FINAL REPORT
ARMY STAFF COLLEGE LEVEL TRAINING STUDY
13 June 1983

by

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This report is an evaluation of mid-career training and education needs of US Army officers and the ability of the Command and General Staff College to meet those needs. It evaluates and summarizes other recent findings and recommendations of other studies. In addition, the author conducts his own evaluation of the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and outside influences impinging on it, and compares CGSC to foreign staff college programs. The author concludes that the Army's staff college level training requires upgrading to meet
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future demands and that this upgrading depends on a reorientation of assets and resources at the highest levels as well as actions within the means of the Commandant of CSC.
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FINAL REPORT:

ARMY STAFF COLLEGE LEVEL TRAINING STUDY.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. PURPOSE: Historical experience underscores the fundamental truth that an army which must fight outnumbered, under difficult circumstances and with limited resources, must rely heavily on the professional excellence of its officer corps, and, therefore must place a high priority on the excellence of its officers' professional training and education. Military excellence has always depended on an officer corps which could think creatively about war—one which understood principles and theories of war. The intent of this study is to present an analysis of the Command and General Staff College's ability to train and educate the Army's officer corps now and to examine what needs to be done to increase its effectiveness to meet the challenges facing the US Army as we approach the year 2000. This study was undertaken at the behest and with the full support of the leadership at Fort Leavenworth and reflects their concern that the CGSC continue to meet the needs of the Army into the twenty-first century.

2. THE EDUCATION TRAINING GAP: Recent studies associated with the development of the new FM 100-5 (1982) revealed that the nature of modern war and the conditions under which we will have to fight make it imperative
that we provide more training and greater educational depth to future Army leaders. In recognition of this, it is not unusual for senior US Army officers to remark that our officer corps needs to develop better "tactical judgement," that we need a corps of "super tacticians," and that our Army needs an education which develops a "common cultural perspective" on fighting to facilitate the rapid adaptation to changing battlefield conditions. Why is there a gap between where we are and where we need to be in the effectiveness of our military education systems?

The specific factors which cause the adequacy of our Army's staff college level training to be called into question are:

- First, in today's Army there is less time to learn on the job, partly because of turbulence in key developmental jobs and the shorter period of time our officers serve in operational troop billets compared to years past, and partly because our units and staffs must maintain unprecedentedly high states of readiness to fight upon short notice. Our officers must be better trained to perform on arrival in their units.

- Second, modern warfare is much more complex at all levels. Comparing World War II and present formations, we see that present division operations compare more to World War II corps operations in range, scope, and complexity, and that decisions, coordination, movements and execution must be accomplished in less time. Moreover, all indications are that this complexity will increase exponentially and not linearly.

- Third, modern officers need to know more about increasingly complex weapons and hardware. Combined arms integration is more difficult
to achieve because we have larger numbers of more effective weapons at all levels, more complex C³I, and more complex logistical support requirements. Not being able to spend enough time in simulated combat situations to become comfortable with this increased complexity, too many of our officers seek simple formulas, recipes, and engineering solutions to make order of potential chaos. Any specific methods we teach will have decreasing relevance as changes occur on future battlefields.

o Fourth, modern officers must be able to do more with less forces than their World War II counterparts. Fighting outnumbered and at the end of long and vulnerable lines of supply places a premium on competency of our leadership in all areas of planning, training, fighting and sustaining.

o Finally, rapidly changing technologies and conditions of war make training in today’s methods a transient goal. A system of officer education which emphasizes "how-to" training applicable only to the present will fail to provide the needed education the US Army officer corps will need to be adaptive in the uncertain future. More officers must be educated in theories and principles which will make them adaptive and innovative.

In summary, we demand more of our leaders than ever before. They now need to do more with less, at a faster pace, and under more complex and dangerous battlefield conditions. Better training and more education will be required to maintain an edge over our potential enemies (who devote much more time and resources to both than we do).
3. **FILLING THE GAP:** To fill this gap we must develop officers with better military judgment in order to deter war or win if we must fight. Military judgment is derived from:

- greater depth in tactics and operations;
- greater depth in combined arms theory and applications;
- greater facility in logical planning and decisionmaking;
- greater depth in knowledge of how the army works in peace and war.

Better military judgment will lead to more competency in:

- preparing for war;
- planning;
- fighting;
- adapting to and driving change into profitable channels.

Improving military judgment will ultimately result in a more effective army with:

- better plans;
- better force structures;
- better training;
- better units;
- more combat effectiveness;
- and a more adaptable officer corps.

4. **THE KEY IS BETTER STAFF COLLEGE LEVEL TRAINING AND EDUCATION:** The key to achieving the above is to upgrade the Army's Staff College level training. This training should take place at three levels of complexity. All Army officers should attend the Combined Arms and Services Staff School.
(CAS3) to learn fundamental staff skills applicable to all specialties Army wide. The top 30% to 40% of the OPMD managed officer corps should attend a much more rigorous Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) to learn US Army doctrine and its application to preparing for and conducting war at the tactical and operational levels in the most dangerous and most likely scenarios. A selected group of combat arms officers in key personnel, intelligence, operations, and logistics specialties, equal to about 4-5% of each year group of OPMD managed officers should follow their year at CGSC with a course of study now in its pilot phase at CGSC called the Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP). These officers study the theory behind current doctrine and the more advanced application techniques of theory and doctrine to the preparation for and conduct of war at the tactical and operational levels. These officers follow their CGSC studies with assignments to key staff positions within our divisions and corps, later alternating assignments at these levels with assignments to higher level staffs and US Army school system faculties.

5. SOME RECOMMENDATIONS: The program for upgrading the Army's Staff College level training depends on a reorientation of assets and resources at the highest levels as well as actions within the means of the Commandant of the Command and General Staff College.

a. CAS3. It is imperative that the highly successful CAS3 program expand to begin training all senior captains as rapidly as possible.

b. CGSOC. The CGSOC must build on the foundations of CAS3. This course must rapidly evolve into (1) a much more rigorous and appropriately
weighted curriculum, (2) taught with more appropriate methods, (3) to a less heterogeneous student body, (4) by a first rate faculty in adequate numbers.

(1) CURRICULUM REVISION. The process of revision of CGSOC to adapt to CAS3 foundations has begun. But more must be done than merely revising the start point of the CGSOC curriculum. This report argues that the balance of the CGSOC curriculum needs to be readjusted in favor of the knowledge most critical to preparing for and conducting war—developing a better knowledge of the means, methods and conditions of warfighting. An annex of this report outlines a curriculum which is more rigorous and better balanced to meet the Army's needs. The proposed curriculum is divided into essentially two parts—a "main effort" curriculum which focuses on how to prepare for and conduct combat at the division and corps level which is taught intensely and a "round out" curriculum which consists of all other material with which CGSOC students need some familiarity. This material is taught at a lower level of intensity. The "main effort" curriculum is taught much in the fashion of the CA33 course and other foreign staff colleges which use the staff group or "syndicate" approach. One well integrated course is taught to 12-15 man staff groups or syndicates by an experienced combat arms officer.

(2) FACULTY REORGANIZATION. Adopting a new curriculum should be accompanied by a reorganization of the faculty. This report recommends the establishment of a "School of Operations and Tactics" to teach the "main effort" curriculum consisting of the doctrine and its application to all aspects of warfighting and all of its functions—from division to corps,
including the corps in a combined or joint context at theater level (Europe, Korea, Mid-East) as well as low intensity conflicts. Other smaller departments are charged with teaching specialized courses. The new School of Tactics and Operations can begin on a pilot basis, develop its new curriculum and begin teaching it to one or two sections of students who are CAS3 graduates. Faculty assigned to it can be drawn from current departments. It can grow as the CAS3 graduate population of the College expands.

(3) NEW TEACHING/LEARNING METHODS. The CGSOC needs a fundamental reorientation of teaching philosophies and methods. The application of the "syndicate method" to the "main effort" curriculum has already been mentioned. Concurrent with the development and adoption of the new curriculum, new and more effective teaching methodologies need to be adopted which feature less student/faculty contact in the classroom and more use of wargaming as well as more time outside of the classroom. Students should be challenged to solve case study type problems either individually or by small groups with less "spoon feeding" of facts in class. Students should be required to consult references to acquire these facts. Evaluations should be more intense and personal. Annex A and the body of this report expand on these ideas.

(4) STUDENT BODY INPUT. The success of this more rigorous program depends on a revision of the student body input to the CGSOC course. First, the student body must be limited to those officers who have the greatest need for this training and education. This logic would eliminate attendance by non-OPDM managed officers. Within OPDM branches selection for CGSOC

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should be based on an analysis of needs. Clearly a higher proportion of Combat Arms Officers should attend. Second, the student body should be limited to those officers who will be promoted to at least the 0-5 level, and are highly likely to be promoted to 0-6. CAS3 serves the purpose sufficiently for those who will not. This may require the tightening of eligibility to close to 30% of a year group with percentages varying by specialty.

(5) ACQUIRING A FIRST RATE FACULTY. Ultimately, the upgrading of the CGSFC depends upon acquiring a first rate faculty in adequate numbers. Recently the ODP for CGSFC faculty was raised to DAMPL 1. The effect of this decision has not yet been felt at CGSFC.

(a) STUDENT FACULTY RATIOS. The recent action to raise CGSFC faculty to DAMPL 1 may not be enough to obtain the student faculty ratios which are required. The staff colleges of other first rate armies with much fewer demands on faculty time besides staff college course instruction, have student faculty ratios of about 5 to 1. CGSFC during the years prior to WWII enjoyed a ratio of 4 to 1. The current estimate for CGSFC is about 8 to 1 but when all other missions are calculated in the ratio is closer to 12 to 1. This is compounded by high turn-over rates, especially at the higher levels. The current manning levels require that the college place new instructors, who are only marginally better prepared than their students, "on the platform" immediately after their arrival. It is the conclusion of this author that no rigorous instruction can occur under such circumstances
even if we were to select our very best officer teachers for our faculties (which we do not do). The computation of instructor requirements must include a period equivalent to about six months out of an instructor's tour during which he is trained and educated in the theory behind the doctrine he is to teach. Other functions which have been added to the CGSC mission in recent years are also inadequately resources. These other requirements—other short courses, and doctrine development—tend to be associated with concrete products and the time necessary to accomplish them are paid for with the time a faculty should spend on less tangible products such as instructor development projects and lesson preparation.

(b) THE ASSIGNMENT OF FIRST RATE TEACHERS. The quality of a faculty also depends on the selection and assignment of first rate teachers. The German army prior to WWII understood this better than any other. The Chief of Staff of the German army went on an annual tour of units to interview candidates for his staff college faculty. Although this is neither practical nor necessary for our Army, it demonstrates the need to recognize the "seed corn" aspect of instructor duty at our service schools. We must place a higher value on instructor duty and select our potential instructors more carefully. This report outlines one such plan for doing this. Essentially this plan calls for an "instructor potential" screening of all CGSC students and the identification of a pool of prospects who can be requested against instructor vacancies which occur about three years after they graduate. The list of prospects may be large enough to give
MILPERCEN a great degree of latitude. At the end of their instructors tour, the College can again draw up a list of prospects for a second tour on the faculty. Through personal involvement by the Deputy Commandant in negotiations with MILPERCEN, these selections can then be placed in assignments where their experience as instructors will be of benefit to the Army. More importantly for the College, this post-instructor tour can also be used to further develop the officer to be a more valuable faculty member for his next CGSC tour. Such a plan can also do much to build these officers' individual files (a valuable faculty recruitment tool.) It is often said that there is no better way to develop real expertise in a field than to have to teach it. For example a combat arms officer who has spent two years teaching division and corps operations would be an asset to any corps G-3 staff. Today we miss opportunities for such two-way effectiveness enhancement.

c. AMSP. The Advanced Military Studies Program must be fully implemented. Doing so would make a tremendous impact on the US Army by the year 2000. Just by the year 1990 the Army will have 288 majors and 180 LTCs with this additional education. If the current plan of assigning AMSP graduates directly to divisions and corps is implemented then each division can have from 12 to 15 recent graduates and each corps headquarters could have 10 to 12 such majors. The 180 graduates who are LTCs will be in certain key division and corps staff positions, on higher level staffs or on the faculties in our service schools (if they are not commanding our battalions). By the year 2000 the distribution to divisions and corps will
be enhanced with the presence of some colonels and generals who are graduates of the program and 288 LTCs and a somewhat larger number of colonels will be available for duty at higher level staffs and in our school systems. The key reasons we need these officers is that the complexities of the present will be compounded in the future. If we need training and education in greater depth now, we will need it even more in the future. If we examine closely what can be learned in CAS and an upgraded CGSOC we conclude that we can only teach current doctrines, procedures, and techniques and how these may apply to a fixed set of possible scenarios. We cannot develop the depth of judgment which will be required in a world of rapidly changing parameters. We need to impart a more refined military judgment relating to preparing for war (planning, resourcing, force structuring, doctrine development, manning the force, equipping the force, sustaining the force and total army mobilization) and conduct of war (combined arms integration at tactical and operational levels, dynamics of joint and combined operations, and low intensity conflict). We need to enhance the ability of selected officers to think clearly, logically, and rapidly, to conceptualize and innovate, to teach and develop subordinates, to integrate the work of specialists and to create "high performing staffs," and to anticipate and adapt to change. This program also allows the further development of a professional ethic through close faculty mentor observation and guidance, through historical readings on leadership styles and through discussions of ethical issues. The impact of this program will be as great through the interaction of these officers with fellow workers as through
their own enhanced abilities to carry out assigned individual tasks. Such a program will clearly need to be superbly staffed and adequately resourced. Half measures will not insure quality and anything less will not, on-balance, be worth the effort to the Army at large. Keeping a highly competent major in school an additional year is worthwhile only so long as there is a good margin of return on this high investment. This report develops the full rationale for this program and details the curriculum for the pilot Advanced Military Studies Program in Annex F.

6. CONCLUSIONS.

a. Faculty. Faculty in adequate quantity and quality is the most fundamental challenge to overcome. The continued success of CAS³, the enhancement of CGSOC, and the effectiveness of the AMSP depend on it.

b. The Importance of the CGSC Mission. The Army at large must be educated to understand that the importance of the product of Ft. Leavenworth will continue to increase in the future and will touch on everything we do. This understanding must lead to a reshuffling of resources. The numbers of students in the CGSOC course can be decreased but the student to faculty ratio must be brought in line with ratios which have proven to be effective.

c. CGSC Internal Readjustments. CGSC must realign its CGSOC curriculum and the departmental organization which supports it. It must come to grips with teaching methodologies which teach more substance and less form. Incremental changes will not serve our purposes. A pilot of a revised curriculum and a pilot "School of Operations and Tactics" need to be developed to provide the basis of an orderly changeover. CAS³ and the AMSP must be expanded as programmed to round out the CGSC contribution to a more effective Army of the future.
I. INTRODUCTION

1. KEY FOCUS ON CGSC: The Command and General Staff College is considered the school which has the greatest impact on the professionalism of the officer corps and thus plays the key role in insuring the long-term effectiveness of our Army in preparing for and conducting war. This report focuses on that institution and the policies and army-wide practices which affect it. Over the next decade, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) must meet the challenges (1) of preparing its graduates to serve under new and demanding conditions, and (2) of developing and disseminating a doctrine to meet varied and complex needs of the near term and beyond the year 2000. The full impact of these challenges have only recently been fully realized.

2. STUDY METHODOLOGY: This study is undertaken under the auspices of the Army Research Associate Program of the US Army War College with the joint sponsorship of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, US Army, and the commandant of the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. The views expressed in this study do not represent a coordinated position of either DADCSOPS or CGSC, but are the author's alone.

a. Author's Background. The author's background makes him well suited to undertake this study. He has recently completed a 2-year tour on the CGSC faculty as the principal author of FM 10C.5-5, as an instructor, and as doctrine branch chief in the Department of Tactics. During that tour, he also had the opportunity to visit equivalent staff colleges in the People's Republic of China. His immediate prior assignment consisted of four years...
in an infantry division. During that time he served in battalion, brigade
and division staff positions as well as in command of a mechanized
battalion. During that tour, he also had the opportunity to serve with the
Chief of Staff of the Army's Review of Education and Training of Officers
(RETO) study group on a TDY basis in 1978. This work has made him aware of
the Army's need to reevaluate the educational goals for its field-grade
officers.

b. Study Sources. The background for this study was derived from a
review of Post World War II studies of CGSC and leans most heavily on three
recent studies: the 1978 Review of Education and Training of Officers
(RETO) report, the 1982 SSI study entitled "Operations Planning: An
Analysis of the Education and Development of Effective Army Planners," and
the 1982 report of MG Meloy (DCSOPS) to the Chief of Staff of the Army.
(See Annex A--Summary of Recent External Studies of CGSC). Interviews and
discussions were held with participants in these studies, and with senior
officers in the field, with CGSC faculty and students and with graduates of
the British, French, Canadian, German and Israeli staff colleges.
Interviews have also been conducted with faculty of the Canadian and German
staff colleges (Annex B--Staff Training in other Armies outlines programs in
these armies of Israel, United Kingdom, Federal Republic of German, France,
German Democratic Republic, and Soviet Union.) Most important, however,
have been the contributions of ideas by past and present CGSC faculty and
students. Therefore, the bulk of the ideas contained in this study are not
necessarily new nor are they original to the author.
3. CONCLUSIONS OF RECENT EXTERNAL STUDIES. The Army has periodically reviewed its officer training and education needs and made appropriate changes in its schooling system. Three recent external studies have examined the training and education of officers at Fort Leavenworth. These are the 1979 RETO study, the 1982 SSI study entitled "Operation Planning: An Analysis of the Education and Development of Effective Army Planners," and the 1982 MG Meloy (DCSOPS) study. (See Annex B—Summary of Recent External Studies of CGSC.) These studies and our own examination of the Command and General Staff College and of officer training and education implications of AirLand Battle doctrine cause us to conclude that what we are now doing at Fort Leavenworth can and must be done better in the future. Some general conclusions:

- All three studies recognized the need to obtain a higher quality output from CGSC.
- All studies recognized the broad nature of the CGSC mission and recommended ways to narrow it.
- All three studies urged a "generalist" education at CGSC.
- All three studies identified the critical need for effective teachers in adequate quantity on the faculty.
- RETO especially focused on our relatively austere approach to staff training when compared to that of first rate foreign armies.
- All three studies identified the diverse entry level preparation of the student body as a problem. The Meloy report took particular issue with the attendance of professional officers—chaplains, doctors, dentists, nurses, lawyers and veterinarians.
The RETO report recommended a smaller more highly select student body be offered a more rigorous course.

The SSI and Meloy reports identified the problems of lack of rigor in the curriculum and apparent over-scheduling of the student's time.

4. OUR AUSTERITY COMPARED TO FOREIGN ARMIES. We do considerably less officer schooling than other modern first-rate armies. Staff college training, which occurs in all these armies at about the same career point as it does in ours, is illustrative of our relative austerity. The Israelis send their staff college selectees to 46 weeks of school, supplemented with 9 additional weeks for those chosen to command battalions. The Canadians send all officers to a 20-week staff course and a selected minority to 45-weeks of preparation for service on higher level staffs. The British and Germans each devote about 100 weeks while the Russians put their potential general staff officers through an astonishing 150 weeks of intensive education. In sharp contrast is the United States' modest 42 weeks of CGSO instruction.

5. CURRENT COLLEGE MISSIONS. Undeniably, the College is now doing a considerable amount with limited resources. The College today teaches several different courses to a large and diverse student body with a proportionately smaller faculty than it has ever had. Today's faculty of about 150 is responsible for:

- The 10-month Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSO), also known as the "regular course," of over 1,000 field grade officers per year of all branches, services, and allies. (The 19-week course for Reserve and
National Guard officers runs concurrently with the regular course during August to December.)

- The Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS^3) which will train 900 officers in everyone of five courses annually beginning FY 86.

- Two week Battalion and Brigade Pre-Command Courses 11 to 12 times annually.

- Several Reserve Component refresher courses annually.

- Writing combined arms doctrine and reviewing doctrine written at the branch schools. (This is a considerable load. The College is responsible directly for writing and updating 30 manuals and indirectly for reviewing 293 and approving 68 branch school authored manuals.

- Participation in Joint Readiness Exercises by faculty members numerous times annually.

- Preparing and conducting conferences scheduled irregularly—several times a year to update general and senior field grade officers from the field on doctrinal developments. (An important contribution to Army readiness, these exercises consume considerable faculty time.)

- Writing and updating course material for the CGSO non-resident course, and conducting several annual training sessions for the reserve component faculty of this course.

- The college began teaching a pilot 48 week Advanced Military Studies Program for selected CGSC students beginning AY 83-84.

Doing all of this at the Staff College is a tall order. Doing it well is extremely important but also exceedingly difficult.
II. CHALLENGE FOR THE FUTURE: EDUCATING FIELD GRADE

BATTLE LEADERS AND STAFF OFFICERS

1. THE REQUIREMENT. Our Army has a tougher task than any other army in the world. For this we will need more than just commitment and dedication, we must also measure up intellectually. We will clearly have to be better trained and educated than the enemy. It is important to reiterate here that the Soviet Union takes much longer to train and educate their officers. The new challenges facing our officers and the paramount importance of their competence to lead require that we reexamine our officer training and education needs.

The combined effect of battlefield and peacetime requirements for the training and education of our officers is staggering in its impact. We need an Army run by leaders who can do more with less, under high risk conditions, and in less time—given a very wide-ranging set of possible missions. We must also be able to integrate smooth and continual change in our organizations to effectively harness America’s technological capability. This will require a leadership with a common educational and cultural perspective on war which can stay conceptually ahead of our ever changing technology. The day-to-day peacetime running of the Army requires more knowledge in order to manage resources under tighter tolerances, to get more out of available training time, to cope with social pressures while at the same time maintaining a daily high standard of readiness unprecedented in our history.

Training for Peace or War? It has been said many times that the most important duty of a soldier in peacetime is to prepare for war. But that
dictum by itself is an insufficient guide for action. It is the peculiar nature of the profession of arms that there is no way to predetermine the training and education needs of its members with any certainty prior to first combat. And therefore it is difficult to argue the case for more training or education resources devoted purely to the study of war. On the other hand, peacetime training and education needs can be defended with greater certainty and, indeed, peacetime management tasks also contribute to preparing for war. As a result, since at least 1951, we have seen a steady decline in the number of hours devoted to tactics and operations in the 10-month CGSC curriculum which has only recently been reversed. At the same time we have added peacetime related subject matter because the need for it was clearly indicated. Since our approach to training and educating officers has not changed significantly since World War II, it may be helpful to summarize some of the specific reasons why we think we must make substantial improvements in the training and education of our leaders now.

2. PRESENT WARTIME TRAINING AND EDUCATION REQUIREMENTS. One by-product of our recent revision of FM 100-5 was a better appreciation of what the combat competency of our battle leaders must be. It is clear that AirLand battle doctrine cannot be executed by Army leaders who do not understand the human dimension of combat, are not trained in the facile employment of modern hardware and systems and are not educated to employ them with sound judgment.

Role of Leadership is Paramount in Battle. Our studies associated with the development of the new FM 100-5 show that the outcome of battle is as often determined by differences in intangible factors—such as leadership, courage, skill, and unit cohesion—as by numbers and mechanical factors.
"The appropriate combination of maneuver, firepower, and protection by a skillful leader within a sound operational plan will turn combat potential into actual combat power.

"Leadership provides purpose, direction, and motivation in combat . . . While leadership requirements differ from squad to corps, leaders must be men of character; they must know and understand soldiers and the physical tools of battle; and they must act with courage and conviction. The primary function of leadership is to inspire and to motivate soldiers to do difficult things in trying circumstances.

"Leaders must set the preconditions for winning.

"As battle becomes more complex and unpredictable, decisionmaking must become more decentralized. Thus, all echelons of command will have to issue mission orders. Doing so will require leaders to exercise initiative, resourcefulness, and imagination—and to take risks."

The new FM 100-5 appropriately recognizes the crucial role of all leaders on the modern battlefield. Leadership has always been crucial. But there was a time in the history of war when a few outstanding leaders could single-handedly affect the behavior of many. Picture Wellington at the battle of Waterloo personally encouraging his troops and remember the difference the personal presence of Napoleon made in the performance of his soldiers. Soldiers still need that kind of leadership, except that the compartmented nature of modern war demands many, and much more junior, Wellingtons and Napoleons. The requirements for dispersal and rapid
concentrations, for high speed attacks, and for resolute defenses by scattered smaller units places much more emphasis on lower level leadership. We should recall that BG S. L. A. Marshall's studies of the US Army in both World War II and Korea revealed that a large number of soldiers became passive and ceased to fight when leaders could not, or would not, lead in person. The degrees of dispersion required today compared to then will increase this leadership challenge. Also, as our units become more capital intensive—more heavy weapons per soldier—we must rely more heavily on the individual battlefield contribution of each fighting man. For these reasons, the quality of our leadership at all levels may be the "sine qua non" on the next battlefield.

**New and Unique Battlefield Conditions.** The conditions of modern battle differ vastly from those of earlier wars. These new conditions are described succinctly in the new FM 100-5. We must be prepared to fight campaigns of considerable movement, complemented by intense volumes of fire and complicated by increasingly sophisticated and lethal weapons used over large areas. Air and ground maneuver forces; conventional, nuclear and chemical fires; unconventional warfare; active reconnaissance, surveillance, and target-acquisition efforts; and electronic warfare will be directed against the forward and rear areas of both combatants. Such conditions are difficult to replicate short of actual combat against a major power. Neither field training exercises nor simulation based command post exercises can acquaint us with all dimensions of modern battle. The full impact of
these conditions, taken together, are difficult to imagine, much less to understand. But their study is imperative. In the next war, the prize will go to the side which has best thought through the implications of such battlefield conditions and best prepared its force to deal with them. It is difficult to say which of the following requirements of modern battle will prove to be the greatest challenge.

- Opposing forces will rarely fight along orderly, distinct lines. Massive troop concentrations or immensely destructive fires will make some penetrations by both combatants nearly inevitable. This means that linear warfare will most often be a temporary condition at best and that distinctions between rear and forward areas will be blurred.

- To fight and win under modern conditions, the commanders and staffs must rapidly concentrate potent modern ground and air units at the decisive point from dispersed locations and disperse them again to avoid lethal counterstrikes.

- They must understand the capabilities and employment of complex surveillance, target-acquisition and communications systems, and their implications for both combatants.

- Nuclear weapons are proliferating to more and more potential adversaries. Our principal adversary, the Soviet Union, is likely to use such weapons in any major confrontation with the Western Powers. This likelihood alone means that operations which ignore the effects of these weapons on battlefield schemes can no longer be conducted.
The growing number of nations which can employ and are apparently willing to use chemical weapons forces us to face the stark realities of combat on a battlefield where chemical weapons have been used or are likely to be deployed. Commanders and staffs must understand chemical protective and countermeasures and the impact chemical weapons will have on military operations.

Electronic warfare, vulnerability of command and control facilities, and mobile combat will demand resiliency and flexibility of command and control means and methods and extreme resourcefulness of commanders and staffs at all levels.

As combat in built-up areas becomes more unavoidable in Europe, and combat in vast arid regions over extended frontages becomes more probable, new and different demands are placed on the skill, training and education of our officers to deal with these environments.

New Logistic Constraints. Our commanders and staffs must understand battlefield logistics better than ever before. We will, in all likelihood, fight our next battles at the end of long, vulnerable lines of logistical support and against an enemy which outnumbers us and has significantly shorter supply lines. This significantly increases the requirement for skillful leadership and first rate staff work in both combat and logistics units to compensate for this significant disadvantage.

Enlarged Battlefield Perspectives at All Levels. Battlefield perspectives have changed radically since World War II at every level of command. And with these changed perspectives have come higher expectations of our officers at all levels.
Corps operations today are more akin to World War II field army operations in both complexity and territorial dimensions. We have added the responsibility for logistic concerns. We have removed field army headquarters from most combat employment schemes and have tied corps directly into a joint or combined forces structure. We have added new C^{3I} capabilities and made combat support organizations more potent. At the same time, the corps will enjoy less time to make decisions and execute them than World War II field armies. Corps are no longer mere "resource allocators" in the new US Army doctrine. They are fighting/maneuver headquarters which will plan and execute campaigns, and also fight critical battles in a very complex/nonlinear battlefield environment.

The place of World War II corps has been taken by our modern divisions. Modern division sectors are wider and deeper and the range of current division responsibilities exceeds that of corps in most World War II circumstances. World War II corps rarely managed the complex logistical tail which is a characteristic of our modern divisions. In all likelihood, divisions will operate with one or more attached brigades or regiments in addition to organic brigades. The division battlelines will be less distinct, and battle requirements will demand information gathering, analysis, decision-making, coordination, and execution in less time. While generally aware of the increased complexity and lethality of division weapons individually, few officers are acquainted with the impact of all of them taken together. Many new tools of battle have been added. We will see more division level air-ground interface with the Air Force, and between
Army air and ground elements. We are just beginning to come to grips with some new challenges:

—new C3I requirements,
—increased capabilities,
—new functional elements,
—how to move the division rapidly over operational as well as tactical and strategic distances,
—and how to fight it effectively and maintain the synergism of its separate parts.

The place of World War II's divisions is taken by cavalry regiments and divisional and separate brigades. In the operational schemes of divisions and corps, these formations must do more with less men than was often done by World War II divisions. The relative shortcomings in foxhole strength must be offset by the proper employment of more lethal weapons within attached or organic battalions and squadrons. Fast-paced fluid situations dictated by modern battlefield conditions require more flexible tactics—more facile concentration and dispersion of battalions, more rapid maneuver, and more violent concentrations of fires. While there is more potential combat power available to modern brigades and regiments than was available to World War II divisions, its effective and synergistic application relies on command and control of a much higher order.

Implications of New Battlefield Conditions. What all of this implies is that staff officers and commanders at all of these levels must know more and must discharge their combat functions much more rapidly over wider areas.
with greater consequences of failure by several orders of magnitude than their World War II counterparts. For example, this means that today's brigade S3s must be competent in more areas than World War II division G3s.

3. **PRESENT PEACETIME TRAINING AND EDUCATION REQUIREMENTS.** The need for more training and education to manage the Army's day-to-day unit peacetime business is unassailable.

**Unit Day-to-Day Resource Management.** Our commanders and their staff officers manage resources many orders of magnitude greater and under much tighter tolerances than their World War II era counterparts. World War II era company commanders managed property worth thousands of dollars. Current company commanders are responsible for equipment worth tens of millions of dollars. Even taking inflation into account, this is a significant difference. Not only this, but current commanders also manage resources which were formerly merely issued and consumed. Even at battalion level, this includes food, ammunition, fuel and other training and maintenance funds in the hundreds of thousands of dollars annually. The need to man a large volunteer peacetime army, changes in UCMJ procedures and processes, and the smooth implementation of social change in the institutions of the army have demanded new knowledge, approaches, and efforts by all officers. These and other peacetime administrative matters are an important aspect of an officer's daily life. Combined, they have had an unprecedented impact on an officer's training and education needs. Our focus on these concerns has tended to cause us to overlook other important new requirements.
Impact of Technological Growth and Rapid Rate of Change. The difficulty of officer tasks in peace and war is increasing as we continually add new and more potent hardware. Our Army is introducing 40 new major items of hardware and many more lesser items. This dynamism adds to an already complex problem. For an initial impression of the dimensions of this problem, one could start by comparing the contents of a World War II rifle platoon arms room with that of a modern mechanized platoon. As one proceeds from echelon to echelon, the contrast between the weapons and equipment of World War II formations and present ones is similarly striking. Officers must know enough about all of these items to insure they are properly maintained and effectively employed, and that soldiers are properly trained in their use. In essence, the effective employment of this equipment demands deeper and wider technical knowledge at lower levels. The increase in the variety of weapons at all levels also demands a higher order of knowledge at all levels to integrate them well and not waste potential capabilities. Not only this, but the continual introduction of new systems into units which must maintain constant readiness compounds the problem and adds many new challenges for our officer corps.

More Missions, Less Response Time, and Greater Uncertainty About Conditions. One reflection of a potentially unstable world, and the role of our nation in it, is that our officers must be trained and educated to accomplish more missions, with less response time, and under greater uncertainty than ever before. Officers must be trained in skills applicable to an entire spectrum of possible conflict and near-conflict situations—to
which we have recently added peacekeeping. The range of missions of Army units are greater and are far more complex than they ever were before. This demands a much higher order of readiness in our units. For instance, a World War II unit could expect months or weeks between notification of movement into battle and actual engagement with the enemy. Today, both CONUS and forward deployed forces must be prepared to deploy in hours. CONUS unit deployment plans, as well as those for forward deployed forces, are frequently exercised. This is further complicated for CONUS units by the diversity of their possible and likely missions. The reserve components face similar problems compounded by their unique situations.

**Units Must Be Trained To Do More, Better, In Less Time.** Not only must our officers know how to fight more effectively under most difficult and diverse conditions, but they must learn to train their subordinate individuals and units to do more and better in far less available training time. The possible imminence of combat and the high initial standard of performance required of units whose first battles may be the most significant of the next war raises the importance of high quality training. We cannot afford a Kasserine Pass or Task Force Smith experience the next time we go to war. Precious training time must be well used. To use time well, officers must know and use sophisticated modern training and training management techniques. Knowledge of this sort is also an important training and education requirement for officers.
4. **EDUCATION AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS OF THE FUTURE.** Up to this point we have merely catalogued the complexities and demands of the present. We must be mindful of the fact that the current crop of Staff College graduates will probably experience more change in methods and conditions of warfare and preparation for war during the balance of their active military careers than has been experienced in all the years since WWII. The task of maintaining our Army's effectiveness is becoming increasingly more difficult because we must make choices about change at an accelerating rate against a wide backdrop of uncertainties. As the conditions of warfare change, the methods and techniques of our doctrine must evolve with them. Hardware choices, which constitute considerable long-term investments, must be made more frequently as Armies become more "capital intensive" and as the rate of technological options expands. The risks associated with these and other choices grow as time between changes becomes compressed. We must become masters at integrating the right changes smoothly and effectively. Knowing what to change will be more difficult and risk laden as the rapid rate of technological innovation and the relative brevity of future high-to-mid intensity conflicts combine to create a situation where the consequences of peacetime choices can be irretrievable in war.

5. **CONCLUSION: A SHORTFALL.** Very few of our officers understand even the complexity of war under current conditions or how to prepare well for it. While the separate elements of this combat environment are easily pictured, their combined effect is difficult to imagine. Not being able to spend enough time in simulated combat situations to become comfortable with this increased complexity, our officers yearn for formulas, recipes, and safe
engineering solutions to make order of potential chaos. Another natural modern solution for dealing with a complex environment which requires vast amounts of knowledge is to specialize—to compartment knowledge and those assigned to master it. This also poses new requirements. Some specialization is necessary, but there is also an urgent need for some individuals to be broadly based and still maintain a degree of depth across that spectrum to be able to lead specialists, to integrate their work and not be led by them. Essentially, a key segment of our officer corps must know how to think and not only what to think about war. This is especially critical in an environment of rapidly changing parameters.

If we desire to field an effective army—one that can win—we have little choice but to agree that there exists a gap between the competency levels we can now achieve with current programs and those which we ought to be able to achieve. The key question is whether this Army is willing to commit the resources and undertake the revisions required to meet this goal. The best place to begin is at the Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth because that school is the intellectual hub of our Army and because recent reforms undertaken there in the past few years, if fully supported by the Army and carried further, can pay great dividends.

It is the conclusion of this author that it is not possible to meet these requirements without making some major adjustments at the Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth.

The new Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3) is a big step in the right direction. It will soon be providing a firm foundation of basic staff skills and an awareness of Army wide problems to all senior captains.
The CGSC plans to build on this foundation as it upgrades its curriculum for the Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC), however, it will be necessary to: upgrade the faculty in quantity and quality, determine new curriculum priorities, modernize teaching methodologies, select a student body which is more homogeneous in composition and preparation and more clearly reflects the needs of the Army by specialty, and eliminate teaching inefficiencies and inertia derived from outdated internal departmental structures.

The recent addition of the Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP), currently undergoing its pilot phase, promises to provide a leavening of broad based individuals to fill key personnel, intelligence, operations and logistics staff positions in our divisions, corps and subsequently at higher levels who will be capable of leading the Army into the unknown and difficult future. This program, fully described in Annex F, will require a small, but first rate, faculty. It will require protection until its graduates begin making a contribution in the field. It represents a long term investment in future capability. A similar investment in long term schooling paid off for the US Army before WWI and WWII. In WWII ultimately all divisions and corps were commanded by two year men and many two-year men designed and guided the near miraculous pre-WWII mobilization.
III. PROBLEMS IN MEETING THIS CHALLENGE

It is the conclusion of this author that the solution to closing the gap between our officer education and training system output and present and future requirements lies both beyond the Command and General Staff College, in Army wide practices and traditions, and within its own practices and traditions. Both will require revision.

Most would agree that the Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth is the central educational institution in the US Army. It has the greatest short term and most enduring long term impact on the US Army. Graduates of its courses move immediately into key field grade positions from battalion to the highest levels. Habits of thought and attitudes developed during the "regular" course endure to the end of a graduate's career. In this the US Army is not unique. Other first rate armies place equal or higher value on the impact of their staff colleges.

Because of this, CGSC plays the key role in improving the military judgment of the US Army officer corps. It can act as the one pressure point from which effects can radiate to other parts of the Army.

1. EXTERNAL FACTORS. To raise the quality of its graduates CGSC needs help from the Army it serves. To produce graduates who possess better military judgment, CGSC requires from the Army primarily three key ingredients.

   o First, it requires high grade faculty in adequate numbers who are properly prepared and motivated to teach.

   o Second, it requires a clear statement of its mission, one which reflects the current and future needs of the Army as the basis for course development and internal resource allocation.
Third, it requires that the Army send only those officers who need the courses being taught, who are relatively evenly prepared to begin the instruction, and who are motivated to learn what is offered.

The US Army must recognize, as it has in other fields, that a commitment to excellence in a particular area requires the investment of some of its best people. The "seed corn" aspect of staff college instructor duty has been recognized in our army in the past, and it is recognized in other first rate armies today. A shortsightedness, derived from the perception that the current readiness mission is always the most important, denies the logic which points to the conclusion that growth in capability can only occur when the education of the officer corps is in the hands of its most able members.

Not only must our best officers serve as faculty but they must be prepared for the teaching roles they will fill. Too often instructors, even the most able, find themselves only "lesson plan deep." Time is not available for faculty development. As a result, rigor in the classroom suffers.

So not only must we assign good officers to teaching positions but we must assign enough so that thorough faculty training programs can be possible.

The CGSC mission per AR 351-1, "to provide instruction for officers of the active Army and Reserve components, worldwide, to prepare them for duty as field grade commanders and principal staff officers at brigade and higher echelons" provides no clear definition of the "main effort" and leaves the door open for a patchwork quilt of outside guidance and interference. In
view of the wide spectrum of knowledge now required by our officer corps (as discussed in the previous section of this study) a clearer definition of the mission is required to make best use of available time and to permit the focusing of available resources for greatest effect. This mission should key primarily on what we expect the Staff College selected portion of our OPMD managed officer corps to know about conducting military operations at the tactical and operational levels, and what we expect them to know about training, planning, and preparing for war, the peacetime functioning of the Army, and the management of change in peacetime.

The Army has had a long standing tradition of sending the top 30 to 40 percent of each officer year group to the CGSOC regardless of specialty. This is a luxury the Army can no longer afford. With the advent of CAS3 the traditionally sound logic for doing so no longer holds. At any rate the instructional inefficiencies incurred by the practice of enrolling a very heterogeneous student body no longer makes the price bearable. Seats in the classroom ought to be allocated based on specialty needs and the course ought to be optimized for the majority of our top OPMD managed officers who require this training and education.

2. INTERNAL FACTORS. Many interrelated factors contribute to making the goal of filling the education and training gap difficult to achieve. The external ones cited above inhibit internal improvements. But as the external problems begin receiving attention, many necessary internal changes can proceed.
Its the conclusion of this author that the three tiered approach to mid-career level education adopted by CGSC and the US Army is the right approach. Little criticism can be leveled at either CAS3 or AMSP in terms of curriculum and teaching methodology. But the CGSOC still requires a great deal of improvement. Subsequent sections will focus on improvements in this area. Annex C will deal exclusively with the improvement of the CGSOC course. The content of the CGSOC curriculum needs to be realigned and the departments charged with teaching that course need to be reorganized for greater efficiency and subject matter coherence from a pedagogical standpoint.

The Command and Staff College should play a greater role in the selection and continued development of its faculty. It is clear that the faculty cannot be composed totally of ex-commanders. Other ways must be developed to insure a quality faculty is available. This report makes several proposals for CGSC "self-help" programs in this area in subsequent sections.

The Command and Staff College should also continue efforts to develop programs which even out the entry level preparation of students. Several initiatives are underway to do this and this report suggests some others in subsequent sections.

A vital mission of the Staff College closely linked to the teaching mission is the development of the US Army's doctrine. While this mission is not central to the teaching mission it is closely related. Because of this relationship this function is discussed in a separate Annex. (See Annex E, College Organization for Doctrine Development.)
IV. CGSC CURRICULUM FOCUS-THREE LEVELS OF COMPLEXITY

1. MISSION FOCUS. The Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth should teach the science and art of war at the tactical and operational levels. The science of war consists of the study of the principles, conditions, means and methods of war. The art of war consists of the sound application of principles, means and methods of war to the ever changing conditions of war.

   The staff college should be the agent for disseminating a coherent, forward looking, and homogeneous doctrine throughout the Army. Such a doctrine includes both the enduring principles of combat embraced by the Army, and the latest methods, rules, means, and procedures for employing combat capability Army-wide.

   The staff college must teach officers to master the modern means of war. The rapid pace of technology will make this much more difficult than in the past. The staff college should teach students to deal with this change in the means which will be at his disposal. A corollary aim of the staff college should be to lift the student out of his branch parochialism and make him a "combined arms officer" rather than an infantryman, tanker, artilleryman, air defender, engineer and so on. These two aims should be pursued in tandem.

   Staff college students should also be familiarized with how the peacetime Army works. The Department of Army IG has recently uncovered a widespread ignorance of these matters in his study of how well the Army is managing the many changes currently underway. His study focused on the
institutional change processes from the conceptualization of a new idea in either weapons design or force structuring until that weapon or that organization is fielded. It is an extremely complicated system, but it is effective if people understand how it works. An understanding of this process must also be a part of the curriculum.

2. CURRICULUM EVOLUTION—A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE. The current CGSO curriculum has evolved over many years in response to changing Army needs. What was done in 2 years from 1929 to 1936 was compressed to 1 year after World War II. Between then and now, the tactical and operational portion of the curriculum was compressed even more to make room for the new knowledge required—of a more complex cold war environment; to keep units in an unprecedentedly, constant, high state of readiness; for managing more constrained resources; and to develop new officer skills pertinent to the modern military environment. Specifically, the tactical and operational portion of the curriculum was compressed from 665 hours in 1951, to 582 hours in 1957, to 335 hours in 1968 and finally in 1974 to the recent levels of about 170 hours. CGSC has recently increased tactics instruction in the electives program and has added three week-long college-wide exercises, but in this area, we are still much weaker than we need to be. The decreased portion of the curriculum dealing directly with fighting has also had to cover more material as the means of waging war and sustaining operations has grown more complex. This has severely constrained CGSC's ability to do much more than is currently done in the 10-month course—providing preparation that is admittedly "a mile wide and an inch

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deep." The result has been a need to focus on current methods and techniques in currently important scenarios. The emphasis has been on "training" for immediate tasks. The 1-year curriculum has had to deemphasize education and could spend only limited time teaching the sound application of methods and techniques. There remained little time to develop the "combined arms perspective" so vital to senior field grade staff officers and commanders above battalion.

3. AN ASSESSMENT. While some improvements in the present CGSC "regular course" curriculum are underway along the lines recommended by recent studies, evaluation of the curriculum suggests that room cannot be made to provide all educational needs identified in these studies without introducing considerable change. There is more knowledge to impart today than in former years and therefore less time to develop depth of knowledge in each area. In reviewing the curriculum, the SSI study noted that "... the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth is essentially instructing at the cognitive level and testing at the recognition level and has been since the early 1970s." And also that "The CGSC curriculum must be examined to eliminate hours that do not make a direct contribution to developing a foundation in combined arms, operations, and planning..." The SSI study identified a need to improve the teaching of planning skills—to analyze problems, conceptualize, integrate across specialty fields and to be creative. Their conclusion was that all army officers are "planners" to one degree or another, but that CGSC needed to produce officers who have enough breadth and depth across a wide spectrum so that they can be effective
integrators and conceptualizers as field grade commanders, as principle staff officers at division and corps and as branch and division chiefs at Major Command (MACOM) level and above. They felt that key to such preparation was "a sound education in combined arms operations and support," and that "all officers must be trained to think logically; the best should be exposed to an environment which encourages the development of innovative thinking."

The solution to the problem of mid-level career training and education in the US Army is to provide this training and education at three discrete levels as we are doing now. The Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3) (the most successful course at CGSC) is oriented on providing all officers with basic staff skills. Its primary focus is on the practical solution of common staff problems using established procedures in peace and war.

The regular course, the Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC), should eventually build on this foundation and be oriented on higher level knowledge about the theory and application of current doctrinal methods and techniques to current missions in the context of the most important current scenarios. Clear priorities should be established within the CGSOC curriculum. The "main effort" of the CGSOC should clearly be on leadership, mobilization, deployment, planning, training, sustaining, and fighting knowledge appropriate to the commander, chief of staff, G1, G2, G3, and G4 staff areas at divisions and corps. There seems to be little argument that the "senior tactical school of the Army," the Army's proponent
for combined arms and operations, should concentrate first on these areas. The curriculum should be organized so that this material can be taught in an efficient and integrated way and so that resources can be made available to do this well.

The secondary effort or "round out" curriculum should be comprised of the following:

- Peacetime administration and management skills.
- US Army peacetime practices and programs.
- Education about operational environments in the areas of greatest strategic concern for the United States.
- The operations at the joint and combined level.
- National Defense Policy.
- Army life cycle management.
- OPMS specialty training.
- And all other subject matter with which graduates need some acquaintance.

This roundout portion of the curriculum is taught in larger groups by specialized faculty, guest faculty, or guest speakers as appropriate.

Today, in peace or war, our profession requires mastery of a vast amount of knowledge—our business has just become too complex to really master in a 1-year course. The expansion of knowledge required of field grade officers since World War II lead the CGSC to reexamine the pre-World War I and pre-World War II practice of educating some officers at Fort Leavenworth for 2 years. The Army concluded it should invest more heavily in the education
of those with potential for full 30-year careers at the highest levels—specifically those who are likely to be battalion and brigade commanders, division and corps principal staff officers, and MACOM and above branch and division chiefs. These officers, it was agreed, should extend their studies into a second year. The observation was made that other first rate armies take more time to educate their officers for good reason, and so must we. The officers in an advanced study program should be taught to apply sound military judgement across the entire spectrum of present and future US Army missions. They should gain greater depth in how to prepare for war in a dynamic environment and how to conduct war successfully at the tactical and operational levels and within the context of Joint and Combined Operations. They should be taught why our doctrine is as it is so they can assist in reshaping it as conditions may dictate.

4. A REDEFINED MISSION. Another way of looking at the three levels of CGSC education is this. If all pertinent knowledge in the science and art of war were arrayed on a continuum from the very theoretical to the very practical, the CAS course would cover mainly the practical end of the spectrum to a limited depth, the CGSO course attempts to reach out in both directions from the middle, and the Advanced Military Studies Program extends this reach in greater depth in both directions. The following is the author's perception of the standards or aims of the three courses—what graduates of the three courses ought to BE, KNOW, and DO, using the construct of the Army's new leadership manual.
EDUCATION/TRAINING FOCUS BY LEVEL

Combined Arms and Services Staff School

BE: A CAS^3 graduate is a motivated, competent, team player on a battalion, brigade, division or installation staff. He should be a logical thinker and adequate practical problem solver.

KNOW: A CAS^3 graduate understands basic staff functions at the above levels, knows and can practice fundamental staff skills and techniques, is familiar with primary Army missions and how they are accomplished, has a sound basis of knowledge in his primary branch, some fundamental knowledge in his secondary, a general familiarity with other branches, and knows how to approach practical everyday problems in a logical way.

DO: A CAS^3 graduate is capable of serving as a primary staff officer at battalion, principal assistant staff officer at brigade, and as a staff action officer at division and installation level. The most capable individuals can do more. Without additional schooling and appropriate experience, these officers can be battalion executive officers, principal staff officers at brigade level and principal assistant staff officers at division, installation, and equivalent staff levels.

Combined and General Staff Officer Course

BE: A CGSO graduate has demonstrated more potential than most of his peers prior to his selection. As a result of his schooling, he should be a committed, competent, team player on a battalion,
brigade, division, corps or MACOM staff. He should be most effective at division level since the center of focus of his CGSO education is at this level. He should be an analytical, logical thinker and practical problem solver.

**KNOW:** A CGSO graduate understands more advanced staff functions, techniques, and planning systems at the above levels. He understands how the Army functions to accomplish its current missions in a working level (as opposed to highly theoretical) conceptual framework. He is expert in his own branch and has a working knowledge of other branches. He is an expert on current combined arms doctrine and how it is applied. He understands how to organize staff subordinates to solve the more difficult everyday staff problems in the day-to-day running of the Army.

**DO:** The CGSO graduate is thoroughly prepared to perform the duties of an executive officer at battalion level, to serve as a brigade principle staff officer, and as a principle staff assistant at division, installation, and equivalent levels. He is highly capable of serving as a staff action officer at corps and higher levels. He can quickly adapt to service on a Joint and Combined staff. The most capable graduates can develop into excellent battalion and higher level commanders and principle staff officers at division and corps or equivalent levels.
Advanced Military Studies Program

BE: A graduate of the advanced studies program is first a highly selected member of his peer group (in certain personnel, intelligence, operations, and logistic specialties) with unusual growth potential. He is a bright, selfless, and thoroughly competent team player with unusual commitment to a full 30-year career. The additional schooling gives him a broad perspective, a flexible and creative approach to problemsolving, and the inner confidence and drive to solve the most difficult and complex problems.

KNOW: A graduate of the advanced studies program gains a theoretical understanding of current combined arms doctrine. He understands the application of doctrine to all possible near term US Army missions. He learns how to adapt current methods and techniques to new conditions. He has a working level knowledge of all combined arms at battalion, brigade, division, and corps. He knows how Army operations fit into the Joint and Combined context. He understands the theory and application of the operational level of war. He has a working familiarity with the strategic context. He understands how the total Army works. He is familiar with near term new technology and its applications.

DO: Initially upon graduation, the student of the advanced studies program will bring to his duties (which will essentially be the same as other CGSO students) a wider contextual perspective to problemsolving. He will be a better tactician. He will be better at
solving the everyday tough problems. He will be more at home on the higher level operational staffs. He will also be able to bring to his duties a tough-minded and creative flexibility for dealing with complex new problems and the problems inherent in change.
V. TEACHING/LEARNING METHODOLOGIES

1. CAUSES OF THE LACK OF RIGOR:

   a. A common criticism of CGSC is that the current CGSOC curriculum lacks rigor. Classroom hours are over-committed to imparting information that needs to be gotten across for evaluation purposes and there is too little time for discussion in the classroom and reflection outside the classroom. While students are taxed with a heavy schedule, they are not adequately challenged mentally. CGSC courses often do not bridge the gap between the necessary learning of facts and developing the practice of good judgement—the sound application of knowledge to varying contexts—because they build on an insufficient theoretical foundation. The College spends too little time in the CGSOC developing theoretical depth, and from this depth, judgement. There is too much "spoon feeding" of fundamentals and too little directed "digging" by students to find answers. There are too many contact hours of the wrong kind (passing out the poop) and too many contact hours in guided discussions around the finer points of a subject. Essentially the focus is on teaching doctrinally prescribed procedures, conventions, and rules, and knowledge of facts—capabilities of types of units, of types of systems, of hardware etc. We attempt to develop judgement by having students apply the knowledge in these two areas in brief map exercises, terrain exercises, etc. But this is rarely accomplished because the curriculum moves too quickly and provides too little time for repetitive exercises and for the explanation and discussion of the "why" behind current methods and procedures and to what conditions they generally
apply. (Students should learn not only current methods and procedures, but why they are necessary and to what conditions they generally apply. This is necessary so that our Army will be able to modify current methods and procedures to adapt to future changes and conditions on the battlefield.) Students spend too little time developing an understanding of the impact of modern battlefield conditions and how these might change in the future. There is too little use of military history to teach enduring principles and theory. There can be a more frequent, effective and imaginative use of war games and simulations. These problems have been recognized and addressed by most recent outside studies of CGSC. Recent curriculum guidance from the commandant and deputy commandant have also been aimed at solving these recognized deficiencies. However, these are merely symptoms which stem from deeper causes, some of which are beyond the control of the College.

2. ROOT CAUSES BEYOND COLLEGE CONTROL: Causes beyond the immediate control of the College are:

   a. The lack of adequate depth in numbers and professional preparation of the faculty.

   b. The diverse background of students, their uneven preparation, and the perceived need to evaluate their performance against a common standard. This severely limits the degree of rigor of the course. This topic will be discussed at length below.

   c. The limited time available in the current 42-week CGSO course. (At least 4 weeks may need to be added to the CGSOC to do what must be done in that course.) See Annex D—Proposed CGSOC Curriculum.
3. ROOT CAUSES WITHIN COLLEGE CONTROL: Causes within the control of the staff college are:

   a. Establishing priorities within the curriculum. At least one-half to two-thirds of the curriculum should be oriented toward the "main effort" identified earlier.

   b. The current College plan to build on CAS³ foundations should be accelerated. Beginning with the AY 84-85 class, students should complete the CAS³ non-resident instruction phase and should be familiar with the contents of PMs 100-1, 100-5, 101-5, and 100-10. (See Annex D—Proposed CGSOC Curriculum.)

   c. The College should treat the "main effort" part of the curriculum as one integrated course taught by the same faculty throughout using the small group "seminar," "syndicate," or "staff group" approach used in foreign staff colleges and which is so successful in our own CAS³ course. Roundout courses may be taught in larger groups by specialized faculty. (This will require a realignment and restructuring of departments.)

   o The "main effort" course should be structured so that students learn new knowledge continually in a context which reinforces the ultimate course objective—the development of an individual who can apply military principles, skills, rules, and procedures with judgment. What follows the teaching of a principle, skill, rule or procedure must continually reinforce it until the student has it all wrapped up in one compact ball he can handle. The ideal way to do that is for the same instructors to teach the entire course about fighting—consisting of all of its interrelated

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erts—in 12- to 15-man work groups. For instance, the college should structure one course about fighting from brigade all the way to the joint and Combined level, and make this the "core" of the "core" course. All other "core" things are scheduled around this. This course begins with fundamental principles, staff skills (C^3I in general), and rules and procedures, and progresses through a series of exercises of increasing scope and complexity. The fundamentals are constantly exercised and reinforced because the instructor knows what he taught (about the estimate process for example) and makes students practice these skills as they build judgement about fighting at the various levels. In other words, the building blocks are reinforced later in the course and things which weren't clear about a subject early in the course can get cleared up eventually in new contexts.

Knowing that teaching such a course would impose quite an instructor load, and that we can't expect these instructors to be expert in everything, we establish committees or smaller departments of subject matter experts. They assist in writing lesson plans and present subject matter related classes to larger groups of students as necessary, and conduct instructor seminars for each of the blocks of lessons for which they are responsible. These departments also teach the "round out" curriculum.

d. The College must reduce instructor contract hours and increase the amount of time students spend studying and working in 4- to 5-man staffs to solve problems for presentation in class. Students must be made responsible for digging up facts on their own. Class time must be devoted to discussing student group solutions to problems. Faculty must have time to prepare in
depth for these discussions. (This is essentially the case study method employed at the Harvard Business School and at the German "Kriegsakademie" before it. CGSC does some of this but it must do much more. More case study problems must be prepared and used in instruction to be solved by small student groups who meet and learn together outside of class.)

e. The College should avoid causing instructors to write lesson material which is a duplication of material which can be found in published doctrinal manuals or college-approved draft manuals. More use should also be made of articles published in military journals. Using such articles in class can be useful in generating discussion. A well-prepared instructor can often make an important point even if the article is critical of current Army methods. There seems to be a prevalent mistaken belief that using such articles implies a doctrinal stamp of approval of all ideas contained in them. Depth of understanding about a particular issue can result from a skillfully led discussion which seeks to sort the wheat from the chaff in such articles. For example, the promulgation of AirLand Battle doctrine was preceded by a spate of articles on the subject by knowledgeable and respected officers. These articles appeared in Army Magazine, Military Review, and branch periodicals. They could have added tremendously to the rigor of the classes on the subject.
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VI. FACULTY SHORTFALLS

Every major study of Fort Leavenworth since World War II has commented on deficiencies in faculty effectiveness. The SSI study noted that both "quantity and the quality of the instructor staff are critical to the development of the student." Both the SSI and Meloy studies recognized a great deficiency in instructor "qualifications." The Meloy study reviewed faculty Officer Record Briefs (ORBs) to examine assignment histories as a basis for faculty qualifications and found the faculty not only inadequate in number but only marginally qualified to teach the subjects to which they were assigned. This cause is attributable to the shortsighted view which the Army as an institution has recently taken of its school system. This is reflected in the distribution of resources and the evident unwillingness to economize in current productivity in order to invest in greater future output. Since World War II, the Army has in effect been "leaning forward in the foxhole." As a result, the Army hesitates to assign its best qualified officers in adequate numbers to instructor duty and thus implicitly places a lower value on the output of its schools than it did before World War II. This, of course, leads to a vicious cycle. During the 30s, this Army conducted a 2-year course of instruction for 6 years which produced World War II commanders for every division and corps, as well as numerous key staff officers. Other first rate armies invest heavily in officer schooling and keep the products of their schooling longer. Our potential adversary, the Soviet Army, invests in this commodity more heavily than any other first rate army. (See Annex C--Staff Training in Other Armies.)
If only the CAS³ and CGSO courses are considered, the student faculty ratio is about 8 to 1 at the time of this report. Once the other demands on the instructors' time are factored in, the adjusted ratio is greater than 12 to 1 (although it is difficult to compute a hard figure since subjective judgements are involved). This compares to a ratio of 4 to 1 during the 1930s and ratios of about 5 to 1 in first rate foreign staff colleges.

As a profession we do not seem to recognize the value of instructor duty in the service schools. One indication is (as the SSI study points out) that the CGSC faculty may not be getting its "fair share" of former commanders. First rate foreign armies select their best former commanders for such assignments. Another indication is that promotion and senior service college selection rates for CGSC faculty are very low. This has two immediate impacts: first, instructor morale is deflated; second, student respect for the faculty suffers; and finally, faculty recruiting suffers and many competent officers on the faculty who are passed over for promotion to 0-6 simply retire. In short, as faculty service is not rewarded, a self-fulfilling prophecy comes full circle.

1. THE SYMPTOMS: The faculty today is generally underqualified to teach and is overworked. Being overworked, it has little time to develop teaching skills and subject matter depth and, thus, to keep classes challenging and interesting. Instructors are barely better prepared to teach than the student body. This results in instructors who lack confidence and become defensive and dogmatic in the classroom. Being overcommitted, there is little time for even the most motivated instructors to read and study to
gain the theoretical understanding of a subject required to face a section or work group of highly motivated, bright and articulate near peers. The natural reaction to these conditions is to focus the learning process on the simple, the explicit, the measurable, and the "safe ground" of the instructor's limited expertise. Areas which are fuzzy, interdisciplinary, imprecise, unquantifiable, not easily assimilated, or arguable (adjectives which describe almost everything to do with the actual conduct of war) are either ignored or explained in terms of rigid pedagogical constructs geared to the level of understanding of the instructor and the needs of the evaluation system.

2. **THE CAUSES**: While the symptoms—underqualified and overworked—are readily apparent, the root causes are not.

a. **Qualification to Teach**: Qualification to teach is a function of several things. First, it is a function of temperament, intellect, and aptitude. Second, it is a function of previous education, training and career experience. Many good officers are assigned to the faculty, and they are normally CGSC graduates, but their schooling suffered from the same shortcomings now being inflicted on a new generation of students. The assignment histories of many of the faculty do not provide the necessary field experience to close the gap in competency levels because our Army assigns many good officers to recruiting, reserve component and ROTC instructor duty. Third, qualification to teach is also a function of opportunity to develop on the job as a faculty member. This opportunity to develop competency on the job is further dependent on a deliberate faculty
development program of both formal and informal components and a sufficiently high level of staffing on the faculty which would permit such programs.

b. The Faculty Workload Problem. The evidence clearly suggests that the CGSC faculty is overworked. It is common for faculty members to spend 24 hours a week "on the platform," and rewrite lesson material for next year, review manuals and revise non-resident course material, not to mention preparing for class. The reasons for this are also not simple. First, and very simply, there are not enough officers available to do what must be done. This is essentially an army-wide phenomenon in a system where demand exceeds supply and we must distribute shortages. The same logic which applies to external distribution of shortages should be applied internally; therefore the teaching function should be manned in accordance with the importance of the subject matter in the curriculum. Some functions should be eliminated or manned at a lower level. Second, instructors are overworked because we link resources to platform hours and we link platform hours to learning. We should look at ways to shift more learning out of the classroom and convert those platform hours to instructor development/learning and preparation time. Third, instructors are overworked because the College attempts to maintain a low student-to-faculty ratio and maintain a large class size. Instructor requirements are reduced as we either reduce the number of students, or increase the faculty. If there is a limit to what the Army can afford in instructor resources, then we should gear the class size to the number which can be adequately taught by the resources available.
3. THE "QUALITY" SOLUTION: How do we get "quality" instructors? The fact is that there is no dearth of good people on the faculty. Some of this talent is simply too inexperienced or not adequately prepared to teach. Some of this talent is lost prematurely each year to retirement (or pre-retirement syndrome) because of the adverse career implications of CGSC instructor duty. Even though there is much potential talent on the faculty, the current selection process does allow the assignment of a significant number of officers who are unsuitable for the classroom.

a. Selection Strategies. CGSC needs a realistic selection strategy which is not necessarily dependent on broad qualitative selection instruments which may not apply or may not be necessary. The college should take advantage of the fact that every future instructor can be evaluated for potential and can be motivated to request future instructor duty while a student in CAS3, CGSC or AMSP at CGSC.

(1) Short Term Strategy. In the short term, faculty selection/recruitment should focus on quality LTCs who are on the alternate command list, and quality recent graduates who are about to complete their post-CGSC assignments. Such a "want list" can be compiled from existing records.

(2) Long Term Strategies. For the long term, a three-tiered program is needed to build a faculty from bottom up. While shorthand indicators of faculty potential such as battalion command, are helpful in identifying the potential for assuming greater responsibility, they are not always indicators of effectiveness as teachers. Experienced subject matter experts are also not always effective teachers. Good teachers must be
recruited Army wide, developed, and returned for repeat tours at Fort Leavenworth. In short, Leavenworth must "grow its own" under a long-range program.

- First tour instructors should be selected based on student records. Each department should maintain a file of potential future instructors. Immediate post-CGSC instructor assignments should be avoided. It would be preferable to identify potential instructors for assignment after their post-CGSC tour of duty. One element of available information which can assist in the selection process is knowing what posting the officer is going to and keeping track of his duty assignments there. Two years after a class graduates, the list drawn from that class is refined by discussions with the potential instructor and with MILPERCENT. A finalized list becomes the basis for new instructor input to the faculty.

- A portion of each first-tour faculty cohort should be selected for later (second-tour) reutilization. Having taught a subject once, and having done it well, is the best possible preparation for a subsequent faculty assignment. These selected officers should be directed to appropriate post instructor tour assignments. These "directed" follow-on assignments serve three purposes: first, to benefit CGSC by directly obtaining the experience base needed by the College faculty; second, to benefit the Army by feeding CGSC subject matter expertise back to the field in critical jobs; and third, to benefit the individual by placing him in a "quality" position which will help to "build his file" to remain competitive with his peers. For example, a first rate instructor who has been teaching
division or corps operations would make an excellent corps G3 plans or operations officer. The Deputy Commandant should become personally involved with MILPERCEN and peers Army wide to make such placements possible. (This planned exchange between the College and the field would enhance instruction and doctrine development in the College, and raise understanding of doctrine and performance in the field. It would also motivate good officers to serve as teachers. In the end, better prepared graduates would fill positions of responsibility in the field.) A significant number of the very best instructors leave the college for assignments which are not particularly "career enhancing," and do not use the knowledge and skills he has acquired as a teacher. These officers are usually lost to the system due to early retirement and discouragement. Not continuing to build their expertise, they would be less effective if they were reassigned to the faculty at a later date.

(3) Long-Term Stabilized Assistant Deputy Commandant. The key to this system would be a long-term, stabilized, Assistant Deputy Commandant. One of his most vital functions would be faculty selection, recruitment, and placement. This long-range faculty selection and development strategy provides for quality faculty input and through repeat instructor assignments, alternating with related field assignments, promises to greatly raise the expertise of the faculty. The number of officers managed this way would not be great.
b. Initial Faculty Training/Education. The assumption is often made that any CGSC graduate with an appropriate assignment history should be qualified to teach any subject in the curriculum upon assignment to the faculty. Foreign staff colleges recognize the need for additional preparation. In some cases, a first year instructor serves in a teaching assistantship position until he is fully prepared to teach. During his assistantship, he goes through the course material once as an observer and follows a prescribed study program. CGSC should adopt a similar approach to preparing the new instructor.

(1) Initial General Preparation. The new instructor preparation should be expanded beyond the current 2-week program of instruction relating to administrative and teaching techniques. All new instructors should be well versed in new doctrinal developments and military theory in general.

(2) Departmental Preparation. They should each be required to follow a tutorial program laid out by their department directors to deepen their subject matter expertise.

(3) Recognition of Preparation Time in Requirements Documentation. The time required to do this must be recognized in CGSC faculty requirements documentation.

c. Maintaining Currency. Instructor currency should be maintained by periodic interchanges with the field. During the instructor's second and third year, he should participate in at least one field exercise or CPX with the Army in the field. CGSC is currently asked to participate in a certain number of such exercises annually. A deliberate effort should be made to
use this as a tool to develop faculty. This requirement should also be used
to justify a higher ratio of preparation to platform hours in the formula
which computes instructor requirements. (There is always a need for
participants as staff augmentees or as evaluators in most large exercises.
Funding is available from exercise funds for such participation and thus
need not be funded by CGSC.)

4. THE "QUANTITY" SOLUTION:

a. Officer Distribution Plan Priority. How do we get enough quantity?
One way is to raise the priority of the CGSC faculty on the Department of
the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL). This has just recently been done in
response to MG Meloy's report to the Chief of Staff of the Army.

b. Review of Requirements Documentation. Another way is to examine
requirements to insure that those requirements are not understated. A
review of requirements should be undertaken because an inappropriate yard
stick may be applied in computing that number. An examination of first rate
foreign staff colleges and past experience at CGSC indicates that the goal
should be a 1 to 5 faculty to student ratio after factoring in all demands
on an instructor's time such as the pre-command course, reserve refresher
courses, non-resident instruction preparation, manual reviews,
"externalization" missions (seminar and symposiums for the army at large,
briefings on doctrine and tactics to outside army agencies, participation in
field exercises, etc.) and a period of time at the beginning of each
instructor's tour needed to study his subject before he is prepared to teach.
c. Reduction in Mission Requirements. Another option is to seek to reduce requirements. An option which should be seriously considered is the reduction of the number of students in the CGSO course closer to the RETO standard so that a reduction in student sections and work groups results.

d. Internal Redistribution of Faculty Assets. A combination of the above and a rational redistribution of assets internally will lead to an alleviation of the "quantity" dilemma. Some CGSC missions must receive a priority of assets allowing a more intense effort and others need to be resourced more sparingly.
VII. CGSOC STUDENT BODY DIVERSITY

A continuing problem at CGSC is the diverse background of students. This results in a curriculum "pitched" at the "lowest common denominator" of a diverse student body and not optimized for any particular group of students.

1. GENERALIST vs. SPECIALIST ORIENTATION: One impact of OPMS is to focus students on specialties rather than on generalist skills and knowledge. A prevalent attitude among a large number of students seems to be "If it isn't in my job description, I don't need to know about it." Some faculty have termed this the "union card mentality." This sets up a tension between what students perceive they need and what the "regular" course, the Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC), has traditionally offered. There are two ways to resolve this tension. One is to structure the curriculum entirely along specialty lines and the other is to set the curriculum and select those who most need it. The weight of the recent external studies and this author's perceptions suggests that we should choose the latter course.

2. IMPACT OF NON-OPMS MANAGED OFFICERS, ALLIES, SISTER SERVICE OFFICERS, AND RESERVISTS: Students are selected for CGSC training and education regardless of specialty requirements.

   a. The impact of non-OPMS managed officers, such as veterinarians, dieticians, doctors, and dentists, on the CGSOC is to lower the general level of instruction. The overall utility to the Army of their attendance of the CGSOC is questionable now that the CASJ is available. If they must
attend, they should attend as observers for a lesser period than the full course.

b. The impact of Allied students, sister service officers, and reservists is generally mixed. Some contribute a great deal and are well prepared. Others have difficulty with the subject matter.

3. **IMPACT OF UNIFORM EVALUATION SCHEME:** The impartial evaluation scheme requires that all students have an equal opportunity to earn good grades. This scheme also limits the degree of rigor of the course. The impact of this diversity of background can be minimized by changes in the evaluation system. For instance, non-OPMD officers may attend but not be graded—and receive a certificate of attendance. This practice could be extended to sister services or Allied students. By doing this, the rigor of the course is pitched to the better prepared OPMD officers and the level of complexity of the course can be raised.

4. **LACK OF UNIFORM PRE-ENROLLMENT PREPARATION.** There is no current mechanism to insure that students arrive with some uniform baseline of knowledge. As all students become CAS3 graduates, this problem will diminish to some extent but will not be altogether eliminated.

   a. This handicap is unique to our system of staff college education since various devices are used by other armies to insure a uniformly prepared staff college input. (The most common is a comprehensive pre-examination.) This handicap is made even more formidable by our insistence on a stringent objective evaluation system which does not attempt to discriminate between diverse backgrounds.
b. Students need to be familiar with some basic knowledge before they arrive. The following is a reasonable start point:

- Students need to be familiar with FM 100-1, FM 100-5, FM 101-5, and FM 100-10.
- They need to be familiar with battalion level manuals and ARTEPS of their own branch. This may require a branch update prior to CGSC attendance.
- Students need to be familiar with division level doctrinal manuals.
- Students need to receive a diagnostic self-test to assess the above knowledge shortly after selection.
- Students need to pass an entrance examination in May prior to moving to Fort Leavenworth (a number of alternate selectees should also be examined). (This could also include a PT test and weight screening.)
- During a period of transition of several years until all selectees are CAS graduates, an initial period of a few weeks should be set aside to bring students up to a uniform entry level. The college plans to begin doing this next year.

5. IMPACT OF CURRENT SELECTION CRITERIA: The Army's policy has been to select the best files, regardless of specialty, to fill student vacancies. This may not be wise for several reasons.

a. In recent years, CGSC students have been passed over by promotion boards which have been instructed to select by specialty. It is questionable whether the US Army should invest in a year's schooling for an officer who
is not selected. Perhaps the CGSC selection cut-off is too low. The Army should be confident to a very high degree of probability that all of its staff college graduates are promotable to at least Lieutenant Colonel, and a vast majority are promotable beyond this rank. In a cursory examination of the data, it also appeared that the officers who were passed over for promotion were also low in class standing. It therefore appears that a higher selection cut-off would also permit instruction to proceed on a higher plane.

b. It is also questionable whether all specialties should receive the same number of quotas by percentage. It seems reasonable that the Army would benefit more by selecting a higher percentage of combat arms officers than those of other specialties.

c. Therefore, we may need to consider tightening the percentage to attend CGSC to the top 33 percent of each officer year group in the combat arms and perhaps a smaller percentage of other branches until we reach the level of attendance recommended by RETO. Non-OPMD managed officers (AMEDD, JAGC and chaplains) may be limited to less than 10 percent of a year group since fewer of these officers require "general staff skills."
VIII. COLLEGE ORGANIZATION FOR TEACHING

The current college organization is not designed to accomplish its expanded missions. The college has acquired significant new missions in recent years and has an outdated and unwieldy organization for accomplishing them. This section deals only with teaching responsibilities.

1. A DIVERSITY OF COURSES: Essentially the college now teaches several different courses. The college should be organized to optimize the instruction in, and the support of, these various courses.
   a. CAS³ is taught autonomously. It has its own subject matter experts and instructors who teach all subject matter in an integrated course. Eventually it will equal the CGSO course in size.
   b. The CGSO course is taught in five departments, each of which receive a share of the students' time.
   c. The new Advanced Military Studies Program will essentially be organized much like CAS³, as a separate entity.
   d. In addition, the college teaches a pre-command course for battalion and brigade command and several reserve refresher courses.

2. THE CAS³ MODEL. In general CAS³ works well and students learn a great deal in a short amount of time. CAS³ is very successful largely because one director is charged with insuring that the course content is adequately integrated and effectively taught. It is also a success because the instructors are highly selected. Most are ex-battalion commanders, those who are not are "near misses" for battalion command. Significantly, the latter teach as well as the former. This course is also a success
because one staff group leader (instructor) takes his staff group through the entire curriculum of the course and is able to relate the parts to the whole. This method of instruction is also employed by the Canadian, British, German and Israeli staff colleges.

3. PROBLEMS IN CGSO COURSE INTEGRATION: The current CGSO curriculum is taught by diverse functionally oriented departments and, hence, is not well integrated. For instance, tactics and operations are taught without adequately reinforcing the instruction of another department in decisionmaking, command and control, intelligence operations, logistics, personnel, and human dimension considerations. These subjects are taught less well separately by the other subject matter oriented departments since they are not integrated well into a sound tactical context. Some savings in time and a great deal more learning could occur by integrating the instruction and having it taught by the same instructors as is done in CAS3 and all first rate foreign staff colleges.

a. It is difficult to develop an integrated course under the present organization because departments guard their turf and demand their "fair share" of the students' time for a given subject. Department resourcing is based on lesson hours in the curriculum. This leads to vested interests and a focus on course inputs rather than results. This requires that the Deputy Commandant must get involved in adjudicating minor course details and in making marginal trade-offs between subject matter hours. The wide ranging responsibilities of the Deputy Commandant and his extremely wide-span of control do not allow a great deal of time for this important function.
b. Current department organizations and responsibilities makes it difficult to sort out the relative value of subject matter between those identified as belonging in the category of the "main effort" and those which are secondary. Since faculty resources will never be adequate to teach everything at a 1 to 12-15 faculty student ratio, there must be a clear identification of subject matter which deserves such intense treatment and that which does not.

4. INTEGRATED "SCHOOLS" AND "SUBJECT MATTER" DEPARTMENTS. This line of thinking suggests a radical reorganization scheme. In this reorganization, we may have three "schools" (counting the newly proposed Advanced Military Studies Program as one) and several college level "departments." One school would be, as is now, the "Combined Arms and Services Staff School." The other would be the "School of Tactics and Operations." The third would be the "School of Advanced Military Studies." Then there would be the various functional departments. These departments would interact with all schools. The school directors prepare the overall plans for their courses. Once approved, the subject matter expert departments assist in writing some of the lesson plans for the integrated courses. For instance, when we teach the military decisionmaking process, the subject matter experts help design the lesson, may pitch an introduction, and are present in the classroom to guide and monitor when the work group instruction takes place. But the work/staff group instructor from the "school" executes and works the subject matter into the fibre of the course. The "school" instructors are the "homogenizers" and "integrators"—they provide the continuity and over-all perspective. (It works much this way on a smaller scale in CAS.)
a. The subject matter departments also teach matters which do not require being fit into the integrated courses on fighting, either as part of the core curriculum or as individual development courses. They also write portions of the correspondence courses, review doctrine, and speak for the College through the Deputy Commandant in their areas of expertise.

b. The subject matter expert departments may look much like the current ones, except smaller, after one establishes the School of Tactics and Operations. Each of the committees may consist of only a handful of people. The glue between the departments would be the schools and their instructors at one end, and an enlarged doctrine office, or department, at the other. (More on the subject of doctrinal coherence in Annex E.)

c. The School of Tactics and Operations teaches the heart of the core curriculum in the CGSOC using the staff group methodology pioneered at CGSC by CAS3. This school teaches an integrated curriculum devoted to decisionmaking, leadership, combined arms, mobilization, deployment, planning, training, sustaining and fighting appropriate to divisions and corps from the perspective of the commander, chief of staff, G1, G2, G3, and G4. The course uses a series of integrated problems which build from the general to the specific and from the simple to the complex.

d. See Annex D—Proposed CGSOC Curriculum for details.
IX CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. CONCLUSIONS. In summary the problem is many faceted and stems from many interrelated causes, some of which are readily apparent and others of which are not.

- The first and foremost contributing cause is **faculty**—quantity and effectiveness. It is primarily a matter of numbers, of experience levels, and of a lack of systematic faculty development programs.

- The second cause is a lack of clear **priorities** for elements of the curriculum. A clearer definition of the mission of the college is required to allow the college to define its "main effort" and its "round out" efforts. Some elements of the curriculum must be taught intensely and must receive the lion's share of resources, while other elements need only be taught at a "recognition" level.

- The third contributing cause is the use of inappropriate or outdated teaching/learning methodologies. Better teaching and learning methodologies could make better use of the time and other resources available.

- The fourth contributing cause is the diversity of background, perceptions of training/education needs, and entry level preparation of students. This condition causes the curriculum to be geared to the lowest common denominator.

- The fifth contributing cause is the current **departmental organization** of the college which makes subject matter integration difficult. Related material taught by different departments leads to gaps, overlaps, and contradictions—and learning inefficiencies. Subject matter
departments jealously guard turf and departmental prerogatives. This makes the smooth integration of related subject matter difficult both in teaching and in doctrine writing.

2. RECOMMENDATIONS.

- Faculty Development.

- CGSC and MILPERCEN cooperate to seek the assignment of officers to the faculty who have been identified by CGSC as having high instructor potential after an initial post CGSC assignment.

- CGSC and MILPERCEN cooperate to reassign selected first tour faculty members to commands and positions (where possible) where the officer can enhance his CGSC faculty potential prior to a second faculty tour. After this assignment the officer is returned to the faculty for a re-utilization tour as soon as possible.

- CGSC and MILPERCEN cooperate to reassign selected 0-6's to the CGSC faculty as directors and committe chiefs who have had two previous faculty tours.

- In the short-run CGSC and MILPERCEN cooperate to identify and assign more 0-5's and 0-6's who have been designated alternates or 0-5 and 0-6 command lists.

- CGSC develop a formal system for identifying and tracking potential faculty members from among each CGSO course. This system should identify about three times the annual input requirement. It should also track the post-CGSC assignment history of such officers and update the file annually. This file should provide a basis for negotiation with MILPERCEN about the annual fill of first tour faculty.
--CGSC develop a formal system for identifying outstanding first tour faculty members for reassignment to the faculty. An effort should be made to negotiate post-faculty tours for these officers which will further develop their faculty potential, build CGSC prestige in the field, and enhance the career of the officer in question. The most outstanding of these should be returned to the faculty a third time by the same means.

--CGSC reviews its requirements for faculty. This review should take into account all missions assigned to the college. The need to provide time to review manuals and concepts, and the need to provide more initial faculty training and subsequent lesson preparation time must be adequately reflected. Historical data of former faculty to student ratios and a comparison with foreign staff colleges would be helpful in making the case for more preparation time. Requirements should also recognize the need to have more faculty time to visit units in the field to maintain currency.

--CGSC institutes a more extensive formal faculty development program. The current program which focuses mainly on instructional technique and administrative procedures should be augmented with an update on doctrine revisions for all and an individually tailored tutorial development program for each new instructor designed by his department.

--CGSC should develop teaching methodologies which require less faculty contact time and more student individual or small group learning to achieve the same learning objectives.

--If faculty resources cannot be increased, DA should consider reducing class size by enough to eliminate several student sections.
The Assistant Deputy Commandant should be an outstanding Colonel who is selected in his 24th or 25th year and stabilized until mandatory retirement. One of his principle tasks would be faculty planning and recruiting.

- CGSOC Student Body.

- Thirty-three percent (or less) of OPMD managed officers be selected for CGSOC attendance shortly after selection for 0-4.

- Ten percent (or less) of AMEDD, JAGC, and Chaplain corps officers selected for CGSOC attendance shortly after selection for 0-4. These officers not be graded during attendance and be graduated after the first term.

- Attendance be limited to one AF officer, one Navy officer and one Marine Corps officer per section. These officer not be graded unless their service requires it.

- Attendance be limited to one allied officer per section. These officers not be graded unless their government desires this.

- All US Army students be CAS\(^3\) graduates and pass a validation examination prior to attendance.

- All US Army students be "Field grade qualified" by their basic branch through completion of a non-resident instructional packet and a qualifying exam.

- Reorganization of CGSC.

- CGSC reorganize its departmental structure around three "schools": CAS\(^3\), a School of Operations and Tactics, and a School of Advanced Military Studies.
—Smaller subject matter oriented and supporting departments be formed to service all three schools and perform other CGSC functions.

—CAS^3 is essentially separate now.

—The School of Advanced Military Studies conducts the Advanced Military Studies Program. Essentially this only requires changing the name of the Advanced Military Studies Department.

—A new School of Operations and Tactics be formed from a nucleus to be drawn from present departments. This nucleus first prepares a curriculum for the "main effort" curriculum of CGSOC. A pilot course for one or two sections of CAS^3 graduates be then conducted. School then be expanded as CAS^3 fill in CGSOC expands.

**Curriculum Revision.**

—A new curriculum be developed for the CGSOC based on the recommendations of course scope, content and methodologies as outlined in Annex D. The bill for this effort should be paid by minimizing changes in the current curriculum.

—Round out curriculum packages are prepared by appropriate subject matter oriented departments and taught to pilot sections of new CGSOC course.

**Doctrinal Development Reorganization.**

—A separate doctrinal development and coordinating department be formed to research, teach, develop and integrate doctrine.

—Build on nucleus of AirLand Battle Study Group.

—Add Doctrine Literature Management Office.

—Consider adding functions not now in teaching departments which orient on externalization of doctrine.

—See Annex E.
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ANNEX A

TEACHING THE SCIENCE AND ART OF WAR

TO

FINAL REPORT: ARMY STAFF COLLEGE STUDY
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ANNEX A—TEACHING THE SCIENCE AND ART OF WAR

1. INTRODUCTION: The Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth should teach the science and art of war at the tactical and operational levels. The science of war consists of the study of the principles, conditions, means and methods of war. The art of war consists of the sound application of principles, means and methods of war to the ever changing conditions of battle.

Teaching all of this at the Staff College is a tall order. This instruction should be limited to what we expect the Staff College selected portion of our OPMD managed officer corps to know about conducting military operations at the tactical and operational levels, and what we expect them to know about training, planning, and preparing for war, the peacetime functioning of the Army, and the management of change in peacetime.

The Staff College should be the agent for disseminating a coherent, forward looking, and homogeneous doctrine throughout the Army. Such a doctrine includes both the enduring principles of combat embraced by the Army, and the latest methods, rules, means, and procedures for employing combat capability Army-wide.

The Staff College must teach officers to master the modern means of war. The rapid pace of technology will make this much more difficult than in the past. The Staff College should teach students to deal with this change in the means which will be at his disposal. A corollary aim of the Staff College should be to lift the student out of his branch parochialism and make him a "combined arms officer" rather than an infantryman, tanker, artilleryman, air defender, engineer and so on. These two aims should be pursued in tandem.

Staff college students should also be familiarized with how the peacetime Army works. The Department of Army IG has recently uncovered a widespread ignorance of these matters in his study of how well the Army is managing the many changes currently underway. His study focused on the institutional change processes from the conceptualization of a new idea in either weapons design or force structuring until that weapon or that organization is fielded. It is an extremely complicated system, but it is effective if people understand how it works. An understanding of this process must also be a part of the curriculum.

2. WHAT IS THE SCIENCE AND ART OF WAR: The teaching of the science and art of war has never been easy. Field Marshal Maurice de Saxe in his Reveries concluded a long time ago that "war is a science so obscure and imperfect" that "custom and prejudice confirmed by ignorance are its sole foundation and support, all other sciences are established upon fixed principles . . . while this alone remains destitute; and so far from meeting with anything fundamental amongst the celebrated captains who have written upon this
subject, we find their works not only altogether deficient in this respect, but also so involved and undigested that it requires very great gifts, as well as application, to be able to understand them . . . ."

Since 1757 when this was published, many great minds have attempted to clarify the art and science of war. Among these have been Clausewitz, Jomini, and more recently, J. F. C. Fuller and B. H. Liddell-Hart. But the organization of the discipline or the study of the art and science of war is still greatly unstructured and hence is unorganized and difficult to teach. To learn the science of war we must study the enduring principles of war, the development and application of methods and procedures springing from such principles, the conditions of war, and the development of systems and weapons of war. The art of war, which we will discuss later, consists of the proper application of the above knowledge and depends on informed judgment.

3. TEACHING THE SCIENCE OF WAR: In the study of the science of war, we must differentiate between principles and methods. We must also develop a sound knowledge of the means or tools of battle and study the impact of conditions of battle on the application of principles, and on the means and methods of war.

a. Principles. The principles referred to here are more than the nine "Principles of War." They are the abstract ideas behind our methods. While methods tend to change with the introduction of new technology, the principles behind the methods usually remain the same. For example, the methods employed in the security echelon in the former "are defense" and that of current defenses differ. Yet the essential principles involved in conduct of operations in the security echelon have not changed. (These are that this element must mislead the enemy as to where the principal defensive effort will be made, must orient on the main effort, must cause the enemy to reveal his main effort and must provide time for necessary adjustments of the main defensive effort.) Such principles help us how to think about tactical problems; they don't necessarily teach us what to think.

b. Methods. Many of our officers are said to have a "cookie-cutter mentality" because they are taught to rely on method with an insufficient grounding in principles. It is difficult for the average officer to recognize that methods no longer apply unless he has learned the underlying principles. The Leavenworth student should learn that changed conditions lead to different methods for accomplishing similar tasks. Learning such principles teaches him to reason from an informed basis. American officers, in unique situations in past wars, have referred to this as "throwing away the book." If "the book" teaches only method—"how to" in current parlance—then officers have no choice but to fall back on instinct. However, it is not difficult to teach officers to deduce principles from methods by recognizing the conditions for which the methods were devised.
Reasoning back to the underlying principles, new and more appropriate methods are then improvised by applying the same underlying principles to the new conditions.

The dissemination and teaching of the latest doctrinal procedures, rules, and methods is also a vitally important function for the Staff College. In general, these provide a uniform, predictable, and widely understood way to arrange the details of any complex undertaking. For instance, when one division is passing through another, it is vitally important that the commanders, staffs, and soldiers of both divisions have a common understanding of how this is to be done. This uniformity in the understanding of technique is vital to successful operations in a high tempo battlefield environment. It is at the Staff College level of officer education and training that doctrine is most effectively and enduringly taught.

We must recognize that doctrinal methods will change and that we expect the graduate to be updated on these changes throughout the remainder of his career. This updating is done through the professional literature, by attending pre-command courses, and through frequent revisions of the doctrinal literature. Some graduates will also attend the senior service college approximately 6 to 10 years after Staff College attendance. The instruction at that institution begins at the operational level and encompasses military strategy, grand strategy, and national policy formulation. Some overlap 7 to 10 years after Staff College attendance can be helpful since doctrinal methods will have been revised. Many senior service college graduates will continue to return to brigade, division, and corps command and staff assignments. (But instruction in these matters should be based on current CGSC teachings, the Army cannot tolerate CGSC versus War College interpretation of doctrines. At the same time, familiarization on matters in the strategic and national policy realm should be based on war college teachings and interpretations. We must recognize that many O6s will serve in important positions who will not be war college graduates and who will also need some familiarization with matters taught at the war college.)

c. Means. Another vital function of Staff College training is to teach the function and capabilities of the tools of battle. More depth in the knowledge of current hardware capabilities is vitally needed, and is more difficult to get on the job because of the number and complexity of modern weapons. But, learning and teaching the capabilities of what is now available is essential both to the formulation of new methods and the effective employment of present capabilities in the near term.

The Staff College student must also learn to quickly adopt new tools of battle. To achieve this aim, the student must first be familiarized with the history of change in weapons and other implements of war. He must understand that he is standing on a point in a continuum. Change is part of
his past and will accelerate in his future. He needs to study the modern history of arms and he must be familiarized with changes in technology which might lead to new systems to be fielded in the span of his career.

Another vital function of the Staff College is to develop a combined arms mentality in its graduates. There must be thorough cross training between branches, if not for all, then at least for some. Staff College graduates need to understand the principles which make up or comprise the theory of combined arms. In other words, the theory of how weapons and functional organizations are combined to achieve that synergistic effect in which the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. (Our educational system has never explicitly taught combined arms theory, our former doctrinal literature has never discussed it, the new FM 100-5 does devote nearly one page to this subject before discussing the separate arms in turn.) The integrated employment of modern weapons cannot be reduced to simple rules. Practitioners must be guided by an understanding of underlying principles. The complexity and the variety of effects of modern weapons makes it imperative that officers know how to think about the combination of means. Reliance on simple combined arms methods such as the World War I dictum of "artillery leads and infantry follows" is not enough.

d. Conditions. The study of the science of war is incomplete without a study of the likely conditions prevailing on the battlefield and their varied and combined effects on operations. These include a study of the likely enemy, the separate and combined effects of weapons, geography, climate, weather and light conditions, and the human-dimension of battle—the effects of leadership, skill, stress, unit cohesion, morale, confusion, surprise, shock and panic. The combined effect of such battle conditions are difficult to teach because they are very difficult to replicate in sterile classroom environments or battle simulations. But the study of the implications of these conditions on methods and means of warfare must nonetheless be a vital part of the Staff College curriculum.

4. TEACHING THE ART OF WAR: The artful practitioner is master of the science of war. His judgment is enhanced by the knowledge of theories, methods, capabilities, and the effects of conditions. But his judgment is honed by experience which gives him a facile grasp of these foundations or fundamentals. Working out solutions to tactical, operational, and strategic problems repeatedly and under different conditions disciplines his mind to sort through trivial data rapidly, to weigh the essentials from an informed basis, and to make decisions quickly and decisively. Obviously, the art of war is best learned in combat through the course of several campaigns. But in a time when war may be very short, when so much depends on the initial performance of our leaders, and when so much depends on proper planning and preparation to insure the success of our units during the initial days of the next conflict, there must be great emphasis on developing sound military judgment in peacetime. While experience with units in the field is important, proper military schooling is vital.
SHORTCOMINGS IN HOW WE NOW TEACH THE SCIENCE AND ART OF WAR. In light
of the above, we see generally three kinds of things being taught in our
service schools today under the common rubric of "tactical instruction"
(logistics and other instruction can also be similarly categorized).

- Doctrinally prescribed methods, procedures, conventions and rules.
- Knowledge of capabilities of systems, types of organizations, and
  the enemy.
- Judgment about how to use, apply or deal with these under prescribed
  conditions.

In the first category fall such things as: the techniques and
coordination requirements for the conduct of a passage of lines or a river
crossing; the definition and use of a fire support coordination line; the
graphics to be used under such and such a condition; the procedures for
requesting close air support; and so on.

The next category comprises such things as the capabilities of the M1
tank and the M1 tank battalion, the capabilities of the multiple launch
rocket system, the CEWI battalion is capable of such and such missions, the
threat motorized regiment organizes for the attack in such and such manner,
and so on.

Finally, we try to teach an element of the art of war, tactical
judgment—how to plan and execute operations based on a given set of
circumstances; how to integrate the use of combat means to insure success on
the battlefield; and how to compare courses of action and select the best
one. We often try to teach procedures and capabilities at the same time as
we are attempting to teach tactical judgment. Sometimes we allow the
teaching of the first two categories to get in the way of teaching "tactical
judgment." At other times, we try to instill a judgemental process with
emphasis on the process. This can happen when students are not first fully
grounded in the knowledge of applicable procedures and capabilities. This
can also happen when instructors are not well grounded in the theory behind
the methods they teach and cannot resolve disputes satisfactorily or answer
questions in depth about methods, procedures and capabilities because they
lack sufficient grounding in principles.

When we look at the three different categories of "things to teach," we
find that different teaching strategies apply to different types of subject
matter.

For instance, procedures and capabilities must ultimately be committed
to memory. They consist of specific and fairly objective pieces of
knowledge which can be taught by narrow subject matter experts. Tests can
be objective, pretesting and self-paced instruction can be used. One
instructor can teach many students.
On the other hand, "tactical judgment" can only be taught based on an understanding of concepts, fundamentals, principles, and battlefield conditions. This understanding can only be gained by extensive reading and instructor-led small group discussions. Examinations must be essay type. Instructors must be knowledgeable to be effective. This requires extensive instructor preparation. Tactical judgment is developed by allowing students to develop courses of action and to make informed judgments about which is best. Instructors must critique. Too often our service school instructors cannot explain why one course of action is better than another and therefore must rely on how closely the student arrived at or followed the "school solution." Too often he simply critiqued how closely procedures and rules were followed. He does not base his critique on principles. Students must be able to immediately apply what they have learned to a new but similar situation in order for learning to take place. (The current curriculum allows too little or no time for this.)

Interactive war gaming is one way for students to learn from their own mistakes, but the games must be long enough to make the point, and there must be time for replay (current war games need some work to make them better for the classroom). Basically we need to spend more time having students develop courses of action and being critiqued either by an instructor or a war game or, preferably both. Explanations should be based on principles. We need to structure problems so that they get progressively more complicated. In short, we fail to teach tactical judgment because we tend to concentrate on the teaching of doctrinally prescribed procedures and capabilities. We test how well students know these and test less well on whether they can explain rationally why they chose a particular course of action.

There are several reasons why this is so. First there is insufficient time in most service school curriculums to build the foundational, understanding of principles and real battlefield conditions necessary to develop tactical judgment. There is insufficient time to conduct iterative exercises. Students rarely have the opportunity to practice what they've learned after a critique—to do the problem again in slightly different circumstances and thereby to develop their judgment. Second, our instructors are too few, overburdened and underprepared to conduct the kinds of indepth critiques that are necessary to properly teach tactical judgment. Often instructors are only marginally better qualified than their students and are given no time in the beginning of their assignment to develop the intellectual skills necessary to properly teach their subject matter.

If we relate the above discussion to the problem of teaching the science and the art of war, we find that we do not teach the complete "Science" and therefore, cannot teach the "Art." To the first two categories of subject matter we must add two more—the teaching of principles and a better understanding of the "frictions" brought about by the conditions of war.
6. DEVELOPING THE ARTFUL PRACTITIONER. There is nothing magical about developing the artful practitioner. It does not depend on an inborn sense, or what the Germans call "finger spitzengefuehl,"--a magical feel in the end of one's fingers. It depends on a carefully patterned mode of thinking about military concerns. It is "how to think" and not "what to think" in solving military problems.

Developing the artful practitioner, therefore, depends on the right kinds of relevant real, simulated, or vicarious experience. Relevant real experience is rare and, in today's rapidly changing world, has an increasingly shorter half-life. Long periods of peace interrupted by short wars, either ours or that of others, allow for periodic updating of real or vicarious experience.*

a. Learning from History. Military history is nothing more or less than the record of trial and error on which today's principles and methods are based. The purpose of this reading should not be the accumulation of trivia to be called forth to impress others with one's erudition, but rather the purpose of the study of history should be the distillation of enduring principles and insights. Insights are, after all, rudimentary theories or hypothesis. For instance, people change little over time. Knowing what enabled a commander to impose his will on his own troops and ultimately on those of the enemy is valuable indeed.

What kept Hood's 15th and 47th Alabama regiments from taking Little Round Top at Gettysburg or what caused the 24th Wisconsin to prevail on Missionary Ridge at Chattanooga is as useful today as ever. Also, the study of former methods is valuable if one discovers the reason for their success and can deduce underlying principles. A knowledge of ancient weapons is worthwhile if one discovers the relationships between weapons and arms and the fundamentals of combined arms theory. Operational military history is more valuable for gaining insights into the conduct of war than institutional military history, yet we tend to stress the latter. Nor should the American officer limit his study to American military history. Doing so severely limits the available vicarious experience.

Weapons and conditions change, but principles, relationships, patterns, and mental images remain. In the early eighteenth century, Marshal de Saxe warned against entrenchments as a method of defense, and advocated a system of redoubts and cavalry counterattacks. The soldiers of World War I relearned that same lesson late in the war as they adopted mutually supporting strongpoints and counterattacking reserves.** Our latest doctrinal revision of FM 100-5 again draws on this image as it advocates the combination of static and dynamic elements rather than linear dispositions in the design of modern defensive methods.

b. Learning from War Games and Simulations. War games and simulations are one apparent solution to gaining some kinds of relevant experience, and the US Army has made great strides in this area. However, learning from war games is also fraught with danger. These games must be scientifically designed, the inner workings of the games must rest on a firm foundation of enduring principles or the wrong lessons are learned. Too often the inner workings or decision logic of these simulations is hidden from view. Gamesmanship and not military art is learned from improperly designed war games and simulations. War games never allow the full manipulation of all variables the combat commander must deal with in "real" situations. They simply cannot portray all variables—especially the human factor. The players must know this and must be constantly made aware of the variables which are not portrayed (or which are given fixed, constant values) to avoid developing biased thought patterns.

War games in the hands of soldiers who understand their limitations are excellent training tools. We have all played Dunn-Kempf, CAMMS, and First Battle. However good these are—they are certainly better than what was before—they teach firepower biased lessons in which soldiers are never unwilling, afraid, cold, hungry, tired, sleepy, surprised, or skilled (or unskilled). We can move or shoot. We can service targets, coordinate fires (in a sense), and practice some of our tactical methods and communications procedures. We cannot attack the will of the opposing commanders and soldiers, which is the essence of victory and defeat in warfare. Their units and ours continue to fight until only so many soldiers or pieces of equipment remain. Then we remove them to oblivion. In short, of necessity we make war very simple in these games. We make it manageable. And that's the crux of the problem—we may be teaching only the management of war, and not how to think of creative, strategic, operational, and tactical solutions and how to lead soldiers in battle. War games in the hands of the untutored are dangerous in that incorrect conclusions and patterns of thought can be developed. For instance, students can develop fatalistic attitudes based on a too confining belief in the inescapable judgment of force ratios. There are too many cases in history where the results have defied the odds. Again, the 20th Maine at Little Round Top and the 24th Wisconsin at Missionary Ridge are two of many such examples.

In the end, the art of war consists of the artful practice of the science of war. Something akin to "finger spigenfueh1" can be developed. But first the professional soldier must master the fundamentals of his science at his particular level. Then he must gain a variety of experience (classroom war gaming, and discussion will suffice for a beginning) until his mind is disciplined and ordered. Finally, more experience and reflection can lead to near intuition as he reaches the plateau of familiarity with the conduct of war. In sum, the art of war demands disciplined intellectual activity. To develop the artful practitioner, we need to examine our current approaches to officer education and training.
ANNEX B

SUMMARY OF RECENT EXTERNAL
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ANNEX B

Summary of Recent External Studies of CGSC

1. INTRODUCTION: Three recent external studies have examined the training and education of officers at Fort Leavenworth. These are the 1979 RETO study, the 1982 Strategic Studies Institute study entitled "Operation Planning: An Analysis of the Education and Development of Effective Army Planners," and the 1982 study by MG Meloy of DA DCSOPS for the Chief of Staff of the Army. What follows is a summary of their findings.

2. REVIEW OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING OF OFFICERS (RETO) STUDY. No study of any aspect of our Army school system is complete without reference to or examination of at least portions of the five volume RETO report. The RETO study was one of the most exhaustive studies ever made of the US Army's procedures and practices for developing its officers from the pre-commission stage through the end of their careers. Many RETO recommendations are being implemented and others are still under active consideration. A short summary of RETO findings and recommendations can hardly do justice to the rigor of RETO study methodology and the depth of thought behind them.

   a. RETO Focus: Staff college education/training was given thorough attention and was examined in the context of the continuum of career-long officer development. What our Army does was compared to what is done in foreign armies, sister services, industry and in other professions.

   b. Discussion and RETO Findings: One of the important things to remember though in reading the RETO report was the fact that the study was accomplished during a time when training and education resources in the Army were under heavy external pressure and when OPMS was newly introduced and heavily championed by the same Chief of Staff of the Army who chartered the RETO study. One result of the former is that a constant concern of RETO was to minimize costs through streamlining the Army school system. This caused RETO to not seriously consider a 2-year CGSC course, but they did recognize the need to obtain a higher quality output from CGSC. Their combined recommendations in this area, when totally implemented, would definitely improve output.

   o While one could not with a clear conscience say that they were looking for ways to make OPMS work, one can say that the newness of OPMS and General Rogers' sponsorship of it caused them to seek ways to align the Army school system with the new officer management system. It is significant then to recognize the emphasis they placed on generalist staff training.

   o They recognized our austerity in this area compared to first rate foreign armies and, within the constraints placed on them, recommended an increase of resources be devoted to mid-career staff training. (This was the only area of officer development for which this was done. Other areas were pared.)
c. RETO Recommendations: Their recommendation was to establish CAS3 for all officers except those to attend the 10-month course. The 10-month course was to become much more rigorous by selecting only 450 Army officers annually rather than the nearly 900 attending now. This they determined in their studies would meet the Army's need for officers with "higher order general staff skills," but further they recommended a front-end analysis be done by specialty to determine what specialties needed how many annual quotas in the course. The reasoning here was that a smaller percentage of some specialties need attend than other specialties. It was thought that the smaller, more highly-selected, student body could be taught at a higher level and faster pace.

This recommendation was coupled to the belief that a "quality" student body required a "quality" faculty in enough numbers to create a stimulating, rigorous, and cost-efficient learning experience. Based on their findings about similar programs in other first rate armies, industry and academia, they determined that the student faculty ratio must be about 5 to 1. They also noted that other Armies considered the quality of their faculties a very top priority, and recognized the positive developmental value of staff college faculty time for their very best officers.

The 10-month program was to be based on a foundation of fundamentals derived from the completion of a 120-hour non-resent instruction "mail ahead packet" and a program of Military Skill Qualification (MSQ) requirements prior to selection for the rank of Major.

The RETO study group had the expectation that their combined proposals would meet the Army's needs. As they put it in their report:

"The complexity of modern war, both in preparation and execution, requires broader knowledge and more rigorous application than has been demanded in the past. We believe this proposal is a significant step in that direction."

d. Conclusion: Eventually the Army and the 10-month CGSO course will benefit from the product of CAS3. However, the large CGSO classes and the continuing faculty shortfalls will hinder the accomplishment of their aims for the CGSO course.

e. Appendix 1 to this Annex contains excerpts from the RETO study.
3. Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) Study "PLANNER STUDY". SSI Study "Operation Planning: An Analysis of the Education and Development of Effective Army Planners," identified a need for better education of Army planners—more officers who can conceptualize and be creative. Some quotes from that study:

a. Study Focus. - The genesis and focus of this study was described this way:

"LTG Richardson (DADCSOPS) stated that the central problem was to be found in the Army's reduced ability to develop effective and executable contingency plans, particularly plans for deployment and employment of existing forces, and particularly in innovative and nontraditional modes; he wished this study to identify deficiencies in the Army's schooling system which are contributing to the problem and to recommend actions to correct them."

b. Study Methods and Problem Definition. This study conducted far-ranging interviews to determine what the extent of the problem was, who these "planners" were, and what they needed in training or education (among other things) to make them better planners. This study also elicited comments in several other areas.

o First, who are "planners"?

"All army officers are "planners" in one sense or another—"that individual who performs the necessary rational abstract and concrete reasoning involved with the conceptualization, integration, and/or technical processing of data necessary in the planning process."

o Second, what are the ingredients of a good Army planner at any Army or joint level?

"The basic ingredient for a good army planner is a sound education in combined arms operations and support."

"All officers must be trained to think logically; the best should be exposed to an environment which encourages the development of innovative thinking."

"Perhaps more important is the Army's failure to recognize what it really needs in a joint planning position, and that Army officers in these positions act as the Army's representatives in the joint arena and must above all be fully qualified in combined arms education."

"An Army officer in a joint planning position is able to acquire a working knowledge of JOPS within a relatively short time . . ."

"Without being more broadly educated as opposed to being narrowly trained, planners cannot appreciate the consequences of their decisions."
o "... all planners, to include all innovative thinkers must be firmly grounded in logic, doctrine, organization, and functions."

o "The logic patterns of the Military Decisionmaking Process, the Estimate of the Situation, and the Five Paragraph Field Order predate operations research and systems analysis techniques. However, in recent years this logic pattern fell on hard times. More exposure to and awareness of these patterns is not sufficient in a risk-laden, imprecise, and stressful environment that surrounds military operations. 'Hands-on' training in a variety of circumstances, with constant iterative feedback is required to impart that singleminded awareness of 'language, practices, and techniques' that will be critical to the success of the Operational Concept (of the new FM 100-5)."

o "An impact of NMS appears to be the narrowing of an officer's outlook, which restricts the development of innovative thinking and the capability to perform the necessary integrative actions required in good planning."

o "Review of Command and General Staff College. One part of the study was devoted to a review of schooling at Fort Leavenworth (both CAS3 and CGSO courses).

The team visited Fort Leavenworth ... to determine whether planning was being adequately addressed within the scope of the current curriculum, and second, to determine if the scope of the curriculum was such that it provided an educational background for the development of planners to adequately perform in the multi-faceted planning areas."

o "Curriculum. Recognizing that CGSC is the "premier school in the Army," the following weaknesses in CGSC programs were noted:

o "... the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth is essentially instructing at the cognitive level and testing at the recognition level and has been since the early 1970's. We can get by with training the data manager, but we must educate the conceptualizer and integrator."

o "Narrow focusing (on OPS and next job) along with a very busy schedule does not create an atmosphere for the encouragement of innovative thinking among CGSC students."

o "Opinions were expressed to the study team by ranking key personnel in the field, that CGSC was also too involved in training in response to what the Army is rather than educating for what the Army should be. These opinions were expressed in support of a broad military education which would help develop logical and innovative thinkers and planners versus a narrow focus on training which will ultimately produce commanders who are not broad based and thereby 'totally captive of their staffs.'
The curriculum is a mile wide and an inch deep. Without being more broadly educated as opposed to being narrowly trained, planners cannot appreciate the consequences of their decisions. A broad education in the profession of arms, not just training for the next assignment, is required for an officer to be a conceptualizer or integrator.

The Army schooling system is structured more to train its officers for their next assignment than to educate them for the military profession.

The (CGSC) curriculum is tightly structured, creating pressure on both the faculty and student body. Insufficient unstructured time is provided for broad thinking and development of logical and innovative concepts, which might ultimately be presented orally or in writing. The curriculum is constrained from incorporating situations into the practical exercises or written evaluations which require the development of innovative solutions as answers because of the additional faculty time required to critique such solutions. While the Military Decisionmaking Process is taught at CGSC, it is not very well reinforced by the way the POI is structured. The deliberate development of options as a part of this sequence is a highly useful tool for encouraging logical and innovative thinking; however, the use of this tool is restrained by the overall constraints placed on the curriculum. This sequence is a basic tool that every commander and staff officer must master if he is to be able to plan.

Operations and planning through the division level are covered adequately at CGSC. On the other hand, corps operations and support are covered only minimally.

The CGSC curriculum must be examined to eliminate hours that do not make a direct contribution to developing a foundation in combined arms, operations, and planning. Hours freed be used as unstructured time for individual and group projects and development of innovative solutions to problems.

e. Faculty: The SSI study noted that "Only a highly experienced faculty with sufficient time can guide students toward meaningful alternative solutions to problems, a necessary step in developing logical and innovative thinking." They recognized the "seed corn" aspects of CGSC faculty assignments and that both "quantity and their quality of the instructor staff are critical to the development of the student."

With regard to quantity, they recognized that "As of 4 December 1981, the faculty had 52 percent on hand of recognized requirements and 66 percent of authorizations." (What was not pointed out to them was the fact that CGSC requirements are based on a yard stick of "platform hours" which does not fully recognize all problems unique to CGSC, such as longer instructor preparation time for instruction at a relatively high cognitive
level and the heavy burden of manual reviews of all manuals produced at all branch centers. The latter requirement is totally unrecognized. The other aspect of this problem is that there is no recognition of the time it takes to bring a new instructor "off the street," especially if he graduated from CGSC several years ago, and educate him enough so he is more than "lesson plan deep." The recent decision to place CGSC at level 1 on the DA Master Priority List will alleviate some of the "quantity" problems. However, CGSC must undergo a parallel reevaluation of its manning requirements to meet the need identified in the SSI study.

The SSI study also saw a distinct bias in "quality" of faculty when compared to that found in other Army agencies. Some of their findings:

- Promotion to 06: Of 32 eligible, 7 selected.
- Faculty with previous command experience: Of 113 05 and 06 on faculty, 13 with previous command (and these tended to cluster on the very successful new CAS3 faculty).
- Selection for FY 83 Command: Of 90 05s eligible, 5 selected, and of 10 06s eligible, none selected.
- Selection for SSC AY 83: 2, one of which was deferred from AY 82.
- They compared these to the Army Readiness and Mobilization Region located in Aurora, Colorado, which, during the same time frame, had 11 ex-brigade commanders of 24 assigned Colonels.

f. Conclusions: The SSI study went far in recognizing what is needed to develop capable "planners." They also saw some weaknesses in the 1-year CGSC course. But what they saw were mostly symptoms of a deeper cause. They recognized only one of those causes—the faculty—and touched on several others without seeing those clearly. One of those is the exponential explosion of knowledge which is now fundamental to how the Army operates and the lack of time to do much more than is now done in the 1-year course. Another is the need to explore ways to better integrate the instruction, raise the level of rigor of instruction, and apply better teaching methodologies. This can only be done with a more experienced faculty who has time to be thoroughly prepared and stimulating, and requires a structural reorganization of the College. The compartmented nature of the education process at CGSC is the final root cause. Departmental lines of jurisdiction lead to artificially narrowed focusing in the teaching and learning process. One important factor in the success of CAS3 is the fact that one staff leader takes one small group of students through the entire curriculum and can relate previous instruction to the subjects currently being studied.
g. Appendix 2—Excerpts from SSI study, are provided for additional information.

4. MG MELOY STUDY: Though brief, MG Meloy's report on CGSC is the most useful and illuminating report on the Staff College in recent years.

   a. Study Focus. This report was precipitated by the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Edward C. Meyer, who sent MG Meloy, a respected ex-division commander on the DADCSOPS staff, to Fort Leavenworth to see whether some criticism of Fort Leavenworth made by General George C. Marshall in a 1933 letter to the Commandant at there Leavenworth was still valid (for summary of GEN Marshall's criticism, see appendix 3 to this annex).

   b. Findings: MG Meloy and his team visited Fort Leavenworth 18-21 January 1982. The executive summary of their findings is included in appendix 3 to this annex. Those noted here apply particularly to the subject of this report.

   o College Mission and Curriculum. MG Meloy found too much crammed into the 1-year program and observed that the mission of the College was too broad to be adequately covered in 1 year. The curriculum did not allow discussion of material in adequate depth to impart more than fundamental knowledge of a subject.

   o Faculty. He found the faculty inadequate in number and only marginally qualified to teach. He strongly urged that faculty manning be given top priority.

   o Student Body. He took issue with the diversity of the student body and the need to pitch classes at "Joe Homogeneous."

   o Evaluation System, Teaching Methodology and Rigor of Course. He took issue with the method of evaluation and noted that because of the limited time for each subject, the faculty tended to "teach the examination." He found that talented students were very busy but only marginally challenged.

   o Ongoing Changes at CGSC. He also found that numerous improvements in curriculum and teaching methodology were moving the College in the right direction.

   c. Conclusion: The programs proposed in this study go far to address the problems surfaced by MG Meloy and his team.

   o The mission of the College is more achievable with the addition of the proposed second year course and the proposed revision to the CGSO course. In both, time is made available to provide the in-depth discussion and critiques needed to develop depth of understanding.
- MG Meloy's findings about faculty are also addressed in the proposals.

- MG Meloy's findings about student body diversity is a problem which is also addressed in this study's CGSO proposals.

- MG Meloy's criticism of evaluation methods and their impact on the teaching/learning process are taken into account in the structure and methodology of the proposed programs. Formal written examinations are deemphasized in the CGSO proposal and not used in the second year program. Emphasis is on subjective evaluation of student performance by the faculty in both proposals.
3. FIELD GRADE OFFICER DEVELOPMENT TRAINING AND EDUCATION SYSTEM...

a. The Review of Education and Training for Officers analysis concluded that all field grade officers need staff training and approximately 20 percent require an intensive education in higher order skills and advanced knowledge.

b. The career of a field grade officer is devoted mainly to staff duty. Command positions are exceptions to this pattern, but are few in number and infrequent even in the career of the officer who commands. Staff duty is the common experience for all, ranging from battalion level to Headquarters, Department of the Army.

c. For optimum efficiency of utilization, staff training should be given before promotion to major or early in that grade. As described in appendix 3, all officers would be permitted, upon promotion to captain, to enroll in a 120-hour nonresident (NRI) Combined Arms and Services Course offered by the Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Completion of this course, culminating in a 6-hour, locally proctored examination, would be a prerequisite for:

(1) Promotion to major,

(2) Attendance at CAS3, and

(3) Consideration for selection to USACGSC.

Shortly after selection for promotion to major, all officers who have completed the NRI course would be programmed into the resident 297-hour CAS3, on TDY and then return to their units of assignment. The course, a follow-on to the 120-hour nonresident course, would stress staff techniques at the battalion and brigade level, including combining of arms and services in the division.
d. For the minority of officers who require higher order skill training and advanced education, the USACGSC would admit approximately 20 percent of each year-group of new majors. This percentage has not been determined arbitrarily; rather, it reflects the total number of majors needed to be trained in each specialty, for higher level principal staff officer duties in the grades of major/lieutenant colonel/colonel (see enclosure 1, appendix 4). The 42-week USACGSC curriculum, described notionally in appendix 4, would be a follow-on to the 120-hour nonresident course and would include the substance of CAS3 in its early portion. The new USACGSC would be more intensive than the current USACGSC, by virtue of both preparation in the nonresident course and a more highly selected student body. Graduates of USACGSC would be allocated to the major commands of the Army on a basis of each command’s needs for higher order skilled officers in each specialty. A maximum of 200 Active Army and 200 Reserve Component officers would be allowed to take a nonresident version of USACGSC annually, on a competitive basis, as is now the case in the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) "Corresponding Studies Program.”

4. ALLIED OFFICER PREPARATION.

Allied officers may attend the resident CAS3 course after completing the 120-hour nonresident course and examination. A maximum of 13 (one per section) Allied officers can be programmed for each resident CAS3 course. A total of 56 allied officers would be programmed into each USACGSC course, with the NRI course and examination being completed as part of the 4-week Allied Officer Preparatory Course. Total annual Allied officer enrollment in USACGSC and CAS3 will be 108.

5. SUMMARY.

The new training and education system for field grade officer development has been comprehensively designed with regard to all aspects of the Army’s needs for trained and educated majors and lieutenant colonels (and colonels who do not attend a Senior Service College). It is also part of an overall training and education system for the entire officer corps. For this reason, the field grade officer development training and education system should not be viewed in isolation but as part of the whole—the total system of professional development for Army officers.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS. It is recommended that:

a. A CAS3 be established at the Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to train all Active Army and Reserve Component majors for service as staff officers with the Army in the field.

b. The 9-week resident course be preceded by a nonresident 120-hour pre-CAS3 course and a 6-hour locally proctored examination.

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(1) The resident CAS³ be designed to accommodate 600 students per course, 4 courses per year, with normal attendance of 500 Active Army, 72 Reserve Component officers and a maximum of 13 Allied officers per course.

(2) A nonresident CAS³ be developed for Reserve Component officers who do not attend the resident course.

c. All Active Army officers not selected for USACGSC attend the resident CAS³ in a TTV and return status prior to the end of their 12th year of service.

d. Completion of the nonresident pre-CAS³ course and examination be a part of Military Qualification Standards. (Recommended in annex D.)

e. CAS³ graduates be considered for all duty positions (including command and high level staff) commensurate with grade, experience and specialty qualification.

f. An actual or implied prerequisite of graduation from USACGSC, Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC), or equivalent be explicitly removed from the selection process for battalion command and SSC once CAS³ graduates have achieved the appropriate rank and years of service to compete for selection.

g. The 42-week USACGSC course at Fort Leavenworth be modified to include CAS³ and be continued for centrally selected officer students in all specialties between their 10th and 12th years of service:

(1) Reduce attendance at the resident course to approximately 20 percent of a year-group.

(2) Determine USACGSC class composition by specialty to meet Army needs for officers trained in higher order staff skills and possessing advanced knowledge in various commands.

(3) Reduce Allied officer enrollment from 94 to 56 in each USACGSC course (a maximum of one per workgroup).

(4) Increase Reserve Component spaces at USACGSC from 4 to 14 annually (one per section).

(5) Discontinue the current resident 18-week Reserve Component course at USACGSC.

h. Sister service and foreign staff college attendance be continued for centrally selected Army officers and that they be CAS³ graduates prior to attendance.
1. The current USACGSC nonresident program (design based on the 18-week RC course) be replaced with one that centrally selects 200 Active Army and 200 Reserve Component CAS3 graduate applicants annually for a 2-year "Corresponding Studies Program" based on the full academic year regular course along the lines of the current USAWC program.

j. The Army recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a complete review of the curriculum at the current 22-week permanent change of station AFSC course with a view toward creating short, functional, TDY courses for Army CAS3 and USACGSC graduates enroute to joint assignments. Additionally, AFSC should develop NRI packages.

1. The Army create a comprehensive faculty development program for the USACGSC which insures:

   (1) Subject matter experts.

   (2) Sufficient numbers to allow at least 50 percent of the instruction to be small-group, instructor-led seminars.

   (3) Tenured and extended-tour faculty.

   (4) A student to faculty ratio of about 5 to 1.

Excerpts from:

REVIEW OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR OFFICERS

APPENDIX 1

PREPARING FIELD GRADE OFFICERS

TO ANNEX E

TRAINING AND EDUCATION FOR FIELD GRADE OFFICER DEVELOPMENT

With increased rank come greater responsibility and broader horizons. The relatively narrow, primary-specialty-specific, troop-oriented focus of most company grade officers changes at the rank of major to include the integration of diverse functions and organizations. The purpose of this Appendix is to discuss how the Army should train and educate its field grade officers during this important transition phase of their careers.
The crucial question in designing a system to train and educate field grade officers to meet Army requirements is one of proportions. How much training do all field grade officers need? Is there some minority who require broader and more intensive education to prepare them for high-level staff duties? If so, how many should receive this education and of what should it consist? Finally, what are the implications of a system that differs from the current one?

COMMON FIELD GRADE TRAINING

The basis for determining what training and education is required for all field grade officers is the nature of the duties to be accomplished by those officers. Analysts examined the significant duty modules (clusters of tasks) for field grade officer positions in all OPMS specialties. The criterion for significance used was that an officer should have at least a 40-percent chance of performing the duty module while serving in a particular grade. The majority of significant duty modules were found to involve staff and management activities of a general nature, and majors and lieutenant colonels spend most of their time in such staff duties. This led to the conclusion that, regardless of specialty, the field grade officer needs staff training soon after selection for promotion to major. Further, all the evidence studied indicated that this conclusion would be valid for the 1980's and 1990's as well.

As an officer progresses from the company grades to the field grades, the balance between technical, human, and conceptual skills shifts. ... A large proportion of company grade training is technical in nature. The field grade middle-manager needs a broader understanding of human and conceptual skills than he did as a captain. The RETO proposal to restructure the current career course, coupled with the establishment of Military Qualification Standards, will lead to a more technically proficient captain, and it shifts the requirement for the more sophisticated learning to the field grade years. On selection for promotion to major, then it becomes essential that all officers acquire the fundamentals of Army staff procedures and expand their basic knowledge of the doctrinal basis for combined arms employment.

Given that there are a number of "significant duty modules" for field grade officers and that they apply to both specialties in which the officer will serve, what are the essential skills and knowledge required for all field grade officers? Analysis indicated that the skills needed are Army-relevant, middle-management abilities in the training, equipping, supplying, maintenance, administration, and tactical employment of combined arms and services on the modern battlefield. Additionally, there is a recognized requirement for effective communications and interpersonal sensitivity.
After considering all feasible options, it was concluded that the training and education requirements for field grade officers could best be met by the creation of a Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3) for all field grade officers, with attendance shortly after selection for promotion to major. A preliminary curriculum analysis completed by USACGSC led to the recommendation for a 9-week TDY course as a resident follow-on to a 120-hour non-resident (NRI) (equivalent to four weeks of resident instruction) preparatory package. The officer would complete the NRI phase while a captain, as part of the RETO recommended system of Military Qualification Standards. CAS3 would focus on troop staff procedures incident to the employment of combined arms at the battalion, brigade, and division level, and would satisfy the Army's fundamental requirements for trained staff officers. It would also insure that every field grade officer would be trained in standardized staff procedures and in the same doctrinal concepts, thereby achieving procedural and doctrinal unity throughout the Army to a degree never before attained.

E3W MANY—HOW MUCH—OF WHAT?

In the process of establishing that all field grade officers need training in staff fundamentals, it was also determined that some proportion needed to be educated more intensively in higher order skills and to be provided a broader foundation for continuing professional growth.

The pressures placed on the military establishment are ever increasing. The international situation demands forces-in-being at an unprecedentedly high state of readiness. This situation requires that the officer corps—prepared by a thorough system of professional development—maintain an even greater standard of excellence than that which laid the groundwork for the victories of World War II and served so well during the Cold War era. This must be done in the face of severe budgetary constraints and rapid inflation. Simply put, the Army must have some number, as yet undetermined, of officers intensively trained in complex, higher-order staff skills.

As a basis for determining how many field grade officers need a more intensive professional education, a list of higher-order staff skills was compiled using duty modules from field grade positions Army-wide. These skills were more complex and difficult to master. Some of these skills were required in virtually all field grade positions, and were prioritized by weighting each higher-order duty module, in order of complexity. By comparing and weighting the relative frequency with which various
higher-order duty modules occur in each specialty and in the Army as a whole, about 20 percent of each year-group entering field grade ranks were determined to require advanced training in these skills. Since officers will serve about half their time in each of their two specialties, and since all specialties have some requirement for higher-order skills at all field grades, a methodology to determine the appropriate percentage in each specialty who required more intensive education was also developed. This methodology and its implication for determining USACGSC class size and specialty mix is discussed in appendix 4 of this annex.

A detailed analysis of the current curriculum of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, in light of expected requirements and the fact that all officers to attend either CAS3 or USACGSC will have completed the pre-CAS3 nonresident package, led to the recommendation that the 20 percent centrally selected for more intensive education should attend a course at USACGSC for a full academic year.

The fundamental purpose of the USACGSC course would be to educate and train selected officers in the higher order skills necessary for the coordination and integration of combined arms formations, and the necessary high level staff skills of personnel management, all-source intelligence collection and evaluation, and logistics on the modern battlefield. The course would also educate officers more effectively in resource management, training management, coalition warfare, analytical techniques, conceptual skills, and communicative arts.

* * *

**CONCERNS**

* * *

Opportunity for as many as possible for as long as possible is a fundamental tenet within the officer corps of the American Army. It is alleged that selecting only 20 percent to attend the 42-week USACGSC course will pre-determine the future competitiveness of that small minority, whereas the current system of 40 percent/60 percent allows for "late bloomers" and is therefore more "equitable."

In fact, the reverse is the case. Using projections of future promotion rates (provided by ODCSPER), it appears that the selection rate from major to lieutenant colonel will be around 70 percent and from lieutenant colonel to colonel around 50 percent. If one postulates that most USACGSC graduates will be promoted and if 40 percent of all majors attend USACGSC (current system) and 35 percent of all majors (70 x 50) go on to make colonel, the non-USACGSC 60 percent are effectively excluded from promotion to colonel and thereby demotivated for further service. But if only 20 percent needed attend USACGSC (RETO proposal), a significant proportion of the remaining
80 percent (all CAS3 graduates) have a chance to make colonel, thereby sustaining the professional motivation by the entire 80 percent. For a recent analysis by Trevor Dupuy of the impact on performance and morale following the enlarging of the German Staff Corps, see Inclosure 1.

Inclosure 1—RETO Command and General Staff College Recommendation (Appendix 4—Command and General Staff College to Annex E—TRAINING AND EDUCATION FOR FIELD GRADE OFFICER DEVELOPMENT attached in full.)
SUMMARY

The Army recognizes that serious deficiencies exist in all Joint and Army planning systems, and that these deficiencies derive in part from the skill of people at all levels, from ADP hardware and software limitations, and from the design of the systems themselves. This study identifies and examines the shortcomings in the operation planning system (as defined in the four-volume Joint Chiefs of Staff manual, the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPPS), and specifically those deficiencies which come from Army procedures for identifying, educating, and developing operation planners.

The purpose of this study is to identify actions to improve operation planning through changes in the Army's system of developing and using Army planners. The study approach included extensive interviews of general and other senior officers in three areas: the Army and Joint schooling systems, where planning concepts are taught; major commands, where planning is accomplished; and the Joint Staff, where overall planning policy is developed and review of plans takes place.

Observations:

a. No clear agreement on what constitutes planning exists. The study proposes that the planning process consists of:

(1) Conceptualization: Commander's visualization of the operation and its development in the pursuit of his mission.

(2) Integration: Staff actions to integrate the concept and the components of the plan into a harmonized whole within the overall planning system.

(3) Technical processing: Development, management, and maintenance of data in support of the plan.

b. If an officer is to be a proficient planner, he must understand the major types of operation planning. These are:

(1) Employment;
(2) Deployment;
(3) Mobilization;
(4) Reception;
(5) Sustainment; and,
(6) Execution.

c. Army planning as a system is beset by misunderstanding of how the system works and of the types of planning accomplished at the various echelons, and lack of an appreciation of the educational responsibilities of the various levels of schooling for instruction in planning.

d. The core issues of this study are the critical elements in the development of planners. These issues are:

1. An institutionalized planning logic. The system contained in the Estimate of the Situation is cited as the logic required. Paragraph 3a of the Operation Order, Concept of Operations, is considered to be the product of the logic process.

2. Approved Army doctrine upon which planning can be based and planner development can be guided.

3. An Army school system which develops the planners' abilities in conceptualization, integration, and technical processing in accordance with Army logic and doctrine.

e. An interlocking relationship exists among the three core issues—logic, doctrine, and schooling. Logic supports doctrine and neither has been taught properly in Army schools for a decade.

f. The formal instruction of logic is foreign to most military officers; it is not taught in any program of military-controlled instruction from Officers' Basic Courses through the War College. Yet, logic is critical to the planning situation; for to plan, one must think logically. The logic patterns of the Military Decisionmaking Process, the Estimate of the Situation, and the Five Paragraph Field Order predate operations research and systems analysis techniques. However, in recent years, this logic pattern has fallen on hard times.

g. Equally critical is the doctrine that provides the matrix for this logic. Once again, while the "How-to-Fight" manuals capture the essence of division and below, the principal planning organizations of the Army, the corps and echelons above corps (EAC), have been without doctrine to provide guidance, delineate functions, or define responsibilities.

h. In linking doctrine and logic, CGSC is critical to the development of planners. The critical focus lies in CGSC's program of instruction for both resident and corresponding students. Its purpose is to develop the officers' abilities in conceptionalization, integration and technical processing of data in accordance with planning logic and doctrine.
Overlapping this is a military education designed to provide an appreciation of the broad aspects of the military art. Through such a program, all resident and corresponding graduates would possess the basic "tool kit" required for planners. This "kit" would include logic, doctrine, organizations and functions, and an understanding of the planning system. Through additional exposure and use as planners, those who possess the distinct and unique talents of innovative thinkers would be recognized and identified for higher and more complex planning assignments. All planners, to include all innovative thinkers, must be firmly grounded in logic, doctrine, organization and functions. Any less firm foundation for planners would result in less-than-professional products.

Conclusions:

a. The Army planning system is lacking in logic and order:

   (1) There is no consensus: on what a planner is, what he should know, or be able to do; on the types of planning required by the Army or the types of planning in general; or on what types or levels of planning should be the primary domain of the various levels of schooling.

   (2) Vocabulary in the planning area is chaotic. Inadequate terminology and misleading, contradictory, and undisciplined use of existing terms abound.

b. The significant deficiencies in Army planning do not derive simply from inadequate schooling, and cannot be corrected alone by any school curriculum.

c. However, proper schooling of Army officers in planning logic and doctrine can have a significant impact on improving the Army's capability to plan.

d. Fort Leavenworth (CAE3 and CGSC) has the key role in developing operation planners because of its role in teaching the Army combined arms concept. In addition, the majority of officers involved in operation planning have not been to the War College.

e. The schooling system should teach all officers to be planners and logical thinkers. In addition, the curricula should be designed to permit the best officers to develop into exceptional planners and innovative thinkers. That system and environment have been lacking at CGSC for at least a decade.

f. Over the past decade, the teaching and use of planning logic and the associated frameworks (Military Decisionmaking Process, to include the Estimate of the Situation) have been inadequate.
The Military Decisionmaking Process, to include the Estimate of the Situation, has not been reinforced adequately in school tactical exercises and other instructions.

There appears to have been a general lack of appreciation of the value of the Estimate of the Situation in developing the Concept of Operation.

The key to a good Concept of Operation and ultimately a good operation plan is a logical and thorough Estimate of the Situation.

The value of developing alternative courses of action to include the analysis of risks involved in each has not been appreciated in the teaching of officers to think logically and to plan.

The 1942 Naval War College work, Sound Military Decision, unequivocally established the importance of the Estimate in operation planning. It need updating.

The operationally permissive environment during combat operations in Vietnam led to development of a "hands-on" learning experience that failed to reinforce or illustrate the need for thorough and logical planning conducted within an established framework (Military Decisionmaking Process).

g. Corps and EAC doctrine have not supported the schools or the Army in the field well for at least a decade.

h. The lack of published doctrine for corps and EAC (to include joint commands) has hindered the development of planners through the teaching of "what is" (without doctrine) as opposed to "what should be" (with doctrine).

i. Education and training in corps and EAC operations, support, and planning are primary ingredients in forming an intellectual foundation for competent operation planning.

j. As a result of the foregoing, the Army's schooling system is deficient in its development of a sound foundation for planners:

(1) The military decisionmaking process is not emphasized and reinforced sufficiently throughout the courses of instruction.

(2) Instruction in corps and EAC operations, support, and planning is lacking.

(3) Deployment operations and planning instruction is insufficient.

(4) Mobilization planning training is lacking.
(5) The system is structured more to train its officers for their next assignment than to educate them to the military profession. It does not provide an atmosphere for the development of innovative thinkers.

(6) Excessive turbulence, decreased quality and quantity of instructors, and constrained curriculum have had an adverse impact on CGSC's development of logical and innovative thinkers.

k. The basic ingredient for a good Army planner is a sound education in combined arms operations and support. In spite of deficiencies that exist in the CAS3 or CGSC curricula, Fort Leavenworth still provides a better educational foundation for Army planners, even in joint assignments, than the other equivalent level schools.

l. Of all the institutions in the Army schooling system, CGSC is the premier school. It is the repository for the combined arms concept which is the framework for the Army profession of arms. Therefore, CGSC should be given special consideration in the allocation of qualified manpower, time and other instructional resources and encouraged to experiment further with innovative approaches to provide mid-career officers with a firm grounding in the military profession. In addition, command, faculty, and curriculum turbulence in CGSC must be lessened.

m. CAS3 serves as a good first step in developing Army planners. For the levels and needs of the student body, the curriculum is well structured, and has the potential for freeing badly needed time in the CGSC curriculum.

n. The War College devotes minimum time to the areas in which CGSC is considered deficient. There is a need for some overlap of instruction in these two schools. However, since War College graduates are planner supervisors and the source of our general officer corps, they must also be taught to understand thoroughly the functioning of the JSPS, JOPS, and PPBS.

o. An impact of OPMS appears to be the narrowing of an officer's outlook, which restricts the development of innovative thinking and the capability to perform the necessary integrative actions required in good planning. This is contrary to the original intent of OPMS.

p. Lack of understanding of how the major planning systems interface leads to difficulty in vocabulary and to confusion as to the processes and procedures involved in each system.

Recommendations:

a. CGSC and USAWC should coordinate the establishment of the Army planning system—the hierarchy of Army planning. This hierarchy should include what types of planning are accomplished at each level and which level of schooling in the Army covers the various types and levels of planning.
b. In order to bring more order and logic to planning, the terms identified in Appendix H (Glossary of Terms) which do not appear in the DOD Dictionary should be adopted for inclusion in AR 310-25.

c. At all levels of Army schooling a thorough understanding of the Estimate of the Situation should be emphasized; it should be applied to tactical situations so that students come to appreciate its practical value; and its tie-in and importance to the Concept of Operations of the Five-Paragraph Field Order should be made clear.

d. The Military Decisionmaking Process should be taught thoroughly at CAS3 and CGSC and reinforced in school tactical exercises.

e. The curriculum at CGSC should be structured so that the development and analyses of alternative courses of action, to include the analysis of risks involved in each, is permitted.

f. Either CGSC or USAWC should undertake a revision/republication of the 1942 definitive work, Sound Military Decision, published by the US Naval War College.

g. In order to help create an environment more conducive to development of logical and innovative thinking, the following should be implemented:

   (1) The CGSC curriculum should be examined to eliminate hours that do not directly contribute to developing a foundation in combined arms operations and planning.

   (2) Hours freed should be used as unstructured time for individual and group projects and development of innovative solutions to problems.

   (3) Precourse instructional packets (concept similar to CAS3) should be used by CGSC to insure that all incoming students are brought to a selected level of knowledge prior to beginning the course, thereby allowing additional time in support of g(2), above.

h. In order to decrease turbulence at CGSC, the following should be implemented:

   (1) The Deputy Commandant should be made the Commandant with a rank of major general. (As of 6 May 1982, the position of Deputy Commandant has been established as a major general billet).

   (2) Department head positions should be stabilized for a minimum of three years.

   (3) CGSC should continue to expand precourse and postcourse surveys of student officers to help validate the curriculum and defend it from vested interests.
(4) CGSC should be given increased fill of its authorizations. (As of 1 May 1982, CGSC has been raised to DAMPL One.) Fill should focus on quality as well as quantity.

i. Doctrine for corps and EAC should be published and disseminated as soon as possible.

j. Instruction in corps and EAC operations and support, and mobilization and deployment should be expanded at CGSC.

k. The scope of LOGEX should be expanded to include mobilization and deployment, with the lessons learned disseminated to schools and field.

l. Armed Forces Staff College or other so-called "equivalent" schools should not be considered equivalent to CGSC because they do not provide the Army planner the necessary background in Army combined arms operations.

m. An objective appraisal of OPMS should be made to insure it is neither inhibiting the broad development of officers, nor the teaching of planning to the officer corps, and that the way it operates will support the planner needs of the Army (to include the development, identification and assignment of planners).

n. Proposed identification and assignment of planners as outlined in Appendix D of this study should be examined by ODCSPER for feasibility.

MID-LEVEL CAREER SCHOOLING

General: Schooling at Fort Leavenworth is a key juncture in an officer's military education, whether he attends only Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3) or is further selected to attend CGSC. Until then, an officer's training has been focused narrowly within his own branch; for the first time he enters the Army's formal schooling system to learn the full spectrum of the Army as well as joint and combined operations. Here he should gain an understanding and appreciation of combined arms operations and planning. Leavenworth must provide the educational foundation to support an officer in meeting the challenges of future command and staff assignments. If an officer is to gain a foundation for sound operation planning, it must be accomplished here. As noted within the text of this study, for an officer to plan, he must be able to think logically. The logic in turn must be used within a framework. And within the Army there is one such framework—the Estimate of the Situation and its larger companion piece, the Military Decisionmaking Process. The logic and the framework embodied in these thought patterns are crucial to planning. To these must be added a knowledge of tactics, organizations, weapons systems, sustainment operations and common relationships. Lastly, to be a competent planner, an officer must understand the planning system within which he must function. To impart this material, as well as to provide a voice of experience and a sense of "having been there," there must be a faculty which is experienced, articulate, qualified, and in suitable numbers to interact in an iterative mode with the student officers.
Observations:

a. Curricula.

(1) Most of the branch schools appear to do a good job in teaching the Estimate of the Situation and the Five Paragraph Field Order. The curricula of these schools touch upon division, corps, and echelons above corps only slightly; these areas are left to the combined arms school at the Leavenworth level. The combat service support school curricula appear to stress the technical aspects of support but lack the integrated planning concepts required at corps and above.

(2) Operations and planning through the division level are covered adequately at CGSC. On the other hand, corps operations and support are covered only minimally. Through the late 1960's, CGSC had a Department of Larger Unit Operations, which was responsible for the corps and echelons above corps. That department was eliminated and in the early 1970's the corps was effectively dropped from the CGSC curriculum. This means that the Army schooling system since has failed essentially to address corps operations and planning. A generation of Army officers has passed through our schooling system without benefit of thorough education and training in the corps and echelons above corps.

(3) Deployment operations and planning are not taught well throughout the Army schooling system. Combat service support schools concentrate on sustainment operations and planning but as yet do relatively little in the area of deployment. (While the schools use the lessons learned from LOGEX, LOGEX itself has not been a mobilization and deployment exercise). CGSC acknowledges that it is deficient in its deployment curriculum; this is clearly a matter of priorities in light of the broad demands being made upon the school. Even so, there appears to be a movement in the right direction, for there is an effort to move 30 hours of mobilization and deployment planning from electives to the core curriculum. However, additional subjects also need to be included, such as sealift. The thrust of the above should be to educate officers in deployment concepts versus just training them to handle numbers. They should recognize a continuity from predeployment through deployment to employment planning and understand how factors in each stage affect planning decisions in the other stages. In this way they will appreciate more the consequences of their decisions, a factor which some key personnel see as a major problem in planning.

(4) A large part of the curriculum of the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) is devoted to joint operations and planning. After reviewing the curriculum and methods of instruction, the study team was impressed favorably and believes that graduates are well qualified in the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS). Graduates also leave AFSC with a very good appreciation of deployment planning. With its electives CGSC covers
the JOps adequately, using much of the same material that AFSC uses. While
the CGSC does not teach joint operations and planning as comprehensively as
the AFSC, in turn, the AFSC does not provide the combined arms education
Army officers need to function most effectively in Army command and staff
positions, to include planning positions. An Army officer in a joint
planning position is able to acquire a working knowledge of JOps within a
relatively short time, whereas he cannot acquire the same level of knowledge
of combined arms operations and support, should he be assigned to such a
position without a CGSC background. Tactics, weapons systems,
organizations, sustainment operations, and command relationships taught at
CGSC are not covered at the AFSC or equivalent schools, and knowledge of
these areas cannot be readily acquired once assigned to a staff. Yet
knowledge of these areas is needed by Army officers, even in joint planning
positions, where, regardless of how the position is designated, they will in
reality function as Army component representatives. The Army and the Joint
System have every right to expect the Army staff officer to be fully
competent in Army combined arms operations. Hence, the observation which
was noted earlier that CGSC is the Army's premier school and should be so
regarded in terms of manning and emphasis.

b. Development of Logical and Innovative Thinking. All officers must
be trained to think logically; the best should be exposed to an environment
which encourages the development of innovative thinking. Aspects of CGSC
adversely impact on the Army's development of logical and innovative
thinkers. Logical and innovative thinking stems from a solid, disciplined
educational background and is nurtured by the environment in which a planner
operates. If the Army is going to provide the educational background for
such thinking, CGSC must be in the forefront of the effort. Yet, the
atmosphere and the environment do not exist at CGSC to promote this
development in either the faculty or student body.

(') The curriculum is tightly structured, creating pressure on both
the faculty and student body. Insufficient unstructured time is provided
for broad thinking and development of logical and innovative concepts, which
might ultimately be presented orally or in writing. The curriculum is
constrained from incorporating situations into the practical exercises or
written evaluations which require the development of innovative solutions as
answers because of the additional faculty time required to critique such
solutions. While the Military Decisionmaking Process is taught at CGSC, it
is not very well reinforced by the way the POI is structured. The
deliberate development of options as a part of this sequence is a highly
useful tool for encouraging logical and innovative thinking; however, the
use of this tool is restrained by the overall constraints placed on the
curriculum. (It was noted by the study team that this decisionmaking and
planning process was dropped altogether for a period of time during the
1970's.) This sequence is a basic tool that every commander and staff
officer must master if he is to be able to plan.
(2) So that the students can better understand the consequences of their decisions in the process of developing options during tactical exercises, war gaming the options could be a highly useful tool. The curriculum as now structured does not allow for the extensive exercise of this capability.

(3) The quantity and quality of the instructor staff are critical to the development of the student. As of 4 December 1981, the faculty had 52 percent on hand of recognized requirements and 66 percent of authorizations. Most instructors are faced with a strenuous challenge of developing courses, preparing lesson plans, instructing, grading papers and writing doctrine. The recent decision to place CGSC at level 1 on the DA Master Priority List and to man CGSC to that level will alleviate to a degree the personnel problem. Hand-in-hand with quantity, however, goes quality. The four tables in Figure C-1 illustrate the current selection rates among the CGSC faculty for battalion and brigade command, for attendance at a Senior Service College, and for promotion to 06. Twenty-two percent of eligible 05's at the College were selected for promotion to 06, as compared to 29 percent for the Army as a whole. Twelve percent of the 05's and 06's have had command experience (26 percent of the 06's and 8.5 percent of the 05's). The present selection for eligible 05's for command appears to be about the same as for the rest of the Army. However, the selection for Senior Service College for eligible officers appears to be about two-thirds that of the rest of the Army. The one statistic in favor of CGSC when compared to the Army as a whole is 06's with previous command experience. But for comparative purposes, it is interesting that the Army Readiness Mobilization Region located in Aurora, Colorado, had, as of the same timeframe as the CGSC data collection, 46 percent of the 06's as ex-brigade commanders (26 percent for CGSC). These statistics overall do not reflect very favorably on the quality of the faculty, and for it being a role model for the students it is guiding. Yet that faculty is the "seed corn" of the Army.

(4) OPMS may be having an impact on CGSC student's attitudes toward their own broad service development, also a necessary background for innovative thinking. The faculty noted that some number of students were so concerned about proficiency in their two designated OPMS specialties that they were reluctant to become involved in other areas. This is unfortunate since CGSC affords the opportunity for officers to see the whole Army for the first time. However, these student officers obviously understand the system well enough to know that qualifications and assignments in their specialties are the prerequisites to getting promoted. Recent selections for promotion based on performance in their two specialties reinforce this perception. Contrast selection criteria for CGSC (best overall file) to promotion criteria (best file within specialties) which resulted in 18 04 students in CGSC class of 1982 being passed over for promotion to 05. Narrow focusing along with a very heavy schedule does not create an atmosphere for encouragement of innovative thinking among CGSC students.

*Figures available as of April 1982.
Figure 1. CGSC Selection Rates
c. Turbulence. Even though the CGSC curriculum appears to evolve fairly gradually, a sense of turbulence exists in the College. Consider first the frequent change of Deputy Commandants (average time of 13 months). Each Deputy Commandant may see things differently and may have an urge to make his own imprint. Few are ever in position long enough to have to live with and be able to evaluate the decisions they make. Even if a new Deputy Commandant decides to make no changes, a change in his position still creates turbulence; the new general must be brought on board, briefed, etc. He will obviously have questions about many things, thereby generating fact sheets, briefings, etc, creating turbulence and perhaps a perception of a need or a desire for change. The Commandant, Commander of the Combined Arms Center, may have ideas of his own about change, even if the Deputy Commandant does not. While the Commandant's position has generally been more stable than the Deputy Commandant's, the change in one or the other or both has had a tendency to keep CGSC in a state of flux. Additionally, department heads have changed frequently. One department recently had four heads in one year. Add to this the shortage of instructors, already discussed, and the added workload of doctrine development, recently transferred from Combined Arms Combat Development Activity (CACDA) without compensating resources, and the sense of turbulence grows. It is hard to imagine an atmosphere for developing logical and innovative thinking in this type of environment.

d. The Impact of the Combined Arms and Services Staff School. The Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3) curriculum is generally an across-the-board slice of the core CGSC curriculum. The preliminary correspondence course helps equalize the level of expertise of incoming students and helps reduce the length of the course. The curriculum covers employment and sustainment planning up through division level. CAS3 covers the decisionmaking process and basic problem-solving. As with CGSC, it is weak in the area of Corps, EAC, and development operations and planning; the curriculum does not include JOPS. However, this is probably justified for officers at this level and with the limited time available. CAS3 will serve as a good first step in developing Army planners. It will supplement the Army education of officers attending the AFSC or "equivalent" schools, who otherwise miss the Army combined arms education of CGSC. The study team was impressed favorably with the CAS3 curriculum and the enthusiasm of its faculty. Graduates with whom the team spoke praised the school highly. By 1985 or 1986 all incoming CGSC students should have had CAS3. This will help equalize the level of expertise of the student body, which should eventually free some time in the CGSC curriculum.

e. Training versus Education Debate. The thrust of the Army schooling system appears to be directed toward training its officers to function effectively in near term future assignments. The TRADOC model emphasizes training. This is what the branch schools and probably CAS3 should be doing, recognizing, of course, that this training serves as a general educational base for future schooling. Opinions were expressed to the study
team by ranking key personnel in the field that CGSC was also too involved in training in response to what the Army is rather than educating for what the Army should be. These opinions were expressed in support of a broad military education which would help develop logical and innovative thinkers and planners versus a narrow focus on training which will ultimately produce commanders who are not broad based and thereby "totally captive of their staffs." After visiting CGSC and reviewing the constrained hours in the curriculum, the study team sensed that the thrust seemed to be toward training officers to meet most possible situations (the curriculum is "a mile wide and an inch deep"), which tended to support criticism from the field. This impression also was supported by the fact that when a "visiting fireman" arrives touting the importance of some special subject, such as Survival, Escape, Evasion and Resistance (SEER), the normal reaction has been to substitute X hours of SEER for something with a less vocal sponsor. Without being more broadly educated as opposed to being narrowly trained, planners cannot appreciate the consequences of their decision. A broad education in the profession of arms, not just training for the next assignment, is required for an officer to be a conceptualizer or integrator. For nearly ten years we have attempted to train CGSC graduates for the "First Battle" and for virtually nothing beyond that yet-to-occur confrontation.
APPENDIX 3—Excerpts from MG Meloy Report

of

ANNEX A (Summary of Recent External Studies of CGSC)

EXCERPTS FROM MG MELOY REPORT

What follows is first a summary of General George C. Marshall’s 1933 criticisms of the Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, and, second, an executive summary of MG Meloy’s report.

I. GEORGE MARSHALL’S 1933 CRITICISMS OF CSC

(This is a summary of MG Marshall’s 1933 letter to MG Heinzelman)

1. Schools do not recognize or stress the importance of simplicity; methods of maintaining control on fluid battlefield.

2. Schools stress the easy and infrequent things to do and give little attention to the hard things to learn, which will be the normal requirement at the outset of operations.

3. Opening campaigns will be characterized by clouds of uncertainties; haste; rapid movements; congestion on roads; strange terrain; lack of ammo; lack of supplies at right time and place; commo failures; misunderstanding and confusion caused by inexperienced officers/units plus aggressive enemy actions; minimum info on enemy dispositions; poor maps; fast pace; maintenance problems.

4. Four things necessary to success under these conditions are discipline; thorough grasp of techniques involved; and knowledge of two vitally important matters—real simplicity and correct methods for maintaining control.

5. Handling (inexperienced) troops with small scale and commercial maps (or no maps except maybe road maps) is a much more difficult problem than doing same thing with a Gettysburg map; requires different techniques.

6. Warfare of movement does not permit orders one-half or even one-fourth as long as those turned out in our schools; the shorter order, especially if oral, is much more difficult problem than the elaborate, detailed order.

7. Infrequency of (JTX/FTX), lack of troop duty, tremendous number of (peacetime) desk jobs. . .has led to theoretical misconceptions that do not hold water in actual business or handling large bodies of troops in practical maneuvers.
8. Urgent necessity for simplifying matters--but hard to convince (Benning) instructors of that.

9. Meticulous marking or grading methods causes instructors to draft problems from viewpoint of uniform and exact grading.

10. Real problems/real difficulties usually will not be comprehended until it's too late: (school) information on the enemy about 80 percent too complete; requirements call for a decision at a pictured moment when the real problem is usually when to make a decision and no. what the decision should be.

11. (In combat) won't have time to prepare lengthy (school-style) orders; we lack skill and technique to prepare brief orders.

12. Officers seldom properly estimated any situation or problem other than the tactical.

13. Need to assign ex-CdRs/Staffs to faculties.

14. Too much extraneous (general & special) situation material at far too high a level.

15. Sheer volume of G2 sit reps too much for Cdr—jeopardizes decisionmaking on timely basis.

16. The unit model used by Schools to represent real US Army on next battlefield will not exist—units will be short people, equipment, supplies, and training.

17. Important topics such as mobilization, deployment, sustaining the force given lip service, neglected in favor or an over-emphasis on tactical operations.
1. General Impression.

- Most of Marshall's 1933 criticisms still valid.
- Not enough time teaching expect the unexpected. Still too much enemy information provided. Detailed general/special situations include analysis and guidance that student should have to develop rather than get free.
- But faculty knows this; they are not trying to evade the issue, working hard to find ways to improve realism, inculcate challenge of the battlefield and the "watch out for Murphy."
- Long range curriculum improvement program already underway, well established. CAS3 will have growing impact and by AY 86 we won't recognize AY 82 course content.
- College can only do so much, must have DA backing for selection of faculty (qualifications, strength, stability).
- College must also have clear statement of purpose (what's the product supposed to be) and mission (why are we educating/training him). Present mission hands staff and faculty broad charter which is promoting "mile wide and an inch deep" instruction.
- DA should (again) reconsider value of mixing battle captains of future with doctors, lawyers, dieticians, veterinarians, hospital administrators, chaplains.

2. College Purpose and Mission

- The 1956 Educational Survey Committee reported that, "in the process of attempting to achieve perfection, the College has ... lost sight of some of its objectives, has overcrowded the curriculum, and has overburdened both faculty and student body ..."
- In all likelihood, a 1982 version of that committee would reach the same general conclusions. There is an upper limit to the type and amount of material that can be covered in 10 months of instruction; do not believe the college has defined that limit clearly.
- Current mission of College (TAB D) is so open-ended that selection of specific course content and deciding what is and is not important can be widely interpreted, is generally a reflection on the philosophy and experience of the incumbents. Consequently, curriculum in constant state of flux (which may not be all bad, but not good either).
- CAS3 may well be the finest academic innovation in this half of the 20th Century. Certainly it will have a major impact on CGSC development, but don't believe we yet fully understand the total implications that CAS3 will have on the ultimate purpose or mission of the College.

- What is CGSC supposed to be, a graduate level institution or an advanced degree training school? Does it train officers or does it educate them, or a little of both? Which officers, all branches or primarily battle captains and battle staffs? Does it prepare officers for the short term—their next one or two assignments—or does it prepare them for the long term? Unfortunately, RETO addressed these issues in only the most general terms—"train career officers who are imaginative, creative, reflective . . . take pride in profession . . . successful commanders and staff officers in peace and war . . . ."

- As Leavenworth understands current mission, they are supposed to produce brigade commanders and also lay the foundation for any staff assignment from brigade to division to corps to EAC to MACOM to HQDA to OJCS to OSD to Unified Commands to Combined Commands. All in 10 months. Consequently, curriculum is jam packed, an enormous amount of material has been crammed into the course, and given available time there is insufficient in-depth coverage of those subjects that contribute directly to killing Russians.

- We need to think hard: who are we trying to train; for what; why? Until this is answered, College cannot determine how to train/educate, focus curriculum on Army's most important requirements/problems, develop best core curriculum or electives program.

3. Faculty.

- COL and MAJ strength not too bad, but assigned only 125 LTCs against authorized fill of 145 and required fill of 197.

- Faculty turbulence also high. In last four years, there have been five Directors, Department of Command; four Directors, Department of Joint and Combined Operations; four Directors of Academic Operations; four Chiefs of Doctrine; four Directors, Department of Combat Support; four Logistics Committee Chiefs; three Professional Arms Committee Chiefs; and five Deputy Commandants.

- An ORB (only) analysis of faculty experience was a shock. Even by lenient qualification standards (an Assistant Bn/Bde S3, for example, was considered fully qualified to teach), Dept of Command had only four instructors exceptionally qualified (to include Dept Director), 10 who were considered fully but not best qualified, five marginally qualified, and five totally unqualified. Department of Tactics no better—only five instructors exceptionally qualified (to include Dept Director), 12 fully but not best qualified, 12 marginally qualified, and 11 totally unqualified.
- With high faculty turnover rate which handicaps continuity, coupled with such a large percentage of faculty with limited to none experience to teach the courses assigned, student perception that instructors can do little more than pass on textbook theory and are incapable of in-depth discussion is hardly surprising.

- To illustrate size and consequences of the problem, College recently added a 9-hour block of leadership instruction; no additional instructors provided; Dept Director had to take out of hide, tried to select best qualified; in most cases, though, this boiled down to who was most available.

- If students are to be encouraged to move away from a somewhat dogmatic approach and produce innovative tactics, then command, staff and tactics instructors must have both the experience and self-confidence to encourage and direct them.

- With the curriculum plate already so full, faculty quality and turbulence (a problem even under best of circumstances) assumes far greater impact on student training and education.

- At present, ROTC has higher DAMPL priority. If Leavenworth is to be a first class institution, then DA has to bite the bullet on tenure, stability, qualifications, strength of faculty; micro-manage faculty selection and assignment.

4. Doctrine, Tactics, Curriculum.

- CGSC deserves applause—they threw out the calculus approach to tactics and have steered off matching force ratios and target servicing. Now they simply talk about fighting, defeating, destroying, killing the enemy. They have also brought renewed emphasis on maneuver vice firepower/attrition warfare.

- Marshall's concerns regarding simplicity, maneuver, warning and frag orders, on-the-spot troop leading, substance over form, scarcity of enemy intelligence, and poor maps well known to faculty. They are working to incorporate, but have an awfully long way to go.

- Staff procedures are stressed so heavily that many times these become the means to the end in itself, rather than only the vehicles used to teach tactical judgment.

- Many classroom (and examination) requirements make only 20 percent of the time available for the students to study/analyze-develop/compare/select their course of action... then they need about 80 percent of the time remaining to write it up.

- Tactics instructors (both core curriculum and IDC) should look again at the time allotted to the student to plan and execute, as there appears to be only limited time to discuss/debate "what we just learned."
- Much (maybe most) tactics instruction assumes away logistics and personnel constraints, effects of weather, and Murphy. Students seldom made to appreciate what happens if the trucks don't show up, if leading tank throws a track on a one-way bridge 10 minutes before LD Time, how to refuel/rearm in the middle of the battle.

- Logistics/Personnel planning/execution usually worked out in isolation from the tactics instruction. Students need to be forced more frequently into determining, "can this plan be supported logistically?" On those occasions they are asked, answers and solutions sometimes reflect only superficial analysis.

- Students ordinarily required to write only paragraphs 2 and 3 of Operations Orders, and sometimes in frag order form. But then school solutions for these same two paragraphs can run several pages in length. While some of that includes detailed discussion, nonetheless it gives the student false impression and reinforces exactly what Marshall tried to turn around.

- Although there are some requirements for students to prepare/issue frag orders during core curriculum tactics, a remarkable number of students could not recall ever being asked to do so. While there are probably several reasons for this, the main point is that frag orders apparently are not being emphasized to the degree required.

- Top flight students (small sample) disappointed because they are not given enough time or opportunity to bounce off new ideas, debate the pros and cons of tactical solutions with the instructor (who was "running short on time and still had three more requirements to cover").

- Soviet tactics used exclusively, but most scenarios continue to include far more enemy information than we could realistically expect. In fact, a few scenarios appeared to be 100 percent complete.

- AY 82 students provided only 5 hours for terrain walk. TEWT is offered only as an elective. There will be two terrain walks in AY 83, however.

- Tactics instruction improving yearly, but still remains too theoretical. Officers are not being made to think on their feet and look at the problem realistically. Form oftentimes seems more important than substance.

- The IDC advanced tactics instruction is a combat arms course, not a combined arms course. That's an important distinction. This unfortunate result is attributed to the fact that all combat arms officers must take the advanced tactics course, but it is optional for everybody else. Consequently, very few non-combat arms officers elect to take advanced
tactics (most seek other electives more OPMS oriented). The end product is that the combat arms officers are trying to learn combined arms tactics without the benefit derived from expert discussion of the real world complexities in organizing and fighting the complete combined arms team of Signal, CENI, Aviation, Forward Area Support, Engineer, etc.

5. Student Evaluation

- Common impression among students and widely held even among the faculty is that classroom instruction focuses on evaluation rather than a transfer of knowledge, which leads to neglect in other important areas and sterilizes instruction. Students under considerable pressure to simply spit back Field Manual meat and potatoes.

- Key questions: Is the cost paid in terms of faculty time and energy to develop, manage, administer the evaluation system worth the results? Is there a better (or different) way to do it? Does the College need to do it at all?

- Officers selected to attend Leavenworth in the top 40 percent of the Army in terms of self-discipline, curiosity, intellect, and sense of responsibility. They've had 10+ years of critical evaluation by their seniors to confirm these characteristics. Why assumption that student sets these traits aside at class registration, somehow picks them up again on graduation day. Current evaluation system seems to ignore such factors as personal pride, peer pressure, and unwritten ingredient known as peer evaluation.

- If evaluation system is primarily a discriminator, then we need to look at its utility because not many bosses or boards worry about class standing. If system is primarily a motivator, then we need to look at how else we can motivate without generating an examination environment which rightly or wrongly drives instruction inside the classroom.

- In short, let's evaluate the evaluation system. Surely there are other methods to identify the indifferent, the incompetent, the exceptionally talented. If we are trying to "keep the students honest," perhaps greater focus on collecting/grading/criticizing homework assignments, more unannounced spot quizzes instead of announced examinations.


- In spite of points made in preceding paragraph, on balance AY 82 core curriculum examinations were relatively straightforward and, in fact, not all that difficult.

- 65 percent of the combat arms officers made an A on the Defense Exam, and so did 56 percent of the professional officers. Failure rate for both the offense and defense exam ran only 3 percent.
- Intelligence Exam. Could be maxed if all student had done was commit Div CEWI TOE to memory. No enemy analysis or terrain analysis required.

- Defense Exam. Bde in Fulda Gap. Student is Bde S3. Complete mission analysis and Bde Cdr's guidance provided in special situation, which also provided an 8-point checklist of considerations which should be factored into developing a task organization. Student had single requirement—determine allocation of forces and produce written rationale for same.

- Offense Exam. Also Fulda Gap. Student is Div G3. Special situation included complete enemy and terrain analysis. Student required to list four critical events from LD/LC to objective, then select most critical event and explain why in writing; next complete written analysis (war game) of how to deal with most critical event, then prepare division task organization. So far so good, but then school solution used standard buzz word list; avoids enemy main strength, facilitates rapid penetration, excellent covered and concealed routes, concentrates combat power, excellent observation and fields of fire, and leads directly to main objective.

7. Student Population.

- Combat Arms = 375 (168 inf, 107 Arty, 75 Armor, 25 ADA).

- Combat Support = 173 (60 Engr, 49 Sig, 44 MI, 16 NP, 4 Chemical).

- Combat Service Support = 130 (43 Ord, 30 TC, 30 AG, 22 QM, 5 Finance).

- Professional = 42 (18 MSC, 9 JAG, 5 Chaplains, 4 Surgeons, 3 Dentists, 1 Veterinarian, 1 Nurse, 1 Other).

- Student body mix forces faculty to limit core curriculum to focus on bottom half of class. Nobody satisfied at either extreme, thwarts initiative and intellectual development, frustrates the battle captains because they find little challenge. In fact, some students claim branch advanced course more difficult.

- Given that tactical knowledge and previous staff experience among students varies so widely, difficult for any instructor to find the right start point... thus he wastes his time and also the student's.

- Given present mix of class Leavenworth has no choice, must spend many core curriculum hours in a remedial training mode.
8. Selected Student/Faculty Observations.

- There tends to be dogmatic approach to tactics. This partially attributable to evaluation system, student desire to do well on exams, instructors gearing class to the exam, and inexperience of many faculty members.

- Students are overscheduled but not necessarily overworked. . . definitely not overchallenged.

- We need to dig deeper into what to do as first enemy muke, or first enemy, chemical round. . . we pass right by that as if it won't happen.

- Don't understand rationale for the Army hand-picking ex-battalion commanders to teach 12 captains how to be Bn and Bde staff officers, yet (Army) doesn't seem to mind using relatively inexperienced MAJs/LTCs to teach 50 field grade officers how to be staff officers at every level to include NATO.

- Enemy usually reacts exactly as we expect him to. . . too much attention to plotting and tracking the little red boxes. College should give Soviets more credit for tactical innovations.

- College should quit giving students a complete terrain analysis, especially on exams. They should be making us think; instead we're only getting lazy.

- We need to get out into the hills more often. . . I'm convinced half the class doesn't know a contour line from a stream bed.

- TOC exercise was great, but not nearly long enough. . . we were just beginning to get warmed up and start learning things when they made us quit.

- How come we never leave the Fulda Gap. I feel like I was born in Schlucht. Doesn't VII Corps ever fight.

- Core (curriculum) tactics too structured in order to pull along my table mate, who is a dietician.

- Primary problem is that everything is too structured, too pat and dried. We wasted the first five months trying to bring everybody up to speed.

- The point (evaluation) system discourages faculty and students alike in exploring the non-traditional, focuses the instruction on test material, restricts students and faculty from pursuing new ideas that might stray away from the subject at hand but would stimulate thought.
- The evaluation system encourages root memorization rather than expanded logic. . . thought we were supposed to learn how to be problem solvers.

- I'll tell you how to wake up some folks. . . the faculty needs to have unannounced turn-ins of homework and then be sure to grade it.

- I spent three hours putting together a frag order, then three different groups briefed it (to include their courses of action). But then the instructor said we still had two more requirements so he just issued the school solution with no further discussion.

- Most of the time I know where every enemy company and platoon is located, even in the second echelon.

- But bottom line is that yes, I'm glad I came; yes, I've learned a lot. (Virtually every student met or interviewed made this statement, and in all cases it was made spontaneously.)
ANNEX C

STAFF COLLEGE TRAINING IN FOREIGN ARMIES

TO

FINAL REPORT: ARMY STAFF COLLEGE STUDY
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<td>GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC</td>
<td>C-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOVIET UNION</td>
<td>C-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FACULTY</td>
<td>C-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>C-22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. PURPOSE. This Annex compares the salient features of the Staff College level of officer education and training of six foreign armies with the current US system.

2. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY.

a. The Staff College level schooling of the Armies of Israel, United Kingdom, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, France, German Democratic Republic and Soviet Union were analyzed. The objective of this comparative study is to identify practices in foreign armies which might be appropriate for adoption in our own programs.

b. This is a survey leaning very heavily on the extensive work done in this area by the REVIEW OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING OF OFFICERS (RETO) Study Group, updated by means of interviews with liaison officers of those armies stationed at Fort Leavenworth and US liaison officers at foreign staff colleges. US and allied graduates of foreign staff colleges were also interviewed.

3. OVERVIEW OF STAFF COLLEGE TRAINING IN OTHER ARMIES. Staff college training, which occurs in all these armies at about the same career point as it does in ours, is illustrative of our relative austerity. The Israelis send their staff college selectees to 46 weeks of school, supplemented with nine additional weeks for those chosen to command battalions. The Canadians send all officers to a 20-week staff course, and a selected minority to 45 weeks of preparation for service on higher-level staffs. The British and Germans each devote about 100 weeks, while the Russians put their potential General Staff Officers through an astonishing 150 weeks of intensive education. In sharp contrast is the United States' modest 40 weeks of instruction. Formal staff training is also provided all captains in the Canadian, British and FRG Armies. This is in addition to the later training at Command and Staff colleges for selected majors. Command and staff training is provided to only selected officers in the Israeli, GDR, and Soviet armies.

Even more striking are the differences among faculties. Virtually all Canadian staff college instructors have commanded at the battalion level; they are regarded throughout the service as "the best of the best and operate on a ratio of 1:8 with the students." British instructors are carefully selected lieutenant colonels and colonels. They are regarded the elite and include some very high grade early promotion lieutenant colonels. The German "Fuehrungssakademie" has a mentor/tutor for each 10 to 12 students (as does the British). The mentor, a lieutenant colonel who has been an outstanding battalion commander, instructs, guides, assists, and evaluates...
his younger charges. The Israeli system is similar, but the mentors are usually newly promoted colonels and have only 5 to 6 students apiece.

The Soviets are unique, in that their faculty members are professional military pedagogues/scholars. They have specialized in academic and doctrinal areas since graduation from one of the staff academies. They remain in this field and are promoted regularly, most retiring eventually as colonels but some reaching two-star rank. In addition to teaching and tutoring, they write manuals and publish articles in the Soviet Army's many military periodicals and journals.

The U.S. Army's staff college has a faculty largely composed of officers only marginally older and better qualified than their students. The teaching mode ranges from one instructor to fifteen students to one instructor to fifty-odd students, compared to Israel's one to five or six, Canada's one to eight, Britain's one to ten, West Germany's one to ten or twelve, and the Soviet Union's one to ten. (Other staff college faculties also do not have the numerous additional functions assigned to the CGSC faculty.) Most use the syndicate mode of instruction adopted by our CAS3 course rather than the departmental approaches used in the CGSO course.

A third and final basis for comparison is that of student selection. All six armies use performance of duty as the key criterion. All except the United States use written examinations as part of the selection process. The Canadian examination differs from the other four countries' in that it is a "go-no go" before staff college selection, rather than being scored competitively. Of those meeting selection prerequisites (length of service, grade, minimum exam score, etc.), the following approximate percentages are selected in each of the countries:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>5-10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>8-10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Command and staff colleges are joint for officers of the Canadian, Israeli, West German and East German armies. In some respects, both German staff colleges serve as the highest military education level for officers. In all cases, selection is highly competitive.

Examinations, in one form or another, precede entry to all general staff level colleges. Soviet officers are expected to spend 2,000 to 3,000 hours of study prior to taking staff academy entrance exams.

The most extensive staff college experiences are in the East German and Soviet armies where staff college is often combined with scientific research and pursuit of civilian advanced degrees.
It should be noted that the Soviet staff academies are still branch/specialty specific.

Figure 2 portrays the various mid-level education and training courses.

**Figure 2. Mid-Level Education and Training/Staff Colleges**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CANADA</th>
<th>1. Command and Staff Course (45 wks). Joint. Selection is highly competitive. Mostly majors.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Middle Management Course (15 days). As required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Management Course (14 days). As required.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**UK**

| 1. Self-study (*3 weeks of formal instruction) for promotion exam to major. |
| 2. Staff College. (Promotion exam to MAJ used also as entrance exam to SC.) First phase - Royal Mil College of Science (2-12 mos); Second phase - Staff College, Camberley (12 mos). Selection is highly competitive. |

**ISRAEL**

| 1. Staff College (11 mos). Entrance examinations required. |

**FRG**

| 1. Field Grade Qualification Course (3 1/2 mos). Joint. All captains. |
| 2. Either S-Staff Courses (3 mos) or General Staff Course (21 mos). Joint. GS Course highly competitive. Exam required. Mostly captains. GS Course is prerequisite for promotion to general (with some exceptions). |
| 3. Bn Cdr update course. |

**GDR**

| 1. Friedrich Engels Military Academy (3-5 yrs). Joint. Course length dependent on branch and type of outside research. Some advanced civilian degrees awarded. Selection is intensely competitive. Entrance exam probably required. Mostly CPTS. Trained to command bn and regt, perform staff functions at division. |
| 2. A few graduates of academy sent for further schooling to Soviet Staff Academies or those of other Warsaw Pact countries. |

5WPC00423/AUG83 C-3
1. Eight Ground Force staff academies (3-5 yrs). All branch/specialty specific. Course length dependent on specialty and type of outside research. Some adv civilian degrees awarded. Trained to command bn and regt and perform staff functions at division. Pre-requisite for promotion to general. Selection is intensely competitive. Entrance exam required.
4. ISRAEL. A joint service command and staff college is conducted for selected mid-level officers in the IDF. The course lasts 11 months and is divided into four terms devoted to the following subject areas:

1st Term - General Military Command and Staff Procedures
2d Term - Structure and Organization of IDF
3d Term - Tactics
4th Term - Strategic Studies

Seventy percent of the instruction is single service oriented. Air force officers attend for only 5 months, while navy officers attend for 3. While attending the command and staff college, many Israeli officers have their first opportunity for advanced civilian education. College courses can be taken (after hours) at the University of Tel Aviv, and certain courses at the command and staff college are accomplished by first obtaining a recommendation and then passing a test consisting of professional military knowledge and tactical problems. Approximately 75 percent of all regular army officers attend the course.

Instructors at the command and staff college are former battalion and brigade commanders; high ranking military and civilian guest speakers also take part. Instruction takes place 6 days a week. Physical training is highly emphasized. The objective of this course is to provide officers qualified to occupy designated key command and staff positions in the IDF.

Officers of all branches who have been recommended for battalion command must attend a 9-week battalion commanders' course. Prior to attendance, officers are furnished instructional materials on which they are tested during the 1st week of the course. A general framework of the course is provided below:

1st week - General Instructions.
   Diagnostic test
2d/3d week - Instruction and Visits to Syrian Front
4th week - FTX
5th week - Instruction and Visits to Jordanian Front
6th week - FTX
7th week - Instruction and Visits to Egyptian Front
8th week - FTX
9th week - Summary and Final Exams
5. UNITED KINGDOM.

The education and training of British junior officers is regulated by their "Progressive Qualification Scheme (PQS)", the first introduction to which begins at the Junior Career Course at Sandhurst. The rationale for PQS is explained thus:

Every officer should strive throughout his service to continue his military and general education. The majority of the military skills and expertise that an officer will need during the early years of his career will be acquired largely through day-to-day experience in his job and through specialist military courses. The knowledge and understanding required in his profession is not, however, confined solely to military matters. The officer must widen his interest in national and international affairs and in economic and sociological factors within Great Britain and the World both as they effect his country and the Army. To assist in this study and to ensure that certain minimum standards are achieved during each stage of an officer's career, the Progressive Qualification Scheme has been introduced. . . . The officer will leave the scheme when he has successfully qualified for selection for promotion to major or for staff training.

The PQS is divided into levels as follows:

PQS 1
- Troop duty after completion of basic officer course.
- Examinations (practical and written) for promotion to captain.

PQS 2
- Troop duty for minimum 18 months.
- Attendance at Junior Command and Staff Course.
- Examinations (practical and written) for promotion to major and selection to Army Staff Course. (No practical exam if officer has passed Junior Command and Staff Course.)

The examination for promotion to major serves also as a qualifying exam for consideration for attendance at the Army Staff Course. In addition to
the tactical exam given during a division level FTX (except for officers who have passed Junior Command and Staff Course), essays on the following subjects are required:

- International Relations and War Studies
- Contemporary Strategy Warfare since 1945
- Terrorism/Unconventional Warfare
- Military Technology and the role/organization of the British Army
- Military Technology
- Current Issues British Forces (e.g. use of Aviation)
- Discussion paper type of questions (e.g. role of Women)

Permission to take these exams, which constitute the final phase of PQS 2, is granted after an officer has been recommended by a special report from his commanding officer. Approximately 80 percent of captains are allowed to take the exams. From those passing the exams, a board selects captains to be promoted to major and the most outstanding among them for attendance at the Army Staff Course. This examination is taken any year from age 27 to 32. Only two attempts are allowed to qualify for the Army Staff Course.

The British Army Staff Course consists of two phases: one lasting 2 to 12 months, at the Royal Military College of Science (RMCS), Shrivenham, and the other lasting 1 year, at the Staff College, Camberley.

The length and curriculum of study at RMCS, Shrivenham depends on an officer's scientific background. Officers are classified into three divisions:

**Division I:** Officers with baccalaureate degrees in engineering or science. Time spent at RMCS: 42 weeks. From among these officers come those who are selected to pursue graduate degrees in scientific disciplines.

**Division II:** Officers without degrees, but with some scientific background. Time spent at Shrivenham: 48 weeks.

**Division III:** Officers having little or no scientific background. Time spent at Shrivenham: 10 weeks.
Division I and II officers cover basically the same subject matter, while division III officers are given instruction designed merely to acquaint them with the military applications of technology. The Shrivenham curriculum for Division I and II officers includes the following main subject areas:

- Aids to Decisionmaking
- Telecommunications
- Firepower
- NBC
- Equipment Management
- Fighting Vehicles and Mobility
- Aerial Vehicles
- Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Guided Weapons

The instruction at Shrivenham is sequenced so that all officers finish at the same time and continue on to the staff college at Camberley.

Instruction at the staff college is directed towards providing to the students: a broad knowledge of national and world affairs, a thorough understanding of the principles and techniques of the employment of forces on the modern battlefield, a thorough understanding of the principles of command and staff work, the ability to collect and collate information and to examine a problem with balance and imagination, the impetus and opportunity to read and think on a broad and varied range of subjects, and practical experience of working on a team under as realistic conditions as possible.

The syllabus includes instruction in each of the following subject areas:

- Tactical Principles and Doctrine
- Operations
- Staff Duties and Training
- Intelligence
- Geopolitics
- Logistics
- Command Studies
- Joint Studies

British officers promoted to major but not selected for attendance at the Army Staff Course can qualify as "staff trained" by on-the-job experience in a series of staff positions. This form of training is considered, officially, equivalent to resident instruction at the staff college.
6. **CANADA.** Immediately upon being commissioned, Canadian officers proceed to their last summer training session. Here they complete their branch/specialty qualification and are then assigned to units (or, for some officers, more specialist training).

From this point until they reach the grade of major, they are governed by the "Officer Professional Development Programme (OPDP);" a program similar to the British POS. The objective of the OPDP is to broaden and deepen the junior officer's knowledge of the military profession beyond the specific technical expertise of branch training.

The OPDP is a two-part program. Part I is a self-study phase in the following six subjects:

- **General Service Knowledge**
  - Organization roles and functions of the Department of National Defense
  - Internal Security Operations
  - Information Services of the Canadian Forces

- **Personnel Administration**
  - Canadian Forces Classification System
  - Canadian Forces Trade Structure
  - Canadian Forces Training System
  - Career Policies and Procedures
  - Personnel Resource Management
  - Civilian Employment Assistance Program

- **Military Law**
  - Discipline in the Canadian Forces
  - Legal Administration
  - Finance Law
  - Security

- **Financial Administration and Supply**
  - Financial Administration within Department of National Defense
  - Financial Administration and National Police Forces Supply
National and International Studies

Canadian System of Government
International Organizations
National Policy
Arms Control
Current Events

War and the Military Profession

The Profession of Arms
The Nature and Cause of War
The Conduct of War

The Heritage of the Canadian Armed Forces

Each year an officer selects a minimum of two of the above subjects which he will study during the period October through March. He is provided the appropriate study materials and, on a single date chosen for all officers, he must write an examination on those subjects. Grades are "Distinguished Pass," "Pass," or "Fail." Part II of OPDP is a performance test now administered in some branches. Although these exams are not a prerequisite for promotion, they must be completed before the 7th year of service and before participation in the next level of education—the Canadian Forces Staff School Course.

The Canadian Forces Staff School Course is a 10-week course to prepare junior officers to perform staff functions of a general nature that are appropriate to their rank and to provide a basis for their subsequent professional development. Students are selected from all branches normally within their 3d to 7th year of commissioned service. Attendance is restricted to those junior officers who have clearly demonstrated potential for an intermediate service engagement (up to 20 years service) and require elementary staff training.

In addition to the courses listed above, junior officers may be sent back to branch schools for advanced branch training. Canadian regulations emphasize that "OPDP does not relieve a commander of his responsibilities for continuing professional development of his officers, or substitute in any way for existing career courses."
Approximately 85 percent of senior captains will be selected to attend the Canadian Land Forces Staff Course, held in Kingston and lasting 5 months. The course curriculum includes the following subjects:

- **Operations**
  - Combat Arms
  - Combat Support
  - Combat Service Support
  - Operations/General
  - Offensive Operations
  - Defensive Operations
  - Other Operations
    - Nuclear Warfare
    - Mountain Warfare
    - Northern Warfare
    - Jungle Warfare
    - Peacekeeping
    - Airborne Operations
    - Air Assault Operations
    - Internal Security
    - Leadership and Command
    - Battle Procedure

- **Staff Duties**
  - Administration
  - Air Warfare
  - Intelligence
  - Movement
  - Staff Systems
  - Operating Staff Procedures

**Training**

The objectives of this course are: (1) to prepare an officer to assume a staff position at brigade level, and (2) to develop command ability to prepare the officer for the rank of major (companies are commanded by majors in both the Canadian and British forces). Completion of the land forces staff course is a prerequisite for selection to the field grade level Canadian Forces Command and Staff College.
The Canadian Forces Command and Staff College in Toronto conducts a 10-month joint command and staff course. Approximately 40 percent of land force officers attend the course, the objective of which is to prepare an officer to fill command and staff positions up to and including theatre/fleet/national level. Emphasis is, however, placed on division and corps operations. Land forces command and staff training is also designed to further develop command ability in preparation for the rank of lieutenant colonel.

The curriculum has five sequential components as follows:

- Command and Staff Duties I - 4 weeks
- Service Phases - 18 weeks (for sea, land and air forces independently, but concurrently)
- Joint Operations - 8 weeks
- Command and Staff Duties II - 1 week
- National Strategic Readiness - 12 weeks

An outline of the curriculum for land forces officers is as follows:

**Command and Staff Duties Phase, Part I**

National Strategic Readiness Structure

Command and Staff Duties

**Organization of Land and Tactical Air Forces**

Organizations at Divisions, Corps and Theatre levels

Logistics and Service Support at Divisional, Corps and Theatre levels

Communications at Divisional, Corps and Theatre levels

Land Force Air Defence

Psychological Operations

Rear Area Security

Civil Affairs and Military Government

Organization and Employment of Tactical Air Forces

**Staff Duties**

Staff Planning

Fire Planning

Orders

Intelligence and Staff Duties

Road Movement

Training
Land Warfare

The Nature of War
The Theatre Campaign Plan
Conventional Operations
Special Operations
Nuclear and Chemical Warfare
Automatic Data Processing
Electronic Warfare
Allied Armies
Selected Foreign Armed Forces
Canadian Land Forces Doctrine and Equipment Developments
United States Army Doctrine and Equipment Developments

Land Operations

Selected Corps and Divisional Staff Exercises

Joint Operations Phase

Cross-Environmental Familiarization

Sea
Land
Air

Internal Security

Operational Concept
Legal Considerations

Peacekeeping

Canadian Government Policy
Peacekeeping Operations
Peace Observation and Truce Supervision

Amphibious Operations

Command and Control
Communications
Intelligence
Supporting Arms
Logistics
Air Operations
Amphibious Assault
Trends in Amphibious Warfare
Organization of the Beach
Joint Task Force Operations

Joint Operations Planning
Joint Planning for:
Psychological Warfare
Unconventional Warfare
Civil Affairs Operations

Command and Staff Duties Phase - Part 2

Leadership
Innovation
Bilingualism

National Strategic Readiness

The Environment of National Security
Geopolitical Areas of Concern for Canada
Canada's Capabilities
Executive Decisionmaking Techniques in Defense Management
Defense Logistics
Canadian Forces General Defense Readiness
Field Study Exercises

Students will normally be majors, or in exceptional circumstances, lieutenant colonels from all branches. Canadian students will normally have at least one performance evaluation report in the rank of major and have demonstrated a potential for colonel rank. Approximately 23 foreign officers of comparable rank and experience attend as guest students annually.

7. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. Beginning in 1978, an army-wide "Tactical Professional Training Program" (TPTP) for junior officers was initiated. Its purpose is to insure a sufficiently high training status and uniform understanding of tactics by all regular and 15-year obligated junior officers, as well as special category officers (Fachdienststoffiziere) who have become troop officers. Participation in the TPTP is mandatory for all officers in the 7th year of service.
Objectives of the TPTP are:

- Understanding the basic doctrinal rules with regard to command/control and decisionmaking.
- Mastering the command/control system.
- Gaining the capability to make proper estimates of the situation; and complete mission requirements.

Training is conducted in two major phases:

Phase I

- Guided self-study program (regulations, directives and doctrine)
- Tactical Defense Problem (solved independently by the officer and submitted to division)
- Bn level CPX (held at division)

Phase II

(Same as Phase I, but with a problem in tactical 'fense.)

The TPTP is controlled by the division chief of staff who writes an evaluation on each participant.

During the 8th year of commissioned service, senior captains are assigned (by year-group) to the Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr (Staff College of the FRG Armed Forces) for the Field Grade Officer Qualification and Selection Course (FQSC). This course is designed to give a basic knowledge of national security, management, and the social sciences, and to provide qualification tests for promotion to major and selection to attend the General Staff Officer Course.

The FQSC is 3 1/2 months long and heavily oriented toward academic work, with virtually no study of tactics. Tests and student presentations are very frequent.

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Subjects covered during the FQSC are:

- Military Strategy of the Nuclear Powers
- Military Strategy of Alliances
- Military Geographic Factors and NATO
- Warsaw Pact Policies
- Theory of Collective Security
- Theory and Problems of Deterrence Strategy
- Cooperative Armaments Control
- All-European Cooperation
- International Crisis Management
- FRG Security Policy
- National Military Defence
- Civil Emergency Planning

Each student must participate actively in one of the following seminars:

- Nature of War According to Clausewitz
- Theory and Practice of Limited Scale War
- Patterns of Armed Conflicts
- East/West Contrast in Europe 1945-1965
- Armed Forces of FRG and NATO
- Significance of Deterrence and Detente
- Military Theory, Doctrine and Strategy of USSR
- Military Psychological Situation in the FRG
- Terrorism and the Role of the UN
- CSCE, MBFR, SALT

All students must pass the course in order to be promoted to major. From among those who pass, the top 40 to 50 will be considered for attendance at the General Staff Officer Course (GSOC). Selection to the GSOC is based on: (1) class standing at the FQSC; and (2) an officer's last three efficiency reports.

Officers not selected for the GSOC are scheduled for attendance at one of the 3-month S-Staff courses conducted at (or monitored by) the Fuehrungskademie. These courses prepare field grade officers as staff officers or as assistants to general staff officers of the principal staff branches. Students who graduate from these courses are scheduled for careers in the principal branch of the staff for which they are trained.

The S-Staff courses are as follows:

S1: Administrative field (less Medical) - Public relations, recruiting, general management theory, industrial and organizational science and economic theories.
S2: Intelligence and Security - This course is held at the FRG Armed Forces Intelligence School at Bad Ems, but it is monitored closely by the Staff College.

S3: All operational aspects, less intelligence and security, and those aspects which come under S1 in the NATO system to include command and control, planning, organization, and training.

S4: Logistic support, which includes some computer techniques.

The S1 Course is joint, except that some exercises are single service activities. The S2, S3 and S4 courses each have a joint service period and a single service period as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Tri-Service Weeks</th>
<th>Single Service Weeks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Half of each course consists of practical exercises, group work and seminars. There is considerable emphasis on student presentations during the course of instruction.

Upon receiving the required three outstanding performance evaluation reports and passing with a sufficiently high score the FQSC, the prospective officer student, who has usually served as company commander for 3 1/2 years, is notified about 1 year prior to attendance that he has been selected for the GSOC. He must expect to attend the Government Language School in Cologne-Huerth for about 12 weeks to improve his English knowledge. If his English is sufficiently good, he may choose another language, since he must study a foreign language.

The General Staff Officer Course (GSOC) lasts 21 months and is designed "To teach selected officers to perform satisfactorily, independently, and responsibly in general staff officer assignments, both within and outside their services, on national and on NATO staffs, at all levels of command. Because about 50 percent of all general staff officer positions are dedicated to joint, national and international headquarters, the training by necessity must be broad."
The following subject areas are included in the GSOC:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Theories</th>
<th>Medical Service Techniques</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World Political Contacts</td>
<td>Military, Admin Agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Politics of NATO and WP</td>
<td>Languages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Politics of Germany</td>
<td>Personnel Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Politics of Germany</td>
<td>Combat Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management, Operations Research</td>
<td>Combat Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Science</td>
<td>Logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military History</td>
<td>Overall Defense Combined Arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Law (Military Justice)</td>
<td>Decisionmaking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordnance, Armaments Development</td>
<td>Army Decisionmaking, Command and Control</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Brigade and division operations serve as the vehicle for tactical instruction during the 1st academic year. During the 2d year, corps operations are studied.

8. GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC. Officers in the GDR Army leave Thaelmann Ground Forces College prepared to assume duties as platoon leaders in their respective units. From that time until they are eligible for selection to Friedrich Engels Military Academy in Dresden, officer training takes place primarily in the troop units. Much emphasis is placed on self-study during off-duty-time. Some special short courses for commanders and chiefs of staff are reportedly taught at Thaelmann.

Some battalion commands are held by senior captains in the GDR Army. It is also at this rank that officers are selected for the Staff Academy.

The objectives of the Engels Academy are to prepare officers for assignments to staff and command positions at battalion, regiment and division level. Engels is the highest level of military professional training in the GDR. The course there is 3 to 5 years and is attended by officers from all services. At Engels, many officers are afforded the opportunity to acquire advanced degrees. Training often consists of a period of internship with civilian industry.

Selection for this command and staff course is highly competitive. Prerequisites are changing (as more and more GDR officers attain higher education), but include at least recommendations from one's commander and Party organization. At times, battalion command has been a prerequisite and entrance exams have been administered. Whether or not these requirements are still in force is unknown.
A few officers who have outstanding records with their units, demonstrated academic excellence at Engels, and Party support, attend Soviet or other Warsaw Pact academies.

9. **SOVIET UNION.** Newly commissioned Soviet officers arrive in their units direct from the military commissioning colleges. During the next 5 to 7 years they will serve as platoon leaders, company commanders and as members of battalion and regimental staffs. Some may be battalion chiefs-of-staff or battalion commanders before they are promoted to major. During these years as a junior officer, the ambitious Soviet lieutenant or captain has one overriding goal: to pass the entrance exams for attendance at one of the Soviet staff academies.

There are sixteen 3 to 5 year Staff Academies for mid-level education of Soviet Armed Forces officers. Of these, the following support Soviet ground forces (including air defense):

- Frunze (Combined Arms)
- Malinovsky (Tank Troops)
- Kalinin (Artillery)
- Zhukov (Air Defense)
- Govorov (Air Defense)
- Budenny (Signal)
- Timoshenko (Chemical)
- Kuybyshev (Engineering)
- Academy of Rear Services and Transport

Selection for command and staff academies is fiercely competitive; candidates must take exams in the following subjects:

- Tactics
- Combat Equipment
- Employment of Combined Arms
- Military Topography
- Russian Language and Literature
- History of the USSR
- Geography
- Foreign Language

Candidates are initially screened at the military district level by examinations in mathematics and physics. Approximately three officers for each vacancy are allowed to take the entrance exams. Those who pass the exams with high enough marks to earn for themselves a position at one of the academies have spent from 2,000 to 3,000 hours of prior study.

Officers apply for acceptance to the staff academy appropriate to their branch. The selection rate is very small, no more than 10 percent of each year-group. Most students are senior captains but, as staff academy
graduates, they are virtually assured of eventually reaching the rank of colonel; many will be promoted to general without further military schooling. Outstanding officers from Warsaw Pact countries also attend Soviet academies.

Information available on the Frunze Staff Academy (the oldest and most prestigious of the academies) indicates its mission is to prepare officers for battalion and regimental command, as well as staff duties at regiment to Army level. Probably 60 percent of the training time is spent on combined arms operations, although lectures are also given in:

- Logic
- Psychology
- Literature
- Art
- Science

Between 1964-1968 Frunze faculty members headed up a study group which attempted to analyze the duties of commanders and staff officers after they graduated from the academy. As a result of the findings of the group, curriculum revisions were made at Frunze. This field evaluation effort appears to have been similar to current U.S. "front-end analysis" efforts.

Summer and winter field training for staff academy students occurs each year. Some of this time is taken up with CFs lasting several days, or FTs where academy students participate in various roles. Reportedly, students are performance-rated by a division commander (at the end of the first academic year) as either "qualified" or "not qualified" to command a battalion. Work at the staff academies includes course papers or projects. Graduation at Frunze and all staff academies is preceded by comprehensive MOD exams.

Some officers, who demonstrate the talent and inclination, are chosen to pursue in-depth studies in scientific and other scholarly areas. They remain at the academy 5 years and finish with master's degrees in their field of endeavor. From among these officers will come the teachers and professors at military schools (all levels) and the high level strategists, referred to as 'defense intellectuals.' Promotion opportunities for the academic oriented officers are such that all probably will make colonel and some will become general officers within the defense academic/strategic community (see section -- below for more information on Soviet faculty).

Probably all graduates of the staff academies go directly to command and staff positions earmarked specifically for academy graduates. By law, graduation from a staff academy guarantees certain "privileges" which non-graduates do not enjoy.
Officers not selected for one of the staff academies have other educational opportunities and obligations. Many of the commissioning colleges and staff academies have correspondence courses or provide refresher training, as needed, for officers of all grades. Junior officers, especially, are expected to enroll in correspondence courses. These studies are often supervised by the officer's commander or political officer.

Such off-duty study is no easy task for the young officer whose "free" time is often filled with other obligations. Nevertheless, a young officer is expected to organize his time so that 1,100 to 1,200 hours per year (100 to 120 hours per month) can be devoted to correspondence work.

Are these figures realistic? Yes, they are. Every officer is given three days off per month. If they are used properly, he can get a good 30 academic hours. During evenings when he is free from work he can study no less than 5 hours, which gives him more than 60 hours a month. The remaining time he can find in the evenings of other work days, on holidays and while on leave when, without giving up too much relaxation, he can study language and mathematics. (Military Academies and Colleges, p. 168)

Presumably, the time spent on these correspondence courses is counted as part of the 2,000 to 3,000 hours referred to above (preparation time for academy entrance exams). Correspondence courses are of many types but are usually centrally administered. Staff academy correspondence courses may be taken only by those officers who successfully pass the regular entrance exams.

At least two army-wide short courses for updating officers of all grades are offered at various military posts and schools. "Vystrel" courses are attended by lieutenants through colonels. At least 60 percent of the time is taken up with tactical instruction in the field. All Vystrel courses end with an examination. Artillery advanced or refresher training is provided at artillery schools under a program called the "Central Artillery Course."

10. FACULTY. The quality of officer education and training is directly related to the quality of instruction. Each army studied here appears to choose its faculties from among the best officers available (at least at the staff college and senior service college level). There are, nevertheless, some major differences between faculty selection in the foreign armies and in the U.S. Army.

In the Israeli, Canadian, British and FRG Armies, for example, most key instructors at the staff academies are former battalion commanders. (Very
little is known about faculty selection at the GDR Engels Staff Academy.) At the USACGSC, subject matter specialists and former staff college students are employed as instructors. More than one-half, however, are majors. Among the lieutenant colonels and colonels who make up the remainder of the USACGSC staff and faculty, relatively few have commanded battalions.

The most remarkable faculty, by all accounts, is that of the Soviet military education system. Soviet faculty members of commissioning colleges, staff academies and the Voroshilov General Staff Academy are primarily professional military teachers/scholars, or very senior officers with extensive military experience. Officers are selected for faculty development while in attendance at one of the staff academies. Teaching, combined with research and writing, then becomes a career specialty. From the ranks of these officers will come the strategists and writers of doctrine for the Soviet Army. These scholars write textbooks, manuals and articles for scholarly military journals and newspapers published by the MOD. Most Soviet military scholars will retire as colonels or one-star generals, although some will achieve three- or four-star rank.

Academic positions within Soviet higher military institutions are equated by law to operational billets in the field. For example, a staff academy commandant is equal to a military district commander; a department chairman—an army or corps commander; a senior instructor—a division commander or chief of staff; and an instructor—a regimental commander. "Appointment to a permanent faculty position at a staff academy . . . is viewed as a promotion."

11. CONCLUSION. The fact that most successful U.S. Army officers acquire about 138 weeks of formal military instruction—less than their counterparts in any of the six foreign armies studied—may be significant. For instance, that 138 weeks represents only one-third the amount of military instruction received by a successful Soviet officer.

The following practices which appear to be essential elements in the education and training systems of all or a majority of the six foreign armies studied—but lacking in the U.S. Army—are recommended for consideration:

—Testing on professional military subjects as a prerequisite for attendance at command and staff colleges.

—Reevaluation of the manner of selecting and developing professional military faculty. All recognize the "seed corn" aspect of instructor duty and are willing to provide adequate (1 to 5 instructor/student ratios) and quality (often the very best).

—Selecting a small segment of the officer corps for extended studies at CGSC beyond the 10-month curriculum.

—Introduction of the syndicate system for instruction. This method provides continuity and coherence in instruction and a better means of evaluation based on subjective as well as objective criteria.
### Table: Progressive Courses and Duration of Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years of Service</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>MKS</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>LTG</th>
<th>MLA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-enlistment</td>
<td>Basic 18</td>
<td>Conducted during 4 yrs</td>
<td>Officer Training</td>
<td>Cadet 28</td>
<td>Basic Ind 14</td>
<td>Military Academy 120</td>
<td>Summer camp 250 hours on campus</td>
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<td>Company Cdr 6</td>
<td>Basic Branch Qual 9</td>
<td>Career Cra 23</td>
<td>Unit Ldr 19</td>
<td>Branch Cra 10</td>
<td>Branch Unit Ldr 16</td>
<td>Intensive Testing</td>
<td>Basic Cra 1c</td>
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<tr>
<td>Company Cdr 6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Command &amp; Staff College 45</td>
<td>Command &amp; General Staff College 150</td>
<td>Command &amp; General Staff College 150</td>
<td>Command &amp; General Staff College 150</td>
<td>Command &amp; General Staff College 150</td>
<td>Command &amp; General Staff College 150</td>
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<td>Command &amp; General Staff College 150</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Defense College, less than 5% attend</td>
<td>National Defense College, 6% attend 27</td>
<td>War College 23 (proposed)</td>
<td>War College 23 (proposed)</td>
<td>War College 23 (proposed)</td>
<td>War College 23 (proposed)</td>
<td>War College 23 (proposed)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Wks In Inst 185</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>15%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Wks In Inst Tng 76</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
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### Notes:
- **Battlefield Qualification**: Field Grade Qualification-15 requires 2000-3000 hrs of study.
- **Cadet Cadre**: Cadet Cadre 28 of Basic Ind 14 at Military Academy 120.
- **Combined Arms**: Combined Arms and Services Staff College 150.
- **Command & General Staff**: Command & General Staff College 150.
- **National Defense College**: National Defense College, 6% attend 27.
- **War College**: War College 23 (proposed).
ANNEX D

PROPOSED COSOC CURRICULUM TO

FINAL REPORT: ARMY STAFF COLLEGE STUDY
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ANNEX D

Annex D—Proposed CGSOC Curriculum.

1. INTRODUCTION: The purpose of this Annex is to provide a model one-year Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC). It is an outgrowth of needs expressed in the main body of this study. It assumes that programs and trends currently entain at CGSC are continued. And, it assumes practical and achievable resource constraints. It is a distant target—probably AY 88/89—and incorporates CGSC ideas and initiatives already programmed for the intervening years.

   a. Assumptions. This report assumes the following:

      (1) All US Army students are CAS3 graduates.

      (2) Student Body.

          o Only the top 33 percent (or less) of QPM managed officers are selected for attendance shortly after selection to O-4.

          o Only the top 10 percent (or less) of "professional" officers (AMEDD, JAGC, and Chaplain) are selected for attendance. (Not as many officers in these branches require "general staff" training. These officers may be graduated after the first term.)

          o One reservist, one AF officer, one Navy or Marine Officer per section. Limited to one or two allied officers per section.

      (3) All US Army students are "field grade qualified" by their branches (by branch administered inventory exam, and non-resident instructional packet completion).

      (4) All US Army students can pass an objective examination on the contents of FM 100-1, FM 100-5, FM 100-10, and FM 101-5. Examination is administered at prior home station. Passing grade is required for assignment to Fort Leavenworth. A number of alternates also take the examination and may be activated to fill slots.

      (5) Faculty staffing receives a high priority—both in quantity and quality. Some form of the faculty development program recommended in this report is implemented. Faculty are top former CGSC graduates who have extensive and appropriate experience in the fields they teach.

      (6) GSOC faculty is organized into a School of Tactics and Operations and several smaller subject matter expert departments. This assumption is key to both the curriculum and the methodology outlined here. The School of Tactics and Operations teaches 50% of the curriculum in a
sequenced, coherent, and integrated manner in 12-15 man workgroups led by experienced 05 workgroup leaders. This is the same methodology applied in CAS3 and AMSP as well as in first rate staff colleges around the world.

b. **Course Principles.** The course design is based on these principles:

1. Course is designed/administered to challenge and develop a committed, professional officer who has the potential for promotion to 0-6 and a full 30-year career.

2. Entrance preconditions permit instruction to be geared at a higher level and at a faster pace than is currently possible. (Since one of the preconditions for course entry is an objective examination on the contents of FM 100-1, FM 100-5, FM 100-10, and FM 101-5, there is no need to cover the essential fundamental information in these manuals. This permits instruction to begin at a much higher plane and eliminates many hours in the current curriculum which teach such basic information contained in these manuals. This entrance level knowledge is reinforced continually in the new course by requiring students to use it frequently in the solution of problems throughout the course.)

3. Normal teaching/learning mode for the most essential curriculum is staff group level instruction/discussion (12- to 15-man groups).

4. Teaching/learning dynamics center on group/team work oriented problem-solving rather than on individual work. (That is how staff work is done in the Army—by team work and not by individual staff brilliance.) These dynamics depend on a distribution of specialties across staff groups and a cross fertilization of knowledge between students of the various branches. These dynamics also depend on scheduling more non-class time to permit student "staff teams" to meet informally to work out solutions for presentation to the entire staff group (work group) in scheduled class periods.

5. Maximum use is made of the "case study" method of teaching in courses where it applies (will apply to most). Students are given introductory level information in lectures and readings and then gain depth by grappling with problems presented in case study format (real or notional) in small groups (4 to 5 students). Then students present solutions to the seminar/staff group as a whole (12 to 15 students). A faculty member guides, summarizes and critiques.

6. Structured classes and seminars are only scheduled in the morning. Afternoons are student study and group work periods. It is assumed that students will read, study, work, and sit in class a total of about 10 hours daily. Assignments and outside requirements are geared to this pace. However, of this, only about 3 hours daily are instructor contact hours. The exception to this is during CPXs, terrain exercises, and other exercises which require a continuity of effort.
Evaluations can be mostly subjective and formal "testing" can be eliminated. The teaching/learning methodology described above allows OPMD managed officers to "carry" AMEDD, JAGC, Chaplain, reserve, other services, and allied officers. These officers in turn can enrich the education of OPMD officers by providing their branch/service/country perspectives. Since grades are subjective and focus is on a group product, the level of instruction can be pitched at a higher level.

(a) Only OPMD managed officers are graded. Others (allies, sister services, AMEDD, JAGC, Chaplains) are not graded unless they ask to be. Reservists in OPMS specialties are graded. Non-graded officers receive a certificate of attendance.

(b) Evaluation scheme is based on:

1. Instructor end-of-course subjective grade and a written evaluation of performance submitted to Academic Counselor/Evaluator (ACE). (The ACE role increases in importance.)

2. Periodic peer ratings by OPMS students within a work group.

3. End-of-term ACE reports.

4. Letter grades, peer ratings, ACE reports, and AFPT scores are combined to determine class standing and designation of "Honor Graduates."

The number of electives or "individual development courses" (IDCs) are sharply reduced from roughly eight to four. This is not as significant as it seems on the surface. The choices of current students are sharply bounded by the requirement to take certain courses to fulfill specialty track requirements of the G1/G4, G2/G3, or Combined Arms tracks. After track requirements are met, the current student has about four choices left open—two in each of the last two terms. The current individual development course offerings are designed to expand the "core" course. The proposed core course encompasses more than the student would be able to gain from the current system of IDCs and "tracking" and retains the flexibility to tailor four 30-hour electives to his own immediate needs after he has received his next assignment. The core course takes care of his general and long-term needs more completely than the current system. This is enhanced by the "tracking" feature of the core course, which separates G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4 related specialties during portions of that curriculum and which places students in G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4 related positions during the numerous exercises. The other feature of the proposed program which reduces the need for more tailoring is the changed composition of the student body. It is less heterogenous. The final argument for the reduced number of IDCs is the uniform view of all three recent external evaluations which express
the notion that CGSC should provide a general education—a common frame of reference—for all specialties, and that specific specialty preparation should take place outside the CGSOC.

(9) Students are expected to remain fit on their own time. AFPT is administered by ACE four times—during orientation week, during December interterm period, during spring interterm period, and during the week prior to graduation. Passing the AFPT and maintaining weight standards is a graduation requirement.

(10) Reservists, non-OPMD managed officers, and officers selected to attend AFSC are graduated before Christmas. (AFSC is not considered a substitute for CGSC. See Annex B—Summary of External Evaluations of CGSC.)

2. CURRICULUM: The CGSO course is organized around three 12-week terms and four short periods of from one to three weeks. (See Figure 1.) The latter consist of an initial three weeks in August for orientation and validation of fundamentals, a December inter-term period of two weeks for briefings on Army-wide issues, short courses, graduation of reservists and AFSC attendees, a one week inter-term period in March, and a graduation week. The core curriculum is divided into two parts: an integrated and strictly sequenced course about fighting, and a sequence of courses which need not be integrated. The integrated course is taught by the School of Tactics and Operations and covers all aspects of staff procedures, combat, combat support, and combat service support related to the operations of all echelons from brigade to the corps as part of an echelon above corps or a Joint Task Force. The teaching vehicle is a series of exercises which increase in complexity from the basics to advanced applications of doctrinal principles, methods and techniques and current forces and capabilities to increasingly more complex environments. Frequent use is made of simulations to wargame and CPX student solutions. Some elements of this instruction diverges into G1, G2, G3 and G4 tracks during the planning phases of those exercises. During this time, additional "track" oriented instruction is provided. This course meets every second day during the three terms except during CPXs when the CPX may go around the clock for most of the week. The other courses in the core curriculum include short courses in History, National Security, Leadership Skills, Installation Management, Management Skills, Wholesale Logistics, Resource Management, Corps and EAC Intelligence and Communications, Manning the Force, Army Force Planning and PPBES, Military Theory, Training and Training Management, Unified/Specified Commands and the Joint Planning System, etc. The last term permits students to take four individual development courses (IDCs). These four 30-hour IDCs are scheduled in consecutive afternoons over sequential two week periods allowing students to concentrate on one IDC at a time. This also permits IDCs to be better tailored for all OPMS specialties. (For instance, a team from the personnel center could come to Leavenworth for two weeks and teach a special course for SC 41 or 42 officers.) Students will be involved in six week-long CPXs throughout the course and four other extended exercises.
using battlefield simulations. The course is rounded out by means of an Operational History Reading Program. Students are required to read a certain number of books each term which are selected to support the learning objectives of the course. Some books will be mandatory for all within the same term. Reading lists are compiled to correspond to the course material of the term.

a. Orientation and Validation of Fundamentals Period. (3 weeks in August).

(1) This period may be reduced to one week as all students become CAS3 graduates and as the non-resident study, pre-examination program becomes effective.

(2) Entry week consists of orientation and welcoming activities, inventory survey, ACE activities, and validation determination.

(3) The remainder of the period is used for self-paced instruction to bring students up to a common entry level of knowledge. Students who validate a number of areas read an extra book or two from the reading list and receive branch issue updates from branch representatives during this period. ACE monitors and insures that no student is wasting his time.

(4) Students are introduced to the Operational History Reading Program.

b. Term I. (12 weeks). (See Figure 2.)

(1) Division Combat Fundamentals: This course is scheduled every second day from the first week of September to the end of October. The month of November is spent in two versions of a CPX. Combined Arms Fundamentals and G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4 battle staff functions at division level are taught in the context of a division level problem set on local terrain. The course includes terrain walks, staff execution drills, student presentations, elements of combined arms, threat instruction, divisional logistics, divisional communications and C3I, overview of all division operations and functions—all within a straight-forward corps defensive situation and corps support structure.

o Division is initially CONUS based and is deployed overseas. Students solve a succession of group problems to move the division from CONUS station to initial combat. For this phase, each staff group is broken down into 4 or 5 man staffs. Each staff presents its solutions to a variety of situations and other staffs within the work group critique. Facilitator critiques, makes teaching points and sum up.
Next a series of combat situations are faced to familiarize students with various operational situations and related doctrine. Students learn the fundamentals of doctrine for attack, defense, delay, passage of lines, reliefs, security operations, reconstitution of depleted units, rear area protection, nuclear and chemical operations, intelligence operations, EW, mobility and countermobility, air defense, communications, artillery support, JAAT, Air Force interface, etc. Students are exposed to application of doctrine to pieces of the problem. Students practice decisionmaking skills—mission analysis, estimates, etc. They also learn rudiments of threat tactics. During CPXs, they put it all together.

During November, students participate in two CPXs. During the first week, division A plays the US side while division B plays the threat side. The second week, division C plays US and division D plays threat. The third and fourth weeks, a different version of the employment of the same division by the same corps is played and the roles of US and threat players is reversed. Each iteration of the CPX goes around the clock with students assigned to 04/05 level positions only on the brigade and division staffs. Faculty plays 06 and higher positions. These are limited free play exercises in that constraints are placed on the exercise by faculty input through roles as 06 and higher players and by faculty control of overall play. CPX plays three days of battle. Monday is for preparation and Friday is for critique/discussion. The threat play is used to cap the threat fundamentals instruction. Students play threat regimental and division staffs, use Soviet doctrine, staff and battle procedures. On the threat side, faculty also plays 06 and above positions.

Curriculum hours:

Twenty 3-hour classroom sessions = 60 hours. Twenty 4-hour student small group (4 to 5 man) work sessions = 80 hours. Twenty evening study periods of 3 hours each = 60 hours. CPX involvement (two CPXs, preparation, execution, discussion and critique) = 80 to 100 hours. Total student involvement in learning Division Fundamentals = 280 - 300 hours.

(2) Doctrinal Foundations Seminar: Five 3-hour seminars which examine the theoretical foundations of US doctrine. Based on FM 100-1, FM 100-5, and a book of supplementary readings. Scheduled on alternate mornings with Division Combat Fundamentals (or scheduled prior to start of Division Combat Fundamentals and taught by same faculty, whichever works best). Afternoons and evenings of these days are reserved for readings and study. Curriculum hours: 15 hours seminar discussion, 30 hours reading and study time. Total: 45 hours.

(3) Management Skills: Five 3-hour seminars and practical exercises in management skills and decisionmaking aids, applicable to division and installation level staff officers. PERT diagrams, use of computers, etc. Use afternoon hours for student group projects, etc.
Curriculum hours: 15 hours instructor contact time, 20 hours small group projects, 10 hours individual study time. Total: 45 hours.

(4) Leadership Skills/Human Dimension: Five 3-hour seminars to cover the basic concepts of leadership, and organizational effectiveness in combat. Introduction to human dimension and discussion of four case studies. Use afternoons for student small group solutions and reading time. Curriculum hours: 15 hours instructor contact time, 20 hours small group projects, 10 hours individual study time. Total: 45 hours.

(5) Installation Management: Five 3-hour seminars to cover the principles and problems of installation management. First session is introduction. Sessions 2 through 5, use case studies method to generate small group solutions and critique/discussion of solutions in seminar. Schedule afternoons for small group study and preparation. Curriculum hours: 15 hours instructor contact time, 20 hours small group projects, 10 hours individual study time. Total: 45 hours.

(6) The History of the US Army: Five 3-hour seminars on the history of the evolution of US Army institutions. Afternoon sessions scheduled for reading and study of assignments. Curriculum hours: 15 hours seminar discussion, 30 hours reading and study time. Total: 45 hours.

(7) National Security Environment: Five 3-hour seminars on the issues of National Security. The first session is on the security policymaking mechanisms and the remaining sessions are on security issues in the areas of greatest strategic concern. Afternoon sessions are scheduled for reading, study and small group dynamics/problemsolving. Curriculum hours: 15 hours instructor contact time, 20 hours small group projects, 10 hours individual study time. Time: 45 hours.

(8) Other Term I Activities:

—MILPERCM visits.

—A select few guest speakers (no more than 3). The balance are scheduled during the interterm periods.

—Monthly ACE seminars (3 hours scheduled on Friday afternoons).

(9) Operational History Reading Program: Students should be asked to read three books during this period in the following areas: Histories of Combined Arms warfare; histories which relate fighting to logistics such as Martin von Creveld's Supplying War, or Sinews of War, by James A. Huston. Other good choices for this period are books which focus on the human dimension in war. While S. L. A. Marshall's books are among the best, there are many others. One hour a day of the student's 10 total daily

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working/learning hours is allotted to this program. Thus a total of 60 individual study time hours are allotted to this program during this term.

c. December Inter-Term Period (2 to 3 weeks).

(1) This period is used to familiarize students with Armywide issues, to complete term-end evaluations, and to prepare for graduation of reservists, non-OPMD managed officers, and officers selected for AFSC attendance. It is a break from rigorous "evaluated" work, and a time to schedule social activity.

(2) Officers who are to remain at CGSC are asked to read Weigley's *Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaigns of France and Germany, 1944-1945,* prior to January. This is in preparation for operational level instruction to follow in Terms 2 and 3.

(3) Guest speakers are scheduled most mornings during this period.

(4) APFT is scheduled.

(5) Students are introduced to Operational History Reading Program for the next term.

(6) Afternoons are used for briefings on armywide issues or to discuss issues raised by guest speakers. Topics to be included are:

- Army Life Cycle management issues.
- Total Army issues.
- National Security issues.
- Force Planning issues.
- Introduction to Joint and Unified Commands and related issues.
- The management of change in the US Army.
- Terrorism.
- Peacekeeping.
- Mobilization issues.

(7) Graduation of reservists, non-OPMD officers, and AFSC students.
d. Term II (12 weeks). (See Figure 3.)

(1) Operations. This course is conducted every second day. All students participate, but the course is "tracked" along separate G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4 lines based on student specialties. At times, instruction is integrated by work groups and staff teams (subdivision of work group to G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, G-5 role players to make up two or three teams per staff group for joint problem resolution). At other times, students in a section meet by staff specialty area to discuss/learn matters pertaining to that area in greater depth. Integrated instruction may be conducted in the first two hours each morning, staff specialty discussions may be the second two hours, and staff team work is done in the afternoon.

o The course is organized around four exercises, each of which is scheduled over three weeks. The first week covers pertinent doctrinal theory and procedures, the general and special situation, the corps mission, and corp level planning. The students present their corps orders on the first morning of the second week of each exercise period. After a critique and discussion of corps orders, they develop the division plans and orders. By the end of the week they have discussed and compared staff team orders and selected/revised one for execution the next week. By the first meeting of the third week, staff teams have prepared brigade plans. Each section then conducts an exercise during the third week using a battle simulation to execute the agreed on plans. One section plays the corps staff and corps troops, two sections play subordinate divisions and the third section plays the opposing force and assists in controlling the exercise. Faculty members play the roles of corps, division, and threat force commanders to provide the necessary degree of control, but defer to imaginative or innovative student staff recommendations whenever possible. The final day of the week is an extensive critique and review of lessons learned during the CPX.

o The first exercise presents students with the problems of the defense of a NATO corps sector reacting to a "standing start" situation. Mock GDP plans are already prepared. Students review, discuss, and modify these. They complete plans for reception of a CONUS based reinforcing division (drawing FOMCUS stocks, etc) and plan for its employment. This problem is based on a nuclear threat situation, but only chemical weapons are employed by threat forces in the execution phase. In the execution phase of the exercise, the corps receives the threat main effort in its sector.

o The second exercise is the defense of the same NATO corps sector but the situation is made more complex. This is not a "standing start" situation. One reinforcing division is already on board. The corps has had about two to three weeks from initial warning until commencement of hostilities and a second reinforcing division (an infantry division) is enroute by the time the first units are engaged. During the execution phase, the threat force begins its attack with tactical nuclear and chemical
weapons. However, the threat front main effort goes into the neighboring corps sector. This sets up a situation in the execution phase (third week exercise) which allows the corps to transition to the offensive (if the student developed plan is well enough prepared and executed to do so.)

- The third exercise is patterned after a likely III Corps European contingency. The corps' notional deployment, reception, and employment plans are reviewed, discussed and modified during the first week. The corps is moved into the theater during the first week and employment plans are modified based on a continual flow of information. Division plans are developed during the second week. During the third week, the corps is introduced into combat by conducting an attack through an allied corps sector. The attack is executed in a similar manner as in the first two exercises using a suitable simulation.

- The fourth exercise is patterned after the World War II US Third Army's reaction to the Battle of the Bulge. Students work through the problem of a corps which is disengaged from one sector, where it is defending against a secondary effort, to launch an attack in reaction to a penetration in another sector. The subject corps is required: to be relieved in sector by having another corp extend its front to relieve it of sector responsibility, detach and attach some divisions, to reorient its operations 90 degrees, and to launch an offensive to cut off and encircle the attacking enemy forces.

- Curriculum hours:
  
  Classroom contact hours - 80 hours.
  
  Student staff team work - 100 hours.
  
  Exercise hours - 100 hours.
  
  Total student involvement in the learning of operations: 280 hours.

2) Wholesale Logistics/Resource Management. Five 3-hour seminars to familiarize students with the wholesale logistics system and resource management. After the initial session, this course uses case studies and problems for student group solution and presentation as a learning vehicle. Afternoons are free for student group meetings and study of readings and resource material. Faculty teaches students where to find information on the subject they may need in future assignments. Students are issued a handy reference library for future use. (Curriculum hours: 15 hours of seminar; 20 hours of student group problemsolving; and 10 hours of individual study and reading. Total: 45 hours.)

5WPC7704E/SEP83   D-11
(3) Corps and EAC Intelligence/Corps and EAC Communications. A classified series of seminars and briefings scheduled in five 3-hour morning seminars. Afternoon sessions are for solution of small group problems and individual study. The course familiarizes students with the latest capabilities and procedures in these areas. Students are issued handy references for future use. (Curriculum hours: 15 hours of seminar; 20 hours of student group problemsolving; and 10 hours of individual study and reading. Total: 45 hours.)

(4) Manning the Force/Army Force Planning/PPBES. Five 3-hour seminars to familiarize students with these areas. Afternoon study sessions are used to explore group solutions to problems which provide insight and depth into key issue areas. Issue handy references for future use. (Curriculum hours: 15 hours of seminar; 20 hours of student group problemsolving, and 10 hours of individual study and reading. Total: 45 hours.)

(5) Military Theory. Five 3-hour seminars to survey and discuss readings from the most noted military theorists. Focus is primarily on tactical and operational ideas. Afternoons are used to provide additional reading and study time. Prepare and issue a set of reprinted excerpted readings and a paper back library. (Curriculum hours: 15 hours of seminar; 30 hours of student study and reading.)

(6) Training and Training Management. Five 3-hour seminars to familiarize students with US Army training theory, doctrine and literature, training techniques, battle simulations, and other training devices, and to teach the fundamentals of sound training management. Teach the fundamentals of organizing and conducting good collective and individual training. Use afternoons for solution of group problems and preparation of group solutions to case study problems. Prepare and issue a reference library. Issue a sampling of "good training" programs and ideas from units in the field. (Curriculum hours: 15 hours of seminar; 20 hours of student group problemsolving; and 10 hours of individual study and reading. Total: 45 hours.)

(7) Unified Command Structure/Joint Planning System. Five 3-hour seminars to familiarize students with the Unified Command Structure and the Joint Planning System, and their impact on army component commands. Students work on case studies after introductory meeting in afternoon sessions. Issue references for use in future assignments. (Curriculum hours: 15 hours of seminar; 20 hours of student group problemsolving, and 10 hours of individual study and reading. Total: 45 hours.)

(8) Operational History Reading Program. From the end of Term 1 to the end of Term 2, all students are required to read three historical studies of World War II campaigns and one historical study of counterinsurgency operations. One should be Russell Weigley's Eisenhower's
Lieutenants: The Campaigns of France and Germany, 1944-1945. This book should be read during December before the term begins. One should be on the German campaigns against the Russians such as Von Mellenthin's Panzer Battles or Von Manstein's Lost Victories. One should be on MacArthur's Pacific campaigns to illustrate the close working relationship possible by Army, Air Force and Naval elements in a theater of war. A number of books on counterinsurgency operations will be recommended by the faculty. (Curriculum hours: One hour each academic day is allotted to this program during Term II or a total of 60 hours during this term.)

e. Spring Inter-Term Period (One week).

(1) This period is used to complete Term II evaluations.

o Instructor grades.

o ACE evaluations.

o Peer ratings.

o APFT testing.

(2) Guest Speaker Program (One every morning).

(3) Branch up-date briefings, other briefings on current issues.

(4) Final selection and announcement of second year students.

(5) ACE meetings.

f. Term III (12 weeks). (See Figure 4.)

(1) Operational Level Exercises. The entire core curriculum during this period consists of four exercises. The scenarios for these exercises depict four likely missions for army forces in a Joint and Combined Forces setting. The exercises are conducted over three weeks. The first two weeks of each exercise consist of a series of staff planning exercises. Staffs meet every morning for a total of ten 4-hour work sessions. Students are organized into staffs and assigned staff positions for each exercise down to division level. Second year students serve as chiefs of staff at division and corps level. Faculty members serve as commanders.

- The European based exercise is set either in NORTHAG or CENTAG and requires the deployment, reception and employment of a CONUS based corps composed of heavy, light, and reserve component divisions. Plans are partially completed. Plans must be completed, coordinated, modified and executed. A continual flow of new information is presented to staffs throughout the exercise period to simulate a real situation. During
the third week, the corps is committed to combat and the entire week is taken up with a round-the-clock CPX. The last day consists of reviews of lesson learned and appropriate critiques.

- The Korean based exercise calls for the deployment to Korea of a corps headquarters and divisions from Hawaii and the west coast of CONUS, to include a mobilized reserve division. The exercise could take one of two forms. One form would be a reinforcing reserve mission for the corps prior to hostilities commencing. The other could be to conduct an Inchon type landing as part of a JTF which includes a Marine Amphibious Force of one or two marine divisions.

- The RDJTF exercise calls for the deployment of a corps to the Persian Gulf to secure the Straights of Hormuz. The corps is composed of an airborne division, an air assault division, a mechanized division and a high technology light division. The corps is the army component headquarters initially, but as a second corps is committed, a field army is introduced and students must deal with this new command arrangement.

- The stability operation exercise stems from the need to acquaint US Army officers with the basic elements of a very likely mission for US Army units. The background readings for this exercise are a part of the "Operational History" readings for this term, and could include such books as Colonel Harry G. Summers' *On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context* and Jeffrey Race's *War Comes to Long An*. The exercise is based on a notional case study and requires students to solve problems and plan actions in support of a stability operation in that country. Readings and lectures focus on lessons learned in Vietnam, Africa, Latin America, and Afghanistan. The CPX features a counter-insurgency operation after US forces have been invited to participate in the defeat of insurgent forces. (This is preferred to a purely advisory scenario on the premise that if we don't understand how we ourselves would conduct such operations, it is unreasonable to expect that we would be effective advisors.)

- Curriculum hours:

  Staff planning exercises - 60 hours.

  CPX preparation execution and discussion/critique - 200 hours.

  Total student involvement in planning and executing operations: 280 hours.

- (2) Individual Development Courses. Individual development courses are designed to meet the individual needs of the students. Students will select four individual development courses within certain guidelines. These courses are scheduled over ten 3-hour periods conducted from 1300 to
1600 or from 1800 to 2100 on consecutive days during the initial two weeks of each of the operational exercises. Due to the placement of these courses in the last term, these courses can be better geared to the student’s next assignment and specialty needs. For example, students enroute to battalions and brigade staff assignments may choose a series of electives geared to deal with the practicalities of serving in such positions. Or, students headed for Department of the Army or Joint Staffs may select courses especially tailored for them. Other courses of general interest, such as those in Military History, Comparative Military Systems, or National Security Issues, round out the course offerings.

- Students with specialties for which CAC has proponency would be required to take a series of at least two courses specifically tailored to prepare them for service in these specialties. This may include preparation of students for service in the "strategist" program.

- Programs for other specialties can be developed based on proponent input. The 2-week duration of each course makes it possible to have instructors from proponent schools or centers travel to Fort Leavenworth on TDY to conduct such courses. For instance, instructors from Fort Lee, Fort Benjamin Harrison, or Fort Sam Houston could conduct courses tailored for students in their proponent specialties.

- Another advantage of this placement of the electives is to facilitate the further preparation of students selected for a second year of education/training. For these students, the four IDCs will be used to prepare them for the second year course.

- Curriculum hours: 120 classroom seminar hours; 80 individual study time hours. Total IDC involvement: 200 hours.

3. Operational Military History. Students will be asked to read three books during this period on subjects related to the exercises of the core curriculum. Students should read histories of fighting in the Middle East or North Africa and on recent insurgency or counterinsurgency experiences worldwide. (Curriculum hours: 60 hours of individual study time.)

g. Graduation Week. During this period, the following activities take place.

- Guest lectures.
- APFT (final).
- Peer ratings.
- Compilation of final grades.
ACE counseling period.

Graduation on Thursday.

3. Assessment:

a. This course is 4 weeks longer than the current course. The school year starts in the second week in August and goes to the last week in June. It lasts 46 weeks (including the Christmas break of two weeks). It is divided into three 12-week terms, an initial three weeks of orientation and individual "fundamentals validation," a three week December "interterm period," a one week spring "interterm period," and a short "graduation week." This can be reduced by two weeks as the full initial 3-week orientation and validation period is no longer needed.

b. Nearly 50 percent of the course is directly related to fighting brigades, divisions and corps with the center of mass on the division. All aspects of fighting are integrated: employment of combat, combat support and combat service support forces, C3I, and decisionmaking, and the solution of problems under all battle induced or natural environments of war. The course continually challenges the student to use skills and knowledge acquired early in the course in increasingly more complex contexts. Thus it continually reinforces the fundamentals until they become second nature.

c. Another 20 percent of the student's time is involved in gaining theoretical knowledge about war through the Operational History Reading Program, and two theory courses.

d. The other 30 percent of the course focuses on the army's peacetime functions and programs as well as on those operational environmental factors beyond corps operations which frame and shape its activities.

e. The student spends less time in a classroom environment and learns more. Much more is demanded of students individually and in small groups without a faculty presence. Less spoonfeeding of facts and data, more requirement to dig these out for himself.

f. Since the practice of war depends on the ability of staff officers to work out solutions as members of a team, there is less focus on formal written examinations. This frees up more time for learning and solving problems by students and places less focus on "teaching the exam" by instructors. There is more emphasis on the discussion and critique of student solutions.

g. Instructors still give grades based on participation and individual contribution. Students are motivated more by peer pressure and professional
standing in the eyes of faculty (instructors and ACE). This system should not make selection of outstanding students more difficult.

h. Current CGSC organization would need to be substantially restructured to effectively execute this program.

4. TRANSITION: The problems of transition from the current program to that proposed can be minimized by a staged approach to change. The greatest problem to be faced is in rewriting the core curriculum and forming the School of Operations and Tactics. The first stage of a transition should be to form an interdepartmental team to write the curriculum for the School of Operations and Tactics and to become the core of the School of Operations and Tactics. This requires an experienced 06 and about ten officers. This task could take one year. The next stage would be the formation of the School of Operations and Tactics to teach the new pilot course to two sections of students. The other courses of the new curriculum are developed by existing subject matter departments and taught to the pilot course sections without need for reorganization. After the conduct of the pilot course, the college is reorganized along the new lines and the new curriculum is taught to the entire student body.
CGSOC COURSE PLAN (44 WEEKS)

Orientation and Validation Period (3 Weeks)

TERM I (12 Weeks)

December Inter-Term Period (3 Weeks)

TERM II (12 Weeks)

Spring Inter-term Week

TERM III (12 Weeks)

Graduation Week

FIGURE 41
## Term 1 (12 weeks)

### September

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Courses scheduled on alternate days.
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Courses scheduled on alternate days.
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<td>Week 12</td>
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ANNEX E

CGSC ORGANIZATION FOR DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT TO

FINAL REPORT: ARMY STAFF COLLEGE STUDY
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<td>ORCHESTRATING DOCTRINAL CONTENT</td>
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<td>FOCAL POINT OF EXTERNAL DOCTRINAL COORDINATION</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOCAL POINT FOR &quot;EXTERNALIZATION&quot;</td>
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The doctrine development process is also not well coordinated at CGSC because doctrinal responsibilities are scattered across the departments of the College. New doctrine is not well integrated between departments and the doctrine development process moves in fits and starts with little continuity as departments shuffle resources between teaching and writing. Doctrine writing generally suffers because classes meet daily and are, therefore, daily a more visible and immediate requirement.

1. INTRODUCING NEW DOCTRINE: There is a need at the College for an agency to introduce new ideas and to pull the strands of combined arms doctrine together. The current Doctrine Literature Management Office (DLMO) cannot do that. The Deputy Commandant needs a doctrine spokesman with authority on content as well as suspenses. The focus of intellectual effort in this area is diffused in the College. To be effective, the Deputy Commandant must be closer to the doctrine "workers" so that he can have a more direct influence on developing doctrine, both inside and outside the College.

2. ORCHESTRATING DOCTRINAL CONTENT: Someone must orchestrate the overall content of CGSC proponent manuals for the Deputy Commandant and the Commandant. To put this responsibility at a teaching department level does not work well. During the writing of FM 100-5, the draft products and their content were considered the sole property of the Department of Tactics, and other departments, who should have been more involved, felt no proprietary interest. Therefore they did not follow its development with much interest. Other manual writers in the College were not linked into the development of FM 100-5 or vice versa. For instance, there was little interchange between FM 100-5 and FM 101-5 authors. Neither was there a tie-in between FM 100-5 and the development of the excellent staff handbook done by CAS. What coordination occurred between FM 100-5 and other manuals being written simultaneously, to include the leadership manual, was by accident or by the initiative of the authors concerned. The latter was the case between the excellent tie-in between FM 100-5 and the leadership manual. One agency must be the integrator of manual content and the process of internal review needs to be better institutionalized.

3. FOCAL POINT OF EXTERNAL DOCTRINAL COORDINATION: Someone must be able to speak for the Deputy Commandant outside the College on matters of combined arms doctrine. The introduction and development of AirLand Battle doctrine is a vivid case in point where more than one department had a stake and lack of unity of effort resulted. Differences between other schools and the CGSC were difficult to work out because the existing Doctrine Literature Management Office (DLMO) did not understand the issues involved in disputes and neither the Department of Tactics (DTAC) nor the Department of Command (DCOM) could speak for the school as a whole. No one person below the Deputy Commandant could talk with authority about AirLand Battle outside the school. This hampered smooth working relationships with concept writers at
CACDA and TRADOC, at the ALFA agency and with the JSNK working group. A means to do this is vitally necessary. Teaching department directors have enough to do without getting bogged down in unresolved theoretical issues between the College and outsiders.

4. FOCAL POINT FOR INTERNAL DISSEMINATION OF DOCTRINAL THEORY: At the same time, the College does not need a doctrine ivory tower. This doctrine agency also must have a teaching function, but it should be oriented primarily on teaching the faculty. This doctrine department needs to be involved in instructor development, setting a common understanding of theory, or "why" we do things the way we do them, and must work with the other departments to develop the "how." This department should also be charged with heading the theoretical instruction in the College. There could be a subcourse early in the CGSOC curriculum, developed and introduced by the doctrine department and taught by the "School of Tactics and Operations" on the underpinnings of US Army doctrine. It would be based on the main ideas in FM 100-1 and FM 100-5 and their source, including the principles of war, some excerpts and ideas from Clausewitz, J. F. C. Fuller, Liddell Hart, Sun Tzu and others (about 15 hours of seminar discussion). Over time, such a course and the teaching function suggested for the "doctrine department" would raise the level of understanding of the "why" in our doctrine and would cut down much of the nonproductive purely academic "How many angels can dance on the head of a pin?" type of arguments and discussions around the college. Interaction between "theorists" in the doctrine department and pragmatic instructors would yield a healthy synthesis, and result in a better doctrine in the long run.

5. STABILITY OF EFFORT OVER TIME: The doctrine effort needs to be more deliberate and stable over time. Current methods and organizations need to be reviewed to insure this. There are three basic reasons for why this is not so now.

- First, doctrine will always be a second priority in a teaching department for obvious reasons. The department director's time is valuable and tends to focus on the teaching mission.

- Second, our current departments take a short term view of the business of manual writing. Manuals come and go, requirements for man-hours are difficult to project and there is always the temptation to use doctrine writers to put out fires. Once the manual is written, the work is seen as a completed action. The files are lost and responsibility for the next revision passes into limbo. The record of why changes were made, or why the manual is as it is, is lost. DLMO is not staffed to pick this up.

- Third, the doctrine support staff managed by DLMO is in constant turmoil, has divided loyalties, and cannot function to best advantage as a result. Doctrine support staff is assigned to and rated by DLMO, but they work in the various departments where manuals are being written. The policy
of having people rated by other than those they take their daily instructions from is not good people management. A better scheme would be to create a stable work environment for both doctrine writers and doctrine support staff. Authors of combined arms manuals should be assigned to this department from among outstanding instructors in the schools or from subject matter departments during their last year at CGSC. Generally it should take one year of full-time work by one writer to write a manual from scratch to the coordinating draft stage. Another writer can pick it up at that stage—often to good advantage. Minor manuals which need only updating take much less time. But the same editor must work with the author throughout the writing period. (Having the same typist doesn't matter now that we have word processing gear. And one visualizer can do several manuals because the text must be rather well set before he becomes engaged.) All of this can take place much better if all of the work effort is consolidated and managed by the same individual.

6. FOCAL POINT FOR "EXTERNALIZATION." This doctrine department should also handle all of the "externalization" required in the process of introducing new doctrine. This would be a much better vehicle for running the conferences the College is frequently charged with putting together. This would not detract from the missions of the other departments nearly as much as the current system of ad hoc organizations.
DEPARTMENT OF DOCTRINE

COL (DIRECTOR)
(COPS OFF, ADMIN MSO)

WPC TIPING POOL

DLMD

REVIEW BOARD

OPERATIONS
1. Transforms new ideas and approved concepts into doctrine.
2. Transmits new doctrine to Army through manuals, curriculum, conferences, and briefings.

COORDINATION BRANCH
1. Links past, present and future doctrine
2. Builds theory
3. Teaches theory
4. Maintains files of "inactive" manuals
5. Reviews manuals and concepts

MANAGEMENT BRANCH

RESEARCH/ SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS

AUTHORS/ INSTRUCTORS
1. Ex-Instructors write CGJC proponent manuals
2. Editor/Researchers assist authors
3. Coordinates with other departments
4. Briefs on manual
5. Visualizer assists authors

FACULTY DEVELOPMENT/ CURRICULUM REVIEW
1. Authors of new manuals teach school instructors
2. Review lesson plans and observe instruction.
3. Review manuals and concepts
4. ATP-35 action officer

TRAINING
ANNEX F

CGSC ADVANCED STUDIES PROGRAM

TO

FINAL REPORT: ARMY STAFF COLLEGE STUDY
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## APPENDIX 1—LIMITATIONS ON THE SIZE OF AN "ELITE" COMPONENT OF THE OFFICER CORPS

## APPENDIX 2—US ARMY ATTITUDES ABOUT EXTENDING CGSC CURRICULUM
WHY AMSP?

1. THE PROBLEM: Today, in peace or war, our profession requires mastery of a vast amount of knowledge—our business has just become too complex to really master all aspects of it in a 1-year course. In short, conditions of warfare have changed dramatically since the post WWII assessment was made that this Army could not afford and did not require a two year CGSC course. Warfare tends to be much more rapid, lethal, and decentralized. Decisive battlefield decisions can be reached more quickly. The task of battlefield integration of combat, combat support and combat service support means has grown immensely complex. And, what is more disturbing, these trends will continue at an accelerating pace. While margins for error on the battlefield, and in preparing for battle, are now significantly less than they were in WWII and Korea they will continue to decrease rapidly. What is most significant is that the Staff College students of today may personally experience changes in the conduct of war during the remainder of their careers as significant as those experience in all of the years since WWII. Developing a key segment of the officer corps capable of not only keeping pace with change but actually shaping that change effectively will be imperative. Notable also is the fact that the Soviets invest heavily in the education of their best officers and are investing heavily in the development of scientific methods of combat leadership. While their methods may not fit our style of war, they can make the Soviet officer a formidable opponent. The perceptions of the vast majority of senior leaders with whom this program has been discussed is that there is a gap between the levels of officer competencies they observe and those they would be comfortable with. This observation applies to tactical performances in the field in ARTEPs, National Training Center Exercises, and large scale CPX's and FTX's. It also applies to staff planners at all levels and in all functional areas. Other first rate armies take more time to educate their officers for good reason. So must we.

a. Staff college training, which occurs in all other first rate armies at about the same career point as it does in ours, is illustrative of our relative austerity. The Israelis send their staff college selectees to 46 weeks of school, supplemented with 9 additional weeks for those chosen to command battalions. The Canadians send all officers to a 20-week staff course and a selected minority to 45-weeks of preparation for service on higher level staffs. The British and Germans each devote about 100 weeks while the Russians put their potential general staff officers through an astonishing 150 weeks of intensive education. In sharp contrast is the United States' modest 42 week of CGSO instruction. (See Annex C - Staff Training in Other Armies.) This course is clearly no luxury where the Army with the toughest missions in the world possesses the most austere school
system of all first-rate Armies. We possess no special qualities or alternate systems of officer education and training which compensate for this differential.

b. The principal constraint to do more in the 10-month CGSO course at CGSC is simply time. While some improvements in the present CGSO curriculum are underway along the lines recommended by recent studies, internal evaluation of the curriculum suggests that room cannot be made to provide all educational needs identified in these studies—especially the time to study in-depth, to learn the theory behind current methods and techniques and thus achieve mastery of the art of war at the tactical and operational levels. We think little of sending those in the comptroller specialty to up to 2 years of graduate schooling to learn the complexities of comptroller ship. But some would hesitate to prepare those at the heart of the profession for service in a much more complex field, the conduct of war under modern conditions. Normal assignment policies, rapid promotions, and short careers when compared to first rate foreign armies do not permit our officers to build as wide an experience base as is possible in those armies. On 28 December 1982, the TRADOC Commander approved a pilot program which adds an approximately 1-year course of instruction to the CGSO Course for selected students. This approval stemmed from a growing realization that one year of instruction was not sufficient to educate all field grade officers who will occupy critical command and staff positions in peace and war.

2. HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS: The idea for a second year of instruction for selected officers is not, however, new. Prior to both World War I and World War II, a 2-year course of instruction was taught at Fort Leavenworth, but it was discontinued due to the exigencies of Army expansion and preparation for war. Indeed, the Leavenworth influence is credited with the near miraculous conversion of the 1939 US Army of scarcely 180,000 men, characterized by the horse cavalry and the regimental post into the war winning 1944 modern mechanized Army of eight million men that dominated the battlefields around the world. More remarkable than this was the better than 50-fold expansion of the officer corps. The thorough CGSC preparation of that time facilitated this remarkable transformation by producing officers who were thoroughly enough grounded to teach other, and flexible enough to adapt to the massive changes which were necessary. Because of a strong focus on immediate readiness in the Post World War II era, the two year course was not revived at the end of World War II.

a. Starting in 1904, selected officers went to two Fort Leavenworth courses each a year in length: the United States Infantry and Cavalry School (later designated as the School of the Line), and the General Service and Staff College. These schools were interrupted during World War I but reopened and combined in 1919 under the name General Service Schools and continued until 1922. In that year, due to the pressure to train more officers (the World War I "hump"?) the course was reduced to 1 year in
length. Starting in 1928, the course was again extended to 2 years (now called the Command and Staff School). This course had a comprehensive curriculum which contained instruction in all military disciplines. The first year was primarily oriented on division level tactics and logistics, while the second year concentrated on Corps and Army level. Courses were also conducted in strategy, war planning and military geography. Throughout both years, history, legal principles, and leadership were also taught. Morning periods were devoted to "conferences and lectures" with afternoons set aside for study and research, map maneuvers, "tactical rides," terrain exercises and Command Post Exercises (CPXs). In 1936, under the pressure for increased numbers of officers to man units and staffs, the course reverted back to a 1-year curriculum again.

b. The impact on World War II of the officers produced during the period from 1929 to 1936 was undeniably great. General Omar Bradley wrote this in his book, A Soldier's Story:

While mobility was the "secret" US weapon that defeated von Rundstedt in the Ardennes, it owed its effectiveness to the success of US Army staff training. With divisions, corps, and Army staffs, schooled in the same language, practices, and techniques, we could resort to sketchy oral orders with assurance of perfect understanding between US commands. /Emphasis add./

A quick review of the rosters of the 2-year classes of the 1930's reveal the names of these well-known graduates:

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<td></td>
<td>Jonathan M. Wainwright</td>
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<td>'31</td>
<td>George E. Stratemeyer (Air Corps)</td>
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<td>'32</td>
<td>J. Lawton Collins</td>
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<td>Ernest N. Harmon</td>
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<td>'33</td>
<td>Manton S. Eddy</td>
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<td>'34</td>
<td>Mark W. Clark</td>
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<td>'35</td>
<td>Matthew B. Ridgeway</td>
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<td>'35</td>
<td>Maxwell D. Taylor</td>
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<tr>
<td>'36</td>
<td>Lucian K. Truscott</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'36</td>
<td>Albert C. Wedemeyer</td>
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</table>

While these well-known names are primarily those of combat commanders (and several of them served under Bradley as corps commanders during the period he refers to), many other graduates of that period attained general officer rank or served as colonels in key staff positions throughout the US Army of World War II. For example, Charles A. Willoughby, class of '31, remained on the CGSC faculty and wrote a classic textbook entitled Maneuver in War which is still useful today. He later joined MacArthur's staff in the Philippines in 1939 and served as his G-2 throughout both World War II and the Korean War. All of the divisions and corps in the US Army were at some point commanded by 2 year Leavenworth men.
In 1946, addressing a group of senior staff officers in the Pentagon, Winston Churchill praised the US Army's World War II mobilization and expansion, "a prodigy of organization, of improvisation . . . a wonder in military history." From his observation of this phenomenon, he had concluded:

... the tendency in the future should be to prolong the courses of instruction at the (service) colleges rather than to abridge them, and to equip our young officers with that special technical professional knowledge which soldiers have a right to expect from those who can give them orders, if necessary, to go to their deaths . . . . Professional attainment, based upon prolonged study, and collective study at colleges, rank by rank and age by age—those are the title reeds of the commanders of future armies, and the secret of future victories.

3. PURPOSE OF SECOND YEAR COURSE: The purpose of the second year course is to provide a broad, deep military education in the science and art of war at the tactical and operational levels that goes beyond the CGSO course in both theoretical depth and practical application to officers who have demonstrated a high degree of potential for serving as battalion and brigade commanders, as principal staff officers of divisions and corps, and as branch chiefs and deputy division chiefs on major command and Department of the Army level staffs or their equivalents. The course focus is on operational planning skills and on developing sound military judgement across the entire spectrum of present and future US Army missions in the preparation for and conduct of war.

a. One purpose of this course is to develop a group of officers who are better prepared to serve as our future principal staff officers at divisions and corps and who can better serve in those key jobs at higher Army joint and combined staffs requiring broad integration and conceptualization skills. The case was made early in this report that modern conditions demand extraordinary competence. The need for more officers to possess conceptualization and integrating skills of a high order was made clear in the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) study (see Annex C). Many senior officers have also expressed the opinion that the Army needs to develop military thinkers with a firm footing in the fundamentals of combat.

b. The other purpose of this course is to seed the Army with a number of officers annually who will produce a leavening influence on the Army by their competence and impact on other officers. This influence will—over time—gradually raise the levels of competence Army-wide. The purpose of this course therefore is not only to train individuals to do certain key jobs better, but to create a multiplier effect in all areas of Army competence as these officers teach others.
c. It should not be the intention of this program to produce an elite corps of officers who will receive special treatment and more rapid advancement, except that their next assignment be close to troops. The latter is necessary to complete their preparation. After this they should be allowed to rise purely on their own merit. They should not comprise a new elite shadow "general staff."

d. There should be no skill identifier to single them out and the requirement for this training should not be justified by identifying a certain number of annual requirements by position. The rationale should simply be that all CGSOC selectees need this additional schooling but that we can only afford so many.

4. PAY-OFF TO THE ARMY: The pay-off to the Army will be long term but considerable. In short, a leavening core of officer with refined military judgment, greater competence in tactics and operations, and a more fully developed professional ethic will help produce better plans, better force structures, better training and better units and therefore will increase the probability of future tactical and operational success. The officers in the first course will be battalion XOs, brigade principal staff officers, and assistant principal staff officers at division level from FY 95 to FY 87. From that time until FY 95, they will be battalion commanders, division principal staff officers and staff assistants at higher levels. During this time they will also attend the Senior Service Colleges. From FY 95 until about FY 03, these officers will command units from brigade on up and provide a portion of the senior leadership of the Army.

COURSE GOALS

The goal of this course, simply put, is to develop an officer who will make a positive contribution toward producing a winning army throughout a long career as a commander or staff officer in key positions of increasingly greater responsibility. Such an officer must be able to apply sound military judgement across the entire spectrum of present and future US Army missions during the preparation for and conduct of war. Leading under difficult conditions and applying sound military judgement in responsible positions will require character, the knowledge and perspective to integrate the work of specialists, and the professional competence to produce positive results. It is important, therefore, that the course goals focus on shaping character, providing knowledge, and building competency (the 'be.' "know," "do" of the new leadership manual) with the above in mind.

1. WHAT GRADUATES MUST BE: These officers must be leaders who exemplify the professional soldierly qualities of commitment, competence, candor and courage. They must be men of character who have internalized the Army's ethical values of loyalty to the institution, loyalty to the unit, personal responsibility and selfless service. While the fostering of these qualities and values is a goal of all CGSC programs, this program, because of its
nature and probable impact on the Army, must be especially committed to fostering them. It would be well to have these men internalize the famous dictum of the elder Maltke "to be more than you appear to be." This course must be organized, structured, and conducted so as to lead the student to adopt these high ideals of character.

2. WHAT GRADUATES MUST KNOW: The curriculum must expand the student's knowledge to a higher plane beyond that acquired in the CGSO course. A good commander must understand all staff functions, and so does a good G-1, 3-2, G-3, or G-4. He must be an educated generalist. The positions for which he is being trained will require a broad spectrum of interdisciplinary knowledge about Army missions and functions.

   a. First, the individual must thoroughly understand how to prepare for a broad range of conflict contingencies in an atmosphere of shifting national strategies. In short, he must know how to prepare the *total Army* for effective war-fighting. For this he must understand how the peacetime Army works and how it transitions to war. Elements of this knowledge include: how the Army manages change—from new concepts about fighting techniques, weapons and force structures to the fielding of new units, equipped with new weapons, manned with personnel trained to employ new doctrines, how the Joint Planning System, PPBES and Force Planning Systems relate and interact, and a broad range of mobilization planning issues to include an understanding of the reserve components.

   b. Second, the individual must thoroughly understand combined arms theory, doctrine, force structures and training. He must be thoroughly acquainted with combined arms operations at the tactical level in all likely battlefield environments. This means that he must know current methods and current capabilities in all functional areas. To this must be added an understanding of why these methods and capabilities are effective and what assumptions about the next battlefield were made in their development. This is the nuts and bolts of knowledge at the tactical level of war and the basis of a "common combined arms perspective."

   c. Third, the individual must thoroughly understand the theory and application of the operational level of war. His first year foundations in the tactical level of war are expanded to a fuller understanding of the operational level of war through historical case studies, classroom exercises and participation in actual exercises with the Army in the field at operational levels of command.

   d. Fourth, the individual must thoroughly understand US Joint Forces theory, doctrines, and operational techniques. Since Army operations at the operational level of war cannot be fully understood without a firm grounding in sister service theory, doctrines and operations, this course must expand the student's ability to work with sister services in preparing for and conducting war.
e. Fifth, the individual must understand the theory and conduct of low intensity conflict—the entire range from foreign arms sales to active counterinsurgency operations. While not the most important Army mission, it is perhaps the most likely. This course provides the time to build on CGSO course fundamental knowledge in this important area.

f. Sixth, the second year graduate must internalize the seven essential command and control competencies of troop leading so well that he not only practices them instinctively, but that he can teach them to others in varied contexts.

- He must know how to acquire the right information rapidly in the tactical, operational and peacetime administration positions he finds himself in. To do this, he must know how to seek and interpret information.

- He must know how to effectively communicate this information. To do this, he must know with whom he must share this information (and why) and how to do this quickly and effectively.

- He must know how to reach decisions rapidly based on both inductive and deductive logic. Essentially the first emphasis should be on developing analytical thought processes by having the student fully internalize the military decisionmaking process. Gradually the emphasis in training should shift to developing the student's inductive reasoning capacity toward more creative thinking.

- He must know how to communicate decisions effectively. He must understand to whom decisions must be communicated and he must learn to do it clearly and succinctly so that not only what must be done is understood but the contextual information of the intent of the decision is clear.

- He must know how to execute decisions effectively. To do this, he must know how to supervise performance giving positive and negative feedback, and he must know how and when to adjust to developing circumstances during the execution of a plan.

- He must know how to follow-up to verify that instructions are being followed without squelching the initiative of subordinates. (While CGSO students learn the military decisionmaking process and other fundamental decisionmaking skills, their opportunity to develop these skills into habitual and instinctive mental processes is limited due to course length. These skills can be further developed in this course by exposing the student to iterative problemsolving situations under a variety of conditions and in all course contexts.)

g. Seventh, the modern day officer must be prepared to stay ahead of the accelerating pace of change—in the environment, in potential threats, and in technology. This can only result from close, detailed, and
reflective study of a wide spectrum of technology, threat, history, world setting and trends. The 10-month CGSO course does not allow the time to do this to the requisite extent. The second year course, however, should make such study a constant theme in the flow of established course work, round-out lectures, and directed study projects.

h. Finally, the second year student must understand the human dimension of the battlefield. Being one of the most constant dimensions of war, it is ignored at great peril. The student must learn to understand the basis of human motivation in battle, of morale, esprit and unit cohesion, and of effective leadership in war. Not only must he learn these things in the abstract, but he must understand their relationship to modern battlefield tasks and the battlefield environment in which they will be performed.

3. WHAT GRADUATES MUST BE ABLE TO DO: The curriculum, the faculty, and the education process of the second year course must develop certain key competencies in the student.

a. In general, he must be able to

- Teach.
- Listen.
- Write and speak clearly.
- Take responsibility.
- Lead.
- Follow.
- Think straight and fast.
- Work effectively with peers, with other services, with allies.
- Adapt.
- Maintain his self confidence, and speak his mind when asked for counsel.

b. Immediately after graduation, he must be able to

- Plan, conduct and supervise combined arms operations at battalion, brigade and division level.
- Train, sustain, and maintain a combined arms force in peace and war.
Apply theory and doctrine to a given situation, and to adapt when conditions change.

Use hardware and weapons effectively.

Be an effective staff officer in combat at up to corps level.

Lead a battalion of his branch in combat.

c. In subsequent years, he must be able to

Plan, conduct and supervise operations at corps and echelons above corps.

Train, sustain, and maintain a corps or echelon above corps force in peace and war.

Apply operational theory and doctrine to a given situation, anticipate change and direct the processes of change.

Direct the development of new doctrine and hardware.

Be an effective staff officer in peace or war at corps, echelons above corps, joint, combined, or at the highest levels of military organization.

Command at brigade (or equivalent) and subsequently higher levels.

TEACHING/LEARNING METHODS

1. Faculty. The Advanced Military Studies Program faculty is comprised of an institute director (0-6) and two faculty facilitators (05 or 06) per seminar. (This provides a 1 to 6 student faculty ratio comparable to ratios in similar courses in other armies.) This faculty teaches the entire curriculum. It is supported by outside subject matter experts.

The faculty is responsible for course development and the teaching of all courses.

The rigor and length of the course, the amount of time instructors must spend "on the road" with their students, and the faculty training and preparation required to maintain high standards, demands the assignment of two full-time faculty to each seminar of 12 students. One faculty member is the principal seminar leader and the second one (a first-year instructor) is his assistant.

2. Methodology: This course is taught primarily in small groups of 12 students called seminars, using a variety of student centered learning techniques.
a. Student total work load is based on the expectation that they will attend seminars, participate in exercises, participate in staff group work sessions, work on individual projects, study and participate in physical exercise a total of 12 hours daily. Roughly 2 or 3 hours of preparation are required for each hour of seminar work.

b. Normally subcourse seminar meetings are scheduled 3 hours daily 4 days a week except during exercise periods and periods set aside for students to work on individual projects. Seminar meetings will require extensive individual and group preparation. Seminar leaders may guide discussion of readings on complex materials. Students may be required to make oral presentations, or lead discussions, on assigned topics. Small groups of students may be given specific study and/or research assignments under the guidance and direction of the seminar leader. From time to time outside experts may be employed to make presentations and answer in-depth questions on subjects in assigned readings.

c. In addition to work in the seminar room, the course features extensive travel and practical field application. Field trips are conducted to reserve component units conducting active duty training, to the National Training Center and to major exercises worldwide. Additionally, the students will often execute battle plans using appropriate battle simulations, and will participate in staff battle exercises with CGSO students.

d. Lectures or briefings of 1 or 2 hours duration not requiring preparation may be scheduled once or twice weekly in addition to subcourse seminar meetings. Such presentations are normally on technological, threat, and other militarily important developments and trends which round out the curriculum. These are normally conducted on the day of the week when no seminars are scheduled.

CURRICULUM

1. OVERVIEW: Major General F. W. von Mellenthin, who epitomized the best qualities of the German general staff corps, in a paper entitled, "Thoughts on Present Day Training of Staff Officers," advises us that we must balance the practical and the theoretical in the training of staff officers. This course attempts to apply that dictum. It ranges from the theoretical to the very practical. It builds on the foundations laid in the core curriculum and in certain prerequisite individual development courses (IDC) of the 10-month CGSO course. Parts of the second year curriculum add depth to knowledge already acquired at the fundamental level. Other parts of the curriculum add new areas of understanding.

a. This course begins approximately two weeks after the regular course graduation and lasts until May of the following year. The curriculum consists of a core course, a program of directed studies which culminates in
a thesis requirement, a series of military classics colloquiums and a guest
discussant program. Students also participate in selected lectures
available to CGSOC students and faculty.

b. This course cannot be viewed in isolation of the CGSO core
curriculum and the prerequisite individual development courses which prepare
the foundation for the increasing depth in both theory and practical matters
attained in the second year. During the last two terms of the CGSO course,
student candidates for this course are asked to take the following special
IDCs: Modern Military Thought, Quantitative Combat Models, Force
Development, Joint Strategic Planning System.

c. The core course provides the major focus for the program and
consists of seven courses: Foundations in Military Theory; Preparing for
War; Tactical Theory and Practice; Theory and Application of the Operational
Level of War; Joint Theory, Doctrine and Operations; Field Exercise
Applications: NATO, PACOM and CENTCOM; and Low Intensity Conflict.

d. Students are required to produce an original work of research, a
masters thesis leading to a Master of Military Arts and Sciences (MMAS)
degree. Students will be required to defend their theses and to pass a
comprehensive oral examination at the conclusion of the course.

e. The military classics colloquiums will allow the student to examine
the classics in the art of war. (This may take place during the last two
semesters of the first year in later iterations of the course.)

f. The guest discussant program will give the student access to
individuals with subject matter expertise outside the faculty.

g. The general flow of this course is as depicted in figure 1.

2. Military Classic Colloquiums. Ten military classics colloquiums are
scheduled throughout the year. (These are labeled MCC 1 through MCC 10 on
figure 1.) The following are the topics for academic year 1983/84.

MCC-1 The Greek and Roman Military Experience.
MCC-2 Medieval Warfare and the Military Renaissance.
MCC-3 The French Way of War
MCC-4 The German Way of War
MCC-5 US Civil War
MCC-6 World War I
MCC-7 World War II
MCC-8 Technology and War
MCC-9 Guerrilla War
MCC-10 Limited War and the Moral Effect of Combat
The selection of readings for each colloquium are based on the need to examine the constant intangibles in war, such as qualities of leadership, courage, morale, discipline, and concepts and principles which have stood the test of time.
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**Course Introduction**
- INDIVIDUAL SKILLS DEVELOPMENT
  - CASE
  - STUDY
  - ANALYSIS
- THEORY OF WAR
- NUCLEAR STRATEGY

**Preparation for War**
- CASE
- STUDY
- ANALYSIS

**Tactical Theory and Practice**
- Engagement
- Theater

**Advanced Military Studies Program Schematic Schedule**

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<tr>
<td>9-15 Oct</td>
<td>Military Classics Colloquium 1</td>
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<td>3 Jan</td>
<td>Military Classics Colloquium 6</td>
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<td>8 Dec</td>
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<td>5-31 Mar</td>
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<td>18 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>24 Feb</td>
<td>Military Classics Colloquium 7</td>
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<tr>
<td>27 Feb</td>
<td>Military Classics Colloquium 8</td>
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**Thesis Time**

**Operational Studies of Luftflieger**
- General Operations
- Soviet Operations
- US Army Operations
- Nuclear Operations

**Case Studies**
- Operation Kursk
- Operation Cobra
- Battle of the Bulge

**Joint Theory, Doctrine & Operations**

**LIE III Exercise**
- Practical Exercise Phase
- Wrap Up Seminar
- Mid-Stage Exercise

**Low Intensity Conflict**
- Special Operations Forces
- Future Execution
- Counter Terrorism
- Foreign Internal Defense

**Oral Comprehensive Exam**
3. Foundations in Military Theory

a. PURPOSE: This introductory course can simply be said to teach the student "how" to think about war as opposed to "what" to think about war. During the CGSO course the emphasis was on learning doctrine. Students were also introduced to military theory in their readings and in individual development courses required for this course. This course introduction begins their education in the tools required for critical analysis of, and judgment about, military affairs of a broader and less present-constrained nature. The centerpiece of this series of lessons is Carl von Clausewitz's classic On War. Students are also further exposed to the key thoughts of other prominent thinkers.

b. COURSE OBJECTIVES:

(1) To teach rational and logical thought processes regarding warfare in general.

(2) To develop a theoretical basis for further learning in the science and art of war.

(3) To explore the theoretical foundations of US Army doctrine.

(4) To develop a capacity for innovative, creative, and forward-looking thinking about military affairs.

c. COURSE OUTLINE.

(1) Course Introductory Lesson (One Seminar)

(2) Individual Skills Assessment (Two 6-hour Periods)

(3) Theoretical Foundations (Eight Seminars)

(4) Guest Discussants

   (a) Staff Group Dynamics (2-hour Session)

   (b) Creative Problem Solving (6-hour Session)

(5) Military Classics Colloquium (2-hour Session)
### AY 83/84 Schedule

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<td>Wed, 22 Jun</td>
<td>ISA</td>
<td>Individual Skills Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thu, 23 Jun</td>
<td>ISA</td>
<td>Individual Skills Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fri, 24 Jun</td>
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<td>Creative Problem Solving</td>
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<tr>
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<td>06</td>
<td>War Planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tue, 5 Jul</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wed, 6 Jul</td>
<td>MCC-1</td>
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<td>Thu, 7 Jul</td>
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<td>Fri, 8 Jul</td>
<td>09</td>
<td>The Future of Military Theory</td>
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</table>
4. Preparing for War

a. Introduction. A cursory examination of the history of military institutions reveals that the destinies of armies in combat have been intrinsically linked to their preparation for war in peacetime. This was true in the days of Alexander, Caesar, and Hannibal. It is still true today. War, however, has become and will continue to develop as a much more complex undertaking. In an era of strategic nuclear deterrence, rapid technological change, and shifting national priorities, the soldier must prepare himself for a wide spectrum of warfare ranging from guerrilla war to global nuclear conflict. To meet this challenge completely is a task of almost insurmountable magnitude. For the professional soldier, however, there is no alternative but to try. This course of study guides the student in that effort.

b. Purpose. The purpose of this course is to develop in-depth knowledge and understanding of the fundamental tasks the Army must perform in preparing for war, with an emphasis on those activities that directly enhance combat effectiveness.

c. Student Goals. The student goals of this course are as follows:

(1) To develop a historical perspective of the functions of preparing for war in both a peacetime and a mobilization environment.

(2) To develop an understanding of the probable requirements of future war and the impact of these requirements on the United States Army's current war preparation efforts.

(3) To develop the student's ability to direct in a creative fashion the Army's major systems for preparing for war.

(4) To enhance knowledge and understanding of current war preparation issues.

(5) To analyze the current trends of war preparation in the US Army.

(6) To understand the role that creativity and character play in the preparing for war.

d. Scope. Course 10 consists of the following seven parts:

(1) Defining the problem (1 Seminar).

(2) Case study analysis (3 Seminars).

(3) The nature of future war (2 Seminars).
(4) Forging combat effective forces (6 Seminars).

(5) Mobilizing, deploying, and sustaining forces (3 Seminars).

(6) Role of Reserve Components (2 Seminars, 2 on-site visits).

(7) Course summary: the role of creativity and character (2 Seminars).

e. Methodology. Course 10 will be conducted primarily in the seminar group discussion mode, with students required to do extensive outside reading and make in-seminar presentations focused on key learning objectives. Where appropriate subject matter experts from various Army agencies and headquarters will address current issues involving war preparation.

f. Critical Book Review. Students will be required to write a critical 1500-word analysis of a work dealing with the Army's preparation for war. The critical analysis will be due in class for Seminar 10-19.
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<td>Tue, 12 Jul</td>
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<td>The Battle of Kasserine Pass</td>
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<td>Wed, 13 Jul</td>
<td>GD 10-1</td>
<td>Topic Definition and Research Strategies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thu, 14 Jul</td>
<td>10-3</td>
<td>Preparing for World War II: Doctrine, Organization, Equipment, Training &amp; Officer Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fri, 15 Jul</td>
<td>10-4</td>
<td>Preparing for World War II: Strategic and Operational Planning, Mobilization Deployment, and Sustainment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mon, 18 Jul</td>
<td>10-5</td>
<td>The Nature of Future War: The Strategic and Technological Setting</td>
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<td>Tue, 19 Jul</td>
<td>10-6</td>
<td>The Nature of Future War: The Doctrinal Setting</td>
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<td>Wed, 20 Jul</td>
<td>GD 10-2</td>
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<td>Equipping the Force, Case Study: The Bradley Fighting Vehicle</td>
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<td>10-11</td>
<td>Manning the Force, Case Study: Implementation of the Regimental System</td>
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<td>GD 10-4</td>
<td>The Reserve Component Environment (FM)</td>
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<td>Mon, 1 Aug</td>
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<td>Designing the Force, Case Study: Evolution of Division 86</td>
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Tue, 2 Aug 10-15: Mobilizing the Force, Case Study: MOBEX 78 to MOBEX 82, Comparison and Contrast (FORSCOM)

Wed, 3 Aug 10-14: Deploying the Force, Case Study: III Corps Deployment Plan

Thu, 4 Aug MCC-2: Medieval Warfare and the Military Renaissance

Fri, 5 Aug 10-15: Sustaining the Force, Case Study: Logistical Support Planning for a CENTCOM Contingency

Sat, 6 Aug N/A: Visit to IDT (Tentative)

7-12 Aug N/A: Selected Students visit 69th Inf de (Sep) KS NG FTX; Remaining Students Conduct Directed Course Development Research

Mon, 15 Aug 10-17: Total Army Wrap-up

Tue, 16 Aug 10-18: Course Summary: The Role of Creativity in Preparing for War

Wed, 17 Aug 10-19: Course Summary: The Role of Character in Preparing for War
5. Tactical Theory and Practice

a. PURPOSE: During the COSO course, students learned current doctrinal methods and techniques and how to apply this doctrine to typical missions in the most likely scenarios. While reinforcing this fundamental knowledge, this course teaches abstract reasoning about the dynamics of engagements and battles—the tactical level of war. Students learn the theory behind doctrinal methods and functions, the capabilities of current and soon-to-be-deployed hardware, the impact of modern battlefield conditions, threat tactical theory and doctrine, and the human dimension of war, primarily through a learning process involving numerous battle simulation exercises which provide the point of departure for the discussion of and exposure to the writings of theorists and experts. This course encourages creative, forward-looking tactical thinking based on sound principles, and a thorough knowledge of soldiers and hardware.

b. COURSE OBJECTIVE: To develop an indepth understanding of:

o The theory and practice of combined arms action, command and control, combat and combat service support functions, and the leadership of soldiers under a variety of battlefield conditions at the tactical level on the AirLand Battlefield; and

o The impact of emerging doctrines, weapons systems, force structures, and training methods, on the conduct of war at the tactical level.

c. ENABLING OBJECTIVES:

(1) Understand the application of enduring principles and theories to modern combat at the tactical level.

(2) Understand the combined impact of modern battlefield conditions on modern warfare at the tactical level.

(3) Understand the application of current and emerging weapons and hardware, current and emerging branch functions, and current and emerging force structures.

(4) Understand the application of emerging doctrinal methods and procedures at the tactical level.

(5) Understand Threat tactical theory and doctrine.

(6) Understand the human dimension of combat.

d. AY 83/84 Schedule.
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<td>GD-11-1</td>
<td>Soviet Assessment of AirLand Battle</td>
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<td>GD-11-2</td>
<td>The Physical Element of Combat</td>
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<td>GD-11-3</td>
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<td>Engagement Analysis I (Presentation on ORSA Techniques &amp; Analysis)</td>
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<td>GD-11-7</td>
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<td>Engagement Laboratory V (Sqdn/TF/Bn Defense—strong pts)</td>
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<td>GD-11-9</td>
<td>Role of Intelligence Units</td>
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<td>GD-11-10</td>
<td>Communications Support in Modern Battle</td>
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<td>The French Way of War (PM)</td>
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<td>Engagement Laboratory VI (TF Deep Attack)</td>
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<td>Engagement Analysis VI</td>
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<td>6 Oct, Thu</td>
<td>11-29</td>
<td>Course Summary</td>
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</table>
6. Theory and Application of Operational Level of War

a. PURPOSE: During the CGSO course, students were introduced to war at the operational level. This course will expand and deepen the students' knowledge and ability to operate in that arena between the tactical and strategic. Students review the theory behind and observe the doctrinal methods and functions in action in different national contexts against different national foes. They learn the capabilities of hardware and its impact upon doctrine, past battlefield conditions and its impact upon the human element, and are provided an opportunity to reflect upon and trace the results of these campaigns into the present to examine and question the applicability of these past lessons to our present and future.

b. COURSE OBJECTIVE: To develop an indepth understanding of:

- The theory and practice of combined arms action, command and control, combat and combat service support functions, and the leadership of soldiers under WWII conditions at the operational level.

- The impact of changing doctrine, weapons systems, force structure, and command systems on the conduct of war at the operational level.

c. ENABLING OBJECTIVES:

1. Understand the application of enduring principles and theories of modern combat at the operational level.

2. Understand the combined impact of modern battlefield conditions on modern warfare at the operational level.

3. Understand the application of past, current and emerging weapons systems and hardware, past, current and emerging branch functions, and past, current and emerging force structures.

4. Understand the application of past, current and emerging doctrinal methods and procedures at the operational level.

5. Understand historical and current Threat tactical theory and doctrine.

6. Understand the human dimension of combat at the operational level.
## AY 83/84 Schedule

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<td>Wed, 7 Dec</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thu, 8 Dec</td>
<td>12-31</td>
<td>Corps Wargame XII—War Fighting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fri, 9 Dec</td>
<td>12-32</td>
<td>Corps Wargame XIII—Critique and Course Summary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-16 Dec</td>
<td></td>
<td>Thesis Time</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. Joint Theory, Doctrine and Operations

a. PURPOSE: During the CGSO course, students were familiarized with sister service doctrinal methods and techniques as applied to typical missions. While reinforcing this familiarity, Course 13 will delve deeply into the fundamental theories which enable operational planning and execution. Students learn the theory behind doctrinal methods and functions, the capabilities of current and developing hardware, the impact of modern battle conditions, threat operational theory and doctrine. This will be achieved through a familiarizing Battle Analysis of a Joint Service Operation, reading and discussion of the writings of Air power and Naval power theorists and experts and orientation visits to CINCLANT, 2d Fleet, FMF, TAC and MAC headquarters.

b. COURSE OBJECTIVE: To develop an indepth understanding of:

- The theory and practice of Joint Service Operations, Command and Control, Combat and Combat Service Support functions, and the handling of joint forces under a variety of battlefield conditions at the operational level.

- The impact of emerging doctrines, weapons systems, force structures, and training methods, on the conduct of war at the Joint Task Force level.

c. ENABLING OBJECTIVES:

1. Understand the application of enduring principles and theories of Army operations in a Joint Force context.

2. Understand the theory and practice of Air and Naval operations as components of a Joint Task Force.

3. Understand the application of current and emerging weapons systems and hardware, current and emerging service functions, and current and emerging force structures.

4. Understand the application of emerging doctrinal methods and procedures at the joint operational level.

5. Understand the capabilities and limitations of Air and Naval assets in Joint Task Force deployment operations.

6. Become familiar with Threat air and naval operational doctrine.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SEMINAR</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tue, 3 Jan</td>
<td>13-1</td>
<td>Leyte I--Battle Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wed, 4 Jan</td>
<td>13-2</td>
<td>Leyte I--Implications of Operational Factors in the Joint Arena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thu, 5 Jan</td>
<td>13-3</td>
<td>Leyte I--Implications of Operational Factors in the Joint Arena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fri, 6 Jan</td>
<td>GD-13-1</td>
<td>Japanese Liaison Officer--Japanese Army</td>
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<td>Mon, 9 Jan</td>
<td>13-4</td>
<td>Air Force--Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tue, 10 Jan</td>
<td>13-5</td>
<td>Air Force--Theater Air Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wed, 11 Jan</td>
<td>13-6</td>
<td>Air Force--Strategic Air Operations</td>
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<td>Thu, 12 Jan</td>
<td>MCC-6</td>
<td>World War I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fri, 13 Jan</td>
<td>13-7</td>
<td>Navy--Theory</td>
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<td>Mon, 16 Jan</td>
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<td>Navy--Fleet Operations</td>
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<td>Tue, 17 Jan</td>
<td>13-9</td>
<td>Navy--ASW</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wed, 18 Jan</td>
<td>13-10</td>
<td>Joint Deployment--Joint Deployment Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thu, 19 Jan</td>
<td>13-11</td>
<td>Joint Deployment--MAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fri, 20 Jan</td>
<td>13-12</td>
<td>Joint Deployment--MSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun, 22 Jan</td>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Departure from KCI</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mon, 23 Jan</td>
<td>13-13</td>
<td>CINCLANT, 2d Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tue, 24 Jan</td>
<td>13-14</td>
<td>FMF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wed, 25 Jan</td>
<td>13-14</td>
<td>TAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thu, 26 Jan</td>
<td>13-15</td>
<td>TRAVEL (Pentagon stopover)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fri, 27 Jan</td>
<td>13-15</td>
<td>MAC</td>
</tr>
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<td>Sat, 28 Jan</td>
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<td>Mon, 30 Jan</td>
<td>GD-13-2</td>
<td>Canadian Liaison Officer--Canadian Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tue, 31 Jan</td>
<td>GD-13-3</td>
<td>Australian Liaison Officer--Australian Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wed, 1 Feb</td>
<td>GD-13-4</td>
<td>Korean Liaison Officer--Korean Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thu, 2 Feb</td>
<td>MCC-7</td>
<td>World War II</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fri, 3 Feb</td>
<td>13-16</td>
<td>Leyte II--Situation Brief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mon, 6 Feb</td>
<td>13-19</td>
<td>Falklands--I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tue, 7 Feb</td>
<td>13-20</td>
<td>Falklands--II</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wed, 8 Feb</td>
<td>13-21</td>
<td>Leyte II--Joint Planning Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thu, 9 Feb</td>
<td>13-22</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fri, 10 Feb</td>
<td>13-23</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>SEMINAR</td>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mon, 13 Feb</td>
<td>13-24</td>
<td>Leyte II—Joint Wargame</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tue, 14 Feb</td>
<td>13-25</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wed, 15 Feb</td>
<td>13-26</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thu, 16 Feb</td>
<td>13-27</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fri, 17 Feb</td>
<td>13-28</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mon, 20 Feb</td>
<td></td>
<td>HOLIDAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tue, 21 Feb</td>
<td>13-29</td>
<td>Leyte II—Joint Wargame</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wed, 22 Feb</td>
<td>13-30</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thu, 23 Feb</td>
<td>13-31</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fri, 24 Feb</td>
<td>13-32</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. FIELD APPLICATIONS: NATO, PACOM AND CENTCOM: This course is designed to examine the application of theory learned thus far to operations in NATO, PACOM, and CENTCOM theaters of war and to further deepen the understanding of practical methods and techniques used in the conduct of operations in the current contexts. Seminars at Fort Leavenworth and on the road prepare students to understand the strategic setting and operational peculiarities of each theater. Participation in "real world" exercises such as WINTEX or CRESTED EAGLE, TEAM SPIRIT and GALLANT KNIGHT as staff augmentees enhance the students' understanding of the real world parameters of operations and allow them to study firsthand how higher headquarters operate. Following this, students participate as commanders and chiefs of staff of corps and divisions in a week-long exercise for CGSO students at CGSC based on a possible CENTCOM contingency. Here they apply theoretical knowledge, practice leadership and decisionmaking skills and also enhance the learning of the CGSO students participating in their staffs.

AY 83/84 Schedule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SEMINAR</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27 Feb-23 Mar</td>
<td>Field Exercise Participation-TEAM SPIRIT (Korea), CRESTED EAGLE (NATO).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mon, 26 Mar</td>
<td>14-1</td>
<td>Debrief I--Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tue, 27 Mar</td>
<td>14-2</td>
<td>Debrief II--Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wed, 28 Mar</td>
<td>14-3</td>
<td>Technology and War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thu, 29 Mar</td>
<td>14-4</td>
<td>Mid East Exercise Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fri, 30 Mar</td>
<td>14-5</td>
<td>Mid East Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mon, 2 Apr</td>
<td>14-6</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tue, 3 Apr</td>
<td>14-7</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wed, 4 Apr</td>
<td>14-8</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thu, 5 Apr</td>
<td>14-9</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; and Critique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fri, 6 Apr</td>
<td>14-9</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-20 Apr</td>
<td></td>
<td>Thesis Time</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9. **LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT**: The final course covers a gamut of likely US Army activities and missions including foreign arms sales, military assistance, peacekeeping, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. It builds on an understanding of CGSO course learned fundamentals and seeks to deepen the student's understanding of these important missions and activities.

10. **DIRECTED STUDIES/THESIS PROJECT**: A student's directed studies in the area of C3I, Maneuver, Combat Support, Logistics or Planning result in a thesis and represents original analytical thought toward the solution of an Army problem. This effort must meet all the requirements of an MA thesis. Standards of work are the same as required in the most demanding graduate programs of other professions. Four weeks are set aside for students to devote their undivided attention to their thesis work. This is time needed to make trips associated with the project, to work in functional groups or as individuals with project counselors, and to become immersed in the study and research of the assigned topic. Students choose a project in one of the following areas:

- Contribution to the body of theory on tactics or operational level warfare (e.g., impact of tactical nuclear weapons on division or corps level operations and support).
- Contribution to concepts or doctrine developments at CAC or branch schools (e.g., new operational methods based on accepted theories of combat, or postulated new conditions of warfare).
- Contribution to force development at CAC or branch schools (e.g., new force structures based on combined arms theory and new concepts for fighting).
- Contribution to combat development at CAC or branch schools (e.g., weapons or hardware characteristics required to complement other systems in an approved new concept for fighting or support based on known technology and accepted theories of warfare).
- Contribution to US Army training developments in theory, methods or devices (e.g., a new method for teaching division level staff skills of a particular nature based on accepted training theories and known technology).

11. **GUEST DISCUSSANT AND LECTURE SERIES**: The course includes one or two weekly discussion seminars or lectures. These lectures include some CGSO course guest speakers, the CSI Historical Lecture series, and discussion of topics relating to future changes in concepts or doctrine, combat developments and technology, force structures, Manning systems and other new information such as threat updates, Mideast war lessons learned, Falkland Islands lessons learned, etc.
AMINISTRATION

I. Student Body Size. The current program plans call for expansion (see graph below) from an initial 14 students to 24 students in the second pilot year of the program. Thereafter the program doubles every year until a sustained level of 96-100 students is reached in AY 86-87.

EXPANSION PLANS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AY</th>
<th>STUDENTS</th>
<th>STAFF &amp; FACULTY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>83-84</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84-85</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85-86</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86-87</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
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</table>

a. These numbers were arrived at by the following reasoning:

- An assumption was made that the student account at Ft. Leavenworth would remain constant.

- There is no scientific way to compute the total Army requirement for advanced education and training. If we could, such requirements would easily outstrip resource constraints. The RETO study attempted the closest thing to arriving at a figure for officers who need "general staff" training of a broad nature. They arrived at roughly 20 percent of a year group. A theoretical upper limit can be defined by applying the RETO rationale (about 400-500 annually).

- A theoretical lower limit can be defined by determining the minimum number of officers required to make an impact on the Army. By looking at a theoretical distribution of graduates based on the concept that they would rotate between tactical and operational assignments at division or corps and higher level staff or school faculty assignments it was determined that fewer than 50 graduates annually would get lost in the background clutter.

- Other considerations:

- How large a program would assure quality. Considerations were the availability of first rate faculty, appropriate educational methods, and the availability of student candidates who are capable of the intellectual and motivational challenge of an intense course of study. The range of feasibility lay between about 36 to 120 students.
The affordability of the program in terms of resources. A course over 96-100 students may be too expensive both in terms of high quality faculty availability and travel funding.

The size of the CGSO course is reduced as the Advanced Military Studies Program size increases. This is a result of keeping the student account constant. The loss of up to 100 spaces in the CGSO course might not be significant. More certainly would be. RETO evidence suggests that if a specially prepared group is very small, they will not block advancement opportunities for peers not fortunate enough to receive the special training. (See Appendix 1 to Annex F—Limitations on the size of an "Elite" component of the officer corps.)

b. The table below displays the impact of 96 graduates annually (based on an initial assignment of graduates to divisions and corps) out to the year 2000 and an average retention rate of 30 years with current "due course" promotion rates. While this is clearly an optimistic view, the table is a good projection of 0-4 and 0-5 distribution. 0-6 numbers would be less due to some retirements before the 30 year point and because we can expect a number of officers to be promoted to general officer rank. But in general we can expect 0-6 distribution to be skewed to higher level staffs and the Army School System.
## IMPACT ON THE ARMY (A SCHEMATIC)

### HIGH LEVEL STAFF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>O-4</th>
<th>O-5</th>
<th>O-6</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>DIV/CORPS</th>
<th>ARMY EDUCATION SYSTEM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>(2/DIV, 1+/CORPS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>(15/DIV, 12/CORPS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>(15/DIV, 12/CORPS)</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>(15/DIV, 12/CORPS)</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### A 5WPC7557E/AUG83

F-33
c. It is clear from this projection that the impact on our tactical and operational units would be more immediate than for our higher level staffs and the Army education system. In the end the two would balance except that under this scheme it would be rare to find O-4 graduates of this program on staffs above corps level since the O-4 years for these officers are spent at the tactical and operational level. This may be a long term benefit. If these O-4's were drawn up to high level staffs or school faculties immediately after graduation they would not have the opportunity to serve in positions they are best qualified for. More importantly, they would not remain competitive with their peers for promotion and command opportunity. Finally, they would not be as effective as O-5s and O-6s later for having missed those developmental opportunities at these tactical and operational levels.

2. ARMY-WIDE ACCEPTABILITY: We are a pragmatic army. Education, even in our profession (or especially in our profession), is not highly valued.

   a. Army-wide acceptability will be a difficult hurdle (1978 RETO survey shows most COLs and LTCs don't think more time in school is necessary). Appendix 2 provides a summary of RETO survey results on the question of a second year at Fort Leavenworth.

   b. Personnel managers will say that officers spend too much time in school as is. The typical officer attends 3 to 5 months in branch basic and other TDY courses before joining his unit. Then he attends 5 to 6 months of a branch advanced course. Following this, he/she will attend 9 weeks of CAS3. The top 40 to 50 percent of a year group attends 10 months of CGSC and less than the top 10 percent of a year group attends 10 months of a senior service college program. This amounts to roughly 3 years out of a 20-year career without considering specialty training which could amount to an additional 2 years in some specialties. But there is a key point to be made with regard to the 1-year increment under consideration here. Officers selected for this program should be those who will tend to serve for 30 years, not 20 years. Then the ratio of school to field service years is considerably less.

3. STUDENT SELECTION PROCESS: AMSP students are volunteers. They are selected based on performance at CGSC and during prior service. CGSC faculty nominates volunteer candidates during the first term, they are interviewed and screened by a board established by the Commandant. MILPERCEN is consulted to determine the quality of the candidates' files.

   a. Initial Selection Criteria:

      o Candidates must volunteer for the program.

      o Specialty code of 35, 54, 92, 41.
o No candidates who have participated in a fully funded graduate degree program are permitted to volunteer.

b. Then CGSC screens for:
   o Professional experience.
   o Academic achievement.
   o The capacity to integrate the combined arms.
   o Communication skills.

c. CGSC then prepares a rank-order and list of suitable candidates.

d. This list is then screened by MILPERCEN DA for:
   o Suitability of file.
   o Availability.

e. The final selection is made by the Commandant, CGSC.

o Some may not want to be labeled as "planners" and everything that might imply for future job assignments. No ASI will be awarded to the graduate of AMSP. A single notation in the education block of the ORB identifies him as a Advanced Military Studies Program graduate. The fellowship will not be billed as a "planning" school, although planning skills are heavily emphasized, but as a broad "generalist" education in the profession of arms preparing one for highly responsible field grade positions.

4. PILOT PROGRAM ISSUES: A pilot program essentially along the lines identified above has been approved by TRADOC and will be launched June of 1983; however, it carries some restrictions which need to be closely examined.

a. One such TRADOC imposed restriction is that only officers who have not already received fully funded graduate education toward an AERB assignment are eligible. This restriction, would eliminate from consideration a talented pool of officers (such as those who have received advanced degrees to serve on the West Point faculty). If one were to examine the background of many key officers on the DA staff—or only DADCSOPS—one would find many such officers. The education of most of these officers was not directly related to specialty training. This criteria had the effect of severely restricting the choice of candidates for the first pilot course by eliminating some of the best prospective students.
b. Another TRADOC imposed restriction is to limit the course to Combat Arms officers with OPMS specialties 41, 54, 35 and 92. This may be overly restrictive. Some 49s should also be permitted to participate because of the key role they play in developing the future doctrines, organizations and weapons of the Army.

5. FACULTY RECRUITMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: Faculty recruitment must receive the highest priority. It will certainly be key to the success of this program. The Army will also benefit from the education the faculty will receive if a forward looking strategy of faculty assignments is used.

   a. The program director needs to be a colonel of unusual breadth and depth. It is important that he be stabilized for at least three years.

   b. The other faculty members should be experienced teachers with varied experience backgrounds. There should be a former G-1, G-2, G-3 and G-4 on the faculty. There should also be several faculty members who are military historians. There should be one or two with joint staff and combined staff experience. During their first year they all would be assistant seminar leaders and during the second they would be principal seminar leaders.

   c. We must not overlook the tremendous learning which will occur for this faculty and make use of this spin-off benefit for the Army. The best course of action will be to assign a number of new SSC graduates who will serve as faculty for only two years. At that point they could be reassigned either within the College or Army-wide.

6. EVALUATION OF PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS: It will be difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of this program in the short run, but the Army Research Institute (ARI) has been tasked to develop an evaluation scheme. Here are the key questions which should be asked in such an evaluation.

   a. Short Run (Next 5 years):

      o Is the AMSP graduate a product which is sought after in the field for what he knows and how he performs or for the selection screen he passed through?

      o Is the performance of AMSP graduates judged to be better than comparable officers without this training/education?

      o Are AMSP graduates improving the capacities of their peers and subordinates? Are they teaching?

   b. Long Run (5-20 years):

      o What is the collective contribution of AMSP graduates to total Army effectiveness?
Are AMSP graduates moving into positions of responsibility requiring integrator, conceptualizer skills?

There is no doubt that these questions will be difficult to answer in an objective sense.
APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX F

LIMITATIONS ON THE SIZE OF AN "ELITE" COMPONENT OF THE OFFICER CORPS

Inclusion 1 to Appendix 1 of Annex E of RETO Report

Preparing Field Grade Officers

1. The well-known and widely respected military historian and analyst, Colonel Trevor N. DuPuy, (USA RET), Executive Director of the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, recently published a monograph for the President's Committee on National Command Structure entitled "The German General Staff". It is a follow-on to his compelling book, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945, published in 1977.

2. One of the sections of the monograph is of particular significance to RETO in its efforts to determine what percent of the majors should attend USACGSC and the long range effects of any change from the current 40 percent. This is the section of the monograph which describes the impact on the morale of German officer corps after increasing the General Staff Corps from one to five percent.

The following extract describes the "Command Structure Implications" of the recent German experience (found on pp. 28-29):

"The Staff Officer Corps

a. The method of selecting and training has been evolving since 1955. Officers are now selected as the result of a 3-month course at Hamburg in the Fuhrungs-Adademie (Command Academy), the modern version of the old War Academy.

b. This short course is attended at about age 30-31 by all officers, at senior captain level. They have had company command experience (or equivalent) for about three years. The course is designed so as not to give advantage either to combat arms experience or to memorizing capability. As a result of his performance during this course, an officer's future career is settled. About 5-8% are selected for General Staff training, and will attend the regular Command Academy course. (This is two years and three months in length.)

c. The relatively high percentage of General Staff officers (about 5-7%) has created serious, unanticipated problems.
In the past, there were only three General Staff officers in a division (I-A, I-B, and I-C—or G-2, G-3, G-4) and usually only two. Now it is: Chief of Staff, G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, plus the G-3 and G-4 in each of three brigades, or a total of eleven. Yet in each division there are only four command positions below the division commander. In the old days, with two or three General Staff officers, there were five or six brigade level command positions below the division command.

Thus, in the past there was some opportunity for promotion to command for non-General Staff officers. (As noted above, Kluck was an example; so was von Senger and Etterlin.) Now there is virtually none. This has created great unrest and unhappiness in the officer corps. Those near the cut-off point are particularly bitter. In the past such officers could keep trying, and sometimes achieve; now it is virtually impossible. After battalion commander it is the end of the line for non-General Staff officers. In the past, General Staff officers were respected and admired and copied, and not much envied. There was no argument about competence. It is quite different now.

Of the current twelve division commanders, eleven are General Staff officers. The one who is not is not really as competent, but was selected by direct order of the Minister of Defense. Of the current brigade commanders, 33 of 34 are General Staff officers.

This situation has seriously degraded initiative and motivation of non-General Staff officers. One General Staff officer fears that this could destroy the modern version of the General Staff.

DuPuy goes on (p. 32) to describe "Implications of US National Command Structure" with the following paragraph.
"The most significant new implication for the United States Command structure is the evidence which seems to suggest that there were no serious problems when the rest of the officer corps with an elite of about 1%, but that there are serious problems when the elite group is more than 5%. Obviously this deserves much more study."

3. It would appear that if an organization ascribes special qualities or treatment to too large a portion of its members, then the rest see no means to satisfy their aspirations since they have been placed in the position of being noncompetitive. To maintain motivation in an organization there must be more opportunities available than "special" members.
APPENDIX 2 to ANNEX F

US ARMY ATTITUDES ABOUT EXTENDING CGSC CURRICULUM

Second Year of CGSC Education of Selected Officers

1. The following is an excerpted portion of a RETO Information Paper dated 20 Jun 78 which outlines preliminary observations on OPMS commissioned officer responses to a survey conducted during the closing months of 1977.

2. The following question was asked, and what follows is the RETO analysis of the response.

"Several foreign armies provide extended level 4 training for selected officers; for example, a small percentage of a given CGSC-level class is selected to remain for an additional year of professional development in military thought, philosophy, and application. If the Army could adopt the 'Second Year at CGSC' concept outlined above, what would be your view regarding this alternative?"

Sever percent of all respondents are in favor of implementation of such a plan. However, the range of endorsement extends from a high of thirteen percent on the part of lieutenants to a low of three percent among colonels. Thirty-six percent of the officers feel that the concept might have some merit and should be given a "trial run." Again, rank appears to be significant in the distribution of responses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Percent Agreeing With a &quot;Trial Run&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Second Lieutenant</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Lieutenant</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Selection of "I don't care one way or the other" as a response runs from a low of one percent among Colonels to a high of nine percent for Lieutenants. Colonels are three times as likely (34%) as Second Lieutenants (11%) to respond that "the Army can't afford this luxury; we need more 'do-ers.'"
"A total of eighteen percent of all officers responding rejected the foregoing concept completely, taking the position that such a policy would create an "elitist" group in the Army. Those most likely to hold this view are Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels (23%), followed by Majors (22%), Captains (15%), and, finally, Lieutenants (9%)."