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THE INDIAN OCEAN NAVAL ARMS LIMITATION TALKS:
FROM A ZONE OF PEACE TO THE ARC OF CRISIS

A Thesis
Presented to the Faculty
of
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

by

JAMES FRANCIS GIBLIN, JR.

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

The history of U.S. involvement in the Indian Ocean is long and varied. Successive U.S. Administrations have tried to safeguard and further U.S. and Western interests in this oil-rich and strategic part of the globe.

In the immediate post-World War II period, the Truman Administration, relying on the U.S. nuclear monopoly, forced the Soviet Union to end its occupation of Northern Iran. Several years later, in 1949, the U.S. established the Middle East Force as a symbol of its interests in the region. President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles promoted various regional security pacts and tried to establish a Northern Tier consisting of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan as a bulwark against Soviet-inspired attempts to expand communist influence and geographic reach at the expense of the West. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, preoccupied with events from Cuba to Southeast Asia, did not concentrate their attention on the region for the most part until Great Britain announced its intention to withdraw "East of Suez." The Nixon Administration inherited this legacy as well as the specter of a politico-military vacuum in the region. Still tied down in Southeast Asia and constrained by domestic opposition to new foreign commitments,
Nixon and Kissinger built a multidimensional apparatus of regional security without undertaking costly and major U.S. military commitments.

This approach consisted of the Nixon Doctrine with its emphasis on Iran and Saudi Arabia and a modestly enhanced U.S. naval presence. This framework lasted until early 1977 when signs of stress began to appear. These included the growth of Soviet military capabilities in the region, a decline in U.S. military strength vis-à-vis the USSR, and a recognition by some that the U.S. had relied too heavily on local states. Concurrently, there was a growing movement among the Non-Aligned Nations to declare the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. Domestically, there was strong congressional opposition to enhancing U.S. military presence in the region.

The Carter Administration initially ignored these signposts of stress and tried to further détente by means of naval arms control in the Indian Ocean. This approach ended abruptly because of Soviet gains in the Horn of Africa, the fundamentalist Islamic revolution in Iran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the Indian Ocean Naval Arms Limitation Talks (NALT) were the first substantive attempt to control naval warfare since the Washington Naval Arms Limitation Treaty of 1922 and its successor regimes. They were significant because they furnished an insight into the tone of the Carter
Administration's approach to both national security policy and arms control and signalled a change in U.S. foreign policy for the Indian Ocean region.

This study examines these talks based on open source literature, declassified documents and a measure of deductive as well as inductive reasoning. It proceeds from some general, well recognized principles of arms control as a technique of international political behavior to the analysis of four specific issues that confronted the superpowers in their negotiations. By reviewing the events that form the background to the talks and identifying the rationale for the apparent shift in U.S. policy on NALT, the study analyzes these issues in terms of both the policy and operational impact on U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean region.

In the broadest sense the Indian Ocean talks may be a unique case study of the formulation of U.S. national security policy in a regional context as well as vis-à-vis the Soviet Union without the associated "historical baggage" of the long-standing superpower relationships in Europe and Northeast Asia. In addition, the background to the talks, their issues, and their aftermath reveal a compelling relationship among arms control, geography, and national security policy.

The study concludes that there still is a strong linkage between the element of power and the geographic
circumstances in which states find themselves and that the Carter Administration's "mental map" of the region gave rise to an arms control forum that tried to separate the geo-strategic entity, the Indian Ocean, from the larger, global concerns of the United States. This in turn suggests that a broader, more sophisticated appreciation of the influence of geography on arms control in particular and national security policy in general is needed.
VITA

Commander James F. Giblin, Jr., USN, was born in Maplewood, New Jersey, on July 15, 1943, the son of the late James F. and Jean McDouall Giblin. He entered the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland, in 1962 and was graduated and commissioned an Ensign on June 8, 1966.

Following a tour as Communications Officer in USS F AN (DD-782) homeported in San Diego, he served as Office in Charge of PCF's 18 and 80 operating from Danang, RVN. He also served as Officer in Charge of a detachment of ten PCF's operating out of Chu Lai, RVN. Additional sea tours include duty as Executive Officer and Weapons Officer in USS GURKE (DD-783) homeported in Yokosuka, Japan, Commanding Officer, USS DEFIANCE (PG-95) homeported in Naples, Italy, and Executive Officer in USS REASONER (FF-1063). He is currently serving as Commanding Officer, USS KIRK (FF-1087) and is homeported in Yokosuka, Japan.

His tours of duty ashore have included service in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and duty under instruction at the Naval Destroyer School and Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. He graduated with highest distinction from the latter in June 1979. CDR Giblin holds
a Bachelor of Science degree from the U.S. Naval Academy, a Master of Arts in International Relations from Georgetown University, and a Master in Arts in Law and Diplomacy from The Fletcher School. He was awarded the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by The Fletcher School in May 1984.
Figure 1. The Indian Ocean Basin
PREFACE

As a naval officer with a good deal of operational experience in the Indian Ocean and background on matters relating to the region, it seemed ironic to me that the United States and the Soviet Union would seriously sit down to negotiate a limit on the deployment of their respective naval forces in the Indian Ocean precisely at the moment when the West finally recognized that the vulnerability of its oil supply was a crucial, if not vital, factor in the national security calculations of the United States and its allies. Nonetheless, on March 9, 1977, President Jimmy Carter announced that he had proposed that the Indian Ocean be completely demilitarized. Carter's initiative was significant because it furnished an insight into the tone of his approach to both national security policy and arms control and signaled a change in U.S. policy for the Indian Ocean region. As a result of Carter's initiative, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in the first substantive attempt to control naval warfare since the Washington Naval Arms Limitation Treaty of 1922 and its successor regimes.
Despite an auspicious beginning, Carter decided to forgo further talks on the subject because Soviet naval operations in support of the USSR's political activities in the Horn of Africa in 1977 and 1978 suggested that there was no common understanding on how the Indian Ocean Naval Arms Limitation Talks, commonly referred to as Indian Ocean NALT, would actually affect the behavior of the United States and the Soviet Union in the region. Despite a brief flurry of activity at the June 1979 Vienna Summit, the talks remain dormant.

As a student, I found that academic literature was rich in analyses of arms control and disarmament; but literature devoted specifically to conventional naval arms control was rare. Indeed, there was relatively little current scholarship on this subject. It seemed that historians especially had not examined naval arms control negotiations in their entirety with a view towards isolating generalizations about their various aspects. Indeed, there did not appear to be a single scholarly work that covered the period from the Washington Naval Conference to the demise of the regime established at Washington during the Second London Naval Conference in 1935.

I also found that none of the existing works addressed their subjects by utilizing geography as a principal element in their analysis. This was surprising to me because one particularly popular academic approach to arms control has
been concerned with measures to reduce military confrontation in border areas. These studies assumed that mutual withdrawal of military forces would reduce the risk of war-provoking accidents or incidents, thereby reducing tension and the chances of conflict. Schemes to accomplish this recurred frequently throughout the literature, most often in proposals for nuclear-free zones and a mutual reduction of forces, usually in Europe. However, there were few, if any, specific mentions of confrontations which happened at sea.

The absence of geography as a determining element in arms control literature was also evident in a review of that literature. This was not at all surprising since geopolitics, the relation of international political power to geography, received scant attention after World War II due, in part, to the fact that it had exerted an undue influence under the leadership of the German geopolitician, General Haushofer, on the power calculations and foreign policies of the Nazi regime. Moreover, the advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles convinced some analysts that geography had lost the relevance that it formerly had to the relationship between states. They argued that this was especially so in the case of the Soviet Union and the United States because a strategic nuclear exchange—the central factor in that relationship—was largely independent of geography.
However, it seemed to me that geography and its influence on inter-state relations had undergone a resurgence of sorts in recent years. In 1977 Colin Gray's *The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era* explored the often overlooked relation of geographic setting and physical power to international politics with a view towards setting the national security policy of the United States in a global framework. Edward B. Atkeson cogently explained Soviet perceptions of geopolitics in 1976 in his "Hemispheric Denial: Geopolitical Imperatives and Soviet Strategy." Alan K. Henrikson's "The Geographical 'Mental Maps' of American Foreign Policy Makers" argued in 1980 that statesmen responded to world events as they perceived and imagined the world—which may not be the way the world really is.

The Indian Ocean Naval Arms Limitation Talks emerged as a saddlepoint between my professional and academic observations on the subjects of geography, arms control, and national security policy. In the broadest sense, Indian Ocean NALT may be a unique case study of the formulation of U.S. national security policy in a regional context as well as vis-à-vis the Soviet Union without the associated "historical baggage" of the long-standing superpower relationships in Europe and Northeast Asia. Moreover, the talks highlight in microcosm a wide range of factors and issues which are central to international politics in general and arms control in particular. In addition, the
central issues of the negotiations offer an insight on several specific politico-military considerations of arms control viewed in the context of the theory of arms control but tempered by the geography of the Indian Ocean.

To a large extent, I based this study on my professional association with the problems of naval operations in the Indian Ocean. My studies in diplomatic history and international security studies at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Georgetown University, and the Naval War College created the academic and analytical framework. Unfortunately the negotiating records of the talks remain under the protection of those portions of U.S. law pertaining to material under negotiation with foreign governments. Hence, my research focused on the small portion of documents that I was able to have declassified, interviews with members of the Carter Administration who were associated with the talks, and open source literature tempered by a measure of inductive as well as deductive reasoning. Nonetheless, this dissertation represents the framework and substance of what is available and, therefore, is conclusive for the time being. What precludes this study from being complete are those documents which cannot be used

in works such as this because of the security interests of the states involved. Moreover, the loyalty and discretion of individuals who have served their respective governments also locks further information in their minds and private papers. Even though this study is concerned with both historical reporting and analysis of national security policy, I do not believe that these shortcomings distort the thrust or findings of the dissertation.

I am particularly indebted to Cyrus Vance, Paul Warnke, and Leslie Gelb for graciously taking time from their busy professional lives to discuss the talks with me and suggest various sources of information and avenues of approach. Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, USN (Ret.), former Chief of Naval Operations, shared his thoughts and recollections of the first round of the talks with me during a trip from his home in Honolulu to Washington. VADM Marmaduke G. Bayne, USN (Ret.), was a most gracious host at his home, "Seascape," in Irvington, Va. His broad grasp of the issues of the talks as well as his expertise on the Indian Ocean region caused me to rethink some of my original ideas. Capt. Gary Sick, USN (Ret.), presently with the Ford Foundation, was an incisive and helpful critic as well as a source of general insight into the subject. Professor Paul Doty of the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University assisted me in putting my research on the origins of the talks in perspective. Professor Philip Stewart of the
Political Science Department at Ohio State University expanded on Paul Doty’s assistance and provided me with material from the Tenth Dartmouth Conference.

The staff of the Australian Consul General in New York was most helpful, and understanding, in locating much of the material on the Australian perceptions of the talks. Mr. Murray Bradley and the staff of the Naval War College Library in Newport, R.I., overcame some rather unusual administrative obstacles that enabled me to use the War College’s fine library as if I had been assigned there. The personnel of the Naval Ocean Surveillance Information Center in Suitland, Md., did yeoman-like work in retrieving the data on Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean. Mrs. Connie Nordahl worked diligently in the typing and preparation of this study through its various stages despite my shortcomings in penmanship and style.

Professors Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Alan K. Henrikson of The Fletcher School directed my work throughout and offered constructive criticism in matters of both substance and style. Both of these men along with their colleague at Fletcher, Professor John C. Perry, convinced me that, when all is said and done, strategy is an intellectual exercise. However, I alone am responsible for errors of fact, opinion, and conclusion. I also am indebted to the Honorable Fred C. Iklé, Francis J. West, and the late Captain Hugh G. Nott, USN (Ret.), for their comments on a
1978 project that formed the substance of this dissertation.

Finally, I owe the largest debt of thanks to my wife Pat who, in addition to serving as a sounding board and monitor for this whole undertaking, has endured and sometimes even enjoyed the vagaries of Navy life that ultimately led to our assignment to Fletcher. Though I suppose I should dedicate this to her, the credit for this endeavor finally coming to pass belongs to a fellow naval officer and friend, the late Lieutenant Robert L. Crosby, United States Naval Reserve, and to the officers and men of the "Brown Water Navy" and especially to those who "remained upriver."
PART ONE

THE PROBLEM
CHAPTER I

THE SETTING

. . . There are, strictly speaking, only two geostrategic regions today: (1) the trade-dependent maritime world, and (2) the Eurasian continental world. Projecting our views into the future, we anticipate the eventual emergence of a third geostrategic region—the Indian Ocean.

-- Saul Bernard Cohen (1963)

. . . Current and future strategic concerns seem to find too little reflection in the present arms control approach. . . . Arms control must again address the dominant security concerns.

-- Christoph Bertram (1980)

Introduction

It seems ironic that the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in four rounds of bilateral negotiations in 1977 and 1978 to limit their respective naval forces in the Indian Ocean. These talks, surprisingly, took place at a time when the West finally recognized that it was vulnerable to the interruption of its oil supply—then a crucial, if not vital factor in the national security calculations of the United States and its allies. Moreover, the Indian Ocean Naval Arms Limitation Talks, commonly referred to as
NALT, are difficult to understand when considered in the context of geography—one of the dominant factors that has shaped the perceptions of the Indian Ocean in both U.S. and Soviet national security policy.

The United States has traditionally had interests in the region which have had little to do with the presence or absence of the Soviet Union there. These interests have been principally maritime in nature and have been dominated by the fact that communications between the United States and all of the states of the region must cross the Indian Ocean. However, the Soviet Union shared land borders with one of the states of the region which was crucial to the economic well-being of the United States and its allies. Moreover, the distance from the Indian Ocean to the southern borders of the Soviet Union was less than 1000 miles in certain cases. On the other hand, the continental United States was more than 10,000 miles away. These seemingly mundane facts of the physical geography of the Indian Ocean and their effect on the national security policies of both states is a classic case of geography at work in the policy process.

These geographic realities suggest that the United States had different military requirements in the region from those of the USSR. Events in the Horn of Africa, Iran, and Afghanistan lend credence to this perception. If the Indian Ocean Naval Arms Limitation Talks had resulted in an
arms control treaty that did not equitably address these differences, the flexibility of the United States to respond militarily to events such as these would have been curtailed. The acceptance of such a restraint by the United States seems to contradict the geographic realities of the region described above. Nonetheless, as a result of President Jimmy Carter's initiative on March 9, 1977, to "demilitarize the Indian Ocean," the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in the first substantive attempt to control naval armaments since the Washington Naval Arms Limitation Treaty of 1922 and its successor regimes in the 1930's.

There are several fundamental questions about these talks that remain unanswered. Why did the United States choose to negotiate with the Soviet Union in the first place? Why did President Jimmy Carter make this decision at the time he did? What factors influenced these decisions? The answers to these questions require an analysis of several others. For example, was Carter's policy for the Indian Ocean consistent with that of previous administrations? If it wasn't, how did it change under the Carter Administration? What were the immediate and long-term implications for U.S. national security policy as a result of these talks and the events surrounding them?

This study probes these questions, and others, within the framework of a broad range of issues. They include the
origins of the talks, their politico-military implications, and the impact of technology on the contending positions of the two sides.

Within the category of origins, the study addresses the formulation of U.S. national security policy for the Indian Ocean since 1970, the impact of the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace on that policy, and the issue of congressional oversight of Diego Garcia. By examining Soviet literature on the subject, the study assesses Soviet interest in the question of naval arms control in the Indian Ocean and how this shaped the Soviet negotiating strategy. The study also traces the views of officials in Carter's national security apparatus on the subject and how these perspectives shaped the decision to negotiate with the USSR on the Indian Ocean.

The political issues of the talks highlight in microcosm a range of factors which are central to international politics in general and arms control in particular. These include interests, risks, and perceptions and how they affected U.S. national security decision-making for the Indian Ocean. The study examines such diverse politico-military elements as bases, strategic forces, the alliance implications of the talks and general purpose forces. Because these issues have a technological side as well as a politico-military one, they can offer an insight into the subject of technical arms control, tempered by the
geographic realities of the Indian Ocean. This in turn leads to a consideration of technical arms control versus political arms control and how each side viewed the Indian Ocean negotiations in this regard.

In the broadest sense, Indian Ocean NALT is a unique case study of the formulation of U.S. national security policy in a regional context as well as vis-à-vis the Soviet Union without the long-standing inheritance of the superpower relationships, as in Europe or Northeast Asia. Because of this, the diplomacy surrounding these talks provides an opportunity to examine a recent case study of the continuing debate between realism, geopolitics, idealism, and arms control as guiding forces in U.S. foreign policy. Moreover, because geography so heavily influenced the national security policies of both states for the Indian Ocean, the study addresses the broader issue of the role that geography brought to bear on these issues and the talks themselves.

The Methodology and the Measures of Effectiveness

The analysis of these issues cuts across several disciplines including those of international politics, arms control theory and practice, and diplomatic history. Because this study blends factors from each of these fields, it does not test the Indian Ocean negotiations on the basis of any one of these disciplines above. The complexity of
arms control in the national security calculus of the super-powers makes such a unitary approach to what is a process of integration of many factors suspect at best. The application of these several disciplines to the talks provides a means of examining them in a more comprehensive context.

This study measures the Indian Ocean Naval Arms Limitation Talks against several fundamental assumptions of international politics. The first of these is that arms control is a technique of international political behavior that may lead to restraint on the use of force or the acquisition and deployment of armaments. The second is that arms control negotiations may attenuate or divert other political or legal conflicts. The third premise is that arms control is a technique and process in which one actor in the international system tries to influence the structure and deployment of the military forces of an adversary. If successful, the actor can then perhaps change a fundamental national security doctrine of his foe. These techniques are grounded on a set of assumptions that form, in theory, a complementary means of enhancing national security. Were the three assumptions cited above mutually reinforcing or did they contradict each other in the case of the Indian Ocean talks? If they were in opposition to each other, then what effect did this have on the negotiations?

The lessening of the scope of war has been closely linked to the concept of strategic parity between the United
States and the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, strategic parity has heightened concern about the ability of the two superpowers to regulate the use of force and the escalatory potential of conflict at the conventional level. Conflicts wherein U.S. and Soviet nationals killed each other seemed likely to develop into crises which may not have been controllable. These types of conflicts may well have occurred wherever Russian and U.S. forces operated in close, geographic proximity to each other. Hence the perception that effective regional arms control offers one method of defusing superpower conventional conflicts or at least limiting their potential to escalate.

What has evolved from this concern over the ability to control conflict was a concept of two zones of interaction within the international system. The first was an area in which the superpowers avoided the use of force and violence to alter or maintain existing political arrangements on an inter-zonal basis. These areas included the continental United States, the USSR, Japan, the PRC, and Western and Eastern Europe. They were areas of conflict avoidance. The second zone was one wherein conflict management was the rule. The superpowers appear to have placed the entire Third World in this second zone.

Taken together, this technique and process of international politics try to compensate for one of the fundamental facts of the international system: most nations are
free to arm themselves. They do so to achieve and maintain their core state values of security, sovereignty, equality, and economic well being or for geographic and political expansion and conquest. This quest for armaments acknowledges that there are goals that otherwise could not be attained unless a nation has the capacity to employ force. Though some argue that arms control provides an alternative technique to attaining security through the possession of arms, there are others who view it as merely a process of regulating a political relationship by varying the levels and types of armaments that an adversary can bring to bear in a crisis. It is important to determine which of these analytical concepts applied to NALT. Such a determination will identify the intellectual approach to arms control that shaped Carter's decision to negotiate on the Indian Ocean. It will also enable one to assess its long-term validity, in light of the course of history and the realities of the relationship between the United States and the USSR as superpowers.

Given this political context of arms control, it is just as important to recognize the respective geographic circumstances in which the superpowers found themselves. The United States, at the time, was a maritime power and the Soviet Union was a continental power. These facts plus the premise that the basic framework of arms control negotiations is political, suggest that one of the fundamental
considerations in the formulation of the political context in which negotiations are cast is geography. Did this political context with its geographic derivative drive the choice of issues to be negotiated in the case of the Indian Ocean? If so, what does this mean for other arms control agenda?

Given this interaction among these various considerations of arms control, it is important to distinguish between what has been termed political and technical arms control. Robin Ranger defines technical arms control as a process by which two or more states negotiate solutions to potential problems of instability in the balance of military forces whether they be nuclear or conventional. Such solutions usually involve technically effective restraints on the quantity, quality, or deployment of the forces so limited or controlled: hence "technical" arms control. Synonyms include real, effective, substantive, or meaningful and legitimate arms control. Such arms control negotiations can, but need not, have political significance, as well as having a measurable net effect on force deployments or developments. In contrast, what Ranger termed political arms control is a technique which has no, or very little, technical effect. That is, it is a process which imposes no real limitations on military forces, technology, or activities, but which does have considerable political significance. Synonyms for this kind of arms control,
though usually pejorative, include nominal, cosmetic, ineffective, symbolic, or token.¹

Ranger explains this distinction by way of examples. He argues that Carter's March 1977 SALT II proposals were technical arms control. They included, for example, significant reductions in superpower strategic forces and extensive constraints on the modernization of these forces. Both were designed to lessen the threat to strategic stability posed by the emerging vulnerability of the land-based U.S. ICBM force. Similarly, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty limited both the U.S. and USSR to very low levels of ABM deployment. The 1974 Protocol to the Treaty lowered this level further from two to one ABM site each with no more than 100 ABM launchers. In both cases, the military forces and deployments of both sides would have been affected by the arms control regimes proposed, unsuccessfully in the case of Carter's 1977 proposals but successfully in the 1972 ABM Treaty.

The difference between these two measures of arms control becomes clear if the so-called partial measures, from the 1959 Antarctic Treaty to the 1977 Environmental Modification (ENMOD) Convention, are considered. These involved promises to abstain from activities which were of

¹ Robin Ranger, Arms Control in Theory and Practice (Kingston: Center for International Relations, Queen's University, 1981), p. 3.
little or no military use, such as military activities in Antarctica or ENMOD for military purposes. For political purposes, however, considerable importance could be, and was, attached to "demilitarizing" Antarctica—an area which had not and could not (at least not then) be militarized—and to "banning hostile military ENMOD techniques," an activity which was not yet possible. 2

The problem is how one blends the political and technical approaches in a specific arms control proposal with national security remaining the independent variable in the relationship. This is significant because technical arms control can have political significance which can be either positive or negative for the negotiating parties. The problem with a purely technical approach to arms control is that it oftentimes ignores the broader, political ramifications of the issues at hand while purely political arms control does not come to grips with the significant military issues at hand. If this is so, then it is instructive to examine how the United States and the USSR approached NALT? Was it technical arms control, political arms control, or a blend of the two? What should the proper choice have been?

Given the foregoing, there are certain measures of effectiveness which can be applied to a specific arms control proposal. The first of these is derivable from the

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2. Ibid., p. 3-4.
differences between purely political and purely technical arms control. This distinction suggests that the basic arms control approach of the adversaries may very well be asymmetrical. Hence any arms control proposal must be capable of addressing these asymmetries and resolving them. One such asymmetry is the adversaries' geographic situation since location influences the choice of allies as well as doctrine and force structure. Other asymmetries include such issues as existing and planned military capabilities, technological bases and capabilities, and the values and interests of the states concerned. How many of these elements of arms control came to bear on the talks and were able to resolve such differences will indicate, to some degree, the capacity of conventional arms control negotiations between the superpowers to resolve such problems.

The second measure of effectiveness is the degree to which an arms control proposal affects the interests of allies. This is a self-evident, though often ignored, proposition because arms control agreements have implications in international politics far beyond the relationship between the two superpowers. Negotiations which offer hopes for a modicum of stability for the superpower relationship may generate uncertainty and insecurity among one or the other's allies. The net effect of this consideration is that no member of a military alliance can initiate arms control talks which are not, in the main, acceptable to its
allies. Because the case of the U.S. consultations with its NATO partners on the issues of SALT I and SALT II suggest that this measure of effectiveness is both valid and significant, it is important to examine what was the impact of the Indian Ocean talks on the Western allies.

The third measure of effectiveness deals with the idea of relative advantage. Historically, arms control agreements have been successfully negotiated only where a careful attempt has been made to preserve prevailing strength ratios among the participants. The carefully worked out ratio system of the Washington Naval Conference is an example of this premise. Hence, almost any control or reduction of armaments inevitably produces shifts in relative power. However, a second kind of a shift is more subtle. No two nations have exactly the same kinds of security problems, and therefore the utility of any particular kind of force structure varies from state to state. Historically, Great Britain emphasized the importance of a strong navy, while continental powers emphasized their armies. The Soviet Union has extensive land frontiers along with a long history of invasion by land. Except for Cuba, all of her important allies are accessible to it by land. In contrast, the United States has only a minimal requirement to defend its land borders, but is more dependent upon overseas commerce, and has extensive commitments to its overseas allies. This
makes its army more crucial to the Soviet Union and the Navy more crucial to the United States.

Thus any arms control agreement that did not address this doctrinal asymmetry would have an unequal impact because of the differences in national needs and geographic circumstances. Moreover, there are certain implications for crisis management in this notion of marginal advantage which need to be considered in any arms control option. Did the talks come to grips with this problem of relative advantage? The answer to this question is important because crises today may in fact represent a surrogate for war at the superpower level. If this is true, then the importance of the superpower's military capabilities that can be brought to bear to attain a position of escalation dominance in a crisis is a vital factor of statecraft and must be addressed in regional arms control talks.

The fourth measure of effectiveness is that an arms control proposal must be negotiable. This suggests that the adversaries must agree on a context for negotiation of their issues and that the outcome in this forum must be acceptable to its members. In the final analysis, any agreement which is reached should provide an outcome which the adversaries prefer to having no agreement at all. This is, and must always be, a political decision. Nonetheless, the more important the issue, the less likely is the chance of agreement. Could talks on the Indian Ocean have produced
such an agreement or was the importance of the Indian Ocean in the national security policy of the U.S. and the USSR of such a scale that there was little chance for agreement?

**Linkage and the Objectives of Arms Control**

Identification of the objectives of an arms control proposal is crucial to the integration of arms control in national security planning. These objectives set the standard of accomplishment and provide tests of feasibility for possible alternatives. Choice of the right objective is more important than choosing the right alternative since accomplishment of the wrong objective may result in failure.

Nations traditionally negotiate arms control agreements to achieve some combination of at least three objectives: the enhancement of national security, the reduction of military expenditures, and the attainment of non-military goals. Against these interests must be set those national concerns which prompted the acquisition and deployment of arms in the first place. The primary concern of a state is its national security and, to be acceptable, an arms-control agreement must at least not diminish that security, and preferably enhance it. The second concern is with the role of military force as an instrument of national policy in peacetime. If this is to be circumscribed by the agreement, then it must be clear that the overall gains from the
agreement outweigh the probable losses. It is in securing these political objectives that the association of linkage politics with arms control has come to be a common and accepted tactic.

A most convincing and substantial case can be made for a specific arms control agreement if there is an affirmative response to the question, "Will an agreement substantially reduce the probability of war?" Henry Kissinger argued that "the test of any agreement is whether it adds or detracts from stability, whether it makes war less likely or more so. . . ." However, under certain conditions, some weapons systems and force structures might well be a stabilizing influence and tend to reduce the probability of war. An example is the relatively invulnerable nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) which, allegedly, was not accurate enough to be a credible first strike weapon until the advent of the Trident II (D-5) missile. If both superpowers have only systems that are susceptible to a first strike, any condition of strategic parity between the U.S. and the Soviet Union will be substantially less stable. It follows that some forms of arms control which render an SSBN force more invincible, while not alleviating

the vulnerability problems of the bomber and missile forces, may destabilize the relationship between the superpowers.

In a like manner, anything else which reduces the credibility or capability to respond to a threat may be destabilizing over a period of time. Such things as a substantive change in relative military strength or any series of events which requires a sudden or substantial increase in force levels during a period of superpower political tension can be destabilizing. Actions that provide prompt and authoritative sources of information about the intentions and capabilities of adversaries (i.e., intelligence) tend to increase stability by lessening the chance for miscalculation or accident.

Nonetheless, history provides an abundance of cases that dispute the logic that arms control agreements nurture stability. It has been argued that the single most significant factor that brought about World War II in Europe was the failure of Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union to enter into an arms race against Germany with sufficient vigor and clarity of purpose.4 In a similar manner, the Washington Naval Treaty may have led straight to Pearl Harbor. The United States, the British, and the French, lulled by the Treaty and hard pressed to find money

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for their navies, permitted their building programs to lag behind their quotas while the Japanese, and later the Germans, took full advantage of their quotas. The post-World War I arms limitation agreements—demilitarization of the Rhineland and the various naval agreements—may also have failed to prevent World War II. Some scholars conclude that those agreements helped to bring on World War II by reinforcing the blind and willful optimism of the West, thus inhibiting military preparedness and diplomatic actions that could have deterred the war. What were the prospects of an Indian Ocean arms control agreement enhancing the national security of the United States?

Reduction of Defense Expenditures

The limitation of defense funding is not new. Imperial Russia tendered the first major initiative of this type at the Hague Peace Conference in 1899. Since then, this means of arms control has been suggested numerous times in a variety of forums but there is no known case wherein constraints on a nation's naval budget have been accepted and

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The major objective of any arms control measure limiting funding for naval forces is to increase the perception of stability in the international system as well as the security of its actors by constraining the level of naval force that one actor can bring to bear on another. It is complemented by the notion that if conflict does occur, the decreased level of expenditure may contribute to the lessening of the destructive potential of modern naval warfare.

In addition to saving money, constraints on military budgets have two other perceived advantages. Because they are couched in monetary terms, such restrictions can cover the entire spectrum of naval programs. This includes such program elements as research and development which are difficult to control physically. Secondly, since funding is the most general of all force measures, budgetary limitations permit states sufficient latitude in reallocating resources to meet special requirements within agreed limits.

Not too long ago, the mention of arms control conjured up visions of large sums being diverted from the defense budget to domestic programs. However, the cause and effect relationship is not that simple and this expectation is no longer valid. Arms control agreements may not yield rapid

and significant reductions in defense expenditures for two principal reasons. First, there is the delayed cost question. An arms control agreement may only serve to change the timing of defense expenditures. In this regard, there has been a distinct tendency on the part of the United States to alternate periods of low military profile with periods of sustained rearmament. World War II and the Korean War are cases in point. The results have proven to be not only militarily precarious but also less than economically efficient. The second problem is that an arms control agreement may not result in a net reduction in expenditures but an increase in other military outlays or even qualitative improvements in the armaments subjected to constraints. Moreover, it is clear that the SALT accords have not reduced Soviet expenditures.

Yet of all the objectives of arms control, this particular one may have offered the best chance of achieving some symmetry of interest in the Indian Ocean talks. Both nations demonstrated some desire to reduce their naval expenditures. However, while the percentage of the U.S. GNP allocated to defense declined, there was evidence at the time that there would not be a corresponding slowdown in the

Soviet military growth rate. Given the foregoing, then it is of some significance to examine how the Carter Administration shaped its naval program and what effect, if any, this program had on the role of the U.S. Navy in the Indian Ocean.

**Attainment of Non-Military Goals**

A nation may use arms control as a means to achieve a non-military goal. This theorem suggests that national security is a precondition of attainment of other core values of the state (i.e., equality, sovereignty, and economic well-being). By means of manipulating its level of armament, a nation may be able to enhance its ability to pursue effectively its other goals whether they be political or economic. This objective incorporates the primacy of politics and economics in the international system. The principal strategy that has been employed in the pursuit of these non-security goals, and in some cases security objectives, is linkage politics. In the case of U.S.-Soviet relations, the United States has generally pursued the strategy of linkage while the USSR has tried to block the strategy. Though there are other meanings for the term, linkage is both a conscious strategy and a deliberate tactic.

of binding separate issues together. It is a negotiating strategy—a quid pro quo type of arrangement.

There were three key reasons why the U.S.-Soviet relationship gave rise to linkage situations. First, there was no "normal" economic system between the two countries. All aspects of the relationship were highly politicized. The two states were rivals in conscious opposition as economic systems and political ideologies. Since World War II, they had confronted each other as the leaders of two competing military coalitions. Moreover, even the most basic exchange was seen as fraught with political meaning. 10

Second, the relationship was asymmetrical. The Soviet state was a monopoly not only of political power, but also of economic power. Economic development was both a central concern and responsibility of the political leadership. But the USSR was oriented to the U.S. in the way a less developed country is oriented to a developed country, needing the more advanced state's technology, managerial expertise, and finance. For the U.S., economic matters were less pressing. While trade may have been profitable for certain sectors of the U.S. economy, it hardly in itself was of central concern to Washington. Thus there was a tendency to

seek political concessions in return for economic concessions the Russians sought.¹¹

Third, the United States government had to concern itself with the play of domestic politics and find a way to mediate between certain factions who viewed the Soviet Union as a market and others who were concerned more with the ideological, political, and security practices and goals of the Soviet state.¹²

The issue of linkage and arms control during the Carter Administration remains a delicate one. On October 6, 1976, during the second Ford-Carter debate in San Francisco, presidential candidate Carter said that he would bargain more toughly with the Soviet leadership, move human rights to the fore of his foreign policy, and abandon the secret and pragmatic diplomacy of the early 1970's.¹³ Carter repudiated his intent to employ linkage politics as a tactic in achieving these goals shortly after being elected. In February 1977, he explained that:

"... I think we come out better in dealing with the Soviet Union if I'm consistently and completely dedicated to the enhancement of human rights ... and I think this can legitimately be severed from our inclination to work with the Soviet Union, for instance, in reducing dependence..."

¹¹ Ibid.
¹² Ibid.
upon atomic weapons, and also in seeking mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe. I don't think we want the two to be tied together. Yet on January 4, 1980, he asked the Senate to defer further consideration of the SALT II Treaty in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. How did this rejection and then reaffirmation of linkage operate in the case of the Indian Ocean talks? Was it a credible basis from which to deal with the Soviet Union in the region?

The Means to These Ends—Regional Arms Control

The method of arms control that was most applicable to the U.S.-USSR Indian Ocean NALT was the imposition of limitations on the naval capabilities of the two states in a regional context. Arms control proponents have often suggested regional arms control agreements as a means of defusing potential areas of conflict. As a process, regional arms control seeks to impose constraints on the movement into or basing of forces in an agreed upon geographic area such as the Indian Ocean. The principal goal is the enhancement of the political and military stability in regions of both conflict avoidance and conflict management although, in a sense, regional arms control shares the same broad objectives as all other efforts to

reduce or control military capabilities. The classic naval example of such an arrangement is the Rush-Bagot Treaty of 1817 wherein Great Britain and the United States agreed to limit the number of naval vessels deployed on the Great Lakes. A second and more recent example is the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America or the Treaty of Tlatelolco. It contains protocols which commit its signatories to respect the denuclearization of Latin America and not to use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons against any of the other signatories to the treaty in the region.15

Geography clearly is a central element in the regional approach to arms control. Virtually from the earliest times the owner of territory has endeavored to devise some effective means of protecting it from external aggression.16 In modern terms arms control arrangements on a regional basis have consisted of demilitarization agreements, nuclear

15. At the time the United States was a party to Additional Protocol II of this treaty. See U.S. Treaties, etc., "Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America," United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, TIAS 7137 (Washington: U.S. Department of State, 1971), v. 22, pt. 1, p. 754-756, 766-786. President Carter forwarded Additional Protocol I to the Senate for ratification on May 24, 1978. It should be noted that Cuba was not a signatory to the treaty.

weapon free zones, zones of peace, confidence building measures, and actual force limitations or reductions. Because the origins of Indian Ocean NALT and the talks themselves contained elements of all five of these approaches, this raises the question of whether or not they are compatible. Moreover, were they applicable to the Indian Ocean?

**Geography and Arms Control**

Although political and military leaders have paid lip service to geography for centuries, they have not always appreciated its lessons or, more significantly, applied them. National security planning requires a knowledge of the effects of geography on military operations. In this sense it seems imperative that policymakers dealing with problems of national security such as arms control not be satisfied with a simplistic appreciation of Mercator geography. They should realize that this geographic system creates distortions and hence misconceptions. Only by appreciating and applying the elements of a region's geography in a global sense is it possible to comprehend the world as a unit wherein geography, power, and strategy are intimately linked. Though geography, including the mental images manifest in policymaker minds, is not the sole, and rarely the decisive, factor in national security calculations, geographical factors, both objective and
subjective, have been underestimated in the study of international politics in general and arms control in particular.\(^{17}\) These notions raise one final question about the Indian Ocean negotiations. Did a concern for enhanced U.S.-Soviet political and military stability in the Indian Ocean region distort Carter and his advisors' mental image of the Indian Ocean region within a global framework?

The American geographer Saul Bernard Cohen offered several theories in 1963 which are useful in addressing this question. Cohen argued that any framework of geopolitical analysis should distinguish between divisions that have global extent and those that have regional significance. He called the first a geostrategic region and the second a geopolitical region.\(^{18}\) He went on to explain that a geostrategic region must be large enough to have certain global influencing characteristics and functions. Moreover, a geostrategic region is the expression of the interrelationship of a large part of the world in terms of location, movement, resources, and cultural bonds. It is a single feature region in the sense that its purpose is to embrace areas over which power can be applied. He cited control of


strategic passageways on land and sea as frequently being a crucial element to the unity of geostrategic regions.\textsuperscript{19}

A geopolitical region, according to Cohen, was a subdivision of the geostrategic region and was an expression of the unity of geographic features. Because it was derived directly from geographic regions, this unit provided a framework for common political and economic actions. Contiguity of location and complementarity of resources were distinguishing marks of the geopolitical region. Cohen argued that geopolitical regions were the basis for the emergence of multiple power nodes within a geostrategic region. Put another way, the geostrategic region had a strategic role to play and the geopolitical region a tactical one.\textsuperscript{20}

Carter's Secretary of Defense Harold Brown alluded to this kind of conceptual framework in June 1977 when he remarked that:

\begin{quotation}
In addition to Europe, there are a number of other areas around the world in which there are delicate or even potential explosive situations. The Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and Korea are three examples of areas where the U.S. and its allies have vital interests. Conflict in one of these areas not only might require the dispatch of some appropriate U.S. forces to the scene in support of friends and allies; such a contingency could very
\end{quotation}

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
well precede and even set off a crisis or conflagration in Europe. Was this indeed the perception of the Carter Administration with respect to the Indian Ocean? Or did, in reality, Carter address the Indian Ocean as a geopolitical region in the talks? If the former is the case, then how did the geostrategic nature of the region shape the issues of the negotiations? If the latter is true, then were the talks simply a tactic in Carter's vision of the U.S.-Soviet relationship?

In summary, the objective of this study is to outline a case study of a regional arms control regime to limit naval forces from which a series of generalizations can be drawn. These generalizations will provide insight into the national security policy of the Carter Administration as well as the role that geography plays in arms control.

PART TWO

THE BACKGROUND OF THE TALKS
CHAPTER II

THE DISTANT ORIGINS OF THE TALKS

The future is like a corridor into which we can see only by the light coming from behind.

-- E.J. Weyer

Thomas B. Millar, a noted Australian scholar and student of Indian Ocean affairs, once argued that the majority of foreign policy decisions were like Topsy—they just grew. They matured out of past policies, were shaped by the bureaucratic process, and were heavily circumscribed by the logic, or lack thereof, of events. This logic and the legacy of the past explained most foreign policy transactions and, where they did not, they could be called on to justify those policies.¹ One can draw a parallel to Millar's observations in examining the evolution of a specific national security policy. In the case of U.S. national security policy for the Indian Ocean, there were four such sequences that formed the logic of that policy

with respect to the Indian Ocean Naval Arms Limitation Talks.

The first was the formulation of the concept of an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace in September 1970 at the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in Lusaka, Zambia, and subsequent actions on the proposal by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The second was the attempt by members of the U.S. Senate from 1974 through 1976 to operationalize NALT in the Indian Ocean. Throughout both of these, the U.S. and the Soviet governments maintained a consistent position on the subject: they discounted the utility of NALT in both word and deed. The third event that influenced Indian Ocean policy was the move into the Carter Administration of policymakers who sharpened their ideas on this subject through their association with the Tenth Dartmouth Conference in May 1976 and a study conducted by the United Nations Association of the United States (UNA-USA) in November 1976. Former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance confirmed that these three sequences of events were uppermost in his mind at least when President Carter announced his intentions with respect to the Indian Ocean.²

The last, and perhaps the most significant, event was the recognition by Carter in early 1978 of an increasing

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level of instability, uncertainty, and insecurity in the littoral along the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean and the function which naval power would play in any role the United States might choose for itself as a result of these disturbances.

U.S. Presence in the Indian Ocean and the British Withdrawal from East of Suez

For over one hundred and fifty years Great Britain imposed a Pax Britannica on the Indian Ocean. The cutting edge of that force for stability was the COLONY and LEANDER class cruisers of the Royal Navy and their successors that Great Britain argued for so forcefully in the London Naval Conference of 1930. The Royal Marine Commando, as well as other British forces on station at such posts of the Empire as Aden, Singapore, and Trincomalee, bolstered the presence of the Royal Navy. Moreover, the British political residents in the states along the Persian Gulf insured that Great Britain's interests, as well as those of its friends, were protected.

The United States traditionally favored this arrangement. Even as late as 1964 Prime Minister Harold Wilson remarked after a meeting in Washington with President Lyndon Baines Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara that "the most encouraging fact about the conference was America's emphasis on Britain's worldwide role" and that "McNamara had gone out of his way to emphasize the
importance of Britain's role east of Suez.\textsuperscript{3} However this presence and its effect were to be short-lived.

Though there is an abundant literature on Britain's decision to end its role east of Suez, it is worthwhile to review the highlights of that decision.\textsuperscript{4} In June of 1966 elements of the British Labour Party argued for decisive reductions in the United Kingdom's military commitments east of Suez so that Britain could focus more on its military requirements in Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The cost of maintaining military forces suitable for use in the European theatre was rising. Moreover, these forces were not compatible with the kinds of missions that the U.K. historically had encountered east of Suez. The landings in Kuwait in 1961 at the request of the Government of Kuwait for assistance against Iraq as well as the suppression of mutinies in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika in 1964 demonstrated that a qualitatively and quantitatively different force structure than that required by the British Army of the Rhine in Germany was necessary for operations.


like these. This issue and Great Britain's declining economy dictated that a resource-driven policy decision was inevitable.

When this dilemma came to the fore in January 1968 Wilson announced that the United Kingdom would withdraw its forces east of Suez by 1971. Spurred by one of the several economic crises that marked Wilson's tenure as Prime Minister, Wilson also explained that all British aircraft carriers, the very instruments which had permitted Britain to intervene in the littoral of the Indian Ocean, were to be scrapped. The details of the U.S. reaction to this decision as well as the degree to which the United States took part in the debate remains a subject for future scholars. However, two things are certain. The first is that Wilson's decision marked the beginning of a concerted effort by the United States to establish a logistics support facility in the Indian Ocean. The second is that the Soviet Union began

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to deploy naval forces to the region on a regular basis less than two months after Wilson's announcement.\textsuperscript{8}

U.S. association with the Indian Ocean region dated from the eighteenth century and the entry of the United States into global maritime trade. Geography influenced this activity because the only favorable way to reach the trade of Asia and the Indies was via the Cape of Good Hope and the Indian Ocean because of the wind patterns in the Indian Ocean as opposed to those in the Pacific. The geography of these winds in the days of sail was also the starting point for anyone planning military operations in the Indian Ocean as well as the navigational considerations of U.S. merchant captains who sought out new markets for the developing industry of the United States.\textsuperscript{9} One of the earliest contacts in this regard was the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman in 1833.\textsuperscript{10}

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8. The first Soviet surface combatants deployed to the Indian Ocean in March 1968. The first Soviet submarine appeared in the region in March 1968 with the surface combatant group. Soviet naval TV-95 BEAR aircraft operating from bases in Soviet Central Asia began reconnaissance flights over the Indian Ocean in 1967. See SECSTATE WASHDC msg 122333Z Sep 80 (State Cite 233001) (Subject: Soviet Military Buildup in the Indian Ocean Region).


Nonetheless, with the exception of occasional transits of the ocean by such forces as the squadron commanded by Commodore Robert Wilson Shufeldt, USN, in 1879 and the Great White Fleet in 1908, U.S. military presence in the region remained insignificant until World War II.\textsuperscript{11}

Prior to 1945, when the European colonial powers dominated the area, U.S. interests centered on Persian Gulf oil.\textsuperscript{12} During World War II the United States established the Persian Gulf Command in Iran to deliver lend-lease equipment to the Soviet Union. Only given lip service as a major combined command, the China-Burma-India (CBI) theatre remained a backwater of operations during the war. In the 1950's the U.S. began sending military advisory missions to Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Ethiopia. These missions complemented the growing economic aid to the region and underscored U.S. concern for the area. In addition, the


United States, largely through the efforts of Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles, expanded the idea of containment
to the Indian Ocean by supporting such regional defense
agreements as ANZUS in 1951 and the Baghdad Pact in 1955
along with its successor the Central Treaty Organization
(CENTO) in 1959. Moreover, the United States entered into
bilateral agreements with Iran and Pakistan thereby forging
the first formal U.S. security commitments in the region.

Nonetheless, it was not until 1971 that Congress saw
fit to examine U.S. policy for the region. Congressional
hearings revealed a wide diversity of opinion both within
and outside the U.S. government foreign and national
security policy apparatus as to what were the real U.S.
interests in the region, what the United States and the
Soviet Union were doing there, and what U.S. policy for the
region should be. Other hearings followed these in 1972
and 1973 and focused on U.S. policy in the Indian Ocean.

13. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific
Developments, The Indian Ocean: Political and Strategic
Office, 1971).

14. See U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, The United
States and the Persian Gulf, Hearings (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1972); U.S. Interests in and
Policy Toward the Persian Gulf (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1973) (hereinafter referred to as Interests
in and Policy Toward the Persian Gulf).
These proceedings revealed that U.S. military presence in the region was modest to say the least. Ever since 1948 the U.S. Navy had maintained a flagship and two destroyers in the Indian Ocean. These ships constituted the Middle East Force (MEF). They performed essentially politico-diplomatic functions such as showing the flag, demonstrating U.S. interest in that part of the world, and enhancing U.S. friendship with the littoral states through an extensive schedule of port visits by individual MEF units. Throughout the several crises, such as the troubled history of Iran during the 1950's and the Suez crisis of 1956, the tiny force of one seaplane tender and two destroyers remained unchanged.

This low force level was commensurate with a national security objective of maintaining stability. Naval forward deployments in sensitive areas were a classic diplomatic expression of a state's intention to foster stability and demonstrate interest in a region. These commitments also served to develop relationships favorable to U.S. interests. These tactics presumed that the principal U.S. interests in the region, an area where the United States could not easily maintain a military capability, were commercial and economic in nature. The United States left the politico-military considerations to Great Britain.

Oil and mineral resources were the most important in this regard. The United States and the other industrialized
nations depended on the Indian Ocean region for natural resources including, in addition to oil, such strategic minerals as antimony, asbestos, copper, lead, nickel, tin and uranium. Access to these resources was indispensable to the economic structure of Europe and Japan. At the time of the 1973 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) boycott western Europe depended on oil from the region for 75% of its energy needs; Japan's dependence was conservatively put at 85%. Moreover, some 50% of the world's seaborne oil imports crossed the Indian Ocean. Hence a stable regional order in which the states of the area favored international cooperation rather than conflict was a reasonable national security objective for the United States. At the time, the military mission performed by the MEF was a logical expression of a military capability to support this policy objective.

However, in the event of a serious challenge to this goal such as might develop in a crisis situation, the MEF was inadequate either to affect the outcome of the crisis ashore or to control the situation at sea. Indeed the

United States never seriously considered the mission of the MEF to be war-fighting in nature. Hence, the United States recognized the need to augment the Middle East Force from time to time in the Indian Ocean to demonstrate a crisis resolution capability. The USS BONHOMME RICHARD (CVA-31) was the first U.S. aircraft carrier to deploy into the Indian Ocean in 1960 and was symbolic of the U.S. intent to insure its ability to manage crises in the region. When it became apparent that the Pax Britannica in the Indian Ocean was going to end, the United States adopted a policy of periodic augmentation of the Middle East Force by more militarily capable naval forces. Although several battle groups operated in the region on what were essentially politico-diplomatic cruises, the U.S. Navy never fully implemented this Indian Ocean deployment policy. The cause attributed to this non-implementation was the overriding force requirements of Southeast Asian operations. The one exception to this trend was the deployment of Task Force 74

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built around USS ENTERPRISE (CVN-65) during the Indo-
Pakistani crisis in December 1971.18

However, with the end of the Vietnam War and in the
aftermath of the Arab-Israeli October War in 1973 and the
OPEC oil boycott, the United States carried out this policy
by sending a carrier battle group centered on USS HANCOCK
(CVA-19) into the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean.
Shortly thereafter, in November 1973, Secretary of Defense
James Schlesinger announced the return to a policy of more
frequent and more regular deployments to the Indian
Ocean.19 This pattern of U.S. naval presence continued in
the Indian Ocean through 1978.

What these decisions imply is that in the early 1970's
the United States formally adopted an Indian Ocean strategy
as part of its national security policy. The force levels
and patterns of operations allocated to support this policy

18. This deployment remains a controversial issue even
today. For a description of the events surrounding Task
Force 74's Indian Ocean incursion see, for example, Henry
Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1979), p. 842-918 (hereinafter referred to as White
House Years); James M. McConnell and Anne M. Kelly,
Superpower Naval Diplomacy in the Indo-Pakistani Crisis,
Professional Paper No. 108 (Arlington: Center for Naval
Analysis, February 5, 1973); Michael Walter, "The U.S. Naval
Demonstration in the Bay of Bengal During the 1971
Indo-Pakistani Crisis," World Affairs, Spring 1979,
p. 293-306; Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force
Without War (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1978),
p. 175-214.

Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean, p. 53.
demonstrated that the United States had shifted from a policy of maintaining stability to enhance its commercial and economic interests to one of maintaining this stability supplemented by a capability to contain crises. The choice of the modest presence of the Middle East Force occasionally augmented by battle groups with the power to influence a situation either at sea or ashore supports this contention. Moreover, the periodic deployment of these crisis oriented forces as opposed to their continuous presence suggested that, for political reasons, there was an element of tacit restraint with respect to the region by the United States.

When President Richard M. Nixon took office in 1969, he immediately began a major review of U.S. policy in the region. Perhaps prompted by the concerns posed by the Amir of Kuwait in a meeting with Nixon and his National Security Advisor, Henry A. Kissinger, on December 17, 1968, as to just what were Nixon's plans for the Persian Gulf after the United Kingdom left the area,20 the policy review focused on how the Nixon Doctrine, announced on Guam on July 25, 1969, could best be applied to the regional powers in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean.21

20. White House Years, p. 51.

The Nixon National Security Council completed the review of Persian Gulf policy in late 1970. Based on this study, it concluded that the British intent to retain much of their political presence in the Gulf implied that there was not so much a power vacuum as a realignment of the existing power balance. Though there was potential for instability in the Gulf, the study concluded that the situation was unlikely to be responsive to U.S. military power. Hence the problem was cast as a political rather than a military one. Based on this appreciation of the situation, Nixon and Kissinger approved a low profile policy that emphasized security cooperation with regional states. Because it relied so heavily on Iran and Saudi Arabia, it quickly became known as the "Two Pillar Policy." One key element of this policy was to maintain the tiny U.S. naval presence embodied in the Middle East Force intact.

Because this policy concerned itself only with the Persian Gulf, it left unanswered the problem of U.S. interests in and military strategy for the broader area of the Indian Ocean. The Kissinger national security apparatus undertook further studies to examine this question as well as the issues of naval presence and bases in the region. On November 9, 1970, Kissinger promulgated National Security

22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., p. 57-58.
Study Memorandum (NSSM) 104 which called for "an assessment of possible Soviet naval threats to U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean area and the development of friendly naval force and basing alternatives consistent with varying judgments about possible threats and interests over the 1971-1975 period."24 NSSM 104 marked the beginning of a year or more of considering what the United States could and should do in the Indian Ocean. NSSM 109 ordered a study of U.S. policy for South Asia.25 NSSM 110, chaired by the State Department, asked for a much broader, politico-military analysis of the region.26 NSSM 118 directed a contingency study on secession in Pakistan.27 Finally, NSSM 133 required the U.S. national security apparatus to begin contingency planning on South Asia.28 This was the first review of regional military policy in nearly a decade and the first attempt by the U.S. government to examine systematically the elements of an integrated Indian Ocean policy.29

25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Sick, op. cit., p. 58.
These studies concluded that the Indian Ocean could not be regarded as a political unit. There was simply too much diversity to regard it as a whole. Moreover, no state or group of states in the region had the same importance to the United States as did Europe, the Far East, or Latin America. Nixon and Kissinger recognized, however, that U.S. interests would suffer if the region fell under the sway of forces hostile to the United States and its allies. The importance of oil in this regard was specifically highlighted. Although the Soviet Navy's presence in the region would probably increase over time, the studies characterized these deployments as cautious probes. Hence Nixon and Kissinger concluded that the United States had a relatively low level of interest in the Indian Ocean and that these interests could best be served by normal commercial and political access supported by a low level of military presence. 30

However the strategic environment that shaped the premises of these decisions was fundamentally altered in 1972 and 1973. The Treaty of Friendship between the Soviet Union and Iraq in April of that year ultimately provided modern military equipment to Iraq, then the most radical Arab state, and posed a problem for Nixon and Kissinger. They decided to help Iran arm itself or face a shift in the

30. Ibid., p. 59.
basic power considerations in the Gulf. The second factor that altered U.S. perceptions of the region was the October War and the Arab oil embargo against the United States. These two events prompted the Nixon Administration to undertake another comprehensive review of its Indian Ocean strategy. This review and its policy implications will be discussed later in conjunction with Diego Garcia.

In summary, at least until 1973, three separate yet interrelated factors influenced U.S. national security policy for the Indian Ocean region. The first was the withdrawal of British military forces from east of Suez. The second and the most enduring element of this policy was the relentless demand for Persian Gulf oil by the industrial nations of the West and Japan. The last factor was the growth of Soviet military presence and political influence in the region.

**The Indian Ocean Zone of Peace**

Concurrent with these developments was a growing impatience among the Third World nations to exert their influence politically and try to achieve some degree of control over their own future. The Indian Ocean Zone of Peace movement was one such tactic in this strategy. Members of

32. Sick, op. cit., p. 64.
the Non-Aligned Movement had traditionally endorsed the idea of a Zone of Peace in the Indian Ocean. As early as 1964, the Cairo Non-Aligned Conference condemned the intentions of the "imperialist powers" to set up bases in the Indian Ocean region. The Lusaka Conference adopted a resolution in 1970 that reiterated this charge and called upon the non-aligned nations to focus their efforts in the next session of the U.N. General Assembly on the adoption of a resolution that called:

.. . upon all states to consider and respect the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace from which great power rivalries and competition as well as bases conceived in the context of such rivalries and competition, either army, navy or air force bases, are excluded. The area should also be free of nuclear weapons.

Sri Lanka and Tanzania caused the item to be added to the agenda of the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly in October 1971. They recommended that the entire high seas area of the Indian Ocean be declared a zone of peace to be used exclusively for non-military purposes. The wording of the proposal took special note of the role that

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34. Main Documents Relating to Conferences of Non-Aligned Countries (Georgetown, Guyana: Ministry of External Affairs, 1972), p. 78.
naval vessels, especially submarines, played in the context of superpower rivalry in the Indian Ocean.

The General Assembly adopted Resolution 2832 (XXVI) in December of 1971 declaring the Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined, together with its air column and sea bed, to be a zone of peace. Appendix A contains the text of this document. The Resolution called upon the "Great Powers" to enter into negotiations with the littoral states of the region to halt further escalation of their military presence and to eliminate all bases and other symbols of superpower competition. Moreover, the General Assembly requested its Secretary General to report on the progress of the implementation of these measures at the following session of the United Nations.35 The resolution passed by a vote of 61-0 with 55 abstentions. The extent of the opposition to the idea can be gauged not only by the high number of abstentions--almost equal to the number of votes in favor of the resolution--but also by the fact that all of the permanent members of the Security Council, with the exception of China, abstained. It is also significant that the General Assembly adopted this resolution on December 16, 1971,

during the height of the Indo-Pakistani War and the U.S.-
Soviet naval buildup in the Indian Ocean.

The United States took the position that such a concept
would infringe on the traditional freedom of the high seas
and warned that "purporting to establish special regimes for
particular areas" would undercut the more general negotia-
tions then ongoing in the United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea. Furthermore, the United States rejected
"the view that a group of States in a certain region can
establish a legal regime for the high seas in that region"
because such a move could affect the "fundamental security
interests" of all states. 36 The Soviet Union, while sharing
the reservations of the United States concerning the Law of
the Sea, argued that the first efforts of the General
Assembly should be directed toward the elimination of the
existing foreign military bases in the region and that the
proposal should "become the object of agreement among the
parties concerned before the General Assembly takes a
decision." 37

36. "Statement by the U.S. Representative (Martin) to the
First Committee of the General Assembly ... December 10,
1971," quoted in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
Documents on Disarmament 1971, (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1972), p. 866-867 (hereinafter referred to
as Documents on Disarmament 1971).

37. "Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to
the First Committee of the General Assembly ... December
1, 1971," quoted in Documents on Disarmament 1971,
p. 814-815, 866.
During its twenty-seventh session in 1972, the Secretary General advised the General Assembly that the negotiations requested had not taken place. In response to this and to continuing pressure from the Non-Aligned Movement, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 2992 (XXVII). The resolution established the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean to "study the implications of the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace Resolution with specific reference to practical measures that could be taken to facilitate its implementation."  

The number of votes in favor of the resolution increased from 61 to 95 in favor, none against, and 33 abstentions. The United States and the Soviet Union, along with France and the United Kingdom, continued their opposition to the measure.

Since 1972, the focus of the actions of the General Assembly on the Zone of Peace question has centered on the yearly reports of the Ad Hoc Committee. Based on the recommendations contained in the Committee's first report,


39. Australia, Madagascar, Singapore, and Thailand were among those littoral states that changed their position from that of abstention to open support. Israel, Oman, and South Africa were the only remaining littoral states to abstain.
the General Assembly carried Resolution 3080 (XXVIII) in 1973 requesting the Secretary General to compile a factual statement on military presence in the Indian Ocean with emphasis on the patterns of naval deployments. Accordingly, the Secretary General appointed a panel of three experts who submitted their report to the General Assembly in April 1974.

The report of this panel generated substantial controversy. The United States, France, Great Britain and the USSR labeled the document as inaccurate and speculative. The U.N. experts criticized the U.S. facility on Diego Garcia and charged that the United States was creating a situation conducive to an intensified regional rivalry in the future. Because of the criticism of the document, the Secretary General referred the report to the head of the United Nations Disarmament Division for review. As a result, the experts submitted a somewhat less contentious


version of the report which replaced the original in its entirety. 43

That same year, 1974, a new facet of the issue became part and parcel of the debate. Resolution 3295 (XXIX) requested the littoral and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean to begin consultations to convene a conference on the Indian Ocean. 44 Moreover, the Committee recommended that it be constituted as a negotiating forum so that it could begin discussions with the four permanent members of the Security Council who were not members of the Committee (i.e., the United States, USSR, U.K. and France) aimed at lessening their rivalry in the Indian Ocean. 45 Once again, the United States and the Soviet Union abstained.

In 1975 the General Assembly again used the report of the Ad Hoc Committee as its principal working document and adopted Resolution 3468 (XXX) calling for the continuation


of the consultations on the Indian Ocean conference. The remainder of the resolution was worded substantially the same as its predecessors. The 1976 document of the Ad Hoc Committee reported that several nations, among them the United States and the Soviet Union, declined to participate in the ongoing deliberations on the proposed conference. The General Assembly noted this lack of participation in Resolution 31/88 and invited all states and, in particular, the superpowers and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, to cooperate with the Committee.

Shortly after Vance's trip to Moscow in late March 1977 to discuss Carter's arms control proposals with the Soviet leadership, the chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee approached the U.S. and Soviet U.N. delegations to clarify the status of the Indian Ocean component of Carter's arms control

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program. Noting that substantive talks had not begun, the Committee chairman reported that the position of the U.S. on the Indian Ocean and the Ad Hoc Committee had not changed, though its future policy could not be separated from mutual and reciprocal actions by the Soviet Union. The USSR restated that its major concern was still the dismantling of foreign military bases and that it did not have any intention of constructing such bases in the region. However, both the Soviet Union and the U.S. agreed to keep the Ad Hoc Committee informed of the progress of their negotiations.\(^5\)

The General Assembly took note of the Committee's report in Resolution 32/86. It cited the beginning of the Indian Ocean talks between the United States and the USSR in June 1977 and noted that the next step in the convening of the Indian Ocean conference was a meeting of the littoral and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean in New York at a time yet to be determined. The General Assembly tasked the Ad Hoc

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Committee with the responsibility for the preparations for this meeting. 51

The U.S. and the USSR abstained without exception on all the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace resolutions in the General Assembly through 1976. With minor exceptions, all the littoral and hinterland states of the region consistently voted in favor of the Zone of Peace resolutions. A voting record is contained in Appendix B. The United States justified its position by stressing the issue of freedom of navigation and by fending off criticism of its Naval Support Facility on Diego Garcia. The U.S. emphasized that it could not accept criticism of Diego Garcia when the General Assembly took no notice of the military activities of other states external to the region. The intent of this stance was to publicize the then active Soviet facility at Berbera in Somalia. The U.S. explained its abstention on the issue by arguing that:

... it constituted in effect a move on the part of certain states to impose a regime on the high seas. While there may be good reason in the eyes of certain countries from time to time in wanting to do this, the interests of the United States in a global sense require us to take unswervingly the

position that the high seas are not to be limited by any group of nations, particularly by those who simply happen to be on a particular ocean."

While expressing sympathy with the principles which motivated some of the nations in the area to promote concepts like the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace, the United States went on to argue that:

... all major maritime powers, including the United States and the Soviet Union, have been doubtful about a special right to limit or control the use of the high seas by others. The United States has long held the view there must be unimpaired freedom of navigation on the high seas."  

Despite an agreement in principle on the issue of the Law of the Sea, the Soviet Union used the issue of bases as a rationale for its own actions and stressed that the principal problem was the elimination of foreign military bases from the area.  

The Zone of Peace Resolution, popular as it was among the littoral states, suffered from a number of drawbacks, not the least of which was its name. The very term "Zone of Peace" carried a connotation of a well intentioned but visionary hope which proved to be impossible to translate into a political and practical reality. To some in the United States, it evoked memories of such undeniably


53. Ibid., p. 27.

54. A/32/29, p. 5.
laudatory but nonetheless ineffective efforts as the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1929\(^55\) which called on all states to forgo the use of war as an instrument of national policy. Moreover, apart from declarations on such matters by the U.N. General Assembly, no such zone has ever been legitimized in a multilateral arms control agreement.

The declaration also suffered from its association with the United Nations where the Secretary General of that body remarked in an unusually candid statement in 1982 that the organization had largely been defied and ignored.\(^56\) The General Assembly, perhaps recognizing that such a concept was without structure, failed to subject the concept of a zone of peace to an examination such as that conducted in 1974 by a U.N. experts' study on nuclear free zones.\(^57\) Moreover, the resolutions passed by the General Assembly on the Indian Ocean raised a legal issue. Like all other U.N. General Assembly resolutions they were essentially political

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55. The position that the Kellogg-Briand Pact was a largely useless multilateral treaty is argued in academic literature by Robert H. Ferrell in *Peace in Their Time: The Origins of the Kellogg-Briand Pact* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952).


documents. They were only recommendations and were not legally binding on the members of the General Assembly in the sense that full effect had to be given to them. In other words, they did not have the effect that a treaty would have. Nonetheless, they may have constituted a loose form of jurisdiction in the sense that a recognized international organization was speaking on how an issue should be addressed.

The debate also demonstrated a lack of political consensus on the issue both among the extra-regional states, whose military activities posed the initial and continuing sources of concern, and the regional states who remained divided over such basic issues as the geographic scope of the zone as well as its functional intent. This point demonstrates that there was a lack of homogeneity in the region which, in turn, created a regional sense of uncertainty, insecurity, and instability.

Although the littoral states of the region were broadly in agreement with the concept of the Zone of Peace, their approaches to the presence of the superpowers differed. The positions of two of the more important littoral states--Sri Lanka and India--provide an insight to this problem. Both worked hard to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. Sri

Lanka, however, perceived a threat in the increasing Soviet interest and presence in the region. While hosting the fifth Non-Aligned Conference in August 1976, Sri Lanka's Prime Minister, Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, said that:

The United States has now engaged upon expanding military and naval facilities in Diego Garcia. There is also the intensified military and naval presence of the great powers in the Indian Ocean which by reason of their known rivalries in other areas could cause apprehension of danger to the security of the Indian Ocean region. . . . We must, therefore, stand together and demand the dismantling of the Diego Garcia base and must also demand that the great powers which have no littoral interests withdraw their navies and military presence from the Indian Ocean region for detente and the interests of security are not concepts that can have one meaning to powerful nations and no meaning at all to the rest of humanity.

Even though couched in cautious rhetoric, her unmistakable reference to the Soviet presence in the region disturbed the Soviet Union. 60

India considered Bandaranaike's fears to be unfounded. While Sri Lanka viewed both superpowers with apprehension,


the Indian attitude was less critical of the Soviet Union. Speaking in May 1976 on the occasion of the visit of Iranian Premier Amir Abbas Hoveyda to New Delhi, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi distinguished between Soviet and U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean by arguing that:

As for the difference between the Russian presence and the American presence, I think the difference is that the Russians do not have a base. They may be going back and forth, but we hear that the American base in Diego Garcia is going to be a nuclear base.

However, even in India, there was a shift in attitude on this issue between 1977 and 1979 when the government seemed to evince a greater awareness of Soviet activity in the region. In the Indian Parliament on July 14, 1977, Prime Minister Morarji Desai explained that, "There is a race between two powerful nations. It is from that we have to save Asia and that is what we are engaged in."

There were also differences between India and Sri Lanka over the basic concept itself. While Sri Lanka wanted the Indian Ocean to be a nuclear free zone, India disapproved of

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this proposal. The fact that China possessed nuclear weapons remained a major constraint against any unilateral abandonment of the nuclear option by India. At the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament in June 1978, Desai argued that it was:

... idle to talk of regional nuclear free zones when there would still be zones which could continue to be endangered by nuclear weapons. Those who have such weapons lose nothing if some distant area is declared non-nuclear. The nations without nuclear capacity who imagines that their inclusion in such zones affords them security are suffering from delusion.

The denuclearization aspects of the Indian Zone of Peace also suggest that there would be disagreement between India and Pakistan, Iran and Iraq, and China and India. A review of the records of the Ad Hoc Committee bears this out. This rivalry, especially in the case of one, or perhaps several regional powers attaining a nuclear capability or being well on their way to that position, suggests that the other states of the region may very well have welcomed an outside nuclear presence as a counter to their adversaries' capability. For this reason India has worked to disassociate the concept of a nuclear free zone from the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace by raising objections to the inclusion of land.

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64. The Indian Express, November 30, 1978, quoted in Problems and Prospects, p. 1245.

territories and territorial waters in this concept. Hence, the other states of the region, even though they supported the Zone of Peace openly in the forum of the U.N., may have been less than enthusiastic for the idea in private.

The Zone of Peace declaration was not an international agreement ready for signature and implementation. The text stated that it was only a call for consultations, first by the "Great Powers" with the littoral states and, secondly, by the "littoral and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean, the permanent members of the Security Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean." The declaration was a statement of principle and intent—a goal towards which states might work. It was not a detailed negotiating proposal. To have translated it into an agreement capable of producing tangible, verifiable results would have required defining terms, expanding general statements of principle into precise formulae for action and even specifying precisely such basic matters as the exact geographic limits of the area in question. These problems proved to be insurmountable to such a political body as the General Assembly.

Moreover, even as a general statement of principle, the declaration left something to be desired. For example, it prohibited warships and aircraft from using the Indian Ocean not only as a means to employ force but also as instruments implying the threat of force—at best a difficult situation to resolve. Did the presence of a warship during a crisis or when hostilities seemed imminent constitute a threat of force per se, especially if the vessel belonged to a state not directly involved in the crisis and was engaged in innocent passage? At first glance, the answer would appear to be not; but one state's exercise of the right of innocent passage could be perceived as a threat by another state. Even more difficult to translate into a formula for action was the clause seeking to eliminate any manifestation of superpower military presence "conceived in the context of Great Power rivalry." This appeared to be an escape mechanism of sorts, inserted for no readily apparent reason, which would permit a superpower to maintain a military
presence so long as it was not so planned. But how was such a determination to be made and by whom?67

Despite these shortcomings, the movement for the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace did work an influence on the concept of bilateral arms control for the Indian Ocean even though its political shortcomings, compounded by the complexities of the region's strategic character, weighed heavily against it. Though the non-aligned nations had little to lose and clearly everything to gain by keeping the Zone of Peace issue alive, the United States and the Soviet Union could not afford to draw attention to their rejection of what was essentially a regional arms control accord for the Indian Ocean. Though they would have preferred to be rid of the problem, they participated reluctantly in the debates rather than take a negative stand on the issue. Indeed, the Soviet Union may have even achieved a marginal political gain by exploiting the issue of Diego Garcia.

The foregoing evidence demonstrates that the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace was a political issue within the Third

World and its dealings with the superpowers. From the perspective of the developing nations, the Indian Ocean was, in effect, a Third World ocean and the Third World viewed it as coming more and more under the sway of the two superpowers. These perceptions and their background offer a partial explanation of Carter's decision to pursue the Indian Ocean Naval Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviet Union.

Two of Carter's key policy advisors, Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski, were in agreement regarding the importance of improving U.S. relations with the Third World. Indeed one of Brzezinski's ten original foreign policy goals for the Carter Administration was to diminish hostility toward the U.S. in the Third World. This approach dated from the early emergence of Brzezinski as Carter's principal foreign policy advisor. In late December 1975, when Carter asked him to "develop for me the outline of a basic speech/statement on foreign affairs," Brzezinski replied that:

... our national purpose must be (1) as the first priority to create a stable inner core for world affairs, based on closer collaboration among the advanced democracies (open-ended trilateralism); (2) secondly, to shape on the above basis more stable North-South relations, which means (i)

more cooperation with the emerging Third World countries. . . .

Brzezinski also felt that the Carter Administration should address itself to the many problems that had emerged in the wake of the collapse of what he called "the Eurocentric world order."  

Vance took over the duties of Secretary of State in January 1977 with the conviction that very real progress had been made in the first half of the 1970's in strengthening strategic stability, limiting the nuclear arms race, improving political relations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, and intensifying U.S. cooperation with Europe. The one area that had not evinced any progress was U.S. relations with the Third World. He considered it essential to demonstrate early on to the Third World an understanding of and a willingness to take a leading role in addressing their problems as well as dealing with them on an equal footing as legitimate, sovereign governments. In October 1976 Vance sent a memorandum to Carter setting out specific goals and priorities for a Carter foreign policy should Carter be elected. Much like 

69. Ibid., p. 7.
70. Ibid., p. 515.
72. Ibid., p. 256; Vance.
Brzezinski's early advice to Carter, Vance argued that "... perhaps the most difficult set of problems [that Carter would encounter] are the global issues, i.e. ... north-south disputes. ..."73 Carter took these recommendations to heart. The appointment of Andrew Young as Ambassador to the United Nations served as a signal to the Third World that Carter was committed to a new framework for dealing with the Third World.

To argue that the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace was dominant among Brzezinski and Vance's concerns for the Third World would be overstating the case. Nonetheless, the debate within the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean and the consistent record of U.S. abstention in supporting the concerns of the Third World in this forum were cases in point, even if only psychological and political ones, that Carter could use to demonstrate his concerns for the Third World by modifying existing U.S. national security policy.

CHAPTER III

THE PROXIMATE ORIGINS OF THE TALKS

If we make it easy for the Navy to go places and do things, we will find ourselves always going places and doing things.

-- Stuart Symington (1974)

The U.S. Senate and Diego Garcia

It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that the issue which dominated the concern of the littoral and island nations of the Indian Ocean in the Zone of Peace proceedings was Diego Garcia. The same was true of the U.S. Senate although different motives generated its interest. A chronology of the U.S. Navy's legislative proposals concerning Diego Garcia is helpful in understanding the Senate's scrutiny of the project as it developed.

In June 1968, Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford approved the Navy's request to construct a modest logistic support base on Diego Garcia. The Navy, as a follow-on action to Clifford's approval, submitted a request for $9.6 million to Congress in January 1969 for the first increment of construction. Though approved by the House of Representatives, the Senate denied the Navy's request in
December 1969. The Senate position prevailed in the House-Senate conference to resolve the issue. In March 1970, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird approved the inclusion of $5.4 million in the Fiscal Year (FY) 1971 military construction budget for the construction of the first increment of an austere naval communications facility on Diego Garcia. Later that same year, in December, Congress approved the funds which the Navy had requested. The House and Senate funded the second increment in November 1971 in the amount of $8.95 million and the third increment in October 1972 in the amount of $6.1 million. In January 1974, Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger directed inclusion of $29 million in the FY74 Supplemental Authorization Bill to expand facilities on the island to provide for logistic support facilities. Though passed by the House, the Senate disapproved the project. However, the Senate indicated that it expected the Navy to resubmit its request in the FY75 defense submission and that it would more thoroughly examine it then.

Schlesinger resubmitted the request as part of the FY75 Military Construction Authorization Bill and included an additional $3.3 million for Air Force construction on the island. House-Senate conference action reduced the amount to $14.8 million for the Navy while leaving intact the Air Force funding request. But the conference committee attached a rider to the legislation stipulating that the Department of Defense could not obligate any of the funds authorized for construction on Diego Garcia unless the President advised Congress in writing that he had evaluated all policy implications regarding the need for United States facilities on the island and that he certified the additional construction essential to the national interest of the United States. However, even though they refused to fund the Diego Garcia projects in a separate authorization, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees authorized the Navy and Air Force to use other funds available to them in the Appropriations Act for the construction of any facility on the island, provided that neither house

of Congress adopted a resolution disapproving the construction. 3

The Navy's request to expand the military capabilities of Diego Garcia stemmed from the United States' reevaluation of its Indian Ocean strategy after the 1973 Arab-Israeli October War discussed in the preceding chapter. The most dramatic change emerging from this review was the recognition that Persian Gulf oil was of direct and vital interest to the United States and its allies. For the first time there was a clear understanding that OPEC could turn off the oil at the wellhead for political reasons rather than any identifiable military threat. This recognition by senior policy makers was the major watershed in U.S. strategy for the Indian Ocean. 4

Two other changes in perceptions of the region emerged from this study. The first was an intensified apprehension over the growing Soviet military presence in the area because of the form and size of the Soviet force posture during the Indo-Pakistani crisis of 1971 and the October War. 5 The second perception was that the United States

4. Sick, op. cit., p. 64.
5. Ibid., p. 64-65.
could not rely on its allies in future crises in the region. These two perceptions, more so than any others, led to the reconsideration of the kind and level of U.S. logistics infrastructure required in the Indian Ocean. These impressions raised several issues—issues whose resolution formed the substance of U.S. national security policy for the Indian Ocean until Carter's initiative on NALT in March 1977. The substance of these issues dealt with what level of U.S. military presence would best serve U.S. interests in the region and how could the United States most effectively combine that presence with political instruments, including possible arms control initiatives, to achieve U.S. objectives. Nixon and Kissinger decided that no initiatives on Indian Ocean arms limitation would be undertaken with the Soviet Union for the time being. Rather, the United States would pursue a policy of "tacit restraint" with respect to its naval deployments to the Indian Ocean. Schlesinger reported that the first element of this problem had been resolved when he announced in a press conference on November 30, 1974, that a contingency naval presence for the Indian Ocean would take the form of

6. Ibid., p. 65.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p. 66.
periodic deployments of battle groups from the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Because Schlesinger's disclosure was his opening statement and not in reply to a reporter's question, its significance was thus underscored. In practice, the Navy implemented this policy by deploying three battle groups per year to the Indian Ocean with every other battle group including an aircraft carrier.

The decision to upgrade Diego Garcia, discussed earlier in this chapter, was the focal point for the discussion of U.S. Indian Ocean national security policy in the Congressional debates on these decisions. At about the same time as this investigation got underway, Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts introduced Senate Concurrent Resolution 79 (SCR-79). The intent of SCR-79 was to express the sense of the Senate that Nixon should negotiate with the Soviet Union to get an agreement on limiting the deployment of naval forces to the Indian Ocean. Kennedy recommended that these negotiations be conducted either on a bilateral basis or under the auspices of the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean. Because the Senate failed

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10. Sick, op. cit., p. 65.

THE INDIAN OCEAN NAVAL ARMS LIMITATION TALKS: FROM A ZONE OF PEACE TO THE ARC OF CRISIS(U) FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY MEDFORD MA J F GIBLIN MAR 84
MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
to carry SCR-79, Kennedy reiterated his concern by introducing Senate Resolution 117 (SR-117) in March 1975. The language of SR-117 closely paralleled that of SCR-79 one year earlier.¹² SR-117 became an amendment to the FY76 Economic Foreign Assistance Bill. However, on May 12, 1975, President Gerald R. Ford certified that the new construction on Diego Garcia was essential to the national interest. As a result, the House-Senate conference committee that was preparing the final draft of the legislation dropped the Kennedy amendment.

The submission of Senate Resolution 117 by Kennedy for himself and Senators Jacob Javits of New York, Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island, John Culver of Iowa, and Patrick Leahy of Vermont rekindled the debate on the advisability of seeking Indian Ocean arms control talks with the Soviet Union. The essence of Kennedy's sense-of-the-Senate resolution was that Ford should not certify that construction on Diego Garcia was essential, nor should he approve planning for the military use of facilities on Masirah Island off Oman without first trying his best to negotiate directly with the USSR to limit facilities and forces in the Indian Ocean area. When Ford certified that the expansion of Diego Garcia was essential to the national interest without first

making some effort to negotiate, it was likely that a combination of forces in the Senate would unite to challenge his certification.

Kennedy, Javits, and Pell were not alone in issuing a call for a limitation on naval forces in the Indian Ocean. One week later, on May 19, 1975, in another move intended to block construction on the island, Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana, the Senate majority leader, introduced SR-160. The resolution argued that the construction on Diego Garcia was an unnecessary escalation in an area of the world where none was needed. Mansfield labeled the Defense Department's request as a "down payment" on a much larger U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, he drew a parallel between the authorization for Diego Garcia and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964.13

The Senate Armed Services Committee considered the Mansfield Amendment and disapproved it in committee. The Armed Services Committee took the position that the U.S. should have the capability to maintain a naval presence in the Indian Ocean and that the new construction on Diego Garcia would substantially enhance that capability. The committee's report noted that the United States had vital

interests in the region and that Soviet presence in the area had steadily increased. The committee considered the request for construction funds to be prudent and recommended approval. There is every reason to believe that the Senate Armed Services Committee recommended disapproval of the Mansfield Amendment because of Schlesinger's testimony in June 1975 in which he publicly revealed that the Soviet Union was constructing a base, including missile facilities, at Berbera in Somalia. The Senate upheld the committee's recommendation by disapproving SR-160 by a vote of 53-43. The debate that accompanied this vote was spirited and evinced the level of emotion that had become associated with Diego Garcia and, by implication, Indian Ocean NALT in the overall context of U.S. national security policy for the Indian Ocean region.

Additional evidence of this emotion was evident in a controversy that erupted in the latter half of 1975 concerning the resettlement of some 1,000 inhabitants of the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia, to Mauritius. Great Britain had carried out the resettlement as part of the series of events in which the Wilson Government created


the British Indian Ocean Territory and granted base rights to the United States. There was a good deal of controversy in the United States and Great Britain over what some described as a forcible and callous removal of people from their homes to build a military base. Congress expressed its resentment because, before approving funds for the base, it believed that Diego Garcia was uninhabited. However, Congress was not entirely blameless in this matter because the fact that the island did have a population, even if only a very small number of itinerant fishermen and copra farmers, was reported in the press as early as 1965. Nevertheless, Congressional critics were incensed by what they considered to be deception by the Executive Branch and the Soviet Union exploited this opportunity to criticize the United States and Great Britain. The controversy gradually died down in late 1975 in part because the people had


17. Anthony Lewis, "Indian Ocean Coral Atoll Will Be Used as a Joint British-U.S. Base," The New York Times, November 11, 1965, p. 8:3; the author is personally familiar with information provided by the Department of Defense to Congress on this matter in 1970.

long since relocated to Mauritius and in part because, as it turned out, the British government had compensated the people involved. But the incident, implying, as it did, callousness and deception in a matter involving national security did nothing to reduce opposition to Diego Garcia in Congress. 19

In fact, the incident generated another opportunity for the pro-NALT group to get additional leverage for their cause. On September 11, 1975, Senator Gary Hart of Colorado asked the General Accounting Office (GAO) to report to him as to how the dislocation of the Ilois inhabitants of Diego Garcia was financed and whether U.S. law was violated in this regard. 20 The GAO reported that the United States, in


a classified note to the U.S.-U.K. agreement on the use of the British Indian Ocean Territory, agreed to provide up to half of the total detachment costs not to exceed $14 million. The U.S. share of these costs was offset by a waiver of the five percent research and development surcharge imposed on Great Britain under the April 6, 1963, POLARIS sales agreement.\textsuperscript{21} The report concluded that, although no U.S. law had been violated, the GAO considered that the method used in financing the relocation of the Ilois was a circumvention of congressional oversight authority.\textsuperscript{22} This finding exacerbated the already emotional debate over the issue of Indian Ocean NALT. Nonetheless, Congress authorized and obligated $18.1 million for the FY75 construction increment on Diego Garcia. Funding for the second increment of construction on the island in the amount of $13.8 million was contained in the FY76 Appropriations Bill.

However, early in July 1975, a delegation of U.S. senators visited Moscow as part of a parliamentary exchange program. The delegation, headed by Senator Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota and Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania,

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p. 2.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., p. 1.
included Senators Culver, Hart, and Leahy. Given their personal commitment to arms control in the Indian Ocean and their allegations of Soviet interest in the subject of Indian Ocean arms control, it is not surprising that Culver, Hart, and Leahy pressed the issue again on their Soviet counterparts.

When pro-NALT senators realized that Mansfield's resolution would not have enough support to carry it in the Senate, Culver asked Kissinger to begin discussions with the Soviet Union on limiting naval operations and base construction in the Indian Ocean on July 17, 1975. Hart and Leahy joined him in this effort. The State Department responded that there was little probability for success in negotiations at that time and explained that the chances would increase if the U.S. finished the proposed construction on Diego Garcia. Its completion would demonstrate that the U.S. had both the means and the resolve to protect its interests in the region. Culver did not agree. As a result of his private discussions with the Soviet leadership during his trip to Moscow for the U.S.-USSR parliamentary conference, he argued that the Soviet Union would respond


favorably to a U.S. initiative to reduce tensions in the Indian Ocean through NALT. Concurrent with this activity was the release of a study by the Brookings Institution that argued that the Indian Ocean was the one region where there was a good possibility that a U.S./USSR naval limitations agreement could be negotiated.

Later in 1975 Hart introduced an amendment in November to the FY76 Military Construction Appropriations Act requiring that none of the funds appropriated under that act were to be used prior to April 15, 1976, for the purpose of carrying out any military construction on Diego Garcia. His intent was to complement another amendment submitted by Kennedy to the FY76 State Department Authorization Bill which required Ford to report to Congress on his efforts to begin talks with the Soviet Union. Hart argued that the inclusion of his amendment in the legislation would afford the Administration a few months to get the talks started. The amendment passed the Senate by a vote of 51-44.

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25. Ibid.


House conferees agreed with their Senate colleagues on this matter.29

Prompted by this continued congressional interest in Indian Ocean arms control, Ford directed the National Security Council to conduct an in-depth study of the technical problems associated with possible naval arms limitation agreements for the Indian Ocean region. The NSC established a working group under the auspices of its Verification Panel, the senior NSC coordinating committee for SALT and certain other arms control issues. The membership of the working group roughly paralleled that of the Verification Panel but at a lower level. These included staff members from the State Department, the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). In early April 1976 the Verification Panel Working Group (VPWG) completed its task. Its report concluded that naval arms limitations in the Indian Ocean would pose severe technical problems but would not necessarily be impossible to negotiate. However the consensus view of the Verification Panel, as expressed by ACDA Director Fred C. Iklé, was that the timing for such negotiations was

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inappropriate considering the recent Soviet incursions into Africa. Nonetheless, the VPWG report did serve a purpose in that it formed the core document that identified many of the issues when the Carter Administration began to study the subject of Indian Ocean arms control.

In April 1976 the State Department submitted the report required by the State Department Authorization Act to Congress. It concluded that it was inappropriate at that time for the United States to negotiate with the Soviet Union. The explanation acknowledged that the actions of the Soviet Union in Angola and the buildup of its facilities in Somalia had raised substantive questions about Soviet intentions in the Indian Ocean and its littoral. Moreover, any form of arms control agreement might convey the impression that the United States was willing to acquiesce in Soviet use of a proxy or surrogate state to exploit local crises. The report emphasized that successful negotiations could only be achieved within a general political framework.


of mutual restraint in the region. 32 Culver, one of the most outspoken supporters of NALT in Congress, described the report as a "curt rejection of the Congressional request," and Kennedy referred to the report as nothing more than a "weak and lame explanation by the Department of State." 33 So the lines were drawn for another round of debate since the issue remained an open one as the Presidential campaign of 1976 drew nearer.

The debate in the Senate was not so much concerned with Diego Garcia as it was with the formation of U.S. national security policy. Diego Garcia was the symptom—the control and direction of foreign policy by the Executive Department were the perceived ills. The experience of the Vietnam conflict and Watergate helped in their own way to fuel the controversy over the distribution of foreign policy power between the President and Congress. Any initiative was fair game for scrutiny. The Indian Ocean, both in the Zone of Peace context and the debate over the expansion of Diego Garcia, was an issue whose timing was ideally suited to generate controversy—a controversy which questioned the essential national security ramifications of its basic issue.

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The case of the Senate and Diego Garcia through 1976 is perhaps a unique case study of Executive-Congressional relations. It was among the first of the post-Vietnam era and was symptomatic of the growing tendency of the legislative branch of the U.S. Government to assert itself in the details of national security policy by exercising a greater legislative oversight role. The case of Diego Garcia demonstrated that role in the context of the broader issue of Executive-Congressional relations in at least one major way: Congress can and has questioned the rationale for major administration programs. Although serious challenges came from Congress relatively infrequently, they began to grow in number. Diego Garcia was such a case of challenge and denial by forcing further study and by controlling the allocation of funds to implement national security policy. This reaction was part of the overall disillusionment with the war in Vietnam. This, in turn, had fueled a reaction to U.S. involvement overseas. Indeed the 1972 campaign theme of Senator George McGovern, the Democratic candidate for President, was "Come Home America." In a sense, this reflected a concern of many of his colleagues in the Senate.

which their critics described as a kind of neo-isolationism.

Whether or not isolationism in the classic sense was the right label, there was a considerable interest in reducing the scope of U.S. politico-military involvement overseas. In addition to the efforts to block the expansion of the facilities on Diego Garcia, the Mansfield Amendments to Defense authorization bills requiring major cuts in the number of U.S. military personnel stationed overseas, the Tunney Amendment of 1975, and the Clark Amendment of 1976 to cut off U.S. covert involvement in Angola are additional examples of this trend.

International concern over U.S. expansion of Diego Garcia complemented the domestic battle over the control of the direction of U.S. national security policy. If a state's military forces are to serve the requirements of its foreign policy, if navies exist to be the instruments of that policy, then decisionmakers must take into account at some point in the policy formulation process what kind of reaction a specific national security policy is likely to


have overseas. Certain members of Congress recognized this theorem of foreign policy and tried to use it to buttress their arguments against expansion of the facilities on Diego Garcia and for NALT. In response to requests from Congress in 1974 and 1975, the Department of State analyzed the reactions of the Indian Ocean littoral states to the proposed expansion of facilities on Diego Garcia. The analyses were based upon canvassing by the U.S. embassies in those countries and are worth examining.37

On March 6, 1974, during hearings before the House Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, the subcommittee chairman Congressman Lee H. Hamilton of Indiana asked that he be provided with the results of the State Department canvass. Six days later on March 12, during hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee, a Defense Department official was asked for similar information which was supplied to the committee. Because this information was recorded in a form slightly different from the information provided to the House, it is not clear whether the two tabulations were based upon the same data. A little more

37. The results were published in two separate Congressional committee documents. It is not clear whether canvassing was undertaken on two or three different occasions. Though it was definitely done once in 1975, it may have been done once or twice in 1974. See Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean, p. 45, and U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Armed Services, Selected Material on Diego Garcia, Report (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 9-11.
than one year later, in mid-1975, the State Department canvassed reactions again, and the results were published together with the above-mentioned Senate information from 1974.

The 1974 House tabulated the information according to "official" and "press/public" reactions in 30 countries and classified the reactions under five headings: "favorable," "balanced," "negative," "unfavorable," and "no reaction." Unfortunately, the meanings of those terms were not defined, so it is not clear, for example, what the difference was between "negative" and "unfavorable" or exactly what "balanced" means. The tabulation for "official" reactions showed seven favorable, four balanced, one negative, five unfavorable and twelve with no reaction. "Press/public" reactions included one favorable, seven balanced, three negative, seven unfavorable and twelve with no reaction. Thus, the single reaction most often reported was "no reaction" which occurred 24 times and, of a total of 60 tabulated responses, eight were favorable while 16 were either unfavorable or negative.

The Senate reported the information differently. Reaction in each country was described in a few sentences of text. Nonetheless, the overall results seemed to be essentially the same despite some slight differences. For example, the House information reported press/public reaction in South Africa as "favorable," but the Senate
information described press reports in South Africa as "balanced." The House information tabulated official Ethiopian reaction "favorable," press/public as "balanced," while the Senate data reported "no official Ethiopian comments" and "no editorials and very little press reporting." The House information described official reaction in Yemen as "favorable," while the Senate information noted that in Yemen "mid-level Government reaction was confined to the one word 'good'"—a rather slender thread on which to hang a "favorable" rating. The results of the 1975 canvass were summarized as a single reaction for each country and classified in one of four categories: "favorable," "balanced," "unfavorable," and "unknown." The results as reported were: favorable—none; balanced—four; unfavorable—twelve; unknown—thirteen.

Though it is clear that substantive decisions affecting the national security policy of a state should neither be made on the basis of this kind of polling nor on the basis of what public or official opinion in foreign countries appears to be, the results of the State Department polling should not be dismissed out of hand since they probably do reflect what the general trend of thought among the countries of the Indian Ocean periphery was with respect to
Diego Garcia and, by extension, to NALT. In many, perhaps most, of the countries—the smaller countries with very small or non-existent navies and few maritime interests—there was little or no reaction to U.S. intentions. But in the large, influential states with navies and significant maritime interests and foreign trade—in short, the important countries regionally and even globally—there was opposition to American activities on Diego Garcia. Support was given only reluctantly, and those countries giving it were unwilling to declare their approval publicly. The opponents of Diego Garcia, and hence the proponents of NALT, used these surveys in their arguments whenever it was convenient.

These observations give rise to two themes that influenced the Senate during the 1970's. The first was that U.S. national security policy worked some sort of unfavorable influence on the states toward which it was directed. Culver referred to this theme in his statement on Diego Garcia on July 28, 1975. He argued that:

We are responding to the tragic misadventure and trauma of Vietnam in a way which shows we did not learn anything, but are only hell bent in our

38. Though it perhaps offers only a snapshot of the various states' positions, a compendium of these declaratory policies is contained in U.S., Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, "Official Positions on Demilitarization of the Indian Ocean" (Washington: July 1977) (DDI-220-32-77).
...madness to reassert our machismo in a reckless fashion.

Earlier that same month he argued that the United States should cease its "exclusive reliance on gunboat diplomacy and condescending colonialism." The second theme was that the foreign policy of the United States relied too heavily on its military capabilities. Senator Walter Mondale of Minnesota argued in June 1975 that:

...military power is increasingly irrelevant to the host of economic, social, and political issues facing this country. If there is anything that must underline a new foreign policy for the United States, it should be the recognition that the source of America's strength and influence in the world is our ability to meet our needs at home.

Culver went so far as to charge that "the State Department [was] running around with its tail between its legs trying to catch up with foreign policy as it [was] set by the Defense Department." 42

One final episode in the Senate's relationship with arms control in the Indian Ocean requires mention. In 1976 Congress passed the International Security Assistance and Arms Control Export Act of 1976. In the broadest sense Public Law 94-329 channeled most U.S. foreign arms transfers into the easily monitored foreign military sales route and established procedures designed to force the Executive branch to articulate a national policy on arms sales overseas. Moreover, the act required public disclosure of this policy in order to foster Congressional oversight on such transactions. Specifically it directed the President to submit certain statements concerning the arms control impact of each proposed sale. The law tasked ACDA with the responsibility for preparing these statements in coordination with the State and Defense Departments. In essence this tasking institutionalized ACDA's role in the policy process along with the State and Defense Departments. President Ford issued Executive Order 11958 in January 1977.


directing implementation of this legislation.44

The law also made specific reference to the Indian Ocean. Section 407 set forth the sense of the Congress that the President "should undertake to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union to achieve an agreement limiting the deployment of naval, air, and land forces of the Soviet Union and the United States in the Indian Ocean." These negotiations should be convened as soon as possible and should consider, among other things: limitations with respect to the establishment or use of facilities for naval, air, or land forces in the Indian Ocean and littoral countries; the number of naval vessels which may be deployed in the Indian Ocean, or the number of shipdays allowed therein; and the type of military forces and facilities allowed therein. The law also required the President to report to the Speaker of the House and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee not later than December 1, 1976, with respect to the steps taken to carry out the provisions of this section.45

The Senators that had been opposed to Diego Garcia and for negotiations on the Indian Ocean also were critical of the role that arms sales had assumed in U.S. foreign policy and particularly in the Persian Gulf. During the course of his campaign, Carter supported this opposition and thus, at

least by association, became linked to that element of the Democratic Party which opposed U.S. arms sales there.

The Tenth Dartmouth Conference and UNA-USA/UNA-USSR Meeting of November 1976

Private contacts among influential citizens of states have served as a traditional method of bringing issues to the attention of policymakers. The issue of Indian Ocean arms control did not prove to be an exception and was discussed by the participants in the Tenth Dartmouth Conference from April 30 to May 4, 1976, in Rio Rico, Arizona.

Organized at the initiative of Norman Cousins, Editor of The Saturday Review, and Alexander Korneichuk, the Dartmouth Conferences have been held since 1960. Their objective has been to open up broader lines of communication between the people of the Soviet Union and the United States. Once such contact had been established, Cousins and Korneichuk believed that a more rational discussion of the issues dividing the two states might at least become possible. The first four Dartmouth Conferences focused on exploring the nature of these issues while succeeding meetings tried to find and promote common solutions to them.

Participants from the United States in the Tenth Dartmouth Conference included: Barry Blechman, head of the Defense Analysis Staff at The Brookings Institution and
author of the Brookings study on naval arms control mentioned earlier in this study; Marshall Shulman, Director of the Russian Institute at Columbia University; Brzezinski, then Director of the Research Institute on International Change at Columbia; Richard N. Gardner, Law Professor at Columbia and a former foreign policy advisor to Carter when he was Governor of Georgia; and Paul C. Warnke. Soviet conferees included Georgi Arbatov, Director of The Institute of USA and Canada Studies.\textsuperscript{46} During the course of the conference these men and the others attending it devoted considerable attention to identifying ways and means of making further progress in arresting and reversing the arms race. The conferees addressed a number of topics in this regard including naval arms limitations. During the course of the discussion one U.S. participant remarked that "it may be fruitful to codify measures of restraint that each of our two countries would take in specific local conflict situations, such as the Middle East or the Indian Ocean."\textsuperscript{47}

Both sides expressed the hope that their two countries would pursue negotiations on limiting naval presence in the Indian Ocean. The U.S. conferees expressed their opinion


\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., p. 20.
that such an agreement should limit the size of deployments in the Indian Ocean and ban foreign military bases as well.\textsuperscript{48} Agreeing that there should be no bases or "permanently deployed fleets" in the Indian Ocean, a Soviet delegate urged his American colleagues to understand that the Indian Ocean "is as important for us as the Panama Canal or the Magellan Straits for the U.S." Therefore, the Soviet Union shall continue to "insist on the right of passage and certain measures relevant and pertinent to that."\textsuperscript{49} The final joint communique emphasized the potential benefit of talks between the two governments on ways to abolish military bases and limit naval deployments in the Indian Ocean.\textsuperscript{50}

The Tenth Dartmouth Conference was not the only forum in which representatives of the two sides discussed NALT. Just after the Presidential election in November 1976, a joint meeting of representatives of the United Nations Association of the U.S. (UNA-USA) and the U.N. Association of the USSR took place in Moscow. The meeting was held under the auspices of UNA-USA's Parallel Studies Panel and was the first of the Association's meetings following the 1976 U.S. Presidential elections. Coincident with this

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., p. 22.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., p. 9.
meeting was the completion of a major study by the UNA-USA's National Policy Panel. The study addressed possible new initiatives for limiting conventional arms and was one of the three papers presented by the U.S. delegation.

The study started with the premise that, while it was imperative that strategic arms control negotiations continue to receive very high priority, it was advantageous to initiate a parallel effort to control conventional armaments.\textsuperscript{51} Among the approaches available, the study identified "the limitation of naval deployments as having the capacity to forestall incipient arms races in potentially explosive regions by decreasing the possibility of dangerous military incidents."\textsuperscript{52} The study attributed much of the impetus of these so-called arms races to the growing competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in general purpose naval forces\textsuperscript{53} and suggested that "limitations on general purpose forces were an appropriate subject for serious bilateral U.S.-USSR negotiations."\textsuperscript{54} Citing the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean as potential regions for discussion, the study suggested that U.S.-Soviet NALT would

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., p. 7.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., p. 22.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
be less difficult to negotiate than reductions in other major conventional force components and would be effective in promoting stability.\textsuperscript{55} As side benefits, such negotiations were perceived as:

1. symbolic of the superpowers' awareness of the future dangers of unrestrained naval competition;
2. helpful in maintaining the momentum of detente; and
3. conducive to the creation of an atmosphere in which other significant negotiated reductions might be possible.\textsuperscript{56}

The study concluded that it was in the interests of the U.S. to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union to limit or control general purpose naval forces and their deployments. Such an agreement would be an important step toward stabilizing relations in certain potentially dangerous regions.\textsuperscript{57} The Mediterranean was discounted in this respect since the study projected that conditions in that region might eventually stabilize. However, the Indian Ocean was identified as the region with the most potential for successful NALT.\textsuperscript{58} In this regard, the study suggested that the Indian Ocean, unlike the Mediterranean, had not been an area of intense naval competition between the superpowers.

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., p. 24.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., p. 27.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., p. 37.
However Soviet and American interest in establishing military bases and increasing their respective naval deployments in the area appeared to be on the increase. The study contended that several factors were promising for successful negotiations on the Indian Ocean. Among these the policy panel alleged that neither state had truly vital interests in the region but immediately qualified this perception by stating that this was true only so long as hostile military action did not impede Western access to oil. Moreover, its authors argued that U.S. and Soviet deployments in the area had leveled off after several years of growth. The report accurately characterized these deployments as being motivated just as much by political considerations as military factors.

The study concluded that it was an especially auspicious time to broaden the arms control agenda and to reevaluate widely held assumptions regarding the proper scope and priorities of arms control. Limitation on naval forces should be given a particularly high priority in this effort. The United States and the Soviet Union should agree to limit their naval deployments and bases in the Indian Ocean to be followed by negotiations to reduce this presence. The study concluded that such an agreement would

59. Ibid., p. 29.
60. Ibid., p. 30.
be a significant step towards stabilizing one of the potentially most dangerous and expensive aspects of the Soviet-American military competition. 61

When considered in the context of the subsequent Carter initiative and the membership of UNA-USA National Policy Panel on conventional arms control—the body that authored the study—the origin of the shift in U.S. policy toward the Indian Ocean takes on new perspective. Four of Carter's appointees to policy level positions in his national security organization were members of this panel. They included: Vance, Vice-Chairman of the panel and subsequently named as Secretary of State; Paul C. Warnke, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and later appointed Director of ACDA; Lynn E. Davis, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, member of Carter's transition team, and designated as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans, Policy and National Security Council Affairs; and Barry Blechman, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and author of The Control of Naval Armaments: Prospects and Possibilities, and subsequently selected as Assistant Director, Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau of ACDA.

61. Ibid., p. 79.
As was customary with UNA policy panel reports, the final section permitted its members to express minority opinions. None of the foregoing members expressed any variance with respect to Indian Ocean NALT. However, Davis did render an opinion that the United States should begin negotiations with the Soviet Union to limit the size of naval deployments in the eastern Mediterranean as a first step toward an overall agreement on the number and kinds of superpower naval forces in the Mediterranean. She also remarked that the arguments in the report in favor of limits on Soviet-American naval deployments in the Indian Ocean were contradicted by the subsequent emphasis on how such an agreement would not inhibit the projection of U.S. naval power in the region during a crisis.

Thus, as of late November 1976, there was a significant amount of carryover on the subject of the Indian Ocean and arms control that confronted the incoming Carter Administration. Brzezinski's and Vance's early views on the subject were discussed in the preceding chapter. However, there is little information available on how the subject developed during the transition process. Nonetheless, David Aaron, Mondale's foreign affairs advisor and chief of Carter's National Security Council transition team, did bring up the subject on at least one occasion. While

62. Ibid., p. 83, 85.
interviewing incumbent members of the NSC staff to determine those who would stay on under Brzezinski's revised concept of the NSC, Aaron raised the subject of Indian Ocean arms control with Commander Gary Sick, USN, who had only reported to the NSC about a month earlier from the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Commander Sick, an expert in the regional affairs of the Near East and South Asia as well as a Ph.D. in political science with a concentration in Middle Eastern affairs, had a broad operational and staff background in the region and participated extensively in the 1976 VPWG Study. Aaron briefly discussed the Indian Ocean issue with Sick. Commander Sick stayed on in the Brzezinski NSC. Though it is certainly tenuous to suggest that his retention on the NSC staff was solely the result of his discussion with Aaron on the Indian Ocean, the incident does suggest that the subject of Indian Ocean arms limitations was on the minds of some of the Carter national security team.

Brzezinski, both independently and within the context of the NSC, was an early supporter of the idea of Indian Ocean arms control. The studies that were commissioned on

63. See Power and Principle, p. 74.
64. Sick.
January 5, 1977, during the Carter Administration's first informal NSC meeting reflect the broad scope of Carter's policy. Three of the first ten Presidential Review Memoranda (PRM) dealt with issues that, although not directly related to the Indian Ocean, contributed to the perceptions of the utility of NALT to the Carter Administration.

PRM-2, issued on January 24, 1977, dealt with SALT. PRM-8, announced on January 21, 1977, addressed the issue of North-South strategy considerations. PRM-10, issued on February 18, 1977, directed a comprehensive review of U.S. global military force posture. With SALT II stalled, Carter may have wanted to have several additional options available in his repertoire of arms control initiatives to maintain the momentum if, as was the case, the Soviet leadership rejected Carter's "deep cuts" proposal and to impress the Soviet Union with his interest in arms control. The PRM on North-South strategy reflected the concern by Carter, Vance, and Brzezinski of the need to develop a more accommodating framework of North-South


68. Warnke.
relations so as to diminish hostility toward the United States and lessen Soviet influence in the Third World.\textsuperscript{69} The use of Indian Ocean naval arms limitations as a tactic to support this policy goal cannot be discounted. PRM-10, the most ambitious project of the Carter NSC undertaken by Professor Samuel Huntington of Harvard University assessed the overall global balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. Though it took over six months to complete and thus shaped the initial Carter Administration's perceptions only peripherally, it provided the intellectual underpinnings of Brzezinski's optimistic poll on detente\textsuperscript{70} and thus could very well have influenced the decision to negotiate on the Indian Ocean.

PRM-10 identified the military domain as the one in which the Soviet Union was making the most gains. It also earmarked the Persian Gulf as a vulnerable and vital region to which greater military concern ought to be given. PRM-10 led to what was perhaps one of the two most important Presidential Directives (PD) of the Carter Administration. Issued on August 24, 1977, PD-18 entitled "National Strategy" directed the maintenance of "a deployment force of light divisions with strategic mobility" for global contingencies, particularly those in the Persian Gulf region.

\textsuperscript{69} Power and Principle, p. 54.

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., p. 177.
However, there was a faction within the Administration that preferred to address the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf region through arms control talks with the Soviet Union. Thus, it seems that some sort of preference for Indian Ocean NALT existed within the national security apparatus of the Carter Administration probably at the outset of the PRM-10 process and more certainly as the prospect of what was to become the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) emerged during the staffing process of PRM-10.

71. Ibid. See also Korb, op. cit., p. 131.
CHAPTER IV

THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE ON THE TALKS

You Americans will never be able to do this to us again.

-- Vasily Kuznetsov to John J. McCloy (October 1962)

Any discussion of the Soviet approach to arms control is necessarily inductive as well as deductive. It is also difficult, because what the USSR says and what it does are two quite different things. While Soviet declaratory policy endorses the western notion of technical arms control in principle, Soviet development and deployment of military forces implies that the USSR rejects these principles and prefers to guarantee its national security through its military forces. The Soviet Union believes that this policy fosters deterrence and, at the same time, ensures that if deterrence failed, the USSR could fight and win a war and limit damage to its territory. In addition, the Soviet Union has used arms control negotiations to further its image as a supporter of detente and disarmament. In a sense, what the Soviet leadership has done is to take the technical concept of arms control and use it to advance a
process which has limited the adverse politico-military effect on the USSR of U.S. advances in military technology.

In general, Soviet pronouncements on the subject have demonstrated the same dichotomy. Selected passages from both official Soviet media as well as public forums demonstrate that the USSR supported the creation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean even though, as previously discussed, its voting record in the U.N. General Assembly on the subject did not corroborate that rhetoric.

Although naval disarmament was one of the leading themes of international politics in the 1920's and early 1930's, the low level of Soviet naval capabilities prevented the USSR from being a major factor in the Washington Conference of 1921 and its successors. The Soviet Navy, whose posture was purely coastal, did not draw much attention when compared to the five major powers who were building capital ships at a substantial rate. H. Wilson Harris points out in his work on naval disarmament of the period that:

Russia [was] not relevant in a discussion on naval disarmament . . . [Great Britain's] concern, if it be a naval war, [was] only with the United States, Japan, France and Italy. . . .

However, since the late 1960s, there has been a qualitative and quantitative change in the character of Soviet peacetime naval operations and more emphasis on the

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diplomatic and power projection missions of the Soviet fleet. An on-again, off-again diplomatic campaign for mutual U.S.-USSR naval limitations in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean has paralleled this development. The timing and content of these proposals reveals something about their motivation and the seriousness with which the Soviet leadership has offered them.

Soviet Rhetoric--
The Political Leadership and the Press

Soviet concern for U.S. actions in the Indian Ocean appeared at about the same time as the United States and Great Britain created the British Indian Ocean territory. On December 7, 1964, in a memorandum to the United Nations, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko charged that actions by the U.S. and U.K. to create a structure for new military bases in the Indian Ocean were "contrary to the clearly expressed will of the peoples of that region [and] merit[ed] resolute condemnation." 2

The first, and most substantive, initiative happened in March 1971, when Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin asked Secretary of State William Rogers in private what the U.S. view would

be of a declaration designed "to keep the Indian Ocean free of major competition." In June of that year Communist Party General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev publicly expressed interest in the subject when, in a Supreme Soviet election speech on June 11, 1971, he argued that:

We have never considered . . . that it is an ideal situation when the navies of the great powers are cruising about for long periods far from their own shores, and we are prepared to solve this problem, but to solve it . . . on an equal basis.

The Soviet media gave minimal coverage to Brezhnev's initiative. A Soviet domestic radio service broadcast on June 13, 1971, alleged that the U.S. State Department's refusal to respond immediately to the Brezhnev speech was an indication "that the Nixon Government intends to study this proposal carefully before issuing any statement." Only one follow-up story mentioned the Indian Ocean specifically. A TASS dispatch of June 20, 1971, citing the Indian newspaper


National Herald, pointed out that:

... the Soviet Union readily responded to the call of the peoples of Africa and Asia to make the Indian Ocean a peace zone ... the recent Soviet proposal ... to reduce great powers' naval presence far off their shores, had again displayed the Soviet Union's sincere striving for safeguarding peace on earth.6

Though Nixon and Kissinger tried to get more information from the Soviet Union on Brezhnev's speech, no reply was forthcoming. U.S. Ambassador Jacob Beam raised the issue during a meeting with Gromyko in Moscow in July 1971. Beam referred to Dobrynin's informal conversation with Rogers and told him that the United States agreed in principle that it would be in the mutual interests of the United States and the Soviet Union to avoid military competition in the area and that the U.S. wanted to know more about what Dobrynin had meant. Gromyko told Beam that he had not been briefed on the subject but would look into it. The Soviet Government never again raised the subject.7

There were perhaps two explanations for Brezhnev's proposal in addition to the Dobrynin-Rogers conversation.

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The first was the promulgation of the Soviet Peace Program at the 24th Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Congress in April. The Peace Program alleged a Soviet commitment to detente and offered a broad range of measures, including various arms control regimes, to enhance the process. The Indian Ocean proposal seemed to fit within the general framework of this scheme since Brezhnev had also called for talks on force levels in Central Europe less than a month earlier in a speech on May 14, 1971. Indeed, Brezhnev challenged NATO to respond to his May 14 proposal in the same speech in which he raised the issue of talks on the Indian Ocean.

The second possible explanation, cast in terms of the SALT negotiations, had more to do with one specific issue in those talks. The Soviet Union had pushed hard for the inclusion of the Forward Based Systems (FBS) issue in the SALT agreement. However, in May 1971, the Soviet leadership agreed to exclude this problem from the forthcoming agreement. One month later Brezhnev went public with the call for naval limitations in the Indian Ocean. Thus, when the USSR agreed to table the FBS issue until after the signing of the SALT I agreement, it changed the forum in which the campaign was conducted. Soviet persistence on

this question suggests more than mere exploitation of the issue for immediate political gain; the USSR was reminding the United States that it did not consider the issue closed.

Later in 1971, just after the U.N. General Assembly had placed the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace on its agenda, Radio Moscow broadcast an editorial in Hindi on October 15, 1971. The commentator explained that:

The inclusion of this vital issue in the assembly agenda is significant and timely due to reports of continued large-scale aggressive activities by Britain and the United States in the Indian Ocean.

In the wake of the Indo-Pakistani crisis in late 1971, the Soviet Union again criticized U.S. naval activity in the Indian Ocean as a source of tension and an attempt to put pressure on the states in the region. The Soviet media avoided, however, any discussion of "great-power naval rivalry."

Articles in Pravda on January 8, 1972, and Red Star on January 12 cited documents released by Washington Post columnist Jack Anderson to deplore the Department of Defense's announcement regarding U.S. Seventh Fleet patrols in the Indian Ocean after the Indo-Pakistani crisis. Citing the documents as evidence that a U.S. carrier battle group had deployed to the Bay of Bengal to exert pressure on the

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Government of India, Pravda criticized what it described as a long-term U.S. policy of constant politico-military pressure on states in the region. Red Star claimed that there were "ill-omened analogies" between events in the Bay of Bengal in 1971 and the Tonkin Gulf in 1964 and condemned these operations as a source of "dangerous tension." A January 18 Izvestiya article introduced the factor of Sino-American relations in assessing the U.S. policy. According to the article, U.S. failures in Indochina and South Asia motivated these "new gambles." The "present direction of American-Chinese relations," according to the article, demonstrated that the United States did not have to fear any initiatives by the PRC in defense of national liberation movements in Asia. 10

Although the subject remained dormant in both the official and media context for some time, the Soviet Union took advantage of the visit to Moscow of the Prime Minister of Mauritius, Sir Seewoosagor Ramgoolam to raise the issue again. Alexi Kosygin, in a speech during this visit,

reiterated the position that:

The Soviet Union treats with understanding the desire of Mauritius and other countries of the Indian Ocean to strengthen peace and security in the area. This can be reached through renunciation by states of the use of force or threat to use it, respect for sovereignty . . . and also through elimination of foreign military bases in that area.

Some four months later during Brezhnev's visit to New Delhi from November 26 to November 30, the Soviet Union and India concluded a comprehensive fifteen-year economic agreement, an agreement on cooperation between the Soviet and Indian economic planning groups, and a consular convention. This visit marked Brezhnev's first to a Third World country since he became Chairman of the CPSU in 1964. He took the occasion to link the Indian Ocean with his Asian collective security system in a major speech before the Indian Parliament when he explained that:

Many interesting initiatives, inspired by concern for a peaceful future of Asia, are arising, such as the idea of neutralisation of South East Asia, the search for formulas of mutual relations between states of southern Asia which would safeguard good neighborly cooperation between them, the proposal for making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace, and plans for regional cooperation.12

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12. FB-M-77-10009, p. 3.
At the end of the visit Brezhnev and Gahdhi issued a joint declaration on November 30. On the subject of the Indian Ocean, the declaration announced that: "The two parties reaffirmed their readiness to take part, together with all interested states on an equal basis, in the search for a favorable solution" to the issue. This was in contrast to a 1971 joint declaration that specified that:

The Prime Minister of India reaffirmed that the Indian Ocean area should be made a zone of peace. The Soviet side expressed its readiness to study this question and to solve it together with other powers on an equal basis.

This rhetorical qualification can perhaps best be explained in the context of Brezhnev's attempt to get Gandhi to support his Asian collective security system. A Delhi radio broadcast in late August 1972 established an early linkage between the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace and the Asian collective security proposals. The commentator explained that a collective security system was "inextricably linked with a trouble-free Indian Ocean" and that under circumstances of "big power rivalry," India was against involvement in any security pact or system. However, the

13. Ibid.
Brezhnev speeches and the joint declaration offer no evidence that he was able to change Gandhi's reluctance to endorse his Asian collective security project. In his speech to the Indian Parliament the Soviet leader linked support for his proposal with what he called "active, broad, and constructive" discussions on the concept. Brezhnev's rhetoric thus suggested the convening of an international conference on the subject—a proposal whose implications for an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace were meant to sway India. His call for talks pressed Gandhi to give at least reserved support for his vaguely defined proposal. Spokesmen from both sides revealed the sensitivity of both the USSR and India on this subject in press conferences during the visit. These spokesmen stressed that the Asian collective security was not discussed during at least four of the five meetings between Gandhi and Brezhnev, even though the situation in Asia was said to have been the main topic during one of these discussions.16

The Soviet media tried to exploit this linkage. In a commentary in English on December 20, 1973, Radio Moscow remarked that:

A joint Soviet-Indian declaration notes that both sides reaffirmed their readiness to participate with all the countries concerned on equal basis in

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16. Ibid., p. 11.
finding a favorable solution to the problem of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace....

The linkage of the Zone of Peace concept with Brezhnev's Asian collective security system was most apparent in the closing words of the broadcast. The commentator explained that:

The Soviet Union has full understanding for the Indian Ocean countries' desire to enhance their security. It has repeatedly made proposals on the liquidation of the military bases in the region and on the disbandment of the aggressive military blocs. Supporting [the proposal] of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace we believe that its implementation could become an important step forward toward creating a collective security system on the entire Asian Continent.

Schlesinger's request to Congress for funds to expand the capabilities of Diego Garcia in January 1974 elicited a flood of Soviet criticism of the United States. Articles in Pravda, Izvestiya, and Red Star criticized Great Britain's agreement to the U.S. plan, contending that U.S. efforts to control the Persian Gulf would jeopardize the region's security and intimidate the national liberation movements in Africa and the developing countries of Asia. Numerous Moscow Radio Asian-language commentaries accused the United States of planning to construct a base on Diego Garcia capable of supporting "the same strategic bombers used over

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17. FB-M-77-10009, p. 8.
18. Ibid.
Vietnam and nuclear submarines that would keep a considerable part of Asia and Africa at gunpoint."\(^{19}\)

The Soviet media contrasted the U.S. plans for Diego Garcia with Soviet efforts to relax tension as exemplified by Brezhnev's Asian collective security system and Soviet support for the Indian and Sri Lankan proposal to declare the Indian Ocean a peace zone. This rhetoric was consistent with long-standing Soviet sensitivity to U.S. military activities in the Indian Ocean—manifested after the U.S. and the U.K. reached agreement on Diego Garcia in 1966 and 1972, and whenever the U.S. Navy deployed a sizable force in the area. The Soviet campaign included exploitation of public protests against the expansion by various littoral countries.\(^{20}\)

Commenting on U.S. claims that reopening of the Suez Canal would permit a buildup of the Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean, \textit{Pravda} defended the Soviet naval presence there on February 10, 1974, insisting that plying normal sea routes was not "exceptional" and was "a generally accepted practice." Similarly, an article in \textit{Red Star} on February 13, 1974, "exposed the falsehood of U.S. propaganda

\begin{itemize}
\item[\(^{20}\)] Ibid.
\end{itemize}
statements" alleging the USSR would gain a strategic advantage when the canal was opened. Several TASS foreign-language radio commentaries denied that the Soviet Union had naval bases in the area and countercharged that the United States was planning to construct a chain of bases to control the sea routes and intimidate the littoral nations. 21

An article in Pravda on February 27, 1974, on U.S. plans to expand Diego Garcia repeated the same themes of the earlier media commentary. The article charged that the United States was "threatening the peace and independence of countries in the area" and explained that "Soviet military activities in the Indian Ocean posed no threat." It went on to claim that the USSR had adopted a favorable position on the proposal to make the Indian Ocean a peace zone. 22 The article concluded by explaining that:

The Soviet Union's position on the question of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace was clearly expressed in the joint Soviet-Indian declaration during the visit to India by L.I. Brezhnev . . . last November. This declaration points out in particular: "Both sides confirm their readiness to participate together with all interested states on an equal basis in seeking a

21. Ibid.

favorable solution to the question of turning the
Indian Ocean into a zone of peace.

Later the same year, on July 21, 1974, in a speech
before the Polish Parliament, Brezhnev called for the
"withdrawal of ships carrying nuclear weapons" from the
Mediterranean. The choice of Poland as a location to
speak about a maritime security issue was strange unless the
target audience was the Soviet domestic and Bloc factions
opposed to the economic and military commitments of the USSR
in the Third World. Given the downward turn in Soviet-
Egyptian relations beginning with the ouster of the Soviet
military advisors in July 1972, and capped by the Egyptian
defeat in the October War, Brezhnev's speech may have been
designed to placate this opposition.

Moreover, since the Soviet Union considered the U.S.
Navy's nuclear capable platforms in the Mediterranean to be
part of FBS, the choice of an Eastern European country,
directly involved in the MBFR talks, to raise a Medi-
terranean security issue appears to be more than mere coinci-
dence. More explicit evidence that the Soviet Union
intended to discuss FBS in future negotiations appeared in a
speech by Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny in Sofia,


24. U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical Infor-
mation Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
"Brezhnev SEJM Speech," FBIS Daily Report: Soviet Union,
Bulgaria, on September 8, 1974. Podgorny explained that:

Among the more urgent practical steps which would substantially improve the international atmosphere, . . . is the further easing of tension in sectors where NATO and Warsaw Pact forces are directly contiguous. . . . In addition, the Soviet Union advocates the turning of the Mediterranean into a zone free of nuclear weapons and into a zone of peace. This would be promoted by the withdrawal of ships with nuclear weapons on board from the Mediterranean region. The Soviet Union is ready to take such an important step, of course, on a basis of reciprocity.

Because he made this speech during the 1974 Cyprus crisis, Podgorny could have used the occasion for propaganda by trying to contrast Soviet actions with those of NATO. He may also have put the idea forth for its propaganda value in relations with the non-aligned states of the region, the majority of which would like to have seen both fleets withdraw.

Podgorny thus forged a link between Brezhnev's Mediterranean proposal and the issue of what the USSR called "military detente in Europe." His discussion of these two concepts in the same speech and the importance he assigned to naval arms control for the resolution of security issues in Europe suggest that a nuclear stand-down in the Mediterranean was, from the Soviet point of view, an

essential adjunct to the reduction of land and air forces in Europe. In early October 1974 Brezhnev, speaking in East Berlin, raised the issue again by calling for the removal of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons platforms from the Mediterranean.26

There were significant differences between the Soviet statements of 1971 and 1974. First, Brezhnev's 1971 statement stressed both the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean; the 1974 speeches addressed only the Mediterranean. Second, the 1971 statement focused upon steady state naval deployments and not on intermittent deployments to "show of the flag," transits, and crisis operations. The 1974 statements did not address the issue of steady state versus intermittent deployments; they emphasized the weapons systems of the deployed forces. Taken together, these differences could have reflected Soviet flexibility in offering alternative approaches to reach agreement. Nonetheless, it could be argued that Brezhnev's 1974 proposal superseded his 1971 statement.

Diego Garcia again elicited comments from the Soviet press. As a result of a remark by Ford in a news conference

on August 28, 1974, concerning the expansion of Diego Garcia, the Soviet press criticized Ford for the first time since he assumed office on August 9, 1974. The initial TASS account of Ford's news conference made no mention of the Indian Ocean issue, although a more comprehensive Pravda commentary on August 30 noted that Ford said he supported the expansion of Diego Garcia. But when Ford went on to add that he did not view this as a challenge to the Soviet Union since the USSR already had three major naval operating bases in the Indian Ocean, and that this "particular construction [Diego Garcia] is, I think, a wise policy," Pravda said only that he claimed that expansion of the base "would not complicate the situation in the area." Pravda also reported him as concluding that the base should not "lead to any spread of problems" in the Middle East.

On August 31, TASS again chided Ford for a "regrettable inaccuracy" in declaring that expansion of the U.S. base on Diego Garcia did not represent a challenge to the Soviet Union. TASS absolved Ford himself of the error, declaring


that he had been, "unfortunately, misinformed by his staff," since "there are neither three nor even a single Soviet naval base" in the Indian Ocean.\textsuperscript{29} TASS cited testimony by CIA Director William Colby before the Senate Armed Services Committee during a July 11 closed-door hearing, made public on August 3 in The New York Times.\textsuperscript{30} The broadcast noted that Colby had described the Soviet military presence in the Indian Ocean "as a relatively small one" while the Times quoted Colby as saying small "and inactive." TASS also noted that Colby had said that the level of Soviet forces in the Indian Ocean "would depend on what forces the United States allotted for that area." Summing up "Pentagon plans" for making Diego Garcia a "major U.S. naval base" in the Indian Ocean, TASS explained that these plans had met with "serious objections" from Congress and had triggered a wave of protests from countries in the Indian Ocean.\textsuperscript{31}

On November 11, 1974, Kosygin seized the opportunity of a visit to Moscow by Sri Lanka's Prime Minister, Mrs. Bandaranaike, and again tried to link the Indian Ocean to the broader context of Asia. He said that:

\begin{quote}
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\end{quote}
We view with respect the political initiatives of Asian countries motivated by concern for peace. These include, for example, the idea of creating a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. The forces of imperialism and reaction are striving to hold on to their positions in Asia. To this end they are endeavoring to galvanize the activity of aggressive military blocs, expand the network of military bases in this area, and maintain the hotbeds of tension existing here.

At the conclusion of Bandaranaike's visit, a joint Soviet-Sri Lankan communique of November 17, 1974, explained that:

Sri Lanka outlined its views on the proposal to turn the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. The Soviet side pointed out that the Soviet Union supported the idea aimed at consolidating the national sovereignty and strengthening the independence of countries and removing foreign military bases from the area. The two sides reaffirmed readiness to participate, together with all interested countries on an equal basis, in searching for a favorable solution to the question of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, in accordance with the principles of international law.

Perhaps the greatest volume of Soviet rhetoric on the issue of the Indian Ocean appeared in 1976. Speaking before the 25th CPSU Congress on February 24, 1976, Brezhnev remarked that:

There have recently been many speeches in a number of countries in support of the Indian Ocean not becoming an area of military bases of this or that power. We agree with these speeches. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, we have never intended and do not intend to construct military...

32. FB-M-77-10009, p. 3.
33. Ibid.
bases in the Indian Ocean. We call on the United States to take up a similar position.

Later that year in May Pravda carried a report of a joint Soviet-Laotian communique that focused on the issue of Diego Garcia. The communique said that:

The USSR and the LPDR support the opposition of the countries of the Indian Ocean region to the United States building a military base on the Island of Diego Garcia.

The visit of Mozambique's President Samoro Machel from May 17 until May 22, 1976, was also the occasion for another joint communique that addressed the Indian Ocean. The Soviet leadership and Machel advocated that:

... the Indian Ocean be free of foreign military bases and call for the liquidation of the bases which exist in the region. They condemn the creation of a U.S. military base on Diego Garcia Island, which represents a threat to the peace and security of the freedom-loving peoples.

Later that same month during a visit to Iraq by Kosygin another joint communique reiterated that:

Both sides support the struggle to turn the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace free from all foreign military bases and for securing the freedom of navigation in accordance with the principles of international law.

The visit of Mrs. Gandhi to Moscow during June 1976 afforded the Soviet leadership another opportunity to

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34. Ibid., p. 4.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
expound on the subject. The Soviet Union and India reaffirmed their economic and political links in a joint declaration signed on June 11. The joint declaration, signed by Gandhi and Brezhnev, repeated the positions of both countries on international issues and updated the declaration signed during Brezhnev's November 1973 visit to India. The overall tone was positive, outlining broad areas of common agreement. However, differences remained over Brezhnev's Asian collective security plan.38

The USSR again supported India's proposal for a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, affirming in the joint declaration, as it had in 1973, that the Soviet Union would participate in "finding a favorable solution to the question of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace." The 1976 declaration underlined Soviet interest in unrestricted naval access to the area, however, by adding that this should be done "in conformity with generally recognized rules of international law." Both sides also opposed the establishment of "foreign military bases" in the Indian Ocean. Brezhnev repeated his challenge to the United States to announce its intention not to build military bases in the


39. Ibid., p. 15.
The joint communique issued at the end of Gandhi's visit on June 14, 1976, reflected the foregoing. It said that:

India and the Soviet Union support the desire of the peoples of the Indian Ocean area to prevent it from becoming an arena for the setting up of foreign military bases. The sides reaffirm their readiness to participate together with all states concerned on an equal basis and in conformity with generally recognized rules of international law in finding a favorable solution to the question of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace.

Soviet opposition to Diego Garcia continued to be the central theme of both official and press statements on the Indian Ocean. An article in Izvestiya on June 27, 1976, explained that:

The Indian Ocean is one of those regions of the world in which the opposed aspirations of the imperialist circles and of the young independent states conflict most obviously.

It went on to remark that:

Regardless of opposition in the Congress, the U.S. military continues speeding up the construction of naval and air establishments on the atoll of Diego Garcia.

Finally, it concluded with the observation that:


41. FB-M-77-10009, p. 11.

42. Ibid.
Where the big fish go, the small fry will follow. Certain Asian countries are also turning toward arms buildups in the Indian Ocean region. Cleverly playing on the anti-communist sentiments of these countries' ruling circles, the United States is providing mass supplies of combat equipment to the Persian Gulf region. Western propaganda tries to justify the military actions of the United States and its allies by referring to the notorious "Soviet threat." In fact, the Soviet Union has not had and still does not have any intentions of building military bases in the Indian Ocean.

However, the most significant statement on the subject came from Gromyko in his annual speech to the U.N. General Assembly on September 28, 1976. He delivered a generally cautious assessment of the world situation but reaffirmed the Soviet Union's commitment to detente. He expressed some reservations on East-West relations as to what could be expected of the United States during an election year and avoided detailed comment on Soviet relations with most other Western countries. On the subject of arms control, he restated the well-known Soviet proposal for a treaty which would ban the use or threat of force in international relations. On the issue of the Indian Ocean, Gromyko indicated a Soviet willingness to consider measures for "reducing" military activities in the area by non-littoral states.

In his remarks on the Indian Ocean, Gromyko went beyond Moscow's vague support for transforming the area into a "peace zone" and suggested that the Soviet Union might be

43. Ibid.
willing to entertain more concrete proposals in this regard. He said that "the Soviet Union is ready to look, together with other powers, for ways of reducing on a mutual basis military activity of non-littoral states in the Indian Ocean and the areas directly adjoining it." The only previous Soviet public indication of this sort was the more broadly phrased offer made by Brezhnev in his Supreme Soviet election speech in 1971.

Gromyko followed this speech by submitting the annual Soviet memorandum on disarmament to the United Nations on September 30, 1976. In it he alleged that:

The Soviet Union believes it is desirable to make new efforts on an international scale to achieve the liquidation of all foreign military bases on alien territory and the withdrawal of foreign troops from such territories . . . the littoral countries of the Indian Ocean are expressing alarm over the fact that several states which are geographically very remote from this region are deploying military bases there and increasing their military presence. . . . Obviously a key question here is to insure that there are no foreign bases in the Indian Ocean region, that those bases which have been created there are liquidated and that new bases are not created.

He closed the memorandum by proposing that:

. . . the Soviet Union would be prepared, together with other powers, to seek ways to reduce, on a mutual basis, the military activity of non-littoral states in the Indian Ocean and the regions directly adjacent to it. Of course, measures of this sort must take full account of the universally recognized norms of international law concerning freedom of shipping on the open sea

44. Ibid., p. 6.
and the need for business visits connected with this to the ports of littoral states and for scientific research. For the Soviet Union this question is important because virtually the only sea route open all year round connecting the European part of the USSR with the Soviet Far East passes through the Indian Ocean.

Izvestia restated general themes echoed by Gromyko in an article on November 4, 1976, only two days after Carter had defeated Ford. The article began by noting that "the attention of the world press is now riveted on Western military strategy in the Indian Ocean." After discussing U.S. naval deployments to the region and Diego Garcia, the article concluded with the remark that:

The USSR is not seeking onesided advantages for itself. If the Soviet proposals encounter a positive response, our country would be prepared together with other powers, to seek ways of reducing military activity, on a reciprocal basis, in the Indian Ocean and the regions immediately adjacent to it. Of course, measures of this sort should take fully into consideration the norms of international law concerning freedom of navigation in the open sea and the need for access to the ports of the littoral states for business purposes, and also for scientific research.46

The invitation to Carter was obvious.

From November 1976 until March 1977 the Soviet press remained silent on the subject of Indian Ocean negotiations. However, on March 24, 1977, the same day that Carter raised the issue of Indian Ocean talks for the second

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45. Ibid.
46. Ibid., p. 11-12.
time in a news conference, Podgorny, in a speech in Zanzibar, declared:

The Soviet Union is ... prepared to solve on an equal basis with other interested states the questions of declaring the Indian Ocean a "peace zone." The key question of preserving peace in that region is the elimination of the existing imperialist military bases in the Indian Ocean which represent a direct threat to international security, the independence of the coastal states and world navigation.47

Soviet Rhetoric--The Military

The foregoing discussion of the Soviet political leadership and media view of the Indian Ocean talks covered the years from 1971 through 1976. During the same period a parallel commentary appeared on the subject from within the Soviet military. Not surprisingly the author of these works was the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral of the Fleet Sergei G. Gorshkov. The admiral authored two major works during this period. The first was a series of articles entitled "Navies in War and Peace" published in the Soviet Naval Digest in 1972 and 1973 and reprinted in United States Naval Institute Proceedings in 1974. The second was a major book, Sea Power of the State, published in February 1976. While the series dealt more extensively and more explicitly with the issue of naval arms limitations, the treatment of the subject was sufficiently similar in the

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47. Darnton, op. cit.
book to suggest that Gorshkov's views on it did not change. 48

Gorshkov presented a generally pessimistic view of the naval arms control agreements of the period between the two World Wars. He argued that they did not achieve their purpose and that "from the mid-1930's, a new unrestrained and in no way regulated naval arms race began." 49 He bordered on sarcasm in his description of the successive naval conferences as "the war of the diplomats for supremacy at sea." 50 Accordingly, a case can be made that Gorshkov was arguing against naval arms control. 51

48. There are contending positions as to the authoritativeness and content of these articles. Some analysts believed that the articles reflected doctrine. See, for example, Cdr. Clyde A. Smith, USN, "The Meaning and Significance of the Gorshkov Articles," Naval War College Review, March-April 1974, p. 18-37. Others argue that Gorshkov was writing as an advocate for his navy. See, for example, Robert Weinland, Robert Herrick, Michael MacGwire, and James McConnell, "Admiral Gorshkov's 'Navies in War and Peace'," Survival, March/April 1975, p. 54-63.


Gorshkov drew on the historiography of the Anglo-American naval competition in the aftermath of World War I to reach these conclusions. Rather than engage in a difficult, costly and probably hopeless naval arms race with the United States, the British cabinet decided to concede equality. Soviet discussion of detente in general, and SALT in particular, reflected this same theme and argued that progress toward world peace had come about because realistic western statesmen abandoned the policy of trying to deal with the Soviet Union from a position of strength, and, instead, agreed to the principle of equal security.\footnote{52}

The discussion of America's "prolonged struggle" to achieve naval parity with England appeared in August 1972.\footnote{53} The July issue did not contain an article in the series, while the June issue was signed to press on May 29, 1972, before the end of the Nixon-Brezhnev summit, and was written and approved even earlier. In other words, Gorshkov's discussion appeared in the first article of the series to appear after the summit meeting between Nixon and Brezhnev. This bit of evidence, though perhaps circumstantial, supports the notion that this article was intended as a discussion of the relations between the U.S. and the

\footnote{52}{Ibid., p. 8.}
\footnote{53}{"Navies in War and Peace," June 1974, p. 47-48.}
USSR with respect to arms control agreements.\(^54\) Thus Gorshkov was able to explain to naval officers, and perhaps officers of the other Soviet armed services as well, the benefits the USSR could obtain from SALT.\(^55\)

Gorshkov's description of the naval arms control agreements, both in terms of their goal "to limit and regulate the construction of warships" and achievement of "a delaying function in naval construction" followed by an arms race proceeding "without any sort of limitations," sounded like an appraisal of the Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons of May 1972. Perhaps Gorshkov was trying to reassure the Soviet officer corps that the Soviet leadership recognized that, if they could not extend the Interim Agreement major new expenditures for arms would be forthcoming.\(^56\) Hence the Soviet Union could then confront the United

\(^{54}\) CNA 74-2005.20, p. 8. It can be argued that the discussion of America's "prolonged struggle" in the August number of Morskoi sbornik is mere coincidence and that the discussion, however awkwardly placed in an article entitled "The Building of the [Soviet] Navy," would have been even more awkwardly placed elsewhere. Michael MacGwire, "Naval Power and Soviet Oceans Policy," in Soviet Oceans Development, U.S. Senate, Committee on Commerce and National Ocean Policy, Study (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1976), n. 111 to p. 123. However this may be from the point of view of logic, Gorshkov does discuss, cursorily, the post-World War I naval agreements in the article "The First World War," which appeared in the May 1972 number.


\(^{56}\) Ibid., p. 10.
States, if necessary, from a position of strength.

However, Gorshkov argued that, with respect to naval forces, the U.S. had not recognized the "equal rights" of the Soviet Union. He explained that:

... today abroad there is widespread propaganda produced by American ideologists asserting that the Soviet state does not need a powerful navy. 57

Gorshkov went on to cite Nixon's news conference on July 30, 1970, in which Nixon argued that what:

... the Soviet Union needs in way of military preparations differs from what we need. The USSR is a land power ... while we are primarily a sea power 58 and our needs are therefore different. ...

The admiral concluded this article with the observation that:

One hardly has to say that this speech of Nixon's, which is a modern version of the old attempts by the English politicians to show Russia's lack of need for a strong Navy, bears no relationship to the actual state of affairs and contradicts 59 the interests of our state both past and present.

Gorshkov's main purpose was to attack, by comparing the effect of British propaganda in the late nineteenth century

on Tsarist Russia, Soviet officials who would willingly accept naval inferiority. 60

However, some form of naval arms control which recognized the "equal rights" of the USSR would put an end to this problem. For instance, in advocating, in 1971, limitations on out of area naval deployments, Brezhnev expressed a willingness to solve the problem of "the navies of the great powers . . . cruising about for long periods of time far from their own shores, . . . but to solve it . . . on an equal basis." 61 While Brezhnev maintained that any agreement would have to be on an "equal basis," he did not specify just how the principle of equality would be applied. Since he specifically cited Soviet deployments in the Indian Ocean as a source of U.S. concern, some analysts interpreted his proposal as a call for deployment limitations in that body of water. 62

Gorshkov contended that the achievement of American naval supremacy was due to two causes. The first was the effect of the law of the nonuniformity of development of capitalist countries. The second was the revolutionary and

60. CNA 74-2005.20, p. 12.
national freedom movements embracing the entire world. The former referred to the fact that the U.S. outstripped Great Britain in economic development. At the time, the Soviet Union seemed to have accepted the idea that the U.S. would remain the economically predominant power, although it had not given up the belief that, eventually, the economic superiority of socialism would make itself manifest. The latter, which operated to the advantage of the U.S. vis-a-vis England, now worked against the U.S., which had taken over the role of "suppressor of the national freedom movement of peoples who are freeing themselves of the colonialist yoke." It would therefore seem that the basic factors which led to American naval supremacy now opened the long-range prospect of Soviet supremacy. This analogy with the U.S.-Soviet competition demonstrated, according to Gorshkov, that the existence of "detente" should not impede the Soviet "prolonged struggle" for naval parity and eventually superiority. Furthermore, there would seem to be no reason why naval arms control could not play a role in this long-range development. 63

Gorshkov referred to the Soviet Union as "one of the strongest continental powers" but as only "a mighty seapower." Nonetheless, he suggested that the absence of

naval parity would detract from the political equality which the Soviet Union had attained. Unless the Soviet Navy could defend Soviet interests with the same facility as the U.S. Navy permitted the United States to protect its interests, complete equality would not exist.\textsuperscript{64} It therefore seems that he was making a case for naval parity.

What Gorshkov seemed to fear most was that the Soviet political leadership would repeat the mistake of the Tsar's advisors in believing that the USSR should accept a position of naval inferiority. In particular, he feared that some Soviet leaders would be willing to freeze Soviet naval inferiority by means of a naval arms control agreement in return for concessions from the United States in other areas. He might have interpreted Nixon's remark as evidence that the United States was thinking along the same lines. Nixon suggested that it would be reasonable for the United States to recognize, possibly formally, Soviet superiority with respect to ground troops in return for a similar Soviet recognition of U.S. naval superiority. Gorshkov would find such an agreement unacceptable. Naval agreements "on an equal basis," on the other hand, to the extent that they could be negotiated, would seem to serve Gorshkov's

\textsuperscript{64} CNA 74-2005.20, p. 16.
purposes as steppingstones on the way to parity and perhaps even superiority. 65

**Soviet Actions**

Yet, despite this rhetoric, there was a demonstrable pattern of the use of the Soviet Navy in politico-military missions in the Indian Ocean between 1963 and 1976. When Somalia rejected a $10 million military aid program proposed by the U.S., Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany in November 1963, the Soviet Union seized the opportunity to gain a foothold in the Horn of Africa by providing Somalia with a military aid package totaling $35 million to develop a 14,000-man army, a coastal navy, and a modern air force. Substantial amounts of Soviet military equipment began arriving in Somalia in 1965 and 1966 along with Soviet military technicians and advisors. 66 These events set the stage for the first use of the Soviet Navy as a politico-military instrument in the Indian Ocean.

The first case followed the military coup in Somalia in October 1969. On April 27, 1970, the Somali government announced that it had discovered a plot against itself. How

65. CNA 74-2005.20, p. 17-18. It should be emphasized that no such interpretation of Nixon's remarks is here asserted. What is suggested is merely that Gorshkov may have believed (1) that they were subject to such an interpretation, and (2) that others in the Soviet hierarchy might wish to probe the matter further.

66. State Cite 233001.
much of this rhetoric was real remains open to debate. Nonetheless, on April 17, 1970, some ten days before this announcement, two Soviet destroyers arrived in Mogadiscio for an official five-day port visit. Though scheduled to depart on April 23, 1970, there was no announcement of their departure as is customary at the end of an official visit. The ships apparently did not get underway from Mogadiscio until the second week in May when the stability of the Somali regime seemed assured.67

The second of these, the harbor-clearing operation in Bangladesh from March 1972 until December 1973, was an example of a Soviet initiative in naval diplomacy to enhance and consolidate Soviet influence in this infant republic.68

While the efforts to help reopen the Suez Canal represented an attempt to cut expected political losses, the Chittagong operation was an attempt to maximize gains that resulted from Soviet support for the independence of Bangladesh.

The third case involved Soviet support of "wars of national liberation." There were at least two cases of Soviet naval support of actions by regimes engaged in


conflict against pro-Western or non-aligned nations. In April 1973, the Soviet Navy provided overt support to Iraq in its territorial conflict with Kuwait. Although the Soviet Union probably did not approve of Iraq's attack on Kuwait, Gorshkov's and his navy's presence in Iraq during the negotiations on the dispute indicated Soviet interest in border changes that would increase Iraq's security. The operation was also associated with other practical steps the Soviet leadership undertook at the time to promote unity in the Arab ranks. The Soviet naval activity in the Iraq-Kuwait case, along with the Soviet sealift of Moroccan troops to Syria in the spring and summer of 1973, were concrete steps to promote the Soviet message of Arab "unity," and actively involved the Soviet Navy.69

The fourth case, the establishment of an AGI patrol in the Strait of Hormuz in 1974, was not so much a reaction to real or potential threats to Soviet shipping in the Persian Gulf but rather a capacity to monitor passage through this choke point. It may have served to signal Soviet desires to prevent control of the Gulf by Iran and the West. A similar case could be made for Soviet mineclearing operations in the

Gulf of Suez in 1974 incident to reopening the Suez Canal.  

The fifth case, the creation of the Somalia/PDRY axis at the other strategic choke point in the northwestern Indian Ocean—the Strait of Bab el Mandeb—suggested that the Soviet Navy was both instrumental in enhancing Soviet relations with Somalia and South Yemen and the major beneficiary of expanded Soviet access to these states. Gorshkov's navy frequently used the naval facilities in both Berbera and Aden, and it no doubt played a role in Soviet efforts to bring these states into closer coordination politically and militarily. The Soviet strategic objective seemed to be to strengthen its position at the southern end of the Red Sea, using Aden and Mogadiscio as vehicles. In April 1975, the Soviet Union had begun to stage IL-38 flights out of airfields in Somalia. In October 1976, TU-95 BEAR reconnaissance aircraft deployed to Somalia for the first time. This was more than a symbolic operation because it marked the first time that the Soviet Union introduced land based aircraft into the region. Moreover, because the Soviet Union lacked tactical air support, even


71. State Cite 233001.
if only in the form of reconnaissance aircraft, for its Indian Ocean squadron, this qualitative change in mission support for the Soviet Navy marked a milestone in Soviet Indian Ocean operations and demonstrated that the Soviet squadron was moving toward the development of both a crisis intervention and warfighting capability as opposed to a symbolic presence role. 72

Summary

It is clear that the Soviet Union continued over time to raise the naval arms control question in various contexts. As will be demonstrated in the following chapters, there were substantial incentives for Soviet interest in such controls. These include, but were not limited to, removing U.S. strategic forces from within striking range of the USSR, inhibiting the ability of the U.S. to intervene in the Third World, weakening the alliance relationships of the United States, and achieving regional parity with the United States in another area of superpower competition.

In fact, the USSR was already a party to at least one form of naval arms restraint: the prevention of unsafe navigation practices by the superpower navies vis-à-vis each other. In signing the Incidents at Sea Agreement in May

72. Sick, op. cit., p. 68.
1972, each party undertook not only to "observe strictly the letter and spirit of the International regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea," but also to "refrain from simulating attack by training naval weapons on the other party's ships," to "remain well clear" of the latter while operating in proximity to them, and to "avoid maneuvering in a matter which would hinder" the "evolution of the other party's naval formations." While this agreement did not limit forces or deployments, it modestly constrained the use of naval forces. The Soviet Union publicly indicated that this instrument, though a step in the right direction, did not go far enough. Consequently, the probability that the Soviet Union was serious about pursuing some form of naval force limitation agreement cannot be discounted.

The rhetoric cited in this chapter also demonstrates that the Soviet leadership took every opportunity to portray the Soviet Union as a supporter of detente and arms control as well as a champion of Third World causes. The Soviet


Navy, on the other hand, was developing its utility as a political instrument much as the U.S. Navy had traditionally been employed. The Soviet naval operations discussed in this chapter demonstrate that, although still a developing navy, the Soviet Navy was capable of sidestepping technological disadvantages and actively supporting Soviet political goals in the Third World. The Soviet political leadership, as well as its naval bureaucracy, recognized that the Soviet Union may have been at a tactical disadvantage in the Indian Ocean through 1976. They viewed an Indian Ocean agreement, in some form, as a hedge against a crisis situation in which Soviet naval forces may not have been able to fight and win. Thus the Soviet leadership approached Indian Ocean NALT as an exercise in political arms control as well as a means of further isolating U.S.-Soviet competition in the Third World.

The foregoing also suggests that the Soviet Union had nothing to lose and everything to gain from negotiating with the United States on the Indian Ocean. If the USSR was serious, then it stood to gain some measure of control of U.S. activity in the region while preserving a good deal of political maneuvering room for itself. If the Soviet Union was not serious, then, by accepting Carter's call for talks, it could at least maintain its position vis-à-vis the United States with respect to disarmament. Moreover, it could use
the talks as a means of learning as much as possible about U.S. strategy and policy for the Indian Ocean.
PART III

THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THEIR ISSUES

When the Carter Administration assumed office on January 20, 1977, the individual actors who had been influenced by the background discussed earlier in this study were in place. Moreover, Carter was on record as favoring a broad improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. He attached a great deal of importance not only to SALT but to reactivating the MBFR talks in Vienna. He also had pressed his advisors to develop new arms control initiatives to engage the Soviet leadership in a deeper, more broadly based dialogue.\(^1\) Thus the stage was set for Carter's Indian Ocean arms control proposal.

At the recommendation of Brzezinski, Carter sent a personal letter to Brezhnev on January 26, 1977. Carter stressed that it was his "goal to improve relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of reciprocity, mutual respect and benefit."\(^2\) The President met with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly

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2. Ibid.
Dobrynin for the first time on February 1, 1977, to underscore some of the points he had made in this letter. Among other things, the two discussed U.S.-Soviet reciprocal restraint in crisis areas as well as the mutual reduction of insecurity and uncertainty with regard to each state's intentions and capabilities. During the course of the meeting Dobrynin probed Carter for his position on a variety of topics including the Indian Ocean. As a result of this meeting and Brezhnev's response of February 4 to the President's letter, Carter directed Vance and Brzezinski to draft a response on February 7 which would be "personal and specific, including particular comments on . . . a demilitarized Indian Ocean." 

This was the first time that Vance became aware of Carter's intention to pursue the Indian Ocean option. That very same day, Fred S. Hoffman, the Associated Press correspondent for the Pentagon, wrote an article that contained the first public reference to Carter's Indian Ocean plans. The article remarked that Carter himself raised the idea of Indian Ocean naval arms control talks in the context of discussing issues bearing on the size of the defense


5. Vance.
budget. Hoffman reported that a memorandum had been circulated to Cabinet and NSC officials listing a range of subjects, among them Indian Ocean naval arms control, requiring the preparation of position papers for submission to the President. Within the Department of Defense, one of the position papers that Carter called for addressed a "Concept for Naval Forces Limits That Might Be Sought Through Discussion With the Soviets."  

Precisely thirty days later, on March 9, 1977, Carter announced in a press conference that he had "proposed that the Indian Ocean be completely demilitarized." Eight days later on March 17 he revised his goal downward in an address before the United Nations General Assembly, when he declared that "[the United States] will seek to establish Soviet willingness to reach an agreement...on mutual military restraint in the Indian Ocean." Though Carter's earlier call for "demilitarization" and his subsequent goal of "restraint" raised some questions as to the real intent of his policy for the Indian Ocean, these statements were

6. The relationship of the Indian Ocean talks to the size of the defense budget will be discussed later in this study.


significant because they furnished an insight into the scope of his Administration's approach to both national security policy and arms control and signalled a change in U.S. foreign policy for the Indian Ocean region.

Carter raised the subject again during his opening statement at his March 24, 1977, news conference.\(^9\) Though the rhetoric framing the issue was somewhat different from that of the President's, the Soviet government accepted Mr. Carter's challenge that very same day. Speaking in Tanzania, Podgorny indicated that the USSR was "willing to open talks with the United States and other concerned nations on the question of declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace." Podgorny dampened hopes for a quick resolution, however, when he argued that "the key question" in preserving peace in the area was "the elimination of imperialist bases."\(^{10}\) Nonetheless, Carter's policy pronouncements came as a surprise to many government officials. Military officers in the Department of Defense knew of no PRM ordering a study of the question of arms limitations-- naval


or otherwise—in the Indian Ocean. Even Paul Warnke, the Director of ACDA, was surprised. He believed that the Indian Ocean talks were not an "actor initiative" and that "the first he heard about it was the press conference which President Carter gave in which he said that [the Indian Ocean talks] was one objective that [Carter] had."

Vance carried Carter's proposal to Moscow with him in March 1977 when he discussed the Carter Administration's SALT II proposals with the Soviet leadership. During the second meeting between Vance and Gromyko on the afternoon of March 28, 1977, the two men agreed to set up bilateral working groups to examine Indian Ocean naval arms control as well as a number of other matters concerning the limitation of armaments. Though the relative priority of these proposals is open to debate, they included a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, discussions addressing chemical weapons, an agreement providing for prior notification of missile firings, an anti-satellite weapons agreement, the entire issue of civil defense, a radiological weapons treaty, a discussion of limiting conventional arms transfers to Third World countries, and steps to strengthen the


12. Warnke.
Non-Proliferation Treaty. A summary of these initiatives and their outcomes is contained in Appendix C.

The Carter SALT proposals called for "deep cuts" in the strategic forces of both states with Soviet forces taking the larger share. On March 30 Brezhnev abruptly rejected not only the "deep cuts" proposal but also Carter's backup approach that accepted the Vladivostok ceilings and deferred the cruise missile and BACKFIRE bomber issues. The agreement to set up the various working groups stood in sharp contrast to the overall outcome of Vance's mission. The rejection out of hand of the entire Carter SALT strategy, a strategy that was the first test of Carter's strategic and political acumen, was devastating. It also cut directly at Carter's deep, personal commitment to reverse the trend of strategic warfare and not simply to curb it. Thus, perhaps to minimize a possible political loss, the bilateral working groups were the only positive result of the Moscow talks.

The United States proposed to establish a bilateral working group on the Indian Ocean and the Soviet Union.

accepted the offer before any comprehensive interagency review of the problems at hand took place. Though the study by the VPWG in 1976 could very well have served as a basis for such a review, Carter did not issue PRM/NSC-25 on the subject of arms control in the Indian Ocean until April 7, 1977.\(^\text{14}\) In accordance with the organizational framework of the Carter NSC, the review process was in the hands of the Special Coordination Committee (SCC)—a committee which had been tasked with decisions regarding intelligence policy, arms control, and crisis management.\(^\text{15}\) Brzezinski as Assistant for National Security Affairs chaired the SCC.

Brzezinski appointed an ad hoc working group to examine the issue of Indian Ocean arms control and prepare a range of alternative negotiating strategies for consideration by the SCC. This interagency group, in addition to members from the National Security Council, consisted of staff members from the Departments of Defense and State, ACDA, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The working group completed its task of developing

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various options late in the spring of 1977. The SCC first addressed the question of the Indian Ocean talks in May 1977. Thus Carter did in fact announce a policy objective prior to subjecting that policy to the scrutiny of his own National Security Council apparatus. Available evidence suggests that the SCC meeting in May 1977 left unresolved the decision as to what the ultimate negotiating objective of the United States should be. It did, however, recommend to Carter that the U.S. delegation to the first round of talks adopt an exploratory posture to gauge the Soviet Union's position on the subject. This was a prudent approach since it had the advantage of not only determining


18. Leslie Gelb contends that this was not the case. He argued that Carter simply announced a long-term objective (i.e., demilitarization) without committing the U.S. Government to negotiation. See Indian Ocean Arms Limitations, p. 10; interview with Leslie Gelb, Former Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State. Washington, D.C.: August 3, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as Gelb).

the level of seriousness of the Soviet Union on the question but also gauging the range and depth of the issues that the USSR would raise. These objectives could be accomplished in the context of demonstrating Carter's interest in a meaningful give and take on the issue of arms control while, at the same time, providing the U.S. with an opportunity to see if there was any hope for progress on Indian Ocean arms control.

The delegation heads met for their initial meeting in a private session at 6:00 p.m. on June 21, 1977, in Moscow. Warnke in his capacity as Director of ACDA headed the U.S. delegation. The senior U.S. military representative on the delegation was Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, USN, who was then serving as Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT). Reginald Bartholomew, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the State Department assisted Warnke as deputy head of the delegation. Dr. Lynn E. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and LtCol. Thomas P. Gorman, USAF, represented the Department of Defense. M. Lyall Breckon, John G. Hibbits and Sherrod B. McCall were the State Department's members of the delegation. John Newhouse and John F. Twombly represented

20. SECSTATE WASHDC msg 202002Z Jun 77 (State Cite 142836) (Subject: Indian Ocean Working Group Meeting) (hereinafter referred to at State Cite 142836); Warnke.
ACDA. Captain Charles H. Kinney, USN, was the other military member from the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff while Commander Gary Sick, USN, represented the NSC. The delegations interpreter was Cyril Muromcew.21 Ambassador at Large Lev Isaakovich Mendelevich of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs headed the Soviet negotiating team. Admiral Nikolayevich Amel'ko, Deputy Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy,22 assisted Mendelevich. Ambassador Mendelevich chaired the first session which consisted of plenary meetings of the delegations beginning at 10:30 a.m. on June 22, 24, and 27.23

Carter did, however, provide an indication of the framework within which Warnke tested Mendelevich during the first round. Speaking to the press on the very same day that the talks began in Moscow, Carter explained his views on the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean. He said that:

Our basic hope is that we can stabilize the status quo in the Indian Ocean and refrain from any further escalations. . . . Our first hope, and without delay, is that we might prevent any further build-up of military presence in the Indian Ocean; later prior notification of any military movements there, and perhaps later on,

21. SECSTATE WASHDC msg 142132Z Jun 77 (State Cite 137909) (Subject: Indian Ocean Working Group Meeting in Moscow).

22. Interview with Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, USN (Ret.), Former Chief of Naval Operations and senior U.S. military delegate to the first round of talks, Washington: September 15, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as Hayward).

23. State Cite 142836.
some reduction in the present level of military presence, which is fairly low at this time. Thus Carter's original objective of demilitarization had shifted to one of stabilization of the U.S. and Soviet presence in the region by the time of the first round of the talks.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union generally agreed on the issues involved in the negotiations during the first round even though there was disagreement on the substantive aspects of the questions themselves. It is perhaps for this reason that Warnke remarked, at the conclusion of this round of negotiations, that there were "good expectations of reaching some sort of constructive result." The two sides agreed to meet again in late September 1977. Warnke reported his impressions of this first round of talks to Carter on July 11, 1978.

The working group and the SCC met again during the summer to assess the results of the first round of talks and


25. Sick; Hayward.


to develop a strategy for the second round. Carter must have believed that the Soviet Union was serious about negotiating an arms control agreement for the Indian Ocean because, by September 1977, the United States was ready to move forward with a proposal for a mutual declaration of restraint.\textsuperscript{28} This confirms that the SCC refined the U.S. goal in the talks to one of stabilizing the U.S. and Soviet military presence in the region.

Mendelevich and his delegation arrived in Washington on Sunday, September 25, 1977, for the second round of the talks. He and Warnke again met privately at 6:00 p.m. on that same evening.\textsuperscript{29} Leslie Gelb, Director of the State Department’s Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, replaced Bartholomew as deputy head of the U.S. delegation. Thomas McNamara of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow joined the delegation.\textsuperscript{30} Finally, Secretary of the Navy Graham Claytor recalled Vice Admiral Marmaduke G. Bayne, USN (Ret.), to active duty on August 31, 1972, to replace Admiral Hayward as the JCS representative to the talks. This action caused some concern on the part of the Soviet delegation who viewed

\textsuperscript{28} Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 174.

\textsuperscript{29} SECSTATE WASHDC msg 192217Z Sep 77 (State Cite 224734) (Subject: U.S.-USSR Indian Ocean Talks) (hereinafter referred to as State Cite 224734).

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
it as a signal that the United States was not seriously concerned with pursuing the talks.\textsuperscript{31}

The remainder of the U.S. delegation remained the same for the second round of talks which took place from September 26 through September 30 in Washington with plenary sessions at 10:30 a.m. on each of these days.\textsuperscript{32} During these sessions both sides discussed the specific elements of a possible agreement.\textsuperscript{33}

There is no question that the basic negotiating objective of the United States was to stabilize the military presence of the two superpowers in the Indian Ocean. Four days after the end of the second round of talks, Carter himself re-emphasized this objective in an address to the

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\textsuperscript{31} Interview with VADM. Marmaduke G. Bayne, USN (Ret.), Senior U.S. Military Representative on the U.S. Delegation to the Indian Ocean Arms Control Talks. Irvington, Va.: August 15, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as \textit{Bayne}).

\textbf{Hayward}. The presence of a four-star officer on the U.S. delegation to the first round of talks was in response to the presence of Admiral Amel'ko on the Soviet delegation. This in itself may have been a contentious issue from a bureaucratic standpoint since Admiral Hayward, even though he had been involved in the negotiation of the Prevention of Incidents at Sea agreement as a Rear Admiral, was more concerned with his operational responsibilities as CINCPACFLT. As an operational commander he would not have had the time to keep up on the details and planning for subsequent sessions as well as fulfilling his primary responsibility as CINCPACFLT. Hence Admiral Hayward recommended that a Vice Admiral who could devote his full attention to the negotiations was sufficient.

\textsuperscript{32} State Cite 224734.

\textsuperscript{33} DPC 194, p. A2.
U.N. General Assembly on October 4, 1977. The President explained that:

In the Indian Ocean area, neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union has a large military presence, nor is there a rapidly mounting competition between them. Restraint in the area may well begin with a mutual effort to stabilize our presence and to avoid an escalation in military competition. Then both sides can consider how our military activities in the Indian Ocean might be even further reduced.

There is also evidence to suggest that, if successful in stabilizing their presence, the superpowers would have considered reducing it. In welcoming the Mauritian Prime Minister to New Delhi on November 2, 1977, Prime Minister Desai of India noted the announcement that the United States and the USSR had commenced talks on naval arms limitations in the region. Desai remarked that when both the U.S. and the Soviet Union had agreed on no increase in their base structure or force levels in the area, it was then to be their objective to lessen their presence every year thereafter until it disappeared. Moreover, Desai confirmed that the Soviet Union was keeping him advised on the status

of the talks. The State Department and ACDA supported this approach as a long-term negotiating objective for the talks.

At first the USSR probably opposed the stabilization concept, because it allowed the U.S. the flexibility to deploy carrier-based aircraft to the region if necessary. However, by the second round of talks, in the fall of 1977, the Soviet Union was ready to accept several elements of the freeze. At the U.N., the Soviet delegation indicated that a provisional agreement "freezing" the military activities in the area, if reached, should be followed by talks on a


36. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 175.
drastic reduction of military activities there, including the dismantling of foreign bases.37

The two delegations met in Berne, Switzerland, from December 6 until December 10, 1977, for the third round of talks. There was no change in the principles involved in the negotiations. However, the U.S. delegation increased in size by the addition of Michael Arietti and Jerome Kahan from the State Department as well as CDR. Haig Pakradooni, USN, from the Office of the Secretary of Defense.38 The United States tabled a draft treaty 39 during this round of talks which was designed to ensure, at a minimum, that, during a period of about five years, deployment of Soviet and American naval forces in the Indian Ocean would be limited approximately to the current levels on each side.40 Thus the United States remained committed to its goal of stabilization through the third round.

Both delegations met in Berne again from February 7 until February 21, 1978, with plenary sessions on February

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38. SECSTATE WASHDC msg 110004Z Nov 77 (State Cite 268815) (Subject: U.S.-USSR Indian Ocean Arms Control Talks).


40. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 175.
7, 9, 14, and 17 at the Soviet Embassy. Prior to that session and because of its context in his overall arms control policy, Carter addressed the Indian Ocean talks in his State of the Union message on January 10, 1978. He explained that:

the fundamental purpose of our arms limitation efforts is to promote our own national security and to strengthen international stability. In the Indian Ocean, where neither we nor the Soviet Union has yet deployed military power on a large scale, we are working for an agreement to prevent a major military competition.

Additional evidence supporting this position was found in the statement on NALT of Secretary of Defense Brown that ". . . [the U.S.] . . . hope[s] to achieve stability at the levels that prevailed during recent years." However, because of the increasing involvement of Soviet and Cuban forces in the Horn of Africa and the related buildup of Soviet military presence in the Indian Ocean, Carter approved a recommendation of the SCC on January 24, 1978, that Warnke should deliver a protest to Mendelevich regarding the negative implications of the Soviet actions on

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41. SECSTATE WASHDC msg 111929Z Jan 78 (State Cite 007443) (Subject: U.S.-USSR Indian Ocean Arms Control Talks).


43. DOD FY80 Annual Report, p. 43.
the negotiations at their first private meeting in Berne in February. Warnke did this as did Bayne in private discussions with his Soviet Navy counterpart. Both tried to convey the sense of U.S. disbelief. Having received no positive reply to these protests, Carter decided not to schedule any more rounds of negotiations because Soviet naval operations in support of their political activities in the Horn of Africa in early 1978 had suggested that there was no common understanding on how a stabilization agreement would actually affect the behavior of the United States and the Soviet Union. Although there were several attempts by the Soviet Union to remove this linkage and get the talks going again by lobbying with the littoral nations of the Indian Ocean to exert pressure on the U.S. to resume the talks and by direct approaches to the U.S. Government, these

44. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 175.


efforts produced no immediate results. Warnke conveyed this decision to Mendelevich by informing him that, because of these problems, the Government of the United States had reserved the right to arrange the scheduling of the next round of talks to the government to government level. This authority had previously been delegated to the head of delegation level.

One final comment is necessary before beginning the analysis of the issues of the talks. The most comprehensive public statement of U.S. hopes for NALT appeared in testimony before a panel of the House Armed Services Committee empowered to review and study governmental activities in international arms control and disarmament. On October 3, 1978, Gelb testified that:

Under a stabilization agreement neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union could increase the size of its military presence in the Indian Ocean or significantly alter its pattern of deployments. The U.S. would maintain our Middle East Force and continue our pattern of periodic task group deployments to the Indian Ocean. Our ships could continue to transit the area and to make routine port calls in littoral countries. We would


maintain our facility on Diego Garcia. Our military forces would continue to participate in military exercises with our ANZUS and CENTO partners. The military forces of our allies would not be limited by the agreement. In sum, an agreement would maintain the U.S.-Soviet force balance and would permit us to fulfill our security and foreign policy commitments in the area.

The foregoing discussion describes the framework within which the delegations discussed the issues of the talks as well as establishing the chronology of the policy formulation process for the Indian Ocean talks. The next part of this study discusses the substantive and technical aspects of those questions.

CHAPTER V

BASES

We can never tell beforehand in war what points it will be necessary to occupy as naval bases. . . . The making of a provision which will tend to force ships to go for supply and repair to certain positions, whether they are placed conveniently or not in regard to operations in hand, is a policy likely to end in some loss and much wasted expense.

-- Philip Colomb (1891)

The occupation, defense and use of naval bases have traditionally been three of the quintessential factors in the naval element of the national security policy of maritime nations. Mahan argued that without overseas bases the U.S. Navy would "be like land birds, unable to fly far from their own shores."¹ Indeed bases just such as those that the European colonial powers established around the rim of the Indian Ocean from the beginning of the sixteenth century through the early twentieth century were an

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imperative for the maintenance of their overseas empires. The loss of this spiderweb of bases not only signalled the end of those empires but marked the beginning of a new competition to secure their capabilities.

The limiting of overseas bases was a tactic of this competition as well as a technique that complemented the regional approach to arms control. Just as major maritime powers recognized the need for naval bases overseas, they tried to impose constraints on their adversaries' basing structure to limit the forward deployments of their naval forces and thus constrain any political advantage derived from such operations. In the case of the Indian Ocean, this technique of naval arms control would, no doubt, have satisfied those non-aligned nations, such as India, which expressed concern over the presence of bases in the region but would also have worked a serious disadvantage on the United States and, to a lesser extent, the Soviet Union.

The preponderance of Soviet rhetoric on the subject demonstrates that the subject of bases was one of their principal, if not the dominant, concerns in the Indian Ocean talks. Soviet official and press statements issued after Carter's proposal and Vance's Moscow trip confirm this. On April 1, 1977, Podgorny, during a visit to Mozambique, raised the issue of bases and said that "the Soviet Union
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favors the idea of creating a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean being free of foreign military bases." The Soviet media criticized Carter's March 9 press conference by echoing the standard Soviet position that only dismantlement of Diego Garcia could achieve a demilitarized Indian Ocean. In an editorial on April 12, TASS explained that Carter's failure to follow up his call for demilitarization by liquidating U.S. Indian Ocean bases indicated that the United States intended to do the opposite of what it professed. Citing Congressional testimony that work on Diego Garcia would continue as proof that Carter's Indian Ocean policy was unchanged, the TASS commentator concluded that initial optimism toward the plan by the Indian Ocean states had been "hasty" and attributable to the "propaganda hullabaloo" raised by Carter over his "broad plan" to limit the strategic arms race. He argued that the removal of military bases must be the "first step" toward relaxing tensions in the Indian Ocean, and that this should be followed by the mutual reduction of military activity in the region by non-littoral states. This critical treatment of Carter's plan was consistent with Soviet public statements cited earlier in this study depicting the USSR as willing to

2. FB-M-77-10009, p. 7.
limit Indian Ocean naval activity despite an alleged buildup of U.S. naval capabilities in the region. 3

The same theme resurfaced later that month in the joint Soviet-Indian communique on the occasion of Gromyko's visit to India from April 25 through April 27, 1977. The communique said that the Soviet Union and India stood "for the elimination of all existing foreign military bases from the Indian Ocean and the prohibition of new ones." 4 In a commentary on this communique on April 29, 1977, TASS added that:

The means of achieving this is to abolish existing foreign bases in the Indian Ocean and insure that no new ones are established. 5

Pravda took note of the issue on May 18, 1977, and indicated the potential range and depth of what the Soviet position on bases would be during the forthcoming talks. The Pravda article alleged that:

The United States [had] an entire network of bases which [were] constantly being expanded and modernized. On the perimeter are the Persian Gulf bases; the air force base on the island of Al-Masirah in the Arabian Sea; the Republic of


5. Ibid., p. 13.
South Africa's naval air base in Simonstown; the naval base in Cockburn Sound (Australia); the Subic Bay and Clark Field bases in the Philippines which control the approaches to the Indian Ocean in the east.

The article went on to suggest that:

In order to transform the Indian Ocean into a peace zone, it is necessary to liquidate the foreign bases there, not to create new ones. Given this solution of the bases issue, the Soviet Union is prepared to join other powers in seeking ways of reducing, on a mutual basis, the military activity of nonlittoral states in the Indian Ocean and the areas immediately adjacent to it.

TASS, in the first public Soviet commentary on the Indian Ocean talks after the initial round of negotiations in Moscow, linked the "key problems of international peace and security" with "the network of military bases belonging to states lying geographically very far from the Indian Ocean." Two weeks later, in what was more direct evidence of the importance of bases in the Soviet negotiating strategy, TASS explained that "the main thing on which the possibility of turning the Indian Ocean into a peace

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7. Ibid.
zone is the liquidation of foreign military bases in the area.9

Carter, however, decided to continue with the expansion of Diego Garcia's military capabilities planned by the Ford Administration and authorized by Great Britain in the Anglo-American agreement of February 25, 1976.10 Thus, even before the talks began, there was substantial evidence of disagreement on the basic functional issue of the talks.

Base Limitations in Historical Perspective

Perhaps the best known attempt to impose limitations on an overseas basing system was Article 19 of the Five-Power Naval Treaty. Though originally omitted from the "stop now" proposal of the U.S. delegation to the Washington Conference because of a promise to the U.S. Navy's General Board that any treaty would not prohibit fortification of the U.S.


Pacific island naval bases, Article 19, the non-fortification clause, restricted the improvement of existing fortifications on the island possessions of the treaty's signatories. This included Hong Kong, the Philippines, and Guam but omitted the Hawaiian Islands, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, the West Coast of the United States, the islands off the Panama Canal Zone, and the home islands of Japan.

The issue came to the fore when a deadlock developed over the problem of the ratio of capital ships. Japan linked acceptance of a lower capital ship ratio with the Pacific islands fortifications agreement as a quid pro quo. The negotiations surrounding Article 19 were detailed and highlighted some of the enduring geographic realities of bases in the national security of states.

Japan's naval establishment took the position that inferiority to Great Britain and the United States in capital ships was acceptable only if the two powers agreed

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12. Ibid., p. 84.

to limit or destroy fortifications in their territories in the Western Pacific. The Imperial Japanese Navy argued that:

The fact that the Imperial Navy is readily able to maintain the national defense against the United States Navy depends principally upon the fact that the United States has insufficient advanced bases in the Pacific and the Far East. If . . . the [Americans] were to complete the necessary military facilities . . . our strategic relationship would take on a completely new aspect.\(^\text{14}\)

The main premise of the U.S. War Plan Orange for hostilities with Japan was that the United States Navy needed to hold or to recapture Guam to establish a secure basing system in the Western Pacific to support anticipated operations against Japan. The key to the success of this concept of operations was the development of protected shore facilities around the Panama Canal, in the Hawaiian Islands, on Guam, and in the Philippines. The opening of the dry dock at Pearl Harbor in 1919 coupled with the transit of the battleships of the Pacific Fleet through the Panama Canal in the same year signalled a commitment of sorts to this strategy even though Guam and the Philippines remained neglected.

These contending positions, as well as the negotiations that sought to advance them, suggest that the United States recognized, perhaps less than Japan did, its dependence on a Pacific basing system from which the U.S. Navy could project.

\(^\text{14}\) Dingman, op. cit., p. 188.
power when U.S. national interest so required. Moreover, Japan understood full well that this adjunct to power projection in the interwar years was a threat to its national security as embodied in the Imperial Navy. Hence Japan tried to control this threat through negotiation during the Washington Naval Conference.

Contending Positions

There is a striking parallel between the positions of Japan and the United States in 1921 and 1922 in the Pacific and those of the United States and the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean in 1977 and 1978. For a variety of reasons, the United States had not seen fit to develop Guam or any suitable location in the Philippines as a major fleet operating base. 15 The Navy's facilities construction and dredging program at Pearl Harbor had achieved results of sufficient magnitude to enable the U.S. Navy to use Hawaii as a base for forward deployment of the Pacific Fleet by 1919 even though the decision had been made in 1908 to develop Pearl Harbor as the principal U.S. overseas naval

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base in the Pacific. Thus, if the U.S. executed War Plan Orange in 1921 or 1922, the United States Navy would have had to project its forces across some 5000 miles of the Pacific Ocean in order to engage the Imperial Japanese Navy and, ultimately, the home islands of Japan. The logistics problems inherent in such an operation were monumental and the U.S. Navy recognized them.

Japan understood the advantages that these positional deficiencies conferred on her. The other premise of War Plan Orange was that the U.S. Navy would have a numerical advantage on the order of two-to-one in capital ships and that this numerically superior battle fleet could go on the offensive from well supplied and protected bases in the Philippines or Guam. Japan, at the time, had no need to project power anywhere beyond the Western Pacific. The Japanese were thus in a defensive posture—a position which conveyed an advantage to its holder because of the technology of the period. Moreover, this positional aspect of conflict insured the success of subsequent Japanese operations nearer to Japan's power base—its home islands and the Asian mainland.

The Soviet Union enjoyed similar circumstances with respect to military operations in the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean. The central Asian border of the USSR was only 700 miles north of the Gulf of Oman. The USSR was thus able to project substantial numbers of ground forces and aircraft over that distance from nearby bases in the Soviet Union. Portions of the USSR such as the Transcaucasus, Turkestan, and Central Asia were all within 2,500 miles of the Indian Ocean, the approximate combat radius of the BACKFIRE bomber. In addition, the reopening of the Suez Canal conveyed a marginal advantage in the Soviet Union's ability to surge naval forces into the Indian Ocean from its Mediterranean Squadron or Black Sea Fleet. Such forces could be on station in the Arabian Sea in approximately five days' time as long as Egypt did not deny them permission to transit Suez.

However, the United States, if it did not already have a battle group deployed in the Indian Ocean, would have needed some twelve days to deploy one of the Seventh Fleet's carrier battle groups from the western Pacific and longer if one had to transit from the United States. If Soviet forces had to transit to the Indian Ocean from the Soviet Navy's Pacific Fleet, the Soviet Union would be at a similar disadvantage. The issue then was one of sustaining both Soviet and U.S. forces and providing support in the form of communications, intelligence, logistics, etc., during their
operations in the region. It is for these reasons that bases were a likely candidate as an agenda item during the talks.

Previous discussion in this study regarding the Soviet declaratory position on bases in the Indian Ocean suggests that the Soviet Union introduced the issue. If one takes the USSR's stated position of not maintaining or having any intention of constructing any bases in the region as an entering argument, it follows that the Soviet objective would have been the U.S. abandonment of Diego Garcia as well as Bahrein. The USSR perceived these facilities as bases relatively close to Soviet territory from which the United States could project military power into the Indian Ocean as well as serving as facilities in being should the United States decide to create an enhanced permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean. The Soviet negotiators were particularly concerned with any bases which they thought were capable of supporting strategic forces.18

The principal political and military objective of the United States with regard to this issue was to constrain the establishment of a major Soviet naval support infrastructure in the littoral of the Indian Ocean. Recognizing that both the United States and the Soviet Union had legitimate, if asymmetrical, security interests in the region, the United

18. *Sick, Warnke.*
States wanted to limit use of support facilities but not routine port calls by Soviet naval and merchant vessels. The United States, however, would not discuss Diego Garcia in isolation from other facilities in the region nor would it consider the abandonment of Diego Garcia as any kind of precondition to further discussions. 19

Thus, even from a conceptual viewpoint, the issue of limitation on bases offered little chance of success. While the Soviet Union approached the issue from a doct that was akin to disarmament (i.e., abandonment of Die Garcia), the United States tried to regulate the utilization of the various facilities available to the Soviet Navy throughout the Indian Ocean littoral. In this regard these facilities, or bases, could be limited both as to the frequency and the nature of their use. Both approaches, however, were not without political risk for both the U.S. and the USSR. Such restrictions on the use of bases might have suggested that bases, or facilities for that matter, as symbols of interest and guarantees of a capacity to act in peacetime and crisis had lost their importance in the national security policy of both the U.S. and the USSR.

Nevertheless, if the United States could have concluded an agreement preventing the development of additional facilities in the region, it would have constrained Soviet

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Indian Ocean operations although, at the same time, it would have capped its support infrastructure in the region. Moreover, such an agreement might have prevented the Soviet Union from enhancing its politico-military position in certain of the littoral states by capitalizing on its political advantage and developing additional facilities in the region.

Recognizing that this objective would be unacceptable to the United States, the Soviet Union pushed for the cessation of construction on Diego Garcia with a commitment to no new construction as a fallback position. Even though the U.S. opposed any Soviet demand to abandon Diego Garcia, a possible U.S. position would have been to insist on finishing the current phase of construction on the island with an agreement for no new military construction. However, coincident with the opening of the negotiations and in response to a Congressional directive to report on the progress of the talks prior to going ahead with certain portions of the FY78 Military Construction program for Diego Garcia, the Carter Administration delayed certain projects on the island which were related to the kind and level of operations that the facility could support. In early 1978, after the Administration had made clear its decision not to build up Diego Garcia beyond the authorized program and upon notification to the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator John C. Stennis, Secretary of Defense
Brown authorized the Navy to proceed with the complete FY78 program. Even though such a position would have been consistent with that previously articulated on the future of the island as well as the U.S. objective of stabilizing U.S. and Soviet presence in the region, the U.S. delegation informed its Soviet counterpart during the third and fourth rounds of the negotiations in Berne that the programmed expansion on Diego Garcia would not be discontinued and was not negotiable.

Nonetheless, the United States enjoyed one distinct advantage over the Soviet Union with regard to facilities in the Indian Ocean. The U.S. position on Diego Garcia was politically secure while the Soviet Union ran the risk


22. There is a contending view that argues that the claims of Mauritius, attacks by the British Labor Party in Parliament and ambiguities in the terms of the original cession of the island to Great Britain and in the U.S.-British arrangements governing its use pose vulnerabilities to the United States. See Joel Larus, "Diego Garcia: Political Clouds Over a Vital U.S. Base," Strategic Review, Winter 1982, p. 44-55.
that, just as in the case of the Soviet expulsion from Egypt, certain host states would terminate or curtail Soviet access to such ports as Aden, Um Quasr, and Berbera.

However, the situation at Bahrain was somewhat different. The U.S. established the Naval Support Activity (NAVSUPPACT) at Manama, Bahrain, in 1971 when the Sultanate of Bahrain achieved its independence from Great Britain. The United States took over the facilities of the former HMS JUFAIR by negotiating a treaty with the newly independent state. The agreement contained the provision that either party could terminate the treaty at any time upon one year's notification of its intention to do so.\(^{23}\) The Government of Bahrain exercised that option on October 20, 1973\(^{24}\)--the very same day that Saudi Arabia announced that it and the other Arab oil-producing states, including Bahrain, had decided to embargo all sales of oil to the United States. Though Bahrain subsequently withdrew its decision, this incident should have demonstrated to the United States that facilities, no matter whose they were, were vulnerable to


political coercion by the littoral states of the Indian Ocean. Indeed, even the 1976 joint U.S.-U.K. agreement on the use of the island nominally constrained the United States' use of Diego Garcia. The agreement stipulated that the U.S. commanding officer and the officer-in-charge of the United Kingdom service element "shall inform each other of intended movements of ships and aircraft in normal circumstances." However, "in other circumstances the use of the facility shall be a matter for the joint decision of the two Governments."²⁵

Both cases suggest a relationship between the issue of overseas bases and the political cost-benefit analysis that any host state would normally undertake relative to the granting of access to its territory for base rights or even the semblance of base rights. Such scrutiny could become the focal point for political opposition, both domestic and international. In a like manner, the inclusion of bases as an agenda item in an arms control forum, such as the Indian Ocean talks, heightens such perceptions as well as rendering the host state more conspicuous in the regional political system. Perhaps in an effort to defuse any such development, as well as to emphasize the austere nature of its facilities on Diego Garcia, the United States provided an

²⁵. TIAS 8230, p. 318.
opportunity in April 1977\textsuperscript{26} for the first group of journalists to get a firsthand look at what had taken place on the island since construction began in 1971.

**The Question of Utilization**

A base does not simply exist to support itself. To be useful, it must be functional—it must be capable of supporting operational forces. This logic suggests that the negotiations addressed not only the issue of bases per se, but also their utilization. It would have been to the advantage of the Soviet Union to include some form of limitation on the utilization of Diego Garcia such as no SSBN/SSN support, limited support for a carrier battle group, or no use of the 12,000-foot runway by B-52's in a treaty. Such an agreement would not have been in the overall interests of the United States even though the U.S. did try to achieve stabilization at some level of prior usage within the context of its overall negotiating objective. Within this same framework, it seems plausible that the question of alternative facilities in other parts of the region as well as adjacent areas would have been raised. Here the problem would have been one of definition.

\textsuperscript{26} See, for example, Jack Fuller, "Dateline Diego Garcia: Paved Over Paradise," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1977, p. 175-186.
Even among professional military officers there was a certain amount of semantic confusion over the terms "base," "facility," and "access." The Joint Chiefs of Staff Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms\(^27\) did not contain a definition of access. However, Robert E. Harkavy's work on overseas bases suggests that the term "access" normally subsumes all types of bases and facilities, aircraft overflight rights, and port visit privileges not involving any permanent military presence by the visiting state.\(^28\) The Joint Chiefs did, however, provide an insight into what the United States defined as a base and a facility. The JCS defined the former as a locality from which operations were projected or supported and an area or locality containing installations which provided logistic or other support.\(^29\) They refined this definition in the case of a naval base to focus on the support of forces afloat and usually contiguous to a port or anchorage, consisting of activities or facilities for which the Navy has operational responsibility, together with interior lines of


\(^{29}\) JCS Pub. 1, p. 45.
communication and the minimum surrounding area necessary for local security. These definitions, as general as they may be, provide a clue to the U.S. negotiating position on the subject of bases. As discussed earlier in this study, the main points of contention were Diego Garcia and Berbera.

The principal military facility utilized by the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean at the time was Berbera. The Soviet Union constructed the complex principally for its own use. It became available in 1972 although the USSR had been developing Berbera as a deep-water commercial port since the mid-1960's. After 1972, there was a major expansion of the port's capabilities, including a Soviet large floating drydock which was capable of docking any of the Soviet submarines that had operated in the Indian Ocean as well as surface ships up to the size of KRESTA II class guided missile cruiser as well as storage capacity for 200,000 barrels of fuel.

These capabilities included a naval communications complex built in 1973 consisting of a transmitter and receiver site as well as a facilities control center. When

30. Ibid., p. 229.

Senator Dewey Bartlett of Oklahoma and his staff of defense experts visited Somalia in July 1975, their Somali escort officer insisted that the group could not enter or inspect the communications station because the station belonged to the USSR and the Soviet officer in charge had refused Somali requests to obtain permission for the U.S. delegation to enter.\(^{32}\)

Moreover the USSR had constructed a housing complex to accommodate support personnel in addition to the berthing capabilities of a Soviet barracks and repair barge which arrived in Berbera in 1972. Again, the Bartlett delegation was unable to visit the barracks ship though this action was justified since it did fly the Soviet naval ensign and hence was under the sovereignty of the Soviet Union. However, the Bartlett delegation gained only limited access to the housing compound. Signs in this compound, including those in an outdoor movie theater, were all written in Russian in the Cyrillic alphabet. Bartlett's delegation estimated that this compound could support a contingent of about 1000 personnel.\(^{33}\)

The Bartlett group also identified a location in the port area as a cruise missile handling and storage complex.

\(^{32}\) Visit to the Democratic Republic of Somalia, p. 12, 17, 21, 25, 29; State Cite 233001.

\(^{33}\) Ibid., p. 11, 16, 20.
This facility was substantially larger and more elaborate than similar complexes in other states which had obtained Soviet tactical cruise missiles. The Somalis argued that the complex was theirs and intended to service the SS-N-2 STYX anti-ship cruise missiles which would arm the OSA fast patrol boats which Somalia was scheduled to receive from the Soviet Union. The Bartlett delegation noted several inconsistencies in this line of argumentation.34

One of the buildings in the complex contained a 25-ton capacity crane while several of the missile storage bunkers had relatively sophisticated temperature and humidity controls. In addition, artillery ammunition stored in these bunkers had the appearance of having been hastily arranged. Moreover the Somali officer who was put forth as the commanding officer of this complex could not even answer the most elemental technical questions about the missile complex.35

In addition to Berbera, Somalia also provided additional bases to the Soviet Union. AN-12 CUB reconnaissance aircraft and IL-38 MAY ASW aircraft operated from airfields at Berbera, Hargesia, Galacio, and Uale Uen within Somalia. The Soviet Union and Cuba also utilized the port facilities

34. Ibid., p. 21, 27, 31.
35. Ibid., p. 22, 26, 31, 32.
at Kismayu in the southern portion of the country.  

The foregoing suggests three considerations that might be useful in answering the question of whether or not Soviet access to Berbera constituted a base. If the JCS definition of the presence or absence of a specific support infrastructure in the form of command and control capabilities, airfields, military housing, and ammunition and missile storage handling capabilities, and a petroleum storage capacity is used, then Berbera was a Soviet base since these factors were evident in the case of Berbera and the other Somali installations. The other factor that both the JCS definition and Somali statements on control over at least portions of this infrastructure suggests is that the Soviet Union had certain extraterritorial rights over the Berbera complex. Usually, when the host state imposes some form of control or where joint access is the rule, as in the case of Diego Garcia, it is common practice to refer to the complex in question as a "facility" as opposed to a base.

Semantics aside, the real question was one of utilization and what constituted utilization in the context of operational support. One criterion that analysts have

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37. Harkavy, op. cit., p. 15.
relied on to assess these problems is the aggregate data for port visits of the Soviet Union. In this regard, the Indian Ocean along with the Mediterranean littoral accounted for almost all Soviet port visits up to the time of the Indian Ocean talks. Most Soviet naval combatants visited Berbera at least once during their deployment to the Indian Ocean. The issue then turns on the question of at what level or frequency do visits to a given port constitute that port being a base in the context of the definition derived above. It seems that some sort of common ground could ultimately have been reached, within the context of the foregoing argument, on the distinction between full utilization of a facility or base, which could be limited, and routine port visits, which need not have been limited.

The limiting of U.S. overseas bases was an attractive goal to the Soviet Union. If successful in the Indian Ocean talks the Soviet Union would have achieved a verifiable constraint on U.S. operational capabilities in the Indian Ocean at a modest cost to itself. However, the converse is not true. The assumption that Soviet bases were easily

38. See, for example, Center for Naval Analyses, Institute for Naval Studies, Port Visits and the Internationalist Mission of the Soviet Navy, Professional Paper No. 143 (Arlington: April, 1976).

verifiable does not stand up to analysis. One only has to consider the various landing rights agreements wherein the Soviet Union may get ground support from Soviet Bloc nations such as its Cuban proxies in, for example, Angola, and pseudo bases as Berbera used to be, to comprehend the definitional problems of negotiating the issue of bases.

Moreover, the USSR could not have ignored the political implications for other U.S. overseas activities such as Yokosuka and Subic Bay in terms of the precedent that could have been established. Though such an agreement might have hurt the Soviet Union more in the near term by politically hindering it from seeking bases where it did not have them (e.g., the South Atlantic), its effect on the U.S. would have been more significant in the out years. The U.S. might have been forced to seek other options such as an increased Mobile Logistics Support Force (MLSF) structure or construction of facilities in the former Trust Territory of the Pacific to retain its operational flexibility. The impact in future budget dollars would not have been insignificant. Moreover, such an agreement might have encouraged the Soviet Navy into becoming increasingly more self-sufficient by relying more on its MLSF.

For any Indian Ocean agreement to demonstrate significant political and military credibility, both parties would have had to retain the capability to quickly and decisively return to the region if their interests so dictated. However, an arms control agreement from which breakout in the event of a crisis was not only feasible but expected should have been approached with more caution than was evident. This dilemma raises the question of where did the U.S. intend to be when negotiations were concluded. The Soviet Union, as demonstrated by the events in Afghanistan, was a back-door neighbor to the region. It is precisely for this reason that not finishing the planned construction on Diego Garcia, or any form of more severe limitation, was more in the interest of the Soviet Union. Such rationale was an argument against the successful completion of NALT since naval power was essential to the U.S. position in the region while it was only marginally additive to the capabilities available to the Soviet Union to influence events there during a crisis or warfighting environment. The reported expansion of Soviet airfields in Afghanistan in November 1982\(^4\) highlights this perception. Such a capability substantially complicates the problem of

executing the Carter Doctrine because of the enhanced land-based strike air capability of the Soviet Union because of these bases in Afghanistan.

The importance of bases became readily apparent in the wake of the events in Iran and Afghanistan and will be discussed later. Nonetheless there was a foreshadowing of the significance of this issue when the Government of Somalia severed ties with the Soviet Union and expelled Soviet personnel and fleet units from Berbera. In abrogating the agreement of July 11, 1974, between Somalia and the Soviet Union, the Somali government withdrew the use of "any facilities of a military nature [formerly] available for the use of the Soviet Union in the territory and waters" of Somalia on November 13, 1977. Moreover, "all Soviet experts, military and civil, [then] in [Somalia] [were] requested to leave the country within a week."42

The Soviet delegation thus entered the third round of negotiations at Berne in December 1977 at a disadvantage in the short term since Soviet use of other facilities in the region had generally been on an ad hoc basis. Thus the United States enjoyed a slight tactical advantage with respect to the issue of bases although, in a lighter vein, 

42. Official text of the Somali Minister of Information's statement on November 13, 1977, as quoted in AMEMBASSY MOGADISCO msg 141105Z Nov 77 (Mogadiscio Cite 1924) (Subject: Text of GDSR Abrobation of Soviet Treaty, Cuba Break).
Mendelevich used the occasion to drive home his point that the Soviet Union really didn't have any bases in the Indian Ocean. 43

The USSR reacted promptly to this disadvantage and tried to get access to an alternative port facility. In a flurry of diplomatic activity, it tried to gain access to both the port and airfield, vacant since 1966 when the British left it, at Gan in the Maldives. However, the Government of the Maldives, having joined the Non-Aligned Movement only a year before this Soviet overture, rejected the request on the grounds that a Soviet presence on Gan would only exacerbate what the Non-Aligned Movement viewed as superpower confrontation since Gan's airfield was only 400 miles north of Diego Garcia. 44 The President of the Maldives, Ibrahim Naisir, at a time when his country was desperately in need of foreign capital, emphasized that the Maldives were "simply not interested in leasing the former base for military purposes to the superpowers." 45

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43. Warnke.


The Soviet Navy moved rapidly to reestablish itself at nearby facilities in Ethiopia and South Yemen. Indeed, Massawa, Assab, Aden, and anchorages in the Dahlak Archipelago replaced, and possibly even enhanced, the capabilities of Berbera. A number of Soviet naval units moved directly from Berbera to Aden. Even the floating drydock at Berbera was repositioned to form the nucleus of a repair facility in the Dahlak Islands. These facilities may very well have placed the Soviet military in a better position to provide support, especially land-based tactical air support as well as reconnaissance, for Soviet operations in the northwest quadrant of the region. In any case, Soviet access to Ethiopian facilities enabled the USSR to capitalize on Ethiopia's desire for more military aid through the December 1976 Soviet-Ethiopian arms agreement. However, the United States did not protest the Soviet overture to the Maldives. This suggests that, within the framework of the ongoing talks, each party was prepared to recognize the legitimacy of the other party having one major base or facility in the region.

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Twenty-twenty hindsight suggests that, had the issue of bases been carried to a conclusion in NALT, the U.S. would have been at a severe disadvantage when it needed to project a force into the region to support its national security policy. If one accepts that the premise that the goal of the negotiations was stabilization at levels consistent with previous activity in the region, then it seems that, using the criteria established earlier in this chapter, Diego Garcia and Berbera, or another Soviet facility, would have legitimized each other. The intriguing question remains what would have been the effect on U.S. national security policy of an agreement limiting shore support beyond this if, as was the case, the United States tried to get access to facilities closer to the Persian Gulf in Somalia and Oman in response to the Soviet move into Afghanistan. Perhaps such an agreement cast in the geographic terms of reference to be described later in this study would have prevented such a U.S. move while not addressing Afghanistan which, although not an Indian Ocean littoral state, could assist in bringing Soviet forces to bear in an Indian Ocean crisis. The distance of Diego Garcia from the Persian Gulf could not have offset such a Soviet gain.

The problem of bases is the most striking of the questions addressed during the talks in terms of its geographic implications. Carter's decision to seek expanded access to support facilities in the Indian Ocean demonstrates the
association of distance with the effective projection of military power. The perceptions of U.S. ability to project power into the region, and in particular into the Persian Gulf, held by the Carter national security apparatus changed by a quantum factor in early 1978 and culminated in the frantic search for access in the Indian Ocean littoral. This set of events demonstrates that distance, and its politico-military implications, is a matter of perception. Moreover, these perceptions are more often than not mental or cognitive and reflect individual perceptions of the world and thus influence the policy options of their holders. This in turn suggests that Carter pursued Indian Ocean NALT out of a belief, honest though it was, that the Indian Ocean could be dissociated from the global politico-military framework and geographically isolated from the continuing U.S.-Soviet adversarial relationship.

Such perceptions, and they are only perceptions, offer a recent and perhaps compelling case study to support the idea that even a regional arms control issue must be subjected to analysis using as a framework the global considerations of the national security policies and interests of the states concerned. Moreover, such analysis cannot be limited to using geography as its sole or dominant criteria since, as a discipline, it constitutes but a collection of partial solutions separated from the issues at hand. The limitation of geography in this regard derives
from the fact that a purely geographic analysis tends to focus on the one or several distinctive phenomena that differentiate an area or region. The key to integrating such an analysis of a regional proposal into an arms control forum is to blend the region's geopolitical and geostrategic characteristics into the global framework of the state's interests.

The issue of bases also demonstrates that geographic interpretations of an issue may change as a result of relative changes in the military capabilities of adversaries. The Soviet move from Somalia to Ethiopia placed the Soviet Navy in an advantageous position on the Red Sea. The increasing use of Aden called into question the ability of the West to control the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb. The Soviet presence in Afghanistan threatened one of the premises of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF)—that its principal mission was to contain a cross-border attack from the north in the Gulf region. The Soviet air bases in Afghanistan, besides posing a threat to Pakistan, dictated that RDF operations must also consider a threat axis to the east as well as to the north. These factors call into question Carter's premise of stabilizing the superpower relationship through a regional arms control accord given the changing pattern of base access of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Soviet shift to Ethiopia demonstrates that any form of base or facility limitation would have had little or no effect on the
question of Soviet military assistance—the principal Soviet instrument for gaining leverage with its client states or other governments leaning toward the Soviet Union.

This in turn suggests that those who would design a regional arms control proposal must take account of the difficult notion that the significance of geography is not static and immutable. Though the broad, physical aspects of the discipline are enduring, the implications of a change or variation in the political forces that control the physical geography are the key elements in the relationship between a geographic area and the international political process. Bases serve as a case study of this theorem. Hence, regional arms control, just like all other forms of arms control, must recognize the primacy of politics in the arms control process and must integrate the technical issues, such as bases, with the broader, long-term political concerns of the states involved.
CHAPTER VI
THE INDIAN OCEAN AND STRATEGIC WARFARE

The imperialists are converting the World Ocean into a vast base of launching sites for ballistic missile submarines... Our Navy must be capable of countering this real threat.

-- Admiral Sergei Gorshkov (1972)

The Problem

There is substantial evidence that the Soviet Union considered the issue of U.S. strategic force deployments as equally an important agenda item as bases during the talks. The TASS statement on the first round of negotiations cited in the preceding chapter tried to link Diego Garcia with ballistic missile submarines. The commentator argued that "strategic strike forces [were not] needed for ensuring the security of oceanographic and other scientific investigations" in the Indian Ocean. The article concluded by explaining the relationship of strategic forces to "one very important fact of geography, namely, that some sections of the Indian Ocean, especially in its northwestern part, lie comparatively close to the southern regions of the Soviet
Union.\textsuperscript{1} TASS reiterated this theme two weeks later and remarked that:

The peculiarity of the geographic position of the Indian Ocean is such that some of its areas, above all in the northern and northwestern part, are situated quite close to the Soviet Union's southern districts. . . . The significance of this circumstance from the strategic viewpoint is easy to see.

Indeed, some analysts have argued that the basic Soviet maritime interest in the Indian Ocean stems from Soviet concern for and assumptions about U.S. Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) deployments in the region.\textsuperscript{3} Several prominent Soviet publicists have suggested that the primary focus of these operations was the anti-SSBN mission.\textsuperscript{4} Moreover, the issue of bases in the region, such as Diego Garcia, which was addressed in the preceding chapter demonstrated the concern on the part of the Soviet Union that the United States would utilize Diego Garcia to

\begin{center}
\textbf{--------}
\end{center}

4. See, for example, V. Kudryavtsev, "The Indian Ocean in the Plans of Imperialism," \textit{International Affairs} (Moscow), November 1974, p. 117, and Zhitomirsky, op. cit., p. 12.
support two elements of the U.S. strategic triad—SSBN's and B-52's. The lengthening of the runway on the island to 12,000 feet and testimony in 1973 which inferred that there may have been some advantage to the basing of the TRIDENT force on the west coast of the United States with respect to TRIDENT operations in the Indian Ocean may have reinforced Soviet apprehension in this regard.

The Soviet leadership has historically demonstrated a willingness to expend considerable resources whenever the defense of Soviet territory has been concerned. This has been true even when the potential return on their investment may not have been substantial. This historical precedent suggests that any method of countering the U.S. SLBM threat would have been extremely attractive. Indeed, the Soviet Union had been addressing the problem of U.S. SSBN's, as well as those of France and Great Britain, in a variety of arms control forums. Though its ultimate goal may very well be the operational deployment of a surveillance system that


would continuously locate all missile firing submarines coupled with a rapid response kill capability, the USSR would certainly have been prepared to pursue any approach that offered a chance of reducing the overall threat from the sea-based forces of the United States. Those means that offered an option of reducing the resource allocation problem while at the same time constraining the threat would have been even more remunerative to the Soviet Union. The Indian Ocean talks were one such option.

The Sea Based Leg

The issue of U.S. SSBN deployments in the region was an old one. The initial operational deployment of the POLARIS A-1 missile with a range of 1200 nautical miles on board USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (SSBN-598) on November 15, 1960, constrained United States SSBN's to operate from patrol stations in an area off the north coast of the Soviet Union. Its follow-on version, the POLARIS A-2 missile, became operational in 1962 with a range of 1800 nautical miles. As a result the eastern Mediterranean was a feasible deployment area for the U.S. POLARIS force. When the A-3 missile went to sea in 1964 with a range of 2500 nautical miles, it was readily apparent to anyone who could use a chart of the Soviet Union, a globe, and a piece of string whose length equated to the A-3's range that Moscow was within range of an A-3 missile fired from a hypothetical patrol station in
the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean. Moreover, agreements with the United Kingdom and Spain for bases at Holy Loch in Scotland and Rota, Spain, accompanied the deployment of the A-1 and A-2 variants of POLARIS. It was logical then that the Soviet Union began to look for evidence in the form of negotiations for base rights to support an Indian Ocean POLARIS deployment.

The United States did not disappoint the Soviet government. In July 1959 the NSC, with the concurrence of the JCS, directed that U.S. planners consider the "availability of Australian facilities in limited hostilities in the Far East" in their deliberations with their SEATO and ANZUS counterparts. Also, the 1959 review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of U.S. strategic objectives indicated for the first time the growing importance of the Indian Ocean as an area of concern to the United States. The decolonization of Africa and the Chinese operations in Tibet suggested that


the Soviet Union and the People's Republic could soon break out of the U.S. containment perimeter into the immediate Indian Ocean area and thus add the region to the ongoing Western-Communist confrontation. Because of this perception, the Chiefs envisioned an expanded operational role for naval forces in the area.\(^9\)

Although a U.S. fleet operating base or facility in Australia was not required, a need did exist for a communication station to support U.S. conventional and strategic forces. At the time, this requirement implied that there was a need for a communication station which was capable of operating in the very low frequency (VLF) band because VLF was the principal means of communicating with SSBN's on patrol while they remained submerged.\(^{10}\) In


\(^{10}\) VLF transmissions are those carried in the 10 to 30 kilocycles portion of the radio frequency spectrum. Because of characteristic long wave length, VLF transmissions possess physical attributes which are very desirable for reliable communications with submarines at substantial ranges. Primary among these are the ability to follow the curvature of the earth and insusceptibility to ionospheric interference.
reviewing the planned worldwide VLF program the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) determined in early 1959 that the network did not provide adequate coverage of the Western and Southern Pacific and the Indian Ocean areas to meet strategic requirements. Initially, the Navy staff planned to construct a VLF station in the Marianas Islands to offset this shortfall. The Office of the Secretary of Defense approved this plan early in 1959.\footnote{11}

By August of that year, however, the Navy had assembled sufficient data to support an argument for siting the required VLF facility in Australia rather than the Marianas.\footnote{12} The shift was the product of "continued engineering analysis" which "indicated that such a facility in the Western Australian area would have great advantages over one in the Marianas." Locating the station in Australia would improve worldwide VLF coverage and enhance the command and control capability to support operations in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.\footnote{13}

\footnote{11. U.S., Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Operations, Naval History Division, Unclassified Files on Naval Communications, cited by Wallace, op. cit., p. 131.}


Negotiations for a site at Northwest Cape in Western Australia began in 1959. The United States and Australia reached agreement on the matter in May 1963. Construction began later the same year. The U.S. Navy commissioned the station as an operational facility in September 1967 with a VLF mission. Moreover, the negotiations with the United Kingdom concerning the formation of the British Indian Ocean Territory also fueled Soviet apprehension over U.S. intentions for the Indian Ocean with regard to strategic warfare.

The Soviet Union was not the only party watching these events. Shortly after the naval communications station at Northwest Cape was operational, a noted Indian military analyst suggested in 1968 that the U.S. had, or would soon have, ballistic missile submarines deployed in the Indian Ocean. He argued that:

The U.S. has built a VLF communication station at Northwest Cape in Australia and this is part of a global network with other stations being located

at Cutler [Maine], Japan, the Canal Zone, Maryland and Seattle. The Australian station is stated to be many times more powerful than the others, and in addition a wireless station has also been built at Asmara in Ethiopia. The communication in the VLF band enables submarines to receive signals without surfacing. This would indicate that U.S. nuclear...ballistic missile submarines are operating in the Indian Ocean. Before the Poseidon and Polaris A3 missiles were developed, the Polaris missiles A1 and A2 had ranges of 1,380 and 1,785 miles. Because of the limitations on their range with reference to main Soviet target clusters, it was necessary to station most of the Polaris submarines in the Arctic Ocean. The Poseidon has a range of 2,900 miles and 31 out of 41 U.S. ballistic missile submarines are to be fitted with Poseidon missiles operating from the Arabian Sea.

Michael MacGwire, a well-known Canadian defense analyst, reiterated the essential points of this argument, alleged that the facility at Diego Garcia was the third node of an Asmara-Diego Garcia-Northwest Cape chain of communication stations stretching across the Indian Ocean, and concluded that:

On the basis of this evidence, Soviet strategic planners could hardly conclude otherwise than that the United States was developing...the capability to operate submarines in the Indian Ocean. And since there was no realistic role for U.S. attack submarines in the area...it could only be concluded that these new facilities were

intended to provide the necessary command and control for ballistic missile units.\textsuperscript{16}

There was, however, a contending approach to U.S. SLBM operations in the Indian Ocean. Other commentators alleged that evidence of this sort was not compelling. They described the idea of U.S. SSBN's patrolling in the Indian Ocean as a rather surprising misconception for Soviet planners to entertain. James M. McConnell, a well-known American naval analyst, explained that:

\begin{quote}
[The U.S.] government has never announced such deployments; there is no need for them at the present time. There would be a requirement if [U.S.] submarines deployed elsewhere were in jeopardy or if the Soviets had an effective ABM--since an Arabian Sea launch would add a complicating angle of approach. . . . If Polaris submarines were in the Indian Ocean, there would have to be a tender in the area. Otherwise, Indian Ocean patrols would actually detract from [U.S.] deterrent posture, by appreciably reducing total on-station time. It takes only a few days for the submarines serviced by tenders at Holy Loch, Rota or Guam to reach their stations in the North Atlantic, Mediterranean and Pacific. No one contends that [the U.S. has] a tender in the Indian Ocean. This would be visible and everyone
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{16} MacGwire, op. cit., p. 439. A similar line of argumentation was proposed by other experts who reached similar conclusions. "Introduction of Polaris A3 and the later Poseidon with similar range of about 2,800 nm [has made] the Arabian Sea the second-best deployment area in the world, only slightly inferior in its range of targets to the eastern Mediterranean." See also Geoffrey Jukes, "Soviet Policy in the Indian Ocean," Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints (New York: Praeger, 1978, p. 311. Jukes went on to say that "there still was no sign that Polaris/Poseidon boats [deploy to] the Indian Ocean," but he added that "this does not, however, mean that the Polaris/Poseidon factor can be left out in examining why the Soviet Navy deployed into the Indian Ocean in the first place, and why it is still there."
would know about it. From where, then, would boats deploy? Transits from the continental U.S. . . . would be prohibitively time-consuming, devouring the entire 60 days allotted for the standard patrol. Guam is closer, but even here more than half of the patrol period would be used in passing to and from an Arabian Sea station. What planner could justify such a wasteful expenditure of American strategic resources, just to have another launch point that offers no significant advantage over existing ones?

During testimony before the House Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia in 1974, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, then Chief of Naval Operations, fueled this argument even more when he commented on the possibility that countering POLARIS was a mission of the Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean. In response to a question concerning possible Soviet naval missions in the Indian Ocean, he replied that one such mission was to "counter U.S. POLARIS activity" though he quickly disclaimed any plans with regard to U.S. SSBN deployments to the region.18

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union responded to what it considered as a strategic threat. This argument has some merit since the timing of the actions associated with it was closely related to the beginning of the extensive out-of-area deployments of the Soviet Navy to the Mediterranean and the Caribbean, and, to a lesser extent, the Indian Ocean.


Though it is correct that the first Soviet deployment to the Indian Ocean in 1968 roughly coincided with the initial operational deployment of the POLARIS A-3 system, there is little convincing evidence that the force mix that deployed there—an aged SVERDLOV class cruiser, two destroyers, and an oiler—had any credible anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability against a nuclear-powered submarine since none of these platforms had a modern ASW detection and weapons suite.

Moreover, the logistic problems in supporting U.S. SSBN deployments to the Indian Ocean were enormous. Given a nominal 60-day patrol cycle, too much time would be required in traveling nearly 4000 miles from Replenishment Site Three on Guam in the Marianas Islands to a hypothetical patrol station in the Arabian Sea. Employment of SSBN's in such a manner would have decreased weapon system availability due to extended patrol cycles and lengthened post-patrol refit periods.¹⁹ When coupled with possible extended scheduled refit periods for maintenance that could not be accomplished during the normal refit periods conducted by a submarine tender, the concept of maintaining an SSBN patrol station in

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the Indian Ocean does not appear very attractive. One measure that would have overcome this loss of availability would have been the establishment of a Replenishment Site by stationing a submarine tender designed or converted to service fleet ballistic missile submarines at Diego Garcia. However, the United States had not exercised this option at the time the talks got underway.

Perhaps the Soviet Union also perceived a threat from future Chinese strategic systems. Though China was not a maritime power on the order of the Soviet Union and the United States, Soviet analysts had argued prior to the talks that the Chinese might use the Indian Ocean either as a launching area for its yet-to-be developed SLBM force or as a test range for ICBM's. This argument made sense in terms of China's continuing debate over where its scarce resources should be allocated. Given that China was making progress in the technology of ballistic missiles and that a program was underway to develop a nuclear submarine, it followed that perhaps the quickest and most economical means of establishing a viable Chinese nuclear deterrent capability was via an SSBN force. Moreover, China's economic and military aid to Tanzania, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan assumed an added dimension when considered in terms of the potential of

20. Of the submarine tenders (AS) designed or converted to provide repair and supply services to U.S. Fleet Ballistic Missile submarines, none deployed to Diego Garcia.
their ports from which the Chinese might support SSBN operations in the Indian Ocean.\textsuperscript{21} Though the PRC did not successfully test an SLBM until October 1982,\textsuperscript{22} and did not deploy its first SSBN until 1983,\textsuperscript{23} the implications of Chinese strategic weapons research and development programs, when considered in the context of Sino-Soviet antagonism, were not lost on the Soviet leadership. Though it is not clear precisely how the Soviet Union would have constrained this Chinese capability in the Indian Ocean talks, the possibility remains that the USSR could have argued that a Chinese deterrent force, like its British and French counterparts, were an adjunct to the U.S. strategic force posture and that the Soviet Union had no such equivalent.

The USSR charged repeatedly that the United States had deployed, or had plans to deploy, SSBN's in the northern

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{23} "Peking Deploys a Missile-Firing Nuclear Sub," \textit{The New York Times}, August 23, 1983, p. 10:1. The submarine is reportedly the first of five that will ultimately be operational. It is believed to be capable of firing the CSX-NX-3 missile with a range of 1800 miles.
\end{itemize}
sector of the Indian Ocean. Perhaps the most significant such allegation was set forth in a book entitled *Submarines Against Submarines* in 1968. Published by the Soviet Ministry of Defense, the work was regarded as something more than mere propaganda for external consumption. The book discussed POLARIS deployments in the North Atlantic, Eastern Mediterranean and Pacific Oceans, and went on to say that: "In the future, the Americans intend[ed] to extend these regions by including the northern part of the Indian Ocean in the combat patrol sphere."

Argumentation of this sort is, in the main, largely academic. Only a handful of people in the United States know for sure whether the United States has deployed, or had plans to deploy, SSBN's in the Indian Ocean. Likewise only a very few people in the Soviet Union know with some degree of certainty whether the Soviet Union deployed its Navy


there primarily to counter a U.S. SLBM threat. Nonetheless, it is useful in that it demonstrates the range of opinions on the issue of U.S. SSBN operations in the Indian Ocean and therefore suggests some of the perceptions held by the negotiators.

There is substantial historical evidence that demonstrates that whenever states have negotiated to control their respective navies, the principal naval strategic platform of each of these states has been the centerpiece of the various naval arms control talks. In this regard, there are several comparisons that can be drawn between the Five-Power Treaty of the Washington Conference of 1921-1922 and the Indian Ocean Naval Arms Limitation Talks.26

The Five-Power Treaty focused on the battleship as the major strategic unit of measurement for comparing the sea power of states after World War I. Battleships were the queens of the sea—the element of naval power on which ultimately rested the outcome of conflict between maritime states. Their firepower was awesome as was their mobility. The SSBN exemplified superior mobility coupled with the ultimate capability in projecting power ashore. Both the

SSBN and the battleship had the ability to concentrate firepower together with the unique military capability of being able to disappear in the vastness of the oceans, wait, and return to fire again if necessary. Both were the classic embodiment of Mahan's notions of presence and deterrence. Both were technological successes as well as sources of pride and gratification.

From a technological perspective both the battleship and the SSBN were at the upper end of existing technology at the time of the Five-Power Treaty and the Indian Ocean negotiations. Their design and construction were measured in years which permitted states to conduct negotiations before arriving at an irreversible decision to proceed with construction followed by deployment. Both platforms were quantifiable in units of measure that were broadly agreed on by the states concerned. This implies that an upper limit of 35,000 tons per battleship meant about the same to the United States as it did to Japan and Great Britain during the Washington Conference. The issue of missile launchers and SLBM's became part and parcel of SALT I AND II much in the same way as the tonnage of battleships did in the Washington talks.

Their political importance was also comparable. According to the strategic doctrines of the day, they represented a key, if not vital, element in national power. They were therefore valuable not only as military platforms
but as symbols of national resolve. They were the ultimate means of deterrence. This perception created a strong desire to prevent one's potential adversaries from deploying them or at least as many of them as would pose some threat or achieve some particularly undesirable goal. Moreover, because of the expense involved in their construction, the commitment of a state to such a program represented a major milestone in terms of prevailing strategic thought and resource allocation.

Nonetheless, a prudent national security planner, whether he be a Soviet or an American, should have proceeded from a shrewd assessment of a potential adversary's capabilities rather than from a soft estimate of his intentions. As long as ballistic missiles launched from U.S. SSBN's deployed in the Indian Ocean remained an option, however remote, to U.S. planners, the Soviet Union would have had to find ways either to eliminate or minimize the threat posed by those forces. It is generally recognized that Soviet general purpose forces did not have the capability to threaten the U.S. SSBN force for the foreseeable future at the time of the talks. Nevertheless, the Soviet Navy was probably hard at work developing such capabilities. Moreover, the Soviet Union had not neglected the Indian Ocean in this regard. It had conducted oceanographic research and laid the groundwork for the kind of facilities
network required to conduct ASW operations in waters which
were not contiguous to the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{27} It had been
reported that the Soviet Union had installed a hydrophone
barrier stretching from the Kola Peninsula to Spitsbergen to
protect the approaches to the Barents Sea. It was also
likely that fixed acoustic installations in the Kuril
Islands guarded the straits into the Sea of Okhotsk.
Moreover, the USSR had developed and deployed bottom-
anchored acoustic devices, essentially large sonobuoys,
which enhanced ASW operations in some waters, such as the
Indian Ocean, not contiguous to the Soviet Union. Such
systems can be laid covertly and can be read by passing
submarines, aircraft, or surface ships.\textsuperscript{28} However, these
systems were technologically primitive.

Because of these limitations on Soviet ASW capability
at the time of the Indian Ocean talks, there were essen-
tially three possible approaches open to the Soviet Union to

\textsuperscript{27} Oles M. Smolansky, "Soviet Entry into the Indian Ocean:
An Analysis," Alvin J. Cottrell and R. M. Burrell, eds., The
Indian Ocean: Its Political, Economic and Military Impor-

\textsuperscript{28} Joel S. Wit, "Are Our Boomers Vulnerable?" United
There have also been indications that similar systems may
have been emplaced in the Canary Basin off Northwest Africa
as well as off Norway, Great Britain, and in the North
Pacific.
conduct strategic ASW against the U.S. SSBN force. The first, an area search strategy, could theoretically have resulted in the destruction of a given portion of the U.S. force. For the Soviet Union to implement such a strategy would have required the development and deployment of a system capable of continuously searching an entire SSBN operating area. This could only have been done either by the deployment of a large scale acoustic surveillance system or by means of a satellite constellation. Having achieved localization of the SSBN's by such national technical means, the Soviet command and control structure would then have had to vector ASW forces to intercept them or destroy the SSBN's by bombardment with ICBM's using high-yield warheads. This option presumed a substantial technological breakthrough on the part of the Soviet Union.

This search strategy offered the best chance for the Soviet Union ultimately to neutralize the U.S. SSBN threat. However, because of geographic asymmetries, the USSR would have to construct such a system based on satellite, non-acoustic systems capable of providing near or real-time locating data to Soviet command and control facilities ashore. At the time of the talks there was speculation that
the Soviet Union was developing the framework for such a national technical means of ASW detection.  

The second approach available to the Soviet Union, the use of Soviet attack submarines in trail on a given SSBN, might also very well have taken out a given percentage of the U.S. seabased strategic force. The Soviet Union might have developed the ability to trail U.S. SSBN's on departure from their replenishment sites or refit bases. This would most probably have entailed the use of active sonar. If a large portion of the SSBN force could have been trailed simultaneously, a coordinated preemptive attack might have become feasible. Alternatively, the Soviet Navy might have fought a war of attrition during a given patrol cycle in which those SSBN's on station would have been destroyed during their patrol with the hope that the losses would go

29. See, for example, "U.S. SSBN Force: How Vulnerable?" Defense/Space Business Daily, December 23, 1977, p. 291-292; U.S., Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, FY 1978 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty Selected Reserve, Hearings (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 6654. To some extent, the deployment of the TRIDENT class of submarines minimized this vulnerability due to their ability to operate in U.S. home waters. However, the size (18,700 tons) of the TRIDENTs suggests that they are more likely to generate more distinctive non-acoustic signatures than POLARIS boats.
unrecognized until the first ship failed to return. Though there is little evidence to suggest that the Soviet submarine force was capable of executing such a tactic, there is substantial argumentation that, if there was to be a credible threat to the U.S. SSBN force, it would most likely evolve from the techniques described above.

Geography was a powerful constraint on this Soviet strategy. Sheer physical distance between Soviet submarine homeports and U.S. SSBN bases limited the ability of the Soviet Navy to concentrate sufficient assets to execute this strategy on anything more than an occasional basis. Both of these strategies were really the only treatments of choice for the Soviet Union as long as it lacked any meaningful capability for long-range detection in the open ocean employing a form of national technical means of surveillance such as cable systems and satellites. The area

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30. The Submarine Emergency Communications Transmitter (SECT) system includes a buoy capable of radio transmissions and is automatically released if an SSBN were destroyed. The system was designed as a specific countermeasure to such a war of attrition.

31. Tsipis, et al., op. cit., p. ix. Recent articles suggest that such an attack would involve, most probably, two attack submarines in trail on a single SSBN. The possible exception to this is the use of a single Soviet ALFA class SSN. See Norman Friedman, "The Soviet Fleet in Transition," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1983, p. 156-173.

32. Cuba and Central America pose interesting anomalies in this regard.
search strategy was a particular vulnerability of Soviet strategic ASW. By choosing such an option, the Soviet Navy probably attempted to identify ocean areas where U.S. SSBN's patrolled. Given this identification, the Soviet Union would then have had to allocate resources (air, surface, and sub-surface as well as national technical means) to detect, and if considered desirable, to localize U.S. SSBN's.

The third and final option was that the Soviet Navy could have improved its open-ocean ASW equipment suites by enhancing its ship and aircraft ASW capability either by improving their acoustic search capability or by some other undefined non-acoustic technique. It is this option that the deployment of the TRIDENT system was designed to counter. To be effective, such a tactic would have had to offer a high probability that contact could have been maintained on a substantial portion of the U.S. SSBN's on patrol at any given time so that a coordinated, preemptive attack could be carried out. It seems unlikely that, given the state of Soviet ASW technology and command and control, such coordination could have been achieved.

There is little evidence that the Soviet Union had the ability to employ any of these three options at the time of the talks with any chance of success. Moreover, it is important to distinguish between those potential vulnerabilities which the United States could have been reasonably expected to be aware of (e.g. active trail) and those which
might go undetected (e.g. a satellite with an unknown ASW detection capability). The latter would be far more dangerous from a military and technological viewpoint while the former would entail more political risks to the perception of deterrence. Both, however, would have been significant in the negotiation of an arms control agreement.

The development of an effective national technical means of detection by the Soviet Union would have changed both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the strategic ASW problem it faced. The achievement of such a breakthrough in technology would have substantially enhanced the probability of a successful area search strategy. As a minimum, it would have reduced the geographic area that required coverage. Barring a successful space system effort and the deployment of mobile platforms, the Indian Ocean would be a difficult milieu for the Soviets to operate such a system because of the lack of contiguity—an issue clearly tied to bases and geography. Because of this, geographic considerations were an important, if not dominant, factor in Soviet strategic and tactical ASW considerations for the Indian Ocean.

Figure 2 highlights the effect of geography on Soviet naval operations. Straits and restricted waters controlled by other states constrain Soviet access to the sea in warm water areas. Direct access to the sea in the Atlantic is
Figure 2

GEOGRAPHIC CONSTRAINTS ON SOVIET NAVAL OPERATIONS

restricted to the far north around Norway's North Cape and in the Pacific to Petropavlosk on the Kamchatka peninsula. The United States does not have to contend with these problems in deploying its strategic and general purpose ASW forces. Hence geography affects the issue of strategic warfare in the Indian Ocean.

Because of these constraints on the Soviet Navy's ability to wage an effective strategic ASW campaign, limiting SSBN deployments anywhere in the world's oceans would have significantly diminished the problem facing the Soviet Union in defending against SLBM's. Because the situation was essentially one of detection and localization of the missile firing platform coupled with that of defense against the missile or destruction of the platform prior to launch, the Soviet Union remained at a significant disadvantage due to its lack of technology to solve the detection and localization issues. Any attempt to create an anti-ballistic missile defense system to guard the southern approaches to the USSR would, in general, have been detectable. Moreover, it would have opened the Soviet Union to charges of violating the ABM treaty. The inherent quietness of the U.S. submarine force made the problem even more thorny for its Soviet counterpart.

One additional factor in the continued survivability of the U.S. SSBN force was an increase in the size of the submarine patrol areas. As a rule of thumb, the available
submarine operating area increases with the square of the increased missile range. Because the limiting arcs of the A-3 and C-3 missiles extended only into the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean, the C-4 missile significantly increased the ocean area suitable for SSBN patrol areas by extending this arc deeper into and more across that ocean. Moreover, as this area increased, the quantitative problem of increased ocean area which had to be covered by Soviet mobile ASW platforms also increased. Table 1 describes this relationship quantitatively in terms of SSBN operations as a function of distance from Moscow. 33 The implications of these figures with regard to the Indian Ocean could not have been lost on Soviet planners.

The Soviet Union had to understand that the forthcoming deployment of the TRIDENT system would open up vast areas of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans as SSBN operating areas. Use of the Indian Ocean would not be necessary to stay within range of the USSR. In this sense, the deployment of TRIDENT somewhat increased the attractiveness of an agreement to restrict naval operations in the Indian Ocean. However, the increased ocean area provided by Indian Ocean SSBN operations would be of value to the United States if

33. Moscow was selected as the target because of the apparent value that has historically been attached to its defense by the Soviet and Russian political and military leadership.
TABLE 1

OCEAN AREA AVAILABLE FOR U.S. SLBM OPERATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSILE</th>
<th>INITIAL OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENT</th>
<th>RANGE</th>
<th>AREA AVAILABLE (NM²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A-3 (Polaris)</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-3 (Poseidon)</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-4 (Trident I)</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>4230</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-5 (Trident II)</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>53.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the Soviet Union achieved a major breakthrough in ASW or if the Soviet Union abrogated the ABM Treaty and began a major effort to deploy an integrated ABM system. Either case might require the United States to use the Indian Ocean to complicate the Soviet defensive problem and to ensure continued broad target coverage by the U.S. SSBN force.

The foregoing demonstrates that, whether or not the U.S. actually employed the Indian Ocean as an SSBN operating area, it was to the advantage of the United States to retain the option and thus require the USSR to consider it in its national security policy calculations. This option required that the Soviet Union be prepared to conduct strategic and local ASW in four ocean areas versus three (Atlantic, Pacific, and Mediterranean). Moreover, the United States stood to gain little, if anything, from a corresponding limitation on Soviet SSBN's operating in the region since they posed no threat to the continental United States. Hence, the United States refused to discuss any explicit ban on SSBN deployments in the Indian Ocean even though the Soviet Union continued to argue for inclusion of the subject on the agenda throughout the four sessions of the talks.34

34. Rayne, Gelb, Sick, Warnke.
The USSR was not concerned solely with the issue of SSBN deployments in the Indian Ocean. Although there was no direct mention of the issue of B-52 deployments to the Indian Ocean in the open testimony before the House panel on the Indian Ocean talks, there was reference to a limit on land-based strike aircraft.\textsuperscript{35} There was good cause for this since the United States wanted to control Soviet long-range aviation deployments in the region that could threaten U.S. military forces or support Soviet military operations in the littoral states and the Indian Ocean. Yet, the United States was constrained in its pursuit of such an option because of the reluctance on the part of its allies to accept limits on such deployments. The obvious candidates for such a ban were the U.S. B-52, the FB-111, and the Soviet BACKFIRE and BADGER aircraft.\textsuperscript{36}

U.S. strategic aircraft were not strangers to the Indian Ocean. The Strategic Air Command (SAC) operated a recovery base at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, from 1951 until

\textsuperscript{35} Indian Ocean Forces Limitation and Conventional Arms Transfer Limitation--Report, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{36} For analytical purposes, tactical aircraft considerations have been excluded in this section even though there is a supportive relationship between tactical and strategic aircraft.
1962. The Soviet Union could not but help recall this fact when the Department of Defense proposed to extend the runway on Diego Garcia from its original 3500 feet first to 8000 feet and finally to 12,000 feet and to upgrade the fuel storage capacity of the island to provide support for KC-135 tanker aircraft by October 1977. The USSR interpreted this move as a signal that Diego Garcia was moving toward the capability to operate B-52's from its airfield. Indeed, in open testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in June 1975, General George S. Brown, USAF, the Chairman of the JCS, suggested that the U.S. intended to deploy long-range combat aircraft to the Indian Ocean from Andersen Air Force Base on Guam and Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines as soon as the runway extension was completed. However, the concept of operations governing these


38. Selected Material on Diego Garcia, p. 6.

deployments envisioned multiple in-flight refuelings on the long-range, open ocean, sea control missions.\(^40\) Hence, the importance of Diego Garcia was principally to support KC-135 tanker aircraft rather than as a B-52 base. U.S. Department of Defense officials stressed that the extended runway on Diego Garcia would not have either the strength to support sustained B-52 operations or the width to accommodate the outrigger wheels on fully loaded B-52's. However, B-52's operating in a less than fully loaded configuration could use the runway.\(^41\)

Limiting this threat, whether by negotiating a limitation on deployment of B-52's to the Indian Ocean region or by limiting the base support structure, was an obvious


attraction for the Soviet Union. Moreover, there was an incentive for the United States to negotiate some form of limitation on Soviet heavy bombers since several of the key oil facilities in the region, such as the terminals at Kharg Island, Juaymah and Ras Tanura, were less than 1000 miles from the Soviet border.

The issue of the operational status of the BACKFIRE aircraft complicated U.S. calculations. After several years of testing and modification, the BACKFIRE entered service in 1974 amid a substantial degree of uncertainty as to its operational capabilities and mission. Much of this uncertainty centered on the BACKFIRE's unrefueled combat radius.42 Varying estimates within the U.S. government as well as by aerospace industry experts placed it at anywhere from 1750 to 3100 nautical miles.43 The lower figure would have excluded this Soviet aircraft from consideration as an intercontinental strategic bomber while the higher one would put it in the same class as those Soviet aircraft which were SALT accountable. However, in either case, the BACKFIRE could fly unrefueled missions over the Arabian Sea. Hence


it was of concern to the United States at the time of NALT.

Thus there was a mutual interest in limiting the operations of strategic aircraft in the Indian Ocean for both the United States and the Soviet Union. Indirect evidence suggests that the United States tried to exploit this potential area of agreement. In April 1977, a usually well informed Australian journalist reported that the United States had "shelved indefinitely" a decision to conduct long-range, open ocean surveillance flights by B-52 aircraft into the Indian Ocean. There is no evidence available on Soviet actions with respect to their strategic aircraft. This is significant since April 1977 was the same month in which PRM-25, the Presidential Review Memorandum on arms control in the Indian Ocean, was issued. This evidence, even though circumstantial, raises the question of whether or not the Carter Administration implemented some form of self-restraint on strategic aircraft operations in the Indian Ocean. This could very well have been in the form of a confidence building measure to reassure the Soviet Union on Carter's seriousness about arms control. Such a decision would, presumably, have required the approval of Carter himself.

CHAPTER VII

THE ALLIANCE IMPLICATIONS OF THE TALKS

When one asks a neighbor to come to aid and defend one with his forces, they are termed auxiliaries. . . . These forces may be good in themselves but they are always dangerous for those who borrow them, for if they lose you are defeated, and if they conquer you remain their prisoner.

-- Niccolo Machiavelli (1513)

The Soviet Union has generally defined its national security to be the condition wherein Soviet military power is at least equal to, and preferably greater than, that of the United States plus that of its allies which could be brought to bear against Soviet forces or Soviet territory. An example of this policy that is germane to naval arms control is the force of SSBN's operated by France and Great Britain. In the preliminary SALT I discussions the USSR raised the question of this eight-ship force and left unresolved how these submarines should be counted in the SALT balance computations. The Soviet Union argued that the United States could control the proliferation of French and British SSBN's beyond those operational or under construction and claimed the right of corresponding force
level increases.\textsuperscript{1} The United States rejected this allegation and explained that the forces in question were national forces and not open for discussion within the bilateral context of U.S.-Soviet negotiations.

\textit{The Basic Element: Geography}

Another case study of this linkage is the record of Great Britain's dilemma in 1921 with respect to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and its concern over the growing naval power of the United States. The major element in Britain's strategy to protect its interests in East Asia was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. Though originally intended to act as a check on Imperial Russian expansion in Central and East Asia, Great Britain and Japan renewed the Alliance in 1907 and again in 1911 with the threat of Germany uppermost in their minds. Unless extended by mutual agreement, the Alliance would end in 1921. Great Britain successfully used this relationship to steer Japanese expansion towards the Asian mainland, and Manchuria in particular, to protect British commercial and colonial interests in Tibet, Burma, India, South China, and Australia. However, the Alliance was a thorn in Anglo-American relations and the subject of increasing concern to Great Britain because of the growth of the U.S. Navy during

\textsuperscript{1} Tsipsis, et al, op. cit., p. 240.
World War I and its planned post-war building program. Moreover, disagreement between the United States and Great Britain over such matters as the interpretation of the law of the sea with respect to the rights of neutrals during hostilities complicated this situation. Two of Britain's overseas allies, the Dominions of Australia and Canada, had strong views on Britain's approach to these problems—views that were shaped in the main by geography.

Canada opposed the renewal of the Alliance because the Canadians regarded it as a source of friction, if not war, with the United States. Canada believed that continuation of the Alliance was bound to damage future Anglo-American relations and that the consequences of such friction would be disastrous to Canada's interests should the United States choose to act against the closest member of the British Commonwealth—Canada. The Canadians signalled their seriousness by indicating that Canada would not contribute to the naval defense of the British Empire and by expressing strong support for some form of international agreement on naval arms limitations. The Canadians were convinced that Great Britain was ignoring Canada's interests in the Pacific as well as its increasing linkage with and dependence on the

good will of the United States. As a result, Canada supported the U.S. position that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance should be abrogated.³

Australia, however, believed that the Alliance restrained Japanese expansion and immigration. The geography of the Pacific, as well as the resource implications of that geography, suggested that sooner or later Japan would focus its attention on Australia. There was, moreover, a significant element of racism in Australia's policy since the Government of Australia was vigorously enforcing its "white Australia" policy and opposing Japanese immigration. Indeed, this was a hallmark of the policy of the Australian Prime Minister William M. Hughes.⁴ Moreover, Australia argued that the Alliance could be modified in such a way that the United States would not object to it or could be convinced to join it.⁵

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Thus Great Britain was in the grips of a seemingly unsolvable problem. Though unwilling to disrupt its good relations with Japan in the Pacific, the United Kingdom had to contend with its aging fleet vis-a-vis that of the United States while simultaneously trying to enhance Anglo-American relations. Surrounding both these problems was the disparity of opinion within the Commonwealth on the very point that linked all three issues: the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The only way out of this deadlock was to postpone any final action on this question until after the convening of an international conference to address the issues of the Pacific. The result was that Great Britain asked the United States to convene a conference to discuss issues relating to the Pacific--issues which, to a great degree, were shaped by geography and alliance politics.6

The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks have a similar geopolitical complexity. The MBFR negotiations have dragged on since 1973. The delay has been the result of the recognition that regional arms control is not a purely technical issue as well as the perception that such negotiations involve the broad security and political interests of the states within the region in question. MBFR

6. There is a contending view which argues that the Dominions did not influence British policy as much as this study suggests. See Ira Klein, "Whitehall, Washington, and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1919-1921," Pacific Historical Review, December 1972, p. 460-483.
has demonstrated that such negotiations, especially in a regional context, have the potential of expanding the range and depth of issues considered in such talks. 7

For example, although NATO achieved a breakthrough of sorts in 1978 with the Soviet Union's acceptance of NATO's demand for equal overall ceilings as opposed to proportional cuts, this breakthrough has not achieved any positive results. Negotiators continued to disagree on the precise levels of manpower already deployed. Moreover, disagreement remained on such other basic issues as the types of forces open for negotiation (strategic/nuclear versus general purpose), verification, and the problem of the imposition of national sub-limits within an overall ceiling.

Underlying these questions, however, was a broad range of technical problems. The fact that the MBFR negotiations involved some nineteen different states as well as the corresponding bureaucratic actors within each of them and their respective alliance systems complicated the negotiations. Military issues have similarly handicapped progress in the talks. In what was strangely reminiscent of the "yardstick" controversy surrounding the London Naval Conference of 1930, there have been almost insolvable problems of how to compare forces designed to accommodate diverse, if not, antithetical, military doctrines.

Moreover, the close proximity of the Soviet Union to the area under consideration compared with its distance from the United States was an obvious, though oftentimes overlooked, reality with which the negotiators have grappled. The result of this geographic asymmetry is striking. Any Soviet forces withdrawn from Central Europe under the terms of an MBFR agreement could rapidly return to the tactical area of operations. However, U.S. reinforcements would face

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a long, and perhaps opposed, return in the event of a crisis and certainly in the case of war. This geographic mismatch seems to contradict NATO's, and hence the United States', fundamental doctrine of a credible forward defense—a doctrine which, if it is to work, is contingent upon at least three weeks' warning time of impending Soviet hostile action. These realities demonstrate that the influence of geography is a decisive factor in the national security calculations of NATO—a fact that the Soviet Union has not ignored. Moreover, the geography of Central Europe may very well have created a situation in which the fundamental doctrines of the adversaries were so different that meaningful progress on arms control in an MBFR context is impossible.

The MBFR negotiations have offered little chance of success because they have been an exercise in solving what is a political problem through the application of technical arms control. Moreover, their technical basis has been flawed because of the varying means of measuring the NATO-Warsaw Pact force level balance. Geographic considerations circumscribed both these fundamental discontinuities in the strategy and policy of the parties to the negotiations. These precedents suggest the utility of certain tactics as well as negotiating strategies of the United States and the Soviet Union which have been used in both bilateral and multilateral talks in which the two superpowers have participated.
One such case in point was the Soviet Union's use of a tactic employed by the United States to expand the geographic scope of the MBFR negotiations. When the U.S. tried to broaden the area covered in MBFR to the flanks of NATO, the Soviet delegation rejected the demand and explained that this expansion would entail negotiations on peripheral problems excluded from the initial MBFR bargaining process. A northern context would, for example, not be included in a restricted area definition. They maintained that Soviet forces in the north did not exist to balance those of Norway in isolation but rather the sum total of NATO's northern forces. A Kola Peninsula-northern Norway perspective would, therefore, require that the whole of Iceland, Britain, and the Norwegian Sea be addressed. Such a context might well have included U.S. and NATO FBS as well as POLARIS/POSEIDON.9

Despite this explanation, the Soviet Union took advantage of the geography of Central Europe in the MBFR talks. Indeed, the first concession by NATO related to the scope of the area in which forces were to be reduced—the guidelines area.10 NATO insisted that Hungary be included in the guidelines area given the substantial level of Soviet

forces deployed there and Hungary's common borders with the USSR and Yugoslavia. Soviet negotiators, however, refused to agree to this demand. They argued that a guidelines area which included Hungary must include Italy as well. The result was a compromise in which the two sides agreed to exclude Hungary from the guidelines area with the proviso that NATO unilaterally claimed a right to raise the issue at some point in the future. The result was that NATO accepted a geographic framework for the MBFR talks which included all major U.S. and West German ground force deployments in Europe but excluded Soviet forces in Hungary.

The Indian Ocean Case

The Soviet Union applied the same method to the Indian Ocean talks in an effort to include British, Australian, and French forces—the other Western naval powers in the region—in the negotiations as it did during the MBFR talks. During the first session of the negotiations, Mendelevich remarked to Warnke that "we are going to have to take into account the allied factor." The Soviet delegation put forth a definition of military presence that contained four elements. They equated presence to: (1) U.S. forces in being in the Indian Ocean; (2) those forces of allies in

the Indian Ocean with whom the United States had bilateral or multilateral defense agreements; (3) U.S. and allied forces in areas adjacent to the Indian Ocean; and (4) the forces of friends of the United States in the region whether mutual security agreements existed with them or not. The Soviet delegation contended that, because of the U.S. forces in the Indian Ocean and agreements with Australia, Great Britain and France as well as those forces in areas adjacent to the Indian Ocean, the Soviet Union had to have a larger presence in the region to offset this disadvantage. The Soviet delegation argued that this preponderance of military presence, sustained largely through the forces of allies, made the United States geographically closer to the region than the Soviet Union! Though seemingly an untenable position, Mendelevich and his delegation made a very good case of it.13

The issue of regional definition in the Indian Ocean was analogous to the MBFR case discussed earlier. There had been enough argument about what actually constituted the Indian Ocean that both the Soviet Union and the United States could exploit this ambiguity in the talks. Therefore, the issue of the limits of the Indian Ocean, though seemingly a simplistic one at first glance, was as much a

problem in the talks as the definition of the guidelines area was in MBFR. Indeed, as extraordinary as it may seem, this problem was complicated and remained unsettled.\(^{14}\) Though there have been contending views on the question of the limits of the Indian Ocean, one thing was certain. The elements of these boundaries were five in number: first, the ocean itself; next, its boundary with the Atlantic; third, the Pacific limits; fourth, the islands that dotted the surface of the ocean; and finally the Antarctic shore. Beyond this, there was little agreement in academic and historic sources.\(^{15}\) However, it was possible to arrive at a definition based on strategic and geopolitical considerations. These factors, when viewed in the context of the effect of physical and political geography on an arms control forum, cause one to focus sharply on the effect of the Indian Ocean talks on U.S. alliance relationships.

The clearest limit, as well as the one most generally agreed on, was that with the Atlantic Ocean. It ran from Cape Agulhas in South Africa due south along the twentieth meridian (20° E) to the shore of Antarctica. The limit on the Pacific side to the southeast usually ran from South

\(^{14}\) *Indian Ocean Arms Limitation Report*, p. 4; Warnke.

East Cape on Tasmania, south along the one hundred and forty-seventh meridian (147° E) to Antarctica. Some geographers considered Bass Strait, between Tasmania and the Australian continent, as part of the Indian Ocean while others argued that it was part of the Pacific. The northeastern limit was the most difficult to define. Some geographers held that it ran across the Torres Strait between Australia and New Guinea and then from the island of Adi, off the western New Guinea coast, along the southern shores of the Lesser Sunda Islands and Java, thence across the Sunda Strait to Sumatra. Others, however, considered the Arafura Sea and the Timor Sea as parts of the Pacific and not the Indian Ocean. Between Sumatra and the Malay peninsula the boundary was sometimes drawn at Singapore and sometimes from Cape Perdo on Sumatra to the northeast, thus making the Strait of Malacca a part of the Pacific. 16

Because geographers, in general, have tended to associate various bodies of water with one of the world's major oceans, there was also the question as to just what seas, bays, and gulfs were properly part of the Indian Ocean. The Encyclopedia Britannica includes the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf to the north as well as the Arabian Sea to the northwest and the Andaman Sea to the northeast. The Gulfs of

Aden and Oman as well as the Bay of Bengal, the Mozambique Channel, the Gulf of Carpenteria off the north coast of Australia, and the Great Australian Bight off Australia's south coast are also included in Britannica's definition.  

The United States had publicly suggested what it considered the limits of the Indian Ocean were prior to the talks in a 1976 CIA publication. Though it included the Great Australian Bight and the Strait of Malacca, it excluded the Timor and Arafura Seas as well as the Gulf of Carpenteria, the Bass Strait and the Torres Strait. Figure 3 portrays these limits.

Though there was no corresponding Soviet document, it is possible to sketch out a probable Soviet position. Because of the strategic considerations discussed earlier in this study, it is likely that the Soviet and United States delegations agreed on all but the eastern boundary of the Indian Ocean. In fact Mendelevich used the CIA chart of the Indian Ocean to argue his case. By trying to exploit the ambiguity of the contending academic approaches to defining

17. Ibid. The International Hydrographic Organization holds to a more limited definition which does not include the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal. See International Hydrographic Organization, Limits of Oceans and Seas (Special Publication No. 23), 3rd ed. (Monte Carlo: 1953), p. 22.


the Indian Ocean, the Soviet delegation tried to expand the scope of the area to be covered in an agreement. They argued that the Indian Ocean included the Timor Sea and the Arafura Sea to the Torres Strait as well as the Indonesian Straits.\(^2^0\) At first, in an effort to further constrain U.S. operations, they argued that the definition of the Indian Ocean should include the waters up to the east coast of Australia.\(^2^1\)

The southern limit of the Indian Ocean was perhaps the easiest to agree on since the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 prohibited any measures of a military nature, including military exercises, on Antarctica and in the waters surrounding the Antarctic continent south of 60\(^\circ\) south latitude.\(^2^2\) Both the United States and the Soviet Union were signatory to the Antarctic Treaty.

**Australian Concerns**

The implications of these positions disturbed Australia. The Soviet definition, if accepted by the United States, would have extended the terms of Indian Ocean NALT to the Pacific. Even the United States definition included

20. *Rayne*.


the waters that washed the shores of Western Australia and included the approaches to Australia through the Great Australian Bight. Either of these positions would have posed both definitional and political problems for the United States in terms of its obligations under the ANZUS treaty and would have been politically unacceptable to Australia.

The language of the ANZUS treaty referred to assistance to its signatories in the event of "an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction, in the Pacific, or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific." The concern of ANZUS, and particularly Australia, turned on the meaning of "... in the Pacific." In the past it had been convenient not to impose a rigid definition on what this phrase implied. However, the Australian Government, prompted by what it viewed as excessive Soviet interest in the littoral of the Indian Ocean, interpreted the pact as broadly as possible. The withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the Asian mainland, coupled with what Australia perceived as an unsteady U.S.

23. Gelb.

policy for the region after Vietnam, confronted Australia with a perplexing national security problem. The sparsely settled yet mineral-rich western and northwestern portions of the country, together with Australian responsibility for the Cocos-Keeling Islands and Christmas Island, suggested a burgeoning of Australian defense requirements. Moreover, the concept of a 200-mile economic zone under the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea added to Australia's concern over the issue of maritime surveillance. These problems prompted Australia to extend de facto coverage by ANZUS into the Indian Ocean.

These concerns emerged in 1976 during Parliamentary hearings on the Indian Ocean. The government took the position that it "interpret[ed] the spirit of the ANZUS treaty as conferring obligations on all parties to include the Indian Ocean." Moreover, shortly after the first


round of the Indian Ocean negotiations in June 1977, Australia raised the issue in the twenty-sixth ANZUS Council meeting on July 28, 1977 at Wellington, New Zealand. The final communique of the Council included a clause reaffirming that, in the event of an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States, any such agreement should "be balanced in its effects and consistent with the security interests of the ANZUS partners." 27

The United States was prepared for such concerns because of the consultations that it held with various friendly governments. In addition to Australia, the United States discussed NALT with the Governments of the United Kingdom, France, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and possibly Italy. 28 However, the most extensive reaction to Carter's initiative came from the Australian press and government. The Australian government viewed Carter's announcement on March 10, 1977, as a "complete surprise" 29 with possible future implications for the region, and a reversal of American


policy. Indeed, the Carter initiative was at first, to say the least, unsettling to Australia and was an example of how not to run an alliance.\(^{30}\) An editorial in *The Australian* on March 11, 1977, underscored the impact of Carter's announcement on Australia's position as an ally. The editorial commented that:

> The composite problem of being a numerically small nation in a huge continent in an isolated position has always been with us. As world relationships shift and turn, the problem becomes more acute, its solution both more necessary and more difficult. President Carter's throwaway pebble into the [Indian] Ocean has set up another ripple to remind us that it is essentially a problem we have to solve ourselves. But to do so without allies would be a terribly lonely and difficult task.\(^{31}\)

This was especially significant because Australia was the only littoral nation to reverse its official stand on Diego Garcia and the peace zone proposal. The former Labor government of Gough Whitlam was openly and outspokenly critical of U.S. plans to expand the facilities on Diego Garcia.\(^{32}\) But the coalition government under Malcolm Fraser, voted into office in December 1975, reversed that stand. Fraser, who was largely conservative, indicated a greater willingness to cooperate with the United States on defense matters. Indeed, shortly after assuming office, he

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30. Warnke.


welcomed American development of Diego Garcia and promised that the Australian base under construction at Cockburn Sound would be available to U.S. Navy ships. What was significant in the Australian position, however, was not that the Government of Australia supported what the United States was doing, but that an Australian government and a significant body of opinion in Australia ever opposed it.

In reaction to Carter's proposal, Australia reaffirmed that its attitude on the Indian Ocean remained unchanged: Australia supported the Zone of Peace concept but did not believe it possible at that time. The Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrew Peacock, explained that:

It [Carter's Zone of Peace announcement] [was] an important step but it would still be a long way off because you would need to have the Soviet Union react favorably to the overtures that have been made, and then enter into negotiations for a lowering of their significant facilities and presence in the Indian Ocean.

Nonetheless, Peacock discussed the Indian Ocean with U.S. officials shortly after Carter's announcement and said that he was satisfied that U.S. Indian Ocean policy remained similar to Australia's long-standing position. He added


that Australian and American policies for the Indian Ocean were in complete accord. Warnke's long-standing personal relationship with the Australian Ambassador to the United States, Alan Renouf, helped in assuring the Australian Government that there was no effort on the part of the United States to undercut Australia and that the United States would consult closely with Australia on this matter.

Nevertheless, Fraser wanted further assurances from Carter concerning his intentions with respect to the Indian Ocean talks. Australia was concerned about the Soviet Navy's buildup and its increased capabilities in the region. Fraser, speaking on the subject at the time of his first visit to the United States to meet with Carter, charged that the USSR had expanded its naval operations in the Indian Ocean and tilted the balance of power in the area against the U.S. He assured Carter that Australia, with the exception of the Whitlam government, had been a supporter of the U.S. presence on Diego Garcia and critical of


36. Warnke.

Soviet facilities in Somalia. Speaking on this subject the Prime Minister explained that:

... [The Australian] Government has supported the extension of activities on Diego Garcia by [the U.S.] Government. ... we believe that balance is a precondition for stability. We are also concerned that further efforts by the U.S.S.R. to enhance its strategic status in the Indian Ocean should be discouraged or adequately matched.

Fraser's visit coincided precisely with the first round of talks in Moscow in June 1977. Carter explained to Fraser that he had used his Indian Ocean initiative to induce the Soviet Union to negotiate in a serious vein not only on the Indian Ocean but on other arms control issues as well. Moreover, because of Australia's long-term interests in the outcome of the Indian Ocean negotiations, Carter assured Fraser that he would keep him informed as to the issues under discussion as well as the progress of the talks. 39


39. SECSTATE WASHDC msg. 232030Z Jun 77 (State Cite 146566) (Subject: White House Statements on Indian Ocean Working Group Talks). The politics of this visit as well as the problems of getting Carter to agree to meet with Fraser are explained in Alan Renouf, The Champagne Trail: The Experiences of a Diplomat (Melbourne: Sun Books, Ltd., 1980), p. 126-127.
Vance, at the request of Peacock, wrote to him in December 1977 to assure him "on behalf of the United States Government, that any arms limitation agreement [the United States] reach[ed] with the USSR on the Indian Ocean will not in any way qualify or derogate from the US commitment to Australia or limit [U.S.] freedom to act in implementing [U.S.] commitments under the ANZUS Treaty." Vance went on to add that the United States had so advised the Soviet Union and, specifically, that combined exercises in the Indian Ocean sponsored by ANZUS would not be affected. 40

From a politico-military perspective Australia considered any constraint on the ability of the United States to continue its long-term cooperation on matters of national security as inimical to its interests. Hence, Fraser would not have been opposed to the termination of the negotiations in February 1978 even though this would have made Australia's efforts to moderate the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace effort within the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean substantially more difficult. Nonetheless, he probably would not have objected to the resumption of the talks by Carter as long as the United States consulted frankly and in a timely fashion with Australia and provided assurances in consonance with Carter's promise to Fraser and Vance's

letter to Peacock that the United States would not accede to anything in the talks that undermined U.S. security commitments to Australia and ANZUS.41 However, the conditions under which Carter ended the talks may have provided Australia with an unexpected leverage to encourage a more extensive U.S. commitment to ANZUS in general and Australia in particular. Perhaps the Soviet Union did not consider this outcome in its pre-NALT calculations and decided that negotiating with the United States would serve its interests by creating an atmosphere of uncertainty and distrust within ANZUS.

Just how the Soviet Union tried to constrain the Australian and ANZUS connections remains an open question. By using the tactic of expanding the definition of the Indian Ocean region, the Soviet delegation could have argued to limit U.S. use of Australian facilities. This objective, however, seems somewhat doubtful once the goal of the negotiations had shifted from Carter's March 1977 aim of demilitarizing the Indian Ocean to the later, mutually agreed objective of stabilizing Soviet and U.S. activity in the region. This suggests that U.S. facilities in Australia were not the subject of negotiation because they had been in

41. See, for example, AMEMBASSY CANBERRA msg. 060722Z Apr 79 (Canberra Cite 2902) (Subject: Foreign Minister Peacock Discusses Soviet Presence in Vietnam and the Balance of Power in the Indian Ocean.)
operation for some time. Moreover, both sides had a mutual interest in retaining access to those facilities which would sustain their ability to project forces promptly into the region in the event of a breakout from the terms of any Indian Ocean agreement as well as to monitor compliance with those terms. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that NAVCOMMSTA Harold E. Holt at Exmouth, Western Australia, the Joint Space Defense Research Facility at Pine Gap, and the Joint Defense Space Communication Station at Nurrungar were not the objects of serious Soviet attention in the negotiations nor was it in the interests of the United States to open these facilities to discussion in the talks. 42 There is some evidence of this in an article in the Canberra Times from the Soviet Union's Novosti Press Agency that described stabilization as "the renunciation of the construction of

42. For a discussion of the capabilities of these facilities at the time of Indian Ocean NALT see Desmond Ball, A Suitable Piece of Real Estate: American Installations in Australia (Sydney: Hale and Iremonger, 1980). In general, NAVCOMMSTA Harold E. Holt is tasked to provide ship-to-shore communications support for U.S. Fleet units in addition to its VLF capability (see Chapter III). It is linked through the Defense Communications System (DCS) to other naval communications stations in the Western Pacific including the Naval Communications Area Master Station Western Pacific (NAVCAMS WESTPAC) on Guam. It did have a Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) capability which linked it to, among other facilities, Diego Garcia. The Space Tracking and Communication Facilities at Pine Gap near Alice Springs and at Nurrungar perform command, control, and communications functions in connection with satellite surveillance.
new military bases . . . and the termination of the expansion of the already existing ones." 43

However, there was one Australian facility that probably attracted Soviet attention in terms of both U.S. and Australian military capabilities as well as the fact that the United States had not established a pattern of regular and extensive usage of it. Just prior to Carter's statement in March 1977, Fraser's Minister of Defense D. J. Killen announced in February 1977 that the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) would begin to operate from its new facility at Garden Island on Cockburn Sound in Western Australia beginning in early 1979 on a permanent basis. Though he avoided tying this basing policy to a Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean, Killen confirmed that, in the future, half of Australia's submarine force would be deployed in the Indian Ocean. 44 Construction at Cockburn Sound began in 1970 and wasn't completed until 1978. The base was capable of handling a variety of naval vessels with alongside berthing and support facilities for submarines and surface ships up to and including heavy cruisers. The Sound was a good, natural, medium-sized harbor which Britain's Royal Navy


identified as long ago as 1911 as an ideal site for a base on the western coast of Australia. \(^{45}\)

Shortly after Fraser took office, he offered the use of Cockburn Sound to the United States. \(^{46}\) Despite a flurry of rhetoric during the construction of the base and shortly following the Australian offer, the United States had not used Cockburn Sound for anything other than occasional, routine port visits because its potential use as a major Indian Ocean operating base for the United States was limited. The distance from Cockburn Sound to the Arabian Sea, the presumed tactical area of operations, was approximately 4900 nautical miles. Moreover, should any battle group operating from the Sound need to transit to another area of interest such as the South China Sea or Northeast Asia similar voyages of 2800 and 4800 nautical miles respectively would have been required. Thus, there were clearly defined disadvantages to the use of Cockburn Sound by the United States.


However, should it have become necessary to divert U.S. or allied naval and merchant shipping south of Australia because of the closure of the Strait of Malacca or the Indonesian Straits, there would have been value in having access to the facilities at Cockburn Sound. Such an option also highlighted the reasons for excluding the Great Australian Bight and the Bass Strait from any definition of the Indian Ocean. Such a tactical requirement would have also increased the importance of Australian naval facilities at Melbourne and Adelaide. Should the base at Subic Bay have been sealed off or access to it lost because of unfavorable base rights negotiations with the Philippine Government, Cockburn Sound, Melbourne, and Adelaide would have proven valuable to the United States. Finally, even though it was remote from the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia, Cockburn Sound offered the advantage of not being constrained by straits or territorial waters should any force using it need to transit to these locations. Hence, the Soviet Union probably considered the Sound as a subject for negotiation during the talks.

A similar case could be made for the Soviet try to link the Timor and Arafura Seas with the Indian Ocean. Even though the Torres Strait between New Guinea and Australia is one of the most treacherous bodies of water in the world, it is at a terminus of the Port Said to Torres Strait route—one of the major commercial routes of the Indian Ocean.
Moreover Darwin, a base of increasing importance to Australia, was situated at the southeastern edge of the Timor Sea. Tactical and strategic considerations aside, these two seas and the Torres Strait were not contiguous to the Indian Ocean and were more appropriate to naval operations in the Pacific for both the U.S. and the USSR.

One other Australian concern that arose during the Indian Ocean talks addressed the issue of military exercises. Traditionally, combined exercises have served as both a tangible and symbolic means of demonstrating a state's continuing commitment to a mutual security relationship as well as sharpening the tactical proficiency of the forces participating in the exercise. As such they were an alternative to controlling the force levels of an adversary in an arms control agreement. This option avoided the many technical problems inherent in the traditional approaches to naval arms control while still retaining the option of affecting the actual use of naval forces—a consideration that may have had greater political impact in some circumstances than the actual force levels themselves.47

The United States, Australia, and New Zealand had a long-standing program of bilateral and multilateral exercises to test tactics, doctrine, and the interoperability of

various military forces and equipment. These included the annual RIMPAC series of exercises since 1971 which brought together, in addition to the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, forces from Canada and Japan. In the summer of 1974, the bi-annual KANGAROO series of exercises began to be held in the Coral Sea/Queensland area of Australia. This series of exercises included forces from ANZUS countries as well as the United Kingdom. In addition, there have been other lower level exercises conducted throughout the years involving individual units of ANZUS. In general, Australia has always regarded itself as a favored ally by the United States in this realm of their relationship.

Perhaps Australia felt it necessary to test this position in its relationship with the United States because of the talks. An Australian delegation headed by W. B. Pritchett, Assistant Secretary for Policy Coordination in the Australian Department of Defense, traveled to the United States for consultations with U.S. officials from April 11 to 14, 1978. Pritchett's probable concern was to gauge

48. F. A. Mediansky, "Indian Ocean Arms Accord May Backfire on West," Australian Financial Review, June 16, 1978; Pritchett was accompanied on this trip by RADM Peter H. Doyle, RAN, Chief of Joint Operations, Air Vice Marshall S. D. Evans, RAAF, Acting Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, and John R. Burgess, Acting Assistant Secretary for Defense Policy, Defense Division, Department of Foreign Affairs; see AMEMBASSY CANBERRA msg 070547Z Apr 78 (Canberra Cite 2576) (Subject: U.S./Australian Consultations on the Indian Ocean).
THE INDIAN OCEAN NAVAL ARMS LIMITATION TALKS: FROM A V/IZONE OF PEACE TO THE ARC OF CRISIS

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the effect that the four sessions of the U.S.-Soviet negotiations had worked on the ANZUS treaty and Australian interests in light of Vance's letter to Peacock and Carter's promise to Fraser. The vehicle that Australia chose to test the cohesion of the ANZUS alliance was an existing proposal for an exercise to be held in the waters off Western Australia in the fall of 1978--SANDGROPER I.

It would have been extremely embarrassing to both the Carter Administration and the Fraser government if the United States did not agree to participate in SANDGROPER I. Such a decision would have demonstrated to Australia that the United States had agreed to some form of limitation on its participation in such events in Western Australian waters within the framework of an Indian Ocean agreement. Furthermore, it would infer that Vance had been something less than candid in his assurances to Peacock regarding the Indian Ocean talks. Moreover, when considered in the context of the United States' condemnation of Soviet activities in the Horn of Africa, rejection of a long-standing ally's proposal for a combined military exercise would have been politically devastating to Fraser.

The issue was a double-edged sword. If the United States had chosen to retain the option of reopening the talks with the Soviet Union as a result of some demonstration of their good faith in the Horn of Africa, then the United States would have had to consider the relative merits
of a precedent-setting, large-scale exercise in the Indian Ocean off the west coast of Australia vis-à-vis a Soviet claim that such activity was a change in the U.S. pattern of operations in the region. The issue, if this was the case, turned on the question of whether the U.S. and Australian governments believed that the political and military benefits in conducting combined, peacetime operations could be reconciled with the goal of constraining future increases in Soviet military capabilities in the region via an arms control agreement. Perhaps the U.S. goal of stabilizing the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean had placed the United States between "a rock and a hard place" with one of its oldest allies even though the U.S. delegation made it clear to its Soviet counterpart during the talks that the U.S. periodically conducted such exercises with certain littoral states and that it would continue to do so under an Indian Ocean agreement. The Soviet delegation did not raise any objections to this statement.49

The United States opted to reassure Australia in this regard. During Vice-President Mondale's visit to Australia from May 7 to May 9, 1978, Mondale confirmed that he and Fraser had "reviewed a number of security interests our nations share as ANZUS allies." He went on to say that he

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49. SECSTATE WASHDC msg 2118202 Jul 78 (State Cite 184776) (Subject: Status of Indian Ocean Talks).
and the Prime Minister had "agreed that as part of defense cooperation, the United States look[ed] forward to conducting a joint naval exercise off Western Australia in the near future." He concluded his remarks by noting that the significance of this joint naval exercise was that it underscored the United States' "commitment to the ANZUS Treaty, and to the understandable, necessary security commitment and needs of Australia and New Zealand." 50 Mondale also reaffirmed Vance's commitment to Peacock that the discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union would not reduce the ambit of the ANZUS treaty in any "sense, shape, or form" in a major policy speech at the East-West Center in Honolulu. 51 As a result, ANZUS forces conducted SANDGROPER I from October 22, 1978, until November 1, 1978.

These actions assuaged Fraser's concerns that an agreement with the Soviet Union on Indian Ocean issues was of more value to the United States than continued good relations with Australia. Fraser confirmed this during a

50. AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 080823Z May 78 (Canberra Cite 3528) (Subject: Press Conference, Canberra, Australia, Vice President Mondale).

speech in Parliament shortly after Mondale's visit. He referred to SANDGROPER I as "something concrete from the USA" and "a significant move toward linking ANZUS to the Indian Ocean." Though there have been contending interpretations of the U.S. decision that suggest that it was taken to help the U.S. position in the Indian Ocean more than that of Australia and ANZUS, the inclusion of New Zealand forces in an exercise more than 4500 miles from their traditional operating area demonstrated that the members of ANZUS, and the U.S. in particular, had recognized that ANZUS was not limited to a strictly Pacific context and that ANZUS exercises in the Indian Ocean were not a new extension of the alliance. Moreover, SANDGROPER I served as a tacit signal to the Soviet Union that the United States and its allies had not only the capability but also the will to challenge the Soviet buildup in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, such a decision on the part of the United States suggests that the Soviet Union and the United States did not reach an agreement during the four rounds of negotiations on how much, if any, of the waters around Australia should be included in an agreement.


53. See, for example, Tow, op. cit.
The French Connection

Australia was not the only state that the Soviet Union tried to include in its force calculations in the talks. Both France and Great Britain maintained the types of naval capabilities that concerned the Soviet Union. Both nations had consistently abstained from voting on the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace issue in the United Nations. France deployed the single largest naval surface force in the region at the time. Moreover, France expressed concern to the United States over Soviet operations in the Indian Ocean as well as over the negotiations themselves.\textsuperscript{54}

The French connection was somewhat unique because of the long history of French presence and activity in the Indian Ocean and France's continued maintenance of both French forces and dependent territories in the region. French policy in the Indian Ocean was a reflection of France's conviction of the need for an independent presence to serve the goals of visibility and deterrence. In a large measure, this determination to sustain its independent role in the Indian Ocean was a microcosm of France's belief in the efficacy of its own force de frappe. It was, in a

\textsuperscript{54} Indian Ocean Forces Limitation and Conventional Arms Transfer, p. 45.
sense, a continuation of de Gaulle's policy that "the defense of France be French."

To support this policy and French interests, France had traditionally maintained a military presence in the Indian Ocean including the naval facilities at Djibouti. Though the airfield was not very large, the troop areas offered little more than barracks space, and the port facility was small, Djibouti provided France with a military foothold in the Northern Indian Ocean. France created a naval command responsible for operations in the Indian Ocean and the Cape route leading to it. The naval forces assigned to this command were not insignificant and included, on the average, about twenty ships at any given time. Although the force mix was somewhat on the low side with one guided missile frigate and five dual purpose frigates, it was significant in terms of its capability to demonstrate presence and France's commitment to the importance of the Cape route. In addition, France usually deployed five minesweepers to its


Indian Ocean squadron—the only Western ships of this type in the Indian Ocean.  

France also maintained an Exterior Action Force, renamed the Rapid Assistance Force in 1983, organized as an intervention force somewhat along the lines of the RDF. The manpower assigned to this force numbered some 20,000 and was extremely flexible in terms of its ability to be employed. U.S. and NATO officers who had observed this force in exercises remarked that it was well trained and made up of more long-service troops than other French units stationed in metropolitan France and Germany. Since 1973 France had used this force, or at least portions of it, twice in Zaire and in Djibouti, Mauritania, Lebanon, Chad, and the Central African Republic. France also maintained smaller contingents of all three of its armed services on Mayotte in the Comoro Archipelago and on Re’union.

France's considerable naval presence and its demonstrated willingness to employ military force in Africa suggests that the USSR would have been concerned with French capabilities in the Indian Ocean. There was a precedent for similar considerations in the MBFR talks in that NATO consistently excluded French military capabilities from the

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60. Ibid.
MBFR context while the Warsaw Pact maintained that such an exclusion was unreasonable in view of its assessment that France would meet its NATO obligations in the event of a war in Europe. Though the extent of French cooperation with the United States in the event of a crisis in the Indian Ocean would have been difficult to estimate at the time of the talks, it seems probable that France would have provided assistance if the French government perceived a serious danger to French economic and political interests.

While French economic and trade interests, with the notable exception of oil, pose somewhat of a paradox when analyzing why France maintained forces in the Indian Ocean, France's political interests were tied to the military aspects of French policy. French interests in the region were oriented more toward the protection and

61. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact have, in general, been disappointed that they have failed to get France to join in the MBFR talks. The USSR views the French Army and Air Force as part of the NATO Military Organization despite France's withdrawal. They have insisted, and NATO had agreed, to count the approximately 60,000 French forces stationed in West Germany. However, because France refuses to participate in MBFR, no forces stationed on French territory are included in the forces within the general guidelines area. See John G. Kelihier, The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), p. 126-127.

enhancement of diplomatic, technical, and political relations with states which had recently gained independence from France as well as those that provided energy sources and raw materials to France. Hence the interest in the Red Sea, the Mozambique Channel, Suez, and the Cape route as funnels of these resources. Moreover, France had established a firm linkage with many of the states around the littoral of the Indian Ocean as a supplier of arms. South Africa, Pakistan, and Indonesia were prime examples of this relationship.

However, there was another, perhaps more subtle, reason for French concern for the Indian Ocean. As the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea moved through its various stages, it became increasingly clear that the littoral and island states of the region could achieve broad legal rights over portions of the Indian Ocean as well as their resources. France stood to gain from these rights and especially those that pertained to deep-sea mining. Indeed, the nodules containing manganese, copper, iron, nickel, and cobalt were more uniform in composition in the Indian Ocean than anywhere else. A review of the known locations of insular and offshore mineral sites of the Indian Ocean suggests that France, because of its ownership of Re'union.

63. See Indian Ocean Atlas, p. 17, for the location of the known insular and offshore mineral sites in the Indian Ocean.
Mayotte and the French southern and Antarctic lands of Iles Crozet, Iles Kergulen, Ile Amsterdam, and Ile Saint Paul, as well as certain smaller islands in the Mozambique Channel, stood to gain substantially from the provisions under consideration. Perhaps the Soviet Union recognized the potential of such a claim. Shortly after the fourth round of talks in Berne in February 1978, the USSR mounted a diplomatic effort to encourage Mauritius to maintain its claim to sovereignty to at least one of the French islands in question, Ile de Tromelin. Thus France would have perceived any limitation on its maritime activities or regional military presence in the Indian Ocean as clearly not being in its long-term interests. Moreover, since the United States had provided logistic support to certain of France's military operations in Africa, France would have been concerned over any agreement that might limit future cooperation in the region.

The timing of the U.S.-Soviet negotiations must have also caused concern on the political level in France since France granted independence to the French Territory of Afars and Issas, formerly known as French Somaliland, in the very same month that the first round of the Indian Ocean talks

were held--June 1977. The new country took the name of the Republic of Djibouti. However, France retained the right to use the port of Djibouti as a naval base and also the right, and to some extent political obligation, to continue to station French forces there to block any possible takeover by Ethiopia or Somalia--the two states which had a paramount interest in the future of the mini-state. The timing of this event coincided almost precisely with the fundamental strategic shift in the Horn of Africa that ultimately led to the breakoff of the Indian Ocean negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

This interest stems from the fact that the _..._ of Djibouti was a terminus of the Franco-Ethiopian railway which ran from Djibouti to the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa. As such, it served as the main route for most of Ethiopia's foreign commerce. Though the territory was not of any great economic importance to Somalia, control over Djibouti would have allowed Somalia to exert a degree of pressure on Ethiopia in other areas of their long-standing boundary dispute. Hence France found itself politically and militarily linked, even if only as an interested observer, in the outcome of the struggle in the Horn of Africa and, by association, with what was to become a key political element.

in Indian Ocean NALT. It is little wonder that France expressed its concern to the United States over U.S. intentions in the talks. France's real and continuing interests in the region, which included the long-term health and welfare of the Republic of Djibouti, as well as the possible precedent effect on arms control negotiations in the Mediterranean, suggests that France opposed the whole idea of Indian Ocean NALT. To the French, the negotiations could only have been perceived as an exercise in pre-emptive diplomacy even though, had some sort of formal agreement been reached to lower the superpower presence, France stood to gain the most from such negotiations.

**NATO**

The issue of French capabilities and willingness to use them in the region raised an even larger issue in the context of the Indian Ocean talks and, in particular, the Persian Gulf. One of the geographic foci of the principal long-term political and military problems facing the United States and the Western European members of NATO, as well as Japan, was the Persian Gulf. The issue was the threat to the security of NATO by crises which developed outside the established area of operations of the Alliance.

There was demonstrated reluctance to deal with this issue within NATO. Indeed, this was one of the perceptions
that emerged from the OPEC oil boycott of 1973\textsuperscript{66} which demonstrated that Europe and the United States did not necessarily share a common view of their vital interests. This hesitation, and its potential benefit to the Soviet Union, was not lost on the Soviet leadership in their consideration of entering into arms control talks on the Indian Ocean with the United States since it was generally recognized at the time that NATO had done little to prepare contingency plans to deal with Soviet activity outside of its strictly defined boundaries. Though there had been informal planning by NATO's Defense Planning Committee as early as 1972 for protection of the oil tanker traffic around the Cape of Good Hope from the Persian Gulf to Western Europe and North America, some members of the Alliance opposed the diversion of forces from the central and northern fronts of NATO. Even though NATO reportedly had completed provisional planning for a NATO battle group composed of a large command ship, four frigates, a submarine, and several auxilliary vessels,\textsuperscript{67} opposition within NATO to the deployment of this battle group argued that thinning out U.S., British, or even French capabilities for operations elsewhere would virtually eliminate any

\textsuperscript{66} See p. 79.

chance of prolonged resistance to a Soviet drive into Western Europe. It seems that NATO had adopted the attitude that such missions should properly be met by the United States, Great Britain, and France.\textsuperscript{68} Had the United States successfully concluded an agreement on its force levels in the Indian Ocean with the Soviet Union, NATO would have been forced to come to grips with the implications of such an agreement on its ability to protect the oil routes. These circumstances might very well have brought the question of NATO's use of its forces outside the area to which they had been historically committed since 1949 to the fore—an issue which had traditionally been a divisive one within the Alliance.

The reluctance of the Western European allies derived, in the main, from fears that U.S. force withdrawals from Europe would detract from the linkage between the deterrence of ground warfare in Europe and the U.S. strategic nuclear guarantee to Western Europe—a classic case of military decoupling of political issues. Refusal to recognize that NATO must bear a greater share of the defense of Europe if, as was the case, the United States placed a greater emphasis on its legitimate national security interests outside of

Europe and allocated forces to support those interests, only exacerbated an already divided Alliance.

The Carter Administration recognized the potentially devastating effects of these circumstances on alliance politics and sought to defuse them early on. For some time, the United States and Great Britain had been holding talks on the Indian Ocean. Generally held every six months alternatively in London and Washington, the talks did not involve negotiations, commitments, or agreements. Their purpose was to provide a regular opportunity for officials of the State Department, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council to meet with their British counterparts from the Ministry of Defense and the Foreign and Colonial Offices to exchange views on a series of politico-military matters in the Indian Ocean area. Carter's Indian Ocean arms control initiative was discussed at the U.S.–U.K. meeting on May 24 and May 25, 1977, in London and again on June 23, 1978, in Washington.69

In a much broader perspective, the Carter Administration wanted to lead NATO in the development of practical programs to redress the imbalance in military power in Europe. In May 1977, the NATO members, under Carter's

69. SECSTATE WASHDC msg 111531Z May 77 (State Cite 106891) Subject: U.S.–U.K. Indian Ocean Talks).
leadership, committed themselves to aim for an annual increase in defense spending of about three percent in real terms. Carter's goal in this regard was to dampen some of the disunity which had grown up in NATO in the preceding decade and to restore a semblance of politico-military cohesion to the Alliance. His rationale was to shift some of the burden from what some had called an American-West German defense arrangement\textsuperscript{70} to one in which military capabilities were more broadly evident.

Though Carter was successful in getting an agreement to aim for increased defense expenditures, he had difficulty in alleviating allied concerns over his arms control policies in general and particularly SALT II. Beginning in mid-1977, the United States began intensive consultation on SALT with NATO. Previously, these consultations had been carried out by routine briefings. Under the Carter plan, no SALT issue of importance to European security was resolved without advance consultation with the allies.\textsuperscript{71} The Carter Administration followed a similar policy with respect to the Indian Ocean talks. At the conclusion of the first round of talks in Moscow in June 1977, Warnke discussed them with

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{70} See, for example, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., \textit{The Atlantic Community: A Complex Imbalance} (New York: Van Nostrand, Reinhold, Co., 1969), p. 37.
\item \textsuperscript{71} Vance, op. cit., p. 67.
\end{itemize}
NATO's political body while Hayward had an extensive session with NATO's Military Committee. 72

The circumstances surrounding the relationship of NATO's member states and the Indian Ocean reflected the broader issues of comparative military strength, political will, and alliance cohesion. All of these can be gauged by only approximate indicators. Moreover, political will is very difficult to assess before a crisis—a situation in which varying perceptions of a critical national interest or value are, more often than not, the subject of varying policy perceptions. The readiness to make armed forces available for an alliance's use is just as much an indicator of alliance cohesion as the stationing of foreign forces on one's territory is. These elements of alliance politics suggest that the issue of Indian Ocean NALT could very well have been a divisive one at a time when the United States fought for a unified front within NATO on such measures as real growth in military spending. Because of these very real concerns of alliance politics, it seems likely that most of the NATO states would not have objected to the U.S. decision to hold the Indian Ocean negotiations in abeyance nor would they have objected to their continuation provided that the United States retained the responsibilities which NATO's membership had come to expect of it in both Europe

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72. Hayward.
and the Indian Ocean. However, should the talks have been continued NATO members might have inferred that the United States no longer linked Soviet involvement in the Horn of Africa with its arms control program—a perception that could have had ominous effects on the question of politico-military linkage in Europe.

China and Others

The role of the Chinese cannot be neglected in evaluating Soviet long-term objectives. Though China was not an ally of the United States, the potential for a Chinese SLBM threat to the USSR from the Indian Ocean, though it did not appear to be an immediate threat at the time of the negotiations, cannot be discounted in Soviet negotiating strategy. Though China was the only great power that voted in favor of all the U.N. Zone of Peace resolutions, the PRC never criticized the U.S. presence on Diego Garcia. Indeed, China favored a strong U.S. military posture in the Indian Ocean as a counter to Soviet presence. The PRC perceived Soviet actions in the Indian Ocean as an extension of Russia's attempt to control southern Africa, including the


Cape route, and the West's vital sea lanes. Repeated statements by then Chinese Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-Ping on the need for increased U.S. naval presence in the Western Pacific, from where the bulk of the Indian Ocean force ultimately came, confirmed the continuing validity of this appraisal of the Chinese position. The reportedly successful launch of a Chinese SLBM only heightens this perception. China would have been concerned over the contents of an agreement as well as a U.S. decision to resume the negotiations. China could have only viewed Indian Ocean NALT as another example of Soviet plans to achieve a regional hegemony compounded by a perception of the United States' penchant to compromise with the Soviet Union.

India was another case in point. Carter came to The White House with a belief that U.S. relations with India could be and should be improved. Among the ten original foreign policy goals established by Brzezinski in 1977 was the weaving of "a world wide web of bilateral, political,


and, where appropriate, economic relations with the new emerging regional influentials.\textsuperscript{78} India was such a state along the littoral of the Indian Ocean. Moreover, Brzezinski established the goal of consulting on critical issues with such countries as Saudi Arabia, Iran, India, and Indonesia. Specifically Brzezinski developed a list, appropriate to each state, of positive acts which would symbolize the United States' new relationship with them.\textsuperscript{79} Indian Ocean NALT may have been one such issue. Accordingly India, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan were briefed on the substance of the talks by the United States.\textsuperscript{80}

It was in the interest of the United States to keep its allies and friends well informed of its intentions with respect to the Indian Ocean talks as well as the progress of the actual negotiations. The lessons learned from the FBS issue during SALT I, the cruise missile during SALT II, and MBFR illustrated the value of such consultations. They could have served as a strong counterweight to the possible Soviet use of the talks as a means to weaken U.S. alliances and influence its friends. Because of the precent-setting

\textsuperscript{78} Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 53.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., p. 54.
\textsuperscript{80} Vance; SECSTATE WASHDC msg 030104Z Feb 78 (State Cite 028785), (Subject: Indian Ocean Talks).
nature of the tactic, Warnke firmly resisted any attempt by the Soviets to link an agreement to allied forces or facilities in the region.\(^{81}\) In short, Warnke made it very clear to Mendelevich that the United States had no intention of negotiating for anybody else.\(^{82}\)

Moreover, the question of the relationship of alliances to the Indian Ocean demonstrated the linkage of geography and arms control. Two elements stand out in this regard. The first is the territory of a state—perhaps the most fundamental element in the modern theory of states. The second, resources, is perhaps more geopolitical in nature since it is an aspect of a state's power. In either case, both were elements in the considerations of U.S. allies about the Indian Ocean talks. These deliberations over an arms control issue brought to the fore the fact that geography in the form of territory and resources did affect the national security and economic viability of the states concerned as well as their alliance relationships. Hence, there is a relationship between geography and any process or technique, such as arms control, which affects the national security of a state.

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81. Bayne, Gelb.

82. Warnke.
CHAPTER VIII

GENERAL PURPOSE NAVAL FORCES

... We may agree about the signs but can we agree about their relative value? ... Experts in calculation! I leave it to you to count, to measure, to compare.

-- Jean Jacques Rousseau (1762)

This last issue is the most substantive of the four since it deals with controlling the principal business of both superpower navies in the Indian Ocean—naval presence, or the use of naval forces short of war to achieve nonmilitary objectives. The question of presence was significant because of the character of the forces that both sides used to carry out this mission—the general purpose naval forces of the United States and the USSR. This study defines general purpose forces as those naval forces not earmarked for a strategic mission. However, this paper does not address submarines for two reasons. The first is the implications of verification. The second is that the classic operational doctrine for the employment of nuclear submarines has stressed the need for remaining undetected while at sea. Indeed, even visits to foreign ports have
been few. Therefore submarines operating in their normal, undetected mode lack the psychological and coercive impact of a surface battle group. However, on occasion, even a ballistic missile submarine has executed a political mission whose goal was particularly sensitive to its capabilities. For example, USS PATRICK HENRY (SSBN-599) visited Izmir, Turkey, in November 1963 to reaffirm Turkey's inclusion in the scope of U.S. nuclear doctrine after the removal of land-based ICBM's from Turkey following the Cuban missile crisis. However, there has been relatively little consideration given to the possibility of exploiting the unique capabilities of the nuclear submarine to achieve limited objectives in peacetime. Nonetheless, deployment options do exist which could strengthen the presence role of naval forces.

However, by its very nature, presence implies that the surface components of the respective navies are the most appropriate for this role. The method chosen to constrain surface forces in the Indian Ocean talks was the imposition of numerical limitations on their movements into or their basing in an agreed upon geographic area. Since this study

has already addressed the problem of bases and the geographic area, this chapter focuses on limitations on their movement into or about the Indian Ocean. Because the basic U.S. objective in the talks was stabilization of the superpower naval presence in the region, the analysis is further directed to means and measures of achieving this goal of the talks. Finally, the discussion addresses the resulting constraints on naval power from both an operational and a policy perspective.

The Presence Mission

National security planners have devoted most of their time to the warfighting missions of armed services. In terms of the United States Navy this implied a concentration almost exclusively on the problems of either waging war at sea or projecting force ashore. While this is properly so, most of the operations carried out by the U.S. and Soviet fleets have been conducted during peacetime, interrupted periodically by crises requiring the use of force. This suggests an anomaly in the relationship of force and its political uses. The presence mission is the actualization of that anomaly. President Warren G. Harding aptly characterized it in a speech before the Seattle Press Club on July 27, 1923, when he explained that "the Navy is rather
more than a mere instrumentality of war. It is the right arm of the State Department. 3 Gorshkov, reiterated the same theme in his 1972 series of articles when he described the Soviet Navy as the USSR's "pet instrument of foreign policy." 4 Blechman and Kaplan's 1978 study Force Without War found that the United States employed its armed forces 215 times for political purposes between 1946 and 1975. 5 Naval forces participated in 80 percent of these cases, and more than 100 incidents involved only naval forces. If one narrowed the period under consideration to focus on uses of force since 1955, the United States Navy has been involved in nine out of every ten cases. 6

The role of the Navy in carrying out national security policy in this regard has been termed as "gunboat diplomacy," "overseas presence," and "forward deployment" to name but a few of the more common terms. Taken together these


6. Ibid., p. 39.
terms have described "the Misunderstood Mission" or "the Least Understood Mission." There is good reason for this since one of the most difficult situations that a national security planner can encounter is that of being thrust into the midst of a rapidly developing crisis overseas, under conditions of less than precise objectives, complicated by broad rules of engagement governing the forces at hand, and inadequate intelligence available about the changing situation. Moreover, the planner may be less than perfectly clear about the desired political goals stemming from the crisis. Yet, he must somehow tailor a force level to support those goals. These perceptions seem equally applicable to a Soviet planner as they do to a U.S. national security planner. Moreover, the historical record of the two state's navies in the Indian Ocean confirms these perceptions. There is no documented case of a U.S. or Soviet naval force engaging in combat operations in the Indian Ocean from 1945 until the U.S. Navy's support of Operation DESERT ONE in 1980. Hence the dominant business of the two navies was the presence mission.

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Measurement--A "Squishy" Problem

The crux of the matter during the Indian Ocean negotiations was the issue of how could the United States and the Soviet Union agree on some sort of criteria to define and measure their presence. Indeed, this problem was the central one of the negotiations—the one to which the two delegations returned time and time again. There have been various means of constraining naval power proposed throughout the years, and each has generally had some measure of the constraint imposed associated with it. While each measure had its own advantages and disadvantages, each, in varying degrees, illustrated the difficulty of trying to quantify the naval power of two states whose navies were intrinsically asymmetric in both doctrine and force structure. Thus, in a broad sense, the U.S. and Soviet delegations had to contend with the problem of whether to quantify their respective presence in the Indian Ocean in a rigorous fashion or to work toward a more generally worded agreement that would define presence in a broader, more qualitative sense describing the general force levels that each state had had in the region in the past.

8. Bayne.

The first option raised two subissues: What should be rigorously quantified and how should it be done; both were "squishy" problems facing the delegations. The strength and force structures of the U.S. and Soviet fleets, both of which represented the scope and intensity of their respective national interests and objectives, influenced each navies' missions. In turn, it was this structure and its capabilities which gave meaning and weight to each state's will in various situations. Unless these technically generated force structures were somehow integrated into the political considerations of arms control, there was no easy way to determine if each navy could perform particular politico-military tasks well in isolation, much less against a determined adversary, within the context of an arms control agreement. In this regard, a force structure that supported the presence mission and all of its political implications may very well have been poorly suited to a warfighting mission. The U.S. Middle East force was such a case in point.

This somewhat idiosyncratic journey through a confused and chaotic jumble of ideas has not brought this study any closer to the specific criteria by which the delegations tried to quantify presence. Quite the contrary, it suggests that perhaps it was not in the interests of the United States or the USSR to try to apply a rigorous "yardstick" to such considerations especially in the glaring light of an
arms control forum. Unlike negotiations on strategic systems, such as SALT, where it was possible broadly to gauge static measures of balance such as deliverable warheads, equivalent megatonnage, missile throw-weight and bomber payload, there was no easy way to measure naval power in the Indian Ocean talks given the asymmetric force structures generated for diverse purposes and in response to each state's differing needs. Nevertheless, both sides recognized that there was a need for some agreed standard of measurement. Despite this agreement in principle, this issue remained one of the principal ones faced by Warnke and Mendelevich during the talks and, indeed, remained unresolved at the close of the fourth round of negotiations in February 1978.10 However, there was agreement that naval ships, and not merchant ships, should be the object of their quest to find a "yardstick."11

**Combatants v. Auxiliaries**

This too, though seemingly an obvious and appropriate objective of a naval arms control forum, was not without controversy. The U.S. Middle East Force serves as an instructive paradigm in examining how this question probably turned. This study has demonstrated that the MEF performed

11. Ibid.
essentially a politico-military function in a diplomatic context by showing the flag, demonstrating the continuing U.S. interest in the Middle East, and enhancing U.S. friendship with the littoral nations through a continuing program of port visits. The force traditionally consisted of a flagship and two destroyer or frigate class ships. The flagship at the time of the talks, USS LA SALLE (AGF-3), had generally remained in the area on a permanent basis with the destroyers deploying from the U.S. Atlantic Fleet. Since the delegations agreed that any U.S.-Soviet treaty on the Indian Ocean deal with naval ships only, the U.S. delegation could have argued that such a premise excluded LA SALLE because it was legally classified by the Secretary of the Navy as an auxiliary and, as such, should be exempt from a limitation ceiling on combatants. This raised the question of what is an auxiliary ship as opposed to a combatant vessel within the overall framework of "naval ships" and, more broadly, should the talks cover combatants and auxiliaries or combatants only.12

The issue was not as easily resolved as its simplistic semantic nature suggests. At the time of the talks, the U.S. Navy had long excelled in the technique of replenishing its carrier battle groups while underway. However, the Soviet Navy was only beginning to perfect and refine its

techniques in this one of the most difficult and dangerous
seamanship evolutions. In the Indian Ocean the Soviet Navy
oftentimes used deep sea mooring buoys to create anchorages
because it lacked recourse to underway replenishment
skills. Moreover, even when the Soviet Navy did develop the
nucleus of a Mobile Logistic Support Force (MLSF) such as
was operational in the U.S. Navy, its ships, such as BORIS
CHILIKIN, tended to be smaller and less capable than U.S.
MLSF ships such as the multi-product, Fast Combat Support
ships of the SACRAMENTO class. CHILIKIN class fleet
replenishment ships displaced 20,500 tons and were capable
of providing both liquid and solid replenishment products to
Soviet combatants. SACRAMENTO class AOE's typically dis-
placed 53,600 tons and could provide up to 177,000 barrels
of fuel and aviation gas, 2150 tons of various munitions,
and approximately 750 tons of dry and refrigerated stores.
In addition, a SACRAMENTO class ship could deliver these
stores either alongside its customer via underway
replenishment (UNREP) or vertical replenishment (VERTREP)
using embarked UH-46 SEA KNIGHT helicopters.¹³ Because of
these disparate capabilities, the Soviet Navy, on the
average, required more auxiliary vessels in the Indian Ocean
to support its combatants than the United States.

¹³ See, for example, Capt. John Moore, RN (Ret.), ed.,
The Soviet Navy could have also exploited this deficiency by citing it as a reason for its larger numerical presence in the Indian Ocean. Hence, it seems that it would have been in the interest of the USSR to exclude auxiliaries from the Indian Ocean talks or, in some way, to cover them in a different mode than combatants. The close integration of the Soviet merchant and fishing fleets with the Soviet Navy exacerbated this issue even more. Speaking in the same month that the Indian Ocean negotiations began, VADM George P. Steele, USN (Ret.), former Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet, argued that:

This "interconnection" has been painstakingly built so that the Soviet Union could send and keep its naval forces anywhere in the world without having to wait for political gains that would enable the building of the traditional system of overseas naval and air bases. The ubiquitous presence of Soviet naval forces sustained by [their] merchant and fishing fleets has contributed in a small way to [their] remarkable gains.

There is a precedent in international law that could have been brought to bear on the question of what constituted a combatant as opposed to an auxiliary vessel. In the existing Law of the Sea at the time of the negotiations, Article 8 of the Convention on the High Seas defined a "warship" as a vessel belonging to the naval forces of a

state and bearing the external markings distinguishing warships of its nationality. This article went on further to classify a warship as a vessel under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the government and whose name appeared on the navy list, and manned by a crew who were subject to regular naval discipline. This legal interpretation suggested that the naval auxiliaries of the United States were properly those vessels displaying a recognized hull designation for an auxiliary and classified as naval auxiliary ships in the directives so designating such units issued by the Secretary of the Navy. In general, this definition implied that a U.S. Navy ship whose first letter of its hull designation was "A" was an auxiliary naval vessel of the United States.

Although similar documentation for the Soviet Navy is not available, it is possible to formulate a probable Soviet position on the subject from open-source literature. Writing in the *Soviet Naval Journal* in 1976 Captain 1st Rank

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16. There were two exceptions to this general rule. A CVT (training aircraft carrier) and an SES (surface effects ship) were legally classified as auxiliaries. The directive governing these classifications on the Navy list at the time of the talks was SECNAVINST 5030.1G of January 6, 1975. See U.S., Navy Department, Classifications of Naval Ships and Craft, SECNAVINST 5030.1G (Washington: January 6, 1975), Enclosure (3).
M. Ovanesov and Captain 1st Rank R. Sorokin acknowledged the general concept of a military warship embodied in Article 8 of the Convention on the High Seas. They argued, however, that this definition was too academic and did "not take due regard for the development of naval means." The article explained that each state should determine the status of a naval auxiliary vessel on the basis of national legislation and played down the importance of armament aboard a vessel as a pre-condition for recognizing it as having the status of a "warship." 17

Hence, it seems that the Soviet Union would have held that "naval ships" included both combatants and auxiliary vessels which had the right to sail under the naval ensign or the flag of naval auxiliary vessels of the Soviet Union—a rather disadvantageous position in an arms control negotiation that was trying to constrain U.S. naval operations in the Indian Ocean while seeking to preserve the underway logistic support structure of the Soviet Navy.

Because of this disadvantage, the Soviet delegation probably tried to define auxiliaries in the broadest

17. See Morskoï Sbornik, November 1976, p. 77-79. The translation of this article came from U.S., Department of State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Regional Security Affairs Division, Unclassified Files on Indian Ocean Arms Limitation Talks. The precedent for this position seems to have come from the definition of an auxiliary vessel agreed to by the USSR and the United States in the 1972 Treaty for Prevention of Incidents on and Over the High Seas. See TIAS 7379.
possible sense with respect to U.S. forces. In addition to the commissioned vessels of the U.S. Navy, they probably moved to include those vessels of the Military Sealift Command (MSC) that supported the U.S. Navy. At the time there were two such classes of vessels; the first was the USNS fleet manned by civilian crews and operated for the U.S. Navy by MSC; the second was the group of merchant tankers that operated under charter to MSC under the CHARGER LOG program. All three components, it could be argued, directly supported the operations of U.S. Navy combatants and should, therefore, be subject to some form of limitation.

The Soviet negotiators stood on solid legal ground with respect to the USNS vessels manned by civilian crews and operated for the U.S. Navy by MSC since such ships were within the scope of the definition of an auxiliary described earlier. However, the issue of merchant tankers under charter was less clear since it could be argued that such vessels were not government owned and were commercial vessels within the purview of the extant Law of the Sea.

Again there was substantial precedent for this line of argumentation on the part of both the USSR and the United

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States. The Soviet Union, in considering Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention on High Seas, held that government ships, including those operated for commercial purposes, fell under the protection of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, a privilege usually reserved for warships. The United States, on the other hand, objected to such a broad definition and countered that the immunity of a vessel owned or operated by a state, and hence its legal character, should be based on the purpose of its service. Thus it is possible that the U.S. delegation would have agreed, because of previous U.S. declaratory positions on the subject and because of an advantage in the capabilities of the U.S. Navy's MLSF ships, that a ship operating in support of a naval vessel or battle group should be regarded as an auxiliary vessel for purposes of the negotiations. Because


of its asymmetrical MLSF, the Soviet Union, for reasons previously described, would have preferred a more restricted definition or perhaps the generation of a separate paradigm for auxiliary vessels.

Definitions such as these, though adequate for purposes of the Law of the Sea treaties, were not comprehensive enough to be applied in an arms control context. The implication here is that the Soviet Union probably tried to exploit any question of definition to its advantage to constrain the operations of the U.S. Navy in the Indian Ocean either by the inclusion of auxiliaries in the proposed agreement or the creation of a separate one. The impact of such a broad limitation would have been greater on the already existing extensive underway replenishment capability of the U.S. Navy as opposed to the still growing one of the USSR. If a separate paradigm were adopted, the Soviet Navy stood to gain the most, at least in terms of ship-days, because of its higher levels of auxiliary presence in the past in the Indian Ocean.

The Carrier Battle Group

The Soviet Union has consistently focused its attention on the U.S. capability to use aircraft operating from carriers to deliver nuclear weapons against Soviet territory. The following statement as well as the Soviet reference to the carriers as non-central or Forward Based
Systems (FBS) exemplifies the Soviet position on the subject:

The Soviet Union . . . does not have military bases on foreign territories close to U.S. territory, whereas the United States possesses numerous military bases in Europe and Asia. According to a number of U.S. evaluations, this can increase the strategic potential of the United States and enable it to use it against the USSR in the event of war, if it is not successfully averted. Not only nuclear facilities with an intercontinental radius of operation but so-called forward forces—above all aircraft based . . . on aircraft carriers.

Though the USSR focused on aircraft deployed overseas that were capable of striking Soviet territory, it broadened the scope of the FBS issue to include a significant number of U.S. overseas bases on the periphery of the Soviet Union and the sea launched cruise missile. For whatever benefit it hoped to derive from pursuing the issue, the USSR did not consider the marginal utility to be sufficiently high to prevent it from setting the FBS problem aside in 1972 to get an agreement on SALT I. Throughout 1973, the Soviet Union insisted that SALT II must include limits on FBS and raised the issue again—in a regional context—in September 1973 Podgorny called for denuclearization of the Mediterranean. 22

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The agreement at Vladivostok in 1974 not to include FBS in the basic accord demonstrated that FBS was not of significant marginal utility from a strategic viewpoint in comparison with the central U.S. strategic delivery systems. Kissinger alluded to this when he reported that:

the progress that has been made in recent months is that the Soviet Union gradually gave up asking for compensation for the Forward Based Systems partly because most of [them], or I would say all of them, are not suitable for a significant attack on the Soviet Union. At any rate, this is an element that has disappeared from the negotiations in recent months.23

Moreover, the Soviet leadership apparently realized that, because of the coordination among the NATO allies during the SALT negotiating process, the FBS problem had not significantly divided the Alliance as it had hoped. Nonetheless, the USSR may have used the FBS problem to extend the SALT I negotiations to the point where the USSR concluded that it had achieved strategic parity with the United States. Since the Soviet Union had so forcefully pursued the issue, it became a simple matter of declaring it to be a bargaining chip and writing it off as a major concession to the United States. The Soviet leadership thus retained the option to raise it again in another negotiating context.

The United States traditionally held that its so-called Forward Based Systems were tactical in nature. Prior to SALT II and the issues of the sea and ground launched cruise missiles, the U.S. insisted that only those systems that were inter-continental, or central, were open for negotiation. The Soviet Union countered by arguing that any nuclear capable system which could reach its territory should be subject to negotiation. Given its previous level of interest, it was reasonable to assume that the USSR would reintroduce the FBS issue in the Indian Ocean negotiations as a means to enhance the defense of its territory and with the hope that it might set a precedent for other regions such as the Mediterranean and Northeast Asia. For purposes of analysis as well as delimiting the problem, this study focuses on FBS as represented by the carrier battle group (CVBG). The land-based strike aircraft component, although an issue of equal importance in the context of FBS, is not discussed.

At the time of the Indian Ocean talks the carrier battle group was the centerpiece of the Navy's concept of an offensive strategy. It had the flexibility, mobility, and resiliency to establish local sea control and air superiority in addition to its ability to conduct strike warfare ashore or at sea. It combined the ability to conduct both
the sea control and the power projection missions.\textsuperscript{24} Moreover, the U.S. carrier battle group was developing into a formidable ASW force—a force that did not rely on land-based aviation or facilities to conduct local and, to some extent, strategic ASW. The Soviet Union, at the time, was unable to send to sea anything similar to this force. Thus the Soviet delegation was concerned about the flexibility of the carrier battle group to conduct both strategic and conventional operations in the Indian Ocean as well as offsetting a tactical disadvantage for Soviet forces operating in the region during a crisis.

The limitation of carrier (CV) operations in the Indian Ocean would have cut at the heart of the U.S. Navy's ability to project national power and achieve local sea control. An agreement limiting CV deployments might have caused some allies who shared the U.S. desire to be able to project that power to question not only that capability but also U.S. intent. Indeed, such an agreement might even have required the abrogation or renegotiation of existing NATO commitments if the precedent were later applied to the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{25}


\textsuperscript{25} See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, \textit{NATO Facts and Figures} (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1969), p. 34, for a discussion of these commitments.
The ability to control sea areas vital to U.S. economic interests and those of its allies would also have been seriously constrained. At best, the Soviet delegation could have offered only the Soviet Navy's KIEV class carriers as an offset. However, to equate the tactical capabilities of the two would have been to the disadvantage of the U.S. in any such trade-off. Another option which the Soviet delegation could have proposed, although there is no evidence that it did, was that a battle group be denuclearized before it operated in the Indian Ocean. Such a proposal would have been unacceptable to the United States because to agree to such a limitation would have been both tacit and explicit violation of the U.S. national policy concerning nuclear weapons. This policy neither confirms nor denies the presence or absence of such weapons aboard a specific naval vessel. Though Warnke could have approached Mendelevich concerning a limit on Soviet deployments to Cuba, it is doubtful that the Soviet leadership would have accepted such a constraint.

Nevertheless, since the CVBG was the quintessential symbol of all the elements of the presence mission, the negotiators addressed it in the context of their goal of stabilizing the superpower presence in the Indian Ocean. The United States operated from a marginal advantage during the talks on this issue since the Soviet Navy had yet to deploy a carrier to the Indian Ocean. The United States, on
the other hand, had deployed carrier battle groups regularly into the region. Therefore, the onus was on the Soviet negotiators to demonstrate that operation of their KIEV class ships in the Indian Ocean would be consistent with the mutual goal of stabilization or to argue that U.S. carrier battle group operations should be reduced to a level lower than that of the past.

How to Measure Presence

Now that the issue of what to measure has been addressed, it is necessary to turn to the more difficult question of how to quantify it. The reader should be aware at the outset that there were numerous criteria that could have been used to measure limitations on naval forces. The following discussion summarizes some of the more prominent criteria with their respective pros and cons. These include such tactics as confidence building measures, numerical constraints on force levels, and qualitative limitations on naval weapons systems and platforms. Though some are less precise measures than others, all could be accommodated within the framework of a regional arms control agreement.

Confidence building measures (CBM) offer an alternative to the frustrations inherent in naval arms control. They can satiate the desire for progress in arms control since they are void of the problems of definition and technology inherent in quantitative approaches to naval arms control.
There are two naval precedents for the use of CBM's. The first was a 1930 protocol between Greece and Turkey. The two states agreed not to order or construct naval units without having first given the other six months notice so that both governments may thus be enabled if necessary to prevent any competition in the sphere of naval armaments by means of a friendly exchange of views and explanations on either side. . . ."26 The second was the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas.27

CBM's, such as those described, could be applied to the notification of naval exercises as well as deployment data. However, where the national technical means of verification provide a reasonably high level of confidence, CBM's are largely a symbolic gesture adding more to the form of relations than to their substance. Where such is not the case and the notification process is carried out both to the letter and spirit of the agreement, CBM's can add to the stability of a relationship. This may be of value during a


27. TIAS 7379.
crisis when the uncertainty of the intent of a specific naval capability could destabilize the issue at hand. However, a contending approach to the utility of CBM's argues that the existence of an agreed to CBM will detract from the ambiguity inherent in the alert of a naval force during a crisis, a tactic that has been historically useful to the United States.

Richard Haass has extensively addressed the subject of CBM's and naval arms control and has grouped CBM's in three broad categories. The first type establishes a set of general procedures to minimize the chance of accidental conflict at sea as well as reducing the opportunities to harass or intimidate an adversary's vessel. The 1972 U.S.-Soviet Agreement on Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas is such a CBM. Haass' second type of CBM requires that prior notification be provided for certain types of naval operations. These could include changes in force levels, exercises, deployments to a certain area, and transits. There is some precedent for this type of notification in the notices which are provided to various parties of land maneuvers and exercises under the CSCE Final Act. The final type of CBM that Haass defines is the imposition of actual constraints on the use of

28. See Richard Haass, "Confidence Building Measures and Naval Arms Control," Adelphi Papers, No. 149.
naval forces. In effect these are tantamount to activity controls.

Haass' second type of CBM offers grounds for further analysis since the issue of transits did arise during the negotiations. Both delegations recognized that each of its navies had a legitimate right to sail the Indian Ocean. Moreover, perhaps as much as one-third to one-half of the Soviet merchant fleet operations takes place in the Indian Ocean. It seems that the issue again turned on the definition of transit and how to constrain and measure it so as to minimize its effect on presence.

Unlike the question of what is and what is not a warship, there was little of precedential value which the negotiators could have used to shape their discussion on the subject of transit. Although there was a substantial literature on the idea of innocent passage and transit passage, no precedents existed that defined transit in terms of the high seas. There was, however, a means of addressing the problem indirectly.

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Though really only addressing commercial ocean transport, de Kerchove's *International Maritime Dictionary*, referred to transit as being "on passage." In turn, de Kerchove defined "passage" as an outward or a homeward bound trip or a journey by water from one port or place to another. Therefore, a reasonable definition of transit was one that applied to a ship on passage from one place to another. For purposes of the Indian Ocean, this could apply to a ship on passage from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific via the Indian Ocean or vice versa. However, because of the Suez Canal and the geographic definition of the Indian Ocean discussed earlier in this study, this definition needed to include vessels on passage from the Mediterranean to the Pacific through the Indian Ocean and vice versa.

There were several other considerations that could have come into play in the question of transit. They include the total distance to be steamed and the desired speed of advance. Normally, a vessel in transit, whether it be a commercial vessel or a military vessel, takes advantage of the well known, optimum track between its point of departure

33. Ibid.
34. A similar criteria could be applied to military aircraft in transit across the Indian Ocean.
and its destination taking into consideration such factors as the prevailing meteorological conditions as well as any hydrographic situations that might cause it to deviate from its planned track. Moreover, a ship in transit, especially a military vessel, usually sails that route at the most economical speed available for its given propulsion plant. In most cases at the time of the talks this tended to be about twelve knots unless operational requirements dictated otherwise.

Given the foregoing it is easy to derive a set of criteria for transit of the Indian Ocean. Using the data available in the Tables of Distance Between Ports as well as the appropriate Sailing Directions, the data in Table 2 are calculated. These figures, however, do not take into consideration that a ship in transit may have to divert from its planned track in order to enter port to refuel, take on provisions, obtain voyage repairs, or to maneuver at sea to avoid bad weather. This suggests that any definition of transit needed to include some provision for such contingencies in the form of 2-3 port calls of 2-3 days each or an aggregate of 4-9 days in port. An alternative to this

TABLE 2
TRANSIT FROM WEST TO EAST AT 12 KNOTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>SINGAPORE</th>
<th>SUNDA</th>
<th>LOMBOK</th>
<th>CAPE LEEUWIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAPE OF GOOD HOPE</td>
<td>5,580</td>
<td>5,132</td>
<td>5,461</td>
<td>4,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUEZ</td>
<td>5,026</td>
<td>7,454</td>
<td>5,921</td>
<td>6,389</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12 kts. x 24 hrs. = 288 miles made good per day

DAYS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>SINGAPORE</th>
<th>SUNDA</th>
<th>LOMBOK</th>
<th>CAPE LEEUWIN</th>
<th>AVG.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAPE</td>
<td>19.37</td>
<td>17.81</td>
<td>18.96</td>
<td>16.18</td>
<td>19.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUEZ</td>
<td>17.45</td>
<td>25.88</td>
<td>20.56</td>
<td>22.18</td>
<td>21.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 3
SUMMARY OF TRANSIT DATA (DAYS)

Avg. + Port Calls + 15-20% =

\[ \frac{(19.69 + 21.51)}{2} + \frac{(4+9)}{2} + \frac{(2.95 + 3.93)}{2} = \]

\[ 20.60 + 6.50 + 3.44 = 30.54 \]
consideration is to anticipate an additional 15-20 percent deviation for each transit.

These data are summarized in Table 3. Hence it seems that 31 days was a reasonable transit time of the Indian Ocean provided that the delegations agreed on such issues as the definition of the Indian Ocean as well as transit speed.36

The advantage of numerical constraints on force levels is the relative ease of verification. Though there are several measures which can be applied to this means (e.g., total tonnage, number of ships, manpower levels, limits on the class of ship, etc.), all have this attraction. Additionally it offers, depending on the measure chosen, the flexibility of each country allocating its resources as it sees fit within that limitation. Another objective that is achievable is a reduction in defense expenditures through the avoidance of operations and maintenance costs, ship construction costs, and aircraft procurement costs because of the lower force level required.

It is in this means that the classic, historical precedent for naval arms control is found. The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 fixed, by mutual consent, the strength

36. A similar table could be developed for aircraft in transit. This study has not addressed the case wherein a vessel is towed across the Indian Ocean. This, in the past, has been a common practice for Soviet vessels.
of the navies of the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy based on a numerical scheme of tonnages and ratios for capital ships. As discussed earlier in this study the negotiations of the 1920's and 1930's on naval arms limitations were principally an exercise in limiting force size. The Soviet Navy was not even considered germane to the issues at hand. Indeed during the heyday of naval arms control regimes of the 1920's and 1930's, the Soviet Union participated in only one, relatively minor protocol.\textsuperscript{37}

On the other hand, the use of qualitative limitations in naval arms control slows the momentum that technological breakthrough conveys to the development of weapons systems capable of being employed in naval warfare or to platform improvements. The objective of this particular means of naval arms control is to inhibit destabilizing developments in naval warfare. There has never been a substantive and practical test of employing this means to any arms control problem to date. The task of defining and negotiating qualitative constraints, whether it be in the realm of NALT

or in the context of START, will prove exceedingly difficult if not impossible.

Generally speaking, the quantitative aspects of arms control are concerned with countable and measurable factors. Unmeasurables, like flexibility, convenience, or political factors, are intangible and thus not subject to a systematic quantitative analysis even though in most cases they are too important to be ignored. Thus they are usually relegated to being discussed in words.

Moreover, many other factors which, on the surface, seem amenable to measurement, suffer from an imprecise formulation. In conventional arms control parlance, such terms as firepower and mobility serve as useful examples. Consider what is meant by as well as inferred by these terms. Can they be measured? Although certain limited characteristics of each of them can be measured, such as missile range in the case of firepower and number of strategic lift aircraft in the case of mobility, it is impossible to produce a reliable, quantitative aggregate of firepower for a ship or battle group, for example, because these terms mean different things to different people
as well as states. The reason for this disparity is that there is usually a divergence of opinion on the relative merits of each characteristic when such matters are referred to experts—a situation not uncommon in arms control negotiations. There is no universally accepted paradigm or rationale by which these characteristics can be combined.

The Soviet Union was concerned with the same kind of problem. Gorshkov, in commenting on the means of measuring naval power, remarked in 1972 that:

... the relative strength of naval forces cannot be measured in numbers of combatants or their total displacements, just as one cannot measure their combat might by the weight of the gun projectile salvos or by the quantity of torpedoes or missiles being launched.

In another article Gorshkov argued that:

The sharp increase in naval offensive and defensive capabilities is being achieved not only and not so much by an increase in the number of ships and other weapon platforms as by expanding the range of missions which each platform is able to prosecute... In other words clearly it is

38. Some of the other factors that could be measured with respect to firepower are the maximum rate of fire of a gun or missile system, the sustained rate of fire of that system, the number of batteries or missiles of a given system on a given platform, the accuracy in terms of circular error probable of a given system, as well as a measure of lethality in terms of probability of kill (P_k) of a given system.

not the quantity, but the quality of the weapons platforms . . .

Thus the task in trying to quantify naval presence in the Indian Ocean was to develop some "yardstick" that was both measurable, commensurable, and meaningful. This task was complicated by the very real asymmetrical characteristics of Soviet and U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean. While the Soviet Union had more ships, the U.S. had an advantage in the tonnage of individual ships. The issue then devolved about a method of deriving a "yardstick" to resolve the issue of the Soviet numerical advantage versus that of the U.S. tonnage advantage. During the Indian Ocean talks these two contending positions took the form of using either ton-days or ship-days as the measurement of naval presence. 41

**Ship-Days v. Ton-Days**

Ship-days have been used as a convenient guide for describing the trend of naval presence in a given region or, for that matter, a given port. Identifying such a trend is in itself, however, of little significance unless such totals can be refined and analyzed to reflect some continuity, or change therein of purpose or mission. Moreover,


41. Bayne, Gelb, Hayward, Vance.
the criteria of ship-days may not have been a very meaningful unit of measurement since it not only did not distinguish between combatant and auxiliary vessels but also did not differentiate between the relative capabilities of such vessels. For example, there is a substantial gap between the capability of a U.S. FORRESTAL class CV and a Soviet KRIVAK class guided missile destroyer (DDG). Nonetheless, a FORRESTAL class CV in the Indian Ocean for one day would be considered as commensurable to the presence established by the KRIVAK DDG for a like period—one ship day. Though measurable, there is some doubt as to the significance of such a unit of measure.

Should the delegations have chosen ship-days as the unit of measure, the Soviet Union would have been at a disadvantage. The data contained in Appendices D and E demonstrates that, on the whole, the Soviet Navy had exceeded the U.S. Navy in ship-days in the Indian Ocean. The majority of these days, however, were attributable to other than combatant vessels. These data are summarized in Table 4. Hence while the Soviet Union, on balance, may have been able to insure a certain measure of sustainability in the Indian Ocean, it had been at a high cost to its war-fighting ability. Given the goal of stabilization and the high ratio of Soviet support vessels to combatants, the use of ship-days would have been disadvantageous to the Soviet Union if the level of stabilization was based on historical
data. On the other hand, U.S. presence measured in ship-days had generally been lower, though perhaps more attuned to a warfighting or crisis management mission because of the higher ratios of U.S. combatants to auxiliaries. Hence this unit of measurement was a two-edged sword for both the United States and the Soviet Union.

**TABLE 4**

U.S. and Soviet Ship-Days in the Indian Ocean

1970-1979

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S.</strong></td>
<td>1246</td>
<td>1337</td>
<td>1448</td>
<td>2172</td>
<td>2730</td>
<td>2715</td>
<td>2937</td>
<td>3747</td>
<td>2807</td>
<td>4041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Soviet Union</strong></td>
<td>4400</td>
<td>4700</td>
<td>9050</td>
<td>10339</td>
<td>11391</td>
<td>7200</td>
<td>7220</td>
<td>6842</td>
<td>8581</td>
<td>7829</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ton-days, on the other hand, favored the Soviet Union since it would have given an advantage to the force whose ships were, in the main, smaller. It is theoretically possible to use the total displacement of ships measured in tons to compare the relative merits of naval vessels since such a unit of measurement does reflect the aggregate weapons suite, stores, and crew carried by a ship. However, as in the case of ship-days, ton-days does not reflect the actual capabilities of an individual ship or a battle group and is thus not very significant.

In general, Soviet ships at the time of the negotiations had a smaller displacement than their U.S.
counterparts. This has been attributed to a variety of technological factors including the state of Soviet naval architecture and marine engineering. However, these technological constraints and the resulting size limitation permitted the Soviet Navy to attain nearly a 3:2 ratio trade-off in construction of hulls for a given amount of resources. Moreover, the Soviet Navy designed these hulls primarily in response to a military doctrine which emphasized speed, concentration of force, and the primacy of the offensive. There was, however, evidence to suggest that the Soviet Navy began to change its design criteria in the late 1970's. Ships such as battle cruiser KIROV are about the same size as would have been designed according to U.S. standards. Indeed, there seemed to be a growing trend to concentrate on large, highly capable ships displacing 7,000 tons or greater to conduct open ocean ASW operations.43

However, by comparison, the United States generally built ships to correspond to a military doctrine which emphasized superior state of the art technology and


engineering performance, economy of force, and combat effectiveness. This trend resulted in the U.S. Navy building a smaller number of vessels which were larger, more expensive, and perhaps more complex to operate. Hence the use of a measurement criteria that brought the displacement of a vessel into play would give the advantage to the Soviet Navy since it would have been able to achieve proportionately a larger level of presence within a fixed ton-day limitation.

In general, since Schlesinger's pronouncement on the subject in 1973, the United States has sailed a battle group into the Indian Ocean on the average of three times a year. These battle groups have, at various times, been centered around a nuclear carrier, a conventionally powered carrier, or a guided missile cruiser. Hence, the options for negotiation would probably have been built around these three entities operating in the Indian Ocean for varying lengths of time. Because it would be prohibitive to analyze all the possible combinations that could be used to define such limitations, this study addresses only one such prototype in detail. It is not the goal of this analysis to criticize this paradigm but simply to employ it as a means to analyze the talks and their operational impact.

44. Ibid.
It has been suggested that the delegations tried to get an agreement based on ship-ton-days. Such a measure allegedly took into account not only quantitative factors such as the number of ships and the duration of stay but also qualitative elements to the extent that tonnage can be said to relate to warfighting capability. This approach allowed each state the flexibility to mix numbers and types of platforms as well as the duration of stay as long as the aggregate remained below the agreed quota. Table 5 contains the model agreement. Assuming that this model was a negotiating proposal, several questions would most probably have been raised by both the Soviet Union and the U.S. such as those posed earlier in this chapter with respect to the classification of LASALLE as well as the carrier battle group.

The remainder of the ship-ton-days allocated to the United States are used to make up three battle groups, each with a mix of four surface combatants, deploying to the Indian Ocean for 30 days each. The model permitted the U.S. Navy and the Soviet Navy a good deal of flexibility in allocating their forces to deployment cycles within an agreed limit. But there were very definite costs that would have accrued in accepting this benefit. They took the form of less flexibility available for the remainder of a given year. For example, if the United States chose, for some reason, to increase the deployment of one of the model's
TABLE 5
MODEL FOR A U.S.-USSR INDIAN OCEAN SHIP-TON-DAY AGREEMENT

(Based on maximum 12.5 million ship-ton-days per year per country, surface combatants only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER OF SHIPS</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>TONNAGE</th>
<th>DURATION</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>AGF-3 (USS LASALLE)</td>
<td>8,040</td>
<td>365 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>DDG (Charles F. Adams class)</td>
<td>4,100 (each)</td>
<td>365 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CV (Kitty Hawk class)</td>
<td>80,800</td>
<td>60 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CGN (Bainbridge class)</td>
<td>8,580</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>DDG (Farragut class)</td>
<td>5,800</td>
<td>90 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>DD (Spruagut class)</td>
<td>7,800</td>
<td>90 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>FF (Knox class)</td>
<td>4,100</td>
<td>90 days</td>
</tr>
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</table>

(Total: 12.626 million ship-ton-days per year)

Soviet Union

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>TONNAGE</th>
<th>DURATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CLG (Kara class)</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>365 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>DDG (Krivak class)</td>
<td>3,900 (each)</td>
<td>365 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>DD (Skory class)</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>365 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>LST (Alligator class)</td>
<td>5,800</td>
<td>365 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>MSF (Natya class)</td>
<td>650 (each)</td>
<td>365 days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Total: 10.22 million ship-ton-days per year)

CVBG's to 60 days vice 30 days and included in that battle group an AAW cruiser such as a BELKNAP class CG, the cost of opportunity incurred by the U.S. with respect to subsequent deployments as described by the model would have been some 3,435,000 ship-ton-days, or almost 28% of the total allowable ship-ton-days. The significance of this example is that even though there were numerous force combinations that could have been constructed and deployed, they were all constrained by a model that was generated from data depicting the peacetime naval presence of the forces of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and not force mixes that were truly representative of a warfighting capability.

From a policy perspective any such limitation would have reduced the flexibility of U.S. decisionmakers by undercutting the U.S. ability to promote stability in the region and contain crises. U.S. policymakers have routinely employed sea-based power--primarily that offered by the CVBG's and amphibious ready groups (ARG) of the Sixth and Seventh Fleets--as a means of influencing the behavior of other actors in the international system. The means of exerting this influence were those forces that were forward deployed to a region to reassure U.S. allies, offer a visible deterrent to potential adversaries, and guarantee a quick response capability to demonstrate U.S. intent and resolve. Except in war, the tempo of naval operations has always been driven by the pattern of these forward
deployments. These were the forces that represented the ability of the United States to influence events ashore.

The second aspect of the stabilizing nature of such forces was the perception of U.S.-Soviet naval parity whether on a regional or global scale. Forward deployed units were a premium that the U.S. paid to insure that it would be able to assure sea control and influence the outcome of the land battle in the event of a crisis or major war. The trend in the open literature had emphasized Soviet gains at sea, as well as elsewhere. The forward strategy of the U.S. linking it to its allies required the use of the sea. The perception that the Soviet Union could deny this use to the U.S. and its allies would have been damaging to this strategy.

In many instances where the U.S. has desired to indicate its resolve, naval forces have been the preferred means of leverage for a U.S. policymaker. Forward deployed naval forces can be employed without being committed to battle and without committing allies. They are mobile and, since they operate in an international medium, they do not need to be quite so concerned about the violation of sovereign territory. They convey, as the policymaker chooses, a calculated ambiguity and a calibrated response capability whose presence does not irrevocably commit the U.S. to a given course of action. They can complicate the calculations of adversaries in assessing the consequences of
their available options. Moreover, the deployed naval force can be tailored to the mission and, through its composition, convey the message that the decisionmaker desires. If the crisis is resolved, naval forces can be withdrawn with limited fanfare.

The Soviet Union had gained an appreciation of these aspects of the employment of naval forces and had begun to exploit them to counter the effects of U.S. presence in a crisis setting and to neutralize the political effects of the U.S. interposition option. Events of the Mid-East War in 1973 lend credence to this thesis. It is precisely for these reasons that it would have been in the Soviet interest to constrain U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean and vice versa.

It could also be argued that it was in the context of the presence role that the attractiveness of limiting conventional naval forces gained the attention it appeared to have in the original concept of Indian Ocean NALT. Indeed, the presence mission was not and is not defined as an explicit mission of the U.S. Navy. Moreover, the U.S. Navy did not size its naval forces to support a presence mission. Hence, a commitment to presence, such as in the

Indian Ocean, could have been viewed as conflicting with the Navy's principal missions of deterrence, power projection and sea control. Therefore, the commitment of forces to a mission for which they were not designed made the idea of constraining that mission more attractive to those who had criticized the U.S. Navy for not being able to size its forces in proportion to its missions.

In February 1977, the same month that NALT surfaced, Carter reduced the Ford Administration's FY78 shipbuilding program, largely general purpose in nature, from 25 ships in FY 1978 and a total of 157 ships at a cost of $44.6 billion over the FY 1978-1982 planning cycle to 22 ships in FY 1978 and 152 ships in the overall program. Though the essentials of the Ford program were derived from a 1976 NSC study, Congress reduced the FY78 program to 18 ships.46

In January 1978 Carter did not present a new five-year shipbuilding plan to Congress as required by law. He promised that a plan would be submitted as soon as a naval force planning study, Sea Plan 2000, had been completed. However, the Navy, at OSD's direction, did submit requests

for 15 ships estimated to cost $4.7 billion. The second aspect of Carter's approach to the Navy was that only $42 billion would be available for shipbuilding in the FY 1979-1983 budget cycle.

On March 24, 1978, the Carter Administration forwarded Sea Plan 2000 to Congress. The plan identified three options for shipbuilding programs through the year 2000. The first, the high risk option, provided for a 1% growth rate in real spending for the Navy with a projected authorization of $6.79 billion and 290 new construction ships. The second, or minimum acceptable risk option, called for 3% annual growth rate with an average annual ship construction authorization of $8.8 billion and 395 new construction ships. The final option, a much lower risk, called for an average annual expenditure of $9.5 billion representing a 4% real growth and 447 new construction ships. The analysis of Sea Plan 2000 identified several naval missions, including presence, to support three national security objectives—maintenance of stability, containment of crises,


and deterrence of global war. Only option one, the high risk option, provided for a relaxation of then current forward deployed operations—the essence of presence.

Less than one week later, while speaking at the Current Strategy Forum at the Naval War College, Edward Randall Jayne, II, Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), argued that one of the deficiencies of Sea Plan 2000, and indeed of the Navy, was "the simple question of how much emphasis and attention the Navy [was] giving to its various missions." He went on to question the peacetime presence mission. He asked his audience if "it was really mandatory to have a carrier task force sail into a foreign harbor in order to have the desired foreign policy effect during a crisis?" He closed his remarks by explaining that "what the Navy needs to do is to understand itself, to know its highest and its lowest priorities, and to be able to tailor its forces accordingly within a budget share reasonably consistent with those of the past."

Less than three weeks later, on April 10, 1978, in testimony before the House Subcommittee on Seapower, Brown

51. Ibid., p. 8.
52. Ibid., p. 15.
revealed Carter's revised five-year shipbuilding program. It called for 83 ships, only 70 of which were new construction, estimated to cost $32 billion. The heart of the presence mission, one new midsized, conventionally powered CV, was funded at $1.5 billion. The implication, as stated by Brown, was that Carter had opted for a 12 battle group Navy. This shipbuilding plan was a rejection of even the high risk option of Sea Plan 2000 and a clear message to the Navy that Carter had other ideas on the importance of presence to naval strategy. Indeed this was the case according to New York Times correspondent William Safire, who reported that the Navy's key function in the future, according to Brown's classified posture statement, was to provide "adequate sea control forces" to protect critical waterways and sealanes, or sea control, and that the power projection role was to be deemphasized.

The Office of Program Appraisal and Evaluation (PA&E) of the Office of the Secretary of Defense supported the position in the FY79 Consolidated Defense Guidance that the U.S. Navy should presume that "the U.S. surface fleet could


be sized for peacetime and for conflicts in which the Soviets chose not to become involved." Brown tried to clarify this approach in a major policy speech to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations on June 6, 1978, by arguing that the United States did indeed design its navy for the standard NATO war scenario as well as highlighting the need for capabilities to reinforce U.S. allies on the flanks of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the perceptions set forth in the preceding paragraphs influenced formulation of U.S. national security policy in the Carter Administration. Their specific effect on NALT cannot be discounted.

Summary of Issues

If this was the case and if there is indeed a close, perhaps even symbiotic, relationship between the doctrine governing the use of weapons and arms control, then there is at least an arguable relationship between this apparent shift in U.S. national security policy advocated by Carter and set forth in his budget proposals and naval arms control in the Indian Ocean. However, there is a corollary of arms control that contends that arms control programs should flow from the doctrine of a state's adversary. In the case of

the Indian Ocean talks, no corresponding change in Soviet naval doctrine was evident. If anything, Soviet doctrine, as embodied in the Soviet Navy's ship construction program, was shifting to one more akin to classic U.S. naval doctrine. In addition, the Carter Administration ignored a time-tested principle that a presence and warfighting capability cannot be divorced. Presence forces deployed to areas wherever crisis management is the rule must have a credible warfighting capability. They must also demonstrate the degree of U.S. interest in the area relative to that of any potential adversary. To be effective in the presence role, naval forces must signal an identifiable linkage with the global capability of U.S. power.

Some critics charge that it is difficult, if not nearly impossible, to judge the effect of presence. Little can be offered to change this perception. It is only when the other actors in the international system have decided what to do during a crisis that it is possible to estimate the impact. Even then, it is difficult to attribute such actions to the effect of presence alone because other options (e.g., economic, political, etc.) may have been brought to bear on the situation. All that can be known with a reasonable degree of certainty is that naval presence, or its absence, is but one transmitter of such signals. To constrain the option of naval presence available to the decisionmaker that enables him to transmit
his intent and resolve is to deprive him of a valuable tool—a tool that once traded away is difficult to replace.

Table 6 summarizes the four issues. It highlights various advantages and disadvantages for each issue for both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. All four issues were a high risk for the United States in the long term should some form of agreement have been reached on them in the talks. Indeed, all four favored the Soviet Union. Therefore, when measured against the criteria set forth in the first chapter of this study, conclusion of the talks would have enhanced the national security of the Soviet Union more than that of the United States.
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<td>1. Loss of</td>
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Less than three years after Carter's Indian Ocean arms control initiative, political upheavals in Iran and Afghanistan, a war between the two Yemens, changing alliance patterns in the Horn of Africa, and an energy crisis combined to sharpen the West's focus on the region.

In Iran, a fundamentalist Islamic clique dominated by its anti-Western leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, overthrew Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. The result was that the U.S. lost its principal partner in Nixon and Kissinger's "Two Pillar Policy." In Ethiopia, a Marxist military government closed U.S. communications and surveillance facilities at Kagnew Station and Asmara. Meanwhile, a Muslim regime in Somalia, reacting to the signing of two separate arms agreements between the Soviet Union and Ethiopia in December 1976 and May 1977 and trying to get military assistance from the United States, expelled its Soviet military advisers, renounced its Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union, and broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba in November 1977. In Afghanistan, a Soviet invasion on
December 28, 1979, contributed to the downfall of one pro-Soviet regime and the prompt installation of another.

Despite a hopeful beginning, the United States decided to forego further talks on the subject of arms control in the Indian Ocean because Soviet politico-military activity in the Horn of Africa in 1977 and 1978 strongly suggested, as Gelb testified, that there was no common understanding on how the Indian Ocean Naval Arms Limitation Talks would affect the behavior of the United States and the Soviet Union in the region. Carter finally realized that an essentially naval agreement could not address the broader issue of intervention in the region by other military and political means. The Carter Doctrine was a statement of policy that described how the United States would redress this imbalance.
CHAPTER IX

THE CARTER DOCTRINE AND GEOGRAPHY

The state . . . finds itself forced to choose one of two alternatives, either to give up this endless labor and to abandon its frontier to perpetual disturbance . . . or to plunge deeper and deeper into barbarous countries, where the difficulties and expenses increase with every step. The greatest difficulty is knowing when to stop.

-- Prince Gorchakov to Imperial Russian Representatives Abroad (1864)

Throughout the remainder of 1978 and all of 1979 three events dominated U.S. policy in the Indian Ocean region. The first was the developing relationship between Egypt and Israel that led to the Camp David Accords in September 1978 and, ultimately, to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of March 1979. The second was the series of events leading to the collapse of the monarchy in Iran in February 1979. The third event was the growth of Soviet influence in the Horn of Africa. Although a comprehensive analysis of the first two of these events is not possible in this study, their outcomes altered the U.S. strategic perception of the Indian Ocean region and require some discussion.

1. Sick, op. cit., p. 69.
The continuing dispute with Israel conditioned the policies of the Arab states, including the oil producers of the Persian Gulf. It was an issue deeply rooted in centuries of conflict and competing religious tenets. In some cases, certain Arab states used the Israeli issue as a pretext for playing out inter-Arab rivalries. But whether it was in the foreground or the background, the Arab-Israeli issue was a constant factor that had to be accommodated in any policy for the Indian Ocean area.2

The problem was particularly acute for the United States which had become the arbiter of a Middle East peace settlement and the staunchest supporter of Israel. The opposition to the Camp David Accords in most of the Arab world expanded the problem of formulating an effective U.S. Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf policy. For example, the probability of continuing Arab-Israeli problems made it very difficult to maintain a significant ground force in the region3—a problem that ultimately shaped both the concept of operations and the force structure of the RDF and caused Carter to reexamine his long-term plans for the United


3. Ibid., p. 4.
States Navy in the region. Egypt and Israel, both publicly and privately, welcomed the increase of U.S. military presence, in the form of the U.S. Navy, in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. However, other Arab states believed that the lack of progress on the Palestinian question made it politically unattractive for moderate Arab states publicly to approve this U.S. policy.

The collapse of the monarchy in Iran demonstrated the problem of Nixon and Kissinger's "Two Pillar Policy" which relied on Iran as a regional surrogate for the United States. The fundamentalist Islamic revolution illustrated the difficulty, and perhaps the futility, of depending on clients to look after the vital interests of the United States in the Indian Ocean. Even though the U.S. gained a new ally in Egypt while losing Iran, the importance that previous U.S. Administrations had attached to Iran left U.S. policy for the region in a near vacuum. The seizure of the hostages in Teheran on November 4, 1979, was the capstone of these events.

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5. Ibid.
The situation in the Persian Gulf brought these problems sharply into focus. The combination of the Gulf as a source of the bulk of Western oil, its strategic location and the region's instability, insecurity, and uncertainty made it a source of concern. It was a unique geographical setting in which all forms of international power—the resource power of the Arabs, the military strength of the USSR, the commercial and diplomatic leverage of Japan and Western Europe, and the political leadership of the United States—intersected. Saudi Arabia emerged as the dominant factor in U.S. considerations during policy reviews.

Although Saudi Arabia privately welcomed the demonstration of U.S. resolve to resist Soviet aggression in the region, it publicly explained that U.S. bases would not be welcome.\(^6\) The Saudis made it clear that a large U.S. ground presence in the region could be potentially destabilizing both domestically, as in the case of Iran, and regionally. Yet Saudi Arabia was genuinely concerned about the ability of the United States to deter Soviet aggression in the region using conventional forces.

The Soviet Union and the Horn

Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean region grew considerably since 1970 and rose sharply in late 1977. From one end of the region to the other, the USSR tried to bolster its political and military position. Mrs. Gandhi's return to power in India in 1979 produced a more workable relationship with the dominant power in the subcontinent. Along the western littoral, the Soviet Union supported the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia against both Somali forces and Eritrean guerrillas. Moreover, the Soviet Union developed a close relationship with the government of People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) and secured access to Aden's superb maritime facilities in the process. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was the last in a series of moves that reflected the shift in the region's strategic military balance in favor of the Soviet Union. In Afghanistan, the USSR was closer to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean than ever before. By staging flights from Afghan airfields, it was easier for Soviet forces to project land-based tactical and strategic air power towards those areas. This would be important in a crisis or war in which targets in the Persian Gulf, U.S. carrier battle groups within range, and major U.S. support complexes, like Diego Garcia, presumably would be Soviet targets.

The Soviet Navy supplemented Moscow's accomplishments on land as it evolved from a coastal force to one capable of
operations anywhere in the world. Moreover, the Soviet Union had used its merchant marine effectively to provide much of the arms and other material that it had supplied to its regional client states. During the Somalia–Ethiopian conflict, for example, Soviet merchantmen delivered nearly one billion dollars in military equipment to Ethiopian ports. While Soviet naval operations in the Indian Ocean had not always been extensive, they did not have to be. In situations short of war, operations such as those described in Chapter IV of this study were sufficient to create the perception of a substantial naval presence in the region.

However, in April 1979, the Soviet carrier MINSK, the amphibious warfare ship IVAN ROGOV, and a KARA class guided missile cruiser conducted a demonstration cruise for South Yemeni officials while visiting Aden and also visited ports in Mozambique, Mauritius and the Seychelles. That same month two Soviet IL-38 aircraft on open ocean reconnaissance flights in the Arabian Sea flew so close to USS MIDWAY (CV-41) that MIDWAY's aircraft in its landing pattern had to take emergency evasive action. Soviet access to air and naval facilities increased following a coup in June 1979 that brought a pro-Soviet government to power in the PDRY. In August 1979 a Soviet nuclear powered ECHO class submarine entered Aden along with a submarine tender. In October 1979

7. State Cite 233001.
the USSR and the PDRY signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation. By early 1980 the Soviet Pacific Fleet was maintaining a continuous nuclear submarine presence in the Indian Ocean as well as enlarging its conventional submarine presence.8

U.S. Responses

These events suggested that a reappraisal of U.S. national security policy for the region was necessary. The Carter Administration, responding to circumstances that had slipped beyond its control, recognized the need to reassess its ability to protect U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean. The result was a shift from considering the region as one suitable for the negotiation of naval arms limitations to believing it to be part of Brzezinski's "Arc of Crisis." This term, expressed in rather colorful language a premise which had been intuitively recognized for a long time—the region that stretched from North Africa through the Middle East to the Persian Gulf and thence to the Indian subcontinent was one of peril for the United States and the Western democracies because of its instability and

insecurity. An examination of Carter's reappraisal of the importance of the Indian Ocean, a process that began early in 1978, will show why and how, in terms of the background and the issues of the talks, Carter rejected his earlier approach.

The Zone of Peace

Although its prospects for success seemed slim, the Zone of Peace was not a dead or forgotten issue especially among the littoral countries. In 1977, the year the talks began, the Soviet Union, along with its Warsaw Pact allies, voted in favor of the resolution on the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace for the first time. Perhaps the Soviet leadership intended this move to offset any political advantage that the United States might have gained from its NALT proposal to the Soviet Union earlier that year. The United States abstained to keep the question of the Zone of Peace separate from its talks with the USSR.

When the talks broke off in February 1978, the littoral and hinterland states tried to exert pressure on the U.S. and the Soviet Union to reopen them. The General Assembly, in Resolution 33/68, urged that talks be resumed without delay. In addition, this resolution recommended the

convening of a meeting of the littoral and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean in New York during the summer of 1979 in preparation for the long-sought-after conference on the Indian Ocean to implement the zone of peace in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 2832 (XXVI). When the USSR realized that there was little hope of getting the talks going again, it, along with its allies, reverted to their previous policy of abstaining on resolutions dealing with the Indian Ocean. The Soviet delegation explained its change in position by arguing that the resolutions did not place the blame for suspension of the talks on the United States.

It was at the Meeting of Littoral and Hinterland States at the United Nations Headquarters in New York in July 1979 that the issue of precise limits for an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace came to the fore. In what was strangely reminiscent of the problem that confronted the United States and the Soviet Union in their bilateral talks, the Final Document of the 1979 meeting stated that


... the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace should cover the Indian Ocean itself, its natural extensions, the islands thereon, the floor subjacent thereto, the littoral and hinterland states and the air space above. . . .

and then qualified this definition by noting that "the final limits were yet to be agreed upon." This suggests that the idea of the Zone of Peace had expanded to include the territory as well as the territorial waters of the littoral states as well as the high seas of the Indian Ocean. Much as during the Indian Ocean negotiations, several states were not pleased with this aspect of the document. Australia rejected the document because the geographic scope defined the Indian Ocean as including all of the territory of the littoral states and precluded it from entering into defense agreements pertaining to that part of its territory lying outside the Indian Ocean region.

The USSR favored the so-called "narrow" approach set forth in the 1971 U.N. resolution. Although it did not specifically object to a broader definition, the USSR argued that it was better to adopt the least complicated definition initially since it would help to achieve an agreement and could be broadened later. The United States also revised


13. Ibid., p. 6-7.
the position that it held during the talks and expressed a preference for a broader approach to defining the limits of the Indian Ocean. The U.S. representative, participating as an observer, argued that it would be wrong to take into account only the armed forces which were stationed in the area since such a definition ignored the need for an overall balance and courted instability. He argued that account should also be taken of air and ground forces based permanently in areas contiguous to the littoral and hinterland states which could be used to influence the regional security balance.  

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was the focal point for further debate on the subject within the U.N. By 1980, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean consisted of 45 members, several of which were leading world powers and not countries of the littoral or hinterland holding parochial views about the Indian Ocean. In addition, the General Assembly enlarged the membership of the Ad Hoc Committee in 1980 by adding new members to be appointed by its President and inviting the permanent members of the Security Council


and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to serve on the expanded committee. France and the Soviet Union accepted this invitation almost immediately whereas the United States at first informed the Committee of its intention to attend the meetings of the Committee on an interim basis pending its formal reply to the invitation. The U.S. subsequently became a permanent member of the Committee, along with Great Britain, in June 1980. In addition, the Committee developed an informal agenda for the as yet unconsummated conference. The agenda items included the unresolved definition of geographical limits, foreign military presence, nuclear weapons, security, and use of the Indian Ocean by foreign vessels and aircraft—issues strangely reminiscent of those in the talks.

There was significant opposition to this conference. In general the United States and its allies opposed the

16. A/35/29, p. 2. Membership of the Committee included: Australia, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Poland, Romania, Seychelles, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Yemen, Yugoslavia, and Zambia. Sweden has attended meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee as an observer.

17. Ibid., p. 3.

18. Ibid., p. 5.
meeting on the grounds of "continuing substantive differences among the members of the [Ad Hoc] Committee regarding the fundamental principles of the Zone" and "the marked deterioration in the security of the region over the past year, caused to some extent by local conflicts but most especially by the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan." The traditional proponents of the Zone of Peace, as well as the Soviet Union, argued that, while further agreement of views was preferable, it was not essential since the conference itself would serve this goal.

Indeed, by linking the conference to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan while urging compliance with the General Assembly's resolution calling for Soviet troop withdrawals from Afghanistan, many of the Western members of the General Assembly along with some regional states, such as Pakistan, seemed to suggest that a Soviet pullout was a pre-condition to their agreement to hold the conference. Thus, for the first time, a resolution of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean passed by consensus with only


Albania "disassociating itself." Even the United States, because of the compromise wording of the resolution, was, for the first time, in a position to support a draft resolution on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.21

Diego Garcia and Bases

In the course of the long debate in Congress as well as in academic literature and the press over U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean, it became a cliche to reiterate the fact that the Indian Ocean lay on the opposite side of the earth from the United States. Trincomalee in Sri Lanka was exactly 11,500 miles from New York if measured westward and the same distance from San Francisco if measured eastward.

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21. See A/C.1/35/PV.42, p. 32. The substance of this debate and the positions maintained therein continued throughout 1981 and 1982. The only consensus achieved was that consideration be given to convening the conference at Colombo, Sri Lanka, not later than the first half of 1983. The issue of U.S.-Soviet NALT was part of this debate. On March 12, 1982, Mendelevich queried the U.S. delegate to the Ad Hoc Committee if the U.S. was prepared to resume bilateral talks on the Indian Ocean. Mendelevich charged that, in the absence of any meaningful progress by the U.S., the Soviet Union would have to reconsider its own activities in the Indian Ocean. Mendelevich argued that, although these activities were restrained in the eyes of the Soviet Union, the USSR would be forced to strengthen its position in the Indian Ocean as a matter of strategic necessity. The U.S. delegate responded to Mendelevich's allegations. He argued that, as long as the Soviet Union resorted to the use of force or the threat to use force, the idea of mutual restraint in the Indian Ocean lacked credibility because of Soviet actions in Afghanistan. See United Nations, General Assembly, Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, Summary Record of the 182nd Meeting . . . on 12 March 1982, (A/AC.159/SR.182) (New York: 1982), p. 4-9.
This fact of geography is obvious, perhaps even banal, but nevertheless important, because it is one of the reasons why the debate over U.S. Indian Ocean policy has continued for so long. It is geographically impossible for the United States to establish and maintain a military presence farther away from its territory. That very remoteness remained a nagging issue in the minds of those who questioned the wisdom of having such a capability in the Indian Ocean. Did the United States, they asked, really have interests of sufficient importance so far away as to require a permanent naval installation where none existed before? In a sense Albert Wohlstetter presaged this debate in his 1968 article "Illusions of Distance" in Foreign Affairs when he argued that distance bore no simple relation either to interests or military strength.\(^{22}\)

However, distance was the principal problem confronting the United States in 1978, 1979, and 1980. Diego Garcia, while it was an excellent location for supporting Indian Ocean operations, was 2100 miles from Aden and 2600 from Bahrain. Facilities at the port of Mombassa in Kenya were

almost as far. Australia had offered Cockburn Sound on its west coast as a base for a U.S. Indian Ocean force. However, operating from Cockburn Sound, as discussed in Chapter V, would be comparable to staging operations from Subic Bay in the Philippines though it would have the advantage of avoiding the potential choke points of the Malaccan, Lombok, and Sunda Straits.

To overcome these disadvantages, the United States required land-based support facilities to sustain operations in the Indian Ocean. Operational requirements were too great to be satisfied without such facilities. However, total reliance on access to shore facilities that were subject to the vagaries of regional and domestic politics, such as the case of Berbera, was equally untenable. The United States, therefore, needed a logistics infrastructure that utilized both shore-based and sea-based and had the flexibility to shift from one to the other when the need arose.

When the United States began seriously to consider expanding its naval presence in the region, Diego Garcia was pivotal in the options that were available. Once Carter made the decision to deploy an increased U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean, access to ports and airfields was the driving factor in both planning and operational considerations. Nonetheless, the United States was cautious in its approach to this problem. The Carter Administration
dispatched a delegation of Defense and State Department officials to Kenya, Somalia, and Oman in December 1979 to sound out their governments on the issue of U.S. access to facilities as well as security cooperation. As a follow-on to this visit, U.S. technical inspection teams visited facilities in the three countries in January 1980. Mr. Reginald Bartholomew, Warnke's deputy at the first session of NALT in June 1977 and Gelb's successor as Director of the Politico-Military Affairs Bureau of the State Department, headed this delegation.23 Bartholomew also visited Saudi Arabia. Carter confirmed his Administration's interest in such facilities in a January 7, 1980, interview with television reporter John Chancellor though he disclaimed that any agreement had been worked out.24 Vance went to great length to explain that the United States was "not talking of huge U.S. bases for the use of facilities that exist in various countries."25


24. SECSTATE WASHDC msg 082336Z Jan 80 (State Cite 005916) (Subject: U.S. Interest in Indian Ocean Facilities).

The significance of the issue came to the fore when the logistics problems involved in supporting three carrier battle groups in the Indian Ocean began to be felt in late January 1980. The geography of the region created enormous logistics problems. In a superb study of the historical evolution of logistics, Martin van Creveld argued that after World War I, as a consequence of the changing nature of warfare, strategy became an appendix of logistics. This was a hallmark of U.S. operations in the Indian Ocean area. Logistics considerations virtually drove American policy and strategy because the geography of the problem imposed serious constraints on military options available to policymakers. The principal facility responsible for this task was the U.S. Naval Facility at Subic Bay in the Philippines, itself the subject of joint U.S.-Philippine control since the conclusion of the U.S.-Philippine base rights treaty in 1979. Diego Garcia was strained to its limit to augment this support because of its size and the


fact that it was 2300 miles from the Strait of Hormuz. The constraints placed on operations because of the length of the logistic pipeline demonstrated the need for U.S. access to facilities closer to the Persian Gulf.

In essence, the events surrounding this quest for U.S. access transformed Carter's policy for the Indian Ocean region from one whose hallmark had been cast in an arms control forum which addressed bases to one which focused on the importance of access to facilities in the region as a necessary adjunct to the U.S. ability to project force into the Persian Gulf. The SCC had completed some preliminary work on the problem during the summer and fall of 1979. On December 4, 1979, at an NSC meeting Carter instructed Brown and Vance to develop joint initiatives for approaching Oman, Kenya, and Somalia. This sudden, indeed almost frantic, reversal of the long-term decline of U.S. and Western facilities in the Indian Ocean marked a recognition of the importance of the region in U.S. national security policy.

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29. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 446.

The focus of the effort was Berbera. For almost the entire first half of 1980, the United States negotiated with the Government of Somalia on the issue. Although the U.S. was prepared to support Somalia as early as 1978 in a limited fashion, including the transfer of defensive arms, this support was contingent on Somali withdrawal from the Ogaden. Such withdrawal was not forthcoming.\(^{31}\) In what can only be seen as a tactic aimed at favorably influencing the Government of Somalia towards U.S. basing requirements, the outgoing Carter Administration cleared the way for President-elect Ronald Reagan to deliver $40 million in military aid to Somalia after he took office. The House Appropriations Committee had previously held up approval of this aid package until the President had provided verified assurance that Somali forces were no longer engaged in combat with Soviet-backed Ethiopian troops in the disputed Ogaden region.\(^{32}\) The Carter Administration's action was the culmination of an unexpected turn in the negotiations.


in August 1980 and the subsequent relief of Congressional skepticism on the issue.\textsuperscript{33}

Berbera was attractive for a variety of reasons. In addition to the port facilities discussed earlier in this study, the Soviet Union had finished construction of an air base with a 15,000-foot reinforced concrete runway southwest of Berbera.\textsuperscript{34} Before the Somali government expelled the Soviet presence, the Soviet Union had completed, in addition to the runway, reinforced revetments for parking aircraft and was in the process of erecting hangars and administration buildings. The potential for such a base, both in terms of tactical and strategic aircraft, was not lost on U.S. security planners.

Oman did not prove as difficult as Somalia in negotiating access to its facilities at Muscat, Masirah Island, and the airhead at Seeb. Though there was some hesitancy among the states of the region to become too closely identified with the United States because of a perceived inconsistency in Middle Eastern policy, the U.S. reached


\textsuperscript{34} State Cite 233001.
agreement with Oman in June 1980. Kenya also proved to be amenable to expanded U.S. access in the form of the right to stage P-3 flights through Mombasa as well as an expanded use of the port facilities at Mombasa.

**Strategic Forces**

In planning for the expanded Indian Ocean operations a major problem became apparent to the Carter Administration.

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36. "Kenya Agrees to Expand U.S. Use of Military Bases," *The New York Times*, June 28, 1980, p. 5:5. This trend continued with the Reagan Administration. Shortly after President Reagan's inauguration he submitted a request for almost $1 billion in additional funding for Indian Ocean related operations. These funds included a $106.4 million provision for the improvement of the Egyptian port and military base at Ras Banas on the Red Sea. A lesser amount, $75 million, was earmarked for the refurbishment of the former British base on Masirah Island off the coast of Oman as well as improvement of the airfield at Seeb. Approximately $24 million was identified for the repair of various facilities at Berbera while the Port of Mombasa was allocated $26 million for dredging. Diego Garcia was also addressed in this funding request. Funds in the amount of $237.7 million were identified as necessary to complete a variety of projects, including the widening of the air strip and construction of ramps to accommodate B-52 aircraft. See Richard Halloran, "Reagan to Request $38 Billion Increase in Military Outlays," *The New York Times*, March 4, 1981, p. 1:6; Richard Halloran, "Reagan Plan Looks to String of Bases in Mideast and Indian Ocean," *The New York Times*, March 12, 1981, p. 8:1; Richard Halloran, "U.S. Base in Indian Ocean May Be Enlarged," *The New York Times*, April 6, 1980, p. 16:4.
In a sense, it was a variant of the problems associated with the United States' loss of escalation dominance. The notion that by virtue of its strategic nuclear superiority the United States could forestall a conventional attack or other action short of a nuclear war in Europe or elsewhere had been undermined by the USSR's achievement of parity, or better, at the strategic nuclear level. American strategic nuclear dominance had, at one time, made up for any gaps in U.S. capabilities to wage conventional warfare that were becoming all too apparent. Escalation dominance demanded that there be no such gaps. Their existence relinquished control over the process of crisis management to the adversary and left to him the choice of taking the next escalatory step. This deficiency suggested the need to be able to bring a balanced force of arms, in addition to general purpose naval forces, to bear on the region. The actions of the Carter Administration in this regard may have been just as important, and perhaps more telling to the Soviet Union, than the imposition of the grain embargo on January 4, 1980.

On November 23, 1979, the U.S. Air Force established a detachment of four KC-135 tanker aircraft on Diego Garcia. Some two months later B-52 aircraft operating

THE INDIAN OCEAN NAVAL ARMS LIMITATION TALKS: FROM A
ZONE OF PEACE TO THE ARC OF CRISIS(U)
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F/G 5/4
from Andersen Air Force Base on Guam and in conjunction with the KC-135 tanker detachment from Diego Garcia overflew the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron on January 21, 1980. The arrival of B-52 aircraft in the Arabian Sea was obvious cause for concern by the USSR. Although the aircraft were reportedly being employed in a maritime surveillance role as provided for in the 1975 USN-USAF Collateral Functions Agreement, the demonstration that U.S. strategic aircraft could be introduced into the Arabian Sea could not have been lost on the Soviet Union. The use of aircraft that were earmarked for a strategic role on a mission that could have been performed more cheaply by the expanded P-3C ORION detachment on Diego Garcia suggests that there was more to this sortie and subsequent ocean surveillance flights by B-52 aircraft in the Indian Ocean.

The publicity associated with this first B-52 mission may have been intended as a signal that, because of Soviet


activities in the region, any prospects for the continuation of NALT were poor. The choice of the B-52 as the carrier of this message was clear and unmistakable. Moreover, the Air Force requested some $39 million in March 1981 to construct the parallel taxiway and parking apron extension to enable B-52's to operate routinely from Diego Garcia. In support of this operational concept, the United States concluded an agreement with Australia on March 11, 1981, permitting B-52's operating from Guam on Indian Ocean surveillance operations to use the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) airfield at Darwin for refueling and crew rest. The text of this agreement is contained in Appendix F. Even though the agreement contained a clause that required the United States to obtain Australian agreement prior to the use of Darwin for any mission other than ocean surveillance and navigation training, the impact was far-reaching to say the least.


Australia and the United States renewed the agreement in October 1982. The U.S. also considered using the airfield at Berbera to support B-52 operations in the Indian Ocean.

Alliance Implications

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan created a situation that brought the issue of allied burden sharing to the fore. It demonstrated both the capability and intent of the USSR to use military power against a non-European state in a manner that posed a threat to Western interests outside the traditional NATO geographic area of operations. The invasion and the seizure of the hostages created a force allocation problem for the United States—a problem that was not simply military in nature.

The dominant political question that confronted the leadership of the Alliance was how could the United States continue to bear the major burden for the maintenance of European security while, at the same time, allocating scarce resources to support crisis management in the Persian Gulf where European interests were as great as those of the


United States while NATO adhered to a Europe-first policy. On February 27, 1979, General Alexander Haig, USA, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), warned that:

"Clearly our most important challenge in the period ahead is the necessity to deal with the relationship between events occurring outside NATO's geographic boundaries and the security of the alliance itself."

Carter, in his State of the Union message on January 23, 1980, warned that the United States could not be expected to shoulder the entire burden of international security on its own.  

NATO was not pleased with the prospect of U.S. force redeployments or picking up the slack. In a speech to the Bundestag in January 1980, Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of West Germany, warned against "unconsidered talk about a geographical extension of NATO obligations."  

The Military

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Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly argued in 1980 that:

When discussing re-establishing an allied naval presence in the Indian Ocean on a permanent basis, it should be remembered that naval assets in NATO's current areas of responsibility are already said to be below SACLANT's requirements and national replacement programs do not provide for greater numbers. While the allies will have to cover any gaps left by American redeployments ... it is unrealistic to expect a permanent contribution to the Indian Ocean without creating a shortfall elsewhere.  

Nonetheless, in May 1980, NATO agreed to the first phase of a plan enabling the U.S. to employ forces currently earmarked for or assigned to NATO for contingencies in the Persian Gulf.  

Hence, even if only by implication, NATO tacitly defined a security interest which lay outside its traditional defense perimeter.

In what certainly was a test of this agreement, there is evidence that the deployment of several German warships to the Indian Ocean in 1980 was the result of pressure from the United States to send naval forces into the region even if only as a symbolic gesture of recognition of the importance of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean to NATO. The notion of deploying German forces outside the NATO


geographic area of operations was sensitive and involved certain constitutional questions within Germany. Indeed, there was a prohibition in the basic law of the Federal Republic against permanent deployments of West Germany's maritime forces in areas such as the Indian Ocean. Nevertheless, some Christian Democrats in Germany expressed the opinion that a symbolic West German naval presence in the Gulf would serve as a valuable gesture of solidarity toward the United States. They explained that such action was not inconsistent with German national security policy in view of West Germany's decision on where its warships would operate in the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea in support of NATO. While U.S. efforts to operate with these ships in spontaneous tactical maneuvers, commonly referred to as Passing Exercises, in both the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean were unsuccessful, the German ships did exercise with French forces in the Mediterranean. This deployment demonstrated that with more detailed NATO planning, the Bundesmarine either could provide some units for an Indo-Pacific contingency or, more preferably, could deploy a more substantial number of surface combatants to the Baltic and North Seas thereby releasing the more experienced U.S. and

British forces for duties elsewhere. Since 1979, Great Britain and Italy have also contributed directly to the force structure in the Indian Ocean through the deployment of naval forces to the region. Between March 1978 and September 1980 Great Britain raised its force level in the Indian Ocean to an average level of eight ships of the Royal Navy. These units usually operated in the Gulf of Oman with four on patrol at any given time.

Australian cooperation with the United States, both on a bilateral basis as well as within the framework of ANZUS, increased. At the Twenty-Seventh Meeting of the ANZUS Council in Washington, D.C., on June 7 and 8, 1978, the Council reviewed the Indian Ocean Naval Arms Limitation Talks between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and reiterated its concern that any Indian Ocean agreement "must not detract from the ANZUS Alliance." At its meeting in Canberra on July 4 and 5, 1979, the Council noted that the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to discuss the


52. Kelly, op. cit., p. 182.

resumption of their bilateral talks on questions concerning arms limitation measures in the Indian Ocean. Although the Council expressed its support for mutual restraint, it did so only so long as any such measures were "consistent with the security interests of the ANZUS partners." When the Council met in Washington on February 26 and 27, 1980, it "acknowledged that the political climate" as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was "not conducive to resumption of U.S.-Soviet talks on arms limitations in the Indian Ocean."

Despite this cautious rhetoric there was growing evidence that the Indian Ocean had become part of ANZUS' sphere of concern. Australia began to step up its maritime patrols in the Indian Ocean ranging as far as into the Bay of Bengal. It is also significant that RAAF P-3 aircraft began to use Diego Garcia on an ad hoc basis to support these reconnaissance flights. Moreover, the airfield on the Cocos-Keeling Islands took on a new significance in this regard. In early 1980, Australia and New Zealand agreed, in discussions with the United States under the aegis of the ANZUS treaty, to expand their respective military roles in the Indian Ocean. Australia agreed to deploy a battle group


55. Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs, "Backgrounder No. 223 of February 27, 1980, Annex, p. 3.
built around HMAS MELBOURNE. Beginning in 1979 a series of combined exercises nicknamed BEACON COMPASS have been held in the Indian Ocean with the Australian, New Zealand, and British navies. The U.S. participated in BEACON COMPASS 80 contributing a battle group centered on USS MIDWAY. This exercise, planned largely by the ANZUS navies, involved 25 ships, 170 aircraft and 18,000 personnel. Its objective was to demonstrate the continued presence, cooperation and readiness of allied forces in the Indian Ocean.56

The question of Cockburn Sound arose again when Defense Minister Kileen again extended an invitation to the U.S. Navy "to use the facility at HMAS STIRLING" on Cockburn Sound in Western Australia. He also noted that "a warm welcome will always await [the U.S. Navy]."57 In the wake of the search for facility access in the Indian Ocean, the United States began to reconsider Cockburn Sound. Speaking during a visit to Sydney on June 3, 1980, Admiral Robert L. J. Long, USN, Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC), commented that:

The U.S. Government is certainly looking at Cockburn Sound as a likely homeport for its carrier forces in the Indian Ocean. We are looking at a number of possibilities, including Singapore. If the U.S. were to establish a

56. SECSTATE WASHDC msg 210005Z Oct 80 (State Cite 280482) (Subject: Public Affairs Guidance - Exercise BEACON COMPASS.
57. Ibid., p. 56.
homeport at HMAS STIRLING on Cockburn South it would involve several thousand families.

The prospect of U.S. use of Cockburn Sound for homeporting a CVBG became a political issue shortly after Long's remarks. Speaking at a press conference in Perth on August 22, the leader of the Australian Labour Party, William Hayden, stated that "if the Fraser Government approved the use of Cockburn Sound for homeporting U.S. ships and a Labour Government gained power, the approval would be repudiated."59 The State Labour Party Conference supported Hayden's views on the subject and called on the Fraser Government to press for a resumption of the U.S.-Soviet Indian Ocean Arms Limitation Talks.60 Though this rhetoric was probably the result of domestic political infighting, there was some concern that, should a Labour Government replace Fraser's Conservative Government which had been in power since 1975, the Labour Party's left wing would


59. AMCONSUL PERTH msg 250303Z Aug 80 (Perth Cite 0343) (Subject: Opposition Leader States ALP Would Repudiate Any Agreement for US Homeporting in Cockburn Sound).

60. AMCONSUL PERTH msg 270344Z Aug 80 (Perth Cite 0348) (Subject: State ALP Conference Opposes Permanent Basing of Non Australian Naval Units at Cockburn Sound and Urges Resumption of Indian Ocean Peace Talks).
press the new Prime Minister to depart in some areas from Australia's growing support of the United States. 61

**General Purpose Forces**

The problem of Soviet and Cuban involvement in the Horn of Africa raised the issue of what, if any, response in addition to refusing to schedule the next round of talks was appropriate. Although the debate within the Administration was cast in the broader context of linking SALT with Soviet conduct in the Horn of Africa, 62 there was discussion in SCC during 1978 of deploying a U.S. carrier battle group near Ethiopia. Brzezinski supported this position while Vance and Brown opposed the deployment in the area of the Horn. In the end, Carter did not approve the deployment of

61. When the Labor Party won the elections in March 1983, Prime Minister Robert Hawke selected Hayden as his Foreign Minister. Hawke, however, reassured the Reagan Administration during a visit to the United States in June 1983 on this matter. Though he acknowledged that there were some in Australia who wanted U.S. bases there closed, he went to explain that he believed that Australia had:

... a clear perception of global realities and would regard it an exercise in delusion to think that we can engage in some unilateral process of disarmament and detachment from the alliances of the West.


62. See Vance, op. cit., p. 84-98; and Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 178-190.
the battle group to the Horn but did indicate a willingness to consider moving a CVBG to the vicinity of Diego Garcia. However, a decision was made to enhance U.S. presence in the region. On February 21, 1978, the same day that the fourth round of talks ended, USS FOX (CG-33), a guided missile cruiser, accompanied by two frigates and an oiler, entered the Indian Ocean on what was described as "a routine deployment in keeping with [U.S.] policy of conducting naval operations in international waters." In April 1978, FOX became the first ship of its class to operate with the MEF. There was no change in the U.S. deployment patterns until November 15, 1978, when a surface battle group comprised of USS STERRET (CG-31), USS WADDELL (DDG-24), USS BRADLEY (FF-1041), and USNS PASSUMPSIC (T-AO-107) entered the Indian Ocean. The deployment of this battle group marked the beginning of what was to be a near continuous pattern of presence in the Indian Ocean until well after Carter left office. This deployment was in response to the worsening situation in Iran. Some two months later on January 7, 1979, guided missile destroyers USS DECATUR (DDG-31) and USS HOEL (DDG-13), destroyer USS

63. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 183; Vance.


65. Ibid., p. 179.
KINKAID (DD-965), and the replenishment oiler USS KANSAS CITY (AOR-3) joined this battle group.66

Armed Iranian rebels attacked the U.S. Embassy in Teheran on February 14, 1979—the same day that rebels killed U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Adolph Dubs in Kabul. One week later on February 21 the MEF flagship, USS LA SALLE (AGF-3), and five destroyers from the battle group in the Indian Ocean evacuated more than 400 persons, including 200 U.S. citizens from the Iranian ports of Bandar Abbas and Chah Bahar.67 Once again the concern of the West focused on access to Middle East oil as a result of the growing instability in Iran. Two weeks later on March 8, 1979, the Defense Department announced that a carrier battle group led by USS CONSTELLATION (CV-64) had deployed to the Indian Ocean. In addition Thomas B. Ross, the Defense spokesman, explained that STERRETT, WADDELL, and KANSAS CITY had extended their deployment to the Indian Ocean.68

On March 25, 1979, during a routine press briefing at the Defense Department, Ross made known that a new naval

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66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. Brzezinski claims that Carter personally approved this deployment when, by prearrangement with his national security advisor, the President showed up unexpectedly at an SCC session and approved the SCC's recommendation to sail CONSTELLATION immediately to the Arabian Sea. See Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 447.
force, which would be called the Fifth Fleet, was an option under study by the Carter Administration. He acknowledged that Carter and his advisors were seeking a larger military presence in the area and that a Fifth Fleet was "a serious option" in view of the instability in Iran and Yemen.69 Two weeks later on April 6, 1979, a surface combatant battle group led by guided missile cruiser USS ENGLAND (CG-22) entered the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Malacca. Guided missile destroyer USS ROBISON (DDG-12), destroyer USS ELIOT (DD-967), frigate USS DOWNES (FF-1070), and the fast combat support ship USS CAMDEN (AOE-2) accompanied ENGLAND. Thus by early April 1979 U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean had increased to 15 ships.70 This marked the highest level of U.S. presence in the ocean at any one time since the 1973-74 oil crisis.

Therefore, by mid-spring of 1979 the Administration's decision regarding U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean began to take shape. The decision to sail the CONSTELLATION battle group to the Arabian Sea and the expansion of U.S.


70. SECSTATE WASHDC msg 061733Z Apr 79 (State Cite 085529) (Subject: Indian Ocean Deployment).

naval presence in the region lend credence to this perception. Although nothing came of the discussion of the Fifth Fleet and the Administration did not choose to draw a CVBG from another theater for permanent assignment to the region, battle groups did deploy more frequently. Until 1979, the customary interval between the departure of one battle group and the arrival of the next one in the Indian Ocean had been no less than two months with the average nearer to three months. Implementation of a revised policy was evident on April 14, 1979, when a carrier battle group built around USS MIDWAY relieved CONSTELLATION on station in the Indian Ocean. This simultaneous replacement of one carrier battle group with another seemed to signal the Carter Administration's recognition that it was in the national interest to demonstrate the ability to project power in the region. In June 1979, the Administration refined its new national security policy when the Policy Review Committee of the NSC examined the question of U.S. military posture in the Middle East and South Asia. The President's approval of three of the Committee's recommendations suggests that its principal agenda item was the ability of the United States effectively to project power in the region. The first of Carter's decisions authorized an

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increase in the force level of the U.S. Navy's Middle East Force. The second policy decision increased the number of incursions by U.S. carrier battle groups in the Indian Ocean from three to four per year. Finally, Carter directed the U.S. Air Force to begin a program of "Demonstration Visits" to selected Arab states, particularly Oman and several Gulf sheikdoms. Carter made reference to the maritime portions of this decision during his October 1, 1979, address on the Soviet brigade in Cuba when he explained that "we have reinforced our naval presence in the Indian Ocean."74

The seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Teheran on November 4, 1979, by armed Iranian students marked the watershed in U.S. Indian Ocean policy. Although the outlines of a strategy had been identified, including the initial identification of U.S. forces for the RDF, the seizure prompted a thorough, high level review of U.S. military capabilities in the region. The sobering conclusion of that review was that U.S. ability to project military power in the region was limited. On November 20 Carter approved an NSC recommendation to deploy an additional carrier battle group to the

73. Ibid.
Indian Ocean. By the end of November 1979, U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean had increased to 21 ships. One month later the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.

In response the Carter Administration increased the level of naval presence to three full carrier battle groups centered on USS KITTY HAWK (CV-63), USS MIDWAY, and USS NIMITZ (CVN-68). On February 13, 1980, Ross announced an unprecedented change in U.S. policy. He explained that:

A four ship amphibious task force from the Seventh Fleet with an embarked Marine Amphibious Unit, including 1800 Marines, will deploy to the Arabian Sea in mid-March. The Amphibious Task Force is now in the Western Pacific and will conduct exercises there during the next two weeks. It will then proceed to the Arabian Sea to join with the two Carrier Battle Groups operating there.

This force included the helicopter assault ship USS OKINAWA (LPH-3), dock landing ship USS ALAMO (LSD-33), attack cargo ship USS MOBILE (LKA-115), and tank landing ship USS SAN BERNARDINO (LST-1189). USS GRIDLEY (CG-21) and USS BARBEY (FF-1088) escorted this force into the Indian Ocean. This was the first time in the history of U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean that a Marine force of this size had deployed to the Indian Ocean and was the first of four such deployments that saw a Navy-Marine Corps amphibious

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75. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 483.

76. SECDEF WASHDC msg 132047Z Feb 80 (Subject: Press Announcement--Indian Ocean Deployment).

77. SECDEF Washington DC msg 132047Z Feb 80.
capability on station in the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean almost continuously until March 1981. One month later on April 27, 1980, U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean reached a record level of 34 ships with the return of the CONSTELLATION battle group. U.S. presence remained at or near this level for the remainder of 1980 and for two months subsequent to the release of the U.S. hostages on January 20, 1981. The U.S. Navy continued to maintain two carrier battle groups in the Indian Ocean until October 21, 1981, when the force level dropped to one battle group for the first time since November 1979.

Reconsidering NALT

The Soviet media did not remain silent throughout these events. Though interested in continuing the talks, the Soviet Union tried to embarrass the United States because of its decision not to schedule further rounds of negotiations. Even before the U.S. broke off the talks in February 1978, Radio Moscow charged that U.S. actions in the Indian Ocean, such as the completion of the planned construction on Diego Garcia, were a "direct result of deliberate attempts by certain groups in the United States, closely connected

with the military-industrial complex, to torpedo the Soviet American talks on the Indian Ocean." 79

Six months later in June 1978, TASS, in a commentary on the Twenty-Seventh Session of the ANZUS Council in Washington, charged that:

The recent trip to countries of Southeast Asia and Oceania by U.S. Vice President Walter Mondale has patently showed that to preserve its positions in that area the United States is making a stake on further enivigoration of the ANZUS bloc. Attempts are being made to involve the Indian Ocean basin in military preparations. The testimony of this is, specifically, the intention of the United States, Australia, and New Zealand to hold major joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean this year.

The reference to SANDGROPER I was unmistakable.

One month later in July 1978 in a summary commentary on the talks TASS again criticized the United States for refusing to reschedule the talks. Noting that "neither side has officially suspended the talks," the commentator went to great length to explain that the decision to halt further rounds was "by no means on the Soviet Union's initiative."

The commentary concluded by noting that "while talks on the Indian Ocean are not conducted, the USA is intensively


widening its military activity in that area.\textsuperscript{81} The USSR supplemented this public diplomacy with private efforts to convince various states that the United States was trying to establish a position of military advantage by delaying the talks.\textsuperscript{82}

The announcement in March 1979 that the United States was considering establishing the Fifth Fleet touched off a flurry of activity in the Soviet media. After the fall of the Shah and during the Yemen crisis, the Soviet media used every opportunity to criticize U.S. actions in the Indian Ocean as "gunboat diplomacy."\textsuperscript{83} On March 15 Izvestia claimed that the U.S. was "building up its naval forces in the Indian Ocean to ensure its military superiority in the Indian Ocean region and impose its will on the states in the region."\textsuperscript{84} TASS also reiterated the claim that the United States was "preparing to establish a special Indian Ocean fleet" and "enlarging its facilities on Diego Garcia to


\textsuperscript{82} SECSTATE WASHDC msg 211820Z Jul 78 (State Cite 184776) (Subject: Status of Indian Ocean Talks).


\textsuperscript{84} Ibid.
support this increased naval presence." The commentary also alleged that the U.S. broke off the Indian Ocean talks because "the very prospect of curtailing military activity in the Indian Ocean came up against U.S. strategic concepts." It also claimed that, unlike the USSR, the U.S. had refused to support the United Nations resolution calling for a resumption of the talks.85

In February 1979, one year after the talks had been held in abeyance, TASS marked the event. The commentary noted that:

A year passed since that time. There is hardly any doubt that over this period the negotiations on the Indian Ocean could have been brought to their successful conclusion had they continued the way they began. But this did not happen. Instead of continuation and intensification of the negotiations, the American side unilaterally suspended them. Though the Soviet side repeatedly proposed resumption of the negotiations, the delegations of the USSR and the USA had no other meetings. In Washington they fully disregarded the anxiety expressed by the countries of the Indian Ocean area, specifically India, in connection with the suspension of the negotiations. At the 33rd session of the U.N. General Assembly the United States refused to support a resolution which urged an undelayed resumption of the Soviet-American

negotiations on the Indian Ocean (the Soviet Union voted for the resolution).\(^86\)

The commentary concluded with the observation that:

The matter obviously is that determinant in the American policy in the Indian Ocean again becomes the approach which the United States practiced for many years in the past and which seemingly started to be replaced by a more realistic line that made it possible to open Soviet-American negotiations. The priority in this policy apparently received not the objective of strengthening the peaceful situation in the area of the Indian Ocean, on the basis of accords with the USSR with due account for the legitimate interests of both sides and the coastal states, but the desire to ensure for the United States military supremacy in the Indian Ocean area so as to dictate its will to the countries of the region. The build-up of the American naval force in the Indian Ocean and its movement in the most acute period of the political crisis in Iran reaffirm this most patently.\(^87\)

The focus on propaganda in the Third World was evident in the joint communique issued at the conclusion of Kosygin's visit to India in March 1979. The communique stated that both India and the Soviet Union:

\[\ldots\] reaffirmed their support for the idea of transforming the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace in accordance with the aspiration of that region's peoples. They expressed their regret that the Indian Ocean talks between the USSR and the United States have been suspended. India rates highly the USSR's readiness to resume those talks. Both sides advocated their immediate resumption and successful completion—which would contribute to

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87. Ibid.
implementing the UN declaration on proclaiming the
Indian Ocean a zone of peace.

Radio Moscow addressed the Fifth Fleet specifically on
March 21, 1979. The commentator charged the issue of the
force under consideration indicated that:

... the reduction of military activity in that
zone goes against the new plans the United States
has for the Indian Ocean region. Judging by
statements from Defence Secretary Brown, Secretary
James Schlesinger and various senators the United
States is planning again to operate from a
position of strength. This is in reaction to the
events in Iran, when the people decided to take
the fate of the nation into their own hands.
Washington views the situation in Iran as
justification for reviving the doctrine of armed
interference in the affairs of other countries,
therefore the United States is planning to
increase its military presence in the Middle East
and enlarge naval forces in the Indian Ocean, and
so the United States has turned to the policy it
practiced for many years.

The broadcast concluded by alleging that:

... the United States is not making it a
priority policy to strengthen peace in that part
of the world by reaching an agreement with the
USSR on the basis of the legitimate interests of
both countries as well as the coastal nations.
Instead, priority is being given to building

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military superiority in hopes of being able to dictate to the countries in the region.

Despite this rhetoric, the talks were the subject of discussion between Carter and Brezhnev at the June 1979 summit in Vienna. U.S. actions in the Indian Ocean prior to the seizure of the hostages suggest that the Carter Administration remained open on the subject of resuming the talks. As discussed earlier, the U.S. did not change its deployment patterns in the Indian Ocean in any drastic way when the Soviet Union expanded its presence in the Indian Ocean from November 1977 to June 1978. However, even though Soviet naval presence returned to near normal by the summer of 1978, Soviet and Cuban involvement in the Horn of Africa and in Afghanistan demonstrated that there were other factors in the presence equation which had not been addressed in the negotiations and which seemed to contradict the idea of stabilization under such an agreement.

However, Carter and Brezhnev agreed to have their heads of delegation to the talks meet to discuss their resumption. As a result, Mendelevich and Ralp Earle, Warnke's successor at ACDA, met in Washington on July 20, 1979, but were unable to reach agreement on a basis for resuming the

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90. Ibid.

negotiations. The talks remain dormant. Although the Reagan Administration has not taken a formal position on resumption of the talks, there is no evidence that either the United States or the Soviet Union has tried to resume them.92

This decision having been made, the Soviet Union exploited it to exert pressure on the U.S. to resume the talks and as a tactic of public diplomacy to discourage a larger U.S. presence. On August 21, 1979, Pravda carried an article that detailed the history of arms control proposals concerning the Indian Ocean. Though noting that both the U.S. and the USSR shared certain security interests there, the article alleged that:

Precisely at the time when the outlines of a possible accord were beginning to appear the Americans called a halt to the talks and rejected all subsequent approaches from the Soviet side suggesting their resumption. At the same time a

rapid buildup of the U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean began.

The article went on to explain that, although the Soviet Union "reaffirmed its readiness to resume the Indian Ocean talks," the next step in this process was up to the United States. This public criticism of the U.S. position on the Indian Ocean talks was timed to coincide with the opening of the meeting of the Non-Aligned Coordinating Bureau in Havana on August 28, 1979.

What then did the Carter-Brezhnev communique mean in terms of Indian Ocean NALT? The Earl-Mendelevich meeting probably was the culmination of a decisionmaking process that decided not to resume the talks at that time. Carter probably had a choice of three options in the process. He could either begin the talks again at some appropriate time, wait to make such a decision to see how Soviet behavior in the Horn of Africa developed, or, as was the case, abandon


95. See SECSTATE WASHDC msg 2422082 Aug 78 (State Cite 223010) (Subject: U.S. Position on Indian Ocean Talks).
the negotiations entirely. If selected, the first option would have inferred that Carter still considered it in the best interest of the United States to constrain the USSR from building up its infrastructure in the Indian Ocean even at the cost of accepting some limit on U.S. military capabilities in the area. His speech at the graduation ceremonies at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis on June 7, 1978, referred to the talks and suggested that they were an "avenue of cooperation despite the basic issues which divide" the U.S. and the USSR. The second option suggests that Carter, with some legitimacy, was hoping that, even though the situation in the region was too unsettled at the time to decide whether or not to resume negotiations, relations between the two superpowers would improve. There is some evidence that this was a viable option in the cable sent by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher to all U.S. Ambassadors in the Indian Ocean region on August 24, 1979, on the subject. He told them that "for our part, we intend to continue contacts with the Soviets with regard to the resumption of formal talks." The final option, if chosen, would confirm that the United States had decided that it needed the flexibility that it was originally


97. State Cite 223010.
willing to yield in the Indian Ocean talks. Moreover, this decision implied that refusing to resume the talks would have only marginal significance on the U.S.-USSR relationship and, that the United States, at least for the time, was better off without an agreement than with one.

Because the summit communique committed Carter and Brezhnev only to have their respective representatives meet promptly to discuss the resumption of the talks, it seems that Carter chose the last option. Carter's choice gave him the advantage of not complicating the SALT II process which was already in trouble domestically in the United States and was both personally and politically important to the President, while deferring any firm commitment to resume a set of marginally useful talks in the glaring light of a summit meeting. By choosing this option, Carter was able to delegate the responsibility for advising the Soviet government that he had decided not to resume the talks to a head of delegation meeting—a forum that would certainly be less public and less politicized than a summit meeting.

The Carter Doctrine

On January 23, 1980, Carter delivered the final blow to Indian Ocean NALT. In his third State of the Union message,

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he explained that:

An attempt by an outside force to gain control of Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America and such assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

Later that year he argued that:

Soviet aggression in Afghanistan unless checked confronts all the world with the most serious long-term strategic challenge since the Cold War began. To underestimate the magnitude of that challenge would constitute an historic error.

The Indian Ocean talks pose a dilemma if examined in terms of the Carter Doctrine. Though Carter and his advisors could not have reasonably predicted how events would develop, the political and military realities of the situation in the Indian Ocean made it difficult to understand how the United States could have foresworn the ability to project power, as embodied in U.S. general purpose naval forces, into the region. The Carter Doctrine recognized this reality. Yet, the question remains as to how Carter would have handled the situation had the Indian Ocean talks been carried to some form of successful conclusion. Almost all the elements of this policy which were in operation by

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the end of 1980 were, in one way or another, issues during the Indian Ocean talks.

Brzezinski, who claims credit for the drafting of Carter's State of the Union message, detailed these elements in a little-noticed speech in Montreal on December 5, 1980. Recalling an interview he gave to The Wall Street Journal on January 15, 1980, Brzezinski began with an analysis of U.S. policy in the post-World War II era for what he termed "the two central strategic zones--Western Europe and the Far East." He went on, much like Saul Cohen did some 17 years earlier, to explain that "a third strategic zone [had] assumed in recent years vital importance to the United States and its allies: the region we call Southwest Asia today, including the Persian Gulf and the Middle East."

Brzezinski explained how the Carter Doctrine was an expression of the views discussed in the SCC on the need for a new "regional security framework"--a subject on which Brzezinski had drafted a memorandum to Carter on January 9,

102. Sick, op. cit., p. 74.
104. Sick, op. cit., p. 74.
1980.\textsuperscript{105} Brzezinski noted that Carter, subsequent to this memo and his State of the Union speech, had convened the NSC on several occasions and more than twenty meetings of the SCC had been held to develop this concept.\textsuperscript{106} Brzezinski later explained that this was a logical conclusion to his "Arc of Crisis" thesis\textsuperscript{107} in late 1978 and to his memorandum to Carter on February 28, 1979, on the Indian Ocean talks. This memorandum urged Carter to consider a new "security framework" to reassert U.S. power and influence in the region and thereby abandon his earlier plans to demilitarize the Indian Ocean.\textsuperscript{108}

The framework of this policy already was evident before Carter's speech. The discussions with Oman, Somalia, and Kenya for access to bases are noteworthy in this regard. The establishment of the KC-135 detachment on Diego Garcia, followed by the open ocean reconnaissance flight of B-52 aircraft in the Indian Ocean, was singularly significant.

\begin{quotation}
\textsuperscript{105} Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 444.
\textsuperscript{106} Sick, op. cit., p. 74.
\textsuperscript{108} Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 446-447. There is another possible explanation of Brzezinski's actions. The "Arc of Crisis" and the role in the formulation of the Carter Doctrine could very well have been an exercise in bureaucratic politics designed to help Brzezinski seize the high ground in his differences with Vance over U.S. foreign and national security policy.
\end{quotation}
The increased level of presence generated by the deployment of carrier battle groups to the region beginning in April 1979 was a portent of things to come.

Others followed. Secretary of Defense Brown made it clear in his January 1980 Annual Report that, as a consequence of renewed turbulence in the region, it was imperative for the United States to "accelerate [its] efforts to improve the capabilities of our rapid deployment force." By March 1980 the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) headquarters had been established at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida.

To support that force, the Carter Administration accelerated a December 1979 decision by Brown to develop a force of ships carrying the heavy equipment and supplies to sustain the three U.S. Marine brigades earmarked for assignment to the RDJTF. The ships would be prepositioned in the Indian Ocean. On March 5, 1980, Deputy Secretary of Defense Graham Claytor testified that, as a near-term option, MSC was assembling a seven-ship force of commercial vessels which would be prepositioned within a few days.


sailing time of the Persian Gulf-Arabian Sea. MSC completed action to charter these vessels by mid-June. One month later in July 1980, they arrived on station at Diego Garcia.

In addition to these maritime prepositioning ships, the U.S. Navy proposed to purchase eight 27,000-ton, high speed SL-7 container ships which would be converted to roll-on/roll-off ships. These ships could carry both cargo and troops and could travel at a speed of 33 knots. Given this capability, such a force could reach the Suez Canal from the east coast of the United States in approximately 11 days with a mechanized infantry division on board.

Thus, by the end of 1980, the Carter policy for the Indian Ocean had shifted from one of stabilization cast in a regional arms control proposal to confrontation built around an enhanced U.S. military capability in the region. Although some, including Brzezinski himself, explained this


change in the historical perspective of the Truman Doctrine,\textsuperscript{113} there may be a more fundamental explanation of this shift. Its basis is the geography of the problem.

As a result of this geography and its effect on the politico-military position of the United States, geopolitics underwent a resurgence of sorts in U.S. national security policy for three reasons—all of which are germane to the Indian Ocean. The first, the West's growing dependence on imported sources of energy, especially oil, sensitized policymakers to the realities of geography. In the past, physical terrain, demographic characteristics, and boundaries did not play in the calculations that governed the flow of oil. However, because of the West's dependence on oil from the Persian Gulf and the politics of the Indian Ocean region, there was a growing concern over the stability of Gulf regimes and the impact of external intervention in the affairs of the states along the littoral of the north-west quadrant of the Indian Ocean. In a sense, these events gave new meaning and relevance to the theories of Mahan and Mackinder. As long as there was a requirement for the oil of the Persian Gulf states, U.S. interest in the region would continue. As long as that dependence remained, there

\textsuperscript{113} Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 444-446; see also Melvyn P. Leffler, "From the Truman Doctrine to the Carter Doctrine: Lessons and Dilemmas of the Cold War," \textit{Diplomatic History}, Fall 1983, p. 245-266.
would be a close linkage between the energy that it provided and the security consequences that it engendered.

The second factor, the growth of Soviet power and the enhanced capability to project that power beyond the borders of the Soviet Union, had invested a hitherto ignored area of the world with considerable strategic importance. Defense planners found themselves addressing questions of distance and climate as the probability of confronting Soviet forces in the region increased.\(^{114}\) Moreover, enduring geopolitical realities played a role here. There is a striking parallel between Russian expansion into central Asia in the nineteenth century and the Soviet advance into Afghanistan. To protect its borders, the Russian Empire had felt it necessary to expand, only to be confronted with resistance from new forces. Over a century after they were written, the words of Prince Gorchakov,\(^{115}\) the czarist Foreign Minister who presided over that expansion, cited at the beginning of this chapter, are indicative of this.

The third element that stimulated the recognition of geography as a factor in strategic planning was the perception that the existence of parity between the Soviet

\(^{114}\) Woolsey and Moodie, op. cit., Appendix B, p. 2.

Union and the United States at the strategic level may have lessened the utility of nuclear weapons. As a consequence, general purpose forces have assumed a new significance in the national security policy of the U.S. This fact required that geographic factors must be carefully evaluated if these forces were to be employed effectively. This element is particularly germane to the sizing of general purpose naval forces since the composition of these forces is usually estimated by specifying theaters and missions, by analyzing hypothetical but plausible naval campaigns, and by determining the number of theaters to be dealt with simultaneously. The applicability of this element, which is geographic in nature, to arms control is one that was neglected in the case of the Indian Ocean talks even though it was the driving force in the considerations of the United States that led up to the Carter Doctrine.

These geopolitical considerations affected the conduct of military operations in the Indian Ocean as well as the type and quantity of forces assigned to carry them out. This perception is not new. The shift from wood to coal and then from coal to oil, for example, each created a new geopolitical situation for the Royal Navy in the nineteenth century and generated new operational requirements as well. Then, just as in 1980, three issues loomed large in the calculations of the respective national security decision-makers. The first of these was that the focus of planning
for such operations should be on the Navy's role in a conflict or crisis in the region. While the logistics difficulties discussed earlier created problems for peacetime naval operations, those problems were not insurmountable. The third point was that to address naval operations in the region in isolation was virtually useless. The role of naval forces in the Indian Ocean was primarily to influence the situation on land. The naval environment, therefore, cannot be divorced from the land and air operations, because events in one milieu strongly influence operations in the other. Unless a planner deals strictly with sea control operations, naval operations in the Indian Ocean must be considered in conjunction with operations ashore. The air environment is equally important as well since a case can be made that the party who quickly secures control of the air in a conflict in the Persian Gulf holds the key to ultimate success.

Although the Carter Administration ignored these premises in its conduct of the Indian Ocean talks, the Carter Doctrine recognized these geopolitical realities. It is hard to find a situation in the diplomatic history of the United States wherein a policy of an administration had been so completely rejected and replaced by its exact conceptual opposite in so short a period of time.
CHAPTER X

CONCLUSIONS

The influence of geographical conditions upon human activities has depended . . . not merely on the realities as we now know them to be and have been, but in even greater degree on what men imagined in regard to them. . . .

-- Sir Halford John Mackinder (1919)

It has been suggested that President Carter's Indian Ocean arms control initiative was a cardinal maritime error. He embarked, it has been said, on a voyage into unknown waters without the requisite charts which any mariner knows he must have at hand to help him avoid the inevitable rocks and shoals. Nonetheless, the four sessions of the Indian Ocean negotiations from June 1977 until February 1978 were the first serious attempt to control naval warfare since well before World War II. The circumstances that formed the background against which this study has examined this policy change--the Zone of Peace,


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Diego Garcia and the U.S. Senate, the UNA-USA study, the Tenth Dartmouth Conference, and the events of 1978, 1979, and 1980--illustrated the range of both the political and technical problems that the Indian Ocean talks were bound to encounter. Even if the talks had continued, their background and content augured that there was a good probability that they would have bogged down in a mire of technical issues that would have turned them into a technical game wherein the substantive, political problems involved might have become lost in the play.

The Background

The Zone of Peace did not contribute anything to the success of the talks. It was a proposal that was devoid of rigorous definition and measures of limitations; it cost nothing to support, or at least express sympathy with, and was loaded with emotionalism. Its principles meant different things to different people and some of its supporters in the U.N., such as Australia, evinced no problems whatsoever in living with what appeared to be conflicting preferences.² As a policy issue per se, it had become one of the accepted elements to which the nonaligned nations routinely subscribed. The verbiage associated with the statements of

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² See, for example, Andrew Peacock, "Opening Address to the Conference 'An Australian Dilemma: Defence and Diplomacy in the Indian Ocean'," Canberra: Australian Institute of International Affairs, November 12, 1976.
its supporters and the language of the various U.N. resolutions illustrated both the range of concepts associated with the Zone of Peace and the lack of depth of its definitional content. It was so lacking in rigor that both the United States and the USSR, in spite of the talks, declined to participate in the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee until 1979. Instead they chose to keep that body "informed" of the progress of their negotiations.

The obstacles to an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace were two in number. The first was the attitudes of the extra-regional states whose military activities were the greatest source of concern. The second was the inability of the regional states to agree on such basic matters as the geographic scope of the Zone. This point demonstrates both the range and depth of the intra-regional, interstate disputes, which attracted competition between the United States and the Soviet Union—disputes which were oftentimes shaped by geography.

The issue of the geography of the Zone of Peace reflects these perceptions. The official list of "littoral and hinterland" states of the Indian Ocean did not contain such key states as Israel and South Africa. This is incredible, from an arms control perspective, in view of the relationship of Israel to the United States and the fact that most of the South African coast fronts on the Indian Ocean. Despite Israel's declared willingness to participate
in the proceedings of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, both South Africa and Israel were excluded from the discussions entirely for political reasons. This decision calls into question the efficacy of the Zone of Peace proceedings as well as the ultimate validity of any possible agreement on the Zone of Peace. Moreover, the U.S. and the USSR, as a result of their interests, steadily increased their presence in the region. Because of this heightened perception of interests and values and the associated military activity that accompanied it, any substantive progress on the Zone of Peace was not possible. However, had the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace been pursued seriously rather than as a forum for local and superpower diatribes against each other, it may well have demonstrated that the Indian Ocean could not be isolated from the broader, global context of the national security interests of the United States and the Soviet Union as well as those of the littoral and hinterland states.

The debate in the Senate opposing the construction on Diego Garcia was deceptive when examined in terms of naval arms control. It was principally a manifestation of the resurgent congressional interest in the formulation of foreign policy. Its main objective was to challenge the doctrine that the President was the sole representative in matters of foreign policy. The dominant issue was not the expansion of a naval support facility on a small coral atoll
in the British Indian Ocean Territory but rather a challenge to the structure in which U.S. national security policy for the Indian Ocean region was being formulated. Although the War Powers Act of 1973 was perhaps the pinnacle of this debate, it continued with concern by some over Carter's withdrawal of recognition from Taiwan and Reagan's views on the two China issue. What this suggests is that naval arms control was used as the case to prove the point. It was a lever on the larger question of policy formulation and its use may have been based on a less than clear appreciation of all the problems involved.

Although generated by honest concerns for decreasing the potential for conflict between the superpowers, the members of Congress who supported negotiations on the Indian Ocean did so with a myopic view of the world. They refused to acknowledge that, despite U.S. disengagement from Vietnam, crises and conflicts would continue to be part and parcel of the international system and that, in such cases in the Indian Ocean, distance would accentuate the United States' inability to achieve escalation dominance. If they believed that crises created a situation with a dangerously high probability of war, then it is difficult to understand how they refused to recognize that escalation dominance was a desirable capability to have in resolving a confrontation.
U.S. inability to check Soviet gains in Angola, Mozambique, and Yemen demonstrated a lack of ability and will to discipline Soviet behavior on the periphery. This was not only a question of political will. It was also a question of location. The events of 1978 through 1980 in the Indian Ocean also demonstrated this factor of conflict. Moreover, they suggest that the force required by either of the parties in such a crisis situation is directly proportional to the distance between those forces' normal bases and theater of operations. Moreover, the forces available tend to be inversely proportional to the distance. Therefore, distance in a purely physical, geographic sense serves as a modifying factor, and perhaps as an equalizer, in the application of escalation dominance in a crisis situation. Hence, any arms control agreement for the Indian Ocean had to take this into consideration.

Because of its positional advantage the Soviet Union could exert more pressure than ever before in its history on the Northern Tier and the region in general because of its role in Afghanistan, its ability to use the former Royal Navy base in Aden, and its presence in Ethiopia. In a world where the evaluation of intent versus capability was becoming increasingly less clear, the recognition of naval parity with the Soviet Union and the inference of a Soviet sphere of influence that accompanied it could very well have intimidated the states of the region and caused their
leadership to question just how much and what type of pressure the Soviets might be willing to exert in any future test. Continuation of the Indian Ocean talks could only have exacerbated this perception and could very well have been interpreted as U.S. intent to withdraw from the region and leave the Soviet Union as the sole remaining manager of conflict within the framework of detente. Just as the recognition of strategic parity may have altered the international system, the recognition of naval parity in the Indian Ocean could have had a similar effect on the regional sub-system.

The association of several of Carter's key policy level officials with the Dartmouth Conference of 1976 and the UNA-USA study in November of that same year prove that Carter and his associates were sincerely searching for a new and broader based approach to the role of arms control in the superpower relationship. However, there are a number of other plausible explanations for Carter's 1977 initiative on the Indian Ocean.

The first is that it institutionalized, in a sense, an already existing politico-military situation. In 1977 there was no imminent danger of a maritime competition in the Indian Ocean between the United States and the USSR. By casting the negotiations in a bilateral forum, the U.S. and the Soviet Union regained control and remained the principals in the talks. This tactic blunted the Ad Hoc
Committee's approach to move talks on the Indian Ocean to a multilateral basis yet still satisfied those states which wanted progress on the talks.

A second, and closely related, explanation was that the talks served to counter Soviet rhetoric in the Third World that the United States was not really interested in the process of arms control and disarmament. Moreover, the talks served to give both form and substance to Carter's hope for improving relations with the Third World while, at the same time, serving as a tacit signal to the Soviet leadership that the superpower relationship in the Third World could be handled differently. Carter honestly believed that reasonable men could solve problems that were central to their relationship, such as SALT II, by opening a dialogue on problems, such as Indian Ocean naval arms control, which were only marginal to the central balance.  

Carter, more than any other American president who has had to contend with this problem, believed deeply in the importance of dialogue and mutual accommodation between the United States and the Soviet Union on fundamental issues of peace and international security. He was truly prepared to walk the second mile in pursuit of nonviolent solutions to

3. Vance.
issues of East-West competition.\textsuperscript{4} Perhaps this commitment caused Carter and his advisors to operate at first under the assumption that, because arms control could lead to a reduction in superpower tension, it would necessarily do so. Carter's first statement on "demilitarizing" the Indian Ocean also reflected his belief that progress on issues of lesser concern in the superpower relationship would lead to progress in issues that were central to that relationship. In both cases, the end result, or at least the first step in that process, would be disarmament. The means that Carter saw to these ends was technical arms control. In the case of the Indian Ocean, it was technical arms control in a regional context.

Carter's convictions were symptomatic of what was, in many ways, a backlash against the tradition of Realpolitik of Nixon and Kissinger. Carter tried to shift the emphasis of U.S. foreign and national security policy from one grounded in power to one based on morality. The shift from an overriding concern for East-West detente to Carter's addition of North-South cooperation to U.S. policy was indicative of this. His desire to establish grassroots contacts between ordinary American citizens and their counterparts overseas was also distinctive in this regard. His emphasis on human rights and his deep, personal commitment

\textsuperscript{4} Sick, op. cit., p. 73.
to non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament also indicated this. Perhaps Carter viewed the Indian Ocean talks as the first step in his goal of moving from arms control to disarmament.

Yet, less than one year after Carter's proposal, the United States refused to reschedule any more rounds of talks. Less than two years after the initial proposal, the United States was looking for ways to enhance its presence in the Indian Ocean. Three years after the March 1977 announcement, the Carter Doctrine had been proclaimed and the United States Navy was allocating more of its resources to the Indian Ocean than ever before. This trend reflected a conflict between Carter's commitment to disarmament and his recognition that power did play a role in the superpower relationship. This dilemma, and it was a dilemma for Carter, is another case of the juxtaposition between interest and ideals in the formulation of foreign and national security policy. If the Indian Ocean case was typical, then long-term interests as articulated by the state dominated the state's policy. However, to reject the idea that ideals and moral values contributed to the formulation of these interests was to reject a portion of the intellectual process by which strategy and policy are made. Yet, despite this, Carter chose interests over his ideals in the end. The Indian Ocean talks were a case in point of what Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., has called "the tension between experiment
and ideology ... in the American experience in world affairs.\textsuperscript{5}

\textbf{The Issues}

Carter's principal strategic problem in the Indian Ocean was the disjunction of U.S. interests and military power. Historically, the presence of vital interests unattended by sufficient military power to protect them has been a standing invitation to adventurism. It is difficult to believe that this mismatch escaped the attention of the Soviet Union. This raises an interesting question regarding Soviet national security policy. Were the Soviet actions in Ethiopia, Aden, and Afghanistan part of some master plan or were they simply an exercise in taking advantage of an opportunity? Perhaps the two were not mutually exclusive since broad geopolitical and geostrategic considerations may have come to the fore in Soviet considerations of a region marked by uncertainty, insecurity, and instability.

Once Carter chose to explore the possibility of negotiating with the Soviet Union on the Indian Ocean, geography became a determining factor. The Indian Ocean was a naval theater. Its overwhelming feature was its distance from the United States. These two elements dictated that the talks would focus on the superpowers' navies since only these

\textsuperscript{5} Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Foreign Policy and the American Character," \textit{Foreign Affairs}, Fall 1983, p. 2.
forces could provide the access and operational endurance required to support policy across such a broad reach of geography. Therefore, distance shaped the fundamental issues of the talks. However, the events in Iran, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa ultimately caused Carter to question his decision to limit the agenda of the talks to forces afloat. This in turn demonstrated a lack of appreciation for the finer points of the relationship of a state's power to the geography in which that power must function and suggested that the role of geography in the strategic and policy calculations of the United States required a more informed and sophisticated appreciation.

Bases were important because a naval force operating thousands of miles from its support infrastructure required a well developed and integrated system of forward bases, replenishment sites and repair facilities. The general purpose forces were relevant because the U.S. had traditionally employed such forces as symbolic of raw, yet relevant, power whose deployment best supported U.S. interests. The general purpose forces, and especially the carrier battle group, had the sustainability and mobility that could expand the radius of U.S. influence ashore while securing the sea.

The issue of bases suggests that location once again may have entered into the national security calculus of the superpowers much more so than it had in the past. Diego
Garcia, Berbera, and Aden demonstrated that, when there was no substitute for their capabilities, national interests took on a situational character. Berbera was important to the Soviet Union as long as bases in Ethiopia were not available as an alternative option. Once that option was available to the Soviet Union, Berbera and Somalia were expendable. Oman, Kenya, and Somalia took on an importance in U.S. national security policy that was hitherto unknown. The islands of the Indian Ocean such as Diego Garcia, Gan, and Masirah took on the same enhanced value.

Thus it seems that, at least in the case of the Indian Ocean Naval Arms Limitation Talks, the issue of bases, whether they were wholly owned by a state or simply a subject for negotiation for access, demonstrated a return to Mahan's international value system that placed a substantial emphasis on geography in the strategic considerations of states. The locations cited in the preceding paragraph were permanent features of the geography of the Indian Ocean. However, their importance rose and fell according to who controlled them in the context of the superpower competition in the region.

The distance from the Indian Ocean to the southern border of the USSR and the fact that physical distance constrained the Soviet Navy from operating there much as it did the U.S. Navy made the problem of SSBN operations an element of concern in the talks. Faced by a technological
disadvantage in anti-submarine warfare as well as no apparent way to defend against the threat, the Soviet Union had to try to raise the issue of U.S. SSBN's operating in the Indian Ocean in the talks.

Perhaps no other issue in the talks demonstrated the problems of relative advantage as did the question of strategic warfare in the Indian Ocean. The factors of geography and technology combined to give the United States a decided advantage at the time of the talks. U.S. SSBN's operating in the Indian Ocean could execute a strategic strike against the Soviet Union. However, Soviet SSBN's operating from the same region could not strike the continental United States. This relative advantage dictated that the issue would ultimately not be negotiable. When the Soviet Union raised the issue it introduced a new facet into the dialogue on U.S.-Soviet arms control. By introducing a weapons system that was central to the strategic balance and which the superpowers had previously addressed only in the functional, mission oriented SALT forum, the Soviet Union tried to address a strategic issue in what was essentially a conventional arms control forum. By so doing it complicated not only the forum for the negotiations but also the possible outcome of those negotiations.

What this suggests is that the association of geography and technology will make it difficult at best to separate the superpowers' central, strategic relationship from the
various regional concerns of their national security policy. The problems of the Soviet BACKFIRE bomber and the U.S. cruise missile in SALT II and now the issue of the Soviet SS-20 missiles and the U.S. PERSHING II and cruise missiles are additional examples. The Indian Ocean talks demonstrated that consideration of a central strategic system can have substantial consequences for a theater military balance and that a relative advantage held by one side will not be easily bargained away.

The Indian Ocean negotiations brought to the fore the theorem that arms control agreements must take into account the interests of allies and that the substance of any agreement must be generally acceptable to allies. The Indian Ocean talks highlighted this perception especially with respect to Australia. The level of Australian interest in the talks demonstrated that an arms control agreement that may be conducive to a more stable superpower relationship can be counterproductive to longstanding alliance relationships. Australia was genuinely concerned that the talks would institutionalize U.S.-Soviet naval parity in the Indian Ocean which, in turn, would ultimately reduce the linkage of the United States with the defense of Australia. Carter and Vance went to great lengths to reassure Fraser and Peacock in this regard. The net result of this give and take demonstrated that no member of a politico-military alliance who places value on the alliance's continued
existence can initiate independent actions of an arms control nature which are not generally acceptable to its allies.

The subject of alliances also illustrated other classic elements of alliance diplomacy. It has been suggested that the U.S.-Soviet competition after World War II may have caused international politics to become an extension of war by other means. Perhaps no single feature of this competition demonstrated this mutation of the Clausewitzian dictum than the alliances which evolved as a dominant part of the superpower Cold War strategy. The principal goals of this strategy were to retain the allegiance of one's own allies, weaken the adversary's coalition, and win the support of the non-aligned nations—all elements of both the U.S. and Soviet strategies for NALT. However, the Soviet Union stood to gain more in this regard by pursuing Indian Ocean arms control since such a tactic would certainly win favor with India, its principal friend in the region. Moreover, if the United States chose to accede to some form of agreement, its principal coalitions capable of influencing events in the region, NATO and ANZUS, would have been weakened.

Perhaps the quintessential aspect of classical alliances is the purpose for which they were formed—the conduct of or preparation for war. Indeed, this partnership for war has been the fundamental index of the performance of
alliances and their members. The alliances of the Napoleonic Wars and World War I are perhaps the prime examples of this ingredient of traditional alliance politics. Yet it has been this aspect of alliances that eventually caused their disintegration. NATO was not interested in preparing for war, or even crisis management, in the Indian Ocean. Perhaps the Soviet Union took this into consideration in its NALT calculations and recognized that in either the case described above or in the issue of preparing for war, it stood a chance of weakening the Western alliances.

The events in the aftermath of the negotiations demonstrate another factor of alliance politics in U.S. national security policy--the problem of globalism versus regionalism. The United States was a nation with global interests as well as global commitments. Its partners in NATO and ANZUS, on the other hand, had global economic interests but only regional military commitments and capabilities. The disjuncture in this fact of alliance politics with respect to the Indian Ocean suggests a relationship between globalism, regionalism, and the strategic quality of the sea.

The importance of the sea comes from the access it provides to the land. If this is so, the function of navies is to secure such use when it is to a state's advantage and to prevent such use when it is to the state's disadvantage.
Such interests can be positive or negative depending on the outlook of the state. The positive aspect of the use of the sea lies predominantly in the carriage of seaborne trade while its negative element is the denial of the use of the sea for this purpose as well as the projection of force ashore. NATO's nations were predominantly interested in the positive aspect of the Indian Ocean but did not have the military capability or the political will to fund and deploy forces to support that interest. Hence they relied on the United States to take up this portion of their national security.

Much like the issue of the cruise missile, NATO and ANZUS wanted a voice in the U.S. position on NALT but were concerned that the talks might lessen the U.S. commitment to keeping the Indian Ocean lines of communication open. In other words, NATO did not want the U.S. to bargain away its naval capability in the Indian Ocean nor did it want to provoke the idea of creating a naval force that would operate outside the NATO tactical area of operations to offset this shortfall. In short, NATO's regionalism dominated its global concerns.

As a policy, NALT implied that it was both cheaper and more desirable to negotiate a mutual restraint on presence in the Indian Ocean than to compete with the Soviet Union there. The context in which this study discussed the issues of the talks tends to confirm this perception. Carter's
willingness to pursue a form of regional, general purpose naval parity would not only have directly affected the naval balance but would also have legitimized a sphere of influence for the USSR in the region. Moreover, any agreement, especially when signed by the heads of state and attended by worldwide publicity, would have resulted in the widespread perception that, in the Indian Ocean at least, the U.S. and Soviet navies were equal in capabilities. In fact, the U.S. Navy could have achieved an edge in war-fighting in that region. It is, therefore, difficult to identify a real quid pro quo for the United States in the Indian Ocean talks; indeed it is difficult to determine any measurable advantage that would have accrued to the U.S.

The foregoing does not challenge the fact that arms control is a valid alternative to the use of force, but it does suggest that it is not the only way to enhance U.S. national security. Arms control by itself cannot reverse the trend of Soviet military growth and the influence it exerts. In any case, naval arms control could only have contributed in a limited manner to the situation because the United States had relatively little margin of global conventional maritime safety remaining at the time of the talks. The key issue was the effect which the acceptance of limitations on general purpose forces would have played in the overall balance of power in the Indian Ocean. Power projection was crucial to U.S. interests in the region. It was
principally this consideration which made such limitations so unattractive for the U.S. In considering the power projection balance, the role of air power—a factor which gave the Soviet Union a decided advantage especially since it could overfly all the countries between its domestic bases and the Persian Gulf—could not be ignored. The Navy's carrier-based air was the only means available to the U.S. to counter this threat.

Although it has often been argued that air power has revolutionized the naval environment, the most potent offensive naval system is the attack carrier with its mix of aircraft. Nevertheless, improved land-base tactical air power has complicated the projection of naval power against the shore while maritime reconnaissance has been improved by the introduction of even more capable reconnaissance aircraft and satellites. This suggests that any conceptual distinction, as in the case of the Indian Ocean talks, between the dominance of sea power over land or air power in the region was fictitious and indeed misleading.

Because the maritime environment cannot be separated from the land and air milieu, land, air, and naval forces have to complement each other. The public record of the Indian Ocean talks suggests that the Carter Administration ignored the criteria of complementarity and attempted to isolate the naval forces of the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean from their land and air counterparts at the cost of
working the same disadvantage on U.S. naval forces in the region.

The talks were unable to resolve this most basic of force asymmetries—an asymmetry that was generated in the main by geography. The Carter Doctrine symbolized this failure of arms control to resolve this asymmetry. Moreover, the Carter Doctrine, much like the other presidential doctrines in American history such as those of Monroe and Truman, addressed itself to a geographic area.

For the U.S. to have foregone superior naval capabilities in favor of a negotiated semblance of naval parity, it must have gained an offsetting advantage in some other sphere of Soviet-American interaction. What the linkage was is not clear. While Carter stressed that arms control was not linked to other issues, his suspension of the Indian Ocean talks in disapproval of Soviet actions in Ethiopia demonstrated that at least this arms control forum had a linkage formulation.

The question is: linked to what? The most apparent link was a U.S. willingness to forego its war-fighting edge in the region in return for less Soviet military assistance and political meddling in Africa. A written contract to that effect would have been technically and politically impossible. There could be no verification of Soviet compliance in a gentlemen’s agreement to forebear in African or Mideast politics. Indian Ocean arms control for the sake of
such political linkage was unwise and unworkable. Moreover, if arms control was independent of the environment, then the controls should have pertained in times of crises as well as in times of relative tranquility. The 1978 Ethiopian and Iranian crises as well as the events of Afghanistan demonstrate that naval arms control in the Indian Ocean was a subject totally dependent on the environment. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union placed other objectives ahead of NALT. This suggests that their navies were a subject most fit for negotiations when they were not needed. Moreover, both sides demanded escape clauses to any agreement so that in a crisis each could have employed its navy as it wished.

These actions, when coupled with the decision in February 1978 not to continue with the talks, suggest that the strategy of linkage politics was very much an option of the Carter Administration despite repeated statements to the contrary. This in turn suggests that there was some question as to the real utility of Indian Ocean NALT. If NALT was to be pursued on its own merits, then why, other than as a tactic, was it linked to Soviet behavior in Africa when no successful linkage was achieved in SALT II until January 1980 despite the efforts of both Kissinger and Brzezinski? This tends to cast some doubt on the intrinsic validity and merit of the objectives of the Indian Ocean negotiations.
Arms Control, Geography, and National Security Policy

Because arms control is first and foremost a political process, the framework of any arms control negotiation is political. One of the principal, if not dominant, considerations that must be addressed in formulating the political structure of such negotiations is the impact that they could have on a state's power vis-à-vis its negotiating adversary. The historic struggle for power among nations and peoples cannot be interpreted without the help of geography because geopolitical considerations, in their broadest sense, have been the cause of most wars. Geography has been an integral part in the planning and execution of war on land as well as at sea. Indeed, as Will and Ariel Durant have observed, geography is the matrix of history. It is no less important today to the effective planning of a state's arms control strategy because geographic factors may tend to drive the issue of what systems are appropriate for a specific set of negotiations.

Because there is a strong relationship between this power equation and the geographic circumstances in which states find themselves, geography should be high among those elements that enter into the formulation of the political context of arms control negotiations. How then did

geography operate on Carter's perceptions of the Indian Ocean?

Perhaps Carter and his associates did not recognize that the Indian Ocean was emerging as the third geostrategic region that Cohen had forecast in the early 1960's. Although the region lacked both social, cultural, and political cohesion and both real and potential political instability were present at the time of the talks, there was a certain coherence developing in the region that gave meaning to Cohen's definition of a geostrategic region.

The resources of the region and the sea lines of communication that carried those resources between what Cohen called the "trade dependent maritime world" and "the Eurasian continental world" lent an element of strategic coherence to the Indian Ocean and its littoral. One resource of the region--oil--was vital enough to have a global influence. Moreover, the changing patterns of superpower access to overseas bases and the growing economic interdependence of the world added to the Indian Ocean's emergence as a new geostrategic region—a region that was more maritime than continental. It was in fact becoming a single feature region in the sense that the Indian Ocean was the unifying feature that enabled power to be applied to the region. In short, the region was moving from one that was tactical in the considerations of the United States and the
Soviet Union to one that was part and parcel of the central balance between the two superpowers.

Perhaps Carter believed that the region was a geopolitical one rather than a geostrategic entity and that arms control was a possible technique to govern the superpower relationship in the Indian Ocean. What he ignored was the fact that geography influenced, and oftentimes governed, the range of policy options that a nation could exercise since the regional setting, especially in a state with global interests, sets the framework for its international behavior. The net result of such a perception is complicated even more when the state that holds it cannot match its global interests with the global politico-military capability to support those interests. Carter's misperception of the Indian Ocean is a good case for Mackinder's prescription at the beginning of this chapter. The Carter Doctrine and the actions of the Reagan Administration represent a reordering of American "mental maps" of the region. One can surmise that this reordering recognized the need to address the Indian Ocean region, particularly Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf, as a geostrategic entity that could not be separated from the global issues confronting the U.S. The implications of such a decision are clearly geographic in nature.

Finally, the Indian Ocean naval arms limitation talks violated a seemingly irrefutable theorem of arms control.
Because arms control must be related to deterrence theory, national security must be the independent variable. The form and the substance that any arms control negotiations assume are the dependent variable in the equation that relates arms control to national security. In practice, an Indian Ocean agreement would have constrained U.S. response options more than those of the Soviet Union in either a regional or global crisis or warfighting situation. The talks were not able to resolve the asymmetries that characterized the U.S. and Soviet force presence in the region. This failure and the aftermath of the talks suggest that the imperatives of flexibility and control in the realm of conflict at points of confrontation between the U.S. and the USSR pose serious problems for arms control. Moreover, the talks attempted to isolate the Indian Ocean from the broader global context of the superpower relationship—a premise that proved to be both impractical and imprudent. By separating the Indian Ocean from its littoral, Carter lost sight of a time-tested premise of strategy and policy. Navies in war and crises have been primarily used to support and otherwise further a state's interests ashore. Lacking any ground or air capabilities in the Indian Ocean, the United States depended on its Navy to exert political influence, control crises, apply pressure when necessary, and project power if required. The Indian Ocean talks ignored this principle and tried to separate the Indian
Ocean from its littoral. Thus, the Soviet Union would have been free to operate outside the structure of such an agreement to maximize its influence and presence in Africa and Southwest Asia without concern.

The entire aura surrounding these talks suggests that they were an adjunct to the Carter Administration's principal national security objective—the successful conclusion of SALT II. When push came to shove in the Indian Ocean, Carter abandoned them. Their worth as a dependent variable did not enhance U.S. national security. Of all the arms control negotiations in which the United States has been involved in recent years, NALT was among the most ill-conceived and executed. The general lack of appreciation of the importance of the Indian Ocean as a geostrategic region to the West and the United States as well as the attempt to decouple the region from a comprehensive global setting created an untenable political situation that was to boomerang and cause Carter to reverse course. In short, the Indian Ocean had moved from a zone of peace in 1970 to an arc of crisis in 1979.
APPENDIX A

DECLARATION OF THE INDIAN OCEAN
AS A ZONE OF PEACE
APPENDIX A

2832 (XXVI). Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

The General Assembly

Conscious of the determination of the peoples of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to preserve their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to resolve their political, economic and social problems under conditions of peace and tranquillity.

Recalling the Declaration of the Third Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Lusaka from 8 to 10 September 1970, calling upon all States to consider and respect the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace from which Great Power rivalries and competition as well as bases conceived in the context of such rivalries and competition should be excluded, and declaring that the area should also be free of nuclear weapons.

Convinced of the desirability of ensuring the maintenance of such conditions in the Indian Ocean area by means other than military alliances, as such alliances entail financial and other obligations that call for the diversion
of the limited resources of the States of the area from the more compelling and productive task of economic and social reconstruction and could further involve them in the rivalries of power blocs in a manner prejudicial to their independence and freedom of action, thereby increasing international tensions.

Concerned at recent developments that portend the extension of the arms race into the Indian Ocean area, thereby posing a serious threat to the maintenance of such conditions in the area.

Convinced that the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean would contribute toward arresting such developments, relaxing international tensions and strengthening international peace and security.

Convinced further that the establishment of a zone of peace in an extensive geographical area in one region could have beneficial influence on the establishment of permanent universal peace based upon equal rights and justice for all, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

1. Solemnly declares that the Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined, together with the air space above and the ocean floor subjacent thereto, is hereby designated for all time a zone of peace;
2. **Calls upon** the Great Powers, in conformity with this Declaration, to enter into immediate consultations with the littoral States of the Indian Ocean with a view to:

(a) Halt in the further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean;

(b) Eliminating from the Indian Ocean all bases, military installations, and logistical supply facilities, the disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of Great Power military presence in the Indian Ocean conceived the context of Great Power rivalry;

3. **Calls upon** the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, the permanent members of the Security Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, in pursuit of the objectives of establishing a system of universal collective security without military alliances and strengthening international security through regional and other cooperation, to enter into consultations with a view to the implementation of this Declaration and such action as may be necessary to ensure that:
(a) Warships and military aircraft may not use the Indian Ocean for any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of any littoral or hinterland State of the Indian Ocean in contravention of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;
(b) Subject to the foregoing and to the norms and principles of international law, the right to free and unimpeded use of the zone by vessels of all nations is unaffected;
(c) Appropriate arrangements are made to give effect to any international agreement that may ultimately be reached for the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session on the progress that has been made with regard to the implementation of this declaration.
APPENDIX B

INDIAN OCEAN ZONE OF PEACE VOTING RECORD
THROUGH 1976
APPENDIX B

INDIAN OCEAN ZONE OF PEACE VOTING RECORD

THROUGH 1976

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1. 1976 was chosen because U.S.-USSR Indian Ocean NALT commenced the following year - 1977.

2. The states chosen are either littoral or island nations of the Indian Ocean region or considered to be "Great Powers."
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Voting Legend:  
- Y - Voted in favor of U.N. resolution  
- N - Voted against U.N. resolution  
- A - Abstained  
- X - Indicates that the nation was either not in attendance or did not vote or in the case of South Africa has not participated in the forum of the General Assembly.
APPENDIX C

U.S.-SOVIET BILATERAL ARMS CONTROL WORKING GROUPS
### Appendix C

#### U.S.-Soviet Bilateral Arms Control Working Groups

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**Sources:** Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Says Moscow Threatens to Quit Talks on Missiles," *The New York Times*, October 12, 1983, p. 1:6; U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East,
APPENDIX D

SOVIET SHIP-DAYS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
1970-1979

The data contained in this appendix was derived from the following sources:

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APPENDIX E

U.S. SHIP-DAYS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
1970-1979

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<td>0</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>970</td>
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<td>1246</td>
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APPENDIX F

AGREEMENT RELATING TO OPERATIONS
OF
UNITED STATES MILITARY FLIGHTS THROUGH
RAAF BASE DARWIN
AGREEMENT RELATING TO OPERATIONS
OF
UNITED STATES MILITARY FLIGHTS THROUGH
RAAF BASE DARWIN

The Department of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and has the honour to refer to recent discussions between representatives of the two Governments concerning the proposal by the United States for the staging of United States Air Force B52 aircraft and associated KC135 tanker aircraft through Royal Australian Air Force Base Darwin, and the terms under which the proposed operations might proceed.

Subject to the terms and conditions specified below, the Government of Australia agrees to USAF use of RAAF Base Darwin for these staging operations:

(I) The B52 staging operations shall be for sea surveillance in the Indian Ocean area and for navigation training purposes. The agreement of the Government of Australia shall be obtained before the facilities are used in support of any other category of operations.
(II) The operations shall consist of periodic deployments through Darwin of up to three B52 and six KC135 aircraft, supported by about 100 USAF personnel and associated equipment. En route to or from Darwin the B52s may conduct low-level navigation training over Australia on the basis of the arrangements announced by the Australian Minister for Defence on 3 February 1980.

(III) Staging may include the stationing at RAAF Base Darwin of some US support personnel and equipment if requested. The support personnel would remain under US command and the RAAF would provide mutually agreed levels of logistic and administrative support. The Status of Forces Agreement of 9 May 1963 would apply.

(IV) Irrespective of financial arrangements agreed between the two Governments, RAAF Base Darwin shall remain an Australian facility under Australian control. No circumstances arising from this Agreement shall affect the title of the Government of Australia to the relevant land, or the pre-existing authority of the Government of Australia in the use of RAAF Base Darwin.

(V) Arrangements shall be made for consultations to ensure that the Government of Australia has full and timely information about strategic and operational
developments relevant to B-52 staging operations through Australia.

(VI) In considering whether to agree to any request for alteration of the terms of this Agreement the Government of Australia shall give weight to its international commitments and policies relating inter alia to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to Australia's commitments under the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America signed at San Francisco on 1 September 1951, to the common objective of deterrence of Soviet military expansion and to its understanding of US strategic and operational policies and activities as derived from the consultations under sub-paragraph VII above.

The Department of Foreign Affairs has the honour to propose that, if these terms and conditions are acceptable to the Government of the United States of America, this Note, together with the Embassy's reply, shall constitute an agreement between the two Governments. The Department further proposes that the Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the Embassy's reply and that it shall continue in force until terminated on one year's notice in writing by either Government.
The Department of Foreign Affairs takes this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the United States of America the assurances of its highest consideration.

Canberra, ACT

11 March 1981

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 38

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Department of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to acknowledge receipt of the Department's Note Number CH099032, dated March 11, 1981, concerning the proposal for the staging of United States Air Force B-52 aircraft and associated KC-135 tanker aircraft through Royal Australian Air Force Base Darwin and the terms under which the proposed operations might proceed.

The Government of the United States of America accepts the terms and conditions for the use of Royal Australian Air Force Base Darwin specified in the Department's Note and concurs that the Department's Note, together with the Embassy's reply, shall constitute an agreement between the two Governments effective as of the date of this Note.
The Embassy of the United States of America avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of Foreign Affairs the assurances of its highest consideration.

Embassy of the United States of America

Canberra, March 11, 1981

### GLOSSARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAW</td>
<td>Anti Air Warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>Anti-Ballistic Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACDA</td>
<td>Arms Control and Disarmament Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGF</td>
<td>Miscellaneous Command Ship</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANZUS</td>
<td>Australia, New Zealand, and the United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOE</td>
<td>Fast Combat Support Ship</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARG</td>
<td>Amphibious Ready Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>AN-12 CUB</td>
<td>Soviet reconnaissance aircraft</td>
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<tr>
<td>AS</td>
<td>Submarine Tender</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>Antisubmarine Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-52</td>
<td>U.S. bomber aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BACKFIRE</td>
<td>Soviet bomber aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BADGER</td>
<td>Soviet bomber aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIOT</td>
<td>British Indian Ocean Territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBI</td>
<td>China-Burma-India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBM</td>
<td>Confidence Building Measure</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTO</td>
<td>Central Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Guided Missile Cruiser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGN</td>
<td>Nuclear Powered Guided Missile Cruiser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief, Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPACFLT</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLG</td>
<td>Guided Missile Cruiser, Light</td>
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CSCE: Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CV: Aircraft Carrier
CVA: Attack Aircraft Carrier
CVN: Nuclear Powered Aircraft Carrier
CVBG: Carrier Battle Group
D-5: Designation of Follow-on TRIDENT Missile
DCS: Defense Communications System
DD: Destroyer
DDG: Guided Missile Destroyer
DSCS: Defense Satellite Communications System
ENMOD: Environmental Modification
FBS: Forward Based Systems
FB-111: U.S. fighter-bomber aircraft
FF: Fast Frigate
FY: Fiscal Year
GAO: General Accounting Office
HMAS: Her Majesty's Australian Ship
ICBM: Inter Continental Ballistic Missile
IL-38 MAY: Soviet ASW aircraft
JAGC: Judge Advocate General's Corps
JCS: Joint Chiefs of Staff
KANGAROO: Combined exercise conducted in Australian waters
LST: Tank Landing Ship
MBFR: Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction
MEF: Middle East Force
MLSF: Mobil Logistics Support Force
MSC: Military Sealift Command
MSF: Fleet Minesweeper
NALT: Naval Arms Limitation Talks
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVCAMS WESTPAC: Naval Communications Area Master Station, Western Pacific.

NAVCOMMSTA: Naval Communications Station
NAVSUPPACT: Naval Support Activity
MSC: National Security Council
NSSM: National Security Study Memorandum
OPEC: Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OPNAV: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OSA: Soviet fast patrol boat
P-3: U.S. ASW Patrol Aircraft
PD: Presidential Directive
PDRY: People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
PRM: Presidential Review Memorandum
RAAF: Royal Australian Air Force
RAN: Royal Australian Navy
RDF: Rapid Deployment Force
RIMPAC: (Rim of the Pacific) combined exercise
SALT: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SANDGROPER I: Combined exercise conducted in Australian waters
SCC: Special Coordination Committee
SCR: Senate Concurrent Resolution
SEATO: Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SECDEF: Secretary of Defense
SLBM: Sea Launched Ballistic Missile
SR: Senate Resolution
SSBN: Nuclear Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine
SSN: Nuclear Powered Attack Submarine
STYX: Soviet Surface to Surface Cruise Missile
UH-46: U.S. Sea Knight Utility and Transport Helicopter
UNA-USA: United Nations Association of the United States of America
UNREP: Underway Replenishment
USAF: United States Air Force
USN: United States Navy
VADM: Vice Admiral
VERTREP: Vertical Replenishment
VLF: Very Low Frequency
VFWG: Verification Panel Working Group
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