MOSCOW CAMPAIGNS AGAINST WAR PROPAGANDA

Summary

On September 23, 1982, the USSR Supreme Soviet suddenly ratified the September 23, 1936, League of Nations International Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace. The convention essentially prohibits the transmission of "war propaganda" or any other information prejudicial to "good international understanding." The unexpected Soviet move, coming in the midst of a "peace" campaign against alleged US Cold War policies, may presage a new Soviet diplomatic offensive against Western radio broadcasting to the USSR and Eastern Europe.

The USSR signed the convention in 1936 with significant reservations relating to the fact that enforcement presupposed diplomatic relations between signatories, but the USSR had few diplomatic ties. The Soviets never moved to ratify the convention, although after World War II the war propaganda issue became a regular element in their arms control initiatives in UN disarmament bodies. These efforts were buttressed by 1951 Soviet domestic legislation defining the spreading of war propaganda as a "heinous crime."

Throughout the early post-war period, Moscow's definition of war propaganda, as used in the arms control context, remained relatively consistent with that expressed in the 1936 convention. By the late 1960s, however, with the emergence of politically active newly independent nations, Moscow began to expand the concept to subsume political and social issues of concern to the Third World. An alliance between the USSR and several developing nations subsequently emerged on certain communications issues. This alliance specifically
challenged Western advocacy of the free flow of information and press freedom, particularly where "propaganda against peace" was concerned.

The Soviets may have ratified the 1936 convention to revive the war propaganda theme internationally. Their goal would be to target Western radio stations--Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in particular--as well as other "subversive" Western information media as violating the convention's basic principles. In any event, Soviet claims that ratification was "timely" seem consistent with Moscow's recent propaganda attacks on RFE/RL's alleged role in the Polish crisis and bitter denunciations of an alleged US "ideological offensive" against the USSR. Moreover, such claims implicitly provide the USSR with justification for the continued jamming of Western broadcasts.

Moscow presumably calculates that because of the convention's moral and symbolic significance, Soviet exploitation of the war propaganda theme will find receptivity among developing nations, which share the USSR's contention that the international flow of information is Western dominated and should be regulated to protect "national sovereignty." Having become a full party to the agreement, the Soviets nevertheless could find themselves vulnerable to charges of violating certain of the convention's articles, specifically those calling for the verification and correction of incorrect or inaccurate broadcasts.

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Recent Trends

Moscow's campaign to outlaw war propaganda had begun as a single-issue effort to insulate the USSR (and later its East European allies) from "hostile" radio transmissions from the West. By 1970, this campaign had evolved to encompass the prohibition of religious and racial hatred, respect for national sovereignty, and the protection of public order and health—all technically peripheral to the principle of free flow of information but of considerable political interest to developing nations just entering the realm of international politics.

During the 1970s, Moscow actively solicited support from Third World nations, which increasingly found it possible to set aside political and ideological differences in order to lobby jointly for their own interests. A coalition of nonaligned nations emerged, demanding changes in what was perceived as an imbalance in the international operation of communications networks and their programming and technical and administrative functioning. The coalition activists aimed in particular to:

--counter the influence of the international mass media on their domestic cultures and traditional values;

--eliminate both their dependence on Western information systems and the growing consumer expectations from exposure to Western media; and

--enhance their own ability to disseminate information internally and abroad.

These demands, along with various other Third World and Soviet proposals, sharply politicized the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) conferences of the 1970s. By 1976, a conference of nonaligned nations called for the establishment of a "new order" for communications. They formally summarized their demands in 1978 in a document titled "The New World Information Order" (NWIO). At the 1980 UNESCO General Conference, the USSR, together with several Third World states:

--proposed an assortment of NWIO initiatives calling for legal measures to ensure that international news agencies conform to local national laws and development policies (some of these initiatives were approved in a conference resolution), and

--advocated the right by all states to rebut "inaccurate" or "malicious" reporting.

Moscow has since promoted the NWIO concept vigorously, exploiting Third World grievances to the detriment of Western interests while soliciting Third World support for the principle of noninterference in internal affairs of states and the sovereignty of states over the free flow of information.

The Soviets may well choose to surface the war propaganda issue when the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) review conference opens in Madrid November 9, 1982, in responding to Western criticism of Soviet activities vis-a-vis Poland and Afghanistan. Indeed, an October 27, 1982, Moscow Radio commentary listing alleged US violations of the Helsinki Final Act specifically mentioned US "radio calls for the overthrow of legitimate governments."

Background to the 1936 Convention

As radio developed into a global medium and the major instrument for international dissemination of information, the Soviet Union turned increasingly to broadcasting in its propagandizing to Europe and Asia. Given the relatively small number of private radio receivers in the USSR, the effects of foreign broadcasting on the Soviet population was of little concern to the regime until the Nazi propaganda campaigns of the mid- to late-1930s. That development, together with sharpening Nazi-Soviet political rivalry, provided the impetus for the USSR to seek international restraints on the flow of information by radio into the Soviet Union.

In September 1931, the League of Nations Assembly requested member states to encourage the use of broadcasting to create better understanding between peoples; the Intellectual Cooperation Organization (ICO), an educational and humanitarian agency of the League, was designated to examine the issue. The ICO in turn established an International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC), a body composed of eminent scholars whose task was to draft an appropriate international convention. By 1935, the ICIC twice had submitted a draft convention to League members and nonmember states and twice had revised it in accordance with their proffered amendments. In September 1935, the League Assembly approved a resolution to convene an Inter-Governmental Conference
for the conclusion of a "Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace." The conference was held in Geneva, September 17-23, 1936, under the presidency of Arnold Raestad, former Norwegian Foreign Minister. 2/

The resultant convention was signed on September 23, 1936, by 27 nations including Albania, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Romania, and the USSR. It was registered with the League Secretariat and entered into force April 2, 1938.

Provisions

The essential provisions of the convention prohibit the transmission of war propaganda or any broadcast likely to prejudice "good international understanding." In addition, Article 7 established an arbitration and conciliation procedure in the event of a dispute between the contracting parties as to the interpretation or application of the convention. This article provided for settlement by diplomatic negotiation or, failing that, by a reference to the Permanent Court of International Justice or to the Hague Arbitration Tribunal. The parties may also use a preliminary conciliation procedure involving recourse to the ICIC. For this purpose the ICIC would set up a special committee.

The remaining eight articles cover provisions for signature, ratification, accession, registration, entry into force, denunciation, application, and revision. (See Annex 1 for text of the convention's substantive articles.)

The Final Act of the conference included several recommendations for the extension of the scope of the convention. The conference noted that the convention itself involved no obligations "save as regards acts of manifest gravity" and did not expressly list all categories of broadcasts likely to be prejudicial to good international relations. It accordingly recommended that the contracting parties:

2/ All League member states were invited to attend, as were Brazil, Costa Rica, the Free City of Danzig, Egypt, Germany, Ireland, Japan, and the United States (all nonmembers). In all, 37 countries sent representatives: Albania, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, USSR, United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. Estonia, Latvia, and Siam sent observers. (Italy subsequently withdrew from the conference.)
take into account the influence that may be exercised by transmissions calculated to harm the interests or offend the national, political, religious, or social sentiments of other peoples;

show particular vigilance in regard to transmissions intended for foreign listeners in the latter's vernacular;

reserve time in their broadcasting programs for items calculated to promote a better knowledge of the civilization and conditions of life of other peoples;

take concerted action at times of international tension to broadcast appropriate transmissions calculated to lessen the strain and restore a peaceful atmosphere; and

lend one another support, if occasion arises, in detecting and abolishing clandestine stations.

The Final Act was signed by 29 nations including Albania, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Romania, Yugoslavia, and the USSR.

Soviet Reservations to the 1936 Convention

Article 7 of the convention calls for the "satisfactory settlement through diplomatic channels" of disputes regarding the interpretation or application of its provisions. The USSR, an international pariah in the inter-war years, had formal diplomatic relations with few states and, therefore, made its signature to the convention conditional on two reservations:

It reserved the right to apply "reciprocal measures" to any country carrying out "improper transmissions" against it, insofar as such a right existed under the general rules of international law.

It stipulated that the convention "should be regarded as not creating formal obligations" between states that did not maintain diplomatic relations. The USSR contended that such states would be unable to enforce Article 7 of the convention.

When the USSR Supreme Soviet ratified the convention, it evidently did so with these original reservations intact. (See Annex 2 for the text of the reservations.)

Rationale for Ratification

Writing in Izvestiya September 27, 1982, Soviet Doctor of History Yuriy Kashlev discussed the 1936 convention under the
headline "A Timely Theme: Radio Broadcasting in the Service of the People." According to Kashlev, ratification was "timely" because "imperialist" propaganda, notably that of the United States, used radio broadcasting "as the main instrument of 'psychological warfare' and subversive interference in the internal affairs of other nations." The volume of RFE/RL, claimed Kashlev, "exceeds by many times the volume of radio propaganda of pre-World War II Germany and Italy." He argued that the convention was consistent with the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act and in the "current international situation is more timely than at any point in the past."

Kashlev's explanation for the sudden Soviet ratification of a 46-year-old convention is consistent with recent Soviet propaganda on the alleged role of "subversive" US radio broadcasting. This has included vitriolic attacks on RFE/RL's alleged exploitation of the Polish crisis, severe criticism of the US Information Agency and "Project Truth," and repeated polemics on what Moscow alleges is a US "ideological offensive" against the USSR.

Soviet Domestic Legislation

The USSR "Law in Defense of Peace," published in Pravda on March 13, 1951, and applicable today--decrees that war propaganda is the "gravest crime against humanity" and that persons found guilty of spreading such propaganda shall be "tried as heinous criminals." Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, Moscow referred constantly to this legislation as evidence of the USSR's commitment to the cause of peace and understanding between peoples. Indeed, as late as 1961, Moscow submitted a memorandum to the UN in which it asserted that war propaganda was one of the most "heinous crimes" because it ultimately would bring death to millions. (See Annex 3 for the text of the Soviet Law.)

Postwar Initiatives

With the onset of the Cold War, the West intensified its broadcasting to the USSR and Eastern Europe significantly and also succeeded in getting UN social and economic bodies as well as other international fora to enact a number of resolutions and conventions supporting the principle of free flow of information across international borders.

Moscow sought to counter these Western initiatives by:

--proposing in UN disarmament bodies prohibitions on the international transmission of "war propaganda," as defined in the 1936 convention, usually as part of broader peace and disarmament packages that ultimately were rejected; and by
--promoting collateral action in UN social and economic bodies with somewhat more success. (Together with its allies, the USSR managed to have several UN documents drafted in these bodies include sections that it now cites in support of restricting the flow of information.)

The Disarmament Context

On September 18, 1947, at the 84th plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly (and the first UNGA session following enunciation of the Truman Doctrine), the Soviet delegation introduced a resolution on "Measures to be Taken Against Propaganda and the Inciters of a New War" as the agenda item of "greatest concern" to the USSR. The draft resolution alleged that criminal propaganda for a new war was being carried on in the US, Turkey, and Greece via the dissemination of "all types of fabrications" in the press, radio, cinema, and public speeches. It sought to have the UN declare that all governments should be called upon to prohibit war propaganda in any form "on pain of criminal penalties" and to take measures for its suppression as antisocial activity. In essence the Soviet resolution charged that:

--"reactionary circles" in a number of countries, "particularly in the United States, Greece and Turkey," were carrying on an organized campaign for war against the Soviet Union, using lies, slander, and incitement to aggression;

--this war propaganda was designed to support US military preparations; and

--US monopolies and cartels, closely linked to the German trusts before the war and subsequently engaged in reestablishing their connections, were resisting attempts to outlaw the manufacture of atomic weapons and reduce armaments generally.

After 20 days of debate over the Soviet draft, the UNGA at its 108th plenary (November 8, 1947) unanimously adopted Resolution 110 (II), which condemned "all forms of propaganda" that would "provoke or encourage" a "threat to peace" or an "act of aggression." The resolution also requested all UN members to take acts "within their constitutional limits" to "promote friendly relations among nations." (See Annex 4 for the text of Resolution 110 (II).)

On October 23, 1950, the Soviets introduced another draft resolution on the condemnation of war propaganda, this time combined with a prohibition on atomic weapons and one-third reduction of great-power forces. The resolution established what would become the standard Soviet peace and disarmament "package"
with the call for prohibiting war propaganda subsumed in a broader initiative. In contrast to the September 1947 Soviet draft resolution, this one was less bellicose in tone:

"The General Assembly condemns the propaganda in favor of a new war now being conducted in a number of countries and urges all states to prohibit such propaganda in their countries and calls those responsible to account."

The entire 1950 draft resolution was rejected by the General Assembly November 17, 1950. The UNGA did, however, pass a "Condemnation of Propaganda Against Peace" resolution that same day reaffirming previous resolutions (110 (II)) and declaring that propaganda against peace included incitement to conflicts or acts of aggression, measures tending to isolate peoples from any contact with the world, and measures tending to silence or distort UN activities in favor of peace or to prevent peoples from knowing the views of other member states.

On September 24, 1953, the Soviets introduced in the UNGA's eighth session a draft resolution titled "Measures to Avert the Threat of a New World War and to Reduce Tension in International Relations," apparently in response to Secretary of State Dulles' September 17 address to the General Assembly on limiting armaments. The Soviet resolution asked the Assembly to:

-- declare atomic, hydrogen, and other weapons of mass destruction to be "unconditionally prohibited" (by force of the declaration alone);

-- recommend to the five permanent members of the Security Council that they reduce their armed forces by one-third within a year; and

-- recommend to the Security Council that it take steps to insure the elimination of military, air, and naval bases in the territories of other states.

The Soviet draft also included a provision condemning war propaganda:

"The General Assembly condemns the propaganda which is being conducted in a number of countries with the aim of inciting enmity and hatred among nations and preparing a new world war, and calls upon all governments to take measures to put a stop to such propaganda, which is incompatible with the fundamental purposes and principles of the United Nations."

In a paragraph-by-paragraph vote November 30, the General Assembly rejected all the operative paragraphs, and the resolution as a whole was not put to a vote.
On May 10, 1955, the USSR put forward a proposal titled "Reduction of Armaments, the Prohibition of Atomic Weapons, and the Elimination of the Threat of a New War." It abandoned previous Soviet insistence on one-third across-the-board reductions and called for cessation of nuclear weapons tests as part of the prohibition of nuclear weapons. The proposal charged for the first time that the terms of Resolution 110 (II) were not being observed; that "open propaganda" for a new war was being carried on in a number of states; and that "calls to war," including atomic war, had become increasingly frequent in the press, on the radio, and in public statements with a view to "fanning" war hysteria. The first clause in the proposal dealt with war propaganda:

"The General Assembly recommends to all States to take the necessary measures to ensure scrupulous compliance with General Assembly resolution 110 (II), condemning all forms of propaganda for a new war and to put an end to all calls for war and for the kindling of hostility between peoples in the press, on the radio, in the cinema and in public statements. Non-compliance with this recommendation shall be regarded as a violation by a State of its international duty and of its obligations to the United Nations, namely, to abstain in its international relations from the threat or the use of force and not to permit violations of the territorial integrity or political independence of any state."

The proposal as a whole was never voted on by the Disarmament Subcommittee. (Soviet Premier Bulganin, at the Warsaw Conference of the Eastern European States at which the Warsaw Pact was established, reiterated the substance of this latest war propaganda clause on May 11, 1955.)

On April 30, 1957, another Soviet memorandum on "Implementation of Partial Disarmament Measures" was submitted to the UN Disarmament Subcommittee. This one called for a renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons and requested that all states concerned "make every effort" to agree to the complete prohibition of such weapons. The ninth proposed measure contained in the memorandum treated the issue of war propaganda:

"Propaganda for war and incitement to war, and especially the propaganda carried on in certain countries for the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons against certain States, are playing no small part in straining relations between States and kindling animosity and hatred between peoples.

"The resolution on the prohibition of propaganda for war, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1947, is not being observed. Only the Soviet Union and some other
States have passed legislation against propaganda for war. The absence of such legislation in other countries creates a favorable soil for fanning militarist passions and war hysteria. To ease international tensions and lessen the danger of war, appropriate measures should be taken to put an end to propaganda for war.

"It is also inadmissible that in certain States the ideological struggle is being allowed to enter into relations between States. To end a situation in which ideological disputes and differences are used as a means for straining relations between States, there is urgent need for an agreement under which States would undertake not to allow their ideological differences to enter into relations between States."

A declaration on measures for "strengthening universal peace and the security of the peoples," was appended to the Soviet memorandum and reiterated its main points. Moscow's line on "peaceful coexistence," as enunciated by Khrushchev at the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956, was reaffirmed by the declaration:

"THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THIS DECLARATION,

"Taking into account that, in spite of the General Assembly resolution adopted unanimously in 1947 condemning all forms of propaganda 'designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression', a number of States openly continue to conduct propaganda for a new war, and the incitement to war, so far from being halted, is even intensified in the press, in broadcasts, and in public statements, with a particular preponderance in recent times of appeals for atomic war,...

"Assume an obligation to take the necessary measures to put an end to incitement to war and to all forms of war propaganda intended or likely to provoke or encourage a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression; and

"To found their relations with all the countries of the world on the principle of peaceful coexistence of States irrespective of their social systems, and to take in accordance with this principle appropriate measures to prevent ideological conflict from entering into relations between States."

On August 25, 1957, Soviet Ambassador to the UN Valerian Zorin again addressed the issue of war propaganda in a statement
criticizing the UN Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee for lack of progress on "ending" the arms race:

"The Soviet Government considers that attention must now be devoted to the implementation of measures which would contribute towards the easing of international tension, would promote cooperation among States and the development of economic and cultural links, and would help to do away with commercial discrimination. The prohibition of war propaganda, particularly of propaganda regarding the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons against particular countries, could do much to improve relations among States. The resolution prohibiting war propaganda adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1947 is not being carried out. Laws prohibiting war propaganda have been passed only in the Soviet Union and in a few other countries. The absence of such laws in the other countries leaves the field clear for the dissemination of militaristic moods, enmity and hatred among peoples. Suitable measures to put a stop to war propaganda are called for in order to ease international tension and lessen the threat of war."

On September 20, 1957, just 10 days before the Disarmament Commission was to meet to prepare its annual report to the General Assembly and Security Council, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko submitted a new Soviet memorandum on "Partial Measures in the Field of Disarmament." Essentially a restatement of the April 30 proposals, the memorandum inter alia specifically called on "certain states" to enact legislation, as the USSR had done, to prohibit war propaganda:

"In the Soviet Government's proposals for partial measures in the field of disarmament submitted for the consideration of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, it was stated that the war propaganda and incitement to war conducted in certain countries, especially propaganda for the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons against any given State, plays an important part in aggravating international relations and spreading hostility and hatred among nations. In those proposals, the attention of countries represented in the Sub-Committee was drawn to the non-observance by certain States of the General Assembly resolution of 1947 on the prohibition of war propaganda and also to the fact that the absence of legislation against war propaganda in many countries creates favorable conditions for the fomenting of militaristic attitudes and a war psychosis.

"Unfortunately, the countries represented in the Sub-Committee disregarded the Soviet Government's proposals
on this subject, and unbridled war propaganda is still being conducted in those countries and in a number of others.

"And yet the cessation of war propaganda, including propaganda for atomic war, might play a considerable part in improving relations between States and relaxing international tensions.

"The Soviet Government considers that war propaganda must be brought to an end, by the enactment of appropriate legislation in certain States, as has been done in the Soviet Union and other countries, and by adopting other measures for the prevention of such propaganda."

Soviet Premier Bulganin, in a letter to President Eisenhower on December 10, 1957, also picked up the war propaganda theme:

"The last ten years have been characterized by the policy of 'a position of strength' and 'cold war' proclaimed by certain circles in the West.

"During all these years the minds of men in the West have been poisoned by intensive propaganda, which, day after day, has implanted the thought of the inevitability of a new war and the necessity of intensified preparations for war. This propaganda for war, which contributed not a little toward aggravating the international situation and undermining confidence in the relations between states, is one of the chief elements of the policy of 'a position of strength.'

"Today the entire world is witness to the fact that this policy has not produced any positive results, even for those powers which have for such a long time and so insistently been following it, and which have confronted mankind with the threat of a new war, the terrible consequences of which would exceed anything that can be pictured by the human imagination.

"It is not by accident that the voices in the world which call for an end to propaganda for war, an end to the 'cold war', an end to the unrestrained armaments race and an entry upon the path of peaceful coexistence of all states are becoming louder and louder. The idea of peaceful coexistence is becoming more and more an imperative demand of the historical moment through which we are passing."

On May 5, 1958, the Soviet delegation to the UN introduced a memorandum titled "Proposals as to Questions to be Considered at the Conference with Participation of the Heads of Government." The document was a followup to a January 8, 1958, Soviet proposal
for a high-level conference of top government officials, together with the participation of heads of government, to "discuss issues the settlement of which would promote the easing of international tension and the creation of trust in relations between states." The May 5 memorandum reiterated the call for a summit meeting and proposed several topics of discussion, among them the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests, creation in central Europe of an atomic-free zone, and the cessation of propaganda "for war, hostility and hatred between peoples."

"Notwithstanding the fact that ten years have already passed since the adoption in October 1947 of the resolution of the UN General Assembly on the banning of propaganda for war, this unanimous resolution of the Assembly is not being implemented in a number of countries. The idea of inevitability of a new war is being continually suggested to the peoples of these countries in the press, by radio and television, and by other means; the necessity of a race in nuclear armaments and of a further increase in military budgets and taxes on the population is being urged.

"There is no doubt that, with good will and a mutual desire on the part of all participants in the summit conference, it would not be difficult to reach an understanding on the question of ceasing propaganda for war and carrying on instead a propaganda for friendship among peoples.

"A settlement of this question could be achieved by means of the adoption of a joint declaration whereby the governments participating in the conference would confirm their intention to carry out faithfully the resolution of the UN General Assembly of October 1947 on the banning of all kinds of propaganda for war inimical to the cause of peace and mutual understanding and would undertake to adopt effective measures for the suppression of such propaganda in their own countries."

On September 18, 1958, the USSR published a detailed memorandum on "Measures in the Field of Disarmament" transmitted to the President of the UN General Assembly by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. It urged inter alia the banning of the use of outer space for military purposes, the reduction of foreign troops stationed in Germany and in other European states, and the prohibition of war propaganda:

"The propaganda of war and incitement to war conducted in certain countries, especially agitation for the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons against certain States, poisons relations between States and helps to spread enmity and hatred among the nations. The cessation of war propaganda,
including agitation for atomic war, would play an important part in improving relations between States and in clearing the international atmosphere.

"The Soviet Government believes that war propaganda and the fomenting of hostility among nations must be brought to an end both through the enactment of appropriate legislation by States, as has been done in the Soviet Union and some other countries, and through the adoption of other measures for the cessation of such propaganda."

On September 18, 1959, Soviet Premier Khrushchev outlined to the UN General Assembly the "most important" measures to be taken to strengthen international security and asserted that the USSR's disarmament proposals of May 10, 1955, constituted a "sound basis" for agreement on the subject.

The following day, September 19, 1959, a "Declaration of the Soviet Government on General and Complete Disarmament" was submitted for consideration by the UN General Assembly. It outlined a three-stage disarmament program that ultimately would result in the "destruction of all types of nuclear weapons and missiles." Also included as an element of this general disarmament initiative was a proposal calling for:

"The prohibition by law of war propaganda and the military education of young people, and the enactment of legislation prescribing severe penalties for the infringement of any of the measures enumerated above."

On the evening of August 30, 1961, the USSR announced its resumption of nuclear weapons tests, alleging that the measures taken by the Western powers after the outbreak of the Berlin crisis had raised the danger of war. (Testing resumed September 1.) It was against this backdrop that on September 26, 1961, one day after President Kennedy's presentation before the UN General Assembly of a new set of US disarmament proposals, the USSR submitted to the UN a memorandum on "Measures to Ease International Tension, Strengthen Confidence Among States, and Contribute to General and Complete Disarmament." The proposed measures included a freeze on military budgets, renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons, conclusion of a nonaggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, and the prohibition of war propaganda:

"All States could make an important contribution towards improving the international atmosphere by jointly advocating the cessation of all types of propaganda for war or enmity and hatred among nations."
"Although as far back as 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution banning war propaganda, that resolution is still not being observed in many countries. It is no secret that in the press, on radio and television, and in the public statements by prominent personalities in certain countries the idea of the inevitability of war is being systematically propounded, the nuclear arms race is being justified, and feelings of hatred and enmity towards other nations are being kindled.

"As we know, various attitudes are taken towards such propaganda. In some countries it is regarded virtually as an expression of freedom of speech. We, on the other hand, call a spade a spade and regard incitement to war, even when it takes a disguised form, as one of the most heinous crimes, since it seriously undermines confidence in relations among States, contributes to the acceleration of military preparations and increases the danger of war, which would bring death to millions upon millions of humans beings.

"But whatever view one may take of war propaganda, one fact remains clear, namely, that such propaganda impedes the establishment of peaceful relations among States. If steps were taken everywhere to put an end to such propaganda not just one country, but all countries and all peoples would benefit.

"Various steps might be taken to prevent such propaganda. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries have enacted special legislation prohibiting war propaganda. Similar action might be taken in other countries as well. The adoption of a joint declaration or statement calling for the cessation of war propaganda, which is inimical to the cause of peace and understanding among peoples, would be of great political importance."

On October 31, 1961, the Soviets released in advance extracts from the CPSU program that eventually were adopted at the 22nd CPSU Party Congress the following year. They included a call for the "discontinuance of the 'cold war' and the propaganda of enmity and hatred among the nations."

The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) meeting in Geneva in 1962 selected a Soviet proposal on the cessation of war propaganda as the first item to be deliberated by its Committee of the Whole (set up to consider collateral measures for the reduction of international tension). By May 25, 1962, the Committee had unanimously approved ad referendum a draft declaration against war propaganda on which the US and USSR delegates,
taking into consideration the views of other ENDC members, had agreed. According to the pertinent portion of that draft:

"The Governments of the States participating in the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva:

"...Recognizing that war propaganda, meaning propaganda in whatsoever form or country conducted which can provoke or encourage a threat to or breach of the peace, is incompatible with the United Nations Charter and can lead to acts of aggression and war;

"Recognizing that an end to such propaganda could facilitate the conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament;

"(1) Solemnly affirm their support for the United Nations General Assembly Resolution (110 (II)) which condemned 'all forms of propaganda, in whatsoever country conducted, which is either designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression';

"(2) Condemn appeals for war and for the settlement of disputes between states by the use of force, and also statements to the effect that war is necessary or inevitable;

"(3) Affirm their conviction that in our day war can no longer serve as a method of settling international disputes, and their desire to educate the younger generation in this conviction and to promote the ideas of peace, mutual respect and understanding among peoples;

"(4) Undertake to promote by every means at their disposal the widest possible circulation of news, ideas and opinions conducive to the strengthening of peace and friendship among peoples, and to extend cultural, scientific and educational relations with a view to better dissemination of the ideas of peaceful and friendly cooperation among states, and general and complete disarmament;

"(5) Call upon all states to adopt, within the limits of their constitutional systems, appropriate practical measures, including measures in a legislative form in the case of states which consider such form appropriate, with a view to giving effect to this declaration against war propaganda;

"(6) Call upon all other states to support this declaration."
Four days later, however, on May 29, the USSR representative at a plenary session of the conference sharply reversed the Soviet position and refused to approve the draft declaration. Ambassador Zorin's rejection of the agreed draft was in the form of a Soviet Government statement proposing highly propagandistic amendments that obviously would be unacceptable to the West. The Soviet Union proposed inter alia that statements expressing advocacy of preventive nuclear war be branded as war propaganda and indicated that it regarded a remark ascribed to President Kennedy by Stewart Alsop in the March 31 Saturday Evening Post as being in this category. (The Soviet interpretation of this article ignored its context—i.e., possible first use of nuclear weapons in the event of a massive Soviet attack with conventional forces—as well as the White House clarification on that point issued a few days after the article appeared.)

The USSR also proposed an amendment condemning alleged West German "revanchism" and advocacy of revision of European frontiers, another amendment branding as war propaganda statements urging the use of force against national liberation movements, and still another calling on parties to the declaration to take legislative action within six months. (The Soviet Union and other bloc states that already had pro forma laws against war propaganda on their books would have been exempt from this requirement.) The Soviet amendments were rejected and the entire initiative eventually was dropped from discussion.

The Soviet turnabout apparently was directed by high-level party officials in Moscow who overruled Foreign Ministry acceptance of the May 25 agreement in Geneva. The immediate reason for the party's decision was domestic: Moscow was preparing to explain to the Soviet population a rise in the price of meat and butter slated for June 1. Because of the threat of nuclear war, the Soviets claimed that spending for defense could not be reduced and the consumers would therefore have to bear the burden of increased investments in agriculture. Announcement of a formal agreement with the West which implied progress at the disarmament talks and improved relations with the US would have undercut the party's case.

Collateral Soviet Efforts

Throughout the post-war years, the USSR and its allies were significantly more successful in the social, economic, and specialized bodies of the UN than in its political and disarmament organs in their efforts to restrict the flow of "hostile" information. They were able to insert into many resolutions and documents produced by these bodies passages barring, condemning, or otherwise restricting information that incited to war; advocated national, racial, and religious hatred or violence; or infringed
on national sovereignty. Similarly, Moscow succeeded on occasion in having documents couched in terms of intent rather than obligation and on having them include requirements that information from a foreign source be subject to national laws and customs.

The USSR was able to accept the UN's 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights—which Article 19 asserts the right of everyone "to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers"—by maintaining that this article referred only to personal freedom and the right to express an individual opinion, not to the spreading of "mass information" that could harm relations between countries and peoples.

The alleged evils of capitalist control over the international mass media emerged early as a major Soviet theme in UN consultations. During the 1946 debates on the UN Declaration on Freedom of Information and those in 1947 on the UN resolution condemning all forms of propaganda, the Soviets argued that true freedom of information could not exist as long as the international media were controlled by what Moscow described as small groups of capitalists.

Moscow used this theme at the 1948 UN Conference on Freedom of Information, insisting that the concept of freedom of the press was an unrealistic abstraction. Uncontrolled freedom of information only led to a concentration of power over the mass media in the hands of a few, and the abuse of such freedom worked to the detriment of the majority. The conference adopted a document containing language on controlling those flows of information considered in violation of national security (and only those). The Soviets subsequently used that formula to justify their censorship of foreign press and radio, even though the UN never officially adopted the conference document.

3/ During these early postwar years the USSR increased its international broadcasting nearly threefold while the United States—through the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty—and Britain—through the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)—expanded their own broadcasting to Soviet and East European audiences. In the competition for control over the allotment of international frequencies, Moscow proposed at the 1948 International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Conference that frequencies be allocated on a basis that took into account a country's area, population, and number of official languages. The formula would have given Moscow the greatest allotment and greatly reduced the West's share. When its plan was not accepted, Moscow in 1949 began a massive jamming of all British and US broadcasts which lasted, with a few sporadic interruptions, until 1963 following signature of the US-Soviet "hotline" agreement and the Limited Test Ban Treaty.
During the 1960s, the UN adopted several documents that the Soviets have since cited to support their position for controls over the international information flow. (They have also insisted on inserting reference to these documents in various international agreements involving communication issues.)

--- The 1965 International Convention on Liquidating All Forms of Racial Discrimination declares illegal any propaganda based on ideas or theories of racial superiority.

--- The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (which the Soviets did not sign until 1973) provides in Article 19 for limitations by a country of the individual's right to express freely his opinion when that is necessary to guarantee "respect of the rights and reputation of others" and "the protection of national security or of public order... or of public health." Article 20 of the Covenant also condemns incitement to war, the advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred and any form of discrimination, hostility, or violence.

--- The 1963 UN Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space and the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space include references to the November 8, 1947, UN Resolution condemning propaganda against peace.

Prepared by David Hertzberg
x29120

Approved by Martha Mautner
x29536
Annex 1

The substantive articles of the 1936 Convention read as follows:

Article I

The High Contracting Parties mutually undertake to prohibit and, if occasion arises, to stop without delay the broadcasting within their respective territories of any transmission which to the detriment of good international understanding is of such a character as to incite the population of any territory to acts incompatible with the internal order or the security of a territory of a High Contracting Party.

Article II

The High Contracting Parties mutually undertake to ensure that transmissions from stations within their respective territories shall not constitute an incitement either to war against another High Contracting Party or to acts likely to lead thereto.

Article III

The High Contracting Parties mutually undertake to prohibit and, if occasion arises, to stop without delay within their respective territories any transmission likely to harm good international understanding by statements the incorrectness of which is or ought to be known to the persons responsible for the broadcast.

They further mutually undertake to ensure that any transmission likely to harm good international understanding by incorrect statements shall be rectified at the earliest possible moment by the most effective means, even if the incorrectness has become apparent only after the broadcast has taken place.

Article IV

The High Contracting Parties mutually undertake to ensure, especially in times of crisis, that stations within their respective territories shall broadcast information concerning international relations the accuracy of which shall have been verified--and that by all means in their power--by the persons responsible for broadcasting the information.

Article V

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to place at the disposal of the other High Contracting Parties, should they so
request, any information that, in his opinion, is of such a character as to facilitate the broadcasting, by the various broadcasting services, of items calculated to promote a better knowledge of the civilization and the conditions of life of his own country as well as the essential features of the development of his relations with other peoples and of his contribution to the organization of peace.

Article VI

In order to give full effect to the obligations assumed under the preceding Articles, the High Contracting Parties mutually undertake to issue, for the guidance of governmental broadcasting services, appropriate instructions and regulations, and to secure their application by these services.

With the same end in view the High Contracting Parties mutually undertake to include appropriate clauses for the guidance of any autonomous broadcasting organizations, either in the constitutive charter of a national institution, or in the conditions imposed upon a concessionary company or in the rules applicable to other private concerns, and to take the necessary measures to ensure the application of these clauses.

Article VII

Should a dispute arise between the High Contracting Parties regarding the interpretation or application of the present Convention for which it has been found impossible to arrive at a satisfactory settlement through the diplomatic channel, it shall be settled in conformity with the provisions in force between the Parties concerning the settlement of international disputes.

In the absence of any such provisions between the Parties to the dispute, the said Parties shall submit it to arbitration or to judicial settlement. Failing agreement concerning the choice of another tribunal, they shall submit the dispute, at the request of one of them, to the Permanent Court of International Justice, provided they are all Parties to the Protocol of December 16th, 1920, regarding the Statute of the Court; or if they are not all Parties to the above Protocol, they shall submit the dispute to an arbitral tribunal, constituted in conformity with the Hague Convention of October 18th, 1907, for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.

Before having recourse to the procedures specified in paragraphs 1 and 2 above, the High Contracting Parties may, by common consent, appeal to the good offices of the International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation, which would be in a position to constitute a special committee for this purpose.
Annex 2

The USSR's reservations to the Convention read as follows:

"The Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that, pending the conclusion of the procedure contemplated in Article 7 of the Convention, it considers that the right to apply reciprocal measures to a country carrying out improper transmissions against it, in so far as such a right exists under the general rules of international law and with the Conventions in force, is in no way affected by the Convention.

"The Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that its Government, while prepared to apply the principles of the Convention on a basis of reciprocity to all the Contracting States, is nevertheless of the opinion that certain of the provisions of the Convention presuppose the existence of diplomatic relations between the Contracting Parties, particularly in connection with the verification of information and the forms of procedure proposed for the settlement of disputes. Accordingly, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is of the opinion that, in order to avoid the occurrence of differences or misunderstandings between the States Parties to the Convention which do not maintain diplomatic relations with one another, the Convention should be regarded as not creating formal obligations between such States."

Annex 3

Law in Defense of Peace

March 12, 1951

The Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, guided by the high principles of Soviet peace-loving policy which pursues the aims of strengthening the peace and of friendly relations between nations.

Recognizes that the conscience and sense of justice of the peoples, who suffered the calamities of two world wars in the course of one generation, cannot reconcile themselves to the impunity with which war propaganda is being conducted by aggressive circles of some states, and is in solidarity with the appeal of the Second World Peace Congress, which expressed the will of all mankind in regard to the prohibition and condemnation of criminal war propaganda.
The Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics decrees:

1. To consider that propaganda for war, regardless of the form in which it is carried out, undermines the cause of peace, creates a threat of a new war and because of this constitutes the gravest crime against humanity.

2. Persons guilty of propaganda for war shall be brought to trial and tried as heinous criminals.

President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, N. Shvernik.

Secretary of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, A. Gorkin.


Annex 4

UN General Assembly Resolution 110 (II) adopted November 8, 1947, reads as follows:

"Whereas in the Charter of the United Nations the people express their determination to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and

"Whereas the Charter also calls for the promotion of universal respect for, and observance of fundamental freedoms which include freedom of expression, all Members having pledged themselves in Article 56 to take joint and separate action for such observance of fundamental freedoms,

"The General Assembly

1. Condemns all forms of propaganda, in whatsoever country conducted, which is either designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression;

2. Requests the Government of each member to take appropriate steps within its constitutional limits:
"(a) To promote, by all means of publicity and propaganda available to them, friendly relations among nations based upon the Purposes and Principles of the Charter;

"(b) To encourage the dissemination of all information designed to give expression to the undoubted desire of all peoples for peace;

"3. Directs that this resolution be communicated to the forthcoming Conference on Freedom of Information."