THE RESERVE COMPONENT DILEMMA: MISSION VS TIME (U) ARMY
COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH KS
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UNCLASSIFIED
MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
THE RESERVE COMPONENT DILEMMA:
MISSION VS TIME

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by

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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The Reserve Component Dilemma: Mission vs Time

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

THE RESERVE COMPONENT DILEMMA: MISSION Vs TIME,
by Major Donald B. Skipper, USA. 259 pages.

This thesis is a study of the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve (Reserve Components) premobilization training requirements and training time available in which to accomplish them. The original intent of Congress in establishing the post-World War II Reserve Components, the Total Force Policy that places heavy reliance on the Reserve Components, and CAPSTONE related training programs designed to improve Reserve Component readiness are examined to determine if available time resources support training requirements.

Data for this thesis were obtained from a myriad of civilian and government sources published over the last eighty years and from interviews with key policymakers in the Reserve Component training community.

This study concludes that the Legislated minimum of thirty-eight (nine) training days per year is no longer enough time to accomplish all required training and briefly examines the various categories and costs of extra-training time now being provided to the Reserve Component to conduct wartime-mission planning and training. Several long-term implications of this approach are also examined. Based on study
conclusions, six recommendations are made to address the long-term implications of the use of extra-training time by Reserve Component personnel.
Acknowledgments

This thesis could not have been written without the active support and encouragement of many key leaders throughout the Total Army who have been deeply involved in many of the programs discussed herein. Among those who have provided comments and suggestions are Colonel James McDevitt, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs, Colonel Jerry G. Ledford, Chief, Reserve Component Training Division, ODCSOPS, U.S. Army Forces Command, Colonel William R. Larson, Consulting Faculty member of the Combined and General Staff College and Assistant Chief of Staff, Personnel, 311th Corps Support Command, Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Stilly, National Guard Bureau, Lieutenant Colonel Roger Goodrich, Congressional Liaison Office, Department of the Army, Lieutenant Colonel Philip Brehm, ODCST, U.S. Army Europe, Lieutenant Colonel Roger Pruter, Commander, 2-137th Infantry Battalion, 69th Infantry Brigade of the Kansas National Guard, Major Mahlon Williams, First U.S. Army, Major Harry Clyde and Mr. Douglas Frampton, Sixth U.S. Army, and Major Peter Rodda, CGSC-84.

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Donald B. Skipper
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CHAPTER 1
MISSION VS TIME - AN INTRODUCTION

In the midst of peace, war is looked on as an eventuality too distant to merit consideration.
Vegetius: De Re Militari, iii, 378

Much has been written concerning mobilization, Reserve Component training, and our ability to rapidly prepare for war. Even a casual review of readily available literature on these subjects reveals hundreds of studies undertaken in the last decade to document problems and recommend improvements in our mobilization and deployment capability. Most of these past studies concentrated on training program problems. Most of these past studies were also conducted prior to the development of the Army CAPSTONE program.

Budget constraints imposed by an unprecedented force modernization effort have forced an increased reliance upon the Reserve Component to execute mobilization and early deployment to protect U.S. interests world-wide. Several new training programs have been developed to assist the Reserve Component in pre-mobilization training. Selected Reserve Component units have begun force modernization programs and full-time manning levels continue to grow. In fact, considerable attention is now being directed at the Reserve Component and all resources—except time—are being greatly increased.
This study addresses the multitude of relatively new training programs in which the Reserve Component must participate and the standard training requirements that they must successfully accomplish prior to deployment in times of national crises. It is narrowly focused on the most precious resource necessary for training—time. The laws which prescribe the currently authorized training assemblies and annual training period have not changed in the last three decades and limit the Reserve Component to thirty-eight training days a year (thirty-nine for the National Guard).

Background

In the age of an all volunteer Active Component undergoing an unprecedented force modernization, the Reserve Component has become an attractive and relatively inexpensive alternative to an even larger and more expensive active force. The Reserve Component is, in fact, a real defense bargain. "In their absence, the American taxpayer would be burdened supporting a much larger force that would be required to meet our security needs."1 Recognizing this increased reliance on the Reserve Component, several new training programs have been developed to insure that high priority Reserve Component units will be ready for combat immediately upon mobilization. Force modernization efforts

are also being directed at the Reserve Component to equip them with the modern equipment necessary to support the forward-deployed active forces upon mobilization. However, as Lawrence Korb, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics, has pointed out, "Resolution of Guard and Reserve equipment deficiencies, including tools and test equipment, will not be easy. What has evolved in two decades cannot be reversed in two years." As more resources are directed toward the Reserve Component, a theoretical decision point is reached where it becomes no more expensive, indeed, it becomes desirable, to expand the active forces rather than spend additional resources on the Reserve Component.

No one has yet determined the dollar value of that theoretical decision point, but it is obvious that Congress does not believe that the U.S. Army is even close to approaching it this year. The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) recently recommended freezing active duty Army end-strengths while increasing the Army National Guard end-strength by 6,600 personnel. The Senate Armed Services

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2 Dr. Korb was Resident Director of Defense Policy Studies at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research prior to assuming his present position in May 1981. A U.S. Naval flight officer from 1962 to 1966, he is currently a commander in the Naval Air Reserve. He received a BA degree at The Athenaeum of Ohio, an MA from St. Johns University and his Ph.D. from the State University of New York of Albany.

3 "Paving the Way for Stronger Reserve Forces," p. 25.
Committee, meanwhile, recommended increasing the Army National Guard and Army Reserve end-strengths by 6,000 and 3,000 personnel, respectively. Other agencies strongly agree with this viewpoint. The Reserve Forces Policy Board, in its annual report to Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, recommended that the Reserve Component receive still more money for additional equipment and training. The Reserve Officer Association (ROA) has recommended that the Army transfer additional defense responsibilities, now performed by active forces, to the Reserve Component in order to save defense dollars without reducing the current level of national security. Speaking at a Reserve Officer Association Conference in early 1983, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs Edward J. Philbin said, "I am convinced that the full potential for making greater, and more effective, use of the Reserve Components in peace and war has yet to be realized."

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6 Dr. Edward J. Philbin is Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and is the highest ranking member of the administration with specific responsibilities for overseeing the Reserve Components. Enlisted in the Naval Air Reserve in 1949, he received his commission from Air Force ROTC at San Diego State University. He served 2 years on active duty as an Air Force navigator and held the rank of Colonel when appointed to his present position.

While these special interest groups and key individuals can be expected to take a somewhat parochial position in favor of increased reliance on the Reserve Component, it must be noted that the Army leadership has been moving swiftly toward a true Total Army policy. Often alluded to during the last ten years, a Total Force philosophy implies one force made up of three parts: the Active Component, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve. All indications are that "... today the Active and Reserve Components are full partners in one combat-ready force. 'Total Force' is no longer a concept. It is now the 'Total Force' policy which integrates the Active, Guard, and Reserve forces into a homogeneous whole."\(^8\)

According to official strength figures published by the Department of Defense, the Reserve Component comprises over fifty percent of the Army's deployable forces.\(^9\) A detailed breakdown of force composition is at Appendix B. Impending Division 86 reorganization will result in a further transfer of active duty spaces to the Reserve Component. Each of the ten heavy Divisions scheduled for reorganization will have a special Reserve Component augmentation package consisting of combat support and combat service

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support elements. As Bowman pointed out in his study of the Total Force Model, to be successful, Army implementation of a Total Force policy must depend on the ability of the Reserve Component to train to and maintain the same standards as the Active Component.  

Recognizing the increased reliance being placed on the Reserve Component to be mission-ready with little or no post-mobilization training, the Department of the Army in the late 1970's established a number of training programs specifically designed to improve Reserve Component readiness through more realistic, mission-related training. In 1980, U.S. Army Forces Command initiated an effort to relate and unify the many individual and separate training programs and provide a management philosophy that would optimize Reserve Component training. This effort resulted in the Army CAPSTONE Program which aligns Active and Reserve Components into force packages enabling units to train in peacetime for their wartime missions.

Increased reliance, force modernization, enhanced budgets, force structure changes, and a myriad of new training programs and requirements will certainly aid the Reserve Component in achieving higher readiness levels, but the one resource that has not yet been increased is time.

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to determine if the time authorized for the Reserve Component to accomplish pre-mobilization training is adequate and will realistically permit Reserve Component wartime mission accomplishment.

Thesis Hypothesis

The Reserve Component has been authorized the equivalent of thirty-eight training days each year in which to successfully accomplish the myriad of requirements that should make them combat-ready. These thirty-eight days consist of forty-eight four-hour drill periods that are usually combined in multiples of four to make up one weekend drill period a month. The remaining fourteen training days are used for an annual training period (fifteen for the National Guard).

These time periods apply to the majority of the soldiers in our Reserve Component. It must be pointed out, however, that key unit personnel often donate two or three weekends and several weekdays and evenings each month to unit training and management.

In comparison, the Active Component uses about 260 days each year to conduct training.

This study will attempt to validate or refute the thesis hypothesis that the most vital Reserve Component resource—time—is in critically short supply.
Study Applicability

"At least one-half of the Army's war-making capability, and thus of its deterrent character is maintained in its Reserve Components . . . this has been the central thrust of the Total Force doctrine . . . to hold down defense spending by eliminating as many active units as national security permits and by elevating the combat readiness and capability of the Guard and Reserve, enabling them to take up the slack."¹ Unless we can be certain that the Reserve Component will be able to successfully accomplish its diverse post-mobilization missions then the Army's ability to perform its national security missions must be reevaluated. If the peacetime resources now being dedicated to Reserve Component pre-mobilization training are not adequate for mission accomplishment, then we must apply suitable corrections or change our current military strategy of increased reliance on the Reserve Component.

Definition of Terms

Used throughout this study, the term Reserve Component refers to organized troop units of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. When reference is made

to just the Army Reserve, it will be specified by the name Army Reserve or just Reserves. The Individual Ready Reserve, while a part of the Reserve Component, will not be discussed in this study because most recent efforts to increase Reserve Component readiness have been directed at Troop Program Units. Other key terms, jargon, and acronyms are defined in Appendix B, Glossary of Terms.

Sources

The research for this study was conducted by consulting a myriad of sources that included Congressional records, current U.S. Army program guidance, official government reports and studies, current periodicals, and private organizations studies and published reports concerning the Reserve Component. Key Reserve Component advisors and policy makers at Department of the Army, U.S. Army Forces Command, the Second Continental United States Army, and Command and General Staff College were interviewed during the preparation of this study to determine their perceptions of and concerns over the resources, especially time, allocated to the Reserve Component.

Methodology

This study uses the historical method to research and synthesizes previous studies and reports, current research, and the opinions of several Reserve Component
policy makers, as well as reviewing both the standard training requirements that must be accomplished by all Reserve Component units and those requirements resulting from recently developed training programs. Findings and conclusions will be related to the existing legal and regulatory time constraints which determine the training performed by the Reserve Component in peacetime.

Scope, Limitations, Assumptions

The subject of Reserve Component training and readiness is exceedingly broad, both horizontally and vertically. Horizontally, the subject entails strategy, funds, manpower, material, organizations, missions, training conducted world-wide, military commands, and many state and territorial governments. Vertically, the subject involves levels of structure from squad level to the Department of the Army and the Department of Defense. Due to the very real time and budgetary constraints placed on report preparation, this study is narrowly focused on the one key resource necessary for training that has not been increased in the last twenty years -- time. The study assumes that readers understand the historical development of the citizen soldier concept and the reliance placed on the Reserve Component in times of past national crises and, consequently, will not dwell on problems experienced during previous mobilizations. The evolution of the current Reserve Component training time
periods will, however, be reviewed to understand the original Congressional intent and the environments, economic, political, and strategic, in which the current regulations were legislated.

Study Content

Chapter two contains a review of the pertinent legislation, summarizes and evaluates the existing research on this subject, and attempts to place the findings of the previous studies within the context of today's Total Force philosophy.

The Reserve Component training evolution over the past decade is closely examined in Chapter three of this study. Training programs, Force Modernization, and the CAPSTONE philosophy will be reviewed to distill their individual, collective, and, possibly synergistic impact on Reserve Component training and wartime mission accomplishment.

The evidence presented in the preceding chapters will be discussed and analyzed in Chapter four. The emergence of both anticipated and unanticipated findings, correlations, and problems will be highlighted and will lead to the presentation of the study conclusions and recommendations in Chapter five.
CHAPTER 2

A REVIEW OF CONGRESSIONAL INTENT,
LEGISLATION, AND PERTINENT LITERATURE

In the beginning there was the Guard . . .
MAJOR Roger Pruter, 1981.

This chapter will review and summarize the studies and surveys conducted in recent years that have examined the Reserve Components' training, readiness, missions, and resources. However, before beginning this literature review, the original legislation that established the Reserve Components, subsequent changes in applicable laws, the mood of the country and Congressional intent must be examined to provide a baseline reference of an examination of the Reserve Component of 1984.

The Reserve Components 1792-1944.

To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.
George Washington: First Annual Address to Congress, 8 January 1790

The Reserve Components were first recognized as an organized militia by the Dick Act of 1903. Prior to this time, the only pertinent legislation under which America's
militia were organized was the Militia Act of 1792. Reserve Components under exclusive federal control were first authorized by the National Defense Act of 1916. This Act also originally established the Regular Army Reserve. With the passage of the National Defense Act of 1920 the reserve forces were established as a federal reserve force almost wholly the responsibility of the National Guard, but with increased federal control of, involvement in, and financial support for training, organization, and equipment of the Guard force. The National Defense Act of 1920 also abolished the Regular Army Reserve as established by the 1916 National Defense Act. At that time, there were over 280,000 personnel in the Regular Army Reserve but, in the event of an emergency, there was also available a great reservoir of four million trained World War I veterans. Congress believed that under those conditions little need for the Regular Army Reserve existed, and therefore abolished it.

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The final step to make the National Guard a component of the Army was taken in 1933 when Congress made the National Guard a part of the Army at all times. "It did this by conferring a new status on the guard, by constituting it a reserve component of the Army."\(^5\)

By 1938, the reservoir of World War I trained manpower had disappeared and pre-World War II Active Army readiness was of great concern to Congress. Instead of an authorized strength of 280,000 personnel, the Army of 1938 was only 165,000 men strong.

Limited to that strength, the Regular Army would, in emergency, encounter serious difficulty in carrying on its tasks. Its units are maintained in peacetime at a size below that necessary for active field service. For reasons of economy, some units, though needed for a balanced force in active operations, are entirely missing.\(^6\)

Congressional records document the deep concern over the Army's poor readiness and proposed that "... either the Regular Army strength should be greatly increased, or a reserve should be provided for it."\(^7\) The provisions of the 1938 bill to reestablish the Regular Army Reserve varied little from those of the 1916 National Defense Act. However, the report from the Committee on Military Affairs that


\(^6\)Amending the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916, As Amended, by Reestablishing the Regular Army Reserve, p. 2.

\(^7\)Ibid.
recommended passage of the 1938 bill stipulated that to be effective, the proposed Army Reserve must have certain qualifications. "It must be available for active service in an emergency under the same conditions as the Regular Army. Its members must have sufficient training, and must be in such physical condition that they can function in a tactical unit without delay for further training." It was the intent of Congress that this reserve force was to mobilize, deploy, and employ with no further training. The bill passed, the Regular Army Reserve was reorganized, and, as Levantrosser notes: "... The reserve components provided a substantial source of trained military manpower at the outset of World War II."9

Public and Congressional Concern 1944-1952

Again and again we have owed peace to the fact that we were prepared for war.

Theodore Roosevelt: Lecture at the Naval War College, June 1897

Toward the end of World War II, military leaders were determined not to make the same mistakes that had been made in the past during a rapid demobilization period. Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall brought Brigadier General John Palmer back on active duty to develop guidelines

8Ibid.

9Ibid.
for a post-World War II Army Reserve Component. Palmer outlined his plan for a small citizen army in War Department Circular 347, dated 24 August 1944. It was not until 1946, however, that the Army announced plans to organize the post-World War II Reserve Components into three separate classifications. Category A units were to be at full wartime strength, supplied with all essential equipment, and trained during once-a-month drills and a two-week annual training period. Category B units were to have a full complement of officers and a cadre of key enlisted personnel, essential training equipment, and trained during monthly drills and a two-week training period every other summer. Category C units were to have an assigned complement of only officers who would conduct two weeks of training every third summer.

The announced plans created a great deal of controversy and public debate on both the need for a standing reserve force as well as its eventual composition. General Chamberlain, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for the War Department Training Section in 1946, publicly stated that future plans for national defense depended in large part on a three-category reserve organization, "... one ready to take the


field immediately and two available from three months to a year later." In late May 1946, Hanson W. Baldwin, a staff writer for the New York Times, added fuel to the fires of public controversy by touring key Army installations and reporting on the understrength post-demobilization Army. He reported that:

The United States today really has only a "token" ground force in this country, and every one of the units inspected was well understrength . . . . The weakness of the Army's strategic reserve is all the more glaring at the moment since the National Guard has had no time to reorganize and build up its various state units since the war, and at the moment it is virtually nonexistent.

Major General B. B. Miltonberger, Chief of the National Guard Bureau of the War Department in 1946, in an address to the 1946 Governors Conference, stated that "the War Department wants the National Guard organized as an M-day force . . . . By that I mean an organization capable of fighting on M-day." Here again is a key reference to a force that would be capable of deploying and fighting with no post-mobilization training. In an interview prior to his


attendance at the same conference, General Eisenhower indicated that he would speak on problems of the War Department with special reference to the National Guard. General Eisenhower said "we hope to get the Guard up to a strength of 150,000 this year and ultimately to 600,000." By September 1946, the public was convinced of the necessity of a quick response Reserve Component.

The National Guard, like the Regular Army, is intended to be 'capable of immediate mobilization and field service' in the defense of the United States against any type of invasion, to cover and aid in mobilization, or to participate in all types of operations, including the offensive, either in the United States or overseas. To make the mobilization day force a completely balanced force, some Organized Reserve units also are needed. Some of the Reserve units, designated Class A-1 and Class A-2, are supposed to be ready for combat immediately and to take the field with the Regular Army and the National Guard.

Speaking before the Manhattan chapter of the Reserve Officer Association in October 1946, General Courtney H. Hodges, First Army Commander, made a strong plea for a responsive, ready-reserve organization. He remarked that "in two wars our military weakness encouraged aggressors and agrandizors to attack us. In both wars their attacks failed, but they


failed only because, on both occasions, we had allies who
were able to withstand the onslaughts of the enemy while we
made ready. We would not have that advantage in any future
war." 17 By the end of 1946, the situation was getting
desperate. Congress had not yet acted on the various propo-
sals for a Reserve Component force, demobilization was
almost completed, and the public mood was beginning to shift
towards indifference. In November 1946, General Jacob L.
Devers, Commanding General of the Army Ground Forces,
addressed the Pennsylvania Education Congress and stressed
the "... desperate need for an adequate military
establishment to offset the effects of a too hasty demobili-
ization program and the gradual deterioration of our armed
reserves." 18

Not everyone was convinced of either the need for or
the capability of the National Guard to become an M-day
force ready for immediate world-wide service. In December
1946, Lieutenant General Hugh A. Drum, Commander of the New
York State Guard, decried the National Guards' "... im-
possible official mission of training to become an M-day
force ... . No part-time soldier, such as the National

17 "Hodges outlines 20-Year Army Plan," New York
Times, 1 October 1946, p. 95. (Ann Arbor, Mich.:
University Microfilm, 1965).

18 "Devers Sees Need of Vast Army Pool," New York
Times, 22 November 1946, p. 96. (Ann Arbor, Mich.:
University Microfilm, 1965).
Guardsman, can ever become, even with the best will in the world, ready for service anywhere in the world on 'M-day'. Baldwin finally expressed his own doubts over the ability of the Reserve Components to respond on M-day with pre-trained, go-to-war forces. In a March 1947 article, Baldwin explained his position.

War experience proved, if any proof were needed, that no part-time soldiers--trained as the National Guard and reserve are intermittently, but at the most about one armory drill a week and two weeks in the field every year--can possibly be ready for active service on 'M' or mobilization day. Months, and even years, of additional continuous training are essential after a crisis starts or an emergency comes if these part-time soldiers and sailors are to become effective forces.

Despite these public protests, Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson remained adamant that the Reserve Components could not afford the luxury of months or years of post-mobilization training. In an address at New York's City Hall in February 1947, Secretary Patterson said that "... in an era of long-range weapons and plans with a 10,000 mile radius... reserve forces must be ready strength, available immediately." For the first time in


21"Patterson's Talk Here Warning on Budget Cut," New
the post-World War II demobilization period, Secretary Patterson alluded to other reasons for a heavy reliance on Reserve Components. He pointed out that: "American tradition and American economy will not accept a great standing Army. The alternative . . . is to rely, for mobile tactical forces in case of an emergency, on a strong force made up of trained civilians--the National Guard and the Organized Reserves."\(^{22}\)

The public controversy continued to rage while demobilization efforts resulted in a very weak active Army with a significant number of soldiers performing occupation duties in both the European and Pacific theaters and a disorganized National Guard and Army Reserve. In July 1947, the House Committee on Armed Services considered establishing the three-category concept for both National Guard and Army Reserve units, and expressed deep concern over the immediate availability of a Reserve Component.

This legislation is based on the concept that the next war, if there is one, will come swiftly and that, at that time, there must be immediately available a reasonably well trained civilian corps of officers to take the field with the Regular services . . . . The Army's expectation is that, in the event of war, the first 8 or 9 months after it begins are likely to be the most critical phase. The success with which the country can weather these early months will have to depend largely upon the readiness and effectiveness of the National Guard and the Organized Reserve Corps.\(^{23}\)

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\(^{23}\) Ibid.
The bill also provided for the Organized Reserve to meet and train on the same basis as that prescribed for the National Guard. 24

Efforts by the Department of Defense on a concept for a unified and standardized Reserve Component program were finally initiated in 1947 by Secretary of Defense Forrestal when he appointed a Committee on Civilian Components to make recommendations on necessary reorganizations. However, before the committee's recommendations could have any impact on the Reserve Component structure, hostilities in Korea diverted national policy-makers' attention to the problem of meeting immediate military requirements with Active Army units supplemented with Reservists recalled to active duty. The Korean War required only a partial mobilization, something for which we had never before planned. This partial mobilization was very inequitable and resulted in a general dissatisfaction with the entire Reserve Component and mobilization system.


The Department of Defense Committee on Civilian Components led to the establishment of a Department of Defense Civilian Components Policy Board. The Policy Board, although first established in 1949, accelerated its efforts in 1950 to establish uniform categories of readiness for all the Reserve Components of all services. The Policy Board reexamined every facet of the Reserve Components with the intent of developing proposals for legislative action. In 1950, "the Board held consultations with all military associations and government agencies interested in reserve problems in which they had an opportunity to submit comments on the Board's report to the Secretary of Defense. It was this report that formed the basis for legislative proposals on reserve organization in 1951."25

The legislation finally passed by Congress was entitled the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, and formally established seven Reserve Components—among them the National Guard of the United States and the Army Reserve.26 The Act also mandated categories for units and members of the Reserve Components according to type and degree of training. Category A units would train in forty-eight

25Levantrosser, Citizen-Soldier, p. 53.

drills and fifteen days active duty annually. Category B units would train during only twenty-four drills annually and Category C units would train in only twelve drills annually.\textsuperscript{27} Limitations on annual training for both unit members and individuals not assigned to a unit were also established at fifteen days of active duty training annually.\textsuperscript{28}

Once again, Congressional intent can be gleaned from a House Committee on Armed Services Report which indicates that the Committee members were sensitive to the need for an immediately available reserve force that would be fully deployable and ready to fight upon mobilization. The Committee Report highlighted the fact that:

Modern warfare will no longer allow us to rely upon ocean barriers to provide the necessary time to completely train reserves and to build up our active military forces to whatever strength may be required. Instead, the future security of the Nation demands that the reserve components be ready for almost instant call.\textsuperscript{29}

Hanson Baldwin believed that passage of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 was only a first step in a long process of creating an adequate reserve force. He also continued to


\textsuperscript{28}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{29}\textit{The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1951}, p. 9.
disparage the idea that a reserve force could ever be part of the Nation's first line of defense.30

The Cold War 1954-1963

Only the dead have seen the end of war.
Plato, 428-347 B.C.

Congress continued to produce legislation designed to refine and clarify the laws pertaining to the Reserve Components, while simultaneously expressing concern over both the ability of the Reserve Components to quickly mobilize and deploy, as well as the limited time available for training. A 1954 Report of the Interim Subcommittee on Preparedness discussed the need to reduce active force levels and reduce military expenditures while retaining a credible defense. "We must have a reserve force which will be able to take up this slack . . . . In fact the need for trained men is more acute by reason of the suddenness of modern warfare. Our civilian reservists of old were called minutemen--the time factor in the Reserve today is equally important."31 In the same report the Subcommittee noted


that the normal Reserve unit trains for only two hours a week which, in many cases, did not justify issuing these units complex equipment since they couldn't make effective use of or maintain such equipment in just two hours a week.

"The average reservist is available for training for between 150 and 200 hours per year--the equivalent of about four weeks of full-time active duty. It is difficult to instill a recruit with an awareness of what is involved in military duty in such a brief training period. The training is merely familiarization for the great bulk of recruits."  

Continuing Congressional concern with the amount of Reserve Component training available led to the passage of legislation designed to insure that adequate training time would be available. In 1955, Congress established a minimum of forty-eight scheduled drills or training periods annually, as well as an annual training period not to exceed seventeen days for all members of the Ready Reserve, except as specifically provided by regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense.  

Additional time for meaningful training was made available when, in early 1957, Department of the Army announced a new

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32Ibid., pp. 6-7.

policy"... which would require an initial training period of six months for Reserve Component enlistees... It was put into full effect on 1 January 1958... Enlistees would now receive basic training from the active force rather than in their home states." Prior to this time, all Reserve Component enlistees were completely trained within their own units. Because of the burden of basic training requirements, Reserve Component units had concentrated on individual training to the detriment of unit training needs. This policy change permitted a Reserve Component enlistedee to complete both Basic and, in most cases, Advanced Individual Training before he joined his Reserve Component unit for training. Reserve Component units could now dedicate their limited training time to unit training tasks as well as individual refresher training.

In 1959, the Reserve Components were reorganized to bring them into close alignment with known mobilization requirements. This Army reorganization plan also attempted, for the first time, to place "... specific units in various priorities in accordance with their scheduled mobilization and deployment." This was a significant departure

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from the previous policy of standardized amounts of training time for all Reserve Components units. It represented a return to the late 1940's concept of tailoring the amount of peacetime training to the individual unit's position on a mobilization/deployment list.

Congressional concern for Reserve Component limited training time was next manifested when the Reserve Forces Act of 1963 changed the time requirements for unit training assemblies. This act:

... required unit training assemblies to be at least 4 [sic] hours per assembly. As this requirement made weeknight training unpopular, the units went to weekend training once a month. The effect of this change was that units now trained two full days in a row each month (called multiple unit training assemblies MUTA) rather than four evening meetings per month. Consequently, unit proficiency improved.36

**The Threat of War in Asia 1965-1970**

Only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain that they will never be employed.

John F. Kennedy: Inaugural Address 20 January 1961

The significant reliance that had been placed on the Reserve Components by Army war planners became very evident

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as Active Army forces were committed to South Vietnam in 1965. To improve overall military readiness, Department of the Army formed a Selected Reserve Force (SRF) in 1965 from both National Guard and Army Reserve assets. The SRF contained units that were considered to be so essential to successful accomplishment of early wartime missions that they would have to be ready for deployment with little or no post-mobilization training. To support enhanced pre-mobilization training, the SRF, initially composed of 744 National Guard and 232 Army Reserve units, was given a much higher priority over other Reserve Component units for all resources. Later designated as SRF I, these units were authorized to be at full TOE strength, to receive full logistic support, and to conduct up to 72 [sic] paid drills annually, in addition to annual training. 37 Following initial testing of the concept in 1966, the initial SRF was divided into four categories to tailor additional training time to the needs of individual units. The majority of SRF units became Category II units performing fifty-eight training assemblies annually, in addition to regular annual training. The initial increase from forty-eight to seventy-two training assemblies resulted in a significant retention

37Wallace C. Magathan et al., Tailoring of Reserve Components Unit Training Assemblies and Unit Manning Levels Vol I (McLean, Va.: General Research Corporation, 1974), p. 5.
problem as conflicts with family and civilian employers quickly developed. However, as the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam gradually increased, the need for a truly ready Reserve Component force led to the passage of the Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and Vitalization Act of 1967. This act established a second SRF on a statutory basis to provide more Reserve Component units that could rapidly deploy with little or no post-mobilization training.

In 1968, selected SRF II units were mobilized to meet the Active Component's needs during the rapid escalation of the Vietnam conflict. "Virtually all SRF units mobilized in 1968 had to undergo complete unit training programs to achieve readiness for deployment. The training readiness achieved by the SRF units was either overstated, outdated in the readiness reporting system, or lost."38

By September 1969, the political realities of not mobilizing the Reserve Components for commitment to the Vietnam conflict, the less than successful mobilization of selected SRF units, and the less than enthusiastic response to additional training time exhibited by SRF unit members led to cancellation of the program. "The stated reason for the termination was that the 'improvement in readiness of Reserve Component and Active Army Strategic Army Forces eliminates the requirement for an SRF as a separate entity."39

38Ibid., pp. 6-7.

39National Guard Bureau, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 30
In reviewing the SRF experience, the General Research Corporation noted that all of the additional time devoted to training by SRF units was conducted under the threat of an imminent mobilization. "However, SRF experience indicated that additional training assemblies did in fact increase the readiness of the participating units."40 Well publicized Active Component participation in the Vietnam conflict, problems with the Selective Service system, and public dissatisfaction with the U.S. military in general, as well as a reticence on the part of National leaders to declare war (and possibly cripple the domestic "War on Poverty") all contributed to the decision not to fully mobilize the Reserve Components during this period. It was in this atmosphere that the Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird,41 announced in August 1970, the Total Force Concept.

The Total Force 1970-1974

No nation ever had an army large enough to guarantee it against attack in time of peace or insure it victory in time of war.

Calvin Coolidge, Address, 6 Oct 1925


41Melvin R. Laird served as the nation's 10th Secretary of Defense from 1969 to 1973 during the period
The Total Force concept applied to the total integration of all Active and Reserve Component planning, resources, and employment. Driven by the need to control the growing defense budget while simultaneously assuaging the concerns of the Reserve Component community over their long-term contribution to national defense, the Secretary of Defense in August 1970 announced:

... an increased reliance on the combat and combat support units of the Guard and Reserves ... Emphasis will be given to concurrent consideration of the total forces, active and reserve, to determine the most advantageous mix to support the national strategy and meet the threat ... Guard and Reserve units and individuals of the Selected Reserves will be prepared to be the initial and primary source for augmentation of rapid and substantial expansion of the active forces ... 42

This decision to publicly reaffirm the nation's reliance on the Reserve Components and to integrate them in every way with the active forces was incorporated as part of our

when the draft was eliminated and the All Volunteer Force came into being. From 1953 to 1969 he was a member of the House of Representatives and a senior member of its Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. He is now Chairman of the Advisory Council of the American Council of the American Enterprise Institute's Public Policy Project on National Defense.

national policy by Congressional action during the same time period that the Nixon administration launched the "all-volunteer Army." Both the Military Service Act of 1971 and the Defense Authorization Act of 1973 called for the Reserve Components to be the initial and primary source of augmentation for the Active Component in any future emergency. As Leon pointed out in his study of the Total Force concept, "... the Reserve Components have now become the only option that is available to the President for expanding the military force until legislation to implement the draft can be implemented."\textsuperscript{44}

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) conducted a comprehensive review of the Reserve Components in 1971. The OSD Reserve Component Study was undertaken to identify manpower, equipment, and training needs to develop the best methods to use the Reserve Components within the Total Force concept. Among the final study recommendations were:

- currently authorized manning levels for Reserve component units be recognized as optimum or near optimum and major revisions should not be attempted.

\textsuperscript{43}Colonel Gustavo A. Leon just completed a three-year assignment as the USAEUR Senior Army National Guard (ARNG) Advisor and is the Senior FORSCOM ARNG Advisor.

\textsuperscript{44}LTC Gustavo A. Leon, "Total Force Concept, Reality or Myth?," U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 21 November 1975, p. 1.
• selected units be required to attain battalion-level orientation or proficiency annually.

• twelve additional assemblies be authorized where required to early deploying units, and legislative revision be requested for reduction of unit assemblies where not required.

• provide full-time Reserve Component cadres in headquarters of the early mission divisions and separate brigades and at each organic subordinate headquarters to company level.\(^{45}\)

• use Reserve Component units to roundout Active Army Divisions reduced by removal of a number of its maneuver battalions.\(^{46}\)

The study also warned that "as readiness and deployment plans and schedules become more exacting, the requirements which must be imposed upon individual reservists (and indirectly, upon their families and employers) will be growing."\(^{47}\) This study was to have far-reaching impact on the organizations, missions, and training programs for the entire Army and set the stage for the development of several

\(^{45}\) The Study recommendations eventually led to the development of the Affiliation and Full Time Manning (FTM) programs as well as higher annual training goals for selected units. For a detailed discussion of the Affiliation Program see pp. below and for the FTM Program see pp. below.


separate programs designed to improve Reserve Component unit readiness.

With the OSD Study recommendations and emerging readiness programs in hand, then Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, in a 23 August 1973 memorandum, strengthened the Total Force concept by noting that "the Total Force is no longer a 'concept'. It is now the Total Force Policy which integrates the active, Guard, and Reserve forces into a homogenous whole." In the future, Reserve Component programs to increase manning level, improve equipment, and enhance training were to receive priority.

In 1974, Congress gave the President authority for a limited mobilization of the Reserve Components (originally 50,000 soldiers, it was subsequently increased to 100,000 soldiers in 1980) without the need for a declaration of war or national emergency. Commenting on that authority, William Brehm, then Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower

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48 During the period 1969 to 1975, James Schlesinger served as Assistant Director, Office of Management and Budget (1969-70), Chairman, AEC (1970-71), Director CIA (1971-73), U.S. Secretary of Defense (1973-75). He is currently Senior Advisor to the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Senior Advisor, Lehman Bros., Kuhn Loeb Inc.


50 William K. Brehm held this position from 1973-1977. He began his career in government as Director, Land Forces Programs in the Office of Secretary of Defense in 1964. He is now Chairman of the Board of Systems Research and Applications Corporation.
and Reserve Affairs noted that "... if our Total Force--active and reserve--has the clear capacity to deploy rapidly in a crisis situation, we both reduce the chance of our forces being needed, and assure ourselves of a better outcome if they are." 51

The 1792 concept of an unpaid, unstructured militia had slowly evolved during a 182-year period into a Total Force Policy that considered the Reserve Components as an integral part of our military forces for national defense. Since the 1930's, Congressional concern over our ability to rapidly mobilize and deploy a citizen-soldier force resulted in new structures and organizations, new plans and concepts, and new equipment and training procedures to meet the needs of national security. The 1940's categorization of units and training time and the 1960's SRF experiments with increased unit training assemblies reinforce the contention that throughout this period the Department of the Army was responding to both the needs of the times and the original intent of Congress. That is, to create a Reserve Component that would be capable of immediate mobilization and deployment with little or no post-mobilization training. The Total Force of 1974 was certainly not the immediately deployable force envisioned. However, the Total Force Policy set the stage for the development of a multitude of programs

51"National Guard as a Defense Priority," National Guard 35:13.
designed to improve Reserve Component readiness. "The total force unquestionably is one of the most important developments of the past several decades in the U.S. military establishment, giving each of the three components--Active, Guard, and Reserve--vital significance both in the assessment of immediately available combat power and the dynamics of deterrence."  

**The Total Force 1974-1977**

There are two things to aim at in life: first, to get what you want, and, after that, to enjoy it. Only the wisest of mankind achieve the second.

Logan Pearsall Smith, *Afterthought*

Much has been written since 1974 concerning Reserve Component readiness. A thorough review of the many studies, reports, essays, and articles written in the last decade reveals that most authors and analysts consider readiness to be the result of a proper mixture of equipment, personnel, training, and time. Those that have addressed readiness examined equipment and found it to be old and/or short supply, examined personnel and (at various times) found shortages or overstrengths, and examined training and found it to be useless, meaningful, and/or satisfactory. With just a few notable exceptions, most analysts and authors

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have ignored the last element of readiness—the available
time in which to plan and train for mission accomplishment.
Only recently have Reserve Component leaders begun to
allude to the time factor as one of the major problems inhi-
biting readiness in this decade.

OSD conducted a special program during the period FY
72 to FY 74 to test some of the recommendations made in the
1971 OSD Study. The test varied the amounts of additional
unit training time in the form of unit training assemblies
(UTA), additional training assemblies (ATA), additional active
duty for training (ADT), and full-time personnel in an
attempt to reduce post-mobilization training and increase
units' rapid deployability. In reviewing the conduct and
results of this test program, General Research Corporation
analysts found that the tailoring of both unit training
assemblies and manning levels were both feasible and
desirable. The amount of additional training time could be
managed by U.S. Army Forces Command based on post-mobiliza-
tion training requirements and unit deployment dates. The
General Research Corporation Report noted that additional
training can lead to improved training proficiency in
Reserve Component units, particularly those in which the
turnover of key personnel is moderate. It also reported
that approximately fifty-four unit training assemblies (UTA)
equivalents per maneuver unit per year were needed for the
attainment of company-level proficiency, and at least sixty
would be needed for attainment of battalion-level proficiency. A possible negative effect of additional training time was identified in terms of the impact on Reserve Component unit members' morale and career development, as well as Reserve Component recruiting potential. This impact was dismissed since "the concept of tailoring UTA equivalents should be acceptable to a majority of RC personnel, since almost two-thirds of them would belong to units eligible for ATA's, one-quarter retaining 48 UTA's, and one-seventh only to units suffering a reduction of UTA's." The report concluded with the recommendation that the Department of the Army adopt the concept of tailoring Reserve Component unit training assemblies and manning levels in accordance with overall mobilization and deployment requirements.

Chiorini, in commenting on the OSD Study, noted that there is a direct relationship between training readiness and costs. He said that "as the amount of post-mobilization time is reduced . . . the ability to achieve readiness in a sudden surge becomes more dependent on the expenditure of funds and resources with costs increasing dramatically as


54 Magathan, Tailoring of Training Assemblies, Vol 1, pp. VI-14.
post mobilization times are reduced towards zero.\textsuperscript{55} This is significant in that he formally recognized that trade-off involved in buying higher levels of pre-mobilization readiness to offset faster deployment schedule requirements. As noted in chapter one,\textsuperscript{56} as more resources are directed toward the Reserve Components for pre-mobilization training, a point is reached where defense planners should conclude that further resources for pre-mobilization training could be better spent on the Active Component. Indeed, Chiorini predicted that as the desire for faster mobilization and deployment increases the associated costs of Reserve Component readiness in the pre-mobilization period will also increase.\textsuperscript{57}

These recommendations for more pre-mobilization training time were somewhat offset by a 1975 General Accounting Office (GAO) report of its investigation into the quality of Reserve Component training. The report:

\ldots estimated that 43 percent of the time the reservists got paid for in fiscal 1974 was wasted either through idleness or through doing jobs other than

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\textsuperscript{56}For the initial discussion on this trade-off see Chapter 1, p. 2 above.
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\textsuperscript{57}Chiorini, Litton Support for OSD Study, Vol 1, pp. 9-10.
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their military specialities . . . This waste amounted to 15 million days and cost about $1.2 billion out of $2.7 billion the taxpayers paid that year in drilling reservists.58

The quality of available training time would divert attention from the question of quantity of time sporadically for the next several years.

The Literature of 1977-1978

A wise man in time of peace prepares for war.
Horace: Satires II,c,30 B.C.

Colonel Daniel Gans59 suggested in a 1977 Army article the adoption of a cyclic annual training plan to achieve battalion-level training status similar to that used successfully by the Israeli reserves. He based his concept on the limited post-mobilization time that would be available for key Reserve Component units to attain their readiness objectives by M+30 and he concluded that their pre-mobilization objective must be battalion-level training.60 COL Gans reviewed two cyclical annual training


59COL Daniel Gans, USAR, retired, was for eight years Deputy Commander of the 181st Separate Infantry Brigade. In 1977 he was a consulting nuclear engineer with a Boston firm.

60COL Daniel Gans, "The Israeli Way and U.S.
plans and proposed the adoption of the best aspects of both plans for U.S. Reserve Component use. The Israeli reserve has a seventy-two hour mobilization capability, with an active duty cadre of eight to ten percent of TOE. Their training is based on a four-year plan that follows a regular but flexible cyclical sequence. Their cycle starts in year one at unit through company level training, progresses through years two and three at battalion- and brigade-level training respectively, and concludes in year four with division-level training in large-scale exercises. There is no provision for post-mobilization training and they are considered immediately available. The U.S. Marine Corps Reserve has a planned M+30 deployment capability with an active duty cadre of four percent. The Marine Corps Reserve plans recognize the time limitations imposed on pre-mobilization training and rely on a comprehensive five year cycle. A significant part of their cycle is at battalion and combined-arms level with nine divisional infantry battalions engaged in five special operations each year during their annual training. 61 He suggests that U.S. Reserve Component inactive duty training (IDT) and annual training (AT) could be the equivalent of at least five weeks of training annually by making the optimum use of available training


61 Ibid.
time. COL Gans concluded that cyclical training, coupled
with better management of both IDT and AT, would provide a
more responsive and deployable Reserve Component.62

Others have reviewed the successes of the Israeli
Reserve system and proposed its application to both the
National Guard and the Army Reserve. In the May 1977 issue
of Military Review, Captain John Fishel63 proposed adoption
of an Israeli-like system for the U.S. Reserve Component.
Fishel noted that, despite pre-mobilization training, little
or no training time was saved by the Reserve Component mobi-
лизations for World Wars I or II, Korea, the Berlin crises,
or Vietnam. He pointed out that "if the reservist cannot
carry out the assigned missions, then all the money paid out
for the part-time soldier is wasted."64 He believes that "an
RC unit should be deployable within 72 hours . . . because
they will not have 30 days to mobilize and 30 days to
deploy. They will be needed immediately."65 Fishel recom-
mended establishing a thirty-consecutive-day annual training

62Ibid., pp. 22-23.

63In 1977 CPT John T. Fishel, USAR, was a mobiliza-
tion designee with the Office of the Assistant Chief of
Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and a member
of the USACGSC Consulting Faculty. He was, and still is, an
associate professor of political science at the University
of Wisconsin.

64CPT John T. Fishel, "Effective Use of the Reserve

65Ibid., p. 60.
period with most, and in some cases all, inactive duty training eliminated. Adoption of this concept would result in a leaner, more cost-effective, less expensive and better trained Reserve Component.66

The General Research Corporation also reviewed the training concepts of the Israeli Reserve and concluded that "if the test of a reserve system's effectiveness is the ability to mobilize rapidly and perform well on the battlefield, then the Israeli system has proved effective."67 Their report noted that, like the U.S. Reserve Component, the Israeli Reserves conduct training for about forty days a year and identified two major differences in training philosophies. One difference is that training is conducted during forty consecutive days a year rather than being divided among twelve months. The other difference is the full participation of the active Israeli Army in planning and conducting Reserve Component training, rather than the complex system employed by U.S. Reserve Components.68

Major Sherwood Ash, in his study of the training aspects of Reserve Component readiness, concludes that the Israeli system is more effective than the U.S. system because of the better use of available training time and

66Ibid., pp. 61-62.


68Ibid., p. 12.
higher quality training assistance. He suggests that Reserve Component units that are part of the early deploying Total Force deserve more than an improvement on a 1960's system; they deserve a system such as the Israeli Reserve system, where their readiness would be assured. He concludes that to significantly improve readiness, current laws must be changed to increase the training time available for early deploying units.69

Captain Roy Werner70 questioned the viability of Reserve Component deployment schedules in a 1977 Military Review article. He argued that Reserve Component units, both combat and "surge" logistical units, should be ready for deployment within thirty days of mobilization and suggested that the elimination of some nonpriority Reserve Component units may be desirable, "... especially those with job specialties for which civilian skills are easily transferable. The savings from the elimination of these unnecessary units then could be directed to ... tailoring training of other Reserve units to specific missions."71


70In 1977 CPT Roy Werner, USAR, was a Legislative Assistant to Senator John Glenn. He had served with the White House Conference on Youth, the Oxford University Strategic Studies Group and the Federal Energy Administration. He was a Ph.B. from Oxford and was a Ph.D. candidate.

Colonel Irving Heymont\textsuperscript{72} also questioned the ability of Reserve Components to be ready on time in a March 1978 \textit{Army} article. He began his analysis with a review of the assumptions upon which the Total Force had been developed and pointed out that:

The Army system assumes that a unit composed entirely of reservists--the preponderance of which have no active-service experience in units--can on its own achieve and maintain company-level proficiency in peacetime by annual training, equivalent to 39 days a year and with only two continuous weeks, and with an annual turbulence rate of 25 percent or more. No other country makes such an assumption.\textsuperscript{73}

Heymont agrees that reserve forces could achieve a much higher level of pre-mobilization training if additional training time were available. He, too, proposed the elimination of selected reserve units, based on unsatisfactory strength or proficiency levels, to provide the necessary resources to support the additional training. Heymont concluded that, based on the 1978 threat, the Reserve Component training system was inadequate to permit the

\textsuperscript{72}In 1978 COL Heymont, USA retired, was Director, Resource and Policy Analysis Department, Operations Analysis Division of the General Research Corporation. He and his associates also conducted an analysis of mobilization readiness discussed below.

\textsuperscript{73}COL Irving Heymont, "Can Reserve Units Be Ready On Time?," \textit{Army}, (March 1978), p. 24.
Reserve Components to meet their readiness and deployment missions.74

Fishel again addressed the question of readiness in a November 1978 Military Review article. He identified several wartime scenarios and the Reserve Component roles and missions associated with each. Fishel noted that U.S. credibility, in every case, depended on the readiness posture of the Reserve Components and that, while training had improved over the past several years, problems remain. He postulated that the Army had set its minimum readiness goal too low and, with proper use of available pre-mobilization training times, higher readiness could be achieved.75

"Come As You Are" 1979-1980

Civilized governments ought always to be ready to carry on a war in a short time-they should never be found unprepared.

Jomini: Precis del'Art de la Guerre, 1838

Sharrett76 believes that, while increased reliance on the Reserve Components clearly equates to a need for high

74 Ibid., pp. 25-26.


76 In 1979 Major Thomas B. Sharratt was serving as an Army advisor to the Iowa National Guard. He earned a
readiness, they are not capable of accomplishing the mission assigned to them in contingency war plans. In a June 1979 article for *Army*, he wrote that "there is no doubt that time is the most significant limiting factor in determining how much training can be accomplished in a reserve unit." In examining training time, Sharrat notes that, rather than the commonly recognized thirty-eight days a year in which to train, because of many distractions, a unit commander may be able to devote only nineteen days to actual MOS or unit training. He wrote that "today's Reserve Components are required to operate and maintain vastly increased numbers of complicated equipment within the same time constraints that applied 50 years ago." Sharrat also identifies mid-weekend of annual training, personnel action, preparation for inspections, medical requirements, travel time, and state-assigned mission training as time consuming distractors. To meet all of these distracting demands and still conduct unit mission training requires that unit members donate hundreds of manhours in an unpaid status annually. To the time problem, he proposes two possible solutions. One would be to increase

Master's degree from Purdue University and has served in Vietnam and Europe.

77MAJ Thomas B. Sharratt, "Full Partners at Last, But How Ready?", *Army* (June 1979), p. 43.

78Ibid.
the amount of paid preparation and training time and the other would be to increase the number of full-time technicians to support unit training.79

The Association of the United States Army (AUSA) also recognizes the many distractions to meaningful training and believes that the keys to solving these kinds of problems are innovation and flexibility.

Guardsmen and Reservists can devote only a fraction of the time to the military side of their lives that active soldiers devote to their fulltime profession. Consequently, the need for flexibility assumes real significance in such commonplace areas as administrative requirements and training that's not mission related to the Guard/Reserve environment.80

In his Total Force study, LTC Leon compared the time devoted to Reserve Component training and highlighted the great disparity between the Active and Reserve Components. He noted that the Reserve Components train for 280 hours per year. This time is made up of 192 hours of unit training assemblies (UTA's) and an average of eighty-eight hours of annual training devoted to mission training. This equates to approximately seven weeks a year devoted to training, compared to approximately forty-five weeks a year available to

79 Ibid., pp. 43-44.

80 A Status Report on the Guard and Reserve, p. iii.
the Active Component. The Reserve Components are not the mirror image of the Active force.

Colonel John Dew Pelton also questioned whether a Reserve Component unit could realistically achieve readiness in just 192 hours of training per year. In his 1975 essay, he presented the results of a unit commanders' opinions survey he had conducted and concluded that an additional ninety-six hours of paid drill time per year would be required to achieve unit readiness objectives.

For a Reserve Component unit, IDT is a series of starts and stops wherein a new beginning is made each time. Continuity is hard to achieve because many of the lessons learned in a previous period have to be reviewed to insure understanding. Time is used in nontraining activities. Each time a soldier has to make the transition from civilian to soldier and too many times, he brings his problems with him from home.

Like Sharrat, Dew Pelton attempted to identify the unit mission training detractors and said that "it becomes evident that 192 hours per year is not an adequate amount of time if we sum up the distracted times gathered from the

81 Leon, "Total Force Concept," p. 5.
82 COL John Dew Pelton, "Reserve Component Combat Readiness in 192 Hours Per Year?," U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 17 October 1975, pp. 19-29.
83 Ibid., p. 33.
unit opinion survey . . . . A total of 83 hours are devoted to distractors."84 As Fishel had suggested earlier, Dew Pelton made the point that, while it is apparent that more time is obviously required, he didn't believe that Congress would appropriate more money to support it unless Reserve Component commanders make better use of their units' training time through good training management.85

In late 1979, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs published a report that reviewed both the Guard and Reserve and emphasized the reliance being placed on the Reserve Components.

The key element of the ability of NATO to react to a major non-nuclear attack by the Warsaw Pact with little or no warning is the ability to move large numbers of military forces from North America to Europe in the early days of the crises. Many of the forces that must move . . . starting at M-day are in the National Guard and Reserve Force . . . .86

The U.S. response to this Warsaw Pact challenge must be " . . . come as you are employment of Active and Reserve Forces. There will be little or no time available for post-mobilization Manning, equipping, and training of the Reserve

84Ibid., p. 10.

85Ibid., pp. 19-20.

This report emphasized the need for a higher peacetime readiness for the Reserve Components than ever before and predicted that "by the mid 1980's all Reserve Components will be scheduled for employment or deployment in the first four months after M-day." The report also noted that, with little or no post-mobilization training time possible, every effort must be made to provide individuals in the most demanding skills more than just forty-eight assemblies per year.

High readiness ratings have been achieved by units in which personnel are authorized more than 48 training assemblies per year. Authorization of additional training assemblies (ATA) would reduce or eliminate post-mobilization training and thus permit employment of mobilized Reserve Forces in the early, critical days of a major war.

This was not the first mention of the need for "come as you are" readiness. As early as 1976, General Bernard Rogers said, "we must make an assumption here that the next

87Ibid.
88Ibid.
89Ibid., p. 23.
90In 1976 General Rogers was the FORSCOM Commander. He became the Commander-in-Chief of European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe in 1979 after serving as Army Chief of Staff. He is a U.S. Military Academy graduate and attended Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar, receiving a Bachelor of Arts and Master of Arts in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics.
war is going to be long enough to use most of the reserve components sic that we have in the structure . . . . It's going to be a 'come as you are' war. You're going to have to come with the equipment you've got . . . ."91

Major General Emmett Walker92 emphasized the need for "come as you are readiness" in an article in the October 1979 edition of Army magazine.

The term 'come as you are' has very real meaning. Shorter schedules will effectively preclude receiving filler personnel, additional equipment, or supplementary training before going overseas. The transition from unmobilized Guardsperson to deployed soldier ready for combat may be accelerated to the point where the entire process will require less than a week.93

Countering the Rogers/Walker position on the ability of Reserve Component units to respond to a "come as you are" war, the 1980 AUSA report on the status of the Guard and


92In 1979 MG Emmett H. Walker, Jr. was Director, ARNG, National Guard Bureau in Washington, D.C. Enlisted in the Army in 1942 and commissioned from OCS in 1944, he served in Europe before separating from active duty in 1946. He joined the ARNG in 1951, served with the Far East Command during the Korean War and returned to ARNG status. He returned to active duty in 1976 as Deputy Director and was appointed Director in 1978. In 1982 he was appointed Chief, National Guard Bureau.

Reserve emphasized that the Reserve Component is not the mirror image of the Active Component.

Guard and Reserve units are not active units. They have their own dynamics rooted in their civilian community and based on such factors as the limited time they can spend on military matters. Shortages in training sites, equipment, personnel, and above all, time, inhibit their operations and make it necessary to use shortcuts and expedients where possible.94

A 1978 Congressional Budget Office study observed that "the reserves have problems . . . as a result, the Army reserves [Reserve Components] today might not be ready to meet the increasing demands placed upon them."95 The report noted that recent trends of thought about the nature of future conflict, coupled with increased strength in Warsaw Pact forces, have stressed earlier use of the Reserve Component. After considering constraints to higher readiness, the report postulated several alternative roles for the Reserve Components.

Different notions about these criteria--costs, the nature of a war the reserves [Reserve Components] might

94A Status Report on the Guard and Reserves, pp. 28-29.

help fight, and particularly, their ability to be effective in such a war—suggest three broad choices of role of the Army reserves Reserve Components. The United States could seek a highly ready reserve Reserve Component capable of assisting in all phases of a war. The nation could emphasize the reserves [sic] intended for use early in a war. Or, the reserves [sic] could be limited to acting as a hedge against a long war.96

Associated costs of all three options were identified and the report noted that "on a man-for-man basis, Army reserves Reserve Components are about five times as cheap as active forces. Even with all the readiness improvements discussed in this study, the reserves sic are unlikely to be more costly on a man-for-man basis."

The Debate Continues 1981-1983

Be Prepared
Motto, Boy Scouts

The trend in extending new missions, more training and planning requirements, and more reliance on the Reserve Components has accelerated in the past three years. The remainder of this chapter will briefly review the literature of the 1980's to survey the positions and concerns of key Reserve Component leaders and policymakers in regard to limited training time.

96 Ibid., p. xii.

97 Ibid., p. x.
General Robert Shoemaker, in noting the dramatic changes in the role of the Reserve Components in the 1970's and the increased reliance being placed on the Reserve Components for immediate response, stated "... we're not as ready as we should be and would like to be. Even though that has always been true in peacetime the state of the modern world requires that our preparedness reach and be sustained at much higher levels." General Shoemaker was very aware of the total disappearance of lagtime. He often spoke of the luxury of a systematic and time consuming buildup of Reserve Components that the U.S. used to enjoy. He would remind the Forces Command staff that any lagtime has been exhausted by modern technology.

The National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) has repeatedly taken the position that the "Guard and Reserve forces must be prepared and maintained in a state of readiness for immediate use should the need arise." To attain this high state of readiness, NGAUS

General Robert M. Shoemaker was the Commander of U.S. Army Forces Command in 1981 and had the responsibility for setting training standards for the Reserve Component. Commissioned Infantry upon graduation from the U.S. Military Academy in 1946, he served a distinguished career until his retirement in 1982.


I served on the FORSCOM staff under General Shoemaker from 1979 until his retirement in 1982.

has taken the position that "the National Guard should be authorized and funded for additional training. Two weeks of annual training may not suffice." 102

Major General Herbert Temple 103 has recently begun an effort to envigorate peacetime training for National Guard units. He has continually spoken out on the "myth" of extensive post-mobilization time.

One of the great myths of the Army National Guard is an expectation that there will be time at the mobilization station to complete training to be combat ready . . . . From hereon, the drive will be that the annual training period will be as close to the post-mobilization period as possible and it will be reflective of the early battles that we'll have to fight. That means a totally different approach to how we conduct annual training. 104

He has also undertaken an effort to elevate the level of peacetime training in the National Guard above company level and is now stressing both battalion/brigade-level training and units capable of conducting combined arms operations. 105


103 MG Herbert R. Temple became Director of the ARNG in 1982 after four years as Deputy Director. Enlisted in the ARNG in 1947, he saw combat in Korea as an NCO. He received a direct commission in the ARNG in 1952 and, for the next 22 years, held command and staff positions at all levels. MG Temple holds a Master's degree from Shippensburg State College, PA.


This concept of higher level and combined arms training in a pre-mobilization environment was the subject of a 1980 General Research Corporation study which found that:

The last major factor militating against the rapid availability of combat-ready Reserve Component units is organizing these units at too high a level. Large formations such as divisions and brigades require more training time and experienced leadership than smaller formations such as battalions.106

Despite this caution and the limited training time available in which to conduct higher level and combined arms training, the current emphasis remains on high-level pre-mobilization training. MG Temple again emphasized "go to war" readiness and stated that:

The demands of the present day threat have erased the comfortable cushion of time that once served to afford Guardsmen months to prepare for the rigors of battle. Mobilization will not allow for months or weeks of preparation. Guardsmen must be ready today!107

In stressing both higher-level training and maximum use of limited time, MG Temple told attendees at a recent NGAUS convention that the National Guard will be required to assume more missions; therefore, it must be qualified to do so with


107 Temple, "National Guard Must Be Ready," p. 118.
adequate training. "He also urged the states to use inac-
tive duty training periods for individual weapons qualifica-
tion and the annual training periods for combined arms
training."

National Guard Bureau Chief LTG Emmett Walker

strengthened BG Temple's arguments with a recent letter to
state adjutants general in which he stated:

More Reserve Component units than ever before have been
assigned high priority roles . . . . Our goal must
naturally be to field a combat ready force. We cannot
let these changes in mission and organization deter us
from our ultimate aim of bringing NG units up to unpre-
cededent readiness levels.

In recent testimony before the Senate Subcommittee
on Preparedness, Brigadier General Randall Peat pointed
out that:

The most demanding requirement placed on Guard and
Reserve Forces is the ability to participate in a major
conventional war in Europe that begins with little or no
warning and is of such high intensity that many Guard
and Reserve Forces must be capable of deployment and
employment within the first 30 days.

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108 "To Ready the Force with Increased Training,"
National Guard 37 (February, 1983): 83.

109 "Be Ready Despite Changes, Says Guard Chief,"
Larry Carney, Army Times, 29 August 1983, p. 31.

110 BG Peat, USAF, is Assistant Deputy Director,
Force Development and Strategic Plans, Plans and Policy
Directorate, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

111 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed
In his testimony before the same Subcommittee, Dr. Edward Philbin emphasized the critical reliance now being placed on the Reserve Components by the Department of Defense. "Within the first 30 days . . . there are substantial percentages of Reserve Components which will be deployed right up front, and I might add that in the Rapid Deployment Force there are quite a number . . . which are intended to go within hours."112 Following Dr. Philbin's testimony, General Shoemaker stated the case for pre-mobilization training as plainly as it could ever be said.

The Total Force has resulted in the National Guard and the Army Reserve assuming roles in the current Army strategy which are vastly different and far more important that what was the case 10 years ago. Many units will be performing wartime missions within hours and days of their callup. None will have the luxury of months of post-mobilization preparations in the tradition of our historical experience.113


112 Status of the Guard and Reserve, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Preparedness, pp. 21-22.

113 Ibid., p. 46.
General John Vessey, current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Vessey began his long military career as a sixteen-year old enlistee in the Minnesota National Guard and has not forgotten about Reserve Component readiness and pre-mobilization training.

My outfit in World War II was one of the first to fight, but it has been on active duty for a long time. That's not going to be the case for the next war... We can expect Army Reserve Component units in the very first days to round out our deployed forces... It means that the Reserve Components have to be readier than they have ever been.

Summary

The real objective of having an Army is to provide for war.

Elihu Root: Annual Report of the Secretary of War, December 1899

In reviewing the pertinent literature, this study has revealed that all sources reviewed and cited have identified limited pre-mobilization training time as one of the

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114 General John W. Vessey, Jr., Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff, has served in the U.S. Army for over 40 years. He was a 1st SGT when he received a battlefield commission in 1944 at Anzio beachhead, Italy. His recent assignments include Commander of all forces in South Korea and Army Vice Chief of Staff.

critical aspects of Reserve Component unit readiness. Several critical facts and two general positions have emerged in regard to the continuing problem of limited pre-mobilization training time. The facts include:

- The Congressional intent behind passage of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 was for an immediately available Reserve Component that would be fully deployable and ready to fight upon mobilization.
- Adequate training time available in pre-mobilization has been of concern to Congress since 1947.
- Department of Defense war planners have gradually increased their reliance upon the Reserve Component and now expect a significant number of units to deploy with no post-mobilization training.
- Department of Defense policymakers and Army Commanders are cognizant of the shortage of time but insist that, despite this handicap, the Reserve Component must be ready.

Among all the analysts and authors who have examined this subject, two general positions have emerged:

- One school believes that with the use of better management techniques, reorganization of peacetime training schedule concepts, and/or proper use of training time through reduction of distractors and prioritization of training tasks, the Reserve
Components can be ready in time to meet mobilization and deployment schedules.

- The second school contends that mobilization and deployment schedules will be met only if Reserve Component units are provided with additional pre-mobilization training time, either in accordance with a deployment priorities or based on degree of difficulty of unit mission.

Today's Reserve Components, as part of the Total Force, are being relied upon as Congress had originally intended. Dr. Philbin placed them in the proper context when he said that:

Reserve Components are no longer forces in reserve. They are adjunct forces, fully professional, totally integrated, and completely involved. They are part of the daily operations of the Department of Defense, a crucial component of our deterrent posture, and are as dedicated as their Active Component colleagues and largely indistinguishable from them professionally speaking.\(^{116}\)

With the high reliance placed on the Reserve Components and no change in the limited time available for training, several programs have been developed for over the past decade to enhance pre-mobilization training and hence, Reserve Component readiness. The following chapter will trace this evolution in training and briefly examine these

\(^{116}\)Status of the Guard and Reserves, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Preparedness, p. 10.
training programs, as well as changes in training requirements to distill their individual, collective, and possibly synergistic impact on Reserve Component training and wartime mission training accomplishment.

All components would benefit from fresh looks at some of their most recalcitrant problems. Total conformity with the norms established for the parent service is not always essential. If ways can be developed of doing things that better satisfy Guard/Reserve needs without seriously impinging on Army tradition and Army practice, it should be given consideration.\footnote{A Status Report on the Guard and Reserve, p. 36.}
CHAPTER 3

Coming of Age Under CAPSTONE

In war, only what is simple can succeed.
Paul von Hindenburg, 1847-1934

If deterrence were to fail, the Reserve Components would be called upon to provide the necessary depth of military capability to win the next war. The very existence of well trained and deployable Reserve Components serves as a deterrent against overt acts of aggression. Following adoption of the Total Force Policy in 1973, efforts were initiated to develop training programs that would enable the Reserve Components to meet their enhanced mobilization and contingency mission requirements. The individual and separate training programs slowly evolved as the demands for Reserve Component readiness continued to increase until, in 1979, Forces Command (FORSCOM) initiated an effort to relate and unify these programs. This was done to provide a Total Force management philosophy that would optimize Reserve Component training and resulted in the Army CAPSTONE Program.

This chapter will examine those Reserve Component training programs designed to train the individual soldier, unit training programs designed to increase unit readiness, and the evolution of CAPSTONE. The unifying theme throughout these examinations will be training time, in terms of both quality and quantity, dedicated to accomplishing each training program requirement.
Individual Reserve Component Training Programs

In the final choice a soldier's pack is not so heavy a burden as a prisoner's chains.
Dwight D. Eisenhower: Inaugural Address, 20 January 1953

Reserve Component soldiers, like their Active Component counterparts, receive Basic and Advanced Individual Training on an active duty status in active Army Training Centers. The training programs that are examined in this section are those that are intended to teach new skills, provide intense refresher training for key personnel, and recurring training such as Soldier's Manual tasks and weapons qualifications requirements.

Reserve Component enlisted personnel are subject to skills qualification tests (SQT) that consist of both written and hands on components. While still not formally linked to the Enlisted Personnel Management System (EPMS), the preparation time for the written MOS-specific test, the common task test, and the hands on component is substantial. Skill qualification testing was expanded in FY 83 to include all enlisted National Guard personnel for the first time. This has led to a conscious effort to conduct all individual training during inactive-duty training.¹ Problems remain, however, with application of the SQT to the Reserve Components since many personnel have never worked on the

¹MG Herbert Temple, "National Guard Must Be Ready" Army, October 1983, p. 122.
equipment that is tested in the written portion of the SQT.

A recent Missile and Munitions Center survey of Reserve Component personnel found that

The majority of the CMF 55 personnel were apprehensive about the many questions in the SQT pertaining to the various low density missile systems (i.e., Lance, Pershing, Hawk, and Nike). The soldiers in most units never worked with these missile systems and it is not likely that they will ever have an opportunity to do so in the near future.²

In addition to SQT preparation, training the trainers in the Battalion Training Management System (BTMS) is time consuming. BTMS is the Army's standardization model for training and training management in units. BTMS training began for Reserve Component units in early 1979 and has been accomplished primarily during regularly scheduled inactive-duty training periods. Personnel in command, leadership, and training management positions should be qualified in, understand, and apply the Army's training management principles. This BTMS requirement means that newly assigned or promoted soldiers in any of these positions must attend the appropriate level BTMS workshop as soon as possible either before or after assumption of the new responsibilities.

BTMS training materials, consisting of a coordinated group of four workshops, are available to train leaders at all levels on the latest concepts for training and training management and how best to apply these concepts and techniques to their units. The workshops are designed to be administered to the entire leadership of a Reserve Component battalion or company during a sixteen-hour period. Recognizing that time is the critical training resource, FORSCOM encourages Reserve Component units to use the principles of BTMS to gain full benefit from their limited time.

FORSCOM training guidance directs Reserve Component unit commanders to select the critical soldiers' manual tasks and prioritize them based upon the criticality of the tasks to the unit's preparation for carrying out its wartime mission. Based on limited training time, the tasks not required by the unit's wartime mission will become post-mobilization requirements. This FORSCOM policy recognizes and accepts the risk that Reserve Component personnel may not be qualified to perform some lower priority tasks.

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because they have concentrated on the high priority ones.\textsuperscript{5}

There are other required individual tasks, however, which take up additional scarce training time. Each individual must qualify annually, or biennially depending on facilities, available ammunition, and time, with individual and crew served weapons.\textsuperscript{6} Whenever possible this individual weapons qualification must be conducted during inactive-duty training.\textsuperscript{7} National Guard units assigned civil disturbance control missions by their State adjutant general, and Army Reserve units that have civil disturbance control operations as part of their unit mission, must conduct this type of training during inactive-duty training, or during additional training assemblies. Reserve Component soldiers are no longer exempt from nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) training. Individuals must demonstrate proficiency in soldier's manual NBC tasks as well as the common tasks SQT annually. Becoming proficient in these tasks also takes up some of the limited time available to the Reserve Components.

Preparation and training for mobilization and deployment is a continuous process and must be integrated into the training schedule throughout the training year. Such activities as a review of alert procedures; an update of


\textsuperscript{6}Ibid., p. B-1.

\textsuperscript{7}Ibid.
mobilization plans; COMPASS data; personnel and finance records; and equipment shipping procedures must be conducted to insure that the unit is prepared to conduct mobilization and deployment. These activities can be time consuming for key individuals in a unit.\textsuperscript{8}

As Leon pointed out in his Total Force study, the Reserve Components have other problems in conducting individual hands-on training. "In many cases, the equipment is located at a weekend training site which is usually a two or three hour drive from the unit. Consequently, a considerable amount of time is spent in armory training."\textsuperscript{9} To counter this problem, more resources are being dedicated to the development, production, and distribution of simulators to provide more realistic armory training.

That which has been discussed so far are individual training requirements that, while time-consuming, are not dissimilar from those that must be accomplished annually by active-duty soldiers. Several individual training programs have been developed that are Reserve Component unique and, in most cases, increase the training time requirements for Reserve Component individuals. One of the newest and most popular of these programs is the Key Personnel Upgrade Program (KPUP).

\textsuperscript{8}Ibid., pp. 3-5, 3-6.

\textsuperscript{9}LTC Gustavo A. Leon, "Total Force Concept, Reality or Myth?," U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 21 November, 1975, p. 8.
Key Personnel Upgrade Program

This program is a National Guard training initiative designed to further develop key personnel within National Guard units through direct association during additional training periods with a counterpart Active Component officer or NCO.

Program objectives include contributing toward individual professional development, building confidence of unit key personnel, maintaining individual tactical skills through a one-on-one relationship with an Active Component counterpart, and to foster the Total Army Policy through direct association between component leaders. ¹⁰

Staff Sergeants through Colonels in the National Guard are eligible to participate and are fully integrated into the Active Component unit during the period of training. KPUP began in FY 81 and has proven to be extremely beneficial to all participants.¹¹ In fact, KPUP is now the second highest priority among the National Guard's various readiness programs according to MG Temple, Director, Army National Guard, and will continue to grow this year.¹²

In writing about this program in a recent Army article, he


¹¹Ibid., p. 1-32.

said that KPUP "... provides additional training time for commanders and key personnel to train with an active-Army counterpart in a tactical environment, allowing Guardsmen to maintain and increase their tactical skills and gain valuable practical experience." To participate, an individual must not only meet program prerequisites, but also have the time available to conduct the additional training.

NATO Counterpart and Contingency Training

The NATO Counterpart and Contingency Training (NCCT) Program is another initiative originally developed by the National Guard to permit selected individuals to visit Army headquarters and units in Germany for a period of seven to ten days to further wartime mission planning. Now expanded to include the Army Reserve, the program objectives include developing a functional rapport with Active Components in the area of operations and wartime mission planning; familiarizing selected commanders and staffs with current plans affecting the overseas area; orienting them on the terrain; and increasing the individual proficiency of Reserve Component commanders and staffs. Individuals who have participated in this training indicate that they have gained

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13MG Temple, "National Guard Must Be Ready," p. 126.

a real familiarization with the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) logistical, maintenance, communications, transportation, and host-country support plans and operations in the geographic areas in which their units are scheduled to deploy in wartime.¹⁵

The NCCT Program is conducted twice a year with each group consisting of approximately fifty Reserve Component leaders. Each participant must meet certain selection criteria and, as in KPUP, have the time available to undertake the additional training.

Readiness Training Program

The Readiness Training (REDTRAIN) Program was designed to improve the proficiency of Active and Reserve Component tactical intelligence personnel as well as contributing to the satisfaction of Army intelligence requirements. REDTRAIN keys on the training needs of Reserve Component individuals. There is a published handbook listing REDTRAIN opportunities; however, if those listed don't meet an individual's training requirements, a unit commander may request a REDTRAIN opportunity tailored for an individual's needs.¹⁶

¹⁵Interviews with MG Temple and NCCT participants, Heidelberg, Federal Republic of Germany, 8 May 1983.

¹⁶Interview with Dr. William Dempsey, REDTRAIN Program Manager, Headquarters, FORSCOM, Ft McPherson, Ga., 4 April 1983.
There are three different types of REDTRAIN available to Reserve Component individuals. Specialized operational training is conducted by proponent agencies or activities for specific technical or specialized skills. These agencies and activities are usually at the national intelligence level and the REDTRAIN opportunity is designed to meet specific training needs of Reserve Component units. The second type of REDTRAIN is called live-environment training and is conducted by tactical intelligence personnel against live (real) targets. Reserve Component personnel are placed in a target-rich environment or in operational training in support of real-world requirements. In-unit training is the last category of REDTRAIN. This is conducted at the individual's home station by tactical intelligence personnel using real-world intelligence and focused on an assigned tactical objective, usually associated with the Reserve Component unit's wartime mission.\(^\text{17}\)

REDTRAIN provides necessary tactical intelligence training for Reserve Component personnel who can afford to devote the time for program participation. REDTRAIN opportunities are available world-wide and may last up to six months. Like the other individual training programs, participation in REDTRAIN requires the time to devote to additional training.

Captains to Europe

The Captains to Europe Program is another program developed by the National Guard to give selected captains the opportunity to serve twenty to thirty month tours of active duty in Germany. In addition to providing valuable overseas active duty experience, the program "... helps the Army fill junior officer needs overseas. According to MG Temple, 120 Guard captains from 40 states are serving in Europe. ..."¹⁸ The National Guard Bureau is attempting to expand this program into Korea and Panama, but has been having difficulty in getting qualified volunteers. The problem is again one of available time. As MG Temple recently pointed out: "Men and women, who would, because of their personal intellectual qualities, be selected to lead in government and industry in executive roles, will also be leaders in the Army National Guard."¹⁹ The converse is also true. Men and women who would be leaders in the Reserve Components have also become leaders in government and industry and can often not afford the extra time that would be required to take advantage of these excellent and professionally rewarding training opportunities.


¹⁹MG Temple, "National Guard Must Be Ready," p. 118.
Officer/NCO Development

Reserve Component personnel have the same opportunities for professional development as do their active-duty counterparts. The formal school systems, from the Officer and NCO basic courses to the Senior Service College level, are open to Reserve Component personnel for resident and/or correspondence attendance.

In addition to the active and Army Reserve school systems, National Guard and Army Reserve personnel have the opportunity to attend State schools to improve their professional education. State Military Academies run Officer Candidate Schools and NCO courses designed to fit into the IDT/AT schedule whenever possible.

One of the major problems in attending a professional school is obtaining time away from full-time employment. Recognizing this time limitation, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), in coordination with FORSCOM and the National Guard Bureau, established shortened professional courses to assist those Reserve Component personnel who are unable to attend the regular long courses. Officer Basic, Officer Advanced, and Command and General Staff College (CGSC) all have shortened Reserve Component courses. A current major problem, however, is the new nine-

\[20\] State OCS programs consist of four phases with the first three phases conducted by the state. Phase four is the basic officers' course attended in residence at active Army service schools.
week phase II, Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS³) resident course which will not be shortened to facilitate Reserve Component attendance. Eventually, CAS³ completion will become a prerequisite for CGSC selection and attendance, thereby requiring all Reserve Component Officers to devote an additional nine weeks to active duty training to continue their professional development.

Statistics indicate that time is generally not available to the Reserve Component soldier to attend resident courses. Even though resident courses represent the quickest means of becoming professionally qualified, when available, the most preferred method of completing formal course instruction seems to be by correspondence.²¹

Individual Training Summary

The individual training requirements discussed here are just representative examples of a wide variety of requirements and programs confronting the individual Reserve Component soldier. During the training year, Reserve Component personnel are challenged to accomplish all of their individual training requirements, as well as take advantage of the numerous training opportunities offered by various professional development and special training programs, while maintaining full-time employment in the

²¹Army National Guard 83 Management Book, pp. 3-5 to 3-58.
civilian sector. A recent AUSA report highlighted this challenge and pointed out that

... the Guard and Reserve are confronted by the same need as the Active Component for flexibility—in training practice and in thinking. The Reserve Components cannot, and need not, be fitted precisely into the same mold as the Active Forces in every respect of their military existence.22

Even more challenging than meeting the requirements for individual training is the challenge posed by unit training requirements.

**Unit (collective) Training Programs**

There is nothing so likely to produce peace as to be well prepared to meet an enemy.

*George Washington: Letter to Ellridge Gerry, 29 January 1780.*

As the Reserve Components assume responsibility for more contingency missions formerly performed by the Active Component, concern has increased over their ability to perform these missions with little or no post-mobilization training. Concurrent with the increased Reserve Component role in support of national objectives, new unit training opportunities are being developed to better prepare the Reserve Components for their wartime mission. General

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In the next several years, a greater number of reserve component units, divisional and non-divisional, will round out active-Army units. To meet this challenge, intensive management will be necessary. A program geared specifically toward improving training readiness of round-out maneuver units is the round-out rotation program at the National Training Center (NTC), Ft Irwin, Calif.

In addition to round-out and an NTC rotation program, numerous other programs such as the Partnership, Overseas Deployment Training, and Joint Training Exercise programs have been developed to improve Reserve Component unit readiness. These programs, among others, will be examined in this section to provide the background for the eventual development of the Army CAPSTONE program. In briefly examining these unit training programs, particular attention will be paid to the training prerequisites for Reserve Component unit participation in, and the time that must be devoted to actual participation in, these programs. Before these special programs are reviewed, however, the unit

23 General Richard E. Cavazos assumed command of FORSCOM in March 1982 after almost five years as a division and corps commander. A veteran of infantry combat in both Korea and Vietnam, he received a commission from ROTC in 1951. General Cavazos commanded the 9th Infantry Division and Ft Lewis, Wa. from 1977 to 1980 and commanded III Corps and Ft Hood, Tx. during 1980 to 1982.

24 General Richard E. Cavazos, "Readiness Goal is Ability to Deploy on Short Notice," Army, October 1983, pp. 41-42.
annual training requirements prescribed by FORSCOM and applicable to all Reserve Component units must be examined to ascertain the annual training burden imposed on the Reserve Components.

The Reserve Component training philosophy is promulgated in FORSCOM Regulation 350-2, Reserve Component (U.S. Army) Training, which emphasizes that "training is the central and primary task of military units in peacetime. There are no good units without good training programs . . . . There is no doubt--Good Training Comes First." Specific training objectives are also provided and become the driving force in establishing pre-mobilization training programs.

Specific training objectives for RC units are as follows:

(1) Deployable units - Be prepared to successfully execute assigned wartime missions by the earliest Date Required to Load (DRL). This is normally the Sea Date Required to Load (SDRL) except for units deploying solely by air, in which case Air Date Required to Load (ADRL) will be used. A unit with a SDRL of D+10 must have all mission essential training requiring equipment by D+10. Plan to conduct other training and administrative processing between SDRL and ADRL.

   (a) Uncommitted deployable units - Be prepared to meet an assumed earliest DRL of D+60.

   (b) Deployable units with an initial installation support mission - Be prepared to assume the installation support mission upon arrival at the mobilization station/site, and be prepared to execute assigned wartime mission by their earliest DRL.

(2) Nondeployable units - Be prepared to execute support or training base missions upon arrival at the mobilization station/site.26


26 Ibid., pp. 1-3, 1-4.
The implications of this guidance, specifically pre-DRL training in relation to the training and equipment requirements in a post-mobilization environment, will be examined in Chapter Four below.

Unit level pre-mobilization training is receiving more emphasis than ever before. Colonel John R. Gereski, Chief of the Army Organization and Training Division, National Guard Bureau, recently addressed the National Guard Association Convention and said: "collective training at the company level and staff training at the battalion, brigade, and division levels were of the utmost importance this fiscal year 1983." This emphasis can also be seen in the minimum exercise frequency guidelines published in FORSCOM Regulation 350-4, Training Under CAPSTONE.

Minimum RC Exercise Frequency

(1) CS/CSS HHC/HHD - annual FCPX in a field environment, 24 hours duration, minimum of one displacement.
(2) Brigades/Battalions - annual FCPX in tactical field environment. Participation in higher level CPX/FTX can satisfy this requirement.
(3) Divisions - annual CPX.
(4) Corps Level/Echelons above Corps Commands - Biennial CPX.²⁸


Additional guidance for combat units for the conduct of annual unit training in a CPX/FTX environment is contained in the revised FORSCOM Regulation 350-2. The National Guard Bureau also provides guidance for staff headquarters training.

a. Staff Headquarters (battalion, group, brigade, division) should participate in a Command Post Exercise (CPX) to coordinate and train on war plans. In the past, this was not always possible since staff sections had to attend annual training with their units.
b. Staff Headquarters training should provide commanders and their staffs:
   (1) Opportunity to train on war plans developed with CAPSTONE headquarters, CONUS or overseas.
   (2) Provide the real go-to-war environment for mobilization and deployment readiness.
   (3) Expose personnel to the terrain, host national support, POMCUS procedures, and deployment procedures.29

This was not always possible in the past because of time and budget constraints. Today, however, funds are available to support additional time to accomplish this training. It is left up to the individual commander or staff member to make the time available to take advantage of this opportunity.

Reserve Component logistical control headquarters are required to participate in a special training program whenever possible. The Combat Service Support Tactical Readiness (COSSTAR) Training Program is a concept whereby major Reserve Component logistics commands participate in

realistic mission oriented training by providing logistical support to selected training sites/installations during the normal AT period. COSSTAR functions should be performed each year during annual training and should consist of planning, coordinating, and supervising logistical support at the training site.

Reserve Component units at all levels must also train for a full spectrum of NBC environments. FORSCOM Regulation 350-2 stipulates that units will:

(a) Be able to perform the unit mission(s) in an NBC environment to include:
1. Operate in MOPP4 (i.e., full protection). The desired level of proficiency is to be able to function effectively on a wartime mission/task for six continuous hours.
2. Conduct complete personnel decontamination operations.
3. Conduct partial decontamination of the unit's equipment.

c. With these objectives in mind, units will train for the full spectrum of CW chemical warfare. Every unit moving to the field should always carry all individual and unit chemical defense clothing and equipment to ensure that having and using it will become second nature for the soldier.

Like their Active Component counterparts, Reserve Components potentially nuclear capable units have difficult peacetime training objectives. Even though nuclear certification is still a post-mobilization training

30 FORSCOM Regulation 350-2, p. 3-3.
31 Ibid., pp. 3-6, 3-7.
requirement, units having both a nuclear and conventional capability must conduct nuclear pre-mobilization training. These units, and their tactical command and control headquarters, now receive nuclear training standard ratings. Potentially nuclear capable units that are part of the Intensive Management Force must train to the N-2 level, which equates to a Unit Status Report training rating of C-1.32

As a pre-mobilization unit training goal, Reserve Components should conduct an Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) external evaluation every two years.33 The ARTEP defines the unit training mission in terms of performance objectives. These can be accomplished through decentralized training using performance oriented training techniques. Performance oriented training is a

. . . method that puts the emphasis on the results rather than the teaching method. Training and appearance, lesson plan format, instructor MOI, and status reports are largely irrelevant. What is critical is to test results at the conclusion of each period of training--the achievement of the standard.34


33FORSOM Regulation 350-2, 1 October 1983, p. 2-11.

34Maj Everett R. Jenkins, "Training is Better Than Ever . . . It Had Nowhere to Go But Up," Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell, A.F.B., Al., March 1982, p. 5.
The ARTEP defines the major training tasks and pertinent Soldier's Manuals provide the supporting sub-tasks. Used together, these documents guide a unit commander in preparing the unit's yearly training program. General Berkman, Chief of The Army Reserve, stresses the need for units to use the ARTEP because "the ARTEP gives training managers a means for tailoring a training program to the specific requirements of the unit and assists unit commanders with diagnostic evaluations of training." Heymont and Muckerman reviewed Reserve Component ARTEP training and identified the major tasks as core training.

... the minimum mission-related tasks in which a unit must demonstrate proficiency in order to qualify for employment in a combat situation. As such, these training tasks are not the totality of the tasks for which a unit was designed. Rather, designated core training tasks are useful for guiding the training and establishing deployment criteria for Reserve Component units that have limited training opportunities.

35MG William R. Berkman, Chief of the Army Reserve since July 1979, was commissioned in the Reserve from ROTC in 1950. He served on active-duty in Korea from 1952 to 1954 then reverted to the Reserve. Serving in positions of increasing responsibility, he became commander of the 351st Civil Affairs Command in 1975 and retained that position until he returned to active duty for his present assignment.


With limited time in which to train, not all ARTEP tasks are accomplished during the training year. Ash noted that the ARTEP system is guided by a philosophy that decentralizes training decisions to the unit commander. This allows a commander to set his own training priorities for either individual, crew, company, or battalion level activities. "However, a RC unit has tremendous difficulty in sustaining proficiency in all training categories--individual, crew, etc. The time is simply not available." 38

As discussed in chapter two, the authorized pre-mobilization time available for training is limited to the equivalent of about thirty-eight days a year. The conduct of unit training is hampered by the need to prepare for and recover from annual training as well as the time devoted to travel to and from training and/or equipment sites. In his study of Reserve Component readiness, Colonel Pelton found that suitable training areas for tactical training are not generally within a reasonable travel time for the units. This has a great impact on the time available for training. For example, an Infantry Battalion from Buffalo assembles at its armory at 7 P.M. on Friday night, drives to Fort Drum arriving at about 1 A.M. Saturday morning, falls out on its equipment at 8 A.M. Saturday, trains until 11 P.M. Saturday. The unit

trains and prepares equipment for turn-in to the equip-
ment concentration site between 8 A.M. and 12 o'clock
noon Sunday. Then it travels back to Buffalo, arriving
at 7 P.M. Sunday. This is scheduled as a MUTA5
(minimum of 20 training hours), yet the unit must devote
12 out of 31 hours, or 38% of the time, traveling.
Other units traveling from New York City to Fort Dix
schedule a MUTA4 and spend approximately 44 to 50% of
their time traveling . . . . This severely limits the
type of realistic training that combat units must con-
duct to maintain or develop proficiency. 39

FORSOM guidance on travel time to training sites is quite
specific and stipulates that to "... gain the best
training benefit, travel time to and from training sites
must not exceed 25 percent of the UTA/MUTA." 40 Despite this
guidance, many units' training time is curtailed because of
the travel time requirements imposed on them.

That which has been reviewed so far in this section
are collective training requirements and training detractors
that are applicable to most Reserve Component units,
regardless of unit contingency missions or deployment sched-
ules. Several unit training programs, unique to the
Reserve Components, have been developed over the last decade
to strengthen and increase integration of the Reserve
Components into the Total Force and improve their readiness.
One of the first programs developed to accomplish these
objectives was the Affiliation Program.

39Col John Dew Pelton, "Reserve Component Combat
Readiness in 192 Hours Per Year?" U.S. Army War College,
Carlisle Battacks, Pa., 17 October 1975, pp. 6-7.

40FORSOM Regulation 350-2, 1 December 1983, p. 2-5.
The Affiliation Program

The Affiliation Program was originally established in 1974 to improve the readiness of twenty-six high-priority Reserve Component battalions. Since then, the program has greatly expanded but the program objectives have remained unchanged. This peacetime training program establishes a Directed Training Association (DTA) between carefully selected high priority Reserve Component units and Active Component sponsors. The Affiliation Program is fully funded, directed by Headquarters, Department of the Army, and managed by FORSCOM. Originally, there were three distinct categories of affiliation:

A. Roundout - Reserve Component units designated to raise understructured Active Component divisions to full mobilization deployment configurations.

B. Mobilization and Deployment Capability Improvement (MDCI) - Reserve Component units which are associated with a dedicated Active Component unit to improve the Reserve Component unit's capability to deploy.

C. Augmentation - Reserve Component units designated to increase the combat power of Active Component divisions and brigades above their mobilization deployment configuration.41

The program was significantly changed in late 1983 with the merging of guidance for several here-to-fore separate training programs into FORSCOM Regulation 350-4, Training Under CAPSTONE. The category of Augmentation was deleted from the Affiliation Program. The affected Reserve Component units (five brigades and one battalion) were either transferred to the Partnership program or the MDCI category of Affiliation.42

The Roundout category has received a great deal of recent attention as limitations on total Army force structure have placed more Reserve Components into this category. Ongoing Total Army Analysis (TAA) will result in more changes in the active force structure and more reliance on roundout units in the future. This increased reliance has forced some significant changes in resourcing and modernization program policies. Roundout units are now resourced in the same priority sequence as units contained in force package two of the Intensive Management Force List (IMFL). Force package two contains the NATO essential force. As force modernization actions provide new equipment to an Active Component sponsor unit, its Roundout unit will be modernized simultaneously.43


43Force Modernization Program problems will be addressed later in this section as a separate problem due to the size and complexities of the problems associated with this program.
Based on TAA, Department of the Army develops a five-year forecast of necessary Roundout initiatives that must be taken, and FORSCOM and the National Guard Bureau participate in the selection of units to fill Roundout requirements. This selection is now based on a Reserve Component unit being in the top six force packages of the IMFL. CAPSTONE relationships and geographic proximity to the proposed Active Component sponsor unit are also considered.

In his 1983 annual report to the Congress, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger\textsuperscript{44} stressed that

\begin{quote}
Our active forces continue to rely on the Reserve Components to achieve their full combat potential. Of our 19 active divisions, 10 will require roundout by reserve combat battalions and brigades to reach their full complement. In addition, a large number of service support units needed for early deployment of the active force are also in the Reserve Components . . . .

FY 84 will also witness important changes in our Reserve Component force structure. We plan to begin a two-year expansion of the Army Reserve Component Roundout Program [sic]. By year's end, all non-deployed active Army divisions (except the 82nd Airborne and 101st Air Assault Divisions) will be rounded out by reserve component units. The number of divisions with round-out by brigade-sized units will increase. We also plan
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{44}Caspar W. Weinberger was appointed Secretary of Defense in 1981. He also served as chairman of the Federal Trade Commission (1968-69), deputy director, Office of Management and Budget (OMB)(1970-72), Director, OMB (1972-73), counselor to the President (1973), and Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (1973-75). Secretary Weinberger earned his A.B. degree from Harvard, graduating magna cum laude, in 1938 and an LL.B from Harvard in 1941. He was general counsel, vice president, and then director of the Bechtel Corporation from 1975 to 1980. From 1941 to 1945 he served in the Army Infantry in grades ranging from Private to Captain.
to expand the roundout program [sic] to other combat units, as well as to combat support and combat service support units. 45

Obviously, much is expected from a Reserve Component Roundout unit, and integrated training with active parent units must become routine rather than exceptional if the concept will work when it is most needed. Unit level training for the Roundout unit becomes extremely important to insure that parent unit deployment schedules can be met on time. General Cavazos, FORSCOM Commander, noted in Army magazine that:

Increasing levels of training and evaluation program proficiency of round-out units will require continued emphasis on collective training in which active-Army and reserve components' integrated training should be a factor. The round-out unit must work as part of a team and be mission-capable. In early deploying round-out units there will be little time after mobilization to catch up, so high levels of readiness must be achieved before mobilization. 46

Is the Affiliation Program effective and does it improve unit readiness and, hence, deployability? LTC Merrill


46 MG Richard E. Cavazos, "Readiness Goal is Ability to Deploy on Short Notice," p. 42.
Burruss indicates that the objectives are being met. "The relationship affiliation has produced positive results and is one of growing mutual respect. In terms of improving Reserve readiness, it has been a resounding success." Fishel also believes that the Affiliation Program has had a positive impact on Reserve Component readiness.

The effects of the program for affiliated RC units have been positive. All are fully equipped with modern equipment. Training with the Active Army for the same mission at the same time has had a very positive impact on their Reserve Component personnel strength and general level of readiness.

LTG John Galvin, former Commander of the 24th Infantry Division, noted in a recent Army article:

47LTC Merrill B. Burruss, Jr. was the Commander of the 1st Battalion, 158th Field Artillery, Oklahoma ARNG and was affiliated with III Corps Artillery, Ft Sill, Oklahoma in 1979.


50LTG John R. Galvin was Commanding General of the 24th Infantry Division (a rapid deployment force) and Ft Stewart, Ga. A 1954 graduate of the U.S. Army Military Academy, he earned a Masters Degree at Columbia University. MG Galvin has also written several books: The Minute Men, Air Assault, and Three Men of Boston. LTG Galvin now commands VII Corps.
The realities of a concrete rapid deployment mission have erased the "us" and "them" mind-set in the 24th Infantry Division and Georgia's 48th Infantry Brigade, fostering close and continuous cooperation between the two components . . . . As we look at where we are today, we see that we have created with this relationship a matrix in which several new and vital aspects of training have grown and prospered; a shared sense of mission, a long-term interface, internalization, common standards, and a year-round dynamic.51

With one-third of the combat power in his rapid-deployment force coming from a Reserve Component Roundout brigade, MG Galvin has aggressively pursued a solid, year-round relationship with the 48th Infantry Brigade.

When the interaction between the Guard unit and the active unit approaches a daily or even weekly relationship as it has for us, the entire focus on training and mission readiness is reinforced and heightened. The continual presence of Guard officers and key NCOs during planning, coordination and execution of training tends to erase any sense of difference . . . .

A round-out relationship . . . can become a year-round, continuous dynamic in which contact between round-out unit and parent is a continuous series of events overlapping each other and taking place at several levels at once.52

Not everyone, however, is convinced that the

Affiliation Program is meeting its stated objectives.

Captain Gerald P. Nye,53 writing for the Field Artillery


53 In 1979 Captain Gerald P. Nye was assigned to Headquarters, 1st U.S. Army, Ft Meade, Md.
Journal, expressed his concern over the policy of reliance on Round-out units. "For the first time in history, the United States is planning to commit units immediately after mobilization, with no further training between call-up and introduction into combat. Historical evidence indicates that Reserve Components take almost as much time to 'whip into shape' as do entirely new units." 54 The Association of the United States Army has noted that:

The system Affiliation has limitations. Conceivably, the parent division may have to deploy to some overseas contingency without its affiliated Guard/Reserve element . . . . Its biggest advantage is that it permits the Army to maintain a force structure of the kind required in today's world, which would not be feasible if compelled to rely solely on Active personnel . . . . 55

Others are not this subtle in expressing their doubts about the ability of Roundout units to deploy with their parent units. Colonel John Stuckey, in his Army War College study project, noted that: "the roundout concept has and does call for participating RC units to deploy with their AC division. However, in actual fact the deployment plans do not so prescribe. There is no correlation between roundout


and deployment plans."  

He concluded that augmentation forces could not deploy as required.

In their study of the Affiliation Program, Samuels and Nomey concluded that

Finally, a reserve component unit has a limited amount of training time available to attain and sustain a high level of readiness . . . . Specific yearly requirements and objectives should be established . . . . that focus on preparing the affiliated unit for deployment as a combat ready unit . . . . Realistically, a mobilization time in consonance with the active sponsor division is not practical.

Captain George Olney, in a 1979 article in Infantry magazine, points out that "while an affiliated National Guard unit must meet the same training status requirements as an Active Army unit, and more, they only have 39 days a year in which to do it."  

LTC Harlan Herner, in a 1978 Military Review article, wrote that "having been involved


LTC Harlan C. Herner was the commander of the 164th Support Group, USAR, Phoenix, Arizona in 1978. A graduate of the University of Arizona, he has served as a USACGSC instructor in the USAR school program and as commander of an armor battalion.
with affiliation for three years as the commander of a Reserve
tank battalion. I have concluded that there are a
great many positive benefits to be gained from the program."60

He sounded a note of caution, however, in regard to active
parent unit expectations of the Roundout unit's ability to
meet Active Component standards.

Recently, there has been much talk about establishing
one standard for both RC and AC units. Persons who
espouse this cause must remember that there would be no
need for the Active Army if, in fact, the RC units could
accomplish in one weekend a month and two weeks of annual
training what the Active Army deals with 365 days out of
the year.61

The Affiliation Program works to the degree that the
subtle barriers to full integration of the Active and
Reserve Components are being worn away. The program imple-
ments the Total Army Concept, but serious questions per-
taining to the ability of the Reserve Components to mobilize
and deploy with their active-duty counterparts remain
unanswered.

The Active Component/Reserve Component Partnership Program

The objective of the Active Component/Reserve
Component Partnership Program is the improvement of training

60 LTC Harlan C. Herner, "A Battalion Commander Looks

61 Ibid., pp. 43-44.
readiness and deployability through the establishment of a formal mutual support training relationship between major Active and Reserve Component combat units. Partnership units are encouraged to exchange personnel and units to participate in training exercises and conferences throughout the training year. The Active Component partner is the primary source of training assistance and support of its Reserve Component partner. However, this relationship does not alter the standard responsibilities for command, control, and supervision by the peacetime chain of command. Partnership differs from earlier Active Component training support programs in two ways. First, these partnerships are planned as a long-term relationship between units and, second, the program provides for year-round training support. Partnership replaced the Active Component Support to Annual Training (ACSAT) and the annual training evaluation programs. Both were operated only during the two-week annual training period, and the unit relationships were changed annually.

This program differs from the Affiliation Program in that only high priority, early deploying units were Affiliated. The Partnership Program is designed to provide support for the remaining non-affiliated Reserve Component


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Partnerships have been developed based on geographic location of units, previous relationships, suitability and capability of units to provide support, and CAPSTONE. The program has rapidly grown until today: "all major combat units of the RC except those listed as Roundout will be in partnership with an AC sponsor." Brigadier General Ent praised the Partnership Program in a recent Military Review article as a positive step forward in the Total Army Concept. "... AC/RC Partnership is working ... The partnership is a most valuable and salutary arrangement for the One Army and for national defense." In fact, almost half of the wartime fighting strength of the Army has been improved through participation in this program.

A closely related Reserve Component training program is the Counterpart Program for National Guard attack helicopter units. The Counterpart Program goal is "to improve


64 FORSCOM Regulation 350-4, p. 3-3.

65 BG Uzal W. Ent, Pennsylvania ARNG, retired, is a senior associate with the consulting firm C.A.C.I. Inc.-Federal. An Army War College graduate, he held several positions in the ARNG culminating in his assignment as chief of staff of the 28th Infantry Division.


the combat capability of the ARNG attack helicopter units
by increasing their knowledge concerning the utilization,
capabilities, tactics, and techniques of employing the AH-1
aircraft. The intent of this program is similar to that
of the Partnership Program and provides for new equipment
training, as well as refresher/qualification training, for
aircrews and maintenance personnel.

Both training programs provide numerous oppor-
tunities for Reserve Component units/personnel to train,
exercise, and coordinate with their Active Component
partners/counterparts if the training time is available.

The Overseas Deployment Training (ODT) Program

The ODT Program was designed to provide realistic,
in-country training for Reserve Component units listed in
the IMFL. The program deploys them in peacetime to prepare
them to respond in extremely short notice to support over-
seas contingencies. ODT has grown from an FY 76 par-
ticipation of 26 units/cells (a cell is a 2-10 man planning
group, usually commander and key staff) to over 570 units/
cells participating in FY 84. In 1983 alone, over 18,000
Reserve Component personnel deployed overseas for wartime
mission planning and training.

68FORSCOM LOI, AC/RC Partnership Program, p. 5.
69ODT program statistics are shown in Table 3,
Appendix B.
Originally intended to be a reward for attaining a high readiness status, the ODT Program has matured and is now the vehicle used for conducting wartime missions planning with the CAPSTONE gaining command overseas. In 1981, the program was enlarged (concurrent with CAPSTONE Program development) to provide for ODT in the Pacific Theater with U.S. Army Active Components stationed in Japan and Korea. Selection criteria for Reserve Component participation are listed in Army Regulation 350-9, Reserve Component Overseas Deployment Training with Active Component Commands and include CAPSTONE alignments, frequency of overseas training, active forces needs, and to a very small degree, Reserve Component unit needs, and/or readiness.\footnote{U.S. Department of the Army, Regulation 350-9, Reserve Component Overseas Deployment Training with Active Component Commands, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, August 1983) pp. 2-4.}

The ODT program has had a positive impact on both the Reserve and Active Components. The mutual respect developed between the participating units of both components has become stronger with each training year. The training opportunities for Reserve Component units, especially combat service support units in the deployed theater areas, have, in most cases, been unique. They have experienced intense and demanding training and increased realism in terms of their assigned wartime mission.\footnote{U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Forces Command, Reserve Component Deployment Training with}
the RC ODT program is excellent."\textsuperscript{72}

Overseas commanders have also been enthusiastic over
the training of Reserve Components in their theaters.

General Kroesen,\textsuperscript{73} Commander of the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) in 1982, aggressively pursued an ODT Program expansion.

In my opinion, nothing contributes more to the overall
health of our Army than the mutual exposure of USAREUR
units with those that are going to reinforce them, those
we have to rely upon if we have any hope of sustaining
our capability to conduct combat operations over there . . .
I'm sure I don't need to remind you that the first
National Guard battalion is due in Germany only 10 days
after mobilization.\textsuperscript{74}

Eighth U.S. Army in Korea has also recognized their reliance
on Reserve Component units and now provides a wide spectrum
of realistic training opportunities.


\textsuperscript{73}General Frederick J. Kroesen was Commander of U.S. Army Europe and Central Army Group (NATO) from May 1979 to April 1983. A 1944 OCS graduate, he commanded a company in WWII, a battalion in the Korean War, and a brigade and division in the Vietnam conflict. In 1972, he was named commander of the 82nd Airborne Division. In 1974, he became the Deputy Commanding General, V Corps and from 1976 to 1979 he commanded FORSCOM. General Kroesen retired in 1983.

\textsuperscript{74}"The Army Guard is an Integral Part of the Active Army," National Guard 36 (January 1982): 18.
FY 82 RC training in Korea ranged in size from cell planning groups to an engineer battalion. Locations varied from training areas near the DMZ with the forward deployed infantry division to small sites scattered along the trans-Korean pipeline system. Training missions covered the spectrum from field exercise PSYOP broadcasts to 'real world' maintenance backlogs and shower house construction.\textsuperscript{75}

General Berkman has noted that the ODT program: "... constitutes some of the most effective mission-oriented training in which a Reserve unit can be engaged ... Overseas deployment training is especially valuable in improving unit readiness and testing mobilization plans."\textsuperscript{76}

With approximately 30,000 Army Reserve soldiers scheduled to participate in this program during the next five years, General Berkman has become an ardent supporter of further program expansion.

\ldots the Army Reserve must be prepared to support operation in Europe on short notice. Approximately one-fifth of the Army Reserve's units would be committed within 30 days of mobilization and some units have deployment times so short that they would move directly to their ports of embarkation when called to active duty ... Realistic foreign-area training is provided to ... these units through the reserve components overseas deployment training (ODT) program.\textsuperscript{77}


MG Temple considers the ODT Program to be a high priority program. "It's critical for Guardsmen to familiarize themselves with an area where they might fight. The overseas training program is the best way to do that."78

The ODT Program has obviously been very successful in meeting its stated objectives. Each eligible Reserve Component unit scheduled to deploy in support of overseas contingency plans can now expect to participate in ODT (as a unit or with a planning cell) to receive orientation, mission familiarization, and actual training in the overseas environment approximately once every third year. There are several notable exceptions, however, to this once every third year guideline. Several types of Reserve Component units, i.e., psychological operations, civil affairs, rear area operations centers (RAOC), etc., that are not found in the deployed active force structure may (and do) participate as often as five times annually. Reserve Component higher headquarters, i.e., Brigades, COSCOMS, TAACOMS, etc., also participate in ODT many times annually.

With these high levels of participation, the ODT program has grown quite expensive. Incremental travel costs incurred by ODT participants now account for the majority of both Army National Guard and Army Reserve travel budgets annually. Testifying before the Subcommittee of the House

78 "Fewer in NG to Train Overseas," Army Times, 14 November 1983, p. 45.
Committee on Appropriations, MG Berkman noted that five million dollars had been appropriated for Army Reserve ODT in FY 83 (the National Guard supports the ODT Program at a similar level annually) and the Army Reserve would require twenty million dollars annually to support full unit participation in ODT annually.\textsuperscript{79}

The continued high level of participation by many units in the ODT Program has led to another significant problem. Interviews and discussions with hundreds of ODT participants during the 1981-1983 time period indicate a developing reluctance by lower and middle grade level Reserve Component personnel to continue to support this program (no matter how important and beneficial) if they would be required to deploy overseas on additional duty training status too often.\textsuperscript{80} Family and civilian employment problems have begun to develop for those key individuals who have participated in ODT "too often". The question of maximum frequency of program participation depends on an


\textsuperscript{80}As the ODT Program Manager, I attended all pre-camp conferences, ODT coordination conferences, JTX planning conferences, and CAPSTONE planning conferences world-wide. I also visited Reserve Component units and interviewed unit members during their conduct of ODT in several foreign countries as well as at their home stations during their preparation for ODT.
individual's situation, but a trend seems to be developing that indicates, for many of the annual units, some key individuals are approaching their limit.

In addition to the time spent in actual ODT Program participation, the Reserve Component unit (or planning cell) must spend time in meeting all overseas deployment requirements. Mundane things like inoculations, identification tags, and other processing for Overseas requirements (POR) take time, but additional time must be spent in coordinating complex overseas movements, coordinating with overseas active sponsor units, updating CAPSTONE planning documents prior to ODT, numerous inspections by higher headquarters to "make sure they are ready", refining training plans to fit the overseas scenario, and (often) preparing equipment for shipment. These very real time requirements, as well as recovery from ODT, have a great impact on yearly training schedules and constrict the time available to accomplish those standard individual and collective training tasks already discussed.

Joint Training Exercises

The Reserve Components have participated in numerous joint training exercises (JTX), such as LOGEX, in the Continental United States (CONUS) since before the Total Force Concept became a reality. However, with the ODT Program facilitating Reserve Component unit annual training in
Europe, USAREUR exercise planners realized in 1978 that the ODT Program could be used to supply Reserve Component units for NATO JTX participation.

Several Reserve Component units and cells participated in REFORGER exercises in the late 1970's. Their after-action reports and exercise reports indicated that a normal fourteen-day annual training period did not provide enough time for meaningful participation in a REFORGER type exercise. Consequently, in 1980 Department of the Army authorized and funded a twenty one to twenty-six day annual training period for Reserve Component units who are nominated to participate in an overseas JTX. The concept was tested with several units participating in three weeks annual training for REFORGER 81, but a detailed analysis of their participation indicated that twenty one days was still not enough time for the units to gain full benefit from the JTX experience.

For a battalion-size unit to participate in an overseas JTX, a full issue of equipment must be made available. There are three ways to provide the necessary equipment. The most obvious, but also most expensive in terms of funds and time, is for the Reserve Component unit to ship its equipment overseas for the exercise. A second method is to have the Reserve Component unit draw a full POMCUS (Pre-positioned Material Configured in Unit Sets) set of
equipment to use in the JTX. The third, and least preferred method, is for the Reserve Component unit to borrow a full set of equipment from an overseas Active Component unit not participating in the JTX.

Shipping equipment and POMCUS-draw are both time consuming, but proved to be the most realistic methods of facilitating full Reserve Component unit participation in overseas JTXs. In 1982, a FORSCOM/USAREUR group of ODT and exercise planners developed an optimum twenty-six day annual training schedule that would permit a unit to either ship equipment or draw POMCUS, fully participate in a REFORGER, reship or turn in equipment and redeploy to home station. The schedule was tested by the 467 Engineer Battalion, USAR, which used POMCUS equipment during REFORGER 82, and it proved to be accurate. Their twenty-six day annual training period must not be considered unique or unsupportable. For Reforger 83, a task force from the 30th Infantry Brigade, North Carolina National Guard deployed with their equipment to Italy to participate in JTX Display Determination.

When 800 soldiers from the 30th Infantry Brigade . . . deploy to Italy in late September their equipment will be waiting for them when they arrive.

This can be accomplished even if the unit is not normally authorized POMCUS equipment by securing a Department of the Army exception to policy.
It is the first time any Guard unit's equipment has been shipped there for field training exercises. The task force will conduct a three-week joint field training exercise with the Italian Army. It will be the largest joint training mission undertaken with the Italian Army since formation of NATO more than forty year ago.

Getting the task force's equipment to Italy involved shipping 143 boxes and shelters, 93 tracked vehicles, including 15 M-60 tanks, and 234 trucks, jeeps, and other wheeled vehicles.82

The time devoted to JTX participation and movement planning by unit members spanned the nine-month period preceding actual deployment. In addition to the ODT preparations discussed above, brigade and task force staff members traveled to Italy three to four times to conduct planning with exercise, SETAF (Southern European Task Force), and Italian Army staffs.

Training in loading aircraft and ships and a 16-hour course for drivers leading to international licenses will precede the deployment.

In addition to the required training many members of the task force have attended courses in conversational Italian at local community colleges.83

Current ODT plans indicate that this unit will participate in a similar exercise every other year for at least the next five years. However, this unit's training requirements are


83"800 North Carolina Guardsmen to Train in Italy," Larry Carney, Army Times, 29 August 1983, p. 15.
no longer unique. The 1st Battalion, 198th Armored Brigade, Mississippi Army National Guard also participated in REFORGER 83. The 198th Armored Brigade is the Roundout brigade for the 1st Cavalry Division, a major REFORGER 83 participant. The battalion conducted a twenty-six day annual training period, successfully drew and turned in POMCUS, and redeployed to home station. Overseas exercise participation by Reserve Component units for FY 83/84 is displayed in Table 4, Appendix B.

General Walker, National Guard director, has pointed out in Congressional testimony that

... participation in Joint Training Exercises (JTX) continues to provide units with training opportunities that are not normally available in a unit training environment. ... combat, combat support, and combat service support units are tasked to perform realistic missions alongside their active counterparts in a joint service environment that challenges them to produce under realistic and stressful conditions.\(^\text{84}\)

USAREUR leaders are convinced that, despite the high costs, Reserve Component units must continue to participate in JTXs. Colonel Richard Polo, Commander of the 7th Engineer Brigade of VII Corps, was recently interviewed by National Guard and said:

\(^{84}\)Hearings Before a Subcommittee of The Committee on Appropriations, p. 208.
Under the Total Army Concept, National Guard and Reserve forces are becoming more involved in REFORGER and other exercises. Some units will mobilize early because under present constrictions, they have resources we don't have in the active Army. To be ready in wartime, they must practice in peacetime.85

The Association of the U.S. Army agrees with the National Guard Bureau position and recommends that JTX opportunities for the Reserve Components be expanded.

Realistic exercises offer the ultimate training opportunity. They add the final polish, the close approximation of actual operations that can be attained in no other way. Consequently, opportunities to take part in exercises need to be expanded for Guard and Reserve forces.86

The requirements for Reserve Component participation in overseas JTXs will continue and soon expand in the Pacific Theater. General Wickham,87 Army Chief of Staff, is aware of the Reserve Components' enhanced participation in joint exercises and believes it necessary.


87General John A. Wickham, Jr. became Army Chief of Staff after serving as Army Vice Chief of Staff for a year, following a three-year tour as Commander in Korea and Eighth U.S. Army. A 1950 U.S. Military Academy graduate, he holds two master's degrees from Harvard and has served in numerous command and staff positions world-wide.
We continue to fund large scale joint exercises around the world--REFORGER, exercises in Southwest Asia, the annual Team Spirit exercises in Korea, the largest in the free world. Reserve Components participate in these exercises to an increasing extent. Such training is indispensable to improving readiness.\textsuperscript{88}

Once again, the challenge is time to prepare, participate, and recover from the OCONUS JTX. In many cases, the time required equates to an entire training year.

**POMCUS Reconnaissance and Inspection**

Because of limited transportation assets in time of war, a great deal of equipment is prepositioned and stored in ready-for-issue condition in strategic locations in Europe. The equipment is maintained while in storage, and a system has been developed to keep the unit sets modernized. These POMCUS sets must "... mirror the appropriate state-side unit's equipment so that the units can hit the ground, draw equipment like they have been using in the United States and move out."\textsuperscript{89}

In the past, only Active Component combat units have had POMCUS equipment ready for their use upon deployment. With the many changes in TOE, and on-going force modernization, Active Component units found it necessary to


conduct annual inspection and reconnaissance of their stored equipment on-site in Europe. The POMCUS Inspection and Reconnaissance Program (PIREP) was developed to coordinate these visits to Europe and optimize participating units opportunitites for inspection. General Glenn Otis, Commander of U.S. Army Europe, Seventh U.S. Army, and NATO's Central Army Group, has pointed out that while the current "... POMCUS inventory consists of four division sets of equipment plus logistical and medical augmentation packages ... other sets are planned or in various stages of completion." 91

Reserve Component units began participating in the PIREP in 1982 under the auspices of the ODT Program. Many Reserve Component units now have equipment in POMCUS and more are planned. These units are expected to send a small (two-three man) team overseas annually or biannually to inspect their stored equipment. Experience has proven that these inspections cannot be conducted in conjunction with a Reserve Component unit's participation in either ODT or a JTX. For units with POMCUS to inspect, this means an additional one-week active duty requirement for selected unit members annually.

90General Glenn K. Otis assumed this position on 15 April 1983 after serving as the TRADOC Commander since 1981. He enlisted in the Army in 1946, graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1953, and holds a master's degree in mathematics from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.

Western Command (WESTCOM) Expanded Relations Program

WESTCOM has developed an Expanded Relations Program to further interoperability training with numerous Pacific rim nations. Active Component units, as well as Reserve Component units with the appropriate CAPSTONE alignments and wartime contingency missions participate in this program with their allied counterparts in a manner similar to the ODT Program. Many CONUS-based Reserve Component units (in addition to those based in Hawaii) have been given the opportunity to participate in this training program to gain valuable mission-related training in foreign countries. Fully funded, the only resource that the Reserve Component unit must provide in order to participate in the program is time.

Training at the National Training Center

The National Training Center (NTC), Ft Irwin, California, was designed to offer participating Active Component units a dynamic combined arms training environment in which to perfect peacetime training. With expansion of the Roundout Program, as already discussed, it became apparent that Reserve Component Roundout brigades and battalions should be given the opportunity to join their parent active units at the NTC. A normal rotation schedule for active units to train at the NTC led to the development in 1983 of the NTC Roundout Rotation Program for Reserve Components units.
Roundout Battalions of the ARNG will commence participation in the NTC Roundout Rotation Program in late FY 83. The concept ... is that roundout battalions of the ARNG undergo rotational training as one of the maneuver battalions in selected Active Component Brigade task forces. ARNG units will participate with the Active Component Division with which they are affiliated.92

The tentative Roundout rotation schedule identifies one National Guard battalion in FY 84 and five battalions in FY 85. The standards of training for Reserve Component units are the same as those applicable for Active Component units training at the NTC. Consequently, Reserve Component units must strive to attain higher levels of proficiency in order to be selected for NTC training.

All Active and Reserve Component units scheduled for rotation to the NTC will strive to be proficient in the individual and collective skills necessary for success on the modern battlefield. Given that train-up will vary with specific unit circumstances, the following guidelines are provided to assist in attaining the required levels of training excellence:

(1) Leader training using appropriate simulations ...
(2) Extensive maintenance training ...
(3) Crew-served weapons qualification including Crew Combat Course (qualification) and tank table IX within the six months preceding deployment to the NTC. Refresher training on all weapon systems immediately prior to deployment.
(4) Combined arms training at all levels through battalion task force, to include external ARTEP evaluations within six months prior to deployment to the NTC ...
(5) Company team live fire exercises incorporating mortars, artillery, and attack helicopters.

(6) Intensive train up on the installation, operation, trouble-shooting, and maintenance of MILES equipment within the 90 days preceding deployment to the NTC.\textsuperscript{93}

To achieve these high levels of peacetime training proficiency and readiness, Reserve Component units scheduled to train at the NTC will need additional training assemblies. For example, the normal pre-mobilization tank gunnery crew qualification standard is completion of table VIII. To rotate to the NTC these units will have to successfully complete tank table IX. This will require at least another week of range time that is not available in the standard yearly training schedule. The funds for additional unit training assemblies are available, as are all other resources, except possibly time.\textsuperscript{94}

Taking advantage of the unique training occurring at the NTC, an associated Leader Training Program has been established. The program capitalizes on both the training environment and complete instrumentation available at the NTC to build upon the on-going tactical leader training that takes place at a Reserve Components home station. Participating commanders and staff are not necessarily from just Roundout units and will come from Reserve Component divisions, separate brigades, and armored cavalry regiments.

\textsuperscript{93}\textit{U.S. Department of the Army, "NTC Standardization for ARNG Battalions," by LTC William Dampier (Ft McPherson, Ga.: FORSCOM, 14 January 1983), p. 1.}

\textsuperscript{94}\textit{"ARNG Training at the National Training Center (NTC),"} p. 1-19.
From a vantage point overlooking the exercise area, the commander will issue an operations order based on the tactical situation of the rotating unit that will be observed. Subordinate commanders and staffs go through their planning processes and selectively brief their concept of the operation. Prior to the start of the actual operation, an NTC briefing officer will present the "player" commander concept of the operation. From the vantage point, the group is able to observe and discuss the doctrinal and tactical issues as the battle unfolds. Later in the day, at the operations center theater, the group reviews the audio, video, and statistical data resulting from the battle.95

This NTC Leader Training Program should prove to be an excellent training vehicle for the Reserve Components and provide invaluable experience in tactical command and staff operations. It will be relatively inexpensive to conduct with the only scarce resource being the time required for the command and staff groups to conduct the necessary additional active duty for training.

Force Modernization

As the Total Force Concept envisioned, the various training programs discussed above facilitate the Reserve Components training alongside their Active Component counterparts just as they would fight in time of war. Yet, the problem of equipment compatibility (and associated operational capabilities) threatens to denigrate the Total Force Concept and hinder the Army's wartime mission.

accomplishment. Senator Strom Thurmond\textsuperscript{96} recently pointed out:

In sum total, one-half of the nation's combat power and two-thirds of the support capability are maintained in the Reserve Forces. Despite this heavy responsibility, the Guard and Reserve lack much of the modern equipment they need to mobilize and deploy as required. Changing these conditions is not only desirable, it is essential. We must keep these forces strong if our nation's ability to deter aggression is to be maintained.\textsuperscript{97}

Tables 2 and 7 of Appendix B indicate that the Reserve Components have approximately seventy percent of the Army's non-divisional maintenance capability. Yet, the Reserve Component equipment, while deployable, is not, in many cases today, compatible with the equipment used by, or stored in POMCUS for, the Active Components. A closely related problem concerns the Reserve Component maintenance personnel who are expected to repair modern equipment upon mobilization. In its 1980 Reserve Component Status Report, the

\textsuperscript{96}Senator Strom Thurmond served with the Army of the U.S. from 1942 to 1946 as a Major General. He was attached to the 82nd Airborne Division for the invasion of Europe and was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. Senator Thurmond received a B.S. degree from Clemson College and has also received 14 honorary degrees. The Governor of South Carolina from 1947 to 1951, he has been representing South Carolina and the Armed Forces in the Senate since 1955.

Association of the U.S. Army highlighted this problem.

"Equally important is that Reserve forces maintenance personnel train routinely on the equipment they will service on the battlefield as well as the (older) equipment in the hands of the Guard and Reserve."  

Congressional Representative Les Aspin, a member of the House Armed Services Committee, has also become quite concerned over the problem of training Reserve Component maintenance personnel on modern equipment.

... while 70 percent of the Army's maintenance capability on mobilization will come from the Reserves, very few of the people in these units have ever seen the Abrams M-1 main battle tank ... You can't expect them to repair what they haven't even passed their hands over ... The M-1 is a vastly different tank from the M-60 ... Yet we're going to ask guys who can take a diesel engine apart blindfolded to try to grapple with a gas turbine they'll see for the first time lying in a wheatfield in the middle of a rainstorm.

The third Reserve Component problem with Army force modernization efforts concerns the equipment displaced from the Active to the Reserve Component when the active force receives new equipment. From a Reserve Component viewpoint,


99Congressman Les Aspin received his Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1965. He served in the Army of the U.S. from 1966 to 1968 as a Captain. He has represented Wisconsin in Congress since the 92nd Congress.

"displaced" equipment is new equipment and often requires the same new equipment training (NET) effort as is normally required by units receiving new (recently manufactured) equipment. Yet, neither DARCOM nor TRADOC NET teams are available to provide on-site transition training for displaced equipment (DET). General Wickham has admitted that

The Army has tried to match increasing reliance on the Reserve Components with modern equipment. We've not done well enough in the past, but now we have programs that are firmly in place that will put modern equipment in the Reserve Components. We calculate, according to these programs now, that we are sending roughly $1 billion a year of new equipment into the Reserve Components. In addition, there would be several hundred million dollars of "trickle down" equipment that would come from replacement of older equipment in Active units. 101

Thus, Force Modernization presents a three-part challenge to the Reserve Components. New and displaced equipment transition training, and systems training for those maintenance personnel who could logically be expected to service and repair new system in wartime may be collectively termed Force Modernization Training (FMT).

Force Modernization Training

How big a problem does FMT pose to the Reserve Component? MG Temple, writing in the October 1983 edition of Army magazine, highlighted the impact of new and displaced equipment on the National Guard.

Over the next seven years, 74 new and displaced systems are planned for delivery to the ARNG. Some of these include the Vulcan and Chaparral air-defense artillery systems, the M9 armored combat earthmover (ACE), the high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV), the M1 tank, Bradley fighting vehicle and Tacfire tactical fire direction system. 102

MG Berkman is also sensitive to the issue of new equipment. "The Army Reserve received 550 new trucks and forklifts during fiscal 1982. The first Army Reserve DAS3 (decentralized Army service support system) was delivered in March . . ." 103

The receipt of new or displaced equipment in a Reserve Component unit requires transition training. NET transition is accomplished under the guidance of DARCOM/TRADOC NET teams which conduct on-site training for system operators and organizational mechanics and provide receiving units with a recommended sustainment training program. According to FORSCOM:

DARCOM NET plans for RC units are based on AC plans and tailored to fit available RC training time . . . As plans for NET are finalized, they are incorporated into unit training plans/schedules for execution . . . This same concept is also true for displaced equipment training. 104


While the FMT plan is for NET/DET to be incorporated in the unit's normal training schedule, this does not appear to be possible. The first National Guard unit to receive new M1 Abrams tanks is the 2nd Battalion, 252 Armor, North Carolina National Guard. "This battalion is a 'round-out' unit for the 2d Armored Division located at Ft Hood, Texas."105

MG William E. Ingram,106 North Carolina Adjutant General, has indicated that the normal available training time just isn't enough to conduct the transition training. "Ingram said the battalion will undergo three weeks, instead of the usual two weeks, active duty training this summer in order to become familiar with the new tanks."107 This extra time requirement is not surprising when the complexities of the new technology incorporated in the M1 tank are considered.

In their study of the M1 NET challenge to the Reserve Components, Simms and White108 found the magnitude of the effort associated with the initial skill training for

105 "M-60A3 Tanks, ITVs Rollout for the Army Guard," National Guard 36 (October 1982): 22.

106 MG Ingram received his B.S. degree from the Citadel in 1943 and served with the Army of the U.S. from 1943 to 1946 before entering the National Guard. Serving in a variety of positions in the NCARNG, he assumed his present position in 1977.


maintenance personnel takes longer than just two weeks. They found that the average length of the planned NET effort to transition active Army mechanics from the M60/M48 tanks to the M1 to be 3.9 weeks with the longest lasting 6.0 weeks of training. Table 5 of Appendix B shows the number of M1 tasks, by MOS, in which each M1 mechanic will be required to be proficient. Table 6 displays the length of M1 NET for active mechanics stationed in CONUS.

Beyond the NET/DET challenge for Reserve Component operators and organizational maintenance personnel is the greater challenge of training the Reserve Component combat service support (CSS) units having mobilization missions of supporting Active Component units that have received new systems. To meet this challenge, Department of the Army developed a Combat Service Support Units Alignment and Training Program. General Cavazos, FORSCOM Commander, believes this program essential to the Total Army's ability to go to war.

This program began in January 1983, with a concerted effort to identify new systems, align supporting and supported units, assign wartime missions and develop the training concept. Our concept follows the displaced equipment training "menu" approach which enables us to take maximum advantage of the training alternatives. Success of these program is essential to our readiness to go to war.109

Planning and conducting this training is more complex than it might at first appear. DARCOM must identify and acquire the necessary special tools and test equipment and other ancillary TOE equipment on a wholesale basis. Once TRADOC documents the necessary TOE changes, the Reserve Component CSS unit must request issue of applicable tools and test equipment. Some type of training program must then be developed based on the needs of the unit and the type training required.

Initial emphasis will be on individual training. The types of training being considered include training at service schools, USAR schools, regional training site, active and reserve component installations, DARCOM depots and exportable training. Training will be conducted during IDT and AT and will be intensely managed to ensure skills are attained in the least amount of time possible. Consideration of the peacetime support mission of the units involved is paramount, however; every effort will be made to minimize the impact of this training on the peacetime mission.110

The more advanced the new equipment, the more complex the maintenance required, and the greater the challenge of developing the sophisticated maintenance skills in Reserve Component CSS units. Current fielding of the M1 Abrams tank represents only the "tip of the iceberg" for Reserve Component maintenance units. The problems encountered,

and the extra training time required to prepare these CSS units to maintain the M1, will also be encountered during fielding of other complex new systems such as the UH60 Blackhawk, AH64 Apache helicopters, M2/3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and Division Air Defense Gun. There is no doubt, however, that conducting initial transition training, while supporting conventional peacetime operations and training in the time span of a normal training year, will present an enormous challenge to the Reserve Components. Even if successful transition training can be accomplished, the technical skills acquired must be sustained. Simms and White found that

The planned sustainment training is . . . inadequate because of a lack of periodic exposure to the M1 for hands-on training. To sustain the highly technical skills required by the M1, RC mechanics will require frequent access to M1 tanks and use of sophisticated maintenance simulators in a systematically developed training program. The lack of a formal program to assure access to the M1 and the distances involved in moving reserve units to active installation [sic] will not allow RC mechanics to gain the needed hands-on experience.111

One approach to systematic skill sustainment that does afford Reserve Component maintenance personnel frequent opportunities to gain hands-on experience with a new system is

111 A Concept for Training Reserve Component Mechanics to Support the M1, p. 3-8, 3-9.
was described by MG Berkman in a recent article for Army magazine.

Recently, two Blackhawk helicopters, the Army's newest utility model, were transferred to Reserve maintenance units for use as maintenance trainees. This means that the units will repair the helicopters and then trade them to active-Army units for similar aircraft in need of maintenance.\(^{112}\)

The U.S. Army has embarked on the most ambitious and extensive force modernization effort in history. Hundreds of new systems will be entering the Army inventory during the next decade and they will require tremendous NET/DET and CSS training efforts for the Reserve Components. Based on current Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL) and current CAPSTONE alignments, just "the M1 training requirement is in excess of 5,000 guardsmen and reservists sic, beginning in the mid-1980's.\(^{113}\) Initial transition and long-term sustainment training for Reserve Component units and individuals will require more training time than is currently available during the standard training year.

Central Command
(Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force)


\(^{113}\)A Concept for Training Reserve Component Mechanics to Support the M1, p. III.
The Reserve Components play a key role in providing combat support and combat service support to Central Command (CENTCOM) active forces. CENTCOM was established in January 1983 as a unified command, succeeding the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. Its area of responsibility includes the area from Egypt to Pakistan and as far south as Kenya, Somalia, and Sudan. LTG Robert Kingston, CENTCOM Commander, stresses that Reserve Components would play a significant role in any emergency requiring the deployment of CENTCOM forces.

Thus, if a major crisis should threaten U.S. interests in Southwest Asia, Kingston said he would depend heavily on the authority granted the President to call up to 100,000 members of the Guard and Reserve on as little as 24 hours notice. In fact, we will be dependent on most of the presidential callup of 100,000 in a major crisis.

Speaking before a recent Washington, D.C. meeting of the


115 LTG Robert C. Kingston received his Master of Arts degree from George Washington University. His recent assignments include commander of the 1st and 3rd Brigades, 1st Cavalry Division, Vietnam, Commanding General of the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance, and Commander, 2nd Infantry Division, Korea. He assumed command of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (now CENTCOM) in 1981.

Reserve Officer Association, LTG Kingston admitted that, beside the Reserve Component combat support and combat service support units the CENTCOM would need in an emergency, "... individual Reservists would staff his headquarters. In the event my staff would have to deploy we will fill their positions in my headquarters ... with Reserve personnel."¹¹⁷

The National Guard provides about 1,200 personnel in 29 company-size combat service support units and the entire 48th Infantry Brigade (Roundout to the 24th Infantry Division) to CENTCOM in case of emergency. The Army Reserve provides about 12,000 personnel for CENTCOM use. CENTCOM relies on the Army Reserve "... for a major portion of its transportation, fuel, and civil affairs support. In some cases, the Army Reserve units are the only ones of their type available ... ."¹¹⁸

Not all of these Reserve Component units or personnel would always be mobilized to support CENTCOM emergencies. CENTCOM has designed force packages to meet the specific needs of different contingencies. LTC Kingston is quick to point out that:

¹¹⁷"CENTCOM CG Counting on Reserves in Emergency," p. 32.

Reserve and National Guard units are an integral part of the force, a critical piece of the fabric of the force. And while smaller contingencies could mean that fewer members of the reserve component will deploy as part of the force, I cannot do without them.\(^{119}\)

The force modernization problems discussed above also apply to those Reserve Components who would deploy in as little as twenty-four hours as part of a CENTCOM contingency force package. Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh\(^{120}\) is aware of these equipment and training shortcomings. "The National Guard has over 130 units assigned to the Rapid Deployment Force . . . which are short over $100 million worth of everyday equipment."\(^{121}\)

Overseas exercises, as well as CONUS exercises, place additional training requirements on CENTCOM Reserve Components. CENTCOM headquarters elements deploy three times a year for readiness exercises. Selected force packages also participate in CONUS exercises such as Bold Eagle and Border Star, and OCONUS in the Middle East exercise Bright Star. Reserve Component personnel are strongly


\(^{120}\)John O. Marsh, Jr., Secretary of the Army since 1981, is a former four-term Congressman from Virginia. A 1951 graduate of Washington & Lee University Law School, he retired from the Virginia National Guard as a Lieutenant Colonel in 1976, after 32 years of active, Reserve, and Guard service that began in 1944. Secretary Marsh has also held a series of high-level executive-branch appointments.

encouraged to participate in these excellent training opportunities. As in so many other special training programs, the funds are available to support Reserve Component participation, and the one limiting resource is available time for Reserve Component personnel to participate.

Collective Training Summary

The collective training programs reviewed in this section are applicable to selected Reserve Component units. Obviously, not all Reserve Components participate in all of these training programs but most are involved in at least one, and many units are involved in several of these programs simultaneously. An affiliated or partnered Reserve Component unit today has a good chance of also undergoing force modernization (NET, DET, or associated CSS efforts) training while preparing for ODT or JTX participation. Each individual program was designed to strengthen and increase integration of the Reserve Components into the Total Force and improve their readiness. Undoubtedly, they have succeeded. However, as these individual training programs were being developed and matured, it became evident that a unifying methodology had to be developed to provide a direct link between all Army units and their wartime chain of command. This unifying methodology became the CAPSTONE Program.
CAPSTONE Concept Development

The country must have a large and efficient Army, one capable of meeting the enemy abroad, or they must expect to meet him at home.

Wellington: Letter, 28 January 1811

The CAPSTONE Program was implemented in December, 1979 to provide a system to orient all efforts toward meeting Reserve Component wartime readiness requirements. The CAPSTONE methodology was intended to influence all programs and actions which provide organizational planning, resources, and training to insure that each action is directed toward attaining wartime missions readiness. For the first time, the Total Army has a tool that shows the planned wartime alignment of all Active and Reserve Component units, where they are going to fight, in what sequence these units will deploy, and who they will be expected to support.

CAPSTONE allows for the peacetime preparation of war plans and facilities planning and training between the Reserve Components and their wartime chains of command.

Most important is the heightened sense of purpose that CAPSTONE brings to peacetime training. The information gained from the association of the commanders and staffs in the discussion of their wartime roles has led directly to mission-oriented training goals that are tangible and that have a real-life urgency and importance.


123 LTC Larry V. Edwards, "CAPSTONE," Commanders Call (DA Pamphlet 360-879), August-October 1983, pp. 3-4.
CAPSTONE was designed to influence on-going actions and programs. It does not determine force structure requirements nor does it replace the established chain of peacetime command and control of Reserve Components. It does, however, provide the Reserve Components with the opportunity to plan and train in peacetime with the units (both Active and Reserve Components) that they will be aligned with in wartime.

To achieve the intent of CAPSTONE requires that wartime associations be established in peacetime for planning and, when possible, for training. These associations may initially take the form of simply an exchange of liaison visits, SOPs, and issue of wartime mission statements. The extent of planning or training is dependent on many factors, i.e., geographical location, time constraints, training missions, etc.124

The CAPSTONE concept was quickly embraced as the panacea for the confusion over the wide variety of conflicting programs that had been developed in the 1970's to improve readiness. The General Accounting Office (GAO) recently reviewed implementation of the CAPSTONE Program and found that USAREUR was using CAPSTONE as "... the single management tool they USAREUR Headquarters have to prepare

for a smooth transition to wartime operation."^125 The CAPSTONE Program quickly became a powerful management and planning tool and a more in-depth review of its uses will be made in following sections.

Despite some early problems with implementation, the CAPSTONE program worked. General Berkman, in testimony before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations, stated that "the CAPSTONE program is a highly successful initiative that has improved Army Reserve training. This single initiative has focused training on wartime mission, heightened interest and has certainly improved Reserve Component readiness."^126 In his study of the status of mobilization planning, Colonel Stuckey agreed with MG Berkman's assessment. "The organizational associations which result due to CAPSTONE should enable units to transition to war more efficiently."^127 Heymont and Muckerman also believe that the CAPSTONE methodology will work. "The CAPSTONE Program should reduce the many instances now existing where RC combat service support units are subordinate to other RC units with dissimilar

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^125 Clifford I. Gould, Director, GAO, Problems in Implementing the Army's CAPSTONE Program to Provide All Reserve Components with a Wartime Mission, GAO letter to the Secretary of the Army, Washington, D.C., 22 September 1982, p. 3.

^126 Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, p. 194.

missions . . . .

The initial Army-wide experience with CAPSTONE was so positive that the CAPSTONE methodology was soon expanded to cover all contingencies.

Multicontingency Problems/Prioritization

Initially, the Army CAPSTONE Program organized the Total Force only to support the reinforcement of NATO contingency. Subsequently, CAPSTONE was expanded to include the CENTCOM and Pacific Theater contingencies, as well as the CONUS Sustainment Base. Unfortunately, there are not enough units, either Active or Reserve Component, to fulfill the requirements of all Army worldwide contingencies simultaneously. In expanding CAPSTONE during 1982, force planners realized that it would be necessary to task many Reserve Component units with the responsibility for planning for more than one contingency mission.

Selected Reserve Component units, which had been informed only one or two years before that their CAPSTONE alignment was with a USAREUR unit, which had enthusiastically initiated CAPSTONE planning with the USAREUR unit, and which (in some cases) had traveled to USAREUR in the ODT Program to conduct face-to-face CAPSTONE planning and training, were also force-listed for Pacific or CENTCOM

contingencies. In a few cases, a Reserve Component unit was listed for all three contingencies. This "dual or triple hat" situation can create serious problems for a mission-oriented Reserve Component unit.

CAPSTONE planning involves establishing a channel of communications with the gaining wartime command, visiting the gaining command (in CONUS or OCONUS through the ODT Program) to coordinate unit standard operating procedures (SOPs) and policies, conducting terrain and mission analysis on-site, and upon return to home station, implementing the mission/planning/training guidance received from the wartime gaining command. In addition to the initial CAPSTONE coordination, Reserve Component units are expected to "stay in touch" through correspondence, more visits, and attendance at CAPSTONE planning conferences. "Some units, such as the 310th TAACOM, USAR, are having annual CAPSTONE planning/training conferences, bringing together the sub-units that would actually be under their control in war."129

These time consuming requirements can impose severe hardships on already time-constrained Reserve Component units.

RC headquarters units face the same training time constraints as do RC operating companies, must also conduct their own training, and are often far from their

129"CAPSTONE", Commanders Call, p. 4.

134
subordinate units. These headquarters units are designed for workload management and administration and spaces are usually not provided for personnel with the technical skills found in the subordinate operating companies. Conversely, many Active Component units lack the facilities or workload required for training RC units. 130

To alleviate the problems that resulted from multi-mission taskings, a prioritization of missions for planning and training was developed in 1983. These priorities establish the one CAPSTONE alignment for which each Reserve Component unit should devote all peacetime efforts. These CAPSTONE priorities also serve as guidelines for planning, coordinating, and executing all other training programs.

Beginning with the FY 84 edition of the CAPSTONE Program, five interrelated volumes will be published to establish the CAPSTONE alignments for each contingency. The first volume will also contain unit planning and training priorities and a multiple alignment report to show every unit in the Total Force and its wartime or post-mobilization alignment(s). 131

CAPSTONE Impact on All Training

All of the special training programs discussed in previous sections of this chapter have embraced CAPSTONE as the unifying methodology for selecting Reserve Component

130 Mobilization Readiness Selected Priority Reserve Components, p. 3-8.

units for participation. The ODT, JTX, NCCT, KPUP, NTC, and FMT programs incorporated CAPSTONE in their planning and execution. For example, all units and planning cells participating in ODT are in accordance with CAPSTONE. The key to identifying those Reserve Component CSS units in need of FMT to support specific modernized systems being fielded now and in the future is CAPSTONE. With a known wartime mission (derived from the CAPSTONE alignments), the CSS unit and its peacetime chain of command can review the DAMPL and identify the FMT mission that must be accomplished.

The interrelation of these major end items with displaced equipment, with new equipment training and with training "CAPSTONE"-affiliated Guard and Reserve combat service support units to be able to service the combat forces they support is not readily apparent. All of these special training programs have a common purpose: improving readiness and deployability of the Reserve Components. Although "not readily apparent", they are all interrelated and, under the unifying guidance provided by CAPSTONE, should have a synergistic affect on improving readiness and deployability. Yet, as readiness improves, the complexities of training under CAPSTONE have increased.

CAPSTONE Relationships

To successfully capitalize on the CAPSTONE Program, a Reserve Component unit must carefully distinguish among three separate and distinct chains of command, and understand the separate but interlocking set of functions of each. Peacetime training is further complicated by the different rules governing the operation of each chain of command.

With the advent of CAPSTONE, Reserve Component units must now coordinate with the standard peacetime chain of command, wartime (CAPSTONE) chain of command, and a training assistance chain of command.

The peacetime chain of command includes the CONUSA (for Reserve units) and the state adjutant general (for National Guard units) and has the ultimate responsibility for the training of all assigned units. This chain of command provides all the resources necessary for subordinate units to conduct training and is responsible for informing subordinate unit of their priority CAPSTONE alignment within three months of receipt. The peacetime chain of command must ensure that subordinate units are adequately resourced to accomplish the peacetime training required by their CAPSTONE mission.

The CAPSTONE chain of command provides mission, planning, and training guidance, SOPs, and policies to its CAPSTONE priority aligned subordinate units. It is also
responsible for inviting CAPSTONE aligned subordinates to participate in exercises and CAPSTONE planning conferences, for visiting subordinates to coordinate planning, and observing training. Only those CAPSTONE aligned subordinate units that have this CAPSTONE chain of command listed as the first priority for planning and training will be contacted.

The training assistance chain of command, though not a chain of command in the literal sense, includes the CONUSA, Army Readiness Groups, Active Component units with a specific training relationship, i.e., Affiliation, Counterpart, etc., and other Active and Reserve Component units that may provide assistance under memoranda of agreement. All provide training assistance on unit collective training tasks, and this assistance need not depend on CAPSTONE alignment.

Three separate and distinct chains of command do exist and provide guidance to each Reserve Component units. Each instance of coordination, each visit by representatives of these chains, and all the guidance received requires time to host, conduct, digest, and execute. Probably the most time consuming (and frustrating) problem with this situation is the result of changes in CAPSTONE alignments or priorities. Changes do occur. They are based on a myriad of factors ranging from a change in the supported commands priorities to an evolution in doctrine.133

133FORSOM Regulation 350-4, pp. 2-1 to 2-4.
While justified, a change in CAPSTONE alignment or priority is a time consuming event for the affected units since, in most cases, the CAPSTONE planning process must start all over again.

The training opportunities offered by the CAPSTONE chain of command (especially those overseas) are often so attractive that Reserve Component units and planning cells confuse the responsibilities of the peacetime and wartime chains of command and devote valuable time to planning for training that will not occur.

Ultimately, the responsibilities for training rests with the peacetime unit commander. Participation in training opportunities proposed by the wartime chain of command is invitational. These training opportunities are ... subject to the approval of the peacetime chain of command.134

Despite some shortcomings, and despite the additional requirements for wartime mission planning imposed on Reserve Components without a commensurate increase in training time, the Army CAPSTONE Program has become a powerful tool that allows the Total Force to concentrate on peacetime training for wartime missions.

134 Ibid., p. 4-4.
Summary

The man who is prepared has his battle half fought.  
_Cervantes: Don Quixote, 1605_

In reviewing Reserve Component training requirements, it becomes apparent that a variety of programs have been established to improve both readiness and deployability. Successful completion of common individual and collective training requirements applicable to all Reserve Component units, and training program requirements (NTC, ODT, etc.), coupled with the growing planning requirements and training opportunities offered by CAPSTONE require more training time than is available today. A Reserve Component unit that must deploy with no post-mobilization training has to be mission ready at all times—just like their Active Component counterparts. Yet, the Reserve Components have available just $1/9$ the training time of the Active Components. While more active duty training would produce a more responsive Reserve Component, the increased costs and, a possible reluctance on the part of both individuals and their employers to support an increase, could mitigate against any more training time. The following chapter discusses and expands on this conundrum and postulates possible solutions.
CHAPTER 4

Peacetime Training and the Wartime Mission

To be at war openly and to the full is one thing; to be at peace, real peace, another. To be at both is disquieting (to put it mildly) if for no other reason than it is confusing.


Chapter two reviewed the development of the thirty-eight (nine) days per year time limitation and Congressional intent in establishing this training time resource.

Chapter three reviewed the pre and post-mobilization training requirements that have evolved over the last twenty years. This chapter will analyze the current Reserve Component training requirements and how they are established, determine if the training requirements exceed available resourced training time, and explore various alternative strategies, and their implications, to improving readiness.

Reserve Component Wartime Mission Determination Process

Older men declare war. But it is youth that must fight and die. And it is youth who must inherit the tribulation, the sorrow, and the triumphs that are the aftermath of war.

Herbert C. Hoover: Address to the Republican National Convention, Chicago, 27 June 1944.
Reserve Component peacetime training has undergone dramatic changes in the last two decades with ever-increasing readiness requirements. Concurrent with changes in training, demands on both individual and unit training time have increased significantly, while the legislated time available for training has not increased beyond thirty-eight (nine) days a year. In fact, under the Total Force Policy developed in the early 1970's, the first months of intensive combat in any war would have to be fought with both Active and Reserve Components. The commitments for deploying the Reserve Components are today very nearly as demanding as those for the active force. In his contribution to Toward a Consensus on Military Service, Robert B. Pirie, Jr. pointed out that

Requirements for reserves Reserve Components are calculated to meet the needs of a worldwide war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact that breaks out suddenly in Europe . . . Not only do they supply reinforcement and follow-on echelons, but, since the advent of the "Total Force" policy . . ., the reserves have been assigned tasks integral to large Active force units, and are essential to their operation . . . Present U.S. military planning makes unprecedented demands upon the reserve forces, as a matter of necessity, since we clearly cannot pay the cost of maintaining active forces of the size needed if we did not have reserves.

1Robert B. Pirie, Jr. was Director, Naval Strategy Group, Center for Naval Analysis, and has served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics.

The wartime missions of the Reserve Components are determined through a complex process that begins with an analysis of the Threat. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) provide guidance for contingency planning through the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). Unified and Specified Commands prepare contingency plans as directed by the JSCP and supporting component commands then prepare their supporting plans. The Army utilizes a Total Army Analysis (TAA) process to determine the combat support and combat service support unit requirements in theater, over a period of time, for various scenarios. A careful analysis of these time-phased requirements assists in determining which units can be placed in the Reserve Component force structure and which units must be maintained in the active force. Various factors, such as doctrinal changes, mission evolution, and force modernization, mandate an almost continual TAA process to modify the force structure accordingly.³ A Time Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL) is then prepared and published as part of each contingency plan.⁴ It is the TPFDL that establishes the deployment times and other data for the Reserve Components.


⁴A TPFDL development chart has been included in Appendix B to assist in understanding this complex process.
This complex contingency planning process determines deployment schedules which, in turn, identify the amount of training time that a Reserve Component unit will have at a mobilization station between mobilization day (M-day) and actual deployment. However, actual deployment is usually divided into two separate dates. Colonel John Stucky, in his 1980 study of mobilization and deployment noted that

The single most critical postmobilization date which will dominate commanders of mobilized units will be the Date Required to Load (DRL), specified in deployment schedules. This date will determine when a unit must onload from the mob station for deployment, and thus determines the amount of time a unit has to train at the mobilization station. This means that units may or may not have completed every processing action or may not be filled with personnel, equipment, or supplies or may not have completed FTXs, ARTEPs, etc., that is desired. Furthermore, the unit training program at the mobilization station will also be affected by available ranges, ammunition, fuel, and other training assets.... There is no policy or guidance which addresses the training of a unit following loading of equipment for overseas movement or prior to the unit personnel deploying overseas.5

Equipment sets are required for combat units to train during postmobilization before they can be validated as ready and subsequently deployed. Consequently, premobilization training requirements must be based on individual Reserve Component units' ability to train on its equipment

between M-day and its sea DRL (SDRL). Yet, the distribution of equipment and other resources is based on a unit's position on the Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL) and not on TPFDL or mobilization requirements. In some cases, contingency plan TPFDL's may require negative SDRL's, that is, the unit's equipment must be loaded aboard ship prior to M-day for the unit to achieve its assigned Latest Arrival Date (LAD). Colonel Stucky found that

A full deliberate mobilization and present mobilization plans are not based on the definition of "come-as-you-are war." However, in conversations with staff planners (AC and RC), the concept constantly emerges, and is generally believed to be what will occur if mobilization is required in the near future.

Since a unit's postmobilization training time is predicated on its SDRL, which is based on the unit's LAD in a TPFDL (plus shipping time), which, in turn, is predicated on the JSCP, it is improbable that postmobilization training time would or could be increased to accommodate the need for more Reserve Component unit training. Consequently, the efforts undertaken to improve Reserve Component unit

6Col Stucky notes that FORSCOM defines a "come-as-you-are" war as a contingency of sufficient gravity to require Reserve Component units to deploy in a peacetime configuration without the benefit of additional training or personnel and equipment fill.

training and readiness over the last three decades have been targeted toward the premobilization training environment.

**Approaches to Improving Premobilization Training**

The war the Generals always get ready for is the previous one.

H. M. Tomlinson. 1873, *All Our Yesterdays*

There are many different approaches to overcoming the problem of limited premobilization training time. Reducing the number of training detractors; providing additional time for training through additional training assemblies (ATA's); active duty for training (ADT); readiness management assemblies (RMA's) or additional flight training periods (AFTP's); providing additional unit training assemblies (UTA's) per year; extending annual training beyond the standard two-week period, and providing full-time personnel to Reserve Component units are all viable alternatives. Combinations of these approaches are being used today to improve both training and readiness in the premobilization environment.

**Maximizing the Use of Existing Training Time**

To lead an untrained people to war is to throw them away.

Confucius: *Analects*, xiii, C. 500 B.C.

Maximizing the use of limited training time has always received a great deal of attention. Speaking at the
recent reactivation of the Second U.S. Army in Atlanta, Georgia, LTG Charles P. Graham,8 Second Army Commander said

We must maximize time to accomplish meaningful training. We have a lot of programs designed to assist in this mission. We also have a full time manning system to help units maximize their drill time. Time is the most critical resource for units training.9

LTG Graham's concern is well-founded. A recent Missile and Munitions School survey found, however, that, despite strong emphasis on maximizing limited training time, Reserve Component unit commanders

... were fortunate if they could set aside 15 of the 38 possible training days for MOS type training ... . The other 23 days were normally used for such things as inspections, and other administrative requirements and activities ... . Unit officers claimed that they had insufficient time and resources to prepare innovative and realistic training. NCO's complained of numerous additional duties, incurred by administrative reports that prevented their active participation in planning or executing unit training.10

8LTG Charles Passmore Graham is a 1950 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and a 1957 graduate of the University of Michigan with an MS degree in engineering. General Graham has served as the Director, Force Programs and Structure, ODCSOPS, Headquarters, DA from 1975 to 1977; Commanding General of 2nd Armored Division from 1977 to 1980; Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, FORSCOM, 1980 and 1981; and Chief of Staff, FORSCOM from 1981 to 1983.


The emphasis being placed on successfully undergoing inspections in Reserve Component units is demonstrated by the guidance promulgated by Sixth U.S. Army (USA6). The Organizational Effectiveness Office of USA6 has developed a model to provide unit commanders with a systematic approach to inspection preparation that presumes that the preparation and conduct of the inspection have the highest priority and suggests that a great amount of time be spent in inspection preparation. Originally intended to facilitate annual general inspection preparation, the model can also be applied to preparation for all other types of inspections to which Reserve Component units are subjected throughout the training year. Colonel Gustavo A. Leon, Senior National Guard Advisor, FORSCOM has noted that

Current IG inspections are serious time distractors for RC units. Information from the field indicates a minimum of one MUTA-4 IDT period was totally devoted to IG inspection preparation, with up to 4 MUTA-4 periods being partially or totally involved in some units. Thus, a system that provides minimum indication of readiness for war and mobilization may consume up to 33% of inactive duty training time available to the RC unit commanders.

Pre-IG inspections by State/Division/Brigade and Battalion exacerbate the problem, and each of these requires preparation.

When other unit inspection-type activities are considered, the IDT training year is consumed by activities focused on things other than training. These inspections

include annual examinations by USFPO auditors, maintenance inspections, Command Logistics Readiness Team (CLRT) visits, and Maintenance Assistance and Instruction Team (MAIT) visits, to name but a few.¹²

Colonel Leon is convinced that the Reserve Components must be allowed to make better use of their limited training time through better management and coordination of training requirements and a complete overhaul of the current inspection and evaluation philosophy.

Colonel Jerry Ledford, Director, Reserve Component Training Division, FORSCOM, agrees with Colonel Leon's belief that the answer to the limited training time challenge is to make better use of the available training time—not in increasing the thirty-eight (nine) available training days a year for all Reserve Component soldiers. Colonel Ledford believes that the additional training time authorized for selected Reserve Component personnel will assist other unit members in their training during the regular thirty-eight (nine) days of training each year.¹⁴

Colonel Benjamin Sharp, Assistant Chief of Staff,


¹³Interview with Col Leon, Headquarters, FORSCOM, Ft McPherson, Ga., 7 February 1984.

¹⁴Interview with Col Jerry G. Ledford, Headquarters, FORSCOM, Ft McPherson, Ga., 7 February 1984.
Second U.S. Army, is concerned over the deemphasis on team building caused by the separation of Reserve Component leaders from their troops. This is due to the extra training time being made available to leaders who, because of their military responsibilities and civilian job positions, participate in extra training while their lower ranking enlisted personnel do not. He too, however, believes that maximizing Reserve Component training is now possible due to recent recruiting successes and better unit stability which permits higher levels of unit training.15

More Premobilization Training Time

Untutored courage is useless in the face of educated bullets.

George S. Patton, Jr., Cavalry Journal, April 1922.

Increased financial resources have been provided to the Reserve Components in recent years to equip at least the high priority units with the equipment and repair parts needed for peacetime training and wartime deployment. This has been accompanied by recent efforts to provide the funds necessary to support limited additional training time. Testifying before a House Subcommittee on Appropriations, Harry N. Walters, Assistant Secretary of the Army for


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Manpower and Reserve Affairs said that

The fiscal year 1983 budget begins improvements to accelerate and enhance the readiness of Reserve Component units in the D to D+60 force package by providing full-time training NCO's down to company level; increased funding for selected units for three weeks (21 days) Annual Training; additional JCS exercise participations; an additional 10-15 days of training for staffs to conduct command post exercises with CAPSTONE associates; and an additional 15 days of counterpart training for key personnel.¹⁶

The more complex the tasks that an individual must perform in wartime, the more difficult it is to initially train and then sustain individual proficiency. Reserve Component aviators are expected to perform their complex aviation tasks safely and professionally in all circumstances. Unable to sustain the required proficiency and readiness levels within the standard thirty-eight (nine) days training year, the aviation community in 1964 developed the concept of additional flight training periods (AFTP's) . . . "to develop and maintain proficiency to meet mobilization readiness requirements."¹⁷ AFTP's must include at least


four hours duty time and flying time for each AFTP must average at least one and one half hours. "Essentially, IDT and AT for aviation units is utilized to conduct collective unit training, while the AFTP is designed to support individual aviator proficiency requirements. Twenty-four (4 hour) AFTP's are authorized for each aviator."\textsuperscript{18}

In addition to AFTP's, several other special extra training time periods have been developed to provide for the accomplishment of specific requirements. For example, the use of additional training assemblies (ATA's) is restricted to training functions and limited to twelve periods annually. Reserve Component units have found this policy to be unresponsive to their needs for extra time in which to conduct administrative and support functions. Recent efforts by several agencies (DA staff, RCCC, OSD) have resulted in the creation of readiness management assemblies (RMA's) for the accomplishment of management, administrative, and support functions. These RMA's are to be used by commanders and key personnel to perform such duties as: preparation of correspondence, review of personnel records, board actions, preparation of efficiency reports, typing support, counseling, conduct of reports of survey, vehicle

Extra training time, whatever its title, costs extra money. The total cost of extra time, beyond the standard thirty-eight (nine) days per year, for just training year 1984 exceeds $1.727 Billion.

By far, the greatest effort to improve peacetime training and readiness of the Reserve Component has been the development and strengthening of the Full Time Manning (FTM) Program.

Establishment of the FTM Program in 1979 resulted from earlier studies relating to the development of an improved readiness posture for the Reserve Components. In his 1983 study of FTM, LTC Wayman Robertson noted that

The purpose of the program was to provide additional full-time personnel to selected units to enhance readiness through improved training, administration, supply, and maintenance.

... Postulating that FTM has a non-linear relationship with respect to readiness, it would

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20 See Table 9, Appendix B, for details on categories of extra training time and associated costs.


22 The Gerard study examined the costs differential between a full-time active duty program and the civilian military technician program and the Stroud study identified minimum requirements at battalion and lower levels for full-time personnel for the Reserve Components and to restructure the technician authorizations at those levels.
stand to reason that optimum FTM could probably be reached around the 10-15% level.
Cost effectiveness of FTM might defined as the point where rate of readiness improvement diminishes with increasing FTM.23

These FTM personnel perform many of the daily command, control, maintenance, logistical support, administrative, and training preparation duties leaving more valuable time for unit training during both IDT and AT.

Other readiness improvement programs (CAPSTONE, Affiliation, Partnership, and Key Personnel Upgrade) created an additional workload above and beyond the normal day to day activity in most National Guard units. All of these programs were added generally without any consideration for increasing manpower authorization in the Civilian Military Technician Program. Therefore, the FTM Program is essential if National Guard units are to meet the total force requirements.24

Civilian technicians and both Active and Reserve Component soldiers participate in FTM with Guardsmen and Reservists called to active duty for two to four years of full-time service with a unit. The program has been quite successful and will continue to be expanded in the future. General Maxwell Thurman, Army Vice Chief of Staff, has said he has "... no magic numbers on just how many more fulltime people were needed but he said the total could run


24Ibid., pp. 15-16.
into the thousands." In an October 1983 Army article, MG Berkman provided some FTM strength figures for the Army Reserve.

Full-time support strength for fiscal 1984 includes 7,476 full-time active-duty Reservists, 1,320 active-Army members and 6,753 civilian technicians, for a total of 15,549 full-time unit support personnel.

The Army National Guard is similarly manned with FTM personnel.

Currently, 840 active-duty soldiers, 8,247 full-time Guardsmen, and 5,978 full-time civilian technicians are assigned to the Army Guard. Current plans call for an expansion of the full-time manning program's strength to about 55,000 by FY 89 in both the Guard and Reserve.

General Cavazos believes that FTM "is one of the most important programs in the Total Army." FORSCOM has conducted a survey of the FTM Program and the . . .


28General Richard E. Cavazos, "Readiness Goal is Ability to Deploy on Short Notice," Army, October 1983, p. 46.
"preliminary survey data shows that the FTM Program is working and accomplishing its main goals, to increase the readiness of USAR units and to increase the overall 'go-to-war' levels of the Reserves." Ninety percent of the respondents to the FORSCOM survey indicated that . . . "units with FTM support need less time for postmobilization training; there is better continuity of operations; readiness has increased; and the overall mobilization status is improved." Many other key Army leaders believe that FTM is the answer to the problem of limited training time. LTG John R. McGiffert, Jr., former commander of the Fifth U.S. Army, recently stressed that . . . I believe strongly that if the National Guard and Army Reserve are really expected to be ready for mobilization and deployment on the timetables now prescribed, the number of fulltime unit support personnel must be significantly increased even more than now envisioned.


30 Ibid.

31 LTG John R. McGiffert, Jr. graduated from the University of Maryland in 1967 and earned an MS degree from George Washington University in 1968. He joined the Army as a private in 1945 and advanced through the ranks to LTG in 1977. LTG McGiffert has served as the Director of the Army Staff from 1977 to 1980 and assumed his position as Commanding General of Fifth U.S. Army, Ft Sam Houston, Texas in 1980. He retired from active duty in 1983.

32 "The Army Guard is an Integral Part of the Active Army," National Guard 36 (January 1982): 12.
As noted in Chapter three, another approach to overcoming the problem of limited training time is to expand the annual training period beyond the standard two-week period. Reserve Component units are now being invited to participate in joint and combined exercises overseas and exercises at the NTC for the duration of the exercise. The FY 84 budget supports many three-week annual training periods. To meet all exercise requirements, many units are forced to schedule split-training periods to cover as much as a sixty-day exercise period. Any excess days are covered by ADT or ATA authorizations.

All of these approaches to overcoming the limited peacetime training time limitations are really short-range in nature. The additional training time provided by all of these approaches is authorized by the Department of the Army in an attempt to match a resource (time) to expanded Reserve Component missions. As discussed in Chapter two, the original intent of Congress in legislating thirty-eight premobilization training days a year was to have an immediately available reserve force that would be fully deployable and ready to fight upon mobilization.

Modern warfare will no longer allow us to rely upon ocean barriers to provide the necessary time to completely train reserves and to build up our active military.

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33 See Table 10, Appendix B, for actual budget levels and Table 4, Appendix B, for Reserve Component joint exercise participation.
forces to what-ever strength may be required. Instead, the future security of the Nation demands that the reserve components be ready for almost instant call.\textsuperscript{34}

Today's wartime mission requirements drive peacetime training and determine the training tasks and CAPSTONE planning that must be accomplished. The existence of additional training time, beyond the legislated thirty-eight (nine) days a year, demonstrates that all that is required of Reserve Component units cannot be accomplished without the use of more training time. When this situation was discussed with Colonel William L. Larson, Assistant Chief of Staff, Personnel, 311th Corps Support Command, an Army Reserve unit in California,\textsuperscript{35} he agreed that neither his unit, nor its subordinate units, could meet all annual training requirements in a thirty-eight day training year and were relying on active-duty for training time to meet peacetime training requirements.\textsuperscript{36}


\textsuperscript{35}The 311th COSCOM is an Army Reserve unit headquartered in California. Under current CAPSTONE plans, this unit has a critical wartime mission that requires a great deal of peacetime planning and training in the overseas theater to which it will deploy in wartime. Col Larson is also a consulting faculty member of CGSC and a Professor of Behavioral Science, California Polytechnic University, Pomona, California.

\textsuperscript{36}Interview with Col William R. Larson, Command and General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, KS, 30 January 1984.
Long-Term Implications of Short-Range Approaches to Improving Premobilization Training

The Army used to have all the time in the world and no money; now we've got all the money and no time. George C. Marshall: Remark January 1942.

The reliance now being placed on the Reserve Components ability to quickly perform their wartime missions will not decrease in the future. Consequently, the need for extra training time through the use of ADT, ATA, RMA, FTM, or extended annual training periods is likely to continue and probably increase as pressures to limit the growth of the defense budget increase. Former Presidential Counsellor Edwin Meese III,37 in addressing a recent Adjutants General Association meeting, said of national defense needs: "This nation will never be able to afford on active duty the numbers of people necessary to maintain the peace."38

There are several implications of this continued reliance on extra time to accomplish peacetime training

37Edwin Meese III is a former counsellor to the President with cabinet rank and has been nominated as the next Attorney General. He served as executive assistant and chief of staff to President Reagan when he was the Governor of California. Meese is a graduate of Yale University and received his law degree from the University of California at Berkeley and recently received a very controversial promotion to Colonel in the Army Reserve.

missions that, while not readily apparent, should be considered by national policymakers. Among these are the expectations of the individuals, and their families and employers, who serve in the Reserve Components, the hidden accrual of extra retirement credits, and the administrative costs associated with the pursuit and approval/disapproval of authorizations for extra training time.

Family/Employer Support

The best form of "welfare" for the troops is first-class training. Erwin Rommel: Infantry Attacks, i, 1937.

Individuals join the Reserve Components for a variety of reasons, but the majority of those who join expect to devote one weekend a month and an additional two full weeks a year to military service. The promotional campaign has, for several years, stressed the "part-time job" aspects of National Guard service. Army Reserve recruiting has stressed, not only the professional aspects of Reserve duty, but also the supplemental income earned in thirty-eight days of duty a year. Neither effort mentions the possibility of additional training time requirements.

Samples of Reserve Component Recruiting advertising are at Appendix A.
As training requirements and opportunities increase, the individual is faced with several subtle, and some not so subtle, pressures to voluntarily join other unit members in extra training time. The desire for professional advancement, the need to "belong", peer pressures, and a myriad of other motives operate synergistically to urge a soldier to participate in extra training time.

The impact of continued extra peacetime training on soldier's families and civilian employers, as well as the reactive pressures on the individual soldier, must also be considered. Richard Ellis, Director of the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve, recently summarized this problem when he noted

Our tragedy today is the loss of all the Reservists and Guardsmen. Last year we lost 181,000 trained Guardsmen and Reservists. The number one reason—employer problems. Sixty-one thousand talented young men and women in this country threw down their rifles, threw down their uniforms, threw down their tools and walked away from their military jobs because of "hassles from the boss", as the kids say. Another 60,000 tied for first place (because of) our second largest reason, spousal difficulty, spousal misunderstandings, one of the most important reasons that we lose talented Guardsmen and Reservists today . . .

Ellis cites the United States Postal Service and small town police and fire departments as the agencies that least support

their Guardmen and Reservists because the preponderance of the work performed in these agencies is shift work that conflicts with week-end military duties.

Current law stipulates that employers must hold open the job positions of Reserve Component soldiers who leave their civilian jobs to perform military duty as long as they are not gone for more than ninety days in three consecutive years. A bill still pending in Congress would extend this job protection to soldiers performing military duty for not more than twelve months in three consecutive years. Civilian employers have expressed concern over the possibility of longer or more frequent absences for their Guardmen and Reservists employees. "'Who would hire them to begin with?' asks Warren Stumpe, a vice president of Rexnord, a Wisconsin-based manufacturing firm that numbers Guardmen and Reservists among its employees."41 Tony Velocci, staff writer for Nation's Business, points out that if that bill ever became law, "it would be a mixed blessing for Guard and Reserve members . . . Traditional business support . . . could soon be tested."42 Some employers and political leaders, however, support the idea of more protected military time for their Guard and Reserve employees.

42 Ibid.
Congressman William Nichols\textsuperscript{43} actively encourages employer support.

In the state of Alabama we provide up to 21 days of military leave to state workers who have to go to summer camp. And we do it with full pay. I feel like that's setting the right example . . . We're having enough problems as it is in attracting and in retaining people in the Reserves. You're asking a man and his family to do a good bit by giving up weekends and sometimes giving up the summer vacation in order that Daddy or the husband can go up to camp.\textsuperscript{44}

All of the personnel interviewed while conducting research for this study expressed the conviction that any across-the-board increase in training time minimum requirements would result in a mass exodus of Reserve Component personnel due to increased employer and family support problems.

Retirement Costs

War is highly competitive; we are trying to train people to endure the hardships and strain of war and we would be doing ourselves and our country a disservice to adopt measures which would soften the fibre of men in uniform.

Admiral Robert B. Carney, USN, 1895, remarks while Chief of Naval Operations to Naval officers stationed in Washington.

\textsuperscript{43}William Nichols has served in Congress since first elected in 1969 as a representative from Alabama. He has been on the House Armed Services Committee since 1969 and is the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation.

\textsuperscript{44}"Congressman Bill Nichols," Lt. Spiher, USNR, The Officer, May 1981, p. 27.
The retirement system for the Reserve Components is similar to that of the Active Component with three notable exceptions. First, retirement eligibility for a Reserve Component soldier is determined by the accumulation of retirement points, earned by attending training, schools, etc. There is a minimum number of points (50) per year that must be earned to have that year counted for retirement purposes. The second exception is that once a soldier serves for twenty qualifying years he may retire and will begin receiving retirement pay at age sixty. Lastly, many career Reserve Component soldiers serve beyond the twenty year minimum before eventually retiring. In doing so, they earn extra points which equate to extra retirement income. These factors have always been considered in budgeting for retirement costs and average costs factors have been developed to assist defense planners and Congress in developing the budget.

The current Reserve Component retirement costs are based on the service of soldiers who accumulated retirement points years ago before the advent of CAPSTONE and all of the associated programs that offer extra training time. Soldiers serving in the Reserve Components today are accruing more points much faster than their predecessors. In addition to more easily qualifying each year for retirement, today's soldiers are accumulating significantly greater point totals that, upon retirement, will result in
higher retirement pay. For one Colonel interviewed, each additional day of active duty performed equates to $.27 per month in additional retirement benefits. While an extra $.27 a month does not seem excessive, if all the extra training time now being used each year is considered, as well as the grade levels of the soldiers performing the extra training, future retirement costs begin to grow much larger. These greater retirement costs are not now being considered as additional programs, offering more extra training time, are developed to increased peacetime readiness.

At some point in the near future, funds supporting Reserve Component retirement must be increased to cover the escalating costs. Concern over increased retirement costs and large military budgets must be tempered however, with an appreciation for the decreasing number of young men and women available for military service.

America's available pool of young men and women in the late 1980's and early 1990's will be progressively smaller because of decreasing birth rates experienced during the 1960-80 time period.

To maintain present force levels, about one of four eligible males is now required to enter the military, active and reserves, officers and enlisted. According to Dr. Charles C. Moskos, the pool of available manpower in 1993 will shrink to the point that about one in three eligible males will be required to serve. If full-time
college youth are excluded, the ratio becomes approximately one in two.45

Table 11 in Appendix B depicts the dismal demographic situation facing the military service.

Administrative Costs Associated with Extra Time

To bring men to a proper degree of Subordination, is not the work of a day, a month, or even a year.

The different categories of extra training time now available for Reserve Component use have, in addition to the pay and allowance costs already discussed, associated hidden costs that must also be considered. Additional training opportunities require additional training time which often must be requested by the Reserve Component unit. The time required to prepare, staff, and approve/disapprove these requests can be surprisingly high. For example, when the 467th Engineer Battalion was selected to participate in a Reforger exercise for a three-week annual training period, the unit commander determined that seven additional MUTA-4's would be required to prepare for unit participation in the exercise. His staff prepared a detailed request for

approval of ADT and submitted it to their chain of command for approval. This request was reviewed at each command level and passed on through Army and FORSCOM levels to the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve where it was disapproved and subsequently returned through channels to the unit. Determined to secure approval for the additional training time, the battalion commander resubmitted the request with additional justification and the entire costly administrative process was repeated. Following a second disapproval and another round of appeals, funds were made available at Army level to support the extra training. This is not an isolated situation. These kinds of requests, and associated administrative costs, tax a peacetime chain of command already burdened with other responsibilities.

Another cost must also be considered. Each time a Reserve Component soldier performs extra training through use of ADT, ATA, etc., he must fill out a form detailing the time used, justification, and approving authority. These forms are then turned in to the unit, authenticated, approved, and sent forward to the servicing finance center for pay and retirement credit. Briefly, more extra time spawns extra paperwork which causes additional administrative workload that increases operating costs. Eventually, the administrative burden reaches the Army

46Interview with Col Paul L. Babiak, Senior USAR Advisor, FORSCOM, Ft McPherson, Ga., 7 February 1984.
Reserve Personnel Center, where soldier records are main-
tained.

The administrative costs associated with extra time
for Reserve Component training are not identified or cap-
tured anywhere within the existing management systems. Yet,
these costs will certainly continue to increase as pressures
for increased readiness, and the resultant extra training
time expended to achieve higher readiness, continue to
increase. As William D. Clark, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Army, Manpower and Reserve Affairs,
recently noted in an address to the Reserve Officer
Association's National Leadership Conference, "the trend
toward more reliance on Reserve Components will continue
into the future as missions continue to be transferred to
the Reserve Component."

Summary

We must remember that one man is much the same as
another, and that he is best who is trained in the
severest school.

Thucydides: History of the
Peloponnesian Wars, i, c. 404 B.C.

The training objective for all Reserve Component
units is to "attain the highest possible state of individual
and collective proficiency that can be achieved in a premo-

47"Secretary Clark Cites Role of Army Reserve," The
bilization training environment. To attain this objective and meet all peacetime training requirements, Reserve Component units and individuals rely on extra training time provided through a variety of programs. Use of additional training time often exacerbates spousal and employer support problems, results in the accelerated accumulation of retirement points, and increases associated administrative costs. Other approaches to solving or at least reducing the limited training time problem, such as maximizing use of the limited training time available through proper training management, continue to be emphasized. Proposals to increase Reserve Component unit readiness through across-the-board increases in training time have not been favorably considered. William D. Clark, testifying before a Congressional committee in 1980, best summarized the training challenge now facing the Reserve Components during their limited training time.

We have reached the point where Reserves must have the same level of emphasis and consideration as the Active Component because, under most scenarios, an increasing proportion of the Reserves will mobilize, deploy, and be employed along with, not following, the Active Army....49


CHAPTER 5

Conclusions and Recommendations

To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.
George Washington, Address to Congress, 8 January 1790

The concept of a readily available Reserve Component that could deploy with little or no postmobilization training and successfully accomplish wartime missions had its genesis in a different world than that of 1984. It was a post-World War II world in which there was no shortage of trained personnel; warning times were great; and the perceived enemy was geographically remote. Above all, it was a world in which military service was held in high regard and part-time military personnel were expected to be ready for mobilization and deployment to fight with equipment very similar to that which had helped win World War II.

That world has passed. Today's world is characterized by rapidly changing societal values and national priorities; it is a world of shortages and intense competition for constrained resources in the face of multiple threats and the requirements of diverse global contingencies with little or no warning time available or expected. These
changes in both the domestic and international environments have reshaped both the national military strategy and the subsequent thrust of force development efforts toward fulfilling all requirements necessary to support that strategy, militarily, on a global basis.¹

Today's world is characterized, above all, by a national military strategy that places a tremendous reliance on the U.S. Army Reserve Components to deploy forces on the same schedule as the Active Component. Yet, significant differences still exist between Active and Reserve Components that must not be overlooked. Differences such as time available for training, civilian employer and spousal relationships, and geographic location of units will always prevent the Reserve Components from becoming identical to their Active Component counterparts. Despite these differences, however, additional resources are being provided to the Reserve Components to improve peacetime training and readiness and strengthen the Total Army.

Conclusions

In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the military.


¹Interview with Colonel Donald C. Askew, Senior U.S. Army Reserve Advisor, Command and General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, Ks., 1 February 1984.
CONCLUSION #1: REQUIREMENTS VS TRAINING

Today's training requirements very often exceed the thirty-eight (nine) training days available annually. Consequently, additional time is being made available in the form of extended training periods and additional training assemblies. Units participating in overseas joint exercises as part of the Overseas Deployment Training Program, heavy Round-out battalions in rotation at the National Training Center, and Round-out battalions undergoing force modernization training for the M1, M2, and M3 combat vehicles are all performing three week (+) annual training periods. Units designated to train at the National Training Center also receive up to eighteen additional unit training assemblies, extra training days, and additional training assemblies for pre-NTC leadership training. The concept of Resource Management Assemblies to provide time for administrative support is now being tested. The patchwork extra time now being applied to selected units and individuals to alleviate time constraints is permitting attainment of peacetime training goals but does not reduce employer or spousal support problems. An across-the-board increase in unit training assemblies to improve readiness does not appear to be supportable. Research indicates that significant decreases in unit training assembly attendance, recruiting, and retention would occur if annual minimum training
requirements were raised beyond thirty-eight (nine) days annually.

CONCLUSION #2: CONGRESSIONAL INTENT and the LAW

The intent of Congress in establishing the Reserve Components after World War II was to provide for an immediately deployable, mission-capable force. Current law provides time guidelines for the attainment of peacetime training objectives. However, the total of inactive-duty training and annual training performed each year can be greater than the standard thirty-eight (nine) annually. This training has been limited to the established minimum each year, however, by the funding levels established in the budget.

CONCLUSION #3: FORCE STRUCTURE and INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS

The reliance now being placed on the Reserve Components will not change in the future. Nor will the process of wartime mission determination change. Resource constraints placed on Active Component force structure will continue to necessitate a heavy reliance on the Reserve Components for Round-out, combat support, and combat service support units capable of rapid deployment and effective performance whenever required for any contingency. Reserve Component readiness, and the resources dedicated to support that readiness, then become important signals of national intent.
to both allies and Warsaw Pact nations.

CONCLUSION #4: CAPSTONE and RELATED TRAINING PROGRAMS

CAPSTONE and the individual Reserve Component training programs established to improve readiness are working, but increase the peacetime unit workload, introduce an additional chain-of-command, and create the need for extra-premobilization training time. Increased levels of Full-Time manning, further reduction of peacetime administrative requirements, renewed efforts to maximize use of available training time, streamlining inspection procedures, and better articulation of actual CAPSTONE training requirements by unit commanders to both the peacetime and "assistance" chains of command would alleviate, to some extent, the problems now being imposed by both training time constraints and the extra time available to conduct necessary training.

CONCLUSION #5: EXTRA TRAINING'S HIDDEN COSTS

Extra training times costs extra money. This is reflected in the increased budget levels now supporting the various categories of additional training time each year. However, the hidden and associated costs of extra training time are not being considered by national policy-makers. Future Reserve Components aggregate retirement costs will escalate as the soldiers now earning extra retirement points
eventually retire. The associated costs incurred by soldiers performing extra training are more difficult to quantify, but do exist. They are reflected in the increasing number of soldiers leaving Reserve Component duty each year due to employer and spousal support problems. No staff or agency is currently identifying either future Reserve Component retirement costs or the relationships between pressures on soldiers to perform extra training, civilian employer and spousal support, a decision to separate from Reserve Component duty, and the associated costs of training a suitable replacement.

CONCLUSION #6: RECRUITING and DEMOGRAPHICS

Current Reserve Component recruiting campaigns stress part-time military duty as a way to learn a marketable skill while earning extra income without interfering with full-time civilian employment. As extra training opportunities are developed and funds to support the extra training time to participate in these training opportunities are legislated, the Reserve Component soldier is expected to dedicate more than the "standard" thirty-eight (nine) days a year to military training. The current recruiting campaigns downplay or ignore the additional training time requirements. Declining demographics coupled with growing civilian employer and spousal support problems will increasingly hamper the Reserve Component soldier who joined to
accomplish just thirty-eight (nine) days of military training each year.

Recommendations

I think the necessity of being ready increases--Look to it.

Abraham Lincoln: Letter (in entirety above) to Governor Curtin of Pennsylvania, 8 April 1861.

RECOMMENDATION #1: REQUIREMENTS VS TIME

PURPOSE: to provide a more realistic balance between requirements and resources.

Congress should reexamine the laws that provide annual premobilization training time, as well as the various categories of extra training time being made available, to determine if the minimum training times authorized, coupled with the various categories of extra training time, provide enough total premobilization training time to meet today's training and readiness requirements. If this reexamination determines that time resources, or the manner in which they are distributed, do not support attainment of all peacetime training requirements, then consideration should be given to revising applicable laws to stipulate annual total training times in excess of the present thirty-eight (nine) day standards depending on unit CAPSTONE mission and related premobilization training requirements.
RECOMMENDATION #2: CONGRESSIONAL INTENT and the LAW

PURPOSE: to increase resources commensurate with unit mission.

The Department of the Army should examine the total training time resources being provided to Reserve Component units and individuals, determine adequacy, and target any future increases in unit training assemblies to those high priority units, based on CAPSTONE priority contingency alignments, that must deploy with little or no post-mobilization training. Local commanders' perceived needs for extra training time must also be considered in this process.

RECOMMENDATION #3: FORCE STRUCTURE and INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS

PURPOSE: to achieve a better balance between requirements and capabilities.

The Department of Defense should reexamine the U.S. Army's increasing reliance on the Reserve Components to determine if the established mobilization and deployment schedules are realistic and achievable. If they are not, the additional premobilization training time necessary to meet these goals must be provided or the existing force structure altered to permit successful achievement of all international commitments.

RECOMMENDATION #4: CAPSTONE and RELATED TRAINING PROGRAMS
PURPOSE: to better relate training programs and reduce peacetime training distractors.

The Department of the Army should revise the 350 series (Training) of Army regulations to better articulate training under CAPSTONE, Active/Reserve Component relationships and responsibilities, and the often complex interrelationships and funding among existing training programs. In addition, Department of the Army should reexamine all Reserve Component administrative requirements and inspection procedures of all command levels in an effort to eliminate as many as possible and consolidate or streamline the remainder to reduce the quantity of training detractors now hampering peacetime training.

RECOMMENDATION #5: EXTRA TRAINING'S HIDDEN COSTS

PURPOSE: to determine true total costs of reliance on the Reserve Components.

The Department of the Army should develop total costs of the extra training time now being made available to assist defense policy-makers in future force structure decisions. In addition to standard Reserve Component pay and allowances, future retirement costs and annual separation (due to additional training requirements)/replacement training costs must be quantified so that true costs of present and future policies of reliance on the Reserve Components can be identified and considered.
RECOMMENDATION #6: RECRUITING and DEMOGRAPHICS

PURPOSE: to marshall civilian support of the nation's increasing reliance on the Reserve Components.

In light of the diminishing pool of available recruits through the year 2000, Congress should develop a system of federal/state incentives for civilian employers and increase the military benefits available to Reserve Component spouses to encourage their support of Reserve Component soldiers who will be encouraged/required to spend more than the minimum thirty-eight (nine) days a year in military training. In addition, the Department of Defense should revise Reserve Component recruiting campaigns to better reflect the true military commitment that prospective recruits are being enticed to make. Portraying a more realistic picture of total annual training time requirements should reduce the number of soldiers who eventually separate from Reserve Component duty because of the requirement to train for more than thirty-eight (nine) days a year.

Summary

It cannot be too often repeated that in modern war . . . the chief factor in achieving triumph is what has been done in the way of thorough preparation and training before the beginning of war.

Theodore Roosevelt: Graduation address, U.S. Naval Academy, June 1902.
In a time of scarce resources, the necessity for prioritization will always exist. Logic and good management mandate the resourcing of those claimants that best and most economically accomplish assigned missions. The economics of maintaining the Reserve Components in relation to the cost of Active Components are valid only to the extent that the Reserve Components can produce levels of readiness commensurate with Total Force needs and can respond to contingencies as an effective force within the established time requirements.\(^2\) Proposals to increase the reliance placed on Reserve Components and increase peacetime resourcing warrant thoughtful examination. Reserve Component units are the repository of skills that would be desperately needed in wartime and impossible, in terms of both time and money, to replace. Proper attention to the problems addressed in this study will assure that the Reserve Components remain a mission capable, readily deployable part of the Total Army.

APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY OF TERMS

War admittedly has its own grammar, but not its own logic.
Clausewitz: On War, 1832

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACCELERATED MOBILIZATION</td>
<td>Mobilization at a rate faster than programmed or planned, requiring units and members to enter on active duty without regard to planned schedules.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTIVE DUTY</td>
<td>Full-time duty in the active military service of the United States, other than active duty for training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTIVE DUTY FOR TRAINING (ADT)</td>
<td>A tour of active duty which is used for training members of the Reserve Components to provide trained units and qualified persons to fill the needs of the Armed Forces in time of war or national emergency and such other times as the national security requires. The tour of duty is under orders which provide for the return to non-active duty status when the period of active duty for training is completed. It includes annual training, special tours of active duty for training, and the initial tour performed by non-prior service enlistees.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AC SPONSOR
The AC unit designated as responsible for the provision of dedicated training assistance to a selected DTA unit. Normally an AC unit will not be asked to sponsor more than three RC units of comparable size.

AC/RC PARTNERSHIP
The improvement of training readiness and deployability through the establishment of a formal mutual support training relationship between major combat RC and AC units.

AFFILIATION
A funded and directed program to improve the readiness of selected Reserve Component high priority combat and support to combat units.

ANNUAL TRAINING
Inactive duty training periods authorized for selected individuals to participate in specialized training or in support of training. These are in addition to the training assemblies an individual attends as part of unit training.

BATTALION TRAINING
Training given to unit officers and NCOs to plan, conduct, and evaluate performance-oriented training.

MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (BTMS)

CAPSTONE
A management program designed to
CAPSTONE (continued) improve the readiness of the Total force through the alignment of Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) units into force packages which enable units to train and plan in peacetime for their wartime missions. A road map that orients a unit's readiness, mobilization and deployment programs toward the primary objective — the accomplishment of a wartime mission. It provides a guide for force readiness and aids in prioritizing resources.

CAPSTONE ALIGNED UNIT

Army units (AC or RC) which are aligned in one of the three principal CAPSTONE directions (Europe, Pacific, or South West Asia). To identify the specific alignment, refer to Vols II - IV of the Army CAPSTONE Program. Units listed on more than one principal OPLAN are identified in Vol I. The priority alignment is identified by an asterisk. Units will plan and train only in the identified priority direction. Where used in this regulation, the phrase CAPSTONE aligned unit or CAPSTONE alignment will refer to that wartime
chain contained in the OPLAN identified as Priority 1.

A contingency of sufficient gravity to require Reserve Component units to deploy in a peacetime configuration without the benefit of additional training or personnel and equipment fill.

A computer assisted activity designated to provide movement planning aids to Active and Reserve Component units and activities.

RC units who, upon mobilization, will be permanently assigned to another CONUS based MACOM. Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Communications Command (USACC), Health Services Command (HSC), Material Readiness Command (DARCOM), Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) are all gaining commands upon mobilization. These MACOMs have peacetime responsibilities to provide training assistance to the RC units and post-mobilization mission guidance based on MOU between FORSCOM and the MACOM concerned.
CORPS DIVISION

TRAINING COORDINATION PROGRAM

CORTRAIN is designed to provide a means of including the staffs of major AC and RC combat units in Corps level exercises. CONUS based Corps headquarters exercising under this program will use the priority CAPSTONE alignment in the selection of participants. Major AC and RC combat units not CAPSTONED to CONUS based Corps have been so aligned to permit their participation. Corps Commanders will ensure all CORTRAIN aligned units are cycled into the exercise program so that both CAPSTONE aligned and non-aligned units are afforded the opportunity to exercise in the Corps environment. Units in Hawaii participate with the concurrence of WESTCOM. Commander XVIII Corps, when requiring Echelons above Corps (EAC) play, will coordinate with Commander ARCENT for appropriate participation.

DATE REQUIRED TO LOAD

The date a unit must out-load at an installation to meet its assigned "in-theater" arrival date in support of a specific OPLAN.
DELIBERATE MOBILIZATION
This mobilization is characterized by its orderly approach and by sufficient time to execute progressive and phased mobilization actions.

DIRECT DEPLOYMENT
A term that indicates that the deploying unit has no post-mobilization training time authorized.

DIRECTED TRAINING ASSOCIATION (DTA)
A mutually beneficial horizontal training assistance relationship between an AC sponsor and an ARNG or USAR unit. The purpose of the relationship is to provide dedicated year-round training assistance to the RC unit with the objective of improved unit training readiness. Units previously identified in funded programs such as Affiliation and AC/RC Partnership are included under this title.

FORCE LIST
A list of forces, expressed as type units, constituting the total forces required by an operation plan, including assigned forces, augmentation forces, and other forces to be employed in support to the plan (JOPS). The UTC is the primary means for enumerating units in the force list.
FORCE PACKAGE
A grouping of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces linked together or uniquely identified so that they may be extracted from or adjusted as an entity in the TPFDD to enhance flexibility and usefulness of the operation plan during a crisis (JOPS).

FORCE REQUIREMENT NUMBER
The FRN is the alphanumeric code used to uniquely identify each force entry in the TPFDD of a given OPLAN. Not necessarily consistent between versions of a TPFDD (JOPS).

FORMDEPS
FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System. A five-volume set of documents which provides guidance and procedures and assigns responsibilities for planning within HQ FORSCOM, other MACOM, subordinate commands, mobilization stations and Reserve Component units.

INACTIVE DUTY TRAINING
Any of the training, instruction, or duty performed with or without compensation by members of the Reserve Components as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Army pursuant to Sec-
INACTIVE DUTY tion 501 of the Career Compensation Act
TRAINING (continued) of 1949, as amended.
INTENSIVE MANAGEMENT All Active and Reserve Component Army
FORCE LIST (IMFL) units are organized into 11 priority
force packages designed to fill the
requirements for wartime contingencies.
The IMFL is used as a basic management
tool for the resourcing of units.
KEY PERSONNEL A National Guard program to provide
UPGRADE PROGRAM personnel the opportunity to train in
unit activities with Active Component
counterparts.
LATEST ARRIVAL DATE The LAD is the latest date the sup-
ported commander wants the unit/
supplies to arrive at Port of
Debarkation in response to the concept
of operations (JOPS).
MOBILIZATION The process by which the Reserve Forces
or part of them are brought to a state
of readiness for war or other national
emergency. This includes assembling
and organizing personnel, supplies, and
materiel for active military service
(DOD Dictionary).
MUTUAL SUPPORT Mutual support training associations
TRAINING include all horizontal training
ASSOCIATION associations other than those which are
MUTUAL SUPPORT

TRAINING

ASSOCIATION

(continued)

directed (DTA). These associations between AC and RC units are not funded as part of any program, and should be covered by a locally developed memorandum of agreement.

(1) Roundout - A subcategory of DTA. An RC unit organized to complete an under-structured AC unit. Roundout units are given the same Troop Program Sequence Number (TPSN), priority for resources, will mobilize and deploy with their AC sponsor unit or as soon as possible thereafter.

(2) Affiliation - A subcategory of DTA. A dedicated training assistance relationship between an AC sponsor and a selected RC unit based on its priority and specific unit training need. RC units in the first six priority packages on the Intensive Management Force List (IMFL) are candidates for affiliation.

(3) Partnership - A subcategory of DTA. The alignment of major combat units of the RC with similar AC units for the purpose of improving the
| MUTUAL SUPPORT | training readiness of the RC units. |
| TRAINING ASSOCIATION | This category also includes the ARNG attack helicopter units air cav. |
| (continued) | troops, and their directed training association with partnership (counterpart) divisional aviation units. |
| NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER (NTC) | A training center that provides CONUS-based heavy combat battalion task forces 2 weeks of advanced, intensive combat training on a rotational basis in a general environment applicable to Europe, Africa or the Middle East. |
| OPERATION PLAN | A plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. It is usually based upon stated assumptions and is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commands to prepare supporting plans and orders. The designation "plan" is usually used instead of "order" in preparing for operations well in advance. An operation plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time. |
OPERATION PLAN (continued)
or on signal and then becomes the operation order (DOD Dictionary)

OPERATION PLAN IN COMPLETE FORMAT
An operation plan for the conduct of joint operations that can be used as a basis for development of an OPORD. Complete plans include deployment/employment phases, as appropriate (JOPS).

OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENT TRAINING (ODT)
A directed program which provides unique OCONUS training opportunities for selected high-priority Army units with their CAPSTONE gaining commands. Guidelines for RC ODT are outlined in AR 350-9 and in Appendix I to this regulation. ODT for AC units is addressed on a case-by-case basis by FORSCOM headquarters.

PLANNING AND SOURCING GUIDE (PASOG)
Provides the philosophy and concepts of force planning terms of CDR FORSCOM/USCINCARCED/CINCARLAND missions, planning agent responsibilities, and command and control considerations. This guide is designed to assist unified commands, component commands, and tactical headquarters in planning for the development and selection of
PLANNING AND SOURCING GUIDE (PASOG)(continued) 
appropriately tailored forces for world-wide contingencies. It is also intended to aid planning by MACOMs, TOAs, installation headquarters, and commanders at every level in the discharge of their responsibilities for the readiness training, deployment, and logistical/administrative support of the units/force packages listed herein.

POMCUS 
Pre-Positioned Organizational Material Configured in Unit Sets. The placement of substantial quantities of war equipment in European storage sites, ready for airlifted troops from CONUS bases to fall in on following their deployment.

RAPID DEPLOYMENT 
A force designed to respond swiftly to a non-NATO contingency.

READY TO LOAD DATE 
The day that a unit is estimated to be capable of deployment from its mobilization station enroute to an air/sea port of embarkation (POE).

SKILL QUALIFICATION 
A performance-oriented test normally consisting of a hands-on component, job site component, and a skill component.

The test measures individual profi-
ciency in performing critical tasks related to the soldier's primary MOS. Results provide the basis for remedial individual training.

SOLDIERS'S MANUAL (SM) A field manual listing the critical tasks for each skill level of an MOS. It provides the performance steps, the conditions under which the task is performed, and the standards which must be met. All tasks tested in the SQT are in the SM.

SPECIAL ACTIVE DUTY FOR TRAINING (SADT) A tour of active duty for training used to complete projects that are considered vital to Reserve Component programs. To qualify, the project must be a temporary special project of specific duration. It includes short tours of 1 to 179 days or extended tours of 180 days to two years duration.

TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE READINESS TRAINING (REDTRAIN) An Army-wide program conducted by national level intelligence agencies and activities designed to maintain and improve the technical and foreign language skills of tactical intelligence personnel.
TIMES

See the DOD Dictionary (JCS Pub 1) for additional details. (C-, D-, M- and N-Days end at 2400Z).

1. C-Day. The unnamed day on which a deployment operation commences or is to commence.

2. D-Day. The unnamed day on which a military operation, e.g., land assault, air strike, naval bombardment, parachute assault, or amphibious assault, commences or is to commence. (Will be superseded by JCS Pub 6.)

3. M-Day. The term used to designate the day on which mobilization is to begin. The day the Secretary of Defense, based on decision by the President and/or Congress, directs mobilization. All mobilization planning (e.g., alert, movement, transportation, and deployment/employment) will be based on that date.

4. N-Day. An unnamed day prior to C-day. (N002 = 2 days prior to C-Day.)

5. A-Hour (Alert Hour). A-hour is the time designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at which generation of non-alert
TIMES (continued) forces will commence.

6. **H-Hour.** The specific hour on D-Day at which a particular operation commences or is to commence.

7. **L-Hour.** The specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation commences or is to commence.

8. **Enroute Time.** The estimated time for one element to move from the origin to the Port of Debarkation.

**TIME-PHASED FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT LIST** (TPFDL) That part of the TPFD which includes a time-phased force list, identifies type units to be deployed, and provides data concerning their destination (JOPS).

The computer-supported data base portion of an operation plan; it contains time-phased force data, nonunit-related cargo and personnel data, and transportation data for the operation plan, including:

a. Units to be employed.

b. Units to be deployed to support the OPLAN, with a priority indicating the desired sequence for their arrival at ports on a given day.

c. Routing for forces to be deployed.
d. Mobility data associated with deploying forces.

e. Nonunit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted concurrently with the deployment of forces.

f. Estimate of transportation requirements that must be fulfilled by common-user lift resources as well as those requirements that can be fulfilled by assigned or attached transportation resources.

TPFDD REFINEMENT

A two-phased process that identifies specific forces, incorporates accurate movement requirements for the first 90 days of a TPFDD, and insures that the deployment transportation requirements for the TPFDD are within the capabilities defined in JCS guidance. The process is administered by JDA in coordination with the supported commands, supporting commands, services, TOA's, and other agencies. TPFDD refinement is a JDS procedure that complements JOPS procedures for selected operation plans and occurs during the JOPS plan development phase. Phase I provides
TPFDD REFINEMENT
(continued)
actual unit data to fill notional
requirements. Phase II allows the
Transportation Operating Agencies to
flow the force list (JOPS).

UNIT TRAINING
An authorized and scheduled training
ASSEMBLY (UTA)
assembly of not less than four hours
duration, including roll call and rest
periods. One retirement point and one
day's pay are authorized for each
assigned and attached individual who
satisfactorily completes the entire
assembly. This type of assembly is man-
datory for all troop program units,
except USAR schools.
### TABLE B-I

**RC Unit Contribution to Total Army Wartime Unit Structure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Active</th>
<th>Guard</th>
<th>Reserve</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Division Combat Increment</strong></td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Division Combat and Special Theater</strong></td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tactical Support Increment</strong></td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>?%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>General Support Forces</strong></td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Strength (000)**

TABLE 4-2

Comparison of Army Reserve Components to Total Army Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>National Guard</th>
<th>Army Reserve</th>
<th>Active Army</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combat Divisions</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separate Brigades</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Forces Groups</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armor Battalions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Artillery Battalions</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional Ammunition Companies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Equipment Maintenance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Training Divisions</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

TABLE B-3

FY84/85 Reserve Component Participation in Overseas Deployment Training

<table>
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<th>Command</th>
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<tr>
<td>USAREUR</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACIFIC</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCINCSO</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>80</td>
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### TABLE B-4

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program/Exercise</th>
<th>FY 84</th>
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<th>FY 85</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>cells</td>
<td>units</td>
<td>total</td>
<td>cells</td>
<td>units</td>
<td>total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ABLE ARCHER</strong></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CRESTED EAGLE</strong></td>
<td>138</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>94</td>
<td>93</td>
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<td>468</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>615</td>
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* DATA NOT AVAILABLE FOR FY 84
** DATA NOT YET AVAILABLE FROM DODCS

## Force Modernization Training

### TABLE 3-5  NUMBER OF M1 TASKS BY MOS

<table>
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<tr>
<th>MOS</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>M1 Tasks</th>
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<tr>
<td>41C</td>
<td>FIRE CONTROL INSTRUMENT REPAIRER</td>
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<tr>
<td>45G/34G</td>
<td>FIRE CONTROL COMPUTER REPAIRER</td>
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<td>45K</td>
<td>TANK TURRET REPAIRER</td>
<td>120</td>
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<tr>
<td>63G</td>
<td>FUEL &amp; ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS REPAIRER</td>
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<tr>
<td>63H</td>
<td>TRACK VEHICLE REPAIRER</td>
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### TABLE 3-6  ACTIVE COMPONENT NEW EQUIPMENT TRAINING

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<td>0.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>45G/34G</td>
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<tr>
<td>45K</td>
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<td>63G</td>
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<tr>
<td>63H</td>
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### TABLE 3-7  NONDIVISIONAL MAINTENANCE COMPANIES SUPPORTING COMBAT VEHICLES BY COMPONENT

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORCE COMPONENT</th>
<th>TOTAL COMPANIES</th>
<th>PERCENT</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACTIVE ARMY</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>ARMY RESERVE</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATIONAL GUARD</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>54</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>164</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
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B-5
TABLE B-8

TPFDD DEVELOPMENT*

PLAN REQUIREMENTS

JCS

MISSION FORCE ALLOCATION

SUPPORTED COMMANDER

CONCEPT COMBAT FORCES PRIORITIES

ARMY COMPONENT

CS/CSS REQUIREMENTS DEPLOYMENT PHASING

FORSCOM

TPFDD FOR APPROVAL

JCS

JDA

REFINEMENT

SUPPORTED COMMANDER

DRAFT TPFDD

ARMY COMPONENT

AUGMENTATION UNITS

* DEPENDENT ON:
  - PLAN SCENARIO
  - MOBILIZATION AUTHORIZED
  - FORCES ALLOCATED

3-6
## Reserve Component Training Assemblies

**ARNG**

- **UNIT TRAINING ASSEMBLIES (UTA)** - 48/INDIV/YEAR (≈24 DAYS) MINIMUM REQUIRED BY LAW.
- **ADDITIONAL TRAINING ASSEMBLIES (ATA)** - DISTRIBUTION WITHIN THE ARNG BY TYPE ATA AND UNIT.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command Supervision</th>
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<th>En</th>
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<tr>
<td>STARC/STATE HQS (10,000+)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STARC/STATE HQS (5,000-10,000)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STARC/STATE HQS (5,000-)</td>
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<td>36</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIVISION HQS (MAX 12/INDIV)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDE/GRP/BN HQS (MAX 12/INDIV)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Preparation</th>
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<tr>
<td>COMPANY (MAX 12/INDIV)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DETACHMENT (MAX 12/INDIV)</td>
<td>24</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership Training for Civil Disturbances</th>
<th></th>
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<tr>
<td>Varies by Unit</td>
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| Additional Flight Training Periods | 24 |

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<tr>
<th>Nuclear Weapons ATA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIVARTY/BDE/GRP</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155 FA ZW</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8&quot; FA BN (MAX 8/INDIV)</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155/8&quot; FA BN (MAX 8/INDIV)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HOW BRTY, ACS</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Additional Unit Training Assemblies (AUTA)</th>
<th>18/5 BNS/YR</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Commencing FY 83 for Roundout BNS Scheduled to Train at the NTC.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Readiness Management Assemblies (RNA)</th>
<th>TEST PROGRAM NOW BEING CONDUCTED - PROBABLE FY 86 IMPLEMENTATION IF CONCEPT VALIDATED AND APPROVED BY CONGRESS (MAX 12/INDIV).</th>
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<tr>
<td>DIVISION HQS</td>
<td>72</td>
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<tr>
<td>BDE/BN HQS</td>
<td>48</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMPANY</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Reserve Component Training Assemblies

**USAR**

- **UNIT TRAINING ASSEMBLIES** (UTA) - 48/INDIV/YEAR (= 24 DAYS).
- **ADDITIONAL TRAINING ASSEMBLIES** (ATA) - 12/INDIV/YEAR (= 6 DAYS).
- **ADDITIONAL FLIGHT TRAINING PERIODS** (AFTP) - 24/INDIV/YEAR (= 12 DAYS).
- **ADDITIONAL AIRBORNE UNIT TRAINING ASSEMBLY** - 6/INDIV/YEAR (= 6 DAYS).
- **ADDITIONAL ASSEMBLIES FOR RND, TRAINING**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BN STAFFS</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>EN</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARTY BNS</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **READINESS MANAGEMENT ASSEMBLIES** (RMA) (TEST NOW BEING CONDUCTED) 12 12

**Source:** U.S. Department of the Army, VCSA Study to Improve Collective Training Readiness in the Reserve Components through Additional Training Time. (Washington, D.C.: Office Chief of Staff Army, 21 November 1983). Tabs F, G.
TABLE 8-9 CON'T

Reserve Component Annual Training

ARNG/USAR

- **BASIC ANNUAL TRAINING** - 15 DAYS/INDIV/YEAR MINIMUM REQUIRED BY LAW

- **ADDITIONAL 6 DAYS TRAINING (3 WKS AT)** AUTHORIZED FOR:

  UNITS PARTICIPATING IN ODT/JCS Exercises - 15 BN/EAR
  ROUNDOUT BATTALION TRAINING AT NTC - 5 BN/YEAR
  NEW EQUIPMENT TRAINING FOR MAJOR SYSTEMS -
  M2/M3 REQUIRES ONE 3-WK AT
  M1 REQUIRES TWO SUCCESSIVE 3-WK ATs

- ARNG UNITS ARE AUTHORIZED ADDITIONAL AT DAYS AS REQUIRED FOR:

  TRAVEL TO/FROM AT SITE (1 - 3 DAYS)
  TANK GUNNERY DURING AT (7 DAYS)
  TRAIN-UP/SUSTAINMENT FOR HI-PRI MISSIONS (3 - 6 DAYS)

### Reserve Component Programs Funding

#### ARNG (SM)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 82</th>
<th>FY 83</th>
<th>FY 84</th>
<th>FY 85</th>
<th>FY 86</th>
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<tr>
<td>ANNUAL TRAINING (P+A) - OFF</td>
<td>55.72</td>
<td>60.92</td>
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<tr>
<td>- EM</td>
<td>190.79</td>
<td>215.23</td>
<td>213.43</td>
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<td>274.90</td>
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<td>ANNUAL TRAINING (TVL) - OFF</td>
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<td>4.44</td>
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<tr>
<td>- EM</td>
<td>10.12</td>
<td>14.34</td>
<td>20.91</td>
<td>22.72</td>
<td>23.88</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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<td>18.23</td>
<td>24.98</td>
<td>26.99</td>
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<td>UNIT TRAINING ASSY - OFF</td>
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<td>129.70</td>
<td>131.47</td>
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<tr>
<td>- EM</td>
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<td>660.21</td>
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<td>- EM</td>
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<td>9.84</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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<td>23.58</td>
<td>24.69</td>
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<td>28.34</td>
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<td>SCHOOL TRAINING</td>
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**Note:** All the above programs are NGPA except IDT Travel, which is OMARNG. FY 82 figures are actual others are estimates.

#### ARNG FY 84 - 89 (POM LOCK) ($000)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 84</th>
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<th>FY 86</th>
<th>FY 87</th>
<th>FY 88</th>
<th>FY 89</th>
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<td>19,500</td>
<td>24,250</td>
<td>24,250</td>
<td>25,750</td>
<td>27,250</td>
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<td>OPN TRAINING:</td>
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<td>RESTRAIN</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>778</td>
<td>800</td>
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<td>AVN TNC &amp; SPT</td>
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<td>4,875</td>
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B-10
<table>
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<th>TABLE B-10CONT'D</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Reserve Component Programs Funding</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>USAR (SM)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>ANNUAL TRAINING</strong></td>
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<td><strong>SCHOOL TRAINING</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td>FY 83 - 86</td>
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<td><strong>SVC MISSION/SUPPORT</strong></td>
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<td>(1) CONTAINS .7 MILLION FOR UNIT CONVERSION</td>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Males Age 19 (1,000s)</th>
<th>All Males</th>
<th>Eligible Males*</th>
<th>Eligible Males*</th>
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</tr>
</tbody>
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ASSUMPTIONS OF ANNUAL NON-PRIOR SERVICE ENTRANTS:
1. ENLISTED ACTIVE FORCE = 325,000
2. ENLISTED RESERVE FORCE = 45,000
3. ENLISTED GUARD FORCE = 60,000
4. ENLISTED TOTAL FORCE = 410,000
5. COMMISSIONED OFFICERS = 30,000
6. TOTAL ENTRANTS = 460,000
7. MINUS FEMALE ENTRANTS = 50,000
8. TOTAL MALE ENTRANTS = 410,000

*Two-thirds considered eligible on physical, mental, and moral grounds

*One-third of eligible males considered college population

If you're eager to return to civilian life, but reluctant to give up your hard-earned rank and benefits, joining the Army Reserve can give you the best of both worlds.

If you join now, you'll enter the Army Reserve at your present rank. An E-4 with 3 years earns over $1,660 a year part-time. Over $2,000 if you're an E-6 with 6 years' service.

You'll serve just one weekend a month and two weeks a year, usually in the summer. And you'll have PX privileges, credit for retirement, and all other Army Reserve benefits.

You worked hard to get where you are, so why not keep your rank and benefits in Reserve?

For more information, call toll free 1-800-USA-ARMY.
A GOOD PART-TIME JOB IS HARD TO FIND.

If you're headed back to civilian life, reserve yourself an extra income one weekend a month.

Did you know that one out of three Americans now "moonlights" to help make ends meet?

But as a returning veteran, you don't have to "moonlight." If you want an extra income, just "weekend" once a month with your local Army Reserve unit.

For instance, an E-5 with four years' experience now earns over $115 for a weekend's work. Over $1,922 a year, counting two weeks annual training pay.

As a Reservist, you also get PX privileges, low-cost life insurance, and retirement points toward a pension which begins five years before Social Security.

Wouldn't it be nice to have an extra income waiting when you get home?

It can be arranged!

See your reenlistment NCO or unit commander.

Or talk to your in-service recruiter, listed below. Act fast.

Good part-time jobs are scarce.

ARMY RESERVE, BE ALL YOU CAN BE.
See your reenlistment NCO, unit commander or in-service recruiter today

COMMANDERS CALL, Nov-Dec 1983
YOU WIND UP WISHING IT WERE MORE THAN ONE WEEKEND A MONTH.

You might find yourself in a chopper, cruising the treetops at 90 miles per hour. Or doing something more down to earth, like repairing an electronic circuit. What you won't find yourself doing is getting bored. Because this isn't ordinary part-time work. It's the Army Reserve.

You'll get valuable skill training. Then one weekend a month, and two weeks each summer, you'll put that training to good use, while receiving good pay and benefits.

But maybe most importantly, you'll come away with a feeling deep down that you were challenged and came through. And that doesn't disappear when Monday rolls around.

See your local Army Reserve recruiter about serving near your home. Or call toll free 1-800-USA-ARMY.

ARMY RESERVE. BE ALL YOU CAN BE.
You’ve got a lot to earn.

These days, an extra income is more important than ever, and the Guard can provide it. Generally, based on your grade and length of service, you will be paid for 48 training assemblies and one annual training period a year. That can add a bundle to your yearly income.

As a member of the Army Guard, you are eligible for limited PX and commissary privileges. Other benefits may include limited space available air travel, continued education, low cost life insurance, and retirement benefits. As a veteran, you’ve got a lot to earn in the Guard.

On Guard.
Because your military education is free.

Whether you want to pursue a skill you learned in the Army, or learn an entirely new one, the Guard can make a difference. To help achieve your objectives, we’ll pay for your training and even pay for your time. Our schools are located throughout the United States (you may have been to some) and offer a wide range of courses. We offer two types of schools: resident and non-resident (correspondence). Generally if your unit has a need, and if you qualify, you can attend resident courses. Correspondence courses are available to almost everyone. And we pick up the tab.

You may pursue a career that’s in big demand in today’s job market, one that could put you in demand. Here are just a few of your choices:

- Communications
- Computer Science
- Personnel
- Medical
- Carpentry
- Electronics
- Plumbing
- Environmental Support
- Surveying
- Heating Systems
Be a part of a team that makes history.

Combat Arms is where the action is. It's not an easy job. You'll have to push yourself to do your best, but you'll learn a lot, too. New skills. Experience in handling tough situations. Experience in leadership. Experience that can be a big help in whatever you do in civilian life.

You'll be part of a proud tradition. Army National Guard soldiers have been making history ever since the citizen-soldiers of Lexington and Concord fired the "shot heard around the world." Since that time, Army Guard units have established a distinguished record in every major conflict, including both World Wars, Korea and Vietnam.

As an Army Guard soldier today, your job may be to command your own small unit in combat, control a fast moving tank, direct a missile launcher, or supervise the construction of field defenses. Whatever job you do, you can be proud of it.

For one weekend a month and two weeks a year you'll practice to sharpen your skills. And you'll be earning extra income and many other benefits while you help to guard your country, state and hometown.

If you're willing to test yourself and win, to accept the demands of responsibility and leadership, you could be ready for the challenge of Combat Arms.
IT DOESN'T TEAR UP THE NATION.
IT TEARS UP A STATE.

AND WHO'S THERE TO HELP PUT IT ALL TOGETHER?

The Army National Guard of Kansas. Or. Mississippi. Or wherever that emergency may be.

You see, the Guard is the military branch that's first to come to a state's rescue.

The Army Guard is trained as a partner of the Army in case of national defense. Then it puts that training to work to protect your state and community.

Won't you join us? Two days a month and two weeks annual training (after your initial training) lets you earn extra income and learn new skills while you protect everything that's close to you.

For more information, call your local Army Guard recruiter or call toll-free 800-638-7600.* And see if we can put it all together for you.


The Guard is America at its best.
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Books:


An excellent reference for the conduct of research.
The section on content analysis is both comprehensive and concise.


LTG Collins presents a philosophy of training and then discusses the entire training spectrum from management through individual and unit training.


The text evaluates the experience and prospects of the Reserve Components in the all-volunteer era.


An interesting, but dated, review of the development of the Reserve Components and the influence of special interest groups on pertinent legislation.
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An interesting history of the National Guard, this text is strong on early history but very weak on recent (1970-84) developments.

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This text offers a unique set of procedures for identifying, in a useful and meaningful way, recurrent patterns within written and verbal communications.

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Gould, Clifford I., Director, General Accounting Office.  
Problems in Implementing the Army's CAPSTONE Program to Provide All Reserve Components with a Wartime Mission. 
Director, GAO Letter to the Secretary of the Army, 

Laird, Melvin R., Secretary of Defense.  Support for Guard and Reserve Forces.  Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director, Defense Research and Engineering, Assistant Secretaries of Defense, and Department of Defense Agencies. 

The Secretary of Defense memo that provided specific guidance on the actions to be taken to upgrade Reserve Component Readiness.

U.S. Department of the Army. AR 350-1, Army Training. 

This revision updates HQDA training policies, objectives, and programs; defines responsibilities, and includes guidance on common military training.


A one-stop source that gathers useful information concerning the role of the U.S. Army as an instrument of national security into a single volume.


A well written report on USAONE ODT in Europe, Korea, and Japan highlighting program problems and shortfalls as well as strong points for FY 82.


Report details special problems encountered in training Reserve Components in Korea during FY 82.

This report concludes that substantial reduction in post-mobilization times can be realized by extending the training week, eliminating non-mission essential training, and by eliminating division level field exercises for early deploying units.


This paper provides a concise overview of the Army experience with post-mobilization.


This LOI defines AC/RC Partnership relationships and delineates objectives, policies, and responsibilities for the program.


This letter explains the expansion of the Affiliation Program and redefines selection criteria.

This regulation supplements DA policy and guidance on training in the Reserve Components.


This document provides information and guidance to RC unit commanders to assist them in mobilization planning, mobilization, and movement to mobilization station.


This document provides installation commanders with information to assist them in preparing for and executing mobilization and deployment.


This information paper provides guidance and training standards for ARNG roundout battalions scheduled for training at the National Training Center.
Battalion Training Management System
This information paper provides background information on the Battalion Training Management System and its application within the Reserve Components.

Force Modernization Training for RC Units
This information paper describes new and displaced equipment training for RC units, identifies responsibilities, and provides guidance on force modernization planning.

Reserve Component Non Commissioned Officers' Education System
This information paper provides the background for and goals of the RC NCO education system.

FORSAM USAR School System
This information paper details the goals and responsibilities of the USAR school system.

This information paper provides the purpose, objectives, and responsibilities as well as trend data, of the ODT program for RC units.


This information paper provides updated information on the Affiliation Program and plans for a Phase III expansion.

FORSCOM 5-Year Overseas Deployment Plan, 3rd ed. by MAJ Donald Skipper, LTC Robert Odom, Mr. Kenneth Klarner, and Su Shaw. Ft. McPherson, Ga.: World Wide Military Management Command and Control System. May 1983. This is an excellent document that details ODT program plans and participation as well as statistical management information.


This document contains the budgets for USAR training programs as well as the FORSCOM Commanders statement of critical areas and shortages.

This regulation supersedes all previous guidance, policies, and regulations pertaining to Affiliation, Partnership, CORTRAIN, CAPSTONE and implements applicable provisions of AR 350-9 (ODT).


This updated regulation incorporates CAPSTONE philosophy in establishing training standards for the Reserve Components.


An excellent paper that questions whether the current techniques used to inspect and evaluate the Reserve Components best serve the needs of FORSCOM and Reserve Component commanders in determining readiness for mobilization and performance of wartime mission. He concludes that current techniques are, in fact, detrimental and proposes streamlined methods that would not interrupt or detract from unit training and yet provide better measurements of unit readiness.

This paper reviews the plans for testing mobilization planning and execution and to determine ARNG field artillery battalions readiness for mobilization and performance of CAPSTONE wartime missions.


This regulation contains specific provisions for the conduct of ARNG aviation activities and details the rules governing use of AFTPs.


This booklet provides a ready reference for all personnel involved with the organization and training of the ARNG. It includes current facts on the training, education, force structure, and authorization documents of the ARNG.
Additional Flight Training Program (AFTP) by Mr. Ronald Eaton, Aviation Division, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md. 23 November 1983.

This information paper provides the background on the AFTP and outlines a survey currently underway to determine if more extra training time is necessary.


This is an excellent and timely study of some of the time related problems discussed in this thesis. The Study Group interviewed selected General Officers and reviewed several RC Training programs. Their efforts resulted in a number of recommendations on improving readiness. VCSA decision was pending as of this date.


This is a guide for the preparation of inspections. Generic in nature, it presumes that the upcoming inspection (and preparation for that inspection) has the highest priority within a Reserve Component unit.

This report describes the exercise requirements that the unit would have to accomplish prior to deployment to the exercise area.


This circular establishes policies, priorities, training goals, and guidelines for the conduct of training for all subordinate units of the battalion for training year 1982.


This is a detailed document that describes tasks and responsibilities for the unit's 2-30 September 1982 participation in REFORGER.

This report details the problems and shortcomings in the training and supply of RC missile and munitions units.


This report provides the background and Congressional concerns that led to the reestablishment of the Army Reserve just prior to World War II.
This report details the concerns of Congress following World War II and the debate over whether or not (and how much) to pay the new peacetime USAR as well as indicating what was expected of them.

This report discusses what the committee expected the Reserve Components to do during IDT and the readiness standards they would be required to attain.

This report details the proposed significant changes to the Reserve Component environment and specifies the Congressional intent for an immediately responsive Reserve Component.


This report provides the background and intent of Congress that led to the passage of the Act that established the Reserve Components as an immediately deployable force in time of national emergency.

This report also provides the vital background and Congressional compromise and intent in establishing the post-Korean War Reserve Components as a rapidly deployable force in time of national emergency.


This report detailed the readiness and unique training problems confronting the Reserve Components in 1953-1954.

This report provides some insights into the problems (and proposed solutions) confronting the Reserve Components of 1954-1955.


This report indicates the Congressional concern of 1955 over the very low readiness of the Reserve Components and the proposed solutions to make them ready for mobilization.
The results of some of the readiness improvement programs of the 1970's are detailed here as well as plans for the expansion of several of these programs to make the Reserve Components readier for mobilization and deployment.

This report provides a status report on Reserve Component organizational structures and readiness programs.

This excellent document discusses the inherent problems in relying on the Reserve Components to rapidly respond in times of national crises and makes three proposals to improve the RC's ability to rapidly mobilize and deploy as a framework for future debate.


This is a very detailed study that recommended limited reorganization of the Reserve Components to strengthen command lines while retaining separate ARNG and USAR structures, as well as targeted ADT for priority units.


The purpose of this study was to make a careful and comprehensive review of the RC missions, manpower, equipment, and training needs. This volume provides the study's executive summary of findings and recommendations.
OSD Reserve Components Study, vol. 2.

This volume details RC 1971 capabilities and makes a requirements versus capabilities comparison, as well as reviewing RC readiness improvement programs.


This is a status report of RC units that notes the increase reliance being placed on the RC to rapidly respond to mobilization and deployment requirements, suggests that the RC may not be capable of meeting its mobilization requirements and suggests more pre-mobilization training time as a possible solution.


A detailed assessment of Reserve Component Training and Readiness.

This is a very detailed report on the threat, DOD missions and capabilities, and improvement programs for both active and reserve forces.

Periodicals and Articles:


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Though dated, the report identifies 33 concepts with potential for improving the level of RC unit readiness. Several recommendations deal with pre-mobilization training resources.


A good assessment of the pre-mobilization capability of selected high priority Reserve Component units and recommended measures to improve RC unit capabilities to meet deployment schedules.


This report is a review and analysis of the historical experiences of mobilization and deployment of the Reserve Components from World War II through Vietnam.
Macathan, Wallace C.; Berger, D. C.; Connerat, W. H.;

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Volume 2 contains details of the study group's concept of tailoring the number of training assemblies conducted each year and varying unit manning levels for USAR units.
Simms, Edward D., Jr. and White, Thomas A. *A Concept for Training Reserve Component Mechanics to Support the M1.*
Washington, D.C.: Logistics Management Institute
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This report presents a proposed concept for training RC nondivisional DS and GS units to maintain the M1 tanks and its components.

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A review of the current Reserve Components and a proposal for reorganization to better meet mission requirements.


The essay presents the results of a unit commander survey which indicated that additional pre-mobilization training time would be necessary for RC units to attain required readiness.


This report examines the use of program review and evaluation techniques as a management tool to assist RC Commanders in planning for and conducting mobilization.

The essay examines RC readiness status of the 1970's and the programs designed to improve that low readiness.


This excellent study reviews the evolution of the Total Force Policy and the 1975 RC missions and capabilities to assess weaknesses in the Total Force Concept and propose solutions to strengthen the concept.


A comprehensive history of the RC from the Revolutionary War Militia to the Total Force of the 1970's.

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