports that President Amin had "disappeared" after an assassination attempt were denied by Radio Uganda, which declared that the President was well and "resting after a long period of hard work." The broadcast followed reports of an assassination attempt and a widespread purge by his secret police of dissidents in the Army and civilian life. His car was apparently ambushed on June 18th. A Ugandan Army Major said that planning of the coup had gone on for a year, with nearly 1,000 people involved in the plot, including soldiers, civilians, and some exiles, but that Amin had learnt of the plan shortly before it was to go into operation, and led loyal members of the Marines and Mechanised Regiment against the conspirators. Many deaths resulted.
Participants: The leader of the abortive uprising was a senior Force Major, one of Amin's most trusted pilots, but he was named.

Agent Causes: A recent purge of Bantu ethnic group soldiers the alleged cause.


- NDA (c) 500 05-11-80

Description: Soldiers took over the radio station and post office in Kampala. State radio reported that a six-member Military Commission had "assumed the powers of the Presidency," stripped President Binaisa of his powers. The military time announced the formation of a Cabinet that replaced Sisters close to Binaisa with supporters of Milton Obote.

Participants: The coup was led by Brig. David Ojok, Army Chief Staff, and a close associate of Obote. The Military mission was headed by Paulo Muwenga, Binaisa's Labour minister. On his return to Uganda on May 27th, Obote denied any involvement in the takeover.

Agent Causes: Muwenga said that the action was "forced upon " by Binaisa's conduct. The takeover followed Brig. Ojok's dismissal by Binaisa. Also involved was a desire to return Obote power.

cription: Following a general strike and demonstrations inst Pres. Yameogo by the trade unions and the consequent ch of the demonstrators to government headquarters demanding ion by the army, Col. Sangoule Lamizana, Army Chief of Staff, k power "until further notice." On January 5 the President placed under house arrest, the Constitution suspended and the nal Assembly dissolved.

ticipants: Col. Lamizana and the army. The trade union onstrations were apparently led by Assembly ex-president J. draogo.

arent Causes: The labour unions promoted the demonstrations protest legislation by the National Assembly which had cut the ries of government employees by 20%. The austerity budget luded no reductions in the President's salary. Col. Lamizana d that he had assumed power to "safeguard republican andocratic institutions and avoid all bloodshed". This was a erence to the potential use of the gendarmerie to force the ikers back to work and dismiss the demonstrators.


cription: Pres. Sangoule Lamizana announced that the army had ized power. The Constitution was suspended, the National embly dissolved and a curfew imposed throughout the country. ew cabinet dominated by military men was formed to replace t of former Premier Ouedraogo.

ticipants: Members of the army led by General Lamizana.

arent Causes: Lamizana stated that the army takeover wasigned to save the country from "catastrophe threatened by babbling politicians." The National Assembly could not approve Kraft Bill on January 30th and as a consequence government chinery and institutions had been paralyzed. There was a ger of open confrontation between rival political factions ch might cause permanent division among the people. The nation's economy was also in considerable difficulty.

Pres. Lamizana was overthrown in a bloodless coup by a group of army officers calling itself the Military Committee for National Progress, led by Col. Saye Zerbo (a former Foreign Minister). The President and members of his entourage were placed under house arrest. A curfew was imposed, airport and telecommunications closed, the Constitution and political parties suspended, the National Assembly dissolved and political activity outlawed.

Participants: Col. Zerbo and army elements. (Those officers who did not cooperate in the coup were arrested).

Recent Causes: The coup was justified on the grounds that the lack of a suitable, coherent and sustained policy had led to unprecedented social and economic disturbances, including the lure to find a solution to widespread famine. It was also asserted that institutions and authority had disintegrated. However, the immediate cause was probably the teachers' strike which began on October 1, 1980 and which led to a major political confrontation between the opposition parties and the government.


A group of noncommissioned and junior officers led the government of Col. Saye Zerbo in a predawn coup. At least 20 people died in the fighting, including Lt. Col. Nezien Zimbe, Upper Volta's Interior Minister. Unconfirmed reports stated that Zerbo had been wounded in the coup. The new provisional People's Salvation Council immediately closed the borders and imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew. It also disarmed the country's gendarmes and confined them to barracks because of doubts about their loyalty, but otherwise there was little resistance to the coup.

Participants: Two para-commando units led by NCOs. The chairman of the council was named as Maj. Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo, an army officer.

Recent Causes: The new regime accused Col. Zerbo of turning the military into "agents of terror."

Sources: The N.Y. Times (1982:Nov. 8, p. 5), Phoenix Gazette 82:Nov. 11, p. 4).

The Congo army announced that it had seized power.
placed Premier Lumumba under house arrest. The Chief of
Col. Mobutu, and President M. Kasavubu declared that they
imposing a "truce" on the politicians by "neutralising" them
Dec. 31, 1960. Control was placed in the hands of a
ege of High Commissioners, composed of young university
ates and students, who served until Feb. 9, 1961. M. Bomoko
amed President and A. Ndele Vice-President.

icipants: Military forces, under the leadership of Col.

ent Causes: It appeared to be due to the breakdown of the
itutional regime, caused by the power struggle between
ubu and Lumumba, who had attempted to remove each other from
ce. Prior to the army intervention Kasavubu had suspended
ament for one month to prevent Lumumba's supporters
 it from passing a retroactive constitutional amendment
ving the President of the power to dismiss the Prime

ces: Morrison et al (1972:222), Index to the N.Y. Times

ription: Pres. Mobutu announced the arrest of 40 soldiers
out 20 civilians for allegedly plotting to kidnap and
 him and other leaders.

icipants: Unnamed soldiers and civilians.

ent Causes: None given.

c: Index to the N.Y. Times (1961:233).

ription: A plot to kill Mobutu, Kasavubu, Bomoko and
rity Police Chief Nendaka on November 19th was revealed when
golese soldiers were executed for their part in the plot
bruary 9, 1964.

icipants: Unnamed soldiers.

ent Causes: None given.

c: Index to the N.Y. Times (1964:206).
General Mobutu deposed President Kasavubu and sed Prime Minster Evariste Kimba in a bloodless coup. He installed an army government with himself as President. Gen. Molamba was named Premier and Maj.Gen. Bobozo military Mobutu cancelled the '66 elections and announced that he be President for 5 years. On December 1 he assumed the to rule by decree.

Participants: Gen. Mobutu, commander-in-chief of the army.

Int Causes: Mobutu said that the army acted because of the lute failure of the Kasavubu government and the sterile bles of politicians. There was dissatisfaction over ubu's ouster of Tshombe in October and his replacement as r by Kimba. The army was reputed to fear that Kasavubu was g away from a pro-Western position and that he was willing gotiate with Gbenye's CNL.


The Government claimed that it had foiled a plot to sinlate the President and overthrow his government. Four ian notables were arrested, tried by a military tribunal and ted on June 2, 1966. Some military officers led by Colonel la were initially involved, but it was later claimed that were "turn-coats" who were only pretending to be part of lot. These officers arrested the conspirators and handed over to the President (Mobutu). During the trial, however, conspirators claimed that their actions were instigated by ity.

Participants: Four civilians (former ministers), and some officers.

Int Causes: They opposed the army's staying in power for years, which was against its original intent. They also nded that the legislature had been made a "rubber stamp," the judiciary had been diverted, that President Mobutu had ed a private militia and that the economic apparatus of the had been systematically disorganized.

Ex: Keesings (1966:21457).

The security forces claimed to have uncovered al plots to assassinate the President and overthrow the ment. General Olenga and four others were sentenced to
1 years imprisonment on August 24th, 1971 for being ed in the plots. Some students were sentenced on August 971 on charges of subversion.

pants: General Nicolas Olenga, university students and four peole.

at Causes: Not given, but there seemed to be a general of insecurity.


(p) 490 10-05-71

ption: Two former ministers, an ex-Colonel and a General rested on October 5th, 1971 on charges of conspiring to he President. They were sentenced to various terms of onment on Feb. 11, 1972.

pants: Two former ministers, ex-Colonel Patrice Kudra-
, and General Alphonse-Devos Bangala (former governor of ia). Other ranks in the Army were also involved.

Causes: Not given, but since it was General Bangala who e "turn-coat" army officers who handed over some civilian rators in 1966, it would appear to have been a genuine : to overthrow the government.


(p) 490 06-16-75

ption: The Zaire newspaper Salongo reported that a plot to inate the President, scheduled for September 30, 1975, had covered. Three Generals, one Colonel and two Majors were ed, as well as an unspecified number of others. A General missed, all principal military commanders were transferred posts and ten senior officers suspended from their posts general staff and in the armed forces command. There were ations that the C.I.A was behind the plot; American ador Dean Hinton was ordered, on June 20, to leave the y as soon as possible. The Zairean Ambassador to the U.S so recalled for briefing. On September 1, seven high-g army officers were condemned to death, twenty-seven were given prison terms of up to twenty years, and seven rs were acquitted. General Mobutu said that a "great power" lled on "some misguided blacks" to assassinate him. The Department in Washington described the charges as "utter se."

pants: Those named were Brig.Gens. Kasiwira, Wembolenga

B-91
and Sumbu; Majs. Bajikila and Bikembo and Col. Djunga.

**Apparent Causes:** The plot was blamed on a U.S policy of destabilisation. It should be noted that this event occurred during the high point in the Angolan civil war in which Zaire and the USA were both supporting the same side.


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**ZAIRE** (p) 490 02-27-78

**Description:** It was announced that Security Forces had arrested 250 Army officers following an abortive coup attempt against President Mobutu. The officers were arrested between February 20-25. The coup was apparently planned while President Mobutu was out of the country. The plotters decided to wait until his return but were betrayed by a Colonel and the coup failed. On March 7th it was announced that 91 soldiers and civilians were to stand trial for involvement in the plot. Eight officers and five civilians were executed on March 17th.

**Participants:** 67 of the 91 arrested were in the military including 12 Colonels, 18 Majors, 13 Captains, 11 Lieutenants and several NCOs. Included were Defense Ministry Director General, Brigadier Bompeye; Col. Kalomda and Major Kalume; National Police Chief's head adjutant, Col. Muepu; Presidential Security Officers Major Panubule; some Mirage jet fighter pilots and two Air-Zaire national airline pilots.

**Apparent Causes:** None given.


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**ZAIRE** (ac) 490 12-20-79

**Description:** The leader of the Zaire government in exile claimed that there was an attempted coup against the Mobutu regime by elements of the military. He said that the rebels tried to take over the airport in Kinshasa but were thwarted by loyal troops. Some rebel leaders were subsequently executed, but rebel NCOs and soldiers were shot on the spot. Borders were closed and a ban imposed on flights over the country.

**Participants:** Some Army officers, NCOs, and soldiers.

**Apparent Causes:** None given.
**ZAMBIA (ac) 551 01-?-80**

**Description:** It was alleged that an assassination attempt was made on the President in January, 1980 when nine army officers pursued him through the Presidential residence before being captured, interrogated and hanged.

**Participants:** Nine army officers.

**Apparent Causes:** None given.

**Source:** Keesings (1981:30738).

**ZAMBIA (ac) 551 10-16-80**

**Description:** The government claimed that an attempted coup had been foiled. The country's armed forces had apparently engaged in a gun battle in the south of Lusaka with some 200 men believed to be mercenaries and dissidents supported by South Africa. However, those arrested included Zambian military officers and civilian businessmen. A ban on private flying was imposed and a curfew declared in all main towns.

**Participants:** Maj. Gen. Kabwe and Brig.Gen Godfrey Miyanda, as well as mercenaries and civilian dissidents.

**Apparent Causes:** It was alleged that the aim was to form a government which would allow Katangese gendarmes to launch an attack on Zaire. Since most of the people arrested were from the Bemba ethnic group (Zambia's largest), an ethnic factor may have been involved.


**ZAMBIA (p) 551 06-14-81**

**Description:** It was announced on June 23rd that on June 14th the security forces claimed to have uncovered a coup planned for June 17 which would overthrow the government and assassinate President Kaunda. Alleged to be involved were South African mercenaries, Katangese gendarmes and some Zambian officers. Many arrests were made.

**Participants:** An army major and an airforce warrant officer.

**Apparent Causes:** To free the detained plotters of the October 16, 1980 coup.

**Sources:** Keesings (1981:31185), Africa Research Bulletin
ZIMBABWE (p) 552 02-17-82

Description: P.M. Mugabe announced that J. Nkomo had been dismissed from the government, following the discovery of a huge arms cache on a farm owned by Nkomo's party. It was alleged that he was planning to overthrow the government and plunge the country into a civil war. Nkomo later charged that the tale of an anti-government plot had been cooked up by Mugabe as an excuse to oust him from government.

Participants: Mugabe dismissed Nkomo and three members of his party from the Cabinet. On March 10th security forces arrested army Lt. Gen. Lookout Masuku (Mr. Nkomo's top military aid) and Dumiso Dabengwa (former supreme commander of ZIPRA, the military wing of Nkomo's Patriotic Front Party).

Apparent Causes: All involved were close associates of Nkomo, who was apparently harbouring a grudge over not being elected P.M. and was therefore determined to overthrow Mugabe's government.


ZIMBABWE (ac) 552 06-24-82

Description: The home of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe was attacked by a group of soldiers who had earlier seized weapons and commandeered a truck from Army barracks in Harare. The attackers were beaten off by guards at the gate of the house, but later exchanged fire with a Police officer guarding the home of Senator Enos Nkala, the Minister of Supplies. One soldier was killed and the rest fled. Eight soldiers of the National Army were later seized at roadblocks between Bulawayo and Harare. All were believed to be former members of Mr. Nkomo's ZIPRA freedom fighters.

Participants: Eight soldiers and an undisclosed number of civilians were subsequently arrested. The dead soldier was named as Sgt. Hlupo Tshuma.

Apparent Causes: None given.

## APPENDIX C: SUB-SAHARAN COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

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REFERENCES


ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES OF MILITARY COUPS D'ETAT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, 1960-1982

FINAL REPORT

APPENDIX D: CASE STUDIES OF AFRICAN MILITARY INTERVENTION

April 1983

Prepared for:
Defense Intelligence Agency
U.S. Department of Defense

A collaborative research project by The Orkand Corporation and Arizona State University.

The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the Defense Intelligence Agency or the United States Government.

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overthrown civilian regime of Dr. Busia. The two plots recorded under a civilian regime could be linked to junior officers' displeasure at the civilian regime's apparent inability to purge the country of corruption after the 1979 military uprising.

Analysis of Military Intervention, 1960-1982

Ghana has had three civilian and five military governments since independence in 1957. In order to understand the peculiar nature of the Ghanian military and its penchant to intervene in national politics, the civilian-military relations surrounding the first coup of February, 1966 become highly relevant.

Immediately after independence the politicization of the army became possible because of interference in internal military matters by the CPP and Prime Minister Nkrumah. The sudden expulsion of eight British officers from the army and the coincidental use of the army to quell the Sekondi-Takoradi riot of 1961 marked a watershed in civilian-military relations (Gutteridge: 1975, 68). In addition, the secondment of officer cadets for training in the USSR introduced the possibility of rival officer cliques in the army due to the potential effect of varying military traditions. The establishment of the PDGR and the transfer of all security functions to special agencies directly responsible to the President, as well as the introduction in 1964 of military training for the Workers' Brigade, directly challenged the corporate interests and prestige of the army.

These actions obviously marked the beginning of the differences between Nkrumah and his army, but in addition abrupt changes were made in the top army hierarchy as officers thought loyal to Nkrumah were promoted and others retired early. These actions were a sequel to the army's service in the Congo, where it
The last successful coup, of December 13, 1981, originated from outside of the army and was against the civilian government of Dr. Limman. It was prompted by the inability of the civilian government to stop the continued deterioration of the economy, as well as the alleged repressive nature of the regime. It aimed therefore at "revolution" to effect the social and economic transformation of Ghana. A Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) was formed, with Flt. Lt. Rawlings again as its leader.

In the category of attempted coups, a trend can be identified. Apart from the 1964 attempt on Nkrumah's life, all other attempts at overthrow were made while a military government was in power.

The January 2, 1964 attempt to assassinate and overthrow Nkrumah was as a result of his clampdown on political opposition and general dissatisfaction with his style of rule among the populace and security forces. It was therefore a conspiracy between the opposition and some elements in the police force.

The other failed attempts were each from within the three military governments that have ruled Ghana. Mainly junior officers were involved and the causes were varied. They ranged from lack of promotion, such as the March 17, 1967 attempt against the NLC which began as a mutiny by a section of the army; to reactions against corrupt senior officers and the general economic malaise of the state, such as Rawlings' abortive attempt of May 15, 1979; to divisions within the ruling military junta, such as the November 24, 1982 attempt against the PNDC which was carried out by soldiers loyal to Sgt. Akate-Pore, one of its members.

The recorded plots were mainly attempts to restore a previous government. The three plots recorded during the NLC were (unlike the attempted coup of the same period) aimed at the restoration of the overthrown Nkrumah. The six plots recorded during the NRC (1972-1978) were mainly aimed at bringing back the
and economic conditions of the country since independence. Politically, Nkrumah's dictatorial tendencies and extravagance were rejected, while the economic deterioration was reflected in the disproportionate increase of cost of living compared to national income, i.e. 56% to 3% respectively.

A seven man junta of army and police officers, led by General Ankrah, formed the National Liberation Council (NLC), ruled the country for several years until it returned power to civilian politicians.

The second coup (January 13, 1972) was against the civilian administration of Dr. Kofi Busia. It was in reaction to economic mismanagement, as well as a desire to protect the military's interests. The civilian regime had, among other things, devalued the currency, introduced austerity measures and cut military expenditures.

A National Redemption Council (NRC) headed by Colonel I. K. Acheampong was formed. It comprised five other officers and heads of the navy, air force and police.

The third coup, on May 7, 1978, was against the incumbent military government. General Acheampong was forcibly removed by the Supreme Military Council (SMC) and the mantle of leadership fell to General Akuffo. The coup was pre-emptive, and was undertaken to forestall a probably violent coup by junior officers who were dissatisfied with the country's unabated economic problems, and a controversial "Union-Government" proposal which could have civilianized the military government.

This was followed by the fourth coup, on April 6, 1979, staged by junior officers against the incumbent military government. It was instigated by the "need" to revamp the professional image of the army by punishing the corrupt senior officers and their civilian collaborators. An Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) was formed with Flt. Lt. Jerry Rawlings as its Chairman.
In the economic realm, Nkrumah saw industrialization in terms of rapid development of most aspects of the economy, including agriculture (Card, 1975: 817). He concentrated on large-scale development projects and committed the nation's 300 million pound foreign exchange reserve to the development of a modern infrastructure, which included tarred roads, harbor facilities, and the creation of the Volta River dam as the largest man-made lake in the world (Potholm, 1979: 51). However, all these projects were geared to long-term benefits at the expense of short-term economic goals. Prestige projects were also engaged in, such as the Palace of African Unity, built for a one-week conference at a cost of 30 million pounds (Lefever, 1970: 54).

In spite of these development efforts, many economic indicators were not positive. By 1965 a foreign debt of $1.26 billion had accumulated and more than 70% of this debt consisted of short-term obligations to Western countries (Potholm, 1970: 52). Rising unemployment was becoming a problem in the middle 1960s as the creation of new jobs did not keep pace with population growth and the vastly expanded educational system whose graduates were often left without employment for which they were qualified. Nkrumah's development policies started a trend in that since 1957 the balance-of-payments had shown a deficit every year due to declining cocoa prices and the increased import of capital goods.

Military Intervention, 1960-1982

The level of military involvement in politics in Ghana between 1960-1982, including plots, attempted coups, and successful coups d'état, is the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Ghana has experienced at least eleven plots, four attempted coups, and five successful coups overall.

In the category of successful coups, the first occurred on February 24, 1966, while President Kwame Nkrumah was away in Hanoi conducting a Vietnam peace mission. The coup can be viewed as a reaction to the adverse political
Development of National Government

At independence in 1957 Ghana had a unitary constitution. The CPP was in firm control of the central government, having won a majority of seats in the Legislature, and Nkrumah was elected Prime Minister of independent Ghana in the 1956 elections.

It was not long before Nkrumah abolished the interim regional assemblies, and his party's majority in the Legislature removed the constitutional safeguards for the opposition. He enacted the Preventive Detention Act in 1958, which was modified in 1962 to allow detention of anyone without trial from between one and twenty-eight days (Lefever, 1970: 44). The act restricted the press and opposition groups, with the result that the opposition, heretofore a coalition known as the United Party, crumbled (Austin, 1976: 96).

In 1960 a Republican Constitution was adopted and a Presidential system of government introduced, with Nkrumah being elected President. The new constitution concentrated powers in the hands of the President and in 1965 Nkrumah became President for Life (Apter, 1972: 337). With the introduction of the Republican Constitution and the use of the Preventive Detention Act, Ghana became a one party state in 1964 and the CPP became little more than a vehicle for Nkrumah's personal rule (Aluko, 1976: 7).

After independence Nkrumah did not continue the political mobilization of the populace and did not present his political policies to the people. The CPP, which had been a mass party at independence, withered away (Potholm, 1979: 53). There was increased disaffection among the students and intellectuals as the government became more repressive. In a move fraught with consequences, Nkrumah created a Presidential Own Guard Regiment (POGR) as a counterforce to the regular armed forces (Ocran, 1968).
made for the non-indigenisation of the officer corps of the Gold Coast Regiment. Therefore, at independence in 1957, only 10% of the regiment's officers were Ghanians (Lefever, 1970: 39).

The military and security forces were loyal to the British colonial power and played no part in fostering the decolonisation process (Lefever, 1970: 18), a process that was largely non-violent. In the first years of independence, the new Ghanian army did not identify with any political faction and was generally seen as a politically neutral symbol of statehood (Lefever, 1970: 40; Gutteridge, 1975: 32). In the British tradition, the army was a servant of the state and the government of the day. It was not to be involved in politics or to be partisan in any way. The army was both neutral toward and insulated from the political process in the Gold Coast-Ghana.

In the nationalist struggle for independence, the Convention People's Party (CPP), which had broken away from J.B. Danquah's elitist United Gold Coast Convention in 1949, played the leading role. At independence it was a mass party and its charismatic leader, Kwame Nkrumah, was regarded as a national hero (Aluko, 1976: 8). In its struggle for independence the CPP demanded "independence now" and because of its mass support, it was against the alliance of traditional chiefs and intellectuals, as represented by the UGCC. Its strategy was one of non-violence. Called "positive action" it included political agitation, newspaper and educational campaigns, strikes, boycotts and other forms of non-cooperation (Potholm, 1979: 54). After the CPP won a majority of seats in the Legislative Assembly in 1951 and Nkrumah became Leader of Government in 1952, its policy changed to one of negotiation with the British.
nevertheless fragile because it was based on the export of a single crop, cocoa, which in 1957 accounted for 66% of total exports. An additional problem was that of poor agricultural productivity, which resulted in an expenditure of 17.4 million pounds (a third of the country's total import bill) on food.

The Gold Coast's relative economic strength among African colonies was one reason why Great Britain granted it independence before any other entirely Black African territory (Sudan, independent in 1956, is an Arab-African state). At that time the British had no intention of continuing economic assistance to former colonies and it appeared that the new state of Ghana could finance its development efforts out of its accumulated foreign reserves and its export earnings. This ignored the dependent character of the Ghanian economy with its trade overwhelmingly concentrated on the U.K. and devoted to the export of a single major product (both classic indicators of a dependent economy). It also ignored the fact that Ghana had benefited from the Korean War-induced boom in commodity prices, a boom that was ending at the time of independence. Finally, this policy did not take account of the ambitions of Ghana's first Prime Minister, Kwame Nkrumah, who wished that his new state be a model for Africa and spent accordingly in often ill-conceived development efforts and in involvements elsewhere in Africa (e.g., Ghana's loan to Guinea in 1958 when Sekou Toure broke with the French).

The colonial military and security forces were imperial as the Gold Coast Regiment was part of the Royal West Africa Frontier Force (RWAFF). The Force, grouping units from all of Britain's West African territories, was small (9,000 in 1946) and based on the imperial strategy by which metropolitan or other colonial armies could be moved at a moment's notice in the event of an emergency. By implication, therefore, the Force was not intended to play a national role. The colonial strategy after 1947, predicated on the permanence of imperial rule,
19% (Tanzania) to 97% (Swaziland); 57% for Party Dominance (the percentage of the vote cast for the winning party at independence) whereas the thirty-five country mean value was 66%; and 11% for Political Participation (electoral turnout) where the range in values is from 1% (Tanzania) to 64% (Swaziland). As a consequence of the values on Jackman's independent variables, Ghana's predicted TMIS score is 22.9, some 25.1 points below its actual score of 48. The question must therefore be asked: Why do these structural determinants not account for the events occurring in Ghana between 1960 and 1982? This case study will therefore be an attempt to explain the unique case of Ghana.

An examination of pre- and post-independence politics and government and the country's instances of military intervention may highlight some of those features which are unique to Ghana.

Pre-Independence Government and Politics

Ghana's pre-independence politics (1945-1957) were characterized by a high level of agitation for self-rule. Frequent constitutional conferences were held after the Second World War, consequent on a change in colonial policy, in order to prepare the colonial Gold Coast for independence.

The colonial economy encouraged the production of raw materials, mainly cocoa and gold, for export to Britain. In 1957 (the year of independence) Ghana's trade was almost exclusively with Great Britain (total imports and exports to and from Great Britain were 98% and 96% respectively) as compared to only 0.5% with other West African states (Aluko, 1976). Per capita income was about 50 pounds sterling, some two and a half times that of Nigeria. Foreign reserve assets were 200 million pounds allowing the country to finance much of its own development from 1951-1957. Of the 124 million pounds spent, only 3.5 million was obtained from the U.S. (Aluko, 1976: 10). The national debt (much of it internal at independence) was only 20 million pounds. The economy was
whose levels of military involvement in politics in the period 1960-1982 were much lower than previous research would lead one to predict. Both states were therefore selected for intensive case study analysis.

CASE STUDIES OF SUB-SAHARIAN MILITARY INTERVENTION

Each of the case studies presented below will focus on the question: why does this state fail to fit the patterns of results as presented by Jackman's (1978) model. In answering this question, pre-independence developments, the development of the national government, the political role of the military, social mobilization, cultural pluralism, party system, and civilian-military relations will be analyzed vis-a-vis the country and Jackman's (1978) model.

GHANA

Introduction

In an attempt to identify the structural determinants of coups d'état in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1960-1975, the four variables of Social Mobilization, Ethnic Dominance, Party Dominance and Political Participation have been used by Jackman (1978). However, replication of Jackman's study to include coup data from 1975 to 1982 produced several outliers from the predictions of his structural model. The African state which most deviated from the model's predictions was Ghana, which experienced much more military intervention behavior than its scores on Jackman's four structural variables would have led one to predict.

For the period under study (1960-1982) Ghana's Total Military Involvement Score is 48 (the highest in Africa) as compared to the thirty-five country mean of 13.8. For each of the independent variables, it scored 74% on Social Mobilization (the second highest value) whereas the average value was 36%; 44% for Ethnic Dominance (size of the largest ethnic group) in an African range of from
African politics, it might be thought that the correct strategy for case selection would be to choose the four African states with the most military involvement activity not accounted for by Jackman's model—Ghana, Congo-Brazzaville, Uganda, and Madagascar. In nonexperimental research however the most satisfactory method is the method of concomitant variation. Therefore, we must select cases from among both high and low scoring classes of states.

Starting with those states which had more military involvement than predicted, Ghana immediately suggested itself as a candidate for a case study. Independent in 1957 under Kwame Nkrumah, the Black Star of Africa was at one time Africa's model of successful decolonialization and political modernization. Yet, today it ranks at the top of all Sub-Saharan African states in terms of its experience with military interventions and military rule. Having now chosen to study three states of British colonial heritage, it was incumbent upon us to select a state of French experiences. We chose the Central African Republic over the higher ranking Madagascar and Congo-Brazzaville because it has had two successful coups d'etat since 1975 and neither the Congo nor Madagascar have during the 1976-1982 period. Thus, the case studies presented in this Report have been selected from among those countries which least well agree with Jackman's previous study and which provide a balanced design between states with more and less than expected coup behavior and which have experienced such behavior since 1975.

Turning to the countries that manifested considerably less military involvement than predicted, we felt that Lesotho and Mauritius could be eliminated because of their relative insignificance in the world of African politics and United States interests. Sierra Leone and Tanzania remained as the two states...
Comparatively, only two African states had much less than predicted, Lesotho and Sierra Leone. Among the ten states with more military involvement than expected, common characteristics are not immediately apparent except that all but Madagascar have experienced significant military intervention events, coups or attempted coups, since 1975.

Among the states with less military involvement than expected, several common features are apparent. First, Lesotho, Mauritius, Botswana, and Swaziland were not included in Jackman's 1978 study. Also not included by Jackman was Madagascar, a state with considerably more coup behavior than predicted. The inclusion of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland among the states with much less than expected military involvement in national affairs reflects the fact that it was only in the late 1970s that these states even formed small army units and perhaps the fact that they are within the sphere of influence of the white controlled Republic of South Africa, which would very likely intervene in any one of these states if a military coup brought to power a new regime clearly hostile to white South African interests.

It is not clear how much can be made of the fact that seven of the ten African states with less than predicted military involvement scores are former British territories, whereas only three of the ten states that scored more than expected share this colonial background. If a British heritage tends to inhibit military interventions, they why have Ghana and Uganda had so many?

Given that little more can be said at this point about why these countries are deviant cases, our strategy has been to select from among them in an effort to uncover theoretically relevant reasons for their distance from what previous research would have led us to expect. Resources available required that we select but four countries for intensive case analysis. Since our primary concern in this report is to explain and forecast military interventions in
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APPENDIX D: CASE STUDIES OF AFRICAN MILITARY INTERVENTION

INTRODUCTION

During an early stage of our research project concerning military intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa, it was decided that systematic case studies would be undertaken on those countries that did not "fit" the patterns established from our analysis of quantitative models of this phenomenon. It was also decided via consultation with DIA that the deviant cases for the case studies would come from our replication of Jackman's (1978) model. The purpose of this Appendix is to present those case studies.

DEVIAN'T CASES OF THE JACKMAN REPLICATION MODEL

It will be recalled that when TMIS 1960-1982 was regressed on Jackman's seven independent variables the model did not fit well and that R Square, the amount of variance accounted for in TMIS 1960-1982, was only 42.6 percent (see Chapter V). This means that many of our thirty-five African states had military involvement scores that deviated significantly from this model's predictions. Some states had more military involvement than predicted by the model, others had less. In Table I we list the twenty states with the largest positive (more observed than predicted) and largest negative (less observed than predicted) residuals, or deviations from what Jackman's model when used with TMIS 1960-1982 would lead us to expect.

The numbers in Table I can be read as the distance of the state's total military involvement score from what was predicted by Jackman's model, the larger the number (residual) the greater the deviation from the model's prediction. Five states—Ghana, Congo-Brazzaville, Uganda, Madagascar, and the Central African Republic—had much more military involvement than predicted.
resisted Nkrumah's attempts to use it politically and instead chose its professional pride and integrity by obeying United Nations' directions. By implication, therefore, a basic disagreement between Nkrumah's government and its policies and the army could be said to have occurred. These early developments were unique to Ghana and were brought about by Nkrumah's pan-African ideas. This was in contrast to the modal situation in other Sub-Saharan states, where the politicization of the army was the result of the extension of ethnic and elite rivalry inside the military. A result was that the army became politicized and suspicious of politicians. It also made for homogeneity of the army along professional lines as contrasted to some African states where factions along ethnic lines tend to predominate.

The military and police coup d'état of 1966 can therefore be seen as reactive (Janowitz 1977: 161). This was demonstrated by the immediate and spontaneous widespread support for the NLC, which further indicated that the CPP had lost the genuine support of the Ghanian people (Lefever, 1970). The military regime was therefore of a "holding operation mode," which theoretically would quickly restore civilian rule (Decalo, 1976: 248). The emergent NLC government was a military-civilian coalition, (Bebler, 1971: 75) and it tried to restore power to traditional leaders. It was therefore anti-CPP and anti-socialist (Kraus, 1978: 15).

The 1972 NRC coup was also to some degree reactive in nature. While it aimed at the promotion of personal and corporate interests, it was also reacting to the deteriorating Ghanian economy. Also like Nkrumah, Busia tried to switch top military officers around in order to put trusted officers in top military commands.
Nevertheless, the NRC coup also revealed a different pattern of military intervention. The mere occurrence of the coup showed that the army had overthrown civilian regimes from opposing wings of the national elite; the CPP of Nkrumah and the Patriotic Front (PP) of Dr. Busia. In institutional terms, the army became non-aligned vis-a-vis the two major political groupings within the country (Hansen and Collins, 1980: 7). Two basic problems therefore confronted the military: the problem of legitimacy and the question of disengagement. Legitimacy implies the ability to mobilize support predicated upon effective performance. The NRC initially achieved some economic improvement, especially in agricultural development (Shepard, 1978: 54). Yet because of the 1973 oil crisis, the government ran into the same economic problems that had plagued previous regimes (Bank and Jordan, 1975: 126). With increased political problems it became more difficult to mobilize political support. In addition, the political establishments of the CPP and the PP combined to mobilize the populace against the regime.

The NRC was originally of a "holding operation modality," but, having no identifiable elite civilian collaborators, it increasingly changed to a "bureaucratic modality," in other words it ceased to see itself as transitional in nature. It divided the country into nine districts and put military officers in charge of each. General Acheampong proposed a no-party political system (the so-called Union Government) which would be a combined military-civilian regime. The concept was alien to the political values of the country, and was opposed by the elites, who organized strikes and demonstrations from 1975 to 1976 that embraced all strata of society. Socio-economic mismanagement was therefore linked to a non-democratic political system (Rothchild and Boadi, 1981: 4), with resulting pressures on the NRC to return to barracks.
An important aspect of the political development of Ghana under the NRC may have been the personal ambition of Acheampong to seek political support outside the army by his strategy of Union Government. The implication is that factions existed in the army which opposed the bureaucratization of military rule. It may also plausibly explain the dramatic increase in Ghana's military intervention score between 1976 and 1982. Military intervention and rule in Ghana had been characterized by a "holding modality" until the idea of the Union Government was raised, which could be said theoretically to have infringed upon the traditional neutrality and autonomy of the army. Rawlings' abortive coup of May 1979 and his successful one in June of the same year that brought the AFRC to power can be seen more as expressions of popular frustration and as means of purifying the existing order, rather than as rebellions against the current government. Rawlings' actions of 1979 may indicated a degree of professional concern by the army, especially as the execution of some senior officers was described as "house-cleaning," in order to redeem the image of the army before power was handed over to civilians.

The 1981 coup was different from those preceding it in that it was "designed" rather than reactive in nature. The deposed civilian government was no better than the military government it had replaced. The tide of economic decline was not halted, inflation was at 120% and shortages in essential consumer goods continued (Kraus, 1982: 60). This caused a loss of political support for the government. But the coming to power of the PNDC marked a different format in civil-military relations in Ghana, as the new junta had no immediate plans for handing power back to the civilians. Flt. Lt. Rawlings was quoted as declaring, "I ask for nothing less than a revolution, something that will transform the social and economic order of the country." In terms of mobilization, it rode on the populist expressions that had been manifested in the 1979 coup,
and on the nationalist personality and popularity that Rawlings had then acquired. The PNDC allied itself to the "masses" in an attempt to build a civilian base in the country by bypassing the professional and the elite, who had organized the downfall of Colonel Acheampong.

Conclusion

What is unique to Ghana is the relative unimportance of cultural pluralism as a factor in military involvement in politics, whereas it is very important in some countries, such as Nigeria. It is true that Rawlings' AFRC was composed mainly of members of the Ewe ethnic group, but the attempt by the PNP (the last civilian party) to use this ethnic composition to discredit the AFRC and to prevent the emergence of the PNDC did not work. Issues in Ghana have revolved more around economic conditions, which cut across ethnic divisions. Political mobilization for or against military governments therefore has not been on ethnic grounds. Since Jackman's structural model places great emphasis on Ethnic Dominance and its interaction with Party Dominance and Political Participation, while completely ignoring measures of economic performance, it is not surprising that Ghana is such a deviant case.

Another characteristic which distinguishes Ghana from much of the rest of sub-Saharan Africa is its relatively high degree of national integration. To be sure, the people of Ghana can be categorized into various ethnic groups, but party competition in the country from independence onwards has eschewed regional or cultural polarization to a great extent. This has made it difficult for aspiring political leaders to build the basis of their support along ethnic lines, unlike in Benin where the army serves a "managerial brokerage function" among contending ethnic and regional groups (Decalo, 1976: 247). This lack of a non-traditional base of support makes the military responsive to public opinion and pressure and thereby guards against the establishment of personal
dictatorships, such as in Zaire or Uganda. The frequency of military interventions must, therefore, be seen in terms of the political culture of Ghana which relates to a larger territorial unit, unlike some African states where the parochial, traditional culture still competes effectively with the modern nation-state system. Such a high level of political interest was seen in the degree of party competition in 1969, where eleven parties (later merged into five) fought the 1969 election (African Research Bulletin, 1969: 1464). It was also demonstrated in the 1979 election, where the PNP won only 35.3% of the vote and had to win the Presidential race in a runoff election (ARB, 1979: 5308).

Politics in Ghana now revolve around class and ideological differences far more than ethnic rivalry. Diverse interests or policy differences will either be reflected in competitive elections, as in 1956, 1969 and 1979, or they will find an outlet through differences within the military hierarchy, as reflected in a high level of coup activity.

Post-independence elections and other measures of national politics were not included in Jackman's model. Also ignored was post-independence economic performance such as inflation and economic stagnation. In the case of Ghana, the 1969 and 1979 elections reflected changes in power relations and Political Participation, although the country still retained, in some measure, the same party system, i.e., pro and anti CPP. An analysis based upon pre-independence, as was Jackman's, cannot adequately capture power relations in Ghana that have evolved over time: first, competition among civilian elites, second, civilian elites against military elites, and now the military against itself.
THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Introduction

The former French colony of Oubangui-Shari was granted independence on August 13, 1960 and assumed the name of the Central African Republic (the CAR). The country's new leaders had hoped to form a federation which would include the other three French equatorial states (Gabon, Middle Congo and Tchad), but lack of enthusiasm for the project from the other leaders forced the landlocked, undereducated and underpopulated territory to assume the burdens of independence alone.

The country's experience since independence has not been a happy one. It has remained poor, underdeveloped, and politically unstable. Yet, when the territory was granted semi-autonomy in 1957 it possessed an able leader, a diverse agricultural base, diamond mines, and a relatively united population. While the vast majority of the population was illiterate, it would have been difficult to predict then the turn that future events were to take. An analysis of the country's history, from the end of World War II to the present, will be undertaken in an attempt to discover those factors which may have contributed to the CAR's high level of military involvement in politics.

Pre-Independence Developments

From the end of 1945 until the granting of independence in 1960 the Federation of French Equatorial Africa (AEF) was governed by local Territorial Assemblies, with each assembly consisting of two electoral colleges. The first, known as the "Citoyens de Statut Francais," was elected by French residents and the more educated members of the local population enjoying the status of citizens of France. The whole of Oubangui and Chad formed a single electoral constituency. The second, larger college, named "Citoyens de Statut Local," was supposedly
elected by enfranchised Africans, but the electors were in fact mainly government officials and non-French settlers and merchants. The major problem faced by all the Assemblies in French Africa was the fact that their powers had never been clearly defined, but this problem was exacerbated in Oubangui as tension existed, not only between the Assembly and administration but also between the first and second Colleges.

Economically, the territory of Oubangui-Shari was first exploited for its rubber, but the first companies to arrive in the territory around 1900 also came full of illusions about its endowment of natural resources. The country's land-locked position and lack of adequate roads, coupled with the fact that human porterage was the only means of transportation, made it almost impossible to develop the country at a profit. Yet, by the system of concessions, instituted between 1898 and 1900, companies were granted rights of tenure and exploitation (usually for thirty years) except for mineral resources, in exchange for fixed annual payment to the colonial government and a 15 percent share of the profits. The system of forced labor that ensued created misery for the population and its decimation from sleeping sickness. However, even after the scandal of the companies broke in France, most of them managed to preserve their privileges. They simply became trading and transportation companies, which allowed them to conserve their monopoly positions right up to the time of independence.

Even though forced labor was officially abolished in 1946, compulsory cultivation of cotton in Chad and Oubangui provided more than 60 percent of the revenue of French Equatorial Africa. The prospects for independence were welcomed by the population which had a dislike for the colonially required cultivation of cotton, due to its association with coercion.

Other than cotton, coffee was the major crop. However the planting and cultivation remained largely in the hands of Europeans, who were so anxious to
preserve their monopoly that at a so-called production conference held in Bangui in 1950, they succeeded in preventing the development of plantations by Africans.\footnote{Their arguments, such as the risk of theft on the European plantations, the danger of parasites through insufficient attention to hygiene, and the possibility of contaminating the 'methodical' plantations, were mere pretexts. The colonists really feared that if planting were introduced in the villages, it would deprive them of the labor they obtained at a strict minimum wage without even having to provide food (Kalck, 1971: 88).} Mining was the other major source of income, with two French companies, the "Compagnie Equatoriale des Mines," and the "Companie Miniere de l'Oubangui Chari," predominating. The United States became the principal importer of Central African industrial diamonds when in 1950 substantial American loans were granted to the chief mining companies in exchange for guaranteed delivery to the American government.

On the eve of independence, Oubangui's economic prospects were not promising. Agricultural production remained low due to the population's distaste for certain occupations associated with forced labor, as well as its ignorance of scientific farming methods. A proposal to regroup some scattered villages and to create experimentally a few collectives in the cotton country was therefore put forward.

The colonial army recruited in French Africa was known as the "Force Noire," and consisted mainly of Senegalese troops until the introduction of compulsory military service in 1919. However, due to the fact that AEF's population was sparse and generally in poor physical shape, only a small proportion of those eligible to serve were actually drafted. In fact conscription was hardly necessary, as members of Chad's Sara tribe happily volunteered for military service in large numbers. During World War II the Free French army in the Federation numbered around 10,000 men, and although the Oubangian Rifles were fairly active,
the vast majority of the troops were Sara. In Oubangui itself, a French military garrison provided the country's only defense forces until a national army was established in 1962, two years after independence. Colonel Jean-Bedel Bokassa was its first Chief of Staff. The police force numbered only about a thousand on the eve of independence.

The "Mouvement Pour L'Evolution Sociale De L'Afrique Noire" (MESAN) was founded in Bangui in September, 1949, by Barthélemy Boganda, who wished it to be open to "all the Blacks of the world," (Kalck, 1980: 90). The Europeans, who assumed Boganda was a communist, responded by opening branches of the Gaullist "Rassemblement de Peuple Français" (RPF), but this party was never popular with the Central African masses as they associated it with coercion and French colonial rule.

Boganda was a former headmaster and defrocked priest (he had been educated by the Catholic missions) who liked to introduce himself as the son of a polygamous cannibal (Kalck, 1971: 75). To the people of Oubangi, Boganda was MESAN. He had been elected to the French National Assembly in 1946, but his impassioned speeches on the injustices inflicted on his people by the colonists, while listened to politely, were largely ignored by the French. He therefore became disillusioned with Parliamentary circles, and decided to devote himself to becoming a popular leader rather than a colonially elected politician. His success in this venture was such that the highly religious population came to regard him as an "African Christ." Although Boganda authorized other parties, which were effectively no more than tiny groups, when Oubangui became semi-autonomous in 1957 MESAN won all the seats in the elections to the first Government Council. Boganda's untimely and suspicious death in a plane crash in 1959 left a political void in the country on the eve of independence which has never really been filled to this day. His replacement theoretically should have been

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the Vice-President of the government, Abel Goumba, but the Minister of the Interior, David Dacko, used his alleged kinship as Boganda's nephew to brush aside Goumba's succession and take over himself.2

The Development of National Government

The 1958 constitution, promulgated by Boganda, guaranteed basic political and human freedoms. Goumba had responded to this by founding a new party, the "Mouvement d'Evolution Democratique de l'Afrique Centrale," (MEDAC). A proposal by Dacko to the Central African Legislative Assembly in November 1960 effectively to suppress all the constitutional liberties elaborated by Boganda was greeted by a protest demonstration from MEDAC. Dacko then used this as a pretext to dissolve the party and arrest its leaders.

The constitutional amendment having been passed, Dacko set out to transform MESAN into a mass movement and the single legal party in the country. In November it was announced that all political parties were to be dissolved and MESAN institutionalized as the ruling party. The party was in effect fused with the organs of the State and a party-State created.

The entire population, children included, were to belong to the party. MESAN was to be responsible for all political appointments, from Municipal Councillor to Head-of-State. A Management Committee was created and charged with defining national policy and ensuring its execution.

This body issued a Constitutional Law in November 1963 by which the regime was to become presidential. The President was to be elected for seven years by universal suffrage. In January 1964 Dacko was presented by MESAN as the sole presidential candidate, and was elected with ninety percent of the vote. In

2 Dacko was able to use his support among Bangui's colonial administrators to his advantage. See Pierre Kalck, La Republique Centrafricaine. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1971, p. 24.
March of the same year a new Assembly was elected from a single MESAN list of sixty names.

This election marked the end, as Dacko had hoped, of all political pluralism in the country. Opposition leaders had been imprisoned and their parties banned. Also, all trade unions were re-grouped into one state-controlled union.

Having thus consolidated his power, Dacko set out to reform the economy, and in this his success was mixed. Priority was given to the cotton sector. After negotiations with the cotton companies in December 1963, a joint-stock company, created out of the existing four companies, was to take charge of the whole sphere of production, from cultivation to sales. The cotton zones were to be reduced to more manageable proportions, with a resulting decrease in costs. This collaboration between the cotton companies and the state resulted in the founding of the "Union Cotonniere Centrafricaine" (UCCA). This reform of Dacko's finally began to produce results around 1967, but by then his successor was to reap the benefits.

Reforms in the mining sector included the establishment of a diamond stock market so that government taxes could be based on the real value of the stones, and the foundation of a search syndicate called Grands Collecteurs, which was given a contract to dredge the deep rivers. Half of the profits from this venture would go to the State, even though it had contributed nothing. By these measures, the government's future mining revenues seemed assured.

Dacko was eager to industrialize. Within seven years he hoped to have built a textile factory, an oil and soap works, an iron works, a cement works, and a factory to manufacture bags and sacking. The aim was to augment the value of the products produced in the country. By the time he was overthrown the building of the textile factory was already underway.
His attempt to reform agriculture was Dacko's most conspicuous and costly failure. His "Jeunesse Pionniere Nationale" was an attempt to create villages along the lines of kibbutzism in Israel, and several youth camps were founded in the countryside and placed under the direction of Israeli officers. The system infuriated the peasants, however. They saw in it the production of a new privileged rural class to replace the former colonial administration. By the time the experimental structures were dismantled, millions of CFA francs had been spent.

Dacko was one of the founders of a true regional common market, which replaced the customs union that had previously existed between the former AEF states. In December 1964 the "Union Douaniere et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale" (UDEAC) was created, with Bangui being chosen as the organization's headquarters.

In spite of Dacko's efforts, CAR's internal problems were becoming increasingly impossible to cover up. Numerous difficulties existed in the prefectures and sub-prefectures, with conflicts among administrators, Ministers, and leading party members, who levelled almost constant accusations of corruption and inefficiency at each other. A decree issued in November 1964 set up "vigilance committees" to try to settle the differences between MESAN and representatives of the administration. What these committees revealed was that there was effectively no real state of party structure, just a network of taxation benefiting the government and MESAN.

Dissatisfaction was widespread. The capitation tax on the peasants left them with virtually nothing, to which they responded with increased inertia and passive resistance, resulting in a disastrous cotton season in 1965. Dacko then took the step of re-introducing forced labor to improve output. Salaried workers and traders had a portion of their salaries deducted to contribute to a national
loan in aid of social and economic development, with goals that were never
clearly defined. All this was in stark contrast to the Ministers, Members of
Parliament and higher party officials who continued to maintain an extravagant
lifestyle. This new elite was also unhappy, however, over Dacko's signing of
a treaty of friendship with the People's Republic of China and its opening of
an embassy in Bangui.

When the President presented the Assembly with budget proposals for 1966
reducing expenditure by about two thousand million CP francs, his political doom
was effectively sealed. Aware of his inability to manage the country's financ-
es he offered to resign, but his resignation was rejected by MESAN on the grounds
that the lack of an obvious successor could only lead to chaos.

Military Interventions, 1960-1982

A plot by the gendarmerie to overthrow the government was discovered by
the army, and on the last day of 1965, the Chief of Staff, Col. Bokassa,
outwitted Chief of Police Izamo and had him arrested. The army then went ahead
with its own plan to take over, a plan which had been minutely prepared by
Captain Banza. Parachutists stormed the radio station and Presidential Palace,
and Dacko and his Cabinet were placed under house arrest. On the morning of
January 1, 1966 Bokassa proclaimed that "the bourgeoisie is abolished, and a
new era of equality between all citizens is inaugurated." He claimed to have
saved the President's life by forestalling a coup attempt by Izamo and his
"pro-Chinese accomplices." Following the coup Communist Chinese nationals were
ordered to leave the country within 48 hours and diplomatic relations with
China were broken. The National Assembly was dissolved and a Revolutionary
Council established.

The coup leader, Colonel Jean-Bedel Bokassa, was also a relative of Boganda. He was born in Boubangui, Lobaye, in 1921. When he was six his father, who was suspected of being a German sympathizer, was beaten to death by French officials, and his mother committed suicide from grief (Kalck, 1971: 154). In spite of these unpleasant early experiences Bokassa was loyal to France, in fact he always considered himself French. In 1939 he joined the French army, where he served with distinction and was decorated twice. In 1960 he returned home with the rank of Lieutenant. He founded the new Republic's army in 1962, and in 1963, when a major, he was appointed Chief of Staff at the Ministry of Defense.

Bokassa apparently did not intend to remain long in power. He explained that he had felt it incumbent upon him to act, due to the previous regime's extravagance resulting in the depletion of the national income, but that "as soon as order is restored and the economy is on a firm footing again, I, who am a soldier not a politician, shall feel it my duty to put forward President Dacko as candidate in the elections. If he wins, he will return to power. If another Central African is elected, then he will take over. But until then, President Dacko must stand aside while I try to bring the situation back to normal," (Kalck, 1971: 155).

Two constitutional documents were drawn up to serve as the basis of the new regime. The first authorized the President to deal by decree with circumstances as they arose, the second set out the regime's structure.

Captain Banza, who had planned the coup, was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and became Minister of Finance. He belonged to the numerous Baya ethnic group, whose members so far had been excluded from governmental circles. Also chosen were two French-educated young civil servants, Ange Patasse and Antoine Kezza,
countries, Tanganyika never developed a wealthy, politically oriented farming class.

For the most part, development of the Tanganyikan economy was dependent upon the British colonial administration. By the 1950s, "Even the British prewar expectations for Tanganyika had not entirely been satisfied (Bienen, 1967: 275). Educational facilities were not sufficiently expanded, the groundnut scheme for clearing and planting crops came far short of the envisioned three million acres and investment for the future development of the economy was neglected. Tanganyika's misfortune was a product of the relative unimportance the British attached to the country's natural resources and its "European community."

Role of Colonial Military. The role and composition of the military in East Africa was similar, if not identical to the RWAFF of West Africa. The military's primary function was to augment the British Royal Army in times of crises, and maintain internal stability at home.

The East African force, the King's African Rifles (KAR) comprised militia from Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika. Discriminatory recruitment practices favored soldiers from territories of supposed martial tradition. No attempt was made to balance representation in the military proportional to tribal composition in the population. However, unlike the other two countries, misrepresentation in the military did not prove to be a serious problem for Tanganyika, due to the absence of tribalism in the country (Gutteridge, 1969: 25).

Similar to the RWAFF, whereby soldiers were stationed in "tribal enemy territory", in the KAR, soldiers from one country were often stationed in another. The British exploited both internal heterogeneity and traditional rivalries for the purpose of maintaining domestic tranquility.
of authority in local regions. Subsequently, it left a vacuum for political organization of the rural peasants.

The white-settler community of Tanganyika accounted for less than 2% of the total population. Unlike Kenya and Uganda, which housed a relatively homogeneous European community, the European community of Tanganyika was comprised of various Greek, Italian, Asian and South African minorities.

Tanganyika's "insignificant" European community, in combination with its relatively unstrategic location and immaterial natural resources made the country one of the least important of Britain's colonial possessions. Because the British had competing demands elsewhere and the payoff for Tanganyika judged to be small, the country's economic development was somewhat neglected. It wasn't until the postwar period that the British attempted to stimulate the economy in preparation for independence, as required by the United Nations' Trusteeship Council.

**Economic System.** Under colonial rule, Tanganyika remained a poor, underdeveloped country. Large regional inequalities in population distribution were, to a large extent, the result of a poor communication and transportation network and British colonial development policies.

Agricultural production accounted for 40% of the country's GDP and almost 80% of total export earnings (Grove, 1974: 862). Sisal alone accounted for one-third of total domestic exports. Sisal was one of the few products which was traditionally controlled by non-Africans. Coffee and cotton, the second and third largest export products were generally produced by African peasants.

The non-monetary or subsistence sector accounted for more than one-third of the total GDP (Bienen, 1967: 262). To an increasing extent, farmers were introducing cash crops to their land. However, unlike other East African
Tanzania has experienced far less military intervention than the Jackman replication model predicted. The size, heterogeneity, and frequent periods of harsh economic conditions suggest greater instability. Tanzania however, remains a relatively stable and politically calm nation. The following case study examines Tanzania's history in light of Jackman's dominant variables and attempts to explain the country's stability by taking account of factors exogenous to the Jackman replication model.

Preindependence Government

Following World War I, Tanganyika was established as an international trusteeship under the jurisdiction of the League of Nations, and later transferred under the aegis of the United Nations. Nonetheless, the British administered the country essentially as a colony according to the principles of "indirect rule."

Unlike most other East and West African countries, the British system of indirect rule in Tanganyika undermined the very institutions it sought to uphold (Bienen, 1967: 41). Following World War II, the British relied on the traditional chiefs to implement colonial agricultural and land policies. Strong opposition to colonial policies, in addition to the inherent weakness of the traditional chiefdoms, further discredited the local rulers and British control. In the 1950's the British introduced multi-racial elected councils, to represent both Asian and Europeans, as well as Africans. The elected councils eventually replaced the local traditional authorities. The absence of strong centralized tribal chiefs in Tanganyika, prevented the British from developing a strong hold
Bokassa. Thieves were to have an ear cut off for each of the first two offenses, followed by a hand for the third. He was known to have personally beaten to death a number of petty criminals in Ngaragba prison in order to "set an example" (Africa Contemporary Record, 1976-77: B475). The fact that he claimed his lavish lifestyle was endorsed by the people, who wanted to see their "Emperor" live well, was an illustration of the degree to which he had lost touch with the masses. Bokassa's rule was so abhorred by students and workers in the towns that they found it difficult to accept Dacko's return to power due to his close association with his predecessor. It was Bokassa, as much as the military, that was responsible for Dacko's overthrow a second time.

In addition to putting to death an unpopular chief, it was also expected in the tribes that if the chief was obviously no longer effective as a leader, he would remove himself voluntarily. These beliefs may somewhat explain why the overthrow of a modern political leader in the CAR is in fact in keeping with tradition. Yet the irony of the situation is the fact that traditional social structures are profoundly democratic. The fact that seventy-nine percent of the population shares these, coupled with the presence in the country of French-educated students who have returned imbued with democratic principles, makes the lack of democracy in the country all the more unfortunate. Yet it must also be a source of hope; the installation in power of an able and dedicated, not to mention democratic leader, could usher in a new era of political stability and allow the development of enduring political institutions to finally begin.
Ethnic rivalry is not a major factor in Central African politics; the main division that exists is between the detribalized town dwellers and the traditional peasants. This urban-rural gap has been, and continues to be, one of the major factors contributing to the country's history of instability.

If national integration is to be achieved with a concomitant decrease in military intervention events, then another charismatic leader like Boganda must be found. By the time independence was granted the village chief was a figure from the past, due to the fact that the French colonial administration had replaced them with village administrators, whose claims to authority had no basis in traditional society. By portraying himself as a mediator between the French and the people, and leaving no doubt as to whose side he was on Boganda was seen in the eyes of the people as a traditional king, not as a modern politician. He ultimately came to be seen as a "Black Christ" due to the fact that he had been ordained a priest, even though he was later defrocked for marrying a French woman (Kalck, 1980: 17). His own lifestyle was closer to that of the villagers than to the Europeans. Yet although he spoke of detribalism, economic development, industrialization and the creation of a nation state, he convinced the peasants that such measures would be to their benefit. If Boganda had survived the plane crash, the history of the country may have been quite different.

Spiritual successors to Boganda have and do exist, but they have either been imprisoned or exiled for too long to have been effective. Men such as Ange Patasse have the respect both of trade unions and students in the towns, as well as the peasants in the countryside. Now in exile in Togo, his return to power could herald the beginning of real political stability.

The impact of Bokassa's "reign" on Central African politics cannot be overstated. In terms of brutality he easily rivalled Amin of Uganda and Macie of Equatorial Guinea. Petty crime was said not to exist in the country under
segments of the population did not identify with the dominant party. Within a very short time after Dacko's accession to power most of the peasants (eighty percent of the population) ceased to identify with MESAN.

From the regressions that Jackman ran on his four variables, he concluded that a strong political party is particularly important where a dominant ethnic group exists, and that party strength is a more stabilizing force than mass political participation in the form of voter turnout in countries with a dominant ethnic group. Since we have shown in the case of the CAR that in addition to low political participation a dominant ethnic group does exist and that the dominant party is weak, Jackman's general model may well account for more of the political instability in the CAR than was at first apparent.

We have attempted to show that it may have been the indicators used by Jackman (1978), rather than his theoretical propositions, which produced a false image of stability in the CAR. However, there are certainly factors within the country, not examined by Jackman, which need to be considered in order to fully understand its troubled history.

As already stated, education in the country beyond the primary level of 1960 was virtually non-existent. Most future politicians were the products of mission schools, but these were not sufficiently numerous to provide the country with the administrators it also required. Important positions were therefore filled by the semi-educated, who having lost their traditional roots were quickly seduced by high salaries and material advantages. The rural population meanwhile, which had rallied temporarily to Boganda's call to set aside tribal affiliations and place the country first, (as it was evidently based on a genuine concern for his people's welfare), now sunk deeper than ever into their traditional way of life as a means of escape from the injustices inflicted by the "black whites."
were also temporary rulers with limited time in office, and they too could be put to death by the people. The chiefs of villages or heads of wider geographical areas were considered as mere mediators among family groups or lineages. The only organized, large social unit was the clan, or group of lineages. Its role was so important that Boganda described it as being the equivalent of the European concept of nation (Kalck, 1971: 28).

Another similarity between these ethnic groups is that of the importance of age groups. In the so-called secret societies, young people receive an agricultural, social, and religious training that lasts for several years and produces a mature member of society. Not to have been initiated is still regarded as a form of illegitimacy.

The traditional social organization has a religious basis. All the groups believe in the existence of one supreme being, although he has a different name for each. This may account for the widespread adoption of Christianity among the various people of the CAR. They also believe that the dead remain part of the clan of the living, and are not preoccupied with fear of death.

Therefore, in language, social structure, and religious beliefs, Jackman's indicators of cultural homogeneity, the Baya-Mandjia, Banda and Sara tribes are a homogenous group. Together they form seventy-nine percent of the population, so if they, and not the Banda alone, had been considered the largest ethnic group in the country, Ethnic Dominance would have been apparent in Jackman's results for the CAR.

In the case of Party Dominance, eighty-nine percent of Central Africans who voted did vote for MESAN at the election of April 5, 1959. What this does not reveal however, is that the election was barely one month after Boganda's death, and that more than forty-five percent of the eligible voters abstained. Party dominance would surely not be a stabilizing factor if in fact large
order to stay in power. The privileges he heaped upon them only seemed to increase their indifference to the poverty of the mass of the people in the villages. Their thirst for power and money was evidenced by the constant bickering and corruption which came to typify Dacko's administration.

While the majority of the population remained almost totally untouched by independence, it was the rapid upward mobility of this particular new class that was to be the source of potential for instability. Since coup activity is undertaken by the few, upward social mobility by the many is not a necessity in order for instability to occur. Bokassa recognized that it was this new elite which was the barrier to the country's political development, and it was this class that he claimed to have abolished on seizing power in 1966. However, as his lust for power increased, the elite became more entrenched than ever.

Jackman's (1978: 1263) indicator of Cultural Pluralism, i.e., the percentage of the population in the largest ethnic group, is also deceptive in the case of the CAR. By Cultural Pluralism he is referring to the extent to which countries are heterogenous with respect to "primordial" attachments such as language, religion, and ethnicity. By the same token, a country would be considered homogeneous if its population shared common primordial attachments.

In the CAR there are eight major ethnic groups: Baya-Mandjia, Banda, Oubanguians, Sara, Zande, Nzakara, Muslims and Camerounians. These groups all share remarkably similar language patterns, one of Jackman's indicators of ethnicity. In addition, the baya-Mandjia, Banda, and Sara have attracted the attention of ethnologists because of their identical social structures, which can be described as a state of "ordered anarchy."

In the case of an external threat a war-chief would be selected and given wide powers, but these powers would cease with the hostilities. Any chief who refused to relinquish his powers would be executed by the people. Tribal kings
He found that, in contrast to some earlier studies, increased electoral turnout decreases the probability of coups, as there is less need for covert political activity. In the CAR, only eight percent of the population were voters, a very low score by African standards. Thus, on only one out of four variables did the CAR score high. Those variables on which the country scored low will therefore be considered in more detail.

In the CAR, the percentage of population not in agriculture and the percentage of population literate are not particularly valid indicators of social mobilization. At independence the lack of education was undoubtedly more of a problem. Secondary education was limited to one lycee in Bangui, which had a staff of nineteen teachers, all of them Europeans. Technical education was practically non-existent; only one person was awarded the Certificate of Professional Aptitude in 1959. There was no institution to train students in public administration. In 1959-60, most primary schoolteachers, overseers in the cotton zone and in the Public Works, as well as agents in the coffee plantations, were Europeans.

Boganda had planned for the Europeans to remain in the country until such time as qualified Africans could take over, which in his estimation would be about twenty years. The French had, however, installed unqualified Africans in many positions of authority after granting semi-autonomy to the colony in 1957. Boganda saw this as a deliberate attempt to wreak administrative havoc in order to forestall aspirations for independence. He watched with horror the emergence of this new African bourgeoisie whom he called "Mbouzou Voko", (black whites) as they were scarcely distinguishable in behavior from their French predecessors, whom they wished to emulate. He did not wish independence to come to the country before the people were really ready. Yet it was this same new class that Dacko, claiming to be Boganda's spiritual successor, actively cultivated in
percentage of the population not in agriculture and the percentage of the population that were literate were added together to form an index. Findings showed that Social Mobilization will have a destabilizing influence in countries that do not have well-developed political institutions. The Central African Republic certainly did not possess the latter on its attainment of independence, yet only two percent of the population was literate and only fifteen percent not employed in agriculture. The overall score of twenty-five percent was therefore low in comparison to the rest of Black Africa, so this particular variable would seemingly not account for the country's high level of coup activity.

For Cultural Pluralism, the percentage of the population in the country's largest ethnic group was used by Jackman as an indicator. It was found that the presence of a dominant ethnic group, i.e. accounting for at least forty-four percent of the population, was a destabilizing factor, as other groups might find difficulty in achieving political representation. In the CAR the largest group is the Banda, which account for only thirty-one percent of the population. On this variable also therefore, the country scored low in comparison to other African states.

For Party Dominance, Jackman used as an indicator the percentage of the vote cast for the winning party in the election closest to, but preceding independence. His findings indicated that Party Dominance is a stabilizing factor, in fact multipartyism, while destabilizing, is particularly so when coupled with the presence of a dominant ethnic group. In the CAR, MESAN received a high eighty-nine percent of the votes in the election immediately prior to independence. This, coupled with the lack of a dominant ethnic group, should have made the country particularly stable.

Jackman's measure of Political Participation was the number of voters in the last election prior to independence as a percentage of the total population.
appointed in an attempt to show willingness to break with the past. But follow-
ing Presidential elections in March 1981, in which Dacko got 50 percent of the
vote amid accusations of irregularity by his opponents, his regime became in-
creasingly repressive. Legislative elections were never held, and an important
trade union was banned. Dacko also lost the support of France when Francois
Mitterand's Socialist party gained power. By August he was apparently in poor
health, and was persuaded to hand over power to the military. The entire mili-
tary hierarchy then entered the government, with Chief of Staff Andre Kolingba
becoming Head of State. Dacko's political opponents issued a joint letter of
support for the new government, while urging a quick return to democracy. By
March of 1982, when there was still no sign of the regime's departure, Patasse
and his supporters staged an abortive coup. Patasse took refuge in the French
embassy in Bangui (France denied any involvement in the coup attempt) before
being given political asylum in Togo.

Analysis of Military Involvement in CAR Politics

According to the model of coups d'etat elaborated by Jackman (1978), the
Central African Republic should have had much less military involvement than it
has experienced. An attempt must therefore be made to explain why this has been
the case. First, a brief description of Jackman's theory will be given. This
will then be followed by a fuller analysis of his use of variables as they re-
late to the CAR. Finally, an attempt will be made to discover those factors
peculiar to the Central African Republic which were not accounted for in Jackman's
analysis.

The four variables used by Jackman to explain coup activity in Black Africa
between 1960 and 1975 were Social Mobilization, Ethnic Dominance, Party Domi-
nance and Political Participation. As indicators of Social Mobilization, the
Contemporary Record, 1978-79: B520). Zairean troops brought in to quell the riots killed anywhere from one hundred to three hundred protestors. Bokassa then rescinded the order on the uniforms and blamed Lebanese merchants for the troubles.

The spirit of rebellion intensified over the next few months, and came to a head in May 1979 when reports began to circulate that Bokassa had helped the police to massacre over a hundred children. They were apparently suffocated in Bangui's Ngaragba prison (Africa Contemporary Record, 1979-79: B405). Any last shred of legitimacy remaining to the Emperor disappeared after this incident, including French support. On September 20, while Bokassa was in Libya seeking financial aid from Khaddafi, he was overthrown in a bloodless coup by former President David Dacko, with the acquiescence of the 350 French troops ostensibly brought in by Bokassa to maintain order.

After spending a considerable amount of time under house arrest, Dacko had been released to resume political activity, and since 1976 had been Bokassa's personal adviser. For this reason his return was not generally welcomed. Shortly after his return to power, 1,500 students demonstrated to protest the continued presence of Ministers from Bokassa's regime in the new government. The arrest of Ange Patasse, long popular with the students, also provoked an outcry.

By June 1980 the government was paralyzed, due to open dissension between the Vice-President, Henri Maidou, and the Prime Minister, Bernard Ayondo. Maidou had been Bokassa's last P.M. and was extremely unpopular with students due to his denial of the children's massacre. Further student demonstrations in August led to the dismissal of both Ayondo and Maidou. Jean-Pierre Le Bouder became Prime Minister and a Cabinet consisting mostly of young technocrats was
three hundred arrived in November and was later doubled. Fearing a mutiny by the army he dispatched most of the 1,000 troops to remote parts of the country, leaving the French in the capital. On April 10, 1968 he had his second in command, Lt. Col. Banza arrested, and shot at dawn the next day. He had apparently been inciting the army to murder the Head-of-State and intended to seize power himself, but as several other men of standing who were close to Banza were also executed in secret, the move was seen by local observers as an attempt by Bokassa to consolidate his personal power.

In 1972 Bokassa became President for Life and in 1974 he promoted himself to the rank of Marshall of the Republic. He survived two coup attempts against him; the first in 1974 by members of the gendarmerie, the second in 1976 by army officers. Conspirators had apparently made nine previous attempts on the life of the President, who seemed to share Idi Amin's knack for avoiding death.

In December 1976 it was announced that the Republic was to end and that a Central African Empire was to be founded. Bokassa's coronation as Emperor took place in December 1977, in a ceremony which cost $22 million, equivalent to almost a quarter of the country's annual foreign exchange earnings. The lavishness of the proceedings in one of the world's poorest nations was met with international criticism, and prompted the United States to suspend its aid program in the country.

After his coronation as Emperor, Bokassa withdrew more and more to his "Court" at Berengo. Ange Patasse, the civilian technocrat and Vice-President of the Revolutionary Council resigned in protest at the Court's expenses.

1979 began with three days of student rioting. The students had been ordered to buy and wear imperial uniforms, made in a shop owned by the Bokassa family. Many bureaucrats had not been paid in months, and the students marched to the chant of "Pay our parents and we will buy the uniforms" (Africa
who were responsible for development, public offices and labour. Captain Timothee Malendoma held the post of Minister of Economy. These new ministers, however, represented only two-thirds of the government; the remainder were from the former Dacko regime and had been appointed in order to ensure a smooth transition.

The appointment of able and dedicated ministers soon produced results. Malendoma created a National Diamond Bureau, which was to receive forty percent of the commercial profits made on the international market. By this measure the national revenue from diamonds between 1965-68 more than doubled. In the cotton sector, Patasse's decision to abolish all taxes except those on produce was welcomed by the peasant producers, and output increased. He also re-organized the coffee-growers' cooperatives, and by doing so managed to increase the price paid to producers.

Bokassa recognized the need to re-establish contact between the government and the people. In order to avoid a meat shortage in the country he personally went to the Chadian cattle breeders who were owed money by the Central African butchers and paid them in cash. His first month's salary was donated to a Bangui hospital. Conscious of the Christian missions' influence over a large section of the population, he made frequent appearances in church, often spending hours in noisy prayer before statues of the Virgin Mary. Such activities, coupled with daily radio announcements, while smiled upon by local Europeans, definitely succeeded in their objective of solidifying his rule.

As time passed, however, Bokassa showed progressively less inclination to relinquish power. He began styling himself "absolute monarch" and forbade mention of democracy and elections. He liked to think of himself as a latter-day Napoleon. He also became obsessed with plots against him, and in September 1967 he asked Paris to send French troops to his aid. The first contingent of
Steps Leading to Independence

Tanganyika, the earliest country to gain independence in East Africa, was also the poorest. The British were only too willing to turn over power to an indigenous government. The lack of development both politically and economically provided a vacuum for the leading nationalist movement to organize the rural community (Bienen, 1967).

Ethnicity of the Population and Political Participation

There are over 120 different ethnic units in Tanzania. Despite the number of ethnic units in the country, there was a high degree of homogeneity in the language and culture of the country. Swahili, the national language, was spoken by 88% of the population (Morrison, 1972: 355). The wide use of Swahili and the absence of any predominant tribe aided the nationalist movement in its quest for unity.

Tanzania has never been plagued by tribalism and factionalization, despite extreme regional ethnocentricity in the country. The predominance of numerous small tribes inhibited any one tribe from commanding a dominant position. The absence of tribalism throughout Tanzania's history supports Jackman's findings that it is ethnic dominance, rather than ethnic heterogeneity that is destabilizing (Jackman, 1978). The lack of ethnocentric hostility, in addition to the predominance of Swahili, undoubtedly contributed to Nyerere's ability to develop national unity and political consciousness prior to independence. Further, Nyerere's ability to reach various regional and ethnic communities through a common language enhanced the strength of his nationalist movement.

Political Parties and the Nationalist Movement

The vacuum left by colonial indirect rule created an avenue for Tanganyika's nationalist movement, the Tanganyikan African National Union (TANU) to mobilize
the rural peasants. Under the leadership of Nyerere, this nationalist movement was transformed into Tanzania's first and single ruling political party.

The foundation on which TANU was built was the Tanganyikan African Association (TAA). The TAA, originally a mutual benefit organization for urban Africans, later developed into a national movement for rural farmers. Because Tanganyika did not have large, centralized chiefdoms, as complaints against colonial regulations multiplied, the TAA was able to field grievances and ultimately represent rural farmers. By the 1950s, the TAA was firmly entrenched in the politics of Tanganyika.

In 1954, Julius Nyerere transformed the TAA into the Tanganyikan African National Union, in an effort to overcome the organizational weakness of the TAA. TANU inherited the political consciousness, leadership and territorial base of the TAA. Most important, TANU inherited the legitimacy of the TAA, which allowed the leadership to establish and consolidate legitimacy for the party.

TANU, originally a platform for voicing rural discontent, evolved into a nationalist movement in the struggle for independence. In the absence of tribal opposition, the party was able to broaden its base of support by appealing to all ethnic minorities. The familiarity of Swahili across ethnic and regional lines was the most important factor in creating a national movement. Swahili made TANU accessible to all peoples of Tanganyika, rather than to a specific ethnic group or region (Bienen, 1967). The lack of opposition from tribal authorities and the absence of chiefs loyal to the British, left the colonial administration without a strong avenue for opposing TANU. However, that is not to say that the colonial administration did not attempt to thwart the development of the party.

In 1956, the United Tanganyika Party (UTP) was formed under the sponsorship of the colonial administration. The UTP was embodied to support the multi-racial policy of the British, calling for equal representation among Africans,
Asians and Europeans. The 1958-59 elections resulted in an overwhelming victory for TANU candidates, despite restrictions on the African electorate. The strength of TANU's party organization was however, deceiving in relation to the party's electoral victory. TANU's strength at the polls was, in part, due to the disunited support for UTP, by the European community and the virtual lack of opposition by the colonial government (Bienen, 1967).

In the 1960 elections preceding independence, TANU again received an overwhelming majority of the total number of votes cast--82.3% However, only one-half of the eligible electorate voted. Bienen points out, the small electoral turnout reveals the inherit weakness of TANU's party organization in mobilizing the electorate (Bienen, 1967: 56). TANU was, however, able to fare well at the polls, due to the absence of strong opposition. More important, TANU claimed the legitimacy of its predecessor, the TAA, and benefited from the wisdom and leadership of Julius Nyerere.

In the absence of economic development and modernization, TANU proved to be the most important force in mobilizing the electorate. Despite its organizational weakness, the party carried the country to independence in December of 1961. The strength of the party was tested in transforming this nationalist movement into a ruling political party.

The Leadership Behind TANU

It would be unfair and unrealistic to talk about TANU and Tanzania without mention of Julius Nyerere. Nyerere is the undisputed father of Tanzania. He is the embodiment of the nation and its people. Through his leadership, TANU achieved independence.

Unlike many nationalist movements which faced a crisis once they achieved independence, TANU under the leadership of Nyerere, was able to adapt itself to its new role as a governing political party.
In a speech conveyed to the Uganda People's Congress, Nyerere stated:

"The job of a strong political party is to act as a bridge linking the people to the government they have elected, and the government to the people it wishes to serve. ... The job of our political parties is much more difficult now than it was when we were struggling for independence. ... Our job now is to educate, to explain and to build." (Nyerere, 1973: 33).

The importance Nyerere attributed to a strong political party was manifest in Nyerere's resignation as Prime Minister within two months following independence. He resigned in order to devote his full attention to the reorganization of TANU (Welch, 1970: 19).

Following independence Nyerere's aim was to increase local political participation through the development and extension of TANU local organizations and development committees (Bienen, 1967: 335). It was here that Nyerere first implemented self-reliance programs to further nation-building activities.

Nyerere not only had the insight to comprehend the importance of the political reorganization of TANU, but the skill with which to guide and nurture the transition of TANU from a nationalist movement to a ruling political party. It is undeniable that it is Nyerere's leadership that provides TANU the political strength its organization lacks.

**Development of a National Government**

Nyerere's commitment to cooperation and non-exploitation has clearly permeated the development strategy of the country. The emphasis of the Arusha Declaration was on rural and agricultural development, primary education, cottage industries and self-reliance. Most important, Nyerere sought to maintain the political and economic independence of the country.
Economic Development Under Nyerere

In 1962, Tanganyika adopted a Republican constitution. Nyerere was elected the first President and Mr. Kawana, who had served as Prime Minister during Nyerere's absence, as Deputy President.

The economy of independent Tanganyika was typically colonial. It depended on the production of subsistence foodstuffs and primary commodities for export. Sisal, cotton and coffee together accounted for 54% of total export earnings. The market grew and contracted according to foreign needs. The vast majority of farmers were subsistence producers. What industry did exist was owned and operated by non-Africans. At independence, the economy was virtually stagnant and the nation's people living at little more than subsistence level.

During the immediate years following independence, development proceeded according to a 3-year plan developed in coordination with the World Bank. The plan called for little more than disjointed public expenditure projects, much as the colonial development policies of the past. The plan was viewed with disdain by the populace and perceived as doing little to eradicate poverty. In an attempt to introduce policies pertinent to the economic and political needs of the state, a program was developed to institute development communities at the village level. It wasn't until Nyerere could bring together his own foreign experts and party ministers that a socialist policy of self-reliance was undertaken.

Africanization

As in most newly independent African countries, Nyerere embarked on a rapid policy of Africanization in the civil service, to correct the imbalance of African representation. The fast track promotions of Africans meant that some civil servants were not well qualified for their positions; however, it was an important symbol to boost the self-confidence of the people and promoted national identity. Nyerere's fervor for Africanization of the civil service did not
include the military. Initially, Nyerere recommended a ten year period to complete Africanization of the military (Gutteridge, 1969: p. 24). It wasn't until after the mutiny of 1964, that Nyerere realized the importance of developing a cohesive, national militia.

The Military Following Independence

The Tanganyikan Rifles had its origins in the British colonial Kings African Rifles. At independence, the Tanganyikan Rifles consisted of two battalions totaling 2,000 men. The force remained British trained, and British officered. Under Nyerere, the military received relatively low priority, both in terms of Africanization and military expenditures. Prior to independence, Nyerere had thought of dispensing with the Army altogether (Gutteridge, 1969: 24).

The Armies of independent Africa, including Tanganyika, were not 'national armies'. The organization, training and equipment depended heavily on expatriate sources. The relatively slow pace of Africanization of command positions perpetuated the image of the army as expatriate-controlled. Two years after independence, only one-third of the officers above the rank of warrant officer were Tanganyikan (Bienen, 1974: 363). In 1963, the Tanganyikan authorities recruited indigenous soldiers from 38 different tribes, however, in almost all respects this force was still a British oriented army. The relatively low priority accorded to military expenditures and Africanization culminated in the 1964 mutiny at Colito Barracks in Dar es Salaam. It wasn't until the 1964 East African mutinies that the political potential of the military was fully realized.

Military Intervention 1960-1982

The East African Mutinies of 1964 grew out of frustration over the slow rate of Africanization in the military and grievances over pay and living conditions. In Tanganyika as elsewhere in East Africa, the mutinies were not
political in nature, but violent protests against military conditions (Gutteridge, 1969: 28).

Events Leading to Military Intervention

In order to understand the 1964 mutiny, it is necessary to first examine the Zanzibar Revolution. Many students of African studies, including Welch and Bienen, suggest that seizure of control in one state may touch off violence in another (Welch, 1969: 27). The Zanzibar Revolution had a tremendous impact on the surrounding nations. In a matter of two weeks, military unrest spread through Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya.

In January of 1964, the sultan of Zanzibar was overthrown. Following the Revolution, the Zanzibar Afro-Shirazi party established the People's Republic of Zanzibar, which later that year joined together with Tanganyika and the island of Pemba to form the United Republic of Tanzania.

The significance of the Zanzibar Revolution cannot be overstated. Aside from the eventual union with mainland Tanganyika, the revolution introduced violence as a means of changing a constituted independent government. Never before had a non-colonial government in East Africa been confronted with an armed force in the name of a revolutionary movement (Bienen, 1967: 365).

Military intervention as a means of changing a constituted government was virtually unheard of in Tanganyika. The disease however spread quickly approximately one week following the Zanzibar Revolution, troops from the Colito Barracks moved into Dar es Salaam and took control over key points in the capital. On January 20, a group of soldiers placed their British officers under detention and then moved on to Dar es Salaam to make their demands known to the government. The mutineers' demands concerned military pay, conditions, and the replacement of British officers by Africans in the senior ranks.
In an attempt to stop the looting and rioting which subsequently broke out, Nyerere appealed to the nation over the radio. He succeeded in calming the population, but made little headway with the mutineers. Tensions began to rise when information about a political attempt to exploit the situation reached the capital. Fearful of the previous weeks events in Zanzibar, Nyerere appealed to the British government for help. On January 25, the Royal Marine Commandos from the carrier Centaur moved in to help restore control. A Nigerian battalion subsequently replaced the British force, until Nyerere could rebuild a national army.

The aims of the mutineers were not political in the sense that the mutineers were not looking to circumvent or replace the current government. Their demands were intrinsic to army conditions. Despite the apolitical nature of the mutiny, the uprising itself signified the first direct means of military involvement in the political system for Tanganyika. Nyerere was left with a virtually disbanded army, and the stigma of having invited the British into the country to restore order.

Nyerere's immediate problem following the mutiny was in building a national military. It was obvious he would have to make an effective break from colonial military support, institutions and personnel. Nyerere was not interested in building an elite force, but one fully integrated into the national life, and nation-building activities of the state (Gutteridge, 1969: 32).

Building a Socialist State

Following the mutiny, Nyerere announced the establishment of a Presidential Commission to investigate the introduction of a one-party system in Tanzania. The mutiny more so than any single event exemplified the internal weakness of TANU. Key communication points in Dar es Salaam were virtually occupied by the mutineers, yet the rest of the country remained relatively unaffected. TANU although
prominent in most localities, lacked centralized leadership. This proved to be both a strength and a weakness for Nyerere and TANU (Bienen, 1967).

In an attempt to consolidate and exploit TANU's nation-wide organization, Nyerere strived to adopt a one-party system, which in actuality already existed in Tanzania. In 1965, the party and the government accepted the recommendations for a one-party State put forth by the Commission.

In September of the same year, Tanzania's first parliamentary election on the basis of adult suffrage was held, under the new one-party constitution. Although only half the potential electorate voted, Nyerere's government enjoyed a strong sense of legitimacy and popular support.

Socialism Under Nyerere

In early 1967, the government adopted a program, known as the Arusha Declaration which embodied the principles of egalitarianism and self-help. The program emphasized rural and specifically agricultural development through the establishment of cooperative villages. In education, the program strove to transform what was then an elite institution, to an educational system responsive to the population at large; a system which emphasized the integration of primary education and rural existence. In the industrial sector, banks, small industries, and commercial businesses were nationalized and placed under the ownership of the government. Development as a whole was to be achieved through self-reliance and not through dependence on foreign investment. All party leaders were required to divest themselves of private income and observe the specific codes of conduct. The Arusha Declaration was not just a philosophy, but a guideline for the government to implement in order to achieve economic independence.

The program was an outgrowth of the previous difficulties Nyerere had experienced under the First Five Year Plan. Under this plan, the government relied on foreign investment and foreign aid for more than three-fourths of the
required capital investment. Nyerere's independent foreign policy subsequently cost the country the required foreign aid it had anticipated. Nyerere's relations with the Chinese alienated the West. Recognition of East Germany cost Nyerere aid from West Germany. And finally, strained relations with Britain over Rhodesia cost the country crucial assistance from the British. Nyerere's policy of self-reliance was necessitated by the country's commitment to domestic and political independence.

Because the country lacked an established elite class, opposition to the Arusha Declaration was not as fierce as it could have been. In addition, Nyerere commanded the popularity and legitimacy necessary to implement the program. Most important, the relative lack of importance of the industrial and commercial sector in Tanzania made nationalization that much more palatable to the British. From 1960 to 1962, the industrial manufacturing sector only accounted for 3.4% of the total GDP. Nyerere once stated, "You can't nationalize nothing" (Bienen, 1967: 411). The Arusha Declaration was a reaction to the experience under the First Five Year Plan; whereby foreign aid was used as a political weapon against Nyerere for daring to follow an independent course.

**Tanzania After the Arusha Declaration**

Nyerere's tenure in office did not proceed without incident. In 1969, a plot to overthrow the government and assassinate Nyerere and other leaders was uncovered. The plot was alleged to have been master-minded by Oscar Kambona, former General Secretary of TANU and former Foreign Minister. Kambona had been living in exile in London since 1967. Six of the seven conspirators accused of plotting to overthrow the government were subsequently brought to trial and convicted.
The discovery of the treason plot in Tanzania coincided with the discovery of a plot to overthrow the government on the island of Zanzibar. Although the two alleged plots were unrelated, it is interesting to note the difference in the subsequent trials of the alleged conspirators. On Zanzibar, the People's Revolutionary Council held a secret trial, the results of which were never made public. In marked contrast, the accused in Tanzania were tried by normal judicial procedures in an open court. The nature of the treason plot was fully exposed and the accused judged to have been granted a fair trial (ACR, 1968-9: B171). The contrast between the two governments could not have been more clearly exemplified than by the two trials.

Nyerere has weathered two economic crises in 1975 and 1979, involvement in the civil war in Uganda, balance of trade deficits, and the implementation of austerity programs to correct economic ills. Despite sporadic opposition from the educated elite, Nyerere's popularity is undying. The stability of the country is testament to Nyerere's leadership and authority. As Bienen suggests:

"It is undeniable that in Africa, where personal leadership is so important, the individual commitments and political character of leaders do distinguish countries from one another" (Bienen, 1967: 458).

Analysis of Military Intervention in Tanzania

In an attempt to analyze the factors contributing to Tanzania's stability, it is necessary to consider factors outside Jackman's four structural variables. However, first, a discussion of social mobilization, political participation, cultural pluralism and party dominance is warranted.

Social Mobilization and Political Participation

Deutsch and Huntington maintain that the degree of instability is related to the rate of modernization (Huntington, 1968: 49). Rapid modernization disrupts traditional social groupings and invites mass movements. Jackman uses
literacy rates and the percentage of the adult labor force in non-agricultural occupations as indicators of modernization.

Over the twenty year period from 1960 to 1980, the percentage of the adult labor force employed in the agricultural sector decreased only 5.7%. Despite efforts to institute universal primary education, only 5.1% of children 15 years or older are enrolled in school (Bornschier and Heintz, 1979: 230-32). More important, the educational system in Tanzania emphasizes rural existence—training people for a life in the agricultural sector. Nyerere has attempted to avoid the problems of contemporary African education, whereby students leave the university with skill irrelevant to their indigenous labor market, thus promoting discontent and false expectations.

Tanzania remains today among the 25 poorest countries in the world (ACR, 1975-76: B316). Nyerere himself has stated that he has accepted a slower rate of growth, in order to pursue independent economic development (Nyerere, 1973: 263). Although economic development may have been stymied due to Nyerere's socialist policies, the country has managed to escape political instability due to rapidly increased economic inequality.

As indicated in the Ghana Case Study, Jackman's social mobilization score only accounts for political participation prior to the date of independence. The same holds true for "winvote", the percentage of total votes cast for the winning party.

In Tanzania, although political participation has historically been low, (1% of the electorate in 1958, 25% of the potential electorate in 1962, and 50% of the potential electorate in 1965), the percentage of total votes cast for Nyerere has been as high as 93% (Morrison, 1972: 102-103; Bienen, 1967: 382; ACR, 1975-76: B316). Unlike similar results elsewhere in the Third World, the electoral results in Tanzania accurately reflect opinion in the country (ACR,
The low level of political participation and slow rate of modernization in Tanzania has undoubtedly contributed to the country's stability. Probably the most stabilizing factor in Tanzania is the degree of legitimacy associated with the current government. Nyerere is the undisputed father of Tanzania. He not only enjoys overwhelming popularity but, a strong sense of legitimacy as well. Welch (1974: 27) and Huntington (1968) both suggest that military intervention rarely occurs in a country with a high degree of legitimacy. "The legitimacy enjoyed by a government affects the political role of its armed forces far more than any other environmental or internal factor." (Welch, 1974: 27). Just as TANU inherited the legitimacy of its predecessor, the TAA, Nyerere's government inherited the legitimacy of the nationalist movement which he commanded. Welch concludes "The ease with which the armed forces assume political power varies inversely with the legitimacy enjoyed by the existing civilian government." (Welch, 1974: 30).

Cultural Pluralism

Heterogeneous countries with strong primordial ties are generally thought to experience greater instability (Jackman, 1978). Unlike many Sub-Saharan countries, Tanzania enjoys a high degree of homogeneity in language and culture, despite the existence of over 120 different ethnic units in the country. The predominance of Swahili, and the absence of any predominant tribe has undoubtedly contributed to the stability of the country.

Tribalism and factionalization was never a problem in the Tanganyika military, despite British recruitment practices (Gutteridge, 1969: 25). The fact that Tanganyika was composed of groups from a large number of small tribes was as important militarily as it had proved politically. The absence of tribalism throughout Tanzania's history supports Jackman's proposition, that it is ethnic dominance rather than ethnic heterogeneity that is destabilizing (Jackman, 1978).
**Party Dominance**

Jackman's fourth variable Party Dominance, suggests that single party systems are a stabilizing force in society, in that they're able to aggregate competing political interests, thereby transcending political cleavages (Jackman, 1978).

Huntington suggests that the stability of a modernizing political system depends on the strength of its political parties; a party is strong to the extent that it has institutionalized support (Huntington, 1968: 408). He examines institutionalization in terms of generational age. That is, the more often an organization has surmounted the problem of peaceful succession and replaced one set of leaders by another, the more highly institutionalized it is. Similarly, adaptability can be measured in functional terms, such that when one function is no longer needed, an organization is able to change and meet new requirements. The greater the frequency of functional change, the more adaptable and highly institutionalized is the organization (Huntington, 1968: 425).

In terms of TANU, although the party, and for that matter the country, has not experienced political succession of a new leader, TANU did experience a functional change from a nationalist movement to a national ruling political party. Nyerere, through personal political insight and skill, was not only able to recognize the importance of TANU after independence, but was able to transform a nationalist movement into a national ruling political party. Despite the internal weakness of the party infrastructure, TANU was a strong mobilizing force in fostering national unity and organizing the rural electorate. According to Huntington's (1968) argument, TANU's strength evolves from the party's institutionalization.
March 1967 Coups

Official results of the March 17th elections were never announced. On March 21st, SLPP claimed to have won 32 seats, the ACP 31 seats and the Independents 2 seats. The ACP however, charged that five of the recorded SLPP members ran as independents in the election, therefore, Stevens as leader of the APC, claimed a majority. Unable to reach a coalition between the two parties, Governor-General Sir Henry Lightfoot-Boston appointed Stevens the new Prime Minister. Within minutes of his swearing in, Brigadier David Lansana seized power as "custodian of the state to protect the constitution" (ARB 1967-68: 12). Lansana claimed the Governor-General had no right to declare Stevens Prime Minister when election results were not final. Martial law was declared in effect until civilian rule could be restored.

Lansana claimed his intervention was necessary to avert tribalism, due to the closeness of the election. However, Margai was implicated in the Army's seizure of power, as it was surmised Lansana was acting under his orders. The Lansana-led coup was a classic case of "arbitration" as defined by Decalo, whereby "Armies still led by former colonial officers, presided over extralegal shuffles of civilian elites against the background of societal turmoil." (Decalo, 1976: 231). In the case of the March 1967 elections, no single party won a clear majority. Ethnic divisions and tribalism threatened social unrest. As Decalo (1976) explains, intervention by the armed forces was meant to assure peaceful, bloodless, succession of the legitimate ruling party. In the case of arbitration, it is not the intention of the army to usurp power, as much as to ensure the "favored candidate", in this case, Sir Margai, is placed in power.

Forty-eight hours after Lansana seized control, a group of young officers led by Majors Juma Blake and Kalsamba, plus Mr. William Leigh, Commissioner of Police, deposed Lansana in a counter coup. Blake stressed the officers involved
llion (Fyfe: 698). Margai's economic practices in this period nearly depleted the country's financial reserves. Charges of bureaucratic corruption and the growing schism between the wealthy party elite and urban and rural masses contributed to popular opposition of the Margai government.

**Military Intervention 1960-1982**

The dual coups of 1967 in Sierra Leone grew out of the March Parliamentary elections which were marked by fraud and tribalism. The first coup, an act of "arbitration" was succeeded by a counter coup, in which the military seized control of the government. The third coup resulted from the dissatisfaction of the rank and file with the military-police government, which was perceived as indifferent to their demands.

**Events Leading to Coups**

Adverse trade conditions and an ever increasing foreign debt forced Margai, in 1967, to call on the IMF for a 7.5 million loan to ward off a balance of payments crisis. In an attempt to acquire the loan, the government agreed to a stabilization program including decreased government spending and additional tax measures. These recommendations, though agreed to, were for the most part, never carried out. Margai's attempt to introduce a Republican constitution granting him permanent monopoly power eroded his initial popularity. Personal corruption, and lavish outlays of government funds further eroded his support in the general electorate. By February of 1967, the Margai regime lacked the support and credibility it required to implement a much needed austerity program.

In February of 1967, Margai dissolved the Parliament and called for general elections in March. The elections were contested between Margai's SLPP and the PC, under the leadership of Sanka Stevens.
In February of 1967, Margai dropped the one-party state proposal and instead embarked on a plan to change Sierra Leone to a Republic. In order to pass the bill, a two-thirds majority vote was required by two consecutive parliaments. This meant Margai would have to dissolve the current parliament by February, in order to capitalize on the 1967 general elections.

Following Margai's announcement that the state was no longer considering a one-party system, Margai announced a plot to assassinate himself and Brigadier Lansana was uncovered. The alleged military personnel were connected to Saika Stevens, the leader of the APC. The next day, seven senior officers were detained, Lt. Bangura, the only Northerner was removed from military office.

Concomitant with the erosion of Margai's political base in the civilian ranks was an erosion of support in the army. Albert's attempt to gain political control over the Sierra Leone armed forces failed, due to the remaining number of non-Mende, non-SLPP loyalists, and the subsequent division which erupted in the officers corps. In addition, Sir Albert failed to meet the immediate needs of the rank and file. Military expenditures remained fairly constant and living conditions were substandard. Far from integrating the army and creating a cohesive loyal cadre of officers, Albert's policies fostered tribal and class divisions within the army. Declining support both within the political and military arena combined with the government's diminishing legitimacy paved the way for military intervention.

Economic System and Performance

From 1961 to 1967 Sierra Leone's Balance of Payments showed a deficit. In 1965-66, Sierra Leone experienced serious financial and development difficulties. The balance of trade recorded a large deficit for the second successive year ($-40.3) (Zurich, 1979: 76-78). By the end of 1966, the official foreign exchange reserves had been reduced from Le.30 million in 1964 to Le.11
the APC was entrenched in the North, the SLPP had nationwide support. The
Election results suggested that even where dissent with tribal chiefs and the
existing system was strong, the populous responded to the particular chiefdom
within their local area (Cartwright, 1970: 155).

The Margai SLPP Government

Despite the lack of a clear majority in the 1962 elections, Milton Margai's
government sustained nationwide support in its initial years in power. However,
with no party organization, the SLPP became a loose aggregation of local repre-
sentatives, based entirely on tribal chiefs. In an effort to consolidate power,
Margai attempted to curb APC activity. This action eventually cut away at his
electoral base in the North, as well as handicapped his efforts to build a
strong party organization. Electoral returns from the 1964 Freetown Council
Elections confirmed Margai's eroding popularity. The APC received the majority
of votes in the West and Central Regions and was behind the SLPP by 8% in the

After his death in 1964, Albert Margai, Milton's half brother succeeded
him. Threatened by APC activity and urban/rural discontent, Margai initiated a
drive to strengthen the SLPP. In October of 1965, Sir Albert's ministers
introduced the concept of a one-party state. Margai justified the plan on the
grounds it would encourage national unity and a cohesive allegiance among the
people. Far from promoting national unity, the populous looked upon the proposal
as a device to enrich the political elite at the expense of the ordinary citizen
(Cartwright, 1970: 224). The SLPP's political base was further eroded in the
district elections of 1966, which witnessed a strong swing of support to the
APC.

D-66
participation of lower status groups, which paved the way for universal suffrage in 1962.

**Political Parties and Public Support**

The 1962 elections marked the first elections in Sierra Leone following independence. It was also the first election in which the SLPP faced a serious challenge by an opposing party. Tribal discontent in the northern provinces and anti-chief attitudes provided the basis for the APC, against the loose coalition of local chieftans and traditional electorate of the SLPP (Cartwright, 1970: 147).

In the 1962 elections, the number of ordinary seats in the House was increased from 39 to 62. The APC attempted to mobilize the electorate outside of the traditional organization of tribal chiefs. Their activities, however, were somewhat curtailed, due to their standing as the opposition party. The SLPP, the ruling party, remained dependent on the traditional organization of chieftans for popular support. They made no attempt to directly involve the masses in political participation.

The APC combined anti-chief appeal with Northern dissatisfaction over tribal representation in the current administration. Despite its effort to mobilize the electorate, the APC was unable to function as a thorough mass party, because the SLPP and the chiefs possessed significant coercive powers to prevent it from developing into a widespread party. Although official candidates of the SLPP did not win a majority in the election, they received the largest percentage of the vote—34.7%. In addition, nearly all of the independent candidates supported the SLPP. The strength of the independents, together with SLPP candidates, put the SLPP and Margai in power.

Although the SLPP did not receive a majority of the vote, it managed to win at least a quarter of the votes in each district. Whereas the strength of
Margai's cabinet was comprised of 29% Temne, 36% Mende, and 36% Creole (Morrison, 1972: 334). The Creoles however represented less than 2% of the population, the Mendes' approximately 31% and the Temne tribes of the North, 30% (Morrison, 1972: 334). The obvious misrepresentation in Margai's cabinet was, in large part, due to colonial influence. In addition, Cartwright suggests the over representation of the Creoles in the legislature may in part have been due to the recognition that if dissatisfied, the Creoles may have inhibited the move towards independence by appealing to the British (Cartwright, 1970: 265).

Margai's SLPP continued to be dominated by an elite class, dependent on the traditional chiefdoms as point of contact with the masses. The opposition party, led by Saika Stevens, resented the government's attachment to the traditional tribal chiefs and colonial structure. Continued dominance of the traditional elite and the misrepresentation of tribal factions in Margai's cabinet fostered the development of Saika Stevens' APC opposition party. Unlike the SLPP, the APC was led by Northeners representing the Temne tribes. Party leadership, including Stevens, were descendents of a lower level economy class, and less educated. The median age of the party was 35 as opposed to 53 in the SLPP. The APC represented the first political party in Sierra Leone that had a truly different ideological orientation than the ruling party (Cartwright, 1970: 139). The APC called for more rapid development, was suspicious of foreign investment and attacked the traditional tribal authority system. The APC was the first party to mobilize the population through its own organization and not through the tribal chiefs. The establishment of the APC created a division between the ruling coalition of traditional and Western elites and the tribal based new cash economy class. The development of an opposition movement in Sierra Leone increased the extent of political
following independence, the Sierra Leone military was a rather unimportant organization, with little or no influence in political developments.

**Development of a National Government**

Sierra Leone achieved independence in April of 1961. Because Sierra Leone, as well as most nations in British West Africa achieved independence with relative "ease" there was no revolution uniting the populace in a nationalist struggle. As a result of the peaceful transition to autonomy, Welch explains, African leaders tended to ascribe extraordinary powers of social, political and economic change to political parties (Welch, 1970). The military in some respect was viewed as irrelevant almost unessential. This viewpoint is not only reflected in the slow pace of Africanization, but also in the incremental increase in the military budget following independence. Because political parties were credited with driving out the colonial power, they achieved a strong sense of legitimacy in the public's eye.

**Role of The Leaders**

The character of the two major political parties of the late 1950's reflected the background and nature of the party leaders. Margai, a member of the traditional ruling elite relied on the traditional chiefdoms for support. Stevens, on the other hand, represented the new cash economy class and was the first to actively mobilize the peasant electorate.

Prior to his political career, Sir Milton Margai served 23 years in the government's medical service. Margai was a conservative who drew most of his support from the paramount chiefs, as did the colonial government which preceded him. Margai's age and attachment to the traditional chiefs alienated the younger educated class which derived their wealth from the diamond boom of the mid 1950's.
to the SLPP, marked two sharp shifts in Sierra Leone's political system: most important, it marked a new regional alignment based on tribalism and constituted a new class entering the political elite for the first time (Cartwright, 1970: 165). A major motivating force behind the party was Northern dissatisfaction with Mende over representation in the Margai cabinet.

Role of the Military

The Army in most British colonies was extremely decentralized with separate units in each territory. As a consequence of territorialization, each territory had an embryonic national army upon independence (Coleman, 1972: 97). However, due to the lack of Africanization in the RWAFF, no indigenous officers class existed at the time of independence. Prior to and after independence, a white officers class still controlled the military forces in most independent countries.

Few African leaders including Margai embarked on drastic military reorganization immediately following independence. The stability of the current forces and lack of trained African officers inhibited Africanization. From 1960 to 1965, military manpower in Sierra Leone remained roughly the same--three thousand. Military expenditure remained constant during Margai's tenure in office.

In Sierra Leone, Africanization was not completed until five years after the date of independence. The military, however, was still dependent on the former colonial power for organization, training and equipment. The extent of Africanization, or lack thereof, and the dependency of the Sierra Leone on the British for training and equipment provided the expatriate country with strong influence in national affairs long after independence had been achieved. The military was somewhat isolated from internal political and ethnic divisions, due to the predominance of white British officers. Prior to and immediately
Steps Leading to Independence

The transition from colonial dependence to independence was a smooth one. Colonial influence remained strong in the immediate years following independence. The emergence of a new party, the All People's Congress was the first institution to challenge the traditional ruling elite and heightened political consciousness.

Political Parties and The Masses

The electorate in the mid 1950's was dominated by the traditional ruling chiefs and their descendents and an elite cash economy class. The ordinary farmer found no party during this time which represented his interests (Cartwright, 1970).

The 1957 general elections were contested primarily between the SLPP, led by Albert Margai and the United Progressive Party (UPP), led by Cyril-Rogers Wright. The SLPP was dominated by the traditional ruling elite and relied on the traditional chiefdoms for support. The UPP, was led by Creoles of high status, but attempted to broaden its support among the high status populace.

The SLPP won 26 of the 39 seats open for election in 1957 and gained the support of the 12 paramount chiefs. The SLPP victory marked the ascendency of the SLPP and of protectorate educated men. The SLPP victory placed Milton Margai, Albert's half brother in power, until the 1960 Constitutional Convention.

Prior to the convention, all parties agreed to form a United Front under Sir Milton Margai, in order to present united demands for independence to the British. Saka Stevens, however, refused to sign the conference report on the grounds that it did not provide for elections prior to independence and committed Sierra Leone to a defense agreement with the British.

Stevens subsequently formed a new opposition party, the All People's Congress. The rise of the All People's Congress (APC), the principle challenger
Freetown in February of 1955. The capital was torn by two days of rioting following a strike of the two major trade unions. "The strike itself was sparked by a rapid increase in the cost of living in late 1954, due in part to the diamond rush and consequent demands by wage earners for increased wages." (Cartwright, 1970: 73). Unlike most periods in Sierra Leone's history, the mid 1950's were a time of rapid modernization, which initiated an increase in political consciousness and eventually led to the establishment of a class conscious party--The All People's Congress.

**Role of the Colonial Military**

The military in British West Africa was generally used to augment the British Royal Army in times of crises, after which it was immediately demobilized. Military units formed in Western African territories were all part of the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF). The RWAFF was primarily used for expeditions to establish British rule on the frontiers of the empire and as an internal security force to combat regional and tribal unrest (Gutteridge, 1969). Consequently, there was a distinct tribal imbalance in recruitment. "Officers and noncommissioned officers tended to come from the more 'developed' regions of Africa and the 'other' ranks from areas with supposed martial traditions." (Coleman, 1962: 103). The British exploited the tribal divisions and heterogeneity of the country by stationing recruits far from their place of origin and in some instances "tribal enemy" territory. This practice enhanced the ability of the British to combat domestic violence. In Sierra Leone, a country with extreme regional and tribal divisions, the practice of exploiting the natural enmity of one tribe against another proved an effective means for the British to maintain domestic tranquility.
Economic System

The 1950's witnessed a strong drive to develop the country's mineral resources. The Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST) Company, a British controlled subsidiary, held exclusive prospecting rights through the 1950's. Rampant smuggling and loss of government revenue prompted the SLST to relinquish their monopoly and allow private diamond diggers to prospect under government license.

The economy of colonial Sierra Leone was predominantly subsistence. The country's chief exports, palm oil and palm kernels were exported to Europe in exchange for manufactured goods. Although 78% of the population worked in the agricultural sector, the majority of the country's export earnings were from mining. In addition to the diamond trade, Sierra Leone exported bauxite, iron ore and molybdenum. The majority of the country's revenue was received from mineral royalties and custom duties on imported goods.

Favorable agricultural prices in the early post war period and the subsequent diamond boom provided the government with capital to invest in developing the economy. Large-scale government funded development projects served to increase communication and mobility between regions. Concomitantly, the diamond mining boom of the 1950's brought individuals from neighboring tribes and regions together on a large scale for the first time. Social interaction during this period introduced new values and diffused traditional attitudes which undoubtedly contributed to the Freetown riots of 1955.

Huntington (1968) suggests that there is a direct link between social mobilization and political instability. The diamond rush of the mid 1950's was the single greatest force in disrupting traditional social groupings, creating a new cash economy class and increasing social mobilization. The dramatic pace of modernization during this period contributed to the riots in
SIERRA LEONE

Introduction

The Jackman replication model results indicate that Sierra Leone should have experienced greater military involvement than has occurred. The following case study identifies both the country's history, under the various ruling governments from 1960 through the present, and the salient factors which seem to have influenced the country's relative stability in recent years.

Preindependence Government and Politics

British colonial policy in Sierra Leone, as elsewhere in British West Africa, was administered by the principle of indirect rule, whereby a local traditional leader or hand-picked agent rules under the aegis of a British administrative officer. Indirect rule provided the British with a means to exploit tribal identification so as to continue disunity of the country. In this fashion, the British were able to keep their subjects weak and prevent their advancement to self-government (Gutteridge, 1969).

Form and Type of Colonial Government

In Sierra Leone, as elsewhere in British West Africa, the second world war brought a change in colonial policy. Following the war, the British government declared that the colonies should move towards self government. A new constitution was introduced in Sierra Leone, which gave political power to those who won a majority of votes in the national elections. In 1951, the Sierra Leone Peoples' Party (SLPP) became the dominant protectorate-based political party. The party was led by Milton Margai, a Mende from the South. During the next decade, British rule was gradually phased out and replaced by the Margai government.
and attitudes, which is a destabilizing force (Eleazu, 1973: 273). The reconstructed forces however, experienced common military training, which Eleazu suggests fosters ideological cohesiveness. Eleazu (1973) The Tanzania People's Defence Forces (TPDF) was the main training institution for both defense and socialism.

Welch suggests that "one of the most significant aspects of the military is its organization." ... Further, "the likelihood of military intervention diminishes if the armed forces undertake civic action programs." (Welch, 1974: 12-13). Following the mutiny, Nyerere sensed the importance of identifying the army with the nation state. (Gutteridge, 1969: 30). The TPDF was administered by the same principles as the country—socialism and self-reliance. The importance of the mutiny, aside from its political implications, provided Nyerere the opportunity to create a loyal, "national" armed force, which was thoroughly integrated into the nation's political and economic structure.

Since independence, Nyerere has had overwhelmingly dominant influence in shaping Tanzania's post-independence political and economic development. He has created and implemented a development plan unique to the cultural traditions and rural poverty of the country. Nyerere's Arusha Declaration has created a nation based on egalitarianism and self-reliance. The program has emphasized rural development to increase the standard of living for the nation's rural poor. Nyerere has been able to weather opposition from the educated elite and from those in his administration that have opposed his puritanical socialist ways.

Nyerere's popularity both at home and abroad has never suffered, despite sporadic opposition. He is characterized in the press as the least vain, and most thoughtful of all nonaligned leaders (NYT, 11/16/70: 18).
Eleazu (1973) and Huntington (1968) both argue that if the political institutions of a society are weak, in the sense they are not effective instruments for mediating social conflict, then other forces may impinge on the political arena. (Eleazu, 1973) Both prior to and after independence, TANU was a strong mobilizing force in fostering national unity and integration. Prior to independence, the party represented the rural poor, as grievances against colonial regulations multiplied. As a nationalist movement, the party appealed to all ethnic minorities in a united struggle for independence. Since independence, the party has proved to be the most important force in mobilizing the electorate and fostering national unity. Unlike many other political parties of Sub-Saharan Africa, TANU has never been plagued by factionalization. The predominance of Swahili has made the party accessible to all ethnic tribes and representative of all regions. Huntington would therefore argue that the absence of military intervention, is in part, due to the institutionalization and strength of Tanzania's TANU party.

Aside from the four dominant Jackman principles discussed, additional factors must be considered to explain Tanzania's political stability. The most salient of which are the military establishment following the 1964 mutiny and Nyerere himself, as the leader and father of Tanzania.

It is important to remember that following the 1964 mutiny, the army inherited from colonial Tanganyika was virtually disbanded. Nyerere himself built a national military, which was integrated into the government/TANU structure, along with the trade unions, cooperatives, and national service organizations (ACR, 1968-69: B170). Unlike most Sub-Saharan African countries, Tanzania's reconstructed force was trained internally and not by the former expatriate country. Eleazu suggests that army personnel trained in various countries, learning different national traditions encourages different values.
intervened to avert Civil War and to institute a national government representative of all peoples (ARB, 1967: 926).

The counter coup was followed by the establishment of the National Reformation Council (NRC) including 5 army officers, and 2 senior police officials. On March 27th, it was announced that Lt. Colonel Juxon-Smith would be appointed Chairman of the NRC and not Lt. Colonel Gende, as previously anticipated. The appointed switch was designed to fortify greater representation on behalf of the Northern Temne provinces.

The official line for intervention was published in the Dove-Edwin report:

The whole of the Government's arrangements of the 1967 election was rigged and corrupt ... they were determined to use all means fair or foul to win and remain in office and if all failed to get Brigadier Lansana to take over ... [delay in reporting election results] could have developed into a tribal war if the National Reformation Council had not stepped in on March 23rd, 1967. (ARB, IV. 12 (1967) 927C)

There were both ethnic and class factors involved in the election, as the defeated candidate, Sir Albert Margai, was from the same tribe (Mende) as Brigadier Lansana. The NRC officers in the counter coup were wary of Lansana's link to the traditional ruling families as well. In addition, they acted in order to prevent Lansana from imposing Sir Margai on the country (Cox, 1976: 137). Margai had already tried unsuccessfully to impose a one-party state system and institute a constitutional amendment declaring the country a Republic.

Subsequently, the NRC dissolved all political parties, the House of Representatives and the 1961 Constitution. They instituted a censorship law prohibiting the mention of dissolved parties in the press and mandated the registration of all newspapers. Sierra Leone marked the 10th African country to change over to military rule since 1965.

The dual coups of 1967 were a direct response to the political infighting and political manipulation of the March elections. Both the original and
counter coups were acts of "arbitration" to instate the "legitimate" party or candidate in office. Intra-army cliquism and outright praetorianism fueled both acts of military intervention. In the first instance, Lansana and loyal SLPP officers seized power on behalf of Albert Margai. The rift between Lansana and his subordinates encouraged the counter coup which deposed the Margai-Lansana axis and the traditional ruling elite.

Uma O. Eleazu writes that "In most cases of military intervention, the army does not act cohesively; rather, a segment of its acts, and this segment is then opposed by others." (Eleazu, 1973: 273). This pattern of coup and counter coup described by Eleazu predominates in Sierra Leone's history of military intervention. Primarily, it is caused by the heterogeneity of the armed forces and polarization of the military along political and tribal lines. The factorization in the armed forces mirrors that of the political parties.

April 1968 Coup

The 14-month rule of Juxon-Smith's government was characterized by corruption and self-serving policies. Although the Dove-Edwin Commission recommended turning over the government to civilian rule, Smith's personal ambitions inhibited the transition, as he was unwilling to relinquish power. Growing unwillingness of the NRC to step aside and the Council's indifference to the demands of the rank and file in the Army prompted a third coup in April of 1968.

Disgruntled with low pay and the apparent self-serving attitudes of the NRC, an Anti-Corruption Revolutionary Movement, led by Sergeant-Majors Patrick Conteh and Amadou Rogers, seized power in a coup d'etat April 17, 1968. Broadcasting on the morning of April 18, Sergeant-Major Rogers accused the NRC members of being "more corrupt and selfish than the ousted civilian regime; of wishing to remain in office indefinitely; and of practicing in the army and police force nepotism and blatant victimization" (ARB, 1968: 1035C.)
A National Interim Council (NIC) was immediately established to work on a peaceful return to civilian rule. Juxon-Smith and 83 other army and police officers were detained. The NIC primarily composed of junior officers, rescinded all military promotions which had been granted to NRC officers during their reign. Free press was restored and the newspaper decree was lifted. On April 26th, the country returned to civilian rule under the leadership of Saika Stevens. Stevens' formed a nationalist government with both ACP and SLPP members, previously elected in the March 1967 elections. This act more than any other contributed to the high degree of legitimacy accorded the Stevens' administration.

Austerity programs and Smith's hesitation to return to civilian rule contributed to the unpopularity and lack of legitimacy of the Smith government. The regime was thought incapable of building bridges to a popularly based civilian sector, which was supposedly their original mission (Cox, 1976: 165). The NRC was characterized by institutional weakness from the start. Intra-party feuds developed within the initial conspiratorial group and within the remaining officers active in the military. In addition, the NRC was unresponsive to military demands for higher wages. This mobilized the armed forces against the NRC, which were perceived as hostile to military interests.

The Stevens' APC Government

Through political maneuverings and courtship of the military, Stevens was able to eventually attain control over both the political opposition and the military establishment. He was able to turn sporadic eruptions of violence to his advantage, by further consolidating power and purging potential rivals in the armed forces.

At the first budget session following his inauguration, parliament ratified salary increases and appropriated funds for new uniforms. In 1970, subsequent
legislation was adopted which appropriated additional monies for the construction of new barracks and for anticipated expenses, due to plans for the creation of a new military battalion. From 1968 to 1970, defense expenditures increased 12.5% (Cox, 1976: 209).

Concurrent with his courtship of the military, Stevens purged the officers corps and NCO's of personnel alleged to have participated in anti-government activities. In this fashion, Stevens was able to weed out officers, who, because of tribal affiliation, were thought to be untrustworthy. Although, Stevens' initial actions heightened intra-army factionalization, the Prime Minister was able to capitalize on the resultant instances of disorder.

In 1969, the detention and trial of the primary conspirators in the March 1967 coup eliminated a potentially powerful anti-government faction from circulation. In addition, the treason trials provided a forum to demonstrate the supremacy of civilian institutions in Sierra Leone.

In 1970, Sierra Leone experienced a resurgence of violence and tribalism. The activity was sparked by the resignation of two Stevens cabinet ministers, Dr. Mohamed Forma and Mohamed Bash-Tagi, who eventually allied with Karefe-Smart to form an opposition party, the United Democratic Party (UDP). Following a series of violent clashes in the Northern provinces, between UDP supporters and APC backers, Stevens declared a state of emergency. He later banned the UDP under emergency regulations. Stevens was fearful that political intra-party strife would infiltrate the military, subsequently splitting it along political lines.

Five days later, on October 13, six army officers were arrested for allegedly preparing a coup. The officers were said to have had some 650 pounds of ammunition, when they were arrested. Although Brigadier Bangura, a known
UDP sympathizer was implicated in the attempted coup, Stevens was reluctant to dismiss him for fear of inciting a pro-Bangura coup.

Fearful of military violence, Stevens called on Guinea, under the mutual defense pact, to deploy troops to ensure the stability of the country. The stationing of foreign troops in Sierra Leone, ultimately led to Stevens second clash with the army.

In March, 1971, a group of officers attacked the residence of the Prime Minister, killing two of his bodyguards and placing the Governor-General under house arrest. Brigadier John Bangura, Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces announced over the radio that the army had seized control of the government. A large percentage of the armed forces however, disassociated themselves with Bangura's actions claiming allegiance to Stevens. The following day, March 24th, Stevens announced he was well, after a second attempt on his life, and in control of State affairs.

The coup participants opposed the continued existence of the State of Emergency declared in September 1970 and Stevens' attempt to change the constitution to transform the country to a republic. Further, the coup conspirators were opposed to the government's mutual defense pact with Guinea and the stationing of foreign troops in Sierra Leone (KCA, 1971: 24559). Bangura's attempt to seize power was reminiscent of the counter coup led by the NRC in March 1967. The coup was clearly designed to supplant the government and install military rule.

The coup activity of 1970 allowed Stevens to further purge the ranks of the military of dissident officers. Three weeks after the attempted coup, Stevens acting under emergency powers, introduced a bill into parliament to proclaim Sierra Leone a Republic and himself President. The enactment of this bill allowed Stevens to further consolidate power and ensure his tenure for
another five years. All that remained now was to institute a one-party state, which would give him control over all opposition forces.

During the 1970's Stevens aimed to consolidate his power within the military, as well as the government. He managed to balance appointments between Northerners, Southerners and Creoles and blend traditional tribal practices with a central government. In 1978, a referendum was adopted which instituted a one-party system in Sierra Leone. By the end of the decade, the SLPP opposition party was virtually dormant.

Two critical factors have undoubtedly played an important role in Sierra Leone's political stability in recent years: Stevens' ability to attain political control over the military and his adroit political skills in "uniting" the country behind a central government.

Social Mobilization

The Jackman replication model results indicate that social mobilization is a destabilizing force. This finding is congruent with Deutsch and Huntington, who suggest that as political participation increases, political consciousness is raised (Huntington, 1968). In a country where the existing government does not have the capacity to meet rising expectations, social mobilization is a destabilizing force.

In the Jackman replication model, social mobilization was measured by the percentage of the adult labor force in non-agricultural occupations and by the literacy rate as a percentage of the adult population. In Sierra Leone, 77% of the population were employed in the Agricultural sector in 1960. This figure has decreased to 65% in recent years (USDA, 1983 Congressional Presentation). The literacy rate in Sierra Leone in 1960 was 7%, over the next twenty years, it increased to 15% (USDA, 1983 Congressional Presentation). Huntington suggests
that there is a correlation between literacy and stability. His analysis revealed that 95% of the countries with literacy rates between 25%-60% experience some form of instability. In countries with literacy rates between 25%-10%, 83.3% experience some degree of instability; while, only 50% of the countries with literacy rates below 10% experienced instability. Huntington goes on further to say that it is transitional societies, those experiencing or undergoing modernization that are the least stable (Huntington, 1968: 43).

Modernization came very slowly to Sierra Leone, unlike other African countries. According to Huntington's argument, Sierra Leone's low literacy rate has contributed to the relative stability of the country. In addition, only 2.8% of school age children 15 years or older are enrolled in secondary school. And only one-third of all primary school children are enrolled in school (ACR, 1979-80). For the country which pioneered modern education in West Africa, Sierra Leone is a long way from enjoying universal primary education.

During the mid 1950's, modernization was accelerated in Sierra Leone, due to the economic boom of the diamond rush. The period ended in violent riots. The diamond rush of the mid 1950's brought large numbers of people from neighboring tribes and regions together for the first time. Social interaction during this period introduced new values and ideas which diffused traditional attitudes and adherence to tribal affiliations. Newly acquired values were, subsequently, brought back to the small tribal towns and villages. Rapid economic growth of the diamond boom produced a "nouveaux riche" class, increased geographic mobility and increased the number of people whose standard of living declined. These forces, together with increasing expectations contributed to the Freetown riots of 1955.
During the 1960's, when Sierra Leone experienced coup activity, the country's traditional ruling authorities and structure were undermined by social, economic and political forces. Traditionally, the SLPP was dominated by an elite class and the traditional tribal chieftains. The party made no attempt to organize the peasants. The opposition party the APC, wielded its strength from the anti-chief attitudes of the Northern Temne provinces. The establishment of the party itself, created a division between the ruling coalition of traditional and Western elites and the tribal based new cash economy class. The APC was the first party to ever organize the popular masses. APC's organization of the masses encouraged the move to universal suffrage in 1962, and helped establish the APC as a nationwide party.

Instability and coups are particularly likely where voter turnout is low and the party system highly fractionalized (Jackman 1978). This was certainly the case in Sierra Leone prior to the adoption of universal suffrage. As mass participation increased, a more equitable representation of tribes and regions occurred. That is not to say that indiscriminate misrepresentation ceased. Increased political participation and a relatively slow rate of modernization in Sierra Leone has contributed to the country's relative stability today.

**Cultural Pluralism**

Heterogeneous societies, like Sierra Leone, with strong primordial ties, are thought more likely to experience instability. The primordial ties of each group tend to compete with the notion of a national civil authority (Jackman 1978). The Jackman replication model however, reveals that cultural pluralism is in actuality, a stabilizing force. By providing a system of countervailing power centers, cultural pluralism contributes to stability
provided no one group dominates numerically. Jackman suggests that ethnic
dominance rather than ethnic heterogeneity has a destabilizing effect
(Jackman, 1978).

The peoples of Sierra Leone comprise at least thirteen different tribes,
each having its own language. Approximately one-third of the population are
Temnes from the Northern provinces. The Mendes predominate in the South, also
comprising approximately a third of the population. Scattered through the rest
of the country are a host other tribes of inferior numbers. The Creoles, repre-
senting the smallest percent of population are perhaps the most distinctive
and influential.

Politics in Sierra Leone have, for the most part, been organized along
regional and tribal lines. Traditionally, the SLPP was led by Southerners of
the Mende tribe. The party drew its support from the paramount chiefs, and
relied on the traditional chiefdoms as a point of contact with the masses. The
APC, on the other hand was led by Northerners from the Temne tribe. The party
capitalized on Northern dissatisfaction with the tribal elites and misrepresen-
tation of tribal factions within Margai's government.

During Albert Margai's rule, fusion between senior army officers and the
leading members of the civilian elite was attempted. Sir Albert's efforts to
manipulate the ethnic composition of the army was no more than an extension of
tribally based politics in the military sphere. Instead of creating a united
army bound by tribal identification, Sir Albert managed to exacerbate divisions
between senior and junior officers and regional factionalization.

In contrast, it was precisely Saika Stevens' ability to balance Northern,
Southern and Creole representation in his cabinet, in recent years, that has led
to relative political stability in Sierra Leone. In addition, he has been able
to blend traditional tribal practices with a central government. Unlike his

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counterpart, Stevens upon attaining power, actively courted the military. At the first budget session following the return to civilian rule, parliament ratified salary increases and appropriated money for new uniforms. In a two year period from 1968 to 1970, defense expenditures increased 12.5% (Cox, 1976:207). In addition to Stevens' courtship of the military, he weeded out officers, who, because of tribal affiliations, were thought to be untrustworthy, thus consolidating his power and the loyalty of the military.

Stevens' ability to transcend tribal fractionalization within the country has undoubtedly contributed to the relative political calm which prevails today. Stevens' relationship with the military, in contrast to that of the Margai government's, seems to have played a significant role in his longevity as President of Sierra Leone.

Party Systems

Our Jackman replication model results suggest that multiparty systems are a destabilizing force in society. In contrast, one-party states are seen to be more stable, in that they can aggregate competing political interests, thereby transcending political cleavages (Jackman 1978).

Huntington argues that the stability of a modernizing political system depends on the strength of its political powers. Further, if the political institutions of a society are weak, in the sense that they are not effective as an instrument for mediating social conflict, then other social forces may begin to impinge on the political arena (Huntington 1968: 425).

Margai's attempt to introduce a one-party state and subsequently a Constitutional Republic alienated the populace and further eroded his initial support. Flagrant financial mismanagement and depletion of the country's financial reserves eroded the legitimacy of the Margai Administration. Subsequently, the military intervened to assume control of the state.
Margai's real problem during these years was his inability to control the dominant political opposition party, the APC. All attempts to stifle political opposition, far from uniting the populace, turned the masses against him. The APC was able to turn Margai's attempt to introduce a one-party state to their advantage. Margai's inability to check political opposition, combined with the deterioration of the SLPP, invited military intervention.

Unlike multi-party systems, in a one-party system a new group can only come about by entering the party. Fewer avenues exist for the assimilation of new social forces. The political leaders of the system can hence exercise a higher degree of control over the mobilization of new groups.

Since attaining power in 1968, Saika Stevens has also had problems combating political opposition. Stevens attempted to counter political opposition activity by introducing legislation for a Republican constitution. This attempt to consolidate power failed for Stevens as well. It wasn't until after an attempted coup in 1971 and the enactment of emergency powers, that Stevens was able to introduce legislation to change Sierra Leone to a Republic.

Stevens final act to consolidate power and check opposition occurred in 1978. Stevens introduced a referendum which instituted a one-party state in Sierra Leone. By the end of the decade, the SLPP opposition party was virtually disbanded. Stevens, no longer fighting opposition, was able to gain firm control of the country.

There are a number of factors contributing to Stevens' success in implementing these two dramatic pieces of legislation: 1) he had previously managed to balance appointments between Northerners, Creoles and Southerners, thus establishing a representative pluralist base; 2) He successfully blended traditional tribal practices with a central government and; 3) most important, Stevens' administration held a high degree of legitimacy, due to his victory
over the SLPP in the March 1967 elections. Together these forces have allowed Stevens to consolidate power and maintain relative stability in the country today. Clearly, the establishment of a one-party state in Sierra Leone has eliminated the most potent political weapon—opposition parties organized along tribal and regional lines.

If all factors truly point towards increased stability in Sierra Leone, why then does the Jackman replication model suggest Sierra Leone should have experienced greater instability? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to look at additional factors, which the model does not include. And second, assess whether these additional factors have in some way influenced the relative stability of Sierra Leone today.

The following section will address the military relationship, which each leader developed during his tenure, and the consequence of that relationship. This additional factor will help to explain why Sierra Leone has experienced stability in recent years.

Civilian-Military Relations

Although both Albert Margai and Siaka Stevens embarked on the same path to gain political control of the military, Albert's initiative fell short of its stated objective. Stevens' success in establishing the support and loyalty of the army seems to be attributed to the legitimacy accorded to his administration and to his personal political skill. From 1961-64, during Milton Margai's tenure, the army remained an obscure institution whose role and status was primarily ceremonial. The SLPP never espoused rapid Africanization. Military expenditures remained constant throughout the four year period. Just as Africanization was not an issue in the first SLPP government, so too were the notions
tribal composition and political-military interface. With the advent of Albert’s government came the introduction of a new form of civil-military relations in Sierra Leone.

Military Under Albert Margai

It wasn’t until 1964, when Sir Albert attained power that Africans replaced aristocrats in the military in significant numbers. From 1964 to 1967, the Sierra Leone army truly became a national army. During Albert’s tenure, a fusion of senior army officers and leading members of the civilian elite was conducted. Initially, Albert developed a personal relationship with Lt. Colonel Lansana, Sierra Leone’s Commander-in-Chief. During the period of declining government legitimacy in 1966-1967, the leaders of the SLPP became cognizant of the potential of a politicized army, sympathetic to the SLPP.

The combination of a wholly Africanized army and the establishment of a Sierra Leone military academy paved the way for Sir Albert to stack the army in favor of his own tribesmen. Whereas Mendes represented 26% of the officer corps in 1964, by mid 1967, their proportion had increased to 52%, far outstripping their actual numbers in the population. Albert’s attempt to gain political control over the Sierra Leone military failed, due to the number of ranking officers who were not Mende or SLPP loyalists; and the subsequent division which erupted in the officer corps due to politicization. On a more general level, Albert failed to meet the immediate needs and demands of the army during this period. Living conditions in the military were substandard and housing inadequate. Although the government appropriated money to build new barracks in 1966, less than a third of the appropriated funds were actually spent. In addition, military expenditures remained relatively constant throughout the period. Far from integrating the army and creating a cohesive loyal officers class, Albert’s policies encouraged tribal and regional divisions.
g the military corps. In 1967, when Lansana attempted to seize control of government following the March elections, the majority of the army deserted him. A counter coup, composed almost entirely of military personnel overthrew Lansana and established Sierra Leone's first non-civil government.

Albert's most serious mistake was that he catered to a very select class of the army. Even within that class, his policies did not reach deep enough. He also alienated the rank and file by not acting upon their demands. In addition, Albert's courtship of the army came too late, by the time he embarked on enhancing civil-military relations, his government had lost its initial clarity and sense of legitimacy.

Military Under Saika Stevens

Saika Stevens' courtship of the military was initiated immediately upon his appointment as Prime Minister. In the first budget session, the parliament approved salary increases and appropriated funds for new uniforms. From 1968, when Stevens assumed power, to 1970, defense expenditures increased 12.5% (Cox 1976: 207). Military expenditures in 1970-71 were 45 percent above the 1966-67 outlays. Stevens realized that political success would require firm control over the military. Upon attaining power, he concentrated on creating a stable relationship with the country's armed forces.

Less than two months in office, Stevens purged the officer corps of several officers alleged to have participated with SLPP politicians in anti-government activities. Stevens subsequently weeded out officers who, because of tribal affiliations were thought to be untrustworthy. In this fashion, Stevens attained political control over the military and established a force loyal to the APC and government.
A number of officers implicated in alleged anti-government activities were publicly brought to trial. The treason trials were meant to affirm the supremacy of civilian institutions and deter future coup activity.

In 1970, the APC government again appropriated additional monies for the construction of new barracks and for anticipated expenses, due to plans for the creation of a second army battalion.

Through courtship and consolidation practices, Stevens was able to establish a loyal cadre of officers. Unlike, Albert Margai, Stevens was able to attain political control over the military establishment. His adroit political skills "united" this traditionally factionalized nation behind a central government. How long Sierra Leone's current stability will last is uncertain. Should the army have reason to topple the present government, it could probably do so without much difficulty.

Stevens unique relationship with the military has clearly played an important role in Sierra Leone's present stability and Stevens own longevity in office. Civil-military relations have undoubtedly influenced the political history of the country. Judging from Sierra Leone's current stability, it is reasonable to assume that the exclusion of qualitative variables to represent the civil-military relations of present and past regimes in Sierra Leone has contributed to the inflated instability rating for the country.
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