SYRIA AND IRAQ:
RELATIONS AND PROSPECTS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study focuses on six aspects of Syrian-Iraqi relations:

1. The political history of the Fertile Crescent region, with special emphasis on the background of contemporary Syrian-Iraqi relations.

2. The comparative analysis of Syrian and Iraqi political, military, ideological, economic, and ethno-religious structures, and their dynamic interaction within and between these two states.

3. The analysis of the structural dynamics of the Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party in both its Syrian and Iraqi configurations, with particular focus on the complex osmosis between the party apparatus, the military elite, the state bureaucracy and the ethno-religious-economic substructure.

4. The identification and explication of the determinants of Syrian and Iraqi foreign policies and strategic perceptions, with concentration on the crucial linkages between domestic politics and foreign policies.

5. The longitudinal analysis of the patterns of Syrian-Iraqi relations (1958-1984) and the consequences of these patterns for the ruling elites, party factions, military establishments, regional conflicts, superpower relationships, and the propensities of unity/disunity between the two states.

6. The prognosis of Syrian-Iraqi relations under future scenarios.

Syria and Iraq: Anatomy of Power

Syrian-Iraqi relations are shaped by the interaction between the internal political dynamics of each state and the forces of the larger regional and international environment. In both Syria and Iraq, power is concentrated in the hands of small oligarchies of mili-
military officers and Ba'ath Party bureaucrats led by Presidents Hafiz al-Asad and Saddam Husayn respectively.

The two oligarchies represent opposing factions of the Ba'ath Party dominated by different ethno-religious minorities. In Syria, President Asad's power is mostly centered on his kinsmen drawn from the Alawite minority (12%), who rule over a society where Sunnis are the majority (65%). In Iraq, President Saddam Husayn's Sunni kinsmen from Takrit dominate the Shi'ite majority (55%). The narrow sectarian base of the two oligarchies coupled with economic disparities triggered major Islamic fundamentalist revolts in both countries during the late 1970's, which were crushed at great cost. In Syria, the fundamentalist uprising was led by the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood; in Iraq, the Shi'ite insurrection by Hizb al-Da'wah was supported by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Aside from internal instability, Syrian and Iraqi foreign policies are powerfully influenced by the personalities and perceptions of Asad and Husayn. The social-psychological profile of these leaders was formed by their rural lower class roots, inequitous socio-political environment, and the influence of Arab nationalism. Thus, both Asad and Husayn were driven to seek supreme power in compensation for their modest origins. While Asad used the military to gain power, Husayn utilized the Ba'ath Party. Saddam's leadership style reflects his suffering and imprisonment as a revolutionary; he insists on total loyalty and uncritical acceptance of his policies by associates, who have been the object of frequent purges and liquidation. Asad is equally prone to use force against opponents, although he is known to rely on
experts and consultative procedures in decision making. Asad's entourage of subordinates has remained remarkably stable until his recent illness. He is an introverted pragmatist, whose foreign policy is marked by cool calculation and flexibility, rather than ideological radicalism.

Syrian-Iraqi Relations: Unity and Disunity (1921-1984)

The Anglo-French division of the Fertile Crescent into five territorial units—Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan—produced multiple schemes to unify the area, most of which proved unsuccessful. These included:

1. King Faysal's attempt to unite Syria and Iraq (1921-1933).
2. The Fertile Crescent plan of Iraq's Nuri al-Sa'id to unite Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, and Palestine, as a prelude to a larger union with Iraq (1943).
3. The Greater Syria scheme advanced by King Abdallah of Transjordan to unite Syria, Palestine and Lebanon under his rule (1940-1951).
4. The Greater Syria plan of Antun Sa'adah to unite all former Umayyad territories under the leadership of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (1932-1949).
6. The Arab Federation which united the Hashimite Kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan (1958).
8. The tripartite federal union of Iraq, Syria and Egypt (1963).
10. A phased union between Iraq and Egypt (1964).


Both quantitative and descriptive analyses of Syrian-Iraqi relations indicate that the intensity, frequency, and duration of interstate conflict far exceeded attempts at unity and cooperation. The brief periods of harmony and united action reflected tactical alliances prompted by the wars against Israel and outbursts of popular Arab nationalist enthusiasm.

**Future Scenarios of Syrian-Iraqi Relations**

Six different scenarios are projected, depicting the probable types of relations between a variety of future Syrian and Iraqi regimes. Of the 16 different regime combinations, only three are expected to develop mutually friendly relations:

1. Syria (Ba'ath/Alawite)—Iraq (National Reconciliation/Shi'ite)
2. Syria (Ba'ath/Alawite)—Iraq (Islamic Shi'ite)
3. Syria (Ba'ath/National Reconciliation)—Iraq (Ba'ath/National Reconciliation)

**Conclusions**

1. There is a greater probability of gradual change in the Syrian elite than in the Iraqi elite, assuming that the two top leaders remain in control.
2. The departures of Asad and/or Husayn from the political arena are likely to moderate Syrian-Iraqi enmity. However, both events are likely to produce internal instability and external weakness. Asad's departure is likely to be more destabilizing.

3. A Jordanian move to negotiate with Israel on the Palestinian future is likely to exacerbate Syrian-Iraqi and inter-Arab conflicts.

4. Any increase in the Soviet presence in Syria and explicit U.S. support for Iraq might deepen the Syrian-Iraqi conflict and further polarize the region.

5. Arab-Israeli confrontation is likely to drive any combination of Syrian and Iraqi regime types toward cooperation, once an Iraq-Iran peace is established.
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I. INTRODUCTION

During the four decades since World War II, Syria and Iraq have been at the epicenter of the Middle Eastern crisis environment. In view of their strategic location and demographic composition, these Arab states have been involved, directly or indirectly, in virtually every major regional development or conflict, e.g.—the Arab-Israeli confrontation, the Lebanese Civil War, the Iraq-Iran conflict, the Kurdish question, the Yemen crisis, and the multi-faceted rivalries in the gulf and the Horn of Africa. Operating in an internal and external milieu of persistent instability and insecurity, Syria and Iraq have constituted a focal point of regional and international stress situated at the confluence of powerful ideological, economic, sectarian, and political forces. Increasingly, the dynamic configuration of these forces has affected the interests of the superpowers. In geopolitical terms, Syria and Iraq control much of the landmass between the Gulf and the Mediterranean—a vital fulcrum in the tenuous Soviet-American balance of power in the Middle East. In this context, the evolving relationships between these two states assume critical importance in the formulation of American foreign and security policies.

The present study shall focus on six main aspects of the Syrian-Iraqi nexus and its domestic, regional, and international environments. These aspects are:

1. The historical analysis of politics in the Fertile Crescent region during and after World War I, with special emphasis on Syrian-Iraqi relations until 1948.
2. The comparative analysis of Syrian and Iraqi political, military, ideological, economic, and ethno-religious structures, and their dynamic interaction within and between these two states.

3. The analysis of the structural dynamics of the Ba'th Arab Socialist Party in both its Syrian and Iraqi configurations, with particular focus on the complex osmosis between the party apparatus, the military elite, the state bureaucracy, and the ethno-religious-economic substructure.

4. The identification and explication of the determinants of Syrian and Iraqi foreign policies and strategic perceptions, with concentration on the crucial linkages between domestic politics and foreign policies.

5. The longitudinal analysis of the patterns of Syrian-Iraqi relations (1958-1984) and the consequences of these patterns for the ruling elites, party factions, military establishments, regional conflicts, superpower relationships, and the propensities of unity/disunity between the two states.

6. The prognosis of Syrian-Iraqi relations under future scenarios.
II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The analysis of the Syrian-Iraqi relationship necessitates the employment of a composite conceptual framework designed to integrate five distinct theoretical domains:

1. Theories on multi-ethnic societies, focusing on ethno-sectarian conflicts and their political and economic consequences. (Lijphardt, Kuper and Smith, Dekmejian)

2. Theories of military rule, centering on the modalities of state clientship to the ruling military elite. (Huntington, Hurewitz, Dekmejian)

3. Theories on single party systems, centering on ideology, leadership, organization and recruitment of cadres. (Brzezinski, Abu Jaber)

4. Theories of foreign policy formulation, centering on the linkages between domestic conditions and foreign policy, and their consequences for interstate relations. (Holsti, Rosenau, Snyder)

5. Theories of personality, focusing on the psychological profiles of the top leaders. (Erikson, Barber)

The five clusters of variables presented in Fig. 1 operate within the constraints of the larger regional and global environment, which constitutes a sixth variable. In the Syrian and Iraqi cases, the interaction of their foreign policies is conceived as the product of ethno-sectarian relationships, the interventionist role of military elites, and the Ba'ath Party's leading position—all of which are affected by the personalities of single leaders and their perceptions of reality.

The various components of the two political systems operate in unstable political and socio-economic environments, characterized by inter-sectarian conflicts, economic disparities, inter-elite and intra-elite power struggles, and the destabilizing pressures from...
the external environment, both regional and global. The linkages between domestic political instability and externally unstable environments produce two-dimensional interactions, culminating in ever-escalating levels of both domestic and external instability. Thus, the foreign policies of internally unstable states reflect the discontinuous, erratic, and unharmonious nature of the political systems. As such, these foreign policies become the catalysts of interstate discord, particularly in the conflictual setting of the Middle East region, and in the larger global milieu of bipolarity. In return, the conflictual external environment of interstate relations induces increasing levels of internal political instability affecting the elite and its political destiny.
III. SYRIA AND IRAQ: THE ANATOMY OF POWER

The application of the foregoing eclectic conceptual framework to the Syrian and Iraqi political systems reveals important similarities and salient differences. Historically, the rivalry between Syria and Iraq goes back to the overthrow of the Umayyad Dynasty of Damascus by the Abbasids (750), who made Baghdad their capital city. With the rise of the Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt, Syria became the focus of geopolitical and ideological conflict between the Abbasids (Sunni) and the Fatimids (Isma'ili Shi'ite). In 1171, Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi ended Fatimid rule in Egypt and proceeded to expand his power throughout Syria, Iraq and Palestine in the name of the Abbasid Caliph. However, Salah al-Din's success against the Crusaders (1187) did not prevent the disintegration of the Islamic realm after his death. Beginning with the Thirteenth Century, Syria and Iraq were thrown in chaotic conditions under Mamluk, Mongol and Turkic rulers. In 1516, Syria and Iraq were conquered by the Ottomans. The subsequent decline of Ottoman power and the concomitant European cultural and political penetration of the Empire made Greater Syria the center of Arab nationalism during the early 1900's.

The concept of 'Greater Syria' was a nebulous formulation as it appeared in the writings of Arab nationalist intellectuals. It was perceived as encompassing the territories of present-day Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Jordan. During and after the halcyon days of the Arab Revolt against the Turks (1916) led by Sharif Husayn of Mecca,
the concept of Greater Syria became fused with the larger idea of a united Arab kingdom which included the Hijaz and Iraq. The apogee of nationalist sentiment was reached when Faysal, the second son of Sharif Husayn, was proclaimed King of Syria on March 8, 1920. The French invasion of Syria in July 1920 hastened Faysal's departure. With Faysal's subsequent accession to the throne in Baghdad (August 1921), Iraq assumed new importance as a center of Arab nationalist activity. As a symbol of Arab nationalism, Faysal had become the magnet for Arab patriots yearning for unity and independence.

After Faysal's death, Iraqi politics was shaped by growing nationalist militancy against the Monarchy and its pro-British custodians like Regent Abd al-Ilah and Nuri al-Sa'id Pasha. Meanwhile, Syria had been granted independence in 1945, soon to become destabilized by a series of coups d'états which ushered a period of military rule (1949-1954). During the mid-1950's, both Syria and Iraq were influenced by a new wave of Arab nationalist fervor led by the Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasser and the Ba'th Party. The two immediate consequences of the new nationalism were the formation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in February 1958, and the overthrow of the Hashimite Dynasty of Iraq in June 1958.

The present-day Ba'thi regimes of Hafiz al-Asad and Saddam Husayn had their origins in the tumultuous decade after 1955 when Nasserite Pan-Arabism held sway. Indeed, both Asad and Husayn were the younger exponents of Nasser's generation of secular Pan-Arab nationalists. As members of the Ba'th Party, they had experienced the successive attempts at unity between Egypt, Syria and Iraq. But in contrast to
their idealistic elders in the Ba'thi and Nasserist movements, Asad and Husayn were pragmatists who recognized the difficulties inherent in achieving Arab unity. As the holders of supreme power, the political systems which the two men have dominated during the last decade reflect the fusion of their respective personalities with the social-political culture of their milieu.

The Syrian Political System

The salient components of the Syrian political system under Asad include ethno-sectarian structure, the military establishment, and the party system; the interrelations between them sustain the powerful Presidency. Syrian society is characterized by substantial heterogeneity. The major ethno-sectarian groups include: the Sunnis (65%), the Alawis (12%), Christian sects (12%), Kurds (7%), Druze (3%), and smaller numbers of Armenians, Isma'ilis, Yazidis, and Circassians. While most of the Sunni population resides in the urban centers, the Alawites, the Kurds, the Isma'ilis and the Druze are concentrated in the countryside. Traditionally, the urban upper and upper-middle class Sunnis and Christians dominated Syrian political and economic life. These classes included landowning families, entrepreneurs, and traders who provided most of Syria's governing elite during the early years of independence. The nationalist aspirations of these elites were blunted by the French mandatory authorities who favored the minorities, particularly in the armed forces. Moreover, the rural minorities constituted a ready source of military recruitment, even after independence, in view of their low socio-economic status. Hence, the numerical predominance of Kurds, Alawites, Isma'ilis, Druze, and the poorer Sunnis and Christians in
the officer corps. The successive military coups and counter-coups after 1949 brought into power large numbers of minority officers. By the mid-1960's, the Alawites had emerged as the most cohesive element in the military. After Hafiz al-Asad's ascendance in November 1970, political and military power came to be centered on his kinship power base—the village of Qardaha and the Numailatiyyah sub-group of the al-Matawirah tribe (see Table 1).

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Kinship</th>
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<tr>
<td>Rif'at al-Asad</td>
<td>Commander of Saraya al-Difa'; one of three Vice Presidents</td>
<td>Brother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adnan al-Asad</td>
<td>Commander of Tartus; in Charge of tribal affairs (North-East); ex-Commander of Saraya al-Sir</td>
<td>Cousin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adnan Makhluf</td>
<td>Commander of Presidential Guard; ex-Deputy Commander of Saraya al-Difa</td>
<td>Brother-in-law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad al-Khuli</td>
<td>Chief, Air Intelligence and the President's Intelligence Committee</td>
<td>Matawirah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Dubah</td>
<td>Head of Military Intelligence</td>
<td>Matawirah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Arslan</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff</td>
<td>Matawirah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Salih</td>
<td>Commander, Air Defense</td>
<td>Matawirah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Haydar</td>
<td>Commander, Wihadat al-Khassah</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shafiq Fayyad</td>
<td>Army Commander</td>
<td>Brother-in-law</td>
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In addition to his Alawite kinsmen, Asad has coopted Sunni officers like Generals Mustafa Tlas and Hikmat Shihabi, who occupy
high posts in the military apparatus. However, non-Alawite military officers and civilian officials are often assigned Alawites as deputies. Indeed, control of the military establishment has always been a main prerequisite of political power in Syria. In 1977, it was reported that no less than eighteen of the twenty-five army commands were led by Alawite officers.

In order to assure personal control over the political system, Asad created several elite fighting units consisting mostly of Alawite recruits, and commanded by his relatives. These included the Saraya al-Difa' (Defense Companies) led by Rif'at al-Asad, the President's brother; Saraya al-Sira' (Struggle Companies) under Adnan al-Asad, the President's cousin; and Wihadat al-Khassah (Special Forces) under Ali Haydar, an Alawite kinsman (see Table 1). The operational tasks of these units are to defend the President and the leading figures of the government, and to secure the regime against internal foes, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, its affiliates and pro-Iraqi Ba'thists. In essence, these elite forces constitute a source of coercive power outside the regular military establishment. In the event of an anti-Asad military coup, the elite forces could be used as a means to protect the regime; ultimately, these contingents could defend the Alawite minority in case of a takeover by Islamic fundamentalists or other opponents. This does not mean that Asad's ruling kinship group is representative of the whole Alawite community, since it does not include General Salah Jadid's Alawite faction which was purged between 1970-1973. However, the Alawite community has had little choice but to support President Asad because of its fear of vengeance, particularly from a future Sunni fundamentalist regime.
The Ba'th Party apparatus is another important source of presidential power. As a one-party system, the Ba'th emulates many of the features of the Leninist prototype of party organization. It is led by party professionals and ideologues. Despite its pyramidal structure, the Syrian Ba'th lacks the ideological and structural cohesiveness of communist parties. Unlike the Soviet Communist Party, Ba'ethi cadres do not effectively permeate all sectors of Syrian society. The zampolit system of the U.S.S.R., where political officers maintain party control over the military formations, has not been institutionalized in the Syrian armed forces.

In terms of ideology, the Syrian Ba'th is Pan-Arabist and quasi-socialist. However, it does not recognize the intellectual or administrative leadership of Michel Aflaq's National Command, now situated in Baghdad. Instead, the Syrian Party has its own National Command and recognizes the ideological primacy of Zaki al-Arsuzi, an Alawite teacher-ideologue expatriate from Turkish-held Alexandretta. Unlike the activism of Michel Aflaq and Salah Bitar, Arsuzi was a loner who concentrated on philosophical writings during the early 1940's. In its present configuration under Asad, the Party pursues a non-ideological pragmatic course, and is subservient to the Presidency (al-Ri'asah), its elite forces, and the military establishment. However, the Ba'th Party exercises considerable influence in the areas of education, propaganda and relations with other Arab states, and with socialist and communist parties. As in the case of the military, the Ba'th attracted minority members during its ascent to power. This common recruitment base of minorities and
poor rural and urban elements produced a social convergence between the Ba'th and the military, which culminated in a party-military symbiosis under Alawite rule. Yet, the Party remains a junior partner to the Presidency and its military organs. Similarly, the governmental bureaucracy under the Cabinet is subservient to the Presidency. It is significant that President Asad has always appointed Sunni prime ministers during his tenure of office. The appointment of Sunnis to positions of great visibility such as Prime Minister, Defense Minister and Chief of Staff is a means to placate the country's Sunni majority.

The militant Islamic opposition to President Asad led by the Muslim Brotherhood stems from the Sunni majority, which has lost its political and economic predominance in Syrian affairs. The Alawi ascendance has been accompanied by the erosion of the economic fortunes of the Sunni urban bourgeoisie, which has been adversely affected by the Ba'th's socialist-etatist policies. Despite Asad's protracted efforts to win over the Sunni element, its opposition to the regime has persisted, particularly since the Syrian intervention in Lebanon (1976). The Sunni resistance has manifested itself through the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic elements, which have engaged the regime in violent encounters like the Hama revolt of February 1982. The government's successful employment of its special forces to crush the Islamist movement has brought charges of brutality. These large-scale repressions, coupled with the Syrian confrontation with Israel and the United States in Lebanon during 1982-1983, brought a decline in anti-regime fundamentalist activity. In the long-run however, it is likely that the Islamic groups will rise again to challenge the regime.
The Iraqi Political System

The ethno-sectarian setting of Iraqi politics is as heterogeneous as Syria's, although its components are somewhat dissimilar. These include: the Shi'ites of Baghdad and the South (52%), the Kurds of the North (22%), the Arab Sunnis of central Iraq (18%), and various Christian sects (6%). Since the British conquest of Iraq during World War I, the Sunni Arab minority has dominated the country's political life. Its dominance has been repeatedly challenged by Kurdish revolts and Shi'ite insurrectionary movements—a process which has prompted large-scale state repression. The disparity of wealth between the Sunni Arabs and the less-developed Kurds and Shi'ites has reinforced the cleavages between the rulers and the ruled.

The Ba'ath regime, headed by Saddam Husayn since 1979, came to power in 1968. Despite their mutual enmity, the Ba'athi regimes of Syria and Iraq share an identical ideology. However, the Iraqi Ba'ath presents itself as being faithful to the original Pan-Arabist orientation of the Party under Aflaq. After the coup of 1968, Aflaq was invited to Baghdad to certify the credibility of the Iraqi Ba'ath, as compared to the "deviationist regionalist" Party of Syria. Also, the Iraqi Ba'ath resembles its Syrian counterpart in organization and refusal to share real power with other parties. However, the Iraqi Ba'ath places greater emphasis on ideological indoctrination and is less subservient to the military than the Syrian Ba'ath. This important difference stems from the joint efforts of Saddam Husayn and his predecessor, General Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, to neutralize the military's tendency to overthrow the Party, as it did in 1963 under General Abd al-Salam Arif. As the emerging strongman of the regime
during the 1970's, Saddam Husayn persisted in limiting the military's interventionist propensities by increasing the presence of civilians in the hierarchy of power. Basically, Saddam was motivated by his own self-interest; as a civilian Ba'ath Party apparatchik, Saddam was not inclined to permit the military's hegemony, which characterized the Syrian regime. Thus, both the Syrian and Iraqi regimes are the products of a party-military symbiosis. But, where in Syria the military constitutes the dominant force, in Iraq the Party and the military share power. This important difference should not obscure the subservience of both Party and Army to the personal leadership of Saddam Husayn, who has dominated the regime through his kinship network drawn from the Awja district of Takrit, a Sunni area north of Baghdad. Consequently, real power has come to rest in the hands of a small Sunni provincial kinship group within the Ba'ath Party. This Takriti oligarchy around Saddam Husayn constitutes a minority within the Sunni minority of Iraq—hardly a prescription for stability in a country of Shi'ites, Kurds and Christians, who are theoretically accommodated in the secular framework of the Ba'th. In this sense, Saddam Husayn's minoritarian regime bears a strong resemblance to that of Syria under Hafiz al-Asad and his Alawite oligarchy.

The higher echelons of the Takriti oligarchy are depicted in Table 2. Until mid-1983, the three top positions of power under Saddam Husayn were held by members of his immediate family. The Minister of Defense, General Adnan Khayrallah, is Saddam Husayn's cousin and brother-in-law. His half-brothers, Barzan and Wardah were the Directors of Intelligence and Security respectively until their dismissal during mid-1983. Subsequently, two other relatives of the
### TABLE 2
**SADDAM HUSAYN'S KINSHIP GROUP**

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<th>POSITION</th>
<th>KINSHIP</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Adnan Khayrallah</td>
<td>Deputy Prime Minister for Defense</td>
<td>Cousin and Brother-in-law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Talfah)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Hasan al-Majid</td>
<td>Director of General Security (Amn al-'Am)</td>
<td>Cousin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fadhil al-Barrak</td>
<td>Director of Intelligence</td>
<td>Relative</td>
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<td>Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri</td>
<td>Deputy Chairman of Revolutionary Command Council (Former Minister of Interior)</td>
<td>Takriti</td>
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<td>Kamil Yasin</td>
<td>Secretary General of Revolutionary Command Council</td>
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<td>Munzir al-Shawi</td>
<td>Minister of Justice</td>
<td>Marriage Ties</td>
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<td>Abd al-Qadir Izz al-Din</td>
<td>Minister of Education</td>
<td>Relative?</td>
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<td>Sa'dun Shakir</td>
<td>Former Minister of Interior, Former Head of Intelligence Service</td>
<td>Takriti</td>
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President have replaced his brothers: Ali Hasan al-Majid as Director of General Security and Fadhil al-Barrak as Director of Intelligence. Another Presidential confidant from the Takrit area is Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, a former Interior Minister who now holds the Deputy Chairmanship of the Revolutionary Command Council. Equally important is the position of Kamil Yasin, another Takriti relative of Husayn, who is Secretary General of the Revolutionary Command Council. Of lesser importance are Abd al-Qadir Izz al-Din, the Minister of Education, who is from the Takrit region and Munzir al-Shawi, the
Justice Minister whose family is related to Takritis. Another Presidential confidant, Sa'dun Shakir al-Takriti, was former Director of Intelligence and Minister of Interior. Three years ago the President decreed that "al-Takriti" be dropped as a family name in order to de-emphasize the regional background of those in power. It is reported by reliable sources that the Iraqi President maintains a network of Takritis interspersed throughout the government who have greater power than their non-Takriti superiors. This practice is similar to the role played by Asad's Alawite kinsmen in the Syrian regime.

In contrast to the relative cohesion of Asad's Alawite oligarchy, the Takriti contingent and the larger Iraqi elite have experienced substantial turnover during the last five years. Saddam Husayn has repeatedly purged party leaders, cabinet ministers and even some relatives for their alleged corruption and conspiratorial activities, which reflects his increasing sense of insecurity brought about by the protracted war with Iran. Unlike the Syrian Army of Lebanon with its generally loyal Sunni majority, there have been a significant number of Shi'ite defectors from the Iraqi Army fighting Iran's Shi'ite forces. Meanwhile, the militant opposition from the Shi'ite majority led by pro-Khomeini clerics has been defeated at great cost. However, Shi'ite terrorism has persisted, although at a lower level of frequency.

In his struggle against militant Shi'ite fundamentalism, Saddam Husayn has combined massive repression with socio-economic inducements to win over the Shi'ite majority. In this sense, there is an obvious parallel between Asad's policies toward the Sunni Islamic militants and Saddam Husayn's efforts toward the Shi'ite
fundamentalists. However, in the long term, Husayn's policies of cooptation are not likely to succeed as long as the Shi'ites remain a politically and economically underprivileged sector of the Iraqi population.

**The Foreign Policy-Making Process**

The foreign policy of any state is the product of a complex blending of many diverse factors. As depicted in Figure 1, the foreign policy process in Syria and Iraq is influenced by the external environment and a plethora of internal variables—ethno-sectarian structure, the economic system, the military, the party, and the top oligarchy led by the two presidents. Yet, the actual formulation and execution of foreign policy involves a small group of top functionaries and is centered on the President himself. On major issues, foreign policy-making becomes a narrowly personal affair with Hafiz al-Asad and Saddam Husayn. In both cases, the personal insecurity of the two top leaders and of their narrow oligarchies generate tendencies toward confrontation and militancy in foreign affairs. In the final analysis, Asad and Husayn preside over the larger frameworks, as well as the details of foreign policy-making and its execution. Thus, foreign policy is highly personalized; it is less a process involving institutions and groups, and more a reflection of the leader's perceptions and reactions toward domestic and foreign realities. Consequently, the content of Iraqi and Syrian foreign policies is determined by each leader's perceptions of self-interest in terms of power preservation. Calculations of national interest play a secondary role to the "ruler's imperative."
Asad and Husayn: Psychological Profiles

The utility of developing psychological profiles of top leaders is predicated upon the perceived linkages between personality and political action. However, any attempt to relate personality types to political behavior would have to take into consideration various intervening factors--institutional influences, socio-economic limitations and external parameters. Despite these problems, studies of personality have been useful in predicting the overall thrust and content of domestic and foreign policy, particularly in oligarchical political systems. In such polities, usually there is a clear-cut decisional linkage between the dominant leader and policy, without the intervening influence of parliamentary institutions and interest groups.

Social Marginality

The personalities of Hafiz al-Asad and Saddam Husayn bear certain similarities as well as significant differences which have affected their respective leadership styles and decisions. The political careers of both leaders reflect their common lower class peasant backgrounds. Both individuals were provincials born into economically, socially and geographically marginal collectivities. Thus, their quest for upward mobility was a powerful motivating factor to overcome their marginal socio-economic status. While Saddam used the emerging Ba'th Party as the medium of his socio-political ascent, Hafiz joined the Syrian Army and then the Ba'th Party in his quest for power. Asad's ascendence was encumbered by his Alawite background in a country dominated by Sunnis. Hence, the importance of
the military as a means to power and as a framework to clothe with legitimacy Asad's drive for supreme authority. As a Sunni in a polity dominated by Sunnis, Saddam was free of Asad's stigma of sectarianism. Saddam's major drawback was his civilian status, since a military career had been the *sine qua non* of the revolutionary in the Arab political culture. While the military was to become Asad's main pathway to power, Saddam Husayn had to struggle against the Iraqi military establishment to make it an obedient servant of the Party—an unprecedented feat in recent Arab history. Consequently, in the conflictual setting of Syrian-Iraqi relations, Hafiz, the military revolutionary, was pitted against Saddam, the party revolutionary. This divergence in revolutionary experience, combined with the peculiar circumstances surrounding Asad's and Husayn's formative years, were to leave a powerful imprint on their personalities, political styles, and performance as leaders.

**Formative Years**

Despite the commonality of peasant roots, the early formative experiences of Asad and Husayn were significantly different. In contrast to Asad's relatively normal family setting, Husayn was orphaned as a child and escaped to Baghdad to live with an uncle and to attend school. Saddam's unhappy childhood was followed by successive clashes with the law which set him on a revolutionary course. Soon after the 1958 Revolution, Saddam was falsely accused and jailed for assassinating a Takriti notable. In prison he befriended fellow Ba'thi militants, and soon after his release joined an abortive attempt to assassinate General Qasim. Saddam successfully eluded the
police and escaped to Syria and on to Cairo in 1960 to study and lead the hard life of a political refugee. The brief return of the Ba'th to power in General Abd al-Salam Arif's regime brought Saddam back to Baghdad to become a Ba'th Party functionary. After an abortive attack on the presidential palace, once again Saddam was jailed, only to prepare for the revolt of July 1968; a subsequent Ba'thi counter-coup brought him to the fore of Iraqi politics.

The rapid progression of Saddam Husayn to the apex of power in Iraq in less than two decades was due to his readiness to take risks, ability to manipulate the Party's bureaucracy and success in neutralizing rivals. It appears that the deep sense of alienation and insecurity ingrained in Saddam's psyche during his orphaned childhood and turbulent revolutionary career made the Iraqi President acutely suspicious of colleagues and subordinates. He has insisted on total loyalty to his person and uncritical acceptance of his policies. This sense of paranoia has become more accentuated in the context of Iraq's deepening crisis induced by the war with Iran. Thus, the slightest suspicion of disloyalty is usually punished by death or imprisonment.

There is also a remarkable consistency between Saddam Husayn's social-psychological background and his political attitudes and foreign policy orientation. A lifetime of economic deprivation, suffering and imprisonment have hardened him into a tough revolutionary with a radical ideological bent. Only in recent years has the secularism and radicalism of the Iraqi Ba'th become muted because of the Iran-Iraq War and internal Shi'ite pressure. Saddam's psycho-
logical makeup also explains his decision-making style, which is highly personalized and generally unsolicitous of critical inputs through consultative procedures. This style of leadership maximizes decisiveness as well as the probability of judgmental mistakes. Finally, during the height of his power and prestige during the late 1970's, Saddam began to emulate Nasser by aspiring to Pan-Arab leadership. This quest has become muted partly due to Iraq's uncertain future in the ongoing war with Iran.

Hafiz al-Asad is a more enigmatic character than the extroverted Saddam Husayn. As an ambitious member of the Syrian officer corps, Asad possessed the same mastery of conspiratorial technique which characterized Husayn's activities in Iraq's Ba'th Party. Yet, in sharp contrast to Husayn the revolutionary Ba'hist, the Syrian President's career did not pass through prisons but centered mainly in the military's institutional framework. In essence, Asad operated through his kinship group of Alawite officers and non-Alawite loyalists, who ended up on the winning coalition in every struggle for power. In 1970, Asad's control of the military assured his success over Salah Jadid's radical party coalition. Thus, as a master manipulator of military factions, Asad took the easy path to the top—an ascent that lacked Saddam's radicalizing experiences. Indeed, in the party disputes of the 1960's, Asad never shared the ideological militancy of his leftist colleagues; nor did he display Saddam's revolutionary zeal.

A retrospective analysis of Asad's fourteen years in office and his modalities of leadership reveal the "Mu'awiyah pattern" of rule.
Among the Arabs he is considered an Amawi—an 'Umayyad' who is known to emulate the techniques of Mu'awiyah, the founder of the Umayyad Dynasty in Damascus. This type of leadership is referred to as Mu'awiyah's "thread" or "hair" after the great Caliph's well-known words: "And even if there be one hair binding me to my fellow men, I do not let it break: when they pull I loosen, and if they loosen I pull." This is how Talcott Seelye, former U.S. Ambassador to Syria has characterized American-Syrian relations in recent years. Indeed, the Mu'awiyah pattern can be detected in most of Asad's foreign and domestic policies. These include a cool realism and considerable flexibility and pragmatism to adapt to changing circumstances. While Asad retains the ultimate power to make important domestic and foreign policy decisions, he is known to encourage discussion and the free flow of ideas among his subordinates. Clearly, there is considerable collegiality in Asad's decision-making, as well as reliance on experts. The composition of Asad's entourage of military officers, technocrats and party functionaries has remained remarkably stable until his recent illness. During the last decade there were no major instances of purge in the Syrian elite in sharp contrast to the Iraqi leadership. Yet the Syrian President has used coercion as decisively as his Iraqi counterpart, but only as a last resort against implacable opponents. Aside from Asad's carefully managed ascent to power and pragmatic policies, the Mu'awiyah pattern can be seen in his personal style and behavior. Despite his admiration for Nasser, Asad has never shown charismatic propensities. He knows that as a Syrian Ba'thi of Alawite origin, his potential for
Pan-Arab leadership is limited. Moreover, Asad is an introverted and private individual who eschews public theatrics and grand gestures. While he is an articulate speaker, Asad has shunned excessive publicity and discouraged the development of a cult of personality around him. Should Asad leave the political arena because of his recent illness or death, the internal and external policies of Syria are likely to fall into disequilibrium, with potentially serious consequences for Syria, its neighbors and the great powers.
IV. THE FERTILE CRESCENT: BACKGROUND TO SYRIAN-IRAQI RELATIONS

The ebb and flow of contemporary Syrian-Iraqi relations are grounded, to a significant extent, in the momentous historical developments which originated in World War I. This period was marked by the emergence of new elites, ideological movements, boundary configurations, and great power involvement, all of which combined to define the parameters of conflict and cooperation between Iraq and Syria and the larger Fertile Crescent region (Mashriq).

Arab Nationalism under Ottoman Rule

The Arabic-speaking communities under Ottoman rule constituted the largest single ethno-linguistic bloc in the Empire. Unlike the Greeks, Armenians, and the Jews, the Arab communities were not socially and ideologically integrated. Indeed, there was great diversity among the Arabs along sectarian, regional, tribal and racial lines. The various Arab Christian sects and the Muslim communities shared little except language and literature. The Arabs of Greater Syria and the Egyptians were split by geography and historical experience, and even by race. Nor were the tribally divided Bedouin Arabs closely tied into the culture of the urban centers. In short, as late as the mid-nineteenth century, the Arab communities of the Empire represented a non-cohesive whole.

Two factors combined to rekindle the spirit of ethnic consciousness among the Arabs. First was the impact of European nationalism, which was a consequence of the growing Western imperial presence in
and around the Ottoman Empire. Exposure to imperialism generated a nationalist response among the Arabs to emulate the European experience in building national identities. The second factor triggering the search for an Arab identity was the changing nature of Ottoman imperial rule. Traditionally, the aspirations of the Sultan's Muslim Arab subjects had been accommodated by the Islamic nature of the Empire. As Muslims, the majority of the Arab population regarded themselves as being part of the Islamic ummah (community) led by the Sultan. It was no accident that the seeds of Arab nationalist consciousness first appeared among the Arab Christian communities of the Levant. The Christian Arabs, like the Sultan's Greek, Armenian and Jewish subjects, felt little loyalty toward the Empire which had denied them basic human rights and equality with the Muslims. Moreover, the Christian Arabs were more receptive to Western cultural influences than their Muslim compatriots. In this context, the formative impact of the Christian missionary schools, the American University of Beirut and the Jesuit St. Joseph University was substantial.

It was not until the turn of the century that Muslim Arab intellectuals of the Fertile Crescent area began to manifest nationalistic tendencies. This process was accelerated after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. After promising major reforms, the Young Turkish government adopted the ideology of Pan-Turanism, which advocated continued Turkish dominance in the Empire and the Turkification of its non-Turkish subjects. The policy of Turkification was anathema to the Arabs, since Arabic was the sacred language of Allah's revelation to his Arab Prophet Muhammad, as told in the Qur'an. The result
was the establishment of various Arab nationalist societies such as al-Ahd and al-Fatat. In June 1913, a congress of Arab nationalist groups convened in Paris; this marked the convergence of Muslim and Christian aspirations into a single Arab nationalist movement directed against Turkish hegemony. Yet, it was not until World War I that the Arab nationalist leaders decided to seek total independence from Turkish rule.

Meanwhile, the leadership of the nascent movement had shifted to Sharif Husayn of Mecca and his sons Abdallah and Faysal. Before the war's outbreak, Abdallah informed the British Consul General in Cairo, Lord Kitchener, about his father's willingness to lead a revolution in the Hijaz. During 1915 and 1916, Sharif Husayn negotiated with Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Cairo, through an exchange of letters. The Husayn-McMahon correspondence formed the basis of a military alliance which led to the successful Arab Revolt against the Turks. The ambiguous British promises to Sharif Husayn included the establishment of an independent Arab Caliphate from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, except the Christian areas of Lebanon. While the Sharif insisted that the Lebanese Arab Christians be included in the projected Arab state, the dispute was postponed until the war's aftermath. Sharif Husayn's revolt was strongly supported by the Arab nationalist societies. The appeals of the Turkish governor of Syria, Jemal Pasha, inviting the Arabs to wage Jihad (holy war) against the Allies were rejected. The Arab leadership was suspicious of Turkish promises of reform, as it witnessed the fate of the Armenian community, which was being decimated. In response, Jemal Pasha unleashed a
"reign of terror" by executing most of the leaders of the Arab nationalist movement.

Syria and Iraq under Mandatory Rule

The victory of the combined British and Arab forces over the Turks and the Germans in the Middle East was followed by an Anglo-French struggle to dominate the region. The British wartime promises to the Arabs, the French and the Zionists were overlapping and therefore impossible to honor. President Wilson's efforts to modify the Anglo-French wartime agreements proved unsuccessful, as the two Allies rejected the findings of the King-Crane Commission regarding the Arabs' desire for independence, possibly under an American mandate. Under the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916), the French claimed all northern Syria, which was being governed after the war by Amir Faysal from Damascus. Faysal was prevented from extending his rule to Beirut as French forces replaced the British in Lebanon. In March 1920, the General Syrian Congress proclaimed Syria-Lebanon-Palestine-Transjordan as an independent entity under Faysal. A month later at the San Remo Conference, Britain agreed to the establishment of a French mandate in Syria. This prompted a French attack on Damascus and the termination of Syrian independence under Faysal.

In exchange for its acquiescence to the French takeover of Syria, Britain asserted its control over Iraq, including the Mosul area, which had been originally assigned to France under the Sykes-Picot Treaty. In 1920, the harsh rule of the British India Office under Sir Arnold Wilson, the Acting Civil Commissioner, generated nation-
alist ferment culminating in a tribal revolt of Sunnis and Shi'ites which claimed 10,000 casualties. Consequently, Britain replaced Wilson with Sir Percy Cox, who was sympathetic to Arab nationalism. In March 1921, Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill convened a conference in Cairo, where it was decided to make Faysal King of Iraq, while his brother, Amir Abdallah, was made King of British-ruled Transjordan.

There were major differences between French and British mandatory policies. The French administered Syria by dividing it into ethnically based provinces—Jabal Druze, Damascus, Aleppo, Jazirah and Lataqiya. Lebanon was ruled as a separate mandate and the Alexandretta area was placed under a special regime as a prelude to its cession to Turkey in 1939. The French policy of "divide and rule" magnified Syria's communal differences, and reinforced ethno-nationalistic tendencies among the Alawites, Druze, Kurds, and Christians. Nor were the French prepared to contribute materially to Syria's modernization and economic development. From the outset, the mandatory regime faced unrelenting opposition from the Arab nationalist movement. In 1925, the nationalist rebellion spread through the urban centers and was joined by Druze forces, only to be suppressed during 1926. The rise of pro-German sentiment among the nationalists prompted France to adopt more conciliatory policies after the mid-1930's. In 1941, British and Free French (Gaullist) forces conquered Syria by defeating the Vichy French administration. Three years later, France granted Syria independence under British and U.S. pressure.
The British presence in Iraq was more benevolent than the French mandate in Syria. After Faysal's enthronement in August 1921, the British incorporated the mandate into the Anglo-Iraqi treaty, which gave Iraq a large measure of domestic autonomy. But all real power rested with the British High Commissioner. While both Faysal and the nationalists opposed the treaty, they were forced to accept it under British pressure. In 1932, Iraq became a member of the League of Nations, after the British Labour Government granted the country full independence in a legal sense. In practice, the new Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930 placed substantial limits on Iraq's sovereignty, particularly in military and foreign affairs. Faysal's death in 1933 created a vacuum in Iraqi politics. The resulting political instability was marked by the massacre of Assyrian Christians, Kurdish uprisings, Sunnite-Shi'ite conflict, and tribal discontent. In Fall 1936, General Bakr Sidqi took power with the support of the Ahali group of liberal leftists. Subsequently, Sidqi emerged as the head of a right-wing military dictatorship, only to be assassinated in August 1937. Sidqi's regime became the prototype for subsequent military coups d' états in the Arab world.

The late 1930's witnessed the dramatic ascendance of German influence in Iraq under the stewardship of Dr. Fritz Grobba, the German Minister in Baghdad. Indeed, Iraq and the Middle East provided fertile soil for Nazi propaganda, in view of native nationalist opposition to the British presence. In December 1938, General Nuri al-Sa'id seized power and established a pro-British government. Despite his dictatorial methods, Nuri al-Sa'id was unable to maintain
stability. This government was replaced in March 1940 by an Arab nationalist, pro-German regime under Rashid Ali al-Ghaylani, who resisted new British demands for additional military bases. A British attempt through Regent Abd al-Ilah to force Rashid Ali from office failed as the Army supported the regime. The consequent British invasion of Iraq and the German's logistical inability to extend sufficient military support to Rashid Ali caused his regime's demise, and the reinstatement of Nuri al-Said as Prime Minister.
V. THE QUEST FOR UNITY (1921-1945)

The mandate system and the establishment of separate governments in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Transjordan, and the Hijaz had effectively partitioned the Arab East—a far cry from the dreams of Arab unity espoused by the nationalists. However, the heaviest blow to nationalist aspirations was the establishment of Israel in the heart of the Arab world.

The territorial fragmentation of the Fertile Crescent did not extinguish the quest for Arab unity, which came to be seen by the nationalists as the ultimate solution to the Arabs' problems. Thus, during the half-century after the Arab Revolt against Turkey, the ideal of a united Arab state centering on Greater Syria persisted in the political discourse and activities of the region. The germinal idea of unity could be found in the program of the Syrian National Congress of 1920, which envisioned three steps to achieve unity:

1. To unite "geographical Syria" which would include Lebanon, Palestine, Transjordan and the Hijaz—all of Greater Syria;

2. To federate Syria with Iraq;

3. To establish looser links with other Arab states.

Fertile Crescent Plan

During the inter-war years, the focus of Arab unity sentiment began to shift away from Syria to the Hashimite Kingdoms of Iraq and Transjordan. While Syria retained its epicentric position in Arab nationalist sentiment, there was no Arab government in French-ruled
Damascus to pursue the goals of Arab unity. In contrast to French rule in Syria, the British authorities in Iraq and Transjordan did not constrain the activities of their Hashimite clients in the Arab unity sphere. Consequently, Faysal's enthronement in Baghdad made Iraq a rival to Syria as a center of Arab nationalist activity. However, the King's aspirations of Arab unity based on a Syrian-Iraqi union enjoyed little sympathy in London and Paris. Meanwhile, the general mood in Damascus had turned toward the establishment of a republican regime. After Faysal's death, his associates continued to propagate the notion of Arab unity. The outstanding exponent of a unity scheme centered on Iraq was Nuri Pasha al-Sa'id. In his Blue Book (1943), Nuri al-Sa'id proposed the Fertile Crescent plan to unity Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan as a prelude to a larger union with Iraq. In such an entity, the Jews of Palestine and the Maronites of Lebanon would be granted autonomy.

Greater Syria Scheme

A rival unity project was advanced by King Abdallah of Transjordan who outlived his brother Faysal by two decades. Abdallah's Greater Syria project would unite Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan. Under this plan, launched in July 1940, Abdallah would lead the unity effort rather than the Hashimites of Iraq. Indeed, after Faysal's death, the Hashimite regime in Iraq lacked the potential for Arab leadership under the child-king Faysal II. The Greater Syria plan enjoyed some support among the Druze, the Alawites, the tribes and several Syrian politicians. In point of fact, both branches of the Hashimite Dynasty had lost their Arab nationalist credibility because of British ties and misrule of the
Hijaz, leading to their expulsion by Ibn Sa'ud in 1926. Consequently, there was growing anti-Hashimite sentiment among Arab nationalists in Iraq, Syria, and Palestine. Yet, both Iraq and Transjordan continued to pursue their respective hegemonic policies in the Arab East in the increasingly complicated Middle Eastern political arena that emerged after World War II.

Greater Syria: Another Vision

A third type of unity project made itself manifest in the interwar years which directly challenged the Fertile Crescent and Greater Syria schemes. This new approach to the constitution of a Greater Syria centered on a purely "Syrian" nationalism, as distinct from the larger context of Arab nationalism. Its foremost propagator was Antun Sa'adah, a Lebanese Christian from Brazil, who founded in 1932 the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (al-Hizb al-Suri al-Qawmi al-Ijtima'i). The SSNP was rigidly organized along fascist lines, and its ideology advocated the establishment of a secular Syrian state including Lebanon, Iraq, and the rest of the Arab East—the territories of the Umayyad Caliphate. However, the Party envisioned a Greater Syria, without Abdallah. The fortunes of this strictly secular and super-nationalist movement were compromised because of its subversive activities in Syria and Lebanon. In 1949, Sa'adah took refuge in Syria, after being implicated in an attempted insurrection in Lebanon, only to be extradited and executed. The SSNP took vengeance by assassinating the Lebanese Prime Minister Riyad al-Sulh (1951). The Party was once again suppressed by the Lebanese
authorities for an attempted coup in December 1961. It reemerged as a radical group during the 1970's and has continued to play a role in the ongoing civil strife in Lebanon in support of the anti-Maronite National Movement.
VI. THE STRUGGLE FOR ARAB PREEMINENCE (1945-1963)

The emergence of Syria as an independent state in 1945 triggered a five-cornered struggle for leadership in the Eastern Arab world. The Hashimite contenders, Iraq and Transjordan, were now joined by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, with Syria emerging as the main arena of struggle. Each Arab state sought to further its interests under the guise of Arab unity, since Arab nationalism was increasingly assuming a concrete psychological presence among large segments of the people.

The first government of independent Syria was led by upper class politicians committed to liberal democratic norms and opposed to incorporation into the neighboring Arab states. Two factors contributed to the demise of Syrian democracy: 1) defeat in Palestine and, 2) intense pressures from other Arab states to influence the course of Syrian politics in conformity with their irredentist objectives.

The first military regime that took power in March 1949 under General Husni al-Za'im, was initially pledged to unify Syria with Iraq. This unity scheme was supported by the SSNP and the pro-Iraqi People's Party. Soon, however, intense Saudi and Egyptian diplomatic pressure and financial aid induced Za'im to renege on his promise to seek a Syrian-Iraqi union.

In August 1949, General Za'im was overthrown and executed by Colonel Sami al-Hinnawi, who established a regime pledged to unity with Hashimite Iraq. In order to abort Hinnawi's unionist plans, the Army effected a third coup d'état in December 1949, led by Colonel Adib al-Shishakli. These three coups d'états were influenced by
extra-regional forces. The Za'im regime was basically pro-French and pro-American in its orientation, while Hinnawi's pro-Iraqi stance enjoyed muted British support. Shishakli's policy toward the great powers tended to be neutral and isolationist, while in the Arab sphere close ties were forged with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The Za'im regime was basically pro-French and pro-American in its orientation, while Hinnawi's pro-Iraqi stance enjoyed muted British support. Shishakli's policy toward the great powers tended to be neutral and isolationist, while in the Arab sphere close ties were forged with Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Two periods characterized Shishakli's rule. The two years after the December 1949 coup witnessed a return to civilian politics under military guidance. In the midst of several cabinet crises, the leader of the Populist Party, Shaykh Ma'ruf al-Dawalibi, emerged as prime minister triggering a second coup by Colonel Shishakli who took over as president and prime minister. In February 1954, Shishakli fled Syria in the face of an Army revolt, clearing the way for the establishment of a civilian government.

The Rise of Pan-Arabism (1955-1958)

The mid-1950's found Syria and Iraq at the confluence of powerful socio-political forces, which heightened the inter-Arab struggle and altered the patterns of interstate relationships. The specific events and movements which determined the nature of the Arab conflictual milieu included:

1. The consequences of the Arab defeat in Palestine (1948).
2. The assassination of King Abdallah in 1951.
3. The July 1952 Egyptian Revolution.
5. Arab adherence to nonalignment (1955).
8. The advent of Soviet power (1955).
10. The rise of Nasserism (1956).

The cumulative impact of the foregoing events and developments created an unstable Middle Eastern environment, characterized by deep crisis and revolutionary fervor, which has persisted to this day. Indeed, the 1950's constituted the formative period of contemporary Arab and Middle Eastern history, which set the stage for the involvement of the two superpowers and the patterns of their relations with local client states.

The establishment of Israel in 1948 contributed, more than any other factor, to the destabilization of the Middle Eastern environment. It also had a powerful impact on the evolution of Arab nationalism which developed four foci of militant action:

1. Perpetual struggle against the Jewish State.
2. Demand for retribution against Arab regimes responsible for the defeat in Palestine.
3. Struggle against Western imperialism perceived as being responsible for the establishment of Israel.
4. Emergence of strong popular sentiments to promote Arab unity against Israel and the West.

The nationalist vengeance against the Arab regimes resulted in the military's overthrow of the Syrian civilian government in 1949, the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, the Iraqi Revolution of 1958, and
the destabilization of Hashimite Jordan. In July 1951, King Abdallah of Jordan was assassinated by a Palestinian Islamic fundamentalist for his failure to commit the Arab Legion to the 1948 War. Meanwhile, for the first time in recent history, the leadership of the Arabs abruptly shifted to Egypt—a country which until then had been reluctant to shed its Pharaonic identity. During the inter-war years, the first signs of an Arabist identity had become apparent in Egypt. Already, Cairo had emerged as the cultural and religious epicenter of the Arab world. Moreover, the establishment of the Arab League in Cairo (1945) underlined Egypt's political primacy, the Arabist trend persisted during the 1940's as Egypt became increasingly concerned with the rising Zionist challenge in Palestine. Finally, participation in the Palestine War fused Egyptian nationalist sentiment with that of the Eastern Arabs in a common cause. Nevertheless, the ideological focus of the 1952 Revolution was limited to Egyptian nationalism without explicit reference to the Arab nationalism of the East. It was not until the crucial events of 1955 that an abrupt shift occurred in the Egyptian revolutionary dynamic from Egyptian nationalism to Pan-Arabism. The specific determinants of this revolutionary re-orientation were: 1) the Israeli threat, 2) the Baghdad Pact, 3) the emergence of nonalignment in world affairs, and 4) Soviet willingness to support the Arab cause.

The year 1954 marked the rise of Lt. Col. Gamal Abd al-Nasser and his officers' faction after their power struggles against the civilian parties and the Muslim Brotherhood. Despite its ascendance, the new military elite lacked a clear-cut direction in
terms of developmental ideology and foreign policy. The early efforts of the military junta to seek a rapprochement with the United States had not been crowned with success. Any request for sizeable economic and military aid depended on a firm Egyptian commitment to the Western alliance system. Under the stewardship of U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, American policy sought to establish a regional defense arrangement between incompatible Middle Eastern states which, until recently, had been enemies—i.e. Turkey, Iran, the Arab states, and Israel. While the American priority was defense against the Soviet Union, the primary Arab concern was Israel. Indeed, the Arab states were being asked to ally themselves with Britain and France, their imperial masters, along with their historic enemies, Turkey and Iran, against the Soviet threat which they had neither seen nor experienced. Under these circumstances, the Turkish-Iraqi announcement of February 1955 to join the Baghdad Pact brought vociferous Arab criticism led by Egypt's Nasser. Two months later, Col. Nasser attended the first meeting of the nonaligned states at Bandung, Indonesia, where he was received as the leader of the Arabs. Meanwhile, the Arab-Israeli confrontation had intensified with the return of the retired David Ben Gurion to reassert the Premierships of Israel. This signaled the end of Prime Minister Moshe Sharet's secret attempts to achieve a modus vivendi with Nasser, and the beginning of large-scale retaliation against Egyptian border posts, in response to Palestinian guerrilla activity. The manifest Egyptian military inferiority prompted an urgent quest for modern armaments, since King Faruq's failure to provide adequate weaponry
to the military in the 1948 War had been a prime catalyst of his overthrow. In the face of the tripartite arms embargo of the West, Nasser turned to the Soviet Union as a source of modern armaments in September 1955—a move which opened up the Arab world to Soviet military penetration. Thus, by late 1955, mistakes in U.S. diplomacy, coupled with the adoption of an offensive Israeli posture, had radically transformed the Arab political environment. Nasser's successive responses to Western and Israeli pressure—defiance of the Baghdad Pact, adherence to the Nonaligned Bloc at Bandung, and the Soviet arms deal—had placed the Egyptian President in the mainstream of Arab nationalist sentiment. Nasser's subsequent nationalization of the Suez Canal (July 1956), as a response to the U.S. decision to withdraw the offer to build the Aswan High Dam, made him immensely popular in the Arab world and led to his emergence as the charismatic embodiment of Pan-Arabism. In less than a decade after the Arab defeat in Palestine, the center of the Arab unity movement had shifted from the Arab East to Egypt.

The United Arab Republic (1958-1961)

The Egyptian revolutionary quest for primacy in the Arab world was helped by the political deterioration of the Syrian, Iraqi, and Jordanian regimes. None could match the cultural centricity of Cairo and the revolutionary vigor of Nasser's Pan-Arabist call to unity. Nasser's appeals evoked the deepest popular yearnings among the masses for dignity and unity, and induced a precipitous decline in the legitimacy of Arab rulers and a corresponding increase in revolu-
tionary fervor. Once again, the most sustained response to the call of Arab unity came from Syria.

The overthrow of Colonel Shishakli's regime in February 1954 ushered in a period of unstable civilian rule. Syrian political life of the mid-1950's was influenced by three important factors. The first involved the emergence of the Communist Party led by the very able Kurdish Stalinist, Khalid Bakdash. Aside from its organizational capabilities, the Party enjoyed the support of key army officers, led by General Afif al-Bizri, who became Chief of Staff in 1957. This was accompanied by pervasive manifestations of Pan-Arabist sentiment in support of the Nasser-led Arab unity movement. Finally, there was the emergence of the Ba'th Party with a Pan-Arabist ideological program, the promulgation of which had preceded its adoption by Nasser. As a secular movement, the Ba'th sought to attract all Arab nationalists regardless of sectarian or regional affiliation. However, it had been unable to dominate Syrian political life in the face of the competing ideological influences of Nasserism and communism. The Ba'th's efforts to gain hegemony over Syria prompted the adoption of three policies which were pursued simultaneously with great energy:

1. The aggressive recruitment of minority elements which had been marginal to Syrian economic and political life.

2. The establishment of strong ties with the Army by recruiting military men from Syria's underprivileged minorities and rural plebians.

3. The acquisition of Nasserite support to obtain Pan-Arab legitimacy and to neutralize the communist threat. 5

The minority elements in the Ba'th included Alawites, Isma'ilis, the Druze, and the poorer Sunnis and Christians, most of whom came
from rural lower and lower-middle class backgrounds. These were the same groups which provided a large pool of recruitables for the military. In effect both the Ba'ath and the military accorded Syria's disadvantaged classes and minorities unprecedented opportunities for upward mobility. This convergence of Party and Army recruitment policies was destined to shape Syria's political fortunes after the mid-1960's.

However, it was also necessary for the Ba'ath to attach itself to Nasser—the dominant symbol of Pan-Arab legitimacy. The Nasserite connection could render the Ba'athi cause acceptable to Syria's Sunni population and nationalist elements both within and outside the Army. Not only the Ba'ath lacked popularity, but also the capacity to block the emerging communist threat inside Syria. In view of Nasser's proven record of anti-communism in Egypt, the Ba'ath could find no better ally than the Egyptian President; hence, the concentrated effort to conclude a unity agreement with Nasser. Despite Nasser's initial misgivings, the Ba'ath succeeded in persuading the Egyptian President to establish the United Arab Republic in February 1958.

The Arab Federation (1958)

The formation of the United Arab Republic was an unprecedented event in modern Arab history. Under Nasser's leadership, the U.A.R. generated intense emotions in virtually all sectors of Arab society. As the Northern Region of the new entity, Syria was in a strategic location to influence the unionist movements operating in Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon. the nationalists of Iraq opposing Nuri al-Sa'id
and the Hashimite Monarchy were inspired by the Egyptian Revolution and by Nasser's fiery nationalist stance against the West. Many opposition leaders in Baghdad were in constant touch with Cairo's revolutionary officers, whom they frequently visited for consultation and guidance. Similar contacts existed between Cairo and the nationalist groups of Jordan, Lebanon, and particularly Algeria, where the anti-French insurrection was in full swing. Consequently, after 1956, Egypt had become the "nucleus state" around which the Arab countries began to gravitate, despite their leaders' polycentric tendencies. The momentous event which finally destroyed the withering legitimacy of pro-Western Arab elites was the tripartite attack by Anglo-French-Israeli forces on Egypt in October, 1956. Indeed, British participation in the Suez War made the Hashimites' position in Iraq and Jordan increasingly untenable. The Jordanian government of King Husayn was confronted with repeated insurrectionary attempts from Palestinian and Jordanian nationalist elements. Meanwhile, Nuri al-Sa'id's situation was deteriorating in the midst of popular revulsion against Britain and France, forcing him to break relations with these states. These pressures intensified with the establishment of the U.A.R., which prompted the Hashimites of Iraq and Jordan to establish, in February 1958, the Arab Federation. As a counterweight to the Egyptian-Syrian Union, the Arab Federation brought together Iraq's King Faysal II and Jordan's King Husayn, who were Hashimite cousins. The two monarchs would retain sovereignty over their respective territories, although their armed forces, foreign policies, diplomatic corps, educational systems, and customs services would be
unified. Moreover, a federal legislature was to be chosen, with equal representation from the deputies of the Jordanian and Iraqi parliaments.

The efficacy of the Arab Federation as a practical unity scheme could be seriously questioned. It was unclear as to the modalities by which the two Kings would exercise dual control over the Federation, while retaining sovereignty over their respective states. In effect the Iraqi-Jordanian unity scheme was a pale reflection of the U.A.R., since it failed to generate any popular enthusiasm. The overthrow of Hashimite rule in the Iraqi Revolution of July 1958 destroyed The Arab Federation. In August 1958, Jordan's King Husayn officially declared the dissolution of the Federation.


In sharp contrast to the Arab Federation, the U.A.R. proved more durable but not completely viable. Its relative longevity was the consequence of the great strength of the Pan-Arabist unity sentiment. The ultimate failure of the U.A.R. after a lifespan of three-and-a-half years was due to five major factors:

1. The deterioration of Ba'thi-Egyptian relations.

2. The incompatibility of Egypt's homogeneous Pharaonic political culture and Syria's multi-sectarian conflictual individualism.

3. The heavy-handed modalities of Egyptian rule in Syria.

4. The incongruity between Nasser's socialist-etatist policies and Syria's entrepreneurial milieu.

5. Nasser's reluctance to utilize maximal coercion to preserve the union.
The significance of the foregoing causal attributes of failure transcend the Syrian-Egyptian unity experiment because they have been inherent in virtually every attempt at Arab unity. The first dysfunctional attribute concerns inter-elite conflict, which has been an endemic feature of the Arab scene. The Ba'th wished to rule Syria under the halo of Nasser's legitimacy, with a minimum of Egyptian interference. Soon the Ba'th was shunted by Egyptian administrators who preferred to rule through unpopular Syrian Nasserites such as Colonel Abd al-Hamid Sarraj. In practice, Egyptian rule was heavy-handed but not repressive. The Syrians resented the Egyptian determination to implement the July 1961 Socialist Laws, designed to nationalize the business sector. Ultimately, there was a clash of cultures between the "dark-skinned" bureaucrats from the Nile Valley and the free wheeling individualism and heterogeneity of the Syrians. Syria proved to be far more difficult to govern than Egypt, which had a tradition of centralized authoritarian rule. Finally, the Nasserite vision of Arab unity seemed more attractive to the Syrians than its implementation in the context of the U.A.R. Nor was Nasser satisfied with the Union, despite the persistence of his personal popularity among the Syrian masses. A secessionist revolt led by conservative anti-Unionist officers was not resisted by Nasser, who announced the dissolution of the Union on September 28, 1961.

In retrospect, the demise of the U.A.R. was the consequence of objective social forces which militated against unity. The surprising fact was that the U.A.R. lasted longer than any other Arab unity scheme. Indeed, it was difficult, if not impossible, to preserve the
Union, in view of its internal contradictions and the strong opposition from Arab ruling elites, the superpowers, and the West. Yet during its lifetime, even after its disintegration, the Union exercised a powerful influence on the Arab world. The Imam of Yemen was quick to join the U.A.R. as associate member. In Lebanon, the strong unionist influence manifested itself as part of the opposition to President Shamun's government during the Civil War of 1958. More powerful was the U.A.R.'s role in precipitating the 1958 Iraqi Revolution.

An Abortive Unity Scheme: Iraq and U.A.R.

In view of the overwhelming Arab nationalist fervor of the Iraqi revolutionaries, it was the general expectation that the new regime would soon join the U.A.R. However, there were several factors which aborted an Iraqi role in the Syrian-Egyptian Union. In contrast to the Egyptian revolutionary experience, the Iraqi Revolution was a joint endeavor by military and civilian groups. Therefore, it lacked centralized military control and discipline in the execution of the Revolution. As a result, the overthrow of the Hashimite Monarchy in July 1958 was a bloody affair, unlike Egypt's relatively peaceful Revolution. Thus, the Iraqi military regime lacked the internal cohesion of Nasser's Free Officers' group; nor did it possess a leader who could boldly impose his will on the decisional process.

At the outset, the government of Brigadier General Abd al-Karim Qasim met all of the expectations of its Arab nationalist supporters.
It seceded from the Arab Federation with Jordan and declared its recognition of the Soviet Union and of the People's Republic of China.

The new regime also severed Iraq's ties to the West by rejecting the Baghdad Pact. These steps were followed by negotiations with the U.A.R. to form either a union or a federation. Indeed, in the wake of the Revolution, there was enthusiastic anticipation on both sides that a union was imminent. However, the confluence of several discordant issues prevented the incorporation of Iraq into the U.A.R. These included the insistence of Iraq's Ba'th Party on an immediate and total union with Syria and Egypt, which was opposed by the National Democratic Party. There was a reluctance on the part of some Iraqis to share their country's oil wealth with the U.A.R. Nor was General Qasim inclined to sacrifice his position of leadership. This prompted the General to suppress the pro-Nasserite forces led by the Ba'th and Istiqlal parties. Under Qasim, the Iraqi Communist Party reached its apogee of power because of its excellent organization and capable cadres. Along with the weaker National Democrats, the communists occupied important positions in the Qasim regime. By 1961, these parties had become internally divided, and the government was unable to implement necessary socio-economic reforms in the midst of continuing instability. Meanwhile, the breach between Nasser and Qasim had become irreparable. On February 8, 1963, the Qasim regime was overthrown by Col. Abd al-Salam Arif, his former deputy, with the support of Ba'thist and nationalist officers.
VII. CONTEMPORARY SYRIAN-IRAQI RELATIONS (1963-1984)

The internal and external political dynamics of Syria and Iraq impose certain categorical imperatives which shape their foreign policies and mutual relationships, within the larger context of the inter-Arab, Middle Eastern, and global environments. To a significant degree, the Syrian and Iraqi political systems share similar attributes, which have determined their mutual relations and foreign policy behavior.

Determinants of Syrian-Iraqi Relations

A. Domestic Determinants

1. Ethno-religious heterogeneity of society.

2. Historical-territorial disjunction arising from the Anglo-French partition of the Fertile Crescent.

3. Hegemony of two opposing political elites, belonging to opposite wings of the Ba'th Party and dominated by dissimilar sectarian minorities (Alawites in Syria and Sunnis in Iraq).

4. Personalized style of leadership based on patron-client networks and the consequent centralization of foreign policy-making and execution in the hands of the two top leaders.

5. Legitimacy crisis of ruling elites and institutions due to: a) the failure to forge a viable synthesis of competing ideologies—ethno-nationalism, state nationalism, Arabism, Islamism and socialism; b) sectarian minority elites ruling sectarian majorities; and c) excessive elite reliance on systematic coercion to maintain power.

6. Geographical and economic factors: e.g., foreign aid, the Euphrates River, and the transit of oil.

B. External Determinants

1. The Arab orbit and concomitant Arab nationalist pressures.
2. The Islamic framework and the transnational influence of Islamic fundamentalism.

3. The proximity of Israeli power.

4. The economic and political influence of intermediate powers—France, Britain, China, West Germany, Japan and India.

5. The influence of the Nonaligned Bloc.


7. The economic and diplomatic role of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.

8. The Soviet role as provider of political support and military hardware and technology.

The foregoing similarities between Syrian and Iraqi determinants of foreign policy should not overshadow important differences which flow from their systemic peculiarities, geopolitical locations, demographic differences and types of natural resources. These dissimilarities are:

1. The identity and size of the ethnic and religious communities of the two countries.

2. The significant Iraqi dependence on oil production as a source of revenue versus the lesser Syrian dependence on oil exports.

3. Contrasting geopolitical and strategic priorities dictated by Iraq's contiguity to the Gulf and Iran, and Syria's contiguity to Israel, Lebanon, and the Mediterranean, and greater involvement in the Palestinian cause.

4. Different degrees and types of dependence on Soviet military power and technology: Syria is more dependent on Soviet power and military hardware than Iraq, which has diversified its sources of weaponry.

5. The existence of a greater sectarian balance in Iraq resulting from the large-scale implantation of Egyptian farmer-soldiers and expulsion of Iranian Shi'ites. 1

6. Differences in respective foreign policy orientations stemming from the dissimilarities between the individual political styles and personalities of Hafiz al-Asad and Saddam Husayn.
The cumulative impact of the foregoing determinants has been detrimental to Syrian-Iraqi relations in the contemporary period. Thus, the quest for unity has been counterbalanced by powerful polarizing tendencies which have promoted long-term conflictual relations, particularly since the mid-sixties. This conclusion becomes evident when the forces and incentives to achieve unity are arrayed against those promoting disunity and conflictual relations.

**TABLE 3**

**FACTORS OF UNITY AND DISUNITY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unity</th>
<th>Disunity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab nationalism</td>
<td>Ethno-religious heterogeneity and enmity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic unity</td>
<td>Minority rule by opposing Ba'thi sectarian elites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial contiguity</td>
<td>Oppressed majorities having affinities with minority elites of the other country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic complementarity</td>
<td>Lack of unifying ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External threats (Israel, Iran)</td>
<td>Differing foreign policy interests and elite priorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military potential</td>
<td>Legitimacy crisis of elites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political influence</td>
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The foregoing comparison reflects the imbalance between the factors promoting unity and disunity. The quest for unity is motivated by Arab nationalist/Islamic zeal to create a large and powerful state which could achieve economic self-sufficiency and military potential against its neighbors—particularly Israel. However, the forces promoting disunity are clearly overwhelming. One major disunity factor is ethno-religious composition. Iraq's Shi'ite majority
opposes any unity scheme with Syria, since the latter's Sunni majority would threaten the Shi'ites' majority status. Similarly, the large Kurdish minority of Iraq would be submerged into an Arab ocean in the context of a unified state. Nor would the Alawite ruling minority of Syria support a unity scheme that would automatically threaten its dominant position. In point of fact, Arab nationalism by itself was not sufficiently powerful to create strong unionist sentiments among Syrian and Iraqi ethno-sectarian communities, even at the apogee of Nasserism.

It would have been difficult to create a Syrian-Iraqi unified entity even if the societies were homogeneous, because of the "ruler's imperative". The opposing wings and leaders of the Ba'th Party were not eager to consummate a union because of their personal interests and ideological differences. On the other hand, the possibilities for some type of confederal union would have been greater had it not been for the enmity between the two Ba'ths. Even in such an ideal scenario of inter-elite compatibility, the "ruler's imperative" would probably abort the establishment of a tightly unified Arab entity. Indeed, a classical axiom of politics is that most rulers do not willingly relinquish their positions of leadership.

Beginning with the 1960's, Syrian-Iraqi relations entered a new phase characterized by powerful countervailing forces emanating from domestic, regional, and international sources. In this context, Nasser and the Ba' th Party played the central roles in the ensuing struggle for power.
The Tripartite Federal Union (March-September, 1963)

Colonel Arif's coup d'état of February 1963 that overthrew General Qasim was supported by the Ba'ath Party. As Head of State and Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, Arif proclaimed his government's intention to establish Arab unity and socialism. The Ba'athi General Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr became Prime Minister at the head of a mixed Cabinet of independent nationalists and party members. The main opposition to the new regime came from the Communist Party, which was overwhelmed by military units and Ba'athi detachments. On March 8, 1963, exactly one month after Qasim's overthrow, the Syrian Ba'ath seized power in Damascus. Consequently, the conditions were propitious for a new Arab unity attempt involving the three Pan-Arabist regimes of Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. In March 1963, delegations from Syria and Iraq were sent to Cairo for unity talks with President Nasser. During the next three weeks, Nasser and his Ba'hist guests engaged in protracted and animated debates which, in terms of their depth and comprehensiveness, were unprecedented in Arab history. The tripartite unity negotiations centered on three major issues:

1. Type of leadership: single vs. collective.
2. Type of governmental system: federal vs. unitary.
3. Modality of political representation.

In view of his differences with the Ba'ath during the U.A.R. period, Nasser was suspicious of Ba'athi unity schemes which centered on the Party's role as the main link between the masses and the
government. Instead, Nasser proposed a coalition party to include Nasserites, Ba'thists, and independent nationalist elements. On April 17, 1963, the negotiators signed a charter to establish a federal union by stages. While it was understood that Nasser would become the President of the tripartite union, actual leadership would be exercised by a collective group over a federal entity. The adoption of a federal scheme was in sharp contrast to the unitary nature of the ill-fated United Arab Republic. However, the old distrust between Nasser and Syrian Ba'thi leaders, Michel Aflaq and Salah Bitar, was to wreck the tripartite union in the midst of abortive plots by Pro-Nasser elements in Syria and Iraq. As a result, the unity charter was officially repudiated on July 22, 1963.

Despite the breakup of the nascent federal union, there was a second attempt by the Iraqi Ba'thists to conclude a federal agreement with Egypt. This quest stemmed from the strength of pro-Nasserite unionist sentiment in the Iraqi military led by President Arif. Also, the relations between Nasser and the Iraqi Ba'ath lacked the rancor that characterized his dealings with the Syrians. The negotiations were conducted personally by President Arif in Cairo over a ten-day period, in late August 1963, without achieving progress toward Egyptian-Iraqi unity.

A Union of Parties: Syria and Iraq (September-November, 1963)

The failure of the Syrian and Iraqi Ba'ath parties to achieve a Pan-Arab federal union with Egypt prompted a rapprochement between
the Damascus and Baghdad regimes. The new efforts to explore the possibilities of a union centered on the establishment of party unity between the Ba'th's Iraqi and Syrian branches, as a prelude to the unification of governments. The attempt to achieve a fusion between the parties was a novel approach to unity. In fact, the Ba' thi experiment in party fusion sought to approximate the Leninist prototype of the single party—the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—the "national" branches of which rule the fifteen constituent republics of the U.S.S.R. It appears that despite its anti-communist ideology, the Ba' th was seeking to emulate the structural characteristics of the Soviet party system. The Ba' th's Pan-Arab National Command was theoretically in control of its Regional Commands (Qiyadah al-Qutriyyah) ruling in Syria and Iraq. Therefore, the National Command would serve as the organizational nexus of party unity, and would constitute the backbone of a federal union between the two states. By late October 1963, the two sides appeared ready to institute unification schemes in the military and economic spheres. However, infighting in the Iraqi Ba' th during November disrupted the plans for party unity. The leftist members of the Iraqi party led by Ali Salih al-Sa'adi attempted to take power, only to be purged. This conflict was temporarily resolved by the intervention of the Ba' th National Command, headquartered in Damascus. The Party's Secretary General, Michel Aflaq, flew to Baghdad to pacify the warring Iraqi factions. This intervention, however, was not destined to further Syrian-Iraqi unity efforts, which were aborted on November 18, 1963 when President Arif expelled most of the
Ba'th from the government. The two remaining Ba'thists, Vice President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and Defense Minister General Hardan al-Takriti, were edged out early in 1964.

A Phased Union: Iraq and Egypt

Arif's takeover signaled a reorientation of Iraq's unionist efforts from Syria to Egypt. This change of focus stemmed from Arif's personal predilection for Nasserism, as well as from the resurgence of pro-Nasserite sentiment in Iraq. In May 1964, Arif journeyed to Egypt to participate in the inauguration of the Aswan High Dam. On May 26, Nasser and Arif concluded an agreement to form a union in several stages. The first stage came in September 1964 with the formation of an Iraq-U.A.R. Presidency Council. The next stage was the creation of a unified political command in December 1964.

The agreement to proceed by stages reflected the mutual realization that, prior to effective unity, the two entities would have to create parallel institutions and processes. Consequently, Arif agreed to establish a single party organization patterned after Egypt's Arab Socialist Union. Yet, both sides were cautious not to rush into a comprehensive unity scheme modeled after the Syrian-Egyptian unity experience of 1958-1961. In Iraq, Arif faced considerable opposition to Egypt from the Ba'th and other groups. In September 1964, Arif aborted a Ba' thi attempt to seize power with Syrian help. At the other end of the spectrum, Arif had to fight the growing influence of pro-Nasserite elements who pressed for a tighter union with Egypt. In mid-September 1965, the pro-Egyptian Prime
Minister Arif Abd al-Razzaq led an abortive coup against the regime, which resulted in the dilution of President Arif's unionist sympathies toward Egypt.

In an effort to pursue a middle course between opposing factions, President Arif appointed Iraq's first civilian prime minister since the 1958 Revolution--Professor Abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz. As a well-known Arab nationalist, Bazzaz enjoyed wide respect, which served him well in establishing a degree of domestic tranquility. The accidental death of President Arif in April 1966 brought his brother, Major General Abd al-Rahman Arif, to the Presidency. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Bazzaz had made progress in settling the Kurdish insurrection in the North through a twelve-point peace plan. Also, Bazzaz instituted important political and economic reforms. However, the Prime Minister's Kurdish and domestic policies were resisted by Nasserite and communist elements. A second coup d'état by Arif Abd al-Razzaq on June 30, 1966 was also defeated; although the regime continued to work toward amicable ties with Egypt. After years of unionist rhetoric, the quest for Arab unity had begun to weaken in the face of repeated failures.

Ba'thi Ascendence and Disunity (1966-1968)

The suppression of the Ba'th by General Arif in November 1963 imposed upon the Party an underground existence until its resurgence in the coup d'état of July 1968. Meanwhile, the Syrian Ba'th had
taken power in March 1963, and held it despite Egyptian and Iraqi enmity. By mid-1963, the tripartite Syrian-Egyptian-Iraqi federal union had collapsed, as the Syrian Ba'th ruthlessly suppressed a coup by Nasserite officers. It had become increasingly evident that the Ba'thi leadership under Aflaq and Bitar could survive only with the support of the military—hence, the emergence of General Amin al-Hafiz as Army Commander-in-Chief and Chairman of the National Revolutionary Council. It was this Ba'thi regime which had attempted to establish a Syrian-Iraqi union during Fall 1963 through a fusion of the two Ba'th parties. However, like its Iraqi counterpart, the Syrian Ba'th was deeply divided between pro-Marxist radicals and centrists. The split between the two ideological orientations became manifest at the Sixth National Congress of the Party that met in Damascus in October 1963. The radicals, led by Alawite General Salah Jadid, included Drs. Nur al-Din Attasi, Yusif Zu'ayyin, and Ibrahim Makhus, who had fought in the Algerian War of Liberation. In November 1963, General Salah Jadid became Chief of Staff as a prelude to his appointment as Secretary General of the Ba'th Regional (Syrian) Command. The centrist opposition led by Aflaq included Prime Minister Bitar, General Muhammad Umran, and Dr. Munif al-Razzaz, who together dominated the National (Pan-Arab) Command of the Ba'th. In the midst of the intra-party struggle, the government decreed a policy of state socialism during 1964-1965, resulting in the nationalization of major economic enterprises. These policies, coupled with the Ba'th's anti-religious ideology, were responsible
for the manifestation of large-scale opposition by Sunni elements in the cities.

Throughout this period, the center of power increasingly gravitated toward the Ba'th Military Committee which mostly consisted of minority officers—Alawites, Ismailis, Christians, and Druze. In February 1966, the Ba'th radical wing led by General Jadid overthrew the government of Amin al-Hafiz and arrested Bitar, Aflaq, and other members of the National Command. Thus, in an unprecedented move, the Syrian Regional Command had rebelled against the Pan-Arab authority of the National Command—a move which effectively weakened the Ba'th's inter-Arab legitimacy. The new regime forged closer ties with the Soviet Union and permitted the rehabilitation of the Syrian Communist Party; but it could not generate sufficient Pan-Arab legitimacy after its overthrow of the National Command. The efforts of Salah Jadid to convene the Ninth National Conference in September 1966 met with limited success. Meanwhile, Iraq's underground Ba'th Party declared its loyalty to the old National Command under Aflaq. Consequently, two opposing Ba'thi National Commands emerged, each claiming Pan-Arab legitimacy.

The intra-party struggle entered a new stage with the defeat of the Arabs in the June 1967 war. Syria refused to attend the Arab Summit Conference in Khartoum (August 1967). The Syrians rejected the "political solution" formula agreed upon by the Arab leaders at Khartoum; instead, they advocated protracted armed confrontation with Israel. This policy isolated Syria from the Arab mainstream and became a factor in the subsequent struggle for power between Generals...
Salah Jadid and Hafiz al-Asad. Another event contributing to Syria's isolation was the establishment of a rival Ba'thi regime in Iraq (July 1968), in a coup led by former Prime Minister General Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr. After a lapse of five years, the Ba'th had returned to power with a firm determination not to be overthrown and with a vengeance against its enemies. These enemies included the radical wing of the Ba'th under General Jadid, which had taken power in Syria in February 1966 by overthrowing the National Command led by Michel Aflaq. The Iraqi Ba'th invited Aflaq to relocate the National Command of the Party from its exile in Beirut to Baghdad. Subsequently, Aflaq was elected Secretary General of the Party in opposition to the Neo-Ba'th National Command in Damascus. This led to a protracted confrontation between Syria and Iraq, which now were being ruled by opposing factions of the Ba'th. Under these circumstances, there could be no prospect for Syrian-Iraqi unity unless one of the two contending parties could be overthrown. Despite the concentrated efforts of both regimes to subvert each other, the two governments have managed to survive longer than their predecessors—an uncommon feat in their unstable environments.

Ba'th vs. Ba'th (1968-1978)

The decade after the establishment of Ba'thi power in Iraq can be characterized as a period of virtually continuous conflict between Syria and Iraq, marked by repeated attempts at mutual subversion. Significantly, the two parties and governments were internally split into factions led by rival leaders. Moreover, neither party
enjoyed widespread popular support, which necessitated resorting to coercive means to maintain power. Finally, the two Ba'th parties were dominated by elites drawn from two different ethno-religious minorities. In both states, effective power within the army, party and government came to rest in the hands of small military-bureaucratic oligarchies, largely recruited from the sectarian kinship group of the dominant leader.

**Syria Under Asad**

The struggle for power between Alawite Generals Asad and Jadid came to a head in September 1970 during the armed conflict between King Husayn and the Palestinians in Jordan. Salah Jadid's decision to dispatch a tank brigade to support the Palestinian forces was resisted by General Asad who, as defense minister, refused to provide air support. During October-November 1970, Asad's control of the military was decisive in liquidating Salah Jadid's party apparatus. In March 1971, General Asad became Syria's first non-Sunni President, as well as the head of Ba'th's Syrian-based National Command.

Soon after his takeover, President Asad inaugurated a wide-ranging policy of "rectification" (tas'hih) in order to broaden his regime's legitimacy. These policies included:

1. A retreat from radical socialism by introducing economic liberalization to attract the support of the urban Sunni entrepreneurial classes.

2. The inauguration of a Pan-Arabist policy to end Syria's isolation by close cooperation with other Arab countries, particularly Egypt, Libya and the Sudan.

3. The appointment of Sunni officers and civilians to high-ranking positions to counter the minority image of the regime.
4. The restoration of a measure of constitutional life in which the Ba'th and four other parties could play a role.10

The liberalization program was well received, although the regime's secular orientation and étatist policies drew criticism from Islamic Sunni urbanites. More successful was Asad's policy of rapprochement with Egypt and Sa'udi Arabia, based on pragmatic considerations. However, Syrian-Iraqi relations continued to deteriorate because of inter-party enmity and oil pipeline disputes. When Iraq nationalized the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) in June 1972, Syria followed suit by the takeover of IPC's pipelines and terminals. The Syrian action met Iraqi displeasure, in view of the higher fees charged for oil transit from Iraqi fields to the sea. Similar differences arose when in July 1973 Syria inaugurated a Soviet-built dam at Tabqa, which depleted Iraq's share of water from the Euphrates. However, the intensity of ideological polemics was attenuated. These differences were muted when Iraq came to the aid of Egypt and Syria during the October 1973 War. In military terms, Iraq made a larger contribution than in any previous Arab war effort against Israel, by dispatching two divisions which took an active part in the fighting. Yet this singular manifestation of military cooperation was not followed by political or diplomatic collaboration. Indeed, Iraq did not cooperate in the Saudi-led OAPEC oil boycott against Israel's supporters in the West. Even in the diplomatic-military sphere, Arab unity broke down when Sadat agreed to a cease-fire on October 22, 1973, which Hafiz al-Asad eventually
accepted, despite opposition from Iraq and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. In view of Iraq's geographical distance from the battlefront, the Ba'thi leadership could afford to reject the cease-fire and mollify its domestic opponents by calling for continued struggle until the liberation of all occupied territories. Iraq's uncompromising position exacerbated its stormy relations with Syria, particularly when Iraq established the "Rejection Front" in February 1974. This effort was directed against Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait—all of which had accepted the American "step-by-step" diplomatic option to achieve an Israeli withdrawal from Arab lands. Despite the Iraqi pressures, Syria concluded a disengagement agreement with Israel on May 31, 1974, which brought a gradual restoration of relations with the United States.

In retrospect, the period 1974-1976 was crucial for Syria in terms of its foreign and domestic policies. President Nixon's visit of mid-1974 and the disengagement agreement with Israel had been instrumental in effecting an unprecedented Syrian-American rapprochement. Consequently, President Asad's decision to intervene in the Lebanese Civil War in mid-1976 against the Palestinian-Leftist-Muslim coalition, represented the confluence of American, Sa'udi, and Syrian policies with tacit Israeli approval. Meanwhile, Asad had proceeded to normalize relations with King Husayn, which culminated in the establishment of joint military commands and exchanges of 13 visits by the heads of state.

Initially, the outcome of Syria's intervention seemed conclusive. Asad had succeeded in preventing the establishment of a
militant Palestinian-Leftist regime in Lebanon. Indeed, such a regime could have been detrimental to Syrian interests by aligning itself with Iraq and Libya and increasing the likelihood of an Israeli attack on Lebanon. However, the Syrian situation began to deteriorate as a result of Maronite recalcitrance, which was supported by the new government of Menachem Begin. This led to protracted fighting between Syrian and Maronite forces during 1978, which persisted until the Israeli attack of June 1982. Meanwhile, Syrian suspicions about Sadat's willingness to sign a separate peace with Israel were fulfilled as Sinai II was concluded in September 1975. In response, a new Rejectionist Front was formed, composed of Syria, Iraq, Algeria, South Yemen, Libya, and the PLO. In September 1978, the group met in Damascus under the new name of Arab Steadfastness and Confrontation Front to reject Sadat's peace initiative as being detrimental to the Arab cause. In view of Sadat's determination to sign the Camp David Accords, the two Ba'thi enemies unwittingly found themselves in the same camp, with sufficient incentives for mutual cooperation to organize a united Arab Eastern Front to oppose Israel. But genuine collaboration always eluded the two regimes, because of their peculiar minoritarian configuration and historical enmity.

Iraq Under Saddam Husayn

The coup d'état of July 17, 1968 brought to power a coalition of officers and civilians from the Ba'th Party and the Arab Revolutionary Movement. The Ba'thist General Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr assumed
the Presidency and proceeded to lead a counter-coup on July 30, ousting the non-Ba'thist members of the government. The next two years were marked by major inter-elite conflicts and purges. The new regime was largely in the hands of army officers and civilians from the town of Takrit and the surrounding region, known to be a Sunni stronghold. Thus, while the Ba'th National Command in Baghdad preached Arab universalism, the composition of the Iraqi ruling elite reflected narrow sectarian regionalism.

The year 1969 saw the emergence of Saddam Husayn al-Takriti, who had played an important role behind the scenes in the Ba'th counter-coup of July 30, 1968. He was chosen by General Bakr as his deputy to strengthen the civilian Ba' thi element in the regime. In November 1969, the ruling Revolutionary Command Council was enlarged from five to fourteen members, and Saddam Husayn was appointed Vice President. In view of the Ba'th's manifest unpopularity, Bakr and Saddam approached the Communists, the Kurds, the Nasserites, and other Arab nationalist groups to form a Ba'th-led National Front. The reluctance of these groups to cooperate brought intensified government repression. Meanwhile, the regime was split with feuds and rivalries as Bakr and Saddam tried to establish their supremacy over the army, party and the state. Vice President Hardan al-Takriti was murdered in February 1970, as were several other prominent officers and civilians. In July 1973, the Shi'ite chief of internal security, Colonel Nazim Kazzar, led an unsuccessful coup which killed Chief of Staff General Hammad Shihab, but could not destroy the Takriti oligarchy. The abortive coup shook the regime which once again at-
tempted to form a national front with the communists and the
Kurds. The Communist Party was legalized in the context of a
Soviet-Iraqi rapprochement, as the U.S.S.R. provided Iraq with new
shipments of weaponry needed to fight the Kurdish rebellion.

By 1974, the Ba'th regime had succeeded in achieving some measure
of internal stability, along with significant wealth from rising oil
prices. However, there remained several problems which had defied
resolution under previous regimes. Foremost among these intractable
problems were the Kurdish quest for autonomy, and the border dispute
with Iran. Neither the Ba'th nor the hardliners in the military were
prepared to grant the Kurdish areas of the north a measure of genuine
autonomy, as proposed by the liberal government of Prime Minister
Bazzaz in 1965. Indeed, the regime chose to renew the offensive
against the Kurdish forces led by Mulla Mustafa al-Barazani. Mean-
while, Iraqi-Iranian differences were settled at the OPEC summit
meeting of March 1975 in Algiers. The Shah suspended his support for
the Kurdish insurgency in return for Iraqi termination of support for
the Baluchistan Liberation Front and concessions over the Shatt al-
Arab border area. As a result, the Kurdish rebellion was
crushed, followed by large-scale deportations of the population to
the lower Euphrates region. Kurdish guerrillas and refugees escaped
to Iran and Syria, although some fighting continued in the mountain
regions.

The Iraq-Iran settlement was the handiwork of Saddam Husayn who,
during the 1970's, emerged as the Ba'th's strongman. It was sig-
nificant that both the settlement with Iran and the suppression of
the Kurds were destined to have serious consequences for Husayn and the Iraqi regime in subsequent years. One such consequence was the emergence of revolutionary opposition to the Ba'th among Iraq's Shi'ite majority. The origins of Shi'ite dissatisfaction went back to the early days of the Hashimite Monarchy, when power became concentrated in the hands of Sunni military and civilian leaders. Except for the Qasim regime, no Iraqi government had given the Shi'ites a significant leadership role commensurate with their majority status. The Shi'ite disaffection was heightened and progressively radicalized as a direct consequence of Ba'thi policies, which included anti-religious propaganda, disruption of religious processions, and failure to ameliorate Shi'ite poverty. Another source of resentment was the government's forced deployment of Shi'ite soldiers in the fighting against the Kurdish rebels. The large number of Shi'ite war casualties triggered protests and demonstrations, which evoked massive state repression and the hanging of several clerical leaders. During 1977, the Ba'thi-Shi'i confrontation intensified as the government began to use systematic terror to crush the emerging revolutionary societies, particularly the Hizb al-Da'wah al-Islamiyyah. Meanwhile, the Shi'ite opposition found encouragement in the growing Islamic revolutionary fervor against the Shah. In a fateful move, Saddam Husayn expelled the Iranian Ayatullah Ruhallah Khomeini in 1978, who had taken refuge in Najaf after his exile from Iran. During the next year, Khomeini assumed the leadership of Iran's Islamic Revolution which overthrew the Shah. Meanwhile, Saddam Husayn had taken full control of the
Iraqi regime in 1979 after General Bakr’s retirement. These developments signaled the emergence of new relationships and alignments which would soon involve Syria, other regional powers, and the United States.

**Dynamics of Syrian-Iraqi Relations (1974-1978)**

Syrian-Iraqi relations during 1974-1978 represented a complex blending of divergent state interests, domestic pressures and the influences of the regional/global milieu. As such, an analysis of Syrian-Iraqi relations after the 1973 War should help discern Syrian and Iraqi policy priorities and assess the dynamic configuration of forces which affected them.

**The Post-War Policy Environment**

Syria and Iraq emerged from the October 1973 War with differing exigencies and policy priorities. Syrian policy was shaped by three specific concerns:

1. The diplomatic maneuvering between the Arabs and Israel to reach a post-war settlement which would safeguard Syrian interests.
2. The deteriorating situation in Lebanon.
3. The strengthening of the regime’s domestic and foreign posture militarily and economically.

The foregoing policy imperatives required a Syrian rapprochement with the United States, while maintaining existing strategic and
economic relations with the Soviet Union. In the Arab sphere, it was necessary to perpetuate the Syrian-Egyptian wartime alliance in the context of a united Arab front to force concessions from Israel and the United States. Consequently, President Asad manifested substantial flexibility toward Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's mediation efforts, while forging close ties with Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.

In view of Iraq's geographical location and domestic realities, its exigencies and policy concerns were significantly different from those of Syria. Despite its active participation in the October 1973 War, Iraq's territorial non-contiguity with Israel rendered the Arab-Israel conflict a secondary focus of concern. Iraq's immediate policy priorities included:

1. The Kurdish insurrection in the North.
2. The ongoing confrontation with Iran.
3. The maintenance of a strong economic and strategic posture against its Iranian and Syrian neighbors and in the Gulf.

In pursuing the foregoing policy objectives, Iraq continued to forge close ties with the U.S.S.R. as a counterweight to the U.S.-supported Iranian monarchy. Yet two of Iraq's immediate problems—Iranian enmity and Kurdish insurrection—were closely interrelated; hence, Saddam Husayn's decisive move to resolve Iraq's outstanding differences with the Shah in March 1975. Such a solution would effectively terminate Iranian-American-Israeli aid to the Kurds, in return for Iraqi concessions to Iran on the Shatt al-Arab. Sig-
significantly, this solution enjoyed Dr. Kissinger's support, presumably because it would free the Shah to strengthen his sphere of influence over the Gulf and draw Iraq away from the U.S.S.R. Israeli misgivings about a renewed threat from an Iraqi army freed from its Kurdish foes were soon neutralized by the growing rift between Iraq and Syria and Syria and Egypt. Meanwhile, Iraq was busy cementing its ties with the Arab world, which included the settlement of its territorial disputes with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

The Period of Confrontation (1975-1977)

Despite the existing enmity between the Iraqi and Syrian Ba' thi regimes, their joint involvement in the October 1973 War against Israel had produced an era of good feeling in the name of Arab nationalism. While there were indications of Syrian-Iraqi economic cooperation in the immediate post-war period, the era of good feeling began to unravel during 1974. By early 1975, the two Ba' thi states entered a period of protracted confrontation which lasted over three years. The conflictual issues included:

1. The sharing of water from the Euphrates River.
2. Syrian distrust of Iraqi intentions after the Iran-Iraq reconciliation agreement.
3. Iraqi opposition to Syrian partial agreements with Israel.
4. Attempts at mutual subversion.
5. Iraqi opposition to the Syrian military role in Lebanon.

In retrospect, it appears that the immediate cause of conflict was the dispute over the sharing of Euphrates waters. The Tabqa Dam
came into operation at the end of 1974. In March 1975, Iran and Iraq took steps to settle their differences. Less than a month later, Iraq and Syria became engaged in controversy over the Euphrates. Mediation efforts by the Arab League and Saudi Arabia failed, as the dispute degenerated into armed confrontation. During May 1975, Syria closed its air space, suspended air service to Iraq and shut down the Iraqi consulate in Aleppo. In June, Syrian armored units were sent to the Iraqi border as Iraq threatened to bomb the Tabqa Dam. Under a limited agreement through Saudi Arabia, Syria agreed to release more water to Iraq "as a gesture of good will." However, in July 1975, there was a further deterioration when Syria closed down the Iraqi military mission in Damascus and withdrew its military attaché from Baghdad. Meanwhile, Iraq accused Syria of repeated violations of its air space and encroachments on its northern border.

Iraq's efforts to settle its border disputes with Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in March-July 1975, were followed by a Syrian-Jordanian rapprochement as well as a Syrian-Iranian entente reached during President Asad's visit to Tehran in December 1975. While Saudi Arabian mediation efforts continued, Iraq claimed that the Syrian blocking of the Euphrates had caused massive economic difficulties in the South by depriving three million people of water. The confrontation appeared to have subsided during the early months of 1976, although Syrian-Iraqi negotiations on oil transit and oil supply fees were adjourned in February 1976 apparently without agreement. Another period of heightened confrontation ensued during June-July 1976, with Iraqi charges of Syrian border violations and
reports that 70% of the winter crop had been lost because of reductions in Euphrates water.

The Conflict in Remission (1976-1978)

The Syrian-Iraqi dispute showed signs of remission during the second half of 1976. In November, it was announced that the two sides had withdrawn their forces from the border. Soon however, armed confrontation was replaced by mutual subversion involving sabotage and assassinations which continued throughout 1977. Because of Iraq's displeasure with Syria's paramount role in Lebanon, the locus of Syrian-Iraqi conflict was transferred to that country. Iraq attempted to exploit Syria's exposed position in Lebanon by aiding various Palestinian and Sunni factions operating against the Syrian peace-keeping forces. Simultaneously, Iraq began to support the growing Islamic fundamentalist movement in Syria, which aimed at the overthrow of the Asad regime. Syria responded by encouraging Kurdish resistance and supporting the Shi'ite opposition to the Iraqi Ba'th. The interstate conflict persisted at an abated level until August 1978, when Crown Prince Fahd visited Syria and Iraq to shore-up the Eastern Arab Front against Israel in the wake of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. This was quickly followed by the formation of the Arab Steadfastness and Confrontation Front and a new phase of Syrian-Iraqi rapprochement.

The foregoing detailed account of Syrian-Iraqi relations reveals certain patterns of foreign policy behavior which are consistent with the "determinants of policy" enumerated on pages 47-48. Thus, the
patterns of foreign policy orientation in each period depended on the respective perceptions of Iraqi and Syrian elites of their domestic and foreign policy priorities. In their responses to internal and external changes, the two elites sought to establish an equilibrium of forces to preserve their respective positions of power. This required that the two countries perform complex balancing acts in forming coalitions against their external and internal enemies.

In conclusion, several behavioral patterns characterized Syrian-Iraqi relations during 1974-1978. These were:

1. The predominant concern of the two Ba'thi elites with the preservation of their respective power positions. Thus, Arab nationalist ideology was often sacrificed on the altar of national interest as perceived by the two competing oligarchies.

2. The reluctance of the two regimes to be drawn together except under extreme crisis conditions generated by the Arab-Israeli confrontation. This was the case in the 1973 War and after Sadat's "peace initiative".

3. The pursuit of economic interests irrespective of the ideological dictates of Arab unity. This tendency became manifest in the controversy involving the sharing of water from the Euphrates River. Syria's ambitious agricultural schemes centering on the Tabqa Dam, and Iraq's farms in the South were dependent on Euphrates water, which was also being tapped upstream by Turkey.

4. The determination of the two elites to ally themselves with any external power except Israel, to further their respective inter-
ests, regardless of ideological and historical considerations. Iraq's settlement with Iran and Syria's rapprochement with the United States were cases in point.

5. The persistence of historic enmities and distrust between the two Ba'thi regimes as an abiding determinant of Syrian-Iraqi relations. Despite the objective necessities of political and economic cooperation, the two oligarchies failed to transcend their historical enmity and the personal antipathy between Hafiz al-Asad and Saddam Husayn.

6. The close relationship between major issues of internal/external policy and the ultimate survival of the oligarchies. In the Syrian perception, any question involving Israel, Lebanon and the Palestinians was considered a matter of overwhelming priority, since these concerns coupled with the state of the economy would probably determine the regime's survival. Similarly, the Iraqi Ba'th viewed the Kurdish revolt as a major threat to its position of power. Indeed, the Kurdish Question had been responsible for the unmaking of several Iraqi governments since 1960; hence, Saddam Husayn's decision to settle with the Shah, his ideological enemy, in order to crush the Kurdish rebellion. As to the economic importance of the Euphrates waters, it would be fair to state that the Syrian stake was greater than Iraq's in view of the Asad regime's major investments on the Tabqa Dam and related irrigation schemes. Moreover, in the halcyon days of the 1970's, Iraq possessed substantial oil-generated wealth to compensate for the agricultural losses resulting from the Syrian diversion of the Euphrates.
In retrospect, had it not been for the existing reciprocal hostility between the two Ba'aths, the Euphrates controversy would not have culminated in an armed confrontation at the Syrian-Iraqi border. In the final analysis, by the mid-1970's, the two regimes had come to view each other virtually as mortal enemies. Only a major realignment of regional power could bring the antagonists together. This was brought about by the Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement, which provided the catalyst for a new unity attempt between Damascus and Baghdad.

Another Abortive Union (1978-1979)

The period 1978-1979 produced major realignments in inter-Arab politics as a result of the peculiar interaction of international and domestic forces. One major factor was Sadat's decision to leave the Arab fold by signing a definitive settlement with Israel, which brought together the other Arab states in the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front. It was in this context, during 1978, that Baghdad and Damascus sought to cooperate on many levels, despite a decade of manifest enmity. On October 24, 1978, in an unprecedented move, President Asad went to Baghdad to meet President Bakr. Two days later, the heads of state signed a charter of mutual cooperation to establish a joint political committee which would govern military and economic relations. During the next three months, the relationship continued to develop as the two former enemies began to discuss the formation of a political and economic union. Thus, Saddam Husayn's visit to Damascus in January 1979 was termed "a unification meeting."
The outcome included the signing of agreements for the transit of Iraqi crude oil through Syria and the joint development of oil fields. After a hiatus of four months, President Asad attended another unification meeting in Baghdad which lasted four days (June 16-19, 1979). It is unclear what transpired in the Baghdad meeting, although the success of the Iranian Revolution and the ongoing inter-elite power struggle in Iraq were major factors which influenced the deliberations. On July 16, 1979, President Bakr resigned for reasons of "ill health" and Saddam Husayn assumed the Presidency. During the next three weeks, the new regime executed twenty-one top party and government officials who had reportedly organized a conspiracy, allegedly with Syrian support. Clearly, this was a turning point in Iraqi-Syrian relations. The unification process was aborted as the two states returned to their former conflictual relationship.

The break with Iraq signaled a realignment of Syrian policy in favor of revolutionary Iran. The shift was implicit in the Iranian foreign minister's visit of September 10 to Damascus. This was followed by the visits of high ranking Iranian political and clerical leaders who were warmly welcomed. Thus, it was not surprising that Syria supported the Iranians when hostilities broke out between Iraq and Iran in September 1980.

**Syria vs. Iraq (1979-1982)**

The resumption of heightened animosity between the two Ba'thi regimes transcended the Iranian Revolution, to center on the deeper
issues of inter-elite rivalries and domestic problems. Despite the unity efforts of 1978-1979, there was little chance that the two Ba'athi antagonists would forget the past and overcome their mutual suspicions for the sake of unity. In any case, Asad and Bakr appear to have been more interested in the achievement of cooperative schemes than Saddam Husayn. Reportedly, the personal antipathy between Hafiz al-Asad and Saddam Husayn contributed to the discord. Moreover, both leaders issued from minority kinship groups which maintained a precarious hold over recalcitrant majorities. In point of fact, Iraq had supported the Muslim Brotherhood of Syria in its terroristic attempts to overthrow the Asad regime since the mid-1970's, while suppressing its domestic Brethren. It was no mere accident that at the height of the struggle between the fundamentalist groups and the Syrian regime during 1980, President Asad accused Iraq of being a primary source of military support for the Islamic revolutionaries. Similarly, the Iraqi regime had materially aided anti-Syrian elements in Lebanon, to bleed the Syrian forces stationed in that country. After the severance of Syrian-Iraqi unity efforts in Fall 1979, Saddam Husayn resumed his support of Islamic elements, both in Syria and Lebanon.

The Syrian response took the form of establishing a "Shi'ite axis" which encompassed the Shi'ites and Druze of Lebanon, Syria's Alawites, the Hizb al-Da'wah of Iraq, and the Iranian revolutionary regime. This axis would permit Syria to have allies in Lebanon, and a means to destabilize the Iraqi regime which had declared war on Iran at a time of internal dissension in the Khomeini regime. By
wrapping himself with the halo of Pan-Arab legitimacy, Saddam Husayn sought to cast the Iraq-Iran War in the psychological framework of an ethnic conflict between Arabs and Persians. His rhetorical reference to the war as "al-Qadisiyyah" was an attempt to heighten Arab nationalist feelings by evoking the memory of the Arab conquest of Persia in 637. Indeed, for the Iraqi regime, the Iranian Revolution and its Shi'ite ideology constituted a mortal danger. Iraq's restive Shi'ite majority was the main target of Iranian religious revolutionary propaganda. Khomeini's call to revolution found fertile soil among the Shi'ite fundamentalist societies led by Hizb al-Da'wah, which had initiated a terror campaign against the Ba'athi authorities. Saddam Husayn responded by unleashing large-scale repression against the Shi'ite community, which included the execution of the distinguished Arab Ayatullah, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. The killing of Baqir al-Sadr, who had been a confidant of Khomeini and the architect of Iran's Islamic Constitution, incensed Khomeini; it seems to have deepened his determination to destroy Saddam Husayn's "satanic" regime.

In the struggle against Iran, Saddam Husayn had the firm backing of King Husayn, as well as the muted support of Anwar al-Sadat, the Saudis, and several conservative Gulf states. In a significant move during 1980-1981, King Husayn aligned Jordan with Iraq, as the Syrian regime accused the Jordanians of supporting Syria's Muslim Brotherhood. Sadat supported Iraq because of his friendship with the Shah, his aversion to Khomeini's Islamist ideology, and the large Egyptian emigré population living in Iraq. The Saudis and the Gulf
states generously aided Iraq since they viewed Iran as the greater of two evils. The revolutionary influence of the Khomeini regime on the Gulf Shi'ite communities was considered a greater peril than Saddam Husayn's occasional subversive activities in the Arab Gulf states. Moreover, Jordanian and Egyptian support for Iraq was prompted by the fear that an Iranian victory would destabilize the Gulf monarchies and cause their overthrow. Such an eventuality would undermine the economic health of many Arab countries, particularly Jordan and Egypt, which are dependent on the largesse of the Saudis and other Gulf states.

In retrospect, Saddam Husayn's decision to attack Iran was a colossal mistake. The Ba'thi leader had misread the Iranian Revolution and miscalculated its internal and external dynamics. As a mass revolution of the classical type, the overthrow of the Shah represented powerful social forces which the Ba'th failed to understand and evaluate. The insurgents possessed the very ingredients of revolutionary success that the prosperous Ba'thi regime had lacked—nativistic ideology, grass roots support, a cadre structure, and charismatic leadership. The initial success of Iraqi arms only solidified Khomeini's support, as his clerical partisans progressively liquidated the powerful dissidents, led by the mujahidin.

The Syrians opposed King Husayn's pro-Iraqi policies and refused to attend the Arab Summit meeting in Amman (November 1980), along with Algeria, Libya, South Yemen, and the PLO. However, Asad's pro-Iranian stance was mostly rhetorical at the war's outset, except for his efforts to put pressure on Jordan by a troop buildup at the
border in November 1980, soon diffused through Saudi mediation. Only after Iran had turned back the Iraqi onslaught did Asad extend tangible aid to Iran with Libyan help. 26 This included large-scale exchanges of Iranian oil for Syrian food and phosphates, in addition to arms supplies. In April 1982, Syria closed its borders with Iraq, accusing Saddam Husayn of sending arms to the Islamic militants. Having been assured of Iranian oil supplies, Syria proceeded to shut down Iraq's oil pipeline to the sea, thereby inflicting upon the latter substantial economic hardship.

Asad's explicit alignment with Iran and his repressive policies toward domestic Sunni fundamentalists produced significant misgivings among the Gulf states, which were providing Syria with substantial economic aid. However, they were reluctant to court Asad's displeasure and Arab popular criticism by cutting off support to a "confrontation state." By his defiance of Israel and the United States in Lebanon during 1982-1983, Asad was able to make a far better case as defender of Arab nationalism than Saddam Husayn had made by his war against Khomeini. Consequently, the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia have persisted in funding Syria, although at a much lower level than the billions given to Iraq to stop the Iranian armies. Additional help came from Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi, with whom Syria had formed two brief and ineffectual unions, along with Egypt and the Sudan during 1969-1971. In September 1980, Qadhafi announced yet another Syrian-Libyan unity scheme, without a definitive commitment from Syria. However, on August 24, 1981, Qadhafi and Asad affirmed their plans for a merger which were never implemented.
Despite the lack of progress on unity, Syrian-Libyan relations have become increasingly harmonious, particularly since Israel's invasion of Lebanon.

**Syria vs. Iraq (1982-1984)**

The decade since the October 1973 War has witnessed a realignment among the Arab countries, both in regional terms and in relation to the superpowers. The defection of Egypt from the Soviet orbit after 1973 was not followed by a similar Syrian move, in view of Washington's inability and/or unwillingness to provide the necessary inducements, which included the return of Golan and progress toward a Palestinian settlement. Meanwhile, Syria's lengthy presence in Lebanon, its exposed position toward Israel, and internal fundamentalist resistance, all combined to prompt Hafiz al-Asad to seek a more durable strategic relationship with the U.S.S.R. Thus, on October 8, 1980, Asad arrived in Moscow to conclude the Syrian-Soviet Friendship and Cooperation Treaty. As the Iraq-Iran War continued unabated, developments in Lebanon came to broaden the locus of Middle Eastern conflict. The Syrian impotence against Israeli air power embarrassed the Asad regime and its Soviet allies. This prompted a major Soviet resupply of advanced weaponry, including a modernized air defense system. Simultaneously, there was a significant enlargement of the Soviet military presence in Syria. By mid-1983, the Syrian President was in a strong position to resist American-Israeli pressures to withdraw from Lebanon. Syria insisted on the abrogation of the U.S.-sponsored Lebanese-Israeli agreement, the total with-
drawal of Israeli troops, and the constitution of a pro-Syrian regime in Beirut. Moreover, Asad and his Druze and Shi'ite Lebanese allies had successfully fought the Maronite militia and the fledgling American-trained Lebanese Army. Meanwhile, the American peace-keeping force, backed by naval units, had become committed to the survival of President Amin Gemayel's minority government. Indeed, there was little that American and Israeli military pressure could do to effect a Syrian withdrawal, short of a full-scale invasion of Lebanon. The sustained Druze attacks against the Lebanese Army at Suq al-Gharb, the killing of 241 Marines by a truck bomb in October 1983, and Syrian anti-aircraft fire directed at U.S. reconnaissance flights, prompted American air raids and naval bombardment of Syrian and Druze positions. On another front, Syrian-supported Palestinian rebels had forced the evacuation of Yasser Arafat and his partisans from Tripoli. The resumption of negotiations between Arafat and Husayn on the Reagan Plan exacerbated the conflict between Syria and Jordan, and their Arab and PLO supporters. Amid reports of President Asad's illness and intra-elite struggles of succession in November-December 1983, several factors became evident:

1. The centrality of Syria to any definitive settlement in Lebanon, and the larger Arab-Israeli conflict.


3. The likelihood of continued conflict in Lebanon, in the absence of a tacit Syrian-Israeli agreement to push their respective Lebanese clients toward a settlement.

The withdrawal of American, French, Italian and British peace-keeping forces from Lebanon, and the abrogation of the May 1983
Lebanese-Israeli treaty were major victories for the Asad government. Yet ironically, in the wake of Asad's great successes, he was confronted with the reluctance of Lebanon's warring factions to accept a Syrian-mediated settlement. More serious was the struggle for succession which raged around Asad involving his brother Rif'at and other associates. By all indications, the struggle for power pitted Rif'at al-Asad against powerful Alawite and Sunni military leaders, including Adnan Makhluf, the Chief of the Presidential Guard, Muhammad al-Khuli, Chief of Presidential Intelligence, General Hikmat Shihabi, Chief of Staff, and possibly Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas. The opposition of Makhluf, Khuli, and other powerful Alawite commanders to Rif'at al-Asad, signified a major split in President Asad's kinship network and the larger Alawite community, which could have serious consequences for Syrian stability and foreign policy.

On the Iraqi side, President Saddam Husayn's difficulties were being compounded throughout 1983 by the ongoing war with Iran. The insistence of Iran on Saddam's departure as a pre-condition for peace made him the target of both direct and indirect pressures to resign. Despite the generous assistance of the Gulf states, the war had damaged the Iraqi economy. Equally serious were the mounting casualties at the war front and reports of instability inside the Takriti oligarchy. In a surprise move, Saddam Husayn instituted a purge of his immediate entourage during Fall 1983, which included several of his relatives and two half-brothers who held key posts in the power apparatus. Meanwhile, the Shi'ite resistance persisted inside Iraq,
triggering widespread repression. In the face of a potentially desperate situation, Saddam Husayn has shown little inclination to resign. Instead, he has threatened to use newly-acquired Super Etendard Fighters and Exocet missiles against Iranian oil installations to compel the Islamic government to negotiate. In response, Iran has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz and to otherwise disrupt the flow of Arab oil. By mid-December 1983, U.S. presidential envoy Donald Rumsfeld visited Baghdad, perhaps to put pressure on Syria and Iran. The visit appeared to be the culmination of a long process of U.S.-Iraqi rapprochement, and a possible end to America's self-proclaimed neutrality in the Iran-Iraq War. In view of Iraq's close military ties to France, Egypt and Jordan, the Rumsfeld visit could be taken as an American tilt toward Iraq. Significantly, there were rumors of a corresponding Soviet tilt toward Iran which had not materialized by mid-1984. An Iranian-Soviet rapprochement after their recent discord could result in the supply of modern weaponry to Iran. In return, the Iranians would show tolerance toward native communists and the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Such an accommodation would require significant Iranian compromises in Islamic ideology and policy. Should Iran persist in its determination to defeat and overthrow Saddam Husayn, she has nowhere to go but the Soviet Union to acquire the necessary military technology. However, should the Soviet-Iranian and the American-Iraqi axes become a reality, there would emerge two superpower-led blocs of confrontation states across the Middle East, creating a
potentially dangerous linkage between the region's three ongoing conflictual situations: the Lebanese Civil War, the Arab-Israeli Conflict, and the Iran-Iraq War.
VIII. A QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF SYRIAN-IRAQI RELATIONS (1958-1984)

The descriptive analysis of Syrian-Iraqi relations presented in Chapter VII may be augmented with a quantitative evaluation of conflict and cooperation between the two states. Such an empirical approach will serve three purposes. It will provide:

2. An evaluation of the structure and intensity of conflict and cooperation between the two states.
3. A methodology to cross-check the validity of the descriptive analysis in Chapter VII by using chronological "events" data assessed by independent judges.

The primary source of events data is the "Chronology" of the Middle East Journal; it has been supplemented, whenever necessary, by Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Facts on File, and the Arabic press. Events and developments in Syrian-Iraqi relations since 1958 have been weighed individually through coded indices, in terms of intensity and frequency on a quarterly basis. The task of assigning coded weights to individual events was given to three Middle East experts with special familiarity with Syrian-Iraqi affairs. In weighing the degrees of cooperation and conflict, three positive and three negative levels of intensity were used respectively, ranging from unity projects to overt hostility.

The results of the quantitative assessment of Syrian-Iraqi relations were found in substantial agreement with our descriptive
Figure 2: Syrian-Iraqi Relations (1958-1985)

- 1971
- 1972
- 1973
- 1974
- 1975
- 1976
- 1977
- 1978
- 1979
- 1980
- 1981
- 1982
- 1983
analysis. As depicted in Figure 2, the hostile relationship between
the United Arab Republic and the Arab Federation during the first
half of 1958 was followed by a period of heightened cooperation
between the U.A.R. and the revolutionary Iraqi regime under Brigadier
Qasim. The latter's reluctance to join Nasser's U.A.R. produced a
relationship of deep and protracted hostility. During the six months
prior to U.A.R.'s breakup, there were some cooperative efforts with
Iraq which intensified soon after Syria's secession on September 28,
1961. This was followed by another period of significant cooperation
brought about by the Ba'th-Arif coup that overthrew Qasim (February
1963) and the Ba'athi takeover in Syria (March 1963). This culminated
in the abortive "Union of Parties" in September-November 1963, which
was ended by General Arif's countercoup against Iraq's Ba'th Party.
As a Nasserite, Arif's focus of cooperation was Egypt, thereby
precluding close relations with the Syrian Ba'ithists. Arif's death
and the coup by Ba'athi radicals in Syria ushered in a period of
reduced enmity, until the June 1967 War. The Arab defeat by Israel
prompted Syria and Iraq to achieve considerable cooperation for a
one-year period, until the Ba'athi overthrow of General Abd al-Rahman
Arif of Iraq in July 1968. The return of the old Ba'th to power in
Iraq, after its overthrow in Syria (February 1966), precipitated a
three-year period of conflictual relations between the rival party
factions. After the emergence of Hafiz al-Asad in November 1970, the
inter-party conflict became muted as Syria and Iraq began to
cooperate before and during the October 1973 War. Yet, after the
war's end, the relationship turned into hostility because of mutual
suspicions and divergent interests.
The year 1974 witnessed the progressive deterioration of Syrian-Iraqi relations, which set the stage for a four-year period of mutual enmity. Early in 1975, there were reports of Syrian military assistance to the Kurdish rebels fighting Iraq. A more serious dispute involved the sharing of water from the Euphrates River. This situation was exacerbated by border encroachments and air space violations. While the Euphrates conflict was resolved through Saudi mediation, the confrontation between Syria and Iraq persisted throughout 1976 and 1977. It came to an abrupt halt as a result of President Sadat's rapprochement with Israel. In response, Syria and Iraq began to cooperate within the Arab Steadfastness and Confrontation Front. This effort culminated in an unanticipated unification scheme inaugurated by President Asad's two visits to Baghdad during October 1978 and June 1979. The ten-month era of cooperation was abruptly ended after Saddam Husayn's takeover from General Bakr in mid-July 1979. The ensuing period of intense hostility was punctuated by Iraq's attack on Iran in September 1980, and Syria's alliance with the Islamic Republic. This state of enmity has persisted to this day.

In conclusion, the quantitative analysis illustrates that the intensity and duration of Syrian-Iraqi conflictual relations far exceeded those signifying cooperation and unity. Consequently, the brief periods of harmony and united action reflected tactical alliances during confrontations with Israel and outbursts of popular enthusiasm. Thus, the natural pattern was one of conflict rather than cooperation.
IX. PROGNOSIS OF SYRIAN-IRAQI RELATIONS

Despite the general tendency toward conflict in Syrian-Iraqi relations, their future interaction defies easy prognostication in view of the instability of their internal and external environments. In developing future scenarios on the evolving Syrian-Iraqi relationship, both quantum and incremental changes have to be considered as they occur on the domestic and external fronts.

Figure 3 identifies four distinct clusters of interacting determinants which are expected to have a causal impact on the content

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Figure 3: PROGNOSTIC DETERMINANTS OF SYRIAN-IRAQI RELATIONS

- INTERNAL CHANGE
- SOVIET INITIATIVES
- EUROPEAN INITIATIVES
- AMERICAN INITIATIVES
- REGIONAL ACTORS AND EVENTS: (LEBANON, EGYPT, JORDAN, ISRAEL, IRAN, SA'UDI ARABIA, AND GULF STATES)
and modalities of Syrian-Iraqi relations during the next decade. The determinants of the external environment include American and European initiatives, the policies of major regional actors, and the policies of the Soviet Union. Thus, the evolution of Syrian-Iraqi relations is likely to be influenced by the sum total of these external influences converging upon Syria and Iraq and the three major conflicts in their immediate environment: the Iraq-Iran War, the Arab-Israeli dispute, and the Lebanese Civil War. Within the dynamic parameters of the external political setting, the Syrian and Iraqi polities will generate diverse responses to both external and internal demands and events. Among the internal determinants of Syrian-Iraqi relations are possible revolutionary manifestations, purges, changes of leadership and economic developments in one or both countries. On the basis of the conceptual schema in Figure 3, six probable scenarios are chosen to define the independent variables, which would provide the framework to postulate various policy outcomes ranging from unification to armed conflict.

**SCENARIO 1: RADICAL REGIME TRANSFORMATION**

Two primary factors may precipitate radical change in the Syrian and Iraqi regimes:

A. The violent overthrow of one or both Ba'thi regimes.

B. The sudden removal of Hafiz al-Asad and/or Saddam Husayn through assassination, illness, or resignation.

The overthrow of either or both regimes opens new possibilities for conflict as well as cooperation. Similarly, the demise of either
or both top leaders is likely to trigger the process of significant regime transformation. Four probable sub-scenarios may be constructed for each regime.

**Syria**

**A. An Alawite-led regime without Asad**

The sudden removal of President Asad would have serious consequences for the regime's stability, since there is no one who could effectively take his position. In such a case, another Alawite-led regime could emerge as Asad's kinship network rallies around Rif'at al-Asad or another Alawite leader. In all probability, the Alawite contingent would have to share power with high-ranking Sunni officers. Considering its Alawite backbone, such a regime is not expected to achieve long-term legitimacy and stability. It can only maintain control by imposing totalitarian measures possibly with the help of leftist Ba'thi cadres. This type of regime will face increasing levels of fundamentalist internal opposition and external pressures, thereby compelling it to request a larger Soviet presence to shore up its position. The regime's relations with Iraq under Saddam Husayn are likely to become hostile, possibly after an initial period of cordiality, unless external threats force the two antagonists into cooperation. As noted earlier, the struggle for succession has already split the Syrian hierarchy including Asad's Alawite kinship group. Despite Rif'at's appointment as one of Syria's vice presidents, there are many indications that his quest for supreme power will be resisted by a coalition of powerful Alawite
leaders and their Sunni and other allies in the military and the Party. Should Rif'at's adversaries succeed in defeating his challenge, they are likely to constitute a mixed Alawite-Sunni regime which would continue to pursue Syria's present foreign policies. Such a regime would enjoy a greater degree of legitimacy than one led by Rif'at al-Asad. In view of Rif'at's reputation of brutality and profligacy, it is highly unlikely that a Rif'at regime will achieve any legitimacy or stability. In all likelihood, such a regime will be resisted by virtually all segments of the Syrian population. While Rif'at is likely to manifest a pro-Western orientation, the internal instability of his government would render its foreign policies erratic and inconsistent.

B. A Ba'thi regime of national reconciliation

A regime of national reconciliation under the Ba'ath Party would mean the dilution of Alawite power and a corresponding increase in the Sunni presence in the hierarchy. If broadly based, such a Ba'ithi regime could well acquire some legitimacy should it remain internally cohesive. It is anticipated that such a regime would reduce the level of conflict with Iraq, although not sufficiently to forge long-term friendly relations.

C. A pro-Islamic regime of national reconciliation

Should the Syrian Islamic movement and the Ba'ath Party remain factionalized, there will be some likelihood that an all-Syrian regime of national reconciliation would emerge. This might permit an Islamic role in the regime along with participation by old Ba'athists,
Nasserites, Socialists, and independents. Such a polity would be less radical than a purely Islamic order, and under the best circumstances it could revert to a limited multi-party system. While the level of conflict with Ba'thi Iraq would drop, genuine cooperation is not likely to ensue.

D. An Islamist regime

A takeover by Islamic fundamentalist elements is likely to produce a radical totalitarian regime under the leadership of Sunni ulama and intellectuals from the urban middle-class. The Islamist elite is likely to experience a split between moderates and militants. It is unlikely that such a regime would seek rapprochement with Ba'thist Iraq, due to the manifest incongruities of ideologies and policies between secular Ba'thism and Islamic fundamentalism.

Any one or a mix of the foregoing scenarios is not expected to produce a stable polity in Syria. A successor regime, regardless of its nature, is likely to exhibit several basic traits and policy orientations:

1. Persistence of the military in political affairs.
2. Sectarian and class conflicts.
3. Inter-elite cleavages.
4. A larger Sunni presence in the political elite along with some degree of pro-Islamic orientation.
5. Resistance to a settlement with Israel on American terms as presently formulated, i.e., Palestinian 'autonomy' with a Jordanian connection.
Iraq

A. A Ba'athi regime without Saddam Husayn

As in the case of Hafiz al-Asad, Saddam Husayn has not designated an heir-apparent. Consequently, there will be a struggle for succession in which the Party and the Army would play decisive roles. Should the Takritis succeed in maintaining power, the regime's narrow social base would render it highly unstable. Such a regime may succeed in reducing the level of confrontation with Asad's Syria, although a long-term reconciliation is considered unlikely, unless there are external factors (e.g. Israeli attacks) which may force the two regimes to come together.

B. A Ba'athi regime of national reconciliation

Such a regime may emerge should the Takriti oligarchy become defunct. A broad-based Ba' thi effort at national reconciliation might ensue, with Michel Aflaq in the role of conciliator as the Ba' th's eminence grise. Aflaq could play such a role because he symbolizes the Ba' th as founder and elder statesman, although he does not control the party apparatus. In order to stabilize itself, such a regime would need army backing. Unless the Ba' th is prepared to accord the Shi'ites a significant role, it will be denied general support by the Shi'ite majority. Because of the presence of Aflaq and his partisans, this regime cannot be expected to be welcomed by Asad's Syria.
C. A non-Ba'thi regime of national reconciliation

This type of regime will emerge only if the Ba'th is overthrown, possibly by a military coup prompted by an Iraqi defeat in the war with Iran. In the event of a significant Iranian victory, it is probable that Khomeini will insist on a non-Ba'thi regime as a precondition for peace. The advent of an all-Iraqi government of national reconciliation would permit Kurdish participation along with a significant Shi'ite presence in the hierarchy. Relations between such a regime and Asad's Syria are likely to become cordial in terms of promoting economic and military cooperation; however, it would be too optimistic to expect any abiding commitment to unity schemes.

D. A Shi'ite-led Islamic regime

The emergence of a Shi'ite-led Islamic order is possible only after a decisive Iranian victory over Iraq. As an Islamic polity, this regime is likely to include a large Shi'ite clerical contingent. In view of its theocratic nature, the regime is likely to exercise strong ideological pressures upon Syria's avowedly secular Ba'th. Consequently, long-term unity schemes are unlikely between a Shi'ite Iraq and the Alawite Ba'thist Syrian regime. However, these regimes are expected to cooperate closely in military and economic affairs.

The foregoing analysis of inter-regime relations is based on introducing four distinct types of regime changes, while holding constant the opposing regime as being entrenched under Asad or Husayn. Yet, it is not impossible to suppose that both regimes would
experience radical transformations simultaneously during the next few years. If one assumes roughly simultaneous incidence of radical regime change, sixteen types of relationships could obtain among eight regime combinations from both sides (see Table 4).

**Syria: Ba'th/Alawite—Iraq: Ba'th/Takriti**

After the departures of Asad and Husayn, an unfriendly relationship can be anticipated between two opposing Ba'thi regimes based on narrow kinship groups from two different sects. However, the absence of the chief antagonists—Asad and Husayn—and the inherent insecurity of both regimes, might produce a *modus vivendi*.

**Syria: Ba'th/Alawite—Iraq: Ba'th/National Reconciliation**

The likelihood is for a relatively unfriendly relationship between the Ba'thi parties, as long as the present Aflaqist faction retains control in Iraq.

**Syria: Ba'th/Alawite—Iraq: National Reconciliation/Islamic Shi'ite**

A friendly relationship can be anticipated because of the pro-Iranian policy-line established under Asad. No serious unity project will be in prospect, except military cooperation or alliance.

**Syria: Ba'th/Alawite—Iraq: Islamic Shi'ite**

A close relationship can be expected, at least initially, particularly in the military and economic areas. However, relations are likely to deteriorate should the Iraqi Shi'ites attempt to pressure the Syrian Ba'th to adopt Islamic policies.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Iraq (Ba'th/Takriti)</th>
<th>Iraq (Ba'th/National Reconciliation)</th>
<th>Iraq (National Reconciliation/Islamic Shi'ite)</th>
<th>Iraq (Islamic Shi'ite)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Syria: (Ba'th/Alawite)</td>
<td>Unfriendly</td>
<td>Unfriendly</td>
<td>Friendly</td>
<td>Friendly</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syria: (Ba'th/National Reconciliation)</td>
<td>Unfriendly</td>
<td>Friendly</td>
<td>Ambiguous</td>
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<td>Syria: (National Reconciliation/Islamic Sunni)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syria: (Islamic Sunni)</td>
<td>Ambiguous</td>
<td>Unfriendly</td>
<td>Ambiguous</td>
<td>Ambiguous/Friendly</td>
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</table>
Syria: Ba'ith/National Reconciliation—Iraq: Ba'ith/Takriti

A broadly based Syrian Ba'ithi regime is not likely to be friendly to a post-Saddam Husayn Takriti based regime, unless the latter sheds its Takriti underpinnings. In such an eventuality, the two Ba'ithi regimes may be drawn together to strengthen themselves against internal Islamic opponents and possible threats from Israel. Other major factors affecting this scenario would be the Iraq-Iran War and the evolving Syrian relationship with Iran.

Syria: Ba'ith/National Reconciliation—Iraq: Ba'ith/National Reconciliation

Two Ba'ith regimes of national reconciliation are likely to effect a genuine rapprochement, particularly if Aflaq leaves the scene, or if the Syrians choose to include in their regime Aflaq's partisans from Syria. However, serious moves toward party unity or political union would require the support of the two military establishments.

Syria: Ba'ith/National Reconciliation—Iraq: National Reconciliation/Islamic Shi'ite

Relations between a Syrian Ba'ithi national reconciliation regime and a Shi'ite-supported non-Ba'ithi Iraqi government are likely to include a mix of cooperation and conflict, depending on the internal composition of the two regimes and Syrian relations with Iran. Should the Syrian Ba'ith persist in pursuing a secular course and purge its Alawites, its relations with the pro-Iranian regime of Iraq are likely to deteriorate.
Syria: Ba'ath/National Reconciliation--Iraq: Islamic Shi'ite

The previous prognosis is likely to apply to this relationship. One major question will center on the continuing Syrian willingness to remain aligned with Iran, and to provide a connection to the politically ascendant Shi'ite community in Lebanon. Another factor is the extent to which a Shi'ite Iraq will seek to change the Syrian Ba'th's secular stance. Thus, their relationship might range from ambiguity to unfriendliness.

Syria: National Reconciliation/Islamic Sunni--Iraq: Ba'ath/Takriti

A non-Ba'thi pro-Islamist Syrian regime of national reconciliation is likely to have an ambiguous relationship with a post-Saddam Husayn Ba'thi-Takriti regime. The broad-based, non-Ba'thi nature of the Syrian regime might be seen as a threat to Iraq's narrowly based Ba'th. On the other hand, the Sunni Islamic role in Syria might find some favor among Takriti Sunnis, in view of their support of the Muslim Brotherhood in its struggle against Asad.

Syria: National Reconciliation/Islamic Sunni--Iraq: Ba'ath/National Reconciliation

The nature of these regimes is likely to portend at best an ambiguous relationship. The ideological antipathy between the non-Ba'thist Syrians and Iraq's Ba'th would be a dysfunctional factor. However, should the Syrian reconciliation regime include pro-Iraq Ba'thists, then relations may improve.
Under this scenario, interstate relations will depend on the internal composition of the two regimes, as well as on Syrian foreign policy toward Iran. At best, an ambiguous relationship is envisioned, unless external pressures dictate a rapprochement, possibly along Islamic lines.

In all probability, a Shi'ite polity in Iraq will be closely allied with the Iranian regime. The Islamist Sunni presence in the Syrian regime may preclude a close relationship with the Shi'ites of Iraq and Iran, partly because of the latter's support of the Asad regime. Should the Syrian regime develop strong ties with Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, then its orientation toward Iraq and Iran is likely to become unfriendly.

Initially, relations are likely to be friendly because of Iraqi support given to the Islamist insurgents against Asad. However, there can be no ideological compromise between the secular Ba'th and the Islamic fundamentalists, although temporary alignments cannot be precluded. For example, should Iran support an Alawite insurgency, the Syrian Islamist regime is likely to seek Iraqi support. Much will depend on the balance between radical and moderate elements in Syria's fundamentalist ruling elite. Cooperative relations would be possible only against common foes like Israel.
Syria: Islamic Sunni--Iraq: Ba'th/National Reconciliation

The previous description is likely to apply to this scenario. In addition, the Islamization of the Syrian government would constitute a primary threat for the Iraqi Ba'th, since it would dash the hopes for a Ba'thi resurgence in the country where the Party originated. The likely consequence is a stressful relationship. The Iraqi Ba'th might be tempted to encourage the secular opposition to the Syrian Islamic regime by attempting to unite under its banner Alawites, Christians, Socialists, Nasserites, and Sunni secularists.

Syria: Islamic Sunni--Iraq: National Reconciliation/Islamic Shi'ite

The relations between a Syrian Sunni Islamic regime and a pro-Shi'ite Iraqi government will raise complicated problems which defy prognostication. Should the Iraqi regime develop liberal pluralist tendencies, it might be considered a threat to the Islamic hold on Syria. At best, an ambiguous relationship is likely to develop.

Syria: Islamic Sunni--Iraq: Islamic Shi'ite

Two factors could preclude a friendly relationship: a) The historic Sunni-Shi'i antipathy and, b) The Iranian-Alawite connection under Asad. However, other factors might intervene to change the scenario. A Syrian Islamist regime will not be welcomed by Egypt and Jordan. Also, the militant wing of the Syrian Islamist movement is known to admire the Iranian regime. Isolation in the Arab world, coupled with ideological imperatives, might well compel Islamist Syria to seek some type of inter-Islamic cooperation with Iraq's
Shi'ite regime and its Iranian allies. A major external challenge from the United States or Israel may solidify this "Islamic axis" and transform it into a more permanent Islamic unity scheme.

SCENARIO 2. INCREMENTAL CHANGE IN THE TWO OLIGARCHIES

Under certain circumstances, there may be a greater probability of incremental changes in the two elites, than quantum changes through coups and revolts against the regimes. In the Syrian case, President Asad could significantly broaden the recruitment base of his regime, by bringing more Sunni leaders into power and relaxing his heavy-handed controls. A related possibility is the gradual emergence of a coalition regime of Alawi and Sunni Ba'thists along with some Islamist elements, should President Asad become progressively incapacitated. Such an evolutionary development would be contingent upon Alawite readiness to transfer significant power to Sunni military officers and civilians. However, it cannot be assumed that some of President Asad's Alawite entourage (e.g., Rif'at al-Asad), will be prepared to permit such an evolutionary solution. As indicated earlier, recent developments in Syria tend to reinforce the foregoing scenario. Reportedly, Asad's Alawite and Sunni oligarchy was opposed to Rif'at's 'Bonapartiste' moves undertaken during and after the President's illness. Thus, it is highly probable that the Sunni military chiefs, in coalition with leading Alawite officers, will attempt to neutralize Rif'at, either with the President's consent or after his departure from the scene.
In the event that an evolutionist Ba'thi regime emerges in Syria based on Sunni-Alawi cooperation, a rapprochement with Iraq may become likely, particularly if the Iraqi Ba'th has been able to shed its "Takriti" image. However, Saddam Husayn has shown a lesser degree of predisposition than Asad toward evolutionary regime change. Should such changes occur on both sides, then the two Ba'ths might decide to cooperate for the sake of self-preservation against possible challenges from fundamentalists or Israel. This scenario will be profoundly influenced by the turn of events in Lebanon, in the Iraq-Iran War, and in the Arab-Israeli context.

SCENARIO 3. ARAB-ISRAELI ARMED CONFRONTATION

This externally induced condition is likely to drive any combination of Syrian and Iraqi regimes toward military and economic cooperation, particularly in a situation of peace between Iraq and Iran. Confronted with the Israeli challenge, Syria and Iraq possess the military and strategic capability to constitute an effective northern front against Israel with strong Soviet support. Their military effectiveness is expected to increase under national coalition or fundamentalist governments. It is significant that both Arab nationalists and Islamic fundamentalists have been opposed to the Iraq-Iran War on the grounds that it saps Arab and Islamic strength and diverts attention from the "real enemy"—Israel.

Situations of armed confrontation with Israel are likely to bring Syria and Iraq together in some form of military cooperation. The
extent of rapprochement depends on the types of regimes ruling in Baghdad and Damascus, as well as the settlement of the Iraq-Iran War.

In terms of regime combinations as presented in Scenario 1, the most effective cooperation is likely to be achieved under three situations:

A. Mutually compatible Ba'thi-led national reconciliation regimes in Syria and Iraq.

B. An Alawite-led Syrian Ba'th, in alliance with an Iraqi pro-Shi'ite non-Ba'thi regime of national reconciliation.

C. An Alawite-led Syrian Ba'th in alliance with an Iraqi Islamic regime dominated by Shi'ites allied to Iran.

The last two scenarios are likely to be the most potent combinations against Israel since they will constitute a militant "Shi'ite axis," extending from Lebanon to the Gulf. The Sunnis will have no choice but to join the onslaught. In any case, future Israeli militancy, possibly with U.S. support, is the surest catalyst to induce Iraqi-Syrian cooperation.

SCENARIO 4. CESSATION OF FIGHTING IN LEBANON AND IN THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR

A resolution of the Iraq-Iran conflict on the basis of "parity" would free Iraq for greater involvement against Syria and Israel, depending on the scenarios discussed under 1 and 2 above. A similar outcome might be expected from an "honorable" Syrian departure from Lebanon. Even a small-scale Iraqi victory against Iran is likely to make Saddam Husayn a threat to Syria, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf
states, whereby the latter might be compelled to seek Egyptian and Syrian support.

However, the situation on the Iraq-Iran battlefront, as it has developed in the last two years, might presage an Iraqi defeat, rather than a victory. Such a defeat might be staved off by U.S. intervention on the Iraqi side, along with continuing French and Egyptian support, and Gulf money. Khomeini's death or incapacitation might also have a calming effect on the Iranians. But the magnitude of Western and Arab assistance to Iraq and the risks that U.S. intervention might entail, raise salient questions about the cost-effectiveness of supporting the Ba'thi elite in power. At this late hour, the Iranians might well be satisfied with a solution which could include: a) financial reparations and b) establishment of any regime of national reconciliation which will give the Iraqi Shi'ites an important role in government. The relations of such an Iraqi regime with Asad's Syria are likely to be friendly. This type of solution might prevent the emergence of an explicitly pro-Iranian Shi'ite-led regime in Iraq, which is likely to occur in the event of a clear-cut Iranian victory. The realization of this scenario would reduce the chance of great power intervention, and limit the possibility of a Soviet-Iranian rapprochement.

From the Syrian perspective, any Iraqi defeat would be welcome if it leads to Saddam Husayn's departure and the weakening of the Iraqi Ba'ith. However, in the long-range, Asad may prefer the constitution of a pro-Syrian Ba'thi regime with Shi'ite participation, rather than a full-fledged Islamist government in Baghdad. Despite the Alawites'
strategic and spiritual connections with the Shi'ites of Iran and Iraq, the Syrian Ba'ath is too secular to feel at ease with the powerful fundamentalist pressures that are likely to radiate from Tehran and Baghdad after a full-scale Islamist takeover in Iraq. In the final analysis, the Gulf is not of primary interest to Asad or any other Syrian government. The establishment of a pro-Syrian regime in Lebanon constitutes a much higher priority for the Syrians, as do the Arab-Israeli conflict and the return of the Golan Heights. Ultimately, the Asad government or any successor regime would seek a prominent Syrian role in an Arab-Israeli settlement. This imperative will guide Syrian foreign policy toward Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, the Gulf, Jordan, the Palestinians, and the great powers.

SCENARIO 5. A JORDANIAN ROLE IN THE WEST BANK

A positive Jordanian response to negotiate with Israel under the Reagan Plan is likely to trigger virulent Syrian opposition toward King Husayn and his Palestinian supporters. The closeness of Iraqi-Jordanian relations and the increasing rapprochement between the U.S. and Iraq are likely to mute Iraq's traditionally militant opposition to peace initiatives toward Israel. Indeed, Saddam Husayn has already acknowledged to Congressman Stephen Solarz Israel's need for security. Any Iraqi support for a Palestinian initiative by King Husayn and Arafat will further exacerbate the Syrian-Iraqi confrontation. Ironically, Asad's opposition to such an initiative might enjoy the blessing of most militant Islamic fundamentalists.
throughout the Arab world. While there is little chance of cooperation between Asad and the Islamists, the relations between the latter and King Husayn can be expected to worsen. Also the recent rapprochement between Arafat and the Islamist groups is likely to unravel. In the larger Arab, Islamic, and superpower environment, the Jordanian move is likely to further polarize the region, particularly if the Lebanese War persists and the Iraq-Iran War draws in the superpowers. The utility to Saddam Husayn of a Jordanian move on the West Bank centers on its potential to isolate Syria and worsen U.S.-Syrian relations. Meanwhile, the Iraqi President is unlikely to become a leading exponent of peace with Israel, even in the event of an Iraqi-Iranian settlement.

SCENARIO 6. EXPANSION OF THE SOVIET PRESENCE

A quantum increase in the Soviet military presence in Syria, in response to growing Israeli and/or U.S. threat, is likely to significantly influence Syrian-Iraqi relations. Should the current Soviet military role in Syria increase, Iraq might feel pressured to seek further rapprochement with the United States. The opposite scenario, unlikely under present conditions, might draw Syria to the U.S. and Egypt. While a Soviet tilt toward Iran appears improbable due to the massive ideological chasm between the Islamic Republic and the Soviet Union, this eventuality cannot be dismissed. In view of Khomeini's monomania toward the destruction of Ba'thi power in Iraq, and the magnitude of Iran's fundamentalist fervor, a continued
deadlock on the battlefield may prompt the Iranians to sacrifice their anti-communism for the sake of acquiring advanced Soviet weaponry. Such a development will further polarize the Middle East and exacerbate Syrian-Iraqi relations.
I. INTRODUCTION

II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

III. SYRIA AND IRAQ: THE ANATOMY OF POWER


3. Ibid, pp. 31-44.


13. Private Communication.
IV. THE FERTILE CRESCENT: BACKGROUND TO SYRIAN AND IRAQI RELATIONS

1. Among the early Christian Arab nationalists were Boutros al-Bustani (d. 1983), Jurji Zaydan (d. 1914), Farah Antun (d. 1922) and Najib Azury (c. 1905). See Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939 (London, 1970), pp. 99-102; 246-248; 253-259; 263; 271-280.


V. THE QUEST FOR UNITY (1921-1945)


VI. THE STRUGGLE FOR ARAB PREEMINENCE (1945-1963)


2. Ibid., pp. 114-117.


VII. CONTEMPORARY SYRIAN-IRAQI RELATIONS (1963-1984)

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6. Ibid., pp. 333-346.


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